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2) - Summary of discussion at second meeting of the European Study Commission With East European Representatives.
3) - Future problems of European security.

SECOND EAST - WEST MEETING
EUROPEAN STUDY COMMISSION
October 25/26, 1968

List of Participants*

Dr. Achille Albonetti	Director, International Affairs Dept., Comitato Nazionale per l'Energia Nucleare, Rome
Dr. László Báti	Karl Marx University of Economics Department for International Relations, Budapest
Général d'Armée André Beaufre	Director, Institut français d'études stratégiques, Paris
Dr. Christoph Bertram	Institute for Strategic Studies, London
Dr. Karl E. Birnbaum	Director, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm
Mr. Niels Haagerup	Diplomatic Correspondent, Berlingske Tidende, Kopenhagen
Mr. Michael Howard	Fellow of All Souls' College Oxford
Brigadier Kenneth Hunt	Deputy Director, Institute for Strategic Studies, London
Dr. L.G.M. Jaquet	Director, Institute for International Affairs, The Hague
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Professor Leo Mates	Director, Institute of International Politics and Economy, Belgrade

* Participation from Rumania and Czechoslovakia has not yet been confirmed

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Dr. John Sanness	Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Oslo
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Dr. Mieczyslaw Tomala	Deputy Director, Polish Institute for International Affairs, Warsaw
Professor Jaques Vernant	Director, Centre d'études de politique etrangère, Paris
Dr. Wolfgang Wagner	Acting Director, Research Institute of the German Association for International Affairs, Bonn
Mr. Philip Windsor	Reader of International Relations, London School of Economics

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THE INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

Summary of Discussion at Second Meeting of the European Study Commission with East European Representatives

London, 25th-26th October, 1968

Friday, 25th October

Signor Spinelli in the Chair

Introducing his paper 'Future Problems of European Security' as the basis for discussion, Dr. Birnbaum said that its purpose was to formulate the framework within which a continued search for new avenues to a more satisfactory European constellation might be fruitfully pursued; although it was debateable whether this was the right moment to make such an attempt, we should nevertheless address ourselves to the question. The paper then discussed what he considered to be the essence of the very lively debate on European security during 1966-68 up to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the period of détente, defined as the search for new political and military arrangement more in accordance with the specific aspirations of the main actors on the European scene. And in the Appendix the characteristics of four preferred constellations reflecting the declared aspirations of the major powers operating in Europe were presented - Soviet, American, Gaullist and 'European'. These constellations were not to be taken too seriously. They overlapped to some extent, some of their characteristics were debateable, some additions or modifications might emerge in the course of discussion.

He had made a number of assumptions. First, that the events in Czechoslovakia showed that Moscow was clearly far more concerned about consolidating its sphere of influence than about exploiting leverage. Secondly, that the search for a new constellation was likely to continue: some people in the West were already behaving almost as though nothing had happened in Czechoslovakia; there was also a consensus that in the longer term there was no alternative to resuming this search. He believed that the search for a new constellation would be pursued after a period of 'normalisation' in the East. If one believed that the Soviet leadership would not be able to contain over the long run the dynamic forces in its own camp militating against a rigid confrontation in Europe without re-imposing Stalinist repression, it followed that Moscow must in the end acquiesce in a cautious growth of contact and interdependence between the two parts of Europe.

He had set out to identify some of the crucial relationships and major issues which would confront anyone who wanted to discuss a possible new constellation. Among the minimum requirements for a fruitful search for a new constellation were, first, mutual willingness on the part of the super powers to move beyond nuclear deterrence. The conviction must exist among the two ruling elites that some co-operation would be in their mutual interest. This led to the conclusion that consolidation in American-West European relations and in Soviet-East European relations was a necessary pre-condition for a new super power relationship. The difficulty here was that whereas different forms for a 'consolidated relationship' between Western Europe and the US had at least been defined conceptually and discussed, it was difficult to envisage a relationship in the East except in terms of hegemonial Soviet rule over most of Eastern Europe. Any alternative would depend on a basic change in both Soviet-German and German-East European relations. This was the crux of the matter.

He spelt out more fully what he meant by requirements in terms of Western postures to facilitate such a reassessment, and particularly his reference to the adoption by the Federal Republic of a "fully credible, demonstratively non-provocative politico-military posture". First the credibility aspect: there was need for greater consistency in German declaratory policy as far as East-West relations and West Germany's frontier policy was concerned. The formula of a peaceful order in Europe was very much a compromise formula of the grand coalition; the SPD was markedly more enthusiastic about this than the CDU, partly for domestic reasons, and there would have to be some basic agreement between the two major parties to make their position more credible. By a non-provocative military posture he meant a non-nuclear posture. The present position did not go far enough. A German declaration was called for (i.e. signature of the NPT), and also an organisation of West European defence which would make it possible for the West Germans to have a purely non-nuclear defence (in terms of delivery vehicles, as well as warheads) without thereby making opportunities for Soviet pressure and aggression. This would be very difficult to achieve. But it was necessary in order to eliminate the residual East European apprehension and in particular the possibility for the USSR to use the West German bogy as a means of consolidating their own sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. With regard to the political posture, the main elements were the border question, the full recognition of the Oder-Neisser line, possibly a step further on the Munich agreement, and in particular recognition of the GDR at least as an equal negotiating partner. Obviously recognition of the GDR was not on the cards at the moment. But it was a requirement. /He made it clear during the course of discussion that he was advocating recognition as part of a package deal, not as a unilateral step./

So far he had been dealing with requirements on the Western side. The issue of recognition of the GDR raised the question of the countermeasures required: this would be a very difficult step for the West Germans, and they could not be expected to take it if recognition were viewed by the USSR and East Germany as an instrument for intervening in West Germany. (There were clear indications of this, for example in Ulbricht's new year message and the new programme of the KPD published in February which did bear the interpretation that recognition of the GDR was to be a first step in a process which would bring about the democratisation of West German society.) Thus the issue of recognition must be divested of any intention to meddle in West German internal affairs. In this respect he saw a basic conflict of interest between the East European countries and the USSR: the latter clearly had an interest in meddling, because this would be a main instrument for breaking up the Bonn-Washington axis, but this did not apply to the East Europeans. The West should not exploit this conflict of interest, but we should make it clear that the East Europeans had a vested interest in pressing their Soviet ally to make a distinction between recognition of the GDR as an equal negotiating partner for a solution of the German question and as a first step to "democratise" West Germany.

The last section of the paper was concerned with the significance of certain forces, operating both within national societies and transnationally, for the future shape of East-West relations in Europe. It could be argued that powerful economic and technological forces were at work which would make our present concern about confrontation at least less urgent. One could also argue the other way, particularly in regard to the domestic upheaval in many countries and its impact on foreign policy postures. His own judgement would be that West European economic integration was not conducive to East-West reconciliation. But if the impact were on balance favourable, an element of political choice which may be crucial was likely to be involved, and he had tried to identify this. In regard to the changing role of the military alliances in Europe, he tried to warn against exaggerated pessimism due to the re-assertion of old structures (the two Pact organisations) in the aftermath of the Czech events. Clearly this re-assertion did limit the choice before us; but it may also lead to a cautious search being made for some new ground between the two major alliances.

The first speaker from the Western side considered that the events in Czechoslovakia had brought about little change in the military situation: the Soviet troops stationed there had probably been earmarked for stationing elsewhere, moreover the Czech army was doubtless considered unreliable. With regard to the political situation, the situation in the East was obviously unstable. The USSR had felt compelled to show force and halt the evolution which was in process. On the other hand, as Dr. Birnbaum had argued, it was by no means certain that the dynamic forces in the Eastern camp could be contained completely in the long run - the issue had been delayed rather than avoided. In the West, two contradictory trends were apparent: a feeling of insecurity, particularly in Germany and Austria for example, but also a feeling that détente must continue nevertheless.

The situation was more dangerous today from the political than the military standpoint-because more incidents of the Czech type were to be expected, and such incidents could escalate and produce situations which might prove dangerous. The essential requirement was for greater emphasis on crisis management and contingency planning: merely to sit and await future developments, as the West had done in the Czech crisis, was the worst possible posture. Asked whether this exercise should not also include members of the Warsaw Pact, since they had a vested interest in ensuring that events did not get out of hand, the speaker said he envisaged preliminary work on crisis management being done within each camp separately, then some osmosis between them. During a crisis the two camps would need to be in effective communication to avoid any misunderstandings about moves by either side. Later in the discussion another speaker argued that crisis management had been exercised between the super powers: the US President accepted the Soviet Ambassador's assurance that the Czech invasion was an internal operation within the bloc and had no international aggressive intent. Therefore in the military field at least détente could continue.

The argument that little change had been effected in the military balance was generally endorsed by East and West European speakers, although it was suggested that the brilliance of the Soviet operation in occupying a country the size of Czechoslovakia in five or six hours, involving the movement of some 500,000 men and 10,000 armour in a very short time within that area of Central Europe, should not be disregarded.

A second speaker identified another factor contributing to the anxiety in Western Europe: the sense of frustration due to the fact that the Czech crisis was one of the results of the opening of barriers between East and West in consequence of the gradual adoption by the Western powers over the past five or six years of a view of what had been defined in the US as peaceful engagement with Eastern Europe. The approaches which to the West appeared to be a way of peace and détente appeared to certain elements, at least, in East Europe and the USSR to be subversive and something which they ought to resist.

It was suggested that another factor of frustration, particularly for the West Germans, was that peaceful approaches were deemed aggressive approaches. From this standpoint, however important and necessary recognition by Bonn of the Oder-Neisser line and of the GDR might be, concessions from the West German side would not change the situation.

Another Western participant said it was now clear that the type of peaceful engagement we had attempted, the Brzezinski formula of improving and intensifying relations between the individual countries of the two blocs, did not work, mainly because the Russians did not allow it to work. On the other hand, it should be said, recalling Dr. Birnbaum's argument, that while the West might feel that after recognition of the GDR peaceful engagement would mean intervention from the Eastern side in the political affairs of West Germany, the Eastern side did have precisely the same fear in relation to Western aims: our efforts <u>were</u> seen as attempts to penetrate Czechoslovakia.

Assuming that the avoidance of nuclear conflict must still have top priority, and that the only practical possibility to have something more than the existing nuclear balance was by means of peaceful engagement, in the light of the events in Czechoslovakia this would seem attainable only on a bloc to bloc basis. This in turn would involve some change of mentality in both parts of Europe, a recognition that the leading power in each bloc would play a more important role than the individual small countries.

Against this it was suggested that it was not so much the character as the timing of the Western policy of peaceful engagement that needed re-examination: the crisis in Czechoslovakia was largely brought about by the Czechs going too far and too fast from the Soviet point of view, and it could be argued that it was better for the world at large if we now saw more clearly what the Russians found acceptable and possible.

A speaker from South-Eastern Europe saw two main factors affecting the political situation in Eastern Europe. First, the Czech crisis showed that despite all expectation of the peaceful settlement of international disputes, force was still being used as the only possible instrument for solving some problems between states in Europe; he did not accept the theory of the Commonwealth of Socialist States as a possible basis for such a use of force. Secondly, the relationship between internal developments in individual states and their foreign policy had again been called in question. If the policy of peaceful co-existence were accepted, as it was in Europe, questions of internal development had to remain the responsibility of individual states and foreign policy had to be based on respect for the will of all peoples in connection with their own internal development.

The most hopeful element until the Czech crisis had been the general move towards a concept of Europe as a whole, something to be composed of states and with the possibility for some relationship between European states independently of ties within blocs. Although we had now reverted to envisaging détente within the framework of blocs, and this may be necessary as a first step, we must not forget the general trend towards Europe as a whole. Blocs were not suitable political instruments. We should not overlook the possibilities for action through the normal diplomatic relations between states.

It was interesting to note that the ideological factor in relation to the events in Czechoslovakia had been raised only at the United Nations, not in criticism from the West European side, which focussed on the use of force by one state against another. This may mark the difference from the first period of the cold war when the ideological confrontation was very much stressed by the Western countries. In the socialist states too a general movement in social relations leading towards liberalisation was apparent.

A second speaker from South-East Europe expected the general trend towards a rapprochement among all the countries of Europe to continue, despite the possibility of crises in Europe and in the world at large. Today, as opposed to the inter-war years, the outstanding problems between the countries of Europe were primarily political. European security was therefore mainly a political problem, and dominated by the necessity for very strong co-operation among all our states. To achieve European security would involve a very complicated multilateral process, and it would be essential to keep in view the interests of all the countries concerned, not merely those of the super powers or of a particular group of powers. From this point of view he supported the third and fourth constellations (the Gaullist and the European) in the working paper. We should also not overlook the moral aspect of international relations, which was important both for our discussion and for European security: because of its tradition of civilisation, Europe was in a position to set an example to the other continents.

It was suggested at this point that to be fair to the Gaullist constellation, the main aspirations and concerns of the fourth model applied to the third as well, although perhaps with a different meaning. It was further suggested that 'containment of Germany', mentioned only in the third constellation, could be considered a main aim of all four.

The first speaker from Eastern Europe suggested that the reference in the first constellation to "freezing and legalisation of the present status quo" should rather be termed simply "recognition of the status quo" which indeed was a matter of concern to some Western, as well as to the East European, countries. Recognition of the status quo as a starting point was the crux. He certainly felt, and this was the view of several of his ministers, that the recent events in Czechoslovakia were not a barrier to further improvements in relations either between individual countries or between the two blocs: indeed, in the sense that, as a previous speaker suggested, we now had a firmer picture of how to proceed, further talks and negotiations would perhaps be more useful than before. He also felt that certain questions which had been tackled previously should be reconsidered, such as nuclear-free zones and the level and importance of troops in certain areas. Before any useful conversations could be undertaken, however, it would be essential to settle certain problems and in particular to regularise the German problem by the recognition of existing frontiers, recognition of the two German states and of the peculiar status of West Berlin.

A Western participant saw the concepts of deterrence and détente as reflecting two basic considerations: the effort to prevent things from getting worse, and the effort to improve the state of affairs. Logically deterrence had priority over détente, because before things could be made better we had to be sure they would not get worse; the events in Czechoslovakia made this clear once again. He would even say that so long as deterrence worked, we could live without détente. He did not believe that the process of détente on the basis of deterrence could continue as we had imagined it would. Détente as the West understood it was built on the supposition that the kind of international action witnessed in Czechoslovakia would not happen. It was useless to pretend that once this supposition was proved wrong the policy could be continued as though nothing had happened. The climate had changed, not because five members of the Warsaw Pact had invaded Czechoslovakia, but because the new doctrinal rigidity on the part of the USSR, as expounded in 'Pravda' of September 26th and rephrased in 'Pravda' of October 24th, made nonsense of détente. This doctrine made the unique intervention in Czechoslovakia into a model operation for the future; it was also highly objectionable in its implication, going far beyond the position that the Socialist Commonwealth would not suffer any of its members being broken away from the Socialist camp, that the USSR had hegemonial power in Eastern Europe and determined not only the limit but the content of the Socialist Commonwealth and dictated to its allies the degree of warmth which they may introduce into their multilateral or bilateral dealings with Western states. This doctrine was leading to an ideological disparagement of the main instrument of détente, namely co-operation (for example in 'Pravda' of 24th October Yugoslavia came under heavy criticism because of its relationship with West Germany); disparaging co-operation meant disparaging détente as well. The prospects for détente would remain at nil unless there were a change in the attitude or the leadership of the USSR. So long as there were no tolerance between the communist states and parties in East Europe, there could be no détente or co-existence or tolerance between the communist states as a whole or individually and the West.

With regard to the German problem, recalling Dr. Birnbaum's recommendations for the West German military and political posture, the Federal Republic was already de-emphasising the nuclear component of its strategy and military apparatus. It would not go out of the business completely, thereby implying that it was in the business: Bonn disposed of no nuclear weapons except in case of aggression and after express release by the US, which would be an alliance decision. But the Germans themselves had for political reasons scaled down the nuclear component of which they might dispose in case of war. With regard to recognition of the Oder-Neisser line, he personally had been in favour of this step; the Bonn Government respected it as Poland's western border and had indicated, perhaps not in sufficiently strong language, that it did not expect anything to be changed when this border would be finally sealed at the peace conference. Bonn recognised the GDR as a state existing and acting on the international system; Bonn did not, however, want to

recognise the GDR as a foreign country. The GDR itself recognised the existence of a single German nation. He personally considered recognition of the GDR practically and morally inexpedient rather than undesirable in principle. On the other hand, in the course of a successful process of détente, formal recognition might be one very important step. At the present moment, however, even those in West Germany who favoured these two measures of recognition were not in favour of making any concession to the Poles or East Germans. He agreed with a previous speaker that concessions from the West German side would not change the atmosphere. The Federal Republic would continue to be in favour of détente, but it would look to its defences with a little more interest than it had been planning to do.

On the point about deterrence and détente, it was argued that nuclear deterrence, being a purely defensive weapon, provided security for the West alone; only moral deterrence could bring some influence to bear on the other side and thus be of help to all. Moral deterrence, defined as a psychological inhibition produced in the other party by some statements or by some instruments or by the pressure of world public opinion, was one of the aims of crisis management, the other aim being to reinforce and revitalise and make credible nuclear deterrence, as Kennedy did in the Cuba crisis. /Asked whether this did not in principle presuppose a common concept of what morality is, the speaker maintained that a degree of moral deterrence did apply in the Czech crisis, since the USSR did not dare to take certain measures that were within their power./ With regard to détente, the basic problem was that while East and West sincerely wanted détente the aims of both sides were entirely different: the Russians wanted agreement on the absolute status quo, the West wanted détente for the movement it offered.

It was further argued that while deterrence must have priority in the present situation, deterrence was not conducive to change: it tended to freeze the situation. We needed security in the ultimate sense; but we surely wanted to eliminate the specifically nuclear application of deterrence which was a barrier to a wider agreement between East and West.

Recognition of the status quo could be acceptable to the West as a starting point - provided it were accepted as a starting point in the East too, which did not appear to be the case as far as the Soviet Union was concerned. On this point there was perhaps a conflict of interest between the USSR and her East European allies.

Relating this point to the sense of frustration felt in the West, another member of the conference emphasised that the movement aimed at was not a movement of existing frontiers, it was a qualitative change, a different climate in the political situation in Europe between East and West.

A speaker from Central Europe said that the Czechoslovak crisis had repercussions on the internal policy of all European countries, and especially those neighbouring Czechoslovakia: it was difficult in democratic countries to ignore public opinion, and there was now a credibility gap between official support for détente and the actual sense of insecurity. His own country had begun to purchase arms. The crisis had led to an emphasis of ideology and a reinforcement of blocs: in the eyes of the USSR to be neutral or non-aligned seemed politically too attractive for the states of Eastern Europe, so the concept of neutrality or non-alignment had been devalued in favour of the necessity of belonging to a bloc. This constituted a risk for certain countries outside the blocs. He agreed that the German attitude was not the key to the problem: the USSR was not willing to change its attitude towards the Federal Republic because it needed the danger of so-called German aggression as a means to consolidate its own bloc.

He was not optimistic about prospects for peaceful engagement; we should have to wait and see if this were possible for domestic political reasons. In any case, however, it was not realistic to envisage this on a bloc to bloc basis because of the reluctance of many countries to belong to a bloc or to envisage the blocs evolving into entities which could promote co-existence.

Another speaker from South-Eastern Europe stressed two points in relation to the events in Czechoslovakia. First, what happened was an aggression. If we did not have war in Europe it was due not to the USSR but to a decision by the Czech Government not to react in the traditional way of a state faced with the unauthorised entry over its borders of troops from a foreign state, even if that state were a member of the same alliance. Although the Czech Government not only declared that the entry of foreign troops was without their permission but protested about that entry, they decided on political resistance to the aggression short of armed resistance. The important point about this entry to his mind was that it was made with the explicit intention, according to the statement of the invading forces and their governments who claimed support for this action, of acting on the territory of Czechoslovakia and influencing developments in that country.

Secondly, this action had affected the political balance. There had been a doctrinal change creating a precedent out of the Czechoslovak case, so ill-defined and ambiguous that one could more or less call it a global precedent. It would not be applied globally, because of the risk of nuclear war, and this was the restraining factor. Nowhere however was it stated that the doctrine applied within the area of a treaty organisation, nor did it require any consent by the country involved. It was a clear instrument not of Soviet hegemony, which had existed for many years in a variety of forms, but of complete freedom of action on the territory of foreign states, despite the existence of legal authority in those states, the identity of the states concerned being very imprecise.

With regard to our future course of action, all the views expressed so far had fallen somewhere between the two extremes of (a) disregard the incident and carry on as if nothing has happened, and (b) revert to a full cold war posture. The problem obviously was where to strike the balance. He felt that to adopt the first extreme could well have precisely the opposite effect to that intended: besides giving the green light to the new doctrine, unilateral pursuit of détente by the West might make matters worse by softening up relations within the blocs even further and thus giving rise to more situations of the Czechoslovak type. On the other hand adopting a cold war posture would probably also lead to a deterioration of the situation. Deterrence was not a means of preventing the situation from getting worse: it was a necessary evil perhaps, but still an evil, and its consequences were evil because it led to an arms race and thereby heightened tension. The only sure way to prevent war was to build peace, to create such interdependence and vested interest in peace (as had been created between France and Germany, for example) that any deterioration of relations, let alone war, would be a serious impairment of established interest on both sides.

A middle of the way solution would mean keeping open avenues to détente, trying to improve relations of all kinds within Europe, but at the same time making clear that there must be not formal assurances but a genuine re-establishment of a sense of security in Europe. Repeal of the new doctrine would not necessarily be enough in itself; on the other hand so long as it remained valid it would hardly be possible to renew the effort of détente, although it need not prevent a general improvement of relations. The question remained that there were a number of countries belonging to neither political organisations nor blocs in Europe, and had a particular position represented in Dr. Birnbaum's fourth constellation (European). Irrespective of their existence, however, he did not consider the idea of détente between the blocs a workable proposition. Since it would mean trying to dismantle the very foundation of the bloc existence, it would necessarily cause a new deterioration of the situation, as he had indicated. The situation within Czechoslovakia would soon be more or less as it was before January this year, but with the presence of Soviet troops. The point was that whereas the USSR was previously in a position to have its way in Czechoslovakia without a military presence, it now insisted on this. If there were not sufficient in-built cohesion able to support at least acquiescence in being part of the bloc, if the détente created sufficient

sense of security to permit a desire for more independence, then the USSR would put troops into a country to maintain the discipline which was no longer based on the degree of tension between the blocs. Thus unless the softening up of inter-bloc relations were acceptable to both central powers, there could be no loosening of blocs without inviting the USSR to use more force on her partners: there was no talk of the United States occupying France because of her withdrawal from the military side of NATO.

Continuing the general debate after lunch, a speaker from Eastern Europe said that the existence of groups of states of different political, economic and social structures neither prevented nor limited the development of all kinds of co-operation between them, as was made clear by the development of political contacts, the cultural exchanges, the exchange of economic means and contacts and the increased scientific and technical co-operation already achieved within Europe. Since these groups constituted the two opposing military and political camps which based their security on the existing balance of power, it would seem an important condition for bringing about a favourable political atmosphere for the expansion of this co-operation if the present political and territorial map of Europe were accepted as a starting-point for East-West co-operation. He emphasized this point in relation to his own country's attitude towards European co-operation for two reasons: first, territorial claims were outstanding against his own state from the Federal Republic (despite the observations made by participants in the discussions this was still the formal position of the West German Government); secondly, in the face of the present political realities in Europe, the security of his country as a member of one of the opposing military camps was connected with the preservation of the existing balance, including also the existing political and territorial pattern. The understanding and observance of these conditions by the West European partners was the most essential factor for ensuring the further expansion of co-operation.

A West European participant saw a rather artificial distinction drawn between deterrence and détente. We did not have to choose between the two. On the contrary, whatever people's feelings, détente was continuing. The invasion of Czechoslovakia affected not the <u>fact</u> of détente but its <u>content</u>. It was continuing obviously in Soviet-American realtions on the strategic level, also perhaps in some demarcation of interest between the two powers. The difficulty was that in the past we had assumed that because the Soviet-American détente appeared to be fairly well established each super power was prepared to pay a certain price in terms of its relations with its European allies; in recent weeks, however, it seemed that the USSR was no longer prepared to pay this price. /Another Western participant argued that this would not be détente but strategic accommodation on the super-power level. It would be a purely negative enterprise. Détente meant either arriving at solutions or agreeing on non-solutions, which was a way of solving problems too./

This did not mean that measures of co-operation and understanding and bilateral relationships were ruled out. It was interesting that 'Pravda' attacked Yugoslavia for her relations with the Federal Republic, but did not attack Poland, or the GDR which enjoyed a higher degree of relations with the Federal Republic than any other country: this was because the political context was different. The important thing therefore was to define the political context in these relations. It would be impossible for states in Eastern Europe to pursue bilateral or multilateral relations with the Western states and find that their relations with each other were not affected.

The question was whether, and in what manner or to what extent, we wished to change the relations of these countries to our advantage, or whether we wished to try to establish a continuing loosening and flexibility of relations which would produce political crises, but which would with an evidence of lack of exploitation on our part not produce the kind of action taken in Czechoslovakia. It remained to be seen whether this latter course would be possible.

Turning to Dr. Birnbaum's argument on the German question, he suggested that the day when it would be necessary for the Federal Republic to decide whether to recognise the GDR had been brought closer by the events in Czechoslovakia. Since the USSR was clearly insisting on a pre-definition of the German role in Europe before allowing the wider process of détente to gather pace, it would be better for the Federal Republic not to persist in trying to keep all the options open. It was most unfortunate that the notion of peaceful engagement as a programme for winning away the East European countries from their closer relations with the USSR should have been part of official American policy at the same time as the German Ostpolitik developed to the point that it had. It was a combined threat in the mind of the USSR, because both approaches were opening up the question in a wider sense precisely when the USSR was trying to define it in a narrower sense, i.e. the role of the two Germanies. Therefore a formal recognition of the GDR would not be regarded as an aggressive act. Indeed, since the Russians had not tailored their policies to react to such a move it would most likely cause stupefaction. /An East European participant demurred: the Socialist states had always spoken of recognition of the GDR as a pre-condition./

With regard to the idea of the USSR using West Germany as a whipping boy, the question was posed whether the USSR seriously believed the fear of Germany to be an integrating force among the East European countries, or whether this aroused just enough response in Eastern Europe to be workable as an integrating force. Did the USSR miscalculate the strength of anti-German sentiment in the Socialist Commonwealth? The other aspect of the whipping boy theory was that since West Germany stood to gain most from détente, if the USSR were opposed to any change in the status quo her first aim must be to discourage Germany from pursuing détente. Was this the point of the demand that the Federal Republic must <u>from the beginning</u> formally recognise the Oder-Neisser line and the GDR? However, the West European attitude towards Germany was no less relevant so far as recognition was concerned: West German policy had been changing during the past two years of détente because of the element of hope that an atmosphere of co-operation could be created across the iron curtain; now that this element of hope had gone, a framework of West European support was required to provide a new element if Germany were to take the steps many of her friends were urging on her.

Another participant commented that the USSR had increased its antipathy towards West Germany during the period of détente, while it had been relatively well disposed towards the Federal Republic during periods of tension (there was some preliminary diplomatic exchange just after the Berlin wall, for instance). If the USSR had now embarked on a programme of showing who was boss in East Europe, would it be capable of combining this with a new approach towards the Federal Republic if it so desired?

It was further argued that the anti-German element was likely to be dropped only if the USSR succeeded in consolidating its relationship with its allies. The speaker did not find the idea of a 'Socialist Commonwealth' outrageous - most people in history lived under imperial or semi-imperial systems. The point of interest to his mind was whether the present system in the East would gradually disintegrate under the pressure of the periodic internal political crises which were inevitable in the Communist countries, principally because they had not yet devised a legitimate form of transfer of power, or whether it could assume new forms and generate genuine inter-dependence among its members. Especially in the West, dissolution of both

alliance systems was widely considered synonymous with détente. But whereas in Western Europe other forms of co-operation, including a degree of supranational organisation, were established, in Eastern Europe the only bonds were ideological and military, and the ideological bond had perceptibly weakened. To his mind, the fact that the Russians had used force and persuaded other members of the system to help them indicated their serious intention of trying to develop their system further.

The conditioning factor was the pace and the strength of the revisionist movement in the Soviet Union itself. The Czechs outran it and were crushed, as the Hungarians had been before them. Although Soviet society was at present dominated by bureaucratic conservatism, the revisionary forces were quite strong, we could expect revisionist revivals and even a major political crisis leading to considerable liberalisation of the régime (i.e. a revolution of the 1830 type). Moreover the USSR would have to work to increase its ties with Eastern Europe - and especially with the three most important countries, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland. If we assumed that, albeit rather slowly, revisionism did make progress in the USSR, we could well see the establishment of a common market-type organisation or a free trade zone in preparation for greater political integration and interdependence, in the sense that economic structures always accorded with a certain political perspective.

Another speaker saw a general conspiracy inspired by a variety of motives to keep very cool about what was happening in Czechoslovakia: by the US which did not wish the bilateral relationship and balance with the USSR to be upset, and there was some British convergence with this idea, by many European governments (not only Western) who were clinging to their aspirations of a new European system, and by all those who were in general in favour of détente and international understanding. We were in danger of talking ourselves into a consensus and confusing it with reality. As already stated, all the speakers had adopted a position between a cold war and a pro-détente posture. But it was obvious that the way to Moscow via Eastern Europe had been blocked. Any sort of solution beyond the present situation could only be reached by the direct way to Moscow. But nobody wanted to take this road, because we expected to meet with a clear-cut no, which would force us to draw the consequences from the Czech event which we were trying to avoid. Looking ahead, however, if we were faced with a stabilised, continuing, monolithic and imperial system it was quite inevitable that consequences of some kind would be drawn, in the US and in Western European opinion generally. At a certain stage, détente would come into conflict both with the interests of an imperial bloc and with the vested interest in their own closer unity of the West Europeans, and both sides would have to make a choice.

He disagreed with the previous speaker on two points. First, he saw no justification for assuming a political consequence from liberalisation in the Soviet system. Secondly, even if this were the case, it would not affect the basic military and political facts of an imperial structure in the East. Action to create a closer imperial structure in the East was strongly incompatible with preventing some sort of response in favour of closer unity in Western Europe.

On the point about the ways to Moscow, it was suggested that while the East European countries clearly could deal with the West by permission of Moscow, for West Germany the road to East Europe lay not through Moscow but through Pankow, and until the Federal Republic recognised the GDR there would be no way for it to treat with East Europe without provoking further crises. The speaker was not advocating an immediate recognition, but the time-frame was shorter than some of us would assume.

A West German participant stressed the complexity of the issue of recognition. First, a distinction should be drawn between recognition in the sense of acquiescing in the partition of Germany without any prospect of overcoming this situation, which he considered neither possible on constitutional grounds (the Basic Law would prevent it) nor credible politically, and recognition regarded as a means of improving the situation in Central Europe and between the two parts of Germany. Secondly, supposing that Bonn were to recognise the GDR and simultaneously declare that this had been done in order to improve the situation in Central Europe and foster closer links between the two German states, Soviet resistance would have to be envisaged. Moreover a whole series of related problems would arise: the question of simultaneous recognition of the GDR by the three Western powers, the question of the existing rights of all four powers in Germany, the status of West Berlin, which if the present status were maintained would involve the question of civilian access to West Berlin.

A participant from South-Eastern Europe warned against viewing Soviet policy in Europe as concerned with the situation in Europe alone rather than in relation to the global strategy of the USSR as a super power. The American reaction to the Czech crisis just referred to indicated how important the possibilities of agreement between them on the global level were to both super powers.

He fully agreed that the internal situation in the USSR was a conditioning factor for developments in Eastern Europe. But while there had been some very important developments in the USSR on the economic level, politically he saw a stabilisation of neo-Stalinist forces. Thinking about the Socialist Commonwealth idea, it was far from clear yet what form it might take: it might lead to a federation, or a confederation, or the territorial enlargement of the USSR; he doubted, however, whether it would fulfill the British notion of a means towards giving independence to parts of an Empire.

A previous speaker objected that the Soviet system was not Stalinist, it was a collective bureaucratic leadership. The situation was not very stable: there could be a sudden crisis leading either to a more liberalised system or to the emergence of another Khrushchev - who was a Stalinist but who nevertheless made the greatest step in the direction of anti-Stalinism. A second South-East European speaker considered a change of Soviet leadership not improbable. Although he did not anticipate this in the near future, the pattern of Khrushchev's fall could repeat itself.

In regard to the point that we should not view events in Europe in isolation, it was suggested that the position adopted by India and Egypt in the Security Council must have been a considerable disappointment to those who believed there could be a non-aligned grouping that could survive blocs. Another speaker maintained, however, that the non-aligned countries lacked the inner unity and the political, military or economic importance to exert a dominant influence on East or West. Developments between the blocs would depend much more on developments within each of them.

The speaker in favour of bloc to bloc détente felt that the criticism of this idea did not dispose of the argument. To promote the movement we wanted, a change of climate was necessary. But unless this proceeded on a bloc to bloc basis and primarily between the leaders of the two blocs, any endeavour to promote fluidity would be interpreted as an attempt to change the existing balance of power, and the outcome could well be another Czech affair. It was highly important not to move too quickly towards a change of the balance of power.

Secondly, in the absence of a change of climate, he was not happy about the idea of moral deterrence applied to the Soviet bloc. The issues at stake in Czechoslovakia were familiar to Moscow: Sik had been trying to do no more than some people in the USSR. For a long time to come, an attempt by East or West to influence each other from the ideological point of view

might produce a dangerous situation. The West must accept the fact that the USSR was not prepared to pay the same price as the US where multilateral tendencies within the blocs was concerned; this may mean acquiescing in actions to establish her position in her own bloc. This was important from the point of view of what was the status quo. He would define it as the existence of the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO countries and some non-aligned countries which should be kept non-aligned. But did it mean an unresolved situation between countries who once belonged to one ideological sphere but withdrew from it? In the latter case, any Western move which could be interpreted as a roll-back policy would be very dangerous indeed.

A West German speaker pursued the question of the status quo, recalling the point made earlier that the importance of the ideological change was that it prevented a qualitative change in the status quo. There were three kinds: the territorial status quo; the existence of two zones of influence (whatever they may be called); the ideological status quo. Speaking as a German, he would say that none of us would be interested in a change of the territorial status quo. The existence of the two zones of influence was also generally accepted - there would be no attempt to upset some kind of Soviet influence in the Eastern part of Europe. What the West would like to change was the ideological status quo, particularly the confrontation between the two spheres in Europe. The West Germans had a special interest in a change of this kind, for two reasons: first, because so long as the confrontation persisted in Europe the two parts of the German nation could not come together in any way; secondly, because of the very dangerous situation in West Berlin. The answer to the question whether détente was possible and whether it would continue depended on whether or not the ideological confrontation in Europe would continue. He would not expect it to be abandoned; it could however be lowered. In his judgement, the meaning of the Czech crisis was that the confrontation had been strengthened. And as had already been said, it was entirely up to the Soviet leadership whether this state of affairs continued.

This led back to the question whether the USSR had put a moratorium on progress in the field of European security until the socialist camp had taken the shape prescribed by the Soviet Union. To what extent did the new doctrine imply a Soviet will to impose one mould on the whole socialist camp again? Did the attack on Yugoslavia for having too great a proportion of trade with the West mean that the Soviet Union would ask all its partners to have no more than a certain percentage of trade with the West? Would it mean an end to private agriculture in Poland, and end to small private enterprise in the GDR, an end to Western mass tourism in Bulgaria, for instance? How much field of manoeuvre did the East European representatives feel that they now had for bilateral or multilateral co-operation?

One participant felt that notwithstanding the Soviet repression of Czechoslovakia for going too far and too fast, the extent to which the USSR had already been obliged to come to terms with different policies on the part of Albania and Yugoslavia, and to some extent Rumania, showed how strong the pluralistic forces were. How far did the East European representatives feel that the USSR would be able to resist their desire for more latitude vis-à-vis relations with Western Europe?

It was further argued that from the point of view of how to treat the Russians, the West might be wrong in assuming continuity in Soviet policy in relation to the Czech affair, i.e. might not the forces of revision in the USSR be part of the target attacked in Czechoslovakia?

The speaker from South-Eastern Europe said that in referring to the limitations of bloc to bloc détente he did not mean there was no possibility of improving relations between blocs; he meant that détente in the sense of the French tripartite model was impossible between blocs, and from this point of view he preferred the third (Gaullist) to the fourth (European) constellation. There was a clear alternative in this respect. The events in Czechoslovakia

only emphasised the lack of symmetry between the two blocs, of which we must draw the consequences. Moreover the global relationship between the super powers was not part of the relationship of the two European blocs: super-power relations were not a solution for alleviating the situation in Europe. He reiterated that a prerequisite for détente was the readiness of the USSR to accept the consequences of détente upon the relationship within the bloc resulting from a decrease in inter-bloc tension. But this required essentially a change of atmosphere rather than formal declarations. He would not ask for repeal of the Socialist Commonwealth doctrine: if there were a real change in the atmosphere the doctrine could simply be forgotten.

He agreed that some of the non-aligned countries were party to the conspiracy of playing down what had happened. He personally believed that the attacks levelled at his own country were aimed primarily at the West, to indicate that the USSR was so firmly opposed to any kind of private dealings not cleared with Moscow, above all deals with West Germany, that even in the case of a non-aligned country resentment would be aroused. But this did not mean that the countries of the CMEA would be prohibited from making contacts with West European countries. What would be intolerable was <u>independent</u> action. All the other CMEA countries had better economic relations with West Germany than Czechoslovakia, and only Czechoslovakia did not have credits. He agreed that the road to the East European countries was via Moscow: so long as the firm control persisted, progress would be impossible without first getting clearance from Moscow. What the Russians allowed, would go forward.

An East European participant deprecated the tone of some interventions. He saw no cause for perplexity or mistrust. Whatever the precise terminology used in relation to the Socialist community of nations, imperialism was one of the most rejected notions in those countries and the East European people in no sense considered themselves members of such a system. Several speakers had mentioned a great change in socialist doctrine; but in his own country there was no talk of change. He did not consider this a matter of major importance. Certainly it was going much too far to envisage the Socialist system developing into a federation or a real empire.

Various questions had been posed about the possibilities for expanding trade and tourism etc. with the West. There were no limits to the expansion of economic or cultural co-operation. One of the main aims of the new economic management in his own country which made it possible to trade with individual enterprises was precisely in order to promote trade relations with all countries. Pressed as to how far the progress of economic reform was dependent on Soviet approval, the speaker said he had found nothing of Soviet interference in his country. The difficulty in the way of a faster expansion of trade with other countries was a shortage of trained people. He could not accept the idea that what the Russians allowed would go forward.

This argument was endorsed by a second East European participant. So far as his own country's economic development was concerned, they took their own decisions. Nor was it a question of Moscow's permission in regard to their good contacts with West European countries, especially by way of trade, but rather of their <u>special responsibility</u> towards other countries in their camp. He found the discussion too emotional: we should do better to concentrate on the future of European security, in particular on the possibilities for concrete steps in this field. We had been talking about disengagement in Europe for eleven years; one cause of the rising tension was that we did nothing to put any of our plans into effect.

A speaker from South-Eastern Europe maintained that the events in Czechoslovakia were far too recent for objective analysis or judgement. The most important thing was to seek the road towards European security and co-operation and détente. This did not lie through a military or ideological rapprochement; any policy of blocs or camps or strengthening camps did harm, because it was not in the general interest of Europe as a whole. The interest of all our countries in co-operation was very clear and contacts had been developing steadily. There may have been some deterioration of the political climate; on the other hand statistics proved that despite the events in Czechoslovakia there had been no lessening of exchanges - economic, commercial, cultural and political - between East and West European countries. And only by encouraging such exchanges could we develop the mutual confidence and common interests and the systematic search for areas of common agreement which could lead us to the goal of European security.

Welcoming the assurances about further East-West co-operation given by the East European representatives, Dr. Birnbaum said he accepted their sincerity given the situation that the interests of those countries were not identical with those of the Soviet Union. The question still remained in his mind, however, of the leeway the USSR would be willing to acquiesce in. He identified three main criteria: the first, but not the most important, was trade. He believed a fair percentage of trade would be acceptable to the USSR. Second, the possibility for independent relations. He personally agreed that only bloc to bloc relations were on the cards for the time being and we should address ourselves to these. Third, the level of revisionism in Moscow itself. There were a number of difficulties in assessing this factor - for example, how could the West get at the true state of affairs in the USSR? Moreover as had already been stated, there was no automatic link between economic reform and political change. He did feel however, that this was the forum in which such questions should be considered, rather than between representatives of the super powers.

One point which he would like to hear discussed further was the Soviet motivation for sanctifying their practice with a doctrine. Was it to create a global precedent, which would be an offensive interpretation, raising the spectre of further Soviet intervention, or did it simply reflect the need felt in Moscow to rationalize a performance generally considered objectionable by the rest of the world, which would be a less aggressive interpretation?

It was further argued that the basic problem posed early in the debate had not been resolved. We had been urged to build vested interests in peace. This was another way of putting 'peaceful engagement' and what another speaker meant by avoiding purely military and ideological rapprochement and developing common interests. But this was precisely what had led to the trouble we were in now. Developing vested interests meant developing an awareness that we all had a common culture. It meant the development of ideas considered revolutionary in the West and counter-revolutionary in the East. It meant trade. The Czechs were not alone in discovering that in order to trade effectively with the West a country must radically adjust its economic mechanism. All this could be seen by certain influential people in East Europe as a counter-revolutionary threat to the Socialist Commonwealth. It was not suggested at all that if the East European countries wished to increase their trade with the West they would have to seek Moscow's permission. The concern was rather that the Czech crisis showed that if the process of building vested interests went on, it was likely to be seen in Moscow as a threat to socialism and perhaps to lead to something like the invasion of Czechoslovakia to repress it.

Another speaker considered the interdependence between the kind of system and the latitude for trade particularly important in the Czech case, because for them the attempt to pursue détente any further would mean their economy coming to an end. To talk about opportunities for increasing trade was meaningless if the development of the economy reached the point where a different kind of mechanism was required and this were forbidden for political reasons.

Recalling the reference to the emotional tone of the debate, another Western representative considered it fairly relaxed, taking place as it did against the background of an invasion that was a shattering blow to the expectations of one nation and the hopes of many others. We should indeed look to the future. But the future was conditioned by the present. It was important to understand why the Czech affair had a deep moral impact in the West. The Western representatives present here were mindful of political realities. In terms of public opinion, however, it cut very deep and the mood was reminiscent of 1956 or 1961. The Western concern was not with the terminology of the new doctrine but with its content. The content was, first, that proletarian internationalism entitled a number of countries to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, of which the only definition given was that they ought to be 'Socialist'; it was the vagueness that caused apprehension. Secondly, this proletarian internationaliam established a claim to the right of intervention. One particularly heinous aspect was that it made it possible for the USSR to pressure some small allies into the perpetration of the act. We were worried because in the week of the proclamation of the doctrine we were getting a whole series of explanations that there must be normalisation in the Eastern camp before anything could be done in the field of inter-bloc affairs. But there was no logic in postulating the consolidation of one bloc and in the same breath condemning the efforts to consolidate the other bloc (stating that the primary duty of the Socialist countries was to build up a hard core of power and attacking the imperialists for doing precisely this).

Were the East European representatives able to say what options they thought the new doctrine left to them and to the West? Of course trade and contacts would continue and increase. But this was not détente, it was the normal intercourse without political consequences such as continued even during the cold war. Détente meant co-operation, and this presupposed two things: first, certain adjustments in our respective economic mechanisms. The Yugoslavs could talk about co-operation because they had made it possible for single firms to invest in their country. /In reply to the interpolation that Poland was co-operating with West Germany in enterprises in Africa, it was stated that the essential difference was the possibility for Western capital investment in Yugoslavia./ The second prerequisite was the willingness on both sides to expose one's system to the other system and to the test of reality and profit and functioning. Did the new doctrine mean that the USSR would not permit for the foreseeable future the exposure of its system to infectious ideas from the West?

It was impossible to rest any guess for the future on anything more than intellectual assumptions until we saw Soviet intentions in Czechoslovakia more clearly. Reviewing the possible directions developments could take, the most pessimistic was that the Soviet Union would take full control, impose a military régime to be sure their wishes were carried out to the letter. This could not be excluded. A second possibility was that the Russians would put so much pressure on the present Czech leadership that it would either split up under the strain or conform; this may well be happening at the moment. A third was that the Russians would organise an old-line opposition to the reformist leadership. The most optimistic assessment would be that the Russians would declare that now they had achieved what had been their aim since February this year, the stationing of Soviet troops on Czech territory, whatever the Czechs did behind that military screen was their own affair. For a while he had thought this would happen. But if this was the Soviet intention, why formulate a doctrine which countervailed this?

An East European participant said that in regard to the decision of the Warsaw Pact states to intervene in Czechoslovakia, they felt that this decision just had to be taken in pursuance of the article which stated that the Warsaw Pact countries were on the side of a brother country in a case where certain essential and vital interests were concerned and endangered. They considered this a vital case because the cause of socialism was in danger.

Coming back to Dr. Birnbaum's question about the interpretation of the new doctrine a West European participant said the Socialist camp had always rested on two pillars, the doctrinal and the imperial. At the end of the Fifties, when the conference of 82 leading Communist Parties was held and the decision was announced by Moscow that there was to be no primacy of leadership exerted by any one socialist country, the Soviet leadership felt able to give up reliance on the imperial pillar so far as theory was concerned. Khrushchev was a true believer, and thought that the church of communism would work on dogma alone. But it became apparent in the Sixties that the doctrinal pillar was not strong enough, that differences in aim and method were emerging, to the point where they felt obliged to shift their leadership back on to the imperial principle as well.

A speaker from Central Europe argued against over-estimating the importance of the new doctrine. He inclined towards the less aggressive interpretation of it as a justification for the intervention in Czechoslovakia. No doubt if it become politically important enough to them, the Soviet Union would do the same again, although we should not take this as axiomatic. The possibility would remain open; the doctrine itself did not make a great difference.

The previous speaker agreed that the doctrine made little difference in practice. It was however a very important indication that the gospel was not enough to ensure solidarity. And if the gospel did not work, the Soviet leadership had to put greater reliance on the imperialistic element. It was interesting that whereas Khrushchev had put co-existence at the top of his priority list his successors soon switched priority to support for wars of liberation: the priority always indicated the direction in which the leadership envisaged the rescue of parts of their empire.

Another speaker argued that we were missing the real problem. Détente was a state of mind. The real problem was to stabilise the situation in Europe by healing the wound left by the war. Was it better to leave things as they were, with the danger of the tonsion growing and perhaps coming out in a new war a generation hence, or to try to overcome the division of Europe and of Germany in a certain way? This had been the aim of his own Government's policy in recent years. Then we found that for internal reasons the USSR could not accept this reunification and believed that the best solution was the status quo -which was the wound. It was not a question of the West gaining some superiority or encroaching upon the East, but simply of healing the wound; now we had made another scar. It was a matter of balancing the difficulty of the change and the necessity for the change.

The German problem was part of a more general problem of h w to recreate Europe. By treating it in isolation our Eastern friends only increased the German danger. The social differences did not matter; countries as far apart as the USSR and Spain could co-exist. The question was how could we live in a more unified status and deal with the German problem in a Europe which would make a whole and allow for the reunification of Germany or at least the absorption of Germany into this European entity. The German problem was also a reason for saying let us move.

Another speaker saw the ideological division as the real obstacle to reunifying Europe (which incidentally had never been united). The problem was essentially one of legitimacy: in the West, legitimacy was conferred by consensus through elections; in the East, legitimacy was the existence of the

communist party itself. It had been said that communist ideology was weakening. But among the many motives for the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, the fundamental one was that Czechoslovakia was putting in question the absolute authority of the party. This authority had now been reasserted, at a cost. And there was considerable solidarity among the communist countries on this point.

It was not by chance, however, that Yugoslavia was moving in the direction of pluralism, not only dismantling economic centralisation but also reducing the supremacy of the party. In these communist societies, if the process of modernisation and industrialisation were successful, the point was reached when a certain diminution of the role of the state and the central control of the party was required. Was this in prospect in the USSR? If so, many forms of rapprochement would be possible. If not, good relations would be possible only within a limited sector, i.e. trade, although this too would be limited by the pace of economic revisionism in the East. /It was suggested by a South-East European participant that the problem did not arise primarily from the political character of the state but from the desire to retain political control./

In regard to the motivation for the intervention in Czechoslovakia it was argued that the doctrine of the sanctity and the monolithic character of a particular communist party applied only so long as that party followed the Moscow line; otherwise all manner of means of subverting its leadership were employed by Moscow. Subversion of the Yugoslav party had been attempted in 1968; it was being attempted vis-à-vis the Czechoslovak party now. If the doctrine of the sanctity of the party were decisive, there would be a possibility for co-existence and co-operation with a difference. But the difference was not permitted: the Soviet interpretation of internationalism always in fact meant that there was one leadership and the other parties were part of a monolithic world-wide movement.

The speaker's concern about the new doctrine not only related to its vagueness; it marked a fundamental departure by the USSR from the accepted principles of international law which it had hitherto been careful to support in theory even if it did not always observe them in practice. The USSR adhered to the UN and its agencies. When the Chinese Communist Party came forward with the theory of a world-wide class struggle there was very considerable opposition by the USSR, which stated that this theory was dangerous in the nuclear era and that there must be respect for states. But now something which had governed international relations had been thrown overboard. He added that he personally regretted the behaviour of the Czech leaders who accepted this, because it added to the complexity of the situation, although he also appreciated that any different behaviour would have put the whole situation into a different context.

Looking at the text of the 'Pravda' article, if any change of policy could be interpreted as opening the gates for NATO forces to come to the Soviet border this doctrine could be applied. The Czechs did not apply to join NATO. But the judgement was given that their behaviour was such as to cause concern that this might have happened - 'neutrality' would have pushed them into the den of the German revanchists. If this were to be the justification for invasion, it was not very reassuring for other countries. Countries who took specific measures against this could not be blamed. This was not a question of emotion. He personally had not believed there would be an invasion of Czechoslovakia: there would be no wisdom in it, and he had said so in print. His worry was that while this had been done to strengthen the Soviet position in the world, it had if anything weakened it, politically at least, and this could constitute a new kind of need for repressing the opposition. As they had taken the wrong way of repressing it, their action could lead to further counter-productive results, thus still further increasing tension.

It was further suggested that the Soviet intervention was provoked by Dubcek having sinned both nationally and internationally against the rule of the heirarchical minority. Rumania, for example, had departed from orthodoxy in the international field, but not within the country. Dubcek however was not only not in consensus with Moscow internationally, by declaring that the party must adapt itself to the base instead of the base being shaped by the party he even deprived Moscow of the hope of saving the situation by regaining control of the party leadership through pressure or negotiation.

Asked whether he considered the visit to Czechoslovakia by Yugoslav and Rumanian leaders a significant factor in the Soviet decision, the previous speaker saw no sign that these visits played a decisive role in shaping Soviet policy. He believed the decision would have been taken anyway, on the basis of fundamentals, as had just been argued: the internal development went too far and too fast in certain reforms of the economic system and in its repercussions on the political system, and combined with the disobedience on the international level surpassed the limit of what Moscow was prepared to tolerate.

The further comment was made that Moscow was well aware what the Yugoslav position would be since Tito had visited Moscow at the end of April. Although there had been fear of armed intervention for some time before August, when it occurred Yugoslavia was as surprised as other countries; the prolonged political debate and the declarations of Cierna and Bratislava had been considered as making it less likely.

Saturday, 26th October

Invited to comment on his paper in the light of the previous day's general debate, Dr. Birnbaum suggested that discussion should centre on four main aspects. First, the short term: there seemed general agreement on the need for a pause, a period of consolidation. The question was, what could the West do during that period, and what would our Eastern friends encourage us to do? Were there any positive steps we could take, or should we just wait and do nothing? It had been suggested that the guiding factor in the immediate future would be the course of developments in the USSR, not only in the decision centres but in the wider context of Soviet society where the repercussions of the Czech crisis were by no means finished. We had yet to see how the crisis would influence the composition of forces in Soviet society at large and reflect on the centres of power in Moscow. Would this be generally agreed? The second aspect was the long term. His own view, set out in the paper, was that a viable American-West European relationship was a sine qua non for a more permanent arrangement with the Soviet Union in Europe. The third consideration was the transnational forces in the economic and technological field and their significance as an independent variable. The fourth aspect centred around the prospects for the alliances, whether the trend towards reassertion was a wholey unfavourable development.

To the suggestion to consider the short-term aspect first, it was argued that this would be determined by people's thinking about the long-term. For the immediate future, however, there was nothing to be done; the strong moral condemnation felt by the West, including Yugoslavia, would remain, and although the point may be reached when political trends would be resumed this would not imply approval for the Soviet action. Economic trends would probably simply continue along present paths. Greatest attention would be focussed on developments within the USSR. It was further suggested that the prospect of a new American Administration in January and the German election campaign later in 1969 were inhibiting factors on a quick unfreezing of the situation. The determining factor however was what happened in the East, as had been argued the previous day: there was no possibility of co-operation except in a climate of co-operation, and it was the East that had changed the climate.

Another speaker maintained that looking beyond the next six months, the Czech affair could not put a stop to attempts to overcome the confrontation pattern. He expected the West to resume consideration of means towards lowering the confrontation in the military field: was there any hope of reciprocity? The willingness in the West before the Czech crisis to do some thinning-out unilaterally had gone for the present at least. In this connection would not the German offer of renunciation of use of force agreements be worth discussing, particularly since it contained a certain element of recognition of the GDR? A third point for consideration might be the suggestion of an agreement on non-intervention mooted at the Geneva conference of the non-nuclear powers immediately following the Czech crisis.

Reflecting on the possibility of the US and USSR moving towards a more co-operative relationship as mentioned in the paper, another Western speaker suggested that the prospects for arms control agreements between them were well nigh frozen at the moment. This raised the question whether there should be a period of 'punishment' of the Soviet Union. Should the West welcome any agreement because it would lower the arms race, or would we see it as a super-power agreement over the heads of Europe?

Supporting this argument, a West European participant suggested that it may not be to the advantage of our friends in Eastern Europe if the West should fail to react. The Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia must have been preceded by prolonged weighing up of the advantages and disadvantages, including the reaction of the West as well as the repercussions on the other members of the Warsaw Pact. If it were revealed to the Soviet leadership that they could intervene without incurring any disadvantages, they would have the best of both worlds. Asked what he thought the Western reaction should be, he replied a freeze of relationships, in every sense of the word.

Expressing his concern about this advocacy of a return to an absolute cold war posture, albeit in a passive way, an East European participant maintained that it was in the interest of all our states, Western as well as Eastern, to discover ways and means of continuing détente. Freezing relationships would not help anybody, moreover it could lead to unforeseen conflicts. /Western speakers insisted however that it was just not possible to act as if nothing had happened: the East could not have it both ways./

A South-Eastern European participant said it would be a mistake to treat the Czech affair as concluded. It was still happening. Therefore in the short term we had to expect developments in Czechoslovakia. He did not think the present situation, with which clearly both the Czech and the Soviet leaders were dissatisfied, could last too long. We were watching the unfolding of a drama. We had seen one point of climax, the night of August 20-21, but this only inaugurated a new chapter. Nobody could do more than guess at the situation at the end of the drama. When the situation stabilised in Czechoslovakia, as it must, our position would depend on the character of this stabilisation. The latest step in the process, the stationing of Soviet troops, was not an encouraging sign. Asked about the opportunity for 'audience participation', the speaker saw no possibility of the onlookers influencing the course of this drama. /The point was made that in democratic countries the audience could not be prevented from participating to some extent./

A Western participant wondered if there was anything the Western world, and the US in particular, could do to prevent any extension of the drama. Would an indication of greater military preparedness be helpful?

A further question was posed whether, given the general understanding that for the time being the West must acquiesce in the status quo and refrain from bilateral relations with the Eastern countries, there was any point in continuing talks among the ten countries of the Harmel group. Might not even such exchanges be interpreted by one side or the other as aimed at undermining the cohesion of the bloc?

A speaker from South-Eastern Europe said one lesson was that we must create a new framework for our efforts to develop a sense of Europe as a whole. The old concepts had failed. One of the first consequences of the new situation had been the greater emphasis on the military factor, reflected both in the reassertion of blocs and in the growing uneasiness of the non-aligned countries./ And it was noticeable that in the Western countries, the importance of involving the United States in European developments had come to the fore again, contrasting with the tendency previously to seek ways of acting independently of the super powers.

Speculating from the short to the medium term, a speaker from Western Europe thought that the moral condemnation would wear off, as it did after 1956; it may wear off more rapidly on this occasion because the intervention was not so bloody. But the East had done certain things. First, in carving out a doctrine of intervention in its own camp, it justified a mirror doctrine on the other side, thereby supporting American interventionism. Secondly, the action of the five countries had given a new lease of life to NATO. No-one was talking any more about the serious possibility of France withdrawing from the alliance altogether, or of other member countries breaking away. Indeed, some governments were expected to declare that they would not take advantage of the provision of the treaty allowing them to give notice of withdrawal for five or ten years to come. Thirdly, there was now a greater readiness to make whatever progress was possible with West European integration - there was no longer any suggestion not to move too far because the East Europeans might not be able to catch up.

Turning to the long-term aspect, Dr. Birnbaum specifically sought the reaction of the East European representatives to the framework within which he was trying to set out a conceptual East-West understanding in Europe. These elements were, first, that a reconciliation in Europe could not be expected without the participation of both super powers; secondly, that the USSR could not be expected to give up the aim of breaking the Bonn-Washington axis until American-West European relations were in far better shape than today. He would assume the repair of those relations to be also an East European interest. In the paper this was expressed as revitalisation of the Western alliance. This did not mean making NATO as such operate more efficiently, although he thought NATO would have to be the point of departure, but stressing the political rather than the military side of NATO. Within a revitalised Western alliance there could be a different West European military posture with less emphasis on nuclear deterrence, which he would personally consider necessary for a reconciliation. A change in the alliance posture would also make it possible for West Germany to adopt the more consistent and credible political posture and a distinctly non-provocative military posture which he had outlined the previous day. He stressed however that this was feasible only as part of a package agreement involving a different all-over military balance in Central Europe with nuclear deterrence in the hands of the super powers. The 700 MRBMs, for example, would have to be included in the package.

It was argued that in the context of deterrence the nuclear posture was <u>defensive</u>; this was what deterrence was all about. There was a case for a lower density of nuclear weapons in Europe; but the starting point should not be that Western military mechanisms were provocative. The speaker supported the argument for mutuality. It would be a very difficult equation, however.

A second speaker argued that we could nevertheless probably afford to make some alteration in our organisation to meet the East European concern; for example certain nuclear delivery vehicles (such as long-range strike aircraft) could be seen as more appropriate for an attack-type structure.

A participant from South-Eastern Europe did not consider this a useful approach. Weapons systems had not played a decisive part in shaping international relations since the way. Détente had come about without any material change in weaponry. What mattered from the Soviet standpoint was that NATO began to put more emphasis on its political aspects and less on its military aspects: there was a change of atmosphere.

A Western speaker did not fully agree that détente had nothing to do with weapons systems. It developed out of a balance of US and Soviet weapons systems, because the balance created a dialogue. However, with the temporary rearrangement of things in Europe, political things had become very important. The new status quo in the invasion of Czechoslovakia was relevant because it had changed the nature and degree of political interchange in Eastern Europe.

Dr. Birnbaum recalled the opinion expressed in his paper that "a durable peace on the European continent can hardly emerge from a relationship in which the credible threat to inflict unacceptable damage is the main basis for the feeling of security among great nations". Perhaps this was as far as we could agree on this aspect.

An East European participant came back to the suggestion of a treaty on the renunciation of the use of force - not just between the Federal Republic and the socialist countries but among all European countries, including the Soviet Union. The present situation was not favourable for steps towards the limitation and control of armaments. But we needed to find ways of improving the climate to make other steps possible. This treaty would be very suitable as a subject for discussion now, in preparation for proposals of a more long-term nature. Such a treaty had two aspects. First, it was a political and not a military measure. It affected neither the military nor the geographical status quo. It was a recognition of the status quo from the political point of view. It could improve the atmosphere between East and West European states by freeing them to a great extent from the fear of invasion by the other side, a fear which still persisted from the cold war and was used by some states for their own purposes. Secondly, it could constitute a first step on the road to overcoming the political and perhaps the military division of Europe and would be a good starting point for building European security. If future efforts could be directed towards combining an undertaking by the European states not to use force in international relations with a positive all-European obligation for the common defence of the peace and security of Europe and for the co-operation of states in this respect, this could be the foundation of a system of political security. Asked whether this first step should take place before West German recognition of the GDR or as part of a package deal, the speaker replied that the treaty was envisaged as the beginning of discussion: it would recognise the substance of the status quo in Europe.

A Western participant saw a non-use of force agreement as setting the seal on a development that had already taken place, not as an instrument to create an atmosphere that did not exist. Secondly, he was wary of the theory of first steps unless we knew in which direction the steps were supposed to lead. He was not opposed to such an agreement, but he did not see how it would help us forward. From the German point of view, there were two reasons for scepticism: first, Soviet adherence to such an agreement. If they broke pledges of non-intervention and non-use of force in the context of the Warsaw Pact to their allies, how could we be sure of their adhering to such an agreement vis-à-vis West Germany? Secondly, the problem of the enemy states clauses in the UN Charter which the USSR had repeatedly pointed to in recent diplomatic exchanges and which they obviously interpreted as giving them the right to interfere in Germany by force or by any other means even after a treaty were signed. The Federal Republic would not sign a non-use of force agreement unless this problem were dealt with. /In a brief exchange about the rights of the four powers as victors of the second world war the point was made that the Western powers had the same rights vis-à-vis the GDR as the Soviet Union had vis-à-vis the Federal Republic./

A second Western participant supported the previous speaker's argument. He also felt that a reunciation of force agreement would be of little use unless it were explicitly applied to the Socialist Commonwealth. The new doctrine would have to be explicitly rejected by the Soviet Union - not because any country in the West felt threatened by the USSR but because no country could know how far it could go in developing its relations with East Europe without invoking a Soviet reaction.

Another speaker from West Germany felt that a more positive response was called for. Of course such agreements would not change the situation; but they might improve the climate, and this was precisely the motivation of the Federal Republic in proposing non-use of force agreements to the USSR and the Eastern countries. Personally he was optimistic that the problem of the enemy state clauses could be got round if the four major powers could agree that action could only be taken against the Federal Republic by all four jointly. The real problem was whether recognition of the GDR should be a pre-condition. The Federal Republic's offer was envisaged as a temporary settlement of European problems to make a final solution of the German problem easier; we were now being asked to agree to a <u>permanent</u> solution of European problems prior to the conclusion of agreements that were designed to remove the apprehensions which were an obstacle to reaching a solution.

Pursuing the point raised about the Socialist Commonwealth doctrine, the question was posed to the East European speaker whether an intervention by members of one of the alliance systems against another member of that alliance would amount to a use of force according to the terms of such a treaty. Suppose that in certain circumstances the United States, Britain and Germany were to invade Norway: would this be a violation of the treaty?

With regard to the question of the non-use of force treaty as a first step towards a settlement of the German problem, the East European speaker was asked whether his proposal would make the conclusion of an agreement conditional on German acceptance of all Eastern demands for a Central European settlement, as the Russians had been doing in their diplomatic communications to Bonn; whether it was seen as an instrument for attaining a goal which we could not attain by other means; or whether it was seen as a means of improving the climate given that a final solution was not yet possible. He confirmed the third interpretation: in the present atmosphere in Europe, such a treaty was the only way to create a better climate for the future. And during the discussions we could see what further steps might be possible. /Asked what the likely response would be to a communication from the Federal Republic suggesting German-Polish talks on a non-use of force agreement, he said that he did not favour bilateral negotiations on this question which would exclude the Soviet Union; however, the Soviet Union would be able to reply, because the Soviet Union could also speak for Poland./ He envisaged discussions among all the European states: his idea related to the proposal for a European security conference which could lead to a treaty. He confirmed that he envisaged the treaty including non-aligned states, as well as the European members of the two alliances. With regard to the question of use of force between alliances or between states within an alliance, etc.; this was all a matter for discussion. The same applied to the question whether, if an agreement were binding on all signatories, this might not amount to a rejection of the Socialist Commonwealth doctrine.

A West European participant recalled his argument of the previous day about freezing as opposed to curing the situation. This proposal would freeze the situation. It was up to the Europeans themselves to <u>cure</u> the division of Europe and of Germany.

It was suggested that to much official opinion in Eastern Europe, freezing the situation was identified with curing it. The East European speaker demurred: freezing the status quo was the first step towards changing it - not in the sense of territories or states but in the sense of improved trade and cultural relations. It was the prevailing bad atmosphere that impeded better political relations.

It was argued from the Western side that the East European view did not necessarily stop at recognition of the status quo. It was felt that it would be partly a step towards curing the difficulties in the present situation (i.e. the inherent possibility of undesirable change, such as German reunification) to acknowledge the status quo and that this would then leave room for manoeuvre for subsequent changes which were at present blocked. This view deserved to be treated with some respect.

It was further suggested that in this sense a renunciation of the use of force agreement could be viewed as opening the door to curative forces which would continue working; these curative forces could well be the transnational forces referred to in the working paper. The East European speaker accepted this interpretation: the agreement would not be dependent on the settlement of outstanding problems, and the open questions which must be solved in order to bring stability in Europe could then be approached in a sense of security.

Welcoming this interpretation, a West German participant regretted that it was in contradiction to the Soviet attitude over the past eighteen months.

Turning to the transnational forces, Dr. Birnbaum recalled the earlier notion that while there may be little opportunity for movement on the political front, transnational forces operating in the economic and technological field could indirectly take care of these unsolved problems of the division of Europe. This was the convergence theory, the idea that similar patterns of production and consumption in East and West were likely to erode the concept of confrontation and thereby to create a different political environment as well. He put the question whether this theory was not liable for re-assessment.

A West European speaker said he expected the two social and economic systems to become more similar, although he doubted whether this would apply to the political systems; but if the convergence theory were true, how could we have had war in 1914? It was difficult to think of another period of history when a greater degree of convergence existed.

A South-East European participant considered comparisons with 1914 misleading. The general attitude towards war as a legitimate instrument of policy, and in the case of nuclear war as a practicable instrument of policy, had been transformed in the light of two world wars. Many other things had changed besides. He would rather view the situation from the standpoint of the evolution in the economic and political pattern in the Soviet Union and East European countries. Despite reservations about stalinism in this or that country, undeniably a serious and important change had taken place. Irrespective of the unfolding drama, we would be as wrong to extrapolate the existing negative trends into the future as we had been in the past in extrapolating positive trends ad infinitum. The elements which were forcing change on those societies were highly discrete and often conflicting, and the movement was bound to be erratic. However, he did not doubt that in the long run the liberalising course in the Soviet Union, upon which the application of the transnational forces depended, would be reinstituted. The problem was to overcome the sense of insecurity during the intervening period. The point about the convergence theory so far as the Eastern states were concerned was that the transnational forces should lead ultimately to the creation of a society in which armed conflict was as unthinkable as it was today among members of the Six in Western Europe.

A West European speaker endorsed this argument. The situation of 1914 had lessons, however: among the causes of that conflict situation was the impact of international developments in the field of international capitalism and international workers' organisation on the social structure of the various countries concerned and on the tensions within them. We faced a comparable situation today in that precisely the same kind of inter-penetration of cultures, the same kind of almost automatic developments in terms of economic change, and change in concepts of social organisation were in process; these were creating backlashes in certain places. There had been a Soviet backlash last summer. While he was optimistic over the long term, he did expect more backlashes and the situation to be temporarily made worse on occasion.

A second South-East European participant suggested that it was not enough to rely on the influence of these transnational forces: it must be combined with conscious political activity directed towards a programme taking into account the real aims and political realities of the world around us. Given that in real life there was more conflict than agreement, the concept of moral deterrence outlined the previous day was very important. We should try to institutionalise this, perhaps through strengthening the UN.

The question was raised from the Western side about the extent to which the communist party in the orthodox communist societies exerted a counterforce to the transnational forces. In modern society, party bureaucrats were parasites; their only justification lay in conducting vigilance campaigns which depended for their credibility on the threat of foreign devils at the gate. This counterforce would be very powerful so long as the Soviet and other elites did not change their concept of what the real function of the party ought to be - as the Yugoslavs had done and the Czechs were trying to do.

It was doubted whether any reconsideration of theoretical views in Eastern Europe would precede change. The realities of life would bring about the need for change, and with it many things would follow outside of the changes in the sense of more flexibility in economic relations which were being introduced already. /The speaker maintained his view in an exchange with a West European participant about the influence of Libermann's theories./ Of course strong forces resisting change existed within the communist parties; there were conflicting forces in any society; this was why the movement was bound to be erratic. He could not however accept the argument that the implementation of new ideas and new practices in the orthodox communist societies was made much harder by the need to rely for their implementation on a party apparatus that was in itself artificial and resisting change.

This argument was also contested by an East European speaker. The transnational diffusion of culture and technology was welcomed by all the socialist countries. It would be a great mistake to imagine that the party machinery in these countries was fossilised and regarded progressive measures as a threat to its own interests. Everything new and good and progressive was welcome. The one thing which was detested in all the socialist countries was doctrinairism. There had been a period when conservative forces were in the ascendant and put a brake on progress, but this was all over now.

The Western participant agreed that he had over-stated his case. But he felt that preaching the gospel of class warfare within a country and between the two systems must be inimical to convergence and the emergence of transnational forces.

Another Western speaker considered that more attention should be given to the likelihood of backlashes, which if one accepted the convergence theory could be regarded as the stuff of international politics. In regard to the argument about liberalisation in the communist societies, first of all he was not convinced of the necessary spill-over of economic decentralisation into the political field. He did not believe the Soviet Union saw it in these terms. Obviously they intended to take further steps of economic liberalisation. But their opposition to the Czechoslovak economic liberalisation was not because of its purely economic aspects but because it was linked with political trends which the Russians believed could be separated from economic liberalisation. Secondly he disagreed with his Western colleague about the communist party function. The party played a political role in a technical society. No society could be worked without politics of some kind. The men working for economic reform in the Soviet Union were not denying the legitimacy of the party leadership in party politics, they were working for broader scientific discussion of the issues involved before decisions were taken.

He warned against deceiving ourselves that convergence would in itself resolve international problems. We should concentrate on the problems rather than speculate about convergence.

This led to the fourth aspect mentioned by Dr. Birnbaum, the role of the alliances. Dr. Birnbaum recalled the point made in his paper, that there had been a reappraisal of both alliances although it had taken different forms; in the West it was more in the nature of a swing back. The question was whether this tendency was an inevitable consequence and enhances the rigidity of the confrontation in Europe, or whether some consensus might be reached about the changed role of alliances: could they be given specific functions in the field of arms reduction and crisis management in Central Europe which could lead them to stress not the rigidity but the possibility for co-operation?

A Western participant suggested that the proposal for renunciation of the use of force agreements might be relevant here: if such a European agreement could be guaranteed by all the members of the alliances, the alliances would then have a useful function in crisis management and in collective security.

A second speaker put various considerations about the machinery of crisis management. Crisis management by the alliances would be impossible, for the simple reason that unanimity except on the mildest of measures would never be reached among fifteen allies in a difficult political situation that was not really war. In the Cuban crisis, for instance, if the US had formally asked her allies to agree to the blockade of Cuba certain of them would never have agreed. It was the American decision which decided the issue. For this reason, the aim of crisis management should be to ensure a degree of co-ordination of views and policies. It was not possible to build up a crisis management emergency plan, a scenario in which a series of agreed decisions would be put in motion. But by considering the whole range of possible moves for a hypothetical crisis we should have a clearer idea of the implications and consequences of a particular measure. In a crisis, each nation would make its own decision, but in the light of what it knew of the opinion of its allies and also of what it knew of the situation. If such an exercise were made for crisis management, it might lead to a better understanding of what security means. It might lead as a byproduct to some understanding of a common policy. A European study of crisis management or security in Europe might lead to a better understanding between the East and West European nations, a better understanding of a political line which would be better than the sum of the national lines we had now.

Others saw the growing asymmetry in the alliances as an important factor. It was recalled that during the 1950's, Atlantic political structuring was at the core of all attempts to strengthen NATO. In the 1960's there was a shift towards all-European structuring. The speaker doubted whether there

would be a reversion to the concept of an Atlantic community: anything we may do now in considering whether NATO machinery or other overriding forms of co-operation were viable was intended to reassure ourselves that we stood on firm ground with respect to possible dangerous effects in the event of détente. We needed crisis management now; but the feeling that we have to find an all-European order would persist. With regard to the Warsaw Pact, however, revitalisation of their alliance was focussed essentially on their internal political structuring.

One speaker compared the Warsaw Pact to a series of concentric rings centred on the Soviet Union, with Poland and East Germany forming the hard core, Hungary/Tittle further out, Rumania on the edge except in the case of a sharp conflict with the other countries, and Czechoslovakia hardly counting at all from the military point of view.

A South-East European participant argued that the asymmetry arose in that the West European countries had succeeded in detaching themselves to a great extent from the world role of the United States, whereas this had not yet proved possible in the Warsaw Pact. The key consideration was whether something similar to the West European/American relationship could evolve in the East. This was made more important by the double character of the Soviet Union as a European and a world power having become more emphasised. As long as the USSR played a strategic role only in terms of her nuclear capability and had only a tactical capability in terms of conventional weapons this was not so evident. Now, however, having achieved parity in nuclear weapons as a super power, the USSR was building up her conventional capability for intervention in confrontation with American forces in different local theatres - particularly in the Mediterranean, for instance. This trend was not connected with the Czech events. It was initiated some ten years ago, when the naval construction programme and the reinforcement and development and expansion of various tactical forces was undertaken, when they reverted to new-look conventional forces having completed the basic foundations of their nuclear forces. We could not draw any direct conclusions. But there was no doubt that the world-wide role of the Soviet Union was on the increase and that adjustments for increasing this role were being made in the Soviet Union. Therefore only if it were possible to visualise to some extent intra-European developments separately from relations between the super powers on a global basis would it be possible to speak of any kind of constructive role for the two alliances for co-operation in Europe. If the very close attachment remained on the one side, the repercussions of the ups and downs of the global relationship would be felt in the European theatre.

He considered it very unlikely, therefore, that the alliances would be able to play a role in developing co-operation. They would play a role in bringing about the initial stages of it, through the fact of their existence, and even in the medium term, because a step forward would be possible only by actions that included the alliances. But it was going too far to expect a real degree of co-operation <u>through</u> alliances, any more than we could have crisis management by committee.

Other participants from Western Europe supported this argument. The point was also made that Yugoslavia was now of much greater interest to the alliances; hitherto the likely areas of conflict were the Eastern Mediterranean or Central Europe, but South-Eastern Europe now assumed far greater importance.

The discussion was then brought to a close, with the express hope that an opportunity might be found to continue this exchange between Eastern and Western European representatives more frequently than on an annual basis.

SECOND EAST - WEST MEETING

EUROPEAN STUDY COMMISSION

October 25/26, 1968

List of Participants

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Future problems of "European Security"

The impasse in East-West relations in Europe caused by the invasion of Czechoslovakia may serve as an occasion for reassessing some of the fundamental tenets about "European security" put forward in the course of recent years. In the given circumstances, the ambition of anybody concerned with these issues ought to be modest. The purpose of the present paper is limited to formulating, with the assistance of conference participants, the framework within which a continued search for new avenues to a more satisfactory European constellation may be fruitfully pursued. It is therefore an open ended excercice not only in terms of the envisaged immediate results of our common endeavours, but also with regard to the findings which may eventually be incorporated in a larger study on the same subject, in which the author is presently engaged.

What "European Security" is all about

The two years preceeding the crisis in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968 have been characterized by a significant escalation in official and academic discussions about "European security" both in the East and the West. The intensification of these debates was hardly due to a genuine concern about security in the sense of a serious fear of an impending aggression in any European country, either among governing elite groups or the population at large. (We disregard here the local conditions in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, where a mutual fear of aggression at times obviously prevailed.) Nevertheless, there was a great deal of talk about "European security" during these years, mainly because that has been the name of the game. The question then arises what is its essence? It would seem to be the search for new military and political arrangements, which began to appear at least conceivable in view of the general fluidity of the European situation, both in terms of intra-bloc relations and with regard to the over all East-West confrontation. What many of the proponents of "European security" were trying to achieve was ultimately a constellation different from the prevailing and more in accor-

dance with their specific aspirations. These aspirations have in some cases been overlapping, in others diametrically opposed to each other, but the differences were often - and sometimes intentionally - blurred by the fact that the programmes in question had been put forward in the name of "European security".

4 models

In order to clarify the issues, some of the general characteristics of four preferred constellations which are related to identifiable aspirations of the major powers operating in Europe are presented below (see Appendix) in a simplified fashion. Some of the proposed features or main concerns are clearly incompatible, others could be reconciled with each other. But all four constellations - the "Soviet" admittedly less so than the others - were predicated on the assumption of a continued fluidity in East-West as well as intra-bloc relations. With the invasion in Czechoslovakia it became definitely clear how much more Moscow is concerned about containing the erosion of its influence in Eastern Europe than about exploiting the opportunities opening up in Western Europe as a result of the continuing disintegration of the Western Alliance and the void in American leadership. The short term effect of recent events will probably be a decrease in East-West contact and cooperation and an abatement of the hopes for a peaceful transformation of conditions on the Continent in accordance with the wishes of the peoples most immediately concerned. In spite of these temporary set-backs in terms of East-West rapprochement the search for new European configurations is likely to continue in the West, although on a lower level of expectations. In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union will insist on and probably be able to enforce a period of "normalization". Future developments may very much depend on the emerging power constellation in the Politbureau and Central Committee of the CPSU as well as on the wider repercussions of the Czechoslovak crisis in Soviet society, the nature of which is not yet clearly discernable. It is hard for the present author to envisage how the Soviet leadership should be able to contain in the long run the dynamic forces within its own camp militating against a rigid confrontation in Central Europe without far more radical repressive measures amounting to the introduction of a semi-Stalinist regime. Alternatively, Moscow may after a period of consolidation, acquiesce in a cautious growth of contact and interdependence between the two parts of Europe. In that situation the

search for new European constellations would conceivably enter another round.

2. Crucial relationships and major issues in the search for new East-West constellations in Europe.

The following discussion of some basic issues confronting anybody who attempts to envisage a transformation of East-West relations in Europe is meant to be suggestive rather than exhaustive. Yet, to reach more definite conclusions on the prospects for a qualitatively different constellation on the Old Continent, it is desirable to identify the major "neuralgic" points and to arrive at some consensus on the minimum requirements with regard to these issues that ought to be fulfilled in order to permit the emergence of a political environement in which a new constellation would be conceivable. The assistance of conference participants in this excercice would therefore be specifically welcome.

It is generally agreed in the East as well as in the West - and indeed a commonplace - that the shape of a future Europe will be primarily determined by four main, highly interdependent relationships; (1) US-Soviet relations, (2) US-West European relations, (3) Soviet-East European relations and (4) relations between the two parts of Europe (including those between the Soviet Union and West Germany). It is far less obvious wh t the nature of these relations ought to be in order to promote a stable peace in Europe.

Most observers will probably argue that a Soviet-US détente, implying at least a continuation of the adversary/partner-relationship of recent years, is a necessary precondition. But is it sufficient? In the opinion of the present author it is not, mainly because of the role of nuclear deterrence in the American-West Europeań-Soviet constellation. Nuclear deterrence by its very nature is liable to impede rather than promote political change. In the European theater nuclear deterrence plays a crucial role in the military balance between the two alliances and any basic change in this relationship presupposes (1) a mutual willingness on the part of the superpowers to move beyond

deterrence and (2) a change in American-European relations which would allow a different military posture for the defence of Western Europe. This is not to imply that nuclear deterrence in Europe can be disposed of easily, nor that some residual elements of it would not for a long time perform an important stabilizing function. But a durable peace on the European Continent can hardly emerge from a relationship in which the credible threat to inflict unacceptible damage is the main basis for the feeling of security among great nations. It would seem therefore that an evolutionary political process aiming at East-West reconciliation in Europe will come to fruition only when the perception of the self-interest of the ruling elites in Washington and Moscow makes them inclined to cooperate in Europe beyond the goal of deterrence or of consolidating their respective spheres of influence.

There is no reason to believe that Soviet perceptions will develop in the proposed direction as long as American-West European relations remain in their present unresolved state, leaving open the possibility - however remote - of a virtual American disengagement from Europe, not only in terms of military presence, but also in terms of political commitments; Soviet hopes for the complete disintegration of the American-West European alliance will have to be demonstratively frustrated before the Soviet Union is likely to show any interest to cooperate with the Unites States in order to find a more generally acceptable modus vivendi in Europe. Nor is it realistic to expect Soviet acquiescence - not to speak of active participation - in all European cooperative schemes as long as any inclination to do so tends to erode Moscow's influence in Eastern Europe to an extent that the ruling Communist elites in Berlin, Warsaw and even in the Soviet capital itself consider their own power position to be jeopardized. Thus, some kind of "consolidation" in both US-West European and Soviet-East European relations is likely to be a necessary precondition for a less conservative Soviet attitude towards all-European cooperation, including a willingness to contemplate more far-reaching arrangements with the United States relating to Europe. Whereas different forms for a "consolidated relationship" between Western Europe and the United States have at least been defined conceptually and discussed among responsible

politicians - without, to be sure, so far producing a consensus - it is at present difficult to envisage a "consolidated relationship" in the East, except in terms of hegemonial Soviet rule over most of Eastern Europe. This is not a basis likely to elicit widespread enthusiasm for all-European ventures in any part of Europe West of the Bug-river. Is there any way out of this blind-alley? If at all it can only be found in the context of a basic reorientation of both Soviet-German and German-East European relations. For these crucial relations are not only closely linked with each other; they are also a major determinant of Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe.

No durable peaceful order in Europe is conceivable without a genuine reconciliation between the Soviet Union, Germany and the East European nations. But the Soviet Union cannot be expected to come to terms with Germany as long as

(1) Moscow can hope to derive tangible benefits from attempts to
   (a) isolate the Federal Republic in order to achieve greater leverage in Western Europe
   (b) manipulate the "German threat" vis à vis Eastern Europe in order to promote the cohesion and subservience within its own camp;

does not promote only ingot

(2) the Soviet leadership has reason to believe that a hostile Soviet-West-German relationship is the only reliable barrier to Western infiltration in Eastern Europe of a kind that would in the long run totally erode Moscow's power position along the Western periphery of the Soviet Union.

If this assessment is basically correct it would seem to lead to the following conclusions

(1) A viable American-West European relationship is a <u>sine qua non</u> for a more permanent arrangement with the Soviet Union in Europe. This Western combination would have to satisfy the basic security requirements of Western Europe and specifically those of the Federal Republic by emphazising America's willingness to undertake long term political commitments rather than trying to devise new military arrangements.

(2) The revitalisation of the Western alliance should allow the Federal Republic to adopt a fully credible, demonstratively non-provocative, politico-military posture without undue concern about the risk of Soviet black-mail, pressure or aggression. Such a posture would tend to eliminate both the residual credibility of Soviet claims about aggressive designs on the part of West Germany and the distinct reservations prevailing in Eastern Europe against acquiescing in any "solution" of the German question as long as credible West-German reassurances at least with regard to the unsettled border questions and the future German military potential are not forthcoming.

(3) One of the main goals of the revitalized Western alliance would be the reorientation and coordination of Western policy towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This should be undertaken with a view to promoting the emergence of an environment in which all-European cooperation could develop without causing undue Soviet fears about infiltration and "counterrevolution". The latter may very much sound like a prescription for the quadrature of the circle. Yet, some kind of compromise between these seemingly incompatible requirements would have to be found, if, as is the case with the present author, one attributes to current preceptions and priorities among the ruling elites in East and West a high degree of inertia.

3. Some discernable trends and their impact on the European situation

This last section of the paper is, even more than its previous parts, meant as an invitation to assist the author in his task of coming to grips with some of the realities and potentialities of the present situation in Europe. What may hopefully emerge from a discussion under this point is: (1) a preliminary identification of developments in the fields of politics, economics, science and technology and other related areas which are likely to be of major significance for the future conditions in Europe, specifically with regard to East-West relations. (2) Some consensus about the range of conceivable repercussions attributable to these developments. The three trends discussed briefly below which in

the author's opinion constitute dynamic elements in the present European situation have been chosen to illustrate the type of issues envisaged rather than to prescribe a framework for the process of identification.

1. Domestic upheaval and foreign policy. The United States and Western Europe as well as the Soviet Union and some of the East European countries have recently witnessed significant domestic upheaval. Without underestimating the differences in each of these cases with regard to context and motivation they seem to have had similar effects at least in so far as the governments and ruling elites were thereby induced to pay more attention to domestic issues. If it is justified to envisage a period of domestic preoccupation in a number of crucial countries in East and West, the question arises what the impact would be on foreign policy? Clearly, the developments are not likely to be symmetrical in East and West. Yet, it is arguable that such preoccupation tends to inhibit rather than inhance the freedom of action of governments necessary for a basic reorientation in foreign policy which is probably a precondition for a process of genuine European reconciliation. Alternatively, the point could be made that if domestic upheaval brings about a re-structuring of the official value system in a given society - such as seemed to be under way in Czechoslovakia earlier this year -, this may eventually result in a wider rather than narrower margin of choice in the field of foreign affairs.

2. Western European economic integration and East-West cooperation. While it is by now apparent that West European integration will not automatically "spill over" into the political field, the constraints and dynamism inherent in the trend make major reverses within the more limited area of economic, financial and trade policies increasingly unlikely. Thus, on purely economic grounds the question poses itself with increasing urgency what impact the EEC will have on East-West trade and on other forms of cooperation across ideological border lines in Europe. This is a complex issue, but two possible answers can at least be hinted at. On the one hand, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the EEC exercises a significant attraction on East European governments wishing to modernize their societies with the help of Western

capital and technological know-how. It can be argued, therefore, that far from being incompatible with East-West cooperation, Western European integration - at least as long as it is limited to the economic field - will be conducive to the promotion of better relations with Eastern Europe. One should not, on the other hand, overlook the fundamental differences between the eocnomic systems of East and West, which set distinct limits to the type of cooperation with the EEC which any East European country could for a foreseeable time envisage. Lacking a "market" in the Western sense of the word, these countries - even if one disregards for the moment political inhibitions - could neither form a sufficently coherent economic grouping, nor simply join a common market of the Western type. It is arguable therefore that the "attraction" of individual East-European countries to the EEC amounts to nothing more than a natural inclination of these countries to come to terms with a powerful economic combination in Western Europe whose existence and viability they can no longer disregard; that while the EEC is justifiable on many grounds which may rightly claim prime consideration, it is more of a liability than an asset in terms of the promotion of East-West cooperation. The conclusion would then be that if one wishes to mitigate these consequences of West European economic integration, alternative and subsidiary instruments for the promotion of East-West economic cooperation ought to be divised or stimulated in their present functions.

3. The changing role of military alliances in Europe. This again is a very wide subject area, where distinct differences in official positions have tended to inhibit an unprejudiced debate. The tragic events in Czechoslovakia may have a sobering effect on that debate in so far as they seem to indicate that, while the role of military alliances in Europe is definitely changing, they are likely to remain basic elements in any future East-West constellation in Europe. Is the inevitable consequence of this reassertion of WTO and NATO a continued and perhaps even more pronounced rigidity of the confrontation in Central Europe? Or is it conceivable that some consensus might eventually be achieved with regard to specific functions of each alliance - for example in the field of crisis management or arms regulations - which ought to be stimulated in order to promote at least the development of a less hostile politico-military environment in Central Europe?

Four preferred constellations

	1 (SOVIET)	2 (US)	3 (GAULLIST)	4 ("EUROPEAN")
Main features:	1. Stabilization in Central Europe through freezing and legalization of the present status quo.	1. Stabilization of the military environment in Central Europe through arms control arrangements and "political evolution".	1. Strengthening of independent Western Europe based on increased cooperation among Western European states and governments.	Gradual emergence of a durable system of peaceful order in Europe through détente, arms control agreements, promotion of mutual confidence, and systematic search for areas of coinciding interests.
	2. Elimination of significant weakening of U.S. commitment to Western Europe.	2. Emergence of a new viable U.S.-West European relationship based on a strengthened, politically unified Western Europe.	2. "Détente, Entente and Coopération in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals".	
Main aspirations and concerns:	1. Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe.	1. Less costly, more stable superpower confrontation in Europe.	1. Containment of Germany.	1. Transformation of present alliance systems into "European system" without jeopardizing basic security interests of West and East European states.
	2. Increased Soviet leverage in Western Europe, especially in the Federal Republic. or in France?	2. "Atlantic Community"	2. Liberation of Europe from superpower predominance.	2. All-European cooperation and some "solution" of the German problem.

Future problems of "European Security"

The impasse in East-West relations in Europe caused by the invasion of Czechoslovakia may serve as an occasion for reassessing some of the fundamental tenets about "European security" put forward in the course of recent years. In the given circumstances, the ambition of anybody concerned with these issues ought to be modest. The purpose of the present paper is limited to formulating, with the assistance of conference participants, the framework within which a continued search for new avenues to a more satisfactory European constellation may be fruitfully pursued. It is therefore an open ended exercice not only in terms of the envisaged immediate results of our common endeavours, but also with regard to the findings which may eventually be incorporated in a larger study on the same subject, in which the author is presently engaged.

What "European Security" is all about

The two years preceeding the crisis in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968 have been characterized by a significant escalation in official and academic discussions about "European security" both in the East and the West. The intensification of these debates was hardly due to a genuine concern about security in the sense of a serious fear of an impending aggression in any European country, either among governing elite groups or the population at large. (We disregard here the local conditions in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, where a mutual fear of aggression at times obviously prevailed.) Nevertheless, there was a great deal of talk about "European security" during these years, mainly because that has been the name of the game. The question then arises what is its essence? It would seem to be the search for new military and political arrangements, which began to appear at least conceivable in view of the general fluidity of the European situation, both in terms of intra-bloc relations and with regard to the over all East-West confrontation. What many of the proponents of "European security" were trying to achieve was ultimately a constellation different from the prevailing and more in accor-

dance with their specific aspirations. These aspirations have in some cases been overlapping, in others diametrically opposed to each other, but the differences were often - and sometimes intentionally - blurred by the fact that the programmes in question had been put forward in the name of "European security".

In order to clarify the issues, some of the general characteristics of four preferred constellations which are related to identifiable aspirations of the major powers operating in Europe are presented below (see Appendix) in a simplified fashion. Some of the proposed features or main concerns are clearly incompatible, others could be reconciled with each other. But all four constellations - the "Soviet" admittedly less so than the others - were predicated on the assumption of a continued fluidity in East-West as well as intra-bloc relations. With the invasion in Czechoslovakia it became definitely clear how much more Moscow is concerned about containing the erosion of its influence in Eastern Europe than about exploiting the opportunities opening up in Western Europe as a result of the continuing disintegration of the Western Alliance and the void in American leadership. The short term effect of recent events will probably be a decrease in East-West contact and cooperation and an abatement of the hopes for a peaceful transformation of conditions on the Continent in accordance with the wishes of the peoples most immediately concerned. In spite of these temporary set-backs in terms of East-West rapprochement the search for new European configurations is likely to continue in the West, although on a lower level of expectations. In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union will insist on and probably be able to enforce a period of "normalization". Future developments may very much depend on the emerging power constellation in the Politbureau and Central Committee of the CPSU as well as on the wider repercussions of the Czechoslovak crisis in Soviet society, the nature of which is not yet clearly discernable. It is hard for the present author to envisage how the Soviet leadership should be able to contain in the long run the dynamic forces within its own camp militating against a rigid confrontation in Central Europe without far more radical repressive measures amounting to the introduction of a semi-Stalinist regime. Alternatively, Moscow may after a period of consolidation, acquiesce in a cautious growth of contact and interdependence between the two parts of Europe. In that situation the

search for new European constellations would conceivably enter another round.

2. Crucial relationships and major issues in the search for new East-West constellations in Europe.

The following discussion of some basic issues confronting anybody who attempts to envisage a transformation of East-West relations in Europe is meant to be suggestive rather than exhaustive. Yet, to reach more definite conclusions on the prospects for a qualitatively different constellation on the Old Continent, it is desirable to identify the major "neuralgic" points and to arrive at some consensus on the minimum requirements with regard to these issues that ought to be fulfilled in order to permit the emergence of a political environement in which a new constellation would be conceivable. The assistance of conference participants in this excercice would therefore be specifically welcome.

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There is no reason to believe that Soviet perceptions will develop in the proposed direction as long as American-West European relations remain in their present unresolved state, leaving open the possibility - however remote - of a virtual American disengagement from Europe, not only in terms of military presence, but also in terms of political commitments; Soviet hopes for the complete disintegration of the American-West European alliance will have to be demonstratively frustrated before the Soviet Union is likely to show any interest to cooperate with the Unites States in order to find a more generally acceptable modus vivendi in Europe. Nor is it realistic to expect Soviet acquiescence - not to speak of active participation - in all European cooperative schemes as long as any inclination to do so tends to erode Moscow's influence in Eastern Europe to an extent that the ruling Communist elites in Berlin, Warsaw and even in the Soviet capital itself consider their own power position to be jeopardized. Thus, some kind of "consolidation" in both US-West European and Soviet-East European relations is likely to be a necessary precondition for a less conservative Soviet attitude towards all-European cooperation, including a willingness to contemplate more far-reaching arrangements with the United States relating to Europe. Whereas different forms for a "consolidated relationship" between Western Europe and the United States have at least been defined conceptually and discussed among responsible

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(2) The revitalisation of the Western alliance should allow the Federal Republic to adopt a fully credible, demonstratively non-provocative, politico-military posture without undue concern about the risk of Soviet black-mail, pressure or aggression. Such a posture would tend to eliminate both the residual credibility of Soviet claims about aggressive designs on the part of West Germany and the distinct reservations prevailing in Eastern Europe against acquiescing in any "solution" of the German question as long as credible West-German reassurances at least with regard to the unsettled border questions and the future German military potential are not forthcoming.

(3) One of the main goals of the revitalized Western alliance would be the reorientation and coordination of Western policy towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This should be undertaken with a view to promoting the emergence of an environment in which all-European cooperation could develop without causing undue Soviet fears about infiltration and "counterrevolution". The latter may very much sound like a prescription for the quadrature of the circle. Yet, some kind of compromise between these seemingly incompatible requirements would have to be found, if, as is the case with the present author, one attributes to current preceptions and priorities among the ruling elites in East and West a high degree of inertia.

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This last section of the paper is, even more than its previous parts, meant as an invitation to assist the author in his task of coming to grips with some of the realities and potentialities of the present situation in Europe. What may hopefully emerge from a discussion under this point is: (1) a preliminary identification of developments in the fields of politics, economics, science and technology and other related areas which are likely to be of major significance for the future conditions in Europe, specifically with regard to East-West relations. (2) Some consensus about the range of conceivable repercussions attributable to these developments. The three trends discussed briefly below which in

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1. Domestic upheaval and foreign policy. The United States and Western Europe as well as the Soviet Union and some of the East European countries have recently witnessed significant domestic upheaval. Without underestimating the differences in each of these cases with regard to context and motivation they seem to have had similar effects at least in so far as the governments and ruling elites were thereby induced to pay more attention to domestic issues. If it is justified to envisage a period of domestic preoccupation in a number of crucial countries in East and West, the question arises what the impact would be on foreign policy? Clearly, the developments are not likely to be symmetrical in East and West. Yet, it is arguable that such preoccupation tends to inhibit rather than inhance the freedom of action of governments necessary for a basic reorientation in foreign policy which is probably a precondition for a process of genuine European reconciliation. Alternatively, the point could be made that if domestic upheaval brings about a re-structuring of the official value system in a given society -- such as seemed to be under way in Czechoslovakia earlier this year -, this may eventually result in a wider rather than narrower margin of choice in the field of foreign affairs.

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	2. Increased Soviet leverage in Western Europe, especially in the Federal Republic.	2. "Atlantic Community"	2. Liberation of Europe from superpower predominance.	2. All-European cooperation and some "solution" of the German problem.