Institute for Strategic Studies.10th annual conference.

1) - Lista dei partecipanti e programma.
2) - S.P.Huntington:Armed forces and social change.
3) - B.Crozier:The strategic uses of revolutionary war.
4) - A.Buchan:Ten years of I.S.S.
5) - B.Brodie:The place of tecnology in strategy.
6) - H.Bull:Arms control/ stocktaking and prospectus.
7) - L.J.Halle:Strategy and ideology.
8) - M.Howard.The classical Strategist.
9) - K.E.Boulding:Social systems analysis and the study of international conflict.
10 - U.Schwarz:Great power intervention in the modern world.
11) - C.F.Von Weizsacker:The ethical problem of modern strategy.
12) - R.Osgood:The reappraisal of limited war.
13) - T.C. Schelling:The uses of force in the nuclear age.

I.S.S. - TENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Main Speakers

Dr. Raymond Aron (France)

Prof. of Sociology at the University of Paris. Editorialist of "Le Figaro". Previously professor at the Institut d'études politiques and the Ecole nationale d'administration, Paris.

Publications: "On War: Atomic Weapons and Global Diplomacy", "Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations", "The Great Debate", etc.

Vice-president of the Institute.

Herman Kahn (U.S.A.)

Defence analyst, Director of the Hudson Institute, White Plains, U.S.A.

Graduated from the University of California and the California Institute for Technology. Worked as a mathematician before joining, in 1948, the RAND Corporation as senior physicist and defence analyst.

Publications: "On Thermonuclear War", "Thinking about the Unthinkable", "On Escalation - Metaphors and Scenarios", "The Year 2000" (with A.J. Wiener), etc.

Thomas C. Schelling (U.S.A.)

Professor of Economics, Harvard University; previously Yale University. Faculty member Harvard Center for International Affairs.

Former staff member of the RAND Corporation, scientific adviser to the Department of Defence and the Department of State.

Publications: "The Strategy of Conflict", "Arms and Influence",etc.

Dr. Carl-Friedrich Freiherr von Weizsaecker (Germany)

Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hamburg since 1957; previously professor of physics in Strassbourg and Goettingen. Scientific member of the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft.

Publications: "Die Verantwortung der Wissenschaft im Atomzeitalter", etc.

Vice-president of the Institute.

Panel Speakers

Yigal Allon (Israel)

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Immigrant Absorption since 1968, Minister of Labour 1961 - 1968. Educated at the Hebrew University and St. Antony's College, Oxford. After military training in the Haganah, he became commander of Palmakh in 1945 and conducted the major campaigns in Israel's War of Independence 1947 - 49. He left active service with the rank of Major General in 1950.

Publications: "Curtain of Sand → Arabs and Israelis between War and Peace", "The Making of Israel's Army", etc.

André Beaufre (France)

Genéral d'Armée (Rt.), Director of the Institut Français d' Etudes Stratégiques, Paris.

Former chief of Staff Logistics and Administration SHAPE (1958 - 1960) and French Representative Standing Group Washington.

Publications: "Introduction to Strategy", "Deterrence and Strategy", "Strategy of Action", "NATO and Europe", "Bâtir l'avenir".

Rt. Hon. Denis W. Healey (U.K.)

Member of Parliament (Lab.) since 1952, Secretary of State for Defence since 1964.

From 1945 - 1952 International Department of the Labour Party, opposition spokesman first on foreign affairs, then on defence, 1956 - 1964. Founder member and former Counsellor of the Institute for Strategic Studies.

Publications: "A Neutral Belt in Europe", "NATO and American Seucrity", "The Race against the H-Bomb", etc.

Henry Rowen (U.S.A.)

Economist and strategic analyst; President of the RAND Corporation since 1967.

1961 - 1965 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for plans and international affairs.
Publications: "National Security and the American Economy in the 1960s", etc.

Committee Speakers

Kenneth E. Boulding (U.S.A.)

Professor of Economics, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado; research director at the Center for Research in Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan, 1964 - 1966.
Publications: "Conflict and Defence", ""Disarmament and the Economy", "The Impact of Social Sciences", etc.

Dr. Bernard Brodie (U.S.A.)

Professor of Political Science, Security Studies Center, University of California, Los Angeles.
Formerly professor of international relations at Yale University and senior staff member of the RAND Corporation.
Publications: "A Guide to Naval Strategy", "Sea Power in the Machine Age", "Strategy in the Missible Age", etc.

Hedley Bull (Australia)

Professor of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra. Lecturer then Reader in international relations, London School of Economics, 1955 - 1964 and, from 1964 - 1967 Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit, Foreign Office, London.
Publications: "The Control of the Arms Race", etc.

Brian R. Crozier (U.K.)

Chairman Forum World Features, journalist and writer.
Formerly foreign correspondent for Reuters and The Economist.
Publications: "The Rebels: A Study of Post War Insurrections", "South-East Asia in Turmoil", etc.

Louis J. Halle (U.S.A.)

Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Affairs, Geneva since 1958.
Department of State, 1941 - 1954, member of the policy planning staff, 1952 - 1954, research professor at the Woodrow Wilson department for foreign affairs, University of Virginia, 1954 - 1958.
Publications: "The Nature of Power", "Choice for Survival", "American Foreign Policy", "Men and Nations", "The Cold War as History", etc.

Michael Howard (U.K.)

Fellow in Higher Defence Studies, All Soul's College, Oxford.
Professor of War Studies Kings, College, London, 1963 - 1968.
Founder member and Counsellor of the Institute for Strategic Studies.
Publications: "Disengagement in Europe", "The Franco-Russian War", "The Theory and Practice of War" (Editor), "Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967" (with R. Hunter), etc.

Dr. Samuel P. Huntington (U.S.A.)

Professor of Government, Harvard University. Faculty member Harvard Center for International Affairs.

Previously assistant director at the Institute for War and Peace Studies and Associate Professor of Government at Columbia University.

Publications: "The Soldier and the State", "The Common Defence", "Patterns of Violence in Twentieth Century Politics" (Editor), etc.

Henry A. Kissinger (U.S.A.)

Professor of Government, Harvard University. Faculty member Harvard Center for International Affairs.

Consultant of the National Security Council (1961-62), the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Department of State.

Publications: "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy", "The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy", "The Troubled Partnership - A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance", etc.

Dr. Robert E. Osgood (U.S.A.)

Professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and Director of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research.

Publications: "Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations", "Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy", "NATO: The Entangling Alliance", "Force, Order and Justice" (with R.W. Tucker), etc.

Dr. Urs Schwarz (Switzerland)

Writer and strategic analyst.

Foreign editor of the Neue Zuericher Zeitung, 1942 - 1965. Counsellor of the Institute for Strategic Studies since 1964.

Publications: "Strategie gestern, heute, morgen", "American Strategy - A New Perspective", "Strategic Terminology" (with L. Hadik), etc.

INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

TENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Oxford 1968

Committee List

COMMITTEE I (Chairman: Wohlstetter)

Amme	USA
Asprey	USA
Bartle	UK
Baumgarten	USA
Beloff	UK
Bussey	USA
C.L.Cooper	USA
Daeniker	SWI
Digby	USA
Gaja	IT
Goodall	UK
Goodwin	UK
Gordon	UK
Groom	UK
Hagedorn	USA
Harkabi	ISR
Harris	UK
Hezlet	UK
Higgins	USA
Jaquet	NETH
King, jr.	USA

COMMITTEE II (Chairman: Sommer)

Alting von Geusau	NETH
Boel	DEN
Braeutigam	GER
Cameron	UK
Chalfont	UK
H. Cleveland	USA
F. Cooper	UK
Cottrell	USA
Duynstee	NETH
Elekdag	TUR
Ewing	USA
Fromm	USA
Gasteygar	SWI
Gottlieb	DEN
Hassner	FRA
Hockaday	UK
Hudson	UK
Johnson	USA
Kimche	UK
Kleiman	USA
Kotani	JAP
Lindsey	CAN
Mackintosh	UK
Martin	UK
Millar	AUS
Morgan	UK
Murray	USA
Newhouse	USA

COMMITTEE III (Chairman: Spinelli)

Bell	UK
Bohn	NOR
Bos	NETH
Chou, Tai Yun	SIN
Clayton	UK
Conant	USA
Cranstoun	UK
Crean	CAN
Douglas-Home	UK
Duncanson	UK
Ellsberg	USA
Evans	UK
Forman	UK
Gerlach	GER
Grubb	UK
Hanning	UK
Harrison	USA
Laroche	FRA
Lincoln	USA
R.A. Mason	UK
Mun, Hui Sok	COR
Nailor	UK
Peck	UK
Quintieri	IT
Ramsbotham	UK
Ransom	USA
Rutherford	UK
Seidenfaden	DEN

COMMITTEE IV (Chairman: Birnbaum)

Barnett	USA
Baughan	UK
Belfield	UK
Bennell	UK
Blumenfeld	GER
Brennan	USA
Broekmeijer	NETH
Brown	UK
Burckhardt	SWI
Carey	USA
Clark	USA
S.Cleveland	USA
Cornford	UK
Davey	UK
Doerfer	SWE
Ellis	UK
Genty	FRA
Gibbs	UK
Gill	UK
Holst	NOR
Huglin	USA
Hunt	UK
Ilsøe	DEN
Ralston	USA
Rounds	USA
Sanders	USA
Simpson	UK
Sloan	USA

COMMITTEE V (Chairman: Goold-Adams)

Beach	USA
Bertram	GER
Bloomfield	USA
Booth	UK
Bowie	USA
Brundtland	NOR
Carpenter	CAN
Colot	BEL
Connell	USA
El Behery	UAR
Everett	UK
Evron	ISR
Gessert	USA
Haagerup	DEN
Hoagland	USA
Hoopes	USA
Humphries	USA
Kalkstein	USA
McDonald	UK
McEachron	USA
Maddox	UK
Miyomoto	JAP
Momoi	JAP
Moss	USA
Mulleneux	UK
Posvar	USA
Roth	GER
Saeki	JAP

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The Institute for Strategic Studies

TENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

St. Catherine's College, Oxford

September 19th — 22nd, 1968

Problems of Modern Strategy:
A Reconnaissance in Force

Members of the Conference

Chairman: Mr. Alastair Buchan

Yigal ALLON	Deputy Prime Minister of Israel, Jerusalem panel 19 sett.
Prof. F. A. M. ALTING VON GEUSAU	Professor of Law of International [illegible] S.J. in inglese Organizations, Tilburg University
Capt. Carl H. AMME	Senior Operations Analyst, Stanford Research Institute, California
Prof. Raymond ARON	Professor of Sociology, La Sorbonne, Paris
Capt. Robert B. ASPREY	Writer, Bermuda
Frank R. BARNETT	President, National Strategy Information Center, New York ~~[illegible]~~ verrà a Roma 3-9 ott.
Dr. S. H. BARTLE	Lecturer in Military History, Leeds University
Prof. E. C. BAUGHAN	Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham
Dr. Erwin BAUMGARTEN	Center for Naval Analyses, University of Rochester
Capt. Edward L. BEACH	Professor of Naval Science, Naval War College, Newport
Gen. André BEAUFRE	Director, Institut Français d'Etudes Stratégiques, Paris
E. M. G. BELFIELD	Lecturer, Extra-Mural Dept., Southampton University

Michael BELL	Ministry of Defence, London
Prof. Max BELOFF	Gladstone Professor of Government and Public Administration, Oxford
A. S. BENNELL	Ministry of Defence (Army), London
Dr. Christoph BERTRAM	Assistant to the Director, ISS, London
Dr. Karl BIRNBAUM	Director, Swedish Institute for International Affairs, Stockholm
Dr. Lincoln P. BLOOMFIELD	Professor of Political Science, MIT Center for International Studies, Cambridge, Mass.
Erik BLUMENFELD	Member of Parliament, Bonn
Niels BOEL	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen
Leif BOHN	Military Correspondent, *Aftenposten,* Oslo
Rev. Alan BOOTH	Secretary, Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, London
Vice-Adm. H. BOS	Office of the Prime Minister, The Hague
Prof. Kenneth E. BOULDING	Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, Boulder
Robert R. BOWIE	Director, Harvard University Center for International Affairs
Jens BOYESEN	Norwegian Ambassador to Hungary, Budapest
Dr. Hans-Otto BRÄUTIGAM	First Secretary, German Embassy, London
Dr. Donald G. BRENNAN	Hudson Institute, New York
Prof. Bernard BRODIE	Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles
Maj.-Gen. Dr. M. J. W. M. BROEKMEIJER	Chairman, Netherlands Defence Study Centre, The Hague
Neville BROWN	Lecturer in International Relations, University of Birmingham
Arne O. BRUNDTLAND	Research Associate, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo
Prof. Hedley BULL	Professor of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra
P. L. BURCKHARDT	Managing Director, Contraves Ltd., Zurich
Col. Donald S. BUSSEY	Legislative Reference Services, Library of Congress, Washington
Rear-Adm. Sir Anthony BUZZARD	Formerly Group Armament Adviser, Vickers Ltd., London
Air Vice-Marshal N. CAMERON	Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Policy), Ministry of Defence, London
Roger CAREY	Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies, Lanchester College, Coventry
Maj.-Gen. F. S. CARPENTER	Commandant, National Defence College of Canada, Kingston
Prof. G. E. G. CATLIN	Political Scientist, London
Lord CHALFONT	Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, London
CHOU, Tai Yun	Ministry of Security and Defence, Singapore; Research Associate, ISS, London, 1968-69
Robert J. CLARK	President, North American Aviation International Inc., El Segundo
Maj. B. A. CLAYTON	Serving Officer, British Army
Harland CLEVELAND	US Ambassador to NATO, Brussels
Stanley CLEVELAND	Minister for Economic and Commercial Affairs, US Embassy, London
L. J. G. COLOT	Ambassador-at-Large, Brussels
Melvin CONANT	Government Relations Counselor, Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), New York
Col. Royal W. CONNELL	Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
Dr. Chester L. COOPER	Director, International and Social Studies Division, IDA, Washington
Frank COOPER	Deputy Under-Secretary (Policy), Ministry of Defence, London
E. C. CORNFORD	Deputy Chief Adviser (Research and Studies), Ministry of Defence, London
Dr. Alvin J. COTTRELL	Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, Washington
Lt.-Col. A. J. E. CRANSTOUN	British Army (ret.)
Gordon CREAN	Canadian Ambassador to Italy, Rome
Brian CROZIER	Chairman, *Forum World Features,* London circolo a Roma (diramazione culturale dei [illegible]
Dr. G. DÄNIKER	Director, Public Relations Agency, Zurich

Maj. A. T. B. DAVEY	Serving Officer, British Army
James F. DIGBY	Program Manager (International), RAND Corporation, Santa Monica
Ingemar N. H. DÖRFER	Research Associate, Russian Research Center, Harvard University
Charles DOUGLAS-HOME	Defence Correspondent, *The Times*, London
J. D. DUNCANSON	Fellow, Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics ha comunicato mio [illegible] all'[illegible]
A. E. M. DUYNSTEE	Minister for Air, The Hague
Mostafa EL BEHERY	Attaché, UAR Embassy, London
Sukru ELEKDAG	Minister Plenipotentiary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara
Brig. P. F. ELLIS	Ministry of Defence, London
Dr. Daniel ELLSBERG	Economist, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica d'accordo con me in Vietnam [illegible] con Keller
Air Chief Marshal Sir Donald EVANS	Commandant, Imperial Defence College, London
C. H. D. EVERETT	Foreign Office, London
Y. EVRON	Fellow in Strategic Studies, London School of Economics
Richard T. EWING	Department of State Faculty, National War College, Washington
F. N. FORMAN	Research Student, University of Sussex
Joseph FROMM	London Correspondent, *US News and World Report*
Roberto GAJA	Director-General, Ministry of External Affairs, Rome
Dr. Curt GASTEYGER	Director of Studies, The Atlantic Institute, Paris
Col. R. L. J. GENTY	Engineering Consultant, Sud-Aviation, Paris
Dr. Hans GERLACH	Political and Military Editor, *Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger*
Robert A. GESSERT	Research Analysis Corporation, Washington
Prof. Norman GIBBS	Chichele Professor of History of War, Oxford
R. Rockingham GILL	Radio Free Europe, Munich
Col. S. E. M. GOODALL	Joint Services Staff College, Latimer
Prof. Geoffrey GOODWIN	Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics
Richard GOOLD-ADAMS	Director, Guthrie Corporation; Chairman of the Council, ISS, London
M. C. GORDON	Lecturer in Modern History, University of Salford
Henning V. GOTTLIEB	Foreign Affairs Adviser to the Prime Minister, Copenhagen
A. J. R. GROOM	Lecturer, University College, University of London
Sir Kenneth GRUBB	Chairman, Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, London, 1946-68
Niels J. HAAGERUP	Diplomatic Correspondent, *Berlingske Tidende*, Copenhagen
Dr. Homer J. HAGEDORN	Project Director, Institute of Naval Studies, Cambridge, Mass.
Prof. Louis J. HALLE	Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva
Morton HALPERIN	Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Security Affairs (Arms Control), Washington panel 19 Sept
Hugh HANNING	Defence Consultant, *The Guardian*, London
Dr. Y. HARKABI	Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Senior Research Associate, ISS, London, 1968
Lt.-Col. P. le S. HARRIS	Ministry of Defence, London
Gilbert A. HARRISON	Editor-in-Chief, *New Republic*, Washington
Pierre HASSNER	Centre d'Etudes des Relations Internationales, Paris panel 19 Sept
Rt. Hon. Denis HEALEY	Secretary of State for Defence, London
Vice-Adm. Sir Arthur HEZLET	Royal Navy (ret.)
Dr. Trumbull HIGGINS	Associate Professor of Military History, Drexel Institute, New York University
John H. HOAGLAND	Executive Vice-President, Browne & Shaw Research Corporation, Waltham, Mass.
Arthur HOCKADAY	Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Planning and Policy, NATO, Brussels
Johan J. HOLST	Strategic Analyst, Hudson Institute, New York
Townsend HOOPES	Under-Secretary of the Air Force, Washington
Michael HOWARD	Fellow in Higher Defence Studies, All Souls' College, Oxford
Geoffrey HUDSON	Director of Far Eastern Studies, St. Antony's College, Oxford
Brig.-Gen. Henry G. HUGLIN	Senior Military Scientist, GEC Tempo, Santa Barbara

PROGRAMME

Thursday, September 19th

5.00 p.m.–7.00 p.m.	Conference Assembles
7.00 p.m.	Dinner
8.30 p.m.–9.00 p.m.	*Ten Years of I.S.S.*—Mr. Alastair Buchan
9.00 p.m.	Panel Discussion—*The Implications of the Czechoslovakian crisis*

Friday, September 20th

9.30 a.m.–11.00 a.m.	*The Evolution of Modern Strategic Thought*—Prof. Raymond Aron
11.00 a.m.	Coffee
11.15 a.m.–12.45 p.m.	*The Ethical Problems of Modern Strategy*—Prof. Carl Frhr. Von Weizsäcker
1.00 p.m.	Lunch
2.45 p.m.–5.30 p.m.	Committee Discussions: see details below (Tea at 4.00 p.m.)
7.30 p.m.	Dinner
9.00 p.m.	*The Influence of Strategic Studies on Policy*—Panel Discussion: Mr. Yigal Allon; Gen. André Beaufre; Rt. Hon. Denis Healey; Mr. Henry S. Rowen

Saturday, September 21st

9.30 a.m.–12.30 p.m.	Committee Discussions: for details see below (Coffee at 10.45 a.m.)
1.00 p.m.	Lunch
Afternoon	Free
5.30 p.m.–7.00 p.m.	Reception given by the Secretary of State for Defence, at All Souls' College
7.00 p.m.	Dinner
8.30 p.m.	*The Uses of Force in the Nuclear Age*—Prof. Thomas C. Schelling

2,50

Sunday, September 22nd

9.30 a.m.–12 noon	*Strategies of the Future*—Mr. Herman Kahn
12 noon–12.30 p.m.	Concluding Plenary
1.00 p.m.	Lunch

Committee Discussions

	Friday 2.45 p.m.–5.30 p.m.	*Saturday* 9.30 a.m.–12.30 p.m.
Committee I—*Approaches to the Study of Strategy* *Chairman:* Prof. Albert J. Wohlstetter	*The Classical Strategists*— Mr. Michael Howard	*Social Systems Analysis and the Study of International Conflict*— Prof. Kenneth E. Boulding
Committee II—*Force and The International System* *Chairman:* Dr. Theo Sommer	*Alliances and the Balance of Power*— Prof. Henry A. Kissinger	*Great Power Intervention in the Modern World*— Dr. Urs Schwarz
Committee III—*Force and Internal Order* *Chairman:* Dr. Altiero Spinelli	*Armed Forces and Social Change*— Prof. Samuel P. Huntington	*The Strategic Uses of Revolutionary War*— Mr. Brian Crozier
Committee IV—*Influences upon Strategy* *Chairman:* Dr. Karl Birnbaum	*Strategy and Ideology*— Prof. Louis J. Halle	*The Place of Technology in Strategy*— Prof. Bernard Brodie
Committee V—*Control of War and Conflict* *Chairman:* Mr. Richard Goold-Adams	*Arms Control: Stocktaking and Prospectus*— Prof. Hedley Bull	*The Reappraisal of Limited War*— Prof. Robert Osgood

Col. Donald H. HUMPHRIES	Director of Arms Control, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Washington
Brig. Kenneth HUNT	Deputy Director, ISS, London
Prof. Samuel P. HUNTINGTON	Professor of Government, Harvard University
Peter ILSØE	Senior Civil Adviser to Chief of Defence, Copenhagen
Dr. L. G. M. JAQUET	Secretary-General, Netherlands Institute of International Affairs, The Hague
Joseph E. JOHNSON	President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York
Herman KAHN	Director, Hudson Institute, New York
Dr. Marvin I. KALKSTEIN	State University of New York, Long Island
Jon KIMCHE	Editor, *The New Middle East,* London
James, E. KING, Jr.	Senior Research Associate, IDA, Washington
Air Vice-Marshal E. J. KINGSTON-McCLOUGHRY	RAF (ret.)
Prof. Henry A. KISSINGER	Professor of Government, Harvard University
Robert KLEIMAN	Editorial Board, *The New York Times*
Prof. H. KOTANI	Kyoto Industrial University
Dr. Dalimil KYBAL	Missiles and Space Division, Lockheed Aviation Co., California
Hervé LAROCHE	Director, British and French Bank Ltd., London
Rear-Adm. John M. LEE	Vice-Director, IMS/NATO Military Committee, Brussels
Sir Basil LIDDELL HART	Strategist and Historian, London
Col. G. A. LINCOLN	Head of Department of Social Sciences, US Military Academy, West Point
Dr. G. R. LINDSEY	Defence Research Board, Ottawa
Edward McCABE	Delegacy for Extra-Mural Studies, Oxford
Prof. J. Kenneth McDONALD	St. Antony's College, Oxford
David W. McEACHRON	Associate Executive Director for Programs, Council on Foreign Relations, New York
Malcolm MACKINTOSH	Author and Analyst, London panel 19 Sept
John MADDOX	Editor, *Nature,* London
Prof. Laurence MARTIN	Professor of War Studies, King's College, University of London
C. M. MASON	Lecturer, Department of Politics, University of Glasgow
Sqn.-Ldr. R. A. MASON	RAF College, Cranwell
Dr. T. B. MILLAR	Fellow in International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra; Senior Research Associate, ISS, London, 1968-69
Noriyoshi MIYOMOTO	European Editor, *Sankei Shimbun,* London
Prof. Makoto MOMOI	National Defence College, Tokyo
Dr. Roger MORGAN	Assistant Director of Studies, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London
Norman MOSS	London Correspondent, *North American Newspaper Alliance*
Cdr. H. H. MULLENEUX	Military Lecturer, London
Brig.-Gen. MUN, Hui Sok	Professor, National War College, Seoul
Robert J. MURRAY	Deputy Director, Near East and South Asia Region, Office of Secretary of Defense, Washington
Peter NAILOR	Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Defence, London
Uwe NERLICH	Foundation for Science and Politics, Munich
John NEWHOUSE	Associate Director, The Tocqueville Series, Paris
J. S. NUTT	Dept. of External Affairs, Ottawa
Prof. Robert E. OSGOOD	Director, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research
Michael PALLISER	Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, London
Sir Edward PECK	Deputy Under-Secretary, Foreign Office, London
Dr. Wesley W. POSVAR	Chancellor of the University of Pittsburgh
Quintio QUINTIERI	Confederazione Generale dell'Industria Italiana, Rome
Jerry W. RALSTON	Boeing Co., Renton
Peter RAMSBOTHAM	Foreign Office, London; Senior Research Associate, ISS, London, 1968
Prof. B. McL. RANFT	Professor of History, RN College, Greenwich
Prof. Harry H. RANSOM	Professor of International Politics, Vanderbilt University
Dr. Klaus RITTER	Director, Foundation for Science and Politics, Munich

Sir Frank ROBERTS	British Ambassador to Germany, Bonn, 1963-68 panel 19 Sept.
Col. Helmut ROTH	Military Adviser to SPD, Bonn
George L. ROUNDS	Director of Systems Analysis and Aerospace Group, Boeing Co., Seattle
Henry S. ROWEN	President, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica
Michio ROYAMA	Chief Researcher, International House, Tokyo
G. M. RUTHERFORD	Diplomatic Correspondent, *The Financial Times,* London
Maj. R. J. d'A. RYAN	St. Catherine's College, Cambridge
Kiichi SAEKI	Executive Director, Nomura Research Institute of Technology and Economics, Tokyo
Noel SALTER	Commonwealth Secretariat, London
Frank SANDERS	Staff Member, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Washington verrà a Roma briefing on NATO
Prof. Thomas C. SCHELLING	Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Dr. Warner R. SCHILLING	Institute for War and Peace Studies, Columbia University
Capt. Paul R. SCHRATZ	USN Faculty, National War College, Washington
Dr. Urs SCHWARZ	Former Foreign Editor, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung,* Zurich
Erik SEIDENFADEN	Warden of the Danish College, Cité de l'Université de Paris
Gustave H. SHUBERT	Associate Head, Economics Department, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica d'accordo con me su Vietnam
John SIMPSON	Assistant Lecturer, Department of Politics, Southampton University
George B. SLOAN	Manager, Environment Forecast Group, Douglas Aircraft Co., St. Louis
Gordon S. SMITH	Canadian Delegation to NATO, Brussels
Dr. Theo SOMMER	Foreign Editor, *Die Zeit,* Hamburg panel 19 Sept
Helmut SONNENFELDT	Department of State, Washington
Air-Cdre. F. B. SOWREY	Ministry of Defence, London
Maj.-Gen. E. SPANNOCCHI	Commandant, Austrian Staff Academy, Vienna
Ronald I. SPIERS	Counselor for Politico-Military Affairs, US Embassy, London
Dr. Altiero SPINELLI	Director, Italian Institute for International Affairs, Rome
Dr. Timothy W. STANLEY	Defense Adviser, US Mission to NATO, Brussels
Gp.-Capt. M. M. STEPHENS	Executive, Rolls-Royce (France) Ltd., Paris
Dr. Jeremy J. STONE	Department of Economics, Stanford University
Francis X. SUTTON	International Division, The Ford Foundation, New York
Bonar SYKES	Head of Planning Department, Foreign Office, London
Dr. Cedric W. TARR, Jr.	Associate Professor, University of California
Sir Robert THOMPSON	Head of British Advisory Mission, Vietnam, 1961-65
Brig. W. F. K. THOMPSON	Military Correspondent, *The Daily Telegraph,* London
John THOMSON	The Cabinet Office, London
J. H. W. TROTMAN	Department of National Defence, Ottawa
Gen. Gastone VALENTINI	Deputy Chief of Staff, Italian Airforce, Rome
J. VAN DER VALK	Chief of NATO and WEU Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague
H. VINDENES	Counsellor, Royal Norwegian Embassy, London
Prof. Carl Frhr. VON WEIZSÄCKER	Director, Research Institute of the Association of German Scientists, Hamburg
Dr. Wolfgang WAGNER	Acting Director, Research Institute, German Association for International Affairs, Bonn
Christopher WAIN	Television Journalist, Salisbury, England
Prof. K. WAKAIZUMI	Professor of International Relations, Kyoto Sangyo University, Tokyo panel 19 Sept.
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INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
10th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

PROBLEMS OF MODERN STRATEGY: A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

COMMITTEE III

Friday 20th September Afternoon

Armed Forces and Social Change*

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The Praetorian Pattern of Politics

Few aspects of modernization and social change are more striking or common than the intervention of the military in politics. Juntas and coups, military revolts and military regimes have been continuing phenomena in Latin American societies: they have been almost as prevalent in the Middle East. In the late 1950s and early 1960s many societies in southern and southeast Asia also came under military rule, and in the mid-1960s the coup contagion swept Africa. Military interventions apparently are an inseparable part of political modernization whatever the continent and whatever the country. They pose three problems for analysis. First, what are the causes of military intervention in the politics of modernizing countries? Second, what are the consequences of intervention for modernization and social change? Third, under what conditions may military intervention promote political development, that is, the emergence of stable and effective political institutions which reduce the probability of interventions?

The very prevalence of military intervention suggests that many of its commonly advanced causes lack persuasiveness. It has, for instance, been argued that American military assistance is a significant factor increasing the proclivities of armies to involve themselves in politics. Such assistance, it is said, encourages the political independence of the army and gives it extra power, extra leverage, and more motivation to take action against civilian political leaders. In some circumstances this argument may have a certain partial validity. But as the sole or principal cause of military interventions, military aid cannot be held guilty. Most countries which experienced military coups after receiving American military assistance experienced them equally often before they became the beneficiaries of Pentagon largesse. No convincing evidence exists of a correlation between the American military aid and military involvement in politics. And, it must be pointed out, the opposite hypothesis also is not true: the hopes of many people that the propensity of foreign military to intervene would be reduced by courses at Leavenworth, indoctrination in Anglo-American doctrines of civilian supremacy, and association with professionalized American military officers have also turned to naught. Military aid and military training are by themselves politically sterile: they neither encourage nor reduce the tendencies of military officers to play a political role.[1]

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* This paper is adapted from my forth-coming Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven & London, Yale University Press, 1968), Ch. 4

It is equally fallacious to attempt to explain military interventions in politics primarily by reference to the internal structure of the military or the social background of the officers doing the intervening. Morris Janowitz, for instance, looks for the causes of military intervention in politics in the "characteristics of the military establishment" of the country, and attempts to relate the propensity and ability of military officers to intervene in politics to their "ethos of public service", their skill structure, which combines managerial ability with a heroic posture, their middle-class and lower middle-class social origins, and their internal cohesion.[2] Some evidence supports these connections, but much other evidence does not. His effort to answer the question, "What characteristics of the military establishment of a new nation facilitate its involvement in domestic politics?" is misdirected because the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of the society.

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[1] On Latin America, see Charles Wolf, Jr., United States Policy and the Third World: Problems and Analysis (Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1967), chap. 5, and John Duncan Powell, "Military Assistance and Militarism in Latin America, "Western Political Quarterly, 18 (June 1965), 382-92

[2] Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964) pp. 1, 27-29

Military explanations do not explain military interventions. The reason for this is simply that military interventions are only one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon in underdeveloped societies: the general politicization of social forces and institutions. In such societies, politics lacks autonomy, complexity, coherence, and adaptability.[3] All sorts of social forces and groups become directly engaged in general politics. Countries which have political armies also have political clergies, political universities, political bureaucracies, political labour unions, and political corporations. Society as a whole is out-of-joint, not just the military. All these specialized groups tend to become involved in politics dealing with general political issues: not just issues which affect their own particular institutional interest or groups, but issues which affect society as a whole. In every society, military men engage in politics to promote higher pay and larger military forces, even in political systems such as those of the United States and the Soviet Union, which have almost impeccable systems of civilian control. In underdeveloped societies the military are concerned not only with pay and promotion, although they are concerned with that, but also with the distribution of power and status throughout the political system. Their goals are general and diffuse as well as limited and concrete. So also with other social groups. Colonels and generals, students and professors, Moslem ulema and Buddhist monks, all become directly involved in politics as a whole.

Corruption in a limited sense refers to the intervention of wealth in the political sphere. Praetorianism in a limited sense refers to the intervention of the military in politics, and clericalism to the participation of religious leaders. As yet no good word describes extensive student participation in politics. All these terms, however, refer to different aspects of the same phenomenon, the politicization of social forces. Here, for the sake of brevity, the phrase "praetorian society" is used to refer to such a politicized society with the understanding that this refers to the participation not only of the military but of other social forces as well.[4]

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[3] See my "Political Development and Political Decay", World Politics, 17 April 1965), 386-430.

[4] See David Rapoport, "A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types", in Samuel P. Huntington, ed., Changing Patterns of Military Politics (New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962), pp. 71-100.

The same causes which produce military interventions in politics in praetorian societies are also responsible for the political involvements of labor unions, businessmen,, students, and clergy. These causes lie not in the nature of the group but in the structure of society. In particular they lie in the absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group political action. In a praetorian system social forces confront each other nakedly: no political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders, are recognized or accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict. Equally important, no agreement exists among the groups as to the legitimate and authoritative methods for resolving conflicts. In an institutionalized polity most political actors agree on the procedures to be used for the resolution of political disputes, that is, for the allocation of office and the determination of policy. Office may be assigned through election, heredity, examination, lot, or some combination of these and other means. Policy issues may be resolved by hierarchical processes, by petitions, hearing, and appeals, by majority votes, by consultation and consensus or through yet other means. But, in any event, general agreement exists as to what those means are, and the groups participating in the political game recognize their obligation to employ those means. This is true of both western constitutional democracies and communist dictatorships. In a praetorian society, however, not only are the actors varied, but so also are the methods used to decide upon office and policy. Each group employs means which reflect its peculiar nature and capabilities. The wealthy bribe; students riot; workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the military coup. In the absence of accepted procedures, all these forms of direct action are found on the political scene. The techniques of military intervention are simply more dramatic and effective than the others because, as Hobbes put it, "When nothing else is turned up, clubs are trumps".[5]

A praetorian society thus lacks community and effective political institutions. These conditions can exist at various levels in the evolution of political participation. In a society with participation limited to a small oligarchy, the actors in politics are relatively homogeneous even in

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5. Quoted by Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations (Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 170

the absence of effective political institutions. Community is more the product of social ties than political action. As political participation broadens, however, the actors in politics become more numerous and their methods of political action are more diverse. As a result, conflict becomes more intense in the middle-class radical praetorian society and still more so in the mass praetorian society. In all stages of praetorianism, social forces interact directly with each other and make little or no effort to relate their private interest to a public good. In a praetorian oligarchy, politics is a struggle among personal and family cliques: in a radical praetorian society the struggle among institutional and occupational groups supplements that among cliques: in mass praetorianism social classes and social movements dominate the scene. The increase in size, strength, and diversity of social forces makes the tension and conflict among them less and less tolerable. In an institutionalized, civic polity, the participation of new groups in the political system reduces tensions: through participation, new groups are assimilated into the political order: as, for instance, the classic case of the extension of the suffrage in Great Britain. In praetorian societies, however, the participation of new groups exacerbates rather than reduces tensions. It multiplies the resources and methods which are employed in political action and thus contributes to the disintegration of the polity. New groups are mobilized but not assimilated. The expansion of political participation in Great Britain made Disraeli's two nations into one. The expansion of participation in Argentina has made the same two nations into mortal enemies.

The stability of a civic polity thus varies directly with the scope of political participation. Its durability declines as participation rises. Praetorian oligarchies may last centuries: middle-class systems decades: mass praetorian systems usually only a few years. Either the mass praetorian system becomes stabilized through the conquest of power by a totalitarian party, as in Weimar Germany, or the more traditional elites attempt to reduce the level of participation through authoritarian means, as in Argentina. In a society without effective political institutions and unable to develop them, the end result of social and economic modernization is political chaos.

The Military: Reformers or Conservatives?

In the 1960s scholars spent much ink and time debating whether the military play basically a progressive or a conservative role in modernization. Most seemed to agree that in the Middle East the military were typically the proponents of change; the army, as Halpern said, is "the vanguard of nationalism and social reform"; it is the most cohesive and disciplined element in "the new middle class" whose "thrust towards revolutionary action... is overwhelming". With respect to Latin America, however, no such consensus existed; proponents of both the progressive and the conservative views made impressive cases out of fact, logic, and statistics.[6]

Both cases were right. Latin America is simply more varied than the Middle East. Except for Turkey, virtually all Middle Eastern praetorian or semi-praetorian societies were still in the process after World War II of expanding political participation from the oligarchy to the middle class. Military officers are drawn from middle-class backgrounds and perform middle-class functions in a professionalized, bureaucratic environment. Where the basic issues of politics involve the displacement of the oligarchy and the accession to power of the middle class, the military necessarily are on the side of reform. This was also true in Latin America. In the more advanced Latin American societies - Argentina, Chile, Brazil - the military played a reforming role in the early part of the twentieth century. During and after World War II military officers led or cooperated in middle-class reform movements in Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Venezuela. In these cases, as in Egypt (1952), Syria (1949), and Iraq (1958), the military led "break-through" coups displacing oligarchical elements from power and inaugurating efforts at modernization and reform.

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[6] Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 75, 253. For the modernizing argument on the military in southeast Asia, see Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Modernization", in John J. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 69-90. On Latin America, the conservative interpretation is argued by Edwin Lieuwen in Generals vs. Presidents (New York, Frederick Praeger, 1964) and by Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America", American Political Science Review, 60 (September, 1966), 616-26. A more progressive role for the military is stressed by John C. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964).

The frequency of military coups in Latin America, Jose Nun has shown, has no relation to the size of the middle class.[7] Praetorian politics exists at all stages of social mobilization and the expansion of political participation. The impact and significance of military intervention in politics, however, does vary with the size of the middle class. In Latin America in the 1950s, in those countries where the middle and upper classes were very small, less than 8% of the total population, (Nicaragua, Honduras, Dominican Republic, and Haiti), politics was still in the personalistic, oligarchical style, and the middle-class military reformer had yet to appear on the scene. In those societies where the middle class was larger, between 8% and 15% of the total population, the dominant groups in the military typically played a more modernizing and reforming role in the 1930s and 1940s. These societies included Guatemala, Bolivia, El Salvador, Ecuador, and Peru. Panama and Paraguay, with upper and middle classes in 1950 estimated at 15% and 14% respectively, were in some respects deviants from this pattern. Among those larger and more complex societies, where the middle class constituted 15% to 36% of the total population, the military either abstained from politics and were a primarily professional force (Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Mexico) or they intervened in politics to play an increasingly conservative political role (Argentina, Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil).

As society changes, so does the role of the military. In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the middle-class world he is a participant and arbiter; as the mass society looms on the horizon he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order. Thus, paradoxically, but understandably, the more backward a society is, the more progressive the role of its military; the more advanced a society becomes, the more conservative and reactionary becomes the role of its military. In 1890 Argentine officers founded the Logia Militar to promote reform. Thirty years later they founded the Logia San Martin which opposed reform and incubated the 1930 coup designed by its promoters to restore the "stable constitutional democracy" which was being subverted by the "mass-ocracy" of President Yrigoyen.[8]

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[7] Jose Nun, "A Latin American Phenomenon: The Middle Class Military Coup", in Institute of International Studies, Trends in Social Science Research in Latin American Studies: A Conference Report (Berkeley, University of California, 1965), pp. 68-69. Nun here reproduces the estimates of the Latin American middle class made by Gino Germani, Politica y Sociedad en una Epoca de Transicion (Buenos Aires Editorial Paidos, 1962), pp. 169-70, and I have, in turn, relied on them in my analysis in this paragraph.

[8] Liisa North, Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and Peru, Politics of Modernization Series, 2 (Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1966),pp. 26-27, 30-33.

So also, in Turkey, the Young Turks in 1908 and the Kemalists in the 1920s played highly progressive reforming roles similar to those which the military after World War II assumed in other Middle Eastern countries. By that time in Turkey, however, the military were intervening in politics to curb the rise to power of a new business class supported by the peasants. The soldiers had not changed; they still supported the reforms of the Kemalist era. But they were now unwilling to admit to power social classes which might make changes in those reforms.

The extent to which military institutions and individuals become politicized is a function of the weakness of civilian political organizations and the inability of civilian political leaders to deal with the principal policy problems facing the country. The extent to which a politicized officer corps plays a conservative or a reform role in politics is a function of the expansion of political participation in the society.

The instability and coups associated with the emergence of the middle class are due to changes in the nature of the military; those associated with the emergence of the lower class are due to changes in the nature of the society. In the former case, the military are modernized and develop concepts of efficiency, honesty, and nationalism which alienate them from the existing order. They intervene in politics to bring society abreast of the military. They are the advance guard of the middle class and spearhead its breakthrough into the political arena. They promote social and economic reform, national integration, and, in some measure, the extension of political participation. Once middle-class urban groups become the dominant elements in politics, the military assume an arbitral or stabilizing role. If a society is able to move from middle class to mass participation with fairly well-developed political institutions (such as in Latin America-Chile, Uruguay and Mexico), the military assume a non-political, specialized, professional role characteristic of systems with "objective" civilian control. Chile, Uruguay, and Mexico were, indeed, the only Latin American countries in which there were no military coups d'etat during the two decades after World War II. If, however, a society moves into the phase of mass participation without developing effective political institutions, the military become engaged in a conservative effort to protect the existing system against the incursions of the lower classes, particularly the urban lower classes. They become the guardians of the existing middle-class order. They are thus, in a sense, the door-keepers in the expansion of political participation in a praetorian society: their historical role is to open the door to the middle class and to close it on the lower class. The radical phase of a praetorian society begins with a bright, modernizing military coup toppling the oligarchy and heralding the emergence of enlightenment into politics. It ends in a succession of frustrating and unwholesome rearguard efforts to block the lower classes from scaling the heights of political power.

The guardian role of the military is legitimated by an impressive rationale, which is persuasive to many armies and often persuasive to American opinion leaders. Military involvement in politics is intermittent and for limited purposes, and hence the military view themselves neither as the modernizers of society nor as the creators of a new political order but rather as the guardians and perhaps the purifiers of the existing order. The army, in the words of President (and Air Force general) Barrientos of Bolivia, should be the country's "tutelary institution.. watching zealously over the fulfilling of laws and the virtue of governments."[9] Military intervention, consequently, is prompted by the corruption, stagnation, stalemate, anarchy, subversion, of the established political system. Once these are eliminated, the military claim that they can then return the purified polity to the hands of the civilian leaders. Their job is simply to straighten out the mess and then to get out. Theirs is a temporary dictatorship - perhaps somewhat on the Roman model.

The ideology of guardianship varies little from country to country. It is most developed, naturally enough, in Latin America, where praetorianism and political participation are both widely prevalent. The army should intervene in politics, as one Argentine general put it, to deal with "the great disasters that can imperil our national stability and integrity, leaving aside the small disasters that any attempt to repair will only serve to separate us from our mission and hamper a clear perception of our duty". Many Latin American constitutions implicitly or explicitly recognize the guardian function of the military. The Peruvian military, for instance, have justified their actions in barring the Apristas from power by the constitutional provision that: "The purpose of the armed force is to assure the law of the Republic, compliance with the Constitution and laws, and the conservation of public order".[10] The military in a sense assume constitutional functions analogous to those of the Supreme Court of the United States: they have a responsibility to preserve the political order and hence are drawn into politics at times of crisis or controversy to veto actions by the "political" branches of government which deviate from the essentials of that system. Yet they are also concerned about their own institutional integrity and hence divided among themselves in the military equivalents of "judicial activists" and "judicial self-restrainers". The extent to which the military are locked in a middle-class outlook suggests that the expectations that the military will increasingly become a force for reform are likely to be unfounded. It has, for instance, been suggested that the future will see the emergence of a Latin American Nasserism, that is, "the assumption by Latin American armed forces of the same kind of modernizing and reforming responsibilities that the military have assumed in the Near East."[11] Many Latin Americans, civilians as well as colonels, see a Nasserite solution as the most promising path toward social, economic, and political development. These hopes have little chance of realization. Most Latin American societies are beyond the possibilities of Nasserism. They are too complex, too highly articulated, too far advanced economically to be susceptible to salvation by military reform. As Latin America has modernized, the role of the military has become more conservative. Between 1935 and 1944, 50% of the coups in Latin America had reformist objectives of changing the economic and social status quo; between 1945 and 1954, 23% of the coups had these objectives; between 1955 and 1964, only 17% did.[12] To say that the Brazil of the 1960s needed a Nasser was somewhat like saying that the Russia of the 1960s needed a Stolypin. The two types of leadership were simply irrelevant to the stage of development which these societies had reached. In the 1960s, an Iran or an Ethiopia could use a Stolypin, and in Latin America there was perhaps room for a Nasser in Haiti, Paraguay, Nicaragua, or even the Dominican Republic. But the rest of the continent was simply too highly developed for such an attractively simple panacea.

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[9] Quoted by Christopher Rand, "Letter from La Paz", New Yorker (December 31, 1966) p.50

[10] Major General Julio Alsogaray, New York Times (March 6, 1966), p.26; Rosendo A. Gomez, "Peru: The Politics of Military Guardianship", in Martin C. Needler, ed., Political Systems of Latin America (Princeton, D. Van Nostrand Company, 1964), pp. 301-02

As society becomes more complex, it becomes more difficult for military officers, first, to exercise power effectively and then to seize power successfully. As a reasonably small, socially homogeneous and highly disciplined and coherent group, the dominant elements in the officer corps can act reasonably effectively as a leadership cadre in a society which is still relatively uncomplex and undifferentiated. As the praetorian society becomes more complex and differentiated, the number of social groups and forces multiplies and the problems of coordination and interest aggregation become increasingly complex. In the absence of effective central political institutions for the resolution of social conflicts, the military become simply one of several relatively insulated and autonomous social forces. Their capacity to elicit support and to induce cooperation declines. In addition, of course, military officers are not necessarily skilled in the esoteric arts of negotiation, compromise, and mass appeal which are required for political action in a complex society. A more simple society can be spurred, commanded, and led toward an objective. But where social differentiation is well advanced, the political leader must be a balancer and compromiser. The tendency of the military to choose a guardian role in the more complex societies in itself indicates some awareness of the difficulties of integrating social forces.

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[11] Lieuwen, Generals vs. Presidents, p. 138. See pp. 136-41 for a good evaluation of possibilities and obstacles to Latin American Nasserism.

[12] Needler, "Political Development". pp. 619-20

The seizure of power by the military in a coup designed to veto the expansion of political participation brings only temporary relief to the political system. The groups which participate in the coup are usually united only by their desire to stop or to reverse the tendencies which they consider subversive of political order. Once the military are in power, the coup coalition begins to split. It may fragment into small cliques, each attempting to push its own ends. More frequently, it divides into two broad factions: the radicals and the moderates, the hard-liners and the soft-liners, the gorilas and the legalistas. The struggle between the moderates and the radicals may focus on a number of issues, but typically the key issue is the return of power to civilians. Invariably, the junta which comes to power in a veto coup promises a quick surrender of power and return to normal civilian rule. The hard-liners argue, however, that the military must stay in power to bar permanently the civilian groups which they ousted from power and to impose structural reforms on the political system. The hard-liners are usually etatist in economics and authoritarian in politics. The moderates, on the other hand, usually view the aims of the coup as more limited. Once the objectionable political leaders have been removed from the scene and a few political and administrative changes introduced, they feel that they have done their job, and they are ready to retire to the political sidelines. As in the break-through coups which mark the rise of the middle-class to political action, the moderates in the veto coups usually come to power first. They are moderate, however, not because they are willing to compromise with the existing oligarchy, but because they may be willing to compromise with the emerging mass movements. The radicals, on the other hand, resist the expansion of political participation. In the break-through coup, the radical does not compromise with the oligarchy; in the veto coup the radical does not compromise with the masses. One hastens history; the other resists it.

The basic dilemma in the guardian role involves the two assumptions that the army is above politics and that the army should intervene in politics to prevent changes in the political system. The guardian role of the military is based on the premise that the causes of military intervention arise from temporary and extraordinary disruptions of the political system. In fact, however, the causes are endemic to the political system and are the unavoidable consequence of the modernization of society. They cannot be removed simply by eliminating people. In addition, once the army does block the conquest of power by another social group, institutional and personal self-interest combine to make the officers deathly fearful of the retaliation which may be visited upon them if they ever withhold their veto. Hence the incentives to intervene escalate, and the army becomes irreversably committed to insuring that the once-proscribed group never acquires office.

The Military and Political Development

In simple societies a sense of community makes possible the development of political institutions. In more complicated societies a primary, if not the primary, function of political institutions is to make the community more of a community. The interaction between the political order and the social order is thus a dynamic and dialectical one: initially the latter plays the major role in shaping the former, subsequently the former plays the more important role in creating the latter. Praetorian societies, however, are caught in a vicious circle. In its simpler forms the praetorian society lacks community and this obstructs the development of political institutions. In its more complicated forms, the lack of effective political institutions obstructs the development of community. As a result, strong tendencies exist in a praetorian society encouraging it to remain in that condition. Attitudes and behaviour patterns, once developed, tend to remain and to repeat themselves. Praetorian politics becomes embedded in the culture of the society.

When such conditions exist in a culture, the question necessarily arises: How can they be remedied? Under what circumstances is it possible to move from a society of politicized social forces to one in which there is legitimacy and authority? Can a praetorian society lift itself by its bootstraps? Where in such a society is there a fulcrum which can be used to move the society out of that condition? Who or what can create the common interests and the integrating institutions necessary to transform a praetorian society into a civic order?

These questions obviously have no obvious answers. Two generalizations, however, can perhaps be made about the movement of societies from praetorian disunity to civic order. First, the earlier this development takes place in the process of modernization and the expansion of political participation, the lower the costs which it imposes on society. Conversely, the more complex the society the more difficult it becomes to create integrating political institutions. Second, at each stage in the broadening of political participation, the opportunities for fruitful political action rest with different social groups and different types of political leaders. For societies in the radical praetorian phase, the leadership in the creation of durable political institutions obviously must come from middle-class social forces and must appeal to such forces.

The ability of the military to play this developmental role or even to play a modernizing role depends upon the combination of social forces in the society. The influence of the military in a praetorian society changes with the level of participation. In the oligarchical phase, little distinction usually exists between military and civilian leaders, and the political scene is dominated by generals or at least individuals bearing the title of general. By the time a society has moved into the radical-middle class phase, the officer corps has usually become more sharply delineated as an institution; influence is shared between military and other social forces; and a limited degree of political institutionalization may take place within the framework of a narrowly defined and non-expansible political system. Military intervention is frequently intermittent, with an alternation of military juntas and civilian ones and with the gradual emergence of more powerful, counterbalancing, civilian groups. Finally, in the mass praetorian phase, the influence of the military is circumscribed by the emergence of large, popular movements. Consequently, the opportunities for the creation of political institutions under military auspices are greatest in the early phases of radical praetorian society.

For a society to escape from praetorianism requires both the coalescence of urban and rural interests and the creation of new political institutions. The distinctive social aspect of radical praetorianism is the divorce of the city from the countryside: politics is dombat among middle-class urban groups, no one of which has reason to promote social consensus or political order. The social pre-condition of the establishment of stability is the reappearance in politics of the social forces dominant in the countryside. The intelligentsia has the brains; the military have the guns; the peasants, however, have the numbers and the votes. Political stability requires a coalition between at least two of these social forces. Given the hostility which usually develops between the two most politically articulate elements of the middle class, a coalition of brains and guns against numbers is rare indeed. If it does come into existence, as in Turkey during the Ataturk period, it provides only a temporary and fragile stability; eventually, it is overwhelmed by the entry of the rural masses into politics. A coalition between the intelligentsia and the peasants, in contrast, usually involves revolution: the destruction of the existing system as a prerequisite to the creation of a new, more stable one. The third route to stable government is by the coalescence of guns and numbers against brains. It is this possibility which offers the military in a radical praetorian society the opportunity to move their society from praetorianism to civic order.

The ability of the military to develop stable political institutions depends first upon their ability to identify their rule with the masses of the peasantry and to mobilize the peasantry into politics on their side. In many instances, this is precisely what modernizing military rulers who have come to power in the early stages of radical praetorianism have attempted to do. The support of rural elements is only a precondition to the development of political institutions by a military regime. Initially, the legitimacy of a modernizing military regime comes from the promise it offers for the future. But eventually, this declines as a source of legitimacy. If the regime does not develop a political structure which institutionalizes some principle of legitimacy, the result can only be a military oligarchy in which power is passed among the oligarchs by means of coups d'etat, and which also stands in danger of revolutionary overthrow by new social forces which it does not possess the institutional mechanisms for assimilating. The alternative is for the military to retain power but at the same time institutionalize it. There is no necessary conflict between their personal interests and those of political institutionalization. They can, in a sense, convert military *intervention* in politics into military *participation* in politics. Military intervention violates whatever rules of the game may exist and undermines the integrity of the political order and the basis of legitimacy. Military participation means playing the political game in order to create new political institutions. The initial intervention may be illegitimate, but it acquires legitimacy when it is converted into participation and the assumption of responsibility for the creation of new political institutions which will make impossible and unnecessary future interventions by both the military and other social forces. Intermittent military intervention to stop politics or to suspend politics is the essence of praetorianism. Sustained military participation in politics may lead a society away from praetorianism.

The principal obstacle to the military's playing this role in radical praetorian societies comes not from objective social and political conditions but from the subjective attitudes of the military toward politics and toward themselves. The problem is military opposition to politics. Military leaders can easily envision themselves in a guardian role; they can also picture themselves as the far-seeing impartial promoters of social and economic reform in their societies. But, with rare exceptions, they shrink from assuming the role of political organizer. In particular, they condemn political parties. They try to rule the state without parties, and they thereby cut off the one major way in which they could hope to move their countries out of their praetorian condition.

In Burma and Egypt, for instance, the efforts by military leaders to organize mass association to institutionalize participation and to legitimize their power came to naught. In both cases the leaders had to redirect their efforts to what was in fact, if not in name, a cadre party. In Pakistan, Ayub Khan's institutional innovations required the reintroduction of political parties to make them operate effectively. In all three cases, the leaders resisted political parties, but were eventually compelled either to accept them or to accept continued illegitimacy and instability. In other cases, military leaders have been more willing to organize political parties and to start the process of building modern political institutions which could create a basis of parmanent political stability and authority. Perhaps the most striking example of political institution-building by generals is Mexico, where at the end of the 1920s Calles and the other military leaders of the Revolution created the Mexican Revolutionary

Party and in effect institutionalized the Revolution. The creation of this institution made it possible for the political system to assimilate a variety of new social forces, labor and agrarian, which rose to prominence under Cardenas in the 1930s. It also created a political institution which was able to maintain the integrity of the political sphere against disruptive social forces. During the nineteenth century, Mexico had the worst record of military interventions in politics of any Latin American country. After the 1930s, its military stayed out of politics, and Mexico became one of the few Latin American countries possessing some form of institutional immunity to military coups d'etat.

The achievement of the Mexican military was duplicated by Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish generals without benefit of a complete social revolution. The Turkish Republican Peoples Party and the Mexican Revolutionary Institutional Party were both founded by political generals. In both cases, the bulk of the leadership of the party came from the ranks of the military. In both cases also, however, the party acquired an institutional existence apart from those groups who initially created it. In both parties (although more pronouncedly in Mexico than in Turkey) the military leaders were civilianized and civilian leaders in due course replaced military ones. Both parties, as well-organized political groupings, were able to establish an effective political counterweight to the military. In Mexico, the top leadership of the party and of the country was transferred from military to civilian hands in 1946. By 1958, military men accounted for only seven of twenty-nine state governors and two of eighteen cabinet ministers. "Inside the ruling party and inside the government itself, civilian professionals predominate", one expert observed in the early 1960s; "they are the real policy-makers. The army is under their control. On issues that do not concern the military establishment they can act without consulting the armed forces, and they can, and do at times, oppose it on military issues."[13] In Turkey a similar, although not quite as successful, process of civilianization also occurred through the mechanism of the ruling party. In 1924 the chief of staff was excluded from the cabinet. The number of former military officers in political positions gradually declined. In 1920, officers constituted 17% of the Grand National Assembly; in 1943, 12.5%; and in 1950 only 5%. At the death of Mustafa Kemal in 1938, leadership was transferred to his associate Ismet Inonu, who like Kemal had come out of the army but who had functioned for two decades in civilian roles. In 1948, the first cabinet was formed which did not include any former military officers, and in 1950, of course, elections were held in which the opposition party peacefully acquired power. A decade later, the efforts of the leadership of this party to suppress opposition provoked the Turkish military, in the name of the Kemalist tradition, to reenter politics and to establish a short-lived military regime, which in 1961 returned power to a freely elected civilian party regime. Mexico and Turkey are two noteworthy examples where parties came out of the womb in the army, political generals created a political party and the political party put an end to political generals.

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[13] Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York, Frederick Praeger, 1960), p.119.

In the two decades after World War II, the most notable effort by military men to duplicate the achievements of the Turkish and Mexican generals was made in Korea. For almost two years after he took power in South Korea in the summer of 1961, General Pak Chung Hee was under pressure by the United States to reestablish civilian rule and under pressure by the hardliners in his own army to retain power and keep the civilians out. He attempted to resolve this dilemma by promising elections in 1963 and arranging in a Kemalist manner to shift the base of his power from the army to a political party. In contrast to the military leaders of Egypt and Pakistan, those of Korea accepted and provided for political parties in the new constitution which they drew up for their country. Far from discouraging or forbidding parties, the constitution gave them special stress. In three years, a military junta transformed itself into a political institution. In three years, military intervention in politics with power based on the praetorian use of force had been converted into military participation in politics with authority based on popular support and legitimated by electoral competition.

The achievements of Ayub Khan in Pakistan, of Calles and Cardenas in Mexico, of Kemal and Inonu in Turkey, of Pak and Kim in Korea, plus those of others such as Rivera in El Salvador, show that military leaders can be effective builders of political institutions. Experience suggests that they can play this role most effectively in a society where social forces are not fully articulated, if they are willing to follow the Kemalist model. In many of these countries, the military leaders are intelligent, energetic, progressive. They are less corrupt - in the narrow sense - and more identified with national goals and national development than most civilians. Their problem is more often subjective than objective. For they must recognize that guardianship serves only to corrupt further the society which they wish to purify and that economic development without political institutionalization leads only to social stagnation. To move their society out of the praetorian cycle, they cannot stand above politics or attempt to stop politics. Instead they must make their way through politics.

At each level in the broadening of political participation, certain options or possibilities for evolution may exist, which if not acted upon disappear quickly. At the oligarchical level of praetorianism, a viable, expansible party system, depends upon the action of the aristocrats or oligarchs. If they take the initiative in the search for votes and the development of party organization, a country may well move out of its praetorian condition, in that phase. If it does not, if middle-class groups begin to participate in a praetorian political milieu, the opportunity to act passes to the military. For them modernization is not enough, and guardianship is too little. What is required of the military leaders is a more positive effort to shape a new political order. In many societies, the opportunity which the military have for political creativity may be the last real chance for political institutionalization,short of the totalitarian road. If the military fail to seize that opportunity, the broadening of participation transforms the society into a mass praetorian system. In such a system, the opportunity to create political institutions passes from the military, the apostles of order, to those other middle-class leaders who are the apostles of revolution.

In such a society, however, revolution and order may well become allies. Cliques, blocs, and mass movements struggle directly with each other, each with its own weapons. Violence is democratized, politics demoralized, society at odds with itself. The ultimate product of degeneration, is a peculiar reversal in political roles. The truly helpless society is not one threatened by revolution, but one incapable of it. In the normal polity, the conservative is devoted to stability, and the preservation of order, while the radical threatens these with abrupt and violent change. But what meaning do concepts of conservatism and radicalism have in a completely chaotic society where order must be created through a positive act of political will? In such a society who then is the radical? Who is the conservative? Is not the only true conservative the revolutionary?

NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR QUOTATION

INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
10th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

PROBLEMS OF MODERN STRATEGY: A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

COMMITTEE III

Friday 20th September Afternoon

Armed Forces and Social Change*

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

The Praetorian Pattern of Politics

Few aspects of modernization and social change are more striking or common than the intervention of the military in politics. Juntas and coups, military revolts and military regimes have been continuing phenomena in Latin American societies: they have been almost as prevalent in the Middle East. In the late 1950s and early 1960s many societies in southern and southeast Asia also came under military rule, and in the mid-1960s the coup contagion swept Africa. Military interventions apparently are an inseparable part of political modernization whatever the continent and whatever the country. They pose three problems for analysis. First, what are the causes of military intervention in the politics of modernizing countries? Second, what are the consequences of intervention for modernization and social change? Third, under what conditions may military intervention promote political development, that is, the emergence of stable and effective political institutions which reduce the probability of interventions?

The very prevalence of military intervention suggests that many of its commonly advanced causes lack persuasiveness. It has, for instance, been argued that American military assistance is a significant factor increasing the proclivities of armies to involve themselves in politics. Such assistance, it is said, encourages the political independence of the army and gives it extra power, extra leverage, and more motivation to take action against civilian political leaders. In some circumstances this argument may have a certain partial validity. But as the sole or principal cause of military interventions, military aid cannot be held guilty. Most countries which experienced military coups after receiving American military assistance experienced them equally often before they became the beneficiaries of Pentagon largesse. No convincing evidence exists of a correlation between the American military aid and military involvement in politics. And, it must be pointed out, the opposite hypothesis also is not true: the hopes of many people that the propensity of foreign military to intervene would be reduced by courses at Leavenworth, indoctrination in Anglo-American doctrines of civilian supremacy, and association with professionalized American military officers have also turned to naught. Military aid and military training are by themselves politically sterile: they neither encourage nor reduce the tendencies of military officers to play a political role.[1]

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* This paper is adapted from my forth-coming Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven & London, Yale University Press, 1968), Ch. 4.

It is equally fallacious to attempt to explain military interventions in politics primarily by reference to the internal structure of the military or the social background of the officers doing the intervening. Morris Janowitz, for instance, looks for the causes of military intervention in politics in the "characteristics of the military establishment" of the country, and attempts to relate the propensity and ability of military officers to intervene in politics to their "ethos of public service", their skill structure, which combines managerial ability with a heroic posture, their middle-class and lower middle-class social origins, and their internal cohesion.[2] Some evidence supports these connections, but much other evidence does not. His effort to answer the question, "What characteristics of the military establishment of a new nation facilitate its involvement in domestic politics?" is misdirected because the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of the society.

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[1] On Latin America, see Charles Wolf., Jr., United States Policy and the Third World: Problems and Analysis (Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1967), chap. 5, and John Duncan Powell, "Military Assistance and Militarism in Latin America, "Western Political Quarterly, 18 (June 1965), 382-92

[2] Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964) pp. 1, 27-29

Military explanations do not explain military interventions. The reason for this is simply that military interventions are only one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon in underdeveloped societies: the general politicization of social forces and institutions. In such societies, politics lacks autonomy, complexity, coherence, and adaptability.[3] All sorts of social forces and groups become directly engaged in general politics. Countries which have political armies also have political clergies, political universities, political bureaucracies, political labour unions, and political corporations. Society as a whole is out-of-joint, not just the military. All these specialized groups tend to become involved in politics dealing with general political issues: not just issues which affect their own particular institutional interest or groups, but issues which affect society as a whole. In every society, military men engage in politics to promote higher pay and larger military forces, even in political systems such as those of the United States and the Soviet Union, which have almost impeccable systems of civilian control. In underdeveloped societies the military are concerned not only with pay and promotion, although they are concerned with that, but also with the distribution of power and status throughout the political system. Their goals are general and diffuse as well as limited and concrete. So also with other social groups. Colonels and generals, students and professors, Moslem ulema and Buddhist monks, all become directly involved in politics as a whole.

Corruption in a limited sense refers to the intervention of wealth in the political sphere. Praetorianism in a limited sense refers to the intervention of the military in politics, and clericalism to the participation of religious leaders. As yet no good word describes extensive student participation in politics. All these terms, however, refer to different aspects of the same phenomenon, the politicization of social forces. Here, for the sake of brevity, the phrase "praetorian society" is used to refer to such a politicized society with the understanding that this refers to the participation not only of the military but of other social forces as well.[4]

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[3] See my "Political Development and Political Decay", World Politics, 17 April 1965), 386-430.

[4] See David Rappoport, "A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types", in Samuel P. Huntington, ed., Changing Patterns of Military Politics (New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962), pp. 71-100.

The same causes which produce military interventions in politics in praetorian societies are also responsible for the political involvements of labor unions, businessmen,, students, and clergy. These causes lie not in the nature of the group but in the structure of society. In particular they lie in the absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group political action. In a praetorian system social forces confront each other nakedly; no political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders, are recognized or accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict. Equally important, no agreement exists among the groups as to the legitimate and authoritative methods for resolving conflicts. In an institutionalized polity most political actors agree on the procedures to be used for the resolution of political disputes, that is, for the allocation of office and the determination of policy. Office may be assigned through election, heredity, examination, lot, or some combination of these and other means. Policy issues may be resolved by hierarchical processes, by petitions, hearing, and appeals, by majority votes, by consultation and consensus or through yet other means. But, in any event, general agreement exists as to what those means are, and the groups participating in the political game recognize their obligation to employ those means. This is true of both western constitutional democracies and communist dictatorships. In a praetorian society, however, not only are the actors varied, but so also are the methods used to decide upon office and policy. Each group employs means which reflect its peculiar nature and capabilities. The wealthy bribe; students riot; workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the military coup. In the absence of accepted procedures, all these forms of direct action are found on the political scene. The techniques of military intervention are simply more dramatic and effective than the others because, as Hobbes put it, "When nothing else is turned up, clubs are trumps".[5]

1 Definition

A praetorian society thus lacks community and effective political institutions. These conditions can exist at various levels in the evolution of political participation. In a society with participation limited to a small oligarchy, the actors in politics are relatively homogeneous even in the absence of effective political institutions. Community is more the product of social ties than political action. As political participation broadens, however, the actors in politics become more numerous and their methods of political action are more diverse. As a result, conflict becomes more intense in the middle-class radical praetorian society and still more so in the mass praetorian society. In all stages of praetorianism, social forces interact directly with each other and make little or no effort to relate their private interest to a public good. In a praetorian oligarchy, politics is a struggle among personal and family cliques: in a radical praetorian society the struggle among institutional and occupational groups supplements that among cliques: in mass praetorianism social classes and social movements dominate the scene. The increase in size, strength, and diversity of social forces makes the tension and conflict among them less and less tolerable. In an institutionalized, civic polity, the participation of new groups in the political system reduces tensions: through participation, new groups are assimilated into the political order: as, for instance, the classic case of the extension of the suffrage in Great Britain. In praetorian societies, however, the participation of new groups exacerbates rather than reduces tensions. It multiplies the resources and methods which are employed in political action and thus contributes to the disintegration of the polity. New groups are mobilized but not assimilated. The expansion of political participation in Great Britain made Disraeli's two nations into one. The expansion of participation in Argentina has made the same two nations into mortal enemies.

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[5] Quoted by Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations (Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 170

The stability of a civic polity thus varies directly with the scope of political participation. Its durability declines as participation rises. Praetorian oligarchies may last centuries: middle-class systems decades: mass praetorian systems usually only a few years. Either the mass praetorian system becomes stabilized through the conquest of power by a totalitarian party, as in Weimar Germany, or the more traditional elites attempt to reduce the level of participation through authoritarian means, as in Argentina. In a society without effective political institutions and unable to develop them, the end result of social and economic modernization is political chaos.

The Military: Reformers or Conservatives?

In the 1960s scholars spent much ink and time debating whether the military play basically a progressive or a conservative role in modernization. Most seemed to agree that in the Middle East the military were typically the proponents of change; the army, as Halpern said, is "the vanguard of nationalism and social reform"; it is the most cohesive and disciplined element in "the new middle class" whose"thrust towards revolutionary action... is overwhelming". With respect to Latin America, however, no such consensus existed; proponents of both the progressive and the conservative views made impressive cases out of fact, logic, and statistics.[6]

Both cases were right. Latin America is simply more varied than the Middle East. Except for Turkey, virtually all Middle Eastern praetorian or semi-praetorian societies were still in the process after World War II of expanding political participation from the oligarchy to the middle class. Military officers are drawn from middle-class backgrounds and perform middle-class functions in a professionalized, bureaucratic environment. Where the basic issues of politics involve the displacement of the oligarchy and the accession to power of the middle class, the military necessarily are on the side of reform. This was also true in Latin America. In the more advanced Latin American societies - Argentina, Chile, Brazil - the military played a reforming role in the early part of the twentieth century. During and after World War II military officers led or cooperated in middle-class reform movements in Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Venezuela. In these cases, as in Egypt (1952), Syria (1949), and Iraq (1958), the military led "break-through" coups displacing oligarchical elements from power and inaugurating efforts at modernization and reform.

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[6] Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 75, 253. For the modernizing argument on the military in southeast Asia, see Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Modernization", in John J. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 69-90. On Latin America, the conservative interpretation is argued by Edwin Lieuwen in Generals vs. Presidents (New York, Frederick Praeger, 1964) and by Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America", American Political Science Review, 60 (September, 1966), 616-26. A more progressive role for the military is stressed by John C. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964).

The frequency of military coups in Latin America, Jose Nun has shown, has no relation to the size of the middle class.[7] Praetorian politics exists at all stages of social mobilization and the expansion of political participation. The impact and significance of military intervention in politics, however, does vary with the size of the middle class. In Latin America in the 1950s, in those countries where the middle and upper classes were very small, less than 8% of the total population, (Nicaragua, Honduras, Dominican Republic, and Haiti), politics was still in the personalistic, oligarchical style, and the middle-class military reformer had yet to appear on the scene. In those societies where the middle class was larger, between 8% and 15% of the total population, the dominant groups in the military typically played a more modernizing and reforming role in the 1930s and 1940s. These societies included Guatemala, Bolivia, El Salvador, Ecuador, and Peru. Panama and Paraguay, with upper and middle classes in 1950 estimated at 15% and 14% respectively, were in some respects deviants from this pattern. Among those larger and more complex societies, where the middle class constituted 15% to 36% of the total population, the military either abstained from politics and were a primarily professional force (Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Mexico) or they intervened in politics to play an increasingly conservative political role (Argentina, Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil).

As society changes, so does the role of the military. In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the middle-class world he is a participant and arbiter; as the mass society looms on the horizon he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order. Thus, paradoxically, but understandably, the more backward a society is, the more progressive the role of its military; the more advanced a society becomes, the more conservative and reactionary becomes the role of its military. In 1890 Argentine officers founded the Logia Militar to promote reform. Thirty years later they founded the Logia San Martin which opposed reform and incubated the 1930 coup designed by its promoters to restore the "stable constitutional democracy" which was being subverted by the "mass-ocracy" of President Yrigoyen.[8]

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[7] Jose Nun, "A Latin American Phenomenon: The Middle Class Military Coup", in Institute of International Studies, Trends in Social Science Research in Latin American Studies: A Conference Report (Berkeley, University of California, 1965), pp. 68-69. Nun here reproduces the estimates of the Latin American middle class made by Gino Germani, Politica y Sociedad en una Epoca de Transicion (Buenos Aires Editorial Paidos, 1962), pp. 169-70, and I have, in turn, relied on them in my analysis in this paragraph.

[8] Liisa North, Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and Peru, Politics of Modernization Series, 2 (Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1966), pp. 26-27, 30-33.

So also, in Turkey, the Young Turks in 1908 and the Kemalists in the 1920s played highly progressive reforming roles similar to those which the military after World War II assumed in other Middle Eastern countries. By that time in Turkey, however, the military were intervening in politics to curb the rise to power of a new business class supported by the peasants. The soldiers had not changed; they still supported the reforms of the Kemalist era. But they were now unwilling to admit to power social classes which might make changes in those reforms.

The extent to which military institutions and individuals become politicized is a function of the weakness of civilian political organizations and the inability of civilian political leaders to deal with the principal policy problems facing the country. The extent to which a politicized officer corps plays a conservative or a reform role in politics is a function of the expansion of political participation in the society.

2

Different rôles

The instability and coups associated with the emergence of the middle class are due to changes in the nature of the military; those associated with the emergence of the lower class are due to changes in the nature of the society. In the former case, the military are modernized and develop concepts of efficiency, honesty, and nationalism which alienate them from the existing order. They intervene in politics to bring society abreast of the military. They are the advance guard of the middle class and spearhead its breakthrough into the political arena. They promote social and economic reform, national integration, and, in some measure, the extension of political participation. Once middle-class urban groups become the dominant elements in politics, the military assume an arbitral or stabilizing role. If a society is able to move from middle class to mass participation with fairly well-developed political institutions (such as in Latin America-Chile, Uruguay and Mexico), the military assume a non-political, specialized, professional role characteristic of systems with "objective" civilian control. Chile, Uruguay, and Mexico were, indeed, the only Latin American countries in which there were no military coups d'etat during the two decades after World War II. If, however, a society moves into the phase of mass participation without developing effective political institutions, the military become engaged in a conservative effort to protect the existing system against the incursions of the lower classes, particularly the urban lower classes. They become the guardians of the existing middle-class order. They are thus, in a sense, the door-keepers in the expansion of political participation in a praetorian society: their historical role

oligarchic
middle class
mass

is to open the door to the middle class and to close it on the lower class. The radical phase of a praetorian society begins with a bright, modernizing military coup toppling the oligarchy and heralding the emergence of enlightenment into politics. It ends in a succession of frustrating and unwholesome rearguard efforts to block the lower classes from scaling the heights of political power.

The guardian role of the military is legitimated by an impressive rationale, which is persuasive to many armies and often persuasive to American opinion leaders. Military involvement in politics is intermittent and for limited purposes, and hence the military view themselves neither as the modernizers of society nor as the creators of a new political order but rather as the guardians and perhaps the purifiers of the existing order. The army, in the words of President (and Air Force general) Barrientos of Bolivia, should be the country's "tutelary institution.. watching zealously over the fulfilling of laws and the virtue of governments."[9] Military intervention, consequently, is prompted by the corruption, stagnation, stalemate, anarchy, subversion, of the established political system. Once these are eliminated, the military claim that they can then return the purified polity to the hands of the civilian leaders. Their job is simply to straighten out the mess and then to get out. Theirs is a temporary dictatorship - erhaps somewhat on the Roman model.

The ideology of guardianship varies little from country to country. It is most developed, naturally enough, in Latin America, where praetorianism and political participation are both widely prevalent. The army should intervene in politics, as one Argentine general put it, to deal with "the great disasters that can imperil our national stability and integrity, leaving aside the small disasters that any attempt to repair will only serve to separate us from our mission and hamper a clear perception of our duty". Many Latin American constitutions implicitly or explicitly recognize the guardian function of the military. The Peruvian military, for instance, have justified their actions in barring the Apristas from power by the constitutional provision that: "The purpose of the armed force is to assure the law of the Republic, compliance with the Constitution and laws, and the conservation of public order".[10] The military in a sense

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[9] Quoted by Christopher Rand, "Letter from La Paz", New Yorker (December 31, 1966) p.50

[10] Major General Julio Alsogaray, New York Times (March 6, 1966), p.26; Rosendo A. Gomez, "Peru: The Politics of Military Guardianship", in Martin C. Needler, ed., Political Systems of Latin America (Princeton, D. Van Nostrand Company, 1964), pp. 301-02

([illegible] the [illegible] King in Eng. of XIX cent.)

assume constitutional functions analogous to those of the Supreme Court of the United States: they have a responsibility to preserve the political order and hence are drawn into politics at times of crisis or controversy to veto actions by the "political" branches of government which deviate from the essentials of that system. Yet they are also concerned about their own institutional integrity and hence divided among themselves in the military equivalents of "judicial activists" and "judicial self-restrainers". The extent to which the military are locked in a middle-class outlook suggests that the expectations that the military will increasingly become a force for reform are likely to be unfounded. It has, for instance, been suggested that the future will see the emergence of a Latin American Nasserism, that is, "the assumption by Latin American armed forces of the same kind of modernizing and reforming responsibilities that the military have assumed in the Near East."[11] Many Latin Americans, civilians as well as colonels, see a Nasserite solution as the most promising path toward social, economic, and political development. These hopes have little chance of realization. Most Latin American societies are beyond the possibilities of Nasserism. They are too complex, too highly articulated, too far advanced economically to be susceptible to salvation by military reform. As Latin America has modernized, the role of the military has become more conservative. Between 1935 and 1944, 50% of the coups in Latin America had reformist objectives of changing the economic and social status quo; between 1945 and 1954, 23% of the coups had these objectives; between 1955 and 1964, only 17% did.[12] To say that the Brazil of the 1960s needed a Nasser was somewhat like saying that the Russia of the 1960s needed a Stolypin. The two types of leadership were simply irrelevant to the stage of development which these societies had reached. In the 1960s, an Iran or an Ethiopia could use a Stolypin, and in Latin America there was perhaps room for a Nasser in Haiti, Paraguay, Nicaragua, or even the Dominican Republic. But the rest of the continent was simply too highly developed for such an attractively simple panacea.

As society becomes more complex, it becomes more difficult for military officers, first, to exercise power effectively and then to seize power successfully. As a reasonably small, socially homogeneous and highly disciplined and coherent group, the dominant elements in the officer corps can act reasonably effectively as a leadership cadre in a society which is still relatively uncomplex and undifferentiated. As the praetorian society becomes more complex and differentiated, the number of social groups and forces multiplies and the problems of coordination and interest aggregation become increasingly complex. In the absence of effective central political institutions for the resolution of social conflicts, the military become simply one of several relatively insulated and autonomous social forces. Their capacity to elicit support and to induce cooperation declines. In addition, of course, military officers are not necessarily skilled in the esoteric arts of negotiation, compromise, and mass appeal which are required for political action in a complex society. A more simple society can be spurred, commanded, and led toward an objective. But where social differentiation is well advanced, the political leader must be a balancer and compromiser. The tendency of the military to choose a guardian role in the more complex societies in itself indicates some awareness of the difficulties of integrating social forces.

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[11] Lieuwen, Generals vs. Presidents, p. 138. See pp. 136-41 for good evaluation of possibilities and obstacles to Latin American Nasserism.

[12] Needler, "Political Development". pp. 619-20

The seizure of power by the military in a coup designed to veto the expansion of political participation brings only temporary relief to the political system. The groups which participate in the coup are usually united only by their desire to stop or to reverse the tendencies which they consider subversive of political order. Once the military are in power, the coup coalition begins to split. It may fragment into small cliques, each attempting to push its own ends. More frequently, it divides into two broad factions: the radicals and the moderates, the hard-liners and the soft-liners, the gorilas and the legalistas. The struggle between the moderates and the radicals may focus on a number of issues, but typically the key issue is the return of power to civilians. Invariably, the junta which comes to power in a veto coup promises a quick surrender of power and return to normal civilian rule. The hard-liners argue, however, that the military must stay in power to bar permanently the civilian groups which they ousted from power and to impose structural reforms on the political system. The hard-liners are usually etatist in economics and authoritarian in politics. The moderates, on the other hand, usually view the aims of the coup as more limited. Once the objectionable political leaders have been removed from the scene and a few political and administrative changes introduced, they feel that they have done their job, and they are ready to retire to the political sidelines. As in the break-through coups which mark the rise of the middle-class to political action, the moderates in the veto coups usually come to power first. They are moderate, however, not because they are willing to compromise with the existing oligarchy, but because they may be willing to compromise with the emerging mass movements. The radicals, on the other hand, resist the expansion of political participation. In the break-through coup, the radical does not compromise with the oligarchy; in the veto coup the radical does not compromise with the masses. One hastens history; the other resists it.

The basic dilemma in the guardian role involves the two assumptions that the army is above politics and that the army should intervene in politics to prevent changes in the political system. The guardian role of the military is based on the premise that the causes of military intervention arise from temporary and extraordinary disruptions of the political system. In fact, however, the causes are endemic to the political system and are the unavoidable consequence of the modernization of society. They cannot be removed simply by eliminating people. In addition, once the army does block the conquest of power by another social group, institutional and personal self-interest combine to make the officers deathly fearful of the retaliation which may be visited upon them if they ever withhold their veto. Hence the incentives to intervene escalate, and the army becomes irreversably committed to insuring that the once-proscribed group never acquires office.

The Military and Political Development

In simple societies a sense of community makes possible the development of political institutions. In more complicated societies a primary, if not the primary, function of political institutions is to make the community more of a community. The interaction between the political order and the social order is thus a dynamic and dialectical one: initially the latter plays the major role in shaping the former, subsequently the former plays the more important role in creating the latter. Praetorian societies, however, are caught in a vicious circle. In its simpler forms the praetorian society lacks community and this obstructs the development of political institutions. In its more complicated forms, the lack of effective political institutions obstructs the development of community. As a result, strong tendencies exist in a praetorian society encouraging it to remain in that condition. Attitudes and behaviour patterns, once developed, tend to remain and to repeat themselves. Praetorian politics becomes embedded in the culture of the society.

3 How to move from praet. to inst.

When such conditions exist in a culture, the question necessarily arises: How can they be remedied? Under what circumstances is it possible to move from a society of politicized social forces to one in which there is legitimacy and authority? Can a praetorian society lift itself by its bootstraps? Where in such a society is there a fulcrum which can be used to move the society out of that condition? Who or what can create the common interests and the integrating institutions necessary to transform a praetorian society into a civic order?

These questions obviously have no obvious answers. Two generalizations, however, can perhaps be made about the movement of societies from praetorian disunity to civic order. First, the earlier this development takes place in the process of modernization and the expansion of political participation, the lower the costs which it imposes on society. Conversely, the more complex the society the more difficult it becomes to create integrating political institutions. Second, at each stage in the broadening of political participation, the opportunities for fruitful political action rest with different social groups and different types of political leaders. For societies in the radical praetorian phase, the leadership in the creation of durable political institutions obviously must come from middle-class social forces and must appeal to such forces.

The ability of the military to play this developmental role or even to play a modernizing role depends upon the combination of social forces in the society. The influence of the military in a praetorian society changes with the level of participation. In the oligarchical phase, little distinction usually exists between military and civilian leaders, and the political scene is dominated by generals or at least individuals bearing the title of general. By the time a society has moved into the radical-middle class phase, the officer corps has usually become more sharply delineated as an institution; influence is shared between military and other social forces; and a limited degree of political institutionalization may take place within the framework of a narrowly defined and non-expansible political system. Military intervention is frequently intermittent, with an alternation of military juntas and civilian ones and with the gradual emergence of more powerful, counterbalancing, civilian groups. Finally, in the mass praetorian phase, the influence of the military is circumscribed by the emergence of large, popular movements. Consequently, the opportunities for the creation of political institutions under military auspices are greatest in the early phases of radical praetorian society.

For a society to escape from praetorianism requires both the coalescence of urban and rural interests and the creation of new political institutions. The distinctive social aspect of radical praetorianism is the divorce of the city from the countryside: politics is combat among middle-class urban groups, no one of which has reason to promote social consensus or political order. The social pre-condition of the establishment of stability is the reappearance in politics of the social forces dominant in the countryside. The intelligentsia has the brains; the military have the guns; the peasants, however, have the numbers and the votes. Political stability requires a coalition between at least two of these social forces. Given the hostility which usually develops between the two most politically articulate elements of the middle class, a coalition of brains and guns against numbers is rare indeed. If it does come into existence, as in Turkey during the Ataturk period, it provides only a temporary and fragile stability; eventually, it is overwhelmed by the entry of the rural masses into politics. A coalition between the intelligentsia and the peasants, in contrast, usually involves revolution: the destruction of the existing system as a prerequisite to the creation of a new, more stable one. The third route to stable government is by the coalescence of guns and numbers against brains. It is this possibility which offers the military in a radical praetorian society the opportunity to move their society from praetorianism to civic order.

The ability of the military to develop stable political institutions depends first upon their ability to identify their rule with the masses of the peasantry and to mobilize the peasantry into politics on their side. In many instances, this is precisely what modernizing military rulers who have come to power in the early stages of radical praetorianism have attempted to do. The support of rural elements is only a precondition to the development of political institutions by a military regime. Initially, the legitimacy of a modernizing military regime comes from the promise it offers for the future. But eventually, this declines as a source of legitimacy. If the regime does not develop a political structure which institutionalizes some principle of legitimacy, the result can only be a military oligarchy in which power is passed among the oligarchs by means of coups d'etat, and which also stands in danger of revolutionary overthrow by new social forces which it does not possess the institutional mechanisms for assimilating. The alternative is for the military to retain power but at the same time institutionalize it. There is no necessary conflict between their personal interests and those of political institutionalization. They can, in a sense, convert military *intervention* in politics into military *participation* in politics. Military intervention violates whatever rules of the game may exist and undermines the integrity of the political order and the basis of legitimacy. Military participation means playing the political game in order to create new political institutions. The initial intervention may be illegitimate, but it acquires legitimacy when it is converted into participation and the assumption of responsibility for the creation of new political institutions which will make impossible and unnecessary future interventions by both the military and other social forces. Intermittent military intervention to stop politics or to suspend politics is the essence of praetorianism. Sustained military participation in politics may lead a society away from praetorianism.

The principal obstacle to the military's playing this role in radical praetorian societies comes not from objective social and political conditions but from the subjective attitudes of the military toward politics and toward themselves. The problem is military opposition to politics. Military leaders can easily envision themselves in a guardian role; they can also picture themselves as the far-seeing impartial promoters of social and economic reform in their societies. But, with rare exceptions, they shrink from assuming the role of political organizer. In particular, they condemn political parties. They try to rule the state without parties, and they thereby cut off the one major way in which they could hope to move their countries out of their praetorian condition.

In Burma and Egypt, for instance, the efforts by military leaders to organize mass association to institutionalize participation and to legitimize their power came to naught. In both cases the leaders had to redirect their efforts to what was in fact, if not in name, a cadre party. In Pakistan, Ayub Khan's institutional innovations required the reintroduction of political parties to make them operate effectively. In all three cases, the leaders resisted political parties, but were eventually compelled either to accept them or to accept continued illegitimacy and instability. In other cases, military leaders have been more willing to organize political parties and to start the process of building modern political institutions which could create a basis of parmanent political stability and authority. Perhaps the most striking example of political institution-building by generals is Mexico, where at the end of the 1920s Calles and the other military leaders of the Revolution created the Mexican Revolutionary

Party and in effect institutionalized the Revolution. The creation of this institution made it possible for the political system to assimilate a variety of new social forces, labor and agrarian, which rose to prominence under Cardenas in the 1930s. It also created a political institution which was able to maintain the integrity of the political sphere against disruptive social forces. During the nineteenth century, Mexico had the worst record of military interventions in politics of any Latin American country. After the 1930s, its military stayed out of politics, and Mexico became one of the few Latin American countries possessing some form of institutional immunity to military coups d'etat.

The achievement of the Mexican military was duplicated by Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish generals without benefit of a complete social revolution. The Turkish Republican Peoples Party and the Mexican Revolutionary Institutional Party were both founded by political generals. In both cases, the bulk of the leadership of the party came from the ranks of the military. In both cases also, however, the party acquired an institutional existence apart from those groups who initially created it. In both parties (although more pronouncedly in Mexico than in Turkey) the military leaders were civilianized and civilian leaders in due course replaced military ones. Both parties, as well-organized political groupings, were able to establish an effective political counterweight to the military. In Mexico, the top leadership of the party and of the country was transferred from military to civilian hands in 1946. By 1958, military men accounted for only seven of twenty-nine state governors and two of eighteen cabinet ministers. "Inside the ruling party and inside the government itself, civilian professionals predominate", one expert observed in the early 1960s; "they are the real policy-makers. The army is under their control. On issues that do not concern the military establishment they can act without consulting the armed forces, and they can, and do at times, oppose it on military issues."[13] In Turkey a similar, although not quite as successful, process of civilianization also occurred through the mechanism of the ruling party. In 1924 the chief of staff was excluded from the cabinet. The number of former military officers in political positions gradually declined. In 1920, officers constituted 17% of the Grand National Assembly; in 1943, 12.5%; and in 1950 only 5%. At the death of Mustafa Kemal in 1938, leadership was transferred to his associate Ismet Inonu, who like Kemal had come out of the army but who had functioned for two decades in civilian roles. In 1948, the first cabinet was formed which did not include any former military officers, and in 1950, of course, elections were held in which the opposition party peacefully acquired power. A decade later, the efforts of the leadership of this party to suppress opposition provoked the Turkish military, in the name of the Kemalist tradition, to reenter politics and to establish a short-lived military regime, which in 1961 returned power to a freely elected civilian party regime. Mexico and Turkey are two noteworthy examples where parties came out of the womb in the army, political generals created a political party and the political party put an end to political generals.

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[13] Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York, Frederick Praeger, 1960), p.119.

In the two decades after World War II, the most notable effort by military men to duplicate the achievements of the Turkish and Mexican generals was made in Korea. For almost two years after he took power in South Korea in the summer of 1961, General Pak Chung Hee was under pressure by the United States to reestablish civilian rule and under pressure by the hardliners in his own army to retain power and keep the civilians out. He attempted to resolve this dilemma by promising elections in 1963 and arranging in a Kemalist manner to shift the base of his power from the army to a political party. In contrast to the military leaders of Egypt and Pakistan, those of Korea accepted and provided for political parties in the new constitution which they drew up for their country. Far from discouraging or forbidding parties, the constitution gave them special stress. In three years, a military junta transformed itself into a political institution. In three years, military intervention in politics with power based on the praetorian use of force had been converted into military participation in politics with authority based on popular support and legitimated by electoral competition.

The achievements of Ayub Khan in Pakistan, of Calles and Cardenas in Mexico, of Kemal and Inonu in Turkey, of Pak and Kim in Korea, plus those of others such as Rivera in El Salvador, show that military leaders can be effective builders of political institutions. Experience suggests that they can play this role most effectively in a society where social forces are not fully articulated, if they are willing to follow the Kemalist model. In many of these countries, the military leaders are intelligent, energetic, progressive. They are less corrupt - in the narrow sense - and more identified with national goals and national development than most civilians. Their problem is more often subjective than objective. For they must recognize that guardianship serves only to corrupt further the society which they wish to purify and that economic development without political institutionalization leads only to social stagnation. To move their society out of the praetorian cycle, they cannot stand above politics, or attempt to stop politics. Instead they must make their way through politics.

At each level in the broadening of political participation, certain options or possibilities for evolution may exist, which if not acted upon disappear quickly. At the oligarchical level of praetorianism, a viable, expansible party system, depends upon the action of the aristocrats or oligarchs. If they take the initiative in the search for votes and the development of party organization, a country may well move out of its praetorian condition, in that phase. If it does not, if middle-class groups begin to participate in a praetorian political milieu, the opportunity to act passes to the military. For them modernization is not enough, and guardianship is too little. What is required of the military leaders is a more positive effort to shape a new political order. In many societies, the opportunity which the military have for political creativity may be the last real chance for political institutionalization, short of the totalitarian road. If the military fail to seize that opportunity, the broadening of participation transforms the society into a mass praetorian system. In such a system, the opportunity to create political institutions passes from the military, the apostles of order, to those other middle-class leaders who are the apostles of revolution.

In such a society, however, revolution and order may well become allies. Cliques, blocs, and mass movements struggle directly with each other, each with its own weapons. Violence is democratized, politics demoralized, society at odds with itself. The ultimate product of degeneration, is a peculiar reversal in political roles. The truly helpless society is not one threatened by revolution, but one incapable of it. In the normal polity, the conservative is devoted to stability, and the preservation of order, while the radical threatens these with abrupt and violent change. But what meaning do concepts of conservatism and radicalism have in a completely chaotic society where order must be created through a positive act of political will? In such a society who then is the radical? Who is the conservative? Is not the only true conservative the revolutionary?

NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR QUOTATION

INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
10th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

PROBLEMS OF MODERN STRATEGY: A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

COMMITTEE III

Saturday 21st September | Morning

The Strategic Uses of Revolutionary War

BRIAN CROZIER

1. Concept and Technique

Traditionally, guerrilla war and insurgency are tactical concepts. During the past twenty years, however, a variant of small-scale action known as "people's revolutionary" war has emerged as a strategic technique. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the strategic possibilities and limitations of this technique, in the light of recent history. I shall attempt to show that people's revolutionary war, though capable of dramatic strategic successes - as in China, Vietnam and Algeria - is a weapon of limited potency when used by a Power far from the field of military action. This conclusion is, at any rate, strongly suggested by the experience of the past few years in Africa and Latin America.

Although the concept of people's revolutionary war emerged during the Chinese civil war, it is more properly described as a Sino-Vietnamese theory. Certain individual, though in practice ineffectual, modifications were made as a consequence of Fidel Castro's successful insurrections in Cuba. Care must be taken, however, to distinguish between theory and practice, between technique and theory.

In China, Mao Tse-tung assumed popular support for his revolutionary guerrillas in the theoretical writings distilled from his experience in fighting the Japanese occupying forces and the army of Chiang Kai-shek's central government. In the special circumstances of China in the 1930's and 1940's, he does in fact appear to have achieved popular support. China was entering the final and agonizing phase of a century of foreign occupation, humiliation, civil conflict and general disorder. Chiang Kai-shek's régime, though itself revolutionary in a republican and nationalistic sense, was both corrupt and brutal; landlordism, warlordism and the effect of China's population explosion, all afflicted the peasantry.

By promising land to the peasants and enforcing a strict code of courtesy and consideration for agricultural needs on his soldiers, Mao achieved the practical ideal enshrined in his famous dictum about the army moving among the people as a fish in water. He could offer protection against the depredations of the warlords and of the Kuomintang army. The fact that China was occupied by Japan added a further dimension to his revolutionary war effort. The peasant soldiers who rallied to his banner did so from patriotic as well as other motives. Indeed, the needs of patriotism and revolution happily co-incided. An important consequence of these favourable circumstances was that Mao had no need, broadly speaking, to resort to coercive terrorism during his years of military struggle.

The enormous size of the country was yet another advantage to Mao. His concept of "protracted war" spanned three stages. During the first, the revolutionary forces, being relatively weak, must be prepared to retreat. Unhampered by a cumbersome supply machine, the guerrillas could withdraw, if necessary, over thousands of miles. The pursuing forces, whether Japanese or Kuomintang, could follow only up to a point. The time would come when they must stop to consolidate their territorial gains, their lines of communication having been stretched to near breaking point. Once the pursuing forces were immobilized, the revolutionary guerrillas could begin harrassing them, in the second stage, during which they would capture as many weapons as possible and set about training and equipping a regular army. The third stage was that of the "revolutionary final offensive". Exhausted and demoralized, and surrounded by a hostile population permeated by the revolutionaries, the enemy forces would face inevitable defeat. By this time, the revolutionary army, itself strong, well-equipped and experienced, could deal the death blow.

In both Indochina wars, patriotism was also a powerful rallying cry - first against the French and later against the Americans. But the relatively restricted and congested territory available to the guerrillas in Vietnam ruled out the protracted geographical attrition that had been possible in China. Moreover, until 1949 (when the French-sponsored Bao Dai administration took office in Saigon), the Vietnamese revolutionaries lacked the "advantage" of an indigenous central administration that could be blamed for oppressing or neglecting the peasant, and thus serve as a rallying cry to supplement that of patriotism against the foreign occupier. Indeed, from 1945 to 1949, the only indigenous administration worthy of the name was that of Ho Chi Minh's own Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which the ex-Emperor Bao Dai himself served for a while. All three of the major figures in the Vietnamese revolution - Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap and Truong Chinh - were deeply influenced by China's example.

The theories of revolutionary war elaborated by the second and third of the triumvirate reflected this debt.

On the political front, too, they borrowed from Mao Tse-tung, and the Vietminh, or League for the independence of Vietnam, drew heavily on Mao's "united front" policy. Initially, the Vietminh attracted a wide spectrum of Vietnamese nationalists, and this was important, in the early stages, in giving a "patriotic" character to the revolution. When the true communist character of Ho's régime became apparent, however, many of the non-communist nationalists - including Bao dai - deserted Hanoi. The French were very late in taking advantage of this development, and their lateness must be deemed one of the causes of their final defeat.

Whatever the causes, the Vietnamese Communists resorted both disruptive and coercive terrorism during both Indochina wars. The disruptive terrorism - including attacks on the French community - were to some extent "legitimate", in that they were aimed at the main enemy. In South Vietnam, however, a non-communist member of the Vietminh, Nguyen Binh, developed coercive methods of terror against the civilian population which were to become sadly characteristic of both Indochina wars. In the war against the French - as in the Malayan Emergency some years later - coercive terrorism was undoubtedly used to counter-productive excess. In the second Indochina war, on the whole, coercive terrorism was far more selectively applied; though it continued to be an indispensable element in the Vietnamese Communist approach.

Since we are concerned here with the strategic uses that may be made of the new technique of revolutionary war, it may be useful to point out that:-

1. Mao's forces did not defeat Japan's in a strategic sense.
2. They did defeat Chiang's army, but only after the Russians, in their last-hour-offensive, had handed over vast quantities of seized nationalist arms and equipment in Manchuria.
3. Chiang's régime largely collapsed because of its own internal "contradictions", i.e. corruption, inflation and demoralization.
4. Though disastrous, especially in terms of morale, Giap's defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu was not in itself strategically decisive. The French could have fought on. France's collapse was due to a combination of domestic factors, including war weariness, the weakness of successive governments, the high cost of the war in human as well as financial terms, and so on. For reasons that need not be elaborated here, Bao Dai's administration did not prove an alternative focus of nationalist support.

5. The geographical proximity of China was a decisive factor in the Vietnamese Communist victory. After Mao's troops had established themselves along the northern frontier of Kontieng, sanctuary for the Vietminh and logistic support along short communication lines became possible. Although Giap lacked air support, he was able in the end to achieve a decisively superior concentration of artillery.

Let us turn now to the Cuban experience. Despite later claims to the contrary, the Cuban conflict was not, in the Sino-Vietnamese sense, a people's revolutionary war. It began as the revolt of a small group of intellectuals, led by Fidel Castro. The Communists stayed aloof during the conflict, though they later joined the victorious band-wagon. The peasant who had nothing to lose, and potentially much to gain, joined the revolutionaries and fought with them. In the end, the corrupt and repressive dictatorship of Batista collapsed, and *Fidelistas* had a walk-over victory.

Generalizing from this rather special case of limited partisan warfare, Castro's guerrilla tacticians, Major Ernesto "Che" Guevara, argued that the orthodox Communists - in Moscow and Peking - were wrong when they stipulated that a revolution could be successful only when "objective" conditions were ripe. The mere fact of fighting, he added, would create the right conditions for a successful revolution. Later, Castro's young French admirer Régis Debray, went still further, by rejecting the concept of a united front, and even that of a special leading role for the Communist Party. Until victory had been achieved, he wrote, both the political and the military leadership must be vested in one man, and throughout the struggle military priorities must take precedence over politics.

2. The first phase: 1948-54

During this phase, people's revolutionary war achieved two major strategic successes: in China in 1949, and in Vietnam in 1954. In neither of these wars was Russia involved, except marginally. Stalin, who was highly sceptical of Mao's theories of peasant revolution, gave him no help until victory was in sight and then only as an incidental bonus in Russia's own military strategy against Japan; indeed, he maintained more or less correct diplomatic relations with Chiang Kai-shek throughout the Chinese civil war. He did, of course, contribute indirectly to Ho Chi Minh's victory over the French by despatching vast quantities of Soviet and Czech armaments across Siberia and China. But I know of no evidence that Moscow "ordered" Ho to launch his insurrection against the French Republic. Indeed, the evidence suggests that Giap and other militants took the initiative while Ho was in France negotiating with the French government in 1946 and forced his hand.

Thus, although the Soviet Union, at least initially, made enormous strategic gains as a result of the Chinese communist victory, and not unimportant ones as a result of the French defeat in Vietnam, it cannot be said that these gains were the outcome of conscious planning on Moscow's part - except in the general and indirect sense that Moscow had employed Ho Chi Minh for many years as a Comintern agent in South-East Asia.

During that period, however, the Russians did make a concerted effort to win strategic gains by launching parallel revolutionary wars in a number of countries in that area. To put it that way is only mildly to strain the language. Of course the Russians did not themselves take part in the insurrections they fostered in 1948: but at that time, Stalin's empire still maintained its monolithic unity, and Communist Parties everywhere were obedient instruments of his foreign policies.

When Stalin decided that revolutionary violence was to be used in South-East Asia three years after the end of the Second World War, however, he was not making conscious use of the technique of people's revolutionary war. Rather was he acting from pre-formulated ideological postulates. When most of South-East Asia was under Japanese occupation, resistance movements had sprung up, and in most of them the local Communists had played a dominant part. This militancy did not, however, bring the expected prize of political power when the fighting was over. Instead, the defeated imperial powers - Britain, France and Holland - had returned and resumed control over their colonial possessions. And then, contrary to the theoretical assumptions of Leninism and Stalinism, the "imperialist" American and British had begun to discard their colonies. This had already happened in the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma. In all these countries "bourgeois nationalist" régimes had come to power. The ideologist therefore argued that the national revolution in these countries was incomplete, and that it must now be "completed" by the removal of the existing authorities.

Before the war, the natural instrument for the furtherance of such an aim would have been the Comintern, but this organization had been formally dissolved during the war. In 1947, it was - in effect - revived under the name of Cominform. In September of that year, the new body met in Poland and Zhdanov, at that time Stalin's right-hand man, made an important speech in which he argued that the time had come for the colonial peoples to "overthrow their oppressors". This message was carried to Communist Parties throughout the world through the Cominform journal, For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy.

More precise instructions were given in Calcutta the following February, at an Asian youth conference sponsored by the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students, both Communist-controlled front organizations. The detailed execution of plans in these countries, however, was left to individual Communist Parties.

Within a few months, Communist-led insurrections broke out almost simultaneously in Burma, the Philippines, Malaya, Indonesia and India. The point of interest to us in this paper is that they were all unsuccessful, for reasons which may be summarized as follows:

1. In Burma, the Communists were unable to appeal to nationalist aspirations, since the country was already independent. After a while the two Communist insurgent groups - White Flag and Red Flag - became just two more of the many insurgent groups that plagued Burma.
2. In Indonesia, the nationalists had already proclaimed independence, although the Dutch had not yet transferred sovereignty. The Communists could not compete with the nationalist leaders, Sukarno and Hatta, and their rebellion was quickly crushed.
3. The Philippines had already been granted independence, but the Quirirno régime was notoriously corrupt and the peasants were severely oppressed. The Communists were able to exploit this situation through the Huk guerrillas, whose insurrection was not defeated until the 1950's.
4. In Malaya, on the other hand, independence was not even in sight. Hence, there was some credibility to the Communist call for liberation. In the end, the insurrection was defeated by a combination of police and military operations, together with political progress towards independence. The whole process was spread out over twelve years (1948-60).

What conclusions emerge from this brief study of the first phase? The first is that the technique of people's revolutionary war, if resolutely applied by a totalitarian party, may bring devastating results when it is harnessed to a nationalist cause, as in China and Vietnam. The second is that to launch insurrections from preconceived ideological motives and in conditions that are irrelevant to local needs is self-defeating.

In terms of a model to be applied elsewhere, the most interesting of the examples we have considered was undoubtedly that of the first Indochina war, in which the Vietminh demonstrated that a totalitarian party, using coercive terrorism to enforce conformity on the population, and disruptive terrorism to make normal administration and public order impossible, is capable - given the proximity of friendly territory - to hold a great Power at bay and in the end inflict defeat. The lesson has not been lost, as a study of the next phase shows.

3. The second phase: 1954-65

The first Indochina war was scarcely over when the Algerian war began. The handful of Algerians who formed the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) were not Communists, but had closely studied the methods of the Vietminh in Indochina. They were ruthless in their use of disruptive terrorism in Algiers and other cities, and coercive terrorism both against their own countrymen in Algeria and among Algerians living in France. They received considerable material and financial help from the Arab countries - and in the later stages of the war - from China. Although far from the territory of any friendly great Power, they enjoyed the sanctuary of acquiescent neighbouring countries, Morocco to the West and Tunisia to the East.

From the logistical standpoint, the French defenders were much better situated than they had been in Indochina, or than the Americans were during the second Indochina war. The French, on their side, were equally ruthless, and smashed the terrorist organizations in Algiers by means that included torture. Geographical proximity and a preponderance of advanced weapons helped the French gradually to establish mastery over Algerian terrain. By 1961 or 1962, French control over Algeria - in the military sense - was more or less complete, and the bulk of the ALN (the Army of the National Liberation Front) had taken refuge in Tunisia.

During the last two years of the conflict (which began in November 1954 and did not end until the spring of 1962), the French suffered for a second time the bitter disillusion of revolutionary war. Though conventional military victory was theirs, it did not follow that political or diplomatic success would crown it. The travelling diplomats of the Algerian provisional government, formed in 1958, scored increasing successes in rallying world opinion to their side against French colonialism. Inside France, although the French were more passionately involved in a defence of the concept of "French Algeria", the climate of opinion gradually turned against an indefinite French military commitment in that country. The Indochina war had shaken the Fourth Republic, and the Algerian war brought it down. General de Gaulle, recalled by the French settlers and the army, disappointed the hopes placed in him, and in the end came to terms with the FLN. The special potency of "revolutionary war" had yet again been demonstrated.

In the second phase that now concerns us Algeria was the only major and definitive success to be attributed to the technique of a revolutionary war. Some other events are, however, worthy of comment. These include:-

1. The beginning of the second Indochina war, in 1958, and the gradual American involvement in that conflict.

2. The World Communist Declaration of November 1960, in which the Soviet Union and China defined a common attitude towards the "National Liberation Movement".
3. Fidel Castro's victory in Cuba in January 1959.
4. A confusing series of involvements by Communist Powers (especially China, Russia and Cuba) in "liberation movements" of various kinds in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Let us comment on some of these developments.

The second Indochina war was in some respects a continuation of the first after an interval, with the United States replacing France as the "imperialist" enemy to be dislodged by "people's revolutionary war". It originated in regional insurgency against the authoritarian government of Ngo Dinh Diem by the political-religious sects, mainly the Hoa Hao and the Caodai, with which the remnants of the Communist Vietminh associated themselves. The Communists soon dominated the insurgent groups; arms that had been concealed at the time of the Geneva settlement of 1954 were recovered, and cadres from South Vietnam who had gone to the north for further training and indoctrination were sent southward again. Once more, the initial appeal was to patriotism and anti-imperialism - the Americans, as protectors of the Diem régime, having taken on the former French role as colonialist bogeymen.

The old techniques of disruptive and coercive terrorism were further refined, selectively applied and devastatingly successful. The central government's authority over rural areas was effectively neutralized by murders of village officials, while the youth of the country were terrorized into co-operating with the revolutionary forces. The Diem régime proved highly vulnerable to these tactics, and despite some successes, was brought to the edge of defeat within four years.

The Americans, who were initially involved only as advisers and suppliers, were themselves drawn into the conflict. During this period, the Chinese and the Russians, though prodigal with verbal support for the insurgents and their North Vietnamese controllers, and moderately generous with economic and military supplies, kept out of the fight. True, the Russians under Khrushchev sent arms, including aircraft, to the left-wing forces in Laos; but there is evidence that the Soviet leader himself conceded that this was a mistake, and that he sought to rectify it by withdrawing from a potentially dangerous adventure.

The World Communist Declaration of 1960 is important both because it is the last major policy statement to which both China and the Soviet Union subscribed, and because the Russians cannot entirely free themselves of the need to abide or to appear to abide, by its provisions, if only to demonstrate that they are still "revolutionaries" in an increasingly competitive field. Specifically, the 81 Communist Parties that attended the world meeting in Moscow in December 1960 recognised "their duty to render the fullest moral and material assistance to the peoples fighting to free themselves from imperialist and colonial tyranny". With the semantics of communist jargon in mind, this amounted to a call for assistance, not only to movements fighting for colonial freedom, but also for those fighting to remove non-communist governments in newly independent countries.

In a speech on 6 January, 1961, Khruschev went further by specifically endorsing aid to "revolutionary wars", while on 6 December, 1963, Pravda declared that it was the duty of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to give all political and economic support to national liberation movements - and if necessary, support by arms. This obligation was reaffirmed the following year by Mr. Khrushchev's successor as boss of the Communist Party, Mr. Brezhnev.

As I have suggested, Fidel Castro's victory in 1959 was not, in the true sense, the outcome of a "people's revolutionary war". When Fidel Castro belatedly discovered that he was a Marxist (at the end of 1961), Cuba became a base and training ground for revolutionaries and guerrilla fighters from various countries in Africa and Latin America. Cuban-trained Africans seized power in Zanzibar in December 1963, and Cubans themselves were involved in fighting or training activities in the ex-Belgian Congo and Brazzaville in the early 1960's. We shall return later to Cuba's far more extensive revolvement in revolutionary violence in Latin America.

Of the many examples of "national liberation" wars in Africa and Latin America during this second phase, we need say no more at this stage than that all were unsuccessful. Let us turn now to the recent past and to the problematical future.

4. The third phase: 1965-

The third and current phase in this arbitrary classification has been marked by: the escalation of the third Indochina war into a major conflict involving the United States on the one hand and, to an increasing though indirect degree, the Soviet Union on the other; the proclamation by the Chinese of a new world strategy of "national liberation"; the announcement of a policy on similar lines by the late Cuban guerrilla leader Ernesto "Che" Guevara; the emergence of a tri-continental organization based in Havana and devoted to the promotion of revolutionary guerrilla wars; and Moscow's pursuance of a policy in which State and Party needs have often seemed to be in conflict.

The contradiction between Party and State policy in the Soviet Union is an important factor in this third phase. In Stalin's day, there was no such conflict, or if there was it was relatively unimportant. A monolithic world communist movement served the State interests of Russia as an imperial Power. If State policy changed for tactical reasons, Communists Parties all over the world obediently executed the required somersault. Khrushchev was unable to maintain this unity and obedience. His overt and secret speeches at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956 destroyed Moscow's infallibility. The doctrine "different roads to socialism" led to what the late Togliatti called "polycentrism", and Moscow lost its position as the sole fount of wisdom in the communist world. Although the Sino-Soviet split of 1957-1960 was not primarily ideological in character, it was the culmination of the polycentric syndrome, as it might be termed. Thereafter, the Party-State conflict in Russia inevitably became more acute.

Although the Soviet ideologists did not share Mao Tse-tung's faith in peasant revolutionary war as the royal road to revolution, they often felt compelled to pay lip service to it, and even to provide material aid for guerrillas, if only to show that they were as "revolutionary" as the Chinese; and thus nip in the bud any trend towards defection from Moscow's leadership to Peking's. But this policy was often in conflict with the government's needs of the moment. In Vietnam, for instance, Khrushchev's distinction between big, little and local wars did not remove the danger inherent in too open an identification of the Soviet Union with North Vietnam, in that there was always the possibility that it might lead to the kind of nuclear confrontation that had opposed the Soviet Union to the United States over Cuba in 1962, which, on grounds of State interests, Khrushchev wanted to avoid.

These considerations explain the extreme circumspection with which Moscow approached the problems of conflict in Indochina. Despite lip service to the cause of "national liberation" in Vietnam, the Russians gave virtually no material assistance to the North Vietnamese for the first seven years of the second war. Indeed, by the summer of 1964, the Soviet leaders seem to have decided to opt out of Indochina's crisis. On 26 July of that year, Moscow threatened to withdraw from the "co-chairmanship" of the Geneva conference, which had been shared between Britain and the USSR, and under which the two governments were supposed to deal with difficulties arising out of the Geneva agreement of 1954 and 1962 (the latter dealing with Laos).

Mr. R.A. Butler (as he then was) visited Moscow immediately afterwards as Britain's Foreign Secretary, and is said to have been told by Khrushchev that Russia had no taste for further involvement in Indochina. One of the things he may have had in mind was the fact that Soviet planes, sent to the Laotian neutralist leader, Kong Lae at a time when the neutralists were working with the communist Pathet Lao army were later used against the Communists. By early 1965, however, Khrushchev's successors seem to have decided that the worst risks of a nuclear confrontation with America were now over. The North Vietnamese seemed to be on the point of achieving, through the National Liberation Front, the distinguishing aim of revolutionary war - the complete disintegration of society and administration in South Vietnam. The Americans had been unable to stem the tide by the mere provision of advisers and weapons, and it seemed unlikely that they would venture further into the country.

This was the time chosen by Mr. Kosygin, the Soviet Premier, to commit his government to massive military aid to North Vietnam. In so doing, he may have hoped to achieve two objectives: to demonstrate Russia's willingness and ability to provide North Vietnam with modern weapons in contrast to China's relative impotence, and to stake a claim for Russia as one of the major participants in any future peace conference.

While Mr. Kosygin and his high-powered team of ministers and advisers were in Hanoi, however, the Vietcong in South Vietnam, probably on direct orders from Hanoi, attacked American military installations, killing or wounding 70 Americans and destroying 17 helicopters and 3 transport planes. The Americans retaliated by bombing attacks on North Vietnam. The great escalation had begun, and there are grounds for believing that Kosygin was surprised and indignant at this unexpected turn of events.

Nevertheless Russia has supplied an ever-increasing flow of advanced weapons to North Vietnam, which have duly sent them southward "via the Ho Chi Minh trail" in Laos or by sea. To some extent therefore, the latter phases of the Vietnam war have amounted to a fresh confrontation between America and Russia, with the Americans directly, and the Russians indirectly, involved in the war.

Undaunted by the disparity in ultimate power between North Vietnam and the United States, the most extreme wing of the leadership of the Lao Dong party in Hanoi has followed an astonishingly bold, excruciatingly dangerous yet basically sound strategy in South Vietnam. Escalating on their own account, they have committed ever-larger conventional forces in South Vietnam, drawing the American forces away from the countryside, and committing the Americans to an ever-rising spiral of military expenditure, thus exposing them to the full force of a rising tide of public indignation and protest, carefully orchestrated by the international Communist movement (which whatever its disunity on certain ideological points, was united in opposing "imperialism" in Vietnam), and thus preparing for the "final offensive" that is the logical culmination of people's revolutionary war. In the meantime, the Vietcong stepped up its terrorism in the villages, to counter any military successes on the American and South Vietnamese side, and went so far as to challenge the enemy's power within the citadels in Saigon and other cities in the Tet offensive of 1968. True, the trumpeted "final offensive" failed to materialize. But much of the work of rural pacification was shattered, President Johnson announced his decision not to seek re-election, and preliminary talks began between the Americans and North Vietnamese in Paris. There is every reason to hope, or fear, that another major success for the technique of people's revolutionary war is on the way.

Perhaps partly with the object of countering Moscow's great propaganda success in taking up the cause of Hanoi's liberation war, Peking launched a new revolutionary world strategy in December 1965. The author of the policy was Marshal Lin Piao, Defence Minister and Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Politburo. He expressed himself in an article entitled "Long live the victory of the people's war", in which he called for the extension to the entire world of the Maoist theory of "encirclement of the cities from the countryside". On this world scale, he said the capitalist countries were "the cities", and Asia, Africa and Latin America were the "countryside"; and he made it clear that the process of "encirclement" could be carried out only by people's wars led by Communists ready to take China's revolutionary war as a model. Now one glance at the world map makes it clear that this much debated call for action was a purely Utopian concept, since it is not physically possible for the world's "countryside", as Lin Piao defined it, to encircle the world's "cities". As interpreted in private, however, Chinese diplomats and other statesmen have made it clear that by provoking people's revolutionary wars in many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, they hoped to strain the military and economic resources of the United States to breaking point, and indeed if one makes a simple arithmetical extrapolation from the example of Vietnam, it is possible that the experience of Vietnam, repeated on a world scale, would indeed cause even the mighty United States to run out of men and munitions.

This rather wide-eyed notion evidently appealed to the late "Che" Guevara, who, in April 1967, issued a call from "somewhere in the world" to the Latin American peoples to set up "new Vietnams" throughout the continent. About 15 months earlier Havana had become the home of what a witty ambassador called the "guerrillas' international". A tri-continental organization set up in January 1966, with the object of co-ordinating the efforts of revolutionary guerrillas in the three continents of the "third world" and helping them wherever possible.

These wild, Utopian and essentially romantic calls for revolutionary action by the Chinese and Cubans have deepened Moscow's dilemma. On the one hand, the Russians cannot afford to appear to be outbid by Communist Parties that do not accept Moscow's leadership; on the other hand, they were realistic enough to know that guerrilla warfare was unlikely to bring down the main citadel of capitalism as quickly as the Cuban and Chinese might suppose. Faced with this dilemma, the Russians have adopted an ambiguous policy, consisting of paying lip service to individual "liberation wars" and actual aid - in arms or training - for selected revolutionary movements.

The first Tri-continental Solidarity Conference in Havana in January 1966 provided a good example of the inherent clash between Soviet Party and State interests. The Russians had sent a delegation, which subscribed to some of the inflammatory resolutions passed by the conference. This immediately brought a wave of protest from Latin American governments with which Moscow had diplomatic relations, and which asked Moscow how calls for their overthrow, to which the Russians had subscribed, could be reconciled with friendly intercourse. Moscow's response was to deny that the Soviet delegation at the Havana conference had an officially representative character - a deception which deceived nobody. However, the deepening disunity of the communist world has not, in fact, relieved the non-communist world of revolutionary and subversive pressures.

Instead, it has been faced with what I have called "competitive subversion", in which the main competitors are the Russians, the Chinese and the Cubans; with further competition provided by certain "Trotskyist" groups in Latin America, and a profusion of African "liberation movements", helped externally not only by the communist Powers but also, at times, by such revolutionary or militant régimes as those of Algeria, the United Arab Republic and Nkrumah's Ghana.

While I have no wish to burden this text with excessive detail, it may be useful to summarise the situation in the three continents of the Third World. I have in mind insurgent activities now being supported by the communist Powers.

A. Latin America

The main Castroite bodies are:-

Colombia: Ejercito de Liberación Nacional or ELN, under Fabio Vasques.

Venezuela: Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional and its political arm, the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria; together with the Douglas Bravo guerrilla group, formerly of the Venezuelan Communist Party, but now expelled.

Guatemala: Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, which, in August 1967, joined forces with the pro-Chinese Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre, led by

Marco Antonio Yon Sosa (previously infiltrated by Trotskyites, now expelled). The FAR is led by César Montes.

Uruguay: Movimiento Revolucionario del Oriente.

Argentina: Movimiento Peronista Revolucionario.

Peru: Movimiento d'Izquierda Revolucionaria.

Although Moscow's policy, as expressed through Communist Parties loyal to Russia - such as the Chilean and Venezuelan parties - has been in favour of "constitutional" methods of struggle, the Russians are in fact involved in revolutionary guerrilla movements. [redacted]

Their policy is, in fact, opportunistic in that they hold that a Communist Party should be prepared for all forms of struggle, whether singly or in combination. Peaceful methods are advocated when they seem to offer a chance of success, and violent ones condemned when their adoption is arbitrary and failure likely. They have no taste for futile adventures that may interfere with State to State relations. The Russians do, nevertheless, support armed action in some Latin American countries, even when failure is likely, so long as their own interests are unlikely to be damaged. One example of this attitude is in the Soviet broadcasts in Quechua, calling on the Andean Indians to revolt; another is Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress programmes, supporting armed struggle, for instance in Venezuela - and Paraguay.

This opportunism reflects, in some degree, the Soviet Union's complex dilemma in Latin America, which lies in the difficulty of making sure Cuban subversion does not get out of hand, while retaining control over the orthodox Communist Parties and avoiding a direct confrontation with the United States, on the model of the Caribbean crisis of 1962.

Chinese activity in Latin America is still on an insignificant scale.

B. Africa

The Russians, Cubans and Chinese are all involved in various "liberation movements" in Africa; at different times, and in different ways, East European countries have also been involved. The Russians in particular, supported rebel guerrillas in the Congo (Leopoldville) in 1964. More recently, as the trials of African guerrillas in Rhodesia and South Africa have revealed, the Russians have been - and presumably still are - providing training for revolutionary war, both in those countries and in the Portuguese African dependencies. They were deeply involved in Nkrumah's organization of terrorist or guerrilla groups.

It is probably true to say that the Cubans and Chinese are more systematically involved in revolutionary violence in Africa than the Russians or East Europeans. As long ago as 1960, members of the Armée de Libération Nationale Kamerounaise were arrested on returning from China, where they had received guerrilla training. The Chinese have provided instructors in guerrilla warfare in training camps in Ghana (under Nkrumah), Tanzania and Congo-Brazzaville. They are still training terrorists and guerrilla fighters in China itself.

Cuba has been providing training courses for African guerrillas since 1961; in Africa itself, Cuban instructors have been at work in Congo-Kinshasa (Leopoldville), Congo-Brazzaville (where their numbers have been reduced latterly) and in Tanzania.

C. Asia (South and South-East)

The most active revolutionary irredentist force in the area is, of course, North Vietnam. We have considered the first and second Indochina wars. It should never be forgotten that North Vietnam's territorial ambitions are not confined to South Vietnam, but extend to Laos, Cambodia and even Thailand. The Pathet Lao movement in Laos was created by Ho Chi Minh's agents, and remains entirely under Hanoi's control. Large areas of Laos are held by North Vietnam, either through occupation by regulars of the North Vietnamese Army, or through the Vietnamese-officered Pathet Lao "People's Liberation Army".

In Cambodia, according to announcements by the Chief of State, Prince Sihanouk, last January and February, Vietnamese Communists are behind attempted revolts in Battambang Province (along with Communists and with Peking's support), and among the Montaguards of the Khmer Loeu district of North-East Cambodia.

In Thailand, the North Vietnamese are involved in the insurgency in the North-Eastern provinces, both through supporting activities by the Vietnamese minority in that area and through the Thai Communist Party guerrilla training school at Hoa Binh in North Vietnam.

We have already considered Russia's belated but extremely important involvement in the present Vietnam war. Apart from that, I know of no evidence pointing to Soviet involvement in revolutionary war elsewhere in South-East Asia, although the Russians are, of course, involved in the affairs of various Communist or left-wing parties, in competition with the Chinese.

What are the Chinese themselves up to? One difficulty is in distinguishing between verbal support and propaganda, on the one hand, and actual involvement on the other. The Chinese press and radio report in great detail, with evident approval and in terms that imply a claim to paternity (e.g. attribution of guerrilla successes to the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung), virtually every local war from India to the Philippines. There is, however, no reason to believe that the Chinese are materially involved in guerrilla fighting in the Philippines or on the Sarawak-Indonesia border - although Peking's influence over the Philippine Communist Party, as distinct from the Huk guerrillas, and over the Sarawak Communist organization and parts of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) is strong. These remarks also apply to the Malayan Communist guerrillas, who have shown renewed signs of activity lately on the Thai-Malayan border.

On the other hand, the Chinese are involved - in the sense of supplying money, arms and training - in:-

Thailand: The leaders of the Thai Communist Party, which controls the insurrection in North-Eastern Thailand, are ethnically Chinese and live in Peking.

Burma and India: An important recent development has been the setting up of a working alliance between the Chinese and the Kachin Independence Army in northern Burma. For the first time, communications are now open between Peking and the pro-Chinese White Flag guerrillas of the Burma Communist Party, and with the Nagas and Mizo tribesmen on the Indian border, who are now being trained and armed in China. Chinese material support for the insurgents in Bihar (northern India) is also probable.

The Chinese are also involved in the Vietnam war, mainly through shipments of small arms, probably through Cambodia (despite Prince Sihanouk's neutral denials). The inability to compete with the Soviet Union in aid to the Vietcong is clearly a cause of deep frustration.

5. Strategic Prospects

There is perhaps an a priori case for arguing that revolutionary war was bound to be used increasingly in the nuclear age, since the risk of nuclear confrontation inhibits the super-powers from direct involvement while it does not limit their indirect involvement through money, arms, advice and training. America's direct involvement in the latter stages of the current Vietnam war does not necessarily invalidate this contention, since the North Vietnamese and Russians (together with the Chinese) may have discounted the risk that the Americans would commit their own forces to the struggle.

It would be premature to conclude from the repeated failures of "people's war" in Latin America and Africa that the strategic uses of the technique have been exhausted. Many factors are involved in a successful revolutionary war: contiguity with a supplying Power; discipline, fanaticism and ruthlessness on the part of the political organization of the revolutionaries; local martial traditions and abilities; the vulnerability of the régime and society to be undermined; avoidable errors on the part of the opposing forces and - where this applies - of their protectors. Some human material is more suitable than others: the Tonkinese have formidable traditions of military valour and physical and mental toughness, as the Chinese discovered in their day and the French, Americans and Cochinchinese have found in theirs. Conversely, as Hugo Blanco discovered in Peru, and "Che" Guevara in Bolivia, the Andean Indian seems refractory to the notion of revolutionary struggle.

Terrain, too, is important, though less so than the factors I have mentioned above. The low hills and relatively open country of North-East Thailand are less suitable for guerrilla war than the mountains, jungles and paddy fields of Central and South Vietnam. Each case has to be judged on its merits, and it is impossible to say, with sweeping finality, either that revolutionary war is invincible or that the techniques of counter-insurgency have been mastered once and for all.

Much depends on whether the countries - primarily though not exclusively communist - that support revolutionary war for strategic ends, will continue to do so. And whether they do will depend in turn both on the persistence of their ideological belief that revolutionary war works, and on the degree to which this belief coincides or clashes with actual experience.

If Fidel Castro experiences several more "Bolivias", it is conceivable, though not certain in view of his repeated calls for action, that he will gradually abandon his attempts to gain control of Latin American countries through peasant insurrections.

The most decisive test case of revolutionary war, however, is unquestionably Vietnam. If the Americans are forced, whether for military or for political reasons, to pull out of Vietnam, their defeat, however disguised, will be hailed by revolutionaries everywhere as the final vindication of the theory of people's revolutionary war - the demonstration that even a super-Power can be defeated by a peasant army. In that event, the efforts now being made to launch such insurrections, or sustain them, in Africa and Latin America, would be redoubled. Even the Russians, who do not appear to share the faith of the Chinese, the North Vietnamese and the Cubans in the efficacy of the technique, will feel bound to improve on their commitment to insurgents.

But by far the most dangerous field of activity will continue to be South-East Asia, whether or not the Vietcong achieve victory. It is a relatively painless intellectual exercise to reject President Eisenhower's original and simplistic "domino" theory. But an examination of the situation as it actually is will show a fair number of "dominoes" ready for toppling. A North Vietnamese victory in South Vietnam would be followed, very rapidly, by the absorption of Laos. Though Cambodia's capacity for resistance is inherently greater, it may be doubted whether that country would survive for long, especially if Peking encouraged Hanoi to go ahead and attempt to fulfil the original (1930) programme of the Communist Party of Indochina.

Thailand's turn would come next; and in this context, it should be noted that the vast American investment in strategic air bases in Thailand, and in aid to its governments over the years, makes sense only on the assumption that South Vietnam is to be held. If it is abandoned, Thailand will be expendable.

The future of other insurrectionary movements in the area may depend partly on China's ability to overcome its present internal difficulties and - in time - on the policies adopted by Mao's successors. But the trend of recent events, particularly during the past three years, suggests that Peking is fulfilling a long-term plan of supporting revolutionary violence in Burma and India; and, when conditions, including communications, permit, in Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia.

In short, revolutionary war will continue to be a problem, and probably a growing problem, in the years ahead.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR QUOTATION

INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
10th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

PROBLEMS OF MODERN STRATEGY: A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

COMMITTEE III

Saturday 21st September Morning

The Strategic Uses of Revolutionary War

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1. Concept and Technique

Traditionally, guerrilla war and insurgency are tactical concepts. During the past twenty years, however, a variant of small-scale action known as "people's revolutionary" war has emerged as a strategic technique. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the strategic possibilities and limitations of this technique, in the light of recent history. I shall attempt to show that people's revolutionary war, though capable of dramatic strategic successes - as in China, Vietnam and Algeria - is a weapon of limited potency when used by a Power far from the field of military action. This conclusion is, at any rate, strongly suggested by the experience of the past few years in Africa and Latin America.

Although the concept of people's revolutionary war emerged during the Chinese civil war, it is more properly described as a Sino-Vietnamese theory. Certain individual, though in practice ineffectual, modifications were made as a consequence of Fidel Castro's successful insurrections in Cuba. Care must be taken, however, to distinguish between theory and practice, between technique and theory.

In China, Mao Tse-tung assumed popular support for his revolutionary guerrillas in the theoretical writings distilled from his experience in fighting the Japanese occupying forces and the army of Chiang Kai-shek's central government. In the special circumstances of China in the 1930's and 1940's, he does in fact appear to have achieved popular support. China was entering the final and agonizing phase of a century of foreign occupation, humiliation, civil conflict and general disorder. Chiang Kai-shek's régime, though itself revolutionary in a republican and nationalistic sense, was both corrupt and brutal; landlordism, warlordism and the effect of China's population explosion, all afflicted the peasantry.

By promising land to the peasants and enforcing a strict code of courtesy and consideration for agricultural needs on his soldiers, Mao achieved the practical ideal enshrined in his famous dictum about the army moving among the people as a fish in water. He could offer protection against the depredations of the warlords and of the Kuomintang army. The fact that China was occupied by Japan added a further dimension to his revolutionary war effort. The peasant soldiers who rallied to his banner did so from patriotic as well as other motives. Indeed, the needs of patriotism and revolution happily co-incided. An important consequence of these favourable circumstances was that Mao had no need, broadly speaking, to resort to coercive terrorism during his years of military struggle.

The enormous size of the country was yet another advantage to Mao. His concept of "protracted war" spanned three stages. During the first, the revolutionary forces, being relatively weak, must be prepared to retreat. Unhampered by a cumbersome supply machine, the guerrillas could withdraw, if necessary, over thousands of miles. The pursuing forces, whether Japanese or Kuomintang, could follow only up to a point. The time would come when they must stop to consolidate their territorial gains, their lines of communication having been stretched to near breaking point. Once the pursuing forces were immobilized, the revolutionary guerrillas could begin harrassing them, in the second stage, during which they would capture as many weapons as possible and set about training and equipping a regular army. The third stage was that of the "revolutionary final offensive". Exhausted and demoralized, and surrounded by a hostile population permeated by the revolutionaries, the enemy forces would face inevitable defeat. By this time, the revolutionary army, itself strong, well-equipped and experienced, could deal the death blow.

In both Indochina wars, patriotism was also a powerful rallying cry - first against the French and later against the Americans. But the relatively restricted and congested territory available to the guerrillas in Vietnam ruled out the protracted geographical attrition that had been possible in China. Moreover, until 1949 (when the French-sponsored Bao Dai administration took office in Saigon), the Vietnamese revolutionaries lacked the "advantage" of an indigenous central administration that could be blamed for oppressing or neglecting the peasant, and thus serve as a rallying cry to supplement that of patriotism against the foreign occupier. Indeed, from 1945 to 1949, the only indigenous administration worthy of the name was that of Ho Chi Minh's own Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which the ex-Emperor Bao Dai himself served for a while. All three of the major figures in the Vietnamese revolution - Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap and Truong Chinh - were deeply influenced by China's example.

The theories of revolutionary war elaborated by the second and third of the triumvirate reflected this debt.

On the political front, too, they borrowed from Mao Tse-tung, and the Vietminh, or League for the independence of Vietnam, drew heavily on Mao's "united front" policy. Initially, the Vietminh attracted a wide spectrum of Vietnamese nationalists, and this was important, in the early stages, in giving a "patriotic" character to the revolution. When the true communist character of Ho's régime became apparent, however, many of the non-communist nationalists - including Bao dai - deserted Hanoi. The French were very late in taking advantage of this development, and their lateness must be deemed one of the causes of their final defeat.

Whatever the causes, the Vietnamese Communists resorted both disruptive and coercive terrorism during both Indochina wars. The disruptive terrorism - including attacks on the French community - were to some extent "legitimate", in that they were aimed at the main enemy. In South Vietnam, however, a non-communist member of the Vietminh, Nguyen Binh, developed coercive methods of terror against the civilian population which were to become sadly characteristic of both Indochina wars. In the war against the French - as in the Malayan Emergency some years later - coercive terrorism was undoubtedly used to counter-productive excess. In the second Indochina war, on the whole, coercive terrorism was far more selectively applied; though it continued to be an indispensable element in the Vietnamese Communist approach.

Since we are concerned here with the strategic uses that may be made of the new technique of revolutionary war, it may be useful to point out that:-

1. Mao's forces did not defeat Japan's in a strategic sense.
2. They did defeat Chiang's army, but only after the Russians, in their last-hour-offensive, had handed over vast quantities of seized nationalist arms and equipment in Manchuria.
3. Chiang's régime largely collapsed because of its own internal "contradictions", i.e. corruption, inflation and demoralization.
4. Though disastrous, especially in terms of morale, Giap's defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu was not in itself strategically decisive. The French could have fought on. France's collapse was due to a combination of domestic factors, including war weariness, the weakness of successive governments, the high cost of the war in human as well as financial terms, and so on. For reasons that need not be elaborated here, Bao Dai's administration did not prove an alternative focus of nationalist support.

5. The geographical proximity of China was a decisive factor in the Vietnamese Communist victory. After Mao's troops had established themselves along the northern frontier of Kontieng, sanctuary for the Vietminh and logistic support along short communication lines became possible. Although Giap lacked air support, he was able in the end to achieve a decisively superior concentration of artillery.

Let us turn now to the Cuban experience. Despite later claims to the contrary, the Cuban conflict was not, in the Sino-Vietnamese sense, a people's revolutionary war. It began as the revolt of a small group of intellectuals, led by Fidel Castro. The Communists stayed aloof during the conflict, though they later joined the victorious band-wagon. The peasant who had nothing to lose, and potentially much to gain, joined the revolutionaries and fought with them. In the end, the corrupt and repressive dictatorship of Batista collapsed, and Fidelistas had a walk-over victory.

Generalizing from this rather special case of limited partisan warfare, Castro's guerrilla tacticians, Major Ernesto "Che" Guevara, argued that the orthodox Communists - in Moscow and Peking - were wrong when they stipulated that a revolution could be successful only when "objective" conditions were ripe. The mere fact of fighting, he added, would create the right conditions for a successful revolution. Later, Castro's young French admirer Régis Debray, went still further, by rejecting the concept of a united front, and even that of a special leading role for the Communist Party. Until victory had been achieved, he wrote, both the political and the military leadership must be vested in one man, and throughout the struggle military priorities must take precedence over politics.

2. The first phase: 1948-54

During this phase, people's revolutionary war achieved two major strategic successes: in China in 1949, and in Vietnam in 1954. In neither of these wars was Russia involved, except marginally. Stalin, who was highly sceptical of Mao's theories of peasant revolution, gave him no help until victory was in sight and then only as an incidental bonus in Russia's own military strategy against Japan; indeed, he maintained more or less correct diplomatic relations with Chiang Kai-shek throughout the Chinese civil war. He did, of course, contribute indirectly to Ho Chi Minh's victory over the French by despatching vast quantities of Soviet and Czech armaments across Siberia and China. But I know of no evidence that Moscow "ordered" Ho to launch his insurrection against the French Republic. Indeed, the evidence suggests that Giap and other militants took the initiative while Ho was in France negotiating with the French government in 1946 and forced his hand.

Thus, although the Soviet Union, at least initially, made enormous strategic gains as a result of the Chinese communist victory, and not unimportant ones as a result of the French defeat in Vietnam, it cannot be said that these gains were the outcome of conscious planning on Moscow's part - except in the general and indirect sense that Moscow had employed Ho Chi Minh for many years as a Comintern agent in South-East Asia.

During that period, however, the Russians did make a concerted effort to win strategic gains by launching parallel revolutionary wars in a number of countries in that area. To put it that way is only mildly to strain the language. Of course the Russians did not themselves take part in the insurrections they fostered in 1948: but at that time, Stalin's empire still maintained its monolithic unity, and Communist Parties everywhere were obedient instruments of his foreign policies.

When Stalin decided that revolutionary violence was to be used in South-East Asia three years after the end of the Second World War, however, he was not making conscious use of the technique of people's revolutionary war. Rather was he acting from pre-formulated ideological postulates. When most of South-East Asia was under Japanese occupation, resistance movements had sprung up, and in most of them the local Communists had played a dominant part. This militancy did not, however, bring the expected prize of political power when the fighting was over. Instead, the defeated imperial powers - Britain, France and Holland - had returned and resumed control over their colonial possessions. And then, contrary to the theoretical assumptions of Leninism and Stalinism, the "imperialist" American and British had begun to discard their colonies. This had already happened in the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma. In all these countries "bourgeois nationalist" régimes had come to power. The ideologist therefore argued that the national revolution in these countries was incomplete, and that it must now be "completed" by the removal of the existing authorities.

Before the war, the natural instrument for the furtherance of such an aim would have been the Comintern, but this organization had been formally dissolved during the war. In 1947, it was - in effect - revived under the name of Cominform. In September of that year, the new body met in Poland and Zhdanov, at that time Stalin's right-hand man, made an important speech in which he argued that the time had come for the colonial peoples to "overthrow their oppressors". This message was carried to Communist Parties throughout the world through the Cominform journal, For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy.

More precise instructions were given in Calcutta the following February, at an Asian youth conference sponsored by the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students, both Communist-controlled front organizations. The detailed execution of plans in these countries, however, was left to individual Communist Parties.

Within a few months, Communist-led insurrections broke out almost simultaneously in Burma, the Philippines, Malaya, Indonesia and India. The point of interest to us in this paper is that they were all unsuccessful, for reasons which may be summarized as follows:

1. In Burma, the Communists were unable to appeal to nationalist aspirations, since the country was already independent. After a while the two Communist insurgent groups - White Flag and Red Flag - became just two more of the many insurgent groups that plagued Burma.
2. In Indonesia, the nationalists had already proclaimed independence, although the Dutch had not yet transferred sovereignty. The Communists could not compete with the nationalist leaders, Sukarno and Hatta, and their rebellion was quickly crushed.
3. The Philippines had already been granted independence, but the Quirirno régime was notoriously corrupt and the peasants were severely oppressed. The Communists were able to exploit this situation through the Huk guerrillas, whose insurrection was not defeated until the 1950's.
4. In Malaya, on the other hand, independence was not even in sight. Hence, there was some credibility to the Communist call for liberation. In the end, the insurrection was defeated by a combination of police and military operations, together with political progress towards independence. The whole process was spread out over twelve years (1948-60).

What conclusions emerge from this brief study of the first phase? The first is that the technique of people's revolutionary war, if resolutely applied by a totalitarian party, may bring devastating results when it is harnessed to a nationalist cause, as in China and Vietnam. The second is that to launch insurrections from preconceived ideological motives and in conditions that are irrelevant to local needs is self-defeating.

In terms of a model to be applied elsewhere, the most interesting of the examples we have considered was undoubtedly that of the first Indochina war, in which the Vietminh demonstrated that a totalitarian party, using coercive terrorism to enforce conformity on the population, and disruptive terrorism to make normal administration and public order impossible, is capable - given the proximity of friendly territory - to hold a great Power at bay and in the end inflict defeat. The lesson has not been lost, as a study of the next phase shows.

3. The second phase: 1954-65

The first Indochina war was scarcely over when the Algerian war began. The handful of Algerians who formed the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) were not Communists, but had closely studied the methods of the Vietminh in Indochina. They were ruthless in their use of disruptive terrorism in Algiers and other cities, and coercive terrorism both against their own countrymen in Algeria and among Algerians living in France. They received considerable material and financial help from the Arab countries - and in the later stages of the war - from China. Although far from the territory of any friendly great Power, they enjoyed the sanctuary of acquiescent neighbouring countries, Morocco to the West and Tunisia to the East.

From the logistical standpoint, the French defenders were much better situated than they had been in Indochina, or than the Americans were during the second Indochina war. The French, on their side, were equally ruthless, and smashed the terrorist organizations in Algiers by means that included torture. Geographical proximity and a preponderance of advanced weapons helped the French gradually to establish mastery over Algerian terrain. By 1961 or 1962, French control over Algeria - in the military sense - was more or less complete, and the bulk of the ALN (the Army of the National Liberation Front) had taken refuge in Tunisia.

During the last two years of the conflict (which began in November 1954 and did not end until the spring of 1962), the French suffered for a second time the bitter disillusion of revolutionary war. Though conventional military victory was theirs, it did not follow that political or diplomatic success would crown it. The travelling diplomats of the Algerian provisional government, formed in 1958, scored increasing successes in rallying world opinion to their side against French colonialism. Inside France, although the French were more passionately involved in a defence of the concept of "French Algeria", the climate of opinion gradually turned against an indefinite French military commitment in that country. The Indochina war had shaken the Fourth Republic, and the Algerian war brought it down. General de Gaulle, recalled by the French settlers and the army, disappointed the hopes placed in him, and in the end came to terms with the FLN. The special potency of "revolutionary war" had yet again been demonstrated.

In the second phase that now concerns us Algeria was the only major and definitive success to be attributed to the technique of a revolutionary war. Some other events are, however, worthy of comment. These include:-

1. The beginning of the second Indochina war, in 1958, and the gradual American involvement in that conflict.

2. The World Communist Declaration of November 1960, in which the Soviet Union and China defined a common attitude towards the "National Liberation Movement".
3. Fidel Castro's victory in Cuba in January 1959.
4. A confusing series of involvements by Communist Powers (especially China, Russia and Cuba) in "liberation movements" of various kinds in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Let us comment on some of these developments.

The second Indochina war was in some respects a continuation of the first after an interval, with the United States replacing France as the "imperialist" enemy to be dislodged by "people's revolutionary war". It originated in regional insurgency against the authoritarian government of Ngo Dinh Diem by the political-religious sects, mainly the Hoa Hao and the Caodai, with which the remnants of the Communist Vietminh associated themselves. The Communists soon dominated the insurgent groups; arms that had been concealed at the time of the Geneva settlement of 1954 were recovered, and cadres from South Vietnam who had gone to the north for further training and indoctrination were sent southward again. Once more, the initial appeal was to patriotism and anti-imperialism - the Americans, as protectors of the Diem régime, having taken on the former French role as colonialist bogeymen.

The old techniques of disruptive and coercive terrorism were further refined, selectively applied and devastatingly successful. The central government's authority over rural areas was effectively neutralized by murders of village officials, while the youth of the country were terrorized into co-operating with the revolutionary forces. The Diem régime proved highly vulnerable to these tactics, and despite some successes, was brought to the edge of defeat within four years.

The Americans, who were initially involved only as advisers and suppliers, were themselves drawn into the conflict. During this period, the Chinese and the Russians, though prodigal with verbal support for the insurgents and their North Vietnamese controllers, and moderately generous with economic and military supplies, kept out of the fight. True, the Russians under Khrushchev sent arms, including aircraft, to the left-wing forces in Laos; but there is evidence that the Soviet leader himself conceded that this was a mistake, and that he sought to rectify it by withdrawing from a potentially dangerous adventure.

The World Communist Declaration of 1960 is important both because it is the last major policy statement to which both China and the Soviet Union subscribed, and because the Russians cannot entirely free themselves of the need to abide or to appear to abide, by its provisions, if only to demonstrate that they are still "revolutionaries" in an increasingly competitive field. Specifically, the 81 Communist Parties that attended the world meeting in Moscow in December 1960 recognised "their duty to render the fullest moral and material assistance to the peoples fighting to free themselves from imperialist and colonial tyranny". With the semantics of communist jargon in mind, this amounted to a call for assistance, not only to movements fighting for colonial freedom, but also for those fighting to remove non-communist governments in newly independent countries.

In a speech on 6 January, 1961, Khruschev went further by specifically endorsing aid to "revolutionary wars", while on 6 December, 1963, *Pravda* declared that it was the duty of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to give all political and economic support to national liberation movements - *and if necessary, support by arms*. This obligation was reaffirmed the following year by Mr. Khrushchev's successor as boss of the Communist Party, Mr. Brezhnev.

As I have suggested, *Fidel Castro's victory in 1959* was not, in the true sense, the outcome of a "people's revolutionary war". When Fidel Castro belatedly discovered that he was a Marxist (at the end of 1961), Cuba became a base and training ground for revolutionaries and guerrilla fighters from various countries in Africa and Latin America. Cuban-trained Africans seized power in Zanzibar in December 1963, and Cubans themselves were involved in fighting or training activities in the ex-Belgian Congo and Brazzaville in the early 1960's. We shall return later to Cuba's far more extensive revolvement in revolutionary violence in Latin America.

Of the many examples of "national liberation" wars in Africa and Latin America during this second phase, we need say no more at this stage than that all were unsuccessful. Let us turn now to the recent past and to the problematical future.

4. The third phase: 1965-

The third and current phase in this arbitrary classification has been marked by: the escalation of the third Indochina war into a major conflict involving the United States on the one hand and, to an increasing though indirect degree, the Soviet Union on the other; the proclamation by the Chinese of a new world strategy of "national liberation"; the announcement of a policy on similar lines by the late Cuban guerrilla leader Ernesto "Che" Guevara; the emergence of a tri-continental organization based in Havana and devoted to the promotion of revolutionary guerrilla wars; and Moscow's pursuance of a policy in which State and Party needs have often seemed to be in conflict.

The contradiction between Party and State policy in the Soviet Union is an important factor in this third phase. In Stalin's day, there was no such conflict, or if there was it was relatively unimportant. A monolithic world communist movement served the State interests of Russia as an imperial Power. If State policy changed for tactical reasons, Communists Parties all over the world obediently executed the required somersault. Khrushchev was unable to maintain this unity and obedience. His overt and secret speeches at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956 destroyed Moscow's infallibility. The doctrine "different roads to socialism" led to what the late Togliatti called "polycentrism", and Moscow lost its position as the sole fount of wisdom in the communist world. Although the Sino-Soviet split of 1957-1960 was not primarily ideological in character, it was the culmination of the polycentric syndrome, as it might be termed. Thereafter, the Party-State conflict in Russia inevitably became more acute.

Although the Soviet ideologists did not share Mao Tse-tung's faith in peasant revolutionary war as the royal road to revolution, they often felt compelled to pay lip service to it, and even to provide material aid for guerrillas, if only to show that they were as "revolutionary" as the Chinese; and thus nip in the bud any trend towards defection from Moscow's leadership to Peking's. But this policy was often in conflict with the government's needs of the moment. In Vietnam, for instance, Khrushchev's distinction between big, little and local wars did not remove the danger inherent in too open an identification of the Soviet Union with North Vietnam, in that there was always the possibility that it might lead to the kind of nuclear confrontation that had opposed the Soviet Union to the United States over Cuba in 1962, which, on grounds of State interests, Khrushchev wanted to avoid.

These considerations explain the extreme circumspection with which Moscow approached the problems of conflict in Indochina. Despite lip service to the cause of "national liberation" in Vietnam, the Russians gave virtually no material assistance to the North Vietnamese for the first seven years of the second war. Indeed, by the summer of 1964, the Soviet leaders seem to have decided to opt out of Indochina's crisis. On 26 July of that year, Moscow threatened to withdraw from the "co-chairmanship" of the Geneva conference, which had been shared between Britain and the USSR, and under which the two governments were supposed to deal with difficulties arising out of the Geneva agreement of 1954 and 1962 (the latter dealing with Laos).

Mr. R.A. Butler (as he then was) visited Moscow immediately afterwards as Britain's Foreign Secretary, and is said to have been told by Khrushchev that Russia had no taste for further involvement in Indochina. One of the things he may have had in mind was the fact that Soviet planes, sent to the Laotian neutralist leader, Kong Lae at a time when the neutralists were working with the communist Pathet Lao army were later used against the Communists. By early 1965, however, Khrushchev's successors seem to have decided that the worst risks of a nuclear confrontation with America were now over. The North Vietnamese seemed to be on the point of achieving, through the National Liberation Front, the distinguishing aim of revolutionary war - the complete disintegration of society and administration in South Vietnam. The Americans had been unable to stem the tide by the mere provision of advisers and weapons, and it seemed unlikely that they would venture further into the country.

This was the time chosen by Mr. Kosygin, the Soviet Premier, to commit his government to massive military aid to North Vietnam. In so doing, he may have hoped to achieve two objectives: to demonstrate Russia's willingness and ability to provide North Vietnam with modern weapons in contrast to China's relative impotence, and to stake a claim for Russia as one of the major participants in any future peace conference.

While Mr. Kosygin and his high-powered team of ministers and advisers were in Hanoi, however, the Vietcong in South Vietnam, probably on direct orders from Hanoi, attacked American military installations, killing or wounding 70 Americans and destroying 17 helicopters and 3 transport planes. The Americans retaliated by bombing attacks on North Vietnam. The great escalation had begun, and there are grounds for believing that Kosygin was surprised and indignant at this unexpected turn of events.

Nevertheless Russia has supplied an ever-increasing flow of advanced weapons to North Vietnam, which have duly sent them southward "via the Ho Chi Minh trail" in Laos or by sea. To some extent therefore, the latter phases of the Vietnam war have amounted to a fresh confrontation between America and Russia, with the Americans directly, and the Russians indirectly, involved in the war.

Undaunted by the disparity in ultimate power between North Vietnam and the United States, the most extreme wing of the leadership of the Lao Dong party in Hanoi has followed an astonishingly bold, excruciatingly dangerous yet basically sound strategy in South Vietnam. Escalating on their own account, they have committed ever-larger conventional forces in South Vietnam, drawing the American forces away from the countryside, and committing the Americans to an ever-rising spiral of military expenditure, thus exposing them to the full force of a rising tide of public indignation and protest, carefully orchestrated by the international Communist movement (which whatever its disunity on certain ideological points, was united in opposing "imperialism" in Vietnam), and thus preparing for the "final offensive" that is the logical culmination of people's revolutionary war. In the meantime, the Vietcong stepped up its terrorism in the villages, to counter any military successes on the American and South Vietnamese side, and went so far as to challenge the enemy's power within the citadels in Saigon and other cities in the Tet offensive of 1968. True, the trumpeted "final offensive" failed to materialize. But much of the work of rural pacification was shattered, President Johnson announced his decision not to seek re-election, and preliminary talks began between the Americans and North Vietnamese in Paris. There is every reason to hope, or fear, that another major success for the technique of people's revolutionary war is on the way.

Perhaps partly with the object of countering Moscow's great propaganda success in taking up the cause of Hanoi's liberation war, Peking launched a new revolutionary world strategy in December 1965. The author of the policy was Marshal Lin Piao, Defence Minister and Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Politburo. He expressed himself in an article entitled "Long live the victory of the people's war", in which he called for the extension to the entire world of the Maoist theory of "encirclement of the cities from the countryside". On this world scale, he said the capitalist countries were "the cities", and Asia, Africa and Latin America were the "countryside"; and he made it clear that the process of "encirclement" could be carried out only by people's wars led by Communists ready to take China's revolutionary war as a model. Now one glance at the world map makes it clear that this much debated call for action was a purely Utopian concept, since it is not physically possible for the world's "countryside", as Lin Piao defined it, to encircle the world's "cities". As interpreted in private, however, Chinese diplomats and other statesmen have made it clear that by provoking people's revolutionary wars in many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, they hoped to strain the military and economic resources of the United States to breaking point, and indeed if one makes a simple arithmetical extrapolation from the example of Vietnam, it is possible that the experience of Vietnam, repeated on a world scale, would indeed cause even the mighty United States to run out of men and munitions.

This rather wide-eyed notion evidently appealed to the late "Che" Guevara, who, in April 1967, issued a call from "somewhere in the world" to the Latin American peoples to set up "new Vietnams" throughout the continent. About 15 months earlier Havana had become the home of what a witty ambassador called the "guerrillas' international". A tri-continental organization set up in January 1966, with the object of co-ordinating the efforts of revolutionary guerrillas in the three continents of the "third world" and helping them wherever possible.

These wild, Utopian and essentially romantic calls for revolutionary action by the Chinese and Cubans have deepened Moscow's dilemma. On the one hand, the Russians cannot afford to appear to be outbid by Communist Parties that do not accept Moscow's leadership; on the other hand, they were realistic enough to know that guerrilla warfare was unlikely to bring down the main citadel of capitalism as quickly as the Cuban and Chinese might suppose. Faced with this dilemma, the Russians have adopted an ambiguous policy, consisting of paying lip service to individual "liberation wars" and actual aid - in arms or training - for selected revolutionary movements.

The first Tri-continental Solidarity Conference in Havana in January 1966 provided a good example of the inherent clash between Soviet Party and State interests. The Russians had sent a delegation, which subscribed to some of the inflammatory resolutions passed by the conference. This immediately brought a wave of protest from Latin American governments with which Moscow had diplomatic relations, and which asked Moscow how calls for their overthrow, to which the Russians had subscribed, could be reconciled with friendly intercourse. Moscow's response was to deny that the Soviet delegation at the Havana conference had an officially representative character - a deception which deceived nobody. However, the deepening disunity of the communist world has not, in fact, relieved the non-communist world of revolutionary and subversive pressures.

Instead, it has been faced with what I have called "competitive subversion", in which the main competitors are the Russians, the Chinese and the Cubans; with further competition provided by certain "Trotskyist" groups in Latin America, and a profusion of African "liberation movements", helped externally not only by the communist Powers but also, at times, by such revolutionary or militant régimes as those of Algeria, the United Arab Republic and Nkrumah's Ghana.

While I have no wish to burden this text with excessive detail, it may be useful to summarise the situation in the three continents of the Third World. I have in mind insurgent activities now being supported by the communist Powers.

A. Latin America

The main Castroite bodies are:-

Colombia: Ejercito de Liberación Nacional or ELN, under Fabio Vasques.

Venezuela: Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional and its political arm, the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria; together with the Douglas Bravo guerrilla group, formerly of the Venezuelan Communist Party, but now expelled.

Guatemala: Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, which, in August 1967, joined forces with the pro-Chinese Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre, led by

Marco Antonio Yon Sosa (previously infiltrated by Trotskyites, now expelled). The FAR is led by César Montes.

Uruguay: Movimiento Revolucionario del Oriente.

Argentina: Movimiento Peronista Revolucionario.

Peru: Movimiento d'Izquierda Revolucionaria.

Although Moscow's policy, as expressed through Communist Parties loyal to Russia - such as the Chilean and Venezuelan parties - has been in favour of "constitutional" methods of struggle, the Russians are in fact involved in revolutionary guerrilla movements. [redacted]

Their policy is, in fact, opportunistic in that they hold that a Communist Party should be prepared for all forms of struggle, whether singly or in combination. Peaceful methods are advocated when they seem to offer a chance of success, and violent ones condemned when their adoption is arbitrary and failure likely. They have no taste for futile adventures that may interfere with State to State relations. The Russians do, nevertheless, support armed action in some Latin American countries, even when failure is likely, so long as their own interests are unlikely to be damaged. One example of this attitude is in the Soviet broadcasts in Quechua, calling on the Andean Indians to revolt; another is Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress programmes, supporting armed struggle, for instance in Venezuela - and Paraguay.

This opportunism reflects, in some degree, the Soviet Union's complex dilemma in Latin America, which lies in the difficulty of making sure Cuban subversion does not get out of hand, while retaining control over the orthodox Communist Parties and avoiding a direct confrontation with the United States, on the model of the Caribbean crisis of 1962.

Chinese activity in Latin America is still on an insignificant scale.

B. Africa

The Russians, Cubans and Chinese are all involved in various "liberation movements" in Africa; at different times, and in different ways, East European countries have also been involved. The Russians in particular, supported rebel guerrillas in the Congo (Leopoldville) in 1964. More recently, as the trials of African guerrillas in Rhodesia and South Africa have revealed, the Russians have been - and presumably still are - providing training for revolutionary war, both in those countries and in the Portuguese African dependencies. They were deeply involved in Nkrumah's organization of terrorist or guerrilla groups.

It is probably true to say that the Cubans and Chinese are more systematically involved in revolutionary violence in Africa than the Russians or East Europeans. As long ago as 1960, members of the Armée de Libération Nationale Kamerounaise were arrested on returning from China, where they had received guerrilla training. The Chinese have provided instructors in guerrilla warfare in training camps in Ghana (under Nkrumah), Tanzania and Congo-Brazzaville. They are still training terrorists and guerrilla fighters in China itself.

Cuba has been providing training courses for African guerrillas since 1961; in Africa itself, Cuban instructors have been at work in Congo-Kinshasa (Leopoldville), Congo-Brazzaville (where their numbers have been reduced latterly) and in Tanzania.

C. Asia (South and South-East)

The most active revolutionary irredentist force in the area is, of course, North Vietnam. We have considered the first and second Indochina wars. It should never be forgotten that North Vietnam's territorial ambitions are not confined to South Vietnam, but extend to Laos, Cambodia and even Thailand. The Pathet Lao movement in Laos was created by Ho Chi Minh's agents, and remains entirely under Hanoi's control. Large areas of Laos are held by North Vietnam, either through occupation by regulars of the North Vietnamese Army, or through the Vietnamese-officered Pathet Lao "People's Liberation Army".

In Cambodia, according to announcements by the Chief of State, Prince Sihanouk, last January and February, Vietnamese Communists are behind attempted revolts in Battambang Province (along with Communists and with Peking's support), and among the Montaguards of the Khmer Loeu district of North-East Cambodia.

In Thailand, the North Vietnamese are involved in the insurgency in the North-Eastern provinces, both through supporting activities by the Vietnamese minority in that area and through the Thai Communist Party guerrilla training school at Hoa Binh in North Vietnam.

We have already considered Russia's belated but extremely important involvement in the present Vietnam war. Apart from that, I know of no evidence pointing to Soviet involvement in revolutionary war elsewhere in South-East Asia, although the Russians are, of course, involved in the affairs of various Communist or left-wing parties, in competition with the Chinese.

What are the Chinese themselves up to? One difficulty is in distinguishing between verbal support and propaganda, on the one hand, and actual involvement on the other. The Chinese press and radio report in great detail, with evident approval and in terms that imply a claim to paternity (e.g. attribution of guerrilla successes to the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung), virtually every local war from India to the Philippines. There is, however, no reason to believe that the Chinese are materially involved in guerrilla fighting in the Philippines or on the Sarawak-Indonesia border - although Peking's influence over the Philippine Communist Party, as distinct from the Huk guerrillas, and over the Sarawak Communist organization and parts of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) is strong. These remarks also apply to the Malayan Communist guerrillas, who have shown renewed signs of activity lately on the Thai-Malayan border.

On the other hand, the Chinese are involved - in the sense of supplying money, arms and training - in:-

Thailand: The leaders of the Thai Communist Party, which controls the insurrection in North-Eastern Thailand, are ethnically Chinese and live in Peking.

Burma and India: An important recent development has been the setting up of a working alliance between the Chinese and the Kachin Independence Army in northern Burma. For the first time, communications are now open between Peking and the pro-Chinese White Flag guerrillas of the Burma Communist Party, and with the Nagas and Mizo tribesmen on the Indian border, who are now being trained and armed in China. Chinese material support for the insurgents in Bihar (northern India) is also probable.

The Chinese are also involved in the Vietnam war, mainly through shipments of small arms, probably through Cambodia (despite Prince Sihanouk's neutral denials). The inability to compete with the Soviet Union in aid to the Vietcong is clearly a cause of deep frustration.

5. Strategic Prospects

There is perhaps an *a priori* case for arguing that revolutionary war was bound to be used increasingly in the nuclear age, since the risk of nuclear confrontation inhibits the super-powers from direct involvement while it does not limit their indirect involvement through money, arms, advice and training. America's direct involvement in the latter stages of the current Vietnam war does not necessarily invalidate this contention, since the North Vietnamese and Russians (together with the Chinese) may have discounted the risk that the Americans would commit their own forces to the struggle.

It would be premature to conclude from the repeated failures of "people's war" in Latin America and Africa that the strategic uses of the technique have been exhausted. Many factors are involved in a successful revolutionary war: contiguity with a supplying Power; discipline, fanaticism and ruthlessness on the part of the political organization of the revolutionaries; local martial traditions and abilities; the vulnerability of the régime and society to be undermined; avoidable errors on the part of the opposing forces and - where this applies - of their protectors. Some human material is more suitable than others: the Tonkinese have formidable traditions of military valour and physical and mental toughness, as the Chinese discovered in their day and the French, Americans and Cochinchinese have found in theirs. Conversely, as Hugo Blanco discovered in Peru, and "Che" Guevara in Bolivia, the Andean Indian seems refractory to the notion of revolutionary struggle.

Terrain, too, is important, though less so than the factors I have mentioned above. The low hills and relatively open country of North-East Thailand are less suitable for guerrilla war than the mountains, jungles and paddy fields of Central and South Vietnam. Each case has to be judged on its merits, and it is impossible to say, with sweeping finality, either that revolutionary war is invincible or that the techniques of counter-insurgency have been mastered once and for all.

Much depends on whether the countries - primarily though not exclusively communist - that support revolutionary war for strategic ends, will continue to do so. And whether they do will depend in turn both on the persistence of their ideological belief that revolutionary war works, and on the degree to which this belief coincides or clashes with actual experience.

If Fidel Castro experiences several more "Bolivias", it is conceivable, though not certain in view of his repeated calls for action, that he will gradually abandon his attempts to gain control of Latin American countries through peasant insurrections.

The most decisive test case of revolutionary war, however, is unquestionably Vietnam. If the Americans are forced, whether for military or for political reasons, to pull out of Vietnam, their defeat, however disguised, will be hailed by revolutionaries everywhere as the final vindication of the theory of people's revolutionary war - the demonstration that even a super-Power can be defeated by a peasant army. In that event, the efforts now being made to launch such insurrections, or sustain them, in Africa and Latin America, would be redoubled. Even the Russians, who do not appear to share the faith of the Chinese, the North Vietnamese and the Cubans in the efficacy of the technique, will feel bound to improve on their commitment to insurgents.

But by far the most dangerous field of activity will continue to be South-East Asia, whether or not the Vietcong achieve victory. It is a relatively painless intellectual exercise to reject President Eisenhower's original and simplistic "domino" theory. But an examination of the situation as it actually is will show a fair number of "dominoes" ready for toppling. A North Vietnamese victory in South Vietnam would be followed, very rapidly, by the absorption of Laos. Though Cambodia's capacity for resistance is inherently greater, it may be doubted whether that country would survive for long, especially if Peking encouraged Hanoi to go ahead and attempt to fulfil the original (1930) programme of the Communist Party of Indochina.

Thailand's turn would come next; and in this context, it should be noted that the vast American investment in strategic air bases in Thailand, and in aid to its governments over the years, makes sense only on the assumption that South Vietnam is to be held. If it is abandoned, Thailand will be expendable.

The future of other insurrectionary movements in the area may depend partly on China's ability to overcome its present internal difficulties and - in time - on the policies adopted by Mao's successors. But the trend of recent events, particularly during the past three years, suggests that Peking is fulfilling a long-term plan of supporting revolutionary violence in Burma and India; and, when conditions, including communications, permit, in Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia.

In short, revolutionary war will continue to be a problem, and probably a growing problem, in the years ahead.

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INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

10th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

PROBLEMS OF MODERN STRATEGY: A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

PLENARY SESSION

Thursday 19th September — Evening

Ten Years of I.S.S.

ALASTAIR BUCHAN

1. My first and pleasantest duty is to welcome you all to this Decennial Conference, which is held, like three of its predecessors, in this great grey university - one of the most loved and the most hated cities in the world - to discuss a field of policy and study that, like Oxford itself, arouses strong passions. I am indebted to the Prime Minister of this country for his message of encouragement, for the words of introduction that Sir Basil Liddell Hart - one of the greatest living of the classical strategists - has spoken, and above all to you, the members of this Conference, drawn as you are from eighteen countries in four continents, for finding the time and resources to attend.

2. At this point I find myself in an unfamiliar situation. The preparation of the Annual Conference involves over six months of work, though it is only one of the activities of I.S.S., and my role in it is that of impresario rather than conductor. By now with the speakers assembled, the papers written, the participants organised, I can generally sit back while some august person starts the substantive proceedings, my mind uneasily concentrated on the danger/that the lights will fuse or that the simultaneous translator will have a heart attack. Now, at the order of my Council I find myself in the Chair. I have often compared my role in this Annual Conference to the manager of the le Bourget air show; his job is to organise a great international occasion in which the participants come primarily to meet each other and to buy each other's products: his job is to arrange a display of aerobatics to enable them to justify the time and the travel involved to their consciences, their budgets, or

their employers. But no-one has ever expected the manager of le Bourget himself to open the proceedings by doing a barrel roll in a Mirage IV ten metres above the runway. This, it seems, is what you are calling on me to do.

3. Circumstances, however, have come to my assistance, though not circumstances that any of us welcome. Clearly it is imperative that we discuss the implications of the Czechoslovak crisis for international security. This is the first of our Annual Conferences which is not concerned with some aspect of policy but with strategic studies themselves.

It would be a gross misuse of our time and opportunity, however, if we do not take advantage of the assembly in this hall of so many able minds to talk about Czechoslovakia. I am, therefore, cutting short my opening remarks, and will shortly ask half a dozen members of the Conference to join me as an informal panel on the subject.

4. The story of I.S.S., how it came into being, how it has grown in just under ten years from a small Ford Foundation grant, a shoebox full of names, three rooms and two typewriters to an organisation which - though still modest in resources and objectives - has a membership in thirty-two countries, is an interesting one. But the telling of it can wait. Tonight I want to make only a few simple points about the Institute and its history and to use this opportunity to repay some long-standing debts of gratitude.

5. We live today in a dark world in which many of the false horizons of the 1950's and earlier 1960's have disappeared, either into new thunderclouds or a kind of grey penumbra. True the central balance is more stable than it was ten years ago, but the alliance systems which extended this stability to Europe and the Far East are beginning to decay, for reasons that I am sure Henry Kissinger will analyse, and the advance of technology poses new problems in the maintenance of the central balance itself, as Bernard Brodie and others will discuss. Economic pressures of a kind unforeseen ten years ago may rob deterrent strategies in the 1970's of that flexibility, which, after a tremendous battle between opposing schools of thought, it has at last been intellectually appreciated that they must have. The concept of peace-keeping

is in dissaray and in some contempt, for reasons which Urs Schwarz's excellent paper explains. The concept of the limitation of warfare has made headway in the thinking of the larger powers, as Robert Osgood's paper points out; but in other conflicts it has been more the product of limited resources than of any accepted philosophy of restraint; at the same time the concept of arms control has so far carried us - as Hedley Bull emphasises - only a very short distance down what must eventually - if we are to survive - be a very long road. Meanwhile ideological preconceptions still cloud rational calculation of the national interest, as Louis Halle discusses.

In the meanwhile the structure of the nation state itself is becoming precarious, as Sam Huntingdon and Brian Crozier will be discussing, whether in the sixty new countries of the world, many of them under siege from some form of revolutionary warfare, or even in the advanced states. In the great developed powers, the Chicago riots, the days of May, the sense of despair and restlessness in the younger generation, from Tokyo to Turin, from Edinburgh to Istanbul, are clear signs that the 1970's are going to be a very difficult decade to live through. Meanwhile, as Michael Howard and Raymond Aron may discuss, the classical study of strategy as a specialised aspect of human organisation and behaviour has reached something like a full stop in the sense that it has become inseparable from the study of international relations as a whole with its growing complexity and endemic imprecision, while the approach to the analysis of conflict through behavioural and social sciences, with which Kenneth Boulding will be dealing, has been initiated very late in human history, and its findings and its methodology are not yet politically influential.

6. It is not unnatural, therefore, that those of us who work in this particular field of study or of policy should have moments of black despair and should wonder why we should have given the better part of our working lives to this unrewarding field of endeavour, why we have not laboured in some more fruitful vineyard like development studies or world health, or did not just go and make money. Some of you must have been tempted, as I have, to abandon the attempt to organise or to

pursue dispassionate analysis of the role and the context of force in international politics, and to join the young and the angry in some great crusade against human folly and pretensions; but then we are safely neutered, for we know, better than most, to what fresh barbarities such crusades cnn lead. Above all, in a world such as ours, where ignorant armies clash by night, what use is a little Institute of this kind?

But when we do feel like this, it is useful to look back a space as well as forward. Since this is a tenth anniversary, let me give you some personal recollections of the year 1958, when I.S.S. was founded.

First of all, there were no accurate orders of magnitude in circulation anywhere in the world on which the politician or the journalist or the scholar could base his own assessments of the war potential of his own or other countries. Figures of bombs or aircraft or divisions were guarded jealously by governments in principle, but in practice leaked in driblets to favoured journalists or academics, in the interests either of inter-service arguments or of disputes between allies. In consequence to the public the Russians were always ten feet tall and there was always one perfect weapons system in one environment which would be the answer to everything. Second, there was intense suspicion between those responsible for defence policy and what Coleridge once called"the clerisy" - the decision-making elite in modern social science jargon - journalists, politicians, academics, and so on. Again the reason was partly inter-service rivalry, which made a dispassionate exchange of views with the ordinary chief of staff or defence planner, especially in air forces or navies, virtually impossible. Partly it was because of official bureaucracies themselves who were quite uncertain what policy they should implement in the face of new and frightening problems. The consequence was an external attitude of Mandarin-like obscurity in London, Paris, Bonn, and even Washington, the most open of the capitals, very similar I am sure to the affect that the cultural revolution has produced in Peking, an attitude of "if you knew what I know, you wouldn't say what you do", which brought rational intercourse to a full stop.

Third, the subject itself was in a state of methodological and substantive chaos, not surprising given the rapid pace of technological and political change. In the minds of those concerned with international affairs, officially or academically, there was no proper distinction between defence studies, which are concerned with the security of a particular nation, strategic studies, which concern the role of power and force in international relations as a whole, the study of conflict as a widely disseminated cultural phenomenon, and the study of the control of war and armaments. There was also a total confusion between the study of war strategies and of ways of keeping the peace. The consequence was that those who were interested in the study of war and conflict were a melange of the classical strategist, the defence expert, often a hardware man, the soldier, and the idealist. The dissimilarity of their approaches perhaps justified the official planner in thinking that the public were a pack of fools and that his really was an arcane craft.

Meanwhile in the United States a great intellectual effort had been going forward during the 1950's to clear away the debris of old ideas, very largely through the agency of RAND. Classical strategists like Bernard Brodie, men coming in from new disciplines like Albert Wohlstetter from mathematics, Herman Kahn from physics, Henry Rowen, Tom Schelling and Alain Enthoven (one of our absentees) from economics, had been introducing some conceptual order at least into nuclear strategy. I will not retell the story, partly because they are almost all here to tell it themselves, partly because I do not wish to preempt Michael Howard's admirable paper.

But here a fifth difficulty emerged, namely that there was very little international communication - trivial by comparison with the field of economics. One or two people in Europe had made it their business to seek out these men in the United States, and their colleaguee in the East coast universities - Raymond Aron was one, Denis Healey was another, I was a third. But the international community of analysts and scholars that exists today, a fair proportion of which is represented in this room, simply did not exist.

Finally, the universities were, except in the United States, largely uninterested in researching or teaching the kind of subjects we shall be discussing this weekend. There were a number of reasons for this. The minimal encouragement they got, intellectual or financial, from governments; the European distrust for contemporary history studies; the slower evolution of the discipline of international relations than in the United States from its chrysalis of international law and diplomatic and military history, meant that the European universities were in no position to play the same role in a great international or national policy debate that they were already playing in economic or social policy. It was the work during the 60's of men like Geoffrey Goodwin at London, Louis Halle at Geneva, Rix Löwenthal in Berlin, or Raymond Aron, Bertrand de Jouvenel and others in France who have made the European universities part of the strategic debate. Countries that come more recently to serious strategic problems like Australia or Japan come also better equipped in this respect.

7. At the end of these ten years there is some progress to record. First of all, public and political debate is now grounded on a more accurate basis of knowledge about the orders of magnitude involved. The old bugbear of security still dogs the subject to a much greater extent than it need, and does give rise to some very distorted political debates and some very inaccurate journalism. But the principal sufferers from a myopic attitude to security are now really the Russians rather than the Western powers. Second, in almost every country there is a less frightened relationship between officials and theorists, between governments and their elites. Each has come gradually to recognise their mutual dependence on the other. There is a disappointing exception to this generalisation, namely the legislator, who has not taken this subject as seriously as he should; one can count on the fingers of two hands the number of parliamentarians in Europe and the Commonwealth other than ministers who have really made a thorough study of this field of international policy. I find it sad that there are only two parliamentarians in the audience tonight. But, third, there is now an international community of which this Annual Conference is the

expression so that people no longer work in watertight compartments. Finally there is now clear evidence of a continuity of interest, evidence that there are a great many young people in many countries who are prepared to make the study of strategy, conflict or security the main focus of their attention. Probably a fifth of the membership of I.S.S. is now under 40 and the proportion is growing. Many of the most important contributions to the literature have been made by men in the twenties and thirties, Morton Halperin, Hedley Bull and Pierre Hassner to name only three examples. And this, of course, is part cause, part consequence, of the fact that strategy and conflict studies have become a normal part of the scope or curriculum of schools of political science and international relations.

8. I have so far said little or nothing of the role of I.S.S. in this, for though I think we have played a useful part in this process of making the study of security a serious and an international subject, there have been other centres and more powerful forces at work. Let me close by making a number of brief points about the Institute itself. First, I would like to dispel for good and all the notion that the growth of this Institute is a one-man tour de force. I gather it is sometimes said, and I should be flattered, but it is very unfair to a number of people who have had as much to do with it as I. To begin with, there were the men who called the Brighton Conference of 1957 - Dick Goold-Adams, Denis Healey, Sir Kenneth Grubb, Anthony Buzzard, Michael Howard and Alan Booth, and who had the foresight to see that it must be made into a permanent centre and who organised the finance to make this possible. I had nothing to do with this and the credit is entirely theirs. Second, there were the important figures already in the field, most of them here tonight or coming tomorrow, who helped, encouraged and guided me in the early years: Albert Wohlstetter, Raymond Aron, Thomas Schelling, Henry Kissinger, Henry Rowen, André Beaufre. Third, by no means all the innovations which are central to I.S.S. sprang full-grown from my own brain; for instance, the Military Balance is the publication by which the Institute is most widely known; the idea for it was not my own but was suggested to me by M. Paul-Henri Spaak when he was Secretary

General of NATO. Fourth, I make no claims to be an original thinker in the field of strategic studies, and this is confirmed by the fact that I find no reference to any of my own works in the footnotes of any of the papers at this Conference. But I do know an original mind when I see it and I.S.S. owes a great debt to the many original minds who have worked here as Research Associates or as authors of our studies, a galaxy so large, diverse and able that to pick out any one name would be invidious. Fifth, there have been my fellow Institute Directors in Europe, in the United States and in many other countries and continents. Without their active interest and co-operation I.S.S. would never have become a serious international operation. The now famous Anglo-French-German group of 1962 was a ground-breaking exercise of great importance and its successor, our European Study Commission, has not only given us who work in London insights into the preoccupations and objectives of the countries of the Six plus Scandinavia which we could have obtained in no other way, it has also been quietly influential in a number of European capitals.

Finally I could have achieved little or nothing without the assistance of an able and hard-working staff, most particularly because financial resources have never permitted us the luxury of a large infrastructure and we have always had to make pennies go a very long way indeed. I would like to take this opportunity to thank four people in particular who have been with me almost from the start: Arthur Majendie, our Administrative Director; Eve Streatfeild, our Librarian; Patricia Evans, who runs both our Meetings and our European Study Commission, and Bettine Strdogo, who keeps control of my own untidy affairs. Finally I owe a great deal to Curt Gasteyger for his work in extending the contacts of the Institute not only in Western Europe but in Eastern Europe and in Asia as well during his four years at Adam Street.

9. This is no conventional list of acknowledgements, and you will note that I have omitted any reference to the Council of the Institute, who have been my masters down the years. For they deserve gratitude and credit of a different kind, namely for taking, at various stages, five decisions which have been crucial to the success of this particular operation.

1. The decision to seek no access to classified material. I was certain that with a good Library public resources were adequate for serious analytical work, though this looked a much harder proposition to sustain ten years ago than it is today. This decision has been an immense boon, for it has raised the Institute above suspicion of covert dealings with any government and has given us great freedom of expression. Without it the full internationalisation of I.S.S. would of course have been impossible. It does however impose limitations, and these I clearly recognise. For instance, though I.S.S. played I think a central role in the whole argument about the strategy of flexible response, I never permitted anyone to undertake, let alone publish, any studies on tactical nuclear weapons, knowing that the dispositions and the nature of these systems involved certain necessarily guarded secrets which would make any work that did not have access to them look amateurish. The same is true today of certain technologies that are still under development. But with so vast a field of work such blind spots are of minor importance. if one is running an institute that is concerned with analysis and scholarship and not with planning.

2. The decision fully to internationalise the Institute in 1963. This had been inherent from the very foundation of I.S.S. for the Brighton Conference Association itself was international. It was my own conviction from the start that strategic studies was an international, not a national, subject. And the full internationalisation of the Institute has been a great source of strength. What we have done is to exploit London as an international capital with its great diversity of political, diplomatic, commercial and cultural contacts rather than let London exploit us.

3. The decision to seek financial independence. I have a great respect for the contract research institutes. I believe in contract research: and without for instance the famous RAND base study we would not have the degree of stability in the central balance that we have today.

But I do not think it would have been right for a centre such as ours to have become dependent on contract research. And this is the proper place to pay tribute to the great foundations - Ford, Carnegie and Rockefeller in the United States, Nuffield, Leverhume and Wolfson in Britain, Volkswagen in Germany, Agnelli and Olivetti in Italy and others besides which have supported us.

4. The fourth decision did not present itself as a black and white one. It was in effect a decision that we were not concerned to try and reach the mass public but that our constituency was those who do influence the public: the academic, the journalist, the politician, and, in this context, the official and the minister. With this has gone a high emphasis on the provision of common services for other institutes, whether in helping national institutes of international affairs to develop some expertise or specialism in the strategic field or in the setting up of new institutes of defence or strategic analysis as for instance recently in India.

5. The fifth and the most important was a decision at the very beginning to set the subject firmly in the context of international relations as a whole rather than concentrating purely on nuclear strategy, on war strategy, or on any one area of the world. This has often had the effect of making our publications seem rather unglamorous or even peripheral by comparison with work emanating from other centres. But it has, I think, given it a certain consistency and durability, and it has kept I.S.S. work from being too influenced by fashions in strategic thought, for instance by the overweening preoccupation with nuclear relationships of the late 1950's or the preoccupation with counter-insurgency of the mid-1960's. The second study which I commissioned was a comparative analysis of the way in which European governments raise military manpower and the relative effectiveness of different methods: I was attacked by a member of the Institute's Council for wasting resources on a marginal subject when I ought to have been concerned with the great question of human survival. Yet seven or eight years later, no subject was more fully relevant to survival than the availability of conventional military manpower in Europe.

Men who founded the Institute were deeply concerned with the moral implications of dependence on a strategy of massive retaliation, and in our early years we had a much stronger connection with the churches than I am afraid we do today. I know they will forgive me if I have sought to achieve the same goal as they by rather different means, namely by encouraging professional studies of ways in which war can be minimised, restrained or prevented.

9. I.S.S. is, and should remain, a relatively small operation. It always amuses me when I hear someone ask me if it is the European equivalent of the RAND Corporation. At the last count our budget was one sixty-fifth that of the size of the RAND Corporation, and I must check the latest figure with Harry Rowen. Where RAND has some 300 full-time research workers we have never had more than four people permanently on the staff working on substantive problems, though we now have eight Research Associates a year from a wide variety of countries. Our role is primarily that of a clearing-house; but of course that is quite inadequate to sustain the momentum of an institute or to retain good people. The operation will wither on the vine without its own programme of studies and research.

But the context in which I.S.S. exists is changing. It is no longer sufficient to pursue the kind of studies that clarify the basic principles of strategy. There are other new centres of research activity outside the United States, the problems of strategy and security become more complex as they become less purely military in character, and the challenge to the Research side of the Institute augments each year. I shall be leaving I.S.S. within a year or so and I think that my successor must be more adept than I in the techniques of quantification and analysis.

10. Finally, let me say a word about this particular Conference. It is, as I have said, the first that is concerned with a particular field of study rather than a particular field of policy. It is therefore right that the speakers should be primarily pundits rather than policy-makers. But it is highly significant that something like half the members of the Conference should be men concerned with policy. This acknowledges a convergence of interest

that certainly did not exist a decade ago.

The I.S.S. Annual Conference has become a recognised institution and over 1500 people have attended them. But not all have been of the same quality. Three in particular stand out in my mind; the 1960 Conference on arms control here in Oxford, when the "new thinking" on the subject was first discussed in Europe; the 1962 Conference in Bad Godesberg, where the dialectic between Mr. McNamara's young men and their European counterparts got its first public airing; and the 1966 Conference in Vienna, where we first introduced East Europeans into our discussions - a link that I am glad to say still holds. I am sure that this will prove to be the most memorable of them all.

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR QUOTATION

INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

10th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

PROBLEMS OF MODERN STRATEGY: A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

COMMITTEE IV

Saturday 21st September   Morning

The Place of Technology in Strategy

BERNARD BRODIE

The original title of this paper was to be, rather grandly, "Strategy and Technology," but after I had somewhat rashly accepted the invitation to present it here, the question arose: What can now be said on the subject of technology and strategy that is both significant and new? I do not wish to strain for novelty, but neither do I wish to waste your time. The opportunities for concocting fresh generalizations in this area are not what they once were.

Some twenty-seven years ago I published a book which, insofar as it was not simply a history of the major naval inventions of the past hundred years, presented the basic argument that change in the instruments of war which appear to be simply tactical can be so far-reaching as to have large strategic and political effects.[1] I thought when I published it that there was some novelty in the idea, but that thought may have been illusory even then. Today the point would be obviously and ludicrously banal. The literature dealing directly or indirectly with the relationship of technology to strategy has especially since World War II been very considerable, and much of it has been quite good. In this present company I have to remember that one of the more recent examples of that literature was Adelphi Paper Number 46, entitled "The Implications of Military Technology in the 1970s," which contains six of the eighteen papers delivered at this Institute's Ninth Annual Conference at Elsinore last year.

But merely to refer to the vast amount of pertinent literature is certainly to understate the influence which preoccupation with technology has had on our recent strategic thinking. The whole impressive development of systems analysis and of related techniques, especially in the United States, has fostered the notion that selection of future weapons systems for appropriate development and deployment represents most of what there is to modern military

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1. Bernard Brodie: Sea Power in the Machine Age, Princeton, 1941.

strategy. I suspect that the former American Secretary of Defense, Mr. Robert S. McNamara, tended automatically to think in such terms. Military history, which used to be the main acknowledged source of strategic insight - Clausewitz and Mahan are examples - has been enormously down-graded in favour of the new analytical techniques. Except for economics the modern social sciences have had only a peripheral influence.

As you may by now guess, I shall use this circumstance as the basic challenge in this paper, and I shall be emphasizing mainly the limitations of technology in strategy, and also the limitations of the study of technological trends as a means of acquiring strategic insights. The time is indeed overripe for considering these limitations. Vietnam is almost too conspicuous an example of technological superiority having inadequate payoff and of the modern techniques to which I have referred proving irrelevant. Over the past year, incidentally, I have witnessed two instances where a remark like the one I have just made provoked in each case the retort that systems analysis could not have been proved inapplicable in Vietnam because it has not been tried - the implication being that an appropriate trial might produce some very far-reaching results. In each case the person making that retort was a distinguished member of the strategic intellectual fraternity. I feel that such a reply reflects either a profound misunderstanding of what has been happening in Vietnam, or a stubborn refusal to distinguish between the areas of consideration where systems analysis is applicable and indeed invaluable and those in which it has little or no relevance. I suspect it reflects both.

One of the first points I should like to make is that the speed and extent of technological change have never been very closely coupled with the strategic and political implications of the relevant changes. Some technological advances may be so earth-shaking in their consequence that subsequent ones, however more sophisticated individually and impressive in the aggregate, cannot but be of diminished significance relative to the original device. The outstanding example is the weapon which introduced the nuclear age, the original fission weapon tested at Alamagordo in 1945 and used in that same year at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[2] A corner was turned in those few months which vastly separates the world before those events from the world after them. Against the bursting flash of the first A-bomb, the later much larger thermonuclear weapons and all their associated gear are of distinctly lesser importance.

Let me develop this example a little further. At the end of the first decade of the nuclear age, that is about 1955, a condition had settled upon us which in most essential respects is the same as that in which we find ourselves now and which involved changes much greater in their political implications than were to derive from the second decade of that age, ending about 1965. I will also venture the prediction that the second decade will prove more significant than the third, in which we now live.

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[2] It is, of course, now well-known that the Nagasaki bomb was the same (implosion-type) as that tested at Alamagordo and that the Hiroshima bomb was different, but for the purposes of this paper the difference is inconsequential.

At the end of the first decade there was fairly general understanding among statesmen that major war must be avoided at almost all costs. Notice I do not specify thermonuclear war but simply major war between powers possessing large nuclear capabilities, because no one is entitled to have, and practicing statesmen seem never to have, any abiding faith in our abilities to control or avoid escalation from non-nuclear war between such powers. We might observe, however, that at the end of this first decade the ideas were already developing that were subsequently to constitute a kind of theory of limited war, the existence of which has in itself had enormous political consequences, including on the negative side, I regret to say, helping to get the United States involved in the Vietnam war.

At the end of the second decade the most important achieved realization was that the balance of terror was really not delicate, that is, that the expectation of being able to make a surprise attack against their major opponent with near-impunity was most unlikely ever to be entertained by leaders of either of the super-powers. This second decade, embracing the shift from fission to fusion weapons, included also great developments in ballistic missiles of all ranges, and vast increases in the stockpiles of all nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. As it happened, missiles lent themselves to passive protection and to concealment in a way that aircraft did not - or at least appeared not to among those responsible for operating them. The result of this latter change was enormously to reduce the fear of surprise attack, which persisted halfway through the second decade of the nuclear era and which was in itself by far the single most important factor that would make for swift escalation to nuclear war in the event of a really serious break in the peace between the superpowers. The dominant military concern for those powers in the earlier period was with getting one's delivery vehicles moving in time in order to avoid their being destroyed on the ground. The coming of underground silos and Polaris submarines greatly reduced that anxiety, though this reduction of fear was also greatly assisted by various political and psychological influences, including simply the experience of having lived for years under a regime of strong mutual deterrence, during which process one may also get to know the enemy much better.

For reasons I have already hinted at, I am not able to be seriously disturbed by such new technologies as MIRV or as Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), which in its present American form we call the Sentinel system and which is probably as sophisticated as any yet existing. MIRV has been called potentially destabilizing because it tends to alter in favour of the attacker the cost in offensive missiles of destroying retaliatory missiles - that is, it seems to put "surprise attack" back in business. From the strictly technological side, I should expect that if the individual components of the MIRV system acquire the accuracy they will need to make them a real threat to heavily hardened retaliatory missiles, there will be some options open to the defender which will enable him to restore some large measure of his defensive integrity - assuming he moves not altogether too laggardly with the times. But much more to the point, the patterns of thought and of emotional response with which governments have become imbued as a result of living with nuclear deterrence are undoubtedly capable of surviving very large perturbations in the style of the weaponry which originally induced them. One needs also occasionally to remind oneself that even the return of those hardly-to-be-expected technological conditions under which surprise attack is back in business is far from being a sufficient motivation for one great nation to destroy another, even one which the former was accustomed to regard as an adversary over many years of time. To repeat, the "many years of time" make a difference, because an enemy one has lived with a long time has after all proved that it is possible and perhaps not even very inconvenient to live with him. I am merely describing something like the relationship existing today between the United States and Communist China, where the Chinese seem not to fear and have no real reason to fear preventive action by the United States, whose nuclear superiority is not only wholly commanding, but, unlike the situation vis-a-vis the Soviet Union prior to 1950, expressed also in huge capabilities.

I do not mean that we should be indifferent to changes which threatened sharply to reduce the retaliatory capability of American nuclear power against our major opponent or opponents. I only mean that our panic-level in the face of such apparently impending changes would remain rather high, partly, I suppose, but only partly, because we would expect an alert and provident defence organization to be anticipating these changes by appropriate technological measures. Since 1945 the United States record in this respect, though flawed, is clearly not one of neglect. If, however, such anticipation failed to being the deterrence factor quite back to its previous high level, I should expect the defence communities on both sides to become quickly adjusted to being adequately deterred with other patterns of potential attack and response. That awful phrase "assured destruction" will inevitably still count for a lot in a world which has as many nuclear weapons in it as exist already today.

Similarly, the BMD has been accorded vast potentiality for both good and evil, but it seems to me likely to be enough limited in its future technical effectiveness as to have little consequence other than adding huge additional expense to the weaponry systems that accomplish nuclear deterrence. U.S. Senator Frank Church has been quoted somewhere as having called it potentially the most expensive sieve in history. An article in the March 1968 issue of Scientific American by Drs. Richard L. Garwin and the enormously respected Hans A. Bethe (reprinted in the August 1968 issue of Survival) has, I should hope, shaken among many in the American defence community, the previously excessive confidence in the utility, from a cost-effectiveness point of view, of the Sentinel system. The story of how that confidence became so inflated in the first place is itself interesting and significant, and is unfortunately the kind of story that rarely gets properly told in print. To do it requires someone with the requisite experience and with the talents of a Professor R.V. Jones. I have myself seen only the outer edges of the BMD enthusiasm, and all I can bear witness to is the fact that people who have access to the classified information needed to make a rounded evaluation of the system are by no means immune to highly subjective judgments. Some tend to be particularly prone to a desire to see put in service highly sophisticated and novel weaponry that they have been working on for a long time. I might add that Drs. Garwin and Bethe are particularly merciless about the proposal for a so-called "thin" BMD defence against China, as is also Mr. Don G. Brennan, who unlike Garwin and Bethe, strongly advocates a large BMD system.

I will not pretend to know much more than is in the public domain about the Sentinel system. I will only say that the arguments made for that deployment, and especially for the thin defence against China only, seem to me to be transparently full of flaws both in logic and in the reliability of the applied data. They certainly do not take into account the vital points made by Garwin and Bethe, as well as others. The simple fact that the Spartan exo-atmospheric missile alone will cost about two million dollars each, and is easily confused by decoys, is enough to suggest to me that although the case for deploying it may be substantial, it can hardly be overwhelming in technical terms alone, even before some negative political considerations are taken into account. Of course the presently available BMD system will improve, especially if we avoid or postpone as long as possible that deployment which tends to freeze designs, but so will the means of defeating it.

Both MIRV and BMD represent an extraordinarily high degree of technological sophistication, but, as I have already suggested, they do not compare with the original A-bomb in their effects on the whole pattern of deterrence.

Their appearance stems from and in turn induces a good deal of costly competition - possibly avoidable in part by international agreement, tacit or formal. Also, because of their effects on the total costs of nuclear capabilities, they will tend when and if deployed to maintain the exclusivity of the superpower club.

That last observation suggests, however, a contrary idea which is possibly worthy of being called a second "major point". We have become accustomed, largely through the thinking fashioned over a long period of American denunciation of French nuclear ambitions, to conceiving of very high thresholds of expense below which it makes no sense to have or to aspire to a nuclear capability. However, the same people who have made the most of that alleged threshold have often expressed a fear of proliferation, I think appropriately - though somewhat inconsistently. Some of them have also displayed a fear of the Chinese nuclear capability which seems to me to be entirely disproportionate to the true menace of that capability, and which is anyway entirely inconsistent with their arguments about the nullity of French nuclear power. The reasoning which shows the French being shatteringly overwhelmed if they dare raise the threat of their nuclear power against the Soviet Union (not to mention the United States, which figures in the "All-asmuths" plan) applies just as cogently to the case of China. Nevertheless, China's potentiality for mischief is for some reason - somewhat obscure so far as the manifest argument goes - supposed to be sufficient to warrant the construction of the thin missile defence referred to above.

We notice here a certain disorderliness of thinking that goes on above those levels which all would agree are appropriate for the application of cost-effectiveness or systems analysis. What was the basis for Mr. McNamara in his speech of September 1967 justifying the projection of the thin BMD system partly on the ground that China was a less responsible adversary than the Soviet Union so far as concerned the use of military force? On what evidence and whose expert analysis was this finding based? Political judgments of such character and importance can be carefully weighed and evaluated by persons of the appropriate political expertise and sensitivity, but the patterns for doing so systematically seem not yet to be established in government practice. The Chinese have said and done many foolish things, but where have they shown the tendency to mad abandon in their use of military force beyond their frontiers which is presupposed by those who advocate the thin defence - which incidentally must also presuppose a form of Chinese nuclear missile attack that is technologically primitive, i.e., sans decoys. At least one student of Chinese affairs has, apparently without major dispute from his colleagues, cogently argued the case that the Chinese Communists have always shown appropriate circumspection and indeed caution in their external use of military power.[3]

None of this would matter very much if the thin BMD defence would really stay as thin and as cheap as some of its advocates claim, but if the restatement by Mr. Clifford of Mr. McNamara's proposal and the Senate support thereof does not actually prod the Russians into the appropriate arms control agreement - which the Russian response to the Senate vote of funds gives us some reason to hope it may - then there are several reasons for predicting with relatively high confidence, that the thin defence would soon become a thick and enormously expensive one, and that it would probably have other mischievous political consequences as well.

However, I have allowed myself to be distracted from the point about thresholds of expenditure for meaningful nuclear capabilities. A very few nuclear weapons, perhaps even one, in the hands of either Israel or the United Arab Republic could be of very great significance in the Middle East, even though deliverable only by fighter aircraft. The effects of possession by one side or the other would not be symmetrical, and mutual possession would have still different and possibly even favourable effects, though I should certainly not have enough confidence in the possibility to want to see it tried out in practice.

Still on the subject of meaningful thresholds of nuclear power: I admit to finding it somewhat difficult in my own thinking to find a convincing utility for the French nuclear effort on its present scale of activity, but I might find it at least as difficult to justify those additional conventional military forces that could be purchased and maintained with the same money. One of the common fallacies of our time is that nuclear forces are inevitably expensive and conventional forces are by comparison cheap. It certainly matters how much and what kind of each one is talking about. Well-equipped ground divisions or naval forces are certainly not cheap, and the one sure thing de Gaulle could accomplish by sacrificing his nuclear power to buy more divisions is please the Americans - which is clearly not his main endeavour in life. Anyway, he would not get many more divisions.

My third major point concerns a phenomenon, related to the one just discussed, which is very well known but is very far from being well understood. We have witnessed, for what is surely the first time in history, a huge development and growth of outlandishly powerful weapons systems which are sealed off from use but not yet from utility. How much are they really sealed off from possible use? What utility do they nevertheless continue to have? When provided in the lavish manner in which they are provided and developed in the United States, strategic nuclear forces are exceedingly costly. If we should add a large anti-missile defence to our existing anti-bomber defence and retain our offensive nuclear capabilities in anything like the configuration that they have today, the cost of maintaining both the offensive and defensive sides of the strategic nuclear capability in the United States may come to approximate what we are currently spending each year on the Vietnam war. We could bear it, but who should want to?

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[3] David P. Mozingo, "Containment in Asia, "World Politics, April, 1967, pp. 361-377.

I have been speaking thus far only of strategic capabilities, not of the tactical nuclear capabilities which according to official reports are already large and still growing and which appear to be sealed off from use to only a slightly lesser degree than the strategic nuclear weaponry. Everyone of course agrees that for the United States huge expenditures on these tremendous and all-too-powerful forces are indispensable. The debate of some few years ago on the question of minimum or finite deterrence seems to have petered out - or rather to have been replaced by a debate on the question of whether it is really necessary or even meaningfully advantageous to maintain a numerical superiority over the Soviet Union if that country should choose to challenge our existing superiority, as she appears to have been doing of late. The jargon of debate has given us such barbaric terms as "overkill," "assured destruction," and several similar unappetizing word figures. On the whole, however, I would submit that on these issues there has been much dogmatism but little searching inquiry. How much are all these weapons systems really sealed off from use in war, and under what situations might they become unsealed? Almost everyone seems to be agreed that the cement should be very strong indeed, but should it mean effectively a promise of non-use under almost any circumstances? If so, the utility of these systems-in-being will be much diminished, and that utility is presently high. It makes major war between the super-powers and between their respective alliance systems not only much less likely than without them but perhaps critically so.

The vital question, however, is: how much utility have these capabilities exerted in deterring much lesser conflicts? This is the area in which I feel we have sustained a real failure in our efforts to understand the issues. All the diplomatic pressure by the United States on her allies over the last six or eight years to build up their conventional forces, alleviated within the last two years only by the allies' refusal to heed these admonitions and demands, has been based on the assumption that our large nuclear capabilities had inadequate utility in deterring less than major wars and were not even proof against the occurrence of major wars on the conventional level. Some of this pressure was not simply an attempt to interpret probabilities but rather to strengthen the cement which would keep the nuclear capabilities totally and completely out of use. Many relevant propositions have been presented and pressed home simply as articles of faith with a very minimum of what might be called hard, cold analysis. To be sure, analysis in areas of this kind do not yield hard and fast figures, which can be neatly portrayed in graphs on charts. Those who produced numbers on charts have enjoyed a better hearing in recent years than those who were merely reflective and who asked relevant and penetrating questions. My friend and former RAND colleague, Dr. Amrom Katz, has said that the trouble with charts is that one can present only data on them, usually in the form of numbers, and that therefore the motivation to produce charts tends to become an incentive to gather data because of its availability rather than because of its relevance.[4]

Thus, while we have relatively rigorous and disciplined thinking at the levels at which systems analysis is applicable, the tolerance for sloppy thinking appears to be at least as great as ever the moment we spill over into those areas or rise above those tactical levels of inquiry where systems analysis, according to common agreement by the best practitioners of the art, has no real applicability. As it happens, these are the areas where we find all the really tough and important questions. I am not suggesting that the questions settled by the new quantitative techniques are not important; I am suggesting rather that generally they prove to be of much lesser importance than the questions which are normally answered out of the simplest kind of intuition or bias. The point would not be worth making except that I believe a great deal more rigour is possible in what might be called the soft areas.

To be sure, the appearance of a new problem - and the questions of choice which arose following World War II with respect to new weapons systems had the dimensions of an historically new problem - had a greatly stimulating effect in producing a new kind of skill. People who had the requisite training for developing into systems analysts might not have become interested in strategic questions at all if these new problems, and the research institutions for solving them, had not come forward. On the other hand, a prestige factor has been involved, and what should have been supplementary talent tended in fact to become preemptive of the field of strategic study. Under the seven critical years of the regime of McNamara, something like the effect I am describing took place in the United States. The demand

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4. Amrom H. Katz, "The Short Run and the Long Walk", Air Force, June, 1967.

for figures, and for the use of computers, is relatively easily met. I understand that something called music is now being composed by computers. No doubt I should try to hear some before passing judgment on it, but I always have felt that both the composing of and the listening to music were a deeply personal kind of communication. The fact that machines have now intruded into this process suggests to me only that it has become extremely fashionable to find new and additional ways - the farther out the better-- of putting these machines to use. One is always interested in useful work, but not in make-work projects.

I turn now to some relevant considerations of the Vietnam experience. What makes Vietnam especially germane to our discussion today is that a vast American technological superiority in practically every department has turned out to be of much lesser value than we had expected and sometimes even dysfunctional. By dysfunctional I mean, for example, that we sometimes fix our attention on ways for utilizing our technological superiority rather than on methods of solving the problem, like letting the Air Force and the Navy's air arm compete with each other to produce high sortie rates. When we begin to put an emphasis on sortie rates and on weight of bombs and shells dropped, we are not only tearing up real estate needlessly but also requiring additional services of supply to maintain those rates of expenditure.

The problem seems to be intensified, as Dr. Katz has also pointed out, by the fact that there is no front line to bring both sides into common agreement on how they are doing. When a front line is moving backwards or forwards, both sides know who at the moment is winning or losing. But the kind of war we have been fighting in Vietnam is one in which our "winning" is demonstrated by the use of charts containing data. These data may or may not be accurate and they may or may not be terribly relevant. The enemy is probably using a very different kind of criteria for determining gain or loss from what we are using. This is something beyond what is generally meant by a non-zero sum game.

Although the fighting still continues, we cannot wait for its end to begin organizing our thinking about what has gone wrong in Vietnam. The effects of our enormous frustration in that land will long influence and perhaps blight United States military and diplomatic policies elsewhere. Some of these effects will no doubt be beneficial. A more realistic appraisal of our true capabilities is always to the good, but we have probably experienced a real constriction of those capabilities rather than merely a clarification of them. The political disunity within the United States which is so largely attributable to the war in Vietnam, and the disaster which has overtaken President Johnson as a result of his personal commitment and involvement, will not soon be forgotten by his successors.

I cannot presume to know all the important things that have gone wrong in Vietnam, but I don't doubt we can group most of them under the heading of "political misjudgment". Clausewitz did his best to warn us against neglecting the political dimension in strategy, but that was a long time ago. It may not be fair to blame this neglect of political considerations upon our preoccupation with technology and with the various analytical skills we have developed, but it is remarkable how few of the pitfalls we have encountered in Vietnam were taken into account in the kinds of war games, scenarios, and cost-effectiveness analyses done at places like RAND over the past twenty years. Nobody warned us of the pitfalls involved in attempting to support through military action a regime or series of regimes with a high common denominator of corruption and ineptitude and which have in any case failed utterly to attract the allegiance of the people. Nor do I remember that we ever took into account what frustration might mean with respect to the attitudes of the American people in supporting such a war, and also the attitudes of other peoples who were simply witnessing what was going on. We had in fact had some warning in the Korean experience.

One of the great weaknesses of our Vietnamese military policy is that it has been based on the draft. As both a parent and a teacher I have seen at first hand how insidiously the draft affects the plans and outlooks of the young men who are subject to it. Much if not most of the moral indignation stimulated within the United States by our Vietnamese adventure has been connected with the draft. There are, indeed, other reasons for finding real moral issues, one certainly being the effects of the prolongation of the war upon the Vietnamese people. Even this prolongation, however, is to some degree draft-connected, for the draft accounts for the one-year rotation system, which has been extremely costly to our military effectiveness. The United States can obviously afford a professional army where the incentive to enlist is higher pay. We are now spending about thirty billion dollars per year in Vietnam, which amounts to about $60,000 for each military person we have in that country. That leaves a good deal of room for increased pay, especially if we get direct and disproportionate increases in efficiency as a result of being able to lengthen periods of rotation or to dispense with rotation altogether. This is really a cost-effectiveness issue, and should be amenable to familiar analytical techniques.

Incidentally, the $30 billion annually amounts to some $100,000 for each North Vietnamese or Viet Cong fighting man engaged in the war. I am not speaking here of enemy casualties, which cost astronomical figures each to produce, but simply of soldiers in the field. War seems always to confine us to the costliest possible way of producing (or failing to produce) a desired result.

I am trying to avoid a judgment as to whether it was or was not a correct policy to become committed in the first place. However, I do have a strong allegiance to the idea that failures of the kind we have experienced thus far should be predictable. Some persons did in fact predict failure, and for approximately the right reasons.[5] Before committing U.S. combat troops we had rich opportunities for informing ourselves about the situation in Vietnam, and actually since that time we have had few surprises from the environment. The major surprise is that the environment has changed so little. Naturally, to avoid predictable failure means either to avoid the commitment altogether or to change the methods normally used for fulfilling such a commitment. Our experience in shaking bureaucratic structures in order to bring about a change in methods does not warrant optimism about the results of such attempts. It is also relevant that our declining to invade North Vietnam - in line with the concept of "sanctuary" which is so conspicuous a part of modern limited-war theory - affected the conditions of the war in a most fundamental way, and inasmuch as we were making that choice we should have had some awareness of the probable penalties. The restraint was, surely, a correct one; what was incorrect was our failing to appreciate the military burden it entailed.

Another problem that has been acute concerning Vietnam has been the "information gap," which again flies in the face of a marked advance in the technology of communications. The Vietnam war is reported daily on the television screens of America, with more than enough views, in colour, of the fighting, the killing and the destruction. It is almost surely the first war in history that has been so reported. Yet it is a war in which the public, including that part of it which is usually highly informed, seems to be at a loss not only about the issues but about the facts of the situation. The government, with its own monumental but bureaucratic sources of information, which tend to overwhelm or at least displace outside and contradictory sources, is probably differently confused rather than less confused. The books, articles, and shorter news reports on the war are by now voluminous, but to get some detached view of what is really going on is extraordinarily difficult, even among the few who try. The question of stopping the remaining bombing in North Vietnam how now become a hot election issue, yet surely not one in a hundred voters has any idea what kind of bombing is involved, or where it takes place.

I know how partial and inadequate is this synopsis of lessons we should be deriving from Vietnam. I intend it as much to illustrate as to implement remarks made earlier in this paper. Nevertheless, what I have called "the political

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5. Two such persons I can mention are Prof. J. Kenneth Galbraith, who while he was ambassador to India warned President Kennedy against involvement, and Dr. Guy Pauker of The RAND Corporation.

dimension" is remarkably visible in Vietnam. So is the fact that a virtually complete monopoly of air power and a great preponderance of every other form of war material have bought us only the conviction that we cannot escape the quagmire through military defeat, as did the French. Also, if pride goeth before a fall, members of the American strategic fraternity have had both their pride and their fall. Let us hope we recognize the fall for what it is and do not rationalize away its benefits.

A friend said to me recently that history teaches us only how to fight past wars. In a very real sense that is true, precisely because of the rapid advance of technology. Nevertheless, I suspect that the wisdom that the same friend brings to his own interpretation of our military needs is in large measure based on his own experience with military and associated bureaucracies, in other words, on recent history as it has funnelled through his personal experience. I think that history is of far greater value than my friend allows, but it obviously has to be another kind of history than the one we are accustomed to. In any case, we learn from history that while some battles and even campaigns have been won by clever technological tricks, others have been quite unaffected by considerable technological superiority. We should learn that technology amounts to very much indeed - it after all separates the rich and the powerful from those who are neither - but it falls very short of being the name of the game which is strategy.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR QUOTATION 6

INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

10th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

PROBLEMS OF MODERN STRATEGY: A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

COMMITTEE V

Friday, 20th September Afternoon

Arms Control: Stocktaking and Prospectus

HEDLEY BULL

I

The foundation of the Institute for Strategic Studies ten years ago coincided with the beginnings of a great debate within the Western world about the implications of nuclear weapons for arms control and disarmament. One of the high points of that debate was the conference of the Institute held here at Oxford in 1960, when the 'new thinking' on this subject that had been developing in the late 1950's, chiefly in the United States, was first presented to a wide international audience.

The 'new thinking' of 1960 was not as new as it seemed to some of us at the time: much of it was a restatement of old principles, concerning the balance of power or the political control of forces, in new terms, or an application of these principles to new circumstances. But it seemed to herald the birth, or at all events the renaissance, of a subject that was both intellectually exciting and of great practical importance. Some of the central ideas of the 'new thinking' may be briefly recapitulated:

First, there was a feeling of concern about the dangers of nuclear war, and of dissatisfaction with the existing policies of the nuclear powers, that was shared with radical disarmers and was much more intense and immediate than the concern that is felt now. Our anxieties were focussed upon the possibility of war between the United States and the Soviet Union, arising especially out of the dangers of a premeditated surprise attack, a pre-emptive attack dictated by the need to disarm the adversary if war was imminent, or the unintended expansion of a local conflict in Europe. The policies of the United States in the period of the 'New Look', of the United Kingdom after the 1957 Defence White Paper, and of the Soviet Union after Mr. Khrushchev's speech of January 1960 seemed to envisage the unlimited use of strategic nuclear weapons as the chief, if not the only means of conducting a major conflict in the nuclear age.

Secondly, representatives of the 'new thinking', in common with advocates of unilateral nuclear disarmament, who were then a force to be reckoned with on the British political scene, were suspicious and distrustful of the goal of a negotiated general and comprehensive disarmament agreement, which was still powerfully upheld by men such a Philip Noel-Baker and Jules Moch, whose thinking about disarmament had been shaped in the League of Nations period, and whose ideas still provided the chief content of 'disarmament' as a concept in the public mind. The goal of a general and comprehensive disarmament agreement was adopted in principle by the nuclear powers, and had recently been forcefully restated in the Soviet proposal of 1959 for 'total disarmament'. Like members of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Britain those who gave expression to the 'new thinking' were apt to draw attention to the gap which separated the professions of the major powers to a belief in negotiated disarmament and their actual practice, the predominance of propaganda over genuine negotiation in disarmament conferences, the atmosphere of dilatoriness and humbug that accompanied these meetings, and the urgent need to do something to reduce the dangers of war, without waiting for the great powers to reach agreement on remote and improbable schemes for transforming the world.

Thirdly, by contrast with both the traditional disarmement doctrine stemming from the pre-war period and the school of unilateral nuclear disarmament, which were inclined to regard defence and disarmament as opposed objectives of policy, and the influence of the military on disarmament policy as a sinister one, the 'new thinking' insisted upon the unity of strategy and arms control, the continuing need for defensive measures under conditions of disarmament, the need for defence planners to take disarmament into account, and the subordination of both defence and disarmament to the objective of security. While this doctrine of the unity of strategy and arms control meant that traditional defence thinking, unrefined by the element of collaboration with the antagonist in military policy, was inadequate, it also carried the implication that arms control was not the preserve of radicals and rebels, but was a respectable pursuit that could be contemplated without alarm in the corridors of power. Radicals and rebels were quick to interpret the 'new thinking' as essentially a capitulation of disarmament thinking to defence thinking, or as the new apologetics developed by the defence establishment to protect itself against the criticism to which it had become subject.

Fourthly, implicit in the treatment of arms control rather than disarmament as the essential focus of concern, was a broadening of the scope of the subject and a perception of links between varieties of military activity hitherto thought separate. 'The essential feature of arms control', Schelling and Halperin wrote, 'is the recognition of the common interest, of the possibility of reciprocation and cooperation even between potential enemies with respect to their military establishments'.[1] Along with disarmament agreements it was necessary to recognise formal agreements which restricted military policy without involving disarmament, tacit agreements arrived at without being given formal or even verbal expression, and unilateral actions undertaken in the pursuit of common interests. The effect of this broadening of the scope of the subject was to weaken the claims that advocates of disarmament had always made that theirs was a new and untried course. For a great deal of what counted as arms control in this extended sense was already a part of the established practice of states.

The broadened definition also introduced a note of obscurity and even of metaphysics into the discussion of arms control. For while we may easily recognise a formal agreement when we see one there are inherent difficulties in establishing the existence of an agreement which has never been alluded to in the statements of governments. The fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have both refrained from doing certain things (e.g. directly confronting one another in war, using nuclear weapons in war or stepping up their defence expenditure to Second World War levels) does not mean that they have agreed not to do them. Moreover, it is also often difficult to determine whether unilateral military policies can in fact be regarded as instances of arms control: for steps taken to strengthen command and control procedures, to render retaliatory forces invulnerable to destruction or to avoid provocative deployments of forces, have a simple defence rationale, and if they are to be regarded as measures of arms control it has to be shown that they are motivated by a perception of interests shared with the adversary, or at all events that they result in the advancement of such interests, which is sometimes difficult to demonstrate.

Fifthly, the 'new thinking' was critical of the assumption that disarmament, in the sense of the reduction or abolition of armaments and armed forces, should be the objective of arms control policy. It was argued that 'total disarmament' was not qualitatively different from any lesser degree of disarmament; that whatever meaning could be given to the term, it still implied a situation in which war was physically possible. It was argued also that drastic disarmament, while it might or might not prove desirable, should be regarded as the objective of arms control policy only in cases where it could be demonstrated that a reduction of armaments, rather than an increase of them or a maintenance of them at existing levels, promoted the overriding objective of security.

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[1] Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin: Strategy and Arms Control, 1961, p.2.

In particular, it was suggested that while the uncritical pursuit of disarmament implied the dismantling of the Soviet-American balance of terror, the proper object of arms control policy was rather to preserve or perfect it. Armsccontrol policy should distinguish between those military developments which tended to stabilise the balance of terror, and those which tended to destabilise it; and while restricting the latter it should tolerate or even encourage the former. From this perspective measures directed towards making retaliatory forces invulnerable, or towards the maintenance of the ability to threaten unacceptable damage, were welcomed as stabilising, while measures directed towards the acquisition of a disarming capacity or the provision of an effective defence of cities against missile attack, were branded as 'de-stabilising'.

Sixthly, although the 'new thinking' was directed in part towards destroying the illusions and exposing the humbug that surrounded the discussion of disarmament it was also deeply infected with optimism, especially the optimism of the social sciences in America. There was a sense of being at the threshold of a new era in arms control, reflected in proposals to expand governmental machinery for dealing with arms control, in hopes placed in the goal of what was called 'stable deterrence', and above all in the confidence that was displayed in study and research as a means of improving the prospects of peace and security. One of the most memorable interventions in the discussion at Oxford in 1960 was that of Mr (now Sir) Con O'Neill, who warned that the hopes now being placed in logic or mathematics in the search for a solution to the problem of disarmament might prove as illusory as those which had been placed by a previous generation in the moral transformation of mankind.

II

What progress has been made since 1960 towards the goals that the 'new thinking' mapped out? The answer to this question presents something of a paradox. On the one hand the world is a great deal safer than it was at the beginning of the decade, at all events against the danger of major nuclear war. But on the other hand the progress of arms control, while it has not been negligible, has been slight and the contributions it has made to the strengthening of international security are problematical.

It is obvious that the sense of impending catastrophe that gripped the Western world during the late 1950's has now given place to a more relaxed view of the dangers of nuclear war. Disarmament has lost much of its urgency as a public issue in Western countries; governments are not so much on the defensive against radical groups pressing for action in this field, and radical groups themselves have found other matters on which to focus their protest.

This more relaxed attitude does not necessarily reflect an objective improvement in the position. Moreover, there may be some risk that the new mood of relaxation will itself help to resuscitate the old dangers. While the departure of panic and hysteria from the discussion of nuclear problems can only be welcomed, we should beware of assuming that the twenty-three years' nuclear peace we have had reflects the operation of inherent tendencies of the nuclear age that are in no need of encouragement from us, of neglecting the part that has been played in our survival so far by conscious efforts to remove the dangers and by sheer chance.

In fact, however, there has been an objective improvement in the position. We remain, it is true, in a world of states that are sovereign, armed and divided, and subject to the insecurity which this entails. If progress is to be measured by the degree to which we have altered the political structure of mankind by depriving states of their sovereignty, or their armaments, or by removing the political conflicts among them, we have made none. But within this framework a situation of relatively greater security has grown up.

First, the United States and the Soviet Union have devoted much effort and attention to devising procedures and techniques for ensuring adequate command and control of their own nuclear forces and weapons. The novels and films which depicted the outbreak of a nuclear war as the result of failure in command and control, whether or not they draw attention to dangers which actually existed in the 1950's or early 1960's, cannot be taken very seriously as warnings now. I believe that these dramatised warnings, exaggerated as they no doubt were, served a useful purpose; and although I have no evidence on this point I believe they may have played a part in stimulating the measures which the United States and the United Kingdom have taken to improve command and control measures in relation to nuclear weapons.

I believe it is desirable that the United States and other nuclear powers should make more information available to the public about the steps they have taken in this field. Information about command and control is, of course, necessarily subject to the highest security classifications. But at the present time the public can only take it on trust that in this vital area their interests are being adequately safeguarded. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the dissemination by the United States of information in this field to other nuclear powers, including unfriendly ones, might help to guard against common dangers.

Secondly, the United States has carried out the steps to ensure the invulnerability of its strategic nuclear forces, for which the strategic writings of 1958-61 called as if with one voice. Moreover, the Soviet Union in due course followed the United States in the multiplication, dispersal and hardening of land-based missile sites and developing a nuclear-submarine-based missile force, and added the technique of the mobile land-based ICBM.

As a consequence of these measures it is not reasonable now, as it was in 1960, on the basis of the information then publicly available about the state of nuclear forces, to doubt the stability of the situation of mutual deterrence, in the sense of the tendency to persist of the situation in which the United States and the Soviet Union could each survive a first blow by the other side and retain a capacity for Assured Destruction.

It is true that the situation of mutual deterrence remains 'delicate' or unstable in principle, in the sense that its persistence is not assured by the mere existence of nuclear weapons on both sides but only by constant attention to the measures that are necessary to provide an Assured Destruction capability. It is true also that there are actual 'destabilising' trends perceptible, both in the measures being taken by the United States and the Soviet Union to provide Ballistic Missile Defence of their cities, and in such harbingers of the development of a disarming capability as the MIRV and the improvement of submarine detection. But experts do not now expect that trends such as these will undermine the situation of mutual deterrence within the foreseeable future.

A stable balance of nuclear terror does not ensure the preservation of peace. The form of order it provides, moreover, as Osgood and Tucker have pointed out, labours under the disadvantage that 'a single breakdown of that order in nuclear violence would be catastrophic'.[2] But it does ensure that deliberate resort to the unlimited use of force by either side cannot be a rational act of policy. And it does reduce - while not eliminating - the incentive to get in the first blow in a situation in which war is believed to be imminent. For these reasons the increased stability which the balance of terror between the super-powers has come to possess in the 1960's has made for a safer world, despite the absolute increase in the size and destructive potential of the Soviet and American strategic nuclear forces, and in the money spent on them, during this period.

Thirdly, we have much less reason now than we had in 1960 to assume that if the United States and the Soviet Union did become involved in hostilities these would necessarily expand or 'explode' into an unlimited conflict. Perhaps even then there was reason enough to doubt any automatic tendency of a Soviet-American conflict to become unlimited, and evidence enough from the experience of the Berlin Blockade, the Korean war or the Quemoy crisis of the ability of the superpowers to contain conflicts in which they were involved. But in the nineteen sixties the United States has come to espouse a sophisticated doctrine of the need for and the possibility of limitation of war, at a variety of different levels; and the Soviet Union, although it began later and has not gone nearly as far, has moved in the same direction.

The United States and the Soviet Union, I believe, need to go much further in elaborating a doctrine of limited war. Because espousal of the idea of limited war implies acknowledging the place of war in international relations, because it appears to weaken the force of deterrent threats, and because, as the United States discovered when it sought to enunciate this doctrine within NATO, it raises awkward questions about the different interests of allies in the nature and extent of the limitations proposed, there are great obstacles to carrying the doctrine of limited war further. Once the United States and the Soviet Union, moreover, are directly engaged in hostilities, the pressures for expansion of the conflict must be great. But at least if the major powers accustom themselves to the idea of limited war, and allow for it in their strategic planning and preparations, there will be some possibility of limiting a Soviet-American conflict that has broken out. United States and Soviet policymakers, although they have studiously avoided direct military conflict and have controverted those who argued that once the strategic nuclear balance was stable, war between the superpowers would

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[2] Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker: Force, Order and Justice, 1967 p. 39

for a plan that would, in Schlesinger's words, 'strengthen allied unity and beat the Soviet Union in the U.N.' he overruled the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 'extreme arms controllers' and ruled in favour of general and complete disarmament.[3]

There followed the McCloy-Zorin talks of 1961 and the 'Agreed Principles' concerning GCD which they drew up; and the following year the presentation of Soviet and United States draft GCD plans to the new Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference. Perhaps because of the new element of professionalism injected into the planning of disarmament policy by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency the United States GCD plan of April 1962 was a reasonably sophisticated document which attempted to spell out the meaning of drastic disarmament in terms of the stages necessary to accomplish it, and the institutions necessary to verify and enforce disarmament measures and to maintain international order in a disarmed world. Under the impact of this professional argumentation Soviet plans for drastic disarmament became less frivolous than they had previously been. The period 1961-4 was one of sustained intellectual attention to the subject of drastic disarmament on the part of the E.N.D.C., bureaucracies, and outside scholars and writers, and it resulted in the appearance of a great deal of material of interest to students of the subject.

But it never showed any sign of resulting in any agreement in this field, apart from 'agreements of principle' like the McCloy-Zorin one which merely serve to obscure the differences between the parties and to create an illusion of progress. Since 1965, the discussion of GCD in the E.N.D.C. has become a perfunctory affair, the time set aside for this subject being devoted to the canvassing of measures such as a freeze in the production of nuclear delivery vehicles, which may be formally linked to progress in the field of GCD but have in fact been discussed as separate proposals. Critics of the pursuit of GCD have often argued that it distracted attention from the discussion of partial measures and imposed an obstacle to agreement on them. In recent years, however, negotiators have experienced no difficulty in detaching particular proposed agreements from the GCD framework, and discussion of the latter has become a ritual affair. It is also striking that among non-official students of arms control and groups interested in promoting arms control, advocates of drastic or comprehensive disarmament have ceased to exert a significant influence.[4]

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[3] Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr: A Thousand Days. John F. Kennedy in the White House, 1965 p.418

[4] This is bemoaned by R.R. Neild in What Has Happened to Disarmament? Annual Memorial Lecture, David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, April 1968

The most tangible evidence of progress in arms control is provided by the formal arms control agreements, not involving disarmament, that have been signed in the 1960's. Following upon the Antarctica Treaty of December 1959 we have had the Partial Test Ban Treaty signed in August 1963, the tripartite declaration on outer space of October 1963, followed up by the Treaty on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space of January 1967, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty this year. The Hot Line agreement of June 1963, although it imposes no restriction on military policy and hence cannot strictly be considered an example of arms control, nevertheless may be mentioned as giving effect to the objective of perceived common interests in military security and embodying a technique advocated by students of arms control.

The intrinsic effects of these formal arms control agreements on military competition among states are not negligible. 'Realists' argue that the Partial Test Ban Treaty is ineffective because it does not prevent nuclear explosions, but merely registers the fact that the powers who launched it had exhausted the utility of tests in the atmosphere. Or they argue that it had merely the effect of intensifying underground explosions. These are misleading half-truths. It did not in fact prove possible to terminate United States and Soviet bouts of competitive nuclear testing without the instrumentality of the Partial Test Ban Treaty. And although underground testing has been intensified, the prohibition of testing in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space represents a real restriction, which elements within the United States and the Soviet Union, and among potential nuclear powers that are signatories of the Treaty, undoubtedly find irksome.

The Antarctica and Outer Space agreements similarly prohibit the deployment of weapons in areas where the pressure for deployment is in any case not yet powerful. But they do add an additional inhibition to others which already make against the extension of armaments competition into these areas; and they serve to advertise and to define the intentions of signatory states and thus to reassure them about one another's intentions. The Non-Proliferation Treaty similarly has to be viewed as an instrument which cannot by itself arrest the spread of nuclear weapons, but which adds a legal inhibition to other more powerful factors already making against proliferation, and which helps signatory states to arrive at a more precise appreciation of one another's intentions than they would be able to make in the absence of a formal agreement.

No one would argue, however, that any of these agreements has vitally affected the course of military competition. The chief importance of these agreements lies not in their intrinsic effects upon the military policies they are designed to restrict, but in their symbolic effect. The signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which demonstrated that arms control negotiations were not necessarily forever without concrete issue, and that the United States and the Soviet Union were able to agree upon a tangible restriction in the nuclear weapons field, marked an important stage in the emergence of the political detente. Similarly, the chief importance of the Non Proliferation Treaty may lie in its qualities as a symbol of positive cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in promoting a universal arms control measure in opposition to the policies of other states, and as a dramatisation to the world at large of the possibility of taking action to arrest the spread of nuclear weapons.

A number of important expectations or hopes that were entertained in 1960 in relation to formal arms control agreements have failed to bear fruit. There have been no agreements bringing about any actual reduction of armaments. There has been no progress in the application of international inspection machinery to arms control agreements, contrasting with an immense investment by the United States in the study and development of techniques for such inspection, although the Non-Proliferation Treaty will result in the extension of I.A.E.A. safeguards to the peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear weapon state signatories. Advancing technology has greatly improved the means of verifying some agreements without international inspection machinery, as illustrated by the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the role which satellite intelligence might play in a limitation on deployment of nuclear delivery vehicles. But many possible agreements still clearly require formal inspection procedures for adequate verification, and many students of arms control in 1960 placed great emphasis upon international inspection as something valuable in itself, as undermining military secrecy and establishing a momentum towards further measures of arms control.

Above all, no progress has been made towards a formal arms control agreement, or series of such agreements, that would stabilise the balance of terror at a minimum level of force. Perhaps the chief specific objective that was singled out by the 'new thinking' was in this field. It was thought that whether or not radical disarmament was a feasible ultimate objective, the first step was to stabilise the balance of terror; that this was unlikely to come about as the result of Soviet-American arms competiton itself; and that arms control agreements could be designed specifically to this end. This immediate goal, which was viewed by 'disarmers' as part of the first stage of a GCD plan and by 'arms controllers' as a subject for negotiation in its own right, could be pursued directly by means of a comprehensive agreement on strategic nuclear weapons which would proclaim the desirability of distinguishing 'stabilising' from 'de-stabilising' weapons developments, rather as plans in the inter-war period had proceeded deductively from the principle that 'specifically offensive' weapons were to be restricted and 'defensive' weapons to be retained. Or the goal could be sought indirectly by means of agreements such as a freeze of nuclear delivery vehicle (NDV) production, a deal on numbers of deployed NDV's arrived at by 'straight bargaining', a prohibition of Anti-Ballistic Missile deployment or a 'bomber bonfire'.

In fact, as has been noted, the United States and the Soviet Union, unaided by formal arms control agreements to this end, have created a stable balance of terror. It is, however, subject to destabilising tendencies as illustrated by the MIRV and the ABM; and in terms of the numbers and size of missiles and destructive potential of warheads available to both sides, it exists at a vastly higher level than the strategic balance of 1960. Within and around the Western defence establishments some progress has been made in thinking through the great complexities of this subject. President Johnson's 1964 proposal for a freeze on numbers and characteristics of nuclear delivery vehicles proposed a way of opening the discussion of this subject, but at the time it was presented it would have frozen a great United States superiority; it involved a great deal of intrusive inspection; and it would have frozen such 'stabilising' developments as the hardening of Soviet ICBM forces. The 'Gromyko proposal' of 1962 for a nuclear umbrella, which also led to some valuable thought on this problem, was never spelt out in detail nor detached from the framework of GCD.

What contribution has arms control made to the improvement of security against major war during this decade? Measures of 'unilateral arms control', like the strengthening of command and control and the securing of retaliatory forces, have undoubtedly played an important part, although it is difficult to estimate whether the dimension of arms control thinking was essential to the taking of them. The category of 'tacit arms control agreements', if by that we mean studied attention by the great powers to one another's moves in military policy, plus the attempt to jockey each other towards minimax solutions, is central to the present Soviet-American expectation of secure coexistence. But this remains an obscure field in which there are some illuminating notions about what might happen or could happen, but little hard evidence about what actually goes on.

Tangible, formal arms control negotiations have resulted in some agreements, but these agreements have affected the course of events by virtue more of their symbolic than their intrinsic importance, and the negotiations themselves have contributed to international security more because of their side-effects, in the communication of strategic ideas and the definition of arms control policies, than as the result of their pursuit of the central purpose of arriving at agreements.

III

What lessons can be drawn from this experience for the study and practice of arms control in the future? If the fruits so far of the 'new thinking' have been disappointing should we return to the pursuit of radical disarmament, bending our efforts once again towards a general and complete disarmament plan, or some comprehensive proposal of this sort, rather than expending our energies upon measures which, even if they are implemented, are of slight significance?

Such a course would be disastrous. If progress in the negotiation of limited measures has been disappointing, in the field of comprehensive disarmament there has been none at all. The detachment from such comprehensive plans of items for separate negotiation, beginning with the Surprise Attack and Test Ban negotiations that opened in 1958, was the most constructive step of the disarmament negotiations in the postwar years. The developments that have flowed from this step have brought arms control out of the realms of cynical propaganda and scholastic irrelevance and into that of serious international politics.

I believe on the contrary that the Western powers should seek to deprive GCD plans of the foothold they still enjoy in disarmament conferences. When this course is suggested to them, officials are inclined to argue that the public will not stand for it. Very frequently, however, when this subject comes up for discussion it is the officials who are in favour of continuing to negotiate about GCD and the members of the public present who wish to drop it. The vocal public in this field are in fact a good deal more sophisticated about this matter than they were in the 1950's

It is certainly not possible, nor would it be desirable, to abandon official espousal of a disarmed world as an ultimate goal. It is desirable that our leaders should uphold the idea that military force is in itself repugnant, and that we maintain it and pay for it only because it is an unfortunate necessity. The notion of a world without arms, moreover, is a necessary point of reference in maintaining the momentum and sense of direction of an enterprise devoted to the reduction and limitation of armaments.

What should be eliminated is the pretence that plans to bring about general disarmament are a matter that can be negotiated about in good faith by governments now. GCD plans need not be dramatically disavowed but can be quietly dropped. The accomplishment of this task would be facilitated if the Western powers were able to interest the Soviet Union in some reciprocated restraint to this end.

Apart from this negative one what positive lessons can be drawn? First, we should recognise that among the different sorts of measures that go to make up arms control 'unilateral action' is more important than the pursuit of agreements, and 'tacit agreements' are more important than formal ones. This may have been implicit in some of the 'new thinking' but it was nowhere clearly spelt out. It now seems to me that one of the defects of the 'new thinking' was that it was not radical enough, and overrated the importance of formal arms control agreements in imposing severe curbs upon armaments competition, and especially the importance of international inspection.

Formal agreements in areas of vital military concern. such as that of the reduction and limitation of strategic nuclear weapons, are immensely difficult to negotiate not only because of the sensitivity of governments towards them and the suspicion with which their military advisors regard them, but also because of the inherent difficulties of translating the uncertain and constantly changing balance of power into the precision and fixity of a treaty.

For as long as states remain the primary actors in international relations and possess arms, which is for as long as we can foresee, what will chiefly determine international security will be the decisions these states make about the use of their arms. International agreements, even when satisfactorily concluded and brought into operation, are at best a means of influencing these decisions.

As has been argued above, the improvement of international security in the 1960's owes more to unilateral actions than to the pursuit of formal agreements. Accordingly it is regrettable that the major organisational innovation of the period, President Kennedy's Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency, is one primarily oriented towards the pursuit of such treaties. I have great respect for the work of the A.C.D.A., and believe its creation was a great step forward. Nevertheless, the heart of the problem of international security lies in the defence or strategic policies of the major powers, and the negotiation of international understandings is necessarily subordinate to it.

The prime need is perhaps to inject a greater element of self-consciousness about the arms control dimension of strategic policy into the defence and foreign policy establishments of these states. No doubt a good deal of awareness of this dimension already exists. But this awareness might be strengthened if there were established within the defence and foreign policy machine groups charged not merely with the search for agreements, but with the definition of interests shared with adversaries, and the study of ways in which these interests might be advanced.

An example may be given from the field of anti-proliferation policy. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, in my view, has a part to play in the control of proliferation. But the spread of nuclear weapons will be more vitally affected by the overall policy of the nuclear powers on this matter: the restraints they themselves practice in their nuclear weapons policy, the assurances they can provide, the inducements and pressure they can bring to bear. These wider considerations are by no means neglected but one may doubt whether they have received the degree of attention that has been bestowed upon the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Another example is the field of Soviet-American competition in strategic nuclear armaments. It is this field which is the most sensitive of all areas of military activity at the present time, because on it the whole structure of power in the world depends. Formal agreements may affect it, as up to a point the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the Outer Space agreement already have done. But in this area progress towards restraint and a scaling down of effort is more likely to come by means of reciprocated unilateral action than by treaty.

Secondly, we should recognise that the chief function of formal agreements may sometimes be the symbolic one of demonstrating 'progress' and facilitating the conclusion of further agreements, rather than the intrinsic contribution they make to military security. The 'new thinking', which was characterised by a certain intellectual purism in the pursuit of military security and by disdain for the merely political and theatrical, was inclined to overlook this. Thus we have had the Partial Test Ban Treaty dismissed as a 'clean air bill', the Hot Line agreement disparaged as something that could as well have been arranged quietly between the United States and Soviet post offices, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty derided as a merely declaratory instrument with inadequate provision for verification and none for enforcement. Such narrowly strategic appreciations of these agreements overlook the political dimension in disarmament negotiations, the force in the world of the desire for tangible evidence of action to curb the dangers of war, and the effect that can be produced upon relations among the negotiating countries by a dramatisation of this evidence.

Clearly we must continue to insist on establishing the intrinsic utility of arms control agreements before we set off in pursuit of them. In the accumulation of merely symbolic or hortatory treaties there is a risk that we shall repeat the errors of the 1920's and become the victims of our own illusion - making. But it should be recognised that the creation of a political effect can be a legitimate part of the utility of an agreement.

Thirdly, given that disarmament talks frequently prove to be chiefly important in the function they have of providing opportunities for the exchange of ideas and for mutual education in strategic policy, there is a case for explicitly recognising this function and assigning it an important place in the planning of arms control policy. Jeremy Stone's recent study of the strategic dialogue brings out the extraordinary difficulty of conveying strategic ideas as between the United States and the Soviet Union.[5] The United States should give very careful attention to what it wants to say to the Soviet Union and how it can most effectively say it; and in making its voice heard through the interference, it would seem valuable to brief disarmament delegations explicitly to this end, and to include among them persons whose skills lie in the exposition of strategic ideas.

Fourthly, the most important proximate goal of arms control remains the stability of the Soviet-American strategic balance. The ideas entertained in 1960 for surrounding the balance with a measure of control and for maintaining it at a lower level, remain valid. A reduction, or cessation of expansion, of Soviet-American nuclear armaments remains important for its symbolic effect upon the detente, its possible economic benefits and its relations to the prospects of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The stability of the balance remains a chief foundation of peace and security.

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[5] Jeremy J. Stone : Strategic Persuasion:Arms Limitation through Dialogue, 1967.

It is unlikely, however, that this objective will be arrived at by means of a comprehensive arms control agreement to this end. Such prospects of it as there may be depend upon reciprocated restraint, of the sort the United States was trying to practice until early this year in relation to the deployment of BMD. A stable balance at minimum levels might become the object of each side's negotiating policy, but it cannot be made the operative principle of an arms control scheme, from which the numbers and sorts of the N.D.V's that each side is allowed to have will be deducted. Such a way of proceeding involves a rationalistic attempt to side-step the politics of arms control discussion, and would founder on this rock. Formal agreements dealing with particular aspects of the strategic balance - a comprehensive test ban, a freeze on numbers of N.D.V's could help indirectly to promote the objective of a stable balance at minimum levels.

Fifthly, whereas the 'new thinking' was focused principally on the dangers arising out of the Soviet-American relationship, it is necessary now to take more seriously into account other dangers to international security that have arisen in the world - not only from the spread of nuclear weapons but also from the acquisition of sophisticated armaments by new countries.

A great deal of attention has been devoted to the spread of nuclear weapons in the last few years, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty is now under way. There may be some danger t arms control in the very success of the Treaty and in the developing consensus among the super powers which it reflects. This is that the cause of arms control, like that of the League of Nations in the 1930's, will become identified with the interests of a particular power group and tarnished with the brush of ideology.

The United States and the Soviet Union do have a special position in world politics; and there is in fact a general interest in their cooperation for some purposes. It will be important, however, not to give priority to Soviet-American cooperation at the expense of failing to engage the interests of other major powers, including China, in the arms control conversation. For the present there is clearly no possibility of engaging the interest of China, but it must surely be a high priority to bring China into the negotiations at the first opportunity, even at the expense of a lowering of consensus.

Sixthly, it is time that the study of arms control was redirected towards an examination of fundamentals. Whereas the 'new thinking' was remarkable for the questioning of old assumptions and the spelling out of new ones, the research that has been carried out since, now on a massive scale and under the aegis of large institutions, has tended to be encased within these latter assumptions, which are now ageing. The technical character, the professionalism and the absorption in detail of recent research in arms control, like research in the wider field of strategic studies, have tended to obscure the uncertainty of the starting points.

In particular, it is necessary to ask again how valid is the assumption that the balance of terror is the chief foundation of international security, and the preservation of it the first object of arms control policy. If this assumption was valid at the time of the cold war, does it remain so in a period of declining concern about military security? If it does remain valid, do we have to accept Mr McNamara's assumption that the objective of Assured Destruction requires an ability to destroy $\frac{1}{4}$ - $\frac{1}{3}$ the Soviet population and $\frac{2}{3}$ Soviet industrial capacity, or can adequate deterrence be maintained at a lower level of Assured Destruction? What are the circumstances in which security would be enhanced rather than imperilled by the diminution of the capacity for Assured Destruction?

The importance of the debate about BMD is that it has tended to reopen these questions. The 'classical' view of the arms controllers, that BMD of cities is unwelcome because it is 'de-stabilising', has come under attack from two directions: from right wing critics who accept that BMD is de-stabilising but welcome it because they see in it the means of establishing preponderance; and from left wing critics who also accept that it is de-stabilising but believe it will lead to the establishment of a 'higher' form of stability based on defence rather than deterrence. In the new political and technological environment of the 1970's new basic assumptions may have to be thought out.

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INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

10th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

PROBLEMS OF MODERN STRATEGY: A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

COMMITTEE IV

Friday 20th September Afternoon

Strategy and Ideology

LOUIS J. HALLE

The basis of what follows is that, in the great conflicts of mankind, ideological considerations and strategical considerations generally stand opposed to each other. If this were not so there would be no "problem", and our general subject at this conference is "Problems of Strategy".

There have in the past been many conflicts in which ideology played no part at all. Such conflicts represent pure power politics (a term I do not use, here, in a pejorative sense), and in such conflicts the strategist has had a free hand. One example is the War of the Spanish Succession, in which Britain, Holland, and Austria fought to prevent the French state, which was Louis XIV, from extending its hegemony to the Iberian peninsula. Another is the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, fought to decide whether Germany should be ruled from Vienna or Berlin. In both examples, no ideological considerations stood in the way of what I might call the strategy of power politics.

The case was different in the crusades, when ideological considerations were opposed to any co-operation between Christian and Muslim potentates, however advantageous strategically. It was different in the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was different in the wars of the French Revolution. It has also been different in the great wars of our own century (among which I include, for present purposes, the Cold War); for these wars have had ideological conflict as their most publicized and conspicuous feature - - although perhaps not as their most fundamental feature. This has sometimes played hob with strategy, as we shall see.

The conflict between ideology and strategy is illustrated by the conflicting interpretations that have been offered of the three great twentieth-century wars. The strategical interpretation of World War I has it that the Kaiser's Germany was upsetting the balance of power, and that this threatened the security of France, Britain, and the United States, which therefore undertook to thwart it. The ideological interpretation is that democracy went to war to save the world from autocracy. World War II, likewise, was either a balance-of-power struggle, or it was a contest between fascism and democracy, or (in still another ideological version) it was a conflict between peace-loving and aggressor nations. That brings us to the third war, and to the question (which I shall explore later) whether the objective of the Atlantic allies in the Cold War has been to contain Russia or to contain Communism. If the answer to this question is "Russia", then what is the United States doing in Viet Nam? If the answer is "Communism", then this further question appears not to arise.

The interpretation of these three conflicts, then, poses a manifest ambiguity. The nature and role of ideology pose another ambiguity. On the face of it, a nation, having given itself to an ideology, goes to war for the promotion or the defence of that ideology. There are cases, however, when this sequence is reversed, when a government engaged in war invents an ideology, or fabricates false ideological considerations, to persuade the people under its jurisdiction to fight, or to subvert people under the jurisdiction of rival governments. In other words, an ideology is not always a cause in itself. It is sometimes a conspiratorially contrived weapon of psychological warfare.

This ambiguity goes back at least to Karl Marx's statement in 1845: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it." It is clear that Marx's objective, in formulating the original ideology to which his name was attached, was not simply to discover the truth of man's destiny but to move men to certain kinds of action. The Communist Manifesto set forth an ideology designed to serve as an instrument that would bring Marx and Engels, or people with whom they identified themselves, into power. The contradiction implicit in this has since been perpetuated by the contradiction implicit in Marxism's appeals for desperate action by its votaries to bring about changes in the world that it has proclaimed to be inevitable. If they are inevitable, then why can't the Marxists relax? Saying they are inevitable, however, is simply a way of encouraging the troops. The point is not to interpret the world but to change it.

The same contradiction is represented more cynically in the birth of Italian Fascism. In 1922, the year that Mussolini seized power by his March on Rome, he said: "Our program is simple: we wish to govern Italy." The

Fascist ideology was concocted only after he had achieved power and, finding himself insecure in it, felt the need of an ideological appeal that would induce the Italian people to bow their heads beneath his yoke and to follow him in foreign adventures.

The use of ideology to serve the purposes of power politics need not be altogether cynical and is, in any case, the common practice of the very best democracies. I think it is clear that the United States got into World War I to prevent the Kaiser's Germany from replacing the British naval supremacy in the Atlantic, a naval supremacy on which the United States depended for its security. The threat became vivid when German submarines began sinking merchant ships outside New York Harbor. This led to a legalistic quarrel between Washington and Berlin that revolved about such abstruse issues as the rights of American nationals on armed merchantmen of belligerent powers traveling on the high seas between belligerent and neutral ports. When this brought the United States to the brink of war, President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing were suddenly confronted by the dilemma that they could never get the American people to fight and die over legal quibbles, nor could they get them to fight and die over the issues of Realpolitik for which the legal quibbles were simply a cover. They had no choice, therefore, but to formulate an ideological appeal that would inspire the American people to make sacrifices, the real need for which they were, for the most part, incapable of understanding. So Wilson proclaimed the war to "make the world safe for democracy," which was, consequently, also a war "to end all wars." (It would end all wars because it would put an end to power politics, which were the practice of autocratic princes and not the practice of democracies.)

The American people responded to this appeal, which was so deceptively attractive, in consequence of which the security of the United States (and of Britain and France) was saved - - although the world was not made safe for democracy, and victory did not bring an end to all wars. Only afterwards, the failure to realize the ideological objectives for which the American people had been told they were fighting led to a terrible disillusionment, and consequently to an embittered return to isolationism.

A score of years later, none of the Atlantic allies went to war against Hitler's Germany simply because it was ideologically obnoxious - - although that it was. They went to war against it because, by upsetting the balance of power, it threatened their security. The case of Stalin's Russia was no different, as witness the Hitler-Stalin pact of August 1939. The United States did not fully get into the war until it was attacked; and Russia did not get into the war at all, except on Hitler's side in Poland, until it, too was attacked.

As the United States moved toward increasing involvement in World War II, President Roosevelt faced precisely the same dilemma that Wilson had faced as the United States had moved toward increasing involvement in World War I. The very notion of power politics - - of balance of power and spheres of influence - - was ideologically repugnant to the American people. Therefore he could not make his appeal to them on what were the real grounds of American involvement. He had to invent an ideological myth. The myth he invented was that the world was divided between two opposed species: the peace-loving nations - - the United States, Britain, Russia, and China - - and a monster species of aggressor nations represented by the Germans, the Italians, and the Japanese. The American people were told that wars occurred only because it was the nature of aggressor nations to start them; from which it followed that, once the aggressor nations had been disarmed forever, and only peace-loving nations were left with arms in their hands, there could be no more war. (Peace-loving nations, by definition, don't make war.)

Well - - it wasn't true, but it enabled us to overthrow the gangster governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and this we could not otherwise have done.

When I speak in such disenchanted terms I have to recall Woodrow Wilson's words in his own "moment of truth", as the United States was about to enter World War I: "We live in a world which we did not make, which we can not alter, which we can not think into a different condition from that which actually exists." This from the father of "Wilsonian idealism"!

Winston Churchill, who was, in these matters, a more sophisticated man than Franklin Roosevelt, was always ill at ease with the ideological window-dressing and allowed himself, on more than one occasion, to blurt out certain indiscreet truths. One such occasion was when, speaking in the House of Commons, he paid a debt that he owed to the fascist dictator of Spain for the latter's restraint in not interfering with the preparations at Gibraltar for the North African landings of November 1942. Let me quote a little exchange that followed between him and a man of ideological passion, Mr. Emmanuel Shinwell:

> The Prime Minister: . . . Internal political problems in Spain are a matter for the Spaniards themselves. It is not for us - - that is, the Government - - to meddle in such affairs - -
>
> Mr. Shinwell: Why then in Italy? My right hon. Friend did remark, as regards the restoration of the Government in Italy, that it could not be Fascist. That was his declaration. Why not in Spain?

> The Prime Minister: The reason is that Italy attacked us. We were at war with Italy. We struck Italy down. My hon. Friend, I am sure, will see that a very clear line of distinction can be drawn between nations we go to war with, and nations who leave us alone. . . . There is all the difference in the world between a man who knocks you down and a man who leaves you alone. . . . we pass many people in the ordinary daily round of life about whose internal affairs and private quarrels we do not feel ourselves called upon to make continued inquiry. . . .

The truly grandiose indiscretion that Churchill allowed himself on this occasion was a statement that outraged half the population of England and America. "As this war has progressed," he said, "it has become less ideological." The statement was, I think, true - - if that is in its favor.

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And this brings me to the Cold War, to the question whether it has been primarily a balance-of-power conflict - - with Stalin's Russia cast in the role previously played by Napoleon's France, the Kaiser's Germany, and Hitler's Germany - - or an ideological conflict between something called "Communism" (and God knows what this is today!) and something called "Capitalism", which is equally difficult to identify in terms of present-day actuality.

I daresay most of us would agree, today, with George Kennan's estimate of February 1946, that Marxism was merely the "fig leaf of . . . moral and intellectual respectability" that covered the nakedness of Stalin's power politics. It is a fact that the basic objectives of Russian foreign policy under Lenin, Stalin, and their successors have been the same as the basic objectives of Russian foreign policy under the czars for centuries past. The strategic approach has also been the same, except for the notable addition implied by the use of a new weapon in the form of an ideology that has hypnotized and captured millions.

How does the matter stand on the other side, on the side of the NATO powers? Here we begin with the policy of "containment" formulated by George Kennan in 1946 and 1947. The key question we have to ask, with respect to containment, is containment of what? Mr. Kennan was explicit. In the Foreign Affairs article of July 1947 he wrote (under the signature "X"): "It is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies . . . (my italics)."

This is unambiguous, and what it shows is that, at the outset of the Cold War, the great coalition under American leadership was embarked on a strategic policy, a typical balance-of-power policy. Not the containment of Communism (which was merely one weapon of the Russian state), but the containment of the Russian state itself.

What happened then?

We have seen how the United States entered World War I for strategical reasons, and how the dynamics of popular involvement then made it interpret its participation as an ideological crusade. We have seen how it entered World War II, as well, for strategical reasons, and how the dynamics of popular involvement - - in all the allied countries, I might say - - again made it necessary to interpret its participation in ideological terms. Now, for the third time, we all entered into a great conflict, this one the Cold War, for strategical reasons, and for a third time the dynamics of popular democracy transformed it into what it had not been at the outset - - or had not been primarily - - a war between rival ideologies.

The fact is that cold strategical considerations are too abstruse and uninspiring for the rank and file of people in any country. Their zeal responds only to the fairy-tale conception of two species: the Servants of God and the Minions of Satan, the Good People who represent our common humanity and the Villainous Conspirators who are plotting to enslave that humanity, the Cops and the Robbers, the Cowboys and the Indians, the Good Guys and the Bad Guys. Read any such newspaper comic-strips as "Steve Canyon" or "Buzz Sawyer" and there you have it naked. The great conflicts must be presented in terms that the readers of such fiction understand.

The proof that these are the terms of their participation is that virtually all the militant crusaders against Communism, if asked to say what Communism was, would be unable to define it in any terms that were relevant to the real circumstances of life on earth. It is simply a new name for an old myth, the myth of a demonic species that is trying to conquer the earth and enslave mankind. For the majority of people in Russia and China today that demonic species is the "capitalist-imperialists". For M. Jean-Paul Sartre it is that hoary nineteenth-century abstraction, the "bourgeoisie." For the majority of my fellow countrymen it is the "Communists".

Democratic governments are run by politicians, and politicians must, of necessity, represent the common mind. Messrs. Truman, Eisenhower, and Johnson have represented the common mind in America, and throughout the West, far better than has Mr. Kennan. To the common mind, the "containment of Russian expansive tendencies" quickly became the containment of something quite different: it became the containment of a mythological monster that now bore the name "Communism". Communism was not geographically delimited, as was the Russian state. It was, rather, ubiquitous, having already infiltrated the civilization of the good species everywhere - - not least of all, as Senator Joe McCarthy maintained, in Washington.

The thing about a conflict conceived in these terms is that it cannot be resolved by compromise. The angels must not do business with Satan and his agents, the cops must not make deals with the robbers. This would be to follow a policy of "expediency", and we all remember the scandalous connotations of that word in the 1950s - - especially in the mouth of Mr. John Foster Dulles, who insisted on an absolute and irreconcilable opposition between "expediency" and "morality". "Morality" required us to follow policies without regard for "expediency".

Now, I hesitate to say that the word "expedient" is synonymous with the word "strategic", but certainly there is a close relationship between them. If strategy is not expedient then it is bad strategy - - however good it may be in moralistic or ideological terms.

Here you have the basic conflict between strategy and ideology that I cited in my opening remarks. Let me now illustrate that conflict by a couple of case-histories.

When, in November 1942, the Anglo-American forces made their surprise landing in French North Africa, they confronted the resistance of French forces obedient to the Vichy Government of Marshal Pétain, the Government that had accepted collaboration with the Nazis as the Czechoslovak Government has now accepted collaboration with Moscow. The only man in North Africa who could end the resistance of these French forces was Vichy's High Commissioner for Africa, Admiral Darlan. So the allied leaders on the spot, in the emergency of the moment, made a deal with Darlan whereby he stopped the resistance and, in return, was recognized by the invading allies as "Chief of State in French North Africa."

In strategic terms, this was a magnificent deal, with consequences of which we are all, today, the beneficiaries. It won over to the allied side the only man whom the French forces in Africa would obey. It was, however, ideologically obnoxious, for Darlan had been so closely identified with the Vichy régime that he was regarded as belonging to the demonic enemy species. The public outcry against the deal was such as to create a major political crisis in England and America. The editor of the American weekly, The Nation, a woman of the fiercest ideological zeal, wrote that if Darlan's favors could be won only by keeping him in a position of command, then "we should have done without them - - even if lives were to be lost and military advantage forfeited as a consequence." She did not say how many American and British lives she would have been willing to sacrifice on ideological grounds - - whether a thousand, a million, or five million. Nor did she say how much military advantage she would have been willing to forfeit - - whether, for example, she would have accepted the defeat of the allied cause. Since ideological considerations are based on an absolute morality, it would be immoral to enter into such calculations.

Now for my second case-history. In 1948 a break occurred between Stalin's Russia and Tito's Yugoslavia. If Tito should make good his independence, this would prove to be (as, indeed, it did prove to be) one of the great turning-points of the Cold War. It would mark the end of the expansion of Russia's post-war empire and the beginning of its retraction. It would be the beginning of the realization of the objective of containment, in the terms originally formulated by George Kennan and accepted by the Government in Washington.

But Tito would not be able to make good his independence without the support of the United States. This posed for Washington the question whether the United States should accord that support. The question was presented in the form of a request from Belgrade that Washington license the exportation to Yugoslavia of an American steel mill. A cabinet-level meeting was held in Washington at which two opposed points of view were advanced. There were the strategists who, regarding "Russian expansive tendencies" as the threat to be overcome, favored co-operation with Tito and, consequently, the granting of the export license. And there were the ideologists who, regarding "Communism" as the enemy, said that Tito was no less a Communist than Stalin and that we should not do business with any Communist. To do business with a Communist would be to sacrifice "morality" for "expediency" - - in other words, to sacrifice ideology for the sake of strategy. These latter did not make Churchill's distinction between the man who knocks you down and the man who leaves you alone, between a state that was commiting aggression under the Communist label and a state that, while bearing the Communist label, was without any aggressive disposition. Mr. Shinwell had asked: if fascist Italy why not fascist Spain? The ideologists in Washington now asked: if Communist Russia why not Communist Yugoslavia.

Today, I think, none of us regret that the decision taken twenty years ago represented a victory for strategy over ideology. A year or two later, however, by the middle of 1950, it would surely have been the ideological considerations that prevailed.

This was, in fact, the case with China, where the same issue presented itself. Until the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the Truman Administration was moving toward a recognition of Mao Tse-tung's régime in the hope that this régime would, sooner or later, break with Stalin's régime in Moscow as Tito had. In moving in this direction, however, it was running into mounting public opposition; and the public opposition, ideologically motivated, at last prevailed over the strategically motivated policy of the Administration. Those who said we should enter into no accommodation with any Communists prevailed.

I am bound to admit, however, that now the ideological fervor of the American people was surpassed by the ideological fanaticism of the new Chinese régime. Faced with such fanaticism, it is not clear to me that an accommodating attitude in Washington, responding to strategic considerations, would have achieved an accommodation. It takes two to accommodate - - and that is still the case today.

The same thing in Viet Nam. The United States is involved in Viet Nam today because, about 1950, it substituted, for the containment of Russia, the containment of whatever bore the label "Communism". Now, however, when Washington would like to reach some strategic accommodation with the North Vietnamese régime, that régime is manifesting the total intransideance that goes with ideological purity. And the situation is made the more difficult because a majority of Americans, thinking in ideological rather than strategical terms, favor the continuance of the present American military intervention if the alternative is less than victory.

To come, now, to my peroration and conclusion. Strategy, in the nuclear age, is bound to be concerned with the maintenance of limits. Deterrence and the limitation of war are its overriding preoccupations. Certainly they are overriding of ideological considerations. It follows that strategical policies, today more than ever, are policies of practical accommodation and compromise. Ideology, however, implicitly aims at total victory - - God's Servants over the Minions of Satan, of the Freedom-lovers over the Enslavers, of the Proletarians over the Capitalist-imperialists, of Democracy over Communism. It implicitly opposes accommodation and compromise with what it regards as the forces of evil.

My subject has been the influence of ideology on strategy. My conclusion is that, especially in the nuclear age, the influence of ideology on strategy is nefarious.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR QUOTATION

INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
10th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

PROBLEMS OF MODERN STRATEGY: A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

COMMITTEE I

Friday 20th September — Afternoon

The Classical Strategists
MICHAEL HOWARD

It may help to begin with a definition of 'classical' strategy. Liddell Hart has provided us with one which is as good as any, and better than most: "The art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy".[1] Whether this remains adequate in the nuclear age is a matter of some controversy. André Beaufre, for example, has adumbrated the concept of an 'indirect strategy', to be considered later, which embraces more than purely military means;[2] but even he still gives as his basic definition of the term "the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute".[3] It is this element of force which distinguishes 'strategy' from the purposeful planning in other branches of human activity to which the term is often loosely applied. When other elements such as economic pressure, propoganda, subversion and diplomacy are combined with force, these elements may also be considered as 'strategic'; but to apply this adjective to activities unconnected with the use, or threatened use, of force would be to broaden it to such an extent that it would be necessary to find another word to cover the original meaning of the term as defined by Liddell Hart.

It need hardly be said that students of strategy have generally assumed that military force is a necessary element in international affairs. Before the First World War, there were few who questioned even whether it was desirable. After 1918, many regretted its necessity and saw their function as being to ensure that it should be used as economically, and as rarely, as possible. After 1945, an even greater proportion devoted themselves to examine, not how wars should be fought, but how they could be prevented, and the study of strategy merged into that of arms-control, disarmament and peacekeeping. There the 'classical strategists' found themselves working with scholars of a different kind; men who believed that the element of force was not a necessary part of international intercourse, but could be eliminated by an application of the methodology of the social sciences. The work of that group is being covered by Dr. Kenneth Boulding. This paper will, therefore, concern itself solely with the Thinkers who assume that the element of force exists in international relations, that it can and must be intelligently controlled, but that it cannot be totally eliminated. Further, it is confined to the men who have primarily used the methodology of history or traditional political science; though it includes such figures as Schelling and Morgenston, who have made considerable contributions in the newer disciplines as well.

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[1] B.H. Liddell Hart: Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London 1967) p.335

[2] André Beaufre: An Introduction to Strategy (London 1965) passim, esp. pp 107-130

[3] Ibid. p. 22

The art* of strategy remains one of such complexity that even the greatest contributors to its study have been able to do little more than outline broad principles; principles which nevertheless must often be discarded in practice if the circumstances are inappropriate, and which must never be allowed to harden into dogma. Even when these principles appear self-evident, it may be extraordinarily hard to apply them. In the Second World War, 'command of the sea' as advocated by Mahan and 'command of the air' as advocated by Douhet were certainly necessary preliminaries to the military victory of the Western powers. The problem was, how to obtain them, with resources on which equally urgent calls were being made for other purposes. The academic strategist could not help the Chiefs of Staff much, for example, in deciding how to allot a limited number of long-range aircraft between the needs of the strategic offensive against Germany; the war against German submarines; interdiction bombing of German railways; the requirements of the Pacific theatre; and support for guerrilla activities in occupied Europe. Operational research and systems-analysis could simplify the problem without ever eliminating it. In the last resort the quality termed by Blackett 'the conventional military wisdom'[4] remained the basic factor in making the decision; and as often as not that decision was determined by what could be done rather than by what ideally should. The military commander is always primarily conscious of the constraints under which he operates, in terms both of information and of resources. He is, therefore, likely to be impatient with the advice of the academic strategist which may appear to him either platitudinous or impracticable. His decisions must be based at best on educated guesses.

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* The term seems appropriate. Strategy deals with too many imponderables to merit the description 'science'. It remains, as Voltaire described it two hundred years ago, "murderous and conjectural".

[4] P.M.S. Blackett: Studies of War (London 1962) p. 128

But the academic strategist does have one vital role to play. He can see that the guesses *are* educated. He may not accompany the commander to battle, as Clausewitz expressed it, but he forms his mind in the schoolroom, whether the commander realises it or not. In the Second World War, the Allied High Command did operate in accordance with certain very definite strategic principles. It is tempting to link these principles with the names of specific theorists: General Marshall's desire for concentration against the enemy army with Clausewitz. General Brooke's desire to enforce dispersal on the enemy with Liddell Hart, the doctrine of the Allied air forces with Douhet: tempting, but difficult to prove. The name of Douhet was virtually unknown in the Royal Air Force.[5] The most eminent thinkers sometimes do no more than codify and clarify conclusions which arise so naturally from the circumstances of the time that they occur simultaneously to those obscurer, but more influential figures who write training manuals and teach in service colleges.[6] And sometimes strategic doctrines may be widely held which cannot be attributed to any specific thinkers, but represent simply the consensus of opinion among a large number of professionals who had undergone a formative common experience.

Of this kind were the doctrines which were generally held in the armed forces of the Western world in the mid-1940s as a result of the experiences of the Second World War. It was considered, first, that the mobilisation of superior resources, together with the maintenance of civilian *morale* at home, was a necessary condition for victory; a condition requiring a substantial domestic 'mobilisation base' in terms of industrial potential and trained manpower. It was agreed that, in order to deploy these resources effectively, it was necessary to secure command of the sea and command of the air. It was agreed that surface and air operations were totally interdependent. And it was agreed that strategic air power could do much - though *how* much remained a matter of controversy - to weaken the capacity of the adversary to resist. The general concept of war remained as it had been since the days of Napoleon: the contest of armed forces to obtain a position of such superiority that the victorious power would be in a position to impose its political will. And it was generally assumed that in the future, as in the immediate past, this would still be a very long-drawn-out process indeed.

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5 Sir John Slessor: "Air Power and the Future of War". *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution August 1954*

6 For a valuable analysis of this process as applied to air power, see R.A. Leonard, *The Rise of the Bomber: a Comparative Analysis of the Development of National Doctrines of Strategic Bomber Aviation, 1914-1941,* Ph.D. thesis, University of London 1968

The advent of nuclear weapons, to the eyes of the layman, transformed the entire nature of war. But/~~the~~ for professional they made remarkably little difference at least in a conflict between two powers of the size of the United States and the Soviet Union. These weapons obviously would make it possible to inflict with far greater rapidity the kind of damage by which the strategic bombing offensive had crippled Germany and Japan. But the stockpiles of bombs were small - how small is still not known. The bombs were vulnerable to interception; and they had to operate from bases which had to be protected by land armies which would have in their turn to be supplied by sea. All this was pointed out to the general public by, among others, two scientists with long experience in military planning - the British Professor P.M.S. Blackett and the American Dr. Vannevar Bush. Blackett, on the basis of careful calculations from unclassified material, concluded in 1948 that "a long-range atomic bombing offensive against a large continental Power is not likely to be by itself decisive within the next five years".[7] Bush, a figure closely associated with the American military establishment, described in 1949 a conflict barely distinguishable from the last.

> The opening phases would be in the air, soon followed by sea and land action. Great fleets of bombers would be in action at once, but this would be the opening phase only... They could undoubtedly devastate the cities and the war potential of the enemy and its satellites, but it is highly doubtful if they could at once stop the march of great land armies. To overcome them would require a great national effort, and the marshalling of all our strength. The effort to keep the seas open would be particularly hazardous, because of modern submarines, and severe efforts would be needed to stop them at the source. Such a war would be a contest of the old form, with variations and new techniques of one sort or another. But, except for greater use of the atomic bomb, it would not differ much from the last struggle.[8]

It was along these lines that planning went forward when the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established at the end of the 1940s. Such ideas were legitimate deductions from the then "state of the art". NATO planners had to think what could be done with the weapons they had available, not with those which might or might not be developed in ten years' time. But a few academic strategists were already thinking ahead. Because their views had little immediate relevance they had little impact on policy, but the historian can salvage and admire, the shrewd insights shown by two thinkers who had already established their reputation in the pre-nuclear era:

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[7] P.M.S. Blackett: The Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy (London 1948) p. 56

[8] Vannevar Bush: Modern Arms and Free Men (New York 1949) pp. 115-6

Bernard Brodie and Sir Basil Liddell Hart. Both of them, in works published in 1946, made prophecies which twenty years later were to be commonplaces of strategic thinking.

In the final chapter of The Revolution in Warfare,[9] Liddell Hart suggested that, failing disarmament, attempts should be made "to revive a code of limiting rules for warfare - based on a realistic view that wars are likely to occur again, and that the limitation of their destructivness is to everybody's interest. "Fear of atomic war, he wrote, might lead to indirect methods of aggression, infiltration taking civil forms as well as military, to which nuclear retaliation would be irrelevant. Armed forces would still be required to fight 'sub-atomic war', but the emphasis should be on their mobility, both tactical and strategic.

The great armies of the past would be irrelevant to the needs of the nuclear age. Liddell Hart did not, at this stage, consider the problems and contradictions of limited war, including the possibility which emerged fifteen years later, that it might be necessary to have large conventional forces precisely in order to keep war limited.

Neither did he explore the implications and requirements of deterrence. Brodie, however, with his collaborators in the Yale Institute of International Studies publication The Absolute Weapon, did exactly this, and with remarkable prescience. Much that he wrote was to become unquestionably valid only with the development of thermonuclear weapons, but his insights were none the less remarkable for that. He rejected, for example, the whole concept of a "mobilization base". "The idea" he wrote, "which must be driven home above all else is that a military establishment which is expected to fight on after the nation has undergone atomic bomb attack must be prepared to fight with the men already mobilized and with the equipment already in the arsenals".[10] More important, he set out the whole concept of a stable balance of second-strike forces.

> If[wrote Bodie][11] the atomic bomb can be used without fear of substantial retaliation in kind, it will clearly encourage aggression. So much the more reason, therefore, to take all possible steps to assure that multilateral possession of the bomb, should that prove inevitable, be attended by arrangements to make as nearly certain as possible that the aggressor who uses the bomb will have it used against him...

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[9] B.H. Liddell-Hart: The Revolution in Warfare (London 1946) p. 87

[10] Bernard Brodie (ed): The Absolute Weapon (New York 1946) p. 89

[11] Brodie Op. cit. p. 75-6.

> ...Thus, the first and most vital step in any American programme for the age of atomic bombs is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves in case of attack the possibility of retaliation in kind. The writer in making that statement is not for the moment concerned about who will win the next war in which atomic bombs are used. Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.

Not until thermonuclear weapons had been developed and the Soviet Union had shown itself to possess an intercontinental delivery system did the US Joint Chiefs of Staff accept Brodie's logic; though it is significant that shortly after the publication of this work Brodie joined the newly formed RAND Corporation, where with the support of the US Air Force the full implications and requirements of his ideas were to be exhaustively studied. The first western government to adopt the concept of 'deterrence' as the basis of its military policy was that of the United Kingdom in 1952; very largely thanks to the thinking of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor the then Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff.(12)

Giving a late account of his stewardship at Chatham House in 1953, Slessor was to say

> The aim of Western policy is not primarily to be ready to win a war with the world in ruins - though we must be as ready as possible to do that if it is forced upon us by accident or miscalculation. It is the prevention of war. The bomber holds out to us the greatest, perhaps the only hope of that. It is the great deterrent.(13)

This doctrine of "the great deterrent" was to unleash within the United Kingdom a debate which foreshadowed that set off in the United States by the comparable 'New Look' strategy which Mr. Dulles was formally to unveil there in January 1954. Among its earliest and ablest critics were the men who, four years later, were to be primarily responsible for the foundation of the Institute for Strategic Studies: Rear Admiral Sir AnthonyBuzzard, Mr. Richard Goold-Adams, Mr. Denis Healey and Professor P.M.S. Blackett. In its public presentation by Ministers and senior officers, the doctrine of "massive retaliation" provided its critics in England with an even easier target than it did in the United States. No official distinction was made between the use of Bomber Command as a first-strike force in response to a Soviet 'conventional' invasion of Western Europe and as a second-strike force to retaliate after a Soviet nuclear attack. In face of the growing strength of Soviet nuclear-strike forces, the first role appeared to lack political, the second technical, credibility. Liddell Hart had already pointed out in 1950 that defence against nuclear weapons would be credible only if accompanied by massive civil-defence measures of a kind which no government showed any sign of being prepared to carry out.(14) Britain's military leaders indeed at first assumed that the civilian population might be induced to grin and bear the nuclear holocaust as cheerfully as they had endured the German blitz. The inhabitants of areas which contained no protected installations, suggested Slessor, "must steel themselves to risks and take what may come to them, knowing that thereby they are playing as essential/a part in the country's defence as the pilot in the fighter or the man behind the gun".(15) This attitude presumably remained the basis of British official thinking until the acquisition of the Polaris missile-system gave the United Kingdom a second-strike weapon which was technically if not politically credible. The validity of this thesis however gave rise to widespread doubts, and not only among the members of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. In a famous lecture to the Royal United Service Institution in November 1959, after Mr. Duncan Sandys had, in two Defence White Papers, laid yet greater stress on the importance of "the deterrent", Lieutenant General Sir John Cowley was to ask a question unusual for a senior serving officer:

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(12) Richard N. Rosecrance: The Defense of the Realm (Columbia University Press, New York and London 1967) p.159.

(13) Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor, 'The Place of the Bomber in British Policy'. Reprinted in The Great Deterrent (London 1957) p.123.

> The choice of death or dishonour is one which has always faced the professional fighting man, and there must be no doubt in his mind what his answer must be. He chooses death for himself so that his country may survive, or on a grander scale so that the principles for which he is fighting may survive. Now we are facing a somewhat different situation, when the reply is not to be given by individuals but by countries as a whole. Is it right for the Government of a country to choose complete destruction of the population rather than some other alternative, however unpleasant that alternative may be?(16)

As a coherent theory of strategy in the traditional sense, the doctrine of deterrence by the threat of massive retaliation, in the simple form in which it was set out by the British and American governments in the early nineteen-fifties, is not easy to defend, and its exponents tended at times to use the vocabulary of exhortation rather than that of rational argument in their attempts to justify it. But three points should be noted if we are to appreciate their standpoint. First, the British Chiefs of Staff from the beginning saw Bomber Command as a supplement to rather than a substitute for the United States Strategic Air Command, with the task of striking at targets of particular significance for the United Kingdom. Its strategic utility and its credibility as a deterrent were thus to be judged - unlike the French force de frappe - within the context of the Western deterrent force as a whole.(17) Secondly it was an attempt, like the American 'New Look' two years later, to solve the problem - and one far more difficult for the United Kingdom than for the United States - of maintaining an effective military force in a peacetime economy. The burden of rearmament assumed in 1950 had proved not only economically crippling but politically unacceptable; and since the political objective of the United Kingdom was the maintenance, virgo intacta, of the status quo in Europe, a policy which imposed the maximum penalty for any violation of that status quo was not so irrational as it appeared. A vital interest is what one declares to be a vital interest, and for the United Kingdom not one inch of Western Europe could be considered negotiable.

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(14) B.H. Liddell-Hart: The Defence of the West (London 1950) pp.97,134,139,140.

(15) Sir John Slessor: Strategy for the West (London 1954) p.106.

(16) Lieut. General Sir John Cowley: "Future Trends in Warfare". Journal of the Royal United Service Institution February 1960, p.13. General Cowley received no further promotion, and since his lecture no serving officer has been permitted to speak at the R.U.S.I. unless his text has been cleared by the Ministry of Defence.

Finally, as British officials repeatedly said later in the decade, 'The Great Deterrent' existed not to fight but to deter war: "If it is used, it will have failed". This argument was open to the rejoinder that a strategy which was not militarily viable was not politically credible, but this rejoinder is by no means conclusive. The concept of 'deterrence' takes us out of the familiar field of military strategy into the unmapped if not unfamiliar territory of political bargaining, where total rationality does not invariably reign supreme. Schelling and others were only then beginning their studies of "the strategy of conflict"; but even without the help of game-theory techniques, it could be reasonably argued that, even if there was only one chance in a hundred that a political move would really be met by the threatened nuclear response, that chance would be an effective deterrent to any responsible statesman.* "The most that the advocates of the deterrent policy have ever claimed for it" said Slessor in 1955 "is that it will deter a potential aggressor from undertaking total war as an instrument of policy, as Hitler did in 1939, or from embarking upon a course of international action which obviously involves a serious risk of total war, as the Austrian Government did in 1914."(18)

Certainly the British advocates of the 'deterrent policy' in the 1950's did not underrate the continuing importance of conflicts which would not be deterred by nuclear weapons. Liddell Hart repeatedly pointed out that nuclear stalemate would encourage local and indirect aggression which could be countered only by conventional forces; a lesson which British armed forces tied down in operations from Cyprus to Malaya had no need to learn. Faced with the double burden of deterring total wars and fighting small ones, it was natural enough for British strategists to adopt the doctrine later termed "minimal deterrence". This was stated with uncompromising clarity by Blackett in 1956:

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(17) Resecrance, op. cit. pp. 160-1.

(18) Slessor, Lecture at Oxford University, April 1955, reprinted in The Great Deterrent p. 181.

*This of course begs the whole question so carefully examined by Stephen Maxwell in Adelphi Paper No. 50: Rationality in Deterrence.

> I think we should act as if atomic and hydrogen bombs have abolished total war and concentrate our efforts on working out how few atomic bombs and their carriers are required to keep it abolished. In the next few years I see the problem not as how many atomic bombs we can afford but as how few we need. For every hundred million pounds spent on offensive and defensive preparations for global war, which almost certainly will not happen, is so much less for limited and colonial wars, which well may.(19)

British strategic thinkers in fact - even Slessor after his retirement - tended to take the existence of stable deterrence very much for granted. In view of the highly classified nature of all information relating to bomber Command and the absence of any serious intercourse between Ministry of Defence officials and freelance strategic thinkers, this was not altogether surprising. It enabled them to concentrate, not only on problems of limited wars (Liddell Hart) but on graduated deterrence and restraints on war (Buzzard) and, in the atmosphere of détente which followed the German Summit Meeting of 1955, on 'disengagement', disarmament and arms control (Blackett and Healey). When a few years later American thinkers questioned the validity of the doctrine of 'minimal deterrence' they evoked from Blackett a violent rejoinder,(20) in which he expressed the fear that to depart from such a policy would only lead to an endless and increasing arms race. But by the end of the nineteen-fifties it was becoming clear that any doctrine of deterrence depended for its validity on technical calculations which stretched far beyond the orthodox boundaries of strategic thinking; and on which it was difficult for thinkers who did not enjoy access to the facilities available in the United States to pronounce with any degree of authority.

Within the United States the controversy was now well under way. It had been got off to an excellent start by Mr. John Foster Dulles, whose definition of the doctrine of 'massive retaliation' in January 1954 had been far more precise and dogmatic than the statements emanating from Whitehall to the same effect during the past two years. This, it will be remembered, announced the intention of the United States Administration to place its military dependence

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(19) P.M.S. Blackett: Atomic Energy and East-West Relations (Cambridge 1956) p. 100.

(20) P. Blackett: 'Critique of Some Contemporary Defence Thinking'. First published in Encounter in 1961, this article is reprinted in Studies of War, pp. 128-146. See also Blackett's dissenting note in Alastair Buchan: NATO in the 1960's (London 1960).

"primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing", thereby gaining "more basic security at less cost".[21] The rationale behind this policy was of course political and economic: American weariness with the Korean War, and the desire of the Republican Party to return to financial 'normalcy' after what they regarded as the ruinous spending spree of the last four years.[22] It should perhaps be judged, not as a coherent strategic doctrine, but as a political expedient - or even as a diplomatic communication, itself a manoeuvre in a politico-military strategy of 'deterrence'. By these criteria the policy must be pronounced not ineffective. But its logical fallacies were too glaring to be overlooked. The assumption of American invulnerability to a pre-emptive or a retaliatory strike was unconvincing in the year in which the Soviet Union first unveiled their intercontinental bombers. Even when that assumption had been justifiable four years earlier, American nuclear monopoly had not deterred the Korean conflict; and in that very year American nuclear power was to prove irrelevant to the conflict in Indo-China. These, and other points, were rapidly made with force and relish by Democrat politicians and sympathisers out of office, academic specialists, and members of the armed services which were being cut back to provide greater resources for the Strategic Air Command.

There has perhaps never been a strategic controversy which has not been fretted by political passions and service interests. It is entirely understandable, and for our purposes quite unimportant, that the U.S. Air Force should have sought every argument to justify the doctrine of massive retaliation while the U.S. Army powerfully supported its opponents. What is significant however is that the latter included every strategic thinker of any consequence in the United States; and the failure of the present writer to find any serious academic defence of the doctrine may not be entirely due to unfamiliarity with the literature. Among the first critics was that pioneer of deterrence theory, Bernard Brodie, who published in November 1954[23] one of the earliest analyses of the place of 'limited war' in national policy; but the first really formidable broadside was fired by a group of scholars at the Princeton Centre of International Studies under the leadership of William W. Kaufmann, in a collection of essays published in 1956 under the innocuous-sounding title Military Policy and National Security. In this work Kaufmann himself stressed the need for the

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[21] Text in The New York Times, January 13, 1954.

[22] See the analysis '"The New Look" of 1953' by Glenn H. Snyder, in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond and Glenn H. Snyder: Strategy, Policy and Defense Budgets (Columbia University Press 1962) pp. 379 - 524.

[23] Brodie: 'Unlimited Weapons and Limited War', The Reporter, 18 November 1954. For an indispensable annotated bibliography of the whole controversy, see Morton H. Halperin: Limited War in the Nuclear Age (John Wiley, New York and London 1963).

United States to have the capacity to meet, and therefore deter, communist aggression at every level;[24] that "spectrum of deterrence" in fact which Mr. Robert McNamarra was to develop, not without some assistance from Dr. Kaufmann himself, when he became Secretary for Defense four years later. In the same work Dr. Roger Hilsman discussed the actual conduct of nuclear war; both making the distinction between counterforce and countervalue targets in total war, and considering the tactics of war with nuclear weapons fought on the ground;[25] and Professor Klaus Knorr gave one of the earliest published estimates of the kind of civil defence policy which might be feasible and necessary if the United States were really to employ the kind of nuclear strategy implied in Mr. Dulles's statement.[26] Finally Mr. Kaufmann emphasised the necessity for ensuring that military force should be tailored to the actual requirements of foreign policy: a point which was to be expanded more fully in two important books published the following year.

These were Dr. Robert Osgood's study of Limited War and Dr. Henry Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.[27] Neither author had any significant experience of military operations or operational research. Their intellectual training was in the disciplines of history and political science; but with the shift of strategic thinking from the problem of waging war to that of its prevention, this background was at least as relevant as any more directly concerned with military affairs. Both analysed the traditional rigidity of the American attitude towards war and peace, contrasting it with the flexibility of communist theory and, as they saw it, practice. Both emphasised the irrelevance of strategic nuclear weapons to the conduct of foreign policy in peripheral areas. Both stressed, as had Kaufmann, the need to provide the appropriate forces for the fighting of limited wars; and both considered that tactical nuclear weapons should be regarded as appropriate for this purpose - a view shared by Mr. Dulles himself,[28] and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the Chairmanship of Admiral Radford.

Osgood based his belief in the need to use nuclear weapons in limited wars largely on the difficulty of preparing troops to fight with both nuclear and con-

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24. William W. Kaufmann (ed) : Military Policy and National Security (Princeton University Press 1956) pp. 28, 38, 257.

25. Ibid. pp. 53-7, 60-72.

26. Ibid. pp. 75-101.

27. Robert E. Osgood: Limited War: the Challenge to American Strategy (University of Chicago Press 1957). Henry A. Kissinger: Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, 1957).

28. J.F. Dulles: 'Challenge and Response in United States' Policy', Foreign Affairs, October 1967.

ventional weapons.[29] Kissinger, whose study developed out of panel discussions at the Council on Foreign Relations in which a number of professional soldiers took part, went into the question more deeply, discussing both the possible modus operandi of tactical nuclear forces and the kind of limitations which might be agreed between two belligerents anxious not to allow their military confrontation to get out of hand.[30] In doing so he aligned himself with the views of Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, who was energetically canvassing before British audiences both the value of tactical nuclear weapons in making possible graduated deterrence at acceptable cost, and the feasibility of negotiating agreed limitations on the conduct of war.[31] But Buzzard's views were hotly contested in England. Slessor gave them general support, but Liddell Hart was highly sceptical (believing the capabilities of conventional forces to be unnecessarily underrated) and Blackett, after some hesitation, came out flatly against them.[32] In the United States the same controversy blew up. Brodie, writing in 1959, was prepared to admit only that there might be some circumstances in which tactical nuclear weapons might be appropriate, but considered that "The conclusion that nuclear weapons must be used in limited wars has been reached by too many people, too quickly, on the basis of too little analysis of the problem". Schelling the following year suggested that the break between conventional and nuclear weapons was one of the rare 'natural' distinctions which made tacit bargaining possible in limiting war.[33] By this time Kissinger himself had had second thoughts, and agreed that, though tactical nuclear weapons were a necessary element in the spectrum of deterrence, they could not take the place of conventional forces.(34) Within a year Mr. McNamara was to take the debate into the council chambers of NATO, where the advocates of tactical nuclear weapons had already found staunch allies among officials grimly conscious of the unpopularity and expense of large conventional forces. Throughout the 1960's the debate was to continue, in three major languages, about the place of tactical nuclear weapons in the defence of Europe.(35) Only the sheer exhaustion of the participants keeps it from continuing still.

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[29] Osgood, op. cit., p.258.

[30] Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 174-202.

[31] Anthony Buzzard ct al. On Limiting Atomic War. (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 1956).
'The H-Bomb: Massive Retaliation or Graduated Deterrence', International Affairs 1956.

[32] Slessor: 'Total or Limited War?' in The Great Deterrent, pp.262-284. Liddell-Hart: Deterrent or Defence: a Fresh Look at the West's Military Position (London 1960) pp. 74-81. Blackett: 'Nuclear Weapons and Defence', International Affairs October 1958.

[33] Brodie: Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton University Press 1959) p.330. Thomas C. Schelling: The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press 1960) pp.262-266. But the debate continued Brodie in Escalation and the Nuclear Option(Princeton University Press 1966) was to argue strongly against what had by then become known as the "firebreak" theory, and emphasise the deterrent value of tactical nuclear weapons.

It will be seen that the major American contributions to strategic thinking published in 1956-7 were distinguished by two main characteristics. They attempted to reintegrate military power with foreign policy, stressing, in contradiction to the doctrine of massive retaliation, the need for "a strategy of options". And they tended to be the work of academic institutions; Kaufman's group at Princeton, Osgood from Chicago, Kissinger working with the Council on Foreign Relations. Their authors were thus concerned less with the technicalities of defence (Hilsman at Princeton, a former West-Pointer, was an interesting exception) than with its political objectives. Over what those objectives should be, they had no quarrel with John Foster Dulles. Although British thinkers, like British statesmen, had been exploring possibilities of détente ever since 1954, in the United States the Cold War was still blowing at full blast. The Soviet Union was still, in the works of these scholars, considered to be implacably aggressive, pursuing its objective of conquest in every quarter of the globe, its machinations visible behind every disturbance which threatened world stability. As Gordon Dean put it in his introduction to Kissinger's book, "Abhorrent of war but unwilling to accept gradual Russian enslavement of other peoples around the world, which we know will eventually lead to our own enslavement, we are forced to adopt a posture that, despite Russian military capabilities and despite their long-range intentions, freedom shall be preserved to us".(36) The strategy of options which they urged had as its object, not the reduction of tensions, but the provision of additional and appropriate weapons to deal with a subtle adversary who might otherwise get under the American guard.

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(34) Kissinger: The Necessity for Choice (London 1960) pp. 81-98.

(35) The literature is enormous, but three outstanding contributions are Helmuth Schmidt: Verteidigung oder Vergeltung (Stuttgart 1961); Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor: Arms and Stability in Europe (London 1963); and Raymond Aron: Le Grand Débat (Paris 1963).

(36) Kissinger: Nuclear Weapons p. vii.

Two years later, in 1959-60, the major works on strategy in the United States showed a slight but perceptible change of emphasis. As it happened, the most significant of these were the work, not of full-time academics, but of men who had been working in defence research institutes on classified information, particularly at Rand Corporation. As a result they analysed the technical problems of deterrence with an expertise which earlier works had naturally lacked. These problems appeared all the more urgent after the launching of the Sputnik satellite in 1957; which revealed the full extent of the challenge which the United States had to meet from Soviet technology. For the first time in its history the general public of the United States felt itself in danger of physical attack, and the question of civil defence, which had hitherto preoccupied only a few specialists, became one of general concern. Yet at the same time there was beginning to emerge, at least in some quarters, a new attitude to the Soviet Union. This saw in that power not simply a threat to be countered, but a partner whose collaboration was essential if nuclear war through accident or miscalculation was to be avoided. It recognised that Soviet policy and intentions might have certain elements in common with those of the United States, and that its leaders faced comparable problems. This attitude was by no means general. For scholars such as Robert Strausz-Hupé and William Kintner the conflict still resembled that between the Archangels and Lucifer rather than that between Tweedledum and Tweedledee. But the concept, not only of a common interest between antagonists but of a joint responsibility for the avoidance of nuclear holocaust became increasingly evident after the new Administration came into power in 1961.(37)

The view which commanded growing support among American strategic thinkers was, therefore, that the 'balance of terror' was a great deal less stable than had hitherto been assumed, but that if it could be stabilised (which involved a certain reciprocity from the Soviet Union) there would be reasonable prospects of lasting peace. The instability of the balance was described by Albert Wohlstetter in the famous article which appeared in Foreign Affairs at the beginning of 1958, describing on the basis of his classified studies at Rand Corporation, the full requirements of an invulnerable retaliatory force: a stable 'steady-state' peace-time operation within feasible budgets, the capacity to survive enemy attacks, to make and communicate the decision to retaliate, to reach enemy territory, penetrate all defences and destroy the target; each phase demanding technical preparations of very considerable complexity and expense.(38)

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(37) For an analysis of the various attitudes of American strategic thinkers to the question of détente see Robert A. Levine: The Arms Debate (Harvard University Press 1963) passim.

The following year Oskar Morgenstern was to suggest, in The Question of National Defense, that the best answer to the problem as defined by Wohlstetter, and the best safeguard against accidental war, was to be found in the development of seaborne missiles; and that it would be in the best interests of the United States if such a system could be developed by both sides. "In view of modern technology of speedy weapons-delivery from any point on earth to any other," he wrote, "it is in the interest of the United States for Russia to have an invulnerable retaliatory force and vice versa."(39) Whether Morgenstern reached this conclusion entirely through applying the game-theory in which he had made so outstanding a reputation is not entirely clear. Professor Thomas Schelling, who also brought the discipline of game-theory to bear on strategy, reached the same conclusion at approximately the same time;(40) but even by cruder calculations its validity seemed evident, and the concept of a "stable balance" was central to Bernard Brodie's Strategy in the Missile Age, which also appeared in 1959.(41) This study pulled together all the threads of strategic thinking of the past five years and set them in their historical context. Brodie reduced the requirements of strategy in the missile age to three: an invulnerable retaliatory force; "a real and substantial capability for coping with local and limited aggression by local application of force"; and provision for saving life "on a vast scale" if the worst came to the worst.(42) About how, if the worst did come to the worst, nuclear war should be conducted, he did not attempt to offer any guidance beyond suggesting that the most important problem to study was not so much how to conduct the war, but how to stop it.

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(38) Albert Wohlstetter: 'The Delicate Balance of Terror'. Foreign Affairs, January 1958. The article is reprinted in Henry A. Kissinger (ed.): Problems of National Strategy (New York and London 1965).

(39) Oskar Morgenstern: The Question of National Defence (New York 1959) p. 75.

(40) See particularly his 'Surprise Attack and Disarmament' in Klaus Knorr (ed.): NATO and American Security (Princeton University Press 1959). Schelling's whole work on the problem of dialogue in conflict situations is of major importance. His principal articles are collected in The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press 1960).

(41) Brodie: Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton University Press 1959), Chapter 8. Brodie and Schelling, like Wohlstetter, were at the time working at Rand Corporation, as also was Herman Kahn. All have acknowledged their mutual indebtedness during this formative period in their thinking.

(42) Ibid. pp. 294-297.

Not all of Brodie's colleagues at Rand Corporation were so modest. The following year, 1960, saw the publication of Herman Kahn's huge and baroque study On Thermonuclear War;(43) the first published attempt by any thinker with access to classified material to discuss the action which should be taken if deterrence *did* fail. The horrible nature of the subject, the broad brush-strokes with which the author treated it, his somewhat selective approach to scientific data and the grim jocularity of the style, all combined to ensure for this study a reception which ranged from the cool to the hysterically vitriolic. Many of the criticisms, however, appear to arise rather from a sense of moral outrage that the subject should be examined at all than from serious disagreement with Kahn's actual views. In fact Kahn basically made only two new contributions to the strategic debate. The first, based on the classified Rand Study of Non-Military Defense for which he had been largely responsible, was that a substantial proportion of the American population could survive a nuclear strike, and that this proportion might be considerably increased if the necessary preparations were made. The second was that the United States should equip herself with the capacity to choose among a range of options in nuclear as well as in non-nuclear war; that rather than relying on a single spasm reaction (von Schlieffen's Schlacht ohne Morgen brought up to date) the United States should be able to conduct a controlled nuclear strategy, suiting its targets to its political intentions - which would normally be, not to destroy the enemy, but to 'coerce' him.(44) Kahn in fact reintroduced the concept of an operational strategy which had been almost entirely missing, at least from public discussion, since the thermonuclear age had dawned ten years earlier. For smaller nuclear powers any such notion, as applied to a conflict with the Soviet Union, was self-evidently absurd. Between the super-powers it was - and remains - a perfectly legitimate matter for analysis. Kahn may have exaggerated the capacity of the social and political structure of the United States to survive a nuclear holocaust; certainly many of his comments and calculations were oversimplified to the point of naiveté. But it is hard to quarrel with his assumption that that capacity, whatever its true dimensions, could be increased by appropriate preliminary measures; while the position adopted by some of his critics, that even to contemplate the possibility of deterrence failing might increase the possibility of such failure, is hardly one that stands up to dispassionate analysis.

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(43) Herman Kahn: On Thermonuclear War (Princeton University Press 1960).

(44) Ibid. pp. 301-2.

At the beginning of 1961 President Kennedy's new Administration took office and Mr. Robert McNamara became Secretary for Defense. Not entirely coincidentally, the great period of American intellectual strategic speculation came to an end, after five astonishingly fruitful years. The military intellectuals were either drawn, like Kaufmann and Hilsman, into government, or returned to more orthodox studies on university campuses. Most of them continued to write. Kahn has produced two further works refining some of the views expounded in On Thermonuclear War.(45) Kissinger has remained a sage observer of, and a prolific commentator on the political scene. Osgood, Wohlstetter and Brodie have all produced notable work of synthesis or criticism. Perhaps the most interesting work has been that of Knorr and Schelling, who have broadened their studies to embrace the whole question of the role of military power in international relations;(46) a remarkably little-explored field in which a great deal of work remains to be done. It would be absurdly premature to suggest of any of these scholars - many of them still comparatively young men - have no more substantial contributions to make to strategic studies;* but they are unlikely to surpass the intellectual achievement for which they were individually and jointly responsible in the 1950's. Between them they have done what Clausewitz and Mahan did in the last century, during times of no less bewildering political and technological change: laid down clear principles to guide the men who have to take decisions. Like Clausewitz and Mahan they are children of their time, and their views are formed by historical and technological conditions whose transformation may well render them out of date. Like those of Clausewitz and Mahan, their principles are likely to be misunderstood, abused, or applied incorrectly, and must be subjected by each generation to searching examination and criticism. Debate will certainly continue; but at least we now have certain solid issues to debate about.

The principles established by the thinkers of the 1950's were to guide Mr. McNamara in his work of remoulding American defence policy during the eight years of his period of office in the Department of Defense. "The McNamara Strategy" had a logical coherence - almost an elegance - which may have commanded rather more admiration among academics than it did in the world of affairs.(47)

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*Since several of them are likely to be present at this conference it would also be remarkably tactless.

(45) Thinking the Unthinkable. On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios. (London 1965).

(46) Knorr: On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (Princeton University Press 1966). Schelling: Arms and Influence (Yale University Press 1966)

(47) William W. Kaufmann: The McNamara Strategy (New York 1964) provides a useful if uncritical account. It should be read in association with Bernard Brodie's dry commentary 'The McNamara Phenomenon' in World Politics July 1965.

An invulnerable second-strike force was built up on a considerably larger scale than that considered adequate by the believers in 'minimal deterrence'. These forces were endowed with the capability, even after a surprise attack, of retaliating selectively against enemy forces rather than against his civilian population, so that "a possible opponent" would have "the strongest imaginable incentive to refrain from striking our own cities".(48) Forces for 'limited wars' at all levels were created, armed both with nuclear and with conventional weapons. This involved an increase in expenditure, but it was an increase which was not grudged by Congressmen alarmed by an alleged "missile gap" and happy to see fat defence contracts being placed within their home States; and the techniques of systems analysis which had also been developed at Rand Corporation were employed to keep this increase within bounds.(49) Overtures were made, official and unofficial, to the Soviet Union to establish arms-control agreements based on the principle of a stable balance resting on invulnerable second-strike forces on either side. And plans were put in hand for civil defence projects on a massive scale.

McNamara was able to carry out much of his programme, but not all. The Russians were remarkably slow to absorb the reasoning which appeared so self-evident to American academics. The American public were even slower to co-operate in the sweeping measures which would have provided effective insurance against holocaust. The ideal of a second-strike counter-force strategy seemed to many critics to be one almost intrinsically impossible of realisation. And America's European allies flatly refused his requests that they should increase their conventional forces to provide the necessary 'spectrum of deterrence'. The Germans saw this as a diminution of the deterrent to any invasion of their own narrow land, and besides had their own not particularly enjoyable memories of 'conventional war'. The British, struggling to maintain a world presence on their obstinately stagnant economy, could not afford it; while the French had ideas of their own. None of them, perhaps, could produce a coherent theoretical framework to sustain them in their arguments, but they remained obstinately unconvinced. Several of Mr. McNamara's emissaries received, in consequence, a somewhat gruelling introduction to the refractory world of international affairs.

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(48) McNamara speech at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, 16 June 1962. Kaufmann op. cit. p. 116.

(49) See Charles Hitch and Roland McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (London 1960) for the promise. The performance was examined in Planning - Programming - Budgetting: Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate. 90th Congress, 1st Session. (U.S. Government Printing Office 1967).

For the American strategic programme was based on two assumptions which were not accepted by all the major Allies of the United States, first, that America was the leader of "the Free World" and had both the right and the power to shape its strategy; and second, it was in the interests of the world as a whole that the United States and the Soviet Union should enter into an ever closer dialogue. Neither of these assumptions was challenged by the British; though not all their countrymen admired the assiduity with which successive Prime Ministers set themselves up as 'honest brokers' between the Super-Powers the moment they set foot inside Downing Street. Indeed the most substantial British contribution to the strategic debate in the early '60's, John Strachey's On the Prevention of War, quite explicitly advocated a Russo-American diarchy as the best guarantee of world peace.(50) But on the Continent reactions were different. The Chancellor of the Federal German Republic took a glum view of a Russo-American détente which could only, in his view, confirm the division of his country and might even threaten the position of Berlin; and long before Mr. McNamara had appeared on the scene the President of the French Fifth Republic had made clear his own attitude to the American claim to act as leader and the spokesman of "the Free World".

Too much should not be made of the personality of General de Gaulle in shaping the French contribution to the strategic debate which began to gain in importance towards the end of the 1950's. French military experience during the past twenty years had been distinctive and disagreeable. They had their own views on the reliability of transmarine allies as protectors against powerful continental neighbours - neighbours who might in future comprise not only Russia but a revived Germany or, in moments of sheer nightmare, both. The decision to develop their own nuclear weapons had been taken before de Gaulle came into power, though perhaps it took de Gaulle to ensure that they would not be integrated, like the British, in a common Western targeting system. General Pierre Gallois, the first French writer to develop a distinctive theory of nuclear strategy,(51) advanced the thesis that nuclear weapons rendered traditional alliance systems totally out of date since no State, however powerful, would risk nuclear retaliation on behalf of an ally when it really came to the point. In a world thus atomised (in the traditional sense of the word) the security of every State lay in its capacity to provide its own minimal deterrence. The more States that did, indeed, the greater the stability of the international system was likely to be.

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(50) John Strachey: On the Prevention of War (London 1962).

(51) Pierre Gallois: Stratégie de l'Age Nucleaire.

Extreme as Gallois's logic was, it probably reflected the sentiments of a large number of his countrymen and a substantial section of the French Armed Forces. In spite of innumerable official expressions to the contrary, there is every reason to suppose that many influential members of the British governing establishment felt very much the same about their own nuclear force. A more subtle variant of this doctrine was presented by General André Beaufre, who argued powerfully in his work, Deterrence and Strategy, that a multipolar nuclear balance in fact provided greater stability than a bipolar, since it reduced the area of uncertainty which an aggressor might exploit. So far from atomising alliances, argued Beaufre, independent nuclear forces cemented them, "necessarily covering the whole range of their vital interests".(52) He was careful to distinguish between multipolarity and proliferation. "The stability provided by the nuclear weapon" he argued, "is attainable only between reasonable powers. Boxes of matches should not be given to children";(53) a sentiment which one can endorse while wondering what Beaufre would define, in international relations, as the age of consent. As for the Russo-American diarchy welcomed by Strachey, Beaufre specifically identified this as a danger to be avoided. "The prospect of a world controlled by a de facto Russo-American 'condominium' is one of the possible - and menacing - results of nuclear evolution" he wrote. "Looked at from this point of view, the existence of independent nuclear forces should constitute a guarantee that the interests of the other nuclear powers will not be sacrificed through some agreement between the two super-powers."(54)

The doctrine of 'multipolarity' was thus one distinctive contribution by French theorists to the study of strategy in the nuclear age. The second was their analysis of Revolutionary War: a subject virtually ignored by American strategic thinkers until the Viet Nam involvement brutally forced it on their attention.. For the French it had been inescapable. For nearly ten years after the Second World War the flower of their armies had been involved, in Indo-China, in operations of far larger scope than the various "Imperial Policing" activities which absorbed so much of the attention of the British Armed Forces, and one which imposed on the French nation a longer, if not a more severe strain than the Korean War imposed on the United States. The war in Indo-China was lost.

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(52) André Beaufre: Deterrence and Strategy (London 1965) p. 93.

(53) Ibid. p. 97.

(54) Ibid. p. 140. Beaufre's experience as commander of the French land forces in the Suez operation of 1956 may have had some relevance to his views on this point.

It was followed by six years of struggle in Algeria which ended, for the French Armed Forces, no less tragically. The outcome of these wars significantly altered the balance of power in the world, but the strategic concepts being developed in the United States appeared as irrelevant to their conduct as those which guided - or misguided - the French armies during the two World Wars. The concepts which were relevant of course were those of Mao-tse Tung; those precepts evolved during the Sino-Japanese struggles of the 1930's and developed into a full theory of revolutionary warfare whereby a strongly-motivated cadre operating from a position of total weakness could defeat a government controlling the entire apparatus of the State.

The theories of Mao lie outside the scope of this study, though there is little doubt that he is among the outstanding strategic thinkers of our day. Certainly the French paid him the compliment of trying to imitate him. The literature on the subject is so considerable that it may be only by hazard that the earliest French study to receive widespread recognition was Colonel Bonnet's historical analysis Les guerres insurrectionnelles et révolutionnaires (1955).(55) Bonnet in this work gave a definition which has since been generally accepted: "Guerre de partisans + guerre psychologique = guerre révolutionnaire. Posercette équation" he went on to claim, "c'est formuler une loi valable pour tous les mouvements révolutionnaires qui, aujourd'hui, agitent le monde."(56) On the basis of this definition and their own experiences, French military thinkers, true to their national intellectual traditions, attempted to formulate une doctrine. (It is interesting to note that the pragmatic British, whose cumulative experience in counter-insurgency campaigning was certainly no less than that of the French, thought more modestly in terms of 'techniques'.)(57) As worked out by such writers as Bonnet himself, Hogard, Lacheroy, Nemo and Trinquier,(58) this doctrine set out the object, both of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary war, as the gaining of the confidence and support of the people, by a mixture of violent and non-violent means directed both at 'military' and at 'non-military' targets. It was not enough to suppress guerrillas: it was necessary to destroy the basis of their support among the population by eliminating the grievances which they exploited, by giving protection against their terroristic activities and, insisted the French writers, by a process of intensive indoctrination to combat that of the revolutionary cadres themselves.

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(55) Gabriel Bonnet: Les guerres insurrectionnelles et révolutionnaires de l'antiquité a'nos jours (Paris 1958). Important unpublished studies by Colonel Lacheroy were in circulation at the same time.

(56) Ibid. p. 60.

(57) See for example Julian Paget: Counter-Insurgency Campaigning (London 1967), and Sir Robert Thompson; Defeating Communist Insurgency (London 1966).

(58) For a good select bibliography see the excellent and highly critical study by Peter Paret: French Revolutionary War fare from Indo-China to Algeria (London 1964).

It would be painful to record in detail where and why these excellent recommendations went wrong. The use of undifferentiated violence by legitimate authority undermines the basis of consent which is its strongest weapon against revolutionary opponents. Indoctrination of a population can be done only by men who are themselves indoctrinated; and since the whole essence of the 'open societies' of the West is virtually incompatible with the concept of ideological indoctrination, the men thus indoctrinated rapidly find themselves almost as much at odds with their own society as the revolutionaries they were trying to combat. In Algeria the French Army applied its doctrines with a fair measure of at least short-term success, but in so doing it alienated the sympathies of its own countrymen. The main fault of its theorists - and of their imitators in the United States - was to overlook the element of simple *nationalism* which provided such strength for the insurgent forces: a curious failing in the country which was the original home of that immensely powerful force. They accepted the propaganda of their adversaries, and saw the conflict simply in terms of a global struggle against the forces of world communist revolution. Marxist categories of thought make it impossible for their theorists even to consider that the most potent revolutionary force in the world may be not the class struggle but old-fashioned 'bourgeois' nationalism. The French theorists were no doubt equally unwilling to take into account a consideration which boded so ill for their own side. But there is good reason to suppose that the F.L.N. won in Algeria, not because they were Marxist but because they were *Algerian*, and the French were not. *Mutatis mutandis* the same applied - and applies still - in Indo-China. Marx and Lenin may provide the rationale of insurgency warfare; Mao-tse Tung may provide the techniques; but the driving power is furnished by the ideas of Mazzini. It is therefore difficult for foreign troops, however well-intentioned, to apply counter-insurgency techniques, among a people which has awoken to a consciousness of its national identity, with any chance of success.

In addition to the doctrines of multipolarity and revolutionary war, France has produced yet a third contribution to strategic thinking: the doctrine of indirect strategy. This was not totally novel. A group of American thinkers based on the Centre for Foreign Policy Research at the University of Pennsylvania had long been working on the assumption that "The Free World" and the communists were locked in a protracted conflict which could end only in the victory of one side or the other and in which force was only one element out of many which might be used.(59) It was an assumption that could certainly be justified by reference to the works of Marx-Leninist theoreticians. But the publications of these writers tended to be as emotional and tendentious as those of the Marxists themselves. Certainly they had never formulated their theories with the clarity, reasonableness and dispassionate precision of General André Beaufre and his colleagues at the Institut d'Études Stratégiques in Paris.(60) For Beaufre the whole field of international relations constituted a battlefield in which the Communist powers, thwarted in the use of force by the nuclear stalemate, were attacking the West by indirect means. Strategy had progressed from the 'operational' (Clausewitz and Jomini) through the 'logistic' (the great build-ups of the Second World War) to the 'indirect'. Political manoeuvres should therefore be seen as strategic manoeuvres. The adversary attacked, withdrew, feinted, outflanked, or dug in, using direct force where he could and infiltration where he could not. The West should respond accordingly, devise a single overall political strategy and use economic, political and military means to implement it.

The trouble with this is that it is not simply a theory of strategy but also a theory of international relations. If it is correct, Beaufre's recommendations follow naturally enough; but Beaufre states his assumptions rather than argues them, and to most students of international relations they are not self-evident. It is natural enough for military men to bring to the complex world of politics the modes of thought which they have used in dealing with more orthodox conflicts, and to assume that, because there is not a state of peace, there is a state of war. Many senior officers throughout the Western world would probably accept Beaufre's diagnosis without question and unhesitatingly endorse his recommendations. Most students of international politics would be more sceptical. Such a view leaves too many factors out of account. The world is not really polarised so simply. Communist leaders do not control events so firmly. Whatever the ideologues may say, in practice interests are not so implacably opposed. Strategy must certainly be shaped by the needs of policy; but policy cannot be made to fit quite so easily into the Procrustean concepts of the professional strategist.

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(59) Robert Strausz-Hupé and others: Protracted Conflict; A Challenging Study of Communist Strategy (New York 1959); A Forward Strategy for America (New York 1961).

(60) André Beaufre: An Introduction to Strategy (London 1965); Deterrence and Strategy (London 1965); Strategy of Action (London 1967).

Perhaps the most significant conclusion to be drawn from this survey is the extent to which the quality of strategic thinking in the nuclear age is related to an understanding of international relations, on the one hand, and of weapons technology on the other. There is of course nothing new in this dependence. Clausewitz emphasised the first, though he never fully adjusted his purely strategic thinking to take account of the political environment whose overriding importance he quite rightly stressed. The second has been evident, particularly in naval and air operations, at least since the beginning of the twentieth century. But strategic thinkers, from Lloyd to Liddell Hart in his earlier writings, were able to assume a fairly simple model of international relations within which armed conflict might occur, as well as a basically stable technological environment. Neither assumption can now be made. No thinking about deterrence is likely to be of value unless it is based on a thorough understanding of 'the state of the art' in weapons technology. Any thinking about limited war, revolutionary war, or indirect strategy must take as its starting point an understanding of the political - including the social and economic - context out of which these conflicts arise or are likely to arise. Inevitably the interaction works both ways. Strategic factors themselves constitute an important element in international relations: the statesman can never be a purely despotic lawgiver to the strategist. Similarly, strategic requirements have inspired scientists and technologists to achievements they would normally consider impossible. Increasingly the three fields overlap. That is why strategic studies owe at least as much to the work of political scientists like Raymond Aron, Arnold Wolfers, or John Herz, and of physical scientists like Jerome Wiesner or P.M.S. Blackett as they do to the classical strategist. But does the classical strategist any longer exist?

NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR QUOTATION

INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
10th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

PROBLEMS OF MODERN STRATEGY: A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

COMMITTEE I

Saturday 21st September Morning

Social Systems Analysis and the Study of International Conflict

KENNETH E. BOULDING

In the last generation something that could legitimately be described as a "new look" in the study of international relations has developed as a world movement. It springs from two, not unrelated, but quite distinct sources. The first is a movement from the side of the social sciences to bring the study of international relations into closer relationship with both the theory and the methods of the social sciences themselves. This might be called the social systems approach to international relations. It arises mainly out of a dissatisfaction with the more literary, historical, intuitive approach which has characterised most previous discussion of the subject, mainly on the grounds that it did not produce the kind of cumulative growth of knowledge that is so much admired in the sciences. The second source of dissatisfaction with the older approach to the subject comes from the "peace research movement". This is a movement among social scientists, primarily for the application of social science methods to the international system, so that it shares most of the discontents and the ambitions of the social systems approach. It is motivated, however, by strong normative principles, the "steam" for the movement being derived from deep dissatisfaction with the present international system and a strong desire to replace it with some alternative, perhaps yet to be discovered, which would be less costly economically and less outrageous morally. The peace research movement, therefore, has much the same origins as the peace movement in the sense that it rejects the existing international system and denies its legitimacy. It differs from the peace movement, however, in being primarily a movement among social scientists who are not satisfied with exhortations and denunciations, and who seek to achieve deeper understanding of the international system through the aid of the methods of social science in the hope of thereby finding out how to change it into something more satisfactory.

The relation between these two sources of criticism of the conventional approach is established by the fact that they both involve social scientists and the application of social sciences, and whether the motivation is out of idle curiosity, which is supposed to be the ideal foundation of science, or whether it is strong normative beliefs and a desire for a radical social change should not, at least, make much difference so far as the application and extension of the methods of the social sciences to the international system are concerned. The normative element, however, cannot be overlooked, simply because there is a strong suspicion that the older literary and historical approach was concerned mainly with the justification of the existing system and had normative principles of its own in the sense that its main concern was how to operate the existing system effectively, whereas the new approach, with a somewhat different set of normative principles closer to that of the peace movement, is more concerned with how the existing system can be transformed. In this sense the new approach is more radical, the old approach more conservative. There is certainly, however, a wide middle ground where they can come together.

The word "systems" has become such a catchword, at least in the penumbra of the scientific community that there is real danger of its being drained of all real meaning, or even worse, that it may simply become a "good word" with which to bless somewhat dubious enterprises. Nevertheless it does mean something. It deserves to be rescued from the dismal fate suggested above. It represents in the first place a clear view of the world as a space-time continuum in four dimensions which exhibits recognisable patterns. It is the perception of regularities and patterns in the space-time continuum which is the prime task of the epistemological process, and which really constitutes the growth of knowledge in any field whatever. The broadest possible definition of a system is anything which is not chaos. Specifically, it is a perceived regularity in the space-time continuum. In the case of relatively simple systems, such as the solar system, the regularities can be expressed in terms of difference, or differential, equations. I have elsewhere called these "difference systems" as they depend on the perception of stable differences between successive states in the universe in time. More generally, if there is a stable relationship between the state of the system today and the state tomorrow, we have a difference system of the first degree; in a stable relationship between three successive states of the system, say yesterday, today and tomorrow, we have a difference system of the second degree and so on. A good example of a difference system of the first degree in the social systems would be the growth of a sum at compound interest, where the amount tomorrow is a constant proportion of what it is today. If these relationships are stable over time it is possible to predict the course of the system into the future and to project it back into the past. This is the reason for the remarkable predictive successes in celestial mechanics, for instance, in predicting eclipses, because most of the movements of the solar system can be described by difference, or differential, equations of the second, or at least of the third, degree.

As we move into the biological sciences difference systems break down as an epistemological pattern either because they do not exist at all, or because they become unbearably complicated. The movements even of an amoeba, for instance, cannot be described in terms of differential equations of any order whatsoever. Nevertheless, all is not chaos. We are able to perceive patterns in the space-time continuum which then also can be projected into the future. The simplest of these is the "creode", or the standardised pattern of development of a living creature from a fertilised egg to its final death. This represents a kind of equilibrium pattern or line of development, variations from which may occur, but which on the whole is remarkably stable. The kitten never grows up into a dog and all individuals of any one species grow, age and die in approximately the same pattern. This is why the age of a human being is probably the most important single piece of information about him, in spite of individual variations.

More complex, but still discernible, patterns can be detected in the whole evolutionary process even though the principle of "survival of the fittest" may be practically empty of content, for all fitness means is capacity to survive. Thus we can say something about survival value in relation to the environment. We know something about ecological equilibria and ecological succession even though evolutionary theory has very little predictive power.

As we move from biological into social systems the complexity of the patterns again takes a large jump. Even so we are still a long way from chaos. We perceive patterns in decision-making; we perceive patterns in social organization, in communication networks, in role structures, which may effect decisions. Underlying the social system there are patterns which have an almost mechanical character about them, such as the growth of population, or even the growth of per capita real income, or in some circumstances the growth of the money stock and the rise in the price level, which at least for short periods behave like difference systems. They always, however, seem to be subject to parametric change at unpredictable intervals. One can detect also in the social system evolutionary patterns. Artifacts like the automobile, organizations like the corporation or the national state, and even ideas and ideologies are recognisable as social species coming into the world through forms of mutation and either surviving or not surviving by the process of selection. Concepts of ecological equilibrium and succession likewise apply to society. Economists are familiar with the concept of an equilibrium structure of relative prices. This could easily be generalised to include an equilibrium structure of populations of social species of all kinds and their inter-relations. Just as a pond maintains an equilibrium of populations of chemicals, algae, bacteria, fish, frogs and so on, society maintains a kind of equilibrium - commodities, industries, churches, families, schools, political organizations and so on. We can even detect a structure of "niches" or probability peaks of certain types of organisms. In Australia, the marsupials developed into marsupial equivalents of the dog, the deer, the bear and so on. In socialist countries we find party functionaries playing the role of the clergy, the managers of socialist enterprises acting like businessmen, and so on.

The contrast between the older literary and historical approach and the social systems approach should not be drawn too sharply simply because both, after all, are studying the same thing; the images which they derive should therefore be recognisably similar. Nevertheless the social systems approach does have some peculiarities of its own which may be subject to differing evaluations. It tends to have, for instance, what might be called a "Copernican syndrome"; that is, a shift from a "homocentric" to a "universalist" systems point of view. Thus the older approach to international relations often looked at the system from the point of view of an individual nation, as the Ptolemaic system looked at the universe from the earth. It does take a certain leap of the imagination, which, oddly enough, is almost poetic in character, to see the international system as a total system involving the whole surface of the earth into which each nation or other unit interacts, theoretically at least, with every other, as, for instance, in the Laplaceian system every planet and every other body in the solar system interacts with every other.

Another characteristic of the systems point of view is largely concerned with the improvement of the perceptive apparatus as it is involved in information collection and processing. It is at least a tempting generalisation to suggest that the essence of a scientific revolution is a combination of a Copernican type of theoretical shift in point of view (new theoretical model as a result) with an improvement in the perceptual apparatus. In astronomy the original Copernican revolution went hand in hand with the development of the telescope. In general, science has owed an enormous amount to the development of improved perceptual apparatus such as the microscope, spectroscope and the radiotelescope and so on. We find the same phenomenon in the social sciences. The Keynesian revolution in economics, for instance, was associated in the first place with a Copernican change in "stance" from the particular and partial equilibrium theory of Alfred Marshall to what was essentially a macroeconomic general equilibrium model of Keynes. This would almost certainly not have been successful, however, if it had not come along with a profound improvement in the collection and processing of economic information, represented by the development of national income statistics, and the development of such concepts as the gross national product and its various constituents, which fitted very easily into the Keynesian framework and supported it with massive empirical data.

A great deal of the present dissatisfaction with our state of knowledge of the international system arises from the belief that the existing apparatus for collecting and processing information about it is not only hopelessly inadequate, but is even corrupt and is, indeed, designed to produce false images of the world. These images, furthermore, are not subjected to any feedback processes which would correct them. The whole organization of the international system is designed, not only to create false images in the minds of the decision-maker, but to protect especially powerful decision-makers from any existing information which might upset their existing images. In particular, it is argued that information which originates in spies, newspaper reporters and diplomats is more subject to error at the source than information which is collected by social scientists and that the organizations which process this information into the form in which it finally reaches a decision-maker are designed to corrupt it even further. It is not claimed that this corruption is necessarily conscious or malicious. Indeed, if it were conscious it would not be so dangerous. It arises indeed from a lack of self-consciousness about the nature of the system itself, and from the acceptance of the system, by those who operate it, at its face value.

This is a serious charge and we must examine the nature of the epistemological process a little more carefully and try to substantiate it. The great epistemological problem, as Hume pointed out a long time ago, is that images in the mind of the knower can never be compared directly with reality, but can only be compared with other images in the same mind. Hence, it is never possible to test by direct comparison the truth of an image; that is, its correspondence with some outside reality. Nevertheless, we are all convinced that successful epistemological processes do take place; that is, we learn in the sense that our images become better and better approximations of reality. The process by which they do this is by the elimination of error. Error of some kind is detected when predictions fail; that is, when an image of the future, as it has existed in the past, is compared with an image at the same time and place as we have it in the future. In this sense, the beginning of knowledge always consists of a disappointment. All disappointments do not result in the correction of error in the basic image, but the steps are these: a basic image of the world leads by inference to some expectation about the future; in the passage of time the future is realised, that it becomes present and then past, and we receive new messages by which our previous expectations are either confirmed or disappointed. Thus, suppose I have an image of my home town in which I think I know where the post office is and from this I predict that if I go in certain directions I will find the post office. If I follow my prediction and I find that the post office is not there, I must do one of three things - either I must reject the inference, and assume that I have come to the wrong place and gone the wrong way; or I must reject the message that tells me that the post office is not there and denounce this as a delusion; or I have to change my basic image of where the post office is. It is only by protecting ourselves against rejection of either the inference or the message that disappointment results in the correction of error in the basic image. In our ordinary life, in what I have called "folk knowledge", in fact, we do this all the time and I have argued that there is no essential difference in the epistemological process by which we derive knowledge of any kind, whether this is folk knowledge or the more elaborate knowledge which results from the scientific method. The difference indeed between folk knowledge and scientific knowledge is in the complexity of the systems involved, not in the epistemological method.

Consider now our image of the international system and compare it with our previous image of the post office. It is clearly much more complex. It consists as does our image of the post office of an image of certain static structures - for instance, nations and their boundaries, armed forces, governments, certain people occupying certain roles, certain lines of communications, certain expected sources of messages of varying degrees of reliability and so on. It consists also, however, of certain expected or probable patterns in time as well as in space, of certain causative relations. Our image of the post office might also include an image of the effects of a few sticks of dynamite upon it. Thus, it consists in part of various possible patterns of the future which may also, of course, be subject to varying probability, patterns of the sort that if A does this, B will do that. It also consists of certain rather vague principles, such as the balance of power, or the domino theory, or Lebensraum, or traditional enmities.

Unfortunately, because of the extreme complexity of the system, the difficulty of making exact predictions, and hence the difficulty of perceiving disappointment even when it occurs, these images tend to be self-reinforcing and are not subject to the kind of progressive elimination of error which takes place in simpler systems. The key to the problem indeed is the probablistic nature of the predictions involved, especially where the events predicted are not members of a large class of similar events. Thus if one predicts an event tomorrow, let us say rain with a fifty per cent probability, it is virtually impossible to be disappointed, for whether it rains or does not rain, the prediction is fulfilled. If, of course, the event is one of a large class of similar events the insurance principle can be applied and we can predict, for instance, that out of a million people age sixty this year, so many will die within the year. The degree of probability is so high that if the prediction did not come true we would certainly be disappointed. In the international system, however, events tend to be unique. Hence, probabilities are very hard to determine. How could we say, for instance, what was the probability of a nuclear war at the time of the Cuban crisis in 1962? Even if it was 95 per cent we will never know because we were in the five per cent.

Probabilistic systems, and especially systems with strong random components in them, are highly likely to produce superstition, that is, the perception of order where it does not exist, and the development of self-fulfilling images of the world, because the ordinary processes by which error is detected and corrected do not operate. If we believe strongly that we have done something which is unlucky, like spilling salt or walking under a ladder, not only is something bad more likely to happen to us, and we may even subconsciously desire it, but in our perception of subsequent events, we will censor out the good things and only remember the bad ones so that our superstition will be confirmed.

The international system is not only highly probabilistic in its nature and especially in the nature of its predictions, but it also contains strong random elements in so far as its dynamics depend on the decisions of relatively few people. Random elements are not cancelled out by the law of large numbers as they tend to be, for instance, in the operations of the market and in many aspects of economic life. We would expect it, therefore, to be a system which is peculiarly subject to superstition, to the perception of non-existing order of which perceptions will tend to be self-justifying, even sometimes self-fulfilling, both in the general perceptual apparatus of the perceiver, and also in the organizational setting in which he operates. All organizations operate as information filters which filter out and condense information as it passes up through the heirarchy, so that by the time that information reaches the powerful decision-makers it has been filtered many, many times. If the powerful decision-makers are able to control their information receivers they are likely to find themselves in an essentially schizophrenic position in which reality testing, in the sense of change of images through disappointment, becomes almost impossible.

The basic criticism of the literary and historical approach to a study of the international system is that it is subject to precisely the same epistemological diseases which afflict the system itself since it does not lead into any radical criticism of the system or to the development of new models and new information. This criticism is perhaps unfair to many devoted scholars who have ranged widely in their historical sources, who have tried to be objective, and who certainly tried to look beyond the image of the system as it seems to have been present in the minds of the major actors in it. The scholar has access to more sources of information, he can be wise after the event, and one should never underestimate the capacity of poetic insight to perceive patterns in the record which the most painstaking numerical and statistical analysis may fail to perceive. Nevertheless, there is a very strong feeling that what we have had hitherto is not good enough. The more complex the system, the less likely it is to be unraveled and be made explicit by insight. Poetic insight alone, for instance, would never have given us our present knowledge of DNA and all the philosophers in the world would never have split the atom. Complex systems only yield to highly complex and specific models capable of precise inference with high degrees of probability and modification through feedback from sharp disappointment. There is a feeling, therefore, that there is a great deal more to know about the international system than can possibly be revealed by the methods of literary, philosophical and historical research of the old type.

Turning now to the contribution of the peace research movement, the problem here is the impact of normative criticism on the general epistemological process. There is a myth that the success of the scientific method in various fields is a result of its freedom from normative considerations, its icy objectivity and its rejection of the "ought" in favour of the "is". As no myth can survive without some elements of truth, there are of course elements of truth in this one. Nevertheless, it is by no means the whole truth and it can be extremely misleading. It is not only that the scientific subculture itself, like all subcultures, is possessed of a strong ethic without which it could not exist, but also normative considerations have always played a significant role in the epistomological process itself at the level of scientific knowledge as well as at the levels of folk knowledge and literary knowledge. Knowledge always grows towards what is of interest to the knower and normative considerations are powerful generators of interest. Idle curiosity and random search have their own place in the growth of knowledge, but it would be a rash assumption indeed to suppose that they dominate the process. The importance of what might be called "normative discontent", therefore, is that it creates interest in areas of knowledge which might otherwise be neglected.

The fact that normative considerations are capable of perverting the growth of knowledge and of leading us, in the classic words of Will Rogers, towards "knowing things that ain't so", through wishful thinking and filtering out of unwanted information, should not blind us to the fact that normative discontent has a legitimate and indeed a necessary role in the total process of learning. It is absurd to suppose that we can make a sharp distinction between pure knowledge, which is utterly detached from human needs and interests and grows at random through idle curiosity, and applied knowledge which is devoted to improving the lot of mankind. In fact at all levels pure and applied knowledge are inextricably mixed. It is precisely when they are separated, indeed, that each tends to go off into superstition, philosophical superstition in the one case and practical superstition in the other. Thus the very title of "The American Philosophical Association for the Promotion of Useful Knowledge" gives us the key to the success of the scientific enterprise, which is precisely its combination of the pure and the applied. In the physical sciences, for instance, the useful knowledge of engineering, and the philosophical knowledge of physics and chemistry, are continually fed one into the other in a co-operative ecological relationship.

In the social sciences, likewise, interaction between the pure and the applied has been constant, necessary and fruitful. Economics provides us with a number of examples; the classical economics of Adam Smith arose very clearly out of normative discontent with the mercantilist obsession with the power of the national state and shifted its focus of interest towards the welfare of the average man as measured by per capita real income. The Marxian criticism arose out of normative disappointment with what seemed like a failure of the classical prescriptions. Unfortunately Marxism, like Liberalism, became an ideology of "true believers" which destroyed some of its epistemological value, but it nevertheless had a profound impact on the capitalist, as well as on the socialist,world through questioning the legitimacy of accepted institutions, especially of private property, and in calling attention to certain limitations of the exchange mechanism, and to the necessity of studying distribution of income and wealth as well as its overall magnitudes. The Keynesian revolution arose very clearly out of normative dissatisfaction with the failure of the existing systems to provide full employment, and has also had a profound effect on economic policies throughout the world through the prescriptions which it generated.

The peace research movement can best be understood as an effort to produce a "Keynesian" type revolution in the international system. It begins with a rejection of the legitimacy of the institution of war as Keynes rejected the legitimacy of mass unemployment. It recognises, however, that war is endemic in an international system which rests on unilateral national defence. It seeks, therefore, to discover a practical dynamic which will change the system in the direction of eliminating war, just as Keynes discovered a practical dynamic, through change in fiscal and monetary policy, which would eliminate mass unemployment.

Normative differences are not easy to characterise simply because in a certain sense every man has his own norms (values) and partly because unconscious, or latent, norms are often more important, especially in moments of crisis, than consciously stated norms. Nevertheless, we may perhaps characterise the norms of the more traditional study of international relations as involving an acceptance of the threat system as dominant, and acceptance of the positive probability of war as an essential element in the conduct of international relations. In these days there is not much glorification of war as an end in itself, though what might be called the martial virtues of courage, fortitude, gallantry and so on, continue to be somewhat covertly admired even though the martial style is somewhat alien to the academic and reflective life. By far the most important of these traditional norms, however, is the acceptance of the national state and the national identity as not only unexamined, but virtually unexaminable ends, especially in the conduct of international affairs. By contrast, within the peace research movement, the institution of war itself tends to be regarded as the major enemy even though the martial virtues may continue to be admired in a somewhat modified form. The major human conflict is seen as between the world war industry and the civilian population and enterprise which supports it, rather than between national states. This does not mean, however, that the abolition of national states is seen as an end in itself, or as even desirable. Indeed, the pattern which now seems to be emerging as the most probable road towards peace is the development in the world of large numbers of national states at stable peace with each other within a loose framework of international organisations, rather than the development of a world state which would involve the abolition of the national states themselves.

These two normative syndromes, as they might be called, may seem very far apart. Nevertheless, their impact on the pursuit of knowledge about the international system need not be so very different. Whenever we have two objectives, that is, two maximands, both of which cannot be maximised at the same time, we have to maximise one under the constraint of a minimum acceptable value of the other. Thus, we might say that the "national security" school is interested in the problem of maximising national security, that is, the probability of survival or of the maintenance of the power of the national state, subject to the constraint of a certain probability of peace, whereas the peace research school is interested in maximising the probability of peace subject to the constraint of a minimum probability of the survival of the national state. These two problems could easily have solutions which are very close together, in spite of the fact that the normative view which underlies them may be far apart.

Nevertheless, the peace research movement has called attention to certain elements and aspects of the international system which have been previously neglected, such as, for instance, the movement towards stable peace among national states. This is a concept which has been neglected by the more traditional school. Nevertheless, in the last hundred and fifty years, partly as a result of the revolution in science and technology, islands of stable peace have emerged in the middle of an international system characterized by unstable peace. In the particular cases this has happened largely by accident, but as a general phenomenon stable peace now clearly has a positive probability of achievement. This whole process has been somewhat neglected by historians or traditional students of international relations; it has either been taken for granted or has been regarded as something exceptional and of no great interest. Nevertheless, a stable peace is a quite recognizable phase of the international system. It exists between any two countries where the threat relationship has become subordinate to exchange and integrative relationships. The principal historical cases are North America and Scandinavia, in both of which, one suspects, stable peace was achieved largely by accident. Nevertheless, I have argued that a profound change in the international system may be very close. The payoffs of stable peace are extremely high, in spite of the fact that the dynamics of achieving it are unstable. The process can easily be set back. But with the payoffs as high as they are today, it would be surprising if even the processes of unconscious social evolution do not produce a strong movement towards stable peace, and if the movement can achieve self-consciousness it should be even more rapid. We may well, therefore, be in a situation in which the islands of stable peace will grow until they coalesce, and from having an international system of unstable peace with islands of stable peace we will move to a system of stable peace with islands of unstable peace in which, as it were, the figure has become the ground. In particular, with a little bit of luck and good management we may achieve stable peace around the whole Temperate Zone, leaving perhaps islands of unstable peace throughout the Tropics. This change however would be a radical change in the system. It is this towards which the peace research movement is moving.

One further point should be noticed which differentiates the new look from the old look in the study of the international system - that scientists are increasingly realizing that they are not studying a system which is independent of the knowledge they create. All sciences indeed are running into this problem. Even physics has its Heisenberg principle which states in effect that we cannot get information out of a system without changing it. The social sciences are dominated by what might be called a generalized Heisenberg principle; for information, and especially the kind of information which is obtained by the social sciences, it is a crucial and essential element of the system itself. What we are aiming for in the social sciences therefore is not so much knowledge as control. Thus in economics we used to be interested in studying the business cycle as a hydrologist might study the tides. Anything we find out about the business cycle, however, will change it and the focus of interest has properly changed from studying the business cycle to controlling it. In the international system we are no longer interested in merely studying the miserable course of international history; we are interested in transforming it into something better. The present international system, that is to say the global costs of armaments and armies, costs us about $160 billion a year and with this we purchase a positive probability of almost irretrievable disaster.

The social sciences have to be therapeutic or essentially medical sciences. They have to treat war as a problem of public health. I suspect that there is a real difference between the systems approach, which regards the international system as a process capable of control, and the historical approach, which looks upon history as if it had to happen. The great difference here is between probabilistic thinking and deterministic thinking, the systems approach being probabilistic, regarding human history as containing a strong random element which is capable of being diminished by organization, just as random changes in outside temperature can be controlled inside by means of thermostats. The historian tends to be causitive in his approach and it is threatening to him to learn that history did not have to happen the way it did, and especially does not have to continue this way into the future. Thus, we are now drawing to a critical state in the evolution of mankind in which man is no longer content to be at the mercy of history and in which the rise of social self-consciousness of the total planet as a system is rapidly bringing the age of civilization and the first phase of recorded history to an end. This is a crisis and a revolution of an intensity with which traditional studies are quite unable to cope. The social systems approach may not be able to cope with it either, but at least it seems to have a better chance. What I must plead for, however, is cooperation rather than enmity between the two approaches. In the present crisis of mankind we need every possible epistemological approach that we can manage. Jealousy and enmity are completely out of place.

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INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
10th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

PROBLEMS OF MODERN STRATEGY: A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

COMMITTEE II

Saturday 21st September Morning

Great Power Intervention in the Modern World

URS SCHWARZ

1. The Concept

In a world of sovereign states whose relationship is governed sometimes by power, sometimes by international law, morality or the lack of it, and always by self-interest, we come across a twilight area where the four elements meet. It is the area where actions by a government or an international organization assume the specific character which places them in the wide category of "intervention". The problem of intervention is one aspect of the political effects of military measures or attitudes, or of the possession of superior military or economic strength on the family of nations, on world policy. It is, therefore, a problem of strategy in the fullest sense of the word.

This specific kind of strategic action cannot be thought of otherwise than as of a combination of policy with power - economic power and more frequently military might. It is distinguished from the many other international situations in which will stands against will, force against force, by three elements: the power relationship between intervener and intervened, the limited scope of the act, and the intention or at least the claim that a rule of international law or morality has to be upheld. This narrows down the field of investigation. We are not to deal with all possible cases and situations in which pressure is brought to bear internationally, or where force is applied in order to achieve national ends - which would mean the whole field of conflict strategy. We are dealing with situations in which one much superior nation or an international organization or multilateral combination tries to impose its will on a nation which has no great power status, or where far superior power is lent to a hard-pressed lesser nation in defence of some concept of a political legal order, and always with a limited duration of the action in mind. This, then, is our definition of intervention.

Of a different kind are those actions related by history, often called interventions in a much wider meaning, in which purely imperialistic aims were pursued, such as the opening of Japan to world trade through demonstrations of force by Russian and American warships, the French and the British interventions in India in the 18th century, the conquest of Mexico by France (1861-1867), the intervention of the United States in the Cuban rebellion against Spain, the many actions of the Great Powers in China, the Russian interventions in Central Asia and those on behalf of the Slavic populations of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century.

Before World War I the philosophy behind intervention was that great powers represented enlightened civilization, humanitarian ideals and domestic order favourable to international order, as opposed to the backwardness, ignorance and instability of smaller nations, especially when these were not European or North American. Up to 1914 the possession of the Christian faith strengthened the never well-defined title of a power of order and a guardian of right and law. When, after 1918, Japan joined the ranks of the surviving great powers, Christianity became a less obvious prerequisite of the great power status which bestows the right to intervene. At the same time, Germany, because it was held responsible for the war, was eliminated from the ranks of the "happy few".

After World War II the background of interventionism changed. The motivation split in two different sets of political ideals and aspirations. The United States - and to a lesser degree Great Britain and France - remained to carry the banner of law and order in international relations, now summarized in the terms "freedom and democracy", into the lands of the infidels. Yet they were joined by a new power, the Soviet Union, which had emerged from the holocaust with greatly increased military and political might and with an increased appeal of its ideology. The Soviet Union, representing scientific Marxism-Leninism and the promise of a future world order under the dictatorship of the labouring classes, was well equipped to intervene in foreign countries in its turn, under the banner of a different philosophy. Interventionism, from then on, evolved before two entirely distinct backgrounds, which had in common only the fact that the two political systems producing them laid claim to universality.

2. The Law

Characteristically, the relationship of force between the parties to intervention, which practically only admits great powers or recognised international organizations as entitled to wield this instrument of policy, has helped to legitimize intervention. Over the centuries, it has seemed less objectionable than stark aggression or attack. The bigger the difference between the size and power of the intervening nation and that of its opponent, the more intervention seemed morally and legally justified as an act in defence of international order and law. It signified that a great power had "taken the law in its own hands". Such an attitude was universally or almost universally accepted: by the great powers because it represented the system of imperialistic rule to which they themselves adhered, by the smaller nations because they could, sheltered by this system, comfortably conduct their own business.

International public law has tried, accordingly, to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate intervention. When the Drago-Porter convention, signed on October 18, 1907 at the Hague, prohibited recourse to armed force for the recovery of contract debts from a Government, it stated that this undertaking would not be applied when the debtor state refused arbitration or, after arbitration, did not submit to the decision. In other words, illegitimate intervention became legitimate when the defaulting debtor did not comply with the legal proceedings established by the treaty.

Under the treaties for the protection of minorities concluded in 1919/20 as corollaries to the peace treaties ending World War I, the members of the Council of the League of Nations were entitled, the Council consenting, to take "all measures" which seemed effective for the safeguards of the rights of such minorities.

In the 19th and 20th centuries, the cases in which governments took action by force to protect the interests of their nationals, their own interests, or to take revenge for any "affront and indignity" 1) committed against a great power or its nationals, run into the hundreds. These steps were widely approved by public opinion and international public law. The bombardment and destruction of San Juan, Nicaragua, in 1854 by a US warship, the "Boxer" expedition against China in 1900/01, the blockade of Venezuela by Germany, Italy and Great Britain in 1901, the destruction of the Venezuelan fleet by the Netherlands in 1908, the landing of US marines in Haiti and in Mexico in 1914, all seemed at the time legitimate measures in self defence, of redress of injustices.

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1) Resolution of the Congress of the U.S., April 22, 1914.

The reasons for this acceptance of intervention as a legitimate institution in the relations of nations are twofold. One has to do with power, one with ideology. This latter background providing justification has already been mentioned. Power is not less important. The wider the gap between the forces of the intervener-agressor and the attacked, the lesser were the risks of intervention degenerating into, or, as we would say today escalating to, war. Hence the Great Powers could easily tolerate strong action by their equals against a much weaker nation, since general peace would not be threatened and their interests not be involved. Therefore resistance to interventionism did not develop in the limited circle of Great Powers but rather among the victims of these actions and of the law of intervention, especially among the Latin American nations. When, in 1823, President James Monroe stated the principle of non-intervention in the Western Hemisphere, the United States did not yet consider themselves as a great power, but rather as the champion of its smaller equals. The first international step towards limiting the exercise of a right which had become doubtful was the introduction of arbitration, which in any case would precede unilateral armed acts.

The doubts which arose about the legal basis in international public law moved the powers at a very early date not to "go it alone" but rather to seek the support and sympathy of other powers or of an international organization, which would lend legitimacy to the act. In 1815 Russia, Austria and Prussia joined in the Holy Alliance whose aim was to intervene against revolutionary movements in Europe. From 1889 on the American states developed by a series of subsequent conferences the Organization of American States (OAS), which aimed at substituting pacific settlement and common action for self-help and thence interventionism. Similar provisions lay at the heart of the Covenant of the League of Nations (1920), the Charter of the United Nations (1945), and were also embodied in later agreements on collective security as the North Atlantic Treaty (1949) or the Warsaw Pact (1955).

Gradually, international organizations rather than individual great powers became the instruments of intervention, since they were more readily accepted as representing international legality. Under Chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations, the Security Council is given wide discretion to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to decide what measures, ranging from economic or diplomatic sanctions to military action, the organization or its members were to take in order to restore international peace and security. The charter goes on expressly to reserve the rights of regional organizations to deal with such matters, and states that the Security Council might utilize regional arrangements as agencies for enforcement action under its authority.

Among "threats to the peace, breach of the peace, or acts of aggression" can be visualised the widest possible range of situations in which a government comes into opposition to an ideal world order or international law as conceived by the members of the Security Council or other organs of the United Nations. In April, 1946, Poland asked the Security Council to declare the existence of the Franco régime in Spain a threat to international peace and security. The proposal was not carried, but in December the General Assembly suggested that the Security Council consider measures to remedy the Spanish situation and recommended the recall of diplomatic representatives from Madrid. In December, 1966, the Security Council adopted a resolution imposing sanctions on the Ian Smith régime of Rhodesia - the first such decision taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter - because its very existence, its claim to independence and its rebellion against Great Britain were considered a threat to the peace. These examples show that almost any situation, and all those which in earlier times justified great power intervention, fall under the term "threats to the peace". Chapter VII is, therefore, the charter of intervention in our time.

Article 2, paragraph 7 of the UN Charter excludes intervention in domestic affairs of a nation, in declaring that nothing contained in the charter "shall authorise the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state". Then it goes on to say that this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures. The resolution "Peace through Deeds" of the General Assembly of November 17, 1950, condemned intervention by a state in the internal affairs of another undertaken in order to change its legally established government by the threat or use of force. Aggression, whether committed openly or by fomenting civil strife in the interest of a foreign power or by other means, was called the gravest of all crimes against peace and security. Yet this discrimination of intervention as a crime against peace and security automatically opens the way to intervention under the auspices of the international organization. In addition, the charter gives in its Article 53 in conjunction with Article 107 a brief for individual intervention, as long as it is directed against a state which during World War II has been an enemy of any state which signed the charter of San Francisco.

Modern international public law knows even a much wider range of intervention. All the instruments aimed at collective security contain an element of it. The convention on prevention and punishment of genocide of December 9, 1948, provides for trial by an international penal tribunal or action under the charter. Measures of both kinds can hardly be visualised without the use of force by an intervening government or by the United Nations.

Treaties concerned with arms control, future or already in force, have to deal of necessity with inspections and safeguards, which all have aspects related to intervention. The Non-Proliferation Treaty of July 1, 1968, for example, in its Article III obliges the non-nuclear-weapon states which are parties to the treaty to accept safeguards in accordance with the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguard system. This, of course, presupposes, within the provisions of the treaty and agreements with the IAEA and its statutes, activities of international inspectors on the territory of the contracting states. They can report on non-compliance with the treaty obligations, whereupon the IAEA may apply sanctions. These are very mild indeed, and far remote from any steps which might be called intervention. The sanctions include information of other parties to the treaty, termination of assistance given and recovery of the materials made available to the defaulting nation by the Agency. Any step towards nuclear armament is of a delicate nature. When it is known, it will inevitably unleash corresponding measures by rival nations. The making public of the fact that such steps are being considered, therefore may act as a deterrent. Finally, a report of the inspectors on non-compliance may set in motion the whole machinery of sanctions of the United Nations under Chapter VII of the Charter, which is the legitimate system of intervention of our times.

As we see, public international law, in its recent evolution generally prohibits individual intervention but expressly authorizes intervention by international organizations within the limits set by their constitution and in the framework of the legal proceedings which they have developed.

3. Recent Experience

The object of intervention, which distinguishes it from other types of international use of force, is the defence of some concept of ideal political order or legality as conceived by the intervener or public opinion favourable to him.

From November, 1917 to February, 1920, France, Great Britain, the United States of America, Japan, and Polish and Czechoslovak forces intervened in the civil war or wars existing between the revolutionary armies in the Russian empire and the antirevolutionary "white" government and its allies. The intervention which was originally aimed at winning back a defecting ally in the way against Germany and Austria, was later transformed into an attempt to prevent the victory of a revolutionary movement deemed dangerous for international order and stability. As we know, this intervention utterly failed, due to the weakness of, and deep splits between, the anti-revolutionary forces in Russia which the intervention had been intended to encourage.

Typical interventions of the "take the law in one's own hands" type occurred in Manchuria in 1929, when Soviet troops took action in defence of Russian treaty rights over the Chinese Eastern Railroad, and in 1931 when Japanese armed forces opened hostilities against China in revenge for the alleged murder of a Japanese officer.

In July, 1936, Italy intervened in Spain on the side of the revolutionary movement led by a group of military commanders aimed at the overthrow of the Republican government in Madrid. The operation started by providing air transport to the rebels and grew into dispatch of large military forces - three Divisions and auxiliaries - to Spain. Germany provided, under the thin disguise of an organization called "Legion Condor", bomber and fighter forces, anti-aircraft artillery, a communications system and naval support to the party headed by General Franco. In the course of its intervention Germany also revived typical gunboat policy, when, as a reprisal for the bombing of a German warship by a Spanish aeroplane, the Berlin Government ordered its naval ships to open fire on the coastal city of Almeria, causing havoc among the civilian population. The Soviet Union, in turn, intervened on the side of the Spanish Government by encouraging and arming a number of international brigades, formed by volunteers from many countries, further by assuming through the Soviet embassy and the Communist party political control over the republican government, and by the sale of munitions to the government. These had the openly admitted object of establishing in Spain a political order corresponding to the views and aspirations of the intervening powers- fascism and national-socialism on the one hand, Marxism-Leninism on the other hand. In the process both sides tried to win an ally and a military basis for the day of the world conflict which seemed inevitable, and Germany further sought much needed resources of raw materials. France declared its non-intervention, while it sent aeroplanes and munitions to the Madrid government and favoured the transit of volunteers through its territory. After a vain attempt to stop all foreign meddling in the conflict, the five great powers - France, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union - set up a so-called non-intervention committee in London, which served as a thin veil to cover the intervention of four of the five powers.

The most significant and far-reaching intervention of the modern type was the UN intervention on behalf of the Republic of Korea. Having been informed that North Korea forces had invaded South Korea, the Security Council determined on June 25, 1950, that the attack was a breach of the peace, called for the cessation of hostilities and the assistance of members in carrying out the resolution - a resolution following proposals from the United States and made in the absence of the Soviet Union. On June 27, after the USA had already joined the fight in Korea, the Council adopted by seven votes to one (Yugoslavia), with the Soviet Union absent, a resolution recommending that members furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as might be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security. A later resolution requested members providing military forces to make them available to a unified UN command. Subsequently, combattantunits were provided by sixteen member nations. The successful intervention ended with the armistice of July 27, 1953.

Central America, the classic area of great power intervention, witnessed in 1954 a revolution in Guatemala, where a government of anti-American and pro-communist leanings headed by General Jacobs Arbenz was overthrown. The United States had earlier tried to prevent arms imports from Eastern Europe for the government, and had clandestinely supported the revolutionaries. The following year, an invasion of Costa Rica by forces of Nicaragua was repelled with the help of aircraft supplied by the United States to the nation under attack. Both interventions were theoretically based on some kind of collective decision, the one in Guatemala on the resolution against communism of the 10th Inter-American Conference of Caracas, 1954, the other in response to an appeal by Costa Rica to the Organization of American States.

In November, 1956 the Soviet Union suppressed with armed forces the new government of Hungary headed by Imre Nagy, which had come to power after an uprising of students and workers against the communist régime. The intervention was explained as response to an appeal by the legitimate government and an act to re-establish the legal authorities.

At the same time, Britain and France landed troops in Egypt with the intention of occupying the Suez Canal and forcing Egypt to accept some form of internationalization of the canal, as proposed in September 1956 by the conference of eighteen user nations. The operation failed, both militarily and politically, after the opposition of the United States of America and the Soviet Union had discouraged both France and the United Kingdom. The international basis required for a successful operation of this importance had proved too narrow and weak. It is significant that intervention, national or international, could not be successfully conducted against an open violation of sacred international treaties by Gamal Abdel Nasser's then relatively weak régime, and this in a situation where interests of the family of nations of the highest importance were at stake. This event, therefore, may be considered as a turning point in the history of interventionism.

The following years brought two interventions in the Middle East. In 1957 British forces in South Arabia supported the Sultan of Muscat against a rebellion, which was defeated. In July, 1958 US marines landed in Lebanon, and British airborne forces in Jordan. Both countries were threatened by revolutions fostered by Syria and Egypt with the open support of the Soviet Union. After the military intervention, which was of the "administrative" or "red carpet" type, unopposed, and did not lead to any fighting, the civil war in Lebanon subsided and the Jordanian monarchy survived. In an emergency session of the UN General Assembly the United States of America had attempted to internationalise the intervention conveniently by entrusting the protection of the integrity and security of the Middle Eastern nations to a security force of the UN, a solution similar to the one applied so successfully in Korea. The attempt did not succeed. The foreign forces were withdrawn accordingly in October, after the security of Lebanon and Jordan seemed assured for the time being. Both interventions had been undertaken, as the USA and United Kingdom underlined in the debates at the United Nations, in the name of the security of sovereign nations against outside interference and subversion fostered by foreign countries. They wanted them to be considered as abstract motions in the service of international peace and security. The fact that in the process the Western powers had defeated a communist takeover and an attempt of the Soviet Union to gain a foothold in the Mediterranean area was part of the bargain.

1960 witnessed the massive intervention of the United Nations in the civil war or wars which had broken out in the Congo after Belgium had granted independence on June 30, 1960. When a chaotic situation arose and the Belgian troops still remaining in the Congo were engaged in protecting Belgian nationals, the new government of the Congo invited the USSR to intervene against "Belgian aggression". In view of this development, the Security Council of the UN adopted a resolution inviting Belgium to withdraw its troops and offered to replace them by a security force of the world organization. The operation prevented the interference of the Soviet Union, which would most certainly have been countered by an American counter-intervention, with manifest danger of a confrontation of the two world powers in Africa.

The UN security forces, in the course of events, addressed themselves not only to the protection of the legal government of the Congo or what seemed to be the least illegal government, and of threatened sectors of the population against revolutionary and chaotic forces, but also to intervene against the secessionist movement of the Katanga province. This operation, an open intervention in civil war, was rather the result of conflicting influenceswithin the headquarters of the United Nations in New York and of personal policies of international civil servants on the spot than a planned and approved move of the world organization in the interest of peace and stability. Yet, in the long run, the UN operation proved rather successful. A degree of stability was achieved and the UN security forces could be withdrawn in June, 1964, after four years' presence in the threatened area.

The Vietnam war, the origins of which go back to the settlement reached in Geneva in 1954 after the withdrawal of France from Indo-China as colonial power, provides an example of how technical, economic and military aid, the mildest form of intervention, directed at establishing a stable and friendly régime in a certain area, may degenerate, under the pressure of events and local forces, into military intervention and a major war, including an indirect confrontation of the military technology of the two world powers. It is an example of how a world power, partly blinded to realities by its own sense of mission, engages in intervention, going much farther than originally expected, which eventually brings it into opposition not only to its enemies but to its own public opinion, its friends and the intervened nations themselves, and to its own interests.

Typical recent examples for armed intervention in civil war are yielded by Yemen and the Dominican Republic. In Yemen, a revolutionary movement starting in 1962 was supported by massive Egyptian military aid including combattant troops, whereas the conservative forces attacked by the revolutionaries enjoyed the help of Saudi Arabia. The case, of course, is not great power intervention, but rather local aggression and interference by neighbouring nations, which did not achieve the desired result because the opposing forces were too similar in strength.

When an armed revolt broke out in the Dominican Republic in 1965, US armed intervention, which started as an attempt at protecting the life of US citizens and other foreign tourists caught in the fighting, soon turned into a political move favouring the conservative and anti-communist forces in the struggle. However, under pressure from American and world opinion and especially Latin American criticism, which is always ready to attack any kind of US intervention in domestic affairs of the South, it was converted into an operation of the Organization of American States. The US Marines were replaced by an Inter-American peace force, which succeeded in restoring a reasonable degree of order and stability.

The most recent and at the same time most shocking act of intervention of our time is the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the armies of the Soviet Union, its East German satellite régime, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria, on August 21st, 1968. It was conducted in the name of the unity of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact, the Eastern European countries' collective security. Preceded by the classical movements of politico-military pressure - deployment of troops, manoeuvers, negotiations, propaganda attack, delusive agreements and withdrawals designed to deceive and reassure the victim, - the intervention was conducted as a military surprise action, seizing the nerve-centres of the invaded country by airborne and mechanised forces. Characteristically, Moscow brought forward the threadbare argument that intervention had been invited by leading political figures of Czechoslovakia. For a power of the size of the Soviet Union to overwhelm a small country evidently no help in a physical sense by allies was required. Yet Moscow took great pains to conduct the operation not in isolation but assisted by forces of four other members of the Warsaw Pact. In so doing, it tried to give the aggression an international aspect and some varnish of legitimacy.

Before ending the list of recent interventions, both successful and abortive, it is necessary to add a significant example where no intervention took place. This instance is the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. In spite of the fact that the war engulfed a crucial area of the world, in spite of the vital interests of great and medium powers being involved, the world powers carefully avoided any open interference. Unless we consider abstention in a special situation where intervention had been promised and threatened - as it was the case for the Soviet Union - as a particular and subtle form of intervention, the case is very significant for the future. This negative form of intervention, which consists in not doing what certain governments had been led to expect, might be a new formula in great power policy.

4. The Strategy

The instruments of intervention are all those political and military means conferring on a nation the status of great power. Armed intervention is the direct way and its classical instrument was, up to 1914, sea power. Gunboat diplomacy was the civilized way in which the great powers - Great Britain, France, the United States, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria - used to deal with less civilized and minor nations in Asia and Latin America. In more modern times, deployment of force may range from unopposed landing of a fighting force, in British parlance a "red carpet" landing, in American an "administrative" landing 2), to all-out military operations with landings under fire, airborne or from the sea, terrestrial invasions, and the use of air power, land-based or carrier-based. Which method will be required, what size of engagement is to be expected, is of the utmost importance for the decision-maker. Political and military intelligence, and the apt interpretation of its results, is absolutely crucial in such situations, even more than in any other situation of conflict.

The lessons of Suez (1956) and Cuba (1961), Vietnam (1962 to 1968), Czechoslovakia (1968), point out the importance of intelligence and of a sound assessment of the situation in the enemy camp and also within the camp which the intervention is aimed at supporting. It also points out the great difficulty of a correct assessment and the fact that surprises may always be in store for the intervener. So great is the uncertainty in all these cases, that it is not advisable to undertake even the smallest operation of this kind unless a government is prepared, willing and able to accept the risk of escalation to extended warfare.

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2) L.W. Martin, The Sea in Modern Strategy, ISS, London 1967, p.51.

We have already seen that one condition of intervention - and we have included it in our definition - is maximum inequality between the subject and the object of the act. If the two parties are equals or near equals and one party wants to achieve change, there are only two possibilities: accommodation or war. Yet modern military technology and modern military skills have had far reaching and significant effects. Conventional war between equals becomes so destructive that it is less and less a rational way of solving bilateral problems. The same technology and skills provide such intensity to conventional war, that it soon becomes an intolerable strain, with the effect that nations very different in size, population and economic power come very close to each other when we ask what damage they can inflict on the other. The short war between India and Pakistan in September, 1965, and the six-days war between Israel and the Arab countries in June, 1967, give ample proof for this development. We have to keep in mind, however, that at the beginning of the 20th Century the opinion prevailed that modern weapons - especially the machine gun and field artillery - would make a war necessarily a short war. This proved conspicuously wrong, and we do not want to repeat this error. Yet the development of air force, of mechanised weapons, of stronger explosives, of transmission systems has been so spectacular, that objectively the nature of war is changed. It assumes not only other dimensions, but other qualities.

Modern conventional weapons systems have become the "equaliser", much more than the atom bomb which some analysts, not very convincingly, tried to construe as such. We have, therefore, in a strictly strategic meaning, among the non-nuclear-weapons states, many more pairs of equals than in earlier times. This automatically minimises the possibility of intervention in the strict acceptance of the term which we have proposed.

This is one of the reasons which brings another system of military intervention to the forefront, warfare by infiltration into the territory of the opponent and subversion from within. The first is exemplified by recent Arab operations against Israel, the second by the so-called "wars of national liberation", especially the war of North Vietnam against South Vietnam in its earlier stages. As the French colonel Albert Merglen points out 3), this form of warfare played an important role in World War II, and will probably be one of the essentials in future conflicts. Its effectiveness is based on the fact that the forces of subversion and of subversive war are relatively

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3) Albert Merglen, La guerre de l'inattendu, opérations subversives, aéroportées et amphibies. Paris 1966.

immune to the effects of powerful means of destruction and sophisticated weapons systems, and that they are apt to mobilise in most areas parts of the population of the invaded territory against the defender. In practice this kind of warfare can only be employed successfully where a movement of opposition, hostile to the home government and friendly to the invader, exists. This kind of warfare should not be considered as a communist invention and a strategy reserved to communism, but rather as one of the most effective, most modern, methods of warfare and perfectly effective in opposing communist régimes in cases where it is necessary. As far as intervention in the true meaning of the word, as used in this paper, is concerned, it is probably the only method of the future available for the successful conduct of limited operations by force.

Since intervention frequently uses military force only as a threat, and by so doing achieves its aim, we have to ask whether the threat to use nuclear weapons is and will be in the future an instrument of intervention of the great powers in the atomic age. History seems to point to the contrary. The only nuclear threat ever openly pronounced was the warning addressed by chairman Khrushchev to Great Britain and France in 1956 during their Suez intervention. Neither before the US/UN intervention in Korea from 1950 to 1953 nor during the crisis of the French forces in Indochina, when the United States considered intervention (including atomic intervention) on their side, nor when American assistance to South Vietnam early in 1962 became armed intervention in the war waged as a combination of subversion and invasion, were atomic threats used. On the contrary, the US government was at pains to reassure public opinion and the opponent that the use of nuclear weapons was not considered. As long as the strategic equilibrium, the "delicate balance of terror", 4) exists between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, and as long as in an area in which intervention is considered as a possible course of action, interests of one of the world powers are involved, nuclear threats as an instrument for achieving limited goals are out of the question. Since Moscow as well as Washington conceive their interests and responsibilities as worldwide and universal, there is no spot outside the territory of the superpowers where an atomic threat, proffered by one of them, would not meet with the opposition of the other one.

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4) Albert Wohlstetter, Foreign Affairs, January 1959, p. 211.

Another development in modern strategy makes armed intervention, both nuclear and conventional, more and more unlikely. It is the concept of deterrence. Military power is conceived today in the first place as an instrument designed with the intention not to be actively used but to prevent antagonistic nations from using theirs. Armed intervention, with its recourse to the actual active use of one's physical force, which automatically invites the use of counterforce, breaks the spell of deterrence and will, consequently, be treated with the greatest restraint. Even great powers whose physical capability to overwhelm the nation that is the object of the intervention is beyond any doubt, are to use restraint if the instrument of deterrence is to be kept intact.

More promising than the use of military force, which is highly objectionable in the eyes of an awakened public opinion and less and less likely to yield the easy results so frequently obtained in the 19th and the early 20th centuries, is the use of the instruments provided by modern economic interdependence. We stretch the definition of intervention very far if we include the use of economic power in the list of tools available to an interventionist power. Too far, as a matter of fact. Therefore, we will not regard the normal interplay of economic might in the relationship of nations great and small, which of course deeply influences the will of a government and hence its decisions, as likely to fall under the concept of intervention. We only admit one special kind of economic relationship and its effect on policy as belonging to the range of tools of intervention: economic aid.

Decolonisation has created a great number of new sovereign nations, many of which unfortunately as yet economically weak and politically unstable. They would, in the international atmosphere prevailing in the 19th and early 20th centuries, have been the classic field of great power intervention by military force. We have seen why they are practically immune to such threats - intervention by military force has ceased to be a practical possibility in the modern strategic environment. On the other hand, most of the new nations depend on some kind of outside support. This support has replaced the investments of money, skill and talent which the former colonial powers used to make in their possessions overseas, and the stable markets which they offered to the colonies. Development aid is a necessary condition of the economic and social progress of the new nations of the third world. In many cases, as for instance Algeria, Egypt, India, imports of foodstuffs on a non-commercial basis are a question of life and death for wide sectors of the population. Military aid is in many cases the condition for the survival of the political régime in power: the régime would be overthrown if it could not rely on an army well equipped with Russian or American hardware, and on good terms with the governing circles, which in turn keep the military men happy by ensuring the constant flow of generous gifts. Therefore, both economic and military aid become a most potent instrument of intervention in cases where the power providing this aid should choose to use it for such purposes.

We are not thinking of the lasting influence which the nation giving aid will always wield in a receiving country, even if the help is given with no strings attached. Since we are concerned with intervention, which means operations aimed at achieving well defined limited aims within a limited period we are thinking of more specific uses of outside help. Such assistance may be given to a government which fights a revolutionary movement, in order to ensure its survival, or on the contrary to a revolutionary movement, with the intention to help it in overthrowing a régime to which the intervening power objects. Help may induce a government to do something the intervening nation wants it to do (adhere to an alliance, break ties with another government, sign economic agreements), or not to do something it intended to undertake. Or else, assistance can be withheld. In countries where assistance has become a condition for stability, progress or mere survival, this will cause considerable deprivation and produce perhaps the effects the intervening power desires. Therefore: "Timeo Danaos aut dona ferentes".

Operations of this special kind, pressures exercised this way, are so close to armed intervention both in their aim and their effect that they may safely be included in the concept of intervention. In the process of such intervention, the original motivation governing the institute, that some kind of legal order has to be upheld or enforced, is, of course, soon forgotten. It is replaced by the concept that an ideal ideological or political system or order has to be established or protected.

5. Intervention and World Policy

In reviewing recent cases of great power intervention against the background of the law and the history of this particular instrument of strategy, a new pattern of thought emerges. Intervention has failed so often that second thoughts seem in order. As Hans J. Morgenthau puts it in an article "To Intervene or not to Intervene: we have come to overrate enormously what a nation can do for another nation by intervening in its affairs - even with the latter's consent". 5)

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5) Foreign Affairs, April 1967, p. 436.

Intervention by one single nation has acquired new aspects, even if it can invoke a legal title under public international law, even when the power relationship is such that the operation could be conducted swiftly, even when it is requested by a lawful government or representative of the country object of it. It has become completely uncertain in its effects and highly objectionable to world opinion, and, therefore, not practically feasible. Only an international organization may confer a legal right to intervene, within the framework of its statutory proceedings. Unless at least the impression can be conveyed that a multilateral agreement governs the operation, no armed intervention may be undertaken with any expectation of a favourable outcome and lasting results. Yet, even international and multilateral intervention has its narrow limits.

The existence of two antagonistic world powers is one of the main reasons. Any nation victim of an individual armed threat or attack or infiltration, or of pressure by an international organization, or of an attempt at influencing it by instruments of economic assistance, can always appeal to one of the world powers, directly, or indirectly through the United Nations. It is an almost unfailing means to discourage the attempt. Even when intervention may count on the explicit consent or request by the intervened, the parties can never be certain whether they will not unleash a major crisis in which the world powers are involved. Although it is, under the law of the strategic balance, in most cases extremely unlikely that in protecting the victim of an intervention the opposing world power would resort to war, this possibility, even remote, counsels extreme prudence and restraint. The United States in Vietnam cannot deploy their overwhelming military strength to "get the thing over with", as would conform with American impatience and traditional strategic attitudes. The Soviet Union cannot crush, with its overwhelming military power, the seats of "revisionism" and "sectarianism" in Peking, Belgrade and Prague, as would be in consonance with its powerful verbal condemnation of the heretics.

Leaving aside the influence of the balance of power, we discover another fact opposing intervention. Sovereignty is so jealously guarded by modern nations, that all interference in their domestic affairs, however well intended it may be, is easily resented. Requested from a friend, undertaken by a friend, intervention may suddenly become unwanted. In a world of complex interdependence, political friendships are not permanent. We may well remember the 17th century philosopher's word: "...*les amis:ou ils se détachent par intérêt, ou ils nous perdent par leurs tromperies, ou ils* nous quittent par faiblesse, ou ils nous secourent à contre-temps; et toujours ils nous accablent." 6)

Another point. It is difficult to repeat intervention. Deployment of power, a swift thrust at a disobedient small nation may be conducted successfully. But it will inevitably be accompanied by a loss of face - a power was not powerful enough to wield its influence peacefully. It will be accompanied by a loss of prestige - superior force had to be deployed against a weaker nation. A great power can certainly survive such losses. Hungary, the Dominican Republic provide examples of how such acts are apparently soon forgotten. But they are, in fact, only nearly forgotten and it would be difficult to repeat a similar operation.

We have entered upon a period where the sovereign state triumphs, be it large or small. It enjoys almost complete freedom of action and is sheltered by the balance of power, a vocal world opinion easily mobilized by the mass media, and its membership in international organizations. The smallest nation may indulge in highly provocative attitudes towards neighbours large and small, near and far. The risk of an intervention, even by a very powerful neighbour, which has to face an outraged world opinion, almost equals the risk of the intervened.

We seem to be past the time when great powers would restore "law and order" or what they considered as such, and we have entered upon a rather chaotic and anarchic period of history. Yet, freedom of action still is limited. Limited less by practice and precepts of international law than by ever present sets of new forces of world policy. One set may be deemed negative: the ever-present risk of escalation of conflict to a level where the threat of nuclear war and uncontrolled destruction appears; the destructive power of modern conventional weapons; the instability of modern governments in face of a highly vocal and excitable public opinion. The positive set of forces include: a critical attitude of the highly suspicious governments of the third world; a critical world opinion created by mass communications, by common technology and hence economic interdependence, by the

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6) Jacques Bénigne Bossuet, 3^{e} sermon preché devant le roi sur la passion de N.S. Jésus-Christ.

".... the friends: they will abandon us out of self-interest, or they may harm us by their falsities, or they will desert us out of weakness, or they help us against our wish; and they are always a terrible burden."

prestige of international organizations as such, by the free flow of cultural exchanges, by the bond of common aspirations towards a better life. These influences, which pass national borders as freely as they cross the seas, are themselves interventions in a deeper, more philosophic sense. They are the profound expression of the community of thought which once made intervention a lawful instrument of policy. They make the earlier concept of intervention, as an institution of international public law or as a valid instrument in world policy and strategy, obsolescent.

In the light of the most recent events the claim that the era of great power intervention has passed seems a bold one. But, in the modern world, military power pitted against the political will-power of a nation and against universal or almost universal condemnation by public opinion, has become a poor and not very effective instrument of great power policy. Of course, new technology or new developments in the balance of power may again fundamentally change the situation. Yet, unless such changes occur, we conclude that intervention has had its day, that it has ceased to be a rational and useful weapon in the great power's panoply.

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INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
10th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

PROBLEMS OF MODERN STRATEGY: A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

PLENARY SESSION

Friday 20th September Morning

The Ethical Problem of Modern Strategy

CARL FRIEDRICH VON WEIZSÄCKER

I. Introduction

The title of this paper is not quite my own invention. At the Council Meeting at which the Conference was prepared, Alastair Buchan asked me over the table whether I would be willing to talk about the ethical problems of modern strategy. I retorted by asking him whether that would permit me to include the political problems. He agreed, and I accepted the title: In writing the paper I changed "the ethical problems" into the singular:"the ethical problem".

We may take General Beaufre's definition of strategy as a starting point. He understands strategy to be the dialectic of two wills, the art by which one will can force a way of action upon another will. This definition immediately subdivides the ethical problem. We may either accept the situation of two contending wills as given and unchangeable. Then the ethical problem of strategy is reduced to the question, what means of forcing one will upon the other are permissible. These are the terms in which the ethical problems of modern strategy are in general discussed, not very successfully, I am afraid. Or we may wonder whether it is not the truly ethical problem to change the given situation and to reconcile the two wills. This would mean that the true task of ethical behaviour is precisely not to accept the irrational voluntarism of every-day life and of every-day politics, to which contending wills are irreducible absolutes.

There are at least two ways of thought that would have every reason to adopt this second, critical attitude: scientific and religious thought. Within science, disagreement is considered to be the consequence of our not having found the truth. A conflict of scientific views is to be resolved by finding and accepting the truth. You used no strategy but only arithmetic to resolve a conflict on the question whether 17 times 19 equals 323. Now the conflicts of every-day life and of politics are not on scientific questions; but there is a tendency in the scientific mind to hope for a reduction of those conflicts, too, to questions on which agreement may be reached once we sincerely search for the truth. This tendency gives me the impression of being a secularized version of the belief of all great religions, certainly of Christianity, in a truth about the agreement of human wills. The love of my neighbour ought ultimately to reconcile his and my wills in the will of God. The political and military worlds, as far as they take opposing wills as given and unchangeable, are from the scientific point of view unenlightened, from the religious point of view unredeemed. An ethical code that only defines admissible and inadmissible means of coercion is no more than a second best.

This second best, however, has for evident reasons been the field of military ethics all through human history. The very start of a war means that reconciliation has either not been tried or has failed. It is a grave mistake of some pacifists to belittle or to despise the efforts and results of the ethics of war. War has so far been an ineradicable fact of human life. The attempts of many centuries to limit war with respect to its justification, its ends, and its means, carry great ethical weight and have done much good to mankind. It has been a great task to humanize war, be it by a code of chivalry or by the Hague and Geneva Conventions. Thus I think a lecture about the ethical problems of classical strategy might very meaningfully be given. But our question is the ethics of modern strategy. Here the classical foundations are shaken.

This is indicated already by a certain blurring of classical distinctions which follows from the rather extended modern use of the word "strategy". We now speak of the strategy of deterrence, of political strategy, of the strategy of games; thus we are induced also to speak of "military strategy", a phrase which in earlier language would have been pleonastic. The French term for strateg y of deterrence, "stratégie de dissuasion", may easily lead us forward towards a strategy of persuasion. The idea of persuasion, however, indicates that a will can rationally be changed; it no longer stays within the irrationality of voluntarism. This extension of the use of the word strategy is meaningful. It has at least partly been induced by the fact that there is an enormous power of persuasion in modern weaponry: its self-destructive effects. Our own technical achievements in the field of destruction force upon us the attempt not to intimidate but to convince each other.

More poignantly the shaking of the classical ethics of strategy is seen in any positive attempt to apply it to the modern reality. Having been a member of several Church committees on atomic weapons, both on a national and an ecumenic level, I have been exposed to many discussions on the ethical and theological admissibility or inadmissibility of those weapons, discussions which, in my impression, utterly failed their purpose. Their results may be condensed into three statements. (1) Nearly all participants in general shared the feeling that atomic weapons ought never to be used. (2) No clear-cut ethical or theological deduction has ever been found why this prohibition should apply to atomic weapons rather than to conventional weapons; sheer quantity of effect on a continuous scale did not offer an ethical criterion. (3) No-one, except wishful thinkers, knew how to transform that common feeling into a workable rule which atomic powers would obey even in cases in which they would find it in their vital interest to use atomic weapons; this part of the discussion reminded me of the council of the mice deliberating who would bind the bell around the cat's neck. I would challenge any member of this audience to say whether he has ever received better advice in this sort of discussion.

I have tried to analyze the reasons for this failure. It was not due to a lack of sincerity or of competence of the participants. I came to the conclusion that the question itself - whether atomic weapons are admissible or not - was the expression of a wrong approach to the problem. It stayed within the frame of classical casuistics. Given the aim to win a war, are fire-weapons, dum-dum bullets, poison-gas, air raids, or finally atomic weapons admissible means? This list of well-known historical examples seems to show that all those weapons have finally been accepted which turned out to be decisive for winning the wars. Effective ethical verdicts were confined to those weapons whose use would not turn the scales of war. Historical precedent thus shows that ethical inhibitions have succumbed to what considered a vital necessity, and that the casuistic ethical way of putting the question has generally been confined to questions of secondary rank. Today we have every reason to believe that atomic weapons will be used once their use will be considered of vital importance. Those who will have to take such a decision may very well be men of serious ethical principles. But they will find themselves under an objective constraint. In a case in which the use of a weapon would be of vital importance, not using it would no longer mean to refrain from one possible means for an end, but to renounce the very end, e.g. the freedom of one's own country. At present this fact is slightly obscured by a lucky technological situation which does not easily produce cases in which the use of atomic weapons would seem expedient or even vital to any power. Technology, however, may change.

Ethical casuistics which takes ends for granted and discusses admissible means will not resolve the problem of atomic weapons. These weapons will either come to be commonly used as have fire weapons and air raids. Or, if the feeling of their inadmissibility should express a basic truth, the rejection of the means would necessitate the rejection of the ends, too. We would have to learn not to impose our will, but to change our will. Hence the question of admissible ends in an atomic age, is the first-ranking ethical question. Only after having taken a clear stand on it will we be able to answer the casuistic question to which the actual facts of armaments and of limited wars expose ourselves.

II. The Imperative of Peace

In this central part of my paper I shall propose an overriding ethical imperative by which all our political and strategic decisions are to be measured. It says: The political situation in the world must be thoroughly changed into a truly peace-preserving structure. This is an imperative not about means but about ends. I am unable to deduce it from more general principles by strict theoretical arguments; and if I were able to deduce it I would probably here refrain from doing so, preferring some argument ad hominem. Our fundamental ethical decisions are not consequences of theoretical deductions. They impose themselves upon us, once we have opened our eyes and seen the reality of life. I shall try to express a few parts which, I think, we all see.

Thus let me begin not by an analytical statement but by a somewhat macabre anecdote. During the second world war I belonged to a group of German physicists who worked on atomic energy. We were lucky enough to discover that we would not be able to build a bomb during the war, but the ethical and political problems of the bomb were clearly and depressingly in our minds. Once, in the second half of the war, two or three of us walked through the famous Berlin street "Unter den Linden", then sometimes jokingly called "Unter den Laternen", since Hitler had removed the tall old tiles and replaced them by tiny young trees and by huge ugly lamp-posts. One of us said: "I have counted ten lamps; they would just suffice to hang all of Hitler's Gauleiters and Kreisleiters on them". Mother replied: "All right, but after the next war it is the physicists who will be hanged".

It is not only the physicists. I venture the statement: After a total atomic war, no matter how convincing were the original reasons for starting it - self-defence, saving of democracy or of socialism... - no justification for having started it will be accepted. This statement is not trivial. I try to explain it by discussing some objections. I can easily think of two objections:

1. The statement is meaningless, since a total atomic war, due to its known distructiveness, will never happen.

2. The statement is false, since an atomic war, if at all fought, will have limited effects. Like all wars it will be survived by the victors who will define the values of the future, including their own justification.

I use the possibility of any one of these two objections for questioning the validity of the other one.

1. What reason do we have to believe that a total atomic war will never happen? The atomic peace has now been lasting for 23 years. In history competitive situations between candidates for hegemony usually have been resolved by war, but the peaceful spell before the military decision in many cases lasted longer than a quarter of a century. And the suicidal character of nuclear war is not established beyond doubt. Today it rests on a particular technological situation which is known as the existence of a second strike capability on both sides. Technological development in itself does not warrant stability. I shall briefly discuss the ABM problem in the fourth chapter. What do we know about the possible stability in a truly multilateral atomic club? Unfortunately I feel safe in saying that, technologically seen, stable situations as well as unstable ones will arise in the course of time. An unstable situation would be one in which at least one of the competing powers would feel that it might be advantageous to go to war. Since great technological changes usually take about a decade to be completed, I do not for technological reasons feel safe with respect to the great war for more than a decade from now. I hope I am mistaken, but if so, we may be safe for two or three decades, which still does not leave us much time for the necessary political steps. This is the conclusion I propose: The techology of war does not stabilize itself automatically; peace must rest on a political stabilisation.

2. What reason do we have to believe that nuclear war might be morally and politically defended due to its limited effects? Here we must ask: limited in what proportion? We may be fairly certain that it would not kill all mankind. Present estimates speak of casualties around 50% of the

populations of the nations directly involved in the war. Great ABM systems might reduce these figures considerably. Germany recovered from the loss of 10% of her population and more of her houses and territory in the second world war within ten years in the West, within less than twenty years, under adverse circumstances, in the East. America and Russia might recover within twenty or certainly fifty years from an atomic war. But all these figures, easily estimated, completely hide the absolute horror of the event, should it really happen. This atomic flash will never be forgotten, as long as men will tell history to their children. It will be the one great symbol for the abyss to which the wickedness of the human heart once has led us. The protracted medical horror of the consequences of radio-active fallout will equally impress itself on the minds of the survivors. Furthermore, no rational estimate can be made of the long-term political and social consequences of a sudden breakdown of a highly interdependent city-life. After a period of troubles such a war might well precipitate a political world-union, presumably a rather dictatorial one. This union would psychologically have to rest on a firm and absolute condemnation of those who started the war. Those who started it or made it inevitable may very well belong to the finally victorious group,and thus it is quite plausible that they will try to get away with the usual lies of the victors about the war guilt; and, as human affairs go, they may even be successful in such a course for a while. Still, I firmly and non-trivially maintain, that such a war will not permit a stabilisation of the ensuing peace on the basis of the victor's lies. My reason for so thinking is partly the extraordinary symbolic power of the events of atomic war; they will remind everybody of the Biblical discriptions of what will precede the Last Judgement. Partly it is that the victor's lies are stable if the victorious group is not vitally hurt and hence apt to soul-searching itself; this however will not be the case.

These considerations offer no strict proof: I know quite well that many different scenarios can be written. Yet I would give a high degree of probability to the above description. The order of magnitude of destructiveness of weapon-systems is more likely to increase than to decrease with time. Protection can only be given by highly specialised technical means. Every failure of these means will let destruction revert to its "natural" scale. History is full of examples of failures of limiting devices (Maginot line). Wars tend to be protracted, and to be most devastating in their final phases.

Thus I revert to the statement. No justification for having started a total nuclear war will be accepted after the event. This, I think, implies: No justification for waging such a war can be considered acceptable now. On the other hand, given the possible development of technology, the present political status of the world does by no means exclude the possibility of such a war within the remainder of our century. Hence I conclude: The political situation in the world must be thoroughly changed into a truly peaceful structure.

III. Peace Construction

The meaning of the imperative of peace is only made plain by two comments. First: the world situation to which it refers has no historical precedent. Second: in spite of much lip-service and of some serious efforts the factual handling of world politics today is in strict disagreement with the imperative.

Our world situation has no historical precedent. At no earlier epoch was war, waged with all available weapons, self-destructive in the above described sense. Hence the preservation of peace was generally considered as a conditional ethical imperative, not as an overriding one. Most of our political habits have been framed under those earlier conditions; they do not respect the preservation of the world peace as a highest value. Hence, it is an ethical imperative of the first rank that all these habits be changed.

It is not at all surprising that the political practice of the present world does not conform with the imperative of peace. The present world is not particularly bad, but it has not learnt its lesson fast enough. I doubt whether it will learn it fast enough. But that is not our present question. The question is: what is the lesson to be learned? What is the practical meaning of the imperative of peace?

An ethical imperative is not a political recipe. Let me use Kant's categorical imperative as a structural example. "Let the maxim of your action be such that it might be used as the principle of a general legislation." It depends on the field of action, it may depend on the particular circumstances, what principle of a general legislation will be suitable. But you should never permit yourself an action that corresponds to a maxim which, if generalised as a principle of legislation, would be untenable. This is precisely our situation. How my political act can contribute to the stabilisation of a lasting peace or at least not endanger this aim, must be seen in the particular situation; but every political act is to be measured by this principle.

The imperative does not demand the preservation of the present status of the world but its active transformation. It does not ask us to protect peace, since what we possess today is not peace in the sense of the imperative; it asks us to construct peace. I rephrase the argument which leads to this central statement. Technological knowledge will stay with us, it will develop in an unpredictable way. It is not self-stabilizing. Hence a political structure of the world must be framed that will be stable, in the sense of avoiding great war, for an indefinite time under changing technologies, while it will certainly have to permit great and unpredictable inner political and social changes during the same time. Nothing short of this will fulfil the conditions imposed by the present and future situation.

Let me venture a few political suppositions. History offers but one structure that has achieved a performance comparable to what we are asking for. It is the unified state, whether it was a city-state, a nation, or an empire. The task is not to eliminate conflicts - an impossible task - but to eliminate a particular way of fighting them out, namely the organised war of great parties. Within a unified state this is achieved by a monopoly of the state for the possession of an organised army. This minimizes the danger of internal war. The question how to preserve freedom under such a monopoly is far more delicate. A federal structure and democracy are so far the best approximations to this goal. People who understand the necessity of a world peace are thus easily led towards the idea of a world state.

Yet this idea encounters severe criticism. The world state - it is argued - will not be achieved; and if achieved, it would be a tyranny. Thus it seems either impossible or undesirable. Other peace-preserving devices are proposed which seem less ambitious and more desirable: a bloc-system, polycentrism, economic interlinkage, and the United Nations. Some of these structures are certainly more desirable; in my view their main weakness is that they are less ambitious. They can be achieved, but they do not warrant a sufficiently stable peace. I would propose the idea of a world state not as a goal but as a criterion: the stabilisation of the peace of the world is at least as difficult, at least as ambitious an undertaking as it would be to create a world state. To think of a better solution of the problem than the world state is a challenge to our political inventiveness.

This challenge is to be closely connected with other inevitable tasks of an active transformation of the world. I mention just one of them as a typical example: developing economically underdeveloped areas in connection with the combat against the impending hunger-catastrophe in many of them. The connection between such tasks and the task of erecting a peace-preserving structure is quite natural. The problems to be solved always originate in the instabilities inherent in the social and political consequences of growing science and technology. The means to be applied for their solution presuppose or include the creation of a sufficiently stable political structure. In very general terms we may say: science and technology have produced problems and responsibilities which can only be satisfactorily handled on a world-wide scale. We must hope that these very responsibilities will help us with sufficient clarity to define the structures we must frame in order to bear them. Peace construction is but one of our tasks. Still it has, if I may say so, a guiding character among the tasks of the present world, since failure in this task would be the most catastrophic of possible failures. In this sense our time has a well-defined political goal which it is not free to choose or to reject, which is clearly understood by the man in the street, and which we are not certain to reach. Hence all political achievements are ultimately measured by it.

IV. Peace preservation

To speak of peace construction in September 1968 may seem utterly unrealistic; perhaps it is. Instead of an active reconstruction of international relations, tending towards a common solution of common tasks, a steady reduction of imperial sovereignties and the growth of a "world-domestic policy" (Weltinnenpolitik") - instead of all that, we may expect to see in the future a lingering on of contending blocs and of local violence or even a revival of the cold war. In order to be realistic we must consider what actual course of action can be taken in a world that is not ready for the necessary transformation. We are thus reduced to the classical field of casuistic ethics which I characterized in the beginning as the field of the second best. What can a government, a group, or an individual do in a world in which the absolutely necessary steps towards peace construction are actually not done?

As a first topic I shall treat what may be called peace preservation. Here the word "peace" carries a different meaning as compared to the phrase "peace construction". The peace to be constructed would be a clearly stable, self-perpetuating political structure. The present peace which we wish at least to preserve is no more than a truce, a precarious balance of power. In order to construct peace we would have to be architects; unfortunately we have not found a contractor to make use of our art. In order to preserve peace we must be rope-dancers ("Seiltaenzer" in German).

In speaking of peace-preserving I shall furthermore narrow down the meaning of the word "peace" towards "absence of total war". Peace as meaning "absence of local or limited war" may locally be preserved, and this is a task to be discussed in the next chapter; globally we cannot preserve it since it does not globally exist.

Absence of total war may also be described as the non-use of the great "strategic" weapons. Now in popular language we are sometimes told that their only purpose is to prevent their ever being used. The adressee of this little paradox, the well-known man in the street, might retort that this result would be reached even more safely if the world did not have such weapons. Yet I confess I am highly sceptical of disarmament. It works successfully where the armament involved does not seem vital to the combattents. Thus disarmament is a consequence of a détente rather than its start. So-called

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realists usually think that disarmament is bound to fail since it is too ambitious an attempt. One may as well say that it fails since it is not ambitious enough. We cannot preserve a political system that craves for arms, and at the same time deny it the arms which belong to its working. Given this situation, the present system of a really assured peace, preserved by the second strike capabilities of the two super powers, is a very intelligent approximate solution to a problem that has no exact solution except the radical one discussed above. Its inventors, I think, deserve respect on ethical grounds.

The approximate solution is approximate and not exact precisely because it is not inherently stable. Anything we can do to stabilize it is again a second best at which we must aim with all our strength as long as nothing better can be offered. The non-proliferation treaty seems to contribute to this aim; hence, in spite of its well-known difficulties, I think it is a step forward. I dare to propose a personal view which is shared by some but certainly not by all analysts, in saying that it is far more important - perhaps of vital importance - to avoid an ABM-arms race. Many estimates have been made on the influence of large ABM-systems on the credibility of deterrence. For a recent estimate I may refer to a paper by my collaborators H. Afheldt and Ph. Sonntag which, I hope will soon be published. hat I infer from these estimates is mainly that the credibility of deterrence depends very sensitively on the probabilities with which missiles will hit and destroy their targets (targets on the soil as well as other missiles). This fact explains quite easily why widely differing estimates on the effects of ABMs have been published in recent years. Yet in my mind it implies that at least we have no security whatsoever that the ABMs will not destroy the present balance, that means (for such is the weakness of the political structure in the world) the most secure existing formulation of world peace. I feel that every effort must be made to make this danger understood to those responsible for armaments in all larger nations.

Here we encounter a most important psychological fact. We all have met some quite intelligent generals, politicians, and maybe, scientists, who just failed to see the point of the danger. I am not speaking of those who may even be a majority in the present audience who might differ with me on quantities; e.g. those who say that large ABM-systems will never be very useful and hence a fortiori not dangerous. This is a meaningful theme for discussion. I speak of the view that ABMs are

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defensive weapons after all and hence can only be for the good, since they will protect and not kill lives. To this primitive reaction the mathematically trained scientist will of course reply that the absolute expectation value of casualties consists of the conditional expectation value of casualties, assuming there will be a war, multiplied by the probability of such a war. If, feeling protected by ABMs, we go to war more lightheartedly, the probability of a war may easily increase by a factor of ten or more, thus far superseding the decrease of the conditional expectation value of casualties in case of war.

But - and this is my psychological point - such an argument needs a level of abstraction which is not common in mankind. Here we encounter an essential weakness, I would say an ethical weakness, in all our cold-blooded modern strategy. I favour the mathematical estimates of probabilities myself and I use them. But I use them as a second best. They are the most rational way of expressing the ideas of our strategy of deterrence. But the average man cannot induce himself to think of his own death as a quantity in a probability game, and he is right in that. He may be unable to express himself consistantly, but he feels that what we protect by this sort of deterrence is not yet peace but a delicate, haphazardous truce. He may even not think far enough and may rely on a fake protection which is more haphazardous than no protection, a Maginot line, an ABM shield. Still, in all his pathetic intellectual shortcomings, he has better than many of us understood the imperative of peace. It is vital for our future to understand that what we preserve today is not yet peace.

V. Limited War.

Limited war is a fact of our time. There are no comparably compelling reasons to avoid it as against total war. Consequently limited wars have been fought all through the past 23 years. Two ethical problems arise: Can we strive and hope to abolish limited wars? And : How are we to behave in them?

There is very little hope to abolish limited wars altogether as long as there is no all-embracing peace structure of the world as discussed in earlier chapters, or perhaps even then. Some degree of violence is present within many nation-states and will be present in the world as far as we can foresee. Yet, I think, even now limited war is no longer considered to be the usual and natural, though deplorable, event it was in earlier centuries. Public opinion in the world considers war or military occupation, be it in Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, Palestine, or Biafra, as an anomaly which ought to be stopped. Public opinion here expresses a correct feeling in a helpless manner. It first, and rightly, reacts on the violation of lives, of independence, and of freedom. But it also feels the interconnection of all events in the world, and the danger that any one of these conflicts may produce a war that will not be limited. This danger may have in fact been small in all past cases. But what if we incur a danger of one half percent two hundred times, or if the inhibitions against total war should relax for a while?

These remarks are directed against a rather primitive view which still, I am afraid, is the half-conscious guiding principle of most of our political reactions, wherever a limited war is either considered to be in favour of our own interest, or far enough away not to touch our interest. That view may be formulated in saying: Total atomic war will not happen, and limited wars are bound to happen as wars always have happened in history. This view does not see the interconnection of all events, and the lack of stability in a world of changing technologies and gradually varying orders of magnitude of possible conflicts. If total war should ever break out it is most likely to be the result of an escalation of a limited conflict.

This is not a profound statement, but in its consequence another problem arises. It is not always possible to prevent or to stop limited conflicts except by use of power. Even within established nation-states we need a police-force. The limited wars which we have seen during the last two decades either arose because nobody acted as a policeman or because somebody acted as a policeman. The question who is to act as the policeman is so unsettled, as it is bound to be in a world in which peace construction is not achieved. I find it difficult here to avoid expressing my personal predilections. Being a democratic Central European I a hundred times prefer the United States as a policeman to the Soviet Union; not being in favour of self-appointed policemen I would prefer the United

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Nations as a policeman a thousand times to the United States. But sufficient police-force of the United Nations (cf. Clark and Sohn, Peace through World Law) is beyond our present reach, and great powers will go on in some cases to act like policemen in the future. What is the political ethics under which we are to judge such acts?

It is clear that generally accepted principles like the right of self-determination ought to be applied wherever it is possible. But as we all know the partisans in a conflict normally interpret these rules in different ways. What ethical criteria - as distinct from positive legal rules or from mere considerations of expediency - will help us in our judgments? I think we in the West ought to see that the establishment of representative democracy is not per se an ethical criterion, unless a majority in the nation concerned realizes that it is a workable means to protect some of our highest civil values. We should also see that the ethical imperative of peace and the ensuing ethics of an active transformation of the world is far more easily understood in the present world. There is the reason for the ideological success of Marxism, if compared with Western democracy, in all those parts of mankind where the necessity of fundamental change is deeply felt, be it in developing countries or with our own rebellious students. The ethical weakness of much of Marxist political practice lies in its view that acts are permitted to "progressive forces" that would be criminal if executed by the reactionaries. Here a deep insight into the social and economic conditioning of ethical codes is pervertedly used to justify acts which remain criminal, whoever commits them. This is a regression behind the ethical level reached in the principles of classical democracy. But democratic nations are judged by those who ought to learn democracy on their visible acts, not on their theoretical principles or their home situation. Considering all that, one would become very hesitant toact as a policeman, knowing that the possibility of a world peace rests on the ability of the nations sincerely to agree to its principles.

This leads us to the second question, that of theprinciples of behaviour in an actual limited war. I am afraid I am going to repeat trivial and still not sufficiently acknowledged facts. Limited wars in our day are in principle classical wars, and the classical war ethic applies to them. Neutrality and free access

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for the Red Cross, protection for civilians and for prisoners, confining of military action to combattants, all these are well-established rules. The public opinion in the world knows them, and it is generally nowadays well-informed about the violations. It is true that guerrilla warfare makes use of these very protective principles for shielding its own military activities. I am unable to give strict casuistic advice about the degree to which counter-guerrilla warfare may relax in its observation of the classical rules. I can only express the conviction that such a relaxing of rules, wherever it deviates from strictly evident military necessity, does not pay. Violations of the accepted rules may pay if performed by a petty rascal who happens to get away with them and to establish an ephemeral local power. But quod licet bovi non licet Iovi. The same violations, I am convinced, do not pay if performed by a world power which represents a principle on which it hopes to rest a political peace system of the world. I have lived in German cities during World War II, and I have seen what strength was restored to the decaying numbers of the Nazi regime by the public reaction in the cities to the Allied air raids.

I end this chapter confessing that writing it is as equally unsatisfactory on preaching in a church where the crimes are not actually committed and where all of the present community find it easy to agree to the principles proposed in the sermon. The preacher himself will - or should - feel most of all guilty under such circumstances. The point of principle I wish to emphasize is that limited wars today are rightly judged not only by classical war ethics but by the imperative of constructing a world peace.

VI. Civil Disobedience and Non-resistance

Non-violent action has its own strategy which ought to be subsumed under modern strategy. The increasing, all-pervading power of government and technocracy increasingly narrows down the field in which military action has a chance of success. Industrial regions are reduced to forms of civil disobedience against their own rulers as well as against militarily superior foreign intruders. If we depict a future peace structure of the whole world by the vision of a world state, even emigration would disappear as an ultimate hope for the suppressed. It is to be supposed that civil disobedience will steadily increase in importance.

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Differently from military strategy, the strategy of non-violence has its very origin in an ethical principle. Hence the obvious objection that there are situations in which it will not be successful does not hit it precisely. I am not going to expound the ethics of non-violence here, but I would have been insincere if I had not mentioned it. It is still most worthwhile to read Gandhi today.

There is one ethical problem, however, that has caused much discussion in my country as in other countries, in which the two principles of military and non-violent behaviour must be compared, that is objection against military service on grounds of conscience. In most Western and in some Communist countries conscientious objectors are in principle recognized. This very fact exposes young men to a sometimes difficult ethical choice, a choice in which a professor can come to act as a confessor. In such cases I have found it necessary but not sufficient to say, that whatever choice a man may reach after sincere searching of his conscience must be respected. There are strong arguments for both ways, each of which makes a remarkable use of Kant's categorical imperative. The defender of military service will tell the objector: "If all of you would refrain from military service, the free state in which you are permitted to do so would be without a defence. You refuse your help in growing the corn you wish to eat". The objector may retort: "If all young men in all nations would refuse military service, no defence of our freedom would be needed. You create the situation you fear by fearing it".

When exposed to this dilemma by my students, I tried to say that they should not hope for a casuistic code that would tell which of the two was right, but that they should measure their choice by the contribution it would give (if consistently followed by other acts) towards constructing the necessary peace-structure of the world. Such advice inevitably leads into detailed considerations of possible political activities, and this is probably where ethical considerations on strategy and peace ought to lead us.

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VII. Concluding Remarks.

I do not wish to feign a coherence of my considerations that does not actually exist. I rather wish to make explicit its inconsistencies since I think they reflect inconsistencies of the present world. I wrote this paper under the fresh impression of the occupation of Czechoslovakia. In that situation I was unable to give my presentation the pitch of encouragement it would have needed in order to be consistent.

I feel that any deduction in sections I, II, III is consistent. That means: there is no other way open to us but peace construction; whatever course of action leaves aside this guiding principle is ethically to be absolutely condemned and will in the long run turn out to be pragmatically self-destructive. The next step ought to have been a presentation of this end in terms of means; a possible encouraging programme of peace construction. Such a programme can be framed in principle, and perhaps it is the only worthwhile task for a political thinker in our times to work on it. I here refrained from it and instead immediately went on towards "peace preservation". The positive programme was replaced by a few pessimistic remarks in the first sentences of section IV. This structure of my paper reflects my sincere judgment of the present world situation, and it does so even more clearly since it was not my intention to express pessimism; pessimism just happened to shine through the holes in the walls of my edifice. All my considerations on the casuistic ethics of peace preservation, limited war, and non-violence carry the stigma of this feeling: "and if we have fulfilled all these commandments we will not have done the one thing needed". I wish at least that this fact be understood by the audience.

Still it is ethically inadmissible to stay within a pessimistic inaction. It is fundamental for human behaviour that the future is unknown. No scientific prognostics will ever remove the uncertainty of future events such that the free space of action would be narrowed down to zero. Even if we were convinced that the world war could not possibly be avoided we would have to act somehow before its advent, and even if it should happen as predicted, there will be some acts previous to it that will turn out to be most important for the time after it. The necessity of helping starving nations to limit their population growth and to feed themselves by agricultural, industrial, educational and social development - this necessity will, if understood, induce actions whose effects will be perhaps even more important after a world war than before it. And the preparation of a general political atmosphere in which the overriding necessity of peace is understood, may be no more necessary for avoiding a war if possible than for reconstructing the world after a war, should it happen.

Thus the programme for peace construction, the strategy of peace, so to speak, remains the central task, whatever may be the vacillation of our hopes and despairs. The audience will perhaps forgive me for not having developed such a programme here, if at least we all agree that it is the one task to which we must apply our forces.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR QUOTATION

INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
10th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

PROBLEMS OF MODERN STRATEGY: A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

COMMITTEE V

Saturday 21st September Morning

The Reappraisal of Limited War

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1.

One of the most significant developments in international politics since World War II is the change of attitude toward armed force in the advanced Western countries. The change is reflected in the contrast between the common disposition between the two world wars to view the kind of warfare relevant to policy as almost exclusively general and total, in which victory would depend on destroying in the most thorough way the enemy's capability and will to fight, and the widespread acceptance in the Cold War of the view that the principal objective of military policies is the avoidance of general war and the limitation and control of lesser wars according to political ends short of traditional military victory. One aspect of this change of attitude is the great attention devoted to limited war strategy and preparedness in the United States, especially in the last ten or twelve years.*

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*One symptom of the increased acceptance of the concept of limited war is the increased ambiguity of the term, since the concept of controlling war within rational limits relevant to specific political objectives has come to be applied to _any_ kind of war, even one involving a nuclear exchange. Broadly defined, a limited war is generally conceived to be a war fought for ends far short of the complete subordination of one state's will to another's and by means involving far less than the total military resources of the belligerents, leaving the civilian life and the armed forces of the belligerents largely intact and leading to a bargained termination. Although a war between nuclear states might possibly conform to this definition the term limited war is generally applied more restrictively to relatively more likely local non-nuclear wars in which no more than one nuclear adversary is directly involved. The difficulty of defining limited war arises, partly, because the relevant limits are matters of degree and, partly, because they are a matter of perspective (since a war that is limited for one belligerent might be virtually total from the standpoint of another, on whose territory the war is fought). Furthermore, a limited war may be carefully restricted in some respects (for example, geographically) and much less in others (for example, in weapons, targets, or political objectives).

To an extent that must amaze early proponents of limited war, who sought to overcome the formidable antipathy toward the concept during the Korean War and the Eisenhower-Dulles administration, the rationale of limited war gained widespread acceptance in the United States and, in somewhat lesser degree, allied countries in the 1960's. The United States went far in implementing the concept with strategies, weapons, and organisation. Among research, academic, and military analysts the concept of limited war inspired a great outpouring of strategic doctrine. In the Kennedy administration limited war became official doctrine and achieved something approaching popularity.

But now the war in Vietnam, which has called so much into question, raises doubts about some limited-war concepts and the premises upon which they were based. It is not just Vietnam, however, that raises these doubts; it is the conjunction of Vietnam with basic changes in the international environment within which limited-war concepts arose and flourished. To reappraise limited-war thinking, therefore, it is important to understand the context in which it attracted such marked attention.

The concept and practice of limited war are as old as war itself; but the consciousness of limited war as a distinct kind of warfare, with its own theory and doctrine, has emerged most markedly in contrast and reaction to three major wars, waged between several major states, on behalf of popular national and ideological goals, by means of mass conscription and massive firepower: the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II. The contemporary interest in limited war springs partly from a determination to avoid World War III.

The relevance of limited war to contemporary international politics is manifest in the occurrence of more than fifty internationally significant limited wars of various kinds since World War II while there have been no general wars and the armed forces of the most powerful states have come no closer to fighting each other than the American-Soviet confrontation in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Most of these wars, however, did not directly involve a nuclear or even a major power. They were limited, as before World War II, by such factors as the restricted fighting capacity of the belligerents, the one-sided nature of the contest, or the inherent limits of internal war. With the diffusion of power and intensification of subregional conflicts such local wars in the Third World may become an increasingly disturbing element in international politics, if only because they could involve major powers. But the kinds of wars that have occasioned the systematic concern with strategies and weapons of limited war are wars which the United States fought, which might have expanded into much wider and more violent conflicts, but which remained limited because the United States and its adversaries deliberately refrained from conducting military operations with their full capacities. Equally important, the concern has arisen from the desire to deter or limit wars that never occurred - especially wars that might result from limited aggressions impinging on America's vital interests abroad.

The detailed elaboration of a strategic doctrine of limited war, the formulation of specific plans for carrying out this doctrine, and the combined efforts of government, the military establishment, and private analysts and publicists to translate the doctrine into particular weapons and forces are developments peculiar to the nuclear age. They are products of the profound fear of nuclear war and the belief that the limitation of war must be carefully contrived, rather than left to inherent limitations upon military capabilities. But they are also products of American foreign policy in a particular period of history - a period in which the Cold War expanded to Asia and the Soviet Union achieved the capacity to inflict terrible damage on the United States in any nuclear exchange.

Thus our thinking about limited war is largely shaped by technological and political conditions in the postwar international environment by characteristics of a particular period of international conflict, and by the military and political experiences of the United States. To reappraise limited-war thinking one has to understand its relationship to the full context in which it arose. One can then try to distinguish between those aspects of limited war thinking that are obsolescent or of only transitory relevance, because they reflect vanishing or short-run circumstances, and those that are likely to remain valid or become increasingly relevant, because they reflect fundamental conditions or significant international developments.

2.

On the most general level the conception of limited war surely remains relevant - indeed, imperative. On grounds of morality and expediency alike, it is essential that states - especially nuclear states - systematically endeavor to control and limit the use of force where force is unavoidable. The fact that American public officials and spokesmen now generally take this for granted, while little over a decade ago high government officials commonly asserted that once war occurs it has no limits save those determined by the capacity to gain a military victory, must be regarded as a major and probably permanent triumph of reason over viscera. But nothing about the feasibility and utility of particular methods of limitation, whether with respect to deterring or fighting a war, can be deduced from the general rationale of limited war. Nor can feasibility and utility be deduced simply by applying the logic derived from abstract models of conflict, although these may sometimes aid rational calculation. Judgments about the feasibility and utility of particular methods of limitation must, of course, take account of objective technical and physical facts, but these facts do not speak for themselves in strategic terms. Such judgments must depend largely on disciplined intuitions, informed and qualified by experience, about the way states actually behave when they are faced with war or the threat of war. Yet experience is likely to be an inconclusive and misleading guide. If the test of a particular strategy lies in warfare, how can one be sure that the outcome is due to a particular strategy, the way it was carried out, or to unrelated factors? If the test is deterrence, how can one know whether either the occurrence or non-occurrence of the act that one intended to deter was due to the strategy or to other circumstances? At best, experience is a partial representation of the full range of circumstances that might affect the feasibility and utility of strategies of limited war. Yet strategy has no self-contained logic like mathematics; experience of one kind or another has been and must be the primary shaper of strategy in thought and action.

It is significant, in this respect, that limited-war thinking has been conditioned by the perspectives common to a particular phase of the Cold War. It first blossomed in response to the Korean War (although the implications of nuclear weapons had led Bernard Brodie and a few others to write earlier essays on limited war). It flourished during the Eisenhower-Dulles administration. The motivation and appeal of limited-war strategy in this decade were basically twofold: on the one hand, the desire to mitigate the danger of nuclear war; on the other hand, the desire to support the policy of containment more effectively. The underlying disposition in both respects was to bring force under control as a rational instrument of policy, but the motive for control has been a combination of fear and determination in different admixtures at different times and in different minds.

In the course of applying the concept of limited war to changing international circumstances, it became apparent that these two objectives might lead to different policy conclusions, depending on whether one emphasized effective containment or the avoidance of nuclear war. They might lead to different conclusions not only about particular strategies, which were copiously examined and discussed, but also about two issues that were scarcely discussed at all by proponents of limited war: (1) when or whether to intervene in a local war and (2) the proper intensity and scope of intervention.

But even more important than the two objectives of limitation in shaping views on these questions were certain premises about the international and domestic political environment which were relatively neglected in limited-war thinking: (1) the nature of the communist threat and its bearing upon American security, (2) the willingness of the American government and people to sustain the costs of fighting aggression, and (3) the identity and behaviour of potential adversaries.

It is not difficult to understand why the issues of intervention and the premises about the objectives and the political environment of limited warfare received far less attention than specific strategies of limited war. The explanation lies in the familiar limits to man's ability to foresee basic changes in his environment or to imagine how events and conditions which he cannot foresee might affect his outlook. Strategies, on the other hand, are adaptations to foreign policy in the light of realities and trends that are perceived at the moment. They are frequently rationalisations of existing military capabilities and domestic constraints. Man's political imagination is constrained by what is familiar, but his strategic imagination is relatively free to draw its inferences and design its plans until some unforeseen war tests its propositions - and most strategic propositions fortunately remain untested in the nuclear age.

3.

Limited-war thinking was conditioned by a period in which the overriding objective of American policy was to contain international communism by preventing or punishing external and internal aggression. According to the prevailing consensus, a local communist aggression even in an intrinsically unimportant place could jeopardise American security by encouraging further aggressions in more important places and leading to a chain of aggressions that might eventually cause World War III. This view, fortified by the lessons of fascist aggression, did not depend on the assumption that international communism was under the monolithic control of the Soviet Union - an assumption that the proponents of the consensus abandoned as readily as its critics - but it did assume that a successful aggression by one communist state would enhance the power of the Soviet Union, China, and other communist states vis-à-vis the United States and the free world. By this reasoning American security interests were extended from Western Europe to Korea and, by implication, to virtually anywhere aggression threatened.

In this period the dominant concern of the proponents of limited-war strategy was to strengthen containment. They hoped to make deterrence more credible and to bolster allied will and nerve in crises, like the one arising over access to Berlin. They argued their case from the standpoint of strategic revisionists seeking to save American military policies from an increasingly irrational and ineffective posture by freeing them from the thralldom of misguided budgetary restrictions imposed at the expense of security needs. Conscious of America's superior economic strength and military potential, they rejected the thesis of the Eisenhower-Dulles administration that the United States would spend itself into bankruptcy if it prepared to fight local aggression locally at places and with weapons of the enemy's choosing.

With the advent of the Kennedy administration the revisionists came into office. Responding to a dominant theme in Kennedy's campaign, they were determined to fill the military gaps in containment. The United States, according to this theme, was in danger of losing the Cold War because the government had not responded to new conditions - particularly to the rise of Soviet economic power and nuclear strength and the shift of communist efforts to the Third World. The most dramatic evidence of America's threatened decline of power and prestige was the Soviet's prospect of gaining the lead in long-range missile striking power, but the missile gap was thought to be part of a wider threat encouraged by misguided American political and military policies that had allegedly alienated potential nationalist resistance to communist subversion in the Third World and forfeited America's capacity to deter or resist local aggression. To safeguard American security and restore American prestige it would be necessary not only to reinvigorate the domestic base of American power and adopt policies better suited to the aspirations of the underdeveloped countries but also to ensure America's strategic nuclear superiority and build up its capacity to fight limited wars without resorting to nuclear weapons. If the communists could be contained at the level of strategic war and overt local aggression, the new administration reasoned, then the Third World would be the most active arena of the Cold War and guerilla war would be the greatest military threat.

In office, the Kennedy administration not only increased America's lead in long-range striking power; it also built up America's capacity to intervene quickly with mobile forces against local aggression at great distances, and it emphasized a strategy of "controlled and flexible response". Identifying the most dangerous form of communist expansionism as "wars of national liberation", it created special forces to help combat aggression by guerillas and concerned itself intensively with methods of counter-insurgency.

By 1964, after the Cuban missile crisis and before large numbers of American forces got bogged down in Vietnam, the United States looked so powerful that Americans and others (particularly Frenchmen) began to think of the world as virtually monopolar and of America's position in the world as comparable to that of a global imperial power. The only remaining gap in military containment might be closed if the United States could demonstrate in Vietnam that wars of national liberation must fail. In this atmosphere of confidence and determination there was no inducement to question the premises about the wisdom and efficacy of intervention that underlay the prevailing American approach to limited war. The tendency was, rather, to complete the confirmation of a decade of limited-war thinking by proving the latest and most sophisticated conceptions in action.

We shall return to the impact of the adversities of Vietnam on American conceptions of limited war. Before that it is necessary to review the development of limited-war thinking that had taken place in the meantime.

4.

Apart from the fascination with counter-insurgency in the early 1960's, the great outpouring of strategic imagination in the United States was inspired by efforts to deter or fight hypothetical conflicts in Western Europe and between the United States and the Soviet Union. But these conflicts, in contrast to wars in the Third World seemed less and less likely as détente set in. So in this area it was not the discipline of war that impinged upon strategic thought but rather the discipline of restrictions on defence expenditures and changes in the international political atmosphere. Moreover, in the absence of war, merely the passage of time caused a certain attrition of ambitious strategic ideas, as the inherent implausibility of limited war in Europe or between the superpowers and the difficulty of gaining agreement on how to meet such unlikely contingencies dampened successive sparks of strategic innovation.

In Europe, as in the Third World, the dominant objective of limited-war strategy was to strengthen deterrence of and resistance to local non-nuclear aggression and to bolster the West's bargaining position in crises on the brink of war. But the task of resistance was far more difficult because of the greater physical and political obstacles to limitation and the greater strength of potential adversaries.

The effort to formulate a strategy that would combine effective resistance with reliable limitations reached its logical extreme in 1957 with the theories of limited tactical nuclear war propounded by Henry Kissinger, Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, and others. But these strategies soon died from indifference and incredulity. The difficulty of settling upon a convincing strategy for integrating tactical nuclear weapons into limited warfare in Europe evidently remains overwhelming, and the interest in doing so has declined as the credibility of the West using any kind of nuclear weapons first except in circumstances warranting the risks of general war has declined.

While the Cold War was still relatively warm the search for a strategy of limited war in Europe enriched the postwar history of military strategy with some ingenious ideas. Yet most of these ideas now seem strangely irrelevant. Strategies for fighting large-scale limited wars (endorsed by Alain Enthoven and, apparently, by Mr. McNamara in the early 1960's) were condemned to irrelevance by the unwillingness of any ally to support them with the requisite expenditures and manpower, by the unlikelihood of a war involving such powerful adversaries in such a vital area remaining limited, and by the fear of allied governments that emphasizing large-scale conventional resistance would undermine the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. That left strategies for enforcing short conventional pauses and somewhat raising the threshold of nuclear war (first publicised by General Norstad), strategies seeking to combine static with mobile and conventional with tactical nuclear resistance in limited wars resulting from accident and miscalculation (notably, the works of F.O. Miksche and Malcolm Hoag), and strategies of bargaining and controlled escalation featuring non-nuclear and nuclear reprisals and demonstrations (chiefly identified with Herman Kahn and Thomas Schelling).

All of these latter strategies were attempts to accommodate the logic of limited war to the realities of limited means. They were also responses to perceived security needs in an international political environment in which it was assumed that the threat of Soviet-supported limited aggression was undiminished - and, perhaps, even rising, since strategists were now conscious of the Soviet achievement of virtual parity with the United States in the capacity to inflict unacceptable second-strike damage. But this assumption became much less compelling or was abandoned altogether with the onset of détente. Consequently, although the logic of flexible and controlled response prevailed on paper and in strategic pronouncements, the means to withstand anything more than the most limited attack for longer than a week were not forthcoming. France's withdrawal from most arrangements for collective defence only made this predicament more conspicuous.

Only the French government rejected the objective of avoiding an automatic nuclear response to a local non-nuclear incursion; but for all governments the objective of deterrence increasingly overshadowed the objective of defence; and effective limited defence no longer seemed an urgent component of deterrence but only an option for avoiding nuclear war. Yet despite the de-emphasis, in practice, on strategies of limited resistance, the allies were less concerned than ever about their security. This was not because nuclear deterrence was more credible. Indeed, one might suppose that Secretary of Defense McNamara's open admission that the United States could not prevent the Soviet Union from devastating the United States even if the United States struck first would have destroyed any remaining confidence in America's will to use the ultimate deterrent to defend its European allies. The point is that now even a low degree of credibility was regarded as sufficient for deterrence under the new political conditions of détente.

In this atmosphere there was a tendency of strategic thought to revert to the conceptions of the Eisenhower-Dulles period. Proponents of limited-war strategy now took comfort in pointing to the deterrent effect of the danger that any small conflict in Europe might escalate out of control. Considering the nature of Soviet intentions, the value of the stakes, and the integration of tactical nuclear weapons into American and Soviet forces, they were prepared to rely more on this danger and less on a credible capacity to fight a limited war effectively. It is symptomatic that this view found support from Bernard Brodie, an outstanding former champion of local conventional resistance in Europe, who now saw the official emphasis on stressing the conventional-nuclear threshold and increasing conventional capabilities as unfeasible, unnecessary, and politically disadvantageous in America's relations with its allies.*

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*Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). Brodie's differences with the official position (which, incidentally, he exaggerated in attributing to it the objective of resisting conventionally a large-scale Soviet aggression) were no less significant for being differences of degree. For they were intended as an antidote to a strategic tendency, just as his earlier advocacy of preparedness for limited conventional defence was intended as an antidote to the Eisenhower-Dulles emphasis on nuclear deterrence in Europe. See, for example, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 335 ff.

In one respect, the limited-war strategy of the Kennedy-McNamara administration underwent a modification that was tantamount to official abandonment. The most far-reaching application of the idea of contrived reciprocal limitation of warfare was the counterforce or no-cities strategy, which was intended to make possible the option of a controlled and limited Soviet-American nuclear exchange. An even more radical (but necessarily less plausible) strategy for limited strategic nuclear war, based on striking cities selectively rather than sparing them had already attracted some academic attention.* This limited countercity strategy appealed to some as a way of enhancing American power by increasing the credibility of a nuclear first strike against coventional aggression and by enabling the United States to fight a strategic nuclear war advantegaously as well as rationally. When Mr. McNamara first publicly announced his counterforce strategy at Ann Arbor in June 1962, critics charged that it was intended to serve the same objective. But in McNamara's mind it was evidently intended only to keep any strategic nuclear war that might result from accident or miscalculation as limited as possible, not to enhance America's ability to deter or fight such a war successfully. In subsequent statements McNamara explained the objective of a counterforce strategy as exclusively damage limitation. He also explained the difficulties of inducing the Soviets to fight a limited strategic war in such a way as to cast doubt upon its feasibility.** Finally, in successive annual reports on the nation's defence posture he indicated that cost-effectiveness considerations dictated an increasing emphasis on the prior objective of a capability for assured destruction (that is, a capacity to inflict unacceptable damage on a second strike) as compared to the objective of damage limitation.

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*Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read, eds., Limited Strategic War (New York: Praeger, 1962).

**On the one hand, he explained, the Soviet Union would be unlikely to withhold its countercity capability as long as its missiles were relatively scarce and vulnerable; but on the other hand, he acknowledged that as Soviet missiles became more numerous and less vulnerable, the prospects of confining retaliatory damage from them would vanish completely. In any event, in each annual "posture statement" he stated in progressively more categorical terms that there was no way the United States could win a strategic nuclear war at a tolerable cost.

Summing up the fortunes of limited-war strategy with respect to Europe and central war, we can say that the basic rationale of limited war seems firmly established in the United States and in allied countries, with the possible exception of France, and that this rationale is to some extent implemented in operational plans, military policies, and weapons. But the high-point of limited-war theory - in terms of the inventiveness, thoroughness, and energy with which it was carried out in strategic thought and actual policies - was roughly in the period 1957 to 1963. Since then a combination of economic restrictions and international political developments, together with the inroads of time upon novel plans for hypothetical contingencies that never occur, has nullified some of the most ingenious strategies and eroded others, so that limited-war thinking is left somewhere between the initial Kennedy-McNamara views and the approach of the Eisenhower-Dulles administration.

In military affairs, as in international politics, one senses that an era has ended but gets little intimation of the era that will replace it. Meanwhile, strategic imagination seems to have reached a rather flat plateau surrounded by a bland atmosphere in which all military concerns dissolve into the background.

5.

This was the state of limited-war thinking when American forces became the dominant element in fighting communist forces in Vietnam. At that time the only really lively ideas were counter-insurgent warfare and controlled escalation.

Some regarded the war as a testing ground for strategies of counter-insurgency. When the United States began bombing selected targets in North Vietnam, ostensibly in retaliation for the Gulf of Tonkin incident, some regarded this as a test of theories of controlled escalation. When American forces in South Vietnam engaged regular units of the North Vietnamese army in large numbers, a host of new strategic-tactical issues arose, such as the issue, which was surely oversimplified by polemics, between search-and-destroy and seize-and-hold methods and the equally overdrawn issue between a mobile and an enclave strategy.

The war in Vietnam should have been a great boon to strategic innovation, since it fitted none of the existing models of limited war, although it contained elements of several. But the lessons derived from the strategies that were tried have been either negative or inconclusive, yet it is not apparent that alternative strategies would have worked any better. Some critics of the conduct (as opposed to the justification) of the war assert that different political or military strategies and tactics, executed more skillfully, might have enabled the United States to gain its political objectives - primarily, the security of an independent non-communist government in South Vietnam - more readily. Others assert that those objectives were either unattainable because of the lack of a suitable political environment in South Vietnam or attainable only at an unacceptable cost, no matter what methods had been adopted. Hanson Baldwin draws the lesson that future interventions against insurgency, if they are undertaken "under carefully chosen conditions and at times and places of our own choosing," must avoid the sin of "gradualism" by applying overwhelming force (including tactical nuclear weapons, if necessary) at an early stage.* But Walter Lippmann concludes that Vietnam simply demonstrated that elephants cannot kill swarms of mosquitoes.** Given the general disaffection with the war, the latter conclusion is likely to be more persuasive; but, in either case, it would be misleading to generalise about the efficacy or utility of limited-war strategy on the basis of this single sad experience, since the war in Vietnam is almost surely unique in its salient characteristics: the effectiveness of North Vietnam's combat forces, the organising genius of Ho Chi Minh, the north's appeal to the south on nationalist grounds stemming from the postwar independence movement, and the rigidly authoritarian policies of President Diem.

Perhaps the strategy that has come closest to a clear-cut failure is controlled escalation, which was applied by means of selective bombing in North Vietnam. But even in this case it would be misleading to generalise about the efficacy of the same general procedure under other conditions. Controlled escalation is a strategy developed principally to apply to direct or indirect confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union.***

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*"After Vietnam - What Military Strategy in the Far East?", New York Times Magazine, June 9, 1968.

** "Elephants Can't Beat Mosquitoes in Vietnam," Washington Post, December 3, 1967.

***The concept and strategy of controlled escalation are set forth most fully in Herman Kahn, On Escalation (New York: Praeger, 1967), and Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), although both authors developed the idea in earlier writings. Needless to say, neither author believes that controlled escalation was properly applied in Vietnam.

It envisages influencing the adversary's will to fight and his willingness to settle through a process of "bargaining" by means of a "competition in risk-taking" on ascending - and, hopefully, on the lower - levels of violence, culminating in a mutually unacceptable nuclear war at the top of the escalation "ladder". In the Korean War some advocates of tactical air power, lamenting the frustrations of ground warfare, expounded a strategy of bringing the enemy to terms by incremental punitive bombing. After the Gulf of Tonkin incident the American government put something like this into effect, borrowing language and style from the latest thinking about controlled escalation. Through highly selective and gradually intensified bombing of targets on lists authorised by the President - incidentally, a notable application of one of the tenets of limited-war theory: strict political control of military operations - the United States hoped to signal and bargain so as to induce the government in Hanoi to come to terms. Hanoi, alas, did not play the game.

Perhaps the experiment was not a true test of escalation, since the punitive nature of the bombing was ambiguous. Indeed, in deference to public protests throughout the world, the United States explicitly stressed the purely military nature of the targets as though to deny their bargaining function. Perhaps the escalation was not undertaken soon enough or in large enough increments. Perhaps the fault lay in applying to an underdeveloped country a strategy that presupposes a set of values and calculations found only in the most advanced countries. Perhaps escalation works only when there is a convincing prospect of nuclear war at the top of the ladder. Or perhaps the difficulty lay in the fact that Hanoi had unlimited ends in the south, whereas the United States had quite limited ends in the north. Whatever the explanation, controlled escalation failed to achieve its objective; and that should be sobering to its enthusiasts, if any remain. Nonetheless, the experience does not prove much about the efficacy of a different strategy of escalation against a different adversary in different circumstances.

Nor does the war carry any clear lesson about the wisdom of denying the enemy a sanctuary from combat in his home base of support for an internal war in an adjacent country. Critics contend that carrying the war to the north violated one of the few clear-cut rules of the game on which limitation might be reliably based, alienated world and domestic opinion, fortified North Vietnam's determination to fight for an unconditional victory, and distracted attention from the real war - the civil war - in the south, without substantially affecting that war. But advocates of carrying the war to the north can argue that the attrition against North Vietnamese units and logistics was significant and might have been decisive but for self-imposed restrictions that were unnecessarily confining. They can argue that these operations were necessary to South Vietnamese morale and provided a valuable bargaining counter for mutual de-escalation. They can also argue that the denial of sanctuary is a valuable precedent for avoiding disadvantageous rules of the game and may be a useful deterrent against other states who may contemplate waging internal wars against their neighbours.

Be that as it may, Vietnam does at least indicate that the United States will go a long and frustrating way to observe significant self-imposed restrictions on a war rather than insist on a military victory. At the same time, it suggests that the prior question for the future is not how but whether to intervene. Both the Korean and the Vietnamese wars indicate that the particular restrictions on military operations will be determined by such a variety of conditions and considerations that it is almost fruitless to try to anticipate them in advance. In some conceivable future circumstances, one can even imagine a sensible case being made for crossing the sacred threshold that bars the United States from using tactical nuclear weapons. It is unlikely, however, that the prevailing reaction to Vietnam will be in the direction that Hanson Baldwin advocates in condemning the constraints of gradualism and the "cult" of self-imposed limitations.

It is significant how weak and ineffectual American all-or-nothing sentiment was in the Vietnamese as compared to the Korean war. The idea of the United States confining itself to a limited war, which was novel and antithetical in Korea, was widely taken for granted in Vietnam. Indeed, the most influential American critics urged more, not less, restrictions on combat despite the fact that the danger of nuclear war or of Chinese or Russian intervention never seemed nearly as great as in Korea. Those (including some prominent conservative Senators and Congressmen) who took the position that the United States ought either to escalate the war drastically in order to win it or else disengage, clearly preferred the latter course. But their frustration did not manifest a general rejection of the conception of limited war but only opposition to the particular way of applying that conception in Vietnam.

Thus the popular disaffection with the Vietnamese war does not indicate a reversion to pre-Korean attitudes toward limited war. Rather, it indicates serious questioning of the premises about the utility of limited war as an instrument of American policy that originally moved the proponents of limited-war strategy. In Vietnam the deliberate limitation of war has been accepted by Americans simply from the standpoint of keeping the war from expanding, or from the standpoint of de-escalating it, whereas in Korea the desire to keep the war limited had to contend with a strong sentiment to win it for the sake of containment. In Korea the principal motive for limitation was the fear that an expanding war might lead to general war with China or nuclear war with the Soviet Union, but in Vietnam the limits were motivated more by the sense that the political objective was not sufficiently valuable and the prospect of winning the war not sufficiently promising to warrant the costs of expansion. This change of emphasis reflects more than the unpopularity of the war in Vietnam. It also reflects the domestication, as it were, of limited war as an operational concept in American foreign policy. But some of the reasons for the strength of sentiment for keeping the war limited bear upon the political question of whether to intervene in local wars at all. These reasons suggest that the specific lessons about the strategy and constraints of limited war that one might derive from Vietnam are likely to be less important than the war's impact on the political premises that underlay American intervention.

6.

If Vietnam exerts a fundamental impact on American policy with respect to limited-war interventions, it will not be merely because of the national determination to avoid future Vietnams and to restrict American commitments to a scope more compatible with American power and the will to use it. The whole history of the expansion of American commitments and involvements is pervaded with the longing to avoid new commitments and involvements. Yet a succession of unanticipated crises and wars has led the nation to contravene that longing. Sometimes the desire to avoid the repetition of unpleasant involvements has only led to a further extension of commitments, which in turn has led to further involvements. That is what happened when the Eisenhower-Dulles administration formed deterrent alliances (including SEATO) to avoid another Korean war.

The reason for this contradiction is not really a sublimated national longing for power - at least not power for its own sake - but rather the nation's persistant pursuit of a policy of containment, which under the prevailing international conditions has repeatedly confronted it with predicaments in which the least objectionable course has seemed to be the exercise and extension rather than the abstention or retrenchment of American power. If a fundamental change in America's use of limited-war strategy takes place, it will be because the premises of containment are no longer convincing and Vietnam has acted as the catalyst to enforce this realisation.

In effect, the United States has equated communist aggression with a threat to American security, although the relationship of communist aggressions in Asia or Africa to American security is quite indirect and increasingly far-fetched. Yet this equation was plausible enough if one assumed - as Americans generally did assume until after the Korean War and the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950's - that the Cold War was essentially a zero-sum contest between the two superpowers and that an aggression by any small communist state would shift the world balance of power toward the communist bloc. Moreover, there was no need to question this view of American security as long as America's efforts to counter aggression were successful at a tolerable cost.

But détente with the Soviet Union and the increasing divergencies of interest among communist states and parties are changing the American view of international reality and of the nature and intensity of the communist threat in particular. Thus a gain for China or even North Vietnam is not automatically seen as a gain for the Soviet Union or a loss for the United States, and opportunities for limited co-operation with the Soviet Union occasionally appear attractive. Moreover, the accentuation of national and subnational particularism outside the communist world may have diminished what capacity the Soviet Union or China ever had to extend their control and influence through diplomacy, subversion, or revolution. In Africa, most notably, Americans are becoming accustomed to a great deal of disorder and communist meddling without jumping to the conclusion that the balance of power or American security are jeopardised. To some extent China emerges as a new focus for active containment; but despite the long strand of American obsession with China, the Chinese do not yet - and may never - have the strength to pose the kind of threat to Asia that the Soviet Union could have posed to Western Europe, and Asia is simply not valued as highly on the scale of interests as Western Europe.

American involvement in the Vietnamese war began on a limited scale at a time of national self-confidence and self-assertion in the Third World. The United States applied forceful containment there according to familiar premises about America's general interest in stopping communist aggression without questioning the precise relevance of the war to American security. The scope of American involvement grew in an effort to defeat North Vietnam's war of national liberation and establish a secure non-communist government in the south. But during this period the familiar American image of the communist world and its threat to American security was changing. Furthermore, in contrast to the Korean War, the Vietnamese war never seemed to pose a threat to the security of Western Europe or Japan.

Nonetheless, if American objectives could have been achieved with no greater pain and effort than the Korean War, which was also unpopular but not beyond being resolved on satisfactory terms, the nation might have accepted the Vietnamese war as another vindication of containment - troublesome and frustrating but not so costly or unsuccessful as to call into question the premises of American intervention. In reality, however, the war became so costly and unpromising that, given its remote relationship to American security, Americans began to doubt the validity of the premises on which the government has intervened. At the least, these doubts seem likely to lead to a marked differentiation of interests in the application of containment - a downgrading of interests in the Third World and a greater distinction between these interests and those pertaining to the security of the advanced democratic countries. Possibly, they will lead to abandonment of containment in Asia altogether in so far as containment requires armed intervention against local aggression on the mainland. More likely, they will simply lead to a sharper distinction in practice between supporting present security commitments and not forming new ones, and between supporting present commitments with American armed forces when aggression is overt and abstaining from armed intervention in largely internal conflicts. What they seem to preclude for a long time is any renewed effort to strengthen military deterrence and resistance in the Third World by actively developing and projecting America's capacity to fight local wars.

7.

The history of limited-war thought and practice in the last decade or so provides little basis for generalising confidently about the feasibility and utility of particular strategies. Many strategies have never really been put to the test; and where they have been tested, either in deterrence or war, the results have been inconclusive. Moreover, strategies are very much the product of particular circumstances - not only of technological developments but also of domestic and international political developments. This political environment is always changing. Developments that have made some strategies seem obsolete - for example, the impact of détente, domestic constraints, and the balance of payments on strategies of conventional resistance in Europe - might change in such a way as to revive abandoned strategies or nurture new ones. The limited-war strategies appropriate to the international environment of the 1970's - especially if there should be a significant increase in the number and severity of local wars, a more active Soviet policy of intervention in local wars, a more aggressive Chinese military posture, or new nuclear powers - might contain some interesting variations on strategic notions that were born in past periods of intense concern with military security. Changes in military technology, such as forthcoming increases in long-range air- and sea-lift capabilities, will also affect strategies and politics of limited war.

Yet one has the feeling, which may not spring solely from a lack of imagination, that in the nature of international conflict and technology in the latter half of the twentieth century there are only a limited number of basic strategic ideas pertaining to limited war and that we have seen most of these emerge in the remarkable strategic renaissance of the past decade or so. These ideas can be combined in countless permutations and combinations and implemented by a great variety of means, but we shall still recognise trip wires, pauses, reprisals, denials, thresholds, sanctuaries, bargaining and demonstration maneuvers, escalation, Mao's three stages, enclaves, seize and hold, search and destroy, and all the rest.

What we are quite unlikely to witness is the perfection of limited-war conceptions and practice in accordance with some predictable, rational calculus and reliable, universal rules of the game. The conditions and modalities of international conflict are too varied, dynamic, and subjective for limited war to be that determinate. Any search for the strategic equivalent of economic man on the basis of which a grand theory of military behaviour might be erected is bound to be ephemeral and unproductive. On the other hand, I think it is equally clear that military conceptions and practices among the advanced states are not going to revert to romantic styles of the past that glorified the offensive spirit, war à outrance, the national will to victory, and overwhelming the enemy. If counterparts of the stylised limited warfare of the eighteenth century are unrealistic, counterparts of the total wars of the following centuries would be catastrophic.

The nuclear age has not made armed conflict obsolete, nor has it excluded the possibility of catastrophic war. It has, however, inculcated a novel respect for the deliberate control and limitation of warfare. That respect is a more significant and enduring achievement of limited-war strategists than any of their strategies.

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INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

10TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

PROBLEMS OF MODERN STRATEGY: A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

Saturday, September 21st Evening

The Uses of Force in the Nuclear Age

THOMAS C. SCHELLING

Like the other speakers who were honoured by invitations to address this tenth anniversary of the ISS, I accepted many months ago. And probably like them, too, I delayed, not until the last minute but until the last month, to compose my thoughts. Unlike them, I was offered a topic that involved neither historical reminiscence nor a speculative leap into the future, a topic that concerns not how we participants in the Institute think about strategy but how military force is actually used, or can be used, in this nuclear age. And as I was in the middle of composing my thoughts, the Russians organized a demonstration, far more vivid and far more suggestive than anything I might have told you.

That the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia - or uninvited entry, or comradely rescue, or whatever it was - still appears to some of us ambiguous, inconclusive, even perhaps indecisive, as my comments might have been ambiguous, inconclusive and indecisive, makes it only that much harder for me to speak with authority. I find it much easier to say things that sound true and important than to say things that sound relevant against the events of the past seven weeks in Eastern Europe.

I have to confess that within the last six months I have predicted in public, not once but several times, that the Russians would not do the kind of thing that in August they did. This is one of the "uses of force" - to use the words of my assigned title - that I might have stood here and depreciated again in public if it had not already occurred to contradict me. I do not know where I went wrong, and I have the uneasy feeling that anything I tell you today may be proved wrong by the next time we meet.

Although I am unable to construct in my own mind exactly the talk that I would have prepared for you during the second half of August, I am sure that one of the more confident parts of it would have concerned the state of the cold war between East and West and the need for a new doctrine to replace the Truman Doctrine of 21 years ago as the basic diagnosis and prescription for coping with a troubled world. According to the Truman Doctrine, the world was divided into two parts, one communist and the other not, the communist part having a cohesion that the rest of the world could hardly aspire to, a suffocating ideology that would suppress and eliminate not only dissent but national and cultural identity, a subversive talent for both violent and non-violent intervention in developed and underdeveloped countries, and a willingness to risk the use of military force, even to use it, in ruthless pursuit of world expansion.

It turned out that the communist world could itself split betterly. It turned out that the communist world could invest prestige, diplomatic attention, and military and economic aid and still not achieve decisive control of the underdeveloped continents. It turned out that communist leadership was militarily cautious, especially after the Korean War launched the arms race and the NATO alliance. But most interesting of all were two trends that I had hoped to emphasize here today.

One was the emergence of Soviet-American collaboration, as especially symbolized in the Non-Proliferation Treaty that was jointly composed by two declared adversaries even while the war in Vietnam was alleged to be a decisive obstruction to progress. The other was the demonstration, in several countries of Eastern Europe, that a communist system imposed by military force and secret police could not in 21 years suppress national character and national interest, could not cope with political evolution, but nevertheless could evolve in unintended directions conducive to genuine coexistence and to some reduction in the institutional discontinuity between so-called socialist society and so-called capitalist society. This development, substantially unpredicted on either side of the Iron Curtain, I considered good news for mankind.

I always told myself, and told others when I spoke in public, that only the most tentative conclusions were justified, that glimmering possibilities should not be misconstrued as overwhelming probabilities, that events as unexpected as the Cuban missile crisis had happened and could happen again, that all our plans should allow for the contingency that hopes would be disappointed, and that even if progress were to continue it would likely be uneven.

But on reading the news that Tuesday morning in August I realized how little I had heeded my own warning, how much I had let myself hope, and how unready I was to put a setback into any kind of perspective.

I am still unready, and am not going to try to give you my perspective.

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Three years ago I completed a book on a subject very close to the one that Alastair Buchan asked me to speak about today. I wondered, when I finished it, whether it really provided wisdom and guidance for the future (as I naturally hoped it might) or merely summarized the strategic intellectualizing of an era that was about over. As I reread my own book, after it appeared in print, I was struck with how much it reflected the strategy of the cold war. So were some of those who reviewed it. At first, of course, as I imagine any author would be, I was afraid that my book would become obsolete and be less relevant to the future than to the past. But as time passed, and the sense of authorship diminished, I found myself hoping that what I'd written would be less relevant to the future than to the past. What more could a father of four sons hope for than that a book about the uses of force in the nuclear age should become uninteresting? But I am afraid the subject is still interesting. I must not, especially with this diversified audience, blame the Russians entirely for whatever dismay we now feel. Without Czechoslovakia there would still be Vietnam.

I hope it is neither unseemly nor tedious to refer to my own book on an occasion like this. But three years ago I did, sitting in an office of the Adam Street building of the ISS in London, put the finishing touches to my carefully composed thoughts on the same subject as I am supposed to speak about today. If I still believe what I wrote I cannot repudiate it, but I also cannot just summarize orally what you could read at leisure. If I no longer believe what I wrote, I should renounce the book and start over, acknowledging that I may three years from now want to disassociate myself from what I say today. Since I actually did collect my thoughts about the uses of force in the nuclear age three years ago, and actually did so as a guest of the Institute for Strategic Studies, it possibly makes sense not to repeat it, not to renounce it unless I'm ashamed of it, not to ignore it unless I think nobody here ever looked at it, but to take it as a point of departure, amending it where I think it was wrong and bringing it up the year 1968.

The book made seven points, with a chapter for each point. The first point was that one of the most impressive things that can be done with military force is to hurt people and to destroy things. I don't think this is often enough appreciated. Whether in the nuclear age or any other age, whether the force is military or criminal or any other kind, what force can do is to hurt and destroy. The first sentence in my book - the very first sentence of my preface - states what I think is true and significant and discouraging. "One of the lamentable principles of human productivity is that it is easier to destroy than to create." Bullets can kill people; thermonuclear weapons can wipe out cities; police clubs can crack skulls; assassins can eliminate unique individuals; vandals can derail trains. Pure force can achieve hardly anything constructive.

I said in my book that with military force a country can repel and expel, penetrate and occupy, seize, exterminate, disarm and disable, confine, deny access, and directly frustrate intrusion or attack. An unfriendly reviewer quoted this sentence as though I had extolled what could be accomplished with military force. But I had meant this list to be impressively inadequate. You can't make people do things with military force. You can only threaten to hurt them, to destroy what they value, and hope that, to avoid the pain and the damage, they will do what you ask. But you can't make them. If they are obstinate or heroic or dumb, or if they are administratively and politically inflexible, or if rightly or wrongly they believe you don't mean it, your threat won't work.

Nuclear weapons don't change this, they merely dramatize it, the way Russian tanks in the centre of Prague dramatise it. The cannon on a tank cannot make a man express enthusiasm in front of a television camera, or make a man vote or work or go someplace. All it can do is kill him. That's a lot, but it's not versatile, because if it kills him he cannot vote or work or express enthusiasm. I still think our intellectualizing about military strategy inadequately recognizes that military force is mainly a base for extortion, a kind of power that, used directly rather than for bargaining, can accomplish only very limited things.

The second point of my book was that a good part of diplomacy, including the stationing of military forces, was concerned with making threats credible. The third point was that the risk of unforeseen and unforeseeable consequences is a significant and manipulable part of military diplomacy. The fourth was that even military action, war itself, is a bargaining process, and that military actions are as significant in what they communicate as in what they conquer or destroy. The fifth was that any war, on whatever scale, ought to be or could be a limited war, and that there was no point beyond which conscious diplomacy and accommodation became irrelevant. The sixth point of my book was that the shape and structure of military force has an influence of its own, and that military force should be so designed as to minimize the abdication of decision to the machinery of warfare. And my seventh point was that even the most unfriendly adversaries can profit from a dialogue aimed at restraining the arms race, at limiting war itself if war should occur, and at designing military force in a way that makes it reponsive to control.

Well, that is what my book said, though I spelled it out in a little more detail in the book itself. Do I have anything to add? Do I have anything to take out?

The basic idea, I believe, is confirmed in both Vietnam and Czechoslovakia. Most of what you want to do you cannot do with military force. Russian force has been, at least temporarily, effective in Czechoslovakia. But few of the guns were fired. Half a million armed men went into Czechoslovakia, and they have shot hardly anybody. They can kill and burn and knock down, and they can prevent the Czechs from producing, from governing themselves, and from expressing themselves. At least, they can if they're willing to try hard enough. But this is all negative. They can't make people volunteer. They can't make people work. They cannot command enthusiasm, or loyalty, or compliance. You can shoot a man if he won't behave, but you can make him behave only if he will respond to your threat to shoot him. The Russians could unquestionably win a war in Czechoslovakia; and if what they want is a war, their kind of force is just great. But apparently war is not what they want; and the only thing that military force will get you, directly, is war.

So far, that is what it has got us in Vietnam. Getting people actually to behave as you want them to requires something more than military force. This has always been true, but nuclear weapons dramatized it for us. Nuclear weapons have been peculiarly recognizable as the weapons with which you destroy the people who didn't behave, not weapons that make people behave.

Nuclear weapons accentuate, but they do not originate, this fundamental limitation on military force. Nuclear weapons appear to be able to do such enormous damage at such a distance that one may be induced to speculate why such power is so clumsy. Yet a bayonet is much the same; the only thing that a bayonet will directly procure is blood. Military power is essentially negative. If you want a person not to do something, you can kill him or disable him; if you want him to do something, something more than to bleed and die, military power is only indirectly relevant, and its value depends on how skillfully it can be indirectly used.

And actually nuclear weapons, man for man and dollar for dollar, are not so impressive. Roughly speaking, a nuclear weapon that costs a million dollars can destroy a billion dollars. But I estimate that a young vandal who could hope to earn three or four thousand dollars a year could destroy three or four million dollars a year. What is truly impressive in the modern age is not what you can do with a thermonuclear weapon packed in the nosecone of a missile; it is what you can do with a .22 caliber bullet.

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What I'd change in my book if I wrote it today, three years later, is not so much what I said as what I didn't say. Aside from all those chapters that I actually wanted to write but could not quite formulate at the time, there are the chapters that didn't occur to me three years ago that are much on my mind now. Let me mention three of them. They all relate to the use of military force, but they all relate to the difficulties of using military force indirectly, of seeking to accomplish some positive aim through an essentially negative destructive physical capacity. And they all, I must confess, reflect the limitations on my own way of thinking about this subject. The more I learn, or think I learn, about this subject, the more I realize how little I knew already, and the more I wonder just how little I know even now.

The first point I would elaborate relates to the familiar subject of deterrence. Were we deterred in August? Did the Russians successfully forestall intervention by the Atlantic nations, acting either individually or as an alliance? I have checked my dictionary - one of those modern American dictionaries that uses simple English - and it tells me that to deter is to keep a person from doing something through fear, anxiety, doubt, and so forth. Did the Russians do that to us?

I have found no-one in my country who admits that he for a moment contemplated military intervention or even the threat of it. None of the several candidates then running for nomination gave any hint that intervention even occurred to him, and one of them, now no longer a candidate, even thought it provocative to convene the President's National Security Council. Wasn't it the same over here? I read intermittently some of the European newspapers, and I find no-one in print who ran through the calculations, adding up the pros and the cons and balancing them against each other, to reassure himself that staying out was the right thing or to see, considering the dominoes that might fall in succession afterwards, whether we shouldn't risk a confrontation. President Johnson publicly deprecated any Rumanian repetition, but it is hard to read any threat in his language. And the most massive retaliation that former Vice President Nixon has proposed is that we should continue not to sell strategic goods to the Soviet Union, which was already our policy in July. So, strictly speaking, apparently we were not deterred, because intervention was something we never contemplated in the first place.

A similar question is sometimes asked in retrospect about NATO. Did the NATO alliance deter a Russian invasion of Western Europe? There are some who see that NATO confronted the Soviet bloc with an effective capacity for military resistance and that the Soviet bloc did not attack westward, and for whom these two facts are enough: the Russians were evidently deterred. There are some, though, who doubt whether the Russians were ever on the point of attacking westward, who doubt that the Russians counted up divisions or nuclear warheads and revised their military plans or rejected a proposal for military action. It would not surprise me if the Russians might truthfully say that they never intended to attack Western Europe, that the existence of NATO as an alliance and of NATO as a military force never affected their military intentions or plans, and that, therefore, they were never deterred.

Yet maybe that's the way deterrence works best. Maybe, in understanding how deterrence works, it is more revealing to acknowledge that we were deterred, completely deterred, from intervening in Czechoslovakia. More than that, we were deterred even from talking ourselves into a commitment that might have obliged us to weigh the pros and cons of intervention explicitly. We were so throughly deterred that no-one even expected us to intervene, with the result that the high cost of disappointing those expectations could not confront us as a counterdeterrent. And, of course, we were so evidently deterred that the Russians themselves, in the end, were not.

I suppose the same could be said about Russian plans to invade Western Europe. Deterrence can be said to work well if one's opponent, contemplating the act that we would like to deter, weighs the consequences and decides against it, through, "fear, anxiety, doubt, etc.," to use the language of my dictionary. But deterrence may work best of all when the opponent so clearly perceives that the enterprise is too risky, or too doomed to failure, that the enterprise never even takes the form of an articulate proposal, never comes to a vote in a cabinet or a politburo, never even gets put forward seriously. I doubt, to take an example, whether any senior official of the American government proposed the invasion of North Korea, or a declaration of war against that country, at the time of the Pueblo incident; there may have been some who privately would have favoured such an action, but even they must have judged it a waste of time, and perhaps an embarrassment to their careers, to propose it seriously. The highest goal of NATO deterrence should be to make a Russian, civilian or military, feel ridiculous even in proposing the kind of act that it is NATO's purpose to deter.

I rather like my new dictionary. My old one, given to me when I was a high school student, noting that the verb "to deter" derives from the Latin word for terror, mentions only fear - "to turn aside through fear, to prevent from action by fear of the consequences." I am no judge of dictionaries, but as a primer on strategy I think the new one is wise to include the anxiety, the doubt,and the "etc".

Isn't this probably the way that capital punishment works, if it works at all in dissuading capital crimes? Not that a gunman, about to pull the trigger, thinks of the electric chair and changes his mind, but instead that he avoids getting into situations in which he might have to kill, even deliberately leaves his gun home, or goes about with a general horror of killing that may be partly attributable to anxieties about capital punishment that are more a part of his culture than of his conscious calculation. People who have trained themselves to stay out of trouble may not have to be consciously deterred over and over again on every occasion.

If I am right about our having been successfully deterred in relation to Czechoslovakia, are we glad that we were? This is not a purely rhetorical question or - as some dictionaries might have it, to the discomfort of people in my profession - an academic question. It is indeed a retrospective question, but it is a question about policy, because we probably helped to deter ourselves. We probably collaborated in the process of deterrence. We avoided any commitment to Czechoslovakia; furthermore, we publicly avoided it, so that our resolve to defend Greece or Turkey or Germany or Norway is not much affected, we hope, by our declining to support Czechoslovakia. Indeed the very strength and clarity of the NATO commitment draws a line that may be as significant for the areas it excludes as for those that it includes. As a matter of policy we have minimized the cost, especially the cost in credibility and resolve, of non-intervention. Indeed it is probably better on our side to be thoroughly deterred, to have our acquiescence a foregone conclusion, than to be ambiguously deterred or doubtfully deterred. If we are even half expected to intervene, because we are only half decided against it, the cost in disappointed expectations is higher than if nobody has those expectations. It's not an easy question to answer, because if we were only half deterred the Russians themselves might have been more deterred, enough more not to do what they did. I'll let each of you give his own answer to that question, though I imagine I can guess the majority view. At least, we were not caught bluffing. Not yet, anyway. But then Czechoslovakia was probably not the most embarrassing target for us that the Russians might have picked.

Incidentally, before I go on to my next point let me call your attention to an interesting "use of force in the nuclear age" that I had not anticipated. Hungarian troops participated. I take it that for the Hungarian government this was an act of weakness, not of military strength, a symbolic surrender, a kind of pre-emptive renunciation. For what audience was this token primarily displayed? I suppose the Hungarian audience. The Hungarian government displayed to itself where it stands. I take it that Hungarian participation is not evidence of sympathy for the Russian cause and lack of sympathy for the Czech but is rather an act of submission that tests whether sympathy was the determining factor, and the Hungarians now know where they stand. They have my sympathy.

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The second point I would emphasize, were I writing that book now, is that nations are not like people, and governments are not like people, at least not enough like people to permit reliance on the analogy, or on what is sometimes merely a metaphor. We sometimes talk about "changing a government's mind," but a government has no literal mind. We talk about affecting the government's perception of consequences, but governments have no perceptions. We may even talk about deterring through fear of the consequences, but fear is something that people have. Governments indeed are composed of people, but the composition is not equivalent to one large-sized individual who perceives, cogitates, and decides. I had an eloquent paragraph about this in my book, but most readers may have missed it, and those who didn't miss it may have taken it as a perfunctory acknowledgement that was quite insufficient to cleanse my book of the sin of personification. I not only wish that I had had a chapter, rather than a paragraph, on it but wish I had taken that chapter seriously in writing the other chapters.

Governments are characterized by politics and bureaucracy, personal careers and rivalries, leaders and interest groups, and formal mechanisms like chains of command, voting procedures, committees within committees and overlapping committees, and numerous individuals who have their own sources of information, their own lines of communication, their own understandings of national goal and ideology, their own measures of boldness and timidity, their individual capacities for boredom, sickness and even death, and their families, their incomes, and their places in history.

When I was a boy I thought I would grow up strong and brave if I used a minimum of blankets on my bed at night; every night, shivering in bed, I cursed that boy who in the daytime made my decision for me. It was too cold even to get out of bed to get another blanket. Many of us, as adults, when we try to stop smoking discover that we are at least two people, one of whom wants to quit and one of whom badly wants a smoke from time to time; and it is interesting to watch who gets the upper hand and by what techniques they compete for control. Even people are more complicated than the artificial individuals who sometimes serve as analogies for governments in the theories of people like me; and governments are more complicated than people.

How does a government change its mind? One of the alleged purposes of the bombing of North Vietnam was to raise the costs of the war to the North Vietnamese, so that they would find it not to their advantage to pursue the war against us. Which North Vietnamese, the ones who feel the pain or the ones who make the decisions? How do they make their calculations of cost? Do they calculate cost?

Is it enough that each senior Vietnamese official privately do his own calculation; or is something more still needed, some initiative, some political process, some bureaucratic mechanism, by which private estimates get translated into official policy?

I am struck by how many times a government, when it does what we might call "changing its mind," does so by changing the complexion of the government itself. What is often required is some change in the authority, prestige or bargaining power of particular individuals or factions or parties, some shift in executive or legislative leadership. Those who calculate the costs as too high may have to bring bureaucratic skill or political pressure to bear on individuals who do exercise authority, or go through processes that shift authority or blame onto others. In the extreme case revolt, sabotage or assassination may be involved.

My colleague, Ernest May, Professor of History at Harvard, in a brilliant paper called to my attention the obvious fact that governments that fight wars rarely surrender: new governments are formed when it is time to surrender. True, a change of regime may bear some analogy to an individual's change of mind; but the time that it takes and the way that it happens and the way that it is influenced by other governments is a complex phenomenon.

The nearest thing I know to a literal "change of mind" by a government, a government under duress in time of war, was the effort of the Allies to change the mind of the German government. Strategic bombing was involved then, too. One of the questions then, as now in Vietnam, is whether a government will ever change its mind in the desired direction as a result of bombardment. Well, the German government almost did. The process involved placing a small suitcase where the mind that was to be changed could be blown all over the walls of a conference room; but the brain and the body that housed it survived the blast, and the final step in an elaborate conspiracy was a failure.

Communist China in recent years has been a superb example of a nation, figuratively speaking, making up its badly disordered mind. American policy toward China may be a good example extending over almost two decades of how hard it is for a government to change its mind even when many of the people who comprise the government have already changed their minds.

And it is widely expected that the American government will in some direction change its mind about Vietnam during these coming months; but constitutionally this occasion comes only once in four years, though other parts of the process can occur between elections.

This is not meant to be a lecture in political science, but one about the uses of force in the nuclear age. But since the main use of force is to persuade opposing governments to take actions or to abstain from them, to reach the right decisions, to change their minds or to make up their minds, this neurophysiology of government is central to the use of force. I know of no place where theorists like me are more deficient in their theory than in understanding the ways that different governments can respond to the threat or use of force; more important, I know of no place where the policies and actions of governments may be more seriously deficient than in not thinking through the mechanism by which the influence of force is supposed to be translated into action within the target government.

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The third point about the use of force in this nuclear age that I wish I had understood well enough to elaborate in 1965 I do not need to elaborate for you today. You understand it as well as I do. Maybe you understood it better than I did in 1965. It is about the user of the force, not the target or the victim or the opponent.

The instrumental use of force, the restrained use of force, the use of force except in desperate self-defence or in a gigantic moral crusade, can be a terribly divisive and corrosive influence at home. I guess I knew this when the Institute was founded ten years ago; the Korean War had been important in the career of Joseph McCarthy and may have been decisive in the election of President Eisenhower. I knew that three years ago when I wrote my book. But I did not know it the way I know it now.

I do not know whether President Kennedy or President Johnson would have foreseen the high cost in national unity, in national self-confidence and hope, and in the sense of fair play that underlies democratic institutions, if he had anticipated the course that the war has taken. But I think if it had been foreseen, and if the actual course of the war had been seen as a likely one, the price would have been judged too high. The bombing of North Vietnam has probably disrupted American institutions as much as it has disrupted North Vietnamese. The war is both too big and too small for Americans to abide over an extended period, too big to ignore and too small to command either patriotic fervor or obligatory acquiescence.

The missile crisis of 1962 was brief and intense; people had to hold their breaths and trust their President, who alone had to make the decisions, whether we had faith in him or not. The Dominican crisis, for all the familiar reasons, generated enormously greater discontent; but the biggest decision was already taken by the time people could argue about it or express their discontent; and even in America there are limits, except at election time, to the attention people will pay to mistakes already made and alleged evils already committed. And the Bay of Pigs, in the end, was probably forgiven by most of us whose native language is English, under a grading system that favours an uptrend in a President's performance.

The war in Vietnam is different. The cost in money, even the cost in casualties, might not have appeared exorbitant to the Presidents who, between 1959 and 1964, brought us into it. The cost in political vitality, I feel sure, was not foreseen.

Is this a phenomenon of the nuclear age? Indirectly, perhaps; the nuclear age appears to be an age of cautious warfare, and cautious warfare may tend to be indecisive. Still, the nuclear age coincides with so many ages whose connection with nuclear weapons is partial at most that it is hard to discern cause and effect. In America this is the age of affluence and the age of the cold war, the age of instant communication and of mass tourism, the age of Negro political emergence, of mass college education, and of teenage assertiveness.

And it is the age of assassination. Time may tell, though even time has a way of being secretive about these things, just how all of these phenomena intertwined with the war in Vietnam to bring us to where we are in American political life. Time may even eventually tell us just where it is that we are in American political life.

But to some extent surely, perhaps to a decisive extent, we are staggering under our own use of force in the nuclear age.

VACHELLI

Orebaugh