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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE

Conference on Blocs, the German Problem and the Future of Europe

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COMMON INTERESTS AND PROPOSALS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

by Dr. Tamás Bácskai

Theoretically, there are two ways to maintain peace and establish security in a region:-

- (a) through the application of force and power; and
- (b) through a network of agreements or an international system of pacts.

Peace secured through the application of power can be based either on the hegemony of one power in a region or on an equilibrium of two, relatively equal, opponents (or groups of opponents).

Under the present circumstances in Europe, precarious peace is ensured by a balance of the main forces of socialism and capitalism, directly facing each other on this continent. This is why the possibility of the peaceful settlement of conflicts outside Europe depends too much on the situation in Europe. On the other hand, extra-European conflicts affect the European scene and the possibilities of resolving European problems.

Peace in Europe, which, as mentioned above, is based on the balance of the main forces of the two world-wide social systems, is far from perfect, and many governments have proposed ways and means to improve and ensure it through international agreements. This means a combination of the afore-mentioned theoretical possibilities of establishing security: under the conditions of the prevailing balance of force, the introduction of a series of mutually acceptable norms of international relations, the application of which would guarantee peace.

Undoubtedly, the elimination of force from the European scene, i.e. general and complete disarmament, would be the ideal road to European security. But in the near future we cannot rely on disarmament. So we have to accept the combination of the balance of forces and a system of international agreements as fundamental pillars of European security.

Hence we have to say that we have the balance of power but we do not yet have the agreements; what are the points to be agreed upon and in what sequence?

Two completely contrary concepts have been put forward regarding European security and the German question. In some circles of the West, above all in West Germany, it is said that the German question must first be solved, that is the two German states must be reunified in order to bring about security in Europe. We consider that the present circumstances call for a change in sequence: Firstly, a system of European security must be established and then the German question can be solved. Were we to make the security of Europe subordinate to the German

problem, this security would then depend upon the policy of the German Federal Republic. It should be noted that recently, before the formation of the new West German government, President Johnson declared for the first time that the road to a settlement of the German question passed through a reduction of tension in Europe. Though only a tactical consideration in his part, it contains the admission of a reality. Thus the starting point has to be the settlement of less difficult questions, those of economic, technical and cultural cooperation, promoting all easing of tension.

I intend to prove that:-

- (a) all European states have a common interest in solving the question of European security and cooperation;
- (b) a number of identical or similar points exist in the proposals put forward by different Governments for the solution of this question.

Common European Interests in Economic Competition with the USA

As far as Western Europe's relations with the USA are concerned, we are witnessing a contradictory process. On the one hand, an integrated Western Europe represents an ever stronger competitor for the USA in the traditional branches of industry. On the other, the more dynamic branches of science and production in Western Europe continue, even to an increasing degree, to be dependent on the United States.

The Common Market has achieved considerable successes over the last ten years. Yet, as Professor Bognár pointed out: "The balance of forces that has emerged proves, however, that in three branches of industry the Common Market is capable of competing with the USA with any chance of success. These three branches of industry - the chemical industry, machine and construction and electronics - influence technical development, the total industrial structure and capital concentration decisively. America's lead in this field will increase further in the coming decades, since the scientific and technical revolution also leads to a polarisation in the developed world, as the eminent French economist, F. Perroux, has proved by mathematical methods." 1)

Here the question arises of whether these branches of West European industry cannot perhaps be made competitive.

For this, however, the following prerequisites are necessary:-

- (a) more capital;
- (b) greater scientific capacity; and
- (c) wider and securer markets.

The Socialist countries of Europe are also interested in developing three branches of industry. Such a process, if carried out without cooperation between both parts of Europe, would obviously be drawn out much longer. Hence, it would be mutually advantageous to join forces to achieve this common aim. The additional capital needed to catch up on the US lead could be raised by a complementary policy of industrial development attainable through an advanced production technology. This would entail reciprocally supplementing investments to enable capital savings on both sides. Complementary structure would release considerable forces in both West and East that could be used beneficially to modernise the economy.

1) Professor J. Bognár, "Opportunities for Economic Cooperation in Europe" - "Perspectives" No. 5/1967, pp. 14 - 15.

The most promising method of widening markets is that of industrial cooperation: consistent technical and economic contacts between two or more production units, preceding or following the reciprocal supply of goods. This might comprise the mutual supply of products on the basis of joint research and development, the systematic provision of machinery or appliances for large industrial plans, co-operation on third markets, the acquisition of licences, exchange of documentation, sub-contracting, the procurement of parts required for domestic production balanced by equivalent deliveries of similar goods, etc. Industrial cooperation is, moreover, the best remedy against payment difficulties and - since agreed upon by the partners concerned - is at the same time the most reliable way of improving the export structure.

The assumption that only countries or enterprises of the same or similar systems are capable of good cooperation has been refuted by experience. The safest point of departure for all economic cooperation is a community of mutually synchronised interests.

Economic growth does not merely depend on how much labour and capital is "put in"; it also depends very largely on the kind of capital and labour input. Technological progress in turn is largely determined by education, by research and development. Not merely economists and industrialists, but governments, too, have come to recognize this. "In advanced countries, something like 7% of gross national income is absorbed for these purposes. R and D alone now takes about 3% of GNP in the USA, USSR and Britain. In other countries, the percentage is much less, ranging from some 2% in various industrialised countries, both East and West, down to some 0.3% elsewhere." 2) With its higher living standard and favourable research facilities, the US also attracts a large number of West European scientists. Let us not forget that in R and D accomplishments it is the total figures, and not the ratios and percentages, that count. And here the "economy of size" has a decisive say. Another factor is that if an economy of 200 million people does R and D work on a national level or is split into 5, non-coordinated, national entities, the outcome will be quite different due to the doubling and trebling of research processes because of lack of coordination.

The Socialist part of Europe has highly efficient scientific institutions at its disposal. Centrally coordinated and financed, they are capable of extraordinary results. Clearly, cooperation between the research institutions of East and West, and their joint or coordinated actions would:

- (a) create "the most economic size" for research;
- (b) minimise the doubling of operations; and
- (c) create the necessary scientific back-ground without which lasting success in the leading branches of industry is today unthinkable.

This would greatly help to close the technological gap existing between the USA and Europe.

European economy, strengthened and revived by cooperation between East and West, would be in a position:-

- (a) to expand its foreign trade with the USA - including imports from it;
- (b) to provide wider, more diversified and alternative aid to the economically less developed countries in order to accelerate their development.

2) Dr. Theodor Prager, "R and D for War or Welfare?", "Perspectives" No. 3/1967, p. 28.

What happens if cooperation between East and West is not achieved? It would certainly slow down the economic growth of the Socialist countries of the continent, but would not have a historically lasting effect on this complex. Such a development would affect the Soviet Union least of all; as a world power, it will continue, by its own energies in international politics, to play one of the most important roles even if, for one reason or another, European cooperation cannot be accomplished. But "West Europe would be forced into a subsidiary position by the USA in the economic and scientific fields, and demographically (from the point of view of latent political potentialities) by the less developed world, above all Asia." 3)

Common Interest in Eliminating US Intervention in the European Economy.

The particular position held by the reserve currencies made it possible for the United States to settle their internal economic problems at the cost of other countries. If the United States spent more abroad than it received, it was able to cover the margin of deficit with its own currency which was equivalent to taking a credit. For in these cases the Americans claimed goods or services from other countries without an equivalent compensation.

For many years America has had an adverse balance of payments. It was partly settled by gold, and was partly cancelled by short-term debts. These debts - the foreign dollar holdings - today amount to more than double the remaining US gold reserves. If they were to be presented for exchange, the United States would, so to say, have to go bankrupt or raise the gold price which would be tantamount to a devaluation of the dollar.

As the central banks of the West European countries have up to now accepted dollar bills instead of gold for the settlement of American debts, they have imported inflation from the United States to their own countries. For a certain part of the goods and services offered in these countries was taxed away by the Americans and, at the same time, the dollar holdings of the central banks and the credit structure built up on them were used to increase the monetary circulation.

In addition, US business-men used the credits received by the USA from the European countries to buy up important branches of the growth-industries in Western Europe and subordinated its activity to the interests of big American concerns.

This system of financing the balance of payments deficit of a reserve currency country enabled the US to pursue an expansionist foreign policy. The aggressive war in Vietnam, the widespread network of foreign military bases throughout the world, the "aid" directed against the independence of the countries in development, are not only the result of the immense productive capacity of American industry, but also to a considerable degree to this world monetary system.

The devaluation of the pound showed that Britain cannot afford simultaneously to be a world monetary centre, large-scale exporter of capital and world gendarme of the second order. The non-acceptance of further dollar holdings by some central banks, above all that of France, also shows that to be No. 1 world gendarme, No. 1 world exporter of capital and No. 1 world monetary centre goes even beyond the great powers of the USA.

America's partners in Western Europe have made it clear that they are no longer prepared to pay the American balance of payments deficit by increasing the circulation of money in their own countries.

3) Professor J. Bognár, op. cit. p. 27.

Despite this situation, America does not want to rid itself of this deficit by cutting down its inflated arms expenditure, by stopping the war against the Vietnamese people and by abandoning its expansionist foreign policy. It wants to reorganise the dollar at the price of its West European allies.

In order to restore confidence in the dollar, President Johnson has put forward an economy programme by which the American government wants to reduce the balance of payments by three thousand million dollars. This amount is roughly equivalent to the American balance of payments deficit for 1967. Less optimistic observers, however, believe that last year's deficit must be calculated at from 3.5 to 4 thousand million dollars.

A closer analysis of the American "austerity programme", however, shows that it does not penetrate down to the real roots of the balance of payments deficit. For the military expenditure, in particular that required for the daily more costly war in Vietnam, that encumbers the American balance of payments by the expenditure of foreign currency to the tune of nearly 2 thousand million dollars is not to be cut.

Instead of this the NATO allies are asked to cooperate partially in financing the stationing of American troops in Europe, to buy more armament "goods" in America and to invest their official dollar reserves in long-term American treasury bonds. And that is not all! Europe is not only asked to cooperate "voluntarily" in stabilising the dollar, America is to impose certain sanctions on it. Restrictions on American investments in Europe, limitation of American bank credits to foreign countries, and limitations on the American tourist traffic are to economise an amount of 2.5 thousand million dollars. This programme creates the danger of a serious obstruction to economic growth in Western Europe. The American measures will result in the exportation not of inflation but of deflation to Europe. The credit supply will be considerably lower on the European capital market and the demand on this market by American firms will increase considerably. This will result in increased rates of interest which will also be contingent on the need to prevent the flight of the "hot currencies" to America. This leads to a restriction of production, employment and technological development.

As the Americans also want to increase the surplus in their balance of trade, they will strike a heavy blow against the foreign trade of the West European countries with the introduction of the export reimbursement system and the import compensation tax; apart from the high duties announced, these countries will now also have to overcome the obstacles of the compensation tax. If the West European countries reply to the American challenge by taking similar protectionist measures in trade and money transfers, the Western world can go back to the conditions of post-war bilateralism that are obstructive to development.

However, Western Europe has an alternative to the harmful policy of docilely following in the train of the American economy: this alternative is to build up an all-European economy, in which the concerted economic and scientific capacity of the socialist and capitalist parts of Europe would be capable of competing with the United States. A Europe with close cooperation in economy and science would be capable of providing considerable economic and technical aid to the countries in development. This aid would in turn lead to a considerable extension of the market, lowered costs and brisk employment and at the same time would create a market in Europe for the developing countries. An economic development in Europe that takes into account the need to industrialise the developing countries and creates a new industrial division of labour with them, is a much more attractive alternative than that of bearing the burden of reorganising the American balance of payments and of possible new American adventures.

Common Interest in Increasing and Concerting Aid to Developing Countries

It is necessary to emphasise the historical significance of a qualitative increase and a qualitative improvement of economic aid to the developing countries. From the economic point of view, the technological-scientific revolution creates productive forces requiring the whole world population as a market. Hence the purchasing power of this population has to be radically increased. This is only possible through the overall, agrarian and industrial development of the less developed countries.

From the political point of view, far-reaching tensions exist because the economic gulf between the economically under-developed countries and the rest of the world widens continuously. These tensions are heightened by the fact that the distribution of the world's economic resources does not correspond to that of its population. While at present 71% of the world's population inhabits the countries in development (to rise to as much as 81% by the year 2000), their national income amounts to only 11% of the total of the world's national income. So if they remain dependent only upon their own resources, these countries are incapable of joining the rapid development which, with its ever more homogeneous political history and highly developed means of communication, the world of today requires.

No solution to this extraordinarily difficult problem is conceivable on the basis of the classical world trade and world market principles; the rich would only become richer, the poor poorer. The amount of goods to be redistributed on a world scale (currently 0.63% of the GNP of the developed world) must first be raised and the power of absorption of the developing countries then increased, so that the goods can be effectively placed.

In this context the question of disarmament has to be raised. In arms expenditure we find the resources which could be converted to the aims of economic development, both in the economically less developed countries, and in the industrially developed world itself. At the same time, experience has shown that the easing of tensions cannot be made a function of general and complete disarmament, whereas the opposite may be the case.

Hence, an easing of the tension in a major sphere of confrontation such as Europe might contribute essentially to the starting of a disarmament process. Let us have a look at the potentialities of disarmament for development.

It is a well-known fact, that the developing countries with relatively low capita incomes must introduce technology requiring increasing per capita inputs of capital in amounts generally exceeding the means at their disposal. It is rather difficult to calculate exactly the capital requirements of the developing countries and I shall only try to estimate here the order of magnitude of their annual requirements.

In my attempt to assess the required annual volume of capital, I assume the following conditions:

- (a) the capital-output ratio in the developing countries amounts on the average to 3,5:1; ⁴⁾
- (b) the rate of the population growth in the developing countries will be 3% annually; ⁵⁾

4) "Worldwide and Domestic Economic Problems and their Impact on the Foreign Policy of the United States", Washington, 1959, p. 57, and W. W. Rostow, "Stadien wirtschaftlichen Wachstums", Göttingen 1960, p. 59.

5) A. Sauvy, Rate of Population Growth in the Less Developed Countries According to the 1960/61 Census. Paper E/Conf. 39/B/30, UNO Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas. Geneva, February 1963.

- (c) the growth rate should allow for an annual 5% increase of the present per capita national income.

In assuming condition (c), I was aware that it will seem exaggerated to many of my fellow economists. Gross output in these countries has increased at an annual rate of 4% only in the last ten years ⁶⁾. However, with such growth rates the developing countries will need 17 - 18 years to double gross production and not less than 80 - 100 years to attain the present level of output in the developed countries. I refer to the gross output and not per capita production to achieve the present level for which they would need several centuries. At the same time we must take into consideration the extremely low per capita national income in the developing countries, (about \$80 a year ⁷⁾, a five per cent increment of which gives only \$4 per capita a year).

Even this growth rate, significantly higher than that envisaged by the experts of FAO⁸⁾ and the United National Development Decade⁹⁾, cannot raise satisfactorily the extremely low per capita consumption and is not able to allow for the absorption of the redundant manpower. It would not solve the problem of increasing per capita inputs of capital, but, nevertheless, it would contribute to diminishing the gap between the developed countries and the developing countries, which at present is widening.

Nevertheless, even this unsatisfactory growth rate demands enormous productive investments.

TABLE 1. The Required Investment in Percentage of the National Income

Annual Population Growth Rate (%)	Annual growth rate of per capita national income capita output ratio - 3.5					
	0	1	2	3	4	5
0	-	3.5	7	10.5	14	17.5
1	3.5	7	10.5	14	17.5	21
2	7	10.5	14	17.5	21	24.5
3	10.5	14	17.5	21	24.5	28

Thus, a growth rate of 5% of the national income with a population growth of 3% at a capital-output ratio of 3.5 requires the investment of 28% of the national income annually.

At present, according to estimates of Leontief, the aggregate productive investment in the underdeveloped countries lies between 7.7 and 11.3% of the Gross National Product ¹⁰⁾.

- 6) K. Ivanov, B. Batsanov, "What Disarmament will give to Developing Countries", Moscow, 1965, p. 34.
- 7) See J. Stanovnik, "Im Schlagschatten der Satttheit", Vienna, 1965, p. 25.
- 8) Report of the President of FAO, Dr. B. R. Sen, World Population Conference, 1965, p. 10.
- 9) A 5% increase of the national income annually.
- 10) W. Leontief, "Disarmament, Economic Aid and Economic Growth" - Peace Research Society (International) Papers, Vol. II, 1965, p. 158.

Parviz Khalatbari puts the average ratio of investments to the national income in the developing countries as 10% ¹¹⁾.

TABLE 2. The Ration of Capital Formation in Developing Countries ¹²⁾

Per cent of national income			Per cent of GNP		
Country	Year	Ratio	Country	Year	Ratio
Mexico	1950	7.2	Afghanistan	1954	5
Chile	1950	9.5	Ceylon	1954	5
Panama	1950	7.5	Pakistan	1954	6
Philippines	1952	6.4	Indonesia	1954	5
Puerto Rico	1952	7.6	Philippines	1954	8
India	1953	7	Chile	1954	11
Colombia	1950	16.3	Argentina	1954	13
Congo (Belg)	1951	21.7	Brazil	1954	14
Nigeria	1951	5.1	Colombia	1954	14 ¹³⁾
			Venezuela	1954	23 ¹³⁾

The above-mentioned 28% of the national income of the developing countries amount, according to calculations of Khalabari, to \$22.5 billion in 1966 and will increase to 50 billion by 1975 ¹⁴⁾. This is a productive investment programme of about \$360 billion over ten years. Taking into consideration the costs of the training of national personnel, adequate housing and other necessary investments into infrastructure, the total investment would amount to a round figure of \$500 billion. It is interesting to note, that the above-mentioned Soviet study, analyzing the available concrete projects for Asia, Africa and Latin America, arrived at a similar figure: "If we are to proceed from the projects available now (see Chapter IV, V, VI) for tapping the power and other natural resources of these countries and the consequent possibilities for the comprehensive development of industry, transport and agriculture according to very rough estimates, the total expenditure for these purposes, including the training of national personnel, would amount approximately to \$200,000 million for Southeast Asia and the Middle East, \$160,000 million for Africa and \$140,000 million for Latin America." ¹⁵⁾

11) Parviz Khalatbari, "Das Problem der Bevölkerungsstabilisierung in den Entwicklungsländern", - "Deutsche Aussenpolitik", Berlin, 1966 Vol. 4, p. 473.

12) Rostow, op. cit., pp. 62 and 207.

13) Including imported capital.

14) op. cit. p. 472.

15) op. cit. p. 80/81.

The actual net investment figure (1961) of the developing countries was around \$ 14 billion ¹⁶⁾. The arms expenditure of these states, especially that of those who adhere to military pacts, spent under the pressure of the world-wide arms race, constitutes a direct deduction from the wealth created by the population and which would be so important for the advance of their peaceful economy. Calculations based on a study by Emile Benoit and Harold Lubell ¹⁷⁾ show that this deduction is around \$ 13 billion. The same study contains the following important statement:

"It emerges from our Table that the less developed countries are now spending a total of considerably over \$ 1 billion a year for weapons procurement alone. Thus, even allowing for a 10% rate for testing and renewal, about \$ 1 billion in resources of an essential industrial type, well suited to contribute to industrialization, could be made available to the less-developed countries from their own resources, without cutting their present military power in the least - simply by a weapons freeze and the abandonment of further military buildups: i.e. by ending the arms race at least in the less developed countries themselves. If the major military powers were willing to extend guarantees to protect the less developed countries against aggression they might, with no additional drain on their own resources, release over a billion dollars a year of key resources for economic development. Moreover, unless the arms race in the LDCs is stopped soon, the amounts spent on military personnel as well as procurement are likely to increase greatly as more sophisticated weapons systems are obtained. ¹⁸⁾

It seems rather dubious, whether the developing countries will agree to disarm in an armed world and rely on the guarantees of great powers. Thus, general disarmament seems to be the only remedy, alleviating the DCs from this burden. Nevertheless, Benoit and Lubell made a significant point, drawing attention to an additional source of capital formation in the less developed countries.

A number of developing countries are producing arms and developing arms production. In a few Asian, African and Latin American countries the arms industry constitutes a significant part of national industry with the most up-to-date equipment and the most qualified technical specialists. In the absence of data concerning the capital invested into arms production I only mention this important problem. At the same time I would like to note that the armies and arms production in the DCs consumes a considerable part of the very valuable and very rare middle-level and high-level manpower.

Taking into consideration the above mentioned factors, the capital formation in the DCs in case of a general disarmament would increase, without serious problems by \$ 1,5-2 billion, in resources well suited to contribute to industrialisation. Concerning the remaining \$ 11 to 11.5 billion spent on the pay and support of military personnel, military medical and education services, up-keep of buildings, operation and servicing of planes, tanks, ships, etc. military construction could partly be used as counterpart contributions to foreign aid (see next section), partly integrated into the medical, educational, etc. system of the country, economizing thereby on a significant part of infrastructural investments necessitated by agricultural and industrial development.

On the basis of the aforesaid, at the initial stage of a general disarmament process, capital (productive and infrastructural) formation in the DCs would amount to a sum between \$ 16 to 17 billion, contributing to a programme with an average annual capital requirement of \$ 50 billion. An annual average of \$ 33 to 34 billion foreign aid is required.

16) J. Stanovnik, op. cit. p. 127.

17) E. Benoit and Harold Lubell, "World Defense Expenditures", - "Journal of Peace Research, No. 2, 1966, pp. 105, 108, 109.

18) *ibid.*, p. 112.

In 1965, the less developed countries received foreign aid from both government and private sources amounting to \$10,979 million¹⁹⁾. The real volume of this aid is significantly less, as we have to deduct the payments of the DCs to the industrial countries. The World Bank estimated that the repayment of capital and interest by 74 developing countries alone amounts to an annual total of \$5 billion²⁰⁾. This was equal to 20% of their export earnings. Therefore, we can estimate in an optimistic way the present level of foreign aid as \$5 billion. An annual increase of foreign aid, amounting to \$28 - 29 billion is required.

The only possible source for a sum of this magnitude is the world defense expenditure. The sum allotted to procurement is something under \$40 billion, to construction slightly under \$5 billion, to military research and development programmes around \$14 billion, the operations and maintenance bill (running defense agencies, military and education services, operation and servicing of planes, tanks, ships, etc.) runs to \$33 billion and something under \$40 billion goes for pay and support of military personnel²¹⁾. A combination of a supply of productive equipment, fuel, building material, medicaments and trained manpower for production as well as for medical and educational services in the framework of \$28-29 billion lies within the possibilities, if the arms race stopped and a general and complete disarmament started.

The use of that sum, in conjunction with domestic efforts and resources, would suffice to enable all the economically underdeveloped countries of the world to overcome their economic backwardness and to approach closely the current level of industrial output in such developed countries as the United Kingdom and France within the next 10 - 15 years. As the Soviet draft of the "Declaration concerning the Conversion to Peaceful Needs of the Resources released by Disarmament", which was submitted to the 17th session of the UN General Assembly declares:

"With these resources it would be possible to set up from thirty to forty power-based industrial centers of world significance in the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. To do so it would be necessary to harness and make extensive use of the rich resources of those countries in water-power, petroleum, gas, ferrous and non-ferrous metal ores and other natural wealth. Industrial development would make it possible to exploit the surrounding agricultural areas on a modern technical basis These projects are not idle fancies, but realistic estimates. They have been worked out by eminent scientists on the most recent achievements of science and technology.

The creation in the Asian, African and Latin American countries of several dozen power-based industrial centers of world importance would lay a firm foundation for industrialization of the developing countries, would enable them to overcome the narrowness of the agrarian and raw-material structure of their economy, and would radically change the present division of states into highly or less developed industrially.

Thus, disarmament and the conversion of immense resources to peaceful needs would give ample scope for the development of peaceful cooperation between states, on the basis of equality and in the interests of all concerned to the benefit of all countries, great and small, economically developed and under-developed; it would ensure the growth of production and would provide employment for additional millions of people.

19) O.E.C.D. "Mitteilung an die Presse", Paris, July 20, 1966..

20) Stanovnik, op. cit. p. 119.

21) Benoit and Lubell, op. cit. pp. 111, 112.

Common Interest in a Growing Role for Europe

A leading Hungarian columnist, Tibor Péthó, has written the following:-

"In the recent period, the shaping of a modern concept of Europe and of an overall European viewpoint have come to the fore. The Soviet Union has put forward the idea of setting up some kind of European solidarity organisation, similar to that already existing in connection with Africa, Asia and Latin America..... Recognition that a community of culture exists in Europe and that the face of Europe can be perceived behind the present day profile of the nations, is becoming increasingly widespread. If we examine our own mental attitude, we shall agree that it is at least as much 'European' as National." 22)

This continent, as Maurice Lambilliotte emphasized,

"...is still capable of playing an important historical role. It will not be able to exercise this role as a power in arrogant vanity about its past, but rather as a creative force for culture and peace. It is not solely the matter of Europe providing a link between the USA and the USSR, but of a more creative vocation - not to leave the world under a dual leadership, and to go even further and reopen the essential dialogues with all nations of Asia and Africa and all the vital forces of Latin American countries It is in this domain that its long historical experience can serve in modern times." 23)

The first prerequisite for carrying out such a mission is that Europe should resolve its own internal differences.

Non-dissemination of Nuclear Weapons - a Prerequisite for the Solution of European Problems

In this context I must emphasize the significance of a nuclear non-dissemination treaty. I fully share the views expressed in the memorandum on European Security of the World Council of Peace, stating that "the present situation reveals a particularly dangerous factor which could prejudice the whole development towards a constructive all-European solution: this is the further dissemination of nuclear weapons in Europe. Prevention of the German Federal Republic obtaining any access to nuclear weapons is an imperative task; its achievement will influence further developments decisively." 24) Any access to nuclear weapons by the GFR would create a completely new and dangerous situation, blocking the way towards an easing of tension and cooperation in Europe, towards the negotiated settlement of European problems.

22) Tibor Péthó, "Some Questions of European Security", - "Perspectives", No. 1/1966, Vienna, p. 22.

23) M. Lambilliotte, "European Collective Security", - "Perspectives", No. 1/1967, Vienna, pp. 24 - 25.

24) Memorandum on European Security, adopted by the World Council of Peace, Geneva, 16 June 1966 in "Perspectives", No. 5/1967, p. 13.

The Inviolability of Frontiers - a Second Prerequisite

Any discussions about the state frontiers of Europe is in time with the revanchist efforts and aims of the GFR Government and the nationalist groupings within the GFR. Apart from Western Germany, no country in Europe questions present frontiers nor raises the problem of their revision. The frontiers are not a subject for negotiations, as the GFR government puts it, as no one can negotiate about things it does not possess.

The present borders in Europe are the consequence of the second world war, which was launched by Germany and was lost by the Third Reich. The present borders represent the geo-economic, political and historical system which teutonic expansion tried to destroy over the centuries.

Any attempt to open a discussion on this theme would only increase tension in Europe. Any attempt to revise the borders by force would be disastrous for Europe.

As long as the GFR fails to recognise the present frontiers, it is impossible to believe in the renunciation of force proposed by the GFR government.

The well-known philosopher, Karl Jaspers, in his book "Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?" (Whither the Federal Republic?) deals extensively with the important question of the territorial status quo and the recognition of frontiers. His book was sharply attacked by those who are blind to realities. In his reply he wrote: "This non-recognition of frontiers is, in itself, a threat to peace. If I demand a revision of the frontiers, which de facto will not take place and cannot in any circumstances be expected, this, by the very nature of the thing, implies a threat to peace, whatever one may say."

European Problems to be Solved by Europe

The GFR government could not pursue its revanchist policy without the backing of the US government. The American presence in Europe - the economic and monetary consequences of which we have already dealt with is hindering the settlement of European problems because it encourages non-acceptance of the realities: the existence of two German states, the acceptance of the inviolability of frontiers by the GFR government. It also disturbs the normalisation of relations between the two Germanies, thereby causing human sorrows and problems, which would disappear in a state of normal relations between the GFR and the GDR, in a Europe where tensions are eased.

Common Points in Different Proposals for European Security

There are quite a number of common points in the different proposals for detente and security in Europe submitted by East and West.

(a) Nuclear-free and limited armament areas.

An agreement on limited total strength of armed forces and armaments in an area to be decided upon on both sides of the line dividing Eastern and Western Europe was proposed by then Prime Minister A. Eden at the Geneva "Summit Conference" (21.7.1955). A note of the USSR government (17.11.1956) dealt with the elimination of all bases in a 800 km. wide zone "on both sides of the demarcation line, within two years. It proposed a reduction of foreign troops in Germany by 35% and, later, gradual disarmament leading up to complete demilitarisation. A letter from twelve Democratic Congressmen to the President (December 1956) proposed

demilitarisation including the withdrawal of all foreign troops from a 1,000 mile wide area from the Rhine to the frontiers of the USSR. Hugh Gaitskell, then British Opposition leader, in his speech at Harvard University (11.1.1957) suggested the gradual withdrawal of foreign troops. In his first plea, Polish Foreign Minister A. Rapacki (UN General Assembly, 2.10.1957) proposed the creation of a nuclear-free zone covering both German states and Poland. The second Rapacki Plan (14.12.1958) included Czechoslovakia too; its third version (4.11.1958) scheduled the process as follows:- 1st stage: freeze on nuclear armaments; 2nd stage: complete denuclearisation and simultaneous reduction in conventional armaments. In two broadcasts on the BBC, George Kennan suggested the withdrawal of foreign troops from both German states, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and proposed that both Germanies withdraw from military alliances as well as a ban on the stockpiling of atomic weapons in this area (25.11.1957 and 2.12.1957). The Joint Statement by the British Labour Party and TUC (23.4.1958) suggested that the pact-bound countries of Central Europe withdraw from alliances. Senator Humphrey, speaking on the BBC (4.2.1959), supported the gradual withdrawal of forces from both Germanies and Eastern Europe, creating a nuclear-free zone with arms limitations. The German Social Democratic Party in its Plan for Germany, (18.3.1959), included the GFR, GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary in a nuclear-free zone of limited armaments; an identical proposal was put forward in the Plan for Germany of the Free Democratic Party, (20.3.1959), envisaged, for both German states and Central Europe: immediate cessation of and no German participation in nuclear weapon tests; renunciation of atomic armament; participation in a nuclear-free zone; renunciation of the manufacture or procurement of ABC weapons. The first Unden Plan, (26.10.1961), called for the formation of a club of non-nuclear nations. Its second variant, (15.4.1964), called for a ban on the dissemination of nuclear weapons. The Kekkonen Plan, (28.5.1963), asked for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Scandinavian area (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and Iceland). Bulgarian Foreign Minister J. Bashev, (16.6.1964), proposed the creation of a nuclear and missile-free zone in the Balkan Peninsula.

(b) Non-aggression Treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and/or an all European Security Treaty

The idea of a NATO-Warsaw Pact Treaty formulated in the Note of the USSR government, (17.11.1956), that of an all-European Security Treaty in the Memorandum of the USSR government, (8.1.1958). The former proposal was seconded by the Labour Party Programme, (8.1.1964), calling for a security pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation to guarantee security in Central Europe. The second proposal was also formulated in Hugh Gaitskell's aforementioned speech, in the First Statement of the British Labour Party and TUC, (23.4.1958), in the Plan for Germany of both Social Democratic and Free Democratic Parties.

(c) On the question of borders, the Potsdam Agreement, signed on 2nd August 1945, put the present western territories of Poland under the administration of the Polish state. The Warsaw Declaration by the government of Poland and the GDR, (6.6.1950), and the Zgorelec Agreement, (6.7.1950), proclaimed the inviolability of this frontier. Regarding the interpretation of the Potsdam Agreement, let us quote Cordell Hull ²⁵⁾ "Prime Minister Churchill had suggested a five point solution Second, Poland to receive East Prussia, Danzig and Upper Silesia as far as the Oder River." Churchill himself declared in the House of Commons, (24.5.1944), "There is no question of Germany enjoying any guarantee that she will not undergo territorial changes, if it should seem that the making of such

25) "Memoirs", London, 1948, Vol. II.

changes renders more secure and more lasting the peace of Europe." The inviolability of frontiers was emphasized repeatedly by President de Gaulle. The resolution adopted by the Labour Party Conference, (Blackpool, 4.10.1961), stressed that the present frontiers were final. Senator Humphrey, on 1 September 1961, proposed that the USA should recognise the present frontiers of Poland.

(d) On the reunification of Germany the opinion of the European Socialist countries is that it is primarily a matter for the Germans themselves to settle. In this settlement the point of departure must be the fact that two different social systems exist in the whole of Europe and will have to find ways of working together. Recently, the Paris Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, an institute closely linked with the Quai d'Orsay, published a study ²⁶⁾ proposing a German Confederation. The study is an elaboration on H. Wehner's proposals for an economic community of the two German states.

I share the view of Foreign Minister Rapacki that: "recognition of the existing territorial and political status quo should also be in the interests of the US. But the European policy of that power is but part of its global policy. And it is my deep conviction that US, global policy is based on unrealistic premises and extremely dangerous conclusions." ²⁷⁾

Europe's task is not to become involved in the dangers created by US policy, but to serve as an example to the US for another alternative.

26) "Sicherheitsmodelle für Europa" (Security Models for Europe), in Europa-Archiv, 25.1.1968.

27) Lecture delivered on November 18, 1967, in "Polish Perspectives", 1968, 1. p.6.

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GERMANY AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS*

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The German problem, a crucial factor in East-West relations whose importance today has once again captured the attention of political observers, has its roots in the postwar policy which led to the division of that country. It was precisely in those very years which were characterized by a rapid shift from a policy of collaboration to one of increasingly pronounced antagonism between the Soviets and the West, that the process of the division of Germany was begun. The guidelines for a common European, and thus German, policy worked out at Yalta and later legally embodied at Potsdam, could be considered as outdated by the end of 1946, thus opening the way for unilateral policies in the West as well as in the East. The prospect of a decisive conflict at the time concerned the entire European continent, by now bound to an increasingly rigid division into two opposing sides; in such a situation, Germany could not escape a similar fate. The policy put into effect along largely pre-existent frontiers in the rest of the continent was put into effect in Germany along lines running within the country itself, with the result that a situation whose dramatic and perilous aspects stood out in an obvious way was created.

It is not our task (and the brevity of this historical resumé would render it most difficult) to single out the specific responsibilities of the two sides in order to determine whether the West or rather the Soviets were the initiators of this process. The prevailing impression is that both of the contenders were driven by pressing politico-ideological motives and by power to act in a parallel fashion so that every move by one side ended up by corresponding to an equivalent counter-move by the other. The criticisms expressed in some West German circles which presume a lack of political capacity on the part of the great Western powers that the division could have been avoided with greater foresight, seem to be out of place. Such criticisms, other than overlooking the fact that, to a certain extent, the division represented the historical price which German aggression had to pay to the anti-Nazi coalition, do not seem to take account of the objective reasons which existed in support of such a situation.

It is certain that Germany's economic potential and military strategic importance following the war were such as to give her a key

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position in the struggle for influence in Europe between the hegemonic powers, that is to say, between the United States and the Soviet Union. And it was in fact for precisely these reasons that these two powers became involved in a bitter struggle directed at integrating their German sectors in to their respective politico-military systems as a means of creating an allied force with which to oppose the other camp. The division was rapidly put into effect along the lines of demarcation between the respective occupation zones, thus cutting the country in two on a completely artificial basis; the same principle was adopted for the city of Berlin on which a fourpower occupation regime had been imposed; a regime which had presupposed a lengthy period of interallied collaboration and certainly not the creation of two separate cities.

Thus, through the gradual concession of the prerogatives inherent to sovereignty, two equally artificial states, represented by West Germany and East Germany, were established on this basis. In both cases the Germans as a nation were the object of an external diktat imposed by political considerations to which, deprived as they were of any institutional instruments for the expression of their own position, they were not able to oppose any alternative. Thus, it can well be said, they were forced to accept the Western and Soviet decision, although it was not long before irreconcilable antagonisms between philo-Occidental and philo-Soviet elements within the country grew so strong as to cause a deep division between German political groups, in particular those of the Left.

From a chronological point of view, the first to formulate a "separatist" German policy was the West which, in the course of 1947, had already decided to establish an autonomous German state and to then integrate it into the Western alliance system. Thus, in 1949, once the three occupation zones had been unified, the German Federal Republic, with its capital at Bonn, was created; later, in 1954, with the Paris agreements, it became a member of Nato. In only a few years West Germany had reacquired its status as a sovereign nation and the disposition of a national army, even though it was integrated into and under the control of the Western alliance.

The Soviets proceeded in a similar fashion with the analogous operation of the consolidation and the integration of those regions of Germany which had been occupied by the Red Army. Once the first phase of the postwar period (in which the German regions had been thought of primarily as lands to be economically exploited) had passed, Moscow became concerned with creating an allied German state. In 1949 the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was set up with its capital at East Berlin; later, in 1955, it became a member of the Warsaw Pact which had been created that same year as a reaction to the German Federal Republic's entry into Nato. Once again, although on a less defined basis than in the case of West Germany, a new state, represented by East Germany, appeared on the European scene.

Unlike the West, however, which had always insisted consistently on a "separatist" political line, the Soviets demonstrated certain uncertainties and contradictions in this regard. While proceeding

with their plans for strengthening the GDR, the Soviets did not seem, at least until 1955, to have completely given up the alternative hope of reaching an agreement with the West on the creation of a united and neutral Germany. This was the period in which plans were worked out by Moscow for the creation of broad neutral zones in Europe, which were to act as a sort of buffer zone between East and West, and to which Germany would have in fact belonged. Stalin in 1952, in what remains the most explicit proposal in this regard, and Beria and Malenkov later in 1953-1954 in a more confidential manner, expressed intentions to this effect. The decisive rejection of this point by the West made it impossible to test Moscow's real intentions, leaving many doubts about the seriousness of a proposal which was to a great extent motivated by the desire to block the rearmament of West Germany and its adhesion to Nato.

By 1955 the prospects for the reconstruction of German unity within the near future had disappeared, and thus in both the East and the West the validity of a two Germanys' policy was confirmed. Although originally begun as an external settlement, the process of the consolidation of two separate states now began to develop a dynamic of its own based on opposing autonomous political courses of action. This complex phenomenon was fostered by the adhesion of the two states to antagonistic politico-ideological theses, and by the weight of socio-cultural elements rooted in a certain bivalence of the German animus which historically has been driven towards expansion and integration in the East on the one hand and in the West on the other. The Adenauer and Ulbricht regimes, having been founded on this combination of past and present elements, developed in those years parallel policies directed at the strengthening of their respective regimes.

Nevertheless, it was not without great differences between them, due primarily to the fact that in terms of territory, population and economic resources the Federal Republic had emerged from the process of division in a much stronger position than the GDR, that the two German states were established. Favored by these conditions and by ample Western assistance, the Federal Republic was able to make a rapid and spectacular revival. The German miracle, which above all was supported by widespread popular adhesion to the regime's official policy, assured Western Germany of a role of growing importance on the European scene. Gradually, the Federal Republic acquired a position of considerable economic importance and, within certain limits, this importance applied to the sphere of military policy as well, for West Germany soon it became an important component of the Western alliance.

The East German policy of consolidation in the same years was as difficult and contradictory as the revival of West Germany was rapid and impressive. Throughout the second half of the 1950's the GDR, starting from a very weak economic position and deprived of the necessary popular consensus, lived in a state of permanent crisis which was kept under control by Soviet support alone. There is no doubt that without the massive presence of Moscow - of which the armed intervention in 1953 which suffocated the revolt in East Berlin represents only the most dramatic episode - the Ulbricht regime would not have survived. Given these difficult conditions and its strict dependence

on the Soviet Union, the role of East Germany within the Warsaw Alliance remained a very limited one which certainly cannot be compared to the corresponding role of the Federal Republic in the West.

The two Germanys, each of which was tightly integrated within its respective alliance, even if they enjoyed widely differing positions of strength and prestige, now confronted each other with total hostility. At Bonn, under the leadership of Adenauer, a policy of no-contract prevailed towards the Communist bloc in the conviction that German unification could be arrived at only by operating from a position of strength, thus compelling the Soviets to gradually withdraw from East Germany. Adenauer's government rejected every call by the domestic opposition for the development of a truly autonomous diplomacy; the attainment of reunification was considered possible only as the result of collective action by the West, as according to the guarantees given to Bonn by the allies in the 1954 Agreements of Paris. The Hallstein Doctrine, which aimed at keeping the problem of the GDR alive on the international level through the threat of the rupture of diplomatic relations with countries having formal relations with East Berlin (the USSR being the only exception), represented the basic instrument of this policy.

In East Berlin, the Ulbricht regime, entrenched in rigid positions both in its international and domestic relations, could, after the 1956 wave of liberalization, be called one of the most extremist states of the region. These were the years in which the East German leadership observed the Chinese experiences in socialist construction and the extremism of Chinese international conceptions with great interest, thus regarding any possible East-West contact on the problem of reunification with suspicion. This attitude, which revealed the regime's profound state of internal weakness, could not fail to create difficulties for East Berlin in its relations with its eastern allies who were more favorable to the idea of détente. In Poland, in particular, there were expressions of disagreement with the East German line, and even the USSR seemed compelled to support the Ulbricht regime more for reasons of "force majeure" than for any real politico-ideological solidarity.

The extremist stances of the two Germanys must be evaluated within the framework of the general cold war climate which prevailed in those years in the relations between the two blocs. The contacts which took place between 1955 and 1957 confirmed, irrogardless of all general expressions of good will, the basic incompatibility of the positions of the two sides. The plan presented at Geneva by the Soviets for the creation of a European security system which would replace Nato and the treaty of Warsaw was rejected by the West for reasons of security and political consistency (the allied commitment to the Federal Republic on reunification). And the later and somewhat less compelling proposals advanced by Moscow for a non-aggression pact between the Nato and the Warsaw alliances, and for the creation of zones of nuclear disarmament etc., met with no better results. All of these proposals, in fact, stemmed from the desire to obtain the recognition of the European political and territorial status quo and thus of the existence of two Germanys which the West was absolutely unwilling to accept. Thus, it could be said that the problem of German

reunification was by now seen by the great opposing powers in the drastic terms of a policy directed at the consolidation of the allied German state and eventually at the absorption of the German state heretofore integrated in the opposing alliance.

There is thus nothing surprising if, in the period 1958-1962, some of the most dramatic episodes recorded in the period of the cold war in Europe took place in the German sector. This was the moment, it should be remembered, in which certain new factors (technological and military progress, economic successes, revived diplomatic initiative) seemed to guarantee a real superiority to the communist bloc, in the military as well as other sectors. Strengthened by this seeming advantage, it seemed to the Soviets to be the moment in which to pass from a policy of détente to one of pressures geared to obtain their traditional objectives in Germany. A complex politico-diplomatic policy was put into motion as a means of arriving at the formal recognition of the GDR, which would be guaranteed by a peace treaty with the West recognizing its political and territorial integrity in every respect. Moscow, by creating a series of politico-diplomatic crises over Berlin, aimed at what has been defined as a super-Yalta; that is at a new formal agreement on the division of Europe in general, and on that of Germany in particular. An international guarantee for Ulbricht's regimes seemed at that moment to be the only means of assuring the survival of East Germany, troubled above all by the massive exodus of the best part of its labor force.

At the same time the Soviets had set for themselves an even more ambitious objective: to arrive at a change in the European balance of power by applying political and diplomatic pressures on Bonn such as to encourage its gradual separation from the West and from the United States in particular. By striking out at Bonn's basic aspirations for reunification, they hoped to attain its isolation and thus the possibility of the neutralization of West Germany with all the imaginable consequences for the European equilibrium. The objective of loosening the relations between the United States and the Federal Republic, which springs from the fear that such relations might eventually lead to Bonn's atomic rearmament, has been revealed as one of the constants of Soviet policy in Europe.

Under such conditions, relations with Bonn (despite the re-establishment of diplomatic relations in 1955), remained quite cold, influenced as they were by the rigid position of the USSR towards the Federal Republic and vice versa. This attitude, for that matter, was shared with equal if not greater zeal by the various countries of Eastern Europe, and in particular by those directly involved in the German question. The rearmament of West Germany, and her official policy towards the GDR, towards the eastern frontiers and towards nuclear arms are factors giving rise to strong fears in the Eastern capitals. In Warsaw as in Prague, in Budapest as in Belgrade, the common preoccupation with Bonn's attitude is translated into solidarity with East Berlin irregardless of how little sympathy they really have for the Ulbricht regime. Throughout this period the "German problem" has represented one of the most important factors of cohesion for the Eastern bloc both in the relations among the People's Democracies

themselves and those between them and the Soviet Union. For Moscow, this common anti-German sentiment, which embraces broad non-communist strata in the region, has represented a strong element of support for its political and diplomatic actions. As a result also of the conditions of undebatable supremacy in which it continues to mind itself throughout the Communist area, the Soviet Union was able to present a compact and rigidly anti-Bonn front to the West.

Soviet policy, supported by the other Communist regimes, was not to attain any of the objectives it had set for itself, and rather Moscow's incapacity to force the situation in Germany was revealed. In 1962, in the framework of a general reshaping of Soviet international policy, influenced by a series of new factors (such as the Western technico-military revival, domestic economic difficulties, obstacles to international action), the military race for Germany came to a close. The collective commitment by the West and the attitude of the Federal Republic had succeeded in containing the Soviet offensive and thus in revealing its intrinsic flimsiness. Despite some differences of position the Nato countries, and in particular the United States, had provided a guarantee to West Germany which left no room for Soviet manoeuvres. Beyond the diplomatic dialogue the Western policy of no-contacts was all-embracing, based as it was on the conviction that guaranteeing the division of Germany by establishing agreements on disarmament and security which might confirm the European status quo would be intolerable.

With 1962 a new phase in Moscow's German policy began; a phase adjusted to the need for greater caution on the international scene. The Soviets abandoned their policy of pressures geared to obtain the stipulation of a peace treaty with the West, and instead put all their emphasis on the strengthening of the GDR. The priorities which had been maintained among Soviet objectives until this point were inverted, and international recognition was no longer considered a presupposition to the GDR's domestic consolidation, but vice versa domestic stabilization was seen as a pre-condition for international recognition. This task was made much easier by the adoption in Berlin in the summer of 1961 of the so-called "defensive measures", whose economico-social and psychological consequences were to be of great importance for the Ulbricht regime. The hypothesis of German reunification was at this time postponed to a distant future; it would be influenced by the domestic developments within West Germany (such as the rise of socialist elements) which were beyond the direct responsibility of Moscow.

The firm commitments made by the Soviets in support of the GDR did not, on the other hand, hinder them from beginning a campaign of "avances" and contacts with the Federal Republic in 1964. The persistent fear of Bonn's nuclear rearmament and the desire to exploit the dissent within the Western camp drove Moscow once again to attempt a policy of diversion. The attention called on that occasion by certain observers to the risk of another Rapallo seems rather exaggerated; yet this does not exclude the possibility that had negotiations - unexpectedly interrupted by the fall of Khrushchev - been proceeded with, there might have been significant results on the economic and commercial, and perhaps even on the political, level. In this regard

it is worthwhile to underline the permanent ambivalence in the Soviet attitude in which a strong temptation to reach a direct agreement with the German Federal Republic in an anti-American sense remains an alternative to the basic plan of reaching a USA-USSR compromise on the German problem. Given the personality of Khrushchev, it would seem plausible that although he was not aiming at the impossibility of a reversal of alliances, he was prepared to play this hand to the very end. A significant factor was the extreme irritation expressed by the East German regime about such contacts, to the point that a note of relief at the announcement of the fall of Khrushchev was allowed to leak out.

At the same time that the East-West confrontation over the German problem has continued, tendencies of nationalist inspiration within the two opposing alliances have gained strength, with the result that the unity of the two systems has been weakened. The process is a meaningful one among the member states of the Warsaw Pact where strong polycentric tendencies have developed as a reaction to the excessive centralization of the past. The case of Rumania is but the most evident manifestation of a state of mind, which exists to different degrees of intensity in all the people's democracies, eager to claim growing margins of autonomy in domestic and international policy. This revival of the national principle in Eastern Europe has assumed the character of a drive for the revision of the Communist community institutions (Comecon and even the Warsaw Pact) and the attenuation of the Soviet hegemony.

The GDR is the only Communist state which is an exception to this trend and which is opposed to polycentrism and to the weakening of ties with the USSR; on the contrary, these ties have been formally confirmed in a treaty of alliance and mutual assistance stipulated in 1964 (on the model of similar agreements signed earlier between Moscow and other European Communist regimes). For the Ulbricht regime, the Warsaw Pact represents the indispensable collective instrument to contain West Germany claims. Any factor likely to weaken the present structure of the alliance is thus considered a dangerous attack on the multilateral guarantee of its own positions.

In the same period similar polycentric tendencies have been revealed within the Western alliance which are causing the weakening of the community structures. The analogy with the Eastern situation is obvious even if great differences, due among other things to the particular impetus of the drive for economic integration of the Common Market exist. Here too there is an extreme case, represented by France, the revealer, in rather clamorous terms, of a general tendency which embraces, with different nuances, the various member countries of Nato. The situation in the West is complicated by the fact that the hegemonic power as well, that is the United States, is increasingly involved in policies of global importance which seem to be leading to a reshaping of its commitments in Europe. This trend is that much more preoccupying, according to German observers, in that it coincides with the contrary strengthening of the Soviet commitment in Europe.

The weakening of the alliances, on the other hand, has contributed to a meaningful revival of primarily economic relations among the

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countries of East and West Europe. After a long period of silence, the dialogue between the two Europes began once again with the revival of the great themes of coexistence after the Cuban crisis of 1962. What is particularly significant is that despite the existence of community institutions in both of the two regions, relations have been tending to develop on a bilateral basis between individual countries. France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, etc., have been unilaterally proceeding with their own contacts exploiting both new and traditional factors of prestige in the area. In the same way, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Poland, etc., are making efforts to establish and review fruitful contacts with the West on the same basis.

The Federal Republic thus finds itself in a very delicate position; she is inclined to regard the prospect of a direct East-West dialogue which is not based on a united Western position with great caution. There is, in fact, no doubt that these new trends have had an important effect on the position of the Western countries on the German problem. In the late 1950's and early 1960's the tendency among Bonn's allies to consider the division of Germany as a tolerable if not a downright satisfying situation did, in fact, become strengthened. Paradoxically, it was precisely the "defensive measures" adopted in Berlin in 1961 which contributed to reinforcing this attitude by guaranteeing a new stability to the situation. The West's commitment to reunification has not been accompanied by any concrete proposals in this regard and at this point seems to have assumed a purely declaratory character designed above all to tranquilize the Bonn regime. But the situation does not end here; gradually even the appearance of a common Western position on the German problem has been fading while differentiated national policies have been evolving. Here, too, it is the France of de Gaulle which has stepped forward with, among other things, the idea of a direct agreement between Europe and the Soviet Union for a solution of the problem.

Bonn's leaders are faced with the task of dealing with a highly fluid situation and adjusting their political program to the new conditions without, however, disclaiming their traditional objectives. Since the prospect of attaining reunification by operating from a position of strength within a Nato which is capable of imposing its will on the USSR has been seriously weakened, new and more complex questions have arisen. With regard to Eastern Europe in particular, the Bonn regime is hesitant about developing a more courageous policy despite its traditional economic and cultural influence in the area. Even after the transfer of power from Adenauer to Erhard a policy of immobilism which put a brake on any deviation from the traditional line continued to prevail; in method as in objectives it was impossible to escape from the Adenauerian plan. Only an isolated voice was raised to contest the official political line, and only a few first steps of economic importance were taken with the creation of commercial missions in various eastern countries. But we are dealing with very limited initiatives, mere foreshadowings of change in a slow and painful process of development.

It was necessary to arrive at the coalition government headed by Kiesinger in order, primarily as a result of the desire of the Social

Democrats, to begin to lay down the lines of a new political course. By this time the opinion that it was necessary to carry out an autonomous policy towards the East (if possible with the agreement of the Western allies) had gained credence; a policy which would be based, among other things, on the strong appeal that the high economic and technological potential of West Germany can have in this area. The offer to the Eastern European countries of the re-establishment of normal diplomatic relations, and thus the abandonment in their case of the Hallstein Doctrine, reveals Bonn's desire to take part in the new course of East-West relations in order to derive whatever advantages possible.

Reservations and criticisms of the Kiesinger government's policy are not, in reality, lacking. In the eyes of many observers the government remains strongly compromised by its refusal to consider the eastern frontiers as definitive, to renounce atomic weapons and to recognize the GDR. The first two points in particular are considered unsustainable, and supporters of the third point, the recognition of East Germany as the only means of bringing about the liberalization of that regime, are by no means lacking. Nevertheless it would be unduly simplistic to speak of a change in tactics alone and Bonn's purely instrumental adjustment to the new situation. At present, in fact, new elements of ambiguity and contradiction have appeared in the official policy itself such as to leave alternative hypotheses open. To begin with, legal, territorial reunification in the strict sense is no longer spoken of as much as the necessity to restore freedom of expression to the East Germans. In the second place, the policy of contacts with the Eastern countries, even if it is qualified by the non-recognition of the GDR and is instead explicitly directed at that country's isolation, need not necessarily lead to this result. The new line can in fact also be interpreted as a direct means of preparing public opinion and the German political class for a gradual normalization of relations with the GDR.

Despite its serious limits and ambiguities the new Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic has not failed to arouse broad and complex reactions in the Eastern camp. One of the more interesting consequences of Bonn's political initiative is that it has shed light on the degree of political differentiation on the German problem which has in the last years been created among the various Communist regimes. The Warsaw alliance seems seriously divided as a result of the question of the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic; for the southern and Balkan nations, which on the whole are in favor of the proposals made by Bonn, a series of factors was determining: the absence of frontier problems, strong economic motivations, and a public opinion which was well-disposed in this direction. For the northern nations, on the contrary, which have unsolved frontier problems with the Federal Republic, the importance of their political goals outweighs any consideration of economic and commercial opportunities. (A particular case is that of Czechoslovakia as some symptoms of uncertainty in her attitude clearly demonstrate). Poland, in particular, displays an extremely rigid attitude which is due, other than to understandable preoccupations of an international nature, to important domestic reasons. The necessities of the defence of the

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eastern frontiers, in fact, guarantees wide popular support to the Gomulka regime and represents a very important element of diversion from the parallel but latent anti-Soviet feeling.

Finally, the reaction of the GDR is of considerable interest because of the political and diplomatic ability with which she reacted to Bonn's Ostpolitik. The GDR, in fact, demonstrated the influence which it has gained in the last years within the Communist camp, and showed itself capable of conducting a policy of pressure and persuasion on the USSR and the other Communist regimes. Many factors have contributed to this development: to begin with there is the considerable economic and social strengthening of the regime which has made the GDR the second industrial power in the Communist camp; in the second place the reduction after the break with China of the extent of the Communist camp to a purely European dimension and thus the relative strengthening of all the other member states; and in the third place the key role occupied by the GDR in the defence of the Soviet Union and, more generally, of the eastern alliance.

The action taken by the GDR to stem the Bonn initiative was an important factor in the blocking (except in the case of Rumania) of the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. By underlining the danger that a split among the Communist countries could result from the differing positions taken with regard to Bonn, East Berlin was able to bring about the intervention of the USSR (which is vitally interested in the question over and above her evaluation of the significance of Bonn's new policy) in order to prevent a new factor of division from ripening in the eastern camp. Other than using the mediation of Moscow to guarantee herself the multilateral protection of the members of the Warsaw alliance, the GDR then set about establishing a series of bilateral anti-German agreements with several of the countries of the area.

The decisions taken in this case confirm that today, in East Berlin, any action liable to disturb the situation is likely to be considered negatively in the conviction that time is working in favor of a further strengthening of the GDR. Any contrary point of view, such as that a more flexible attitude towards Bonn - thereby presenting a more liberal image of the GDR - would favor her prestige in Western Europe, is, for now, out of the question. Even the fact that such a policy, in so far as it is expressed in the demand for a right of veto over the relations between the Communist regimes and the Federal Republic, might cause strong reactions within the Communist camp which could facilitate isolation - which is feared above all else - does not seem to be taken into consideration.

The common position - towards the Federal Republic - which was arrived at by the various Communist regimes (Rumania excluded) at Karlovy-Vary in the spring of this year constitutes a success for East Berlin but does not represent the final word on the problem.

The unity achieved at Karlovy-Vary has served to temporarily block the initiatives of the Kiesinger government, but has certainly not

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established an organic unity of position among countries whose interests differ so considerably. When, and if, Bonn decides to re-launch a policy based on further concessions, above all in the question of the recognition of the eastern frontiers, there is no doubt that the crisis will be destined to be reopened. In the USSR, which is the arbiter power in the area, as the West Germans have very realistically understood, the situation is being considered with growing concern. The Soviets know that they cannot restrict their policies to a defence of the European status quo, as East Berlin would like, but that it is necessary to develop a more dynamic and flexible position which will meet the problems created by the new situation.

The recent events on the European and international scene make it clear that it would be opportune to redraw the old politico-diplomatic guidelines. The obvious parallelism between the tensions troubling the Nato alliance and those afflicting the Warsaw Pact reveal that there is a widespread state of crisis in the present international order.

It is precisely with regard to the necessity of creating a new international order in Europe which is capable of guaranteeing sufficient stability and equilibrium that the German problem has been raised again in its full importance. The real key to the power struggle being waged in the heart of Europe, as political observers note unanimously, is the German key. Germany's strategic position in the center of the continent and the strength of its economic potential (the two Germanys, re-united, would hold the third place in the world's industrial production) make Germany a determining element in any new international settlement. Now that the postwar formula which placed the two German states within two rigid alliances and presupposed their effective political and economic integration within these two systems has been weakened, the necessity for new solutions is at hand. The questions are those which have always existed: reunification or an indefinite prolongation of the status quo, and then, what type of reunification and which status quo in particular?

The new factor, in respect to the past, which has put the prospects of solution in new terms, lies in the autonomous strengthening of the Federal Republic (and, within certain limits, of the GDR) which has taken place. This means that while the structures of the European alliances have tended to become more fluid, those of the two Germanys have become increasingly rigidified, thus creating a center of tension in the heart of Europe. The Germans have gradually transformed themselves from mere objects of the political decisions of the hegemonic powers, as was the case even in the 1950's, into political actors with their own political programs. The phenomenon of rediscovered autonomy, which exists today to different degrees for all the medium-sized and small powers, assumes in the German case a potentially dangerous character due to the persistent antagonism between the two states. The dilemma for the Europeans, that of how to coordinate the exigencies of stability with those of the German problem, is now presented in particularly complex terms.

There is, in fact, no doubt - and this is demonstrated by the greater autonomy which has been acquired in these years - that the

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strengthening of the two German states, East and West, renders an agreed-upon solution in Europe much more complex today. The Federal Republic and the GDR, though from very different positions, both look with suspicion upon the evolution taking place in the relations within the two alliances and between the two alliances themselves. The Bonn leaders are deeply opposed to a revision of the Nato structure, not to mention its dissolution, in the fear that the price for a new European order will be paid with the consolidation of the status quo in Germany. The bilateral relations which have been established with France, or even with the United States, cannot, in the eyes of West German public opinion, compensate for the value of the multilateral protection of the Atlantic alliance as the only real guarantee vis-à-vis the Soviets. In East Berlin, on the other hand, it is suspected that a loosening, or even worse a dissolution, of the Warsaw alliance as a means of reaching agreement on a European security pact might lead to the opposite consequences - those desired by Bonn - of a change in the status quo regarding the German problem. The anachronistic appeals made to the strengthening in traditional terms of the Warsaw alliance bear out this fear of isolation, as do the objectively rather justified requests to proceed with a policy of economic integration in Comecon. The East Germans, too, despite the stipulation of bilateral agreements with the USSR, Poland and other Eastern nations, continue to consider the multilateral alliance as the best guarantee in the face of the adversary's initiatives.

It has thus come to the point in which a certain similarity can be observed in the positions taken by Bonn and by East Berlin with regard to the development of East-West relations, which in both of the capitals is seen from the particular angle of its own political exigencies. For both the Federal Republic and the GDR the process of international détente ought to stem primarily from a solution of the German problem as each side interprets it. For both, on the other hand, détente serves to strengthen contacts and relations with the enemy camp with the aim of isolating the other Germany. The political and diplomatic offensive of the Kiesinger government constitutes the most revealing example of this trend on Bonn's part. But it should not be forgotten that East Berlin as well, within the limits of its capacity, is seeking to broaden its relations with all the Western countries other than the Federal Republic (even though strong economic relations still exist between the two Germans).

In this situation European, Soviet and American policymakers are increasingly obliged, in dealing with the German problem, to take account of the positions expressed by Bonn and by East Berlin. These views should be clarified. If it is in fact true that no one can legitimately contest the right of the Germans to make their own national problem the object of autonomous politico-diplomatic action which is supported by all the means which their strengthened position allows them, it must on the other hand be underlined that policies aiming at a solution of the German problem cannot be considered only as an internal question between the two Germans. The implications of power which would be related to any European settlement including the Federal Republic and the GDR require that a harmonious solution to the two problems be found in order to avoid the risk of clashing interests.

The attainment of an agreed-upon solution for reunification or, on the contrary, for a normalization of relations between the two Germanys which is based on the status quo, cannot be considered as the pre-condition for a further relaxation in East-West relations. It would in fact hardly be realistic to choose the sector of greatest tension between the two opposing camps as the starting point for a general agreement in Europe. This is true both for Bonn, in its insistence on exercising almost a right of tutelage over the relations between the Western countries and the GDR, and to a certain degree on tying together the separate questions of the non-recognition of the GDR and of the eastern frontiers (the subject of the question of nuclear arms is instead more autonomous), and for East Berlin when it links the problem of its recognition to that of the relations between Bonn and the eastern countries. The finding of a solution for Germany, in fact, must be considered as but an element, no matter how crucial alone, of a more general European agreement and, in any event, as the final result of the gradual normalization of East-West relations.

It is generally agreed that the solution of the German problem is directly linked to a general re-organization of interstate relations in Europe, and it thus remains for us to consider what concrete prospects exist today in this direction. There are certain remarks which can be made in this regard. There is no doubt that, even beyond the policies of the states themselves, there exist strong objective incentives for eliminating the system of two opposing alliances and for strengthening inter-European relations. On the economic level the general industrial development and the gradual standardization of production and technology which have taken place among European countries works in the direction of greater European collaboration. (This is that much more true in the case of the Eastern countries which need to become part of the international market and to attain the more advanced technological level of the Western countries). The great development of activity on the cultural and social level which has taken place in Europe both on the mass and on the elite levels also constitutes an important stimulus for the growing contacts between East and West. And this subject could be analyzed at greater depth in order to single out the forces and the social groups which have been exerting pressure in this direction. Today, in fact, it is society, that is, something beyond the structure of states and alliances, which tends to strengthen the trend toward a more marked European interdependence on the various economic, social and cultural levels.

All these elements, when taken together, tend to modify the situation of precarious stability which was created in recent years and to encourage a new international political order on the European continent. The question is now being raised from all sides if the Western and Eastern alliances will be able to retain their present structures much longer. In the case of Nato, whose member states will in 1968 be faced with the problem of renewing or not, their membership in that alliance, revisions and renovations are being called for in order to meet the necessity for more open relations with the Eastern countries and for a more efficient partnership between Western Europe and the United States. As for the Warsaw Pact, although the

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twenty-year date of expiry in 1975 is still quite distant, it seems probable that some type of internal reform will take place well before that date. Here, too, it is not merely a question of affronting the problem of relations with the West but of establishing a new basis for the relations among the European Communist regimes themselves and between them and the Soviet Union. Both of these cases reveal the strict correlation which exists between the trend towards opposition to the respective hegemonic power, and the drive to reconstruct a European equilibrium which is based on the more direct participation of the small and medium-sized powers.

It is precisely in such circumstances that the Soviet thesis presented at the Conference of Bucharest in 1966 and restated this year at Karlovy-Vary for the establishment of a system of European security is significant. The moment, even from the psychological point of view, is a favourable one for an initiative of this type, and in addition allows the Soviets to emerge from a dangerous state of political and diplomatic inertia in Europe.

Even if it is no simple matter to define the eastern proposals on the basis of that which, aside from several fixed points, is generally expressed in the documents from Bucharest and Karlovy-Vary, a few initial observations can be made in this regard. For Moscow, the European security project is to gradually set up a series of diplomatic agreements among the countries concerned, which will deal both with a mutual guarantee of the borders and nuclear disarmament, and with economic, cultural and technical cooperation based less on the balance of power than on a relationship of reciprocal trust. Although the formula of the elimination of the blocs has been explicitly adopted, it does not seem that the Soviets foresee, at least not in the near future, a total dissolution of the alliances, but rather a reduction of their military character and the preservation of their political structure.

The modification of the European state system through mutual agreements which will be able to create an atmosphere of trust among the countries concerned, will ensure the preservation of the two blocs within, however, a broader general international structure. This would allow the development, even on the bilateral level, of more open and direct relations between the European countries under the umbrella of a multilateral system. guaranteed, it would seem, in the final analysis by the USSR and the United States. Moscow's attempt, vis-a-vis the United States, to become the paladin of a pan-European movement in such a way as to exclude the United States or at least to reduce its role within the Security Pact is, nevertheless, obvious. But we are dealing with an attempt alone, because within the eastern camp itself this hypothesis, which would give too strong a role to the USSR and to the Federal Republic, will be considered negatively by the various Communist regimes concerned as they are with maintaining a certain equilibrium in Europe.

The European security plan deals with the German problem in the usual way; that is it calls for the formal participation of the GDR, her state sovereignty fully recognised, in the collective system. Thus the consolidation of the status quo of the region once again appears to be the basic objective of the Soviets with the advantage, with respect to the past, of being able to count on an East Germany which is strong on the economic and social level and, at least apparently, has achieved a certain stability on the

political level. But this is not merely an attempt to ensure the participation of the GDR in the negotiations and thereby to guarantee her legitimacy as a state in such a way as to bring about de facto recognition by the Western countries, as was the case at the time of the first proposals on European security presented in the mid-50's. By making the East German presence at the conference table a precondition for a European conference, the Soviets are attempting to pre-establish a position of strength for themselves in the future discussions of which Germany represents one of the basic themes. In the event that their proposal might not be accepted the USSR will in any case be left with a good card which she can play on the propaganda level regardless of what would be her real reactions, not to mention those of East Berlin (and Warsaw).

Even if at present we are faced only with the possibility of negotiations on the topic of European security, given the hesitations of the Soviets themselves to undertake negotiations of such importance, it is necessary to begin to deal with the question. In fact it could not be said, at least for the time being, that the terms of the problem and the possibilities of alternative proposals have been sufficiently analysed by Western political circles.

It is not ^{by} pure chance that several of the most authoritative appeals in this regard have stemmed from groups in the Federal Republic who are worried by the absence of Western counter-proposals. The fear of these groups is that the Soviets may be allowed the advantage of taking the initiative without being forced to commit themselves to the idea of negotiations. This would allow Moscow to unload a part of the internal tensions of the Communist camp onto the Western camp thereby accentuating its uncertainties and divisions without having its real intentions put to the test. There is no doubt about the fact that deep divisions exist among the points of view of the Western allies on the possible forms of an international settlement. For the United States it is essential that the two alliances continue to exist (even if it is willing to accept some revisions) as the only effective guarantee of equilibrium in Europe; rather than attempting to set up new and equally artificial systems of relations among the states, it is worth-while for the moment to rely upon the Russian-American bipolarity. As for the German problem, as is perhaps demonstrated by the reduction of troops in the area, it does not seem that Washington intends to commit itself in search of new effective solutions.

De Gaulle's France, on the other hand, would like to put an end to the present system of alliances and negotiate the German problem directly with the USSR within the framework of a Pan-European agreement which would exclude the United States. Paris would aim at the preservation of a divided Germany, making the domestic evolution of the GDR a precondition to any agreement. As for the other Western countries such as Great Britain, Italy etc. which are also able to play a role in this question, it does not seem for the moment that they are prepared to go beyond general formulations which are not politically binding.

This situation explains Bonn's concern and its call for the development of a common position on the German problem. The position of the West Germans is becoming increasingly delicate given the objective difficulties

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in implementing a policy line (and let us leave aside objections relating to the real limitations of this policy) on the basis of an autonomous platform which is not coordinated with that of its allies. Despite the prestige of which it disposes the Federal Republic is not for the time being, as the latest developments in her Eastern policy demonstrate, capable of putting the situation into motion and arriving at an agreed-upon solution to the German problem on her own. The Soviets on the other hand, well aware of the situation, are trying to capitalise on Bonn's sense of isolation in order to weaken her contacts with Washington and to play up the hypothesis of direct negotiations.

The only way out of this situation lies not in Bonn's renunciation of an autonomous policy as regards a problem crucial to her national interest, but that it succeeds in coordinating this policy with general Western policy. It is necessary to reconsider the various problems in such a way as to be able to face the negotiations with a united position, bearing in mind the possible terms of an agreement which can only be the result of reciprocal concessions. If the goal is a change in the European and German status quo then it is necessary to know the limits of the proposed objectives and to clearly delineate their contours in such a way as to prevent, among other things, confusions of a semantic order.

This is particularly valid for the concept of the status quo which has so often been adopted in the German case. In fact, a distinction must be made between the concept of territorial status quo, that is the preservation of a territorially distinct East Germany, and the concept of a political status quo, that is the preservation of the present East German regime. Whereas on the first point, the territorial one, Bonn is beginning to demonstrate greater flexibility, it does not seem willing to compromise on the political nature of the Ulbricht regime. The maintenance of the illegitimate nature of the East Berlin government is the condition laid down by Bonn for its participation in any future negotiations on the grounds that the present East German regime has lasted thanks only to Soviet support and does not enjoy a legitimate popular consensus. The problem of the GDR status will thus represent one of the fundamental topics of negotiation on which compromises cannot be made prior to arriving at the negotiations themselves. The Hallstein Doctrine, it is maintained, has served to make the problem of East German recognition a question of international importance, and thus can only eventually be abrogated at the conclusion of international negotiations. Otherwise Bonn would end up participating in negotiations having abandoned, a priori, her strongest card, and making the acceptance of the Soviet thesis an outcome to be taken for granted.

Given everything which has been said up to this point, it seems clear that, given the prospect of general negotiations in the future, the fate of Germany's future structure will depend on the more general fate of Europe. In this regard, albeit simplifying to the greatest degree and presenting the possible outlines of a new European state order in the most abstract of terms, it would seem that two hypotheses could be made.

I - The process of the dissolution of the present alliance system will be carried through to its logical conclusion; the national states will take on a new lease of life with the result that Europe will pass from the present bipolar equilibrium to a traditional status quo founded on a

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balance of power among states. Paradoxically in an era which would witness the reconfirmation of those values favouring the identification of state and nation, the Germans would be the only divided people deprived of this right. The risks implicit in such a situation are obvious. The Federal Republic, left on its own and orientated towards the creation of a united German state, would end up by destroying the established equilibrium. It is difficult, in fact, to think of diplomatic and military formulas which would be capable of containing the thrust of a Germany characterised by increasing economic and social growth and by uncontrollable political aspirations. In the absence of effective supra-national structures in Europe which would be able to bridle the Federal Republic and protect the GDR, a rapid absorption of the latter by a unified Germany is not to be excluded. The process of reunification could also come about by peaceful means, as the result of domestic political and social developments within the two Germanys, but this would not alter the grave consequences which reunification would have for the European equilibrium. And the prospect of the creation of a unified, disarmend and neutral Germany within a system of national states hardly appears realistic. The memory of the Versailles experience, which led in the period between the two wars to the creation of a European system which was incapable of containing the aspirations of an unsatisfied Germany, is inevitable.

In reality, in order to guarantee a new European state system which is based on the division of Germany or on a united and neutral Germany, the participation of a United States and a Soviet Union who are in basic agreement is necessary. But given present conditions this seems hardly likely even granting the possibility of a substantial improvement in Moscow-Washington relations once several crucial points of friction (the war in Vietnam etc.) are overcome; and above all it would reconstruct a situation of bipolar hegemony, this time explicitly agreed upon, which is precisely what a new European settlement would be seeking to eliminate.

II - The process of the erosion of the present alliances will be interpreted in all its positive aspects and thus in both the Eastern and Western blocs new forms of economic and political association will be created among the member states. The European Communist states will arrive at a reorganisation of their mutual relations both as regards the relations among the People's Democracies themselves and those between them and the Soviet Union. The Western countries, on the other hand, will create an analogous situation; that is to say that they will put the relations within the European community and those between the latter and the United States on a new basis. The possible solutions, both in the East and the West, present a very broad range of alternatives depending on the degrees of autonomy and of interdependence which are proposed. What is important is that certain rigidities in relationships within the alliance are eased, and that more efficient structures are developed in order to find a correct point of equilibrium between the necessities of pluralism and of collectivism. This would be followed by a change in East-West relations of either a bilateral or multilateral nature depending on the prevailing trends of the period. On the basis of this reinvigorated and more flexible equilibrium the creation of an effective security system would be possible with the greatest probability of success.

In a Europe in which the national motive were to give way to a broader conception of community, a just solution could be found even for the

problem of Germany. The strengthening of relations between the Eastern and Western countries and the gradual relaxation of the European atmosphere would dedramatise the German question and make the reunification an objective to be considered in a historical context; it thus would have a series of positive consequences. To begin with, in the event of domestic political crises in the GDR, which are not be completely excluded given the rigidity of the regime's present structure, these developments would impede such crises from degenerating into a popular wave of nationalism with all the imaginable consequences to the international order. In the second place, it would encourage open and positive relations between Bonn and East Berlin whose possible result, at the end of a lengthy evolutionary process of mutual relations, could be the reconstruction of German national unity. By beginning with particularly important contacts in the economic, social and cultural fields, it would then be possible to proceed to increasingly close relations of a political nature. The phenomenon of a reunification attained within the framework of a European security system would not give rise to external tensions because it would have eliminated any drive for revisionism on the part of the new, united Germany.

What is more probable, however, is that in the climate created by European normalisation, the basic elements which constitute the Federal Republic and the GDR will be strengthened, thus leading to a definitive confirmation of the existence of two Germanys; and this would occur without giving rise to external pressures and without the aggravation of mutual antagonism. In this way two autonomous German states would be created; each with its own distinct national and political physiognomy, each endowed with an important role within its respective system. The case of Austria, a German country which has succeeded in gradually creating its own national physiognomy and which today enjoys a well-defined autonomous political and territorial personality, is often cited in support of the realism of such a prospect. But it is obvious that we are dealing with an example which has its own particular characteristics.

In the case of the GDR which, regardless of whether or not any domestic consolidation takes place, is bound to remain a national entity with specific characteristics, many questions (given the intrinsic difficulty of transforming the national motive into a basic element in its structure) remain unanswered. Among all the European countries, East Germany is that which has the strongest need to participate in supranational arrangements. For this reason limited forms of regional integration with West Germany itself, or with its Eastern neighbours, Poland and Czechoslovakia, are not to be excluded. As for the development of the East Berlin regime, that is, the liberalisation of its domestic policies, this would be greatly facilitated by an atmosphere of détente and normalisation.

It is somewhat more difficult to hypothesize today about the trend which such liberalisation would take. The idea put forward in some quarters of the transformation of the regime into a Titoist style state does not seem to take sufficient account of the deep diversities in the origin and the development of these two Communist states, Yugoslavia and East Germany. On the other hand, the possibility of an evolution of the traditional democratic type would appear to be rather remote considering the profound economic and social transformation through which the country has passed in recent years. In any event, in the case of both of these hypotheses, we are entering the realm of abstract speculation. It is impossible today for us to evaluate the international and domestic factors which are likely to influence the course of the evolution.

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THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GERMAN STATES - A
PIVOTAL QUESTION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

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The creation of a lasting European order of peace through a system of collective security wins an ever increasing number of active followers among the peoples of Europe. The governments of the Socialist states have submitted for years numerous proposals for a détente in Europe. The leading politicians of the West European states also come to realize to an increasing extent that the creation of a European system of security is possible and also necessary in the interest of peace and the well-being of all peoples of the continent in spite of the existence of two opposing political and social systems in Europe.

The relations between the two German states are of great importance with regard to the efforts for European security. There are above all the following reasons for it:-

- (1) The frontier between the GDR and FRG is the only frontier between two European states that is not recognized and therefore a permanent source of danger.
- (2) The frontier between the two German states is at the same time the longest line of separation where the two opposing social and political systems in Europe and the two biggest military groupings meet.
- (3) The relations between the two German states are marked by the GDR's recognition of the sovereignty of the FRG while the FRG not only ignores the sovereignty of the GDR but also regards it as its declared aim to eradicate the existence of the other German state and to incorporate it into the social and political system of the Federal Republic.
- (4) The differences between the two German states are not primarily based on state interests in the ordinary sense, but they are governed by social and class contradictions. These widen even more the rift between the two German states and make the regulation of their relations, which can only proceed from the status quo, more difficult but also especially necessary.

The basic requirements of a stable European order of peace are above all:-

- recognition of the existing realities, above all of the existence of two social systems in Europe as well as on German soil;
- recognition of the territorial status quo in Europe, including all existing frontiers, of the principle of sovereignty and the equality of all states;

- readiness for disarmament measures, above all for the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear arms;
- readiness for the simultaneous liquidation of the two military groupings and the dismantlement of military bases on foreign soil;
- condemnation of non-European military conflicts, above all of the US aggression in Vietnam which is an imminent danger to world peace.

It is in the interest of all European peoples to meet these requirements since they contribute to a high degree to safeguarding their national existence. The governments of most European states already see the necessity of meeting these requirements, though without making it their declared policy to stick to them in any case. Although it is therefore a matter of generally known and recognized principles they are not yet reality. The main reason for this is the resistance of one of the most powerful capitalist states in Europe, the Federal Republic, which in accord with the policy of war of the Johnson administration exerts pressure on other capitalist states of the continent. For the West German government the implementation of these principles is a serious obstacle to its great power aspirations. It thus not only endangers the peace of its own people but also the security of the peoples of Western Europe.

The reason for this is that the ruling quarters in the Federal Republic occupy key positions in NATO to which a number of European countries are linked. They occupy a dominant position in the EEC and the goal they pursue is the political, economic and military unification of Western Europe under their supremacy. From this position the Federal Republic pursues its dangerous great power policy which shows it to be the main troublemaker in Europe.

In the Federal Republic the same social forces are in power as in the German Reich before 1945. Key positions are even occupied to an increasing extent by persons who worked in the time of fascist dictatorship as state officials, officers in the Wehrmacht or in the most important economic positions. They have not given up the goal of achieving supremacy on the continent, an aim which was also pursued by German fascism during two world wars, and therefore refuse to recognize the social, political, military and international status quo which has emerged in the last 20 years. Components of this status quo are above all the frontiers established as a result of the Second World War, the existence of the sovereign socialist GDR and the special status of West Berlin according to international law.

Bonn is the only European government to demand the alteration of the status quo in Europe. This manifests itself in its refusal to recognize all European frontiers, in its nuclear ambitions, and above all in its pretension to speak for all Germans, a potential declaration of war against the GDR, which is firmly rooted in the socialist camp.

This policy is the main obstacle to a European peace settlement. Failing to recognize the current relation of forces and encouraged by the imperialist war adventures in Vietnam and the Middle East, by the reactionary putsch in Greece and the attempts of NATO on the neutrality and sovereignty of Cyprus, the Federal government now pursues its goals still more energetically. The ruling circles in West Germany openly solidarize themselves with the aggressors and the global strategy of the war party of the USA on which their actions are based. They use their temporary successes to stir up anti-communist hysteria. Thus they create a hotbed for the policy of the neo-Nazi NPD which tries to outdo the CDU/CSU in the proclamation of the expansionist programme.

The emergence of neo-Nazism in the Federal Republic has aroused concern among the peoples of Europe and the world. This concern was expressed in the declarations of the Soviet government to the governments of the Federal Republic, the USA, Great Britain and France, handed over on December 8, 1967.

The declaration, which was presented to the government of the Federal Republic, says,

".....Those circles in the FRG who today unscrupulously step on the platform of nazism again, obviously consider appropriate too the current international situation in which the peoples are more and more often confronted with the aggressive and adventurous acts of the imperialist powers.

"By giving scope to the activities of the neo-Nazis the West German politicians want to demonstrate overtly that the FRG is standing in line with the currently acting aggressive and war forces and that it intends to make a contribution to the sharpening of the international situation in the future, too."

Inspired by the benevolence of the CDU/CSU and particularly by its right wing, the leaders of the NPD went a step further than the government party at their party congress in Hanover. In addition to claims on territories of Socialist countries, they also made claims on territories of the other neighbouring countries of the Federal Republic, on Northern Italy (South Tyrol) and on the incorporation of Austria.

The power of the socialist camp and the activity of the forces of peace in the capitalist countries make more and more governments, also of capitalist countries of Europe, proceed from a sober assessment of the relation of forces and explore new avenues of security through relaxation of tension.

In order to prevent further international isolation, attempts were made during the formation of the Kiesinger government with the participation of Social Democrat ministers to camouflage West German policy as a policy of European security and policy of détente.

Kiesinger's governmental declaration of December 13, 1966, avoided in a very striking manner and in contrast to Adenauer's and Erhard's practices the whole vocabulary of the Cold War which was either replaced by more conciliatory formulations or many a problem was completely ignored. The new Chancellor maintained that "the will to peace and understanding among the peoples was the first word and the main concern of the foreign policy of this government".

The governmental declaration also said that for the Federal Republic the German question was a matter of "peace and democracy".

However, those searching for the concrete contents of these slogans of understanding were disappointed. Neither could one find the recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier in the governmental declaration nor the recognition of the existence of two German states, and in vain did one look for clear formulations as regards the Munich agreement as well as the renunciation of nuclear armament for the Bundeswehr.

It is a result of the vigilance of the peoples and the activity of the peaceful forces that the Federal government has to drop its camouflage more and more. As a result, the Bonn policy has not become less dangerous, but it is more patent where the forces can be found who jeopardize European peace.

Thus Federal Chancellor Kiesinger told the Economic Congress of the CDU in 1967:

"One has to know what is meant by this détente. If one understands by this that the status quo must be put up with, then our policy of détente has indeed not been understood." (Bulletin of the press and information office of the Federal government, Bonn, 31.1.67.)

On October 13, 1967, Kiesinger praised before the Bundestag the Social Democratic ministers who have completely submitted to this conception of the CDU/CSU and cited Willy Brandt, "We shall not tolerate, take part in and talk about the recognition of the regime over there under international law". (Bulletin of the press and information office of the Federal Republic, Bonn, 17.10.67.)

And on September 21, 1967, Minister Wehner emphasized three essential points of West German policy against the maintenance of the status quo by calling unacceptable:

- " (1) recognition of West Berlin as an independent political entity;
 - (2) recognition of the other part of Germany as second sovereign state of the German nation; and
 - (3) recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as final frontier."
- (Frankfurter Rundschau, 22.9.67.)

This was still more clearly pointed out by Minister von Hassel when he called the incorporation of the GDR the prerequisite to a European order of peace. Von Hassel wrote in the official press service of the CDU on November 2, 1967:

"But the forcible maintenance of the separation of Germany is one of the important centres of tension in Europe and therefore Europe cannot find its peace in the long term until the reunification of Germany. We thus speak of a European order of peace as a long-term goal of our policy."

And Bundestag Deputy Gradl of the CDU made it clear in the monthly "Berliner Politik" of December, 1967, that the Federal government also wants to make this concept binding on other states.

"German policy must continue to be intent on making foreign countries show an attitude of non-recognition taken by the Federal government towards the 'GDR'."

This attitude of the Federal Republic proves two different things:

- (1) Most concentrated expression of the Bonn policy are its efforts at incorporating the GDR and the refusal emanating from this goal to recognize the German state of peace according to international law.
- (2) The government of the Federal Republic does not want to keep to the generally recognized rules of international law and tries instead to force upon other states its aggressive legal conception. This attitude shows itself in the "inalienable legal positions" proclaimed by Bonn which are contrary to international law. Under Adenauer they were formulated as "right to a home" and are today "enriched" by the sole representation obligation for all Germans proclaimed by Kiesinger and the pretension to propose to the GDR relations which are declaredly not to be regulated by the recognized rules of international law.

The Federal Republic declares to be willing to regulate its relations with all states by negotiations and offers declarations on the renunciation of force. This policy is reduced to absurdity by the ruling circles themselves because they are not willing to renounce expressly and definitely all territorial claims, because

they refuse to drop their sole representation pretension for all Germans and because accordingly they neither want to enter into negotiations with the GDR on an equal footing nor are they ready to regulate their relations with the GDR, e.g. through the conclusion of a treaty on the renunciation of force which would be binding under international law.

But since the decisive frontier between the two German states runs between two social systems and two military groupings, all "proposals for a détente" are only camouflage as long as they are not directed to the GDR and the other European states in the same form and with the same binding force for, without normal relations with the GDR there cannot be a European détente.

In the recent past the thesis has been propagated in the Federal Republic that the relations between the two German states are not a matter of relations under international law, but at best under constitutional law. This is to justify in a new disguise Bonn's alleged right to interfere with the internal affairs and above all with the development of the social order of the GDR and to regulate the character of the relations with the GDR on the basis of the West German "legal position" instead of according to the rules of international law.

The sole representation pretension was thus made more and more the essence and irrevocable principle of the Federal Republic's Eastern and German policies with the sole representation pretension draped as "sole representation obligation".

Federal Chancellor Kiesinger declared in this context;

"We have also made a few terminological changes which alarm some people; by using less the term of sole representation claim, we do not drop this legal claim! (Bulletin of the press and information office of the Federal government, Bonn, 27.6.67.)

The parliamentary Secretary of State at the Federal Chancellory Freiherr von Guttenberg characterized even more clearly the policy of the Federal Republic in a speech delivered at Königsstein (Taunus) on July 28, 1967: "There will be no change in the Eastern policy of the Federal government. The world has changed. To this the West has responded with its policy of détente - I say so - called policy of détente. This includes that German policy adapts itself to the different scenery. Methods must be adapted to the specific situation. But that does not at all mean that indispensable positions are nibbled at." (Neues Deutschland, Berlin, 16.8.67.)

The purpose of the Federal Republic's decided maintenance of the claim to speak for all Germans and consequently the non-recognition of the GDR was explained by the influential politician of the CDU Ernst Majonica:

"In Germany it is our duty to interfere. We must connect the isolation of the GDR with our greatest possible influence." (Politische-Soziale Korrespondenz, Bonn, 15.2.67.)

And the speaker of the Bundestag Eugen Gerstenmaier went so far as to claim at the Party Congress of the CDU at Nordwürttemberg on June 24, 1967:

"Recognition would condemn every attempt at exerting influence on the Zone as interference in the internal affairs of foreign states. So it is clear that the Federal government resorts to political, tactical and terminological manoeuvres under the pressure of the different balance of power or public opinion but that it does not give up political principles and - if necessary - is ready for a direct armed conflict in case of a different assessment of the situation. What official politicians cannot express openly is plainly formulated in the press organs of the Springer concern which influence the citizens of the Federal Republic by their circulation running into millions.

So "Bild-Zeitung" wrote in a comment on the aggression of Israel against the Arab states that certain conclusions can be drawn from the events in the Middle East which go well for the situation in Europe too. "Our Arabs are Walter Ulbricht's People's Army or the Czechs or the Poles or the three of them."

The policy of non-recognition of the GDR is to serve as legal protection for the interference of the Federal Republic in the internal affairs of the GDR in future too with the employment of military means not excluded.

The parliamentary Secretary of State at the Ministry of Defence, Eduard Adorno, confirmed this lasting orientation on the potential employment of military means when he said that a powerful Bundeswehr is a prerequisite to efforts at finding "acceptable political solutions for political problems still existing in Central Europe".
(Kölnischer Stadtanzeiger, 4.5.65.)

In the draft of an action programme of the CDU, submitted at the beginning of 1968, the following principles are laid down:

"There cannot be recognition of a second German state The state and economic order in the Federal Republic must be comprehended as an all-German task."

The policy of the FRG is not only directed against the GDR. Its aim is the alteration of the status quo in favour of the Federal Republic. "Therefore the German Federal Republic welcomes and supports every move towards a détente if its goal is to overcome the 'status quo'." (Von Hassel, ib.)

The sole representation pretension and the refusal to recognize the GDR under international law are concentrated expressions of this policy of altering the status quo in Europe.

A first main reason for the claim that the recognition of the GDR under international law is in the interest of all European states is that it would be an effective obstacle to the expansionist tendencies in the Federal Republic. It would thus be an important guarantee for security and peace in Europe.

The government of the Federal Republic tries to exert pressure on other states and to dictate to them how to form their relations to the GDR. As far as the socialist countries of Europe are concerned, their representatives have clearly affirmed time and again that the recognition of the existence of two German states and the establishment of normal relations of all states with the GDR are a precondition for the creation of European security.

During their deliberations in Karlovy Vary the representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the European states stated that the renunciation of force binding under international law, recognition of the existing frontiers, including the state frontiers of the GDR, renunciation by the Federal Republic of its revanchist policy and its renunciation of the access to nuclear weapons in any form are prerequisites to the establishment of normal relations between all European states.

The leading politicians of the West European states also realize more and more that progress on the road to the relaxation of tension and creation of a European security system is only possible with the participation of the GDR. Nevertheless, the West European states do not yet oppose resolutely enough the sole representation pretension of the Federal Republic.

The second main reason for the claim that the recognition of the GDR under international law is in the interest of all European states is that it would be an expression of the sovereignty of these states.

In the struggle for a stable European order of peace, the German Democratic Republic plays a leading part. As reliable ally the GDR by its consistent policy of security largely contributes to dooming to failure the plans of the ruling circles in the Federal Republic which are directed against peace and security. Moreover, the GDR is one of the most important industrial states on the continent which also uses its great economic power for the formation of an order of peace in Europe.

A third main reason for the claim that the recognition of the GDR under international law is in the interest of the European states is that it would mean a strengthening of the forces of peace and security in Europe.

The GDR develops its social order inspired by the confidence of its citizens and in close cooperation with the other socialist countries. The GDR has at its disposal the necessary material and spiritual means to lead socialism to victory. The GDR does not need to be recognized by the West German Federal Republic for perfecting the construction of socialism. But in the interest of European security and the security of the citizens of the Federal Republic, which is solely menaced by the current policy of the Bonn government, Bonn must be forced into recognizing the realities and establishing normal relations between the two German states. To make it clear, the recognition of the GDR, the normalization of relations between the two German states are not a GDR problem but a European key question.

The normalization of relations between the two German states is in the interest of all European peoples. A unilateral approval of the alleged legal position of the Federal Republic - willy nilly - amounts to a support of the Bonn policy which is directed against the status quo and consequently against European security.

The GDR has advocated for years the improvement of relations between the two German states. It regards the normalization of relations between the two German states as a contribution to the relaxation of tension in Europe. This is especially evident from the various initiatives taken by the GDR last year. So Walter Ulbricht, Chairman of the State Council of the GDR proposed in his message on the turn of the year of 1966 that the governments of both German states make an agreement on the establishment of normal relations with each other and sign a treaty on the renunciation of force in their mutual relations.

In addition, the governments of both German states should recognize the existing frontiers in Europe in identical agreed statements and agree upon the halving of their armament expenditures as well as their renunciation of the possession, control or co-control of atomic weapons.

The VIIIth Party Congress of the SED held in April 1967 emphasized anew the necessity of negotiations at government level on a basis of equality with a view to seeking and embarking upon roads to détente, disarmament and normalization of relations between the two German states. Time was ripe to change fundamentally the character of relations between the two German states. In spite of the existence of different economic, cultural and other relations, the non-regulated relations between the FRG and the GDR had become more and more a zone of danger for the security of the peoples and states. For that very reason the VIIIth Party Congress of the SED came out in favour of holding talks between the heads of the governments of the two German states, and that at the seats of government in Berlin and Bonn.

On May 10, 1967, Willi Stoph, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, proposed in his letter to the West German Chancellor Kiesinger to enter into negotiations on the normalization of relations between the two German states.

These first steps proposed by the GDR government are a minimum of what was necessary to remove the chief obstacles on the way to the relaxation of tension and creation of a stable European order of peace.

Kurt Georg Kiesinger, however, Chancellor of the West German Federal Republic, rejected the proposals of the GDR government and went so far as to claim that his government must stick to the pretension to represent exclusively the whole of Germany.

In July 1967 the GDR government addressed a memorandum to the governments of other states in which it declared anew its readiness for ensuring European security. It emphasized that it will continue to do all in its power to bring about normal relations between the two German states based on equality and to implement the principles of peaceful coexistence in their relations.

"The government of the German Democratic Republic continues to be prepared for unconditional agreements based on equality and agreements between the Prime Ministers of the two German states. In accordance with this, it is in favour of talks between authorized representatives of both governments for the preparation of these negotiations Peace and security make it necessary for the German Democratic Republic and the West German Federal Republic to take such an attitude to each other as is common among many other states with different social systems which for many years, in Europe and all over the world, have been on good terms in accordance with international law, for their mutual benefit and advantage and on the basis of agreements binding in international law."
(Neues Deutschland, 22.7.1967.)

On September 18, 1967, Willi Stoph, Prime Minister of the GDR, addressed a new letter to Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Chancellor of the FRG. Willi Stoph reiterated his readiness for negotiations between the governments of the two German states on a basis of equality and submitted the draft of a treaty on the establishment and cultivation of normal relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

In the draft of this treaty it is stated that the relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany are relations between sovereign states of German nation which aim at peaceful coexistence and rapprochement and which are marked by the application of generally recognized principles of international law.

On this score the GDR proposed, "The governments of the two German states make an agreement on the renunciation of force. The government of the German Democratic Republic and the government of the Federal Republic engage themselves to base their mutual relations on the following principles:-

- respect of sovereignty, equality and non-interference in the internal affairs;
- respect of the territorial integrity of the European states and recognition of the existing frontiers in Europe, including the Oder-Neisse frontier and the frontier between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany;
- recognition of West Berlin as an independent political entity;
- recognition of the invalidity of the Munich agreement from the very beginning;
- renunciation by both German states of the access to nuclear arms in any form or piling up nuclear arms on its territories."

(Neues Deutschland, Berlin, 20.9.67.)

It was found out by public opinion polls in West Germany that due to this initiative of the GDR more than 50 per cent of the citizens of the Federal Republic have come to realize that the GDR must be recognized while up to 90 per cent demand direct negotiations between the government of the Federal Republic and the government of the GDR.

There is an ever wider circle of politically active forces in the Federal Republic who do not only advocate the recognition of the GDR and warn against the dangerous consequences of the current West German governmental policies, but also plead for a discussion of the GDR proposals and develop their own alternatives to Bonn. The scale of these forces ranges from workers to intellectuals, comprises large parts of the trade unions and the important youth organizations, and involves politicians of all parties represented in the Bundestag at present. Writers, publicists and clergymen also play an active part in the concentration of forces of peace and democracy in the Federal Republic. Prof. Dr. Harold Rasch's statement is very characteristic of these forces:

"The Grand Coalition has not shown so far that it has understood the real interests of the country. The letter of Willi Stoph, Chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers to Federal Chancellor Kiesinger on September 18th, 1967, put forward starting points for reasonable negotiations. The fact that he demanded the recognition of the GDR as an independent state entity and legal object of international law was no 'maximum claim' as the government and the biggest part of our press wants to make the people believe, but simply a matter-of-course." (Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, Stuttgart, November 1967.)

And a commentary entitled, "Détente Through Recognition" says;
"The cosmeticians of détente be told, 'the real road to détente only leads via the recognition of the political realities, that is GDR, Oder-Neisse frontier, the necessity of European security guaranteed by the renunciation of nuclear weapons and fixed frontiers'." (Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, Stuttgart, November 1967.)

The Federal Republic was created in violation of the Potsdam Agreement in 1949. It was founded with the aim of re-establishing the political and economic rule of Big Business first of all in the three Western zones to strive for a revision of the results of the Second World War.

But the solution of the national question of the German people required to learn the lessons of German history and to eliminate those forces from the political and economic power who are responsible for two world wars and two national catastrophes. These lessons of the German history were drawn in the East of Germany by the foundation of the German Democratic Republic which was an answer to the division of Germany and the breaking away of the three Western zones.

In the following period the government of the Federal Republic continued on its road to the deepening of the division of Germany by joining NATO and forming the Bundeswehr. The situation on German soil is at present marked by the existence of two sovereign German states with different political and social orders. In addition, there exists the independent political territory of West Berlin which does not belong to the Federal Republic according to international agreements.

Both the solution of the German question and above all the interests of European security today require as a first step the normalization of relations between the two German states. In this connection it must be noticed that these have to be set up on the basis of usual rules of international law thus representing themselves a factor promoting peace. That means that these relations must proceed from the equality of the two German states, from the respect of their sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs. These principles must also be taken into consideration vis-à-vis third states. After their normalization the relations between the two German states will show a particularity in that they are relations between two states of a German nation. From this result, for example, opportunities for the common cultivation of socio-historical traditions. But above all they can be the necessary first stage of a later unification of the two German states and West Berlin to a German national state which must show a peace-loving character with adequate guarantees according to the lessons of history and the

requirements of European security as well as in accord with the Potsdam Agreements and other agreements of the Powers of the anti-Hitler coalition.

The unified peace-loving Germany can thus only be a socialist Germany.

The road to a unified Germany will not be short. For a long period, the end of which cannot yet be foreseen, two social systems will coexist on German soil - just as in Europe on the whole. The regulation of the peaceful coexistence of the two German states whose primary condition is the normalization of their relations is therefore the nucleus of the settlement of the German question at present which is in the interest of the citizens of both states as well as of the European peoples.

Walter Ulbricht, Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, summed up the constructive proposals of the GDR for guaranteeing European security and solving the German question in his New Year message on the threshold of the year of 1968 in the following five proposals:-

- (1) We renew our proposal for the conclusion of a treaty on the renunciation of force between the governments of the two German states. It is my opinion that every West German who does not want to shoot at the GDR and its citizens can subscribe to this proposal;
- (2) We stick to our draft of a treaty on the establishment and cultivation of relations on an equal footing between the two German states which is lying on the table of the Bonn government;
- (3) We propose negotiations between the governments of the two German states as well as between the elected executive boards of the trade unions and other mass organizations on the complete disarmament of both German states, on the renunciation of the production, co-control and employment of nuclear weapons; on the prohibition of piling up nuclear war heads on the territories of the two German states and on the creation of a nuclear free zone in Central Europe.
- (4) Steps towards détente can be of real value only if the government of the West German Federal Republic renounces its aggressive sole representation pretension and revanchism in any form; recognizes the existing frontiers in Europe, including the frontier of the GDR with the West German Federal Republic, and bans any revanchist propaganda;
- (5) On the strength of the internationally valid Potsdam Agreement of the Four Powers, it is the duty of both German states and their citizens to liquidate militarism and nazism and to crush the hegemony of monopoly capital.

This has been done in the German Democratic Republic. In the West German Federal Republic this duty has not been fulfilled yet. The fulfilment of this duty is a basic condition for the future of the nation.

The German Democratic Republic and its citizens recognize their duty to help the peace-loving and democratic forces of the West German Federal Republic politically and morally in accomplishing these tasks set by the Potsdam Agreement.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE

Conference on Blocs, the German Problem and the Future of Europe

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SOME REMARKS ON THE GERMAN PROBLEM

by Dr. Imanuel Geiss,
Bonn.

For centuries Germany and the Germans have been a problem to their neighbours and to Europe as a whole in one form or another. Twice in this century, the haunting German problem became a nightmare for the rest of the world, and but for Vietnam, it would still be today.

Wars and conferences have been fought over the German problem, and although present anxieties may have been partly overshadowed by even bigger concerns, potentially the German problem continues to constitute a threat to European security.

But what is the German problem? For want of a rational definition by someone else, I venture to offer my own, provisionally and with trepidation, being intrinsically involved in it myself. The German problem, I submit, consists of finding an answer to the following question: How to organise the Germans, traditionally the second biggest nationality on the Continent, placed, as they are, in the centre of Europe, politically and from the point of view of power politics, in such a way that, in the long run, both the Germans and their neighbours are simultaneously satisfied. Such a solution has, so far, never been found. When Germany's neighbours were happy with the status quo, then, in the long run, the Germans were unhappy and reacted by trying to change it into their favour. On the other hand, when the Germans were happy with their lot, then their neighbours had reasons for fear or were actually threatened.

The main trouble with us Germans always was, and still is, that we are too numerous and occupying or claiming large territories, which, if united into one single State, would almost automatically set up German domination over Europe. Since a powerful centre was always a threat to Europe, Germany's neighbours were interested in keeping Germany weak.

The Germans, on the other hand, resented such a state of affairs and again and again tried to make the centre of Europe as powerful as possible. In their reaction against the inevitable excess of power, Germany's neighbours, in self-defence, had to destroy or reduce German power to more manageable proportions and in its turn this again provoked the Germans to restore their former power, etc., etc. So far, the history of the German problem has been a vicious circle which naturally defied any attempt at squaring it, and the Germans have not yet found the vision and the strength to break out of it.

In order to do so the Germans would have to see and to accept the basic dilemma which arises out of their numerical strength, central position in Europe, economic power, technical skill and (alas, all-too-well proven) military prowess: that all Germans can never be united in one State and be a first-class military power on the Continent at the same time. In other words, whether they realised it or not, whether they accepted it or not (and they never did), they had, have and always will have to choose between national unity and military weakness on the one hand, and military power and national division on the other. They cannot have it both ways, and every attempt in the past to enforce that elusive combination of national unity and military power landed them only in national catastrophe, the more painfully, the harder they had tried.

A rapid look at German history seen under such an angle will illustrate those abstract reasonings and may give some hints as to the possible solution of the perennial German problem. The Medieval "Roman" Empire of the Germans can be interpreted as the first attempt at establishing German hegemony over Europe. After the collapse of the Empire about 1250, Europe was accustomed for centuries to having a weak centre. There was in Germany, behind the continuing facade of the lingering Empire, a kind of confused power vacuum, or two great German Powers (Austria and Prussia) neutralised each other. The nominal end of the Old Empire in 1806 only provoked the clamour for another Empire, this time more powerful and efficient than the first one. In 1815 the European Powers, supported by the conservative instincts of Metternich, admitted nothing more than the German Confederation as a kind of "ersatz" for an Empire. It provided for a minimum of "national" unity and was so loose a political structure that it could threaten no one, but would have been powerful enough for legitimate self-defence, if the German Confederation had been attacked from outside. Nevertheless, the German Confederation was, in some respects, just as irrational a political structure as the Old Empire had been, for though it comprised practically all Germans, it also included many non-German minorities who had been conquered, annexed or otherwise acquired through dynastic arrangements by the two great German Powers, Austria and Prussia. Since the partitions of Poland, the possession of Polish territories, in particular, had become symbolic of German power in the East.

In the age of growing nationalism in the 19th century, the Germans became more and more dissatisfied with their German Confederation and also pressed for a clear-cut solution along more national lines. But there were two difficulties, which, in the end, helped towards the undoing of all German "national" aspirations. First of all, the Germans never were a nation in the modern sense, i.e. a political society within reasonably clear-cut frontiers, based on the principle of democracy and the sovereignty of the people, introduced by a democratic revolution or the threat of democratic revolution. German "nationalism", it seems, has always been a misunderstanding. There was (and is) no German nationalism, but only a "Reichspatriotism" at the best, chauvinism at the worst. Thus, the call for a German "national" state could only end in the creation of the second Reich. After a first attempt to re-constitute the Reich on a semi-revolutionary, parliamentary and liberal basis in 1848/49, the new Reich was created, as is known, by Bismarck in a rapid succession of three comparatively brief and easy wars. The Second German Empire was in fact a military monarchy, with a parliamentary facade, super-modern in its bureaucratic and technical machinery, and very soon also had a powerful economic basis; but it was anti-modern, even reactionary in its political and intellectual structures. The unification of most Germans in one "national" state (even if with cumbersome national minorities in the east, north and west who amounted to about ten per cent of the whole population) made the new Germany automatically the most powerful state in Europe.

Yet, at least in one respect, the Second Empire was a compromise, which seemed to offer a reasonable solution of the perennial German problem: the Second Empire had not achieved the absolute "national" unity of the Germans, i.e. it did not include all Germans, in particular not those of Austria, and its position in Europe was only one of latent or relative hegemony. Bismarck knew that his hard-fought compromise would be threatened the very moment Germany tried to overstep these limits and to achieve absolute "national" unity and absolute German hegemony over Europe. This is why, after 1871, he declared Germany to be "saturated", not only in order to dispel mistrust in European quarters about the new centre of power and to accustom Europe to the new Empire, but also to warn German chauvinists who were not satisfied with the "Lesser German" ("kleindeutsche") solution achieved by Bismarck and aimed at the "Greater German" ("grossdeutsche") solution.

However critical one may be of Bismarck and his work, one will have at least to admit that he had an insight into the subtle dialectics of the German problem. The rapid industrialisation of Germany soon after the creation of the Second Empire, the drive of German industry in the age of imperialism soon made Germany forget the relative restraint of Bismarck. German "Weltpolitik" tried to raise the Reich from the status of a continental power to a world power, equal only to the British Empire. The building of a powerful battle-fleet, second only to the British, meant that the most formidable military power challenged the first naval power by sea as well. German "Weltpolitik" inevitably led to a collision with all the other world powers and thus to World War I, which started over an apparently minor matter, the conflict of the young rising nations in the Balkans with the dynastic anachronism of the Dual Monarchy, the only German ally, and, as everyone knew, of doubtful value. In July 1914, Germany egged or even bullied Austria into war against Serbia; as Berlin perfectly well knew, this was bound to spark off at least a continental war with Russia and France, because she wanted not only to preserve her basis for a successful "Weltpolitik" (which would have been threatened by the disintegration of Austria-Hungary), but also her own conservative political structure, which would have been threatened by the victory of revolutionary and democratic nationalism over the dynastic Dual Monarchy.

It was only logical that the outbreak of World War I produced an outburst of chauvinism in Germany, which crystallised into fantastic war aims, both private and official, to expand German power both on the Continent and overseas in one form or another.

German policies in World War I represented the first German attempt in this century to establish German domination over Europe by war. In the end it failed miserably, and the negative results of the lost war were mitigated for defeated Germany only by the now overriding interest of the victorious allies in maintaining Germany intact as a bulwark against communism. Nevertheless, the terms of Versailles were too hard to swallow for the proud Germans, and it is hard to say what rankled more in their minds and thus infested public opinion of the Weimar Republic from the outset: the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France or the resurrection of a genuinely independent Poland, which was even handed over ex-German provinces, (but with Polish majorities); or the loss of colonies or the so-called "war guilt clause" (article 231 of the Versailles Treaty) ("Dictat" in German nomenclature); or whether it was the loss of the German battlefleet, submarines and airforce, or the reduction of the army to a professional force of 100,000 men; or whether it was the demilitarization of the Rhineland or the permanent veto of the Allies on Austria's Anschluss, which prevented in 1919 what would have been - in the hour of Germany's defeat - her greatest political triumph, the achievement of the "Greater German" solution. The fact that the overwhelming majority of Germans bitterly resented those terms and did not see that they were objectively well founded and on the whole just shows that

the Germans as a political unit had not yet learned the lesson of either World War I or of the dialectics of the German problem.

The Weimar Republic, behind a democratic and parliamentary facade, tried, in effect, hardly more than to re-establish a basis for the restoration of the power of the Reich. It was therefore only a brief interlude between the Second Reich and the Third Reich. The transition was fluid, as domestic developments in 1918/19 and 1930/33 show. The foreign policy of the Third Reich in its first phase executed the programme of the Weimar Republic, which was, by and large, fulfilled by 1938. It was only in March 1939, by marching into Prague and annexing rump-Czechoslovakia under the guise of a "Reichsprotectorat", that Hitler overstepped those boundaries that a majority of Germans thought legitimate. Yet, when World War II started in September 1939 against Poland, there was no more than anxiety in Germany because Britain and France might intervene. World War II was the attempt to improve upon the performance of 1914 under more favourable circumstances.

As long as the Third Reich seemed a success there was no effective opposition. Just as in World War I, Germany tried to fight simultaneously against East and West, again with a marked difference: with comparative (by German standards) restraint and roughly within the limits of international law in the West, with utmost savagery in the East. As in 1918/19 Germany tried to play off West against East, after defeat became obvious. Most of the German opposition, which culminated in the abortive coup of the 20th July 1944, opted for an arrangement with the Western Powers in order to continue the war against the Soviet Union. In the last months of the war, many Nazi leaders pressed Hitler the same way because they became certain of defeat, and in the end, even Himmler tried his hand in establishing contacts with Western allies to fight communism. This was also the policy of the last German Government under Admiral Dönitz. In fact, despite Hitler's refusal, during the last months, after the Western Allies had crossed the Rhine in March 1945, the German front in the West was practically opened to the advancing Allied armies, while fighting against the Red Army went on as stubbornly as possible.

After defeat, the German middle class in Western Germany supported by most leaders of the SPD, simply picked up where they had to leave off in 1932. Their programme was a moderate version of German chauvinism of the early thirties, subdued by the force of circumstances. Their political strategy became that of the German opposition - banking on the West and on the Communist scare. They would never admit that their programme was also identical with that of Himmler and Dönitz in extremis.

The strategy of playing up anti-Communism, of course, appealed to the conservative traditions of German society, and, ultimately, also of American and British society. With the help of an anti-Communist platform Konrad Adenauer and the CDU/CSU, indirectly supported by a sham opposition by the SPD under Kurt Schumacher, later under the effective leadership of Herbert Wehner, succeeded in building up firstly the economic power, then the military power of Western Germany to such an extent that, twenty years after World War II, the Federal Republic had become the first economic and military power on the Continent after the Soviet Union.

For all the brilliant success of West German political strategy, the leaders of the Federal republic could not escape the dialectics of the German problem. In 1945 the choice - so unpleasant to German patriots - between military weakness and national unity on the one hand, and military power and national division on the other, cropped up again.

After Potsdam, the Germans had to choose between maintaining national unity in one form or another at the price of future military weakness or trying to build up West Germany as a bulwark against "Aggressive" Communism at the price of national division. In the first years after the traumatic defeat of 1945, the first solution offered itself as the only reasonable one, and even Konrad Adenauer then posed as its champion. Very soon, however, as early as 1948, Adenauer prepared first secret plans for a future re-armament of Western Germany. The one man who provided the vital contacts with the Americans to prepare the change of alliances and the funds for financing the secret planning, was General Gehlen, chief of the German intelligence service of the Wehrmacht against the Soviet Union during the war. The overwhelming tradition of thinking in terms of power politics, of German Reichspatriotism and of Anti-Communism, however, very soon overcame the phase of political sanity which seemed to have prevailed right after 1945 in Germany. Traditional patriotism had only been paralysed for the time by the shattering defeat of 1945, not destroyed for good. With the foundation of the Federal Republic in 1949 the conservative forces, ably represented and led by Adenauer, openly came to power. In 1950 Adenauer used the Korea scare to impose the rearmament of the Federal Republic on a public opinion and a population that were at first stunned and reluctant, but were very soon persuaded into accepting rearmament as inevitable and profitable. In March 1952 the Soviet offer of a neutralized, armed and unified Germany was brushed aside by Bonn and the Western Allies as an obstacle to West German rearmament within NATO. In January 1955, shortly before the Federal Republic formally joined NATO, the Soviet Union repeated its offer, now coupled with the warning that, with West Germany in NATO, there would be no German re-unification. Again the warning was scoffed at. Again in 1957/58, when Bonn started clamouring for atomic weapons, the Soviet Union countered by warning that German control over atomic weapons would make German re-unification even less likely.

West German rearmament under American pressure as part of the cold war, complicated the German problem almost irreparably and made it - once again - highly explosive. Although Adenauer and his propaganda had claimed that West German rearmament would lead almost automatically to German re-unification "in peace and freedom", German re-unification henceforth became totally illusory. Adenauer and the Americans were helped in imposing rearmament on the Federal Republic by the traditionally conservative and anti-communist structure of German society and also by the heavy-handed and widely unpopular régime in Eastern Germany. Nevertheless, the dialectics of the German problem gradually made out of the Soviet zone another German state, the GDR. It was and is the logical product of the incompatibility of power and national unity on German soil. Because of historical handicaps, any reasonable consolidation had been denied to the GDR for more than a decade: her territory was less and more unevenly industrialized than the Federal Republic; because of the American refusal in 1946 to allow the Soviet reparations to be taken from West German current industrial production, the Soviet Zone and later the GDR, had to carry the burden of (morally legitimate) reparations for all Germany until 1955, when in the Federal Republic the "economic miracle", largely manipulated by political expediency, was already in full swing. Finally, because of the greater economic attractions of the Federal Republic and the political clumsiness and rigidity of the GDR even in its officially post-Stalinist era, about three million people left the GDR up to 1961.

The permanent "voting by their feet" was welcome to the Federal Republic for two reasons: economically, the refugees provided a fairly regular supply for the rapidly expanding West German industry. Politically, it had an unmeasurable propaganda value in Bonn's fight against East Berlin. When, in November 1958, the Soviet Union raised the question of the status of Berlin, the exodus from the East reached enormous proportions. The so-called "Berlin ultimatum" was

cleverly exploited by West German propaganda, both officially and privately, in particular by the press of Axel Caesar Springer, who in early 1958 decided to go into politics with his press concern. The success of the "economic miracle", of rearmament and the apparent willingness of the Americans to appease resurgent German chauvinism even on the point of atomic weapons, made German chauvinism cock-sure. By summer 1961 the situation had become so critical for the GDR that, in a kind of political desperation, the wall in Berlin was built to stop the exodus into West Germany.

The political consequences were shattering. In both West and East Germany there was a feeling of deep shock. In the GDR people were embittered and many may have regretted not having gone to West Germany earlier. But after the first shock had worn off and people realised that life had to go on, the wall, however disagreeable even to its builders, began to show those political results one could reasonably expect if the Government of the GDR made the best of it: economically, the GDR began to recover, now that there was no longer any danger of being bled white to the advantage of the Federal Republic. People came to terms with the existing political order, which, in its turn, began to relax its pressure on the population, even though in a rather jerky and uncertain way. On the whole, the GDR did consolidate politically, internally, and, to a certain extent, also externally, in spite of the constant propaganda barrage directed against her from Bonn and in spite of the emotional handicap constituted by the wall in Berlin, which rendered German division visible and concrete in its most literal sense. The GDR, however reluctantly, has at last been accepted by her own population as their state, and is being widely accepted in the international world, although, for political reasons, formal diplomatic recognition is still lacking outside the Communist countries.

Perhaps even more complicated were the consequences of the Berlin wall in the Federal Republic. At first the reaction bordered upon collective hysteria, in particular amongst the SPD and in Berlin. The SPD tried to overtake the CDU/CSU on the right, while Adenauer and even Strauss were surprisingly calm. A few weeks before and after the weeks of the elections of September 1961, a note of despondent realism crept into the general excitement, again surprisingly nourished by such Conservative groups as that represented by the Catholic Conservative weekly "Rheinischer Merkur". Then it dawned upon some people that, as it was said, the time was coming when the Federal Republic would have to settle the debts of 1945 which had remained unpaid ever since. But after the new Adenauer Government had been formed, the old rot continued, at least superficially. National demagoguery flourished and the Federal Republic, as a whole, moved even further to the right. This development was strengthened by another consequence of the wall. Now, that the steady source of cheap labour had been abruptly stopped, cheap labour came as a kind of sub-proletariat from Southern Europe, Turkey and Algeria. As a result, a substantial part of the West German population developed a new kind of xenophobia, which was avidly exploited by West German neo-chauvinism.

The main political consequence of the Berlin Wall, however, was to make all Germans see that the strategy of re-unification by a policy of strength had miserably failed and some Germans began to realise the dialectics of the German problem. From that time on, a certain polarisation in West German public opinion set in, at first hardly noticeable. On the other hand, the wave of neo-chauvinism was mounting in all political parties. The visible part of the iceberg was to take the organisational form of the NPD, which, ironically, only helped the rest of the world to see and understand the new dangers from that direction. West German neo-chauvinism only hardened its will to enforce a solution of the German problem along its own lines, i.e. re-unification of Germany within NATO

(no neutralization), return to the frontiers of 1937 in the East, and control over atomic weapons. This became more or less the official programme of all three major political parties in Adenauer's last years as Chancellor and under Erhard (1963-1966). More than ever before the arguments of national "self-determination" and of "equality" for the Germans were advanced. Officially, no one took note that such a political programme could only be fulfilled by war. On the other hand, the group of those who had always opposed German re-unification gradually became larger and larger. Until 1958 they had pleaded for German re-unification on the basis of neutralization. After the CDU/CSU had rearmed the Federal Republic and now used the slogan of German re-unification, as it were, offensively, they were prepared to accept Germany's division for the sake of peace in Europe and pleaded for some kind of political arrangement with the GDR. Since the wall, they had gradually won adherents, in particular amongst intellectuals, since about 1964 also amongst students. Although there does exist a political party which holds the same line, the "Deutsche Friedensunion", that group is politically unorganised, because the DFU, so far, has been ineffective. Yet its influence has spread under the Grand Coalition to the point that Chancellor Kiesinger dubbed it the "Anerkennungspartei" (the party for recognising the GDR). The new, but politically unorganised, "Anerkennungspartei" may perhaps remain without parliamentary representation, but the logic of events will probably ensure its victory, perhaps even within the established parties.

By the end of 1966, the crisis of the Federal Republic had developed to such a point that some drastic measures seemed inevitable: the economic miracle at last showed signs of coming to an end, the discrepancy between the economic and military power of West Germany on the one hand, and her unsatisfactory political status in the world on the other, had made a new chauvinism respectable, as represented by Strauss and Springer, in its more extreme (or open) form by the NPD, which, however, raised new and old suspicions abroad. The new wave of chauvinism had neither been successful in furthering re-unification nor the revision of the Oder-Neisse-frontier nor control over atomic weapons by the Federal Republic. It was in order to save the CDU/CSU from total bankruptcy that the party dropped Erhard and turned to the SPD, who, under Wehner, was only too willing, at last, to join the Government. The Cabinet of the Grand Coalition proclaimed the need for a new policy towards the East and even the GDR. Although, so far, there has been no dramatic change in its substance, but only in its verbiage, it would be unfair and unwise to deny that, for all necessary scepticism until real deeds are forthcoming, certain changes have taken place and are taking place. This will require some explanation in order to avoid mis-understandings:

Since the official general programme of the Federal Republic as outlined above (German re-unification within NATO and without massive guarantees to Germany's neighbours and the other interested powers, return to the frontiers of 1937 and control over atomic weapons) could only be implemented by another war, and, on the other hand, the Government and the political parties always affirmed that they would try to realise it only by peaceful means, it had become obvious that one day the leaders of the Federal Republic would have to make up their minds about priorities: whether national unity and power for Germany, or peace in Europe and the world, was more important to them. In other words: they will either have to abandon their claim to peaceful methods for reaching an unrealistic goal (and make war, as has been discretely advocated privately for years, or they will have to abandon their unrealistic goal in order to preserve peace. That day of decision is rapidly approaching or has perhaps already come. The significance of the Grand Coalition in that process is at present hard to gauge, unless one is prepared to fall back on crude classification. One reason is that the process of political re-orientation in the Federal Republic is just beginning, another is

that because of the growing tendencies in the Federal Republic towards a kind of parliamentary oligarchy, institutionalised by the Grand Coalition, it is particularly hard for an outsider to know and judge the true reasoning of the ruling oligarchs. But the following provisional analysis seems to make sense: it is more than probable that the fathers of the Grand Coalition, originally, just wanted to carry on the old, discredited policies of neo-chauvinism, but now more elastically and cleverly disguised behind fine words about a new policy etc. Yet by the logic of their new verbiage they already have, probably against their wish, changed the climate of public opinion considerably, so that heresies of only a few years ago are now becoming commonplace. This new climate will, on the one hand, certainly drive the right even more to the right and help the NPD to a spectacular victory at the polls in 1969 (20 - 25% of the votes, my private guess). This will be the moment of the real crisis because the right wing of the CDU/CSU under Strauss might be tempted and even strong enough to co-operate with the NPD, either informally, the NPD remaining in the "opposition" from the right, or formally by a CDU/CSU-NPD coalition government.

On the other hand, the logic of the status quo and of events in Europe may force, rather reluctantly to be sure, the ruling oligarchy into a direction which would lead to a tacit dropping of the unrealistic and dangerous programme, even if behind a camouflage of "national" propaganda. This would strengthen the forces of sanity in the Federal Republic, and they, together with a re-opened oligarchy might be able to master the impending crisis. In any case, we are in the midst of a political polarisation in the Federal Republic, which will become ever more pronounced by the present or coming economic crisis. The elements of both political sanity and insanity are growing in Germany. The ruling oligarchy, as represented by the Grand Coalition, have probably less created than marked a new phase in German history when, for the first time an open situation is developing again, when signs for not only bad solutions prevail (as usually), but also signs pointing to a sensible solution of the German problem. The Grand Coalition may either break down under the pull of such divergent forces within German society or may join the elements of sanity, because they are at least paying lip-service to a solution of sanity.

The solution will have to come from inside Germany. The outside world can help in that very complicated and delicate process by remaining on the alert, but refraining from crude and heavy-handed interference. The world should neither indulge in undue optimism, leading to a new kind of appeasing German neo-chauvinism, nor in undue pessimism, condemning all Germans wholesale as hopeless political idiots or criminals. Any solution of the German problem must first be worked out by the Germans themselves, accepted by them politically and emotionally and then will have to be translated into terms and treaties of international law. The main job will have to be done by the elements of sanity in the Federal Republic themselves. They have to overcome the demagogic slogans of "self-determination" and "equality" for the Germans, slogans, which in the past and in the present, only serve as a camouflage for ambitious power politics. They have to make the majority of Germans realise the dialectics of the German problem, which they cannot run away from unless they want to face the punishment of losing everything. They must convince their compatriots that the perennial German problem can only be solved if Germany accepts a second rank position amongst the powers of the world.

The only solution possible, of course, is not new and has become commonplace for the world outside Germany: since the Federal Republic consistently spurned the solution of German re-unification on the basis of military weakness, neutralization and international control, she has to accept the only other alternative: the division of Germany, an arrangement with the GDR to the point of diplomatic

recognition, recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier as permanent, no atomic weapons for the Federal Republic in one form or another. Only then will it be possible again to have normal human relations between the population of the two German States, which have arisen on the territory of the former German Reich since 1945. Such a solution must not, necessarily, exclude a long-term development leading to solution No. 1 (unification plus neutralisation), but this would be a very long and complicated process, probably taking decades. Without accepting, without mental reserves, the second solution, the first solution will hardly ever be possible. But even if Germany is never again re-united in one form or another, the Germans ought to realise that there is no law in nature, history or politics which lays down that all members of a language-group have to live in one state. If circumstances run counter to their political unity and if members of that language group lack the political skill to bring it about and maintain it, they will have to put up with other solutions. This is such common-sense that no further word needs to be wasted here.

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INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL DE LA PAIX

La Conférence sur les blocs, le problème allemand et l'avenir de l'Europe

Vienne, les 6 et 7 mars 1968

L' OCCIDENT ET L'UNITE ALLEMANDE *

I - Les fondements historiques du problème

par le Pr Georges Goriely
de l'Institut d'Etudes Européennes
Bruxelles.

Le traité de Moscou a été presque universellement accueilli avec faveur. Il faut pourtant convenir qu'il n'y a pas de proportion entre les espoirs qu'il a fait naître et son objet propre des plus restreints. En effet il ne constitue même pas l'amorce d'un quelconque désarmement. Les grandes puissances conservent intégralement leur effroyable pouvoir de destruction planétaire et rien ne les empêche de l'augmenter encore. Même pour ce qui est son objet propre, l'interdiction des essais nucléaires, sur terre et dans l'espace, n'est pas complète ; les Etats se sont réservés de revenir sur leurs engagements au cas où elles s'y sentiraient contraintes par des raisons impérieuses de sécurité. Aussi n'est-ce pas par ce qu'il consacre, mais par ce qu'il annonce que le pacte de Moscou prend sa signification. Vers quoi doit-il déboucher ? Vers la stabilisation et l'organisation de la coexistence, vers le pacte de non-agression dont M. Spaak s'est fait un des principaux promoteurs entre les puissances du NATO et celles du pacte de Varsovie. Ici il s'agirait d'un acte d'une toute autre portée. Certains diront pourtant : "L'un et l'autre de ces systèmes d'alliance ne s'affirment-ils pas strictement défensifs ? En quoi un pacte pourrait-il fournir un surcroît de non-agressivité à ce qui toujours a été proclamé tel,". Et bien, non, ici il y aurait un changement fondamental. C'est que, si de part et d'autre, on proclame ses intentions pacifiques, encore se refuse-t-on à les reconnaître à l'adversaire. La raison d'être de chacun de ces systèmes d'alliance, c'est une ambition expansionniste illimitée prêtée à l'autre ; volonté d'hégémonie mondiale attribuée ici au communisme, nature impérialiste prétendument inhérente au capitalisme.

UN PACTE DE NON-AGRESSION

Faire un pacte de non-agression, c'est non seulement reconnaître l'intérêt mutuel à éviter l'anéantissement atomique, mais aussi reconnaître la possibi-

* Le Professeur Goriely n'a pu, pour des raisons de santé, terminer le texte qu'il préparait pour cette conférence. Il nous a suggéré de le remplacer par un article qu'il écrivit pour "Le Cahier" en 1963 et dans lequel il expose les éléments de base de son point de vue sur le problème. Voici la reproduction de cet article.

lité de forme positive de coexistence et peut-être de coopération, le caractère durable à échéance historiquement prévisible de l'existence simultanée de deux types d'organisation politique, économique et sociale.

Dans cette perspective, les divers systèmes d'organisation unissant les Etats appartenant à chacun de ces systèmes cessent d'apparaître au regard de l'autre comme des entreprises de domination à visée expansionniste, mais comme pouvant constituer des formes positives de solidarité et de coopération.

Bref, un pacte de non-agression serait non seulement la reconnaissance d'un fait qu'aucun homme ne nie à savoir l'existence de deux blocs, mais aussi comme une légitimation réciproque du principe (je ne dis pas des modalités) de ceux-ci en tant que volonté plus ou moins bien réalisée de solidarité et d'organisation.

Pour arriver à pareil résultat, deux conditions sont indispensables.

1^o Il faut qu'il n'y ait pas de contestation territoriale. Pratiquement cela revient à admettre sur ce plan le statu quo. Attitude qui a, il ne faut pas se leurrer, un aspect moralement choquant. On consacre un partage auquel il serait vain de conférer quelque fondement moral ou juridique, car il n'est qu'un produit de la répartition de la puissance dans le monde, répartition dont le traité de Yalta reste le triste symbole. Mais il y a des réalités qu'il faut avoir la lucidité, et le courage, de reconnaître franchement, justement si l'on veut en transformer certains aspects fondamentaux. Reconnaître un certain statu quo territorial est la seule façon de surmonter, de dégeler le statu quo dans les relations.

2^o Il faut non seulement reconnaître le fait du grand schisme lié à l'existence de deux ensembles idéologiques, politiques, économiques, militaires divergents, mais encore chercher à s'accomoder moralement de ce fait. La non-contestation morale est bien plus difficile que la non-contestation territoriale, car elle ne peut pas s'appuyer comme cette dernière sur le simple effroi de l'apocalypse atomique. Elle demande un effort d'adaptation intellectuel et affectif profond. Car le propre de la guerre froide avait été la contestation morale radicale de l'autre. Seul on représentait un régime conforme à la nature de l'homme, aux exigences morales fondamentales de la société, à la volonté de Dieu ou à l'évolution nécessaire de l'histoire. L'autre n'était qu'un condamné en sursis livré à ses derniers soubressauts, ou le produit d'une aberration nécessairement passagère. Telle était en bref l'attitude du Secrétaire d'Etat Dulles, telle était aussi la position du communisme dans sa version stalinienne ou simplement dogmatique. Pareille attitude ne doit pas conduire à la guerre chaude, car l'angoisse atomique reste, pour les hommes n'ayant pas perdu jusqu'à la dernière trace de raison, plus forte que tous les refus moraux. Mais au mieux elle est une perpétuation de la guerre froide, elle exclut toute forme quelconque de dialogue.

Les pires conséquences touchent à la politique intérieure. En effet, toute expression de la pensée et des aspirations de l'adversaire ne peut avoir qu'un effet pervertissant, puisqu'aussi bien il représente le mal radical. D'où contrôle policier, voire mesures de terreur vis-à-vis de tout ce qui est censé provenir de l'ennemi. En revanche, la coexistence véritable est avant tout une prise de conscience relativiste à l'endroit de soi-même. On est prêt à reconnaître quelque mérite historique, quelque efficacité, quelque avenir à l'autre, et on essaye même de chercher un terrain commun de préoccupation, on manifeste une volonté d'enrichissement mutuelle.

Or, si ces deux conditions semblent correspondre à une évolution qui s'esquisse de manière encore confuse au niveau général des relations Est-Ouest,

cette évolution n'est nullement entamée dans les deux Allemagnes. Il subsiste ici une contestation aussi bien territoriale qu'idéologique qui, tant qu'elle demeurera ce qu'elle est, exclut tout pacte de non-agression, non seulement entre les deux Etats concernés, mais entre les deux blocs dont ils sont des pièces maîtresses.

Nous avons en effet à faire à deux gouvernements qui, avec des modalités variées et non parfois sans embarras, prétendent être chacun le seul gouvernement de l'ensemble de l'Allemagne, et qui, en principe, dénie toute légitimité à l'existence même de l'autre. L'un de ces Etats, nous le connaissons tous, et son existence ne fait, du moins en Occident, pas de problème : C'est la République Fédérale. Pour l'autre au contraire, le problème se pose avant même que l'état en question soit désigné, car la manière de l'appeler représente une prise de position.

COMMENT APPELER "L'AUTRE" ALLEMAGNE ?

Faut-il la désigner "République démocratique allemande" ? C'est lui reconnaître l'existence que ses dirigeants cherchent à lui conférer, et de plus utiliser un qualificatif qui peut difficilement nous apparaître adéquat. "Soi-disant RDA" ? C'est nier ce qui au moins en tant que fait s'impose à tous. "Zone d'occupation soviétique" ? Il est vrai que nous vivons à une époque où, à l'Est comme à l'Ouest, occupation et présence militaire protectrice sont, dans les faits, malaisés à distinguer. On est passé également en République Fédérale de l'un à l'autre sans que la grande masse se soit aperçue du changement. Il n'empêche que même s'il y a présence militaire soviétique, il y a aussi, dans cette région, une réalité gouvernementale allemande qui est tout autre chose qu'une pure fiction, et qui est même moins alignée qu'on le croit, même si ce non-alignement se fait dans le mauvais sens.

"Allemagne centrale" ? Telle est en effet la désignation la plus fréquente dans la République fédérale, mais ceci veut dire qu'il subsiste encore, dans la conscience publique, une Allemagne plus à l'Est, au-delà de l'Oder-Neisse.

"Allemagne de l'Est" ? C'est au contraire reconnaître qu'il n'y a plus d'Allemagne au-delà. Comme nos diplomates ne veulent clairement qu'il soit conclu à aucune de ces interprétations, ce n'est pas un mince problème que de simplement désigner l'Etat dont il est question.

Comme au moins sur un point, nous voudrions que notre pensée ne prête pas à équivoque, nous parlerons sans ambage d'Allemagne de l'Est. Ce qui nous amène à évoquer le problème de la frontière de l'Oder-Neisse.

Fort souvent, ce problème est confondu avec celui de la réunification. Or, il y a ici deux problèmes, pénibles pour une conscience nationale restée traditionnelle, mais par ailleurs sans lien entre eux. Il n'y a aucune relation entre l'existence présente de deux Etats et la perte des anciens territoires orientaux. La première des situations n'est pas une violence spécifique faite au peuple allemand, mais le résultat de la répartition globale de la puissance dans le monde. Elle se situe très à peu près sur l'Elbe, elle aurait pu se situer aussi bien sur la Vistule ou sur le Rhin ou sur la Meuse, ou sur un quelconque parallèle ou méridien, le rapport des forces en eût été peut-être altéré, mais le problème en fût resté identique dans son fond moral et politique.

LE REFOULEMENT AU PROFIT DES SLAVES

La division de l'Allemagne n'est en l'occurrence qu'un aspect de la division générale de l'Europe. En revanche, la perte des régions d'au-delà du rideau de

fer est née d'un indiscutable désir de refoulement de la présence germanique dans une vaste région de l'Europe orientale et centrale, car d'autres régions que le Reich de 1937 ont connu un sort identique. Ce fut une action cruelle, atroce même par moments, indiscutablement contraire à notre sentiment des droits de l'homme ; elle fut malheureusement la conséquence de pratiques encore plus terribles du régime hitlérien qui, en dehors de toute opération militaire, massacra 6 millions de Polonais et au moins 10 millions de Soviétiques. Et par delà même la frénésie hitlérienne, il y eut le vieux "Drang nach Osten", le sentiment, qui n'a nullement commencé avec l'hitlérisme, selon lequel le monde slave, polonais et tchèque au premier chef, n'était qu'un domaine de colonisation germanique. Car il est inattendu de voir les Allemands se réclamer de la frontière de 1937, alors que non seulement en 1937 mais même de 1919 à 1932, il ne se trouva aucun Allemand responsable, et soit dit en passant, les communistes moins que quiconque d'autre, pour s'accorder à cette frontière, pour ne pas considérer que le fameux corridor, le statut de Dantzig ou le partage de la Haute Silésie ne constituaient pas l'abomination de la désolation. Il n'est d'ailleurs nullement prouvé qu'un régime non-communiste eût agi différemment, et je suis même tenté de croire qu'une Pologne des colonels ou une Russie tsariste ou même démocratique eussent pu mettre moins de frein à la frénésie vengeresse, que nullement par humanité mais par calcul politique, sut y mettre à sa façon Staline.

L'expulsion des 10 millions d'hommes de régions qui indiscutablement avaient été leurs, la perte pour le seul Reich de 1937 d'un territoire représentant 133.000 km², un quart de l'Allemagne alors, sont à mettre au compte des cataclysmes qu'a inévitablement entraînés la guerre hitlérienne. La grande majorité des Allemands en sont au fond d'eux-mêmes conscients et la manière dont le problème des réfugiés a été résolu dans la République Fédérale fait, au total, honneur au peuple allemand. Les réfugiés posent moins de problèmes à la République Fédérale que n'en posent en France les rapatriés d'Afrique du Nord, douze fois moins nombreux. Mais c'est là encore un de ces points où la République Fédérale se montre plus raisonnable dans ses actes que dans ses principes : l'étroitesse conservatrice, le manque d'imagination, la crainte aussi des difficultés électorales que pourraient provoquer les réfugiés (celle de voir notamment se reconstituer un parti des "Vertriebene" aujourd'hui éliminé de la scène politique), tout cela fait que le gouvernement fédéral ne veut pas clairement reconnaître une situation avec laquelle il s'est en fait accommodé, et qui aux yeux de tous est devenue irréversible, car même un refoulement imaginable, du communisme, ne suffirait pas à entraîner un retour expansif du germanisme. Malheureusement l'équivoque qui continue à s'attacher à la politique de Bonn en ce domaine a des conséquences fâcheuses ; c'est elle qui est à l'origine de cette solidarité véritablement contre-nature entre Gomulka et Ulbricht.

LES DEUX ETATS

Tout autre est le problème que pose le partage de ce qui reste de l'Allemagne entre Aix-la-Chapelle et Francfort-sur-Oder. Ici la décision n'est pas liée à une volonté de refoulement national, mais au désir pour l'un comme pour l'autre bloc de mettre dans son camp la partie de l'Allemagne dont il avait la charge. Situation qui, au premier abord, se présente sous un jour simple. Il y a deux Etats allemands intégrés chacun dans les deux blocs respectifs, fort bien intégrés, trop bien même par rapport à ce qu'est devenue l'évolution récente des relations entre Washington et Moscou. C'est une situation dont en fait chacun semble avoir relativement bien pris son parti. Il n'est pas très sûr que beaucoup ne trouvent pas cette situation préférable à bien d'autres : si l'on apprécie vivement le précieux surcroît de puissance qu'apporte la partie d'Allemagne que l'on possède dans son camp, peut-être n'en souhaite-t-on

pas tellement davantage, car une Allemagne de 75.000.000 d'habitants risquerait d'être un allié encombrant.

On ne le dit nulle part, mais plus d'un s'est fait cette réflexion, à Washington et à Moscou, à Paris, à Londres, à Varsovie et à Prague. Vraisemblablement aucun homme d'Etat responsable de l'Ouest comme de l'Est ne se pose le problème de la réunification autrement que comme argument de propagande à usage interne allemand. Aussi d'ailleurs veille-t-on, dans les faits, à ce que cette situation ne connaisse pas trop de branle. Comparée à d'autres situations semblables de non reconnaissance d'un certain statut territorial - songez aux relations entre Pékin et Tai-Peh, entre Hanoi et Saigon, entre Israël et ses voisins arabes -, les relations entre les deux Allemagnes sont vraiment fort calmes. Il y a deux entités qui certes contestent, aussi violemment que faire se peut, leur légitimité respective, mais qui quand même dans la pratique veillent à ce que cette contestation ne prenne pas une allure violente et incontrôlée. On s'arrange pour maintenir certaines relations élémentaires en matière de transport, de communications postales, de relations commerciales surtout, lesquelles ne sont nullement négligeables, puisque elles s'élèvent presque à un milliard de marks dans chaque direction. Et pourtant cette acceptation prudente dans les faits reste un refus absolu en droit.

Pourquoi? Il y a d'abord évidemment la situation de Berlin-Ouest qui assurément complique tout. Si j'aborda ce problème-là j'aurais bien trop à en dire, aussi le mettrai-je cette fois entre parenthèses.

C'est permis, à mon sens, dans la mesure où contrairement à ce que l'on croit d'habitude, Berlin n'est pas la cause de différends opposant et chacune des Allemagnes, et les grands alliés de celles-ci, mais bien la conséquence de ce différend. Si l'on parvenait à régulariser la co-existence des deux Etats allemands, la solution du problème de Berlin serait aisée. Or qu'est-ce qui ne va pas de ce côté? Pourquoi met-on tant de difficultés à reconnaître ce dont on a pris généralement son parti, assez allégrement même? C'est que cette évolution vers la constitution de deux Etats a toujours été niée dans son principe. Cette évolution s'est faite au rebours de ce qui avait été proclamé comme l'intention des grands vainqueurs de 1945. Ceux-ci avaient en effet, à la conférence de Potsdam, envisagé le maintien d'un ensemble unitaire qui, conformément à l'aboutissement classique de toute guerre, signerait la paix avec ses vainqueurs et retrouverait sa place d'Etat libre et souverain, non sans avoir d'ailleurs connu un long purgatoire, des restrictions et des contrôles lourds et nombreux, certains permanents même. En fait Potsdam fut le dernier accord définissant une volonté commune d'action des trois vainqueurs auxquels la France était invitée à se joindre, face à la nation qu'ils avaient ensemble vaincue dans des conditions si pénibles. Dès qu'ils furent installés sur place, il y eut un bouleversement complet du système d'alliance et l'avenir de l'Allemagne se fit sous le signe non d'une entente de ses vainqueurs, mais de la rivalité exacerbée entre eux. Les derniers à devoir s'en plaindre sont assurément les Allemands eux-mêmes qui ont profité de cette situation au-delà de ce qu'auraient pu espérer les plus optimistes. Les restrictions et les contrôles, qui s'annonçaient fort lourds, tombèrent rapidement et, économiquement, les Allemands se trouvèrent au contraire même encouragés, à l'Ouest certes, mais bientôt aussi à l'Est, à donner leur pleine mesure, à dépasser, et de très loin, une production d'avant-guerre, qu'on tenait en 1945 pour redoutable. Les Allemands se sont trouvés être réhabilités, se sont trouvés reprendre leur place et leur poids dans le monde avec une rapidité que vraiment personne n'eût en 1945 tenue pour possible. Et, alors que, situation vraiment sans précédent, les Allemands occupent une position de choix

dans l'un et l'autre système d'alliance, ils sont censés être encore en guerre avec leurs alliés.

C'est que le traité de paix supposait un Etat successeur; or bientôt il s'en trouva exister deux. Cela n'était pas en soi incompatible avec pareil traité: en 1914 l'Autriche-Hongrie représentait internationalement une seule entité étatique qui fut seule à déclarer la guerre, et c'est avec deux Etats totalement distincts qu'à Saint-Germain et à Trianon, fut signée la paix. Mais tout le monde reconnaissait l'existence de ces deux Etats et même ils se reconnaissaient réciproquement. Or rien de tel en l'occurrence. La nature des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest après 1945 excluait toute politique convergente, même l'idée de neutralisation, qui a pu s'imposer pour l'Autriche et encore seulement dans la phase post-stalinienne, semblait exclue pour l'Allemagne, car celle-ci représentait un poids trop considérable pour qu'on se risquât à la livrer à elle-même, pour que, de part et d'autre, on ne sollicitât son concours, ne serait-ce que pour devancer les sollicitations prévues de l'adversaire.

Chacun était trop intéressé à avoir dans son jeu une portion du pays pour qu'une autre solution que celle qui s'est imposée fût en définitive concevable. Au moins eût-on pu concevoir un accord sur le désaccord. Or, même cela n'a pas marché, car si on ne songeait pas dans les faits à refouler l'autre des positions qu'il détenait, encore voulait-on avoir pour soi la force que représentait l'idée nationale allemande, le surcroît d'autorité que pouvait donner au régime, dont on avait suscité la naissance, le fait qu'il se proclamait seul représentatif de l'ensemble de la population.

LES SOVIETIQUES ONT FAVORISE LA RENAISSANCE DU NATIONALISME

Les premiers à avoir songé à tourner à leur profit les dispositions nationalistes des Allemands, sont les Soviétiques. En effet, à une époque où l'image que se faisaient les Occidentaux de ce que devait être la configuration future de l'Allemagne était fort imprécise, et où même les Français étaient ouvertement hostiles à toute unité, Moscou, et en tout cas les forces allemandes qui avaient son appui, se faisaient passionnément champions de l'unité et de l'intégration de l'Allemagne, à l'Ouest de l'Oder-Neisse. Le nationalisme des communistes allemands est un phénomène fort ancien. Sous Weimar, le parti communiste a, par instant, renchéri avec l'extrême droite, même nazie, dans sa lutte pour le droit de tous les Allemands d'Autriche, de Pologne, de Tchécoslovaquie et même de France, à disposer d'eux-mêmes, dans l'excitation contre l'"esclavage" de Versailles, contre Locarno, la Société des Nations, le plan Dawes ou le plan Young, contre l'asservissement du peuple allemand à l'impérialisme et au capitalisme mondial. A cette attitude vraiment stupéfiante des communistes allemands d'alors il y a deux explications possibles.

D'abord, les Bolcheviks se sentaient héritiers du socialisme allemand et le pays par excellence de la révolution restait à leurs yeux l'Allemagne. Quand on parlait de révolution mondiale, cela voulait dire concrètement triomphe du communisme en Allemagne. Aussi assurait-on déjà les revendications nationales d'une Allemagne virtuellement convertie au communisme. Mais, indépendamment même de ces perspectives révolutionnaires, qui nous paraissent aujourd'hui avoir été bien illusoire, il y eut, après la première guerre mondiale une convergence d'intérêts entre les deux Etats, indépendamment de leur régime politique, dans leur lutte contre l'ordre de 1919. Convergence qui, elle aussi, peut paraître avoir été faite d'illusions: mais l'idée de cette convergence domina la diplomatie soviétique au moins jusqu'en 1934, et constitua une des constantes de la diplomatie du Reich soutenue surtout par l'armée.

Le symbole en reste Rapallo: les conséquences pratiques les plus graves furent que les Soviétiques mirent leur territoire à la disposition de la Reichswehr qui put par là tourner pratiquement toutes les restrictions de Versailles. Or, ni l'accession de l'hitlérisme au pouvoir, ni même l'invasion soviétique n'ont complètement détourné l'URSS d'une pareille politique, même si celle-ci devait sacrifier l'orientation spécialement anti-polonaise qu'elle avait à l'origine.

"Ein Volk, ein Reich", contre les séparatistes et les démembreurs, contre la domination de l'impérialisme étranger - tels furent les principaux slogans de la SED, et en Allemagne de l'Ouest du parti communiste. L'argument fondamental contre la politique de la République fédérale et contre l'existence même de la République fédérale était que celle-ci était une oeuvre de séparatisme, que toutes ses mesures d'intégration atlantique ou européenne étaient une trahison de l'unité de la patrie.

La perspective de la réunification fut agitée jusqu'en 1952 par la diplomatie soviétique et par les autorités de Pankow. Il y eut même en 1950 et en 1952 des propositions qui avaient une apparence de sérieux, prévoyant des élections libres dans toute l'Allemagne. On peut avoir des doutes sur le sérieux de ces propositions, mais il est certain que la grande crainte de l'Occident fut non pas leur manque de sérieux mais, au contraire, leur chance de réussite, et qu'il mit tout en oeuvre pour éviter toute négociation.

Par conséquent, l'Occident dut se faire à son tour champion de l'unité allemande, sans même trop clairement préciser les limites orientales de ce nouveau Reich. Ce que la propagande adverse présentait comme une consécration de la division de l'Allemagne (alliance atlantique, intégration européenne, etc.) devenait au contraire un pas vers son unité, puisque aussi bien à travers l'adhésion au Pacte Atlantique, l'Allemagne obtenait le soutien des puissances "libres" dans cette juste revendication nationale.

Le plus grave c'est que les puissances occidentales ont conservé ce point de vue au moment où celui de l'URSS évoluait indiscutablement. En effet, on n'a pas évalué à sa juste mesure ce qu'a représenté la reconnaissance, en septembre 1955, de la République fédérale allemande par l'Union soviétique. Ce qui n'était jusque là que la zone d'occupation de l'OTAN ou la base d'agression américaine, devenait soudain pour la diplomatie soviétique la République fédérale, Etat à qui on ne contestait plus la souveraineté internationale. Cette reconnaissance représente une transformation totale de ce qui fut la politique traditionnelle de l'Union soviétique à l'endroit de l'Allemagne.

II - Une solution possible

La reconnaissance, en septembre 1955, de la République fédérale allemande par l'Union soviétique, représente une transformation totale de ce qui fut la politique traditionnelle de l'Union soviétique à l'endroit de l'Allemagne. Sans doute l'évolution interne de la République fédérale a-t-elle aux yeux de Khroutchev, ôté toute possibilité non seulement de révolution, mais aussi d'une orientation diplomatique et politique pro-orientale de ce pays, et, après avoir joué si longtemps la carte de l'unité, voilà qu'au contraire la politique soviétique visait à faire reconnaître le statu quo de la division. Ceci ne fut pas sans créer de très graves embarras pour le gouvernement de la R.D.A., dont toutes les prétentions politiques et idéologiques se trouvaient par là ébranlées. Mais la grande faiblesse de l'Occident a été de ne pas avoir profité de cet ébranlement, et d'être resté fidèle à la ligne Dulles.

Notons que cette irréductibilité de principe de la part des puissances occidentales n'a jamais pris une forme agressive ou expansionniste. Et le gouvernement fédéral lui-même, quoi qu'en dise la propagande de l'Est, n'a jamais cherché la provocation ou l'épreuve de force, ne s'est jamais départi d'une stricte prudence.

REFUS MORAL

Son affirmation que lui seul représentait la légitimité allemande, la doctrine à laquelle s'est attaché le nom du président Hallstein, à l'époque secrétaire d'Etat aux affaires étrangères (ce qui, paraît-il, n'est pas sans le gêner depuis que c'est sur un autre terrain, que s'exerce son action), n'ont jamais été liées à une quelconque volonté de reconquête. Elles marquent un refus moral d'admettre toute emprise communiste sur une partie quelconque du peuple allemand. Le 17 juin, jour de l'unité allemande, en souvenir de la révolte de Berlin de 1953, sert de thème à des discours moralisateurs opposant l'ordre démocratique et chrétien au communisme matérialiste et athée, mais il n'est rien dit qui puisse déchaîner les passions.

Il est absurde d'accuser le chancelier Adenauer d'avoir été un revanchiste et un militariste, d'avoir rêvé d'un nouveau Grand Reich, alors que c'est un homme dont toutes les attaches sont rhénanes, catholiques et européennes, qui de tout temps fut anti-prussien, qu'on n'a d'ailleurs cessé d'accuser de séparatisme rhénan, ce qui comme accusation, dans la mesure où c'en est une, est plus fondé, mais mal compatible avec celle de pangermanisme. Mais c'est par ailleurs un homme qui veut moralement incarner l'intransigeance atlantique, dont l'anti-communisme est étroit et sans nuances, qui ne peut pas spirituellement se dégager de la guerre froide (et, en l'occurrence, soulignons le mot *f r o i d e*, car personne moins que lui ne souhaite quelque aventure guerrière). Il a été vraiment l'homme du statu quo, statu quo qui signifie pour lui non pas conscience lucide de certaines réalités, pour chercher à les aménager, mais maintien de ces réalités dans l'état figé qui les a longtemps caractérisées. Mais il n'est pas commode de faire comprendre que le refus de toute reconnaissance de l'Allemagne de l'Est n'implique pas un désir de reconquête de celle-ci; que la non-reconnaissance de la frontière de l'Oder-Neisse n'implique pas un désir de bousculer les Polonais qui s'y sont installés. Surtout que d'autres ont avantage à ce que ces distinctions ne soient pas faites dans la conscience des gens - et tout spécialement les dirigeants actuels de l'Allemagne de l'Est.

Mais alors nous en venons à la question fondamentale: quelle attitude adopter envers l'Allemagne de l'Est? Ici il convient de distinguer rigoureusement deux questions, le plus souvent fâcheusement confondues: Faut-il admettre l'existence de deux Etats séparés, successeurs de l'ancien Reich? Faut-il donner un surcroît d'autorité et de consécration au régime présent de la R.D.A.? Nous répondons sans hésitation oui à la première question, non à la deuxième.

Et d'abord pour nous démocrates et européens, une question de principe. Il n'est pas question de reprendre la vieille conception quarante-huitarde, même si on la situe dans un contexte pacifique et démocratique, "ein Volk, ein Reich", sans quoi l'existence d'une Autriche indépendante devrait nous indigner tout autant, comme elle a indigné en 1918 quiconque était marqué par les conceptions nationalitaires alors dominantes.

Disons-le même franchement: nous savons aujourd'hui ce qu'a de relatif, d'accidentel, et en fin de compte d'artificiel la création de n'importe quelle entité étatique. On a vu d'autres Etats naître par la seule volonté de grandes puissances impériales et pourtant perdurer: Panama, Transjordanie. Pas plus que tous ceux qui culturellement, linguistiquement, ethniquement sont Anglais, Espagnols, Français, Portugais, Néerlandais, Arabes, Grecs ne vivent dans un Etat unique, pas plus ceci ne doit être le privilège des Allemands.

LE "DROIT" D'AUTODETERMINATION

Ayons même le courage de faire hardiment la critique de ce principe si vague et si équivoque du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes. Car c'est le droit de qui à disposer de quoi? Et après tout le devoir premier des peuples est de contribuer à l'harmonie d'un certain ordre international et ils n'ont pas le droit de se donner une extension qui puisse troubler cet ordre. D'ailleurs le cadre dans lequel officiellement, à l'Ouest comme à l'Est, le destin de l'Allemagne reste pensé ne correspondait pas à l'idée grande allemande, mais à l'idée grande prussienne, c'est-à-dire à une conception dérivée des vues bismarckiennes et liée à une situation sociale, militaire, diplomatique, politique, morale aujourd'hui morte. Il n'y aura pas plus de nouvelle Allemagne bismarckienne qu'il n'y aura de reconstruction du Royaume Madjar de St-Etienne, de la Suède de Gustavo-Adolphe, du Royaume de Pologne d'avant le partage de 1772, de la France napoléonienne ou simplement de la France dans le cadre des frontières prétendument naturelles que lui a longtemps assigné la conscience publique de ce pays.

Mais si les peuples n'ont pas un droit absolu à déterminer les limites de leurs assises étatiques, ils ont le droit de posséder des Etats répondant à certaines exigences fondamentales de liberté et de justice. Or il est plus que douteux que ces exigences soient remplies dans l'Allemagne de l'Est. Ce pays est devenu vraiment le musée du stalinisme, car tout y est stalinien dans les méthodes de gouvernement, d'organisation et d'épuration du parti, de gestion économique, de planification dans ce que celle-ci a de plus contraignant avec ses méthodes dites de compétition socialiste, son travail à la pièce et ses normes, son "activisme" (c'est ainsi qu'on y désigne ce qui fut appelé en URSS stakhanovisme), avec son encadrement de la jeunesse qui évoque constamment l'époque nazie, avec sa propagande constante, abrutissante et imbécile, avec son culte de la personnalité d'Ulbricht, avec, enfin, son rideau de fer qui a pris une forme hideuse et sanglante.

En fait, dans le conflit interne entre Soviétiques et Chinois, la place naturelle d'Ulbricht serait dans le camp des Chinois. Mais alors pourquoi conserve-t-il la faveur de Moscou et pourquoi s'est-il officiellement aligné sur la position de celle-ci? C'est une vieille vérité que la passe la plus dangereuse pour un régime de dictature est le moment où il cherche à se libéraliser. C'est quand les écluses s'entre-ouvrent que les passions longtemps comprimées se précipitent à flots. Il n'y a qu'à évoquer le 17 juin à Berlin, Poznan, et surtout le drame hongrois. Or, la dernière région où Moscou peut se permettre le luxe d'une situation hongroise c'est bien l'Allemagne de l'Est - avec les terribles dangers que peut entraîner l'existence d'une armée en l'Allemagne de l'Ouest dont il serait bien difficile d'exiger dans ce cas qu'elle reste l'arme au pied. Aussi, sans vraisemblablement rien ignorer ni du passé ni du présent d'Ulbricht, Khroutchev a raisonné comme Adenauer: Keine Experimente. Et c'est, semble-t-il, parce que sa rencontre prévue avec Erhard risquait d'aboutir quand même à quelques "Experimente" que d'autres à la direction

du parti ont cru urgent d'empêcher à tout prix pareil saut dans l'inconnu...

ENTRE MOSCOU ET PEKIN

Quant à Ulbricht, il est bien clair qu'il ne peut pas se permettre le luxe de s'insurger contre Moscou dont il est par trop dépendant. Encore est-il notoire que l'action de Moscou a souvent contredit ses propres visées. Ce fut une rude épreuve que la reconnaissance de Bonn par le gouvernement soviétique, que le refus de ce dernier de conclure de traité de paix séparé, réclamé par Ulbricht à cor et à cri. Jouant au conflit avec Pékin, il a mis vraiment les dirigeants de Berlin-Est à la torture. Car enfin, il était bien difficile de s'entendre dire qu'un Etat socialiste était capable d'agressivité et de bellicisme, que face à l'impérialisme américain, la Chine n'était pas par nature et par essence pacifique. Berlin-Est traité de Moscou sur l'arrêt des essais nucléaires; encore est-ce en lui donnant une interprétation quelque peu chinoise. Bien sûr on est, à Berlin-Est comme à Pékin, partisan ardent de la paix. La colombe, le mot "Friede" se rencontrent à chaque coin de rue. Mais il est bien entendu que paix signifie victoire du camp socialiste, que par nature le camp du capitalisme ne peut être qu'agressif. Tout conflit quelconque entre l'Est et l'Ouest ne peut être qu'un conflit entre les forces de paix et les forces de guerre. Il va de soi par exemple que le blocus de Berlin ou l'attaque de la Corée du Nord furent des gestes destinés à préserver la paix contre les entreprises de l'impérialisme.

Le régime affectionne les défilés militaires dans un style copié en tout point de celui de l'ancienne Reichswehr, mais il est bien évident que ce sont là des démonstrations de paix. "La paix est entre de bonnes mains", s'est écrié Ulbricht, après les grandes manœuvres de Leipzig. Et il va de soi que le "mur de Berlin" n'avait qu'un but: préserver la paix contre les entreprises de la propagande et de l'espionnage des impérialistes. Inversement la République fédérale est le successeur de l'Etat nazi et ne peut qu'en avoir les visées. Mais quelle est la signification dans ces conditions de la coexistence? Car enfin celle-ci n'a de sens que si elle est faite de certaines volontés et de certaines fins convergentes. On ne peut pas faire coexister le bellicisme et le pacifisme. Si vraiment l'Allemagne de l'Ouest est le successeur d'Hitler, il faut en tirer les conclusions logiques et ne pas vouloir un nouveau Munich.

Il faut malheureusement dire que cette propagande, dont les fondements sont exactement ceux des Chinois, a une certaine efficacité, et ceci à cause des graves équivoques de la politique de Bonn. Bien que les craintes, que celle-ci suscite, soient peu fondées, elles ont pour elle de sérieuses apparences: le dogmatisme anti-communiste, pendant quasi idéal du dogmatisme communiste des autres, la doctrine Hallstein, la revendication toute théorique mais jamais reniée des frontières de 1937 et aussi la présence malencontreuse, à des fonctions dirigeantes, d'hommes au passé trop suspect. Il est inutile de souligner le parti qu'a pu tirer la propagande de la R.D.A. des affaires Oberländer, Globke, Fränkel ou Krüger. On a l'impression qu'au fond le gouvernement de Bonn ne cherche pas à dissiper les malentendus que suscite sa politique, mais qu'au contraire il y trouve quelque confort. N'est-ce pas signe de son intransigeance anti-communiste, du rôle éminent qu'il tient dans ce bon combat? Déplorable calcul! Car celui-ci a une conséquence certaine, c'est de renforcer aussi bien la dictature interne que la position internationale d'Ulbricht. Mais n'est-ce pas ce qu'inconsciemment à Bonn on désire? Car avec Ulbricht Adenauer a eu en face de lui un communiste meilleur que tout ce que sa propagande pouvait inventer. Avec lui, à la bonne heure! il sait où est le bien et le mal! Au fond Adenauer et Ulbricht n'ont cessé d'entrer dans le jeu

d'autres. Car toutes les méthodes d'Ulbricht trouvent toujours une seule et même justification: nécessité de la défense de la paix contre toutes les entreprises de guerre des impérialistes.

JUSTE COMME ENTRE BELGRADE ET TIRANA

C'est en exploitant cette crainte du "revanchisme" qu'Ulbricht a obtenu son plus gros succès: l'appui de Gomulka. Situation vraiment absurde! Les relations entre Varsovie et Berlin-Est devraient normalement être du même ordre que celles existant entre Belgrade et Tirana. Ici, l'homme qui fut l'exécuteur en tous points zélé des volontés de Staline, l'apologiste du pacte germano-soviétique et là l'homme que Staline avait fait mettre en prison et qui devait figurer au rang des innombrables victimes expiatoires de son culte. Ici un régime resté, en tous points, fidèle à l'ancien style, et là, au contraire, le "new-look" avec ses incertitudes, ses déconvenues, mais aussi sa séduction.

D'ailleurs les relations ne furent rien moins que cordiales entre la R.D.A. et la Pologne au lendemain d'octobre 1956. Ulbricht déclara crûment qu'on ne tolérerait pas de propagande polonaise dans la R.D.A. Et, effectivement, plus d'un communiste fut exclu du parti ou même mis en prison pour avoir manifesté quelque sympathie pour la version polonaise du socialisme. Aujourd'hui encore d'ailleurs, les oeuvres si riches et si variées qui se publient en Pologne trouvent un large écho dans la République fédérale, mais sont bannies à l'Est, et il est bien plus facile à un citoyen de la République fédérale qu'à un ressortissant de la R.D.A. de se rendre en Pologne.

Quel champ d'activité magnifique s'offrait ici à une diplomatie réaliste et imaginative! Sa tâche première eût été de tout mettre en oeuvre pour dissiper les craintes et les ressentiments, combien explicables, que la Pologne pouvait éprouver à l'endroit de l'Allemagne. Essayer d'établir sur tous les plans des relations telles que la propagande menée par la R.D.A. chez un peuple devenu en général fort allergique à tous les effets de la propagande, se trouve manquer complètement son objet. Or ce fut exactement l'inverse qui fut fait. Le gouvernement fédéral se refusa même, au nom de la doctrine Hallstein, à nouer les relations diplomatiques normales que réclamait la Pologne et se priva de tout moyen d'action pour dissiper les contre-vérités, pourtant les plus flagrants. Gomulka a dû finir par se dire qu'avec les Allemands il n'y a décidément rien à espérer, et que pour détestable que soit le régime d'Ulbricht, il est vraisemblablement celui qui leur convient le mieux. Aussi ce ne fut pas une mince réussite des manoeuvres d'Ulbricht que l'appui, beaucoup plus net que celui de Moscou, que lui apporta celui qui, dans le camp soviétique, aurait dû être logiquement son principal adversaire.

ROMPRE LE DILEMME

On ne peut nier que, par les graves erreurs de la politique occidentale et de la République fédérale en particulier, un régime qui est devenu anachronique dans le bloc soviétique s'est trouvé fortement consolidé. Car si cette politique ne change pas, toute la position d'Ulbricht se trouve justifiée. Et si même elle change, mais simplement de guerre lasse, par concessions grignotées, par esprit de résignation et non par volonté positive d'aborder le problème sous un angle nouveau (et tel est le sens des aménagements qu'apporte constamment le ministre Schroeder à la doctrine Hallstein) Ulbricht pourra dire que c'est là le résultat de sa fermeté, que c'est une capitulation des forces de guerre devant l'esprit résolu et intransigeant du socialisme. Aussi, faut-il que l'Occident prenne des

initiatives précises qui seules pourraient rompre le dilemme. Il faut qu'il ait le courage de proclamer ce qui est une évidence pour tous, que le partage de l'Allemagne fait partie d'un équilibre global que l'on ne songe nulle part à remettre en question. Ceci admis, il est permis d'aller résolument au devant de tout ce qu'il y a de raisonnable dans les propositions soviétiques: traité de paix avec les deux Etats allemands, régime spécial pour Berlin-Ouest lui garantissant son ordre interne et la liberté totale de ses communications, institutions de caractère confédéral pour régler certains problèmes communs aux Allemands, création, dans l'esprit du plan Rapacki, d'une vaste zone dénucléarisée et même démilitarisée. Il n'y a donc pas moyen d'aller plus avant dans l'esprit de concession.

Mais, en revanche, l'Occident doit à son tour exiger une concession qui normalement, ne devrait pas en être une, puisqu'elle est conforme aux principes affirmés aux 20ème et 22ème congrès: que le parti communiste de l'Union soviétique dénonce le régime, la politique, les principes idéologiques qui ont cours dans l'Allemagne de l'Est dans les mêmes termes où il l'a fait pour la Chine et pour l'Albanie.

Qu'il ne dise pas que c'est un problème intérieur à ce pays. Le groupe actuellement dirigeant à Berlin-Est a été formé, trié, après de rigoureuses épurations, à Moscou. Ulbricht a été un exécutant des plus basses besognes de l'ère stalinienne et il y a contre lui un dossier terrible qu'il convient de publier. Et tout, dans ses méthodes de gouvernement, indique qu'il n'a en rien évolué, qu'il aborde notamment la coexistence dans un esprit qui tend à la nier.

Certes, nous sommes conscients des troubles qu'un pareil acte pourrait causer en Allemagne de l'Est, et peut-être dans d'autres démocraties populaires mal déstalinisées. Aussi, là encore, l'Occident doit-il être prêt à faciliter au maximum cette entreprise. Il doit prendre l'engagement formel de ne pas chercher à tirer parti des difficultés qui pourraient naître de la déstalinisation pour une quelconque intervention, de ne pas reprendre la propagande irresponsable qui fut naguère celle de Free Europe.

Il va sans dire que la suppression du mur de Berlin doit être un des objectifs de cette libéralisation, Mais là encore l'Occident doit se montrer réaliste. Il est certain qu'une abolition subite risquerait d'entraîner une fuite éperdue et de vider le pays de sa substance. Aussi, peut-on imaginer pour un nombre d'années strictement limité - mettons cinq au maximum - le maintien d'un mur atténué dans ses effets - ou quelque autre formule plus souple encore pourrait être trouvée: il serait par exemple permis aux Allemands de l'Est de voyager, mais les puissances occidentales - y compris l'Allemagne fédérale - s'engageraient à ne pas leur accorder pour un temps le droit d'établissement sans le consentement des autorités de l'Allemagne de l'Est.

Bref, s'il faut avoir le courage de reconnaître ce qu'a d'inévitable un certain partage de la puissance dans le monde, et négocier sur cette base en vue d'une forme nouvelle de coopération, encore faut-il négocier au prix fort, à un prix pour nous incomparable: la liberté des hommes!

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE

Conference on Blocs, the German Problem and the Future of Europe
Vienna, 6th and 7th March 1968.

THE INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, LONDON

DETENTE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE

The Institute for Strategic Studies, as a private international research centre, has been concerned from its inception with problems of East-West relations, European security and German reunification. During the last year the Institute organised a number of study groups and meetings in order to discuss recent developments in these fields and in particular the various political and military implications of a new European security system.

In connection with these discussions three short monographs have been published until now, namely "Europe in the Seventies" by Curt Gasteyger (Adelphi Paper 37), "Détente and Military Relaxation in Europe: A German View" by Georg R. Bluhm (Adelphi Paper 40) and "Change and Security in Europe" by Pierre Hassner (Adelphi Paper 44). As they are all directly related to the subjects the International Institute for Peace is proposing to discuss at its forthcoming conference in Vienna, it is hoped that the following excerpts from these three papers will be a useful contribution. Two further excerpts were taken from a draft paper by Pierre Hassner which is scheduled for publication in later spring (tentative title: "The Notion of a European Security System"). Needless to say that the views expressed here are those of the three authors and not of the ISS.

I. DETENTE

1. The understanding of détente

"... The term détente is imprecise to a degree which politicians and journalists find very useful. There is no doubt that the objectives envisaged in the individual policies of East and West, though totally different and in part contradictory, are all understood as détente. ...

It is easily forgotten that the technological revolution in armaments has not only reduced the risk of war in Europe as an ultimate instrument of policy, but has ruled out one of the most

important motives of classical diplomacy: the solution of international conflicts in order to avoid the greater evil, war. Since none of the great powers can any longer allow itself to revert to the use or threat of force which were previously a feasible means of asserting its interests and claims or those of its allies, conflicts of interest, even those of great weight, are no longer subject to the urgent pressure of having to be solved. This state of affairs has created a new kind of policy: one which is concerned with the control of conflict, with arms control, with crisis management, with techniques and structures which are designed to minimize the incalculable or explosive elements of certain conflicts, rather than to solve them. ...

The conditions of international politics in Europe in the nuclear age have reduced the incentive to find formal solutions to outstanding political differences in order to avoid the greater evil of war. The avoidance of war no longer depends on the solution, but on the control, of protracted disputes. But the element which remains, which moves the international system and still contains possibilities of solving conflicts, is the evolution and implementation of policies which can create mutual interests and advantages.

Military measures, which belong to the first of these political processes, take the form of arms control policy, designed to increase the ability of opponents to handle crises and the efficacy of formal or informal renunciation of useless or destabilizing activities in the arms race. Conversely, military measures have no essential role to play in the other international process, that of solution by compromise, or only an accidental one. It is clearly possible to create a system of increasingly close co-operation, accompanied by growing mutual benefits between states or groups of states that have been adversaries hitherto, without bringing about any immediate changes in their military preparedness. If this identification of interdependent benefits were to go far enough, a continuing military deployment might become superfluous.

The maintenance of, or change in, military preparations have, in the context of such a process, a diminished military but an extended psychological meaning. Developments in military policy would be designed primarily to allay the suspicions of the former adversary; a freezing of force levels could appear to be adequate, while a decision to increase one's military strength substantially, or to open a new round in the armaments programme, would appear inconsistent, and likely to disturb the process of rapprochement...

These are the two approaches: the policy of conflict control by attempting to reduce the explosive elements in the situation while allowing the conflict to continue, and the policy of solving conflicts by creating new interlocking interests which would make the causes of conflict appear relative rather than absolute and might eventually resolve them; both these political strategies could claim to be policies of détente. But if détente is taken as the elimination of a relationship which is characterised by competing and irreconcilable interests, claims, or challenges, and by the fears which arise from these, then a policy which

offers clear advantages to each side, dethrones their conflicting interests, and possibly reduces their driving ambitions to absurdity obviously comes nearer to the true meaning of détente than a procedure which simply attempts to reduce the explosive danger of continuing conflict."

(Bluhm, pp. 2-3)

2. The attitudes of the major Western countries

"In Britain, in France, and in the other memberstates of continental Europe - with the exception of Germany - the prevailing view is that the military threat which the Soviet Union presented to Western Europe has been overcome. But the conclusions that are drawn from this are different. France, which considers that NATO has solved its military tasks, has begun, independently from the Alliance, to prepare for the political solution of the East-West conflict that is still to come: she does not seem prepared to accept the status quo as a solution. Britain's prime interest is in the preservation of NATO in order to make use of its integrated military structure for the maintenance of stability in Europe. Nevertheless, British politicians as well as British officials have shown a high degree of interest in the evolution of a situation which could permit a settlement of the outstanding problems in Europe - especially a settlement of the German question which would create greater stability by being founded on the consent of the people.

In the United States, attitudes vary. It is frequently assumed by those responsible for defence policy that the Soviet Union continues to pose a military threat to Europe. They are concerned to preserve the military efficiency of the Alliance. A different group makes use of the argument of the continuing Soviet threat to Europe in the hope of avoiding a break-up of the Alliance before it has fulfilled its political commitments. The main line of American policy seems to have been indicated in President Johnson's speech of 7 October 1966. Here, the political task of NATO was obviously regarded as unfulfilled, and a solution of the outstanding political problems - détente in Europe and, following from this, a solution of the question of German reunification - was to be attempted through 'peaceful engagement'.

In Germany the task of the Alliance is naturally thought to be unfulfilled so long as no satisfactory solution has been found to the question of reunification. There is thus a particularly strong interest in maintaining it. It is clear that the simplest argument is often used in the service of this objective, namely that the Soviet threat persists. After the fall of the Erhard government, the Grand Coalition embarked on a policy of an 'opening' towards Eastern Europe. This new stage of German foreign policy resembles contemporary French policy and the intellectual concept of peaceful engagement which has been developed by the American Administration, although there are many subtle variations in the three approaches. This policy is understood in Germany as a strategy of détente which, if it were extended in concert with the Eastern policy of the allies, could be expected to lead to a political resolution of the East-West conflict."

(Bluhm, pp. 1-2)

3. Eastern Europe and détente

"It may be assumed that the military and economic preponderance of the Soviet Union will remain the determining factor in Eastern Europe - in contrast to the position of the United States in Western Europe which may further recede. Given this continuing Soviet preponderance one is led to ask how far the present divergences in Eastern Europe can, or will be allowed to, develop. After all, the East European countries, even the most unorthodox ones, are still ruled by well-established Communist parties. Their basis of power has certainly become more stable, but their regime has never been exposed to free elections or any kind of an open political opposition. There may be differences in the degree of political, economic and cultural liberalisation in different countries. But it is already doubtful whether this 'liberalisation' will ever be allowed to go as far as it has gone in Yugoslavia. Harsh Soviet criticism of the changes that are taking place in Yugoslavia may be ephemeral, though it clearly reflects growing concern about their infectious influence in Eastern Europe. It should equally be remembered that, so far, most of the 'liberalisation' in the Soviet orbit has been in the economic field with the purpose of making the economy of the East European countries more efficient within their present political system. ...

For obvious reasons the Soviet Union is less interested in any far-reaching change of the present military and political situation in Europe than the United States. She is quite aware that the East European countries are more vulnerable to change than Western democracies. Zbigniew Brzezinski rightly points out that 'only in a relaxed international atmosphere could the hidden tensions and contradictions that plague the East, surface and become politically important. The Communist regimes, more than the pluralistic West, require hostility and tension to maintain their unity'. Hence Soviet reluctance to allow any further evolution in Europe to be more than confirmation of the present status quo. ...

The preponderant and most urgent tasks which lie ahead of the East European countries are therefore to be found primarily in the domestic field. The attempt of their present regimes to gain a broader consensus of, and a more active support from, the population is therefore closely linked with their determination to solve the manifold economic, social and political problems without losing control over this complex and difficult process or endangering their established positions. In doing so, they, too, have accepted that evolution is safer than revolution, and that it is only in a relatively stable international environment that such evolution can take place. Being vulnerable to any fundamental political change and burdened with a great many internal problems, the East European countries will certainly not be prepared to accept any major change in their international environment. They are all anxious to assert a greater degree of economic independence of the Soviet Union. At the same time they are prepared to accept that the Soviet Union is the only guarantee of their security and stability in Eastern Europe. Under these circumstances it is irrelevant whether they do this by their own choice or by force of political and geographic reasons. The common objective remains the same: to gain a breathing space which allows for a cautious but uninterrupted development. Such common objectives create a community of interests which has little to do with ideological cohesion or 'socialist solidarity'.

There is no doubt that Peking's emergence as a rival centre of authority has greatly facilitated the emancipation of most of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe from satellite status. But this process may soon come to a stop. Richard Lowenthal has pointed out that the impact of China on the cohesion of the Soviet bloc in Europe has by now been largely consummated 'not only because the greater tactical flexibility shown by Khrushchev's successors and the present extreme rigidity of the Chinese leaders give the East Europeans very little scope for further exploitation of the dispute, but simply because the ideological factor has become less central for the development of relations within the bloc'. In future the Warsaw Pact alliance will therefore rest far less on ideological homogeneity and compulsory 'solidarity', but will evolve gradually into a classical alliance system whose cohesion rests mainly on a community of interests."

(Gasteyger, pp. 5-7)

4. The Soviet Union

"The prevailing characteristics of the Soviet approach to détente - and this goes beyond the German problem - are fundamentally different from French policy towards Eastern Europe, or the American approach to 'peaceful engagement'. They are not co-operation, or a form of engagement which offers mutual advantages or interdependent interests, but the elimination of all external factors which could restrict the exercise of Soviet control in the Soviet sphere of influence. In order to carry out her demand for the legalisation of the status quo, the Soviet Union is attempting to bring a European security conference about in the near future. If this conference did meet soon, the East would almost certainly demand détente through the enforced legalisation of the status quo in Germany.

There is no doubt that the Soviet Union is at present resolved to make the fulfilment of this demand a prerequisite for any lasting détente in Europe."

(Bluhm, pp. 5-6)

"There is little plausibility in the assumption that the Soviet Union is fully prepared to support the whole European status quo, including the Atlantic institutions and the American presence in Europe. Certainly there are elements, even in the West European situation, which she strongly wishes to preserve. These have to do with maintaining German inferiority, by way of discrimination, special military limitations, denying her access to nuclear weapons and keeping her from becoming a latent military power. This is precisely what is being done by NATO and by the American presence. Hence the tendency among many reasonable - too reasonable - people to think that the Soviets, like General de Gaulle, when they call for the withdrawal of American troops and the end of NATO cannot really mean it.

This is a fallacy which is due to our lumping together, under the name of status quo, elements which to others seem quite separable or even incompatible. For twenty years now, the West has tried to convince the Soviet Union (and implicitly General de Gaulle) that the best way of preventing the re-emergence of an independent German power which neither party wanted was to integrate Germany as tightly as possible in a Western framework. For twenty years the Soviets have refused to accept the argument, have regarded Western frameworks and organisations not as safeguards against Germany but as vehicles for her influence and rise to power, and have bitterly fought them, thereby bringing about (as in the case of the EDC and German rearmament) a more dangerous version of what they wanted to avoid. They are certainly not totally blind to the argument, but their attitude to the American presence has at best been ambivalent. Signs that they favoured it have usually had to do either with relations within an existing NATO (where they most certainly oppose any increase of German influence and participation, and hence want to preserve American preponderance) or with declarations about the increased bellicosity of a German-led Europe. Nevertheless, the fact remains that for the time being they are confident (but for better reasons than de Gaulle) that, in a continental system which the United States had left, they could handle the Germans and dominate the situation.

The world would surely be a safer place if America's political rivals regarded the American presence as a desirable means of protecting other, less powerful rivals. The trouble is that they don't. If the Soviet Government and General de Gaulle really are clandestine NATO-supporters, they must surely be able to see that the American-German psychological and political relationship is the very basis of NATO, of the presence of American troops in Europe, of Germany's feeling of security, and hence of her lack of military ambition. However, even the most optimistic advocate of the Washington-Paris-Moscow axis for the status quo would not deny that both the Soviet Union and France do their best to undermine the confidence and intimacy of this relationship.

This does not mean, of course, that the Soviet Union does not attach great value to her bilateral relations with the United States and to maintaining whatever bipolar supremacy she can at the global level. Indeed, this is likely to have a clear priority over her continental ambitions, just as it proved to have over her revolutionary commitments or her Middle Eastern entanglements. The point is that she does not see the two approaches as conflicting. Again as in General de Gaulle's case, one tends to forget the distinction, which is as alive with the Russians as it is with him, between the global balance and the regional one. Both regard the global balance between the United States and the Soviet Union as of a fact of life, which has its advantages and its consequences for the regional one; but they see no reason to confuse the two, and they both find it advantageous to deny the United States a direct voice in continental matters.

From the Soviet point of view, there is a striking parallel between the proposal for a non-proliferation treaty and the proposal for a European security system. The first is meant as a bilateral enterprise with the United States against their non-nuclear friends and allies; the second as a continental enterprise with the Europeans against the United States. In both cases, however, the opponent against whom the project is really directed is Germany.

This shows in a striking way that the choice which is constantly urged upon the Soviet between trying to collaborate with the United States to rule Europe or the world, and trying to divide the West and separate the United States from its allies, poses no real dilemma for the Kremlin. For the time being, not only do the Russians manage to get away with their double policy, but its two aspects reinforce each other in two different ways. First, the more the Soviet Union deals bilaterally with the United States, the more she divides the West. Nothing except Vietnam and General de Gaulle has done as much as the negotiations on a non-proliferation treaty to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe. Second, by working on both levels, she has hit upon the best way to isolate Germany - a goal of Soviet foreign policy that nobody would deny.

It is this very goal, however, which raises the most perplexing questions about the future. Let us suppose that the Soviet policy of separating the United States and Germany has some success, and that Germany adopts a more independent line and feels less bound by NATO. This might take the form of an attempt at a more national defence posture, or of a greater openness to Soviet demands, or both. What, then, would Soviet policy be?

One possibility is that the Soviet Union, her eyes open to the dangers of separating Germany from the United States and confronted with a choice she is today able to avoid, would really go whole-heartedly in the direction of bipolar condominium, giving up her attempts to bolster her position vis-à-vis the United States. Another possibility, however, is that she might try to play a bilateral game with Germany. The precedent of Rapallo is, of course, misleading, but so is the notion that because the circumstances of the 1920s will not recur, no circumstances could favour another understanding between Germany and Russia on very different bases.

In other words, the question is whether the Soviet policy of isolating West Germany and of excluding her from the general détente is fixed for all time or is an intimidation tactic. And if it is the latter, is it designed simply to bully Germany into recognising her borders and East Germany, or might it in some conceivable circumstances lead to the kind of Europe implied by the idea, alluded to by every successive Soviet dictator at one time or another, of Germany and Russia being the two great peoples whose mutual understanding could guarantee the peace of Europe.

Whichever Russia's choice would be, in this hypothetical situation in which the present tactical manoeuvring would no longer be relevant, it seems safe to assume that she will always tend to

go for a bilateral deal with a partner whose collaboration she needs or, in her own sphere, whom she hopes to dominate, rather than for a collective security framework which would put an end to alliances or spheres of influence.

Perhaps, however, with polycentric rebellions in the East and socio-economic dynamism in the West, the Soviet Union does consider that trends are against her, and that, to quote Fritz Ermath, since 'the processes at work are irreversible, in order to shape the result, she must set the pace in defining the new order in Europe'. Ermath finds this awareness 'almost pathetically exhibited in Soviet efforts to launch a European security conference'. This would be, then, a kind of fuite en avant, a series of tactical initiatives resulting from a strategic defensive: the Soviet Union would accentuate the active aspect of her policy precisely because she felt its basis, the status quo in Eastern Europe, to be endangered. But this again would go to show that offence is the best defence and that, to use a Marxist formula, one cannot consolidate the status quo without overcoming it."

(Hassner, Adelphi Paper 44,
uncorrected proof.)

5. The limits of détente

"How far can and will détente go? There is no question about the considerable improvement of relations between Eastern and Western Europe. The network of new cultural, economic, technical, scientific and political links has become wider and denser than ever before. Though the gulf between the two political systems of government remains deep it no longer seems to be unbridgeable. ...

Détente has thus made Europe realize to what extent the international climate has changed in recent years. Although the confrontation between the two super-powers in Europe still basically exists, the international context within which Western and Eastern Europe see each other has altered. No doubt, the diversification or even disintegration of the alliances has made the international system more flexible. But at the same time it has also become more fragile, more vulnerable to competitive rivalry and suspicion between formerly allied countries. In fact, it looks as if members of the same alliance often know better how to develop relations with those of the other camp than how to maintain and improve the links with their own allies. With the spirit of integration waning they seem to be tempted to return to a rather old-fashioned bilateralism as the main basis of inter-state relations, both inside and outside the alliances.

For Western Europe this raises the question whether such a policy is really the best means to establish a new and better relationship with Eastern Europe and the two super-powers. It is difficult to see how successful the attempt can be 'to wean the East European countries away through increased contacts and

to prepare for a European settlement' if Western Europe loses still more of its internal cohesion. While a somewhat greater diversification may help a rapprochement with Eastern Europe, it is most doubtful whether this is equally true vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. She will certainly try to exploit the present détente and diversification in her own favour. Thus she might welcome an expansion of the EEC if there were signs of its dissociating itself from the United States and providing a wider political framework which would better neutralise German influence. The entry of Britain might therefore appeal to the Soviet Union as watering down its supranational objectives, helping to reduce Britain's overseas commitments, and further weakening her special relationship with the United States. Soviet support for a loosening-up of the European community is linked with her promotion of precisely the sort of bilateralism Western Europe seems ready to turn to again; both actions are intended to reduce the political impact of European integration. By also encouraging Western Europe to strive for greater independence from the United States, the Soviet Union hopes to increase her own influence there and bring the individual European countries 'into some form of closer and perhaps subordinate relationship, thereby enhancing its power position relative to the United States'. Hence recent Soviet hints of the possibility of technological co-operation with Western Europe and of a European security system without American participation.

The question which Western Europe in the 1970s will therefore have to answer is, in the words of Marshall Shulman, 'whether there can be enough co-ordination and political consciousness in the management of these (East-West) contacts so that the effect will be a strengthening of European independence rather than a fragmentation or subordination (to Soviet preponderance)'. At the same time, Europe must be clear how much it can realistically hope to gain from a rapprochement with the Soviet Union on the one side and a greater independence from the United States on the other. Both approaches require at least a common political understanding on which such an autonomy can rest. One could call it a kind of 'détente management'. ...

Two basic elements have, however, to be taken into account here. First, a Western Europe which demands greater responsibility for its foreign policy and defence should also be able to create the necessary institutions to carry them out. What is therefore required is a common agreement on whether the present alliance system should continue, though in a somewhat modified form, or whether the time has come either to replace or to complement it by a new system better suited for the requirements of détente and greater European independence. The changing nature of American commitment to, and the basically unchanged Soviet interest in, Europe could otherwise lead to an imbalance of forces which may possibly enhance Western Europe's greater independence from the United States but at the same time expose it to a greater pressure from the Soviet Union. The most important task for Europe in the 1970s will therefore be to work out, and agree on, new forms of co-operation which help to establish a more satisfactory relationship with the United States and to counterbalance Soviet power without foreclosing a further improvement of the relations with Eastern Europe.

Second, the Europeans must accept that any process of change or détente as well as any progress towards the establishment of a new security system in Europe can go only a limited distance without a basic understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is thus precisely over Europe that the Soviet-American bilateralism seems to crystalise. This is not without risks because it could revive European fears that such bilateralism might lead to some kind of great power bargain at their expense. Some West-European reactions to the negotiations on a non-proliferation treaty give sufficient evidence that these fears are still with us. But they show, too, how fragile Western Europe's newly acquired self-consciousness and independent position still is."

(Gasteyger, pp. 13-15)

II. EUROPEAN SECURITY

a) Some basic questions

"It seems that for both East and West the problem of European security as well as the problem of German reunification were much more alive in the early 1950s than they are today. From the German point of view, both aspects were more urgent: there was then a real danger to German security, to which integration in the West seemed the most obvious answer, and there was a real case for attempting negotiation with the Soviet Union and for hoping that she might trade reunification against some form of arms control. Of course, there may have been no more prospect that the Soviet Union would invade West Germany, or give away East Germany, in the early 1950s than there is today; but we shall never know, and at any rate the uncertainty at the time was sufficient to give rise to a genuine problem of priorities and of risks. Conversely, from the point of view of the Soviet Union, German rearmament could conceivably have appeared as a threat to her security, and German integration in the West as a blow to her hopes of dominating a weak and neutralised unified Germany. In addition, East Germany was at the most precarious and tense moment of its existence, as demonstrated by the uprising of June 1953.

In short, there could be on both sides a genuine concern for security in the broadest sense, and a genuine temptation to regard the balance of risks and hopes as more favourable to a settlement than to the status quo. Today the feeling that prevails is exactly the opposite; the characteristic of the present situation is the very low level of fears or of hopes. Neither Germany nor Russia can really be worried for her security in any immediate sense of aggression from the other side. Neither can have any real hope of dramatically altering the status quo at the conference table. The military balance seems stabilised; the political status quo, in Germany at least, more and more con-

solidated. The question, then, must arise: if everybody's level of dissatisfaction is so low, why start thinking up models for change? If the Soviet Union is so happy with the two alliances, why does she do her best to destroy one of the most essential foundations of the Western one, the American-German relationship, and why does she call for the suppression of both alliances by 1969? If Germany is so optimistic about her security and so pessimistic about her reunification, why does she need a new policy and dream of a new system?

For an answer to these questions, we shall need to examine more closely the current meaning of, and relationship between, the twin yet distinct notions of security and status quo. But a preliminary and apparently flippant answer would be that, today, the search for a European security system has nothing to do with any direct search for security.

Already in the German debate of the 1950s, the proponents of a European security system were precisely those who refused to give priority to security. They wanted to accept risks for the political objective of reunification, and the notion of a collective security system was there to buttress their claim that one could have both reunification and a degree of security equivalent to the one provided by NATO. Certainly today, however conservative the Soviet Union may be, if she were solely concerned with security she would not call for the replacement of NATO and the Warsaw Pact by a European security system in which the control of Germany by the United States would be considerably weakened.

The truth is that we may have come out of the security dilemma to enter into what one might call the paradox of self-denying security: that is, we may have entered a stage in which the only serious threat to security comes from security being taken too easily for granted. This, by contrast, could not happen to the political status quo. The essential difference between military security and political stability is that politics is never neutral. There can be no clear, final and mutually acceptable definition of the status quo.

One may escape from the security dilemma, not from the status quo dilemma. A policy of maintaining the status quo must, as long as some one is challenging it, be a policy of manipulating the status quo in one's own favour. If no one is challenging it any longer, political attention will no longer be directed towards keeping it; but then the status quo policy will be replaced by an absence of policy, and this is not the best basis for maintaining the posture on which military security is based. Either security will be threatened, or it means that there is no one to threaten it any longer, in which case both the political and the military policies have radically altered.

The question, then, is how much political change- whether through political revisionism, political exploitation of the status quo or political inattention - is compatible with the preservation of military security. Conversely, when and to what extent can political stability stand on its own feet, without being propped by the military balance which has helped to bring it about? Both questions

point to a third one, which is precisely the one raised by the notion of a European security system: if, deliberately or unwittingly, one's political objectives challenge the status quo, and if this modification of the status quo brings about the dismantling of the existing security arrangements, what alternative security arrangements can be devised to help achieve the new political objectives, accommodate the new political conditions or guarantee the new political agreements?"

(Hassner, Adelphi Paper 44,
uncorrected proof.)

b) Defining a European security system

"The only way of achieving some clarity is by exposing some ambiguities. This could usefully be done, for a start, with the three words - European, security, and system themselves. Their possible meanings give us a useful indication of the various directions in which the quest for a European security system may lead us.

A. The term European can be taken in a more active or a more passive sense, which immediately gives us the two opposite answers to our problem; it can also lead to a variety of conflicting conclusions, according to the geographical scope it is supposed to indicate.

The first distinction can be made clear by asking - as was done by one of the proponents of an "Eastern Locarno", the Belgian Senator Henry Rolin, whether, when speaking of a "European security system", we mean a "European system of security" or a "system of European security": is the result method, the system, to be European, or only the result, the security? Are the Europeans to be security producers, or only consumers? Are we to aim at the security of the Europeans, by the Europeans, for the Europeans or is Europe's security basically to be provided by the two great powers, with or without the representation or the participation of the Europeans?

This obviously raises the problem of the relationship between the regional or continental balance and the global one. Probably the most important issue as far as not only European but international security in general is concerned. ...

B. The examination of the second and central concept, that of security, should go in two directions: the question of structure, of the identity and pattern of states concerned, and the question of content, of the nature of security itself, of the values it is supposed to preserve of the threats it is directed against. In other words the first is the question: security of whom against whom?, the second: security of what against what?

On the first question, assuming for the time being, as an answer to the second, that one is concerned with the most general and unavoidable problem - the military security of states - this system can protect:

- 1) All the states against a threat external to their system
- 2) All the states against one of them
- 3) All the states against each other
- 4) Every state against every other
- 5) All the states against accidents linked to the system itself.

In the first case, the system is in fact one of collective defense - like an alliance. A typical example is a cold-war alliance in a bipolar world, directed against the threat of a more or less symmetrical opponent.

In the second one, we still have collective defense but more on the type of the classical multipolar balance-of-power system: rather than holding a line against a menacing environment, it means closing a circle around the most menacing member of the group. This can either take the flexible aspect of the various powers rallying together against whichever of them threatens to become too strong, or the more rigid form of a peace settlement trying to prevent a defeated candidate for hegemony from resuming his bid, by imposing binding limitations on him and commitments on his victors.

The third case constitutes collective security proper, which is distinguished by its stress on reciprocity and on solidarity. Like the first (balance of power) aspect of the second one, it is supposed to be directed not against a particular enemy or a particular threat defined in advance, but against any of the concerned powers itself if it happened to commit aggression; like the second - (peace settlement) one, however, it relies on the keeping of binding commitments (in this case, reciprocal quaranties of common action against any aggressor) rather than on empirical power adjustments based on each state's individual reading of the situation and of his own interest.

The fourth case could be said to be the same in reverse: while equally based on the rejection of partial alliances or defense arrangements which by ensuring the security of some might appear to threaten that of others, and of flexible balances which might lead to unpredictability, hence to insecurity, it is based on every state insuring by itself its own security - against any individual or coalised aggressors. Instead of "all for each, each for all", it would be: "every one for himself" instead of the complete centralisation of collective defense or alliances, and of the ad-hoc coordination of flexible balances, one would have complete decentralisation.

Even if this completely individualistic structure were attainable, however, it would not be incompatible with some of the measures taken in the common interest under our fifth heading - which would correspond more or less to arms control and crisis management: measures taken not against aggression but against the consequences of the existence of military establishments and technologies and of the sheer multiplicity of states - against war breaking out by accident, misunderstanding or insubordination and against its getting out of control if it does break out. ...

The concept of "system" appears as the most urgently in need of clarification among the three components of the "European Security System" idea. In itself, it would seem to suggest three connotations: complexity, construction and fixity. Since we speak of a system, we can mean neither an isolated measure nor an isolated feature of reality, but a set of interdependent and coherent measures or features; secondly, we seem to imply, although less necessarily, a rational intellectual or mechanical and deliberate construction, as opposed to a natural, organic or historical product, with its possible confusions and hazards; and thirdly, from this emphasis on reason rather than life, one tends to assume that although systems may be flexible and responsive to change, they would cease to be systems if this flexibility was not meant to restore a given equilibrium against environmental disturbances or at least to keep a certain proportion or structure, and hence a certain permanence in the midst of evolution.

It is very striking, however, that if one looks at the existing concrete proposal for a European Security System, and at the realities to which they are meant to apply, neither of these characteristics seems universally and unambiguously present. ...

It is very hard to say when from one or several measures one gets into a security system, and when the latter really implies a political settlement. Many current proposals - in particular the Eastern ones - include under the name of a European security system a package of three or four declarations or agreements (recognition of the present borders of the coexistence and of its German states German renunciation to nuclear weapons from aggression guarantees, nuclear-free zones) without explaining to what extent the list is limitative and constitutes a system rather than an addition of measures. To the extent to which either non-aggression between the two existing military organisations or their simultaneous dissolution is involved, these measures certainly are based on the existing alliance system or presuppose an alternative balance. But the question which arises is precisely: what can more adequately be called a security system - the measures listed under this heading or the balance which constitutes their background? ...

The crucial question about a European Security System taken in the narrow, institutional sense is its relationship with the present European and international system taken in its broader military and political sense: is it supposed to be an addition to, (hence, a consolidation of) or a substitute for, the present situation of loose East-West bipolarity in Europe? To take the most obvious example, two standard proposals of the East, presented as contributions to a European Security System, call the one for a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw pact organisation, the other for a suppression of the two military blocs in Europe. Obviously the first proposal would be based on the existing military balance and tend to freeze the existing political status quo, even though, by promoting a change in the relationship and meaning of the two alliances, it would perhaps affect some of its psychological features; obviously the second would imply a fundamental change in the international system and might produce an important change in the military balance even


though a system of reciprocal guarantees or bilateral pacts might work toward preserving some essential features of the status quo. One finds something of this opposition in Willy Brand's distinction between a European Security System based on the existing two alliances (but whose actual content and contribution remain, then somewhat obscure) and a European peaceful order based on their replacement by other arrangements (whose precise mechanisms for solving the security problem are in their turn obscure). ...

But whatever the type of the solution, the basic problem appears as that of the link between the various dimensions of the security problem, applied to the particularly complex and ambiguous region of Europe. Geographically, the problem can be defined as that of the relationship between the military status and the security of Germany, of Europe, and of the two super-powers. The link between the limitation of the armaments of Germany and of the rest of Europe goes from Versailles to the various conferences of the fifties. But it is obviously connected in its turn, with the relationship between the political solution of the German problem, the political structure of Europe and the nature of the international system, particularly of the Soviet-American relationship. The ultimate question is: what kind of Germany can be fitted in what kind of Europe and what kind of world? The link between the three geographical subdivisions crosses with the link between the three levels the institutional, the military and the political. From those complex inter-relationships, the problem of European security re-emerges again at the crossroads between the German problem and the problem of international order; the answers must lie somewhere at the crossroads between the two conceptions of stability, between the preservation of the military balance and the satisfaction of political aspirations. ..."

(Hassner, unpublished manuscript)

c) A model

"If the solution was to be found in building an abstract institutional model, certainly the most satisfactory structure for Europe would be that of two federations of West and East Europe, constituting an all-European confederation with Germany (from the West) and Poland and Czechoslovakia (from the East), constituting a special arms-control zone, and the Soviet Union and the United States being linked with each other and the European confederation through a mutual security treaty (involving multilateral hostages, especially in Berlin), economic association, and common technological projects. One might even represent this structure in the form of three circles, two overlapping ones including in a wider one.



But the very purpose of the exercise would be to show that institutional model-building is at best premature as a contribution to a European settlement. First, a full-fledged settlement of this kind, which indeed would represent a genuine political revolution, could only come at the end of a very long process of economic, social, cultural and ideological evolution, cooperation and convergence of which today we only witness the barest beginnings. Secondly it is in the nature of a process which relies on so many levels and is submitted to so many influences to be unpredictable not only in its course but also in its results. Its relations with the future organisation and balance of Europe are likely to be much more complex and less intellectually satisfying than is imagined either by those who rely on elaborate blue prints for a federal constitution or a security system or by those who are content to put their hopes in a process which, by producing an interlocking of interests, would make war impossible (which it will never be) or unprofitable (which it has already been for quite some time).

The problem of security, hence of balances, will always be there. But its political and military dimensions cannot be foreseen or speculated upon in isolation from the balances and imbalances which will result from different phases of technological and economic progress and different degrees of political and psychological presence and involvement.

They are bound to disturb the symmetric structures which can be constructed on paper. The question is whether, with the help of political will and imagination, they will, at some point, produce a multi-dimensional "balance of imbalances" which would provide the basis and the setting for the resolution of Europe's unsolved problems. For instance, Eastern Europe is likely to remain significantly weaker and more divided than Western Europe, simultaneously more attracted towards the latter than vice-versa, and more dependent on the Soviet Union than Western Europe is on the United States; but this gives all the more reasons for foreseeing anything which may increase the imperfect degree of Eastern Europe's unity, of her ties with the West, and of autonomy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Similarly, it is likely that the United States will continue to be technologically and economically stronger than the Soviet Union and that Western Europe, while the Soviet Union may very well appear more and more as more directly present and concerned politically and militarily than the United States. The two phenomena may well be put to good use for a renewed balance: George Liska has suggested that "a Soviet-sponsored European-security pact may prove to be the necessary, if not necessarily sufficient or easy to most, complement of an American-inspired OECD extended eastward". On the other hand, this might mean the victory of present trends towards a Europe dominated economically by the United States and militarily by the Soviet Union, both, and specially the latter, being able to turn their superiority into political hegemony, unless European political will and unity introduces a third factor within which the first two, in spite of their unevitable and beneficent aspects, would be oppressive and intolerable.

Again, nobody can say whether this European element will take the form of one or several federations or confederations, nor

what pattern of links and influences will emerge from such phenomena as the "technological gap", as West European cooperation, as the Common Market's relations with Eastern Europe's willingness and ability to enter, with or without the Soviet Union, in multilateral enterprises with Western Europe or the United States.

The only indications given by our analysis are that, whatever the actual balance and organisation which may, unknown to us, be beginning to take shape, it will have to be based on an adding and combining her even contradictory ones, more than on cutting them. By the same token, it will have to combine the three levels - the national (and particularly the inter-German one), the European (in the form - both of West European institutions and of all-European cooperation) and the global East-West one (if only as ultimate condition and guarantee).

For all its vagueness, such a perspective should impose some rather specific orientations and constraints. First, the obligation to pursue the day-to-day work on each of the three levels, on Germany's own new policy, on European integration and cooperation, on Soviet-American détente and arms-control negotiation, without sacrificing any of them but also without letting it block the progress of the two other ones. Indeed, the only promising path is to link them by introducing the specific concerns of German and European unification and security into the Soviet-American dialogue on arms-control, or that of the two Germanies on the German problem and European reunification into the Common Market debate about British entry etc. This might conceivably lead to progress toward what Marshall Shulman has called the 'second stage of détente', that in which, perhaps twenty years from now, as he indicates, perhaps by thirty, a real European settlement might be reached. The need, in the meantime, is for interim policies, policies which are justified in their own terms but also take their full meaning either as contributions or as precautions predicated on this long-range perspective. E. Heath's notion of the British and French deterrent 'held in trust' for a future Europe, the idea of many Germans that Franco-German friendship must be maintained at all costs not for its benefits of today but for its possible importance tomorrow, are (whatever their merits as far as the actual issues are concerned) a good example of this attitude.

More negatively, the two basic principles, as annunciated by Stanley Hoffmann, would be to act neither as if tomorrow was already here, nor as if it would never come. A third principle is to be prepared to be both surprised and disappointed by the settlement, if and when our efforts succeed. For, as R.H. Tawney wrote in another context: 'It is the tragedy of a world where man must walk by sight that the discovery of the reconciling formula is always left to future generations, in which passion has cooled into curiosity, and the agonies of people have become the exercise in the schools. The devil who builds bridges does not span such chasms till much that is precious to mankind has vanished down them for ever.'

(Hassner, unpublished
manuscript)

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE

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PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE PRESENT DAY

by The Institute of World Economics and
International Relations,
Moscow.

Europe is an area where the main military and economic forces of the imperialist camp and the countries of the socialist camp confront each other. The Socialist countries of Europe take up about 65% of the continent's territory and account for about a half of the entire European population. Tremendous concentration of manpower and material resources is characteristic of capitalist Europe as well. The high density of the population in European cities, the concentration in this part of the world of the greatest achievements of mankind's spiritual and material culture make the war on the European continent specially tragic. The situation is aggravated by the fact that armed conflict between the forces of imperialism and socialism in Europe can turn into a total world war.

This largely characterises the place and role of the European continent in modern international relations. At the same time, historical factors are of especially great importance. The peoples of the world know that in this part of the world aggressive German imperialism unleashed armed conflicts that grew into world wars. The incalculable human and material losses suffered by Europe were a tragic consequence of World War II.

The tremendous military potential, nuclear missile weapons included, that is concentrated in Europe and that has turned it into a powder keg, gives rise to grave apprehensions. If this potential is used, whole states will be wiped off the map of Europe. And the ensuing world conflict is fraught with fatal consequences for the whole of mankind. That is why the consolidation of peace and security in Europe is of world, as well as European, importance.

However, the problem of guaranteeing European security, which is of such vital importance to the peoples of our continent, comes up against certain substantial negative aspects.

After World War II the Western powers could be expected to draw the necessary conclusions as to Germany's role in the unleashing of the war and to achieve, jointly with the Soviet Union, a settlement in Germany in the spirit of Potsdam agreements which would provide reliable guarantees of peace and security in Europe. But the effort for peace and security in Europe was impeded by the policy of the imperialist states. Guiding themselves by the doctrine of anti-Sovietism and anti-Communism, and also trying, by means of the "power politics", to limit the influence of socialism and to push the peoples away from the socialist road they chose, the imperialist powers, the USA in the first place, began to conduct in Europe an aggressive policy against the USSR and other socialist countries. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was knocked together for the purpose in 1949. Its aggressiveness increased sharply after the GFR joined it in 1955. Under those conditions, the European socialist countries set up their own defensive alliance, the Warsaw Treaty, in 1955.

The feverish arms race, the presence of nuclear weapons on the continent affects the entire life of the European peoples, slows down the social and economic progress, worsens international relations and involves tremendous material expenses.

The total military spending of the European countries - members of NATO - exceeds 300 thousand million dollars. Washington keeps in Europe more than 300,000 officers and men, 7,000 nuclear warheads, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

The concentration in Europe of such big military forces owing to the US policy cannot but evoke legitimate concern on the part of the Europeans. The US policy in Europe is particularly dangerous for the European peoples also because of the fact that it rests to an ever greater extent on the alliance with the revanchist and militaristic circles of the GFR. The alliance of Washington and Bonn threatens European security because it backs up the stubborn efforts of the GFR government to annul the military defeat of Hitler's Germany, to recarve the map of today's Europe.

It is quite natural, therefore, that the expansionist aspirations of the USA and the GFR cannot but clash with the national interests of many West European countries which finds its expression in the crisis of the North Atlantic bloc. To prevent being drawn into a military conflict outside Europe or on its own territory, France has already left the bloc's military setup. The crisis of the NATO and of the US policy is aggravated still further by the Vietnam war. The US attempts to have West European countries render it moral and political, if not direct material, support render in failure - the Europeans see in the Vietnam war a dangerous hotbed of tension capable of turning into a world thermonuclear clash.

France's withdrawal from the NATO deprive American imperialism of one of the main strongholds. Hence its special attention to the GFR. The strengthening of the GFR's role in the military aggressive mechanism of the NATO manifests itself in the fact that the change-over to the "flexible reaction" strategy, presupposing a broader use of the conventional armed forces, automatically pre-determines the higher stake on the Bundeswehr as the most powerful ground force in the NATO framework. At the same time this strategy favours the West German demand that the GFR should be given the right of participating in taking decisions on the use of nuclear weapons. Bonn's representatives reminded the latest NATO session of that in Brussels.

Having at its disposal the Bundeswehr, which has the numerical strength of 500,000 and is armed with modern weapons, the revived German militarism has become the most powerful force of the Atlantic grouping in Europe. The GFR is coming out against the reduction of the American and British troops on its territory and even meets part of the expenditures on the upkeep of these troops in the GFR, which is confirmed by the signing of an agreement among the GFR, the USA and Britain to that effect. The preparations for the atomic armament of the GFR is fraught with grave danger. It is of no importance whether these preparations are carried on directly, indirectly or secretly. In Europe, it is only the Bonn government that proclaims in its official state policy the slogan of revising the existent borders. If the West German militarists get the atomic weapons, this will create a new situation in Europe. In this case the revanchists would get hold of a weapon using which they would be able to spark off the war conflagration and, through the NATO, to draw all its allies into the dangerous adventures. Proceeding from this, the socialist countries brought it to the notice of the NATO, that the atomic armament of the GFR would compel the Warsaw Treaty countries to take the appropriate reply measures in the interests of their security.

European security would become a reality had it not been for the revanchist aggressive policy of the GFR backed up by the imperialist forces of the USA and the NATO. Bonn's foreign policy plans are aimed, above all, at the isolation, weakening and swallowing up of the socialist German state, the GDR, as the first step in carrying

out the aggressive plan of West German militarism. This underlies the so-called "Hallstein doctrine" according to which the GFR is the only German state allegedly representing "the whole of Germany". The GFR uses any methods to prevent other countries from recognising the GDR and establishing diplomatic relations with it. Bonn is doing this for fear of such a recognition impeding its policy aimed at swallowing up the GDR.

Bonn's leaders officially proclaim the task of revising the borders of many European countries. In their revanchist frenzy they demand the 1937 German borders be restored trying to provide a "legal substantiation" of their plans (the claims to "the right to speak for the entire German people", "the right to the motherland", etc.). It is precisely for carrying out these goals that the GFR's military potential keeps increasing on the basis of strengthening the military and political alliance with the USA and that a feverish political campaign is conducted to take the leading positions in the NATO. Appropriate propaganda and ideological work is carried on to justify this policy. Revanchism and militarism is spreading to ever newer spheres of the social and political life of the GFR, evoking associations with the recent past of Germany, with the history of the growth and strengthening of Hitlerism. This is evidenced by the Hanover congress of the so-called "national democratic party" held at the end of 1967. The activation of the neo-nazi forces, banned by the Potsdam Agreement, is carried on with the direct connivance of the GFR government.

But it should be remembered that the Potsdam Agreement provided for the ban "of any nazi and militaristic activity or propaganda" just as of "nazi and militaristic doctrines". As is known, the new Bonn government, actually pursuing the line mapped out by the Erhard government, proclaimed its new "Eastern policy" based on "opening a window" in the notorious "Hallstein doctrine" for the European socialist countries - and for them alone. The new Bonn government is aware of the fact that as far as the socialist countries which have had diplomatic relations with the GDR from the very beginning are concerned, the "Hallstein doctrine" is directed not so much against the GDR as against the GFR itself. Besides, the "new Eastern policy" is a calculated manoeuvre meant to create the impression that the GFR allegedly quit the "cold war" positions and is ready to normalise its relations with the socialist countries. Actually, Bonn still refuses to recognise the fact of the GDR's existence, continues to claim parts of certain countries' territories and to reach for nuclear weapons and, consequently, does not want a real normalisation.

Bonn's militaristic and revanchist policy is a direct threat to European security. This threat is aggravated by the fact that, as the Soviet Government said in its Statement to the GFR Government of December 9, 1967, the GFR is now developing atomic industry which, in a short period of time, can be reorganised for the production of nuclear weapons.

If the GFR gets nuclear weapons - through the NATO or of its own making - and tries to use them for carrying out its aggressive schemes, Europe may suffer an unheard-of catastrophe.

There also exist other factors, directly or indirectly threatening the peace and security in Europe. These factors are connected, above all, with the policy of the United States and with the interests of the NATO. Thus, the opinion of part of the West European ruling circles that the zone of the sharpest international conflicts has shifted to Asia and Africa for a long time is erroneous. The conflict, like the US aggression in Vietnam, can spread any moment and turn into a world catastrophe. And during the Israeli-Arab conflict, the danger of such a spread existed in the immediate vicinity of Europe. A close look at the situation will show that the trajectory of this danger lead further into the very heart of Europe. Thus, the Greek-Turkish tensions around the Cyprus crisis directly affected Europe. This revealed with a still greater clarity the real aims of the USA dictated by the interests of saving the NATO. All this changes the attitude of a number of West European countries to the USA, which manifested themselves, in

particular, in connection with the military coup in Greece, carried out with the knowledge and direct support of the United States. The Western governments cannot but be concerned over the fact that the American intelligence acts not only against the socialist countries but against these governments as well. That is why the events in Greece evoke legitimate anxiety and protest not only on the part of the progressive forces of Western Europe, but also on the part of those countries' government circles.

Such are certain trends of modern political development which are closely intertwined with the problem of ensuring peace and security in Europe and can turn our continent into a hotbed of war.

At the same time, there exist other, positive aspects of the international policy which not only favour the strengthening of European security, but actually made it possible in the course of twenty-two years that have passed since World War II. This, above all, is the powerful socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union. The unity and solidarity of the socialist countries in conducting a peace-loving policy have been guarding their security, deterring the forces of imperialism, militarism and revanchism. Another factor is the first socialist German state, the German Democratic Republic, that emerged after the war.

Among the positive factors favouring the achievement of European security, there are also the peace-loving forces in West European countries. These forces include the Communist and workers' parties, various political groups adhering to broadly different orientations but coming out shoulder to shoulder for guaranteeing European security, men of culture and religion, representatives of science, the youth, etc. Among the most important results of the struggle for European security there is the further strengthening of the international position of the GDR, the Western outpost of the socialist camp in Europe.

The very fact of the existence of the German socialist state consistently carrying on a peace-loving policy and conducting an active struggle against the aggressive revanchist policy of the GFR ruling circles is one of the vital elements of a radical change of the balance of forces in Europe in favour of peace.

The strengthening of the international position of the GDR is favoured by its active peace-loving policy, the support of its lawful rights and interests by other socialist countries. The demand that the GDR should be officially recognised by all countries is of great importance. This demand is a slogan of not only the international communist movement. The need for the recognition of the GDR has been recognised by the representatives of many social circles of Western Europe. In certain West European countries the problem is often discussed at parliamentary sessions and on the national scale. Very often these are not the discussions of whether the GDR exists as a sovereign state or not, as was the case some ten to fifteen years ago, but of when, how and under what conditions and in what forms the GDR should be recognised.

There is no doubt that the official international recognition of the GDR and the normalisation of relations with it by the capitalist states, the European states in the first place; could largely contribute to the cause of peace in Europe and all over the world, and would be conducive to the improvement of the existing political situation that arose as a result of the continued policy of militarism and revanchism conducted by the GFR ruling circles.

As for the socialist countries they keep stressing, in the Warsaw Treaty and in numerous declarations and statements, the important international role of the GDR in the struggle for peace and security in Europe, that have been coming out for its all-round international recognition. The socialist countries are actively coming out in support of the GDR's application for admission to the UN. The admission of the GDR as a peaceful state to the United Nations would be conducive, on the one

hand, to raising the prestige of the UN and, on the other, to the defence of the interests of peace in Europe for upholding the security system in the face of the GFR's intention to perpetrate an aggression against the GDR and to revise the European borders.

The basic factor of guaranteeing European security is the inviolability of the state borders in Europe established after World War II, the Oder-Neisse border and the border between the two German states included, the recognition of the existence of two sovereign and equal German states, the GDR and the GFR, with the latter repudiating its claims to the representation of the whole of Germany, the ruling out of the possibility of the GFR getting access to nuclear weapons in any form - the so-called European, multi-lateral or Atlantic forms included - the declaration of the Munich Agreement null and void since the moment of its conclusion.

Such are the goals for the achievement of which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are coming out together with all the progressive and democratic forces.

As for the Soviet Union, way back in 1934, the Soviet Government actively supported the project of the European regional security agreement, later known as the Eastern pact. The conclusion of this agreement was called upon to guarantee the security of all European states, big and small, and to prevent the split of Europe. But Britain and a number of other countries refused to conclude the collective security pact at the time which largely encouraged the aggression of Germany.

The foreign policy activities of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, their stand on the European problems is called upon to serve the vital interests of not only Europe but of the whole world - such activities consist in consolidating the gains of the peoples achieved as a result of the most terrible war in history and the subsequent socio-political changes in Europe, in isolating the forces of reaction and militarism trying to draw Europe into a world war again, strengthening the security of the borders of the socialist countries and creating the broadest conditions for fruitful cooperation in Europe of countries having different social systems.

It is natural that the attention paid to European problems in the policy of the socialist countries is determined by the place these problems take in the system of modern international relations, by the role played by Europe in the modern world.

The Soviet Union's struggle for peace and international friendship dispersed the myth of "Moscow's aggressiveness", of "Communist threat" - a myth by which the international reaction tries to justify the knocking together of the NATO-type aggressive blocs.

The peace-loving foreign policy of the socialist countries is getting broad recognition. The world public opinion is growing aware of the fact that this policy is the basis of relaxing tensions in Europe. At the same time, the socialist forces attach great importance to the influence of the public circles of the West European countries which are aware of the need for reducing the danger of war, for achieving a relaxation of international tensions, for an all-round development of the mutually advantageous relations among all states without any discrimination.

Of great importance also is the work of the peace-loving, progressive and democratic forces of the whole world coming out for the relaxation of international tension and for guaranteeing European security.

These forces facilitate for all the peoples of Europe the struggle for peace, against the forces of reaction, revanchism and aggression. In the last few years peace in Europe was preserved thanks to the struggle of all the peoples of that continent and to the struggle of the world socialist camp. An analysis of the basic changes in the balance of political forces in Europe and their connection with the problem of European security suggests the following conclusion:- two opposite trends are at work in today's Europe and in the world as a whole - on the one hand, the broadening and activation of the struggle for peace on the part of socialism and other peace-loving forces and, on the other hand, the stepping up in the last few years of the activities of the imperialist, militaristic and revanchist forces, US and GFR imperialism above all.

From the existence of these two trends there ensue two basic conclusions as regards the prospects of the struggle of progressive forces for guaranteeing European security - on the one hand, the Soviet and other socialist countries, together with all the progressive forces, have already achieved a number of important concrete results in the joint struggle with all the progressive forces for peace and security in Europe; on the other hand, a long, stubborn and resolute struggle is still ahead for bringing about European security.

The experience of the last few years confirmed the correctness of the thesis that a world war, as the Statement of the Karlovy Vary Conference of the Communist and Workers' Parties put it, is not inevitable, that it can be prevented by a joint effort of the world socialist camp, the international working class, the national liberation movement, all states coming out against war, all the peace-loving forces. That is why the successes of the struggle for guaranteeing European security largely depend on the new concrete results achieved by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, as well as all the progressive forces, in isolating the aggressive forces in Europe, in relaxing international tension, in a gradual solution of all the disputable problems, in consolidating the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems through the development of the general European co-operation in various fields on a mutually advantageous basis.

An important means of achieving these aims is the unity of action of all the anti-war democratic forces in West European countries and the strengthening of their pressure on their governments with the prime aim of achieving positive changes in the foreign policy of the West European countries, the GFR not excluded. One of the chief problems of European peace and security is the setting up of a new system of interstate relations. It is known that the NATO policy necessitated the conclusion of the Warsaw Treaty. This Treaty, however, has an article which says that it loses its force the moment the collective security agreement is signed.

"To overcome the crisis of NATO, it is necessary to overcome the NATO itself", those Europeans - Catholics, Liberals, Socialists - who are interested in the preservation of lasting peace, say. Representatives of various political circles and public forces of Europe are opposed to the prolongation of the North Atlantic Treaty.

It is necessary to exert every effort to launch a broad-scale movement of our continent's peace forces against the prolongation of the North Atlantic Treaty. This movement is favoured by the constructive position of the Warsaw Treaty countries which repeatedly declared and solemnly re-affirmed at the July 1966 Meeting of the Warsaw Treaty countries in Bucharest their preparedness for the simultaneous liquidation of both organisations - or their military setups, to begin with. There are many constructive ways of strengthening European security. Among the concrete steps mention can be made of the possibility of signing an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with declining the nuclear claims

of the GFR, the possibility of the conclusion by all the European states, of an agreement on the denunciation in their inter-relations of the use or threat of force, on non-interference in the internal affairs - an agreement guaranteeing, in keeping with the principles of the UN Charter, the solution of all the disputable problems by exclusively peaceful means. It would also be possible to call a general European conference for discussing the problems of guaranteeing security in Europe and getting the general European cooperation under way in the field of economics, science and technology.

European collective security is a common cause of the countries having different social systems. It goes without saying that in the process of achieving this aim they can adhere to different views on some concrete problems or other. But one thing is clear - without joint efforts it is impossible to achieve the common goal meeting the vital interests of not only Europe but the whole world.

Those who want to save mankind from the world nuclear missile war should redouble their efforts in the struggle against the aggressive schemes of the imperialists who are the chief enemies of peace.

There exists a danger of nuclear war in Europe. But there are also forces in Europe capable of preventing the war and ruling it out altogether. These forces have already achieved no small results. Our joint efforts for the support of these forces can add substantially to Europe's chances of peaceful development.

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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE

Conference on Blocs, the German Problem and the
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EUROPE AND THE FUTURE OF ALLIANCES

by Prof. Harish Kapur,
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The modern history of Europe has been deeply marked by the system of alliances. The inherent security of some nations, and the expansionist desires of the others have led them to continuously seek alignments. However, these alignments, which centred around five major powers of relatively equal strength in the nineteenth century, were temporary and shifting arrangements directed now against this, now against the other rival with limited objective of preventing drastic political change in Europe.

It is, therefore, not surprising that in response to the new and rapidly changing reality of post World War II, which was infinitely more complicated and explosive, the European nations continued to faithfully follow these historic footprints. But, if such an action could be considered as the normal continuation of European tradition, the shape that the alliance system took was, however, quite different.

The multipolar system, which had constituted as the principal aspect of European diplomatic history of the nineteenth century, was replaced by a rigid bipolar system under which preponderant material and military power was now concentrated in the hands of two nations, the United States and the Soviet Union, who were extra Europeans with vital interests in areas far away from the European continent. And their capacity to destroy or to produce was far superior to that of their allies joined together. Admittedly, the European powers, too, during the height of their imperial power, had been influenced by extra European interests, but their obvious geographical location could not be ignored in the formulation of their foreign policy; whereas for the two super powers, Europe, though important, was another foreign area towards which a policy had to be shaped.

Moreover, the bipolar system was deeply coloured by incompatible political principles and philosophies which were absent from the alliance systems of the preceding century. The leaders of the socialist bloc countries, deeply embedded in Marxist-Leninist thinking, had

developed a fixed view of the outside world. For them, to put it simply, the area beyond the frontiers of the socialist states was dominated by obsolete capitalistic system, whose basic objective was to exploit the masses in their own societies, as well as in the societies of other nations. Although the formulation of such a thesis was attributed to the sober, rational and systematic study of the system, through analytical tools provided by Marxist theory, the conclusions reached were full of moralistic fervour.

The Atlantic nations, in particular the United States, had also injected a tone of intense morality in their assessment of the communist world. For them, it represented "materialistic and atheistic creed"¹, serving "the most ruthless empire of modern times"².

In addition, the strategic balance was uneven. The preponderance of American nuclear power was faced by Soviet conventional power, each arousing apprehension that it might be employed to exploit the advantage possessed in its field. But, instead of creating a military equilibrium, it led to an interacting spiral of mutual anxiety and tension only further complicating and intensifying the already tense situation. Each side felt a sense of vulnerability, inevitably stimulating the arms race, encouraging both to make efforts to neutralize the advantage the other had.

It is evident that the combination of all these factors, compounded with the rapid degeneration of the overall political situation, generated an atmosphere of unparalleled hostility in Europe. On a number of occasions, the spiral of explosive actions and equally dangerous reactions gave the uncomfortable feeling that Europe was sitting on a barrel of gunpowder all ready to explode. Perhaps, what was even worse was the prevalence of a general fear that this was not a meteoric crisis which would rapidly disappear with the movement of time, but something with which the European may have to live perpetually.

However, after the middle fifties, a series of important developments radically transformed the situation in Europe. Some of them weakened the very basis of the alliances, while the others rendered obsolete the circumstances that had originally led to the formation of the bipolar system.

The U.S. monopoly of nuclear weapons was decisively broken by the rapid Soviet acquisition of such weapons, followed by intermediate and intercontinental range missiles. The Atlantic nations now became

¹ This expression was used by John Foster Dulles in an article in Foreign Affairs, October, 1957.

² John Foster Dulles expressed these views in March 1954. For details see John R. Beal, John Foster Dulles, (New York: 1959), p.232.

equally vulnerable, irrevocably neutralizing the qualitative advantage it had enjoyed over the socialist world. But if the introduction of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons had changed the very character of the war, making them infinitely more destructive, they had also interjected certain strategic stabilization, hitherto non-existent in Europe. The clear-cut partition of the continent and the repeatedly announced determination of the super powers to defend their European allies with such weapons if necessary made it apparent that it was no longer possible to forcibly change the status quo in Europe. Political and diplomatic manoeuvres, within certain limits, were the only means left for European nations to attain the goals that they set out for themselves.

Political changes in Europe were equally striking. The rapid steps taken by the new communist leadership to liberalize the political and economic systems of the Soviet Union and eastern Europe generated a considerable decrease of tension, breaking down, to some extent, the rigid and artificial barriers that had divided the continent. And the whole area, which in the early fifties was the central theatre of cold war confrontation, now became the principal theatre of detente, encouraging nations, both in the East as well as in the West, to review and revise their assessment of each other.

Perhaps the most encouraging change pertained to West European nations' estimation of Soviet intentions in Europe. No longer did they view, with any great seriousness, a military threat emanating from the Soviet Union; and no longer did they consider it necessary to set up high barriers against the socialist countries.

It is evident that the evolved situation in Europe has generated a number of significant mutations in the relations between nations belonging to the two blocs. The super powers tend to converge on a number of issues, some barriers between East and West Europe have been broken, and the relations within the two blocs have been greatly altered, permitting nations to develop a diversity hitherto non-existent in the two groups.

The establishment of nuclear equilibrium between the Soviet Union and the United States has introduced a novel and significant situation. While the super power conflict has by no means been terminated - the evidence of which we see around the world - striking elements of co-operation have nevertheless been introduced in their relations. Both of them appear to have become interested in preventing their conflicts and that of other nations from escalating into general conflagrations. Both are interested in insuring against undesired eventualities. In fact, the convergence of interest of the two nations has led them to seek an understanding on many difficult problems, or has led them to pursue confluent, though nonetheless unco-ordinated, policies. It was the coalescence of interests that impelled the two nations to establish a direct communication link, to sign the partial test ban treaty, to agree upon principles concerning activities in outer space, and conclude, after long negotiations and in face of opposition of some of their allies, the important treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

³ For details, see The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1965 (New York: 1967).

It is also the coincidence of interest that is leading Moscow and Washington to pursue collateral policies on many issues. The containment of Chinese expansion - a threat considered by both the nations - is leading them to separately strengthen India against China, pacify the long-standing Indo-Pakistan dispute and develop meaningful relations with Japan.

But if these agreements and understandings have generated an element of hope and have improved the atmosphere of world politics, they have also created difficulties for American relations with some European allies, who consider the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations as a part of a general effort by Washington to establish bilateral relationships with the Soviet Union over the heads of the Europeans and probably at the cost of the Europeans.

In addition to the superpower relations, Europe since the last decade has also witnessed the development of significant contacts in cultural and economic fields for which neither the East nor the West, significantly enough, has sought the previous approval of Washington or Moscow. Relying principally on their own initiatives, and guided fundamentally by their own national interests, the nations of Europe have undoubtedly made important progress in partially undoing the partition of Europe. Britain's continued efforts to maintain bilateral relations with Eastern Europe have been duplicated by de Gaulle's recent economic, cultural and political offensive towards such countries as Poland and Rumania. This has been followed by West Germany's economic and political overtures in that area which has led to the virtual nullification of the Hallstein Doctrine. The development of such bilateral arrangements have been by no means due to the initiatives undertaken only by the West European nations. Important efforts on the part of the East Europeans have also played an important part in partially lifting the curtain that has separated them from the West.

It is evident that there is still a considerable scope for further expansion in these and other domains between the two areas. But what has already been achieved is an indication of the extent to which Europe has evolved from the tragic cold war days when it was rigidly partitioned into two separate and mutually suspicious worlds.

The steady aggrandizement of polycentrism within the two blocs is perhaps the most significant development in the European system. In many countries, the direction given by the super power leadership is now being analysed more objectively and critically. Strategic doctrines emanating from Moscow and Washington are being subjected to a new and more sophisticated scrutiny. And economic plans, conceived in these power centres to accomplish an economic integration of their respective groups, are being abjured.

Within the socialist bloc, the firm decision of the new leadership to destroy the highly furbished image of Stalin and to introduce the much needed reforms in the political and economic systems provoked a series of sequential crises, the continual growth of which we are still witnessing. From a monolithic structure, totally inspired and informally

directed from one centre, the bloc has moved to a form of polycentrism where political control and theoretical inspiration emanate from different centres. Among the socialist countries of Europe, there has begun to develop, after the violent upheavals of the middle fifties, a series of significant mutations organized from above but inspired from below, as a result of which one now discerns a remarkable degree of autonomy and divergence in political and economic realms. Even in the field of foreign affairs, in which the Soviet Union was perhaps most sensitive to contradictory voices, divergence has increasingly begun to manifest itself. The recent discussions on the Middle East crisis, and the element of diversity noticeable on the German problem are striking examples of this development. Undoubtedly these are revolutionary changes, perhaps of the same dimension as the changes that shook the area after World War II.

Even more striking than all this is the relative spirit of accommodation and growing flexibility the Soviet leadership has displayed to these changes. This is indeed remarkable, considering the fact that before 1953 it was known for its intolerance and, accustomed to an atmosphere of complete obedience and fidelity from other socialist countries. In fact, even before the process of diversity really set in, gathering momentum every day, it was the Soviet Union which took the initiative in encouraging reforms in East European countries. Even in the sphere of foreign affairs "specific national interests and tasks in international affairs" of socialist countries appear to have been recognized.⁴

The Atlantic community has also undergone important mutations since the middle fifties. Although the liberal character of the Western nations had always prevented the generation of monolithism, divergence among them, however, had never attained such an intractable pitch as they have since the last decade. And the world today is witnessing growing differences among them on the ways and means of attaining economic and political unification of Western Europe, on the nature of the Soviet "threat", on the German problem, and on the whole question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It is evident that Western Europe, increasingly united by cultural, economic and institutional links, and increasingly conscious of its growing economic power, no longer considers that its interests are always identical with those of the United States, and has come to demand a role of greater independence and greater voice in the coalition of Western powers. It is, thus, no longer possible for the United States to obtain unflinching support for her actions in other parts of the world, and hardly any more possible to bilaterally decide - with the Russians - the future of Europe.

Europe, there is no doubt, has significantly evolved. The objectives

⁴ Sh. Sanakoyev, "Formation and Development of Socialist International Relations", International Affairs, October 1967, p.10.

formulated and the control mechanism established during the period of the cold war do not any more respond effectively to the new and changing reality. Of this there is no doubt. But has it developed to a point where it is justifiable to consider that the military alliances can be safely cast into the limbo of oblivion, that the future of peace on the continent has become contingent on such an action, that the further reinforcement of peaceful coexistence is no more possible without a conscious effort on the part of the European nations to do away with the military blocs?

This, alas, is a utopian dream which seems hardly realizable under the existing circumstances. In the first place, military bipolarity continues to subsist as the characteristic feature of the European military alliance system. Despite the French decision to withdraw her troops from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, none of the European nations⁵ - including France - have renounced the protection they enjoy from the military blocs of which the super powers are still the acceptable leaders. Will they do so in the future? It is of course difficult to say with any exactitude. But considering the fact that the dissolution of military alliances would lead to the withdrawal of the United States from the continent, leaving only one super power in the area, it is unlikely that the West European nations - at least most of them - would renounce American protection as long as the real problems of Europe have not been resolved. One could validly argue that these nations could overcome this difficulty by setting up a joint nuclear deterrent. But such a development would inevitably give West Germany, the most powerful nation of Western Europe, a decisive voice in the formulation of nuclear policy - a development full of explosive possibilities and hardly acceptable to many small nations.

Second, the European situation, even in its present evolved form, has still not laid solid foundations for real peace. There are a number of intractable problems which continuously defy solutions, and there is still, it must be admitted, a lack of confidence in each others' intentions. The sinews of modern military strength continue to grow. The German problem, which had originally provoked the partition of Europe, still racks the continent. And the growth of West Germany into a powerful nation, together with the revival of neo-nazism in that country, has once again generated a feeling of great apprehension among many nations who, not long ago, were victims of nazi aggression.

Third, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization exercises considerable restraint to the establishment of West Germany as an independent military power by having integrated her forces - divorced from national control - into the alliance system. The dissolution of the alliances, before the attainment of effective disarmament, would undoubtedly permit West Germany to become, after the Soviet Union, the most important military factor in Europe. Would this not, once again, revive insecurity and tension, especially when we take into account that West Germany is the most discontented nation of Europe still striving to bring about the reunification of Germany?

⁵ with the exception of Albania

Fourth, if there has been considerable detente in Europe, this by no means can be said for the Third World countries, where escalated conflicts have become incessant, and in which the super powers become directly or indirectly involved on opposite sides. Since the decolonization process had irrevocably set in after World War II, hardly a year has ended without the explosion of a conflict in some part of Africa, Asia or Latin America. If it was the Korean War, the Suez and Cuban crises - to name just a few - that racked the world a few years ago, it is the tragic Vietnam war - to mention just one - which is dominating the world scene today. Admittedly, many African, Asian and Latin American countries are breeding grounds for conflicts and tensions due to frustrated desires of territorial expansion, or unsatisfied aspirations of nationalism, not to speak of the deep economic and social problems that they are faced with. But it is also evident that the involvement of the two super powers in many of these conflicts has dangerously escalated them, thereby further increasing the risks of general conflagrations. The tragedy of Vietnam is a typical example of such a situation. More than a decade ago, the relatively minor crisis centred around nationalism. Now with massive and direct intervention of the United States, and the indirect involvement of the Soviet Union, the conflict is bristling with truculence and is escalating into a major war. It is clear that the growth of China into a major power on the continent of Asia will only exacerbate the involvement of Moscow and Washington in the whirlpool of third world politics.

Therefore, as long as the "inner core" of the European nations recognize the two super powers as the leaders of the two alliance systems, it is difficult to conceive of them disappearing from this continent, for the situation here is bound to be influenced and affected by situations in other parts of the world. Perhaps the European nations, whose interest in the Third World has become marginal since World War II, could to some extent overcome this hurdle by insulating themselves from the leaders of the two blocs. But does this seem likely in the foreseeable future, in view of the fact that they are greatly dependent upon the great powers for political, economic and military support?

If one would accept the underlying assumption of this paper that the rapid dissolution of the military alliances in Europe would be premature, that such a development, in all likelihood, would leave the field open for nations to make endless diplomatic and even military moves at the expense of each other, thus creating instability, it is then valid to reflect on the manner in which nations could proceed to attain collective, organized and generally acceptable detente on the continent.

First of all, it is evident that the mechanisms of change that are already functioning on the continent ought to be intensified. The super powers should continue their bilateral endeavours to seek greater understanding and agreement on points that still divide them. The East-West European efforts to develop bilateral economic and political relations ought to be intensified, and the process of polycentrism within the two political groups should be permitted to make some more headway.

However, there is a point beyond which this process of change could not be carried as this might disrupt the goal of organized and generally acceptable detente. The super powers cannot any more reach bilateral agreements on issues that directly concern the European nations, as the progressively developing polycentric situation would not permit such accords. The East-West European nations could hardly go beyond the development of bilateral relations without the approval of the super powers who are directly concerned with the European situation. And the total fragmentation of the two alliances is also hardly possible, considering the myriad of common ideas and interests that still unite the members of each group and separates them from the other.

But what about the general problems with which all the Europeans are collectively concerned? How can they be resolved? What procedure ought to be followed in order to come to grips with them? It is evident that they cannot be resolved through bilateral negotiations between nations. The ticklish problem of two Germanys, the issue of atom free zones and military disengagement, the problem of European security treaty, etc., are all vital issues which concern all Europeans, and which none of them is prepared any more to leave in the hands of the super powers. It is here in such cases that the role of the two military alliances becomes crucial. For a regular, institutionalized and, admittedly long, negotiation between the chosen representatives of the Atlantic and Warsaw alliances appear to be the only rational channel for seeking, step by step, generally acceptable solutions for the problems of Europe. The chances of real success of such a procedure have considerably increased, as there is now a wide consensus of opinion among almost all Europeans that the most intractable problem - the problem of German reunification - will not be the first, but the last step, in the eventual unification of Europe.

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THE FACTORS OF CHANGE IN EUROPE

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In spite of all the far-reaching facts and changeovers that have happened since the end of World War II, Europe still plays an important role in all international events. As far as maintenance of the world peace is concerned, Europe has a key position for the following reasons:-

- (1) The main confrontation between socialism and capitalism on world-wide scale is taking place for the most part in Europe at present.
- (2) In Europe there are serious political problems in which the main great powers are directly involved.
- (3) In Europe there are powerful armies on both sides, equipped with nuclear and other modern weapons. Nowhere else in the world can we find such a strong concentration of armed forces and war material.
- (4) Launching a war in Europe would lead almost with certainty to a thermo-nuclear inferno on a world-wide scale. A limited local war would be practically impossible.

The importance of Europe as a whole, even in respect of many other positive lines, exceeds a regional frame. The economic potential of European countries is big and is constantly growing. The European countries are both technically and culturally on a high level. Among almost 600 million Europeans, we find the names of a great many prominent scientists, highly able and talented technicians, brilliant artists and persons of world-wide reputation in cultural life. In the space of Europe there also lives the most experienced and politically most mature part of the world's working class.

Until lately it seemed that the existence of two different social and economic systems on this Continent would seriously affect the acting faculties of European nations. Nowadays this fact seems rather to be its relative advantage. Europe has a great opportunity to serve the whole world as example, provided her nations succeed in ensuring a lasting and reliable state of affairs for peaceful coexistence and competition for nations with different social systems, if they solve the problems of confrontation between socialism and capitalism in a peaceful way in this part of the globe. Just this confrontation, competition and cooperation within the new conditions of developing scientific and technical revolution, can make Europe one of the most dynamic and objectively most progressive powers in the future evolution of human civilization.

And such a chance offers itself. In Europe, despite all difficulties, obstacles and sudden backward changes, we can see a certain process of changes which could lead to a positive goal. At present Europe seems to stand at a cross-road. Which way will she take? That is a great and meanwhile open question. Tremendously much will depend on the wisdom of her leaders as well as on the reaction of peoples' masses.

The tension in other parts of the world, especially the American aggression in Vietnam, undoubtedly infests the outlook in Europe and severely reduces the potentially existing possibilities of general relaxation and gradual normalization of the international relations in Europe. In spite of these negative facts, the tendency towards peaceful coexistence, competition and cooperation is cutting its way by steps, but without restraint. The growth of many bilateral relations among the European states with different social systems bears speaking testimony of it. Of course, many obstacles in the positive evolution also have their roots in Europe. In most cases rudiments of old policy and deep distrust with scepticism are the main reasons of misunderstanding. However, the power of the positive trend lies in its objectiveness.

If we wish to understand the main features which emerged in the course of evolution after World War II and which are still now prevailing, and if we wish to find our bearings in the uneasy field of European politics, in many ways coherent with the whole world, it is necessary to ascertain the entities which are qualitative, new and decisively progressive in the present stage of evolution, compared with previous periods. The former post-war period, reaching from 1945 to the beginning of the sixties, can be characterized by the following cardinal features:-

- (1) A forcible disintegration of the then existing political structure of Europe and efforts to build a new structure based on a new proportion of power.
- (2) An explosive conflict of antagonistic social and economic powers contingent on the "moving front" under a prevailing ideological shape of most subjects of the European political evolution, a layout of extreme, contradictory alternatives of evolution.
- (3) A clear preponderance of "power-position" elements, especially as regards military aspects with the aim to change the power-ratio in favour of one party; aiming towards a direct and total solution of the confrontation between socialism and capitalism in Europe. In European politics there were contradictory and discrepant interests prevailing.
- (4) In connection with the polarisation of power, an outstanding consolidation of the hegemonial position of the new great powers in post-war Europe - the USSR and USA. The influence of the middle-sized and small European countries has sunk in many respects.

The principal characteristics and factors of the contemporary European evolution - which are called détente (relaxation) - are above all the following:

- (1) A conspicuous stabilization of the political structure in Europe which results from World War II and comprises Germany.
- (2) The impact of the atomic age upon international relations with bilateral understanding that a nuclear war on a world-wide scale ceased to be a means of politics (although not a threat) and that the long termed basic political aims in European conditions must be strictly followed according to this axiom. The confrontation between socialism and capitalism in Europe, which is going on, has reached a new platform and has become a problem of many years to come.

- (3) Strategically (and under the present conditions also politically) the determinative position of both world great powers lasts, but their influence upon the evolution in Europe has a declining tendency. In European politics the specific interests of the middle and small European countries are gaining ground.
- (4) In the relations of European countries, irrespective of their social and economic systems also common European interests are working their way, even if other contradictory interests might prevail at the present stage.

Above all, it is the imperative interest to prevent any military conflict in Europe, and the risk of Europe being involved in a conflict somewhere else in the world, that does not concern the interests of European nations. Simultaneously, a common understanding is arising that the security in Europe cannot be continuously safeguarded by military means nor by races of armament that could overthrow the existing balance of powers and cause a most unstable situation. Besides, the immense material costs of armament are forcing the smaller European countries to play the role of political outsiders. However, the sums that European countries are spending on armament are a considerable brake to their social and economic progress at a time when economy and science are on the march. The very important connecting link is the effort to surmount the division of the European continent. Playing a still greater role are the problems arising from which is called the disparity of the Continents, be it in respect of Europe to the USA (a problem of technological backwardness) or - in a far greater degree - in respect of the so called "third world" (a problem of nutrition etc.).

The fact that in Europe there are interests exceeding political alliances, that there are common interests of all European nations, represents a quite new value in European policy after World War II, an even more important factor of evolution in the life of European nations.

Of course, the community of the basic interests of both groups, the capitalist as well as the Socialist countries, remains predominant. To a great extent it determines the position of both great powers and sets a limit to an all European settlement. However, thanks to the mentioned factors, the influence of the middle and smaller European countries on European politics is constantly growing and if the present trend goes on, it will be even stronger. The important pre-supposition of it is that these countries will correctly appreciate the developing process of changeover and will exert a positive influence on it. It is of paramount importance not only to use up the possibilities on hand; but also to recognize and to react correctly on the objectively, as well as subjectively, limited lines of the general change in Europe and of the virtual possibilities of the European countries under present circumstances. For the smaller and middle European countries it is important to find out the value of their own position in the European area. For the great powers Europe cannot be more than just one space for their global interests and politics.

In any case, time has come to develop a policy of realism, tenacious of purpose, combined with courage and initiative and proper imagination. The main problem is to design a real system of measures and to achieve an agreement of all determinative powers on such a mood that would forward the gradual creation of a system of European security and cooperation.

In this respect the importance of the correct comprehension of the basic factors and prevalent circumstances, which will influence the evolution in Europe in the near future, is growing.

Perhaps it will be the following factors:-

- (1) The lasting confrontation between capitalism and socialism, an outlook of a long co-existence of capitalist and socialist countries in Europe with the purpose to create reliable institutional conditions for a peaceful co-existence and competition. A great deal will depend on creative understanding of possibilities of further development of the objectively stipulated social changes.
- (2) The interest of maintaining the military-strategic balance which is decisive for seeking new, modern and more reliable forms of security in Europe, including the participation of other than European countries in this system as well as the further existence of today's alliances, their purposes and characters. A great role is assigned to the development of military technology, too.
- (3) The growth of common European interests which concentrates especially on extending the platform of European détente and on passing over to a generally acceptable European settlement. Much will depend on the evolution on world scale. Especially the relations between the USSR and USA, the harmonization of their interests with those of other European countries, the development in Germany, first of all of the policy of the FRG, and of course the evolution in China and in the whole area of the third world will be of great importance.
- (4) The efforts of European countries to diminish the importance of military factors in ensuring their security, especially by means of versatile, mutually advantageous cooperation in economy and science and technique resulting from the need of international distribution of work, first of all in Europe, which is characterized by the existence of many state units. Moreover, the most dynamic power will be the pressure of consequences of the technical and scientific revolution, objectively given by the process of further evolution of human civilization.
- (5) The effort to create gradually optimal prerequisites not only on an international scale but also with necessary measures in each country or their groups. Much will depend on structural changes within the existing social and economic formations of technical advanced society in Europe.

Anyway, it is essential to realize that Europe of today is only at the beginning of a complicated and long process of changes in a positive direction. The main context of the contemporary development is the struggle for the creation of the starting basis of a comprehensive system of European security and cooperation (status quo - a change of the status quo); in the meantime only particular and not yet all-European interests are prevailing in this part of the world. The main task is to eliminate all backward and retarding elements in the European evolution and to concentrate constantly on seeking and enforcing positive and objectively progressive factors that are in harmony with the interest shared by all European countries and nations.

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ALLIANCES AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

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The Origin of the Alliances

The formation of alliances, both in the West and the East of Europe, in the late forties have divided the old continent into two politically opposed camps. Only few countries remained outside these alliances and remained more or less successfully outside of the influence of the policies inaugurated by the alliances. The quasi total division of Europe into two well organized and rather strongly united political and military blocs led to the widespread contention that postwar developments were responsible for the division of hitherto united continent.

The postwar division is indeed a novel phenomenon in many respects, but Europe was in fact divided even before the formation of the existing alliances. Reference is made here, not only to the division developing after the socialist revolution in Russia in 1917, but also to the situation preceding this important event. On the continent of Europe there were before the first world war independent and relatively economically developed nations of the West and the overall less developed East of the continent, where most nations lived under open foreign domination or in antiquated and insupportable conditions of obsolete forms of society. Europe of the first decade of the twentieth century can, therefore, not be considered as a united continent.

The revolution in Russia in 1905 and 1917 as well as revolutionary movements and actual revolutions in practically all countries of eastern Europe in the twentieth century came as a consequence of mounting opposition to existing conditions both in the sense of social and national oppression. As a result of successes of revolutions in most of the East-European countries the stage was set for the present relationship and the division of Europe as we know it now. At the same time, the achievement of independence and the accelerated economic development of these countries prepared the stage for a development aiming at a real and solidly established unity. Apparently, the two parts of Europe had to drift apart, Eastern Europe had to go her way in accomplishing political, social and economic revolutions at an accelerated pace, in order to create conditions needed for relations with the West based on equality.

These developments in Eastern Europe did, of course, not lead automatically to the political division and especially the intense tensions of the Cold War as it originated soon after the end of the Second World War. Even the ideological differences, as they developed in the process of change in Eastern and Western Europe, are no sufficient explanation for it. If they were, then there could be no hope for improvement without a decisive (in the circumstances - catastrophic) show-down between the East and the West, the current détente could never have happened.

The differences in the systems of society and the specific problems of

accelerated growth within Eastern Europe, the efforts to overcome the inherited backwardness, were bound to reduce economic ties and limit other forms of contact, but were not bound to cause high tensions and hostility. In order to verify this argument, we must examine the circumstances in which tensions mounted, leading to the formation of military alliances and also the circumstances in which tensions decreased to a level permitting the unfolding of substantial economic and other relations in recent years.

There can be little doubt that tensions preceded the formation of alliances. We must, therefore, examine the origins and causes of tensions if we want to understand the origin of the alliances and before proceeding further in our analysis. The point of departure must be the interpretation of the underlying substance of the controversies which led, in the first years after the war, to mounting tensions. In other words, we must try to find the common denominator of the several specific differences between the East and the West in the initial period of the Cold War.

Without entering into an extensive discussion of the specific issues which caused tensions between the Allies in the last years of the war and even more tensions, leading to a general Cold War later, we could define the common element in all of them: distrust, if not outright hostility, based on the difference in the political systems of society. In fact, the ill-fated first attempts to negotiate an alliance between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union in 1939 failed mainly because of this.

The uneasy atmosphere in wartime meetings of statesmen of the Alliance and the frictions around the opening of a "Second Front" grew into more concrete clashes about the line of division in Europe, which was to become a border of social systems and not only of countries or zones of occupation. This self-evident circumstance which was, in the course of time, more and more explicitly stated on both sides led to the almost general belief that the whole tension of the Cold War was caused by and inseparably linked with the existence of the two systems, capitalism and socialism, in Europe. The "theory" of an allegedly irreconcilable and final struggle between two systems represented in the two groupings of states, took the place of the hitherto accepted view of Marxists that the struggle of classes of society within national states generates changes in the system of society and its political institutions.

On the other side slogans like that of "rolling back communism" in the United States had a similar content but pointed to the opposite direction. It was based on the concept of using international conflict, pressure and force if need be, in order to nullify the changes which occurred during and after the Second World War in Eastern Europe. This slogan was a maximal expression of an aggressive policy based on the view that internal changes in a state can be a valid reason for international action.

Of course, none of these attitudes was applied strictly and consistently in the real actions of governments, but they have greatly contributed to the belief that the difference in social systems was the inevitable root out of which tension and hostility must grow. The several specific problems which would have in any case been a likely cause for differences between the Allies have, as a matter of fact, grown to dangerous proportions because of the confrontation of the two systems and it is understandable that this should lead to undue generalizations.

The simultaneous effect of two factors, the clash of interests between the major allies in the past war and the presence of two different social systems, were the ingredients out of which the high tensions of the Cold War were made. One of them, the clash of interests, was more likely to fade out of focus with time than the difference in the systems of society. Nevertheless, in order to catch the imagination of the people and because of a general tendency of mankind to generalise, the Cold War was presented as a clash of different systems. The ideological difference was elevated to the status of main, if not unique, cause of tension and of tensions in contemporary international relations in general.

The time that has passed since and the events of recent years in particular indicate, however, that even radical changes in relations are possible without a change in the respective systems of society. Now, the prevailing view is that peaceful coexistence of countries, irrespective of differences in systems of society, is possible and should be the practical goal of political action of governments. The change which made this new trend possible must come next in our examination.

There have been considerable changes within the countries on both sides, but in no case have these changes led to a fundamental transformation of the system of society. On the contrary, the most important outcome of the postwar years was the strengthening and stabilization of the existing system and the prevailing order of things within most countries in the West and in the East of Europe. Above all there was, here and there, a radical improvement of the economic position and an unprecedented growth in production and well-being.

The countries in the East have pushed forward with great success the industrialization of the less developed areas of that region. The general economic progress introduced new elements in the way of life and modified the social structures of these countries. The economic development also brought about a better political climate, particularly after the death of Stalin in March 1953. Internal changes in the countries of the East of Europe led to changes in their mutual relations. Relations became more relaxed and opened the way to a gradual development in contacts with the outside world. Visas for travelling within Eastern Europe were gradually abolished and movements of persons across the border line of the Cold War became ever more frequent and free of excessive bureaucratic formalities.

If there was ever a real ground for the fear that infiltration from the West could endanger the system of socialism, this apprehension dissipated at an accelerated pace. There was less and less need to compensate the prevailing lack of selfconfidence by public manifestations which could induce apprehension on the other side. In fact the need and the ability to expand economic relations with the West and to enhance other relations gave birth to new approaches to inherited theoretical formulations. Coexistence became the main slogan and efforts were even made to trace the desire for coexistence in statements and policies of the period of high tension. In a way this is not surprising, because most of the aggressiveness of the past years was conditioned by fear and a sense of insecurity, rather than by aggressive appetites.

In the West, economic developments also took a favourable turn in the years following the war. Gradually most of the countries of the West rehabilitated their economic establishment and continued to develop

at a pace exceeding earlier experiences and even optimistic forecasts by experts. Western Europe became more independent and gradually developed into a fierce competitor of the United States rather than remaining a junior partner supported by the wealth of the giant across the ocean. The lowering of economic barriers within Western Europe, in spite of the creation of two rivalling groups (EEC and EFTA), contributed further to the economic development and to the desire and ability to expand ties with other regions, including the East.

In the circumstances, a more realistic and sober view was taken of developments and the general situation in Eastern Europe. The increased sense of security and the optimism accompanying achievement permitted a gradual demystification of thinking about Eastern Europe and Socialism. This trend could not wipe out vested interests and pressure groups advocating aggressive attitudes, but the ground was cut from under their feet and they were no longer in the position to dominate the scene.

The changed situation was reflected in public manifestations and, in the eyes of the East, Western Europe became an ever more suitable partner for peaceable relations. Inasmuch as there remained friction and even fierce confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States in regions outside Europe, these events had no decisive effect on intra-European developments. NATO, the main tie of Western Europe with the United States, remained in force, but was now more flexibly interpreted. The countries of Western Europe did not find themselves bound to join the United States in the military action in Vietnam, as they did in the years of the Korean War. The military organization of NATO was less emphasized, France dropped out altogether from the military establishment and the dominant role of the military in East-West politics was greatly reduced.

One should, however, mention that the unresolved German question remained the most important cause of friction in Europe in spite of all these favourable developments. It is also good to keep in mind the special case of Spain and Portugal in the south-west corner of Europe and Greece in the Balkans (since a military junta took over the government there). Furthermore, the strife over Cyprus and in Cyprus is another cause of unrest in Europe. But it appears that the trend of improving East-West relations is not in peril because of these negative factors on the European scene.

The first conclusion to be drawn from this presentation of developments in Europe after the war is that a combination of changing circumstances together with a more constant factor, the confrontation of two systems of society, have created a temporary state of high tension in Europe. The temporary character of this condition is based on the changeable circumstances. The second conclusion which can be made now is that the circumstances which have led to the postwar conflict have substantially changed in spite of the further existence, side by side, of the two systems and that a basis for better and still improved mutual relations has been created.

The argument leading up to these conclusions has been brought in a rather sketchy way and should not be considered as exhausting the most interesting problem of postwar relations in Europe. Only some major points have been briefly indicated with the purpose of helping us to examine further developments leading to a growing East-West cooperation and developments beyond the Cold War.

The Period of Change

The lessening of East-West tensions in Europe and the relaxation of relations within the two alliances introducing a gradual dissolution of the strict bipolar pattern established in the Forties, did not automatically provide a basis for general cooperation. The picture in Europe changed in recent years into a combination of political cross-currents. Basically, the pattern remains dominated by a division into two parts, but the relations between them show marked improvement and the discipline within the two political blocs becomes less and less strictly observed, leading even to rather significant departures from the behaviour of the group as a whole. One is inclined to think in this connection first of France and Romania, but these are only extreme cases of a rather general development.

It would be mistaken to believe that the prevailing degree of across-the-fence cooperation, or even further progress in this direction would automatically usher in a new era of non-aligned general cooperation - the ultimate goal of the doctrine of coexistence. Alliances continue to exist and the inherited bipolar pattern is still the underlying basis for political and economic relations.

There is, no doubt, some inertia in existing political formations and alliances and one must consider it first. It would be an oversimplification to believe that the mere fact of existing treaties and bloc organizations is the only element slowing down the pace of cooperation. In recent history, and particularly in the history of Europe of the twentieth century, we can find enough examples of disregard of treaty obligations, or at least cases of negligence, to permit the supposition that modern States apply with considerable promptness, invoking even slightest pretexts, the dictum "sic rebus stantibus". In political behaviour, departures from hitherto accepted patterns is done with even more expedition. Therefore the inertia in our case must be based on more than conservative respect for formal obligations or slowness in adopting new ways in international relations.

Firstly, the role of the United States in the western alliance and of the Soviet Union in the East is still rather outstanding. The two nuclear super-Powers have, by virtue of their status in the international community and their interests in Europe in particular, still considerable influence over European East-West relations.

This influence is obviously exercised in accordance with the foreign policies of each of the two Powers. It is, however, patent that they are confronted in a substantial manner in several conflicts or situations throughout the world as well as in some of the outstanding universal problems of a political or military nature. In spite of a marked improvement in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, they lag visibly behind the rapprochement within Europe.

Europe may have quite successfully insulated intra-European relations from the echoes and impacts of disturbances in other parts of the world, but through the presence on the continent of and close ties with the two super-Powers, Europe cannot escape the effect of strife and conflict in other regions. These effects are particularly strong in cases when an outside conflict tends to emphasize the East-West confrontation, or rather a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. One of the most important examples of it is the war in Vietnam, although one should say that it is surprising to note how little this conflict has so far influenced intra-European relations. It is, however, obvious that it did cast a shadow over Europe as it did indeed over the whole world.

It is unlikely that Europe could become fully protected from the repercussions of the clashes between the two major nuclear Powers in view of the wide interests the old continent has in world affairs and also because of the special connections of the two Powers with European affairs. It is unlikely that relations of the West of Europe with the socialist countries could develop at the expense of the relations of the West with the United States. It is also obvious that one should not expect to unify Europe at the cost of alienating the Eastern European countries from the Soviet Union.

Politically it is of little consequence that the Soviet Union is on the continent of Europe and the United States not. It is equally irrelevant to insist on the fact that the major portion of the Soviet Union is in Asia. In view of the level of technical development, the ability to conquer distances, similar geographical considerations have little value. It is, in fact, illogical to talk about the growing unity of the world and ignore the close and inseparable connection between countries whose association is the leading example of this integrating trend.

Within both of these groups of States one can find friction and sometimes even divergent attitudes, but it would be exaggerated to believe that the behaviour of France, or the behaviour of any country in the West or the East, justifies expectations that the one or the other super-Power could be separated or excluded from the affairs of the continent. This behaviour can be used only to show the increasing flexibility of relations, but a rigid military alliance is not the only form of close association between States.

It is by far more reasonable to expect that every European country extending and developing relations across the Cold War line in Europe will keep its old friendship and ties without, however, permitting them to interfere with new connections and closer relations with partners who have earlier been prohibited. This is, as a matter of fact, already in progress on both sides. It is therefore natural that the ever more complicated network of relations in Europe tends to confuse sometimes those who have become too used to the simplified pattern of the Cold War, governed by two types of relations mainly: strict adherence to a group of outright hostility.

Now, let us return to our argument. If the developing pattern of relations in and around Europe leaves in existence, although greatly changed, the connection of the two major Powers with European affairs, then it is logical to assume that the Cold War of the past will cast a shadow also over the next future of relations within Europe and that it will at the same time continue to influence relations between the super-Powers. This appears to be one factor slowing down the East-West rapprochement.

Another important factor is the level of economic development in the two parts of Europe. One cannot, of course, speak of uniform levels of development either in the West or in the East. There are countries markedly lagging in economic development in the West, such as Spain, Portugal or Greece, and highly industrialized areas in the East, such as some areas in the Soviet Union, or Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic. These differences in the level of industrialization or of economic progress, measured by whatever method one might apply, would even show that a certain country or area of the West is less developed than an area or country in the East.

For the shaping of political relations this is less important than one could at a first glance assume. Both regions are rather extensively integrated into distinct economic regions. This applies to the West, in spite of the existence of two rival economic organizations. In both cases trade and other international economic activities within the regions are highly developed and are decisive for the economic stability and growth of each one of the countries of the given region. This pattern becomes even more significant for our argument if we include North America into the picture as a part of the West.

Over the years a rather persistent inertia developed and it is extremely difficult to redirect the flow of economic relations and to change this pattern. The development of industries based on a given market and the supplying of energy and raw materials from a given source tends to emphasize the rigidity of the pattern of economic ties on both sides. It is, therefore, from a point of view of political relations relevant to speak of the two areas as distinct, though complex, units on different levels of economic development.

Moreover, the economic policies and the specific needs of economic development are also different and this tends to make an increase of economic transactions between the regions rather difficult. The patterns of consumption and the patterns of productions are different also and differences in the way of life as well as the level of consumption add to the problem. One could go on enumerating the many contrasts in the economic field, but this might be enough for our purpose.

Here it may be enough to note only that the material disparity and the different ways and means to handle it creates real obstacles in the process of developing economic relations

between the two regions. It might be added that the deliberate reduction of trade of the West with Eastern Europe in the past has greatly contributed to the preservation of these obstacles and to the growth of new ones.

We must recall too the blockade of Soviet Russia immediately after the revolution of 1917 and the more or less strictly applied obstacles and restrictive measures since then, as well as the new wave of restrictions during the Cold War. The abandoning of this attitude and the dismantling of the restrictions could not by itself bring about spectacular changes. Expectations that trade could easily grow on the basis of the traditional complementarity - food and raw materials from the East, manufactured goods from the West - could not materialize. The industrialization in the East left little to be exported along these lines and a rather narrow market for the importation of consumer goods in view of changes in the pattern of consumption and the high levels of savings for investment.

The West, developing favourable sources of raw materials and oil in overseas countries and regions, could not absorb expected quantities of commodities from the East of Europe. Sea routes are less expensive and earnings of workers overseas lower than in Eastern Europe. Irrespective of past political restrictions, even the growing interest of the West to develop trade with the East, counting on the rapidly developing potentialities of the expanding markets there, could so far produce only moderate results.

It can be said that both sides demonstrated in the last few years considerable and growing interest in developing economic relations, but found material and objective obstacles which caused these efforts to be only partially successful. In spite of the relatively fast growth of East-West trade in Europe the effect on the general pattern of the flow of trade on the continent is modest, because the point of departure is very low. A percentagewise high increase represents here a rather insignificant change in the pattern. The two areas are still, and will remain for quite some time, distinct economic regions with low to moderate levels of mutual economic relations.

There is no doubt that this state of affairs in the field of economic relations must have repercussions in the field of political relations. The slow change in overcoming the division of Europe through the expansion of economic ties is one of the forces of inertia slowing down East-West cooperation. It cannot be removed by political acts alone. It can be only gradually overcome by economic growth and by economic measures facilitating livelier mutual relations. In the political sphere only favourable general circumstances, that is a climate conducive to the development of mutual relations can be created.

The need for measures facilitating interregional economic exchanges brings us to the third obstacle to East-West cooperation. Changes in the economic sphere which are now underway in all countries of the East of Europe may be generally summarized for the purpose of this argument as measures favour-

ing a more free development of trade and other economic relations with the outside world. This is, of course, not a comprehensive appraisal of these far-reaching reforms, which have a far more deeper significance. It is, however, extremely important to note that they have an intended and actual favourable effect on the developing of economic ties with countries outside the region.

In fact, the regional economic organization in Eastern Europe, the Council for Economic Mutual Aid, and its institutions, are also affected by these changes. One should, however, be cautious and avoid oversimplification. In spite of all these efforts and developments, a substantial increase in the trade and other forms of economic cooperation will for a considerable time be slow because of difficulties caused by general policies and institutions, including regulations created at a time of autarchy. In this respect one might consider as an example the difficulties which Yugoslavia had to overcome internally before developing substantially her mutually beneficial relations with the West.

It follows from the presented argument that, in spite of the existence of good will and of promising potentialities, the East-West rapprochement in Europe, following the lessening of tensions and the demonstrated will to increase cooperation, nevertheless must be taken as a slow process. Important factors of inertia in the political and economic fields in every-day practice and in inherited institutional and conceptual complexes on both sides can be overcome only gradually.

Beyond the Cold War

What is then the prospect for the future of Europe?

It is not easy to give a simple and concise answer. The present is a rather confusing pattern of cross-currents of forces and habits created in the years of the Cold War and new tendencies struggling to assert themselves. The division of Europe has given birth to two military alliances and the two alliances have contributed to a rigid definition and the institutionalization of this division. From the point which has already been reached a return to the past seems rather unlikely, but it is not probable that the past could be simply wiped out or forgotten. It will play, at least for some considerable time, an important role in the forming of the future.

One could, of course, take the facile approach and construct, according to one's preferences, a model and set it as the goal to be achieved. Politicians usually behave like this and they are right in their way. In order to achieve something one must know what one is aiming at. But, for the purpose of this paper, this would still be a facile approach. The purpose is to come possibly to an understanding of current trends and not to add one more set of goals or to repeat those which have already been defined.

The essential disappearance of mutual fear, or of the earlier sense of insecurity, on the one hand, and the economic and technical demand for integration on an ever wider scale, are likely to press developments in Europe towards more general cooperation. The specific and temporary causes of conflict in the years after the war are disappearing from the scene. What remains is the long-term essential problem of cooperation between countries with different social systems, between capitalist countries of the West and socialist countries of the East of Europe.

We shall now try to examine briefly this problem, removing from our mind the specific causes of friction and tension which made these relations tense in the early years after the Second World War. We have seen that the confrontation of countries with different systems of society does not necessarily lead to hostility. It is also obvious that the similarity of types of society is no secure basis for friendship. Wars between capitalist countries have happened, tension developed recurrently between socialist countries and has, so far, been an accompanying phenomenon of the coexistence of several socialist countries.

The question we must ask now is: how far can relations develop between a socialist country and capitalist countries? The obvious thought that occurs in this connection is to examine the case of Yugoslavia. This country has developed relations with countries of the West for almost twenty years, a period long enough to permit some more general conclusions, particularly if we take into consideration the many events that have happened during these two decades. The example of Yugoslavia certainly can be used for more general conclusions, but there are also limiting circumstances which we must take into consideration.

During the first years relations of Yugoslavia with the West have developed in circumstances which were governed by some general features, broadly resembling conditions of East-West relations today. There were unsettled political problems charged with high emotions (Trieste), there was a general desire to develop economic ties and to overcome distrust as well as to reduce obstacles to more free exchanges. There was a will to cooperate and there were elements of restraint. There was the low level of economic development and institutional obstacles in Yugoslavia as negative factors. In the political sphere, inertia generated from past and present political differences and added its weight to the factors slowing down progress in cooperation.

The first steps forward were made in the economic field and economic ties developed further, simultaneously with a gradual change in the economic system in Yugoslavia. The changes were generally along the lines of changes occurring now in other countries of Eastern Europe. The road covered through the years was difficult and the efforts were burdened with the additional weight of inexperience and novelty of the enterprise. Nevertheless the experiment proved to be successful and may have in a way contributed to the relative easing of similar developments on a wider scale in Europe at present.

The main value of this example is in the proof that a state of highly developed relations and the absence of substantial tensions are possible between countries with different social systems. The West is, as a region, the largest partner in trade and in other economic transactions and activities of Yugoslavia. The country is open to millions of visitors; there is a free access to information and gathering of information, as well as abundant travel of Yugoslavs to the outside world. All this went along with the continuous improvement of the economic conditions in the country and the unhindered development of its socialist institutions.

As already stated, we must see to it that the meaning of this example is not overrated. In the first place, it proves only that friendly relations and extensive cooperation between a socialist country and capitalist countries is possible. It does not prove that it will or could always occur. On the one side the cooperation of Yugoslavia with the West has not dispelled all distrust and barriers, but, on the other, this did not hinder the general development. This might prove to be somewhat different in the case of relations on a major scale and involving major Powers on both sides.

Problems of security have a different content in cases of major Powers, they imply interests and considerations far beyond the limits of one country. Even in the economic field, the absolute size of the problem or of the enterprise could introduce new elements complicating the solution. Finally we must not forget the specific circumstances in which this development started.

What is then the overall meaning and significance of the case of Yugoslavia?

If it were possible, and if the cooperation of Yugoslavia with the West continues to develop simultaneously with the development of the relations of Yugoslavia with other socialist countries and with less developed countries, then it should be taken as evident that it is not the difference in social systems that prevents cooperation existent in the case of Yugoslavia and the West and consequently that the future of Europe is not bound to suffer because of it. Furthermore, it should be taken as evident that the formation and continuation of the Cold War alliances is not an outgrowth of differences in social systems and that in the future they could disappear. The disappearance of alliances may, however, leave Europe still having two distinct regions with growing mutual cooperation and developing an economic integration irrespective of material and political differences.

It should not be difficult to indicate the road which would lead to an early implementation of this prospect. Europe, after all, is already underway on this road. Bilateral economic and political relations cutting across the old battle lines of the Cold War pave the road to higher form of multilateral cooperation. There are still few elements of multilateral economic cooperation in Europe which survived the

Cold War and include countries from both sides. The most important is, naturally, the Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations, which has made so far small steps forward after years of almost complete impotence and stagnation.

Expected further steps forward should not be understood as meaning that this commission might in the foreseeable future replace the existing economic organizations of the West and the East. One would rather think of the Economic Commission for Europe as a coordinating body organizing in the beginning only such types of cooperation and in such fields as would be compatible with the normal functioning of the existing organizations on both sides. This might lead to a pattern in which both the separate organizations in the East and in the West would coexist and cooperate with the United Nations body in Geneva.

It would be unrealistic to try to envisage at this stage more detailed plans for the future, but there is obviously still much room left for general economic cooperation in Europe even while the divisive groupings continue to function. After all, the lowering of barriers in the economic relations between the two sides is not incompatible with the carrying out of the integrating functions for which existing organizations have been established. If past and present policies, greatly influenced by inherited habits of thought, preclude substantial mutual concessions and the elimination of obstacles, this should not be considered as an irrevocable attitude built into the foundations of these organizations.

It may perhaps seem over-optimistic to expect all this to happen in the near future, but one should not forget that the time is not far in the past when now existing bilateral arrangements between the major Western countries and the countries of the Council for Economic Mutual Aid were still unthinkable. The development in bilateral relations has not yet been expanded to possible volumes and much can still be done along these lines. But it is time to consider further ways and means and particularly the use of the Economic Commission for Europe as a center for further developing multilateral cooperation and the lowering of barriers in general. Some kind of an intra-European "Kennedy Round" certainly should not be considered as something outside of realistic possibilities in the years to come.

In the political field there is no existing framework that could genuinely serve the purpose of an all-European forum, or even for the purpose of multilateral deliberations and a discussion of problems of general concern. This is not surprising. The climate soon after the war prevented the establishment of similar regional all-European organizations. Europe was the central battlefield of the early years of the Cold War. Existing quasi-European organizations, which have all served as western platforms in the Cold War apparently do not serve this purpose.

There have been made several suggestions for all-European conferences of representatives of parliaments or governments and probably one or the other could at a propitious moment serve as a point of departure for recurring meetings of politicians and statesmen and become a centre for the harmonization of political attitudes as well as a point of departure for more ambitious forms of multilateral cooperation in the more distant future.

In the political field, even more than in the economic, it would be useless to seek the dissolution of the existing alliances before the formation of new and general European frameworks of cooperation. The existing alliances have greatly reduced their public activities connected with the concept of a threat of war within Europe, and the divisive impact of these organizations has diminished considerably.

Bilateral contacts and agreements have in several cases established a new atmosphere between countries of the East and the West. Here, perhaps, still more than in economic matters, vast possibilities remain unused for further developing bilateral friendly relations across the line of division. The general climate must apparently improve still considerably before the German problem ceases to be a stumbling block in the way of general cooperation, but the results achieved so far indicate that the movement in this direction has a great chance to progress faster than hitherto.

The existing alliances are undoubtedly a more serious impediment to general cooperation than the economic organizations. Developments in this field are without any doubt incomparably more complicated and delicate, but they are also greatly influenced by fundamental economic interests. Progress in the economic field, therefore, precedes developments of a political nature. Existing alliances should not be taken as the main target of actions aiming at the unification of Europe. The first stage, already in progress, is bilateral economic ties accompanied by a political rapprochement eventually spreading into multilateral forms of economic cooperation. Then, one would expect, the stage would be ready for more advanced political forms of multilateral cooperation.

If existing trends continue and further progress is achieved, Europe may become united on a sound basis of general economic benefit and prosperity reinforced by political stability and cooperation. Although this paper has not discussed possible forms of this cooperation, it should be underlined that the mere disappearance of the existing alliances will not necessarily and automatically bring harmony and cooperation. It could in some circumstances facilitate strife, conflict and chaos. Cooperation cannot be achieved through dismantling existing unsatisfactory structures alone, it can come only as a result of creative efforts which, necessarily, start within the old frameworks and therefore have for some time to coexist with them. The new structure of Europe can only grow out of the existing pattern. One would wish that this were not so, but wishful thinking hardly helps to achieve results.

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GERMANY AND A NEW EUROPE

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Europe's destiny is inseparably linked to developments in Germany. Since the Government crisis in the Fall of 1966, things have happened in German politics which have resulted in Europe today facing a completely new situation concerning decisive political and security problems. To be able to understand what this change implies, one has to establish what are the factors that determine German politics.

One thing can be ascertained right away: it is a fundamental change of course with rather far-reaching and long-term goals. As the Foreign Minister Mr. Brandt writes in his article in "Aussenpolitik" (No. h/67): "We are now living in the decisive years between two epochs, where the course for a long time to come is being decided". Brandt underlined strongly in the same article that Bonn intends to continue its policy of detente towards the East European countries, including the Soviet Union and the GDR, regardless of difficulties and setbacks. However, West German policy is aiming farther than just for a detente, it is aiming for a "lasting and just peace settlement" for the whole of Europe, including German reunification. The German Foreign Minister is of the opinion that it is advisable to retain, for the time being, the alliances and modify them in accordance with a new security system. "But", he says, "it is a good thing that the problems around a future European peace-arrangement are already being studied and discussed within the alliance. We are vitally interested in this kind of work and we must do our best to bring constructive contributions of our own."

This is fundamentally new in the European security policy, namely, that the very state which, maybe more than any other, has been the corner stone of the existing security system, gives priority to the replacement of this system.

The Hegemony of the Super Powers

The European power constellations have seldom remained stable over a longer period of time. The situation during the last twenty years has been rather exceptional in this respect. This relatively long period of stability has, of course, not occurred in the first place due to the Europeans themselves, but to the two Super Powers, the USA and USSR, who have dominated the scene completely. The confrontation between these two powers in Europe has been a part of a confrontation of global dimensions which, however, over the last years has been marked by the opponents' mutual interest to avoid open conflict and anything that could disturb the stability.

The small European countries, like for instance the Nordic ones, have not only found it necessary to accept this superhegemony. It has actually been regarded as an arrangement which takes care of the small countries' interests. With the

detente and normalisation of relations between the two Great Powers, internal ideological frictions within the small countries between the East and West orientated groups have also gradually declined. At the same time the stabilising tasks of the alliances concerning the situation in Central Europe - in the first place Germany - have been underlined. Experiences from the two World Wars which both originated in Central Europe, make it a natural desire for the small countries to prevent that a rivalry between the former European Great Powers should again have free play. They rather accept the existing Superpower-hegemony. This at least is the case of the smaller Western European countries. Besides, a distant hegemonial power has a less-pressing effect than a close one. Therefore, a strong conservative stand of the small countries' governments is to be expected as to the problem of eventual replacement of the existing arrangement.

The situation appears a little differently, however, to the larger European states, above all Great Britain, France and Germany, who were used to play an important part previously. These, of course, did not wish, and still don't, to be dominated by any Great Power, but the strength of the Soviet Union and their own weakness forced them to accept the American hegemony over Western Europe. Besides, the three former Great Powers, Great Britain, France and Germany, were in quite different positions. Great Britain came out of the war with her prestige of a Great Power fairly intact and was able once again, thanks to her "special relations" with the United States, to maintain the illusion of her world power for some time. France, as a result of her defeat by Germany and the rather poor part she played during the war, became a third rank power. It has been de Gaulle's aim ever since to regain this lost prestige for France, but in the light of the chaotic internal situation during the post war years, such a hope seemed rather unrealistic. Neither could France rely on the USA, as Great Britain did.

It was, however, in the first place, the unsolved problem of Germany which formed the basis for the two Super Powers' hegemony over Europe. Beaten Germany possessed no possibility whatsoever of deciding her own destiny, and the result of the disagreement which had arisen between the victors was a Germany divided between the East and the West, serving as the scene of a giant trial of strength between the two Super Powers.

The building up of alliance systems of both sides served, naturally, to strengthen the Super Powers' influence within their respective camps. And, after the two parts of Germany became integrated into opposite alliances, this leading position became consolidated by treaty. The fact that the integration principle was used as a basis for the West German membership of NATO, made a uniform military organisation - and thus also a uniform alliance command - necessary. And it was a matter of course that the USA should have the decisive voice within this command. West Germany, the only country with all its military forces under alliance-command, became thus inseparably linked to the United States with regard to her entire military policy. The defence of the Federal Republic was simultaneously to be regarded as the main defence line for the USA.

A similar role was played by East Germany in the Soviet strategy, and in this mainly American-Soviet conflict the other alliance-partners had to adapt themselves as well as they were able, to the policy of the Big Powers. This holds true for Germany especially.

In the postwar period the stability of Europe was based on this hegemony of Super Powers. Whether or not this was desired by the European countries did not make any difference, as long as the Cold War way of thinking dominated the scene. But developments of the last few years have revealed that the

arrangement was to the highest degree linked to the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States in Europe. As the two Great Powers took up the policy of detente and status quo, they removed at the same time an important part of what formed the basis of their dominant position in Europe. Released from the menace of a great war between East and West in Europe, overshadowing everything else, the European countries could more easily start manoeuvring on their own. This tendency was most clearly demonstrated by the policy of France, but also the example of Romania reveals the same thing. Both tried to free themselves from the dominating influence of their respective hegemony-powers - and succeeded.

The dominating position of the Soviet Union and the United States in Europe depends, as already mentioned, above all on their position in Germany. As long as this is firm, they can maintain control also over the rest of Europe. Thus we have reached the topic of this article: the latest developments in West Germany and its possible consequences for the alliance, for European integration policy, and for the smaller European countries. As previously mentioned, the Nordic countries would presumably be among the last to wish for an alteration of the existing agreement with the USA as the predominating power in Western Europe. Here they follow Great Britain. However, if Western Germany should take her own, more or less independent course, as seems to be the case, then it is obvious that a new arrangement will force itself through in any case.

Bonn and National Interests

The integration of the Federal Republic of Germany was a compromise between different interests. The Western Powers, above all the USA, did their utmost to obtain West German contribution to the common defense, while on the other hand they desired to continue maintaining control over the situation in Central Europe, i.e. over Western Germany, which, after all, formed the central link of the defence chain. They could not give the newly established Federal Republic a free hand without running the risk that this state might find it fit to arrange itself with the Soviet Union, in order to reach its own highest national goal, reunification. Thus, Bonn had to be bound tightly to the West by ties strong enough to hinder any such eventuality. And the West held all the trump cards. They had the power to keep West Germany occupied and powerless. They had no need for making any further concessions except what was necessary to secure their two main aims: West German contribution to defense and control over West German policy making. Germany was at her lowest ebb, dependent on what the Great Powers deemed right for her. Germany's only trump card was her industrial and military potential which, however, in the existing situation had the weak point that it could not be taken advantage of by the Germans without the approval of and in cooperation with the occupation powers.

Full sovereignty for a united Germany was, naturally, Bonn's primary demand. But since the East/West conflict made reunification impossible, and the occupation powers would not tolerate an independent status for their respective occupation zones, a gradual improvement of their situation was the best the Germans could hope for.

The price of obtaining German participation in Western defense had - from the German viewpoint - to be made as high as possible, paid in extended freedom of action. At the same time the reunification had to be maintained as a national claim which could not be abandoned.

The treaties which formed the basis for Germany's participation in NATO was a "package deal" attempting to unite the interests of the partners in the best possible way. "Integration" was the cue. The incorporation of the Federal Republic in a defence alliance with common organisation and uniform command secured for the Western Powers a West German contribution to the defence and control over West German policy making: The West Germans for their part won back their freedom of action within the framework of this integration, and thus reached considerable improvement of their international status, together with military security. Adenauer's main idea was that further development of the community should gradually rescind inequalities between the partners, leading eventually to the Federal Republic obtaining equal rights with her partners.

As for reunification, which is a principal German national interest, the agreement was based on doubtful premisses: It meant in practice that the Western Powers should strive for a unified Germany belonging to the Western alliance. But the illusoriness of this obligation was confirmed by following historical developments: Germany could not be reunified within any of the existing alliances. The Soviet Union has, naturally, no interest in a Germany reunified and rearmed in alliance with the USA and against the Soviet Union. And, since during the cold war period it became obvious to everybody that the Soviet Union could not be forced to give in to this matter, it was evident that the policy of the Western Alliance would not succeed in trying to fulfil the main German goal. But still - unrealistic as it was, - this illusion of the alliance as a means to reunification served as a foundation for the West German alliance policy. The collapse of this illusion led to an internal weakening of the Bonn Government and to NATO's declining influence in Western Germany.

The other main pillar of the West German alliance policy, the idea of integration, and the hope of obtaining a position of equal rights within the European community, proved as well to be an illusion. The Federal Republic has indeed gradually obtained a better position as an alliance partner, not in the last place thanks to her military power and strategic importance. However, paradoxically enough, the stronger the West German state has grown economically and militarily, the heavier to bear seemed to be the burden still resting upon the West German international status, as a result of the unsolved national problem. After all, the Federal Republic was still to be regarded as provisory, according to the treaty with the Western Powers, which were entrusted to take care of "the problem of Germany as a whole".

West Germany made it a condition that the status of dependence due to the unsolved national problem would be eliminated by an arrangement assuring that the Federal Republic together with the remaining alliance partners would form an integrated community where the Germans had equal rights with the others. But so far, developments brought one disappointment after the other; first the failure of the European Army (ECD), then the unsuccessful planning of a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) within the NATO - which demonstrated that equality for West Germany with respect to nuclear weapons was out of question - and finally the defeat of the principle of supranationality within the EEC. The Germans discovered that they never will be able to obtain their full equality as a nation within the framework of NATO, and that a West European political federation based on the principle of equal rights was incompatible with the French policy. The relationship with France was seriously endangered by de Gaulle's efforts to force Bonn to loosen itself from the USA.

For the West Germans the integration policy has lost its most significant aspect. It has given them several advantages and raised them up from the occupation status and almost - but not quite - brought them to the status of equality. The little remaining step became of decisive importance. The West German Government was prepared to accept the existing arrangement, including the American dominance, as long as this could be reconciled with principal German interests, but it could not accept that the Federal Republic or a reunified Germany should be kept to the status of inferiority in Europe for ever. This attitude was most clearly demonstrated by the Government's strong reaction against the American draft proposal for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

However, the security situation has, over a long period of time, given the West German Government no chance for independent national policy-making. As long as the confrontation between the USA and the USSR in Europe was marked by high tension, security was the most important problem to be considered, which meant that Germany had to adopt the American foreign policy. But Bonn's situation grew more and more difficult as the tension was gradually succeeded by détente and it became clear that the Alliance will not be able to give Germany either reunification or equality. If the Federal Republic with persistent emphasis would continue her cold war policy - which originally formed the basis for West German participation in NATO - she would run the risk of political isolation. On the other hand the prestige of the German Government would grow weaker if it gave in to the pressure from outside to accept the policy of détente, if this policy did not imply advancement of Germany's chief national claims - equal rights and reunification. Strong groups within the Government coalition as well as the Bundestag demanded change of priorities in foreign policy. The so-called "Gaullists" supported a close cooperation with France and establishment of a West European federation through which the Federal Republic would gain the "genuine position of equality". However, they had no grounds whatever to believe that de Gaulle would back up their federation policy or their "policy of strength" which they advocated towards the East. While de Gaulle is of the opinion that the German problem could be solved only by an understanding with the East European countries and is not interested in a West European Federation either - anyway not before he has made quite sure that the remaining EEC countries would join his political course - Franz Josef Strauss and his disciples reject to take part in negotiations on the most important East/West problems in Europe, before West Germany has gained her "equality".

The "Gaullists" within the West German Government forced Erhard to abdicate, but were not strong enough to determine the new course. Through the cabinet crisis in the fall of 1966 the Social Democrats entered the Government for the first time. They shared the opinion with the "Gaullists" that a good relationship to France was a necessity but - in conformity with de Gaulle - opposed them by placing emphasis on a policy of understanding with the East in the matter of reunification. The progress of the nationalistic "National Democrats" in the Federal elections in Hessen and Bavaria during the government crisis influenced the new cabinet programme by giving it a distinct tinge of nationalism in order to weaken the extremist tendencies.

The Government crisis caused a change of priorities in the West German foreign policy. The security policy, including the alliance policy, had to give way to a more active Eastern policy with reunification as the ultimate goal.

If reunification will continue to have first priority in German policy, it will have far-reaching consequences for NATO. As mentioned before, the realisation of German reunification depends upon one condition: that both Western and Eastern Germany separate from their respective alliances, because a Germany reunified within the framework of either of the existing alliances is unthinkable.

Nobody - the Germans in the last place - wants Germany to start operating completely on its own, which would mean a new danger for European stability and become reason for acute differences in the relationship to its neighbours. Thus, military security of Western Germany, or of a united Germany, has to be found within the framework of mainly a European arrangement, as a replacement for the hegemony of the Great Powers over East/West Germany respectively, which excludes reunification.

The natural thing for Bonn, therefore, would be a close adherence to France, the only West European country possessing sufficient independence. If it wants to remain independent of Moscow, Bonn can never reach an agreement with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries without being backed up by Western Europe. Moreover, partnership with France would represent increased respect for Germany's East policy, since France and the Eastern countries generally have common security interests towards a reunified Germany. Also France wishes to protect herself against a too dominating Germany and what France considers acceptable in this respect should be considered acceptable by Germany's Eastern neighbours as well.

If the German policy of reunification should ever succeed, it will be only under the unalterable condition of reaching understanding with the East European countries.

Bonn's New Eastern Policy

Rapprochement to East Europe and simultaneous loosening of the ties with the alliance are the two parallel moves which Bonn has to undertake to achieve reunification. One depends upon the other. This is, of course, something that cannot be done by a single one-time operation but only by gradual development. The new German Government, led by Kiesinger and Brandt demonstrated its awareness of both these conditions. In its inaugural declaration the wish of better relations to France - which implies to a certain degree loosening from the USA - and extended cooperation with the East European countries was underlined. Naturally, the German Government would try to ascertain that the appeasement in its Eastern policy has a chance to succeed, before taking any positive steps on the way of loosening the alliance-bonds. It immediately started an offensive to establish diplomatic relations with the East European countries, and the positive response revealed a great interest on the part of the Eastern States in normalisation of the relationship with Western Germany.

The introduction of diplomatic relations with Romania brought no serious difficulties. Later development revealed, however, that Bonn cannot come very far without undertaking profound alterations also within other sectors of its policy.

Moscow's attitude towards Bonn's new Eastern policy appears to be rather ambiguous. Over a longer period of time, the Soviet Union has accused Bonn of opposing the policy of détente and normalisation in Europe; on the other hand it was Moscow, followed by Poland and the GDR, who vetoed the

establishing of diplomatic relations between Bonn and the remaining Eastern countries. This ambiguity has probably its origins in Moscow's operating two different goals at the same time. Moscow would not object Bonn's policy of détente and normalisation, if it accepted status quo. In that case the Soviet Union, East Germany and Poland would require from Bonn full recognition of the GDR and the existing boundaries, as well as renouncing nuclear arms of any kind; however, not a separation from NATO. In this way, the Soviet Union would continuously maintain control over East Germany, and Germany would remain divided over a foreseeable future.

However, as already mentioned, also the new West German Government gave reunification first priority, rejecting any settlement that might not recognise reunification as legitimate claim. Its policy of normalisation actually aims to change this status quo. If the Government officially accepted the status quo and acknowledged the GDR and the given Oder-Neisse boundary, it would lose effective weapons to influence the Super-Powers in the matter of the German question. This of course, complicates the situation also for Moscow. The Soviet Union does not oppose German reunification under the condition, however, that this does not imply increase of power for her principal opponent, the USA. It seems that the only compensation for Soviet loss of power due to a German reunification would be withdrawal of US troops from Western Germany. As long as the German Government insists on continued alliance with and close adherence to the USA, while simultaneously raising claims for reunification and refusing recognition of the given boundaries, any increase of West German influence in Eastern Europe will be regarded as a reduction of Soviet power position, not in the last place towards the USA, and as a menace to other East European states which might suffer from Bonn's claims, above all the GDR and Poland. If Bonn will do nothing to compensate for this, its diplomacy towards the East has no prospect to succeed.

Here becomes effective the parallelity mentioned before in this paper. The rapprochement towards the East must be followed by a corresponding separation from the USA, in order to satisfy Moscow's demands. During the negotiations pertaining to the stationing of American and British troops in West Germany, this new trend in German policy became evident. Bonn did not oppose a considerable troop reduction, as it would have done earlier. At the same time, the number of NATO divisions in Europe have been reduced from 30 to 20, which means that European NATO countries, all together, have soon reached this goal as far as conventional weapons are concerned. Germany's growing scepticism towards the value of NATO-integration appears reasonable, considering the fact that the Super Powers over a longer period of time have promoted a policy of nuclear disengagement in Europe - even more strongly in view of the Vietnam conflict - and would under no circumstances agree to Germany introducing her own atomic weapons. West Germany itself has twelve combat-ready divisions, more than any other European country, with the exception of the Soviet Union. Additionally as a means of deterrent, she needs only American nuclear guarantee, which cannot be reached through any form of integration, depending only on the American President's good will.

Hitherto, all West German troops have stood under NATO command, but the establishment of an own West German General Staff to place Germany on the same level with the other member countries is no longer unthinkable, if Bonn should find it advantageous for its manoeuvring towards the East. In case NATO should raise objections in this matter, Bonn could defy them with good reason by pointing out that the Western Powers a long time ago ceased to take their treaty obligations seriously e.g. by no longer respecting the interdependence between the alliance policy and reunification policy, as it was settled by the treaties of 1954.

The understanding that these treaties no longer have any practical value for solution of the German question was, not in the last place, the reason for Bonn to begin a completely new policy also towards East Berlin. It became obvious - especially after the demonstrative treaties between the GDR and the other East European countries in latest time - that it is only via cooperation with the GDR the Eastern policy can succeed, if ever. . . Even if such cooperation would presume a full change of opinion on both sides, there are good reasons to believe that the GDR will become of steadily growing importance for Bonn's Eastern policy as a whole. Bonn is bound to accept minimum demands from the East, i.e. acknowledgement of the Eastern Government as equal partner in negotiations, recognition of present boundaries, and renunciation of atomic weapons. Ulbricht is representative for vital interests of the Soviet Union and Poland, as well as of his own. Not before these interests are fulfilled, will the East start seriously considering reunification, and naturally only under the condition that the reunified Germany would be free of alliances and to a certain degree submitted to armament control.

At the present time, Bonn on its part, refuses to meet these demands, regarding the refusal as the only possible way to keep the German question open, hoping, however, that it will be in a position later to promote reunification by other diplomatic means. The first phase of the diplomatic Eastern offensive bypassed these demands and concentrated on gaining political footholds in as many East European capitals as possible. . . In case the acknowledgement of the Oder-Neisse boundaries could no longer be postponed, Bonn would then be, presumably, in the position to influence the development in the desired course. Since this effort failed, due to opposition on the part of the Soviet Union, Poland and the GDR, there is just one way left: to remove this opposition.

Bonn considers the acknowledgement of the Oder-Neisse boundary as the most important trump-card, even if it does not expect them to be changed. Therefore this will hardly be the first step to choose on the way to meet Eastern demands. An acknowledgement offers no guarantee whatsoever of a positive change in Eastern attitude towards reunification. This can never be reached without being approved by the Soviet Union and the GDR.

Thus, the logical thing for Bonn to do is to go via the GDR and fulfill Ulbricht's demand to be acknowledged as equal partner in negotiations. (He does not demand a recognition de jure, though). Contacts between Governments do not necessarily bind the negotiating parts, and negotiations may be interrupted at any time, without having sincerely altered the situation. But should Bonn get the impression that this may be the right way, a promise of acknowledgement of the Oder-Neisse boundary by a reunified Germany - as the GDR did already in 1950 - might be the next step to take. The reunification might be based on the condition that both German states will pledge themselves to comply with their international obligations. Thus, another main obstacle would be removed, and moreover, Poland might be won for the idea of reunification. An interesting proof that developments have taken this new course seems to be the exchange of letters between the two German Governments, opened in May 1967, where both sides have expressed their wish for direct negotiations in order to "normalise" the relationship between the two German parts, although based on different premises.

For the time being, it is too early to predict whether or not Bonn's policy of détente towards the East will succeed. From the Eastern point of view, a "normalisation" based on status quo is to be preferred, which means recognising the GDR as a State and the Oder-Neisse line as boundary. West Germany, however, is not willing to do so, and links normalisation together with abolishment of Germany's partition. Therefore, the necessary prerequisite for Bonn to succeed is via recognition of East-Berlin as equal partner in negotiations to convince Moscow and Warsaw that their interests will not be endangered. Then the process of establishing diplomatic relations between Bonn and the remaining East European capitals could be continued.

In the light of the great inequality between political and economic power of the two German States, a disengagement from alliances on both sides becomes an obvious necessity before any positive step on the way to reunification can be taken. And, just because West Germany would be the dominating part within a common German cooperation, the rapprochement of the two German States, with Germany still adherent to the NATO-alliance, would necessarily be regarded by Moscow as a loss of power.

EUROPE BETWEEN USA AND SOVIET UNION

To a certain degree, this disengagement could be adjusted to the general policy of détente, which until recently has characterised the East/West relations in Europe. From the East came proposals of dissolution of the alliances. Washington has officially advocated a policy to make the alliances superfluous. Also other occurrences are to be regarded as links in the Super Powers' policy of détente, like abandonment of a planned multilateral atomic force within NATO, withdrawal of American and British troops from Germany, or "denuclearisation" of the German air force, all of which would earlier have met strong opposition in Bonn.

USA's policy of détente is based in fact on status quo, including American presence in Western Europe. Bonn, on the contrary, attempts by its own independent contribution to détente, to reach an abolishment of status quo, which, at the end, necessarily must result in American withdrawal from Europe and West-Germany's withdrawal from NATO-integration. NATO would then be dissolved or, in any case, transformed into something completely different from what it is now.

It would be too much to say that the two ways of making a policy of détente, the American and the German one, cannot be coupled. It is not unthinkable that the situation might become "normal" insofar as the USA would no longer deem it necessary to remain in West Germany, and, together with the Soviet Union and the European states, would reach an acceptable security settlement for Europe.

But such development depends on lasting reduction of tension between the USA and the USSR. However, exactly in this respect things are about to happen which might cause a profound change of the whole situation, also in Europe. Particularly the consequences of the Vietnam war might prove to become of decisive importance. Both Super Powers are aware of the tremendous risk connected with any larger conflict in Europe, and both of them are therefore interested to prevent that the Vietnam war should switch over to Europe. On the other hand, it is evident that the continuous escalation of the South Asian war and the increasing Soviet engagement in the War must sooner or later result in stressing the relations between the two Super Powers to such an extent that also the situation in Europe will be inevitably influenced by this. It is assumed that, more than to a certain limit it is not possible for psychological reasons to be at war with a country one place on the globe while, at the same time carrying out a policy of détente elsewhere.

Until recently, the common interests between the USSR and the USA were dominant. This was maybe most clearly demonstrated during the negotiations on non-proliferation of nuclear arms, where particularly America did her best to force her allies (especially West Germany) to accept her proposal; but also the adopted resolution on reduction of American-British forces in West Germany

by more than 40,000 men within the next months reveals the same thing. Moreover, the USA made the effort to persuade the Soviet Union to stop extending her anti-missile system, in order to slow down the arms race.

However, all these occurrences became gradually overshadowed by the war in Vietnam. Once more, the military factor in the East/West relations has considerably gained importance, and a new tension threatens to succeed the détente. The tense situation in South-East Asia, the new crisis in the Middle East, and the failure of disarmament negotiations, all these occurrences are of special importance from this point of view. As a result of American unsuccessful efforts to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union, the American Government had to revise its European policy. The possibility of a new tension within this territory made it a necessity for the Americans to maintain their influential position in Europe. West Germany will, under these circumstances, regain her importance for the USA. A clear expression for this was - among other things - the American official statement that the USA will not sign any non-proliferation agreement which runs counter to German interests.

The most interesting and most important question in this conjunction is what the European, and particularly the West German, reaction would be if Washington decided to form a new firm front against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union could, of course, make the choice easier by taking an uncompromising attitude towards West European countries. But, assumingly, it is in the interest of the Soviet Union to discriminate between the USA and Western Europe, in a situation like this. And Moscow will have plenty of opportunity to take advantage of the conflicts of interest bound to arise. Would, for instance, Bonn remain loyal towards the USA by joining a possibly harder American line after Washington having over a long time continuously put West German interests aside for the benefit of its dialogue with Moscow? Would Bonn do it, even if the higher tension originates, in the first place, from a confrontation between the Super Powers on another continent, and even if this tension would exactly run counter to present West-German policy? An adherence to the USA in such a situation would doubtlessly result in a new conflict with France, and jeopardise possibilities for further development of the EEC. And also the new Eastern policy would be deprived of any chance to succeed. The hope for reunification would thus become more fictitious than ever. The danger for instability in Germany would increase.

Re-establishment of the hegemony of Super-Powers would decidedly run counter to the long-range goals of West German and French foreign policy. Recent developments in these two countries in the direction of extended independence from the USA and deliberate national interest policy eastwards, have gained ground to such a degree that it is rather doubtful whether these two countries could be persuaded to re-adopt the former attitude of Cold War, especially if the reason were chiefly non-European disagreements between the Super Powers. Abolishment of this very hegemony and détente are fundamental prerequisites for any West German and French successful policy toward the East. If America exerted a too strong pressure on Bonn in this matter, the relations between the USA and Western Europe would be put on a more serious trial than ever caused by de Gaulle alone. It might result in a sort of break between the USA and West Germany, and simultaneously in a complete upheaval of European as well as global power constellations.

But would Bonn have any choice at all? Is not the American presence in West Germany itself enough to decide which course the whole of the East/West relations in Europe should take? If the Soviet /American antagonism should considerably increase in the near future, any further withdrawal of American troops from Europe can hardly be expected. Neither can the USA be forced to withdraw. Could Bonn, in the case of increased tension between the Big

Powers, afford to take steps which were to weaken the American defence obligations towards Western Europe, thereby endangering its own security? Both Bonn and Washington are here in a dilemma. Both of them desire détente in Europe, and both wish the highest possible military security. The trouble is that this security cannot any more be found on a common basis. For Bonn, the policy of détente makes sense only as long as it serves its purpose - to bring Germany close to re-unification. But re-unification via détente presumes a different security policy which might be of such a character that the alliances and the American presence in Western Germany become unnecessary. Washington would prefer to build on status quo in its relations to Moscow and treat the situation in Europe from a global point of view. The US Government is afraid that German withdrawal from NATO could be of fatal consequences for the whole of the defence system which is built up against the Soviet Union.

The problem of West-Germany's future role within the framework of Western defence was thoroughly discussed during the visit of Messrs. Kiesinger and Brandt in Washington in August 1967, without, however, reaching any solution. On the other hand, it seems that the German leaders were successful in their attempt to convince President Johnson that a political co-operation between Bonn and Paris would be of advantage for the USA as well as for Bonn. In German quarters it was stressed that a more independent course of the coalition in Bonn regarding Eastern policy had been accepted by the USA, and that Kiesinger had made it clear that Bonn will not be able any longer to follow US instructions in all important matters. The independent "Stuttgarter Zeitung" wrote sarcastically that the relationship USA/West Germany was like a marriage where both spouses agree on going each his own way, both rejecting, however, the absurd idea of a divorce.

If this interpretation of the Washington negotiations is correct - and there is no reason for doubt - it would mean that Bonn intends to continue its new Eastern and reunification policy, which presumes a dissolution of the present alliances and its replacement by a new European security settlement. Even if America's influential position in Europe will be considerably weakened, as a consequence of this policy, it does not seem likely that Washington would seek to hinder it, but rather try to moderate its consequences for the existing defense system.

To the same degree, however, as Germany frees herself of the American dominance, the leadership of European policy as a whole will slip away from the USA. This development may be slowed down or speeded up, in accordance with occurrences in Europe herself or in the relations between the two Super Powers. This process can proceed without causing serious consequences for stability, only under the condition that the new security arrangement will be approved by the main parts involved.

The agreement will, in any case, have to include a solution of the German problem, i.e. to prepare the ground for rapprochement of the two German states with prospective possibility of reunification, since it is presumed that no German government will ever give up this claim. A "greater" Europe must be the goal, if this claim should have the chance of realisation. GDR can never be incorporated in either the Federal Republic of Germany or in any West-European Union. Firstly not, because neither the East nor the West desires a too dominant Germany, secondly because a genuine West-European federation - which eventually might be a means of neutralising such a predominance - is no longer of current interest, neither to the French nor to the German part. If such a federation should be established, then it would have to be accomplished before reunification has taken place. The establishment of a West-German Federation would as such mean a serious obstacle for reunification. That is, it would inevitably make the GDR an "alien" country.

And the West Germans would not be able to pursue a reunification policy on their own, but would be formally dependent on the other member countries. The Germans can hardly take it for granted that reunification should be given first priority in the Federation's foreign policy.

In addition, it is well known that the French policy does not intend to subject itself to majority resolutions before eventual guarantees have been formed, ensuring that the French course would be followed also by the other member states. Thus with respect to supranationality and foreign policy, Bonn and Paris are approximately of the same view. At the moment, neither would like an institutionalised common authority in this field. This does not necessarily imply a reduction of the importance of the EEC. On the contrary, one can expect that increased community of interests between Bonn and Paris will result in sturdier consolidation and harmonisation in most spheres of organisational cooperation.

The greatest obstacle to a far-reaching political and military integration in the EEC, is the unsolved problem of Germany's military status. It is, of course, out of the question that the GDR should even join any West-European defence organisation. And it is likewise unthinkable that an integrated defence-organisation for the whole of Europe would be established in the foreseeable future. Should East and West Germany approach each other, Germany as such will have to achieve a military status which, in any case, excludes atomic weapons on German soil.

It is, therefore, just natural that the still vague conceptions of a European security system concentrate more and more on the idea of a military zonal arrangement in Europe, which might offer the best possibilities for reconciliation of interests. The Soviet and East European interests are evidently taking this course, perhaps most clearly expressed by the so-called Rapacki-plan. De Gaulle took up the same idea during his visit in Poland in September 1967, when he submitted his division of Europe into Eastern, Central, and Western Europe, where Central Europe consisted of East and West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Austria, forming a military neutralised zone, free of nuclear weapons, guaranteed within the framework of a greater treaty system by France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. It would be a matter for the two parts of Germany to settle the reunification problem between themselves, within this framework, and in agreement with their neighbouring countries and guarantee powers. Also in this point there is a remarkable likeness between the French and the Eastern points of view. It is worth while noting the fact that the West German government officially responded to de Gaulle's statements by terming him a "good spokesman for the German cause". In this connection, it could also be mentioned that Mr. Kiesinger, during his visit in Washington, supported in a TV interview "a neutral reunified Germany which does not belong to either of the blocs".

Presuming that the USA accepted the fact that Germany gradually takes its own course, it is to be expected that the American government would consider a zonal agreement a natural solution, since Washington could not possibly station nuclear weapons on a territory over which it no longer maintains military or political control. Moreover, a zonal agreement prohibiting production or stationing of nuclear weapons in Central Europe would make it considerably easier to reach an understanding on nuclear non-proliferation with the Soviet Union.

America's approval of a zonal agreement in Europe, including an extensive American withdrawal, depends upon the condition that it would not imply one-sided increase of power for the Soviet Union. Consequently, also the Soviet Union must be willing to withdraw her forces from the East European countries.

The West European countries comply of course with this viewpoint completely. An uncompromising Soviet attitude on this point would prevent the establishment of a thinned-out zone. It cannot be done without an approval on the part of the Super Powers!

Hitherto, the idea of a military disengagement in Europe has been constantly refused by the Western, especially West German, side, with the justification that such an arrangement would in any case imply a onesided advantage for the Soviet Union, while the USA would have to withdraw her troops from Europe, the Soviet Union would practically just move them some hundred kilometers within the same strategic territory.

The fact that disengagement proposals now again have appeared on the scene, and this time seem to draw greater interest from the chief parts concerned, is less due to change in the opponents' relative military strength than to a reconsideration as to their intentions. A war in Europe is believed to be unlikely, because nobody can expect to win anything by initiating a war. The dispute between the two Communist great powers, China and the Soviet Union, strengthening of self-confidence of the West European countries as a result of the economic growth, increased independence of West as well as East European countries towards their respective Super Powers, and the increased East/West contact in Europe, all this, together with the disillusioning of West German politics, has contributed to a psychological disengagement which is the necessary prerequisite for the military one.

Should a closer cooperation of the two German states become reality - e.g. within the framework of a German confederation where both parts committed themselves to pursue the aim of reunification in their common policy - this effort would as such be a security guarantee of great importance for the two German states, as well as for the rest of Europe. The desired progress in the reunification process would then depend upon both sides' good will to compromise.

As long as reunification has not become reality, there must be a possibility of retreat for both German states, if they should feel that their security is endangered.

Paradoxically enough, the GDR would then be a safeguard for West Germany against possible attacks from the Soviets. For after the inclusion of the GDR into some kind of confederation with Western Germany within a neutralised non-nuclear zone, Soviet military aggression or efforts to re-establish military dominance in Middle Europe, would be connected with enormous risks. Not only the Western guarantee powers, but also the East European states - maybe with the GDR on the top - would oppose such steps, the latter ones for purely national reasons. The desire for reunification in East Germany is at least as great as it is in West-Germany.

On the other hand the Soviet Union and the other East European countries could reasonably expect that Germany would strive for the best possible relationship eastwards, in order to speed up the process of reunification. Moreover, they could build on the identity of security interests between East and West European countries, as far as Germany is concerned.

But still the idea of gradual rapprochement of the two German states within a European system includes so many doubtful elements that serious hesitations in this respect arise, inside and outside of Germany.

Within Germany itself an approach of the two socially and economically unequal systems would necessarily require ideological adjustment of the various interest groups and elites, which, without doubt, would be accompanied by frictions.

Which is the best way to unify the economical system of free enterprise in the West with the socialistic one in the East, in a sort of "synthesis"? Could this problem be reduced by e.g. introducing a more thorough economical planning within the EEC system?

For Germany's neighbours and the Super Powers a following question would then arise: might not rapprochement between the two German states, as mutual and peaceful as it might be, still represent a menace to the stability of the whole of Europe? Would not this process of reunification be likely to assume such a dynamic character that the whole game of power would once again focus on Germany? Would the establishment of a neutralised and militarily thinned-out zone in Central Europe be sufficient to remove such elements of risk? Would the Super Powers be able and willing to keep developments in Central Europe under control by a coordinated policy, or would rather each of them separately attempt to make the most of the dynamics of the situation to his own advantage? And, finally, would Germany in the long run be prepared to tolerate the restrictions placed upon it by such a zonal agreement?

Only the future can answer all these questions. The best way to reduce the risk to a minimum would, of course, be to find a form for cooperation or integration within the framework of a "greater" Europe, which makes it impossible for Germany or any other European state to endanger the stability individually.

Consequences for the Nordic Countries

Regardless of whether or not the USA approves of developments in Europe, it is to be expected that it will try to secure a foothold in Europe by a close military cooperation with Great Britain and the two Nordic NATO countries, Denmark and Norway. Because of the Continental great powers' long-term goals, this kind of cooperation is in the long run out of the question. Sooner or later, Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries will be confronted with a difficult choice.

Should these countries decide to continue their close cooperation with the USA pertaining to foreign and security policy, this will necessarily result in aggravated division of Western Europe, including reduced West European political and economic power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

As for the Nordic countries, this would imply, at the same time, the danger of an increased American-Soviet confrontation in this area. As soon as it became evident that the continental states follow their own course, and that the American leadership of European politics no longer exists, Great Britain and Scandinavia being the only remaining European bridge-heads for American power policy towards the Soviet Union, then the North of Europe might run the risk of getting deeper involved in an eventual new super power conflict. Especially Norway would be of growing strategic importance for the USA. Norway would then, probably, be tightly linked to the USA, and Finland to the Soviet Union. Denmark might possibly venture on an independent approach toward the Continent. In any case, a common Nordic policy would be out of the question.

On the other hand, the nature of the EEC cooperation concerning international politics - a rather limited realisation of the principle of supranationality and the fact that the leading EEC countries will be able to attain their long term international goals only via détente towards the East - will reduce the hesitations of the Nordic countries as to entering the EEC. Since an economic rapprochement of East and West Germany necessarily implies an economic

rapprochement of Eastern and Western Europe, one can expect that such a development will be accompanied by a growing interest in some kind of extension of the EEC eastwards. This will make it easier for countries like Austria, Sweden or Finland to join the EEC.

An alternative policy for the Scandinavian countries, and possibly also for Finland, might be a joint entering the EEC without waiting for Great Britain, which probably would force Great Britain to follow. However, an independent move like this from the part of the Scandinavian countries can hardly be expected. Norway, in particular, prefers an American leadership to a Continental one. She makes the choice dependent on Great Britain, under the assumption that British membership would guarantee an Anglo-Saxon counterbalance against the Continental Powers.

As for the idea of a neutral Nordic union, its realisation would require a dissolution of Norway's and Denmark's respective alliance bonds, as well as of Finland's Treaty with the USSR. Even if such a Nordic union would be advantageous for Nordic cooperation, it would, on the other hand, cause further disunion in Western Europe, economic as well as political: collapse of EFTA, and an even more difficult position for Great Britain. Soviet military predominance would have a unstabilising effect. From the Western, and particularly the American point of view, the North of Europe would, in such a situation, appear too weak and vulnerable towards the powerful neighbour in the East.

All these problems would be much simplified if Great Britain joined the EEC. This depends, however, upon one pre-condition: that Great Britain loosens her ties with the USA enough to make her policy reconcilable with the two leading Continental Powers' long-term goals.

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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE

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CAN BLOCS PAVE THE WAY TO SECURITY IN EUROPE ?

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When we talk about security in Europe what we have in mind is certainly not subjective security alone, despite the fact that the sense of security stems from security understood as a material reality and is at the same time a potential factor for security when there are still obstacles in the way to such a security. Hans Kelsen says: "It is doubtful whether there is a difference between "peace" and "security". International security is guaranteed if international peace is maintained." (1) The formula of Manfred Lachs is similar. The carrying into effect of the ban on aggressive war and making the defense of peace effective, compose, in fact, a system of security. (2) The subjective element should not be played down. Under given circumstances it can play a substantial role. However, its impact is indirect. This is the case when as a relic of the past clashing with the actual setting it comes to retard the process of consolidating the achieved stage of common understanding and cooperation and its further growing. It is also the case when being the reflection of the changes that have taken place in the consciousness of those who realised that a new perspective has opened - it underlies the active attitude of people striving to transform the perspective into political, economic, cultural reality and so on. For our purposes we assume that when we talk of security in Europe we mean first of all objective security, i.e. absence of the state of war and of those elements in international relations which create international tension and may lead to armed conflict.

The sequence of events in Europe after the Second World War is well known. As a result of the war, which started in Europe and assumed world-wide dimensions, a system of collective security was established on a world scale in the form of the United Nations Organisation. It is an open system, tending to universality. It was based firmly on the prohibition of the use of force or the threat to use force in international relations and on the obligation of its members to settle their contentions peaceably and it was provided with a mechanism permitting the Organisation to apply enforcement measures, including military enforcement if needed because of a threat to the peace, an act of aggression or another breach of the peace. The members of the Organisation recognised the fact that the system can be workable only if the great powers are endowed with special responsibility for its effectiveness in matters concerning peace and security. This special responsibility was reflected in the composition of the UN Security Council and in its rules of procedure requiring that this organ should take decisions concerning matters most vital for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states by a majority including all the permanent members of that organisation. The requirement of unanimity of the five great powers, permanent members of the Security Council, together with their special responsibility in matters of utmost importance for peace, became the pillar of the United Nations security system guaranteeing that it will never be used in the particular interest of one or a group of powers, instead of in the common interest, and will never become an instrument in the hands of a majority for imposing its will on those states which find themselves in a minority.

(1) Hans Kelsen: "The Law of the United Nations, A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems, With Supplement", New York 1966, Fifth printing, p. 13.

(2) Manfred Lachs: "system bezpieczeństwa zbiorowego a sprawa bezpieczeństwa i pokoju" w "Zagadnienie bezpieczeństwa zbiorowego w Europie", Warszawa 1955, p. 56

In the postwar period when the socialist system ceased to be confined to the territory of one state, when it turned into a system prevailing in a number of states, and the Soviet Union developed into a world power, the mechanism of enforcement built into the United Nations security system has meant not only that stronger powers will not be able to use the Organisation for their purposes against the will of smaller or weaker states, but, first of all, that the Organisation will not be used by a group of states with a certain economic and social system to the detriment of states with a different system. There is quite a lot to indicate that it is just this specific feature of the United Nations security system which made the United States and several other states complain about the paralysis of the United Nations and express their disappointment with the Organisation.

After the Second World War, forces aiming not so much at security based on the principles of the United Nations as at the attainment of their particular interests even by means of force or pressure, soon began to take the upper hand in the United States and in some Western countries. The process of taking over power by the proponents of this new policy led, within almost two years, to a fundamental change in the international situation. The United States has come to a revision of its goals. Being aware of the enormous economic and military resources at its disposal, it strove to acquire an exceptional position based on its strength. It saw this strength as the title for imposing its will on other states by means of economic measures and military measures as well. On the basis of this, the policy of strength was formed but this policy was a negation of the United Nations system of collective security. It unleashed the chain reaction of phenomena well known in history, as a rule leading, sooner or later, to war. In place of cooperation based on acceptance of the status quo that had arisen after the Second World War, hectic activities began aimed at preparing military superiority permitting the United States to dictate its conditions. Therefrom, the arms race and the search for allies at all costs. This led, among other things, to the destruction of the fundamental provisions of the Potsdam Agreement, to toleration and accommodation of the revenge-seeking elements in the political life of Western Germany, to the open or behind the scenes backing of reactionary and dictatorial forces throughout the world.

Under these circumstances, the United Nations security system had inevitably to undergo a far-reaching paralysis. The United States definitely foresook its traditional policy not to participate in agreements on mutual military assistance. The United Nations security system had also been abandoned for the sake of edifying exclusive military alliances under the leadership of the United States and directed against the USSR and the other socialist countries.

Quincy Wright was correct in saying that this tendency subjugated the cause of strengthening the United Nations to the aim of victory in the cold war.⁽¹⁾ John MacLaurin expressed the same thought in a more emotional and emphatic way, when he demanded the western governments to cease saying that they had been compelled to turn to the cold war as a result of the policy of the Soviet Union, which frustrated their efforts to get the United Nations to function: "This is untrue, our government has not tried yet to pursue an honest policy in the United Nations."⁽²⁾

On the ground of the revised approach to the problem of security and the revised purposes of policy in general, the Western European Union came into being, established by the treaty signed in Brussels on 17th March 1948. This was the first serious

(1) Quincy Wright: "Problem of Stability and Progress in International Relations", Berkeley, 1954, p. 53. (from Manfred Lachs, op. cit. p. 69)

(2) John MacLaurin: "The United Nations and Power Politics", London 1951, p. 445.

breach in the United Nations security system. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, established according to the treaty signed in Washington on 4th April 1949, that is one year later, actually replaced the Western European Union in the military field. Western Germany entered the NATO Alliance five years later, only after the first attempt to introduce it through the medium of the European Defence Community undertaken in 1952 failed. When Western Germany became a full member of NATO and one of its pillars under various agreements signed on 23rd October 1954, which entered into force on 5th May 1955, its military potential was already considerably reconstructed. A clear-cut military alliance emerged. It is a matter of rather secondary importance to seek, in the stipulations of the NATO treaty, indications reflecting its character. The observation made by Wojciech Morawiecki to the effect that the text of the NATO treaty is notable for the generalisation and ambiguity of its formulations, which permit interpretation at will, is correct. (1) It is the activities of NATO and the policy of the states composing it that characterise this organisation. From this point of view, the fact that the Organisation turned down the move of the Soviet Union in March, 1954, to become a member is an indication of its character.

The Warsaw Treaty Organisation was set up as a reply to the inclusion of Western Germany into the military grouping directed against the USSR and the other European socialist countries. Representatives of these countries met at a conference convened in Moscow from 29th November to 2nd December 1954. It is to be emphasised that all European states with which the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations, as well as the United States, had been invited to this conference. However none but the socialist states sent delegations to Moscow. The delegates at the Moscow conference declared then that "should the Paris agreements be ratified, they have decided to undertake common measures in the field of the organisation of armed forces and their command, as well as other measures indispensable for the strengthening of their defence capabilities, in order to protect the peaceful effort of their nations, to ensure the inviolability of their borders and territories and secure their defence against eventual aggression." (2) The socialist states saw the Paris agreements first of all from the angle of the inclusion of West German militarism together with its political programme into the Atlantic Alliance. In view of the share of the West German economic potential in the Alliance and of the tempo of the reconstruction of the GFR's military capability, and in view of the influence the GFR has among the members of NATO, a substantial stepping up of the danger of armed conflict in Europe could be envisaged. This does not mean that the political thinking of the socialist states, confronted with that situation, was limited solely to criticism, although criticism of NATO and the plan to permeate the Atlantic Alliance with an exceptionally dangerous ingredient by reserving in it a privileged place for West German militarism and revisionism was the direct premise of the counter-action. The alternative concept of an all-European system of collective security was opposed to the concept of a military alliance with the participation of the German Federal Republic. The main lines of such an all-European collective security system were presented by Molotov at the Berlin conference on 10 February, 1954, that is still before ratification of the Paris Agreements. However the Paris Agreements were ratified. A couple of days later representatives of the states that had participated in the Moscow Conference (November-December 1954) met in Warsaw. As a result, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was signed on 14th May 1955, by the socialist states of Europe. It is characteristic that the text of this treaty explicitly favours the setting up of a system of collective security covering the whole territory of Europe. The treaty specially emphasises that it is open to all states, notwithstanding their social and economic system. And in the final

(1) Wojciech Morawiecki: Organizacje międzynarodowe, Warszawa, 1965, pp. 381 - 382.

(2) Konferencja krajów europejskich w sprawie zapewnienia pokoju i bezpieczeństwa w Europie, Dokumenty, Ed. PISM, 1955, p. 145.

clauses, preference for the all-European security system also found expression in the stipulation that, should such a system enter into force, the Warsaw Treaty would become void simultaneously.

The circle closed. As a result of the policy of strength, the Western military alliance, instead of promoting a united Europe in mid 1955 completed the circle of its members by introducing as its second pillar Western Germany, which did not acquiesce with the prevailing territorial set-up in Europe and declared its firm intention to revise this set-up. It was then that the socialist states of Europe replied by establishing their own alliance.

Had Europe, divided up into two alliances, become more secure? At this juncture, it would be useless to consider to what extent the sense of security of the socialist states of Europe had grown after the establishment of both blocs. The diplomatic action preceding the conclusion of the Warsaw Treaty, the provisions of the treaty as well as several later statements, including the declaration passed at the meeting of the Consultative Political Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states, on 5th July 1966 in Bucharest, and the statement of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe participating in the conference at Karlovy Vary in April 1967, indicate that the socialist states see the existence of military blocs in Europe not as a guarantee of their security but as a threat to the security of this continent and have always been prepared to cooperate to achieve replacement of the system of blocs by a system of collective security. The Warsaw treaty was the result of the inclusion of Western Germany in the Atlantic alliance. The initiative of creating blocs belonged to the West, to the United States of America and 11 other states, which were joined in 1952 by Greece and Turkey and, finally, by the German Federal Republic. If our question is to make sense it must be applied precisely to those European states which claimed that they sought their security in a return to the system of military alliances.

Here we come to an interesting point. A lot written about the rationale of the Atlantic Alliance mentions the Soviet Union and the danger of an attack allegedly threatening West Europe in 1949 in one breath. Now, too, with reference to the détente which began to make its appearance on our continent in recent years, it is said that this détente is attributable to the fact that the danger of an attack by the Soviet Union has diminished or is no longer present. Both judgements have been formulated with embarrassing oversimplification. It is difficult seriously to contend that when the Atlantic Alliance was being established all its members were moved by the same motives. The economic, political and military situation was different in the United States on the one hand and in the West European states on the other. Just as great were the differences in the situations of the various West European states. It is true that the argument of the "Soviet threat" influenced quite a large section of the population in these countries and served to justify joining the alliance. But it is very doubtful whether the same argument motivated the United States. By 1949 the United States was fully aware of its power, and the temptation to try to impose its will upon the world became irresistible. (1) Besides, it was not isolated in this new formulation of its political aims. France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and to some extent even Great Britain were wrenched by the convulsions of the post-war period. In these countries the struggle went on, in differing intensities, between the distinctly polarised political forces representing definite class interests, and in this struggle the support likely to be obtained from the State that made anti-communism the cornerstone of both its domestic and foreign policy became of non-negligible value. The weight of this factor induced a belief that it was necessary to join the alliance even if this meant sacrificing a considerable measure of national freedom of action.

(1) Confer Pierre Genevey: "Détente en Europe", in "Politique Etrangère", 1967, no. 6, p. 507.

Analysing Italy's policy towards Europe, Bronislawa Norton writes that in no other Western European country, except perhaps France, felt the bourgeoisie so threatened by Communism, and this is why it regarded the Atlantic Alliance as an instrument to restore and stabilise the capitalist system in the context of a world divided for ever. (1) Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor see this same fact as applying not only to Italy and France, but to the whole of Western Europe when they state in terms proper to their style of thinking that "Europe" is "...entirely dependent on the United States for the preservation of herpolitical existence." (2) Finally, it is difficult not to observe that the close tie between membership of the Alliance and the prospect of economic assistance from the only power able and willing to contribute to the restoration of the capitalist economy was not the least argument in favour of joining the alliance. The motives for the establishment of NATO were not so simple and uniform as they have so often been presented. If these were really the circumstances under which NATO was established in 1949, would it not be advisable to disentangle our ideas somewhat about the détente, for, as Philip Windsor says: "The fact that some kind of détente is going on has become commonplace." The same writer asks: "Is this détente purely an indication of NATO's sobering effect upon the Russians, and is it liable to give way to a situation of extreme danger and instability if anyone starts tinkering with the elaborate military structure alliance?" (3)

Windsor believes that this question has recently been replaced by a less extreme position and a more judicious effort to measure the alternative possibilities and dangers involved. However it seems that what is actually taking place is not a change in the question itself but in its wording. The problem still remains whether NATO has contributed to the détente in Europe or whether the process of détente has been developing outside the framework of blocs and perhaps even despite of NATO.

Quite a number of analysts have tried to determine the causes of the easing of tension on this continent, which started in the early sixties. Pierre Genevey not only does not attribute the détente to the existence of alliances but sees them as a factor that to a great extent helped to evolve and perpetuate antagonism between those European states which - as he says - "have no natural feeling of hostility". (4) Genevey, as can be easily understood, writes about both European alliances, but it would be advisable to bear in mind that the alliance created by the Warsaw Treaty appeared in Europe only at the dawn of the period to which Genevey refers. Neither does Genevey speak about the disappearance of the threat presented by the socialist states, but correctly states that "the opinion with regard to the socialist regimes has changed. The appearance of these systems, firstly considered as the fruits of the war and the subsequent disorders and therefore susceptible to being called into question, is no longer regarded as a mere accident. It is recognised that they are firmly implanted and that the transformations accomplished are irrevocable." (5)

The implications here are clear. It became evident that any endeavour to implement the "roll-back" policy would be risky. Philip Windsor points to the "Soviet-American détente", which in his view developed after the Cuba crisis, as the pre-

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- (1) "Wlochy wobec problemów Europy" in "Sprawy Miedzynarodowe", 1966, no. no. 12, p. 39.
 - (2) "Arms and Stability in Europe", a report by Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor, London, 1963, p.3.
 - (3) "NATO and European Détente" in "The World Today", 1967, September p. 361.
 - (4) Pierre Genevey, "Détente en Europe" in "Politique Etrangère", 1967, no. 6, pp. 507 - 508.
 - (5) Op. cit., pp. 512 - 513.

condition to the "second" détente, the European one. Windsor sees the balance between these two super-powers as extremely unstable and perceives in this instability the reason why this balance rules out any trend towards change in Europe. In his view, it is quite the opposite with European détente. It is an attempt "to get things moving". It became possible as many European countries "were able for the first time since the war to differentiate their interests Once security could be taken for granted, at least in the short term, it became possible to distinguish between the necessities of alliance cohesion and the priorities of national development." (1) No matter whether we agree or disagree with the opinions of Genevey and Windsor, these two examples are in themselves enough to show that a sophisticated analyst does not seek an easy answer to the problem of the causes of the détente in the alleged impact of the Atlantic Alliance and does not attribute the détente to the Alliance's "detering capacities". It was not the functioning of NATO that put détente on the agenda. The development processes of the states of Western Europe and of their relations both with the United States and with the other partners in the Alliance against the background of the general set-up in the world had led to the political and strategic conceptions of the American partner being received with growing scepticism and reserve. Windsor writes that NATO was in a state of political disarray which "had been growing since the late 1950s" and that the difficulties in NATO "were concerned with the fact that the United States was attempting to formulate a coherent and centrally controlled strategic policy for the whole Alliance just at the time that the European countries were becoming restive under American control." (2) This process also bore the germs of the revised policy in relations with the socialist states of Europe. The fact that new contacts could now develop in a comparatively short time was ^{also} due to the persistent active policy of the socialist states. This policy made the various West European countries take a new look at their alliance, its function and perspectives. The détente helped to bring centrifugal tendencies into the open in the seemingly monolithic Atlantic Alliance and tended to emphasise national interests subjected until then to the political, strategic and economic plans of the Alliance as a result of the policy imposed upon NATO by the United States.

It is a platitude to say that the détente is a complex phenomenon. However, it is perhaps worth while to recall that it has its roots both in the evolution of the balance of forces at world level and in developments on the European continent itself. The fundamental tenet of US policy since the Second World War has been to fight communism. In terms of politics and strategy this has meant a policy of strength directed against the socialist states, whatever form it may have assumed over any given period. The world lived through the doctrines of containment and liberation accompanied by their strategic opposite numbers. At a certain point - the exact period is immaterial for our purposes and may have been of some duration - this policy was bound to undergo alteration. "Liberation" proved unfeasible. The United States had to realise that it was not in a position to impose its will and that to try to implement such a policy must result in thermo-nuclear war. The nuclear arsenal lost a great deal of its validity as a factor in foreign policy. The new situation raised the question of the utility for NATO members of a structure whose original economic and domestic policy purposes had in principle been accomplished but whose external function was shown to be invalid. One can agree with Genevey when he says that "from this point of view the détente is not a European phenomenon: it is

(1) Philip Windsor: "NATO and European Détente" in "The World Today", September 1967, p. 366.

(2) Op. cit. p. 364.

one aspect of a much broader phenomenon." (1) The effect of this extra-continental variable is not unequivocal. . . The fact that the Soviet Union possesses a parallel nuclear set-up deprives the United States of any possibility of using its own potential in order to extort concessions on the pain of using nuclear weapons, and this is a valid factor of stability on a world level. However, the functioning of this factor is not automatic. It does not rule out the threat stemming from conflicts between smaller powers nor does it prevent the political adventurism of the United States which, as can be seen in Vietnam, brings the world close to the verge of nuclear war. The ups and downs of the confrontation at world level impinge of necessity, on the atmosphere in Europe. They are a reminder of the possibility of this continent being involved in a clash resulting from the brinkmanship which can again be distinguished in the policy of the United States. The stabilising effect of what is sometimes called the balance of terror at world level, therefore, has its limits. In Europe these limits are somewhat extended by the fact that the probability of keeping any armed conflict on the border between two opposing social and economic systems below the nuclear level is, actually, extremely slight. However it is doubtful whether the West European members of NATO can take comfort from the fact that they might find themselves involved in a nuclear conflict started by the United States outside the European scene and not in Europe. One should also not forget that the premise of rational conduct is a purely abstract construction by no means confirmed by history. Many wars fought in the past might perhaps have been avoided had those who decided on starting them been able to foresee their endings. The forces in Europe which aim at obtaining a reshuffling of state borders on this continent have not disappeared. The assumption that this time they will not seize any attempt to use force is based on this very belief in the rational motivation of activities in international relations. The history of 20th century Europe does not provide any material to warrant such a belief.

On the other hand, it is impossible to under-estimate the importance of intra-European developments as a strong factor promoting a change in the attitude of the members of NATO towards the problem of their relations with the socialist states. This development was multifarious but it formed a mutually conditioned complex. The stabilisation of the economy of several states of Western Europe as well as the parallel stabilisation of the political establishment had consequences on the whole of public life in these countries. They reflected on national self-assertion, on the perception of the place these nations occupy in the world, on the evaluation of their relations with other partners in the Alliance as well as with the nations outside the Alliance. Rethinking took place on the understanding of national interests against the background of existing obligations issuing from membership in the Alliance and from participation in the international community. In the course of this reassessment of values it turned out that the interests of all partners within the Alliance did not necessarily coincide, or at least not in all matters, and one of them, France, called into question the very political direction of the Alliance. Differences also arose in the assessment of the degree of security which prevailed in Europe and the tasks which stand before NATO and its participants in connection therewith. The détente reached the basic sphere of the functioning of the Atlantic Alliance. A visible activation in the foreign policy of the socialist states played no small role in this process.

Détente is therefore an aggregate having its sources not primarily in the diminishing of a fear, in one single isolated factor of a psychological character. It grew in the processes taking place in the basic spheres of national life, in the economics, the social structure, political life, relations with other nations, in the broader context of the evolution of the world balance. This is what induced most European members of NATO to revise their understanding of self-interests and their policy of isolation and consolidation of the division of Europe.

(1) Op. cit. p. 508

It is probably not necessary to dwell on the impact on NATO caused by the easing of tension between the states that are members of the two blocs in Europe, on relations between its members and the United States and between these members themselves. These matters are well known. What interests us here is the present and future role of the Atlantic Alliance and in particular how its functioning will reflect on the normalisation of relations in Europe, on the perspectives of eliminating the sources of tension and the replacement of the confrontation between blocs by a cooperation between European nations.

While formulating the problem in this way it is justified to seek the opinion of those who are, or at least should be, most interested in determining what role NATO can play in extending and accelerating the process of détente in Europe. There is no room for an exhaustive exposition of views in the Western European countries that are members of NATO, but an outline of the broad political lines held with regard to détente in these states might be of some use. Such a presentation has to be simplified and perhaps controversial, but perhaps it will be enough to give the general idea of what the final goal of this détente is to be and by what means it is to be achieved in the opinion of those who share in the decision on it.

The opinions in Italy are, in essence, typical for the wing which sees détente as a compound of measures undertaken for the purpose of entering into contact with the socialist states of Europe which would provide grounds for the extension of economic, scientific and cultural relations with them but would end at that. There is no programme of détente in Italy unless we count a negative programme. Under the impact of new trends in the world the center-left government in Italy made its policy somewhat more flexible. This policy has found expression in the attitude of Italy towards NATO and the European socialist states as well. With regard to NATO the ingenuity of the Italian policy is very limited. It boils down to the wish that the Alliance start considering how it should be adjusted to the needs of a community of equal partners. Within this concept the main principles of Italian participation in the Alliance remain unchanged. The Italian policy still considers the Alliance and its integrated organisation as essential for the security of Italy. The Italian government evaluates negatively the idea of throwing up bridges of cooperation over the head of NATO. In relations with the European socialist states this policy is directed towards removing the possible sources of friction in favour of a dialogue between "all nations striving for peace" (as said by Minister Fanfani at the Chamber of Deputies Commission for Foreign Affairs on 19th April 1966). The economic interests of Italy favour protection against the stronger competitors of the European Economic Community and the market oscillations which recently seriously threatened the Italian economy. This is why Italy insistently seeks contacts with the East and takes a serious interest in its markets. However this policy does not have far-reaching aims. The government of Italy deems a too extensive détente to be risky because of its possible effect not only on the shape the Alliance has had up to now but also on the domestic balance of social forces in the state. With regard to Germany the government does not call into question Bonn's position concerning access to atomic weapons and reunification although some pressure groups take a very critical stand from time to time on the Bonn programme under the impact of events in Alto Adige. The détente should by no means adversely affect the coherence of the Atlantic Alliance. All steps toward détente should preferably be channelled through NATO although the diplomatic practice of the Italian government often departs from this principle.

One can observe some variations in several elements of the position of the other European NATO members with regard to key problems of relations in Europe. For instance the policy of Great Britain tends to emphasise the non-proliferation question. Denmark, in its interest in a European inter-governmental conference as an instrument for developing détente, went further than the other NATO members. However, in principle, a number of them tend to consider the future evolution of détente as a process taking place within the framework of NATO and, to an ever greater

extent, through NATO. They are interested in preserving at least correct relations with the United States and perhaps good relations with the Federal Republic of Germany: This does not mean that they are prepared to engage themselves too energetically in favour of the thesis of the priority of German reunification over security, let alone to support the territorial claims of the FRG. They give some weight to the extension of trade with the European socialist states and some even think of cooperation with them. The important exceptions are France and Germany, although the attitude of each of them differs from that of the above-mentioned group in substantially different respects.

It would be difficult to say that the political practice of France represents the opposite attitude. And this is not because its policy does not differ clearly from that of the above-mentioned group of NATO members, but because France is so far the only country to take such an attitude. However, this does not detract from its enormous importance. If we take the position of the Italian government as the level of reference, then the position of France, of de Gaulle, is opposed to it on almost all essential points except perhaps on one aspect of the German problem. At this juncture we take into account the forward-looking concepts only to the extent to which they explain the position taken in a concrete matter. Such a concept - key to the explanation of the attitude of French policy towards détente - is the idea of the grandeur de France linked, on the one hand, with the concept of the unity of Europe and, on the other, with that of equilibrium. Détente is then for the present policy of France a road leading to the unity of this continent, to a European equilibrium, to recovery by France of its former great power position, and not merely a matter of temporary expediency. It can be observed that, in European affairs, the steps undertaken by France towards détente do not differ qualitatively from those undertaken by, for instance, Italy, in spite of the fact that the territorial scope of these contacts is far broader, that more fields are covered, and that these contacts become a continuous process. What distinguishes them, however, is the accompanying conviction that they form only a stage on the way towards further goals, to overcoming the division on this continent. This background is decisive for the qualitative difference of the French position on détente. Only France considers détente to be an affair from which the United States is excluded. Only France takes an almost realistic stand on the role of the German problem in the context of security in Europe. This is why it opposes access by the German Federal Republic to nuclear weapons, the posing of the problem of reunification while ignoring the interests of security and the fundamental condition of reunification, which is full agreement and acceptance by Germany's neighbours of the circumstances in which reunification would take place. This is why the concrete steps of current French policy should be seen not as aims in themselves but as an overture to the process which, according to the premises of this policy, is to lead to basic changes in the whole European set-up. This would comprise a change in the place Western Europe occupies in the partnership with the United States as well as in the place Europe as a whole occupies in the world. The policy of France, in spite of the fact that so far it is a unique phenomenon, is making a strong impact on the opinions taking shape in other countries of Western Europe.

In this gamut of approaches to the complex of problems which has challenged the European members of NATO, the approach of the German Federal Republic is quite specific. To give even a most general outline of its policy is extremely difficult for two main reasons. Firstly, the actual political aims of the Federal Republic are such that they can in no measure correspond to the concept of détente, the precondition for which is to refrain from seeking political benefits at the expense of the other side. It is obvious that détente cannot serve to attain goals which could not have been achieved through a policy of strength. Striving to achieve such goals must lead to the negation of détente, to tension, and make the establishment of security in Europe more remote. The head of the West German government says that "preservation of the status quo is not détente" as

it is conceived in the policy of the Federal Republic.⁽¹⁾ With regard to the territorial image of the Federal Republic, its stand departs considerably from the position of its European allies and compels its public figures to use language permitting the West German government to maintain the appearance of a unity of purpose with the other NATO members. Secondly, this very need to create appearances has, at various times, led to representatives of the West German establishment maintaining this camouflage in different degrees. And this is why the formulas they use in public statements seem contradictory. The impression that a diversity of stands exists is further deepened by the tactical divergencies between the Socialist Party and the right wing of the CDU/CSU which, from time to time, also come into the open.

The fact remains that the Federal Republic does not concur with the policy of détente unless accompanied by steps opening the road towards a revision of the existing territorial set-up. Its political programme has not changed essentially; it is striving to acquire new territories, claiming solely to represent the whole of Germany, and endeavouring to annex the German Democratic Republic. Strategy also remains unchanged; the Federal Republic leans on the United States, uses its allies in order to give its policy a "European" character; directs its policy against the socialist states, against the German Democratic Republic. NATO is seen as a guarantee against a weakening of the unity of the West resulting from détente. The détente should consist of a synthesis of deterrence and easing of tension. Military doctrines also match this concept: opposition to non-proliferation treaty, which might cover the territory of the Federal Republic; the forward strategy and the build-up of conventional arms as the counter-part to flexible deterrence.

Now what hits one's eye is the far-going diversification of interests of the various members or groups of members of NATO which showed up in the process of détente. An almost natural question comes to one's mind: whether NATO is the structure capable of being used for the purpose of channelling so divergent approaches and goals into a common stream-bed? Perhaps one should ponder over the words of Philip Windsor who points to the fact that: "The alliance was in a state of progressive disintegration. Hence, any measures which were taken to halt or reverse this process seemed to be urgently necessary; on the other hand, the exploration of the détente was tentative and hesitant. But the use of NATO as a clearing-house or as a forum for political negotiation required, or at least assumed, a static political relationship among its members. At the very least, it assumed that they approached the problems of East West relations in Europe in the same way, and with the same interests. But the definition of these interests, involving the economic policies and political relationships of the member-countries, included an assessment of the residual security requirements of the alliance as a whole, of the force levels that were necessary to meet these, and of the organisation of the appropriate strategy. Where each definition depended on the other in this way, it was difficult to go on behaving as if all the members of NATO knew what their interests in a détente were, or even that they all shared the same definition of a détente itself."⁽²⁾ However, the answer to our question is certainly not easy. Our reasoning has been focussed on European affairs and the actors on the European scene. The impact of world events on relations between the two blocs has been put aside. It cannot be predicted with a reasonable degree of probability. The aggressiveness of the leading extra-European NATO power might work in several directions. On the one hand it has led the United States to endeavour to win the support of its

(1) K. G. Kiesinger, in "Stuttgarter Nachrichten", 28.2.1967.

(2) Philip Windsor: "NATO and European Détente" in "The World Today", 1967, September, p. 364.

European allies for its extra-European purposes. On the other hand, and in the given circumstances, it can lead the United States to keep Europe out of the drastically increased tension, caused first of all by its war in Vietnam. It is also difficult to overlook the consequences ensuing from the US policy of selective coexistence and its purposes should it continue. But bearing in mind the fact that these factors might bring alterations to the picture, let us come back to the European scene.

One cannot contend that preservation of the military and political structure of NATO is the insurmountable obstacle in the way of the further development of détente in Europe. After all, the process we have daily observed indicates that détente has developed parallel to the existence of NATO. The fact that it grew, not in line with the premises and functions for which this organisation had been established but quite independently from it, and not without friction and pressure being exerted on NATO in order to make it comply with this development, is quite a different thing. Since several West European governments proceed from the assumption that there is a possibility for NATO to assume a new character as a result of some new functions being conferred on it within the field of regulating the process of détente, it is necessary to examine whether this is likely, and to what extent. Windsor formulated his doubts in a global manner. Perhaps it would be worth while, however, to take a closer look at the matter. For this purpose let us try to divide the sphere within which détente can grow. A clear-cut segregation of the military field from the economic, scientific, technical and cultural as well as political fields is not possible. It seems however that such a mental operation might be helpful in determining the role which NATO can play in the course of détente in Europe.

Now it seems that NATO can perform a function with regard to some military measures. Assuming that none of the initiatives undertaken in the détente so far, including relations between France and the European socialist states, has penetrated into the military field, one can infer that this is the field in which the European NATO members are least inclined to pursue an independent policy. This thesis is not contradicted by the withdrawal of France from the integrated NATO command nor by the permanent pressure of the West German government to obtain a further military build-up, because these are intra-alliance affairs. NATO can probably serve as a forum for working out common stands on possible initiatives in the field of some contractual military measures. One should not rule out the possibility of some initiatives which have been talked about for a long time and are being considered in Western Europe more seriously, being implemented, if not with the support of NATO - by using its structure, or at least that they might be implemented without any strong opposition from NATO. This could assist to give an initiative a uniform shape which would protect its proponents from incurring accusations and antagonism from the United States. One can imagine that such initiatives might first of all comprise an all-European treaty on renunciation of the use of force and threat to use force against the independence and territorial integrity of European states, or a treaty between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty states to the same effect. We can also classify in the same category those initiatives aimed at freezing and reducing armaments. Such initiatives have been put forward over the past ten years and include, for instance, the Polish proposals for a nuclear arms freeze, at least in Central Europe; if workable, this might be extended to a wider region and perhaps finally comprise all non-nuclear European states. They also include the proposals for denuclearisation of a wide as possible zone in Europe. Measures to reduce conventional armaments and conventional forces and to reduce foreign armed forces stationed on the territories of other states also come within this category. This list is obviously not exhaustive but points to those measures on which a consensus is perhaps more likely than on others. It is characteristic that the study presented by the Committee on the Study of Relations between France and Germany of the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère in the sixth issue of "Politique Etrangère" of 1967 enumerates among the first measures

envisaged for the "contractual" stage or model, renunciation of the use of force accompanied by the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means, the withdrawal of atomic weapons from some zones in Central Europe and the fixing of levels for conventional forces in a "zone pilote".

It is doubtful whether the possibility of developing a détente in Europe while using the NATO structure goes beyond the above-mentioned category of measures; and we have to qualify even this category with the reservation concerning steps in which the military element is more closely interwoven with the political one. The course of negotiations concerning the non-proliferation treaty shows that NATO has not been found an instrument capable of pushing the solution of this vital problem forward. The extension and deepening of the détente and cooperation in the field of foreign trade, science and technology, and in the field of culture and the arts is likely to proceed over the head of NATO in a bilateral way. This course of events will probably be paralleled by more or less open conflicts with those tendencies within NATO that see this process as a menace to the very idea of the Alliance. The field of economics is one in which the relative role of the United States has, during the last twenty-two years, undergone a substantial reduction and, what is more, a partial transformation from a factor of development into a barrier against further growth. There is no place here for a thorough analysis of the causes of this transformation, but it is a fact that the technological gap between Western Europe and the United States in at least three key industries - chemicals, machine construction, and electronics - is incessantly widening. For obvious reasons, a common denominator between the individual countries in Western Europe making a demand for NATO participation in dealing with the socialist countries of Europe can hardly be found in the field of science, by which we also understand cooperation in technological development, and in the field of cultural and art exchanges.

The events in the field which we may agree inaccurately and for this purpose to call the sphere of political relations is the least amenable to one and the same evaluation by any organ of NATO. The more so because of what Windsor calls the "disarray" of NATO. This is the sphere in which the interests of various European NATO members not only have some common points but also differ essentially. At the same time this is the sphere in which measures towards détente are perhaps most difficult. Détente in politics is no longer only a return to diplomatic courtesy or the discovery, not for the first time it is true, that pecunia non olet, nor is it a mutually beneficial extension of contacts in various fields of public activity. This type of measure if taken by a NATO member reflects on the atmosphere and helps to create a better climate but does not affect important political interests of the remaining partners in the Alliance. The case is quite different with regard to measures in politics. One can say that here a threshold is crossed, beyond which the sphere of détente is fortified by elements of security.

Perhaps it would be easier to point to the consequences of this transformation if we trace it by taking specific examples, even if we are compelled to simplify matters. Behind the letter of the Atlantic Pact, which is common to all its signatories, hide by no means common interests. The role of NATO in the policy of the United States is not identical with the role it is assigned by America's European partners. The United States expected something different from the admittance of the Federal Republic to NATO than what was hoped for by the Federal Republic's West European partners; nor can one say that the expectations of the European members of NATO were similar to those of the Federal Republic. The stumbling block to security in Europe is the position of the West German government regarding the territorial status quo on the continent. It is obvious that security is ruled out as long as there is a state striving to revise existing borders. The fact that it is declared that this state aims at achieving this revision by peaceful means changes nothing. Such an additional clause detracts from the necessity for undertaking all measures indispensable for repelling possible attacks no more than if this formula "by peaceful means" were not attached. It is known that the United States has had recourse

to formalistic statements on the question of borders and has been reluctant to put the dot on the "i" since it is not willing to antagonise those forces in the Federal Republic on which it leans. It is known that on this question France takes a stand diametrically opposed to that of the Federal Republic. It is also known that the policy of the Federal Government does not win support for the GFR among its other allies reluctant to become involved in military adventures for the sake of the revisionist policy of the governing establishment in the Federal Republic. This is true, in spite of the fact that these allies are not willing to antagonise the Federal Government by a too unambiguous stand. It is somewhat hard to imagine that NATO could ever be an instrument assisting those of its members who so wish to tell the Federal Government that its political goals are the main roadblock on the way to security in Europe.

The problem of the reunification of Germany is the second typical case. Here the balance of viewpoints presents itself somewhat differently although the real picture is partly blurred. The fact remains that the contention that the German Democratic Republic should be annexed to the system of capitalist states of Western Europe infringes the fundamental rule of preserving security to the same extent as it would be infringed by a claim for a part of Yugoslav territory to be detached in favour of Italy. In spite of the fact that much has been written as to why the existence of the two German states threatens the security of Europe, it has been done so in a rather dogmatic way and without supporting evidence. It would have been better to advance this thesis when the three Western great powers were toiling in 1949 to establish the Federal Republic and thus divide Germany. But it can easily be seen that reunification on the lines sought by the Federal Government is unacceptable, and certainly not only to the socialist states. From the point of view of security, the reunification of Germany has to be considered in conjunction with the setting within which such reunification might take place. The claim that Germany be reunified in a way and on terms which would destroy the existing political and military balance cannot lead to security. German reunification cannot be achieved regardless of the security of the continent. It is not surprising that the demand of the Federal Government enjoys declarative support from the US administration but, again, it is no secret that by no means all the Federal Government's European partners are inclined to fight battles for the sake of the annexation of the German Democratic Republic to the German Federal Republic. The position of France with regard to the methods and conditions of reunification is opposed to that of the Federal Government in spite of the fact that, for the time being, France, too, does not recognise the German Democratic Republic. So, in this case also, it is hard to conceive how the mechanism of NATO, in which the policy of the United States carries main weight, could work successfully against the catchword of détente being used for purposes running counter to security in Europe. And now perhaps the most striking example: the non-proliferation treaty is one of those measures we have classified as military but more closely connected with the political element than the other military measures mentioned above. The current political situation, not only in Europe but throughout the world, is causing also the United States to be interested in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. For the West German government, however, the nuclear weapon is not merely a form of armament; it is at the same time a mirage of the long-dreamed of possibility of realising its political aims through nuclear blackmail; aims which would change the existing balance of power in Europe. In this case, divergencies between the United States and the policy of Bonn revealed themselves. It turns out that the Alliance is not only a very unlikely instrument for forming opinion in favour of détente against the pressures of the main force of this Alliance, the United States, but that it has failed even as an instrument for unifying the views of its members on measures for détente in a situation where the United States favours such measures while the Federal Government opposes them.

These remarks point to the narrow margin assigned to the Atlantic Alliance as a mechanism which might be used to some purpose in the process of détente. Does this mean that efforts for détente and security in Europe cannot continue because of the existence of NATO? Such a conclusion would clash with reality. It was mentioned earlier that the process of détente has developed in Europe not only despite NATO but most often in opposition to NATO. It is obvious that as long as this process does not go beyond specific limits it will probably continue, the more so as a number of European NATO members are asking that NATO should also play a role in this process. The more the détente encompasses problems decisive for security (that means the recognition of the territorial status quo resulting from the Second World War and the renunciation of all measures in the field of armaments which might be used to try to destroy this set-up quo), the less apt will be the mechanism of the Alliance for the purpose of participating in détente. The state whose world policy is characterised by aggressiveness and arrogance is the pillar of NATO. Its European pillar is the state openly striving to change the existing balance of power in Europe. It is more than doubtful that an Alliance with such an internal balance of power and with the given political purposes, the core of which is to divide and not to cooperate, could be an adequate instrument by means of which those states of Western Europe which are interested in true security could successfully influence their more potent allies. It is more likely that progress towards security, the passage from rudimentary pre-conditions of security, from a normalisation of relations to security, will be made along bilateral channels, and may eventually reach a higher form which could be a conference, i.e. a multilateral mechanism in which all interested European members of NATO would have better conditions to pursue their national interests than is the case when they try to do so through NATO.

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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE

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In the years of World War II, Europe developed a kind of specific thinking, completely new in nature. It relied on the unity of interestst of the European nations suppressed by Fascism and especially on the interests of the occupied countries, oppressed by Hitlerite Germany. This special, new solidarity gradually grew over the certain ideas about the future pattern of Europe. It cannot be said that in the course of World War II these ideas had a definite shape or that they were clear in all aspects to everyone anywhere in equal measure. They were primarily ideas of hope. Accordingly, the principal moment, which influenced them and which was the clearest; was the moment of hope that Fascism would be defeated and that nations would be freed from the yoke of the German occupation. All the rest in those concepts was stressed less and seen less clearly. Tracing the development of these ideas on Europe in the course of World War II in European countries, we can see that it was accompanied by a very strong wave of social conceptions of a future set-up. The resistance which had a distinctly anti-Fascist nature was ever more clearly assuming socialist positions and communists became its leading force in many countries. Even the non-socialist resistance was gradually absorbing the ideas and slogans of the socialist revolutionary resistance and very often, especially in the final stages of the war, it was impossible to tell apart texts of the socialist and the non-socialist illegal press of the resistance in a number of European countries.

Viewed from the historical angle, the resistance formed in its ranks a strong tendency characterized by attempts to make far-reaching social changes after the defeat of Fascism. Reports written by the German Gestapo or the Sicherheitsdienst in the occupied countries during World War II indicate that their authors often reached the conclusion that the entire resistance of European countries was "bolshvist". This, in fact, was certainly not the case; however, the clear revolutionary, socialist trend manifested in the entire resistance activities during World War II undoubtedly influenced the developments in European countries after the end of the war. The liberation of most European countries from Fascism was greeted with national flags and red flags as well, and feelings of revolutionary patriotism mingled with feelings of social revolution. This process took place both in the countries of Eastern Europe and in Western Europe. The big shift to the left which the war caused was, after all, also reflected in the sweeping victory of the British Labour Party immediately after the end of the war in Europe.

The anti-socialist forces placed a barrier against this revolutionary wave tending towards a new Europe. The barrier was, first and foremost, the presence of the United States in Europe. After World War II, the USA, a significant member of the anti-Hitler coalition, embarked on the policy of supporting anti-socialist forces; at first, this policy manifested itself in disarming guerilla groups and restricting the positions of those representing resistance and extreme left-wingers in the Governments of West European countries. Where such interventions proved impossible, there was a big advance of the forces and ideas born in European resistance and political regimes of a new type, highly socialist in nature - which were called people's democracies - came into existence. This was the development predominant in the regions of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. At a later stage these people's democratic regimes openly assumed socialist nature and the countries became socialist. This is the beginning of the process of the division of Europe. While socialist regimes are born in the East of Europe, Western Europe revives in fact the systems existing there before the war. The relations between the two sides are imbued with mutual apprehensions, mistrust and particularly by uncertainty. West European Governments fear a new intensity of revolutionary trends. The United States in Europe fears the victory of communism in Europe. Revolutionary socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe fear an intervention against leftist forces and elements of resistance in a number of countries of Western and Southern Europe.

In this atmosphere of uncertainty, both sides undertake measures which, in the opinion of their leaders, may fortify the position of their respective regimes and safeguard it against the possibilities of an intervention. It is only natural that this course serves a further deepening of differences and eventually, in the late nineteen-forties, leads to a complete division of Europe into two opposing groupings. These groupings, at the beginning strictly political and ideological, are later secured in the military field. Under the leadership of the United States, the anti-communist forces in the Western part of Europe create the Atlantic Pact. It is a military alignment, formally presenting itself as defensive. The socialist regimes in Central Europe, however, must necessarily see it as an alignment having a potentially aggressive character, as they cannot but see the military bases of the Western powers which enter NATO against the will of the resistance leaders and leftists in West European countries. This is why they respond to this challenge by forming their own grouping, the Warsaw Pact. The respective texts of the two treaties show the differences between them. The Warsaw Treaty unequivocally underlines the time limiting aspect and the fact that it provides only an answer to the Atlantic Pact and will be dissolved as soon as the Atlantic Pact ceases its existence.

The realities of the division of Europe into two political, ideological and military blocs quite naturally render their impact on the whole development of international relations on the European continent. The dividing line running across Europe forms for a time two completely isolated units which for ten years make the distance between them ever greater; they are completely isolated and they oppose each other in almost all important political issues. This division is gradually underlined by an economic division. European market ceases to exist in practice and it is replaced by two new markets completely guided by integration tendencies, serving to a great extent to the political aims of the existing groupings. Within this period of almost one generation the conditions of mutual relations between individual member countries of the existing groupings undergo deep changes. Common interests, ideological similarity or unity, membership in one economic and military grouping - these are elements influencing to a great extent the relationship among individual

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countries who are members of the same bloc. Old border disputes disappear; new forms of co-operation, relatively very advanced, rise to prominence. Even the territorial and economic sovereignty of individual states are limited to a considerable extent. Military forces are deployed in different territories irrespective of state borders, joint organs co-ordinating activities or actual management are formed at various levels.

Along with this process, the world is undergoing far-reaching and very complex changes. The epoch of colonialism comes to its end; neophyte nations enter the stage of history and start influencing it. States which were only the object of political games of European powers become important subjects which must be reckoned with in an increasing measure. The integration processes, after having reached a certain stage in the two existing blocs in Europe, practically in 1956 - 1957, start slowing down or stagnating. The Rome Agreements in fact constitute a codification of the achievements of integration but do not initiate new integration stages.

A very important factor which enters practical political decision-making of powers is the realization that it is not possible to crush the new socialist régimes by military force or threat of force. Then comes the period of balance of force. This period carries within itself far-reaching changes in the tactics applied in the fight of the two blocs and in the international relations of the two blocs in general.

The weight of the fight of the two blocs is shifted to other than military fields, especially to the sphere of economy and ideology. However, very soon it is becoming evident that those spheres are of a nature which is different from the rigorous military field. There it is impossible to build up a firm and clear-cut front and to conduct operations in the hinterland of the opponent. On the contrary, these are spheres which offer wide contacts of the two sides, mostly taking the form of personal meetings; very often, this aspect substantially changes the situation and ushers in quite new and unexpected elements.

The two blocs continue to exist, they continue to oppose each other by means of a new warfare without the use of weapons and continue to hold manoeuvres aimed at gaining advantages, each to benefit itself and to weaken the opponent. However, it is becoming ever more evident that the situation has changed to such an extent that the fight of the two blocs may be replaced by co-operation of the countries who are members of the blocs. In my opinion, the initiative in this respect was undoubtedly taken by the socialist side. The socialist bloc was formed only in response to the threat the countries felt. Once the threat was less urgent, they could take the initiative to bring about the elimination of the blocs. At first, their propositions, for instance the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, were not accepted in the West and were interpreted only as political manoeuvres. Step by step, however, the situation started changing. The existing blocs showed a tendency to weaken the rigorous inner relations uniting the countries within the bloc and even showed a tendency to expand contacts between countries belonging to different groupings.

Suddenly there was a new feeling of European coherency and this feeling found its expression in the tendency to revive common Europe on the basis of the security and co-operation of all European countries. In fact, this new situation gave rise to three different approaches to the problem of the relationships between the two existing European blocs:

First, there was a tendency to dissolve the blocs immediately. This tendency relying on the assumption that the blocs are obsolete and therefore may be dissolved without delay reflected the spontaneous desire of European people to

get rid of the bonds within the existing blocs and to open ajar the door of mutual encounter and co-existence. Those advocating this tendency did not believe it was necessary to await further developments and further negotiations; they thought it was urgent to take up the dissolution immediately. It should be said that at the beginning the tendency to dissolve the blocs immediately had many enthusiastic advocates. They believed that such a step would be sufficient to create a new atmosphere and basically to solve the problem of relations among nations. However, difficulties of various kinds started to emerge step by step. It was becoming clear that after all, the existing blocs still reflect to a considerable extent the objective situation in international relations in general. They are a reflection of the fact that in Europe there are states having different social systems and that some countries are not reconciled to the fact that after World War II new political regimes were formed in a number of European countries; they are reluctant to take the fact for granted and to live side by side with these regimes as with equal partners. It is also an indisputable fact that the concepts of a number of states having different social systems in Europe of pivotal questions of world events are different. The differences of views were particularly underlined by the American military operations in Vietnam which made difficult all relations between the socialist countries in Europe and the USA and aggravated relations in the world in general.

Further, it has become evident that up to a certain point and in a very imperfect form, the two existing blocs do form a certain security system in Europe. However, it is a very doubtful system, based on military power equilibrium which, in the event of any deviation or even slight carelessness, might change into a front line. A more profound analysis of the questions of European security makes any observer draw the conclusion that it is impossible to eliminate the system of European security which operates, though imperfectly, unless it is replaced by a new system. And it is precisely the questions of what the system of European security will be like should the pacts be dissolved that nobody could and can seriously answer.

However, the existence of the pacts is fraught with a serious danger. It leads towards a constant growth of the military potential of the two existing blocs to change the balance of forces in Europe in its favour. In this respect Germany has a very important position. Germany is the country of the demarcation line dividing the two blocs. Germany has the biggest concentration of the war potential of armies belonging to the two existing blocs. Moreover, the fact of the existence of the two German states of which one, the Federal Republic of Germany, stubbornly refuses to recognise the existence of the other, the German Democratic Republic, contributes to the fact that the tension between the two blocs is the greatest in Germany and that there it is best possible to put a brake on or to render impossible any attempts aimed at improving relations between the blocs and creating new relations among European countries.

The tension in that region is further aggravated by the fact that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany continues to refuse the recognition of the status quo in Europe created as a result of the Potsdam Agreement. It expressly refuses to recognize the Oder-Neisse line. It does recognize the Czechoslovak border; it refuses, however, to recognize the transfer of the German population made under Article XII of the Potsdam Agreement and refuses to dissociate itself from the Munich Agreement of 1938. All signatories of the Munich Agreement renounced it, with the exception of the Federal Republic of Germany which regards itself to be the legal successor and heir of the German state. No wonder that it was exactly this question, the question of Germany, which caused a dangerous zone of tension in Europe which, should the blocs be simply dissolved and the zone remained, might bring about far-

reaching complications in the European policies in general, might even provoke conflicts of various types.

Second, there were tendencies aiming at the preservation of the blocs or at an agreement between them. The tendencies of this type rose mostly in response to the failure of the far too spontaneous tendencies to dissolve the blocs. A typical feature of these tendencies is to preserve the blocs either forever or at least for a very long time and to settle European questions simply through agreements between the two blocs, agreements which would assume basically two forms; either they would be agreements of a military nature, including first and foremost a non-aggression pact between the two blocs, or possibly agreements on non-proliferation, reduction of armaments, creation of certain forms of armaments control, demilitarized zones, denuclearized zones, the so-called freezed system, etc. All these agreements should be guided by the spirit of easing the tension in Europe and eliminating or at least minimizing the threat of war, including the possibilities of a limited local war with the use of conventional weapons.

In my opinion, these tendencies do not take into account some of the serious changes that have occurred in the situation in Europe in the meantime. First, the Atlantic Pact no longer includes the whole of Western Europe; France withdrew from the military organisation of the Pact and embarked upon an independent policy aimed basically at double alliance - an alliance which has been the great ideal of General de Gaulle since World War II. The other members of NATO have also undergone considerable shifts and serious proposals have been made for a reorganization of the structure of NATO, including a fundamental change in the entire orientation of the Atlantic Pact. It is highly probable that processes aiming at changing the structure of NATO will continue. The Warsaw Treaty, too, has experienced a number of new elements which were formerly non-existent. The states who are members of the Warsaw Treaty reiterated their readiness to dissolve the grouping at the moment when NATO ceases existing and thus they have taken a serious initiative calling for a genuine dissolution of the blocs. Then, of course, some countries, members of the Warsaw Treaty, expanded their contacts with Western countries very substantially, entered into economic, technological and industrial co-operation with them and tried to normalize their relations with those countries of NATO with which their relations had not been normalized, i.e. with the Federal Republic of Germany. Some member countries of the Warsaw Pact gave the German Democratic Republic, which is most endangered by the revisionist claims of the Federal Republic of Germany, guarantees of its security in a form of pacts on mutual assistance on a bilateral basis. This act to a great extent dispelled the hopes of some quarters in the Federal Republic of Germany to isolate the German Democratic Republic from the other socialist countries in Central Europe and then settle accounts with it as an isolated country.

The changes that have occurred within the existing pacts undoubtedly open the door to new possibilities in the mutual relations not only of the two pacts but also in individual countries belonging to different pacts. There is a certain relaxation within the two pacts and a restructuralization process is under way which is under the impact of all influencing factors, both external and internal. Therefore, as the above indicates, time is not suitable for putting the two existing pacts simply back to their original forms and supplementing their missions by certain international agreements between them.

Third, there is a method of a combined approach to safeguard European security. It seems that the current stage indicates a need for working out a serious method of approach to the solutions of the questions of European security. It is my belief that scientific disciplines, atomic physics, military sciences, political sciences and history, all now face a difficult task: to analyze the factors influencing the present situation and to find ways and means which might lead to the safeguarding of European Security. A preparatory analysis, in my mind, offers several solid facts which should be taken as a starting point. The first is the continued existence of the blocs which, despite the changes that have occurred, still constitutes the most expressive political and military constant on the European continent. The development within the blocs, however, requires a more profound clarification. It should be revealed what is the still existing intensity of the dependence of individual member countries of the bloc on the bloc as such, what are the possibilities available to members in influencing the behaviour of the entire bloc and, eventually, what are the mutual relations between the individual members of the bloc in relation to the foreign policy of the individual member states.

On the other hand, it appears to be firmly established that centrifugal forces operating against the blocs are in swing and the example of France brought along serious consequences for the future life of the blocs. It should be clarified whether any other country of NATO or any country of the Warsaw Treaty has a possibility simply to follow suit or whether the case of France is in its way specifically unique. The third important fact is that the attained degree of economic integration does not show a tendency of a further rise. Of course, this does not apply naturally to the extensive operation of the existing integrations and primarily to their attractive power in relation to the countries standing outside the grouping. There the processes are still going on and it is possible to expect that the existing integration groupings, particularly the common market, will further expand. However, the fact that the degree of integration was not further elevated and that in any case economic integration did not go beyond the confines of the field of economy and was not accompanied by the establishment of super-state political organs is of tremendous importance for all activities and for the future development of relations among countries belonging to the opposing blocs. As I see it, this tendency provides a possibility for expanding relations of all types between countries of different blocs and, at least the foreseeable future does not place qualitative barriers of principle on the road of the development of the European co-operation between countries having different social systems, even though, quite naturally, the achieved degree of integration renders a strong impact on each state belonging to one or the other bloc.

A preparatory analysis will reveal that the German question has also entered a new stage and two new tendencies appear. It is first the pressure of hard realities which makes the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Germany go over to a higher degree of understanding the relation between Germany and the socialist countries of Central Europe. The necessity to abandon the Hallstein doctrine and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the socialist countries in Central Europe receive more and more attention and thus the Federal Republic of Germany is becoming more realistic in its understanding of international policy in general. Likewise, the relations between the two existing German states necessarily enter a new stage which demand realistic solutions. Here, too, the laws of development will overcome the stubborn voluntarism which has relied, moreover, on great fantasy and romantic idealism. I believe that the time has come for deeds in the

sphere of European policy; some will probably be made through the two existing blocs, others will be undertaken by European countries, jointly or in groups. It seems to me that the process will, in all probability, start with some agreements of principle concerning the reduction of nuclear and war danger in Europe. In this respect the non-proliferation agreement is ripe for conclusion. Although this agreement brings along a number of serious and complex problems, these must not be regarded as brakes. It provides for a transition to solutions to other problems which must be resolved and settled in due time. Among them, there is the question of small and large countries and the just distribution of the nuclear potential, the question of principal guarantees of the security of countries, which, by non-proliferation, will be deprived of the possibilities of atomic defence. Last but not least, there is the question of the relations of the third world to the advanced industrial countries in the field of the utilization of atomic energy and thus the development of power industry and industrial production. These and similar questions will have to be examined and clarified since all of them make up a complex of questions which, once solved, will constitute a great step forward not only in the relations among European countries but in the relations among all states of the world at large.

Other questions will have to be solved in direct co-operation of individual European countries and it cannot be excluded that in future they might have to be settled through new organs of international co-operation and co-ordination at a scale in which they will come up. It will be necessary to prepare specific scientific analyses of individual questions and submit concrete proposals for certain solutions to provide the political authorities which will make concrete decisions on the matters with elaborated propositions made on the basis of thorough scientific analyses.

It is my firmly held belief that the co-operation of European scientists in this field will have to precede co-operation in politics, in any case it will have to supplement it. Of course, the most significant phenomenon which may crown all efforts in this direction with final success is a systematic co-operation of Governments of all European countries. Therefore the proposal for the convocation of a conference of representatives of Governments of European countries is the most useful initiative recently made in the field of European policy. It is important, however, that the meeting of Heads of European Governments should be well prepared to mark a genuine beginning of a new era in the relations among European states, an era which would meet the expectations of European countries calling for a prosperous and safe Europe. The whole channel of actions in this direction would necessarily result in a gradual elimination of the existing blocs and along with this process of elimination there would be new processes, a process of the gradual creation of a new Europe, a Europe without blocs, based on co-operation among independent European countries, irrespective of their social systems, and based on mutual respect of these countries. I believe that conditions exist for taking up this road. However, it is necessary that European nations should undertake these history-making solutions with courage, realism, self-confidence and with confidence in Europe, in its substance and in its future.

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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE

Conference on Blocs, the German Question and the Future of Europe

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THE BLOCS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

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The security of Europe is a problem of major importance. Twice in the past 50 years Europe has been a stage for the bloodiest wars in human history reaching far beyond the Continent. War activities, although initiated in Europe, involved almost all continents and dramatic consequences of the last of these cataclysms are still felt by the world at large.

Consequently, peace on our Continent is of importance to the entire world and this is what makes the problem of European security so topical. It is here, in Europe, that the two most important military and political groupings of states, the Atlantic Pact and Warsaw Pact alliances, face each other.

When World War II was still in progress, parallel to concepts for a future system of safeguarding world peace through the creation of the United Nations, suggestions were put forward for the establishment of a separate system of security for Europe, where both world wars originated.

In this connection, it seems necessary to draw attention to one significant element of these plans. During the war, European powers and those outside this Continent emphasized by words and deeds that a system of European security must prevent any new aggression on the part of imperialism and German militarism. By the same token, these states always considered imperialism and German militarism as the main peace-destroying force in Europe.

How otherwise can one view the spirit of war time agreements between the Soviet Union and Great Britain (1942), the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia (1943), Soviet Union and France (1944) as well as the meaning of the conferences of the three Great Powers in Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam?

All these agreements concluded during the war seemed to create real possibilities for a final solution of the European security problem, though, unfortunately, such a solution was designed only as a result of the tragic lesson of the last war. This was a prevailing feeling not only at the official level but also among the general public in countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.

The idea of peaceful coexistence, although not yet embodied in an explicit legal framework, has found its expression both in the creation of the United Nations and in the very spirit of the Charter provisions which describe the maintenance of international peace and security as the main purpose of the world organisation. In Article 1, para 1 of the Charter we

read that, in order to maintain peace and security, the United Nations should:

"...take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."

The People's Republic of Poland, since the very beginning, gave evidence that her basic objective was to ensure that the Polish nation will live in peace, security and within just frontiers. The Manifesto issued by the Polish Committee of National Liberation declared that "...Polish foreign policy will be one based on the principles of collective security".

This idea became a corner stone of the first international agreement entered into by the new Poland, namely the Treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and post-war cooperation, concluded on 21 April, 1945, with the Soviet Union. Each of the subsequent accords of the People's Republic of Poland embodied principles which fully conformed with this line set by the Manifesto.

During the first few years after the capitulation of Nazi Germany a tendency to establish a system of collective security, closely related to self-protection against a new German aggression, was also reflected in international agreements concluded between certain West European countries. One may recall the treaty between France and Great Britain signed in Dunkirk in 1947 or the peace treaties with Italy, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria.

Unfortunately, the decision by the West to embark on a road of cold war gradually began to destroy the first elements of a system of collective security in Europe.

One of the most characteristic illustrations of the undermining of foundations of European security was the departure by the West from the principles contained in the Potsdam Agreement.

This process advanced in many directions.

One of them was the failure to implement provisions which called for destruction of the basis of German militarism. This process was also evident in the ignoring of a major commitment of the Potsdam Agreement, namely the stipulations that:

"...the allies will take in agreement together, now and in the future, the other measures necessary to assure that Germany never again will threaten her neighbours or the peace of the world."

It was with deep concern and anxiety that Poland observed the development of the international situation in those years, especially with regard to European matters. Poland could not passively observe such developments as the revival in West Germany of the Bundeswehr or tolerance by the Western Powers of the revisionist claims of the Bonn Government. Our active attitude can be illustrated by a number of disarmament proposals submitted by the Polish representatives at the General Assembly.

While supporting plans for general and complete disarmament we have never failed to try to bring about partial measures in order to limit the scope of danger felt in the most neuralgic points and to solve the most vital matters. This was in full harmony with the principle of constructive peaceful coexistence which we

consistently pursue.

A growing instability of peace in Europe resulting from the expansion of armaments by the Federal Republic of Germany from her demands for the annexation of foreign territories and her stubborn claims for nuclear weapons - all this constituted a direct threat to the security of this part of the world and, thus, a threat to our national security.

Bearing vital interests of national security in mind and, at the same time, taking into account certain possibilities for European detente visible at the moment, in 1957 the Polish Government put forward the plan for the creation of a nuclear free zone in Central Europe.

The creation of such a zone could be supported for both military and political considerations.

A ban on the concentration of arms, followed by a stage of reduction, provisions in the plan not limited to nuclear arms but also including conventional weapons - all this would undoubtedly greatly help to limit the danger of conflict. Quite understandably any conflict can be more easily provoked where there are heavy concentrations of arms than when they are reduced and dispersed.

The political impact of the Polish plan, if implemented, would be signified by an enormous growth of mutual trust between the states of the two blocs. Consequently, the realisation of this plan could become a step towards the solution of the German problem.

Looking retrospectively at the years when our plan was first submitted, and at subsequent actions and proposals of Polish diplomacy, one can see that they form a certain logical chain. Similarly, the obstructive, negative position taken by the governments of the Federal Republic up to the present day has also a certain logical pattern.

The Polish peaceful initiative of 1957 met with an immediate response from official circles of the Federal Republic. In the Federal Government's Aide Memoire dated 24 February 1958 we find the following sentence:

"The Federal Government considers the Rapacki Plan to be only one of many proposals dealing with a future system of European security, a subject on which no negotiations can be conducted which do not link it with the question of the reunification of Germany."

Our subsequent proposal - internationally known as the Gomulka Plan - which was officially put forward by the Polish Government on 29 February, 1964, assumed that the most urgent step in Europe was the freezing of nuclear arms. This stemmed from the fact that the FRG's drive to obtain access to nuclear weapons grew to a very alarming degree.

This fact could not pass unnoticed by the Polish Government. The scope of the Gomulka Plan, in a sense, was limited. However, it dealt with a very important matter and the implementation of the Plan could become a serious step towards the relaxation of tension, strengthening of security and progress in the field of disarmament.

At the moment of the official launching of the Gomulka Plan in 1964, when international detente had advanced in spite of many obstacles and

turning points, the policy of the Federal Government was also aimed at torpedoing this proposal. Several weeks after the publication of the Polish proposals in the press, namely on 13 March, 1964, the then Minister of Defence, Mr. Kai Uwe von Hassell, in his statement at the WEU meeting in Hamburg, spoke against these proposals. Although the Federal Government at that time still tried to assure public opinion that the Polish proposals were the subject of detailed and attentive studies, one of the cabinet ministers brutally tore the veil off this farce. Mr. von Hassell spoke not only against the proposals known as the Gomulka Plan but also recalled the negative attitude of the Federal Government against the Rapacki Plan and added the Wilson Plan to this as well. The crowning argument advanced by von Hassell was that these plans did not solve the main problem - in his opinion that of German reunification. He added, moreover, that as long as there are strained relations, Europe cannot be "militarily thinned out" (militärisch verdünnt). Thus, once more a dead end was reached. Once again the "cart was put before the horse". But let us be clear that the Federal Government took a negative attitude not only with regard to our proposals. It also rejected all suggestions coming from Western countries, suggestions which, like ours - although sometimes differently motivated - led in the same direction: detente in Europe.

Instead, the Federal Government tried to avoid consideration of the merits of our plan, tried to circumvent answering the question of whether our plan really purported a change in the balance of power. It knew very well what the answer must be. But it did not even spare some political blackmailing of partners, asserting that the adoption of the Rapacki Plan could result in the creation of a dangerous vacuum which might "encourage a possible aggressor to take hostile actions".

To attack a policy of detente, regardless of its proponents, even the Bundeswehr generals were involved. At least one characteristic illustration of this is worthy of mention.

On 7 October, 1966, President Johnson emphasized the necessity to relax tension on the European Continent. For the first time the American side publicly stated that European security had supremacy over other European problems, including the German question.

As soon as 11 October, 1966, "Die Welt" published an interview with General Kielsmansegg reporting the following:

- The General is of the opinion that the threat from the East has not diminished and, what is more, the quality of weapons and military preparedness of the Warsaw Pact armies have grown significantly.

Speaking on the so-called nuclear threshold, the General advised "... nuclear weapons should be used at the earliest stage and in the largest possible numbers", while he termed or brushed aside all proposals aimed at the reduction of the risk of war as mere "prescriptions".

Simultaneously, the General obviously felt in a position to criticise his American superiors when, at the close of the interview he declared that "... the American trumpet cannot be again uncertain".

However, we are sure and would like to stress the conviction that it is not the generals of the Bundeswehr who will influence the policy of other Western powers. Also spreading is the conviction that the West

German concept of intimidating its own allies by allegations of possible aggression on the part of the socialist countries has no ground whatsoever. Belief in this concept is disappearing even among certain political circles of West Germany itself!

Despite the fact that our plans have not become a subject of official multi-lateral talks, ^{we} believe that they have not lost their actual meaning. Just the opposite, the more aware Western leaders become of the peace-loving intentions and peaceful foreign policy objectives of our countries, the deeper and more embracing will be the interest in our proposals. The last chapter of their life has not yet been written...

It would be a crude simplification to assert that the Polish disarmament plans, designed to create foundations for European security, were motivated solely by our national interests. Such interests are undoubtedly a basis of our initiatives. Simultaneously, however, they harmonize with principles of general security and, therefore, provide a formula which, taking the matter objectively, is acceptable to any state. We do not pretend to be faultless and, therefore, Poland willingly enters discussions on the subject. We discuss because we want to reach a sincere and honest understanding. We do, however, demand the same in return.

Had the idea of a nuclear-free zone, constituting a basis of our plan, run contrary to interests of other states, then this idea could certainly not have become a subject of talks which seek the creation of similar zones in other parts of Europe and the world.

We do not think that the scope of a European security system should be limited to the introduction of our plans alone. We have emphasized many times the need to discuss other plans submitted by Western statesmen also. It is not, however, due to us that, until the present day, words have not been turned into deeds.

Taking into account the current international situation, particularly the policy of the Federal Republic, and guided by the peaceful principles of its foreign policy, at the close of 1964, the Government of the PPR suggested holding an international conference to discuss problems of the whole complex of European security. The Polish Foreign Minister, Mr. Adam Rapacki, in his statement delivered on 14 December, 1964, at the General Assembly, described the objectives of the conference and proposed that it could be prepared by representatives chosen by the Warsaw Pact and NATO states with the participation, if desired, of representatives from European states not belonging to the two alliances.

Poland's proposal concerning a conference on European security has been supported by other socialist states. The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, in its statement of 21 January, 1965, favoured "holding a conference of European states to discuss steps to ensure collective security in Europe."

The idea contained in the Polish suggestion also received the support of many Western nations. The joint communiqué dated 18 February, 1965, on the Brussels talks between the foreign ministers of Poland and Belgium, Mr. Adam Rapacki and Mr. Paul Henri Spaak, stated, among other things, that "...both parties attach great importance to the question of European security" and "...are determined to continue their efforts, without neglecting any possibility, to reach this objective". Again in the communiqué of 25 April, 1965, on

talks held in Prague between the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and Czechoslovakia, Mr. Stewart and Mr. David, both parties recognized the usefulness of a European conference, although this statement was qualified by the reference to a need for favourable conditions and the appropriate preparation of the conference. One can also mention many instances of Norway's declared readiness to discuss with the Polish Government the question of European security within the context of the Polish plans for the creation of a nuclear-free zone and freezing nuclear arms in Central Europe. A similar attitude was taken by the then Foreign Minister of Denmark, Mr. Haekkerup, when at a press conference in Stockholm on 10 April, 1965, he referred to Denmark's interest in talks with Poland aimed at "the reduction of tension between East and West and the examination of possibilities for disarmament".

The only state which took an obviously negative stand against this Polish proposal was the Federal Republic of Germany. The FRG put forward two basic conditions which ran contrary to the very meaning of the Polish suggestion: a conference, in its opinion, should be devoted "first and foremost to the liquidation of the partition of the German nation through the implementation of the right to self-determination", and the German Democratic Republic should not participate in the conference because allegedly it is not a state in the light of international law.

Developments of 1966 brought further examples of support for the Polish initiative. It was expressed in a joint communiqué issued after diplomatic talks between Poland and Sweden on 10 June, Poland-Italy on 28 July and Poland-Belgium on 8 September, 1966. An elaboration on the idea of the conference on European security was made in the Bucharest Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact dated 5 July, 1966. The declaration emphasized that "an understanding reached at the conference could be embodied, for instance, in an all-European declaration on cooperation to maintain and strengthen European security". Such a declaration could contain an undertaking by states to settle peacefully international disputes, to consult each other and exchange information on matters of common concern, along with an undertaking to promote the development of economic, scientific, technical and cultural exchange. This document should be open for signature by all European states.

As far as the German question is concerned, our whole approach is based on a sober assessment of reality. This reality consists of the existence of two German states. With one of them, the German Democratic Republic, we are bound by a fraternal alliance and close ties of cooperation in all spheres of life. There is hardly any field of political, social, economic, cultural, sporting or other activities in which we do not have mutual relations or expect to develop them.

The German Democratic Republic, following the Potsdam Agreement, recognized the Oder-Neisse frontier as the final Polish-German border. This state pursues a policy in full conformity with the Potsdam decisions relating to the full democratisation of life in Germany. The GDR not only opposes all utterances and claims for the revision of frontiers established at Potsdam, but simultaneously encourages its population to have respect for other nations. Never before was there any German Government which pursued such a policy towards Poland.

Our country develops a wide and universal trade exchange with the GDR. The total volume of our turnover has already doubled that of Polish exchange with the whole of Germany before the war. The scientific and technical cooperation between our two countries is also growing and becoming more diversified.

We attach great importance to strengthening the international position of the German Democratic Republic, to reinforcing her sovereignty and national security. It is in the utmost interest of Poland and all European states for peace to be maintained on our Western border and peaceful cooperation expanded. We want to see this border as a uniting factor, not a dividing one.

On the contrary, the Bonn Government's foreign policy with regard to Poland clearly illustrates that, until the present day, the Federal Republic of Germany has not established normal relations with the socialist states which were the object of Nazi aggression. And this is exclusively the fault of the FRG.

Beginning in 1955, when the Polish Government declared the cessation of a state of war with Germany, it has repeatedly declared its readiness to normalize relations with the FRG in all spheres. Unfortunately, and due to no fault of ours, our constructive efforts did not receive an appropriate response from the FRG. Just the opposite: for many years the whole policy of the Federal Government towards Poland has been characterized by revisionism, by demands to change the existing Polish-German frontier on the Oder and Neisse. We cannot be misled by declarations of Bonn's spokesmen who try to whitewash the real attitude of that Government through verbal assertions that the FRG allegedly does not pursue a policy of revenge against the socialist states, does not intend to pursue such policy in the future and that it wants to live in peace and neighbourly relations with us.

The West German standpoint on the normalization of relations with Poland was expressed in the note of the Federal Government dated 25 March, 1966, and submitted, inter alia, to the Polish Government. The note made an effort to create a false impression that the Federal Republic "is trying particularly hard" to promote relations with Poland and simultaneously to infer that it is precisely Poland who is making these relations more difficult. The Polish Government, in its note of 29 April, 1966, referred to matters raised by the FRG. The reply made a distinction between the official policy of the Federal Republic and the desire of a part of the West German population to normalize relations with Poland on the basis of existing political realities - aspirations restrained by the FRG Government. On this occasion it was recalled that the actual state of affairs between our two countries stems from "...the policy of the Federal Government and its attitude with respect to the vital interests of Poland". Simultaneously, the note stated that the conditions for full normalization will emerge when "...the Government of the FRG recognizes without reservations the existing frontier of Poland on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse and finally discards its claims to the Polish Western and Northern territories".

The new Federal Government constituted in December, 1966, and called the "Government of the Great Coalition", has devoted plenty of its time and paper to the subject of its relations with the socialist countries. It tried to present its policy as an alleged departure from the old dogmas which were governing principles of the Adenauer and Erhard administrations. However, verbal declarations or press articles do not yet constitute a policy. In the final instance, a policy is judged upon specific actions and the results which it brings. Polish leaders, and this goes for political leaders in other countries as well, were easily able to recognize the new accents in Bonn's political vocabulary as only a change of tactics with the simultaneous retention of the basic strategic goals of West German policy, unchanged since 1949.

Poland demands a full revision and change of the policy which the West German Government has pursued until now. The Government of a country of this size and importance cannot maintain an ambiguous policy. Therefore, we ask for clear, specific and practical neighbourly relations. Verbal declarations so often made by Bonn's statesmen with the intention of setting aside controversial issues, particularly those between Poland and the FRG, are misleading, especially for their own people. The establishment of political and diplomatic relations will not become a panacea or a direct method of bringing about normalization. Therefore, we believe that the normalization depends on such conditions as: unequivocal recognition by the Federal Republic of Germany of the Oder and Neisse frontier as the definite Polish-German border; West German renunciation of claims for exclusive representation of the whole of Germany and recognition of the existence of the GDR; total and unreserved renunciation of claims to possess or share nuclear weapons. On these matters it is naturally not sufficient to limit oneself to issuing paper declarations, even the most solemn ones. It is also necessary to achieve the incessant implementation of these undertakings in everyday life. Lack of the above-mentioned prerequisites for normalization fully entitles us to view most sceptically various proposals on an exchange of declarations on renunciation of the use of force. If such agreements are to be enforced, then the Government of the FRG, in the first instance, should renounce those parts of its present policy that are based on the policy of strength. On the other hand, West German reluctance clearly to accept the necessity to conclude an agreement banning the use of force with the German Democratic Republic - a matter of the foremost importance - gives us the right to assert that all prerequisites, by no means, exist for opening discussion on an exchange of declarations.

Many times the Bonn Government has spoken about the need to disarm, including total disarmament. Occasionally it even made a promise to submit its own specific plans on the subject but as yet we have seen no such plans. At the same time it is worthwhile drawing attention to the fact that, so far, Bonn has not changed its negative attitude concerning Polish proposals for partial disarmament in Central Europe. We have no reason to take seriously various plans about European order, alleged reconciliation and bridging the gaps which divide us. We are not dreamers but base ourselves firmly on existing realities. Undoubtedly, we would be glad if it were possible to overcome the existing differences. Certain Bonn politicians sometimes suggest pulling a makeshift cover over these gaps. However, we received only recently a new sample of the true attitude of Bonn on a matter of vital importance for nations, on the issue of the non-proliferation treaty. From our point of view, an attitude on this treaty is an "acid test" for any state policy. Already in 1967, when some possibilities of understanding on the subject became visible, leaders of the Bonn Government launched a massive attack against the draft. This aroused unfavourable reaction among Western public opinion against Bonn. Now, when the two great powers, USSR and USA, submitted a new draft on the non-proliferation treaty, we can again observe the first signs of dissatisfaction on the part of the Federal Republic of Germany, only its methods of undermining the treaty have changed. The present objections are reportedly caused by West German concern over the development of the national atomic industry and fears of the alleged revealing of industrial secrets. The whole absurdity of the thesis that there is a desire to penetrate West German nuclear establishments should be clear when one recalls that it is precisely the socialist countries who, for many years now, have supported the idea of closer economic, scientific and technical cooperation and exchange between nations of our continent. Looking for true reasons for West German objections, one must remember that the treaty is to ban the dissemination of nuclear weapons and that issues raised by the FRG tend to circumvent this main goal.

We in Poland attach great significance to the non-proliferation treaty. Its conclusion could become an important stimulus for bringing about an agreement on a freeze on nuclear weapons in Central Europe. It may become a step forward towards the reduction of nuclear and conventional forces of states.

To sum up, the question of the normalization of relations with the FRG is one of the elements of European security. If this normalization is to be meaningful for peace on this continent and to eliminate after-effects of the last war from relations between the PPR and FRG - as was the case between the PPR and the GDR - then it has to be subordinated to the requirements of European security. These requirements are increasingly recognized by states of all off Europe, except the FRG, and include recognition of the existing European status quo: with regard to territories - recognition of the existing frontiers between the GDR and FRG as well as those between the PPR and the GDR; in the political sphere - recognition of existing states, including the GDR, and the establishment of normal relations with them without any discrimination. These requirements also include the need to renounce any claims by the FRG to nuclear weapons.

Nobody refuses the German people the right to be united. However, we shall never agree to unity and self-determination as a green light for the annexation of the other German state - the GDR, as the permission of another version of Anschluss or other methods of aggression. It is no secret that, in the present conditions, when there are two German states with completely opposite social and economic systems, the reunification of Germany must be a historical process. It is important to understand that this historical process can advance only in conditions of détente, improved security and confidence within Europe. Only such an atmosphere can permit the expansion of cooperation and gradual rapprochement of the two German states.

However, we are well aware that even now, when the Bonn policy with regard to Poland and other socialist countries is marked by signposts leading to nowhere, there are also in that country political forces which soberly assess the past and look at the future even more rationally. These people understand that the future of the German nation lies in peaceful development and not in creating new conflicts.

There are circles of the West German population raising their voices against the policy of revenge and against militarism. They demand changes in the Federal Republic's policy, including recognition of the Oder-Neisse border, recognition of the German Democratic Republic and relaxation of international tension. In the past few years scores of press publications and books have been printed in the FRG defending this point of view. Reference can be made to the work of a renowned German philosopher, Carl Jaspers, in which, among other things, he advocates abandoning the present political course of the FRG. Also worth recalling is a book by the well-known and esteemed Erich Müller-Ganloff with a very expressive title, "Living With Partition" (Mit der Teilung Leben), or a collective work by three authors entitled "Catechism of the German Question" which puts forward a programme for a federation of the two German states. Let us also recall several TV programmes, especially one by Rüdiger Altmann concerning the necessity to recognize the existence of the two German states. Another illustration is articles published in some German newspapers explicitly calling for change in the present Bonn policy, particularly for recognition of the Oder-Neisse border.

All these examples, though quoted at random, give evidence that in the Federal Republic too there are fractions of the population which are not remote from the main stream of progressive thinking in Europe.

Unfortunately, it is the voice of West German reactionary forces, who have never learned the lessons of history, that is predominant in that country. These forces form the substantial part of the power elite in the FRG. They decide on the policy of the country. They uphold an imposturous thesis about "the existence of Germany within the borders of 1937". These are the forces that would like to liquidate the GDR.

We would not like to get down to drawing extensive historical parallels, but it is enough to open a book on the history of Germany within the last century to convince oneself that the Government of the FRG has pursued the same political line directed against the East, Poland and peace - the policy of Bismarck, Wilhelm II and Hitler.

Despite tragic war experiences we are not at all, as some try to infer, anti-German. We are only enemies of German militarism which is similarly viewed, without any difference of opinion, by modern history. We are, and shall remain, enemies of those who try to eliminate us or to send all Poles living in our Western territories "to work in French mines". It takes a large dose of ill will to make an equation between our position and an anti-German obsession. Take our closeness with the German Democratic Republic. Is it not a fine example of our real attitude towards the Germans? Or take our contacts with the young people of the FRG who come to us and do not hesitate to visit the former "death factory" in Auschwitz. Is it not a striking example of our support for everything that is peaceful and anti-war? It is not our intention to constantly recall this tragic chapter in the history of our nation, but people must not forget it. We shall gladly accept a truly and honestly peaceful line by official circles of the Federal Republic, but this must take the existing realities into account. It is not our fault that this may sometimes seem painful to those ruling the FRG. It is rather the fault of those who started the last world war. Are there no sober leaders in West Germany who realize that one must pay the price by recognizing things which we call the status quo? We shall be happy in Poland, perhaps more than anywhere else, when we are able to devote ourselves to peaceful work without the need for simultaneously thinking about threats to our security.

We would like to believe that it is not the forces prevailing in the FRG who are going to shape the future development of international relations. We came here with the intention of seeing that this meeting contributes to better mutual understanding, to improving or, perhaps, laying foundations for an atmosphere of mutual trust. Every achievement on this road, however small, is worth our effort since it contributes to the success of the cause which is of vital interest to all of us.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE

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RULES OF COEXISTENCE

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The world breathed a sigh of relief when talk of coexistence replaced talk of Cold War, with its promise of turning into a hot one. Many in this blessed relief forgot to ask what precisely "coexistence" means. The full phrase current in the Soviet literature is "peaceful coexistence of states with different economic and social systems". Obviously, then, one characteristic of coexistence is "peace" in the sense of "absence of war". But, equally obviously, we already enjoyed absence of war when the world was in a state of cold war; actually only a relative absence in both cases, for there is little difference between the Korean war under the cold war system and the Vietnam war under the coexistence system. And of course the US and USSR coexisted under the cold war system, in the sense of going on living side by side, without wiping each other out. Supposedly this was due to mutual deterrence, a military scheme which has not at all been even partly dismantled. The partial test ban treaty is only an attempt to control further perfecting of nuclear weapons (control which may fail because underground testing is permitted) and to stop further spread of nuclear weapons (an attempt which has failed because France and China have since joined the nuclear club and carried out atmospheric testing); besides this, it is perhaps marginally valuable as a public health measure.

Is there then something distinctive and new in coexistence? Tinbergen¹ believes that "the rules of the game" of coexistence include not only an implicit agreement between the US and USSR to avoid nuclear war at all costs (an agreement which was already implicit under deterrence), but also an agreement to refrain from trying to obtain victory over the other side by means extraneous to the conflict, i.e. by military force or threats, by financial or economic pressure or coercion, or by psychological tricks or lies. While coexistence is conceived as "competitive" and not "cooperative", in the sense that the two economic and social systems, capitalist, liberal democracy and Marxian "socialism", are trying to prove their superior worth to each other (i.e. to each other's peoples over the heads of the leaders) and to the uncommitted, they are permitted to do so only by "legitimate" means. Coexistence of this type becomes possible when proponents of each system have a strong belief not only in the righteousness of their ideology (which alone might make them use illegitimate means for a supremely worthy end) but an equally strong belief in the historical necessity, given either by materialistic laws of historical development or by the will of God, of eventual victory over the opposing system by legitimate means.

* It is interesting to note that Waskow²⁻⁵ describes a possible fully disarmed world in which all means short of violence for promoting the national interest are permitted, including lying, cheating and bribery. He himself admits that this would be unstable, and such a world would soon rearm.

In addition, McWhinney⁶ believes that coexistence implies a preservation of the status quo, a tacit acceptance of non-interference by each great power in the sphere of influence of the other. Cf. also Khrushchev's statement on this point.^{6a}

This is why the US stayed out of Hungary and East Germany during their revolutions, and why the USSR withdrew its missiles from Cuba and did not interfere in Guatemala or Dominica. This is essentially the old-fashioned 19th century balance of power. Coexistence in this sense means that the US gives up all ideas of a "roll back" in Eastern Europe, and the USSR stops using Communist parties in Western countries as agents of subversion or revolution. However, it seems clear that the new and developing countries of the "Third World" are still very much up for grabs. The Soviet doctrine of coexistence specifically excludes "wars of liberation" from its renunciation of war. The Vietnam conflict, among others, proves that the US does likewise, as well as showing that avoidance of nuclear war does not at all mean avoidance of limited war; experimentation is still proceeding in that unhappy country to find out how far escalation can go while keeping the war "limited" in the nuclear age. No one knows for sure, because it has not been tried before. We may yet find out the hard way. Those of us who have done tensile testing in the industrial laboratory, in which a sample is stretched until it breaks, wonder if some "non-destructive tests" could be devised to obtain this information, if the military strategists really have to know.

Perhaps the only gain in the coexistence system over the cold war system, is some gain in stability against all-out war, though not absolute stability; for each side, while presumably swearing off illegitimate means to victory, must necessarily suspect the other side of not keeping this commitment, and therefore is constantly tempted into "preventive cheating" of its own, which of course would confirm the other side's suspicions. This is the same kind of trap into which cheating on a disarmament treaty might fall, if there was disarmament, and this is why disarmament alone would also not be stable.^{*} It is this evaluation of the Soviet-American conception of coexistence which induced Dewart⁹ to consider it much inferior to the coexistence concept of Pope John XXIII in "Pacem in Terris", which is that of a common search for a more human order, and the priority of allegiance to mankind over allegiance to either nation or ideology. While the Soviet-American conception is "competitive coexistence", the Pope's conception might be termed "cooperative coexistence", and would obviously give much better stability.

The question still remains as to the detailed content of the rules of coexistence, either competitive or cooperative or some combination, such as might be attainable in the present international climate. It might be worth noting that, while the East talks about "peaceful coexistence", some in the West talk about "World peace through law", which does not necessarily mean world government, though it might. (The phrase does mean that for Clark and Sohn,¹⁰ but not for Charles Rhyne's World Peace Through Law Center, which would strengthen the International Court of Justice, but does not mention any other governmental institutions at the world level, such as police or legislature.) Is the "peaceful coexistence" concept compatible or even complementary to the "world peace through law" concept? Is this a case where East and West can converge, each approaching the problem of obtaining stable peace from their own peculiar angle?

The main difference in the two approaches seems to be in the amount of supranational institutions involved. The East suspects such institutions, even the International Court, of being necessarily Western-dominated. This is understandable, in view of the Soviet experience of being in a perpetual minority in the United Nations. These fears could be quieted perhaps only by a radical revision of UN voting, in which the natural Soviet desire (shared by all countries) for "legislative justice", in Lusky's sense,¹¹⁻¹² could be satisfied. The Soviet conception of coexistence lays great stress on "national sovereignty", "sovereign equality of nations", non-interference in domestic affairs, and "self-determination of nations". Could the two neverthe-

^{*} Rapoport's "prisoner's dilemma games" illustrate this situation admirably.⁸

less be reconciled, not at the philosophical level, but in the formulation of particular rules or codes of international behavior which both sides would agree to observe as a condition of coexistence, under some minimum form of international supervision and conflict-resolving or conflict-controlling machinery?

World Federalists usually concentrate their attention on the instruments of world law: police, courts, legislature. The content of world law, other than that embodied in the world constitution or revised UN Charter itself, is usually left unspecified, presumably to be settled by the future world legislature or reformed UN Assembly. Could and should this order be reversed? Would it be possible, and perhaps easier, in view of Soviet suspicions of world government, to start with the formulation of world laws, using the old machinery of treaties and UN resolutions, and only later create the supranational machinery as the need for it becomes apparent? Even if this order-reversal is not feasible or desirable, World Federalists should be giving more thought to the content of world law than they are now doing, since this subject is at least as important as the instruments and institutions.

Will the rules be observed if agreed to only in treaties, without at first any enforcement machinery? We must readily admit that they may not be, just as disarmament without world government is not quite stable. It is, however, still desirable to formulate them, because: (1) they would further somewhat increase the present precarious stability of coexistence, and thus give us more time to strive for complete stability; and (2) the formulation of even initially inoperative rules, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (which has not even been ratified by any governments) checks the lawlessness of nations somewhat through the pressure of public opinion, as pointed out by Burchill.¹³

Negotiations on formulating the rules of peaceful coexistence have actually taken place in the United Nations,^{*} although surprisingly little of this has been reported in the Western press. It might therefore be of value to give a brief history here, as gleaned from an article by Potocny in a Czechoslovak journal.¹⁴

The first move was made at the 15th UN General Assembly in 1960, when, during the debate on the report of the International Law Commission to the Legal Committee of the General Assembly, the Eastern and neutral countries demanded codification of the principles of peaceful coexistence, and complained that the Legal Department of the UN Secretariat was inactive (Document A/4425). On December 12, 1960, the Assembly approved Resolution 1505/XV, stressing the importance of codification of coexistence and asking the 16th General Assembly to put this question on its agenda.

At the 16th General Assembly in 1961, a 12-nation resolution initiated by Czechoslovakia asked the 17th Assembly "to consider principles of international law concerning peaceful coexistence". The West at first opposed the whole idea, as it had previously opposed the formulation of a legal definition of aggression,⁵ on the grounds that all the necessary rules of coexistence were already covered in the UN Charter. However, when it became obvious that the neutrals would side with the East and the West would be isolated, the West concurred, but managed to change the wording to "principles of friendly relations and cooperation among states in agreement with the UN Charter".

This was unanimously accepted by the Legal Committee on December 13, 1961, and by the General Assembly on December 18, 1961, as Resolution 1686/XVI.

During the debate at the 17th Assembly in 1962, Czechoslovakia proposed a "Declaration of the Principles of Peaceful Coexistence", on October 26, 1962. This Declaration, conceived as a parallel of the Declaration of Human Rights, contained a preamble and 19 articles.

^{*} Work on codification of these rules is also proceeding at the International Law Association, at its conferences in 1956, 1958, 1960 and 1962.¹⁶

When Western opposition became manifest, 14 neutrals proposed 6 principles of co-existence as a compromise: (1) prohibition of the use or threat of force; (2) peaceful settlement of conflicts; (3) duty of international cooperation in all spheres; (4) right of nations to self-determination; (5) right of sovereign equality of states; (6) duty to fulfil international obligations (See No. 7, added later, in next paragraph). *

After 2 weeks of informal and arduous negotiation, a 37-nation resolution was accepted by the Legal Committee on December 12, 1962, with 73 votes in favour, 1 absent, and by the General Assembly on December 18, 1962, with 70 votes in favour (unanimously), and became Resolution 1815/XVII. It added a seventh principle to the above six: (7) non-interference in internal affairs of states.

At the 18th General Assembly, 4 of the 7 coexistence principles were considered. The Declaration was to be ready for International Cooperation Year in 1965, but this was not achieved. The 18th Assembly passed a resolution establishing a Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States. This Committee held its first session in Mexico City on August 27 to October 1, 1964; 27 states (named in Potocny's article⁶) took part.

The Special Committee was able to reach agreement on only one of the 7 principles, namely that of the sovereign equality of states. This was submitted to the 19th Assembly, but this Assembly was prevented from voting on any issue by the dispute over financing peace-keeping, so that the Special Committee's report could not be properly dealt with.

The Special Committee held no sessions in Spring or Summer of 1965, because of Western opposition. At the 20th General Assembly (1965-6), Resolution 2103/XX was passed unanimously. It declared that the task was not just study of the co-existence principles, but their actual codification and progressive development. To produce a Declaration of the 7 principles, a new 31-member committee was established, containing 5 socialist states, 13 Afro-Asians, 5 Latin Americans and 8 Westerners. Its first session was in New York on March 8 to April 25, 1966. Unlike the previous committee, it could make decisions by majority vote, not by complete consensus.

This new committee succeeded in obtaining agreement on 3 of the 7 principles: sovereign equality of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, and (partly) the duty of international cooperation. Interestingly enough for world federalists, the agreed-upon point on peaceful settlement of disputes left out mention of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court, presumably at the insistence of Eastern and neutral countries.

An interesting argument developed about the principle of national self-determination, when the Eastern countries argued that the use of force was justified for national liberation from colonialism. One wonders how they square this with the other co-existence principle on banning the use or threat of force.

On the whole, the history of these negotiations is very reminiscent of the history of disarmament negotiations¹⁵; the same jockeying for positions that favour one's own national interest, the exploitation for propaganda of both successes and failures, the same lengthy and arduous progress toward an incomplete achievement. There could be no better commentary on the actual state of coexistence today. And yet, 3 principles agreed upon (though not ratified) out of 7, is better than could have conceivably been achieved in the 1950s.

* These principles were discussed in a series of articles by Yugoslav experts.³⁷

Nevertheless, even today, it is perfectly clear that China would have none of these negotiations on peaceful coexistence, even if she were invited. For it is clear, according to Tinbergen ¹, that one of the concrete contents of Soviet-American co-existence is "the formation of a common front against extremists of left and right, against proliferation of nuclear weapons, and against the creation of "illegal" régimes (as defined by a "code of behaviour" or a "battery of tests", not simply constitutionality or democratic election). No wonder China perceives this as a conspiracy of the Big Two, to divide the world between them, as Spain and Portugal did several hundred years ago.

One would wish that the West, instead of dragging its feet and fighting a rearguard action at the UN against the Eastern and neutral countries on the codification of coexistence, in terms of their nationalist-oriented definition of it, would take the initiative and propose some supranational measures as rules of coexistence. It is urgently necessary that scholars in the West give serious thought and study to the rules to be proposed, not as propaganda ploys, but as serious proposals genuinely acceptable to the East, and yet truly promoting a stable peace - something which we do not believe nationalist-oriented rules alone can do.

How could one go about trying to formulate these rules? Tinbergen ¹ includes, besides the "common front of the Big Two" mentioned above, a "socio-economic common effort" (strengthen the peace-loving nations and help the developing countries), improvements in group decision-making processes (perhaps by UN voting revision)*, and a "military common effort" (an effective UN force). The emphasis here is on cooperative coexistence, in the sense of common efforts toward common goals, which sociological experiments show, are the most effective means for reconciling seemingly intractable conflicts (Sherif ¹⁸). Yet supranational institutional elements are still missing.

Since prohibition of aggression in some form would certainly form part of the rules of coexistence (among the 7 principles, the one banning the use or threat of force comes closest to it; also that on non-intervention), it is important to define legally what is meant by aggression.

Sohn ¹⁹ points out that, as long as wars were not prohibited by international law, a definition of the term "war" was of minor importance. But when certain types of war became prohibited by the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Briand-Kellogg Pact, the need for a definition became urgent. Since it was not war in general which was outlawed, but aggressive war (self-defense being not only permitted, but encouraged to become collective defense or "collective security"), it was a definition of aggression rather than a definition of war that was needed.

The Procedural Committee of the United Nations General Assembly decided in April, 1959, to postpone until 1962, "further consideration of the question of determining when it shall be appropriate for the General Assembly to consider again the question of defining aggression" ²⁰. The Committee held further brief meetings in 1962 and 1965, and another is scheduled for April, 1967. The Communist nations at all these meetings have pressed for at least a partial definition of aggression; for example, that the invasion of the territory or the air space of a nation by the armed forces of another nation should be classed as aggression. However, the Western majority of the Committee have consistently opposed any formal definition of aggression, preferring each crisis to be judged on its own merits, presumably by a political act of the Security Council, ruled by the big power veto. ¹⁵

* It is interesting to note that Tinbergen suggests as one possibility the equal division of voting power between the US, USSR and the neutrals, as was independently proposed by Simoni ¹⁶⁻¹⁷.

The long history of the quest for a definition of aggression up to 1958 was written by Stone²¹. He examined minutely almost all the definitions proposed by governments and scholars, and concluded that a definition of aggression is not feasible for technical, political and moral reasons. In arguing against this view, Sohn¹⁹ points out that the lack of unanimity, the danger of non-observance or evasion or abuse, and the difficulties of precise definition, while real, are nevertheless of a type which always has to be faced in developing any system of law. However, the real moral difficulty is that of prohibiting the use of force in countering anything short of an "armed attack", as specified in the UN Charter. E.g. Stone defends the action of Israel against Egypt in 1956, when no other recourse against constant Arab border raids seemed forthcoming. The difficulty, Sohn admits, lies in a failure of the UN system for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The two-fold remedy lies in strengthening that system, and in defining aggression so as to include more than merely "armed attack". Rather than refusing to define aggression because a limited definition would be unjust, we should work more diligently at framing a wider definition which would satisfy the demands of justice as well as peace a little better, even if perfection may be unattainable.

To the classical meaning of aggression as the crossing of national frontiers by another nation's armed forces, the conditions of modern war, revolution, and ideological penetration, plus the rhetoric of politicians, have added other types: indirect aggression, support of rebels in another country's civil war, subversion, propaganda (including broadcasts inciting to revolution), intervention, espionage, overflights by spy planes or satellites. How many of these types of hostile activities, some old and some new, should be included in a legal definition of aggression and prohibited?

Burchill¹³ discusses economic, verbal and military aggression as distinctive types:

One possible approach to a definition of aggression is a list of aggressive acts, such as the partial one above. Thirring²², however, points out that a list can never be complete, and rejects on that basis the draft definition of aggression which was then (1953) being proposed by the Soviet delegate at the UN.

Another, perhaps more hopeful approach, is to study the historical record of some cases of actual crises in the light of existing international law; and then try to generalise on the basis of their common features. This inductive approach to construct a law of precedents has merit, although it may not produce an exhaustive definition either. This type of approach is applicable not only to the problem of defining aggression, but also to the wider one of framing concrete rules of coexistence. Besides considering existing international law, such an approach would necessarily also creat new law on the basis of these precedents, and on the basis of the common intuition of mankind. It would creatively combine elements of science (comparative analysis), history, law; and the normative rules of ethics.

This approach was applied by Quincy Wright, in a series of papers studying the U-2 incident²³, the Berlin crisis²⁴, the Goa occupation²⁵, the Cuban crisis²⁶⁻²⁷, and the US intervention in Lebanon²⁸.

After reviewing the events surrounding the U-2 incident, and giving legal arguments concerning 11 questions arising from it, Wright²³ summarizes his conclusions as follows: "This survey suggests that, in authorizing the U-2 flight over Soviet territory, the US violated international law, and aggravated the offense by statements intended to conceal its action; but it was not guilty of 'aggression'. It should have expressed regret as well as given assurances that there would be no further flights. It had considerable moral, if not legal, justification on grounds of self-preservation and the extensive Soviet espionage activities. Its allies were justified in taking measures to prevent their territory being used as aerial reconnaissance bases, and the USSR was justified in protesting against, but not in threatening to bomb, foreign bases actually so used. The USSR was justified in forcing the U-2 down and in proceeding under its criminal law against the pilot."

On the Goa incident, Wright²⁵ stresses the major differences in interpretation of UN law between the East (both Soviet and uncommitted Asians) and the West. The West insists on the obligation of states to settle disputes by peaceful means, and to refrain from the use of force even in case of injustice. The East considers colonialism illegal, since it was originally established by conquest and recently condemned by the UN General Assembly (December 14, 1960), and classes resistance to it as a delayed resistance to a continuing aggression (in the case of Goa dating from 1510). Wright tends to favour the Western interpretation on legal grounds, but recognizes that the views of the ex-colonial countries will have to be taken into account, since they form the majority in the UN.

Several crucial issues also arise in the Cuban crisis²⁶. Wright concludes that: (1) Aerial surveillance, as practised by the US over Cuba, and credited with discovering the missiles, is illegal, in spite of the Punta del Este resolution of the Organization of American States on January 31, 1962. (2) Soviet shipment of missiles to Cuba was in accordance with international law, which permits nations to supply arms to other nations at the latter's request. (3) The US claim that these weapons were offensive and therefore a "threat of force" in the sense of the UN Charter cannot be sustained, because the difference between offensive and defensive weapons has never been defined, and perhaps cannot be, according to most strategists. (US missiles in Turkey were claimed to be there for defense by means of deterrence.) (4) US objections to violation of the Monroe doctrine cannot be sustained, since this doctrine has no status in international law. (5) The US "quarantine" of Cuba cannot be considered a "pacific blockade", since under the rules of the latter, ships of a third nation (USSR) cannot be forcibly stopped and searched. (6) The quarantine can be construed as a "threat of force" in the sense of the UN Charter. (7) The OAS does not have legal authority to order an "enforcement" action, only the UN has. (8) The US action does not count as "necessary defense", since the UN Charter specifically permits self-defense only to an existing armed attack, not preventively.

About the Berlin crisis²⁴, Wright concludes the following: "From the point of view of international law, it would seem that the West cannot object to Soviet recognition of East Germany, but should enjoy continuous access, at least civilian, to West Berlin, which would not become legally a part of East Germany. Both the West and the Soviet Union 'should refer' the matter to the International Court of Justice in case East Germany is recognized as an independent state and interferes with the present situation."

On the Bay of Pigs expedition to Cuba in 1961, Wright²⁶ comments by calling it not only subversive intervention, but perhaps actually armed aggression, insofar as a state is responsible for any military expeditions from its soil to invade another country. The article discusses in detail the question of balancing the right of free speech against the need of states to protect themselves against subversive intervention, calls for a clear definition of aggression, and urges that unilateral interventions by states should cease, in order to make peaceful coexistence possible.

The legality of the US action in Vietnam was discussed by the Lawyers' Committee on American Policy Toward Vietnam³⁴. The overall conclusion is that the action is contrary (1) to the UN Charter; (2) to the 1954 Geneva Accords; (3) to the SEATO Treaty; and (4) to the US Constitution.

- (1) The UN Charter bars all members from unilateral use of force, except in case of armed attack; this does not include gradual infiltration of a state's own territory. The Charter also empowers the Security Council as the only agency competent to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression", and to decide on countermeasures.

- (2) According to the Geneva Accords of 1954, South Vietnam is not an independent state, only a temporary zone under the armistice agreement. Therefore, it cannot be the victim of an "armed attack" from the North (as South Korea was), and the US action cannot be interpreted as "collective self-defense" at the request of an allied government. The US did not sign the Geneva Accords, but declared that it would not disturb its provisions. Yet, at US instigation, the Saigon government refused to cooperate in the all-Vietnam elections scheduled for 1956 by the Geneva Accords. Both the US "military advisors" and the Northern infiltration were and are illegal by the Geneva Accords.
- (3) SEATO is not a properly constituted regional alliance, because the US, who is a member, is not a South East Asian state. In any case, "regional arrangements" to maintain peace are allowed by the Charter only if undertaken with the authorization of the Security Council. In addition, the key provision of the SEATO treaty is that use of force is permitted only in the event of "aggression by means of armed attack" on a member state; in other cases ("indirect aggression"), there is to be immediate consultation. The US action in Vietnam was never brought before SEATO for approval, because it would require unanimous consent of all present and voting, and it was known that France would veto it. Even if unanimous consent had been obtained, the action would still have been illegal under the UN Charter.
- (4) The US Constitution reserves exclusively to Congress the right to declare war. The Tonkin Bay resolution was not a declaration of war.

The US State Department answered this Memorandum³⁵, and the Lawyers' Committee replied to this in turn.

Before outlining some principles which might emerge from a comparative study of particular crises along the lines laid down by Wright, we should establish a few principles to guide the comparison itself.

In conflicts, especially those in which our own interests are involved, the temptation, which hardly anyone bothers to resist, is to judge them on the basis of our national or ideological bias. The traditional patriot says: "My country, right or wrong, but still my country". The Marxist dialectician says: "A gun in the hand of a worker is an instrument of liberation, a gun in the hand of a reactionary is an instrument of oppression".

If we are to introduce law and order into international affairs, we have to abandon this national or ideological viewpoint and adopt a legalistic one. This always has to be done in any system of law. A policeman or a judge cannot ask "Is A. a good man, or a better man than B.?" or "Is A. one of us or one of them?" He merely asks "Has A. committed this particular act against B. on this occasion, or has he not?"

As Dulles said at the time of the Suez crisis, "The same rules must apply to our friends as to our enemies." (Wish that he and his successors had added "and to ourselves".) It is time to realize that a gun, in anyone's hand, is always and primarily an instrument of violence, and that violence in international relations is obsolete, whether it is for liberation or oppression, for aggression or defense.

Does this also apply to the gun in the hands of the international policemen, the UN peace keeping force? While the pacifist and internationalist wings of the peace movement split precisely on this question, we might perhaps say that under certain rules, designed to minimize violence, the international policeman may be indispensable for the control of conflicts. However, again, the rules for such "UN intervention" need to be just as strictly and clearly defined as the rules of coexistence applicable to national behaviour. A world police state would be a disaster second only to world atomic annihilation.

The rules we are now going to suggest, purely as a guide to further study, are 8 in number, one more than the rules of coexistence being discussed at the United Nations. They deal with the following subjects:

- (1) Armed attack and self defense.
- (2) Intervention in civil wars.
- (3) UN Intervention.
- (4) Conciliation and UN-supervised votes.
- (5) Treaties and countermeasures against violations.
- (6) Recognition of states and universality of UN membership.
- (7) Propaganda, subversion and spying.
- (8) Role of UN forces.

A discussion group of the Hamilton Branch of World Federalists of Canada, the Political Action Committee, met several times in the winter of 1966-67 to consider this subject. The ideas outlined here are a result of these discussions. They must be considered as strictly preliminary. Our main recommendation really is for a full-scale professional study of this subject.

(1) Armed attack and self-defense. The principle is already established in the UN Charter that "armed attack", i.e. the crossing of national boundaries by the armed forces of another state, constitutes an act of aggression. It is also agreed that not only does the victim of armed attack have the right of self-defense, but that other states can and should help them resist aggression, at the direction of the UN.

Several points need clarification, however:

- (a) Does "crossing of national boundaries" include border raids, from which the raiders retreat to home territory after the attack, or only an invasion where the intention is permanent occupation of territory? (E.g. Arab raids on Israel before 1956.)
- (b) Does "crossing of national boundaries" also include infiltration of guerrillas into another state? (E.g. the US claims that the Vietnam war was started by "invasion from the North".)
- (c) Does a "national boundary" include an armistice line, or a demarcation line separating the two halves of a divided country; e.g. Korea, Vietnam or Germany? Does it include Formosa Strait as a line separating two parts of China?
- (d) Is an invasion of air space as much of an aggressive act as a land or sea invasion? Are reconnaissance flights, such as the U-2, analogous to border raids, in the sense that they intend to return home (as they do when they are lucky) or is the fact that they penetrate "enemy" territory in depth important? What about reconnaissance satellites? How high up does a country's "air space" extend? As far as a camera can clearly resolve details of ground installations? (The limit would then change with technical progress, which is reasonable.)
- (e) Does "self-defense" include only repelling the attack, i.e. repossessing lost territory, or can the victim "punish the aggressor" by counter-invading his territory? Can this be construed as "preventing future aggression"? Is a "preventive attack" self-defense, when it is very clear that an attack is impending?
- (f) Should the rules of "collective security" be changed, to the effect that only the UN can help a victim of aggression, not individual countries at their own discretion, or because of regional military pacts?

Questions deserve answers, but it is obvious that some of these are very thorny questions which go to the heart of many vexing international conflicts. A small discussion group certainly cannot give definitive answers, when a UN committee

has not been able to do so for years. Yet we feel that as citizens of the world, we would like to throw in our opinions, while imploring the experts to do more. Here are our tentative answers:

Ad (a) Border raids should not be treated in the same way as armed attack, in the same way that theft is not the same as armed robbery, or manslaughter the same as murder. Both border raids and armed attacks (invasions) are, of course, offenses against international law, or should be if the law has not yet been written; but each requires different countermeasures.

Border raids require a UN peace-keeping force effectively policing the border to keep raids from recurring. This has been successful on the Egyptian-Israeli border since 1956. Invasions, on the other hand, require UN enforcement actions, of the Korea type, which involve actual fighting, not merely a separation of combatants. The aggressor must not be allowed to retain territory conquered by violence, since "rewarding the fruits of aggression" might encourage other aggressors.

Ad (b) Infiltration of guerrillas is in another class again. Discussion of this case will be postponed to Point 2, "Intervention in civil wars", since infiltration into a country not already suffering from civil war or at least civil discontent is unlikely to be successful and therefore unlikely to be attempted. It might be briefly stated here that this is again a case for a UN force patrolling the borders to prevent the occurrence.

Ad(c) The answer here has to be "yes". For purposes of defining aggression, parts of divided countries must be considered as separate countries, until their status is changed by treaty or reunification. Thus the invasion of South Korea by North Korea was an invasion, not a civil war. In Vietnam there has not been a massive invasion from the North, and the Viet Cong actions constitute a civil war within South Vietnam, with both sides receiving outside aid (the US to the government and North Vietnam to the Viet Cong). A sea frontier like Formosa Strait is the same as a land frontier. A disputed frontier, as between China and India, should be up for international arbitration, any unilateral attempt to resolve the issue by violence constitutes aggression.

Ad (d) As already indicated in the question, overflights are analogous to border raids, and the emphasis should be on prevention, although the mechanisms of UN patrolling and enforcement may be more difficult than on land. Reconnaissance satellites should be in the same category as spy planes, but the technical problems of enforcement may make this impossible in practice.

Ad (e) Self-defense must clearly be limited to recovery of lost territory, otherwise the way is wide open for escalation and preventive war. The US was wrong in Korea to cross the 38th parallel. If repetition of the attack is feared, or if an attack seems impending, a UN peace-keeping force should be asked by the potential victim to patrol and inspect and stand ready for possible enforcement action; just as an individual may ask for police protection if someone threatens his life, but is not permitted to preventively murder his threatener.

Ad (f) The answer is "yes", this change in the existing rules would be desirable. It is better if criminals are handled by the police than by vigilante citizens, who might have interests of their own at heart, or be suspected of having them. The one condition for making this practical is sufficient speed and mobility of the UN force, to help the victim before he is defeated or destroyed. This will be further expanded under Point 7, role of the UN force.

(2) Intervention in civil wars. This is without doubt the thorniest question of all the rules of coexistence. The USSR excludes "wars of liberation" from its general renunciation of war. The exclusion of general nuclear war from the realm of practical politics by the balance of terror has meant increased experimentation with "limited wars" by the West, as in Vietnam.

This can be considered as a consequence of the demonstration in the Cuban missile crisis that the USSR will avoid a nuclear war if confronted with it; as a result, the West is no longer deterred from limited wars.

All this is true in a world in which many countries are in a revolutionary mood, emerging from colonialism into independence or trying to do so, attempting an economic takeoff into industrialization, and bucking age-old racial and religious prejudices. There can be no doubt that civil wars will be a frequent occurrence, whether fomented by the great powers or not. Yet each of them provides an occasion for the great powers to stake out their claims, supporting one side or the other, and thus to become embroiled more or less directly with each other. It is generally admitted that this could lead to a general nuclear war by gradual escalation, just as surely as, though more slowly than, a sudden confrontation of the Cuba type.

This whole field of intervention in civil wars therefore needs rules of coexistence more than any other; yet they are the most difficult to frame.

Once a civil war has started, international law, according to Wright²⁹ requires other states not to give aid to either the government or the rebels. This rule has obviously been broken often by many countries: let it suffice to name Greece, Guatemala, Cuba, Laos, Hungary, Lebanon, Dominica, Vietnam and, in the 1930s, Spain.

Obviously, one trouble with international law is not only the lack of enforcement machinery to make its rules stick, but also the absence of specific sanctions or punishments for non compliance. These two deficiencies are obviously connected, but the habit of stating the sanctions along with the laws should begin now, if only to strengthen the demand for the machinery.

The rule against helping either side in a civil war is sound, for the following reasons:-

1. It keeps the conflict from spreading.
2. The constitutional position, i.e. the legitimacy of the government, is not always clear.
3. If support of the rebels were prohibited and support of the government permitted (as some argue on the basis of the "legitimacy" of the government, especially if democratically elected), this would promote a permanent freezing of the status quo, and interfere with the Jeffersonian "right of revolution", recognized by international law. Revolution may be the people's only recourse against unjust or oppressive rule. This would be true in countries ruled by absolute monarchs or dictators, countries with manifestly crooked elections, some colonies, and countries with disenfranchised native majorities (South Africa or Rhodesia).

Does the right of revolution apply to countries with a democratically elected government, where presumably other remedies are available for the redress of grievances? A cogent argument can be made for this, but we feel that we should not make an exception for this case, in order to adhere to our stated principle of remaining uncommitted to any particular ideology.

4. If on the other hand the support of rebels alone were allowed, as seems to be advocated by China and perhaps even the USSR for countries still under colonial rule, this would create unacceptable instability in too many countries; for it could easily be construed that certain countries, even if politically independent, suffer from "economic neocolonialism". It should be remembered that Cuba and Guatemala were not colonies in the usual sense.

There are, however, certain objections to the non-intervention rule. One is the danger that, as in the Spanish civil war, some governments will obey the law and some less scrupulous ones will not, with resultant unjust injury to one of the parties. The other is that it seems callous to seal the borders of the unhappy country torn by civil strife and let them fight it out to the bitter end, while the rest of the world goes about its business as usual.

With this in mind, the non-intervention rule should be supplemented by provisions outlined under Point 3 and 4

(3) UN Intervention A civil war is an internal affair of the country in which it is occurring and as such not be interfered with by other nations, as specified above. But is intervention by the UN also ruled out?

Certainly, a UN peace-keeping force can come into a country to pacify civil strife, if it is invited in by both sides, as has happened in Cyprus and the Gaza Strip, or as the result of an armistice agreement, as in Kashmir. The question is whether uninvited UN intervention is ever justified.

We concluded reluctantly that UN intervention to enforce observance of civil rights in a country such as South Africa or Nazi Germany should not be permitted, because it might be abused by too broad an interpretation of what constituted a violation of human rights, and because it might encourage countries in danger of other such interventions to secede from the United Nations. A dissenting voice is represented by Stanger³⁰, who argues for "legislative intervention" by the UN to bring about domestic social changes whenever civil strife endangers world peace, or whenever major abuses of human rights are perpetrated.

However, UN intervention in a civil war should be permitted or even required. Such intervention should take the form of a peace-keeping action which would stop the fighting, disarm both sides, and supervise the truce; never, of course, intervention on behalf of one side against the other. This type of intervention should have taken place in the Spanish Civil War, during Castro's revolt against Batista in Cuba, and today in Vietnam. It did occur, though not in a perfect way, in the Congo.

UN enforcement of a truce removes part of the objection to simply sealing off a country suffering from a civil war and letting the fighting continue without interference. However, the objection might still be made that the production and enforcement of a truce does not remove the basic cause of the conflict, nor does it produce a permanent settlement. The UN throughout its history has been basically a truce-producing institution; a settlement-producing institution has yet to be invented. For lack of any fundamental solution, the world's trouble spots, such as the Middle East and Kashmir, tend to alternate between uneasy truce and periodic eruptions. This is not good enough. Provisions for "peace-making", rather than merely "peace-keeping", will now be briefly considered.

(4) Conciliation and UN supervised votes. After a peace-keeping force has sufficiently pacified a country suffering from internal strife, one of the following alternative courses should be followed to obtain a permanent settlement:

1. Recourse to the International Court of Justice if the dispute is of a legal nature; but this is rather rare. Until now, the ICJ has usually been appealed to only in disputes between states, not between parties in an internal dispute; perhaps a new court would be more suitable, but it should be one under international auspices, not the country's own Supreme Court, which might be too much under the influence of one of the parties.

2. Conciliation services should be available by the UN, including both mediation and arbitration (the latter involving a binding decision). The parties should be obliged to use these services and try for a settlement, even if it eventually proves impossible. Many lessons could be learned here from labour disputes about "cooling-off periods" and the like.

3. If the above methods fail, there should be held a UN-supervised election or plebiscite to find out whether the people prefer the government or the rebels. It might be objected that this imposes a Western political institution on a country to which it may be unsuited, but it is difficult to imagine how else one can find out what the people really want; and if "self-determination" means anything, it means that the people should decide who is to rule them. Deciding by "ballot rather than bullet" has of course the advantage that the struggle is won or lost on the merits of the case, not by superior strength, which is a consideration extraneous to the substance of the conflict.

There are some precedents for UN supervised elections: West New Guinea (West Irian), Saarland, Togo, Brunei. There were objections to the fairness of the latter by Indonesia, but this is no fundamental obstacle to the proper use of this method.

A combination of Points 2, 3 and 4 gives the following possibility: In a country in which oppression or injustice exists or is alleged to exist, the opposition or potential rebels could organize a brief outbreak, which need not be too bloody, but would be sufficient to bring in a UN force to proclaim a truce and hold an election. If the rebels were certain of sufficient popular support in the country, they would certainly resort to this course of action; and a government which does not permit domestically an orderly displacement of itself does not deserve to go on ruling. However, to prevent an abuse of this by small groups of dissidents in too many countries, which would keep the UN force and election supervisors too much occupied with unnecessary actions, the threshold of violence for the entry of a UN force and an activation of the whole machinery would have to be set high enough, so that a small group without wide popular support could not mount such an effort. It is unfortunate to have to specify that there must be at least 100 killed, or whatever the number would be, but this seems unavoidable.

4. If the rebels and the government are too irreconcilable to abide by a majority decision in a vote, the country may be permanently partitioned; if necessary, a population exchange may be arranged. Partition in the past has pacified Ireland and India; as a last resort, it might settle Rhodesia.

5. Treaties and countermeasures against violations: Obviously, if there is to be any respect for international law, treaties must be upheld, even if the government changes and the new government no longer approves of the treaty, unless both parties to the treaty voluntarily agree to a change.

Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal was a treaty violation and against international law. However, again the question arises as to the redress to which the victim of this type of violation is entitled, or sanctions against the violator; this is unfortunately not specified in any international law concerning treaties. Certainly the use of armed force against the violator would not seem to be justified, since the punishment is out of proportion to the crime, and too dangerous for mankind as a whole. The use of national armed might is to be limited very strictly to defense against an obvious outright armed attack, as the UN Charter specifies, and must never be used under any other circumstances.

A UN force might be able to prevent or reverse such a violation, but some type of conciliation or renegotiation of the treaty, with compensation to the aggrieved party, might be more conducive to international good will. The UN was unfortunately not effective enough in the Suez Canal case, because of its notorious lack of conciliation machinery.

Another point is that treaties which conflict with other principles in our list of rules should be declared invalid. This concerns especially all military alliances which oblige members to come to each other's aid in case of armed attack, for we urged that such "collective security" should be the sole prerogative of the UN as the universal world organization.

Furthermore, to soften the necessity of adhering to treaties which may have become outmoded owing to new developments or a changed outlook (e.g. decolonization), treaties should not have too long a term to run, not more than about 5 or 10 years. Thereafter, they might be extended, renegotiated, or terminated, as the parties desire. Many governments are elected for five-year terms, and the same term might be suitable for treaties.

6. Recognition of states and universality of UN membership: According to Wright²⁹, international law requires states to recognize any new government formed after a revolution or other upheaval as soon as it is in control of its territory with the acquiescence (not necessarily consent as expressed in free elections) of its people. This certainly applies in our time to China and East Germany, as the most obvious examples. To fit the shoe on the other foot, however, it is well to remember that in Stalin's days the Soviet bloc was opposed to the recognition of Spain.

7. Propaganda, Subversion and Spying.

Quincy Wright²⁹ draws a distinction between, on the one hand, "aggression" or "armed attack", and on the other hand, "subversive intervention", which has sometimes been called by the West "indirect aggression". Subversive intervention involves inciting revolution against the existing government of another country, and Wright points out that the US Congress proclamation of "Captive Nations Week" on July 6 and 8, 1959, falls into that category just as much as some actions of Communist parties in Western and neutral countries about which the West has long complained. He makes it clear that existing international law, including the UN Charter, does not justify the use of armed force to counter subversive intervention, although the latter is illegal by international law. What remedy then is available?

Wright²⁹ also points out that subversive intervention is difficult to define, because of two considerations: 1. Since the prohibition of certain types of criticism of foreign governments would interfere with certain human rights, such as freedom of speech, the line between legitimate criticism and illegitimate incitement to revolution is difficult to draw. So is, in practice sometimes, the line between subversive intervention (by infiltration of armed "volunteers" or the sending of "technical military advisors") and armed attack. 2. Governments, especially in non-totalitarian countries, cannot be held entirely responsible for actions of their citizens, although some specific acts can be made illegal.

The topics treated under this heading are very intricate, as shown by the fact that a whole book has been written on propaganda in international law by Larson³¹ and on subversion by Wright³².

8. Role of UN forces: It is obvious from most of the foregoing rules that a UN force is indispensable for making the provisions workable. Let us summarize some of the different roles of UN forces which emerge:

- (a) In its enforcement role, it will defend any country which is subject to armed attack against external aggression. This is the only role which requires actually fighting a war. Perhaps a differently trained and organized force might be used for this purpose than for peace-keeping functions. One might reasonably call this one a "UN Army".

(b) In its peace-keeping function, a "UN Peace Force" will:

i Stop all border raids and incidents by patrolling any troubled borders.

ii Separate the combatants in any fighting between countries in which the identity of the aggressor is not clear.

iii Stop the fighting in any revolution or civil war, without taking sides.

iv Enforce the truce which will be arranged in either an international or an internal war.

v Prevent atrocities committed by one section of the population against another in a spirit of reprisals, as an aftermath of a civil war.

(c) In its strictly police function, a "UN Police" should have the power to apprehend individuals suspected of crimes against international law and hand them over for trial to international tribunals. These individuals might eventually include national leaders made personally responsible for international offences committed by their governments; but this may take some time to develop.

A whole set of rules will have to deal with the operation and control of the various types of UN forces. Here are some questions asked by Jacob Gronning³³:

- (1) In which hands shall the command of the UN forces lie?
- (2) When and where shall the forces be used?
- (3) Who shall have the authority to decide upon the use of the forces?
- (4) Under which legal system shall the forces be acting and what is the procedure for setting up this system?
- (5) What rights and protection should the individuals of the forces have?

With respect to the first question, Simoni¹⁵⁻¹⁶ suggests that the total force should be divided into five separate armies under different commanders and stationed in different regions of the world; this is as a precaution against a usurpation of power by the UN force. It would incidentally also help in getting the force to a trouble spot faster.

Question 2 was answered in the first part discussing Point 8, Question 4, if we understand it right, refers to the whole set of rules of coexistence which this article discusses. Question 5 will not be discussed here.

Something should be said about Question 3. In the interests of speed and avoidance of political arguments, we propose that the UN force should act automatically, on its own initiative, on news of violence anywhere, without waiting for a UN vote in either the General Assembly or the Security Council or a directive from the Secretary-General. (For example, in case of a civil war, it would be activated by the report that a certain minimum number of people have been killed in internal disorders, as noted on page 18). In the interests of efficiency, it would not act as an agent of a government which calls it in and should be able to remain or leave regardless of the wishes of that government or any other government.

APPENDIX

Soviet thinking on the codification of peaceful coexistence has been reviewed by McWhinney³⁶. He points out that, as Soviet foreign policy switched from cold war to peaceful coexistence, so Soviet legal theory switched from Professor Korovin's doctrine, that different social and economic systems generate different "superstructures" of international law (which are therefore basically incompatible), to the arguments of Dr. Krylov and Professor Tunkin, that a common international law for socialist and capitalist states is not only possible, but already exists. However, Soviet principles of coexistence ("mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in internal affairs; equality and mutual advantage") are too vague and general, and need specific secondary principles to interpret and apply them to concrete situations. Soviet jurists, unlike Western jurists, stress treaties as the main source of international law, and downgrade "custom" and international organizations like the UN and the International Court. They insist on strict observance of treaties, but make exceptions of "unequal" treaties between an imperialist power and a weaker state, or a situation in which a social revolution has made a treaty concluded by the overthrown government unacceptable to the new one. Soviet legal theorists criticize Western writers, such as Hans Morgenthau, George F. Kennan, Myres S. McDougal, and Philip Jessup, for, on one hand, their inclination to justify the politics of power, and on the other hand, their tendency to "Mondialism". The American National Committee of the International Law Association on Peaceful Coexistence has suggested that the approach to codification "should not be in terms of an exhaustive listing, but rather to establishing priorities as to the major issues requiring regulation, in the interest of alleviation of tensions".

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REPORT

ON THE CONFERENCE ON BLOCS, THE GERMAN PROBLEM AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE, HELD AT THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE IN VIENNA ON 6th AND 7th MARCH 1968

The awareness of the impasse in which Europe found itself became in recent years particularly conspicuous. As a result of the "cold war", the majority of nations of this continent developed for the last two decades along two different lines. The two broad lines of policy were institutionalised on the international level. One took the shape of various organisations of the West and primarily of the Atlantic Alliance. Then came the reaction in the form of the organisation of the socialist states set up by the Warsaw Treaty. Apart from the drive to determine the outcome of the basic conflict of our epoch by means of force which overclouds the future, in Europe there have remained additional factors of tension. Here still keep in being phenomena and unsolved problems connected genetically with the struggle carried out by the anti-fascist coalition against the Nazi Germany during the second world war. They have generated strains which have been obstacles in the way of normal development of international relations in Europe and are always likely to turn into a threat to the peace. What is more, potentially they can play the role of a lens in which can focus and find an easy outlet the fundamental contradictions of our time if transferred to Europe. The persisting cleavage affects adversely foreign exchange, possibilities of extending contacts and cooperation in various sections of economic, social, scientific and cultural life and in other spheres of relations between states belonging to the two blocs in Europe.

It is natural that the premises of the policy of division began to be subjected to re-evaluation. The growth and stabilisation of many European countries made apparent the problem of utilisation of the potentialities of prosperity inherent in combining all creative forces of the continent. No wonder that the multifarious aspects of the existing division, its consequences, the perspectives of further development of European nations and conditions of its channelling into the optimal streambeds also became the object of interest of experts.

One of the key features of the present state of things in Europe focussing the attention of many researchers is the question of security. What are the possibilities and conditions of protecting Europe against outbreak of armed conflicts on its territory and making it secure for the nations inhabiting it?

The studies of this type are carried out in a number of research centers throughout Europe. Most findings are published in scholarly journals and, therefore, are well-known to the academic community and to the general public. This confrontation of the results of studies has a considerable cognitive value and makes more profound the perspective within which the problem is examined. But it has also practical importance. It permits to fix in what matters the opinions reveal convergencies and are, therefore, indicative of a nearing of points of view on political levels. On the other hand, it is apt to make an impact on political thinking. At this juncture, international meetings of scholars play a particular role. Here, it will be to the point to mention only that they allow, apart from comparing the results of studies, to elaborate upon the theses presented in writings, to clarify ambiguities and doubts, to juxtapose data and arguments and to engage into an exchange of views. The discussion leading to determination of matters on which the opinions are closest and which are most promising from the point of being apt to be solved can have practical consequences.

The number of international symposia devoted to problems of European security went up of late. However, most of them dealt with the problem as a whole. The International Institute for Peace in Vienna made an attempt to bring about a meeting which would take up only selected issues within this area and to examine them in greater detail. The Institute took the initiative in 1967 and based it on two technical

assumptions. One of them was that the theme should be sufficiently concrete to make it possible to obtain opinions of several experts on one and the same subject. The second assumption was meant as a means of making the work at the meeting most effective. Experience shows that when the contributions are read during the meeting the participants have difficulties with familiarising themselves with them and the very reading consumes most of the time which could be used for discussion. In such circumstances, there is no time to think over the ideas presented by others, and to take a well-grounded stand. The Institute thought it important to ensure that the participants coming to the conference were well acquainted with the views of their colleagues in advance of the conference.

The project of the Institute met with sympathetic response on the part of eminent experts in the field from a number of countries from the West and the East of Europe. The meeting brought together the following:-

- (1) Dozent Thomas Bacskai International Institute for Peace, Vienna.
- (2) Dr. Paolo Calzini Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome.
- (3) Dr. Karl Cornides Institute for Strategic Studies, London,
Publisher, Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Vienna.
- (4) Prof. Lionel Dadiani Institute of International Labour Movement.
- (5) Prof. Stefan Doernberg Deutsches Institut für Zeitgeschichte,
Berlin.
- (6) Dr. Immanuel Geiss Hamburg University
- (7) Prof. Georges Goriely Institut d'Etudes Européennes, Brussels.
- (8) Prof. Harish Kapur Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes
Internationales, Geneva.
- (9) Prof. Krylov Institute of World Economics and International
Relations, Moscow.
- (10) Prof. Leo Matès Institut za Medunarodnu Politiku i Privredu,
Belgrade.
- (11) Dr. Hanna Newcombe Canadian Peace Research Institute, Dundana,
Ontario.
- (12) Dr. Martin Saeter Norwegian Institute for International Affairs,
Oslo.
- (13) Dr. Jerzy Sawicki International Institute for Peace, Vienna.
- (14) Prof. Nikolay Sidorov Institute of World Economics and International
Relations, Moscow.
- (15) Prof. Antonin Snejdarek Ustav pro Mezinarodni Politiku a Ekonomii,
Prague.
- (16) Dr. Mieczyslaw Tomala Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw.
- (17) Dr. Martin Winter Deutsches Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Berlin.

The idea of dealing with two selected problems within the field was accepted. One covered the impact of the politico-military blocs in Europe on its security. The other comprised these aspects of the so-called German problem which are inter-related with the problem of security in Europe. The Institute was able to obtain twelve papers, most of them focussing on one of the two themes. They were sent in before the conference and its participants received all the texts before coming to the meeting. This permitted to achieve one of the goals of the project, i.e. to sit down directly to discussion on coming to Vienna.

The debate was held on 6th and 7th March 1968 at the International Institute for Peace in Vienna. Finally, the meeting was given the title "Conference on Blocs, the German Problem and the Future of Europe" although the term colloquy or symposium might have been more adequate. In spite of the fact that the title placed the problem of blocs as the first theme, the discussion started with examination of the German problem. It was considered that beginning the debate with the blocs could involve tackling the role of the Germanies as well and take some of the time which was assigned specifically to the latter.

It was not the purpose of the conference to come necessarily to agreed conclusions. In view of the different backgrounds of the participants, one could expect them rather to differ in their approaches to the problems under consideration. In fact, in spite of all differences, parallelism in several points was clearly discernible.

With regard to the German problem seen as a component of the issue of European security, it is possible to extrapolate some more general conclusions from the circularised papers and the exchange of opinions. These conclusions are not derived from any unanimous views of the participants. They are noted here rather as the most often repeated assumptions around which centered the ideas aiming at fixing the possible development in the matter.

It was held that the German nation is a single one in spite of the fact that it lives in two separate state organisms with different economic, political and social systems. This double reality imposes itself to such an extent that it is difficult to imagine normalisation of relations between the two Germanies without recognising this reality. The prospect of a change was also seen in connection with the above-mentioned realities and in two ways. On the one hand, it was remarked that the recognition of this territorial and socio-economic reality is the prerequisite of a change towards reunification, and that such a reunification can - if at all - possibly be obtained only within the framework of security for all states of Europe. On the other hand, the solution of the problem of security in Europe can hardly be thought of without the acknowledgment of these realities.

Turning to more immediate problems, it was often noted that the evolution of the détente taking place in Europe is conditioned in a way by the progress in détente between the two German states. Many saw the main obstacle in the way of détente in some features of the public life in the Federal Republic of Germany and in the reluctance of the Bonn government to recognise the existing territorial status quo in Europe. The importance of intra-European relationship as a framework within which the desired changes could take place was strongly emphasised.

The discussion on blocs and their role in relation to security showed as well that some ideas were common to several participants notwithstanding the countries they came from. They agreed that the significant decline in tension between members of the two alliance systems was due to the changes which took place in the European economic, social and political settings. They envisaged that the process of détente will go on in a gradual way, as so far, and that it is likely to evolve within the foreseeable future parallel to the further existence of blocs. A lively argument developed on the feasibility of using blocs as a vehicle for further détente. The role of activities on governmental level in promoting détente processes was

emphasised. In this connection some typical measures and methods of proceeding were emphasised as most needed and at the same time realistic. Among the measures indicated were the conclusion of a pact on non-use of force, of a pact on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and pacts on nuclear-free zones.

The Conference produced valuable material. Considering that it should be made public, the International Institute for Peace in Vienna decided to bring out the papers and the summary of the debates in the form of printed proceedings of the Conference. The editing of the volume is under way.

JERZY SAWICKI.

Vienna, 29th April 1968.