

INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

in conjunction with

DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR AUSWÄRTIGE POLITIK

5TH EUROPEAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE

HAUS LERBACH, near COLOGNE

MAY 2 - 4, 1968

PROGRAMME

<u>THURSDAY MAY 2</u>	1530 - 1830	<u>First Session</u> - Model I: Evolutionary Europe (Break for tea at 1700)
	2000	Dinner
<u>FRIDAY, MAY 3</u>	0830	Breakfast
	0915 - 1215	<u>Second Session</u> - Model II: Atlanticised Europe Model III: "Europe des patries" (Break for coffee at 1100)
	1230	Lunch
	1430 - 1730	<u>Third Session</u> - Model IV: Fragmented Europe Model V: Independent Europe (Break for tea at 1600)
	2000	Dinner at the "KUCKUCK" (Köln-Müngersdorf)
<u>SATURDAY, MAY 4</u>	0830	Breakfast
	0915 - 1215	<u>Fourth Session</u> - Model VI: Partnership Europe (Break for coffee at 1100)
	1230	Lunch
	1430 - 1700	<u>Fifth Session</u> - Final Discussion
	1700	Conference closes

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May 2 - 4, 1968

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

(PROVISIONAL)

Dr. Achille Albonetti	Director, Division for International Affairs, Comitato Nazionale per l'Energia Nucleare, Rome.
Ambassador Egon Bahr	Head of Planning Staff, Foreign Office, Bonn.
General A. Beaufre	Director, Institut Français des Etudes Stratégiques, Paris.
Herr Christoph Bertram	Research Associate, Institute for Strategic Studies, London.
Dr. Kurt Birrenbach	Member of the Bundestag, Bonn.
<del>Mr. Robert R. Bowie</del>	Counselor, State Department, Washington.
Ambassador Jens Boyesen	Associate of Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Oslo.
Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski	Policy Planning Council, Department of State, Washington.
Mr. Alastair Buchan	Director, Institute for Strategic Studies, London.
Mr. François Duchêne	<u>The Economist</u> , London.
Dr. Curt Gasteyger	Director of Programmes, Institute for Strategic Studies, London.
Dr. L.G.M. Jaquet	Director, Institute of International Affairs, The Hague.
Mr. Niels Haagerup	<u>Berlingske Tidende</u> , Copenhagen.
M. Pierre Hassner	Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris.
Mr. John W. Holmes	Director-General, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto.
Brig. Kenneth Hunt	Deputy Director, Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

Prof. Henry Kissinger Professor of Government, Harvard University Center of International Affairs, Cambridge, Mass.

Gen. Baron A. del Marmol Commandant, l'Ecole de Guerre de Belgique, 1961-63.

Mr. John Newhouse Writer, Paris.

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Mr. Peter Ramsbotham Research Associate, Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

Dr. Klaus Ritter Director, Foundation for Science and Politics, Munich.

Dr. Ulrich Sahn Ministerialdirigent, Foreign Office, Bonn.

Herr Helmut Schmidt Member of the Bundestag, Head of the Social Democratic Party, Bonn.

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Dr. Theo Sommer Die Zeit, Hamburg.

Dr. Åke Sparring Deputy Director, Swedish Institute for International Affairs, Stockholm.

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Mr. John A. Thomson Cabinet Office, London.

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| Dr. Achille Albonetti     | Director, Division for International Affairs,<br>Comitato Nazionale per l'Energia Nucleare, Rome. |
| Ambassador Egon Bahr      | Head of Planning Staff, Foreign Office, Bonn.   |
| X Herr Christoph Bertram  | Research Associate, Institute for Strategic<br>Studies, London.                                   |
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| X Mr. Niels Haagerup      | <u>Berlingske Tidende</u> , Copenhagen  |
| X Mr. John W. Holmes      | Director-General, Canadian Institute of<br>International Affairs, Toronto.                        |
| X Brig. Kenneth Hunt      | Deputy Director, Institute for Strategic<br>Studies, London.                                      |
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THE INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

MODELS OF WESTERN EUROPE IN  
THE 1970's

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FIFTH EUROPEAN - AMERICAN CONFERENCE, Haus Lerbach, Germany,  
May 2nd - 4th, 1968.

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## INTRODUCTION

The conventional way of forecasting future political developments in Europe is to build on present trends in order to find out where they might lead; the known present, the situation of today and the decisions taken now, is extrapolated into the unknown future. But the results can be misleading.

In this year's European Studies, ISS is experimenting with a more adventurous technique. We have assumed a known future, or rather, several conceivable futures for Europe in the 1970s. The purpose of this exercise is three-fold: First, to examine different structures of a future Western Europe, in order to see what their effects would be, especially their impact on the Atlantic Alliance and East-West relations; secondly, to assess the possibilities each of them offers for the solution of Europe's problems; thirdly, to bring out the choices with which policy-makers will be faced in the coming years.

For this reason, six different models of Western Europe have been set-up for examination, ranging from "Evolutionary Europe" (a status-quo-plus formula) and "Fragmented Europe", (a Europe shorn of collective structures and aims), to a tightly-structured "Partnership Federal Europe". This may not cover the whole scale of theoretically possible European futures, but in an exercise limited to the next decade we have thought it wise to exclude the more utopian.

The models are of different degrees of probability, leaving aside any question of desirability, but all are possible. The purpose of the study is not so much to judge the probability of the models as their feasibility (consistency and inner logic), their effects and possible consequences. While the relative position and policies of the super-powers will no doubt partly determine Europe's future, we have confined our modelling to Western Europe. We have arbitrarily assumed that its future structure will be determined primarily by European decisions, and we have only considered the super-powers in terms of their reactions to the models. These six models must, therefore, be taken as intentionally artificial constructions of the unknown and as artificial points of departure for the assessment of political developments. Some aspects may be overstressed at the expense of others; but this, too, has been done intentionally in order to bring out more clearly the political choices and implications involved in each model.

In order to create an atmosphere suitable for speculation and to avoid being constantly confronted with questions of probability, we invite you to accept the following 'rules of the game':

+ the take-off point of the examination of the models is put at some time in the seventies; 1970 + x; how we managed to get there will not, in the first instance, be questioned.

+ The general political scene at that time is assumed to be the following:

- (1) the Non-proliferation Treaty has been signed but the adversary-partner relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union remains, other things being equal, unchanged
- (2) the German problem is unsettled
- (3) the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact continue in some form
- (4) President de Gaulle has left office but the Fifth Republic continues
- (5) the war in Vietnam is over but the U.S. continue to be substantially committed in Asia
- (6) potential dangers of armed unrest occur mainly in Africa and Asia, but developments in the Third World do not fundamentally affect Europe's position in the 1970s.

During the past six months, a study group of ISS staff and outside consultants have examined the six different models. The discussion, so far, has concentrated on Western Europe and the respective implications for the Atlantic relationship. A further study will be devoted to East-West relations during May.

The paper is in six parts; each devoted to a different model; its structure, feasibility, and effects. At the end of each part, there is a series of questions which we should like to put to the Lerbach Conference.



## I. EVOLUTIONARY EUROPE

- (1) Motive: Some form of political union remains the only long-term solution for Western Europe. But it is blocked, for the time being, by conflicting political concepts - ranging from a federal structure to a mere concert of the leading powers, and from independence of the U.S. to partnership in its orientation. It is agreed, however, that these different views on the future of Europe must not be allowed to create an unbridgeable gap between the West European countries. Governments must, therefore, minimize their controversies and design their policies so as not to prejudice any of the alternative concepts of European political organisation or orientation at a later stage.
  
- (2) Structure: The present situation in Western Europe remains basically unchanged into the seventies. European governments are anxious not to assume commitments which, by being incompatible with the policies pursued by one or other West European state, might jeopardize a unified political structure in the future. Waiting for better times to build a political Europe, governments are reluctant to be closely associated with either of the super-powers. Germany remains preoccupied with her national problem and Britain with her economy.

Intra-European consultation, both bilateral and multilateral, is intensified. The EEC moves slowly towards an economic union, but common policies are kept to a bare minimum; e.g. a common tariff and commercial policy is developed, but monetary policy remains the jealously guarded prerogative of national governments. The division of Europe into EEC and EFTA remains. By necessity or conviction, governments engage in certain forms of functional co-operation, e.g. a European Defence Organisation (EDO) within NATO, and joint efforts in the field of technology, nuclear energy, etc. But the issue of supra-nationality is avoided and the lowest common denominator of agreement among participating governments sets the pace. Functional co-operation is no longer regarded as a step towards a political system.

The EDO, as distinct from the concept of a supra-national European Defence Community (see model Partnership Federal Europe), is a functional organisation for promoting co-operative defence arrangements on an inter-governmental basis. It consists of the six EEC countries and the four applicants, Britain, Norway, Denmark and Ireland. Its ingredients are:

(a) Joint Strategic and Defence Planning. there is an integrated European planning staff concerned with specifically European requirements, based on a strategic concept that may be distinct from, though not necessarily opposed to, an American strategic concept. The EDO is supported by

operational research, policy evaluation, and systems analysis groups which are in close consultation with their American counter-parts.

(b) Joint Arms Procurement: Depending on the incentives behind it and the time given for its development, this may comprise any of the following elements: the pooling of research and development efforts in the major science and defence-related industries where governments are the chief buyers; joint purchasing by governments of military equipment; a separate European Arms Development and Procurement Agency. (c) Reorganisation of National Forces: Integration of national logistic chains; specialized roles for national forces, implying some abandonment of fully balanced national military capabilities; integration of some forces on a European basis.

NATO remains structurally unaltered, though probably with reduced force levels. American troops remain in Central Europe. The EDO takes on the character of an inner core within NATO; acting, in its planning capacity, as a specialist regional group of NATO members concerned with the political-security problems of Central Europe. British and French nuclear forces are kept outside the EDO structure.

- (3) Feasibility: The European countries cannot mark time indefinitely. The long-term aim of political union may have to be abandoned either for lack of interest or lack of choice. Public opinion becomes increasingly impatient. Nationalism, promising to achieve more rapid results, will grow in importance. But even if political union does remain Europe's objective, she cannot indefinitely keep her options open. (Secession from the EEC will become increasingly difficult politically and harmful economically, however timid the steps towards economic union.) Though it is impossible to forecast precisely the point at which the balance will be tipped when a reluctant Europe will lose the option for a more independent political orientation, economic and technological factors are likely to weigh most heavily in weakening her power to resist American domination. Half-hearted economic and technological European co-operation will not enable Europe to stop this happening, nor will it serve as a catalyst for European unity. To be effective, a European Arms Development and Procurement Agency would have to have its own budget and exercise responsibilities in the field of R and D, as well as production and procurement; and its controlling board would have to be governed by majority voting rules. The main obstacle to progress will be the reluctance of West European governments to relinquish direct control over their high technology industries. If they continue to insist on the principle of the "juste retour" for these industries, their chance of withstanding

American penetration will diminish and, with it, Europe's option for eventual political union. Particularly in the field of the defence-related industries, governments will be tempted by the easy option of acquiring American weapons more cheaply, either ready-made or on license.

Nevertheless, the increasing weight of defence costs, the difficulty of maintaining balanced collective forces, the inadequacy of national markets to support R and D investments and the concern about American domination, might provide the incentives for a European Defence Organisation. It might intensify the realisation that something has to be done, that Europe must either acquire a greater amount of unity to keep her independence, or remain passive and become subordinate to the United States. But, given the lack of European enthusiasm, this feeling may serve more to encourage national aspirations rather than collective efforts.

Evolutionary Europe seems, at best, a transitory Europe.

- (4) Effects: This passive Europe might suit the American industrialist but it becomes of diminishing significance for the political objectives of the U.S. More and more, American diplomacy will concentrate on relations with the Soviet Union, with Germany and with Britain and favour the more traditional forms of bilateral relations rather than attempting to build further on the NATO structure. Self-interest will characterize American policy towards Europe. Paying lip-service only to European views and applying pressure to get its way, e.g. arms sales, foreign aid to the Third World, disarmament etc., the U.S. will try to prevent those co-operative projects which may be disadvantageous to its own interests, e.g. joint European arms production.

The Soviet Union sees no need to make any concessions in Central Europe as she feels Europe is drifting in a direction favourable to her objectives. Yet, she would rightly feel that this Europe was not a permanent structure, that a skillful diplomacy could alternate what is left of the European idea. She would, therefore, strenuously object even to an EDO - believed likely to be dominated by Germany -, and would offer special inducements to the more independent and nationalist-minded West European states; France certainly, possibly Britain and Germany as well.

This Soviet attitude might induce Germany to be chary of new efforts to promote closer West European co-operation, so as not to impede her Ostpolitik. If, however, Ostpolitik makes no head-way, Germany may react either by taking new initiatives to increase West European political integration, or by accepting Soviet conditions, or, thirdly, frustrated

by deadlock in the East and stagnation in the West, by lapsing into a state of internal instability, the outcome of which would be unpredictable.

The East European countries will welcome the stagnation of the movement towards political unity in Western Europe, as this offers them more room for manoeuvre in their relations with the West as well as the East. While they would prefer to see Germany integrated into a strong European framework rather than acquire a lone-wolf status, they would want this to stop short of strong political or even military co-operation. West European integration in the economic and technological fields they would find acceptable and even hope to profit from it.

(5) Questions: (the defence aspect)

- (1) Will the European members of the Atlantic Alliance have sufficient incentive to create their own defence organisation?

How far can an EDO develop without effecting the structure of NATO?

- (2) What is the most likely sequence of steps in building a European Defence Organisation?

- (a) Joint Arms Procurement;
- (b) Joint Arms Production;
- (c) Joint Defence Planning;
- (d) Integration of logistics;
- (e) Integration of forces;
- (f) Specialized roles for national forces.

- (3) Is an EDO feasible without (a) France? (b) Britain?

What would be the position of the French and British nuclear forces?

- (4) What will the American attitude be to Evolutionary Europe with Britain (a) inside or (b) outside the EEC and/or the EDO?

## II. ATLANTICISED EUROPE

- (1) Motive: The individual West European countries have given up hope that Europe will again play a significant role in world affairs. The world seems to be dominated by the two super-powers and subject to their antagonisms. So, if Western Europe cannot be a super-power herself, she has but two alternatives: to adopt a neutralist position and be left, an agglomeration of powerless states, at the mercy of two super-powers, or to accept a subordinate role at the mercy of one. Western Europe accepts the unconditional leadership of the U.S. for three reasons: in order to maintain her security against Soviet threats, secondly, to keep up with the U.S., in her industrial development, thirdly, because the U.S. historically and culturally, is most closely related to Western Europe and is, therefore, her ineluctable choice. The more dependent Europe is of the United States, the firmer the U.S. will be linked to her.
- (2) Structure: The European members of the Atlantic Alliance tacitly accept permanent American leadership in foreign and defence policy. West European states support American policies the world over and shape their own accordingly. The American strategic concept is unchallenged and her dominant position in NATO undisputed. Britain and perhaps even France place their nuclear forces under NATO command and dismantle their military research facilities.

There is no common political European structure. The European Communities (EEC, ECSC, Euratom) continue to organise economic policy in Europe (e.g. rules of competition, social policy, harmonisation of legislation), but they are no longer intended to serve European economic independence nor do they pursue a protectionist policy vis-à-vis the U.S. They become part of an Atlantic economic structure based on free trade and unrestricted access to the markets of the member countries.

The Atlantic Alliance broadens its scope to include all matters of mutual concern, not only in the defence field, and is reorganised in order to co-ordinate European policies with American objectives, but not vice versa. Machinery is set up for frequent and regular consultations in Washington among heads of government, foreign, defence and economic ministers and planning staffs; specialized bodies of permanent representatives are installed following the pattern of the NATO Council. The U.S. takes account of the interests and views of her European allies, as far as they <sup>are</sup> compatible with its own interests.

- (3) Feasibility: Atlanticised Europe is a powerless but prosperous Europe, protected by the U.S. and profiting from American know-how and investments, while at the same time slipping gradually under American industrial control.

These very elements, on the other hand, cause widespread anti-Americanism, further embittered by Europe's political impotence. The choice between neutralism and subordination is ever present; neutralism gaining ground the more American penetration is felt and resented. The major force working for neutralism and anti-Americanism is nationalism, spreading through all European countries. Communist movements, already representing a considerable portion of voters in France and Italy, may join with nationalist forces, and together succeed in directing public opinion to a more neutralist approach. This tendency will be further strengthened if France somehow succeeds in protecting itself from the Atlanticised relationship, setting an example to its European neighbours that might prove especially tempting for Germany.

Atlanticised Europe is, therefore, a highly unstable Europe. Unless the Soviet Union has adopted a much harder and more menacing line again towards the West as a whole, West European states, by inclination and domestic pressure, will be little more than passive and reluctant allies to the U.S. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the U.S. would be prepared to exercise domination and accept the consequential responsibilities i.e. guaranteeing Europe's total security, and direct involvement in all matters concerning the European countries.

- (4) Effects: As the model assumes American readiness to accept Europe as a client, the Atlantic relationship is almost a domestic issue. The main interest, therefore, lies in the effects of Atlanticised Europe on Soviet and East European policies.

With the American presence and influence firmly implanted in Western Europe, the Iron Curtain will thicken into the border-line between two spheres of super-power domination. The Soviet Union will harden its position in Eastern Europe and might even welcome the developments in Western Europe as a means of regaining control over the Warsaw Pact countries. This control could be exercised less obviously as there will be little danger of any East European state being attracted by Atlantised Western Europe. East and West European countries, equally resenting super-power presence and dominance, become linked by under-dog solidarity.

Soviet policy towards Western Europe will depend on the overall relations between the two super-powers. If Atlanticisation was the result

of a major debacle in East-West relations from which the Soviet Union had emerged as a strengthened power, she would try to exploit this position to attract West European states away from American domination and towards neutralism. If on the other hand, the Soviet Union had gained nothing, there would be a strong tendency to come to arrangements on Europe with the U.S. in order to stabilize the European situation and to free energy and resources for other problems e.g. China.

In any case, the Soviet Union will be tempted to encourage nationalism and independence among West Europeans and thereby make Atlanticised Europe even more unstable. But she will not offer concessions in Central Europe.

(5) Questions:

- (1) What are the factors likely to bring about a situation of American predominance in Europe?
  - (a) American technological superiority and economic penetration?
  - (b) a major crisis in East-West relations?
- (2) Would the U.S. be prepared to exercise the leadership and underwrite the obligations required by Atlanticised Europe?
- (3) Would European dependence of this kind
  - (a) generate neutralism within Europe and perhaps prompt attempts to seek a rapprochement with the Soviet Union?
  - (b) Cause the Soviet Union to adopt an active policy towards Western Europe or to concentrate on consolidating her position within the communist bloc?

### III. EUROPE DES PATRIES

- (1) Motive: Europe's cultural and historic heritage gives her a special responsibility for safe-guarding world peace. But peace is only possible in a situation of equilibrium between the two super-powers. In order to acquire the necessary weight in world affairs to bring about that equilibrium, East and West Europe must move closer together. This is only possible in a loose political structure. Since the nation state is the only viable entity in international affairs, European unity does not depend on a formal common structure for co-operation or decision-making. But it requires - unlike Fragmented Europe (Model IV) - a general consensus of political views among the European states.
- (2) Structure: West European states join together in a loose grouping with frequent and regular consultation in all fields of policy, on the level of heads of governments and ministers, to bring about common European attitudes and joint actions. Member states keep their full sovereignty, without relinquishing any decision-making powers to European organisations, but all accept co-operation within Europe - East and West - and independence of the super-powers as the major principle of their policies. Consideration of the relationship with Eastern Europe is a major preoccupation. In this respect, Europe des Patries is the most eastward-orientated of all the models.

The EEC continues but is gradually divested of its supra-national structure; the Council of Ministers becoming the only seat of political power and <sup>the</sup> Commission limited to mere administration. The Atlantic Alliance survives in its Article 5, or guarantee, aspect, the integrated machinery and command structure of NATO gradually erodes; defence becomes primarily a national concern again. There is no integrated European defence organisation nor joint arms procurement, but a general acceptance of "Buy European First". French and British nuclear forces are now explicitly designed to serve as a minimum deterrent force for Western Europe. The other West European states accept this protection and the prerogatives accompanying it. Germany remains faithful to the obligation not to build up a national nuclear force and accepts restrictions on her conventional force levels and the requisite inspections.

Treaties of trade and non-aggression are signed between East and West European states.

- (3) Feasibility:
  - (1) European states will only be disposed to disregard American strategic protection and to co-ordinate their policies if they no longer feel that their security is threatened, i.e. if détente continues and the Soviet Union



pursues a mild policy towards Western Europe. Even then, given the absence of political structures strong enough to mould diverging West European policies into some common form, Europe will be little more than the nineteenth century Concert system, providing for permanent co-operation and joint policy-making only in very limited fields, and, moreover, in those least affecting national sovereignty. Europe will, therefore, be unable to live up to her political ambitions; instead of creating an equilibrium between the two super-powers, Europe will, industrially and strategically, continue to be under their influence.

The inequality inherent in the Europe des Patries formula - privileges enjoyed by nuclear powers, restrictions imposed on West Germany - makes for a considerable amount of instability. These inconsistencies can only be avoided in a hegemonial structure, e.g. France or Britain or both becoming the acknowledged leaders in Europe. But, apart from the fact that this leadership would not be taken seriously either by West Germany and Italy or by the US and the Soviet Union, it would scarcely provide the other West European states with advantages in international relations which they could not hope to obtain by purely national policies.

(4) Effects:

The US may, at first, be opposed to this shift in European policies. It would appear to represent the failure of twenty years of American policy towards Europe. If it starts to evolve, there would seem to be only one course open to the US, which is to concentrate on the closest possible working partnership with the Soviet Union and probably on a subsidiary bilateral relationship with West Germany. There would seem to be one possible set of circumstances in which the Europe des Patries formula might suit the US, namely if she has to devote increasing resources to domestic problems while remaining militarily very active in Asia, so that she has diminishing physical and intellectual resources to devote to European questions, and at the same time wishes to free herself from the nagging of her European allies and the restrictions they impose on her freedom of manoeuvre.

The eastward orientation of Europe des Patries makes for an ambivalent Soviet attitude. Satisfaction with what would be regarded as a major setback to the American position in Europe will be balanced by the fear that this Europe may prove almost irresistible to the East European nations. It would seem the Europe of their choice, sufficiently loosely structured to embrace East and West Europeans, reviving the idea of European heritage, restoring the nation state to its traditional importance and challenging the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. To be accepted by the Soviet Union,

Europe des Patries would, therefore, have to coincide with a lessening of Soviet interest in Central Europe as a strategic glacis. But this would seem wishful thinking. Lacking the structure to integrate Germany in a collective organisation or to give her a position of equality among European nations by other means, Europe des Patries does not offer a lasting solution to the German problem, central to Soviet post-war policy. Far from decreasing Soviet interest in Central Europe, it would, therefore, arouse Soviet apprehension and increase Soviet concern about Europe. At the same time, it would push the Soviet Union towards closer co-operation with the US.

Europe des Patries is not capable of uniting the views of West European states for more than a short period, nor of giving satisfaction to Germany. If West Germany is reluctant to accept discrimination this might revive the complexes and fears of the inter-war years among Germany's neighbours, adding to the residual fear in East and West Europe that so loose a system could not handle a European crisis. The result might simply be to break up existing collective structures without putting anything in their place.

Europe des Patries lacks inner stability and may, therefore, be just a slippery slope leading to Fragmented Europe (Model IV).

(5) Questions:

- (1) What will be the effects of Europe des Patries on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union?
- (2) Would the trend towards closer contacts with Eastern Europe imply the dismantling of Western collective organisations, e.g. EEC and NATO?
- (3) Does this model offer any attractions to:-
  - (a) Germany?
  - (b) Britain?
  - (c) The smaller West European countries?
  - (d) The US?
- (4) Is the model viable without a de Gaulle?

#### IV. FRAGMENTED EUROPE

- (1) Motive: Nationalism and independence are the distinguishing features of this model. There is no common motive, but a general acceptance that by pooling their resources, the West European powers can neither better the conditions of their peoples nor increase their influence in the world. West European states must avoid being drawn into super-power conflicts in the Third World. This can only be achieved by more independent national policies. They must co-operate more closely with East European countries. This cannot be achieved through either European or Atlantic international organisations, but only by each state pursuing its own national aims without regard to any collective interests.

Fragmented Europe is in close proximity to "Europe des Patries" in the scale of the models. While in the latter the European states still believe in some common actions though not structures, in the former they have given up any consideration of collective interests in their policy-making and are no longer restrained from doing so by common structures.

- (2) Structure: No common structure. Western Europe splits into two major groups: those countries which prefer a close relationship with the US (cp. Atlanticised Europe), and those whose primary aim is complete independence from any external influence.

The first group includes Britain, trying to maximise what is left of the "special relationship"; possibly the Mediterranean members of NATO, Holland and, in the first instance, West Germany, as long as security considerations are high in the scale of her political priorities and she requires a continuing American presence and strategic protection.

The second group of European countries move towards a policy of protection in the economic and technological fields and neutrality in the political and security field. They seek to counterbalance their diminished influence in Western Europe and the Atlantic world by increasing links with Eastern Europe. France continues to lay the physical basis of a strategic *de tous azimuts*, that is of armed neutrality, and establishes close relations with Rumania, Czechoslovakia and possibly Poland, as well as technical agreements with the Soviet Union. Benelux splits with Belgium and Luxemburg moving into France's orbit. The Scandinavian countries revert to their traditional neutrality but try to acquire more collective power by the formation of a Nordic Union; Sweden, as the leader of the group, opts out of the NPT and decides to build nuclear weapons.

All the West European states accept the fact that each separately cannot keep up with the super-powers, and do not aspire to compete with them in the world. They are resigned to the status of small, unimportant powers. Reluctance to be tied to super-power objectives or to be involved in super-power struggles inspires and increases neutralist tendencies all over Europe.

Some consultation continues in matters of foreign and defence policy within each group, but neither integration nor any other form of supra-nationalism is accepted. The EEC collapses. Economic co-operation in Western Europe is organised through bilateral arrangements and international conventions, including the East European states (e.g. GATT, UN Agencies). The Atlantic Alliance, shorn of military integration and permanent consultative bodies (e.g. NATO Council), continues merely as a pact of mutual assistance in case of unprovoked aggression, while the peripheral members, e.g. Portugal or Canada, have left it altogether. In addition, new defence arrangements link the "Atlanticised" nations to the US, possibly within a mini-NATO.

- (3) Feasibility: Present economic and security arrangements in Europe, like EEC or NATO, have not yet imposed enduring patterns sufficient to prevent fragmentation; e.g. the EEC can stop short of an economic union and turn into a mere secretariat body for administering a customs union. If West Europeans accept fragmentation, it will be at the cost of mounting sacrifices in their economic, technological and military potential. The economic and technological independence of the individual states can only be achieved at the price of industrial provincialism, dirigisme and a decline in standards of living. The disparity between the countries trying to retain independence and those profiting from close defence and industrial ties with the US, will offer a constant incentive to forego the ambition of complete national independence.

Fragmented Europe presupposes that security considerations have a low priority and that West Europeans trust détente to be permanent. But the very unpredictability of Fragmented Europe, the friction between the independent powers and those retaining a link with the US, and the unrest caused by nationalist emotions (e.g. nationalist irridenta breeding crisis) would run counter to détente. The undefined position of Germany and the competition for its allegiance would add to this instability. West Germany might be tempted to seek an arrangement with France both for security reasons and in order to find help in her quest for a stable solution of her national problem. But the chance of reaching a solution acceptable to

German interests will be negligible. At best, if the Soviet Union were ever prepared to come to an arrangement with a Franco-German entente, it would be an arrangement on French, rather than on German, conditions. It is doubtful whether it would be in France's interests to pay more than lip-service to German reunification in a Fragmented Europe.

- (4) Effects: The US would regard this Europe as a risky area and adopt an attitude of political and economic caution, trying to limit her commitments in order to avoid being dragged into inter-European skirmishes, and almost certainly withdrawing her troops.

Yet, the presence of American troops may seem essential to the East European countries. While they are not at all opposed to Fragmented Europe's main features of independence and nationalism and might themselves be influenced by them, they will continue to fear German independence and nationalism. For this reason, they may advocate a collective security structure for Europe, or at least a system providing for continuing American military presence.

The Soviet Union will, at first, regard fragmentation in Western Europe as a congenial development. The absence of common structures or even cohesion within Western Europe, and American reluctance to become involved, will be seen as an opportunity to gain influence in the West without losing control in the East. Yet, second thoughts might lead the Soviet Union to a different conclusion: would a nationalist Fragmented Europe not escape control, and would its latent instability not adversely affect the Soviet position in East Europe? Europe's instability and unpredictability might, therefore, foster closer co-operation between the super-powers, seeking to control the explosive European area.

Such considerations might prompt the Soviet Union to try and impose her own model on Europe. This might take the form of a renewal of the demands of the 1950's for the abolition of all forms of multilateral security arrangements in Europe (relying on the fact that there is already a network of bilateral treaties between the Soviet Union and the Eastern European powers and among them) coupled with a special arrangement for Germany. This might either take the form of a return to Potsdam which might find support in Paris and would be resisted in Washington and London, or some form of four power security agreement involving the two super-powers and the two Germanies. At the very least this would imply the international recognition of the DDR, and of course considerable restrictions on the freedom of the FRG. Yet in this situation it might be difficult for the US to oppose such a suggestion.

Whatever the Soviet reaction may be, the country that has most to lose from Fragmented Europe is Germany.

(5) Questions:

- (1) Would Germany's security needs be satisfied by the American military guarantee or might she seek further security, e.g. the protection offered by a French nuclear umbrella or, despite NPT, a national nuclear force?
- (2) If post-war European co-operation is collapsing, could the essence of European security be maintained?
  - (a) By multi-lateral arrangement between the US and those West European states which accept continuing defence ties with the US?
  - (b) By bilateral defence arrangements between the US and these states?  
Which solution would the US itself prefer?
- (3) Would fragmentation in Western Europe lead to a similar situation in Eastern Europe? Would this facilitate a solution for the German problem?

## V. INDEPENDENT FEDERAL EUROPE

- (1) Motive: The West European powers rally together in order to achieve the maximum independence from the super-powers. They aim to gain a decisive influence for Europe in world affairs by acting as a balancing element between them. They agree that this can only be achieved by the creation of a West European Federal State.
- (2) Structure: West Europe - the six EEC countries and the four applicants - adopts a federal structure. A federal parliament, elected by direct suffrage, controls the federal government, which is equipped with decision-making powers in matters of foreign policy, defence and economic policy, including taxation. The Federation pursues an independent policy towards the US and the Soviet Union.

The Federation inherits national nuclear forces and forms a European strategic force. But it does not succeed to the component states' commitment to the Atlantic Alliance which is abrogated, though the US may retain bilateral defence relations with some European states outside the Federation, such as Greece and Turkey (or Britain if she is not a member). US troops leave federal territory. The unsettled German problem becomes a problem of the Federation which inherits the former allied responsibilities in Berlin.

The federal structure excludes discrimination against a member states or its nationals; the Federation's president, prime minister or defence minister, might, therefore, be German as well as French, British (if she is a member) or Luxembourgish.

- (3) Feasibility: Federation implies that national and regional loyalties have been channelled into a European loyalty to the extent that the French accept being governed by a German, the Germans by an Italian, etc. Only if this amount of cohesion is acquired is an Independent Europe feasible? Failure of complete identification among component states, as well as the persistence of national distrust, will leave the federal government with weak central power and disable it, especially in the field of nuclear defence, from living up to the objective of independence.

But although the required cohesion would be difficult to achieve, the concept of an independent and united Europe might help the Europeans to live through the difficult period of federating; acting as a powerful myth by projecting the nation state on to the European scale and by flattering a sense of moral and cultural superiority vis-à-vis the two super-powers.

A European federation can, if it is ready to make the requisite financial sacrifices, establish at least a minimum, e.g. "arm-tearing-off" nuclear deterrent with hardened second-strike and penetration capability, provided that not only France but Britain, too, contribute their nuclear potential capacity. If the ten member states are prepared to accept an additional 20 per cent expenditure on defence, it should at least be able to affect unacceptable damage on Soviet and American cities. It will not have the counter-force options that the super-powers possess, and to that extent Europe's freedom of action in a real crisis may be limited. Besides in the early years of such a federation, it is inconceivable that the federal government would wield the centralised power required to take rapid decisions about the use of nuclear weapons, if necessary in defiance of Moscow or Washington. Nor would there be sufficient identification of interest among the component nations, so that a serious crisis would involve a high risk of the Federation breaking up. Moreover, the growing costs of maintaining and developing a viable European deterrent could lead public opinion to endorse less ambitious defence policies. The federal government's ability to maintain the independent deterrent would be politically at risk. Consequently, the credibility of the deterrent would be low.

The European nuclear force may, therefore, do little more than mark the formally independent character of the Federation, without endowing Europe with decisive freedom of action in a crisis or creating any long-term balance in the relations of the super-powers.

- (4) Effects: Independent Federal Europe would be unwanted and opposed both in East and West. In the West, it would increase American disenchantment with Europe, mixed with grudging admiration and even the hope of converting this powerful Europe into a worthy partner at a later stage. For both the Soviet Union and East European countries it will be the least desirable Europe. The East European states would draw closer to the Soviet Union for fear of a new power, endowed with nuclear arms and dominated by West Germany. The Soviet Union would share this fear. The possibility of winning over this powerful Europe would not seem to be open to her. The Soviet Union would distrust West Europe's claim to have dissociated herself entirely from the US; and continuing economic and monetary relations would give good ground for this suspicion. The Soviet position in Central Europe, therefore, would harden, and any prospects of settlement of European problems would vanish.

Independent Federal Europe would invite super-power co-operation against it. Its emergence, therefore, is improbable. It would not even come about through some great cataclysm in world affairs. This would have to be a crisis of a kind that is difficult to foresee, in order to bring about



independence as well as federation, since it implies both revulsion against American policy and, simultaneously, renewed apprehension of a Soviet threat to Europe. Unless these were linked, revulsion against America would incite national independence rather than federalisation, while apprehension of a Soviet threat would foster European federalisation but not independence from the US. Besides in the event of a cat clysm in international relations, it is doubtful whether Europe would at all be prepared, in the 1970's, to unite against the Soviet Union in the event of a Soviet threat. It may be more realistic to expect - e.g. with France continuing her present policy - different European states adopting different attitudes towards the Soviet Union.

It is, however, possible to envisage Independent Federal Europe coming about by way of failure of Partnership Federal Europe (Model VI).

(5) Questions:

- (1) Will a minimum deterrent be adequate to sustain the ambition of independence?

Will the signature of the NPT be an incentive for a European nuclear force?

- (2) What will be the effect of this Europe, which includes a strong Germany and has inherited the German problem, on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union?

- (3) What is likely to be the scope of Independent Federal Europe's commitments and obligations in the Third World?

VI. PARTNERSHIP FEDERAL EUROPE

- (1) Motive: Europe cannot on her own play a decisive role in world affairs nor solve her problems, but only in co-operation with, and by influencing the U.S; expecting American support for specific European interests in return for European support for American policies, Partnership is seen as a constellation that will, in the long term, lead to stability in American-European relations and solve problems in East-West relations as well as in the Third World, despite accentuating Europe's division in the short term. To become a partner in its own right in this relationship, Europe must unite.
  
- (2) Structure: West Europe is organised as a federal structure with a federal parliament and government to which component states, among them Britain, have handed over major decision-making powers. Yet, while this structure is similar to that of "Independent Federal Europe", Partnership Europe's political orientation is fundamentally different. Its policy is designed to keep Europe a partner of the U.S., sufficiently independent not to become a satellite, sufficiently co-operative not to alienate the American partner, and to serve American as well as European objectives.

Europe evolves gradually into its new form. During the process of federating, West European governments increase their functional co-operation beyond EEC in order to create a viable pattern for political integration. In the defence field a supra-national, integrated European Defence Community (EDC) is set-up, comprising the following elements: a European general staff with integrated planning staffs, the integration of national conventional forces at divisional level, common uniforms and standardization of equipment and methods of training, and a single European logistics system. There is a European Defence Board with its own budget, to which member states contribute fixed proportions; and a European Arms Development and Procurement Organisation for all major weapon systems. The forces of the EDC are assigned to NATO; SACEUR is a European, with an American deputy for the control of American nuclear weapons.

In the early federating process, the residual British and French nuclear forces remain outside the system, but if they are at all significant when the federal political structure is nearing completion, they will have to be absorbed in some way into the EDC; Federal Europe, as the "successor" state under the non-proliferation agreement, will then have to decide whether to maintain its own nuclear deterrent.

While Europe is evolving into a federation, the basic Atlantic Alliance structure is retained, but a special system of consultation and joint policy-making is set-up to co-ordinate European and American policies, both within the Atlantic area and outside it. American leadership is accepted in the strategic field. The American nuclear deterrent is designed and trusted to cover all partnership objectives. Stronger machinery than the McNamara - Committee is provided to include Europe in the nuclear decision-making process; federating Europe - and subsequently Federal Europe - contributing financially to the cost of the American strategic force. Already at this stage, the European members are sufficiently unified and distinctive as a power group, primarily concerned with Central European problems, to justify a separate relationship with the United States. To bridge the gap until the multilateral alliance is reorganised, the U.S. undertakes to maintain a minimum number of forces in Europe. With the completion of the Federation the Alliance is transformed from a multilateral collective security system into a bilateral relationship between two super-states. The remaining peripheral members of the original alliance are offered bilateral defence treaties with each of the federal partners.

- (3) Feasibility: The federal structure would, in the Federation's formative years, be faced with persisting national loyalties, having a weakening effect on the Federal Government's authority. Yet, in view of the absence of a European nuclear deterrent, a lower degree of internal cohesion is required than in "Independent Federal Europe".

Partnership's major problem is that of balance: Europe, though a formidable economic power can never - even with Britain a member of the Federation - hope to acquire the degree of strategic power, the diversity of interest or the political influence of the U.S. She is, therefore, confined to the role of a junior partner, highly sensitive to American supremacy. This basic inequality constitutes a germ of disunity within the Partnership relation. A considerable degree of goodwill and restraint on the part of the stronger partner is required, not only after the Federation has grown into a sufficiently coherent and strong entity, but even more so during the formative years when Europeans, still preoccupied with their internal problems and unwilling to assume responsibilities outside Europe, need the encouragement and understanding of their American partner. The feasibility of the partnership orientation for Europe depends, therefore, to a large extent on the readiness of U.S. official and public opinion to treat Europe like a partner, notwithstanding her inherent inequality.

Europe acquires a stronger say in American policy-making simply by

speaking with one voice, thus becoming one of the recognised elements in the American decision-making process. She might, after having acquired sufficient internal cohesion, try to increase this influence by putting herself on a more equal footing with the U.S. in the field of nuclear weapons. By building upon residual French and British nuclear capacities, Europe could develop a minimum nuclear deterrent force. If nuclear weapons continue to be an international status symbol, a European nuclear force, however minor, might be regarded as essential by Europeans to maintain Europe's position as an independent partner of the U.S. But a European nuclear force which endowed Europe with any real independence in a crisis, might create a distrustful and difficult working relationship within the Partnership. There would be constant American temptation to gain control over the European strategic capacity.

Europe will, therefore, be a difficult partner. The stronger it becomes and the tighter its federal structure, the larger will be its demands to participate in strategic decisions. The U.S.' willingness to accept Europe's participation will vary in proportion to the degree of its power relative to Europe, the state of American relations with the Soviet Union and China, and her own internal situation. The greater the military threat, the more the U.S. will need a strong partner in Europe; but the less she will feel able to concede in terms of equality and sharing in decision-making. The stronger and the more independent the European Defence Community, the greater the pressure on the U.S. to withdraw troops from Europe and reduce their European commitments.

For the Partnership to remain stable and not to slip over into a relationship between leader and subordinate ("Atlanticised Europe") or into a relationship of rivalry ("Independent Federal Europe"), a state of near equality or healthy competition in the economic and technological fields will need to be balanced by an unequal relationship in military power.

A closely-knit Partnership with a defined structure and formal rights of consultation may only be practicable for matters directly affecting the European-Atlantic area. The U.S. will not readily concede to Europe similar rights in respect of her policies in Asia and Latin America, nor will Europe want to assume new commitments there. But with Europe becoming united and powerful, major events the world over will affect her. It is difficult to conceive that Europe would not insist on a say in American policy decisions relating to East-West problems. Yet, Europe's influence on the U.S. will vary; greater in economic and monetary matters than in defence; on Middle-Eastern and African questions than on Asia. In the early stages of Partnership, the spread of consultation will be clearly limited.

- (4) Effects: The U.S. is looking for a strong united Western Europe, which in times of tension will contribute significantly to Western defences and, in times of detente, will provide a satisfactory framework for Germany and help towards a settlement in Central Europe; besides sharing some of the U.S.' global burdens. Nevertheless, the U.S. will not be prepared to show the amount of patience and consideration for Europe that Partnership relation requires, unless she feels herself internally weak and in need of a military and political partner in any renewal of the Cold War. The U.S. cannot support a degree of politico-military union for Europe which could lead to a political separation of Europe from America. Though she is nominally committed to a Partnership, it is in fact some form of Atlanticised Europe which would suit her interests better.

Partnership Federal Europe might be of considerable attraction to East European countries, as it would keep the Americans in Europe and allay East European apprehensions of a German dominated European Community, while at the same time refurbishing the European image. But the East Europeans will feel themselves excluded from the European process while Western Europe is preoccupied with the exacting task of federating and of defining its relationship with the U.S. As this period is bound to be long and progress slow, the East Europeans will have no other choice than to move closer towards the Soviet Union.

For the Soviet Union, Partnership Europe will be an unwelcome form of West European integration and orientation; it will be seen to perpetuate the American position in Europe and increase Western power. This Western position of strength would preclude any major Soviet concession in Central Europe. This would imply that, even within the Federation, West Germany would have to accept restrictions of a discriminatory character so long as the German and Berlin problems remained unsettled. On the other hand, by the time the process of federation gets underway in Western Europe, Soviet control, both in terms of ideology and of policy, over at least Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania may have been very considerably eroded, China may be her chief preoccupation, and her relations with the U.S. may have made some progress. In this case might not her wisest gambit lie in a different approach? She might encourage a counterpart to Western Europe by the formation of an Eastern European Union, of which she herself was not a part, but to which she was linked in a "partnership" relation and to which she was prepared to give a guarantee of support in the event of aggression.

But whatever the external relations, the Partnership itself will be subject to severe internal strains. Though giving first priority to the Atlantic Partnership, West Europeans will wish to mitigate adverse reactions

From Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. But to the extent that Partnership Federal Europe adapts her policies accordingly, she risks upsetting the Partnership.

Moreover, a fully federal Europe will be more exacting than are the European states today as individual allies of the U.S. The Partnership can only be sustained if both partners continue to act in sympathy and in harmony in order to counter the centrifugal forces implicit in the concept of "equality", and the constant risk of a divorce which could not, thereafter, be mended.

On the other hand, if Europe stops short of full federation, the Europeans will find Partnership frustrating because they will have less power, individually and collectively, than they had before. A half-baked political Europe will lose more than it can win by choosing Partnership. If they chose Partnership, therefore, the Europeans must be prepared to go all the way.

(5) Questions:

(1) Will the traditional American assumption remain valid that, the more integrated Europe is, the more powerful and the more valuable she will be as a partner?

(2) Would a European nuclear force be compatible with  
(a) the federal structure?

Would Partnership Federal Europe be conceivable with France and Britain retaining their national nuclear capacities?

(b) the partnership relation with the U.S?

What would be the minimum that Europe would have to demand to maintain its position as an "equal" partner in the strategic field, and the maximum the U.S. would concede?

Are there circumstances where the U.S. might assist Europe to develop a "junior deterrent"?

(3) Will the U.S. still think it necessary to maintain forces in Europe when the EDC is formed?

Will Europe still require American forces as a "hostage" for its security?

(4) What new structure will be needed to replace the existing Atlantic political and defence systems as Europe moves towards federation?

(5) Will Partnership require consultation and co-ordination on all major policy issues, or will it work better if confined to the European and Atlantic area?

- (6) Does Partnership Federal Europe provide favourable prospects for a settlement in Central Europe?
- (7) To what extent, and how, will the international economic and monetary environment affect the Partnership?