

International Peace research Association.

- 1) - Lista partecipanti.
- 2) - S.Alopaeus:La politique etrangere et la cooperation de la Finlande avec l'Europe.
- 3) - Polish view on some problems of East-Ovest cooperation in Europe.
- 4) - J.Galtung:Cooperation in Europe.Analysis and recommendation.
- 5) - G.Gregorova:The peoples Republic of Bulgaria for peace and security in the Balkans
- 6) - I.Taylor:Britain and Eastern Europe.
- 7) - M.Sahovic:La politique exterieure et la cooperation de la Yougoslavie avec l'Europe.
- 8) - La Tchechoslovaquie et l'Europe.
- 9) - J.Klein:Continuite et novation dans la politique europeenne de la France.
- 10) - I.Kende:Hungary and some problems of European cooperation.
- 11) - D.Frei:Cooperation in Europe Study.
- 12) -C.E.Stalvant:Sweden and Eastern Europe.
- 13) - S.Lodgaard:Norway and the Eastern European Country.
- 14) - La politique Belge en matiere de cooperation en Europe.

1
22 NOV. 1968

INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH ASSOCIATION
Ubbo, Emmiusseingel 19, Groningen, Netherlands

conference
in
Orilia

Cooperation in Europe Conference, Vienna 20-22 December 1968

URGENT: To the participating social scientists

There is now only one month left to the conference in Vienna, and there are a number of important messages in that connection:

1. You shall very soon receive from Oslo two copies of the papers on the national policies of

Austria
France
Great Britain
Italy
Yugoslavia

2. The remaining three papers on

Czechoslovakia
Poland
Romania

will be mailed to you before the conference.

3. The conference itself will start

Friday 20 December at 13.00 - Bundeskanzler
and end Sunday 22 December at 15.00 (after lunch)
Reception)

The agenda will be mailed to you as soon as possible.

4. Please make your flight reservations now if you have not already made them.

5. IPRA, International Peace Research Association, is happy to tell you that if you see no other possibility of covering your return flight costs (economy class), IPRA will reimburse you upon arrival in Vienna. As already mentioned, your hotel expenses in Vienna will be covered.


6. Please find enclosed the names of the 15 social scientists whom we assume will be participating with the institutional affiliation.

7. The problem of politician (someone with political experience who will be useful for our conference) participation is not yet solved in a satisfactory manner. Please write immediately what the situation is in your country, to the best of your knowledge. Again, if the politician cannot secure funds from other sources, IPRA will reimburse the return costs in Vienna. If you have not yet obtained

an affirmative reply we shall help you with ideas as to whom to contact, and may also contact them directly. If you have obtained an affirmative reply, please inform us of the name and address, and please pass on papers and communications to him.

I look forward to hearing from you,

Yours very sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'B.V.A. Röling', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

B.V.A. Röling
Secretary-General
International Peace Research Association

PLEASE REPLY TO GRONINGEN

LIST OF SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

Belgium	Institut Royal des Relations Internatio- nales	33, Avenue de la Couronne BRUXELLES 8
France	Jean Klein	Centre d'Etudes Politique etrangeres 54, Rue de Varenne PARIS VII
Italy	Paolo Calzini	Instituto Affari Internatio- nali Viale Mazzini 83, ROMA
Norway	Sverre Lodgaard	International Peace Research Institute P.O. Box 5052 OSLO 3
United Kingdom	Ian Taylor	London School of Economics Houghton Street, Aldwych LONDON W.C. 2
* * * * *		
Austria	Andreas Kohl	Österreichische Gesellschaft für Aussenpolitik und Internationale Beziehungen Josefsplatz 6, A-1010 WIEN
Finland	Simone Alopaeus	Finnish Institute of Foreign Affairs Tunturik 15 B HELSINKI
Sweden	Carl-Einar Stålvant	The Swedish Institute for International Affairs, Wenner-Gren Center Sveavägen 166 STOCKHOLM Va.
Switzerland	Daniel Frei	ch 5103 WILDEGG Kreutzplatz, Switzerland
Yugoslavia	Milan Sahovic	Institut za Medunarodnu Politiku i Privredu Post. fah 750 BEOGRAD

* * * * *

Bulgaria	G. Grigorova	Comite national Bulgare d'etudes balkaniques Rue Tsar Kalojan 7 SOFIA
Czechoslovakia	Alexandr Ort	Institute of International Politics and Economics Vlasska 19 PRAHA 1
Hungary	Istvan Kende	Department of International Relations, Karl Marx University IX Dimitrov ter. 8 BUDAPEST
Poland	Andrzej Towpik	Polski Instytut Spraw Mied- zynarodowych Warecka 1a WARSZAWA
Rumania	Alexandru Puiu	Institut de Recherche Economique Bd. Ana Ipatescu 50 BUČAREST

NB

Paper

for
Gadting

INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE - OSLO

P.O.Box 5052, Oslo 3, Norway
Telephone: 69 74 60
Cable: PEACERESEARCH, Oslo

Oslo, 26 May 1967
Our ref.: 500/67

To: European international relations institutes
From: International Peace Research Institute - Oslo
Re: COOPERATION IN EUROPE STUDY

The Political Commission of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg last year appointed a sub-committee concerned with problems of peace research. This sub-committee has asked the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) in Groningen for a scientific contribution in the field of European co-operation, where by "Europe" is meant "all of Europe". The sub-committee wants to be better informed on what one thinks in Europe on the subject of intra-European cooperation in general, particularly which fields of cooperation are considered desirable and within what frameworks of cooperation. The Consultative Assembly (the parliamentary organ of the Council of Europe) has taken this initiative in accordance with paragraph 22 of the statutes which entitles the Assembly to further such research as it considers relevant.

The Executive Board of the International Peace Research Association decided to ask the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) to coordinate this research project, with the explicit understanding that the research should be carried out in a spirit of complete objectivity and independence. There will be no "ties" or "strings" of any kind, and the final document will be made generally available.

As Director of the institute I permit myself to ask for your cooperation in this study. More particularly, I wonder whether your institute could

1. prepare a background paper (about 20 pages) on policy thinking of your country on the subject of European cooperation;
2. arrange a conversation between some representative spokesmen from the foreign ministry in your country and the undersigned; and
3. criticize and comment on the papers that will be circulated and perhaps also discussed in a conference some time next year.

All this will involve your institute in general, and the person charged with writing the background paper in particular, with some work - although most of the information should be quite readily accessible. For this we can only offer a modest honorarium in the amount of N.kr. 1,000 (about US \$140) which will be paid from Oslo to your institute or to the person you designate upon the reception of the revised version of the background paper. We are fully aware that this remuneration is a poor expression of what your contribution will be worth, but the research budget does not permit us to go higher. However, we are sure that you will appreciate the significance, both from a theoretical and a practical point of view, of a study of this kind; and the importance of a representative range of participation.

In conclusion, the precise dates for all these operations:

1. Deadline for the background paper: preferably to be mailed to Oslo two weeks before the interview, or 17 June.

If this is impossible, the last possibility would be to make it available at your institute right before the interview, leaving sufficient time to read it carefully, but I would be most grateful to you if this could be avoided.

2. The date of the conversation with the representative of the foreign ministry: Monday 3 July before noon.

I shall arrive by car either the night before or early in the morning and contact you. The interview would of course take place at the hour most convenient for the official of the ministry during that day. I would be grateful if at least one hour's time could be granted.

3. Deadline for revision of the paper: to be agreed upon, probably October 1, 1967.

In the following pages you will find more details about the study, for your orientation and comments. Please do not hesitate to write and ask for clarification at any point.

COOPERATION IN EUROPE STUDY

1. The countries included in the study.

The ideal would have been to carry out this study in all countries in Europe. However, for lack of time, money and other resources this is impossible, so we have decided to limit ourselves to fifteen countries selected in a symmetric manner: five in the West, five Neutral and five in the East. The countries are:

<u>West</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>East</u>
Belgium	Austria	Bulgaria
France	Finland	Czechoslovakia
Italy	Sweden	Hungary
Norway	Switzerland	Poland
United Kingdom	Yugoslavia	Rumania

However, it is quite possible that some countries might be added to this list later on.

In all countries contacts are established with leading institutes on foreign and international affairs. For a complete list of these institutes, see Appendix 3. In addition to this contacts are also being established with the secretariats of the international organizations concerned.

2. The design of the study.

The idea is, for each country above, to ascertain the thinking on how East-West cooperation in Europe should best be carried out, taking the country itself as a point of departure. That is, for the countries in the West we want to know how they want to cooperate with countries in the East; for countries in the East we want to know how they want to cooperate with countries in the West, and for the neutral countries we want to know how they want to increase cooperation with countries both in the West and in the East. This immediately raises a problem, for some countries may feel that with country A they want to cooperate in this manner and with country B in that manner, etc. We are interested in the more general picture, but if there are important nuances of that kind one would of course like to be informed about it. However, we are not interested in information on views on cooperation within West or within East except insofar as they affect the general picture of cooperation between East and West.

This is a rather vast subject, so in order to make the background papers comparable and to focus the research somewhat we have made a distinction between fields of cooperation and frameworks of cooperation. You will find appended to this document a list of 30 fields of cooperation (Appendix 1) and a list of 12 frameworks of cooperation (Appendix 2). They should be considered as suggestive and indicative, and not as exhaustive or definite or final. You may of course add to both. We have found them useful in guiding our own thinking in these matters. Thus, to take one example: the field of economic coproduction, whereby countries decide to join resources in order to produce something (cars, atomic energy, other forms of energy). It raises at least two problems: is coproduction between East and West in Europe desirable in itself? And, in case the answer is yes, what form should it take: direct bilateral cooperation, or cooperation between economic blocs, within the framework of the UN Economic Commission for Europe, or the creation of a new, ad hoc organization, or by other means? In this case, "economic coproduction" is the "field" of cooperation, and the organizational alternatives are the "frameworks".

To summarize in one sentence: what we want to know is which framework each country feels should be used for what fields of East-West cooperation in Europe.

3. The background paper.

For this purpose we ask you to prepare the background paper on your country. You might like to divide the paper in three parts:

1. Some general views on the fields (Appendix 1) of cooperation: which are the fields your country is most interested in and in which fields is there least interest;

2. Some general views on the frameworks of cooperation (Appendix 2): which are the frameworks that command most interest for your country in the fields of all-European cooperation, which frameworks command least interest.

3. And this is the most important part of the paper: the relation between fields and frameworks. Here we ask you, for each field of cooperation, to indicate what your country would consider the most appropriate framework. You will find at the end of the list of frameworks an additional category (VI, 13 and 14) that may be useful for your purpose here - and then there is always the category: no policy exists for the moment. Moreover, in many cases you will probably feel that more than one framework is applicable for a given field of cooperation; that should, in case, be indicated.

In preparing the paper you will probably consult with your foreign ministry and with others, and use documentation about positions taken by your country in these matters. If such documents could be appended it would be most useful. But at least accurate references must be given.


4. The conversation in the foreign ministry.

The background paper should serve as a basis for a conversation between a high-level official of your foreign ministry and the undersigned. The interview should preferably be with the undersecretary of state, or with the head of the political division of the ministry or with somebody of similar rank and acquaintance with these particular problems. He might like to be joined by some of his colleagues, and if you consider it valuable the person preparing the background paper from your institute could also be present. One might also send the background paper to the foreign ministry in advance, not for approval, but for information. The purpose of the conversation would be to clarify better the reasoning behind policy positions in the past and at present, perhaps to eliminate misunderstandings, etc. No direct quotations will appear in any report.

When you contact the ministry you may perhaps make use of this document as an orientation about the project, as well as a copy of the enclosed pamphlet about the institute (PRIO).

5. Revision of the background paper and preparation for publication.

After the interviews in the foreign ministries, when the total pattern is more clear, we might like to ask for some additional information and some revisions in the background paper. It is envisaged that the paper will, eventually, be published (under the name of its author) together with the other background papers, an introduction and a general evaluation. You will receive the entire manuscript, with all papers, for your comments and criticism before any publication, and there is also the possibility of a conference (perhaps early next year) where the whole subject will be discussed.


Johan Galtung
Director

Appendix 1: FIELDS OF COOPERATION

I. EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND CULTURE

1. New agreements on cultural exchange and extension of existing ones
2. Standardization of university degrees
3. Coordination of scientific research, exchange of scientific know-how
4. Cooperation in the field of outer space research
5. Cooperation in the field of research on the conditions of peace (peace research)
6. Cooperation in the field of long time forecasting and planning (future research)

II. HARMONIZATION OF NATIONAL LAWS AND SOCIAL POLICIES

7. Standardization of traffic regulations
8. Cooperation in the field of air and water pollution measures
9. Harmonization of national laws on patents ("Europe-patents")
10. Harmonization of social security legislation

III. COMMUNICATION AND CONTACT

11. Cooperation in connection with communication satellites
12. Exchange and coproduction of cultural programs for radio and TV
13. Visa-free tourist travel
14. Cooperation in the field of sports

IV. TRADE RELATIONS

15. Opening of markets for increase in the exchange of goods
16. Cooperation in the field of multilateral clearing
17. Facilitation of currency exchange
18. Reduction of tariffs and quota restrictions

V. INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION

19. Industrial coproduction for maximum utilization of production capacity
20. Joint planning of investments in new industries
21. Joint transport and communication measures for increased trade
22. Cooperation in the field of peaceful utilization of atomic energy

VI. COOPERATION IN ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

23. Cooperation in the field of volunteers ("peace corps")
24. Cooperation in the field of experts (East-West teams)
25. Cooperation in the field of economic assistance, e.g., stable prices
26. Cooperation on major projects (dams, desalination, etc.)

VII. EUROPEAN SECURITY //

27. The problem of Germany
28. Non-aggression treaties
29. Arms control measures (including frozen or thinned out zones)
30. The general problem of European security

Appendix 2: FRAMEWORKS OF COOPERATION

I. INTERNATIONAL

1. United Nations
2. UN Specialized Agencies (which ones?)
3. Other international, governmental organizations (GATT, for instance)

II. REGIONAL, ALL-EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS

4. New European organizations
 - a. Permanent (with secretariat)
 - b. ad hoc (e.g. summit conference, technical conference)
5. Economic Commission for Europe
6. By extending existing organizations
 - a. Comecon
 - b. Council of Europe
 - c. EEC
 - d. OECD
 - e. EFTA
 1. by extending membership to more countries
 2. by having associate members
 3. by ad hoc cooperation (conferences, agreements, conventions)

III. COOPERATION BETWEEN SUBREGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

7. Military: NATO - Warsaw treaty
8. Economic: EEC(/EFTA) - Comecon

IV. BILATERAL COOPERATION

9. Nation to Nation, but coordinated by subregional organizations (which ones?)
10. Nation to Nation, on a completely independent basis (with whom?)

V. NONGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION

11. Between organizations (international non-governmental organizations)
12. Directly on an individual basis (person-to-person, firm-to-firm)

VI. UNSUITABLE FOR EAST-WEST COOPERATION

13. Can best be handled within existing subregional groups
14. Can best be handled within the nation itself

COOPERATION IN EUROPE STUDY

Institutes asked to prepare background papers

AUSTRIA

Dr. Andreas Khol,
Österreichische Gesellschaft für
Aussenpolitik und Internationale
Beziehungen,
Josefsplatz 6,
A-1010 WIEN.

BULGARIA

Professor N. Todorov,
Comité national Bulgare
d'études balkaniques,
Rue Tsar Kalojan 7,
SOFIA.

BELGIUM

Professor Coppieters,
Institut Royal des Relations
Internationales,
88, Avenue de la Couronne,
BRUXELLES, 3.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Dr. A. Šnejdárk,
Institute of International Politics
and Economics,
Vlašská 19,
PRAHA 1.

FINLAND

Professor Jan Magnus Jansson,
Finnish Institute of Foreign Affairs,
Tunturik. 15 B,
HELSINKI.

FRANCE

Professor Jacques Vernant,
Centre d'Etudes Politique étrangère,
54, Rue de Varenne,
PARIS VII.

HUNGARY

Dr. László Báti,
Chair des Relations internationales
de l'Université Karl Marx
des Sciences Economiques,
BUDAPEST,
IX. Dimitrov tér 8.

GREAT BRITAIN

Mr. Thomas Barman,
The Royal Institute of International
Affairs,
Chatham House,
10 St. James' Square,
LONDON, S.W.1.

ITALY

Mr. Altiero Spinelli,
Istituto Affari Internazionali,
Viale Mazzini 88,
ROMA.

NORWAY

Professor John Sanness,
Norwegian Institute for
International Affairs,
Parkveien 19,
OSLO 3.

POLAND

Dr. Adam Kruczkowski,
Polski Instytut Spraw Miedzynarodowych,
Warecka 1 a,
WARSZAWA.

RUMANIA

Professor Constantin Grigorescu,
Institut de Recherche Economique,
Bd. Ana Ipatescu 50,
BUCAREST.

SWEDEN

Dr. Karl E. Birnbaum,
The Swedish Institute for
International Affairs,
Wenner-Gren Center,
Sveavägen 166,
STOCKHOLM Va.

SWITZERLAND

Professor Jacques Freymond,
Graduate Institute of International
Studies,
132, Rue de Lausanne,
GENEVE.

YUGOSLAVIA

Professor Leo Mates,
Institut za Medunarodnu Politiku
i Privredu,
Pošt. fah 750,
BEOGRAD

Conseil de l'Europe,
M. Francis Rosenstiel,
Secrétaire de la
Commission Politique,
STRASBOURG,
France.

International Peace Research Association,
B.V.A. Rølling, Secretary General,
Ubbo Emmiusingel 19,
GRONINGEN,
The Netherlands.

International Peace Research Institute - Oslo,
Johan Galtung, Director,
P.O.Box 5052,
OSLO 3,
Norway.

2

Simone Alopaeus

LA POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE
ET LA COOPÉRATION DE LA FINLANDE
AVEC L'EUROPE

La présente étude a été établie à la demande de
L'INSTITUT DE POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE
à Helsinki

1. LA POLITIQUE DE NEUTRALITE

La Finlande a aspiré à la neutralité dès le début de son indépendance, mais ce n'est qu'après 1930 qu'elle orienta définitivement dans ce sens sa politique étrangère. En 1935, pour la première fois, le Gouvernement finlandais faisait connaître officiellement son intention de donner à sa politique la même direction que celle des autres pays scandinaves neutres. Malheureusement ces tentatives échouèrent à la suite de la détérioration des rapports avec l'U.R.S.S. et de la guerre qui s'ensuivit en 1939.

La guerre terminée, la question de l'orientation de la politique étrangère de la Finlande revint au premier plan dans des conditions nouvelles. Le but visé essentiellement par la Finlande à cette époque a été d'établir de bonnes relations avec l'U.R.S.S. et de 1945 à 1955 la politique de neutralité qu'elle a pratiqué revêtit un caractère passif.

Pour la première fois, en 1948, le préambule du Pacte d'amitié et d'assistance fenno-soviétique (cf. plus loin) donne à la politique de neutralité finlandaise un caractère formel. On y précise en effet que la Finlande vise à se tenir à l'écart des conflits entre les Grandes Puissances. Depuis cette époque d'ailleurs ce Pacte a souvent été considéré, aussi bien en Finlande qu'en U.R.S.S., comme une garantie de la volonté de neutralité finlandaise.

Ce n'est néanmoins que depuis l'accession à la Présidence de M.Kekkonen que la politique de neutralité de la Finlande est passée au premier plan des préoccupations gouvernementales. En effet l'attitude de l'ensemble des Grandes Puissances vis-à-vis des pays neutres s'est modifiée et ce changement a eu des repercussions considérables sur la politique de neutralité finlandaise. De passive, avec comme but unique de trouver une solution aux problèmes de sécurité, elle s'est transformée en politique active. Le Ministre Ralph Enckell, actuellement ambassadeur à Stockholm, a défini de la façon suivante les principes de cette neutralité active: "Nous cherchons à éviter tout ce qui peut détériorer nos relations avec les autres pays et surtout avec nos voisins. Nous cherchons également à ne pas

prendre de mesures qui puissent provoquer des conflits, les entretenir ou les aggraver. Nous ne sommes pas prêts à soutenir des propositions dépourvues de réalisme mais nous voulons, chaque fois que cela semble possible, soutenir toutes les propositions visant à concilier ou à aplanir les conflits."

On peut ajouter, en complément à cet énoncé de principe, une déclaration faite par le Président Kekkonen qui précise que la Finlande n'est plus neutre lorsqu'il s'agit de guerre ou de paix. La participation active de la Finlande aux forces de l'O.N.U. à Suez et à Chypre illustre cette idée d'une façon concrète.

Au cours du 20^{ème} congrès du parti communiste soviétique en 1956, l'U.R.S.S. a officiellement déclaré qu'elle considèrerait la Finlande comme un pays neutre et les pays occidentaux se sont plus tard associés à cette opinion. (cf. page 21)

La Finlande a également entretenu des relations suivies avec les autres pays neutres, en particulier avec l'Autriche dont la politique est analogue à la sienne avec cette différence que la neutralité autrichienne est garantie dans le "Staatsvertrag" alors que celle de la Finlande repose avant tout sur la clause figurant dans le pacte d'amitié et d'assistance signé avec l'U.R.S.S.

* * *

2. LA FINLANDE ET L'UNION SOVIETIQUE

a- Origine des relations russo-finlandaises.

De grands changements intervinrent dans la situation de la Finlande au début du 19^{ème} siècle. Après avoir été partie intégrante du Royaume de Suède elle devint un Grand Duché dont le Tsar de Russie fût le Grand Duc. De 1772 à 1919 la Constitution de la Finlande ne subit pas de grandes modifications. Après l'engagement du Tsar Alexandre I, le 27.3.1809, devant la Diète finlandaise, de respecter la Constitution du pays, la Finlande rompit tous liens avec la Suède qui le 7.9.1809 la céda à la Russie. La Diète prêta serment de fidélité au Tsar en tant que monarque de Finlande. Cependant la Finlande ne fut pas incorporée dans l'Empire russe en qualité de province. Elle con-

servait son administration originale et ses lois, une Diète, une armée et sa propre monnaie.

A la fin du 19^{ème} siècle le mouvement panslaviste qui se développa au cours des dernières décennies de l'empire des Tsars et la tension croissante entre les Grandes Puissances, devaient arrêter et même renverser cette évolution vers une autonomie réelle. Le 18 février le Tsar Nicolas, par le "Manifeste de Février", supprimait les libertés constitutionnelles de la Finlande et intensifiait la politique de russification en renforçant, en particulier, les pouvoirs du Gouverneur Général russe.

Quoique suivie d'une période plus libérale, de 1905 à 1908, cette politique a fait naître dans les relations russo-finlandaises une méfiance qui a été longue et difficile à dissiper.

Le début de la révolution russe, en mars 1917, entraîna évidemment une modification profonde de la situation. La politique de russification fut abandonnée et la Finlande retrouva son autonomie au sein de l'Empire russe. Des conflits surgirent bientôt néanmoins entre la Finlande et le nouveau Gouvernement russe, et le Parlement finlandais, désireux de relâcher les liens qui attachaient son pays à la Russie, vota la loi du 18.7. 1917 par laquelle il s'arrogeait les pouvoirs du Tsar en Finlande, ne laissant que la direction de la politique étrangère et des opérations militaires aux autorités russes. Cette solution ne donna satisfaction à aucune des deux parties et le Gouvernement provisoire russe, dirigé par Kerensky, refusa de ratifier cette loi, décréta la dissolution du Parlement finlandais et ordonna de nouvelles élections.

L'Assemblée issue des nouvelles élections, profitant de l'écroulement du régime russe, proclama le 6 décembre 1917 l'indépendance totale et entière de la Finlande. Le 31 décembre 1917 le Gouvernement bolchévik reconnut cette indépendance et cette décision influença favorablement la décision d'autres pays.

* * *

b. 1917 - 1944

Bien que le Gouvernement de Lénine ait été le premier à reconnaître l'indépendance de la Finlande, les relations entre les deux pays demeurèrent troublées. En effet 40.000 soldats russes étaient restés en Finlande après la déclaration d'indépendance, et la classe ouvrière manifestait un grand mécontentement. Dans la guerre civile qui s'ensuivit en 1918 les "blancs" furent aidés par des troupes allemandes, les "rouges" par les forces russes restées dans le pays.

Pour les Conservateurs alors au pouvoir en Finlande, le seul rempart solide contre le communisme semblait être l'Allemagne dont on espérait qu'elle aiderait la Finlande à s'étendre au-delà de ses frontières historiques par l'annexion de la Carélie orientale. Cette politique ne fut abandonnée qu'à la capitulation allemande en 1918, mais les relations avec l'U.R.S.S. ne furent pas rétablies. Jusqu'au mois d'Octobre 1920 on considéra qu'un état de guerre existait entre la Finlande et l'U.R.S.S. Dans le traité de paix signé à Tartu en 1920 le Gouvernement soviétique réaffirmait sa reconnaissance d'une Finlande indépendante dans le cadre des frontières de l'ancien Grand-Duché, en lui cédant, en plus, la région de Petsamo. Ce résultat, qui ne satisfaisait pas les nationalistes finlandais, mécontenta également le Gouvernement soviétique, qui avait demandé que lui soit cédé ~~soit une~~ ^{soit une} partie de la Carelie pour protéger Leningrad, soit quelques îles dans le Golfe de Finlande. En 1920 l'U.R.S.S. fut trop faible pour ne pas rabattre de ses exigences, mais elle ne les avaient pas oubliées et elle revint sur cette question en 1939.

De 1918 à 1944 la politique étrangère de la Finlande fut marquée par la tension avec l'U.R.S.S. Cette situation pouvait facilement aboutir à un état de guerre et de toutes façons elle obligea la Finlande à prendre des mesures militaires et diplomatiques pour se préserver de ce danger. Cela ne signifie pas que l'attitude officielle de la Finlande à l'égard de l'U.R.S.S. ait été offensive, sauf pendant quelques courtes périodes immédiatement après la guerre civile et au début de la guerre 1941 - 44, mais l'attitude des milieux dirigeants et de

l'opinion publique était empreinte de méfiance envers le grand pays voisin. Le commerce avec l'U.R.S.S. fut insignifiant et les relations culturelles pratiquement inexistantes.

Le changement de gouvernement qui eut lieu en Finlande en 1937 et la prise de pouvoir par une coalition centre-gauche ouvrit des possibilités pour de meilleures relations entre les deux pays.

A l'occasion de sa première visite à Moscou en 1937 le Ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Rudolf Holsti, essaya de dissiper les soupçons concernant une collusion fenno-allemande et assura aux dirigeants soviétiques que la Finlande voulait préserver sa neutralité. Un an plus tard le Gouvernement soviétique proposait secrètement au Gouvernement finlandais un Pacte d'assistance mutuelle dans le cas où l'Allemagne voudrait utiliser la Finlande comme base d'agression contre l'U.R.S.S. Cette proposition ne fut pas acceptée par le Gouvernement finlandais, qui, s'associant à la politique nordique, espérait que l'U.R.S.S., ainsi que l'Allemagne, tiendraient la Finlande en dehors de leurs plans stratégiques.

L'équilibre des forces existant dans la région Balte ayant été modifié en Août 1939 par la signature d'un traité conclu entre l'Allemagne et l'U.R.S.S. la Finlande fut invitée à négocier à Moscou. Le départ pour l'U.R.S.S. du négociateur finlandais, M. Paasikivi, fut immédiatement suivi de préparatifs militaires et d'une mobilisation camouflée.

Les intentions de Staline en ce qui concerne la sécurité de Leningrad furent une réplique de celles des Tsars. Elles consistaient à pousser plus loin de Leningrad la frontière fenno-soviétique et à installer de l'artillerie sur plusieurs îles du Golfe de Finlande ainsi que dans la région de Hangö. En contrepartie l'U.R.S.S. céderait à la Finlande une partie considérable de la Carélie orientale. Les pourparles n'aboutirent pas car la Finlande refusa de céder Hangö qui était, à son avis, trop proche de la capitale.

Après l'échec des négociations les troupes soviétiques envahirent la Finlande. Le 13 mars 1940 un traité de paix fut signé à Moscou. La Finlande devait céder à l'U.R.S.S. des territoires considérablement plus étendus que ceux demandés

au cours des négociations de Moscou en Novembre 1939. De plus la Finlande s'engageait à n'entrer dans aucune alliance dirigée contre l'U.R.S.S.

La position précaire de la Finlande après la paix de Moscou et l'annexion des Etats Baltes par l'U.R.S.S. l'amènèrent à accorder un droit de passage aux troupes allemandes en 1940. En 1940 - 41 la Finlande se trouva de plus en plus engagée aux côtés de l'Allemagne et en juillet 1941 elle entra de nouveau en guerre contre l'U.R.S.S.

A la signature de l'armistice le 19 Septembre 1944 la Finlande sortait de la guerre amputée de plus du dixième de son territoire et condamnée à payer à l'U.R.S.S. des réparations de guerre s'élevant à 300 millions de dollars.

* *
*

c- La ligne Paasikivi.

Les guerres de 1939 - 40 avaient apporté la preuve que toutes les tentatives pour assurer la sécurité de la Finlande en cherchant des appuis étrangers contre l'U.R.S.S. étaient vouées à l'échec. Il apparaissait donc nécessaire pour la Finlande d'établir des relations avec son puissant voisin sur des bases nouvelles.

Pour le Président Paasikivi (1946 - 1956) la situation géographique de la Finlande (1200 kms de frontières communes avec l'U.R.S.S.) devait dicter sa politique étrangère et seuls les avantages d'une politique réaliste devaient être pris en considération dans les relations fenno-soviétiques. Paasikivi devait également déclarer: "Nous ne devons pas seulement trouver un modus vivendi mais établir de bonnes relations pour que l'U.R.S.S. non seulement accepte la situation particulière de la Finlande mais encore qu'elle réalise que cette solution est la meilleure pour ses propres intérêts.

La réalisation de la ligne Paasikivi rencontra des difficultés considérables, car son premier objectif, le maintien de liens de confiance avec l'U.R.S.S., impliquait de grandes modifications dans l'attitude finlandaise. Il fallait d'abord faire le procès des responsables de la guerre, c'est à dire des gouvernants qui avaient mené la lutte contre l'Union Soviétique. Il fallait de plus payer les réparations de guerre. En même temps cette politique de rapprochement, du moins jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix de Paris en 1947, n'était pas facilitée par la présence d'une Commission de contrôle interalliée, sous présidence soviétique, qui limitait la souveraineté finlandaise d'une manière considérable.

La politique de Paasikivi reposait sur l'hypothèse que le territoire finlandais en lui-même n'intéressait pas les dirigeants soviétiques, mais que seule la préservation de la sécurité de Léninegrad et de la frontière Nord de l'U.R.S.S. était importante. Il fallait donc trouver une solution qui satisfasse l'U.R.S.S. tout en donnant à la Finlande des garanties pour son indépendance. Elle fut trouvée dans le Pacte d'amitié et d'assistance (cf. plus loin).

Le premier succès de la politique de Paasikivi a été la remise par l'U.R.S.S. en 1952 d'une partie de l'indemnité de guerre qui put ainsi être définitivement réglée la même année.

En 1955 la politique de Paasikivi connut de nouveaux succès. L'U.R.S.S. rétrocéda à la Finlande la base de Porkkala dont elle avait reçu libre disposition pour 50 ans. (Cette rétrocession peut aussi être considérée comme une conséquence de l'intense critique que le Gouvernement soviétique avait dirigé contre l'existence de bases militaires étrangères dans plusieurs pays européens.) Le Pacte de 1948 fut prorogé de 20 ans, la Finlande devenait membre de l'O.N.U. et du Conseil Nordique, bien que l'U.R.S.S. ait eu, depuis la création de ce dernier organisme, une attitude méfiante à son égard, en raison de l'appartenance à l'O.T.A.N. de trois de ses membres. Le changement de l'attitude soviétique démontrait que la politique suivie par Paasikivi avait réussi à rétablir la confiance de l'U.R.S.S. vis-à-vis de la Finlande.

Toutefois l'U.R.S.S. s'est montrée assez sensible aux événements de politique intérieure de la Finlande et à l'attitude des différents partis envers la politique suivie par le Gouvernement pendant toute la période d'après-guerre.

Le Président Kekkonen (1956 - -) a continué cette politique en lui donnant un caractère fondamental. Il a aussi réussi à développer et à raffermir les relations fenno-soviétiques en soulignant la position de neutralité de la Finlande. C'est ce qui explique que la politique ainsi suivie ait pris plus tard le nom de "ligne Paasikivi-Kekkonen".

* *
*

d- Le Pacte d'amitié, de coopération et d'assistance

La politique de Paasikivi se concrétise dans le Pacte d'amitié, de coopération et d'assistance mutuelle signé à Moscou le 6.4.1948, qui donne un cadre juridique aux relations fenno-soviétiques.

Ce pacte, conclu pour dix ans, fut reconduit pour une ~~période~~ de vingt ans en 1955. Il est renouvelable ensuite par tacite reconduction par périodes de cinq ans, avec possibilité de résiliation pour chacune des parties, moyennant un préavis d'un an.

L'initiative de ce pacte a été prise par l'Union Soviétique. Le projet initial reprenait les termes des traités que l'U.R.S.S. avait déjà signés avec la Hongrie et la Roumanie, mais les contre-propositions finlandaises eurent une influence décisive sur la forme définitive du Pacte qui diffère considérablement de ceux mentionnés ci-dessus.

Dans le premier des huit paragraphes de ce traité la Finlande, fidèle à ses responsabilités de nation indépendante, s'engage à lutter contre une éventuelle agression armée contre son territoire ou contre l'U.R.S.S. à travers son territoire, effectuée par l'Allemagne ou tout autre pays allié de l'Allemagne.

Le cas échéant le jeu de cette clause entraînera la Finlande soit à lutter à forces communes avec l'U.R.S.S. soit à se contenter de son assistance, selon la décision prise par les deux parties.

La Finlande doit d'abord défendre son territoire par ses propres moyens. Elle discute ensuite la qualité et l'étendue de l'aide soviétique requise.

Dans le second paragraphe du traité les deux contractants s'engagent à se consulter mutuellement dans le cas d'une menace d'agression contre la Finlande de la part de l'Allemagne ou d'un pays allié de l'Allemagne. Il est à noter que, selon l'interprétation de Paasikivi, cette obligation de consultation n'existe que si la menace d'agression est considérée comme telle par les deux pays. Elle ne joue pas pour des questions de politique générale afin de ne pas réduire la liberté d'action en politique extérieure. (Le fait que l'Allemagne soit spécialement désignée comme agresseur présumé est naturellement dû au rôle qu'elle a joué contre l'U.R.S.S. dans les deux guerres mondiales et à l'utilisation du territoire finlandais comme base d'agression au cours du dernier conflit.)

Le 30 Octobre 1961 une note soviétique a été l'occasion de faire jouer les clauses militaires du Pacte. Dans cette note le Gouvernement soviétique, tirant argument du réarmement de l'Allemagne, proposait une consultation sur les mesures à prendre pour assurer la défense des frontières des deux pays.

Au cours des négociations qui eurent lieu le 25 Novembre à Novosibirsk le Président Kekkonen proposa l'ajournement des consultations. A son avis, cette solution était de nature à calmer l'opinion dans l'ensemble des pays scandinaves et de réduire les besoins de préparatifs militaires non seulement en Finlande et en Suède mais aussi en Norvège et au Danemark, membres de l'O.T.A.N. (cf. "l'Equilibre Nordique") En contrepartie le Gouvernement finlandais s'engageait à suivre de près l'évolution en Europe du Nord et dans la région Baltes et, au cas de besoin, à donner son avis à l'U.R.S.S. sur les mesures à prendre.

L'Union Soviétique accepta d'ajourner les pourparlers mais cette affaire prouve néanmoins que les clauses militaires du Pacte d'amitié et d'assistance peuvent donner lieu à des interprétations plus larges qu'on n'aurait pu le penser.

Comme l'a mentionné le Président Kekkonen dans un discours prononcé le 29 Novembre 1965, le Pacte diffère d'une alliance militaire en ce sens que la coopération militaire est limitée au territoire finlandais et ne joue pas automatiquement. Le Président Kekkonen dit notamment que "la Finlande s'est engagée à défendre l'autonomie de son territoire dans le cadre de ses propres frontières, ce qu'elle ferait naturellement en tous cas, même sans pacte. Pour éclaircir la nature du Pacte d'amitié, de coopération et d'assistance il a néanmoins été important d'y faire figurer ce truisme. Si l'Union Soviétique était victime d'une agression autrement qu'à travers le territoire finlandais, nous ne serions pas amenés à entrer en guerre par le jeu du Pacte. Au contraire, notre but serait alors de maintenir notre neutralité par tous les moyens."

Le préambule du Pacte constate, en effet, le droit de la Finlande de se tenir à l'écart des conflits entre les Grandes Puissances et c'est sur ce fait, comme il l'a déjà été mentionné plus haut, que se base la politique de neutralité finlandaise.

Les deux premiers paragraphes du Pacte d'amitié et d'assistance sont les plus discutés mais il n'en constituent pas, à eux seuls, la partie la plus importante. Les deux parties s'engagent également à ne pas conclure d'alliances ou à ne pas participer à des alliances qui seraient dirigées contre l'autre partie - ce qui n'est que la confirmation du troisième point du traité de paix signé à Paris en 1947. Elles prennent aussi la résolution de participer à toutes les actions dont le but est de maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationale, conformément aux buts et principes de l'O.N.U. Dans le cinquième paragraphe du Pacte les deux parties s'assurent de leur intention d'agir dans un esprit de coopération et d'amitié dans le but de consolider et de développer en permanence les relations économiques et culturelles entre les deux pays.

Ce n'est qu'à partir de la conclusion du Pacte d'amitié et d'assistance que la collaboration fenno-soviétique a commencé à prendre des formes claires. La grande évolution des relations commerciales qui a eu lieu depuis 20 ans et dont il sera question plus tard est un bon exemple des résultats atteints grâce à cette politique de coopération.

e- Les relations culturelles fenno-soviétiquess

Comme il l'a été mentionné plus haut, les relations culturelles fenno-soviétiques furent pratiquement inexistantes avant les guerres qui opposèrent les deux pays. Cependant, malgré les conflits et les tensions de cette époque, il y avait eu en Finlande des tentatives pour nouer des liens culturels avec l'U.R.S.S. Il existait quelques organisations amicales, très orientées vers la gauche sur le plan politique, qui durent cesser toute activité pendant les périodes de guerre.

Après l'armistice la situation demandait une organisation adaptée à l'esprit nouveau des relations avec l'U.R.S.S. et susceptible de faire naître entre les deux pays le climat d'amitié et de confiance désiré par Paasikivi. Ce dernier prit l'initiative de créer la société Finlande-U.R.S.S. qui fut fondée le 19 Octobre 1944.

Le premier Conseil de direction de la société fut confié à des personnalités éminentes, dont l'actuel Président de la République. La coloration uniforme des associations précédentes disparut et tous les partis sont actuellement représentés au sein de la société qui se présente sous une étiquette politiquement neutre.

Le but de la société a été dès le début, de dissiper la méfiance causée par le manque d'informations. A cette fin elle organise des conférences, publie des ouvrages, renseigne sur le commerce et les autres secteurs, organise, en coopération avec l'U.N.E.S.C.O., des échanges de stagiaires, développe le tourisme et l'enseignement des langues.

Le nombre des adhérents, en provenance de tous les milieux et représentant toutes les tendances politiques, se chiffrait, en 1966, à plus de 240.000, non compris 159 organisations telles que des entreprises d'Etat, des sociétés privées, des organisations de jeunesse etc.

La société Finlande U.R.S.S. a ouvert des sections dans tout le pays et elle a joué, en coopération avec son homologue soviétique, la société U.R.S.S.-Finlande, un rôle décisif dans le rapprochement des peuples finlandais et soviétique

En outre, en Juillet 1945, le conseil des Ministres finlandais désignait un Comité chargé de créer un "Institut central pour l'étude de la civilisation et de l'économie soviétique". Cet Institut, créé par l'Etat, fonctionnerait sous le patronnage du Ministère de l'Education nationale. Il fut décidé qu'il agirait en étroite collaboration avec la société Finlande-U.R.S.S. qui disposait déjà d'une solide implantation dans le pays.

La proposition de loi concernant la création de l'Institut fut déposée devant le Parlement en 1947 mais l'Institut ne put commencer son activité qu'en 1948.

On peut encore faire mention d'un Accord de coopération scientifique et technique dont la signature à Helsinki, le 16 Aout 1955, avait été rendue possible par la normalisation, après la guerre, des relations fenno-soviétiques.

L'initiative de l'affaire avait été prise par l'U.R.S.S. et elle avait été précédée de la visite de M.Mikojan à Helsinki en 1954. La délégation soviétique qui s'est rendue en Finlande pour conclure l'accord proposait au Gouvernement finlandais la création d'un courant d'échanges techniques et scientifiques. Les propositions soviétiques, telles qu'elles étaient présentées, étaient incompatibles avec le droit de propriété finlandais et la législation sur les brevets.

Finalement les contre-propositions finlandaises ont abouti à l'accord actuel. La coopération prévue est large et porte sur tous les secteurs, à l'exception des questions de défense nationale et des documents, découvertes, brevets, procédures et expériences techniques que des organisations ou entreprises d'une des deux parties ne peuvent utiliser que dans leur propre pays ou ne peuvent céder à des tiers.

Bien que cet accord soit le premier de ce type conclu entre les deux pays et qu'il n'y ait pas eu de précédent sur lequel s'appuyer, il a permis de développer rapidement une coopération qui s'est montrée fructueuse, notamment dans le domaine industriel.

f- Quelques exemples de coopération pratique

La coopération fenno-soviétique s'est matérialisée à plusieurs reprises dans des secteurs divers. Par exemple, à partir de 1955, l'U.R.S.S. a confié à des entreprises finlandaises la réalisation à forfait de quelques centrales électriques de moyenne importance. L'ouvrage de ce genre le plus remarquable est la grande centrale de Tulomajoki, sur la presqu'île de Kola, construite de 1962 à 1966 et à laquelle participèrent sur place 2000 ingénieurs et ouvriers finlandais.

La remise en état du canal de la Saimaa est un autre exemple de coopération pratique. Ce canal est destiné à relier les eaux du lac Saimaa au Golfe de Finlande. Long de 57 kms, il traverse le territoire soviétique sur une partie de son parcours. En 1962 l'U.R.S.S. a consenti à donner à bail à la Finlande les 19 kms 500 nécessaires.

Le canal avait été construit avant les guerres mais il a fallu attendre la reprise des relations amicales entre les deux pays et la période actuelle de sécurité pour reprendre les travaux qui seront terminés, selon toutes probabilités, au printemps de 1968.

La cession à bail par l'U.R.S.S. de la partie du canal traversant son territoire est, aux dires du Ministre Merikoski en Novembre 1962, "une étape importante dans les relations entre les deux pays. Elle prouve que la coopération confiante et amicale qui existe actuellement rend possible de résoudre tous les problèmes."

Le communiqué publié à l'occasion de la signature de ce bail le 27 Septembre 1962 précise que l'U.R.S.S. a accepté la demande de location faite par la Finlande en prenant en considération les bonnes relations de voisinage fenno-soviétiques basées sur le Pacte d'amitié, de coopération et d'assistance mutuelle.

On peut ajouter à cette déclaration celle faite à l'occasion d'un discours, en Avril 1967, par l'Ambassadeur soviétique en Finlande, M. Kovalev, qui, sur un plan plus général, indiquait que l'U.R.S.S. serait toujours dans l'avenir prête à collaborer pratiquement avec la Finlande chaque fois qu'il s'agirait de réalisations importantes.

3. LA FINLANDE DANS LE CADRE DES PAYS NORDIQUES

a- Origine des relations de la Finlande avec les pays scandinaves.

Du 12^{ème} siècle à 1809, c'est à dire pendant environ 600 ans la Finlande a été une province du Royaume de Suède.

Elle fut formellement reconnue comme unité dotée de droits politiques en 1362, époque où elle participait, sur un pied d'égalité avec les autres provinces suédoises, aux élections du Roi.

Les circonstances historiques, jointes aux conditions géographiques (la Finlande a 721 kms de frontière commune avec la Norvège et 536 kms avec la Suède) expliquent que la politique étrangère de la Finlande devenue indépendante ait pris la même orientation que celle des pays scandinaves. Cependant la Finlande possède une position politique et économique particulière au sein des pays scandinaves. Elle constitue en effet une sorte d'île par rapport à l'ensemble suédois, norvégien et danois. Le problème de la langue joue à ce propos un rôle qu'il ne faut pas négliger. Le finnois, langue de caractère original, est parlé par environ 92 % de la population finlandaise dont seulement environ 7 % parle suédois (contre 14,3% en 1880). L'histoire, l'affinité linguistique et le fait que la Suède soit un pays neutre alors que le Norvège et le Danemark sont membres de l'O.T.A.N., explique que la Finlande entretienne avec ce pays des relations plus étroites.

La coopération proprement dite a commencé en 1935 lorsque le Gouvernement finlandais a déclaré qu'il voulait préserver la neutralité du pays en coopération avec la Suède et les autres pays scandinaves. Jusque vers la fin des années 1930 cette coopération fut néanmoins peu fructueuse, tout au moins

en ce qui concerne les deux principaux problèmes abordés à cette époque entre la Finlande et la Suède.

Le premier de ces problèmes portait sur la livraison de matériel de guerre mais les tentatives finlandaises pour obtenir des fournitures d'armes de la part de l'industrie suédoise, au cas où la Finlande serait entraînée dans la guerre, échouèrent. L'autre question, plus importante, concernait les îles Aland, archipel finlandais de la Baltique, habité par une population de langue suédoise et jouissant depuis 1920 d'une large autonomie administrative. En 1921, la Société des Nations avait décidé la démilitarisation de ces îles mais la perte d'autorité de cet organisme à partir de 1930 fit apparaître le système adopté et en particulier l'engagement finlandais de défendre les îles Aland, comme peu réaliste. En Janvier 1939, la Suède et la Finlande décidèrent en commun de rétablir à nouveau des défenses sur les îles Aland - au cas de besoin, la Suède pourrait, si la Finlande le demandait et à condition que les deux pays soient restés neutres, envoyer des troupes au secours de la faible garnison finlandaise. Ce projet néanmoins échoua. En effet en Mai 1939 l'U.R.S.S. déclarait que les îles Aland présentait, pour elle, plus d'intérêt que pour la Suède et exigeait les mêmes droits pour la défense de ces îles. Dans ces conditions le Gouvernement Suédois annula son projet en juin 1939.

* *
*

b- Participation de la Finlande aux organismes nordiques

Pour la Finlande, comme pour les autres pays Nordiques, l'instrument principal de coopération entre les Gouvernements et les Parlements est le Conseil Nordique auquel la Finlande a adhéré en 1955. La participation dès l'origine avait été rendu impossible en raison de la méfiance de l'U.R.S.S. à l'égard des buts visés par cet organisme.

Dès son adhésion la Finlande a néanmoins fait une réserve en déclarant que les représentants finlandais ne participeraient pas aux débats sur des questions militaires où des questions de politique étrangère dont la solution impliquerait une intervention dans des conflits entre Grandes Puissances. Cependant la Finlande a participé depuis 1955 à toutes les sessions annuelles qui, en 1957 et en 1962, ont eu lieu en Finlande.

Les travaux du Conseil Nordique sont bien connus et en plus de cette organisation, les moyens de coopération entre les Etats sont tellement nombreux qu'il serait difficile de tous les passer en revue dans le cadre de cet exposé.

On peut néanmoins mentionner la "Commission Culturelle Nordique" dont la Finlande est membre depuis sa création en 1947. Cette commission comprend deux sections: l'une chargée des questions scientifiques, l'autre des questions artistiques et de leur diffusion.

La coopération Nordique porte également sur des questions de caractère international. Ainsi, des questions inscrites à l'ordre du jour de l'O.N.U. sont débattues au cours des conférences annuelles des Ministres des affaires étrangères des Pays Nordiques aux quelles la Finlande a participé régulièrement depuis 1955:

Il est d'usage, de plus, que la Finlande participe, dans le cadre des Pays Nordiques, à des actions communes dans des organisations internationales telles que l'A.E.L.E. et l'O.N.U.

c- Quelques résultats de la coopération Nordique - les accords principaux

L'un des résultats concrets les plus importants auxquels ont abouti la coopération Nordique est la coordination de la législation interne des pays intéressés.

Le plus grand succès a été obtenu en politique sociale. En 1959 la Finlande a signé avec les autres pays Nordiques un accord aux termes duquel les citoyens des pays Nordiques peuvent circuler sans passeport d'un pays à l'autre, le contrôle des passeports pour les personnes ne possédant pas la nationalité d'un des pays Nordiques ayant lieu à la frontière extérieure du bloc Nordique.

En 1954 a été créé un marché du travail commun qui implique la liberté pour chaque citoyen Nordique d'occuper un emploi dans n'importe lequel des pays Nordiques où il réside.

Le traité du 28.9.1957 sur la Sécurité sociale ouvre le droit à chaque citoyen Nordique de bénéficier des mêmes avantages sociaux que les citoyens du pays où il se trouve.

Ces trois mesures ont joué un rôle important dans le rapprochement des pays Nordiques et comme exemple de l'échange considérable de main d'oeuvre entre les pays on peut faire état de la présence s'environ 240.000 finlandais en Suède, dont plus de 73.000 sont employés dans des entreprises suédoises ou s'occupent de leurs propres intérêts.

La coopération économique rencontre beaucoup plus de difficultés et les tentatives de créer un Marché commun Nordique ont échoué par la suite de la création de l'A.E.L.E., dont il sera question plus tard.

A la dixième séance du Conseil Nordique tenue à Helsinki en Mars 1962 la Finlande a donné son adhésion à l'accord de coopération Nordique dit "Accord de Helsinki" qui, comme l'a défini le Ministre Merikoski, "est une solide déclaration de principe qui souligne la coopération Nordique". Sans entrer dans les détails de cet accord, on constate que, dans 5 chapitres, les parties s'engagent à continuer et à développer la coopération dans les secteurs législatifs, culturels, sociaux, économiques et dans, les questions de transports et de communication. Le chapitre "autres secteurs de coopération" comporte une clause selon laquelle

les parties s'engagent, dans toute la mesure du possible, à se consulter sur les questions d'intérêt commun évoquées dans les organismes ou les conférences internationales.

On peut dire, en définitive, que cet accord a abouti à classer l'ensemble de la coopération Nordique en plusieurs secteurs bien définis et qu'il apporte la confirmation d'une coopération totale entre tous les pays Nordiques.

* *
*

d- L'équilibre Nordique

Le titre de ce chapitre "l'équilibre Nordique" est, pour citer M. Brundtland dans son exposé publié dans la revue "Cooperation and Conflict", "un terme souvent utilisé pour exprimer l'idée que la situation de l'Europe du Nord est la conséquence de la diminution de l'influence des Grandes Puissances et que des possibilités égales existent à la fois pour les U.S.A. et l'U.R.S.S. de neutraliser l'accroissement possible de l'influence de l'autre".

Cette notion d'équilibre Nordique éclaire d'ailleurs la déclaration du Président Kekkonen faite à Novosibirsk en 1961 et mentionnée plus haut dans laquelle il expliquait que la suppression des négociations fenno-soviétiques proposées par l'U.R.S.S. en raison du danger présenté par le réarmement allemand pouvait avoir un effet tranquillisant sur l'ensemble des pays Nordiques.

La sécurité de la Finlande est étroitement liée à la situation générale des pays Nordiques. Les Etats Nordiques suivent, en raison de faits historiques, deux voies différentes sur le plan de leur politique de sécurité: la Norvège et le Danemark sont membres de l'O.T.A.N., la Suède et la Finlande ont choisi la neutralité.

En 1952, au moment où il occupait le poste de Premier ministre, le Président Kekkonen déclara, qu'à son avis, le conflit prévu dans le Pacte de 1948 ne pourrait être provoqué, en

fait, que par une action utilisant comme tremplin les pays à l'Ouest de la Finlande. Il était donc nécessaire, pour la Finlande, d'éliminer cette possibilité, et, pour y arriver, de libérer le Danemark et la Norvège du mécanisme collectif de l'O.T.A.N.

Fidèle à ce raisonnement le Président Kekkonen exposa, dans son discours prononcé à la réunion de la Société Paasikivi, le 28.5.1963, un plan sur la création d'une zone Nordique sans armements nucléaires, en se basant sur la proposition que l'ancien Ministre suédois, M.Östen Undén, avait faite en 1961 sur la nécessité et les possibilités de créer un "club" sans armements nucléaires. Dans l'esprit du Président Kekkonen une telle convention devait garantir une évolution pacifique permanente de l'Europe du nord et tenir les pays Nordiques à l'écart des champs de tension internationale. D'après le Président Kekkonen cette proposition ne devrait pas rencontrer d'opposition, car elle constitue, en réalité, simplement une confirmation du statu quo : la Finlande se voyait empêchée par le traité de paix signé en 1947, de se procurer des armes nucléaires et, conformément à sa politique de neutralité, elle refuse d'en accepter pour le compte d'autres pays. La Suède, la Norvège et le Danemark ont de leur propre gré renoncé à incorporer des armes nucléaires dans leurs armements. Les pays Nordiques forment donc déjà maintenant, en réalité, une zone sans armes nucléaires, mais cela résulte seulement de prises de positions unilatérales.

Ce plan, appelé plan Kekkonen, fut froidement accueilli par les autres pays scandinaves. Du côté officiel on a souligné qu'on ne cherchait pas actuellement de changement de politique sur l'armement nucléaire, et qu'on n'était pas préparé à souscrire des engagements formels sur la question.

Depuis quelques années, on formait, dans certains milieux finlandais, le projet de créer une union de défense à laquelle la Finlande participerait. Ce projet supposait la résiliation du Pacte d'amitié et d'assistance, et le retrait de l'O.T.A.N. de la Norvège et peut-être du Danemark. Cette proposition semble peu réaliste dans la mesure où la Finlande sait que ces deux derniers pays ont l'intention de maintenir leur adhésion à l'O.T.A.N., même après 1969. En ce qui concerne la Finlande, la proposition de créer une union de défense Nordique s'explique, comme l'a dit le président Kekkonen dans un discours prononcé en

1965, par une mauvaise compréhension de la politique étrangère de la Finlande. Le Pacte de 1948 ne représente pas seulement la situation d'un moment, mais exprime les intérêts permanents de la Finlande.

Dans le discours mentionné plus haut, le Président Kekkonen présentait, en parlant de la politique de sécurité de la Finlande, une troisième solution pour résoudre ces problèmes. En définissant la situation de la Finlande au cas où une guerre éclaterait en Europe, le Président attira l'attention sur la partie nord de la Finlande où se rejoignent les frontières de l'O.T.A.N. et du Pacte de Varsovie. En cas de conflit la Laponie serait donc en danger. Si ce danger pouvait être éliminé par un traité avec la Norvège les frontières finlandaises seraient protégées au maximum: du côté de l'U.R.S.S. par le Pacte de 1948, du côté de la Norvège par un traité à conclure visant à assurer la paix des deux côtés de la frontière fenno-norvégienne.

Le Président Kekkonen n'a cependant pas fourni de précisions sur la conclusion d'un traité avec la Norvège, mais il a seulement indiqué qu'un tel pacte renforcerait les possibilités de la Finlande de garder sa neutralité en cas de guerre.

A l'occasion d'un autre discours, prononcé à Moscou en 1965, le Président Kekkonen avait déjà critiqué le projet de création d'une force nucléaire multilatérale dans le cadre de l'O.T.A.N. Cette prise de position fut beaucoup critiquée dans certains milieux finlandais, qui considéraient qu'elle n'était pas conforme à la politique de neutralité finlandaise. Dans sa réponse à ces critiques le Président Kekkonen affirmait son droit de prendre position, en raison de l'importance que la paix en Europe a pour le maintien de la neutralité finlandaise et en raison du fait que la création d'une force nucléaire multilatérale présentait une menace considérable pour cette paix. La neutralité finlandaise étant surtout une question de confiance, il est normal que le Gouvernement finlandais recherche à assurer au maximum cette confiance et par la même à assurer au maximum sa liberté d'action. C'est dans le cadre de cette politique qu'il faut placer des tentatives comme le Plan Kekkonen et la proposition sur la Calotte Nord.

4. LA FINLANDE ET L'EUROPE DE L'OUEST

a- Les Puissances occidentales et la neutralité de la Finlande

Les relations de la Finlande avec les Puissances occidentales furent assez réduites sous la présidence de M. Paasikivi. Ce n'est qu'à partir de 1960 qu'elles prirent une importance plus grande.

A partir de cette époque la Finlande fit porter tous ses efforts pour être reconnue comme Etat neutre par les pays occidentaux. Cette politique a été l'objectif des visites officielles effectuées par le Président Kekkonen en Grande-Bretagne et aux Etats-Unis en 1961 et en France en 1962.

Le communiqué publié à l'occasion de la première visite d'un Chef d'Etat finlandais en Grande-Bretagne est à peu près semblable à celui publié en France l'année suivante. On y constate que le Président de la République Finlandaise a exposé, à cette occasion, les raisons pour lesquelles, depuis la fin de la guerre, la Finlande a adopté une politique de neutralité. Le Président de la République Française a exprimé sa compréhension à l'égard de cette politique.

Le communiqué publié à Washington après l'entretien du Président Kekkonen avec le Président Kennedy, le 16 Octobre 1961, contient une déclaration plus large. Il constate que le Président Kennedy a déclaré vouloir prendre en considération les engagements de la Finlande relatifs à sa situation internationale et a affirmé que les U.S.A. comprenaient les raisons de la politique de neutralité suivie par la Finlande.

On peut dire que ces différentes prises de position, auxquelles s'ajoute la déclaration, citée plus haut, contenue dans le Pacte d'amitié et d'assistance fenno-soviétique, forment le cadre réel de la politique de neutralité finlandaise.

Sur le plan pratique, la coopération avec les Puissances occidentales repose sur ces principes et la Finlande est considérée, dans le cadre de l'O.N.U., comme un Etat neutre.

Les relations de la Finlande avec les autres pays occidentaux sont surtout de caractère commercial.

La confiance dans sa neutralité a amené en 1962 la Grande-Bretagne, signataire de la paix de Paris en 1947, à autoriser la Finlande, contrairement à une des clauses du traité de paix et en accord avec l'U.R.S.S. a posséder des armes téléguidées de caractère défensif.

En conclusion on peut citer les propres paroles du Président Kekkonen qui disait que "meilleures sont nos relations avec l'Est, meilleures elles peuvent être avec l'Ouest".

* * *

b- Le Conseil de l'Europe

En 1963 la question de l'entrée de la Finlande au Conseil de l'Europe avait fait l'objet d'une discussion entre les représentants de divers Etats membres de cet organisme. Les commentaires faits sur cette affaire avaient amené le Gouvernement finlandais à se pencher, de son côté, sur ce problème mais il n'avait pas cru utile de modifier sa position vis-à-vis du Conseil.

A l'heure actuelle, bien que n'étant pas membre du Conseil de l'Europe, la Finlande participe d'une manière effective aux travaux de plus de la moitié des Comités, et entretient des rapports plus particuliers avec le Conseil pour la Coopération Culturelle.

En outre la Finlande a sa place dans plusieurs organismes spéciaux dont la compétence touche à des questions telles que l'Education Nationale, la Justice, les Affaires Sociales etc. En conclusion on peut dire que la Finlande coopère avec le Conseil de l'Europe dans tous les secteurs concrets, bien qu'elle n'ait pas à présent considéré une adhésion politique comme utile.

* * *

5.

LA FINLANDE ET L'EUROPE DE L'EST

La coopération de la Finlande avec les pays de l'Europe de l'Est s'est traduite principalement, jusqu'à présent, par les nombreuses visites officielles échangées au niveau des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères. Au niveau des Chefs d'Etats on peut faire mention de la visite officielle du Président Kekkonen en Yougoslavie en 1963, de la visite du Président Tito en Finlande l'année suivante et de la visite officielle du Président Kekkonen en Pologne en 1964, visite qui fut rendue par le Président de la République Polonaise, M. Ochab, en 1965. En outre le Président Kekkonen, à son retour de Yougoslavie, a fait une visite officieuse en Hongrie.

Ces prises de contact ont été l'occasion de souligner les bonnes relations existantes dans tous les secteurs entre la Finlande et ces pays et le développement satisfaisant de la coopération culturelle dans le cadre de programmes annuels.

Les déclarations faites à l'occasion de ces visites ont eu un caractère général, touchant un grand nombre de problèmes internationaux actuels. Toutefois le communiqué publié à l'occasion de la récente visite en Finlande du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Tchèque, M. David, a pris une forme plus concrète. Dans le communiqué la Finlande soutient, à certaines conditions, la proposition d'une conférence européenne de sécurité. Le Président Kekkonen, dans un de ses discours, a précisé que la Finlande serait favorable à une telle conférence sous réserve que ses travaux soient bien préparés et que le nombre des pays participants soit suffisant.

Comme autre exemple de coopération concrète de la Finlande avec les pays de l'Est on peut citer les Commissions de coopération économique qui planifient, à longue échéance, le développement des relations économiques et commerciales.

On peut encore faire état de l'appartenance de la Finlande au groupement des "neuf", fondé au sein de l'O.N.U., à sa session de 1965, et où se réunissent divers pays de l'Europe de l'Est et de l'Europe de l'Ouest, membres de blocs militaires ou neutres. On peut dire que cet institution vise à harmoniser

les relations entre les Etats Européens à régimes sociaux différents.

Pour conclure on peut constater que la conception de l'Europe, telle qu'elle a été comprise par la politique étrangère finlandaise, embrasse aussi bien l'Europe de l'Est que l'Europe de l'Ouest et que le maximum de coopération entre les deux parties du Continent est considérée comme étant d'importance vitale pour la Finlande.

* *
*

6.

LA FINLANDE ET LA QUESTION ALLEMANDE

La guerre éclata entre la Finlande et l'Allemagne en Septembre 1944 quand l'Allemagne refusa de retirer ses troupes du nord de la Finlande. Les allemands furent repoussés par les troupes finlandaises en 1945, mais l'état de guerre subsistait naturellement par la suite.

Après la signature de la paix de Paris avec les alliés en 1947 la Finlande avait besoin de rétablir des relations égales avec les deux Allemagnes sans prendre parti dans les conflits des Grandes Puissances. Pour aboutir à ce résultat la Finlande fit appel à une solution unique dans son genre. Elle n'a reconnu ni la République Fédérale ni la République démocratique allemande, tout en disposant de représentations commerciales ("Finnische Handelsvertretung") à Cologne et à Berlin-Est. Les deux représentations sont confiées à des Consuls Généraux. Réciproquement les deux Gouvernements allemands ont établi à Helsinki des représentations commerciales qui jouissent des privilèges diplomatiques.

La paix de Paris implique l'accord des Puissances Alliées sur la question allemande et la reconnaissance par la Finlande des décisions prises. La Finlande ne peut donc pas chercher à résoudre ces problèmes de sa propre initiative.

Comme la question allemande est toujours une des plus délicates posées à la politique des Grandes Puissances, il est naturel que la Finlande, conformément au Traité de Paris et au préambule du Pacte de 1948, n'ait pas pris position. Ceci est

également un exemple qui illustre bien la mise en pratique de sa neutralité.

D'autre part les deux Etats allemands semblent satisfaits de l'attitude adoptée par la Finlande.

Par le fait que le Pacte de 1948 mentionne explicitement l'Allemagne, les responsables de la politique ont, à plusieurs reprises, adopté une position critique à l'égard des mesures qui concernent le réarmement de la République Fédérale. On a trouvé que des pareilles mesures pouvaient provoquer des contre-mesures de la part de l'U.R.S.S. et de ses alliés, et par celà rendre actuelle la clause du Pacte de 1948, qui avait déjà eu l'occasion de jouer pendant la crise de 1961, concernant des consultations militaires fenno-soviétiques.

De même le Président Kekkonen, à l'occasion de sa visite à Moscou en 1965, a formellement critiqué les projets de création d'une Force Multilatérale dans le cadre de l'O.T.A.N. avec participation de la République Fédérale. (cf plus haut)

Comme avant la guerre, les relations commerciales actuelles de la Finlande avec les deux Allemagnes sont très importantes. On peut mentionner que l'Allemagne Fédérale est un des tout premiers, si non le premier, des fournisseurs et clients de la Finlande.

Les relations culturelles et scientifiques existantes entre les deux Allemagnes et la Finlande sont toujours restées très proches et n'ont en rien été influencées par la situation que connaît l'Allemagne depuis la fin de la guerre.

* * *

7.

LES RELATIONS COMMERCIALES

a) Les Pays Nordiques - Négociations sur une Union douanière nordique

Depuis le règlement des réparations de guerre à l'U.R.S.S., libérant la Finlande de ses strictes obligations vis-à-vis de l'Est, la coopération économique de la Finlande avec l'Occident a été envisagée, sous plusieurs aspects différents. Ce fut d'abord sur le plan régional, la coopération avec l'Europe du Nord.

A partir de 1954, les pays membres du Conseil Nordique avaient engagé des négociations visant à une coopération économique. Dès que la Finlande fut entrée dans cette organisation, elle participa, à partir d'Août 1956, aux travaux du Comité mixte nordique de coopération économique.

Comme l'avait précisé le Ministre des Finances, M. Simonen, en Février 1957, la Finlande escomptait que ces travaux seraient entièrement indépendants des projets, en discussion à cette époque, de création d'une zone de libre-échange et des décisions politiques qui pourraient être prises à ce sujet.

Les travaux du Comité mixte nordique de coopération économique se concrétisèrent dans l'important rapport d'Octobre 1957 visant à établir une Union douanière nordique. Dans un rapport établi par le Comité, à Kungsälv, en 1959, concernant la création d'une Union douanière nordique en relations avec le projet d'accord de libre-échange entre les pays scandinaves, la Grande-Bretagne etc..., on signalait que la proposition sur cette Union douanière était prête à être présentée au Conseil Nordique. Comme l'a constaté le Ministre du Commerce et de l'Industrie de l'époque, M. Karjalainen, dans une déclaration faite à la presse en Juillet 1959, la situation à Kungsälv fut telle que le projet d'Union douanière nordique passa à l'arrière-plan, car l'intérêt des autres pays nordiques était, depuis quelque temps, orienté vers un autre projet, celui de la formation

de l'A.E.L.E. Le projet d'établir une Union douanière nordique fut donc abandonné par la même occasion. La Finlande avait néanmoins déclaré que, même si l'on prenait en considération le projet des "sept", on devrait continuer la coopération nordique, car elle avait en soi une grande importance dans toutes les circonstances. Les autres pays nordiques approuvèrent entièrement cette idée.

Dans une interview accordée à la presse, M. Sukselainen avait déclaré que les autres pays nordiques avaient déduits - sans que la décision ait été prise en commun - que la question de l'Union douanière n'était plus d'actualité, mais M. Sukselainen a souligné que la Finlande était néanmoins intéressée par toutes les questions de coopération économique avec lesquelles les autres pays nordiques avaient des projets, car cela concernait des territoires vers lesquels environ 30 % des exportations finlandaises étaient orientées. La réalité fut qu'on n'avait jamais demandé à la Finlande si elle voulait participer aux projets des "sept", et elle n'avait aucune raison d'entamer la discussion avant d'avoir pu constater dans la réunion commune que la question de la coopération nordique sur le plan économique n'avait plus d'actualité, que tout l'intérêt était orienté vers la nouvelle idée. La Finlande avait alors souligné qu'elle ne voulait participer à aucune autre forme de coopération que purement économique, et elle ne pouvait accepter que des organismes par dessus son autonomie nationale, décident des questions qui la concerne.

Les autres pays nordiques entrèrent à l'A.E.L.E. en 1960 et alors l'idée de l'Union douanière s'écroula mais de fait la coopération économique a été renforcée dans le cadre de l'A.E.L.E.

b) La Finlande et l'A.E.L.E.

La position spéciale de la Finlande entre deux blocs fait de la neutralité son objectif le plus important,

mais il est souvent difficile de faire une distinction nette entre la politique et l'économie. C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement finlandais avait décidé, dans un communiqué publié le 13.11.1959, que la Finlande, fidèle à sa politique de neutralité, était intéressée par l'établissement de relations purement commerciales et douanières. Pour être sûr d'arriver à ses fins le Ministre du Commerce et de l'Industrie avait demandé aux représentants des "sept" réunis à Saltsjöbaden qu'on accorde à la Finlande des possibilités de suivre de très près l'évolution des projets concernant la zone de libre-échange avant de prendre d'engagements à ce sujet.

Comme la constitution politique de l'A.E.L.E. était favorable à la neutralité et que l'Angleterre est le marché le plus important pour la Finlande, il parut nécessaire que la Finlande soit liée à cette organisation. En 1961 la Finlande estima préférable, afin de respecter les autres engagements internationaux qu'elle avait déjà contractés, de conclure un accord séparé avec l'A.E.L.E. plutôt que d'en devenir membre. Cet accord, signé le 27 mars à Helsinki, entra en vigueur le 1^{er} Juillet 1961 et créa une nouvelle zone de libre-échange, comprenant la Finlande d'une part et les pays membres de l'AELE d'autre part, Finefta. (Abreviation anglaise aussi utilisée: E.F.A. = EFTA + Finland Association.)

Par cette association, la Finlande s'engageait à supprimer progressivement ses droits de douane sur les produits industriels originaires de l'A.E.L.E. et à réduire ses contingents à l'importation suivant un calendrier légèrement différent de celui adopté par les autres pays membres.

Le 13 Novembre 1960 la Finlande signait avec l'U.R.S.S. un accord donnant à ce pays des avantages douaniers correspondant à ceux consentis aux pays membres de l'A.E.L.E. (Voir "Commerce fenno-soviétique")

Dès l'origine il fut convenu que la Finlande supprimerait totalement le 1^{er} Janvier 1970 les droits de douane en vigueur le 1^{er} Juin 1960 sur les produits industriels qu'elle importe des pays membres de l'A.E.L.E. Après une modification de calendrier en 1963 et l'abolition unilatérale de la liste dite "lente" à la fin de 1967 le désarmement douanier était total déjà le 31.12.1967.

L'association de la Finlande à l'A.E.L.E. est sur un point plus lâche que celle des autres Etats membres. Il lui sera plus facile de se retirer de cette forme de coopération, car le délai de résiliation de l'accord n'est que de trois mois. En outre les décisions sont prises dans un conseil joint Finlande-A.E.L.E.

L'influence de l'A.E.L.E. sur l'économie finlandaise apparait dans le tableau suivant: (les chiffres sont indiqués en milliers de marks)

	Année 1960		Année 1967	
	Milliers de marks	%	Milliers de marks	%
Exportations vers la future A.E.L.E.	1067015	33,7	A.E.L.E. 1941557	37,1
Autres.....	2097720	66,3	3288774	62,9
Total:	3164735	100,0	5230331	100,0

	Année 1960		Année 1967	
	Milliers de marks	%	Milliers de marks	%
Importations de la future A.E.L.E.	1023493	30,0	A.E.L.E. 2083782	36,0
Autres.....	2379505	70,0	3710912	64,0
Total	3402998	100,0	5794694	100,0

Dans le bulletin mensuel N°6/1967 de la Banque de Finlande M. Kaarlo Larna définit l'importance de l'A.E.L.E. pour l'économie finlandaise de la manière suivante: "L'A.E.L.E. a été, un facteur important dans le développement des exportations, bien qu'elle ait en même temps facilité les importations en provenance de plusieurs pays plus développés sur le plan industriel, ce qui a eu quelques effets négatifs. Au total notre expérience de la participation à l'A.E.L.E. a néanmoins été favorable."

c- La Finlande et la C.E.E.

L'atmosphère politique de la C.E.E. n'est pas facilement compatible avec une attitude de neutralité, et bien que 34,7% des importations et 30,9% des exportations finlandaises en 1961 se soient effectuées avec les pays du Marché Commun il paraissait, à l'époque où la Finlande commençait à définir sa position vis-à-vis de la C.E.E., que les seules raisons économiques ne seraient pas suffisantes pour se joindre à cette organisation, surtout pendant le temps où la Norvège et la Suède s'en tiendraient à l'écart.

En 1963 la question de la coopération entre l'A.E.L.E. et la C.E.E. rendait actuelle la position finlandaise vis-à-vis de la C.E.E.. Cette année-là le Gouvernement finlandais a installé un représentant officiel auprès de la commission de la C.E.E. à Bruxelles (poste tenu par l'Ambassadeur de Finlande).

Un communiqué du ministère des Affaires Étrangères a exposé ainsi les raisons de cette décision: " La réalisation de l'accord de Rome a provoqué une accélération de l'intégration européenne et la commission de la C.E.E. à Bruxelles a acquis, de plus en plus, une position centrale non seulement en ce qui concerne les relations entre Etats membres mais également pour ce qui regarde les rapports avec les autres pays... Dans le cadre du GATT, la Commission de la C.E.E. a négocié, au nom des pays membres, avec la Finlande depuis 1961."

Le communiqué a précisé que la décision du Gouvernement finlandais ne constituait pas une modification de l'attitude de la Finlande à l'égard de la question de l'intégration européenne et qu'à ce sujet il convenait de se référer au communiqué officiel du 9 Août 1961 indiquant que la Finlande suivrait l'évolution de l'initiative de négociations avec la C.E.E. prise par certains pays de l'A.E.L.E., en tenant compte des intérêts de son industrie et de son agriculture, ainsi que de sa position de neutralité et de ses obligations internationales. C'est dans ce but que la représentation finlandaise auprès de la Commission de la C.E.E. a été installée.

Pour des raisons de politique extérieure les autorités finlandaises s'en sont toujours tenues à une attitude d'attente à l'égard de l'intégration européenne dans le cadre d'un rapprochement C.E.E.-A.E.L.E. Toutefois le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, M. Ahti Karjalainen, a déclaré à Lausanne en Octobre 1967 que la Finlande ~~reste~~ favorable au développement de la coopération économique dans toute l'Europe.

* *

*

d- La Finlande et l'O.C.D.E.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, M. Ahti Karjalainen annonçait le 14.12.1967 que le Gouvernement finlandais avait décidé d'étudier les possibilités que la Finlande aurait de participer plus étroitement aux travaux de l'O.C.D.E.

Effectivement, à la fin de l'année 1967 une délégation composée de fonctionnaires a été créée. En Février 1968 cette délégation s'est rendue à Paris, auprès du Secrétariat de l'O.C.D.E., pour étudier sur place les possibilités qui peuvent s'offrir pour modifier éventuellement la situation présente.

Jusqu'à présent la Finlande a participé à l'activité de cette organisation en qualité d'observateur dans quelques unes de ses sous-sections, comme le Comité de la pâte-à-papier et de l'industrie, le Comité des machines et le Comité agricole. Un représentant du Ministère de l'Education nationale de Finlande a été également observateur dans la Comité de la recherche scientifique.

La décision prise par le Gouvernement ne signifie pas en soi une prise de position pour ou contre une adhésion éventuelle, la Finlande veut simplement définir quels sont les moyens à utiliser par la Finlande si elle veut participer plus étroitement aux travaux de l'O.C.D.E.

A cette même occasion le Directeur des Affaires économiques au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, M. Horn, a

déclaré que "les facteurs économiques de l'O.C.D.E. ne sont pas apparemment en conflit avec la politique économique de la Finlande. Les buts de la politique économique et les moyens pour les atteindre dans le cadre de l'O.C.D.E. ne dépassent pas les engagements internationaux de la Finlande, mais les détails de la question ne sont pas encore bien étudiés en ce moment."

* * *

e- La Finlande et la Commission Economique pour l'Europe

L'intérêt spécial que la Finlande a porté à la Commission Economique pour l'Europe tient au fait que cette représentation régionale de l'O.N.U. est un des seuls liens existant entre les pays de l'Europe de l'Ouest et ceux de l'Est.

Dès 1947 la Finlande avait été invitée à participer à l'activité de la Commission en qualité d'observateur et lorsqu'elle devint membre de l'O.N.U. en 1955 elle devint également membre à part entière de la Commission Economique pour l'Europe.

La sphère d'activité que couvre la Commission, entre autre l'agriculture, la sylviculture et la construction, convient bien à la Finlande qui dispose d'assez d'expérience dans ces domaines. Il n'est donc pas étonnant qu'un Finlandais, M. Sakari Tuomioja, ait occupé le poste de secrétaire général de 1957 à 1960. Un autre Finlandais occupe d'ailleurs actuellement le poste de directeur de la Division du Bois (Timber Division) à la F.A.O./C.E.E.

Au total, apportant sa propre expérience dans des domaines qui lui sont bien connus et la confrontant avec celle des autres pays, on peut dire que la Finlande n'a retiré de son appartenance à la Commission Economique pour l'Europe que des avantages fructueux.

* * *

f- Le Commerce Fenno-Soviétique

Les rapports commerciaux entre la Finlande et l'U.R.S.S. sont fort anciens. Ils s'expliquent par la position géographique qu'occupent les deux pays par rapport l'un à l'autre et l'existence de longues frontières communes. L'U.R.S.S. représente, avec la Grande-Bretagne et la République Fédérale allemande, un des grands partenaires commerciaux de la Finlande.

Elle occupe une position prépondérante dans l'ensemble des échanges commerciaux de la Finlande avec les pays membres du COMECON, liés à la Finlande par des accords de commerce bilatéraux.

Le commerce fenno-soviétique a connu une grande expansion après les guerres qui opposèrent les deux pays. Ce développement des échanges suivait l'amélioration des relations politiques.

L'obligation où s'est trouvée la Finlande, après les guerres, de payer à l'U.R.S.S. d'importantes réparations eût, en définitive, un effet bénéfique sur le développement de son industrie lourde et la fourniture de navires et de cargos a amené une grande évolution des chantiers navals finlandais auxquels l'U.R.S.S. continue toujours d'ailleurs à passer d'importantes commandes.

Actuellement le marché soviétique constitue un débouché important non seulement pour les secteurs mentionnés ci-dessus mais pour l'industrie finlandaise dans son ensemble, ainsi que pour l'agriculture qui y écoule une grande partie de ses excédents.

Sur le plan réglementaire les échanges commerciaux fenno-soviétiques obéissent aux règles ci-dessous: Un important accord a été signé en 1947. Cet accord, toujours en vigueur, pose les principes généraux du commerce entre la Finlande et l'U.R.S.S. qui bénéficie de la clause de la nation la plus favorisée. Depuis 1951, vers la fin du règlement des réparations de guerre, le commerce fenno-soviétique s'effectue en application d'accords de commerce quinquennaux, qui posent des règles générales et qui sont complétés par des protocoles de commerce annuels

comportant des listes de contingents chiffrés. Aux termes de ces accords, les deux Gouvernements, qui ne sont pas responsables de l'exécution complète des livraisons prévues, s'engagent seulement à faire de leur mieux pour assurer et réaliser les échanges.

Le dernier accord quinquennal ouvre des possibilités au commerce frontalier avec la région de Léninegrad qui obéit à des règles spéciales. Ces échanges, dont les quotas ne sont pas fixés, sont autorisés par les deux pays dans la mesure où la balance commerciale est en équilibre. Des efforts ont été également entrepris pour favoriser dans des conditions analogues le commerce frontalier avec d'autres zones (Mourmansk, Tallin).

Comme il a déjà été mentionné plus haut, un accord important a été signé en 1960, destiné à résoudre, selon son préambule, "les questions financières et commerciales entre la Finlande et l'U.R.S.S. qui peuvent se poser dans le cas où la Finlande désirerait conclure un accord séparé avec l'A.E.L.E." En vertu de cet accord, en vigueur depuis le mois de juillet 1961, la Finlande garantit à l'U.R.S.S. les avantages tarifaires qui correspondent à ceux qu'elle accorde aux pays membres de l'A.E.L.E.

Les échanges commerciaux fenno-soviétiques dépassent souvent en réalité les montants prévus dans les protocoles annuels.

Le troisième protocole annuel conclu au mois de Décembre 1967 dans le cadre de l'accord quinquennal de commerce et de paiement couvrant la période 1966 - 1970, prévoit que la valeur des échanges entre les deux pays s'élèvera à 2,1 milliards de marks, ce qui représente 13 % d'augmentation par rapport au montant des échanges annuels prévus dans l'accord quinquennal. Cette croissance illustre bien l'évolution des relations commerciales fenno-soviétiques.

On peut encore noter que depuis 1950 la balance commerciale entre les deux pays tend à être excédentaire, sauf pendant l'année 1963, en faveur de la Finlande.

* * *

*

APERÇU SUR L'ENSEMBLE DU COMMERCE
EXTERIEUR FINLANDAIS

Le tableau ci-dessous donne la répartition du commerce finlandais par grandes zones politiques. Les valeurs sont reprises en milliers de marks. Il est toutefois à noter que le mark finlandais a été dévalué de 31,25 % le 12 Octobre 1967.

Importation

	Année 1963		Année 1967	
A.E.L.E.	1264467	32,7 %	2083782	36,0 %
C.E.E.	1171208	30,3 %	1579548	27,3 %
COMECON	812751	21,0 %	1159914	20,6 %
Autres.....	618432	16,0 %	971450	14,6 %
Total.....	3866858	100,0 %	5794694	100,0 %

Exportation

	Année 1963		Année 1967	
A.E.L.E.....	1149044	31,2 %	1941557	37,1 %
C.E.E.....	1121717	30,5 %	1235295	23,6 %
COMECON.....	772084	21,0 %	1129479	21,6 %
Autres.....	635183	15,2 %	924009	17,7 %
Total.....	3678028	100,0 %	5230331	100,0 %

* * *

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

- Svante Kuhlberg: Katse Neuvostoliittoon, études sur l'Union Soviétique. Helsinki 1967
- Georg Paile: Pelin säännöt, aperçu sur les relations fenno-soviétiques. Helsinki 1967
- Finnish Foreign Policy, "études" publiées par l'association finlandaise de politique étrangère.
- Ilkka Hakalehto: Pohjois-Euroopan Turvallisuus, article sur la sécurité de l'Europe du Nord, revue Ulkopoliittinen (politique Etrangère) N° 2 1966
- Jan-Magnus Jansson: Puolueeton Suomi (article sur la Finlande neutre, revue Ulkopoliittinen N° 1 1965.
- Risto Hyvärinen: Pohjois-euroopan turvallisuus sotilaspoliittiselta kannalta, article sur la politique de sécurité de la Finlande, revue Ulkopoliittinen N° 2/66
- Kalervo Siikala: Kansallinen realismi, réalisme national, Jyväskylä 1960
- Krister Wahlbäck: Från Mannerheim till Kekkonen (de Mannerheim à Kekkonen), Stockholm 1966
- Arne Olaf Brundtland: The Nordic Balance, article paru dans la revue Cooperation and Conflict N° 2 1966
- Keijo Korhonen: Ydinaseettomat vyöhykkeet maailmanpolitiikassa, (les zones sans armes nucléaires dans la politique internationale.) Helsinki 1966
- Finlands Attitude to the German Question; Finnish Features N° 221, publié par le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères.
- Ahti Karjalainen: Features of Finland's neutrality, article paru dans " Finnish Features" en Novembre 1967
- Jaakko Nousiainen: Suomen Poliittisen järjestelmän, (le système politique de la Finlande) Porvoo 1967
- Ulkopoliittisia lausuntoja ja asiakirjoja 1956 - 1966
Série de déclarations et documents de politique étrangère publié par le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères.
- Katarina Brodin: Finland 1956 - 1966, article paru dans la revue "Världspolitiken dagsfrågor" N° 11 1966 Stockholm.
- Ilkka Hakalehto: Suomen ulkopoliittikan kehityslinjat, études sur l'évolution de la politique étrangère de la Finlande, Helsinki 1966
- Paasikiven linja, discours prononcés par le Président Paasikivi en 1944-1956, Porvoo 1966.
- Aimo Pajunen: Finlands säkerhetspolitik. La politique de sécurité de la Finlande, article paru dans la revue Strategisk Bulletin N° 4/ 67, Stockholm
- Ahti Karjalainen: Suomen Kansainväliset taloudelliset suhteet Les relations économiques internationales de la Finlande, article paru dans la revue "Ulkopoliittinen" n° 3, 1965

*

*

*

national security was to be solved on the basis of universal cooperation. In early 1948, it was acknowledged that the existence of tensions between East and West had undermined the basic assumptions on which the UN as a security instrument was built. Because of the polarization process, the UN alternative was moved from top to bottom on the list of priorities, and it is still the least wanted of the four frameworks outlined in the opening. Instead of giving renewed importance to UN collective security, depolarization has brought about a change of focus in direction of some sort of a European security system, an idea often referred to as the final goal, but which is nevertheless very vaguely conceived of. At the same time, however, there is more or less slowly growing understanding that contributions towards war prevention in other parts of the world and more general war-preventive measures other than military defence are relevant for the maintenance of peace and security in one's own area. Thus, Norway has been among the initiators of ear-marked UN forces, together with the other Nordic countries, and various forms of non-military defense are widely accepted though the practical implementations are lagging.

24. The main export commodity groups are the following:

	Value: 1000 kr.
Non-ferrous metals	2 061 192
Fish and fish prepar.	1 054 436
Transport equipment	1 017 499
Paper, paperboard, and manufactures thereof	907 587
Iron and steel	806 442
Pulp and waste paper	570 355
Machinery, other than electrical	556 762
Fertilizers, manufactured	435 889
Food-stuffs for animals	347 683
Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances	281 031

Processed commodities now constitute 25% of the total Norwegian export, as against 15% in 1959.

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Norway, 1967.

25. At the end of 1966, the greatest shipping nations were:

	Gr.tons
1. Great Britain and N.I.	21 542
2. USA	20 798
3. Liberia	20 603
4. Norway	16 421

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Norway, 1967.

26. Source: Economic Survey of Europe in 1966. Prepared by the Secretariat of the ECE, Geneva.

The orientation of a country's foreign trade is usually a function of both economic and political interests. The Norwegian government initially preferred an Atlantic solution to her market problems where North America as well as the Western European countries would participate. Such an arrangement would have been in accordance with Norwegian interests both in the economic and political field. However, considering that this possibility is rather unrealistic today, the table should illustrate fairly well why Norway considers a solution to the Western European market problems to be the most important politico-commercial objective at the moment.

Since its formation in 1959, EFTA has been Norway's most important instrument in the field of foreign trade. The table also indicates that the Norwegian exporters are prepared to work under the assumption that cooperation in EFTA will continue, either within

work of EFTA as the organization appears today, or within wider frameworks. There seems to be more widespread opinion than ever before that Norway should have membership in EEC, provided that Great Britain also enters. But at the same time the probability for an extension of the common market in the near future, seems to be small. As mentioned above, Norway has put greater emphasis on the Western European framework in recent years, and to some extent at the expense of the Atlantic alternative. However, as an extension of EEC is improbable today, the Atlantic framework may get renewed importance. Until now, there are no official statements to be interpreted in favour of a North Atlantic free trade area, but it is discussed as an important alternative. However, irrespective of how the future situation will look and what position Norway will get in that picture, it will define important preconditions for her relations with Eastern Europe and constitute an indispensable perspective for the understanding of her economic cooperation with the Eastern European countries.

27. Source: Economic Survey of Europe in 1966. Prepared by the Secretariat of the ECE, Geneva.

28. Source: Statistical Yearbook of Norway, 1967.

29. See speech made by the Minister of Commerce and Shipping before "Den Norske Advokatforening" (Norwegian Bar Association), February 14, 1967.

30. This was expressed during the Parliamentary debate 11-13 July, 1967.

31. This agreement was put into force on July 1st, 1962. Most of it, the part quoted here included, was only a confirmation of procedures already established.

32. Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland.

33. See note 10. Percentage agreement between Norway and Finland in the same period was 69%. Average agreement with other NATO countries was 71%, and with the Warsaw Pact countries a little above 30%.

34. See Nordic statement in the Trade and Development Board, August 23, 1967.

35. See the background paper for the Minister of Commerce and Shipping's statement in the Storting, Nov. 21, 1967.

36. The various ways in which the Nordic countries have tried to solve their security problems are evidently putting serious limitations on possibilities for integration. Except for Finland, however, Norway does not see any necessary contrasts between the Nordic and the Western European framework. During the 15th session of the Nordic Council, April 1-6, 1967, the Minister of Commerce and Shipping expressed this opinion in the following way:

"As the cooperation within EFTA has resulted in a Nordic free trade area, cooperation within EEC may open the way for further Nordic unity. One may like or dislike the fact that the Nordic community is bound to extra-Nordic forces in this way. But it belongs to the world of reality that EEC may be the most important factor in enforcing Nordic harmonization also in fields where this is not yet attained".

37. It is probable that Britain's decline from being a great power to her present status in the semi-big category with more or less chronic economic difficulties reduces her capability to act as a model for other countries. The close ties between Norway and Britain were strongly reinforced during the Second World War and they were to a great extent based on the assumption of Britain as a great power. Today, Norway relies first of all on the USA in the military field, and the economic dependency on Britain is less than what is often assumed. When Britain still serves as a model for Norway to a great extent, this may partly be due to the traditional nature of British-Norwegian relations. In other words, there is a certain time lag between the disappearance of real common interests and the disappearance of traditions attached to them, and what is indicated here is that British-Norwegian relations have been in this phase for several years already, and that it is only a question of time before Norway has to reconsider the British model on a more realistic basis.

38. For a survey of the total number of trans-Cold War INGO bonds formed since 1945, see Paul Smoker: 'A preliminary Empirical Study of an International Integrative Sub-system', The Peace Research Centre, Lancaster, England. Ranked according to INGO-bonds with the Socialist countries (N.Korea, China, N.Vietnam and Mongolia included), formed since 1945, Norway comes out as no. 9 out of 15 NATO countries (France included).

39. Up to 1966, Norway had a consulate at Gdansk/Gdynia, Poland. With reference to the Nordic consular agreement, the Norwegian interests are now handled by the Swedish consulate at Gdansk/Gdynia.

40. See Norwegian statement at ECE's 22nd session.

41. Speech by President L.B. Johnson made before the National Conference of Editorial Writers at New York, Oct. 7, 1966. Printed in the Department of State Bulletin Oct. 24, 1966.

42. In the Norwegian memorandum to the Group of Four on reorganization of OEEC in 1960, it was stated that a corner-stone of the cooperation in OEEC had been the joint consideration of economic, trade, and payments policies.

43. See the Minister of Commerce and Shipping's statement in the Storting, April 14, 1967.

44. These are Poland and Czechoslovakia. In addition, Bulgaria and Hungary are observers to GATT. Yugoslavia is also a member, but is not counted as an Eastern European country here.

45. See Government Report to the Storting, No. 21, 1964/65.

46. See footnote 48.

47. Government bill No. 18, 1965-66.

48. See Minister of Commerce and Shipping's statement in the Storting, Nov. 21st, 1967.

49. At the end of 1966, Norway had, in all, 16 bilateral agreements on cultural exchange. In addition, she participated in multilateral agreements within the Council of Europe, UNESCO, NATO, and the Nordic Council (The Nordic Cultural Commission).

Many of the bilateral agreements entered into by Norway require mixed commissions with 2-3 members from each country. This is not the case with any of the agreements with Eastern European countries, but for the ones with Poland and the Soviet Union, Norway has, on her part, appointed an advisory body.

50. During the period July 1966-Dec. 1967, the following visits and negotiations took place:

1. Visit to Bulgaria 5th to 13th September, 1966 by Norwegian Parliamentary Delegation.
2. Visit to Norway 27th February to 3rd March, 1967, of Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bachev.
3. Visit to Bulgaria, October 22-28, 1967, by Prime Minister Borten.
4. Negotiations on the cultural exchange programme with Rumania, in Bucharest, October 4-6, 1967.
5. Trade negotiations with Rumania in Oslo, November 11-12, 1967.

51. Foreign Ministry Information Bulletin (UD-Inform) No. 10, 1967.

52. See footnote 55, and the Storting-debate on foreign affairs, May 30, 1968.

53. For a thorough discussion of economic policies pursued during the Cold War, see Gunnar Adler-Karlson: Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967. A case Study in Foreign Economic Policy. (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1968)

54. Gunnar Adler-Karlson: Western views on the problems of East-West trade, A report written at the request of Unctad. Stockholm, 1966, p. 18.

55. An extension of the mandate of this committee was agreed upon during Prime Minister Borten's visit in Yugoslavia Oct. 17-22, 1967.

56. Till now, it has concentrated on three main projects: in South Korea, Tanzania, and Kenya.

57. Johan Galtung: 'Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position.', Journal of Peace Research, vol. 1, 1964.

58. Helge Hveem: Fakta og verdier i utenrikspolitikken. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1967.

59. See Prime Minister Borten's statement during the parliamentary debate on foreign affairs, Nov. 16, 1967.

60. For the period 1963-68, the following amounts were spent with special reference to agreements on cultural exchange:

1963:	332 200 kr.
1964:	400 000
1965:	460 000
1966:	460 000
1967:	460 000
1968:	530 000

The increase from 1963 to 64 is mainly due to changes in the way the budget was set up, and the increase from 1964 to 65 was by and large ear-marked for the new agreement with Ireland. The increase for 1968 is thus the only one ear-marked for Eastern Europe.

61. The data are taken from NATO-papers listing recent East-West contacts.

POLISH VIEWS ON SOME PROBLEMS OF EAST-WEST COOPERATION IN EUROPE

I

Basic elements of the Polish attitude towards the problem of European cooperation

1. The existence in Europe of groups of States of different political, economic and social systems neither makes impossible nor even essentially limits the development of political, economic or any other kind of cooperation between them. There is no field of peaceful cooperation in which European States could not find opportunities for taking mutually advantageous steps.

This is the fact, however, in European situation that the actual scope of cooperation falls short of the existing opportunities and needs of European countries.

2. Stemming from this situation, practical tasks to search for new ways and means which could ensure the further development of all-European cooperation require first of all to focus on those political factors which hamper or limit the possibilities of this cooperation at present, and whose elimination appear to be essential for the creating more favourable conditions for its development in future.

This definite conclusion on the priority of tasks seems to follow also from recent European experiences.

The general picture of the European cooperation at the end of the sixties is evidently different one from that of the end of the forties or of the beginning of the fifties. In examining the causes of this phenomenon however, one has to bear in mind that the decisive role in this respect was played not so much by the economic reconstruction of Europe and corresponding to it growth of possibilities and interest in the economic and technical cooperation, not so much by the revival of traditional cultural bonds between European countries, as, first of all, by the change of the general political climate in

Europe called the „détente“. And it was the new political atmosphere in Europe which was reflected in the development of political contacts, in the exchange of economic mission, in the increased commercial exchanges, and in scientific and technical cooperation.

Certainly, there is also a kind of a feedback between the general political situation and the development of the East-West cooperation and exchange, however, the priority of the political relations in the whole of the problem of the East-West cooperation seems to be beyond any discussion. The best example of this is the pernicious influence that the political relations had upon the general state of the European cooperation during the „cold war“.

The conclusion drawn from the above is that in pursuit of better conditions for the development of the broad East-West cooperation European States should take into account first of all the need to secure a more favourable political context for this cooperation.

Consequently, the nature of steps which can promote real progress in all-European cooperation and increase feelings of security on this Continent must be adequate to cope with remnants of cold war in Europe. Measures to be undertaken should aim at the solution of basic European problems which have a decisive impact on the whole European situation. Realization, at present, of marginal measures only - of nonpolitical and noncontroversial character - aiming at the growth of commercial exchanges, scientific and technical cooperation, sport competition and the increase in tourist exchanges, or even the search of the best formal solutions of and improvements in organization of European cooperation cannot lead to any real and stable results. Those marginal, nonpolitical and noncontroversial steps, albeit useful and purposeful, could create, instead, an illusion of progress and détente in European relations, when leaving behind, in fact, all key problems unsolved.

Thus, a fundamental assumption, for fruitful results of debates carried on the problems of European cooperation, is that the solution of European outstanding problems should be embarked upon. And the solution of those problems only, even if gradual, can lead to the qualitative change in East-West relationship and can help to establish a new and more favourable basis for development of European cooperation.

3. The establishment of a new basis opening better prospects for the European cooperation - political, economic, technical and others - is connected, in Polish view, above all, with the acceptance and recognition by all European States of the existing on our Continent political and territorial status quo.

Calling the European status quo in question by one state, lack of its explicit recognition by others, all this contributes to the creating and maintaining a provisional character of present Europe. In more than twenty years after the end of the second World War the existing situation in Europe is still treated as a kind of „Saison-Europa". This situation, however, excludes the possibilities of any durable solution the problem of European security as well as it must, to an essential degree, limit the prospects of all-European cooperation in general. As it was stated by Polish Prime-minister J. Cyrankiewicz: „We are against building elusory expectations on quicksands of temporariness. One must stand *de facto* and *de iure* on the solid ground of the status quo".

In other words, persistent non-recognition of the results of the last war is and will continue to be an element in European situation exerting restraining and destructive impact on possibilities of political stabilization in Europe and on the development, on the basis of this stabilization, of solid relationship of European States and their cooperation. From this follows that undertaking of specific measures leading to the general acceptance of the European status quo is an essential prerequisite of the favourable all-European cooperation and a point

of departure for any realistic in this respect further considerations. Practical, implementation of this basic requirement includes two interrelated elements:

- recognition of the existing in Europe political and territorial frontiers;

- normalization, i.e. on the basis of this recognition, of the relations between all European States, including, in particular, the normalization of relations between the GDR and FRG and other Western European countries on one side, and on the other, relations between the FRG and the States of Eastern Europe.

4. A positive component of actually prevailing European situation is that more and more ~~and more~~ people are aware of dangers inherent in present European situation and of the unsatisfactory state of interstate cooperation on this Continent. This growing up consciousness is reflected in a number of proposals put forward from various quarters and regarding the means of solution of some cardinal European problems. It has occurred under those circumstances that Poland has submitted her proposal for holding an international conference on security and cooperation in Europe with all States concerned participating in it. The topics to be dealt with at this conference should consist of issues which have been regarded as truly essential and fit for an agreed solution. A list of such problems can be agreed upon by the countries concerned by way of consultations.

It is apparent that this one meeting only will not solve all problems of Europe but it may be of assistance to pave the way for their future solution, also, if it would be considered useful, at the next this kind of meetings. Should some realistic objectives be set which would confront the attendants then we may expect that there will be no disappointment with the results of that conference.

II

Main Problems of European Cooperation: European Security

1. Poland undoubtedly belongs to those European countries which are mostly interested in a proper solution of this problem. This particular interest of Poland is easily understandable if one bears in mind that during the last 200 years of her history Poland was for 129 years deprived of its independence, partitioned by big powers and often being the battlefield for foreign armies. The short period of the restored independence after the First World War ended with the most horrible Second World War which brought for her - although she belonged to the victorious States - more heavy losses - personal and material than that of any other State participating in the War, also among the defeated ones.

Poles have been charged at different occasions that their views and positions are too „historical” and are tinged with sentimentality which is connected ~~with historical experiences~~ with bitter historical experiences, and especially with those of the Second World War, but which, it is said, creates a certain burden to their perception of the present situation in Europe. This charge seems not to be correct, although it is possible perhaps to talk about a specifically Polish look upon the present and the future of the European security from the point of view of historical experiences. These experiences however, do not divert our attention from the present into the past, but make us most cautious not to commit the errors of the past in the present and in the future.

If one speaks sometimes in sociology and in political sciences of an attitude conditioned by previous experiences, of the so called „cultural lag”, in the Polish attitude towards the problem of European security it consists in the most serious approach to this category of problems as to those of

the utmost importance, deciding upon the fate of individuals and nations. And it is one of the sources of the great activity of the Polish diplomacy in the sphere of the European security.

2. The European security is considered in Poland both as a problem of diminishing the dangers of the present situation and of the existing system of international security in Europe, and as a problem of the new organization of the cooperation of European States for the maintenance of international peace and security on our Continent.

3. It is the fact of the post-war Europe that the relative peace and international security in this area have been based upon the system of the balance of power. A certain stability of the international situation resulting from that system as well as a certain sense of international security cannot, however, in our view, be regarded as constant elements. What more, the degree of the concentration of armaments and armed forces on European area, the degree of interests here engaged, and the geographic and demografic conditions of this Continent create a situation in which a risk of an unimaginable catastrophe contained in the present system of the balance of power is the most serious exactly in Europe. In this way the problem of international security, especially in Europe, has reached new dimensions and cannot be put only into traditional notion of international security as a security against aggression or assurance of integrity and political independence of States. The problem of security, at least for the bigger part of Europe, particularly for the central Europe, is simply the one of surviving of European nations.

4. The existing security system by no means has solved in an effective way the problem of European security and, what more, it is not able to bring about such a solution. It is onerous and harmful for the wide European cooperation. Po-

land has never considered such guarantees of European security to be the best and most desirable ones. It should be remembered that when she signed in 1955, with other socialist countries, Warsaw Pact, she did so in response to: the establishment of the NATO /1949/, Western refusal of the Soviet proposals regarding the all-European system of collective security /1954/ and, finally, in response to the admission of the FRG to the NATO /1954/.

Thus, it had not been the result of Poland's, or other socialist countries' policy that the European security has been based on the system of the balance of power. This system was imposed upon Europe by the NATO countries against the will and the desire of socialist countries.

But it has become the basic fact in European situation. It constitutes the sole though precarious source of European security. From this fact also definite consequences must follow both in respect to the way of present thinking in problems of international peace and security and in respect to the practical way of action of European countries aimed at maintaining peace and security on this Continent.

5. The fundamental principle of maintaining international peace and security in this system is to keep the existing equilibrium - understood not only in terms of the balance of military potentials, but also in terms of the existing political and territorial set-up. If the existing military, political or territorial balance were changed in favour of one side it would create not only a threat to the security of the other, but it would mean also threat to the European and world's peace.

In present situation it is the ambitions, and territorial and political claims of FRG which tend to upset the existing balance. They are aiming at actual liquidation and annexation of one of socialist countries and at capturing of the substantial part of the territory of the other.

The danger that European equilibrium could be upset was imminent also this summer in Czechoslovakia. In the estimation of Poland and of other socialist countries, there existed a definite menace that Czechoslovakia could be drawn apart the Warsaw Pact. Of course, nobody can foresee to a certainty, how the European situation would evolve, if it really had happened. Where it could lead, however, and what consequences it could have for the security of Poland and other socialist countries, it must be clear enough, even for a layman, after a close examination of the map of Central Europe. But even, if not considering possible ultimate consequences, one confines oneself only to the most restrained estimation, it must be admitted that the disruption of the Warsaw Pact in such an important point would have to encourage the aggressive forces in Europe to continue and to intensify their efforts aiming at the change of frontiers and the political and social structure of European States.

Having this in mind, accusations that the action of socialist countries upset the balance must be considered nothing but a simple distortion of motives and facts. The action undertaken by socialist countries, disturbed neither European peace nor the existing equilibrium. It prevented only that such disturbance could occur.

The conclusion which must be drawn from the examining the pernicious influence which is exerted upon the whole European situation by the FRG policy of persistent political and territorial claims, and from the understanding of the essence of the Czechoslovakia events, is that the factor of fundamental importance for assuring European peace and security, in conditions, when they are based solely on the balance of power, is the renunciations by all European States of any claims and attempts to upset the territorial and political order of present Europe.

6. It does not mean however, that in the existing European situation there exist no possibility for undertaking the positive programme which could consolidate international security on this Continent.

Such a programme includes measures both in military and political fields. What they should have in common however, is, that they involve really important questions of European security and that they can contribute to the relaxation of political and military tension, and to the building of trust between European states.

An important step in the field of disarmament measures, in opinion of Poland, would be the signing and ratification by all European States of the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This treaty, though conceived as an agreement on the world scale, is of remarkable significance in particular as related to the European continent. It would become the first real and material step on the road towards lessening the military tension in Europe.

If the non-proliferation treaty entered into force and found its application to all European States, it would not mean however, that other measures in the field of nuclear weapons would lose their significance.

Poland has already submitted her proposals concerning the freezing of nuclear weapons in Central Europe and the establishment of nuclear-free zone in this region. These proposals have widely resounded through Europe and it seems to be superfluous to present them here. It should be emphasized rather that despite the efforts of the Polish diplomacy which have found their expression i.a. in multiple modifications of the proposals to meet Western suggestions and in deliberately letting open some of their elements for their solution in the course of negotiations, in a consequence of the negative attitude of some NATO countries, proposed measures have not been implemented, to the evident detriment of European security.

In the field of political measures, which could reduce tension and restore confidence between European States, Poland has proposed the conclusion of the agreement between the all European States, including GDR and FRG, on the renunciation of the use of force or the threat of the use of force and on non-interference in internal affairs of the other States. Such an agreement, would contain also parallel pledges on the security and inviolability of the frontiers of all European States. For no declarations on the renunciations of the use of force cannot contribute to real detente in international relations, if they are to be accompanied by questioning the status quo. If territorial and political claims are to be put forward after the conclusion of the agreement they will have to undermine the reliability of the accepted obligations on non-using the force; at the best, such a situation would testify to the fact that the party which continues to assert its claims renounces the use ^{of} force at the moment when it is not able to use it.

The conclusion of the agreement in the form proposed by Poland might become a turning point in the history of the postwar Europe. It would remove the uncertainty as to intentions with regard to the established territorial and political status ^{quo} in Europe, it would contribute to the stabilization of European situation and to an increase of the feeling of security of European States. It could free them, to a large extent, from the myth of a hypothetical invasion of the other side. This myth based upon suspicions grown during the "cold war" as to intentions of the other side, is still exerting its influence on relations between European States, and is used by some States for their own purposes.

At last, it seems reasonable to suppose that the conclusion of such an agreement can create a new and much more favourable conditions for the consideration and realization of measures relating to the limitation and reduction of armaments in Europe.

Obviously, the conclusion of a treaty of non-aggression will not completely eliminate obstacles existing heretofore on the way of the implementation of these steps. One can, however, believe that the existence of additional obligations on non-aggression should put them in a different light and facilitate negotiations on this problem.

Implementation of concrete measures in the field of disarmament would constitute additional confirmation of intentions expressed in the agreement on non-aggression. These measures would give a material value to the obligations accepted in the agreement. Their undertaking, simultaneously or shortly after the conclusion of the agreement moreover, could introduce to European situation some momentum necessary for further positive evolution, leading to the establishment in Europe of new, stable and effective, security system.

7. According to the Polish view, a radical improvement of European security could be brought about only through the change of the existing system of security. A new system of international security in Europe should create the framework for an efficient cooperation of European States for the maintenance of international peace and security corresponding to the present stage of the development of their political and legal relations. At the same time, this new system should be free from the dangers of the present system, as well as from its negative consequences in the sphere of the European cooperation. The requirements mentioned above can be fulfilled, in our view, by an all-European system of collective security. Poland and other socialist States have advocated uninterruptedly since 1954 the realization of this idea. Its realization remains, however, a distant future.

German problem

1. The essence of the German problem at present is the fact of existence of two German States, separate not only from the legal point of view but also essentially different from ideological and political one.

Coming into being of this situation cannot be a surprise or unexpected development of events for anybody, at least, for West German politicians. Adopting a programme of large scale armaments, becoming a member of one of the two main and opposite military blocks and continuing the political programme aimed at reversing results of the last war, the West German Government has chosen the policy excluding any possibility of reunification. The only result of this policy could be and, in fact, was the petrification of the division of Germany and in final effect coming into being of two independent German States.

2. The settlement of the German problem cannot ignore this fact. As well as this settlement cannot be detached from the problem of European security.

The necessity that the settlement of German question should be subordinated to superior interests of European security follows both from consideration of historic experiences as well as from the present interrelationship of these problems.

The Federal Republic of Germany is the only State in Europe which puts forward territorial claims and represents revisionist ambitions. Her policy of non-recognition and her attempts to reverse the results of the Second World War makes her an element exerting restraining and destructive impact on the possibilities of political stabilization and cooperation in Europe. This policy holds a menace to the security of those States towards which her ambitions and claims are immediately directed, and if proper conclusions are drawn from the European history, not only of those States. The ascertainment that the FRG is „an economic giant but a political dwarf“ cannot be considered in static terms. For it includes a powerful dynamic quality, which cannot be taken into account in thinking on the problem of European security. In this situation FRG declarations on the renunciation of force for the realization of her claims without abandoning those claims cannot be of the great significance. The essence of the problem is not the renunciation of

the use of force when somebody is not able to use this force. The crux of the matter is first of all the final renunciation of claims.

3. The character of a government's policy cannot be judged by declarations made but above all by the course of practical action undertaken by a government. Such a course of action which could be undertaken at present by the FRG Government in order to convince other European States of the sincerity of its intentions should include, in opinion of Poland, the following steps: /1/ Final recognition of the existing state of affairs in Europe - what includes both the recognition of the other German State and recognition of the existing borders in Europe; and /2/ the abandonment of any attempts to possess or control nuclear weapons.

Then, in opinion of Poland the way towards the normalization of its relations with socialist countries will be opened.

4. On the other hand, the settlement of the German problem requires that the discrimination of the other existing German State is given up by Western countries. This requirement of non-discrimination with regard to the German Democratic Republic is the more so essential since it applies to the German State which - in accordance with the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement - has obliterated in its country nazism, militarism and revisionism, has accepted the effects of the ^{last} ~~last~~ war and renounced political and territorial claims, and represent nowadays an important factor of stabilization and equilibrium in Europe.

5. The support given by European States to the candidacy of both German States for their membership in the United Nations could be an appropriate manifestation of the application of the principle of non-discrimination in European relation and an important, additional element of the settlement of the German problem.

Some problems of commercial and economic cooperation

1. The development of mutually beneficial economic relations between the States of Eastern and Western Europe has been regarded in Poland as a problem of great economic as well as political importance.

From the economic point of view it has been regarded as a factor which, by enlarging the international exchanges and specialization of production can contribute to the more rational utilization of resources and productive forces of Poland and accelerate the technical progress and the rate of economic growth of the country.

From the political point of view the development of economic relations can promote the development of peaceful political relations between the groups of European States, and strengthen their peaceful coexistence and competition.

2. Normalization and development of European economic relations dignifies an extensive augmentation of bonds of peaceful cooperation between European States without jeopardizing those already established to the advantage of all those directly concerned. It is necessary, however, to consider ways and means, where by an action might be taken against an undoubtedly undesirable development, as a result of which the economic integration of this or that group of States would at the same time involve the economic disintegration of Europe as a continent. The problem of coordinating the economic interests of the States - members of the grouping - CMEA, the European Economic Community and EFTA is growing nature. For this purpose could be used the European Economic Commission.

3. The development of the Polish foreign trade in the post-war period and the place in it taken by Western countries is shown in the following table:

Polish Exports and Imports in mln zlotys /at the rate: 1 zl = 0,25 US dol./ and percentages

15

	1 9 5 0		1 9 5 5		1 9 6 0		1 9 6 5		1 9 6 6	
	%		%		%		%		%	
EXPORTS										
Total Exports	2.537,0	100,0	3.678,7	100,0	5.302,1	100,0	8.911,4	100,0	9.088,4	100,0
To socialist countries	1.443,3	56,9	2.313,4	62,9	3.304,5	62,3	5.634,7	63,2	5.600,6	61,6
incl.: CMEA countries	1.418,5	55,9	2.128,2	57,9	2.926,4	55,2	5.239,7	59,2	5.080,4	55,9
To other countries, incl.	1.093,7	43,1	1.365,3	37,1	1.997,6	37,7	3.276,7	36,8	3.487,8	38,4
Highly developed count.	1.007,8	39,7	1.119,8	30,4	1.582,2	29,9	2.557,2	28,7	2.771,1	30,5
incl., EEC countries	236,1	9,3	239,0	6,5	549,6	10,4	928,1	10,4	1.013,5	11,2
EFTA countries	614,9	24,2	595,1	16,2	717,1	13,5	1.044,8	11,7	1.134,4	12,5
Developing countries	85,9	3,4	245,5	6,7	415,4	7,8	719,5	8,1	716,7	7,9
IMPORTS										
Total Imports	2.672,6	100,0	3.727,2	100,0	5.979,9	100,0	9.361,2	100,0	9.976,2	100,0
From socialist countries	1.633,2	61,1	2.419,8	64,9	3.758,9	62,9	6.190,0	66,1	6.415,4	64,3
incl., CMEA countries	1.624,6	60,8	2.263,1	60,7	3.482,2	58,2	5.775,1	61,7	6.003,5	60,2
From other countr. incl.	1.039,4	38,9	1.307,4	35,1	2.221,0	37,1	3.171,2	33,9	3.560,8	35,7
Highly developed count.	955,1	35,7	988,4	26,5	1.775,2	29,7	2.295,3	24,5	2.836,3	28,4
incl., EEC countries	321,1	12,0	378,8	10,2	603,1	10,1	845,4	9,0	959,0	9,6
EFTA countries	563,1	21,1	499,3	13,4	653,5	10,9	888,2	9,5	1.263,8	12,7
Developing countries	84,3	3,2	319,0	8,6	445,8	7,4	875,9	9,4	724,1	7,3

According to data of the Polish Statistical Yearbook, Central Statistical Office, 1967.

This trade statistic reveals that in the period of 1950-1955 the turnover of the Polish foreign trade with Western European countries remained almost at the same very low level. As a result of the relaxation in the political relations and of the progressive softening of restrictions by Western countries in their trade with Socialist countries, a speedy growth of this turnover took place in the next five-years-periods. The dynamics of this growth was much higher in the years 1960-1965 than in 1955-1960.

The very high rate of growth of Polish commercial exchanges with Western European countries in, to a great extent, the result of the very low starting point. Nevertheless, the maintenance of this high rate of growth also now, when a much higher level has been reached, shows the existence of stable and large possibilities for constant development of these exchanges.

Despite the high rate of growth of the turnover with Western European countries, its part in Polish total commercial exchanges remains approximately at the same level; its absolute volume is still fairly low and does not correspond to the existing possibilities in this respect.

The further development of this trade requires, in our opinion, the creation of appropriate conditions and the elimination of obstacles which hamper or may hamper in future its development.

4. The above mentioned main obstacles seem to have two different sources:

/a/ commercial policy of the countries of Western Europe towards socialist countries different from the policy followed with respect to other capitalist countries, and

/b/ commodity structure of foreign trade of Poland with the countries of Western Europe.

5. The first obstacle finds its expression in measures limiting the access of East-European products to the Western

markets. Among the most frequently applied measures of this category there are: rigid limitations of the volume of the imports from socialist countries, discriminatory tariffs, different specific administrative regulations in relation to the imports from socialist countries. All these measures make imports from socialist countries less competitive, more difficult and more expensive. The endeavours of the East European exporters to overcome at least some of these obstacles are not easy. So, e.g., the application with regard to products coming from socialist countries of higher tariffs makes their competition on a given market with other exports impossible. In case, however, when, in order to keep pace with other competitors, East-European exporters are forced to sell their goods at less advantageous prices, accusations of „dumping“ and „market disruption“ are brought against them and they meet the application of anti-dumping regulations.

The purpose of all these measures limiting the East-West trade is to prevent a substantial growth of the commercial exchanges with socialist countries, to establish strict control over them and to create the possibility of the immediate administrative influence, in a convenient time, upon the volume and direction of the trade with socialist countries. In consequence, however, we are facing a lack of stability in trade relations with Western countries which makes the investments for export purposes more difficult.

Many of those measures are connected not with the objective economic interests of capitalist countries, but with the political distrust as well as with the lack of good knowledge and understanding of such economic principles of socialist countries as the monopoly of foreign trade and the planning of the production to be exported.

Foreign trade, however, is a two-way business and Polish imports from Western European countries may grow only in a rate corresponding to that of the growth of Polish exports.

to those countries. In a final result, the creation of favourable economic conditions i.e. through the assurance of equal access of Polish exports to the markets of Western Europe, can contribute to the general development of commercial exchanges between Poland and Western European countries.

It should be stated with satisfaction that growing number of Poland's commercial partners are successively abandoning the system of quantitative restrictions and liberalizing the imports from Poland. In 1967 the degree of the liberalization varied from 30 to 40 percent of our exports, reaching 80-90 percent in the case of e.g. Denmark, Norway or Switzerland.

This process corresponds to the aims of Poland whose policy is the development of multilateral and free from restrictions and limitations commercial exchanges with all capitalist countries. And our successful efforts to obtain the full membership in the GATT can serve as an illustration of that policy.

A bilateral instrument which helps to overcome some of the difficulties in the East-West trade is a long term commercial agreement. Its conclusion brings about a certain degree of stability in commercial relations. This fact for the countries with planned economy, is of particular importance. It enables them to include export production into national plans and to ensure necessary means for this production.

Good results have also been obtained in a result of great East-European credit purchases in the West of whole industrial objects. In connection with those transactions requiring, in turn, the purchases by Western countries in a given socialist country, many import restrictions were relaxed.

At last - as emphasized in many discussions between East European and West European economists - some psychological traditional attitudes born in the period of the "cold war" should be eliminated to give way for successful development of trade between both parts of Europe. In the West - some more pragmatic approach to the commercial relations with the countries of planned economy is needed, in the East - more efforts should be made to analyze Western markets as well as to adapt flexibly industrial production to the requirements of Western purchasers.

6. The second obstacle which can hamper the future development of the commercial exchanges between Poland and the countries of Western Europe, is the commodity structure of this trade, and especially structure of our exportations to those countries. The following table shows in percentages the structure of Polish exportations to developed capitalist countries: /Data for 1966/

	Countries of EEC	Countries of EFTA	All deve- loped ca- pitalist countries
I. Agricultural food articles	48,9	41,3	43,2
II. Raw materials and semi,products	41,2	47,8	42,4
III. Industrial consumer goods	7,4	8,3	10,6
IV. Machines and equipment	2,5	2,6	3,8
	100,0	100,0	100,0

It is not enough to say that this structure of Poland's exportations to those countries does not correspond to her level of industrialisation. But it should be taken into account also that in connection with a rapid industrialization Poland, like other Eastern European countries, will cease to be a country of chiefly raw material exports; also her possibilities of food exports will be reduced. The national production of traditional raw materials and agricultural export products will be, to an always greater degree, absorbed by her own developing industry and growing national ^{demand} for food articles. And, although those articles will continue to be an important part of our exports to Western countries, they cannot, however, be the basis of the future growth of our commercial exchanges with Western European countries.

Even if it was possible to ensure a substantial increase of traditional Polish export production especially that of agricultural and food articles, it is difficult to assume that there will be a corresponding substantial increase in demand for those goods in Western European countries. Certain role in this respect will have also the execution of the agricultural policy of EEC which foresees i.a. that in the ^{vo} ~~senties~~ ^{ties} the countries of the Community will attain a net self-efficiency in the production of agricultural and food articles which may be produced in the moderate climate.

Therefore, the possibilities of a further growth of commercial exchanges of Poland and of other socialist countries with the countries of Western Europe must be considered first of all in the group of industrial goods, including industrial semi-products.

It goes beyond any doubt that the realization of the necessary structural change in the Polish exports to Western European countries, what seems to be the main conditions of the future growth of exchanges with those countries, depends first of all on the efforts of Polish producers and exporters.

A successful implementation of this change will require, however, also that the Western European countries will understand and accept its necessity. Only commercial exchanges harmonized in its structure with the economy of partners can develop successfully and to the benefit of both sides.

To sum up, the development of a broad commercial exchanges, Poland's and other socialist countries, with the countries of Western Europe depends to a substantial degree on the creation between them of a new type of international division of labour, characterized also by mutual specialization in the sphere of industrial production.

7. In this connection, a great importance should be attached to all those forms of economic cooperation between the countries of Western Europe and Poland which can contribute to the deepening of contacts between the industries of these countries and to the development of their specialization.

One of these forms in the industrial cooperation between Polish enterprises and French, Italian, British, Swedish, West German, and other Western European firms, which has developed especially in the last years.

When discussing this new form of the East-West economic cooperation and its possible influence on the development of the East-West commercial exchanges based on a new commodity structure it is worth to remember that the rapid development of the trade in industrial products between the countries of Western Europe was connected also with the creation of a number of industrial agreements, although often of a different character than those concluded by Polish firms, between enterprises located in the countries of this part of Europe.

The industrial cooperation between Poland and the Western European countries takes different organizational forms:

- cooperation in the development of common production of a specific product. Each of the two partners produces longer series of parts and sub-units for himself as well as for the other partner. The assembling of the product is being done parallel by both partners;

- cooperation in which a Polish enterprise produces parts of elements of machines /on the basis of a licence or of a documentation furnished by the partner or prepared by itself/. Final assembling is being done in the partner's country;

- cooperation in the exportation of complete industrial objects delivered together to third countries;

- cooperation connected with acquisition of licences for Polish industry. The Polish side is obliged to deliver one part of its production based upon this licence to the firm which has sold the licence;

- cooperation in which Polish enterprise produces certain articles exclusively on the basis of foreign documentation and only for the foreign partner;

- a certain form of cooperation is also one which exists between Polish and Western European construction laboratories. Its aim is to accelerate construction solutions, reduce the expenses for construction and tests of exploited prototypes.

The above mentioned forms do not exhaust the range of possible modes of cooperation in this field. Their application and development depend upon concrete possibilities and needs of Polish firms and their partners, as well as upon the possibilities and needs of the market.

The industrial cooperation seems to be advantageous to both sides:

- it promotes the maximum specialized division of the production process, the best utilization of the production capacity of partners, and, in this way, it contributes to the reduction of the production costs;

- it ensures the mutual access to the most productive and modern technology and technical solutions;

- it creates permanent bonds with cooperator's market;

- it gives access not only to the cooperator's market but very often also to third markets where one of the partners has already been better introduced.

8. Lastly, it should be emphasized that the development of the East-West economic cooperation can be facilitated by the existence of appropriate international agreements concerning different forms of economic, technical and scientific cooperation between governmental and private units in the East and in the West.

A good example in this field are some special agreements concluded by Poland with a number of Western European countries /e.g. with France, Netherlands, Great Britain, Italy and the Belgian-Luxemburg Union/. These agreements foresee i.a. the establishment of the industrial cooperation between Polish industrial and commercial enterprises and their foreign partners, and oblige to undertake steps which could help this cooperation /e.g. the establishment of mixed commissions and working groups to investigate existing possibilities and to elaborate draft programmes of cooperation, the exchange of specialists, the development of exchange of scientific and technical information/. This type of agreements create favourable frameworks the development of economic, technical and scientific cooperation between Poland and these countries.

6

COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Analysis and Recommendations

prepared for the Political Committee
of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe

by

Johan Galtung
International Peace Research Association, Groningen
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo

Chapter VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Notes to chapter I-VI

Oslo, June 1968

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

6.1. General remarks

192. The basic assumption of the present report is that peace has a structure. This structure in our times with the communication revolution, the mutual interdependence due to the expansion of the socio-economic systems well beyond the confines set by the borders of traditional nation-states, and in general due to the shrinking world, is based on cooperation. But not on any kind of cooperation; cooperation, to be peace-building, has to satisfy such conditions as equality, a minimum of similarity, mutual interdependence, institution-building and dispersion of the cooperative efforts on a multiplicity of channels, fields and frameworks.

193. A peace-structure is very different from a controlled war-structure. Today there is a controlled war-structure in Europe, based on the two military pacts, and there are many efforts to improve the control further through various arms control measures, dissolution of the pacts and even general and complete disarmament. This is not the place to argue to what extent that controlled war-structure also has been, is, or will be peace-building according to balance of power theories. We did not seem to have good answers to the old questions of whether military alliances and military policies in general provoke more than they deter, or deter more than they provoke; whether they give added protection because of unity or added exposure because of multiplication of conflicts with nations outside the alliance; or whether the softer elements in the alliance are able to influence the tougher more than the tougher are able to influence the softer, etc. The answers seem to be "both-and", and "it depends on the circumstances", and a heavy shield of protective dogmatism is necessary to argue that one of the answers is valid under all circumstances. But two points must be made in this connection. Thus, even if the war-structure is completely controlled (meaning that there is zero probability of a war that is not premeditated but due to, for instance, technical or human failure or escalation), or even if the war-structure is abolished through disarmament, this will not add up to a peace-structure. And second: a peace-structure and a controlled war-structure do not exclude each other completely; there are possibilities of starting the construction of an active peace-structure even during the softer phases of a cold war, as we have seen.

194. This means that the question often put in Western Europe, "what is the alternative to NATO", usually receives an incomplete or wrong answer; and partly because it may be the wrong question to ask. NATO was an outcome of a certain situation after the Second World War (but with roots long before that), and whether it is regarded as an adequate or inadequate response to that situation, there is little argument that the situation has now changed. There is still, and will always be, a question of security - defined simply as absence of

large-scale, violent conflict - but whether that security is best obtained through a controlled war-structure or a peace-structure is another matter. The answer in the Europe of the 'fifties was essentially in terms of the former. Now, in the late 'sixties, the mixture can be pushed even further towards a true peace-structure. For this is an answer to the problem of security, in general terms, and that is the problem that ought to be formulated. The problem of "how to replace NATO" tends to lead to static answers, in terms of new treaty systems (a Nordic defense union, a defense system based on Britain together with the six EEC nations, etc.), in other words presupposing that the alternative has, essentially, to be of the same kind: a new controlled war-structure, but more in line with new power alignments.

195. The conditions for a true peace-structure in Europe are neither entirely bright, nor entirely dark. On the one hand, geographical closeness, cultural similarity and a certain economic complementarity on that small peninsula of the Asian continent referred to as Europe lead to the conclusion that the conditions for peaceful cooperation are present. But the way cooperation takes place today falls very short of the five conditions of peace-building cooperation: there is some symmetry in the concrete agreements, but there is still much more willingness in East to emulate West than in West to try to learn something from East. And there is an organizational asymmetry that favors West and enables them, to some extent, to penetrate more into East than vice versa. Further, there is a structural dissimilarity between market and state economies, between parliament-based and party-based regimes, hedged around and developed during the early years of cold war polarization, which has served to cut down trade. Then, the level of exchange is far from the point where one can talk about interdependence: both parts of Europe would survive essentially intact if the other part disappeared overnight. Further, as to institution-building Europe as such is probably the most underdeveloped region in the world: there is only one truly regional organization of some stature, the ECE. Characteristically enough, the lower the homology, the lower the institution-building - although institutions are nowhere as necessary as when homology is low. For when the structures are similar, then multilateral cooperation is so much more easy because "opposite numbers" find each other. On the other hand, there is today a relatively high level of dispersion of the cooperative efforts on different channels, fields and frameworks.

6.2. Summary of recommendations

196. To improve upon this situation a number of suggestions have been made in the report, some of them negative, in terms of policies that ought not to be pursued, and some of them positive, in terms of policies that ought to be pursued.

197. As to the policies that ought not to be pursued the three major items mentioned in the report are as follows:

and used Carman?

- to avoid using the military organizations, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in direct confrontations and reduce their influence on individual members as far as possible - in other words to have these organizations recede into the background. On the other hand, if an all-European framework for discussions of military security matter were created, the confrontations between the secretariat members within such a framework might perhaps be useful;
- to avoid using the subregional Western organizations (particularly EEC, OECD and Council of Europe¹)) with no counterpart in East as vehicles of cooperation with single countries in the East - since such deals will, by necessity, be asymmetric and invoke the old ghost of a Western Europe bent on dominating Eastern Europe²). And similarly, one should avoid the use of Eastern subregional organizations in direct contact with nations in the West;
- to avoid big power hegemony in bilateral deals between West and East.

198. As to the policies that ought to be pursued the ten major items suggested in the report are as follows:

- ✓ to base European cooperation as far as possible on the specialized organizations of the UN, where most European nations are already members. For this to happen European commissions of the specialized agencies, particularly ILO, FAO, UNESCO and WHO should be created or strengthened, and great efforts should be made so that all European countries can join, at least as observers;
- ✓ to encourage cooperation between these commissions to the point of creating a relatively strong and representative European organization for functional cooperation. This organization would not make major policy decisions and would have nothing corresponding to the global General Assembly or Security Council, but should still be strong enough to attract the attention of heads of government or foreign ministers during annual sessions, placed in time so as not to compete with the General Assembly in UN;
- ✓ to tie this machinery very closely to ECE, the only existing organization of this kind in Europe today, even using ECE as an organizational nucleus;
- ✓ to encourage OECD-CEMA cooperation within the framework of the ECE with a view to bringing about all-European economic cooperation at a much higher level than today;
- to create a European Security Conference with a secretariat organized along the lines of the ECE. The task of this organi-

- zation, with permanent secretariat and annual meetings at a very high level (and initiated by a meeting of heads of government or heads of state), would be to arrive at an all-European security arrangement with appropriate attachment to the UN system of collective security³⁾, yet satisfying the needs of European states. Within this framework confrontations between NATO and Warsaw Pact as such may be encouraged, except insofar as the ten countries in Europe that are not members of either alliance find this objectionable;

f to increase the structural similarity between Western and Eastern Europe by facilitating the creation, in East, of organizations paralleling such organizations in West as EEC, EFTA and Council of Europe - to the extent that this will facilitate more symmetric forms of cooperation between the two parts of Europe. On the other hand, all-European institutions should be given priority since they probably have a stronger peace-building effect than cooperation between parallel organizations;

- to encourage symmetric exchange of observers in OECD and CEMA, so that a Western country could be observer in CEMA if at the same time an Eastern country were observer in OECD;
- to encourage joint associate memberships for some of the non-aligned countries, so that they could serve as bridge-builders between OECD and CEMA;⁴⁾
- to invite Eastern European countries to participate in the activities of the Council of Europe with a view to using the organization as a forum for all-European general, political discussions. This would presuppose some changes in the Council of Europe, such as the abolition of the Committee of non-represented nations and the acceptance of communist and left wing socialist MPs from member countries to the Consultative Assembly;
- to compensate for big power dominance and other forms of asymmetries in bilateral cooperation by increasing small power cooperation between East and West as much as possible, and by seeing to it that no nation always comes out as "sender" or "teacher", and no nation always as "receiver" or "pupil" in these deals.⁵⁾

199. As collateral measures to these ten, the virtues of non-governmental cooperation, of institutes doing research on all-European cooperation and of foreign ministries aligning their structure more so that they all have offices of all-European cooperation, have been underlined. Many more such measures could be suggested.

200. It is claimed in the report that such policies will contribute greatly to a general peace structure in Europe, making Europe less susceptible in the future to the kinds of devastating wars that have been raging within the region in the past. It is also claimed that the stronger the peace-structure, the more likely that mutually acceptable solutions to the problem of Germany will be found, probably as a connected network of institutions for all-German cooperation within the framework of all-European cooperation. Moreover, it is claimed that the creation of a strong peace-structure will permit the controlled war-structure, gradually "to wither away" - because it will be increasingly inappropriate, and thus contribute to the solution to the problem of insecurity created by the war-system itself.

201. In saying so we have, implicitly, located the cause of peace in the structure of the international system, and sane peace policy in the creation of a sane peace-structure. Although we think there are good reasons to believe that the international structure carries most of the burden for war and peace, there is no doubt that the internal organization of societies also carries a substantial part - as does the internal organization of the personalities that are particularly influential in international affairs. But there seems to be a vicious circle at work here, in the sense that a highly polarized Europe, built around a more or less controlled war-system, creates conditions that tend to foster more belligerent regimes - and vice versa. But a vicious circle has the advantage that it can often be turned into a virtuous circle by finding a point where the process can be turned the other way - and the point suggested here is in the structure of the inter-national cooperation system.

202. Great emphasis is placed upon the importance of promoting a peace-structure in Europe that does not make Europe forgetful about its responsibilities towards the South and towards the world in general, and the United Nations in particular. For this reason the idea of utilizing UN specialized agencies rather than new, ad hoc, all-European organizations is promoted, but with the proviso that these specialized agencies must be permitted to respond to European needs better by creating relatively strong European commissions. On the other hand, a major purpose of all-European cooperation must be, precisely, to find new ways of cooperating with South so as to extend the five principles of peaceful cooperation between North and South, and not only between East and West. It is assumed that a cooperative Europe can do this much better than a divided Europe, partly because of the many joint cooperation ventures, and partly because of the rich possibilities inherent in triangular trade East-West-South. On the other hand, it is also felt that to maintain the present division of Europe is completely untenable as a "solution". The present split creates artificial borderlines that will be made increasingly porous and eventually even be overcome, by the logic of modern industrial and post-industrial civilization alone. The

danger is only that if this development is not from the very beginning - and we are still at the beginning - steered into globally oriented channels, there is a risk that European nations ~~will join together~~ in highly Euro-centric organizations, finding solutions to their own problems with a disregard for the rest of the world.

203. The problem of how to include the US - a country which is not a European power, yet recognized by all as being a major actor on the European scene - can probably be solved by formulas of association, whereby European powers would decide whether a problem should be dealt with in the presence of the US or be considered an intra-European problem.

6.3. Conclusion

204. It is claimed that the proposals suggested here, far from being utopian, are the kind of proposals that could be realized within a relatively limited time-span stretching into the first half of the 'seventies only. A new situation would then be created, with a much stronger peace-structure, probably presenting countless new problems, but also presenting solutions to several old problems. The organizational work needed for these patterns to be operative is not insurmountable, and if only clear signals in such directions were given from important quarters, it is our impression that so many people in Europe, East and West, high and low, are longing for significant steps in directions like the ones indicated in this report, that an avalanche of institution-building might be the result. In that sense we feel that there are reasons for being optimistic about the prospects of an all-European peace-structure.

205. On the other hand, the old slogan that "peace is indivisible" is more true now than that the world has become smaller. In a world with a Vietnam war, with more Vietnam wars threatening, and above all with reasons for having Vietnam wars, it is not to be expected that a controlled war-structure, with its vested interests, in Europe is easily dismantled - even if it looks irrelevant and inadequate to the needs of Europe today. Or more strongly: the creation of a true peace-structure will be impeded; and there is even a certain danger that the controlled war-structure may one day become uncontrolled and explode in a war. For that reason, and for many other reasons, peace in Europe depends on what happens in the rest of the world. Peaceful cooperation is based on a minimum of trust, and if a nation cannot be trusted in other parts of the world, then it is hard to expect other nations to trust it in the center of Europe. The behavior of nations is not that much compartmentalized; their image in one part of the world is colored by their behavior in another part of the world.

206. But peace and justice in Europe can also release forces that may conduce to peace and justice in other parts of the world. And this is in itself a challenge to Europeans who have so many times failed in their responsibilities to the rest of the world. It is to be hoped very much that this challenge will be dealt with more seriously, with more imagination and audacity and purpose, in the future than in the past. For at stake is nothing less than avoidance of major threats to humanity, not only in Europe but in the whole world - and promises for fulfillment of many human wishes and desires - also not only in Europe but in the whole world.

↘ and the UNSS (?)

convergence theory

N O T E S

*This is PRIO-publication No. 22 - 9 from the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. I am indebted to Sverre Lodgaard for imaginative assistance in connection with the preparation of the report.

N O T E S

Chapter I

1. Unfortunately, the number of killed is not easily available. But the average number of wars participated in by each nation in the period 1900 - 1941 was 3.1 for Europe, 3.0 for Asia, 1.4 for Africa, 1.0 for South America and 2.5 for North America. Thus, by this indicator Europe has a slight edge over Asia - but Asia had only eight nations at this time. Moreover, if we accept the currently found estimates of the number of casualties in World War I around 24 million and World War II (around 40 million) knowing that the overwhelming majority of these deaths were in Europe, there is little doubt that Europe comes out on top of this dubious dimension. But since the last World War no other region has been as "calm", with no external wars and no casualties, as Europe - so the gloomy spell cast over Europe comes from the past rather than from the present. Source: Quincy Wright: A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), second edition, Table 41.

The list of wars on which this table is based is intended to include all hostilities involving members of nations, whether international, civil, colonial or imperial, which were recognized as states of war in the legal sense or which involved over 50.000 troops.

2. Thus, it is remarkable how unnoticed and underreported the peacefulness existing between the Latin American countries is in Europe. In this century the only war of real importance in terms of losses was the cruel Chaco war. See Brice Wood: The United States and Latin American wars, 1932 - 1942. N.Y. 1966, and Lewis F. Richardson: The Statistics of Deadly Quarrels N.Y. 1960.

3. This is a major line of argumentation in "Some Basic Assumptions in Peace Thinking", to appear in Festschrift in Honor of Quincy Wright (Oslo: PRIO, 1968, mimeo). The basic argument is, of course, that the communication revolution changes the conditions of international politics completely and makes peace policies based on the idea of distance less valid and even impossible because conflict borders are much less impenetrable to people, to goods, capital, services and to messages - not to mention to weapon carriers - than they used to be. Thus, peace policies in a post-industrial area and era seem to have to be based on closeness rather than on an assumption of artificial isolation.

4. A major source of irritation is the Western inclination to refer to sub-regional, Western organizations as "European", although the "E" in EEC, EFTA and Council of Europe in practice only stands for a part of Europe. It may be objected that an association does not refrain from calling itself the "Norwegian Association of --" because many inhabitants are not members. But then the assumption is usually that membership is not closed to non-members, as it seems to be at the moment for the subregional organizations. Of course, such organizations also exist in the East, but the term "Europe" is not used.

5. Thus, if we compare a tribal map of Africa, (for instance from G. Murdock, Africa, Its Peoples and Their Culture History (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), enclosure) with a map of Europe it is quite clear

that there are districts of Africa divided into much smaller pieces than the nations of Europe, and there are districts divided into bigger pieces. Thus, there is a band of tribal areas, very small in extension, stretching from Western Africa along the Gulf of Guinea and in a diagonal through Central Africa from 10°N to 10°S ending around Dar-es-Salaam. But outside this band the tribal areas have extensions quite comparable to European countries.

Chapter II

1. The clarification of these conditions, under wide varieties of circumstances and with equal concern for other values than peace, in the sense of absence of violence, is, of course the task of peace research. Had this field of human inquiry been in existence for a longer period, a more extensive repertory of peace-building measures would have been common knowledge, just as after Keynes a more extensive repertory of measures to control the economy has become part of the human heritage. Needless to say, one condition for these measures to be instrumental is a need, a wish to secure peace or a well functioning economy. The assumption behind a report like the present one is the presence of a wish of that kind, and that assumption is, evidently, only partly fulfilled. Peace Research can hardly create that wish, but may be useful in case the wish is present.
2. These distinctions are elaborated in Johan Galtung: "East-West Interaction Patterns", Journal of Peace Research, 1966, pp. 146-177 and Johan Galtung: "Cultural Contact and Technical Assistance as Factors in Peaceful Relations" (Paris: UNESCO, 1967) mimeo.
3. For similar types of reasoning in connection with relations between individuals of different races or ethnical groups, see Berelson, Steiner: Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965), p. 513. Berelson and Steiner emphasize the importance of meeting "on personal terms, on a common task - and on terms of social and economic equality". (italics ours).
4. Of course, there are also very many other ways of trying to define "exploitation". If we assume that the basis is exchange of value between A and B (e.g., labor against cash payment) then exploitation obviously means that there is some kind of (gross) imbalance in the exchange. But how is this measured? Relative to the utility to the receivers, as in the text? Relative to the utility to the senders? Relative to some measure established by a third party? Relative to how much the parties depend on the exchange? Or in some other way, such as relative to the shares the parties have in the decision-making process? In this connection we feel that a comparison of what the parties derive from the cooperation is meaningful, since the other aspects of exploitation are dealt with in subsequent paragraphs.
5. More precisely, there will be a feeling of fear that the bigger party has ulterior motives, that he does not put up that much money just because he can afford it - and there may be a feeling that in spite of "one nation, one vote" principles the lesser contributors are nevertheless less legitimate. They may also be constrained in their action lest the bigger parties withdraw their contributions, and this may create both anxiety and aggressiveness. The difficulty with this condition is, of course that

it can never be completely satisfied as long as nations are different in size as they are. Or rather: if nations were much more numerous, then the differences in size would not matter so much, they would become more like differences between individuals. But with few nations very different in size a few of them will loom very large, and this general structure of the international system is a major difficulty according to the type of peace theory presented here. But the remedy is obvious: bloc formation of smaller powers so as to counter-balance the biggest units, just as for balance of (military) power, when alliance-formation is recommended. As an illustration of the role of this type of asymmetry in international relations, as seen from a big nation may serve the following quotation from a speech given by departing US Ambassador C. E. Bohlen to the American Club of Paris: "Mr. Bohlen characterized the difference between the size of the United States and the individual European nations as "an enormous obstacle to harmony". "It sets up a psychological reaction.. Kindness is accepted as an act of bad conscience.. If action is harder.. it is a sign of throwing your weight around. Bohlen then praised the steps towards Western European integration as a way of obtaining more equality relative to the United States." (International Herald Tribune, 26 January 1968).

6. For an analysis of efforts towards cooperation in Latin America using this general perspective, see Per Olav Reinton: "International Structure and International Integration. The Case of Latin-America". Journal of Peace Research, 1967, pp. 334 - 366.

7. On the other hand, it may be argued that this mutual illusion may be a useful basis for engaging in co-operation: both parties think they shall be able to turn the other party around to become more similar to themselves, and in anticipation of this they turn to each other like two merchants equally convinced that they will be able to cheat the other. On the other hand again: this is hardly a stable relation, and for a third party to offer it as a recipe would be to engage in manipulation of a highly dubious kind.

8. In Norway the argument is sometimes heard that NATO membership under US leadership to most or at least to very many Norwegians would be preferable to membership in a Nordic Defense Union under Swedish leadership. For a statement of the general principles involved, see Johan Galtung: "International Relations and International Conflicts: A Sociological Approach", Transactions of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology (International Sociological Association, 1966), pp. 121 - 161.

9. This principle is also another formulation of the more general peace-theoretical principle of entropy, as elaborated in Johan Galtung: "Entropy and the General Theory of Peace" in IPRA Studies in Peace Research. (Assen: van Gorcum, 1968).

10. This is elaborated both in Johan Galtung, "East-West Interaction Patterns", and "International Relations and International Conflicts".

11. Unfortunately, many people seem to think 1. that two high-ranking values such as peace and cooperation must be seen as mutually supportive of each other, and 2. that to doubt this and point out that they may in fact be in conflict with each other is some kind of betrayal. This is usually a sign of low level of analytical penetration, or a sign that

thinking is geared towards speeches and pronouncements rather than towards analysis. For an effort to clarify some conditions under which cultural cooperation and peaceful relations are mutually supportive, see Johan Galtung: "Cultural Contact and Technical Assistance as Factors in Peaceful Relations".

12. We do not develop this possibility here, since we assume that in the current European context cooperation is, generally speaking, desirable. But there may, clearly, be situations where to abstain from any cooperation would be better if any cooperation would lead to continued and exploitive dominance by the dominant powers. Hence, mutual isolation and development of one's own potential would be advisable since this may produce the basis for a real equality that may later on be translated into symmetric cooperation arrangements more easily. On the other hand, we think that the formal equality offered by participation in an international organization is one of the most significant ways in which real equality may be achieved, unless the organization is used excessively and exclusively as an instrument of big power influence. In other words, there would probably be very few situations where total disruption of ties, complete polarization, would be recommended.

13. This is the famous hostage argument. On the other hand, experience seems to indicate that it is relatively easy for rich nations to evacuate their nationals in situations of conflict, and poor nations are less likely to be deterred by the fact that some of their citizens are located in a rich nation since they are unlikely to contemplate war against that rich nation anyhow. Hence, the hostage factor will probably only operate between poor nations and may backfire since hostages can also be used for reprisals and as pretexts for (preemptive) wars of protection.

14. This is the argument made by Lewis Coser in The Social Functions of Conflict (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 60 - 65, based on Simmel's prolific writings on conflict.

15. Of course, the conditions will almost never be fulfilled all at the same time, nor is this necessary. Thus, most nation-states, or all of them, are today composed of building-bricks that are smaller geographical units, called provinces, departments, municipios or what not. The relation between them usually satisfies conditions 2 - 5, but only very rarely condition No. 1. Usually one or a few of them dominate over the rest, they represent the developed center in and around the capital (if the capital has not been moved into the periphery to compensate for this). But the system can stand some asymmetry: it is only when the dominance becomes too extreme, too explicit and naked, that the system disrupts.

16. For a glance at the list seems to indicate that in general all five conditions are left unsatisfied in international reality. Differences in size indicators make for asymmetry; differences in tradition for heterology; symbiosis operates only within mutually disjointed blocs, supra-national institutions are weak and the total volume of cooperation is heavily concentrated on some fields, some frameworks and some pairs of participants.

Chapter III

1. The flying time London - New York is now about $7\frac{1}{2}$ hours, as against 12 hours in 1956 and around 20 hours in 1948. With the supersonic jetliners now under construction, the flying time will be cut to $2\frac{1}{2}$ - 3 hours only.

2. As de Gaulle put in his speech 10 August 1967: "By withdrawing from NATO, France, for her part, extricated herself from US and Soviet Union subjugation" - in other words, France extricated herself from the system of big power interaction and contributed to the change of that system, and the creation of a new dimension in the system.

3. For the non-aligned countries in Group I no military arrangements with the West are known to exist. For the countries in Group II the following elements should be considered:

Cyprus. The Treaty of Establishment (between the UK, the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, published in London on July 7th 1960 as a white paper), defines the areas of two British sovereign bases of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, covering together 99 square miles out of the islands total area of 3.572 square miles. Britain was given the right to use a number of small sites and installations and 10 training areas or ranges) - some permanently and without restrictions or interference - others with less extensive rights, to be released as soon as possible. Britain have the right freely to use a number of facilities for the movement of troops, and British aircraft have the right to overfly Republican territory without restriction.

Ireland. Ireland herself produces neither small arms nor heavy weapons like aircraft and tanks. She has entered a defense agreement with Great Britain, from which she receives military assistance.

France. On February 21 1966 France made it clear that, while wishing to remain a member of the alliance, she would withdraw completely from the integrated Organization.

Malta. As also mentioned in footnote 19 to Table 6: A joint statement was issued in Malta 1965: "Consultation shall take place between NATO and the Government of Malta whenever, in the opinion of the Government of Malta, or of any of the members of the territorial integrity, political independence or security of Malta is Threatened."

Spain. Agreements between the United States and Spain providing for construction and use of defence bases in Spain by the USA, U.S. economic assistance to Spain, and US military supplies to that country were signed in Madrid on Sept. 27 1953. The agreement was renewed in 1963, for a period of five more years.

4. The border-line between Norway and the Soviet Union is 196 kms. and this about one tenth of the total borderline between NATO and Warsaw Pact territory.

5. The following are aggregate:

Voting positions of European UN members on General Assembly roll-call votes where the United States and the Soviet Union votes opposite. Time period: 1960 - 1963. By definition, USA = +100 and Soviet Union = -100, the other countries are located according to % agreement.

West

90 - 100	UK, (USA), Italy, Netherlands, Luxembourg
80 - 90	Turkey, Belgium (Canada), Greece, Iceland
70 - 80	<u>Spain</u> , Denmark, <u>France</u> , <u>Ireland</u> , Norway
60 - 70	Portugal, <u>Austria</u>
50 - 60	<u>Sweden</u>
40 - 50	
30 - 40	<u>Finland</u>
20 - 30	
10 - 20	
0 - 10	

0 - 10

10 - 20

20 - 30

30 - 40

40 - 50

50 - 60

60 - 70 Yugoslavia

70 - 80

80 - 90

90 - 100 Poland, Rumania, Ukraina, USSR, Albania, Bulgaria,
East Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary

The non-aligned countries are italicized; but Malta and Cyprus were not members during the whole period and Switzerland is not a member of the UN. As one sees, except Yugoslavia and Finland, they are solidly West.

From Kurt Jacobsen: The Nordic Countries and the United Nations (Oslo, 1967, mimeo)

6. This is hard to prove, but one way of indicating this is by reference to the proverbial Soviet goal of "catching up" with the United States, whereas one rarely hears about US efforts to catch up with the Soviet Union, except in education after the launching of Sputnik I on October 4, 1957. We are not saying that asymmetry is necessarily justified, only that West seems by and large to enjoy the prerogative of being the top-dog emulated by the underdog, relatively speaking. But good data would in all probability show that this emulation gap has decreased tremendously relative to the situation before the war.

7. For some comments on the relative role of past-oriented and future-oriented approaches in the resolution of conflicts, see Johan Galtung, "Peace Research: Science or Politics in Disguise?", International Spectator, 1967, pp. 1573-1604. particularly pp. 1590 - 1593.

8. In technical terms the appeal would be based on the following: In the West the USA can present herself not only as a leader in terms of her power but also as a model of development as long as GDP/capita is accepted as an indicator. In the East the Soviet Union can only play one of these roles and consequently gets into a rank-incongruent position rela-

tive to some of the smaller powers in the alliance. This will almost by necessity have disruptive influence and also almost invites other nations to present themselves as models, or to be regarded as models.

9. The most extensive analysis of this is given in the excellent study by Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare 1947 - 1967. A Case Study in Foreign Economic Policy (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1968).

10. The study is found on pp. 341 - 364.

11. The best estimates we were able to obtain of the number of people employed in the secretariat are as follows:

UN:	Professional staff and general service: 3388
ILO	1,500 regular officials. In addition, 550 field experts.
FAO	1,000 international civil servants, and about 1,700 field experts
UNESCO	1,600 professional staff members, and an approximately equal number of office and technical personnel. Half of them, including 900 professionals, are working away from headquarter.
WHO	2,960 paid, not including long or short-term consultants.
UNCTAD	280 paid
ECE	Professional staff and general service: 193
GATT	150 paid
OECD	1200-1300 paid
CMEA	Estimates varies from 400 to 2000 employees. See A. Korbonski in International Conciliation, No. 549, 1964.
EEC	6,000 paid
EFTA	100 paid
WEU	Assembly secretariat: 27 permanent employees Secretariat-General: 128 paid employees
CofE	488 paid
NATO	Civil secretariat: about 1500, national delegations included
WARSZAW	

12. Thus, there is institutionalized exchange of information between these three organizations. For instance, in September each year there is the joint meeting of the Consultative Assembly (of the Council of Europe) and the European Parliament (of the EEC) in the Hemicycle in the Council of Europe building in Strasbourg (among other things using Council of Europe to discuss EEC/EFTA relations). OECD sends a report to the Council of Europe (for instance, on DAC) in the beginning of February, and the report is presented for discussion in the Council of Europe by the OECD Secretary General. Correspondingly, there used to be regular meetings between the Secretary Generals of the Council of Europe and the ECE. The Council of Europe has no institutional link with NATO, however.

As to relations between OECD and EEC, the latter normally takes part in the work of OECD. Thus, the Supplementary Protocol No. 1 to the Convention on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development states that "the Commissions of the European Economic Community shall take part in the work of the organization."

13. This was studied in Johan Galtung, "East-West Cooperation Patterns" and extreme cases of asymmetry in favour of big-power interaction were uncovered up to 1965. The data in Table 7 are for the last half of 1966 and show a high degree of asymmetry at the political level. The corresponding data for 1967 are as follows:

Table 7 a. A survey of the pattern of bilateral interaction, 1967

Nation	Nation	No. of pairs	Contacts on political level		Contacts and agreements	
			Number	rel. to pairs	Number	rel. to pairs
Big	Big	2	10	5,0	13	6,5
Big	Small					
Small	Big	26	24	0.9	51	2.0
Small	Small	84	39	0,5	88	1.0

As one sees, the total number has increased for almost all combinations particularly for the more technical contacts. For political contacts the asymmetry in favour of big power contact is down from a ration of 20 to a ratio of 10, whereas the corresponding numbers for the more technical contacts show an increase from around 3 to 6.5: - probably a sign that the tremendous big power political activity has paid off!

Source: NATO press Service: East-West Contacts. 13th Dec. 1967.

Chapter IV

1. But international divergencies do not have to be between nations, the old actors on the international scene. They can also be between other groupings, such as generations - as amply evidenced by the international character of the student activities spring 1968. But the condition is some kind of internationalization, or rather transnationalization, both of the issues and of the conflict groups. The former requires an ideology, such as the Marx-Mao-Marcuse system currently being developed; the latter requires good communication and transportation and capacity for organization. One generation or two ago the capitalist class was much better organized internationally than the proletariat, and the proletariat could not prevent World War I, and this may also be true today. - But today the student generation is much better organized than the older generation, probably because of their highly flexible and fluid position in society and because they can move quickly at very low costs. It will take time before the older generation can attain the same level of organization and ability to launch quick and flexible responses. At the same time it may be said that these conflicts across generations are nevertheless enacted intra-nationally - around the universities of the major capitals in Europe - and that intra-national machineries for coping with conflicts by and large are better developed than the international machineries. Images held by generations are certainly diverging, and increasingly so, both as time moves on and as images are pushed into the future. On the one hand this creates new cleavages that will dominate our existence more and more, but on the other hand these conflicts are 1. absorbed locally (nationally) and 2. criss-cross with the East-West conflict so as to create ties be-

tween people in East and people in West. If one assumes that human beings in general and Europeans in particular only have a limited conflict capacity, that they cannot be both engaged with high level of involvement in East-West conflict and in generation conflict at the same time, then the conclusion seems to be that the generation conflict will serve to strengthen East-West relations. More and more people, on both sides of the generational water-shed, will increasingly identify with people on the other side of the old East-West border, "they have the same problems as we have". There will be systematic training in seeing the similarities between the two ways of running modern, industrialized countries rather than the exclusive focus on the dissimilarities found in the 1950's and this will increase the empathic ability in both camps.

2. Numerous consultations with scientists in Eastern Europe on the precise implications of the concept of "peaceful coexistence" have not contributed much to the clarification of this concept, for the present author. But some of the implications are probably as follows: relations between nations should be guided not only by the principle of absence of violence (including threats of violence?) as a means of resolving conflicts but also by the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. This is meaningful in a situation characterized by very low level of interaction, and the principle of peaceful coexistence would then, essentially, mean "parallel development, with mutual isolation and tolerance". But this could probably best be termed "passive peaceful coexistence". In the world of today low level interaction is unnatural and artificial, and it is impossible to conceive of high level interaction that does not, to some extent, change the parties. Moreover, the concept seems to be blind to other actors than nations. And where is the borderline between this kind of change and interference? Does it depend on whether the change is premeditated or not? And, since some people will always have some "ulterior" motives, does this mean that this allegation of interference will always be true? Or - should one rather try to formulate some rules for high level of interaction and cooperation, for instance along the lines suggested in Chapter 2 - and define cooperation along such lines as "active peaceful coexistence"? This is the line of thinking we have preferred, with complete openness to more suggestions as to the content and meaning of active peaceful coexistence and how we may have misunderstood the concept.

3. This type of reasoning is developed in more detail in Johan Galtung, "On the Future of the International System", Journal of Peace Research, 1967, pp. 305 - 333, particularly pp. 312 - 318. Interpenetration is the logic of our time, since the socio-economic systems of industrial and post-industrial societies outgrow the narrow confines set by the nation-states created during the last centuries. But this interpenetration is far from symmetric, for the (post)-industrial systems of some nations have grown considerably more quickly than the systems of other nations. When Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber writes about Le défi américain this is what he writes about, and he does not have to presuppose any machiavelian intention behind the phenomenon. As a matter of fact he does not have to presuppose any intention at all, since the actors can be seen as acting according to the rules of the post-industrial game, and that game cannot be acted out in one nation alone, not even in a super-nation. The point is essentially that post-industrial or neo-modern societies are global societies, encompassing most of the world if not all of it. As social orders they are indivisible in general, and particularly by nation states - it is only that they have arrived a generation or two (or three, or four) before a world political order, because technical-economical de-

velopment has taken place so much more quickly than socio-political development. Thus, the logical and rational solution to the problems of le. defi lies in adequate internationalization, not in the classical strategies of 1. closing oneself to the penetration by strengthening intra Western European cooperation so as to become self-sufficient, 2. compensate by penetrating into Eastern Europe much the same way as the US has penetrated into Western Europe (and leaving to the Eastern Europeans to penetrate further East or South), or 3. compensate by becoming strong enough to penetrate back into the US so as to achieve balanced, symmetric interpenetration. The last strategy is in line with the general thinking in Chapter 2, but only in line with the point about symmetry, not the point about institution-building, i.e. trans- and internationalization. Europeans are likely to have to live with these problems all through this century, and all three courses of action will be proposed in various mixtures until consonance between socio-political and technical-economical order has come closer.

4. See footnote 1, this chapter.

5. Brain-drain can also be seen in the perspective developed in footnote 3 above. When brains are drained from poor to rich A, B usually engages in one or more of the following three strategies: 1. to outlaw the traffic one way or another, 2. to compensate by fishing brains from the still poorer C, 3. to speed up development so as to compensate by attracting brains from A. The fourth solution is obviously to transnationalize brains, i.e. professionals, by means of international associations of professionals and international organizations so that professionals are regarded as an international pool to be put to work where they are most needed - and this is to a large extent what the system of "experts" is about (although it is not internationalized enough and draws an often artificial borderline between developing and developed countries).

6. This was written in November 1967.

7. In the European setting this general principle is of particular importance. Cooperation implies an increased flow of goods, messages and persons, across frontiers, in all directions. But the consequence of this is a general decrease in the importance of borders: they still serve to demarcate nation states, the limits of political systems, but these systems are no longer isolated so that one cannot obtain the goods produced across the borders, look at the world through their eyes by reading their newspapers or listening to their radio (this is behind the word "messages" above), or meeting freely with persons of one's own choice. This means that many of the basic problems connected with territory, with the exact location of borders, with the legitimacy of governments and political systems lose much of their significance - and lose it almost totally if the exchange of goods, messages and persons is completely unrestricted. Families divided by borders can reunite, friends can meet, and national belongingness neither facilitates, nor impedes - it becomes simply irrelevant. In such an atmosphere problems involving the location of frontiers and the recognition of regimes can more easily be solved, simply because the problems mean less. The less difference it makes where a border runs or how a regime justifies its power position, the less meaningful will any conflict over these matters appear to be.

Thus, it might be interesting to study the differences between the Kurds and the Macedonians and the Lapps, all of them divided between three nations. The porosity seems to be very high for the Macedonians and the Lapps, and much lower for the Kurds - whether this should be seen as cause, effect or both of the fervor of Kurd nationalism.

8. Of course, this does not imply any doctrine about sociological determinism. The scheme indicated above sets certain limitations on what we think are probable developments in Europe, but the range of variation is tremendous, the possibilities within these limitations are unlimited. What is being said is only that unless one wants to reverse technology, and we do not think it is possible to undo major innovations, a Europe divided into very autonomous nation-states with a high level of autonomy will not be possible in the future.

9. Cold war residues, i.e. images typical of the cold war, were of course frequently found in West and in East and less in the non-aligned countries. It will probably take many, many years before the "images of the past", particularly of the factors leading to the cold war, and of the first phases of the cold war, will converge in Europe - if ever. But past is past, more important today are the shadows thrown by the past into the present, regulating images of the present. As mentioned, these images are not always so different, but among the more important difference, or "cold war residues", the following should be mentioned:

(1) There is the denial in one camp that important elements in the other camp exist. The best known examples are, of course, the perception of the EEC in the East and the corresponding perceptions of the CEMA and the DDR in the West. In all three cases the idea is that they exist only artificially, kept alive against the will of many of the members in order to serve certain big power interests; that there are severe internal cleavages that will (soon) lead to disruption, even to total disintegration. Perception is highly selective so as to confirm these images, evidence of success, growth etc. is discounted as propaganda.

(2) The general idea of internal cleavages in the other camp. All kinds of evidence in this direction is picked up, and interpreted as signs of coming disintegration. The evidence of cleavage is not necessarily wrong, but the interpretation is often wrong because of essentially authoritarian images of what an organization should be like. Voices of dissent are seen as signs of weakness and not as signs of strength, e.g. as symptoms that the organization is moving towards a more egalitarian structure with more real, less formal support from the members. The result is confusion when dissent is not followed by disintegration, and the interpretation is in terms of "superpower pressure".

(3) Insensitivity to changes in policy in the other camp. Proclamations to the effect that changes are, in fact, taking place are discounted as propaganda moves, as signals to be particularly on guard lest one is deceived. It is also pointed out that such indications only come from minor officials, on less solemn occasions and so on, and hence cannot be taken quite seriously, whereas similar indications from one's own camp are taken at their face value. This type of reasoning is particularly frequent in connection with security schemes, where ulterior motives are very easily imputed. And even if ulterior motives are not attributed to the other party he is at least deprived of honorable motives; as when arms reduction measures are seen as responses to difficult internal economic problems, and so on.

(4) Asymmetric thinking in connection with convergence. This seems to be the hardest case, expressed in the idea that the internal changes to come shall be changes in the other party, not in oneself. Or - if one can imagine that changes not only will take place but also should take place in oneself - desired changes in the other party are seen very clearly, with specifications, whereas changes in oneself are seen in very general terms. "Many things are wrong in our country or in our alliance, but this is nothing relative to - " and then follows a detailed list. And behind this is, of course, the basic idea:

(5) Our camp is much, much better than theirs. The idea is simply that the two camps are so different that symmetric perspectives are out of order, and the difference is not only one of degree, but also of kind.

10. As to these two major problems the best basis for discussion available today is, in our mind, "the French models", presented in Politique Etrangère, No. 6, 1967 - "Models de sécurité Européenne". One does not have to agree with everything in these "models". The basic point is the idea of presenting an image both of the goal and of the process leading to the goal. It is hard to believe that one would not have come much further towards all-European cooperation and the solution of these central problems if more people had been engaged openly (and not only in the foreign ministries) in this type of creative image-construction. On the other hand, even though the problems treated in the present report no doubt look marginal relative to the problems tackled in the French models, we still feel that the total European system needs to move further along these "marginal" lines before these central problems can be successfully approached.

11. Of course, there were also other reasons, indeed: the cold war conflict in general, especially between the super-powers; the rewards in terms of aid and protection handed out by the superpowers to well-disciplined members of the two camps with consequently vested interests in continued division of Europe, and so on.

12. The level of cooperation is still artificially low. There is no particular geographical or economic reason why we should get this Table:

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF INTRA-EUROPEAN TRADE, 1960 AND 1965

Exports from	Exports to	Year	EEC	EFTA	Rest of western Europe	Soviet Union	Rest of eastern Europe	Europe
EEC		1960	24,6	16,5	2,6	1,0	1,4	46,0
		1964	28,9	14,5	3,0	0,6	1,3	48,3
		1965	29,7	14,4	3,3	0,5	1,5	49,4
EFTA		1960	11,0	9,9	2,0	0,9	1,1	24,8
		1964	10,5	9,7	2,1	0,7	1,0	24,1
		1965	10,2	9,7	2,2	0,7	1,0	23,9
Rest of western Europe (including Yugoslavia) :		1960	1,5	1,7	0,1	0,2	0,5	4,1
		1964	1,5	1,5	0,1	0,2	0,4	3,8
		1965	1,4	1,4	0,1	0,3	0,6	3,8
Soviet Union		1960	0,9	1,2	0,3	..	7,5	9,8
		1964	0,7	1,0	0,3	..	7,1	9,0
		1965	0,7	1,0	0,3	..	6,5	8,5
Rest of eastern Europe		1960	1,3	1,4	0,5	6,8	5,1	15,3
		1964	1,3	1,2	0,6	7,1	4,6	14,7
		1965	1,3	1,2	0,6	6,7	4,5	14,4
Europe		1960	39,3	30,7	5,6	8,9	15,6	100,0
		1964	42,9	28,0	6,1	8,6	14,4	100,0
		1965	43,4	27,6	6,5	8,3	14,1	100,0

Sources: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade OECD, Foreign trade, Series A, Overall trade by countries; national trade statistics for eastern European countries.

To get a more concentrated expression of the intra-European trade, consider this Table:

Percentages of total world export 1966

Exporting Areas	Destination	EEC	EFTA	CEMA	Sum of percentages
EEC		44,1	18,3	3,2	65,6
EFTA		25,2	22,5	4,0	51,7
CEMA		7,8	5,9	62,9*	76,6

Sources: Direction of trade. A Supplement to International Financial Statistics, Annual 1962 - 66. Published jointly by IMF and IBRD.

International Trade, 1966. GATT-report prepared by the Secretariat, 1967.

* See International Trade, 1966, *ibid*: p. 282.

13. On the other hand, there is some kind of interaction between the two approaches: when one gets stuck on the German problem one naturally looks for ways of getting around it and turns to the general problem of cooperation in Europe. When this line has been pursued for some time with no apparent spill-over effect on the German problem one would (should) turn to the German problem with renewed energy. And in this pendular fashion it is likely to continue for some time, and probably with delayed pay-offs since there will be a lag before investment in European cooperation pays off on the German scene.

14. Very few nations in the world have been born without a fight, and very few of them have been born without some internal coercion, or with complete internal consensus. We do not know what will ultimately happen to DDR or to Rhodesia, but the pattern in which they are currently immersed does not look exceptional enough to warrant the prediction that they will never become nation states in good standing. As to DDR the struggle is being fought on many fronts:

socialist	non-aligned	western	German	international
countries	countries	countries	Federal	organizations
			Republic	

de facto
(cooperation,
participation)

de jure
(recognition,
full membership)

Of these ten "fronts" the two fronts involving the socialist countries can be seen as "won", and de jure recognition by the Bundesrepublik as the least attainable of all ten. For that reason it is remarkable how much DDR activity is channeled into exactly this section of the total front, and the tactical and strategic wisdom of the amount of abuse with which this is being done may also be drawn in doubt. If we should try to predict what seems to be a likely development we would bet on something like this:

(1) increasing number of concealed memberships (observer status, ad hoc cooperation) with international organizations, both IGOs and INGOs. One typical formula would be the participation of DDR experts in the international secretariats.

(2) increasing cooperation with non-aligned and eventually also with Western nations.

(3) increasing trade with the Bundesrepublik, and indirectly (like the famous butter to Belgium) with Western countries. Extremely slow emergence of some all-German institutions, for exchange of views, later on for the exchange of goods/capital/services and then of people.

(4) increasing number of real memberships in international organizations, arguing that DDR has passed the test of perseverance and endurance.

(5) recognition of DDR by some non-aligned countries "to the West", perhaps within a political package.

(6) recognition of DDR by some Western countries, perhaps (but this is unlikely) in return for diplomatic ties accorded to the Bundesrepublik.

(7) recognition by the Bundesrepublik - but only within a framework of all-German institutions, weaker than "confederation", stronger than an unorganized set of institutions for very specific and functional co-operation.

15. The point here is that disarmament is a three-stage process, not a two-stage process where armament processes are suddenly turned around and converted into disarmament processes. There seems to be an intermediate stage where the weapons exist but gradually cease to be targeted because the targets become less clear or less demanding. This phase is both mentally and institutionally a phase of adjustment and relaxation and one can hardly bypass it without running the risk of engaging in completely unrealistic schemes. The phase is a structural condition for disarmament, and argument elaborated further in Johan Galtung, "Two Approaches to Disarmament: The Legalist and the Structuralist", Journal of Peace Research, 1967, pp. 161 - 195.

16. If the status quo was not considered so undesirable to most nations, although all agree that it is better than the situation some years ago, there would be no pay-off from the types of changes we advocate, and hence no motivation to engage in them. But all nations seem to want more security (less threat of large-scale violence) and more development, and seem to believe that both security and development can be ensured, to a large extent, by means of cooperation. This circumstance, that the same means can be used to serve two major ends, is a major source of optimism, but on the other hand it should also be emphasized that there is generally, and particularly in the West, a low level of understanding of the conditions under which cooperation is peace-building, while at the same time promoting development. The assumption is often that any type of co-operation will be peace-building. The idea that peace and cooperation are closely related is, indeed, very widespread today. Thus, in the "Report in Reply to the Communication of the Committee of Ministers of 26th April 1967, Concerning the Program of Work for the Intergovernmental Activities of the Council of Europe" (Council of Europe, Document 2273, 27 September 1967) Klaus Peter Schulz puts it this way (paragraph 36): "We know for certain today that international cooperation and peace are two aspects of the same historical trend which leads to the consolidation and integration of the community of mankind" -- "This is what the authors of the Statute meant when they spoke of "peace based on international co-operation". The difficulty is, of course, that not all types of "international cooperation" are compatible with "peace" and Schultz does not specify the conditions cooperation has to satisfy. Thus, the relation between master and slave is also often referred to as cooperation, just to exemplify the difficulties one encounters unless these concepts are made more specific.

17. I am indebted to Leo Mates for this expression.

18. See paragraphs 149 - 159 for further elaboration of this point.

19. See General Assembly resolution 2129 (XX) on "Actions on the regional level with a view to improving good neighbourly relations among European states having different social and political systems, which is formulated in very general terms, however.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25. UNESCO arranged a conference of the type here thought of at Vienna, 20-25 Nov. 1967, between Ministers of Education.

26. Thus, with ILO, WHO and ECE located in Geneva, and FAO and UNESCO not too far away Geneva would be the rational choice for the location of this type of center for all-European cooperation. And perhaps one day in the future Swiss foreign policy will be very meaningfully combined with the need for some kind of "federal district" for even a relatively loose pattern of European cooperation? On the other hand, the Swiss have always insisted that to be non-aligned does not mean the same as to be ideologically neutral; it is a constraint on action, not on thought and value-orientation. But where in Europe is the country that is both non-aligned and neutral?

27. And indeed, ECE was also among the factors bringing the detente about. See Gunnar Myrdal's analysis in "Twenty Years of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe" International Organization, Summer 1968, especially on the role of ECE in connection with the Austrian Peace Treaty.

28. But with the important exception that the DDR has no status within the organization. The only way in which DDR can come close to the ECE is as members of the CEMA secretariat when this secretariat is invited to meetings. On the other hand, it is well known that this technique is quite frequently made use of (personal communications).

29. One way of increasing the intensity of the ECE would be to co-ordinate the activities of ECE with OECD-CEMA - as indicated in paragraph 117.

30. Of course, international governmental organizations of minor political significance also exist. Thus, there are two functionally very important IGOs of all socialist countries from Europe and Asia:

United Institute of Nuclear Research, with headquarters in Moscow, based on a Moscow treaty of 26 March 1958, and

Organization of the Cooperation of Railways, with headquarters in Warsaw based on a Sophia treaty of 26 June 1956, changed in Peking 7 June 1957.

31. But even if this is the situation today it is not at all impossible that changes may take place even in the near future. If EEC is in part a reaction to the défi américain, is a reaction to the défi soviétique so unrealistic? It may be argued that this challenge is of a different nature. But increasing growth of the more advanced industrial societies in the East will also point far outside the confines set by national borders in the first run to other countries with state economies, and beyond the narrow scope set by the CEMA framework.

32. But is it likely that the bigger partners in the EEC will forsake advantages they could obtain bilaterally just for the sake of appearing as one party at the negotiation table, even if this happened in connection with the Kennedy Round?

33. This has, indeed, for a long time been deliberate ECE policy: "But if the political conditions for East-West cooperation should improve, the sub-regional organizations in the West, as well as in the East, might so adjust their activities as to promote, or at least not block, all-European cooperation here in ECE. The Commission's Secretariat had early initiated and has continuously upheld close contacts with the secretariats of the sub-regional organizations in the West and the East and has invited their representatives to all meetings, not only the public but also the private ones. And this Secretariat policy has been backed by governments" (Gunnar Myrdal, in "Twenty Years of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe", International Organization, Summer 1968).

34. If we accept, for the sake of the argument, the Western point of view that the Western organizations are so much more efficient - a point that seems to be even more accepted in the East than in the West - then the important problem is what conclusion one should draw from this. Should one conclude that it is in West's interest to try to reveal the shortcomings and compete and challenge, or would it be in West's interest to offer all kinds of help and advice to improve the Eastern machinery? Needless to say, the first way of thinking is more widespread, and is often referred to as "realistic", as opposed to the "idealism" attributed to the second way of thinking. But the two patterns are also heavily correlated with general orientations toward asymmetry in the first case and symmetry in the second case. Needless to say, we believe more

in the second way of thinking, but another problem is whether East reacts positively to efforts to "assist" them or whether this is seen in a context of manipulation; which may no doubt also be (partly) correct.

35. However, at present the chances of a real axis through the center of Europe and comprising the five non-aligned nations are relatively small. To start in the North, Finland has extensive cooperation with Sweden in many fields, cooperation with Austria and state visits both ways with Yugoslavia - in addition to the pattern of cooperation in the "club of nine, or ten" initiated by Romania through its 1965 UN resolution. But with the idiosyncratic Swiss ideology Switzerland does not seem to be a likely partner to any such cooperation, and the other four are geographically scattered and have little in common except their non-membership. Besides, with Finland moving into OECD as a full member and already having an ambassador accredited to the EEC in Brussels and being linked to EFTA through the Pinefta system, the four non-socialist members of this non-aligned "camp" become even more "Western".

36. See statement made by the Belgian Minister for external trade relations at the 22.nd session of the ECE, April 1967.

37. The International Parliamentarian Union regularly meets in plenary session once a year (usually in september), and the Council regularly twice a year.

38. But the line indicated in the well-known Harmel report is precisely to use NATO above all as an instrument of coordination of members activities, leaving it to the allies to form their own policies towards the East. See item 7 in the report from the special study group on the future of the alliance.

39. USA is a member of the ECE by cirtue of having been one of the occupying powers in Europe. This formula, once used to include the US might also be use to reconsider US membership - but this does not seem to be a major issue today. Moreover, US exclusion would make OECD-CEMA cooperation within the ECE framework less meaningful, there would always be a feeling that the real OECD was the OECD with USA present.

40. One difficulty has always been that MPN status must be accorded to GATT members and USA has found this difficult relative to Eastern Europe. However, a waiver of this rule was obtained for Czechoslovakia.

41. Myrdal gives a number of examples of how "the Eastern countries tend to be the weaker party in trade negotiations with the Western countries" (Myrdal, "Political Factors Affecting East-West Trade in Europe"). "For one thing, East-West trade is a much bigger part of their total trade than it is of the Western countries' trade -- on the average about four times bigger". -- "To a large extent their export is still composed mainly of primary products -- they have never learned how to market them effectively and to adjust their quality and appearance to the demands of prospective buyers".

42. Myrdal, (in "Political Factors Affecting East-West Trade in Europe") makes the important point that bilateralism can also be used as an instrument for protectionist interests: "Bilateral negotiations can be used to press an Eastern country to import more of certain commodities that it would really want. There are at the same time industries which are eager to limit imports that would compete at the home market. If it were a question of raising tariffs, this would have to be argued publicly. In bilateral negotiations the protectionist interests can be pushed without either the press or parliament coming to know much about it - - simply by exerting pressure upon the negotiating officials. This is made easier by the fact that representatives of the industries are often included in the governmental negotiating team. I have the feeling that, on the Western side, this method of exploiting bilateralism for concealed protectionism varies a great deal from country to country but that, on the whole, it is decreasing.

Of course, when there is so much bilateralism in Europe at present, this must also be seen as a natural expression of the detente. With the blocks decreasing in importance the old pattern of channeling interaction between the blocs via the superpower breaks down, and in the absence of good regional machinery bilateralism is the obvious solution, not only between but also to some extent within the alliances. Both sides give up the idea that their alliance is going to dominate Europe, and look out for themselves - leading particularly the West "to go hunting on the Eastern preserve. Such regional multilateralism is a protective shield against efforts to split alliance partners off against each other, bilateralism is a signal of a freer, more competitive market.

43. Much of the conflict-ridden history of Soviet-Yugoslavia relations up to the rupture in June 1948 is the history of heavily asymmetric "coproduction" arrangements. Particularly important is, probably, the location of ultimate decision-making: is it with a joint body administering the enterprise, or with one of the participant countries? If it is with the country supplying most of the inputs, then it should rather be referred to as colonialism if that country also takes out most of the outputs. But, if most of the output remains in the smaller country, then this might more correctly be referred to as ordinary technical assistance. The idea of coproduction must be sharing at all stages, if not always arithmetically speaking proportionate sharing.

44. Of course, there are those who would maintain that the whole concept of "l'Europe des patries" is nothing but a printing error, that it should read "l'Europe de Paris". We would rather say that in a certain phase of European history, in a phase characterized by depolarization, the same steps and actions have served both the interests of depolarization with consequent emphasis on the nation state as an autonomous actor, less dependent on constraints put on it by an alliance and the interests of French reemergence as a big power with a considerable share in the initiation of political action.

45. This has also to do with democratization of foreign policy. It seems impossible to establish anything like a direct link between the "people" and the foreign office of any nation, for many reasons. Hence, one important formula for general participation in international, or rather transnational activities would be via non-governmental organizations. But a consequence of this would be that the power of the State to regulate the transnational behavior of its citizens when they act within

such organizations will be limited. These limitations will probably come fairly soon since more and more people will soon pass the watershed where they identify more with other members in their INGO than with the authorities in their own nation. And this will change the features of foreign affairs completely.

46. This cooperation takes place in many settings today: the International Political Science Association, the International Peace Research Association, the Pugwash Conferences and the Conferences of Directors and Representatives of European International Relations Institutes.

47. Detailed data of these structures are available in Appendix.

48. The point is simply that since we get asymmetry however we try to exclude, in terms of GNP or population or military potential, we might as well leave all European nations in - there is no balanced subset, to put it that way. To achieve some kind of balance something now has to be added on the Western side, and since the US belongs to some extent she should be accorded some kind of "weighted presence" as associate member - the weight being in practice the proportion of meetings the US is asked to attend.

49. This is elaborated in documents from UNCTAD. See conference doc. T.D./18, prepared before UNCTAD II: Review of trade relations among countries having different economic and social systems, including problems of East-West trade. See also doc. T.D./B/128, additions 1 - 3, and report and summary records from the 5th. committee of UNCTAD II.

50. Such projects have very often been urged in resolutions from the Pugwash conferences.

Chapter V

1. The idea of East European participation in the Council of Europe is not new. Thus it was suggested by the Austrian Bundeskanzler, Dr. Josef Klaus in an address to the General Assembly of the Council of Europe on 26 January, 1965: "To me, it would appear reasonable to consider seriously an invitation to the countries of Eastern Europe in order to arouse at first their interest in European cooperation in all of those spheres where a new climate of cooperation between the West and the East could be created irrespective of political resentments and divergencies. I fully endorse the ideas expressed in your recommendation No. 389 last May which stated that it was a duty of the Council of Europe to contribute both towards uniting free and democratic Europe and reducing tensions between East and West".

2. The point is not that one has to ratify the Human Rights Declaration, as shown by the member country France that did not ratify, but that one gives indications of general acceptance of these human rights and willingness to work towards changes that may make ratification possible (as in the cases of Switzerland, Cyprus and Malta who all became members recently).

3. More specifically, when the Brussels Treaty Organisation (BTO) on 23 October 1954 became the Western European Union (WEU) the German Federal

Republic and Italy became members, and the German rearmament started on the condition that Germany should abstain from making ABC weapons, abstain from ICBM and IRBM and accept a (negotiable) ceiling on battleships and strategic bombers. An agency of the WEU for the control of armaments was created, carrying out inspection in teams consisting of three inspectors.

4. The idea of researchers in some kind of dialectical contrast to politicians can be seen as a special case of the relation between experts on the one hand and governments on the other. Typical examples are the cases of pollution and nutrition: experts from different nations and disciplines may recommend measures far ahead of what governments are willing to implement. Thus, to prevent or at least to control pollution river basin authorities with supranational (like the Danube commission) may sometimes be the only solution, and this suggestion may easily put experts against governments. The same applies to the world protein situation where experts for a long time have argued in favor of supranational powers to authorities engaged in planning and accounting in this field, not to mention in actively directing the pattern of protein production and consumption.

5. According to Article 5 associate members have full rights in the Assembly and more limited rights in the Committee of Ministers; a pattern which is loaded in favor of parliamentary regimes.

Chapter VI

1. This list does not include GATT, since it is nearly universal and more specific, and does not present the same difficulties.

2. As it was put by a leading specialist on international relations in one country in the East: "Our country has 20 years ago resolved no longer to be an object of politics - we want to be a subject". This feeling of autonomy, of self-reliance and integrity is to a large extent a post-war phenomenon. For the first time in modern history had Eastern Europe really been able to hit back, the Red Army was at the Elbe, and victorious. Napoleon had been beaten but not pursued to the same points. It was combined with a socialist revolution in these countries, and one may discuss whether that revolution was a necessary or a sufficient condition for this autonomy. But the basic point is that this feeling is irreversible, and will survive any change of regime in any country in the East as far as one can judge today - just as much as even a non-socialist Cuba today would never accept the pattern of US dominance found in pre-Castro days.

3. A major difficulty with this system is, of course, big power veto so that UN peace keeping forces cannot be used against a big power. On the other hand, the difficulty with a purely European system is that such a system, like the OAS on the Western hemisphere, under certain conditions might develop into a shield protecting a region from universal, UN influence and eventually lay the conditions for a super-state that might become a threat to other parts of the world.

4. Clearly, this is above all a challenge to Finland and Yugoslavia in the European system.

5. Western nations very often claim that there is nothing to learn in East. Even granting that in general, on the average, Western standards in many respects are higher, it is also very well known that the standard of living and of development in general is much higher in, for instance, Poland, DDR and Czechoslovakia than in many Western countries located in and around the Mediterranean basin. And more important than averages the socialist countries in the East have been much more able in eradicating the extremes of poverty in their countries than the poorest among the Western countries have. Thus there is no reason other than political why countries in South-Eastern Europe, aligned with West could not learn more from countries in Eastern Europe, aligned with East, for instance.

Moreover, the socialist systems have led to solutions to many problems, such as the problems of the extremes of poverty and misery, that many non-socialist systems still wrestle with without much success, particularly countries or parts of countries in the areas mentioned. It would be a good sign for Europe if such matters could be studied more as technical and pragmatic problems, and less as to whether solutions are in line with some theories developed on a priori grounds only.

And thirdly: socialist countries, even if they are relatively well off, seem often to be able to establish relations with developing countries more acceptable to the latter. This may be due to the nature of the credit system, to the way in which technical assistance is administered or, above all, to willingness to import manufactured goods; but would at any rate be worthy of more study- and not only at a distance, through reports.

6. As a concluding footnote, let us compare some of the proposals put forward here with some of the suggestions found in the works of Zbigniew Brzezinski, and start with some ideas found in scattered places in Alternative to Partition: For a Broader Conception of America's Role in Europe (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).

Brzezinski favours Eastern European participation in OECD, but does not pair this off with Western participation in CEMA. This, of course, is very much in line with general US policy in European affairs formulated in President Johnson's speech October 7 1966, where OECD is seen as a major vehicle of all-European cooperation.

Brzezinski favours periodic all-European conferences of heads of government, but in our view does not formulate the important condition; a solid network of all-European organizations.

Brzezinski also formulates a punishment-reward policy whereby Eastern nations will receive rewards, mainly economic, when they engage in a policy of liberalization and autonomy; punishment otherwise. Apart from the strongly asymmetric perspective inherent in this, international punishment seems by and large to be highly counterproductive. However, he also mentions how difficult a consistently positive policy towards East is, given attitudes of the US Congress.

There is one Brzezinski proposal of a more practical nature which would have important implication (p. 157): "East Europeans could be permitted to exchange their currency at the frontier for convertible Western funds. The East European currency thus acquired could then be used by the West

to finance common East-West undertakings designed to establish closer contacts--".

These problems are also discussed in a more recent article by Brzezinski, "The Framework of East-West Reconciliation", Foreign Affairs, pp. 256 - 275. The article can probably be seen as the most up-to-date publicly available statement of his points of view. We shall make relatively extensive comments on his article since one only rarely encounters so comprehensive and explicit statements of future visions of all-European co-operation, and in order to put our own points in perspective better.

Again the major difference between his perspective and our own is his tendency to see the relation between East and West in Europe in a basically asymmetric perspective. Brzezinski also has a convergence model, but it is quite obvious that the idea is that the East shall change much more than the West, and in the direction of the West. With this perspective as a basis for the general reasoning the present structural asymmetry, (mostly in favor of West) becomes an advantage: Western structural advantages should be utilized to bring about convergence in the direction of the West. Of course, it is very easy to find exponents of Western policies that are more imbued with this crusading spirit than Brzezinski, but this perspective should nevertheless be kept in mind.

This also colors Brzezinski's perspective on how the detente started, by the US "aiding Yugoslavia and then Poland, by developing cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union and the other states, and by exchanging top level visits. At the time de Gaulle scorned these moves and only later began to emulate them" (p.258). Without belittling the impact of these moves from the US, it must be said that de Gaulle's policy was rather different from an emulation of these aspects of US policy. When a system is heavily polarized, as the East-West system was and still is to some extent, changes are brought about not only by creating ties between the blocs, but also by weakening intra-bloc ties. French denunciations of various aspects of US policy and partial withdrawal from NATO can be seen as an important contribution both to depolarization and to multipolarization; particularly since it was combined with the establishment of relatively strong ties with some of the countries in the East. This is a quite different policy line and can hardly be described as emulation, although one may discuss to what extent the wave of depolarization was initiated by de Gaulle and to what extent it was exploited by him, just as one may discuss what will happen if or when French nationalism and depolarization can no longer be served by the same moves on the scene of international politics.

Another expression of the difference is found in Brzezinski's reaction to de Gaulle's long term perspectives (p. 260): "The communist élites, having nothing to fear from a Europe of this kind, would probably be quite responsive to Western overtures because they could then have their cake and eat it too: they could savor the tangible benefits of closer economic contacts with the West without any substantial change in the overall political situation". Brzezinski's asymmetric perspective is clearly expressed here. But this does not mean that others are necessarily opposed to internal changes in regimes, only that they should not come as the result of external pressures, but as autonomous efforts to find adequate political structures that can cope with the tensions and

promises of domestic and international societies.

We disagree rather heavily with a vision found in Brzezinski's article concerning the composition of Europe in the future (p. 264): "a more stable European solution, one more in keeping with present trends and historical tendencies than any of the three concepts discussed earlier, should eventually involve an interlocking structure based on four entities, America and Russia as the peripheral participants, and Western Europe and Eastern Europe as the two halves of the inner core (in time, perhaps, becoming even more closely linked)". This conception looks symmetric but is rather asymmetric: however, one looks at "present trends and historical tendencies" it is difficult to assert that Soviet Union does not, somehow, form more of an integral part of Europe than does the US. But even if one discards this argument, a symmetric, partial withdrawal of the two superpowers would expose the asymmetry between East and West in Europe too much: the six or seven Eastern European countries are too weak and too few. On the other hand, when one leaves the Soviet Union in the balance is tilted too much in favor of the East, for which reason we favor a partial admission of the US in this system. There is simply no way, at present, to make the symmetry perfect - the two halves are not halves. Besides, the nonaligned countries have disappeared, unless Brzezinski counts them as belonging to West.

On the other hand, we fully agree with Brzezinski in his perspectives on economic cooperation (p. 267, p. 271): "It (CEMA) is more likely to become a communist equivalent to OECD, which in itself would make it quite important and useful. (Accordingly, cooperation between OECD and CEMA could be quite useful). - - It is not unreasonable to expect that in the 1970s there will be created a special East-West economic assembly, perhaps sponsored by OECD, ECE and CEMA". And Brzezinski mentions the role of such an assembly for "common all-European projects, such as a Lisbon - Moscow superhighway". But then the asymmetry appears again: "It is also reasonable to expect that in the course of the next five years surplus labor will be permitted to flow from East to West. This could have a considerable social and cultural impact as workers returned home". (p.271). What about the impact the other way? And when this is seen in conjunction with the idea that (p 272): "Even more rapid may be the gradual involvement of the communist states in the specialized functions of the Council of Europe, perhaps leading eventually to its transformation into the East-West Assembly" the asymmetry is even more clear, for there is no mention of how the Council of Europe might or could change to offer a suitable machinery for this task.

But, unlike numerous nebulous statements concerning the future of Europe Brzezinski's writings always combine clarity with imagination. As he says himself (p. 273): "A long-range goal serves as a beacon. It helps to determine not only the desired end; it also signals the best way to get there". Perhaps one may add: it also signals the necessity of making quite explicit what the goal really is: a framework within which one party can, "peacefully", dominate and influence the other; or a framework where there is a maximum of built-in equality and symmetry, protecting the weaker parties against the domineering influence of the stronger ones.

5
Second draft

THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA
FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE BALKANS

By

Dr. G. Grigorova

Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
Institute for Balkan Studies

1. Introduction.

In its foreign policy the People's Republic of Bulgaria proceeds from the principle that no effort should be spared to save mankind from the horrors of a modern and that under the conditions of the division of the world into two systems, the only correct and reasonable policy in international relations is that of peaceful coexistence between the states with different social systems. As we all know, a policy based on this principle consists in paying due respect to the sovereignty and national independence, territorial integrity and equality of states, in applying the principle of non-interference in their home affairs and in implementing practical measures aimed at guaranteeing peace and security in the world.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria thinks that at present, when peace is indivisible, world security is possible only if it is collective. The achievement and consolidation of collective security, is a complex process, because it "is the most far-reaching means of uniting nations with different social systems in their joint endeavour to secure a durable and lasting." (1) It can only be achieved by observing the principles of peaceful coexistence and by applying practical measures that will lead to general and complete disarmament, the settlement of controversial and pending questions between states by means of peaceful negotiations on an equal footing and the development of far-reaching scientific, technical and cultural cooperation, on the basis of equality between parties and their mutual advantage.

2. Security policy.

In view of the fact that relations between the European countries exercise a strong influence on the setup throughout the world and that Bulgaria's situation is that of a European state, during the whole postwar period the People's Republic of Bulgaria has been making constant efforts effectively to help guarantee European security. A vivid proof of this is the "Declaration on the Consolidation of Peace and Security in Europe", adopted with its participation in July 1966 during the Bucharest Conference of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance. (2)

The government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, together with the other countries signatories of the Bucharest Declaration, considers that the increasing and developing trends towards doing away with the remnants of the cold war and the hindrances along the road to a normal development of European co-operation, the trends towards settling controversial questions by mutual understanding, towards normalizing international life and a rapprochement among nations, open up possibilities for the setting up of an effective system of security in Europe.

The main prerequisites on which above all depends European security are: dissolution of all military alliances; definite recognition of the results of the Second World War and abandonment, on the part of the Federal German Republic, of all claims with regard to the territory of the German Democratic Republic and to its access to nuclear weapons in any form; development of co-operation on an equal footing in the field of economy and culture and expansion of contacts on foreign policy problems among the European states on a bilateral and multilateral basis; calling of a European conference on questions of European security and European co-operation in general.

In connection with this, the People's Republic of Bulgaria spares no effort in taking all-sided measures upon which European security depends.

It pursues an active foreign policy with almost all states of Western Europe and with the neutral European states, maintains trade relations with all of them, and has no diplomatic relations only with Portugal, Spain and the German Federal Republic, while endeavouring to strengthen its economic and trade relations with them, to increase its contacts and forms of co-operation in the field of science, technology, culture and art, and seeking new forms of co-operation, especially in the field of industry and the development of tourism.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria has always stood against the division of the world into military blocs or alliances ⁽³⁾ and for doing away with the danger to common peace and security arising therefrom. As a member of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance together with the other of its member-states, the People's Republic of Bulgaria expresses its readiness simultaneously to put an end to the North Atlantic Pact and the Warsaw Treaty and considers it expedient that an agreement should be reached now on the disbandment of their military organizations. It has consistently been endeavouring to establish an efficient system of European security, based on relations of equality and mutual respect among all states on the Continent and the united efforts of all European nations, which will supplant the existing military alliances.

In standing up for general and complete disarmament, the government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria thinks that it is not necessary to wait for a joint settlement of this question, but that a number of partial measures should be implemented which will help ease military tension in the European Continent. ⁽⁴⁾ In the course of many years the People's Republic of Bulgaria has stood for the removal of foreign military bases, for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from foreign territories within their national boundaries, for cutting down, in volumes agreed upon and on dates agreed upon, the number of the armed forces of the two German states and for implementing measures for averting the danger of a nuclear conflict such as: the establishment of atom-free zones, zones of decreased or frozen arma-

ments and in general zones of peace and co-operation in different regions of the European Continent. (5)

A major contribution for the establishment of a system of European security could be introduced by the neutral countries if they pursued a more active peaceful policy and made their contribution to the problems of disarmament. The recognition of the principle of neutrality and the unreserved recognition of the inviolability of neutral states is without doubt one of the elements of European security.

The Bulgarian Government has consistently supported the inviolability of the boundaries established between the European States after the Second World War, considering as finally established the Polish frontier along the line Oder-Neisse and the frontier between the two German states, and looks upon them as constituting one of the firmest foundations of a lasting peace in Europe. It rejects categorically the claims of the Federal German Republic pretending to represent the entire German people, and its attempts at bringing pressure to bear upon states which have recognized the German Democratic Republic.

As it has repeatedly declared it thinks that the danger, which the nuclear claims of the Federal Republic represent for Europe, should be averted by doing what is necessary to exclude the possibility for the Federal German Republic to gain access to the nuclear weapon in any form whatever. (6)

The People's Republic of Bulgaria has always been aware of the significance of a peaceful settlement of the German problem in connection with European peace. (7) It considers the solution of this problem as possible only on condition that the fact of the actual existence of two German states is recognized: of the German Democratic Republic and of the Federal German Republic; that the existing frontiers are recognized and the two German states refuse the appropriation of nuclear arms. As to a united German state, the latter can indeed be only a peaceful and democratic state, which will nevermore be a threat to its neighbours and to peace in Europe. It considers, of course, that the solution of this question depends entirely upon the German people themselves.

As the guaranteeing of European security and the establishment of general European co-operation corresponds to the interests of all European states, the Bulgarian Government thinks that these questions should be discussed at a general European conference. Thirteen years ago already, it took a stand in favour of such a conference (8) and now, when the general setup discloses both the utter necessity and the possibilities for its implementation, the Bulgarian government expresses its resolute readiness to take part in such a conference. The adoption, for instance, of a general European declaration in which the signatory-states would declare that they would be guided in their relations by the interests of peace, that they would settle controversial questions only in a peaceful manner; that they

would consult each other and exchange information on problems of reciprocal interest and would help the full development of economic, scientific, technical and cultural relations among them, is considered by the government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria as an important stage in the setting up of a system of collective security in Europe.

A still more serious element of European security would be a treaty of all European states, in which they would renounce the use of the threat to use force in their mutual relations and to interfere in their home affairs, which would guarantee the settlement of all controversial problems in accordance with the principle of the UN, exclusively by peaceful means.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria attaches importance also to the other methods of discussing European security. A conference of the representatives of all European parliaments could also play a positive role. The ever more frequent contacts of Bulgarian statesmen and political workers with prominent statesmen and political workers of a number of European states reveal close viewpoints on many important problems of European security and help expand political co-operation with those countries, which is in the interest of the building up of a European security system. Naturally, the People's Republic of Bulgaria thinks that every state is free to decide whether or not it will take part in the discussion and settlement of European problems.

Attaching great importance to the problems of European security, the People's Republic of Bulgaria continues its efforts for a more rapid solution of the problems upon which depends world peace and security, and is convinced that their settlement will be favourably reflected on the general setup in Europe.

3. Security Policy in the Balkan Peninsula.

In putting in consistent efforts for the consolidation of European security, the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria at the same time pays special attention to the establishment of an atmosphere of security in the Balkan Peninsula. The particularly great interest of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in the Balkans is perfectly natural, because it is a Balkan nation, and good-neighbourly political and economic relations and cultural ties are a fundamental prerequisite and element of peace and security in every region in the world.

The fact that the Balkan Peninsula is part of the European Continent naturally leads us to the question whether a thesis about the possibility of achieving security within the limits of a regional zone, such as the Balkans, is at all reasonable, and what are the reasons on which it is based.

Naturally, the consolidation of European security settles also the question about Balkan security. European security is influenced by the implementation of the

policy of peaceful co-existence between states with different social structure both in Europe and beyond its limits, by the strategic objectives and tactical moves of the different political and economic groups and alliances, operating on the Continent and by the specific nature of bilateral relations between European nations. These factors are also in operation in the Balkans.

They, however, have certain peculiar aspects, which turn the Balkan Peninsula into a region, in which a number of questions can be settled both on a bilateral and on a multilateral basis. The settlement of these questions consolidates security in this region and constitutes one of the elements of European security.

The Balkan states, while sharing the interests of the other European states regarding the prevention of a new war in the European Continent and the development of economic, scientific interests.

First of all, the Balkan states can be driven into a conflict which is quite detached from the existing controversies between them. It is a fact that the Balkan Peninsula is in geographical proximity with the Near East and Northeast Africa and is considered by certain states like Great Britain and especially the United States of America as well as by the Federal German Republic as a strategic bridgehead for the consultation of their domination in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

In this case it could hardly be argued against the fact that it is in the common interest of all Balkan states not to allow relations among them to be determined and influenced by the calculations of such states which are viewing the Balkans as a base and bridgehead for the attainment of goals alien to the Balkan states themselves. Experience in the last two decades has taught us that those Balkan states which serve such a policy create a tense atmosphere in the Balkans and place themselves in political and economic isolation from their nearer or more distant neighbours, which is against their own interests.

Moreover, the Balkan states have to overcome yet another factor which might be called historical. Between the end of the past century and the Second World War many questions were piled up for solution in this region and an atmosphere of enmity was created - a favourable ground for conflicts.

The regulation of old and newly appearing controversial and unsettled questions and the overcoming of the atmosphere of enmity is undoubtedly in the interest of all Balkan states, because local Balkan contradictions are thus removed as a possible source of conflicts among them.

4. Bilateral Cooperation in the Balkan Peninsula.

4.1. General. The geographical situation, historical development and, more particularly, the social and political changes in most Balkan states after the Second World War and certain traditions in the development of the economy of the different

Balkan states are a prerequisite for economic, scientific and technical relations and co-operation, specific for the Balkan states. A failure to take advantage of these possibilities is to the detriment of their economies.

Side by side with those and certain other interests, common to all Balkan states, there is a common interest in the Balkans which we might arbitrarily call self-preservation and which demands of the states having different social structures to abide by the principles of peaceful coexistence in their reciprocal relations. In this respect the Balkans are a small Europe; and here pass some of the boundaries between the socialist and the capitalist systems, between the North Atlantic Pact and the Warsaw Treaty. But side by side with the requirement to observe the principles of peaceful coexistence which are universal for all states in the world, there exist certain specific possibilities for guaranteeing these principles in the Balkans, the relation of which will help the establishment of guarantees for all Europe. Such a possibility offers, for instance, the setting up of atom-free zones in the Balkans, in the Mediterranean region and the territory of the Danubian states.

These reasons justify the implementation of certain special measures in the Balkans, which render concrete the problem of European security, lending it, though relatively, an independent aspect to a degree that makes it possible to talk about Balkan security, which is in no contradiction with European security but plays the part of one of its constructive elements.

Taking into consideration all these circumstances, the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria does not limit its efforts to a mere participation in the securing of conditions for the establishment of a system of European security, for the establishment of relations of reciprocal tolerance in the Balkans, but goes still further, actively seeking ways and means and forms, and supporting those proposed by other states for the consolidation of security in the Balkans, along the road of a far-reaching development of bilateral and multilateral relations among the Balkan states. More concrete and of a more active character and more effective have been the efforts of the People's Republic of Bulgaria along this line after 1953.

Above all it has hitherto been achieved a development of bilateral trade relations, economic, scientific, technical and cultural co-operation, and as to political co-operation, it has had a very specific character between the different Balkan nations.

In the development of multilateral relations among the Balkan countries, especially political, we cannot even speak of first steps, although there have been a number of proposals, realistic and of common interest. More serious results along the road of inter-Balkan co-operation were scored by the democratic circles

in this region.

4.2. Relations with Yugoslavia.

In speaking about bilateral relations, in the first place, deserving of attention are the efforts of the governments of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia - one of the non-affiliated European states, to normalize diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries, which were violated in the four-year period before 1953. After August 1953, in the course of a few months, the border questions were settled and trade and cultural relations between them were restored. The further improvement of relations between the two countries developed on an ever expanding basis and led to a far-reaching economic, scientific, technical and cultural co-operation.

A mixed committee for economic, commercial, scientific and technical co-operation has been set up, and the fulfilment of the bilateral agreements signed at the end of 1962 is under way: for economic co-operation and long-term trade and an agreement for industrial co-operation. Co-operation and specialization in certain production branches, especially in industry, exchange of specialists, experts and documents in the field of metallurgy, chemistry, electrotechnics, machine-building, construction, oremining and agriculture are being implemented between the two countries. Direct co-operation between plants and factories, institutes and specialists is also being organized.

Positive changes have also been effected in the development of cultural exchanges. Conferences of men of science, culture and the arts are held, co-operation is implemented in the field of cinematography, radio and television, reciprocal visits of orchestras and theatres and contacts between cultural unions and public organizations have been strengthened.

Co-operation is also developing in the field of tourism and is fostered by the agreement for the abolishment of visas between the two countries (which came into force as from May 1965). Sports relations are also getting stronger.

The development of transport and communications between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia is of major importance for the implementation of all-round co-operation between them. According to the convention signed by them in December, 1963, a border station was opened on June 1, 1964, between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Since the beginning of 1964 the two countries have been co-operating in the field of civil air transport. In July 1964 an agreement in the field of road transport was signed, whereby reciprocal passenger and goods transport by motor vehicles was regulated and improved as well as transit transport through the territories of the two countries. In November 1964 the international highway Kalotina-Nish was opened followed by a few bus lines.

The great significance of co-operation between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and

the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia is also determined by the strengthened political cooperation between them which is based on the similarity or identity of their positions with respect to a number of questions, such as: European collective security; further development of good-neighbourly relations for the consolidation of peace and security in the Balkans; support to contacts and undertakings of an all-Balkan character.

4.3. Relations with Greece. But of greatest significance for the consolidation of Balkan peace and security is the development of political, economic and cultural co-operation between the Balkan socialist and capitalist states, and more particularly between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Turkey and the Kingdom of Greece. Up to now, however, co-operation between them has not entered the sphere of political co-operation on general Balkan, European and world problems. Of late, some similarity has been noticed with Turkey in connection with certain questions of international peace and security.

In the last few years, an improvement of Bulgaro-Greek relations has been noted. The Greek Government, while tying itself up, through its membership to the North Atlantic Pact in 1952, a concluding number of bilateral military and political agreements with the United States, at the same time, under the impact of the objective necessity of developing economic co-operation with its closest neighbours and the peaceful initiative of the socialist nations, displayed readiness to regulate a few questions with Bulgaria.

As early as 1953 a step forward was made along the line of trade relations between Bulgaria and Greece. On December 5, 1953, a trade agreement was signed between the two countries whereby trade relations, which had been broken off in 1945, were restored, and the beginning was marked of a new period in Bulgaro-Greek economic relations, a period of development of the traditional economic relations between the two countries under new conditions, when the export and import possibilities of Bulgaria have greatly increased, the possibilities of Greece having also increased to a certain extent. Since then and until not long ago, trade between the two countries, barring certain fluctuations, has marked a steady growth. A positive part along this line was played by the long-term trade agreement of July 9, 1964,⁽⁹⁾ the conclusion of which had been proposed by the People's Republic of Bulgaria already in January, 1960.

These relations could develop much more successfully, if a number of other questions which are of significance for the expansion of trade relations and economic co-operation between the two countries were simultaneously settled. The repeated proposals of the People's Republic of Bulgaria for the restoration of direct railway communications, for a more thorough solution of highway transport, the restoration of post, telegraph and telephone communications, the establishment of air communications between the two countries did not find a positive response in the

Greek side. For many years the Greek government which was taken captive by the policy of the "cold war" and supported its stand with arguments referring to the so-called "danger from the North", rejected the proposals for regulating relations and developing a far-flung co-operation between Bulgaria and Greece which was in the interest of both countries. The above questions were settled as late as July 9, 1964, when concrete agreements ⁽¹⁰⁾ on them were adopted.

As early as 1953, after five months of negotiations, in a Protocol of December 30, the controversial border problems and the demarcation of the border line were settled and, with agreements concluded in 1955 and 1957, a few additional questions aimed at securing a trouble-free border between Bulgaria and Greece.

In 1953 contacts were established between the two countries for the purpose of achieving a restoration of diplomatic relations between them, which had been interrupted by the Second World War. After five months of negotiations, diplomatic relations were resumed by a Declaration of May 22, 1954, but in the course of ten years no complete normalization of these relations has been achieved, because the Greek side insisted on linking this question to other unregulated questions between the two countries. It was only after the agreements of July 9, 1964, whereby many questions between Bulgaria and Greece were settled, that diplomatic relations were completely normalized and immediately after that the legations were raised to the rank of embassies.

During the negotiations, as a result of which on July 9, 1964, as many as 12 agreements were concluded between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Greece, ⁽¹¹⁾ the so-called financial dispute was settled, which had in the last ten years been the object of complicated discussions between the two sides and which seemed all but impossible to be resolved. Agreements were also adopted for the utilization of waters and rivers, flowing through the territory of both countries, for sailing, for mutual customs facilities, for co-operation in the field of tourism and a plan for scientific and cultural co-operation.

The settlement of the financial dispute and the regulation of such a great number of different questions, though as a result of rather long and complicated negotiations, are a proof of the fact that by means of negotiations, carried out in conditions of equality of the parties and with due account taken of their mutual interest, even the complex unsettled problems can be resolved. A major contribution along this line from the Greek side was made by the government of the United Centre, headed by G. Papandreou, with which the negotiations were brought to a successful conclusion.

The far-reaching relations between the two countries established in fulfilment of the above agreements, although constituting a serious step in the bilateral relations between Bulgaria and Greece, are far from being a limit to the development of these relations. The agreements rather brought a number of questions, the solution of

which had long come to a head, to a normal situation, clearing the ground for and laying the foundations of a further development of economic and cultural co-operation and tourist relations between the two countries.

4.4. Relations with Turkey.

Since 1953 positive changes set in also in Bulgaro-Turkish relations, the more so because diplomatic and trade links between the two countries were not broken off either during the Second World War or after it, and the aggravated relations in the last six years were entirely unjustified.

In 1952 Turkey also joined the North Atlantic Pact and in the course of several years concluded dozens of military and political agreements with the U.S.A. Nevertheless, however, here again the objective necessity of developing co-operation with the closest neighbours and the consistent peaceful proposals of the socialist nations have had their say.

The probings of the People's Republic of Bulgaria which were started in 1950 and Turkey's readiness expressed in December 1953 to carry on bilateral negotiations with a view to signing a new commercial agreement, brought about a positive result which was expressed in the signing on February 23, 1955, of a new trade agreement, which, compared with the one in force till then, created a broader basis for trade between the two countries, as was shown by the subsequent results in Bulgaro-Turkish trade. Conditions are studied for co-operation between the two countries in the field of machine-building, power production, non-ferrous metallurgy and other industrial branches, specialists are exchanged in the field of the light industries, the food industry, metallurgy, ore-mining, agriculture, etc.

Pursuant to negotiations between Bulgaria and Turkey, which were started in 1950, a mixed Bulgaro-Turkish commission for border problems started functioning in 1956. In the period which followed, a demarcation of the border line was carried out and a new map of the boundary was made. These undertakings as well as the border agreement and the agreement on the prevention and settlement of border incidents and the maintenance of the state border marks have contributed to securing a trouble-free boundary between the two countries.

After 1953 the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria has spared no effort to normalize diplomatic relations between the two countries, in which certain complications had set in during the preceding years and in May, 1966, the two countries raised their legations to the rank of embassies. Later on a consular convention was also signed.

Between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Turkey a number of steps were made with a view to improving transport and communications, such as the establishment of the Sofia-Istanbul airline, the agreements on the building of the road Malko Turnovo-Lozengrad and a direct railway line Kapitan Andreyevo.

Kapikule- Odrin-Pehlivankeuy, the agreement on automobile and highway transport, etc.

In 1968 an agreement was signed, regulating the question of the voluntary migration to Turkey of Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin whose close relatives had migrated to Turkey prior to 1952.

The two countries envisage to study the possibilities for the conclusion of agreements for co-operation in yet other fields, such as fishing, the construction of an installation for utilizing the waters of rivers, running through the territories of the two countries and other agreements, with a view to regulating all mutual relations and questions upon which depends the further favourable development of Bulgaro-Turkish relations.

4.5. Conclusion.

Of late, co-operation between Bulgaria and Turkey in the field of tourism has developed successfully, going beyond the limits of bilateral co-operation and having co-operation between four Balkan nations: Bulgaria-Turkey-Yugoslavia-Rumania.

In speaking about the possibilities of a further development of economic relations between the Balkan countries it should be said that they include joint bilateral and multilateral construction, the creating of conditions for specialization and co-operation in the different industrial branches by opening separate mounting enterprises, the establishment of mixed trading firms and joint mixed transport companies. The development of all these forms of co-operation under the observance of equality between the parties and respect for their mutual interests, will contribute for a more rational utilization of the economic possibilities of each one of them with a view to improving the material standards of the population.

The facts expounded above, testify that, though with much vacillation and checks, relations of the People's Republic of Bulgaria with Turkey are developing successfully, that Bulgaro-Greek relations developed positively until not very long ago and that in its relations with Yugoslavia there is a substantial progress. Similar measures were taken and continue to be implemented also by the governments of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and the Socialist Republic of Rumania.

The development of bilateral political, economic and cultural relations between the Balkan countries, which is in itself a positive fact, helps consolidate security in the Balkans, especially because it is not directed against other Balkan countries, but is combined with the pursuance of a policy of peace and co-operation with all of them.

5. Multilateral Co-operation in the Balkan Peninsula.

But the development of bilateral relations between the Balkan nations, however, constitutes only one side of Balkan security. The consolidation of security in

this part of the globe depends upon the further development of both bilateral relations and many-sided Balkan co-operation, and, more concretely, upon the establishment of political guarantees for peaceful coexistence in the Balkans.

The necessity of implementing measures of such a nature arises particularly from the fact that the government of Greece and Turkey have adopted a number of decisions of the North-Atlantic Pact and have signed agreements with the United States, in the fulfilment of which rocket bases have been set up and nuclear weapons have been stored in their territory, foreign planes carrying atom bombs are flying across their air space, foreign submarines appear in their ports as well as ships carrying on board nuclear weapons.

Under these circumstances, Bulgaria's security depends upon the implementation of measures along several directions.

In August, 1957, the Prime Minister of Bulgaria put forward the question of the signing of bilateral non-aggression treaties among the Balkan states, Bulgaria's readiness to sign such a treaty with the Kingdom of Greece ⁽¹²⁾ being especially strongly underscored. On January 14, 1958, once again calling attention to its proposal, the Bulgarian Government put the question on a broader basis, pointing out the possibility of concluding collective treaties for non-aggression and co-operation between the Balkan countries. ⁽¹³⁾ On June 9, 1959, the Bulgarian Government turned to the Government of the Kingdom of Greece and proposed a number of measures to be taken to improve relations between the two countries, including the conclusion of a bilateral non-aggression pact ⁽¹⁴⁾ and a month and a half later, on July 22, 1959, it came forward with a draft of such a pact. ⁽¹⁵⁾ As can be seen from the text of the Bulgarian draft, the conclusion of such a pact between the two countries could serve as a basis for the signing of an all-Balkan non-aggression treaty by the Balkan States by their joining the Greek-Bulgarian non-aggression pact. Such an all-Balkan non-aggression treaty would represent a serious stage in the consolidation of collective security in the Balkans and an element of collective security in Europe.

The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria actively supported ⁽¹⁶⁾ the proposals of the Rumanian People's Republic of September 10, 1957 and of June 7, 1959, ⁽¹⁷⁾ to the governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey for the holding of a joint conference of prime ministers for the purpose of discussing and taking a decision on the questions regarding co-operation among Balkan states and the consolidation of peace in this part of the world.

When, at a moment when preparations were being made for the establishment of atomic bases and the storage of atomic weapons in the territories of Turkey and Greece, in May ⁽¹⁸⁾ and in June, 1959, the Soviet Union came forward with the proposals of setting up a Balkan zone, free from atomic and rocket weapons, expressing at the

same time its readiness to become one of the warranters for the observance of its atomic neutrality, ⁽¹⁹⁾ the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria gave a decisive support to these proposals. ⁽²⁰⁾ Similar support was given by the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the Soviet proposal of May 20, 1963 to the effect that Mediterranean region should be proclaimed an atom- and rocketfree zone. ⁽²¹⁾

This, towards the end of 1959 and the beginning of 1960 a whole system of concrete proposals was put forward in the Balkans the implementation of which would not only have secured broad guarantees for peaceful coexistence in this part of the globe, but would also have become a constructive element in Europe's security.

The successful development in the last few years of bilateral co-operation between the Balkan nations has created prerequisites for the settlement of certain questions of all-Balkan security. The military coup d'état in Greece of April 1967, however, proved that circles interested in the discontinuance and the turning back of this process, have once again come out on the political stage there, and that in this connection peace and security in the Balkans are placed before additional serious difficulties.

The failure to implement up to now a number of the above measures, especially those of a political nature, does not deprive of sense the taking of fresh steps along the same line. All Balkan states continue now to be faced, for instance, with the question of excluding the Balkans from the nuclear arms race by setting up an atom-free zone in this part of the world. The positive attitude of a number of Balkan countries toward the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty as well as the decision adopted by the Security Council for guaranteeing the security of the non-nuclear countries participating in the treaty, improve the conditions for such a step. Such a step will constitute a contribution to guaranteeing European Security.

The established co-operation between wide social circles in the different Balkan countries, linked by the consciousness of the common interest of the Balkan states in the development of political, economic and cultural co-operation between them, also contributes to Balkan security.

In this connection the "Movement for Balkan Co-operation and Mutual Understanding" should be pointed out, with the meetings of its representatives held every year ⁽²²⁾, the rally of youth and students of the region of the Balkan and the Adriatic Sea of January-February, 1960, the conference of students from the Balkans, the Adriatic zone and Cyprus, held in March, 1965.

Serious attention deserves also the all-Balkan co-operation between scientific, cultural and sports circles, which is manifested at meetings and conferences and in the activity of certain all-Balkan bodies for co-operation between Balkan writers, journalists, architects, medical workers, film makers, scientists -Balkanists, jurists, sportsmen. The government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria pays great

attention to these initiatives and renders serious material and moral assistance for their implementation. It is no accident, for instance, that of sixteen such major enterprises held in the period of 1964-66, fourteen were held in Bulgaria. (23)

Everything pointed out above enables us to draw the conclusion that the government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, in attaching high value to good-neighbourly relations, is endeavouring to make full use of the possibilities of developing bilateral and multilateral co-operation among the Balkan countries, because it considers this as an important question in connection with both Balkan and European security.

At the same time the People's Republic of Bulgaria does not discontinue its efforts at broadening its political, economic, scientific, technical and cultural co-operation with the non-Balkan European nations for the consolidation of peace and security in Europe.

FOOT-NOTES

(1) А. К. Собакин, Коллективная безопасность в Европе, Госюриздат 1956, стр. 5-6.

(2) See: Декларация за укрепване на мира и сигурности в Европа (Declaration on the Consolidation of Peace and Security in Europe) в. "Работническо дело", 9 юли 1966 г.

Решение на Централния комитет на Българската комунистическа партия и Министерския съвет на Народна република България (Decision of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria), в. "Работническо дело", 13 юли 1966 г.

(3) See, for instance: Важно съобщение на българското правителство (An Important Announcement of the Bulgarian Government),

в. "Работническо дело", 9 юли 1947 г.

(4) The Bulgarian government was one of the first which signed the Moscow Treaty for Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, Cosmic Space and Under Water, and resolutely supported and signed already on July 1, 1968, the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty.

(5) See, for instance: Декларация на правителството на Народна република България

(Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria)

в. "Работническо дело", 25 септември 1959 год.

(6) See, for instance: Съвместно заявление за посещение на партийно-държавната делегация на Чехословакската социалистическа република в Народна република България.

(Joint Statement on the Visit of a Party and Government Delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the People's Republic of Bulgaria), в. "Работническо дело", 18 септември 1966 г.

(7) See, for instance: Декларация на правителствата на Народна република България (Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria), в. "Работническо дело", 23 януари 1959 г.

(8) See, for instance: Отговор от 15 ноември 1954 г. на правителството НРБ на нотата на Съветския Съюз от 13 ноември 1954 г.

(Reply of November 15, 1954 of the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the note of the Soviet Union of November 13, 1954), в. "Работническо дело", 17 ноември 1954 г.

(9) See: Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

(10) See: "Държавен вестник", бр. 87, 3 ноември 1964 г. и бр. 88, от 6 ноември 1964 г. ("The State Gazette", issue No 87, November 3, 1964, and issue No. 88, November 6, 1964).

(11) Ibid.

(12) See: Отговори на председателя на Министерския съвет на НРБ Антон Югов на въпроси, зададени му от Илиас Бредимас - независим народен представител, пратеник на "Атинаки" (Replies by Bulgaria's Prime Minister Anton Yugov to questions put to him by Ilias Bredimas, independent national representative, emissary of the Athinaiki), в. "Работническо дело", 15 януари 1958 г.

(13) See: Реч на председателя на Министерския съвет НРБ произнесена в народното събрание, 14.1.1958 г. (Speech of the Bulgarian Prime Minister held in the National Assembly on January 14, 1958), в. "Работническо дело", 15 януари 1958 г.

(14) See: В Министерството на външните работи на НРБ - Нота от 9 юни 1959 г. (In the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Note of June 9, 1959), в. "Работническо дело", 10 юни 1959 г.

(15) See: Вербална нота от 22 юли 1959 г. НРБ. Проект-пакт за ненападение между НРБ и Кралство Гърция (Verbal Note of July 22, 1959 of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. Draft of Non-aggression Pact between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Greece), в. "Работническо дело", 9 август 1959

(16) See: Отговор от 18 септември 1957 г. на Министерския съвет на Народната Република България (Reply of September 18, 1957, of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria), в. "Работническо дело", 19 септември 1957 г. ; Нота от 9 юни 1959 г. на НРБ, "Раб. д.", 10.6.59

(17) See: Skinteia, September 17, 1957, Anul. XXVII, No, 4011; Skinteia, June 7, 1959, Anul. XXVIII, No. 4543.

(18) One of the first proposals in connection with this problem was made jointly by the USSR and the People's Republic of Albania. See: Заявление от 30. май 1959 г. партийно-правителственних делегаций Советского Союза и Народной Республики Албании, "Правда", 1 июня, 1959 г.

(19) See: Заявление Советского правительства от 25 июня 1959 г. "Правда", 26 июня, 1959 г.

(20) See: Нота от 9 юни 1959 г. на Народна република България (Note of June 9, 1959, of the People's Republic of Bulgaria), в. "Работническо дело", 10 юни 1959 г.; Декларация на правителството на НРБ (Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria), в. "Работническо дело", 9 юли 1959 г.

For more details see: Ж. Григорова, Создание безатомной зоны на Балканах и в районе Адриатики - один из главных вопросов балканской политики Народной Республики Болгарии, 1957-1960 гг. (G. Grigorova. Establishment of Atom Free Zone in the Balkans and in the Adriatic Region, one of the Main Questions in Balkan Politics for Bulgaria, 1957-1960) - Etudes balkaniques, T.VI, p.17-50.

(21) See: Заявление на представителя на Министерството на външните работи на НРБ (Statement of the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the People's Republic of Bulgaria), в. "Работническо дело" 22 юни 1963 г.

(22) Having come into being at the end of 1959 on the initiative of democratic circles in Greece, this movement was rapidly joined by social circles in Bulgaria, Albania, Rumania and Yugoslavia and after 1964, also by the democratic circles of Cyprus.

(23) Held in Bulgaria were: The Seventh Balkan Medical Week, the meetings of writers, architects, jurists and the First Session of the Permanent Council of representatives of the writers' Unions of the Balkan Countries, the First Congress of Balkan Studies, the first conference of students from the Balkans, the Adriatic region and Cyprus, the first meeting of Balkan film workers and the First Balkan Film Festival, the First and Second Folk Song Balkaniade, and the First Circus Art Balkaniade, a seminar of teachers from the Balkan countries, the First Conference of Official Tourist Bodies of the Balkan Countries, etc.

Held in Rumania was: a conference of journalists from the region of the Balkan and the Adriatic region.

Held in Greece was: the Eight Medical Week.

We have not included here the meetings held every year up to 1966 in some of the Balkan capitals by representatives of the Committees for Balkan co-operation and mutual understanding (1964 - in Belgrade, 1965 - in Athens, 1966 - in Sofia.)

Corrections to the Bulgarian paper.

Page 1

- a) in the end of line two after modern the word war is missing.
- b) in the middle of line fourteen after lasting the word peace is missing.
- c) subtitle 2, Security Policy should read Security Policy in Europe.

Page 5

- a) In line twelve between scientific and interests the following passage is missing: "technical and cultural co-operation among all European states have at the same time certain additional specific.."

Page 6

In the end of line eight "and here pass some of the boundaries" should be replaced by "it is here that passes some of the boundaries".

Page 12

In line eleven "Bulgaria's Security" should be replaced by "Balkan Security"

Second Draft

BRITAIN AND EASTERN EUROPE

A Study in Co-operation

by

Ian Taylor

London School of Economics

1. INTRODUCTION

A combination of changing external conditions and internal attitudes and responses has created a pensive mood in Britain during the last few years with regard to foreign policy options. In a sense, 1968 is a key year. The Government's decision to accelerate the withdrawal of British troops from the Middle East and Asia has provided the strategic rationale to the conversion of the Labour Government to the European ideal. The "major national argument about where we should go in defence and foreign policy" which Minister for Defence Denis Healey asked for in March 1966 has begun to reveal that Britain is to turn her attention from the Asian mainland towards her own continent. As Healey himself has declared, "the security of Britain still depends above all on the prevention of war in Europe."¹⁾ That the decision was assisted by a continuing economic crisis does not necessarily mean that the process was not inevitable.

The decision of the Government to submit an application to join the Common Market arose partly from this desire to influence the development of European policy on matters of war and peace. As the Prime Minister declared at the time: "I believe on balance it will be right economically, but the political argument is stronger."²⁾ To gain membership would give this country a greater say in the problems of the European relationship with America and in the future character of the Atlantic Alliance at a time when debate on these issues is at a height. The veto has meant that Britain has to pursue the same objectives from a relatively weaker position.

It is essential to appreciate this transitional phase through which Britain is passing when examining her potential role in an East-West detente. Since the war Britain has always seen herself as a world power enjoying a "special relationship" with the United States, and thus placed squarely in the Western camp as a major protagonist of the Cold War. What is now changing is not her allegiance to the Atlantic Pact, but her estimation of how best to contribute to that alliance in a period of Cold War abatement and the resurgence of western Europe.

Britain increasingly sees her role as one of providing the link between Europe and the United States, helping to organize a European defence force that is a more significant factor with NATO. Hence there is little influential political support for the Gaullist concept of "l'Europe des Patries". It is difficult to envisage a situation in which America would be totally disinterested in the fate of the allies in Europe; at the same time Europe needs its own nuclear contribution to ensure a significant influence on Atlantic policy, and to avoid the possibility of being used as a hostage in the event of a Soviet-American conflict.³⁾

Thus for Britain there are two levels to be considered when discussing the East-West co-operation. Firstly, that military and political contingency plans are based on the assumption that the possibility of an aggressive Soviet Bloc move cannot be discounted. Secondly, that steps should be taken to lessen the chances of such an occurrence as long as such steps do

not weaken the unity of the NATO alliance. It is worth stating that underlying British defence policy is the belief that the balance of power has formed and still forms the real check to the Soviet Union. Thus any policy that weakens the foundations of that balance would serve to undermine the whole basis of peace and stability in Europe. The Soviet Union may indeed be less dangerous than during the Stalinist era, but it would be a policy of irreponsible folly to tempt that country by weakening the West. In a situation where power has been checked by power, one must assess the military and political requirements of European security on the basis of what the Soviet Union has the power to do rather than what we think the Soviet Union intends to do.

2. FIELDS OF CO-OPERATION

2.1. Security.

The British Government has frequently stated its desire for progress in the field of East-West security arrangements.

The problem that exists centres basically around the future of Berlin and Germany. The relaxation since 1961 of Soviet pressure on West Berlin has symbolized the easing of tension in Europe. The Prime Minister declared in 1965 that the continued division of Germany constituted "not a guarantee of security for her neighbours to the West or the East, but a focal point of tension between them."⁴⁾ It is still the Government's policy not to recognize the East German regime, and only the Bonn government is held to be responsible for the German people and able to speak on their behalf.⁵⁾ However, contacts of a human, economic and cultural nature between the two parts of Germany are encouraged in order to alleviate the human misery which partition brings. In common with the French and US Foreign Ministers, the British Foreign Minister has emphasized in 1966 that "the solution of the German question is one of the essential problems in the relations between East and West. This solution can only be found by peaceful methods on the basis of the right of self-determination and through the creation of an atmosphere of detente on the continent, under the conditions guaranteeing the security of all countries."⁵⁾

Linked with the German question is the desire to reduce military tension and the very costly military investment within Europe. The problems here are recognized as being immense. The Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries has been rejected as likely to raise the issue of the status of the so-called German Democratic Republic, denying the right of the US to take part in the discussions on the future of Europe, and would in any case not add much to the declared policies of both sides or to obligations assumed under the United Nations Charter. Britain has supported US proposals for the setting up of observation points on the territory of both camps to reduce fears of armed attack. Also, she supports plans for a verified freeze of the numbers and characteristics of some strategic nuclear offensive and defensive delivery vehicles. Both proposals have met with Soviet objections. On the issue of nuclear-free zones, the basic principles held by

the Government are that such zones must rest on the free agreement of the governments in the area concerned, must include all militarily significant states - and preferably all states - in the zone, must not disturb the military balance, and must be subject to verification adequate to the situation in the region.

Thus in practice these principles exclude total "de-nuclearization" of any zone of major confrontation between the Great Powers, in particular, Europe. However, the Minister for Defence has expressed the belief that attempts could be made to reach agreement "on maintaining the balance of power in Europe at lower cost, to agree on inspection posts, to freeze existing forces and to move on ultimately to reduce the level at which the balance is maintained on both sides."

The problem at the moment is that no solutions have been found on which the two blocs can yet approach agreement⁺. Soviet proposals have aimed at impeding the functioning of NATO, or disturbing the balance of forces by removing West Germany from the Western Alliance. The freezing and reduction of forces in Central Europe must take account not only of weapons stationed in the area, but also those targeted upon it from the Soviet Union, and must be accompanied by progress toward a political solution of the problems of European security and German reunification. Progress in this field is therefore likely to be slow.⁷⁾ An important factor in British policy within the overall objective of the removal of the danger of nuclear war in the context of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, is the proposed Non-Proliferation Agreement.⁸⁾ Disarmament proposals offer a constructive basis for furthering "the process of detente between East and West and for creating the more secure Europe which is the goal of all of us".⁹⁾

2.2. Trade Relations

If progress in the security field is likely to be unspectacular in the field of trade relations far more might be expected. The old US adage that a "fat Communist is a contented Communist" was discarded at an early stage in Britain. For centuries Britain has depended on her ability to trade whatever the political difficulties, and the exceptions prove the rule.

With the Sterling crisis lingering, and with the second veto to entry into the EEC, increased efforts are being made to improve British trade with the Soviet bloc.¹⁰⁾ There is certainly scope for improvement. The bloc accounts for only 4% of British imports and 3% of her exports - rather less than Sweden. Most of the countries are in trade surplus with Britain, notably the USSR.

Trade with the East has been especially difficult. The Communist policy of autarchy, put into effect in the late 40s and early 50s, with their emphasis on self-reliance, resulted in a turn down in trade with the West; the creation of Comecon cooperation has reinforced the tendency to trade only between themselves. Against this, the political attitudes of the West have increased the rift. For instance, there is the strategic

+ See page 11 for discussion on the Soviet European Security Conference Proposal.

embargo of goods on the CONCOM list, carefully maintained by the US. Similarly, the technical problem of the non-convertibility of Eastern currency has led to the over emphasis of the system of barter; and the need to conduct business through central State Import Export Corporations has slowed development.

UK Trade with Comecon Countries

	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
SOVIET UNION						
UK exports	41,921	55,398	38,002	46,903	49,726	63,306
re-exports	15,589	8,474	1,742	487	656	936
UK imports	84,114	90,961	96,967	118,826	125,633	123,510
POLAND						
UK exports	32,449	27,594	24,022	24,400	35,140	48,191
re-exports	517	473	859	830	1,129	523
UK imports	38,492	40,191	48,064	48,347	53,678	56,218
CZECHOSLOVAKIA						
UK exports	12,911	11,464	12,619	12,885	17,721	13,917
re-exports	1,256	496	512	1,683	905	1,125
UK imports	13,236	16,319	17,008	17,398	19,546	20,508
EAST GERMANY						
UK exports	7,191	6,869	5,088	8,064	15,917	13,594
re-exports	2,431	1,129	1,035	220	511	3,468
UK imports	6,604	7,532	10,409	12,102	13,552	12,152
RUMANIA						
UK exports	8,379	11,716	8,149	9,598	10,345	9,763
re-exports	768	160	224	121	333	210
UK imports	7,074	7,427	8,943	11,119	15,169	25,665
HUNGARY						
UK exports	6,783	7,319	8,637	7,571	10,116	12,206
re-exports	213	165	239	165	357	224
UK imports	4,774	5,783	7,520	6,797	7,314	9,611
BULGARIA						
UK exports	1,218	2,099	2,759	3,847	7,368	6,137
re-exports	28	45	25	42	61	74
UK imports	3,339	3,654	4,409	5,383	6,196	6,292
TOTAL						
UK exports	110,852	122,459	99,276	113,267	147,333	167,498
re-exports	20,802	10,942	4,636	3,548	3,952	6,560
UK imports	157,633	171,867	193,320	220,052	241,086	253,972

Source: Overseas Trade Accounts of the United Kingdom.

Trade for the Eastern European countries tends to be more related to their economic need than closely connected to political orientation. It is true that any country is likely to be influenced by the growth sector of its foreign trade however small a percentage that may be of its total trade. However, it is misleading to see increased trade with the West as indicating greater liberalisation within the regimes of Eastern Europe generally. Poland's trade with Britain is growing fast but bears no relation to that country's current political development.

The East also lacks the economic means to couple trade with political pressure, as has been the practice of several Western countries. Britain has been less susceptible to the notion of trade as a political lever than others. Trading is more for the sake of trade.

Not that this makes it any easier. There is still a greater need for discussion of East-West trade prospects between government officials and economic planners and the businessmen who actually sell the products. Their separate intentions do not always tie in. But perhaps because, in Britain, trade is valued on its own worth, enthusiasm may outweigh prospects for expansion. Potential for further trade compatible with developments in Western trading patterns is limited. Even if one assumes that the changes in the East indicate an anxiousness by the smaller countries to weaken their links with the Soviet Union through increased trade with the West, the fact remains that the range of goods produced by them considered tradeable by the West is very limited. The comparative pricing system being established within the Comecon also could go the other way with the result that it could be more profitable to trade as much as possible with the bloc.

Having stated the problems, one can acknowledge those developments that have been made. The Board of Trade has promoted several export services - informatory, advisory, promotional, financial etc. A comprehensive export credit insurance and financial support system has been arranged through the Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD).¹¹⁾ In 1964, Britain was the first to break the general Western ban on offering credits of more than five years to the communist countries. The East European market has generally been found to have a good payment record especially on current account. The Government has also sponsored research into improved trade techniques, and led the pressure to relax the strategic embargo. In the latter case, the rules of the Paris COCOM were observed while efforts were made to change them, aware that non-NATO countries not owing binding loyalty to COCOM were stealing a march. Exceptional British licences were issued under the "special national interest" clause, but were limited by the frequent use of US components. Although the embargo has had a greater sectional than major obstructive effect, the easing of US concern over the strict retention of the strategic list is welcomed.

Official support has also been given for public bodies concerned with British trade with the Soviet bloc. For example the London Chamber of Commerce and the re-established National Export Council's East-West Trade Committee covering both imports and exports.¹²⁾

Alongside the efforts of the ECGD, British merchant and clearing banks and insurance companies are now providing very substantial resources for financing large industrial and construction projects over considerably extended periods. Thus while there are some gaps, British export finance and guarantee facilities are now competitive against most in the world.¹³⁾

Trade with the USSR

Trade between the USSR and Britain is likely to receive a boost from the mammoth Soviet Exhibition which opened in London on August 7th, with the hopeful title of "Through Trade to Peace and Understanding". The Prime Minister when touring the exhibition remarked that Anglo-Soviet trade had always been of special interest to him since his days at the Board of Trade after the war, when he had signed the first trade agreement between the countries. It had expanded at a far faster rate than he had thought possible then. He commented that the emphasis had shifted away from Soviet's traditional primary products like furs and timber towards¹⁴⁾ the more sophisticated products of a technological society. However, as the vice-chairman of the Parliamentary East-West Trade Group recently pointed out, progress towards purchase of sophisticated goods is low. She learnt from a visit to Moscow that British reluctance to buy such Soviet goods is the reason why the Soviet Government has not made efforts to correct the trade imbalance. Compared with British purchase of £35 million worth of timber and manufactured wood products, only £1.8 million of machinery and transport equipment is imported. The Soviet Government is anxious that Britain should buy oil from her; if a contract was signed then, potential British exports of electronic equipment etc. might get a more favourable reception.¹⁵⁾

Generally trade with the East could increase as it becomes more industrialized and its standard of living rises. Even if it is technologically behind it could spare industrial capacity and redeployable labour, but that would be far into the future. Although many barriers to Eastern goods have been reduced, removal of import quotas alone is not enough, and there is likely to be a demand for complete "most favoured nation" (MFN) status. Any practicable developments would be welcomed in Britain. As Joseph Kronsten has remarked:

"For Britain, having to live mainly on special skills and intensive trade, the widening and diversification of her commerce with the East is highly desirable."¹⁶⁾

2.3. Industrial and Technical Co-operation

The need for industrial and technical co-operation has been alluded to above. Although it is difficult for British industry to gear itself to planned economies, the issues have been widely discussed. It seems as if "trade in technology" will assume importance, assisted by the fact that most East European countries are now signatories of the Paris Convention on manufacturing licenses, patent rights etc.

When in Britain last year, Mr. Kosygin invited Britain to engage in joint long-term economic co-operation planning, with some British industries participating in Soviet industrialization and similar projects, and vice versa. Such ideas are not yet feasible, and although they get official verbal recognition little action has been taken. However, the Eastern bloc badly needs technology, and great hopes are held for progress in this field, perhaps in the arranging of the purchase of industrial licenses and knowhow, which would rapidly open up possibilities, particularly of joint projects.

British businessmen have also become increasingly intrigued by the ideas of the Poles and others on the possibility of joint projects in third countries. The British firms would provide the know-how and some of the more advanced components, probably including some electric ones; the Poles would do more run of the mill engineering, possibly at a lower cost than the British or any other European firms could manage. British exporters could at least look hard at these possibilities, despite the obvious administrative complications.¹⁷⁾

2.4. Other Fields of Co-operation.

Co-operation in the fields of military and economic arrangements is inevitably the centre of most discussion. However, in proportion to the degree of positive advance made, it is in the areas of educational, cultural, scientific and athletic co-operation that most hope for the future must be based. Although these fields are relatively peripheral, the British position is to encourage all developments that are likely to lead to improved relations with Eastern Europe.¹⁸⁾

Accordingly, many British artists and performers visit the Soviet bloc countries, and vice versa. For example, Sadlers Wells, the Royal Shakespeare Company, the London Symphony Orchestra have exchanged with their Eastern bloc counterparts. Student visits are typical of the many that take place to encourage understanding amongst the youth of all countries involved. Scientific co-operation has been extended rapidly; most notably the assistance given by Jordell Bank telescope to the Russian space team.

Tourism is also becoming easier for westerners, with the task of obtaining visas being made less awesome. Fortunately, the signs are that the movement is becoming two-way. Czechs for example have been visiting Britain in relatively large numbers this year. Contact between citizens is a vital part of a detente. For too long, knowledge has been limited to officially sponsored trips, and through "twin-city" arrangements, valuable as these are.¹⁹⁾

The Church of England has been most active in making contacts with religious leaders in Eastern Europe. The Archbishop of Canterbury has since his appointment kept closely in touch with the Moscow Patriarch. Also, during the Anglican Archbishop's visit to Orthodox Rumania in 1965 he received a notably warm reception. The visit was returned the following year, and subsequently representatives have been exchanged by the Churches. Relations are maintained with non-Orthodox churches, for example in East Germany. Theological Conferences enabling increased personal contacts are often held in Geneva.

However, in the matter of the printed word, progress is slow. The London "Times" has been on sale at a few points in Moscow since the middle of this year, but generally speaking, only the British Communist paper "The Morning Star" is readily available. With books, more English works are translated into the various languages of Eastern Europe for general sale, but they are still carefully selected.²⁰⁾ Only scientific and technological books are readily accepted.

In that the progress of cultural contacts gives some clear indication of the extent that East-West relations have developed, there is distinct reason for hope that whatever the political developments at any point in time, the underlying trend of improving relations and interpretation of ideas is constant and expanding.

3. FRAMEWORKS OF CO-OPERATION

3.1. Global.

Global institutions by their nature and purpose are less suited to deal with the problems of intra-European relations. In this sense they have a low functionality in European co-operation for Britain. In many cases, the affairs of the United Nations Organization exacerbate rather than ameliorate East-West relations in Europe through the infection of the world conflict. Admittedly, however, the UN does provide an opportunity for behind the scenes discussion.

Within the specialized UN agencies there is probably more opportunity. At the 14th General Conference of UNESCO in October 1966, the countries of Eastern Europe proposed that cultural exchanges should be discussed on a multilateral basis. There seems much sense in this idea, although its enactment may devolve onto regional bodies.

3.2. Multilateral and Regional

ECE: Although the Economic Commission for Europe has those symmetric qualities best suited to co-operation, Britain has not really channelled her major initiatives through this body. Its range of activities do not seem to provide a great hope that it will become an active body in promoting detente unless there is a conscious decision by both sides that it be so. It could have a role, however, in co-ordinating the various economic and technical agreements which are now becoming more numerous. Those agreements would still be negotiated on a bilateral basis even so, with the ECE acting as a clearing house.

GATT: Britain is aware of the desire of East European countries for increased status in world trade, and particularly for an assured "most favoured nation" rank. In return for which they are realising that they must concede some form of right of inspection. This would ensure that their governments are in fact practising the rules of non-discrimination among their various suppliers, communist and capitalist alike. One suggestion is for a new international body to survey East-West trade, allied to OECD and reporting to GATT, which could organize the inspection on a symmetric basis.²¹⁾ There seems no British move yet, however, to give such suggestion official backing. Certainly, some measures are necessarily to enable Eastern European countries to overcome the exclusivity of EEC and EFTA. Despite the low EEC external tariff, the Soviet bloc fears the threat to food and raw material producers, a fear that would be strengthened should sympathetic schemes increasing effective communist participation in GATT. Circumstances are propitious. The Czechs

have now introduced a new system of accounting and profitability, and there is a continued movement toward reform of trade procedures and practices. The introduction of this new pricing system will make Czech membership of GATT more effective, and will make the achievement of multilateralism more possible since the Czechs will know the costs of production in terms of the West.²²⁾

IMF/WORLD BANK: In the problem of world expansion, the issue of the Eastern bloc's finances is paramount. One solution could be to encourage them to join the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. This, as Yugoslavia's experience has shown, could provide that help needed by communist countries to gain access to additional external finances to give substance to their economic liberalisation. The new President of the World Bank has undoubtedly given the matter some thought: although perhaps not an immediate possibility, it is conceivable that the Soviet Union will have to allow such developments in the future.

The basic technical problem of trade expansion is the limited convertibility of Soviet bloc currencies even within the area itself, and even very tenuous connections with convertibility outside it. The long-term solution to the problem could well be found in co-operation with the World Bank.

A further reason for such participation is the increasing need for the Eastern bloc for foreign financial assistance for purchasing capital goods in the West. For Britain, such assistance can be found through the London money market, but it would be of general benefit if such facilities could also be obtained from such non-political bodies as the World Bank and IMF.

The case of Yugoslavia provides strong support for this contention. Alone among the East European countries, she remained a member of both organizations throughout the first twenty-one years of her existence, with considerable benefit. In relation to population size, she has been accorded assistance on a scale that has been exceeded by only a handful of members.²³⁾

For Britain, anxious to develop better markets in Eastern Europe, consideration of these proposals is most likely, although the Treasury does not at the moment seem too optimistic.²⁴⁾

EEC: The failure of the British attempt to enter the Common Market has meant that this organization is not likely to have an immediate bearing on policy towards the Comecon countries. However, as the application is still formally "on the table", it is valuable to note that the Government saw membership as in no way incompatible with better East-West relations. It has been claimed that Britain's entry would help perpetuate the division of Europe and so be an obstacle to detente. The Undersecretary of State, Foreign Office, has stated that all experience since the war suggests that if harmony with the East is to be obtained, then Western Europe's own policies must be coherent and effective. British entry into the Communities would do much to finalize the post-war unity in Western Europe. Far from widening the division of Europe, it would create opportunities for redoubling the efforts to close it.²⁵⁾ Division amongst West European countries is not conducive to a wider unity within Europe, nor would it provide the safeguard sought by the Communist countries - namely the effective

curtailing of the power of West Germany. Furthermore, an economically strong West will provide a powerful attraction to Eastern countries. The possibilities for detente will be increased if the East European countries increase their rate of industrial and technical advance, and west European integration may act as a catalyst for this.²⁶⁾ The above seems to be the basis of British policy, reconciling the desire for membership of EEC with the long-term desire for the unity of the wider Europe. It is also fair to say that Britain feels that she cannot wait for detente before acting in her immediate economic and political interests.

The possibilities of EEC are not considered to be great; except with Yugoslavia, a country in any case that is not regarded as a member of the East for the purposes of this study. It does, however, have the value of serving as an example, both in possible relation with the communities, and with EFTA. The latter has agreed to allow Yugoslav delegates to attend technical meetings including those on double taxation, patents and probably customs.

EEC-COMECON CO-OPERATION: On an institutional basis not much hope is held of any developments. Comecon seems increasingly unlikely to become the Eastern zone's economic superstructure, its role being to implement the economic coordination measures of its members without being their common planning organ. Its officials have little initiative or administrative authority, and there is no Council of Ministers. Hence it is not truly comparable with EEC, but more with OECD. It is quite possible that co-operation would be more feasible with EFTA, though this organization is not a continuing factor in long term British economic policy.

Although British policy is to encourage Eastern bloc economic co-operation to strengthen their economies, there is no doubt that institutionalized attempts at detente such as EEC-Comecon or OECD-Comecon contacts may not lead to most political advantages. Rumania, for example, is anxious to decrease the influence Comecon has on her trade relations. Bilateral agreements thus become important and more flexible.

OECD: British support for President Johnson's 1966 initiative in suggesting that OECD increase its role in coordinating East-West relations was lukewarm,²⁷⁾ as the organization is regarded more as a rapporteur on the condition of member countries' economies than an organization for bridgebuilding, although it may have a role to play in scientific and technical contacts.

Council of Europe: There have been several suggestions recently that membership of the Council of Europe should be extended to East European countries, but with little official support. Yet Britain does see the Council playing a role in future co-operative exercises, as shown by the Political Debate of May this year at Strasbourg. Mr. Maurice Edelman, British Labour M.P., presented the report on the general policy of the Council of Europe (Doc. 2362). He concluded that:

"...all efforts should be directed towards the dual aim of widening the bounds of the Communities and strengthening their political effectiveness while laying the foundations for new cooperation between the two halves of Europe. To attain the latter aim, the primary need

is to tackle the German problem in a fresh spirit and make every endeavour to solve it. Its solution is the only criterion for detente and lasting cooperation in Europe."

To this end the British all-Party delegation gave support to the recommendation of the Assembly that the Committee of Ministers should "invite the governments of member states in their bilateral contacts with East European countries, to promote the possibilities of making fuller and more resolute use of the Council of Europe as an instrument of co-operation and as a forum between East and West Europeans". The Committee of Ministers was also asked to promote cultural unity and international exchanges between East and West, using the Council as a forum for such activities.²⁸⁾ This is likely to become an increasingly important channel for non-contentious contacts, varying from exchanges to agreement on the Council's Water Charter, proclaimed on May 1968. An extension of the ad hoc activities of the Council in this direction would be supported in Britain.

3.3. Military subregional co-operation

NATO and the Warsaw Pact

The British Government has encouraged the progress of the Harmel exercise, and the investigations into the ways in which the alliance can be strengthened as a factor for "a durable peace". The British attitude towards the need for Atlantic unity has been discussed above (p. 1). At the same time, value is placed on the potential role of NATO in furthering chances of detente. During the June 1966 meeting of the NATO Council, the then Foreign Secretary Mr. Michael Stewart²⁹⁾ suggested that NATO draw up an East-West code of co-operation consisting of principles on which both sides were agreed. The Minister of Defense has welcomed the prospect of a dialogue between NATO and the Warsaw Pact aimed at "lowering the cost of security in Europe and creating a climate of mutual confidence in which it is easier to tackle the outstanding political problems created by the Second World War."³⁰⁾ But he added that "no such dialogue has the chance of success unless the Western allies remain united and keep up their military guard."³¹⁾

Thus the British stand on the Bucharest Declaration of the Warsaw Pact³²⁾ on the one hand welcomes a European Security Conference once circumstances are created in which it would have a good chance of success, and as long as the USA and Canada participate; but on the other hand rejects the suggestion of liquidating the alliances. As Mr. George Brown remarked at the time; it would be putting "the military cart before the political horse ... Indeed, if in present day Europe the military sides of the two alliances were to be dismantled and we simply had a number of separate and independent national armies, this would be more likely to create dangers than to remove them."³³⁾ Similarly, to those in the West who not only advocate such a measure, but wish to take unilateral action by dissolving NATO to lead the way, Mr. Healey has said recently that "to argue that because the situation is stable we do not now need NATO, is like saying you can destroy the dam because you have not had a flood since it was built."³⁴⁾

The modification of the Soviet proposals put forward by Britain involves mutual force reductions to ensure that the overall balance between the two alliances would remain unaltered, though at a lower level. The discussions to achieve this could be channelled through the NATO administration.³⁵⁾ Such measures of arms control, if they could be introduced without loss of security, would create a better climate in which to approach Europe's major political problems and would release resources for more productive economic ends.

Thus in some ways NATO could provide a valuable means for promoting the relaxation of East-West tension. However, as in most cases discussed in this section, the stress placed on bilateral methods is greater, even if the regional organizations serve as a clearing house for bilateral agreements. Regarding the use of NATO, Mr. George Brown, then Foreign Secretary, said last year:

"This does not mean that we are thinking particularly of what you might call institutional contacts between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Our view, and perhaps this is also the view of the Warsaw Pact, is that the development of contacts between us will largely be on a bilateral basis. But it is useful to exchange ideas within the alliances on ways in which these bilateral contacts can be expanded, and to exchange experiences."³⁶⁾

Disarmament Negotiations

Apart from regional disarmament negotiations, Britain places great stress on the Geneva Eighteen National Disarmament Conference (ENCD). Although the stability in confrontation between the two blocs is attributable in the Government's view mainly to armament, not disarmament, nevertheless disarmament negotiations are both desirable and contribute to improving relations. As the Minister for Disarmament pointed out during the ENDC meeting in June 1966, "it is possible to argue that in disarmament negotiations discussion is almost as valuable as agreement - as long as we are talking seriously and constructively about how to control the enormous power of the nuclear weapon there is, I suppose, less chance that it will ever be used."³⁷⁾

2.4. Bilateral Co-operation

The framework of co-operation of the highest functionality is the bilateral agreement. This may either be channelled through a regional organization (see above) or on a strict nation to nation basis. The latter has for Britain assumed cardinal importance. Often positive acts of co-operation directly stem from the many exchanges between foreign ministers or their deputies, and between ministers responsible for other departments, such as technology, trade, education, economics and health.³⁸⁾ Some devolution of responsibility by the Government to public and private bodies has been found to increase the effectiveness of bilateral arrangements.

Some ideas of the ground covered by the British government by utilization of this framework is shown below. The hope is that in each category the success so far obtained will provide a solid foundation for further, more radical developments.

Cultural Relations

Britain has a cultural agreement with the Soviet Union, and Programmes with Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania. There is no arrangement with Poland, although the British Council is represented in Warsaw.

The agreement with the Soviet Union is extensive. Its full title is "The Agreement on Relations between Britain and the USSR in the Scientific, Technological, Educational and Cultural Fields", which gives some idea of the wide area covered. First signed during the visit of the Conservative Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Macmillan, to Moscow in 1959, the Agreement is renewed every two years, with significant extensions.³⁹⁾ In the 1967 Agreement, other separate agreements have been incorporated, such as the 1965 understanding between the Royal Society and the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

The British Council is the main agent for the British Government, for implementing agreements such as the one above. In particular, in this case the Council is concerned with the provisions for educational exchanges, exchanges of writers, publishers, lawyers, librarians etc., and with the Arts.⁴⁰⁾

Trade Relations

A trade Agreement exists with the Soviet Union,⁴¹⁾ and confidential Arrangements with Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary. There is a Shipping Agreement with the Soviet Union, and attempts are being made to draw up a treaty on air pollution.

Although the British Government does not recognize the East German regime, the Confederation of British Industry, the spokesman for both private and nationalized industry, has an unofficial arrangement with the Pankow government.

Technological Relations

Science and Technology agreements exist with Rumania, Hungary, Poland, USSR and Czechoslovakia.⁴²⁾ These have been the result of a governmental impetus to provide the framework for greater co-operative options open to industry. Working parties have been set up through each agreement, and provision is made for exchange of personnel, information and for joint research. A major effort is also being made to place eastern bloc science students in British Universities.

The most important hope for the future in this area lies in the work of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI). This body has co-operated with the USSR to set up working parties for technological co-operation in many fields.⁴³⁾ This is a unique departure, being less academic, more practical than the French equivalent. The aim is to bridge the gap between state and private traders, and to overcome the problems of patents and exchange of information. The process began in November 1967 with a CBI mission in Moscow. Subsequently the visits have been two-way. In February 1968, the Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for

Science and Technology visited London, followed in May by a team of Soviet industrialists. With the Soviet Ministry of Trade allowing more flexibility, it is becoming easier to contact firms directly; however, research is still done centrally, thus requiring a central British body to negotiate with that research unit.

In future, it is hoped to secure an exchange of patents and even engage in joint projects. The CBI is not certain that it will succeed in this venture, but on current performance, the outlook is hopeful. At the moment, it has been decided not to extend the arrangement to other countries in the Soviet bloc, partly because research in these is less centralized, and a firm to firm basis more conceivable.

Trade Firms and Missions

These are well supported by the British government and industry. They provide the industrialists of both sides with a chance to meet their opposite numbers and to discover what products are really needed, what design criteria are important, and other information that is usually hard to obtain. For the Eastern industrialists, they usually provide local factory based technicians, engineers and specialists of all kinds with what is often their only chance to see products from outside Comecon countries.⁴⁴⁾ Greater participation in the trade fairs such as Leipzig and Poznan and more efficient trade missions should have extensive returns.

Miscellaneous

Contacts are maintained through a variety of organizations, such as the Parliamentary East-West Trade Group, the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce, the Anglo-USSR Society, the contacts initiated by the Trades Union Council, etc. Delegations of politicians from East European countries also visit Britain periodically. The number and scope of such contacts is growing fast.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is clear that it is through the framework of nation to nation agreements that Britain believes most success will emerge. By expanding the above agreements and using their relative progress as a foundation, better use can be made of institutional opportunities. It is inevitable that with the current state of world politics, the more global an institution, the lower its functionality. An agreement made on an institutional basis tends to deal in generalities, and lack sufficient economic and political nuances.

Thus, for Britain, there are two levels of co-operation. One the global/regional/institutional level, where progress is valuable but not concrete. The other the bilateral, where progress is based on practical experience steadily accumulated. These two levels are interrelated; indeed, they must be, for only a combination of both will secure a realistic detente. The objective of British policy is to strengthen the bilateral level so as slowly to remove the vestiges of Cold War attitudes from wider negotiations.⁴⁵⁾

The view of Europe at the stage of co-operation and interpretation is a distant one. It depends on the flowering of mutual trust, and that plant is still of tardy growth.

Ian C. Taylor

London, 19th August 1968

NOTES

1. Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy HMSO July 1967.
2. To the House of Commons May 8th 1967.
3. Viz. speech of Minister of Defence House of Commons, July 26th 1968. How this organization and control of nuclear military power is to be achieved is still to be made clear. One suggestion is eventual Anglo-French co-operation through the WEU, though this would depend on the trends in French policy.
4. Mr. Harold Wilson on the 20th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe, 7th May 1965.
5. Note of the three Western Powers to the President of the Security Council concerning an East German application for membership of the UNO.
6. Communique issued after the NATO Ministerial meeting Dec. 1966. Note the concern expressed about the recent pressure on Berlin access routes in the June 1968 communique.
7. Viz. "Russia, China and the West" p.98 f. Central Office of Information, London January 1968. The British Government has never entirely rejected such proposals as the Rapacki Plan, although has effectively talked them into oblivion. As Lord Chalfont, Minister for Disarmament has remarked: Having supported the Latin American nuclear free zone treaty, the Government conceded that she could see no reason not to avoid examining the possibilities actively and closely, as this type of agreement on regional arms control could make a contribution of its own. (House of Lords, May 8th 1967.)
8. Viz "Arms Control and Disarmament", notes on Current Developments number 3. Foreign Office 1st March 1968.
9. Speech by Lord Chalfont cited above. See page 12 for discussion of the ENDC.
10. Trade with Eastern Europe is not likely to help solve the Sterling problem. The deficit is on short term balance of payments account. Thus while long term credit assisted exports are welcome, they contribute inadequately to the British current international payments problem and bring no immediate relief to sterling.
11. The ECGD operates the technique of buyer credit now. The Government loans cash to the buyer to pay for the goods, and the buyer and supplier write a simple cash contract between them. In this way money is divorced from goods and it is the government which guarantees payment. Since cash payment is assured, many more manufactures will be willing to undergo the hardships

of negotiating deals with the Soviet bloc countries. There is little hardship for the Government, since the repayment record of the countries is good.

12. The London Chamber of Commerce has recently signed a series of protocols of co-operation with Chambers of Commerce in various east European countries.
13. Viz "East-West Trade: Myth and Matter". J.A. Kronsten in International Affairs (London) April 1967, vol. 43 No. 2. Viz article by Shonfield in International Affairs January 1968. For an excellent discussion of "How to Win a Russian Order", see the London "Economist" June 1st 1968, p. 48. As an example of the expansion of credit facilities in London, on March 22nd this year the Russian Bank of Foreign Trade signed a bulk credit agreement with a representative of a group of merchant banks, allowing the Russians to buy machinery to the value of £ 20 m. - this in addition to the £ 25 m. of orders they have already placed since the end of 1966.
14. The Times August 7th 1968.
15. The Times August 13th 1968.
16. Kronsten loc cit. p. 280. Dr. Joseph A. Kronsten, an economist and export consultant, acts as a Foreign Trade Advisor to a City of London group of companies, with special reference to British trade with Eastern Europe.
17. Report in the "Economist" May 25th 1968, p. 34, on the return of two British trade missions to Warsaw.
18. Viz communique of the NATO Council December 1966.
19. For example, between Coventry and Dresden.
20. Viz "Westerly Winds over Eastern Europe" by Klaus Mehnert in "East Europe in Transition" edited by Kurt London. (Johns Hopkins Press 1966.)
21. Shonfield loc. cit. Incidentally, "Most Favoured Nation" treatment as used here means no-discriminatory treatment on import quotas as well as on tariffs. Several west European countries do accord Comecon countries equal treatment on tariffs but discriminate on quotas.
22. As far as UNCTAD is concerned, there is hope with the membership of Poland and Czechoslovakia. But generally the experience of past conferences has shown this a doubtful framework for improving purely East-West relations.
23. Yugoslavia's ability to draw short term credit from the IMF has helped her deal with payments pressures that have become more frequent since modernizing the face of her economy a few years ago. Also she has obtained loans valued \$330 m. from the World Bank for financing her economic development projects. The Comecon Bank established 1964, has not yet provided an answer to the currency problems of its member, and is more designed to cover temporary fluctuations in the trade balance of its members.
24. Viz C. Gordon Tether in the "Financial Times" August 6th 1968.
25. Mr. William Rogers. Viz "NATO Letter" April 1968, p. 8.
26. Mr. George Brown, then Foreign Minister, in a speech to the International Publishing Corporation Conference of European Editors. Reprinted in "NATO Letter" February 1967.

27. Department of State Bulletin October 24th 1966 - report of a speech to the National Conference of Editorial Writers in New York 7th October 1966. OECD may play a greater role if efforts are made to follow up suggestions as put forward on page 8 (footnote 21); but at the moment it does not figure largely in the policy thinking of the British Government with relation to East-West co-operation.
28. Council of Europe Political Debate on the Report on Cultural Exchanges, Document 2381.
29. Mr. Stewart is, of course, Foreign Secretary again. Mr. Geroge Brown held the office for the intervening 18 months.
30. House of Commons, 27th October 1966.
31. Quoted in "Russia, China and the West", page 89. See also the letter of General Sir John Hackett, Commander, NATO Northern Army Group and British Army of the Rhine, in The Times of 6th February 1968. Viz "Economist" article commenting, 10th February 1968.
32. 8th July 1966. The position of the Government remained the same in response to the Karlovy Vary Declaration of this year.
33. Quoted in "Russia, China and the West". The position would be even worse - the Soviet Union has bilateral agreements with all its Warsaw Pact allies which presumably would not disappear within the superstructure.
34. House of Commons Debate on the Supplementary Statement on Defense Policy, July 26th 1968. See this statement, Cmnd 3701, page 6. Also Statement on Defense Estimates 1968 Cmnd 3540.
35. Viz clause 6 of the final communique of the NATO Ministerial meeting, Reykjavik, June 1968. Also the declaration they adopted, which concludes: "They decided to make all necessary preparations for discussions on this subject with the Soviet Union and other East European countries, and they call on them to join in this search for progress towards peace."
36. See note 26. Also "NATO Letter" November 1966 page 25 for discussion of NATO and East-West Contacts.
37. Lord Chalfont, 16th June 1966 ENDC Proceedings.
38. Britain is well represented in Eastern Europe, having Embassies in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the USSR. For details see the Diplomatic Service Yearbook published by the Foreign Office. There is no representation in the GDR and Albania.
39. Cmnd 3279 (1967). Relevant articles:
 - II. Scientific Exchanges
 - III. Exchange in Technology and Applied Science, Industry, Transport, Standardization, Construction and Architecture
 - IV. Exchanges in Agriculture and Fisheries
 - V. Exchanges in Higher & Specialised Secondary Education
 - VI. Exchanges in Primary and Secondary Education
 - VII. Exchanges in Medicine
 - VIII. Exchanges in the Arts
 - IX. Cinema, Radio and Television
 - X. Exchanges between Non-Governmental Organizations and other Exchanges
 - XI. Sport
 - XII. Tourism

40. Specifically, with articles IV-VIII inclusive and X.
41. Cmnd 2402, July 1964. See the following Board of Trade Journals:
 1. "New Trends in Anglo-Soviet Trade", July 5th, page 3.
 2. "Rumania, a Growth Market for British Exporters", July 12th, page 75.
 3. "Expansion in the Polish Market", July 26th, page 211.
 4. "Bulgaria - A Country Determined to Succeed", August 26th, page 451.Others are to follow.
See also "East-West Trade" - a practical guide with an indispensable reference section, by Peter Zetner (London 1967).
42. Respectively, Cmnds 3295; 3457; 3488; 3710; 3697. These are gradually taking the place of the technological component in the Cultural agreements (see note 39).
43. The initial working parties covered Instrumentation; Patents; Electrification; Electric Generation; Motor Car and Allied Components; Industrial Pollution; Metallurgy & Steel; Scientific Instrumentation. Subsequent groups are studying Building; Railways; Coal; Machine Tools.
44. Viz Economist, June 22nd, 1968, page 67. See also National Provincial Bank Review number 73, Feb 1966, on setting up trade fairs.
45. Admissions that this attitude prevails tend to be mostly made off the record; however, the implication runs through most statements of British policy.

N.B.

Yugoslavia and Albania have been discounted from this study, although for different reasons. Co-operation with Yugoslavia is generally at a more advanced stage than with any of the countries dealt with above.

Interviews with representatives of various Ministries, and non-governmental bodies have been conducted in preparation of this paper.

LA POLITIQUE EXTERIEURE ET LA COOPERATION DE
LA YOUGOSLAVIE AVEC L'EUROPE

par

Milan Sahovic
Institute of International
Politics and Economy

1. Introduction

La politique extérieure de la Yougoslavie est généralement bien connue. Pays socialiste et non-aligné, la Yougoslavie a suivie une politique extérieure de large participation dans la solution des problèmes internationaux. Membre fondateur de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, elle s'est efforcée de contribuer à la réalisation des buts et des principes de la Charte ayant toujours en vue que la politique de coexistence pacifique et active doit être à la base du développement des rapports internationaux contemporains.

Les manifestations de cette politique de la Yougoslavie sont bien nombreuses. Un des pays créateurs de la politique du non-alignement la Yougoslavie a tout fait pour arriver à la réduction des conséquences négatives de la guerre froide, de la course aux armements ainsi que de la politique de la division du monde en blocs de puissances. Elle a été un des pays qui s'opposait dans toute situation à la politique de force et de pression et condamnait tout acte d'agression. La Yougoslavie a donné son appui complet à la lutte contre le colonialisme. Elle est un des membres les plus actifs du Groupe des pays en voie de développement. En soulignant l'interdépendence du développement politique et économique la Yougoslavie a insisté sans cesse sur l'importance de l'amélioration de la situation économique des pays en voie de développement en y voyant un des éléments fondamentaux du maintien de la paix et la sécurité internationales.

En agissant dans le cadre de cette politique, la Yougoslavie a établi des relations amicales et de coopération avec la majorité des pays d'Afrique, d'Asie et d'Amérique latine. C'est également le cas avec ses rapports avec les pays d'Europe. Malgré toutes difficultés et le passé, qui n'a pas favorisé toujours le progrès de ses rapports avec certains pays européens, l'application des principes généraux de la politique extérieure de la Yougoslavie en Europe a mené à des résultats positifs.

2. Les buts et les principes de la politique de la Yougoslavie en Europe

Depuis la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale la Yougoslavie a eu une place particulière en Europe. Elle est restée en dehors des groupements politiques et militaires dont la conséquence directe est la division du continent en deux parties et la naissance du conflit entre l'Est et l'Ouest européen. Cependant, la Yougoslavie n'était pas isolée de l'évolution de la situation internationale en Europe. Tout au contraire, impliqué par son passé et le présent dans les problèmes majeurs d'Europe, elle a été obligée de prendre position et d'agir dans les rapports intra-européens.

Suivant sa propre politique la Yougoslavie a formulé ses vues à propos des problèmes européens en partant d'un nombre de principes particuliers. Ces principes sont l'expression de sa compréhension des réalités politiques et ne doivent pas être interprétés comme base inchangeable de la politique yougoslave en Europe. Ils représentent plutôt la base générale d'une activité constante dont le but peut être défini comme intention de contribuer à la solution pacifique des problèmes d'Europe par intermédiaire du développement des rapports de bon voisinage et de coopération avec tous les états européens et dans toutes les domaines de la vie internationale, tant politique que social, économique, culturel et autres. Cette coopération ne peut pas se dérouler qu'à la base du respect des principes de l'égalité souveraine et de non-intervention dans les affaires internes des autres états et d'autres principes découlant de la Charte des Nations Unies. Le résultat final de cette politique doit être la renonciation complète et définitive à la menace ou à l'emploi de la force dans la vie d'Europe ainsi que la réalisation d'une paix stable dans cette partie du monde.

En prenant à part les principes de la politique européenne de la Yougoslavie, on s'aperçoit qu'ils reflètent l'évolution de la situation en Europe. Le rôle politique d'Europe dans le monde, ses capacités économiques, sa position stratégique, l'héritage du passé-surtout de la deuxième guerre mondiale, de la guerre froide et de la course aux armements-, l'existence de l'OTAN et du Pacte de Varsovie, la présence des États Unis, le problème

allemand, les conflits entre les pays appartenant aux diverses parties du continent, les conséquences de la division économique et l'activité des organisations régionales et subrégionales, en premier lieu de la Communauté économique européenne de Bruxelles et du COMECON, démontrent sans équivoque toute complexité des problèmes à résoudre qui se trouvent face aux pays européens. Mais il faut noter aussi, que sous l'influence de l'apaisement de la guerre froide qui a lieu en Europe ces derniers temps, on demande de plus en plus de nouvelles méthodes et des solutions qui correspondraient mieux à la nouvelle atmosphère qui se développe de plus en plus sur ce continent.

La conception yougoslave a pour base cette dernière ligne d'évolution des rapports intraeuropéens. Deux principes peuvent être indiquées comme fondement de cette conception. Un d'eux insiste sur l'impossibilité de l'isolement d'Europe des tendances générales du développement mondial. L'autre souligne la nécessité de lutter contre la division des pays européens en blocs politiques, militaire et économiques de puissances. L'expérience du passé ainsi que la situation actuelle est la source principale de l'argumentation soulevée en faveur de l'application de ces principes dans la politique européenne.

Tout d'abord on peut voir, et chaque jour nous le montre davantage, que la paix est une et indivisible et que malgré le déplacement des centres de conflit au Vietnam et au Proche Orient, l'amélioration effective des rapports internationaux en Europe dépend de la situation qui régne dans le monde. C'est pourquoi il est presque ou sinon complètement impossible d'établir un modèle distinct de sécurité européenne indépendant du système de sécurité universelle. La sécurité en Europe ne peut être conçue qu'en fonction des tendances du développement des rapports internationaux en général. Ce que ne signifie pas que les devoirs et les responsabilités des pays européens peuvent être réduits. Il s'agit ici d'un fait qui est le reflét du rôle mondial d'Europe. Ce fait souligne encore plus le besoin du règlement pacifique des problèmes européens dont la conséquence directe doit être l'activité plus grande des pays européens dans la recherche des solutions des problèmes politiques, économiques et sociaux mondiaux.

Il est assez facile d'indiquer les exemples qui illustrent cette interdépendance des problèmes mondiaux et des problèmes

intra-européens. Il est notoire que pour la solution du problème du désarmement général et complet, la situation politique et économique en Europe, surtout en Europe centrale et depuis un certain temps dans la Méditerranée, a une valeur primordiale. Le problème allemand ne concerne pas seulement le peuple allemand et les deux états allemands, mais aussi les autres pays et surtout les grandes puissances. Il est difficile à contester, d'autre part, que l'évolution favorable des rapports économiques entre les états européens devait avoir comme résultat non seulement l'amélioration de la situation économique en Europe. Elle devait être suivie par une meilleure compréhension des besoins des pays en voie de développement ainsi que d'une participation plus grande d'Europe tout entière dans l'activité déployée pour aboutir au changement de la position des régions sous-développées dans l'économie mondiale.

En ce qui concerne les problèmes européens, la Yougoslavie a insisté toujours sur le respect du droit de tout les pays européens de prendre une part active dans leur solution. Tout en reconnaissant la réalité et en premier lieu l'existence des groupements politiques et militaires, de l'OTAN et du Pacte de Varsovie, ainsi que des organisations économiques différentes, telles que la Communauté économique européenne et le COMECON, la Yougoslavie avait souligné que la division d'Europe ne devrait pas devenir un facteur permanent dans le cadre du développement des rapports bilatéraux et multilatéraux en Europe. Ça ne signifie pas que la Yougoslavie veut nier les raisons qui ont amené à la formation des groupements politiques et économiques existants et qu'elle estime qu'il soit possible et même raisonnable de les dissoudre dès maintenant ou dans un proche avenir. Elle est bien consciente que la confiance dans les rapports internationaux se gagne qu'avec de grande difficultés et à longue haleine. Ce qui est important, d'après son point de vue, c'est de suivre une politique constante de collaboration et de solution de problème en suspens tenant compte des intérêts légitimes de tout les pays européens,

Nous avons en ce moment devant nous deux catégories de problèmes hérités du passé et les problèmes qui sont le résultat de phénomènes nouveaux de l'affirmation plus grande, par exemple, de la position indépendante des pays européens par rapports aux alliances politiques et militaires ou des difficultés économiques dues

au système insatisfaisant des rapports entre la Communauté économique européenne et les autres pays européens. En présence de ces deux catégories de problèmes on peut se poser la question de la place que ces problèmes peuvent avoir dans la lutte pour le renforcement de la sécurité en Europe. Il est clair, pourtant, qu'il ne faut pas diminuer l'importance de certains de ces problèmes, mais, au contraire, qu'il faudrait les examiner en respectant les intérêts des parties sur le même pied, en déterminant leurs dimensions réelles et en élargissant en même temps les possibilités du développement de la coopération entre les pays européens. De telle sorte on pourrait contribuer à la construction d'une base solide de solution de problèmes hérités du passé ainsi que des problèmes actuels relatifs à la création des systèmes de sécurité et de coopération économique européens.

Dans le cadre de cette conception la Yougoslavie estime que les rapports bilatéraux entre les pays européens et surtout entre les pays voisins ont une importance exceptionnelle. Elle y voit un des éléments fondamentaux du processus de la création d'un climat de compréhension mutuelle qui devrait faciliter la réglementation multilatérale des problèmes majeurs d'Europe. Par conséquent, dans ces rapports avec les pays européens et notamment avec ses voisins, la Yougoslavie est prête à accepter toutes formes de coopération sous la condition qu'elles se réalisent à la base de l'égalité souveraine.

Le résultat de cette orientation dans la pratique est l'attitude de la Yougoslavie d'après laquelle l'appartenance aux groupements politiques et militaires différents ne peut pas être l'obstacle pour la coopération entre les états. De même, l'existence des pays ayant des systèmes socialiste et capitaliste, est reconnu mais le caractère socialiste de l'état yougoslave n'est pas considéré comme élément qui doit jouer le rôle prépondérant dans la détermination de la direction de ses rapports internationaux en Europe et dans le monde. La Yougoslavie entretient les relations politiques, économiques, culturelles et autres avec les états socialistes et capitalistes en même temps et sans aucune discrimination.

En même temps la Yougoslavie s'est déclarée toujours en faveur du rapprochement graduel des groupements politiques et mili-

taires en Europe sous conditions qu'on respecte le droit des pays non membres de prendre part dans la solution des problèmes intra-européens. L'Europe est le continent composé d'un nombre de plus anciens états indépendants du monde moderne et il ne paraît pas opportun insister trop sur les alliances en tant que forme permanente d'organisation de la vie internationale. Leur création est nécessaire quelque fois mais ça ne signifie pas que les alliances doivent servir comme éléments d'immobilisation de l'évolution des rapports internationaux et comme obstacle au développement de la coopération bilatérale et multilatérale qui doit correspondre aux besoins politiques, économiques et autres de la communauté internationale.

Cet aspect de la vie internationale a été un certain temps au deuxième plan. Ce n'est pas plus le cas aujourd'hui. La Yougoslavie l'a remarqué avec un certain nombre d'autres états avec lesquels elle insiste sur la nécessité d'une coopération la plus large possible de tout les états européens.

Le résultat de l'activité de ces pays a été l'adoption de la résolution 2129/XX/ à la XX-ième session de l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU parlant des mesures à prendre à l'échelon régional en vue d'améliorer les relations de bon voisinage entre les états européens avec des régimes sociaux et politiques différents. Cette résolution a été proposé par neuf pays européens: La Suède, la Finlande, le Danemark, la Belgique, la Hongrie, la Bulgarie, l'Autriche, la Roumanie et la Yougoslavie. Après l'approbation de cette résolution ces pays ont continué à travailler dans ce sens laissant à côté les différences des blocs de puissances et en demandant la considération la plus large des problèmes intra-européens. Les points gagnés dans cette voie sont la Déclaration de la Réunion commémorative consacrée à la célébration du vingtième anniversaire de la Commission économique d'Europe et la résolution 2317/XXII de la XXII session de l'Assemblée générale concernant le rôle de cette même commission dans le développement de la coopération économique internationale. Il est significatif, cependant, que cette dernière résolution a été proposé non seulement par le groupe de "neuf" mais aussi par d'autres pays européens qui se sont raliés à eux dans cette action. C'étaient les Pays Bas, le Luxembourg, l'Islande, la Norvège, la Grèce, la Turquie, la Tchécoslovaquie, la Pologne et

l'Ukraine.

On peut voir ainsi, que l'initiative des "neuf" a eu jusqu'a ce moment certains succès dans le domaine économique surtout. Mais on doit mentionner aussi l'initiative relative à la convocation d'une conférence des parlements européens (c'est une proposition du Parlement yougoslave), l'accord concernant des rencontres périodiques des ministres des affaires extérieures du groupe et les consultations de leurs délégations aux Nations Unies.

Le group des "neuf", qu'on peut appeler après la décision des Pays Bas de se joindre aux pays qui le composent, le group des "dix" n'a pas l'ambition de traiter à la fois tous les problèmes européens et spécialement ceux qui intéressent les groupements politiques et militaires existants. Le groupe se concentre plutôt sur les problèmes dont la solution peut contribuer à l'élargissement de la coopération de tous les pays européens. C'est bien ça la raison pour laquelle la Yougoslavie prend part dans l'activité du groupe des "dix" qui cherche dans la pratique les voies nouvelles pour la solution des problèmes intraeuropéens.

3. Les problèmes majeurs européens.

et la Yougoslavie

Il y a un nombre de problèmes qui préoccupent en ce moment les pays européens. Ce ne sont pas des problèmes récents mais chacun d'eux pose de nouvelles questions qui demandent des états de répondre à eux. Notre tâche n'est pas de les analyser ici à fond et nous nous bornons à indiquer l'attitude générale de la Yougoslavie. Nous ne donnerons pas l'historique de l'évolution de la position yougoslave. Nous n'avons que l'intention d'indiquer en bref ses vues présentes.

3.1. La sécurité européenne

Le premier problème a trait à la sécurité européenne. La Yougoslavie a salué sans réserves chaque proposition de réglementation de ce problème qui a comme point de départ des intérêts de tout

les pays européens, les buts et les principes de la Charte des Nations Unies ainsi que le vœu d'aboutir à la fin de la course aux armements et à l'accord sur le désarmement général et complet, sur le problème allemand et d'autres conflits en Europe.

Son point de vue actuel a été exprimé dans l'exposé du Secrétaire d'Etat des affaires étrangères M. Marko Nikezić qui a déclaré récemment dans le Parlement yougoslave à propos de la sécurité européenne:¹⁾

"En s'éloignant de la guerre froide il devient de plus en plus évident et important pour les états européens de poser la question de la sécurité du continent sur une base permanente. Les initiatives données jusqu'à maintenant représentent des propositions qui tiennent compte que de la réglementation des rapports entre les blocs militaires. Nous ne sous-estimons pas l'importance de l'accord entre les alliances militaires ainsi que des mesures possible prévues par ces initiatives, visant la conclusion d'un traité de non-agression entre l'OTAN et la Pacte de Varsovie. Cependant, nous sommes obligé à remarquer qu'au fond le but de ces conceptions est de fixer dans de divers variantes la division qui existe et non pas la création d'un vrai système de sécurité collective et universelle qui partirait des intérêts légitimes de tous les peuples et garantirait d'une manière permanente la paix sur le continent. Nous sommes persuadé qu'aucun système de sécurité ne peut pas être durable s'il a comme fondement exclusif l'équilibre de force. Un système efficace peut être envisagé qu'à la base de la participation égale de tout les peuples et du respect de leurs intérêts légitimes - de leur indépendance et du droit au libre choix de leur voie de développement national".

3.2. Le problème allemand

Quant au problème allemand l'attitude de la Yougoslavie a été inspirée dès la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale par le désir d'empêcher que ce problème devient la cause d'un nouveau conflit en Europe. Elle n'a jamais nié le droit du peuple allemand à l'autodétermination^{que} mais elle a estimé aussi l'application de ce droit doit être envisagée dans le cadre des réalités politiques; de l'existence de deux états allemands en premier lieu. La Yougoslavie a été un des premiers États d'Europe n'appartenant pas à l'alliance occidentale, le premier État socialiste en tout cas, qui a établi des relations diplomatiques avec la République fédérale allemande (le 9 décembre 1961). Plus tard, la Yougoslavie a

reconnue la République démocratique allemande (le 10 octobre 1957) ce qui a eu comme conséquence la rupture des relations diplomatiques de la part de la République fédérale allemande (le 19 octobre 1957) La naissance de la doctrine Halstein est dû à ce cas. Cependant, la pratique a montré la futilité de cette position de la République fédérale. Les rapports entre les deux pays ont continué à se développer et la République fédérale a resté un des pays avec lesquels la Yougoslavie entretient des relations économiques, touristiques, culturelles très intenses. Toutefois, malgré toutes difficultés politiques et le fait que la République fédérale n'est pas prête encore de dédommager les victimes yougoslaves des crimes nazis de la deuxième guerre mondiale, les gouvernement des deux pays ont décidé le 31 janvier 1968 à renouveler les relations diplomatiques. Au moment de la publication de cette nouvelle les deux gouvernements ont déclaré en commun.²⁾

-----"qu'ils sont persuadés que cette décision des deux gouvernements correspond au besoin du renforcement de la coopération pacifiques entre les états européens et représente une contribution positive au processus de la détente en Europe".

Chacun de ces deux gouvernements a donné sa propre interprétation de cet événement. Dans sa déclaration du 31 janvier 1968 le gouvernement de la Yougoslavie souligne que son approbation au renouvellement des relations diplomatiques avec la République fédérale est le résultat de²⁾

"la réalisation de sa politique de coopération internationale en conformité avec les principes de la coexistence pacifique. Tout en approuvant les principes déjà proclamés de sa politique européenne le gouvernement de la République fédérative socialiste de la Yougoslavie estime que le renouvellement des relations diplomatiques avec la République fédérale allemande contribuera au succès de la coopération et du progrès de leurs rapports mutuels"

Ne s'arrêtant plus sur cette question on peut indiquer tout simplement que le normalisation des rapports entre la Yougoslavie et la République fédérale est un événement encourageant qui nous montre encore une fois qu'il n'y a pas de problème international qui ne peut pas être résolu si l'on aborde avec de bonne foi et

en respectant les intérêts des parties et de la communauté internationale, c'est une conclusion qui mérite une attention particulière de ceux qui s'occupent du problème allemand.

3.3 Coopération économique

Le troisième problème majeur européen concerne la coopération économique. Cette coopération s'est développée sous l'influence directe de la nature des relations politiques entre les pays européens. C'est surtout la guerre froide qui a déterminé le contenu et les formes de cette coopération. Non seulement de l'échange de marchandises mais de tous les secteurs de la vie économique. La division d'Europe a eu un des rôles prépondérants dans ce domaine.

Dans cette situation et partant de ses propres intérêts économiques la Yougoslavie s'est engagée pour réaliser une large coopération avec tous les pays intéressés prêt à prendre part dans cette coopération. La distribution géographique de son échange de marchandise en 1966 et en 1967 est une illustration significative de ces efforts de la Yougoslavie.³⁾

La distribution géographique de l'échange de marchandises
yougoslave en 1966 et 1967^{*)}

	1967	%	1966	%	Taux de croissance
<u>1. Pays capitalistes</u>					
Exportation	647	51,6	595	48,6	8,9
Importation	1074	62,9	884	55,4	21,6
<u>Dans ce cadre</u>					
Pays d'Europe occi- dentale y compris la Grèce, la Turquie et le Chypre					
Exportation	560,4	44,7	515	42,1	9,3
Importation	906	53,1	621	38,9	45,9
Communauté économique européenne					
Exportation	372	29,7	340	27,8	10,9
Importation	657	38,5	410	25,7	60,2
<u>2. Pays socialistes</u>					
Exportation	455	36,3	448	36,5	1,4
Importation	446	28,8	499	31,6	-10,7
<u>3. Pays en voie de développement</u>					
Exportation	131	12,1	185		
Importation	143	10,3	198		

^{*)} En millions de dollars et en % de participation dans
l'échange total.

"Cependant, tout en insistant sur le développement de ses rapports économiques bilatéraux, dans le cadre desquels on est au début d'une activité visant à l'accumulation des capitaux étrangers à la base des "joint business ventures" (v. Columbia University, New York and Institute of International Politics and Economy, Belgrade: Joint Business Ventures of Yugoslav Enterprises and Foreign Firms, Belgrade, 1968) - la Yougoslavie a montré un grand intérêt pour la collaboration économique multilatérale."

Elle est l'observateur dans l'Organisation de coopération et de développement économique (OCDE) après la conclusion de l'accord du 28 octobre 1961 et prend part dans l'activité du COMECON à la base de l'accord du 17 septembre 1964, d'après les termes duquel elle a le statut spécifique de membre quasi-associé. Elle est en contact direct avec l'Association du libre échange (EFTA) et elle a demandé il y a déjà un certain temps à la Communauté économique européenne (CEE) l'ouverture de négociations en vue d'aboutir à la réglementation conventionnelle de ses rapports avec cette organisation. Elle a même ouvert une représentation officielle à Bruxelles au centre de la Communauté.

La préoccupation principale de la Yougoslavie dans le cadre de cette activité multilatérale est orientée vers la création des conditions qui aideraient l'application dans la pratique des principes de l'égalité et de non-discrimination dans les rapports économiques en Europe. Comme l'a indiqué le Secrétaire d'Etat des affaires extérieures M. Marke Nikezic dans l'exposé déjà cité, présenté dans le Parlement yougoslave:⁴⁾

"Nous croyons que les tendances actuelles se développent dans la direction de l'intensification des liens entre les pays européens à la base de leurs intérêts communs particulièrement dans le domaine économique. Nous considérons que la tendance vers l'intégration est la conséquence naturelle de l'évolution de l'industrie et du marché contemporains. Cependant, la discrimination et les dommages subis par ceux qui se trouvent en dehors des groupements exclusifs déterminés finissent par la création de nouvelles divisions et non pas par l'unité de l'économie européenne et mondiale. C'est pourquoi la Yougoslavie insistera en avenir encore sur l'établissement de rapports qui pourront garantir les intérêts de son économie et de l'échange international en général ..."

En demandant la solution urgente du problème des rapports entre les membres et non-membres, des organisations économiques subrégionales la Yougoslavie est également très active dans la Commission économique d'Europe de l'Organisation des Nations Unies qui est le seul organe européen universel dans le domaine économique.

Elle souligne sans cesse la nécessité d'utiliser cet organ dans la plus grande mesure du possible, comme facteur de liaison entre l'Est et l'Ouest européen, des pays socialistes et capitalistes, en laissant à côté les différences entre leurs systèmes politiques et économiques et prenant comme base de départ les intérêts communs de leurs économies nationales et de l'économie européenne en général.

3.4 Autres formes de coopération

Il n'est pas indispensable de parler en détail des autres secteurs de la coopération de la Yougoslavie avec les autres pays européens. La Yougoslavie est ouverte à toute forme de coopération. Une des preuves éclatantes de cette vocation universelle de la Yougoslavie est la suppression des visas pour les étrangers provenant de tout les pays du monde qui existe depuis le 1. janvier 1967. La Yougoslavie a conclu des accords de coopération culturelle et scientifique avec des divers pays européens, parmi lesquels on peut citer l'URSS et la Tchécoslovaquie, La France et l'Italie, la Grande Bretagne et la Norvège, La Roumanie et la Hongrie, les Pays Bas et la Grèce et la Bulgarie. Ses accords internationaux sont très nombreux. Seulement au cours des années 1966 et 1967 la Yougoslavie a conclu 164 accords bilatéraux avec les pays d'Europe: -57 avec les pays occidentaux et 107 avec les pays socialistes. Ces accords se rapportent aux échange de marchandises, à la coopération industrielle, technique, scientifique et culturelle, au tourisme, la sécurité sociale, la santé etc.

4. Domaines et formes de coopération en Europe et la Yougoslavie

On peut conclure de ce qui précède que la Yougoslavie est un de ces pays européens qui suivent la politique de la plus large coopération avec tous les pays européens, indépendamment de leur apparten^{an}ce aux groupements qui divisent l'Europe à l'Est et à l'Ouest. En pratiquant une telle politique la Yougoslavie demande qu'on agit en conformité avec les conditions existantes et en respectant les intérêts légitimes de toutes les parties.

Cette position ^{générale}/explique très bien le point de vue yougoslave quant à la question du choix des domaines de coopération. En effet, la Yougoslavie entre dans chaque engagement qui peut

contribuer à la meilleure compréhension et au développement concret de ses rapports avec des autres pays européens. La coopération politique et économique sont au premier rang mais c'est plutôt le résultat de leur importance et de la nature des relations inter-étatiques en général. En ce qui concerne les autres secteurs de coopération leur développement dépend des besoins concrets du moment de la Yougoslavie ainsi que de ses partenaires. Le fait que la Yougoslavie a des rapports plus poussées avec certains pays, et plus particulièrement avec les pays socialistes est plus la conséquence de meilleures possibilités de leur développement qui existent dans ces pays et non pas l'expression de tendances limitatives dans la politique extérieure de la Yougoslavie. Avec la formation de meilleures conditions dans les pays d'Europe occidentale on pourrait attendre un nouvel élargissement de rapports entre la Yougoslavie et ces pays, un élargissement qui aura trait à un nombre de nouveaux secteurs de la vie internationale.

En ce qui concerne les formes de coopération la Yougoslavie préfère en ce moment les formes bilatérales aux formes multilatérales. Cette position s'explique avant tout par l'orientation internationale de la Yougoslavie comme pays non-aligné mais aussi par l'état de choses en Europe. L'Europe est encore bien divisée en deux parties, à l'Est et à l'Ouest. On n'a pas beaucoup progressé dans la voie de suppression de cette division. Tout ce qu'on peut constater c'est qu'un apaisement de la situation politique qui est accompagné que de petits pas concrets. Les grands problèmes européens politiques et économiques sont ouverts encore et on ne voit pas très bien la voie de leur solution dans un proche avenir.

Dans cette situation la Yougoslavie se déclare pour les formes bilatérales du développement des rapports internationaux, et l'activité orientée dans la direction de conclusion d'accords partiels, car les actions spectaculaires n'ont pas toujours des résultats assez concrets. L'expérience qu'elle a accumulée surtout dans ses rapports avec les pays voisins lui a prouvé maintes fois que c'est une voie efficace pour le renforcement de la confiance entre les peuples et leurs gouvernements. Par conséquent, on peut être presque sûr que l'amélioration des rapports bilatéraux entre les pays européens doit avoir comme une des premières conséquences l'augmentation de l'intérêt pour les formes multilatérales

de coopération ainsi que pour la solution des problèmes intra-européens en général.

Il va de soi que la Yougoslavie ne pourrait pas être contre la création d'organisations internationales englobant des pays de toutes les parties d'Europe. Mais pour le moment c'est la question de l'avenir. D'autre part, il faut reconnaître l'importance de l'existence de la Commission économique pour l'Europe de l'Organisation des Nations Unies qui est de nature universelle. C'est un organe spécialisé mais tel qu'il est, cet organe joue un rôle positif qui nous démontre que les organes régionaux des organisations mondiales peuvent remplacer les organisations régionales indépendantes. On peut même dire que ces organes peuvent devenir coordinateurs des travaux des organisations subrégionales différentes. C'est une considération qui se rapporte aux activités de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en Europe et peut être appliqué non seulement aux domaines économique et social, mais également aux organes politiques prévus par la Charte. Les mêmes pensées peuvent être exposées à propos de l'activité des agences spécialisées et les autres organisations mondiales. C'est surtout l'UNESCO qui peut être cité comme agence spécialisée ayant des possibilités de contribuer à l'amélioration des rapports entre les pays européens sur le plan régional et même subrégional. La création d'un Institut de recherche relative aux problèmes balkaniques à Bucarest, qui est dû à l'activité de l'UNESCO, est un bon exemple des possibilités de ce genre.

Quant aux organisations subrégionales, plus particulièrement celles dont la création est dû à la guerre froide et à la division d'Europe à l'Est et à l'Ouest, la Yougoslavie est prête, tout en reconnaissant leur existence, de prendre part dans leur activité dans la mesure du possible et dans le cadre de ses intérêts. D'autre part, on peut dégager de sa conception générale qu'elle ne peut pas penser que ces organisations sont irremplaçables et doivent être permanentes. Le changement du climat en Europe et la solution progressive des problèmes ouverts favoriseront la tendance en faveur de la coordination de leurs activités respectives. En un moment la question de la révision de leurs statuts pourrait être considérée aussi. Car tout en respectant les différences qui découlent de leurs systèmes politiques et économiques on peut indiquer qu'il existe

un nombre d'éléments de cohésion entre les pays d'Europe qui demandent que leurs rapports mutuels soient envisagés dans le cadre de l'interdépendance de leurs intérêts.

La dernière question qui se pose regarde le rapport entre les domaines et les formes de coopération en Europe. Il nous semble que cette question n'a pas en ce moment une grande importance pratique. Il est évident que certains domaines de la vie internationale demandent des formes spécifiques d'organisation. Cependant, nous estimons qu'il est plus opportun, dans la situation actuelle, de favoriser chaque forme de coopération qui peut contribuer à la meilleure réalisation des besoins de toutes les parties d'Europe. C'est pourquoi il est nécessaire de souligner l'importance de la question de la direction des travaux ainsi que des buts et des principes actuels des organisations régionales et subrégionales qui s'occupent de divers domaines de la vie internationale. Cette direction devrait influencer le développement des relations amicales et de la coopération de tous les états européens et la solution des problèmes qui divisent encore l'Europe. C'est une conclusion qui peut être appliquée à toutes les organisations européennes contemporaines.

5. Conclusion.

En terminant nous voulons souligner que malgré toutes les difficultés qu'elle a eu et qu'elle a aujourd'hui encore en restant en dehors des groupements politiques et économiques qui divisent l'Europe après la deuxième guerre mondiale, la Yougoslavie a réussi à développer de bonnes relations de coopération avec presque tous les pays européens. La qualité de ces relations correspond aux possibilités réelles est peut-être sans aucun doute améliorée. Mais ce n'est pas là le point principal qui mérite d'être souligné en parlant de la politique yougoslave en Europe. C'est bien plus le fait qui démontre que la Yougoslavie a prouvé en pratique, que la division d'Europe ne doit pas représenter toujours l'obstacle décisif pour le développement des rapports entre tous les pays d'Europe, en dehors de cette division existe une chambre libre très vaste pour l'activité des pays européens membres ou non membres des groupements particuliers. L'évolution récente qui indique que la guerre

froide dans sa forme originale est derrière nous est un indice du nouveau vent qui souffle déjà peut être au dessus des plaines et des montagnes de notre continent en ouvrant une perspective encourageante aux forces pacifiques et constructives prêtes à contribuer à la création des liens d'amitié et de coopération entre les états européens.

N O T E S

-
- 1) Texte dans le journal Politika, No. du 20 juin 1968.
 - 2) Textes dans le journal Politika, No. du 1 février 1968.
 - 3) D'après l'étude du dr. Ljubisa Adamovic. Les rapports économiques de la Yougoslavie avec l'étranger en 1967, publiée dans l'Annuaire de l'Institut de politique et l'économie internationales pour l'Année 1967, Beograd, 1968.

Beograd, le 21 juillet 1968.

LA TCHECOSLOVAQUIE ET L'EUROPE

par

Alexandr Ort

Institut des Politiques Internationales et Economie.

On a pris l'habitude, en parlant de la Bohême du point de vue de l'histoire de la politique européenne, de la désigner comme le coeur de l'Europe. Cela correspondait sans aucun doute à la position géographique de ce pays, mais aussi au fait que les nations de l'Europe centrale ont joué dans la histoire moderne un rôle non négligeable, relativement à la histoire globale de l'Europe, laquelle a été naturellement déterminée, de même que la politique mondiale, en premier lieu par la politique de grandes puissances et par le rapport de forces entre elles.

Au cours du dernier demi-siècle on a attribué ce rôle de la Bohême à la Tchécoslovaquie, dans laquelle les peuples tchèque et slovaque ont trouvé, après la première guerre mondiale, l'aboutissement de leurs aspirations nationales à vivre dans un Etat indépendant. Le déroulement exceptionnellement dramatique des événements au cours des derniers cinquante ans dans la histoire de la Tchécoslovaquie, n'a fait que confirmer en somme la justesse des assertions concernant l'importance de cet espace pour la politique européenne.

Il est donc logique que les problèmes européens sont devenus, dès le début de l'existence de la Tchécoslovaquie, les problèmes les plus importants de sa politique étrangère. Le calme et la paix en Europe ont constitué la condition indispensable de la sécurité de la Tchécoslovaquie et pour cette raison ils se sont trouvés au premier rang des intérêts de sa politique étrangère, pour laquelle, comme pour la politique étrangère de chaque Etat, la tâche essentielle et première consiste à assurer la sécurité du pays.

Les problèmes européens sont donc devenus une partie indivisible de la politique étrangère tchécoslovaque, de même que la Tchécoslovaquie est devenue une partie indispensable de toute la politique européenne.

Le gouvernement tchécoslovaque, ainsi que le peuple de ce pays, n'ignoraient pas ces réalités. C'est pourquoi la politique étrangère figurait pendant des nombreuses périodes directement au centre des préoccupations de la population tchécoslovaque et elle n'a jamais passé tout à fait au second plan.

Les dures expériences historiques rappellent sans cesse aux peuples de Tchécoslovaquie la nécessité d'accorder une attention soutenue à l'évolution de la situation en Europe et de s'efforcer à l'influencer dans un sens positif, selon ses forces et moyens.

Deux raisons nous obligent en cette année 1968 à procéder à un examen sérieux de la politique étrangère tchécoslovaque. La Tchécoslovaquie célèbre cet automne cinquante ans de sa existence, ce qui constitue sans doute une raison suffisante pour l'analyse critique du passé, afin d'en tirer une leçon pour le présent et pour l'avenir. L'analyse critique des cinquante années passées doit nous conduire nécessairement vers certaines constances qui se sont manifestées dans la politique étrangère tchécoslovaque et nous indiquer la direction principale, une certaine continuité logique, qui doit apparaître après une certaine période dans la politique étrangère tchécoslovaque, comme d'ailleurs dans la politique étrangère de chaque Etat.

De l'autre côté, le premier semestre de l'année courante avait apporté pas mal de changements importants dans toute la vie politique tchécoslovaque et il est impossible de croire que cette situation n'aurait aucune influence sur la politique extérieure. Dans ce domaine agit certainement, bien plus que dans la politique intérieure, cette continuité que découle en majeure partie des facteurs extérieurs, indépendants de la volonté du peuple, lesquels déterminent et limitent la politique étrangère d'un petit Etat de l'Europe centrale, tel que la Tchécoslovaquie. Mais en même temps, la politique étrangère constitue un reflet logique de la politique intérieure, elle est dans une certaine mesure sa continuation et pour ces raisons aussi il faut très sérieusement examiner la politique étrangère tchécoslovaque actuelle.

Un des plus importants documents du processus de renaissance tchécoslovaque, le programme d'action du Parti communiste tchécoslovaque, même si l'accorde l'attention principale aux problèmes intérieurs, politiques, économiques, sociaux et autres, ce qui est compréhensible, n'omet pas et il ne peut pas omettre la politique étrangère tchécoslovaque. Ce document a défini ainsi ses composantes principales, qui sont en même temps également, dans une certaine mesure, l'expression de cette continuité logique: "L'orientation fondamentale de la politique étrangère tchécoslovaque a pris naissance et a trouvé sa confirmation pendant la lutte pour la libération nationale et dans le processus de la transformation socialiste de notre pays."

Le programme d'action souligne donc très clairement dans ce passage, aussi bien notre réalité socialiste que les intérêts fondamentaux de la nation tchèque et slovaque. De ses deux racines part logiquement notre politique étrangère actuelle, orientée en premier lieu sur l'Europe, c'est à dire sur le continent où nous vivons.

Aujourd'hui en Europe peu à peu s'impose la tendance qui veut accepter la coexistence pacifique comme base de la politique européenne. Ainsi le continent, où l'existence de deux blocs opposés et placés face à face avait créé pendant la guerre froide une situation extrêmement dangereuse, devient progressivement la partie la plus tranquille du monde actuel.

La Tchécoslovaquie avait adopté la coexistence pacifique entre les Etats, ayants des régimes sociaux différents, pour un des principes essentiels de sa politique étrangère, depuis son commencement. Le nouveau ministre des affaires étrangères l'a confirmé au cours de son exposé devant le parlement en déclarant: "Pour nous, en tant que l'Etat de l'Europe centrale, la coexistence pacifique a évidemment avant tout une forme européenne et les problèmes européens sont naturellement au centre des préoccupations de la politique étrangère tchécoslovaque."

Ses paroles correspondent exactement à la position du programme d'action, où on dit: "Notre position géographique, ainsi que les besoins et les possibilités d'un pays industriel, nous obligent à faire une politique européenne plus active, tendant au développement des relations mutuels avec tous les Etats et organisations internationales, et ayant en vue d'assurer la sécurité collective du continent européen."

En examinant de plus près les idées mentionnées, il devient très facile de lire et de comprendre les buts principaux de la politique étrangère tchécoslovaque. Ses premiers et derniers mots montrent son cadre global. La sécurité nationale constitue la tâche de chaque politique étrangère et ses possibilités résultent très fortement de la position géographique. La sécurité collective devient donc logiquement le but final de cette politique, parce qu'elle peut le mieux assurer, dans le cadre du continent entier, la sécurité de Tchécoslovaquie également. C'est dans ce sens que doit agir à long terme la diplomatie tchécoslovaque, pour laquelle la sécurité européenne a été dans le passé, elle est à présent et elle sera toujours le but principal de sa politique étrangère.

Dans le passage mentionné, on désigne ensuite le développement industriel de la Tchécoslovaquie parmi les facteurs importants qui déterminent notre politique extérieure. Cinquante ans de histoire récente, notamment les expériences acquises par notre diplomatie, démontrent que les relations économiques extérieures sont devenues depuis l'existence de la Tchécoslovaquie extrêmement importantes, quelque fois presque autant que le souci d'assurer notre sécurité.

La Tchécoslovaquie, qui était parmi les parties les plus développées de l'Autriche-Hongrie, a perdu ce débouché important en même temps, que ses peuples ont enfin après de longues années conquis l'indépendance nationale. Pendant toute la durée de l'existence de la première république il fallait chercher de nouveaux débouchés, la tâche que la crise économique mondiale des années trente avait rendu extrêmement difficile. Le dictat de Munich et l'occupation ont apporté de nouveaux problèmes à l'économie tchécoslovaque. L'incorporation exclusive des économies nationales tchèque et slovaque à la dépendance de l'Allemagne nazie avait nécessité de nouveau une certaine reorientation des relations économiques extérieurs.

Après la guerre la Tchécoslovaquie libérée avait essayé de renouveler ses liaisons économiques traditionnelles en Europe. Mais très tôt, au printemps de 1946, ses contacts en voie de renouvellement ont été à nouveau rompus, lorsque l'Europe occidentale sous la conduite des USA avait tenté de soumettre par le blocus économique la Tchécoslovaquie, qui avait choisie en février 1948 la voie socialiste.

Il fallait à nouveau rechercher et créer les liaisons économiques, qui devaient aider l'économie tchécoslovaque à surmonter des nombreuses difficultés, liées aussi bien avec la reconstruction d'après-guerre que causées par le blocus. L'orientation sur les marchés des pays de démocratie populaire et sur l'Union Soviétique constituait l'unique issue possible. Le développement de la coopération économique entre les pays socialistes avait apporté des nombreuses avantages et une certaine stabilisation de notre situation économique. Mais cette coopération avait simultanément pour conséquence les exigences moindres, en ce qui concerne l'export tchécoslovaque, et de ce fait l'industrie tchécoslovaque a pris un retard notable en comparaison avec le sommet mondial.

Actuellement donc les relations économiques tchécoslovaques extérieures se trouvent devant deux tâches. Elargir et améliorer en ce

qui concerne la qualité notre commerce et la coopération avec les pays socialistes d'un côté, c'est à quoi tendent d'ailleurs tous les pays industriellement développés. Activiser de l'autre côté nos relations économiques avec les pays développés et avec leurs groupements économiques. Cette deuxième tâche est indispensable, si nous voulons renouveler et maintenir les contacts avec le sommet technique mondial, avant tout dans le domaine de l'industrie.

La double tâche de la politique extérieure tchécoslovaque, assurer la sécurité de l'Etat et le développement des relations économiques extérieurs, tend au développement des relations mutuelles avant tout entre tous les Etats européens. Cette politique peut se développer avec succès et sans grands obstacles dans l'Europe d'aujourd'hui, où en général s'impose l'idée de la coexistence pacifique, comme principe de la politique extérieure de la grande majorité des Etats européens. Reste à savoir, quel but doivent avoir ces relations mutuelles et vers quoi elles doivent nous conduire progressivement.

Le but principal c'est sans doute assurer la sécurité européenne. Mais c'est une tâche à très long terme, dépendant en majeure partie de la politique de grandes puissances, lesquelles par leur supériorité militaire écrasante déterminent aujourd'hui en fin de comptes toute la politique mondiale.

Que peut faire dans cette situation un petit Etat européen comme la Tchécoslovaquie, qui est grandement intéressé à la sécurité européenne, mais qui ne peut pas contribuer d'une manière décisive à sa réalisation. Tout au moins pas directement.

Il semble toutefois, que notre continent ne peut parvenir à la sécurité collective que plus tard, en plusieurs étapes. Est-ce que les petits Etats de l'Europe ne peuvent pas contribuer d'une manière quelconque à l'accélération de ce processus ou de l'influencer par leur propre initiative? Quels sont les plus grands obstacles sur le chemin de la sécurité européenne?

La plus grande difficulté consiste sans doute dans le contenu différent qu'attribuent à la sécurité l'Est et l'Ouest de l'Europe. Pour l'Europe occidentale c'est le Pacte Atlantique, pour l'Europe Orientale le Traité de Varsovie. Pour le moment il n'y a pas suffisamment de confiance entre les deux groupements militaires pour permettre la liquidation simultanée de deux pacts militaires, quoique les propositions dans ce sens ne manquent pas.

Certains voient la voie dans les accords diverses, pouvant régler d'une manière partielle les rapports entre les deux groupements, soit dans le domaine des armements conventionnels, soit dans celui des armements nucléaires. Il s'agirait sans doute des pas très positifs, lesquels toutefois ne modifieraient nullement les positions de principe contradictoires.

Une autre voie montrent les plans de la coopération en Europe. Pour la Tchécoslovaquie apparaît surtout la possibilité de devenir le propagandiste de la devise: "Par la coopération vers la paix en Europe", qui reflète le mieux les intérêts multilatéraux de la politique étrangère tchécoslovaque. Cette devise contient la partie économique, très importante pour nos relations économiques extérieures, elle suppose la coopération dans le domaine de la culture, où la Tchécoslovaquie peut jouer un rôle assez important, et elle n'exclut pas non plus la possibilité de la coopération politique. En plus cette devise représente une orientation à long terme, puisqu'il n'est pas douteux que toutes les nations d'Europe aspirent à la paix, dont la sécurité européenne constitue la meilleure garantie.

On peut développer la coopération en Europe tout de suite, sans préparation spéciale quelconque et sans négociations préliminaires, sur les plans les plus divers. La coopération n'exclut personne, au contraire elle suppose une large participation, autant possible de tous, parce que l'exclusion de quiconque rendrait sans doute plus difficiles tous les contacts sur le continent européen.

En outre le développement de la coopération aidera indiscutablement à créer le climat global en Europe plus favorables, où pourraient se renforcer les rapports de confiance, qui seuls peuvent engendrer les conditions favorables pour une solution durable et solide de tous les problèmes européens complexes, y compris les plans en vue d'assurer la sécurité européenne.

Il est certainement toujours très difficile de commencer une action pareille. Mais il semble que dans ce sens aussi, il faudrait rechercher une façon nouvelle à aborder le problème. Jusqu'à présent, les deux parties en Europe se sont eforcées à préparer les propositions élaborées jusque dans les détails, qu'on a présenté à l'autre partie /pour l'avis/. En fait on ne prévoyait pas que l'autre partie pourrait modifier ces projets d'une manière substantielle, selon ses propres idées. C'était en somme une sorte de

monologues par écrit, où l'autre partie ne pouvait qu'accepter l'idée de l'autre partie ou de la rejeter purement et simplement.

Le premier pas en vue d'arriver à une plus grande confiance réciproque, serait l'élaboration d'une proposition commune quelconque, pour commencer assez générale, qui sera précisée et rédigée en détails ensuite au cours des consultations mutuelles. On ne pourra pas s'agir de la proposition d'un Etat ou d'une de ses parties. Il faudra au contraire essayer élaborer une proposition commune de plusieurs Etats européens, membres de l'Est et de l'Ouest européen. La participation d'un Etat neutre de l'Europe pourra peut-être faciliter les premiers pas, même si de l'autre côté il est clair, qu'on pourrait réaliser seulement une proposition pouvant trouver la compréhension et l'accord justement de deux parties opposées.

Un aperçu réaliste de la situation actuelle en Europe indique en principe deux possibilités du commencement d'une action pareille. Ou bien, on réussira à faire prévaloir cette idée d'emblée dans plusieurs pays et par la voie du choc psychologique elle passera au premier plan de l'attention d'opinion publique en Europe, ou bien il faut se préparer à une campagne d'explication relativement longue.

Il semble que la situation est relativement mûre dans le domaine de savants, orientés sur les sciences politiques et le domaine des relations internationales, y compris les chercheurs spécialement orientés vers les problèmes de la paix. De ce côté devrait être développé une campagne concentrée, destinée à gagner dans la presse des pays européens les sympathies pour cette idée non seulement du public, mais aussi des milieux politiques.

De même, que déjà aujourd'hui l'idée de la sécurité européenne a trouve sa place dans une série de documents intergouvernementaux, de même il faudra y faire prévaloir aussi l'idée de la coopération européenne. Cela ne doit pas être tant difficile, puisqu'en général on accepte déjà la possibilité de la coopération économique, culturelle, scientifique, technique et autres, seulement il existe encore une certaine crainte de la coopération politique, quoique même dans ce sens on a fait déjà certains pas dans la pratique politique.

Avec la perspective de la coopération en Europe se pose la question, s'il doit s'agir d'une coopération de toute l'Europe, ou si pour le début il serait possible de se limiter aux diverses régions. Il n'est pas douteux que toutes les expériences acquises

dans le domaine de la coopération régionale seraient accueillis avec faveur. Néanmoins il ne faut pas perdre de vue que la coopération régionale existante, n'est en somme et toujours qu'une coopération dans le cadre soit de l'Est, soit de l'Ouest de l'Europe. Il est évident qu'une telle coopération est rendue plus facile et ses expériences ne seront qu'en partis utilisables pour la coopération planifiée des membres de deux groupements.

Toutefois il apparaît que la coopération dans le cadre de toute Europe n'est pas la seule voie. Elle sera sans doute au début paralysée, comme tous les autres problèmes concernant toute l'Europe, par les problèmes allemands complexes, lesquels rendent extrêmement difficile le moindre progrès des efforts concernant la sécurité européenne. La majorité des essais concernant toute l'Europe a jusqu'ici échoué justement pour cette raison.

Même s'il n'est pas nécessaire de renoncer dès le début à cette perspective de toute l'Europe, il faut toutefois chercher aussi une autre alternative. Et ici un examen d'histoire tchécoslovaque peut servir d'impulsion et d'aide.

Autant que la sécurité européenne signifierait de renouer avec les expériences exceptionnellement positives de la politique de la sécurité collective qu'ont cherché à faire prévaloir dans les années trente la France et l'Union Soviétique et à laquelle la diplomatie tchécoslovaque a pris une part importante, autant on pourrait reprendre cette part des expériences positives de la Petite Entente, laquelle était entre les deux guerres un des domaines, où la diplomatie tchécoslovaque déployait une grande activité.

Ne nous laissons pas tromper par le fait de la dislocation de la Petite Entente. La politique de la sécurité collective n'a obtenu aussi que des succès partiels et à la fin elle était remplacée par la politique de non-intervention. Toutefois, pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale et ensuite, une série de politiciens et de journalistes a rendu le hommage justifié à ses initiateurs et de ce point de vue on peut même dire que l'O.N.U. et sa Charte n'ont pas refusé de s'inspirer de ces expériences d'avant-guerre. Et les plans et les propositions d'aujourd'hui ressemblent en de nombreux points aux idées de cette époque, naturellement adaptées aux conditions modifiées actuelles.

Il faudra analyser les expériences de la Petite Entente, éliminer ce qui erroné et tributaire de l'époque et de ses conditions, mais de l'autre côté reprendre ce qui était viable et ce qui serait possible de réaliser aujourd'hui, dans les conditions nouvelles constituées dans cette région.

La Petite Entente a pris naissance sous forme d'essai de se défendre en commun, entrepris par les trois Etats, Tchécoslovaquie, Yougoslavie et Roumanie, contre les plans à la restauration des Habsbourgs en Hongrie, éventuellement en Autriche. Cette raison de l'alliance des pays de la Petite Entente est sans doute déjà dépassée par histoire. La Petite Entente avait jouée aussi un certain rôle dans les plans de grandes puissances tendant à instaurer un cordon sanitaire autour de l'Union Soviétique au cours des années vingt. Ces expériences aussi ont perdu toute valeur aujourd'hui, d'autant plus que les trois pays en cause sont maintenant socialistes et alliés et amis de l'Union Soviétique.

La tradition de presque vingt ans de coopération de trois pays de Petite Entente a engendré des liens solides de l'amitié entre les nations de ces Etats, qui n'ont pas étaient tout à fait troublés même au temps de la rupture politique avec la Yougoslavie dans les années cinquante. Ici il y a sans conteste une expérience bonne, avec laquelle on pourrait renouer avec succès.

Une deuxième expérience exceptionnellement importante concerne la tentative de compléter l'alliance politique par la coopération économique. La Petite Entente économique, édiflée dans les années trente, n'a jamais été pleinement réalisée. En même temps il faut toutefois constater que cette idée avait un noyau très rationnel. Pas seulement du fait que ses auteurs se sont efforcés de consolider l'alliance politique par les liens économiques, mais aussi du fait qu'ils on voulu renouer dans une certaine mesure avec la tradition séculaire de la coopération économique danubienne.

Cette tentative d'alors devait échouer, parce que les conflits politiques qui ont été à l'origine de la Petite Entente rendaient simultanément impossible une coopération économique plus large. Il faut reconnaître que les initiateurs de la Petite Entente économique ont tenté de l'élargir à d'autres pays danubiens, en premier lieu à la Hongrie, mais il n'était pas possible de réaliser ces plans dans l'Europe d'avant-guerre.

Aujourd'hui ces obstacles insurmontables sont justement non seulement éliminés et dépassés, mais les nouveaux rapports entre les Etats et la situation globale, ont créé les conditions exceptionnellement favorables. La Hongrie d'aujourd'hui n'est pas l'ennemi ni de Tchécoslovaquie, ni de Roumanie, ni de Yougoslavie, mais en tant que l'Etat socialiste elle a non seulement beaucoup de commun avec tous ces pays, elle a aussi d'or et déjà développé la coopération la plus diverse avec eux. Les possibilités de coopération ne sont pas naturellement limitées uniquement à ses Etats. Lorsque on examine les possibilités d'une coopération plus étroite de certains pays socialistes, c'est la possibilité de la coopération des Etats socialistes dans le bassin danubien qui s'offre directement.

Une telle coopération toutefois ne différerait nullement d'une coopération régionale similaire, en Scandinavie ou en Europe occidentale, par exemple. La coopération danubienne cependant n'est nullement obligée de se limiter seulement aux pays socialistes. Les traditions du commerce danubien sont très anciennes et elles s'imposent dans une certaine mesure même aujourd'hui, à l'époque de l'Europe divisée. Ce n'est certainement pas par hasard, si l'Autriche est parmi les pays capitalistes que ont les échanges commerciaux avec les pays socialistes les plus développés, même si ici aussi il y a pas mal de difficultés et de différences notables. On explique ce fait par la position géographique et on a certainement raison, toutefois on ne peut pas négliger in facteur aussi important que représente le Danube et sa région.

Une telle coopération danubienne, à laquelle participerait avec les pays socialistes également l'Autriche, pourrait procurer pas mal des expériences importantes, qu'on devrait utiliser pour la coopération plus large dans le cadre de l'Europe entière. Il serait possible soumettre d'avance les bons résultats et les erreurs à un examen critique et créer ainsi les conditions pour leur utilisation au maximum lorsqu'ils ont été bons et pour les éviter au cas contraire.

Lorsque on regarde la carte, la question de la coopération d'un autre Etat capitaliste, riverain du Danube, se pose automatiquement. Il s'agit de la République Fédérale Allemande, mais il semble qu'il serait plus avantageux pour le commencement à ne pas compter avec sa participation. La question allemande a constitué jusqu'à présent l'obstacle principal à la réalisation des plans européens les plus

divers. La participation de la R.F.A. introduirait automatiquement ce problème dans les plans de la coopération danubienne et comporterait le danger qu'elle va échouer à cause de ces problèmes complexes.

Il vaudrait sans doute mieux d'essayer 'a développer d'abord cette coopération sans R.F.A., sans exclure naturellement la possibilité de sa participation ultérieure. R.F. A. est en outre un partenaire très fort et de ce fait tout à fait égal aux autres, ce qui pourrait rendre considérablement plus difficile les premiers pas d'un pareil expériment.

D'un autre côté, la tentative du développement de la coopération danubienne ne menacerait aucunement les autres plans et idées européennes, parce que la coopération régionale constituerait seulement la préparation ou le premier échelon d'une coopération plus large de tous les Etats européens sans exception. Mais tant qu'on ne réussira pas à la réaliser aussi large, il sera possible de développer une coopération partielle danubienne et d'acquérir ainsi non seulement des connaissances nouvelles, mais contribuer aussi à la création d'un climat de confiance réciproque, ce qui influencerait très positivement tous les plans et projets de la coopération européenne la plus large.

Il apparaît donc, qu'on peut accéder à l'idée de la coopération européenne de diverses manières et qu'il est même possible d'éliminer tout au moins en partie l'influence fâcheuse de la question allemande, laquelle a paralysé jusqu'ici toutes les recherches d'une alternative démocratique et progressiste à la division de l'Europe.

En examinant la situation actuelle, on doit remarquer qu'il existe un domaine important, où les contacts dans le cadre de l'Europe entière n'ont jamais été complètement rompus, même au temps de la guerre froide la plus intense. Il s'agit du domaine de la culture. On ne peut pas dire qu'il n'y avait pas de problèmes ou des entraves et obstacles dans ce domaine, mais il est sans conteste qu'ici la guerre froide n'a jamais réussi à rompre les liens traditionnels complètement. On faisait les traductions de la littérature, quoiqu'à une échelle moindre, on organisait des concerts sans égard à l'origine - d'Est ou d'Ouest - de la musique, on jouait des pièces de théâtre, non sans restrictions, mais il était très difficile de restreindre la projections de bons films, il n'était pas possible de couvrir complètement les émissions radiphoniques ni de se couper des

programmes de télévision organisés pour l'Europe entière. Les contacts personnels et humains n'ont jamais été rompus complètement, quoique dans ce sens justement le "rideau de fer" fonctionnait quelque fois avec une efficacité désagréable.

Le tourisme, qui est devenu non seulement une mode, mais une des plus importantes réalités de notre temps, a engendré les conditions exceptionnellement favorables à la connaissance réciproque de tous les peuples européens. La connaissance mutuelle des richesses culturelles contribue incontestablement au rapprochement des nations diverses et il faudra dans ce secteur aussi prendre en considération les possibilités du développement d'une meilleure connaissance réciproque et d'une initiative européenne d'un rapprochement culturel.

Le domaine de la culture constitue sans conteste un secteur, où s'affrontent nettement les conceptions idéologiques bien différentes. On ne peut pas l'ignorer. Mais la confrontation idéologique n'est pas une lutte sanglante et elle ne comporte pas ni des morts, ni des blessés. La lutte idéologique ne peut pas éviter bien de sacrifices, mais les bénéfices en sont sans conteste bien plus grandes, parce que c'est vraiment le meilleur qui gagne, ce qui peut servir à la fin aux deux parties et apporter à tous bien des avantages.

On n'a pas réussi jusqu'à présent à trouver une plate-forme la plus convenable pour la coopération culturelle européenne plus large. Même dans le domaine des relations scientifiques tout n'est pas tout à fait en ordre et il est nécessaire de rattraper bien de retards et d'améliorer bien des choses. Pourtant la culture constitue un de ces domaines, où il serait très bien possible de commencer la coopération européenne la plus large et essayer ensuite à l'élargir à d'autres sphères.

L'idée qui s'est déjà manifestée, à savoir qu'à côté de la Commission économique européenne pourrait très bien exister aussi la Commission culturelle européenne et devenir une tribune d'échange d'opinions et de préparation des actions culturelles européennes, a beaucoup de valeur. Le fait, que l'U.N.E.S.C.O. s'oriente de plus en plus à l'aide aux pays en voie de développements, où l'urgence du développement culturel est évidente et cette orientation est dans la grande majorité de cas pleinement justifiée, invite directement à la recherche de nouveaux cadres et de nouvelles formes, rendant

possible le développement de la coopération culturelle européenne.

La Tchécoslovaquie, qui fait partie des petits Etats européens, joue dans le domaine de la culture un rôle assez important et pourrait de ce fait et dans ce sens avoir une certaine influence. La presse tchécoslovaque a publié récemment une série des articles intéressantes traitant de la politique étrangère culturelle, des relations culturelles internationales, du rôle de la culture dans la politique étrangère etc.

Ce ne sont pas seulement les conceptions théoriques, puisque dans cette série rentrent les paroles du nouveau ministre des affaires étrangères, prononcées au cours de son exposé dans la commission des affaires étrangères de l'Assemblée Nationale:

"Au cours des dernières années s'accroît considérablement dans la politique étrangère la part des relations culturelles, scolaires et scientifiques. Il n'est même pas nécessaire de souligner l'importance du rôle de la création artistique et de la science pour l'action de la Tchécoslovaquie dans le monde."

Il s'agit sans doute de la discussion en Tchécoslovaquie et de l'attitude du ministre tchécoslovaque des affaires étrangères, mais il est hors doute que avec la détente internationale s'élargit l'espace, dans lequel, en ce qui concerne le domaine de la politique étrangère et des rapports internationaux peut se faire valoir plus pleinement la culture. Dans une série des ouvrages théoriques on parle du rôle grandissant de la culture dans la politique étrangère, ce qui prouve que le processus en cours en Tchécoslovaquie n'est pas notre spécialité, mais qu'il corresponde dans ses grandes lignes à la tendance générale.

Il apparaît donc, que de ce côté aussi il sera possible de tenter un effort en vue de la coopération européenne. Il s'agit de trouver une initiative convenable qui ne se limiterait à un seul Etat. Peut-être les savants et les spécialistes de la culture de plusieurs pays européens auront la possibilité de prendre l'initiative d'une bonne chose. Il y a vingt ans, le congrès des représentants de la culture a donné une impulsion à la naissance du Mouvement mondial de la paix, lequel a joué un rôle très important dans la lutte contre la politique de la guerre froide. Aujourd'hui sa destination aura certainement un caractère un peu différent, mais dans un certain sens du mot, il sera possible de renouer aussi avec les bonnes traditions de ce mouvement.

Le peuple tchécoslovaque est prêt pour toutes les initiatives de ce genre et les milieux gouvernementaux soutiendront toute action pareille. La Tchécoslovaquie était dès sa création un des pays, qui constituaient les bases de la démocratie et du progrès dans une Europe troublée et étaient les facteurs de consolidation sur notre continent. En analysant les cinquante ans du passé de la Tchécoslovaquie moderne, nous pouvons revendiquer avec fierté ces traditions et dans leur esprit développer une politique européenne positive.

Le ministre Hájek a nettement exprimé cette perspective dans son exposé au parlement, lorsqu'il a défini notre politique extérieure ainsi: "Ensemble avec nos alliés nous nous efforcerons d'engager le dialogue relatif aux problèmes européens avec tous les Etats européens, sans perdre de vue notre but final: assurer la paix et la coopération en Europe, ce qui est en fin de comptes dans l'intérêt de toutes les nations de l'Europe."

9

Second draft

CONTINUITÉ ET NOVATION DANS
LA POLITIQUE EUROPÉENNE
DE LA FRANCE

par

Jean Klein

Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangere

1. Introduction.

Il est devenu banal de soutenir que l'accession au pouvoir du général de Gaulle a marqué une rupture dans la politique européenne de la France. Pour étayer cette thèse, on ne manque pas de rappeler sa condamnation sans appel de tous les projets d'intégration politique débattus sous la IV^e République et l'attitude négative des parlementaires qui se réclamaient de lui. Certes, on concède que les engagements contractés par la France n'ont pas été reniés par le nouveau régime et que le plan d'assainissement monétaire et économique défini en décembre 1958 par MM. Pinay et Rueff a permis à la France de jouer sans réticence le jeu de la libération progressive des échanges dans le cadre de la Communauté économique européenne. Toutefois, cette démarche serait moins le signe d'une adhésion franche à l'Europe telle qu'elle avait été conçue par les pères fondateurs qu'un moyen détourné de contribuer au premier chef à la grandeur nationale. Les prises de positions ultérieures du chef de l'Etat et les crises provoquées par la délégation française aux communautés européennes devaient confirmer dans leurs craintes tous les tenants d'une Europe intégrée: la vision de l'Europe du Général de Gaulle s'inscrivait dans une perspective confédérale et était de ce fait incompatible avec la construction supranationale amorcée par la CECA et la CEE. Il reste à se demander si l'intégration tant vantée par ses inventeurs inspire réellement leur politique et si la démarche prudente adoptée par la France dans la construction européenne en cours n'est pas la seule qui se conçoit dans les circonstances présentes. A quoi bon mettre en place des institutions supranationales si la coopération intergouvernementale et les échanges de tous ordres n'ont pas encore atteint le degré requis pour une telle mutation?

Le refus par le général de Gaulle de l'intégration politique, militaire et économique est généralement interprété par référence à sa conception intransigeante de l'Etat-nation, considéré comme la fin ultime et l'agent de la politique internationale. Certes, des déclarations et des écrits du chef de l'Etat illustrent abondamment ce point de vue, mais il serait erroné d'imputer à un nationalisme étroit des démarches aussi significatives que le retrait de l'OTAN et la réduction des pouvoirs de la commission du marché commun après la crise provoquée en 1965 par le

financement de la politique agricole commune. Ce dégagement procède avant tout du souci de distendre les liens unissant les pays d'Europe occidentale à leur puissant protecteur d'outre Atlantique et de mettre à profit la stabilité de l'équilibre militaire entre les deux Grands pour promouvoir le rassemblement de tous les peuples européens que séparent les frontières artificielles nées de la guerre froide. Ce projet rompt avec les entreprises de la IV^e République et il convient de lui réserver une place de choix dans une analyse de la politique européenne de la Ve République. Ainsi, les lignes de clivage de la politique européenne du Général de Gaulle se dessinent nettement: l'application des traités conclus sous la quatrième République, en mettant l'accent sur les nécessités d'une coopération politique entre gouvernements occidentaux dont les intérêts suprêmes coïncident; l'ouverture à l'Est et la multiplication des accords bilatéraux avec les démocraties populaires pour favoriser un règlement européen élargi aux dimensions du continent. Avant d'examiner ces deux aspects, il convient de rappeler sommairement la politique suivie par la quatrième République en matière d'unification européenne.

2. La politique européenne de la IV^e République.

Au lendemain de la victoire des puissances alliées contre l'Allemagne nazie, la préoccupation dominante de la République renaissante était de faire entendre son point de vue sur l'organisation future de l'Europe partout où cette question serait débattue. On sait que le gouvernement de la France libre avait éprouvé de grandes difficultés à se faire reconnaître par les Anglo-Saxons pendant la guerre et que le traité franco-soviétique du 10 décembre 1944 n'avait pas offert de compensation appréciable à l'Est, Staline ayant jaugé la France au nombre de divisions qu'elle avait alignées pendant la seconde guerre mondiale. C'est ainsi que le gouvernement français ne participa pas aux conférences de Yalta et de Potsdam et qu'il ne fut admis à la Commission consultative européenne et à la Commission de contrôle interalliée que grâce à l'intervention de la Grande-Bretagne qui plaida la cause de la France auprès de ses partenaires soviétique et américain. Devenue puissance occupante, la France tenta de faire prévaloir une politique punitive vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne vaincue en préconisant son morcellement en une poussière d'Etats confédérés, la création d'une Rhénanie indépen-

dante placée sous le contrôle de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne et du Benelux et l'internationalisation de la Ruhr ⁽¹⁾.

D'autre part, elle exigeait une application stricte des réparations telles qu'elles avaient été définies dans l'Acte final de la commission des réparations en date du 14 janvier 1946. Cette attitude s'expliquait à la fois par des raisons historiques et des considérations économiques, mais elle était de moins en moins adaptée à mesure que les deux Grands s'engageaient dans la guerre froide et que l'Allemagne devenait un facteur essentiel de la compétition entre les deux blocs. Le cours nouveau transparaissait déjà dans le discours de Stuttgart de M. Byrnes le 6 septembre 1946 et après l'échec des conférences de Moscou (10 mars - 25 avril 1947) et de Londres (25 novembre - 11 décembre 1947) la politique américaine vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne tendra à l'unification des trois zones occidentales (la bizone est effective dès janvier 1947 et la trizone en octobre 1948) et à la création d'un Etat fédéral qui voit le jour en septembre 1949.

Entre-temps, la France avait dû abandonner son plan de détachement politique de la Ruhr et d'internationalisation de ses industries ⁽²⁾ en échange de compensations en Sarre dont le charbon est attribué à l'économie française à partir du 1er avril 1949. La signature des accords de Petersberg, le 22 novembre 1949, clôt l'ère des réparations pour l'Allemagne de l'Ouest et ouvre une nouvelle période caractérisée par la participation de ce pays aux organisations de l'Europe occidentale. Dès lors, la construction européenne aura une double fonction: unifier les pays qui, se réclamant d'une même civilisation et appartenant à des systèmes politiques équivalents, ont intérêt à conjuguer leurs efforts dans les domaines économiques et militaires, mais également fournir un cadre institutionnel pour contrôler l'Allemagne dont le développement autonome était considéré comme un danger pour la sécurité de ses voisins.

A cet égard, le Conseil de l'Europe, dont le statut définitif fut signé le 5 mai 1949 et qui compte aujourd'hui 17 Etats membres, ne représente qu'une contribution médiocre à l'unification européenne. Et pourtant ses inspirateurs avaient voulu en faire l'amorce d'une union

économique et politique à laquelle les Etats européens auraient apporté certains de leurs droits souverains. La France était favorable à une telle conception, mais l'hostilité de la Grande-Bretagne à toute forme d'organisation impliquant un abandon de souveraineté nationale et à la création d'un Parlement européen représentatif empêcha l'application des résolutions adoptées par le Congrès des Mouvements européens à La Haye (7-10 mai 1948). Il en résulte que le Comité des Ministres n'est qu'un organe de coopération intergouvernementale et que l'Assemblée consultative n'a qu'une compétence extrêmement limitée; au demeurant, le mode de désignation de ses membres ne permet pas d'y voir l'embryon d'un véritable Parlement européen. Il faut toutefois mettre à son actif l'élaboration de nombreuses conventions européennes dont une vingtaine sont en vigueur. La principale est la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme du 4 novembre 1950 que tous les Etats membres ont ratifié, sauf la France. Elle a donné lieu à l'organisation d'un système régional de protection des droits de l'homme: son siège est à Strasbourg et sa jurisprudence est déjà abondante. Néanmoins, le Conseil de l'Europe est demeuré un "forum très provincial" (3) et les débats qui se sont instaurés dans ce cadre n'ont pas fait progresser considérablement l'union politique et économique du continent.

Dans le domaine de la sécurité, les progrès de l'unification européenne ont été plus rapides du fait de la menace soviétique qui a été surtout ressentie en France après le "coup de Prague" (24 février 1948). Le traité franco-britannique, signé à Dunkerque le 4 mars 1947, se proposait uniquement "d'empêcher l'Allemagne de redevenir une menace pour la paix" et en février 1948, la Revue de Défense nationale publiait encore un article du Général Léchères affirmant: "Il n'y a qu'une minorité pour proclamer la nécessité immédiate d'étroites alliances occidentales" (4).

Après l'intégration de la Tchécoslovaquie dans le camp communiste, les négociations en cours avec la Grande-Bretagne et les nations du Benelux en vue de constituer une union occidentale prennent un autre tour et, si le traité de Bruxelles du 17 mars mentionne encore l'Allemagne dans son préambule, il n'en est plus question dans les dix articles du dispositif: "l'agression armée en Europe" visée à l'article 4 est manifestement entendue comme ne pouvant venir que de l'Est. D'ailleurs, au moment où le texte est signé, le Ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Georges Bidault, demande au Général Marshall d'envisager un système de défense commun comprenant

les Cinq, les Etats-Unis et d'autres pays européens.

C'est le germe du Pacte atlantique qui sera signé à Washington le 4 avril 1949, après que l'adoption de la résolution Vandenberg ait autorisé le gouvernement des Etats-Unis à conclure des alliances en temps de paix en dehors du continent américain. Ce traité se distingue des alliances de type traditionnel dans la mesure où il prévoit la création d'organismes chargés de mettre en oeuvre une politique de défense commune. Le déclenchement des hostilités en Corée, le 25 juin 1950, amorcera le processus de l'intégration des forces armées sous commandement unique du fait de la définition d'une stratégie la plus à l'est possible contre une agression semblable à celle dont avait été victime la République sud-coréenne. Il va poser par la même occasion le problème du réarmement de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest.

Lors du débat de ratification du traité de l'Atlantique Nord à l'Assemblée nationale, une très forte majorité se déclare satisfaite d'un instrument diplomatique qui permet de rétablir l'équilibre militaire en Europe. Certains auraient même souhaité que l'intervention américaine fût automatique en cas d'agression soviétique et regrettaient que l'article 5 ne contint pas un engagement plus net de la part des Etats parties. La tendance neutraliste qui s'exprimait dans des journaux comme "Le Monde" et "L'Observateur" ne recueille qu'un faible écho et l'avertissement lancé par M. Beuve-Méry dans un éditorial du 6 avril 1949 - "le réarmement de l'Allemagne est contenu dans le pacte atlantique comme le germe dans l'oeuf" - est délibérément ignoré.

Le Ministre des affaires étrangères de l'époque, M. Robert Schuman, conscient des résistances auxquelles se heurterait un tel projet dans l'opinion française, multiplie les assurances et prend devant l'Assemblée nationale le 25 juillet 1949 des positions qui seront démenties l'année suivante ⁽⁵⁾. Par mesure de précaution, on décide que le Président de la République ne pourra donner son agrément à l'accession d'un nouvel Etat que s'il y est autorisé par une loi.

Pourtant le réarmement de l'Allemagne est envisagé dans le monde anglo-

saxon dès le premier trimestre de 1950 et la question est posée brutalement par le Secrétaire d'Etat américain, M. Dean Acheson, lors de la réunion des Ministres des affaires étrangères des "Trois Grands" de l'alliance atlantique en septembre 1950. MM. Schuman et Moch résistent d'abord à ces prétentions mais sont obligés de céder sur le principe, l'unanimité s'étant faite contre la France au Conseil des Ministres de l'O.T.A.N. Dans le communiqué du 16 septembre 1950, on peut lire que l'accord s'est fait sur la nécessité de "mettre l'Allemagne en mesure de contribuer à la mise en état de la défense de l'Europe occidentale" et le 19 septembre les Trois précisent que les "questions posées par le problème de la participation de la R.F.A. à la défense commune de l'Europe font actuellement l'objet d'études et d'échanges de vues" (6).

Dès lors, la politique française va consister à livrer un combat d'arrière garde à la fois pour accoutumer l'opinion française à l'idée d'un réarmement allemand et pour épuiser la patience des Anglo-Saxons dans l'espoir qu'ils renonceront à leur projet à la faveur de la détente internationale. C'est ainsi que le Président du Conseil, M. Pleven, définit le 24 octobre 1950 le cadre d'un éventuel réarmement allemand: il s'agit de mettre sur pied une armée européenne dans laquelle seraient intégrées les unités allemandes. Un ministre européen des forces armées, lui-même responsable devant les organes politiques européens aurait charge d'obtenir des pays membres les contingents, les équipements, le matériel et les approvisionnements dus par chaque Etat à l'armée commune. Le plan Pleven est approuvé, mais il faudra dix-neuf mois de négociations internationales pour qu'il devienne un traité en bonne et due forme. La signature intervient le 27 mai 1952, mais les objections qu'il soulève et les réserves qu'il suscite retardent encore de deux ans l'ouverture d'un véritable débat de ratification. Lorsque le gouvernement de Pierre Mendes-France se saisit du dossier en août 1954 la querelle de la C.E.D. a envenimé la vie politique française et provoqué l'irritation des alliés de France qui, ne s'étant ralliés que de mauvaise grâce au projet français d'armée européenne, sont excédés par les tergiversations qui en retardent la mise en oeuvre. Ils pressent le gouvernement français de prendre une position nette lors des négociations ultimes de Bruxelles mais le 30 août 1954, le traité de la C.E.D. est rejeté par 319 voix contre 264 (7).

La solution de rechange est trouvée dans le cadre du traité de Bruxelles du 17 mars 1948. M. Eden ayant perçu que l'absence de la Grande-Bretagne avait pesé d'un poids particulièrement lourd dans les réticences françaises devant la ratification de la C.E.D., imagine de combiner la participation de la R.F.A. à l'O.T.A.N. avec l'aménagement de l'alliance conçue initialement dans un but défensif vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne. Après un entretien très difficile avec le chef du gouvernement français, le 15 septembre 1954, M. Eden parvient à rallier Pierre Mendès-France à l'idée d'une adhésion de la République Fédérale allemande à l'O.T.A.N. Cette question est débattue à Londres du 28 septembre au 3 octobre et à Paris du 20 au 23 octobre. Il en résulte les accords de Paris qui prévoient l'entrée de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie dans l'Union de l'Europe occidentale moyennant des garanties concernant des interdictions de fabrication d'armes de la part de la République fédérale et la subordination des troupes stationnées en Allemagne au commandement suprême allié en Europe. Ce projet est approuvé à l'Assemblée nationale par une minorité de faveur, le 30 décembre 1954, nombre de partisans de la C.E.D. n'ayant pas pardonné à Mendès-France "le crime du 30 août" ou estimant que l'intégration dans le cadre atlantique ne serait pas un frein suffisant à la reconstitution d'une armée nationale allemande indépendante.

Dans le domaine économique, les efforts d'intégration européenne connaîtront une meilleure fortune puisque le traité instituant une "Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier" est signé le 18 avril 1951 et sa ratification approuvée le 13 septembre 1951 à l'Assemblée nationale par 337 voix contre 233. Ce traité procède également du souci de nouer avec l'Allemagne de l'Ouest des liens imposés par les nécessités de la guerre froide tout en soustrayant à son autorité exclusive le potentiel industriel de la Ruhr. Ce fut ^{1^e} mérite de M. Schuman d'avoir su faire de l'exigence de la réconciliation allemande l'amorce d'une "fédération européenne indispensable à la préservation de la paix" en suggérant le 9 mai 1950 de commencer par placer l'ensemble de la production franco-allemande de charbon et d'acier sous une Autorité commune dans une organisation ouverte à la participation des autres pays d'Europe. Le plan Schuman fut accueilli comme une initiative féconde et le courant d'opinion en sa faveur fut tel que même les adversaires du projet de la C.E.C.A. n'en contestèrent pas les principes généraux. Ainsi, M. Jacques Soustelle, s'exprimant au nom du R.P.F. lors du débat

de ratification, confirmait que son groupe était attaché à la réalisation de la confédération européenne englobant l'Allemagne, mais s'opposait à l'abandon d'un secteur capital de l'économie française à "une technocratie apatride et incontrôlée au lieu de déléguer une part de souveraineté à un pouvoir démocratique". On accepte que l'entente franco-allemande constitue l'axe de la future construction européenne, mais on reste divisé sur les méthodes et notamment sur le caractère supranational de la Haute Autorité qui s'installe à Luxembourg sous la Présidence de M. Jean Monnet en août 1952.

L'échec de la C.E.D. et de la Communauté politique européenne limite les possibilités de la C.E.C.A. qui, destinée à être la "première pierre d'un édifice, fait figure d'un îlot isolé". Mais la conviction qu'une Europe unie apporterait de multiples avantages aux pays membres anime toujours un certain nombre d'hommes politiques et dès le 11 novembre 1954, M. Jean Monnet annonce qu'il ne demandera pas le renouvellement de son mandat de Président de la Haute Autorité pour pouvoir se consacrer avec une entière liberté d'action et de parole à la construction de l'unité européenne.

Les ministres des Six, de leur côté, réunis à Messine en juin 1955, estiment qu'il convient de franchir une nouvelle étape dans la voie de la construction européenne et confient à un Comité de délégués gouvernementaux le soin de préparer un rapport sur l'extension dans le domaine économique et atomique de l'expérience de la C.E.C.A. Ce comité, présidé par M. Paul-Henri Spaak, dépose son rapport le 21 avril 1956 et le 5 juillet 1956, un débat a lieu à l'Assemblée nationale sur la future communauté atomique: un ordre du jour favorable à la politique gouvernementale est adopté par 332 voix contre 181 à la suite d'une brillante intervention de M. Louis Armand.

Le 15 janvier 1957, le traité de marché commun en cours de négociation fait l'objet d'un débat d'orientation au cours duquel un nombre considérable de craintes et de réserves sont exprimées, mais l'atmosphère n'est pas aussi pesante qu'à l'époque de la C.E.D. Par 332 voix contre 207, l'Assemblée demande au gouvernement d'obtenir des garanties sur l'harmonisation des charges salariales, sur l'association des territoires d'outre-mer et sur la politique agricole. Après de nouvelles et laborieuses négociations à Bruxelles et à Paris, les traités instituant le Marché commun et l'Euratom

sont signés à Rome, le 23 mars 1957.

Le 10 juillet suivant, le Président de la République est autorisée à les ratifier, par 342 voix contre 239. Dans l'esprit de leurs auteurs, la réalisation intégrale du marché commun en douze ou quinze ans devait transformer profondément la structure politique des Six et aux termes du préambule du traité instituant la C.E.E., celle-ci établissait "les fondements d'une union sans cesse plus étroite entre les peuples européens". On notera que les institutions de la communauté ont un caractère moins supranational que celles de la C.E.C.A.; certes la "Commission" a un pouvoir de décision propre mais l'organe essentiel est le Conseil des Ministres où les Etats membres disposent de voix pondérées et où les décisions sont prises à la majorité des suffrages exprimés. Par ce biais pouvait s'instaurer un pouvoir européen autonome susceptible d'imposer ses vues à tous les Etats membres et être réalisé le dépassement politique d'institutions à vocation principalement économique.

2. La politique européenne de la Ve République.

2. 1. Introduction.

Tel était l'état d'avancement de la construction européenne lorsque le Général de Gaulle accéda au pouvoir en juin 1958. Les propos qu'il avait tenus sur la politique européenne de la IVe République et l'hostilité des parlementaires qui se réclamaient de lui, faisaient craindre une remise en question de ce qui était acquis. D'ailleurs, les difficultés économiques dans lesquelles se débattait la France auraient pu être le prétexte d'un manquement aux engagements pris. Or, il se trouve que la Ve République s'est fait un point d'honneur de les observer scrupuleusement et, en bien des occasions, elle s'est trouvée d'accord avec la Commission pour sauvegarder l'originalité de la construction du traité de Rome, notamment pour parer aux menaces de dilution dans une zone de libre-échange. Que la plupart des initiatives européennes du Général de Gaulle aient été sévèrement critiquées par les tenants d'une Europe intégrée atteste que les conceptions du chef de l'Etat français se distinguaient profondément de celles de MM. Schuman et Monnet. Nous examinerons successivement les démarches de la diplomatie française dans le cadre institutionnel qui préexistait à la

Ve République et les initiatives nouvelles prises tant à l'Ouest qu'à l'Est pour surmonter les divisions de l'Europe et la libérer des deux hégémonies qui se sont établies sur elle au lendemain de la 2^e guerre mondiale.

2. 2. La coopération dans le cadre de la communauté économique européenne.

Lors du débat d'investiture de M. Pierre Pflimlin, le dernier Président du Conseil de la IV^e République, l'accent avait été mis sur la nécessité, pour la France, de prendre d'urgence les mesures qui lui permettraient d'entrer dans le marché commun. Il appartenait au Général de Gaulle de se prononcer sur cette question, dès son accession au pouvoir, et il semble que le chef du gouvernement français n'ait pas hésité longtemps à s'engager dans la voie que lui avaient tracé ses prédécesseurs. La décision d'appliquer le traité du marché commun à partir du 1^{er} janvier 1959 fut prise lors du Conseil des Ministres du 29 octobre 1958 et le 15 janvier 1959, le Premier Ministre, M. Michel Debré, donnait toutes assurances au partenaire allemand en ce qui concerne la politique européenne et atlantique de la France. Cette démarche pouvait surprendre de la part d'un homme qui n'avait cessé de vitupérer les institutions européennes, mais elle était conforme à l'idée de l'Europe qu'il s'était faite pendant la guerre et au rôle assigné à la France dans cette construction. Aussi longtemps que sa patrie était vouée à l'impuissance du fait du fonctionnement défectueux de ses institutions et du désordre de son économie et de ses finances, son intégration dans une communauté européenne équivalait à l'effacement. ^{Seule une France forte et stable était susceptible de contribuer efficacement,} à la construction d'une Europe indépendante. La rupture avec un passé condamné et les chances offertes par un marché commun dans l'oeuvre de redressement national ont sans doute été des facteurs déterminants de l'adhésion sans réserve aux traités de Rome ⁽⁸⁾.

Ainsi, non seulement le gouvernement du Général de Gaulle prend les mesures économiques et monétaires qui permettront à la France de faire face à l'échéance du 1^{er} janvier 1959 (Plan Rueff-Pinay du 27 décembre 1958), mais il sauvegarde l'originalité du marché commun en faisant échec au projet de création d'une zone de libre-échange lancée par la Grande Bretagne dans les mois qui suivirent la signature des traités de Rome. À la suite de l'accord conclu à Bad Kreuznach, le 26 novembre 1958, entre le Général de Gaulle et le chancelier Adenauer, le Conseil des Ministres de la

Communauté économique européenne transmet à la Grande Bretagne des propositions précises en lui demandant de faire connaître sa position par écrit. Après des péripéties diverses qui faillirent dégénérer en crise, la Grande Bretagne renonça à son projet de création d'une zone de libre-échange dans le cadre de l'OECE. Dès lors, la politique de la France vis-à-vis du marché commun peut se définir à la fois par le renforcement de la coopération économique entre les Etats-membres et l'affaiblissement concomitant des organes communautaires soupçonnés d'être l'amorce d'un pouvoir supranational.

Il faut inscrire à l'actif de la politique européenne de la Ve République toutes les initiatives conformes à la position adoptée par la Commission de Bruxelles, que ce soit dans le domaine de l'accélération du désarmement douanier, de la politique agricole ou de l'association des pays d'outre-mer au marché commun. La crise de juin 1965 elle-même a été jugée salubre dans la mesure où l'attitude de "la France a contribué à la décision prise par les Six d'adopter en 1966 tous les règlements essentiels concernant l'agriculture et restés jusqu'alors en suspens" (9). Ultérieurement, la France ne s'est pas dérobée aux exigences résultant de son ouverture complète à la concurrence internationale et elle a joué un rôle positif dans la négociation tarifaire mondiale, connue sous le nom de "Kennedy round". On soulignera toutefois que cette politique a été conduite selon des méthodes qui privilégiaient la coopération intergouvernementale au détriment des institutions communautaires.

Compte tenu de l'hostilité que le Général de Gaulle nourrit contre l'intégration et la supranationalité, on ne pouvait concevoir qu'il acceptât d'abandonner aux instances de Bruxelles le soin de trancher des questions qui devaient être réglées avec l'accord de tous les Etats intéressés. Dès sa conférence de presse du 5 septembre 1960, les partisans de l'Europe supranationale sont fixés sur le rôle qu'il assigne aux institutions communautaires. Après avoir qualifié leurs conceptions de "rêves", il indique que les Etats sont les seules "réalités" et qu'on ne peut bâtir l'Europe que sur ces piliers. Il admet qu'en attendant qu'on ait pris "corps à corps et dans son ensemble le problème de l'Europe", des organismes plus ou moins extra ou supranationaux aient pu être institués. Néanmoins, ils se réduisent à n'être que des instruments purement techniques à la disposition des Etats

qui prennent les décisions en dernier ressort et, s'agissant des problèmes communs, par coopération ⁽¹⁰⁾.

Sa condamnation des "mythes, fictions et parades" européens est encore plus nette dans la conférence de presse du 15 mai 1962, et l'Europe qu'il imagine après l'échec des négociations de 1961-1962 sur l'union politique se présente comme un groupement d'Etats dirigé par un conseil des chefs d'Etat ou de gouvernement qui serait, en fait, seul habilité à prendre des décisions préparées par les organes des communautés économiques. La formule retenue était celle de l'association qui laisse à chaque Etat la liberté de repousser au nom de l'intérêt national toute décision qu'on prétendrait lui imposer au nom des intérêts de l'ensemble et la procédure de vote majoritaire était rejetée car, toute mesure économique importante étant un acte politique, il n'y avait aucun moyen de faire en sorte qu'une "majorité étrangère puisse contraindre des nations récalcitrantes".

Cette doctrine devait se heurter aux résistances des 5 autres partenaires du Marché commun, mais, après la crise ouverte le 30 juin 1965 par la France à l'occasion du financement des marchés agricoles, elle fut consacrée par l'accord conclu le 24 janvier 1966 à Luxembourg ⁽¹¹⁾. L'arrangement avait pour objet de délimiter les conditions de fonctionnement de la Commission de Bruxelles, privée de tout pouvoir d'action autonome et d'organiser le vote majoritaire au Conseil de la C.E.E. de telle sorte que les Etats soient toujours en mesure de sauvegarder leurs intérêts.

Ce résultat qui, selon certains, équivalait à une révision silencieuse des institutions communautaires ⁽¹²⁾, a été interprétée en France comme l'indice d'une évolution favorable. Ainsi, le Général de Gaulle se félicitait-il, le 21 février 1966, que l'on soit "sorti ouvertement de cette espèce de fiction suivant laquelle l'organisation économique de l'Europe devrait procéder d'une autre instance que celle des Etats, avec leurs pouvoirs et leurs responsabilités". Tout en reconnaissant l'intérêt des études et propositions de la Commission de Bruxelles, il faisait observer que c'était grâce aux interventions des Etats que la construction économique européenne avait surmonté progressivement ses difficultés. Cette politique raisonnable étant menacée par l'application imminente de

la règle de la majorité et l'extension corrélatrice des pouvoirs de la Commission, il importait de réagir pour empêcher une "usurpation permanente de souveraineté". Cette doctrine a été constamment réaffirmée depuis lors et si les négociations économiques n'ont pas toujours produit les résultats qu'un en escomptait, il n'est plus question de trancher les difficultés en recourant à la règle de la majorité. La seule issue qu'envisage le gouvernement français est la coopération, c'est à dire "l'accord de tous les partenaires et leur volonté de progresser ensemble" (13). Toutefois, la coopération économique ne devait être qu'une étape vers l'union politique des Six qui demeure un des objectifs de la diplomatie française.

2. 3. La coopération franco-allemande et l'unification de l'Europe occidentale.

Dès que les résultats obtenus dans le cadre du marché commun permirent d'établir un bilan favorable de l'entreprise, le Général de Gaulle envisagea une mutation politique. Il exposa les grandes lignes de son plan au chancelier Adenauer lors de l'entrevue de Rambouillet, le 30 juillet 1960, mais les réticences allemandes empêchèrent la définition d'une politique commune. Après les conférences "au sommet" de Paris en février 61 et de Bad Godesberg en juillet de la même année, une commission d'experts est instituée. Sa mission est de préparer des propositions qui seront soumises aux réunions des chefs d'Etat ou de gouvernement pour donner "aussitôt que possible un caractère statutaire à l'union politique des Six" (14). Présidée par M. Christian Fouchet, elle tint sa première réunion à Paris le 5 septembre 1961 et fut saisie le 19 octobre suivant d'un document du gouvernement français tendant à organiser la communauté politique européenne sur une base intergouvernementale. Bien que le projet français ait été fort éloigné par son inspiration de l'idéologie des traités de Rome, il contenait, de l'avis même de ses détracteurs, des éléments positifs et avait le mérite de relancer la discussion d'une Europe politique (15). Les cinq partenaires de la France étaient disposés à accepter le projet français au début de 1962, quand le Général de Gaulle y introduisit des modifications qui en précisaient l'orientation (16). Des controverses

s'ensuivirent et c'est en vain qu'on s'efforça de trouver une formule de compromis.

Le 17 avril 1962, les Ministres des Affaires étrangères réunis à Paris devront constater l'échec de l'Union politique, en dépit des concessions faites par la France. Bien plus que la formulation française de la clause de révision du traité, c'est la subordination de l'accord de la Belgique et des Pays-Bas à la participation de la Grande Bretagne au marché commun qui a été l'obstacle principale ⁽¹⁷⁾. Ultérieurement des tentatives de relance de l'Europe politique eurent lieu, notamment au cours de l'année 1964 ⁽¹⁸⁾, mais ils n'ont pas débouché sur la conclusion d'un accord en bonne et due forme. Le gouvernement français, pour sa part, n'a cessé de mettre l'accent sur la nécessité d'un prolongement politique des communautés existantes, mais on peut craindre que les divergences existant entre les Six pays membres de la CEE sur la politique extérieure et la défense, interdiront pour longtemps la définition d'une ligne commune, préalable obligatoire à la création d'institutions politiques ⁽¹⁹⁾.

C'est pour compenser l'échec de l'union politique à Six que le Général de Gaulle s'est engagé dans la voie d'un accord bilatéral avec l'Allemagne. Au cours de son voyage triomphal en R.F.A. du 4 au 9 septembre 1962, le chef de l'Etat exprima le voeu que des liens particuliers unissent Bonn et Paris. Un memorandum à cet effet fut transmis au gouvernement fédéral le 19 septembre 1962 et une réponse positive parvint à Paris le 8 novembre suivant. Alors que la France se serait contentée d'un accord informel, le chancelier Adenauer insista pour inscrire la réconciliation franco-allemande dans le texte d'un traité qui fut signé le 22 janvier 1963 à Paris. Les instruments de ratification furent échangés le 2 juillet 1963 mais, entre-temps, le Bundestag avait assorti le traité d'un préambule dont les termes étaient si contraires à l'esprit dans lequel le Général de Gaulle l'avait envisagé qu'il les ressentit comme une "offense personnelle". D'ailleurs, le traité ne devait pas produire les résultats qu'en escomptait le partenaire français.

Dès la première réunion des chefs d'Etat à Bonn, en juillet 1963, le Général de Gaulle exprimait son scepticisme quant à l'avenir du traité et

le remplacement de M. Adenauer par M. Erhard ne devait pas contribuer à un rapprochement des points de vue. Dans sa conférence de presse du 23 juillet 1964, il admettait que les contacts franco-allemands n'avaient pas permis de définir une ligne de conduite commune et il dressait le catalogue des matières où les désaccords étaient flagrants. La coopération semble avoir mieux ^{réussi} avec l'équipe Kieseinger - Brandt, tant du fait de la personnalité des nouveaux dirigeants de l'Allemagne fédérale que de la levée des hypothèques qui entravaient la collaboration franco-allemande (force multilatérale, position de la France sur l'Allemagne de l'Est...) Néanmoins, l'entente franco-allemande n'a pas débouché sur des prises de position communes à propos de l'organisation des communautés économiques (entrée de l'Angleterre dans le Marché commun) et de l'unification politique de l'Occident. S'agissant de la politique de détente vers l'Est, la France a entamé un processus que la R.F.A. a suivi trop timidement et d'une manière ambiguë pour aboutir à un résultat tangible. Pourtant, c'est dans ce contexte que s'est manifesté l'un des aspects les plus originaux de la politique européenne de la Ve République: le dépassement des blocs et la constitution d'un ensemble européen par delà les frontières qui divisent le continent.

2. 4. Une politique européenne par delà les divisions de la guerre froide.

Le Général de Gaulle n'a jamais considéré comme définitif le partage de l'Europe en sphères d'influence et, dès 1944, il a pris à cet égard des positions très nettes ⁽²⁰⁾. Revenu au pouvoir, il a fait de l'unification européenne, par delà les barrières artificielles imposées par la politique des blocs militaires, un article essentiel de son programme de politique extérieure. Certes, des ambiguïtés subsistent sur les moyens d'une telle politique et sur la configuration de l'ensemble à créer, mais il est aisé de définir l'objectif poursuivi et de caractériser la démarche adoptée pour l'atteindre.

En insistant sur le caractère "européen" de l'Europe en gestation, le Général de Gaulle a voulu mettre l'accent sur la nécessité, pour les pays qui en feraient partie, de suivre une politique indépendante de celle des superpuissances et d'affirmer l'originalité d'une entité qui serait un facteur d'équilibre entre l'Est et l'Ouest. La formule d'une Europe

"de l'Atlantique à l'Oural" signifie que la France ne saurait se satisfaire d'une construction européenne limitée à la partie occidentale du continent, mais vise au regroupement de tous les pays marqués par une tradition et une histoire communes, dès lors que "l'évolution probable des régimes le permettra sans risque pour l'indépendance et la liberté de chacun" (21). C'est en se référant à ces deux pôles qu'il convient d'examiner les principales démarches du gouvernement français pendant les dix dernières années.

Le souci de constituer à l'Ouest une union politique de l'Europe dotée d'une certaine autonomie par rapport aux Etats-Unis a inspiré la politique française aussi bien dans le cadre des organisations économiques existantes que dans le domaine de la défense. Les épisodes de la négociation du Plan Fouchet en 1961-62 et le veto de la France à l'entrée de la Grande Bretagne dans le marché commun attestent avec éclat la volonté délibérée du Général de Gaulle de sauvegarder l'originalité de la construction européenne en la préservant de toute menace de dilution dans un ensemble atlantique. Toutefois, il convient de noter que la voie tracée par la France n'a pas été suivie par ses partenaires et que, dans l'effort de définition d'une politique européenne commune sur les grandes questions internationales, la France est restée isolée (22).

En ce qui concerne l'organisation de la défense commune de l'Ouest, la France a également pris une initiative qui a surpris ses alliées, mais qui s'in^{sc}rit parfaitement dans la ligne d'une politique de dépassement des blocs. Le Général de Gaulle avait fait connaître son point de vue sur l'organisation du traité de l'Atlantique Nord dans un mémorandum transmis le 24 septembre 1958 au Président Eisenhower et au Premier Ministre britannique, Mac Millan. Ce document soulignait les carences structurelles de l'Alliance atlantique et suggérait des mesures propres à accroître la participation de la France aux décisions prises par les Etats-Unis et la Grande Bretagne.

La requête française n'ayant pas été agréée, le gouvernement se dégagea progressivement des organismes militaires de l'O.T.A.N. en soustrayant à l'autorité des commandements intégrés les flottes de la Méditerranée et de l'Atlantique, puis, en 1966, les forces terrestres et aériennes qui leur

étaient affectées. Simultanément, la France se retirait des commandements suprêmes des forces alliées en Europe et du commandement Centre-Europe, ce qui entraînait le transfert hors du territoire français du siège de ces deux commandements ⁽²³⁾.

Cette décision, annoncée par le chef de l'Etat dans sa conférence de presse du 21 février 1966, donna lieu à un débat parlementaire où furent expliquées les raisons du retrait français, non pas de l'Alliance qui restait valable, mais des organismes militaires intégrés qui n'étaient plus adaptés aux conditions nouvelles ⁽²⁴⁾. En effet, la menace qui avait suscité l'intégration militaire s'était estompée et la stratégie de l'Alliance avait subi des modifications tant du fait de l'accession de la France au statut de puissance nucléaire que de la vulnérabilité du territoire américain aux forces de représailles soviétiques. Ces considérations autorisaient le gouvernement français à pratiquer une politique de desserrement des blocs, dans l'espoir qu'un mouvement parallèle se dessinerait à l'Est. En toute hypothèse, une politique de détente en Europe ne pouvait que bénéficier d'une contestation aussi radicale des "servitudes de l'atlantisme" ⁽²⁵⁾ et si le retrait de l'O.T.A.N. a soulevé des tempêtes, en France on a davantage condamné les méthodes utilisées que l'objectif poursuivi.

En dépit de la vigueur des critiques formulées, il ne se trouverait certainement pas en France une majorité pour remettre en question la politique du Général de Gaulle vis-à-vis de l'O.T.A.N. ⁽²⁶⁾ et même aux Etats-Unis il ne manque pas d'observateurs lucides pour souligner les aspects positifs de la démarche française, les échanges de vues qu'elle a provoqués ayant fait ressortir la nécessité d'un ajustement de l'alliance aux tâches qui lui incombent dans un monde qui s'éloigne de la guerre froide ⁽²⁷⁾.

C'est le voyage du Président de la République française en U.R.S.S. du 20 juin au 1er juillet 1966 qui a marqué le début d'une action concrète dans la perspective d'une ouverture à l'Est ⁽²⁸⁾. Ce voyage avait été précédé de contacts diplomatiques et des visites à Paris des hommes d'Etat de pays socialistes; il fut suivi d'un voyage du Général de Gaulle en

Pologne en septembre 1967 et en Roumanie en mai 1968. Si l'accueil a toujours été enthousiaste et si des accords bilatéraux ont contribué à amorcer une politique de coopération avec les pays de l'Europe orientale, il n'en reste pas moins que l'idée européenne progresse lentement sur le plan des réalisations pratiques.

En effet, le problème allemand, qualifié de "problème européen par excellence" n'a pas été sérieusement affecté par la politique de détente vis-à-vis de l'Est et sa solution n'a pas été envisagée jusqu'à présent dans le cadre décrit par le Général de Gaulle dans sa conférence de presse du 4 février 1965 ⁽²⁹⁾. D'autre part, l'intervention soviétique en Tchécoslovaquie semble avoir compromis, au moins à court terme, une politique qui repose sur le postulat d'un desserrement de l'emprise exercée sur les Etats par les blocs alors qu'à l'Est on a procédé à une remise en ordre par crainte de l'affaiblissement des liens de solidarité entre pays socialistes du fait de l'affirmation de la souveraineté et de l'indépendance nationales. Toutefois, ces mécomptes n'ont pas conduit à un infléchissement de la politique de détente qui a été réaffirmée avec éclat lors du Conseil des Ministres du 23 octobre 1968. Plutôt que de revenir à une politique de reconstitution des blocs - celle du "chien crevé au fil de l'eau" - la France a parié pour l'"affranchissement des peuples leur liberté et leur droit à se déterminer eux-mêmes". Les obstacles à cette politique pourraient éventuellement déclencher un conflit majeur, mais l'épisode tchécoslovaque démontre l'existence d'une pression croissante en faveur des indépendances nationales et d'une détente européenne qu'il convient par conséquent de maintenir et de renforcer.

3. Conclusion.

Cette esquisse de la politique européenne de la France depuis la fin de la seconde guerre mondiale fait apparaître les novations apportées par la Ve République à la fois dans le fonctionnement des communautés existantes et dans la définition de nouveaux objectifs. La démarche de la diplomatie française ne s'explique pas sans référence aux changements intervenus dans le monde et notamment dans la nature des rapports entre l'Est et l'Ouest, mais elle procède surtout d'une vision à long terme de l'avenir

du continent et d'un parti pris systématique d'en hâter l'avènement au moyen de la coopération entre Etats. Cette conception est aux antipodes de celle des idéologues de l'Europe intégrée, mais il ne semble pas qu'il faille trop s'en émouvoir. Outre que les contrôles avec la plupart des démocraties populaires et que des chefs d'Etat et des Ministres se sont rencontrés pour débattre du futur ordre européen (1). Les perspectives ouvertes par la diplomatie française à cet égard ont été assombries par l'intervention soviétique à Prague et on a pu douter un moment de la détermination du gouvernement de poursuivre une politique marquée du sceau de "la détente, de l'entente et de la coopération".

Les délibérations du Conseil des Ministres du 23 octobre 1968 ont donné lieu à une prise de position sans ambiguïté du chef de l'Etat et dans la mesure où les mêmes principes continuent d'inspirer la politique extérieure de la France, on peut conjecturer que les méthodes ne subiront pas de changements profonds. D'ailleurs, dans une conjoncture mouvante où il sera nécessaire de tenir de la situation et des intérêts particuliers de chacun des pays de l'Est, le bilatéralisme sera sans doute l'instrument le mieux adapté à la conduite d'une diplomatie qui récuse les clivages de la guerre froide et vise à créer les conditions d'une nouvelle organisation de l'Europe. Certes, de nombreux observateurs expriment des réserves sur l'efficacité d'une telle démarche et ne voient d'avenir que dans le renforcement des alliances existantes sans exclure la négociation d'accords limités dans un cadre multilatéral. Outre qu'une telle politique ne se propose que l'aménagement du statu quo, elle risque de n'avoir d'autre résultat que d'en différer la nécessaire mise en question. En revanche, la voie suivie par la France, pour aventurer sur le concept d'intégration européenne ne permettent plus de la considérer comme une panacée ⁽³¹⁾ et que la plupart des Etats européens ont renoncé à s'en inspirer dans leur pratique, on peut se demander si l'intégration ne consoliderait pas le statu quo et si les chances d'une "décolonisation de l'Europe" ne seraient pas irrémédiablement perdues.

La France pour sa part, n'a cessé de souligner les limites d'une unification purement économique et, dès 1960, elle a proposé la création d'une union politique de l'Europe. L'échec du plan Fouchet a démontré que des divergences sérieuses et difficilement surmontables à court terme

existaient entre les six partenaires du marché commun sur des questions fondamentales. A défaut d'un accord multilatéral, la France s'est alors orienté vers la conclusion avec la République fédérale allemande d'un traité de coopération en espérant que cet exemple serait suivi par les autres Etats de la Communauté économique européenne et qu'il contribuerait à accélérer le processus d'unification politique qui demeure un objectif souhaitable. Vis-à-vis de l'Est, la politique française s'est également inscrite dans un cadre bilatéral, ce qui se conçoit parfaitement, la visée étant le dépassement des blocs par l'affirmation de l'indépendance nationale et la coopération entre Etats. C'est ainsi que des liens économiques, techniques et culturels ont été noués et qu'elle puisse apparaître dans les circonstances actuelles, a des chances de déboucher un jour sur l'établissement d'une Europe à l'échelle du continent "dans la concorde et la coopération en vue du développement de ses immenses ressources". Elle pourrait alors jouer conjointement avec l'Amérique le rôle qui lui revient pour promouvoir le progrès des pays du Tiers-Monde et, renonçant à toute prétention hégémonique, "apprendre aux puissances neuves par son propre exemple l'entraînement ruineux des impérialismes".

N O T E S

- (1) V. la déclaration du Général de Gaulle en date du 10 septembre 1945 et la conférence de presse de Georges Bidault du 2 mai 1945.
- (2) Voir les recommandations de la conférence de Londres que l'Assemblée nationale française accepte de prendre en considération le 17 juin 1948.
- (3) V. Roger Pinto: "Les Organisations européennes" Paris 1963, p.79.
- (4) Général Léchères "Politique militaire de la France" R.D.N. février 1948 p. 155.
- (5) "Au sujet de l'Allemagne, on m'a posé cette question à différentes reprises: peut-on admettre l'Allemagne à participer au Pacte atlantique? C'est une question qui ne peut pas se poser non seulement dans l'immédiat, mais même ultérieurement Il est impensable pour la France et pour ses alliés que l'Allemagne puisse être admise à adhérer au Pacte atlantique comme une nation susceptible de se défendre ou d'aider à la défense d'autres nations" (Discours du 25 juillet 1949).
- (6) La genèse du réarmement allemand est fort bien exposée dans l'ouvrage d'Alfred Grosser: "La IVe République et sa politique extérieure" pp. 239 sq. Pour une vue d'ensemble du problème, il importe de lire "Histoire du réarmement allemand depuis 1950" de Jules Moch, Paris: Robert Laffont, 1965.
- (7) Il nous paraît inutile d'exposer l'économie de la Communauté européenne de défense et de la communauté politique européenne qui devait la prolonger, ces projets d'ayant pas abouti. On en trouvera une description dans "Organisations européennes" de Roger Pinto - pp. 39-43.
- (8) Pour connaître les fondement idéologiques des conceptions du Général de Gaulle sur l'Europe, on peut lire les études de Johanna Schomerus "De Gaulles Europa-Konzeption im Spiegel seiner Memorien und Reden" Europa-Archiv, 9/1963 et de Elliot R. Goodman "the World through de Gaulle's Looking Glass" ORBIS, Spring, 1967. L'ouvrage de référence est la thèse de M. Edmond Jouve "Le Général de Gaulle et la construction de l'Europe", Paris, 1967.

- (9) Conférence de presse du Général de Gaulle, 28 octobre 1966. Ce point a été souligné par des observateurs qu'on ne saurait soupçonner d'indulgence vis-à-vis de la politique européenne du Général de Gaulle. Voir notamment: Robert Lemaigen: "L'Europe au berceau. Souvenir d'un technocrate", pp. 81 sq et Roger Massip "De Gaulle et l'Europe".
- (10) Jean Mialet a décrit la place éminente occupée par la coopération dans la politique étrangère de la France in "Revue juridique et politique" juillet - septembre 1968.
- (11) Il ne saurait être question de faire l'histoire de la crise qui a conduit à l'arrangement de Luxembourg. On peut lire sur ce sujet Carl A. Ehrhardt "De Gaulle und die Integrationsidee", Aussenpolitik 12/1965 et Pierre de Vos: "Une nouvelle dimension pour l'Europe?" Syntheses No 238, mars 1966. Le texte de l'accord de Luxembourg est publié par N.E.D., No 3384 a 3387, p. 32.
- (12) v. Ernst Kobbert "Eine stille Revision der EWG" - Europa-Archiv, 4/1966.
- (13) Discours de M. Couve de Murville à l'Assemblée Nationale, 3 novembre 1966.
- (14) V. Année Politique, 1961, p.660.
- (15) V. Franz Meyers: "De Gaulles Europa" - Die politische Meinung, décembre 1961 et Roger Massip: "De Gaulle et l'Europe" pp. 71-74.
- (16) V. Roger Massip, op. cit. pp. 74-80 - Carl Ehrhardt: "De Gaulle und die Integrationsidee", "Aussenpolitik" 12/1965.
- (17) V. Roger Massip op. cit. et surtout la Préface de M. Edgar Faure à l'Année politique 1962, p. XIII et XIV.
- (18) V. Michel Rem: "Le lent cheminement de l'Europe politique" - Citoyens 60, décembre 1964.

- (19) V. not. Conférence de presse du Général de Gaulle, 28 octobre 1966 - Discours de M. Couve de Murville à l'Assemblée nationale, 15 juin 1967.
- (20) On trouvera en annexe à l'ouvrage de Aldebaran "De Gaulle et les patries" les principales déclarations du Général de Gaulle relatives à l'Europe considérée comme une troisième force indépendante des blocs.
- (21) Allocution radiotélévisée du 31 mai 1960.
- (22) Voir à cet égard les déclarations du Général de Gaulle pendant sa conférence de presse du 16 mai 1967 et le discours prononcé par M. Couve de Murville devant l'Assemblée nationale, le 15 juin de la même année.
- (23) V. les aide-mémoire remis par le gouvernement français aux quatorze représentants des gouvernements membres de l'O.T.A.N. les 10 et 29 mars 1966.
- (24) V. notamment les interventions devant l'Assemblée nationale de MM. Pompidou et Couve de Murville respectivement les 13 et 14 avril 1966.
- (25) La formule est utilisée par Lioubov Vidiassova dans un article paru dans "Temps nouveaux" 34/ 23 août 1967.
- (26) V. Wolf Mendl: "French policy in Europe" - The World today, janvier 1967.
- (27) On peut lire à cet effet "Les malentendus transatlantiques" de Henry Kiessinger et le remarquable article de Stanley Hoffman "De Gaulle, l'Europe et l'Alliance", Esprit, juin 1963 (en anglais in "International Organization", Winter 1964).
- (28) V. Jacques Vernant "Le voyage en U.R.S.S." - Revue de Défense nationale, août-septembre 1966.
- (29) V. Jacques Vernant "Après la conférence du 4 février" Revue de Défense nationale, avril 1965 et "Thesen für eine gesamt-europäische Politik Frankreichs" Europa-Archiv 4/1966 - V. aussi (suite de 2 de

la page précédente) V. aussi Maurice Schumann "Frankreich und die .
Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands", Europa-Archiv 8/1966.

- (30) Les objectifs et les méthodes de la politique française (suite de la
note 1 de la page précédente) vers l'Est ont été décrits par Walter
Schütze: "Die Ostpolitik Frankreichs", - Europa-Archiv 5/1965.
- (31) V. les articles de Karl Deutsch "Integration and Arms control in the
european political environment" et Ronald Inglehart "An end to
European Integration?" in the American Political Science Review 1966
(60) et 1967(61).

Second draft

HUNGARY AND SOME PROBLEMS
OF EUROPEAN COOPERATION

By

Dr. István Kende
Department of International Relations
Karl Marx University, Budapest

1. The Most Important Factors Determining Hungary's Foreign Policy

The present orientation of Hungary's foreign policy, her attitude and activity concerning East-West cooperation, cannot be discussed without being acquainted with certain circumstances and historical antecedents.

Up to the Second World War Hungary for centuries had belonged to the sphere of German political gravitation. Here we are not discussing the reasons for this but it is important to point out that one of the consequences of this orientation was that during both World Wars Hungary stood on the side of countries led and controlled by Germany, and became in both cases, one of the losing partners in the military field. At the same time this German gravitation also meant that up to the Second World War Hungarian progressive forces - both in the working class, and in the bourgeois movements - linked their struggles for social reforms with a struggle of independence against German /and in the given case Austrian/ influence.

In addition to this fact, due to Hungary's internal situation within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy before the First World War - conflicts among the Hungarian and neighbouring nations had been extremely acute and there had been a very strong, chauvinistic, ultra-nationalistic hatred among the peoples of this region. Up to the Second World War there had been no period at all with a balanced and normal political and economic atmosphere prevailing between Hungary and the surrounding nations, a fact that turned out to be one of the serious brakes of Central European development.

In Hungary, the suppression of the 1919 socialist revolution was followed by the rule of the Horthy regime, a counter-revolutionary regime of fascist character, which strongly oppressed any efforts made in the direction of progress and independence. This regime integrated Hungary with the fascist axis powers and led the country to the German occupation and finally to the heavy destruction of the Second World War. From 1919 until 1945, Hungary's political life was in the hands of a fascist regime. This also meant that fascism in Hungary was of a longer life than the same system in Italy or in Germany. The damage caused by the rule of this regime was aggravated by Hungary's highly backward economic and social conditions, at the historical roots of which we find a feudal system exceptionally strong when compared to the same system in any other European country, and the network of huge estates belonging to the church and to the Hungarian aristocracy. All this led to the extreme poverty of both peasants and workers whose living standard was one of the lowest in Europe.

In addition to the factors discussed above, we have to recall other, what one might call, permanent factors, arising from the geographical position and natural charac-

ter of the country. One of these important factors is the extreme shortage of raw materials. Apart from bauxite, there are only relatively small quantities of other raw materials to be found in this country. Moreover, the shortage of raw materials is coupled with a scarcity of energy resources.

All these factors exercised a considerable influence on the country's economic situation in the pre-war period. Until 1938, 57% of Hungary's export consisted of foodstuffs, while 73% of her import contained various raw materials. About 50% of Hungary's industrial production made use of imported raw materials. ⁽¹⁾

It was only after the end of the Second World War that a profound change in this situation took place. But even today's situation is characterised by a shortage of raw materials, and consequently a high level of raw material import that amounts to an annual value of 60 Dollars per capita. ⁽²⁾ After the Second World War Hungary's situation has undergone a fundamental change. After a shorter period of transition the country took a definite stand for the socialist system and became one of the countries of the socialist camp formed after the Second World War. This has resulted in considerable changes first and foremost in the country's social structure. The system of private, Church and other feudal big estates was abolished and the most significant means of production were nationalised. Consequently the country's social structure, as well as the way of life and living standard of the population had and has been undergoing a vigorous transformation. All these of course have been exercising a marked influence on the country's foreign policy and they also modify her economic, political and other relations. Let me give an example to illustrate the consequences of this transformation on Hungary's economic and political position in Europe. Before the Second World War Hungary was a considerable exporter of agricultural goods precisely because there were large agricultural surplus goods available. However, the source of this surplus was the extreme poverty of large masses of the population and the low level of the consumer's purchasing power. Since 1945 the structure of public consumption has changed too. While previously the yearly meat consumption was 31-33 kilogrammes and sugar consumption between 10-11 kilogrammes per capita, after the Second World War these figures rose to 50 and 30 kilogrammes respectively. ⁽³⁾

This increase immediately changed the earlier situation, when the Hungarian economy covered the currency needed for the import of raw materials from the export of agricultural goods, particularly from foodstuffs. The difficulties in this respect were increased by the fact that agriculture developed at a slower than desired rate. Although, even in this respect, agricultural output in 1964 was 28% higher than in the last pre-war year. ⁽⁴⁾

However, the possibility of maintaining the old structure of goods-exchange came to an end because in all the fields that showed redundancy of goods before the

war there appeared a lack of goods due to suddenly increased demands. This in addition to affecting the balance and structure of foreign trade, influenced its role and orientation, and our relations with the countries of the world as well. And this was just one single example from many. As from the end of the 40-ies Hungary once and for all broke with the negative traditions of the past and became a member of the political power which is coordinated economically in the framework of COMECON, the Council for Mutual Assistance among the socialist countries, and from the point of view of defence, in the framework of the Warsaw Treaty.

Due to Hungary's geographical position, most of the countries belonging to the same social system are at the same time her neighbours as well. Hungary has common borders with four countries belonging to the socialist camp, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Rumania and Yugoslavia. Cooperation with those nations with whom we had traditional national conflicts or who due to the anti-communist propaganda of Horthy fascisms we had been in opposition with, is also one of the most important factors and characteristically new features in the trends of Hungarian foreign policy. Another neighbour of ours is Austria, the country we had the widest "official" historical contacts with, whereas now this is the only bordering country with a different social system from ours. This also provides an important factor of our foreign policy, first of all from the point of view of the development of East-West relations.

2. The basic Principles of Hungary's Foreign Policy

All these points we have discussed provide the basis for the new Hungarian foreign policy. The basic principles of that policy were outlined by János Kádár, first secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party in the following way:

"The basis of our foreign policy is lasting and principalled... We are defending our national independence, our country's sovereignty, the socialist achievements of our people, our peace. In accordance with these we fight against imperialism and against any form of aggression and keep on fighting - shoulder to shoulder with all those who, outside our borders all over the world, are struggling for the peace, independence, friendship and equality of people. There is an alliance, friendship and fruitful cooperation between the Hungarian People's Republic and the Soviet Union. We respect the Soviet Union as the firmest stronghold of socialism, of progress and peace... Friendship, cooperation, and the community of interests link us with every socialist country and we are given confidence by the fact that the Hungarian People's Republic is also one of the members of the Warsaw Defence Treaty... Due to her own achievements, the Hungarian People's Republic is today a factor in international life, partly because it is a Socialist country and even more so because she conducts a consistent foreign policy and progresses in close relations and unity with the great family of the peoples of the socialist countries.

We conduct an active foreign policy towards the capitalist countries as well, for we are and will be supporting the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems. In our interpretation of this principle, it is only reasonable if normal inter-state relations are established between a socialist and a capitalist country, if mutually advantageous economic and cultural exchanges develop between them. But the norms are compulsory for both partners:

peaceful coexistence means the respect of the territorial inviolability of each other's country, the independence of each nation, and non-interference into the internal affairs of other countries, as well as respect of the rights of each nation for the free choice of the social system they want to live in, and also the settling of disputed issues through negotiations." (5)

According to the above, the basis of Hungary's foreign policy is the fact that she belongs to the socialist camp, her alliance with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, membership in the Warsaw Treaty and COMECON, and concerning countries with other social systems: Hungary is for an active interpretation of peaceful coexistence, i.e. not simply an existence side by side, without actual wars, but within the given possibilities a large variety of cooperation in every field where it is possible and mutually advantageous. Hungarian foreign policy and Hungarian economic policy have done quite a lot in this field and it has not been primarily our fault if results achieved have not always been satisfactory. Thus, for example, it is obvious that a real obstacle in the realisation of peaceful coexistence is the fact that the strongest of all the capitalist countries is at war with Hungary's friend and ally, the socialist Vietnam Democratic Republic, and thus it constantly endangers the peace of Asia, or indeed that of the whole world, and this of course pertains a challenge and rejection of the basic principles of peaceful coexistence.

Hungary regards peace as an important issue of humanity. That is why we support proposals and agreements aimed at the limiting and final banning of nuclear tests, disarmament, etc. Peace is one and indivisible: - any state that talks about peace and calls for peaceful coexistence while waging aggressive wars and interventions, interfering with the lives of people that had done nothing against them, is in fact the enemy of peace, of peaceful coexistence, and as such, an enemy of the whole of mankind and of the cause of progress.

Peaceful coexistence, the basic principle of Hungarian socialist policy towards countries with different social and political principles is, as mentioned above, an active policy; its aim is to allow a free competition among the various systems, and to provide the possibility for each nation to decide for itself about its lot with peaceful means, attempting to cooperate through economic, cultural, and other contacts and competitions with any country that sincerely is willing to do so.

3. Some Political Problems of East-West Cooperation

Hungary suffered very heavy losses in both World Wars. More than half a million people died, and more than one third of our national wealth was destroyed. (6) It can be easily understood then that one of the central issues of Hungarian diplomacy is that of European security and, closely related to this - especially in Hungary's case, the German question.

3.1. The German Problem

As it is known, our relations with one of the two Germanies - based on the identity of ideologies and social systems is characterised by complete friendship, the organisational framework of which is provided by the fact of belonging to the same defence and economic communities, as well as by a number of bilateral treaties, especially the new treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance signed on 18th May 1967. Our relations with the other Germany, the German Federal Republic however, are loaded with lots of problems. True, that new (or not even so new by now) West German coalition regime has rephrased some of its principles on various issues, particularly on cooperation with the socialist countries, on the "new Eastern policy". However, these rephrasings prove to be far from being satisfactory and far from being new either.

Hungary of course regards the existence of the two German states a reality that would be absolutely unreasonable to deny... "We are ready even now - stated in July 1968 the Hungarian Foreign Minister dealing in his parliamentary exposé with Hungary's relations with the GFR - to raise the standard of official recognition, if this measure is strengthenening European peace and security. But to do this it is necessary that the GFR should deal with the problems of German people and of Europe based on the existence of two German states." (7)

In fact, Hungary cannot allow that the establishment of any diplomatic relations should damage another, essentially stronger relation. In Hungarian opinion, the attempts of the German Federal Republic to "approach" the socialist countries are aimed at weakening the relations among the socialist countries, and particularly among the German Democratic Republic and the other socialist countries. Policies which have the purpose of establishing diplomatic relations only with some socialist countries, while denying even the right existence of the others cannot be regarded as correct aspirations. At his press conference held in Paris on March 30th 1968, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Mr. Jenő Fock said:

"On the very day when the German Federal Republic is ready to acknowledge the existence of another German state and to recognise the irrevocability of the Odera-Neisse frontier, talks can start and can lead to success on the establishment of diplomatic relations."

I may add here that the recognition of the existence of the German Democratic Republic includes the acceptance of the Odera-Neisse border as well. By the way, the partners directly interested in this question have long accepted it to be final. After all, the two states, living on the two sides of that border declared long ago that they regarded their common frontiers as final and "peace frontiers". Today it is only the German Federal Republic that is raising the border question in Europe, thus proving that its policy of "Alleinvertretung" - the principle of sole representation, is one of the main obstacles to peace in Europe. As long as the German Federal Republic sticks to this principle and does not restrain its own internal

revanchist, neo-fascist forces, gaining even more ground these days, there cannot be a real, genuine East-West rapprochement, or a genuine European security.

At the same time Western Germany has not yet abandoned its "Heimatrechtstheorie" either; that means it considers all the members of German speaking minorities of different Central and Eastern European countries resettled after World War II, according to the Potsdam Agreement, to the German territories, as people having conserved a right of returning and/ or of claiming for indemnification. So Western Germany is fomenting a constant desire of certain revanche not only against the GDR but against some other socialist countries as well, including Hungary.

It is understandable that the Hungarian nation, having had grave experiences on these issues from its past history, reacts to all these developments in a particularly careful and sensitive way.

3.2. The General Problems of European Security

The German problem of course, does not embrace the whole issue of European security. And at the same time, European security itself cannot be examined and even less be achieved in practice if treated separately from the situation and events outside Europe. Even if the majority of European problems could be solved, there would be no European security of full value until insecurity exists in any other region of the world, e.g. in Vietnam.

To a certain extent Europe is one of the main grounds of peaceful coexistence today. Peaceful coexistence has been realised here in a relatively more complete way than anywhere else. Among the reasons for this we find the fact that it is this area where armed forces - including nuclear forces of the major powers are in open confrontation with each other. And it is this continent where states, belonging to the two different systems, are separated by the most uncertain frontier. /We call them "uncertain" because - as we have already mentioned - this frontier, the one between the two German states, has still not been accepted by the German state situated on the Western side of this frontier./ This is the area where the two main military blocs, the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty were formed, and these - due to their automatisms - make any local clash impossible, or would turn such an occurrence into a full-scale European or even world clash. It is mainly here that a local clash and local war - be they as frequent at several other parts of the world as they are - would mean direct and immediate danger of a world war, a clash of major forces. /This of course does not exclude the possibility of similar dangers on any other continent./

Realising the primary importance of European security, Hungary extends official support to all initiatives aimed at reducing tension, and guaranteeing the security of Europe. Hungary continues to support the convocation of a conference to discuss European security. This conference should be attended by representa-

tives of every European government. Unfortunately, no such conference has taken place yet, despite the fact that a number of European socialist countries have reacted favourably and even some of the Western countries showed willingness to attend. "The most important obstacle / on the way leading to European security/ is that the change which should serve the interest of the workers of GFR, of every German and of all European people, did not take place in the policy of the West German Government." (8)

During its session in July 1967, the Hungarian National Assembly dealt in detail with the problem of European security and brought a resolution where the tasks were concretely outlined. Among other things, the resolution states: -

"It is fundamentally important that every European Parliament and government should recognise the realities that have emerged after the Second World War, the inviolability of the present frontiers and should renounce the use of force in its international relations.

Detente in Europe could be greatly promoted by the signing of an all-European treaty of cooperation and security. Such a treaty would greatly contribute to the improvement of relations between the two opposing allied systems and would undoubtedly reduce the danger of the outbreak of an armed conflict. The realisation of an all-European security system could be promoted by the signing of regional agreements in various parts of Europe, which would help to serve universal security on the continent."

The recognition of the existence of the two Germanies, - the recognition of the present frontiers, and the renunciation of the demand of changing these frontiers - is an indispensable requirement serving the interest and the security of the people of Europe.

The development of relations between the two opposed military alliances in Europe is also of great significance. Relations between the two alliances should be settled so that - until their mutual and simultaneous abolition becomes possible - the chance and danger of the outbreak of any conflict should be reduced to the minimum."

3.3. The Situation in the Danube Basin

As we have mentioned above, Hungary's position is influenced by a number of important factors. These include the country's geographical position/ the fact that it is lying along the Danube/ the central place it occupies among the Balcanic and Central European states, together with the fact of having a common border with Austria.

The river Danube connects eight countries. In the order of the river's flow, these are: the German Federal Republic, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rounania, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. Out of these, two are "Western", while six are "Eastern" states. The increasing role the river plays in connecting these countries can be illustrated by the fact that while in the pre-war years 6-8 million tons of goods were loaded in its ports, today this has surpassed the 30 million mark. Each year there are about 3,3 million people travelling on board the Danube ships from one Danube state to another. (9)

The Danube, however, would provide the possibility for an even wider cooperation,

especially in the economic field. The Danube Commission, which has its headquarters in Budapest /and the members of which include all Danube states, except the German Federal Republic, although it is also permanently represented at the sessions/ deals with a number of such questions. Possibilities for greater Danube cooperation will increase after the Danube-Maine-Rhine and the Danube-Elbe-Odera canals are opened. The river Danube will play an important role as a source of energy which can only be effectively exploited by a joint cooperation of several Danube countries. /Hungary and Czechoslovakia have already signed such an agreement, which is already at the first stage of realisation./

3.4. Relations between Austria and Hungary

Relations between Hungary and Austria are part of the Danube question and at the same time they represent a lot more than this question, Contacts between the two countries are of a long - although not at all undisturbed past.

But of whatever character this relation had been in the various periods of history, it has certainly always been very significant. As far as Hungarian foreign trade is concerned, in the pre-war period about 10% of the total Austrian export was directed to Hungary, while 20% of Hungary's export went to Austria. (10)

It is understandable that the same proportions were not kept up in the post-war period. The difference of the two social systems, the basically new orientation of Hungarian foreign policy have necessarily modified this rate. However, it was not advantageous at all that following the Second World War relations were at an almost complete halt, or at least they were not of a significant size. Even in 1959, Hungarian export to Austria was only 3% of our total export, and Austrian export to Hungary related to that country's total export was similar, or much the same. In that same year, passenger traffic between the two neighbouring states was only 13.000 from Austria to Hungary and about 8500 in the opposite direction.

Since then a number of agreements have been signed between the two countries and the situation has significantly changed. In 1959 a three year trade contract was signed which was followed in 1962 by the signature of a five year one. In 1967 an Austro-Hungarian treaty on the settling of pending financial matters, on mutual judicial assistance to each other's countries citizens, and afterwards a long term agreement on trade turnover were signed, the protocol of which - covering the period between 1968-1972 was signed in 1967. These were followed by a separate agreement on the further development concerning industrial and economic cooperation of the two countries.

There is an abundance of figures to give evidence of the improving atmosphere. True, in the proportions of Austro-Hungarian foreign trade there is no significant change yet. The three percent level was surpassed only in the Hungarian import

from Austria, while Hungarian export to Austria in 1967 was below the three per-cent. ⁽¹¹⁾ However, due to recent rapid growth of trade, even this stagnation of proportions means quite a significant increase in actual value. Passenger traffic has undergone an important change. In 1967 more than 115,000 Austrian citizens travelled to Hungary, and more than 56 and a half thousand Hungarians visited Austria. /This does not include transit passengers/ ⁽¹²⁾

The first steps then towards establishing broader contacts between Austria and Hungary have taken place. Our agreements include the delivery of jointly produced complete factory equipment to third countries and other activities as well.

3.5. On Other Political Contacts

Of course one could enumerate and analyse Hungary's relations with a number of other countries as well. However, within the scope of this paper there is no possibility for a more detailed discussion of relations, and therefore we thought it would not be justified to select some countries for analyses - in addition to the neighbouring Austria - and leave out others. Instead, this paper will be dealing with some problems of East-West cooperation, problems which because of the character of those cooperations /economic, cultural, etc./ are related to Hungarian politics.

It is important to note, however, that Hungary regards the establishment of both bilateral and multilateral contacts to be of great importance. We do not think that either of the two methods in themselves could serve the purpose. However, we have recently gained a number of good experiences concerning bilateral East-West contacts, and examples in this respect include not only the Austro-Hungarian co-operation already discussed, but the vigorous development of Franco-Hungarian and other relations.

As the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. János Péter stated, "We believe that relations based on bilateral contacts between countries of different regimes should be multiplied in the way that through them a network of security might be gradually elaborated which should meet the interest of all European people" ⁽¹³⁾

4. Economic Cooperation

Foreign trade, and international contacts in general, play a role that is more than of average importance in Hungary's economic life. Both Hungary's geographical situation and the main principles of its foreign policy explain the efforts to establish the widest possible economic relations with every country of the world, which is willing to build economic relations with us on the basis of mutual advantages.

Under the term of "economic relations" we do not only mean foreign trade contacts. For, in addition to foreign trade, there are other forms of contacts, including

industrial, technical and other forms of cooperation which - gaining ground fast - are becoming more and more significant and have lots of still unexplored opportunities that could fully develop only in the atmosphere of peaceful co-existence.

In the absence of this proper atmosphere the relations cannot be satisfactory either. Nothing proves this better than the fact that after 1945 relations between countries with different social systems developed in very difficult circumstances. Some Western sources tend to explain this by referring to the one time autarchic trends of the socialist countries. In reality, however, these trends were first of all the products of the cold war atmosphere, the products of the embargo system dictated by the cold war, or more precisely, by the United States. It is common knowledge that - connected to the realisation of the Marshall Plan - various grave sanctions were taken, prohibiting the delivery of different goods even to Western Europe, in case those goods were decided to be able to promote the production of goods delivered to the socialist countries. The list of the so called strategic goods included items which can be anything but strategic. Between 1952 and 1954 "around half of all the goods circulating in international trade were included in the embargo list." (14)

This naturally led to increased isolation. Although it is true that some Western states and particularly some Western companies and enterprises opposed these American trends, one can still understand that in such circumstances - in the field of trade turnover, and economy in general - contacts between East and West were narrow, and this naturally affected later relations as well. The development of relations was impeded by a number of elements in the process of Western integration that we have no scope for discussing in this paper.

In recent years significant changes have taken place in the economic relations between the socialist countries - Hungary included of course - and the Western European states. Today, Hungary has an extended trade turnover with the outside world: in 1967 Hungary imported goods from 80 countries, while exported various items to 137 countries. (15) About 70% of Hungary's total foreign trade turnover is with the COMECON countries and 30% with the rest of the world. (16) And although during the period between 1961-1965 Hungary's foreign trade turnover with the OECD countries had increased by 44-45%, this figure lags behind the increase of Hungary's total trade turnover of 78-82% during the same period. (17)

Relations with the capitalist countries of the West are not always developing in the right direction and at a sufficient rate. The following data provide a very characteristic comparison about this process:

ANNUAL AVERAGE OF TRADE BALANCE IN MILLION FORINTS

	1963	1965	1966
COMECON countries	-577.6	+299.7	+739.9
Advanced capitalist countries	-542.9	-633.5	-282.2 (18)

Regarding the whole of Hungarian foreign trade balance, it has ceased to be passive during the past few years, except for relations with the West.

The structure of Hungarian export to Western countries is not very advantageous; while 65% of Hungary's export to the COMECON countries consists of industrial goods, in Western relations it is only 22%. (18) So it is obvious that the perspectives of foreign trade between Hungary and the Western states are fundamentally influenced by the extent of how Hungary's Western partners accept Hungarian export in general, and industrial export in particular. The importance of this issue is increased by the rapid development of Hungarian industry, a fact that at the same time pertains the possibility of changing this structure. As compared to 1938, in 1967 the total industrial index of Hungarian industrial production was 709, and even compared to 1950 it was 448. The most outstanding development has taken place in the machine industry which plays a very important role in Hungarian export as well. With the production index of 1950 taken as 100, the index of machine industry production has risen to 618. (20) There is a figure to prove the important role Hungarian industrial production plays in the country's export turnover which also shows the trend of general development and economic transformation of Hungary. In 1938, the share of food export in the country's total export trade turnover was 57%, while that of the industrial items was only 23%; however, by 1964 in this rate the figures have almost changed places: the share of foodstuffs then was 20% of the country's total foreign trade turnover, while the export of industrial items rose to 54%. (21)

Concerning proportions rather than absolute numbers, the role of European economic integration in Hungary's foreign trade has been stagnating or only slightly rising in the past few years. From 1961 to 1965 the share of the EEC countries in Hungarian export rose from 10.3% to 12%, while in import it decreased from 12.9% to 12.3%. The share of EFTA countries increased in Hungarian exports from 7.7% to 8.8%, while in Hungarian import it increased from 10.0% to 10.3%. Considering absolute numbers, i.e. taking the 1961 figures as 100, the share of the EEC and EFTA countries in Hungary's exports increased to 171, while in its import the EEC countries' share rose to 142, while that of the EFTA countries to 150. (22)

The share of Hungary's most important Western European trade partners in Hungary's foreign trade was as follows (1967):

	export (%)	import (%)
German Federal Republic	5.8	4.3
Italy	3.1	4.9
Austria	3.6	2.8
United Kingdom	3.2	2.3
Switzerland	2.4	2.7
France	2.0	1.4 (23)

We are sure that these figures also prove Hungary's endeavour to establish the widest possible relations with the West European countries in accordance with the principle of peaceful coexistence - in fact, even beyond the existing or not even yet existing diplomatic relations. We regard bilateral treaties as - if not the only, but certainly the most effective organisational forms to promote this endeavour.

But of course, foreign trade represents but a part of our economic contacts. The industrial-technical revolution widens and gives greater importance to technological cooperation and this is especially and increasingly true for the East-West relations. In this context it is worth mentioning (underlining the active role of Hungary) that an article published in the 23 January 1966 issue of the Swiss paper, Neue Züricher Zeitung (Die Industrielle Kooperation der Ostens und Westens) clearly states that East-West cooperation started at precisely Hungarian initiative. Really, in 1964 a Hungarian goodwill delegation visited Great Britain, France, the German Federal Republic and Italy for this very reason, with the aim of establishing cooperations, and these visits were shortly followed by significant economic negotiations. We have conducted talks on cooperation not only with the above mentioned countries, but also with Austrian, Belgian, Dutch, Danish, Swedish, Swiss and Norwegian partners. Since that time a number of important agreements have been concluded concerning industrial cooperation. To mention just some of them: cooperation agreements on truck production have been reached between Hungary, the French Renault and the West German Man-Ferrostal firms. The contract is at a value of about 110 million French Francs. As a result of cooperation in this deal, the joint plant at the Western Hungarian town of Győr will produce 10,000 various trucks per year, not only for the home market but for foreign consumption as well. Significant cooperation deals have been concluded with the West German Friederich Krupp /Essen/ Works on joint machine tool production. Agreement with another West German firm, Rhein-stahl /Essen/ embraces mining machine production, while the contract with the Siemens-Reiniger Werke / also from West Germany/ concerns cooperation in the production of X-Ray machinery. Other cooperation agreements have been signed with Unitherm of Austria and Blowtherm of Italy on the production of machines for the oil industry; more foreign companies on the cooperation list are Zschocke,

/Döttingen/ of Switzerland, Reymold of Holland, guest Keen and Nettlefols of Britain, Neyrpic-Alsthom of France, etc. (24)

Hungary's cooperation with Austria on the mutual supply of electric energy deserves special mention, since this cooperation is already functioning. Long distance electric cables have already been installed and in fact the exchange of electric current is already going on. Hungary has developed similar co-operation with the neighbouring socialist countries.

We believe that cooperation in the field of industrial production will become an increasingly major part of East-West contacts which might lead to results of yet imperceivable importance. Since the Western partners of the Hungarian state organs are mostly enterprises, or groups, the best organisational form of co-operation with them seems to be the continuation of traditional inter-state agreements on cooperation

5. Cooperation in the Scientific, Cultural and Sports Fields.

Hungary regards cultural and scientific contacts to be most important fields of cooperation ensured by peaceful coexistence. Naturally that does not mean that this cooperation will ever change the ideologies of the two different systems, or that it could lead to a kind of equalisation, ideological convergence. As phrased by györgy Lukács in a recent interview, "Behind coexistence we find the continuous contact of culture that no war, or prohibition can stop... Coexistence also means an uninterrupted increase in cultural contacts without, however, the disappearance of those political, economic, cultural, etc. contradictions that separate the world of socialism from that of non-socialism. That is why I... think that the problem of coexistence can only be approached and assessed as a new form of international class struggle... In the field of cultural coexistence too, it is only with cultural products of high level that one can achieve genuine results in the cultural struggle." (25)

In view of this one of the principles of Hungarian cultural policy is to make known in our language a possibly very wide range of foreign literary, artistic works and cultural values. This involves not only the classic authors like Shakespeare, Moliere or even G.B. Shaw, etc., who are well known and much played or much published /in some cases even to a greater extent than in their own country/, but also some of the famous contemporary writers from abroad. In the same time Hungary makes it possible to acquaint foreign countries, foreign readers with Hungarian values. Much has been done especially in the past years in the field of translation of some of the masterpieces of Hungarian literature. Another essential aspect of Hungary's cultural relations concerns a wide range of scientific exchanges unanimously recognised to be useful for all parties interested.

The cultural cooperation between Hungary and other countries is based on some 30 bilateral cultural agreements. Besides this great number of agreements, Hungary's cooperation in the field of culture and sciences extends to about 70 countries. One of the very important results of this is that Hungarians have

better ideas about the way of life and national culture of the people than they did before. The traditional image of Hungary has also been changed in the mind of other people because they are now better informed about Hungarian cultural values.

From the Capitalist countries of Europe Hungary has cultural state agreements among others with Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Great-Britain, Italy, Norway, Sweden. There are permanent cultural institutes in some European capitals, as in Vienna, Paris, Rome and university departments for our language and literature in Austrian, Finnish, Italian and Swedish universities.

Hungary has especially strong cultural relations with Austria, France, Italy and Great Britain. To quote only one example, there are about fifty French cultural delegations of different kinds in a year visiting Hungary.

As it has been stated, cultural ties are very **important** ^{aspects} of active peaceful cooperation between nations. The interest of the parties concerned in this field being of quite a different nature as it is in the field of economic relations, foreign trade, etc., It is sometimes much easier to arrive at a result in the cultural or scientific matters - or especially in the field of sport. - These relations may have a different influence on the broad masses which is therefore deeper and broader. As a contribution to a general comprehension of nations nothing may be as important as this kind of cooperation.

We want to emphasize the cooperation in the field of information, journalism, etc. It appears that much is still to be done until misinformation disappears; we could quote a lot of examples how some irresponsible newspaper-informations are sometimes capable of spoiling the result of a long cooperation and foment misunderstanding between people.

6. The Organization of International Cooperation

Hungary is a member of 521 international organizations. 36 out of these are inter-governmental political bodies and 485 are economic, cultural, scientific, religious and sport organizations. Hungary has diplomatic relations with 72 countries (before the Second World War the figure was down to 38).

The country has been a member of the UN since December 1955. The only time when her activities in this organisation were disturbed was in the period immediately following the 1956 counter-revolution in Hungary, when certain countries made efforts to limit her rights as a member and abused the events in Hungary by trying to organise anti-Hungarian and Anti-Soviet campaigns. After a short while, however, as soon as - due to increased indifference - the so-called "Hungarian question" was taken off the agenda, Hungary could resume her active participation in the activities of the organisation. One of the vice-presidents of the General

Assembly of the 21st Session was the permanent UN representative of Hungary.

Hungary is also a member of some special committees, such as the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations - which has 33 member countries and in which Hungary is especially active - the Commission on the Status of Women and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. At one session each, both committees had Hungarian vice-presidents elected. In the UN committees, specialised and other international organisations, Hungary held 34 elected offices.⁽²⁶⁾ In the mechanism of the UN and its organisations there are 23 international civil servants from Hungary, and there are 25 Hungarian experts working in the various UN agencies.⁽²⁷⁾

Hungary is actively participating in the Economic Commission for Europe which had a Hungarian vice-president in 1966. Here, too, Hungary does its best to promote and strengthen East-West relations, to establish and develop foreign trade and the new methods of economic cooperation.

The country is a member of 11 Specialised Agencies of the UN / ILO, UNESCO, WHO, FAO, UNICEF, Universal Postal Union, International Telecommunication Union, International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee, International Radio Consultative Committee, World Meteorological Organisation, International Atomic Energy Agency /. Among these let us emphasise Hungarian participation in UNESCO, that stands very high in Hungarian eyes. Hungary has been a member of this organisation since 1948. In 1966 there was a Hungarian member elected Vice-Chairman of the Executive Board. In June the same year, by the way, the Executive Board held its session in Budapest to discuss the protection of historical monuments and the development of tourism.

Although Hungary highly appreciates the work of all these organisations, she believes that the activity of both the UN and that of the other Specialised Agencies would be of more universal value if the camp of their members were wider, that is, if any state could become a member without any discrimination. Because the situation is different today, neither the Chinese People's Republic, nor - as a European example - the two Germanies / and sometimes it seems only one of the two Germanies, the GDR/ are members of these organisations.

Among the other international, governmental organisations Hungary is a member first of all of the two organisations of the socialist countries, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, and the Council for Mutual Economic Aid. Furthermore, as mentioned before, Hungary actively participates, in the Danube Commission which has its headquarters in Budapest, and also in a number of other organisations, the most important of which are the organisations promoting legal cooperation, UNIDROIT, International Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, IU for the Protection of Industrial Property, etc.

Hungary participates as observer in GATT. Here we should note that the customs

system in Hungary is just undergoing a transformation by the end of which it would correspond to the general requirements of GATT. At the last UNCTAD conference new Hungarian tariff system enjoyed an extremely favourable reception by the countries of the third world.

Among European organisations we have already mentioned the UN Economic Commission of Europe. It is to be considered as the most important all-European organisation of cooperation. Its importance is still increased by the fact that almost all European countries are represented in it. But in the same time this is the very point where a further step should be made to make it the real instrument of a multilateral and universal European cooperation: the participation of the German Democratic Republic - the German Federal Republic already taking part in it - should make at least this organisation really all-European in the very sense of the word. But even in its restricted form it had an important role of keeping contacts in the most difficult years of Cold War. We should highly appreciate if it could extend its activities in the field of finding out and of elaboration ever new forms of cooperation and in the organisation of scientific cooperation. We have also described the relationship of the Warsaw Treaty and of NATO. This relationship which represents a question of utmost importance, could only be solved, as we have suggested, by the simultaneous abolition of both organisations. As far as Hungary is concerned, as a member of the Warsaw Treaty, she has announced more than once her willingness in this direction. In case there are obstacles in the way of an immediate realisation of this, a gradual way of solution could be worked out.

As far as economic integration of the Western World is concerned, Hungary naturally recognises their existence. Hungary's general endeavour is to keep good contacts with all the members of every grouping. "We especially expect from the Common Market - said the Hungarian Foreign Minister in the Parliament - that it shall help the economic cooperation of European countries by eliminating its discriminatory measures. Our representation in Bruxelles is ready to study the possibilities of a possibly broad European economic collaboration with the Office of the Common Market, as well as with the countries represented in it." Nepszabadsag, July 14, 1968.

Mr. Jenő Fock, the Hungarian Prime Minister stated at his press conference in Paris during his visit there, that in theory one can imagine the COMECON and the Common Market to create high level contacts. But the Common Market, this highly organised economic integration, causes Hungary and a number of other countries much damage because of its policy of discrimination. "If I regard nothing but our own interests, I would vote for its dissolution" he added. "Nobody could say that COMECON is a hindrance to normal cooperation in Europe, but the case with the Common Market is this unfortunately." (28)

Concerning the European Council, Hungary finds it incompetent even to indicate tasks of European cooperation. The Council of Europe is a product of the Cold War. Its charter, all its political aims are fundamentally anticommunist, making it completely impossible to promote the peaceful coexistence of the two kinds of regimes. It passed quite a lot of decisions against the socialist countries, thereby deepening the atmosphere of the cold war. The Committee of Non-Represented Nations, organised in its framework excludes in se all forms of cooperation with socialist countries, as the very existence of this committee constitutes a net position on the side of the enemies of the socialist system.

In the same time Hungary highly appreciates the activity of a number of non-governmental organisations and is sure that they provide excellent possibilities of cooperation. Among them there are a high number of organisations which even perform part of their activity - hold conferences here, etc. - in Hungary.

Again, Hungary does not take a specific stand concerning participation in their work, or cooperation between them. Hungary promotes the activity and cooperation of all organisations that are genuinely for peaceful coexistence, and work with open methods and democratic means. The same way, when these are granted, Hungary supports all kinds of personal cooperation, person-to-person contacts. Hungarian scientists and experts hold individual and honorary memberships in about 150 international organisations.

Through various international organisations /UN, UNESCO, etc./ Hungarian experts are also working in a number of developing countries. The sending of experts through these international organisations as well as on the basis of cultural, scientific and other bilateral and multilateral agreements on cooperation, and agreements on economic aid, credit, etc provide an appropriate form to our attempt to help the developing countries. On a cooperative basis the country participates in numerous major projects as well. In this field it shall have new chances to promote further development of East-West cooperation in Europe. It believes that in the context of the third world, such cooperation can open up new vistas for East-West cooperation.

It is, however, difficult to see any other serious opportunities which would widen the organised form of joint activities with the third world. Hungary's intentions in this field are so different, that cooperation can only be established within the grouping of her own political system.

FOOT-NOTES

- (1) Hungarian Survey, 1966, Corvina, Budapest p.89.
- (2) Studien. Handbuch der Ungarischen Wirtschaft. Politik und Kultur. Corvina, Budapest, 1967. p. 72.
- (3) Hungarian Survey, 1966. p. 89.
- (4) Hungary 67. Pannonia Press, Budapest 1967. p.190.
- (5) Speech on 22nd February 1967. Published in "Patriotism and Internationalism" Kossuth, 1968. pp. 361-363.
- (6) Encyclopedia of Diplomatic Affairs and of International Law. Academy Publishing House, Budapest, 1967. p. 542.
- (7) Nepszabadság, 14.7.1968.
- (8) Declaration of Z. Komocsin, Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Nepszabadsag, 10.8.1968.
- (9) Studien. pp. 5 and 9.
- (10) Hungarian Survey. 1966. p. 95.
- (11) Hungarian Statistical Pocket Book, 1968. pp. 96-97.
- (12) Hungarian Statistical Pocket Book, 1968. p. 124.
- (13) Nepszabadsag, July 14th, 1968.
- (14) G. Adler-Karlsson: Western Economic Warfare 1947-67, Almquist and Wiksell, Stockholm, 1968, p. 54.
- (15) Hungarian Statistical Pocket Book. 1968. p. 96.
- (16) Hungarian Survey 1966. p. 90.
- (17) Hungarian Survey, 1967. p. 22.
- (18) Hungarian Survey, 1967. p. 23.
- (19) Hungarian Statistical Pocket Book 1968. p. 45.
- (20) Hungarian Statistical Pocket Book 1968. p. 47.
- (21) Hungarian Survey 1966. pp. 89-90
- (22) Handbook of Hungarian Foreign Trade. Corvina. Budapest 1967. pp. 19-20.
- (23) Hungarian Statistical Pocket Book 1968. pp. 96-97.
- (24) Studien pp. 73-77.
- (25) Kortars, A literary review - "Contemporary"/1965/ 5 pp. 745-746.
- (26) Encyclopedia of Diplomatic Affairs and of International Law. p. 537.
- (27) Hungarian Survey 1967. p.94.
- (28) Press conference of Mr. Jeno Fock, Paris, 30th March 1968.

11
Second draft

Cooperation in Europe Study

SWITZERLAND

By

Daniel Frei

1. Switzerland has engaged in a full-scale effort to take part in the European unification movement. Since the war, she always took part in the efforts to achieve a united Europe, and when it became obvious that all-European integration would not be feasible, she began promoting the foundation and development of the European Free Trade Association. She applied for association with the European Economic Community, and she is an active member of many international and intergovernmental organizations created for European cooperation in various fields. All this brings about a great number of issues of cooperation with countries belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as well as with other neutrals, like Austria and Sweden. Since the focus of this study is on the whole of Europe, the subject matter to be treated on the following pages can be limited to the problem of cooperation between Switzerland and East European countries.

2.1. The fundamental principle guiding Swiss foreign policy is, as might be generally known, the principle of permanent neutrality. That is to say that Swiss foreign policy is aimed at making the country fit for observing neutrality in case of any armed conflict. The kind of neutrality envisaged thereby is more or less identical with the neutrality defined in the Hague Conventions of 1907. It refers therefore to inter-State armed conflict, not to ideological competition etc. In peacetime, Swiss foreign policy has to avoid any actions that might render strict neutrality impossible in the case of war, and it has to make suitable provisions in preparing Switzerland to maintain neutrality in case of war. This policy is called "policy of neutrality"¹.

2.2. Swiss policy of neutrality is considered to be a matter of the State only, i.e. it primarily and exclusively concerns governmental behaviour. In particular, it is not deemed necessary that public opinion always be oriented in the same direction as the official foreign policy; thus State neutrality does not require a neutral attitude of the individual citizen. This is linked up with the fact that, secondly, a considerable number of matters affecting relations with countries in the East are not handled by the Government; cooperation in the field of sport, matters of cultural exchange, questions of industrial coproduction and planning of investments in new industries - to quote just a few examples - are left to private initiative. In such fields, strictly speaking no "policies" exist.

2.3. Hence two conclusions may be drawn which concern Swiss relations with East European States. Firstly, the principle of the policy of neutrality calls for correct diplomatic relations with all States, whatever their internal political structure might be ². The will to maintain the principle of universality in her diplomatic relations is based on the view that it is the State and not the Government that Switzerland recognises ³. No discrimination is therefore made against East European States, nor is there any preference given to relations with these countries. The second conclusion which has to be drawn from these basic facts of Swiss foreign policy in

general is that the Swiss Government has very little ways and means of influencing the intensity and nature of Swiss relations with certain States. Apart from the purely diplomatic level, in most cases it can just, by means of its diplomatic representations, give some assistance if so desired by private citizens or groups. As a general rule, it is not considered to be the task of Swiss Government to direct the inter-State activities in fields like trade and cultural relations.

3.1. It goes without saying that the Swiss Government does, within the scope of action left to it by the two principles mentioned above, undertake all efforts suitable to ease relations with East European States and to further all-European collaboration. In fact, a representative statement was made recently which clearly confirms this line of policy. In the 1966 State of Federation Report, the Federal Council expressed the opinion that the gap separating East and West European countries should be bridged and that therefore the European countries should embark on a closer collaboration⁴. The Swiss Foreign Minister, Federal Councillor Dr. Willy Spühler, recently said that Switzerland, precisely for being a neutral country, is particularly fit for assisting the task to ease East-West relations within Europe⁵. Apart from these programmatic statements, the Federal Council already advanced similar views four years ago. Referring to the relations with East European states, they said that the normalization of relations would be welcomed by the Swiss Government, Eastern Europe forms an integral part of our continent and the fate of their countries must not be considered irrelevant to Switzerland⁶. It is clearly the feeling of a common European solidarity which is reflected in such a statement. The Swiss Government also feels that now the time has come to give active expression to this common European solidarity. In August 1967, Federal Councillor Gnägi visited Moscow in order to inaugurate a new Swissair/Aeroflot air service. Though this trip was declared to be a private visit, Federal Councillor Gnägi was accompanied by a large group of high-level officials who got in touch with their Soviet counterparts. This has been the first time a member of the Swiss Government visited the Soviet Union⁷. Some months later, the Swiss Chief of General Staff, Dr. Paul Gygli, was on an official visit to Poland⁸.

3.2. The official Swiss policy towards East European countries has been much more stable and steady than the attitude of public opinion on this subject. The two things must not be confused, though of course, interaction between them is sometimes inevitable. Swiss public opinion was deeply shocked by the events that occurred in 1956 to the Hungarian people, and again by the erection of the Berlin wall in 1961. These two occurrences raised a heated discussion on the opportunity of contacts with East European countries, mainly in the field of trade and cultural relations. The arguments put forward against trade relations expressed the fear that such relations would strengthen the military potential of the Communist block and that large sums of the money earned by the East European countries would be spent for subversion purposes in the West⁹. As for cultural contacts, the question has been raised if Eastern States would abuse such contacts in the sense of a one-way traffic for propaganda

purposes ¹⁰. It must, however, be noted that many representative personalities of public life already expressed ~~contrary~~ views; they ~~emphasize~~ that it would be quite wrong to pursue in the cultural field a policy of "cordon sanitaire" and of "Réduit idéologique", and that it cannot be the task of Switzerland to construct a Western Iron Curtain ¹¹. The emotional concern of public opinion radiated into politics when such issues were raised in parliamentary discussions. On December 18 1961, a member of parliament, National Councillor Grendelmeier, asked the Government whether it would not share the opinion that trade relations with East European countries may jeopardize world peace ¹². And on December 20, 1961, another member of parliament, National Councillor Olivier Reverdin, invited the Federal Council to inform Parliament on its point of view regarding commercial and cultural relations with Communist States ¹³. These questions gave the Swiss Government the opportunity to describe its policy in these matters.

3.3. In his answer to the question of National Councillor Grendelmeier, Federal Councillor Dr. Hans Schaffner first pointed out that in contrast to 1937, when 11.7 % of Swiss imports came from Eastern Europe, the present trade volume with these countries has shrunk to 2.2 %; the corresponding figures for exports are 8.9 % and 3.3 %. As to the general principle of trade policy to be applied to relations with Eastern countries, the principle of universality necessitates the maintenance of correct trade relations with all States ¹⁴. In this context, it was also clearly pointed out that, since business is a matter for private citizens and not for the State, the Government must not interfere. Its duties are limited to keep open all channels of commercial exchange - notwithstanding whether these channels would be used or not ¹⁵. These channels are primarily of a bilateral nature: There are trade agreements with most East European countries which are usually binding for one year and which are regularly signed again after each year of validity. Such agreements contain lists of goods, stipulations regarding the volume of exchange and bilateral arrangements concerning the mode of payment ¹⁶. It must, however, be kept in mind that such agreements do not oblige Switzerland to sell and to buy all the quantities listed in those agreements; it is up to the individual firm to decide whether or not it finds it interesting to make a deal within the framework of an agreement, and the government cannot impose anything on individual firms. Apart from these trade agreements it is important to note that, as far as imports to Switzerland are concerned, the most-favoured nation clause is applied to all East European countries despite there are no formal arrangements on this point. In this respect, Switzerland represents therefore an exception among all West European countries ¹⁷. Free access to the Swiss market for competitors from all countries of course tends to increase competition. As a matter of fact, East European export firms have not always been lucky in this competition, either because their marketing organization was not efficient enough or because East European producers were not able to match successfully their competitors from other countries ¹⁸. The following table gives information on recent developments in trade relations between Switzerland and East European countries ¹⁹:

	Alb.	Bulg.	Cze.	GDR.	Hung.	Pol.	Rum.	USSR	Yugos.	all countries
trade volume in Mio. sFr.										
1961 imp.		7,2	79,1	28,7	43,7	49,1	28,5	30,0	22,5	11,644.4
exp.		10,9	62,6	30,1	34,3	55,9	48,5	37,9	63,9	8,822.1
1962 imp.		5,3	76,3	21,1	48,9	47,8	27,5	25,4	30,1	12,985.5
exp.		8,2	58,9	21,2	34,5	42,1	56,5	30,0	68,5	9,579.9
1963 imp.		7,2	68,2	23,4	66,1	46,5	26,4	26,8	39,6	13,980.4
exp.		11,4	57,5	23,7	34,9	43,5	54,1	50,8	92,0	10,441.7
1964 imp.		7,1	71,6	27,2	84,7	45,3	39,5	35,0	45,5	15,540.8
exp.		14,7	68,7	23,3	45,4	41,0	41,2	43,0	89,5	11,461.6
1965 imp.		9,5	85,3	33,0	86,8	57,3	23,9	52,6	46,9	15,929.3
exp.		29,8	81,5	35,1	48,5	63,0	35,2	66,0	84,6	12,801.0
1966 imp.		13,4	106,4	35,6	78,1	58,5	32,9	88,8	64,5	14,203.8
exp.		43,5	94,4	53,1	82,1	77,2	59,8	94,5	104,2	12,004.5
1967 imp.		16,9	116,9	38,6	88,5	50,2	26,6	48,6	57,0	17,786.0
exp.		43,8	87,3	66,3	81,7	82,6	86,6	98,6	138,4	15,164.8

With most East European countries agreements have also been signed on the question of compensating nationalized property formerly owned by Swiss citizens or companies. No agreement has been reached with Hungary; this fact to some extent stresses bilateral relations with this country²⁰.

3.4. Coproduction schemes and arrangements for exchange of technological know-how cannot be on a government to government basis. The Swiss Government cannot impose individual firms to reach such arrangements. According to a high Swiss official, the number of such arrangements may be larger than is generally known²¹. No exact data on these aspects of cooperation are known since this kind of economic interaction is completely free; there are no government licences or registration procedures.

3.5. A special position had to be taken by the Swiss Government with regard to visa-free travel. The rapid expansion of Swiss economy in the postwar period led to a serious shortage of labor. This, in turn, led to an unprecedented immigration of foreign workers. When the ratio of foreigners nearly touched 15 % of the whole Swiss population, it became inevitable to arrange for some restrictive measure in order to stabilize the ethnic and social equilibrium. Often, foreign workers try to get into Switzerland as "tourists". In order to prevent such "false tourists" from settling in Switzerland, it has been necessary to retard liberalization of travel.

3.6. As indicated above, trade relations between Switzerland and East European countries are primarily handled within the bilateral framework. However, arrangements have been made with Yugoslavia to wind up international payments on multilateral footing within the OECD²². Apart from this, the Swiss Government has proved it useful to cooperate with the Economic Commission of Europe; Switzerland takes part in the

work of ECE as a consultative member. The Swiss Government feels that ECE is the most useful instrument for economic interaction with East European countries, since all European countries are members of this organization. A representative spokesman of the Swiss Government has pointed out that ECE's role as a meeting place for discussions and studies has become all the more important since the consolidation of regional groupings within Europe (EEC, COMECON) has increased difficulties in commercial interrelations between countries in the East and countries in the West²³. With regard to the GATT, too, the Swiss Government expressed the view that collaboration among countries of different economic systems is a useful thing²⁴.

3.7. In the cultural field even more than in the economic field, all activities are shaped by the internal background of Swiss foreign policy. As Federal Councillor Dr. Friedrich T. Wahlen in his fundamental utterance on Swiss cultural and economic relations with East European countries said, it is one of the firm principles of Swiss life that cultural life does not be directed by state control²⁵. This is one of the reasons why Switzerland has no cultural agreements with any State²⁶. A second important obstacle to cultural agreements is the decentralized structure of Swiss culture; all questions relating to education and culture belong to the competence of the 25 cantons. When, in 1962, Switzerland adhered to the "Conseil de la Co-operation Culturelle" (CCC), she did so by adding a reserve clause concerning the cantonal rights and prerogatives in the cultural field²⁷. A third cause which obviously does not allow the institution of cultural agreements lies in the impossibility of meeting all the commitments created by such agreements. As a neutral State, Switzerland would be obliged to sign cultural agreements with many other States than only the ones of Eastern Europe; it is supposed that at least 30 agreements would have to be signed. This of course would almost certainly pass all of Switzerland's bounds of possibility; she simply lacks the personnel to handle such an accumulation of issues²⁸. For these reasons, it is up to the individual institutions, associations and private citizens to make arrangements with their East European counterparts. As Federal Councillor Wahlen noted, it is hoped that these institutions will look for a reasonable degree of reciprocity. The Swiss Government can, if necessary, take steps in order to promote reciprocity in the field of cultural exchange by not granting visas in cases where the lack of reciprocity is becoming obvious. But Federal Councillor Wahlen **emphasized** that it would be wrong to assume a defensive attitude; he drew attention to the increased tendency towards polycentrism in the East which creates conditions suited for an intensified exchange of ideas²⁹. What has been said here on cultural relations is also applicable to relations in the field of sport³⁰.

3.8. Among the institutions dealing with cultural contacts with East European countries, special attention must be devoted to the "Pro Helvetia" Foundation. It is financed by the Federal Government, but set up and managed as a non-governmental, completely independent body. Among its tasks it has to take care of cultural relations with other countries³¹. The Foundation has no special policy guideline concerning the

allotment of actions in countries in the East and countries in the West of Europe; its budget is established on a ratio of distribution to different fields of activity (publications, theater, music etc.) ³². The Foundation has adopted the view that cultural contacts cannot be furtered by schemes and programmes and that they rather have to evolve from spontaneous responses to spontaneous demands. On the other hand, the Foundation is taking care not to discriminate against any State or group of States; such a principle clearly arises from the principle of neutrality, and it has also been publicly confirmed by the President of the Foundation ³³. As a matter of fact, the Foundation had considerable success in accomplishing a series of programmes like the exchange of journalists ³⁴, professors, artists, exhibitions etc ³⁵. On request, support has also been given to organizations like the Association for Cultural Relations Switzerland-USSR to take care of outstanding personalities of academic life invited to visit Switzerland.

3.9. In the paragraph, which the State of Federation Report 1966 devoted to relations between Switzerland and East European States, only one multilateral framework was explicitly mentioned: This is the Council of Europe which is presently initiating technical cooperation with Staes of Eastern Europe ³⁶. The Federal Council, in its Annual Report, also said that the Swiss Government welcomes these contacts, which it deems necessary, since they might contribute to a further normalization between the two parts of Europe ³⁷. It seems, however, that the Swiss members of parliament delegated to the Council of Europe are somewhat reluctant on this issue. In a speech delivered to the Consultative Assembly of the Council, Mr. Willy Bretschner, one of the foremost Swiss Parliamentarians, expresses the view that the initiative for technical cooperation with East European States may largely be due to the fact that the present deadlock in West European unification has created some feelings of frustation. He found an accurate assessment of the nature, the purpose and the limits of the proposed technical cooperation lacking, and he strongly rejected the "new myth of convergence" between East and West. On the contrary, he said, member States of the Council should not delude themselves about the extent of the changes which have occured and are still occuring in the East; the fundamental difference still exists and will continue to exist. The peoples of those countries are non-represented as long as those Governments do not rest on the freely expressed consent of the citizens, and any departure from this view for the sake of shortsighted and possibly shortlived expediency would be contrary to the Constitution of the Council, which proclaims the principle of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, as the basis of all genuine democracy ³⁸. A similar stand has been taken by Mr. Walter Bringolf, a prominent Swiss Social-democrat; he said, though not objecting to the idea of technical cooperation, that he would prefer to see the re-establishment of the Social-democratic and other parties in the States of Eastern Europe, since this would be proof of the readiness for real co-existence ³⁹. On the whole it is however, quite obvious that Switzerland is observing the endeavours of the Council of Europe with great sympathy. The Swiss Government feels that at any rate nothing suitable for improving relations with all of Europe

should be undone - despite the fact that, from a Swiss point of view, the Council's primary task still is to bridge the gap between the "Six" and the "Seven".⁴⁰

4. Main principles governing the choice of fields and frameworks of Swiss cooperation with East European states.

4.1. Among the conclusions that can be drawn from what has been gathered in a general survey of Swiss cooperation with East European countries, it must be pointed out that the Swiss Government in general does not actively promote East-West collaboration nor does it put any obstacles to it. Federal Councillor Dr. Friedrich T. Wahlen, in his basic speech on Swiss relations with Communist countries, even emphatically turned against those representatives of Swiss public opinion who advocate to curb cultural and economic contacts with the East; he emphasized that, in the view of the Swiss Government, it would be completely wrong to use the despicable means of intimidation and defamation against citizens who have decided to have contact with individuals or organizations in East European countries. It originates from the fundamental principles of freedom of speech and freedom of action that it must be left up to the individual citizen to decide on these questions. In a democracy, these matters must not be regulated by order of the Government⁴¹. For the same reason, it is the firm belief of the Swiss Government that, on the other hand, the development of cooperation with East European countries must not be artificially accelerated. There must be a natural development in all fields of cooperation.

4.2. One of the principles guiding Swiss foreign policy in choosing frameworks of cooperation is the will to avoid any duplication of work. Given the limited diplomatic machinery typical of a small country, Switzerland cannot afford to waste her efforts in one field of cooperation to several frameworks. Swiss Government officials have on several occasions drawn attention to this fact.⁴² For example it has been found that the problem of harmonizing national laws on patents may best be handled within the B.I.R.P.I. (Bureaux internationaux réunis pour la protection de la propriété intellectuelle)⁴² and the matters of family planning should be dealt with within the existing framework of WHO. As a general rule it may be said that Switzerland gives preference to a universal organization if it qualified to handle a certain matter as satisfactorily as a regional organization.

4.3. As to the basic question of multilateralism vs. bilateralism in cooperating with East European countries, Switzerland takes a special position because of her policy of permanent neutrality. The central idea of the Swiss attitude toward international organization in general is that no engagement should be made that might anticipate a one-sided stand in any potential conflict. For this reason, Switzerland decided, in 1946, to remain outside the United Nations Organization⁴³. In recent discussions the idea of an access of Switzerland to the UNO has been put forward; however, the main argument in favour of an access just confirms the traditional point of view since it has been said that the UNO may now be compatible with Swiss neutrality because of

its failure of materializing the principle of collective security ⁴⁴. Also, Switzerland's application for membership in the Council of Europe in 1962 has been justified to Parliament by drawing attention to the fact that the Council in the meantime had changed its nature and aim and that it did not aspire to a common European foreign policy any more ⁴⁵. Being a small country, Switzerland also is keen on not being entangled in organizations where she might have to carry out decisions to which she did not give her consent ⁴⁶. This view has been prevailing till about 1967. Since some months, however, greater emphasis is being put on multilateralism - if not in practice, so at least in verbal statements by leading spokesmen. In the Swiss Government's programmatic statement for the period 1968-1971, it is said that the traditional concept of independence has become relative and that interdependence has become the most important feature of international life ⁴⁷. The Swiss Foreign Minister, in his parliamentary comment on this statement, added that interdependence of course means increasing multilateralism ⁴⁸. This tendency is also reflected in the funds allotted to multilateral and bilateral assistance to developing countries. From 1953 to 1956, the Swiss contribution to multilateral assistance (UNO) was ten times as high as the amount spent on bilateral assistance projects, from 1957 to 1959 it still was five times as high ⁴⁹. Thereafter, this amount receded to some 50 % of the whole amount spent for assistance purposes, and in 1964, the decision was made to apportion 40 % to the financing of multilateral activities. This decision was motivated by the will to give Swiss aid a genuine character and to avoid its being lost in the somewhat anonymous bulk of multilateral aid ⁵⁰. The large portions allotted to multilateral aid in former years has largely been due to the lack of any own administrative setup to handle this matter. According to the latest programme, multilateral aid will get about one third of Swiss foreign aid expenditure ⁵¹. But it seems, however, that these portions will be changed again in favour of multilateral aid. The Swiss Government is increasingly becoming aware that the projects most urgently needed by the developing nations usually are far too big as to be financed and managed by one single small state. Furthermore, the scarcity of means available for development purposes on the whole requires a clear order of priorities that may best be established by multilateral organizations ⁵². Swiss foreign aid policy may not concern the Swiss attitude to European cooperation very much, but it illustrates Swiss attitude to multilateral framework in general. It can also contribute to the understanding of why there is no tendency to harmonize foreign policy in East-West relations with other European countries. Swiss foreign policy, according to a definition given by a representative spokesman, is a synthesis between an aspiration towards maximum independence and obligations towards the international community ⁵³.

4.4. On the other hand, mention must be made of the Swiss position with regard to the Special Organizations of the UN, which, in Swiss practice, are also called "non-political organizations". It is the wish and intent of the Swiss Government to engage in a far-reaching collaboration with these organizations most of which Switzerland has

adhered to as a full member⁵⁴. Swiss politicians and officials have often expressed the full solidarity of their country as regards the task of these organizations - provided they do not embark on political discussions outside their scope⁵⁵. Swiss spokesmen are constantly deploring the trend of "politization" noticeable in the development of the specialized agencies and organizations, and Swiss delegates to international organizations are instructed to counteract this tendency⁵⁶. If political discussions outside the intrinsic scope of an organization are developing, the Swiss delegates do not take part nor do they oppose to such a development⁵⁷. But as long as these organizations remain within the limits of their clearly defined tasks, Swiss collaboration with them will be very active and with no conditions. This policy line may also apply to collaboration with East European States whether this be in the multilateral or in the bilateral framework; at the same time, it also marks the delimitation of the scope of collaboration.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 Cf. PAUL GUGGENHEIM, Traité de droit international public, vol. II, Geneva 1954, pp. 500-510; RUDOLF L. BINDSCHEDLER, "Die Neutralität im modernen Völkerrecht", Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, vol. XVII (1956), pp. 1-31. - One of the fundamental statements on this subject has been given by MAX HUBER in the "Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung betreffend die Frage des Beitritts der Schweiz zum Völkerbund", Bundesblatt der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft (quoted: BBl.) 1919 vol. IV, pp. 541-648. - Cf. also RAYMOND PROBST, "Die Gütem Dienste der Schweiz", Annuaire de l'Association suisse de science politique vol. 3 (1963), pp. 21-49.
- 2 Cf. Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über seine Geschäftsführung im Jahr 1964 (quoted: Gesch. Ber.), Allgemeiner Ueberblick pp. 3-7.
- 3 Cf. Exposé présenté par M. l'Ambassadeur PIERRE MICHELI, Secrétaire général du Département politique fédéral, au Rassemblement annuel du Parti libéral genevois, le 8. 12. 1966. This and a number of other public statements quoted here have been placed at my disposal by courtesy of the Federal Political Department. For further documentation I am also indebted to the "Pro Helvetia" Foundation.
- 4 Gesch. Ber. 1966, pp. 3-7.
- 5 Ansprache von Bundespräsident WILLY SPUEHLER am Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei der Schweiz, Basel, 16. Juni 1968, p. 22. - A similar view is to be found in the Swiss government's programmatic statement for the period 1968-1971, cf. Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Richtlinien für die Regierungspolitik in der Legislaturperiode 1968-1971, Vom 15. Mai 1968 (quoted: Richtlinien) p. 7.
- 6 Gesch. Ber. 1963. p. 90.
- 7 Cf. Année politique suisse - Schweizerische Politik im Jahr 1967 vol. 3 (1967), p. 39.
- 8 Ibid. and Neue Züricher Zeitung (quoted NZZ) Nr. 5498, 20. 12. 1967.
- 9 Cf. for instance PETER SAGER & R. DAETWILER, Osthandel, Bern 1960.
- 10 Cf. NZZ Nr. 1402 (8. 4. 1962) and Nr. 740 (22. 2. 1964). - A representative collection of opinions on this problem is given in Die Koexistenz in schweizerischer Sicht (Jahrbuch der Neuen Helvetischen Gesellschaft vol. 32, 1961).

- 11 See HERBERT LUETHY, "Réflexions sur les relations culturelles de la Suisse avec l'URSS et les pays de l'Est européen", Revue économique et sociale vol. XXI, numéro spécial avril 1963, pp. 153-1964. - OLIVIER REVERDIN, La plus grande ouverture d'esprit dont les Suisses romands font preuve à l'égard de nos relations avec les pays de l'Est est-elle compatible avec notre indépendance idéologique, Cours donné à la Volkshochschule Zürich 1964. - NZZ Nr. 25, 4. 2. 1968.
- 12 NZZ Nr. 4924 (21. 12. 1961)
- 13 Ämtliches Stenographisches Bulletin der Bundesversammlung (quoted: Sten. Bull.), N.R. 1962 vol I, pp. 304-310.
- 14 NZZ Nr. 4924 (21. 12. 1961).
- 15 This view has been expressed in an editorial of NZZ Nr. 4979 (27. 12. 1961). At that time, the editor-in-chief of this newspaper, Mr. WILLI BRETSCHNER, was chairman of the parliamentary committee on foreign relations.
- 16 Examples may be found in BBI. 1966 vol. I, p. 1134; 1965 vol. I p. 484; 1964 vol. II p. 129. There is no trade agreement with the German Democratic Republic and with Albania. There are, however, negotiations being held with GDR (cf. NZZ Nr. 344, 7. 6. 1968).
- 17 Exempted from this principle are: eggs (for reasons of Switzerland's own agricultural problems), and certain textiles (for anti-dumping reasons).
- 18 Cf. ALBERT GRUEBEL, "Schweizerische Osthandelspolitik", Schweizer Monatshefte vol. 48 (1968/69), pp. 1-12. Ambassador Grübel is Delegate of the Swiss Government for all matters concerning trade agreements. - Apart from this representative statements cf. also NZZ Nr. 75, 4. 2. 1968.
- 19 Sources: Statistisches Jahrbuch der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft 1967, pp. 172-175; Jahresstatistik des Aussenhandels der Schweiz 1967 vol. I, pp. 442-453. Figures are given in Mio. s.Fr.
- 20 Cf. Gesch. Ber., 1964 p. 38, 47; 1966 p. 31; 1967 p. 24.
- 21 Cf. GRUEBEL loc.cit.
- 22 Cf. BBI. 1958 vol. I, p. 13.
- 23 Conférence prononcée le 5. 6. 1967 à l'Athénée de Genève par M. l'Ambassadeur PAUL R. JOLLES, Directeur de la Division fédérale de commerce, p. 6.
- 24 BBI. 1966 vol. I, p. 713.
- 25 Sten. Bull. 1962 N.R. vol. I, pp. 308-310.
- 26 Cf. CARL DOKA, Kulturelle Aussenpolitik, Zürich 1956, pp. 295-302. - Cf. also Gesch. Ber. 1967, p. 55.
- 27 RICHARD REICH, "Die kulturelle Mitarbeit der Schweiz im Europarat". Jahrbuch der Stiftung Pro Helvetia vol. 2 (1967) pp. 131-140.
- 28 A recent study on patterns of diplomatic representation demonstrated that the average number of Swiss diplomats per foreign capital is 3.4 only. With the exception of Austria (=3.1), this is the lowest figure of all Europe. As to the difference in the number of diplomats received minus the number of diplomats sent abroad, Switzerland is even ranking well behind a considerable number of African States (cf. CHAWICK F. ALGER & STEVEN J. BRAMS, "Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations", World Politics vol. XIX (1966/67), pp. 646-663.)

- 29 Sten. Bull. 1962 loc. cit.
- 30 In a statement made by a representative spokesman of Swiss sport, the possibility of employing sport as a means of furthering coexistence has been frankly denied for general reasons: "Dans le sport de prestige, le sport nationalitaire, pratiqué par des professionnels du sport dirigés par des professionnels de la politique, de l'agitation et de la propagande, nos amateurs peuvent prendre de bonnes leçons, mais ils n'ont a part de cela aucun rôle à jouer" (PAUL ALEXIS, "Le sport peut-il aider à la détente internationale?" "Die Koexistenz in schweizerischer Sicht" op. cit. pp. 204-214).
- 31 Bundesgesetz vom 17. 12. 1965 betr. die Stiftung "Pro Helvetia" art. 2, letter d.
- 32 Cf. Jahrbuch der Stiftung "Pro Helvetia" vol 1 (1964), pp. 174 sq.
- 33 Radio broadcast by Prof. J.-R. DE SALIS, February 1964.
- 34 Cf. Jahrbuch op.cit. vol. 1 p. 205 and vol 2 pp. 37-49.
- 35 As an example of cultural activities arranged or supported by the Foundation cf. the survey of Swiss-Polish exchange given by HENRI BIRECKI, Head of the Section for Cultural and Scientific Cooperation in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published in the Swiss Newspaper "Die Weltwoche" Nr. 1747 (5. 5. 1967); cf. also Jahrbuch op.cit. vol 2 pp. 23-35.
- 36 Gesch. Ber. 1966 p. 7.
- 37 Ibid. p. 42-44.
- 38 Conseil de l'Europe, Assemblée consultative: Compte rendu des débats, 18e session ordinaire, 3e partie, vol. III, séance 17-24, pp. 663-665.
- 39 Ibid. pp. 720 sq.
- 40 Gesch. Ber. 1967 p. 46.
- 41 Sten. Bull. 1962 N.R. vol. I, p. 308.
- 42 For instance, Federal Councillor Dr. WILLY SPUEHLER in his Ansprache anlässlich der Luftfahrt- und Weltraum-Tagungen, 21. 9. 1966, in Genf, p. 4. - Cf. also, with regard to the Council of Europe's "Working Program" Gesch. Ber. 1963 p. 45 f.
- 42 Gesch. Ber. 1967 p. 5.
- 43 Cf. HANS HAUG, Neutralität und Völkergemeinschaft, Zürich-St. Gallen 1962, pp. 98-105, and the reference given there.
- 44 Cf. the speech by Federal Councillor SPUEHLER delivered to the Social-democratic Party in Lausanne, 21. 10. 1966. See also Année politique suisse - Schweizerische Politik vol. II, Berne 1966, pp. 24 2q.; DENISE BINDSCHIEDLER-ROBERT, "La politique étrangère 1965", Annuaire suisse de science politique vol. 6 (1966), p. 215. - An official report on this question is presently being prepared and expected to be released by the end of this year (1968).
- 45 BBI. 1960 vol. I. p. 853.
- 46 This idea has been expressed many times in nearly all official documents concerning the access to new international organizations; cf. e.g. BBI. 1961 vol. I, p. 1043, and BBI. 1960 vol. I, p. 853.
- 47 Richtlinien p. 4 sq.
- 48 Einführendes Referat des Bundespräsidenten Dr. WILLY SPUEHLER zu den eidgenössischen Bundesversammlungen vom 1. bis 3. März 1967, p. 1.

nössischen Räten unterbreiteten Richtlinien für die Regierungspolitik, gehalten im Nationalrat am 17. Juni 1968, pp. 20 sq.

- 49 BBI. 1959 vol. II, p. 401.
- 50 BBI. 1964 vol. I, p. 1069.
- 51 BBI. 1967 vol. I, pp. 13-54.
- 52 Gesch. Ber. 1967 pp. 44 ff., 61 ff.
- 53 MICHELI op.cit. p. 3: "Notre politique étrangère est donc une synthèse entre notre aspiration à une indépendance aussi grande que possible et nos obligations à l'égard de la communauté internationale".
- 54 An inventory of organizations where Switzerland has become member is given in BBI. 1962 vol. II, p. 1206. To be amended: UNIDO (cf. BBI. 1966 vol. II, p. 131).
- 55 Gesch. Ber. 1964 p. 47; 1965 p. 44 sq.; 1966 p. 41.
- 56 Cf. statement by the President of the Federation Dr. WILLY SPUEHLER, to the Party Congress of the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland, June 16th, 1968, p. 13.
- 57 On one occasion, Switzerland added a reserve clause; see the final document of the I.T.T. Conference, where resolutions on South Africa and Portugal were passed; cf. BBI. 1966, vol. II, p. 131.

12
Second draft

SWEDEN AND EASTERN EUROPE
A study in European Cooperation

By
Carl-Einar Stålvant
The Swedish Institute for
International Affairs

A. 1. General remarks

1. 1. A number of interacting factors constitute the setting in which Sweden's foreign policy operates. In this paper I will restrict myself to some fundamental traits.

1. 2. Geopolitical situation. Sweden is a semi-insular country bounded by the North Sea and the Baltic and the inaccessibility of Northern Scandinavia. From North to South Sweden the distance is 1700 km, in other words thus constituting one third of the exposed European boundary region between East and West. This certainly has some strategic implications. Many countries have ascribed the reduced tension and partial disengagement in the zone to the substantial Swedish defense.

During most of her history, Sweden has been on the periphery of the international trade routes. While the other Nordic countries have found natural core areas in the east, south, or west, Sweden has oriented herself in all directions, depending on political conjunctures and market possibilities.

1. 3. Historical experiences. A persistent pattern underlying the Swedish conception of foreign policy is her historical experiences. Officially this was recognized as a guide-line by Mr. Nilsson, Swedish Foreign Minister, in 1964. "In the vital issues affecting our nation we feel our way forward using as our divining-rod our experience and the interpretation we have put upon it".¹⁾

Sweden has not been a participant of any war since 1814. Although the doctrine of neutrality and nonalignment was not formulated until after the First World War, the fulfillment of a peace policy with the implicit understanding of obtaining all possible neutrality in case of war has long been apparent.²⁾

Probably as a result of the Swedish policy, the continuity and the inherent attitude has been conceived as a value per se, some sort of ideological conviction that the policy constitutes a morally right foreign

x) "East Europe" = Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Soviet Union.

orientation. This also means that so wide an opinion demands a neutrality policy,³⁾ that any alternative could scarcely be considered. So far efforts to modify or change the accepted formula have failed.

2. Sweden's foreign policy.

2. 1. Formula. The officially professed aim of Sweden's security policy can be summarized in the catch-word "non-alignment in peace to make possible neutrality in war". In everyday language, the eulogistic concept of "neutrality" also denotes the Swedish peace-time policy.

In the following I will briefly underline some features appearing in the application of this basic principle.

2. 2. Character. The Swedish policy of neutrality is instrumental to Sweden's own interests. Furthermore it is self-imposed, not bound by any international guarantees.

Neutrality in war does not imply neutrality in its ideological sense or a duty to "spiritual neutrality". According to an official declaration, "neutrality as a political concept and as a concept of international law does not mean that a nation denies the right of its citizens to participate in debate on international questions or to speak up on behalf of democracy and liberty".⁴⁾ Sweden imposes her own values that determine her attitude toward divergent opinions.⁵⁾

On the other hand, Sweden's foreign policy is to operate without ideological bindings. "We must stick to the old previously accepted view that nations with widely different political, economic, and social opinions and institutions can live peacefully side by side".⁶⁾

The position of non-alignment is basic to Swedish foreign policy. It defines the scope of international duties and commitments, eventhough it cannot be denied that the adopted view causes Sweden difficult problems of adjustment when she is confronted with other significant aims and ideals, notably in trade and economics. (Sweden's application for membership in the EEC has actualized this problem to the fore. The confidence and credibility that Sweden's neutrality policy enjoys must not be put in question. The current aims and goals of the EEC are not judged compatible with Sweden's political orientation. Swedish membership must be based on such conditions and organized in such forms that her neutrality policy is guaranteed.

It appears that Sweden's international behaviour is characterized by a pragmatic approach in most instances, e.g. to start with problems of trade,

culture etc. and then use the cooperative spirit ensuing from all this to solve political questions.

2. 3. Ends and means. Before penetrating further into the scope and limitations of the neutrality policy we must relate it to external pressures. Closely connected with this question is Sweden's appraisal of her role in world politics.

Passive policy. The first interpretation encompasses "a passive foreign policy" which finds its principal support in speeches and declarations issued up to the early 60's. To preserve neutrality in case of war, a policy of non-alignment must be followed with great consistency. With the antagonism between the blocs at its peak, Sweden imposed clear restrictions upon herself in international relations. "We do not wish to pursue a foreign policy that might help to make our corner of the world a centre of unrest and a cause of friction between East and West... Nor do we imagine that we are able to play any part in bridging the gap that exists between the groups of Great Powers".⁸⁾ Another statement summarizes this: "We ... do not think that we should come forward with initiatives of our own for the solution of the problems that cause the tensions in the world... it would be to overestimate considerably our chances of exercising any real influence if we believed that in matters where the vital interests of the Great Powers were at stake, far-reaching proposals coming from Sweden would meet with any great success. There is a great risk that our initiatives would be exploited by one side or the other in support of its own interests or be construed as having been made in the interest of one party. Our reputation for objectivity and the fund of good-will we may have acquired might then vanish very quickly".⁹⁾

Active policy. The last-quoted sentence offers a key to the second interpretation, "an active foreign policy". In 1965, Foreign Minister Nilsson acknowledged that "our foreign policy has become more active during recent years".¹⁰⁾ The changes within the alliances and the international effects of non-alignment itself has made the first interpretation obsolete. Within the resources available, Sweden hopes to use the good-will that has ensued as a result of her foreign policy to contribute toward relaxing international tensions. It is in the UN that Sweden has found a natural framework for pursuing such a policy.¹¹⁾ Thus the result of the neutrality policy has, in this interpretation, become an end in itself.

3. Sweden in the international community. Three levels of membership.

3. 1. The United Nations. Sweden characterized her entry in the UN as, in principle, an action by which she gave up her policy of neutrality.

The rules and orders of the charter imposed far-reaching commitments upon the country. The veto construction of the Security Council was judged as making Sweden's participation in a great power conflict impossible.

Sweden has consistently supported the UN as the natural instrument for settling disputes and international problems. As a collective security system, the functioning and undertakings of the UN can of course be criticized from an ideal point of departure, but Sweden has accepted participation in the UN as a natural part of Sweden's foreign policy, with the clear understanding of strengthening the position of the UN.

Sweden promotes the transfer of organized international cooperation to the UN, or to take place under its auspices.^{x)} ¹²⁾

Neither of these ideals has been fully realized. The cleavage between the blocs is a seriously retarding factor. But for regional cooperation, the regional agencies of the UN are recognized as a highly appropriate frame of cooperation on questions without immediate relevance to security problems.

As a consequence, an ambivalence between a short and long perspective appears in Swedish foreign policy. The short one refers to immediate practical solutions in accordance with fundamental political facts, as determined by the position of the Great Powers. The regional and sub-regional alliances have thus offered great advantages to Sweden.¹²⁾

An ideal interpretation of the long perspective could be, as a practical aim, the coordination of agencies under the UN and the reduction of wasteful overlapping functions.¹³⁾

^{x)} By this I understand the tendency on Sweden's part to join most UN - organizations, even when no direct Swedish interests are involved¹. There is also a tendency to support collective security as a real solution to the problem of security, while regional arrangements are only provisional arrangements. West European arrangements as the Council of Europe has no effect on the relations with the UN¹.

¹ Eek, Håstad m.fl.: Sweden and the United Nations, p. 178, 181, New York 1956.

3. 2. Europe. With the crucial restrictions that may be deduced from the basic principle and its auxiliary reasoning, Sweden has joined some of the institutions which link the Western world together. Eastern Europe has never been conceived as an alternative. As late as in November 1967, in the parliamentary debate on economics and trade, Mr. Wickman, the Minister of Economy, stated: "We have already been told in this debate that the Western Europe of today is the entirely dominating market for Swedish export. It is truly not an expression of lack of interest in the trade with other countries, if one states that the focus of our foreign trade within surveyable time must remain Western Europe. I wholly support the view that desires an expansion of trade between Eastern and Western Europe and the undeveloped countries. But it is impossible for me to see this as opposed to or as an alternative to a solution of the problem of the West European market integration." 14)

Trade policy. Let us further focus on Sweden's aims in her trade policy and foreign trade, a theme that will re-appear later on. Endeavours in this field have been consistent throughout the post-war period. Sweden's attitude has been marked by interest in liberalizing trade, low tariffs, free currency exchange, and avoiding discriminatory treatment of other states as far as conceivably possible. 15)

The economic reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War was realized by Marshall Aid and the OEEC (OECD). Later Sweden became a member of the IMF, EPU, GATT, Council of Europe, and in time, the EFTA. The most important trade partners for Sweden are, regionally, the EFTA countries (which includes the Nordic neighbours) and the EEC.

Table 1. Sweden's foreign trade. Regions.

REGION	EXP			IMP		
	percentage 1966	1967	value m.kr. -67	percentage 1966	1967	value m.kr. -67
EFTA	41,7	43,7	10 347	34,0	35,2	8 565
EEC	30,2	26,8	6 273	36,0	35,2	8 561
East Europe (incl. Ju- goslavia).	4,2	4,7	1 091	4,8	4,7	1 140
Total	76,1	75,2	17 711	74,8	75,1	18 266

source: Sverige på världsmarknaden 1967. Exportföreningen 1968.

Although Sweden is highly oriented towards Western Europe, the East European trade plays an increasing role in her external affairs. This trend has continued during the first half year of 1968. Especially the Soviet market is expanding.

Table 2. Sweden's foreign trade with East Europe January-June 1968 in relation to the same period 1967.

	Exp. value m.kr.			Imp. value m.kr.		
	1967	1968	change %	1967	1968	change %
East Europe	471	565	+ 20	501	570	+ 14
Soviet Union	139	187	+34	204	248	+ 22

Source: Meddelanden från Statistiska Centralbyrån, August 1968.

Economy. The Swedish economy has thus become highly integrated in international trade, particularly in European trade. This is true not only of the economy as a whole but also of the individual branches of production. On balance, the Swedish economy is indeed so integrated with that of Europe that a reversal of the pattern would have very serious consequences.

Strategy. European integration could be studied with the existence of institutions and the goals agreed upon as a point of departure. Sweden's attitude to centralized integration is avoidant and careful. During the negotiations for a West European free trade area the government stated: "It is true that close coordination of economic policy between the member states may be both desirable, and, as obstacles to trade are removed, even inevitable. But such coordination should be allowed to develop as a natural result of the development of co-operation and to adjust itself to the real requirements while not being determined in advance as to form or extent".¹⁶⁾

3. 3. The Nordic Area. On our third level, that of Nordic cooperation, pressures are exerted in a more immediate sense, since Sweden, Finland, Denmark as well as West and East Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union are all Baltic powers.

Nordic cooperation is primarily symbolized by the Nordic Council, founded in 1952. Its competence is restricted to consultations and recommendations, but joint consultations are asked for whenever possible, sometimes even in certain areas of foreign policy and security problems.¹⁷⁾

Sweden's foreign course is decided with due consideration for its neighbours, especially Finland. The position of non-alignment is not only said to serve Sweden's own interest but is also mentioned as a stabilizing factor in this part of the world. The concept of "Nordic Balance" is very often used to summarize the effects and the Great Powers. It implies that the current constellation has appeared to lessen the level of tension in North Europe.

Joint Nordic behaviour, when possible, is regarded as a strength in questions of mutual interest dealt with by international organizations and at international conferences.

Strategy. On Nordic issues, the strategy chosen differs somewhat from that adopted on European questions. While lacking authoritative support from a common institution and goals agreed upon in advance, Nordic integration is favoured by a fairly homogenous culture.

The approach is a pragmatic one, starting with joint consultations and investigations on an ever-increasing number of non-political questions at low level. In case of general agreement, the next step is application within the countries themselves. The effects could in the long run greatly increase mutual dependencies. ¹⁸⁾

4. Sweden and Eastern Europe

4. 1. Sources. The official Swedish foreign attitude as well as actual decisions and communiques issued in connection with official visits are all available in the annual report "Documents on Swedish foreign policy", published in Stockholm by the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The art of interpreting political language and diplomatic language in particular is a difficult one; therefore the reading of diplomatic texts was supplemented by some interviews and conversations with foreign ministry officials. A single statement or communique really does not offer much information, but taken together and viewed over a period of twenty years, a general picture is likely to be accurate in its main features. Some paths are distinguishable and there is little doubt in which direction they are running. ¹⁹⁾

This source raises another problem. When evaluating the political climate, the included speeches and statements, in general, do not specify Sweden's relations to different countries. E.g. there seems to be little difference between "the East" and "the Soviet Union". This leaves us with the unsatisfactory assumption that transnational contacts with Eastern Europe are functions of the Swedish-Russian relationship, at least up to the early 60's ^{x)}

^{x)} By unsatisfactory assumption I mean that comments upon bilateral relations between Sweden and different socialist countries declares the relations to be "satisfactory". Governmental declarations on the general international situation (tension between the blocs and the ideological struggle) have a somewhat different content, including Swedish criticism of the socialist system and of Soviet international behaviour.

Besides, my documentation differs widely regarding aims, substance, and quality, and it is gathered from highly disparate institutions. The survey encompasses many fields and the investigation does presuppose a special theory to be answered; hence very few theoretical considerations are made. Moreover, materials on some questions, e.g. trade relations and satellites, are not generally available, since these questions at the moment are of government interest.

From the material available, the following disposition seems reasonable:

4. 2. Policy formulation: attitudes and issues. Modern history shows a cold war that has undergone three or four phases. Swedish-Eastern Europe contacts seem to have passed through similar transitions.

1945-1948. Sweden's policy during these years could be described as a 'good neighbour' policy, primarily symbolized by advantageous economic incitements to increase trade.

An agreement, economically motivated as a reassurance against possible depression and unemployment, and psychologically explained as a kind of compensation for the inconveniences inflicted by Sweden by her deviations from the road of strict neutrality in favour of Germany during the Second World War, resulting in the grant of credits for 100 million kronor to the Soviet Union. The agreement did not stimulate trade as much as was expected. The policy undertaken by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe seems to have deterred Swedish enterprises. This also sheds light on the limitations of the government's ability to direct the operations of enterprises in a free economy.

With Poland and Czechoslovakia, bilateral agreement was reached with various payment and currency arrangements in order to guarantee Swedish imports.

The proceedings undertaken against Swedish enterprises in some socialist countries remained an unsolved problem for a long time. Agreement was reached with Poland in 1949, Hungary in 1951,²⁰⁾ and recently with the Soviet Union.²¹⁾

1948-1953. Bipolarization made Sweden negotiate with Denmark and Norway on joint Scandinavian defence. Negotiations failed and Sweden declared the neutrality position analyzed above. As was mentioned earlier, Sweden joined the West-European work of reconstruction. Although Sweden did not join the NATO and Cocom for economic warfare against East, Sweden was in fact affected by this policy, and Swedish-Soviet trade saw only a slight increase in 1950 and 1951.²²⁾

The Swedish position was met with open distrust from the East. Various intermezzos burdened relations in the early 50's. The following incidents, inter alia, were highly critical.

The claim from the Soviet Union that her territorial waters extended 12 nautical miles from shore. In 1951, identical claims followed from Rumania and Bulgaria. The Swedish view is that such claims are beyond the limits sanctioned by the custom of territorial waters in the area, and consequently saw them as encroachment upon the freedom of the seas. Measures^{were} undertaken by the Soviet Union to harass Swedish Baltic fisheries. Similar measures have also occurred much later. Two unarmed Swedish military aircrafts were shot down in 1952. Several cases of serious espionage from the Soviet Union as well as from Rumania and Czechoslovakia. ²³⁾ The negative Soviet response to the Swedish efforts to get satisfactory information concerning the fate of a Swedish diplomat, Raoul Wallenberg. The international Communist propaganda for the Stockholm appeal (it concerned prohibition of atomic weapons). Soviet criticism of Swedish voting in the UN. To this, a pamphlet, "our foreign policy" summarized in 1952: "The political climate in the Baltic has deteriorated..." and these incidents "forced us to consider our interests in the Baltic with increased vigilance". ²⁴⁾

1954-1962. The international climate changed after Stalin's death. Sweden's cross-national contacts with the East followed the general trend. The first concrete result was an agreement with the Soviet Union on sea rescue operations in the Baltic. ²⁵⁾ Some years later, agreements on civil aviation were signed with most of the socialist countries.

Direct contacts between the Soviet Union and Sweden were promoted and extended in a number of spheres - cultural, technical, sport, and so on. Prime Minister Erlander stated in 1957: "On Sweden's part there is every reason for encouraging contacts of this kind, for which there is real interest in the Swedish circles concerned". ²⁶⁾

Officially in joint communiques issued in connection with mutual visits, the relation was characterized as "friendly" and "good neighbourly". ²⁷⁾ Although Swedish reaction to the Hungary crisis and some sharp attacks by influential politicians before the later-cancelled visit by the Soviet Premier in 1952 temporarily led to some restraints and irritation, the interest in maintaining friction-free good-neighbour relations was strong on both sides. ²⁸⁾

Four themes in the contacts call for closer attention:

1) Soviet proposals on international conferences. In 1954, the Soviet Union suggested a European security conference; and in 1958 high-level conferences on nuclear weapons tests, and later on other proposals for measures to lessen world tension. The attitude of the Swedish Government was positive: Sweden would take part, if the proposals were generally accepted by most states, and the purposes of the conferences were agreed upon in advance. ²⁹⁾ Notes were also exchanged in 1960 on the Soviet decision to discontinue participation in the inquiry into disarmament in the Ten-Nation-Committee and to request the Secretary General of the UN to put the question of disarmament on the agenda of the UN General Assembly.

Various proposals in order to create regional nuclear free areas.

First off was the Polish Rapacki Plan in 1957, which aimed at reducing tension in Central Europe by prohibiting atomic weapons on both sides of the "iron curtain". In 1959, a proposal from the Soviet Union suggested that the Baltic become a non-nuclear zone, "a Sea of Peace". A Swedish plan, the Undén proposal, aimed at the creation of a "non-atomic club". The non-nuclear Powers would accept an agreement on the suspension of tests that might be reached by the Nuclear Powers. They could take a further step by declaring that they would refuse to participate in nuclear armaments and that they did not intend to manufacture nuclear weapons nor permit stockpiling of nuclear weapons on their territories for their own or any other state's account. ^x Finnish President Kekkonen, and Polish Prime Minister Gomulka have proposed plans in the same direction. None of the proposals, however, though similar in thoughts and aims, has been accepted as consistent with Swedish security demands. Other methods and ways have been thought of as being more appropriate to handle disarmament issues. (Compare B VII).

The need for joint Baltic negotiations has also appeared at a much lower level, namely, regarding measures to be taken to protect the salmon stock in the Baltic. This is a question of great concern to some parliamentary members. The main problem has been to find a form of settlement for a regulation whose provisions would be binding on all countries". ³⁰

Memoranda exchanged in 1960 and 1961 on Sweden's membership in the EFTA and its consistency with the 1924 Swedish-Soviet commerce agreement. The Swedish answer stated that if any repercussions were to follow in their mutual trade due to Sweden's participation in the EFTA, they would be very slight and were sure to be to the advantage of trade between the two countries in the long run. A request for a reduction of Swedish tariffs

^x Katarina Brodin: The Undén proposal. Cooperation and Conflict II/66.

to the same level as that imposed on imports from the EFTA countries on those Soviet goods subject to duty and which the USSR was to export within the 1961 trade protocol, could not be complied with by Sweden. The memorandum emphasized the desire for continued development of Swedish-Soviet trade.³¹⁾

4. 2. 4. 1963-1967.

Character. Of course the dividing line between the periods can always be discussed. Here, it is drawn considering (1) a whole series of new agreements with most of the Eastern European countries, (2) meetings between the Swedish government and many socialist countries, (3) relaxation of tensions in world politics as a whole, (4) negotiations on questions of disarmament in the 18-nation committee, in Geneva.

This period has been characterized by a further strengthening of exchange in the cultural, scientific, economic, tourist, sports and other fields. Like in earlier periods, relations are said to be "developing favourably", "good neighbourly" etc. in connection with official visits to Poland, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia.

Different systems. A communique issued in connection with an official visit to Warsaw in 1964 further recognized "that the differences in the political and social systems of the two countries did not stand in the way of cooperation in commercial, cultural, scientific, and technical fields."³²⁾

Similar thoughts have been expressed at a more general level in joint Swedish-Soviet communiques, which hold that the two countries "endeavour to strengthen peaceful co-existence and peaceful cooperation between countries of different social systems."³³⁾ In the UN, Sweden was a co-sponsor of a resolution in 1965, on Rumanian initiative, regarding steps to improve relations between neighbouring countries in Europe with different social and political systems.³⁴⁾ x)

Actual attitude. A statement by the Foreign Minister in 1966 makes a good summary of the trends to actual cross-border contacts: "For Sweden's part we also want to extend our relations with the East European states. Everything that can counteract the unhappy division of our Continent can count on our support. Nor have we been inactive. During recent years our traditional good relations with the East European countries have been further strengthened and extended. We believe that these contacts and practical co-operation in an increasing number of fields are of great moment. Moreover, economic and technical development in their innumerable

x) Hence, Sweden is one of the members in the Club of 9.

ramifications weld people together. They create mutual independence irrespective of the economic and social system holding's way. We must acknowledge this factor, and it has a beneficial effect on international relations as a whole. A better foundation is laid for efforts to find solutions to complicated European problems that have remained outstanding throughout the whole post-war period." 35)

5. On fields of co-operation

Since the splitting-up between East and West in the late 40's Sweden has followed her policy very consistently. Regarding relations with the East there are no signs of new aims or drastic changes.

I have found little evidence on specific policies towards any of the spheres in question. It is also hard to distinguish a pattern of priority or in what sphere Sweden takes most interest.

With the general political setting once given, and an openness towards new initiatives, the issues seem to be handled in a more or less ad hoc manner by administrative agencies. But certainly, on this level, there has been a definite increase in the number of fields of cooperation during the very last years.

These difficulties of finding general lines of direction for each sphere complicates the investigation. Hence, much consideration is given to each issue of cooperation. They may very well offer some good experiences useful to the future.

B. ANSWERS TO APPENDIX

I EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND CULTURE

II. New agreements on cultural exchange and extension of existing ones.

1.1. Cultural exchange has increased considerably during recent years, after having been almost frozen since the end of the 40's, when the position of Swedish lecturer in Warsaw and Prag was abolished and the granting of scholarships to Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia ceased because they were not reciprocated. ³⁶⁾ The increase, however, is mostly in the field of person-exchange. Dissemination of information from our country is still being very restricted. In the East they still watch information from foreign countries carefully. Some possibilities are offered, e.g. in the form of exhibitions, in which Sweden take part quite often.

There exist several forms of person-exchange. Of great importance are visits by expert groups and individuals for study purposes and exchanges of lecturers and scholars. It is difficult to get exact information regarding exchanges made at intermediate stages by a great number of individual and official funds and institutions. There are no reliable statistics. The "Swedish Institute" (Svenska Institutet), a semi-official organization, is principally responsible for the promotion and development of cultural relations between Sweden and other countries.

The exchange of scholars and scientists is built on reciprocity and financial division, so that the receiving country is responsible for the guest's living expenses, while the sending country pays for travelling expenses. These conditions are due to the East European restrictions, which do not allow currency to leave the country. ³⁷⁾

Sweden has tried to enlarge bilateral contacts. Since 1957 there has been a foreign lectorship in Poland, and another one is planned. A technical-scientific attaché is accredited in Moscow. From now on the Foreign Office plan to station a cultural attaché there as well. ³⁸⁾

There is also a very slight exchange in the sphere of theatre, music, and film actors. However, such cooperation is managed ad hoc and is not determined in advance as to extent or form. ³⁹⁾

1.2. Sweden's policy can almost be said to avoid big cultural contracts which for a long time may pre-empt the budget and consequently dam up other important activities. The exchange is made within the setting of so-called cultural-programs.

Such a program contains a survey of what Sweden and each country can do during one year, with the means available. Moreover, measures are noted that can be taken if further means should be placed at disposal. 40)

Since 1964 this has actually been done by the Foreign Office with a view to stimulating exchange with Eastern Europe. These programs are minimum programs. Both countries may enlarge the program during the year if possible, and revisions are made every year.

Besides this settled exchange there are more informal contacts between individuals, institutions, and universities. 41) Possibilities for Swedes to visit Eastern Europe at their own expenses are numerous, while the East demands a formal invitation from the host and an established program for the visit in advance. Successful scientists have since long been given opportunities to come to Sweden in this way.

Standardization of university degrees

2. For the time being there are very few problems for those scientists and students who have come as they have been highly qualified. The aiming at equal standards in examinations is a very important matter for the purpose of increasing the stream of students across the borders. The request is most advantageously dealt with by multilateral agreements.

A recent conference between the European members of UNESCO discussed the problems which arise from the different school and university systems of each country. The initiative emanated largely from the East-European states. Sweden also backed many of the recommendations accepted by the conference. The following quotation is of great interest here:

Recommendation B.

The conference "recommends that UNESCO continues its studies and work in the sphere of the comparability and equivalence of secondary school diplomas and university degrees from the point of view and for the purpose of adopting in the near future an international instrument on the equivalence of diplomas and degree acquired in the course of secondary and higher education in different countries taking into account existing intergovernmental conventions". 42)

Also for the future UNESCO seems best adapted to handle these similar problems.

3. Coordination of scientific research and exchange of scientific know-how.

3. 1. USSR. Exchange within this field has traditionally been fairly intense between Sweden and the Soviet Union. Nowadays the scientific-technical attaché in Moscow has an important mediatory role. The agent has many tasks; among other things he creates personal contacts necessary for the direct contact between scientists and technicians, facilitates

the exchange of scholars and supplies industrial news. A great deal of the work by the contact man is done independently, but he also works on commissions from Swedish institutions or enterprises.

3. 2. Some years ago the Soviet Union invited Sweden to an exchange of scientific information within this general sphere; and since 1965 there has been a limited exchange of scientists between the "Swedish Academy of Engineers" (Ingenjörsvetenskapsakademin) and the Soviet Akademija Nauk. It should be emphasized that the matter is dealt with in direct correspondence between the two sides.

The start was modest enough: it comprised ¹⁾ four young scientist to work for 3-10 months and ²⁾ two established scientists to lecture for a couple of weeks. In the revised agreement of May 1967 the two sides agreed on an exchange of an increased number of younger and older scientists within the time of 50 scientific months. The entire right of both sides to nominate the scientists themselves is an important restriction.

Sectors favoured by the agreement are mostly advanced pure science, technology, and medicine: branches of instruction where each country has much to offer the other.

The purpose is to familiarize the scientists with the research of the institution concerned. The result will be exchange of scientific know-how. As a perfect solution the cases can be mentioned, when results from joint research have been published in a common report.

The experiences gained are positive and there are examples of how very limited projects have continued to go on supported by the academies within the framework of the programs of individual researches and special institutions. During the spring of 1968 the agreement was extended to include exchange of information on the peaceful use of atomic energy.

3. 3. Another agreement between the Swedish academies and the Russian GKNT ^{x)} aims at industrial innovations and technical improvements within industry. The co-operation has not yet started. The idea is to enlarge the activity to comprise the exchange of delegations from the various branches of industry.

3. 4. Exchange of information is also made possible through mutual borrowing of interesting literature, often in the form of microfilms. Involved are three Soviet libraries (Akademija Nauk, Saltykov-Scedivna and Vitini) and the Swedish library of the Academy of Engineers. Moreover, a number of symposia on technical and medical subjects are to take place in the near future.

^{x)} State Committee on Science and Technology.

3. 5. 42) The other East European countries. With the Czechoslovakian, Rumanian, and Hungarian Academies of Science, Sweden has agreements on data exchange in pure science. A very modest agreement with Bulgaria is already in existence, although cooperation has not yet started. There have also been negotiations with Polish authorities regarding pure science as well as industrial-technical cooperation, but as yet there is no established cooperation of the type described above.

4. 46) Cooperation in the field of outer space research

Within the area of meteorology, data are exchanged on current weather observations and other observations, e.g. radiation phenomena. The role of the WMO is self-evident here. Concerning outer space research, scientific data are available from international conferences arranged by Space and Astronomy Societies (e.g. COSPAR). Statements about satellite techniques are, however, rare.

A notable innovation of Swedish-Soviet cooperation is the study of the fine structure of the sun's magnetic field from a stratosphere balloon. A new method for measuring magnetic fields has been improved by Swedish scientists, while the instruments for the balloon are being built in the Soviet Union, where the balloon is also to be sent up. This cooperation, agreed upon in 1967, is probably unique.

5. Cooperation in the field of peace research

In 1966 an International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research was established in Sweden. Scientists are recruited on an international basis. But it must be emphasized that the Institute by no means directly influences Swedish governmental policy and it is therefore of little interest to this study. 47)

At the University of Lund there exists an interdisciplinary Peace Research Seminar. Scholars from Czechoslovakia and Poland have participated in its conferences. These contacts are expanding through mutual personal visits. On the international level the Lund committee is involved in the Youth Study project under the auspices of the European center for Documentation and Coordination in the Social Sciences, Vienna.

6. Cooperation in the field of future research

The suggestions which have been discussed in this context are primarily connected with the EFTA and OECD countries, which have established a far-reaching market integration.

II. HARMONIZATION OF NATIONAL LAWS AND SOCIAL POLICIES

II 7 & V 21 ⁴⁹⁾ Standardization of traffic regulations and joint transport and communication measures for increased trade.

1. 1. Within this sector we may distinguish a broad spectrum of norms, from the general traffic policy decided by the countries themselves, to more technical questions where the endeavours obviously favour international harmonization of legislation.

Both multilateral and bilateral forms of contact are of use in this field. An illustration: Aviation agreements are arranged bilaterally according to the quid pro quo principle, i.e. an exchange of equivalent rights. On top of this, there is multilateral cooperation regarding prices, tour problems, etc.

1. 2. In Sweden, relatively unimportant questions like feasible time adjustments and allocation of labour are dealt with by administrative agencies, while more important decisions are restricted to parliamentary and governmental authorities.

2. 1. Land transport. The coordinating organization is the ECE with its suborganization the Land Transport Committee.

2. 2. Railways. The coordinating organizations are the CIM and the CIV.

2. 3. Shipping. The IMCO and for some questions the Trade and Development Board (TDB) are the most appropriate organizations.

2. 4. Aviation. For Sweden there are two important aviation organizations, the ICAO and the IATA.

8. ⁵⁰⁾ Cooperation in the field of air and water pollution measures.

These questions receive increasing attention in Swedish politics. The problems are of such scope that Sweden is forced to cooperate with other countries.

A world conference under the auspices of the UN on the question of human milieu problems, e.g. combating air and water pollution, was proposed by Sweden in the General Assembly in December 1967. According to the proposal, the conference should take place in 1970 or 1971. In the meantime, the governments of the member countries should intensify both their measures against milieu deterioration and their investigations on how to master this threat. ⁵¹⁾

Concerning the Baltic, a convention to protect the sea against oil pollution is in existence (IMCO). A Swedish proposal wish to gather the Baltic Powers

and to make them cooperate on an investigation of pollution problems in the Baltic. ⁵²

FAO, ECE and WHO have all air and water questions on their programs.

Sweden is very active on these questions within the OECD. The project for the moment is to measure geographical diffusion of air pollution. Measure stations are placed in various countries. Czechoslovakia, the only participating country from the East, is to put up a background station for continuous measurement of sulphur dioxide. Data collection is managed from Sweden.

A symposium held in Sweden in the summer, 1968, discussed the problems of water pollution in big lakes. The conference was arranged by the OECD and Svenska Naturvårdsföreningen. It was the intention also to invite Soviet and Hungary. Due to economic problems, the Eastern countries did not participate this time. Efforts are still being made to establish some form of cooperation for the future. ^{x)} In connection with a recent visit to Sweden, Soviet Premier Kosygin acknowledged the importance of the problem of water pollution and expressed the view that it could become necessary to discuss this problem in a very short time with Sweden. ^{xx)}

Besides this much voluntary work is being done, mostly on the preservation of the fauna and flora. Such collegial discussions as the IUCN symposium on "Conservation Education at the University Level" in Geneva in 1966 are almost certain to continue.

Mutual visits to study the pulp industries of Sweden, Poland and Czechoslovakia have been made.

9. Harmonization of national patent laws.

In recent years the stream of applications for patents has increased considerably between the East and the West. The Soviet Union has been notably active, and in 1965 it became a member of the BIRPI (Bureaux internationaux réunis pour la protection de la propriété intellectuelle).

There are differences in the forms of legal protection which can be explained by the different social systems of the East and the West. Inventors' certificates do not signify private protection but have the character of an official protection that allows certain possibilities of compensation. This compensation, however, is entirely determined by state authorities. Patent protection on the other hand embraces in principle, all individual rights of the owner to use the invention by himself or to transfer it to

^{x)} Interview docent Ulf Grimås, Uppsala.

^{xx)} Pressmeddelande UD.

another person. The patent may be sold to the state (the only purchaser) separately or combined with an agreement on exchange of know-how. ⁵³⁾

Soviet entrance into the BIRPI actualized a restricted revision of the most important multilateral convention in the area of industrial rights of possession, namely the Paris convention of 1883. This matter was discussed at an international diplomatic conference in Stockholm, summer 1967. It resulted in an amendment (moment 1) to article 4, that inventor's certificate ranks equal with patent application regarding priority in the countries where option exists between the two institutes. ⁵⁴⁾

10. Harmonization of social security legislation

10. 1. ⁵⁵⁾ Regarding such questions we may distinguish between two endeavors on the international level:

I) To guarantee a social minimum standard. These questions are handled by the ILO, which through conventions and recommendations tries to harmonize national legislation of the signatory powers.

II) To mitigate difficulties caused by international labour force mobility. Obviously these matters are of interest only to the countries that have an open labour market policy to Sweden, and is thus not yet of any interest to Eastern Europe.

10. 2. Since 1924 Sweden has had a bilateral agreement with Czechoslovakia on the reciprocity of workers' social security. A similar agreement has existed with Poland since 1928. The agreements guarantee Swedes working in Czechoslovakia and Poland, and Czechs and Poles working in Sweden equal advantages with the citizens of each country respectively. ⁵⁶⁾

III. COMMUNICATION AND CONTACT

11. ⁵⁷⁾ Cooperation in connection with communication satellites.

11. 1. The international exchange program through satellite relay transmissions, "Our World", last summer was less successful than planned, because of occurrences in the Middle East. The idea was to link together the US satellite network with the Soviet "Orbita"-satellites. The program was relayed in June via US satellites. Eastern Europe did not participate. No similar program is due in the near future except for the more regular regional line relays.

Since 1963 the European governments have exchanged views on the desirability of a European-sponsored satellite-program (ESRO) to complement the US system. A provisory agreement exists concerning the arrangements of a world-wide commercial transmitting satellite system between the West European countries, The USA, Canada, and Japan. Up to 1970 matters will be

dealt with by the U.S. Comsat corporation and an interim committee. The European countries whose agencies of telecommunication are co-owners in the system have formed a European Conference on Telecommunications via Satellites (CETS) with the task of coordinating the policy of the committee. There are many problems to solve, e.g. in Sweden, no commercial advertising is permitted on the national TV-network.

At this moment it is hard to judge the possible role of these satellites in East-West contacts.

11. 2. The present point-to-point system is functioning within its given setting. On the other hand, Sweden is concerned about direct broadcasting from an orbiting satellite to home receivers. Such direct broadcasting satellites open possibilities of interfering with the direct national control over telecommunication facilities. The legal problems in this field are at present under discussion in a UNESCO subcommittee.

12. 58) Exchange and co-production of cultural programs for radio and television.

12. 1. In this sector, cooperation takes place through multilateral organizations (the EBU and the IORT) as well as bilaterally. Of the general organizations, UNESCO is the sponsor for this kind of production and backs educational programs.

Sweden is interested in increasing this cooperation. The field is marked by a consistent endeavour - from all participants - to handle the issues on a collegial basis without being disturbed by political intentions.

When the cooperation in a few cases has not been as good as could have been expected on Sweden's part, the delays have not been due to political complications but sooner to bureaucratic hindrances.

12. 2. 58) Each year screening sessions are arranged by EBU and the IORT. The broadcasting corporations of the member countries may thus sell and purchase programs of general interest. In this way Sweden has bought a number of television programs from Eastern Europe. The earlier claim for reciprocity "meter for meter, minute for minute" and the duty to broadcast a program if it was bought, is slowly disappearing. Also on a bilateral basis teams from the Swedish Broadcasting Company ("Sveriges Radio") have been able to make "on the spot" reports on social and cultural conditions in Eastern countries without special arrangements for revisits.

12. 3. 58) "Sveriges Radio" has presented on television a "Czechoslovakian week" and a "Polish evening". These programs were announced by studio reporters from each country. The series is to continue with contribution

from other Eastern countries.

The Soviet Union put at the disposal of "Sveriges Radio" unique background material for a documentary program on the Revolution in connection with its fiftieth anniversary.

12. 4. 58) Some circumstances could make cooperation more difficult: All Eastern states have not signed the Bern Convention on protection of immaterial rights.

Some types of programs are evidently not fitted for exchange. Sweden distinguishes between the entertainment and pedagogic functions when showing children and youth programs. In the East this distinction is not made, so programs may often reflect political conditions.

13. 58) Visa-free tourist travel

At present the Soviet Union is the only country to consent to a forty-eight-hour tourist visa-free visit in the country for visitors arriving by cruising ships or charter aviation. Otherwise different norms are applied. In general the formal procedures of receiving a transit visa have been much facilitated for all countries.

14. Cooperation in the field of sports

Athletics tries to avoid all political involvement that might disturb the exchange of sportsmen. The exchange with East Europe embraces many forms of sports and is intense. It may be suitable to distinguish between two kinds of competitions:

- 1) Exchange where the opponent is chosen to match approximately, the Swedish team in strength, and also on the basis of geographical accessibility.
- 2) International tournaments where the opponent has been drawn by lot and matches are played independent of relative location.

The contacts are made between the actual organization and its corresponding organization in the other country. In case of large sports events or study visits, the respective National Head Athletic Federation is likely to become involved. The meetings are based on reciprocity regarding income, accomodation, board, and travel. 61)

TABLE 1

Total number of matches with the East European countries/year for all organizations belonging to the Swedish Athletic Federation ("Svenska Riksidrottsförbundet"):

	1947	1951	1958	1964
Bulgaria			2	3
Czechoslovakia	7	2	5	18
Hungary	1	2	3	9
Poland	3		5	20
Rumania			6	8
USSR			6	16
East Germany			5	26
total	11	4	32	100

source: Svensk Idrott, years as above.

This table gives us reason to believe that the possibility of world athletics to go against political trends are small. The result seem to follow the attitudinal transitions which were analyzed earlier.⁶²⁾

IV TRADE RELATIONS

As the only organization where Western and Eastern Europe can meet on trade problems in general, the ECE has a particularly important task in the promotion of the East-West trade. Moreover, trade has been influenced by the GATT regarding the most-favoured nation principle.⁶³⁾ During the last twenty years Sweden's exports have increased from 3.2 billiard Swedish crowns to 22.1 or 12.3 billiards at constant prices, while exports to Eastern Europe rose only from 0.2 to 0.8 billiard crowns, or 0.5 billiards at constant prices.⁶⁴⁾ In total, Eastern trade comprises 4.2 per cent of Sweden's total trade, showing tendencies to increase.

15. Opening of markets for increase in the exchange of goods.

As stated earlier, Sweden pursues a liberal policy in her trade relations with other countries. This applies also to the centrally-planned European countries.

Sweden has long-term trade agreements with the Soviet Union (six years), Hungary (five), Bulgaria (five), Czechoslovakia (three), and Rumania (three). These agreements contain clauses determining the basic conditions for trade.

In the fall of 1965 Sweden took an important step to further stimulate trade with Eastern Europe. Save for East Germany, with which special agreements have been made, the imports of a great majority of all industrial items as well as many agricultural products were fully liberalized (70 % of total imports) and no import licences were required for those commodities. The few commodities left belong to areas where Swedish industry is undergoing structural changes, and are therefore vulnerable to a possible low price importation. The step taken is an autonomous Swedish proceeding which means that due regard must be taken to Sweden's own production against

market disruptions. Furthermore, the Swedish Government intends not only to continue this policy but also to introduce additional liberalization measures. Similar steps from the Eastern European countries would of course be very valuable. ⁶⁵⁾

16. ⁶⁶⁾ Cooperation in the field of multilateral clearing.

Sweden has endeavoured to terminate all post-war restrictions on international payments. In 1960 an agreement on multilateral clearing with Poland was signed. In 1963 similar agreements were made with Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and two years later with the remaining Eastern European countries, except for East Germany, where earlier agreements on bilateral payments still remain.

17. ⁶⁷⁾ Facilitation of currency exchange.

There are possibilities for the Eastern European countries to buy foreign currency in Sweden. Their interests seem to depend on value needs and not on short-term speculation motives. Besides Swedish Crowns, mostly U.S. dollars and Swiss francs are sold. The Soviet Union constitutes an exemption. Through the Orjobank in Paris and the Moscow Narodny Bank in London it takes part in business as well. The currency bought in Sweden is very often transferred to a European bank in the U.S. These Russian banks offer good payment conditions on medium-long and long terms.

18. ⁶⁸⁾ Reduction of tariffs and quota restrictions

Gradually increased quotas have been granted during recent years for non-liberalized commodities. Imports could be made beside and above the quotas and extra licenses are permitted.

As to tariffs the Eastern European countries have been granted de facto GATT treatment. No negotiations have taken place except with Czechoslovakia, who is a member of GATT (and indirectly with Poland, who is an observer).

V INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION

19 - 20 ⁶⁹⁾ Industrial co-production for maximum utilization of production capacity and joint planning of investment in new industries.

1. Within this sector, officials cooperate with private interests; the negotiators may be governmental members as well as members of the Chambers of Commerce or representatives of private firms.

The industrial cooperation is based on and perhaps a result of existing trade and commodity-agreements. Eastern Europe has expressed wishes that

this field also be guaranteed by governmental contacts. Similar agreements already exist between the Eastern European countries and several Western European states. The Swedish Government has stated that they "are willing to support all forms of cooperation within the industrial and commercial fields". but their attitude to far-reaching commitments in the form just mentioned is hesitant, a view shared by private industry.

Contracts agreed upon are signed on a firm-to-firm basis. The initiative to such co-production lies completely in the hands of private industry. Governmental authorities can support initiatives to extend trade through contributions to exhibitions abroad.

19 - 20. 2. ⁶⁹⁾ Some different forms of projects of co-production:

In Swedish-Eastern European trade, technical know-how and help plays an important role, especially with the Soviet Union. Swedish firms have constructed and delivered complete factories and other forms of heavy equipment to some Eastern European states (L.M. Ericson, Tetra-Pac, Alfa-Laval). Beside other arrangements, some parts of the products produced in these factories have been taken as payment. This could be seen as a form of joint investment.

Some difficulties have arisen in such affairs. It is difficult to maintain the necessary service to the factories when Swedish technicians cannot go there and besides, domestic products have been added to the original equipment, which might prevent maximum exploitation of production capacity. A solution which has been used in an increasing number of cases is to let Swedish technicians instruct the first generation of employees in the factories (Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.) The stream in the opposite direction has so far been minimal.

Through concessions to Eastern European enterprises commodities may be produced more cheaply and enter the market this way. A system of sub-suppliers of goods within this framework is relatively common.

Licenses are a form of cooperation regarded as less favourable on Sweden's part, due to deficient protection against imitation that exists in Eastern Europe.

It could also be mentioned that in connection with exhibitions direct contacts between producers and consumers sometimes are permitted (FACIT). But all trade on the Eastern European side is still centrally administered and decided.

21. See II:7.

22. 70) Cooperation in the field of peaceful utilization of atomic energy.

There exist no cooperation projects between the countries. Bilateral exchange is limited and is prevented within the field of applied research by the equipments and conditions which the U.S. sellers (who deliver most of the equipment) set for the use of their equipment.

In the field of theoretical physics, on the other hand, information channels are open. Above all the Institute for Theoretical Physics in Stockholm has cooperation with colleagues in Moscow and Novosibirsk.

In the international field, the IAEA ought to be mentioned. Its daughter institute, the Institute for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, is a direct manifestation of the intent to make the Eastern states and the developing countries participate in nuclear cooperation and do research on their own. Between CERN in Geneva and the Nuclear Research Establishment at Dubna in the outskirts of Moscow the channels are open. In this way, cooperation between Sweden and the Eastern European states is possible. These agreements are of a very special kind and the exchange takes place outside ordinary diplomatic channels.

VI 71) COOPERATION IN ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Of the sectors examined, this one seems to have the fewest contacts. Cooperation is more dependent on accidental circumstances than on a planned policy. Sweden's interest is currently directed towards coordination of policies within the frame of the UN and its special agencies, OECD and DAC. Viewed over a long time, cooperation between the blocs is of course desirable and might even become necessary. The role of UNCTAD is here self-evident.

There are difficulties even in obtaining information about the intention and volume of Eastern European assistance, also in cases when the assistance is sent to the same receiver from different sender-countries.

Through proposals to the UN from a developing country a lot of means are directed to the country in question, where the various types of assistance are coordinated by the UN residential representation. In such a way cooperation between Sweden and Eastern Europe could be established. Specific examples are still lacking.

23. Cooperation in the field of volunteers

The "peace-corps" institution in the way established by President Kennedy has received a negative response from the East. No similar Swedish governmental projects exist. 72) Religious groups and others carry out such projects on a voluntary basis.

24. Cooperation in the field of experts

There is no clear cooperation in existence.

25. Cooperation in the field of economic assistance

Arrangements of this kind are dealt with by GATT and ECOSOC (ICCIQA and CICT). ⁷³⁾ A solution on a joint-Swedish-Eastern European basis does not seem to have been considered, as both parts' share of the total world trade is low.

26. Cooperation on major projects

On this issue no kind of cooperation is officially established. Through common initiative in order to save cultural values of general interest, joint consultations took place at the removal of the Abu Simbal-temples in Egypt at an early stage of the construction of the Aswan-Dam. The fact that cooperation due to personal initiatives could begin in this way may have a positive effect in the long run.

VII EUROPEAN SECURITY

27. The problem of Germany

The Swedish Government has refused to grant official recognition to the East German Government since 1949. There is no official representation in East Berlin. Special arrangements have been established on the administrative level for making contacts possible.

In an interview in West German television in June 1962, Prime Minister Erlander motivated and defined Swedish policy in this way: Recognition of the DDR... "would be regarded by us as a declaration that we no longer believed in a reunited Germany. At any rate Sweden does not want to head such a capitulation, a rejection of the idea of a reunified Germany". ⁷⁴⁾ This formulation indicates that Sweden's refusal to recognize East Germany and to establish diplomatic relations with East Germany is based exclusively on considerations of political expediency. Should conditions change to the extent that peace and security interests in Europe, in the judgment of the Swedish Government, would be best served by their accepting a partitioning of the German nation into two countries, nothing should theoretically stand in the way of Swedish recognition of East Germany. In the Swedish Riksdag some politicians have not shared the Government's view, but have called for an immediate modification of the Swedish position in respect to East Germany.^{x)}

^{x)} The General Assembly of the United Nations on June 12, 1968, adopted a resolution requesting all states to adhere to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons. Swedish adherence to this is in accord with the general policy of cooperating towards relaxation of tension and disarmament.

x) continued: ment of the world. Sweden has recently signed the Treaty and the instrument of ratification will be deposited as soon as the Treaty has received its constitutional acceptance by the Riksdag.

Sweden regards the Treaty as a necessary step before further disarmament measures may be taken. But Sweden would have preferred a different timetable and at least joint negotiations on non-proliferation, a comprehensive test ban, and also a cut-off of the production of fissile material for nuclear purposes.

Moreover, it has been emphasized that Sweden, not being a participant in the Second World War, scarcely can take an initiative on a question that ought to be decided by the German people and the Allies.

28. Non-aggression treaties

In 1958, the Soviet Union proposed a European agreement on friendship and cooperation. According to this, the participating states "would undertake to observe the basic principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, of non-aggression, of non-interference in the internal affairs of one another, of equality, and of reciprocal advantages, and also to solve all disputes among themselves exclusively by peaceful means in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. ⁷⁵⁾

Lacking concrete proposals on arbitration and investigation procedures in case of disputes, the proposal was not considered appropriate according to the Swedish interests. ⁷⁶⁾ Moreover, the fact that Sweden has rejected all international guarantees for her neutrality may perhaps be prejudicing. ⁷⁷⁾

29. Arms control measures

1. This is one of the rare international questions in which Sweden promotes independent initiatives. The urgency and importance the disarmament question holds in Swedish policy is underlined by the fact that a special minister chair on disarmament matters, assisting the Foreign Minister, has been installed in 1967 (Her Excellency, Mrs. Alva Myrdal).

2. Nuclear-free zones. Under 4.3.2.2. the proposals discussed regarding the zone method in disarmament are enumerated. But a partial disengagement in line with the proposals has proved hard to achieve, among other things because of the negative response of the Nuclear Powers when Sweden has required services in return. ⁷⁸⁾

3. Disarmament, non-proliferation, and comprehensive test ban. In the Geneva negotiations and in the General Assembly, Sweden has strongly supported a non-proliferation agreement on nuclear weapons. Sweden has furthermore worked at attaining a freezing-in of the rearmament tempo of the weapon arsenals of the Nuclear Powers. It has also been an urgent task to make all countries adhere to the Partial Test Ban and that the

exemption of underground nuclear explosions in the Moscow Treaty should be banned. ⁷⁹⁾

4. "Detection-club". On an invitation from the Swedish Government representatives from among other states Rumania and Poland participated in a Stockholm conference in May 1966, to find out if there were possibilities to establish an organized and effective exchange of seismic data. ⁸⁰⁾ A further conference was planned to take part during 1967. The intention was to include experts also from the main nuclear weapon states. So far no conference has been held, partly due to lack of information on the part of these main powers and partly due to their unwillingness to take part in the meeting. The control issue has been the reason for upholding an agreement prohibiting underground nuclear tests. In Sweden, some investigations have been made to construct a reliable system for identifying underground explosions. To this control system is added a "verification by challenge" procedure, whereby a party accused of making underground tests in violation of a treaty should find it in its own interest to provide all available, reassuring information. ⁸¹⁾

30. The general problem of European security

An essential aspect of the Swedish security policy is its effect on the political milieu, internationally. This means an effort to mitigate tension in the Nordic area. The disengagement in Europe was long thought to be a task for the Great Powers. But since the middle of the 60's and the reduced tensions in Europe, Sweden has declared her willingness to promote European security. Mr. Nilsson, the Foreign Minister, stated in November 1966, "...the probability of an armed clash in Europe is considered to have diminished considerably, but this does not mean that the power blocs have ceased to watch each other, or that they have refrained from rather substantial defence preparations. But the tendency towards a greater degree of understanding and more intensive contacts between the countries in Eastern and Western Europe has at the same time become an increasingly noticeable and positive element in the picture of present-day Europe. It is obvious that our foreign policy should support realistic attempts to obtain a continued détente. Our position as a neutral state makes this particularly natural while at the same time giving us special opportunities for fruitful contacts with different groups of states". ⁸²⁾ This apprehension on Sweden's "peace-mongering capacity" has not yet resulted in any concrete tasks on the European arena beside activities in the UN and the Council of Europe.

C. ON FRAMES OF COOPERATION

1. A Contact Pattern

1.1. Diplomacy. Negotiations between the countries remain very traditional in character. Bilateralism and residential diplomacy is far more common than multilateral discussion and organizational meetings.

The diplomatic stamp is further intensified by the fact that there are still only two Swedish consulates in Eastern Europe. (Gdansk and Szczecin in Poland). ⁷⁶⁾ A third one is planned for Leningrad in the near future. ⁷⁷⁾

1.2. Inter-governmental meetings. Direct contacts between governmental representatives have expanded in recent years, especially on the summit level.

TABLE 3

Sweden: Summit visits. Level: foreign minister or higher.

	Phase 1 1945-47	phase 2 1948-53	phase 3 1954-62	phase 4 1963-30.11.67
	to from	to from	to from	to from
Bulgaria				1
Czechoslovakia				1 1
Hungary				1
Poland				2 1
Rumania				1
USSR			1	3 3

source: Documents on Swedish foreign policy. Data checked
with Foreign Department Press Office.

General bilateral agreements as well as specialized questions have been taken up in the political discussions. In important cases the ministers act as intermediaries for Swedish enterprises. For example, during Prime Minister Erlander's visit to Poland in November 1967, a telephone licence sale on the account of L.M. Eriksson, Ltd. was discussed. ⁸⁵⁾

1.3. Inter-parliamentary meetings. Meetings between parliamentary delegates took place in 1955/56. ⁸⁶⁾ This was merely to symbolize friendship, and no specific projects have been promoted in this way.

1.4. Inter-bureaucracy contacts. The delegated authority of the administrative agencies in certain cases to make direct consultations with their Nordic and Western European colleagues does not seem to be applied to Eastern Europe. The intermediating and coordinating role of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and its general supervision is very strict. Consequently, relations are burdened by heavy formalistic procedures which

may complicate the cooperation. ⁸⁷⁾

2. International organizations

For the particular agencies as well as for certain distinct interest groups, the endeavour is of course to find the most appropriate administration. To this equipment could be added another one: the organization must be recognized by the two parts, and its non-political focus must not be called in question. Thus, many of the UN agencies are suitable. Of these, the ECE plays a crucial role. As the only forum that embraces all countries in Europe, it offers opportunities for intergovernmental consultations and a number of techniques for reaching practical agreements. In principle, the Swedish Government favours multilateral consultations to clarify problems between countries with different political and economic systems. The government's attitude to ECE's work is very positive. ⁸⁸⁾

Another example is UNESCO, which handles a wide range of cultural problems, youth exchange etc. A recent meeting between the Nordic and the Baltic UNESCO-Commissions discussed general cultural questions as well as such special problems as women's emancipation and handicapped children. ^{x)}

Despite this, it is evident that the multilateral road is not especially developed, partly because Sweden is hesitant in front of the formulation and implementation of the Eastern policy. The Eastern European countries themselves, despite CMEA, do not readily offer an apparatus for multilateral cooperation.

3. Some remarks

3.1. Cooperation dependent on geographical factors. In some questions a need for cooperation has appeared due to geographical circumstances. I refer to the Baltic "Nordkalotten", the Northern territories in Norway, Sweden, and Finland, a region with a natural extension within Soviet borders.

Its regional character is marked by some activities by the Nordic Council. It initiated the salmon-fishery proposal (4.2.3.3.). Finnish delegates suggested in 1963 that the Soviet Union be partly included in the inter-Nordkalotten cooperation. ⁸⁹⁾ Similar views have been expressed in some conferences arranged by "Föreningen Norden". ⁹⁰⁾

During a visit to Stockholm in 1964 the Ministers of Agriculture from Sweden and the Soviet Union discussed the problems of reindeer-keeping and the need for cooperation on a forestation and plant breeding in this area. ⁹¹⁾

^{x)} Telephone interview Ecklesiastikdepartementet (Ministry of Church).

Concerning the Baltic, some cooperation on navigation matters has taken place. Changes in the marking-out of passages or in the light-house system could scarcely be made without informing the other Baltic states. The so-called Baltic Sea Days in the German Hansastädte are arranged to give colleagues from all countries the possibility of informal discussions on joint shipping problems. ⁹²⁾

The fact that not all countries around the Baltic have diplomatic relations diminishes possibilities of having international conventions ratified. The most important example is the IMCO convention for the protection of the sea against oil pollution. Yet there exist possibilities for the states unilaterally to harmonize their legislation to international standards, a step taken by the Soviet Union in the oil question. ⁹³⁾

3.2. Political circumstances. The cooperation with Eastern Europe is marked by political considerations and procedures. It would be no exaggeration to hold that in any subsector mentioned in the Appendix, the value outcome is almost totally dependent on the political will. Therefore, the borderline between "political" issues and non-political matters is very fluid.

This view is supported by the recent official report on cultural contacts. These are found to depend on political considerations, whether regarding goal-directed activities or more general forms of exchange. ⁹⁴⁾ As already stated, sports were in some cases affected by political incidents.

However, some features of the Swedish democratic system that may modify this rule ought to be taken into account. Official relations are of course regulated by state authorities. As for trade, the system guarantees individuals independent decisions in the handling of business. ⁹⁵⁾ Relatively independent of political intentions, trade has followed a path of its own. During the 60's the volume has stagnated and the total share of the Swedish export has diminished. Despite this, development has officially been declared satisfactory from both sides, at several political meetings.

3. 3. Future probabilities. A transformation of the contact system ought probably to be viewed over a long period. It is hard to judge which ways are favoured by the Swedish government for the most appropriate way of handling contacts between Sweden and Eastern Europe. The experts foresee increased integration and cooperation within the blocs to more practical cooperation between them. ⁹⁶⁾ It also seems that important displacements in the relationship between the countries will come as a consequence of the international development.

4. Recent developments.

1. The General Assembly of the United Nations on June 12, 1968 adopted a resolution requesting all states to adhere to the Treaty of Non- Proliferation of Nuclear weapons. Swedish adherence to this is in accord with the general policy of cooperating towards relaxation of tension and disarmament of the world. Sweden has recently signed the Treaty and the instrument of ratification will be deposited as soon as the Treaty has received its constitutional acceptance by the Riksdag.

Sweden regards the Treaty as a necessary step before further disarmament measures may be taken. But Sweden would have preferred a different timetable and at least joint negotiations on non-proliferation, a comprehensive test ban, and also a cut-off of the production of fissile material for nuclear purposes

2. Political developments.

An announced visit by the Polish Prime Minister was cancelled in May. Unofficially this is said to be due to some judgements and criticism from Sweden about the Jewish situation in Poland.

The Czechoslovakian crisis has evoked a very sharp reaction in Sweden as elsewhere. It is likely that the crisis will have consequences on Swedish policy, but perhaps more on her domestic policy than in her foreign relations. Although an official protest was delivered to the five countries of the Warsaw Pact (who refused to receive it) the Foreign Minister has declared that Sweden will not reconsider her position in relation to the Eastern countries, nor will she cut off her diplomatic relations with the invading countries. On the private level, however, many organizations (e.g. IO) have cancelled study visits, etc. Also the athletic movement has considered cutting off exchange with these countries until the situation is normalized.

Sweden fears that the development towards a détente will be broken off and the international situation will deteriorate. For the time being, it is hard to judge to what extent the occurrence will influence the content and pace of the cooperative efforts described in this paper.

NOTES Documents: Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy.
Annual Report published by the Royal
Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

1. Documents 1964 p. 10.
2. Nils Andrén: Power-balance and non-alignment. Chapt. "A historical perspective" pp.18,22.
3. In a statement for a Youth Division of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, the Foreign Minister refers to an opinion poll. " 92 % of the Swedes asked expressed themselves in favor of neutrality in case of war between the US and the USSR". Documents 1957. p.34.
See also Documents 1965 p. 18.
The strong public support for the position of neutrality is an argument very much in use for this policy. A thorough examination of this argumentation could be found in Östen Undén: Tankar om utrikespolitik, p. 21. Stockholm 1963.
4. N. Andrén: op.cit. p.71.
5. Compare the professed objectives of the Swedish security policy in the official report by Försvarsutredningen, Sveriges offentliga utredningar (SOU) no 56 1966.
6. N. Andrén: op.cit. p. 52.
7. Documents 1965 p. 19.
8. Documents 1950-51 p. 14.
9. Documents 1960 p. 17.
10. Documents 1965 p. 50. See also a paper by the Defence Staff "The total defence of Sweden," 1963 p. 1. "The Swedish policy may be characterized as an active peace-policy"
11. Documents 1963 p. 15.
12. Documents 1961 p. 103.
Documents 1962 p. 11.
Documents 1963 p. 26.
13. Documents 1962 p. 12. ".... In its aim the UN is naturally a universal organization. There are also a large number of regional institutions which have no connection with the UN and which do not extend their activities over a continent or over a regionally limited circle. Regional European organizations, notably, are flourishing. Universal and regional organizations can often be complementary to each other, but the regional organizations

cannot replace the universal ones. This is clearly apparent in the case of the security organizations. Regional defence unions or alliances can never solve the problem of security, quite simply because alliances are directed against potential enemies and thus exarcebate the differences in the world. A universal organization alone can be considered as a real solution to the problem of security.

But unfortunately in the situation today the essential political conditions for an effective and universal security organization do not exist. Partial alliances are therefore the most immediate expedient but are, fundamentally, provisional solutions."

In an analysis of Sweden's policy towards the UN, see (Eek, Håstad: Sweden and the United Nations, New York 1956.) It was stressed that a strengthening of the UN and its functioning as an instrument for collective security would possibly have disruptive consequences on other forms of valuable universal cooperation. (p. 286.)


14. See Riksdagens Protokoll, 7.11.1967. FK 1967/93.
(author's translation)
15. Documents 1959. p. 10. For a general description of Swedish trade policies pursued 1945-1952, see Svensk Handelspolitik, Utrikesdepartementet 1952.
16. Documents 1959 p. 10.
17. N. Andrén: op.cit. p. 134.
18. N. Andrén: "Nordic Integration". Printed in Cooperation and Conflict, no. 1 1957. p. 5.
19. See a review by Mats Bergqvist om Hans F Peterson's doctoral dissertation "Stability and World Order", Cooperation and Conflict no 2 1965 p. 71.
".... For the aims of political science cannot be to give an absolutely true picture of what has happened or has been said, to render historically correct reconstructions of things past. Our aim must be to provide some kind of general image of the political process in the subject-matter chosen. The accurate restatement of past events is a matter for historians. Political scientists should, and on this there seems to be a reasonable degree of consensus today, look for trends and generalizations of the political process".
20. Svensk Handelspolitik, Utrikesdepartementet 1952. p. 74.
21. Sveriges Överenskommelser med Främmande Makter no 48 1964.

22. Gunnar Adler-Karlsson: "Den circulus visiosus in den Osthandel", printed in "Coexistenz zwischen Ost und West", Mayerzedt-Rome, Wien 1967. More details on the economic policies pursued during the Cold War can be found in Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic warfare 1957-1967, Stockholm 1967.
23. For an enumeration of security affairs involving East European States, see Handläggningen av säkerhetsfrågor, SOU no 4 1968 p. 18.
24. Documents 1950-51 p. 159.
25. Documents 1950-51 p. 151.
26. Documents 1952 p. 31.
27. Documents 1954 p. 114.
28. Documents 1957 p. 14.
29. Documents 1956 p. 76
See also Documents 1955 p. 118 on a visit by a Swedish parliamentary delegation.
30. Documents 1957 p. 14. The Prime Minister on the Hungary crise.
Documents 1959 pp. 85-94. On the cancelled visit by Mr. Chrustjev.
Documents 1959 p. 47. On the Chairman of the Conservative Party,
Mr Hjalmarsson, the Soviet Union and the UN.
31. Documents 1954 pp. 117-126 and Documents 1958 pp. 8; 74-87.
32. Documents 1962 p. 176. See also Documents 1959 p. 106 and Documents 1964 p. 188.
33. Documents 1960 pp. 106-107 and Documents 1961 p. 141.
34. Documents 1964 p. 169.
35. Documents 1964 p. 172. See also Documents 1965 p. 161.
36. Documents 1966 p. 48. See also Förenta Nationernas Generalförsamling, VD 1964-65 p. 117.
37. Documents 1966 p. 48.
38. See SOU no 56 1967 p. 31. (on Svenska Institutet)
39. Svenska Institutet informerar no 5 1967.
40. SOU no 56 pp. 16, 86.
41. See Dagens Nyheter 9.12.1967 p. 20 about joint production of an adventure film between Svenska Filminstitutet (SF) and the Russian Goskinoizdat film.

42. See 39.
43. E.g. ^{The} Society Sweden - the Soviet Union and exchange of scientists between the universities of Stockholm and Leningrad.
44. See UNESCO Minieurope/6/ pp. 10-11.
45. Personal interview Mrs. Högberg, Ingenjörsvetenskapsakademin, Information paper on Ingenjörsvetenskapsakademin.
46. Forskning och Framsteg no 3 1967.
47. Documents 1964 p. 149 and Documents 1966 p. 159 on the establishment of an Institute of Peace Research. See also SOU 1966 no 5.
48. Johan Galtung: Fredsforskning p. 57. Verdandi 1967. Telephone interview fil.kand. Håkan Wiberg, Lund. See also SOU 1966 no 5 pp. 23; 25 where seminars ^{on} peace research in Lund and Gothenburg are mentioned. Some more information: on new seminars in Stockholm and Uppsala printed in Dagens Nyheter 8.12.1967.
49. See chapter "Det internationella samarbetet beträffande post, televäsen, järnvägar, flyg och sjöfart", p. 157 in "Internationella organisationer för ekonomiskt samarbete", Industriförbundet 1965. Telephoneinterview hovrättsrådet Nordström, Kommunikationsdepartementet.
50. Telephoneinterviews sjöfartsrådet Lindencrona, Sjöfartsstyrelsen and f. kommerserådet G. Böös, fil.lic. Leif Freyschjuss, AB Luft & Vattenvård, and byrådirektör Esping, Naturvårdsverket. Protocol from IUNC-symposium "Conservation Education at the University level", Genève 1966 (International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources)
51. Press message, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 14.12.1967.
52. See Dagens Nyheter 5.12.1967 p. 5.
53. Patent i Moskva p. 47. Svenska Industriförbundet 1965.
54. Svensk Juristtidning no 9 1967 p. 658. See also Från Departement och Nämnder no 19 1967 p. 406.
55. Telephoneinterview departementssekreterare Lindskog, socialdepartementet.
56. Dossier archive of the Foreign Ministry.
57. Dizard: Television . A World view. Syracuse 1966. "Det internationella samarbetet beträffande post, televäsen, järnvägar, flyg och sjöfart", op.cit. p. 171. Interview Mr Göran Dahlin, head of Foreign Secretariat, Sveriges Radio.

58. Interview Mr. Göran Dahlin, Sveriges Radio.
59. SJ visa rules 1.1.1967. Statens Järnvägar Centraloffice.
60. Documents 1960 p. 125.
61. Personal interview redaktör Sten Svensson, Svenska Riksidrottsförbundet.
- 62 There are of course a number of factors influencing the number of international athletic competitions, e.g. the economic status and public support ^{of the} branch in question; the possibilities to find suitable opponents.
- Some factors are possible to examine: In 1946 the total number of branches participating in international exchange, was 19. in 1950 the number of branches competing reached its lowest point (16) and has ever since increased. (1946:26; 1965:35)
- As for East Europe, in 1946. There were competitions with Poland and Czechoslovakia in altogether 4 branches of sports in 1946. Since, the numbers of countries as well as the numbers of branches has increased.

Competitions



63. Memorandum concerning stability and flexibility in trade with ECE countries having different economic systems. (stencil from UD).
64. Statement by Mr. Gunnar Lange, Minister of Trade, for the ECE 11.4.1967.
65. See 63.
66. Riksbankens årsbok 1960, p.44 and 1963, p. 59 and 1965, p. 52. See also Documents, 1965, p. 40.
67. Personal interview kamrer Wåhlbäck, arbitrageavdelningen Skandinaviska Banken, huvudkontoret.
68. See 63.
69. Personal interview with miss Thunholm, Exportföreningen. Telephoneinterviews Handelsdepartementet and Electrolux. See also Sovjetstaten 50 år, paper published by the Society Sweden - the Sovjet Union, for an enumeration of concrete projects within this field.
70. Telephone interview tekn,lic, Sam Nilsson, IVA. Int. org. p. 39. Published by Utrikespolitiska institutet and Exportföreningen, Stockholm 1967.
71. Telephone interviews byråcheferna Lovén and Ulfenholm, SIDA.
72. On differences between a Swedish Peace Corps, established in 1965 and the American, see Torgil Ringmar and Rolf Örjes: Från i-land till u-land, 1967 p. 24.
73. Internationella organisationer för ekonomiskt samarbete, Stockholm 1965, p. 39 ff.
74. Documents 1962, p. 26.
75. Documents 1958 p. 34.
See also Documents 1964 pp. 152-166. In a letter the Soviet Premier, Mr. Chrustjev proposesan international agreement to be signed by all nations in order to outlaw territorial disputes to be solved by use of force. The letter is written in a context of neo-colonialism and military bases on foreign territory. The Swedish reply refers to the commitments inherent in the UN Charter. It further stresses that the objective of any agreements should be extended to refer to every kind of difference of opinion between the states that might involve the the risk of the use of force.
76. Documents 1968, p. 82.

77. Jfr Karl E Birnbaum, Sverige och Kärnvapenfrågan, p. 23.
Strategisk bulletin no 6, Stockholm 1965.
 78. Karl E Birnbaum: The Nordic countries and European security, Cooperation and Conflict no 1 1968.
 79. Documents 1965, pp. 10-11.
 80. Documents 1966, p. 80.
 81. Statements by Mrs. Alva Myrdal 12.12.1967 for the first Committee of the General Assambly. Press message Foreign Ministry.
 82. Documents 1966, p. 47.
 83. Utrikesdepartements Kalender 1966, p. 99.
Szcecin ranks^{as} consular agent and is managed by a sailors' chaplain. Such information is interesting in the light of an article by Johan Galtung and Marie Holmboe Rue, printed in Journal of Peace Research, no 2 1965 p. 102: ".....First of all, there has been a change from what one might ^{call} ad hoc diplomacy where the parties meet when the circumstances so demand and permit, to institutionalized diplomacy. The latter can actually be subdivided into two categories: permanent diplomacy and diplomacy at regular intervals. On the other hand there is the crucial distinction^{between} bilateral diplomacy that involves two nations only, and the multilateral diplomacy that involves more than two nations. This last category can also be subdivided into two: multilateral in the sense of "some" nations, and multilateral in the sense of (practically) all nations. Thus, we get the following:
- | Table 1. Phases in the history of diplomacy | |
|--|---|
| ad hoc | institutionalized
" (regular and permanent)" |
| <u>bilateral</u> I diplomacy by envoys
(two nations) | → II residential
diplomacy |
| <u>ultilateral</u> III conference diplomacy
(some or 'all' nations) | → IV organizational
diplomacy |
84. Press message from UD 30 november 1967. (Se även Utrikesfrågor 1967 p. 182.)
 85. Dagens Nyheter den 26.11.1967, p. 1.
 86. Documents 1955, p. 118. and Documents 1956, p. 76.
 87. See H. Blix: Statsmyndigheternas internationella förbindelser, Stockholm 1964.

88. See E/ ECE 553 p. 3 . Government's answer to request about the work of the ad-hoc group on East-West trade.
Swedish delegate: ambassador von Platen.
89. See Nordiska Rådet årsbok 1963 sak A 40. For a proposal on East-West trade, see Nordiska Rådet årsbok 1958 sak A 31. See also Nordisk Utredningsserie (NU) no. 13 1967 p. 113 on the problem of water pollution and on the anxiety of having the USSR join such cooperation.
For a general analysis of regional aspects on Soviet affairs, see Klaus Törnudd's dissertation: "Soviet attitudes toward non-military regional cooperation". Helsingfors 1961.

On Sweden's part, the concept of "Baltic region" has been interpreted in the following way:...." I began by pointing out that in the eyes of other nations the Nordic countries are regarded as a political and cultural entity and that Nordic democracy has a special character which has attracted attention internationally. During political discussions in recent years suggestions have sometimes been made for a division within the Nordic region along other lines. I refer to the talk about the Nordic countries being a special zone with uniform interests and common objectives in various spheres of interest. Logically the Baltic countries must mean all countries bordering on the Baltic Sea and no other countries.

Now, geographically Norway and Iceland of course are not among the states bordering the Baltic. Both these countries would therefor drop out of the picture of the proposed Baltic region. Instead- apart from Denmark, Finland and Sweden would be included several "non-Nordic" countries (if I may so express myself) namely Germany- both Western and Eastern Germany- Poland and the Soviet Union. To say the least of it this change in the composition of the circle would not make the new group particularly homogenous. The Baltic countries mentioned cannot very well appear as a political and cultural entity as do the "Nordic countries" according to the long-established use of this term". See Documents 1959, p. 24.

90. Vänner i Norr 1963 pp. 18; 99 - 1965 p. 99 (Föreningen Norden)
91. Documents 1964 p. 176
92. Telephoneinterview sjöfartsrådet Lindencrona, Sjöfartsstyrelsen.

93. Internationella Organisationer p. 55.

Sveriges Överenskommelser med Främmande Makter no. 15 1963.

Telephoneinterview Sjöfartsrådet Lindencrona, Sjöfartsstyrelsen

94. SOU no 56 pp. 10; 69.

95. See 63.

96. See ambassador Carl-Henrik von Platen in "Diplomati och Politik"
Stockholm 1966.

NORWAY AND THE
EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

by

Sverre Lodgaard
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo

1. Introduction

The objectives of Norwegian foreign policy have for years been formulated in the following general way: ¹


1. To protect Norway's freedom and independence
2. To attend to her interests (material and cultural)
3. To contribute to the ensuring of peace and to the promotion of international cooperation. ²

Norway has sought to realize these objectives mainly through cooperation within four frameworks: the Nordic, the Western European, the Atlantic, and the universal (or the UN) framework. The priorities are roughly as indicated in the following schemes: ³

Table 1. Frameworks

Objectives of cooperation	Nordic	Western-European	Atlantic	UN
Security	3	2	1	4
Economic cooperation	2	1	3	4
General foreign policy cooperation (Related to the third objective.) ¹		4	2	3

Fig. 1.



Norway's participation within the frameworks outlined here has been marked by a critical attitude in general towards cooperative efforts in smaller areas that might represent obstacles to participation in geographically more embracing frameworks.⁴ This tendency may be described by a set of circles where the smallest one, representing Nordic cooperation, takes place inside the Western-European circle, which again is placed inside the Atlantic framework (Figure 1 above). The Atlantic framework is in turn presupposed compatible with the universal framework, making the concentric model complete. This model constitutes a most important, general axiom in Norwegian foreign policy.

2. Norway's position in the East-West perspective

Before considering Norway's policy towards Eastern Europe in the perspective already indicated, let us outline Norway's position in the East-West perspective more precisely. One way of doing so is to look at her voting behaviour in the UN on questions where the USA and the USSR vote oppositely.⁵ (+100 means 100% agreement with the USA, - 100 means 100% agreement with the USSR). The countries included are NATO countries and Nordic countries, i.e. countries with which Norway often compares herself.

Table 2. % agreement

1. Italy	90-100
Luxembourg	
Netherlands	
UK	
2. Belgium	80-90
Canada	
Greece	
Iceland	
Turkey	
3. Denmark	70-80
<u>Norway</u>	
France	
4. Portugal	60-70
Sweden	50-60
Finland	30-40

Of the NATO countries, Norway is among those voting most in disagreement with USA; she is all the same firmly Western oriented, the percentage agreement being 70-80.

Another way of measuring foreign policy orientation is to study the international structure of communications tied to the Foreign Ministry and other ministries dealing with foreign affairs. The following tables show the distribution of missions, personnel and communication on regions, and the distribution of external communication on embassies, permanent delegations and international organizations.⁶

Table 3.

3

Ministry of foreign affairs			Communication			Rank
Missions (%)	Personnel (%)		Political affairs (%)	Economic affairs (%)	Ministry (%)	
Western Europe	37	40	27	40	45	5
Eastern Europe	7	7	6	1	6	23
North America	16	16	10	4	21	14
South America	7	5	17	0	5	24
Asia	17	14	11	1	12	15
Africa	10	8	4	7	5	21
Permanent delegations	6	11	25	45	6	
N	70	162	489	695	14 824	

Table 4.

Distribution of external communication (%)

	Ministry of for. affairs		Ministry of commerce
	Department of pol. affairs	Department of economic affairs	Department of foreign trade
Embassies etc.	73	45	7
Permanent del.	25	45	93
Embassies in Norway	2	6	-
International org.	-	3	-
N	489	695	89

These figures should be interpreted with many reservations. Generally, however, they constitute one of many indicators on Norway's position in international relations.

Setting aside the permanent delegations and ranking the areas according to the sum of their ranks on the 5 variables, we get a result as shown in the column to the right (Table 3). Western Europe heads the list, ranking highest on all variables. On the other hand, Eastern Europe is at the bottom, together with South America; if we take the permanent delegations into consideration, the difference between East and West will be even greater. With the exception of UN, these delegations are tied to Western organizations, both European and Atlantic. ⁷

While communication on political questions may express conflict as well as harmony, it seems probable that communication on economic questions is largely proportionate to the degree of economic cooperation. Thus we find that the ratio Western Europe + North-America/Eastern Europe is greater for communication on economic questions than on political ones (44%/1% versus 37%/6%). Furthermore, Western Europe is by far the most important area as to communication on economic questions. And if we look at the distribution of external communication within the Ministry of Commerce, department of foreign trade, this becomes in a sense even more distinct. Altogether, 93% of the communication here is with the permanent delegations, 7% with the embassies. ⁸

The third and last indicator used here is which countries Norway usually compares herself with. Thirty-six Governmental Reports to the Storting for the period 1962-68 have been analyzed for frequency of references to other countries.⁹ The result was as follows:

Table 5.

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Relative frequency</u>
1	Sweden	27.2
2	Great Britain	13.4
3	USA	12.7
4	Denmark	9.2
5	Western Germany	7.9
6	Finland	7.0
7	Italy	4.7
8	France	3.8
9	Netherlands	3.4
10	Canada	1.9

We see that Norway's reference group is completely Western, as expected, and with Nordic and Atlantic countries in the foreground.

The features of Norway's position in the East-West perspective drawn up till now show a nation firmly tied to the Western structure of cooperation, with some particular emphasis on the Nordic and Atlantic frameworks. Norway's voting behaviour in the UN is more in accordance with other Nordic countries than with any other group of countries or single country.¹⁰ And the degree of identification with Nordic countries is very high: measured by frequency of references, there are only great powers like UK and USA, belonging to the Atlantic circle, that compete. For her relations with Eastern Europe, however, it is first of all the great powers that are of importance, although probably less so today than during the most strained period of Cold War.¹¹

3. In the following we shall attempt to make the features more explicit and the whole picture more exhaustive. For every objective, we intend to consider the policy towards Eastern Europe in the perspective set by Norway's main foreign policy orientations as they are outlined, briefly and somewhat simplified, by means of the four circles of cooperation above.

3.7. Security policy

The Norwegian government is of the firm opinion that Norway's membership in NATO is still of major importance for her security, and that the alliance at the same time provides a valuable basis for improving the détente in Europe. In his background paper for the report to the Norwegian parliament, March 7th, 1967, the Foreign Minister stated:

I would like to emphasize once more, that all endeavours in establishing better contacts with the Warsaw Pact countries should be effectuated on the basis of the position of relative security provided by NATO - and without

any reductions of the efforts in the field of military defence forming the basis of this security, unless they are parts of a process characterized by complete reciprocity on both sides."

Thus, we get the impression that the Norwegian foreign policy in this field is based on roughly the following reasoning:

NATO gives its member countries a feeling of security which enables them to conduct a policy towards the Eastern European countries which is more open and favourable towards their demands than would otherwise have been the case. Especially for the small countries, this means they may enter into binding relations with Eastern Europe, knowing that the Atlantic alliance functions as a guarantee against being too much influenced upon by their cooperation partners in the opposite bloc. The countries most active as bridge-builders may then put pressure on the more hesitant ones.¹² But in so doing, a process of higher bids must be avoided, because of the possibilities such situations offer to the other part to split his opponent. In other words, it is preferable that parallel steps be taken by most of the member countries during the process of détente. Therefore, Norway wants neither the Warsaw Pact nor NATO to be dissolved at the moment, but prefers stable relations within the frameworks set by the alliances.¹³

The communique from the Dec. 1966 council meeting of NATO stating "the members of the Atlantic Alliance have confirmed their wishes to continue their efforts towards establishing improved relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states in the political, economic, social, scientific and cultural field", was highly appreciated in Norway.¹⁴ Primarily, Norway wanted a common political basis for the Western countries in their efforts towards relaxation of tensions in Europe, and the agreement on the Harmel Committee Report is considered of importance in this respect, however much diluted it is.¹⁵ But difficulties in reaching a common platform has caused Norway to prefer that the NATO countries form their own policy within the limits mentioned above. In this picture, NATO is to function as consultation organ and as a sort of clearing-house for contacts between East and West: this is very much like the way it actually functions.

Norwegian policy towards Eastern Europe is of course marked by the fact that Norway borders on the Soviet Union: this border comprises 196 kms, or about 1/10 of the total common border between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. In the field of security policy, this circumstance is reflected through the following three restrictions:

1. In a note to the Soviet Union, February 1, 1949,¹⁶ Norway's position with respect to establishment of allied military bases on Norwegian soil was first formulated. The Norwegian government declared it "does not intend to enter into agreements with other countries which will commit Norway to the establishment of basis on Norwegian territory for the military forces of foreign countries as long as Norway has not been attacked or threatened with attack". This policy towards allied military bases was later on more precisely defined:¹⁷

"Our policy towards military bases does not prevent Norway from building up its military establishments in such a way that it can without delay receive and deal

effectively with such allied military forces as might be transferred to Norway to assist in the defence of the country. Our policy does not prevent Norway from participating in allied joint exercises or from receiving short visits by allied naval and air forces in peacetime."

2. In Dec. 1957, Norway declared that she did not intend to stockpile atomic weapons on Norwegian territory "as long as Norway has not been attacked or threatened with attack".¹⁸ The restriction also includes missiles and missile bases.

3. Military exercises have never taken place nearer than 300 kms. from the Norwegian/Russian border, and foreign troop participation in the exercises which have taken place in Northern Norway has been low. There is reason to believe that these manoeuvres are of limited military value, and that one of their main functions is to manifest the unity of the alliance and its obligations.¹⁹

The reasoning underlying these restrictions is not going to be examined in this paper. It is, however, by and large the same. In order not to provoke actions on the part of the Soviet Union, it has been considered necessary to adjust Norway's NATO membership. The restrictions have been conceived as natural concessions to the security interests of the Soviet Union.²⁰ As to the observance of the declarations on military bases, discussions have been going on in Norway for several years, and the question has been matter of a fairly frequent exchange of notes between Norway and the Soviet Union.²¹

With the present state of affairs, there are no plans for changing the policy outlined here. However, modifications or more radical changes can easily be foreseen in connection with possible realignments in Europe, first of all in connection with American military withdrawal from Europe combined with increasing independence on the part of Western Europe (a crucial point being the West German position) as to its relations with the USA.²²

The foreseeable alternatives in this situation and their probabilities will not be discussed here. However, some general points should be outlined.

First, Norway's choice would be strongly influenced by the British attitude. If Britain applied for membership in a Western European security system, it is likely that Norway would follow. If Britain chooses a "mini-NATO", it is difficult to envisage Norway choosing another alternative.

Second, of the Nordic countries, Norway has probably the strongest Atlantic orientation. During the late 1940's and 1950's, the Atlantic framework was made a dominating circle of cooperation in Norwegian foreign policy, and Norway grew used to thinking in Atlantic terms. At that time, one could say in general, as to both military and economic affairs, that the more Atlantic an arrangement, the easier Norway would find her place in the setup. Today, however, the question of consistency between the actual frameworks is more problematic, and the Atlantic orientation may perhaps be restated by saying that the less incompatible with Atlantic interests an arrangement is, the less problematic it is for Norway to take part.²³

The most important point relating to the second main objective of Norway's foreign policy is her foreign trade. Norway's export amounts to about 40% of her GNP, but comprises only 0,8% (1966) of world total export. These figures indicate how strongly Norway depends on international economic development; secondly, they tell something about the limited possibilities available for Norway influencing the conditions on which international trade is based.

Another characteristic of Norwegian foreign trade is that while her import comprises an extensive range of commodities, export is concentrated on a few branches only.²⁴ This makes Norway even more dependent upon her environment than indicated by the percentages mentioned above.

A third characteristic of Norwegian economy is the role played by shipping. The Norwegian merchant marine constitutes about 10% of the worlds total tonnage; about 90% of Norwegian shipping is engaged in commodity transports outside Norway. One of the smallest nations in the world, Norway has one of the greatest merchant marines,²⁵ a fact that has had substantial consequences for her foreign policy.

Table 6 gives a survey of the orientation of Norway's foreign trade which constitutes a major part of the background for the scheme of priorities. (Table 1)

Table 6. Export as percentage of total export

EFTA		EEC		The Nordic countries		North America		Rest of the world	
1959	1966	1959	1966	1959	1966	1959	1966	1959	1966
41	47	27	26	17	25	10	10	22	17

The table illustrates fairly well why Norway considers a solution of the Western European market problems the most important politic-commercial objective at the moment. And only a solution that includes EFTA and EEC can be regarded as satisfactory. If these countries do not get more or less united in one market, Norway is automatically separated from some of her most important trade partners. But the fact that 19% of her export goes to Britain is not enough to explain why British membership in EEC is defined as a precondition for Norwegian membership. It should be admitted, however, that the probability for a merger of EEC and EFTA in the near future seems rather low.

On the universal level, the claims set forth by the developing countries for worldwide economic planning and for assistance from the rich countries in their struggle for economic growth seems to bring about increasing conflict with Norwegian interests. Clearly, changes in the principles governing international economic relations aimed at by developing countries will affect Norway greatly, due to the distinct international orientation of her economy. Questions related to Norwegian shipping, trade, and agricultural policy (and direct assistance to developing countries) will to an ever-increasing degree become matters for negotiations within the framework of the UN. And they would, if realized, constitute a new setting for

East-West economic relations.

Tables 7 and 8 give a survey of Norway's trade with Eastern Europe. ²⁷

Table 7.

Millions of current dollars

Imports c.i.f. from Eastern Europe							Exports f.o.b. from Eastern Europe						
Percentage change			Share in total				Percentage change			Share in total			
Country or area	Value 1965	1965 1960	1965 1964	1966 1965	1960	1966	Value 1965	1965 1960	1965 1964	1966 1965	1960	1966	
Norway	68,3	8,2	1,6	4,4	3,2	3,0	Norway	63,2	10,4	8,0	23,2	4,4	3,1
Tot. Western Europe	3805,6	9,6	12,7	11,8	4,2	4,4	Tot. Western Europe	3310,4	9,3	20,4	11,2	4,1	4,2

Table 8.

Value of exports and imports by country. 1000 Norwegian kr. ²⁸

	Imports				Exports		
	1964	1965	1966		1964	1965	1966
Czechoslovakia	92,011	82,914	84,659		67,220	72,770	54,701
Eastern Germany	70,278	84,595	58,957		113,782	73,655	45,705
Hungary	35,580	26,341	36,501		27,971	39,404	21,470
Poland	80,419	75,401	96,263		72,858	89,058	84,551
Rumania	10,788	7,559	3,425		6,477	11,709	2,578
USSR	183,744	201,063	225,301		121,688	132,073	103,809
Bulgaria	6,147	9,869	4,052		8,052	34,177	34,063

As shown by table 7, Norway's trade with Eastern Europe amounts to slightly above 3% of her total foreign trade as against 4,2%-4,4% on total Western Europe, and it has been somewhat reduced in relative importance the recent years. This tendency seems to have continued during 1967 too. One possible explanation of this shrinkage is to be found in the increased competition from other Western European countries on the Eastern European markets, and that the Norwegian exporters must work the more actively to make the export increase again. ²⁹ However, this is not the only reason. Eastern European countries now produce greater quantities of some raw materials and semi-manufactured commodities previously imported from Norway, at least partly because of the growing needs for currency to import investment goods. Thus, there seem to be some changes going on in the Eastern European countries' import structure, working in disfavour of Norwegian export. However, the commodities in question here have been sold on other markets, and this should most probably be seen in connection with the fact that Norwegian exporters concentrate on Western European markets to an ever increasing degree. The development of Norwegian foreign trade, as indicated by Table 7, clearly shows that. And with the firm political will expressed, both in Norway and many other Western European countries, and with the close attention attached to Western European market questions by the Norwegian foreign policy leaders, the Norwegian exporters are

most probably trying to strengthen their ⁹ positions while waiting for a wide Western European solution. The development of Norway's trade with Eastern Europe should be considered in this context too, although it is difficult to state to what extent we may reckon with causal connections.

The Norwegian government is of the opinion that extended economic cooperation in Western Europe will increase possibilities for more large-scale economic cooperation with Eastern Europe. During the parliamentary debate on Norway's attitude towards and relations with the European communities, July 11-13, 1967, the Foreign Minister said:

".....our country's membership in EEC and other countries' attendances to EEC will by no means make the elaboration of our cooperation with the Warsaw Pact countries more difficult. On the contrary, I believe that further extension of effective cooperation in Western Europe will provide increased possibilities for extending cooperation with Eastern Europe, both for the Western European countries as a whole and for the single states of this region. We are living in a period when the Eastern European countries are orienting themselves towards closer cooperation with Western European economic organizations, and I believe that a stronger EEC will provide the member countries with an increased and steadily increasing possibility to carry through the process of establishing peaceful relations, and thus the possibility for gradual reduction of tensions".

It has been officially maintained several times that Norway favours extended trade with Eastern Europe. As pointed out above, however, correspondence seems to be lacking between statements of principle and actual trends in this field. On the other hand, ^{no} secret has been made of the fact that Norway is not interested in substantial changes in her foreign trade orientation at the moment. In his report to the Storting, April 14th 1967, the Minister of Commerce and Shipping stated: "we are very much in favour of extended trade relations with countries outside Western Europe, but we must record that only Western Europe can offer sufficient possibilities for export increase necessary to uphold our prosperity-development rate".

And the Foreign Minister has expressed the same opinion:³⁰ "There is perhaps the possibility that we may reach a point where it will be provincialism to work for Western European cooperation. But we have not got that far yet."

3.3. General foreign policy coordination

The Nordic Cooperation Agreement ³¹ recommends in its art. 30 that the Nordic countries ³² "shall consult each other on topics of common interest which are going to be discussed in international organizations and international conferences, if this is possible and if it is considered appropriate". To the extent that these consultations are institutionalized, they have the form of Foreign Minister meetings (regularly twice a year to discuss questions related to UN peace-keeping ^{and} ear-marked forces, and a Nordic ministerial committee coordinates parts of the assistance to developing countries. To some extent the preparations before UNCTAD II were also coordinated, ³⁴ and in the Kennedy-round, the Nordic countries negotiated as one unit with one delegation. The results obtained in these negotiations were encouraging: it is common opinion that there would not have been made so many concessions to the Nordic countries if they had negotiated country by country. ³⁵ In general, the experiences from the Kennedy-round seem to have brought about a certain optimism as to future coordination in the field of

The implications of Nordic cooperation for Norway's relations with Eastern Europe can be classified into the following three categories:

1. Discussions on East-West relations at Foreign Minister meetings. These are usually of a general nature as far as the content is known, and one gets the feeling that they have not been among the most important points on the agenda.

2. Implications of various integrative arrangements, e.g. the passport union (see p.14) and the consular agreement.

3. The general impact on Norwegian foreign policy orientation. It is probably of minor importance, but to the extent it may be reckoned with, there are reasons to believe that it constitutes a check on Norway's Atlantic orientation. There are many reasons why Norway has at times opposed proposals for extended Nordic cooperation, one of them being her marginal position as the most Atlantic-oriented of the Nordic countries.

To make a preliminary conclusion at this point, there are two axioms in Norwegian foreign policy not directly related to the relations with Eastern Europe, but which should be emphasized in addition to the concentric model sketched in the opening. First, the strong influence British attitudes exert on Norwegian foreign policy should be stated in more general terms. Being among the most pro-American countries in Europe, both Norway and the UK feel very strongly the problem of how to choose between Atlantic and European alternatives. As already pointed out, Britain will most probably serve as a model in case of military realignments, and British membership in EEC is a precondition for Norwegian membership. Thus, it has been much of an axiomatic principle in Norwegian foreign policy not to move faster than the United Kingdom in questions relating to European integration. British attitudes are traditionally decisive for Norway, although there are reasons to believe that they will be less so in the future.³⁷

Second, Norway has adhered to the liberalist model in the field of foreign economy.

This is first of all dictated by shipping interests, which have fought for liberalist principles with great consequence, not only within the strict limits of the shipping branch, but with an eye to most sectors of foreign economy, fearing a hollowing out of the liberalist model. Liberalist principles are thus backed by the most important single branch in the Norwegian foreign economy, which at the same time constitutes a very vigorous pressure group at the national level.

4. Frameworks of cooperation with Eastern European countries.

4.2. Bilateral contacts.

In accordance with the general East-West pattern, relations between Norway and Eastern European countries are mainly bilateral. As to political contacts, there

has been a substantial extension of contacts taking place in the capitals, although a major part still goes on within the UN and various international organizations, both governmental and non-governmental.³⁸ At the moment, there are Norwegian embassies in Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, Belgrade and Budapest. Belgrade is accredited Sofia, and Prague is accredited Bucurest. At the moment, Norway has no consulate in Eastern Europe.³⁹

4.2 Multilateral frameworks

In addition to the organizations already dealt with, it is in the first place ECE, OECD, GATT and UNCTAD that deserve special attention.

4.2.1. ECE

Although the UN Economic Commission for Europe has greatly increased its activities since the middle of the fifties, it is still of relative low importance for Norway's economic cooperation with Eastern Europe. Norway has certainly profited from work done within ECE in several fields, but she has felt somewhat frustrated by lack of concrete results. At the same time, however, ECE represents an outstanding hope for future efforts to establish closer economic relations between East and West. Norway sees the interplay between bilateral and multilateral contacts as a stimulating influence upon East-West cooperation in general. Therefore, the ECE Commission should look upon bilateral contacts as complementary and encourage them, particularly at the level of the industries themselves.⁴⁰

4.2.2. OECD

In autumn 1966, the USA proposed that OECD be used for coordinative purposes in the field of East-West economic relations.⁴¹ In the case of Norway, however, this request got no response, neither positive nor negative. But there seems to be a tendency to prefer ECE for the purposes thought of here. For Norway, OECD's major importance still lies in the annual examination of the economic policies pursued by the member countries⁴² and in the consultations on questions relating to shipping⁴³ (in the Maritime Transport Committee).

4.2.3. GATT - UNCTAD

A question of great interest today is GATT's position relative to that of UNCTAD. The relevance of the somewhat conflicting relationship between these institutions for East-West relations can be briefly indicated by the following 4 points:

1. The overlapping membership. The contracting parties to GATT now number 72, 45 of them developing countries, and including two Warsaw Pact countries.⁴⁴

2. The wide-spread feeling, especially among developing countries, that the principles and practices laid down in GATT have been modelled with reference to the principles governing economic relations between highly industrialized countries, and that these therefore often work in disfavour of developing countries. To a certain extent, this may also apply to Eastern European countries.

3. There are obvious difficulties in adapting the General Agreement to state-trading economies, as the agreement has been worked out to apply for market economies.

4. The Eastern European assertion that on their part, increasing trade with Western countries is a prerequisite for increasing trade with developing countries. With reference to this point, (and also points 2 and 3 above), the Eastern European countries have therefore preferred East-West relations to be included in UNCTAD's sphere of activity too.

In treating the Norwegian attitude towards GATT and UNCTAD, and the priorities attached to them, it may be appropriate to distinguish between the general attitude towards GATT and UNCTAD as institutional frameworks and the more specific opinions concerning questions dealt with by them.

During the preparations for the first UNCTAD conference in 1964, both types of questions were given explicit answers. Institutionally, all OECD countries wanted to make use of the existing UN organs to the greatest extent possible, and to strengthen and further develop GATT.⁴⁵ It was common opinion that one should try to avoid a new organization in the field of world trade and a reduction of functions exercised by GATT. According to Norwegian opinion at that time, the first step in the direction of increased world trade should be the implementation of GATT's programme of action, and of the intentions underlying the Kennedy-round preparations: all of it based on the principle of non-discrimination.⁴⁶ In 1966, Norway ratified the new chapter on trade and development added to the General Agreement.⁴⁷

During the preparations for UNCTAD II, it was stated that "the government is of the opinion that Norway should participate in the work pursued within OECD, UNCTAD and GATT in order to form a system of time-limited tariff preferences for the developing countries."⁴⁸ Thus Norway decided to deviate from the principle of non-discrimination previously followed in GATT (but as among the last ones of industrialized countries to change her mind). However, Norway still doubts the suitability of discussing certain shipping questions within UNCTAD. In this field, she cooperates within OECD and a special group of Western European countries and Japan (the so-called Consultative Shipping Group), and she firmly regrets the developing countries' demand to reserve parts of their exports and imports for their own ships. Norway also regrets the policy pursued by some Eastern European countries in this field.

As already indicated, there is a general tendency to prefer GATT to UNCTAD in questions which may be handled by both organizations. This tendency, clear-cut some 4 - 5 years ago, is more diffuse today, but it still seems to exist. The priorities thus attached to GATT and UNCTAD can be regarded as an example of a general phenomenon applying first of all to small nations highly dependent on interactions with their environment, as is the case with Norway. Such countries are more sensitive to the degree of harmony/disharmony between the general principles on which international organizations are founded and their own interests than are great ones, lacking the power potentials necessary to rectify for the strongest disharmonies. On the other hand, high degree of harmony means a situation where power is not the only factor of importance, but where proposals can be rejected/supported on the plea that they are in disagreement/accordance with the principles agreed upon, i.e. a favourable situation for small countries. As Norway's economic interests fit in with the opinions and principles of GATT to a greater extent than those dominating within UNCTAD, this difference gets additional weight from Norway's position as a small country whose economy is highly dependent on international transactions.

5. This section is a more concrete survey of what is going on between Norway and the Eastern European countries within some of the most important fields of cooperation.

5.1. Agreements on cultural exchange

Norway has entered into agreements on cultural exchange with Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Besides, cultural exchange programmes have been agreed upon with Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria.

The programmes set up with reference to agreements are usually more comprehensive than programmes not formed within such general frameworks. Norway's cultural exchange with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union is thus more extensive than with Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria.

Today, cultural relations with Poland are the most extensive, having witnessed a rapid development the last 2-3 years. Czechoslovakia and Hungary fall in a middle group, and in this group Yugoslavia may be placed too, although the general relationship with that country is better and more developed than should be expected from the cultural exchange alone. Cultural relations with the Soviet Union also rank high in comparison with other Eastern European countries, but the cooperation-procedures seem to be somewhat more rigid than e.g. with Poland. Contacts with Rumania and Bulgaria are still in an early phase of development, and relations with Eastern Germany are of course impeded by the fact that Norway does not recognize it as a state.

5.2. Coordination of scientific research, exchange of scientific know-how

The cultural agreements/programmes also include coordination of research and exchange of scientific know-how. Here too, cooperation with Poland has been prominent, and the recently-signed programme for 1968/69 implies a further expansion of this contact. Norway also cooperates with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the exchange of research fellows, professors, specialists, and scientific material, besides some coordination of scientific research. Exchange with Rumania and Bulgaria is still limited. Visits to and from these countries have taken place only seldom, and there is practically no exchange of scientific material and coordination of research yet. However, the ministerial visits and negotiation between Norway, Rumania, and Bulgaria going on at present may represent some "take off" for relations with these countries.

5.3. Standardization of traffic regulations

The question of traffic-regulations is first of all a practical question removed from political principles, which makes possible wide-ranging cooperation when the need is articulated. Norway considers ECE the most suitable forum for coordination in this field. Regional agreements are allowed within the ECE framework, whenever the needs are of a regional nature; and this makes for the necessary elasticity.

Traffic branch conferences with participants from both East and West are also relevant in this field, likewise the Council of Europe to the extent that revisions of laws are a prerequisite for harmonizing traffic regulations.

5.4. Cooperation on air and water pollution measures

With the exception of Poland, there are no plans for cooperation on air and water pollution measures. The cultural agreement with Poland, however, envisages common efforts on these problems, which possibly can be traced back to personal interests of negotiators. Due to her geographical position vis-a-vis Eastern Europe, Norway has no pressing problems closely linked to and therefore requiring common solutions with Eastern European countries, such as is the case for e.g. Austria. Norway participates in the work done by the Council of Europe in this field.

5.5. Harmonization of national laws on patents

Norway does not cooperate bilaterally with Eastern European countries on harmonization of national laws on patents, and multilateral cooperation between East and West is of rather limited scope. However, the Eastern European countries have shown increasing interest in cooperation on these matters. Thus, the Soviet Union signed the Paris Convention a few years ago, and USSR invention certificates were then recognized

as being equal to patents. Norway considers this a favourable development.

The increasing cooperation on patents in Western Europe in recent years is first of all a consequence of the integration processes going on in this area, but it may also be seen partly as a consequence of the limited cooperation effectuated through the wider framework of the Paris Convention. It is not restricted only to harmonizing already existing laws, but also includes administrative cooperation on the processes leading to the establishment of patents. Norway participates in this work through the Council of Europe, EFTA, and on the Nordic level. There exists a Nordic patent request: questions influencing all Nordic countries are, according to this agreement, treated in one country, applying for all of them.

Norwegian official institutions have not made use of the patent institute in the Hague, but there have been some private requests.

5.6. Exchange and co-production of cultural programmes for radio and TV

Cooperation between radio and TV-institutions form separate points in cultural agreements/programmes with the Eastern European countries. Norway cooperates bilaterally with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Eastern Germany and the Soviet Union in this field. The most extensive contacts are those with Czechoslovakia, with which she has a special agreement. The concrete projects are decided upon directly between the institutions mentioned.

It is probably the television sector that holds out the most interesting future perspectives. Norway is a member of Eurovision, which in turn has close contacts with the Eastern counterpart, Intervision.

The Norwegian attitude towards cooperation in this field is highly pragmatic: what is important is the quality of the programmes and their information value. For the future, Norway hopes for more comprehensive cooperation on these matters. Initiation of greater technical uniformity, the lack of which has caused many difficulties till now, would be a major contribution to that end.

5.7. Visa-free tourist travel

Norway has an agreement with Yugoslavia on mutual abolition of visa requirements. Bulgaria abolished visa requirements unilaterally for the "tourist year" 1967, and a communiqué from Norwegian Prime Minister Borten's discussion in Sofia (Oct. 1967) announced the abolishment of visa requirements on a mutual basis between Norway and Bulgaria. Norwegian relations with the other Eastern European countries are still subject to visa regulations.

Norway is a member of the Nordic passport union, and this means that agreements applying to one of the countries also apply to the others. It implies further, that the same questions which must be considered by Norway must also be considered by the other Nordic countries, and this may complicate the negotiations. The problems are mostly of practical nature, as for instance the situation on the labour market. At the same time, however, the improvement of the political atmosphere between East and West has obviously been a prerequisite for the abolishments now going on.

Norway has bilateral agreements on visa-free tourist travel with most countries in the world, and is principally in favour of such arrangements. It is sometimes argued that this is well known and that it is therefore up to the Eastern European countries to take the first steps towards mutual abolishment of visas. However, the question is most probably more complicated than that. Actually, the Eastern European countries have taken some initiatives (cf. Bulgaria), and they have made their visa practice more elastic. Norway too has changed her visa procedure by giving her embassies greater authority to deal with these questions. According to Norwegian expectations, there is a fairly high probability for liberalization in the near future.

On the Nordic level, the so-called Hækkerup plan has been matter of discussion at Foreign Minister meetings. In his plan, former Danish Foreign Minister proposed that the Nordic countries carry through a unilateral abolishment of visas in their relations with Eastern European countries. Till now, there have been no concrete results of the deliberations.

Relations with Eastern Germany is hampered by the restrictive practices of the allied travel office in Berlin. However, according to the Norwegian point of view, the rules applied by this office concerning the permission of Eastern Germans to enter NATO countries should be considered in connection with the restrictions imposed by Eastern Germany on exit permits. Norway is of the opinion that it is the restrictions on exit

permits that act as the most efficient brake on the normalization of travel conditions. However, Norway is in favour of liberalizing the rules applied by the Berlin office,⁵² and this has now been discussed for some time within NATO too.

5.8. Cooperation in the field of sports

Cooperation in the field of sports is, as far as Norway is concerned, organized independent of governmental agencies. It is channeled through the sport organizations, without notable governmental interference.

The Finnmark-Murmansk area deserves special attention in this connection. The geographical circumstances taken into consideration, there is a fairly frequent exchange of sportsmen there profiting from an unexpressed recognition by Norwegian governmental authorities.

This field of cooperation is nearly without problems as far as Norway is concerned. Difficulties are mainly restricted to the long time it may take for Eastern Germans to get visas. These problems are almost always solved, but to do so one may have to cope with considerable difficulties. Norway has a special agreement with Eastern Germany on sports exchange, made necessary by the official policy of non-recognition.

5.4. Opening of markets for increase in the exchange of goods

The discriminatory rules applied by Western countries in this field have mainly taken three expressions:

1. Tariff discrimination
2. Quota discrimination
3. Export embargo

Together, these three groups of discriminatory actions did for a long time slow down the development of East/West trade, and they still have some lagging effects. Their counterpart in the East was often said to be the so-called administrative trade walls. Whether this is right or wrong, they did most probably constitute an important part of the image of Eastern trade policy underlying many Western restrictions since 1945. ⁵³

This is, in short, the general background on which Norwegian trade relations with Eastern Europe should be considered. It is important to realize that the discriminatory actions here pointed out, both on the import and the export side, have created long-term effects that continue to influence relations, even when the formal regulations have been abolished.

Norwegian import policy today is among the most liberal in existence. As to tariff regulations, Eastern European countries are subject to most-favoured-nation treatment. The quota restrictions on imports from Eastern Europe are limited to oil and textile products, and these are by no means severe. Thus, liberalizing her import unilaterally, Norway has voluntarily given up politico-commercial means in her foreign policy.

To coordinate the Western policy of export embargo initiated by the United States in 1947/48, a special institutional framework, called the CG-Cocom, was created. In 1950, 11 nations belonged to this group, among them Norway. The CG-Cocom arrangement still exists and Norway is still a member, but the embargo lists are now reduced to goods which are, or could be, of outright military significance. Today the Cocom embargo is, also by Soviet spokesmen, proclaimed as almost dead and of no great significance. ⁵⁴

Norway has trade agreements with all Eastern European countries, each lasting for 3 years. The agreements with Poland and Czechoslovakia, Norway's second and third greatest trade partners in Eastern Europe, are revised every year by mixed commissions examining the lists. The reason for this special procedure is that the lists have grown fairly extensive, and are therefore difficult to estimate. Ordinarily too, there are some consultations during the agreement period, though not as systematic as for the two countries above. As to the Soviet Union, the Norwegian authorities have close contacts with the USSR trade-representatives in Oslo, and with Soviet authorities via the embassy in Moscow.

With only one exception, free currency is used in all trade relations with Eastern Europe. The exception is trade with Eastern Germany, which is regulated by means of clearing. The agreement with that country is not made on the governmental level, but is the result of negotiations between The Norwegian Barter Association (Norsk Kompensasjonsselskap) and the Eastern German Kammer für Aussenhandel.

Some years ago, Norway had clearing agreements with all Eastern European countries. It is common opinion that such agreements have restrictive effects on the exchange of goods, and the conversion into use of free currency should therefore be regarded as a favourable development. Today, there are almost no technical difficulties connected with the payments: as far as these are concerned, the limitations on the exchange of goods lie in the single country's ability to earn convertible currency.

At the moment, extension of trade relations with Eastern Europe seems of greatest interest in the cases of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. These countries are now producing investment goods of high quality, and Norway now relies considerably on import of such goods. As to production of consumer goods, however, Norway is more advanced, while the Eastern European supply in this field is generally marked by low degree of differentiation. Till now, the Eastern European countries have shown almost no interest in importing consumer goods from Norway, but this could possibly change if Norwegian export firms got increased possibilities for appealing directly to the consumers. Today, Norwegian marketing is mainly restricted to participation in certain fairs, and it is often maintained that exhibitions of more continuous character would make the export increase noticeably.

5.10. Industrial and technical cooperation

Apart from some cooperation with the Soviet Union in the field of energy, there has, to the best of our knowledge, been no project of this kind between Norway and Eastern European countries.

However, Norway has cooperated with Yugoslavia for several years. Norway is first of all interested in bauxite and aluminium-oxide, but there is cooperation in the electro-chemical branch too, and a cooperation committee has been instituted to handle coordination and common planning.⁵⁵ Common efforts in shipbuilding have also been discussed in this committee. However, Yugoslavian law does not permit Norwegian establishments in Yugoslavia.

Norway has participated in expert conferences on economic/industrial questions arranged by ECE. Among the topics, rentability questions have been discussed, and with considerable outcome. In total, however, OECD is of greater importance to Norway in this field.

5.11. Cooperation in the field of energy

Norway cooperates with the Soviet Union in building electric power stations by the Pasvik River in Northern Norway. Today, there are 2 Russian and 1 Norwegian

station there. Coordination of power-nets between Norway and the USSR is of minor interest at the moment. But if the Soviet Union should build atomic power-stations near the border, Norway would possibly be interested in some sort of cooperation.

5.12. Cooperation in assistance to developing nations

Norway has no direct cooperat^on with Eastern European countries in the field of development aid, and actually there is no discussion on such cooperation either. Till now, about 60% of the Norwegian assistance has been channeled multilaterally through UN and its affiliated organizations, and except for the Nordic cooperation in this field, ⁵⁶ there are no plans for regional frameworks to replace the use of UN in this respect.

Norway reports to NATO and OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) on her development aid activity.

6. Prospects and priorities for future relations with Eastern European countries

57

In an investigatioⁿ of foreign policy opinion as a function of social position, it was asked which countries or groups of countries Norway should establish closer ties with. Among the so-called social center, the answers were as follows:

Table 9.

Nordic countries	NATO countries	Non-al. dev. countries	Socialist countries	UN	Participate less	DK/NA	
32,5	22,5	10,0	2,5	30,0	0,0	2,5	100

The trends indicated by the table are highly consistent with the outline of Norway's position in the East-West perspective sketched in section 2, with heavy emphasis on the Nordic and Atlantic frameworks of cooperation, but perhaps with higher priority for the UN than expected. When it comes to the Socialist countries, the table clearly shows that although Norway borders on the Soviet Union, the Eastern European countries are still in the periphery of her international relations. As already pointed out, Norway is in favour of extended relations with Eastern Europe.. But at the same time, it is evident that there are no plans for substantial extensions so as to create a new circle of cooperation.

With this limited perspective in mind, which priorities are then put on the different fields of cooperation, and which levels of society are preferred for contacts with Eastern Europe? In the first place, the question here is which forms/fields of contacts are the most functional in the sense that they are efficient in establishing lasting bonds between the countries in focus, at the same time as the cooperation is valuable in itself. And second, the question is how far one is willing to go at the moment in establishing binding relations with Eastern Europe, the political situation and present degree of interaction taken into consideration.

The following table, taken from an interview-investigation of opinions held by the Norwegian foreign policy elite, ⁵⁸ indicates the priorities actually put on different forms and fields of contact for the years to come.

Table 10.

19

Society-level of performers		Administration	
		First response	Double response
Top	Visits by top-level officials	16	21
	Diplomatic representation	2	8
	Exchange of information on political affairs	2	7
Middle	Trade	28	45
	Industrial-technical cooperation	2	8
Low	Cultural exchange	25	46
	Tourism/exchange in the field of sports	8	17
	Other forms/fields, or all of them	15	17
	No Answer/ Don't Know	2 100	2 171
		(n) (88)	(88)

Altogether, the elite clearly prefers contacts on lower levels of society. However, there are at least two interpretations as to what this actually means. First exchange and cooperation on lower levels may be considered not to commit the country as a whole very much, which again means that at the moment, the elite prefers to advance cautiously and step-by-step rather than commit itself more heavily through top-level contacts. Secondly, if we try to examine the nature and content of top-level contacts between Norway and the Eastern European countries, we get the impression that such contact^s have not been given any pretentious content as far as the political discussions are concerned. The main objective has been to clarify points of view: the opportunities offered during such visits for obviating misunderstandings and getting more insight into problems felt and coped with by other countries have been emphasized as the important things aimed at.⁵⁹ In addition, official visits usually have some expressive effects in the form of general good-will, often heightened by synchronizing the visits and the signing of agreements. Thus, while cooperation and contact on lower levels often have concrete consequences, e.g. trade and cooperation in the field of production, the opposite is true for top-level contacts, being all-embracing in domain but vague as to content and consequences. The second, more plausible interpretation is then that while the elite adheres to a step-by-step approach, and high priority on middle and low levels makes that possible, it also wants to build the relations on a common body of concrete, functional interests.

However, what is actually taking place differs somewhat from the priorities outlined here by considering the elite as a whole. It is in order better to explain what happens that the figures for the administration are pointed out. These figures are shifted upwards compared with the aggregate figures, (i.e. more emphasis on top-level contacts) and they seem to be more in accordance with actual trends.

The most meaningful way of making a short supplement and rectification to this discussion on priorities from the point of view of actual trends is probably to compare Norwegian figures with those of other Western countries whenever the data permit. To start at what is here called the low level of society, the actual grants for cultural exchange with reference to cultural agreements/programmes are hardly consistent with the priority put on this by the elite, considered as a whole. The programmes agreed are expanding only slightly,⁶⁰ partly due to the great expense connected with the projects. This explanation is often pointed out by the administration, which is also more reserved as to future possibilities in this field.

When it comes to decentralized cultural contacts, the tourist volume should be noticed. In 1961, tourist flow from Norway to Eastern European countries numbered 18.600, of which 17.300 visited the Soviet Union. This comprised 3.7% of the total tourist flow from NATO to Warsaw Pact countries that year, whereas the population of Norway comprised 0.7% of the total population in the NATO area. This relative high figure may partly be due to geographical contiguity, although several Central European countries lie closer or equally close to the Warsaw Pact area.

As already pointed out, Norwegian trade relations with Eastern Europe have met with difficulties in recent years, and they constitute a smaller part of Norway's total trade than the average figure for Western Europe. However, the difference is only about 1%, and the strong emphasis put on economic cooperation by the elite, especially by the administration, is worth noting, although one gets the impression that there are still severe lacks of concrete initiatives to surmount the psychological drawbacks from the more intense period of Cold War. As to the field of co-production there are, to the best of our knowledge, no agreements between Norway and Eastern European countries.

A remaining field where it is possible to contribute actively towards reduction of tensions on the bilateral level is political contacts between top-leaders. The following table gives an account of the number of contacts between Norway and the Eastern European countries as compared with that of other NATO-countries.⁶¹ (Included in the survey are visits by heads of states, ministers, parliamentarians and high civil servants.)

Table N.

	Number of visits. July 1-Dec.30 1966	Rank	Number of visits. 1967	Rank
Norway	5	3	7	4
Average for the other NATO-countries	3	1. USA 2. UK	4.7	1. USA 2. Turkey 3. UK 4. W. Germ. 4. Denm.

Norway clearly exceeds the average of the other NATO countries; in rank she approaches the great powers.

In addition to the three axioms pointed out in the first part of this article, two more axioms with specific reference to Norwegian relations with Eastern Europe should be emphasized.

The first and most general one has to do with the question of status quo in Europe. Norway does not want either NATO or the Warsaw Pact to be dissolved, but prefers stable relations within the frameworks set by the alliances. This is the point of departure for her contributions to the establishment of peaceful East-West relations, the line of thought being, in short, that NATO gives its member countries a feeling of security that enables them to establish binding relations with Eastern Europe to a higher degree than would otherwise have been the case. Concerted actions are preferred, and in Norwegian foreign policy, the frequently-used concept of *détente* therefore means relaxation of tensions on the basis of status quo. In this sense, Norway is probably among the most status quo oriented countries in Europe.

The second basic principle to be emphasized here is that Norway is careful not to do anything that can cause a split in Eastern Europe, or be regarded as an effort at this. For this reason, and partly because of her exposed geographical position, a relation of trust with the Soviet Union is of greatest importance.

Finally, there are no trends indicating that Eastern Europe will become a new circle of cooperation in Norwegian foreign policy. Until now, functional cooperation does not seem to have kept pace with the improvements of political relations. This may partly be because other frameworks of cooperation yield better results, but it is also a question of utilizing the possibilities that might exist. The period of Cold War has probably created long-term effects, both psychological and structural, that continue to influence East-West relations. Functional relations have been institutionalized within the blocs, with a minimum of relations in-between. And even when formal regulations have been abolished, there may still be psychological predisposition to be reckoned with. It is certainly no easy task for a small nation to have much influence on a situation where the contrasts are so marked and have assumed a nature like those between East and West in most of the post-war period. With decreasing polarization, however, the small countries have also become more active. When it comes to Norway, we do not get the impression that she has played any leading role in the process of relaxation of tensions. On the other hand, she has not been recalcitrant either: the general impression is that while she has not distinguished herself by taking initiatives, she has had no serious political objections to the process of *détente* either, when initiatives in that direction have been taken.

NOTES

* In addition to various sources referred to in the notes, this paper is based on about 20 interviews in the central administration, mainly in the Foreign Ministry.

1. See Knut Frydenlund: Norsk utenrikspolitikk i etterkrigstidens internasjonale samarbeid. (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, 1966.)

2. Questions relating to this objective have come more to the fore in recent years, not least because of developments within Norway's own sphere of international cooperation. See e.g. Foreign Minister Lyng's statement in the Storting Nov. 7th. 1967. UD-informasjon (The Foreign Ministry's information bulletin), No. 48, 1967.

3. See Arne Olav Brundtland: 'Aktuell norsk utenrikspolitikk'. Internasjonal Politikk, No.1, 1967.

4. For a brief description on this point, see Knut Frydenlund; op.cit pp.136-137.

5. Unpublished data collected by Kurt Jacobsen, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. See also Kurt Jacobsen: The Nordic countries and the United Nations. Oslo 1967.

6. The data were collected by a research group at the Institute for Political Science, University of Oslo.

7. The most important ones are those attached to NATO, OECD, and EFTA. (The EFTA delegation also takes care of Norwegian interests vis-a-vis other international organizations stationed in Geneva.) The Norwegian delegates at Brussels do not have the official status of a permanent delegation yet.

8. Unfortunately, there are no data as to how information received from permanent delegations is distributed on areas. There are, however, reasons to believe that the bulk comes from areas covered by the organizations to which the delegations are attached. To the extent that this is not the case, information from other areas of the world is in other words, perceived and filtered by more or less Western-minded delegations.

9. Source: Johan Galtung: Norge i verdenssamfunnet. PRIO-publication no. 21-8 from the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1968. Also in Det norske samfunn, Oslo 1968.

10. Percentage agreement between Norway's voting behaviour in the UN, 1946-66, and that of other countries:

	%		%
1. Denmark	90	6. Austria	76
2. Sweden	86	7. USA	74
3. Island	83	8. New Zealand	74
4. Ireland	81	9. Trinidad/Tobago	73
5. Canada	76	10. Japan	72

Source: Kurt Jacobsen: Voting Patterns in the UN, in preparation at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

11. See Johan Galtung: 'East-West Interaction Patterns', Journal of Peace Research, no. 2, 1966.

12. Of course, the opposite possibility also exists. Considering that the highly influential USA has always been sceptical towards cooperation with Eastern Europe, the official argumentation at this point seems considerably flattering for a small country like Norway.

13. See e.g. speech made by the Norwegian ambassador to NATO, Georg Kristiansen, February 21, 1967, at the annual meeting of "Folk og Forsvar". He concluded by saying that cooperation within NATO does not put any curb on Norwegian foreign policy, but on the contrary makes it more active. With application for all member countries, and especially for the European ones, he claimed that while having binding effects on their defence policy, NATO enables them to act more freely in other fields of their foreign policy, a combination which should be highly appreciated.

14. See the background paper for the Foreign Minister's statement to the Storting, March 7, 1967.

15. See speech delivered by the Minister of Defence, in Oslo Militære Samfund, January 8, 1968.

16. This note was a reply to an inquiry of January 24, 1949, delivered by the Soviet Union's ambassador to Norway.

17. Statement by Minister of Defence, Jens Chr. Hauge, to the Storting, February 21, 1951. The policy on allied military bases is continuously confirmed, and in the same words. See e.g. the inaugural address by the present coalition Government. The Storting Proceedings 1965-66, part 7, p. 52.

18. Prime Minister Gerhardsen's speech at the NATO meeting of Heads of States, Dec. 1957. Government Report to the Storting, No. 26, 1958. It has been repeated several times. See e.g. Government Report to the Storting, No. 28, 1960-61 and the Storting Proceedings 1965-66, part 7, p. 52.

19. Military exercises with participation of foreign troops:

Year	Number of exercises	Number of foreign soldiers
1961	1	500
1962	1	500
1963	3	1140
1964	2	3705
1965	5	8750
1966	2	5250
1967		

Source: Arne Olav Brundtland: "Nordisk balanse før og nå". Internasjonal politikk, No.5, 1966, p. 539.

20. For a thorough examination of this point, see Johan Jørgen Holst: Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, 1968.

21. For a survey of the exchange of notes on these questions, see Johan Jørgen Holst: op.cit., part II. In Norway too, it is often maintained that there has been a hollowing out of the policy on bases. See Kari Enholm: Norge, en NATO-base. (Oslo: 1967.)

22. In order to make progress in its policy towards Eastern Europe, Western Germany will most probably find it necessary to demonstrate that its military forces are not at the disposal of the USA in case of military conflict between the super-powers. And the French attitude on this point has been quite clear-cut for years. Today, a development along these lines seems highly probable, and it will in the long run make considerable changes in the basis of Norwegian military planning. The defence of Southern Norway is based on military support from the continent, and the general American backing will get much more difficult when the continent is no longer at its disposal. Support would then have to be based on the so-called "big-lift" strategy, but it would be difficult to carry through and attended with heavy risks. Finally, American military actions in Scandinavia will most probably come about on the basis of considerations of the total super-power relationship. It may therefore be unrealistic to believe that the USA is willing to bind herself to defend Norway under all circumstances.

Provided that Norway cannot rely on the continent for defence, we may envisage at least 5 categories of alternatives for Norwegian security policy: 1) A bilateral agreement with the USA, 2) A "mini-NATO", i.e. an alliance with the USA and one or more European states, first of all the United Kingdom, 3) Participation in a Western European security system, 4) An all-European security system, and 5) Some sort of a Nordic pact which again can be thought of in 5 different alternatives as to membership: Norway-Sweden, Norway-Denmark, Norway-Sweden-Finland, the three Scandinavian states: Norway-Sweden-Denmark, the four Nordic states: Norway-Sweden-Denmark-Finland.

For an analysis of various alternatives in the field of security policy, see Arne Olav Brundtland: Sikkerhetspolitisk omprøving? (Oslo: The Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, 1968.)

23. The first years after World War II, Norwegian security policy ^{was} rooted in the UN as a security instrument. Rather than work for the solution of security problems on the basis of regional cooperation, the establishment of the UN meant that the dilemma of

national security was to be solved on the basis of universal cooperation. In early 1948, it was acknowledged that the existence of tensions between East and West had undermined the basic assumptions on which the UN as a security instrument was built. Because of the polarization process, the UN alternative was moved from top to bottom on the list of priorities, and it is still the least wanted of the four frameworks outlined in the opening. Instead of giving renewed importance to UN collective security, depolarization has brought about a change of focus in direction of some sort of a European security system, an idea often referred to as the final goal, but which is nevertheless very vaguely conceived of. At the same time, however, there is more or less slowly growing understanding that contributions towards war prevention in other parts of the world and more general war-preventive measures other than military defence are relevant for the maintenance of peace and security in one's own area. Thus, Norway has been among the initiators of ear-marked UN forces, together with the other Nordic countries, and various forms of non-military defense are widely accepted though the practical implementations are lagging.

24. The main export commodity groups are the following:

	Value: 1000 kr.
Non-ferrous metals	2 061 192
Fish and fish prepar.	1 054 436
Transport equipment	1 017 499
Paper, paperboard, and manufactures thereof	907 587
Iron and steel	806 442
Pulp and waste paper	570 355
Machinery, other than electrical	556 762
Fertilizers, manufactured	435 889
Food-stuffs for animals	347 683
Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances	281 031

Processed commodities now constitute 25% of the total Norwegian export, as against 15% in 1959.

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Norway, 1967.

25. At the end of 1966, the greatest shipping nations were:

	Gr.tons
1. Great Britain and N.I.	21 542
2. USA	20 798
3. Liberia	20 603
4. Norway	16 421

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Norway, 1967.

26. Source: Economic Survey of Europe in 1966. Prepared by the Secretariat of the ECE, Geneva.

The orientation of a country's foreign trade is usually a function of both economic and political interests. The Norwegian government initially preferred an Atlantic solution to her market problems where North America as well as the Western European countries would participate. Such an arrangement would have been in accordance with Norwegian interests both in the economic and political field. However, considering that this possibility is rather unrealistic today, the table should illustrate fairly well why Norway considers a solution to the Western European market problems to be the most important politico-commercial objective at the moment.

Since its formation in 1959, EFTA has been Norway's most important instrument in the field of foreign trade. The table also indicates that the Norwegian exporters are prepared to work under the assumption that cooperation in EFTA will continue, either within

the framework of EFTA as the organization appears today, or within wider frameworks. Today, there seems to be more widespread opinion than ever before that Norway should apply for membership in EEC, provided that Great Britain also enters. But at the same time, the probability for an extension of the common market in the near future, seems to be falling. As mentioned above, Norway has put greater emphasis on the Western European framework in recent years, and to some extent at the expense of the Atlantic alternative. However, as an extension of EEC is improbable today, the Atlantic framework may get renewed importance. Until now, there are no official statements to be interpreted in favour of a North Atlantic free trade area, but it is discussed as ^{an} important alternative. However, irrespective of how the future situation will look and what position Norway will get in that picture, it will define important preconditions for her relations with Eastern Europe and constitute an indispensable perspective for the understanding of her economic cooperation with the Eastern European countries.

27. Source: Economic Survey of Europe in 1966. Prepared by the Secretariat of the ECE, Geneva.

28. Source: Statistical Yearbook of Norway, 1967.

29. See speech made by the Minister of Commerce and Shipping before "Den Norske Advokatforening" (Norwegian Bar Association), February 14, 1967.

30. This was expressed during the Parliamentary debate 11-13 July, 1967.

31. This agreement was put into force on July 1st, 1962. Most of it, the part quoted here included, was only a confirmation of procedures already established.

32. Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland.

33. See note 10. Percentage agreement between Norway and Finland in the same period was 69. Average agreement with other NATO countries was 71%, and with the Warsaw Pact countries a little above 30%.

34. See Nordic statement in the Trade and Development Board, August 23, 1967.

35. See the background paper for the Minister of Commerce and Shipping's statement in the Storting, Nov. 21, 1967.

36. The various ways in which the Nordic countries have tried to solve their security problems are evidently putting serious limitations on possibilities for integration. Except for Finland, however, Norway does not see any necessary contrasts between the Nordic and the Western European framework. During the 15th session of the Nordic Council, April 1-6, 1967, the Minister of Commerce and Shipping expressed this opinion in the following way:

"As the cooperation within EFTA has resulted in a Nordic free trade area, cooperation within EEC may open the way for further Nordic unity. One may like or dislike the fact the Nordic community is bound to extra-Nordic forces in this way. But it belongs to the world of reality that EEC may be the most important factor in enforcing Nordic harmonization also in fields where this is not yet attained".

37. It is probable that Britain's decline from being a great power to her present status in the semi-big category with more or less chronic economic difficulties reduces her capability to act as a model for other countries. The close ties between Norway and Britain were strongly reinforced during the Second World War and they were to a great extent based on the assumption of Britain as a great power. Today, Norway relies first of all on the USA in the military field, and the economic dependency on Britain is less than what is often assumed. When Britain still serves as a model for Norway to a great extent, this may partly be due to the traditional nature of British-Norwegian relations. In other words, there is a certain time lag between the disappearance of real common interests and the disappearance of traditions attached to them, and what is indicated here is that British-Norwegian relations have been in this phase for several years already, and that it is only a question of time before Norway has to reconsider the British model on a more realistic basis.

38. For a survey of the total number of trans-Cold War INGO bonds formed since 1945, see Paul Smoker: 'A preliminary Empirical Study of an International Integrative Sub-system', The Peace Research Centre, Lancaster, England. Ranked according to INGO-bonds with the Socialist countries (N.Korea, China, N.Vietnam and Mongolia included), formed since 1945, Norway comes out as no. 9 out of 15 NATO countries (France included).

39. Up to 1966, Norway had a consulate at Gdansk/Gdynia, Poland. With reference to the Nordic consular agreement, the Norwegian interests are now handled by the Swedish consulate at Gdansk/Gdynia.

40. See Norwegian statement at ECE's 22nd session.

41. Speech by President L.B. Johnson made before the National Conference of Editorial Writers at New York, Oct. 7, 1966. Printed in the Department of State Bulletin Oct. 24, 1966.

42. In the Norwegian memorandum to the Group of Four on reorganization of OEEC in 1960, it was stated that a corner-stone of the cooperation in OEEC had been the joint consideration of economic, trade, and payments policies.

43. See the Minister of Commerce and Shipping's statement in the Storting, April 14, 1967.

44. These are Poland and Czechoslovakia. In addition, Bulgaria and Hungary are observers to GATT. Yugoslavia is also a member, but is not counted as an Eastern European country here.

45. See Government Report to the Storting, No. 21, 1964/65.

46. See footnote 48.

47. Government bill No. 18, 1965-66.

48. See Minister of Commerce and Shipping's statement in the Storting, Nov. 21st, 1967.

49. At the end of 1966, Norway had, in all, 16 bilateral agreements on cultural exchange. In addition, she participated in multilateral agreements within the Council of Europe, UNESCO, NATO, and the Nordic Council (The Nordic Cultural Commission).

Many of the bilateral agreements entered into by Norway require mixed commissions with 2-3 members from each country. This is not the case with any of the agreements with Eastern European countries, but for the ones with Poland and the Soviet Union, Norway has, on her part, appointed an advisory body.

50. During the period July 1966-Dec. 1967, the following visits and negotiations took place:

1. Visit to Bulgaria 5th to 13th September, 1966 by Norwegian Parliamentary Delegation.
2. Visit to Norway 27th February to 3rd March, 1967, of Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bachev.

3. Visit to Bulgaria, October 22-28, 1967, by Prime Minister Borten.

4. Negotiations on the cultural exchange programme with Rumania, in Bucharest, October 4-6, 1967.

5. Trade negotiations with Rumania in Oslo, November 11-12, 1967.

51. Foreign Ministry Information Bulletin (UD-Inform) No. 10, 1967.

52. See footnote 55, and the Storting-debate on foreign affairs, May 30, 1968.

53. For a thorough discussion of economic policies pursued during the Cold War, see Gunnar Adler-Karlson: Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967. A case Study in Foreign Economic Policy. (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1968)

54. Gunnar Adler-Karlson: Western views on the problems of East-West trade, A report written at the request of Unctad. Stockholm, 1966, p. 18.

55. An extension of the mandate of this committee was agreed upon during Prime Minister Borten's visit in Yugoslavia Oct. 17-22, 1967.

56. Till now, it has concentrated on three main projects: in South Korea, Tanzania, and Kenya.

57. Johan Galtung: 'Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position.', Journal of Peace Research, vol. 1, 1964.

58. Helge Hveem: Fakta og verdier i utenrikspolitikken. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1967.

59. See Prime Minister Borten's statement during the parliamentary debate on foreign affairs, Nov. 16, 1967.

60. For the period 1963-68, the following amounts were spent with special reference to agreements on cultural exchange:

1963:	332 200 kr.
1964:	400 000
1965:	460 000
1966:	460 000
1967:	460 000
1968:	530 000

The increase from 1963 to 64 is mainly due to changes in the way the budget was set up, and the increase from 1964 to 65 was by and large ear-marked for the new agreement with Ireland. The increase for 1968 is thus the only one ear-marked for Eastern Europe.

61. The data are taken from NATO-papers listing recent East-West contacts.

LA POLITIQUE BELGE
EN MATIERE DE COOPERATION
EN EUROPE.

La présente étude a été établie à la demande de
l'Institut International pour la recherche de la Paix
à Oslo (IPRIO).

I - CONSIDERATIONS DE PRINCIPE.

1.- Le resserrement de la coopération internationale et plus spécialement, de la coopération en Europe prise dans son ensemble, doit être considéré comme un des buts constants de la politique extérieure belge. Aussi dès l'abord, la Belgique n'a-t-elle pas hésité à adopter une attitude résolument positive à l'égard de ce que l'on a appelé à l'Ouest, la détente internationale et à l'Est, la coexistence pacifique. Car elle estime que cette politique parallèle de l'Est et de l'Ouest, qui apparaît comme étant un des phénomènes dominants de l'actualité internationale, revêt une importance prééminente pour l'avenir de l'Europe et par le fait même, pour la paix générale.

2.- Pour la Belgique, une telle politique qui est la condition d'un essor accru de la coopération internationale, s'inscrit tout naturellement dans la ligne traditionnelle de la politique de paix qu'elle n'a cessé de poursuivre en toutes circonstances tout au long de son existence indépendante. C'est pourquoi, elle s'est associée pleinement aux efforts déployés à tous les niveaux sur le plan bilatéral comme sur le plan multilatéral en vue de promouvoir un apaisement et un rapprochement entre l'Est et l'Ouest et ainsi, de créer progressivement des conditions psychologiques et politiques susceptibles de déboucher un jour sur un règlement destiné à se substituer au statu quo précaire existant actuellement en Europe.

3.- En effet, à l'unisson avec les autres pays pacifiques, la Belgique a toujours déploré qu'en dépit des aspirations et des espérances de ses peuples, notre continent en

.....

particulier n'ait pas été en mesure jusqu'ici de refaire son unité, ni d'organiser sa sécurité dans le cadre d'un ordre juridique stable et garanti. A son sens, il importe donc de mettre tout en oeuvre pour combler le fossé qui s'est creusé entre les deux Europe sous le coup des séquelles de la guerre froide sur le plan politique et psychologique.

4.- De ce fait, aujourd'hui encore, les relations entre les peuples de l'Est et de l'Ouest guidés dans leur action politique par des optiques et des intérêts différents sinon opposés, restent hypothéquées par des tensions s'exerçant selon des courbes d'intensité variable au gré des événements intervenant à l'intérieur des groupes de pays en présence ou à l'extérieur de ceux-ci dans des pays tiers. En d'autres termes, ces tensions Est-Ouest sont fonction d'une part de facteurs internes tendant à affecter dans un sens ou dans l'autre la cohésion des blocs, et d'autre part, de facteurs externes inhérents aux désaccords surgissant entre eux à l'occasion de conflits extra-européens tels que par exemple la guerre du Vietnam et la crise du Moyen-Orient. On se trouve donc là en présence d'une donnée essentiellement fluide et incertaine de la politique européenne.

5.- Cependant, dans les principes, sinon dans les intentions, il existe désormais certains points de convergence entre les positions de l'Est et de l'Ouest en matière de relations internationales. En effet, la coexistence pacifique telle qu'elle fut décrétée et définie à l'époque par M. KHROUCHTCHEV dans le discours qu'il prononça au XXe Congrès du Parti Communiste de l'URSS rompait en quelque sorte avec les méthodes de la guerre froide pratiquées systématiquement jusqu'à la fin de l'ère stalinienne en ce sens qu'elle as-

.....

signait à la politique extérieure soviétique une nouvelle règle de conduite consistant notamment à faire en sorte d'éviter les guerres internationales généralisées tout en maintenant l'appui de l'URSS aux guerres localisées et aux soulèvements populaires dits "de libération", et à renouer les contacts avec l'Ouest, à l'exclusion toutefois de toute coexistence sur le plan idéologique.

En 1966, dans la Déclaration de Bucarest, cette politique de coexistence pacifique fut confirmée collectivement par l'ensemble des pays du bloc de l'Est.

6.- Quels que puissent être les objectifs lointains de la coexistence pacifique ainsi définie, qui de l'aveu même de ses auteurs avait pour but d'adapter la lutte pour la révolution mondiale aux impératifs de l'ère atomique, elle n'en comporte pas moins dans le présent certains éléments pouvant constituer le point de départ d'un rapprochement entre les deux camps à la faveur d'un effort de détente gradué. En effet, abstraction faite d'une contestable prétention à un droit d'intervention dans certaines catégories de guerres locales et de conflits internes dans des pays tiers, le désir de paix et de dialogue ainsi professé par l'URSS et ses alliés concorde à certains égards avec les objectifs constants de la politique de détente des puissances occidentales telle qu'elle fut réaffirmée solidairement lors des réunions du Conseil des Ministres de l'OTAN dans le courant de l'année 1966.

7.- Il y a donc là dans les prémisses, un terrain de contact réciproque pour autant que les deux parties soient sincèrement animées l'une et l'autre d'une même volonté d'apporter une contribution à la paix et de s'associer à une action commune et continue en vue de réduire voire

.....

d'éliminer les tensions existantes. Pour être acceptable, la coexistence pacifique ne pourrait donc pas être de la part de ses promoteurs, une tactique conjoncturelle, c'est-à-dire comme disait Lénine, un recul pour mieux sauter dans la voie d'une extension et d'un renforcement des positions de puissance du monde communiste et de la propagation de son idéologie.

La coexistence pacifique ne pourra porter ses fruits que dans la mesure où les deux blocs - et non un seul - s'emploient de conserve à la promouvoir sans arrière-pensée dans toutes ses manifestations. Elle suppose en effet la recherche et la découverte en commun des points positifs pour lesquels un progrès des relations réciproques de toute nature est voulu par les uns et par les autres.

En dernière analyse, son but doit être de consolider la paix là où elle règne, de la restaurer dans le respect du droit et de la justice, là où sévissent encore la guerre et les conflits et de résoudre un à un les problèmes en souffrance.

8.- C'est là une politique qui se fonde non sur un vain pacifisme, mais sur la conviction qu'elle est de nature à constituer, pour autant qu'elle puisse s'appuyer sur la solidarité du camp occidental et sur une dissuasion efficace, le moyen le plus approprié de raffermir la sécurité et la prospérité générales.

Pour sa part, la Belgique estime donc que la détente ne peut être pratiquée en ordre dispersé. Pour la mener à bonne fin, il est indispensable qu'elle soit définie et coordonnée au sein de la communauté occidentale dans le cadre d'actions bilatérales et multilatérales s'adressant à l'ensemble des pays européens. S'il est vrai que cette politique

.....

de détente ne peut s'exercer efficacement en dehors d'une telle consultation collective, cette procédure ne doit cependant pas faire obstacle aux initiatives particulières pour autant qu'elles soient concertées entre alliés. Pour l'Occident, la politique de détente doit donc aller de pair avec un maintien de la solidarité atlantique et la sauvegarde de l'équilibre des forces en Europe. Car les Alliances sont provisoirement le seul fondement et la seule garantie de la sécurité de notre continent.

II - INITIATIVES BELGES EN MATIERE DE DETENTE ET DE COOPERATION EN EUROPE.

9.- Une politique de détente adéquate doit se développer selon un ordre logique tenant compte des possibilités effectives de la conjoncture du moment, car il va sans dire qu'un tel cheminement est en l'occurrence la condition et la garantie du succès. Il y a donc lieu de procéder en l'occurrence par étapes successives qui, conformément aux vues du Gouvernement belge, doivent embrasser progressivement la détente et la collaboration sur le plan des échanges économiques et des relations culturelles d'abord, sur le terrain des mesures collatérales et spécifiques de désarmement ensuite, et enfin, dans le domaine de la recherche des solutions aux problèmes que posent la division de l'Europe et l'organisation de sa sécurité dans le cadre d'un règlement général futur.

10.- Pour ce qui est du premier stade de ce processus, à savoir, la détente économique et culturelle, le but pour-

.....

suivi est de favoriser à la faveur d'une coopération et d'échanges réciproques accrus, une meilleure compréhension mutuelle, voire une communauté d'intérêts propice à un rétablissement progressif de la confiance et du sens de la solidarité entre les deux groupes sur le plan humain. D'ailleurs dans ce domaine, l'expérience récente a démontré que certains progrès pouvaient être assez aisément réalisés.

a) En effet, sur le plan bilatéral ou dans le cadre de Benelux, la Belgique a été en mesure de mettre en place dans ses rapports avec les pays de l'Est, un réseau d'accords destinés à favoriser un développement du commerce réciproque et de la coopération en matière culturelle, économique, technologique et scientifique à laquelle ces pays attachent un intérêt tout particulier. Le relevé qui en est fait dans la liste ci-jointe montre dans toute son ampleur, l'importance des liens contractuels de cette nature entre la Belgique et les pays de l'Est.

Cependant, le développement des échanges commerciaux en particulier se heurte encore à des obstacles dont l'élimination ne dépend pas des pays occidentaux. Jusqu'à nouvel ordre, les relations commerciales avec les pays de l'Est resteront en effet entravées dans le carcan du bilatéralisme étroit qu'ils appliquent à leurs échanges non seulement avec les pays tiers, mais aussi entre eux-mêmes dans le cadre du Comecon. Car une expansion naturelle des relations commerciales internationales est évidemment subordonnée à leur multilatéralisation, c'est-à-dire, à la restauration d'une plus grande liberté économique et de la convertibilité des monnaies.

b) De même, la Belgique a apporté son plein concours à l'action visant à atténuer les affrontements entre les

.....

blocs au sein des organismes internationaux. A cet égard, la relance de la coopération Est-Ouest au sein de la Commission Economique des Nations Unies pour l'Europe a une valeur exemplative de premier plan. Elle a reçu en effet une nouvelle impulsion à la faveur des décisions prises de conserve dans ce domaine lors des XXIIe et XXIIIe sessions de cet organisme tenues à Genève en 1967 et 1968. Pour ce qui la concerne, la Belgique s'est efforcée à cet égard de contribuer utilement aux efforts déployés dans l'intérêt commun. En particulier, grâce à une procédure nouvelle inaugurée conjointement en 1967 par la Pologne et la Belgique en matière de présentation des projets de résolutions ou de motions, il a été possible de jeter des ponts au sein de cette enceinte entre les groupes de l'Est et de l'Ouest. Jusqu'alors, la méthode appliquée dans ce cadre avait consisté à introduire les propositions de cette nature de bloc à bloc dans un esprit de guerre froide dépassé, et non, comme dans le cas de la nouvelle initiative belgo-polonaise, par un ou plusieurs pays de l'Ouest ensemble avec un ou plusieurs pays de l'Est. Depuis lors, cet exemple a fait école et a connu plusieurs applications nouvelles pour le plus grand bien de l'entente et de la coopération entre tous les membres de la Commission.

Dans le même esprit, la Belgique a tenu à proposer également que des réunions plénières régulières soient tenues entre les représentants permanents des pays de l'Est et de l'Ouest auprès de l'Office des Nations Unies à Genève pour leur permettre d'avoir des échanges de vues généraux sur les questions relevant de la compétence de la Commission alors que jusqu'à ce moment, l'usage avait voulu qu'ils ne se réunissent que séparément dans le cadre de leurs groupes respectifs.

.....

M. HARMEL l'avait déclaré notamment dans son discours au Sénat du 17 janvier 1967, la Belgique était-elle résolue dès lors à intensifier son effort en vue de rechercher les voies et moyens d'une diminution progressive et parallèle des armements dans chaque camp.

12.-- Dans l'intervalle, elle fut donc amenée à prendre certaines initiatives en matière de désarmement en Europe. A cet égard, elle avait estimé dès l'abord que l'Alliance atlantique se devait, pour s'adapter aux nécessités de l'évolution politique, d'assumer dorénavant un rôle positif dans ce domaine particulier concurremment avec sa mission de défense et de dissuasion qui doit évidemment rester un élément de base de la politique occidentale. Comme on le sait, cette considération donna naissance au plan Harmel qui lui-même, aboutit en décembre 1967 à l'adoption du rapport du même nom sur les tâches futures de l'Alliance. Il importera maintenant que des propositions concrètes visant en particulier à la mise en oeuvre du paragraphe 13 de ce rapport, qui a trait aux réductions équilibrées, puissent faire l'objet des délibérations du Conseil des Ministres de l'Alliance lors de sa réunion à Reykjavik.

Dans cette perspective, la Belgique a tenu à apporter un concours actif aux travaux des organes de l'OTAN sur la question. Dans ce cadre, elle a soumis à leur examen, à l'instar d'autres pays, un ensemble d'idées relatives à la mise en oeuvre de certaines mesures de limitation des armements et effectifs en Europe.

13.-- Parallèlement, conformément à une décision prise par les Ministres des Affaires Etrangères de Pologne et de Belgique lors de leur rencontre à Varsovie en septembre 1966, des échanges de vues de caractère exploratoire eurent lieu

.....

De même, dans divers organismes internationaux, tels que le GATT, le Conseil de l'Europe, l'UNESCO et d'autres organes des Nations Unies, la Belgique s'est associée aux efforts faits pour promouvoir la coopération entre l'Est et l'Ouest dans l'esprit de la détente.

11.-- La question devient plus complexe et délicate du moment où l'on aborde le stade suivant de la détente qui a trait à la mise en oeuvre de certaines mesures de désarmement en Europe. Car il s'agit là d'un domaine qui affecte directement l'équilibre des forces en présence. Puisque pour des raisons obvies, il ne peut guère être question dans les circonstances actuelles de réaliser un désarmement à l'échelle mondiale, il faudra nécessairement procéder en cette matière selon des étapes successives dans le cadre de limites régionales et quantitatives. En d'autres termes, seules des mesures collatérales ou partielles de désarmement sont actuellement du domaine des possibilités pratiques. Il ne sera pas question ici de mesures collatérales de désarmement de portée universelle, telles que notamment le traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires qui, dans l'esprit du Gouvernement belge, devrait ouvrir la voie moyennant des engagements ad hoc des puissances militairement nucléaires, à des mesures de désarmement effectif d'une part, et à une collaboration internationale accrue en matière d'énergie nucléaire d'autre part.

A cet endroit, il y a lieu d'examiner d'un peu plus près la genèse des idées avancées par la Belgique dans le domaine du désarmement proprement dit. Depuis 1966, le Gouvernement belge a exprimé à plusieurs reprises sa conviction que les conditions politiques et militaires étaient réunies désormais pour que des mesures concrètes de détente militaire soient effectivement envisagées. Aussi, comme

.....

entre des experts belges et polonais sur la question du désarmement en Europe. Mais s'il est vrai qu'ils ont été l'occasion d'une intéressante et encourageante confrontation des points de vue réciproques, il serait inexact de parler d'un plan polono-belge dans ce domaine. Cependant ces conversations entre experts belges et polonais doivent être considérées comme une appréciable contribution à la discussion générale sur la question.

14.- Dans leur conception et dans leur application, les idées belges en matière de désarmement se veulent aussi simples et réalistes que possible. En substance, elles comportent à un premier stade, un gel quantitatif vérifié contradictoirement des effectifs et de certaines catégories déterminées d'armements conventionnels et nucléaires dans une zone donnée s'étendant d'une manière équilibrée sur les territoires des deux camps en Europe. Pour l'avenir, il est envisagé que cette première étape pourra être suivie de mesures de désarmement subséquentes sous la forme d'un gel qualitatif d'abord et de réductions équilibrées ensuite.

Certes, de telles mesures revêtent avant tout un intérêt militaire car leur réalisation éventuelle aurait pour effet de mettre un frein à la course aux armements. Mais leur portée politique n'est pas moins grande en ce sens qu'elle serait de nature à contribuer à une restauration de la confiance réciproque et ainsi à préparer les esprits de part et d'autre de la ligne de démarcation à la mise en place progressive en Europe d'un système de sécurité régionale garantissant l'ordre et la tranquillité de notre continent.

15.- Par le fait même, on s'engagerait ainsi dans la voie de la détente politique qui est l'objectif ultime de

.....

nos efforts dans ce domaine. Le moment venu, il s'agira de cheminer dans cette direction avec prudence et circonspection à la faveur de mesures de nature à dissiper les préjugés, à rapprocher les points de vue et ainsi, à créer progressivement un climat propice à une reprise en temps opportun du dialogue sur le règlement des grands problèmes fondamentaux inhérents à la division de l'Europe dans le respect des droits et des intérêts légitimes des parties en cause. Tel est en fin de compte l'enjeu et la condition de la véritable paix que tous les peuples de notre continent appellent de leurs vœux depuis la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale.

Bruxelles, juin 1968.
