

Conference des directeurs et représentants des instituts Européens de relations internationales. Ginevra, 9-12 III 68.

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- 2) - Rapporto.
- 3) - Ways and means to a detente in Europe including an improvement of intra-German relations.
- 4) - Les elements de la securite Europeenne.
- 5) - Relation between the two German States and their influence on a system of all-European security and cooperation.
- 6) - Report on the conference on Blocs, the German problem and the future of Europe, held at the International Institute for Peace in Vienna on 6-7 III 68.
- 7) - L. Bati: Hungary's cultural relations with West
- 8) - K. E. Birnbaum: The West and the European detente.
- 9) - P. Calzini: Eastern European economies and perspectives for East-West trade.
- 10) - N. Fotino-D. C. Giurescu: Le role des etats petits et moyens dans la creation d'un climat de paix, d'entente et de cooperation en Europe.
- 11) - Detente en Europe
- 12) - L. G. M. Jaquet: The character of detente possibilities and restrictions.
- 13) - A. Ort: La culture, facteur de detente en Europe?
- 14) - M. Saeter: The altered situation for the North.
- 15) - A. Shonfield: Changing commercial policies in the Soviet Bloc.

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CONFERENCE DES DIRECTEURS ET REPRESENTANTS DES INSTITUTS
EUROPEENS DE RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES

Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales

Genève, 9-12 mai 1968

Liste des participants

AUTRICHE

International Institute for Peace, Vienne.

M. Jerzy Sawicki, directeur-adjoint.

Osterreichische Gesellschaft für Aussenpolitik und internationale
Beziehungen, Vienne.

M. Andreas Khol, secrétaire général.

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Institut royal des relations internationales, Bruxelles.

M. Emmanuel Coppieters, directeur général.

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The Foreign Policy Society, Copenhague.

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M. Jan-Magnus Jansson, directeur de l'Institut et président du Conseil.

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Centre d'études de politique étrangère, Paris.

M. Jacques Vernant, secrétaire général.

M. Pierre Genevey, membre du Conseil d'administration.

FRANCE (suite)

Centre d'étude des relations internationales de la Fondation nationale
des sciences politiques, Paris.

M. Jean Meyriat, directeur.

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The Institute for Strategic Studies, Londres. (Institut international
ayant son siège à Londres).

The Hon. Alastair Buchan, directeur.

M. Curt Gasteyger.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Londres.

The Right Hon. Kenneth G. Younger, directeur.

HONGRIE

Karl Marx University of Economics, Department for International
Relations, Budapest.

M. Laszlo Bati.

M. Otto Sütö.

ITALIE

Istituto affari internazionali, Rome.

M. Altiero Spinelli, directeur.

M. Paolo Calzini, chef du Département Europe orientale de l'Institut.

Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale, Milan.

M. Gerolamo L. Bassani, président et directeur.

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M. Sverre Lodgaard, assistant de recherches.

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo.

M. John Sannes, directeur.

M. Kaare Sandegren.

PAYS-BAS

Nederlandsch Genootschap voor internationale Zaken, La Haye.

M. L.G.M. Jaquet, directeur

Polemologisch Instituut, Groningen.

M. Bert V.A. Röling, directeur.

POLOGNE

Institut polonais des relations internationales, Varsovie.

M. Mieczyslaw Tomala, directeur ad interim.

M. Marian Dobrosielski, doyen adjoint de la Faculté de philosophie
et de sociologie de l'Université de Varsovie.

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE ALLEMANDE

Deutsches Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Berlin.

M. Stefan Doernberg, directeur.

Institut für internationale Beziehungen, Potsdam-Babelsberg.

M. Herbert Kröger, directeur.

M. Gerhard Hahn.

REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNE

Forschungsinstitut der deutschen Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik E.V.,
Bonn.

M. Eberhard Schulz, directeur.

M. Hermann Volle, rédacteur en chef de Europa-Archiv.

ROUMANIE

Association de droit international et relations internationales, Bucarest.

M. Nicolas Fotino, directeur.

M. Dinu Giurasco, secrétaire de la section de relations internationales
de l'Association.

SUEDE

International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research, Stockholm.

M. Robert Neild, directeur.

M. Jan Martensson.

The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm.

M. Karl E. Birnbaum, directeur.

M. Ake Sparring, directeur ad interim.

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Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales, Genève.

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M. Louis J. Halle, professeur.

TCHECOSLOVAQUIE

Institut de politique et d'économie internationales, Prague.

M. Antonin Snejdarek, directeur.

M. Alexandr Ort, directeur adjoint.

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Instytut mirovoj politiki i mezhdunarodnyh otnosenij, Moscou.

M. N.N. Inozemtsev, directeur.

M. (second représentant)

YUGOSLAVIE

Institut de politique et d'économie internationales, Belgrad.

M. Leo Mates, directeur.

M. Milan Sahovic.

ETATS-UNIS

Russell Sage Foundation, New York.

M. Richard Snyder.

Genève, le 26 avril 1968.

CONFERENCE DES DIRECTEURS ET REPRESENTANTS DES INSTITUTS
EUROPEENS DE RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES

Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales
Genève, 9-12 mai 1968

PROGRAMME

VENDREDI 10 MAI

9h. - 12h.

LES FACTEURS DE DETENTE EN EUROPE

et

15h.- 18h.

Débats sur les communications présentées
par:

Centre d'études de politique étrangère,
Paris.

Deutsches Institut für Zeitgeschichte,
Berlin.

Forschungsinstitut der deutschen Gesell-
schaft für auswärtige Politik, Bonn.

International Institute for Peace, Vienne.

International Peace Research Institute,
Oslo.

Nederlandsch Genootschap voor internatio-
nale Zaken, La Haye.

Institut polonais des relations internatio-
nales, Varsovie.

The Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
Stockholm.

13h.

Déjeuner à l'Institut.

18h. 30

Réception organisée par la Confédération,
l'Etat et la Ville de Genève.

20h.

Dîner chez les professeurs de l'Institut.

SAMEDI 11 MAI

9h. - 12h.

L'EVOLUTION DES RELATIONS ECONOMIQUES
INTRA-EUPEEENNES

Débats sur les communications présentées
par:

Istituto Affari internazionali, Rome.

The Royal Institute of International
Affairs, Londres.

13h.

Déjeuner à l'Institut.

15h. - 17h.45

L'EVOLUTION DES RELATIONS CULTURELLES
INTRA-EUPEEENNES

Débats sur les communications présentées
par:

Institut de politique et d'économie in-
ternationales, Prague.

Karl Marx University for Economics,
Budapest.

18h.

Cocktail-dîner organisé par l'Institut,
à l'Institut.

DIMANCHE 12 MAI

9h. - 12h.

RAPPORTS ENTRE LES INSTITUTS EUROPEENS
DE RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES (ECHANGE
D'INFORMATIONS, FIXATION DE LA PROCHAI-
NE CONFERENCE)

13h.

Déjeuner à l'Institut.

Clôture.

30.IV.1968

CONFERENCE DES DIRECTEURS ET REPRESENTANTS DES INSTITUTS
EUROPEENS DE RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES

Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales

Genève, 9-12 mai 1968

Liste des institutions annoncées à ce jour

AUTRICHE

Osterreichische Gesellschaft für aussenpolitik und internationale
Beziehungen, Vienne.

International Institute for Peace, Vienne.

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Centre d'études de politique étrangère, Paris.

Fondation nationale des sciences politiques (Centre d'étude des
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Deutsches Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Berlin.

REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE ~~ALLEMANDE~~

Forschungsinstitut der deutschen Gesellschaft für auswärtige
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International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research, Stockholm.

SUISSE

The Graduate Institute of International Studies, Genève.

URSS

Instytut mirovoj' ekonomiki i mezdunarodnych otnosenij, Moscou.

Genève, le 1er février 1968.

CONFERENCE DES DIRECTEURS ET REPRESENTANTS DES INSTITUTS
EUROPEENS DE RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES

Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales

Genève, 9-12 mai 1968

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~~M. Pierre Genevey, membre du Conseil d'administration.~~

M. Hubert Thierry, prof. à la Fac. de droit de Caen

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Russell Sage Foundation, New York.

M. Richard Snyder.

Genève, le 26 avril 1968.

2

REPORT ON
THE CONFERENCE OF DIRECTORS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF
EUROPEAN INSTITUTES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales
Geneva, May 9-12 1968

Explanatory Preface

The second conference of the directors and representatives of the European Institutes of International Relations was held in Geneva from May 9 to May 12, 1968, with the Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales acting as the host. The discussion sessions were devoted to the examination of subjects of both academic interest and of concern for the future of Europe. One session was also devoted to a process of auto-criticism to establish the role that such a conference might usefully perform if it were to be repeated.

The following is a digest of the discussions that took place. The report does not follow in any detail the individual statements of each speaker. It attempts, rather, to state the main arguments used in the discussions and the general conclusions drawn. If the style of the report seems "bitty" this is the result of an uneasy compromise between the need to achieve coherence of argument and a desire to include the main viewpoints put forward.

The reports of the discussions are presented in the order given by the programme rather than the actual. The chairman for each discussion period is given at the head of the report on that period.

The Contents then are as follows:

- The Factors of the Detente in Europe	p. 2
- The Evolution of Intra-European Economic Relations	p. 10
- The Evolution of Intra-European Cultural Relations	p. 13
- Future Relations between the European Institutes of International Relations	p. 15

The Factors of the Detente in Europe

Chairmen: M. Leo MATES, Director, Institut de politique et d'économie internationales, Belgrade. (1st session).

The Right Hon. Kenneth G. YOUNGER, Director, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. (Second session).

The directors and representatives of the European institutes of international relations succeeded in opening the conference with a considerable degree of agreement. There was a consensus on the view that the detente in Europe was a fact. This was due to the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States, which had allowed for the consolidation of the political boundaries and regimes of the countries of central and Eastern Europe. The existence of the states and regimes within this region for a period of twenty years had led to a general acceptance by these states of each others' claim to separate existence. This process, together with the ever increasing numbers of small states within the United Nations, had given to the small and medium powers of the world a new and special role in the maintenance of peace. One result was that the continued existence of the detente now depended less on the policies of the two superpowers and more on the actions of the other European states. Another result was that the uses to which the superpowers could put their overwhelming military superiority were limited in today's world.

It was recognised that the road from the present detente to the final reconciliation of the countries of Europe would be long. It is essential that, at the outset, it should be determined whether the process of the consolidation of the detente should be allowed to develop on its own, with policy being concentrated upon the marginal areas of European integration, or whether the states of Europe should attempt

to create a more general and dynamic framework to provide the long-term basis for European security. One would also have to choose, from amongst the factors of the detente, those considered marginal and those essential to a general framework. Would cultural and economic elements, for instance, come under the heading of marginal factors ?

There was general agreement that a positive policy for the detente was needed in order to institutionalize the forces bringing the countries of Europe together. One reason for this belief was that tensions still existed within Europe and that if the problems giving rise to those tensions were not settled the detente might slip away from a newly divided Europe. Moreover, as the blocs, which had provided some form of order and regulation within Europe, broke up, they might be replaced by anarchy. The reassertion of the old nationalisms that had proved so dangerous in the pre-war period might reopen old divisions among the countries of Europe. However, not only were there dangers of tensions between countries, but also of tensions within countries. The revolt of the students, if symptomatic of a more general malaise, might put in question certain institutions of European states and so lead to a general recourse to force. Unless a general framework were provided for carrying out the present hopes of the detente and liberalisation of political regimes, non-fulfillment could undermine the states of Europe from within. Moreover, it is now that the states of Europe ought to take advantage of the more fluid position created by the gradual military withdrawal of the United States from Europe.

From this position, the argument led naturally to a consideration of the means through which a positive impulse forward could be given to the detente. The suggestion ranged from considerations of desirable behaviour of states to ideal forms of the organisation of the European state system. The former category included pleas for the avoidance of

the use of violent "cold war" language by states in their dealings with each other, as well as the necessity for a continuous effort to maintain a dialogue between states, even when agreement on common problems could not be reached. The desirability of increased contact between the countries of Eastern Europe and those of Western Europe was occasion for the suggestion that leaders of international organisations or members of parliaments from Western Europe should be invited to Eastern Europe in order that some common declaration might be arrived at. In the development of East-West relations, one member stressed that the world will continue to be the imperfect one in which we find ourselves today, and thus there has to be selfish interest for states in the process of integration if the process is to be a viable one. This selfish interest, it was suggested, is to be found in the economic factors of the detente.

Considerations of the ideal form by which Europe should begin to organise itself opened into a debate on the virtues and vices of the multilateral and bilateral approaches. Some belaboured bilateralism as a relic of the crusading spirit of putative exploitation of Eastern Europe by the West. It was asserted that bilateralism was used to maintain and foster an asymmetrical position in the relations of East and West. Eastern European countries were divided amongst themselves by dealing on an individual basis with the West. The East ought to be organised to deal with the West as a group. One way by which this could be achieved could be the matching of similar organisations, such as COMECON in the East with OECD. The multilateral framework could be the only way in which the symmetry in East-West relations could be achieved and tensions resulting from frustration avoided.

This stress on the multilateral framework contrasted with the enthusiasm shown by members from several countries (such as Austria and Rumania) for the bilateral contacts which they had developed and considered as valuable in building bridges between the blocs, as well

as in providing the basis for technical cooperation and the inter-specialisation of industry. Others, indeed, felt that bilateralism was inevitable, pointing out that bilateralism was prevalent between countries of the East as well as between East and West, and that it was often Eastern countries which took the initiative in developing bilateral relations with the West. Furthermore, it was brought to the attention of the conference that the inequality of the Eastern bloc should not be overstressed, as a number of Eastern bloc countries were high in the charts of industrial producers.

II

The role which the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, ought to play within Europe gave rise to two questions. The first being whether it is possible to exclude either from the development of European politics, and the second, whether this would be desirable. It is apparent that the first needs to be answered before the second becomes relevant. One viewpoint attempted to differentiate between the United States and the Soviet Union on the basis that the latter country forms part of Europe geographically, as well as sharing with other European countries the experience of being occupied by the troops of the Third Reich. This differentiation was attacked both on the ground that neither of the superpowers will allow itself to be excluded from European affairs, and also on the basis that this viewpoint attempted to allow for Europe its old role as the centre of world politics. No European country represented a major nuclear power. Europe therefore had to adapt to a neutral position since it could no longer have a great influence upon extra-European events.

The role of the superpowers within Europe revolved in part upon the effect that conflicts outside of Europe involving confrontation of Russia and the United States would have upon the detente in Europe. the "divisibility of peace", a phrase taken from the paper which had been presented by Mr. Karl E. Birnbaum, provided the focal point

for the discussion. One proposition was that Russia and the United States have a mutual interest in protecting Europe from involvement in conflicts which might break out in other parts of the world, while the states of Europe themselves were losing their sense of responsibility for world security.

The proposition that divisibility is possible was attacked on the grounds that such a state was undesirable as it seemed to embody a Eurocentric concept of world affairs. It was put forward that there were tensions all over the world which emanated from universal problems. In today's shrinking world, these events have an impact upon political relationships within Europe, especially in the age of television. Some, moreover, could not share the optimistic view that the present exclusion of Europe from outside events would continue indefinitely. The continuation of global conflicts in a world where two superpowers confronted each other while maintaining a political and military presence in Europe meant that any meaningful stabilisation of the psychological detente in Europe would involve a triangular system of Russia, the United States and Europe in an attempt to safeguard the present restricted security.

A less pessimistic position was that this global confrontation was unlikely as the superpowers established their respective spheres of influence throughout the world. Moreover, it was considered possible to distinguish between the divisibility of peace and the divisibility of politics: while Europe could be safeguarded from the contagion of wars occurring in the Middle East and Asia, the political impact of these wars upon the relations amongst the European states was a reality.

Thus one might characterise the present situation as being one of negative divisibility, in that the political impact of global conflicts made the process of reconciliation of the states of Europe the more difficult to achieve.

III

The significance and the role of the protests made by the young today for the detente formed a continuous theme for the conference. The young posed the example of tensions within states which could be as significant as those between states. Outside the old ideological boundaries of the cold war, the students demonstrated the interpenetration of ideas that had taken place between East and West. Some saw only specific localised reasons for the student demonstrations. For others, the roots lay deeper in generalised protests against manipulation, the stabilisation of systems moving to a higher industrial level, or against the differences in the presentation of certain ideals (such as liberty and justice) and their practice within the states of Europe. Another viewpoint was that the young were rejecting a Eurocentric concept of politics. Concerned with universal problems and the problems of the Third World, one was involved once again with the divisibility of Europe from global affairs. The young had not been taught to understand the world and had no common language with their elders. Sceptical of how long they had to live, aware of fixed institutions and unresolved problems, the students were, however, not always able to provide concrete answers. The members from Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, saw a more positive role for the young in the detente. The Czech students had been the harbingers of the reforms within their country and could provide the dynamism needed for further denouement of the cold war knot. All, however, were agreed on the importance of a greater dialogue between the young and those in positions of power. There might, indeed, be much that the young could teach the old, since the older a mind was the more difficult it might prove to reframe its way of thinking.

IV

The atmosphere, as one delegate remarked, altered considerably when the German problem was discussed. Here it was felt was the crucial problem and the most intractable. The existence of two

Germanies had resulted from an arbitrary division of Europe between two armies but now represented a fact. The desire of many Germans for reunification and the threat that the recreation of a strong Germany once more posed in central Europe reinforced the ties of East European countries with the Soviet Union and the division of Europe into two military blocs. Any plan for reunification would have to meet both the security needs of other European countries and the differing aims of the two Germanies. For the German Democratic Republic any solution would have to be based on the normalisation of relations with respect for the legal equality of both states. For the German Federal Republic any solution which forced Germany to maintain the present division indefinitely would mean discrimination against Germany that could be a source of future tension.

While the present situation was recognised as destabilising, the difficulties of finding an acceptable solution were apparent. There was general agreement, however, on the necessity of a multilateral formula in a broader setting based on the acceptance of the present political boundaries and the establishment of a security system for Europe as a whole. There was also fairly general agreement that a solution to the German problem would ultimately lie in the acceptance of complete freedom for each of the two Germanies and recognition by each Germany of the other's sovereign status. No solution could be achieved through the use of force. This recognition, it was acknowledged, would not be possible at the present time but, on the other hand, it was merely a matter of time-table. If the development of other relations - such as economic and cultural links - were to go ahead, the rigidity of the present divisions would be eroded by a developing porosity. The final boundary of legal recognition then would be crossed easily and without leading to internal tensions within Germany.

V

The detente is a fact but the divisions within Europe are real and must be expected to last for a time. The solutions to the major problems of Europe, such as Germany and security, can finally be achieved only in the increased unity of the European continent. The broad multilateral framework is accepted but the question remains as to which organisations have the ability to fulfil this role. Is there any organisation which has not been too marked by the history of the cold war? Will the European community of civilisation be able to overcome the differences of regimes and economic development which exist within the continent.

* * *

The Evolution of Intra-European Economic Relations

Chairman: Mr. Laszlo BATI, Karl Marx University of Economics,
Department of International Relations, Budapest.

There exists among the countries of Eastern Europe a general trend to the opening up of relations with the Western world, and especially with Western Europe. This trend acts upon the economic relations of Europe as well as upon the political. More precisely one can see changes taking place in COMECON which can allow us to differentiate between the Socialist countries in their relations with each other and with the Western world.

The possibility of an increase in the exchanges between Eastern Europe and Western exists since the differences between the two systems is not as great as generally believed, given that the large enterprises of the West are often strongly tied by political pressures.

The obstacles to the development of the economic relations of the two blocs may be grouped into two main categories: firstly, those derived from the structure of economic relations between East and West; and secondly, internal limitations within the individual countries.

One main structural obstacle to the developing of trade lies in what was termed the 'barbarian' system of bilateral trading arrangements between East and West. The centrally directed trade monopoly system existing in the socialist countries of the East was seen as the major obstacle. This system is not necessary to the functioning of a socialist economy, as Yugoslavia has demonstrated. In the East, COMECON has not achieved its aim of developing collaboration between the socialist economies, and has led to the

fostering of autarchic economies in the East, which are contrary to the development of trade links. One suggestion was that regional trade agreements should be signed between the small countries of East and Central Europe to develop the economies of these areas. This process would provide a more substantial base for intra-European trade. For the countries of the East, the economic groupings which had developed in the West had made the creation of trade links the more difficult. EEC and EFTA rendered an inward orientation of the Occidental countries a significant obstacle, so that there was a danger that instead of creating trade these groupings would merely serve the purpose of creating larger and more formidable protectionist barriers.

In the second category of obstacles to East-West trade, one can posit the example of the fact that although the reforms within the East were opening up that part of Europe to trade, these countries were not able to take advantage since the art of modern marketing had not been mastered by the socialist countries. Competitive prices were not sufficient to export into the consumer economies of the West: hidden persuaders had an important role to play. One more example is provided by the neglect of the market of Eastern Europe by the United States due to the effective barrier that Congress provided to the passing of the East/West Trade Act, despite the favourable attitude of business and the Executive. This trade would be of particular interest to the East since the United States was so far advanced in many of the modern sectors of industry, such as micro-electronics.

In addition to this, one must take account of historical development. Countries which were previously purely agricultural have become producers of industrial goods. The result has been that regionalism as it was understood a few years ago has changed in character, at

least from the economic point of view.

One opinion was that the only positive solution was the break down of the economic barriers which had been erected around states and groups of states. It should be borne in mind that these are not merely economic in nature but are also political.

The only European institution which groups both socialist and Western states together is EEC (Economic Commission for Europe). This institution is the bridge which unites the two parts of Europe and is thus the only organ which can aid in intra-European economic cooperation. But the German Democratic Republic is not represented.

However, up to the present, the EEC has not been able to realise concrete results. If we wish to achieve real results, it is necessary to examine practical measures. To this end, the institutes of international relations can bring very great help.

If, on the other hand, such an evolution of the EEC appears not to be realisable, or if the fact that that institution is one of the economic commissions of the United Nations proves too serious a limitation upon its effectiveness, it will be necessary to search for another means, another institution, purely European, outside the Common Market and EFTA, to be a more favourable instrument for the detente in Europe and the development of East-West relations. This task is all the more important since economic cooperation between states with different socio-political systems can only be a positive factor for the stabilization and the security of Europe.

The Evolution of Intra-European Cultural Relations

Chairman: M. Altiero SPINELLI, Director, Istituto affari internazionali, Rome.

The cold war has acted since the Second World War, against the development of cultural relations between the countries of Europe with differing political systems. This is related to the fact that these cultural relations have been subordinated to the dictates of ideological viewpoints and the requirements of evangelical foreign policies. Until the early 1960's the great powers were not interested in the cultural life of the small countries, with the result that a painful ignorance allowed the propagation of preconceived ideas and the development of stereotypes.

Differences were expressed on the importance of cultural factors for the development of the detente. For some, cultural factors were marginal, but for the majority, cultural exchanges were a most efficacious instrument for the development of international cooperation. This was especially true in those groups, such as scientists, where differences in ideological outlook were not so pronounced.

The suspicion which existed between states on the exchange of cultural contacts has begun to diminish since the advent of the 1960's. For example, a conference was held in 1962 under the auspices of UNESCO on the cultural life of South-East Europe. The results were so encouraging that another conference was held in 1966 at Sophia with more than 70 participants, among whom were specialists from the Soviet Union and the United States. The high academic level of these discussions has increased to the point where these cultural questions can be discussed free from political influences.

To accelerate this process it is necessary that the contacts between national cultures should multiply. Student exchanges above all should be developed, as well as the transmission of information.

This is not easy for reasons of finance (for example, the limited number of grants available and the foreign exchange problems of countries of Eastern Europe). The lack of a cultural organisation covering the European field has made itself felt. The organisations existing are either world organisations (such as UNESCO) or open to a limited number of European states (CCC within the Council of Europe and the European Centre of Culture, Geneva). It is necessary that cultural relations on the European level should be institutionalised to move beyond the present bilateral structure.

In organising the cultural relations one must be careful to remember and to respect the diversity of the cultural life of Europe, and not attempt to assimilate those divergent cultures which do exhibit similarities into all embracing 'groupings'. One must conversely also bear in mind the unity of the European cultural heritage, which can unite Marxists and non-Marxists.

It is clear that cultural relations will not be able to resolve the major problems which face Europe today. However, cultural contacts can help in the development of a common understanding of those problems and so facilitate a dialogue across the political frontier of Europe. The cold war has hindered the development of free cultural contacts in the East and the West and has favoured the establishment of an 'official' culture and the waging of a cultural propaganda war. It is a free and unguided culture which must be allowed to develop within Europe if the results are to be at all meaningful.

Future Relations Between the European Institute of International Relations

Chairman: Jacques FREYMOND, Director, Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales, Geneva.

The discussion of the question of the future relations of the Institutes turned on two main questions:

- 1) Are the meetings between the directors of the institutes sufficiently useful to justify their continuence;
- 2) If so, what improvements could be made in the organisation, and what should be the subject of the next meeting.

On the first question, the debate was opened with the view that the formula of the meetings had not justified itself.

The reasons for this one can summarize as follows:

- a. The institutes represented were of too varied a nature and had too differing interests for a useful annual meeting to be held. Academic discussion in a scientific fashion was not possible since the directors of Institutes were often not experts in the subjects which were in need of serious investigation. The result was a general debate which did little to advance the intellectual contribution to the field of international relations.
- b. There was a lack of clear purpose for the meetings. If the raison d'être were not merely the understanding of the subject but were to be for the advancement of the detente by establishing contacts between East and West, then it would best be left to those best qualified to influence national policy, and not include specialised research institutes. In addition, while meetings of the latter type may have been useful at the end of the cold war, contacts were now so advanced that their utility was to be doubted.

c. The conference was too large in size for any real discussion to be possible. 10/20 is the maximum number of participants that should be envisaged: beyond that discussions became over-formalised.

In the defence of the formula which was employed, it was pointed out that while there might be a number of conferences within the two blocs, and bilateral East-West meetings, there were few occasions for a multilateral conference representing both blocs. A number of delegates attested to the value that the conference had for making contacts with members from the other bloc and with those engaged on the same problems and fields of study. On this point of facilities for contact, many felt that the present conference had not allowed sufficient possibility for informal discussion and that provision for this should be made in future conferences.

There were a number of suggestions for the improvement of the framework for the conference:

1. The necessity for ample preparation was stressed. For this end it was suggested that a steering committee could be established to delineate the subjects to be discussed and to choose the working document for the next conference.
2. Each Institute could present a paper on the progress of current research projects undertaken within the Institute related to the theme of the conference. For this end, if there were to be two representatives from each Institute, the second could be a research assistant.
3. Expert knowledge on aspects of the theme to be discussed at the conference could be provided in lectures given at the conferences by an invited specialist.
4. Before a conference, each Institute should indicate to the host country its particular area of interest within the general theme. On the basis of this information, the conference in its early meetings could be divided into a number of sub-groups for discussion of these specialised subjects. Rapporteurs could present reports of the work

of the sub-groups to a plenary session.

5. While agreement to limit the numbers to 50/60 people was general, some felt that institutes from European countries not represented should be invited.

The formula which had the agreement of the majority of the participants was as follows:

A Conference of all the institutes which had been invited to the present conference should be held at Jablona in one year to be organised by the Polish Institute of International Relations, Warsaw.

The general theme should be within the general subject of European security and cooperation. The title "The Framework for European Security and Cooperation" found general acceptance. This could be more closely defined by questionnaires sent to each institute. The importance of each institute responding to these circulars was stressed.

The conference would be organised along the lines of the American Assembly: small group-discussion (two or three groups of approximately twenty members). Participants should give prior indication as to which subjects are of interest in order to allow for organisation of these groups.

The conference should be of the same duration as the present one, with more time for informal contacts.

The invitation from the Centre d'études de politique étrangère, Paris, to organise a conference in two years' time was accepted.

Genève, le 31 mai 1968

Ways and means to a détente in Europe
including an improvement of intra-German relations

23 years after the end of World War II European politics should be based upon three facts:

1. The development of atomic strategy has increased the power of the two super powers far above that of all other powers. Great Britain, France and China being atomic powers have a certain deterrence-potential, whereas the non-nuclear states militarily don't play any longer an essential part in world politics.

In Central Europe the super powers stand directly and fully armed face to face. The political, economic and strategic importance of Europe is so great that it has become of vital interest to the super powers to maintain the military balance in this part of the world. As a result neither of them will tolerate any disturbance of this military balance. Since major territorial changes in Central Europe would directly affect the military balance they would be highly dangerous. In fact, the slightest territorial change in Central Europe would need the consent of both sides. Up to now both the super powers have respected the mutual interest in the maintenance of the military balance in Central Europe; either of them realizes that a violation of this basic interest of the other party could set off atomic annihilation. The European states are aware of this situation and have practically resigned themselves to the maintenance of the military balance and the territorial status quo.

2. If neither a change of the military balance nor territorial changes in Central Europe are possible within the foreseeable future, there is no longer any reason for the two parties to live in fear of each other, a fear which formerly contributed to the growing political tensions between East and West. Consequently, the need is felt everywhere in Europe for a

further lessening of tensions in order to eliminate the threat of a futile war which would only result in the annihilation of Europe.

3. With the lessening of the political tensions between East and West, the national interests which had been over-shadowed by the East-West conflict emerged again more clearly. There has been much talk about an erosion of the blocks on either side. In reality, however, what happened within both the alliance systems was an altogether natural process: The hegemony of the super powers in either alliance system underwent a gradual transformation towards partnership with the allies. As a result more rights and duties than hitherto have fallen to the smaller members of the alliance.

This situation results in four main problems for the policy of the European states.

First it is in the Europeans' interest to promote a modus vivendi between the two super powers which though not immediately abolishing the alliance systems, will reduce the danger of military conflicts - above all of those which could result from errors, miscalculation and insignificant incidents.

Secondly provision should be made to protect the European states against violence and blackmail.

Thirdly, in a general European settlement the national interests of the Germans should be suitably considered with due regard to those of their neighbours.

Fourthly, an increase in political, economic, and cultural cooperation between the European states could result in creating greater mutual confidence among the nations and in strengthening of Europe's voice in international politics.

Problem No.1: Détente between the Super Powers

Up to now the arms race of the two super powers has not resulted in one of them being able by nuclear strike to prevent the counter-strike of the other. Also it is unlikely that such a breakthrough will take place in the course of the next few years. However, either power is able to inflict severe damage upon the other, to cause her enormous losses in men, to cripple her industrial capacity, to seriously reduce the prosperity of her citizens and to terminate its role of a world power for the time being. However important this ability of either super power in relation to the other one may be, neither of them can practically make use of it. What good is it to the aggressor to concentrate all his forces, if he cannot prevent his enemy from counter-striking nearly as hard?

In this situation neither of the two super powers seems willing to risk an armed conflict with the other. American as well as Soviet policy of the past years has proved this. The danger either super power faces is no longer an intentional act of aggression by the other side, but rather that against the will of the parties concerned a conflict could escalate to a nuclear strike or counterstrike or that such a conflict could be caused by error, miscalculation or accident.

The first kind of danger has above all become an acute threat in connection with the war in Indo-China. It will continue to be so for some time, although it is possible that it may recede after 1968. However, the same kind of danger may arise in other parts of the world. The second kind of danger has been reduced by the "hot wire" between Moscow and Washington. This "hot wire" has already proved its worth on several occasions, yet it would be rash to consider it to be an absolutely reliable remedy.

However unlikely the outbreak of a major armed conflict between the super powers may have become - their common interest in reducing whatever still exists of insecurity is great. This is borne out by the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the treaty prohibiting the military use of outer space and the draft Non-Proliferation Treaty. This trend also became visible when the super

powers reached an understanding over the "hot wire" during the Middle East crisis in 1967. It has become obvious that both super powers have carefully avoided the transfer of nuclear weapons or the control over such weapons to their allies. The interest of both the super powers in this bilateral deal is so great, especially in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, that in order to come to an agreement they have disregarded the sensitivities and interests of their respective allies.

This development has led the allies of the super powers into a dilemma: On the one hand they have been admonished by the hegemonic powers to maintain pact discipline and have been reminded of the alleged aggressiveness of the enemy; on the other hand they are merely observers when the hegemonic powers endeavour to come to terms with each other on levels above the regional alliances. Thus it is quite natural that the smaller members of the two alliance systems also insist on a political détente within Europe. France on the Western and Rumania on the Eastern side have been the most articulate advocates of such a policy, but their motives are largely the same as those of the other European states. If, after all, the détente in Europe has not yet made better progress, this is mainly due to the heritage of World War II, to the conflict in Vietnam and to mutual distrust accumulated during the Cold War. On the Western side, the latter is symbolized for example by the 1948 revolution in Prague and the Berlin crisis of the same year; on the Eastern side, it is manifested by the fear of political revisionism and territorial claims. To try to attain a détente between the two pact systems in Europe is a legitimate concern of the smaller European states who are entitled to the same consideration of their national interests as the super powers. However, the détente can only gain ground, if provision is made for the protection of the European states against war and blackmail and if the basic interests of each state concerned are duly taken into consideration.

Problem No.2: Protection from use of force and blackmail.

Both the super powers are in principle prepared to end the direct confrontation in Europe, provided that this does not result in endangering the demarcation line between their spheres of influence. In practice, however, there is a danger that this might happen, due on the one hand to the possibility of a power vacuum growing in the area, on the other to the possibility of a change of domestic policy in the countries concerned. As regards the other members of both the military alliances, they too have no objection in principle to a diminished confrontation, yet they feel that it might expose them to blackmail and the impairment of their internal stability.

As long as there is no supreme international authority which could counter these dangers effectively and in time - such as an efficient UN police-force which, however, will be utopian still at long sight -, it would appear advisable to maintain the existing alliance systems. Moreover, NATO has the particular advantage of military integration which constitutes an additional guarantee against arbitrary actions by individual member states. Nevertheless, the most suitable form of the existing alliances remains a matter for further discussion. In any case the alliances constitute a certain guarantee against a power vacuum in Central Europe, especially in the case of a regional or general reduction of armaments.

In addition, a European Security System requires that all European states renounce, in solemn and binding form, any use of and any threat to employ force. In this respect the Federal Republic of Germany has submitted proposals for discussion including suggestions for an arrangement between the two parts of Germany. These proposals have been welcomed by several governments. Finally it seems that European security would not be viable without certain guarantees by both the super powers.

If the above conditions are fulfilled, a regional reduction of armaments in Central Europe might be desirable. However, in

such a system it is important that any discrimination of individual states is avoided. One way of doing this would be by an arrangement under which those states that undertake special obligations for a reduction of armament are entitled to special protection, whereas those states that keep their full right to armaments would assume special obligations for the protection of the less armed states. One indispensable requirement of any reduction of armaments is, of course, an effective inspection system for the entire territory concerned.

The reduction of the national defence capabilities by a limitation of armaments and the renunciation of the use of force raises the question of how the vital interests of nations and social groups concerned could be effectively protected. It will be necessary to define as clearly as possible general European guide-lines for non-interference with the internal affairs of other nations if pressure against the less armed states is to be avoided. The protection of national, religious and social minorities in the European states should be assured by strict rules under European agreements providing, if possible, for a special European executive. Otherwise the lessening of East-West tensions would result in shaking Europe by the strain of its internal tensions.

All European states should strengthen existing European agencies for the supervision of human rights so that offences can be identified and enforced of the decisions of a European Law Court.

Due to the Cold War and its results, the German problem has remained unsolved to-date. It is generally admitted that a European peace settlement is impossible while one nation remains divided. The fact that there is no possibility of ending the occupation regime in Berlin for the time being and replacing it by a definite arrangement which would meet the interests of all concerned, shows how remote the prospects for a stable peace settlement in Europe still are.

It is understandable that after their experiences with the Hitler regime, European governments are reluctant to see the former German Reich restored. However, Europe will not get away from the German problem; therefore a policy aiming at a lasting settlement of the Central European problems will at least have to mitigate the division of Germany.

This aim must not necessarily be utopian, if one considers that it is in the general European interest to reduce the individual states' capacity for arbitrary action by gradually creating common European authorities. Thus the sovereignty of the individual state will gradually cease to be a menace to its neighbours. Under these circumstances Germans in either part of the country will appreciate that a European security arrangement will have to include the German problem.

The division of Germany, however, is not only a function of the relations between Germany and its neighbours, but at the same time an internal problem. In the two parts of Germany two different social structures have come into being, which cannot be abolished without the consent of the people concerned. Normal contacts can therefore be reached only if the representatives of both parts of Germany are ready to discuss all pertinent questions. The discussions should, of course, be taken up without any preconditions and are held on a basis of equality without discrimination or subordination of either side. For practical purposes it would be advisable to take the less disputed questions first, a practice that has proved useful in discussions on other political problems (e.g. disarmament where the first items negotiated were agreements on arms control); however, it won't do to disregard the fundamental differences of opinion.

The purpose of such discussions between authorized representatives of the two governments in Germany should be to obtain an improvement of internal relations to the advantage of both parties and not to freeze them. This means that both parties must be ready to show tolerance. Neither side must make changes in the political system of the other a precondition for discussions or seek to upset the system of the other. Discussions

would be blocked right from the beginning if one side were to demand changes which would result in a collapse of the system on the other side.

For the time being, the only real progress apparently possible in the German question, would be to achieve a kind of cooperation by agreement. If this were attained, it could be an important German contribution to the détente. The two parts of Germany should first discuss the possibility of a cooperation which - without endangering the stability - would result in unimpeded relations and greater freedom of movement among the people. Under the prevailing circumstances a facilitation of contacts between Germans under the two existing governments in Germany will be the only means to soothe feelings of discrimination and frustration and at the same time further the cause of European cooperation.

Problem No.4: Development of the cooperation.

The emergence of the idea of "peaceful coexistence" meant great progress as against the situation of the "Cold War". Yet, coexistence is not an end in itself since it does not bring to an end the political instability in Europe. This merely passive form of peaceful behaviour does not remove the mutual distrust of the governments. However, the time appears to have come for an effort to overcome distrust by promoting cooperation between West and East European states on a bilateral and, wherever suitable, on a multilateral basis.

In the economic field cooperation between the states of Western and Eastern Europe has already made considerable progress. Over a period of several years the bilateral economic relations have been strengthened to mutual advantage. Organizational and theoretical questions have been successfully approached on a multilateral basis within the framework of the Economic Commission for Europe. As a result common statistical criteria have been elaborated and problems of the various economies have been discussed.

Particular problems arise from the economic groupings in Western and Eastern Europe EEC and CMEA. The Common Market has resulted in a great economic expansion in the member countries, but at the same time it has raised barriers for third countries, particularly in the field of agriculture. CMEA too, can show good results in certain fields, e.g. a bilateral as well as a multilateral division of labour and specialization. On the other hand it has not always served to the best advantage of its members, because during a certain period economic principles have been disregarded and coordination has not always been successful. When distrust is overcome, it is likely that in spite of the different systems of EEC and CMEA the cooperation between Western and Eastern countries will considerably improve. In a more favourable political climate the members of the EEC might well be prepared to intensify their economic relations with states in Eastern Europe which are interested in extending those relations.

That cooperation is not only concerned with the problems of a direct exchange of goods, but also with common research and development in those sectors in which, at the present level of technology, the means of a single state are not sufficient to close the gap separating them from the super powers. The improvement of the economic infrastructure and the development of tourism raise a lot of common problems for the states of Europe. United efforts in this field could be useful for all parts of Europe. The same applies to the development aid where up to now the countries have competed with each other instead of cooperating. The cooperation of West and East in this field would lead to a greater benefit for the developing countries and minimize expenditure of the industrial states.

In the cultural field relations are hampered by the mutual fear that cultural activities could be used for ideological influence. Nevertheless, cooperation in the cultural field has made considerable progress. This applies mainly to writers and artists, but cooperation in the field of science has also achieved good results. The Federal Republic of Germany has made encouraging experiences with the exchange of exhibitions which further mutual

understanding. Thus the Exhibition of Architecture in three cities of the USSR and the Soviet Exhibition on the occasion of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution in three West-German cities proved a great success for either side. A gradual increase of cultural cooperation seems to be feasible, and the currency problems can be overcome by carrying out these exchanges on a mutual basis.

The chances for political cooperation, which has only just begun, must be expected to remain rather limited for some time. In this field the political scientists could do some pioneer work through theoretical discussions (independent of the governments and without obligation on their part) of the problems of a stable peace settlement in Europe.

It is a task of the conference of the directors and representatives of the European institutes for international relations to contribute to this discussion. Once the danger of military conflict in Central Europe today has receded, the prospects for peaceful cooperation are favourable. When this is duly recognized by the European governments and distrust and resentment have been largely overcome, it will be possible to divers large financial means, hitherto absorbed by the arms race, to productive purposes.

CONFERENCE DES DIRECTEURS ET REPRESENTANTS DES INSTITUTS
EUROPEENS DE RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES

Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales

Genève, 9-12 mai 1968

LES ELEMENTS DE LA SECURITE EUROPEENNE

Institut polonais des relations internationales

Varsovie

Personne ne conteste plus, de nos jours, l'opportunité d'une discussion sur la sécurité européenne ni la nécessité des mesures concrètes à prendre pour aboutir à ce but. De nombreuses propositions ont été avancées, qui visent à assurer des conditions de sécurité en Europe. La variété de ces propositions et le vaste dialogue qui se déroule à leur sujet sont les éléments positifs de la situation actuelle en Europe. La condition fondamentale des résultats fructueux des discussions en cours est de soulever les problèmes clés de la sécurité de l'Europe. Il semble en effet qu'à l'étape actuelle la question la plus importante consiste à mettre au point les solutions concertées des problèmes politiques, militaires et économiques concrets et à aborder leur réalisation.

De notre côté, nous aimerions apporter une contribution concrète à cette discussion et indiquer les mesures à notre avis fondamentales, dont la mise en oeuvre nous rapprochera d'une solution surmontant la division de l'Europe.

I. Eléments de base

Les réflexions ayant pour objet la détente et la sécurité européennes ne peuvent être poursuivies en vase clos, séparément de la situation du monde dans son ensemble. Bien que les conflits armés à l'heure actuelle aient lieu en dehors de l'Europe, on sait qu'ils gênent, voire empêchent parfois la réalisation des mesures de détente en Europe. D'un autre côté, des efforts efficaces tendant à régler la situation sur notre continent seraient de nature à exercer une influence positive sur la solution des conflits et des crises en d'autres parties du monde. Il est donc à la fois souhaitable et urgent d'entreprendre de tels efforts.

Tout conflit dit local, surgissant en dehors de l'Europe risque - tout au long de sa durée, de son développement et de son escalade - de se transformer en conflit global, du fait qu'il retentit directement sur l'ensemble des relations internationales. Ainsi l'agression américaine au Vietnam est-elle le principal obstacle à la détente internationale. Ce qui également, à un degré moindre, fait augmenter la tension dans le monde, c'est la situation au Moyen-Orient, et en particulier le refus d'Israël d'exécuter la résolution du Conseil de Sécurité du 22 novembre 1967. Les foyers de guerre existant au-delà de l'Europe et le calme relatif en Europe ne changent en rien le fait que notre continent demeure le principal terrain de confrontation des deux systèmes socio-politiques opposés et des deux principaux groupements politico-militaires - d'autant plus que l'ingérence des Etats-Unis dans les affaires de l'Europe est inspirée par la conception de la stratégie globale et attise les tensions locales.

Les nombreuses considérations relatives à la sécurité européenne constatent au départ qu'un équilibre de forces existe sur notre continent. L'élément intégral de cet équilibre est la carte politique de l'Europe.

Cet équilibre implique que les mesures tendant à améliorer la situation en Europe ne sauraient la troubler, tandis que ce qui la menace ce sont les ambitions et les prétentions territoriales de l'impérialisme allemand qui mettent ainsi en danger la sécurité internationale.

Comme le démontre l'expérience historique, ce danger menace tous les Etats européens, quel que soit celui qui est directement et incessamment visé par ces ambitions ou prétentions.

Ainsi ni le calme réel, quoique relatif, ni le pacte atomique, ni le fait que les actes d'agression sont dernièrement commis en dehors de l'Europe n'enlèvent rien

à la gravité et à l'urgence du problème de la sécurité européenne. Car en Europe existent toujours des foyers de tension politique et de conflits ainsi que la plus grande concentration de troupes, y compris celles dotées d'armes d'extermination massive, ce qui fait naître une tension sur le plan militaire. En admettant même que la probabilité d'un conflit armé est ici moindre que dans certaines autres parties du monde, les risques qu'impliquerait un tel conflit sont en revanche incomparablement plus graves.

La division de l'Europe en deux camps opposés, qui date de la fin des années quarante et de la première moitié des années cinquante, est artificielle. Elle a fait relâcher les multiples liens traditionnels de coopération, commerciaux et culturels entre les pays européens, elle a fait dresser plusieurs barrières artificielles. Adhérant en 1955 avec les autres pays socialistes au Pacte de Varsovie, à la suite de l'admission de la RFA à l'OTAN et à la CEE, la Pologne ne considérerait nullement que la division de l'Europe fût souhaitable. Quant au Pacte de Varsovie, c'est la première et l'unique alliance multilatérale dans l'histoire qui contienne la clause d'auto-dissolution en cas de création d'un système européen général de sécurité collective. Le dialogue entre les pays de l'Europe orientale et ceux de l'Europe occidentale, qui se développe de plus en plus intensément dans les années soixante, prouve que les pays européens, dans leur écrasante majorité, sont de plus en plus conscients que la division de l'Europe est pénible et nocive, qu'elle n'a nullement résolu les problèmes de la sécurité des Etats européens, mais a encore augmenté la tension et la menace. Aussi la conviction s'affermir-elle qu'il est nécessaire de surmonter cet état de choses.

Le mythe du danger communiste, qui a été inventé pour mener la politique d'isolement du monde socialiste et

qui a provoqué la division du monde entier et celle de l'Europe, n'est plus pris au sérieux sans doute par aucune politique réaliste. La politique conséquemment pacifique des pays socialistes et, en particulier, de l'URSS y a grandement contribué. Cependant des éléments de méfiance réciproque ne sont pas entièrement éliminés et il est certain qu'on ne peut liquider d'un jour à l'autre les conséquences de la "guerre froide" qui a duré près de vingt ans.

Le point de départ à adopter pour servir de fondement à la sécurité européenne devrait être l'équilibre et la situation territoriale existant en Europe, qui réclament cependant des bases plus solides et plus saines, à savoir les rapports de bon voisinage, le respect de l'intégrité territoriale, de la souveraineté et de l'indépendance nationale, l'égalité des droits, la non ingérence dans les affaires intérieures et les avantages mutuels. L'affiliation des Etats européens à deux systèmes socio-politiques différents ne représente à cet égard aucun obstacle. Il n'existe aucun domaine de la coopération pacifique où ces Etats ne puissent trouver la possibilité de prendre des mesures mutuellement avantageuses.

La cassure de l'Europe n'est pas due à l'existence sur ce continent des pays à systèmes politiques différents, de même qu'elle ne résulte pas de l'existence des deux Etats allemands. La frontière entre ces deux Etats, qui est, à l'heure actuelle, une ligne de tension, peut cesser de l'être dès qu'elle ne sera plus l'objet des visées expansionnistes et dès que les deux Etats allemands auront, chacun, la place égale qui leur est due dans le système de sécurité collective en Europe, vers la création duquel doivent converger les plus gros efforts.

La solution du problème allemand dont le trait substantiel est, d'une part, l'existence des deux Etats allemands et, d'autre part, la politique de l'un d'eux, qui freine les processus de détente et de rapprochement en Europe, devrait être subordonnée à l'intérêt primordial de la sécurité européenne. La question des frontières ne saurait être examinée séparément des problèmes de la sécurité européenne, car elle est la condition majeure de cette sécurité. La sécurité des peuples européens, qui était le motif dominant des actes internationaux posant les fondations de l'Europe d'après-guerre, devrait continuer à servir de prémisse fondamentale dans la recherche des solutions efficaces à l'avenir. Or, la solution du problème allemand doit tenir compte des intérêts de tous les Etats européens à l'Est et à l'Ouest, et surtout de ceux des voisins de l'Allemagne.

L'action commune des Etats européens en faveur de la consolidation de la sécurité et de la coopération internationales, qui viendrait se substituer à la division actuelle, ne peut laisser de place à la discrimination d'aucun Etat européen, eu égard à son étendue, à son système politique, aux pays qui entretiennent avec lui les relations diplomatiques ou pour toute autre raison. Le postulat de non discrimination se rapporte aussi à la RDA, Etat allemand qui, conformément aux Accords de Potsdam, a extirpé le nazisme, le militarisme et le révisionnisme, accepté les conséquences de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, renoncé aux prétentions politiques et territoriales et représente un important facteur de la stabilité et de l'équilibre en Europe. La non discrimination pourrait notamment se manifester utilement par l'appui donné par les Etats européens à la candidature des deux Etats allemands à l'ONU.

Dans cette communauté, dont l'existence justifie le fait que, actuellement, presque tous les Etats européens

se laissent guider dans leurs rapports mutuels - sans égard aux différences de système politique - par les principes de coopération pacifique, on ne saurait mettre en question - comme on le fait en RFA - la situation territoriale et politique en Europe ni user du chantage en faisant jouer la menace du nationalisme extrémiste et du néo-fascisme. Bien que la crainte de cette menace puisse se justifier en tout état de cause, l'expérience des années trente a démontré qu'on n'assure pas la sécurité en cédant à la menace. Les intérêts de la sécurité du continent exigent qu'on s'oppose à temps collectivement et fermement à ces phénomènes, quels que soient l'endroit et l'époque où ils se manifestent.

II. Le but

En ramenant la vision de l'Europe future sur le terrain des idées réalistes on peut affirmer qu'une possibilité réelle est apparue du développement pacifique de l'Europe et d'une consolidation de sa sécurité où l'appartenance aux alliances militaires et même leur existence deviendraient caduques.

Il n'est pas réaliste de se proposer une liquidation rapide de toutes les sources de litiges et de conflits internationaux. La tâche réelle consiste à créer les conditions telles où les situations litigieuses ne mettront pas en danger l'existence pacifique des peuples européens.

Certes, la reconnaissance des frontières existantes en Europe contribuerait à approfondir les processus de détente, car la question fondamentale est de renoncer aux prétentions visant à ébranler la situation territoriale établie d'une façon irrévocable en Europe.

Des mesures de détente et de désarmement auraient une importance essentielle. Il en serait de même avec l'extension des rapports de bon voisinage entre tous les Etats européens, notamment par le développement des contacts

économiques, de la coopération scientifique, technique et culturelle. Et il ne s'agit pas seulement d'un développement numérique des contacts mutuels, mais de leur amélioration qualitative - liquidation de toutes pratiques discriminatoires et entière application des principes de non intervention, d'égalité et d'avantages mutuels.

La normalisation des rapports en Europe équivaut à la multiplication des liens de coopération pacifique entre les pays européens, sans la nécessité de porter atteinte aux liens déjà constitués à l'avantage des intéressés immédiats. Cette normalisation rend plus proche la vision d'un système où les blocs militaires, qui donnent à leurs membres le sentiment d'une sécurité relative, seraient remplacés par un système de sécurité collective, donnant le sentiment de la sécurité entière.

III. Les mesures proposées à l'étape actuelle

Une Europe pacifique et coopérante doit être édiflée progressivement. Cependant, pour que les mesures prises entraînent les changements souhaitables vers une amélioration de l'atmosphère et de la situation en Europe, il faut que, tout en étant progressives, elles ne soient pas marginales. Cela veut dire qu'elles doivent tendre à la solution des problèmes fondamentaux. Les mesures marginales ne peuvent donner qu'une apparence de progrès, en laissant en fait irrésolues toutes les questions clés. Aussi faut-il aborder en premier lieu la solution des problèmes décisifs pour l'ensemble de la situation en Europe. Une grande importance reviendrait donc aux mesures qui, tant dans le domaine politique que militaire, réduiraient d'une façon concrète le risque de déclenchement d'une guerre.

Les mesures de détente doivent être adéquates aux séquelles de la guerre froide en Europe. Il faut donc liquider en premier lieu les conséquences de la guerre froide, qui se manifestent encore dans les rapports entre les pays européens.

L'évolution des tendances à la détente signifie en particulier que les rapports de tous les Etats en Europe en bénéficieraient, y compris les rapports entre les pays de l'Europe occidentale et la RDA, et en particulier entre la RFA et RDA ainsi qu'entre la RFA et les pays de l'Europe orientale. Il faut pour cela que la RFA reconnaisse l'état de choses existant. Le fait qu'elle en reste à ne pas ^{re} connaître les choses telles qu'elles sont et qu'elle essaie de mettre en question les de la seconde guerre mondiale en font un facteur conséquences qui gêne et détruit même les chances de stabilité politique et de coopération en Europe.

Les mesures tendant à renforcer la sécurité de l'Europe peuvent être divisées en mesures strictement politiques et mesures partielles (régionales) dans le domaine militaire (mesures de désarmement).

L'ancienne polémique entre les partisans de la thèse "la sécurité d'abord, le désarmement ensuite" et ceux de la théorie opposée semble avoir été tranchée par les événements qui ont démontré une sorte de contre-réaction qui se produit entre les deux éléments.

Nous considérons comme mesure remarquable tendant à consolider la détente et la sécurité européennes la conclusion d'un accord sur la non prolifération d'armes nucléaires. Cet accord, bien que de portée mondiale, possède une importance particulière en ce qui concerne le continent européen justement. La solution du problème de la non prolifération d'armes nucléaires et la conclusion d'un accord international approprié créeront des conditions favorables à l'action tendant à arrêter la course aux armements, en particulier aux armements nucléaires ainsi qu'à interdire et à détruire les armes nucléaires.

Un élément essentiel de la détente et du rétablissement de la confiance entre les pays de notre continent serait l'obligation prise de renoncer dans les rapports réciproques à l'emploi de la force et à la menace de son emploi ainsi qu'à l'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures d'autres pays. Une telle obligation n'est pas superflue du fait qu'elle se trouve déjà dans la Charte de l'ONU, et nous n'avons pas à l'esprit le

fait que quelques Etats européens ne font pas partie de l'ONU. En de nombreuses occasions, des Etats de différentes régions et de différents continents ont renouvelé cette obligation, après la création de l'ONU, en la concrétisant pour les rapports inter-régionaux ou inter-continentaux donnés. En ce qui concerne les rapports en Europe, une telle concrétisation devient d'autant plus importante et a d'autant plus de chances d'être décisive que les Etats de notre continent sont divisés en deux blocs militaires.

Les obligations de ce genre prises dans les conditions concrètes existant en Europe feraient disparaître les incertitudes sur les différentes intentions quant au statut territorial et politique de l'Europe, contribueraient à stabiliser la situation en Europe et à accroître le sentiment de sécurité des pays européens. Certes, pour la cause de la sécurité et de la coopération en Europe, il est nécessaire que tous les Etats européens, y compris les deux Etats allemands, prennent de telles obligations.

Ce qui faciliterait de surmonter la division de l'Europe ainsi que la méfiance et l'incertitude dans les rapports mutuels entre les Etats de ce continent, c'est la diminution de la tension militaire, cette espèce de barrière militaire dans la zone où se trouvent les Etats socialistes et capitalistes de l'Europe, les Etats membres de l'OTAN et ceux du Pacte de Varsovie. La Pologne a déjà émis des propositions à cet égard (Plan Rapacki et Plan Gomulka), qui ont eu un large retentissement en Europe et qui conservent leur entière actualité.

Le gel des armements nucléaires sur le territoire névralgique de l'Europe centrale pourrait être accompagné du gel des armements conventionnels dans cette zone. Ces mesures pourraient être munies d'un appareil de contrôle international, y compris des postes d'observation aux endroits concertés. Il est évident que cette mesure, sans modifier en rien les effectifs existants, n'ébranle pas non plus l'équilibre actuel, et l'on sait que les pays intéressés sont particulièrement sensibles sur ce point, pour des raisons d'ailleurs parfaitement compréhensibles. Une

telle mesure a surtout une signification politique et elle fait partie de la prévention de la course aux armements nucléaires et conventionnels dans la zone et de la tension qui en résulte.

Egalement les propositions de création d'une zone désatomisée en Europe centrale gardent leur entière actualité. L'institution d'une telle zone pourrait s'accompagner d'une réduction concertée des forces armées conventionnelles sur son territoire et d'un système de contrôle international. Cette zone bénéficierait des garanties "d'intangibilité nucléaire" de la part des puissances nucléaires. La zone désatomisée ainsi conçue ne modifie ni l'équilibre stratégique dans les rapports entre les grandes puissances, ni l'équilibre conventionnel sur le territoire de la zone. Outre une influence politique sur les progrès de la détente, l'institution d'une zone désatomisée signifierait aussi une diminution du danger de conflit armé sur le territoire de contact des deux blocs.

Les propositions d'institution d'une zone de gel des armements nucléaires et d'une zone désatomisée ne perdront rien de leur actualité non plus en cas de conclusion d'un accord sur la non prolifération des armes nucléaires ou de renonciation à l'emploi de la force et à l'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures d'autres pays.

La conception de zones désatomisées ou de gel des armements nucléaires peut trouver une très vaste application en Europe. Cependant le sens politique des mesures de ce genre exige que ces zones englobent en tout cas les territoires où cela signifiera une réelle prévention de la course aux armements ou une réelle détente.

Les rapports économiques représentent un autre et vaste domaine qui demande à être normalisé. Les possibilités d'échanges et de coopération économique entre les pays de l'Europe occidentale et ceux de l'Europe orientale sont

loin d'être complètement mis à profit, au détriment de tous les intéressés. Les liens économiques traditionnels et mutuellement avantageux se sont très sérieusement relâchés à l'époque de la guerre froide pour des raisons de politique générale. La période d'une certaine détente en Europe n'a fait que légèrement améliorer cette situation, car le principal obstacle au développement des échanges économiques est constitué par les barrières résultant de l'existence d'un bloc fermé en Europe occidentale. Si nous prenons en considération la thèse générale avancée au début, à savoir que le développement de la coopération européenne signifie la multiplication des liens de coopération sans porter atteinte à ceux qui se sont révélés avantageux pour les intéressés, il faut considérer comme déplacées les tentatives d'immixtion dans les organisations économiques internationales qui existent en Europe. Il est nécessaire cependant de considérer les mesures et les méthodes au moyen desquelles on pourrait réagir contre une évolution indésirable où l'intégration économique de tel ou tel groupe d'Etats signifierait en même temps la désintégration économique de l'Europe en tant que continent. Ainsi arrive à sa maturation le problème consistant à concilier les intérêts économiques des pays membres respectifs du CAEM, de la CEE et de l'AEE. A cet effet, on pourrait agir sur le forum que représente la Commission économique de l'ONU.

Nous avons également à l'ordre du jour le problème important de la coopération scientifico-technique des Etats européens afin d'utiliser au mieux leur potentiel technique. Cette question est particulièrement urgente face à la dépendance économique croissante de l'Europe occidentale vis-à-vis des Etats-Unis, face à la "lacune technologique" de plus en plus large entre l'Europe et l'Amérique du Nord, face aussi à la nécessité consciente pour l'Europe occiden-

tale de relever le "défi américain" et de s'opposer à l'avalanche des capitaux américains dans toute l'Europe occidentale. La mise en place de la coopération économique et scientifico-technique, l'union des efforts de toute l'Europe, y compris le potentiel scientifique et industriel de l'URSS et des autres pays socialistes, l'utilisation des possibilités latentes du marché et de la production de l'Europe entière offrirait des perspectives nouvelles et optimistes.

De divers côtés des propositions sont avancées quant aux modes de solution des problèmes qui le nécessitent, et qui peuvent faire l'objet de discussions utiles. Dans ces conditions, la Pologne a proposé une conférence internationale sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe, avec participation de tous les pays intéressés. Nous estimons que les conditions requises pour une telle conférence mûrissent toujours davantage. Elle devrait avoir pour objet les questions essentielles et susceptibles de solutions concertées. Une liste de ces questions pourrait être établie par la voie de consultation et il ne semble utile ni nécessaire de préciser prématurément l'objet des débats. Certes, une réunion ne permettra pas de résoudre les problèmes aigus de l'Europe, mais elle peut contribuer à frayer la voie vers leur solution, au cours d'autres rencontres éventuellement. On évitera tout désappointement si l'on pose des buts réels devant une telle conférence.

* * * * *

Un degré déterminé de la détente en Europe a déjà été atteint grâce au respect effectif par presque tous les Etats d'Europe des principes de bon voisinage et de coopération pacifique dans la pratique politique courante des rapports réciproques entre les Etats de l'Europe orientale et occidentale.

En adoptant comme point de départ l'équilibre de forces ainsi que la situation politique et territoriale en Europe, les mesures proposées visent à créer des bases durables de la sécurité de l'Europe. Elles se ramènent en substance à :

- s'engager à renoncer à la force ou à la menace de son emploi dans les rapports réciproques et à l'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures d'autres pays;
- réaliser des mesures partielles de désarmement, afin de diminuer les risques d'une confrontation armée;
- développer la coopération entre Etats dans les différents domaines des échanges internationaux.

Le but fondamental de ce programme est le développement pacifique, l'indépendance et le bien-être des peuples européens.

German Institute of Contemporary History

Berlin, April 1968

Relations Between the two German States and their
Influence on a System of all-European Security and
Cooperation

1. The conviction that a cooperation of the states and peoples of our nations, which serves the safeguard of European peace, can only be based on the recognition of the territorial status quo and the respect of the principle of sovereign equality of all states and peoples is more and more spreading and deepening.

This tendency fully accords with the principle of collective responsibility for a lasting safeguard of peace as laid down in article 1/1 of the UN Charter, and with the principle of the utility of regional agreements and organs which - according to article 52 of the UN Charter - are to contribute to guaranteeing peace and security in the world.

Inter-European developments and the influence of processes outside our continent, e.g. the prolonged escalation of the US aggression in Vietnam and its effects, compel us not to tolerate any loss of time in settling regional problems of security and cooperation in Europe. On the other hand, the circumstances for such solutions are more advantageous today than ever before. Let us recall article 11 of the

Warsaw treaty of May 1955 under which this treaty loses its validity when an all-European collective system of security can take its place; let us recall the fact that in 1969 the 20-year validity of the NATO pact will have expired, and the progress made in extending bilateral relations with states with different socio-economic orders in Europe.

2. The GDR government promotes this trend towards an international détente by striving to normalize relations of the GDR with the FRG and with all European countries.

In his letters to Federal Chancellor Kiesinger of May 10 and September 18, 1967 Willy Stoph, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR, proposed to enter into negotiations on the basic questions of the nation at the seat of the GDR government in Berlin or of the Federal government in Bonn. At the same time, Willy Stoph submitted the draft of a treaty on the establishment and cultivation of normal relations between the GDR and the FRG for discussion and passing. Under article 2 of the draft treaty the two governments were to reach an agreement on the renunciation of force and to engage themselves to base their mutual relations on the following principles:

- "respect of the sovereignty, equality and non-interference in the international affairs,
- respect of the territorial integrity of the European states,
- recognition of the existing frontiers in Europe, including the Oder-Neiße frontier and the frontier between the GDR and FRG,

- recognition of West Berlin as an independent political entity,
- recognition of the nullity of the Munich Agreement from the very beginning and
- renunciation of both German states of gaining access to nuclear weapons in any form and of piling up nuclear weapons on their territories."

In a memorandum of July 3rd, 1967 to the governments and peoples of the states the GDR government gave expression to the hope that the peoples and governments be aware of the grave dangers conjured up by the support or tolerance of the aggressive sole representation claim of the FRG to peace and security.

In order to avoid dangers and to make real progress on the road to European security, the GDR government stressed in its memorandum, the establishment of normal relations of all states with the GDR is necessary. This would also be instrumental in normalizing relations between the two German states.

The GDR government also supports partial steps on the road to an all-European and comprehensive security regulation and cooperation and does not make them dependent on the fulfilment of prerequisites as far as genuine steps in the process of approach to the final goal are concerned and not subterfuges and manoeuvres to undermine the final aim.

That factors of prestige of the GDR government - in connection with the normalizations with third countries - are not involved is obvious from the fact that the GDR - e.g. in connection with its application for membership in the UN -- has also declared its readiness to advocate the admission of the FRG into the world organization. The GDR also expressly supports every effort at making progress on the road to a genuine normalization of relations between other socialist states and the FRG. The GDR therefore does not ask for any rights which are not an attribute of every normal European state and which it is not ready to concede to other members of the European community of states, too.

3. For nearly twenty years the GDR has existed and developed as a sovereign, independent state in Central Europe. Today the GDR figures among the 10 most powerful economic states in the world. Most of the states represented in the UN maintain various, partly very extensive relations with the GDR. Many of them recognize the role played by the GDR in European and world-wide cooperation and in maintaining and strengthening the peace and security of the peoples.

In the plebescite of April 6, 1968, in a free decision of will, 94,49 % of the GDR population clearly came out in favour of the socialist state of the German nation and its new socialist Constitution. Those who considered up to now the GDR not to be a completely constituted state are urged upon by the result of April 6, to recognize without reservation the reality of the socialist state of the

German nation, the German Democratic Republic.

The results of the political, economic, social, cultural and military development of the GDR as well as its geographic situation in the centre of Europe prove that it is impossible to conceive a regional system of security round this state, thus excluding it, as well as to speculate on its breakdown, its capitulation or even its "liberation" by force, or to work for the implementation of these wishful dreams by whatever means.

4. The development towards a European détente is decisively hampered by the policy of the FRG. It blocks the road to a system of collective security in Europe and also retards essentially the construction of a comprehensive network of all-European cooperation, i.e. in the fields of economy and culture.

It is common knowledge that the Federal government now as before refuses to recognize the German Democratic Republic as a subject of international law with equal rights and tries to maintain the only verbally modified claim to represent alone all Germans at the international scene. At the same time she refuses to recognize the internationally binding validity of the German frontiers as indicated in the Potsdam Agreement and which have been legally valid for twenty years and have developed as a result of the formation of the two German states since 1949. Finally she refuses to recognize the legal invalidity of the Munich Agreement from the very beginning.

In the face of a growing opposition in its own country the Kiesinger government tries to protect this system of non-recognition of the status quo in Europe in domestic policy by means of a combination of an emergency regime and the verbal and formal recognition of the reality of the two German states.

In foreign policy this aim is to be served by a combination of a verbal and formal adaptation of the Bonn Eastern policy to the Eastern policy of other European NATO partners which are committed to détente, with an access to nuclear weapons - through the so-called European option - left open.

The Kiesinger government pretends to speak for all Germans in decisive questions to leave open a way to the incorporation of the GDR, but this means the disturbance of the relative balance of power in Central Europe, the alteration of the status quo in the interest of German imperialism and thus the clearing of the road to the implementation of largely expansionist aims.

The sole representation claim of Bonn, its refusal to recognize the GDR under international law and its manifold pressure on third countries to strengthen the position of the Federal government in this question are a concentrated expression of a policy of altering the status quo in Europe. Those who support it, wherever it may be, make themselves guilty of promoting this policy and hampering decisive progress on the road to European security.

5. The normalization of relations between the two German states is the only road on which the unification of the two German states will be possible in the long run.

Likewise it would not be realistic and constitute an extremely grave danger to European peace, if one of the German states, posed the overcoming of the division as the main problem of our time and tried to enforce it through the militant, ideological or subversive promotion of a sole representation claim, through a desired export of the socio-economic order of one of the succession states of the ex-German Reich to both succession states.

The division of Germany can only be overcome in a long historic process of development which is taking place on the basis of the democratic international law and the state realities of our time without denying any state its right to exist from the very beginning. Therefore article 8 (2) of the new socialist Constitution of the GDR - in realistic assessment of the national and international situation which has developed since 1945 - says on this score:

"The establishment and cultivation of normal relations and the cooperation between the two German states on the basis of the equality of rights are a national concern of the German Democratic Republic. The German Democratic Republic and its citizens strive towards overcoming the division of Germany forces upon the German nation by imperialism and gradual rapprochement of the two German states until their unification on the basis of democracy and socialism."

In case third states are interested in helping to overcome the division of Germany in the interest of securing a lasting peace in Europe and an all-European cooperation, they - on their part - can make a contribution by means of really normalizing their relations with both German states and promoting the normalization of relations between the two German states.

REPORT

ON THE CONFERENCE ON BLOCS, THE GERMAN PROBLEM AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE, HELD AT THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE IN VIENNA ON 6th AND 7th MARCH 1968

The awareness of the impasse in which Europe found itself became in recent years particularly conspicuous. As a result of the "cold war", the majority of nations of this continent developed for the last two decades along two different lines. The two broad lines of policy were institutionalised on the international level. One took the shape of various organisations of the West and primarily of the Atlantic Alliance. Then came the reaction in the form of the organisation of the socialist states set up by the Warsaw Treaty. Apart from the drive to determine the outcome of the basic conflict of our epoch by means of force which overclouds the future, in Europe there have remained additional factors of tension. Here still keep in being phenomena and unsolved problems connected genetically with the struggle carried out by the anti-fascist coalition against the Nazi Germany during the second world war. They have generated strains which have been obstacles in the way of normal development of international relations in Europe and are always likely to turn into a threat to the peace. What is more, potentially they can play the role of a lens in which can focus and find an easy outlet the fundamental contradictions of our time if transferred to Europe. The persisting cleavage affects adversely foreign exchange, possibilities of extending contacts and cooperation in various sections of economic, social, scientific and cultural life and in other spheres of relations between states belonging to the two blocs in Europe.

It is natural that the premises of the policy of division began to be subjected to re-evaluation. The growth and stabilisation of many European countries made apparent the problem of utilisation of the potentialities of prosperity inherent in combining all creative forces of the continent. No wonder that the multifarious aspects of the existing division, its consequences, the perspectives of further development of European nations and conditions of its channelling into the optimal streambeds also became the object of interest of experts.

One of the key features of the present state of things in Europe focussing the attention of many researchers is the question of security. What are the possibilities and conditions of protecting Europe against outbreak of armed conflicts on its territory and making it secure for the nations inhabiting it?

The studies of this type are carried out in a number of research centers throughout Europe. Most findings are published in scholarly journals and, therefore, are well-known to the academic community and to the general public. This confrontation of the results of studies has a considerable cognitive value and makes more profound the perspective within which the problem is examined. But it has also practical importance. It permits to fix in what matters the opinions reveal convergencies and are, therefore, indicative of a nearing of points of view on political levels. On the other hand, it is apt to make an impact on political thinking. At this juncture, international meetings of scholars play a particular role. Here, it will be to the point to mention only that they allow, apart from comparing the results of studies, to elaborate upon the theses presented in writings, to clarify ambiguities and doubts, to juxtapose data and arguments and to engage in to an exchange of views. The discussion leading to determination of matters on which the opinions are closest and which are most promising from the point of being apt to be solved can have practical consequences.

The number of international symposia devoted to problems of European security went up of late. However, most of them dealt with the problem as a whole. The International Institute for Peace in Vienna made an attempt to bring about a meeting which would take up only selected issues within this area and to examine them in greater detail. The Institute took the initiative in 1967 and based it on two technical

assumptions. One of them was that the theme should be sufficiently concrete to make it possible to obtain opinions of several experts on one and the same subject. The second assumption was meant as a means of making the work at the meeting most effective. Experience shows that when the contributions are read during the meeting the participants have difficulties with familiarising themselves with them and the very reading consumes most of the time which could be used for discussion. In such circumstances, there is no time to think over the ideas presented by others, and to take a well-grounded stand. The Institute thought it important to ensure that the participants coming to the conference were well acquainted with the views of their colleagues in advance of the conference.

The project of the Institute met with sympathetic response on the part of eminent experts in the field from a number of countries from the West and the East of Europe. The meeting brought together the following:-

- (1) Dozent Thomas Bacskai International Institute for Peace, Vienna.
- (2) Dr. Paolo Calzini Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome.
- (3) Dr. Karl Cornides Institute for Strategic Studies, London,
Publisher, Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Vienna.
- (4) Prof. Lionel Dadiani Institute of International Labour Movement.
- (5) Prof. Stefan Doernberg Deutsches Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Berlin.
- (6) Dr. Immanuel Geiss Hamburg University
- (7) Prof. Georges Goriely Institut d'Etudes Européennes, Brussels.
- (8) Prof. Harish Kapur Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva.
- (9) Prof. Krylov Institute of World Economics and International Relations, Moscow.
- (10) Prof. Leo Mates Institut za Medunarodnu Politiku i Privredu, Belgrade.
- (11) Dr. Hanna Newcombe Canadian Peace Research Institute, Dundana, Ontario.
- (12) Dr. Martin Saeter Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Oslo.
- (13) Dr. Jerzy Sawicki International Institute for Peace, Vienna.
- (14) Prof. Nikolay Sidorov Institute of World Economics and International Relations, Moscow.
- (15) Prof. Antonin Snejdarek Ustav pro Mezinarodni Politiku a Ekonomii, Prague.
- (16) Dr. Mieczyslaw Tomala Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw.
- (17) Dr. Martin Winter Deutsches Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Berlin.

The idea of dealing with two selected problems within the field was accepted. One covered the impact of the politico-military blocs in Europe on its security. The other comprised these aspects of the so-called German problem which are inter-related with the problem of security in Europe. The Institute was able to obtain twelve papers, most of them focussing on one of the two themes. They were sent in before the conference and its participants received all the texts before coming to the meeting. This permitted to achieve one of the goals of the project, i.e. to sit down directly to discussion on coming to Vienna.

The debate was held on 6th and 7th March 1968 at the International Institute for Peace in Vienna. Finally, the meeting was given the title "Conference on Blocs, the German Problem and the Future of Europe" although the term colloquy or symposium might have been more adequate. In spite of the fact that the title placed the problem of blocs as the first theme, the discussion started with examination of the German problem. It was considered that beginning the debate with the blocs could involve tackling the role of the Germans as well and take some of the time which was assigned specifically to the latter.

It was not the purpose of the conference to come necessarily to agreed conclusions. In view of the different backgrounds of the participants, one could expect them rather to differ in their approaches to the problems under consideration. In fact, in spite of all differences, parallelism in several points was clearly discernible.

With regard to the German problem seen as a component of the issue of European security, it is possible to extrapolate some more general conclusions from the circularised papers and the exchange of opinions. These conclusions are not derived from any unanimous views of the participants. They are noted here rather as the most often repeated assumptions around which centered the ideas aiming at fixing the possible development in the matter.

It was held that the German nation is a single one in spite of the fact that it lives in two separate state organisms with different economic, political and social systems. This double reality imposes itself to such an extent that it is difficult to imagine normalisation of relations between the two Germanies without recognising this reality. The prospect of a change was also seen in connection with the above-mentioned realities and in two ways. On the one hand, it was remarked that the recognition of this territorial and socio-economic reality is the prerequisite of a change towards reunification, and that such a reunification can - if at all - possibly be obtained only within the framework of security for all states of Europe. On the other hand, the solution of the problem of security in Europe can hardly be thought of without the acknowledgment of these realities.

Turning to more immediate problems, it was often noted that the evolution of the détente taking place in Europe is conditioned in a way by the progress in détente between the two German states. Many saw the main obstacle in the way of détente in some features of the public life in the Federal Republic of Germany and in the reluctance of the Bonn government to recognise the existing territorial status quo in Europe. The importance of intra-European relationship as a framework within which the desired changes could take place was strongly emphasised.

The discussion on blocs and their role in relation to security showed as well that some ideas were common to several participants notwithstanding the countries they came from. They agreed that the significant decline in tension between members of the two alliance systems was due to the changes which took place in the European economic, social and political settings. They envisaged that the process of détente will go on in a gradual way, as so far, and that it is likely to evolve within the foreseeable future parallel to the further existence of blocs. A lively argument developed on the feasibility of using blocs as a vehicle for further détente. The role of activities on governmental level in promoting détente processes was

emphasised. In this connection some typical measures and methods of proceeding were emphasised as most needed and at the same time realistic. Among the measures indicated were the conclusion of a pact on non-use of force, of a pact on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and pacts on nuclear-free zones.

The Conference produced valuable material. Considering that it should be made public, the International Institute for Peace in Vienna decided to bring out the papers and the summary of the debates in the form of printed proceedings of the Conference. The editing of the volume is under way.

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HUNGARY'S CULTURAL RELATIONS
WITH THE WEST

Cultural relations, an important issue in foreign policy have in recent years been more insisted on, their value more consistently appreciated than ever before. It is generally admitted and officially emphasized that one of the best ways towards understanding and co-operation between nations leads through a widely conceived system of cultural and scientific contacts. Various exchanges in the past left their mark on our cultural development and their memory ^{is} ~~are~~ apt to justify and encourage our efforts tending to extend our relations, - which, after all, are also motivated by the growing requirements of science and arts. But we are urged as is every country to establish such contacts by the growing awareness of the need for a world-wide struggle to solve outstanding problems. The world is ever more tending to become a smaller place than it had been and the achievements of the speedily progressing activity in cultural and scientific life could, if applied without selfish ends, very effectively contribute to eliminate certain causes of mistrust and animosity, to have their direct and undoubtedly valuable share in promoting general well-being. To this effect the further extension of existing cultural relations seems to be not only desirable but imperative. This position, recognizing the mutually useful qualities of cultural ties, is held by most governments and is shared by countries of different social systems. Our government, for one, is adopting this point and we are convinced that these contacts, if properly and competently handled would never disappoint the contracting parties, nor would they fail to satisfy the direct beneficiaries of cultural approaches. This is a truism, frequently heard and still invariably welcome when met with in solemn declarations. It is beyond the scope of this lecture to

deal with past events and tendencies in cultural relations. To socialist countries new and formerly unknown prospects were opened up after the liberation and these prospects were facilitating a rapidly progressing cultural exchange. In another respect however, between Western countries and the countries of socialism, the cultural ties were, until quite recently, somewhat limited. In the following I will refer to some causes of the relative scarcity of contacts which were hampered by traditional and obsolete attitudes and by post-war suspicions. The present development, which is in its initial phase, is more promising, and I believe that on the ground of some experiences we are entitled to say that wherever cultural and scientific relations have been set up, the countries concerned are not only profiting of the newly acquired cultural possibilities but find themselves in a better position than before to tackle other problems, economic as well as political which have a bearing on national and international affairs alike. Cultural ties appear to represent a sort of guarantee, a mark of good will for any further approach that might be intended.

2. In the prevailing practice in diplomatic negotiations between East and West, the term "cultural relations" is not applied to matters concerning natural science and technology. These in most cases are subject to separate treatment. Cultural programmes include exchanges between specialists in social sciences, education, as well as exchanges between artists, writers, musicians and theatrical companies. They also provide for exhibitions of art treasures in the countries concerned and for facilities in further education. The usually separate conventions for science and technology deal with reciprocal opportunities offered

for scientists, research workers and also with certain forms of co-operation between scientific and technical institutes of the contracting countries.

For practical purposes the separate treatment of the cultural and scientific aspects is, I think, justified: the two, so understood, represent vast and widely different sectors of national life and especially the scientific and technological side is not merely a matter of theoretical and academic research, but is closely connected with projects within the programmes of technical development and is primarily concerned with the theory and practice of development schemes. The technological programmes of exchange are relatively recent and involve the active participation of technical institutions, and even rely on the help of industrial organizations, while cultural programmes are more in the line of traditional patterns. Indeed, cultural programmes are meant to both preserve past values and to present new ideas and artistic innovations.

3. What is being stated in general terms, can be applied in particular to the efforts of the Hungarian People's Republic, with respect to our cultural and scientific contacts with other countries. We too are convinced of the immense benefits of an intimate knowledge of the cultural heritage of other peoples, of their past achievements, their ways of thinking and their art of creating new values, we consider it absolutely essential to get acquainted with the creative impulses, with the outlook, however different it might be of other nations. The great specimens of a national heritage, in addition to those that have

long been universally cherished, are thus on the way of becoming part of our own national heritage and the in-and outflow of cultural processes will help us as will help others to find out by means of the achievements displayed the real nature of national character. For in this cultural process of give and take, we have an opportunity not only of borrowing and utilizing foreign cultural goods but also of presenting our own values to the benefit of our partners. We wholly agree with the statement within the UNESCO constitution as to the lack of understanding in the past as one of the psychological reasons for tensions. - This unfortunately is not only true of past attitudes. There is still much to be done in overcoming prejudices, in correcting preconceived ideas and removing suspicions and mistrust still lingering in certain quarters with regard to the artistic scientific, literary and other products of other nations specifically of the countries of socialism.

In cultural matters a special sort of discrimination was observed in the past. Owing to special reasons in historical development, to language barriers and mainly to traditional attitudes regarding cultural values, it was a long established practice in Europe that leading nations were little or not interested in the cultural and scientific life of their smaller partners. The diplomatic and other ties between Western nations and the countries of Eastern Europe were chiefly utilized for political purposes, whereas in cultural respect, these relations were expected to express the superiority of the bigger country.

It is a post-war development, and due first to the initiatives of the Soviet Union that real cultural values of any country began to be

treated with the respect belonging to their merit, regardless of the size of the country in which they were produced. Socialist countries, on the whole, came soon to recognize the importance of cultural exchanges, the qualities of national literature and art the scientific effort of their neighbours. Because of the hostile nationalist propaganda of earlier times these values had long been ignored. It is perhaps needless to repeat that the political and human aspect of this belated perception of values is as important as the cultural benefit.

The traditional aloofness of certain countries was increased after the liberation by an unwillingness to recognize certain merits of the cultural products of socialist countries. Though much has been done lately in certain countries to soften this reserve, it is still persisting. The new initiatives in East-West cultural relations will certainly contribute to a gradual elimination of former attitudes. For these approaches are now officially promoted and there is every indication that such measures are not merely formal but are taken as a consequence of growing public interest in countries that have long been almost entirely satisfied, with their own achievements. Recent exhibitions of Hungarian art treasures, old and new, in Basle, Paris London and other places were greatly praised and critics were not rare to express their surprise at the "discovery" of unsuspected qualities. Music lovers had long known and even admired certain Hungarian composers, but it was only recently that they got acquainted with the living reality of that music, by attending the performance of soloists and orchestras that gave a demonstration of what musical life is like in our country. As for musical education in socialist Hungary, a recent analysis of

UNESCO acknowledged the merits of our musical pedagogy and pointed out our successful methods in teaching music as a subject of the school curriculum.

But if signs of some interest can be remarked in the West, in Hungary the best of Western cultural values have always been keenly appreciated, and we hold on to the age old tradition to study the classic and modern works of the West, to put them on the general programme of our cultural life and cultural life and education. The number of works, scientific and literary, translated into Hungarian from any of the great languages of the West is sufficient to prove the efforts of our publishing houses /all of them state-owned/ of offering to the Hungarian public a large and greatly varied selection of the best products of the West. I do not wish now to refer to statistical figures, they would convincingly confirm what I have said. As to the choice of works, a look into the list of foreign books translated into our language would easily demonstrate that it is solely the literary quality, the scientific level that counts in the publishers' decision. Let me say, in addition, that the widely encouraged language learning in Hungary and the resulting command of foreign languages enable people to read foreign works in the original language. For the benefit of foreign readers a number of scientific books and a series of scientific journals - the Actas - specialized for almost every sector of science are published in foreign languages, - new achievements though by far not all are thus made accessible to specialists. Another house deals with Hungarian art books and fiction translated into the great languages, - though the actual number of these publications is, of course, not very large.

It would really devolve on foreign firms and on the great houses of distribution to deal with Hungarian books in the language of their countries. It is true, that besides socialist publishers, there are some firms in France, Germany, Austria and Italy that have published a small number of Hungarian books, - though not always the most representative ones of our classic and modern literature. There are quite a few noteworthy phenomena in our cultural past and some interesting features in our cultural activity after the liberation, and they are not merely picturesque and ephemeral but deserve to be observed, in the very interest of the observer. But in order to get an overall picture of Hungary; s past and present, it would be instructive for the specialist to know the main events in our cultural history. But apart from certain departures, our cultural values still wait to be appreciated according to their merits. National cultures are interrelated, they mutually influence one another, - at the same ^{time} they develop individual characters. Owing to the historical process, some cultures were allowed to live in and to depart, from, more prosperous circumstances than others. This accounts for a difference in size between cultures, and for a flourishing of certain cultures when others were still in an infant stage. But on the whole the specific nature of each national culture displays characteristic features which are significant, by their own right.

4. The cultural and scientific relations of Hungary with Western countries are co-ordinated, on the official level by agreements and exchange programmes. The former are generally concluded for five years or more and contain besides a common declaration of targets provisions for a wide range of exchanges. On a somewhat lower level and subject to

annual or biannual negotiations there are cultural programmes to a more moderate extent equally facilitating all kinds of contacts - of specialists.

The first approaches, on government level, between West European countries and Hungary, apart from a few individual cases were made in the early sixties. The first programme of cultural exchanges that between France and Hungary was settled in 1961, - others followed in subsequent years. On the ground of experiences we may declare ourselves satisfied with the results. Both the Hungarian authorities - in the first place the Academy of Sciences - and their Western partners could find out the contacts that would best satisfy the needs of cultural and scientific circles; and after the exchanges of the first years it has become possible to improve upon certain details. It has been also clear, since the outset that after the relations are officially established the part of officialdom will, with the exception of the duty of financial arrangements diminish even on the formal side: the participants will henceforth find out for themselves the best ways of pursuing the co-operation in their special field.

There is ample room in the programmes allotted for colloques, conferences, lectures and though the actual contributions at conferences are, in most cases, published in journals, the significance of these encounters should not be depreciated. The conferences and meetings of Hungarian scientists and their colleagues, the activity of our research workers abroad are certainly less spectacular than any of the artistic manifestations just mentioned, but their particular importance must, by all means, be recognized: they are apt to launch valuable relations or

to consolidate old ones. Scientific workers will cultivate these newly formed contacts and they will be urged to do so by the very nature of their special research, and these activities, carried on mainly in public view will certainly have though indirectly, a favourable impression on public opinion.

The authorities, it appeared, were eager in most cases to do their utmost to comply with additional requests submitted though demands are always on the increase: with the expanding opportunities both individuals and institutes are ever more resorting to government grants, exchanges being mostly financed by public money. Of course certain artistic events, like concerts, film shows belong to the competence of special commercial agencies and private exhibitions are arranged by galleries, - though for the sake of completeness and mainly in order to introduce young artists such are also - though to a limited extent - on the official programme. Other non governmental projects, such as UNESCO initiatives in cultural and educational respects are useful even to countries like Hungary whose contributions to the projects are however more important than their actual benefit from them. The so called Major Project, promoting mutual appreciation of Eastern and Western values, though mainly concerned with the cultural interchange between European and Asian and African countries, draws also attention to some neglected aspects of the present situation between European countries.

UNESCO scholarships and colloques on the international scale arranged by the Organization are also intended to create useful contacts and the extremely successful exchanges between youth clubs in France and Hungary, though carried out on private means, are under the auspices of UNESCO.

But in the majority of cases, the international cultural relations will continue to be sponsored by the respective governments. In Hungary, the administrative bodies in charge of fulfilling the clauses of the agreements, act on the proposal and advice of the scientific and cultural organs which on their part will consider the individual requests and examine the possibilities of scientific or artistic gatherings. All selections for foreign missions are motivated by strictly scientific standards, without any regard whatever to other reasons but those of scholarly competence.

Within the agreements a prominent part is taken by Hungary's cultural institutes abroad: in Austria, France, Italy - of the Western countries. They are, all of them long established centres in those countries. They were founded in the twenties and have been just like their counterparts in Hungary, actively participating in all sorts of cultural manifestations both in connection with the official programmes and independently of them. It appears that their function has always been useful for all parties: their specialized libraries are at the disposal of readers interested in any aspect of Hungarian life and the cultural gatherings offer another opportunity for friendly meetings. By their very existence they constitute an important link between Hungary and the countries concerned.

5. The opportunities for Hungarian scholars and scientists on exchange visits abroad and their foreign colleagues in Hungary are wide. One could allege that the scientific benefits of a bilateral cultural exchange are mostly on the side of the smaller partner, and that bringing about such an exchange the bigger country is almost exclusively

led by political considerations, so as to manifest a certain rapprochement. Even if such may be the initial and unavowed intention, it will soon be obvious, once the projected contacts are taken, that the exchange of scientific experience is advantageous for both partners and that in specific fields both small and big partners can offer valuable suggestions. In our country, besides the varied branches of science, there are some specific spheres like hidrology and applied mathematics which have always attracted attention, but the contacts in social sciences, like history, statistics and demography are equally close and fruitful. There is much reason to hope that the friendly collaboration of Hungarian and foreign historians will result in elucidating certain facts which up to now have been wrongly interpreted and erroneously presented in textbooks. This immediately raises the crucial question whether different ways in political thinking and the confrontation of antagonistic philosophies are not prejudicial to the very idea of cultural approach. It is still being contended in certain quarters that conferences convened with the definite purpose of promoting discussions on social and historical problems are unnecessary and useless. It is difficult, however, to defend this scepticism, it cannot certainly be justified by scientific reasons. We think that every occasion to bring together scholars or representatives of a special branch of science is good, and that the dialogues of experts, honestly and frankly led in an atmosphere of mutual respect will certainly result in broadening the views on some /if not on all/ disputed problems and in the recognition of mutually interesting targets.

The Hungarian Academy of sciences with its numerous institutes entertains lively and multifarious relations with similar organizations

and - just as universities do - has set up with foreign institutes an exchange system of publications.

It is a commonplace frequently heard that the rapid changes in technology and in techniques of organization make it an urgent and indispensable task to look into the ways and means of a reasonable division of labour. Multilateral agreements concerning technical co-operation between socialist countries have proved to be extremely useful, a number of projects already achieved were due to the collaboration of their technicians and institutes. The bilateral agreements concluded with Western countries for facilitating contacts between scientists and research workers have also been highly appreciated by foreign and Hungarian authorities. It appears, however, that the scheme of traditional exchanges should be gradually extended and effective co-operation in scientific and technical matters should also be commonly decided and achieved. Certain hints to this effect have already been made in the latest programmes for technical exchanges, and a few remarks of Hungarian and Western statesmen refer also to the fact that the co-ordination of some of the scientific efforts would be welcome.

8

THE WEST AND THE EUROPEAN DÉTENTE

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THE WEST AND THE EUROPEAN DÉTENTE

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In 1967 the prevailing European détente was generally hailed by Western political leaders and public opinion as a sign of health in international relations, contrasting favorably to developments in other regions of the world, where increased violence had been a characteristic trend. There was good reason for this feeling of satisfaction: the Old Continent remained the potentially most dangerous conflict area of the world with the enormous concentration of nuclear and conventional weapons on its soil and with the intractable political problem of Germany as the main source of tension in its center. No wonder then if the relaxation of tension in that part of the world was seen as a significant achievement in itself.

Moreover, since the establishment of the Great Coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD in Bonn at the end of 1966 and the ensuing shift in West Germany's foreign policy, the détente concept had served as a framework for Western policy towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe--not in terms of a grand design for a permanent settlement, but as a common denominator for largely parallel attempts to improve East-West relations in Europe. This state of affairs seemed to be satisfactory to the major Western Allies, because no significant progress could be envisaged in terms of a further rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union as long as the Vietnamese conflict was raging with undiminished fervor.

The détente concept, however, has not only been used with divergent connotations in East and West, but it has also tended to conceal significant differences among the Western powers with regard to some of the fundamental European issues. In as far as a basic Western consensus about the European situation and its potentialities appears to be a necessary precondition for making headway beyond a limited détente, it would seem to be an essential task to clarify what has been the nature of East-West relations in Europe since the mid-1960's as officially described by the decision makers in each of the main Western states and what conclusions in terms of policy implications have been drawn from these perceptions. When assessing the significance of these declarations, it should be borne in mind that official perceptions of the international situation at any given moment are always in some measure a reflection of the preferred policy choices of the government in question. A government may "see" more or less of a rising or declining threat, depending on whether for some reasons--which may be external to the issue--such a perception suits its purposes. Admittedly, there are limits to this kind of manipulation of official views: with regard to East-West relations in Europe they would seem to be posed by the stark evidence of a potential Soviet threat on the one hand, and by some tangible inhibitions to Soviet expansionism on the other. But the leeway for different interpretations of the nature and potentialities of the European détente has nevertheless been significant.

A. The United States

1. Perceptions

In view of the elusive nature of the *détente* concept, it is hardly surprising that authoritative definitions of it are hard to come by.

In July 1966 Mr. Harlan Cleveland, U.S. Permanent Representative on the NATO Council, described *détente* in the following terms:

Détente, of course, is not some fixed state of affairs that comes into being through a single agreement and then remains in effect forever after. It is a state of relations in which tensions have been relaxed to safe levels--and which is the cumulative product of contacts and actions and agreements and experiences over the whole range of military, political, economic, commercial, technological, and cultural relations.¹

Cleveland also spoke of the need for "a systematic search . . . for a greater degree of *détente*, for an atmosphere in which fundamental issues might be resolved," thereby indicating that while the process of East-West *détente* had begun, much more was needed in order to achieve "safe" levels of tension. The criterion for what Cleveland chose to call "real *détente*" was in his opinion a situation in which the Soviet Union had concluded that it is in her interests "to come to a peaceful and reasonable settlement of the fundamental issues in Europe".²

Similarly, Undersecretary of State Nicholas de B. Katzenbach in April 1967 distinguished between a *détente* implying simply an easing of U.S.-Soviet tensions--the existence of which he acknowledged--and on the other hand "a large scale *détente*" tantamount to an elimination of the basic issues which gave rise to the Cold War; the latter in his view could only be achieved with the emergence of "a stable and secure Europe."³

The relaxation of East-West tension in general and the emergence of a European détente more specifically have been attributed by U.S. officials primarily to a change in Soviet conduct after the Cuban missile crisis. The latter in turn in their opinion was produced mainly by American determination to contain Soviet expansion and Western cohesion in face of Moscow's probing actions. These assessments seem to have been a consequence not only of a natural preoccupation with America's main contender in the world arena but also of the interdependence between official perceptions and preferred policy choices. Thus, the U.S. Government has strongly emphasized the importance of NATO for a lasting détente: the continued existence of a viable Atlantic defense organization in their view constitutes a necessary precondition for seeking new political solutions in Europe without jeopardizing basic security interests of Western States.⁴

In September 1967 Eugene V. Rostow, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, stressed that "the possibility of détente requires a mutual respect for the principle that there be no unilateral changes of the frontiers of the systems by force, or by the threat of force." And he expressed the hope that the Soviet Union and its allies had accepted this as essential to peace on the continent of Europe.⁵ It is perhaps not accidental that Rostow did not make clear, whether the observance of the "prudent rule of reciprocal safety"--as he called it--is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for a détente

relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The conceptual distinction made by Cleveland and Katzenbach between a limited East-West détente on the one hand and a "real" or "large scale" détente on the other suggests that leading Washington officials have been painfully aware of the difference between a relationship that enables the superpowers to keep conflict issues under control, and conditions allowing for the settlement of basic disputes.

The relaxation of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, while originally addressing itself primarily to the former issue, gave birth to a more distinctly European détente process, which in the latter part of the 1960's had taken on a life of its own, and whose participants on both sides of the division line in Europe were thinking in terms of programs for a final settlement of the unresolved issues in Central Europe.⁶ This European détente, and specifically the initiatives of President de Gaulle in turn impinged upon the perceptions of decision makers in Washington with regard to the requirements of the European situation. By the middle of 1966 there had emerged both among the attentive public and in the Congress a feeling that the United States ought to re-examine its European policy in order to retain the natural position of leadership in the Western Alliance.⁷ And these feelings could hardly fail to influence those bearing the formal responsibility for the formulation of American foreign policy.

2. Policy Implications

The limited European détente has had many repercussions on American policy towards Europe. The following three seem to be the most important and will be dealt with at some length.

1. The revival and modification of the policy of "peaceful engagement" in Eastern Europe;
2. The clarification of the U.S. position on the German question;
3. The attempt to relate United States-West European relations, more specifically to the growth of East-West ties in Europe.

The policy of "peaceful engagement" in Eastern Europe emerged in the aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution of October 1956, which clearly revealed the faultiness of the "liberation" slogan previously used as a shorthand description for American aims in Eastern Europe. The new approach implied that the United States would henceforth seek to promote an evolutionary process of change in the direction of greater national self-assertion in Eastern Europe by a cautious and selectively applied policy of expanding trade and cultural contacts with individual East European countries. While the new policy was conceived during the last years of the Eisenhower administration and became official doctrine under Kennedy, its implementation was for many years hampered by the high level of East-West tensions. Thus the new American signals towards Eastern Europe acquired operational significance only in the more relaxed atmosphere after the Cuban missile crisis.⁸ In the spring of 1964 President Johnson for the first time used the bridge-building metaphor to describe the active efforts to implement the new

policy.⁹ The aims for the bridge-building efforts of the Johnson Administration remained largely unchanged during the following years. As originally conceived U.S. policy in the words of Undersecretary of State Averell Harriman was designed to encourage "a progressive loosening of external authority over Eastern European countries and the continuing reassertion of national autonomy and diversity."¹⁰

The same basic idea was reflected in President Johnson's phrase about "the powerful forces of legitimate national pride" being "the strongest barrier to the ambition of any country to dominate another".¹¹ Thus America's policy of building bridges to the East, while not aimed at instigating hostility between Russia and her allies, was nevertheless conceived as a force working in the direction of an erosion of Soviet and Communist influence in the East European countries.¹² It could, therefore, be argued--and the Soviets have not failed to do so--that the policy of "peaceful engagement" was really only a more sophisticated form of rollback strategy aiming at the same end result: "liberation".

By 1966, however, there had emerged a new element in this policy, which put it in a different perspective. The State Department had apparently come to the conclusion that in order to retain credibility and some leverage in Eastern Europe the United States must explicitly disavow any intentions of subverting Communist governments in Eastern Europe and of exploiting differences between Moscow and her East European allies. "Ours is not an effort," Dean Rusk assured "to subvert the Eastern European governments nor to make those states hostile to the Soviet Union or to each other." "Peaceful engagement" was now presented by the

Secretary of State as "a good policy for everyone". "For all of us-- Americans, Russians, Europeans,--can benefit from drawing closer together. In that way we can reduce the risks of war, minimize the bitter legacies of national conflict, and increase the tangible fruits of economic cooperation."¹³ This did not imply a basic switch in the sense of renouncing earlier American aspirations of bringing about a greater measure of autonomy among the East European ex-Satellites. But it did make a difference whether the attainment of this end result was explicitly presented as a main motivation for U.S. foreign policy toward that region, or if it seemed to be tacitly assumed as a likely consequence. The chief motivation for "peaceful engagement" now appeared to be Washington's desire to promote a comprehensive East-West reconciliation in Europe.

This new interpretation of American policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was given the highest sanction in President Johnson's major speech of October 7, 1966, on the unfinished task of "making Europe whole". There again occurred the phrase that it was not the purpose of the United States to overturn other governments.¹⁴ And it was probably not coincidental that the measures enumerated by the President in this speech, which were meant to implement the policy of "peaceful engagement", addressed themselves more or less evenly to the improvement of relations with both the Soviet Union and her East European allies. The President's pronouncements also signified a shift in emphasis from bilateralism to a conception envisaging the combined growth of bilateral and multilateral contacts and cooperation across the dividing line in Europe.

One of the main architects of "peaceful engagement", Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski expounded its basic raison d'être in a speech in Ottawa in early 1967. He emphasized that the policy of the United States

did not imply a quest for an immediate settlement particularly not over the heads of the Europeans. It was meant to be an engagement to a process of change, in which both East Europe and the Soviet Union had to be involved. Brzezinski added:

I am convinced it would be idle, and probably counter-productive to concentrate on stimulating East European nationalism or hostility to the Soviet Union; to be sure, the more independence there is in the East, the better--but as a means and not as an end in itself. Some East European countries can act as transmission belts moving ahead of the Soviet Union, but not for the purpose of separating themselves entirely from the Soviet Union--rather for the purpose of promoting a different kind of East-West relationship.¹⁵

In this statement Brzezinski made no reference to how East Germany fitted into the policy of "peaceful engagement", which may have been an indication of an evolution in American thinking on that theme. Brzezinski had earlier been a forceful advocate of isolating East Germany from the other East European states.¹⁶ By 1967 the official U.S. attitude toward East Germany seemed to have evolved from non-recognition and active isolation to a position which probably is best described with "silence".¹⁷

The question of Germany's place in Europe posed itself with increasing urgency in connection with America's attempts to improve her relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It took some time, however, before the U.S. position on the German problem and her East European policy could be fully harmonized and presented as a coherent whole. The main issue and a bone of contention between Washington and Bonn in the early 1960's was the relationship between détente and German reunification.

When at the beginning of the 1960's it became obvious that German reunification could not be achieved by building up a Western position of strength, the view gained ground in most Western countries that this goal--if at all--could be attained only as the end result of a lengthy process of East-West détente and of European reconciliation. This position was basically in accordance with United States policy toward Eastern Europe as outlined above. However, the relationship between these two elements in U.S. foreign policy--the basic commitment to German reunification and the attempts to improve relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe--was not fully clarified for a number of years. The reason for this was mainly American deference to the feelings in West Germany, where the process of adjusting to the new realities of the Central European situation was more difficult and more time consuming than elsewhere in the West.

Having earlier argued against any steps toward détente without some progress in the direction of reunification--lest the division of Germany be viewed as permanent--the Bonn government had now difficulties in accepting the position that détente in Europe was a necessary precondition for reunification. The American government, therefore, seems to have avoided complete clarity on this issue. In his bridge-building speech of May 1964, President Johnson emphasized the belief of the American government "that wise and skillful development of relationships with the nations of Eastern Europe can speed the day when Germany will be reunited".¹⁸ This speech according to Brzezinski "marked the final abandonment of the notion that the German problem could be settled outside of, or prior to, an overall change in the

relations of the two halves of Europe."¹⁹ It did not, however, spell out the view, already prevalent in Washington at that time, that détente in Europe was both possible and desirable without any simultaneous steps in the direction of German reunification. In the spring of 1965 President Johnson again spoke of the bridges to Eastern Europe which would "bring closer the day Europe can be reconstituted within its wide historic boundaries". In that same speech he repeated America's commitment to the reunification of Germany and even used strong language, when he spoke of "the shame of the eastern zone" that "must be ended".²⁰ But the President at that time did not make any attempt to relate these two aims of American foreign policy more specifically to each other. This linkage occurred only in his major address of October 7, 1966, in which he stated:

In a restored Europe, Germany can and will be united. This remains a vital purpose of American policy. It can only be accomplished through a growing reconciliation. There is no short cut.²¹

This was the first time that the main spokesman of the leading Western power explicitly stated that German reunification could only be attained by way of a progressive détente, by shaping a "new political environment" in Europe. His statement implied that German reunification could come only at the end of a long process of reconciliation.

Although the President's speech only summed up the U.S. position in a comprehensive statement and did not contain any new elements, it nevertheless produced frictions with the West German Government.²² These difficulties were eliminated with the coming into power of the Great Coalition government in Bonn at the end of 1966, which fully

accepted the views expressed by the President. As the American position on the relationship between détente and reunification was shared by virtually all other members of the Western Alliance, the U.S. initiative, in so far as it induced the West Germans to fall in line, contributed to the emergence of a basic Western consensus with regard to this important issue of East-West relations.

Even in a broader sense the President's speech of October 7, 1966, represented an attempt to make U.S. policy in Europe more coherent, namely by emphasizing the fundamental interdependence between Western unity and the East-West détente in Europe. The President said that the "great goal of a united West" was "to heal the wound in Europe which now cuts East from West and brother from brother."²³ But the way in which the "vigorous pursuit of further unity in the West" which the President advocated, might promote East-West reconciliation in Europe was not spelled out in very clear terms. To be sure Mr. Johnson spoke of "a united Western Europe" that could "move more confidently in peaceful initiatives toward the East". But, he became more vague when next he said: "Unity can provide a framework within which a unified Germany could be a full partner without arousing ancient fears."²⁴ And nowhere in the speech did the President clarify, how a closer relationship between the United States and Western Europe--which "pursuit of further unity in the West" must logically imply--could promote East-West reconciliation. Nor did this linkage become much clearer in the exegesis of Brzezinski, when early in 1967 he stated that the "building of Western unity creates stability in Europe and is therefore in keeping with the thrust of history. . . ." and that "East-West policies must be compatible with this thrust if they are to resolve the European problem."²⁵

It would seem, therefore, that the October 1966 speech signified that the American Government had only entered the first stage of a process of re-examining its relations with Western Europe in the new era of East-West détente in Europe. Washington had become aware of the need to recast its basic conceptions with regard to cross-Atlantic relationships in order to remain relevant to the changed East-West constellation in Europe. One of the main American advocates of this re-examination later acknowledged the difficulty of reconciling the original concept of Atlantic partnership with the new vision of a Europe made "whole."²⁶ Developments after the President's speech indicated that the American position to envisage new security arrangements in Europe only within the framework of the existing alliance system, if adhered to, was likely to create not only increasing difficulties with France but also a growing estrangement between Washington and Bonn.

B. Western Europe

Due to the very close inter-relatedness between official perceptions and policy conclusions in the case of the three main West European States, it appeared advisable to present each government's assessments as a coherent whole and thus not splitting up the West European official views in "perceptions" and "policy implications".

1. The United Kingdom

On February 28, 1967, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, spoke in the House of Commons of the European détente as a process "which is already happening in its early beginnings" and which he hoped would make mutual reduction of forces to lower levels in Central Europe "a practical possibility." While using comparatively cautious language Mr. Brown nevertheless conveyed the impression of viewing East-West relations in Europe as being on the move toward a further

decline of tensions and greater general stability.²⁷ Brown's Cabinet colleague, Secretary of State for Defense Dennis Healey, was even more articulate and optimistic, when on the previous day he presented his views on that same subject to the Commons. Speaking of a prevailing "political détente", which in his view was "recognized by every government on both sides of the dividing line", and alluding to the decision of the NATO Council in December, 1966, to use every possible means of extending the détente, Healey proceeded to analyze its foundations. He saw "solid reasons" for a basic change in Soviet attitudes toward the West, the main being the strengthening of Western Europe, primarily through NATO, the profound political and economic transformation of Soviet society, the emergence of China as a formidable, potential threat to the Soviet Union, and, last not least, the risk of nuclear escalation confronting any potential aggressor in Central Europe. In his opinion it was difficult to conceive that Soviet policy, being rooted in these hard facts, could change overnight so fundamentally that Moscow could contemplate a war in Europe.²⁸

Largely the same threat perceptions appeared in the government's "Statement on Defence Estimates 1967", although the wording there was more cautious.²⁹ The policy implications that the government had drawn from these assessments were summarized in the following terms:

The British Government believes that both the political and military extension of the détente would best be achieved by mutual reduction of the forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers. This measure of arms control, besides giving both sides greater security, would create a better climate in which to approach the major political problems of the European continent, and would liberate resources for the economy.³⁰

It is worth noting that the specific policy proposal of mutual force reductions put forward by the British Government was imbedded in a wider conception of promoting arms control agreements in Central Europe as a preliminary, but essential step toward improving East-West relations. The Labor government had earlier suggested other arms control measures for Central Europe--such as establishing observation posts on both sides of the dividing line--with similar motivations. It had argued that, although political evolution and arms control should in principle go hand in hand, a start must be made somewhere and could in the present European context most easily be made in the arms control field.³¹ The force reduction proposals were conceived in the same context. When later the economic constraints induced Britain to consider a scaling down of the Rhine Army in spite of the absence of any indications that the Soviets might follow suit, the primary economic motivation for the proposed steps was, of course, clearly revealed.

But it is obvious that the British Government was anxious to present one of its major national preoccupations, the need for a sustained economic recovery, in terms compatible with the international requirements of détente in Europe. Indeed, it seems indicative of the importance attributed by Whitehall to the latter, that also with regard to the other major concern of Britain's leaders at that time, the search for a new relationship with Continental Europe, the government went to some lengths in order to couch these aspirations in a language consistent with the further improvement of East-West relations in Europe.³²

On balance, the British seemed confident that the European détente would last and therefore anxious to use it in order to cut defense expenditures, make the military environment more secure through arms control arrangements in Central Europe, and thus create the climatic preconditions for an eventual political settlement.

2. France

An analysis of French foreign policy in the 1960's must be based on the scrutiny of the inscrutable: the ideas and designs of General de Gaulle. Pierre Hassner, one of the ablest students of contemporary French politics, has recently testified to the formidable difficulties of the task by referring to the "studied ambiguity" of the General's pronouncements.³³ There are solid reasons, therefore, for a writer, who has never before tried his hand in the new science of "Elyséeology" to be modest in his aspirations. What has been attempted here is to spell out some representative official views on French perceptions of the European situation and the policy implications which have been drawn from them. In a subsequent chapter we shall seek to identify and describe de Gaulle's grand design for a European settlement. But it must be left to the specialists in the exegesis of the General's words to determine to what extent these plans reflect operational foreign policy goals or represent devices in the game of compensating with "acrobatics" what France lacks in real strength.³⁴

In his press conference of July 29, 1963, shortly after the American-British-Soviet agreement to sign a partial nuclear test ban had been announced, de Gaulle envisaged the possibility that Moscow might be considering a sincere policy of peaceful coexistence. The French

President identified the following main forces that tended to push the Soviets in that direction: a) the "human evolution" in the Soviet Union and the satellite states, b) the economic and social difficulties in these countries, and, c) the emerging Sino-Soviet conflict. France, he asserted, had for a long time believed that the day might come, when a real détente and even a sincere entente would permit to change East-West relations completely; she would then make some constructive propositions with regard to Europe's peace, equilibrium and destiny.³⁵

By 1966 de Gaulle and his ministers were describing the European situation in terms which convey the impression that the possibilities foreseen by the French President three years earlier were rapidly materializing. In November, 1966, the French Foreign Minister, M. Couve de Murville told the French National Assembly that for some time, and particularly during 1966, France's relations with the "Socialist" countries of Eastern Europe had "changed radically". "From formal, infrequent and negative, he asserted, they have become numerous, cordial, constructive, and, all told, normal."³⁶ And President de Gaulle himself in his New Year's message on December 31, 1966, asserted that the Cold War was "in the process of disappearing". France, who had regained her independence, would, he assured his audience, "continue to direct her action toward continental rapprochement".³⁷

Thus, at least since 1966, the French Government was attempting to promote the notion of a progressively developing European détente. Presumably sensing the need to provide a slogan describing East-West relations in Europe in dynamic terms, de Gaulle began to speak of détente leading to entente and eventually to cooperation embracing

all of Europe.³⁸ He acknowledged the importance of the nuclear stalemate between the superpowers for the preservation of peace. But he always emphasized the precarious and basically static nature of that relationship, which, in his view, could not produce reconciliation in Europe. For the latter to occur, de Gaulle argued, it is necessary to overcome the confrontation and restore Europe's unity; and that undertaking the General consistently presented as a task for Europeans "from the Atlantic to the Ural".³⁹ By describing the improvement of East-West relations in Europe as a dynamic and self-contained process, de Gaulle all but ignored the--admittedly limited--relaxation of tension between the superpowers as an essential precondition for the European détente. Only in a negative sense has this factor been taken into account by the spokesmen of Gaullist France: in terms of a potential, external threat to a steady amelioration of the situation in Europe.⁴⁰

The most important French policy measures related to the emergence of détente in Europe have been: a) France's withdrawal from NATO's military organization; b) the multiplication of bilateral contacts with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The former implied a further loosening of France's Atlantic ties on the eve of General de Gaulle's visit to Moscow in 1966 and could be interpreted as a step in the direction of the "European Europe" so strongly advocated by the General as the appropriate context for a lasting peaceful order in Europe. The growth of bilateral relations and specifically of those with the Soviet Union have been depicted by the French Government as a major contribution to European reconciliation and security.⁴¹ It can be argued, however, that the

policy measures mentioned under a) and b), while facilitated by the détente, have ultimately served as a means to achieve French independence, the avowed main goal of Gaullist foreign policy.⁴²

To sum up, it appears that the French Government in its official perceptions ascribed the inception of the European détente process to a basic and permanent change in Soviet foreign policy. The emerging opportunities for a radical alteration in East-West relations in Europe have induced France to reactivate old and open up new channels of contact and communication between the two parts of the Old Continent, thus adding to the momentum of the trend toward a European reconciliation. This development is conceived in Paris as virtually irreversible, if Europe is not disturbed by "external" influences;⁴³ and eventually it should both permit and require the transformation of the present alliance systems.

3. West Germany

During the years 1964-1966 the official West German perceptions of the emerging détente in Europe differed significantly from those of her main West European allies. This was largely due to the priority accorded to the goal of German reunification in all official declarations. To be sure, there were signs of increasing appreciation in Bonn that progress toward this aim could only be achieved in connection with a more general transformation of the military and political environment in Central Europe. But the notion that détente involving arms control arrangement in Central Europe must in some way be linked with a political evolution in the direction of German reunification was stubbornly upheld.⁴⁴ Consequently, there was a tendency in Bonn to disregard all signs of

a genuine change in Soviet attitudes towards the West as long as no evidence was forthcoming that Moscow might be willing to reconsider its basic policy on the German problem. In addition to this preoccupation, the West German perceptions were also influenced by the fact that the Federal Republic was the politically and militarily most exposed of all the Western allies. To the extent, therefore, that Bonn acknowledged Soviet declarations of peaceful intentions, there was a natural inclination to see them mainly as the result of Western determination to oppose threats and pressure, or else as some purely tactical devices in order to split the Atlantic Alliance and isolate West Germany.⁴⁵ The generally negative reception accorded by the West German Government to President Johnson's speech of October 7, 1966, would seem to indicate that this assessment of the détente was, at that time, still the prevailing one in West German Government circles.

However, a different line of thinking had begun to assert itself in the West German public debate during 1965-66 and was, for example, clearly articulated by Helmut Schmidt, the SPD spokesman on defense matters, during the Social Democratic Party conference in June, 1966. Schmidt not only acknowledged the emergence of a détente process which he conceived in far more symmetrical terms than had been customary in Bonn. He also defined the foreign policy of the Soviet Union as basically defensive, aiming at the consolidation of her present sphere of influence. The main factors which in his view had produced this limitations in Soviet foreign policy objectives, were the nuclear stalemate and the pressure sensed by the Soviet leadership to allocate an increasing share of national resources to the development of Soviet society.⁴⁶

With the formation of the new West German coalition government in November, 1966, such assessments became the basis of official policy. Détente in Europe was no longer described as a threat to primary West German interests, but rather as a necessary precondition for making headway toward a permanent peaceful order in Europe, which would do away with the basic causes of tension in that part of the world. Thus, the wording of the government declaration of December 13, 1966, clearly reflected the desire of the new leadership to demonstrate their sincere intention of committing the Federal Republic to the search for peace through the elimination of political tensions and through arms control arrangements.⁴⁷ Early in 1967 Foreign Minister Willy Brandt also explicitly acknowledged the dependence of the European détente on a wider, global relaxation of tensions between the superpowers while at the same time attributing to the former a quality of its own.⁴⁸ What remained were differences in nuance and emphasis rather than principle. Thus, the new West German Government was anxious to stress that the relaxation of tension must not be conceived as an end in itself but as a means to the ultimate goal of removing the causes of tension and of creating the firm basis for a peaceful and permanent order in Europe.⁴⁹

If, in spite of the basic readjustment of official perceptions, Bonn in the course of 1967 continued to display a certain skepticism toward the notion of a prevailing European détente, this was not due so much to the influence of certain less flexible elements in the CDU/CSU, as to two more fundamental factors. The first and most important had to do with the special nature of West German threat perceptions.


Whereas the possibility that the Soviet Union might attempt to change the status quo in Central Europe to its advantage had been the main element in the assessment of the level of tension among other Western powers, West German threat perceptions operated with an additional dimension: the likelihood that the Soviet Union would succeed in permanently denying to the German nation its right to self-determination.⁵⁰ Only the reduction of threats against the present status quo in Europe which does not at the same time increase the latter type of menace against basic German interests is likely to bring about a significant overall decrease in West German threat perceptions. The second factor, closely related to the first, was the selectively applied Soviet détente policy in Europe, which excluded the Federal Republic, and, at least in terms of declaratory policy, the United States. Therefore, West Germany's Foreign Minister found it necessary to invoke the basic Western unanimity "that détente between East and West is conceivable only if it includes the principal, and indeed all, countries of the alliance . . ."⁵¹

As a result of Bonn's revised assessment of the East-West constellation in Europe, West Germany launched in 1967 what has been termed a new Ostpolitik. This policy which was conceived as a concerted, long-term effort to improve relations with the East, had three main elements: a) the opening up of a direct dialogue between West Germany and the Soviet Union; b) the search for full normalization of relations with the East European states; and c) the working out of a modus vivendi with the DDR without de jure recognition of East Germany as a separate state. In a subsequent chapter we shall analyze the Eastern policy of the Great Coalition in some detail. Here it may suffice to point out


in what sense it signified a new West German approach to the problems of East-West relation in Europe.

It would seem that at least in three respects did the policy represent a departure from earlier West German official attitudes. The first has to do both with the formulation of the long-term policy goal and with its relationship to the détente process. Friedenssicherung and the establishment of a permanent peaceful order in Europe were now the terms used by Bonn to describe the ultimate aim of West Germany's Eastern policy, and indeed of its foreign policy in general. German reunification was explicitly subordinated to this wider European objective.⁵² Not only did the new leadership in Bonn acknowledge that "German problems" could only be solved as part of a general settlement in Europe; Foreign Minister Willy Brandt also attested to the view that they could be advanced "only after adjustments have been made between East and West." The reversal of the earlier West German position was clearly borne out in his assertion: ". . . we do not make our policy of détente dependent on progress with the German question" ⁵³ When the new leaders in Bonn argued that a détente in Europe could not be accepted as an end in itself, their position was usually motivated by the contention that the relaxation of tension did not per se guarantee the elimination of the causes of tension, which was a precondition for obtaining the long-term goal of a permanent peaceful order in Europe. Only within this wider all-European framework was German reunification mentioned by responsible spokesmen of the new government as a major national objective for all Germans.⁵⁴

The other new element in West Germany's approach to East-West relations in Europe was the declared intention of the new government to include East Germany in its efforts to promote the relaxation of tension. This stand, which included the offer of a mutual renunciation of the use of force in intra-German relations, did away with the earlier policy directed toward an isolation of East Germany. By recognizing the existence of a second political system on German soil through the extension of official contacts with East German authorities Bonn hoped gradually to diminish the hostility in intra-German relations, alleviate some of the hardships of the division and thereby halt the process of alienation between the two parts of Germany.⁵⁵



The third main aspect of West Germany's new Ostpolitik implied a determined effort to remove obstacles on the road to a reconciliation with the other East European states. This new approach was primarily reflected in the decision to a) abandon the earlier "narrow" interpretation of the Hallstein doctrine in order to clear the way for diplomatic relations with Communist states in Eastern Europe, and b) to give up the position that the borders of 1937 constituted the legal basis for negotiations about a final settlement in Central Europe.



In general, it would seem that the new West German Government, while somewhat less confident than its main West European allies with regard to the nature of the European détente, was determined to use it in order to search patiently for an accommodation with the East. Being singled out by the Soviet Union as the main saboteur of a European settlement, Bonn was understandably anxious to get the full backing of the Western allies for its new policy. At the same time, however, the

Federal Republic began to display a measure of independent initiative in the field of East-West relations, which had hardly any counterpart in West German foreign policy during the whole post-war era. This seems partly to have been due to the concern of the leadership in Bonn with the need to break the complete deadlock on the Central European issues. In addition, it reflected a trend toward German self-assertion, which Willy Brandt has depicted as a necessary element in the process of national recuperation.⁵⁶

C. Some Conclusions

By the middle of the 1960's there clearly existed a Western consensus that a basic change of Soviet conduct was a primary reason for the relaxation of tension between East and West and thus for the emerging European détente. Where opinion differed between the major Western powers--or as in the case of West Germany shifted in the course of 1966-67--was with regard to the official perceptions of the main factors to which this change in Soviet conduct could be ascribed. The following four have been generally referred to in official declarations and comments:

1. the trend toward fragmentation in the Soviet alliance, and more specifically, the Sino-Soviet split;
2. internal developments in the Soviet Union, which tend to increase the vested interests of elite groups in a low level of international tension;
3. the success of the Western Alliance in containing Soviet expansionism; and
4. the nuclear stalemate between the superpowers.⁵⁷



The United States has usually put the main emphasis on the significance of factors 3 and 4. The same holds true of West Germany until the fall of the Erhard government. Since early 1967 all four factors listed above seem to have been given roughly equal consideration not only in British but also in West German statements. France, finally, has emphasized factors 1 and 2 almost to the exclusion of the two others, or in any case of factor 3.

From these varying assessments have naturally flowed differences of opinion with regard to both the likely permanence of the European détente and the policy implications to be drawn from it. All Western

governments, however, have committed themselves to the development of bilateral ties with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, made possible by the change in Soviet attitudes. In fact, not only in France but also in the United States and Britain, representative spokesmen have taken credit for their country being the initiator or the most effective implementor of détente in Europe through the promotion of bilateral contacts and cooperation with the East.⁵⁸ Here it may be useful to introduce the distinction, made by Pierre Hassner,⁵⁹ between policies creating a détente relationship and those utilizing it. Most Western powers contend that their policies of improved bilateral contacts with the East have been conceived as major contributions to European reconciliation. While it can hardly be denied that the U.S. policy of limited bilateral accommodation with the Soviet Union has decisively facilitated the emergence of a European détente, the latter has also been utilized by Washington in order to enlarge its freedom of action in other theatres of world politics. Similarly, General de Gaulle's policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has undoubtedly added to the momentum of the détente process in Europe; at the same time France has profited from the latter in terms of increased independence of action. The same ambiguities can be demonstrated in the case of Britain and the Federal Republic. In each instance the alleged "contribution" to European détente can be shown to be an exploitation of it for the furtherance of specific national interests of the given power, be it economic recovery, reunification, "independence" or others.⁶⁰

In view of these vested interests in the main Western states-- although admittedly varying in degree--to perceive the European situation as one of détente, it may be warranted to raise the question, whether there is some "objective" way of assessing the justification for the purported confidence that East-West relations in Europe are going to be characterized by a continued détente. One might do this by analyzing earlier détente periods and comparing them with the European situation in the late 1960's and different models for "conceivable Europes" of the 1970's. Another method would be to spell out the theoretical requirements for a "lasting" détente relationship in Europe, against which identifiable trends in world politics could then be tested. The latter approach was chosen here, because it has the advantage of clarifying the author's own assumptions about both the characteristics of a détente relationship and the impact of certain perceptible developments in world affairs upon East-West relations in Europe.

Détente between major powers in a world of increasing interdependence is by its very nature a dynamic relationship. In order to last it must develop; otherwise it is likely to "wither away". Thus a "lasting" détente must be "progressive". The following would seem to be minimum requirements for a "lasting" détente relationship in Europe:

1. the mutual confidence in a relatively stable military environment;
2. the mutual expectation that no major attempts would be made by either side to erode the cohesion of or exploit emerging divisions in the other camp;
3. the perception of increasing opportunities for profitable cooperation.
4. the mutual conviction that at least a framework for the eventual settlement or elimination of unresolved political problems is being created.

What is the prospect that these basic requirements will be fulfilled in the next decade or two? While an exhaustive answer to that question would call for a separate study in futuribles, some suggestions may be offered here as to the likely impact of certain identifiable developments in international politics upon the postulated détente requirements.

One such obviously relevant trend is the involvement and increasing risk of confrontation of the superpowers in non-European conflict areas. There are certain parallels in terms of European repercussions between the United States' intervention in Vietnam and Soviet involvement in the Middle East. In connection with both these conflicts it has been at least tacitly acknowledged in the two camps that, contrary to public assertions, peace is divisible; that neither the Vietnamese war nor the armed conflict and continued military confrontation in the Middle East should be allowed to endanger the climate of détente in Europe. Thus, the events of 1967 have probably fortified the European détente relationship insofar as they demonstrated the concern of both superpowers to protect the main theatre of East-West confrontation against the unsettling effects of a non-European crisis. On the other hand, both crises have been divisive issues in the two alliances, thereby creating temptations for each side to exploit these divisions. Here developments in East and West have been asymmetrical, because Vietnam created greater strains in U.S.-West European relations than the Middle Eastern crisis seems to have engendered in the Socialist camp.

Another set of factors impinging upon the European détente and its preconditions are developments in weapons technology. This is not the place to review these in any detail. It may suffice to point out a few likely repercussions of recent trends in this field. The following three would seem to be the most significant for the foreseeable future:

1. the significant Soviet ICBM buildup;
2. the Soviet and American deployment of limited Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems;
3. the U.S. decision to adapt its missile force with so-called MIRVs (Multiple Independently guided Reentry Vehicles).

These trends and innovations are likely to have at least the following three consequences:

1. to complicate deterrence calculations;
2. to complicate defense planning in alliances; and
3. to create increased opportunities for exploiting military capabilities for political and propaganda purposes.

While it is arguable that the very uncertainty of the emerging strategic equation may increase the propensity of the superpowers to reach a European settlement⁶¹ in order to reduce the chances of a major war arising from the unsolved Central European issues, it would seem to the present author that on balance the foreseeable developments in the field of weapons technology are detrimental to the European détente. This assessment is predicated on the assumption that there is likely to be: a) a significant decrease in confidence with regard to the hitherto perceived crude military balance between East and West and therefore an inclination to be "conservative" about military postures, primarily on the global scale and possibly also within the more limited European setting; b) an increased leeway for mutual

mischievous-making in terms of disrupting the cohesion of the opposing camp by radical and hardly verifiable claims of superiority, invulnerability etc. combined with political overtures or pressure.

Alternatively, one could argue that there is evidence of both the United States and the Soviet Union envisaging a new round in the strategic arms race, but that their leaders do not think this to be incompatible with a continued European détente.⁶² The risk from the Western point of view would then seem to be that, with an increasing feeling of West European military impotence, the incipient trend toward uncoordinated and even preemptively executed force reductions in Western Europe will develop further momentum. This is liable to create new tensions within the alliance which the other side may find it difficult not to exploit.

Ultimately, Western views with regard to the endurance of the European détente will hinge on the assessment of Soviet intentions. The more these are seen as being determined by Western postures (both military and political) the greater the inclination to anticipate that Moscow would exploit weaknesses in the West even to the point of sacrificing the détente. The more, on the other hand, one perceives Soviet intentions as a function of other determinants, such as internal developments in the Soviet Union, the constraints of alliance relations and the management of the conflict with China,⁶³ the greater the propensity to foresee a continued détente in Europe, even in the absence of Western cohesion.

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To sum up, it appears that at least two of the four postulated prerequisites for a "lasting" European détente are likely to be endangered by the above mentioned trends in international politics. In the absence of some fundamental reassurance as to the capabilities and intentions of the main actors, opportunities for fruitful cooperation--which undoubtedly exist and seem to be clearly perceived in both camps--are not likely to produce dramatic results in terms of common European ventures overriding ideological border lines. Such common ventures, however, are a necessary nursing ground for the growth of a new political environment in Europe and thus a precondition for mutual confidence in the ultimate solution or elimination of unresolved issues in Central Europe. The creation of a new political environment in Europe, an aim to which lip service has been paid by so many politicians, requires that the problems of European security and cooperation are tackled simultaneously.

1. Address made in the NATO Defense College at Paris, July 19, 1967; printed in Department of State Bulletin (DSB) September 5, 1966, p. 343.
2. Ibid. p. 342.
3. Address before Foreign Policy Association at New York, N.Y. on April 21, 1967, DSB, May 15, 1967, p. 753.
4. See e.g. Statement by Secretary Rusk on July 6, 1967, at Chicago, DSB, July 24, 1967, p. 90; and Secretary McNamara's Posture Statement of January 1967. This position has had the strong backing of the Scandinavian members of NATO. Cf. Karl E. Birnbaum, "The Nordic Countries and European Security", Cooperation & Conflict 1968, No. 1, pp. 9-10.
5. Eugene V. Rostow: "Concert and Conciliation: The Next Stage of the Atlantic Alliance." DSB, October 2, 1967, p. 425.
6. For a discussion of the relationship between the Soviet-American détente and the European détente, see Phillip Windsor "NATO and European Détente", The World Today, September, 1967.
7. 89th Congress, 2nd Session, "Europe Today", A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, by Senator Frank Church, May 1966. See also Congressional Record-Senate, pp. 4756, et seq.
8. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition. For a Broader Conception of America's Role in Europe. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, Toronto, London 1965, pp. 117 et seq.; and John C. Campbell, American Policy Toward Communist Eastern Europe: The Choices Ahead. (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis 1965) pp. 87 et seq. See also Robert F. Byrnes, "American Opportunities and Dilemmas" in: The United States and Eastern Europe, ed. by Robert F. Byrnes; The American Assembly (Prentice-Hall) Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1967, pp. 151 et seq. Byrnes has baptized the new American approach towards Eastern Europe "active or positive containment" and in his view it is based on the same confidence as the original containment doctrine of 1947 "that the Soviet position . . . in Eastern Europe . . . will not be permanent." Ibid. p. 159. While this was probably true as late as 1964, it would seem that by 1966 Washington had come to the conclusion that "peaceful engagement" must not be presented as a policy aiming at sowing discord between the Soviet Union and the East European countries. See below pp. 7-8.

9. Remarks by President Johnson made at the dedication of the George C. Marshall Research Library at Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia, on May 23, 1964. DSB, June 15, 1964, p. 923.
10. Testimony of March 10, 1964, before the House sub-committee on Europe. See Recent Developments in the Soviet Bloc. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, Second Session, Part II (Washington: 1964, U.S. Government Printing Office) pp. 350-357.
11. Cf. the President's speech of May 23, 1964, referred to in note 9.
12. In his speech of February 25, 1964, entitled "Why We Treat Different Communist Countries Differently" Secretary Rusk emphasized that the United States wanted the East European peoples to live "in friendship with their Russian and other neighbors" and "to develop in accordance with their own national aspirations and genius". DSB, March 16, 1964, pp. 390-396.
13. See Secretary Rusk's address "The Goal of a Reliable Peace: A Survey of Free World Progress" made before the Veterans of Foreign Wars on August 22, 1966. DSB, September 12, 1966, p. 366.
14. DSB October 24, 1966, p. 623.
15. Z. Brzezinski, "Toward a Community of the Developed Nations", speech made at Carleton University in Ottawa on January 20, 1967, DSB, March 13, 1967, p. 418.
16. Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition, pp. 139-141.
17. Some European observers have interpreted this silence as tantamount to "tacit de facto recognition" of the East German regime. The most significant feature, however, is the U.S. position with regard to East Germany in 1967 appeared to be Washington's inclination to follow West Germany's lead on that issue--once Bonn had decided to include intra-German relations in its détente policy.
18. DSB, June 15, 1964, pp. 922-924.
19. Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition, p. 123.
20. See President Johnson's speech on the Twentieth Anniversary of V-E Day, DSB, May 24, 1965, p. 792.
21. "Making Europe Whole: An Unfinished Task." Address by President Johnson made before the National Conference of Editorial Writers at New York, N.Y., October 7, 1967, DSB, October 24, 1966, p. 623.
22. Cf. the news analysis by Philip Shabecoff entitled "Indignation in Bonn", New York Times, Oct. 18, 1966, p. 2.

23. DSB, Oct. 24, 1966, p. 624.
24. The use of the word "unity" (rather than "A united Western Europe" as in the preceding two paragraphs) indicates that the term was meant to denote either the unity of the Western Alliance or a united Europe comprising both the Western and Eastern parts of the Old Continent. In the first case, the statement would seem to reflect a concept of a by-gone period in East-West relations, when it was widely but wrongly believed in the West that a united Germany, integrated in a Western alliance, might be acceptable to the Soviet Union as an effective way to contain the Germans. The latter interpretation, which is much more in keeping with the tenor of the whole speech, leaves unanswered the basic question, how this united Europe would relate to America.
25. Brzezinski, "Toward a Community of the Developed Nations", DSB, March 13, 1967, p. 418. The interdependence between Western unity and East-West reconciliation had been publicly expounded by Brzezinski as early as April 28, 1966, in a testimony before a Congressional Committee. See "The Crisis in NATO", Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 89th Congress, 2nd session, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 71 ff.
26. Brzezinski, "The Framework of East-West Reconciliation", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 2, Jan., 1968.
27. Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, Commons, Official Reports 1966-1967, Vol. 742, C. 289.
28. Statement before the House of Commons on 27 February 1967, ibid., Vol. 742, CC. 110-111.
29. See Statement on the Defence Estimates 1967, Cmnd. 3203 London 1967, (Her Majesty's Stationery Office), Page 4, where the relevant passage runs as follows: "It is not perhaps inconceivable that, because of some fundamental change in the world situation, the threat to Western Europe might revive. But such a change is most unlikely to develop overnight."--According to press reports Dennis Healey at the closed Ministerial Meeting of the NATO Council in Paris, December, 1966, had forcefully argued for the contention that the current improvement in East-West relations was fundamental and lasting, whereas his American colleague allegedly had expressed far greater skepticism and cautioned the West European allies against assuming basic changes in Soviet policy. See report by Henry Tanner from Paris, in New York Times, December 15, 1966, p. 8.

30. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1967, p. 4.
31. Cf. statement by Britain's Minister of State for Disarmament, Lord Chalfont before the Assembly of the Western European Union on June 17, 1966. Western European Union, Proceedings, 12th Ordinary Session, First Part, Vol. II; Minutes of Official Reports of Debates, p. 230. See also Arthur Gwynne Jones (Lord Chalfont) "The Value of Observation Posts in NATO and Warsaw Pact Areas", European Review, Vol. XVI, Autumn 1966.
32. See, for example, the speech given by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, at the International Publishing Corporation Conference of European Editors in London on November 21, 1966, partly reprinted under the title "East-West Relations and the European Problem" in NATO Letter, February, 1967, pp. 2-5.
33. Pierre Hassner, "From Napoleon III to de Gaulle" Interplay, Vol. I, No. 7 (February 1968), p. 12 ff.
34. Cf. Pierre Hassner, op. cit., p. 19.
35. See André Passeron, De Gaulle Parle 1962-1966 (Paris, 1966, Fayard), pp. 215-216.
36. Address delivered by M. Maurice Couve de Murville during the budgetary debates in the National Assembly, November 3, 1966, Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, New York, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. 254. (Hereafter quoted as French Embassy, Press Service).
37. Ibid., No. 255.
38. See for example, text of address given by President de Gaulle during his visit to Moscow June 20, 1967, ibid., No. 247.
39. See, for example, de Gaulle's statement at the Press Conference of September 9, 1965, Passeron, op. cit., p. 189; also address given by General de Gaulle at the banquet in the Kremlin on June 20, 1966, French Embassy, Press Service, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. 247.
40. Cf. e.g. Address by the French Foreign Minister M. Couve de Murville before the UN General Assembly Sept. 28, 1966, ibid., No. 252.
41. Ibidem. Cf. also de Gaulle's New Year's message of December 31, 1966, Ibid., No. 255.

42. See, for example, the speech by Prime Minister Georges Pompidou at the Institute for Advanced National Defense Studies, November 21, 1967, ibid., No. 275.
43. See the address of French Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, before the French National Assembly on November 3, 1966, in the course of which he said: ". . . the overall situation in Europe lends itself to long range views and allows us to study a long-term policy, for the time of adventures seems passed there now. This situation has indeed stabilized enough for us to feel that, in the present state, external events alone could challenge it." ibid. No. 254.
44. Cf. the West German "Peace Note" of March 25, 1966, Section V, 2, Europa-Archiv, 7/1966, p. D 175.
45. See, for example, statements by Mr. von Hassel, at the time West Germany's Defense Minister, in the course of the autumn of 1964, reprinted in Kai-Uwe von Hassel, Verantwortung für die Freiheit. Auszüge aus Reden und Veröffentlichungen 1963/1964, Boppard, 1965, pp. 92 f., 126 f.
46. See the introductory speech delivered by Helmut Schmidt on June 3, 1966, in "Arbeitsgemeinschaft B" Tatsachen-Argumente Nr. 205/66, SPD Parteitag 1966, Vorstand der SPD, Bonn, 1966, pp. 4-5.
47. Europa-Archiv 1/1967, p. D 15.
48. Ibid., 4/1967, p. D 81.
49. Cf. ibid., p. D 83, see also Willy Brandt, "Détente over the Long Haul", Survival, October 1967, pp. 310-12.
50. In an effort to analyze a détente relationship, Carlo Schmidt has distinguished between tensions due to the fear of being deprived of a vital possession and those due to the fear of being frustrated with regard to a basic aspiration to which one believes oneself entitled. See his speech before the Council of Europe on September 27, 1966, partly reprinted in Europa-Archiv 24/1966, p. D 637 ff.
51. Willy Brandt, op. cit., Survival, Oct. 1967, p. 311.
52. Cf. the address by Foreign Minister Willy Brandt before the Council of Europe on Jan. 24, 1967, Europa-Archiv 4/1967, p. D 82.
53. Willy Brandt, "Détente over the Long Haul", Survival, Oct., 1967, p. 312.
54. See ibid., p. 311; also Willy Brandt, "German Policy Toward the East", Foreign Affairs, April, 1968, cf. the summary of a speech given by Chancellor Kiesinger at the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik on June 23, 1967, Europa-Archiv, 18/1967, pp. 683 ff.

55. See the Government Declaration of Dec. 13, 1966, Europa-Archiv 1/1967, p. D 18; also Willy Brandt's speech before the Council of Europe on Jan. 24, 1967, Europa-Archiv, 4/1967, p. D 84, where the Foreign Minister used the term Geregeltes Nebeneinander to describe the new relationship that Bonn sought to attain vis-à-vis East Berlin.
56. Ibid., p. D 85.
57. Cf. Marshall D. Shulman: "'Europe' versus 'Détente'?" Foreign Affairs, April 1967, pp. 391-92.
58. Among the innumerable claims made by General de Gaulle on that score the one in his speech in the Kremlin on June 20, 1966, is perhaps the most emphatic. (French Embassy, Press Service, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. 247.) For an American rebuttal and counter-claim see Brzezinski, "The Framework of East-West Reconciliation", Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1968, p. 258, footnote 1. For a corresponding British assertion see George Brown, "East-West Relations and the European Problem", NATO Letter, February 1967, p. 5.
59. Hassner, op. cit., p. 16.
60. Such "national interests" are, of course, often presented as being identical with those of wider regions, such as "Europe" or even the world community at large. These claims, however, must be critically examined in each case before being accepted as valid, because of the natural inclination of governments to argue along the lines of a former president of General Motors Company.
61. Cf. Johann J. Holst, "BMD and European Perspectives", in Ballistic Missile Defence, Two Views, Adelphi Paper No. 43, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, November 1967, p. 26.
62. For the United States this is at least implicitly borne out in a speech by Eugene V. Rostow printed in DSB, October 2, 1967, under the title "Concert and Conciliation: The Next Stage of the Atlantic Alliance". There Rostow acknowledged "an accelerating pace" in the development of nuclear arms by the Soviet Union and the United States. At the same time he envisaged the continuation and, indeed, the further development of détente in Europe. See also Holst, op. cit., p. 27.
63. The future of China and of Sino-Soviet relations, while conceivably among the main determinants of international politics in the coming decade, have not been included in this attempt to map out possible repercussions of perceptible developments upon the situation in Europe, mainly because of the difficulty in identifying any distinct trends at the present time.

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CONFERENCE DES DIRECTEURS ET REPRESENTANTS DES INSTITUTS
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EASTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIES
AND PROSPECTIVES FOR EAST-WEST TRADE

by

Paolo Calzini

The general course of the Eastern European economies during 1966 and the first part of 1967 appears relatively satisfactory, confirming, despite differences from country to country, a certain renewal of expansion. (For 1966, the relative productive slow-down in Poland and Rumania seems more than compensated for by the growth rate in the other countries, particularly Bulgaria and Hungary). We are now in the second year of the respective five-year plans and the individual economies, each one with its own particular emphases and forms, aim at a rationalization of the means and objectives of the economy, which should lead to a higher level of production.

The new economic course presupposes:

- 1) a gradual readjustment in the priorities of investments, confirmed by, among other things, the most recent Soviet budget which favours the sectors of light industry, agriculture, services, etc., to meet the needs of an increased popular consumption and of an increased productivity.
- 2) An advancement of the technical level through modernization of the means of production, the development of the most advanced sectors, the introduction of the most modern forms of technology.
- 3) A more rational use of capital and productive possibilities.

All the countries of the area are committed, as is well known, to a complex policy of reform of their respective systems of administration and planning. From the debates and plans of previous years they have passed into the phase of execution of reform programs (this naturally does not mean that discussion does not continue relentlessly). It is a delicate phase, characterized by notable contradictions due to the importance of the socio-political implications as well as the economic implications attendant on the reforms. To express it in Marxist terms, the problem facing the Eastern European regimes is not only to reform the basis of production but also the administrative and institutional superstructure,

striking at long-established situations.

Although as yet it cannot be held that the reforms have appreciably eroded the traditional system of management and planning, it is certain that they are beginning to influence Eastern European economic life. It is not surprising that the process itself should encounter obstacles and difficulties of varying intensity from country to country. The differing levels of industrialization and of socio-political conditions in the people's democracies strongly condition the enterprise of the Communist regimes, each one committed to a differing line of administration.

The situation in the various Eastern European countries can be set out schematically in these terms:

HUNGARY: The reform plan was varied in mid-1966 and many particular aspects are still being defined. As well as the gradual reform of the price system, the plan is for a transfer of earnings to the individual companies, changing, among other things, the proportion of profits which go respectively to the state and to the industry to the notable benefit of the latter in comparison with the past. Such a system should permit financing of the investments themselves by the industries, the state and the banks.

POLAND: The authorities tend to confront the problem with a series of partial measures without developing an overall plan. The question is to thin out the administrative system, grown cumbersome in the past, by the introduction of incentives and prizes offered to the individual productive units.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: This is the country (together with Hungary) where the reform program is most daring, although it meets with great obstacles due to the existence of a well-established centralized structure based on strong industrial concentrations. As well as the reform of the price system, which in 1967 began to attack wholesale prices, and the reform of administration, the problem has been raised in Prague of diversification in industry

in order to favour new branches of production, such as the precision, glass and specialized chemical industries.

In the USSR and BULGARIA, still the most backward nations on the road to reform, a certain number of industrial and transport enterprises have adopted, or are beginning to adopt, new forms of management capable of granting a higher degree of autonomy to the individual economic units. The Bulgarian regime, in particular, has carried forward the integration of various complexes into sector trusts, intermediate organizations between the ministries and the industries themselves.

The GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC is an interesting case of an economy in phase of development, characterized by relative efficiency despite persistent lacks at administrative and financial levels. Notable measures were adopted at the beginning of 1967 to carry out a general price reform; it was decided as well to transfer decisions relative to investments to the firms themselves, substituting the old centralized quantitative control by credit control by the banks.

RUMANIA: Although the Rumanians, strong in their brilliant economic success of recent years, are the most cautious of all, the first symptoms of reformatory initiatives are not lacking. The impression of many observers is that the Bucarest regime will not be able to limit itself, as it officially declares, to a program of technical and scientific perfection of production. The tendency would seem to be to maintain a centralized price system while decentralizing on the other hand the operation of the industries grouped into the so-called "industrial plants" and submitting them to financial controls.

As far as international trade is concerned, there is no doubt that the reform programs everywhere tend towards development of economic relations with the non-Communist world. (Although it is worth noting that the adoption of decentralizing measures

does not automatically imply a growth of trade, as is shown by the example of Hungary, who was very well placed on the international markets while retaining a rigidly centralized structure). As the Czechoslovakian economist and leading reformer Ota Sik has said, the essential point in the new economic line is precisely the "correlation between international trade and the national economy".

A presupposition of the modernization of the respective economic systems is the overcoming of blockages and obstructions inherent in an autarchically based economy which established itself firmly in the preceding period. In analyzing development after the Second World War, Eastern European economists stress the importance of the strategic political positions during the period indetermining artificial conditions of division and isolation amongst European countries. Although the validity of the programs of intense industrialization on a purely national scale is recognised, it is agreed that it is now necessary to move on to a phase of development of a different nature. In some countries in particular, traditionally part of the major currents of international trade, explicit voices have been raised in favour of the necessity of reestablishing a suitable position in the world markets.

The basic reasons for this may be indicated as follows:

- 1) an efficacious investment policy is tied to the external situation constituted by the international division of labor and international competition. Access to world markets favours the optimum allocation of factors of production, allowing an adjustment to more advanced productive levels. This means the adjustment of internal prices to international prices, remembering however the preponderant influence of the capitalist countries in the determining of the level of prices.
- 2) The improvement of the quality of production, required by, among other things, the raising of the standard of living, imposes the assimilation of more advanced technological techniques coming

from outside. This is valid both for finished products and for, above all, plant equipment, patents, know how etc. necessary for the modernization of the means of production. It must be born in mind as well, always considering the pressure of internal demand, that the Eastern European countries are, in differing degrees, dependent on foreign trade, even to satisfy their needs in the field of agricultural products.

On the other hand, it has been pointed out, factors that could limit the expansion of international trade are: the growing internal demand which curbs possibilities for exportation; the continuing cycle of agriculturally good years which limits imports; the ever present problem of the need not to aggravate the balance of payments situation.

In the reform picture therefore, there appears a first series of measures relative to the organisation of foreign trade leading towards a higher degree of decentralization and a functional thinning out. The general tendency is to overcome the monopoly of the state-run commercial agencies and to allow a certain autonomy in the commercial field to the individual companies or groups of companies.

In Hungary there is still a heavy dependence on the specialized state agencies, but the producers have the possibility of choice between these agencies and may, furthermore, establish particular forms of co-participation in risks and profits. One of the factors that will be born in mind in the granting of commercial autonomy is that the national industries may have technical-economic relations with foreign industries and therefore require forms of more direct and integrated collaboration. In Czechoslovakia, as well, steps have been taken to allow firms to dispose of their own earnings in foreign currencies, particularly Western. Skoda is one of the industrial complexes which enjoy the privilege of managing their own international trade without recourse to the Ministry of Foreign Trade. It is interesting that the Prague regime has extended this opportunity to some state farms as well, which may now

sell their products directly on the Western markets in order to acquire there the necessary farm equipment.

Rumania presents a special case because on one hand the strictest financial control over the activities of industry tends to produce a more selective import policy, and on the other hand the transfer of trade responsibility to the new "industrial plants" should favour contact with foreign companies. Lastly, in Bulgaria, the formation of fifty or so industrial and agricultural trusts which are allowed a certain autonomy in foreign relations has without doubt favoured foreign trade, so much so as to allow a prediction of a growth in foreign trade of about 20 % in 1967.

Bearing in mind all these elements, one may note the basic tendency of Eastern European trade of maintaining itself at a reasonable level, above the general world average, although displaying a certain slow-down in respect to preceding years. (An average growth of 6 % in 1965 and slightly more in 1966, as against 8 % in the previous five year period).

Naturally, great differences persist between one country and another, as the figures for 1966 show, revealing as they do a commercial growth rate varying from a minimum of 2 % (Czechoslovakia) to a maximum of 9 % (Bulgaria).

It is interesting to examine at this point the particular course of trade within the Eastern European area and between this zone and Western Europe, to evaluate particular tendencies and developments.

Trade in the Comecon Area

The question of the Comecon is complex because it is an organism which is going through a phase of contradictory development, conditioned by a series of political as well as economic elements.

Considering its extremely elastic nature, initial plans for a more

rigid supranational organization having been abandoned, many observers are of the opinion that it need not necessarily constitute an obstacle to trade with Eastern nations. It is held rather that the adoption of efficacious measures of cooperation ensuring a more rapid industrial progress in the area would tend to promote a general increase in trade. On the other hand, others maintain that the existence of a whole series of inter-zonal agreements and the tendency, however contradictory, towards closer forms of integration create growing obstacles to an increase of Western trade.

A prominent fact, however, is the slow-down of trade between the Eastern European countries themselves, particularly evident recently. It must be remembered that in 1966 the price revision carried out in the area to bring internal prices into line with international ones lowered the general value of trade. But this is not the case in the preceding period which provides unequivocal figures documenting the existing tendency towards a decline in the growth of trade : 1950-55 (growth of 85 %), 1955-60 (growth of 71 %), 1960-65 (growth of 65 %). Obviously, profound reasons exist which must be looked for in the structural changes which took place in the economy and commerce of these countries. In particular, changes in the priorities and levels of investment, with the result, among others, that the more highly industrialized countries of the area can no longer pour large quantities of machinery and equipment into the less developed countries. Which means, as the Communist observers have not failed to point out, that the progress of Eastern European trade development is clearly inferior to that registered within the Common Market.

Trade within the Comecon countries continues, however, to be of great importance and comprises on an average between 60 and 70 per cent of the world trade of the individual countries; on a qualitative level as well, available figures show the importance of this trade: 73% of total imports of machinery and equipment, 93 % of petroleum and coal, 80% of transport equipment, etc.

At the root of this situation, apart from political connections between the countries, there is an effective complementary nature among the Comecon members. The USSR remains a more or less essential source of supply of primary materials and a vast and certain market for machinery, equipment and finished industrial products. The same is true, within differing limits, of the reciprocal relations between the more and less developed nations of Eastern Europe. Above all, recently even the less developed economies such as those of Bulgaria and Rumania, by now on the way to industrialization, have succeeded in exporting industrial products to the more developed nations (while reserving agricultural products for the Western markets). This is principally due to the existence of strong competitive elements between the individual countries, which may well manifest themselves even more strongly in the future.

The factors which tend to slow down the economic integration of Eastern Europe and therefore to influence negatively the growth of reciprocal trade may be set out as follows:

- 1) The non-achievement of an effective policy of international division of labor. The less developed countries of the area did not wish to concentrate on agriculture, creating beyond a certain point, a general overabundance of simple industrial products which weighs down trade. The autarchic tendency has deep motivations and roots, and despite current progress will probably continue into the future.
- 2) The absence of an efficient supranational comparative cost system, extremely difficult to work out considering that the different countries are each in their own terms committed to the reform of internal prices, which obstructs a policy of rational economic choice.
- 3) The inability to adopt a convertible currency system and therefore the limits imposed on multilateralism and the insistence on

bilateralism. From the foundation of a multilateral system of accounting it is now necessary to pass on to the creation of an international monetary unit convertible into gold or hard currency.

4. Despite the 1966 price adjustments, dissatisfaction persists with the fixed prices, on the Soviet side because they claim that machinery has been too highly valued, and in the smaller countries, on the contrary, because they consider the prices of primary materials to be still unsatisfactory. The continuing Soviet requests for finance for the development of sources of primary materials reveal the growing need for supplies in the fields of combustibles and primary materials.

To these four points can be added others which partially enter into the scope of those already set out, among them the low standard of certain manufactures, the difficulty of establishing international relations between the individual companies, the lack of incentives and competitions, etc.

The reform programs in progress tend towards the overcoming of these problems, while the Comecon itself is developing programs favoring relations of specialization and collaboration on a bilateral basis as well as the multilateral one. The agreements regarding certain specialized production, such as Intermetal, the agreements for the common exploiting of primary materials such as the Czecho-Soviet agreement, the intensification of contacts and exchange of information in the commissions of Comecon all tend to favour more rational cooperation. However, it is extremely difficult to foresee today what results will be obtained.

The course of trade relations between Comecon and Western Europe during 1966 was, despite a certain fall in the growth rate with respect to 1965, generally good, (increase of 12 % in imports and of 11.2 % in exports). As the relative figures show, this is a much stronger development than that within the Communist area itself. There

are notable differences from country to country, however, connected with the peculiarities of the economic policies of the individual nations. Rumania and Bulgaria are excellent examples: the two countries are equally developed, one clearly bent on the slackening of ties with the USSR and the Socialist bloc, and the other determined to strengthen them. (In 1966, while Bulgaria, Poland and Yugoslavia strengthened relations with the Soviets, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic and Rumania showed a tendency to loosen them. Again in 1966, it is worth while noting that Hungary increased its Western trade by 14% as against a 4% increase in Eastern European trade, while on the contrary the G. D. R. tended towards a slow-down in Western trade and in trade with the Federal Republic of Germany in particular).

The effective importance of trade with Western Europe is no doubt high, even if it does not account for more than an average of one fifth of the total, with higher averages in certain countries. It allows the Eastern European countries to: 1) save internal resources and therefore to speed up the process of planned development; 2) have access to products of a high technological level not to be found elsewhere, an equally important factor in the modernization process. For all the above mentioned reasons it seems possible to affirm that for the Eastern European countries the participation on world markets represents, within certain limits, the guarantee of the completion of stated objectives in the stated times. In relations with the West, however, certain countries find themselves caught in a vicious circle because only the importation of certain products and equipment renders them capable of exporting competitively to Western markets. The Rumanians, for example, who intend to become exporters of chemical products, know that this can only be attained by massive importation of Western equipment.

The fundamental problem in East-West trade is to maintain the equilibrium of the trade balance. Available figures show the

existence of a strict relationship between imports and exports from Eastern Europe. For the period 1960-65 it is calculated that Eastern Europe increased its purchases and sales in nearly equal amounts, around one billion three hundred million dollars. Without the valuable currency earned on Western markets, the Eastern Europeans are not able to buy on those markets, apart from certain primary products in certain countries of the third world. (Russia's case is a special one, since she may always call on ample gold reserves).

The principal obstacles hindering the expansion of East-West trade are to be found therefore in the inability of the Eastern European countries to increase their exports to the West in adequate measure. For reasons of price and quality, Western markets tend to reject products not specialized and of a high standard of quality, which the Eastern Europeans are not always able to supply. This inability is essentially due to the fact that the productive diversification between the two regions is still based on the distribution of natural resources rather than on a division of industrial specialization. Of Eastern European exports to the West, three fifths are still made up of primary materials and agricultural products, despite the efforts of recent years to bolster exports of machinery and manufactured goods. What is needed then is a gradual change of the structure of Eastern European commerce, which moreover they are carrying out by overcoming their own economic backwardness. In fact available figures show a reduction in exports of primary materials, an increase in exports of industrial products and an increase in imports of machinery and consumer goods.

Other factors which render reciprocal relations more difficult are the functional rigidities, the bilateral nature of the trading, the lack of a convertible currency, etc., all elements which we have noted also negatively effect commerce within the Socialist bloc.

Obstacles also exist on the Western side. The arguments raised by the Eastern Europeans, although not acceptable in toto, reveal the existence of negative factors operating on the development of trade. The policy of strategic embargo applied by NATO countries to Comecon no longer constitutes an effective obstacle. Rather, the tariffs of the EEC and EFTA countries, although not excessive, as well as all the series of advantages inherent in internal Western trade, tend to condition the East-West trade.

The arguments raised in the Eastern European countries to sustain the usefulness to the Westerners themselves of a facilitation of reciprocal trade are substantially as follows: the extent of the trade is so limited (4.3 % of all Western trade) that the possible easing of tariff barriers would not run the risk of grave consequences; the guarantee of a stable demand, although small, is very important for certain sectors of Western industry; only through expansion of trade beyond its own preferential area can the West guarantee its continued economic development.

The question of the methods of overcoming the difficulties and promoting an increase in East-West trade is very complex. A primary matter for consideration is the development within the Eastern European economies themselves, along the above indicated lines. It is a slow, gradual process, as has been shown, whose rhythm of development is hard to foresee, but which should be advantageous to the equilibrium of the balance of payments also through non-commercial earnings such as that of tourism.

A second matter, on the other hand, concerns factors more contingent on the nature of trade. Among other measures are: memberships of GATT, already obtained by Yugoslavia, who, by means of the most favoured nation clause, is pushing towards multilateralism; the concession of credits, to allow the necessary adjustment of productive structures to the competitive world standard; the establishing of very long terms for trade agreements to ensure their necessary stability; the growth of industrial cooperation,

which is today only beginning, given the great difficulties of attaining a technical, juridical and financial cooperation between such entirely diverse systems.

In considering the general prospects it is interesting to speculate on the possibility of a substantial intervention by the United States in trade with Eastern Europe. Although at the moment extremely limited, American intervention and the possibilities for new alternatives that it could offer to the Eastern Europeans must not be underestimated. The Eastern European insistence on accusing Washington of a discriminatory trade policy towards the Socialist bloc reveals a generally diffused interest in an increase of trade. The United States is already an important supplier of certain agricultural products to the Comecon countries, and it must not be forgotten that the USA is more than able to compete with Western Europe in terms of advanced technology. The United States maintains (except with Yugoslavia) extremely limited relations with the Socialist area (3% of Eastern European trade with the West). Political-ideological reasons tend to limit the possibilities for expansion, although the first symptoms of a changing attitude can be glimpsed.

The trade policy of Japan must also be given consideration, although to a much lesser degree, Japan, strengthened by American technological and financial support, shows a growing interest in developing its trade with Eastern Europe. 90 % of this trade with the communist world is with Russia or China, but it is significant that in 1966 commerce with Eastern Europe increased by one third.

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LE ROLE DES ETATS PETITS ET MOYENS DANS LA CREATION D'UN
CLIMAT DE PAIX, D'ENTENTE ET DE COOPERATION EN EUROPE

par

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Association de droit international et relations internationales
Bucarest

Les Etats petits et moyens ont existé dans toutes les époques historiques et sur tous les continents et ont eu un rôle à remplir; le thème, que nous désirons exposer devant vous constitue donc une réalité qui peut être suivie depuis les temps les plus reculés; il est toutefois devenu ces dernières années d'une grande actualité, étant donné que dans notre monde contemporain, monde d'interdépendances complexes et, reconnaissons-le, obligatoires, la position et le rôle des pays jouissant d'un potentiel réduit ou moyen sont étudiés, posés et appréciés de différentes manières, et comportent des conclusions qui vont de l'affirmation confiante à la négation de l'avenir de ces Etats. Sans doute, la réponse ne sera pas trouvée ex-cathedra mais dans l'évolution même de notre communauté humaine. Notre intention est de vous présenter quelques-unes de nos réflexions ou de préciser quelques faits du passé ou de nos jours lesquels, rapprochés et examinés dans leur enchaînement, nous permettront, nous l'espérons, d'aboutir à certaines conclusions, non pas pour un avenir lointain, mais pour l'actuelle étape historique de notre génération. Nous laisserons de côté dans notre communication, les divisions bien connues de l'histoire - antiquité, Moyen Age, époques moderne et contemporaine ou - à partir du mode de production - période esclavagiste, féodalité, capitalisme, socialisme. Nous retiendrons, en revanche, deux réalités concernant les rapports entre Etats, réalités constamment manifestées au cours de chacune des étapes mentionnées et qui sont déterminantes pour l'existence et l'avenir de toutes les nations, sans exception, à savoir : la suprématie de la force et la suprématie du droit à la vie de chacun. Si nous partons d'un pareil critère, l'histoire de l'humanité ne connaît que deux grandes périodes : l'une qui s'étend sur presque toute l'évolution historique et durant laquelle la justice a été du côté du plus fort; la seconde qui, difficilement, mais infailliblement, devient une réalité, où la justice relève de la loi, reconnue et acceptée par tous, en vertu de leur propre souveraineté.

Dans l'ère des manifestations de la force, les petits Etats, en dépit de leur résistance, se sont inclinés devant les plus grands, en cessant parfois d'exister. Les exemples ne font pas défaut et ils sont nombreux depuis l'époque où Rome rassemblait dans son Orbis Romana des peuples d'Europe et du Proche Orient et jusqu'au seuil de l'époque contemporaine, témoin de l'extermination complète de populations ou de l'assujettissement et de l'exploitation de continents entiers transformés en territoires coloniaux. Sans doute, ces manifestations de la force ont engendré dans certains cas - nous songeons à l'antiquité et au début du Moyen Age - de nouvelles synthèses supérieures, à l'état antérieur; mais ce serait nier notre civilisation contemporaine que d'admettre - ne fût-ce que théoriquement - la viabilité de pareilles formes des relations internationales. La dernière tragédie mondiale, celle des années 1939-1945 a été trop poignante, pour qu'elle pût être diminuée dans la conscience de l'humanité; elle a prouvé que la force - grâce aux progrès techniques - met en jeu toute l'évolution de l'humanité et son existence future elle-même.

Certes, il y eut aussi dans le passé des situations qui n'évoluèrent pas jusqu'au point extrême. Les Principautés Roumaines qui subsistèrent sans interruption en tant qu'états du XIV-XIXe siècles, furent obligées à cette fin, de reconnaître la supériorité de certains de leurs grands voisins, et en premier lieu celle de l'Empire Ottoman. A partir du XIXe siècle et après la première guerre mondiale, tous les peuples européens ont pu se constituer en Etats nationaux unitaires, mais ils durent trop souvent tenir compte de la volonté des plus forts, de ce que le Congrès de Vienne a légalisé sous le nom de concept des grandes puissances qui décidaient dans tous les problèmes majeurs du continent.

Mais même dans cette étape de la domination des rapports de force, les pays limités en étendue et en population ont maintes fois rempli un rôle bien marqué et ont eu la conscience, parfois clairement exprimée, de leur rôle.

La République des Doges et sa rivale Gênes au cours des XIII-XV siècles et plus tard les Pays-Bas furent de véritables grandes puissances du commerce international; les Principautés Roumaines - nous pensons à leur épopée militaire sous les règnes de Mircea l'Ancien (1386-1418) - ont prouvé sur les champs de bataille ainsi que par leurs actes diplomatiques, qu'elles étaient conscientes de ce rôle. Pour ce qui est du domaine de la création culturelle, des arts et de la littérature, les oeuvres classiques ont surgi partout - sans égard à la grandeur du pays - et ce seul domaine est amplement suffisant pour nous faire mûrement réfléchir quant au thème qui nous préoccupe.

A la fin de la seconde guerre mondiale commence une nouvelle ère de profondes transformations, aussi bien sur le plan de la civilisation matérielle - nous voulons parler de la révolution technique et scientifique - que dans celui des relations entre Etats. L'Organisation des Nations Unies a été fondée par 51 Etats; d'autres 73 membres, presque uniquement des Etats petits et moyens, sont depuis leur entrée dans l'Organisation, durant les 22 années de son existence.

Le développement du système mondial socialiste, la liquidation du colonialisme, l'action continue pour la libération complète de toutes les formes d'immixtion ou de dépendance, l'effort persévérant des nations vers une construction économique, sociale et politique propre, conforme à leurs réalités nationales, - tous ces facteurs confèrent un contenu nouveau aux rapports entre Etats et qui se fonde sur le respect d'autres principes qui ne peuvent plus reposer sur la force.

C'est à peine au cours de la dernière décennie que presque tous les peuples du globe ont pu se constituer en Etats indépendants. La nation s'avère être, dans le monde de nos jours, une force motrice importante, tandis que le socialisme affirme sans conteste sa capacité d'assurer le développement libre et indépendant de chaque nation socialiste. "La vie démontre - déclarait le président du Conseil d'Etat de Roumanie, Nicolae

Ceausescu, à la session de juillet 1967 de la Grande Assemblée Nationale - qu'un peuple auquel on ravit une partie de ses prérogatives nationales, cesse d'être libre et souverain, ce qui met en danger son développement social lui-même. Le mépris de cette réalité entre en conflit avec les aspirations des peuples, avec les lois objectives du développement de la société... La garantie de l'indépendance et de la souveraineté, le développement incessant de chaque nation, représente un facteur important du progrès de la société."

Sur de telles bases - lorsque des dizaines d'Etats sont devenus libres à peine depuis quelques années, lorsque ne

l'oublions pas, beaucoup de pays européens ont conquis leur indépendance tout au plus depuis un siècle - lorsque l'Etat national en tant que réalité historique est loin d'être arrivé à son développement et à sa maturité maxima - le poids quantitatif et qualitatif des Etats petits et moyens dans les rapports internationaux ne cesse de croître. Pour l'historien, pour l'investigateur de l'histoire de ces rapports, pour l'observateur et le connaisseur de l'étape contemporaine, la conclusion énoncée est évidente.

Mais quelle sorte de relations doivent s'établir entre les Etats membres de notre communauté mondiale, à l'intérieur de laquelle les Etats petits et moyens constituent la grande majorité?

Il serait injuste d'alléguer que dans le passé des tentatives individuelles ou collectives de placer la raison et la loi à la base des rapports entre Etats ne furent pas faites.

C'est ainsi que le roi Georges de Bohême proposait dès 1462-1464 la signature d'une charte - en fait d'un traité plurilatéral - destiné, ainsi que cela résulte du texte proposé, "à établir la paix dans toute la chrétienté", par l'intermédiaire d'une organisation internationale adéquate. Pendant la guerre de 30 ans, Hugo Grotius écrivait son célèbre ouvrage "De jure belli ac pacis", paru en 46 éditions dans les seules premières cent années de son impression (1630-1730) et dans lequel étaient formulés - peut-on lire dans l'épithaphe latine du tombeau du grand juriste - "les droits de la guerre et de la paix des Etats". Après la longue guerre de succession au trône d'Espagne, Saint-Pierre rédigeait "Le projet

de paix perpétuelle" ; après les coalitions contre la France révolutionnaire, Emmanuel Kant écrivait "Zum ewigen Frieden". Après la première conflagration mondiale, au cours des années de grandes espérances qui suivirent les années de grandes souffrances, était fondée la Société des Nations, dont les buts fondamentaux inscrits dans le Pacte étaient : l'établissement des relations internationales sur les principes du droit international et l'exclusion de la guerre en tant que moyen de solution des litiges.

Enfin, après la seconde guerre mondiale, a été constituée l'Organisation des Nations Unies, appelée à assurer avec sa haute autorité la primauté de la loi, à créer le cadre susceptible de garantir le libre développement de la personnalité de chaque Etat membre et à mettre à la disposition de tous les participants, les moyens menant à la réglementation pacifique des conflits. Ultérieurement, le Comité spécial pour la codification et le développement progressif des principes du droit international - auquel participe aussi la Roumanie - a adopté à l'unanimité au cours de ses trois réunions des années 1964-1967, les quatre principes consacrés par la Charte de l'ONU, à savoir : l'égalité souveraine des Etats, la solution pacifique des différends, la bonne foi dans l'exécution des obligations assumées et la coopération internationale.

Par rapport aux instruments internationaux qui l'ont précédée, la Charte des Nations Unies exprime ainsi d'une manière bien plus complète la conception juridique interdisant non seulement la guerre, mais l'emploi de la force en général et formule les principes gouvernant les relations entre Etats.

C'est ainsi que furent créées, au moyen de textes juridiques internationaux, jouissant d'une haute autorité et reconnus par la majorité des Etats, les prémisses de l'affirmation et de l'initiative sur une vaste échelle des Etats petits et moyens dans le déroulement des relations internationales.

Toutefois, de pareilles formulations ne deviennent des réalités que sous certaines conditions. Les Etats petits et moyens peuvent-ils faire valoir leur place et leur rôle tant que la plupart d'entre eux sont handicapés par le décalage du développement économique, ^{et technologique} militaire et stratégique, et celui de l'éducation ?

L'époque contemporaine vit sous le signe de la révolution technique et scientifique qui se déroule, surtout depuis quinze ans, dans un rythme de plus en plus accéléré, lequel engendre nécessairement le flux continu de valeurs matérielles et spirituelles.

"La tendance des peuples au rapprochement - caractéristique générale de l'évolution de l'humanité - déclarait récemment le président du Conseil des Ministres de Roumanie Ion Gheorghe Maurer, lors de sa visite en Finlande - se manifeste de nos jours avec une insistance particulière, déterminée par le développement grandiose des forces de production. Ce dernier constitue la base matérielle, objective, du besoin ressenti par les peuples de toujours mieux se connaître, de collaborer de plus en plus étroitement, de développer entre eux des rapports de coopération...."

A ce trait dominant du monde contemporain s'en ajoute un second: la possibilité de l'annihilation de la civilisation humaine par le déclenchement de la guerre thermonucléaire.

La seule voie à suivre est donc la coexistence pacifique des nations, imposée par la structure même du monde actuel, monde des interdépendances, du circuit rapide des valeurs, dans lequel chaque pays a à donner et à recevoir, tandis que le progrès et le droit à la vie et à la sécurité de chacun doit être également respecté et assuré. Une pareille conclusion n'est pas une question de conjoncture, d'opportunité, mais une réalité fondamentale en vertu de laquelle aucune con-

sidération - d'ordre géographique, économique ou militaire - ne saurait limiter la capacité d'un pays, quel que soit son étendue, de contribuer à l'établissement et au développement des relations internationales dans un ensemble qui permette à tous les peuples de s'engager, de toutes leurs forces, sur la voie du progrès.

La coexistence des peuples, fondée sur la légalité et l'éthique internationales - constitue la seule base solide assurant aux Etats petits et moyens la possibilité de fournir un apport croissant au développement du monde contemporain.

Sans doute, par le potentiel et l'influence dont elles disposent, les grandes puissances ont une responsabilité considérable dans le maintien de la paix et peuvent beaucoup contribuer au progrès de la collaboration entre Etats. Leur rôle dans l'évolution positive des relations internationales est directement proportionnel à la responsabilité dont elles font preuve dans la défense des règles de justice internationale, lesquelles exigent le respect réciproque entre Etats et nations, la reconnaissance de leur personnalité, de leur individualité. Un tel résultat ne saurait être obtenu que dans la mesure où le droit de chaque peuple de se gouverner selon ses propres lois, son indépendance et sa souveraineté nationale, la non-ingérence dans ses affaires intérieures, son égalité en droits avec d'autres peuples, l'avantage réciproque dans toute négociation, sont respectés et deviennent des règles dominant les relations internationales. Ces normes revêtues d'une valeur politique et juridique majeure, véritables impératifs dans les rapports internationaux, s'imposent graduellement à tous les Etats, quel que soit leur potentiel, une expérience historique réitérée - déterminée par la dialectique même de toute évolution - ayant avéré que la force et la violence finissent par se retourner contre ceux qui les ont déclenchées. "La faiblesse de la force - écrivait Paul Valéry - consiste dans le fait de ne croire qu'en la force". Et c'est précisément dans ce cadre qu'une fois de plus nous

condamnons avec la plus grande énergie l'agression impérialiste dont est victime le Vietnam.

Quels sont les principaux secteurs des relations internationales dans lesquelles la contribution des Etats petits et moyens puisse se manifester avec des résultats les plus efficaces possibles, tendant justement à la consolidation de la confiance et de la collaboration, facteurs indispensables de la détente ?

D'abord le développement des relations bilatérales. La normalisation des rapports bilatéraux sans distinction de régime socio-politique, leur intensification, la collaboration économique sans discrimination, la coopération dans la production, les échanges techniques, scientifiques, culturels et artistiques, le tourisme, constituent les principaux leviers au moyens desquels on peut agir dans cette direction, avec des résultats fructueux. La propre expérience de notre pays nous a montré les possibilités qui se font voir à mesure du développement des rapports bilatéraux. Leur élargissement continu permet la réalisation du mécanisme de la solution par étapes des problèmes en litige, la consolidation graduelle d'un climat d'entente et - ultérieurement - de confiance réciproque, prémisses indispensables à la vie individuelle et collective, ainsi qu'à toute création durable. Plus le réseau de pareilles relations bilatérales devient complexe, plus la paix et le progrès de tous les membres de notre communauté mondiale seront fondés sur une armature solide. Et sans trop donner libre cours à notre imagination, nous pouvons déjà songer au moment où un tel édifice sera si bien consolidé que des secousses accidentelles ne pourront plus l'anéantir.

Mais les initiatives et les actions des Etats petits et moyens peuvent également se manifester avec efficacité et dans un cadre multilatéral. Nous rappelons que neuf Etats européens - dont la Roumanie - appartenant aux groupements militaires et politiques existant ou se trouvant en dehors de ces

derniers, ont pris l'initiative de la résolution bien connue des Nations Unies, adoptée à la XXème session de l'Assemblée générale, recommandant l'entreprise de certaines actions sur le plan régional en vue de l'amélioration de bon voisinage entre Etats régis par des systèmes socio-politiques différents.

La résolution (No 2129/XX) consacre idées et principes essentiels pour le développement des relations inter-européennes et pour le renforcement de la paix et la sécurité en Europe. Elle fait ressortir la responsabilité qui incombe à tous les pays grands ou petits, dans l'établissement d'un climat de paix et de sécurité dans le monde et le rôle qu'ils peuvent jouer pour atteindre ce but - l'existence et le développement des liaisons bilatérales de bon voisinage et de compréhension entre Etats. En saluant l'intérêt croissant porté au développement des relations entre les Etats européens - dans les domaines politique, économique, technique, scientifique et culturel - sans égard à leur appartenance à différents systèmes et, implicitement, à leur puissance ou à leur étendue, la résolution fait appel aux gouvernements des Etats européens pour qu'ils intensifient leurs efforts dirigés vers l'amélioration des relations réciproques, en vue de créer un climat de confiance, pour pouvoir aborder avec efficience les problèmes qui retardent encore la détente dans l'Europe et dans le monde entier.

Au fond, la résolution promeut une conception réaliste pour la coopération et la sécurité européenne - celle de l'amélioration de la situation politique par le développement multilatéral des relations entre Etats.

La conception qui se trouve à la base de la résolution a prouvé qu'elle repose sur des réalités et comme telle qu'elle ne représente pas uniquement un voeu, un principe, mais également une voie pratique par laquelle les Etats européens, écartant peu à peu les rigueurs de la guerre froide, peuvent diversifier et intensifier leurs rapports.

Sont là pour en témoigner les rencontres au sommet de plus en plus fréquentes, les contacts permanents entre les personnalités de la vie politique, économique et culturelle, l'augmentation des échanges commerciaux et le fait que, deux ans et demi après son adoption, la résolution continue à être invoquée par différents Etats de l'Est ou de l'Ouest du continent à l'appui de leurs actions sur le plan européen.

Si nous voulons tracer graphiquement la courbe des relations européennes des dernières années, nous constatons qu'elle monte lentement vers les objectifs majeurs de la coopération et de la sécurité, et que dans les composantes de cette évolution une part importante revient aux multiples actions entreprises par les Etats petits et moyens.

En définitive, le développement des rapports multilatéraux permet de réaliser dans les relations entre Etats un climat de calme, de compréhension et, finalement, de confiance, semblable à celui qui règne dans les conférences et les réunions internationales où les délégations remplies de bonnes intentions venues avec le désir de négocier et de trouver des solutions évoluent de l'observation réciproque à la sympathie, de la sympathie à l'entente, en éliminant graduellement la suspicion - ce facteur dissolvant dans la voie de la coopération - et de l'entente à l'action et à l'organisation en vue de la réalisation de ce qui a été décidé.

A notre époque, lorsque le progrès technique a réduit la corrélation temps-distance de telle manière que l'histoire est réellement devenue mondiale, lorsque des zones situées sur des continents différents sont, du point de vue de la configuration politique, des régions presque voisines, la collaboration basée sur la bonne volonté, sur l'intérêt commun, s'impose d'autant plus pour consolider sur le plan bilatéral, ensuite régional et, en dernier, européen, la collaboration des pays de notre continent. C'est seulement dans un pareil climat que l'on peut tenter, avec des chances de succès, la réglementation des objectifs primordiaux et tellement discutés de la vie contemporaine, à savoir:

la sécurité et le désarmement général et, en premier lieu, le désarmement nucléaire. Mais ce dernier thème ne rentre pas dans le cadre de la présente communication.

* * *

Certes, personne ne nie que les conséquences de la guerre froide et le partage de l'Europe aux blocs militaires constituent des facteurs de tension. Mais nous sommes conscients que pour nous acheminer vers la détente, condition indispensable à la réalisation de la sécurité, nous devons, sans relâche, soutenir par nos initiatives toutes les tendances réalistes qui visent à la collaboration multilatérale entre les Etats de notre continent. C'est dans ce domaine que la Roumanie met l'accent sur le développement des relations d'amitié et de collaboration multilatérale avec tous les pays socialistes et déploie, en même temps, des efforts pour intensifier ses relations avec tous les pays européens, avec tous les peuples du monde.

La réalisation de la sécurité européenne est un processus évolutif complexe, réclamant des efforts soutenus et persévérants de tous les pays. Dans cette voie les Etats petits et moyens parmi lesquels la Roumanie déploient des efforts incessants pour contribuer à l'élaboration d'un traité de non-prolifération élaboré dans des conditions d'égalité et de sécurité pour tous, qui doit devenir ainsi un instrument efficace de la détente.

En guise de conclusion, permettez-nous de dire qu'en Roumanie on est convaincu de l'utilité des efforts déployés par les instituts européens de relations internationales et qu'on envisage prochainement dans notre pays la transformation de notre Association en un Institut qui puisse ainsi apporter une contribution plus grande à l'étude des voies qui mènent à la détente, à la sécurité et à la paix.

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CENTRE D'ETUDES DE POLITIQUE ETRANGERE

- Conférence des Directeurs d'Instituts d'Etudes internationales

GENEVE - 9 - 12 mai 1968

DETENTE EN EUROPE

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Bien que la carte politique de l'Europe n'ait pas varié depuis le début des années 1950, l'extrême tension qui régnait alors entre ses deux moitiés s'est atténuée, puis a fait place à une détente dont le développement est tel que beaucoup considèrent aujourd'hui sa remise en cause comme très improbable. Quels facteurs ont provoqué cette détente, quels sont les moyens de la consolider et de l'amplifier, ce sera l'objet de la présente étude.

I. - RETOUR SUR L'APRES-GUERRE.

Après la deuxième guerre mondiale, les nations européennes se sont divisées en deux blocs sous l'emprise d'une peur réciproque dont les raisons étaient complexes :

a) L'Europe ne s'était pas encore relevée de l'ébranlement économique, psychologique et politique de la guerre. L'Allemagne constituait un gage et un "vide" au sort incertain.

b) L'opposition foncière de leurs régimes politiques et sociaux se traduisait par une méfiance mutuelle, par de violentes prises de position doctrinales, parfois par des entreprises hostiles.

c) Dans ce climat de méfiance s'était développée, non sans raison, la crainte : à l'Ouest, d'une poussée révolutionnaire venant de l'Est ; à l'Est, d'une volonté occidentale de refoulement du socialisme.

d) Enfin, à l'arrière-plan se dessinait la rivalité des deux super-puissances désireuses d'assurer leur sécurité ou d'affirmer leur suprématie.

La plupart des pays européens s'incorporèrent alors à l'un des deux blocs, bien que beaucoup fussent conscients de l'absurdité d'une situation qui pouvait conduire, en cas de conflit entre les deux

superpuissances à opposer des pays ne nourrissant aucune hostilité naturelle comme la France et la Pologne, la Tchécoslovaquie et la France, ou encore les deux Allemagne.

Avec le recul du temps ou l'apaisement de la peur, il apparaît :

1) que ces oppositions ont été dans une large mesure provoquée et entretenues par l'alliance des pays européens avec les deux superpuissances rivales, alors que l'inquiétude prévalait quant aux prolongements possibles du second conflit mondial. A cet égard, elles étaient artificielles et provisoires.

2) que ces alliances étaient, dans une large mesure, justifiées par la crainte que la fragilité économique et politique de l'Europe ne conduise l'une ou l'autre des superpuissances à remettre en cause le règlement de fait intervenu au terme de la deuxième guerre mondiale. Dès lors que l'Europe est reconstruite économiquement et politiquement stabilisée, cette crainte tend à disparaître.

3) que ces oppositions étaient au contraire très réelles dans la mesure où elles traduisaient des différences profondes entre régimes économiques et sociaux.

Or, que l'on se place à l'un ou à l'autre de ces points de vue, on constate que la situation a récemment évolué vers une atténuation de ces tensions, ainsi qu'il va être expliqué.

II. - LA SITUATION STRATEGIQUE ET LE ROLE DES ALLIANCES.

L'équilibre nucléaire entre les deux superpuissances a rendu improbable l'éclosion délibérée d'un conflit armé entre elles. Comment cette situation affecte-t-elle l'Europe ?

1) Les pays appartenant à un même bloc ont été affermis par l'équilibre nucléaire. En imposant une stabilité de fait, cet équilibre a consolidé les régimes à l'intérieur et les a fait respecter à l'extérieur. Il a ainsi conduit à dissiper la peur d'une intervention étrangère. Il a contribué à la détente en éloignant la menace d'un conflit général. De ce point de vue, la détente n'est pas un phénomène européen : elle est un des aspects d'un phénomène plus large.

2) Si, au contraire, on considère les problèmes purement européens, et en particulier ceux qui attendent une solution sans laquelle il n'y aura jamais de "vraie" détente, il faut reconnaître que la solidarité de fait entre les deux superpuissances, résultant de l'équilibre nucléaire, ne peut contribuer à les résoudre. Au contraire, en stabilisant la situation de l'Europe, l'équilibre nucléaire ne fait que perpétuer les motifs de tension en Europe sans leur apporter de remède.

3) Parallèlement s'est trouvée altérée la solidarité des Etats qui avaient compté trouver dans leur alliance avec une superpuissance la garantie de sa protection. Au cas - improbable il est vrai - où se produirait un affrontement direct entre les deux superpuissances, dont les territoires seraient regardés comme des sanctuaires inviolables, on peut en effet s'interroger sur la valeur de cette protection, et se demander si l'implication dans une alliance, donc dans le conflit, ne comporte pas plus de danger que d'avantages, en vouant au rôle de champ de bataille le territoire des Etats "protégés". Un tel souci n'est pas étranger à la conception du plan Rapacki de dénucléarisation de l'Europe centrale.

4) La stabilité de fait constatée en Europe contraste avec l'instabilité qui règne dans d'autres parties du monde. L'attention des superpuissances se détourne de l'Europe pour se fixer sur d'autres points chauds, laissant aux Européens eux-mêmes une plus grande responsabilité dans les affaires européennes. Enfin, l'idée d'une solidarité européenne, née à l'Ouest, est une idée-force qui a suscité à l'Est des échos favorables.

Ainsi, la détente peut être favorisée par l'équilibre entre les deux superpuissances : mais, dans ce contexte général, s'affirme la nécessité de lui donner un caractère proprement européen. Une évolution commune se dessine à l'Ouest comme à l'Est, vers une prise de conscience à la fois nationale et continentale qui remet en question l'appartenance à un bloc, ou qui, au minimum, apporte au sein de ce bloc un élément de contestation, ainsi que l'ont montré l'attitude de la Yougoslavie et plus récemment celles de la France et de la Roumanie.

On concevrait dès lors une Europe continuant à bénéficier indirectement de l'équilibre nucléaire mondial, mais s'efforçant de trouver par elle-même les moyens de réduire les tensions auxquelles le régime des blocs opposés l'avait condamnée.

III. - CONSCIENCE NATIONALE ET COOPERATION INTERNATIONALE.

Une prise de conscience nationale ne signifie pas l'exaltation du nationalisme, avec tout ce que ce sentiment comporte de repli sur soi, de chauvinisme et souvent d'agressivité. Ce nationalisme là est condamné. Il n'est pas question de le ressusciter. Au contraire, on reconnaît la nécessité d'une solidarité, d'une coopération, d'une association internationales que l'évolution du monde impose et qui doit jouer un rôle déterminant dans le maintien de la paix. Mais une telle politique d'association ne peut être fondée que sur des bases existantes, à savoir les entités nationales. On ne peut songer à associer les individus ou les masses sans le truchement des Etats organisés. Si ceux-ci doivent s'effacer un jour, ce ne sera que progressivement, devant la croissance d'une entité supérieure : et cet effacement sera plus ou moins rapide, plus ou moins complet suivant la forme de coopération qu'il aura été possible de réaliser.

Or, les hésitations politiques de ce qui est géographiquement l'Europe s'expliquent en grande partie par la variété des formules de coopération qui s'offrent à elle.

Dans un monde divisé en deux blocs opposés il était théoriquement possible d'organiser et d'institutionnaliser le regroupement au sein de

chacun des deux blocs. C'est ainsi que l'**interdépendance** de leurs économies, l'appartenance à un même système politique et à une même alliance, l'existence de niveaux de vie comparables, l'analogie de leurs législations internes et de leurs régimes sociaux ont facilité la création de liens organiques entre les six États de la communauté économique européenne. La réussite a couronné cette expérience. Cependant, poussée jusqu'au terme que s'étaient proposés ses initiateurs, à savoir la création d'un état européen occidental unifié, elle aurait sans doute rendu définitive, ou du moins prolongé pour une durée imprévisible, la séparation de l'Europe - y compris les deux parties de l'Allemagne - en deux systèmes politiquement opposés, et par conséquent perpétué les tensions qui résultaient de cet affrontement.

Pour réduire ces tensions, une politique européenne d'association doit au contraire surmonter la séparation de l'Europe, séquelle de la guerre. Son but est plus large, mais aussi plus difficile à atteindre, puisqu'il s'agit de mettre en rapport des régimes politiques et sociaux différents. Dans cet esprit, force est de renoncer pour l'immédiat à certaines formes trop étroites d'intégration, dont la réalisation suscite d'ailleurs bien d'autres problèmes.

Quoi qu'il en soit, l'Europe occidentale a ainsi paru se trouver placée devant un dilemme.

Ou bien elle saisissait l'occasion qui s'offrait à elle de s'unir en un État supranational sous le signe atlantique, au risque de cristalliser les tensions entre deux Europe.

Ou bien elle entendait se réserver la possibilité d'élargir aux pays socialistes une politique d'association à laquelle, de toutes façons, elle est vouée.

Dans le premier cas, le résultat paraissait devoir être un effacement rapide des États devant une unité supranationale.

Dans le second cas, au contraire, une lente évolution devait être préparée : présentement, il ne peut s'agir que de créer les

conditions favorables à cette évolution. Du fait des circonstances, et peut-être en partie du fait de la France, l'Europe occidentale semble avoir été conduite à emprunter la deuxième voie. Cette évolution n'a pas été étrangère à la réduction des tensions.

Il ne peut cependant être question de freiner, en Europe occidentale, un processus dynamique d'association qui semble bien engagé. Ce processus est susceptible d'étendre son aire géographique ; il est susceptible aussi de conduire à un resserrement organique des liens entre les Etats membres.

Dès lors se pose la question de la compatibilité entre cette évolution, d'une part, et, d'autre part, la collaboration jugée nécessaire avec les pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale.

IV - DIFFERENCE DES REGIMES POLITIQUES ET SOCIAUX EN EUROPE.

Dans ce domaine aussi, la situation et les idées ont évolué.

1) Pays socialistes

L'après-guerre a été marqué par une crise grave et longue (dévastation des pays, misère générale, mouvement de population, adaptation au nouveau régime social). Cette crise est maintenant surmontée, les régimes se sont stabilisés et évoluent en fonction des conditions nouvelles créées par la croissance économique, le renouveau démographique et la détente.

Les régimes se sont diversifiés en s'adaptant à chaque pays. D'où une atténuation de la rigueur doctrinale et une plus grande tolérance. La pluralité des socialismes modère leur dépendance mutuelle.

Enfin, si le triomphe mondial du socialisme continue d'être l'objectif **proclamé** de la politique, la guerre n'est plus considérée, à l'âge nucléaire, comme un moyen d'assurer ce triomphe.

2) Pays capitalistes

L'étatisation et la planification ont considérablement transformé les structures économiques et sociales de ces pays. Le nivellement social en progrès constant atténue la virulence de ce qui était la lutte des classes. Dictée par des considérations aussi bien politiques qu'économiques, la nécessité d'assurer le plein emploi de la main-d'oeuvre tend à infléchir les politiques économiques des pays capitalistes en conférant à l'Etat un rôle plus actif que celui que lui reconnaissaient les économistes de l'époque libérale. Le sentiment général semble en faveur d'un réformisme actif, sans révolution violente.

Parallèlement, l'opinion sur les régimes socialiste a changé. Ceux-ci, d'abord considérés comme des fruits de la guerre et des désordres subséquents, donc susceptibles d'être remis en cause, ne sont plus maintenant regardés comme de simples accidents. On reconnaît la solidité de leur implantation et le caractère irréversible des transformations accomplies. Mieux, dans la mesure où l'on reconnaît que l'aspiration à la liberté des populations soumises à ces régimes et la démocratisations progressive de ces derniers sont étroitement liées à l'amélioration des conditions de vie des citoyens, les progrès accomplis à l'est dans l'ordre économique ne sont plus considérés en Occident comme une menace, mais comme un facteur de stabilité internationale.

3) Planification de l'économie

A l'origine, les pays socialistes se sont pliés à une planification autoritaire embrassant toutes les activités économiques. Théoriquement parfait s'il pouvait être animé par des hommes dynamiques et infiniment clairvoyants, ce système n'échappe pratiquement pas à la sclérose bureaucratique.

La disparition progressive de la pénurie accuse encore sa lourdeur et met en évidence la nécessité d'une évolution tenant compte des lois d'une économie de marché. La notion de "profit", encore qu'on ne lui reconnaisse d'autre valeur que celle d'un indicateur de rentabilité, fait son apparition : elle est à la base des réformes économiques entreprises, avec des succès variables, dans tous les pays de l'Est. Avec elle, d'autres concepts naguère encore proscrits s'imposent de nouveau à l'opinion : taux d'intérêts, amortissements, et surtout, dans le cadre d'un intérêt général défini par le Plan, autonomie de gestion de l'entreprise.

A l'inverse, dans les pays capitalistes, les inconvénients d'une économie anarchique ont rendu de plus en plus nécessaire l'intervention des pouvoirs publics. Dans beaucoup de cas, c'est l'Etat qui a pris en mains la marche des services publics. C'est lui qui imprime à l'économie son orientation générale, soit par des interventions directes, soit par le biais des subventions et des aides financières, des pressions et des allègements fiscaux, de la politique de crédit. D'abord simplement prévisionnelle, la planification a tendance à se traduire par des interventions de plus en plus actives.

Dans les deux cas, il semble que, en partant de directions opposées, on se rapproche d'un point d'équilibre entre la planification et l'économie de marché.

4) Coexistence ou coopération des économies .

Deux caractéristiques essentielles du régime communiste subsistent qui le différencient profondément de celui propre aux économies occidentales : propriété collective des moyens de production, rejet du principe de la liberté d'entreprise, en vertu duquel quiconque en Occident peut (du moins théoriquement) se livrer à des activités économiques, fonder une nouvelle entreprise, grande ou petite, produire ce que bon lui semble. Ces différences ne doivent pas être minimisées. Il n'en reste pas moins que, sous le signe de la technologie et des nécessités économiques,

une certaine "convergence" se manifeste dans l'évolution des régimes.

Plus que les théories, ce sont les lois d'organisation qui commandent. Dans la réalité des faits, la recherche de structures objectivement valables doit conduire aux mêmes conclusions dans tous les pays avancés et industrialisés, quel que soit leur régime. En schématisant, on pourrait dire que, si la manière de poser les problèmes, à l'Est et à l'Ouest, demeure radicalement différente, la réponse qui leur est apportée l'est beaucoup moins.

A l'Ouest, il n'y a plus d'opposition de principe à l'existence des régimes socialistes. A l'Est, on doit constater que l'Etat bourgeois se transforme lui-même, et l'on a de plus en plus tendance à juger les régimes et les organisations sur leur efficacité plutôt que sur leur "nature".

Y a-t-il eu en fait convergence dans les évolutions ? Ceux qui refusent de l'admettre doivent au moins constater une plus grande tolérance et une meilleure compréhension : et ce facteur a joué un rôle important dans la détente.

Cependant, on peut souhaiter aller plus loin et dépasser le stade de la coexistence pacifique pour s'engager dans la voie de la coopération économique. Dans une Europe politiquement et socialement différenciée, les Etats coopéreraient, sans abandon de souveraineté, au sein de groupements dont les frontières ne seraient pas forcément calquées sur celles des systèmes sociaux. L'intérêt d'un tel rapprochement n'est pas contestable ; il semble très vivement ressenti à l'Est comme à l'Ouest. Mais on est en droit de se demander si l'existence de systèmes différents, qui n'a pas fait obstacle à la détente ne ferait pas obstacle à la coopération. Or il semble bien qu'une coopération plus étroite ainsi que l'accroissement des échanges obligent à résoudre des problèmes nouveaux, qu'il s'agisse de la propriété industrielle, des rapports à établir entre des entreprises de statuts différents, ou encore - et ce n'est pas la moindre difficulté - de la convertibilité des monnaies.

V. LES CAUSES DE TENSION.

Rien ne servirait d'analyser les facteurs de la détente si l'on ne dénonçait parallèlement les causes susceptibles de perpétuer ou de faire naître les tensions.

On a déjà mentionné certains obstacles au rapprochement des deux moitiés de l'Europe : ainsi, en matière économique, la différence des régimes. Dans le domaine politique, une intégration plus poussée dans l'une ou l'autre des moitiés de l'Europe serait sans doute considérée dans l'autre moitié comme un nouvel obstacle. Dans le domaine stratégique, l'effet stabilisateur de l'équilibre nucléaire ne semble pas pouvoir être fondamentalement compromis par de nouvelles découvertes. Par contre, qui oserait prétendre que la course aux armements et la présence de forces et de bases étrangères dans les deux moitiés de l'Europe ne sont pas susceptibles de raviver un jour de graves tensions ?

Mais la principale cause permanente de tension demeure la division de l'Allemagne et la situation de Berlin.

Ce serait une illusion de croire qu'il sera toujours possible, sans péril pour la paix, de s'en tenir au statu quo.

La division de l'Allemagne a pu être acceptée, ou plutôt subie, par une génération qui, s'étant pliée au régime nazi, se sentait une part de responsabilité et de culpabilité dans l'aventure hitlérienne ; la génération suivante, se désolidarisant d'un passé auquel elle n'a eu aucune part, ignorera ces contraintes. Il ne s'agira pas alors d'un quelconque parti néo-nazi : la revendication pour l'unité sera le fait d'une opinion unanime.

On peut d'ailleurs se demander si la détente n'implique pas par elle-même une réunion, sous quelque forme, des Allemands. Par suite, vouloir la détente sans accepter cette réunion apparaît contradictoire.

1985 semble l'échéance inévitable de ce renversement. Il ne peut y avoir de détente durable en Europe si, d'ici là, une solution n'est pas apportée au problème actuellement posé par l'existence des deux Etats allemands et par la situation de Berlin.

Par suite, l'un des facteurs de détente méritant d'être mentionné ici est l'étude en commun des mesures susceptibles de faciliter l'évolution des situations comportant un danger virtuel vers des situations plus satisfaisantes pour tous, plus "stables" et "définitives".

La recherche d'une solution acceptable des problèmes allemands dans le cadre d'une organisation de la sécurité et de la coopération européennes est une condition de la détente, et par elle-même un facteur de détente.

A cet égard les instituts de recherche ont une responsabilité particulière et peuvent jouer, dans la limite de leurs moyens, un certain rôle dans le processus de détente et de coopération européens.

VI - LA PREPARATION DE L'AVENIR.

L'Europe est une des parties du monde où l'opinion publique est la plus éduquée et éclairée, donc la plus apte à peser sur les actions gouvernementales. Il faut compter avec elle. Or, les générations montantes, parmi lesquelles se recruteront les dirigeants de demain, ne porteront sans doute pas sur l'état de l'Europe, et sur les tensions dont elle a été et est encore le théâtre, le même jugement que les générations qui ont vécu la guerre et l'après-guerre. Celles-ci pour préparer l'avenir, doivent faire abstraction de ce qui, dans l'évolution de l'Europe, n'aura, somme toute, été qu'accidentel et passager, même s'il s'agit d'événements revêtant à leurs yeux une importance capitale. Rien ne serait plus contraire à l'intérêt des peuples européens que de perpétuer les rancœurs et les préjugés nés d'une époque en voie de liquidation.

Ce qu'il faut effacer, c'est l'idée d'une Europe divisée en deux camps affrontés, c'est la peur mutuelle qui a suivi la guerre, c'est le repli de chacune des moitiés de l'Europe sur elle-même dans une sorte de ghetto, c'est l'ignorance et la méconnaissance des autres. Cette divisions n'aura été qu'un épisode dans l'histoire.

Ce qui apparaîtra aux générations de l'avenir, c'est au contraire une égalisation des niveaux de vie, c'est une communauté de civilisation, c'est la nécessité de liens et d'échanges économiques, c'est le réalisme d'une politique où la meilleure connaissance de l'étranger et les échanges culturels prendront une place dominante. C'est surtout l'émergence de l'Europe toute entière comme une zone de paix dans un monde secoué par les crises que lui impose la mise en place des nouveaux Etats, la mise en cause de la suprématie de l'homme blanc et la diffusion désormais illimitée du progrès technique.

Tout cela est possible sans que soient pour autant compromises les solidarités nécessaires qui existent aujourd'hui de part et d'autre, solidarité nées de l'histoire et justifiées par elle - et les garanties qui les matérialisent.

NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The Character of the Détente
Possibilities and restrictions.

From bipolarity to polycentrism.

The political situation in the late forties when the cold war started, was influenced to a considerable extent by a combination of factors leading to a bipolar world order. In that time the leading powers of the blocs both enjoyed a two remarkable and rare combination of three factors:

- a. The two super-powers had an overwhelming military superiority. The U.S. had a nuclear monopoly. The U.S.S.R. had a great superiority of conventional forces. In the mid-fifties the U.S. nuclear monopoly was broken and the U.S.S.R. became a major nuclear power.
- b. They had both superior economic resources which made their allies economically dependent.
- c. They enjoyed positions of ideological superiority as a result of victory in war and revolution, so that they became both the ideological leaders of their blocs.

However, from 1960, a gradual process that eroded the pure bipolar situation is at work at least in the non-military field. This process is furthered i.a. by the following factors:

- a. The one sided economic dependence of the members of both blocs of their leaders does not exist any more in the Western bloc and is decreasing in the Eastern bloc.
- b. Since the Cold War had ended it is no longer possible to keep the people of the two blocs in a state of active ideological mobilisation. To the contrary "deideologizing" tendencies are manifesting themselves in the two blocs.
- c. The coming to the foreground of the third world affected bipolarity and the cohesion within the two blocs.
- d. Fear - the cement of alliances - diminished.
- e. Disintegrating tendencies within the two alliances provoked nationalism among the members and the latter promoted further polycentrism.
- f. The nuclear superiority of the U.S. and the S.U. remained in the military field, but the effect of the so called balance of terror is such that the nuclear strength of the big two is paralysed to a considerable extent.
- g. The rise to nuclear status of France, but more so of China had an important effect on the political situation of the world.

So the almost completely bipolar world order as it existed at the beginning of the cold war has been changed by the penetration of political polycentrism within the two blocs. However, bipolarism remained in the nuclear military field.

Meanwhile it is a phenomenon of our nuclear age that never in history the military strength of two superstates has been as enormous as it is today, but that at the same time the possibility of using this enormous power has never been less than it is today. Each of the two superstates - the United States and the Soviet Union - has the capacity to destroy its opponent with an all out nuclear attack. But by doing so it is unable to prevent its own destruction and that of human civilisation in its present form because of the overkill capacity and the second strike capability of its opponent. This situation in fact paralyses the enormous military power of the two superstates to a very considerable extent. All the subtle games played in our nuclear age to impress the rival state are credible to the extent that they can contribute to prevent the opponent to force the issues, but they are hardly credible as instruments of nuclear blackmail.

Beginning of the détente after the Cuba crisis.

After the Cuba crisis the conclusion was apparently drawn that to safeguard the very existence of states - also of super states - in the nuclear age, at least a minimum understanding between the superpowers to avoid a nuclear war had become necessary.

This implies the recognition of the fact that the imposition of power by one of the superstates to enforce international law and order is no longer possible.

In present circumstances international law and order is not enforced by the imposition of power but by a balance of power.

Until recently one could argue that peace or at least the absence of war was an absolute necessity seen from a moral point of view. One could also argue that peace was a common interest for many people and for many states. One could not argue that the maintenance of peace was a common interest for all people and for all states in the world. War could lead to real victory and to win a war could mean to improve one's own position or at least to prevent a deterioration of one's position. It is again a phenomenon of our time that this is no longer true. In a future war there can be no victors but only losers and it is accordingly a common interest not only of allies, but also of opponents and in fact of all humanity, to prevent a war.

This is the real new element in present day international relations, caused by the invention of nuclear arms.

It is a paradox that the same nuclear arms that are a menace to our very existence, have up till now contributed as no other single factor to the maintenance of peace.

However, the result of this situation has not been to eliminate radically the American-Russian conflict, but to change its character and to moderate the actions of the two opponents.

The developments of the last few years led to polycentristic tendencies in both blocs, to growing contacts between the leaders as well as between the members of the two blocs and to an improved political climate in Europe. However, at the same time the absolute nuclear hegemony of the United States and the Soviet-Union has been maintained, the defence budgets of the two superpowers are increasing, a nuclear arms race - which might affect the existing nuclear balance - is going on and basic political conflicts and controversies have not been solved. If one tries to make an assessment of the possibilities and restrictions of the present detente between East and West, one has to take the above mentioned developments into account. They can explain the existence of the detente as well as its limited character.

The limited character of the détente.

The present détente seems to be based on the following factors:

- a. The nuclear balance of power
- b. The common wish and interest to avoid a nuclear conflict
- c. Growing contacts between the leaders of the two blocs based primarily on their common strategic interests
- d. Growing contacts between the members of the two blocs as a result of polycentristic tendencies in the Eastern as well as in the Western bloc and of liberalisation in the Eastern bloc. The latter gave the members of this bloc more freedom of action and enabled bilateral contacts between the members of the two blocs.
- e. A temporary acquiescence in the status quo in Europe and the Western hemisphere.

Only the first three factors (a,b,c) are worldwide, the others (d,e) are locally restricted. In Asia and Africa the two superpowers seem to continue their efforts to improve their respective positions at each other's expense, using all means short of a direct confrontation, to attain their objectives.

As world stability in the long run seems to be indivisible continuing antagonism of the superpowers in Asia and Africa cannot fail to have a negative effect on détente and on the possibility to establish a more stable international order.

The same is true for the continuing (nuclear) arms race between the two superpowers, leading to ever growing defence budgets. The United States defence budget increased from

68 billion dollars in 1966/1967 to
75 billion dollars in 1967/1968 (10 % increase)

The Soviet-Union's visible defence budget grew from

14,5 billion rubels in 1967 to
16,7 billion rubels in 1968 (a 15 % increase).

Whilst disarmament talks are continuing a real escalation in armament and particularly in nuclear armament is taking place.

One of the characteristics of the present sometimes confused, sometimes paradoxical situation is that to a certain extent there appears to be an awareness of common interests and responsibilities between the two superpowers and of diminishing common - or even controversial - views between the leaders of the blocs and their respective allies. This tendency seems to demonstrate itself for example in the reactions on certain aspects of the proposed Non Proliferation Treaty, which legalizes the existing bipolar situation in the nuclear field and accordingly discriminates between nuclear haves and nuclear have nots. It is feasible that endeavours of the members of the respective blocs to undermine the leadership of the superpowers, might provoke a certain rapprochement between these same superpowers aimed at maintaining a bipolar order. At the other hand bloc solidarity (of at least a great majority of the members of the blocs) is demonstrated in many other issues which are controversial between the blocs and in which the interests of the members of the blocs and their leaders coincide.

At present there are unfortunately few - if any - indications of serious endeavours to come to basic solutions of outstanding controversial political issues such as the German problem, the American and Russian positions in Europe, European security, North-South relations and so on. Accordingly the conclusion seems to be justified that the present relations between East and West cannot be considered as the beginning of a rapprochement. The present relations are not more than a limited détente. Professor Halle (Louis J. Halle, The cold war as history) argues that the cold war had the character of a real war, but was fought by other means adapted to the circumstances of the nuclear age. If one shares this opinion, the present limited détente can be compared with an armistice, whereas a real peace will only be obtained after a preceding rapprochement.

Abolishment of the existing alliances?

In these circumstances the question has to be put whether the existing détente would permit the Western and Eastern alliances to fade away and whether the continuation of the alliances would hinder or even prevent a further improvement of the relations between the two blocs. If it is true that the existing limited détente has been established by the existing balance of power, one has to be very careful to change this balance. This leads to the conclusion that for the time being the alliances are still indispensable and that their maintenance promotes rather than hinders a further improvement of the relations between East and West. To be sure the disappearance of the former monolithism as well as a growing liberalisation in the East bloc and a disappearance of the cold war mentality in the two blocs is only helpful for cross national contacts between the countries of the two blocs. It furthers détente. However, it is to be feared that an abrupt disintegration of the blocs would lead to international chaos. Moreover the nationalistic tendencies that will be provoked by a further disintegration of the existing alliances can only contribute to a deterioration of the relations between the blocs as well as between their different members.

That does not mean of course that the alliances should not be adapted to changed circumstances. They definitely should. But the crucial question seems to be how the present situation of relative security can be maintained, whilst a wide spread wish demonstrates itself in the two blocs to change the very conditions that contributed to this security. When one stresses the importance of the balance of power as a peace protecting element, one should not overlook the risks involved, in this same balance of power. The present balance of power, which for the time being has made the American-Russian conflict less dangerous, is still a precarious one. It could be upset by misunderstanding, and - this might be not far off - by technical developments¹⁾, as well as by political controversies that run out of hand. Accordingly the existing balance of power and the common interest to avoid a nuclear war is in the long run not enough to prevent the situation from running out of hand. To stabilize the international situation it seems to be necessary to take at least three other kinds of measures:

- a. Creating more common interests between East and West by stimulating and intensifying East-West-co-operation
- b. Taking measures to prevent the military situation from running out of hand (Arms control, non-proliferation etc.)
- c. Solving or at least cooling off acute political conflicts which might escalate into hot conflicts.

Stimulating East-West co-operation

The international situation could be improved by intensifying the relations between East and West European countries and by stimulating their co-operation in those fields where co-operation offers practical possibilities. It would be a false start to begin with endeavours to bridge the existing ideological differences. If we could only agree to disagree in that aspect without trying to impose our own ideological conceptions upon the other party, ideological differences need not stand in the way of practical co-operation in various fields. The relations between Yugoslavia and the West of the last two decades prove this thesis.

Practical co-operation between East European and West European countries seems in the first place possible and desirable in the economic field. One needs not to be an economist to understand that expanding trade on a basis of reciprocal needs and mutual advantages furthers common interests.

Co-operation in the economic field does not need to be restricted to bilateral trade. An important form of East-West economic co-operation could for instance be the

¹⁾ The B.M.D. (Ballistic Missile Defense) capacity of the two superpowers which increases their defense capacity, the American disposal of the M.I.R.V.'s (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles) and the Russian disposal of F.O.B.S. (Fractional Orbital Bombardment System) which strengthens the American respectively the Russian offensive capacity may prelude technological developments which gradually might affect the existing nuclear balance of power.

the establishment of common industrial and other enterprises. The creation of special funds to finance such common ventures would be helpful. Many non Western countries have obtained long term credits to assist the development of their infrastructure by such institutes as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. So far the East European countries have not yet taken advantage of these possibilities, but they could try to do so.

Other possibilities for expanding economic contacts between East and West - also on a multilateral basis - could be the membership of East European countries of such agencies as GATT (General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade) as well as contracts or arrangements with such institutions as OECD (Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development) and EEC (European Economic Community).

Other measures that could improve and intensify East-West contacts could be found in the cultural sphere. In that context such possibilities could be mentioned as intensifying East-West contacts by such means as concluding cultural agreements and launching cultural exchange programs, by mutually granting scholarships, by stimulating conferences on official and private level between East and West European experts on military, political, economic, scientific and cultural problems and finally by furthering tourist traffic (including visits of students). All this kind of activities could in the long run lead to the establishment of more common interests. But by furthering common interests and intensifying contacts, the existing controversies, clashes of interest and differences of opinion between East and West will certainly not vanish overnight.

There is no short cut to a real rapprochement leading to an essential improvement of these relations to an extent that they do not prevent a real stabilization of the situation in Europe.

However, the furthering of common interests and the intensification of contacts between East and West could at least mitigate a growing nationalism and prevent ideological intolerance and xenophobia.

To prevent the military situation from running out of hand.

Meanwhile two other conditions will have to be fulfilled, namely:

to prevent the military situation from running out of hand and to solve or at least to cool off acute political controversies that could escalate into hot conflicts. To prevent the military situation from running out of hand implies taking measures of arms control. To prevent the further spread of nuclear arms and to try to check a nuclear arms race. All this is of such an overwhelming importance that it should be given high priority in foreign policy.

A second condition for the stabilization of the East-West relations seems to be the solution or at least the cooling off of actual political controversies that could escalate into "hot" conflicts. It can hardly be denied that the German problem belongs to this category.

The German problem.

Throughout the cold war period Germany's reunification has been considered as a condition sine qua non for any eventual European arrangement.

Meanwhile Western priorities have obviously been changed by President Johnson's speech of October 7th, 1966, in which he declared that the solution of the German problem could only be a consequence and not any longer a condition for a détente. Johnson remarked that "Germany can and will be united" but this "can only be accomplished by a growing reconciliation between Eastern and Western Europe". "There is no short cut". These words implied a reversal of the Foster Dulles - Adenauer policy - up till now supported by Germany's Western allies - that German unity must precede East-West-reconciliation. This changed approach has now become the accepted policy of the Western alliance.

The German Government itself accepted the changed Western policy. The Kiesinger government stipulated that a rapprochement with Eastern Europe would have to precede a solution of the German problem. The German foreign minister Willy Brandt wrote in a recent article in Foreign Affairs (April 1968) "We know, however, that this division will not vanish overnight and that as far as one can tell, it will be overcome only in conjunction with a general improvement in East-West relations in Europe". In the implementation of this policy the Kiesinger Government made it moreover clear that it would no longer try to isolate East Germany. To the contrary. Bonn made it clear that every kind of inter German co-operation and contacts short of official recognition would be welcome.

The reversal of Western priorities in the sense that German reunification cannot be a condition for a détente, but that to the contrary a détente will first have to create a climate which ultimately will make a solution of the German problem possible, fits into an acquiescence of the status quo.

It cannot be denied that in present circumstances Germany's reunification would confront the Eastern as well as the Western bloc with the possibility of an important shift of the existing power relations. In theory three possible consequences of reunification would have to be reckoned with. The first one would be an incorporation of East Germany - the G.D.R. - in the Western bloc; the second one an incorporation of West Germany - the German Federal Republic - in the Eastern bloc; the third one would be a neutralized reunified Germany sitting on the fence between East and West. In present circumstances each of these solutions would meet with serious opposition from at least one of the two super-powers, the United States or the Soviet Union.

And it is clear that no solution of a problem in which the vital interests of the big powers are involved, can be forced upon them without endangering security and peace. That means that for the time being a coexistence of the two Germanies, that could try to intensify their mutual contacts, seems to be the only possibility. But it should be clear as well, that in the long run a solution for the German problem has to be found. It is to be hoped that in the future, changed conditions in Europe will make some kind of solution possible. Simultaneously with the problems created by the coming into existence of a more polycentric, but at the same time especially in the military nuclear field still bipolar world, two other developments begin to demonstrate themselves.

In the first place it becomes more and more clear, that Europe is no longer the centre of the world, that world politics and European politics are no longer identical and that to the contrary within one decade there will be a clear shift regarding the important world political problems from Europe to non European parts of the world. It seems obvious that apart from the German problem, most of the important world political issues will be outside European problems (China, India, Japan, the Middle East, Latin America, Africa). In the second place it is possible that bipolarism in those sectors where it still exists and will remain to exist (especially the nuclear sector) will be gradually replaced by a triangular relationship, China becoming the third pole. The only question-mark, that has to be put in this connection, is whether China - because of her weak economic position - will for the foreseeable future be no more than a big Asiatic power, playing its role between countries like Japan and India (a position comparable with the status of countries like England, France and Germany in Europe) or whether it will quickly rise to the superpower status?

If the latter happens , the big question will be whether this will lead to a world triumvirate or to a partition of spheres of influence, or to co-operation of two superpowers against the third (China-SU versus US; US-China versus SU or US - SU versus China). The political climate in the coming decade and accordingly the now existing détente, may well be influenced to a considerable extent by policies of the superpowers either anticipating one of these options or holding as long as possible, as many options as possible open.

At the same time growing cross national contacts between the smaller members of the different blocs can be anticipated.

Whereas these new developments leading to a new structure of international society will be led by a new generation, it is obvious, that the outcome of this process is very difficult to foresee.

Security and change.

As far as present day Europe is concerned, it seems that the interplay between endeavours to maintain the existing security at the one hand and to pursue a process of peaceful change (without endeavouring to change the territorial status quo) at the other hand, have placed the Soviet-Union at this moment

in what could be called a status quo plus position whereas the Western position could be considered to be a status quo minus position. This is especially true for the important German problem, where the West reversed its position for the sake of a détente. Recent developments within the Eastern bloc seem to indicate that the two superpowers are in a status quo minus position as far as the cohesion within their respective blocs is concerned.

As a conclusion of this paper the final part of the introduction of the Strategic Survey 1967 composed by the Institute for Strategic Studies may be quoted with complete agreement.

"Curiously the area where the political relations of the major powers proved most in flux was strategically the most quiescent, namely Europe. Here stand two alliance systems which have largely lost their motive power as the prospect of deliberate aggression becomes increasingly remote, and the degree of super-power dominance which they entail becomes correspondingly irksome. This is creating a sense of malaise which, in the case of Western Europe, is compounded by its inability to proceed from an economic community of limited membership towards a more comprehensive system of political and military co-operation which would enable it to act as a partner of the United States. Governments in both halves of Europe are searching, still very tentatively, for some modification in the twenty-year-old relationship which will afford them the same security as they have today but at a lower political and financial cost than integrated forms of confrontation involve. The search for an adequate solution will be a slow process, for the positions of Western and Eastern Europe are by no means symmetrical, there is a legacy of mistrust to be conquered, and the problems inherent in any form of European settlement which would be secure against the crises to which a dynamic, highly developed region is prone are formidable. The danger which developments in 1967 illustrated is that the false conceptions of an earlier generation may take root again and the alliance systems crumble under financial and political pressure before an enduring and acceptable replacement has been devised."

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LA CULTURE, FACTEUR DE DETENTE EN EUROPE?

par

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Quelle influence la culture peut-elle avoir en vue de diminuer la tension en Europe ? Quels sont ses rapports avec la détente ? Cette question a préoccupé et continue à préoccuper de nombreux chercheurs dans le domaine des relations internationales. Les réponses fournies jusqu'ici sont assez divergentes.

Il n'est pas douteux que le nombre de ceux qui réfléchissent davantage au rôle de la culture et qui se rendent compte qu'il est devenu exceptionnellement important pour le développement actuel des relations internationales a augmenté au cours des dernières années. Les théoriciens classent très souvent la culture, avec les questions économiques, politiques et de puissance, parmi les principaux facteurs déterminant l'évolution des relations internationales.

Lorsqu'on examine l'évolution de l'Europe d'après-guerre, il apparaît clairement que le domaine de la culture et celui des sports sont presque les seuls terrains où se sont maintenus certains contacts entre l'Est et l'Ouest, pendant la phase la plus aiguë de la guerre froide. On peut donc dire que la culture a permis, en quelque sorte, de surmonter la division de l'Europe et de maintenir certains liens, qu'elle a contribué ensuite à créer des conditions nouvelles pour l'essor de relations mutuelles, qu'elle a favorisé la détente internationale et a servi à établir progressivement les bases de la coexistence pacifique en Europe.

Si, aux yeux de l'historien, la culture a joué un rôle aussi positif dans le passé, pourquoi devrait-on rencontrer à présent des problèmes ? A première vue, il semble tout à fait logique que même aujourd'hui, on considère la culture comme un domaine dans lequel les relations entre Etats à régimes sociaux différents peuvent se développer avec succès et sans grandes difficultés.

En est-il réellement ainsi ?

A examiner de plus près la situation actuelle, la réponse ne paraît pas devoir être si affirmative et facile.

Le conflit entre l'Est et l'Ouest de l'Europe concerne aussi, parmi d'autres, le domaine idéologique. Les conceptions de l'organisation sociale qui prédominent en Europe occidentale n'ont rien de commun avec le marxisme-léninisme, lequel représente l'idéologie dominante dans les pays socialistes de l'Europe de l'Est. Le domaine de la culture étant très étroitement lié à l'idéologie - en considérant la culture dans son sens le plus large - il est évident que des collisions et des conflits se produisent très souvent sur ce terrain.

Plus d'une fois, les pays socialistes ont clairement affirmé que s'ils jugeaient la coexistence pacifique souhaitable dans les domaines économique et politique, ils ne pouvaient pas admettre une coexistence semblable dans le domaine idéologique. L'antagonisme dans ce domaine est trop grand et, comme il concerne les principes, le conflit est inévitable.

De même, du côté des pays capitalistes occidentaux, on a déclaré maintes fois sans ambages qu'il fallait utiliser le domaine idéologique pour pénétrer dans les pays socialistes et en détruire l'unité nationale et internationale. On ne peut sous-estimer ces voix, même si, dans certains cas, il s'est agi plutôt des survivances de l'esprit de guerre froide. Déjà pendant cette dernière, la tendance principale de la lutte idéologique contre les pays socialistes consistait dans un anti-communisme acharné; dans celui-ci, on avait investi des capitaux importants. Trop de gens ont directement lié leur existence à lui pour qu'il soit possible d'espérer sa disparition prochaine.

Lorsque nous examinons l'évolution actuelle dans certains pays de l'Europe occidentale, nous ne pouvons pas ne pas noter avec quels soins et quelle sollicitude on y

renouvelle encore aujourd'hui les organisations anti-communistes les plus diverses. Alors que les forces progressistes ont obtenu dans de nombreux pays des succès non négligeables, nous ne pouvons non plus ignorer de quelle façon on confie de nouveau à l'anti-communisme la tâche de briser l'unité des forces de gauche et du progrès.

Il est compréhensible que cette évolution entraîne aussi des répercussions dans les pays socialistes. Ceux-ci savent par expérience ce que signifie l'anti-communisme et quelles sont les conséquences néfastes de ses activités. Des faits de cette sorte ne servent qu'à renforcer une certaine méfiance qui se maintient partout depuis la guerre.

Heureusement, l'évolution orientée vers la détente internationale est actuellement assez forte pour pouvoir s'imposer avec suffisamment de succès face aux tendances adverses. Le domaine culturel doit surmonter et éliminer ces dernières s'il ne veut pas être en retard sur le développement des relations économiques et parfois aussi politiques.

Malgré ces évidentes inquiétudes, qui se sont quelquefois manifestées de part et autre dans les milieux gouvernementaux, les relations amicales entre les différents pays en Europe se développent avec passablement de succès, sans égard à leurs régimes sociaux respectifs. Et il semble que leur rythme est tellement ascendant qu'il permet de prévoir leur développement ultérieur.

Jusqu'à une époque récente, la majorité des pays socialistes sous-estimaient le rôle de la culture comme moyen de compréhension et de connaissance mutuelles entre les nations. De plus, on comprenait et on comprend encore parfois la culture dans un sens très étroit, si bien que certaines vues critiques pouvaient même se justifier.

Dans les pays socialistes, guidés par le marxisme, on a souvent surestimé l'influence de l'économie au temps de stagnation dogmatique, et ce fait a conduit à une sérieuse déformation de toute la pensée politique et sociale en ce sens. Mais par la suite, cette faute est aussi devenue l'objet de

critiques légitimes. De plus en plus, on accorde à la culture la place à laquelle elle a pleinement droit dans la vie sociale.

Mais sans égard à ces changements, il faut se demander s'il est possible de restreindre ou même d'interrompre les relations culturelles. Il est incontestable qu'on ne peut pas les supprimer complètement: même les restrictions restent toujours très limitées, sinon impossibles dans certains secteurs.

On peut par exemple ne pas importer de films, de livres, ne pas jouer de pièces de théâtre, mais on ne peut empêcher l'écoute de la radio, on ne peut interrompre toutes les transmissions de la télévision, comme on ne peut pas complètement abolir les relations sportives, etc. Même si on peut limiter les voyages à des contacts de famille et à des déplacements professionnels, on ne réussira jamais à enfermer tout à fait un pays dans sa coquille. Si on considère la culture dans le sens le plus large du mot, on ne peut pas en exclure par exemple la mode, qui se répand irrésistiblement à travers les frontières. La propagation de mini-jupes en est une preuve suffisante.

Même si on ne range pas le tourisme dans le domaine de la culture, le fait qu'il est non seulement devenu aujourd'hui une certaine mode, mais aussi qu'il s'est transformé en une affaire de masses, joue en la matière un rôle extrêmement important. En voyageant, nous avons l'occasion de faire connaissance avant tout avec la culture d'autres nations, de nous mieux connaître les uns et les autres et de concourir à la diffusion de la culture.

Certains pays ont compris depuis longtemps l'importance de l'influence culturelle et ils lui ont accordé toute l'attention qu'elle mérite. Les puissances coloniales ont été les premières à choisir cette voie et se sont efforcées de consolider de cette manière leurs positions dans les colonies. Aujourd'hui encore, l'influence de la langue anglaise ou française dans les anciennes colonies joue un rôle exceptionnellement important et, en examinant ce fait d'une manière

plus large, du point de vue de la culture générale, la dépendance en est accrue dans la majorité des cas.

Les pays socialistes ont en général sous-estimé l'importance de la culture, qui a joué et joue encore dans leur politique étrangère un rôle relativement peu important. Dans certains de ces pays, la situation s'est un peu améliorée après l'établissement de relations avec les pays en voie de développement. Dans ceux-ci, le besoin urgent de rattraper à bref délai le retard également hérité dans le domaine de la culture a imposé la coopération et l'aide en cette matière.

Pourtant, nombreux sont les pays socialistes qui n'avaient nullement besoin de rougir de leur niveau culturel, qui avaient de quoi rivaliser avec les autres Etats et de quoi être fiers. En prenant pour exemple la Tchécoslovaquie, on notera avec netteté plusieurs de ces aspects.

La Tchécoslovaquie a toujours joué en Europe un rôle non négligeable en ce qui concerne les richesses culturelles. Les sciences, qui se sont développées avec succès dans une des plus vieilles universités de l'Europe, l'Université Charles, ont toujours été largement diffusées dans la population; des liens très étroits ont été aussi établis avec les universités les plus connues d'Europe et avec les centres scientifiques. Depuis le Moyen Age, la civilisation des pays tchèques surtout a compté parmi les plus développées d'Europe.

Simultanément, on assistait au développement de la littérature, mais celle-ci restait presque inconnue à l'étranger du fait des connaissances insuffisantes de la langue. En revanche, la musique, plus facilement compréhensible et communicative, a fait des pays tchèques le conservatoire de l'Europe et Prague est devenue la deuxième patrie de nombreux artistes. Comme dans le cas de Mozart, on a mieux compris ces artistes dans cette ville qu'en leur pays.

Les beaux-arts ont actuellement la possibilité de renouer avec la peinture gothique et baroque, très vaste et développée, ainsi qu'avec la peinture plus récente, notamment celle des 19ème et 20ème siècles. Les sculptures gothiques et surtout baroques comptent parmi les plus importants et les plus évoluées d'Europe. Les monuments d'architecture témoignent de la haute sensibilité plastique de nos aïeux et les architectes tchécoslovaques des années trente ont figuré parmi les plus fameux dans le monde.

Certes, il n'est pas dans les intentions de cet article d'énumérer toutes ces traditions importantes. Il s'agit plutôt d'attirer l'attention sur certaines des racines profondes et âgées qu'il est nécessaire de bien connaître, de renouer avec elles ainsi que de développer et moderniser toutes les bonnes traditions. Il est certainement juste de se réclamer de grandes personnalités de l'histoire nationale qui ont joué un rôle autant dans la politique que dans la culture mondiales. Mais on ferait fausse route en se bornant à cela, en se réclamant de Jean Hus, George de Poděbrady, Jean Amonius, Comenius, etc.

Si la Tchécoslovaquie veut jouer un rôle convenable dans la culture mondiale actuelle, elle doit être aussi classée aujourd'hui parmi les grandes puissances culturelles mondiales. Sans doute, on a beaucoup négligé ce terrain, mais il faut se rendre compte qu'on a obtenu néanmoins des succès non négligeables.

La participation tchécoslovaque à l'Expo 1958 à Bruxelles a marqué la renaissance certaine de la pénétration culturelle tchécoslovaque en Europe. L'expo 1958 avait à la fois renoué avec les bonnes traditions et résumé les quelques nouvelles découvertes et expériences des temps derniers; elle avait été aussi et surtout le début d'une nouvelle politique culturelle envers les autres Etats.

Les Tchécoslovaques n'avaient pas tiré parti de toutes les portes ouvertes par l'Expo de Bruxelles. En revanche, la fin des années cinquante a, sans conteste, signifié l'achèvement d'une étape durant laquelle la Tchécoslovaquie s'était enfermée en elle-même; simultanément, elle a donné l'impulsion au développement de relations culturelles avec le monde entier. Le grand succès de l'Expo 1967 à Montréal constitue la preuve qu'on a persévéré dans la voie empruntée, quand bien même les résultats n'ont peut-être pas toujours été probants. Il reste sans doute encore pas mal de ressources qu'il importe d'utiliser au maximum.

La réussite de la culture tchécoslovaque à l'étranger, inséparable des succès obtenus par les musiciens, par les expositions d'arts plastiques, les tournées de théâtres, de l'opéra, de pantomimes et du Théâtre noir, par les expositions historiques, par le cinéma, la radio et la télévision, etc. a incontestablement accru l'autorité et le prestige de la petite Tchécoslovaquie en Europe et dans le monde.

La Tchécoslovaquie, par l'intermédiaire de sa culture, s'est acquise la sympathie de la majorité de la population des pays qui ont eu la possibilité d'en faire la connaissance. Sans doute, ces succès ont causé également d'autres sentiments dans les milieux qui nous sont hostiles. Pour ses ennemis déjà traditionnels du progrès et du socialisme, les succès tchécoslovaques représentent un élément imprévu dans leurs plans. Mais à mon avis, cela ne change rien au fait que l'offensive culturelle tchécoslovaque a rencontré en général un accueil favorable et positif.

Au vu de ces faits, quelle réponse donner à la question que nous avons posée au début ? Il semble qu'ils ont raison ceux qui pensent que le domaine de la culture constitue un champ de bataille. Mais la bataille est plus complexe que ne le laissait supposer la division schématique entre la culture socialiste progressiste et la culture bourgeoise décadente.

Sur le front culturel des pays occidentaux se déroule une lutte intense entre les facteurs culturels progressistes et leurs adversaires conservateurs. Ceci prouve que le front ne suit pas la division du monde ou de l'Europe entre les Etats à régimes sociaux différents. De même, dans les pays socialistes, la culture est loin d'être tout à fait homogène et de fortes collisions s'y produisent ouvertement.

Ceux qui affirment que le domaine culturel est le théâtre d'une vive et incessante lutte d'opinions ont incontestablement raison. Mais ils auraient tort d'en déduire qu'il faut limiter les relations culturelles. Bien au contraire. La culture a besoin de ces confrontations, car c'est ainsi que naît ce qui est vraiment nouveau et progressiste. Sans conflits, l'évolution sociale s'arrête et recule.

Il faut ajouter à l'adresse des partisans d'une limitation des relations culturelles, qu'il s'agit de rencontres sans effusion de sang, d'un combat sans morts, même si celui-ci comporte parfois des sacrifices. Cette lutte pacifique ne sert pas ceux qui veulent accroître la tension internationale. L'intensification des relations culturelles permettant aux divers intéressés de se connaître personnellement, elle favorisera le développement de rapports amicaux, lesquels contribueront à la détente.

C'est ainsi qu'il nous faut examiner la question posée: la réponse est positive.

L'exemple de la Tchécoslovaquie et de ses relations culturelles avec presque toutes les nations d'Europe en est la meilleure preuve. Dans la majorité des cas, l'évolution favorable des relations culturelles correspond au développement général des rapports mutuels. Il existe toutefois des cas où la culture précède le développement de ces rapports. Les relations entre la Tchécoslovaquie et son voisin immédiat - la République Fédérale allemande - en témoignent. Bien que des relations diplomatiques normales n'existent pas encore, des relations culturelles très actives se développent entre les deux pays aux niveaux les plus variés. Il en

est de même en ce qui concerne le second voisin capitaliste de la Tchécoslovaquie, l'Autriche. Alors que leurs relations politiques ne sont sans doute pas les plus encourageantes en Europe, leurs relations culturelles progressent depuis longtemps et contribuent ainsi à créer aussi un climat plus favorable à la solution des questions politiques qui sont souvent bien complexes.

Si l'on comprend aussi le vaste domaine de la science dans les relations culturelles, il faut se rendre à l'évidence et noter combien les conférences les plus diverses et les relations de savants peuvent aider à la détente et au développement de relations amicales.

L'exemple du Mouvement de Pugwash, qui a ouvert la voie aux accords partiels sur les essais nucléaires et qui continue à jouer un rôle important dans les relations internationales en fournit la preuve éloquente.

Le développement de relations amicales entre les savants n'est nullement limité aux sciences naturelles et techniques, dans lesquelles les divergences politiques ou idéologiques ne sont pas aussi accentuées. Des rencontres ont également lieu dans des disciplines aussi engagées que le sont les sciences politiques et les relations internationales. Les divergences qui apparaissent dans ces rencontres n'empêchent pas une atmosphère amicale car celle-ci n'est nullement troublée par l'échange direct et ouvert des opinions. Les liens personnels et la discussion des points de vue conduisent souvent à une meilleure compréhension mutuelle et, malgré les différences d'opinions, les contacts ne sont pas rompus. Ultérieurement, au cours d'études approfondies, on cherchera de nouvelles réponses aux questions intéressant les deux parties.

La mission de la culture est loin de se limiter aux relations bilatérales. Un rôle exceptionnel incombe à l'UNESCO dans les efforts tendant au développement de relations amicales et à la connaissance mutuelle entre les

nations. Ses activités dans le monde sont des plus méritoires parmi celles des organisations internationales et sont appréciées.

Il faut voir dans la culture, prise dans son ensemble, un facteur essentiel du progrès humain, lequel est un des plus importants et des plus efficaces moteurs de la coopération amicale entre les nations et contribue grandement au développement de la coexistence pacifique dans le monde.

THE ALTERED SITUATION FOR THE NORTH.

By research fellow Martin Sæter

No matter whether or not the USA and the other NATO countries approve of developments on the Continent, it will have sincere consequences for the whole of the Alliance's politics, not least for the relations between the USA and Europe. Based on the fact that the long-range goals of the Continental powers are not compatible with a close association with the USA, the question arises, whether NATO as such will be able to survive, or will the other European member countries have to search for a new form of association to the USA. Sooner or later these countries will be confronted with a difficult choice between the "Atlantic" and the "European" course. To the same degree as the most influential Continental states will take a course independent of the USA, the basis for a uniform command of NATO's policy will be dissolved. Presuming that NATO formally shall continue to exist in the same form as it is now, with France and West Germany as equal members, in other words, that this development will occur within the framework of NATO, then the results will be that the organization will in reality be exposed to a process of dissolution which will reduce its military-political influence to the same degree, as the above countries will free themselves from the American supervision. All the time we assume that such a loosening is indispensable, if Paris and Bonn are to achieve their aims East-wards. To the same degree as these two countries will be able to convince the Eastern countries of their separation from the American supervision, their Eastern policy will become trustworthy. There is no need to say that their position as alliance-partners in a NATO commanded by the USA, will be proportionally reduced.

The central point is here doubtlessly the American military presence in West-Germany. The logical condition for a solution of the German problem in agreement with the French and the German claims is, that sooner or later the American forces will be withdrawn. The USA will then no longer have a foothold on the Continent in peace time. An American nuclear guarantee could continuously exist, but USA's Continental strategy for Europe would have to be changed profoundly. If no other agreement of a bilateral or other nature will be established, those states who wish to continue the close Atlantic co-operation, will have to face the fact that the value of deterrence represented at the time being by the American conventional and nuclear presence on the Continent, will no longer exist.

Should Norway and Denmark decide to continue their close defense alliance with the USA and Great Britain, without changing their base-policy, such development as outlined above will fundamentally alter the basis for their military-strategic planning. As for now, this planning presupposes that support from the Continent will be granted to the defense of the Baltic coast as well as of Southern Norway, but this solution will lose validity to the same degree as the American forces will be withdrawn and the West-German government, for the above reason, will have to demonstrate that her military forces cannot be disposed over by Washington in the case of possible military conflict between the USA and the Soviet Union. Thus no forces on the Continent could be expected to contribute with in Denmark and Norway in case of a conflict.

The military support would possibly have to be based on the so called "Big lift" - strategy with a big-scale supply of airborne forces in critical situations, or Norway and Denmark will have to alter their base-policy with the purpose that the USA would station her forces in Scandinavia also in peace time. From a military point of view, the latter alternative is likely to be preferred, since otherwise an American guarantee might not be trustworthy enough. The hypothesis is, as already mentioned, that there are no American forces on the Continent any longer.

The question is, whether the USA would at all be able or willing to take upon itself a guarantee for the security of the two Scandinavian countries after having been brought to withdraw its forces from the Continent. The confrontation of the Super-Powers, now stretching from the Nordic Sea to Caucasus, would then be localized to the flanks. Is it managable to outline a workable strategy for an American defense of the flanks when the West-European continent no longer is at the Americans' disposal? On the other hand, as the USA could not count on being backed by the strong continental European forces, it would practically be depending on itself to bear the main burden also of the conventional defense of Denmark and Norway. With the small national Danish and Norwegian forces, the Scandinavian territory would be extremely vulnerable towards an attack from the Soviet Union, since it could be hit from the South as well as from the North. An American backing-up action would be difficult to carry out, and connected with the risk of heavy losses. One has to take into account that any American military action within the Scandinavian territory, like anywhere else in the world, will always be pending Washington's judgement of the whole situation of super powers, which means that the USA will hardly be able to bind herself unconditionally to intervene militarily in Scandinavia in any case of a Soviet aggression.

The American guarantee would probably gain increased reliability if American forces were stationed in Scandinavia; however, the effect of provocation would increase simultaneously. The Northern territory would be implicated more directly in the confrontation of the super powers. If Norway and Denmark would in this way become closer tied to the USA, this probably would result in increased Finnish dependence on the Soviet Union. Sweden would have to emphasize her course of neutrality to save its reliability. At the same time the Soviet Union would have more reason to attack the Scandinavian territory in certain crucial situations.

Neither from the American point of view, nor from the one of the Nordic countries, would a re-arrangement of the military co-operation in either of the above mentioned directions appear to be advantageous. The first one would mean a weakened American guarantee, the latter an intensified confrontation of the Great Powers as well as increased disunity in the North.

As we assume that the French-German politics will dominate developments within the EEC-area, also with regard to international- and security policy, the radically new alternative for Norway and Denmark to their existing Atlantic security policy, would actually be their attachment to the EEC. Hitherto, Norway and Denmark made their attitude towards membership in the Common Market dependent on Great Britain. Latest developments have revealed that Great Britain's membership in the EEC is not possible without a fundamental alteration of British policy.

There are signs indicating that a change of course has already been under preparation, that Great Britain is getting rid of her non-European obligations and her Great Power-illusions, for definitively to "join Europe". And if this will take place relatively quickly, then also the course of the Nordic countries seems to be determined.

The character of the EEC-co-operation in the field of international politics - a rather limited accomplishment of the principle of supra-nationality and the fact that the long-range international goals of the leading EEC-countries can be achieved only through détente and co-operation, will reduce the hesitations of the Nordic countries as to entering the EEC. An extension of the economic co-operation in one form or another also eastwards, possibly by an extension of the EEC, is to be considered in the course of the rapprochement between East and West. An economic and political coalescence of the two German states would necessarily bring along and intertwining of East- and West Europe. One can expect that in such a case also the differences in the policy of security between East and West on the Continent would be correspondingly reduced. This will doubtlessly make it easier for countries like Austria, Sweden and Finland to join the EEC.

Should the Nordic countries - or even just Norway and Denmark - join the EEC, and approach the French and West-German European policy, this will necessarily change the security-situation in the North. If the Nordic countries will be attached to a European security system with the Soviet Union as one of the guarantee powers - which after all seems to be the course which both the French and the German policies are taking - then their relations to the Soviet Union will mainly be determined by the relations between the Soviet Union and the big West European states. Assuming that the French - West German Eastern policy will succeed, then these relations will have to build on mutual interests and co-operation, for a long time to come. As soon as the Nordic countries would become a part of this system, any Soviet pressure towards these countries would cause complications for the whole of the system, as well as reduce the possibilities for Soviet's co-operation with the Continental West European states, in other words, this would cause difficulties for the Soviet Union herself. It is hard to see what interest the Soviet Union possibly could have to take up an intimidating attitude towards the Nordic countries, after having achieved one of her most significant aims: namely that the whole Western Europe had been separated from the American supervision. A Soviet pressure would then only support the motives for a new association with the USA.

Norwegian and Danish attachment to the EEC does not necessarily mean instant dissolution of these countries' Atlantic ties. If they do not undertake anything to achieve a compensation for the reduced reliability of NATO function, likely to result from the changed Continental situation, this transition could pass gradually and without dramatical resolutions, particularly because of the fact that no foreign forces are stationed on the territories of either of these countries. At the same time an approachment to the Continent would be reached by association to or full membership in the EEC. The reduced reliability of the American guarantee would be counterbalanced, at least partly, by the expected interest of the Soviet Union in avoiding anything which would cause fear in the Nordic countries and make them tie themselves to the USA once more.

It is to be expected, as mentioned before, that Danish and Norwegian attachment to the Continental European politics would facilitate joining the EEC also for Sweden and Finland. On a certain stage of this development the question arises, whether the North will and should be regarded as a unit within the framework of a greater European system, or if Norway and Denmark should be considered as attached to "West-Europe", Finland to the Soviet Union just like now, and Sweden as continually neutral. Having in mind the dissolution of the Atlantic military community and the change to a European security system, the latter form of "balance" appears rather artificial. Denmark belongs strategically to the Central European area which is supposed to become a militarily neutral zone. As for Sweden, the interest will move in direction of either extending this Central European zone to include the North, or establishing a corresponding Nordic neutral zone. Assuming the Central European zone to include also the Eastern European countries, there seems to be no reason why Finland could not be part of this zone, as well. The Treaty with the Soviet Union should not represent an obstacle more serious for Finland than for the other Eastern European countries in question. On the other hand, one has to consider that neither Finland nor Sweden would be able to join a "West-Europe" in line with the French definition, anyway not in foreseeable time.

Nordic unity in the sphere of security is possible only on the basis of military neutrality, which means that the North within the European security system would form an in-between-zone guaranteed by the Soviet Union on one side and France and Great Britain - in the case Great Britain joins the system - on the other side. (How far the American nuclear guarantee would come into the picture, will not be discussed here. But there might be a reason to point out that neither the Soviet Union nor France eliminate such an idea. It is to be expected that a general guarantee from the side of the nuclear powers towards the non-nuclear powers will be taken into the non-proliferation agreement.)

Of course, very much depends on whether or not, and when Great Britain will join EEC. Not the form of the attachment is decisive, but whether it happens at all; because this is what will determine the direction, while membership or association is a question of the speed of development.

There is a possibility for the Nordic countries of joining the EEC without waiting for Great Britain. Paris approved this idea with the justification that the problems connected with Scandinavia entering the EEC are far from being as serious as the ones raised by the British application.

After the last negotiations concerning the British membership failed, it has become clear that solidarity of the other EFTA-countries is not of much help to the British in their negotiations with the EEC. Neither can Great Britain count on any backing from the side of "the Five" within the framework of the EEC. Whether Great Britain shall or shall not become a member of the EEC depends on her reaching an agreement with the Continental states on the main course of European politics.

It is therefore no longer of the same significance for the Nordic countries to wait and see what the results will be concerning Great Britain. Denmark's economic interests tend overwhelmingly in the direction of joining the EEC. As long as Copenhagen was hoping for an early initiating of negotiations on the membership along with Great Britain, it would not hazard anything that could jeopardize the negotiating.

But after also the last British initiative fell through, the situation became a different one. A common Nordic policy as to the market problems has gained new actuality for Denmark, while at the same time the hope to be able to bet on Great Britain ceased.

Similar reflections became even more clear on the Swedish side. They have, through the press, as well as in responsible political quarters raised severe criticism against the British EEC-policy, especially against the idea of extending EFTA into a North-Atlantic free trade area, (NAFTA).

The Stockholm newspaper DAGENS NYHETER - which in this case seems to represent a broad opinion - speaks of an "evident lack of realism" and "an attitude which is far from reality". - "An action is expected intending to make EFTA countries to fall back again in the line behind England, to accept England's function as a battering ram against the EEC and to become content with the expectations that the British EEC-policy will show positive results and - as an alternative - to follow England "westwards" in a possible attempt to establish an Atlantic economic community with the USA and Canada." It should be made clear to London, in a way which cannot be misunderstood, that such British hopes are illusory, says the newspaper, and claims that the best thing to do right now, would be if the Nordic countries could form one block, firmly welded together, in the question of markets. It is interesting to see that the paper shows the opinion that the British setback was the reason that "the pre-conditions for a Nordic cohesion seem to be remarkably better now than they were a year ago", because it is no longer of current interest to choose between association and full membership. The fact that at present the association is the only possible alternative, will make it easier - according to the newspaper - for Finland to follow the other Nordic countries. Joining the EEC by way of association will also reduce the problems within the Norwegian coalition-government, it says. (Dagens nyheter, 17/1.68). This seems to be general opinion in Sweden, which was also strongly underlined by the Swedish representatives in the Council of Europe in January 1968.

The question of an independent Nordic initiative pertaining to the market problems has herewith come to the fore more distinctly than ever before. It seems to be obvious that the Nordic countries face an alternative which might give them the possibility to exert decisive influence on future developments in European politics. A Nordic affiliation to the EEC - no matter if this should happen in the form of association or membership - would probably force Great Britain to follow suit, because the British economy could hardly bear the loss of EFTA-preferences on the Nordic markets and because she otherwise would put herself into fatal political isolation in Europe. A Nordic initiative like this would very likely arouse unwillingness in Great Britain as well as in the USA; however, this would doubtlessly tip the British scale pan towards the EEC, once for ever. And this again would accelerate developments which, true enough, have already started, but which might otherwise take a long time.

Norway is of all the Nordic countries the one strongest affiliated to Great Britain and the USA. Consequently, it will have the strongest doubts concerning a separated Nordic initiative towards the EEC, independent of Great Britain. The Norwegian government keeps ostensibly a key position in this matter. To begin with, it is confronted with the problem whether to join the coordination of the Nordic countries' policy concerning the market situation, or to choose the alternative of supporting EFTA, as the best solution.

At the first sight, it does not seem to be any big differences between these two lines; after all, there is an extended co-operation between the Nordic countries within the framework of EFTA. But in a long-range perspective the situation appears differently. A strengthening of EFTA would make an alteration of its form of co-operation a necessity, because it will otherwise be impossible to cope with the challenge represented by the EEC, in a satisfactory way. Hitherto, a sort of parallelity has existed between these two economic organizations in Western Europe in their internal customs reductions. As the EEC will gradually develop to an economic union, abolishing not only the customs but also other economic discriminations between the member countries, EFTA, in its present form will not be able to keep up. It would have to establish some authorized institutions to carry out necessary adjustments which would determine also internal economic policy of the member-states. In other words, EFTA would have to gain supranational character, in similarity with the EEC. Besides the EFTA countries would have to face the fact that Great Britain, the leading EFTA-state, no longer possesses the economic power needed for EFTA to compete with the EEC-grouping. This is the reason why by strengthening of EFTA actually is meant an extension of EFTA by including the USA and Canada, that is NAFTA.

This solution would place the USA in a rather pre-dominating position compared with the European members. This would mean a closer association with the USA also politically. Because of this the NAFTA-solution is difficult to reconcile with a common Nordic attitude, since Finland and, as far that, Sweden will not be ready to give up their policy of neutrality on this point. This to a great deal, is an explanation why these countries show a negative attitude toward the idea of strengthening EFTA, and support a Nordic common action independent of Great Britain, instead. And because a strengthening of EFTA, without Finland and Sweden taking part, is not a fairly good alternative for Norway, then the Nordic solution proves to be of more current interest seen also from the Norwegian government's point of view. The strengthening of EFTA can, as mentioned before, hardly be done, and to continue an EFTA-co-operation in the same form as it is now is not satisfying and, in the long run, not acceptable.

Theoretically, there are two possible alternatives for a Nordic solution: either an independent Nordic customs union without direct association to greater economic groupings - EFTA very likely will not be able to survive such extended economic regrouping - or a coordination of the Nordic countries' policy with regard to a common initiative towards the EEC. There is, of course nothing which prevents regarding the first alternative as a first step on the way to the other one. As for Great Britain, both these alternatives would very likely result in her joining the EEC. Then there will be good reasons also for the Nordic countries to do the same. However, as the Kennedy-Round has shown, their position in negotiations will be considerably stronger if they reach an agreement on a common policy in advance.

In the light of the latest developments on the Continent, it appears that a continuation of NATO in its present form would offer a solution as little satisfying to the Nordic countries as a continuation of EFTA in its present form would do. Strengthening of these organizations as a compensation for Continental independence, would result in a more intense confrontation of the great powers in the North and eliminate Nordic unity as to security as well as commercial and economic policy. Contrary to this, a common Nordic policy in both these fields of interest seems to have a good chance to be adapted to the Continental-European politics with regard to a European security and co-operation system.

CHANGING COMMERCIAL POLICIES IN THE SOVIET BLOC

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CHANGING COMMERCIAL POLICIES
IN THE SOVIET BLOC*Andrew Shonfield*

JOKES in Eastern Europe frequently serve as a means of intellectual orientation; they provide a kind of signpost to the stage reached in some argument about public policy. The following story told to me by a Hungarian official at a conference in Budapest on East-West trade last autumn is a fair example of the genre. It is about two trade officials—an 'in-group' joke, since trade negotiation was the business of the teller of the story. The first official announces triumphantly: 'A marvellous day—I managed to export a cat under the trade agreement with our Socialist neighbour, X, for \$50,000'. 'You can't really mean it—one cat?' says the other official. 'It's true', says the first, 'and that's not the end of it. I imported two dogs for \$60,000'.

Here, then, is the starting point for any current discussion of Soviet bloc trade—a feeling that, organised as it is at present, it is yielding diminishing returns. The feeling comes to strongest expression in those countries of the Soviet bloc which are most dependent on foreign trade: Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, in that order. Not that they reject the Comecon system; they are conscious of the gains in new markets for their industrial products which they have derived from it, particularly their *entrée* to the Russian market. But they feel the need for a different method of handling their foreign trade, which will allow them to choose what they export, to whom and, above all, for how much, on a more rational basis than in the past. In short, foreign trade is being reconsidered in the same mood as that which has prompted the general movement of economic reform of the middle 1960s, a mood which refuses to be impressed any longer by sheer volume, whether of production or exchanges of goods, and asks increasingly pertinent questions about costs and consumer preferences.

The conference in Budapest,¹ which was attended by economists from most of the Comecon countries, including Russia, brought out clearly the radical style in which some of these countries now approach the problems of the new economic policy on which they have embarked.

¹ Sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and by the Hungarian Institute of Cultural Relations, September 1967. It was on the specific subject of the effects of regional integration in Europe on Soviet bloc trade.

They make no bones about their uncertainties over the results. This is particularly true of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the two countries which have gone farthest in the process of economic reform. Czechoslovakia took its decisive step at the beginning of 1967, and the Hungarians plan to take theirs in January 1968. The problem, as the reformers see it, is how to ensure that the considerable upheaval that is being conducted inside their economies, in order to secure more freedom of initiative and a wider distribution of economic power, has its counterpart in the improved organisation of external trade. The policy of decentralisation will mean, at least in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, that in future the managers of individual enterprises will have much greater freedom than in the past both to buy and to sell their goods abroad. The price reforms and the new cost consciousness in all forms of business transaction should, it was argued, be a sufficient guarantee that Western commercial interests will be treated fairly both as buyers and sellers. What justification could there be, therefore, for the continued denial by Western countries of the advantages of Most Favoured Nation treatment to the exports of Eastern Europe?

The denial of MFN treatment is resented by the East Europeans chiefly, it soon becomes clear, for its symbolic significance. It is seen as a vestige of the Cold War and of the era of the strategic export embargo. The members of the Soviet bloc are unanimous and vociferous in their public stance that the MFN rule applies to them as of right. But once discussion leaves the ground of political principle, it gradually emerges that there is a willingness, among the smaller East European nations at least, to concede that the West would be entitled to some corresponding right of inspection to ensure that countries with communist governments are in fact practising the rules of non-discrimination among their various suppliers, capitalist and communist alike. There seems to be scope here for a new international body, perhaps allied to OECD and reporting to GATT, to provide some measure of surveillance of East-West trade.

The second impression that one receives from the more sophisticated trade specialists in Eastern Europe is that the achievement of MFN treatment is seen merely as one of several moves which would be required to bring about any considerable further expansion of East-West trade. No one is under any illusion that the mere removal of import quota restrictions in the West would do the trick. It is conceded that many of the barriers to East European exports have been dismantled in the European Common Market and elsewhere in Western Europe during recent years, and that exports to Western Europe have

² MFN is used here in its widest sense, to mean non-discriminatory treatment on import quotas as well as on tariffs. Several Western countries do accord Comecon countries equal treatment on tariffs but discriminate on quotas.

been growing at the highly satisfactory pace of nearly 9 per cent. a year since 1960.³ But Soviet bloc exports to the West are still overwhelmingly composed of primary produce. If the members of the bloc are ever going to make a serious breakthrough into the rich West European market for manufactured goods, a new system of trade relations will, the East Europeans believe, have to be established. This they expect will be based on a series of production and marketing arrangements between individual firms in the West and industrial enterprises in the East, the latter operating under managements with a higher degree of autonomy than they have had in the past.

However, the economic reforms which are to provide the basis for the new order in international trade are, to a large extent, still promise. The progress so far made towards a more decentralised form of management and a less arbitrary system of pricing varies widely from country to country. In the remainder of this article I shall attempt to identify some significant long-term trends in the external commercial policies of East European countries, rather than confine myself to the views on the subject that emerged at the Budapest Conference.

* * *

The essential problem that has emerged in the management of trade among the Comecon countries can best be approached via the critique presented by Professor Imre Vajda, the Hungarian trade specialist, in an essay entitled 'Brakes and Bottlenecks in Hungary's Economic Growth'.⁴ Vajda compares the growth of trade within the Soviet bloc with that among the members of the European Common Market, and shows that the latter has been markedly faster since the start of the 1960s. Why should the deliberate effort of governments which plan to increase their trade with one another be so much less effective than the unplanned activities of capitalist traders in pursuit of normal profitable business? Vajda's answer is that the defects in the techniques employed by the communist countries to secure an exact balance of trade with one another result in the loss of many genuine trade opportunities. Moreover, the system as it is worked at present too easily provides a cover for an active trade in goods for which the real demand is weak—the so-called 'soft commodities'—whose movement across frontiers adds as little to the general welfare as the exchange of dogs against cats in my Hungarian story.

In theory, the Comecon system provides for the full multilateral settlement of the trade balances of all member countries: any credit which is earned in one market can be offset against a deficit in another.

³ *Economic Survey of Europe in 1966*, Table 3. (ECE, Geneva 1967.)

⁴ *Economics of Planning*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Norway 1966).

In practice, each country plans the composition of its trade with all the others individually, with the aim of securing exact equality in the bilateral exchange of exports and imports. The reason is that when any country is left at the end of a trading period with a deficit balance to settle with its creditors, it usually offers them those goods which it has readily available in surplus, regardless of whether they correspond to the creditor country's needs. There is some bargaining, but in practice a creditor will never be able to get hold of 'hard commodities' i.e., goods which are in heavy demand and therefore tend to figure in the exchange of quotas under the bilateral trade agreements—in return for an unplanned trade surplus. The essential problem, as Vajda says, is 'the lack of real money'.⁵ Because of this the incentive to achieve an export surplus is missing. Indeed, the normal incentive system works in reverse: since it is the debtor who calls the tune and decides what the creditor is to receive in return for his export surplus, there is an advantage in running a deficit. Naturally enough, countries with relatively strong trading positions take care to reinsure themselves against such treatment; and the reinsurance takes the form of limiting export consignments to the amounts that can be fully paid for by a guaranteed return flow of specific exports from the partner country. This results in very cautious planning of trade: everything balances, but at a much lower level of trade than would occur if countries used 'real money' instead of barter.

It is worth observing at this stage that there is a further problem connected with the different levels of prices in the various Comecon countries, which complicates trade relations, independently of the issue of 'hard' versus 'soft' goods. Since the prices in each country are fixed by its own government, in line with what it conceives to be the requirements of domestic policy, there are great differences in the prices of even quite common goods when they are offered in different places. For instance, the value of 'transferable roubles' (i.e., the units of account which are used for the settlement of credit and debit balances within the Soviet bloc) are known to be generally worth a great deal less when they are used to buy things in Bulgaria than in East Germany. This is another way of saying that the Bulgarian currency is relatively over-valued. But even when a currency is not over-valued, it may well be the case that particular categories of goods are priced in such a way as to deter a potential buyer inside Comecon. (For sales to countries outside Comecon, different currency rules apply: generally goods have in the past been sold at whatever price, in dollars or other Western currency, the market would bear, and the enterprise concerned compensated for any loss that it would otherwise incur in terms of its

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 236.

domestic currency, by being given a special rate of exchange appropriate to the particular deal.)

I shall return to the problem of price-fixing later; it is fundamental to the whole issue of the new economic reforms in the field of foreign trade. But first it is necessary to see that there is in fact no contradiction between what appear initially to be two incompatible criticisms of the system which are commonly made by foreign trade experts in Eastern Europe. On the one hand they complain that the volume of trade within the bloc is less than it would be if existing trade opportunities were properly exploited. On the other hand they speak of 'over-trading' within the bloc, meaning that certain countries are buying goods from other members of Comecon (and increasing their exports correspondingly) which they could produce more economically at home. The latter assertion is frequently made by the Hungarians, in particular, about their trade relations with the rest of Comecon. Hungary's ratio of imports to national income is, in any case, higher than that of any other member of the bloc, and there is an understandable desire to reduce the country's dependence on the vagaries of foreign trade.⁶ This could be done by cutting out some of the 'soft' goods which figure both in exports and in imports. The result would be a better total allocation of the country's resources. But at the same time, once the obsession with bilateral trade balancing was removed, a number of new opportunities for the import and export of useful goods between East European countries would almost certainly emerge.

In view of the obstacles to a rational international division of labour within the Soviet bloc, it may seem remarkable that so much trade is in fact conducted among the member countries. In the mid-1960s the Comecon countries as a whole directed 63 per cent. of their total exports to markets within the bloc, and took 65 per cent. of their imports from the bloc.⁷ Part of the answer lies in the fact that administrative procedures are flexible enough to offset some of the rigidities of the

⁶ A figure as high as 40 per cent. of GNP for the value of imports (equals exports) of goods and services had been given by Bogнар (*Acta Oeconomica*, Vol. 1-2, p. 85). This would put Hungary almost into the class of Benelux in terms of its dependence on foreign trade income, and considerably above Britain. There are difficulties about making a realistic estimate of the money value of the Hungarian national product in terms of the international exchange values applied to its trade with Western countries; and there is the subsidiary point that Soviet bloc conventions for the measurement of GNP make the latter smaller than if it were valued by Western criteria. However, alternative Hungarian unofficial estimates which attempt to take account of these factors still put the ratio of imports to GNP as around 35 per cent.—that is, higher than the comparable ratio in any of the countries of the European Common Market other than Benelux.

⁷ *International Trade 1966* (GATT, Geneva 1967). These are averages for the years 1964-66.

foreign trade plans. The trade experts conduct half-yearly reviews of the progress of the plans and fix up a lot of new bargains with their trade partners, whenever deliveries look like falling seriously short of the amounts laid down in the bilateral trade agreements. The extent of this practical trade bargaining among men who are, for the most part, intimately concerned with the day-to-day production and distribution problems of their countries is indicated by the fact, established in one case, Hungary, that actual trade flows are different from planned trade flows in transactions amounting to some 30 per cent. of total trade with Comecon partners.* By all accounts bargaining of this type, when the supplier has failed to come up to scratch, either because the quantity or the quality of the product is less than promised, is sometimes fairly tough. The ultimate threat is that the country which has failed to receive the goods promised will itself cut down promised exports of goods included in the schedules of the bilateral agreement. There is no debtor's option of substituting 'soft' goods for the 'hard' goods promised. The deals that are eventually made by the trade officials in these frequent encounters are closely guided by the views of managers of enterprises, who are themselves under pressure to find the best possible substitutes for deliveries that have failed to materialise.

The other factor which may be too easily overlooked is that a considerable proportion of the trade between these countries consists of consignments of standard and fairly homogeneous products. This applies especially to the large exports of raw materials and fuels from the U.S.S.R., and to the considerable trade in foodstuffs. These can be readily accommodated within the system of bilateral quota arrangements. Indeed, it is precisely because the industrial production of these countries is becoming increasingly sophisticated that the simple arrangements that served to cover the large-scale exchanges of more or less standard products no longer suffice. The old-fashioned bulk purchase agreement cannot readily accommodate itself to the process of continuous industrial innovation. As Vajda puts it, this form of trade belonged to a period of history when 'the ancient model of the international division of labour—raw materials (and foodstuffs) in return for industrial products—predominated. This phase, which included a very limited range of goods and revealed the more or less homogeneous nature of the countries concerned, is gone for ever, though its influence still subsists'.

In the light of this explanation, it is easier to see why the reforming governments are ready, in spite of the considerable hazards involved, to contemplate giving their enterprise managers a great deal of power

* Authoritative estimate supplied in conversation.

• *Op. cit.*, p. 237.

in the conduct of foreign trade. Among the advanced exponents of the new economic reforms, notably in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, no doubt is felt that this is the only way to secure the flexible response to changing market conditions which is a condition for the survival of countries so heavily dependent on their export trade. The essential argument is the same as that applied to the economic reforms of industrial investment at home. Only by giving managements the opportunity of increasing the earnings of their own enterprises by a skilful choice of investment projects will it be possible to stimulate them to take the calculated business risks that are required for effective industrial innovation. The communist planners in Eastern Europe have shown increasing awareness since the early 1960s of the fact that the traditional planning system militates sharply against the rapid introduction of new products.

* * *

However, product innovation is not the only, or indeed the chief, aim of the new economic reforms. The primary purpose is to stop the waste of resources, which was one of the consequences of the blind pursuit of production volume at all costs, and to make managers acutely cost-conscious. The central problem here is how to bring into being a rational system of prices which will truly reflect the cost, in terms of scarce resources used, of all commodities and services. Nowhere is the need for rational pricing more acute than in the field of foreign trade. Among the industrialised countries of Eastern Europe, and most notably in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, there is a suspicion that their foreign trade at present imposes an unnecessarily heavy burden on the economy. The nature of the burden is concealed by the fact that the prices charged for goods and services do not reflect the real cost of producing them. The result is that certain exports are bad business for the exporter, if he only knew it, because he is giving a subsidy away to his foreign customer. Equally, it might pay, if the cost calculations were realistically made, to import certain products which are being manufactured at excessive cost at home.

The trouble is that a thorough-going price reform, involving the wholesale removal of subsidies on some goods and services sold to the public, is an awkward, unpopular and even politically explosive exercise. Czechoslovakia's experience since it embarked on the most radical realignment of prices of any country in Eastern Europe last January, has not been encouraging. Wholesale prices during the following six months rose by some 30 per cent.; the result was widespread dissatisfaction and social strains.¹⁰ The Hungarians are approaching

¹⁰ See *The Times*, October 4th, 1967.

their major price reform, which is due in January 1968, with some evident anxiety. It is on a more ambitious scale than the Czechoslovak reform: the prices of approximately one-third of all products are to be freed forthwith, and the remainder to be adjusted over a period to international levels.

There is no mistaking the determination of the Czechs and the Hungarians in this matter. It is seen as the touchstone of the whole reform. It is also the issue on which the conservative forces of the old communist bureaucracy are most likely to be able to challenge the reformers with a measure of popular support. There is no doubt that the reformers are right in seeing this as the crucial decision in the whole process. Without a radical revision of prices to reflect true costs, there can be no decentralisation of economic power. Managers can only make rational decisions about the proper use of resources if the costs that they have to pay and the prices that they charge in their turn truly reflect the state of supply and demand. And without decentralisation of economic decisions, the system is likely to remain wasteful of resources and unresponsive to consumer needs. The issue, in the view of many of the reformers, is essentially an ideological one—nothing less than the second socialist revolution, which is supposed to liberate the consumer from the last vestiges of the Stalinist style in the management of society.

But price reform is not only portentous political stuff; it is also an extremely complicated economic exercise. If it is to be done properly everything, including the existing stock of capital assets, must be revalued by some criterion which will measure, however approximately, what is the equilibrium price which *would*, in a free market, equate supply and demand. The trouble with any piecemeal procedure, which for instance revalued consumer durable goods by allowing the market for these to run free while maintaining controls on all capital goods, is that new distortions in certain price relationships would be introduced while the process was in train. Thus the Czechs found in the middle 1960s, when they embarked on their economic reform, that the rigorous application of the new criteria to enterprises before the price system was completely recast resulted in wide differences in the rate of profit earned by producers of different products, ranging from a return of 50 per cent. on capital to a loss of 20 per cent.,¹¹ without any obvious relationship to differences in their level of efficiency. To be guided by results like these in deciding how a country should invest its resources and what it should sell abroad would be to court even more muddle and waste than under the old régime of rigid planning. The interim period when prices are partially reformed is the trickiest. Alternatively,

¹¹ J. Michal, 'The new economic model', *Survey*, April 1966.

the business of setting new prices for tens of thousands of individual items in the manner apparently envisaged by the U.S.S.R. takes a very long time.

The smaller nations of Eastern Europe, which are heavily dependent on foreign trade, feel that they cannot wait. The short cut which Czechoslovakia and Hungary have chosen through the morass of complicated price calculations is to use international market prices, as established in Western export markets, as a general guide in the process of revaluation at home. The following statement by a Czech economist, Z. Orlicek, Deputy Director of the Prague Institute of Foreign Trade, sets out the reasons for this procedure in forthright terms: '*Nous considérons dans ce contexte les prix mondiaux dans une grande mesure comme critère objectif de l'efficacité, ceci non seulement en tant que critère de l'efficacité de notre intégration à la répartition internationale du travail, mais en même temps en tant que critère de l'efficacité technique et du niveau économique de tout notre processus de reproduction*'.¹² However, it is one thing for Hungary and Czechoslovakia, which are in any case bound to be greatly influenced by world market prices, to use the latter as an automatic guide for their domestic price reforms; in the U.S.S.R., where export trade represents less than 5 per cent. of GNP, the matter is viewed quite differently. The prospect is, in fact, that prices in the East European countries which are now making the running on the economic reforms will get progressively out of phase with prices in the U.S.S.R. and other more conservative members of the bloc. This could have a serious effect on the development of intra-Comecon trade. One has to remember that the price discrepancies will make themselves felt in a situation where enterprise managers will have greater freedom to choose their customers and suppliers abroad. Moreover, they will be encouraged to choose them on the strict criterion of profit maximisation. It seems extremely likely, in these circumstances, that managers with any capacity to spare will look for outlets for their products in markets where they can earn convertible currency, and spend it on goods that are offered at world market prices. That is to say, the tendency will be, as the reforms go forward at widely different speeds among the Comecon countries, for a growing share of trade to be directed outside the area.

There is already discussion among the reformers about the need for special measures to offset the probable reduction of trade with the U.S.S.R. But it is hard to see any likelihood of a compromise on the question of a single Comecon price reform covering the whole area.

¹² Lecture by M. Orlicek (mimeographed), 1966.

in view of the widely divergent interests of the member countries.¹³ Comecon is, in any case, not that sort of a body. It is not empowered even to speak on behalf of its members in trade discussions with countries outside the bloc. Its function, in practice, is to provide certain ancillary services for inter-governmental bargaining among members; in the main about bilateral trade quotas; its officials have little effective initiative in the sphere of ideas, let alone any administrative authority. It is wrong to look for an analogy with the European Commission in Brussels; nor is there an analogous executive body, like the Council of Ministers in the European Economic Community, standing behind the Comecon officials.

True, there is a Comecon bank, the International Bank for Economic Co-operation, established in Moscow since 1964 with a capital of 300 million roubles.¹⁴ This capital fund, to which all the member countries have contributed, has replaced the bilateral swing credits previously granted by individual pairs of countries to one another. The bank's facilities are intended solely to cover temporary fluctuations in the trade balances of member countries. There is no way in which any country which became a net creditor of the group as a whole could take out its earnings—or even a part of them as under the European Payments Union system in the 1950s—in freely convertible currencies. In effect, the creditor country receives a cheque from the bank which it can only spend by shopping around within the Comecon system. By all accounts, the bank does everything possible to keep the net amounts that have to be settled in this way down to a minimum—and is reported to have had some success in doing so. The essence of the whole process is, once again, to support the deficit countries in disposing of goods for which markets are not readily forthcoming. And the end result is to reinforce the incentive of the well placed countries, those with a large export potential, to hold their salesmen in check and avoid the unwanted success of a trade surplus in Comecon.

Thus despite its multilateral trimmings, the system remains firmly embedded in the bilateral mould. Moreover, the lines separating domestic from external policies, which tended to be blurred during the early post-war period, when the Russian party apparatus dominated the

¹³ An attempt was made in 1964 to apply a uniform rule which would bring the prices used in trade between Comecon countries into closer relationship with world prices. A formula was eventually agreed for revaluing products in this trade on the basis of average world prices for the period 1960-64. However, certain exceptions were made; and some products not figuring in the planned quotas under the trade agreements were specifically left for bargaining between trade partners (Kaser, *Comecon* 2nd ed., OUP/R.I.I.A. 1967, p. 185). It is of course in such trade outside the bilateral quota arrangements, where the barter process does not apply, that prices are especially important.

¹⁴ See Kaser, *op. cit.*, Chap. VIII.

governments of all the members of the bloc, grow steadily sharper in the era of polycentrism. Each Communist Party is anxious to show that it is a genuinely national party. This seems to rule out one of the two possible ways in which Comecon could be made into an effective multi-lateral trading system. This method would require the adoption of a single uniform policy of price reform, and the general realignment of the exchange parities of member countries' currencies. In order to maintain the new price and currency relationships once they had been established, Comecon would have to invent some arrangement to ensure the continuance of a uniform system. (This is not, incidentally, the same thing as introducing uniform prices for all products throughout the area. There might be wide variations within a uniform system. The necessary minimum rule would be that all *inputs* which themselves enter into international trade, either as potential exports or imports, must be costed at world market values.¹⁸ Thus there would be nothing against charging different prices for labour or for land in the different countries of the bloc; but there would have to be uniform pricing standards for factory raw materials and capital equipment. Final costs of particular products would vary from country to country; but the rules of valuation would be uniform and would accurately reflect comparative advantage in trading relations between members of the bloc.)

The alternative would be to establish Vajda's 'real money'. This would mean giving surplus countries the right to spend outside the bloc at least a portion of their earnings from trade within Comecon. Only in this way could 'free' exports—i.e., exports outside the planned bilateral quotas—to other members of the bloc become as attractive as normal exports to capitalist countries. The Poles have indeed been pressing a proposal of this kind, but so far it has been sharply resisted. It is easy to see that such a scheme would have serious implications for countries which are not in a position to compete on level terms in international markets. As it is, the Russians have lately been arguing within the bloc that member countries ought to be prepared to pay higher prices for U.S.S.R. raw materials and other primary products—on the interesting ground that capitalist countries, as is well known, use their monopoly power to exploit primary producing countries and to force down the level of world market prices of their commodities. Socialist countries, the Russians contend, should not follow the same course in trade amongst themselves. The argument, it need hardly be said, has not so far found a sympathetic response among the smaller industrial

¹⁸ This rule has actually been proposed by a Hungarian economist, Liska. See A. Zauberman, *Economika*, Feb. 1964; quoted by M. Kaser (*Ibid.*), p. 199. It would be necessary to interpret it rigorously so that an appropriate capital charge would be applied to services like transport where the capital equipment figure is in international trade.

countries of the bloc, who know that their standard of living during the years to come will depend on their ability to sell increasing quantities of manufactured goods, made out of these raw materials, in world markets.

It is to be observed that the conversion of Comecon to the use of 'real money' in intra-regional trade would, in the long run, produce the same sort of result as the imposition of a uniform price and currency reform on all member countries. Thus any country whose prices were too high would gradually lose export earnings—as its former customers discovered that they could use their money better elsewhere—and find in the end that it was unable to pay for essential imports. It would then have to lower its prices to international competitive levels. On the other hand countries charging less than world market prices in Comecon trade would come to realise that they were needlessly subsidising their neighbours' living standards at the expense of their own people. But the process of adjustment would of course take place in an unorganised and piecemeal fashion under the compulsion of market forces—which is another reason why such a scheme is likely to be resisted.

But if both methods are rejected, the prospect is of a gradual but inexorable shift in the pattern of trade, as Comecon countries are subjected to a growing incentive to push the unplanned portion of their exports into capitalist world markets. And in those countries which have successfully brought their prices and costs in line with world market levels, there will be the further temptation to reduce the planned proportion of total trade. In some respects the new pressures on the geographical distribution of the trade of some of the more advanced Comecon countries, which now seem to be in prospect, may represent as profound a change in the economic balance of power within the bloc as the independent foreign policy of Roumania has produced in the political balance. Michael Kaser has argued in his analysis of Comecon as a 'preference area' that the effect of the arrangements whereby member countries are able to charge each other rather higher prices than those ruling on world markets is in essence the same as that achieved by a customs union like EEC.¹⁶ Both are devices for giving members of the group commercial favours which they would not have if they disposed of their products on world markets. In the customs union the insider, when selling a product to fellow members, can add to the price an amount equal to the tariff that is levied on outsiders. Thus it earns more on exports, but also tends to pay more for imports than if it bought them freely at world market prices. 'Members of EEC and EFTA protect those of their industries operating at costs higher than world costs by imposing a duty on non-member supplies; members of

¹⁶ *Comecon*, p. 181.

Comecon do the same by acting as if a duty were applied.' ¹⁷ The effect of a thoroughgoing price reform in countries like Czechoslovakia and Hungary may be thought of as equivalent to the removal of preferential tariff on goods not covered by barter agreements with other members of the bloc. Comecon exports, outside the fixed bilateral quotas, will then have to compete on price with exports from capitalist countries.

It is true that even a significant geographical shift in the trade of a country like Hungary, say of the order of 10 per cent. or so of its total trade, would still leave it with over half of its trading activities within the bloc, instead of nearly two-thirds as at present. But over any extended period a country's external economic policy is likely to be influenced powerfully by the dynamic elements of growth in its foreign trade, even if they make up a smaller proportion of the total than the old-established and relatively static part. The story of Britain's increasing concern about its trade with the European Common Market, in contrast with the relaxed attitude adopted towards the considerably larger share of British trade going to the Commonwealth, is a precedent that should not be entirely ignored.

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¹⁷ *Ibid.* It is worth observing in passing that the analogy does not necessarily apply to a free trade area (like EFTA) where individual members are at liberty to impose tariffs on goods from outside the area which are so low that they afford no significant price advantage to suppliers inside.