

WEST EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO FREE EUROPE INC.XII SESSION.ROME,18-19 XI 68.

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WEST EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMITTEE

to Free Europe Inc.

T W E L F T H   S E S S I O N

ROME, November 18-19, 1968

Report of Proceedings

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WEST EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
to Free Europe, Inc.

T W E L F T H      S E S S I O N

ROME, November 18-19, 1968

The Twelfth Session of the WEAC was held at the Grand Hotel, Rome, on Monday and Tuesday, November 18 & 19, 1968, under the chairmanship of the President, Paul van Zeeland.

The following members of the WEAC were present:-  
Paolo A. V. Cunha (Portugal); Per T. Federspiel (Denmark); Jo Grimond (Great Britain); Birger Kildal (Norway); Jean Lecanuet (France); Randolfo Pacciardi (Italy).

Guests taking part were:- Philippe Deshormes (Belgium); Per Haekkerup (Denmark); Pierre Abelin, Georges Berthoin and Etienne Hirsch (France); Joachim Raffert, Stephan Thomas and Wolfgang Wagner (Germany); George Brown, Lord Carron, Lord Douglass, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas and John Pinder (Great Britain); Alberto Folchi, Pietro Quaroni and Altiero Spinelli (Italy); Haakon Lie (Norway); Harlan Cleveland (United States).

The following attended for Free Europe, Inc.:--  
General Lucius D. Clay, Chairman of the Board of Directors (New York); William P. Durkee, President (New York); J. Allan Hovey, Jr., Vice President (New York); Ralph E. Walter, Director, Radio Free Europe (Munich); David F. Grozier, Director of Information Services, Radio Free Europe, (Munich); Ernst Langendorf, Director, German Affairs Department, Radio Free Europe (Munich); Jan Nowak, Director, Polish Broadcasting Department, Radio Free Europe (Munich); Jaroslav Pechacek, Director, Czechoslovak Broadcasting Department, Radio Free Europe (Munich).

★ FIRST DAY: Monday, November 18, 1968, at 10.30 a.m.

The PRESIDENT (Paul van Zeeland) welcomed participants to the Twelfth Session of the West European Advisory Committee and invited General Clay, President of Free Europe, Inc., to speak.

A GENERAL CLAY: "I am the newly elected Chairman of the Board of Free Europe but this does not mark the beginning of my association, as I was one of those who helped to found it almost 18 years ago. Returning from Europe at that time, I felt there was need of other than a government agency which could broadcast to the countries of Eastern Europe. It was decided to operate under one single policy; to tell the truth, even if the truth were damaging sometimes to our own reputation. This has been the continuing policy of Radio Free Europe and I think it has counted more than anything else in its success.

B Obviously our reporting and our analysis of recent events has given heavy emphasis to the developments in Eastern Europe, and it is particularly timely to us to be able to meet with you to get your frank views and advice."

C General Clay went on to say that the organisation was very anxious to find ways of improving communications with the members of the WEAC. Suggestions to this end would be most welcome.

The present crisis in Czechoslovakia was one in which there could be news at any time. If anything of great interest developed, facilities existed for letting the meeting know immediately.

D The events in Czechoslovakia had raised some very major questions. There had been serious attempts to reach agreement with the Russians on such things as nuclear non-proliferation, armament reduction, co-operation in space, etc., as well as the improvement in cultural and economic relations with Russia and East Europe. It was too early yet to surmise the extent to which this could continue.

E At the time when RFE was formed the countries of Western Europe had not recovered from the War. The collective security provided by NATO was of great importance to all of them, and at that time the communications between the countries were perhaps better than they were now, when all the countries were strong again. It was to be hoped that recent events would improve the communications between them and perhaps restore the close friendships and ties of 18 years ago.

F He hoped, too, that before the meeting was over Ambassador Cleveland, who had come from the NATO meeting, would be able to say something of the developments there.



Without the support and advice of the members of the WEAC, the role of RFE would be very difficult indeed. He was very grateful to all those who had taken the time to come to the meeting and hoped that it would prove a fruitful one.

A Mr WILLIAM P. DURKEE (Acting Secretary-General) said that Mr Walter, the Director of RFE, was present and would very shortly bring members up-to-date on recent developments in Czechoslovakia. He was accompanied by Mr Pechacek, chief of the RFE Czechoslovak Broadcasting Department, and Mr Nowak, Chief of the Polish Broadcasting Department, who would be able to answer any questions on developments in their countries.

B "We would very much like to have your judgment", said Mr Durkee, "on something that we think has been significant in relation to the events in Czechoslovakia. One of the most dramatic changes that took place there, it seems to us, was the fact that the new leadership freed the radio, press and television. As we observed the events between January and August, we were deeply impressed with the wide scope of that press freedom. The programmes of Radio Prague sounded like radio programmes in Europe and the United States, with audience participation; question and answer periods. We were also impressed with the coverage by television of all political events in the country. We believe that those developments in the press, radio, television, and the discussions that took place in Czechoslovakia, in large part motivated Soviet action against Czechoslovakia. We are also very clear that those same press, radio and television people, when the invasion took place, continued their broadcasting and continued to be a link between the Government and the people. We believe that they must have played and continue to play a large role in the unity of the people of Czechoslovakia in opposition to the Soviet invasion. We would very much like to have any judgments on this point from you during the course of our discussions."

D Mr Durkee said that the point had been well defined very recently by a Czech whom the Russians hoped would collaborate with them: "The counter-revolution has been waged not with guns but with pencils and microphones: the most subtle counter-revolution in history." It was indeed a very important part of the events in Czechoslovakia.

E Mr RALPH E. WALTER (Director, RFE): "Our review of recent Czechoslovak developments which you have before you was necessarily prepared just on the eve of what we thought might be a climactic meeting of the Czechoslovak Central Committee in Prague. That meeting has now been concluded, and although we do not have the resolution that it has passed (we hope to get it this evening and to give you some more information on it) it appears that this was not as dramatic a session as some Western observers thought it might be. There have been no dramatic personnel changes. Mr Dubcek continues to play his balancing

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 role, attempting to survive against internal pressures from left and right and, of course, against extreme Soviet pressure. It was also feared that this weekend might mark violent demonstrations on the part of Czech youth, including both workers and students. These did not materialise either. There is a massive 'sit-in' strike at Prague University but no violence whatsoever, and the sit-in is confined to the premises of the University. There is no activity on the streets. The scene is especially quiet."

A Mr Wlater went on to say that a new Executive Committee of the Praesidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was appointed during the meeting that took place over the weekend. Its composition, in terms of the strength of the liberal elements in the Czechoslovak Party, seems to leave room for hope. There were eight members on it.

B It was premature, thought Mr Walter, to draw any conclusions on what this Central Committee meeting had meant, but in all probability a rather long period of increased Soviet and "conservative" pressure on Dubcek could be anticipated. Dubcek was making every possible effort, relying on the continuing support of the mass of the Czechoslovak people and of a substantial number of members of the Central Committee and the leading functionaries of the Czechoslovak Party, to resist this pressure; but, given what was known of probable Soviet behaviour and certainly of past Soviet behaviour, it would appear that Dubcek was going to have a very difficult job indeed, and it was very doubtful whether the progress made in Czechoslovakia could be maintained in the essentials over any long period of time.

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 D Mr PIETRO QUARONI (President, Italian Radio-Television; former Ambassador) referred to the formation of the new Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and said that, according to information received this morning, a group of eight persons had been adjoined to Dubcek to control his activities. Of these, four could be listed as "progressives" and four as "conservatives"; but even those conservatives and progressives should be regarded with a certain amount of reserve for, according to information that was being received, there was a split in the leading group of four. Svoboda and Cernik, in the role of "realists", were more inclined to go a long way towards a compromise with Moscow - a much longer way than Dubcek and Smrkowsky were prepared to go. This indicated a certain success of the Russian policy in Czechoslovakia.

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 F Mr JAROSLAV PECHACEK (Director, Czechoslovak Broadcasting Department, RFE) said that the first split in the Party Praesidium had recently been detected, at the latest session. There for the first time Cernik,

supported by Husak (leader of the Slovak Communist Party) had criticised the post-January developments, suggesting that so-called "anti-socialist" forces were being allowed to play a role, and that the Party should have crushed those attempts of anti-socialist forces. Dubcek had immediately answered Cernik and Husak, expressing his amazement that those people who identified themselves with the post-January developments should be criticising this process in Czechoslovakia. Dubcek was very strongly supported by Smrkovsky, and after a heated discussion both Cernik and Husak withdrew their criticism and suggested that they had not been understood properly during the discussion. This was the first evidence of a certain split in the Party leadership. As far as President Svoboda was concerned, it was felt that he was still very closely supporting Dubcek. With Svoboda now in the Executive Committee of the Praesidium of the Party, it was felt that the unity of the Dubcek group could survive also those attacks by the "conservatives". "We think that Dubcek and Svoboda are still very true allies", added Mr Pechacek. This went also for Smrkovsky. As far as Cernik was concerned, there were some speculations that he could eventually play the role of a Czechoslovak "Kadar".

Mr STEPHAN THOMAS (Department Director, Deutschlandfunk) congratulated those concerned in the production of what he regarded as an excellent analysis of the main forces of the dramatic events in Czechoslovakia.

One of the most striking features was the institutionalised power of the Party as the most important political instrument in Czechoslovakia.

Watching the fascinating events from January to August, all who were concerned with the Czechoslovak drama asked one question again and again: how this transformation process, this experiment to get democratic elements combined with the monopolistic rule of the Party, would work; and at what point would the Soviet Party interfere or intervene. He was one of those who were worried about the escalation of the process as it went from month to month, from week to week and from day to day in that fateful period. There was a provocative danger concerning the Soviet power apparatus which was created in Czechoslovakia. This had been very correctly stressed in the report in relation to the great "institutionalised" power and the role of the Party. Fifty years after 1917 this power of the apparatus of the Communist Party had not changed; the reaction of the Moscow politbureau was the proof of this. It was necessary to recognise this in seeking to analyse events and come to conclusions. Some of those in the West probably under-estimated the importance of this monopolistic power apparatus.

Mr Thomas then turned to what he described as "the impact of Ulbricht" on these events, and all that it had meant in regard to intervention on the Soviet side. A report some weeks ago in the "Sunday Telegraph" had

stressed the impact of Ulbricht in relation to the decision of the Moscow Politbureau on 21/22 August. It was suggested that this had been decisive at the time the final decisions were made. There might be some exaggeration here but it was certain that the 11 men in Moscow must have spent hours and hours, day and night, before coming to the decision to march.

A Mr Thomas felt that one of the most decisive elements was the challenge of the Czech experiment. The Czechs were trying to get a kind of synthesis between emocratic reforms, freedom of speech, freedom of the mass media of communication, and this was a challenge to the rigid line of the conservative Politbureau. Ulbricht had warned of all the consequences that could arise for Eastern Germany. The Czech experiment was a direct challenge to the Communist rule in Eastern Germany, and this was what caused Ulbricht to send a dramatic warning letter to the Russians as to the consequences. This aspect had not been mentioned distinctively enough in the Political Report.

B A second point that seemed to be missing from the analysis was the effect of the German "Ostpolitik" which had been introduced with very great impact after the formation of the coalition, with the Social Democrats as an integrated part of the government. He recalled that when he attended a WEAC session for the first time some years ago in Brussels, deputising for Mr Erler, there had been introduced the American policy of "bridge building" which was an endeavour to find new ways towards the Eastern nations. There was, as he saw it, a specific German responsibility to contribute to this bridge building. There was first of all an historic reason, in the light of German-Slavonic relations in the last 200 years, with the terrible climax of the Hitler barbarism towards Eastern Europe. Then there was the strategic position of Germany inside a European settlement. With the formation of the great coalition and the appointment as Foreign Minister of Willy Brandt, social democrat and anti-fascist, a higher grade of credibility came into German foreign policy and Ostpolitik. When the Chancellor and the Foreign Ministers spoke about peace it meant peace for the nations of the East. When they spoke about the renunciation of power, of force, they meant just that. But, of course, the reaction of Ulbricht was one of denunciation, and all the bigwigs of Pankow were soon warning the East European nations of the danger from Bonn, of the "reason" of the social democrats, and of the "new German imperialism" and Drang nach Osten!

E The most fascinating development was that the people in Warsaw and Prague became quite sceptical about these warnings from the German Communist side.

F Mr Thomas felt that some of the elements of the events in Czechoslovakia should be explained in this kind of context of a higher grade of credibility of the German peace strategy towards Eastern Europe. These elements were not mentioned in the excellent Political Report.

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A Mr PER HAEKKERUP (Parliamentary Spokesman and Floor Leader of the Social Democratic Party; former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Denmark) expressed his appreciation of the excellent Political Report. The policy of RFE which had been followed throughout the events in Czechoslovakia was a wise one from a political point of view. It showed a great sense of responsibility towards the needs of Europe at this time. He also felt that the analysis given in the Report was very good. There could have been, however, a little more emphasis on the extent to which the Soviet Union would allow a certain degree of "self government" to countries seeking to achieve a socialist or communist form of society, or whatever they might care to call it. This was, he thought, dependent upon the domestic development in the Soviet Union itself, as to how far the other Eastern European countries would be allowed to go. The analysis in order to be complete, should attempt to state why the Soviet Union behaved as it did in Yugoslavia in 1948, in Berlin in 1953, in Hungary (and in a different way in Poland) in 1956; as it behaved towards Rumania in the 'sixties and as it was now doing towards Czechoslovakia. Such an ~~analysis~~ would show not only the variation in the Soviet attitude but also the limits to which the Soviet Union would allow the various national Communist Parties to direct their policy.

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C Comparing the events in 1956 in Hungary and Poland with those now in Czechoslovakia, it could be said that Dubcek had avoided two of the things which occurred in Hungary. These were the decisions to become neutral and to allow independent political parties - mainly the social democratic party at that time. This had been avoided in the Czechoslovak development and it was very interesting that this was so.

D The most burning question in the Czechoslovak events was the new freedom of the press and of people working in the television and radio, and the extent to which this would be allowed by the Soviets. The result of the spreading of this liberty to other parts of the Communist world could well be imagined. At the same time as Dubcek stopped the development of the clubs into an independent part, very great freedom was allowed to both radio and television. When this freedom was given to people they were not satisfied simply to put letters into the paper and to discuss matters freely in the restaurants and in their homes. After some time would come a demand for freedom to organise, and this would mean that the monopoly of the Communist Party would be brought into danger. Perhaps this would be less so in Czechoslovakia than in other Eastern European countries, for traditional reasons. A closer analysis on these lines would be of great interest, but apart from this Mr Haekkerup felt that the Report was a very good one.

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F The Soviet Union had reserved its own right to intervene in the other Eastern European countries when it was felt to be in its interest to do so. In his speech at the Polish Communist Party Congress Brezhnev had declared quite openly this intention. It was sometimes

referred to as the "New Brezhnev Doctrine". Some people had called it a new "Monroe Doctrine" but this was an utterly wrong description. Mr Haekkerup wondered how it would be possible for this "Brezhnev Doctrine" to be maintained if the policy of detente between East and West were to be pursued. The leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had declared quite precisely that his country had the right to intervene in the event of socialism being brought into danger in one or other of the Communist countries. Since the policy of detente must of necessity lead to some political changes in the Communist world, in what way would it be possible to circumvent the Brezhnev Doctrine, and what would be the consequences of this?

Mr PIETRO QUARONI (Italy) wondered to what extent the unanimity of the people of Czechoslovakia behind Dubcek and company had been nationalistic or communistic. Certainly a great number of people had been asking to join the Communist Party after the critical days. In his view the mainspring was nationalistic - a reaction against Russian pressure both before, during and after the intervention. This was an aspect which had not been stressed and discussed.

Mr Thomas had quite rightly stressed the influence of the West German "Ostpolitik" on Czechoslovak affairs. This was correct, but it was not only the German policy; it was the European policy of detente.

West Europeans, in speaking of detente and its possibilities, had always thought of detente with the Soviet Union and detente with the "minor" Communist states, not realising that in the eyes of the Russians there was a contradiction between these two policies. The result of pursuing detente with the so-called "minor" Communist states had been to push them towards a greater independence. When General de Gaulle visited Poland and Rumania he had urged this greater independence quite openly, and it may not have been fully realised in the West that he was very much treading on the Russians' toes. The Russians certainly realised it. Others in the West had not spoken as loudly as General de Gaulle but had said the same thing.

Another effect of detente was that some people imagined the Russians had become reasonable and quite different from what they used to be. The Western contacts with these "minor" Communist states had also given them the illusion that they could have a different attitude. The Czech Communists were trying to evolve a new type of Communism, more humane and more civilised, which might have had a greater attraction for Western European countries. "The Czechs must have imagined", said Mr Quaroni, "that the Russians had become so intelligent as to understand how useful this policy might have been to themselves!"

Mr Haekkerup had asked whether detente was possible in the light of the Brezhnev doctrine. "Detente" was the sort of word ("like "virtue") about which discussion could go on for a very long time without anyone being

agreed as to what it really meant. But if they wanted to go on having a certain amount of conversation with Russia (leaving out of account whether this would really bring about a detente or not) there was one thing which must be clear: that the Russians wanted this discussion to be with the Warsaw Pact countries as a whole, rather than there being what was regarded as a "diverting" policy. Despite the policy of "building bridges", nobody wanted to pass on our bridge from that part of the world! But the Atlantic Community ought to be an equally united body, and the Russians must discuss matters with the Community as a whole and not with individual countries. What the Russians meant by detente was that they should preserve intact the unity of the Warsaw Pact and at the same time have a non-existing or dissolving NATO, with each country making its own arrangements.

Sir GEOFFREY DE FREITAS (President, Consultative Assembly, Council of Europe, Member of Parliament, Great Britain) said that his remarks would be rather more as President of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe than as a British M.P.

Mr Haekkerup had pointed to the wider role of mass communications once there was any relaxation in rigid Party control

Sir Geoffrey recalled that at the very beginning of August a letter had been received in Strasbourg from the Czech journalists' organisation asking if they could be represented at a conference to be held on Human Rights and Mass Communications in Salzburg in September. This was a most important conference but the Council had never even dreamed of thinking that the Czech journalists' organisation would be wanting to attend. No publicity was given to the request by the Council because, with things happening so quickly, no one wanted to make matters worse for the Czech journalists. This was, in fact, a story which had not been mentioned before.

Mr Thomas, had referred to the question that arose in some people's minds between January and August as to how far the Czechs could go without the Russians intervening. "So far as a body of Members of Parliament from 16 Parliaments can have a policy", Sir Geoffrey declared, "we have a policy. It is simply a policy of detente. The Assembly of the Council of Europe has several times passed resolutions asking our Governments to work for greater detente, and seeking ourselves to do it at an official secretariat level. But most of the members of the Assembly are, of course, members of NATO, and I do not think any of us question the fact that detente could only come about if there were a balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and it was because that balance had been achieved that we were able to make our speeches and pass our resolutions along those lines."

When the Council of Europe was set up, on 5th May 1949, a few weeks before the establishment of Free Europe, it was on the basis of a Committee of Governments and an Assembly of Members of Parliament drawn from all the countries, with the "Oppositions" reflected in proportion, to uphold the democratic system, and thus the Assembly was a real sounding board. It was not like the United Nations' Assembly where everyone was a Government representative and spoke to a Government brief. But the most important single thing - which probably no one realised at the time - was that they were not allowed to discuss matters of national defence. As a matter of fact, in the early days Mr Churchill in particular had spoken in the discussions about the "European Army", but as the years passed and Western European Union was established, and NATO acquired some unofficial parliamentary arm, the Council of Europe became much more a body which was recognised as not being part of the Cold War. This was why Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and Ireland - avowed neutrals - were members; and Malta and Cyprus. Some of the neutrals perhaps took their neutrality a little too far, one of them having complained that a copy of the NATO Newsletter was on display in the President's outer office! But that was an indication of how strictly neutrality was regarded.

There was only one democratic country not in the Council of Europe and that was Finland. He had been asked by the Finnish Government to go there this summer and had gone there as Finland was hoping to join the Council. This was now less likely than in July when he was there.

Sir Geoffrey said that in August he had received a message, very indirectly, from the Czech Government saying that they would like one of their Ministers to come and talk in one of the debates. This was found to be a quite legitimate request, and he had stipulated that it must be someone who spoke either French or English, in order to get a proper impact on the Assembly. The Bureau and Standing Committee were likely to endorse it, with about one exception. They had not been thinking of inviting so-called Members of Parliament from an Iron Curtain country but a Minister was a Minister, after all, and if problems were to be discussed it was right that a Minister should come. He felt it right never to lose sight of the possibility of expanding the Council of Europe to include all of Europe. There should be no doubt in anybody's mind, that the West was determined, through NATO, to fight if the Warsaw Pact forces broke out from their present bonds, but there was a balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The Council of Europe could play its part in working towards greater detente.

Mr JEAN LEGANUET (France) said that he had been in no way surprised at the brutal aggression of the Soviets in Czechoslovakia, and had not imagined that things might happen in any other way.

He questioned the significance of the word "detente". There had been constant references to the Soviet Union in this context, but the Soviet Union had never made any



statement that went beyond the concept of coexistence between two blocs. Any concept of detente going beyond this was bound to meet with downfall.

Any weapon of disintegration employed against the Soviet bloc was inevitably going to produce a vigorous reaction on the part of the Soviet Union.

A What was the basic inspiration of detente? There had to be certain points of contact. There was nationalism and the liberty of mankind and the right of each people to determine their future freely; to inform themselves and discuss and to multiply the possibilities of contact between each other. It was rather curious that, following certain initiatives in Free Europe, there was in the first place a factor of disintegration of Free Europe and of the Atlantic organisation, and this from within. France, his own nation, had left NATO in order to implement an active policy of detente. This was an illusion that he had never shared. B France had wanted to manifest its refusal to be a member of a bloc, and its will to destroy blocs and to diminish the cohesion of the West - but this was to the profit of the Communist bloc.

C Since the Czechoslovak drama there had been certain interesting signs. There had been the trip of the Foreign Minister of France to Washington, and this should be underlined. There was also the participation of the French Fleet in the recent manoeuvres of NATO. In other words, there was a certain decrease of this lack of union of the West, and this had applied to the Czech business.

D On the other hand, it was true that the diplomacy of the detente had created a certain change eastwards and the Czech affairs developed probably in this new climate. Nevertheless, trying to give a balance, the rather precipitate offensive of detente had weakened the Western field before the Eastern one. Everything seemed to indicate that for a certain time there would be a return to the sort of equilibrium between the Atlantic world and the Soviet world.

E Free Europe as such had never had a political existence. It had not played any co-ordinated role in the difficulties of the Near East. Europe as such had never played any role at all in the Czechoslovak business. He was in no way the adversary of detente. He believed that detente, in so far as it tried to take the place of the Cold War and to produce a climate of exchanges and understanding, was a very good aim, but it should be done in co-operation with the NATO community. The pathway of detente would be difficult. What was needed was a reinforcement of the political union of Europe and the maintenance of the NATO Alliance in such a way that the equilibrium would be maintained - an equilibrium that Russia refused to break. In this way Europe should become stronger within the Atlantic Community in order later to be able to develop this dialogue with the East.

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★ Mr PAOLO A. V. CUNHA (Portugal) said that in Portugal what was happening in Czechoslovakia was regarded as in a certain way very fortunate for the West. He was, of course, very sorry about the things now being done to that country, but at least it could now be seen that this was the reality of the East-West situation, and this was better than going on believing in detente and that everything was going very well when in fact the fire was smouldering beneath the ashes.

A For Portugal it was perfectly obvious that there was no detente on the part of the Soviet Union. It was clear that the Soviet Union was not going to permit even the smallest parcel of land to be lost from its empire. The great dangers of this policy were now apparent to everyone.

B There was also the presence of the Russian Fleet in the Mediterranean, and the fact of Russian bases in North Africa, especially in Algeria. The time had come to revise Western policy, not only in Central Europe and in the Mediterranean but elsewhere as well. It was not only a question of part of Europe being in slavery; there was also the question of Vietnam. All these issues required careful re-examination.

C The Rt. Hon. GEORGE BROWN (Deputy Leader, British Labour Party; Member of Parliament; former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) said that what was most interesting now was how their policies were to be conducted from here on, and this could not be discussed fruitfully until they knew at first hand what had happened at the NATO meeting.

D He agreed with those who emphasised that there were very many different elements in Russian thinking. But he did not agree with anybody who drew the conclusion that Russia was not interested in detente, whatever "detente" meant - and to him it meant "easier living together".

E "I would disagree", said Mr Brown, "with anyone who drew the conclusion that Russia is not interested in arriving at a different kind of modus vivendi from what we have had up to now." There had been insufficient emphasis so far, he thought, on the difficulty the Russians clearly had in making up their minds on the Czechoslovak situation. In his own view, if the West (this really meant NATO) had been more forthcoming with some views of its own, some actions of its own, the Russians' thinking could have been complicated even more. "But we did not complicate it", Mr Brown declared. "We all kept our heads down, yet the Russians still had great difficulty in coming to a decision. I think this is one of the fundamental things in our reading of the situation that we ought to keep in mind."

F "As to what in the end brought them to the decision", Mr Brown continued, "here I must say that I agree absolutely with Thomas. In all the conversations I had with the Russians in the short period that I was Foreign Secretary, the one stumbling block always was West Germany. I was never able to get even the semblance of a civilised reaction. The moment one mentioned West Germany, no matter what I explained to them about my personal knowledge

★ of Willy Brandt and my personal knowledge of his total commitment, they were always, all of them - the alleged moderates as well as the others - totally implacable. It was their great fear - genuine or simulated does not really matter. It was the great obstacle, and I think it was this that in the end pushed them to this decision. That leads me to draw one or two other conclusions. There was a special significance about West Germany in the case of Czechoslovakia. Let us all be realists. The Russian Army was not on the Czechoslovakian border; the Russian Army was on every other Western border. This had historical reasons, but I do not suppose that the Russian military have ever really delighted in the decisions of the Russian politicians which led to this situation. They had lived with it during the period that the Russian politicians could guarantee a strong Czechoslovakia. But once West Germany made headway, as she did, with other Communist states, and was apparently about to make headway with Prague, the Russian military, I would guess, said, "You are now going to reap the consequences of this vital gap". That is why I think Thomas is absolutely right that, in the special circumstances of Czechoslovakia, West German policy being imaginative, appealing and committed, produced a situation which for Russia became an absolutely vital argument. I think that is why in the end they decided - but obviously with great difficulty - to intervene there.

C If I am right about this, it does not follow that they would come to the same decision in any other case. This is why I think I differ a little from Quaroni. That we should go on with the effort for detente - whatever that is - to get fluidity into the situation I have myself little doubt. It cannot suit the West to have a frozen situation. One of the arguments we all know as politicians is that defence commitments cannot be held for very long in a democratic country if the situation is frozen and there is nothing happening. It is all very well to come out of Brussels with a new commitment - that the British are going to keep a few more troops there for a bit longer than had been thought, or maybe Norway is not going to withdraw totally - but that can only be done once, and in six months' or a year's time it will be the Chancellor of the Exchequer in my country who will be calling the tune and not the Minister of Defence - if nothing is happening and all is peace and quiet. So it cannot be in our interests - it could only be in Russia's interests - not to seek for fluidity and for what we call detente, therefore I think we must obviously get on with it again."

E Mr Brown went on to say that he did not agree with Quaroni on the question of doing it only with the Soviet Union, doing it only as between bloc and bloc, NATO to Warsaw. "I think it would be really playing into their hands", he said, "if we accepted their view that we cannot do business with what Quaroni calls the minor states and that we must do it with the great Warsaw Pact alone. Let us face realities. If we accept this, they are in a much better position to impose discipline upon theirs than we are to impose discipline upon ours. The chances of the 'minor' NATO states being willing to be dictated to by America are getting progressively thinner. Most of us are getting progressively restless about the degree

to which it has already gone on. This is why most of us are arguing for the creation of a European group within the Western Alliance. We cannot impose anything. I do not for the life of me see why we should therefore play it on a level which can only suit the Russians and cannot possibly suit us. Equally, the great purpose of detente from our viewpoint surely must be to try to break up this situation in the East. It is specifically to try to prevent Mother Russia being able to govern all her 'chicks'. I do not think the Czechoslovak outcome is going to end the unrest in the Eastern world, which parallels the unrest in ours and pretty well everywhere. Some people in all the minor states will still be wanting to break loose into freedom of expression and so on, and even into freedom of organisation. It must be in our interests to play to that and to encourage it, and therefore I draw the conclusion that in all the Eastern states, wherever there is an opportunity to do something, on whatever limited field there is an opportunity to do something, we should be after doing it. Thereby we complicate life enormously for them. We may make some progress in breaking down the blocs and in those cases where the German question is not as sensitive for the Russians as it was in Czechoslovakia, we may be allowed to do it. This is really my reading of the situation, which may be totally wrong."

H. E. HARRIS CLEVELAND (Ambassador to NATO) said that what seemed to be missing from the Report - and so far in the discussion, except for one or two passing comments - was something about the Czechoslovak problem viewed in a world-wide context. Two or three years ago they were all worried by the position the Russians were taking, which was that no progress could be made about any European problems because of the Vietnamese war; disarmament could not be tackled because of the Vietnam war, and in that global sense detente was indivisible in the Russian view.

"The striking thing about the Czech affair", said Ambassador Cleveland, "is how divisible they seem to think detente is. They come to the British a couple of days after the invasion and in effect argue, 'Why are you British ruining the detente merely because of the Czechoslovak affair, which is obviously our internal political? It is your reaction, not our action, which is hurting detente.' This was the argumentation they used to a number of countries, but most clearly and most bluntly in their relationship with Britain. At the same time they tried to make it clear to all the NATO countries bilaterally that this Czech affair did not have anything to do with the state interests, as they call them in their diplomatic notes, of the Western countries, therefore it was not really something that we ought to get excited about. At the same time it was not too long after that that they began the effort to be at least a little helpful on the Vietnam affair. Their effort to be helpful is more obvious than any results that are clearly attributable to their efforts but for the present context it is their efforts that are relevant. They have consistently pressed, since the Czechoslovak invasion, for beginning the strategic arms limitation talks. There is at least some wishful thinking

in the West that the Russians might want to be helpful about the Middle East. They seem to have concluded that if the best they can do in Europe is just to freeze things on the status quo, that does not mean they have to freeze all over."

"My question, then, is this: Are we to take seriously the Soviet view (which is repeated so many times that it is certainly a consistent view) that as far as they are concerned the Czechoslovak affair is really not something that should put so much iron in our souls as it obviously has done? Can they seriously believe that an action like the invasion of Czechoslovakia would not have the pervasive effect on other people's attitudes about the relationships with the Soviet Union that it has had, at least in the short run? Or do they assume that if they keep pushing for various kinds of co-operation and agreement in other fields, gradually the message of the Czechoslovak invasion will slip into history, and that we shall forget about it and then get back to 'Business as usual'? Do they really think that the Czech affair is their internal affair or is this a pose? I put that question really for the Eastern European experts and the Sovietologists present to consider."

Mr BIRGER KILDAL (Norway) said that he agreed wholeheartedly with those who had suggested that the action in Czechoslovakia must be seen in a wider concept. There had been mention of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean. The Russian fleet was now second only to the American in all international waters. Following the Czechoslovak invasion the Russians had put the screw on the Finns. This was very difficult to evaluate. On a scale from 0 to 100 one would not know where to place the indicator. This summer and early this fall there had been two NATO manoeuvres in Norway, one on land and one on the sea. There had not been anything about it in the papers because the Norwegian authorities were rather reticent in giving news which might alarm public opinion, but it was a fact that when this land manoeuvre took place in Finmark, the northern county of Norway, more than 300 kilometres from the Soviet border, there was a Soviet manoeuvre embracing some thousands of soldiers, all in uniform, all in highly armoured tanks, right on the Norwegian border. Some of the tanks, in turning, even hit the frontier poles. Asked about this, one of the Russian Embassy spokesmen in Oslo said that these were all tourists. He was told that the Norwegians knew that the Soviet Union was completely controlled and uniform but that it was a new conception that even tourists should be in uniform, and using tanks because of the shortage of cars! The fairly large-scale Soviet military manoeuvres close to the Pasvik River, forming the border between the Soviet Union and Norway, caused the Norwegian authorities in that part of the country to get rather nervous. How should they evaluate such a manoeuvre. This part of Norway, the northern flank of NATO, was strategically very important. A fairly big part of the new Soviet Navy being built up under the leadership of a new Admiral was concentrated in

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this area, and it would be much easier for them to control the northern Atlantic waters in any situation if they could have parts of their fleet based in Norwegian ice-free fjords in Northern Norway.

A When the NATO naval manoeuvre took place in the North Atlantic, quite a little Soviet armada was observed leaving Leningrad, with ships ranging from landing craft to large warship size. It went along the Norwegian coast a few miles outside territorial waters, right up to Kirkenaes, crossed the Varanger fjord and on to the Murmansk Peninsula, where there was a manoeuvre. More than 2,000 men were involved in landing craft manoeuvres.

Manoeuvres like this in fairly important strategic areas should not be belittled, especially after what happened in Czechoslovakia. These things should not be overlooked in relation to the wish to get on speaking terms again.

B Mr Brown had said that it would be difficult to get public opinion to support NATO policy in a quiet and peaceful situation. To a large degree he thought Mr Brown was right in this, but it was a fact that in Norway Parliament voted before the summer recess on the question of Norwegian adherence to NATO after April 1969, and with a large majority it was decided to adhere to the Alliance. This was months before the Czechoslovak crisis. It was done in peaceful times, in a situation in which the anti-NATO people had all facilities to state their point of view. This was a healthy thing in a country like Norway, with its old traditional neutrality. Norway had solved this question now, uninfluenced by the Czechoslovak crisis or any sort of reaction to it.

D Mr JO GRIMOND (United Kingdom) felt that one of the most valuable points made in the Report was stressing the importance of the institutions in Russia and in other Communist countries; the immense apparatus of Communism and in particular the Secret Police.

E It seemed to be the opinion of some Czechs, said Mr Grimond, that what finally decided the Russians that they would have to intervene was the determination of the Czechs to hold the 14th Congress of their Party, for this Congress would have finally demonstrated fissures within the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia and would have been extremely damaging to the position of the apparatus, not only the older Conservatives in Czechoslovakia but in Russia. It was also said that this might have had considerable repercussion within Russia itself.

If this were true then it would seem first of all that the detente really had not been of much importance in Eastern Europe; that the important events were the desire for more freedom within these countries themselves and the desire to discuss freely their future and to voice different opinions.

F It was also apparent from the Report that the response of Radio Free Europe to these events in

★ Czechoslovakia was extremely careful. They were careful not to inflame the situation nor to lay themselves open to the charge that they were advising subversion or armed resistance. "But as soon as you begin to allow discussion", declared Mr Grimond, "the demand for organisation inevitably follows and, indeed, almost inevitably, the demand to break the stranglehold of the Communist Parties. I think this is going to present a difficult problem for the future in the attitude of Radio Free Europe to internal affairs in these countries. It will get more and more difficult to draw a hard line between information and a rather academic discussion of what is happening, and incitement to follow up this discussion with actual acts which will inevitably bring them into conflict with the Communist Parties."

A It seemed, said Mr Grimond, that the Russians were anxious to go forward with the detente despite their invasion of Czechoslovakia. This was borne out very much by Ambassador Cleveland. The Russians no doubt hoped that in 10 years Czechoslovakia would be forgotten, as indeed Hungary was to some extent forgotten, let alone the disappearance of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, the Russian messages of encouragement to Hitler during the War and their betrayal of the Polish underground. The West was very good at forgetting these things and no doubt the Russians felt that Czechoslovakia would be forgotten. Even so, Kusnetzov had admitted that Czechoslovakia would be a set-back to Western Communist Parties for 10 to 15 years, after which they might start to make ground again.

B So it would seem, thought Mr Grimond, that while Czechoslovakia was extremely important to the Russians, nevertheless it need not necessarily mean a departure in their policies in general, nor need it alarm the West about a possibility that they would try to change the military situation.

C "I very much doubt whether the Russians are frightened of West Germany", Mr Grimond continued, "and if they are I would have thought that the way to make West Germany more frightening was to undertake the Czechoslovak sort of invasion, for nothing surely was more likely to make the West build up its arms further, and it might well be that such an action as has taken place might have increased the German demand for nuclear weapons. I am sure that some of the other Eastern European countries are frightened of West Germany but I very much doubt whether the Russians are."

D "But what seems to contradict this view that Czechoslovakia is a very important incident but one within their part of the world, where the Russians seek to impose a 'Monroe Doctrine', and therefore not of significance outside it, is this extraordinary naval build-up. I very much hope that somebody here who has made a proper study of Russian thinking will be able to tell us more about that."

E Was it that the Russians felt very "immobile" compared to the Americans or British; that they felt they had to keep up with the Americans for no particular reason except that they were a Great Power? Were they really going to embark on an expansionist policy in the

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A Mediterranean? If this were so, it would be far more serious than anything else. What was the significance of these manoeuvres which Mr Kildal had mentioned? "I cannot claim any first-hand experience equal to his", said Mr Grimond, "but I live in some rather small and (to other people) unimportant islands off the north coast of Scotland. We have for years had a large Russian fishing fleet which does its routine spying, but this summer we have been honoured with the presence of two or three Russian warships for a very considerable period. Some people have suggested that they may be intending this as a world-wide move and that it is tied up with some containment of China; but, on the face of it, if Russia is really frightened of China and faced with a build-up of land forces in Asia, what is the significance of expending her Navy in this way? What is the significance of these moves in the Middle East? It does show a change of policy, and if there is this change of policy, how is it to be reconciled with any detente? The increase in the Russian Navy, her move into the Mediterranean and her actions in the Middle East do not seem to me to make a very favourable climate for a detente."

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C Mr HAAKON LIE (Secretary, Norwegian Socialist Party) said that in his opinion the great manoeuvres in the Kola Peninsula were a warning to NATO. It was not a question of just a few hundred soldiers moving all the way up to the Norwegian frontier. No one needed binoculars in order to see them; they were as close as they could possibly be and probably amounted in strength to several thousand men with 200 tanks. In addition, quite an amount of the Russian Fleet was moved from Leningrad through the Baltic Sea, the Danish Straits and all along the Norwegian coast. Such movements had been seen before, but for the first time the manoeuvres included very realistic amphibian operations. As these movements and manoeuvres took place at the same time as the NATO exercises, Mr Lie believed they represented another warning to NATO. It was a display of power.

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E "When it comes to the Finnish situation", said Mr Lie, "I met Finnish officials immediately after Kosygin's visit to Helsinki and asked them what it was all about. Here I have to differ with my good friend Kildal. The Russians did not put the screw on the Finnish Government; they wanted to show the world that they were just as interested in detente as before. There was no attempt to push or press the Finns. They wanted to tell the entire world that they could get along with their small neighbours. It was a display of friendliness in order to persuade the world that Czechoslovakia was an internal affair, and that Russian policies had not changed."

F "This was the main purpose", felt Mr Lie, "of Mr Kosygin's visit to Finland. In Helsinki the Russians put on big smiles to prove that they were interested in continuing their policy of peaceful co-existence with the West; and they could not prove this better than by going to a small and vulnerable nation and displaying cordial neighbourliness."



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A Mr ALTIERO SPINELLI (Director, Institute of International Affairs, Rome) suggested that the military aspects and consequence of the recent events in Czechoslovakia were only a part of the general political problem. The price paid by the Russians for the Czech occupation was very high. What were the consequences? First, NATO had been in crisis, but now NATO was consolidated again; even the weakest link, France, had conformed to a common attitude. Secondly, NATO had had a certain territorial limitation in Europe which was rather clearly defined, and Yugoslavia was beyond it; the Eastern Mediterranean was beyond it. As a result of the Czech invasion, the position now was that NATO had rather clearly underlined that Yugoslavia and Albania and Eastern Europe were within the competence of NATO, and that NATO would react to any interference with them. Even Rumania knew very clearly that Yugoslavia was connected with the defences of NATO. There had been reinforcement on the Mediterranean side too and in all military aspects.

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C A further heavy price had been paid in regard to the standing of the "old" Communist Parties in the world. The Russians had been obliged to expose the ugliest aspect of domination - military domination. It might be supposed that part of these consequences might not have been that the Russians were quite so stupid! If the bulk of these reactions were foreseen by the Russians and put into perspective, why had they taken the action they took in Czechoslovakia? Far from strengthening their position, surely the Russians had weakened their position in the centre of Europe. This could be seen by looking at the united reaction of the Czechs.

D The great problem was that the Russians had to cope with revisionism. This was a sickness in their whole society, both in the Soviet Union and in the other Communist countries. There was economic revisionism, nationalistic revisionism, and ideological (or political) revisionism. The most feared by the Russians was the third one, because this was the principle of the legitimacy of the power of the Party which was being put in question. As the second world power, the Soviet Union would try in one way or another to maintain its system of socialist nations, but the Soviet Union had to contend with the growing strength of the revisionist forces, which were at work there as well as outside. Action had been taken against Litvinov but the Zakarov document circulated without his having been arrested. The Russian Communist bureaucracy were no longer able to suppress violently these reactions in their own country.

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F It was correct, of course, to react with military prudence and the reassessment of forces, but there had to be an appropriate political reaction in order to profit from the creeping crisis in the socialist system. He did not think that the consequence would be a dislocation of the Soviet system, because it was, after all, based on the stability of the second world power, but there would probably be a very profound transformation and perhaps the emergence of new policies. A recognition of this

possibility should always be on the "agenda" of the West.

(Luncheon adjournment)

The meeting resumed at 3.30 p.m.

A The PRESIDENT invited Ambassador Cleveland to address the meeting.

B H. E. HARLAN CLEVELAND (Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and European Regional Organisations): I should like first of all to make one or two comments about NATO at the moment of the Czech crisis. Mr Lecanuet said this morning that he was not surprised. I think afterwards none of us would admit that we were surprised, but the number of people who said so ahead of time and clearly predicted the Russian action was very small. I only happen to know personally one such person and he said it was "51:49." That was "Chip" Bohlen. At a recent conference at Oxford of the ISS there was a panel on Czechoslovakia in which a group of experts assured us that what the Russians had done in Czechoslovakia was all very rational. When we came to the discussion period Raymond Aron got up and said "I am kind of ashamed myself because I did not predict this." C He asked which members of the panel were on record as predicting the event ahead of time. None of them had done so! He went on to say: "We were all carrying round in our minds two contradictory ideas: first, that if the Czechs got away with it it would be fatal for the Russian system; secondly, that the Russians might inveigh against it but that they would not invade Czechoslovakia."

D I think that was the general mood just before the event. We had had lots of political warning, ever since the beginning of the Dubcek regime in January. We had plenty of strategic warning. We knew roughly which Russian forces were where, poised for an invasion of Czechoslovakia. But the Russians did achieve a tactical military surprise, of course, which was then confounded by the tactical political surprise that the Czechs managed to achieve by keeping their government in being and in communication with the outside world. There has been a lot of nonsense about alerts and warnings and I will get into that later E if necessary, but I think it is sufficiently off your subject for me not to argue with Mr Wigg on this occasion!

F The Ministerial meeting was moved forward by a month. The organisation moves by fits and starts, and the fits are called "Ministerial meetings"; we have them two or three times a year and they perform the primary purpose of creating a synthetic crisis inside each government about what the Minister will say when he comes to the meeting. If we did not have the Ministerial meeting we would never have that discussion going on inside the Government, and therefore we would not have any NATO

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policy meeting in the Governments, which is the main place for NATO policy to be made - not at a NATO meeting.

A Most of our allies, I think, wanted a Ministerial meeting within a few weeks of the invasion. Chancellor Kiesinger suggested a summit meeting but evidently did so without asking his Foreign Office, so that proposal did not get off the ground as a German proposal but only as a radio programme. There was a general tendency to look to Washington to take a lead in proposing a ministerial meeting, and it was something of a surprise and disappointment when President Johnson took the decision that he did not want to turn on the drama until he knew what the denouement would be; until he knew what would come out of a Ministerial meeting he would prefer not to have it held. So there proceeded a kind of multilateral game of "Après vous, Alphonse", "Après vous, Gaston", in which we all prepared to do something more about strengthening NATO but at the same time tried to make sure that everybody else would do at least his share and, if possible, more.

C In that preparatory period we had comparatively little difficulty in agreeing on an analysis of what had happened. That analysis, covering both the military situation and the Soviet doctrine, was carefully put together in a really very good report and agreed at the beginning of October. At the beginning of September NATO had lain low for about 10 days as a deliberate act of agreed policy in the Council, in order to give the Security Council process at the UN time to work out. If it were too much a NATO-Warsaw Pact affair right away it might make it more difficult to get Senegal and Ethiopia to vote for the motion and Algeria to abstain! But after that period of lying low the first statement that came out was a "no reductions" pledge, which was necessary because most of the governments were shaving their contributions, on "detente" grounds, over the past year. Our allies taken as a group - that is the 12 members of the NATO defence system other than the United States - had shaved from just under 5 per cent. of their gross national product to just over 4½ per cent. in a year, so the trend was not good.

E In the analysis we came rather quickly past the "theological" question that is always argued on these occasions of capabilities versus intentions. The military in NATO and in the governments have been so accustomed to having Soviet intentions used as an argument for cutting the defence budget that they had enormous difficulty in getting used to a situation in which the most important reason for strengthening NATO was Soviet intentions. To be sure, the Soviets had more troops farther west, but that was likely to be a temporary situation, and is now proving to be a temporary situation as the Soviets move their force level in Czechoslovakia down from something over 25 divisions to possibly as low as four divisions before they get through. But the analysis put the real finger on the uncertainty created by Soviet behaviour itself, and this is reflected in the communique, and more directly in the confidential papers that underlie it: uncertainty derived really from two different considerations. The first is the sloppiness of the political scenario against

which they use their efficient military force. If you are going to claim you have an invitation, you really ought to have a forged invitation with some recognisable name! Secondly, there was the production, after more than a month of groping for the justification, in "Pravda" of the 24th September, of a definitive piece about the "Socialist Commonwealth" theory -- what has come to be known in some circles as the "Brezhnev doctrine". The uncertainty was compounded by an uncertainty as to what was the area to which this new doctrine of force might apply. My Turkish colleague, on the first day of the crisis, produced the best "bon mot" I have heard on this subject. He said: "The Soviets have told us that they propose to protect their harem at all costs but they have not told us how big it is!"

As a consequence of this analysis, our Government did search its soul and came up with some new military effort for NATO. Every government except Canada did this *at the November meeting* ~~at the meeting~~. Even the governments which had not been previously particularly enthusiastic about the NATO defence system, such as, for example, Denmark, participated in the round of pledges: there was a 13 per cent. defence increase on Denmark's part, for example. Everybody tried to take a little credit for things they were going to do anyway, but there was a good deal of new effort -- perhaps a billion dollars' worth. This is very hard to quantify and I would not stick with that number, but (plus or minus a large factor of error) there was perhaps a billion dollars of new effort announced by countries at this meeting, and something between 80 and 90 per cent. of that clearly new effort was European. It was the first time that in such a crisis the lion's share of the contribution had been on the European side of the Atlantic.

The emphasis on the defence side has been not on increasing the size of the NATO defence programme but on filling up considerable chinks which had opened up in it in relation to better quality, more readiness, more training, more men where men were lacking, more mobility. These are all things that cost money, so essentially there was more money required for defence. This worked out very well and we managed to concentrate the increases on the limited war conventional capability of the Alliance. For example, in the Mediterranean, where we are really extremely well off in the event of general war, the concentration has been on trying to get the structures that would enable NATO to act in a limited way under conditions of a general peace. These decisions on defence are referred to in the way that has become traditional in *NATO Communiqué* ~~our communication~~. Paragraph 8 of the communiqué before you (which is essentially a 14-nation paragraph) categorises the various things that were done. I will not spell them out further unless you would like to have this done later on. So we have first the analysis and then the "beefing up" of NATO defences, which was, after all, the main purpose of this meeting.

In addition to that the Ministers did three things. They issued what came to be known as a signal or warning about future Soviet behaviour. They re-defined their attitude towards detente and made the first definitive

statement about the intention of the Alliance that has ever been made by a NATO meeting. Paragraph 7 is what came to be known in the preparatory work as the "clear signal"; paragraph 6 is what came to be known as the "unclear signal". The "clear signal" is simply, "If you attack us we'll fight", which is no more than repeating the doctrine in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty itself. This is carried over into the Germany and Berlin paragraphs, all of which is "orthodox" doctrine. It added nothing to the communiqués of the past. But the "unclear signal", the material in the three little sentences in paragraph 6 of this communique, is new business in the Alliance. The problem was really quite complicated. How does one say something about these countries that are in the "grey" area, not part of the NATO defence system but also not part of the Soviet defence system, and now presumably under more of a Soviet threat than they were before? Yugoslavia and Albania, Austria, Finland and - in a rather more special case - Rumania, which is inside the Warsaw Pact. It was important, obviously, not to specify the area we were talking about; not to specify the nature of the allied action that would be taken if the Soviets went too far. The three little sentences in paragraph 6 must be read in realisation of how difficult a drafting job that was! But, as in nuclear affairs, "deterrent" is "managed uncertainty", and the effort here is to imply an interest in any further Soviet interventions without specifying ahead of time that NATO as such would act outside the NATO defence area, or whether NATO would become a political consultation body; and on those consultations might be based separate actions by some of the NATO countries.

The area problem is tricky, because the whole Mediterranean is in the NATO defence area, within the formal lines that were drawn, so that an attack on Albania, which might be partly by air but partly by sea, would represent an interesting exercise in whether it is inside or outside the NATO area that the operation is taking place - especially if any of our ships happened to get in the way! So we did issue this warning. It is firm but vague, precisely as it was intended to be, and for my taste at least it came out just about right - not too explicit and not too timid-sounding.

As far as detente is concerned, that is covered in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the communique.

Referring back to the report on the future tasks of the Alliance (which had set up the "double track" theory of the Alliance, in which the Alliance would pursue both the defence programme and also a peace-making effort through mutual force reduction and so on in Europe), this had been quite successful in maintaining and increasing support for the defence aspects of the Alliance in the countries in which detente politics had been an important factor in the political life of the country. As was mentioned this morning, this "glueing together" of defence and detente enabled the anti-militaristic Left in Norway to join a Conservative Government in a 144/6 pro-NATO vote, which is one of the modern miracles.

\* The first thing the Alliance did about detente was to have very quick agreement on a policy that might be rendered as "Let's not be chummy with aggressors for the rest of this year anyway." In fact, the East-West contacts, cultural, political, ministerial visits and that kind of thing, have gone down very sharply for the five Warsaw Pact countries; but, taking the total contact between Eastern and Western Europe, the number of relevant contacts has actually gone up in the same period: in other words, everybody is going to Rumania and Yugoslavia these days rather than to Poland and the other invading countries.

A The contacts with Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia have increased and have more than balanced, in the total statistics, the very sharp reduction in the contacts with the other five. But that is obviously a short-term project which was agreed in the Council alone, with a good deal of symbolic "not going to the Bolshevik Parade" and that sort of thing.

B But the Soviets, as indicated this morning, want to continue to do business on some other fronts, and, as is said here, it would only be consistent with Western values for our side to be in favour of as much detente as it is possible to have, which is obviously going to be a good deal less than we had hoped as of a little while ago.

C The dilemmas here are very cruel; I find them excruciating. If we get in touch with some of the "best people" in these countries and this results in their being set on by the Soviets, are we doing something good or something bad? This kind of exercise in political ethics is going to be facing us all. We have a special problem of when and under what conditions the United States starts the strategic missile and anti-missile talks which would have been announced the day after the Czech invasion if that invasion had not happened. The time and place had already been set in private negotiations.

D Here our dilemma is not only how long should the mourning period be and at what point would it not be bad taste to be meeting with the Soviets. We have another problem. What would the Europeans think about our starting? How much of a trans-Atlantic trouble would it make for us to start? What kind of consultations are necessary if we do start down that road? The case for starting down that road is overwhelming. We are just at the threshold of another 50 billion dollar slice of the arms race, and it is even an outside chance that something could be done about that. It would be nice, but the question is whether we can. The doctrine that can be agreed on that subject in these relatively short terms is expressed in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11.

E Finally, we tackled for the first time seriously at a Ministerial meeting the question: "What about NATO after 1969?" As you know, contrary to Communist claims and many journalistic errors, the Alliance does not end. It is an indefinite treaty as long as two or more members adhere, but there is a withdrawal clause that comes into effect on 24 August 1969. Some of us were anxious to get a pretty strong

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statement on this subject. Secretary Rusk arrived in Brussels having consulted the President-elect, Mr Nixon, on this subject, and with his authority first of all to invite NATO for its spring meeting to Washington, that is, during the first three months of the Nixon administration; but, even more importantly, with a very strong bi-partisan backing of the notion that we for our part did not intend to withdraw from this Alliance, and that we should be glad to say so if everybody else was willing to say so in a collective manner. Not everybody else was willing to say so quite that explicitly. The Canadians and Danes were engaged in internal constitutional or political reviews of NATO policy and did not want to be thought to be coming to conclusions before they had done the internal consultation they had in mind. I think that if it had not been for the Canadian and Danish positions, we probably would have had 14-nation approval of a simple statement that "none of us intend to withdraw from this Alliance - period"; but it had to be done in a slightly more complicated way, as indicated in paragraph 12, which is worth reading because it is a very important piece of constitutional history made late last week:-

"The North Atlantic Alliance will continue to stand as the indispensable guarantor of security and the essential foundation for the pursuit of European reconciliation. By its constitution the Alliance is of indefinite duration. Recent events have further demonstrated that its continued existence is more than ever necessary ...."

This reaches into the foreseeable future without setting another date or doing anything that has to be ratified by senates and parliaments.

There was then the question whether the French would adhere to this. This was finally worked out on a basis that was really optimum from the point of view of the rest of the Alliance, for while it looked that the French might insist on footnoting themselves out of this paragraph ("The French have a special position, as is well known ..."), the way in which it was finally worked out was that we added a fourth sentence in which the Foreign Minister of France characterised his nation's policy in language taken essentially from the letter General de Gaulle sent to President Johnson, which began, "The NATO-France Crisis of the Spring of 1966..." But this was put into the communique in such a way as not to constitute a French dissent from the other three sentences of that paragraph. It was what in our Supreme Court would be called a "concurring opinion" and not a "dissenting opinion", and this is a very important new fact of political life in the Atlantic Alliance.

Mr ETIENNE HIRSCH (President, Central Committee of the European Federalist Movement) (France) said that some speakers had mentioned the question of nationalism in relation to Czechoslovakia. He did not think this was the basic aspect of the problem. Certainly there was a reaction on the part of intellectuals, of writers, artists, journalists, against the restrictions on liberty,

and this had helped to bring about a "show-down" situation. On the economic side, those leaders who were conscious of economic questions showed their reaction against the Comecon system under which there was a heavy economic dependence on the Soviet Union, but this should not be identified straight away with the general reaction against the power of the Soviets.

Mr Hirsch referred to an interview published in "Le Monde" with a former Czech Minister which was quite instructive as to the feelings of the Czech people.

There seemed to be little doubt that the Russians had had deep internal discussions before coming to a decision to invade Czechoslovakia, so that the motivation must have been rather complex. It was evidently very embarrassing for the Russian military leaders to have a territory such as Czechoslovakia thinking of leaving the Soviet orbit. But he felt that there was another aspect which was much more important for the Soviet leaders: that what was happening in Czechoslovakia could overflow and be picked up by other states in the Soviet bloc. The Russian leaders would accept many things but they would never accept the principles of free speech and free decision and full individual liberty of thought. These were, after all, aspects of Western civilisation which had never existed in Russia even before the Revolution, let alone after it. It was a concept which was quite foreign to the Soviet leaders and regarded by them as extremely dangerous.

One of the reasons for the downfall of Khrushchev was that he was trying to decentralise the Soviet administration. Mr Hirsch said that he had been in the Soviet Union one year after this decentralisation and that, whilst in the provinces the "new deal" had been accepted with enthusiasm, or some sort of enthusiasm, in the ranks of the Moscow leadership it was not at all acceptable; indeed, the point was even mentioned to foreigners.

The right course for the West undoubtedly was to continue to give the best possible example to the Communist states of the vitality of the spirit of liberty in the West. In this way the West could reinforce its moral influence on the Eastern nations. It was important in this respect that these liberties should be seen to be fully enjoyed throughout the Western Hemisphere, which is sadly not the case in particular with the present regime in Greece.

Mr PHILIPPE DESHORMES (Secretary General, North Atlantic Assembly) (Belgium) said that, while congratulating the authors of the Political Report, he felt bound to ask why certain areas of information had not been included. Mr Hirsch had just spoken of the internal situation in the USSR. It would be useful to know who was taking the major decisions in the USSR and why they were being taken; and what was the objective of these decisions. What



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 were the motives behind the recent Soviet action, which was stronger than anything witnessed for a very long time?

The reactions of the Italian and French Communist Parties were of considerable interest, but he wondered to what extent it might be of a tactical nature.

A Free Europe was one of the few bodies throughout Europe conducting activities of an "offensive" character against Communism. It was a good thing that the invasion of Czechoslovakia had awakened public opinion in the West, and especially the younger generation, to the true nature of Communism. On the other hand, it was unfortunate that it should require a tragic event of this sort to produce this awakening. It was not enough just to leave things to NATO. There was a real need to educate and influence public opinion in the West. Could Free Europe help on that?

B This morning there had been a discussion about the policy of detente, and certainly this was complementary to the policy of having an informed public opinion in the West. Ambassador Cleveland's comments concerning the recent NATO meeting, were most interesting. Mr Deshormes wondered how it would be possible at the same time to have an alerted NATO, with a stronger policy than hitherto, and a policy of detente and negotiation. Would it be possible to think of detente in the same terms as before the events of the summer?

C Mr STEPHAN THOMAS (Department Director, Deutschlandfunk, Germany) thought that the whole NATO communique was the most appropriate answer of the Western Powers to the aggression in Czechoslovakia. He termed it a "constructive ambiguity". It was detente but at the same time a warning was voiced.

D What was the nature of the leadership today in the Politbureau which had taken the fatal decision to march into Czechoslovakia? What was the view of those who had been looking at the Soviet Union over 50 years, from Lenin to Stalin, from Stalin to Khrushchev, and now Brezhnev-Kosygin? The recent Czech crisis seemed to have caused something without precedent in the discussions in the Kremlin. Mr. Thomas said that he and some of his friends regarded the 11 men in the Politbureau as very incompetent and mediocre and inconclusive in their leadership, so that the decision to march into Czechoslovakia was partly a decision of weak men, not able to measure up to the very difficult problems and complications facing the Eastern bloc.

E In this context the warning given by NATO, this "positive ambiguity", was, he thought, the right one. It was indicating to the Soviet Union that NATO was not prepared to tolerate any more nonsense, but at the same time the way was open to a kind of detente. This kind of strategy was the appropriate answer at the present time.

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A Among the 11 men there must obviously have been a majority in favour of the course taken. As Mr Spinelli had pointed out, the Politbureau ought to have known that this kind of action would bring about the consolidation of NATO. It was Denis Healey in Brussels who had said that Czechoslovakia had stopped the rot, stopped the disintegration of NATO. This surely must have been realised in Moscow. Then there were the consequences in the Mediterranean and in South-Eastern Europe, and the consequences of schism in the Communist world, with the French and Italian Communist Parties taking a strong line against the invasion.

B There was another very important consequence which had not so far been stressed. Students of East European history, of the history of Slavism and the Slavonic nations, knew that for 200 years the Czech and Slovak nations had been the most pro-Russian in Eastern Europe. The Czechs were definitely pro-Russian. Two days after the 21st August there could be discerned the most profound, the most absolute, change in the attitude of the Czech nation towards the Russians; "We are not going to forgive you for this for a thousand years."

C There must, thought Mr Thomas, be a small group, a minority, in the Politbureau today, in the secretariat, the central secretariat or even in the Central Committee, who were pragmatists, realists, and who had never forgotten what Khrushchev did at the 20th Party Congress, the process of transformation and of coexistence, the new aspects of society in an industrial state. All this could not have been lost. NATO's reactions today, tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, should be aimed at this group, which one day might get the chance to change the power set-up inside the Soviet Union and the Politbureau.

D Ambassador Cleveland had stressed the importance of not becoming too chummy too early: "Let us not be chummy with the invaders tomorrow or the day after tomorrow." Mr Thomas said that he was a little cautious in regard to this and was inclined to ask when the point would be reached when "business as usual" was the order of the day;

E When lecturing on these matters in Germany he often came up against the comment, "Oh, well, there was the 17th June in Germany, there was Warsaw, there was the Hungarian revolution, and after some time things come back to normal again." "In my opinion", declared Mr Thomas, "Czechoslovakia is not to be compared with any of these events of the last 10 years. Czechoslovakia is a turning point in the development of Soviet Communism. It is an indication of the further development of the adventurist line of the majority of the Politbureau." All these things were interdependent. The Russians could not act in an isolated way according to their own dogmatic analysis. The Political Report was a first-class document in analysing these recent great events and

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it should on this basis be possible to determine how to act and react in the future.

As for the return to normal relations, he would plead for a longer time in order to achieve certain positive elements of reaction inside the Soviet Party apparatus. This kind of policy would be in support of certain circles in Warsaw and Prague and, he hoped, in Moscow. According to the news of the Central Committee in Prague, there was a majority of reformers around Dubcek. The correct policy was one which could support to the maximum the developments in the various countries of Eastern Europe in a realistic way.

Mr PIERRE ABELIN (Member of the Chamber of Deputies, France) said that he had listened with great interest to the comments of Ambassador Cleveland concerning the NATO communique, which was both good and depressing. It was good to the extent to which it expressed a lively emotion concerning the Czechoslovak operation, and in its reference to the United Nations, dealing not only with defence but also underlining the attack the Soviet Union had made on the independence of a country. But it was also slightly depressing, in that the further declaration was not, in Mr Abelin's view, sufficiently solemn. It was just a little bit negative. In the communique there did not seem to be a sufficiently clear awareness of the problem. It did not seem to be understood to what extent this rape of a country was dangerous to international peace. When it was a question of the operations which could be carried out in the Mediterranean it was simply said that Soviet intervention, direct or indirect, which would affect the situation in Europe or in the Mediterranean, could create an international crisis which could have serious consequences. These statements, however valid they might be, were a little cold and perhaps did not bring home to the population concerned, to the whole world population, and to the members of the United Nations, the seriousness of the problem for the future.

The Gaullist idea was that each country must acquire its full independence, even if it were a participant in certain pacts and agreements. This idea, if it had any chance of success, would obviously contain certain positive elements, for Czechoslovakia or any similar country could, at an international group such as the United Nations, have very clearly demanded a certain form of independence. The error of Gaullist politics was the heavy emphasis on "Go it alone".

He was happy to know that, as Ambassador Cleveland mentioned, the French Government was moving back to a proper NATO position. At the same time, it would not be sound policy to be concerned only with a negative approach, and within the framework of NATO there should be room for an element of "de-freeze". A stronger

and more united Europe could contribute in an important way to the cause of detente. This could happen if Europe were able to achieve its own "personality". It would be possible then to talk more effectively to the East. This could be of value at two levels. There would be on the one hand negotiations between the USSR and the United States on nuclear warfare, in order to prevent nuclear expansion getting too complicated or too vast. On the other hand, there could be negotiations carried out by a European political entity together with a certain number of the Warsaw Pact countries, and in particular with the minor powers. The concern here would be with all aspects of relationships between them, possibly leading to a further "de-freeze". It would also help to deprive the Russians of certain arguments for intervention which were always to be feared.

Mr Abelin emphasised the need for Britain to play a full role, going far beyond commercial and economic interests and really assuming responsibilities of a political and a defence nature. The Americans, too, could play an important part in the building up of Europe, especially in the sense of negotiations carried out at two levels, which he had already mentioned.

In the previous discussions there had been no very clear encouragement to a European group to play this kind of role in the North Atlantic Alliance. He believed that the German Chancellor, in his conversations in the Hague recently with Dutch colleagues, had expressed the idea that there was no thought of setting up a European group within NATO. This, of course, limited the possible autonomy of Europe. Without achieving this better equilibrium the tension existing could even become worse; Europe must be assisted to achieve a state of balance.

He fully agreed with the analysis in the Political Report, but he thought it would be a very good thing to emphasise the need to encourage the creation of a Europe of the kind he had indicated; a Europe which not only had an economic and cultural nature, with relationships with other parts of the world, but a Europe with a military stature which could by its very existence contribute to detente.

Mr JOACHIM RAFFERT (Member of the Socialist Party Parliamentary Group, Germany) felt that everyone could agree with Ambassador Cleveland that the NATO communique on the Brussels meeting was a very well written paper. In his additional remarks this afternoon the Ambassador had not said very much about paragraph 4, which was of particular interest to Germany. However, the paragraph really was self-explanatory and did not require any further elaboration.

The communique pointed out how close was the connection between German problem and all other problems in connection with the "Brezhnev doctrine". It was

very difficult for the Germans to have to face the kind of policy formulated in this document, for the part of Germany still occupied by the Soviet Union was obviously covered by the "Brezhnev doctrine". They could not therefore adopt any policy which was based on an implicit acceptance of this doctrine over a long period. "We must be realistic enough to recognise that it is the basis of the present policies of the Soviet Union", said Mr Raffert, "but we must do all we can to prove that this doctrine is not feasible."

The NATO document and the excellent Political Report from Radio Free showed quite clearly that Soviet policy was incalculable and had become more difficult to forecast; even so, he would still try to give a reply to a question raised by Ambassador Cleveland this morning. "I think that the Soviet Union, under the present leadership, is greatly interested in what we call detente", said Mr Raffert, "even though it may be correct, as stated here, that the Russians imagine detente to mean the peaceful coexistence of the two blocs."

Ambassador Cleveland had asked this morning whether the Soviets really believed that their readiness to co-operate in further steps towards detente would eliminate the memory of the terrible events of the 21st August and the occupation of Czechoslovakia. "I think that is what they really believe", said Mr Raffert. All the contacts which we have had since then, and of which I am informed, seem to indicate this." Of course, one could not judge what the real leadership in the Soviet Union were thinking - and Mr Thomas had emphasised the need for a deep study of the distribution of forces there - but from contacts at all other levels established in the course of the last few months and weeks it appeared clear that the Russians really believed that the attitude of the West towards the Soviet Union would not continue to be greatly influenced by the occupation of Czechoslovakia for a long time, and that they would be able to prove by other measures that this was an event within their own camp which was of no concern to anybody else. "From what I have been able to observe", said Mr Raffert, "I am not at all convinced that they are not quite right. This may be one of the subjects therefore at which we should look more closely."

George Brown was no doubt right in saying that the Russians were mainly concerned with military problems. Since the Russians felt they had solved the military difficulty which they were claiming to exist, and were saying that they had done nothing to hurt the Czechs, they would no doubt try to prove in future that co-operation could be carried on in various ways, perhaps not on the basis of "business as usual" but not very differently from before.

He rather doubted whether it would be possible to have conversations carried on at the level of the two alliances, but he was sure that contacts would be maintained and that conversations would take place between the Soviet Union and other Western countries.

He felt that it would be necessary to be much more reserved - this applied to the Federal Republic of Germany - in the intensity of their contacts with the other East European countries apart from the Soviet Union. Attempts at detente at the lower level by or with individual members of the Warsaw Pact might lead to a situation in which the Soviets felt menaced and inclined to put the "Brezhnev doctrine" into operation. Chancellor Kiesinger, in the course of his statement during the last foreign policy debate, had stressed this point quite clearly. As far as the Federal Republic was concerned, there was a very vital interest in the direct exchange of ideas with the Soviet Union, but this presented many difficulties. Some time ago an overall view was given of this in a sort of "white paper" on these contacts, and it was shown that developments were not very satisfactory in this respect. But it would not be possible to refuse to have conversations with the Russians; these contacts must be made. There were some indications of preparations in this direction, and the trade between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic, in spite of all the reproaches levelled against the Federal Republic by the Soviet Union in connection with events in Czechoslovakia, for which Germany was held to be largely responsible, had increased and continued to increase. Before the recent meetings of the German Parliament in Berlin and before the CDU had its last Congress in Berlin, there were quite a number of threats from East Berlin, but nothing had manifested itself and it was quite obvious that the Russians had pulled back in this respect.

This morning Mr Thomas had referred to the fact that Willy Brandt was Foreign Minister, and to what had been done by the Great Coalition in the Federal Republic in the field of foreign policy. There had as a result of this been contacts with Czechs, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Hungarians and so on, and again and again Germans had been asked whether they really desired the kind of detente leading to peace; was it verbiage or a concrete objective? "Are we justified in trusting you over a longer period?" people had asked. The Soviet Union asked it at every opportunity: "Can we possibly consider the Federal Republic as a factor for peace rather than a factor for disturbance over the long run?" If these questions were asked again and again, not only by representatives of the "minor" East European countries but also by representatives of the Soviet Union, was not this an indication of the possibility of positive conversations and a positive dialogue? It was a matter of convincing these people of the goodwill of the Federal Republic, and if among the 11 men in the Politbureau there were three who were ready to think in a more realistic way and to act in a more reasonable way, progress should be possible. Use should be made of every opportunity for a dialogue, and if conversations could be started on a more permanent basis it should not thought that the Federal Republic was trying to "go it alone" outside the Alliance or outside its close links with the allies. He hoped that, especially in the light of the "Brezhnev Doctrine", such contacts would not be regarded as harmful to the Alliance. They must remain firm within the Alliance, and work for a better organised

★ Europe than the present one, not simply a Europe of the Six but a Europe which included Great Britain.

The role of Radio Free Europe was more important than ever. One had only to note RFE's performance during the Czech crisis to see how valuable it was. He was more hopeful than ever that its task would be carried out successfully.

A Mr GEORGES BERTHOIN (Deputy Chief Representative to the United Kingdom for the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities) said that very recently he had been in contact with a certain number of Czechoslovak individuals and had tried to understand the way in which they themselves analysed the unhappy events which overtook them in August.

B One point had emerged: that the new doctrine apparently accepted by the Soviet military authorities was the same one which seemed to prevail among American military leaders. This new doctrine of escalation and flexible response, in fact, made it conceivable once again to have conventional wars in Europe. It would therefore give a conventional military position an importance which formerly it did not have when the theory of massive retaliation was the one prevailing. In this context C Czechoslovakia became extremely important once again to the Soviet Union. Of course, what was going on there was regarded by other Communist governments as being possibly contagious from an economic and political point of view, but, in the light of this new strategic concept, the position of the two camps might have been considered as being modified in a dangerous way. Against this background, it was not surprising to see elsewhere the Soviets active on more conventional levels. This could explain their presence in the Mediterranean area and in other parts of the world. This attitude could lead to a new impulse being given to policies based on guerrilla warfare and even D to pure political action.

With the flexible response approach, detente, as they had known it for many years, became very difficult, as the area of uncertainty would bring a state of anxiety and unrest which would force people to rally around the two super powers, whereas in terms of the old strategic concept, detente was easier to organise below the nuclear stalemate in fact guaranteed by America and the Soviet Union.

E The paradox, Mr Berthoin suggested, was that in order to have detente it might now be necessary to return to a notion of massive retaliation. How could this "comeback" of former ideas be best handled? This might be a problem East and West would have to face in the near future.

F It was interesting to note from paragraph 8 of the NATO communique that there was an emphasis on increasing conventional capability but nothing on the non-conventional means of action. Having read the communique but not having the experience of Ambassador Cleveland, he had been unable to see if the possibility existed of a return to the

★ old strategic concept of massive retaliation. At first glance it seemed ruled out and this is why he felt that the question should be asked.

A With regard to what Mr George Brown had said on the attitude of the Soviets to Western Germany, Mr Berthoin said that he had heard from Soviet sources not entirely negative views expressed on the point he made about the existence of a strong and well-structured European Community as an objective contribution to the solution of the German problem acceptable to all its neighbours and acceptable to itself. This was not feared nearly so much as the existence of an exclusive German influence in Washington or a Western Germany left to worry only about purely German problems in a German context.

B Mr Berthoin felt that the main lesson to be drawn from the crisis in Central Europe was that at all levels efforts should be intensified towards the formation of a United Europe.

Mr PIETRO QUARONI (President, Italian Radio-Television; former Ambassador) said that the NATO communique was rather like an iceberg. To the Russians it was of no importance what the French or the British or the Germans might do; the only thing of importance to them was what the Americans might do.

C The most important question now concerned the detente: whether to go on with it or not. He fully agreed with Mr Lecanuet that detente was not possible; the only thing that was possible was coexistence - and coexistence in the eyes of the Russians was not the same as coexistence in the eyes of the West. There were still, however, many people in Europe who believed that detente was possible. "I think we have to persuade them", said Mr Quaroni, "that detente is not possible." Mr Thomas had suggested that the leadership in the Kremlin was mediocre. This was an understatement, in Mr Quaroni's view! It might be said that as a result of this the balance between East and West had been re-established. It was consoling to find mediocrity on both sides. "But, being mediocre, I think we can trust the Russians to do everything within their power to help us put our confused ideas in order", said Mr Quaroni, "so, by God, let us try detente if that is what they want!"

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E The relations with the Russians were on two planes. One was the nuclear plane. Here both sides, American and Russian, were convinced that nuclear war must be avoided. This had led them to subscribe to a sort of "non-suicide" pact. It was an unwritten pact. This necessity of avoiding nuclear war made conversation between the Americans and the Russians necessary. This was not detente; it was not coexistence; it was simply a way of arranging things to conform to a certain mutual interest. In terms of this conversation the Europeans had nothing to do because they were not nuclear powers in the true sense, even though Great Britain and France had illusions of being nuclear powers.

F In the eyes of the Russians they were about as nuclear as a



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flea confronting an elephant. There was a sort of "sub-nuclear" situation, however, and the Russians and Americans had to see that this "sub-nuclear" contest did not escalate, but apart from that the contest was free. Suslov had pointed out quite clearly, "We need coexistence in order to avoid a nuclear war but at the same time we must organise the masses against imperialism and exploit the conflicts within imperialism in order to give it a definite blow." The Russians had this very clear policy always of working on two different fronts. This did not seem to be so clear to the Americans. It was very clear at the lower levels but not always so clear at the higher levels! It was not at all clear to the Europeans, whose foreign policies were in terms of historic precedents, and there was no precedent in history for the present situation. It must be understood that detente - for want of a better word - could only be between Russia and America.

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B Referring to Mr Brown's earlier comments about detente with the "minor" Communist states, Mr Quaroni said that it had to be borne in mind that action of this sort could destroy the Russians' "empire". He was not suggesting that it should not be tried but to the Russians it was a hostile policy. The ideal thing would be for the Americans to try for detente with the Russians and for the other members of NATO to try for detente with the "minor" Communist states! But this was a division of jobs which could only be achieved if the Russians went on helping the West to feel a common language and a common view of things by doing a series of "Czechoslovakias" and other things!

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"Detente as such is an illusion", declared Mr Quaroni. "We cannot have detente. We must be content with co-existence. Our grandfathers had much clearer ideas than we have. When there was no war there was peace. We, on the contrary, are not content with that. We want peace signed by a notary and possibly with a judicial executor. This we shall never get until Russia is ruled by people who no longer believe in Communism." As long as there were convinced Communists at the head of affairs in Russia there would not be detente; only coexistence.

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E Mr PER T. FEDERSPIEL (Denmark) said that in face of the situation on 21st August many of them had felt a sense of shock that their Governments had protested but done very little. It was not really until the issuing of the NATO communique that any kind of answer was given on the assumption that what the Russians did to Czechoslovakia might well be the beginning of a wider policy.

F "Although I agree with Mr Thomas in his judgment on the Russian leadership", Mr Federspiel continued, "I wonder whether we can base any policy on the weakness and indecision of the Russians. Certainly we have not seen in this situation the hand of a Stalin or even the gambling ability of a Khrushchev." He believed that the Russians had taken what was regarded by them as a very calculated risk. They knew perfectly well that the invasion of Czechoslovakia would not lead to any kind of nuclear war. But was it really only

their fear of the contagion of Czech "liberalism"? "We are beginning to hear from a number of sources", said Mr Federspiel, one of them an extremely experienced ex-Communist, that the Russian action might just as well have been based on the fear that there was a rapprochement beginning between Easter and Western Germany, and also that the Russians might be considering the existence of some other 'no man's land' than Czechoslovakia. This might be an explanation for this massive invasion with far more troops than were needed to deal with the Czech situation."

"The only reaction from the West European Governments", said Mr Federspiel, "was really talk about this situation not disturbing the policy of detente. I fully agree with what has been said by Mr Lecanuet and others here today - that detente is really nothing more than coexistence. There might be a question of detente but only between the United States and the Soviet Union. No other powers will be able to contribute anything to what we like to describe as detente."

Mr Federspiel felt that the warning given by the NATO communique had come too late. It would probably serve to guide the policy of the Western European Governments but would it make very much impression in Moscow? What symptoms were there of any ulterior action on the part of the Russians? There were plenty of symptoms in the form of activities in the Mediterranean, which may or may not be expansionist in character - it could be just a demonstration of power - but certainly NATO could not afford to take any risk in these things.

Mr Federspiel maintained that there could be no detente in Europe unless it in some way or other ended in a solution of the German problem.

The Russians, for their part, might be saying, in effect, "We are not prepared to discuss any solution to the German problem; we are not going to tolerate any interference with the integration of our Communist 'commonwealth'." "Unless we come to some understanding with the Russians on the question of Germany", Mr Federspiel concluded, "I really think that all this talk about detente is so much skirmishing around policies which have no substance."

The PRESIDENT, before adjourning the meeting, reported that Mr Pipinelia, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, had telephoned to say that it was impossible for him to come, that he was very sorry about this, but would be at the next meeting.

Unfortunately, Mr Pacciardi, who had been present very briefly during the morning session, was not at all well and had had to absent himself.

The meeting adjourned at 5.30 p.m.  
until 10.30 a.m. the following day.

\* SECOND DAY: Tuesday, November 19, 1968, at 10.30 a.m.

A Mr PAOLO A. V. CUNHA (Portugal), in the course of a survey of the world political situation as he saw it, said that although there was trouble in the Mediterranean because of the rivalry between Egypt and Israel, the real cause of it was the arrival of the Russians in the area. The Russian Fleet and Russian aircraft were in Algeria, Libya and elsewhere, and the American Fleet no longer had the freedom of action it formerly enjoyed.

He was very pleased to have heard the rather stronger tone of the last communique of the NATO Council, although it still was not as strong as it might have been. On the other hand, it was a good step forward and must be welcomed as such.

B Paragraph 6 urged the Soviet Union to refrain from using force and interfering in the affairs of other states. It was right to start from basic principles and to be faithful to them. Unfortunately, in the Western Hemisphere there was no real coherence, and this was a very negative feature.

C The American action in Vietnam was not seen in a very good light in the West. The world did not seem to understand the greay effort being made there - an effort which had saved Asia from an even stronger move towards Communism.

D Mr Cunha then turned to Rhodesia, a country in which order prevailed and which had done a great deal to develop a backward part of the African continent. He realised that the black population, which was more numerous than the white, wanted complete equality, but this was not a problem which should concern the United Nations. It was surely a problem for the United Kingdom and Rhodesia alone, just as the United Nations should have no concern with Portugal's problems in Africa. Portugal remained faithful to international principles at all times but unfortunately this could not be said of many other nations in the UN. All sorts of people became very emotional about Africa but they showed no concern with the problem of Gos, the province of Portugal in India which was crushed by the Indian Government, and where there were nearly a million Porguguese who could not vote. Gos had been a province of Portugal since the 16th century, with a traditional Portuguese culture. Though the people were not the same, they were certainly Portuguese in their hearts and wanted to be Portuguese, but no one was concerned with them. Why should there be these terrible contradictions?

F What Russia had done in Czechoslovakia was terrible, and everyone in Portugal took the same view about it, but it was not only in Czechoslovakia that these things happened. In Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa people were happy and tranquil, but the UN wanted to create disorder. There were many states in Africa which

had achieved "liberty" without achieving maturity, and the situation today certainly could not be a happy one for the coloured people. Only those who had managed to become ministers and ambassadors could possibly be any happier! "We should examine our consciences and review all these things", said Mr Cunha, "for we seem to be creating a world which is based on false ideas."

Referring to the reunification of Germany, Mr Cunha said that he was a great friend of Chancellor Kiesinger since they had first attended a seminar years ago. He had had the pleasure of receiving Chancellor Kiesinger in Portugal and had told him in very clear terms that Portugal would support the reunification of Germany. Dr Kiesinger was kind enough to express his support for the Portuguese cause, which he understood to be a very good one.

The problem of France was rather worrying and the events of May 1968 were not easy to understand. He had put it to Mr Lecanuet, who had been unable to explain it. Everywhere there were movements of students and strikes of one sort and another, but the situation had been worse in France than elsewhere. Then General de Gaulle had managed to put things right and won the election with a great majority. There was something peculiar about the whole series of events and it would be interesting to have it analysed.

Mr Cunha agreed with previous speakers who had said that military strategy had been changed throughout the world, so that there was now an emphasis on a new "conventional" strategy. This made detente more difficult. But in spite of this it was necessary to persevere, and to look to China as well as to Russia and Eastern Europe. A good deal of what happened in Africa sprang from Chinese initiative. In many of the newly independent territories there were Chinese elements at work, especially in East Africa. If there were to be a war it would be extremely dangerous to have a Chinese presence there. The Chinese were also busily at work in South America, as well as the Russians, but, of course, Americans knew this well.

"Let us try not to have another Cuba either in South American or in Africa", urged Mr Cunha. In Europe and in Africa, Portugal, though only a small nation, knew how to defend herself, even alone. If there were no "Vietnams" in Africa it was in great part due to the spirited attitude of the Portuguese in defence of civilisation in that part of the world, and the Americans should pay due heed to this.

Mr WOLFGANG WAGNER (Acting Director, Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik. Publisher, Europa Archiv) (Germany) said that as a journalist he could imagine how the RFE representatives must feel after yesterday's

discussion, during which there had been some very strong remarks to the effect that detente was inconceivable! What should Radio Free Europe do in the future? Should it proclaim that detente was impossible and that there was no hope for improvement in Europe; that there was no hope of overcoming the Soviet rule over Eastern Europe?

Mr Wagner said that in trying to give advice to RFE his thesis fell into two parts. The first was that NATO should start from the conviction that detente was not possible as long as there was no major change in Soviet policy. This might never come or it might take decades. This meant that NATO should not relax as it had relaxed prior to the Czech crisis. It meant that, following the Czech crisis, the opportunity should be taken to introduce improvements in NATO which should have been introduced before. The second part of this thesis was that in their relationships with the Eastern nations they should behave as if detente were possible, maintaining the objective of overcoming the present partitioning of Europe. They should continue making proposals like the German proposal of a mutual renunciation of force. "Speaking as a German", said Mr Wagner, "the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line even might be useful in this respect."

It had to be understood that German politicians faced a dilemma. Previously the Soviets attacked the Federal Republic because its policy was considered to be hostile to the Soviet Union; the Federal Republic was attacked as a "cold warrior" and so on. Now, after the change of German policy towards the East it was said by the Soviets that the Federal Republic had adopted a more subtle method of "aggression" towards the East, which was even worse than what was happening before!

The question not only for the Federal Republic but for the West as a whole was what should be done in the future. "I think we should continue doing what we have done in the last two or three years", said Mr Wagner. "This means continuing with a policy of detente."

It was not sheer coincidence that the Soviet Union encountered difficulties several times in Eastern Europe: first in 1953 in Eastern Germany, after Stalin's death, when a feeling of detente came up in Europe; secondly in 1956, after the neutralisation of Austria, and when the same sort of feeling arose in Hungary and Poland; and thirdly, again in an era of detente, in 1968 in Czechoslovakia.

Mr Raffert had warned yesterday of the possible effects of new attempts to overcome Soviet rule in Eastern Europe. "It is not our concern to care for the comfort of the Soviet leadership", Mr Wagner concluded. "On the contrary, our objective should be related to the discomfort of the Soviet leadership."

Mr PER T. FEDERSPIEL (Denmark) thought it was wrong to speak about a "policy of detente", which he had always found very difficult to define. "Detente" was a state of affairs in which tensions were relaxed. One of the best illustrations of the difficulty of this question was the fact that "detente" was almost untranslatable except into German which had the term entspannung which means precisely the relieving of tension.

The Russians had made it quite clear that any political approach by any Western power, even a small one, would be considered as interference in their internal affairs. This obviously limited the approach very considerably. "But what are we seeking?", asked Mr Federspiel. "We are aiming at a better sort of living with the peoples of the East. Can we do anything other than take this up in little ways, making contacts whenever it is reasonable and wherever it does not raise a major political problem with Russia, which will probably set the whole thing back again? This is why I think we should get away from this idea of a 'policy of detente' and address ourselves instead to working out policies in various practical fields which will help in the solution of limited problems."

Mr Wagner had spoken of the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line. "I have never been able to understand how this could relieve any sort of tension", said Mr Federspiel. "As far as I can see, the one reason why the Eastern countries demand this is to get an indirect recognition of the existence of Eastern Germany - and for one very simple reason. Either we accept the right of the German people to self-determination, in which case it is obviously necessary to define within which frontiers this self-determination should be expressed; or, if we take the Russian thesis that Eastern Germany is a state in its own right, what on earth does the question of the Polish-East German frontier have to do with the rest of Europe? This is why I believe that this is not one of the ways in which we can approach detente - by accepting a certain thesis which is really a Russian alibi for having shifted Poland a few hundred kilometres towards the West."

"We should be very careful", Mr Federspiel warned, "in our thinking about detente. It is a state of affairs which can possibly be achieved by a number of policies but not by a combined 'policy of detente'. It may be an ultimate aim but it cannot be a policy in itself."

Lord CARRON (Director, Bank of England; former President, Amalgamated Engineering Union) (Great Britain) said that he was in agreement with the sentiments expressed by Mr Federspiel: that the situation must be looked at in a pragmatic manner, rather than looking for a general policy decision, which might lead to substantial difficulties instead of furthering the ideals of the West.

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 "I should like to refer to a speech made by a former colleague of General Clay", said Lord Carron, "whom he knows very well, who operated with him in the Control Commission immediately following the War, and who as a consequence has a very substantial assessment of the Russian mentality, particularly in the military sense. He said, quite simply, that the leopard does not change his spots, expressing surprise that people should have been unprepared for what happened in Czechoslovakia."

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 In the military sense, of course, NATO had to be alerted, and it was more than a pity that some weaknesses had been observed. While not quarrelling with the communique, he felt that those who had been around for a while would tend to read not only the lines but what was between them. The recent experience had undoubtedly alerted people, and NATO would have to be strengthened somehow, despite the economic difficulties of some of the participants.

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 In considering the situation in Czechoslovakia there had, understandably, been a heavy emphasis on the military aspects, but there were also economic and psychological aspects to consider. This applied particularly to any consideration of Russian strategy. In many countries the enemy could reap considerable havoc without engaging in either a conventional or a nuclear war, and these activities were not nearly so fully recognised and realised as they should be. "The fact that in many instances success can be achieved by the Soviet Union in regard to the economic fortunes of many nations is an indication", suggested Lord Carron, "of the basic strength of the institutions.... We must never forget that these institutions have rather long tentacles and can operate effectively in the economies of many nations."

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 There were many aspects of the psychological field but one would not expect, said Lord Carron, to find the same response from Soviet nationals that one would expect from other territories in Eastern Europe. "I consider that the work of Radio Free Europe should go on completely unimpaired, and strengthened if necessary", said Lord Carron, "for getting across directly to the people in these territories does continue to give them hope which otherwise they would not have. In Czechoslovakia and the other territories the desire for freedom looms very large, but we must not forget that human beings, as well as having ideas, have human needs, and one of the very many factors producing the situation in Czechoslovakia was that, because of Russian operations, the population economically speaking had a much lower living standard than they knew they should have had."

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 He was very glad to have had the opportunity through Radio Free Europe occasionally to give some indications of what was happening in the United Kingdom, referring to the living standards of people.

Results could not be expected in five minutes but history showed that gradually the feelings of people were being aroused, and however powerful a political regime might appear to be at a particular time, it should not be assumed that it would continue for ever. Radio Free Europe was giving very considerable help to the peoples of Eastern Europe and should certainly continue on the same lines as before. He hoped that in this respect due emphasis would be given to the economic factors.

Mr ALBERTO FOLOCHI (Professor of Law, University of Rome; former Minister of Sports and Tourism; former Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) (Italy), referring to the activities of Radio Free Europe, suggested that in dealing with the Communist regime account should be taken of Christian ideologies. A good deal could be made of these through the mass media.

On the other hand, Mr Berthoin had spoken of changes in strategy and of the return to "conventional" ideas. The problem of the strategy of NATO was one of great concern, and especially the aspect of a "graduated retaliation". It was difficult in the end to see how valuable an "atomic response" could be, apart from being a way of going to heaven, perhaps!

Very special attention must be given to the so-called "grey" areas - the nations to which Russian threats might be directed. Yugoslavia, for example, was very important in the Italian context. If there were a military occupation by the Soviets what should be the Italian reaction? "I think we should reason in terms of avoiding suicide", said Mr Folchi, "but of course we could not just stand by and look on if nations such as this were invaded by Russia."

Mr Folchi referred to the Geneva conference of non-nuclear powers, in which he had participated. Nations close to Communism and the Communist ideas had said that they could not hope for very much from the West. In fact the inertia of the West in regard to Czechoslovakia had been very clear. Something stronger might have been done, without becoming involved in an armed conflict. The Russians should be made to understand that a return to the Cold War would have serious consequences for them. The inertia of the West had also made easier the position of the "hawks" in the Kremlin and enabled them to take a stronger line in various respects.

The Geneva conference had also discussed the needs of the non-nuclear nations to be able to utilise nuclear energy in certain types of production. This had a close relationship to the technological and economic gap between Europe and other nations. Unfortunately, there was not much encouragement given by the "happy possessors" of nuclear techniques. However, it was decided that the dialogue should be continued, not only among the non-nuclear powers but



also between the nuclear and the non-nuclear. The availability of nuclear technique was of very great importance to economic development, as everyone knew, and the achievement of higher living standards and greater economic stability was very necessary in order to have security in international relations.

Mr JEAN LECANUET (France) remarked on the recent increase in international tension and the apparent intensity of the thirst of some speakers for detente! As Mr Federspiel had pointed out, "detente", a French word, did not seem to be translatable in any exact sense. For this reason there was bound to be confusion, apart from other reasons. Clearly, as the meeting had shown, "detente" could have many interpretations and could cover many different political concepts and ideas. Without attempting to make a semantic analysis he would try to point out some of these meanings.

First of all, there was detente as between the blocs - the Soviet bloc on one side, covered by the Warsaw Pact, and the Atlantic bloc. Happily for some people, but unhappily for others, the latter was no longer really a bloc. Then there was a possibility one day of a Chinese bloc in the Far East. Was there or was there not a detente between the blocs? He was tempted to reply that in a certain way there was, in the sense of having passed from a Cold War, which seemed to be the prelude to a hot war, to a sort of coexistence. According to their own requirements, people on both sides were doing everything possible to avoid a nuclear war, the results of which need not be pointed out. But on the Soviet side coexistence seemed to include a permanent offensive on the part of the Communist world against the free world by every means. This being so, to some observers the events in Prague had not been very surprising.

In the case of Cuba, the Soviet Union did not push its offensive further because of the United States' reaction. What Radio Free Europe has said about the events in Czechoslovakia was reserved and prudent, giving support to the Czech people but not calling for anything dramatic to be done. "I believe that the Soviet Union knew perfectly well that it did not incur any risk of retaliation of any type", said Mr Lecanuet, "neither military nor economic. On the other hand, they must have appreciated that there were other risks, such as the concern which would be produced in the Free World and also in the Communist Parties - especially those of Italy and France."

Mr Lecanuet went on to say that there was, then, a type of detente in the sense of coexistence between blocs, but this coexistence did not envisage, neither for today nor for tomorrow, any form of reunification of Germany. If, unhappily, the people of the Federal Republic of Germany were to choose, freely and spontaneously, a Communist Chancellor, Germany still would not be unified.

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The second type of detente (which had frequently been explained to the French people by the head of state) was completely different from the first. It was detente within Europe, the idea being apparently to bring this about by the withdrawal of the two great powers. This was a thesis which had not met with any success. It was not even clear whether this Europe that the General had in mind included Great Britain or not. Mr Lecanuet regarded it as a dangerous illusion. This concept of detent would destroy all the progress being made from the starting point of the EEC and did not appear to allow for the inclusion of Britain. Furthermore, a Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals" would really be a Soviet Europe in terms of the balance of forces. For these reasons, Mr Lecanuet said that he was totally opposed to this notion of detente and wanted to see it vanish, because it was very dangerous.

B Detente, which really coincided with coexistence, could ~~exist~~ only if the equilibrium of forces were maintained. A detente which disintegrated the energy of the Free World would only encourage the aggression of the Soviet World. In this sense the NATO communique, as explained by Ambassador Cleveland, was very good. The only basis of coexistence, reiterated Mr Lecanuet, was equilibrium of forces.

C Then there was the idea of the European Community enlarged by the presence of Britain and other nations which would follow the entry of Britain. A Europe which was strong economically would have a higher standard of living and would be capable of providing both liberty and social progress - something the Communist nations were not able to do.

D Another aspect of detente was disarmament, and the nations of the Free World were always prepared for possibilities in this direction, on a realistic basis.

The free nations of Europe also had a contribution to make to the development of the newly independent states and could do a great deal to help them both economically and politically.

E A strong Europe, with the emphasis on liberty, would be able to prevent any domination by the Soviets, and would be an example to the rest of the world. Such a Europe would be able to think of detente in a realistic manner.

F Mr STEPHAN THOMAS (Germany) said that detente was really a very dynamic principle. It did not mean appeasement, and should be seen in a kind of dialectical dimension. The Soviet leadership were, he thought, going back to the classical formula of Marxism-Leninism, the theory that the relationship with the West must be of an antagonistic character. The documents justifying the intervention in Czecho-

slovakia were full of the classical terminology about counter-revolution, imperialistic aims, etc. But at times of real tension there had always been this kind of assessment of the antagonism between the two camps. There had been the famous Zhdanov line of 1947, leading up to the Berlin conflict, the blockade, and the terrific confrontation in the last years of Stalin. In 1957, too, under Khrushchev, there had been an affirmation of the tension and hostility in regard to the West, leading up to the difficulties in 1961 in Berlin and to the Cuba situation of October 1962. The dogmatic assessment of Brezhnev-Kosygin was of the same character, and in respect to this detente was a dynamic policy.

One of the main items in all the Russian documents concerning Czechoslovakia was the German 'drang nach Osten, economically and politically, into Czechoslovakia. This was seen as a very clever, very insidious, new form of approach to a basic objective. In fact, the Federal Republic had, of course, been seeking a new neighbourliness, liquidating the tragic burden of the past. This was a dynamic policy, trying to create a climate of confidence, and Ulbricht and Gomulka were very much afraid of this. It was a growing, new dimension of reality.

One of the greatest crimes of the intervention in Czechoslovakia, said Mr Thomas, was that against the spirit of the time, the zeitgeist. This zeitgeist was something which could not be realised in Moscow because it was a dimension of life which was unknown to them. The Soviet leaders thought only in Marxist-Leninist terms. He believed that the Czechoslovak occupation would prove to be a real turning point against the dogmatists in Moscow. From this point of view he saw detente as realpolitik in the best sense of the term, and it was this that really worried the Russians and their satellites, people like Ulbricht and Gomulka.

There had never been any real declaration in Lenin's time concerning coexistence; this was something which was made up later. But it meant only coexistence in time - for as long as the Soviet strategy felt a need for it. This should not be forgotten for one second.

When Mr Wagner mentioned the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line there had (thought Mr Thomas) been a certain reaction to the statement. "Speaking only for myself", Mr Thomas went on, "I happen to know the Polish nation and the German nation very intimately for very personal reasons, and we have discussed the Oder-Neisse line in our own circles." Two or three years ago the Poles had celebrated 1000 years of Polish history. This was really 1000 years of Polish-German history, during which there had been centuries of harmony, culminating in a tragic 200 years and the Hitler barbarities.

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"My own feeling", said Mr Thomas, "is that if the Bundesrepublik declared that the Oder-Neisse line was to be the future frontier between the Poles and the Germans, it would not be believed in the sense of a political decision. The Poles would simply say 'Niemec' and refer to the history of the last 30 years. The immediate, spontaneous, reaction of the Poles would be an 'anti' reaction. For this reason I would myself plead for a longer perspective in these approaches, so that the Poles could gradually gain confidence in the assertion that there is indeed a new generation growing up in Germany and a new policy which they can trust in the future; that there is a real basis for a great period of German-Polish neighbourliness and harmony."

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Mr Thomas said that obviously if some kind of development of this sort were to take place over a period it would mean that there would inevitably be a rift between the beliefs of the Polish nation and the defamatory line of Gomulka and the Communist Party. "For this reason", said Mr Thomas, "I am in a stage of 'agonising reappraisal' of my own political notion of the Oder-Neisse line against the background of the elements we are discussing here. Detente is an element of political strategy in countering the dogmatic conservatism of the Communists. Detente for us must mean dynamism and change in the conservative type leaders in the East. One day it could probably mean a new chapter in East-West relations, with the guarantee of real peace between East and West. I think it is vital to make this clear, and I hope to profit from all the collective wisdom at this meeting."

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Lord DOUGLASS (Former Chairman, Trades Union Congress; former General Secretary, Iron and Steel Trades Confederation) said that he had listened with great interest to the debate on detente. "I am not sure that I can pronounce it", confessed Lord Douglass, "and the more sophisticated the argument the less I believe I know about it!" Drawing on his experience in trade unionism over the past 40 years, he recalled a time when it was believed that the trade unions in the Communist states were trade unions in the sense that they were understood in the West. "It was inevitably found", he said, "that they were not trade unions in the sense that we understand them; they were organs of state: nothing more nor less." In that trade union sense, detente meant living with them and merging opinions with them, but it was a completely impossible theory. But if detente meant each side maintaining the necessary power to hold its own position, this was something he could understand.

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He had first gone to Russia in 1945, when the emotional ties between the countries who were victorious in the War were at their strongest. They had been given a great welcome, but their first impression had been a lack of forthrightness on behalf of their Russian (so-called) trade union colleagues. This was evident when

the discussed the practical processes in steelmaking and knew without any translation that they were not being told the truth, "If you are not told the truth on one thing", added Lord Douglass, "you do not believe you are on other things, and this proved to be the case." As a result, the report issued by the delegation after a few weeks' visit was extremely critical of the Communist regime, and said quite clearly that the trade unions were not trade unions as understood in Britain; that the Soviet Union was based on Marxist materialism, brooking of no opposition. The report was not well received, and was commented on by a Communist as far away as Australia (a man called Thornton); a special pamphlet was brought out to counter the report, but not one of its arguments was properly dealt with. "I had difficulty in our own country", Lord Douglass recalled, "because of the people who still believed there could be a merging of Communism and democracy, and because Khrushchev had said that there were different ways to socialism. What Khrushchev did not say was that there was only one form of socialism that he wanted all the roads to lead to - Marxism. Marxism means having a dictatorship and it is said that in due course the dictatorship will disappear, but, of course, that never happens; once a dictator is established he can only be got rid of by force."

Touching on the international trade union world, Lord Douglass spoke of the difficulties of establishing trade unionism in France, due to the action of the Communists there who wanted to run things in their own way. The employers laughed to see the workers divided and the result was that at the end of the day trade unionism was weak in France. "Unless there is strong and free trade unionism", Lord Douglass asserted, "the ordinary worker is not articulate, because it is only through his trade union that he expresses his opinion. He discusses his problems in his club rooms and this discussion goes all the way up the scale to the top, so that the feeling expressed at the top derives from the man himself. In the Communist countries this cannot possibly apply because the trade unions are simply organs of the state."

Referring to Poland, Lord Douglass said that he had read only last week that 250,000 Poles had been expelled from the Communist Party since 1964. Forty per cent of the existing Party membership of 2 million in Poland had not more than four years' membership. This meant that they were young men. Had the older members become so tired of the Communism they had built up that they had gone out in sheer disgust at what was happening? Were the young men in the movement because Communism had promised them something quickly? If these promises were not made good, would they very shortly be breaking away too? He believed that divisions of opinion had always existed in the Communist countries but were now expressing themselves, in spite of the strong dictatorships. This was one of the most encouraging factors to emerge of recent months. As General Clay had put it, Radio Free Europe had no need to do anything but tell the truth, and in this respect it had a great role to play.

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 "But what is the good of telling them how good deocracy is", asked Lord Douglass, "if we have the divisions which have been expressed in this room this morning? France says that Britain shall not go into the Common Market. Is that a picture of Europe that we ought to show to the Communists? Does France want to join in with the rest of the Western world or be in isolation? These are the questions I am asking myself. Long experience has not made me too happy and I may as well say so now. I have seen too many good things wrecked by eloquent speeches unsupported by satisfactory action from our French friends. I have many friends in France to whom I have expressed these opinions."

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 On Germany it had to be admitted that, because of the history of the last few decades, there was a considerable degree of fear existing, but, nevertheless, history showed that countries learned by experience. All history showed the moving of the fulcrum of power because of the lessons which were learned. "Surely the question that arises", said Lord Douglass, "is this: Are we more afraid of the Communistic countries or of Germany? If the answer is that we are more afraid of Germany than the Communistic countries, we had better face up to that. If that is not the answer, it is time we drew our forces much more closely together."

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 Mr PER HAEKKERUP (Parliamentary Spokesman and Floor Leader of the Social Democratic Party; former Minister of Foreign Affairs) (Denmark) recalled that yesterday Ambassador Quaroni had mentioned the policy of detente in terms of the two main organisations or blocs. Others had said that efforts at detente should be between the individual states. Mr Haekkerup felt that both points of view were in a sense right, and that attempts should be made to obtain a compromise between the two efforts at detente; that various countries should make their own individual attempts at contacts with the Communist countries. It had also been said that such attempts could bring about danger in regard to the Soviet reaction, and that Moscow would pull the strings again.

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 "I feel that we should continue our efforts wherever we can", said Mr Haekkerup, "but on the clear understanding that we should not push our co-operation, either economically or in other ways, more strongly than seems to be wise in relation to Moscow's reaction."

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 Mr Haekkerup felt that the most decisive thing was what was happening as between Moscow and Washington. Although certain steps could be taken in Europe, the final decision would be in the general international detente situation.

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 He also felt that Moscow's attitude might change over the years. The Soviet system was not, he thought, a static one, but undergoing continuous development.

★ They should try to understand the development and to use the opportunities this development might provide in pursuing their own policy.

A As to the point about the suggested recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, Mr Haekkerup felt that if West Germany were to proclaim today its acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line, it would not have any real effect on the Governments in Eastern Europe. "It is too late and too little", he commented, "West Germany could have got something out of it eight or ten years ago but today it is not a bargaining point any more." When we had discussions with Rapacki he said to us that it would be a good step forward if Western Germany would announce its acceptance of the Oder-Neisse frontier, but when Willy Brandt mentioned the possibility of it Rapacki's reaction was 'It is of no interest; it is a question of the recognition of the DDR.'

B Mr Haekkerup said that from his experience he believed there was no fear in the Soviet leadership of Western Germany, but that there was a fear of Germany on the part of the Soviet population. There was a genuine fear of Germany in Poland. The Poles hated the Russians but they had a fear of Germany. There was in Czechoslovakia a fear of Germany. In the last month especially the Soviet leaders had played on this fear in their propaganda. After their occupation of Czechoslovakia their arguments had varied but they ended up by claiming that it had been done because of the "reactionary, revanghist forces in Western Germany". They had used this argument presumably because it was the most likely one to have a reaction among populations with a genuine fear of Germany.

D "The most important thing for us to do", asserted Mr Haekkerup, "is to get across to the populations in these countries the truth about Western Germany: that we are now seeing a new Germany. All our future possibilities depend upon the new German generation. I think I know something about them, and I believe they have learned from history, and that they have a completely different attitude from the generations we knew 30 years ago. If we can get that across to the peoples in Eastern Europe I think it would be the most effective action we could take towards detente. Radio Free Europe is the best means for trying to do this, not by making propaganda but simply by telling again and again the simple truth about what is happening in Germany and what the Germans think."

E H. E. HARLAN CLEVELAND (Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and European Regional Organisations): I think that in this morning's discussions we are beginning to get some relevant concepts but there is still, three months after the Czechoslovak invasion, what I would call a kind of "cultural lag". I think we all find it enormously difficult to adjust our thinking as much as the enormity of this event and its implications require. I am struck by this in

relation to three subjects that have come up in the last 1½ days: on military strategy, on detente and on the question of bloc policy.

On military strategy, it has been years since I heard anybody say that the right strategy ought to be massive retaliation and I was astonished at Mr Berthoin's defence of the 'fifties and the even more astonishing notion that it is only under a policy of massive retaliation that detente is possible.

The trouble with massive retaliation always was - and is even more so today - that it is not credible to the Russians that minor incursions or even substantial exercises of the use of limited conventional force would persuade responsible leaders to incinerate the Northern Hemisphere, to practise "mutual suicide" or whatever other description you may care to attach to the so-called "strategic exchange" - that antiseptic phrase for suicide.

What is possible and what is credible now, with the development of the weaponry, is a policy of "managed escalation" in which it is possible to meet violence at whatever level violence is initiated. We are close to being able to do this. The parts of the "violence spectrum" that are weakest are, first, our ability to think through the implications of tactical nuclear weapons. I have had to learn in NATO to think of weapons the size of Hiroshima bomb as small. Having had no experience with this kind of warfare, nobody knows anything about it, and it is proving in the Nuclear Planning Group of NATO a fascinating and extremely difficult task to figure out under what conditions these weapons might be used - especially to use them first. It is not inconceivable; it is just very difficult and very dangerous. Having filled in now that part of the escalator, it becomes possible to present a Soviet planner with an insoluble problem: namely, he cannot tell his political boss possibly that, starting at any given level of violence, he is proof against escalation to forms of warfare that neither the Soviets nor we understand, because there has never been any experience; and that degree of uncertainty constitutes the deterrent even to comparatively small aggressions across the line that we have drawn.

It seems to me that it is precisely this graduated or "managed" escalation (which I think is the better term) which is the kind of military strategy that makes a policy of detente possible.

What is detente? Everybody has taken a crack at defining it. I prefer to adapt Clausewitz and to call detente not "relaxation" but "a continuation of tension by other means."

The reason I think this Czech affair is such an enormous watershed in post-War history is that it dramatises the moment in post-War history at which the Soviets, having talked coexistence for 20 years, suddenly decided that they really could not stand competitive coexistence.



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Our own side, the West, having for years been afraid of getting into a dialogue of a peaceful sort, a competition of a peaceful sort, with the Soviets, suddenly find that, having dipped our toes in coexistence, it is perfectly safe from our point of view; it is only dangerous from the Soviet point of view! This means that the Soviet doctrine of coexistence and the apparent Soviet moves towards detente in recent years are now seen by them as contradictory to their other primary desire, which is the maintenance of the status quo in Europe.

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There is a kind of Greek tragedy about the situation in Europe from the Russian point of view, for the continuing progress of the West economically and in terms of prosperity, and particularly the continuing growth in power in many different ways of the Federal Republic, make the maintenance of the status quo not really a feasible policy over the medium term - say over the next ten years. But they do not have any other policy, and they have found - and dramatised in their Czech adventure - that the detente is de-stabilising from their point of view, which is among the best reasons for that to be pursued as a policy by us in the presence of an equilibrium of military force and a disequilibrium of political force.

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Where does our "bloc" fit into that kind of picture? What makes me wince every time I hear it is the assertion, in Europe and at home also, still very widespread, ~~it seems to me~~, that our policy about having an Atlantic Alliance should be primarily dependent on what the Soviets do about their Alliance. This has been the Soviet line for many years: "Let us break up blocs. We'll break up our bloc and you break up your bloc." This is General de Gaulle's line also, of course: "Let's break up blocs, starting with our own." But in fact the breaking up of the Soviet bloc (the domination by the Soviets of their neighbours) is proceeding, and I think it is reasonable to see the Czechoslovak affair as the latest and by no means the last spasm in the decomposition of that bloc.

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But suppose there is a move over the next ten years in the direction of some kind of accommodation with the Soviet Union about Europe - something like what is called "European settlement" - we need our bloc for the maintenance of our side of the military equilibrium; we need our bloc as the consultative caucus for the negotiations leading toward any kind of European settlement and arrangements to answer the German question and the Berlin question, regardless of how the actual negotiations take place. My personal hunch is that too much of the negotiation will tend to take place between the US and the USSR, for when the USSR are really serious about wanting to talk they will feel they have to talk to us; so it is important for us and the Europeans to have a caucus (which at the moment is the North Atlantic Council) to be both our guarantee that we will consult and other people's guarantee that they will be cut into matters affecting their destiny; and to the extent that the European side of that caucus can itself become an effective caucus, so much the better.

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A So we are going to need the bloc for military equilibrium and for the management of these negotiations - the management of detente, if you will. And suppose we get some kind of bargain with the Soviets down the corridors of time somewhere, who is going to keep the deal honest anyway? Are we going to have Nigerian troops working in the UN as a peace-keeping force; or is the peace-keeping force that prevents the European bargain from being broken not going to consist of another kind of "managed balance of power", hopefully with mutual reduction of forces so that it does not have to be so expensive on both sides, and so that the presence of Soviet and American forces does not have to be quite so evident and quite so close? But still we are going to have to be in the act, because we are the offset to the Soviets, for better or worse, and there will have to be, therefore, a continuation of a kind of "managed balance" as the peace-keeping device in a European settlement.

B We are going to be in business together for a long time, and I think it is probably time that we stopped thinking of the Atlantic arrangements as something that could be broken up and swept away just as soon as something happens on the other side. Regardless of what happens on the other side, whether they play it tough for 25 years on the present line or whether they become gradually in such a state of disarray on their side that they have to make some form of peace with the West, I think we are going to need, whether we call it NATO or not, some kind of solidarity organisation with both military and political policies.

C This is the kind of perspective for the future that I would - if it were my responsibility - want to broadcast for Radio Free Europe.

D Mr JAROSLAV PECHACEK (Director, Czechoslovak Broadcasting Department, Radio Free Europe, Munich), at the President's invitation, then gave the latest information available on Czechoslovakia.

E There were only, he said, the reports received from Radio Prague and material just received from Munich. A lot of thinking had been expected to be done at the Central Committee meeting of the Party. There had been some rumours even that Dubcek would be ousted from his position and that a split would occur in the Praesidium of the Party in Dubcek's group. The "conservatives" had made preparations in advance for their attempt, holding a lot of meetings under the auspices and with the support of the Soviet military groups. A big meeting had recently been held in Prague, in the biggest hall there, in which 5,000 people took part. A direct attack had been made on Dubcek and his post-January policy. The Central Committee of the Party still consisted of people from Novotny's era, because it had been created during Novotny's time, before January, but later it had been enlarged by the co-optation of Dubcek's people, so that the forces after the May plenum were rather balanced in favour of Dubcek's group. But there was a question whether this co-optation would be approved; whether it would not be

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challenged by the conservatives. Since the Party statutes did not have a provision making possible co-optation, this measure could easily have been condemned as illegal by the conservatives, and the balance of forces would definitely again be in favour of the conservatives. But nothing like that happened during the session, so this meant that Dubcek still had a majority in support of his post-January policy - a large majority, in fact.

The conservatives had led a very strong attack on Dubcek and his people, and Dubcek personally, on Smrkovsky and other close collaborators of Dubcek, especially Spacek and Simon, insisting on changes in the various elected organs and bodies of the Party. So far the conservatives had not succeeded.

A special 8 member Executive Committee of the 21 members of the Politbureau had been created, and in this body the Dubcek group still have a comfortable majority. The new member of this group was President Svoboda, who still enjoyed a position of very strong authority and respect, not only among the Czechoslovak population but also with the Soviets. This was very important, especially during the crucial negotiations in Moscow in August.

Only two of this 8 member body were openly against Dubcek and his policy, and behind one of them a question-mark still had to be placed.

But as far as the Secretariat of the Party was concerned, the situation was worse. One of the Moscow men, Indra, under the direct command and instruction of the Soviet Union, was now in command not only (as he used to be) of economic and financial matters; he was now also in charge of cadres matters. This meant that, without consulting Dubcek, he had already been able to bring some anti-Dubcek elements into the Secretariat of the Party.

Then there was another unfavourable development. There was a special body acting for the Czech Communist Party, which until now had not existed. There had been a Czechoslovak Party and a Slovak Party. By January there would be a federalistic system but as yet there was no Czech Communist Party. It was supposed to be created in November but its founding convention was now to be held some time in 1969, after the Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

"We have already the text of the resolution", reported Mr Pechacek. "Dubcek's people are still in command in the elected bodies but the position in the Secretariat is more precarious. As far as the resolution is concerned, the Soviet did not get what they had expected. The session did not condemn the post-January development; it only criticised some aspects and phenomena during this process. They did not get what they expected to get, which was a statement that there were anti-revolutionary forces working within and outside the Party, that the Party was unable to control this development, and that this was why the Soviet Union and four other socialist countries had had to come to save the cause of socialism

in Czechoslovakia." There was a kind of mild criticism of developments since January, but the session had condemned very strongly the policy of the Party in the 'fifties and the early 'sixties, suggesting at the same time that there would be no return to the policy before January 1968. At the same time, it was accepted that the communications media must be incorporated into the process of forming and creating Party policy, in order to convey in a better way the Party policy and decisions of the Party.

It was interesting that on the one hand the resolution warned the liberal forces, but at the same time it condemned very strongly those people and those groups in the service of Moscow, suggesting that no "sectarian" activity or distribution of illegal material would be tolerated. It was known that the activity of Jodas, Kapek and others was supported directly by the Soviets, and that the Soviets distributed the so-called Zpravy in millions of copies daily. There was also a radio station, located in Dresden in East Germany, working for the Soviets, called Vlatava (Moldau), making vicious attacks on Dubcek and his people. This went on continually with the open support and authority of the Soviet and East German officials.

What was the general picture now, after this session? The session was over but the struggle would continue. The conservatives would be supported also in future openly by the Soviets. The Soviets would insist upon having their own advisers (people of Russian origin) in the Secretariat and in the central organs of the Party and the State; they would insist upon having their advisers all round the country - not only in the army but in the schools and universities. Every development in Czechoslovakia was to be directly under control. Of course, this would be strongly opposed. Dubcek was not inclined to resign, nor was Svoboda nor Smrkovsky nor other people. They were resolute in continuing their heroic struggle to save as much as could be saved from the post-January achievements and development. Nobody could tell what would be the outcome of the struggle; it depended very much on the international situation and also, as was rightly said yesterday (concluded Mr Pechacek) on the developments in Moscow.

(Luncheon adjournment.)

Resumed:-

Sir GEOFFREY DE FREITAS (Member of Parliament; President, Consultative Assembly, Council of Europe) (Great Britain), commenting on Mr Cunha's reference to Rhodesia, said that he had visited the country several times but had never lived and worked there. He had, however, been British High Commissioner in Nairobi at the time it ceased to be a British colony and became a black-ruled country; and Kenya's conditions were not

wholly dissimilar to those in Rhodesia, in that there was a very large white land-owning community, greatly outnumbered by the blacks. Five years after receiving independence, there was a situation in Kenya in which white people, still owning land, lived in peace under black rule, with law and order: the rule of law prevailed. Last year more white people entered Kenya than left. They were not people who were going to buy land and set up farms or anything like that; they were white people going in as school teachers, technicians, and so on, to work in Kenya. The relationship of the former colonial power towards the black government in these countries was naturally a confused one and would be for several years after independence.

Sir Geoffrey recalled that when he was High Commissioner in West Africa, in Ghana, he had attended a ceremony at which a new bridge was being opened. The minister (an African) had made a long speech in which he criticised white colonialism and the relationship of colonial powers to Black Africa, following which he said, "We will remove all traces of colonialism", and proceeded to say "I now name this bridge the Guggisberg Bridge, in honour of the greatest of the many great colonial Governors we had"! This was a very difficult situation to balance; it was, he thought, a "love-hate" relationship.

Into this arena came Russia and China. The Russians were very clumsy and they were white. The Chinese were just as clumsy but they were not so white. They were also very much more determined, in his own experience. So far they had not achieved the enormous success they might have thought they would, because they were clumsy in their relationship; it was a new field to them.

Referring to Kenya, Sir Geoffrey said that the Russians had sent in enormous quantities of arms, but these were all intercepted, as they were addressed to individual members of the opposition party. It was handled very badly! They had, however, been much more subtle in West Africa, where they had changed the style of their diplomatic representation. Instead of having people who insisted on discussing Marxist-Leninist problems, and talked of enormous outputs per hectare, they had sent attractive young ambassadors with very attractive wives, who were extroverts and fitted in with the character and mode of life of the West African people. The Chinese had not got that far yet. What they had done in East Africa (he did not know whether it was sense or nonsense) was, three or four years ago, to give one million pounds - not even dollars - to an African disgruntled minister to stir up as much trouble as he could!

In Nigeria today, whereas Russia was, among others, supporting the Nigerian Government, the Chinese, among others, were supporting the rebels in Eastern Nigeria.

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A Sir Geoffrey then recalled that in 1963 there had been a very important event in Bulgaria. There was a race riot in which black African students were bashed about by Bulgarians, and this news was very slow in coming out. It was Radio Free Europe which picked it up. Being in Africa at the time, he had only known of it by re-broadcasts from the B.B.C., but the effect of this news when it came out was enormous. "It was realised", said Sir Geoffrey, "that we may be terrible in the Western countries in our treatment of Africans (I am not saying we are, but we may be, for the sake of argument) but these other people are even worse!" By reporting news of this sort Radio Free Europe did enormous service to the West in relation to the Africans.

B Yesterday he had referred to the great importance of having a strong NATO. He had always believed in the balance between a strong NATO and a strong Warsaw Pact, and under this umbrella there could be a detente.

C "I see sitting right opposite me", said Sir Geoffrey, "Mr Deshormes, the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Assembly. In recent years, since I have been much concerned with the Council of Europe, I have not taken as full a part as I would have liked in the NATO Assembly, but I very strongly hope that our Governments over the next year or so will realise that one of the ways of strengthening NATO is by developing its Parliamentary Assembly. At the moment we have a semi-official Assembly but it is important that the NATO countries should get together with their Parliamentary delegations to discuss the problems facing NATO, because our Parliaments need to know these problems and to have people who are informed discussing them in their Parliament. I should like the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, a semi-official body, to become official, and it may be that we would have to combine it - maybe it is a good thing - with our Assembly of West European Union. We could then possibly have a sub-parliamentary assembly of the European members of NATO. Whatever it is, I feel that it is terribly important that we in NATO should have an assembly along the lines of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, where Members of Parliament come and debate and discuss and criticise Governments and then go back, having heard what Governments have to say to their people. They may say that the Governments are not as bad as all that; that this is the problem, and so on. There would be informed discussion and criticism. What I would hope is that RFE would distinguish such a body, and any organisation of NATO, from the role of the Council of Europe itself. I want our defence strengthened and I want Radio Free Europe to say that this is an important body in helping to develop the idea that NATO is not just a bunch of generals; it is controlled by Governments, who are influenced by Parliamentarians."

F So far as the Council of Europe was concerned, he had been most interested in the discussion about detente. The English language was a very rich one; French was also very rich and extremely precise. As Mr Lecanuet had mentioned earlier, there was no precise

translation for "detente". "I can never know exactly what it means in French", said Sir Geoffrey, "but to me it is very clear what we mean by it in English. It is a state of affairs in which there is a relaxation. But I understand from my German colleagues that in their language it has some connotation of a concession. That is not what I mean by 'detente'. It is a state of relaxation. But the point I want to make concerns the mechanics of it. Whether we should regard 'detente' as dynamic or static is irrelevant; what I seek to offer is a suggestion for using an institution we have, the Council of Europe, as a means of bringing about this relaxation."

"I hope", said Sir Geoffrey, "that our Governments will make a more imaginative use of the non-aligned Council of Europe to bring about this state of detente. I hope that Radio Free Europe will draw even more attention than it has in the past to the very nature of the Council of Europe, which is completely different from the military Alliance of NATO. I would draw attention also to the activities of the Assembly and to the much more mundane but very important things the Secretariat do. The Secretariat spend a lot of time in drafting technical conventions which could easily be accepted in Eastern Europe and could contribute to the establishment of a state of affairs of detente. To begin with, there would be just the fact of getting accustomed, at whatever level it is, to sitting round a table, perhaps like this, in alphabetical order, to discuss technical problems such as purer water and the control of pollution in our rivers. I do not hesitate to repeat that in the Council of Europe we have an instrument which could, I believe, be used fruitfully."

Summing up, Sir Geoffrey urged RFE to continue its very sensible contributions about Communism in developing countries. This should be watched all the time. He hoped that it would exploit the means of getting across the story of the strength and importance of NATO: that it was not only an organisation of generals and governments but that there were parliamentarians also concerned with it. He hoped that RFE would distinguish from this the Council of Europe and explain that it was an open-ended organisation which could be of great use in bringing about a detente.

Mr BIRGER KILDAL (Norway), in paying his tribute to the activities of Radio Free Europe, said that, important though it had been in past years, this formidable institution would be much more important in the Western world in the years to come. It was an asset of enormous importance. Those who had taken part in the work of the Advisory Committee from the start, and been many times to Munich and got to know the methods and the daily life inside No.1 English Garden, realised what a tremendous amount of knowledge

\* had been accumulated through the years. RFE went "across" the Iron Curtain; it reached the population and it was listened to. It was constantly, daily, contributing to the forming of public opinion in the various countries of Eastern and Central Europe.

A Mr Kildal felt, however, that all this accumulated knowledge could be used in a much better way if it were distributed on a greater scale than it was at present to the Western journalists in all their countries. As a newspaper man he knew that the information he received through the usual channels from Eastern Europe was far behind that which was accumulated in RFE's files. It would, he felt, be very valuable for all the Western papers, to whichever party they gave their support, to have a greater access to this material. It would also be very valuable if Western journalists could to a greater degree visit Munich and get to know the RFE people and the material of which they were in possession.

B "We are facing now a situation in which a door has not only been closed but slammed", Mr Kildal continued. "I think that door will be shut for many many years to come, so we must start anew trying to get contacts, ties, links, between our part of the world and the Communist-dominated countries. But this is a very difficult question for us as private citizens, as it is also for RFE as an institution. On the one hand we want desperately not to loosen the ties we have had, not to get out of step with the development of public opinion in these countries, but, on the other hand, we know for sure that there is a limit to which we can go. To find this balance is a very important task. If we can find the right balance I think we can have a new start and contribute to keeping alive the spirit of freedom and independence in the difficult times that will come for all the dominated countries in our part of the world."

D He had been very impressed when Mr Federspiel three years ago had spoken of the task he was embarking on, getting into contact with politicians from various countries in Eastern Europe - politician by politician. "If we could start there again", said Mr Kildal, "I think we should also be able to form a basis from which we could work in a wider field. But it is important to find the balance. We must be aware that, however long we debate the question of detente, however we explain that word, the important thing is the Russian conception of detente, and I think there is no detente at all from the Russian point of view."

E He could only agree to a certain extent with what Mr Haekkerup said, especially his point about not going any further than the Russians would accept. The Russians would accept nothing at all and would like RFE to keep quiet!

F They were all, he thought, impressed by the modesty and the balance achieved by the administrators of RFE. The work of RFE was really impressive, and the hopes for the future depended to a great degree on RFE's activities.



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A Mr PIETRO QUARONI (President, Italian Radio-Television; former Ambassador) (Italy) said that the information from Prague published last night, concerning the resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee, was less optimistic than that given by Mr Pechacek. The resolution was, he understood, an open indictment of Mr Dubcek. In this document it was said that the January policy was a compromise which could only generate confusion, and that Mr Dubcek bore personal responsibility for not having prepared the Party for the post-Novotny situation, and having left a free course open to "petty bourgeois adventurers". The first task (according to the resolution) was to restore the unity of the Party on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist international, and friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries; the Party should (it said) adhere strictly to the principles of the democratic centralism and rigid discipline.

B Apart from this, the resolution said there was to be no going back to the policy of the 'fifties, but this did not mean that criticism should not be made about the post-January events.

C Then, of course, the resolution stated that all manifestations of counter-revolutionary activity should be stopped, and that the Party was not going to tolerate any ~~mass~~ declarations which were seeking to influence the policy of the central organs of the Party.

D This resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee showed how far the Russians had gone in getting the Czechoslovaks to recognise their own responsibility for the counter-revolution, so that the Russians could be shown as justified in entering. This was necessary for the Russians in order to calm down the Communist Parties of France and Italy, and to enable them to come back under the Moscow umbrella.

E Activists of the Party had been asked to arrange meetings in order to discuss and support the resolution of the plenum, and in this proclamation the name of Dubcek had not been mentioned. Only the names of Husak and Cernik had been mentioned. This seemed to indicate that Husak and Cernik, as "realists", were detaching themselves from Dubcek.

F Mr PAOLO A. V. CUNHA (Portugal), speaking of Portuguese affairs, said that the repercussions from his country's problems could go much further than some people might expect. Everybody knew that Dr Salazar was very ill. Unhappily, it was impossible to entertain hopes of his total recuperation. The enemies of Portugal quite falsely referred to him as a dictator, and it had been imagined that following him there would be a downfall of the Government. But Portugal was a true democracy and no such thing would happen: democracy was secure. Some had expected

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the leftish parties or the students to provoke trouble, as in France, but, on the contrary, there had been no trouble whatsoever in Portugal. Everything happened quite naturally, in a pure institutional way. Dr Salazar, though a great man, was not the only representative of the regime, which had a value of its own. It was only necessary to ask any man in the street in Portugal about Dr Salazar to see the esteem in which he was held. Everybody was grateful for what Dr Salazar had done for the country. Democracy was not just "Blah, blah, blah" in a parliament - though Portugal had this - but the expression of the true will of the people, who clearly desired the kind of regime Portugal had at the moment. Portugal had only some 10 million inhabitants but was nevertheless of considerable importance in relation to the general policy of Europe. The destiny of Portugal was the destiny of Spain, therefore the result of disorder in the whole peninsula could easily be imagined. Happily, there was no disorder.

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The Portuguese regime (as he had already tried to explain to Lord Douglass) stemmed from the Catholic doctrine, inspired by the Encyclical of John XXIII. A regime standing for this could not be a totalitarian regime. It was not something coming from the state but from the spontaneous initiative of the people. The true interests of the people were represented in every category of life, and these representatives sat in a corporate house and a chamber. He believed that in France there was an intention to change the senate to a body such as that in Portugal.

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Turning to Portugal's overseas problems, Mr Cunha stressed that Portugal was, as always, resolute in defending her interests. The Portuguese position in Africa was very important from the strategic point of view. What would happen to NATO if, on account of formal rules, it did not widen its scope? What would happen if there were a Communist regime established in Angola? The same could be said for Mozambique. What would happen to the Atlantic and Indian Ocean maritime routes? In the United Nations there was always a vote against Portugal; even some of Portugal's friends in NATO abstained. There was a lack of courage on the part of Western powers who must know perfectly well that it was in their interests to have Portugal's position in Africa safeguarded. Every day dozens of Portuguese were dying in defending the cause of the West. Perhaps the situation in Vietnam would open the eyes of the Western nations to the importance of avoiding a second Vietnam in Africa.

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Mr Cunha said that he felt sure that Mr Nixon, whom he knew as a friend and with whom he had spoken at length on the problems of Portuguese Africa, would implement a more intelligent policy in those areas. It was extraordinary that Portugal had offered bases to the United States and to the United Kingdom, and had never asked for or accepted a cent, but there was a great lack of appreciation of the role Portugal was

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playing in defence of Western interests. Mr Cunha recalled the great sympathy shown by John Foster Dulles, who had invited him to visit the United States and discussed these questions with him. Mr Dulles had been accused by Mr Stevenson of being a colonialist, having published with Mr Cunha a communique (the Dulles-Cunha communique) on these important questions. This communique emphasised the importance of the Portuguese position and showed that the territories in Africa were in fact provinces of Portugal and not colonies.

A There was nothing confusing about the situation in Portuguese Africa, where for centuries there had been a total equilibrium between the races. Whatever their racial origin, people had full rights as citizens of Portugal, and since 1820 there had been Portuguese senators of every race.

B Mr Cunha, in conclusion, hoped once again that there would be a more realistic appraisal of the position of Portugal in world affairs, especially in view of the threats from Chinese and Russian interference in Africa.

C Mr JOHN PINDER (Director, Political and Economic Planning) (Great Britain) felt that one factor had not been stressed sufficiently in the course of the most interesting discussion. This was defence integration in Western Europe.

D He felt that a West European defence integration within NATO was a very good idea. It was central to progress towards a United States of Europe which, for many reasons that need not be gone into here, was the solution to many of the problems of Europe. It was quite conceivable, he thought, that during the next year there would be a substantial progress towards a Western European defence integration. If this happened it was certain that the Governments in Russia and Eastern Europe would complain very loudly indeed. They were already saying that the NATO communique was highly provocative, so that the suggestion for defence integration would be regarded as even more provocative. Mr Pinder felt, however, that far from this being the case, a defence community in Western Europe would be a stabilising factor and most definitely not one leaning towards war.

E A united Europe would have the strength and the self-confidence to play a role in the development of a European Security system. Without a fully integrated West European defence community, the term European security system would indeed be no more than a euphemism for a Russian hegemony. It would also point towards the only real solution of the German problem. A proper defence community, which was in effect a United States of Europe, would provide the most far-reaching contribution that it was possible to make to the solution of the German problem. It would be the most genuine and permanent expression that it is possible to conceive of

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the Federal Republic's policy of national Gewaltverzicht, which had been so well emphasised by several speakers. If this could be properly understood by the peoples of Eastern Europe there would be a change in their attitude towards the whole German question, and obviously RFE had a big role to play in this respect.

A Mr PER HAEKKERUP (Parliamentary Spokesman and Floor Leader of the Social Democratic Party; former Minister of Foreign Affairs) (Denmark) said that he happened to be a member of the Board of Directors of the Danish Broadcasting and Television system, which had given quite a good coverage of the events in Czechoslovakia. He wondered to what extent RFE co-operated with the various radio and television corporations in Europe. Having read the RFE reports, B he thought that in some respects the Danish coverage was even a little better. Practical co-operation could well enable them all to achieve a better performance.

C Mr RALPH E. WALTER (Director, Radio Free Europe, Munich), in reply to Mr Haekkerup, said that there was not a great deal of what might be called practical or working formal co-operation with other networks, but during the Czechoslovak crisis they had listened to a great many reports, particularly from German and Austrian television and radio people who were in Czechoslovakia, especially from those who were in Prague. But primarily RFE had relied for its information on a great variety mostly of published reports which appeared through Western correspondents, and, of course, there was extensive monitoring. This was probably the main single valuable source of information for them during that crucial period - all D the so-called clandestine radio stations. This more than any other single feature gave RFE the opportunity to keep abreast of the developments inside Czechoslovakia. This was much more important than the reports from any radio or television sources elsewhere in Europe.

E Mr GEORGE BROWN (Deputy Leader, British Labour Party; Member of Parliament; former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) said that if RFE had a monitoring system, knew what was going on in Czechoslovakia or could interpret it, in the months before the invasion, it was a pity if they were not in touch with those in Britain or Denmark or elsewhere who were concerned. That kind of co-operation would have been very useful. Had there been any contacts on the part of RFE, during the critical months leading up to August, with the British or Danish or other broadcasting authorities? F He did not feel that Mr Walter had quite answered the question.

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A Mr RALPH E. WALTER (Director, Radio Free Europe, Munich), replying to Mr Brown, said that there may have been some misunderstanding as to what happened. Mr Kildal had mentioned that he thought RFE had a great deal of valuable material which was perhaps not widely enough distributed. RFE put out regularly a whole series of background papers and information, many samples of which were to be found on the table here. This was freely and widely distributed. It went to about 700 or 800 people in Western Europe, most of whom were journalists, radio people, Government people, academics, who were particularly interested in Eastern Europe. RFE had a wide acquaintanceship with the Western Press Corps which was involved in the coverage of Eastern Europe. These people frequented the premises of RFE; indeed, throughout the whole crisis period in Czechoslovakia, there were always four, five, six or more Western journalists more or less permanently in the RFE building, just making use of the available information. The information was there and was available to whomever was interested in getting it. There was not a set-up designed specifically to service - by teletype, for example - the radio services of Britain, Denmark, or any other particular country. This would be a fairly complicated and rather expensive operation to which, up to the present, they had not addressed their minds.

C Mr Walter emphasised that the information RFE possessed, whether in a time of crisis or not, was certainly available to anybody interested in sending someone to RFE. It was also true that RFE had offices scattered in 10 major cities of Western Europe, and each of these had a great deal of this information on hand. There was not, as it happened, an office in Denmark (the closest to Denmark was in Stockholm) but there was one in London. The London office had a regular liaison with various people in the B.B.C. who were particularly interested in Eastern Europe; indeed, informal but fairly regular visits were exchanged with these people.

D Research and background information, Mr Walter reiterated, was available to anybody who was interested, wherever he might be, and the more subscribers there were the happier RFE would be.

E Lord CARRON (Director, Bank of England; former President, Amalgamated Engineering Union) said that it was absolutely implicit and axiomatic that if Western Europe were to have the desirable measure of unity, misunderstandings must be eliminated as far as possible and the areas of agreement emphasised.

F This morning Mr Folchi had strongly stressed the vital role of the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the present and particularly in the future. Mr Folchi seemed to have injected a note of criticism that there was a lack of exchange of information

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between the nations with the major expertise and those without it. This was, perhaps, rather misleading. It might well be that Euratom had not achieved all the objectives which some people had wanted it to achieve, but so far as the United Kingdom was concerned, there were quite a number of European nations participating with the UK in nuclear research for peaceful uses in the Harwell establishment. A large number of European nations were participating in the research for the "Dragon" project. There was a consortium formed for this purpose between West Germany, Holland, Belgium, the United Kingdom and others. There was an exchange of information between France and the United Kingdom, and between Italy and the United Kingdom there was co-operation; in fact, there was a joint agency for this purpose. A good proportion of the countries represented at this meeting were in fact co-operating and collaborating in the exchange of information in this very vital nuclear field.

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Mr PER HAEKKERUP (Denmark) said that his question had been partly prompted by the fact that he had the impression that Radio Free Europe was not accepted in all the Western countries as an institution on an equal footing with the others. Had RFE approached, say, the state radio and broadcasting system in Denmark, and, if so, what was the reply? He was quite sure that the news reports on both sides could have been improved with collaboration between them.

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Mr PIETRO QUARONI (President, Italian Radio-Television) said that what Mr Brown said about British television and broadcasting, and what Mr Haekkerup said about the Danish system, applied also to Italy. Mr Walter had quite correctly stated that material was available. There was not, however, the constant exchange of information and contact which existed amongst other European television organisations. The number of telephone calls daily between London and Rome and between Copenhagen and Rome was simply enormous. Up to now RFE had lived a life of its own, and it would be quite a good thing, thought Mr Quaroni, if RFE began doing what the others did among themselves.

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Mr GEORGE BROWN (Great Britain) thought that RFE was leaning over backwards here in order to correct some illusions about it. "In our own country there are certain suspicions about RFE", said Mr Brown, "and RFE is acting so honestly in order to correct this impression that I think this is possibly mitigating against its own potential." It was absolutely true that there was information available in London for anybody who wanted to call and get it, as Mr Walter had explained.

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 "The advice I would offer to RFE and to the Board", said Mr Brown, "in the light of the Czechoslovakian issue, is that RFE should be a little less sensitive and a little more aggressive, a little more willing to push itself and its information into the hands of the B.B.C., into the hands of the Danish broadcasting system, into the hands of any newspaperman in London or Paris or Rome or anywhere who will take it. This involves a certain risk, and we shall then be subject to the charge that we are becoming agents. In the months before the invasion of Czechoslovakia we knew that RFE knew what was happening, and yet somehow we did not get the information over. Frankly, at the risk of making a mistake, my advice would be that RFE should be a little more active than it has been."

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 B The PRESIDENT commented that this was not the first time the question had been raised, As in the past, the comments would be minuted in the record of the meeting, so that the Directors of RFE could consider them as guidelines for future action.

If the general discussion could now be regarded as completed, it would be useful, thought the President, to spend a quarter of an hour discussing the situation in Poland. (Agreed)

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 D Mr JAN NOWAK (Director, Polish Broadcasting Department, Radio Free Europe, Munich) said that developments in Czechoslovakia had far-reaching repercussions in Poland. Czechoslovak reforms triggered off first the rebellion of writers and later that of students in February and March this year. Both the liberalisation in Czechoslovakia and students' demonstrations had scared to death the party apparatus who rebelled against Gomulka's policy of half measures and demanded that all necessary preventive measures should be taken in order to forestall and prevent any trend similar to that in Czechoslovakia. Student riots were ruthlessly suppressed. The more active elements at the universities were arrested and banned. The writers were silenced and the campaign against so-called "revisionists and Zionists" led to the removal of remaining "liberal" elements who survived in the party leadership and in the state apparatus since the upheaval of October 1956. Thus the post-October era came finally to an end with the exception of two sectors: in the agriculture 85 per cent. of the land still remains in the hands of private owners; the Catholic Church still preserves an intact organisation with its influence unaffected by the retrogressive policy of the government.

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 F This was merely a statement of facts. It called for an explanation why the bloodless revolution, which took place in Poland in 1956, could not be repeated in 1968. What was the basic difference between the situation in Czechoslovakia and that of Poland in 1956 and in 1968?

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Mr Nowak believed that some pre-conditions must exist for such bloodless revolutions as that of 12 years ago in Poland and this year in Czechoslovakia. First, there must be a slowly rising wave of discontent of the broad masses of the population concerning the economic situation and the suppression of individual freedom. Secondly, the leadership must be divided and engaged in a struggle for power at the top with at least one wing of the party trying to enlist support from outside, thus becoming a champion, supporter and spokesman of the opposition.

Finally, there must exist some kind of alliance between intellectuals, students and workers.

All these three conditions existed recently in Czechoslovakia and 12 years ago in Poland. As far as Poland was concerned, however, they no longer prevailed in 1968.

No doubt discontent in Poland is very strong today, but the feeling is tinged with frustration brought about by a retreat from reforms of the "October" revolution - 1956, and with deep scepticism as to the ultimate fate of the Czechoslovak experiment. Economic conditions may be bad, but they are not intolerable; certainly the working class is better off now than at the time of the Poznan riots in June 1956. For that reason one link was missing in the necessary "alliance" of forces. Certainly at the time of rioting last March such an alliance existed between intellectuals and students, but workers, although no doubt their sentiments were on the side of students and of writers, did not lend any kind of active support to the demonstrating academic youth. Maybe there was not enough time for them to stir, but the fact remained that the workers were neutral and passive.

The power struggle which no doubt proceeds within the Polish leadership is not between supporters of reform and conservatives. It is a purely personal rivalry between individuals who are otherwise united in their abhorrence of anything that smacks of "liberalism". Another great difference between Czechoslovakia and Poland at this moment may be found in the personality of the leaders. Mr Gomulka never really belonged to the movement which brought him to power in 1956. He was adopted by the "liberal" wing of the party because in 1948 he opposed very courageously Stalin and his idea of the Cominform. This fact won him the reputation of a "national Communist" some sort of Polish Tito. Since he opposed the Soviet Union under Stalin, the people assumed that he would also support a programme of internal reforms. This view proved to be wrong. Gomulka was never a liberal and never a supporter of reform. Being an autocrat by nature, he wanted nothing else by centralised dictatorship. The state of the party which in 1956 approached complete disintegration and collapse, was a frightening experience to Gomulka. He was always acutely aware of the fact that the Communist party in Poland was weak and lacking any public support. He always knew that the rank and



file could not be trusted. From the beginning, therefore, he was determined to create conditions which would prevent once and for ever any repetition of the events of 1956. The supporters of reforms were removed gradually one by one and replaced by "hardliners" - the former Stalinists. The apparatus of the political police was rebuilt as the only effective safeguard against popular opposition. In fact Gomulka allowed such an expansion of the security police under General Moczar that it became an empire within an empire. Moczar became so strong that he is today in a position to challenge even Gomulka himself.

There was, of course, yet another factor. Gomulka of 1968 was a different man from Gomulka of 1956. There was no question that Gomulka had considerable achievements in 1956 which affected the whole Soviet orbit. He succeeded then in creating some new pattern of relationship between Moscow and satellite countries. The agreement reached between Warsaw and Moscow after Gomulka returned to power meant an implementation of his doctrine of "the Polish road to socialism" which implied a degree of independence from the Soviet Union, particularly in the internal running of the country. In this way a precedent was set which served as a pattern later emulated by others.

Why had Gomulka of 1968 virtually destroyed his own achievements by supporting the invasion of Czechoslovakia and helping to create the Brezhnev doctrine, which denied any possibility of an independent Polish road to Socialism? "I personally think", said Mr Nowak, "that the change may have something to do with the German Ostpolitik. I think that Gomulka himself was never really interested in obtaining from Western countries any kind of recognition of the Oder-Neisse line. I think he realises that such a move would have a tremendous impact on the Polish people and would cut the ground from under his feet. On the other hand, the more he relies on the Soviet Union and the other Communist countries, the more apprehensive he is of any possibility of losing their support. I think that the Ostpolitik, by excluding the settlement of the territorial dispute at this juncture, and maybe postponing for the time being the normalisation of the relationship with Warsaw (in the sense that Poland would be the last country to be approached in regard to normalisation), may inadvertently have created some kind of impression in the minds of the Polish leadership that this West German policy may lead not only to the isolation of East Germany but of Poland as well, or at least to some weakening of the Polish position within the bloc. If other countries emulated the policy of Gomulka in some kind of emancipation from the Soviet Union, particularly in their foreign policy, and if the Rumanian example were to be followed by others, Poland might find itself in a much more vulnerable position as far as the territorial issue is concerned. This, I believe, led to the change of the whole attitude of Gomulka and prompted him to seek more solidarity with Ulbricht and with Moscow."

There had been some reports that before the conference of Karlovy Vary it was Gomulka who was trying

to put some pressure on the Russians and not vice versa, in order to re-impose some kind of discipline on all the five countries of East Europe so that they would not deviate in their foreign policies. "I do not suggest that isolation was intended but I think this is how the Ostpolitik was understood - or, if you like, misunderstood - in Warsaw," added Mr Nowak.

A The Czechoslovak developments had no doubt helped Gomulka. He emerged from the last congress as master of the Central Committee and of the Politbureau. Moczar, his rival, was in a sense humiliated because he was passed over in his expected promotion to full membership of the Politbureau. Thanks to Brezhnev's support Gomulka's own position was now unchallenged, and this meant a sort of impasse or deadlock for some time to come.

B "In spite of all I have said, I am not a pessimist in the longer run," said Mr Nowak. "There are still certain powerful forces working to our advantage. Nationalism plays a very important role in the centrifugal tendency operating within the Communist bloc, but fortunately it is by no means the only driving force. I say 'fortunately', because 'national Communism' of the Soviet Union represents the biggest threat to any movement towards greater independence of our countries. It is a growing contradiction between the pragmatic necessities of the modern state on the one hand, and the dogmatic doctrine on the other which must eventually bring about some sort of liberalisation of the system. The Communist leadership has to choose between decentralisation and economic reform or stagnation. Either they liberalise and decentralise the present system which would allow for some kind of democratisation and greater participation of the people, or they are bound to lose the economic race with the West and accept the ever growing gap between the standard of life in the Western capitalist countries and that of the Communist states of the East."

D Finally, there was the conflict of generations. At the last Congress, Mr Gomulka had shown some concern for the fact that only one-fifth of the party members were in the Party at the time of the first Congress in 1945; that there was an influx of new, indoctrinated people. He had called for a tremendous effort in educating the younger elements. "We saw in March", said Mr Nowak, "that 25 years of indoctrination failed completely. The young people rioting and demonstrating against the system in all the Polish university cities were obviously unaffected by the indoctrination effort. The young Polish or Rumanian Communist has a mentality which is entirely different from that of the old Communist. He wants a job, a position, he wants influence and prestige, but once he gets them he wants also results. He wants to achieve something. He is much more pragmatic and much less committed to any dogma or doctrine than the old guard. These younger people come up against the wall of old obsolete ideas, as represented by the old elite. I believe that this conflict of generations is of tremendous importance and will grow not just in Poland but

in other Communist countries as well, including the Soviet Union. In the longer run, then, I could not but be optimistic."

Mr Grimond had suggested that care should be taken in broadcasting to differentiate between information and any programme or comments that might generate discussion in these countries, because such discussion could lead to demands for organisational forms, and this in turn could finally lead to the use of force and to a violent confrontation. "With all respect, I beg to differ on this point", Mr Nowak said. "Even if we limited ourselves to news only, information alone would also be bound to generate discussion inside these countries. Besides, we are by no means the only source of information or propaganda. Radio Free Europe has no monopoly in this respect. People will be always seeking information, and find other sources."

"As long as people want freedom and demand it," Mr Nowak concluded, "there is always hope - even certainty to my mind - that one day they will get it."

Mr JO GRIMOND (Great Britain) said that he had not suggested that RFE should in the least cut down on the information it gave. All he was saying was that it must realise that information was not entirely neutral; that it could lead to organisation and to a demand for action.

The account of the situation in Poland had been very interesting and illuminating, said Mr Grimond, but it would be useful, he thought, to hear a little more about the basis for optimism in Poland in the long run. He was very glad this view was held, but it seemed to him that, even if there were some declaration by the West Germans about the Oder-Neisse line, and even if this were to remove some of the fear of Germany which undoubtedly existed in Poland, events in Czechoslovakia and the very illuminating account of Gomulka's position must make one think that any attempt by the Poles to introduce the Czech type of reform, free discussion, etc., would instantly bring about a reaction on the part of the Russians.

"What should our objective be in Poland?", asked Mr Grimond - "to wait till Gomulka is removed by time and hope there will be a change inside the apparatus? Should it be by some gesture, which would have to come, I think, from the Germans, to reassure public opinion in Poland and therefore remove the terrible dilemma on which they are hooked, on the one hand hating the Russians and on the other fearing the Germans too much to let the Russians go? Or should it be based upon sources of influence outside the apparatus, Poland being the only country within the Communist bloc which has such a source, the Catholic Church? What should our policy aim at in Poland? I should like to know more about whether any steps have been taken internally in Poland since the Czech crisis. It has always seemed remarkable that the Communist authorities tolerate the Church to the degree they do, and I wonder whether,

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A since the Czech crisis, there have been any signs of further pressure on the Church. Poland is one of the Communist countries which allows a very considerable amount of freedom of travel, both of Poles abroad and of foreigners into Poland. I wonder whether this has been checked at all. When we talk of detente, it has been very largely a detente between governments, but there is no doubt that the exchange of ordinary tourists and of business men and so forth between East and West is an important part of the detente, and as far as one can tell, up to the Czechoslovak invasion these things were going on unchecked. Are there any signs, I wonder, that pressure has been brought by the governments to check this flow? If not, it would seem to me that these conservative, rigid regimes will be undermined, whatever the Governments may do, by this constant and growing contact between scientists, business men and ordinary tourists as between East and West. But primarily I should like to know on what the optimism is based.

B

The PRESIDENT suggested that Mr Grimond should get together with Mr Nowak after the meeting for his answer.

C

Mr PER T. FEDERSPIEL (Denmark) referred to the reaction in the world to the death sentence on the man who tried to murder the Greek Prime Minister, and suggested that considerable feeling would be aroused in some Western countries if the sentence were carried out. They all missed Mr Pipinelis, and no doubt he had his own views, but it might be useful to send him a telegram giving him the impression that, without interfering with the administration of justice in Greece, it would make a considerable difference in Western Europe to the image of Greece if clemency were to be shown in this case.

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Mr Federspiel suggested the following draft:

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"Your friends of the WEAC, regretting your absence from our meeting in Rome, would like to impress on you and your Government that in our view it will make a considerable difference to the development of better relations between your country and her friends in Free Europe and NATO if the numerous official and private appeals for clemency in the case of the death sentence on Alexandros Panaghoulis were met with a favourable response."

The Committee agreed to send a telegram in the form suggested by Mr Federspiel.

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It was also agreed, following a suggestion by Mr Cunha, to send a telegram to Mr Bettiol, who was ill, and also to Mr Pacciardi, who was now rather seriously ill.

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Press Communique

The PRESIDENT asked members whether, the business of the meeting having been concluded, they wished to send a communique to the Press. His own opinion was that it would be better not to do so.

A           The Committee agreed with the President's view.

Communique

B           The PRESIDENT then asked members to consider a six-paragraph communique briefly setting out the main lines of agreement reached at the Twelfth Session of the WEAC.

The ensuing discussion having shown that there was disagreement as to the text, the Committee agreed not to issue a communique.

Close of Meeting

C           General CLAY said that it had been a wonderful meeting, frank and open. "It has meant a great deal to all of us", he said, "and to me in particular. We greatly appreciate your having been here to give us your advice."

D           The PRESIDENT said that he too had been struck many times by the high quality of the statements made in the course of the discussion. The two days had been most instructive and everyone must have learned a great deal. The advice of the members of the WEAC to RFE was contained in the report which would be prepared by the Rapporteur.

E           He congratulated RFE on the outstanding work it had done under extremely difficult circumstances, and in an exceedingly dangerous period. The staff of RFE had managed to avoid all the dangers and pitfalls and had given an invaluable service to the millions of people who followed their broadcasts. The peoples behind the Iron Curtain were being provided with what they desired, and he hoped that RFE would carry on with these efforts and have even greater responses in the future.

The President concluded by thanking all those who had attended and participated in such a successful meeting, and the staff for their efforts in organising it.

F           The Session closed at 5.45 p.m.

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WEST EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Twelfth Session

Rome

November 18 - 19, 1968

REVIEW OF RECENT CZECHOSLOVAK DEVELOPMENTS

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The August invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces remains an unfinished chapter in the contemporary history of the Czech and Slovak peoples. If from a technical military point of view the invasion was a success, the occupying powers, mainly the Soviet Union, have clearly failed to gain a corresponding political victory. It was an old soldier, State President Ludvik Svoboda, who played the major role in thwarting the aim of the Warsaw Pact countries by refusing to collaborate either with the occupying powers or with the real or potential traitors, like Alois Indra, among Czech and Slovak politicians. And certainly President Svoboda was not, either at that critical moment or at this writing, a lone individual acting on his own volition. He expressed (and expresses today) the collective feelings of the overwhelming majority of Czechs and Slovaks.

If the invasion was a turning point in modern Czechoslovak history, Svoboda's stand was a turning point in the invasion itself. It forced the intruders to negotiate with the legal and duly-constituted state and Party authorities and, consequently, to restore the Dubcek leadership. This created a bizarre situation in Czechoslovakia. A group of reform-minded Communists dedicated to the elimination of the inhuman aspects of the Communist system was now expected to demolish its own program with the same fervor, and to embrace principles which only days before they had publicly repudiated. Imprisoned and released, humiliated in Moscow but exalted at home, subjected to almost unbearable pressure from all sides, the Czech and Slovak leaders deserve the highest praise for their moral courage as they attempt to determine the fate of the Czechoslovak state. One must respect the statement of the Czechoslovak leadership that it was only a deep feeling of moral responsibility for the country and their respective nations which made them accept the humiliating conditions imposed upon them in Moscow. They returned to positions of responsibility to prevent what they feared to be a potentially greater tragedy looming on the horizon.

The principal tasks jointly agreed upon by Moscow and the old/new leadership in Prague can be defined as follows: "Normalization of the situation" on the basis of the Moscow Protocols. But here the unanimity ended. The Soviet Union interpreted the Protocols as a maximum program designed to return Czechoslovakia to a more orthodox political course, leaving very little, if any, room for specific national considerations in domestic and foreign policy. The Czechoslovaks, conversely, sought to implement only the minimum obligations contained in the Moscow Protocols. Though



realizing the inevitability of great concessions vis-à-vis Moscow, Prague fought--and fights--for an effective degree of autonomy that would permit continuation of the essence of the January reform program and a degree of freedom (while remaining cognizant of the primacy of so-called socialist interests). The contrasting views and attitudes sparked a new conflict between Prague and Moscow whose end cannot be predicted at this stage, but there are several aspects of the situation which deserve special consideration.

1. Not once in the last three months has the Soviet Union indicated any willingness to consider an honorable compromise with the Dubcek concept of normalization. Moscow has steadily increased its pressure on the Czechoslovak leaders. The immediate aims of the Soviet Union are easily discernible: a) To exact further concessions from Prague; b) to split the political leadership and destroy the cohesion of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia, and c) to drive a wedge between the leadership and the population.
2. The Czechoslovak leaders have shown great skill and determination in trying to defend both their national interests and the principles of their reform program. So far they have successfully protected the forces of progress from persecution and, on the whole, have defended individual freedom. Essentially, however, they are engaged in a rear guard action. Periodically they are compelled to make concessions. They are forced to revise many of their earlier pronouncements concerning the January reform program. One major political setback, from both the political and the prestige points of view, was the signing of the occupation agreement. This inevitable backing and filling has obscured, in the public eye, the indicated intent of the Dubcek régime, and has contributed to the general feeling of insecurity among the population.
3. Even more significant is the fact that the Dubcek team was unable to prevent the emergence of factional forces within the CPCS. Under the patronage of the occupation troops, conservative-minded Communists reappeared on the national scene as an organized group, challenging the authority, political wisdom, and personal integrity of the present Party leadership. At the same time, an increasing number of Communists with liberal leanings have objected to the current CPCS line of compromise and retreat. They argue that it is better to resign than to embark upon a road leading to inevitable moral suicide.
4. Thus, Dubcek's policy of zigzag and improvisation is challenged from two sides in the CP--the conservative Left and the liberal Right. This polarization provides

fertile ground for Soviet machinations. The same can be said of the national leadership, with its unavoidable differences of tactical stress, as well as of the relationship between the leadership and the nation, charged as it is with abnormal tensions.

5. Objectively speaking, the Dubcek team could hardly have prevented these negative trends in its relationship with the Party and the population. There was little opportunity or time for creative work, but where such a possibility existed it was used to the full; e.g., the project to federalize the country was carried out with great resolution, and is forging a new national unity between the Czechs and the Slovaks.
6. As to ultimate Soviet intentions, it appears that Moscow will continue to fight for a regime which will comply with its demand for the extermination of "counter-revolutionary" tendencies. Czechoslovakia might then be allowed to follow a moderate neo-reform course analogous to that which has evolved in Hungary over the years since 1956. If the Dubcek team is ready to embark upon this road, it may still be acceptable. If not, the Soviet Union seems determined to destroy it.
7. It cannot be assumed that Dubcek is willing to accept a quisling role and, indeed, it is still a far cry from his present status to that of a Soviet mandatary. His only chance for survival would seem to be to conduct a lengthy war of political attrition behind a solid wall of unity against Soviet machinations. To conduct such a war successfully, the Dubcek leadership must transform the intense emotional ties between itself and the nation, on which its authority has principally rested until now, into a more durable and balanced unity based on a sober dialogue centering on topical imperatives rather than ultimate goals. Only on this basis could a situation arise which could open the way for a new attempt at an equitable compromise--involving much less than the Czechoslovaks hoped to achieve in the heady pre-August days, but also much more than the Soviet Union has up until now been willing to grant.
8. The overall prognosis gives little cause for optimism that Czechoslovakia can preserve the essentials of the post-January period.

## REVIEW OF RECENT CZECHOSLOVAK DEVELOPMENTS

The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia was a Soviet-engineered attempt to prevent that country from developing a "humanistic" socialism and from following a more independent course in international affairs. From the Soviet point of view, the invasion itself was only a partial success. It subjugated Czechoslovakia militarily, but did not subdue the country politically. This failure was primarily due to the circumstance that it proved impossible to install a quisling regime in Prague, and the Soviet Union had to resign itself to Dubcek's return to power. So it is with the pre-invasion leadership that Moscow is now attempting to introduce a post-invasion "consolidation" policy in Czechoslovakia. It is this struggle for political control of the country that determines the nature of the three-month-old history of the occupation.

In the first phase, the battle was polarized primarily between the state and Party leadership of the Soviet Union (sustained chiefly by Pankow and Warsaw) and that of Czechoslovakia. Since the middle of October, however, new fronts seem to be forming in Czechoslovakia, posing the danger of a confrontation between groupings and factions within the Czechoslovak Communist Party as well as between the Czechoslovak regime and the population. The date which marks the end of the first and the beginning of the second phase is the signature, on October 16, of an agreement concerning the stationing, for an unspecified length of time, of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. The prospect of a long occupation of the country, after the original quite unreasonable optimism about an early and complete withdrawal of foreign troops, has deeply shaken the population, and has resulted in several dramatic protest actions by various social groups, mainly the youth. On the other hand, the same prospect has encouraged the conservative elements of the CPCS to mobilize their forces in a desperate attempt to regain lost positions.

It is one of the peculiarities of the situation that, in Soviet parlance, there was no alien, hostile action against Czechoslovak sovereignty. Czechoslovakia, according to Soviet views, was not assailed and subjugated by an invader, but only given "brotherly assistance" to correct "certain mistakes." According to the Soviets, this aid was only meant to help Czechoslovakia to find her way back to the great community of socialist countries, where the old notion of sovereignty has been superseded by higher interests. Consequently, the Soviet Union tries to present the whole conflict to the world as an internal, family affair, a private dialogue between Moscow and Prague which involves no breach of international law. The main subject of the dialogue is "normalization of the situation" in Czechoslovakia.

The dialogue is conducted in a rigid Marxist-Leninist frame of reference. But behind this ideological smokescreen a desperate struggle is going on about the future of Czechoslovakia. In Moscow as well as in Prague, there are constant meetings, negotiations, and conferences, leading to agreements, disagreements, and compromises--all of them revolving around the central question of how to "normalize" the situation in occupied Czechoslovakia.

I.

"Normalization": The Soviet Concept

The essence of the Soviet concept of "normalization" is contained in the so-called Moscow Protocols imposed upon the Czechoslovak leaders in Moscow immediately after the invasion. Although the Protocols have been declared a secret document, their contents can be deduced partially from reports of members of the new emigration, from newspapers and--mainly--from scattered references in speeches delivered by Czechoslovak political leaders. These sources indicate that the main obligations imposed on Czechoslovakia by the Moscow Protocols can be summed up as follows:

1. Strengthening the unity and the leading role of the Communist Party in all sectors of socio-political life. The 14th Party Congress which convened in Prague shortly after the invasion should be declared invalid and another congress convoked at a later date. Persons not in agreement with the accords must be eliminated from leading Party and government positions. On the other hand, the Soviets also insisted that, as CP Presidium member Zdenek Mlynar formulated it, "nobody should be deprived of his position, much less persecuted, for having fought anti-Communist tendencies and defended [Czechoslovakia's] alliance with the Soviet Union."
2. An "implacable struggle" must be conducted against "counter-revolutionaries" and anti-socialist forces; this struggle must include:
  - a. The "temporary" introduction of censorship;
  - b. Cadre changes in the public information media, to assure adherence to the official line;
  - c. Prohibition of the activities of political parties and organizations outside the National Front led by the CP.
3. The Protocols state that the government will be permitted to implement the "January decisions," but fail to clarify how this will be done.
4. Further negotiations will be conducted on the gradual withdrawal of the Warsaw Pact troops (which will be completely withdrawn after "normalization"). With the signing of the formal agreement on the "temporary" stationing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, the continued presence of foreign military forces seems to have little or nothing to do with "normalization."
5. Czechoslovakia must be reintegrated into the socialist community; her foreign political activity must be conducted in accord with the general interests of this community. Czechoslovakia must increase her cooperation

with the socialist countries, and primarily with the Soviet Union.

To sum up, Czechoslovakia must be firmly reintegrated into the community of the Warsaw Pact countries. Internally, the Prague regime is to forego experimentation with a new model of socialism and to take the necessary measures to curb the liberal or progressive elements propagating such reforms. A vague reference to the "January decisions" (ouster of the Novotny regime) indicated that Czechoslovakia was not necessarily expected to make a full return to the past; the country could go on with marginal reform projects (e.g., modified economic changes), provided it left the essence of the system unaltered and did nothing that would conflict with the interests of the members of the socialist community (e.g., those of the German Democratic Republic).

## II.

### "Normalization": The Czechoslovak Concept

Obviously, in the first post-invasion negotiations with their Soviet partners, the Dubcek team had no alternative but to accept the Moscow Protocols, and since they returned home they have referred many times to the binding character of this document. This by no means signifies, however, that the Czechoslovak leadership has identified itself with the Soviet interpretation of the Protocols. On the contrary, there is a persuasive body of evidence to indicate a divergent Czechoslovak concept of "normalization."

1. Dubcek and his team were willing to concede that mistakes had been made in the course of post-January developments in Czechoslovakia. Some, like the new Slovak CP leader Gustav Husak, spoke of the activities of certain extremist elements; official communiqués recognized that the leadership had not always taken sufficient note of the "dark and real power of international factors," of the "strategic and general interests of the Soviet Union and the other four members of the Warsaw Pact," etc. Conversely, in speaking of the mistakes, any reference to so-called "counterrevolution" and "counterrevolutionaries," both of which notions were contained in the Moscow Protocols, was ostentatiously avoided. Furthermore, it was repeatedly pointed out that the leadership was aware of the various shortcomings and that appropriate measures could have resolved them in due time without the intervention of Warsaw Pact troops.
2. Moreover, the Czechoslovak leaders conceived of normalization as a relatively short process, imposing certain obligations on both sides. They were ready to fulfill several of Moscow's basic demands: invalidation of the 14th Congress; reimposition of control over the information media; curbing of the freedom of organization; the making of a limited number of personnel changes in public life; revision of the new concept of the CP as a "guiding" rather than a "dictating" force in society; broadening of cooperation with the bloc; etc. For this price, however, the Dubcek team expected the cessation or at least relaxation of the Soviet propaganda campaign, to permit concentration on practical work under the guidance of "legally-elected state bodies." It was, of course, anticipated that the occupation troops would cease interfering in the internal affairs of the country.
3. The broadest possible interpretation was given to the Protocols' reference to "January decisions." On the Czechoslovak side there was a strong conviction that despite the obvious restrictions contained in the Moscow

document, Czechoslovakia would be able to carry out the essentials of the post-January reform plans as formulated in the April Action Program. These included "humanization" of the system, popular participation in public affairs, improvement of production and managerial methods, federalization of the country, equitable settlement of the status of the national minorities, etc.

Thus, in Prague's view, normalization of the situation was by no means identical with a negation of the January reforms. The CS leaders were ready to reconsider many aspects, as part of the quid pro quo, of their relationship to the socialist community; to pay greater attention to "common interests"; on the home front, they were ready to curb certain social and political phenomena and restrain any extremist forces on both ends of the political spectrum.

The Czechoslovak leaders are, therefore, trying to save as much as possible from their original program and to defend their concept of "normalization." They perform their duty with a high moral consciousness. "We have a responsibility to our people and to our nations," Dubcek declared in October, "[and] to lead them out of this complicated situation."

On whom and on what can the Czechoslovak leaders rely in this prolonged struggle, conducted with unequal forces? The sympathy of world public opinion has certainly been a great encouragement to them and, for practical reasons, the strong voices of solidarity emanating from the world Communist movement perhaps even more so. But their most powerful support comes from their own countrymen. From the very beginning of the crisis, it was their clear intention to remain in close unity with all the healthy forces of the nation. After the dramatic negotiations in Moscow, facing the Party and the people, Dubcek proclaimed: "We do not want to seek the way to the solution of our problems by ourselves; we rely not only on our own strength, but, above all, on your strength, on your moral strength, on your character...."

Indisputably, the difference between the Soviet and the Czechoslovak concepts of normalization was considerable, and to a great extent it has determined the whole history of developments in the occupied country. The Soviet Union immediately began to press for the full implementation of the Moscow agreements. To coordinate political pressure, it dispatched to Prague Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov, as permanent plenipotentiary. The Soviet press, zealously supported by that of East Germany, Poland, and Bulgaria, hewed to the charge of "counterrevolution."

The Dubcek-Cernik regime was accused of slowing down, if not sabotaging, the process of "normalization." In addition



to outside pressure, direct intervention in Czechoslovak internal affairs occurred at all levels. Moreover, the invaders maintain a radio station called Vltava, and publish a paper entitled Zpravy: both these information media systematically and openly attack the liberal forces in the country and ardently advocate the conservative cause. And, finally, through the existing facilities of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship societies, Kuznetsov has attempted to fashion anew a network of Communist Party apparatchiks willing to risk the scorn of the nation by challenging Dubcek on behalf of the Soviet Union. The most serious manifestation of this activity occurred only a few days before the November 14 plenary session of the CPCS CC. Attended by several thousand Communist conservatives, the meeting was the occasion for a loyalist counter-demonstration which resulted in near riot conditions outside the theater where the pro-Muscovites met.

But it would be a mistake to consider all the events and moves of the last three months as a unilateral Czechoslovak retreat in the face of Soviet pressure. Obviously, some statements were made to ease the Soviet pressure without suffering the logical consequences; some of the agreements were concluded without any sign of subsequent implementation. There is little present evidence of action, for example, on the agreement to reinforce the CP organs with "good" Marxists-Leninists and internationalists, a major Soviet demand. And some real concessions on Czechoslovakia's part have been counterbalanced by other decisions and moves. This seems to be especially true in the realm of personnel policy. Liberals and progressives who had to be dismissed were often replaced by other liberals or progressives, or transferred to other responsible positions. In more than one instance, the balance was put straight by shifting or dropping people belonging to the conservative camp.

All this is not to suggest that, in addition to earlier quite real and concrete concessions, no new payments have been exacted. There was, for example, the Czechoslovak "consent" to accept the assistance of their Soviet comrades in solving internal problems. This involuntary gesture was interpreted by several sources as giving the Soviet Union the right to interfere openly in the internal affairs of the Czechoslovak CP and to initiate changes--organizational, ideological, or personnel--as it deemed necessary in the interests of "normalization" in Czechoslovakia. Needless to say, one of the most serious concessions made was the occupation agreement, which provoked deep concern among the population.

In detail, then, how has this complex process of "normalization," with all its conflicts and tensions, affected the most important political centers of the country, various aspects of government work, and public opinion?

### III.

#### The Leadership

What this term refers to in present-day Czechoslovakia is a group of 10 to 12 Party and state leaders, whose nucleus consists of four people: Alexander Dubcek, head of the Czechoslovak CP; State President Ludvik Svoboda; National Assembly Chairman Josef Smrkovsky; and Prime Minister Oldrich Cernik. This "core" has not changed since that fateful August night.

The broader leadership, however, did not remain unaffected by the invasion. Three of its members lost their posts as a result of Soviet pressure. They were Ota Sik, Deputy Prime Minister and the father of the economic reform; Minister of the Interior Josef Pavel; and Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek. Pro tempore, Premier Oldrich Cernik assumed the duties of the Foreign Minister; the two others have been replaced. Another chief target of the Soviet attacks in the pre-invasion leadership, Cestmir Cisar, was removed from the CP CC Secretariat but retained as chairman of the Czech National Council, a newly-created and important post. Zdenek Mlynar, a young theoretician steadily rising in prominence, was elected to the Presidium of the CP after the invasion, an act which automatically elevated him to the group of the most important national leaders. And to conclude the list, Slovak CP head Vasil Bilak, who has never completely exonerated himself from suspicion of collaboration with the Russians, was replaced by Gustav Husak, a former "bourgeois nationalist" who played a prominent role in Czechoslovak politics in the 1940s.

The many fluctuations have not changed the leadership's political profile. Those progressive members of it who had to step down have been replaced by personalities perhaps less distinguished but of equally progressive orientation. And they all, old as well as new, joined forces in support of the Dubcek core and its program to "humanize" socialism, and to restore, as soon as possible and even at the cost of certain sacrifices, the sovereignty of the country.

But despite the undeniable unity of purpose, certain differences in approach to specific tasks have become evident. The two outstanding examples are Prime Minister Cernik and Slovak CP leader Husak, who have frequently surprised the Czechoslovak public with their apparent adaptability to the new situation and their somewhat greater disposition to fulfill Soviet demands for "normalization." They have been more favorably treated by the Soviet (and allied) press than the rest of their colleagues, signals which have prompted speculation inside and outside the country about disagreements among the Czechoslovak leaders. Other observers have

attributed the differences only to variations in personality, not disagreements on essentials. They have called Cernik and Husak realpolitikers, as compared for instance, to the more "emotional" Dubcek. Husak himself brought the subject up in public, denied all the rumors of major differences, and assured Dubcek of his continuing loyalty. Yet, particularly on the basis of his most recent speech, Husak's role seems increasingly open to question.

Speculation has not subsided, and lately it has centered on the person of Zdenek Mlynar. According to Western reports, he was put in charge of redrafting the Action Program of the CPCS, but became frustrated at the constant pressures. He is said to have resigned from the Presidium so as not to compromise his political future by sharing responsibility for the concessions made to the Soviet Union. Although Mlynar's resignation allegedly was not accepted, nothing has been heard of him for weeks. Was direct Soviet pressure responsible for his removal or was he a victim of a regrettable political horse-trade, if indeed he has been removed? Or is he a political "dropout"? And, if so, how far is this typical, and how will it affect the unity of the leadership and the position of Dubcek? The November CC Plenum may provide some clarification of questions such as these.

IV.

The Communist Party

a. Progressive Control. The organization of the CPCS has become a major source of controversy between Prague and Moscow. High on the Soviet list presented to the Dubcek team was the demand that the 14th CP Congress be declared invalid. The Congress originally met in Prague on August 22, in order to prevent a take-over by the Muscovite group and to give moral backing to the legal Dubcek leadership. It was successful. Upon returning from Moscow, however, the Czechoslovak leaders immediately complied with the Soviet demand, and the Congress was abrogated. But a few days later the negative effects of this act were balanced out, at the first post-invasion CC Plenum, which strengthened the progressive element in the leading Party bodies by co-opting into the CPCS CC some 80 members of the Central Committee elected at this abortive Party congress.

The Presidium and the Secretariat were reorganized along similar lines, though the former retained the conservative Vasil Bilak and the latter the notorious Alois Indra, who allegedly tried to set up a pro-Soviet regime on the night of the invasion.

Thus, the invasion and Soviet requirements notwithstanding, the CPCS has remained under the control of a basically progressive leadership, clearly favoring the continuation of the post-January policy as well as an honorable arrangement with the Soviet Union.

b. The Role of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in a Pluralistic Society. Here again, the leadership conceded "mistakes" and "distortions" in the post-January era, and reaffirmed the thesis that the CP must remain the principal directing force behind socio-political developments in the country. In admitting their mistakes, however, the Czechoslovak leaders clearly distanced themselves from the practices of the Novotny era. Presidium member and CC Secretary Josef Spacek, for instance, suggested that the CP, avoiding both extremes, should realize its leading role in constant contact and consultation with the people:

...We do not understand the Party's leading role as government of Party over citizens, but as leadership of society based on voluntary and continually-renewed support for Party policy by the majority of the public.... A guarantee of the most timely and effective definition of Party policy is fully-developed social "control from below by all the people" in the true sense of the word, understood in a Leninist way.

Implied in this control from below was the recognition by Spacek of the existence of a pluralistic society in Czechoslovakia:

If Communist Party policy is to be correct and effective, it must also strive to determine real social and legitimate group interests as exactly as possible, and incorporate them as exactly as possible into the political line, in order to safeguard the basic interests of the entire society and, by the same token, the main legitimate interests of individual groups.

On the whole, statements by other CP leaders on this issue have been along the same lines, but perhaps stress with greater clarity that the strengthening of this role can under no circumstances mean a return to the pre-January conditions and style of Party work, and that CP bodies on all levels should be headed by men who enjoy the confidence of the people, by men possessing "courage," "integrity," and, above all, "perseverance."

The CP leadership had also to take up the subject of the April Action Program. It became obvious that even if the essentials of this program could be preserved, it had to be adjusted to the new circumstances. Work on the project began shortly after the occupation, but with the growing Soviet pressure on the country it developed into a complex undertaking. It was no longer a question of redrafting the old text, but rather of producing a new program. According to the voluble Dr. Husak, the new Action Program on pertinent resolutions submitted to the November CC Plenum, as well as to the subsequent Slovak CC Plenum, should "continue everything positive" achieved during the post-January period.

c. Conservatives on the Move. The factional activity of the conservative forces, as mentioned earlier, is on the increase. Plainly, these forces have not acquiesced in their removal from power. Direct links between Moscow and the conservative group in Czechoslovakia are obvious, and the two phenomena--growing Soviet pressure on Czechoslovakia and increasing factionalism in that country--run parallel with each other, and show signs of careful coordination. As already noted, sporadic conservative activities began early in September, when conservatives criticized, openly or covertly, various aspects of the Dubcek policy. But it was on October 9 that the conservatives first attracted attention as an organized group, when they assembled, together with eight or nine Soviet army officers, in Liben, an industrial district of Prague.

The leading forces in this group--e.g., Antonin Kapek and Josef Jodas--are not impressive people. They come from

the second-rate category of Party leaders who rose to positions of a certain importance in the Novotny era. They are reactionary, primitive, and power-hungry. Nothing is known about their connections, if any, with figures like Bilak or Indra. In any case, since the October 9 meeting more and more can be heard about the activities of the conservatives; they usually address themselves to "old comrades," "good patriots," etc., and try in their resolutions to awaken distrust of the Dubcek leadership. At the beginning Soviet information media paid very little attention to them, but recently, in a new assault on the Dubcek course, the authoritative Pravda praised them and quoted from their almost-forgotten "Liben Resolution."

The activization of the conservatives forced the top leaders of the Party and state to take the floor and address serious warnings to those who want to split the unity of the Party. One of the strongest statements came from Dubcek himself, just three days after the conservatives' Liben gathering. Said the Party leader:

In the present situation I consider it necessary to say very frankly that nobody must misuse the situation which has arisen to create opposition, let alone to undermine the Party by illegal actions, no matter on what platform these may be based. We must take steps against any phenomenon of this kind, simply because the question of uniform action, of uniform fulfillment of the line set out by the organs of the Party, is of the utmost importance today....

But Dubcek's warning (as well as those of others) has had very little effect. Growing conservative agitation elicited a storm of protest from the population, and particularly among Communists in local CP organizations and factories, and among intellectuals. Their resolutions accused the group of anti-patriotic and factional activities and called for the maintenance of unity and solidarity with the Dubcek leadership, as well as for continuation of the post-January program.

There was hardly anything that revealed more clearly to the average CP member the presence of treacherous forces in the country than the sudden cropping-up of the conservative factionalists and the adaptation of their activities to Soviet tactical requirements. Simultaneously, it has come to light that, in compliance with Soviet demands, the Czechoslovak CP leadership has postponed indefinitely both the holding of a "legal" 14th Congress and the organization of the Czech Communist Party. Both plans had to be withdrawn in order to prevent any open demonstration of the strength of the liberal and progressive forces in the country.

V.

Government Activities

The main task of the Czechoslovak government is to realize the process of normalization in day-to-day work. The head of the government, a trusted member of the Dubcek team, has shown great courage in undertaking the many unpopular measures dictated by circumstances. Most of the work done so far has, of course, lacked consistency; most of it was quick and improvised. A notable exception was the adoption of the federalization law, signed in Prague on October 28 and in Bratislava two days later. This brought to fruition a long-felt ambition of the Slovak nation (as well as of the present Slovak CP leader), and provided the framework for a new coexistence of two equal nations, Czechs and Slovaks. Parallel laws regulate the status of the national minorities.

a. Censorship Reintroduced. Coming back to the less comfortable part of government work, certainly one of its most urgent duties was to restrain the activities of the mass information media, many of which, in Soviet eyes, were "agents of counterrevolution." Thus, censorship of the information media was "temporarily" reintroduced in Czechoslovakia, and a Press and Information Office (with branches in Prague and Bratislava) was set up. In practice, this office leaves the actual censorship process to the sense of responsibility of the journalists, writers, and editors. They were warned, however, that if self-censorship failed, the government would be forced to introduce "harsh measures."

In the process of reorganization, most of the pre-invasion papers and periodicals have been allowed to reappear, under their old names or new ones, with comparatively few changes in personnel. (In many instances these changes have been directly favorable to the Dubcek forces.) The latest newcomer among the papers is Listy, successor to the famous organ of the Czech Writers' Association, Literarni Listy.

Controlling the activities of journalists and writers, in many ways the pioneers of the post-January developments, has not proved an easy task. They feel that the Soviet Union and its allies do not respect the rules of the game, and that their own government is going too far in its interpretation of the Moscow agreements, thus imposing unnecessary restrictions on the country. When articles to this effect began to appear and some organs of information media took public issue with Soviet mud-slinging, the government decided to act. On November 8, after assessing the last two months' activity of the semi-monthly Reporter, published by the Czech Journalists Union, the Press and Information Office suspended publication of this magazine for one month. The incident drew strong protests

from the journalists' and writers' community, but with little hope of any practical result. The latest move has been the suppression of Politika, outspoken publication of the Central Committee.

b. The New National Front. The fate of the non-Communist political and social forces constitutes another sensitive problem for the government. These organizations had frequently been cited by Soviet propaganda as proof of the deterioration of the leading role of the CPCS and of the emergence of a new pluralism endangering the existence of the socialist system. It was no surprise, then, that in early September the Ministry of the Interior banned the Club 231 and the Club of Committed Non-Party People, the two main targets of Soviet attack in this sector. Days later, a new government bill was announced according to which the National Front, under the direction of the CP, was to provide a forum for the rest of the political parties and social organizations in Czechoslovakia. But though political parties cannot exist outside the NF and new ones cannot be created, such restrictions do not apply to social organizations. (E.g., various youth clubs have been established since the occupation of Czechoslovakia.) Dubcek called the arrangement "one of the specialities of the Czechoslovak political system."

As the new NF bill was approved, Frantisek Kriegel, a prominent liberal and chairman of the organization, resigned his post under Soviet pressure; he was replaced by Evzen Erban, a former Social Democrat of moderate-progressive outlook. In many of his statements, Erban has pleaded for continuation of the post-January program and promised that a new concept of pluralism would be implemented within the framework of the NF.

c. Modified Economic Policy. Needless to say, the situation requires the establishment of a modified economic policy which will take into consideration the effects of the post-August 20 events. So far, economic decisions have been held in abeyance pending the solution of political questions. The convergence of these factors and the delays are evident in Prime Minister Cernik's exposition of the government's new policies on November 11.

In essence, realist Cernik presented a bleak economic outlook for Czechoslovakia into the 1970s. He predicted austerity for 1969 and a number of years thereafter and projected an economy on the brink of uncontrolled inflation and one which must face an accumulated trade deficit while at the same time reorientating itself to meet the growing demands arising from the second industrialization phase in Eastern Europe. Accordingly, the contemplated switch to consumer goods is to be curtailed; increases in wages and social benefits will be kept to a minimum; the restructuring of industry will be carried out under the most restrictive conditions,



and extended over a longer period. As to the reform of the economic mechanism, this is to be implemented within the restrictions placed on it by the lack of room for economic maneuverability.

Thus, as Cernik's report suggests, a degree of central control of a "war-economy" type will undoubtedly be introduced, and the economic reform thereby substantially hobbled when compared with the April Action Program objectives.

It is not without interest, however, that at the end of October Dubcek was still insisting that the CP had no intention of returning to the out-dated bureaucratic methods of the Novotny era, when the Party openly and directly interfered in economic life in great detail. "The industrial plants and their managements," said the Party leader, "are to have their own responsibility, and they must have a direct interest in the results of their own economic measures."

d. Foreign Policy. One of the earliest self-criticisms of the Dubcek leadership in connection with the Soviet accusations was related to the conduct of Czechoslovak foreign policy in the post-January era--it was acknowledged that Czechoslovak policies did not take sufficient account of the "dark forces" in this field, or of the over-all interests of the socialist community. The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister was forced to resign; no one has yet been nominated to replace him; and no consistent foreign political program has been announced. But judging by scattered remarks and peripheral references, the new line is about as follows:

- Czechoslovakia belongs to the socialist camp, a circumstance which defines its basic foreign political orientation. Neutralism would be against Czechoslovak (and overall socialist) interests.
- The security of Czechoslovakia is guaranteed by the Warsaw Pact. In Europe, the most active ally of American imperialism is the revanchist Federal Republic of Germany, the backbone of NATO. As long as the aggressive Atlantic Alliance exists, it is the duty of Czechoslovakia to strengthen the defensive community of the socialist countries.

The same principles which apply to the foreign-political and military-political orientation of Czechoslovakia are, according to the new, revised line, also valid for her commercial-political orientation. Several of the post-invasion talks between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union have revolved around economic problems and ways and means of strengthening economic cooperation between Prague and Moscow. In these talks the issue of a foreign loan plays a crucial role. Originally, Czechoslovakia was interested in Western financial aid;

since the invasion she has been forced to take up this question solely with Moscow. But, reportedly, Moscow demands that, as part of the price she must pay, Czechoslovakia must expand her heavy industries.

Where does this leave Czechoslovakia's Western ties? The government has on more than one occasion stated that despite the primacy of socialist contacts, Prague does not intend to relinquish cooperation with the West. But most probably it will be easier to maintain and expand cultural and, to a degree, economic contacts with the West than purely political ones. Such projects as the gradual building up of a new relationship with Bonn, without interference from Ulbricht and the USSR, have been postponed indefinitely. Even the slogans on general European cooperation coined at the Bucharest and Karlovy Vary conferences have been used infrequently, and then with the greatest caution.

VI.

Other Factors

As they climbed out of the slough of despair into which they were cast by the invasion of their country, the population of Czechoslovakia desperately harbored the hope that the ensuing problems could be resolved by mutual good will and cooperation. When events began to take a different turn, the hopeful expectations were replaced by a feeling of indignation, which soon erupted into acts of open protest. These protests were expressed in various ways: newspaper articles, letters to editors, solemn or angry resolutions, public meetings, street demonstrations. They have usually been based on one or more of the following demands:

- a. That the Soviet Union and the other occupying countries cease interfering in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia, cease slandering the country, and observe mutual commitments;
- b. That the Dubcek leadership clearly define the limits of honorable cooperation with the Soviet Union;
- c. That factional activities in the CPCS be abandoned forthwith;
- d. That the government keep the people informed of all events and developments pertinent to the future of the country, and that the obligations assumed in Moscow be published;
- e. That the leadership work unceasingly for the withdrawal of foreign troops and the re-establishment of Czechoslovak sovereignty;
- f. That the essentials of the Action Program and the economic reform be preserved.

A typical article, reflecting most of the above points, appeared in the October 9-16 issue of Reporter. It is relevant to quote here the core of this article:

...The limits of what we must actually do is a sensitive element in retaining trust. At the same time, we must take into consideration that many people today do not know exactly what the Moscow Protocols actually oblige us to do. There are even fewer people who know that additional obligations resulted from the subsequent negotiations. In addition, certain problems are now formulated

more precisely. There is a degree of uncertainty and doubt, which under the new circumstances can no longer be allayed by the communications media. The maneuvering-room of the communications media has been restricted even more than it was before January....

It was in the same spirit that Politika, the CPCS CC weekly, now temporarily suspended, objected to the troop treaty, warning that it would be "tragic" if the Party and state leadership, in trying to restore the confidence of the allies, did so in a manner which would make their own people lose confidence in their leaders.

And as so often in the past, now again the writers, the living conscience of the nation, have raised their voices in defense of a free and progressive Czechoslovakia. Thus, the first issue of Listy published two resolutions.

The first of these is a unique document attesting to the solidarity obtaining among the members of the Czechoslovak cultural community. Briefly, the resolution proclaimed that if a single Czech or Slovak artist, scientist, or journalist, wherever he is, should become a victim of persecution, or be legally indicted for his convictions or his work, the signatories would consider it an attack against the entire Czechoslovak cultural community. The second document is a catalogue of the burning political issues and causes of popular anxiety in Czechoslovakia. It pointed out, among other things, that "people who have lost all moral reputé are appearing on the political scene; foreign politicians decide whether our meetings, congresses, or elections shall take place or not.... We note with concern that our politicians are again forced to conduct their political activities behind closed doors."

The resolutions reviewed here were signed by 300 Czech authors and, according to an agency report, "by nearly all writers living abroad, who came to Prague to sign the appeal." This reference to writers abroad brings us to another chapter of the Czechoslovak tragedy: the refugee problem, which in a way also reflects the mood of the population.

When the Warsaw Pact armies invaded the country, thousands of Czechoslovak citizens, including such prominent personalities as Deputy Premier Sik and Foreign Minister Hajek, were traveling or vacationing abroad. Most of the Czechoslovaks in foreign countries wanted to return home, and their leaders, in a special proclamation, encouraged them to do so: "Your place is here. The Republic needs your ability, knowledge, and education, your creative work." No figures are available on how many returned then and how many stayed abroad. Interestingly, Sik resigned while he was in Yugoslavia, and stayed there; Hajek, however, went back to Prague to resign.

Very soon, the borders of the country were reopened, and new waves of travelers went to the West, some with the clear intention of remaining there. Among them were several well-known members of the Czech and Slovak intellectual communities. On November 1, a Prague paper, Lidova Demokracie, reported that this year will probably see more emigrants leaving Czechoslovakia than any year since 1948. But many of these people now staying abroad want to maintain contact. The fact that they have been able to do so is characteristic of the degree of freedom the government wishes to preserve. However, new restrictions on travel and residence abroad have been announced which will considerably restrict the movements of Czechoslovak citizens.

But how many are they, the new refugees? Since there is still so much fluctuation, it is not easy to estimate their number. In Western Europe alone, the following--incomplete--figures are available at this writing:

Austria: Between August 21 and November 4, 2,494 Czechoslovak refugees applied for asylum. Another 5,000 to 7,000 are undecided.

West Germany: Between August and the end of October, 1,186 applied for asylum. The number of those still on valid visas is estimated at between 7,000 and 8,000.

Scandinavia (Finland excepted): The governments have awarded temporary residence permits to about 1,200 Czechoslovaks since mid-August. (Only "a handful" of them were given political asylum.)

Switzerland: The only available information is that of the some 8,000 Czechoslovaks there, 2,500 have been granted political asylum.

Great Britain: Since the invasion, about 300 Czechoslovak nationals have been granted long-term visas.

France: About 30 of the some 5,000 Czechoslovaks who remained in this country have applied for political asylum. At least 10 percent of the 5,000 are students and young workers who happened to be in France under exchange agreements.

Italy: Czechoslovaks who have sought asylum since the invasion number 141.

Benelux: In Belgium, government officials refused to discuss the matter; in Holland, 45 asked for permission to remain.

Meanwhile, the refugee problem has also become a subject of Soviet-Czechoslovak dispute. Early in November, TASS charged that some Czechoslovak émigrés have engaged in hostile activities and are trying to block the process of normalization in their country. The Soviet agency expressed surprise that these individuals are still members of the CPCS.

A N N E X

to the

POLITICAL REPORT

to the

WEST EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Twelfth Session

Rome

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A N N E X  
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POLITICAL REPORT

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## SECTION 1

### RADIO FREE EUROPE BROADCASTING TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The removal of Antonin Novotny from the top leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party signalled the end of an era of stagnation and frustration which had characterized his rule.

The developing situation in Czechoslovakia - both before and after Novotny's fall from power - afforded RFE an unprecedented opportunity to contribute to the discussion of reform in the country.

The June 1967 Writers' Congress clearly indicated a new situation in Czechoslovakia. The action of the Novotny regime in taking disciplinary action against rebel writers and taking their magazine set the stage for political change.

RFE's general comment on the action of the regime against the writers was to ask whether the Party leaders were trying to obscure the substantive issues raised at the Congress. The flight into administrative measures, instead of engagement in a meaningful discussion of real national questions, RFE argued, was ill-suited to bridge the existing gap between the Party and the majority of educated Czechoslovaks. It would only serve to deepen the gap and delay resolution of such problems.

The importance of broadcasts by western radio stations to Czechoslovakia at this time of repression against writers and intellectuals became known later.

Indicative of this were two comments at a meeting of the Slovak Communist Writers in October 1967.

Jan Kalina declared:

"The case of the Czechoslovak Writers' Congress in June 1967 caused considerable agitation among the public. It is necessary to say this was not due to published reports, but to polemics and condemnation of Congress reports with which the public was not acquainted but to which their attention was drawn.....people were forced to look for information where it was provided in abundance - in western broadcasts and in bourgeois publications. It took two months before a concise article discussing speeches long past, quoting them at least in part, appeared in Rude Pravo."

And, Slovak writer Samo Faltaň, speaking at the same meeting, declared:

"What puzzles me is that the public is not allowed to know, even today, what was said at the Writers' Congress or what happened. Only months after the Congress did Rude Pravo discuss it a little and quoted at least some individual sentences and fragments from criticized speeches. Is it assumed that each of us listens to foreign broadcasts and that we get our information in that way?..."

By the middle of October 1967 the situation was one of a nation at the crossroads.

RFE broadcasts at this time stressed that the Party's resort to short-sighted repression of the intellectuals and short-run economic improvisations placed a heavy burden on the nation's future.

At the same time, RFE commentaries to Czechoslovakia were aimed at assuring continued discussion of the basic arguments raised at the June Writers' Congress and sought to extend the scope of discussion by bringing up related, constructive ideas expressed earlier in other quarters such as economists, jurists, scientists and industrial managers. Another RFE aim was to reflect as extensively as possible the attention given abroad to the struggle for reforms in Czechoslovakia.

The substantive breadth of the writers' criticism afforded RFE's Czechoslovak desk a unique opportunity to encourage discussion on all aspects of Czechoslovak national life. Programming was designed to deal with ideas rather than personalities. Listeners were told that individual freedom was their right as was their prerogative and duty to participate in public affairs and to co-determine such questions as the nation's future place in the world and its economic and cultural direction.

After the September meeting of the Central Committee there was conclusive evidence that the country's intellectual elite viewed the political and economic system with feelings of profound alienation; there was for the first time since the 1948 communist takeover a strong unity of purpose among this intellectual elite; the regime top leadership was in a position of disarray and uncertainty; and there was in Czechoslovakia a confluence of internal ferment and international attention.

Throughout the closing months of 1967 dissatisfaction within the country accelerated and culminated with the dismissal of Novotny at a Central Committee session early January.

RFE broadcasts to Czechoslovakia welcomed the Central Committee's action, pointing out at the same time both the great responsibility and the great opportunity facing the new leadership which had been brought to power by forces favoring thoroughgoing reforms.

An RFE program to Czechoslovakia broadcast on 6 January 1968 declared:

"The problems facing the Central Committee of the Party and its new leadership are staggering indeed. Those who knew that Novotny was unable to understand the visible signs of his time, have elected Dubcek. Alexander Dubcek should be able to see that a communist leader in today's world needs a broader base of power than did a lonely communist dictator of an earlier era. The tasks of today are too great and too difficult. Much has been neglected, the rule of inertia lasted too long, too much substance has been consumed. Much has been wasted. But what remains are the talents and energies of the Czechoslovak people. With them a capable and just organizer can still accomplish a great deal. But the citizen from whom sacrifice is demanded along with effort and more patience with new people at the head of the old party, must be given a fair return and recognition. There is no other or better way to give this fair return and recognition than democratization, which is renewal of the citizens' political maturity and sovereignty. This is a call which Alexander Dubcek can hardly fail to hear."

Another program, on 9 January 1968, declared:

"The major task facing the new leadership is a realistic political line, concrete deeds which might at least partly help restore the people's confidence and hope that this time affairs of Czechoslovakia are really in the hands and under the control of better, more able and more responsible people than during the past 20 years of the communist reign.

"The new leadership must not spare any efforts to seek the cooperation of the entire people on a voluntary basis. It is necessary to reconstruct the citizen himself. This begins with the question the communists themselves call being well informed. An end must be made to the system of secrecy and withholding of information and to methods of reprisals and censorship.

"These methods lead to disinterest and passivity on an almost mass scale."

RFE's approach to broadcasting to Czechoslovakia was outlined in detail in a special internal guidance issued on 29 February 1968.

This declared:

"The foremost tactical objective of RFE broadcasting to Czechoslovakia on the country's domestic affairs over the next several months must be to help maximize the existing and incipient social pressures which demand progress from debate to institutionalization, from piecemeal reform to a fundamental overhaul of the political system, from patchwork 'democratization' to a more genuinely democratic exercise of power and a system of government based on and responsive to the consent of the governed.

"The country's political calendar for 1968 offers a number of opportunities to test the strength of the public demand for change, as well as the new leadership's readiness and ability to institute it.

"The real content of all these acts and events, their real significance for the life, liberties and future of the Czechoslovak population, is not foreseeable at this time. To an unprecedented degree, it is an open book in which the existing social pressures, group and individual, will have an opportunity to write their own demands. The leadership is no longer acting from a fullness of power, unchallenged and unchallengeable; it has to negotiate and bargain and conciliate such pressures as exist. It has admitted that it needs the cooperation of all people, and thus implied that it will have to pay a price for it.

"Under the circumstances, the broader conceptual objectives of and points of emphasis in RFE broadcasting to Czechoslovakia during this period can be listed as follows:

"1. Gradual reversal of the 'transmission belt' in as many fields of social life as may be feasible. With particular reference to the forthcoming election of local government bodies, the objective should be to alert the voter to the issues at stake, which involve the question of whether local bodies will be elected that are capable of representing the genuine interests of the community towards the higher authority. Indifference of the voter and citizen, in this and the subsequent National Assembly election, can only play into the hands of the conservatives who have notoriously lacked any sense of responsibility to the needs of their constituents. It may also render more difficult the rehabilitation of people unjustly aggrieved in the past, a rehabilitation promised by the leadership but capable of being carried out only where the spirit of the community is strong enough to insist on implementation.

"2. Fostering the assertion of group interests which, in the current stage of re-structuring and clarifying the relations between Party and state organs, state administration and the economic sphere, the apparatus and elected bodies, non-Party interests and Party power, have a major role in helping shape the structure of the new political system. These groups represent communities of interest crossing artificial Party or class lines, and in the present uncertainty of structural relationships provide a channel through which non-Party and other pressures from below can be brought to bear upon the leadership.

"3. Promoting participation rather than passive expectation of the rank-and-file citizen. While the regime's power is being reconstructed on a new basis, involvement of the broadest segments of the population whose cooperation is being openly solicited, is essential to see that the new system will be shaped on a basis more acceptable to the people and more responsive to their desires.

"4. Raising consistently the issue of the new leadership's credibility in its commitment to meaningful reform. This credibility depends to a large degree on its steps to translate into reality the general pledges into solid, institutional guarantees of civil rights and avenues of effective redress against the abuse of authority. It also depends on enlarging the room for the citizen's participation in the formulation of public policy without requiring him to be dishonest, sycophantic, or cowardly in the face of authority.

"5. Stressing the theme of institutionalization, based on the actual translation into practice of the constitutional principle that the people are the source of all power, and

that all power is ultimately accountable to them. This needs tangible evidence, which the regime owes to the skeptical nation, that the existing institutions acquire real substance, that new institutional safeguards will be provided where needed to protect individual or group rights, and that the new leadership adheres to the rules of the game. Without institutions in which the citizen can place his confidence, the leadership can hardly expect from him the cooperation and activity it is calling for.

"6. Emphasizing the power of precedent, as a way to obtain from the authority rights and concessions which would not be granted otherwise. It is only through social action that nominal rights become real rights and institutions are given substance; it is only social pressure which compels the authority to use its power with restraint.

"7. Keeping in the forefront the issue of national dignity, as a corollary to the need for greater respect for the dignity of the individual citizen. Not only is this dignity expressed in an orderly rather than violent process of social change, but is required to regain for the nation the reputation abroad which it once possessed. A leadership which has committed itself to work for improving the nation's image abroad needs the cooperation of the people in this effort, for which it must increasingly subject its external actions to the scrutiny of the public.

"8. Reaffirming the validity of the nation's political tradition as a means to obtain the largest consensus in mapping out present and future policies. This tradition includes belief in the equality of all citizens, in the right of all nations to freedom and self-determination, and in social justice for all. It also includes pride in this tradition, and faith in the ability of the people to manage their own affairs.

#### "Programming and Priorities

"The ideas, proposals, articulated group interests and grievances expressed at every stage of the Czechoslovak public debate surely provide a continuing source of programming inspiration. In dealing with this material, RFE broadcasts should seek to:

"1. Extend the internal communication system available to the forces of reform. Ideas, proposals, activities emanating from one segment of society or part of the country should be given national coverage and, where possible, related to the thoughts and activities of others in the country. (In this respect, RFE can bring to bear its unique advantage of being simultaneously a Czech and a Slovak communication

medium and having a cross-section of the population as its audience, including those who are not a part of, or have excluded themselves from, the official communication system.) Reform thinking within specialized fields and not readily accessible to or too technical for the general public should be popularized and cross-reported to wider audiences. Conversely, full national exposure should be given to attitudes or activities in any sector of the Czechoslovak society which could impede the general movement toward reform.

"2. Place the Czechoslovak reform-thinking into a broader context of European and worldwide social trends, discussion of the ethical, moral and generally human problems of the modern industrial society, and relevant Western experience in dealing with these problems.

"3. Emphasize specific, institutional approaches and solutions, so as to present a wide range of alternatives and provide additional impulses to the social pressures which desire progress from debate to institutionalization and from vague 'democratization' to a more effective democracy. In the particular case of Czech-Slovak relations, RFE broadcasts should not only explore the possible alternatives and discuss relevant experience in other countries, but also place particular emphasis on the probable advantages of a federal arrangement based on the complete equality of both nations.

"While programming priorities cannot be prescribed in detail and in advance, the preceding analysis of the social forces and pressures operative on the Czechoslovak scene suggests several major themes for continuous coverage over the next few months. These include the broadest possible treatment of the citizen-vs.-authority theme; discussion of institutional safeguards of civil liberties; the role and functioning of interest groups in a modern society; the meaning of modernization and the structural needs of a society in the process of modernizing its system and performance; and in connection with the latter, discussion of educational needs and reforms as a theme especially relevant to the younger people concerned with their own future.

"The openness of the current Czechoslovak debate on the necessity of basic reforms in the country's political structure, as well as the receptivity of the reform spokesmen to unorthodox proposals and solutions is certainly unprecedented in a communist framework. Further assertion of the traditional social and political instinct of the Czech and Slovak nations, continuing pressure by, and progressive institutionalization of, group interests, and growth in the individual citizen's self-confidence in the face of authority are now capable of sustaining the momentum

of change and accelerating the pace of evolution toward a more genuinely pluralistic political structure. To assist these trends and forces must be the primary task of RFE broadcasting to Czechoslovakia over the next few months."

A feature of the new era in Czechoslovakia was the holding of large public rallies where prominent politicians and officials discussed problems of current interest with young people. At the same time, radio and television began open roundtable discussions and even invited questions by telephone from listeners and viewers.

An RFE program to Czechoslovakia on March 22, dealing with Novotny's resignation from the Presidency that same day, commented in part:

"At long last Antonin Novotny has resigned from the office of president. It long had been evident that he had to resign. The circumstances accompanying this long apparent abdication were, however, highly unusual. It was the first time that a top representative of a communist state had to leave after very harsh and systematic public criticism and not only from the ranks of the Communist Party; the whole nation was fed up with its president and loudly gave expression to it...

"It would be best if Antonin Novotny's fall helped establish a new political style in Czechoslovakia: a new method of controlling top officials of state and society. Antonin Novotny in the past few weeks became a symbol which with its importance goes far beyond his personality: a symbol of a public worker's dependence, no matter what his office, on public opinion. After a period of 20 years when public opinion could not find free expression, the entire society, members of the Communist Party as well as non-partisans, found a target of justified criticism in the person of Antonin Novotny...

"Antonin Novotny serves as a model that great national efforts at criticism can be successful. No high state and Party official should disregard this experience. Not to take it into account would mean to prepare an inglorious fate. To be aware of this experience and carefully to have the hand on the pulse of public opinion means to provide one of the important guarantees that people of Antonin Novotny's type will never reach offices of which they are not worthy and in case they actually did would soon collapse in the just and rigorous efficiency test and in the barrage of justified criticism. Antonin Novotny's fall came late. In the end, however, he did resign. It is another proof that inevitabilities stand their ground in Czechoslovakia's new development."



Censorship, which had been gradually eased in practice since January, was abolished by law on June 26. For the first time in a Communist country there existed a virtually free press, freer than even that which had been operating in Yugoslavia.

There began a wave of open criticism of officials and individuals; ministers were subjected to impromptu press conferences and journalists began asking questions which prior to the January changes in Czechoslovakia would never have been permitted.

The Soviet Union and other Communist countries originally adopted a "wait and see" attitude to the changes taking place in Czechoslovakia since January, but as free expression snow-balled in Czechoslovakia it was obvious that the patience of Moscow and her closest allies was wearing thin.

The Soviet Party newspaper Pravda broke a long silence on April 30 when it carried its first original comment on the situation in Czechoslovakia. This reflected cautious acceptance of Dubcek while at the same time pointing to negative features of Czechoslovak political life.

At the end of June there appeared in the Czechoslovak press a remarkable document under the title of "2,000 Words." It was written by Ludvik Vaculik, who played a major role in the June 1967 Writers' Congress, and was signed by some 70 intellectuals. In essence, the document was an expression of deep concern over forces which were still trying to block the reforms outlined by the Dubcek leadership and also noted popular fears that the progress of democratization had stopped. Although well-intentioned, the document caused some embarrassment for the Czechoslovak leadership and was officially rejected in a government statement. Nevertheless, the manifesto provoked widespread discussion and as time showed, it played its part in rallying support behind the Dubcek leadership.

The "2,000 Words" manifesto provided material for Moscow and other orthodox communist capitals to voice concern over the ability of the Dubcek leadership to retain control in Czechoslovakia.

After Dubcek rejected a call by the Soviet Union and four other members of the Warsaw Pact for urgent discussions at a summit meeting, Pravda unleashed an attack on the freedom of the communications media in Czechoslovakia and warned that counter-revolutionary forces were trying to undermine the very foundations of a socialist state. The "2,000 Words" manifesto was cited as an example.

There followed similar press attacks against Czechoslovakia from Poland and East Germany, Warsaw Pact troops on maneuvers in Czechoslovakia tarried, Rumania and Yugoslavia editorially supported the Dubcek leadership, and on July 14 the Soviet, Polish, East German, Hungarian and Bulgarian leaders met in Warsaw. The result was a harsh letter to Prague warning of the dangers to socialism and demanding more restrictive internal policies. The Dubcek leadership remained calm and dignified under great psychological and military pressures in the form of menacing troop maneuvers.

In a subsequent meeting of Soviet-Czechoslovak Presidium members at the end of July, and later in the early August six-power Bratislava conference, the Czechoslovak leaders refused to compromise the gains they had won while at the same time reaffirming Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship and support for the Warsaw Pact alliance.

During this April to August period, the Czechoslovak public was better informed by their own communications media than they had been at any previous time under Communist rule. Czechoslovak press and radio were outspoken and critical, especially of views expressed by some socialist states. Despite this newly-acquired press freedom Czechoslovaks were still anxious to gather information from all sources, including western broadcasts.

RFE's policy in broadcasts to Czechoslovakia was to urge support of the Dubcek leadership which was travelling cautiously along the road to greater democratization.

A policy guidance issued on 9 May 1968 after summit talks in Moscow declared:

"In the pursuance of its policy, the Dubcek leadership undoubtedly commands strong support in the country. Indeed, the First Secretary has more than once made it clear that it is only on this basis of greater rights for all citizens, a peaceful program of domestic reforms without external interference, and a foreign policy which is respectful not only of the country's allies but also of its own interests, that the CPCS can maintain its own political role and the people's support for basically 'socialist' policies...

"In the initial coverage pending further information on the Moscow meeting and subsequent developments, broadcasts will review the course of the Czechoslovak developments since January and emphasize the frequently stated desire of the new leadership to have normal, friendly and peaceful relations with all neighbors and allies. Programs will note that both sides appear desirous to prevent further deterioration and to put these relations on a new basis which would correspond to the changes that have occurred in Czechoslovakia in recent months. It appears that the fact that every country has its own peculiarities which must be respected, has had to be increasingly recognized in the Soviet Union, and that this recognition has become the prevailing pattern

of relations throughout the Communist alliance. If the Moscow summit met in this spirit, it may have made a constructive contribution all around."

Such hopes were not to be realized and Moscow and her allies began pressuring the Czechoslovak leaders. Strong editorials were supported by the tarrying of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia.

An RFE guidance of July 11, 1968, declared:

"With respect to the matter of Soviet units on Czechoslovak territory, the Czechoslovak Broadcasting Department in particular will support the demands made in the country that the citizen has a right to be informed on a matter of such importance to him. As of the moment, the situation remains unclear; according to a statement sourced to the Warsaw Pact forces headquarters and broadcast by Radio Prague, 'gradual' transfers of the troops out of the country are to begin on 13 July and Czechoslovak authorities are in 'permanent contact' with the Pact headquarters. Evidently the problem continues to be under negotiation, and the position of the Czechoslovak authorities remains firm. This firmness, as well as the overwhelming support of the new leadership now being manifested in the country, are a clear result of the unjustified attempts at external interference.

"In reporting relevant, clearly sourced and attributed information on developments relating to the present tense situation, the Czechoslovak Broadcasting Department will encourage the maintenance of calm and discipline in the face of this pressure and will avoid contributing to a 'credibility gap' between the Dubcek leadership and the people.

"The Czechoslovak Broadcasting Department will proceed from the assumption that the reform leaders are under severe and contradictory pressures, both externally and from their own people. While the latter is understandable because it is the interest and future development of the country and all its people which now lies in the balance, the Czechoslovak BD will see its role not in increasing such pressures but rather in providing all the relevant facts and information upon which the Czechoslovak citizen will be best able to form an intelligent judgment of the situation.

"Other broadcasting departments will stress particularly statements, both past and current, made by the Czechoslovak leaders themselves which attest to continuing Czechoslovak adherence to the Warsaw Pact and to principles of 'socialism' as adapted to unique Czechoslovak traditions and conditions."

The conflicting policies arising in RFE's audience countries (dealt with in another section of this report) underlined the importance of cross reporting.

To Czechoslovakia, RFE assured a continuous presentation not only of the views expressed about Czechoslovak developments in the other communist countries, but also those of the Western Communist Parties and of the western press in general.

Likewise, there was tremendous interest inside Czechoslovakia itself as to reaction in other socialist countries to events in Czechoslovakia.

A July 25, 1968 RFE commentary said:

"People who visited some of the East European countries in recent weeks were almost astonished to find the people in East Berlin, Warsaw, Sofia, as well as Budapest, so well informed about the situation in Czechoslovakia, about Moscow's pressure against our country, about the threatening propaganda of dogmatics of the five Communist countries against the Czechoslovak attempt at a new democratic path to socialism. A tourist or an official visitor to these countries is directly tempted to ask: who gives the people all this information? After all, their governments whose present policy reminds one of the old-time satellites, do not allow their information media to release truthful reports on Czechoslovakia. And, yet...although there are only a few Czech or Slovak newspapers and still fewer western magazines or newspapers obtainable in these countries and although their information centers -- with the exception of Hungary -- have not yet reported in detail on CC/CCPS' reply to the letter of the five Socialist countries from the Warsaw conference, although they did not say a word about Alexander Dubcek's statement and about the invitations extended by the Slovak and Czech artists' and journalists' unions, cultural institutions and tourist bureaus to their counter-parts in these countries, the people have all the information they need. This shows how important it is to have free radio stations in the West which keep the population of these countries truthfully and thoroughly informed about events in the world and, in this concrete case, about the development in Czechoslovakia and around it.

"Governments of the five socialist countries which form a dogmatic platform in a hard and directly threatening way denounce the liberalization and democratization line of the new leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, receive precisely a counter reaction on the part of their population. The people are not interested in the official media's reports on Czechoslovakia, they overlook and do not believe them. On the other hand, they follow with great enthusiasm every truthful report on Czechoslovakia regardless of whether released by Czechoslovakia or in the West. The Slovaks and Czechs enjoy great sympathies and admiration among the population of these countries. Naturally, Party officials show no enthusiasm or sympathies but millions of people do in these countries who long for greater freedom and relaxation. Well, Czechoslovakia's credit is high not only with the Western Communists and non-Communists but with the population of the Communist countries in Eastern Europe as well. The East German, Pole, Bulgarian and Hungarian shakes hands with the Czech and Slovak whom they honestly admire and whom they envy their Dubcek..."

In another commentary, broadcast on the 24th of July 1968, RFE dealt with the contrasting attitudes shown by Rumania and East Germany to the drive for greater democratization in Czechoslovakia.

"The dispute between Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia has bared the split in the world Communist movement, proving, inter alia, that the interests of the Soviet Union as an imperialist major power are incompatible with the interests of the Soviet Union as a representative of international Communism. Not a single more-important Communist organization in the free world has swung behind Moscow; but even more remarkable is that Soviet Russia's impertinent interference with the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia has become the target of severe criticism by two Communist countries in Eastern Europe - namely, Yugoslavia and Rumania. Let us briefly note the Rumanian standpoint. The Rumanian press and radio are going to great lengths informing the population of everything that is favorable for Czechoslovakia, placing greatest emphasis on confidence in the Czechoslovak development and the Prague leadership, and on the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of another country. Thus, Rumanian news service and commentaries differ totally from what information is aired in the other Warsaw Pact member countries. Yet the Rumanians, unlike the

Yugoslavs, have as yet not mentioned that the Soviets have asked the Czechoslovak leadership for a meeting; nor have they made a mention of the departure of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, the alleged arms caches, the Moscow Pravda article or other criticism addressed to Prague chiefly from Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria and Hungary. Particularly characteristic of Rumania's approach to informing the public was the simultaneous publication in the Rumanian party organ Scanteia of the Warsaw letter and the CPCPS Presidium's reply; it was reminiscent of the time five years ago when the Rumanians, intent on proving their strict neutrality in the Sino-Soviet rift, published the polemical letters of both disputants. But in the Czechoslovak-Soviet conflict, the Rumanians, rather than being neutral, quite unequivocally and honestly sympathize with Prague. This attitude is mirrored not only in the unprecedented courage the Rumanian leaders are evincing in their statements on Czechoslovakia, but also in the fact that the Rumanian press is quoting virtually all the pronouncements by other Communist parties in support of Czechoslovakia. Particularly clearcut is the new unity of interests between Prague, Bucharest and Belgrade. The Rumanian public receives detailed information on all Rumanian statements favorable to Czechoslovakia, and the Czechoslovak news media fully appreciate the Rumanian and Yugoslav attitude.

"In Ulbricht's East Germany, the situation is different. Neues Deutschland, the Party's main press organ in East Germany, is either keeping silence on latest developments or giving only incomplete information on it, and after a considerable delay...

"The main East German organ day after day quotes voices of citizens agreeing with the Warsaw letter. The fact is that the citizens of East Germany take lively interest in the actual development in Czechoslovakia, that they eagerly enter into conversations with foreigners, notably fellow countrymen from the Federal Republic who are visiting them, and that they are relatively well informed despite the news embargo Ulbricht has imposed on his state. They listen to foreign radios, and those living in East Berlin can go to the House of Czechoslovak Culture on Friedrichstrasse where they obtain precise information on the latest development in Czechoslovakia not only from special bulletins, but also from Czechoslovak newspapers, including the paper Prager Volkszeitung, for several months already banned from Ulbricht's realm."

RFE's programming to Czechoslovakia in the early part of August 1968 analyzed in detail the Bratislava Declaration, in which Prague's reform program was given qualified approval by Soviet, East German, Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian leaders. RFE noted that the document lacked any of the menacing tone of the "Warsaw Letter" of only a month before, and that it stressed the preservation of unity and cooperation.

On the other hand, the Bratislava agreement did not make clear what concessions, if any, had been made by either side. While granting the principles of "equality, respect for sovereignty and national independence," the Declaration did not give specific assurances of non-interference with Czechoslovak internal affairs. In fact, certain passages suggested that the Warsaw Pact allies would be keeping a sharp and critical eye on the reform program as it progressed.

A Policy Guidance of 4 August 1968 outlined the following approach to the Bratislava developments:

"In commenting on the Bratislava document, BD's will note that it has in effect accepted the reasoning of the Czechoslovak reply to the Warsaw Letter -- that if there should not be a Czechoslovak road to socialism, than 'socialism' has lost its chances in Czechoslovakia. It saved 'unity' in what is left of the 'socialist camp' -- but it could not reimpose a monolithic unity of any kind. The Bratislava reaffirmation of 'unity' was another in a series in which the Soviets were confronted with a Communist leadership that had made up its mind to conduct a policy of its own; in most cases, 'unity' was restored not on Soviet terms alone, but on terms and conditions increasingly closer to the desires of the more independent members of the 'socialist' grouping. Thus the Soviet Union is facing on the international level what many of the Communist Parties have faced or will have to face domestically: that to preserve their 'leading role' they have to earn the support and consent of those whom they claim to lead.

"On the Czechoslovak side, the tension of the last weeks has given way to understandable relief, but also to questions about the meaning of the settlement when it is translated into the specifics of Czechoslovak life. Dubcek's team, which has indeed, according to all indications, kept its word to the people and acted according to the mandate given by the people, will now have to answer a multitude of questions, legitimately asked by a people with a 20-year experience of disappointments. Among them will be questions on how the 'leading role' of the Party is to be assured to satisfy the terms of the settlement, and what restraints may have to be placed upon the freedom of expression. But basically, after Bratislava, these are matters to be solved between the Czechoslovak leadership and the Czech and Slovak people. As for the 'friendly'

watchers on the outside, their interpretations of what Czechoslovakia will or will not do are likely to be less than generous; but if the Czechoslovak people and leaders continue their course with the maturity and rational determination that they have so admirably displayed during the past critical weeks, there would not seem to be much else left to the Communist rear-guard abroad than to voice disapproval and, if they still can, seal themselves off from a new practice of 'socialism' which they don't understand. The Czechoslovak people and leaders have now been granted what looks like an opportunity to prove that a more humane form of 'socialism' is compatible with the realities of their geographical situation. There can be little doubt that they will try their best to furnish that proof when they are left in peace."

In the two weeks following Bratislava RFE continued to study carefully the changing situation in Czechoslovakia, noting especially certain moves which seemed to run against the mainstream of reform. These included the firing of General Prchlik for his criticism of Soviet domination of the Warsaw Pact alliance, official defence of the People's Militia despite widespread public criticism of the force, the apparent dismissal of two Rude Pravo editors for their criticism of the newspaper's conservative editor-in-chief and implementation of East German proposals for strengthening European security.

A Policy Guidance on August 16 stated:

"In commentary the Czechoslovak BD will recognize the above actions and statements, and raise questions concerning their meaning. BD will recognize that cumulative tactical moves eventually may run the risk of becoming a basic policy. The continued refusal of the leadership to back away from Prchlik's dismissal, the stress on public security and law and order, the support for the People's Militia, the warning against retaliation toward the Praga signatories, and the statement regarding foreign policy undertakings on behalf of East Germany are issues which cannot but cause concern to everyone who favors the consistent implementation of the letter and spirit of the Czechoslovak reform program.

"CS BD will acknowledge that to maintain flexibility for internal reform, the Party leadership must seek to give the least offense to her orthodox allies. This is part of the political game. Yet, any attempt to restrain the hard won liberties or define the limits of democratization through decree raises the question of how much internal discipline is consistent with liberal reform. At what point do tactical requirements encroach on the long-range principles of the Action Program and the Party Statutes? CS BD will, primarily, ask just what particular gestures toward Pact allies are proper and justified and which threaten the national unity which was a response to pressure from those allies."



RFE also commented on the resumption of polemics between the Soviet and Czechoslovak press. The nature of the Soviet press attacks were substantially different from those prior to Bratislava, RFE observed, in that they were limited to criticism of the Czechoslovak press and did not attack the leadership.

Then, shortly before midnight on August 20, Soviet, East German, Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian troops invaded Czechoslovakia.

Immediately RFE adjusted itself to meet the crisis. Air time was extended to 24 hours a day. The regular broadcasting schedule was revised.

Early August 21 a Policy Guidance detailed the developments to that time and went on to describe RFE's role:

"Warsaw Pact Troops Occupy Czechoslovakia: This morning, Radio Prague went on the air with the announcement that troops of the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria had been entering the country. It also carried a statement issued by the Czechoslovak Communist Party's Presidium which was in session last night. In it the Presidium made it clear that the entry of the Warsaw Pact troops took place without the knowledge or authorization of the Czechoslovak authorities, and termed the act a violation of the principles of international law. The Presidium also appealed to the country's population to remain clam and offer no resistance to the invading troops. It stated specifically that the Czechoslovak armed forces have not received a command to defend the country.

"The Radio announced that emergency sessions of the Czechoslovak National Assembly and the Party's Central Committee were being convened. However, in the ensuing hours the occupation of the country continued, and gradually put Czechoslovak media out of operation. At 4:30 in the morning, Radio Prague said that some of its transmitters were no longer functioning and appealed to listeners to spread knowledge of the Presidium's appeal by all possible means.

"At this point, the situation inside Czechoslovakia is completely obscure; no information is available to permit any judgment on it beyond concluding the obvious -- which is that the invading troops have taken control of most and perhaps all Czechoslovak territory, and begun to silence the country's information media. What is, however, crystal clear is that there had been absolutely no Czechoslovak provocation to justify this invasion. From January onward, the course of the Czechoslovak events was a peaceful one, with not a single person injured (indeed, no violence whatsoever), no aggressive intentions proclaimed, and no

indication that the new Czechoslovak leadership wanted anything but to remain a loyal ally of its 'socialist friends.' Nevertheless, these 'friends' have seen fit to resort to force in acting against a legal government which threatened no one.

"Pending receipt of further reliable information, RFE's role must be that suggested by Prague Radio: to 'inform about everything which is taking place.'

"In broadcasting to countries whose troops participate in the occupation, all BD's will review the facts of the Czechoslovak developments since January showing their peaceful nature and loyalty to 'socialist' commitments and alliances."

RFE conveyed to Czechoslovak listeners the world-wide indignation registered at the Moscow-led action, including the criticism expressed by the Yugoslav and Rumanian leaders as well as a majority of non-ruling communist parties. Official reaction to the invasion was carried in half-hourly newscasts and press comment reviews were given frequently during the broadcast day.

On August 21 RFE commentary to Czechoslovakia stressed that the Czechoslovak reform program initiated in January at no time had violated socialist norms, nor had it ever jeopardized Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship:

"After the brutal rule of Stalinism, the truth and longing for humanity and freedom brought forth a revival process this year. Communists began to implement it with the overwhelming support of the majority of the two nations. Also in this respect we demonstrated a sense for reality. For any more liberal and democratic life could form in our country only with the aid of the Communist Party. And this Party, after the relief of Novotny's incapable and reactionary clique, came to realize that the road of our nations leading to the near future must take as a starting point the substance of our history, the tradition of our nations and our own needs. The Communist Party and the two nations under Dubcek's leadership wished to accomplish a new, humane, and democratic Socialism. They did not wish to violate the commitments of alliance of the friendship with the Soviet Union. They wished, however, to take their own specific road to Socialism to which -- also according to the frequent statement of Soviet officials -- each nation is entitled. Reactionary forces of Communist dogmatists in Moscow, Berlin, Warsaw and Sofia did not grant Czechoslovakia this right. To them it was incomprehensible and unacceptable."

Another RFE Czechoslovak commentary, broadcast on August 22, analyzed the invasion in the light of unified national protest against it:

"Dear Friends -- neither you, nor we, know what will happen in the next hour, during the next half day, what will happen tomorrow. We know what has happened up to now. Some conclusions about this new, tragic chapter in our history can already be drawn from this...

"The army of occupation arrived in our country with everything appertaining to a modern military machine geared for action: with tanks, aircraft, cannons, machine guns, automatic rifles and with broadcasting equipment to start psychological warfare. The plans were ready, there was only need to carry them out, only need to press the button. The preparation was as perfect and as thorough as possible. In the military sense, therefore, the act of occupying our country progressed as it had to progress; rapidly, without any serious delays, and smoothly, however horrible this word sounds -- considering the victims from among the ranks of the population.

"What did not progress smoothly, what failed in the first stage is the political occupation of our homeland, the covering up of the military action by a cloak of apparent legality. The armies of occupation found such solid unity among our citizens as has perhaps never before been displayed by the people of this country. Not only the fact that, in the shadow of the foreign occupation, there was no Czechoslovak Kadar who would seize the first opportunity to sneak onto the political scene, but it was proven that, in the ranks of our citizens, non-Party people as well as Communist, there is no hotbed from which there might overnight rise the sad figure of a new collaborator. The free Czechoslovak broadcasting station, while it was still able to broadcast, became the manifest voice of unity and trust in the legal Czechoslovak representatives, whose authority has been thoroughly grounded long before the military invasion of our territory began and did not need any bayonets for support. In the transmissions of the free Czechoslovak broadcasting station there was not one voice heard to express doubt, fear, compromise, readiness to join anyone who could possibly make compromise with the invading army. The conversations of our citizens with the foreign soldiers are witness to how puzzled the members of the occupation units were by this unity. They arrived in a country which had not invited them, which does not need them, and in whose name no little group of opportunists began to speak as soon as the first tanks had crossed the frontiers, so that the foreign invasion could be justified.

"Yes, the only hope of the occupying forces to make political capital of the well-prepared military action was, it seems, an expectation that the act of force from outside would be supplemented by a speedy act of collaboration and treason from within. The sole political hope of the intruders could only have been a group of Czechoslovak dissenters. Whichever way things turn, this page of the Czechoslovak tragedy, on which we were perhaps supposed to read, in the very first moments, signatures and names, has, in this first phase, remained blank. The distribution of roles was accurate and, with all the tragedy of August 21, honorable: on the one side the physical force displayed by the armies of occupation; on the other, the united will of the people. The political stand of the people who want to speak in the name of the nation is indivisible from this attitude; it must stem from it. Kadarism in Czechoslovakia would be possible only as an unforgivable abandonment of everything that a nation expects from its recognized representatives. The first opportunity for Kadarism -- this is to the credit of this country and the disgrace of the intruders -- was missed. Kadarism still has a chance only as a delayed experiment which will not hide the fact that, in the first act, the military invasion succeeded, but the political invasion foundered."

Although much of the information which reached the West describing events inside Czechoslovakia was sparse, one thing was clear: during the crucial first stages of the invasion several important political institutions in Czechoslovakia continued to function. In addition, the occupying forces were not able to put together a pro-Soviet government to replace the reform-minded leadership. A Czechoslovak radio station reported that a Soviet-sponsored meeting of about half the Czechoslovak Party Central Committee failed to elect a collaborationist leadership. Pro-Dubcek radio stations reported that a National Assembly session voted 165-1 its support of the Party leader. The 14th Extraordinary Party Congress, originally scheduled for September, met in special session to elect a new Presidium which included the old leadership. The Congress also called a general strike if negotiations were not begun with legally-elected Czechoslovak Party and State officials.

With the visit of President Svoboda to Moscow for direct talks with Soviet leaders, and the release from Soviet custody of Dubcek, Cernik and Smrkovsky to participate in the Moscow negotiations, it became clear the Soviets found themselves in a situation which they had not expected. They not only had failed to form a collaborationist government but were confronted with a nation-wide front of non-collaboration and passive resistance. They aimed at reaching some sort of agreement in Moscow which would establish a government to include the present reform leaders but dominated by pro-Soviet conservatives.

Further information from Czechoslovak radio stations confirmed stories of unprecedented national unity behind the Dubcek leadership. Although most Slovaks had been prevented from attending the 14th Extraordinary Congress, their contingent also at a later time expressed strong support for Dubcek. The National Assembly, which was remaining in permanent sessions, showed pro-Dubcek unity. And the Prague Committee of the Czechoslovak youth league gathered a reported 50,000 signatures to protest the occupation.

The communique which closed the 4-day Moscow session was a significant document since it gave an indication, however vague, of what some of Czechoslovakia's prospects for the future might be. RFE Czechoslovak commentary on August 28 analyzed the document:

"The final communique on the Moscow negotiations seems to represent only the tip of that proverbial iceberg, nine-tenths of which are submerged in the inscrutable water. We do not know what concrete accords or political ideas are behind all those general formulations -- for example, 'about the work of Party and government agencies...for insuring...the socialist system, the leading role of the working class...', or about the conditions agreed on for

the departure of the Warsaw Pact armies from Czechoslovak territory. It is only on the basis of future political practice that it will be possible to judge and appraise the objective contents and political significance of the most important sections of the final communique.

"For now, we must restrict ourselves to three overall conclusions: First, the Warsaw Pact troops are staying in our homeland for the time being. True, the final communique does not, at any point, speak of their permanent presence, and President Svoboda has emphasized that they would be completely withdrawn, but we have no way of knowing who is to judge, and under what conditions, whether these conditions have been met. The phrase 'after normalization of conditions' is too vague to make possible a more precise political analysis on its basis.

"Second, the past development toward democratization and humanization of Czechoslovak socialism has been inhibited in many sectors. It is only after a due interpretation of the relevant sections of the Moscow document that it will be possible to draw a more accurate picture of the question which sectors will be affected. All that is known from Alexander Dubcek's speech at present is that a limitation of freedom of the press is intended.

"Third, Moscow is willing to tolerate certain reforms agreed on at the January and May Plenums of the CPCS Central Committee. To be able to assess what in fact is hidden behind this 'willingness,' one must know if the Soviets also consent to the Party's Action Program which the Party Central Committee approved at its plenary meeting on April 5 this year. Since the May session had ensued from the Action Program, the relevant formulation in the final communique calls for elucidation. From what President Svoboda said, the Czechoslovak representatives identify themselves with both the Action Program and the government declaration.

"Communist documents must always be analyzed not only with regard to their contents, but also according to what they do not contain. The final communique of the Moscow talks is highly interesting from this point of view. The fact is it does not contain a number of sections that would have been expected.

"First of all, it makes no mention whatever of the reasons for Czechoslovakia's occupation by the Warsaw Pact armed forces. It bypasses the whole question of the occupation troops allegedly having been invited by local Communists, and it does not try to impart to the occupation an appearance

of a sort of legitimacy. It was also in vain that we were trying to find in the final communique any mention of the so-called 'counter-revolution' in our homeland, of 'ideological diversion,' persecution of 'honest Communists,' -- in short, the Moscow document starts, without any explanation, from the bare fact of the occupation.

"This circumstance, of course, contrasts sharply with the smoke screen of anti-Czechoslovak propaganda in which the invaders have been camouflaging their aggression so far. It reveals the boundary at which they had to stop. For, it is not possible to speak of the non-existent invitation or counter-revolution when their partner in negotiations was Alexander Dubcek along with the head of the legal government, Cernik, and chairman of the legal parliament, Smrkovsky. When the Moscow press had branded Imre Nagy a traitor and counter-revolutionary, the whole world knew it was the death verdict. It was this time, too, that these expressions appeared on the pages of Soviet newspapers in connection with the name of Alexander Dubcek, and yet the Soviet leaders negotiated with him -- according to the final communique -- 'in a frank, comradely and friendly atmosphere.'

"Moreover: The final communique does not contain self-criticism of the Czechoslovak representatives. Not even in the first speeches of Alexander Dubcek and President Svoboda after their return from Moscow contained any word of self-criticism, any attack on so-called 'counter-revolutionaries,' any sign of approval of the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Dubcek and Svoboda spoke not over the collaborationist Radio Vltava (Moldavia), but over the free and legal Czechoslovak Radio broadcasts. They did not dissociate themselves from the Czech and Slovak nation united in the fight against the occupiers, did not criticize their attitude. They only spoke of sad political realities and endorsed their present policies.

"These are facts of the utmost importance. Not only must the Czechs and Slovaks proceed from the reality of the occupation, but the Soviets must accept some -- we would say -- most important Czechoslovak realities. From this follow possibilities of further joint action of the unified nations and the unified political leadership of the Czechoslovak republic."

In an address to the nation August 30, National Assembly Chairman Josef Smrkovsky hinted at some of the Byzantine tactics used by the Soviets during the occupation, such as abducting the country's leadership, permitting their participation in the Moscow talks only after Svoboda's strong insistence and threatening the Czechoslovak President with partition of his nation. Smrkovsky also suggested some of the changes which would have to be made in Czechoslovakia. A major change would be reinstatement of some kind of control over information media.

While Smrkovsky confirmed that the nation would continue on the January course, it was apparent that the course would have to be altered. A plenary session of the Czechoslovak Party Central Committee at the end of August indicated the manner in which the Prague leaders intended to adapt to the changed conditions.

A Policy Guidance of September 2, 1968, analyzed the session in the light of prior events:

"A communique released last night on Saturday's plenary session of the CPCS CC indicates that, in spite of the continued military occupation of Czechoslovakia, the Dubcek leadership remains in office with the complete support of the Party and has resolved, even in the extraordinary circumstances, to pursue when and where possible the objectives of the reformist political course launched last January. After returning from Moscow, the Dubcek leadership was faced with the paradoxical situation that the extraordinary Fourteenth Congress (which met clandestinely following the invasion) which had furnished a perhaps indispensable manifestation of Czechoslovak resistance to the occupation, one which clearly strengthened the position of the Dubcek leadership in Moscow, had now become a barrier to the implementation of the 'compromise' reached in Moscow (the Congress had been publicly condemned as 'illegal' in Soviet bloc media.)

"The Czechoslovak response, as revealed by the present CC session, has been to formally ignore the clandestine extraordinary Party congress; the 'Fourteenth Congress,' according to the Plenum's communique, will convene in the near future, but sometime after the original date of September 9. In fact, however, the Dubcek leadership has subscribed to and vowed the continuation of much of the reformist political content of the clandestine Party Congress proceedings. This may be seen, first, in the altered composition of the top Party organs. Eighty delegates to the Fourteenth Congress, the great majority, if not all, 'progressive,' have been co-opted to the present (post-13th Congress) CC, while a noted conservative, Chudik, has been dropped. A new expanded 21-member Presidium of a solidly reformist but all-state character has been formed with only two conservative members (with Slovakia enjoying equal representation and regional Party organizations equitably represented.)

"Of 15 newly elected Presidium members, seven were elevated to that position by the clandestine Party congress. Of the 11 members of the Presidium as of August 20, the day of the invasion, four conservatives have been dropped, as compared to only one 'progressive,' Kriegel, who apparently became totally unacceptable to Moscow. Dubcek, Cernik, and Smrkovsky remain in the Presidium, with Dubcek still First Secretary and General Svoboda now a voting member



of the top body. The new Secretariat, too, has a solidly reformist character. Apart from Kriegel, CC Secretary Cisar has 'resigned' his Secretaryship, again obviously because of Soviet pressure, yet he will continue to head the Czech National Council. On the other hand, the conservative Oldrich Svestka has lost the editorship of Rude Pravo, to be replaced by Jiri Sekera, another 'progressive,' who was first appointed to that position shortly after the Soviet invasion.

"Dubcek (according to an official paraphrase of his remarks) impressed on the CC session the need to 'place at the head of the Party, in this critical situation, comrades enjoying universal confidence and the ability to lead the Party without extreme actions and internal splits.' This indeed seems to have taken place; the net result has been not only the elimination of a few prominent 'progressives' (who have, however, not been replaced by conservative or pro-Soviet elements) but the removal of even more conservatives, and the creation of a cohesive, solidly pro-reformist and pro-Dubcek Party leadership. It is clear that Dubcek has not forced a Soviet-imposed 'balanced' leadership on the Party. Perhaps the Soviet leaders came to recognize the impossibility of attempting to do that with Dubcek in office, or perhaps, in individual cases, Soviet pressure for the inclusion of conservatives in the top Party leadership was successfully resisted.

"The Czechoslovak Party's continued resolve to continue its reformist course to the maximum extent possible under the present conditions may be seen, however, not only in the personnel changes in top Party organs made by the CC Plenum but in the programmatic statements and discussion at the Plenum as well. While full texts have not been released, the available reports on the Plenum, including a long summary of Dubcek's speech, indicate this commitment, as well as a resolve to attempt to operate on the basis of the Moscow 'compromise', only with the continued support of the Party and nation. Echoing Smrkovsky's radio address of August 29, Dubcek frankly admitted that the Czechoslovak reformers 'did not sufficiently take into account the dark and real power of international factors, including the views held with regard to our situation by the State with whom we are united in the Warsaw Pact.' But he pledged 'even in these hard times' to continue the post-January reform course, based on the CPCS Action Program. Specific restrictive measures would have to be introduced because of the extraordinary circumstances, including limited censorship apparently on foreign policy questions (only). Dubcek also stressed that political activity would have to be confined

to the National Front (which, however, would not operate as it did before January), that security organs and the army would be strengthened, and that the Warsaw Pact was 'permanent.' He made quite clear, however, that the rationale for any concessions or restrictive measures was to insure Soviet respect for its commitments in Moscow - above all, the withdrawal of the occupying armed forces, compensation for the damage caused by the occupation and economic assistance. Even more important, however, Dubcek indicated that even in bowing partially to enormous external pressure, the most basic elements of the Party's Action Program would be safeguarded. Above all, the Party would not attempt to impose its will in the traditional Leninist manner - the authority of the Party would still have to be 'recognized by the people voluntarily, of their own volition.' This voluntary confidence, and support of all segments of society, especially youth, he continued, could be maintained only if the Party continued 'creatively' to show 'full respect for the specific conditions of the building of socialism in Czechoslovakia.' The available summary of the plenum indicates that this resolve was shared by the vast majority of the Central Committee."

On October 18th, a formal treaty was signed in Prague setting forth the conditions under which "normalization" must proceed in Czechoslovakia and confirming the indefinite stay of a reduced Soviet occupation force. An RFE guidance for October 19th summed up the situation which apparently still prevails as of the present writing:

"Although the Czechoslovak leadership seems to have taken another step in accommodating the Soviet Union and has formally accepted major limitations on Czechoslovak sovereignty, it must be recognized that it was faced with brutal Soviet pressure and that, on the other hand, it still retains some internal freedom of maneuver."

As an RFE commentary to its Czechoslovak listeners put it on August 27 -- at the moment of Dubcek's return from Moscow:

"Sometimes it is the duty of statesmen to avert the worst possibilities in order to preserve better opportunities... What Czechoslovakia has now is less than what it had before August 21st; but it is more than it would have had if civil morale had crumbled under the weight of the occupation regime and the government had been assumed by a group of collaborators willing to comply with every foreign wish. There is no government of collaborators and traitors in Czechoslovakia; Czechoslovakia has statesmen who had to give to a foreign power something which does not belong to it, lest they had to give this power everything. Their responsibility for what has remained and what to do with it is incomparably greater than the degree of their responsibility at the time prior to August 21. They will

have to administer their country in the presence of a foreign army and -- however this may be cloaked by phrases -- under foreign supervision... Czechoslovakia is under supervision. It is not suppressed; it is not humble. The Czechoslovak population will not shout with joy, but it need not and it must not despair... The history of Czechoslovakia's advance did not begin on August 21 and it will not end with August 27... A resurgence may follow, however difficult the road ahead may be, because in these August days the nation has demonstrated its hopeful determination, its healthy strength and its free will."

## SECTION 2

### CZECHOSLOVAK LISTENER REACTION

During the recent events in Czechoslovakia, many Czechs and Slovaks found time and opportunity to contact RFE and its members, in writing or even by phone--or personally after they left the country.

Here are some samples:

From a letter from Bohemia: "RFE has been wonderful, objective, calm, with a clear line; it took us usually quite long before we were sure that we were not listening to one of the legal stations. We had the feeling of absolute togetherness, that they belong to us. We will depend on your information now and you are certainly aware that you will have our confidence in the future too, if you continue to be reliable, well-informed and objective without any distortions."

\* \*

From a letter by a German citizen from Koblenz, dated 6 October: "During my recent vacation, I met in Yugoslavia a Czechoslovak couple from Prague. They asked me to tell you that they and many of their fellow-citizens followed with special attention your programs. They also ask you to continue this way as intensively as possible because they cannot do without independent information."

\* \*

An anonymous letter from Prague contained a copy of a student's protest against the invasion and the following handwritten addition: "Thanks for your work!!!"

\* \*

A postcard from Bratislava, mailed in Vienna: "Thanks for your programs, especially now!"

\* \*

From a signed letter dated in Prague on 28 August and mailed in Zurich on 2 September: "I am a member of the CP, I am 24 years old and I am an economist. But first of all, I am a Czech and so, I don't have to explain to you who had to leave our country how important its fate is to me. Until recently, I was a great supporter of Soviet policy. I thought that the Soviet Union could play a progressive role in the world. How everything changed now! . . . Thanks for your moral support."

\* \*

On Saturday, 31 August, a Czech technician came to the RFE building and told our representative: "I just came out of the country and I am on my way to Frankfurt but I simply had to drop in and thank you. You don't realize how valuable your work was for us. The signal of your medium wave is extremely strong and clear."

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From a letter of a Czech theology student in Rome: "As a former editor of the Czechoslovak Radio, I thank you for your reporting which is absolutely perfect and responsible."

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From a friend of one of our editors: "We have been listening to your medium wave broadcast day and night, especially during night hours when our stations are silent."

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From an interview with a young journalist who arrived in Munich on 24 August: "When I waited for my train at Zdice (western Bohemia) everybody at the station was listening to you."

\* \*

From a letter mailed on 30 August in Czechoslovakia: "I admired RFE and I listened to it every evening."

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From a phone call of a relative of one of our employees: "And don't forget us--you know what I mean--don't forget us!"

\* \*

On 25 August a staff member met a Czech Catholic priest and a young lady historian both of whom left the country the day before. Both stated that as soon as the jamming of RFE stopped everyone started to listen to us--especially on the medium wave. People either alternated between RFE and Czechoslovak stations or--where there were more radio sets in the family--"monitored".

\* \*

The editor of a Czechoslovak publication who was visiting Western Europe in the first half of September: "Information broadcast by you was very useful to me and my fellow members of the Coordinating Committee of Cultural Organizations . . . Everything that you have done has been absolutely splendid and I can assure you that all prejudices against RFE have fallen."

\* \*

A well-known Czechoslovak writer stated that he himself had been listening frequently to RFE during the critical days and that he was very impressed by its programs because of their restraint, accuracy and objectivity and because of the wise and--as he put it--statesmanlike tone and standpoint expressed in some of our commentaries. This appreciation is shared by other writers as well as by television and radio workers who worked for the clandestine radio and TV stations after the invasion.

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A Czechoslovak publisher stressed that RFE helped to supply the clandestine transmitters with information from abroad which had not been available in those days because the country had been sealed off almost hermetically. He said RFE could be heard everywhere, even in the streets and public places.

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A Czech radio worker: "After the invasion, the relation of the people toward RFE found a unanimous expression. The introduction of the medium wave broadcasts made RFE programs available to everybody, and the people got at last the possibility to evaluate them. The result was startlingly unanimous. RFE was listened to practically everywhere--in factories as well as in private homes. In a big factory in Prague, for instance, the chief of the department--a Party member of long standing--instructed the employees to listen to RFE and to get its reaction to the Moscow agreement. The best commentators of the Czechoslovak Radio as well as other editors, producers, technicians and speakers, all of them described RFE programs as very objective and helpful. This includes people who--under the impression of the official propaganda--had expressed a negative attitude toward RFE before. In short, there was no difference between the people at home and the emigres from RFE in those days. This almost surprising fact will never be forgotten by the Czechoslovak people.

\* \*

A Bratislava state employee: "RFE enjoys great popularity among Bratislava population as a reliable source of information and objective commentaries. For evident reasons, most of the people listen to the medium wave broadcasts. In the present situation, RFE represents to the people the guarantee of the continuity of free broadcasting and a great moral help."

\* \*

The composite summary of views expressed by a group of Slovak writers and professional people: "RFE played in the critical days a very important role, not only as a source of information but also in the political field. The reception on the medium wave has been and still is good. The voice of RFE is respected very much, not only among the population but also in high Party circles; its influence is still very strong. RFE has become an indispensable part of the daily life in the country. People at home expect that RFE will continue to play this role. The invasion days showed the unity of the people at home and the exiles, and RFE has become a bridge not only toward the West but also toward a better future."

\* \*

A letter mailed from Yugoslavia: "On the very first day of the occupation I was injured. In the hospital it was all the same as elsewhere: all day long all people listened either to our radio or to RFE, thanks to that midwave. The fact is that the Russians contributed to an enormous expansion of RFE reception. After I had been brought home from the hospital, RFE broadcasts were transmitted over the local radio in Vrane. In the factory there, all shops had their works radio tuned in on RFE, I heard. I have to admit to something that, independently from it, was confirmed to me later directly from RFE. I wondered at the fact that you were showing an uncommitted stand, as though also your future were not at stake. This was not only my opinion, but everybody I talked to was astonished in the same way. This may also be a remnant from the times that RFE used to be identified with the words 'propaganda, heckling'. However, I then listened to a talk on that theme one night. I admitted that you were aware of the responsibility for the words put on air which have a multiplied effect."

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Several Czechoslovak Protestant leaders: "The popularity of RFE has never been so great. Your commentaries after the Moscow talks were politically accurate and well balanced."

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From an interview with a journalist from Prague, 17 September:  
"RFE is listened to in the whole country. People especially stress its objectivity."

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From an interview with a middle-aged intellectual from Brno:  
"RFE is very popular and represents for the Brno population the main source of information. During a recent meeting in a big Brno factory, leading workers and representatives of the works council declared publicly that the reporting of RFE is objective."

\* \*

From an interview with a Czech artist from Prague: "In the days of Cierna and Bratislava, I was on vacation at the Bulgarian seaside. All Czech guests listened to RFE in the hotel lobby and when the direction took away the radio set 'for repairs', we used our transistors. It was our only source of reliable information."

\* \*

A Czech from Marianski Lazne: "We recorded your report on the UN proceedings and mimeographed it."

\* \*

A Czechoslovak family: "Your work has been splendid, it almost equalled the work of the legal stations."

\* \*

An elderly engineer from Prague said: "You have become our official radio station. Be aware of it!"

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A doctor from Prague: "I didn't listen personally but every day I had information about your programs from policemen who listened to RFE in their cars."

\* \*

Toward the end of September, a Prague journalist came with his wife to the RFE building to thank the Czechoslovak BD staff for their performance. They brought some posters and other material from the early days of the occupation with them as a token of their gratitude and when parting they said: "You have found the right tone, you have done an excellent job--we are with you, be with us!"

\* \*



From a letter dated September 2 written inside Czechoslovakia and posted in the West by friends of the author: "And now, the Munich broadcasts are a boost for the whole nation. This is a great piece of political work. They were wise in their identification with the nation. . . After our stations are silenced politically, this is the only really Czechoslovak voice. Even former opponents have changed their mind and acknowledge this. . . For the time being there is no jamming and this too shows you the attitude of our communication workers. This is our station and I believe that this possessive pronoun is the best reward for you."

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### SECTION 3

#### EXPLANATIONS OF THE INVASION BY BULGARIA, HUNGARY, POLAND AND RUMANIA

Before the Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968 the Communist bloc countries of Eastern Europe had made their positions clear. The Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria and, to a lesser extent, Hungary, had expressed growing alarm at developments under the new Czechoslovak leadership. Rumania and Yugoslavia on the other hand clearly supported social democratization taking place in Czechoslovakia. The relative quiet that followed the Soviet-Czechoslovak talks at Cierna and the Bratislava meeting of the six Warsaw Pact nations was shattered by the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia.

At 0520 Munich time on August 21, the Soviet Union announced that "Party and government leaders of Czechoslovakia" had asked the Soviet Union and other allied countries for "urgent support, including assistance with armed forces, to meet the threat which has arisen to the socialist system...from counter-revolutionary forces which have entered into collusion with foreign forces hostile to socialism." The TASS announcement reiterated the Bratislava formulation that "the support, strengthening, and protection of the socialist achievements is a common international duty," and claimed that a "further aggravation of the situation in Czechoslovakia affects the vital interests of the Soviet Union and other socialist states," thereby allegedly threatening their security and European peace. The Soviet statements then affirmed that Warsaw Pact military units had entered Czechoslovakia and that they would be "withdrawn without delay" as soon as "the threat to the achievements of socialism in Czechoslovakia and the threat to the security of the countries of the socialist community has been eliminated."

The initial announcement of the troop movements into Czechoslovakia was broadcast by Radio Prague in the early hours of August 21. At the same time, the radio carried a statement issued by the Czechoslovak Communist Party's Presidium, which declared that the entry of Warsaw Pact units took place without the knowledge or authorization of the Czechoslovak authorities and termed the act a violation of the principles of international law.

Throughout the morning of August 21, media in Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary rebroadcast complete texts of the initial statements revealing the entrance of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia. Radios Warsaw, Sofia and Budapest also carried reports emphasizing that "not a single moment should be wasted in the face of the counter-revolutionary onslaught" and calling upon the members of the Czechoslovak army to help the Warsaw Pact forces to eliminate this threat. Radio Sofia became the first East European station to report on mass meetings (in Bulgaria) supporting the military action. The declarations of the Czechoslovak Presidium and the Czechoslovak National Assembly Presidium were not mentioned by Polish, Bulgarian or Hungarian media.

Rumania continued to express its grave concern over developments in Czechoslovakia. A communique, issued on behalf of the Central Committee, the State Council, and the government, was read during a mass rally in the center of Bucharest. In protesting the Warsaw Pact action as a "flagrant violation of national sovereignty," the communique expressed "full solidarity with the Czechoslovak people and their Leninist Party."

Rumanian Party Leader Ceausescu addressed the rally and declared the intervention to be "unjustifiable and unacceptable," exclaiming that "this shameful moment in the history of the revolutionary movement must be ended as quickly as possible. We are persuaded that no Communist will ever approve of this military action."

During the next few days the radio stations and news agencies of the Warsaw Pact countries with troops participating in the occupation of Czechoslovakia continued to devote extensive coverage to Soviet dispatches on events in that country.

Initially Hungarian media displayed marked reticence on the Czechoslovak situation (broadcasting only two brief items in addition to the TASS dispatches). In contrast Polish and Bulgarian media carried original commentaries for the apparent purpose of justifying the Warsaw Pact intervention. In addition, expressions of alleged support for the positions of the Bulgarian and Polish leaderships were registered by Radios Sofia and Warsaw.

On the other hand, Rumanian coverage continued to reflect concern at the situation in Czechoslovakia and support for the Czechoslovak Party and state leadership.

Radio Bucharest reported on numerous public meetings in Rumania condemning the occupation of Czechoslovakia and approving the position of the Rumanian leadership. In addition, the radio station extensively quoted excerpts of various Czechoslovak statements issued by Ceteka and the CS broadcasting stations still in operation.

## BULGARIA

Bulgarian news media lost no time on August 21 in attempting to justify participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Throughout the day Radio Sofia carried reports of numerous meetings throughout the country at which the working people gave "full support" for the action of the Warsaw Pact nations.

The first Bulgarian commentary on the situation was broadcast at 1800 hours.

Titled "A Harsh Lesson for the Counterrevolution," the commentary sought to justify the military intervention by alleging the existence of anti-socialist forces in Czechoslovakia. It denounced the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia for its failure to take efficient measures against the "forces of reaction" and accused the Czechoslovak leaders of having broken the promises given to the "fraternal Parties" at the Bratislava meeting. The program emphasized that the "forces of reaction," disguised behind slogans of "liberalization" and "democratization" and taking advantage of the regime's permissiveness, had continued to cause confusion among the Czechoslovak people.

The commentary also recalled that various "representatives of the American, British, and West German monopolies" had visited Czechoslovakia and referred to the scheduled visit to Prague by the President of the World Bank and former U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara as an illustration of the West's interest in Czechoslovak developments. The Bulgarian radio program commented that events in Czechoslovakia "had completely unmasked" the plans of the "imperialist" nations to carry out a "calm counterrevolution" and stressed that the defense of socialist achievements was the international duty of all "socialist" nations. Finally, the report referred to the approval of the invasion allegedly expressed by the Bulgarian public.

During the following days Bulgarian media devoted extensive coverage to justifying the occupation action. On August 25 came the first official condemnation of the Yugoslav and Rumanian leaders for their support of the new Czechoslovak leadership. Stanko Todorov, a Politburo member and CC Secretary, addressing a meeting commemorating the Bulgarian resistance movement during the time of the Turkish invasion, also referred to current events in Czechoslovakia.

He asserted: "we cannot disregard the improper behavior of the Yugoslav, Rumanian, and Chinese leaders in this decisive hour for the destiny of socialism in Czechoslovakia."

Todorov emphasized that the five Warsaw Pact countries had been aware of the negative reaction of "imperialism and counter-revolution," but added "it is not understandable why some others who consider themselves to be our friends have joined in this chorus." He warned that "as a result of their actions, these people assume a heavy responsibility before their Parties and peoples, the international Communist movement, and the cause of world progress."

Todorov went on to deal with the current situation in Czechoslovakia and stated that the existence of "secret radio transmitters, the distribution of illegal newspapers and leaflets, the filthy anti-Soviet and anti-Communist slogans painted on the wall, and the activity of well-organized illegal centers" documented the "real face of both revisionists and counter-revolutionaries."

On 26 August, Radio Sofia devoted considerable time to Czechoslovak developments.

At 1400 hours the Bulgarian radio broadcast the BTA report from its correspondent in Prague. The report asserted that "the forces of counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia had learned the Hungarian lesson of 1956" and had "abandoned conventional methods in favor of new forms with which to gain control over and undermine the Communist Party, the trade unions, the Komsomol, the state, and the economy." The broadcast attacked Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Hajek, who "spoke at the emergency session of the UN Security Council using the same language as did the US, British and French delegates." The story concluded that the "counter-revolution will not succeed in destroying socialism, and Czechoslovakia will remain a socialist country."

A later Radio Sofia commentary (1800 hours) entitled "The Facts Speak," carried another strongly-worded attack on the "counter-revolutionary forces" in Czechoslovakia. Quoting an interview given by a Czechoslovak radio commentator to an American journalist, the Bulgarian commentary criticized Dubcek by stating that "following his election (to the post of First Secretary), the CC of the CPCS and the Party apparatus were completely disorganized." Dealing with the "imperialist propaganda machine," the broadcast drew a parallel between the current situation and the Hungarian Revolt of 1956, and stated that the invasion was a "timely step taken to save the lives of the old Czechoslovak Communists and patriots," but not an "occupation," as it had been called by "Belgrade, Bucharest, Peking, and others."

In another commentary, "The Door is Closing," Peyo Ivanov sharply attacked Western news media and politicians "for exerting efforts to do away with Communism and its real incarnation -- the socialist states." The radio alleged that events in Czechoslovakia had revealed the "new and actual theoretical and tactical mechanism of anti-Communism," which "aimed at dismantling Communism." Radio Sofia once again attacked Yugoslavia, Rumania and China. Following the statement that "in 1956, as well as in 1968, Belgrade has become the immediate defender and savior," the commentary compared the attitudes of Yugoslavia, Rumania, and China toward the Warsaw Pact action and asserted that the "positions of right- and left-wing opportunism merge," thus constituting "a common anti-Communist chorus."

In its main newscast (1930 hours) on August 28, Radio Sofia broadcast a BTA report from its special correspondent in Prague, strongly attacking the activities of the "counter-revolutionary forces." The correspondent asserted that the main problem now is "how to wipe out the stain of disgrace made on the clean forehead of the socialist republic by the anti-socialist forces, how to heal the heavy moral wounds inflicted on the people by the counter-revolution." The program cited "clandestine leaflets that appealed for the rejection of any compromise," stressing that these were "in full harmony with the many slogans urging neutrality for Czechoslovakia that appear in the streets and on the walls." The report stated that "Czechoslovakia is at a fateful crossroads: one road leads to counter-revolution and bloody disorder, and the other points to normalization and improved cooperation with her allies." The program also reported on the session of the Central Committee of the CPCS and on the decisions of the CS National Assembly regarding the results of the Moscow talks. The correspondent concluded that "future developments will depend on the way in which they [the Central Committee and the National Assembly] solve the most urgent problems, and on the resolution and efficiency with which these decisions are implemented."

A lengthy commentary on the situation in Czechoslovakia, written by the head of the Information Department at Radio Sofia, Nikola Nikolov, was broadcast by the Bulgarian state radio network on August 30. The commentary briefly summarized the alleged intent of "imperialist and counter-revolutionary forces to wipe out socialism in Czechoslovakia" and went on to praise the communique on the Moscow talks, describing it as an "important political document which marks the beginning of a new state in the development of the situation in Czechoslovakia." The Sofia station asserted that the "first positive results in the spirit of the Moscow talks have already become evident" and stated that the appeals of President Svoboda, Party leader Dubcek, and Premier Cernik to the Czechoslovak people, calling on them to cooperate with the Party and the government, "are being met with ever greater understanding."

Expressing the conviction that the Czechoslovak people will find a way out of the great moral and political crisis "in which they were thrown by their enemies," the commentary admitted that "this process, which has already begun, would be a difficult one." It also emphasized that one of the main problems to be solved in Czechoslovakia "is the strengthening of the Communist Party," and went on to accuse the "counter-revolutionary forces" of having inflicted "the greatest damage in this sphere by confusing many people." The commentary asserted that this process had already begun and cited "the denunciation of the Extraordinary 14th Congress of the CPCS by the Congress of the Slovak CP."

Finally, the station again referred to the Moscow talks, describing them as a "great political victory," and stated that "necessary assistance was given to the CPCS while a heavy blow was simultaneously delivered to the forces of the counter-revolution and world imperialism." The commentary concluded that the socialist community will come out of the clash with imperialism over Czechoslovakia still further strengthened, united, and able to fulfill its historic mission as the main decisive force in the struggle with imperialism."

During the weekend (August 31 and September 1), Bulgarian coverage of the Czechoslovak situation showed no significant shift in emphasis. In its main program on August 31, Radio Sofia broadcast a report from the BTA correspondent in Prague, which asserted that the "citizens of Prague are diligently working to deal with the consequences of the outrages of the anti-socialist forces." It was stated that similar actions were underway throughout the country. The reporter noted that "the draft of the new press legislation is in preparation," and that "a Press and Information Directorate" had already been established, adding that "the allied troops did not come to Czechoslovakia to overthrow the government." The radio emphasized that "in accordance with the agreement reached with the allied command, there are no impediments to civilian traffic and the people have begun moving normally," thus revealing for the first time that the occupation forces had imposed a curfew in Prague. The same program announced that "the Czechoslovak government had decided to initiate economic talks with the USSR in Moscow in the next few days." The BTA story reported that "last night the CC of the CPCS was forced to deny rumors about an attempt on Dubcek's life," concluding that "the aim of these rumors was clear -- to create disorder in order to frustrate the Moscow agreement, which has already produced its first results."

The following are examples of RFE commentaries broadcast to Bulgaria during the first week of the occupation.

August 22, 1968

"The international disgrace the Soviet Union has brought upon itself by invading a sovereign, and what is more, an allied, socialist and even 'brotherly Slav country,' under the shallow pretext of having been asked by Czechoslovak 'Party and government officials' to render assistance is anything but justified and in no way reduces the shame of the Bulgarian Communist regime, which now, as always, reveals itself Moscow's most obedient servant. The ignominy of the Bulgarian Communist regime is the greater, because its boot-licking behavior is absolutely contrary to the feelings and views of the Bulgarian people, who are thirsting for more freedom and who are sufficiently proud to retain their national dignity.

"But the shame of the Sofia Communists is not exhausted by this fact that they agreed to send Bulgarian army units to take part in the occupation of a truly friendly country and, thus, to remain fixed in the minds of Czechs and Slovaks as conquerors of Czechoslovakia. It goes much farther and deeper, thanks to its policy regarding public information.

"The Bulgarian Communist regime is determined to mislead Bulgarian citizens from start to finish, even if it is not too blind to see that a lie is inevitably short-lived, that the Bulgarian citizens have the technical possibility of learning the truth in this most tragic hour for Czechoslovakia, which bears such startling resemblance to the occupation of the country by the brutal armed forces of the Nazi dictator, Hitler. The things that have been and are being said in the Bulgarian press, over the Bulgarian radio and television stations about events in Czechoslovakia will forever remain a wretched sad testimony of a criminal attempt to mislead a whole nation over a question which is as important for the whole of Europe and the world as it is fateful for the countries of the socialist camp.

"The latest example of the way the Bulgarian people are being misled was the so-called 'address by a group of members of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, government and the National Assembly of Czechoslovakia,' which was broadcast by Radio Sofia on August 21. On six full typewritten pages, this nameless group of members rack their brains as to how to think up an excuse for their appeal for "help" to the Soviet Union and the other "fraternal socialist countries."

"The Sofia Communist regime is accustomed not to take into account the Bulgarian citizens' personal and national pride over their cultural heritage, and regularly serves them up lies and things in poor taste, but this address surpasses anything that the human mind could conceive. There is no such thing as a Bulgarian citizen who would believe that the Czechs and Slovaks begged the Soviet Union and its satellites to occupy their country. And if such were actually found, then, obviously, they were afraid to give their names, because even they are aware of the fact that, in the eyes of their fellow-countrymen, they appear as traitors. What Bulgarian is going to believe that a power as great as the Soviet Union, merely upon the invitation of a nameless group of Party, government and parliamentary members, would embark upon an international venture of such scope? Anyone can calculate for himself how much time is needed and how much effort is required to prepare such an offensive, in which the armed forces of



five countries, headed by the Soviet Union, are taking part. Occupation was bound to come, even without any thought-out invitation. That the Soviet Union has resorted to such a ridiculous trick merely shows how weak its position is in the eyes of the Free World and before the Communist Parties, not only outside the bloc, but also those within the Soviet bloc itself, as is the case with the Rumanian Communist Party. It is in times such as these that historical words spring to one's mind. Regardless of what deeds Ceausescu will perform, he is bound to be remembered because of the courage he displayed when he said that the invasion of Czechoslovakia 'is a shameful deed.' And the reverse is also true, the fact that the Sofia Communist regime is taking part in this trick of the Soviet Union shows that the sole virtue it still manages to retain is its ability to cringe before Moscow.

"The Czechoslovak institutions mentioned in the 'address' -- the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak CP, the government and the National Assembly, are not anonymous. The names of all their members are well known. Known also are the names of the persons who head these institutions. President of the Republic Ludvik Svoboda, Premier Cernik, Party First Secretary Alexander Dubcek, and National Assembly Chairman Smrkovsky, all occupied their posts legally.

"Very well, but did these reliable institutions not express their will, in contrast to the would-be nameless group of members, who allegedly asked for the occupation of their own country? They most expressly did, in the very first hours of the invasion. Three hours after it had started, the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, which had just been dealing with the preparations for the Party's 14th Congress, announced over Radio Prague that Soviet troops had crossed the border without the knowledge of the President of the Republic, the Chairman of the National Assembly, the Premier, the Party First Secretary or of the institutions they head. The Party Presidium declared that it considers this act not only to be in conflict with the principles governing relations between "socialist countries," but also a negation of the basic rules of international law.

"At 0800 hours, the National Assembly Presidium issued a proclamation, 'profoundly and firmly' condemning the military invasion and calling on the leaders of the respective countries involved to give the order for the 'immediate withdrawal' of their troops from Czechoslovak territory.

"A few minutes later, President of the Republic Ludvik Svoboda spoke briefly over television, and advised the citizens to wait for their 'constitutional representative' to take further steps.

"That same morning, Wednesday morning, National Assembly Presidium member Alois Polednak said over Radio Prague that only Alexander Dubcek, Oldrich Cernik, Josef Smrkovsky and Ludvik Svoboda are empowered to speak in the name of the nation.

"The Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry immediately instructed its ambassadors in the five Warsaw Pact countries to lodge strong protests and demand the immediate withdrawal of these forces. Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek, who was in Yugoslavia on the night of the coup, gave instructions to the Czechoslovak representative at the United Nations to reveal the truth and to inform the Security Council of the Czechoslovak government's stand. After the statement of the Soviet representative, who could think of nothing better to say than to dwell at length on the notorious address of the imaginary and nameless group of Czechoslovak Party and government officials, the Czechoslovak representative exposed the flagrant lie of the Soviet Union and invader of a sovereign country and a crude violator of international law.

"And this morning, August 22, it has been reported that some members of the CC of the Czechoslovak Communist Party met last night in Prague, and that one of them had arrived 'with the help' of Soviet officers. It was announced over the radio that those who had come together with the Soviet officers, had tried to appeal to the others 'to establish collaboration' with the invaders. The names mentioned were those of Bilak, Kolder, Indra and Barbirek. Throughout the meeting, the Soviet officers remained in the room.

"But who are these Party and government officials who appear with the help of Soviet officers and who make appeals in their presence? Can anyone claim that they express the wishes of the Czechs and Slovaks?

"Where are the lawful representatives of Czechoslovakia? Where is President of the Republic Ludvik Svoboda and in what circumstances does he find himself? Where is First Secretary Alexander Dubcek? Where is Premier Cernik? Where is National Assembly Chairman Smrkovsky? Where is National Front Chairman Dr. Frantisek Kriegel? Where is the Chairman of the Czech National Council, Dr. Cisar? And where are the many other prominent Party and government personalities?

"Yesterday, August 21, the National Assembly of Czechoslovakia released a unanimously-passed resolution, in which it expressed implicit support for the legal authorities of the country, at the head of which stood, unopposed until last night's invasion, not only the above-mentioned persons, but also scores of others, about which nothing is being said at present. In the proclamation, the invasion is described as a 'violation of international justice, of the stipulations of the Warsaw Pact and of the principles of equality among nations.' Demanded, at the same time, is the immediate withdrawal of the troops of the five Warsaw Pact countries, and absolute recognition of the state sovereignty of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia.

"Statements to the same effect were also made by those ministers of the Cernik cabinet who were able to meet in Prague.

"The fact that under these circumstances and in the light of such obvious and even glaring truths the Sofia regime took the liberty of lying to Bulgarian citizens by presenting the address of a nameless group of Czechs and Slovaks who asked the Soviet Union to occupy their country to ward off the threat of counter-revolutionary forces, only goes to show how very low the Todor Zhivkov regime's sense of public moral obligation has fallen."

August 27, 1968

"Bulgarian soldiers today play the sad role of occupation forces in Czechoslovakia. No one in Sofia discloses their numbers, when and how they found their way into Czechoslovakia, what instructions they were given before they departed, what precisely their occupation tasks consist of, how and with what feelings they execute them, how long they plan to remain, where they have been sent, where exactly they are stationed, how and to what extent their provision supply system has been organized, whether they are allowed to write to their families, who commands them and how....

"In Sofia, no one considers it necessary to answer these queries, in which only naturally, the Bulgarian people are most keenly interested. Instead -- myths, clumsily concocted, devoid of logic, are dished up to them. One such myth is that about Czechoslovakia's betrayal of socialism, another about giving the Czechoslovak workers brotherly help in staving off their enemies.

"What does the word 'enemy' mean in the Bulgarian language? Until not so long ago, it meant someone filled with harmful intentions toward someone else. An enemy wants to get the better of his opponent by using all available means, including arms.

"And who resorted to force and arms in Czechoslovakia? Was it the Czech workers and their Communist Party? No! The armed intervention came from outside: from the Soviet Union and four other countries, among them -- to our national disgrace -- Bulgaria.

"Until the occupation, the Czechoslovak workers were following and implementing a gradual and peaceful transformation of the system under which they lived, and their aim -- not only their declared one, but also one they proved with deeds -- was to consolidate socialism and make it more humane, gaining the support of the whole nation for it. In following this road, the Czechoslovak workers and their Communist Party manifested a strong sense of proportion and remarkable self-discipline. They believed that they would attain the goals they had set themselves because they relied on the understanding and fraternal help of the other socialist countries. The Czechoslovak Communist Party, the government, the National Assembly, the trade unions, the Komsomol, the writers -- one and all were for fraternity and unity with the rest of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon member partners. Yet all -- the whole nation -- were against one thing: against going back to the mistakes of the Stalinist and post-Stalinist period, personified in Czechoslovakia by Novotny. That is why he had to go. However, he was ousted both from the Party leadership and from the post of President by entirely legal means -- without force. And it was by the same means that his successors, Dubcek and Svoboda, were chosen and installed. Not a hair was touched. Rehabilitation of innocent victims of the past took place, but there was no persecution, no arrests, not even of guilty persons. Czechoslovakia did not wish to stain her socialism.

"And it also remained untarnished after the occupation. The ones who blacken their names were the occupation powers. And they continue to do so more and more. But are they aware of this themselves? It would appear that at least in their subconscious minds they do sense the disgrace of the role they are playing and which they are seeking to find some way of justifying for themselves.

"One way in which they are trying to justify themselves is by chewing over the second myth about the aggression in Czechoslovakia, the myth that they were called on for help by leading Party and government officials in the country. Since no one is bold enough to name these mythical figures, they are now talking in Sofia about a group of Communists from Kosice. But while they toy with this tale, the Sofia propaganda-mongers, either out of gross stupidity, or because they have become caught in their own web, are giving the show away - for they speak of OLD Communists from Kosice.

"The youth of Czechoslovakia, which has been reared under the Communist regime and educated in the spirit of socialist ideals, is against this armed intervention in its fatherland. It means that the youth of Czechoslovakia, to whom by the laws of nature the future belongs, wants for itself and for its whole nation the right to continue along the road they had chosen, the right to build a socialism that is worthy of man, which alone stands a chance of becoming established -- of the age-long dream of mankind. Yet it will not be for the first time in history that some-negative has had positive consequences.

"One such consequence is already beginning to appear. The events in Czechoslovakia really have become a yardstick of truth, loyalty and devotion to socialism. All Communists who have not yet been corrupted by the lust for uncontrolled abuse of power, and are not mere instruments of Moscow's great-power, chauvinistic policy, have condemned this invasion and protested against the occupation of Czechoslovakia.

"'Who is the real Communist now,' one of Sofia's loud-speakers asked. Without intending to, he answered the question himself by denying this quality to his comrades in Bucharest, Belgrade, Rome, Paris, Stockholm.... Yet can there be any doubt at all that also in Sofia, Budapest, Warsaw, East Berlin and Moscow, Party members can be found who are no longer able to believe that true Communists are those of their leaders who gave the order for their armies to invade Czechoslovakia. The events of the past week will have profound repercussions in these five capitals, for they have been a real measure of loyalty and of treachery to the socialist cause."

August 29, 1968

"War is a whiplash for the people; peace, their most sacred blessing. In the history of our times we Bulgarians have also suffered more than once from the scourges of war. The acts of statesmen have been described as the crimes of raving madmen; the courts have sought retribution...

"But alas, the lessons of history are easily forgotten. Now again, the Bulgarian people are the victims of a senseless crime. Now the Bulgarian Communists also have a military adventure to boast about. In their honor the old march, 'allies, robbers,' can now be strummed.

"No one in our country has ever talked so much about peace as the Bulgarian Communist Party. What is more, it has even endowed its words with the strength of laws.

"It was as far back as 25 December 1950 that the National Assembly in Sofia unanimously passed a "Law in Defense of Peace." This short law, containing only four points, invoked rigid punishment for anyone 'who tries to provoke an armed attack by one socialist country on another,' as well as for all who incite such an act or propagate it in any way whatsoever. Those who commit, incite or assist in acts covered under Point Two of the law for the protection of peace, were liable to life imprisonment in solitary confinement; while those found guilty according to Point Three were liable to sentences of up to fifteen years solitary confinement. Besides this, those who were sentenced according to this law were deprived of their civic rights by virtue of Art. 30 of the Penal Code, and either a part, or the whole, of their property was confiscated.

"The punishments invoked were harsh. But there has hardly been another law proposed by the Bulgarian Communists and passed by their National Assembly which the Bulgarian people have agreed with more than with the peace-protecting law. Because all know how essential it is to preserve peace, how imperative it is that it in no way be threatened, shaken or compromised.

"What was the necessity for this work, this wastage of time, this squandering of paper, when at the present time Bulgarian troops have been put in the tragic situation of having to take part in an act of aggression?

"On the night of 20-21 August, Bulgarian soldiers invaded Czechoslovakia. They are still there as occupation forces, against the wishes of the Czechs and Slovaks. Unenviable is the position of these, our fellow countrymen. Their boots are crushing the earth of friendly peoples

to whom we are tied by bonds of true brotherly feelings, to whom we owe so much for what they did in helping to build up present-day Bulgaria after the liberation. But these Bulgarian soldiers never wanted to be sent as occupation forces, to be the object of hatred and loathing. They are only the pawns on the sinister chessboard of Communist internecine wars and Great Russian imperialism. The Bulgarian soldiers of the occupation forces in Czechoslovakia are the victims of the Bulgarian Communist Party, which places them not only in a position of intense inner conflict with their own consciences, not only in conflict with the unwritten laws of mankind, but even brings them into conflict with the laws of their own country..."

## HUNGARY

The Hungarian regime in the period before tension mounted over Czechoslovakia adopted a cautious approach while still echoing Moscow's concern over reform developments. In general terms it could be said that the Hungarian regime, while being disturbed at Czechoslovak events, considered that Dubcek should be given time to prove himself. This attitude changed after the Warsaw Pact occupation in which Hungarian troops participated.

The first announcement of the invasion was given on Radio Budapest at 0744 on the morning of August 21 and closely followed the content of the official Tass communique.

In its afternoon and evening broadcasts on August 21, Radio Budapest devoted extensive coverage to the Tass announcement of the appeal by the unnamed group of Czechoslovak Party and state leaders for military assistance from the Warsaw Pact countries.

Concerning the activities of Hungarian armed forces, Radio Budapest broadcast a short MTI communique at 1700 hours, which said that "units of the Hungarian people's army, which are in Czechoslovakia together with allied troops in order to give brotherly help in the prevention of counterrevolution, met no resistance and accomplished the prescribed tasks without material or personnel losses." This MTI communique was also repeated in three evening broadcasts.

On August 22, a Nepszabadsag editorial asserted that, immediately after the Bratislava meeting, "counterrevolutionary forces in Prague organized meetings and defamed the policy of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries." The Party daily noted that "the standpoint of the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Party and its official paper proved to be inadequate." According to the trade union organ Nepszava, "It was our historic and international duty to render help to our Czechoslovak friends and to comply with the request for comradely help of the Czechoslovak Party and the Czechoslovak patriots anxious for the cause of socialism." An MTI dispatch stated that, due to the "critical political situation" in Czechoslovakia, "there is no doubt whatsoever that intervention was necessary and justified."

On August 22, Radio Budapest carried two commentaries. The first described at some length the events that led to the intervention and concluded that the action of the Warsaw Pact countries was a logical consequence of two factors: the growth



of "right-wing" undermining activities which had endangered socialism in Czechoslovakia and the negation of certain agreements on the common protection of the achievements of socialist countries.

The commentary dealt with the oft-referred to Hungarian theme of the "struggle on two fronts" and asserted that the Czechoslovak Party and state leadership devoted almost exclusive attention to the conservative extreme.

Reviewing the events of recent weeks, the commentator asserted that the danger of a counterrevolutionary threat arose in Czechoslovakia, and that this threat had prompted "a group of Czechoslovak state and Party leaders" to appeal for help to the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries. The report emphasized that this group did not desire a return to the pre-January political line.

In a shorter commentary, Radio Budapest claimed that Hungarian public opinion was in agreement with the measures taken for the defense of Czechoslovak socialist power. Both the sympathy of the Hungarian population toward the Czechoslovak "renewal process," and concern about anti-socialist activities and the use of moral terror against Communists were stressed in the report. While expressing "general approval" for the steps to defend socialist power in Czechoslovakia, the commentary contained no references to specific expressions of support in Hungary.

According to Radio Budapest, "improvised rallies" continued to be held in connection with the events in Czechoslovakia. The radio noted that speeches delivered at various meetings throughout Hungary stressed that the action of the Warsaw Pact countries was well-timed, owing to the rising danger to "the achievements of socialism" in Czechoslovakia. The radio emphasized that the post-Bratislava inactivity of the Czechoslovak leadership found reflection in "the increased activities of the anti-socialist forces."

Hungarian information media began attacking Rumanian Party leader Nicolae Ceausescu and, for the first time, criticized Yugoslavia's attitude toward the Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia. In an afternoon broadcast on August 24, Radio Budapest asserted that "not every Party feels in the same way concerning the common historic responsibility for socialism which is shown, inter alia, by the negative standpoint of the Rumanian and Yugoslav Parties." A subsequent radio commentary carried the second Hungarian attack on Ceausescu. The commentator expressed "surprise" that the granting of Warsaw Pact assistance to Czechoslovakia had been "misinterpreted by part of the socialist side." According to the radio station, "this was exactly what happened at the extraordinary meeting of the Rumanian Grand National Assembly on Thursday when Ceausescu used several such formulations and expressions in his speech, which caused serious indignation among the people of the fraternal socialist countries." The criticism of Ceausescu continued in the press of August 25.

A Nepszabadsag's editorial of August 27 found it "astonishing" that "the leaders of certain socialist countries had joined the Western chorus of feigned consternation in connection with Czechoslovak events." The tone of the Party daily was sharper than that of Radio Budapest. The editorial remarked that "the leadership of socialist Yugoslavia had found it appropriate, in an especially sharp moment of international class struggle, to express its uncritical solidarity with the rightist tendency in Czechoslovakia and to reject all arguments of the five socialist countries in connection with the counter-revolutionary danger." Nepszabadsag also complained that the action of the five countries was characterized "as intervention" by Tito. According to the Party daily, the Yugoslav leaders had thus united with "the Chinese Maoist adventurer politicians." "Their voices," said the editorial, "strengthen the unqualified outbursts of Prime Minister Chou En-lai, who today attacks Czechoslovakia because it does not conduct an armed fight against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, rather than stating that Czechoslovakia is saturated with counter-revolutionary danger."

The editorial also expressed Hungarian displeasure with "the attitude of the Rumanian leaders," once again criticizing Ceausescu for his presentation of "Czechoslovakia's peaceful work being disturbed by foreign troops" and his failure to consider "the tensions of the last months that have jeopardized the Czechoslovak socialist order."

In a regular Radio Budapest program, during which listeners can phone the radio and address questions to journalists or other personalities, the occupation of Czechoslovakia proved to be the topic of major interest. Asked his opinion of the possible consequences that might have arisen if the intervention had not taken place, Jozsef Palfi, editor-in-chief of the weekly Magyarorsag, expressed the "fear that the true followers of socialism would have remained in the minority at the next Extraordinary Party Congress." He asserted that "Czechoslovakia would have sought major credits, not without political strings, from capitalist countries, turning primarily to West Germany." This would have affected "Czechoslovakia's key position in the socialist alliance," according to Palfi, "since a look at the map shows that it lies between West Germany and the Soviet Union."

On other points, the journalist suggested that "the enemies of socialism [had] learned from the experiences of the Hungarian counterrevolution and therefore adopted new, more flexible tactics." He stressed that it would be necessary for the Czechoslovak leaders to engage in the familiar "struggle on two fronts," without which "the anti-socialist tendencies cannot be overcome."

On August 29 a slight change was noted in Radio Budapest's coverage of the situation in Czechoslovakia. Until the conclusion of the Moscow talks, Hungarian information media relied exclusively on Soviet sources and on Hungarian official sources and MTI material. After the issuance of the Moscow communique, however, the radio's broadcasting returned to normal, with heavy coverage devoted to Czechoslovak events. The bulk of reporting from Prague came from the permanent correspondent of MTI, who had been joined by a second correspondent supplying information from Bratislava.

Among the new items of the day (August 29), extensive coverage was given to the Smrkovsky speech, including the admission that during the Moscow negotiations sharp debates took place between the Soviet and Czechoslovak delegations and inside the Czechoslovak delegation. Radio Budapest also stressed his statements that "anti-government forces will not be permitted to influence the press, radio and TV," and that "the recently formed clubs will be dissolved and no new political parties will be authorized."

In its daily foreign policy review at 1705 hours, Radio Budapest again commented on the situation in Czechoslovakia. Reiterating the Hungarian thesis on the necessity for "a struggle on two fronts," the radio asserted that "the internal enemy should be sufficiently controlled" so that it is incapable of attaining the support of "foreign imperialist forces."

Also stressed was the familiar point of the need to strengthen Czechoslovakia's "trust toward the Soviet Union and other socialist countries," which, the radio stated, could only be accomplished by "the followers of socialism in Czechoslovakia."

RFE broadcasts to Hungary took issue with regime claims that Hungarian troops had been invited in to Czechoslovakia and that the Hungarian people approved the Warsaw Pact invasion.

An Hungarian Broadcasting Department commentary on August 22, 1968 declared:

"In a society in which political decisions do not rest on the citizens' agreement, individuals frequently have to participate in actions that run counter to their principles, convictions, and moral attitudes. Hungarian participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia is such an action, one that has nothing to do with the Hungarian people. It was the Party and government leaders who decided to participate in this intervention, paying no more attention to the feeling and opinion of the population than they have on many other important occasions. The sending of Hungarian troops to

Czechoslovakia, the support given to this armed intervention - condemned all over the world, even by Communists - is the more surprising because the Hungarian Party and government leaders sympathized with the Prague reformers for quite some time, and allegedly even wanted to act as mediators, prompted by the conviction that neither Czechoslovakia's security nor the future of socialist achievement was being endangered by Dubcek and his companions. After their demonstrative expression of friendship and sympathy only extreme servility or boundless cynicism can explain their unbelievable change in attitude. Why was it no longer possible to demonstrate understanding and engage in comradely talks in order to settle differences? The Hungarian Party and government leaders were fully aware that no danger of counter-revolution threatens Czechoslovakia, and that the Communist Party has never been as popular as it is under Dubcek's leadership -- why, then, was it necessary for them to succumb to the influence of Moscow's and East Berlin's hysteria, and to decide on a step that may cause irreparable damage to the relations of the two countries? Why did Hungary have to accept the role of a cat's paw who is made to act mindlessly, against its own interests and in the service of others' supposed or true interests?

"The Hungarian soldiers who are taking part in the intervention are on Czechoslovak soil against their will. They did not cross the border of their own free will. They would have liked to be left out of this adventure, because they know how false and hypocritical is the argument on whose basis they have been sent to a friendly neighboring country to put an end to political disagreement and to crush its people's longing for freedom. Hungarian soldiers sent to Slovakia will see that they have been made the tools of a blind desire for power and limitless mendacity. They did not disobey their orders because by doing so they would have risked their lives. Nevertheless how they are going to behave in Czechoslovakia no longer depends not only on their officers; it depends to a great extent on their human attitude, on their decency. We are confident that they will not commit any act against the population that would bring shame on them later, that they will not interfere in affairs that are solely the concern of the Czechoslovak people. Finally, they must not forget that although a passing power has sent them to participate in this enterprise, they are members of the Hungarian nation, of the Hungarian people, and their behavior may determine our prestige in the world perhaps for many decades."

RFE also reminded its Hungarian listeners of the previous policies of the Soviet Union in its subjugation of the East European peoples. A commentary broadcast on August 23 to Hungary declared:

"We meet a series of problems and unsolved questions if we try to observe the East European area over the past 20 years, and if we succeed in suppressing our emotions and anxiety as well as our affection for the peoples who live in Czechoslovakia - in short, if we try to view things objectively.

"I wish to mention only a few of these questions which have not yet received wise and satisfactory answers. For example: the East European peoples' relations with the Soviet Union and with the West; furthermore, the relations of these peoples with each other; relations between the party and society, between Leninism and socialism, and so on and so forth.

"For the last 20 years these relations have been characterized by confusion, tension, clumsy and hasty solutions. Ideologists in the Eastern bloc -- as the internal situation deteriorates and things loosen up -- have recently spoken more and more about the common interests of so-called "socialism," about the necessity for the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. Yet these words have become more and more hypocritical and unrealistic, and have begun to resemble a rear-guard action. These ideologists are compelled to conceal, blur, and distort the true facts, the internal contradictions in the East European area and in East European societies. It has not been possible in the recent past to settle these problems by occupation, by the execution of leading politicians, by intimidation or imprisonment, nor is it possible to do this in the present, and it will not be possible to do it in the future either. Just as it is true that more democracy is the cure for the troubles of democracy, so is it true that more severe dictatorship is the cure for the troubles of dictatorship.

"But if this is the case, how can it go on? How can the Soviet Union go any further in Eastern Europe? How can the parties go any further? How can the East European peoples progress toward their future, their common East Europeanism? This East Europeanism is not identical with either Western Europe or the Soviet outlook, behind which, unfortunately, lie not only the Stalinist past but also the centuries-long Tsarist tradition.

"When we think of the possibilities of the future unfolding we must not forget the post-war years of the East European peoples. During those years there have been many indications that the Poles, Czechoslovaks, Hungarians, or the Yugoslavs and even the Rumanians, have made efforts to move toward a specific, individual social life, different from that of any other economic, political, or ideological system.

"The economic feature of this different and specific social life is the nationalization of industry, banks, and mines--thus, the acceptance of the socialist substructure. Yet at the same time, one must protest against the suppression of freedom of thought. What took place in Poland and Hungary in 1956, and what the Czechoslovaks are now trying to achieve, is the very opposite of a return to capitalism, but at the same time it is a demand for freedom. Freedom in two ways: first, freedom and self-determination for the nation; second, freedom and self-determination for the individual.

"Thus the East European peoples have an independent outlook and concept which differ from those of the West and differ from those of the Soviet Union. This is a socialism which rejects dictatorship. This is democratic socialism; in this expression both the words "democracy" and "socialism" are important, and neither can be omitted; it means an independent social model, a socialist vision. This can be suppressed for a while, but it cannot be destroyed. It is hard to imagine any other lasting evolution in Eastern Europe, and thus it is also hard to imagine it in Czechoslovakia in the future.

"This evolution cannot be provided by so-called Leninism, but only by the road leading back to pure Marxism, in which freedom is an essential ingredient, as are the rejection of minority rule and realism. If the Marxist thesis that man should not exploit man is true, and it is true, then it is also true that no state should exploit another state, no Party should exploit a society.

"This is where the Soviet Union is making its greatest mistakes. It follows a policy under the pretext of Leninism which is not worthy of socialism, and which is unable to solve the problems we face. First 1956, and now the military invasion of Czechoslovakia, are proof of this. Sectarianism is the childhood malady of Leninism, violence is the sickness of its old age. Leninism is like a jealous old man; it has no arguments, only weapons with which it threatens or shoots from an ever-narrowing, hedgehog position. Speaking in general terms, because of the historical events in Prague all Communism is now faced with a choice, and everybody will have to show his colors. Those who represent the conservative line, rigidity, will be responsible for all tragedies.

"In the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, all social, political, national, and international affairs have become burning and up to date. The fact that not only Soviet, but East German, Polish, Bulgarian, and Hungarian troops are participating in the present occupation should be stressed separately. This may be enormously dangerous for the future, from the viewpoint of necessary East European cooperation. I have mentioned before that Eastern Europe has an independent profile, which shows in its desire for a synthesis between a socialist basis and the spirit of democracy. This independent profile, plus the interdependence which is a result of geographical conditions, gives the East European nations a historical order not to abandon each other either economically or in friendship in the future. But the ambiguous and unhappy fact that there are Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Polish soldiers in Czechoslovakia may easily result in exacerbation of the situation around the Danube, in the birth of hostile nationalisms, which may in turn revive the old hostilities. The wrong and mistaken impression will arise in Czechoslovakia that it was not Ulbricht, Gomulka, Kadar or Zhivkov, but the East German, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian people who attacked the Czechoslovak people. One cannot get rid

of the thought that the Soviet Union is deliberately inciting the East Europeans against each other in this way, on the cynical and murderous principle of "divide et impera!" If this succeeds, a devilish plan will have succeeded, and the Danube valley may once more become a vale of tears and battle.

"However, one must not give up hope that the intrigues of the Soviet Union will not destroy the common sense and wisdom of the people and their perception of their common interests."

RFE also analyzed for its listeners the meaning to Hungarians of the Moscow communique issued after the meeting between Soviet and Czechoslovak party leaders. This commentary, broadcast on August 28, declared:

"The Moscow communique is written in the obscure language of Communist communiqués. The concrete content, hidden in the background, and the points of the agreement can only be inferred, correctly or incorrectly, from the repeatedly blurred paraphrases and from slogans that have little meaning to an outsider. The Dubcek leadership, soviet tanks at their backs, naturally knows very well what kind of obligations they have assumed. In the next few days and weeks the Czechoslovak people will also realize -- let me say, will have the bitter experience of realizing -- how much has been saved from their democratic reform program, and what goals of renewal they have had to give up under the influence of the physical force used against them. Actually, the prime minister of the country and the first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party were taken away to Moscow under military escort.

"The communique, however, contains one point which is clear. It reads literally: 'Agreement has been reached on the conditions of the withdrawal of the troops, which will take place in accordance with the normalization of the situation in Czechoslovakia.' Also, Istvan Szirmai said yesterday in the House of Culture of the Hungarian Optical Works: 'It is natural that the allied forces will be gradually withdrawn after the normalization of the situation.' This means that Moscow has promised a 'gradual withdrawal.' And it is precisely this gradualness that offers the chance to the Kadar regime to atone at least partially the serious responsibility which it had assumed by the fact that its troops marched in Hungary. Because Budapest, together with Moscow, sits at the bench of the accused before the tribunal of international public opinion. That this is not some sort of journalistic phrase, is proven by the cancellation of the visits of Jeno Fock to Austria, Janos Peter to Denmark, and British Foreign Secretary Stewart to Budapest.

"The principle of gradualness -- as I already mentioned -- gives Budapest a chance to mitigate to a certain extent the damage done to its international reputation and relations. For example, if the Kadar leadership succeeded -- it is

open to question whether or not it wants to do so -- in withdrawing the Hungarian troops first, or at least among the first, they may thereby give evidence of their good will and may ease the burden of their acts in serving the power interests of Moscow. The attitude of the Hungarian soldiers in Slovakia was more humane than that of the Soviet soldiers, admitted a Czechoslovak newspaper recently. The simple Hungarian soldier has already done something to mitigate the damage and to prevent the prolonged poisoning of the necessary friendship and good-neighborly relations among Hungarians, Slovaks, and Czechs living in the Carpathian Basin. It is now the turn of the Budapest leaders to show: Does a little room still remain in their policy to serve Hungarian interests, as well as their loyalty to Moscow?"



POLAND

In common with the other Warsaw Pact invading nations, the Polish Communist leaders' first aim was to try to convince the Polish people of the necessity for intervention in Czechoslovakia. This was followed by claims of popular support throughout the country for the regime's action.

At 0500 on August 21, Radio Warsaw broadcast a bulletin issued by the Polish government, announcing that "the governments of the socialist bloc countries" had dispatched military units to Czechoslovakia. The bulletin corresponded to the text of the TASS statement. Radio Warsaw's press review at 0740 did not mention the military action; however, several newspapers (including Trybuna Ludu) published strong criticism of Czechoslovakia, asserting that anti-socialist activities in Czechoslovakia had not ceased and that the Czechoslovak press had been allowed to attack "other socialist countries." Zycie Warszawy stated that events in Czechoslovakia provide "blatant proof of the departure of the Czechoslovak Communist Party leadership from the spirit and the text of the Bratislava meeting of the fraternal parties."

Radio Warsaw, following the lead of Bulgarian media, began to report on meetings held in various places throughout the nation expressing support for the military action undertaken in the CSSR. At 2000 and 2300 hours on August 21, the Warsaw station noted that workers in a Lublin factory had indicated their approval of the measures which had been undertaken, while broadcasts at midnight, 0200 and 0700 hours said that similar manifestations by "basic party organizations" had taken place in factories throughout Poland.

In other developments, Polish television asserted during the evening of August 21 that the Warsaw Pact powers' intervention had been a "necessity." The evening news report carried two photos of Russian tanks in Prague surrounded by a "friendly crowd" and commented on the generally positive reception given to the Warsaw Pact troops. This version sharply contrasted with the report of Radio Hradec Kralove in Eastern Bohemia which claimed that Czechoslovak police in the northern Moravian town of Krnov had been "disarmed and treated like prisoners" by Polish occupying units.

Radio Warsaw's evening newscast at 2000 hours (August 21) carried -- in addition to the TASS communique-- a commentary by Aleksander Tarnowski that attempted to justify Polish participation in the invasion. The commentary stated:

"The developments in Czechoslovakia have given birth to the departure of the socialist CSSR from the family of socialist countries. The result of this process led to a change in the relation of power and became dangerous to the vital interests of the socialist countries and also to the cause of peace and security in Europe and the world. This danger became particularly acute for Poland and the GDR, immediate neighbors of the CSSR. And the general change of the relation of power would have primarily favored the GFR, which does not accept the results of World War II, demands the revision of frontiers and attempts to secure nuclear arms for the Bundeswehr.

"These issues were discussed with the political leadership of the CSSR on numerous occasions... (unfortunately) the rightist part of the Czechoslovak leadership did not apply and prevented the application of sufficient means, which would ensure the success of a Party offensive. The Czechoslovak radio, press and TV continued the campaign of lampoons addressed to the Party... and were sowing distrust toward the socialist countries... various reactionary groups continued to increase their activities...."

By the next day Radio Warsaw had expanded its coverage of meetings held in various places throughout Poland expressing support for the military action undertaken against Czechoslovakia. The midnight news broadcast repeated an earlier item (which had dealt with workers in a Lublin factory) and, omitting the word "Lublin," attempted to convey the impression that "numerous factories throughout the whole country" had manifested their support. This format was utilized in two later programs, and finally, at 0600 hours, the Lublin designation was once again inserted. A provincial station, Radio Lodz, raised its voice in praise of the military intervention in commenting on factory meetings in the city and voivodship of Lodz. During shift breaks, workers were said to have been informed of the Polish government statement, at which time they were said to have expressed support for the official policy in a "determined manner."

Radio Warsaw's press survey concentrated on an August 22 Trybuna Ludu article which justified the Warsaw Pact occupation of the CSSR. The Party daily noted the dangers represented in Czechoslovakia by "forces of the right" and by the polemics introduced by a press that is dominated by "revisionist or openly anti-Communist elements." Trybuna Ludu went on to indicate that opposition groups had come to the forefront, endangering socialism. "Political adventurers" were said to have "staged demonstrations and street brawls... (which culminated in) a paralysis of those representatives of the state apparatus who are in charge of public order and security." This situation

quoted Radio Warsaw, became unacceptable and "long ago extended beyond the state of affairs that may be recognized as the internal questions of one of the socialist states." The attack on the CSSR was justified, according to Trybuna Ludu, both by these considerations, by the strategic position of Czechoslovakia on Poland's southern flank, and by the fact that the CPCS "did not fulfill the (Bratislava) pledges and did not intend to keep them."

The Polish paper, in continuing its commentary, noted that the Bratislava agreement was viewed by the Czechoslovak leadership as a "tactical maneuver" that would facilitate the removal from leading positions of "activists devoted to the cause of socialism" at the 14th Congress of the CPCS. In the face of such a development, certain forces emerged within Czechoslovakia and approached the other socialist countries with a view to obtaining assistance "to ward off the threat of a reactionary coup."

The radio press review indicated that other articles "written in the same spirit" had appeared in Zycie Warszawy, Glos Pracy, Sztandar Mlodych, Zolnierz Wolnosci, Slowo Powszechne and Dziennik Ludowy.

Finally, Radio Warsaw's press coverage of the morning of August 22 was completed by a summary of two Moscow Pravda articles dealing with Czechoslovakia entitled "Loyalty is a Brotherly Commitment" and "The Hypocrisy and Falsifications of the Bankrupts."

In its coverage of the situation in Czechoslovakia, Radio Warsaw also has made extensive use of Soviet commentaries and dispatches. At 1500 hours on August 22, the station carried a short resume of the Pravda editorial, "The Defense of Socialism is the Supreme International Duty." Later in the day and on the morning of August 23, several TASS dispatches on the situation in Czechoslovakia were carried. In the 0600 hours newscast, Radio Warsaw broadcast a short reference to an article in today's Moscow Pravda, noting that the Warsaw Pact armed forces had encountered certain "acts of sabotage and terror, provocations, and slander."

The radio station had continued to mention expressions of Polish popular support for the military intervention. Such reports spoke in general terms about "Party meetings" that had taken place in "factories, enterprises and institutions," without reference to specific organizations or localities.

In the afternoon and evening of August 22, Radio Warsaw broadcast several commentaries justifying the military occupation of the CSSR, but also stressing that the decision was neither a pleasant nor an easy one to make. Particular emphasis was placed on strategic considerations and the security of the "southern frontier." In substance and tone, however, the commentaries did not parallel the harshness of Soviet statements.

A commentary at 1600 hours (August 22), entitled "A Hard but Necessary Operation," noted that "our decision to undertake friendly assistance to the nations of Czechoslovakia... raised a furious reaction in Western countries, especially in the FRG." The commentator added that this decision "fulfilled not only an international duty, but also a patriotic duty... toward the Polish nation." Later commentaries emphasized that a deteriorating internal situation in Czechoslovakia and the threat posed by "the global strategy" of West Germany had been two of the major factors necessitating the Warsaw Pact intervention.

In its newscast at 2100 hours, Radio Warsaw broadcast a report on the activities of the Polish units participating in the occupation. The item stated that "among our forces which entered the territory of the brotherly country, there is a general understanding of the necessity to assist the revolutionary forces of Czechoslovakia." In contrast to earlier reports from CSSR sources, the report stated that the units had acted in a "friendly and tactful" manner and had encountered "neither prejudice nor ill-will."

Other items in the radio's evening newscasts on August 22 included reviews of the Soviet, Hungarian, and Bulgarian press coverage of the Czechoslovak situation and mention of the debate in the UN Security Council. The latter report disclosed that the Czechoslovak delegate, acting on the instructions of (Foreign Minister) Hajek "who is not in Czechoslovakia and has no contact with that country," opposed the Warsaw Pact intervention and adopted an "anti-Soviet" position.

Reports on the alleged popular support for the military action in Czechoslovakia continued to be broadcast by Radio Warsaw. According to the Warsaw station, the meetings at factories and enterprises now included non-Party workers. Previous statements had mentioned that only "basic Party organizations" were taking part in the discussions. In referring to these meetings, Radio Warsaw stressed the "prudence and solicitude" of those attending.

At 1700 hours on August 23, Radio Warsaw broadcast a long program on the evolution of events in Czechoslovakia. The commentary noted that the "socialist countries" had reacted to

the changes in January with "confidence and sympathy," but that "the situation had changed completely in May," when "anti-socialist activities" clearly emerged. "Voices of prudence and anxiety were not met with the proper understanding by some Czechoslovak leaders," according to the radio, and "the goodwill shown at Cierna and Bratislava was interpreted by the reactionary forces as a sign of weakness." The commentary concluded that, "in entering Czechoslovakia on August 21, the five socialist countries fulfilled their duty."

For the first time since the beginning of the Czechoslovak occupation, Radio Warsaw carried several reports from its Prague correspondent, Czeslav Berenda. The first report (at 1600 hours on August 23) asserted that "life slowly returns to normal in Prague." In the second report, however, Berenda noted that "in Prague, as well as in other localities in the CSSR, excesses took place, but they do not dominate the atmosphere." The final coverage (at 2343 hours) stated that the outcome of the talks in Moscow was the major subject of interest in Czechoslovakia. The report added that "most of the Polish students in Czechoslovak educational institutions had returned to Poland."

Polish information media also criticized the leaders of Yugoslavia and Rumania. Following the broadcast of the TASS dispatch on the situation in the CSSR (which included the reference to the "leaders" of these two countries), Radio Warsaw commented (2100 hours, August 24) that "the reaction of the political leadership of Yugoslavia and Rumania is surprising and worrisome, as these countries will be able to preserve all elements of their socialist structure only if they are not left alone to face the infiltration of capitalist bourgeois ideology, (and) always will be able to find support in the strong and unified bloc of socialist states."

Press and radio commentaries throughout August 24 emphasized oft-repeated themes, e.g., the danger in the CSSR posed by "anti-socialist excesses" prior to the military intervention, the importance of Czechoslovakia in Polish strategic considerations, the role that West Germany had played in the deteriorating situation in Czechoslovakia, and Bonn's allegedly current frustration. Other items included several reports from Czechoslovakia on the behavior of the Polish troops that took part in the occupation.

In the following days, commentaries continued to point to the "imperialist" effort to draw Czechoslovakia away from the "socialist bloc," and to West Germany's particular interest in the Czechoslovak "democratization process," as well as the "appreciation" of this interest shown by certain members of

Prague's "right-wing team." The most significant commentary, however, was an article by General Jan Czapla, the First Deputy Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Polish Army. Entitled "Our Common Cause," the article was published in Trybuna Ludu on August 25, reprinted by the military daily Zolnierz Wolnosci on August 26, and twice summarized by Radio Warsaw.

Czapla drew a comparison between the "March events" in Poland and the Czechoslovak developments. He concluded that the sources of these "anti-socialist processes" were identical, namely "revisionism and Zionism." Their aims were also identical: "to attack the leading role of the Party, to isolate it from the national life, and to postpone and then destroy the perspective of socialism." The March events in Poland, Czapla continued, were a repetition of the attacks of "revisionist and Zionist force after 1956." These attacks, however, had been effectively repelled, while in Czechoslovakia these forces went so far as to "effectively threaten the basis of socialism and to strike at Communists." According to Czapla, "these forces wanted to dominate socialism in the CSSR" and "to breach the southern flank of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe." The Czechoslovak program of renewal, Czapla stated, initially met with full and justified Polish approval but further developments led to an internal and external threat to Czechoslovakia -- a threat that was "permanently disregarded by some representatives of the leadership of the CPCPS." The Polish general implicitly suggested that American and German troops stationed on the border with Czechoslovakia were only waiting for an invitation from the Czechoslovak counter-revolutionaries. As a result of this threat, Czapla concluded, "a painful but necessary" decision was taken -- the decision to render "political and military help" to Czechoslovakia.

The Moscow communique issued after the Soviet-Czechoslovak talks was broadcast by Radio Warsaw at 1500 hours on August 27 and repeated in later newscasts.

At 2000 hours, Radio Warsaw commentator Jan Zakrzewski noted that the Moscow communique did not provide any details on the manner in which the Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement would be implemented. In asserting that "a return to normal, disciplined life will be difficult" in Czechoslovakia, he questioned whether the CPCPS leadership would be able "to control certain elements... who do not follow the appeals of their own leaders." Zakrzewski characterized Dubcek's speech as "sober" and also referred to the "deep change" in Ceausescu's attitude, quoting the latter as saying that "the most important problem is the deepening of friendship and unity of all socialist countries."

At 2100 hours, another commentator dealt with the CPCS leadership and stated: "One can now assert that, with the help of the Warsaw Pact states, the Czechoslovak Party leadership will break the pressure of the right-wing and revisionist forces." In referring to the decisions taken in Moscow, he claimed that "their realization will allow a gradual and justified normalization of the social-political situation of our southern neighbor, and the withdrawal of the units of the allied armies." The commentator noted, however, that "the enemy (revisionist right-wing forces) has not yet been destroyed."

This theme was picked up by Trybuna Ludu in its editorial of August 28. The article asserted that the "counter-revolutionary forces" have not given up and will oppose the implementation of the Moscow agreement. Nevertheless, the Party daily stressed that the Moscow talks had created the conditions for the "normalization of the situation in the CSSR." Zycie Warszawy again posed the question whether the "Czechoslovak leaders who participated in the Moscow talks have sufficient strength to control the situation and oppose efficiently the further activization of the forces striving for Czechoslovakia's political and military breakaway from the socialist camp." The article concludes that this "paramount question will be answered in the near future." Zolnierz Wolnosci characterized the results of the Communist and workers' Parties of the socialist community, one that had created the conditions "for strengthening the unity and cooperation of socialist countries integrated in the Warsaw Treaty."

Radio Warsaw's morning coverage on August 28 noted that "yesterday's political events have lessened political tension in Czechoslovakia." While reporting on certain "anti-socialist activities," the commentary (0200 hours) emphasized that "the opinion prevails that the results of the Moscow talks are the best and strictly speaking the only possible way out of the crisis in which Czechoslovakia found itself."

Radio Warsaw's press review of August 27 reported that Zolnierz Wolnosci continued to publish dispatches from its special correspondents in Prague. According to yesterday's report, "the main propaganda attacks of the anti-socialist forces in Czechoslovakia use nationalist catchwords." The paper also dealt with certain problems of the Polish forces in Czechoslovakia, noting that "difficult conditions affect everybody, from the general to the private."

Zycie Warszawy (August 28) maintained that "the history of the capitalist world does not include a case where, in negotiations between two countries of such uneven potentials, respect for mutual national interests could prevail." The

editorial stated that the action of the five Warsaw Pact countries did not have "the character of an armed intervention," but "was and remains a political act." It was also noted that the threat has not been eliminated and that "the illegal radio stations demand the rejection of the (Moscow) agreement."

The majority of Polish commentaries, while referring to continued "anti-socialist activities," emphasized that the situation in Czechoslovakia was slowly returning to normal and that "the majority of political groups" support the Moscow agreement. Radio Warsaw's reports in the evening of August 28 followed this line, praising the efforts of the Czechoslovak government and President Svoboda. An official Polish television commentator expressed satisfaction with the Moscow talks, stating that the agreement "guarantees the defensibility of the western outpost of the Warsaw Pact and of Poland's southern flank." He stated that "we have now obtained the basic guarantee that Czechoslovakia's promises to her Soviet bloc allies will be kept."

Through all Polish commentaries ran a tendency to explain and justify the "entry" of Warsaw Pact troops, including Polish ones, into the CSSR. Dubcek's failure to live up to his promises at Cierna and Bratislava (a theme stressed also by Polish TV on August 26) brought about a situation in which anti-Soviet and anti-Polish propaganda could be made by Czechoslovak "counter-revolutionaries," the Polish argument ran.

From the first reports of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, RFE's Polish BD broadcasts condemned the participation of Polish troops and emphasized the illegality of Polish interference in the sovereign rights of another nation.

Commentaries broadcast on August 21 declared:

"The news which spread this morning throughout the homeland must have aroused a deep shock and the moral opposition of the whole people. But simultaneously it must have aroused a feeling of deep shame that Polish units are participating in occupying areas of fraternal Czechoslovakia by force.

"The so-called declaration of the Polish government is a verbatim copy of the Moscow TASS communique. A communique which clearly indicates who decided on the taking of steps which from the point of view of international law can only be called aggression. Let us add at once - an aggression in no way provoked by Czechoslovakia.

"The Czechs and Slovaks - as every nation - have a right to fashion their internal situation and conditions of life in accordance with their own will and their own aspirations.



"Within the framework of the existing international reality and the close bonds within the framework of the Warsaw Pact, the Communist Party governing Czechoslovakia decided to carry through certain internal reforms. Again we clearly emphasize: reforms which not only in no way weakened the position of the governing Communist Party, but on the contrary could have won for it greater support of the people than up to now. Reforms which in no way threatened the directing, as it is called in Communist language, role of the Party and the State...

"...It is all the more painful that against even this narrow sphere of freedom to which Czechoslovakia wished to aspire, armed forces were used in which Poles were present.

"We know well, and this is certainly realized by our Czech and Slovak brothers, that it was not by the will of the Polish nation that the Polish soldiers crossed the frontier of their country.

"The co-responsibility for today's aggression against Czechoslovakia does not fall upon the Polish nation, but upon the leadership, and in particular, upon Wladyslaw Gomulka, who was one of the most bitter opponents of the transformations taking place in our southern neighbor's country.

"Our people are not able to condemn openly either this aggression or the conduct of Gomulka and the Party. They also cannot transmit their true feelings to our brothers on the Vltava and Danube.

"We believe that we are expressing the moods of millions of Poles when we transmit to the Czechs and Slovaks, over our radio station, in these times that are so hard for them, words of deep commiseration and fervent sympathy. We believe that the blow struck at them last night will never break that love of freedom, independence and democracy which fills the people of Czechoslovakia. Alien oppression and tyranny always pass. Liberty is immortal."

RFE also made sure that the Polish people were made aware of the attitude of the Czechoslovak leaders to the invasion of their country by Warsaw Pact forces. The official Czechoslovak statement, ignored by Polish Communist media, was read over the air.

"As we reported in our news, Radio Prague announced in the early hours of Wednesday morning a dramatic communique on the entry into Czechoslovak territory without the knowledge or consent of the Czechoslovak authorities, of military units of member countries of the Warsaw Pact.

"We are in possession of the text of this statement, which was recorded on tape shortly after -0230 hours on Wednesday morning:

'Yesterday, on August 20, at about 2300 hours, troops of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of Poland, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic and the Bulgarian Socialist Republic, crossed the frontier of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. This was done without the knowledge of the President of the Republic, the chairman of the National Assembly, the Premier and the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party.'

"Already this part of the statement issued by Radio Prague gives the lie to the so-called statement of the Polish government, published in the morning hours of Wednesday and which, incidentally, is a word-for-word translation of the statement issued earlier by TASS agency. It is being asserted in them that the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact entered Czechoslovak territory allegedly at the request of - I quote: 'Party and State activists of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.'

"Let us listen to more of the dramatic statement issued by Radio Prague and recorded by us on Wednesday, at about 0230 hours in the morning, about the armed invasion of the country by troops of the Warsaw Pact:

'The Presidium of the CC of the Czechoslovak Party considers this act to be inconsistent not only with the basic principles on which relations between socialist countries are based, but also inconsistent with the basic norms of international law.

'All leading officials of the state, the Communist Party and the National Front, are continuing to fulfill their duties as representatives of the nation who have been elected in accordance with the laws of the Republic.'

"You have just heard authentic fragments from the statement broadcast by Radio Prague on Wednesday, at about 0200 hours in the morning, and which was repeated many times over. At 0437 hours, Radio Prague interrupted its broadcasting for a certain time. The last words uttered by the announcer of the Czechoslovak radio station, words which came just before this interval - we have been able to record on tape. Here they are:

'We are surrounded, friends. There is little we can add to this - and that is a sad thing. This morning, shortly before 0200 hours, the Czechoslovak Radio tried to broadcast the proclamation of the Presidium. But of course all the transmitter stations at our disposal were gradually being taken off the air. We do not know to this very moment how many of you were able to hear this proclamation. We do not even know if you can hear us at this moment!' ...

RFE also took issue with statements appearing in the Polish press in which attempts were made to justify the Polish participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

On 26 August, 1968, an RFE program to Poland said:

"The Party propagandists are trying to justify to the Polish people Polish participation in the aggression against Czechoslovakia. It can clearly be seen that the mass communication media -- as always at such crucial moments -- are under the direct control of the leaders. This can be seen in the argumentation, logic, and tone of the commentaries, which verge on deliberate selfparody.

"Let us look at some of the key arguments and declarations propagated on behalf of Gomulka and his group by the propaganda functionaries of the press and radio.

"On August 22, the Polish Radio, in its program 'Music and Topical Events said:

'The premature use of precautionary measures might do harm to the socialist states and to the whole international workers' movement. But delay in taking action might have incalculable consequences.'

"On August 23, the Polish Radio said:

'If we look from this angle at the steps taken by the European socialist states for the purpose of ensuring a further, undistributed development of socialism in Czechoslovakia, we can say that these are steps aimed at maintaining the present balance of forces...'

"Why 'steps?' - why 'measures?' The official communiques of the intervening governments maintain that the entry of their forces into Czechoslovakia took place at the request of the Czechoslovak leaders. Other commentaries say that - I quote - 'the governments of Poland and the other socialist countries could no longer passively watch the development of events in Czechoslovakia.' Again the same question: hasn't the intervention taken place at the alleged request of the Czechoslovaks themselves? And therefore - a basic question: who is lying, the official communiques of the ruling groups or the propaganda of the Polish leaders?

"On August 23 Zycie Warszawy, Glos Pracy, and Trybuna Mazowiecka published an identical article, dictated by the higher authorities, entitled: 'Against the Peaceful Counter-revolution.' Writing about the so-called anti-socialist escalation in the CSSR, the article states - we quote:

'The false, nationalistic presentation by Dubcek, Smrkovsky, and other revisionists of the results of Cierna and Bratislava as an alleged victory over the Communist Party of the Soviet Union served this very anti-socialist escalation.'

"Let us overlook the fact that this assertion is the sheerest nonsense. Even a cursory analysis of Dubcek's and Smrkovsky's speeches after the conference with the present invaders indicates that both those leaders maintained just the opposite -- namely, that the results of these conferences cannot be interpreted as a victory for either Party, but solely and exclusively - I quote - 'as a victory for the proletarian internationalism, by which the fraternal Communist Parties are ruled.'

"As I have said - let us over look the fact that the propaganda of the PUWP is a lie, for this is nothing new. But how will this propaganda now explain the participation of those 'revisionists and nationalists,' Dubcek and Smrkovsky, in the talks with the Soviet leadership? Could it be that comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny do not consider Dubcek and Smrkovsky revisionists, nationalists, and also 'rightists' -- as other PUWP commentaries call them?

"We read in the same official article of August 23 - I quote: '...The Marxist-Leninist majority of the leadership of the CP of Czechoslovakia decided to ask the five fraternal Parties for aid, including military aid.'

"The leadership of the Communist Party of the CSSR consists of the Presidium, the Central Committee, and finally the Congress. Did the majority of any of these leading bodies ask for aid, including military aid? Just the opposite; all these leading organs officially stated that the entry of the Warsaw Pact forces into Czechoslovakia took place against their will and without their knowledge..."

The economic consequences of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia also were explained to the Polish people by RFE.

A commentary broadcast on August 31 declared:

"Ten million dollars a day. About 70 million crowns every 24 hours. These - according to the estimate of Czech economists from the Institute of the National Economy - are the losses which the Czech economy is suffering as a result of the occupation. These costs running into millions are not only due to direct destruction caused by the military intervention, such as roads, demolished buildings or cars crushed by the tanks. The Czech economists see the lion's share of the losses primarily in decreased production, in unfulfilled trade agreements and in lost income from foreign tourism.

"As it appears from the statement made by the main board of the Institute of National Economy in Prague, it will take at least two years for the Czech economy to make up for the losses caused by the invasion of the troops of five countries of the Warsaw Pact...

"...The aggression of the five countries and the military occupation inevitably interrupted the normal course of trade exchange. Although Czech official authorities are appealing to foreign suppliers that they should send the machines and goods which had been ordered despite the abnormal conditions and promising at the same time that Czechoslovakia will fulfill all its pledges, nonetheless in the present political situation many Western exporters are of the opinion that the risk is too great.

"The economic upheaval caused by the occupation will also affect the exchange of goods between Czechoslovakia and the COMECON countries. Losses due to this will be suffered not only by the occupied country, but also by the remaining partners, naturally not excluding those five countries whose troops invaded Czechoslovakia. Also not settled yet is the important question of the occupation costs. It is not only a question of who will pay for the maintenance of the troops which have occupied the territory of Czechoslovakia, but also of how the costs connected with the mobilization and the aggression will be covered.

"Speaking about the long-range economic costs of the occupation one also cannot forget the fact that one of the consequences of the five countries' aggression against Czechoslovakia was the interruption of the process of economic reforms. According to the uniform opinion of Czech government authorities and economists, such a reform was a sine qua non condition for lifting the Czech economy out of the state of stagnation caused by the dogmatic system of planning and managing the national economy. Obviously the interruption in the implementation of economic reform can only be temporary. In the longer run everywhere and in every country in the end common sense is bound to win. Nonetheless the costs due to the checking of the process of reforms will be incalculable."

## RUMANIA

From the beginning Rumania's Communist leader Nicolae Ceausescu showed open support for the Dubcek leadership. This support continued right up to the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces.

A few days after the invasion, however, there came a noticeable lessening of Ceausescu's outright support publicly, although Rumania maintained its assertion that every country has the right to run its own affairs.

The coverage of the occupation by the Warsaw Pact forces by Rumania differed considerably from that of Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria.

On August 21, 1968, Radio Bucharest at 0630 broadcast a telephone report from its Prague correspondent, stating that Soviet, East German, Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian troops had "illegally" crossed Czechoslovakia's borders during the night. The report included extensive excerpts of the statement of the Czechoslovak Party Presidium and an abbreviated version of the TASS communique. At the same time, Radio Bucharest broadcast the following communique:

"In connection with the situation created by the penetration of Czechoslovak territory by the armed forces of some foreign countries, the Rumanian Central Committee and the Rumanian government have been summoned to a joint meeting today."

Up to 1000 hours, Radio Bucharest had not carried any Rumanian comments on the events in Czechoslovakia; however, at 0905 hours, the radio transmitted news given earlier by Radio Prague and CETEKA. These items included the statement by the Presidium of the Czechoslovak National Assembly, which condemned the occupation of Czechoslovakia and requested the immediate withdrawal of the troops, proclamations of Czechoslovak regional and district Party committees supporting the position of the CPCS Presidium, and the statement by President Ludvik Svoboda.

Rumanian information media focused on the mass meeting held at mid-day, which was carried live by Rumanian radio and television. After the arrival of such dignitaries as Party and state leader Nicolae Ceausescu, Prime Minister and CC member Ion Gheorghe Maurer, CC Secretary Virgil Trofin, and CC members Emil Bodnarus and Ilie Verdet, the joint Party-state communique was delivered, followed by a 20-minute address by Ceausescu.

The communique recalled the solidarity with Czechoslovakia previously expressed by the Rumanians and expressed confidence in and approval of the course charted by the CPCS. In revealing that an extraordinary session of the Grand National Assembly was to be convened on 22 August (1000 hours), the document noted that certain measures proposed by the Executive Committee to ensure the continued "peaceful work of the Rumanian people, the construction of socialism, and the independence and sovereignty of our fatherland," had been unanimously approved.

The nature of these measures was partially revealed in Ceausescu's speech. After outlining the gravity of the Czechoslovak situation, its relation to the fate of socialism, and the unjustifiable nature of the armed intervention, Ceausescu reached the most important part of his address:

"Beginning today, we will start to build up worker, peasant, and intellectual 'guards', defenders of the independence of our country. We wish our people to have their own armed units to defend their revolutionary achievements, to ensure peaceful work, independence, and the security of our homeland."

"It was said in Czechoslovakia that the danger of counter-revolution prevailed, but perhaps tomorrow some will say that this meeting has counterrevolutionary tendencies. We answer all these individuals in this fashion: our people will never allow anyone to violate the territory of their fatherland."

In conclusion, the Rumanian Party and state leader indicated that means must be found to end as quickly as possible the situation that has arisen due to the introduction of "foreign troops" into Czechoslovakia.

Radio Bucharest's coverage of Ceausescu's address in the Rumanian capital was followed by reports (1700, 2100 and 2300 hours) emphasizing that public opinion in Rumania condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia and strongly supported Ceausescu's speech and his proposals regarding the formation of "armed patriotic detachments of workers, peasants, and intellectuals."

The 1700 hours broadcast, for example, carried a lengthy report on expressions of support by various segments of the Rumanian population.

Declarations of support were also forthcoming from the Executive Committee of the Central Council of the Trade Union Association, which, at its August 21 extraordinary plenary meeting, issued a communique expressing solidarity with the Czechoslovak people.

The dissemination of news concerning Czechoslovakia and the briefing of local Party Committees on measures taken by the RCP had apparently taken place with great rapidity. According to a Radio Bucharest dispatch, the first secretaries of these committees on August 21 addressed plenary meetings in all counties and in numerous towns on the Rumanian attitude toward Czechoslovak events.

The Rumanian population was also informed on the foreign reaction to the Czechoslovak invasion. Tito's denunciation of the action, as well as the declaration by the chairman of the Austrian CP, and the reaction of the French and Australian Communist Parties were carried at 1700 hours (August 21). News of the convening of the UN Security Council was also given by Radio Bucharest at 2330 hours.

Radio Bucharest also dwelt at length upon material quoted from Czechoslovak (CETEKA) sources, emphasizing the repeated statements of various Czechoslovak Party and state bodies that the occupying forces had committed an illegal act of aggression and urging their immediate withdrawal, as well as the release of key governmental and Party figures.

On the morning of 22 August, Rumanian media devoted extensive coverage to three major items. These were (1) the speech by Nicolae Ceausescu at the extraordinary session of the Grand National Assembly, (2) the draft declaration adopted by that body following Ceausescu's address, and (3) the Agerpres reports on telegrams of support received by the government and Party.

The Assembly proceedings, covered live by Rumanian radio and television, were opened by Ceausescu. In his speech, Ceausescu dealt almost exclusively with the situation in Czechoslovakia, questioning whether the Warsaw Pact intervention could be considered an act of "international assistance." He asserted that force had been directed against Czechoslovakia's legally-constituted bodies elected by a people who desired to be "free, independent, and sovereign in their own country." The Rumanian leader queried: "Since when have the principles of socialist democracy, of socialist humanism, and the perfecting of socialist relations -- which constitute the essence of the new system -- turned into a counterrevolutionary danger?"

In refusing to accept the explanation offered by the invaders of Czechoslovakia, Ceausescu warned of the dangers to socialism that are inherent in the policy of the five Warsaw Pact countries. He observed that "numerous Communist and workers' parties, progressive and democratic forces, and increasing segments of world opinion" agreed with the Rumanian position. The Rumanian head stated that "it is not yet too late to display a capacity for reasoning... by putting an end to the military actions against Czechoslovakia" and by resorting instead to "discussions and negotiations with the legal Party and state leadership of the country." In this context, Ceausescu pledged that Rumania would work actively to help settle the crisis and that Rumanian actions would follow the basic guidelines to be established by the Grand National Assembly declaration.

The Assembly declaration reiterated the well-known Rumanian position with regard to the observance of proper relations between states, and characterized the use of military force against Czechoslovakia as a "violation of sacred principles." Ceausescu's earlier statement advocating the desirability of comradely discussions was echoed in an appeal addressed to the USSR (and to other socialist countries) to respect correct principles in international dealings and to avoid any "infringement of the liberty, independence, and national sovereignty of a people..."

In a lengthy discussion of the Warsaw Pact, the declaration, as reported by Radio Bucharest, urged its maintenance, but only as "an instrument for the defense of the socialist countries against outside aggression, against an imperialist attack." In no case was the Warsaw Pact to be invoked against a socialist state. Thus, the declaration stated:



Any act committed in the name of this Pact, any military action carried out under its aegis, should be the result of common, unanimous consultations and decisions of all member states, as provided by the Pact itself. Those measures which contravene these regulations cannot in any way commit the Warsaw Pact in its capacity of organization, or its members. In line with the spirit of the Warsaw Pact, its member states are bound to help each other in the event of imperialist aggression. In accordance with the principles of democracy, of the constitution, of the provisions of the Pact, the request for military assistance or the decision to participate in joint military actions falls exclusively within the competence of the legal constitutional bodies of the state in question. They alone are in a position to take decisions in problems of such gravity...

In this fashion, the Assembly stated that a decision regarding the stationing of foreign troops is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the "supreme elected body of a socialist nation -- the parliament." In the event of a violation of this principle, the Assembly declaration noted that such a matter was then a subject for United Nations consideration.

In conclusion, the Assembly urged the "immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Czechoslovak territory" and the creation of conditions in which domestic affairs can be handled by the Czechoslovak Party and government "without any foreign interference."

Radio Bucharest also covered the situation in Czechoslovakia in reports from its Prague correspondents and in news items coming from Czechoslovak radio stations loyal to the Dubcek leadership. In addition, the radio's Belgrade correspondent filed a report on the mass rally in the Yugoslav capital that condemned the Warsaw Pact intervention. Finally, messages of popular support for the position of the Rumanian leadership were carried continuously by Radio Bucharest.

On August 23 at 1130 hours, Radio Bucharest carried the statement issued by the CC of the Union of Communist Youth and the Council of the Unions of the Students' Association. The statement expressed "full solidarity" with Czechoslovak youth and protested against the action of the Warsaw Pact countries. A similar declaration, on behalf of the Executive Committee of the Council of the National Union of Agricultural Production Cooperatives, was subsequently broadcast. Both statements approved Ceausescu's earlier proposal that "detachments of workers, peasants, and intellectuals" be established in order "to defend the independence and sovereignty of Rumania."

On the morning of August 24, the Bucharest radio carried an extensive report on Tito's statement to the Tenth Plenum of the League of Yugoslav Communists. In addition, the radio covered the situation in Czechoslovakia by means of reports from its Prague correspondents and the use of material from "legal" Czechoslovak radio stations. The Security Council debates on Czechoslovakia and Svoboda's discussions in Moscow also carried on the radio. While Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian media

were hard pushed to find positive "foreign" reactions to the Warsaw Pact occupation, Radio Bucharest did not have a similar problem and has commented liberally on the worldwide condemnation of the action.

On August 25, at 1200 hours, Radio Bucharest stated that Ceausescu had received Soviet Ambassador Basov at the latter's request.

There followed a marked decrease in Rumanian coverage of Czechoslovak events and their implication for Rumania. In contrast with the almost continuous reports of the past five days dealing with official and public condemnation of the Warsaw Pact action against Czechoslovakia and the widespread popular support for the position of the Rumanian leadership, Radio Bucharest lapsed into relative silence on August 26. From midnight until mid-afternoon, the radio broadcast only three items of immediate relevance to the Czechoslovak situation.

It also should be noted that in the two preceding days Rumania had come under strong attack in the Soviet, Polish, Bulgarian, and Hungarian press.

The heretofore strong Rumanian position on the occupation of Czechoslovakia was undoubtedly at the basis of Soviet ambassador Basov's request to meet with Ceausescu.

With the exception of a statement published by the Rumanian Writers' Union expressing full support for the Grand National Assembly declaration, Radio Bucharest's references to the Czechoslovak situation consisted solely of reports on the speeches delivered by Ceausescu August 26 in Brasov, Sfintu Gheorghe, Odorheiul Secuiesc and Miercurea Ciuc. While more moderate than in his earlier statements (on August 21 and 22), Ceausescu reiterated the Rumanian position. Addressing a rally in the latter town, he stated once again that there was no "legal justification" for the "patriotic detachments" as proof of "the attachment of the entire Rumanian people to the RCP and the government." In Odorheiul Secuiesc, Ceausescu reasserted Rumania's "determination not to allow anybody to interfere in our affairs or violate our sovereignty."

For the most part, however, the Rumanian leader stressed his country's intention "to contribute to the normalization of relations among Parties" and "to fulfill all our obligations within the framework of our alliances with the socialist countries..." Particular emphasis was attached to the negotiations in Moscow. He expressed on one occasion "hope" and on another "confidence" that the talks would lead to a "solution," under which the Warsaw Pact units would be withdrawn and the conditions created for the Czechoslovak Party and government "to continue the work of socialist construction."

At 2300 hours (August 27), Radio Bucharest (quoting TASS) broadcast the full text of the Moscow communique, and reported that Party and government delegations from Bulgaria, Hungary,

Poland, and East Germany had met with a Soviet delegation and unanimously adopted an appropriate decision. As of 1200 hours on August 28, there had been no Rumanian comment on the outcome of the discussions in Moscow.

On August 28 at 1400 hours, Radio Bucharest carried excerpts from a speech delivered by Ceausescu at a factory in Bucharest. According to the radio's summary, the Party leader again reiterated the principles of Rumania's foreign policy, without, however, mentioning the communique, Czechoslovakia, or the August 22 Grand National Assembly declaration.

In the meantime, there was a noticeable increase in Radio Bucharest's reports of domestic support for the Rumanian position and in the radio's coverage of the situation in Czechoslovakia, although the moderate tone was maintained. In two dispatches from its Prague correspondents, Radio Bucharest reported on the attitude of the Czechoslovak population, following the issuance of the communique and the return of the Czechoslovak delegation to Prague. The full texts of the Svoboda and Dubcek speeches were also broadcast. Other reports from Prague dealt with the activities of Cernik and Smrkovsky and noted that the Czechoslovak delegation at the UN had requested that the "Czechoslovak problem" be removed from the Security Council's agenda.

The conclusion of the Soviet-Czechoslovak negotiations did not, however, presage an end to Moscow's criticism of the Rumanian attitude toward the Warsaw Pact action. In its 1900 hours Rumanian language broadcast, Radio Moscow carried the details of an Izvestia article criticizing the Rumanian leadership for its "secret talks with unauthorized Czechoslovak representatives." Referring to Ceausescu's discussions with Ota Sik, the commentary charged that "this meeting and the declaration of Sik that followed it encouraged even more the actions of counterrevolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia." Furthermore, the broadcast complained that Bucharest had not rejected Western allegations that "Rumania could become the victim of a military action."

The first Rumanian comment on the outcome of the Moscow negotiations was contained in a statement issued by the Executive Committee of the CC of the RCP. The statement noted the "unanimous anxiety and disapproval" expressed by the CC of the RCP, the State Council, the Council of Ministers, and the Grand National Assembly at the time of the Warsaw Pact "penetration into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic." While "appreciating" the return of the Czechoslovak leadership "to their offices" and "the resumption of normal activity by the lawful Party and state bodies," the Executive Committee asserted that "the implementation of the complete withdrawal, in the shortest possible time, of the Armed Forces of the five socialist states from Czechoslovakia was of utmost importance." The statement once again expressed confidence in and support for the CPCS. The document concluded that "in the present difficult circumstances of the relations among the socialist countries, it is imperative that absolutely nothing should be undertaken which might worsen these relations, which might deepen the divergencies and breed fresh sources of tension."

On August 30, Ceausescu made three speeches in Cluj county. In Turda, he stressed the importance of increased cooperation with "all socialist countries," but asserted that only "we -- our people and their leadership -- can decide what is best for Rumania." In regard to Czechoslovakia, Ceausescu stated:

"We deem that it is necessary to act and to support the Czechoslovak people. In order to enable them peacefully to develop the construction of their new socialist life, (and) that it is necessary that the agreement reached in Moscow between the Soviet comrades and the Czechoslovak comrades be implemented so that conditions are created in which the (Czechoslovak) Party and state representatives are able to perform their work unhampered, that the whole Party and the people may unite, in order to be able to overcome these difficult times, and that the withdrawal of the forces of the five socialist countries from Czechoslovakia may be achieved within the shortest possible time."

RFE broadcasts to Rumania endorsed the stand taken by the Rumanian leaders against the illegal occupation of Czechoslovakia.

The following are excerpts from three commentaries broadcast to Rumania on the day of the invasion and on August 24 and 25.

Aug. 21 "Czechoslovakia has been occupied by foreign troops. We are living moments of utmost gravity for the entire world, for Europe in particular, but above all for Rumania. The criminal act of the Soviet Union, by which this power is once more disclosing -- just as in 1956 -- its fear of freedom and its profound contempt for any trace of civilization, is again introducing the law of the jungle into relations between states and even in the very heart of the community calling itself 'socialist.'"

"Without the knowledge of the Czechoslovak President and of the other constitutional authorities, troops coming from five Communist states invaded Czechoslovakia. This fact happened, as was stressed by the declaration of the Czechoslovak Presidium, in spite of the principles on which relations between the socialist states are based and against the principles of international law. All moral and legal principles have been trampled under foot. Why? Everyone is asking himself why, with indignation and with helpless anger. What have the Czechs and Slovaks done to provoke this reckless act?"

"What happened during the latest hours in Czechoslovakia concerns all those believing in justice, in humanity, in morality, concerns all those who believe in sincerity and not in deceiving, who believe in the right of individuals and nations to live in conformity with their own convictions and

aspirations, in conformity with their own responsibilities and hopes. For this reason, we cannot and we must not conceal that we feel proud of the fact that Rumania today is solidly supporting the thirst for freedom and independence of the Czechoslovak people. The Rumanian leadership and the entire Rumanian people at its side are conscious of the grave danger menacing them. With full knowledge of the case, the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist Party has termed the Soviet action a flagrant violation of Czechoslovak national sovereignty, a violation that nothing can justify. The Rumanian government has taken the steps it considers necessary in order to assure the independence and sovereignty of Rumania.

"Mr. Nicolae Ceausescu has affirmed that the Rumanian people will never permit anybody to violate Rumanian territory.

"At these moments of hard test for the Rumanian people, we, the Rumanians living securely in the Western climate, are not able to give advice. We want to tell you only that we are with all our hearts and thoughts at your side, and that with each breath we belong to that national unity and to that sense of responsibility the gravity of the moment demands from every Rumanian."

August 24, 1968

"For the last few days, beginning with the moment when Czechoslovakia was criminally invaded at midnight by those she considered friends and allies, all of us have watched with anxiety and emotion the dizzy succession of events in Prague. The time has come, nevertheless, for us to raise our eyes from our TV sets and to try to get a larger perspective of the situation. That is, to try to draw some conclusions.

"The Russian military invasion of Czechoslovakia and the hypocrisy with which Moscow seeks to justify it, have been copied from Adolf Hitler's Blitzkrieg textbook. But if the military invasion has been carried out in conformity with the plan, the same cannot be said about the progress of the political operation. The Kremlin has intervened in Czechoslovakia in order to impose upon the Czechs a puppet government, just as Stalin did in the 1948 coup in Prague. Stalin, 20 years ago, sent Valerian Zorin to Prague to concoct the coup which destroyed democracy, assassinated Jan Masaryk and led to the installation of a Communist regime which committed, soon after, the most frightful crimes. However, the mediocrities at the helm of the Soviet Union today do not have Stalin's ability, for they appear to have formed a completely wrong opinion of the sentiments of the Czechs and of their new leaders. In venturing to invade Czechoslovakia, the Kremlin has tried to set the clock back 20 years. But the Soviet ruling troika is now realizing that the situation has considerably changed during this interval and nowhere more so than in the countries

upon which the Soviet Union, 20 years ago, imposed its domination by force. The Kremlin's authority in 1968 is deeply undermined, both inside the Communist Bloc and in the Communist international movement. The current leaders of the Kremlin have neither the authority, the force, nor the political acumen the Soviet dictator had in the Forties.

"The Russian hopes to quickly overthrow the Czechoslovak political leadership in a relatively 'comradely' atmosphere, so that the whole meanness of the thing could be forgotten as quickly as possible, vanished. The operation, in political and administrative terms, was nothing but a great failure. Never in the history of Russian-organized coups has there been need for a greater number of soldiers and for more time to find some puppets than now. For whole days the real leaders of Czechoslovakia have been able to brand the aggression, and the daring Czechoslovak radio-television stations have been able and still can spread the truth to the entire world. Not even the Czechoslovak delegate to the UN could be bought or discharged, to prevent him from appearing as the main witness for the prosecution. The civic spirit, dignity and passive resistance characterizing the reaction of the entire Czechoslovak nation to the storm which fell on its country, are of ill omen for the Russians in Czechoslovakia.

"In short terms, the Czechoslovak perspectives are rather gloomy. Yet over the long haul, the perspectives for the Soviet Union and its political system are much worse. The mediocrities in the Kremlin may betray and stab an ally in the back, yet the Kremlin's meanness is not a token of strength, it is the confession of a moral and political weakness. There is nothing new in this Soviet system of handling human beings like mere instruments. The Russian rulers founded the state on the totalitarian principle that man is merely a tool to serve power and ambition. The Soviet leaders, however, have long been convinced that their system will function and win the support of all people. Today, they know perfectly well that their hopes were vain. They could not even tolerate the spark of freedom which appeared in Czechoslovakia. The East German Communist regime could not possibly resist the attraction represented by this Western-type freedom and prosperity. Brezhnev and Ulbricht feared that man's natural thirst for freedom might spread in Czechoslovakia, contaminating the whole of East Europe and the Soviet Union, and leading to the disintegration of the entire Communist empire. They saw themselves forced into action, not by conviction or confidence in themselves, but because they were scared, because they tried to stop the course

of history, to put the clock back. The consequences of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, for the Russians and for Communism, are, and will be, among the most serious. The Communist bankruptcy in its Moscow version, its powerlessness in satisfying people's aspirations in modern society are now evident to everybody. A deep gulf separates Moscow from almost the entire Communist movement, which it will never be possible to bridge. Relations between Moscow and the West will suffer enormously for years to come. Even in East Europe, the lugubrious silence that Moscow is trying to impose will be of short standing. The repercussions of the invasion on the Warsaw Pact and on East European collaboration will be totally negative. The coexistence policy will be seriously shaken."

August 25, 1968

"The situation the Kremlin has produced by occupying Czechoslovakia, is politically extremely fluid and full of unknown factors. Changes may occur any day, even any minute, and may produce unexpected developments. Nevertheless, in this unclear and contradictory situation, some firm points of great significance may be recorded.

"The troops of Soviet Russia and of its four lackeys have completed the occupation of the country in which a highly interesting process of political mutation had raised so many hopes. The Czechoslovak borders, cities and industrial centers are under the control of the armed forces of those who aim at hindering history's course, since they are convinced that spiritual and economic stagnation serves the purpose of Russian neo-imperialism.

"However, if the tanks and guns, the planes and bayonets of the invaders have been able to subjugate to their will everything material they have not succeeded in conquering what is above this material order -- that is, the spirit of the nation. The military occupation of Czechoslovakia has been achieved. But a military operation was but one phase in the fulfillment of the Soviet Union's political plan. Thus, once more it appears clearly that brute force is not enough to win a political battle.

"What was the moral factor that cheated Brezhnev and his comrades of such a victory? In our opinion, the massive, compact, cool-headed and granite-like solidarity of the Czechs has been the decisive element. Despite the immense display of forces, despite military reinforcements still entering Czechoslovakia, despite the efforts of the Soviet agents, the nation's solidarity around the legal government and the liberal leaders remained unflinching. Czechoslovakia has offered one magnificent, prodigious and uncommon example of national unity. From Prague to Kosice,

from Pilsen to Brno, from Bratislava to Ostrava, Czechs, Moravians and Slovaks remained united to such an extent that every Soviet attempt to find the necessary quislings was condemned to lamentable defeat. The dimensions of this defeat are being proved by the simple fact that Moscow's rulers saw themselves restrained to start negotiations with precisely those Czech leaders whom they had denounced as being the instruments of an imaginary counterrevolutionary and imperialist plot. The fact that Moscow invoked the excuse of such a plot when it invaded Czechoslovak territory and violated the country's air space, is not only the sign of a lack of political imagination, and not only proves the absence of any moral scruple, but is at the same time cynical evidence of an action perpetrated by an imperialist spirit which is blindly overlooking the imponderable factors capable of overthrowing even the best prepared enterprises.

"How adroit the Czechoslovak resistance was in frustrating what the Russians sought politically, was proved by the meeting, under their noses, of the Czechoslovak Party's Congress. However skillfully prepared this meeting may have been, it could not have been held, had not perfect solidarity existed between the nation and its leaders, between the people and the entire state and Party apparatus.

"Against this national solidarity of the Czechoslovak nations, the action of the Kremlin and of its accomplices has achieved only one thing: the occupation. None of the political objectives has been effectively fulfilled."



#### SECTION 4

#### OFFICIAL EAST EUROPEAN AND SOVIET REACTIONS TO RADIO FREE EUROPE

"One of the instruments of democratic control is the freedom of expression. Today it can be most effectively realized by the mass information media. However, the task of translating the freedom of expression into reality requires the independence of most or at least a considerable part of these media from political power."

Bratislava Pravda, 21 September, 1968.

The winds of change which swept Czechoslovakia late 1967 and the first eight months of 1968 naturally enough focussed world attention - both East and West - on that country and also on RFE which in programming time is the major Western broadcasting network to East Europe.

Of the five countries to which RFE broadcasts, Poland and Hungary have long been the most aggressive in their attacks on RFE for its influence. Events in Czechoslovakia during this period brought increased attention from Bulgaria and also from the Soviet Union and East Germany to which RFE does not broadcast.

In 1966 and 1967 Czechoslovak regime attacks on RFE by name were not heavy, totalling only 60 for the two-year period. Only a few of these concerned themselves with actual RFE programs, the main emphasis was criticism of RFE as an instrument of Western espionage and as an alleged distributor of subversive propaganda.

With the ousting of Antonin Novotny as Party First Secretary in January 1968, criticism of RFE virtually ceased and was replaced under the new democratic freedom sweeping the country with criticism of regime media for disseminating information slower than RFE and with frequent calls for the abolition of jamming of RFE programs.

The feelings of many lower-rank communist officials were summed up in a letter from Western Bohemia published in the Communist Party fortnightly Zivot Strany in February 1968

A Karel Tanc1 from Brezova wrote:

"The transmission of timely information down to the basic organizations is imperative for the intensification of Party work... It is indeed intolerable that Free Europe listeners are informed sooner than Party members... How are we expected to counter this propaganda?"

During the first half of 1968 the regime jamming of RFE broadcasts became a major issue within Czechoslovakia itself with press and radio reflecting popular distaste for this type of censorship.

By the end of June, the Czechoslovak Minister of Culture and Information, Miroslav Galuska, announced over Radio Prague that a proposal for the abolition of the jamming of RFE was being prepared by officials for submission to the government.

As far back as April 1968, the jamming of RFE was a controversial subject freely discussed over Radio Prague and in the press. Radio Prague reported numerous listener letters asking about the jamming, and on April 9 a Radio Prague announcer called by telephone a press secretary of the Interior Ministry.

The official, named Dubsky, admitted that RFE was the only Western radio station still being jammed and went on to defend this action by stating "...in the past Free Europe served the American intelligence service to direct its agents on our territory... and there is no guarantee today that this Free Europe is not again used for such purposes..."

In a following exchange of differing views, the announcer disagreed with reasons put forward for jamming and said he would rather rely on the political maturity of each listener.

The listener-versus-official-line debate over jamming of RFE came up on numerous occasions. The press and others also took up the issue.

The May 15 issue of the Slovak Trade Union newspaper Praca described the jamming of Western broadcasts as a waste of money. "We have invested millions in jamming stations for which we could have built hospitals, electric power plants and apartments," it declared.

One of the slogans carried in Prague's May 1 parade read: "Stop the jamming of foreign broadcasts" and there were other protests from organizations about the jamming of RFE.

At this point it is worthwhile looking at the jamming pattern against RFE, not only in its broadcasts to Czechoslovakia before and after the Soviet-led occupation, but to the other four target countries as well.

The following analysis was prepared by RFE's Engineering Section on 11 September 1968.

Czechoslovakia - Before and after the invasion of CSSR there was and is heavy jamming on the CS program. This jamming is not selective but is heard on all programs whether news, voice or music. The exception is the medium wave transmitter at Holzkirchen. Before August 21 there was a sort of selective jamming of the afternoon-get-together program on medium wave in that the jammer operated on the news periods but not during the music portion. Also the program had a special midnight feature from 2320 to sign-off at 0015 or 0030 which was not jammed.

An unexplainable feature of the jamming after August 21 is that the medium wave transmitter, which has been carrying CS service the full day, has not been jammed. At least we have not heard any jammers in Munich. Also for several days after the invasion two or three short-wave frequencies used by the CS program were clear of jamming. Since August 24 we have not heard the identification signals of any jammers based in Czechoslovakia but the jamming has been carried out by Russian jammers which were always working along with the CS jammers except that the USSR jammers were usually on the higher frequencies. If the Czechs stopped jamming - as indicated by some lower channels being clear - the Russians probably would not have been able to substitute for them immediately. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that now all CS frequencies are jammed as before and a new kind of noise has been added to the jamming on the lower frequencies.

Some new jammer identification signals have been heard, some jammers do not send any identification signals. We don't know where the newer jammers are except for one reported by the Deutsche Post east of Karlovy Vary and south of Chomutov (Komotau). We expect to get in a day or two some material from the Post with which we hope we can determine other jammer locations. When these new jammers first appeared their operation was erratic - frequent on and off periods and various types of noise - but now they seem to have settled down to business.

Poland - The Polish program has for a long time been affected by the so-called Mayak jamming, a distorted program being transmitted on the same frequencies as Polish. This has not been as effective as the broad band noise type of jamming and has originated in the USSR. No jammers in Poland itself have been noted since 1956. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia some of the Polish frequencies were the object of some new type noise jammers as referred to above and some other jamming was identified by the call letters LG which, according to our records, is the jamming station in the area of Lvov where Polish jamming originates. The only identification heard on the Polish program is this LG and its effect varies according to propagation conditions. Generally all or most of the Polish channels are either clear or strong enough to be heard above the jammer.

Hungary - Since early 1964 this has always been referred to as an unjammed language. Actually we have frequently noticed a weak jammer on various Hungarian frequencies. This has been located by direction finding in the area of Stanislav, near the triangle of the USSR formed by the borders of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania. It is believed designed to disturb reception of our Hungarian program in that area where some of the population understands the language but it has practically no effect on this program service. This jammer is identified as WQ and we have heard it clearly in Munich on 7 or 9 MC channels but it is not considered effective in Hungary because propagation conditions carry the signal beyond that country.

Bulgaria - The frequencies used by this program before, during and after the CSSR invasion have all been jammed from Bulgaria and the USSR. Depending on the time of day or night the jamming is more or less effective.

Rumania - All channels remained clear. Occasional jamming interference was noted but it never lasted long and appeared to be a mistake due to confusion of language and frequency changes we made after August 21.

In July 1968, two Czechoslovak publications - a youth magazine named Student and a Czechoslovak Defense Ministry organ Obrana Lidu - began publishing the first of a series of interviews made with RFE Czechoslovak staffers in Munich.

The first articles brought criticism from official Czechoslovak newspapers, radio and television.

The Party daily Rude Pravo said: "The editors of Student are too young to know from their own experience or from hearing Free Europe what role this radio station played in the past."

The Trades Union newspaper Prace said: "We regard the publication of these articles as immature and we should also regard it as such even if it could not be expected to contribute towards complicating our international situation..."

The criticism of the interviews published in both publications resulted in the series being dropped. The general indication however was that the criticism was made more in sorrow than in anger and a Prague television commentator remarked that the publication of such articles "only give needed arguments to dogmatic forces at home as well as abroad."

It is interesting to note that apart from the critical references to RFE by the press spokesman of the interior ministry in reply to questions about jamming and the rather subdued criticism following the Student and Obrana Lidu publications, there were no other official criticisms of RFE following the ouster in January of First Party Secretary Antonin Novotny.

In fact, this silence from high officials, obvious public concern about jamming of RFE and numerous letters to RFE from listeners voicing their support indicate the popularity and usefulness of RFE's role in the situation which developed in Czechoslovakia.

The events in Czechoslovakia both before and after the Soviet-led occupation were closely watched by the entire Communist bloc. While Rumania and Yugoslavia maintained their support for the Czechoslovak reforms, the five Warsaw pact countries of Soviet Union, Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland and Hungary mounted increased criticism of the Dubcek methods and later sought to justify their armed intervention.

It was inevitable that during this period of rapidly changing events in Czechoslovakia RFE would come in for increased attention by those Communist countries outspokenly opposed to principles of greater democratization.

From this massive campaign against RFE before and after the occupation of Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968 there emerge some interesting points.

Of prime importance is an underlying admission of the effectiveness of mass communication on a population and its tremendous influence on current events.

Despite energetic campaigns by Communist regimes to discredit RFE, there are numerous examples warning of the danger of regime media lagging behind Western broadcasts in giving people information.

There are open Communist admissions that RFE programming has become more refined and flexible and therefore poses an even greater danger to Communism.

As was expected, regime media developed a theme, almost identical with that of 1956, that Western imperialism, principally the U.S. and West Germany, planned and directed counter-revolutionary activities in Czechoslovakia and that RFE was one of the main instruments used.

An outstanding example of Communist concern over the effectiveness of RFE and the importance of communications media is contained in a speech by the editor-in-chief of the Polish Party daily Trybuna Ludu.

Stanislaw Mojkowski, addressing the presidium of the Polish Journalists' Union at Katowice in September 1968 dealt with the subject of "Public Media In The Struggle Against Ideological Subversion."

Mojkowski said:

"The current discussion on the theses for the Fifth Party Congress must, beside the economic problems, dedicate itself to very important political and ideological problems. This concerns on one hand a fight against revisionism and the psychological warfare waged by the 'imperialists', and on the other hand the search for ways of strengthening the ideological involvement of the 'socialist' journalists and the improvement of the methods of work by the public information media."

Mojkowski claimed that the actions of the revisionists run parallel to the actions of the subversive propaganda which is beamed from the West. The new methods of psychological warfare which under the guise of "building bridges" attempt to "soften" the socialist system and gradually erode it, are the brainchild of the notorious Professor Brzezinski. This new imperialist propaganda instead of openly opposing socialism as such, hypocritically suggests ways of "improving it." It fosters slogans allegedly defending individual freedoms and national cultures; by propagating a cult of "technocrats" with the parallel disdain for the "ideologists" it tries to undermine the supreme role of the Party, to undermine the confidence of the working classes in the Party leadership and encourage the attitude of passive resistance.

"Radio Free Europe and other similar 'channels' are the main tools for leading the attack of the bourgeois propaganda which flows mainly from the United States and from the German Federal Republic... and whose methods are being prepared and shaped by dozens of scientific institutions....," he said.

"The chief lines of this policy appeared also in the East German monthly, Aussenpolitik," he added.

"This strategy... concentrates its activities on the members of scientific and cultural circles, who by the reason of their high moral authority over the public are able to propagate further these opinions in their artistic works, scientific publications, films, etc...."

..."These methods of attack became quite blatant in the case of Czechoslovakia and are being pursued with regard to other socialist countries; as we all know, Radio Free Europe is again the chief exponent of these methods."

"The events in Czechoslovakia give us a 'clinical example' of the tactics used by the silent counterrevolution, on the tactics of the peaceful abandonment of the socialist doctrine, masked by the phrases about 'democracy,' 'freedom' and 'putting right the socialist errors,' aimed at a single strategic aim: that of tearing away Czechoslovakia from the socialist bloc and of changing the balance of forces in Europe to the advantage of the imperialists."

Mojkowski suggests that: "The events in Czechoslovakia have clearly shown us that the mass-media of information, such as press, radio and television, can inflict enormous harm in the political and social sphere. As soon as the Party and the authorities lost control over the mass information media, these media became the tool of first a reactionist and then of a counterrevolutionary campaign."

In spite of the fact that allegedly: "...in the crucial days of March the Polish journalists took a decisive stand in support of the Party leadership, headed by Comrade Wieslaw" (i.e., Gomulka)...", Mojkowski suggests that: In order to enable the socialist journalists to counteract the imperialist propaganda, the editorial managements should provide and activate their research departments which should supply a quick and accurate documentation to the journalists concerned: "A broad range and the rapidity of information is the decisive factor for the success of the entire system of our propaganda." The propaganda efforts should be supported more effectively by the scientific research made by the Chairs of the social sciences. He also stresses the need for improvement of the purely technical means for propagating the press as well as radio and TV emissions, whose development, allegedly, lags far behind the current needs. The author ends by stressing that equally important is the need for a consolidated effort toward strengthening of the ideological involvement of the journalistic cadres, for appealing to their patriotism and their loyalty to the socialist doctrine.

(From Trybuna Ludu, 19 September, 1968.)

Concern over RFE also was expressed at the 12th Plenum of the Polish Communist Party's Central Committee on July 8, 1968. Alternate member Josef Lenart said that in the fiasco of the cold war strategy there was a new approach by imperialism in which even RFE was in favor of socialism.

In Hungary, a Nepszava article of June 30 also noted a change in RFE's approach. It said: "RFE has become somewhat more refined and flexible. It now concentrates its programs on our intellectuals, students and peasants... a more subtle, indirect approach to politics has been apparent in RFE's programs in the last four years. All programs from news to scientific, however, still have one aim - to weaken our socialist system."

Two further examples of the new respect the Communist regimes have for RFE come from Hungary.

A report of the National Committee of technical development published in the 20 September 1968 issue of Muszaki Elet, dealt with the urgent necessity of developing Hungarian Radio.

"...We have to compete as well with broadcasts available to the Hungarian listener from abroad, the technical competitiveness of which is being improved in the framework of the strategy of relaxation which is aimed at our system...

"It is not necessary to say that the situation is thought-provoking from the point of view of radio programming. While in our country no new transmitters have been constructed, there is a rapid development taking place in neighboring countries. While our programs can barely be heard in some of our cities, Vienna I and Vienna 2, Timisoara, Bratislava and Novi Sad, Zagreb, Majek and Uzhhorod (Soviet Union) cover most of our country. And we have not mentioned at all such transmitters as operated by Radio Free Europe."

The Hungarian publication Del-Magyarország of 22 September 1968 deals with what it describes as the "new and diversified orchestration of propaganda of Radio Free Europe."

The article claims that RFE has found out that the socialist system is sympathetic and attractive to people who live by their work and talent and that incitement against this system is ineffective.

"They have changed tone. All of a sudden socialism has gained many protectors and advisers. No longer is the system garbage, but in need of stimulation, improvement and reform. Today there is no order to internal forces for counter-revolution but rather they are urged to use restraint. They do not today treat the whole socialist camp as being alike, instead they favor or criticize here and there to separate them from each other by some kind of qualification or classification.

"They use their attributes well. Among their diversified expressions on socialism are: stubborn, rigid, not capable of further development, bureaucratic, reformists, etc.... lately there is a good and bad socialism in their terminology... they keep their fingers crossed for 'good' socialism against the ailing one; they want this socialism to become warmer, more humane, homely and to provide more rights, democracy, higher material satisfaction for the citizen of this society..."

The article cites the case of Czechoslovakia and goes on to describe the new tactics as a "low propaganda trick."

Radio Moscow, in a broadcast on September 18, 1968, also acknowledged the greater danger from a more sophisticated RFE. The broadcast said:

"The intelligentsia of the socialist countries are now more and more becoming the targets of anti-Communist attacks. In Western radio programs, preference is often given to a tendentious explanation of economic, cultural and literary problems. These



broadcasts not infrequently give uninvited advice about how to better things in a socialist country. In a broadcast to Czechoslovakia, RFE even proposed a list of leaders which it claimed could lead the country towards a better life."

(A summary of regime attitudes to RFE during the Czechoslovak events follows country by country.)

#### EAST GERMANY:

From the beginning of the reform in Czechoslovakia following the ouster of Novotny in January, East Germany played a major role in pressuring for Soviet action to curb the Dubcek leadership. Its vitriolic attacks against so-called West German revanchists were extended to blame the Bonn government for interfering in the affairs of Czechoslovakia, and both before and after the Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia East Germany singled out RFE for special mention.

In May 1968 the East German magazine Deutsche Aussenpolitik published a 12-page report on RFE, detailing the structure and alleged connections with both the U.S. and West German intelligence services and condemning its "illegal" broadcasts to East Europe.

A Neues Deutschland article late July said: "By their extent and aggressiveness, the attempts currently undertaken by the mass media of West German imperialism to infiltrate the developments in Czechoslovakia are equal to the subversive activities of the radio station Free Europe against the Hungarian People's Republic in the fall of 1956."

An East Berlin radio broadcast of 31 July warned of the new tactics undertaken by Western imperialism through organizations like RFE. "A new tactical variant was needed. Peaceful penetration was the method chosen. The aim is to subvert the socialist countries ideologically, make them economically dependent, erode them from within and play them one against the other..."

In an effort to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops, the East German News Agency claimed on August 25 - four days after the occupation - that RFE was the guidance station for the clandestine radio stations operating in Czechoslovakia.

"The most important news and commentaries broadcast by the so-called free Czech radio stations and above all instructions for the tactical proceeding of the counter-revolution, are almost completely identical in form and content with preceding broadcasts by Free Europe."

On August 28 all major East German newspapers carried reports on the situation in Czechoslovakia, including the claim that counter-revolutionaries in Czechoslovakia were being encouraged, guided and supported by radio stations in West Germany, including Radio

Free Europe. Similar reports were carried by the East German press in the following days.

On September 3, the East German news agency ADN openly claimed that RFE was being co-financed by the Bonn government and the claim was given widespread publicity in East German newspapers, purporting to give ground for the need to suppress the counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia.

## SOVIET UNION

The Soviet Union always has followed a policy of denouncing Western radio stations in general. But following the developments in Czechoslovakia since the beginning of 1968, Soviet media have been giving more attention to RFE, particularly in language broadcasts directed to those East European countries to which RFE broadcasts.

In a general commentary on the danger of Western radio and in particular American-controlled stations, Radio Moscow in a domestic service program declared on April 11, 1968:

"There is no socialist country which has not become the target of daily torrents of lies and calumnies by a dozen bourgeois radio stations operating openly as mouthpieces of American imperialism under the mask of emigre organizations. The American radio stations operating in Crete and in Munich serve as particular forefronts of this propagandistic struggle against socialism... their aim is to undermine the position of socialism and to weaken the ties among the fraternal countries."

Radio Moscow, on May 20, 1968, directly accused Radio Free Europe of spreading hatred and calumnies among the socialist countries, and repeated this charge two days later in a broadcast in Slovak to Czechoslovakia. The theme was further developed in subsequent broadcasts to Poland and Czechoslovakia on May 25.

On August 2, just 18 days before Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops occupied Czechoslovakia, Sovetskaya Rossia - organ of the Central Committee department for the Russian Federation - demanded that RFE be closed.

"RFE carries on a psychological undermining campaign against the socialist countries with all means and possibilities of modern propaganda... everyone who really desires peace and security in Europe must demand that this degenerate of the cold war be liquidated..." the newspaper declared.

"The Black Sky" Its Masters & Lackeys

"Together they are called, 'The Black Sky.' They include Deutsche Welle, Free Europe, VOA, and the furtive BBC.

"Historians have still to clarify fully the base part played by these Western radio stations in the preparation of the counter-revolutionary forces and the kindling of nationalist and anti-socialist moods in Czechoslovakia.

"However they disguise their ideological diversion by the selection of words and phrases and even after, apparently, having drawn some conclusions from the numerous failures of Free Europe, they did not succeed in concealing their part in the conspiracy against the socialist system in Czechoslovakia, and in the unbridled terror against the healthy forces of the Communist Party of that country.

"They tried to tread softly and to hit only the target'- this was the way in which their task was defined by the American 'Sovietologist,' Brzezinski, who is known for his hatred of communism...

"...Apparently on the initiative of Brzezinski and (the director of Deutsche Welle) Steigner, a conference of the West European Consultative Committee for Free Europe was held at the beginning of June in Copenhagen. Representatives of Britain (the BBC), the USA (VOA) and West Germany (Deutsche Welle) were present. The communique from this meeting asserted that the dialogue with East Europe should be continued, not because its aim is to drive wedges between the socialist countries (as is the fact), but because it 'contributes to international cooperation,' because the 'natural aspiration of East Europe for freedom should be supported' etc. They selected expressions, they were very cautious and precise in defining their designs in order, as one Danish journalist put it, 'not to frighten the birds in Prague,' and not for heaven's sake to give grounds for the discovery or premature signalling of their secret intentions. But all these were vain efforts.

"At last they have drawn the lesson from the crushing defeat of Free Europe in the autumn of '56, when this station was branded as the instigator and culprit in bloodshed. They have learned their lesson but they were unable to avoid exposure. They depicted themselves not only as friends of the Czechoslovak people but almost as champions of the cause of socialism...

"...The angels of 'The Black Sky' were given the job of shaking the foundations of the socialist system, of carrying out the 'gradual dismantling of communism in Czechoslovakia' as the West German newspaper Rheinische Post put it. With this aim in mind they were to disorient the public opinion of the country, stir up nationalist sentiment, prepare for the withdrawal from socialism, spread doubt in the minds of the people and discredit the communist party...

"...The ideological saboteurs only gave the impression that they supported the January plenum of the Central Committee, CSCP which was aimed at correcting the past. By shaking the leading role of the CP and undermining its influence in every way they in practice brought matters to a point where the resolutions of January were being buried...

"...Should one be surprised at the response to the session of the Free Europe Committee, which we mentioned earlier, among the right-wing anti-communist forces in Czechoslovakia? They welcomed it almost openly.

"The Committee stands for 'a dialogue with East Europe,' and the newspaper Lidova Demokracie at once asserts that the two most wide spread ideologies, Marxism and Christianity, should cease their hostility and begin the dialogue which is so necessary today. It is not for nothing that the Prague editors have so often recently visited the West, both Munich and Rome, and received emissaries disguised as correspondents of respectable newspapers but who in fact were representing Free Europe and Deutsch Welle. What did they discuss, what common aims united the anti-socialist elements and the diversionists of the air waves, these ambassadors of 'The Black Sky'?

"The Prague TV commentators, thinking that the discrediting of the CSCP was going more slowly than they would have liked, invited the leaders of the Club of Critical Thinkers to appear on their screens. They organized a meeting of the Club on television. They demanded silence and asked Jan Prochazka to speak. 'The party leadership of cultural life,' Prochazka said, 'is harmful mystification.' Radio Prague went even further -- its announcers enthusiastically read out the articles by the 'philosopher' I. Svitak. 'The Leninist conception of the communist party and its functions in revolution,' he said, 'were necessary at one time, but now they are unacceptable in the conditions of the developed countries...'

"...The attempts of Free Europe and the BBC to embellish NATO, to portray this aggressive bloc almost as a friend of the socialist countries -- all these attempts which are undertaken daily pursued only one aim -- to support the counter-revolutionary forces which have entered into a deal with the forces hostile to socialism within the CSCP, and to equate NATO and the Warsaw Treaty.

"All of this demagogy which issued in an unending stream from the loudspeakers and television screens was not only designed to confuse the minds of the people but also to establish a malevolent anti-Soviet atmosphere, to stir up nationalist fervor, to unleash terror against the communists and against all defenders of the socialist system...

"...Towards the end the ideological diversionists forgot the advice of Mr. Brzezinski to be cautious. They became more and more unrestrained. Recently Czech radio and TV have been engaged in filling the air waves with lies and slander against the socialist system, against the Soviet Army, insulting the memory of our troops who fell for the liberation of Czechoslovakia.

"The Soviet Union and the other allied states have given urgent aid to socialist Czechoslovakia in order to liquidate the threat to the existing socialist system, the security of the socialist countries, and the threat to the foundations of European peace.

"The true masters of 'The Black Sky' -- the American, West German and British imperialists -- are of course disappointed. Although they entrusted the direction and implementation of ideological diversion to the most experienced officials of the Deutsch Welle, Free Europe, BBC, and the other pillars of 'The Black Sky' and although they were confident they had learned the lesson from all their defeats, their ace has been trumped on this occasion, too."

(From a two-column article in Izvestia, 22 August 1968 by K. Nepomnyashchy, Novosti correspondent in Prague)

A Radio Moscow special correspondent in Prague claimed on August 23 that young Czechoslovak soldiers did not know the reasons for the entry in Czechoslovakia of the Warsaw Pact troops, as they listened only to the broadcasts of Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, and BBC.

The correspondent, Artem Panfilov, who arrived in Prague with a group of Soviet journalists by plane, said a group of young soldiers of the Czechoslovak Army approached the Soviet journalists as soon as they landed.

The soldiers asked the Soviet journalists why the armies of the friendly countries entered Czechoslovakia, and the journalists explained to them that there had been an appeal for this by a group of members of the Czechoslovak Central Committee, the Government, and the National Assembly.

"It turned out that they did not rpt not hear about it. They had listened only to the broadcasts of foreign stations: Free Europe, Voice of America and BBC."

(Radio Moscow Domestic, 23 August 1968, 1030 hours)

"When one of the main radio stations which calls itself 'Radio Free Czechoslovakia' ended its yesterday's broadcast on the same frequency and with the same speaker 'Free Europe' from Munich began its program, that means that the famous 'Radio Free Czechoslovakia' is identical with 'Radio Free Europe' which gathers around itself and uses traitors from the socialist countries."

(Radio Moscow Domestic, 26 August 1968, 1730 hours)

"The West German Bundeswehr has established direct communications with counter-revolutionaries operating in Czechoslovakia. On August 22, ADN agency reports, Commander of the Second Corps of the Bundeswehr, Lieutenant General Tilo, on orders from the General Inspector of the Bundeswehr, set up the so-called 'working staff -- Wenzel' whose official aim is to 'maintain technical communications with Czechoslovakia.' The staff, headed by Colonel Trentschi, has at its disposal a number of special units of the Bundeswehr, including a radio battalion stationed at Andernach and special detachments for 'psychological warfare' and other units."

"Radio station Free Europe in Munich and American radio station RIAS in West Berlin, which are supported by the funds of the CIA, and the official West German radio station Deutsche Welle, have sharply stepped up their activity. Also participating in this subversive campaign are the radio stations of special Bundeswehr units, of the secret service of the Federal Republic of Germany and of Czechoslovak emigré organizations."

(Radio Moscow Domestic, 28 August 1968,)

"The malicious wails in the pages of the bourgeois press are not quieting down. The editors continue to defame the present steps taken by the fraternal allied countries which constitute resolute support for the Czechoslovak people in defense of their socialist achievements against the infringements of internal counter-revolution and its external instigators.

"It sounds strange but the present imperialist reaction is appearing in the role of a defender of the principles of non-intervention and self-determination of the peoples. And this part is being played by those who have caused bloodshed on the soil of long-suffering Vietnam, organized the attack on Cuba, instigated intervention in the Congo, Lebanon and the Dominican Republic, inspired and are inspiring the Israeli extremists to continue to hold the occupied lands of the Arab peoples!

"Radio Free Europe in Munich, which is maintained at the expense of the CIA, the American radio station RIAS in West Berlin and the official German radio station 'Deutsche Welle' have sharply stepped up their activities.

"The radio stations of special sub-detachments of the Bundeswehr, of the secret service of the Federal Republic of Germany and of Czechoslovak emigré organizations are taking part in this diversionist and provocative campaign.

"They are deployed in the neighborhood of the frontiers of Czechoslovakia and are spreading confusion among her inhabitants.

"These facts show again," Red Star emphasizes, "that imperialist reaction, after suffering a decisive failure in its attempts to plunge Czechoslovakia back into its family, the so-called 'free world,' is not calming down.

"Its course is set towards the further aggravation of the international atmosphere."

(Red Star, 28 August 1968)



"Units of the U.S. 7th Army in Germany, along with special troops of West Germany's Bundeswehr, entered Czechoslovakia 'disguised as tourists.' The centers for the subversive activities are located at Bad Toelz in West Germany and at Salzburg, Austria. The U.S. special forces that took part in 'anti-socialist' actions were commanded by Col. Jerry Sage, an expert in subversive warfare.

"The Green Berets, many of whom speak either Czech or Slovak, arrived in Salzburg in July.

"From Austria, plainclothed Green Berets under the guise of tourists penetrated into Czechoslovakia.

"By illegal channels arms were shipped into Czechoslovakia from Austria. Imperialist subversion centers again used the territory of neutral Austria for their dirty purposes as they did in the 1956 Hungarian events.

"In addition, counter-revolutionary radio stations were set up in Austria and West Germany along their borders with Czechoslovakia and equipment from these facilities was provided by Radio Free Europe. Twenty-two mobile radio stations were smuggled into Czechoslovakia from West Germany and Austria."

(Literary Gazette, 28 August 1968)

"Radio propaganda and the spreading of rumors are the most important elements of the ideological war in the homeland of imperialist reaction. The radio stations Voice of America, RIAS, Deutsche Welle and FREE EUROPE, satisfying the demands of spying organizations, broadcast for 24 hours a day lies and defamations on socialism.

"Deutsche Welle, FREE EUROPE, Voice of America and BBC, all together are called 'a dark sky.'

"Historians will have to clear up in a full measure the infamous role of these Western radio stations in the preparation of counter-revolutionary forces in the stirring up of nationalist and anti-social currents in Czechoslovakia."

(Radio Moscow, 29 August 1968)

"It is by no means by chance that some of the leaflets published by the underground which slander Czechoslovak-Soviet relations and call for the disruption of the results of the Moscow talks and for the prevention of the normalization of life in the country, are in the hands of the radio pirates at Radio Free Europe. Their vile,

provocative content is not only broadcast but also appears in the pages of the magazine East Europe which is published by members of the staff of this same radio station with CIA funds. The Daily World reported that the so-called 'Free Europe Committee,' which is located on Park Avenue in New York, 'has instigated counter revolutionary elements in Czechoslovakia, since it was founded more than 20 years ago.' The 'Committee' is in charge of Radio Free Europe. This same 'Committee,' which is controlled by the CIA, has made considerable efforts to dispatch political diversionists to Czechoslovak territory. Frequently they are disguised as tourists or journalists.

"At present in the street called NA PSIKOP, these 'tourists' are assembling crowds of all kinds of troublemakers and inciting them to prevent the normalization of life in the country. They are organizing discussions, and making provocative statements. However it is not only the American 'tourists' who are zealous in this respect. A certain Fischer from West Germany is a particularly frequent guest in NA PSIKOP."

(Izvestia, 31 August 1968)

"When the five socialist countries moved troops into Czechoslovakia, the commercial mass media of the United States, Britain and West Germany immediately charged illegal action and violation of Czechoslovakia's sovereignty. The NATO powers brought the issue to the U.N. Security Council, acting without the knowledge or consent of the Prague government. The armed forces of Federal Germany and several other NATO countries were alerted and Federal Germany called for a special meeting of the NATO council to discuss the situation in Czechoslovakia..."

"...It makes you wonder what prompted them to raise a hue and cry about the freedom and independence of Czechoslovakia, unless they were the ones that stirred up the trouble and made it necessary for the socialist countries to introduce troops. It so happens that's just it. The anti-socialist elements inside the country have close connections with the NATO powers. From them they got aid, support, and instructions. It's common knowledge that the counter-revolutionary forces used the past few months to prepare caches of arms and hideouts, transportation facilities, radio transmitters and printing equipment. The 40,000 men known to be in these forces had automatic weapons. When the time came they were going to use these weapons to overthrow the legitimate government and seize power."

"When the socialist troops entered Czechoslovakia the clandestine machine went into operation. Openly and in coded language the population was urged to resist the troops and kill and destroy. Federal Germany assigned army communications <sup>units</sup> to coordinate the forces of counter-revolution...

"Meanwhile the radio stations of Western propaganda did their utmost to confuse the public. Free Europe, RIAS, Deutsche Welle, the BBC, and the Voice of America all spread slander concerning the situation in Czechoslovakia.

"Nevertheless, the counter revolution failed to come off. When the allied troops entered the country and forced the anti-socialist elements to act before they were quite ready, these elements tried to stir up sentiment against the troops and start a civil war. But most of the populace remained calm and refused to be taken in. People soon realized that what the anti-socialist elements wanted had nothing to do with the socialism the nation chose 20 years ago and intends to live by..."

(Radio Moscow in English to North America, 1 September 1968)

"Radio provocateurs from the so-called 'Free Europe' station have stepped up the volume of their broadcasts in Czechoslovak to 20 hours a day. This diversionist station is situated in Munich and belongs to the 'Free Europe Committee' of New York. This 'Committee' is generously financed by the American CIA."

(Radio Moscow, 4 September 1968)

"I turn on my radio receiver and patiently grope around the air. And at last I have that same wave on which a week ago a well-delivered dictatorial voice had announced that the Russians are shooting at Czech children..."

"A chord from the Czechoslovak National Anthem is heard loudly and clearly, just as if the transmitter is somewhere here near Prague. In fact, it is in Munich. This is the Czechoslovak program of 'Radio Free Europe.' Then begins the usual round of psychological warfare. After a sermon, an historical digression. What do counter-revolutionaries like in history? Of course, episodes with counter-revolution! They would construct the periodization of the past according to the putsches. Their legacy for the future -- the '18th Brumaire.' Today they speak of the Hungarian counter-revolution of 1919. The desire to introduce at least a streak of optimism into those unhappy days of reaction shines through the malice of the speaker and in precise details. But behind this hides a deathly anguish and grief at the buried dreams for the counter-revolution of 1968..."

"Radio Free Europe is not only an instrument of counter-revolutionary propaganda, it is an organ for practical preparation of a counter-revolutionary putsch. At the end of June 1968 extensive reportage appeared on the pages of two Prague daily newspapers almost simultaneously on the friendly relations of their employees with the editors of 'Free Europe'...

"The role played by 'Free Europe' in the Hungarian events of 1956 is well known. Its role in the Czechoslovak events of 1968 still needs study. Was it not under the patronage of 'Free Europe' that the notorious 'Club-231' and 'Club of Committed Non-Party Members' (active non-Party people) were formed, which during recent months rallied anti-socialist forces, conducted active propaganda, and illegally set up its own local organizations in enterprises and in institutions? Clearly, 'Free Europe' sheds tears not without reason on the decision of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Interior not to grant anti-socialist 'clubs' the status of legal social organizations...

"However, 'Free Europe' today is not only shedding tears for lost hopes. It continues to give instructions and continues its active practical interference in the affairs of Czechoslovakia..."

(Komsomolskaya Pravda, 7 September 1968)

"A few days ago, Comrades, I returned from Czechoslovakia, where I was a special correspondent for our radio..."

"I think that there now is no one anywhere who does not understand and is not convinced that the intended counter-revolutionary, anti-socialist rebellion in Czechoslovakia was prepared gradually over a long period with the most active participation of the dark forces of imperialism..."

"With the aid of the Central Intelligence Agency and West German Intelligence, with the aid of numerous so-called tourists and all sorts of visitors from the Western countries, underground radio stations and caches of weapons were set up in Czechoslovakia. Plans were worked out for a fratricidal war into which, according to the designs of the imperialist circles, the Czechoslovak people were to be flung.

"In Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia, there is a high hill. There is an ancient fortress there which has now been turned into a national museum. And it was there, among the thick woods that surround the hill, that one of the underground so-called free radio stations was situated. I saw this station with my own eyes..."

"The main work by the foreign reactionaries, who had in every way instigated internal counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia, was to exert influence through the radio and through the press, through the whole propaganda apparatus of the capitalist countries. Radio Free Europe, the BBC, and the Voice of America suddenly expressed their nervousness over the so-called democratic socialism in Czechoslovakia, realizing that it was under just such a banner that they could unleash the anti-socialist forces in the country...

"After the arrival in Czechoslovakia of Soviet and other troops of the socialist community, I was fortunate enough to often pick up radio broadcasts to Czechoslovakia from Munich, London, New York and Paris. These broadcasts tried to slander the Soviet troops and the troops of the other fraternal countries. They were full of lies and misleading information intended to arouse among the population the maximum alarm and nervousness possible."

(Radio Moscow Domestic, 7 September 1968)

"Streams of poisonous propaganda are being poured out against Czechoslovakia. Particularly zealous are the West German radio stations and RFE, broadcasting from Munich, where the old counter-revolutionary rabble have found refuge. These diversionist radio stations, broadcasting in Czech and Slovak, attempt to spread all kinds of slander and fabrications, to distort the essence of the new line of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and state agencies with a view to misleading people and complicating the situation. The influence of this propaganda must not be underestimated because it still has a considerable number of voluntary and involuntary supporters within the country."

(Pravda, 11 September 1968)

"Victor Zorza, the Guardian correspondent, proposes the establishment of a new radio station outside Czechoslovakia. He already has invented a name: The Voice of Free Czechoslovakia. Of course, it is worth mentioning that both the idea and the name are nothing new. Free Europe also broadcasts under the title 'The Voice of Free Czechoslovakia,' and Zorza knows that well. He writes that neither the BBC, nor the Voice of America, nor any other government Western radio station can be of such use as the 'Voice of Free Czechoslovakia - Free Europe.' "

(Radio Moscow in Czech, 13 September 1968)

"Anti-Soviet leaflets being spread in Czechoslovakia and carrying the title 'Ten Commandments for the Czechoslovak Citizen' are almost literally the content of one of RFE's programs. The first of the commandments reads: 'Do not rpt not ever forget that the Soviet Union has one aim - the colonial enslavement of our nations.' The other nine points of the leaflet contain similar disgusting slanders to our party, people and state."

(Radio Moscow in Czech, 18 September 1968)

"The intelligentsia of the socialist countries is now becoming more and more the target of anti-communist attacks. In Western radio programs preference often is given to a tendentious explanation of economic, cultural and literary problems... These radio stations use the methods of one-sided selection of information, concealing events unfavorable to them, stirring up nationalism, spreading half-truths and open lies, and often giving uninvited advice on how better to direct things in the country. In one of its broadcasts to Czechoslovakia, Radio Free Europe even proposed a list of leaders who, as they believe, could better lead the country."

(Radio Moscow Domestic, 18 September 1968)

"The diversionist Radio Free Europe is serving a series of anti-communist elements, including Nazi people of all colors. Not rpt not only is diversionist Radio Free Europe active in Munich, but there also are a large number of organizations of emigrants and anti-communists whose members escaped from the USSR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania. There are also Ukrainian and Yugoslav fascists, former SS from the Baltic Republics, former Henlein party members, Klinca guards and Nazi people of all colors. Shoulder to shoulder with West German revanchists, these collaborators are active in the propaganda waves of Radio Free Europe as well as in various institutions whose main task is to collect political, economic and military material from the socialist countries..."

(Radio Moscow in Slovak, 24 September 1968)

"The Czechoslovak journal Zivot Strany (Party Life) of March 1963 carried an article on radio subversion which pointed out that imperialist radio propaganda was concentrating on undermining the socialist system. Everybody knows what a harmful role was played by radio propaganda in the August days in unleashing nationalist passions in Czechoslovakia. Much has also now come to light about the links between the biggest Western radio centers such as Free Europe or Deutsche Welle and the so-called free and legal radio stations which transmitted in Czechoslovakia at the end of August. They transmitted, one could say, on identical wavelengths. It was a well thought-out radio subversion.

"I think that it will be interesting, therefore, to concentrate today on the way this radio subversion was prepared and to talk about its sources.

"The history of preparations for radio subversion by imperialist countries against the socialist countries in general, and also Czechoslovakia, began a long time ago. To be precise, immediately after the end of World War II.

"At that time, one of the most outstanding American theoreticians of psychological warfare, Professor Paul Linebager, wrote: 'Radio is without doubt the cheapest means for spreading information among millions of people.' This was written by Linebager in his book Psychological Warfare published in Washington in 1948. The American professor was an ardent friend of Goebbels whom he considered as the highest authority in the field of propaganda. This is why he did not care in the least about any sort of objective information for his foreign listeners. On the contrary, in his opinion one could use any method to influence the thinking of listeners, even freely spread invented materials.

"Linebager and other Americans invented the theory of white, gray and black propaganda: white is carried out by governments, gray by known organizations, and black anonymously. The Voice of America carries out white propaganda. Radio Free Europe is full of lies. It insults the lawful, creates disquiet among the population of the socialist countries and takes a direct part in organizing espionage and terrorist activities in these countries. Officially, Radio Free Europe is a private organization but, as everybody knows, this is just a cover.

"Radio Free Europe takes an active part in subverting the socialist countries. Our next talk will be devoted to this subject."

(Radio Moscow in Czech, 5 October 1968)

"Radio Free Europe was one of the organizers and directing bodies of the phenomena which culminated in the counter-revolution in the Hungarian People's Republic in 1956.

"The many transmitters of this station broadcast in October 1956 not only the much promising propagandistic declarations, but also concrete instructions for the uprisers.

"Advice was given to illegal radio stations as to wavelength and how to broadcast. The radio station Free Europe was carrying, during the entire period of the events, appeals to continue the armed fight.

"For example, when the government of Imre Nagy had appealed for a cessation of firing, Free Europe at once called on its listeners to break armistice.

"And it was exactly under the influence of the inciting propaganda of Radio Free Europe and a consequence of the inadmissible intervention of some Western missions that the armistice was made impossible indeed.

"The uprisers started besieging the Budapest City Party Committee (building) and lynching communists...

"The leading representatives of the radio station Free Europe bear an extraordinary responsibility for the bloodshed among the Hungarians, for the appeal to Hungarians to flee to the West, which followed, and also for the tragedy which, as a result of this, thousands of Hungarian families experienced."

(Radio Moscow in Czech, 6 October 1968)

"RFE and RIAS have exhorted listeners in Czechoslovakia to armed uprising. The Voice of America has considerably increased its broadcasting time after the entry of the armies of five Warsaw Pact countries into the Czechoslovak territory in August this year.

"The Voice of America is broadcasting various reports on the situation in Czechoslovakia most of which are taken from the broadcasts of the illegal Czechoslovak radio station. As for the radio station Free Europe or, for example, the American radio station in West Berlin, RIAS, they have been directly exhorting listeners in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to armed uprising."

(Radio Moscow in Czech, 8 October 1968)



"If the nameboard 'Radio Free Europe' were not there, the complex of buildings in the outskirts of Munich could be considered a military construction: barbed wire goes around the buildings of the radio station, during the night the guards are armed to the teeth.

"Here anti-communists of more than 30 countries found a shelter. Radio Free Europe is one of the most poisonous focuses of the global psychological war, it is the center of ideological attacks against socialist countries.

"And this is not a surprise if we take into account the history of its creation.

"Important amounts are spent on the undermining work against socialist countries carried out by this center of psychological war. According to the manager of 'Radio Free Europe' this is not a commercial but a government radio station.

"Anyhow, it has a peculiar character! All links of this organization go to the great monopolies and to the U.S. war machine...

"Another concealed source of government material support to the radio is the CIA which greatly uses Free Europe for its purposes. It is known that the radio is stealing from the ether telegrams, is bugging and monitoring different statements and is dealing with radio piracy...

"Without ceremony and against the principles of international rights, Free Europe interferes constantly in the domestic affairs of European socialist countries. The results of this interference are clear in the memory of all. Free Europe in 1956 participated with enthusiasm in connection with agents in Hungary.

"The radio openly called Hungarian population to rebellion. But after their defeat, the anti-communists changed their tactics. Instead of the policy of 'rejection' they adopted a policy of 'peaceful penetration.' In the programs of Radio Free Europe we can now notice a game of objectivity. The gentlemen from that radio station are even ready to acknowledge some negative phenomena of capitalism.

"According to the strategists of anti-communism, they do not want to interfere in the affairs of socialist countries, they only make efforts to improve socialism..."

(Radio Moscow Domestic, 12 October 1968)

"The heckling radio station Radio Free Europe in Munich, beaming 500 hours of programs per week in the Polish, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian languages, will expand its broadcasts even more. The operation of the radio station working like a private organization without public control, is carried out by Americans and emigrants from Eastern Europe with a fascist past. Radio Free Europe is one of the biggest centers of the cold war on West German territory."

(Radio Vltava, 21 August 1968)

"Only a radio station linked with socialism gives you the correct information. You are listening to Radio Vltava."

"The Voice of Vltava radio presents a danger to Bonn's instigators of counter-revolution. That is why West Germany attempts to suppress this voice of truth and to jam the transmissions with the aid of special transmitters. Special units of the West German Bundeswehr have been assigned this task on the Bavarian frontier. The radio battalion from Andernach is supposed to be working there too."

"AFP has confirmed that West German transmitters are near the Czechoslovak border and are in operation. These radio stations maintain that they are Czechoslovak stations and that they collaborate with Radio Free Europe. All these transmitters assist counter-revolutionary elements in Czechoslovakia and carry their reports."

(Radio Vltava, 26 August 1968)

"The imperialistic propaganda, which is concerned with the situation in Czechoslovakia is now seeking new methods. The so-called radio station Free Europe is gradually coming over to a new tactical approach in order to save what can still be saved. This tactical approach is obviously directed

at the support of the appeals of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and government calling for the preservation of calm and prudence, with the aim of a speedy normalization of the situation, even if it has a different reason for this. Characteristic of this political move is a quotation from a news agency saying literally: 'Why should calm not rpt not be preserved for two months until the Russians have left'?

"Counter-revolutionaries are given the advice to be have calmly and to overcome the first shock of the defeat.

"Thus, a misleading normalization is to be pretended; an outside picture of calm, while the counter-revolution will continue. In this way, the same situation would arise which we had shortly before August 21. Of course, such advice of the Western propagandists has nothing in common with the spirit and contents of the Moscow Agreement. A real normalization requires energetic fighting against counter-revolutionary groups and their liquidation. The elements which give Czechoslovakia dishonest advice must finally recognize the final defeat of their attempt to pull Czechoslovakia out of the community of the socialist states."

(Radio Vltava, 30 August 1968)

"The statements by Czechoslovak writers Vesely, Mnacko and Goldstuecker over Western radio and television are in striking harmony with the radio station Free Europe in Munich. They tried to push the view among the Czechoslovak population that the USSR and socialism are enemies of the Czechoslovak people."

(Radio Vltava, 10 September 1968)

"Our voice is not rpt not popular with Free Europe or Deutsche Welle, or among the followers of these voices of imperialism in Czechoslovakia. But we do not rpt not broadcast in order to praise imperialists and counter-revolutionaries.

"The American intelligence service CIA and the West German secret service Bundesnachrichtendienst are at present concerned with how to engage the escaped counter-revolutionaries in the radio war against Czechoslovakia. Apart from the use of these collaborators by West German radio stations, an independent emigré Czechoslovak transmitter is to be built up for American money shortly. The most important operations of the American espionage service against Czechoslovakia are directed from West Germany. The leader of the adequate staff is Ray Klein, who works under the assistance of the West German government."

(Radio Vltava, 14 September 1968)

## BULGARIA

The Bulgarian regime during 1968 continued to attack RFE broadcasts but it was not until after the Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia that it unleashed a campaign aimed at proving that RFE was connected with the so-called counter-revolutionary movement in Czechoslovakia. Until that time, RFE was grouped along with other Western broadcasts as an imperialist propaganda weapon and a product of Western espionage. There were also attacks on RFE's programming to Bulgaria and instances of criticism and attempted vilification of RFE Bulgarian staff members.

Typical of such attacks was one carried in the Sofia daily Vecherni Novini of 17 July 1968 which said:

"Various are the channels through which the ideological diversionists make efforts to sell their 'goods' in Socialist Bulgaria. Most often they make use of radio broadcasts. Day and night radio stations of the USA, the FR of Germany, Great Britain, France, Spain, Turkey, the Vatican, Monaco and other countries beam 26 radio broadcasts in Bulgarian language with a total duration of 11 hours and 30 minutes. An important link in this organizational system are the radio stations 'Free Europe,' and 'The Voice of America,' supplied with informational materials primarily by the USIA...

"...They have committed themselves to the service of ideological diversion, along with some national apostates and traitors, connected with foreign intelligence agencies. They take advantage of their Bulgarian origin and make all kinds of efforts to incite Bulgarian citizens toward treason through tourists, specialists, people of art and culture, who on some occasions are on a visit in a capitalist country. Such activities are being practiced, for example, by the escapee Lora Kostova - now living in the FR of Germany under the name of Lora Fuchs, the traitors Pazhanko Dimitro, Milyu H. Mileff, Krastyu Zarev, Ivan Voinov and others...."

After the Soviet-led invasion of August 20, Bulgarian media directly accused RFE of being implicated in Czechoslovakia. Typical comments involving RFE follow:

"One cannot pass by in silence the sinister role played in the instigation of counter-revolutionary activities in Czechoslovakia by numerous radio stations of the type of Radio Free Europe. The ideological diversion of Radio Free Europe, this institution of the psychological war which is run by a retired American general and which is situated in Munich, has been recently considerably extended. Broadcasts to Czechoslovakia have been expanded to 20 hours daily thus assuming first place among the rest of the target countries."

(Rabotnichesko Delo, August 25, 1968)

"It also has been announced that the American Radio Free Europe, operating on West German territory, is connected with the clandestine radio transmitters of the counter-revolutionary and anti-socialist forces in Czechoslovakia. It has been ascertained that the instructions disseminated by these clandestine radio stations to the counter-revolutionary forces have been almost identical, both in form and content, with the instructions broadcast earlier by Radio Free Europe."

(Radio Sofia, 26 August, 1968)

"Radio Free Europe broadcasts slanderous and provocative information in Czech language 20 hours daily."

(Rabotnichesko Delo, 26 August, 1968)

"Radio Free Europe and RIAS, both supported by the CIA, have intensified their activity."

"Parts of the West German Bundeswehr invested with special broadcast equipment, the federal German press service as well as organizations of Czechoslovak emigres also are participating in this diversion campaign."

(Radio Sofia, 28 August, 1968)

"The fading secret radio stations on Czechoslovak territory are being replaced by radio stations in West Germany. Their function has been taken over now by the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, BBC, Deutsche Welle, and others."

(Radio Sofia, 30 August, 1968)

A BTA correspondent reporting from Prague, said on Radio Sofia on August 31, that RFE encouraged counter-revolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia. Dealing with the efforts of these forces to create disorder among the Czechoslovak population, the radio added that the West had not ceased to encourage these activities:

"The notorious Radio Free Europe tells the counter-revolutionary forces: Act fearlessly! Do not be afraid!"

"Embittered by the fact that their plans have been crushed, the enemies of socialism do not spare either time, or money. Since August 21 Radio Free Europe, BBC, Voice of America, and Deutsche Welle have sharply increased their foreign language broadcasts and especially those beamed to Eastern Europe."

Praising the outcome of the Moscow negotiations and the behavior of the Warsaw Pact troops in Czechoslovakia, the paper

asked: "Maybe it will become necessary to reduce the number of hours, full of poison, that are beamed by Radio Free Europe and other like-minded stations?"

(Rabotnichesko Delo, 5 September, 1968)

"In the psychological warfare against Czechoslovakia the American radio station Free Europe, located in Munich, unleashed an exclusively active campaign. In the last few months it increased its broadcasts in the Czech language up to 20 hours daily. At the moment it is instigating activities against the armed forces of the allied socialist states."

(Radio Sofia, 4 September, 1968)

"A big part of RFE's twelve transmitters have been used in direct services for the counter-revolution in the CSSR and the Bonn government has subsidized the provoking Radio Free Europe with important sums, through the West German intelligence service..."

(Radio Sofia, 6 September, 1968)

In an alleged expose of the facts behind the need for the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia, Radio Sofia on 4 September, 1968, broadcast a commentary titled "The Facts Expose The Truth."

The commentary claimed direct American and West German intelligence support for counter-revolutionaries and accused RFE of playing its part in the psychological war against Socialist Czechoslovakia.

## HUNGARY

Although Hungary joined with other Warsaw Pact nations in condemning reform moves in Czechoslovakia and contributed troops to the occupation forces, there was a certain understanding for what was taking place in Czechoslovakia. This no doubt was influenced by the events of 1956.

As far as the Hungarian regime reaction to RFE is concerned, there has been over the past few years a mounting awareness of the influence of RFE programming on the population and in particular on the Hungarian youth. Continuing attacks against RFE testify to this point.

It is significant, however, that apart from one instance there was no direct condemnation of RFE in respect to Czechoslovakia before the occupation took place on August 20, 1968. After that date, Hungary joined other Warsaw Pact members in blaming RFE.

The exception came in a Magyar Ifjúság article of August 2 which criticized the Czechoslovak youth newspaper Student for publishing an interview with RFE staffers in Munich.

"We wonder why Student wanted to put forward the views of such evil-minded enemies of socialism who have betrayed the Czechoslovak people... they have forgotten that for two decades RFE has incited against socialist Czechoslovakia and that this air-war is organized by people in Munich who are the sworn enemies of socialism. Student provided a forum for these elements."

Together with Poland, Hungary has shown a developing concern over the effect of RFE broadcasts. It has issued frequent warnings that RFE has become a more sophisticated weapon than in the past and that new and modern methods used by RFE must be treated with the utmost respect. In some cases Hungarian reaction to RFE has been in the form of veiled praise for its effectiveness.

The following is an excerpt from an article which appeared in Csongrad Megyei Hírlap of " August, 1968.

"The essence of this new imperialist strategy is publicly known. It has a double purpose. On the one hand - - and this is the most important - the socialist camp must disintegrate and the unity of the socialist countries weakened by stressing contrary interests. But the main task is to slacken the ties with the Soviet Union. The second line to be taken is the gradual weakening of proletarian dictatorship within the socialist countries, a liberalization which is not directly aimed at the liquidation of socialism, and the termination of the Party leadership, but merely weakens the leading role of the Party and the working class.

"In accordance with the new programs, the key-note also has changed. The old tone of hatred has vanished, but more and more mention is made of 'common interests,' 'common fate of humanity,' and so forth. Propaganda is switched over to the line of the so-called 'objective information,' and the hostile radios give priority in their programs to the internal situation of socialist countries, to meditations on the relationships between the countries and the problems of the international Communist movement. Their intention is to lay stress on those problems with which we are mentally engaged, to join the processes going on inside the country and to influence them. These imperialistic radios even make distinctions, by distinguishing between 'good' and 'bad' functionaries, in order to create a bad atmosphere towards them. They have also stopped, in general, the abuse of the agricultural cooperative system, not because they appreciate it, but because they know that the Hungarian peasants have committed themselves for good to this form of production. Now, the hostile radio stations try to 'teach' the peasants cooperative democracy, independence, but as far as possible they do it in a way to create a bad mood among them against the state of the people and the legal measures.

"It also belongs to their methods of tactics to refer in their broadcasts to another socialist country, because 'it is done better there.'"

In an article published widely in the Hungarian press in September 1968 the Hungarian regime admitted that radio is not only one of the most important means of entertainment but also of propaganda.

"With the help of radio the political system of a country can be strengthened and the goals of the political leadership can be served. But it also can be used by enemies of the country, by the opponents of government for the weakening and shaking of power."

In a specific reference to RFE, the article referred to the time of the 1956 Hungarian uprising.

It said:

"We have our own sad experiences concerning the disturbing effect of hostile radios. In 1956, the so-called Radio Free Europe, located in Munich and financed mostly by the American espionage agency CIA, became one of the propaganda centers of the Hungarian counter-revolution. No political consideration kept Radio Free Europe from giving military advice to the armed counter-revolutionaries..."



"The imperialist propaganda machinery also was extremely active during the Czechoslovak crisis. Their broadcasts to Czechoslovakia have exceeded even that of 1956. But there was considerable change in their tactics and methods to make their work more effective. But, at the same time, probably because they have drawn a lesson from the embarrassing failure of the Hungarian counter-revolution, they wanted to secure a possibility of a withdrawal as well. And they did not want to provide a too spectacular proof of their part in the events in Czechoslovakia.

"This time too - as we got used to it in the relaxation tactics of the imperialist countries: 'the psychological warfare' - there was a considerable, disciplined division of labor. Different tones were used, in connection with the events in Czechoslovakia, by the Voice of America and the Cologne Deutsche Welle, the Radio Free Europe and the West Berlin RIAS or by the London BBC. There was 'cool restraint' but also enraged fuming, there was sympathy toward the sad fate of 'real socialism' in Czechoslovakia and there was the spreading of false reports as well. We do not intend to make 'propaganda' for this or that hostile radio station which, for tactical reasons, has shown a sham-objectivity, thus we do not want to 'give good marks' to the editorial staff of the various radio stations and to the imperialist propagandists behind them, but we just want to point out that this branch of imperialist propaganda is more refined and more sophisticated at present.

"But even this sham-objectivity did not keep the Western radio stations - while referring to illegal Czechoslovak radio stations - from giving room for the wildest disquieting rumors. Certainly they disclaimed all responsibility while saying: 'It is not we who are telling you this, it has been reported by the clandestine Czech radio stations...' And as far as these illegal 'Czechoslovak' radio stations are concerned, it has been proved that most of them were not operated on the territory of Czechoslovakia but West of it..."

(Above article appeared in the following provincial papers: Dunantuli Naplo, 17 September 1968; Pest Megyei Hirlap, 18 September 1968; Fejer Megyei Hirlap, 18 September 1968; Csongrad Megyei Hirlap, 18 September 1968; Nograd, 17 September 1968.)

In yet another reference to what it sees as the changing tactics of RFE, an official booklet on socialist patriotism and the building of socialism in Hungary says:

"The propaganda of the imperialist countries tries to keep alive nationalism. As, for example, the Munich Radio Free Europe takes all opportunities to spread anti-socialist, anti-Soviet nationalist ideas and to mislead - in its commentaries and evaluations - the national feelings of the

peoples of the East European socialist countries. This is in accord with the present policy of the leading imperialist countries which already counts on the failure of the 'liberation' line and, as a replacement, it presses, organizes and is financing the 'ideological relaxation.'"

The Hungarian publication Magyar Hirlap said on 3 September 1968:

"The policy of relaxation in its capacity of a tactical move of the Western states against the socialist countries has been mentioned several times in connection with the Czechoslovak events. This concept is not new, it entered into our political vocabulary on its own right in the early 'sixties, and in recent weeks, we saw it frequently in the radio reports and articles dealing with the development of the Czechoslovak situation...

"The essence of this concept of 'relaxation' is that the undermining work against socialist countries has to be adjusted to the changed conditions. The emphasis should not be on an armed liberation, but on propaganda, on an estrangement of the socialist countries from the Soviet Union. In the interest of an increase of the propaganda, the various radio stations (VOA, RFE, RIAS) and the press agencies of the nationality emigres received orders for the moderation of their open hostile instigation. In place of these, they should limit themselves to de-facto information and the chastisement of mistakes...

"In the case of Czechoslovakia too, the sponsors of these tactics did everything possible to tear out a country - - unnoticed - from the socialist community. While they had words of praise for the process of democratization, they encouraged quietly the rightist forces for raising new and new demands. (Naturally, they interpreted them differently than we or the Czechoslovak leaders did.) And it was not an instigation for an armed attack as in the case of Hungarian counter-revolutionaries in 1956, when they openly attacked our socialist regime. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the errors committed by the dogmatics were blamed. They appealed to nationalistic feelings, when they spoke about the disadvantages of the Czechoslovak-Soviet economic relationships.

"They hoped for a more active conduct of the rightist side in Czechoslovakia. And when the military intervention of the socialist countries took place, they encouraged passive opposition.

"The situation has changed in the last ten years. The open attack on socialist countries has been exchanged for a more cautious action planned for a long term, covering every area of economic, cultural and social life and aimed at the desintegration of the unity among socialist states. This is what we call the 'policy of relaxation.'"

Other attacks on RFE over Czechoslovakia included the following:

"It was also reported that RFE in Munich is in connection with the illegal radio stations of Czechoslovak counter-revolutionaries and anti-socialist forces."

(Dunantuli Naplo, 27 August, 1968)

"It was in vain that the Western propaganda machinery tried to create confusion and misguide our public opinion by a maximally intensified activity, by keeping its program staff on a round-the-clock duty. Even those persons did not believe the siren songs who otherwise do not belong to the politically best-trained. Why is that so? The explanation is extremely simple and clear. The RFE staff and other groups of a hostile psychological warfare had - 12 years ago - thoroughly discredited their whole 'institution.' Our people do not forget those times when yielding to the 'good advice' given by the West, to various tempting appeals, so many of them took to the road for no reason at all, only to return disillusioned in great masses to their forgiving fatherland, to their homeland, whose support they still enjoyed."

(Magyar Nemzet, 29 August, 1968)

"The Czechoslovak Communist Party has now begun to be protected by everybody, from the counter-revolutionary Radio Free Europe to the Voice of America. They are quoting Marx, the communist manifesto, even some documents of the statute of the Warsaw Treaty. They are burning with concern about the destiny of Czechoslovak socialism..."

(Radio Budapest Homeland, 7 September, 1968)

"We remember the hysterical atmosphere, and the inciting advices broadcast by RFE 12 years ago. They have, however, drawn the conclusions from their failure and have become far more moderate. What they chiefly understood was that, by trying to use force, they cannot win but only lose.

"They carry on different tactics now. Imperialist groups hating socialism to such an extent stand now for non-interference and merely voice their sorrow about the Czechoslovak events."

(Tarsadalmi Szemle, August-September, 1968)

POLAND

"The greatest daily penetration of hostile ideology is achieved by means of the programs of Western radio stations, transmitted in Polish by various broadcasting centers. The most important center of American ideological and political subversion against Poland is the FREE EUROPE radio station."

Zolnierz Wolnosci, 19 July, 1968

During the past two years the Polish regime has intensified its criticism of RFE and from January to September 1968 more than 600 individual attacks on RFE by name were recorded from radio, television and newspapers analysed at RFE headquarters. Since not all newspapers published in Poland are received, the figure is a conservative one, especially since there are additional indirect references to Western radio without RFE being named.

As is the case with Hungarian comments on RFE, Poland's communist leaders are expressing increasing concern at the developing sophistication of RFE programming.

While the Polish pattern represents a continuing campaign against RFE for its broadcasts to Poland, the events in Czechoslovakia have been used to link RFE with the danger of counter-revolution and the adverse effect of outside communications media on a population as a whole.

A Radio Warsaw broadcast on 27 September 1968 declared:

"The Sejm Committee for Culture and Art examined the present state and prospects of developing of the material and technical base of radio and TV. As is known the theses for the Fifth Party Congress place particular emphasis on the necessity to develop mass communication media. The deputies established that the intensification of the effectiveness of hostile broadcasting stations requires the undertaking of decisive measures. This imposes important tasks on the ministries and institutions responsible for the development of broadcasting and television. In the opinion of the deputies radio and TV investments should receive priority and should be completed punctually. The effectiveness of this kind of mass communication media depends primarily on the modernization of broadcasting facilities."

The Polish Army daily Zolnierz Wolnosci, quoted above, published in July 1968 an article drawing attention to the "danger" of capitalist propaganda in which RFE was prominently mentioned.

Part of this said . . . "Another commonly used method is that of giving priority to information and commentary. These centers exploit all lapses on the part of our telecommunications media (press, radio, TV), every tiny lack or delay of information, even in the most unimportant matters. . ."

An article in the September 1968 issue of Nowe Drogi, the main theoretical monthly of the Polish Communist Party's Central Committee, openly admits the increased danger of Western broadcasts, particularly that of RFE:

"As a result of the increase of aggressiveness in the general course of American policies, the aggressiveness of the methods of action in the field of ideological subversion increased. At the same time the methods had to become more sophisticated, more perfidious, and as a result of this, no doubt also more dangerous up to a point. The aim of ideological subversion has become the everyday undermining of the foundations of the socialist system in the particular countries, and the weakening of the unity of the socialist commonwealth, and in particular the efforts to wreck the Warsaw Pact, that main pillar of peace in Europe and in the world.

"Thus while continuing to propose their theory of alleged ideological and economic coincidence between the two opposing systems, to pursue the doctrine of 'bridge building', the subversive centers of imperialism are at the same time trying increasingly to interfere with the internal matters of the socialist countries, intend to warp the political and social enlightenment of at least a part of the people, particularly of those who are more susceptible to hostile propaganda, to create difficulties for the people's government and the party which are the leaders of socialist building in those countries. . .

". . . Taking advantage of the relics of the narrow and peripheral nationalism the subversive imperialist circles assume the pose of the defenders of the independence of a given country in order to inject distrust to its tried allies, above all to the Soviet Union, in order to undermine in the minds of the masses the unfailing truth that the Soviet Union is the best defender of the independence of every socialist country against the appetites of the forces of imperialism. One of the main motifs of the hypocritical propaganda of 'Free Europe' against Poland is the attempt to persuade our people that 'a healthy Polish *raison d'état*' would require the loosening of the close ties with the Soviet Union and that the policies of our party, based on the strengthening of the friendship and on the development of general cooperation with the Soviet Union and with other

socialist countries, are inconsistent with the interests of Poland. In fact, these policies are inconsistent with the interests of the bosses of 'Free Europe.'"

One of the frankest admissions of RFE's popularity in Poland was made in September 1968 when Poles were warned against spreading "hostile propaganda" broadcast by RFE. The Warsaw Voivodship Communist Party Committee newspaper Trybuna Mazowiecka declared that conscious or unconscious dissemination of RFE's propaganda was harmful to Poland's national interests.

The article made it obvious that RFE's coverage of events in Czechoslovakia and of that country's occupation by Warsaw Pact troops was not the type of information the people of Poland should be hearing.

"During the recent difficult days some of our people kept a non-stop vigil at their radio receivers listening to Radio Free Europe . . . and there were some who ostentatiously turned on their radios at full blast, as if they were anxious to let their neighbors also hear the voice of Radio Free Europe . . ."

That RFE really irritates the Polish Communist leaders can easily be demonstrated by the daily attacks and references appearing in the Polish press and radio. Some recent examples follow, with particular reference to events in Czechoslovakia.

"Radio saboteurs broadcast whole sets of programs aimed against the young generation in Poland. Thus a program, 'Europe for Five Dollars', which has only the appearance of a light trip on the air, during which the radio speaks of the beauty of Naples, and later of the history of the Cathedral Notre Dame in Paris, adding, however, to this story commentaries about the fascinating life in the 'free world'. In the series called 'The Green Wave' they broadcast reviews of films produced in anti-Polish studios, excerpts from the periodical 'Kultura' in Paris which is financed by the American Intelligence Service, they broadcast all this mainly for young intellectuals. The program 'In Black and White' is aimed especially at students. Its main task is to undermine the authority of the Polish and Soviet parties and of government leaders in the eyes of the young people. Finally, they broadcast music. The latest jazz pieces are a part of the plans to soften up socialism, and 'The Musical Wave' in Munich tries to draw the attention of the Polish youth to all the latest big-beat, throwing at the same time into their throats two or three sugar-coated but poisonous anti-communist pills, hidden among the musical sweets. All those radio programs are cunning and delicately produced."

(Komsomolskaya Pravda, 13 August 1968)

"Ideological subversion means the spreading of lies and slanders about socialism and about particular socialist countries in order to undermine among as many people as possible the trust in the party and in the socialist state. An example of such a center of subversive propaganda is 'Free Europe,' a radio station situated in West Germany, in Munich, financed by the American and West German intelligence, specializing in sowing slanders concerning People's Poland... The methods of such hostile subversion are today very sophisticated...

"But such subversion would have little effect if it had no support in a given country. Such a support is offered by those who are naive and know little about politics, who, however, pretend to be 'great politicians,' who like to boast that they have information which 'has not been printed in the papers,' and repeat nonsense and lies mixed with truth which they heard in a hostile program."

(Zarzewie, 25 August, 1968)

"...contrary to the obligations assumed in Cierna Nad Tisso and Bratislava, some Czechoslovak mass media such as the press, radio and television have not changed their aggressive tone and not even renounced the content of their anti-socialist campaign: attacks on the fraternal socialist states, primarily against the USSR and Poland, overtly nationalistic slogans, full freedom of expression for the representative of reaction, harsh 100-per cent censorship for representatives and activists of the left wing, hospitably open doors even for Radio Free Europe and West German journalists including the well-known ones for their revisionistic attitude, but hermetically closed to the voice of truth and wisdom..."

(Polish Television, 26 August, 1968)

"Our party organizations, particularly in villages, still feel there is not enough information. Hence, here and there, its members are influenced by the hostile programs of 'Free Europe.' We activists are not always able to adopt the right attitude to some matters. For instance we only learnt about the regulation of wages and prices very late, while people in the street talked about it several days before."

(Gazeta Bialostocka, 31 August, 1968)

"The new strategy of imperialism uses the campaign of neo-Stalinism and conservatism against healthy forces loyal to socialism. These blows are directed against everybody who regards revisionism, which is preparing grounds for the overthrow of the people's authority, as a real danger. These methods of attack have come to light brutally in the case of Czechoslovakia, and also are used with regard to other socialist countries. The leader in this is, as you know, 'Free Europe.'"

(Trybuna Ludu, 1 September, 1968)

"The theme of Czechoslovakia continues to be the main motive of diversionary Radio Free Europe. Munich has been transformed in a staff of diversion, where the American and West German intelligence instructed by the highest chiefs of psychological war are working hand in hand. The instigatory role of Freies Europa in the inspiration of counter-revolution is known from the time of the revelation of close connections of this center with the Hungarian reaction in 1956.. "

(Radio Warsaw, 4 September, 1968)

"We also simplified the case of 'Free Europe.' We only presented it exclusively as a yapper whose aim is false information, polemics... The events in Czechoslovakia proved that it was not accidental that this yapper was capable of switching to subversion and to instructions. The fact that within a few hours they created a special studio of 'Free Europe' which could use, as regards Poland, a whole collection of contributors of various origin, and as regards Czechoslovakia - ex-communist activists who addressed themselves to the Czechs - this fact shows that one must not underestimate 'Free Europe' as a political and organizational center for the counter-revolution within the socialist countries."

(Zolnierz Wolnosci, 5 September, 1968)

"The events in the Czechoslovak socialist republic have opened our eyes to many questions which we underestimated in the past, and even made nothing of them until the recent weeks, namely the mechanism of the action of internal and external forces of peaceful counter-revolution directed by imperialist centers of psychological war. True, we have been talking about these matters for many years, more often in recent months under the influence of the March events; however, still not sufficiently. We also have simplified the question of Free Europe. We have been presenting it as a loud-speaker (diffusing propaganda) whose task is to misinform. The events in the Czechoslovak socialist republic have shown the ability of this loud-speaker to switch over to a diversive-instigatory work..."



"This shows that we must not ignore Free Europe as the political-organizational center for the counter-revolution inside the socialist countries. It appears that one has to talk more frankly, and analyze what is taking place in Bavaria. It is not an accident that the centers of ideological, political and military diversion have concentrated there."

(Radio Warsaw, 5 September, 1968)

"It is enough to listen carefully to the programs of 'Free Europe' alone to appreciate the magnitude of the propaganda bluff coming from the people who have undertaken to persuade anyone in Poland that the word 'occupation' is correct with regard to the presence of the Warsaw Pact troops in Czechoslovakia.

"...In spite of everything, in spite of the unmasking of that center of anti-socialist and anti-Polish subversions, it is profitable from time to time to examine the arguments used by that center. To examine them coolly and without any emotions; there is no reason why we should be offended. From time to time, it may be instructive to see what is the object of the opponent's attacks, what tricks he uses, to what aspects of reason and of emotion in our consciousness and subconsciousness he tries to appeal."

(Kierunki, 8 September, 1968)

"The barometers of soldiers' feelings are unusually sensitive. During their stay in the fraternal Czechoslovak country they happened many times to meet the counter-revolutionary elements. During the first days, the whole propaganda effort was directed exactly against them, against our soldiers. They were handed heaps of leaflets, made to listen to portable radios tuned to the Polish programs of 'Free Europe' and were accosted and provoked."

(Sztandar Mlodych, 11 September, 1968)

"We are accused that the armed forces of the allies entering the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic violated the principle of the sovereign rights of nations to self-determination. This is what all the mouthpieces of anti-communist propaganda, headed by the paramour of CIA, the Munich Ober-yapper 'Free Europe,' shout about in all languages to the four corners of the world.

"What is worse is that this enemy, with the aid of internal counter-revolutionary forces, managed to deceive a considerable part of the Czechoslovak public, even communist party members."

(Zolnierz Wolnosci, 11 September, 1968)

"Psychological war is a new idea, but, not to reach farther back in history, it was already Clausewitz who taught that to win a war it was not absolutely necessary to deal with the enemy by means of force: it was enough to deprive him of the will to fight. Or, to use modern terminology, to break him morally, to disarm him ideologically, to woo him so that he becomes one's ally."

(Radio Warsaw, 18 September, 1968)

## RUMANIA

The Rumanian attitude to events in Czechoslovakia is a special one. From the beginning of the January reforms in Czechoslovakia, Rumania gave open support to the new leadership, toning this down only after the August 20 occupation when the Soviets made their displeasure clear. Nevertheless, Rumania continues to support the principle of each nation deciding its own destiny.

Since the summer of 1963 Rumania has not jammed Western broadcasts, including those of RFE. The relatively few attacks on RFE have been confined to polemicizing with programming or criticizing Rumanian Broadcasting staff members. Such references and attacks have been on a very minor scale compared to other listener countries. During 1968 there was not a single instance of Rumanian media attacking or blaming RFE in connection with Czechoslovakia.

Two excerpts from letters received in August 1968 are indicative of the popularity of RFE programming in Rumania.

The wife of a Geneva banker who left Bucharest late August wrote:

"I took the first plane leaving for Switzerland. I therefore was in Bucharest when the invasion of Czechoslovakia took place. After the first shock, the atmosphere was one of mobilization. After Ceausescu's speech, everybody said: 'For the first time for years and years we feel like Rumanians.' Your broadcasts sustain them. Your information is followed passionately and everybody only prays that you should hold out, that you should inform them, and that you should be with them. Think that even though you may be exhausted, your voice is heard. It is the political information and the news which for them over there have a high value and significance. For them it is the only way of communicating with the world to which they feel attached. Your voice is not only heard, it is heard with great eagerness."

A Rumanian listener visiting Czechoslovakia at the time of the occupation wrote to RFE:

"I write to you from Vienna. I arrived here due to events in Czechoslovakia; a country which I was visiting as a tourist. There is no point in my telling you what I saw because on the basis of the programs which I hear with the help of the set which I have with me, you know all the details. I am among those of your listeners who hears at least two to three programs every day. Your broadcasts are well received and have a considerable influence on listeners and, in general, on a large part of the population of the Rumanian Socialist Republic. They are a source of support, they maintain the morale of the people and especially of those who have fought for the creation of Rumania. I believe I do not exaggerate if I say that the number of suicides would have been much higher if so many desperate people would not have had hopes for a better future and would not have listened to your broadcasts."