INSTITUT ATLANTIQUE

Conferenza sulle relazioni Est-Ovest

Parigi - 25/27 gennaio 1968

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The Atlantic Institute
L'Institut Atlantique

WILL EUROPE UNITE

by

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Conference of the Atlantic Institute, January 25-27, 1968, Paris

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Will Europe Unite ?

When this question was asked ten years ago, the answer was clearly and unhesitatingly affirmative. It was a confident answer, untroubled by any doubts about the future. Of course, by now we all know that it was wrong.

Certainly the assumption that Europe would unite, that it was bound to unite and that, in fact, it was already well on the way towards unification sounded reasonable enough at the time. It seemed to have the logic of history and the force of necessity on its side. On March 25, 1957, in the city of Rome, the chiefs of six European governments had put their signatures to the documents on which a united Europe was to be founded. On January 1, 1958, the Rome Treaties entered into force. The Common Market started functioning, and it was widely believed that out of this fledgling economic community, political unity would grow more or less naturally and automatically.

Today we know that this was a delusion. The rather vulgar Marxist determinism underlying the belief in unavoidable, unstoppable evolution was not borne out by events. Not even the economic evolution of the EEC from a Customs Union to Common Market and, finally, to a genuine Economic Union can be taken for granted; and the success which the EEC achieved in its first stage may limit its further development.

The economic fortune-tellers were wrong, and so were the prophets of automatic political evolution. During the intervening years we have learned the hard way that there is no such thing as an automatic spill-over from economics into politics. But if the past ten years should have taught us anything at all, it is surely the lesson that there is no substitute for a determined political will. In the absence of such a will, or in the presence of a strong will to the contrary, economic mergers will not lead to political fusion - nor, by the way, will projects of military cooperation (MLF).

There is no backdoor through which we can sneak into political Europe, hoping that General de Gaulle, who has nailed the front door shut, will not notice.

As John Calmann recently put it: "The weakness of the economic community without political authority is that it can be attacked, hindered, slowed down, or boycotted, if the political leaders of one of the member states feel like it. Admittedly France came back to the Council of Ministers after a seven-month absence, but she made it clear that the Community method was to be limited to economic cooperation."

This, then, is the first point I want to make: There are limits to the Community approach. The logic of history and the force of necessity can be side-stepped, at least temporarily. They need executors. Europe is a matter of will, it is not going to happen by itself. And while I quite agree with Alastair Buchan when he says that there is a growing sense of Europeanness in Europe, I would hasten to add that this sentiment does not translate into political action very easily. As one case in point I might mention the wailing that can be heard all over Europe about the so-called "technological gap" between the United States and Western Europe. Everyone seems to be complaining about it, in fact it is the most fashionable complaint these days, but nobody is willing to do anything about it.

The second point I want to make is perhaps similarly disillusioning. The European idea does not, at the moment, command great popular interest. It is an idea that has lost much of its lustre and its force since it has become enshrined in the impenetrable and inscrutable temples of the Brussels bureaucracy. The technocrats do not fire anyone's imagination. In fact, some of their actions are drawing heavy criticism - the mumbo-jumbo of the Euro-lawyers, the red tape, the seeming idiocy of some of their decrees - like the recent one subsidizing Dutch and French farmers for plowing under vegetable crops which would, if thrown on the market, have brought down consumer prices... Europe, in other words, to many people is no longer a glorious, pure, and immaculate idea but rather a kind of clerk's paradise far removed from the preoccupations, from the reasoning and the feeling of little people. There is a fair measure of disenchantment. It was the bad luck of Harold Wilson to apply for

British EEC membership at a moment when continental European enthusiasm for Europe had reached its lowest point in many years.

There is one third point, equally sobering, which I should like to emphasize. The dominating mood of Europe today is one of uncertainty. We do not know where we are going, and what is more: we do not even know where we want to go.

One may argue, of course, that Charles de Gaulle will not live forever - and for all we know there may even be a kernel of truth to that statement. But I think it would be much too facile to proceed on the assumption that once the General makes his exit, the Europeans can simply take up again where they left off when he first began dominating the scene. For in the meantime the whole situation has drastically changed. Les données, as the French say, are no longer what they were ten years ago.

II

Not only have the years of sterility and stagnation broken the initial momentum of the European movement and killed off a great deal of the erstwhile enthusiasm. What is more important is that a number of new factors have cropped up which cast the European problem in a different light. Let me briefly list the three most important ones.

1) The dominant new fact is the abatement, if not yet the end, of the Cold War. We have seen how the diminution of the threat from the East has been undermining the will towards integration on the Atlantic plane. The very same effect is noticeable on the European level, too. Europe, one will do well to remember, was not only the dream of a handful of idealists; it was also a notion born from the fear of the Soviet Union and its aggressive designs. To the extent, then that the European idea was merely a function of the Cold War, it has lost most of its relevance and appeal. When danger seemed to be clear and imminent, European supranationalism, no matter how narrow its geographical basis, offered one hope of salvation. Now the danger has receded, and the fear of aggressive, expansive Communism has ceased

to be a unifying element.

2) The second salient fact of the new situation is a direct result of this. I am referring to the revival of nationalism which we have been witnessing in the past few years - or rather: the revival of individual nationalisms. Probably some kind of nationalist backlash was inevitable after the many years of integration under duress, both in Eastern and Western Europe. At any rate, a corrective swing of the pendulum in the other direction was to be expected, even without General de Gaulle, and it was helped by the obvious impossibility of achieving Atlantic Union now as well as by the growing difficulties encountered in the construction of Europe.

3) The third factor is a human one: the passing away of the European founding fathers. Konrad Adenauer, who died in April, 1967, was the last of the original threesome to go; Robert Schuman and Alcide de Gasperi had preceded him by many years. They were a breed of giants, compared to the men who have taken over from them, but they shared the same built-in limitations. All of them were essentially Western Europeans, Catholic in outlook and Carolingian in their thinking. As far as they were concerned, Europe ended at the Elbe River; the lands and the peoples beyond that great post-war divide did not lie within their ken. At best, they were thinking of Eastern Europe in terms of roll-back, liberation and "Anschluss"; the possibility of convergence, of peaceful engagement, of "détente, entente, cooperation" was not one they were willing or able to contemplate.

Here again, the question must be asked and answered whether these changes are likely to be permanent. It is worthwhile to look at them one by one.

1) Détente. There is no guarantee for the continuation of détente, of course. East-West crises could recur, a new leadership in the Kremlin might conceivably relapse into the old aggressiveness; and if the Vietnam war drags on even the present leadership might be tempted to open a second front in Europe. But this, I should think, is highly unlikely. Personally, I would expect the evolution from confrontation to cooperation to continue.

2) Nationalism. I would not expect its more strident manifestations to last for very long. I would assume, however, that a modified kind of nationalism

is going to survive. This goes for post-gaullist France, and it goes for Germany too.

3) The spirit of the founding fathers. This spirit is irretrievably gone. Fromnow on, Europeans will find it impossible to think of Europe strictly in terms of Western Europe, or of confrontation, or of conflict.

III

What does all this add up to? It means, in my view, that all previous notions, designs (grand or otherwise), all previous blueprints, schemes and schedules are again in the melting pot. And no one can be sure at this juncture what the final outcome will be.

Will Europe unite? Today every single one of these three words begs the question.

"Will" is the future tense of the auxiliary verb to be; it raises the problem of the time schedule - and here I feel that we shall have to revise radically all previous estimates. Europe will certainly take much longer to create than was generally supposed in 1957. Personally, I do not think the process will be completed in the seventies. We will be lucky if we reach the goal sometime in the eighties.

"Europe" raises the question of the geographical limits of any future European entity. The normal supposition used to be that it was going to embrace what once was the Carolingian Empire - essentially France and Germany, the Benelux countries and Italy, with perhaps some tenuous links extending to such heathen areas as England and Scandinavia, equally loose contacts with the Byzantine region (i.e., Greece and Turkey), and implacably hostile towards the pagan Eastern world of the Slavs. Today, this picture of a Little Europe à la Charlemagne is as dead as the dodo. We start looking again beyond the confines of the former Carolingian Empire, remembering that east of the Elbe River there is Europe, too, as it has been for a thousand years. It seems to me that from now on we shall be extremely reluctant to think only in terms of a Europe of the Six, or the Seven, or even the Thirteen, if you put the EEC and Efta together.

Finally, the word "unite" calls for definition. It used to be interpreted in the strictest sense of the term. Uniting Europe meant creating a federal state on the pattern of such federations as the United States of America, Switzerland or West Germany, with the member states relegated to a rather subordinate role vis-à-vis an overwhelmingly powerful central government. This made a lot of sense when the only kind of Europe that appeared within reach was a small Europe. If it had to be small, so the argument ran - and I for one used to subscribe to it - it might as well be tightly organized, a "Fatherland Europe" rather than a "Europe of Fatherlands". (I always considered it supremely ironical that de Gaulle, in his supercilious way, refused to see the logic of this - he has always been working for a Europe that was both small and amorphous).

But now the vision of a wider Europe is in the offing. And faced with the choice between tightly organized Little Europe and a looser, yet wider association, most Europeans must now be expected to opt for the larger unit. The validity of this statement is not diminished by the fact that until now no one has any idea what shape this larger unit might be given, which degree of cohesion it ought to have, or what kind of institutions it will require. We do not know how to get from here to there, but the goal of "making Europe whole again", to borrow a phrase from President Lyndon Johnson, is now accepted by a vast majority of Western Europeans. They are beginning to give serious thought to ways of achieving this goal and completing the one outstanding unfinished task of the post-war generation. A Great Debate on the future of Europe is now in the making.

IV

It would be presumptuous of me to try and anticipate the upshot of this Great Debate. The only thing I can usefully do is to indicate the intellectual framework within which it will be conducted and to point out the more significant alternatives that may be available. I will limit myself to dividing the thinkable futures of Europe into three different categories, ranging from the unlikely via the possible to the desirable; and in each of these categories I will present a number of sub-thinkabilities and debate the forces that militate against or in favor of their realization.

A. In the range of the unlikely Europe there are three which I should like to discuss: 1) American Europe; 2) Gaullist Europe; and 3) fragmented Europe.

1) By "American Europe" I mean the kind of U.S.-led Western Europe we had in 1949: divided in powerless, fearful states all of whom gladly and willingly submit to American hegemony because it provides the only avenue towards physical survival. This is out of the question today, and I for one can imagine only one single, solitary contingency which could make it acceptable again to the Europeans. That contingency is the revival of Soviet aggressivity. If the Russians pulled off a coup in Vienna similar to the one they engineered in Prague 19 years ago, or if they were to attempt a repeat performance of the Greek civil war of 1944-49, then Western Europe would have no choice other than renewed submission to the United States. It would again have to seek refuge under the protective umbrella of the Western superpower.

In that event, incidentally, the divisive debates which have been rending NATO would come to an abrupt end. All the quibbling about nuclear co-determination, about information and consultation, about command structure and decision-making would then seem as irrelevant as the unending debates of medieval scholars about the question how many angles could be accommodated on a pin-point, or whether the Almighty could create two mountains next to each other without a valley in between.

As I have already said, I consider such a revival of the Cold War highly unlikely. I would not, therefore, lay any bet on the "American Europe."

2) The same goes for the concept of a "Gaullist Europe". By that I mean a Europe led by France, in the basically anti-American spirit of General de Gaulle, either by himself or by his successors.

I admit that I am sometimes haunted by the thought that anti-Americanism might indeed provide a popular - and at this juncture perhaps the only - basis for a united Europe. But then I take consolation from three basic features of Gaullist policy which to my mind and to that of most Europeans negate all the appeal that it may theoretically have.

The first feature is de Gaulle's claim for France to the same kind of hegemonial position which he begrudges the Americans. But if Europe needs a hegemonial patron it is only logical that it turn to the strongest one for help. With regard to strength and power, however, France will never be able to compete with the United States.

The second feature, apart from the fundamental weakness of France, is the unwillingness of Gaullist France to treat its European partners as equals. It criticizes Washington for its lonesome decisions, as well as for its nasty habit of springing new strategies, concepts and programmes on its allies - but its own behavior reveals the same pattern of sovereign disregard for the feelings of others in even crasser fasion. As long as de Gaulle, or his successors, insist on defining the content and the direction of Europe without reference to their fellow Europeans, they will not find many supporters.

The third feature, finally, is the basic contradiction in de Gaulle's design: He purports to aspire toward a Europe that could be an equal of the United States, but he denies to Europe the only means of realizing that aspiration - namely a federal, supranational organization.

Taken together, these three features would seem to guarantee that the vision of a French-led Europe will remain an old man's pipe-dream.

3) Now the third unlikely concept: that of a fragmented Europe - fragmented once more in its component parts, its multilateral organizations and institutions having come unstuck again, with the exception of perhaps a few technical arrangements.

Such a fragmented Europe would consist of four big states vying with each other for influence: the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy. It would further consist of six small constitutional monarchies: Norway, Sweden and Denmark, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg; of four small democratic republics: Austria, Switzerland, Finland, and Ireland; of the two Ibero-fascist states Spain and Portugal; possibly of two military dictatorships at the eastern end of the Mediterranean: Greece

and Turkey. Finally, there would be eight Communist states with different hues and shades of communism: Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania.

Such a Europe, would be a nineteenth century nightmare come to life again. No one will want to go back to that. As the wizard Merlyn said to King Arther in T.H. White's story "The Once and Future King": "The destiny of man is to unite, not to divide. If you keep on dividing, you end up as a collection of monkeys throwing nuts at each other out of separate trees". And history teaches that Europeans, when they sit on their separate trees, don't stop at throwing nuts. For a thousand years they have behaved in a way that fully justified the dreadful phrase coined by Georges Sorel: "Europe - that cemetary, is inhabited by peoples who sing before they go about killing each other." One shudders at the thought that this kind of Europe might be resuscitated - and I am positive that it won't.

B. Looking at the category of possible Europes, we find again three: Status-quo Europe, cooperative Western Europe, cooperative pan-Europe.

1) Status-quo Europe. If we are honest to ourselves we must admit that this is one possibility. Nothing much may change - nothing achieved so far will be dismantled but no new structures will be built. Great Britain's application for EEC membership will be permitted to gather dust in Brussels, while the British, despairing of formal entry, try to conform to the habits and ways of the continental countries in a very pragmatic way: the same will apply to other EFTA countries. Liberalization in Eastern European countries goes on, varying in pace and emphasis in different states, there is greater freedom of movement across the former Iron Curtain, possibly even between the two Germanies, but there is no formal rapprochement.

This is a distinct possibility if only for the reason that hanging on to the status quo sometimes seems to be the least onerous and the least demanding course. Two factors will work in favor of adopting this easy course. Number one is the sad fact that nowhere on the European scene is there any statesman of stature, vision and a clear sense of purpose who might be able to pull the Old World out of the

unexciting, listless routine in which it threatens to settle down. Number two relates to the obvious fact that most European countries in the next ten years will be inward-looking rather than outward-looking. They all have difficult and absorbing domestic problems to solve.

Take France, which after de Gaulle will have to face the task of readjusting completely its political structures. Or Great Gritain, which has yet to take the bold step from a nineteenth into a twentieth century society. Or Italy, where the problems of adjustment to the modern world are even graver. Or Germany, where the viability of its new democratic system still awaits the test of a radical change-over from one party to the other and where a policy of domestic innovation will claim the attention of the best minds in the seventies.

Domestic preoccupations will also keep the Communist nations busy. Two in particular come to mind: the need to transform a cumbersome bureaucratic machinery into an apparatus permitting modern methods of social planning and industrial production, and the development of a sort of pluralism instead of stifling uniformity in both political thought and intellectual expression.

In view of all this I would not be a bit surprised if grosso modo the status quo simply continued.

2) But there are other possibilities, too. The second one I want to mention is the possibility that the Western Europeans, after perhaps a longish interval, decide to expand their cooperation - possibly on a multilateral basis, but probably also bilaterally. It may take them ten or fifteen years, but I have no doubt that they will rediscover the truth of the adage that Europe is like a bicyclist: he has to keep moving lest he fall down. And they will find out that their present organization simply does not permit them the solution of their problems in continued isolation from each other.

I do not want to go into the details of this. In the economic field, one might imagine increased cooperation between EFTA and EEC; one suggestion that has

been bandied about recently is for the Common Market to become a member of the Free Trade Area. In the military field, comparable schemes are thinkable, and Alastair Buchan has outlined some of them, especially that for a European Defense Authority growing out of a joint Armaments Production and Procurement Board. In this way, a new Western Europe could eventually emerge - not anti-American, yet distinct from the United States, cooperating with the Atlantic superpower à la carte, no longer on the American Plan, enjoying a relationship in which interdependence became truly a two-way affair.

There are some drawbacks to this scheme, however. The most significant one is the fact that it does nothing to overcome the partition of the European continent. It leaves out 17 million East Germans and roughly 90 million East Europeans.

3) It is because of this shortcoming that the third alternative holds so much attraction for many people - the alternative of pan-Europe, of increased bilateral as well as multilateral cooperation between the two halves of the continent. In the economic field, this might take the form of agreements between the West European economic organizations and Comecon - I remind you of the fact that in 1962 Nikita Khrushchev seemed to be quite ready to proceed along this line. Similarly, cooperative schemes could be designed between the two military pact systems - leading up, in the end, to a kind of European Security System involving either the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact or their coexistence and cooperation under the roof of a new pan-European structure. This kind of thing is increasingly captivating the imagination of the Europeans. No one can tell whether any of these projects will be realized; but I have not the slightest doubt that they will provide the leitmotif of European political debates in the coming decade.

Of course, the multilateral dealings I have talked about will be complemented by a multitude of bilateral contacts: as a matter of fact, a great deal of such bilateralism is already going on. But I would like to hang out a little flag of warning: too much bilateralism, or bilateral dealings irrespective of the wider ramifications of détente in Europe, may defeat their purpose. I am especially worried by some of the projects General de Gaulle may be wanting to inaugurate. We should be spared the miseries of the mid-thirties, when Great Britain's separate naval treaty with Hitler divided the West in bitterness and mutual recriminations without having the least bit of positive influence on Nazi Germany. I agree with Alastair Buchan that what is urgently needed in the West today is a system of Crisis Management. But I submit that it is at least as urgent to establish appropriate machinery for Détente management.

I don't really know whether the concept of a cooperative Western Europe and that of a cooperative pan-Europe are necessarily mutually exclusive alternatives. They may in fact be supplementing and reinforcing each other. Pan-Europe could be the consequence of Western Europe. On the other hand, the stage of Western Europe might conceivably be skipped altogether. I confess that I do not know and that I will have to give a lot more thought to it.

Another thing I do not know is the speed with which such a pan-European evolution as I have sketched might unfold. The pace of evolution will chiefly depend on the Soviet Union, and I do not think that we should be under any illusion about its eagerness to conform to the new trend. A great many attitudes will have to change in the Kremlin before we can make real headway. But the Russians may already have some second thoughts about the hard line they have taken so far, and they will certainly be exposed to increasing pressures by their Eastern European allies. I have recently read some amazing statements in East European papers to the effect that cooperation between Eastern Europe and Western Europe is indispensable for the states between Germany and Russia. The Soviet Union, one leading Hungarian economist said in Vienna earlier this year, can live without the rest of Europe, but its European allies cannot... There is today a great deal of longing for "making Europe

whole again" on the other side of the Iron Curtain, which is not so Iron any more, after all.

Before passing on to the third category, the kind of Europe that I believe is most desirable to be created over time, let me just interject a few words about the problem of Germany. I do not consider it a special problem any longer, one separate from the larger problem of reunifying Europe. If Europe is going to be made whole again, so will Germany - and in this context it is of relatively little import whether the two parts of Germany will be united within the borders of one single national state or whether they will be united in a more pragmatic fashion - a fashion that would permit the Germans to get together without actually living together under one flag.

For what ails the Germans is not so much that their nation is divided; it is rather that seventeen million of them have to live under an oppressive regime. If that regime became less oppressive, if it were democratized and liberalized though remaining Communist, partition would be less unbearable than it is now. This has long been one strain of German political thinking. Recently Herbert Wehner, chief Socialist architect of the Grand Coalition and now Minister of All-German Affairs, went as far as to say that he would not exclude a revision of Bonn's non-recognition doctrine if East Germany evolved along Austrian lines (separate but free) or even on the Yugoslav pattern (Communist but free). It was amazing to see how little uproar these unorthodox views caused. There are, in fact, more and more German politicians who would be prepared to accept my statement that the goal of German policy must be reunification or else the creation of conditions that make reunification superfluous or at least its absence tolerable.

C. We come now to the third category - that of <u>desirable Europes</u>. Here, while I may be a short-term pessimist, I am a long-term optimist. Europe has been called a hard-nosed illusion, and I have no doubt of its eventual emergence. The kind of Europe which I think is the most likely to take shape by the end of this

century is a European Confederation reaching from the Atlantic in the West, to the River Bug in the East, embracing everything between America and Russia. It will be distinct from, but not hostile to these two superpowers. It will have links with both of them, and they will continue to have a stake in its destiny. There will be no question of tutelage or hegemony; there will be equity if not equality. It will be like the simile where the superpowers act as bookends to a row of books of many different shapes, sizes and contents. The fundamental fact will be the realization that they are all on the same shelf.

Currently topping the German bestseller list is a book entitled, Germany's Place in the World; its author is Professor Klaus Mehnert. The book has 416 pages. On the second page, Professor Mehnert pins down Germany's place in the world, and in doing so draws a picture of Europe in 1990 which I find quite interesting. He envisages a new Power Concert, consisting of seven world powers. Three of them - the United States of America, the United States of Europe, and the Soviet Union - closely collaborate with each other, particularly in their development and aid policies. The others are China, a Pacific Federation under Japanese leadership, India, a Latin American Union; other regional groupings are in the making.

The United States of Europe as envisaged by Mehnert consists of 33 Federal States. Germany is represented by two States, so is Belgium; Yugoslavia contributes four. The central parliament of the USE consists of two chambers - a Senate in which each member state has two representatives, and a lower chamber made up by elected deputies. There will be two moderate big parties in most member states, regional parties will slowly wither away, the strongholds of the communists will be in underdeveloped southern Europe, not in Eastern Europe. The political systems of the member states will range over a wide spectrum, from constitutional monarchies like Great Britain to moderate People's democracies like Bulgaria. There is a European market without internal trade barriers, a common currency, and an economic policy combining both market-orientation and a central planning element, although property arrangements will widely vary - from pure private enterprise to pure

public enterprise and various intermediate forms. The United States of Europe will have a population of half a billion.

This kind of Europe, although possibly somewhat less structured, is roughly what I had in mind when I referred to a European Confederation - or a European System - as the most likely Europe to emerge over time. Only such a Europe can be a meaningful factor in world politics. Only such a Europe can provide the Europeans with the mass markets, the industrial basis and the technological skills that it will take to equal America's economic might. Only such a Europe will make possible a satisfactory solution of the German problem.

I admit frankly that I am at a loss to tell just when and just how this goal will be reached. Reflecting on this question of timing and of methods, I was reminded of the story about the Irish farmer and the motorist. The motorist had lost his way and stopped to ask the farmer for directions to a certain place. The farmer tried hard to explain but finally gave up in despair. He scratched his head and gave the motorist a pitiful look. Then he said:"You know, Sir, it's pretty difficult. If I were you, I wouldn't start from here."

Europeans are in a comparable situation today. The present fix is a terrible place to start from. The path to unification will be long and arduous, but I have no doubt that in the end Europe will unite. We may not know all the right answers at this juncture, but at least I think we have got our questions right.

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PROJECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS

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Prepared for a Conference of the Atlantic Institute, January 25-27, 1968, Paris

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PROJECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS

by Adam Yarmolinsky

In projecting trends to a point in the middle distance (i.e. a date not far beyond the likely term of the political chiefs to whom government planning staffs in the U.S. and the major Western European countries report) it is sometimes useful to project backwards, in effect, from a more distant future.

For example, one finds it difficult to suppose that American forces will still be on the ground in Western Europe, in more than token numbers, 50 or even 25 years from now. That distant projection raises more sharply the question how many American soldiers will still be on the ground in Western Europe in 1975. One might ask the question about more fundamental issues : British entry into Europe, German reunification, the creation of a European nuclear force, the relative levels of economic achievement in the U.S., in Western Europe, and in Eastern Europe.

For some of these questions the distant future prospect is as unclear, or more so, than the shorter-term projection. But it may still be worthwhile to begin with a sketch of the (unspecified) distant future.

Assuming that Europe has not been incinerated, it seems more likely than not that it will be effectively unified, at least to the extent that the role of nation states will be significantly reduced, and probably even to the erosion of sharp distinctions between power blocs. This conclusion is based on three assumptions :

1) The increasing availability of the technology to produce order-of-magnitude jumps in GNP (or GBP - Gross Bloc Product) will create the demand necessary to close the technology gap (which is really an education gap) between Europe and the United States.

2) The increasing dependence of the new supra-national managerial and technological community in Europe on public decision-making will create the demand necessary to develop supra-national decisional mechanisms, even across the Iron Curtain. To some extent these mechanisms may replace formal and traditional governmental structures, perhaps relegating them, in the economic and social spheres, somewhat to the present role of the states in the United States.

3) Wider public understanding of the nature and potential of nuclear weapons, and at the same time a growing reluctance throughout Europe to contemplate the possibility of major non-nuclear conflict, may permit maintenance of nuclear arsenals by East and West to co-exist with common or closely cooperating public institutions on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The security functions of government would thus be quite sharply separated from other functions.

If economic advances bring internal unification, Europe in its relations with the Third World, would hopefully have a large enough surplus of goods and services from annual increments to GNP, so that substantial resources could be devoted to assisting in the development process -- although in time major development responsibilities would be assumed by regional leaders (Japan, Brazil ?) -- and a substantial one perhaps reassumed by the United States. This view does not rule out the likelihood of cyclical waves of continental isolationism affecting the role of Europe (and of the U.S.) in the Third World, nor indeed of extended low-level conflict supported by the security elements of Bloc governments in remote parts of that world.

Given this mini-sketch of Europe as I see it in the 21st Century, it is fair to ask how relevant these long-range trends will be to changes between now and 1975 -- how large a secular element will there be in the cyclical movements ? I suggest that the short answer is considerable in the economic and social areas, less so in the political and military areas.

The most significant development of the next decade, I believe, will be a very large increase in economic relations between East and West. The principal effects of this increased activity should be :

1) A narrowing of the gap in living standards between the more and less advanced parts of the continent -- as well as between Europe and the United States.

2) An increase in common concerns between leaders East and West, keeping step with an increase in common practices.

3) An increase in incentives to resolve differences, or at least to reach second-order agreement on major issues -- political as well as economic.

The current effort to build bridges between Western and Eastern managerial communities should be a factor in accelerating the process, but in a sense it only reflects economic imperatives.

At the other end of the spectrum, it seems unlikely that vertical proliferation of arms will be halted -- although, depending on the outcome of ABM negotiations, it may be slowed down. And if it is not halted, the prospects for avoiding horizontal proliferation, at least in Asia and the Near East, will be significantly reduced. The rhetoric of nuclear "superiority" on one side, and of defense of the Motherland on the other side is likely to prolong the process of creeping escalation well beyond the point at which reason would dictate that no further increase in arms could bring an increase in security.

As U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals increase in sophistication and complexity, if not in size, I would expect the impetus for a European nuclear force would diminish, and, in time, although perhaps not by 1975, the British and even the French nuclear forces would be allowed to obsolesce away -- thereby removing the remaining incentive for a German national nuclear

force. European non-nuclear forces should also decline somewhat, and with them, I would suppose, the size of the U.S. ground force commitment in Europe. Further increases in rapid mobility should take the political sting out of such reductions, provided, as I would assume, enough U.S. forces would remain to serve as visible hostages to the United States commitment.

The NATO Alliance should survive even the possible eventuality of the complete (if temporary) dissociation of France. But by the same token it should remain a defensive alliance, limited to the defense of the European continent, and any attempt to involve it in possible U.S. - S.U. confrontations on other continents will only strain its bonds for European defense, while any attempts to make it a vehicle for supra-national economic or political organization are unlikely to succeed. A limited military alliance is not an appropriate foundation for political or economic agreements -- and NATO is a severely limited alliance since its principal reliance is on the United States Strategic Air Command, which is not subject to NATO command or control. NATO's common institutions are useful in the day-to-day functions they perform, but the center of its strength is not in Brussels. It is in the direct lines between the capitals of its member nations.

There is some danger of imbalances developing in non-nuclear forces between East and West. Non-nuclear force imbalances are in fact a good deal more sensitive than disparities in nuclear force -- provided both sides have a secure second strike capability. And it is not difficult to imagine a variety of situations, from Berlin to Athens, in which non-nuclear zones might become involved. But it is difficult to conceive of a situation within continental Europe that would be allowed to escalate or to continue in open conflict involving the major powers for any length of time.

If the economic situation will show the greatest changes and the military situation the smallest, the political situation should be somewhere in between.

While there is some reason to suppose that General de Gaulle may have passed from the active political scene by 1975, there should still be a substantial residue of Gaullism throughout Europe. As Napoleon left a heritage of increased emphasis on nationalism throughout Europe, so de Gaulle may leave behind a general, if temporary, increase in emphasis on the political prerogatives of national sovereignty, which might be accompanied by a tendency to resist and resent U.S. political leadership, even while following U.S. economic leadership. In the near term, all Europeans will be Gaullists in spite of de Gaulle.

And in spite of de Gaulle, surely by the middle of the next decade Britain should have been permitted to join Europe. One might even hope that a more rational solution would have been put in practice to handle shifts in national balance of payment positions.

On the other side of the Curtain, the states of Eastern Europe may have sufficiently established their independence from the Soviet Union so that they can contemplate closer political relations among themselves, as increasing internal prosperity and international trade begin to overcome traditional national and ethnic rivalries. Prosperity and trade ties cannot resolve the differences between Cypriot Greeks and Turks (a typical Balkan problem in a Mediterranean setting). But they can at least be put in a more rational perspective, from which they will be less likely to embroil the entire Middle East.

German reunification seems likely to remain the great unresolved issue between East and West -- if only because East and West will be in tacit agreement that the time is not yet ripe to resolve the issue. Somewhat

easier relations between the two Germanys may become possible, perhaps even to the extent of breaking down the Wall, if East German prosperity reaches a high enough level. But it may prove to be impossible to recreate a single German state until national states have lost their present significance as centers of power.

The crucial difficulty underlying other differences, however, is the political gap between the Soviet bloc and the West. So long as the Soviets and their allies (no longer simply satellites) do not see the state as a limited enterprise, so long as they lack the means for an orderly transfer of power from one regime to the next, and so long as the Soviets continue, for whatever complex of reasons, to feel an obligation to support violent change in other parts of the world, relations between East and West will continue to be uneasy. Detente is an inverse function of conflict of actual interests, and where the potential for conflict is present, detente has a kind of temporary quality. Even the degree of substantive agreement that results, for example, from the introduction of new elements of competition into the Soviet system is likely to be regarded by both sides as less significant, in the light of these fundamental procedural differences.

I do not assume that Communist China will have achieved any kind of rapprochement with the Soviet Union by 1975, or that, even with a primitive nuclear arsenal, she will be or seem to be significantly more threatening to the West. But the existence of China as an alternative rallying point for communist parties in the Third World may put a limiting condition on East-West rapprochement in the Atlantic World.

The ideological pressure of China on one side of the East-West relationship is probably a given. What the United States can do on the other side to reduce unnecessary friction is to avoid putting ideological pressure on its European allies. They are already inclined to be more pragmatic about relations with the East, and will probably grow even more

so over the foreseeable future. By not fussing at them, for what may seem to be cozying up to the East, while maintaining the U.S. nuclear guarantee, the United States is likely to contribute more to the continuing integrity of the Atlantic Community as a source of economic strength and a model of political freedom.

n° 160
January 10, 1968

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The Atlantic Institute
L'Institut Atlantique

LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DE L'ÉCONOMIE SOVIÉTIQUE ET LES PERSPECTIVES DU COMMERCE URSS-OCCIDENT

par

D. Ferrero

Note sur le Colloque de l'INSTITUT ATLANTIQUE
27-28 janvier 1968

LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DE L'ÉCONOMIE SOVIÉTIQUE ET LES PERSPECTIVES DU COMMERCE URSS-OCCIDENT

L'URSS entre en ce moment dans une délicate période de rajustement de son économie.

Tel rajustement a les objectifs suivants: (1)

1/- Une forte amélioration du niveau de vie pour satisfaire à la demande toujours plus insistante des populations soviétiques.

2/- Une modification des proportions entre les différentes branches, permettant d'atteindre le premier objectif et, en outre, d'augmenter le rendement global du système économique avec une structure de la production plus rationnelle, donnant la priorité aux branches plus avancées (chimie, électronique, etc...)

3/- Une remarquable augmentation de la productivité de travail, évaluée actuellement dans l'industrie à moins que la moitié de la productivité de travail aux Etats-Unis, même selon les sources soviétiques.

La réalisation de ce que l'on appelle la "réforme Kossyguine" devrait, selon les dirigeants soviétiques, poser les bases nécessaires à atteindre ces objectifs.

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(1) - Voir le rapport de Kossyguine au XXXIIème congrès, celui de Baibakov au Soviet Suprême le 10 octobre 1967 et l'article du vice-président du Gosplan Lalajanz dans la Ekonomitcheskaja Gazeta, n.1, 1968.

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L'énonciation de ces objectifs n'a, en soi, rien de substentiellement nouveau. Khrouchtchev en avait parlé beaucoup, surtout à partir de la fin des années 1950, bien que d'une façon désordonnée et peu cohérente. La nouveauté est dans leur systématisation, dans l'indication des moyens non plus bureaucratiques et administratifs, qui devraient permettre de les atteindre (la réforme) et surtout dans la conscience qu'il est absolument urgent d'obtenir des résultats concrets à brève échéance si l'on ne veut pas courir le risque d'importants bouleversements du système économique, avec toutes les conséquences politiques que cela apporterait.

L'économie soviétique a réussi dans les dernières années (65-67) à corriger la tendance au déclin quantitatif, qui s'était montrée pendant les cinq années précédentes, mais n'a pas résolu les problèmes qualitatifs se présentant à elle.

La réforme sera-t-elle capable de créer les conditions nécessaires à répondre aux espoirs qui ont été placés en elle ?

La réponse à cette question ne peut être qu'une, univoque et tranchante: la réforme, telle qu'elle est actuellement, dans le cadre d'une gestion centralisée des branches productives et de prix rigides, bien que "réformée" en 1967, est insuffisante pour atteindre les résultats voulus par les dirigeants soviétiques.

Cette insuffisance (qui ne signifie pas que la réforme n'aura pas certains effets positifs sur le développement de l'économie soviétique) deviendra claire probablement vers la fin du plan quinquennal actuellement en cours de réalisation et au commencement du prochain.

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Il sera alors de faire un approfondissement de la réforme (1) dans le sens d'une autonomie plus réelle des entreprises, avec la possibilité de déterminer les prix d'une façon plus libre et plus souple du côté de ces dernières. De cette façon on ira vers un rétablissement du mécanisme du marché, bien que dans le cadre d'une planification centralisée des investissements décisifs et, par conséquent, des grandes lignes du développement économique.

Un changement de cet ampleur n'est tout de même pas possible pour un colosse tel que l'économie soviétique, sans que paraîssent à la surface une série de contradictions, dont la solution ne sera ni facile ni simple.

Contradictions économiques, car il faudra prendre des mesures extrêmement décisives pour réorienter certaines branches de l'économie, pour en amputer même d'autres, car à l'intérieur de différentes branches il sera nécessaire de réaliser l'assainissement de plusieurs entreprises.

Contradictions sociales car lesdites mesures économiques auront comme effet l'expulsion temporaire du poste de travail de nombreux travailleurs, sans perspectives immédiates de créations d'emplois nouveaux (il s'agirait surtout de paysans, des ouvriers d'entreprises ou branches non compétitives, d'une partie de l'armée immense d'intellectuels occupés dans l'ample réseau d'Instituts de recherche.

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(1)- Il y a aussi, évidemment, la possibilité du choix opposé, c'est-à-dire d'un retour à des structures plus centralisées. Mais je n'ai pas pris en considération cette possibilité, car je suis convaincu que ce choix ne résoudrait pas les problèmes, au contraire les aggraverait et porterait, à brève échéance, à la nécessité d'un retour à la situation qu'on est en train d'examiner.

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Contradictions au niveau directionnel, car, dans l'hypothèse la meilleure, un nombre remarquable de dirigeants actuels, à tous niveaux (depuis le Conseil des Ministres jusqu'à l'institut de prospectives et à l'entreprise) seront dépassés par les évènements et incapables de faire face aux nouveaux problèmes.

Contradictions politiques, probablement, car le cours même des choses fera naître inévitablement un ample débat pouvant difficilement trouver place dans le cadre politique et institutionnel actuel de l'URSS.

Entre temps l'Union Soviétique aura poursuivi son développement économique, technique et scientifique avec des taux, probablement pas très inférieurs à ceux prévus par les programmes actuellement en cours de réalisation.

Dans leurs grandes lignes, les objectifs quantitatifs prévus par ces programmes seront atteints. Mais les problèmes qualitatifs ne seront pas résolus.

Par conséquent, vers 1975, l'Union Soviétique sera une puissance industrielle, technique et scientifique même plus importants en absolu qu'aujourd'hui. Nombreux problèmes économiques ayant actuellement une grande importance pour les populations de l'URSS seront très probablement résolus, au moins partiellement. Je pense au problème du logement, d'un habillement moderne et économique, au problème d'un réseau élémentaire de services et à un certain minimum de biens de consommation durable .

Mais d'un autre côté l'ensemble de contradictions susdites, nous permet de considérer au moins la première moitié des années 70 comme une période de crise pour l'URSS. Il s'agira, bien entendu de la crise d'un pays hautement développé, industrialisé, qui est en train d'accomplir un

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remarquable effort économique et scientifique. Et néanmoins les problèmes qui se posent seront bien compliqués et de solution difficile.

Situation actuelle et perspectives du commerce extérieur Soviétique avec les Pays de l'Ouest -

Le commerce extérieur soviétique n'occupe pas une position importante dans le cadre du commerce mondial et n'a pas d'ailleurs un poids décisif pour l'économie soviétique.

L'URSS avec quinze milliards de roubles d'échanges commerciaux ne se trouve qu'à la septième place entre les nations commerciales du monde. Pour la plupart ces échanges ont lieu à l'intérieur du bloc des "pays socialistes" (65/70% du total). Les échanges avec les pays industriels ne représentent que 20% du total, c'est-à-dire trois milliards de roubles.

Toutefois les importations soviétiques en provenance des pays industriels ont pour l'URSS une importance remarquable, en tout cas bien plus grande qu'on pourrait penser étant donné leur volume.

La raison en est que l'Union Soviétique, ainsi qu'il a été plusieurs fois souligné dans les documents et les déclarations officielles, importe des pays industriels en premier lieu les produits "techniquement les plus avancés, qui contribuent au développement de l'économie nationale".(1)

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(1) - Bulletin économique de la Tass, édition italienne, N. 89 du 7/11/67, page 6

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Une analyse, même très superficielle, des statistiques du commerce extérieur soviétique avec les pays industriels met en évidence que plus de 30% des importations soviétiques desdits pays (à peu près cinq cents milliards de roubles) sont constitués par des machines, installations industrielles et établissements complets.

Ce pourcentage serait encore plus fort si l'URSS, à cause de la mauvaise situation de son agriculture, n'était pas forcée pendant les dernières années d'importer des quantités notables de blé des susdits pays. Les importations de produits alimentaires en provenance des pays industriels qui ne dépassaient pas 4% en 1960, ont atteint 26% dans les dernières années (65/66).

Dans l'hypothèse (suffisamment raisonnable, bien que teintée d'optimisme) que dans 5 à 7 ans l'URSS aura réussi à améliorer sa situation dans le domaine de l'agriculture au point d'éliminer ses importations de blé, revenant de cette façon à la situation des années 50, on peut prévoir que les importations soviétiques de machines et installations atteindront, une fois de plus, le pourcentage d'importations de machines des mêmes années, c'est-à-dire plus de 40%. Cela aurait lieu pendant une période de forte expansion du commerce extérieur soviétique, prévue aussi par les planificateurs soviétiques.

Dans le cadre des importations soviétiques de machines ce sont les installations et les établissements complets qui ont une grande importance.

Il y a 5 à 10 ans, lorsque les planificateurs soviétiques, aiguillonnés par Khrouchtchev, visaient surtout le développement prioritaire de la chimie, il s'agissait surtout d'établissements chimiques. Aujourd'hui, toujours

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en conformité de la direction prioritaire choisie pour l'économie du pays par ses dirigeants, à côté des établissements chimiques il y a des commandes pour des établissements complets de textiles et pour la production de biens de consommation durable (frigidaires, voitures etc...) et aussi pour machines à calculer.

Le commerce soviétique avec les pays industriels présente toutefois de nombreux et graves déséquilibres. Face à une importation constituée pour la plupart par des machines et des produits manufacturés, l'exportation soviétique est constituée surtout par des matières premières.

Dans ce sens le rapport commercial entre l'URSS et les pays de l'Ouest se présente d'une manière analogue à celui des pays sous-développés et il est, par conséquent, peu rentable. En plus, à longue échéance cela risque de limiter d'une façon grave les possibilités soviétiques d'augmenter les importations, à cause du phénomène très connu des "ciseaux" entre les prix des matières premières et les prix des produits manufacturés.

L'Union Soviétique a essayé pendant les dernières années par une action très énergique d'augmenter ses exportations de machines et de produits manufacturés. Mais les résultats réels du point de vue de la création d'un marché stable pour les produits soviétiques sont même inférieurs à ceux, très modestes, dénoncés par les statistiques.

En effet une petite augmentation de l'exportation soviétique de ces produits est dûe, en premier lieu à la pratique, largement utilisée par les organisations soviétiques pour le commerce extérieur, de l'imposition de "counter-buying obligations" aux exportateurs des pays industriels.

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La raison de cet insuccès, malgré l'effort accompli, n'est pas seulement le manque de connaissance du marché occidental où le manque d'organisation des soviétiques, mais surtout l'insuffisant niveau qualitatif des produits manufacturés soviétiques en comparaison avec les standards du marché mondial. Evidemment les éclatants défauts organisationnels ont joué un rôle eux aussi, surtout la violation des termes de livraison, le manque d'une organisation efficace pour l'entretien et la livraison de pièces de rechange.

Conclusions

Le bref tour d'horizon sur les perspectives probables de développement de l'économie soviétique que j'ai essayé de faire plus haut permet d'affirmer que l'URSS aura bien de la peine à résoudre toute seule ces problèmes dans les prochaines années.

Les pays industriels peuvent, de leur côté, donner une importante contribution, à travers leurs cercles économique et financier, à la recherche de solutions valables pouvant à leur tour exercer une influence considérable (1) sur les choix économiques auxquels l'Union Soviétique devra faire face.
Et il y a bien des raisons économiques et politiques pour considérer cette direction comme la plus souhaitable.

Evidemment dans ce but il est nécessaire d'avoir un passage de qualité, une nouvelle approche aux relations économiques entre les pays industriels et l'Union Soviétique.

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(1) Evidemment je parle ici d'influence objective, et non de pressions politiques ou économiques.

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Il s'agit d'arriver à des formes nouvelles et originelles de contacts et de collaboration, lesquelles permettent, à longue échéance, une rentrée complète de l'Union Soviétique dans le marché mondial.

Les bases concrètes pour ces formes nouvelles existent déjà, bien qu'à l'état embryonnaire, au niveau qualitatif le plus haut atteint jusqu'à présent dans les relations économiques avec l'Union Soviétique, c'est-à-dire dans le cas de livraison d'usines complètes. Ces livraisons impliquent toujours le plus souvent non seulement la transmission du know-how et des licences nécessaires, mais aussi des consultations organisationnelles, l'aide technique et organisationnelle pour atteindre certains niveaux de productivité et quelquefois même une collaboration dans le domaine de la recherche scientifique. Presque toujours dans ce cas il est nécessaire de créer un mécanisme financier pour la concession du crédit.

Mais pour le futur il faut être capable de prévoir et de poser les bases d'initiatives nouvelles.

Ces initiatives pourraient se développer dans les quatre directions suivantes:

1/- Création de sociétés mixtes pour l'exploitation de certaines richesses naturelles de l'Union Soviétique. Il s'agit de la forme la plus difficile à réaliser en raison des résistances psychologiques des dirigeants soviétiques, mais aussi peut-être de la plus intéressante au point de vue économique. L'Union Soviétique a eu une certaine expérience de sociétés de ce genre dans les années 20, expérience non négative, mais interrompue par le changement de la situation internationale et par le stalinisme à l'intérieur du Pays. Les soviétiques

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seraient probablement intéressés surtout à des entreprises capables d'exporter leur produits sur le marché mondial, pour des raisons valables. A brève échéance ce sont des initiative de valorisation touristique qui ont le plus de chance d'aboutir à des résultats.

2/- Création de sociétés mixtes pour la commercialisation de certains produits soviétiques sur les marchés des pays industriels. Ces sociétés devraient prévoir souvent des opérations de finissage sur les produits soviétiques pour les rendre acceptables aux marchés occidentaux du point de vue de l'esthétique et de la qualité. Les dirigeants soviétiques seraient prêts dès maintenant à discuter la création de sociétés de ce genre, déjà existantes d'ailleurs en certains pays (Belgique, Angleterre).

3/- Initiatives financières pour le soution des formes de collaboration prévues aux points I et 2 et pour la normalisation des relations financières entre pays industriels et Union Soviétique, fondées jusqu'à aujourd'hui sur crédits des premiers avec une contribution de l'Etat. Il s'agit de problèmes difficiles et complexes qu'il faudra étudier en détail avec les soviétiques. Il est néanmoins nécessaire de trouver des solutions valables à longue échéance si l'on veut la réalisation des autres points.

4/- Collaboration dans la recherche scientifique et technique, où l'URSS pourrait mettre à disposition dans certaines branches le puissant réseau de ses instituts de recherche de base et les pays industriels (en particulier ceux d'Europe Occidentale et le Japon) leurs capacités organisationnelles et leurs ressources techniques pour la réalisation industrielle des résultats des recherches.

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Une certaine coordination des efforts pour la réalisation de ces initiatives est sans doute nécessaire et souhaitable, mais plutôt au niveau d'organisations non-gouvernementales. Mais surtout il est nécessaire d'avoir un vaste échange d'informations dans les formes les plus variées.

E. Ferrero

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LES RELATIONS EST-OUEST DANS DIX ANS

par

Michel Tatu

Note sur le Colloque de l'INSTITUT ATLANTIQUE
Paris, 25-27 janvier 1968

LES RELATIONS EST-OUEST DANS DIX ANS

La situation sera évaluée ici principalement à partir de l'évolution probable des pays de l'Est. Deux analyses complémentaires doivent être distinguées :

1°/- La première consiste à extrapoler les tendances actuelles de la diplomatie soviétique, en tenant pour assurée la continuité dans le domaine intérieur. On peut alors raisonnablement prévoir:

- le maintien et la relance de la course aux armements : il est clair aujourd'hui qu'une des principales décisions prises par les successeurs de Khrouchtchev en 1965 a été d'annuler les insuffisances stratégiques soviétiques mises en lumière par la crise de Cuba en 1962. D'où la construction d'un réseau A.B.M., la mise en chantier de satellites porteurs de bombes, plus récemment la création de forces d'interventions (porte-hélicoptères, "marines", etc...) et la pénétration navale en méditerranée;

- le maintien, et parfois même la création artificielle, de foyers de tension. Contrairement à une opinion répandue, il est faux de croire que l'arrêt de la guerre du Vietnam permettrait une profonde détente entre les U.S.A. et l'URSS. Un niveau assez élevé de tension avec l'Ouest en général et les Etats-Unis en particulier est un <u>besoin interne</u> du régime soviétique dans ses structures actuelles.

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Si rien ne change à l'intérieur, la règle d'or de la diplomatie soviétique restera la suivante : éviter l'affrontement direct avec les Etats-Unis, au besoin s'entendre directement avec eux en cas de menace de guerre générale, mais, en deçà de ce seuil, laisser mûrir les problèmes de manière à en profiter pour pousser des pions : au Proche Orient notamment;

- en même temps ce "seuil d'affrontement" avec la puissance américaine va se trouver repoussé plus loin dans l'échelle des possibilités. Si, comme on l'espère non sans fondement à Moscou, l'équilibre stratégique entre les deux Grands se rapproche de la parité, si surtout l'URSS se montre capable d'assurer au voisinage des divers "points chauds" la présence de forces d'intervention (même inférieures à celles des U.S.A.), la crédibilité des pressions américaines sera très sérieusement diminuée. La possibilité d'une diplomatie plus risquée apparaîtra alors, conjuguée avec le désir d'effacer les humiliations subies entre 1962 et 1967. On sent déjà dans le "style" de Moscou le retour aux vieilles conceptions staliniennes sur l'espace stratégique et les zones d'influence militaire, la préférence donnée aux bases et points d'appui militaires sur les succès de propagande, aux échecs sur le poker. Le militarisme, déjà très sensible chez Brejnev, ira se renforçant.

- En Europe, aucun changement n'est à prévoir à propos de l'Allemagne. Les échanges commerciaux est-ouest connaîtront une progression raisonnable, mais sans excès, tandis qu'on devrait assister, au sein du bloc de l'Est, à un renforcement de l'intégration, au développement d'un embryon de "marché commun" (le système actuel du COMECON est

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tout sauf cela). La progression des réformes économiques, toute limitée qu'elle soit, va en effet mettre les économies plus étroitement en contact, et à un niveau plus bas : entre entreprises et consommateurs, et non plus entre planificateurs gouvernementaux comme jusqu'à présent. En outre, avec les méthodes actuelles de gestion (même réformées) les économies de l'Est européen n'ont aucune chance de devenir compétitives avec celles de l'Ouest : elles seront donc "condamnées" à vivre ensemble, à se tourner, faute de devises, vers le fournisseur soviétique. Le seul moyen d'échapper à cette dépendance serait de recevoir des pays occidentaux une aide massive sous forme de crédits. Mais il est encore prématuré, du moins avec les équipes actuellement au pouvoir : à l'exception de la Roumanie et de la Yougoslavie, celles-ci sont encore trop dépendantes politiquement de Moscou pour effectuer un tel changement d'orientation;

- enfin, il convient d'ajouter que le monde, dans dix ans, vivra dans tous les cas sous le signe de la solution, quelle qu'elle soit, qui aura été trouvée à la guerre du Vietnam. On ne peut donc en faire abstraction. D'autant plus qu'on ne voit aucun moyen terme se dessiner entre la victoire de l'une ou l'autre partie (retour au statu quo, c'est-à-dire division du pays de type coréen, ou ré-unification sous contrôle communiste).

2°/- Tout ce qui précède (exception faite du Vietnam) doit cependant être corrigé et complété par les perspectives d'évolution à l'intérieur; or celles-ci peuvent et vont changer beaucoup de choses. On peut tenir pour certain que les équipes au pouvoir auront changé dans la plupart des pays

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communistes d'ici dix ans. La seule exception pourrait être celle de la Roumanie et de la Tchécoslovaquie, où la relève vient de se faire (au sommet seulement, il est vrai). Partout ailleurs on assistera à la disparition des vieux leaders formés à l'école stalinienne. Les répercussions seront bien entendu les plus importantes dans les grands pays :

- en Chine la disparition de Mao sera suivie d'une répudiation au moins particlle du maoisme. Les excès seront rectifiés, notamment ceux qui ont conduit à l'isolement total du pays à l'extérieur. On peut donc s'attendre à une diplomatie plus souple et en même temps plus active, qui posera de nouveaux défis à l'Ouest. En revanche la rivalité subsistera avec l'URSS, malgré la révision éventuelle de certaines outrances. Une Chine plus modérée pourrait d'ailleurs reprendre les exercices de séduction auprès des autres partis communistes, comme c'était le cas jusqu'en 1963, et causer des ennuis encore plus sérieux à la cohésion du bloc pro-soviétique;

- à Moscou l'on assistera à un changement d'équilibre au sein de la direction collective actuelle (il est évident que plusieurs des personnalités clefs, telles que Brejnev, Souslov, Kossyguine, auront été remplacées d'ici dix ans), mais plus généralement à une relève de grande ampleur du personnel politique à l'échelon du Comité central. L'âge moyen de ses membres de plein droit est aujourd'hui de 58 ans, contre moins de 50 ans en 1952. A la veille du prochain congrès du parti, en 1970, il sera de 60 ans, c'est-à-dire l'un des plus élevés jamais constatés dans

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les équipes dirigeantes d'aucun grand pays du monde. La relève sera brutale, d'autant plus qu'elle a été artificiellement retardée jusqu'à ces derniers temps : paradoxalement, toutes les personnalités limogées ou rétrogradées en 1967 ont été des jeunes ou relativement jeunes (Chelepine, Semitchastny, Goriounov, Egorytchev), et leurs remplaçants ont tous été plus âgés (Andropov, Lapine, Grichine). De ce fait, des rancoeurs se sont accumulées parmi la nouvelle génération des cadres, qui attend son tour plus que de raison.

- Cette relève ira de pair avec des désaccords politiques, probablement des crises. D'ici deux à trois ans, le conflit mûrira entre "réformateurs" et "conservateurs" sur la question de savoir s'il faut pousser plus loin ou arrêter la réforme économique (d'une manière semblable à ce qui a été observé en Tchécoslovaquie en 1967). Le coût effréné de la course aux armements (cf.plus haut) entrera en conflit avec les impératifs du niveau de vie (ce conflit existe déjà, mais le fait nouveau, d'ici deux à trois ans, sera que l'on s'apercevra que la stagnation de la consommation freine le sain développement de l'économie). L'immobilisme des "idéologues" et de l'appareil du parti deviendra de plus en plus insupportable aux économistes soucieux d'efficacité. D'une manière générale, on peut s'attendre à l'éclatement de sérieux conflits, sur les grandes options, au sein d'une direction collective qui n'a pas été renouvelée depuis très longtemps (le dernier changement d'importance remonte à quatre ans), dont les membres les plus importants sont en place parfois depuis plus de dix ans (Souslov), et dont le seul dénominateur commun, à l'intérieur, est le conservatisme. Les trois prochaines

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années seront probablement capitales à cet égard, et verront sans doute se produire le changement d'équilibre attendu. C'est à la faveur de ce changement d'équilibre que la "relève" trop longtemps retardée, de la génération politique dite "de 1938" qui garnit pour l'essentiel les échelons intermédiaires de la hiérarchie, pourra se produire.

- Or les tensions qui existent dans la société laissent planer les plus graves menaces sur le caractère pacifique de ce changement. Les procès d'intellectuels (Bukovski, Siniavski, Galanskov, etc...), les défections à l'étranger (Svetlana, etc...), loin de constituer une anomalie de l'histoire, sont des manifestations parfaitement logiques au stade actuel de développement du régime. Ils iront en se multipliant, tout comme les manifestations de rues, les grèves et autres formes de protestation. Ces phénomènes témoignent à la fois du penchant des gouvernants pour l'autoritarisme, mais aussi de l'affaiblissement de leur autorité, et marquent ce qu'on peut appeler la phase "d'hispanisation" du régime. Bien évidemment, les forces de contestation profiteront de toute vacance du pouvoir qui résultera des divisions du parti au sommet. Une phase proprement révolutionnaire pourrait s'ouvrir dans le cas où la crise politique serait longue, où personne ne réussirait à établir une nouvelle autorité rapidement.

- Dans ce dernier cas (situation révolutionnaire) l'analyse prospective n'est plus possible : qu'il suffise de mentionner les très graves conséquences que cette situation aurait sur la cohésion de l'empire soviétique proprement dit (les nationalités hallogènes en Asie,

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dans les pays baltes, etc...), sur les autres pays du bloc et les partis communistes dans le monde, enfin le danger d'une diversion "aventuriste" à l'extérieur. C'est pourquoi l'hypothèse d'un putsch militaire apparaît comme la plus probable pour le cas où le parti, divisé, serait incapable de maintenir son contrôle.

3°/- En admettant l'hypothèse "optimum", à savoir qu'une direction relativement stable et gardant les choses sous contrôle aura pris la tête en URSS dans dix ans (que cette équipe soit militaire ou civile), la prospective reste malaisée étant donné l'importance de l'élément subjectif dans les sociétés autoritaires. Deux cas d'égale probabilité peuvent être envisagés :

a/- la "révolution" est escamotée, et après une période de troubles tous les éléments conservateurs du parti se regroupent derrière un "sauveur", par exemple un vieux maréchal prestigieux, qui préservera leurs privilèges et restaurera la coopération parti-armée au nom de la "patrie en danger". Dans ce cas l'immobilisme triomphe après quelques concessions passagères au renouveau, l'échéance est ajournée de quelques années;

b/- ou bien la nouvelle génération des apparatchiki parvient à prendre le pouvoir par des moyens relativement démocratiques : par exemple au sein des instances du parti comme cela vient de se produire en Tchécoslovaquie. On peut alors s'attendre à une évolution <u>contrôlée</u>, portant, étant donné ce que l'on sait des caractéristiques les plus générales

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de cette jeune génération et sous réserves des correctifs subjectifs tenant à tel ou tel individu, dans les directions suivantes :

- un esprit plus moderne dans la gestion de l'économie, conduisant à une accélération des réformes. Mais cela au prix d'un accroissement du mécontentement social (chômage, insécurité, hausse de prix).
- Toujours pour les mêmes raisons économiques, une certaine préférence donnée aux impératifs du développement intérieur sur les attitudes de grande puissance à l'extérieur : tendance à réduire le fardeau des armements, donc à une attitude plus constructive vis-à-vis des U.S.A.; tendance également à réduire l'aide à l'étranger (pays arabes); tendance enfin à recourir plus largement à la technique et aux crédits de l'occident.
- En Europe, réaction contre les "excès" de la politique actuelle, principalement celui qui consiste à maintenir une attitude systématiquement et stérilement hostile à l'Allemagne fédérale (on sait qu'une école à Moscou, au sein du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, plaide dès maintenant pour un assouplissement de cette attitude). Une politique plus souple est à prévoir, mais qui n'ira pas jusqu'à l'abandon du régime de l'Allemagne de l'Est. La réunification des deux Allemagne restera un objectif toujours aussi lointain qu'aujourd'hui (du moins, toujours dans le cas qui nous intéresse ici, celui d'une autorité forte établie à Moscou).

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- Dans les démocraties populaires de l'Est européen la relève des générations, notamment en Tchécoslovaquie, en Pologne et probablement en Hongrie, aura très probablement pour résultat de nouveaux ennuis pour les dirigeants soviétiques : les nouvelles équipes seront en effet moins dociles que celles des vieux militants formés à l'époque "héroïque" (même si, comme Kadar et Gomulka, ils ont été victimes du stalinisme). La Roumanie recevra des renforts, ce qui conduira à un durcissement de ses attitudes de défi, et pourra même aller jusqu'à la constitution de "fronts commun" contre Moscou. La tendance à l'indépendance économique s'accentuera : déjà d'ici cinq à six ans la Roumanie, par exemple, sera à peu près complètement indépendante des fournitures soviétiques. Après elle, la Tchécoslovaquie et la Hongrie s'efforceront de suivre son exemple. La seule exception sera celle de l'Allemagne de l'Est, dont la survie politique impose une étroite alliance avec Moscou (ce qui ne l'empêche pas d'ailleurs d'exercer des pressions sur l'URSS, comme on l'a vu en 1967). Il ne semble pas que la disparition d'Ulbricht doive entraîner de profondes modifications à cet égard.

Encore une fois, ces développements ne sont possibles que dans le cas d'une évolution pacifique du système soviétique, tandis qu'une évolution non pacifique apparaît comme une possibilité sérieuse. Le fait principal à retenir est qu'une relève des équipes dirigeantes et même de générations interviendra dans les principaux pays communistes, et surtout à Moscou, d'ici moins de dix ans, et que le monde communiste connaîtra alors une période de mouvement

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au moins aussi importante que celle qu'il a connue entre 1953 et 1960. Nous assistons à la fin de quelque chose, mais nous ne savons pas ce qui viendra à la place.

Michel Tatu

N° 172
23 janvier 1968

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The Atlantic Institute
L'Institut Atlantique

EEC AND COMECON

by

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Prepared for a Conference of the Atlantic Institute, January 25-27, 1968, Paris
Not for Quotation or Citation

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Introductory Note

The paper that follows is an attempt to analyse the relationship between members of the West European trading groups, the EEC and EFTA, on the one hand, and members of COMECON on the other. It is basically an article that was published in Survey in January 1966, although it has been brought up to date where necessary. Otherwise it has not been changed, as it still represents my considered thoughts on that item in the conference's terms of reference on which my contribution would seem to be most useful. In order to place this paper in the context of the conference, however, I set down below my assumptions as to the most likely situation in East-West relations, and in major factors in the East and in the West that affect those relations, in 1975.

Assumptions regarding East-West relations in 1975.

1. General atmosphere. Détente has continued, with setbacks from time to time (e.g. the Vietnam war, which is now over), and without on the other hand becoming an avalanche.

2. China. The Chinese are still chauvinistic and difficult, but have neither gone to war with America nor caused the Russians to rush into the arms of the West.

3. Relations between Russia and the smaller East European countries. The smaller East European countries continue to assert a degree of independence from Russia, without basically changing their trade pattern, heavily orientated towards the Soviet bloc, or their dependence on Russia for defence. Comecon remains stuck fast in its present limited role, because neither Russia nor the smaller countries will give up any sovereignty, which means that control remains with their still highly centralized national systems. There has been no progress towards a coalition or union of the smaller countries (which would be symmetrical with the developments in Western Europe since the war).

4. East Germany. The Ulbricht regime has been succeeded by a government more akin to that in neighbouring communist countries, and economic, social and cultural links with the Federal Republic and with other Western countries have become easier, but there has been no basic change in the legal or political status of East Germany, despite the continuance of the Federal Republic's active and positive policy towards Eastern Europe.

5. The economic systems in Eastern Europe. The introduction of market forces into the East European economies has continued, like détente, with setbacks from time to time, but without becoming an avalanche. The liberalization in external trade has been slower, and East European governments are still very reluctant to relax detailed control over external economic relations, for fear of unpredictable economic and political effects.

6. United States. The US still has some troops in Germany and still provides a nuclear umbrella for Western Europe. The US no longer promotes the integration of Western Europe nor does it actively oppose this development, except in so far as concerns proposals for a unified European nuclear force. There has been no major new development in trading relations with European countries, such as agreement on a North Atlantic free trade area.

7. General de Gaulle is enjoying a well-earned retirement.

8. The European Community:

a. is progressing towards economic union;
b. has been enlarged to include Britain and the other three current applicants;
c. is developing a unified defense policy and system, though it does not yet have a fully integrated defense force or a joint nuclear force;
d. in principle has a common commercial policy towards Eastern Europe, but finds it difficult actually to produce a policy other than the highest common factor of caution and of protection;

e. has nevertheless been working out, at the level of the European Commission, common policies for the development of economic relations with East European countries on constructive lines (as outlined in my paper that follows) to the extent that developments in Eastern Europe (see item 5, above) make possible; and these ideas have evoked a positive response among the policy-planners and public opinion of the member countries, so that one can expect substantial progress in this direction in the next 5-10 years.

9. EFTA no longer exists, three of its members having joined the EEC and the others being associated in some way.

10. Technological cooperation. There is much technological cooperation all round, including cooperation between East European and Western countries. Apart from the collaboration developing within the members of the European Community, this is however not on a scale to alter the political or economic fundamentals of the situation (except in so far as US investment in Western Europe is called technological cooperation). But just as the European Commission is producing plans for constructive economic policies towards Eastern Europe, which may be realized by 1980 or 1985, the Commission is likewise producing plans for technological cooperation on a massive scale between the Community and the United States, and for substantial cooperation, both on a multilateral and a bilateral basis, with the countries of Eastern Europe.

EEC AND COMECON

John Pinder

The most important development in the political economy of the West since the war may well have been the creation of effective multilateral organisations that transcend the nation-state. Gatt, OECD, and Efta have all helped to secure freer trade and better economic cooperation, and to prevent the destructive international competition that characterised the inter-war years. But, as far at least as relations between its members are concerned, the EEC, the European Economic Community, has induced more progress towards these ends than any other organisation. Its members have created a single market as populous as that of the United States; they have developed a system for the formation of common economic policies; and they have transformed a secular hostility between their members into a relationship that places war between them beyond the bounds of possibility. The implications of these facts for the countries of eastern Europe are clearly of great interest; and, even if the new methods of collaboration have now been called in question by General de Gaulle, they have already shown such remarkable results that it is pertinent to ask whether they contain any lessons that could be relevant to the future evolution of eastern Europe.

Problems of Integration in Comecon

While the nations of the West, and particularly those of the Community, have been in the process of moving beyond national sovereignty, those of eastern Europe have been either standing pat on that concept or moving in the reverse direction. The name Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and still more its abbreviation Comecon, somewhat resembles that of the Common Market, and this leads some people to believe that the two organisations are therefore similar. But this is a superficial judgment. For entirely understandable historical reasons, their nature is fundamentally different.

The difference is clearly expressed in the treaties that established the two bodies. The members of the EEC were 'determined to establish the foundations of an ever closer union among the European peoples',[1] while CMEA 'is established on the basis of the principle of the sovereign equality of all the member countries of the Council'[2] The EEC has a strong and independent Commission as its executive and the treaty lays down that the members can take certain important decisions by majority vote; CMEA has a relatively weak Secretariat and all recommendations or decisions must be adopted by the unanimous vote of those members interested in the question under consideration.

The intractable nationalism of the economic arrangements in communist countries stems from the experience of Russia under Stalin, who created a highly centralised system of national planning that concentrated on independence from outside economies (i.e. on basic industries) and rigidly controlled all foreign trade transactions: a system of extreme economic autarky.

When the greater part of eastern Europe fell into Stalin's hands at the end of the war, this system became the stereotype for the countries concerned. Each of them established a highly centralised system of national planning, concentrating on independence from outside economies and insulated from them by means of the control of foreign trade. Stalin's power and prestige were so great that he could doubtless have imposed a unified economic policy on eastern Europe over a long period, even though the systems he had created were so inherently autarkic and recalcitrant to outside pressures. But after his death the logic of the system began to tell. The political expression of this trend is polycentrism (which seems to be a new word for national sovereignty, as far as countries ruled by communist parties are concerned). The economic implications have been trenchantly expressed by the Rumanians. Thus a Rumaian editorialist, rejecting the concept of an interstate development of the lower Danube region, insisted that Rumania was 'an independent and sovereign

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[1] Preamble to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community.

[2] The Comecon Charter, 1960, Article 1. This and the three following quotations are taken from Michael Kaser's Comecon: Integration Problems of the Planned Economies (London, 1965).

state. On this territory nobody has anything to study, neither in detail nor in lesser detail, without authorisation from the Rumanian government, for both the efficient use of resources and the location of objectives, as well as any other problems, big or small, are of the exclusive competence of the Rumanian government and people'. General de Gaulle might speak in similar terms about France in relation to the European Community; but in this he would contradict the letter and spirit of the Rome Treaty, whereas the Rumanian attitude is perfectly consistent with the CMEA Charter and with the communist insistence on national sovereignty. This attitude, which originally served to safeguard the unity and strength of the communist world when it consisted of a single state, has become, with the emergence of a number of communist states, a sorcerer's apprentice that washes away their unity by encouraging them to pull in different directions.

Consistent though this position may be with the post-patristic communist doctrine and the CMEA Charter, however, it is widely recognised in eastern Europe that it flies in the face of modern technology. It is not possible for countries ranging in population from thirty million down to seven million, with much lower purchasing power than those in western Europe, to enjoy a full development of modern industries on the basis of their separate markets, and this applies in particular to the basic industries that began to be established, on the Stalinist pattern, in each east European country. Khrushchev was among those who saw that this pointed in the direction of a single integrated market. Speaking at Leipzig in 1959, he said '. . . the further development of the socialist countries will in all probability proceed along the lines of reinforcing a single world system of the socialist economy. One after another the economic barriers which separated our countries under capitalism will disappear'. In 1962 he tried to translate this idea into action by his relatively supranational proposal for a unified planning organ in Comecon.

It is well known that this proposal for 'shifting some functions of economic management from the competence of the respective state to the attribution of super-state bodies or organs' (Declaration of the Rumanian Central Committee, April 1964) was strongly and successfully opposed by the Rumanians, whose Declaration went on

to say 'these measures are not in keeping with the principles which underlie the relations between socialist countries'. But if the touchy Rumanian nationalism had been the only obstacle, a way might have been found around it. In fact, there are fundamental difficulties stemming from the autarkic national economic systems that Stalin bequeathed to the Soviet bloc, which are in direct conflict with any attempt to integrate their economies.

These difficulties have been well described in Mr. Kaser's book on Comecon. They relate partly to the problem of the prices at which goods are to be exchanged. In the absence of a linked system of market economies such as exists in the West, which provides an 'objective' procedure for price formation, each east European country has its own idiosyncratic set of prices. The east Europeans therefore had to adopt 'world' (i.e. capitalist) prices for their trade; yet this system has been severely criticised in eastern Europe, particularly when the trend of world prices was adverse for a particular country, as it was for Bulgaria for example when the world market for raw materials was weak. Indeed, it is hard to see how the east European governments could agree that major decisions about the structure of their economies should be taken on the basis of prices set by a system of which they disapprove and quite different from the prices according to which they each make their internal decisions on production and investment. An integrated east European economy, giving full scope for large-scale production by centralising the decisions on many of the most important investments, would surely have to wait on the development of a common system of prices that is accepted by each country and by and large applied for purposes of national economic planning as well as for intra-east European trade.

Even if a uniform system of prices were to be applied in eastern Europe, however, there are further conditions that would have to obtain before the centrally-planned economies could be integrated. Thus each country would have to apply the same profit criterion to the production of export goods; it would be no use for each country to apply the same prices if some allowed their exporting enterprises to

run at a loss (in effect subsidising them) while others insisted that their enterprises break even or make a profit. Given the same price system and profit criterion, moreover, there would still have to be a procedure for assessing rival investment projects. There would clearly be many occasions when more than one country wished to construct plant to manufacture a product for which the market was large enough to justify only one new production unit. The feasibility studies would have to be vetted objectively - it is too easy for engineers to produce cost figures and economists market projections optimistic enough to bias the choice in favour of their own country's project. Investments of great importance to economic development would sometimes be involved, and those who had to decide on the merits of the competitive projects would be in the position of a supranational planning authority.

In short, it is hard to see how a number of monolithic nationally-planned economies could be integrated unless they were subsumed in a monolithic supranationally-planned economy. But the nationalism of the east European states and their autarkic economic structure have been too strong to allow this to happen. Only a militantly imperialist Russia, intent on unifying the communist bloc, would have been powerful enough to force it through; but as we have seen it was Khrushchev's Russia, not Stalin's, that perceived the technocratic necessity of integration, and Khrushchev was either unwilling or unable to apply the pressure that would have been required. This being so, the preponderant strength of Russia in Comecon was a positive deterrent to integration, not a motive force; for Russia, whatever its intentions might be, would be bound to dominate any supranational planning authority in Comecon; the Russian government would in fact virtually <u>be</u> the supranational authority. The status of the other members of Comecon would be equivalent to that of provinces of the Soviet Union. Even if they were ready to accept the principle of a supranational economic community, this state of subordination to one of its members would clearly be unacceptable.

The obstacles to economic integration in Comecon, then, stem from basic differences between it and the EEC. The decentralised market economies of the West are more amenable to a process of gradual integration than the centralised

economies of the East, based on imperative target planning (the problems presented by the Common Market to France's relatively mild indicative target planners and their efforts to extend their planning system to the Community level are a further indication of this). And the balance of power within the Community helps to preclude domination of the others by any one member while that within Comecon does not. Where there is a desire on the part of the members for a fair share of democratic control of the integrated economy, or at least for avoiding absorption by a more powerful state, this kind of balance is absolutely necessary. Professor Hallstein has stressed this aspect of the EEC: 'the Community system, the constitution of the Community, is of itself a negation of any hegemony, the organised and methodical rebuttal of hegemony.'[3] Integration within Comecon is, by contrast, hamstrung by the tendency towards hegemony that is built into the structure of its membership because of Russia's predominant size.

The existence of Comecon does not, then, imply that there is, or will be in the next few years, an integrated economy in eastern Europe that negotiates, like the EEC, as a single unit in its external trade. The east European countries will retain, during this period, their centralised, nationally-planned economies, and the institutions of Comecon do not seem likely to make more than marginal differences to this form of organisation.

It is, however, well known that there has recently been some evolution of the east European systems, under the pressure of their transition to consumer societies, in the direction of decentralisation and a market economy. The current reforms, if they become fully effective, will take Yugoslavia far in that direction. In Russia, the Liberman experiments and the Kosygin reforms, bringing criteria of competition and profit, are certainly significant; and the Czechs, Hungarians, and Poles are all engaged in implementing some degree of economic decentralisation.

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[3] Statement made to the European Parliament, 5 February 1963.

In these circumstances, it has become less fanciful to suppose, even if the possibility of full integration among east European economies is still a long way off, that a rapprochement with the western economic system may become feasible. Thus Mr. Kaser says that 'Renewed efforts to create a multilateral programme may not necessarily be kept within the bounds of (Comecon's) group. Soviet ideology has recently buried the hatchet which, at the time of Comecon's foundation, struck down Varga for discerning the feasibility of planning in the west European mixed economies, and a shared economic language is at least evolving as western European and the developing countries embody some of their policies in plans, nationally and internationally. One way for Comecon to enlarge this potential communication would be by the partial transposition of its multilateral programming to a wider arena, such as Gatt, or the proposed United Nations Trade and Development Board, where the plans of developed and developing countries could best be confronted.[4]

Some go farther than this and envisage an association of east European countries with west European free trade systems. This possibility appeals strongly, for example, to many people in the British Labour Party, and their sentiments have often been echoed in sections of the press, notably The Observer. The fear that any prospect of such an association would be thwarted if Britain were to join the "tightly organised" EEC is one argument used by those in the Labour Party who oppose British entry; they contend that Efta, with its much looser institutional system, would be able to make such arrangements with the east Europeans whereas the EEC would not. In order to assess the validity of this argument in particular, therefore, as well as some of the more general economic implications of rapprochement between East and West, it is worth examining the possibilities and the limits of economic cooperation between Eastern Europe and the Western trading systems.

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[4] Michael Kaser, op. cit., p. 4

Eastern Europe and Gatt

The negotiations about Polish membership of Gatt and the discussions on East-West trade in the UN Conference on Trade and Development[5] have brought out many of the problems of closer economic cooperation between East and West, even though no more was being considered than to conduct this trade on the same basis as normal trade between western countries, that is to say with most-favoured-nation tariffs and with the use of quotas limited to certain defined emergencies.

From the point of view of the West, the difficulties derive first from the fact that the trade of communist countries (apart from Yugoslavia) is monopolised by state trading corporations which are subject to the orders of the governments. This means that trade could be used for purposes that were either strategic (e.g. the withholding of oil at a critical moment) or political (e.g. buying elsewhere unless a western country or firm complies with certain political stipulations). Since the governments of most communist countries are by no means friendly to the West, this argument causes western countries to feel the need to hold trade controls in reserve in case they should approach in any sector of their economies a condition of undue dependence on communist countries (which would be hard to define but not so hard to recognise).

Second, it is believed that state monopolies could use their bargaining power to exploit those with whom they trade for purely economic ends: to buy cheaper or sell dearer. It is important to get this argument into proportion. The state monopolies of the smaller communist countries occupy such a tiny corner of the world market for most of the things they buy or sell that they have little scope for any such exploitation. They are much less powerful than a large western firm. But, while there are very few products of which a communist state monopoly is a dominant

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[5] The UNCTAD material on this subject is contained in UN Document E/Conf. 46/PC.47 and UN Document E/Conf. 46/34. The problem of the relations between state-trading countries and Gatt is considered in PEP, East-West Trade (1965), pp. 156-61.

supplier, the orders that the trading corporations of the larger communist countries, and of Russia in particular, can place are so big that the West is right to regard this power as a potential danger to a degree that does not apply with respect to international trade in general.

Third, western countries fear that the trade with communist countries may lead to harmful economic disruption. This is because it is not possible to ascertain whether exports by the state trading corporations are being subsidised; even if they are not, the pricing systems of communist countries have no logic by the standards of market economies, and exports at domestic prices can therefore represent 'unfair' competition; and even if the communists stick to world market prices, their planning system is such that large surpluses can appear that would swamp the market. There is a further cause of economic disruption that is present in any trade between more and less developed countries, and that is worth stressing because it appears to those brought up on the static theory of classical economics as an unfortunate aberration rather than a fact of fundamental importance in contemporary world trade. This is that the more developed countries have an overwhelming advantage in the capital-intensive (i.e. modern) industries, while the more efficient of the less developed cannot be beaten in the labour-intensive (i.e. old-fashioned) industries. Thus if trade between the two is reasonably free, with low tariffs and no quotas, the old-fashioned industries will disappear in the more developed countries, while the modern industries will never take root in the less developed countries. This applies whether the trade is between Asia and Europe, between western Europe and the United States - or between eastern Europe and the West. Now the loss of old-fashioned industries may be uncomfortable for those sectors of an advanced economy, although the process of change can be eased by government help in reconversion, and is also generally eased and often actually prevented by means of high tariffs or special import controls; but the shove in the direction of modernisation is beneficial provided the transition is organised well. To the less developed country, on the other hand, the bargain seems likely to be one-sided; its modern industries will be nipped in the bud and it will be indefinitely relegated to industrial backwardness. It is

eastern Europe, therefore, and not the West that has cause to fear the consequences of freer trade between regions at widely different economic levels.

In fact the east Europeans would have no such fear because (except perhaps the Yugoslavs) they have no intention of abandoning the planned growth of their industries or of accepting the criterion of international compeition. The Poles offered to erect a tariff if this would enable them to negotiate like other members of Gatt; but it would not, because there is no reason to suppose that their choice whether to manufacture at home or to buy from abroad (which is the choice with which nations negotiating about tariffs are essentially concerned) would be altered in proportion to any change in the level of their tariff. Nor are they prepared to let their exports compete freely with those of other countries, by making their currency convertible. This would force them to devalue to a realistic exchange rate and would, even if this were done, introduce a new dimension of uncertainty into what is already a very uncertain sector of their national plans.

The Poles therefore favour an arrangement whereby, in return for a tariff cut that enabled them to sell more to another member of Gatt, they would increase their purchases from that member by an equivalent amount. But this, while it is a sensible and useful proposal, has little in common with the most-favoured-nation system of tariff cuts employed by market economies in Gatt: the reciprocal advantage offered by the Poles would not be extended to benefit all other suppliers of the product in question, as is the case with a mfn tariff cut; nor would the arrangement be in any way multilateral.

This is not to say that closer Polish involvement in Gatt, or a special form of membership for Poland, would be a bad thing. It might, perhaps, slightly weaken the organisation by adding to those special categories, such as agriculture, textiles, and developing countries, that now escape the rigour of its rules; but the Czechs are in any case already members, and for the Poles to join them would be a step towards better relations between East and West, and favour any convergence of the

two systems that might follow from a continued trend towards decentralisation and the introduction of market principles in the East. The lesson is, rather, that the differences between the economic systems of East and West are still such that trade has to be subject to special procedures that are not compatible with full membership of even an organisation like Gatt, which demands no element of integration. The Executive Secretary of Gatt has put it in a nutshell: 'If a free enterprise country comes into the Gatt it accepts a number of commitments. It makes an agreement as to the level of its tariff protection. . . . It agrees not to use import restrictions as a means of protection. It agrees to certain rules relating to subsidies, to dumping, to customs administration, all of which are designed to afford to its trading partners clearly ascertainable and agreed terms of access. . . . None of these conditions exist in a state-trading country.'[6] Even if the present members of Gatt deviate from these principles to a greater or lesser degree, it can hardly be denied that the organisation would be undermined by the introduction as full members of important countries from Eastern Europe that deviate from them wholesale. This is not to say that the difficulties are absolute or eternal. The structure of the Yugoslav economy may soon be decentralised enough to justify full membership of Gatt; and the other East European countries may well later follow suit. Liberal policies on the part of Western countries can moreover help to encourage such developments. But it is not wise to minimise the difficulties or to expect fundamental changes in the near future. The problems of economic relations between East and West are not going to be so quickly or easily solved.

Eastern Europe and Efta

It would be hard to envisage a free-trade grouping under modern conditions with looser institutional arrangements than Efta. Yet, the problems of a free trade trading relationship between Efta and eastern Europe would be those of the Gatt

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[6] E. Wyndham White, International Trade: Challenge and Response (Gatt, 1959), pp. 18, 19.

relationship writ large. The economies of the existing Efta members would be wide open to the possibilities of strategic or political pressure, to exploitation by state-trading monopolies, or to disruption due to the difference of economic systems or economic levels. Special controls could doubtless be maintained on trade with the eastern countries, but in this case there would not be a lot of point in pretending that they were a part of Efta. They, for their part, would find the rules of the association more stringent and therefore still harder to accept than those of Gatt. As in relation to Gatt, such difficulties are neither absolute nor eternal; a decentralisation of the Eastern economic systems may eventually change the situation, and Yugoslavia may even now be evolving a system that would make associate membership of Efta possible.

There is however a further, and more important, reason why the association of state-trading countries with Efta would be to the detriment of the existing members. There are grounds to believe that free trade between modern economies must be accompanied by a high degree of coordination of economic policies. To the classical economists, the government's duty was to keep out of economics, and its only part in free trade was to remove national barriers that should never have been there in the first place. But now that almost all governments plan and intervene in economic life in a variety of ways, a free trade area can hardly be sustained unless the plans and interventions of the member governments pull together instead of clashing with each other.

In order that the competition between free-trading partners can be fair, for example, it is necessary for them to enforce similar competition policies (with respect to monopolies and restrictive practices); there is no point in removing the import duty if imports are still excluded by a market-sharing agreement, or by the buying policy of a state-owned monopoly. What may be called 'market planning' is widely practised in certain sectors such as agriculture, energy, and transport; subsidies are granted or prices fixed by governments, and competition will be distorted unless government policies are brought into line. Target planning, whereby industries

are compelled to adhere to production targets rather than to aim at profitability under market conditions, is a variant of market planning with particular importance in eastern Europe. 'Welfare planning' can affect the conditions of competition by changing the distribution of resources as between different regions.

Thus competition, market, target and welfare planning all need to be coordinated in order to secure fair competition. In a free trade area, moreover, in which the several national economies are open to the economic forces generated in the economies of other members, failure to fulfil the objectives of full employment (or growth) and price stability in any one member can directly affect all the others. A common economic and financial policy therefore becomes necessary, based on a shared doctrine regarding the relative importance of these objectives and the merits of such different instruments of policy as monetary policy or price controls.

It will readily be seen that these fields in which common policies appear likely to be needed by a free trade area are those in which the EEC has from the outset had provision for the formation of common policies, and institutions in which they can be decided upon and by which they can be executed. Together with the free movement of people and of capital, and a common external commercial policy, which are also held to be necessary to the fair and effective functioning of a single market, these comprise the essential differences between the EEC and Efta. Failing a coalescence of the two organisations, it will be difficult enough in any case for Efta to evolve these attributes of economic union. The preponderant weight of Britain has the same inhibiting effect on supranational integration as does the presence of Russia in Comecon. If east European countries, with their sharply divergent economic systems and policies, were associated with Efta, its evolution towards economic union, whether on its own or by joining with the EEC, would become still more problematic. Thus the reasoning of those who oppose British entry into the EEC on the grounds that this route towards free trade in the West would cut across the possibility of free trade with the East may be turned on its head: so far from being an unnecessarily divisive factor, supranational institutions and provision for

common policies such as those of the EEC are a necessary concomitant of free trade among modern economies, and this makes it still harder to envisage any fruitful form of membership or associate membership for centrally-planned state-trading countries in the free trade systems of the West.

Eastern Europe and the EEC

The idea that the centralised state-trading economies of eastern Europe in their present form could become members or associate members of Efta, let alone of the European Community, is then an example of wishful thinking that a little cold logic will dispel. But this does not mean that, pending structural changes in the East European systems, trade cannot increase and other forms of economic cooperation develop. They have been, and they can, should and seem likely to go on doing so.

Trade between eastern and western Europe has greatly increased in the last ten years. It is, however, still a smaller percentage of the European countries' total trade than it was before the war; the east Europeans are anxious to buy more from the West; the economic development of eastern Europe seems likely to produce more goods than are saleable in western Europe (shortage of which, and poor marketing, being among the main brakes in trade at present); and western restrictions on imports from the East are likely to be relaxed rather than tightened. Thus the growth of trade seems likely to continue.

Although western investment in eastern Europe is precluded by communist doctrine, technical cooperation has been developing to a point where the distinction is almost becoming blurred. Sales of know-how have been important for some time. The new trade agreement between France and Rumania provides for extensive technical aid in agriculture and other fields. And many other instances of industrial collaboration between western firms and Polish or Hungarian state enterprises have taken economic partnership a stage further. With abundant labour and capital shortage in eastern Europe, such arrangements seem likely to flourish so long as the political climate is favourable.

Members of the EEC have played a leading part in this development of economic relations with the East (it was natural to mention France and Germany in the last paragraph as pioneers of two forms of technical cooperation). But although the EEC has a common tariff and an obligation to develop a common commercial policy, there have as yet been no negotiations between the Community as such and east European state-trading countries.

This is largely the fault of the East. Displeased, for political and strategic as well as certain economic reasons, at this new initiative towards unification in the West, the east Europeans at first treated the Community as if it did not exist. Khrushchav was the first to suggest in public that it might be advisable to do business with this vast new economic unit. The Poles have sent a delegation to visit the European Commission in Brussels. But officially the east Europeans still do not recognise the Community as the authority that deals with the tariffs of the Six, and they still claim most-favoured-nation tariff treatment, i.e. the extension to them of the Community's internal tariff cuts that will shortly have reduced the tariffs to zero. This is foolish both in theory and in practice: in theory because, as has been explained above, genuine and fair free trade between a centralised state-trading country and a modern free enterprise country would be incompatible with both systems; and in practice because the Community <u>is</u> the body that fixes the tariffs of the Six, and no amount of wishing otherwise will change this situation (the only agency that might do so is General de Gaulle, and this is unlikely, seeing what France would lose by the destruction of the Common Market). The east Europeans will undoubtedly have to come to terms with reality and accept that, if they want to negotiate on tariffs with the Six, they will have to do so through the institutions of the European Community.

The Community has tried to tempt eastern Europe into recognising the existence of the common external tariff by offering the Soviet Union a tariff cut on the oddly <u>dolce vita</u> items of caviar, crab (tinned), and vodka. So far this offer has been ignored. Apart from this, the Six have not been successful in forming a common

policy towards eastern Europe. This is too important a part of the foreign policies of both France and Germany for them to have been able to sink their different approaches in a common policy; and while General de Gaulle is the head of the French Government it will probably remain true that these difficulties 'make the prospect for any real progress on this front in the near future very remote'.[7]

It is possible that the Community, because of de Gaulle's opposition to its institutions, will remain unable to form a common commercial policy towards eastern Europe. De Gaulle may either break the Community, whose members might then join in a general west European free trade area; or, and more probably, he might take all the power of decision out of its institutions, leaving it unable to negotiate changes in its tariff - like a huge and helpless whale stranded on the shores of world trade. In either of these circumstances the relations of east European countries with those of western Europe would be likely to continue to develop as in the recent past, with increasing trade and technical cooperation on a bilateral basis. The east Europeans would remain as a number of small or medium-sized states poised between Russia and the West, attracted by the technical superiority of western Europe and feeling the pull of the centralised military and economic power of Russia.

It is, however, still probable that the Community will outlive de Gaulle and resume its progress towards common policies and the strengthening of its institutions. In this case the weight of western Europe in the international economic system will greatly increase, for the Community will negotiate as a unit of population not far short of 200 million with its present membership, at a high level of technology and living standards, and accounting for over a quarter of world trade. The balance of economic power in Europe would tilt towards the West and, in their balancing between Russia and western Europe, the east Europeans would lean more towards the latter than would otherwise be the case.

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[7] Miriam Camps, What Kind of Europe? (London, 1965), p. 68.

If this were the end of the story, it would still be a matter of great significance in the structure of European power politics and economics. The small and medium-sized states of eastern Europe have traditionally been pulled in opposite directions by Russia on the one hand and by western Europe, represented mainly by Germany, on the other. With the destruction of German power at the end of the war, the pull towards Russia became irresistible, and it is still sufficiently strong for it to be legitimate to classify the east Europeans as belonging to the 'Soviet bloc'. The existence in western Europe of an economic unit (and, in all probability, eventually a political unit too) nearly as populous as the Soviet Union and much richer and more advanced would, in the long run, redress this balance. Ideology and fear of Germany now stand in the way, but they are likely to fade with the passage of time. Eastern Europe's economic relations with western Europe might well become more important than those with Russia.

There is, however, a still more interesting possibility: that the chemistry of the Community's efforts to transcend the nation-state by means of economic integration and supranational institutions might induce a similar chemical reaction in eastern Europe. The establishment of the Common Market has stimulated 'a veritable rash of treaties and proposals for the creation of common markets all over the world'. Though 'various groups of underdeveloped countries have reasons of their own for wanting to create regional common markets - reasons quite independent of the integration movement in western Europe. . . every new plan for regional cooperation among the underdeveloped countries includes as one of its principal objectives the need to strengthen the hands of these countries in dealing with western Europe'.[8] The same arguments appear to hold good for eastern Europe as for the underdeveloped countries. In making his proposal for a unified planning board in Comecon, Khrushchev made it clear that the idea was derived from the supranational EEC.[9] Partly by force of example, more in order to countervail its

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[8] Sidney Dell, Trade Blocs and Common Markets (London, 1963), pp. 11-13.

[9] See Michael Kaser, op. cit. p. 93.

power, the successful development of the Community will provide a pressure in the direction of unification in eastern Europe.

Some people see the Community, in the long run, not so much causing the east Europeans to unite as attracting the several east European states into its orbit, whether as full members when they have evolved fully-functioning market economies or as associate members when they are on the way to doing so (as Yugoslavia may well now be). This possibility, which depends on radical changes taking place in the economic systems of east European countries, does of course refer to a longer term than that being considered in the analysis, above, of the problems of associating eastern and western countries given their present systems.

Yet other observers envisage that the process of union in eastern Europe will be accompanied by a special relationship with western Europe, leading eventually, perhaps, to a union of the two: 'A larger conception of a cooperative community, involving eventually four major units, America and Russia as the peripheral participants, and West Europe and East Europe as the two halves of the inner core (in time perhaps becoming even more closely linked), would provide a more constructive and politically appealing image of tomorrow than a troubled Western partnership implicitly based on the notion of continued European partition.'[10]

It is the prospects outlined in the last three paragraphs that are of the greatest interest: those implying that the European Community may represent not only a bloc (or a new federal state) but also a process, a chain reaction that induces unification in other parts of the world and eventually, perhaps, between itself and other similar units. It is not only Professor Brzezinski who, in the last quotation and with reference to eastern Europe, discerns such a possibility; the idea of the Community as a catalyst of integration rather than a great power is implicit in the thinking of M. Jean Monnet, the 'father of Europe', as expressed in a number of his speeches and articles: 'The natural attitude of a European Community based on the

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[10] Z.K. Brzezinski, 'Peaceful Engagement: a Plan for Europe's Future', Encounter, April 1965.

exercise by nations of common responsibilities will be to make these nations also aware of their responsibilities, as a Community, to the world. . . . European unity is the most important event in the West since the war, not because it is a new great power, but because the new institutional method it introduces is permanently modifying relations between nations and men'; and, again, the union of Europe is 'not an end in itself. It is the beginning of the road to the more orderly world that we must have if we are to escape destruction.'[11] This concept of integration as a process that, starting in western Europe, will induce integration in other parts of the world and perhaps in the world as a whole may become one of the great contemporary myths (the word is used in no pejorative sense - it is only fair to state that it is a myth with which this writer is in full sympathy). As such it deserves examination in relation to the problems of unity in eastern and western Europe.

East Europe and West Europe: problems of union

The experience of the European Community as well as of earlier attempts to create unions indicates that certain conditions are conducive to union and that a majority of them must be present in a certain degree if union is to take place.[12] These conditions will now be considered in relation to the various possibilities of integration within eastern Europe or as between eastern and western Europe.

One set of conditions has already emerged during the examination of eastern Europe in relation to Gatt and Efta. There has to be a broad similarity of economic institutions if close association or, still more, if integration is to be feasible. Not only is it extremely hard to see how fair competition can be ensured between free enterprise economies on the one hand and highly centralised state-trading economies on the other; but the integrating economies must, as explained earlier, have enough

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[11] Speech by Jean Monnet at the Second World Congress on Man-made Fibres, 1 May 1962, and at Dartmouth College, 11 June 1961.

[12] The conditions are considered in more detail in the writer's chapter on the EEC in Evan Luard et al., Evolution of International Organisations (London, 1966). In this chapter the writer has drawn heavily, with respect to the earlier union, on K.C. Wheare, Federal Government (London, 1951).

similarity in their objectives and instruments of economic policy to strike a similar balance between such objectives as full employment and price stability, and between such instruments as monetary policy and price controls. This argues against union between East and West so long as their economic systems are radically different. It does not count against integration within eastern Europe, but here another factor must be recalled. It was shown earlier that there are serious obstacles to the fusion of economies based on centralised and imperative target planning rather than on the criteria of markets and profits. A union of centrally-planned monoliths appears as an all-or-nothing process of absorption in a large unit; that of decentralised market economies can, as the EEC has shown, take place gradually and without any vast and sudden surrender of sovereignty. Effective integration in eastern Europe will therefore probably have to wait on far-reaching progress towards a system of market economy, which is by no means out of the question; Yugoslavia, it may be repeated, appears to be well on the way towards this. The introduction of market principles in the other east European countries will, however, take time, though less time than would be required for a similarity with west European economic institutions and objectives to develop, such as would be required before any integration of eastern and western economies would be possible.

A broad similarity of economic levels (living standards, productivity, level of technology) was also found earlier to be desirable if different economies are to be associated in a single market. This condition is on the whole satisfied with respect to a union of eastern Europe, which has a long way to catch up before it could be said to have reached a level similar to that of western Europe.

It is often stated that a political union is likely to follow from the economic union of the European Community. This is a rather misleading statement, because the Economic Community is already charged with the formation of common policies on questions of great political import. Those who speak in these terms ignore the fact that a large part of politics concerns questions of economic policy. It would be more correct to say that the Economic Community is a political union whose

responsibilities might eventually be extended to other political questions such as defence. But whatever the terminology, it will readily be understood that the members of an economic union must together undertake a variety of exacting political tasks, and in this they are not likely to be successful unless they have broadly similar political institutions and ideas. This has been true in the European Community: when the Treaties were made each member was a parliamentary democracy centred on Christian-Democrat, Socialist, and Liberal parties. It is true of eastern Europe. It is hardly likely to be true of eastern and western Europe together for a long time to come.

The question of balance between the members has also been considered earlier. Union is not likely to take place if it would be dominated by one member who is much more powerful than the others. The presence of Russia therefore precludes the integration of all the existing members of Comecon. Likewise a United Europe 'from the Atlantic to the Urals' is an abortive concept, unless it is based on the pre-condition of a federal union of western Europe, which is hardly what de Gaulle has in mind; European Russia alone, with over 150 million people, is three times as populous as any other European state. It may be said in passing, though it is not the subject of this essay, that an Atlantic Common Market of North America and western Europe has been firmly consolidated (and even then it is hard to envisage a union consisting almost entirely of two giants). On this score, a union of the east European countries except Russia would be practicable. As far as the possibility of eventual entry of eastern Europe into the EEC is concerned, the east European countries separately would not be likely to unbalance it, but they would be hard to accommodate if they were to enter as an already-formed unit.

It has also been found necessary that, at least during the time of formation and consolidation of the union, the largest members should be in close alliance. There is, clearly, a major problem here in relation to eastern Europe. The individual countries have been all to prone to adopt attitudes of narrow nationalism, such as would render union out of the question.

It is, finally and perhaps obviously, necessary for the prospective members of a union to desire it strongly. Many forces will act against it: nationalism, vested interests, inertia. Without powerful motives such as the desire for independence, for defence against an outside power, or for economic gain, and without a profound dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs, these reactionary forces are not likely to be overcome. In the case of eastern Europe, it is not difficult to envisage the existence of these conditions. Dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs has erupted at intervals; independence from Russia is deeply desired by many; a need for economic defence against the Common Market is likely to be felt; and the economic gain from large-scale production for a large market was already seen in most of the countries when the negotiations took place about integration in Comecon. If the other political and economic conditions were already fulfilled, some of these motives might well apply to a union of east European countries with the European Community, in addition to which would be the East's need for capital, the West's need for labour, and the need of both sides for a solution of the German problem.

This analysis has shown that the necessary conditions for union in eastern Europe might well be present in the coming years, provided that the countries there can both overcome their excessive nationalism and find a way of uniting alongside, but apart from, Russia. Union between eastern and western Europe, on the other hand, would have to await a political and economic convergence that will probably be a long time coming, and if eastern Europe has by then already united, questions of balance will make it hard to fuse this unit with western Europe, except within a wider framework.

If a union of the east European countries apart from Russia is indeed possible the West should welcome and encourage it. Polycentrism is an improvement on the hegemony that went before it; but if taken to its logical conclusion it is no more than balkanisation. The geographical connotations of the term are too evocative for the instability of such a system - or rather non-system - to be ignored. What is needed is an 'organised rebuttal' of hegemony, as Professor Hallstein described the

European Community, rather than the disorganised rebuttal that polycentrism represents. A united eastern Europe, standing between Russia and the West and too strong to be dominated by either side, would be a much more stable arrangement: neither hegemony nor polycentrism, but perhaps oligocentrism.

Such a union would have to come about with Russian agreement - the Red Army is stationed in some of the countries concerned. It would, however, be necessary in any case to proceed by stages, with for example an intensification of bilateral economic relations between the prospective members and specific projects like the lower Danube scheme. This would reassure the Russians that no sharp and sudden realignment was contemplated. It cannot, indeed, be the case that the Russians would oppose all schemes for union: the Czechs and Poles have discussed a far-reaching plan of economic association, and it was not Russian opposition but the Czechs' fear of Poland's larger size (absence of that balance which is a desirable condition of union) that prevented agreement. There is no reason to suppose that the Russians would stand in the way of a wider union in Eastern Europe; but people in the West would have to avoid seeing the process as a defeat for Russia; it would no more be a defeat for Russia than the establishment of the European Community was a defeat for the United States.

If this union were realised, then the Nato and Warsaw Pact areas would contain four major units - western Europe, eastern Europe, America, and Russia: what might be called a Greater Europe divided into four main parts. These units would themselves be of sizes that would constitute a reasonable balance should political and economic conditions evolve so that closer relations between them were possible. At the appropriate time their association could be cemented by a political settlement that would include arms control, agreement on economic collaboration, and a solution of the German problem (which would then be, in relation to the whole of the area and the problems involved, of the order of magnitude of the Saar problem in the fifties).

It would be possible for the West to encourage this whole process not only by means of better trading relations through, for example, closer east European involvement in Gatt, but also by judicious assistance such as has been suggested by Professor Brzezinski. The transport system of eastern Europe might be a suitable object of aid in the first instance, with stress on provisions to facilitate traffic between the east European countries whose union it is desired to promote, although communications through these countries from western Europe to Russia should at the same time be improved. A 'Marshall Plan' for the east European economies as a whole might follow at the time of the political settlement.

It may be objected that the sketching out of such grand designs is not a realistic exercise: useless and perhaps harmful. Some of the precedents are discouraging. Dulles's concept of roll-back, the Bolsheviks' world revolution, and de Gaulle's concert of European powers have all been potent sources of dangerous actions. But all political acts are based on a view of the future, and the most dangerous view of all, the one that is absolutely certain to be wrong, is that nothing will change. No more is claimed for the view put forward here than that it is possible, it is desirable, and it is therefore worth trying to bring about.

No. 152
4/1/68

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The Atlantic Institute
L'Institut Atlantique

THOUGHTS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS

by

Klaus Mehnert (West-Germany)

Prepared for a conference of the Atlantic Institute, Paris, Jan. 25-27, 68

Not for Quotation or Citation

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THOUGHTS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS

KLAUS MEHNERT (WEST-GERMANY)

This answer to the six questions concerning 1975 is quite hesitant and very brief, to leave a little room for the presentation of one particular aspect - the relations between China and the West.

1. I expect (and expect does not mean: approve) a thinning out of American forces in Europe - much less of Soviet forces, if at all; only minuscule progress toward a settlement of the German question; some rapprochement between the western and eastern economic systems, mainly by the slow increase of Libermanization in the communist countries.

2. Liberalization will contiue, less in the USSR than in the ex-satellites; the degree of COMECONization will decrease, but not spectacularly.

3. There will still be an Ulbricht East Germany, whether under Ulbricht or under his successor. The "policy of small steps" on the part of Bonn will have but small success because East Berlin will remain opposed to any rapprochement that would lessen its hold on its subjects. Material conditions in East Germany will improve, restlessness will decrease, love of Ulbricht will not increase.

4. As long as the general is in charge of France, there will be no progress in the integration of Western Europe (apart from the implementation of decisions already made among the Six).

5. If integration should stagnate, bilateral relations between western and eastern countries will progress, if integration should move ahead, bilateralism will have to decline.

6. In my view, the integration of Western Europe is most desirable, and if it succeeds, the coordination of Western European policies toward Eastern Europe will follow.

If I may, I would like to give some thought to a question not raised specifically in the questionnaire, yet of considerable interest for the future of East-West relations: the question of China.

As of now (end of November 1967) there are no signs of a renewed onslaught of Maoism in the guise of the great proletarian cultural revolution. Whether Mao has decided on a pause or whether he has given up hope to change China and the Chinese in his image, I do not know. At any rate, the opposition to Maoism (that means: revisionism - or, in Maos terms: Khrushchevism) has proved much stronger than he had expected. As a result, I proceed on the hypothesis that Maoism is on the way out, and that by 1975 Chinese Khrushchevism will be on the way in. During the last years, the Chinese Khrushchevites have not been able to communicate to the world what they would do if they were to come to power. But from the attacks of the Maoists against them, which took a considerable part of their propaganda during the last twelve months, we have a rather good idea about the Khrushchevites. Here we are less concerned with their possible future domestic affairs (which I would expect to be indeed Khrushchevian) but with their foreign policies. These are likely to be characterized by these features:

The Chinese Khrushchevites will try to undo the damage of selfisolation brought about by the Maoists - in all parts of the world. To that purpose they will try to improve their relations with the other communist states and with the West. Theirs will be a pragmatic approach. They will be quite conscious of the rapidly growing population and of the necessity for increasing production. Therefore they will be in favor of getting whatever aid they can get, without strings if possible,

and they will probably understand, that the strings are the thinner the more numerous they are. They will not swing back completely to the Soviet side, but rather exploit the old game of playing one against the other and of thereby increasing aid from both sides. Only in one case would they have to turn to Moscow completely - if the West forced them to. The West should not. Whatever the West can do to make the China of 1975 an independent state on the world scene (including bringing it into the UN, while saving Taiwan from communist domination), the West should do; in fact, the West should make it known in time that it will do this in order to signal this possibility to the Chinese Khrushchevites while they are still ante portas.

With the decline of Maoism, China will also try to improve its relations with the Third World which will not be so easy after all the "china" that has been broken. But there is no need for the West to get panicky about it, because the economic attraction of China will remain small, and it is by the possible economic gains for them that the Third World leaders will judge China.

In view of the importance of the China problem, I would be grateful if it could be dealt with at the forthcoming conference.

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The Atlantic Institute
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SOME NOTES ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN THE 1970s

by

Niels Haagerup

Prepared for a Conference of the Atlantic Institute, January 25-27, 1968, Paris

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Some Notes on East-West Relations in the 1970s

1. A multilateral solution to national security problems is fundamentally a new approach, especially for the small formerly neutral countries (such as Denmark and Norway). The existence of an integrated defense system has given purpose and meaning to the national defense of even a small and exposed country. It has resulted in considerable savings, enabled the participating countries to pursue an independent course vis-à-vis a potential opponent - compare Danish-German relations in the thirties with Danish-Soviet relations after World War II - and created channels for a fruitful military cooperation between small powers and larger powers - such as between Denmark and Germany - which would appear to be much more difficult and perhaps impossible to achieve on a bilateral basis.

2. Granted that a "final settlement" of the outstanding European problems such as the German problem may result in a very different situation than the present, it is suggested that the continued existence of a multilateral security framework be maintained during the long transitional period between the present system of alliances and the creation of some kind of European security system guaranteed by the United States and the Soviet Union. (Attention is drawn to the direct roads to European security and the indirect roads listed in Mr. Karl Birnbaum's paper).

3. It is important, however, that the present integrated NATO defense system not become a stumbling block to progress in the field of arms control measures in Europe or to the development of a political détente, but that the experiences gained under the present system be exploited for carrying out such measures.

4. The outlook is not very bright, as the Communist countries in Europe have - for the most part - committed themselves to a campaign for the dissolution of NATO in 1969 (cp. the Karlovy Vary statement of April 1967) and at the same time of the Warsaw Pact. On the Western side the Harmel Report does not make very satisfactory provision for a multilateral approach in furthering détente. Article 7 states in part: As sovereign states the Allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collective decision. The Alliance affords an effective forum and clearing house for the exchanges of information and views; each Ally can decide its policy in the light of close knowledge of the problems and objectives of the others. To this end the practice of frank and timely consultations needs to be deepened and improved... Article 10 reads: Currently, the development of contacts between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe is mainly on a bilateral basis. Certain subjects, of course, require by their very nature a multilateral solution.

5. Therefore, the problem for the NATO countries is to develop plans which may result in practical proposals for the use of the integrated defense system to promote and, if possible, to inspect and control various arms control schemes such as mutual troop reductions and the setting-up of observation posts (cp. Birnbaum p. 2). At the same time, diplomatic efforts must be made to ensure that the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, in particular Poland and Czechoslovakia, become convinced that the existence of integrated NATO commands may offer all parties certain advantages during a transitional period. Mr. Birnbaum states (p. 14) that "the German government may become increasingly aware of the need to lend credibility to its declaratory policy of reconciliation by adopting distinctly non-provocative military postures and by exhibiting a sincere interest in regional arms control measures." This is believed to be possible only if the continued (if only temporary) existence of NATO and the US presence in Europe are assured. A gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces from Germany and growing signs of the dissolution of NATO will make it very hard for any German government to

"adopt distinctly non-provocative military postures" when the traditional Soviet distrust of (West) Germany is taken into consideration.

6. The problem, therefore, becomes the very difficult one of convincing the Soviet Union that the NATO defense system, guaranteeing continued U.S. military involvement in European affairs and a non-nuclear and a "non-provocative" military posture by Germany, is to the interest of the Soviet Union in the transitional period. Just as the West has now acknowledged that a policy of détente is a precondition for an eventual settlement of the outstanding European problems, the Soviet Union must realize the positive value of existing western security arrangements until an agreement on a European security system has been worked out. Presently members of NATO would be extremely reluctant to give up the many advantages of the present security set-up, committing as it does the U.S. to a European role and Germany to a non-nuclear posture, unless and until the advantages of an alternative system become convincing.

7. It is assumed that the "transitional period" will not end but may in fact only begin in the seventies and may last the rest of the century (cp. Mr. Adam Yarmolinsky's paper). If that is realistic, it will be necessary to inject plans for limited arms control measures and the consequences thereof in the rolling five year defense planning of NATO - currently extending beyond 1972 - and to present such plans to the Soviet Union and East European countries with a view to prolonging the existence of the NATO defense system until the end of the transitional period. It is not believed that the Warsaw Pact presently corresponds to NATO as far as the defense set-up is concerned, but it is by no means excluded that the Warsaw Pact (read: Soviet Union) might be encouraged to set up similar arrangements. It is not visualized that a diplomatic approach be attempted on a multilateral basis (negotiations between the two Pact organizations which are in fact very different in scope and character) but that at least the initial negotiations take place between the two super powers or possibly within the four power framework.

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The Atlantic Institute
L'Institut Atlantique

1975 : TROIS EUROPES POSSIBLES

par

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Notes sur le Colloque de l'INSTITUT ATLANTIQUE

Paris, 25 - 27 Janvier 1968

24 quai du 4-Septembre, 92 Boulogne-sur-Seine, France
Tel. 825 51-40 Cable : Atlinst-Paris

1975 : TROIS EUROPES POSSIBLES

Rien n'est plus difficile que de prévoir une situation à échéance de huit à dix ans. L'auteur serait prêt à parier que, dans deux ou trois ans, malgré l'échéance atlantique de 1969, la situation de l'Europe n'aura pas fondamentalement changé, en ce sens qu'elle continuera à être fondamentalement déterminée par la présence des Etats-Unis et de l'Union Soviétique, et que le problème allemand n'y aura pas évolué de manière décisive. Inversement, l'auteur serait également prêt à parier que dans vingt-cinq ou trente ans la situation sera aussi fondamentalement différente de celle d'aujourd'hui que celle-ci l'est de celle de 1945.

Le ver est dans le fruit du statu quo . Les deux Grands ont échoué dans la construction de deux empires ou de deux communautés (ou d'une communauté et d'un empire) qui auraient institutionnalisé et rendu irréversibles leur présence au centre du continent et leurs liens avec leurs moitiés respectives de l'Europe et de l'Allemagne . La "belle au bois dormant" allemande, qui n'en est encore qu'à s'étirer paresseusement, est cependant sortie de son sommeil. D'autre part les problèmes intérieurs et asiatiques des Etats-Unis et de l'U.R.S.S. vont requérir de plus en plus leur attention. La tendance des prochaines décennies sera donc à une Europe plus différenciée par rapport aux Etats-Unis et à l'U.R.S.S. (ou à une présence et une attention américaine et soviétique moins directes) et à une importance croissante du problème allemand.

Deuxièmement, cette Europe qui ne sera plus l'Europe divisée et passive de la guerre froide, ne sera cependant aucune des deux Europes plus "européennes" que l'on a voulu et que l'on s'efforce encore de leur substituer. L'Europe fédérale de Jean MONNET, (Etats-Unis d'Europe sous la forme d'une communauté intégrée s'étendant progressivement à partir de l'Europe des Six en accord avec les Etats-Unis) , l'Europe des Etats du Général de Gaulle (retour à un équilibre continental, de l'Atlantique

à l'Oural, et à un concert européen, dominé par la surveillance réciproque de la France, de l'Allemagne et de la Russie où la première jouerait le rôle décisif d'intermédiaire et de fléau de la balance) sont toutes les deux condamnées à ne voir se réaliser que certains de leurs éléments, non leur structure d'ensemble. Avec l'aide du changement d'image présenté par l'U.R.S.S. (déstalinisation) et du changement d'attitude esquissé par les Etats-Unis (Viet-Nam, NPT) le Général de Gaulle a montré sa grande efficacité négative en portant à l'intégration européenne sous sa forme classique un coup plus ambigu mais, en profondeur, encore plus grave qu'à la coopération atlantique, il a montré sa totale impuissance positive en ne faisant aucun progrès dans l'acceptation, à l'Ouest ou à l'Est, de l'Europe triangulaire et, en fait, franco-russe de ses rêves.

On peut exprimer le résultat de manière positive en disant que la nouvelle Europe constituera une synthèse des "deux hégémonies" et des deux "grands desseins" européens : il y aura un élément de contrôle et d'influence soviétique et américaine (de style bi-polaire), un élément d'interdépendance économique (de style monnettiste), et un élément de "re-nationalisation" politique (de style gaulliste).

Mais dire cela ne nous apprend pas grand-chose sur la proportion de ces différents éléments et donc sur l'aspect d'ensemble de l'Europe future et sur les perspectives qu'elle offrirait à la solution de problèmes comme celui de l'Allemagne.

Encore moins cela nous permet-il de prévoir lequel de ces éléments aura progressé le plus vite d'ici 1975. Aussi, pour cette date, ne pouvons-nous guère qu'indiquer les facteurs et les limites de l'évolution, autrement dit les éléments de certitude et d'incertitude, et esquisser trois modèles possibles, parmi lesquels il nous semble facile de suggérer un ordre de préférence, mais difficile d'indiquer un ordre de probabilité.

Il va de soi qu'un premier élément à la fois de certitude et d'incertitude est celui, d'ordre biologique, démographique et personnel, qu'il n'est pas nécessaire de préciser davantage. C'est précisément en raison des limites de ce que peuvent faire les Européens que sa date revêt une importance décisive. Une Europe unie et active n'a pas toujours été et ne sera pas toujours impossible ; mais elle n'est ni donnée actuellement ni inévitable. En 1962-63, un coup d'arrêt a été donnée à une Europe qui aurait pu, dans la foulée des succès du Marché Commun et de l'échec soviétique à Cuba, entamer des progrès décisifs à la fois dans la construction communautaire et dans les relations Est-Ouest y compris le problème allemand. Ce mouvement peut reprendre ; mais il exige non seulement une participation de l'Angleterre à l'Europe et un changement de politique de la France (qui, l'un et l'autre, nous semblent très probables sur ce point dans une perspective post-gaulliste) mais encore que le contexte international, que l'attitude non seulement des grandes puissances mais aussi de l'Allemagne y soient encore propices le moment venu.

C'est là que l'incertitude sur la date nous paraît essentielle. Une première course de vitesse entre la construction européenne, le contexte international, et la renaissance des divergences nationales, a été provisoirement perdue par la première, avant tout à cause du Général de Gaulle. Il ne dépend plus uniquement de son absence qu'une nouvelle course de vitesse soit gagnée. Le facteur qui, hier surtout et aujourd'hui encore, a rendu et rend impossible une approche occidentale coordonnée est la France ; aujourd'hui déjà par les effets indirects de la guerre du Viet-Nam et des tentations américaines de "gaullisme de grande puissance" , et plus encore demain, par l'effet probable de la réduction non moins probable de leur présence militaire et de leur coopération politique, ce sont les Etats-Unis ; demain et après-demain, cela risque d'être l'Allemagne qui, ayant respiré l'air du large, ne sera pas nécessairement prête à retrouver le foyer communautaire le jour où ses alliés voudraient y retourner.

Cela dépendra évidemment des tentations ou des ressentiments produits en elle par les séductions ou les rebuffades auxquelles elle aura été soumise par l'Union Soviétique. Un changement d'attitude de celle-ci sur le problème allemand ne peut guère lui-même qu'être produit par une évolution soit de son régime intérieur, soit de sa domination en Europe de l'Est, soit de ses rapports avec la Chine et avec les Etats-Unis qui, pour être probables à long terme, sont encore plus difficiles à dater et à préciser.

Une fois de plus, nous trouvons des lignes d'évolution à la fois distinctes et interdépendantes, qui produiront des résultats fondamentalement différents selon leurs degrés respectifs d'avancement lors de leur rencontre.

Nous nous trouvons donc en présence de trois facteurs certains de jouer un rôle décisif et direct, et d'un facteur potentiel dont le rôle , aujourd'hui n'est ni direct ni décisif, mais dont le rôle demain, pourrait être l'un et l'autre . Les trois premiers sont l'Union Soviétique, les Etats-Unis et l'Allemagne ; le quatrième est constitué par tout ce qui se trouve , à l'Est et à l'Ouest, dans la zone intermédiaire et fluide des deux Europes.

La structure politique et militaire du continent est dominée par la confrontation de l'U.R.S.S. et des Etats-Unis qui s'exprime par leur double présence en Allemagne ; cette présence de chacun des deux grands est commandée à la fois par le souci de contenir l'autre et par celui de se prémunir contre l'éventualité d'une Allemagne dangereuse soit par sa puissance autonome , soit par son alliance avec l'autre grand. Pour chacun des deux grands, la puissance et le danger actuels de l'autre, la puissance et le danger potentiels de l'Allemagne sont les deux considérations décisives en matière de sécurité européenne. Leur politique envers les alliés de l'autre (France, Grande-Bretagne, dans un cas, Europe de l'Est dans l'autre)

resteront subordonnées à ces considérations.

Pour l'instant donc, quelles que soient les initiatives diplomatiques ou les évolutions sociales et idéologiques en Europe de l'Ouest et de l'Est, elles n'auront d'importance décisive que si elles modifient la manière dont les Etats-Unis et l'Union Soviétique évaluent leurs relations entre eux et avec l'Allemagne. A leur tour, ces relations risquent d'être influencées avant tout par l'évolution intérieure en Allemagne même (celle de la R.F.A., celle de la R.D.A. , et celle de leurs rapports réciproques) et par des développements extra-européens, course aux armements stratégiques, problèmes intérieurs, problème chinois. L'évolution intérieure de la Chine aura autant d'influence sur le sort de l'Europe qu'aucun évènement proprement européen, s'il est vrai que pour les Etats-Unis et l'U.R.S.S. l'importance respective accordée aux deux"puissances potentielles", Allemagne et Chine, manifeste une certaine interdépendance qui affecte la nature de leurs alliances et de leurs oppositions et les priorités de leurs intérêts.

La structure de l'Europe, donc, dépendra essentiellement à court terme, d'évolutions soit intérieures soit extra-européennes. Les Etats de l'Europe de l'Ouest et de l'Est influenceront ces évolutions soit en offrant des exemples soit en provoquant des crises dont l'importance tiendra essentiellement à la manière dont ils affecteront l'attitude de l'Allemagne, celle des Etats-Unis et celle de l'U.R.S.S. . On peut penser à une sortie de la France de l'Alliance atlantique, à une sortie de la Roumanie du Pacte de Varsovie, à une crise du type 1956 dans un autre pays d'Europe de l'Est.

A long terme, les Etats européens pourraient, en constituant une unité politique à l'Ouest et en institutionalisant leurs liens avec l'Est, créer le facteur nouveau qui capable de contenir l'U.R.S.S. et d'encadrer l'Allemagne, permettrait de donner au continent une stabilité qui ne serait pas fondée sur la présence directe et prédominante des Etats-Unis et de l'U.R.S.S. Mais , tant au point de vue deses conditions de possibilité que de ses conséquences,un pareil développement seul à offrir des promesses d'une évolution constructive ne peut être isolé des variables relativement indépendantes que constituent l'évolution du sentiment

national dans les deux Allemagnes et celle de la priorité accordée par les Etats-Unis et l'URSS aux affaires européennes.

De toute façon, il est douteux que les deux processus (solidaires à long terme et parfois contradictoires à court terme) d'intégration de l'Europe occidentale et de réunification de l'Europe dans son ensemble soient suffisamment avancés en 1975 pour permettre aux deux grands une pareille "révision apaisante" même s'ils en avaient le désir. Mais il n'est pas exclu que 1975 nous trouve "sinon au commencement de la fin du moins à la fin du commencement" c'est-à-dire dans une situation où à l'intérieur des deux alliances, les Etats d'Europe de l'Ouest et à un moindre degré, ceux de l'Europe de l'Est, auraient commencé à nouer suffisamment de liens entre eux et avec leurs vis-à-vis, pour commencer à esquisser, en filigrane, cette Europe future.

Il est malheureusement tout aussi peu exclu que, les processus de désintégration ayant pris le pas sur ceux d'intégration, on soit, en 1975, sortis du statu quo non dans la direction d'un règlement Européen mais dans celle de la balkanisation ou de l'anarchie. Là aussi, il est douteux que le processus en arrive à un terme catastrophique dans les sept prochaines années. Mais les deux directions à partir de la situation actuelle existent en puissance. Elles nous permettent de passer aux trois hypothèses annoncées, qu'on pourrait désigner sous les noms de:

1/- division coopérative (ou détente sur la base du statu quo);

2/- anarchie (ou balkanisation);
et,

3/- la Troisième Europe (ou intégration européenne nouvelle manière, ou "with a difference")

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La première serait obtenue par la simple extrapolation des phénomènes actuels. Elle correspondrait aux voeux de la plupart des gouvernements d'Europe de l'Est, en particulier de la Pologne et de la Tchécoslovaquie, pour qui la meilleure voie vers le rapprochement est de consolider la division, la meilleure voie vers le changement est de consacrer le statu quo, la meilleure voie vers le dégel est de commencer par geler la situation actuelle. Naturellement la clef de cet apparent paradoxe est la distinction entre ce qui concerne la sécurité, le statu quo territorial, et la division de l'Allemagne d'une part, les échanges et la coopération économiques et culturels de l'autre, la netteté des frontières dans le premier cas rendant possible le dialogue par-dessus elles dans le second.

Si les Etats qui professent ouvertement cette opinion sont une minorité, ceux qui l'acceptent facilement sont peut-être une majorité et ceux qui constatent qu'elle correspond à la situation actuelle sont la totalité. Ce qui se passe aujourd'hui c'est bien un dialogue par-dessus le mur et à l'ombre des hégémonies. On assiste d'une part à une multiplication des initiatives et des dialogues entrecroisés ou contradictoires des petites et moyennes puissances, d'autre part à l'immobilité intacte du statu quo, voire à la consolidation des Etats existants, y compris l'Allemagne de l'Est. "Accepter les réalités" est un slogan de plus en plus général; ce qu'il signifie, c'est que les deux grandes idées, complémentaires ou rivales, des Etats-Unis d'Europe et de la réunification de l'Allemagne qui, toutes deux, visaient à la création ou la reconstitution d'une nouvelle unité politique, sont "redéfinies" de manière à signifier la coopération entre unités existantes. C'est là faire un grand pas dans la direction de la conception gaulliste de l'unité et de la conception soviétique de la sécurité

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européenne. Mais les Etats-Unis et l'Allemagne Fédérale semblent en passe d'abandonner des schémas plus ambitieux (tels que l'isolement de l'Allemagne de l'Est) et se contenter d'espérer un progrès dans un abaissement général des barrières (militaires, économiques, idéologiques, humaines) entre Etats, entre Allemagnes, entre Sociétés, entre Superpuissances, dans la mesure où il ne mettrait pas en cause la sécurité et la stabilité liées aux structures actuelles.

On peut se demander cependant si cette vision d'une coexistence indéfinie entre les caractères contradictoires telle que la bipolarité militaire et le polycentrisme politique, la stabilité territoriale et la manoeuvre diplomatique, des politiques nationalistes et des économies interdépendantes, etc... n'est pas essentiellement statique: les différents niveaux ne doivent-ils pas réagir les uns sur les autres jusqu'à ce que certains l'emportent et d'autres soient éliminés ? Leur intéraction ne doit-elle pas influencer un niveau moins manifeste que les manoeuvres des uns et la présence militaire des autres mais non moins important en profondeur - celui des mentalités politiques, idéologiques et sociales, et des liens psychologiques entre élites dirigeantes et entre Sociétés ? Aujourd'hui déjà, une des doubles tendances caractéristiques est l'accroissement de la supériorité économique et de l'influence culturelle des Etats-Unis et le déclin de leur influence politique: au "gap" technologique à l'avantage des Etats-Unis correspond, sous l'effet principal du Viet-Nam et du Général de Gaulle, un fossé politique et psychologique entre eux et leurs alliés Européens qui profite à l'Union Soviétique: au déclin de celle-ci comme modèle économique et social correspondent ses gains sur le plan diplomatique. Il faut beaucoup de marxisme vulgaire (associé à un impérialisme naïf chez certains Américains et à un anti-américanisme délirant

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chez certains Européens)pour adhérer au déterminisme technologique qui croit que l'influence politique des Etats-Unis croît proportionnellement au rayon d'action de leurs avions de transport au nombre de têtes nucléaires portées par leurs fusées, ou aux nombres d'entreprises européennes tombées sous leur contrôle. Curieusement, la supériorité matérielle des Etats-Unis semble encourager à la fois Américains et Gaullistes à faire des concessions à l'Union Soviétique. Un effet paradoxal de la politique du Général de Gaulle, si on prolongeait les tendances actuelles, serait soit de consolider le statu quo qu'il déteste, soit d'aboutir à une Europe dominée économiquement par les Etats-Unis et politiquement par l'Union Soviétique, avec, comme Second dans les deux rôles, l'Allemagne plutôt que la France.

En effet, et c'est notre seconde hypothèse, la combinaison actuelle de manoeuvres diplomatiques, de stabilité territoriale et d'évolution économique et psychologique, peut aboutir à l'érosion cumulative du statu quo aussi bien qu'à son maintien. Les explorations diplomatiques qui redécouvrent le statu quo , les petits pas sans la perspective d'en amener de grands, peuvent n'avoir qu'un temps et provoquer des déceptions et des ressentiments dangereux.

Les grandes puissances peuvent soit en tirer argument pour renforcer l'aspect coopératif de la bipolarité et aboutir à une vraie solidarité, soit, au contraire, dans le cas des Etats-Unis, être tentées de se dégager par rapport à des alliés ingrats et, dans le cas de l'Union Soviétique, être tentées de séduire des adversaires insatisfaits.

A une extrémité (par la proximité dans le temps, la vraisemblance et la relative absence d'effets tragiques) on trouve la probabilité d'une course au désarmement, en Europe, entre les Etats-Unis et l'Allemagne Fédérale. A

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l'autre on trouverait la possibilité de l'URSS jouant pour de bon le jeu (qu'elle ne fait aujourd'hui qu'esquisser) de la division entre Occidentaux et le poussant jusqu'à provoquer ou exploiter le retrait des troupes américaines du continent et jusqu'à entamer avec l'Allemagne le jeu prédit successivement par chaque dictateur soviétique et qui laisserait aussitôt dans l'ombre les préliminaires franco-russes.

Entre les deux, et plus généralement, l'Europe devrait entrer dans une ère de relative imprévisibilité et insatisfaction. Au centre l'Allemagne, ayant perdu une communauté sans avoir trouvé un rôle, se trouverait dans la situation instable par excellence d'avoir à mener une politique nationale sans buts nationaux réalisables.

Les autres Etats, avec la voie des manoeuvres indépendantes, retrouveraient celle des conflits nationaux et territoriaux.

Dans les deux cas, les conséquences ne seraient pas celles du passé grâce, avant tout, au maintien de la présence des Grands.

Mais d'une part cette présence coïnciderait avec un écart croissant entre les préoccupations des Grands et celles des Petits et des Moyens; ceux-ci la subiraient soit par résignation devant la force soit par calcul de sécurité; tout en ne cessant pas d'être nécessaire, elle apparaîtrait de moins en moins naturelle. Comme, d'autre part, elle aurait une priorité diminuée dans la politique des Grands, en particulier des Etats-Unis, ils s'efforceraient de la continuer avec le minimum de risques et de coûts, et ils pourraient envisager, dans un contexte domestique et international transformé, de la transformer elle-même d'une manière qui deviendrait qualitative.

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L'Europe alors retrouverait en partie le sort d'autres régions du monde, comme le Moyen-Orient ou l'Asie, dont les Etats-Unis et l'URSS ne se désintéressent pas mais où, faute d'otages, nul ne peut assurer à l'avance dans quelle mesure ils sont engagés, dans quelle mesure ils contrôlent leurs amis et quelles formes peuvent prendre leur protection et leur contrôle. L'Europe aurait perdu plus de sécurité qu'elle n'aurait gagné d'indépendance.

C'est précisément dans la perception de ces dangers par les Européens que réside la chance de notre troisième hypothèse - que nous avons appelée celle de la"troisième Europe"- Est-il exagéré de dire que la plupart des forces politiques dynamiques, dans les Etats moyens d'Europe Occidentale, partagent de plus en plus à la fois certaines des aspirations "gaullistes"à une plus grande indépendance de l'Europe par rapport aux Etats-Unis et à une plus grande ouverture à l'Est, et la conscience que les méthodes gaullistes ne peuvent aboutir qu'au renforcement du statu quo, à l'anarchie, à la domination de l'URSS ou à celle de l'Allemagne ? Il est frappant qu'en Allemagne même et en Grande Bretagne, les hommes politiques qualifiés de "gaullistes" ou suspects de sympathie profonde ou tactique pour la politique française, soient les plus ardents défenseurs du triple objectif auxquels celle-ci s'oppose le plus: une Europe Fédérale, alliée aux Etats-Unis, et comprenant la Grande Bretagne. C'est le cas de F.J. Strauss en Allemagne et d'Edward Heath en Grande Bretagne.

En France, quelqu'un comme Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, apparemment assez représentatif d'un certain état d'esprit post-gaulliste, indique assez nettement une évolution vers une politique qui continuerait à rechercher l'indépendance envers les Etats-Unis et un rôle accrû pour la France mais

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le ferait par la coopération et les institutions européennes où l'Angleterre aurait sa place. L'opposition de centre-gauche tient un langage analogue.

En Italie un certain sentiment "continentaliste" se fait jour depuis le projet de traité de non-prolifération nucléaire et l'apparition du thème du "Gap" technologique.

Naturellement le pays décisif serait l'Allemagne mais devant l'échec successif de l'orthodoxie atlantique et d'une exploration indépendante nécessairement prudente et limitée, il y aurait des chances réelles pour qu'elle partage les aspirations des autres puissances moyennes d'Europe occidentale surtout si celles-ci comprennent les siennes et s'y associent. C'est là le point décisif. Contrairement à la conception gaulliste, la troisième Europe n'a de chances que si elle repose sur la coopération institutionalisée ou l'intégration, qui seules permettent un espoir dans la triple voie politique du problème allemand, technique d'une réponse limitée mais réelle au "défi américain" et militaire de la défense d'une Europe politique - et si, d'autre part, elle ne se pose pas en face des Etats-Unis comme adversaire politique mais tout au plus comme rival potentiel.

Mais, plus que dans la conception monnetiste, c'est bien cette indépendance et cette rivalité par rapport aux Etats-Unis, d'une part, la réunification européenne et la solution du problème allemand, d'autre part, qui peuvent seules donner un sens à ses efforts.

Le problème des rapports extérieurs de l'Europe Occidentale ne peut être résolu que par la transformation de sa structure intérieure, mais celle-ci ne peut plus être justifiée et orientée que dans la perspective de ceux-là.

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Comme l'a dit Myriam Camps, l'Europe, si elle doit se faire, ne peut plus être que la fille de l'ambition politique, non de la nécessité. Mais cette ambition politique n'a de chances de se réaliser que si, moins idéaliste que celle des pères fondateurs monnetistes, elle est également plus réaliste que celle de la politique gaulliste.

Elle doit pouvoir offrir des perspectives aux Européens de l'Est qui sans doute surmonteraient la préférence actuelle de la plupart d'entre eux pour le bilatéralisme si une coopération multilatérale leur était effectivement offerte par l'Europe de l'Ouest soutenue par les Etats-Unis.

Surtout ces derniers et l'Union Soviétique ne la tolérerait que si elle n'est pas une machine de guerre dirigée contre eux. Son ambition ne doit être ni d'égaler les Etats-Unis ou de s'opposer à eux, ni de supprimer leur rôle en Europe pas plus que celui de l'URSS, ou que celui des nations qui la composent. Elle ne peut constituer qu'un niveau intermédiaire entre ces nations dont elle unirait les efforts et limiterait la liberté d'action et l'équilibre stratégique des Grands qui pourrait exercer ses effets de manière moins directe et pesante s'il ne faisait que s'ajouter à un cadre régional économique politique et militaire stabilisé.

Que les Etats-Unis et l'URSS voient dans l'évolution pacifique de l'Europe et dans l'encadrement institutionnel de l'Allemagne la chance d'un règlement européen acceptable, cela dépend de la nature des initiatives européennes mais, tout autant, de la nature de leurs propres problèmes et de l'orientation de leurs propres priorités.

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A cet égard, la date de 1975, choisie pour cet exercice, peut être considérée comme importante parce que si l'évolution dans cette troisième direction ne s'esquisse pas d'ici-là, elle risque beaucoup d'être rejetée dans un avenir imprévisible.

Dans la situation actuelle où les Grands ont surtout intérêt à éviter l'imprévisibilité et où les Petits préfèrent encore leur hégémonie à celle de la France, ou de l'Allemagne, la première hypothèse, celle du statu quo, est la seule réaliste.

Si la guerre du Vietnam et le Général de Gaulle continuent à occuper la scène d'ici 1975, le double écart matériel et psychologique entre l'Europe et les Etats-Unis risque de se creuser à un tel point que la seule question sera de savoir si l'URSS décide ou non de sortir de sa rigidité pour l'exploiter.

Mais si Américains et Européens reviennent à temps à une perspective qui leur permette de surmonter les fausses alternatives du globalisme et de l'isolationnisme, de l'atlantisme et du nationalisme, au profit de la recherche patiente de l'équilibre à l'intérieur des communautés et entre elles, il reste une chance pour que la troisième Europe soit plus réaliste que la troisième Rome.

Elle est peut-être trop rationnelle pour être réelle, mais le pire n'est pas toujours sûr. Ce qui est sûr, en revanche, c'est que ni la suprématie bienveillante ou tyrannique d'une grande puissance, ni le condominium paternaliste de deux, ni la rivalité acrobatique de plusieurs, n'ont une meilleure chance de nous introduire à une Europe réellement pacifiée.

Pierre Hassner

N° 165
15 janvier 1968

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The Atlantic Institute
L'Institut Atlantique

THE U.S. AND THE U.S.S.R. IN EUROPE: THE NEXT TEN YEARS

by

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Prepared for a conference of the Atlantic Institute, Paris, Jan. 25-27, 1968

Not for Quotation or Citation

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THE U.S. AND THE U.S.S.R. IN EUROPE: THE NEXT TEN YEARS

William E. Griffith

"Futurism" is fashionable but risky: it can at best explore possibilities but can never be confident of establishing probabilities. Its unreliability is, in my view, due primarily to the always important and all too often decisive role of accident and personality in history - which essentially remains, as Edward Gibbon put it, "the record of the crimes, follies and misfortunes of mankind."

There are, however, more tangible difficulties in assessing U.S. and Soviet involvement in Europe over the next ten years. First, the preliminary assumption I am asked to make in this paper, that "the Vietnamese conflict will be ended by some formula reasonably satisfactory to the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.," is in my view both unrealistic and fraught with serious liabilities. The Vietnamese war currently dominates U.S. foreign and indeed domestic policy. Given the extensive, perhaps essential, Soviet aid to North Vietnam, this conflict has become by now far more a Soviet-U.S. than a Chinese-U.S. confrontation. Its resolution will, therefore, be of great significance for future U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations in Europe as elsewhere.

No previous U.S.-U.S.S.R. confrontation has resulted in a draw - on the contrary, the two Berlin crises and the Cuban missile crisis both ended on terms very satisfactory to the United States and unsatisfactory to the Soviet Union. Less favorable results in Vietnam, i.e. "draw", might tempt U.S. decision-makers to give only minimal protection to American economic interests in Europe while allowing the developing countries to become an increasingly insecure periphery. The present U.S. trend against "overcommitment" would probably greatly intensify, thereby substantially lowering the recent level of U.S. military involvement in third world conflicts.

Conversely, a Vietnam draw would indicate to the Soviet leadership that for a moderate amount of military and economic aid to the North Vietnamese and at no serious loss of prestige to Moscow, vast amounts of U.S. money and manpower were tied down for a prolonged period of time in such a way as effectively to disrupt

the American domestic political consensus. Moscow would probably conclude, therefore, that a favorable cost-effectiveness ratio exists in support of national liberation struggles, and would be the more tempted to support them. Moreover, this temptation will be greatly heightened by the extensive Soviet development of a long-range air- and sea-lift capability, including, for example, the construction of their first helicopter aircraft carrier, which will give the Soviets a worldwide intervention and counter-intervention capability in the seventies.

Increased conventional capability, combined with Soviet perception of stalemate in Vietnam, has already encouraged stepped-up Russian activity in the Middle East. An Arab-Israeli settlement seems unlikely; more probably tension there will remain serious. (This may well lead at least Israel to go nuclear.) Moscow has already invested - and gained - so much in the Middle East that it will probably not abandon or seriously reduce its involvement. On the contrary, since Soviet control will probably not increase in Europe, Moscow will be the more likely to push on with what, after all, was the traditional Tsarist expansionist drive toward the south. Consequently, the probable continuing West European impotence in this area, much more vital to West Europeans than to the Americans, and resultant exacerbated European frustrations, may well further strain U.S.-West European relations.

Simultaneously, a new worldwide factor, perhaps more important than the Vietnam war, is dwarfing the power of Europe vis-à-vis the United States and the Soviet Union: the new spiral in the arms race.[1] Specifically this entails Soviet beginning of ABM deployment, FOBS,[2] and mobile ICBM's; the U.S. decision

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[1] See the authoritative survey by ex-Undersecretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric, "The Atomic Arms Race: A 'Mad Momentum' May Be Under Way," The New York Times Magazine, December 3, 1967, pp. 55, 162-176.

[2] "Fractional orbiting bombardment system." Although its effectiveness is, relatively speaking, not high, in theory it outmodes the BMEWS radar system. The Pentagon has announced that a new over-horizon radar system is under way to counteract this.

to deploy MIRV[3] and a "thin ABM system (SENTINEL). (The latter occurred after complete lack of progress in establishing a Soviet-U.S. dialogue on mutual limitation of ABM.) It makes probable future Soviet MIRV deployment. While U.S.-U.S.S.R. ICBM deployment was at least in part stabilizing, because it meant mutual credible destruction capacity, MIRV and mobile missile deployment are potentially destabilizing, in that they make effective reconnaissance, until now mutually effective due to satellite photography, more difficult. Satellite reconnaissance also tells nothing of how effective MIRV capacity is - how many warheads, how accurate they are, etc. (The same would be true of any major ASW breakthrough.) ABM is stabilizing vis-à-vis irrational small nuclear powers and through point (SPRINT) defense of MINUTEMAN sites, [4] but destabilizing because it induces further offensive deployment (e.g. MIRV). Thus both nuclear superpowers will be increasingly less certain of each other's capabilities, and therefore more likely to escalate the arms race to compensate for errors in their estimates.

The recent rapidly rising Soviet ICBM deployment has substantially degraded U.S. strategic superiority - i.e., the gap has been narrowed from 4 to perhaps 2.5 to 1. The United States will probably not accept strategic parity with the Soviet Union - fortunately so, in my view, since earlier rises in Soviet strategic capability (e.g. Sputnik) have usually led to higher Soviet risk-taking (e.g. the second Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis.) Rather, U.S. maintenance of strategic superiority, a term whose increasing difficulty to define credibly

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[3] "Multiple independent re-entry vehicle" - multi-warhead, individually targeted ICBM's (MINUTEMAN III and POSEIDON) with built-in deceptive devices. As Undersecretary Nitze stated on November 8, 1967, "MIRVs provide much more effective payloads than single large-yield warheads by every relevant criterion of military effectiveness, even though they deliver much less total megatonnage." See also Richard J. Whalen, "The Shifting Equation of Nuclear Defense," Fortune, Vol. LXXV, No. 6 (June 1967), pp. 85-87, 175-183 and Robert Kleiman, "MIRV and the Offensive Missile Race," The New York Times, September 10, 1967. The United States is probably some years ahead of the Soviet Union in MIRV development.

[4] For the contrary view, see Jerome B. Wiesner, "The Case Against an Antiballistic Missile," Look, November 28, 1967. For X-ray ABM, see John W. Finney in The New York Times, November 16, 1967.

also increases escalation, will not only involve U.S. MIRV deployment, already decided upon, but also probably an increase in the number of U.S. launchers over the present c. 1000 level, as well as even more improved missile design (Strat-x.) ABM deployment, even if "thick", will not soon be anywhere near totally effective against a superpower's offensive strategic force or, a fortiori, a MIRV force. Moreover, its effectiveness, like MIRV's, will be relatively unmeasurable by any other power. Thus, although the Soviets have temporarily improved their strategic position, forthcoming U.S. MIRV and ABM deployment will again reverse the trend, at least until Moscow deploys MIRV as well - as it probably will, in view of increased Soviet concern about the greater U.S. first strike potential as a result of U.S. MIRV deployment. There may therefore be a certain temptation in the next few years for the Soviet Union to use its improving status for political effect before reversal sets in. While this will very probably not lead to a U.S.- U.S.S.R. strategic confrontation, the resultant potential strategic destabilization plus decreasing reconnaissance effectiveness will tend to unsettle U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations generally in the decade to come. Perhaps even more destabilizing will be the rising Soviet long-range conventional capability.

Its increasing long-range air and naval capability will enable Moscow to leapfrog the existing U.S. alliance system, thereby making the Soviets more likely to intervene in the third world. This does not mean, however, that U.S.-U.S.S.R. military tension in Europe will revive. On the contrary, European détente will probably continue, because, since both superpowers want to avoid strategic confrontation, they will be the more inclined to compensate for third-world destabilization by maintaining the relative stability of the military confrontation in Europe. However, all these uncertainties will have a marked destabilizing effect on U.S.-West European relations, since the West Europeans will continue to react unfavorably both to rising U.S.-U.S.S.R. tension and to the alternative possibility, greater bilateral U.S.-Soviet communication.

Meanwhile the military factors discussed above are likely to have increasing effect on the European situation during the next decade in two important aspects: the destruction of the credibility of the United Kingdom and French nuclear forces and the increase in the technological gap. ABM destroys the penetration effectiveness of small nuclear forces. The cost of MIRV and even "thin" ABM deployment (in my view a probable step by both the United States and Soviet Union in the next decade) perhaps $50 billion. As for Western Europe, although realistically it would have to unite (including the UK) to deploy ABM (or MIRV), it is now beginning to seem that a European ABM (land or sea-based) would be technologically possible, and, indeed, that its cost, as compared to the cost of a US ABM system, would probably not be as great. (However, it is still unclear if the U.S. would give the West Europeans ABM or MIRV technology.) MIRV deployment is also ex hypothesi not beyond a united Western Europe's financial resources. Yet up to now West Europeans' reaction to any MIRV and ABM deployment by themselves has been universally negative, because of the (up to now correctly) assumed lack of political will either to pay the bill or to federate for that or any other purpose. If this remains the case, and so far there are few if any signs to the contrary, West European political and military frustrations will increase.

The technological gap, by which I mean the increasing ownership and control by U.S. corporations of West European industry, particularly in such "frontier areas" of micro-electronics and computers,[5] is of even greater importance for U.S. relations with Western (and Eastern) Europe. This development has arisen primarily from U.S. superiority in several areas: (1) education, especially in management, science, and engineering, (2) industrial management, (3) much higher concentration on the "frontier areas," (4) extensive central allocation and direction of Research & Development (R & D) expenditures - arising largely from the far greater U.S. defense

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[5] Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, Le défi américain (Paris: Denoël, 1967); A. Kramish, "Technology: Europe's Enigmatic Gap," The World Today, XXVIII, 10 (October 1967), pp. 423-433.

and space expenditures, and spiraling still further because of the Vietnam war and MIRV and ABM deployment, and (5) more generally, the doubling of the U.S. yearly growth rate as a result of Kennedy's adoption of neo-Keynesian countercyclical economic policies.

Western European R & D expenditures are uncoordinated, small, and lack major defense/space input. In theory, if the EEC were rapidly to admit the United Kingdom and form a federal structure for the minimal purpose of joint R & D administration, Western Europe might at least in several significant fields, although probably not in micro-electronics and computers, remain independent of U.S. technology. In fact this seems unlikely because of the lack of political will for such moves in Western Europe. In this sense General de Gaulle's concentration on combatting U.S. influence in Europe is self-defeating because of his opposition to European federation and United Kingdom entry into the EEC, the exact preconditions for avoiding U.S. technological hegemony. Nor are proposals for "technological reinsurance" with the Soviet Union likely to assure West European technological independence. First, the Soviet Union, because of its secrecy and compartmentalization in military R & D and its resultant slow and incomplete civilian spin-off therefrom, is behind the United States, five years, for example, in industrial computers. Secondly, the Soviet Union is a fortiori unlikely to allow technological spin-off to Western Europe from its defense/ space complex when Moscow will not effectively grant it to its own civilian industry.

The probable result, therefore, is the continued rise of United States technological hegemony over Western Europe, especially in frontier areas, and, indeed, over Eastern Europe as well. For example, only one European computer company, the British ICT, is still independent of substantial U.S. participation; and this is likely to end in a few years. In a decade, therefore, U.S. corporations will probably completely dominate such West European frontier areas as micro-electronics,

computers (i.e. the whole new field of information processing) aircraft construction, etc. The Western European states, assuming that economic unity with U.K. accession is likely in a decade but that complete federation (even to the point of central R & D expenditure) is unlikely, will therefore have become from the technological vewpoint a group of larger and much more frustrated Canadas. The United States on the other hand will increasingly be the only worldwide superpower, coupling military and technological superiority with domestic affluence (plus racial strife).

West Europeans will probably remain disunited in their attitude toward the technological gap. Those independence-oriented Europeans who, archaicly like General de Gaulle, or more sophisticatedly, like Monnet, Defferre, Strauss, Wilson, and Heath, wish to avoid U.S. technological and military hegemony and consequent European technological colonization and military impotence, will pursue policies such as West European unity and/or technological and politico-military reinsurance with the Soviet Union.[6] But others, especially West European businessmen and probably most of the populations, will, as in Canada, welcome U.S. technological inflow since it leads to greater profits, lower defense expenditures, and more consumer affluence. One thing seems certain: this situation will probably worsen not improve, U.S.-West European relations, increase neutralism and pro-Soviet attitudes in Western Europe, and provide further opportunities to the Soviet Union to exploit rifts in the Atlantic world.

What of Eastern Europe? Here the Soviet influence within the international Communist movement is an important determinant, even more than in Moscow's relations with West European Communist parties. That influence, in turn, is contingent on the success of Peking's challenge. Prognosis of Sino-Soviet relations is difficult, since so much depends on the succession to Mao. In the long run a younger, more pragmatic, less fanatical leadership will probably come to power in Peking, more inclined toward a partial compromise with the Soviet Union. But this

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[1] Maurice Duverger, "Le vrai cheval de troie," Le Monde, Oct. 29-30, 1967.

may well happen only after an intermediate period in which there will be a succession struggle or at least a transitional situation in which no such major decision could be taken. A Vietnam "draw", by leaving China neither successful nor deterred from further support to armed struggle, might well also postpone such a decision. Basically, however, the geopolitical issues between Moscow and Peking (Sinkiang, Soviet Central Asia, the Maritime Provinces), rivalry over India, differing attitudes toward the United States, are alone sufficient, without the rivalry for supremacy in the international Communist movement, to make a revival of the Sino-Soviet alliance rather unlikely.

In Eastern Europe differentiation, based essentially on the revival of historic patterns, will probably continue. Internally, the major difference will increasingly be between more economically developed states tending toward liberalization on the eventual direction of left-wing social democracy, such as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and less developed ones leaning in the direction of a kind of populist neo-fascism, now exemplified by Rumania or the Partisans in Poland (who will probably come to power there after Gomulka goes). Externally, the northern tier (Poland, the DDR, and Czechoslovakia) will probably continue to adjust fairly well toward Rumanian and Yugoslav deviations, and therefore be increasingly unlikely to revert to hegemonic patterns. The technological gap is already a serious problem for Czechoslovakia, which is purchasing U.S. and U.K. rather than Soviet computers; and its effect there and elsewhere in Eastern Europe will intensify, with concomitant decline in Soviet prestige. East-West contacts, economic, tourist, and others, are likely to increase, particularly with the more liberalized East European states. The Western power whose influence is likely to rise the most in Eastern Europe in the next decade is West Germany, to which I now turn.

The foreign policy reorientation toward west and east undertaken by the Kiesinger-Wehner Grand Coalition in Bonn in October 1966 is likely to continue. It reflects Social Democratic policies, frustration (particularly among German youth) about the East German situation and desire to improve it as a step toward the by now

much more distant goal of reunification, a more independent attitude toward Washington and Paris (albeit the maintenance of alliance with both), a desire to improve relations with Moscow and the East European states, and , more generally, an attempt to translate West German economic and financial strength into political power abroad, with the main aim, via the indirect route of Eastern Europe and Moscow, of increasing contacts with and humanizing living conditions in the DDR. Its successes in Eastern Europe have so far been slow but are likely to continue; I would foresee during the next decade diplomatic relations between Bonn and all the East European states except the DDR and perhaps Poland. Even after Ulbricht's passing I would anticipate only very gradual improvement in relations between Bonn and East Berlin. Moreover, probably neither Gomulka nor his likely successors will move decisively toward rapprochement with Bonn. Nor are major multilateral relationships between Bonn (or the EEC) and Eastern Europe likely. West Germany's influence will rise in Eastern Europe as their economic and technological penetration increases. This will not lead to German hegemony - the Italians, and in some fields the French, U.K., and U.S., are available as competitors. As to whether the Soviet Union will move toward a rapprochement with Bonn, the question of European politics, the prospect is unclear. By now Bonn is for the first time prepared to respond to such a Soviet move; the initiative is therefore for the first time in Moscow. But such a Soviet move would require the kind of major reversal of policy which only a firmly established, almost charismatic Soviet dictator could take; and his shape is not at least as yet on the horizon. In any case, West German politics is on the move again, the younger generation is increasingly disoriented, nationalism is on the rise, de Gaulle having at least temporarily strangled its European ersatz, and the United States and the other West European states will have their hands full containing its possible destabilizing effects. It, plus the probable continuing French desire, even after de Gaulle, to balance between Russia and Germany and thus ward

off U.S. hegemony and keep French diplomatic independence,[7] and the probable continuing U.S. desire to deal unilaterally with the Soviet Union on major issues, make the chances of a coordinated Western policy toward the East slim indeed.

This leads to my concluding point: "European security." The Soviet Union will probably intensify its efforts to call a European security conference, with U.S. participation, in order to get recognition of the DDR and contribute toward getting the United States out of Europe. It will increasingly play the technological gap issue toward these goals, and probably with some profit. But unless it is prepared to reverse its policy on the German question, and thereby risk not only its alliance with Warsaw and Prague, but also its developing entente with Paris, it is unlikely to achieve this objective, since otherwise the West Germans will not have sufficient incentive to deprive themselves of U.S. military protection and technology.

One can envisage some tacit U.S.-U.S.S.R. troop withdrawals in Central Europe; but, because of the continuation of worldwide tensions, a decisive dismantling of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. military confrontation in Europe, and more particularly a settlement of the intractable German question, and therefore the end of the partition of Europe, remains unlikely. More probable, unfortunately, is a unilateral U.S. rundown in troop commitments in Europe, arising from domestic political and balance-of-payments reasons. Combined with greatly increased U.S. technological penetration of Western Europe, this could be a seriously destabilizing factor. These developments would, if they occur, seriously worsen U.S.-West German relations and leave the West German Bundeswehr the primary ground force in Western Europe. Moscow could only be delighted at the opportunities for divisive policies such a situation would present, particularly vis-à-vis Paris and London.

In short, then, my prognosis for Europe in the next decade is neither political union, nor U.S./Soviet withdrawal, nor real independence. Europe will probably by 1978 still be what it has been since 1945; the object, not the subject, of international politics.

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[7] Pierre Hassner, "Entspannungspolitik à la française," Moderne Welt, VIII, 3 (1967), pp. 242-257.

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The Atlantic Institute
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EUROPE IN THE SEVENTIES

by

Curt Gasteyger

Reprinted from Adelphi Paper, No. 37, June 1967, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, for a Conference of the Atlantic Institute, Paris, January 25-27

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Europe in the Seventies

This paper is not an essay in prophecy. Nor can it deal with all the political and economic developments Europe will be likely to experience in the decade ahead. Its purpose is rather to look at the present state of European politics and analyze some of the changes which have taken place in the last two or three years. Perhaps it will then be possible to see how they may further develop and influence the European political landscape. We know already that change is in the air, but we know also that the present political constellation will certainly set definite limits to far-reaching changes. In a way, Europe will remain an object of world politics rather than a power in its own right. But the pace of change in Europe has considerably accelerated, and if there is one striking fact in present European politics it is the speed by which events in the last few years have moved. They may, however, slow down when they touch upon the central interests of the great powers or run against the barriers of national pride and sovereignty.

Furthermore, we do not have the benefit of sufficient hindsight to discern what are the causes and what the effects of these changes. No doubt it would be useful to know exactly the degree of continuing interaction between the evolution in the two alliance systems and to define the various causes of the present détente. We would then be in a better position to define the chief force that is going to influence the next ten years or so. Will it be a continuing improvement of Soviet-American bilateral relationships? Will it be a still stronger pursuit of purely national interests on both sides of the Iron Curtain - by the European states as well as the super-powers? Will European countries become more self-conscious and develop common interests which may collide with those of the great powers? Will West European integration be further slowed down so as to allow closer co-operation with East Europe? A combination of all possible trends seems most likely, and it will certainly change Europe and its position in the world.

Bipolarity need no longer resemble the chess game in which the chessmen of both sides have to follow their kings and cannot be moved unless the kings themselves move. The pawns have become more independent and, while they can never expect to become serious rivals to the kings, more and more they can challenge them on various grounds. What will therefore certainly change over the next five or ten years is Europe's position vis-à-vis the two great powers. Its economic position in the world will also change as a function of its economic and industrial development both in absolute terms and in relation to the economic stagnation or even recession of most developing countries. Though there is still a long and stony way to go, if there is a way at all, before Europe can achieve some kind of political unity, its influence in world politics will nevertheless grow rather than decline. This is probably due less to its own achievements than to a further disintegration of the 'non-aligned bloc' and the decline in status and prestige of some of its leading members.

I

In this changing environment the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to Europe are likely to remain the most stable elements. The main result of the Second World War, the interest and presence of the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe, will not undergo a fundamental change. This does not, of course, exclude a further détente or a closer rapprochement between East and West. There seems to be an extremely remote chance of a renversement des alliances or a complete healing of Europe's division, although many people apparently expect precisely this to happen in the foreseeable future. The changes that do occur may influence and soften the political, military and socio-economic confrontation between the two antagonistic systems in Europe; they are, however, unlikely to overcome it. This will remain true as long as the Soviet Union and the United States confront each other in the centre of Europe and as long as Europe itself is not in a position to take the place of one of them or both. While, therefore, there is little or no prospect of altering the conflict of interest between the super-powers in Europe, there is a growing chance of influencing it by changing the patterns of the subordinate confrontation between the European states themselves.

A complete withdrawal of American troops from Europe, or a noticeable shift of emphasis in Soviet interests from Europe to Asia, would involve basic changes in the general policy of the two super-powers which neither is prepared to make. Both halves of Europe will have to respect this fact, and there is little they can or will do about it. They realize that the willingness of the United States, and potentially also the Soviet Union, to reduce their forces and weapons on German soil does not imply a willingness to disengage from Central Europe, but indicates an intention to make their engagement less expensive, mutually more acceptable and thus more permanent.[1]

The Changing American Commitment

Of the two powers, the United States seems, for various reasons, the more inclined to reappraise its European policy. First, it should be remembered that the American military presence in Europe has always been considered as temporary in character and flexible in size. Second, the United States has incomparably wider commitments and interests in the world than the Soviet Union could ever expect to have. In addition, she is coming under growing internal pressure to reduce the cost of her military commitment to Europe. Third, she has given up the attempt to take more or less direct responsibility for Europe's political and economic integration and to press her European allies into those forms of co-operation she thought best for Europe, for Atlantic partnership and for herself. These efforts failed, and after considerable disappointment Washington came to realize that the American-European nexus is basically so strong that the United States can afford to let Europe shape itself, and that 'the American aspiration to have a strong West European partner is more likely to be realized if the nature of the process is argued out in Europe rather than in Washington'.[2]

In a way, the staunch American promotion of European integration was a function of the Cold War and part of Western containment policy. Its urgency receded with the gradual stabilization of East-West relations and an almost complete

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[1] Wilhelm Cornides, 'German Unification and the Power Balance', Survey (January 1966), No. 58, p. 144.

[2] Alastair Buchan, 'NATO-Krise und europäische Entspannung', Europa-Archiv (1967), No. 10.

disappearance of any immediate Soviet military threat. It is certainly wrong to assume that Europe no longer comes high on the list of American prime interests. The shift of emphasis from the military-political field to that of still closer economic cooperation seems a natural and inevitable result of recent changes on both sides of the Atlantic. Even an only partially successful agreement on the Kennedy Round is likely to accelerate this process. There might, however, be a major break-through in Atlantic economic relations which would at the same time have an adverse political effect by promoting in Europe a still greater community of interests against the United States. In view of the growing economic competition between the United States and Europe, the unsolved problems of international liquidity, European anxieties about the widening 'technological gap' and American economic influence in Europe, the real strain on European-American relations may now come - and increasingly so - in the economic rather than in the military field. On both sides of the Atlantic there has been a noticeable decline of interest in NATO and alliance strategy, as a consequence of détente and the hope of a workable relationship with the Soviet Union. This development has taken away a considerable amount of pressure from what appeared to be the most sensitive area of American-European relations in the last decade. It may now facilitate a gradual withdrawal of American troops to a minimum level without the risk of provoking another serious crisis of confidence on either side of the Atlantic.

But what is a minimum level? Surely, in times of tension the definition of 'minimum' will be different from that in times of general relaxation and stability. Equally, a strategy of 'flexible response' has different requirements of force levels than a strategy of 'massive retaliation'. And a negative balance of payments, rightly or wrongly, sets different priorities than a positive one. In contrast to the highly rigid and relatively consistent Soviet strategy, American strategic policy has undergone various changes. Some of them seemed to be motivated more by reasons of political expediency than by strategic considerations. To the European allies it looks as if American strategy started with an almost exclusive reliance on nuclear weapons in the later 1950s and was then modified by a demand for higher conventional force levels in the early 1960s; it has now arrived at a point where it is maintained that, given greater mobility and an overall balance of power, a sizeable reduction of American

troops in Europe could well be justified.

This is certainly simplifying the case. For some time already, and in my view correctly, writers on strategy like Thomas Schelling have maintained that too much emphasis was laid on the Central European front and the role of conventional force there. Following up this line of thought, Schelling, in his recent book Arms and Influence, stresses the decisive role of nuclear weapons in deterring any kind of armed conflict. He points out that any war in Europe, whether small, conventional or nuclear, will always be affected by the ultimate threat of nuclear weapons. This may well be so, and may justify a substantial reduction of forces. But it rests on the basic assumption that the United States will remain committed to Europe, both politically and militarily, to an extent which alone makes the ultimate deterrent by the use of her nuclear weapons credible. Such a commitment should not be too easily taken for granted for any indefinite period of time. If it is to continue, then Europe must be prepared to accept a high degree of continuing American control over NATO strategy. Europe certainly cannot claim greater emancipation from this control while at the same time basing its security on American nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the United States will have to make clear to the Europeans what kind of strategy she is going to pursue in the next five or ten years under the conditions of a prolonged détente.

The decline of American interest in the continuous evolution of a war strategy for NATO is understandable but does not help to answer and clarify this question. It reflects a feeling that, unless the present détente is interrupted, fighting in Europe is highly improbable. This may eventually lead to a return to a modified strategy of flexible response, non-nuclear as long as possible, with the emphasis on crisis management, and to political rather than military use of an ad hoc build-up of contingency forces. All this may justify a substantial reduction of present forces levels. Nevertheless it does not answer the question as to what the actual minimum size of these forces should be so that they can fulfil their military, political and psychological role as a credible deterrent and essential guarantor of stability in Europe. Much of the answer will depend on the clarity with which the United

States defines her strategic commitment to Europe and what place Europe and European security will be given in future in overall American strategy and in the American-Soviet confrontation.

Durability of Soviet Interests

A great deal of the answer to this question will, of course, depend on what the Soviet Union does and how her policy evolves. Soviet policy towards Europe has remained relatively unchanged mainly because it started from a well-defined concept of the place which the Soviet Union should occupy in post-war Europe. Stalin, and his successors as well, never had any doubt that their country should aim to become and to remain the major European power, both politically and militarily. Thus, the Soviet Union has remained basically a European-centred power. Unlike the United States, she has never ceased to influence, directly or indirectly, European politics on both sides of the Iron Curtain. For obvious reasons she has been more concerned about the developments in Western Europe than was the United States with those in Eastern Europe. A Soviet preference for exerting such pressure or influence through bilateral relations had already been expressed by Stalin. It has remained basically unchanged and explains the deep mistrust of any form of 'supranationalism'. We can now see that Khrushchev's attempt to attain something like a 'supranational integration' within Comecon looks rather more like a spontaneous reaction to the hitherto denied success of the Common Market than a conversion to genuine multilateralism. His attempt failed not only because of Rumania's resistance but also because the Soviet idea of integration offered the East European countries little more than a perpetuation of Soviet hegemony. The growing divergencies in both alliances seem now partially to vindicate Soviet preference for a bilateral approach, particularly vis-à-vis France and Britain. What the Soviet Union neither could nor wished to envisage was a situation in which her former 'satellites' could exploit this bilateralism to their own advantage.

The Soviet military posture in Europe has become somewhat paradoxical. Thomas Wolfe points out that 'even as the threat of its use against Europe has

declined, Soviet military power itself has grown'.[3] A possible explanation for this is not only the excessive security-mindedness of the Soviet Union, but also the fact that Soviet military power measures itself not by European but by American standards. It therefore exceeds by far the size needed to be a sufficient deterrent to any potential European adversary. Yet precisely because of this and because of its geographic proximity, Soviet influence will remain centred on the military and political field, whereas economically it will hardly have an attractive effect upon Western Europe. In the light of Soviet post-war objectives the continued American presence in Europe must have deeply upset Soviet calculations. Still, the American commitment has probably never been considered by any Soviet leader to be a permanent and unchangeable factor in the European political scenery. To be sure, Moscow does not believe in an early and even less in a complete American withdrawal; being Marxists they cannot conceive of any compelling reason for which the United States would voluntarily give up direct influence on her most important economic and political partner. They are themselves uncertain whether the American military presence is to the Soviet advantage or not. Given their general inclination for a stronger bilateral relationship with the United States and their pretended or genuine fear of Germany, they might welcome the prolongation of a common Soviet-American control over her. They know that they share the anxieties of many Western countries less about a revanchist than a politically and economically strong Germany whose army is no longer sufficiently held in check by integration into an alliance system -although the Soviet Union still attempts to wreck this very alliance.

A gradual American withdrawal from Germany would have other effects too, of which the Soviet Union must certainly be aware. Until now the strength of the American commitment in Europe provided a plausible excuse not only for maintaining large Soviet forces in East Germany and in Poland, but also for insisting on the greatest possible internal cohesion within the Warsaw Pact under Soviet leadership. If the NATO structure is loosened and the Bundeswahr becomes less integrated in it,

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[3] NATO Letter, December 1966, p. 22.

there may be an even better pretext to maintain such a strict control and a substantial military presence in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, East Germany might question the credibility of Soviet security guarantees, once the Soviet Union starts reducing her troops. Both sides will have to agree on what size is going to be considered as a credible military deterrent. Furthermore, East Germany may soon be faced with a dilemma between securing such a Soviet guarantee on the one hand and, on the other, proving to the outside world that because of her growing internal stability only the lowest possible level of external forces on her soil is required for defence purposes. In fact, any disproportionate Soviet military presence in East Germany may become an increasing political liability for a regime aiming at 'liberation'. Already today considerably less than twenty Soviet divisions should be able to cope with any possible internal emergency. No doubt a partial Soviet disengagement from East Germany might have political and propaganda advantages. It would give the Soviet Union an improved strategic image because it would prove her ability to afford such a withdrawal without putting her political and military status in this vital area at risk. It would also provide a welcome improvement in East Germany's image as an internally stabilized state which can be trusted to stand on its own feet. On the other hand Soviet leadership could well consider such a withdrawal too unpredictable and destabilizing a risk unless it can be accomplished as a cautious follow-up to a substantial American withdrawal.

For obvious reasons the Soviet Union is less interested in any far-reaching change of the present military and political situation in Europe than the United States. She is quite aware that the East European countries are more vulnerable to change than Western democracies. Zbigniew Brzezinski rightly points out that 'only in a relaxed international atmosphere could the hidden tensions and contradictions that plague the East, surface and become politically important. The Communist regimes, more than the pluralistic West, require hostility and tension to maintain their unity.'[4]

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[4] Alternative to Partition (New York, 1965), p.121.

Hence Soviet reluctance to allow any further evolution in Europe to be more than confirmation of the present status quo. The reasons for this conservative attitude are to be found in both the present political circumstances and in long-term considerations.

The Soviet Union, China and the United States

To take the present first, the war in Vietnam, embarrassing as it may be to the Soviet leadership, has in a way provided a rationale for resisting any rapprochement with the United States unless there are some overriding and pressing reasons for it. Nevertheless American policy in Vietnam will probably have some lasting effect on Soviet thinking. Moscow is certainly worried about the tremendous display of American military power and mobility which the Soviet Union can never hope to match, either in size or in universality. According to an experienced observer, Marshall Shulman, there is a widespread conviction that the combat experience for American troops and the testing of new military equipment is not just an incidental effect of the Vietnam war but an important reason for the American presence there.[5] One cannot expect the Soviet leaders - and particularly the military commanders - to separate this impression from the general trend of present and future American policy, and merely consider Vietnam as an 'exception' to what otherwise Washington claims to be a policy of détente and East-West rapprochement. It is therefore not necessarily a 'total misreading of signals from Washington', as Marshall Shulman describes the present Soviet reaction to the new American overtures for détente. It can be an oversimplified application of the Vietnam experience to what general American policy will be in general. Nevertheless it is arguable whether 'the intentions of the United States are universally interpreted in the Soviet Union within a framework which completely vitiates the American Administration's overtures toward an improvement of relations' with the Soviet Union. Both powers have learnt in two decades of conflict and rivalry that there are still areas of mutual interest which they should not fragment by inimical actions in other fields.

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5 'American Militancy: The Soviet View', Survival, February 1967.

The question, however, remains which side can accept more easily - that is, without too damaging a loss of prestige and status - such costly actions as Cuba or Vietnam. Unless the outcome of the Vietnam war is a humiliating withdrawal of the United States - which is very unlikely - the Soviet Union will have to be the first to take a hard look at her position as a world power. She has been outmatched by her great opponent on almost every level of international politics, be it in terms of economic, military, political or scientific influence. More than the United States, she has come to realize that the political and psychological benefits of great power status in the nuclear age seem to be in no proportion to its responsibilities. The suggestion that the Soviet Union should cooperate in stabilizing the political and military confrontation in Asia in compensation for the American acceptance of the status quo in Europe (including the division of Germany) is therefore at least highly questionable. The Soviet Union, whose influence on North Vietnam has been more limited than most observers would have expected, will hardly ever be in a sufficiently strong position to act in the same way as a guarantor for Asian stability as it does in Europe. It is here that the Soviet conflict with China, and developments there, are relevant. According to Richard Lowenthal, Moscow sees the confrontation with China more as a long-term problem, troublesome and worrying as such turmoils like the 'cultural revolution' may be for the moment.[6] But in terms of prestige and influence, both as the leading Communist power and as a state, the Soviet Union will lose more than the United States once China has established herself as a great power in her own right. Militarily speaking, an emerging China will be a threat to the Soviet Union long before she can credibly threaten the United States. Politically and ideologically China has already seriously challenged Soviet leadership inside and outside the Communist world. In terms of economic development China is, of course, more likely in the long run to catch up with the Soviet rather than the American economy, and outmatch whatever political influence in the Third World results from such economic power.

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[6] 'China's Impact on the Evolution of the Alliances in Europe', in Western and Eastern Europe: The Changing Relationship, Adelphi Paper No. 33 (London, March 1967), pp. 20-29.

In the competition with both the United States and China, time seems therefore to be running against the Soviet Union. This is quite a new experience to the Soviet leaders. For almost five decades, either because of ideological conviction or an almost uninterrupted expansion of Soviet power, these men acted in the belief that history was on their side. Now they find themselves at a crossroad where success and progress become increasingly hard to achieve and well-established positions begin to crumble.

II

Nevertheless the military and economic preponderance of the Soviet Union will remain the determining factor in Eastern Europe - in contrast to the position of the United States in Western Europe which may further recede. Given this continuing Soviet preponderance one is led to ask how far the present divergences in Eastern Europe can, or will be allowed to, develop. After all, the East European countries, even the most unorthodox ones, are still ruled by well-established Communist parties. Their basis of power has certainly become more stable, but their regime has never been exposed to free elections or any kind of an open political opposition. There may be differences in the degree of political, economic and cultural liberalization in different countries. But it is already doubtful whether this 'liberalization' will ever be allowed to go as far as it has gone in Yugoslavia. Harsh Soviet criticism of the changes that are taking place in Yugoslavia may be ephemeral, though it clearly reflects growing concern about their infectious influence in Eastern Europe. It should equally be remembered that, so far, most of the 'liberalization' in the Soviet orbit has been in the economic field with the purpose of making the economy of the East European countries more efficient within their present political system.

This in turn - promoted by the Sino-Soviet dispute - has also led them to reappraise their economic relations both with the Soviet Union and, above all, with the capitalist West. Nowhere, however, has this 'liberalization' been allowed to question the basis of the political system, the dictatorship of one party. And when the ideological discussions or cultural controversies have seemed to risk getting out of control by touching upon the sacrosanct position of the Party, they have soon been

called back to order. In spite of this, the most interesting and promising development will probably take place within the ruling Communist parties themselves. The continuing erosion of Communist ideology has already affected and will further affect their unchallenged political monopoly. They will find it increasingly difficult to maintain it unless it is based on a broader basis of support and consensus among the intellectual and technocratic elite. This seems only feasible if and when the Party agrees to, or at least tolerates, a process of 'democratization' involving both a broader selection and freer election of the Party leadership at all levels. This in turn implies that the policy of the Party, in order to become more widely acceptable, must also become responsive to the wishes of its rank and file members. This development may be further encouraged by the influence which some West European Parties already exert on the changing East European political scene.

The attempt to gain a broader consensus of, and a more active support from, the population is closely linked with the determination of most East European regimes to solve the manifold economic, social and political problems without losing control over this complex and difficult process or endangering their established positions. In doing so, they, too, have accepted that evolution is safer than revolution, and that it is only in a relatively stable international environment that such evolution can take place. Being vulnerable to any fundamental political change and burdened with a great many internal problems, the East European countries will certainly not be prepared to accept any major change in their international environment. They are all anxious to assert a greater degree of economic independence of the Soviet Union. At the same time they are prepared to accept that the Soviet Union is the only guarantee of their security and stability in Eastern Europe. Under these circumstances it is irrelevant whether they do this by their own choice or by force of political and geographic reasons. The common objective remains the same: to gain a breathing space which allows for a cautious but uninterrupted development. Such common objectives create a community of interests which has little to do with ideological cohesion or 'socialist solidarity.'

There is no doubt that Peking's emergence as a rival centre of authority has greatly facilitated the emancipation of most of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe from satellite status. But this process may soon come to a stop. Richard

Lowenthal has pointed out that the impact of China on the cohesion of the Soviet bloc in Europe has by now been largely consummated 'not only because the greater tactical flexibility shown by Khrushchev's successors and the present extreme rigidity of the Chinese leaders give the East Europeans very little scope for further exploitation of the dispute, but simply because the ideological factor has become less central for the development of relations within the bloc'.[7] In future the Warsaw Pact alliance will therefore rest far less on ideological homogeneity and compulsory 'solidarity', but will evolve gradually into a classical alliance system whose cohesion rests mainly on a community of interests. This is reflected in a recent statement of the Rumanian Communist Party. It stresses emphatically that 'diversity constitutes the inevitable and irreversible framework itself of the activity of Communist Parties, and unity can be achieved, developed and consolidated only under the conditions of this variety of situations and differing viewpoints'.[8] So it seems that the more lasting and possibly the only acceptable principle of the Communist system will be a 'unity in diversity'.

Such a community is probably the lowest common denominator on which all Communist leaders in Eastern Europe could agree. It is certainly evidence of a considerable change in Soviet policy that she too has accepted this denominator and does not impose more absolute conformity on her allies. But could she do much else? Probably not. There is more evidence which would support this view than there is against it. While being aware of her limitations even within her own sphere of influence, the Soviet Union knows equally well how vital her support is to the East European regimes. Therefore a more diversified Communist camp does not necessarily mean that the Soviet position is less powerful. The Soviet leaders may well have come to realize that the country's international status as a great power is more important than her ideological leadership in world Communism. Communism has long ceased

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[7] Ibid., p. 24

[8] Scanteia (Bucharest), 28 February 1967.

to be a unifying element and Communist solidarity has become more of a burden than an asset in international politics. If, therefore, under Stalin the expansion of Communism was identical with the expansion of Soviet power, then Khrushchev was prepared to admit that such an expansion could happen by independent revolutions, though they should be kept in harmony with Soviet interests. Khrushchev's successors have gone a step further by questioning whether such an expansion is necessarily relevant or even beneficial to Soviet power and interests. History has already given them a negative answer.

III

All this may not be directly relevant to Eastern Europe, where it is not so much a question of expansion but rather of stabilization and preservation of Communist power. But in a way it also affects Soviet policy in that area, particularly with regard to the problem of the future development of East Germany. It is one question how far the emancipation of Eastern Europe from Soviet tutelage is likely to go, and another what East Germany's position is going to be in a more 'liberalized' East European bloc. Quite apart from the objective limitations to an unlimited emancipation referred to above, the West may well come to admit that it, too, would not like the prospect of a complete break-up of the Soviet system and a return to a 'balkanized' Eastern Europe. Furthermore, such a far-reaching process would pose the problem to the East of an 'emancipated' East Germany in much the same way as an 'emancipated' West Germany to the West.

No doubt the various changes in Eastern Europe have affected East Germany as well, thought not always so visibly. Developments in the Federal Republic have also not failed to impress many East Germans. Bonn's new 'Eastern policy' has not only had some immediate practical consequences such as the establishment of diplomatic relations with Rumania and the further expansion of trade relations in Eastern Europe; as long as the Federal Republic succeeds in avoiding the attraction of a purely national policy, it will help to reduce or even remove the fears about 'German revanchism' and thus take away from Communist propaganda a bogey which has been used so frequently and successfully to appeal to the solidarity of the Eastern bloc. Once the Federal Republic has formally renounced any access to nuclear weapons and has further pursued its Eastern policy successfully, it will become increasingly difficult for the

Soviet Union to make German aggressiveness a uniting bond for common allegiance - and for East European countries to accept it. It would, therefore, be tragic if the re-emergence of a strong nationalism, and particularly of a right-wing group in the Federal Republic, were to undermine and discredit the sincerity of West Germany's overtures. Such a development would provide a welcome excuse to those in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union who neither want nor can accept a basic change in Germany's cliché-image which they have found so useful in the past.

Germany's Eastern Policy

The political changes in West Germany are more visible and outspoken but not necessarily more far reaching than those in its Eastern part. Both may have one important element in common, namely a definite trend towards greater self-assertion and a growing awareness of Germany's economic power and political weight in the two alliance systems. Any comparison between the two halves of Germany is necessarily misleading. But it can be said that this greater self-assurance affects their relationship with the two super powers and with their main allies. It leads both East and West Germany - in different ways and degrees - away from their time-honoured status of almost unconditional allegiance to a larger system. They are now in a position to exert considerable influence on Soviet and American policy respectively, though, needless to say, the Federal Republic is much freer to do so and has greater chances of success. It can challenge American leadership without risking its own existence and while still remaining a loyal ally. Nevertheless, West Germany seems to be moving away from its one-sided Western orientation by opening itself up towards the East. It is a shift back to Germany's former central European position and as such is probably a natural reaction to a policy which for too long a time looked only towards the West.

It is an aspect of the schizophrenic division of Germany that such a new sense of 'central European identity' (Lowenthal) works in precisely opposite directions in East and West Germany. In the West, it raises new hopes for reunification, in the East it reduces its likelihood even more. This is so because for the first time the East Germans take a certain pride in the achievements of their country. They are hardly fervant supporters of the present regime. But open hostility to it seems to have given way to a more active co-operation with it. Such a nascent East German nationalism may become stronger with a progressing economy, and particularly if the regime succeeds in demonstrating a somewhat greater independence from Moscow as a symbol of national self-identity. The Wirtschaftswunder west of the Elbe is losing some of its attractiveness. On its own it is less and less a reason for which the East Germans might wish for reunification. Their greater detachment from and partial disillusionment with Bonn will grow in future once a change of guards or rather generations has taken place in East Berlin. It will bring the relief of Ulbricht and his fellow sentinels of the immediate post-war period. Their places will be taken by a group of self-confident younger men who, though Communist by training and conviction, have a better understanding of the problems of the second industrial revolution. They will probably be less party than state managers, less concerned with considerations of costly international Communist solidarity and staunch anti-capitalism, and more with the efficiency of the economy and the international respectability of their country. Just because they have to do this in the shadow of a sombre past and behind the unglorious Berlin wall, they will try to make their regime more acceptable by other means - more acceptable both to the outside world and to their own citizens.

This development may stiffen rather than soften the rivalry and competition between the two Germanys. But it is of no avail to accuse East Germany of being nothing more than a puppet of the Soviet Union.

It will certainly not help her to find her own and hopefully more independent position with the Soviet Union and within Europe. To a country which has been sheltered by the Soviet Union in every respect, détente is probably the greatest challenge. It will expose the regime to an open competition with the Federal Republic and a growing pressure to 'liberalize' from the other East European countries. The natural reaction to such a challenge is to take shelter again and to withdraw to the safe line of open hostility towards Bonn. This is precisely what, with the blessing of Moscow, Pankow is doing again at the moment. With a hastily woven net of bilateral 'treaties of friendship' she has secured a rather unenthusiastic support of her East European neighbours against any further progress of Bonn's Eastern policy. It is, however, highly questionable whether in the long run such emergency actions will make East Germany safe from competition with the Federal Republic. Their price will certainly be a further loss in prestige and possibly the isolation she is so much afraid of. Such hostility cannot last very long unless East Germany is resigned to looking more than ever like a permanent Soviet 'protectorate'. And that is precisely the impression she wishes to avoid. Therefore, to expose her to the harsh winds of international competition will contribute more than anything else, and certainly more than any isolation, to her gradual liberalization.

To hasten such liberalization West Germany does not have to take the step of formal recognition. In terms of international law, recognition usually follows and does not precede a country's proof that it can run its own affairs. What is more important for Bonn is to make it understood that henceforth East Germany's position and policy will be judged by international standards which allow neither for the present policy of hostility and hatred towards the Federal Republic nor for the deprivation of the basic rights of her own citizens.

West Germany will thus be faced with the difficult task of developing an Eastern policy on three different levels : that is, towards the Soviet Union, towards Eastern Europe and towards East Germany. This cannot be done without careful differentiation lest one or all of them feel antagonized : it requires less insistence on legal 'rights' (Rechtsstandpunkte) and more of a genuine understanding of the anxieties and fragility of some of these countries. In this respect, if in no other, a coalition government of the main democratic parties may be a blessing in disguise. It provides a broad enough basis to resist the claims of the nationalistic parties and to maintain a policy which keeps formal reunification as a distant goal, rating further down on the list of priorities than such requirements as security, economic progress and general internal and external stability.

In setting this order of priority Bonn must also admit that none of its Western allies are willing, or in a position, to do much about reunification. They welcome Bonn's new and obviously more flexible policy towards the East, but have not yet been able to provide a wider European framework within which it can be made fruitful. The Federal Republic might therefore, at least indirectly, seek a solution of the German problem with East Germany by national means. On this the Yugoslav newspaper Borba wrote recently : 'The Federal Republic can, if it really wants, make its own peace with Eastern Europe and Europe in general. For this it does not need any mediator and also no assistant'.[9] No wonder that many Germans now hold that the 'international solution' of the German problem has failed and should be replaced by a national one.

This is precisely what Soviet policy has sought for years. Moscow has consistently resisted any Western attempt to make progress on a concept of East-West relations or European security (including arms control

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[9] Quoted from Die Zeit, 20 January 1967.

measures) that is conditional upon simultaneous or consecutive progress towards a solution of the German question. The link between the German and the European questions was first significantly weakened by the Geneva summit conference of 1955. After that it was gradually eroded until it was given up completely by the West in the early 1960s. Unquestionably it was a far reaching concession made in deference to a continuous Soviet pressure and to an apparently irresistible trend towards détente which no one wished to see frustrated or hindered by the intractable German problem. But the upshot of this successful diplomatic retreat is that it now makes Germany, that is the Federal Republic, and not the Soviet Union, appear to be the power chiefly responsible for continuing tension and European division. The Federal Republic has thus come under pressure from its own allies to soften its rigid anti-Communist policy and agree to as many peripheral concessions as possible. It is maintained that they will contribute to or at least enhance the chances of eventual reunification, that is the only 'central' objective Germany should pursue ; above all, such concessions would decisively promote détente which, by definition, is incompatible with unsettled problems. This policy is designed to make the division of Germany more tolerable and eventually acceptable to the Germans themselves.

The risks of such policy are evident. The new overtures towards the East, undertaken in the belief that they will improve the possibilities of reunification, could easily generate a frustrated nationalism in Germany if it turns out that they cement the division of Germany rather than alleviate it.[10] If there is anybody for whom détente has narrow limits it is Germany. Therefore it is at best debatable whether Bonn should rely so heavily on French support for its new Eastern policy. Not only is France's ability to influence the Soviet Union extremely limited : one may also question whether France is really giving priority to German reunification over her wider objective of general détente. In President de Gaulle's view détente should precede entente. But if the very objective of détente is obstructed by the German problem, one might ask how long he is prepared to accept this situation. If he can

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[10] See Henry Kissinger, 'For a New Altantic Alliance', The Reporter, July 1966.

have détente from which follows entente with the Soviet Union by accepting the Soviet view of a more or less permanent division of Germany and, in doing so, become in turn accepted as the leading partner of Moscow in Europe, can he, or France, resist such temptation ?

We are thus faced with the worst prospect for all concerned, including Germany, namely her attempt to pursue national objectives in the centre of Europe, and to do so by purely national methods. Germany may have no other choice but she will surely be blamed for it. The Federal Government in Bonn will thus come under growing internal and external pressures. It will have to meet objections from both East and West to its more nationalistic policy. And it will come under attack by the right wing opposition for still not being nationalist enough. This will be a serious challenge to any government : it could foster political instability which even a coalition will find increasingly difficult to keep under control.

Within the framework of NATO the Federal Republic will be faced with another very difficult problem. If it is right that, in the words of a German politician, 'integration is the life principle of German foreign and defence policy',[11] then the disintegration of NATO and the gradual thinning out of forces will confront Germany with the delicate problem of redifining the position of the Bundeswehr. As the largest conventional army in Western Europe, its position is becoming more a psychological burden than a military advantage. There is certainly no question of increasing it beyond its present level of twelve divisions, but rather an inclination to cut it down to, say, eight at full strength. Such a step could also be justified by pressing financial reasons. As in every other country, maintenance costs are growing rapidly and, consequently, there is a diminishing proportion of the defence budget that is available for modernization and acquisition of new weapons. This in turn affects directly the question of offset agreements with the United States and Britain which have strained the relations of the three countries. The reduction of American and British troops as part of the answer to this problem may thus be followed by cuts in

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[11] See George Bailey, 'Germany Between Two Alliances', Survival, December 1966, p. 388.

the Bundeswehr. But above all, any such decision concerning its size and organization has complex and far-reaching political implications. One of Bonn's most important tasks in the near future will therefore be to fit major changes in the Bundeswehr into the general process of adapting military planning to a changing political environment. If Western strategy still is to make sense, and if the German army is to stay within NATO (on which all agree), then the military framework of the Alliance shall have to retain a minimum extent of integration to fulfil this function. To meet the legitimate German insistence on integration, NATO will, therefore, have to maintain a sufficiently credible (i.e. non discriminatory) international framework within which the Bundeswehr can operate.

I V

Even France would agree basically with this proposition, though her own policy towards NATO has accelerated its disintegration, without offering any convincing alternative. President de Gaulle's vision of a greater and more independent Europe is more precise in terms of aspiration than of possibilities. National independence as an end in itself has no positive international meaning. Thus until now France's policy has been basically negative in its objectives and achievements, however welcome many of them may have been. France 's criticism of NATO and her subsequent withdrawal from its integrated military organization have not been compensated by any convincing proposal for an alternative European security system. Neither France nor Britain, much as they are flattered by their revived bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union, will ever be considered by her as a real alternative to American power, either world-wide or in Europe.

The French idea of making the Force de Frappe an instrument for the reorganization of European security can hardly be taken seriously. France's nuclear status in the 1970s is likely to decline in relation to that of the super-powers. As a consequence, her credibility as an alternative nuclear guarantor to the United States will diminish unless she joins forces with Britain either bilaterally or in a wider European framework

based on Franco-British co-operation. Otherwise she will, in a sense, be faced with a similar dilemma to that which Britain faced in the 1950s. It is imposed by the tremendous costs and complexity of technological progress which puts definite and growing limitations on smaller nuclear powers. By keeping Britain out of Europe, France has probably succeeded in prolonging her dominant position on the Continent. The emergence of Germany as a rival is a long way off and may be forestalled for ever by Germany's renunciation of nuclear weapons. Raymond Aron has pointed out that, mutatis mutandis, the German-French relationship is very similar to the Franco-American relationship, and this is, as de Gaulle has so persuasively demonstrated, an equally unacceptable situation to Germany.

It may well be that French policy after de Gaulle will not change fundamentally. But it seems certain that Gaullism without de Gaulle will not survive in its present form, and France may revert to a period of greater internal instability. This would probably lead her to concentrate more on domestic, economic and social problems and slow down her costly nuclear programme. But none of these internal changes is likely to alter French foreign policy basically. This is so because, in terms of party politics, one may expect a swing to a Left which will want neither to jeopardize European détente and French independence by too exclusive a promotion of West European integration nor to accept too close an alliance with the United States. What will, however, become an increasingly decisive factor in the future policy of France is her changing relationship with Britain.

Britain and Europe

Europe in the 1970s will look very different if Britain has become an integral part of it. Perhaps the only question will then be to what extent and under what circumstances this has become true. Until recently Britain left, deliberately or because she had no other choice, most of her options open ; her presence in Asia is still required and this in turn helps to maintain a special relationship with the United States. Because of this, and because of her central position in the Commonwealth,

her genuine determination to enter the Common Market is questioned by many continental Europeans. This is probably inevitable as long as Britain finds herself in the painful process of transition from what The Times called the 'post-Imperial' and 'pre-European' area to that of a clearly defined political, economic and military commitment to Europe.

For a long time to come British entry into the Common Market will create for all parties concerned more problems than it solves : Britain's balance of payments will come under great strain, particularly if she adopts the European agricultural system : it will deeply affect the delicate political and economic balance so laboriously established amongst the Six : it will probably postpone even further the already remote chance of a European political union : and it will split the precarious EFTA community beyond repair, leaving some of its members, particularly Switzerland and Portugal, in a very difficult situation.

Nevertheless the long-term economic advantages for Britain are already visible. Still more important than these, however, are the political consequences which either her entry or another rejection would have. The gradual withdrawal from her last outposts narrows down still further the range of options she can turn to should this new application fail. There is no real alternative in sight except in vague and uncertain prospect of an Atlantic Free Trade Area. Conversely, successful negotiations in Brussels may eventually clarify Britain's relationship with Europe and her role in the world.

It is difficult to imagine a Europe in the 1970s without Britain being in some way more closely linked with continental Europe than she has been in the past twenty years. Such an association either with the EEC or a wider European organization would add a new dimension to Europe in almost every field, be it political, economic or technological. Only then Europe may hope to attain the degree of independence of the super-powers that many Europeans wish her to achieve. The political structure of such an enlarged European Community will probably be closer to de Gaulle's concept of a Europe des patries than to an even loosely integrated federation. This means that the inclusion

of Britain and other countries into such an expanded community will inevitably weaken its internal cohesion.

In a short term perspective this may be considered an advantage at a time when thediversification within the European 'blocs' facilitates a rapprochement between Eastern and Western Europe. Most countries may therefore prefer such a more loosely organized Community to the 'integrationist' solution which the East Europeans might again take for an impenetrable or even hostile 'monolith'. Whether in the long term this is the right approach remains at least open to doubt. For one thing, it is worth remembering that the EEC was successful precisely because of its high degree of integration, which has little affected its attractiveness to the East. For another, we know that, for a long time to come, all the East European countries can and will aim at economic co-operation with the West, being fully aware that there is little hope for any kind of political 'convergence' between the two systems. Therefore the institutional framework of Western Europe can matter little to them as long as it guarantees economic progress and does not hinder a further expansion of economic co-operation. Consequently, it would serve nobody's interest if Western Europe abandoned its aim of making an expanded European community equally coherent for the mere sake of not antagonizing the East.

Independent of its relations with the East, Western Europe will have to answer the broad question as to what kind of organization it should work for, in order to cope with the manifold political, economic and technological problems it will face within the decade ahead. Theoretically, it seems, there is no middle road between the integration of nation states into a broader and hopefully more stable international system on the one hand and the restoration of political and military autonomy on the other. But the European states seem to find themselves half way between the two. They are increasingly uncertain about the direction in which they eventually should turn, having experienced in recent history the detrimental effects of a purely autarchic policy and having failed in achieving supranational solutions, as the basis for European unity.

The revival of nationalism, regrettable as it may be, seems unavoidable. But it does not offer any satisfactory answer to a series of increasingly urgent problems which Europe will have to tackle in one way or another in the next decade. To mention only the most important questions : into what kind of international system will Germany have to be embedded so as to allow for her reunification or to avoid a competing nationalism between two antagonistic German states ? Can it be an international system which will constitute a sufficiently solid basis for the security and stability of the whole of Europe, and which might even be able to replace or reinforce the weakening alliances ? What forms of international co-operation will Western Europe be able to develop so as to reduce its dependence on the United States ? Will Europe ever be able to assure its own security without having to rely indefinitely on great power protection ? What will be the role of British and French nuclear forces in a decade ahead ? And in particular, what will happen to them if the superpowers should deploy Ballistic Missile Defence systems ?

There are many more questions of this kind to which Europe will have to address itself. It is not the purpose of this paper to answer them. But it would seem that they point more to the need for further integration and make disintegration still less acceptable. We may now have to pay a price for having put too much emphasis on physical safety and too little on preparing for an international political system which continues to operate once this safety is achieved. Unlike the great powers whose status and security are not dependent on such a system, the European states, and specifically Germany, can hardly dispense with it. Indeed, they will find it more necessary as they move away from great power protection and as détente shows both its limits and inherent risks.

V

There appear to be various interpretations of détente which help to blur the view of what we really want it to be. If it means the unconditional acceptance of the present status quo as the Soviet Union and her allies suggest, then one should have serious reservations about such a détente. On the other hand, the traditional Western under-

standing of détente is that it is a situation intended to create those conditions which eventually help to overcome the status quo, an understanding which certainly meets with strong Communist opposition. Probably these definitions are either too narrow or too wide. Détente remains a highly ambiguous expression for what really amounts to the fact that the mutual suspicion about the aggressive intentions of the other side is replaced by a general willingness to co-operate with each other. It thus creates an atmosphere of relaxation in which both governments and peoples feel freer to put their own national interests before those of common defence and try to escape the strict discipline of alliance systems. Communication between formerly antagonistic or openly hostile groupings then becomes possible again and this opens the door for peaceful change.

But how far can and will détente go ? There is no question about the considerable improvement of relations between Eastern and Western Europe. The network of new cultural, economic, technical, scientific and political links has become wider and denser than ever before. Though the gulf between the two political systems of government remains deep it no longer seems to be unbridgeable.

It is no less an achievement that the open hostility between the two blocs has practically disappeared. Each side seems to have given up the attempt to convert the other to its own political and economic system. This does not exclude change ; on the contrary, a real rapprochement is unthinkable without allowing for changes on both sides. It is interesting to note, though not very surprising, that Western influence on Eastern Europe has obviously had much greater impact on Eastern Europe than Communist influence on the West. The Common Market more than anything else has displayed a particular attraction, thus giving convincing proof of the benefits of forms of integration that are freely negotiated. Welcome as such Western influence is, it cannot conceal the fact that economic ties alone will not solve political problems, though they may have a political spill-over. The most important effect of détente is the loss of ideological fervour which hitherto vitiated the relations between the two halves of the continent. No doubt it has contributed to converting stagnant co-existence into a more fruitful co-operation. This applies already to various non-

political fields. It may one day also become possible in the political realm, particularly when the European countries discover that they have some political interests in common which they should persue either independently of or possibly even against those of the great powers. But at the moment such perspectives still look distant, though not necessarily beyond the horizon.

Détente has thus made Europe realize to what extent the international climate has changed in recent years. Although the confrontation between the two super-powers in Europe still basically exists, the international context within which Western and Eastern Europe see each other has altered. No doubt, the diversification or even disintegration of the alliances has made the international system more flexible. But at the same time it has also become more fragile, more vulnerable to competitive rivalry and suspicion between formerly allied countries. In fact, it looks as if members of the same alliance often know better how to develop relations with those of the other camp than how to maintain and improve the links with their own allies. With the spirit of integration waning they seem to be tempted to return to a rather old-fashioned bilateralism as the main basis of inter-state relations, both inside and outside the alliances.

For Western Europe this raises the question whether such a policy is really the best means to establish a new and better relationship with Eastern Europe and the two super-powers. It is difficult to see how successful the attempt can be 'to wean the East European countries away through increased contacts and to prepare for a European settlement'[12] if Western Europe loses still more of its internal cohesion. While a somewhat greater diversification may help a rapprochement with Eastern Europe, it is most doubtful whether this is equally true vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. She will certainly try to exploit the present détente and diversification in her own favour. Thus she might welcome an expansion of the EEC if there were signs of its dissociating itself from the United States and providing a wider political framework

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[12] See Marshall Shulman, ' "Europe" Versus "Détente",' Foreign Affairs, April 1967, pp. 397-402.

which would better neutralize German influence. The entry of Britain might therefore appeal to the Soviet Union as watering down its supranational objectives, helping to reduce Britain's oversea commitments, and further weakening her special relationship with the United States. Soviet support for a loosening-up of the European community is linked with her promotion of precisely the sort of bilateralism Western Europe seems ready to turn to again ; both actions are intended to reduce the political impact of European integration. By also encouraging Western Europe to strive for greater independence from the United States, the Soviet Union hopes to increase her own influence there and bring the individual European countries 'into some form of closer and perhaps subordinate relationship, thereby enhancing its power position relative to the United States'.[13] Hence recent Soviet hints of the possibility of technological co-operation with Western Europe and of a European security system without American participation.

V I

The question which Western Europe in the 1970s will therefore have to answer is, in the words of Marshall Shulman, 'whether there can be enough co-ordination and political consciousness in the management of these (East-West) contacts so that the effect will be a strengthening of European independence rather than a fragmentation or subordination (to Soviet preponderance)'. At the same time, Europe must be clear how much it can realistically hope to gain from a rapprochement with the Soviet Union on the one side and a greater independence from the United States on the other. Both approaches require at least a common political understanding on which such an autonomy can rest. One could call it a kind of 'détente management'. Its techniques are at least as difficult to agree upon as those of 'crisis management' and may become still more difficult in the near future. And like any efficient crisis management system it requires, to be successful, an institutional framework or a multilateral instrument by which it can be handled.

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[13] Ibid., p. 397.

But leaving aside such an equivocal new term, the fact remains that a Western Europe which demands greater responsibility for its foreign policy and defence should also be able to create the necessary institutions to carry them out. What is therefore required is a common agreement on whether the present alliance system should continue, though in a somewhat modified form, or whether the time has come either to replace or to complement it by a new system better suited for the requirements of détente and greater European independence. The changing nature of American commitment to, and the basically unchanged Soviet interest in, Europe could otherwise lead to an imbalance of forces which may possibly enhance Western Europe's greater independence from the United States but at the same time expose it to a greater pressure from the Soviet Union. The most important task for Europe in the 1970s will therefore be to work out, and agree on, new forms of co-operation which help to establish a more satisfactory relationship with the United States and to counterbalance Soviet power without foreclosing a further improvement of the relations with Eastern Europe.

As long as there is no viable alternative, it would seem that the Alliance still offers the best institutional framework within which solutions to these tasks can be worked out. The emphasis of NATO's functions may then lie more on improving the mechanisms of political consultation and multilateral crisis management than on military integration. Equally, the Alliance may still be a useful instrument for future negotiations on arms control measures between East and West. This is all the more likely since there is no mutually acceptable 'European security system' in sight, which means that the alliances, even if reorganized, remain the best guarantors of security in Europe, and of possible arms control agreements there to sustain it. The Soviet proposal for the convocation of a European security conference offers little more than a vague scheme of international and bilateral co-operation on the basis of the status quo and with the main objective indefinitely to restrain Germany. It is, in other words, a revised version of various similar proposals which the Soviet Union has put forward since the Berlin Conference in 1954. As such it is a useful reminder that the repertoire of alternative international

systems is much more limited than the innumerable plans and schemes for European security and German reunification might suggest. Nor has the United States presented a convincing version of what a future European security system might look like.

All we can be sure of is that any process of change or détente or any progress towards new measures of arms control in Europe can go only a limited distance without a basic understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is thus precisely over Europe that the Soviet-American bilateralism seems to crystallize. This is not without risks because it could revive European fears that such bilateralism might lead to some kind of great power bargain at their expense. Some West European reactions to the negotiations on a non-proliferation treaty give sufficient evidence that these fears are still with us. But they show, too, how fragile Western Europe's newly acquired self-consciousness and independent position still is.

The Atlantic alliance therefore remains vital on three levels : as an essential element of political and military stability and a basis for formal or tacit arms control measures : as still the most important instrument the West Europeans possess to influence American policy and strategy : and as the international framework within which both the policy and the defence of the Federal Republic can be adapted without having to turn to a purely national policy.

Western Europe in the 1970s will, therefore, be faced with four main tasks. The first is to maintain some permanent and credible link between the German problem and the wider question of European security, which will involve the two great powers in a future European and German settlement. Second, to define more satisfactorily its changing relationship with the great powers, particularly by working out forms of co-operation with the United States which will better balance out the responsibilities in matters of common interest and help to reduce American predominance in matters of primarily European interest. Third, to maintain an alliance which provides Europe with an adequate degree of influence on American policy while at the same time allowing for a further improvement of her relations with Eastern Europe and leaving the Soviet Union in no doubt about the credibility of Western defence. Finally,

to find techniques of European co-operation whose impetus stems not from a negative anti-Americanism but from the will to provide a sufficiently broad and durable basis on which Europe's greater aspiration for independence and her search for a new identity can find adequate expression.

n° 166

January 16, 1968.

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The Atlantic Institute
L'Institut Atlantique

THE GERMAN PROBLEM BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

by

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Prepared for a conference of the Atlantic Institute, Paris, Jan. 25-27, 68

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The German Problem between East and West

The recent events on the European and international scene make it clear that it would be opportune to redraw the old politico-diplomatic guidelines. The obvious parallelism between the tensions troubling the NATO alliance and those afflicting the Warsaw Pact reveal that there is a widespread state of crisis in the present international order.

It is precisely with regard to the necessity of creating a new international order in Europe which is capable of guaranteeing sufficient stability and equilibrium, that the German problem has been raised again in its full importance. The real key to the power struggle being waged in the heart of Europe, as political observers note unanimously, is the German key. Germany's strategic position in the center of the continent and the strength of its economic potential (the two Germanys re-united would hold third place in the world's industrial production) make Germany a determining element in any new international settlement. Now that the postwar formula which placed the two German states within two rigid alliances and presupposed their effective political and economic integration within the two systems has been weakened, the necessity for new solutions is at hand. The questions are those which have always existed: reunification or an indefinite prolongation of the status quo? and then, what type of reunification and which status quo in particular?

The new factor, in respect to the past, which has put the prospects of solution in new terms, is constituted by the autonomous strengthening of the Federal Republic, and, within certain limits, of the DDR which has taken place. This means that while the structures of the European alliances have tended to become more fluid, those of the two Germanys have become

increasingly rigid, thus creating a center of tension in the heart of Europe. The Germans have gradually transformed themselves from mere objects of the political decisions of the hegemonic powers, as was the case even in the 1950's, into political actors with their own political programs. The phenomenon of rediscovered autonomy, which exists today to different degrees for all the medium-sized and small powers, assumes, in the German case, a potentially dangerous character due to the persistent antagonism between the two states. The dilemma for the Europeans, that of how to coordinate the exigencies of stability with those of the German problem, is now presented in particularly complex terms.

There is, in fact, no doubt, and this is demonstrated by the greater autonomy which has been acquired in these years, that the strengthening of the two German states, East and West, renders an agreed-upon solution in Europe much more complex today. The Federal Republic and the DDR, though from very different positions, both look with suspicion upon the evolution in progress of the relations within the two alliances and between the two alliances themselves. The Bonn leaders are deeply opposed to a revision of the NATO structure, not to mention its dissolution, in the fear that the price for a new European order will be paid with the consolidation of the status quo in Germany. The bilateral relations which have been established with France, or even with the United States, cannot, in the eyes of West German public opinion, compensate for the value of the multilateral protection of the atlantic alliance as the only real guarantee vis-à-vis the Soviets. In East Berlin, on the other hand, it is suspected that a loosening, or even worse a dissolution, of the Warsaw alliance as a means of reaching agreement on a European security pact might lead to the opposite consequences, those desired by Bonn, of a

change in the status quo regarding the German problem. The anachronistic appeals made to the strengthening in traditional terms of the Warsaw alliance bear out this fear of isolation as do the objectively rather justified requests to proceed with a policy of economic integration in COMECON. The East Germans too, despite the stipulation of bilateral agreements with the USSR, Poland and other Eastern nations, continue to consider the multilateral alliance as the best guarantee in the face of the adversary's initiatives.

It has thus come to the point at which a certain similarity can be observed in the positions taken by Bonn and by East Berlin with regard to the development of East-West relations, which in both of the capitals is seen from the particular angle of its own political exigencies. For both the Federal Republic and the DDR the process of international détente ought to stem primarily from a solution of the German problem as each side interprets it. For both, on the other hand, détente serves to strenghten contacts and relations with the enemy camp with the aim of isolating the other Germany. The political and diplomatic offensive of the Kiesinger government constitutes the most revealing example of this trend on Bonn's part. But it should not be forgotten that East Berlin as well, within the limits of its capacity, is seeking to broaden its relations with all the Western countries other than the Federal Republic (even though strong economic relations still exist between the two Germanys).

In this situation European, Soviet, and American policy makers are increasingly obliged to take into account, in dealing with the German problem, the positions expressed by Bonn and by East Berlin. This should be clarified. If it is in fact true that no one can legitimately contest the right of the Germans to make

their own national problem the object of autonomous politico-diplomatic action which is supported by all the means which their strengthened position allows them, it must on the other hand be underlined that policies aiming at a solution of the German problem cannot be considered only as an internal question between the two Germanys. The implications of power which are related to any European settlement including the Federal Republic and the DDR require that a harmonious solution to the two problems be found in order to avoid the risk of clashing interests.

The attainment of an agreed-upon solution for reunification or, on the contrary, for a normalization of relations between the two Germanys which is based on the status quo, cannot be considered as the pre-condition for a further relaxation in East-West relations. It would in fact hardly be realistic to choose the sector of greatest tension between the two opposing camps as the starting point for a general agreement in Europe. This is true both for Bonn, in its insistence on exercising almost a right of tutelage over the relations between the Western countries and the DDR, and for East Berlin when it links the problem of its recognition to that of the relations between Bonn and the Eastern countries. The finding of a solution for Germany, in fact, must be considered as but an element, no matter how crucial a one, of a more general European agreement and, in any event, as the final result of the gradual normalization of East-West relations.

It is generally agreed that the solution of the German problem is directly linked to a general re-organization of inter-state relations in Europe, and it thus remains for us to consider what concrete prospects exist today in this direction. There are certain remarks which can be made in this regard. There is no doubt that, even beyond the policies of the states themselves,

strong objective incentives exist for eliminating the system of two opposed alliances and for strengthening interEuropean relations. On the economic level, the general industrial development and the gradual standardization of production and technology which have taken place among European countries work in the direction of greater European collaboration. (This is that much more true in the case of the Eastern countries which need to become part of the international market and need to attain the more advanced technological level of the Western countries.) The great development of activity on the cultural and social level which has taken place in Europe both on the mass and on the elite levels also constitutes an important stimulus for the growing contacts between East and West. And this subject could be analyzed at greater depth in order to single out the forces and the social groups which have been exerting pressure in this direction. Today, in fact, it is society, that is, something beyond the structure of states and alliances, which tends to strengthen the trend toward a more marked European interdependence on the various economic, social and cultural levels.

All these elements, when taken together, tend to modify the situation of precarious stability which was created in recent years and to encourage a new international political order on the European continent. The question is now being raised from all sides if the Western and Eastern alliances will be able to retain their present structures much longer. In the case of NATO, whose member states will in 1968 be faced with the problem of renewing, or not, membership in that alliance, revisions and renovations are being called for in order to meet the necessity for more open relations with the Eastern countries and for a more efficient partnership between Western Europe and the United States. As for

the Warsaw Pact, although the twenty-year date of expiry in 1975 is still quite distant, it seems probable that some type of internal reform will take place well before that date. Here, too, it is not merely a question of affronting the problem of relations with the West but of establishing a new basis for the relations among the European Communist regimes themselves and between them and the Soviet Union. Both of these cases reveal the strict correlation which exists between the trend toward opposition to the respective hegemonic power, and the drive to reconstruct a European equilibrium which is based on the more direct participation of the small and medium-sized powers.

It is precisely in such circumstances that the Soviet thesis presented at the Conference of Bucharest in 1966 and restated this year at Karlovy-Vary for the establishment of a system of European security is significant. The moment, even from the psychological point of view, is a favorable one for an initiative of this type, and in addition allows the Soviets to emerge from a dangerous state of political and diplomatic inertia in Europe.

Even if it is no simple matter to define the Eastern proposals on the basis of that which, aside from several fixed points, is generically expressed in the documents from Bucharest and Karlovy-Vary, a few initial observations can be made in this regard. For Moscow the European security project is to gradually set up a series of diplomatic agreements, among the countries concerned, which will deal both with a mutual guaranty of the borders and of nuclear disarmament, and with economic, cultural and technical cooperation based less on the balance of power than on a relationship of reciprocal trust. Although the formula of the elimination of the blocs has been explicitly adopted, it does not seem that the Soviets foresee, at least not in the near future,

a total dissolution of the alliances, but rather a reduction of their military character and the preservation of their political structure.

The modification of the European state system through mutual agreements which will be able to create an atmosphere of trust among the countries concerned, will ensure the persistence of the two blocs within, however, a broader general international structure. This would allow the development, even on the bilateral level, of more open and direct relations between the European countries, under the umbrella of a multilateral system guaranteed, it would seem, in the final analysis by the USSR and the United States. Moscow's attempt, vis-à-vis the United States, to become the paladin of a panEuropean movement in such a way as to exclude the United States or at least to reduce its role within the Security Pact is, nevertheless, obvious. But we are dealing with an attempt alone because within the Eastern camp itself this hypothesis, which would give too strong a role to the USSR and to the Federal Republic, will be considered negatively by the various Communist regimes concerned as they are with maintaining a certain equilibrium in Europe.

The European security plan deals with the German problem in the usual way; that is, it calls for the formal participation of the DDR, her state sovereignty fully recognized, in the collective system. Thus, the consolidation of the status quo of the region once again appears to be the basic objective of the Soviets with the advantage, with respect to the past, of being able to count on an East Germany which is strong on the economic and social level and, at least apparently, has achieved a certain stability on the political level. But this is not merely an attempt to ensure the participation of the DDR in the negotiations

and thereby to guarantee her legitimacy as a state in such a way as to bring about a de facto recognition by Western countries as was the case at the time of the first proposals on European security presented in the mid-50's. By making the East German presence at the conference table a pre-condition for a European conference, the Soviets are attempting to pre-establish a position of strength for themselves in the future discussions of which Germany represents one of the basic themes. In the event that their proposal might not be accepted, the USSR will in any case be left with a good card which she can play on the propaganda level regardless of what would be the real reactions of Moscow, not to mention those of East Berlin (and Warsaw).

Even if at present we are faced only with the possibility of negotiations on the topic of European security, given the hesitations of the Soviets themselves to undertake negotiations of such importance, it is necessary to begin to deal with the question. In fact it could not be said, at least for the time being, that the terms of the problem and the possibilities of alternative proposals have been sufficiently analyzed by Western political circles.

It is not by pure chance that several of the most authoritative appeals in this regard have stemmed from groups in the Federal Republic who are worried by the absence of Western counterproposals. The fear of these groups is that the Soviets may be allowed the advantage of taking the initiative without being forced to commit themselves to the idea of negotiations. This would allow Moscow to unload a part of the internal tensions of the Communist camp onto the Western camp thereby accentuating its uncertainties and divisions without having her real intentions put to the test. There is no doubt about the fact that deep divisions

exist among the points of view of the Western allies on the possible forms of a new international settlement. For the United States it is essential that the two alliances continue to exist (even if it is willing to accept some revisions) as the only effective guarantee of equilibrium in Europe; rather than attempting to set up new and artificial systems of relations among the states, it is worthwhile for the moment to rely upon Russian-American bipolarity. As for the German problem, as is perhaps demonstrated by the reduction of troops in the area, it does not seem that Washington intends to commit itself to search new effective solutions.

De Gaulle's France, on the other hand, would like to put an end to the present system of alliances and negotiate the German problem directly with the USSR within the framework of a Pan-European agreement which would exclude the United States. Paris would aim at the preservation of a divided Germany, making the domestic evolution of the DDR a pre-condition to any agreement. As for the other Western countries such as Great Britain, Italy, etc. which are also able to play a role in this question, it does not seem for the moment that they are prepared to go beyond general formulations which are not politically binding.

This situation explains Bonn's concern and its call for the development of a common position on the German problem. The position of the West Germans is becoming increasingly delicate given the objective difficulties in implementing a policy line (and let us leave aside objections relating to the real limitations of this policy) on the basis of an autonomous platform which is not coordinated with that of its allies. Despite the prestige which it enjoys the Federal Republic is not, for the time being as the latest developments in her Eastern policy demonstrate, capable of putting the situation into motion and arriving at an agreed-upon

solution to the German problem on her own. The Soviets on the other hand, well aware of the situation, are trying to capitalize on Bonn's sense of isolation in order to weaken her contacts with Washington and to play up the hypothesis of direct negotiations.

The only way out of this situation lies not in Bonn's renunciation of an autonomous policy as regards a problem crucial to her national interest, but that she succeed in coordinating this policy with general Western policy. It is necessary to reconsider the various problems in such a way as to be able to face negotiations with a united position, bearing in mind the possible terms of an agreement which can only be the result of reciprocal concessions. If the goal is a change in the European and German status quo then it is necessary to know the limits of the proposed objectives and to clearly delineate their contours in such a way as to prevent, among other things, confusions of a semantic order.

This is particularly valid for the concept of the status quo which has so often been adopted in the German case. In fact, a distinction must be made between the concept of territorial status quo, that is the preservation of a territorially distinct East Germany, and the concept of political status quo, that is the preservation of the present East German regime. Whereas on the first point, the territorial, Bonn is beginning to demonstrate greater flexibility, it does not seem willing to compromise on the political nature of the Ulbricht regime. The maintenance of the illegitimate nature of the East Berlin government is the condition laid down by Bonn for its participation in any future negotiations on the grounds that the present East German regime has lasted thanks only to Soviet support and does not enjoy a legitimate popular consensus. The problem of the DDR's status quo will thus represent one of the fundamental topics of negotiation on which compromises

cannot be made prior to arriving at the negotiations themselves. The Hallstein Doctrine, it is maintained, has served to make the problem of East German recognition a question of international importance, and thus can only eventually be abrogated at the conclusion of international negotiations. Otherwise Bonn would end up participating in negotiations having abandoned, a priori, her strongest card, and making the acceptance of the Soviet thesis an outcome to be taken for granted.

Considering everything which has been said up to this point, it seems clear that given the prospect of general negotiations in the future, the outcome of Germany's future structure will depend on the more general fate of Europe. In this regard, albeit simplifying to the greatest degree and presenting the possible outlines of a new European state order in the most abstract of terms, it would seem that two hypotheses could be made.

I) The process of the dissolution of the present alliance system will be carried through to its logical conclusion; the national states will take on a new lease of life with the result that Europe will pass from the present bipolar equilibrium to a traditional status quo founded on a balance of power among states. Paradoxically, in an era which would witness the reconfirmation of those values favoring the identification of state and nation, the Germans would be the only divided people deprived of this right. The risks implicit in such a situation are obvious. The Federal Republic, left on its own and oriented towards the creation of a united German state, would end up by destroying the established equilibrium. It is difficult, in fact, to think of diplomatic and military formulas which would be capable of containing the thrust of a Germany characterized by increasing economic and social growth and by uncontainable political aspirations. In the absence

of effective supranational structures in Europe which would be able to bridle the Federal Republic and protect the DDR, a rapid absorption of the latter by a unified Germany is not to be excluded. The process of reunification could also come about by peaceful means, as the result of domestic political and social developments within the two Germanys, but this would not alter the grave consequences which reunification would have for the European equilibrium. And the prospect of the creation of a unified, disarmed and neutral Germany within a system of national states hardly appears realistic. The memory of the Versailles experience, which led in the period between the two wars to the creation of a European system which was incapable of containing the aspirations of an unsatisfied Germany, is inevitable.

In reality, in order to guarantee a new European state system which is based either on the division of Germany or on a united and neutral Germany, the participation of a United States and a Soviet Union who are in basic agreement is necessary. But given present conditions this seems hardly likely even granting the possibility of a substantial improvement in Moscow-Washington relations once several crucial points of friction (the war in Vietnam, etc.) are overcome; and above all it would reconstruct a situation of bipolar hegemony, this time explicitly agreed upon, which is precisely what a new European settlement would be seeking to eliminate.

II) The process of the erosion of the present alliances will be interpreted positively and thus in both the Eastern and Western blocs new forms of economic and political association will be created among the member states. The European Communist states will reach a reorganization of their mutual relations both as regards the relations among the People's Democracies themselves and

those between them and the Soviet Union. The Western countries, on the other hand, will create an analogous situation; that is to say they will put the relations within the European community and those between the latter and the United States on a new basis. The possible solutions, both in the East and the West, present a very broad range of alternatives depending on the degrees of autonomy and of interdependence which are proposed. What is important is that certain rigidities in the relationships within the alliances are eased, and that more efficient structures are developed in order to find a correct point of equilibrium between the necessities of pluralism and of collectivism. This would be followed by a change in East-West relations of either a bilateral or multilateral nature depending on the prevailing trends of the period. On the basis of this reinvigorated and more flexible equilibrium the creation of an effective security system would be possible with the greatest probability of success.

In a Europe in which the national motifs were to give way to a broader conception of community, a just solution could be found even for the problem of Germany. The strengthening of relations between the Eastern and Western countries and the gradual relaxation of the European atmosphere would dedramatize the German question and make reunification an objective to be considered in a historical context; it would thus have a series of positive consequences. To begin with, in the event of domestic political crises in the DDR, which are not to be completely excluded given the rigidity of the regime's present structure, these developments would impede such crises from degenerating into a popular wave of nationalism with all the imaginable consequences to international order. In the second place, it would encourage open and positive relations between Bonn and East Berlin whose possible result, at

the end of a lengthy evolutionary process of mutual relations, could be the reconstruction of German national unity. By beginning with particularly important contacts in the economic, social and cultural fields, it would then be possible to proceed to increasingly close relations of a political nature. The phenomenon of a reunification attained within the framework of a European security system would not give rise to external tensions because it would have eliminated any drive for revisionism on the part of the new, united Germany.

What is more probable, however, is that in the climate created by European normalization, the basic elements which constitute the Federal Republic and the DDR would be strengthened, thus leading to a definitive confirmation of the existence of two Germanys; and this would occur without giving rise to external pressures and without the aggravation of mutual antagonism. In this way two autonomous German states would be created; each with its own distinct national and political physiognomy, each endowed with an important role within its respective system. The case of Austria, a German country which succeeded in gradually creating its own national physiognomy and which today enjoys a well-defined autonomous political and territorial personality, is often cited in support of the realism of such a prospect. But it is obvious that we are dealing with an example which has its own particular characteristics.

In the case of the DDR, which, regardless of whether or not any domestic consolidation takes place, is bound to remain a national entity with specific characteristics, many questions, given the intrinsic difficulty of transforming the national motif into a basic element in its structure, remain unanswered. Among all the European countries, East Germany is that which has the strongest need to participate in supranational arrangements. For this reason,

limited forms of regional integration with West Germany itself, or with its Eastern neighbors, Poland and Czechoslovakia, are not to be excluded. As for the development of the East Berlin regime, that is, the liberalization of its domestic policies, this would be greatly facilitated by an atmosphere of détente and normalization.

It is somewhat more difficult to hypothesize about the trend which such liberalization would take. The idea put forward in some quarters of the transformation of the regime into a Titoist-style state does not seem to take sufficient account of the deep diversities in the origin and the development of these two Communist states, Yugoslavia and East Germany. On the other hand, the possibility of an evolution of the traditional democratic type would appear to be rather remote considering the profound economic and social transformation through which the country has passed in recent years. In any event, in the case of both of these hypotheses, we are entering the realm of abstract speculation. It is impossible today for us to evaluate the international and domestic factors which are likely to influence the course of this evolution.

12

The Atlantic Institute
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THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

by

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Prepared for a conference of the Atlantic Institute, Paris, Jan. 25-27, 68

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The Western Alliance and European Security

I

In his posture statement of January, 1967 the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. Robert S. McNamara, described the situation in Europe in terms of ". . . long frozen positions . . . beginning to thaw . . . " and of "an intensified search -- on both sides of the Iron Curtain -- for new arrangements which might better serve security needs of all concerned." He also expressed the opinion that these developments were "not necessarily detrimental" to the interests of the United States.[1]

"European Security", as a concept embracing all of Europe, has indeed become not only a slogan of political rhetoric and propaganda but increasingly also a subject of serious public discussion in Europe on both sides of the dividing line. Admittedly, the phrase has been used with distinctly different connotations in the two parts of Europe. In the East the concept of "European Security" has been associated not only with measures aiming at "military détente" but also with the legalization of the political status quo in Central Europe.[2] In Western Europe thinking about "European security" has recently been encouraged along unorthodox lines, including ideas about a possible transformation of the existing alliance systems and their ultimate replacement by a "European security system", which would better correspond with the changing requirements of security and the new potentialities for political evolution.[3]

Although the aims envisaged by those speaking in favor of "European security" in both parts of Europe are distinctly different, there does seem to exist a limited consensus as to the two main roads along which an improvement of East-West relations in Europe might be sought.

There is first what could be termed the direct road to European security, involving a search for new military arrangements in Central Europe. Two main solutions have emerged in the discussions about possible outcomes of this search:

(a) the continued existence but significant mutual adaptation of present military alliances in order to make them more adequate to meet the specific risks and requirements of the changed situation in Central Europe. (Measures that could be conducive to such a development might include reductions of force levels within both alliances; the establishment of observation posts on both sides of the dividing line; "hot-line" arrangements between supreme theatre commanders in Central Europe, etc.)

(b) a gradual elimination of the existing military alliances in Europe and their replacement by a new, all-European security system.[4] The solution under (b) obviously does not exclude the one under (a) as an intermediate goal, and the proponents of a search for a European security system which would replace NATO and the Warsaw Pact usually envisage the continued existence of the present alliances in a modified form during a transitional period. This seems to be true not only of the members of the Western European Union[5] but also of the Warsaw Treaty Member States. The Bucharest Declaration thus speaks of the great importance of "partial measures aimed at military détente on European territory." And although the concrete steps proposed in the Declaration are highly asymmetrical (to the disadvantage of the West), the concept of "military détente" might conceivably be a basis for negotiations aiming at limited agreements on arms regulations in Central Europe -- to the advantage of both sides.[6] A decisive difference between the West and East European approach is the degree of commitment to the ultimate abolishment of the present military groupings. In the view of many West Europeans the search for such a system should be open-ended,

in the sense that the feasibility of new European security arrangements ought to be verified before any commitments whatsoever are undertaken to dispose of the present military alliances. The Soviet Union and her East European allies on the other hand have suggested that both sides should immediately proceed to conclude an agreement on the liquidation of the two military organizations, thus committing themselves, at least verbally, to that goal before any evidence had been obtained with regard to the viability of a European security system.[7] This procedure, presumably, is unacceptable to most West Europeans.

The second road to European security, which one could call the indirect road, envisages a steady growth of the already multiplying contacts and cooperative schemes across political and ideological borders, with a view that mutually profitable links between countries with different social systems may eventually make the outstanding political problems in Central Europe, such as the status of Germany and the unsettled boundary questions, less intractable. Again there seems to exist a consensus between East and West on the desirability of such a development, at least in the sense that both sides consider it to be a necessary precondition for a permanent settlement in Europe.

These two roads to "European security" are not conceived by their proponents as mutually exclusive but rather as developments that are bound to reinforce each other. Acknowledging the interdependence of the two processes, however, does not necessarily mean that their relationship has been clarified very well in the discussions and proposals about future East-West relations in Europe. Indeed, the opposite seems to be the case: there has recently been a good deal of rather loose talk about cooperation among all European states clearing the way to a new peaceful order that would safeguard the security interests of all concerned.

One way of demonstrating how the two processes mentioned above may impinge upon each other is to specify the concrete advantages adduced by their proponents. In doing so it should first of all be emphasized that the two approaches have two different foci: the first, which we have called the direct road to European security, is primarily concerned with the control and management of conflict by modifying the military arrangements in Central Europe in a way conducive to peace; the second, or indirect, road, on the other hand, is concerned with the ultimate resolution of conflict by political evolution in Europe as a whole.[8] The advantages allegedly accruing from each of the two processes naturally reflect the inherent differences in emphasis and time-perspective. Thus the first approach involving different kinds of measures in the military field is usually recommended because it would:

(a) reduce the risk of war through incidents or misperceptions;

(b) allow immediate and possibly increasing economic savings; and

(c) contribute to the emergence of an atmosphere of mutual trust conducive to the resolution of controversial political issues, primarily the German problem.

To the second approach, implying the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation between East and West in Europe is attributed:

(a1) a decrease in mutual threat perceptions flowing from a better understanding of basic positions and motivations on each side; and

(b2) the creation of a new environment of interdependence -- encompassing the field of cultural, socio-economic, and also political relations -- in which national boundaries would lose much of their present significance and the German problem thereby become susceptible to resolution, and in which the

basis for a permanent peaceful order in Europe would thus emerge.

It will be apparent that it is by virtue of the advantages listed under (c) and (a1) respectively that the two processes would presumably reinforce each other. Obviously, if the military postures on both sides were managed with the intention to demonstrate their non-provocative nature this might significantly facilitate the process of creating a new political environment in Central Europe. Indeed, it would seem to the present author that there are distinct limits to the process of healing the rift in Europe by the growth of East-West exchange and cooperation alone. The maximum benefit in terms of reconciliation in Europe will only be derived from these expanding opportunities for mutually profitable links, if some headway is made simultaneously in the field of security arrangements.9 A cumulative process of increasing mutual trust and understanding generated by the growth of contacts and cooperation should make it easier, on the other hand, to arrive at some arms control agreements acceptable to both sides.

II

It has been argued by some of the keenest West European observers of the Soviet and East European scenes that the concept of "European security" is used by Moscow and its allies primarily as a propaganda slogan aiming at sowing discord within the Western alliance, thereby promoting the double goal of (a) the liquidation of NATO and the withdrawal of the United States from Europe, and (b) the freezing of the present situation in Central Europe implying a permanent division of Germany.[10] Even if one accepts the gist of this argument, it would still appear reasonable

to assume a certain measure of genuine interest in improving East-West relations in Europe on the part of the Soviet Union and of most, if not all, the East European states. This, in any case, is the position of the present writer in the sense that it is postulated here that there exists -- for complex, partly overlapping and partly conflicting reasons -- a Soviet-East European consensus on the desirability of stabilizing the military environment in Central Europe and of promoting East-West cooperation in Europe at least in the fields of trade, science, technology and cultural relations. If, indeed, one can assume a minimum of genuine Soviet and East European interest in this type of "European security and cooperation", then the only way in which the Western powers might help that element to ascendancy over its propagandistic twin-brother would be to demonstrate conclusively the futility of exploiting the slogan of "European security" as a divisive instrument against the Western alliance. This in turn presupposes a concerted effort in the West to achieve some kind of overall coordination in the dealings of each member of the alliance with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Such coordination, however, is badly needed anyway, as the success or failure of the alliance over the next decade is likely to be measured increasingly in terms of its ability to forge a new East-West relationship in Europe. In this situation the search for some rational division of labor among the Western powers in the management of relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would seem to be a worthwhile undertaking.

What is the prospect for arriving at such an explicit coordination of Western efforts? One way of clarifying the scope for agreement in this field is to try to spell out how the two roads to European security outlined above as well as the corresponding <u>foci</u> of concern may relate to the basic interests of the major Western powers.* * *

The overriding preoccupation of the United States in connection with the further development of East-West relations in Europe would seem to be related to the control of conflict and thus to the stability of the existing politico-military environment in Europe. Giving priority to measures that are instrumental to preserving -- and if possible to enhancing -- stability does not necessarily imply accepting the present status quo in Europe as compatible with basic American national interests. But it could be argued that the acceptance of the status quo as the basis for a European settlement conflicts with fundamental U.S. interests only as long as the existing situation in Central Europe is perceived as inherently unstable. Thus while the policy of "peaceful engagement" in Eastern Europe has been explained by American officials in terms of a long-term strategy to bring about a new political environment in Europe conducive to the resolution of conflicts, the ultimate motivation for choosing this policy is likely to have been the concern of U.S. decision-makers with the control of conflict: a policy which held out some prospect for gradual peaceful change may have appeared to be the best way to contain the political forces that might jeopardize the present relative stability in that sensitive area.[11]

Similar considerations would seem to hold true for Britain whose major concern with regard to East-West relations in Europe also seems to be with the control of conflict and the management of crises in such a way that the possibility of large-scale armed conflagrations between the two military alliances is reduced to a minimum. In addition, Britain's primary preoccupation with sustained economic recovery predisposes her to favor arms control measures that would allow the reduction of force levels on the European continent.[12]

West Germany's position with regard to the two major foci of concern in the search for European security is a complex one. On the one hand, because of her exposed situation the Federal Republic must be at least as interested as any of her major allies in the conflict control aspects of Western détente policy. On the other hand, it is only in terms of the resolution of basic conflicts in Central Europe -- or at least significant developments leading in that direction -- that she can hope to attain the major national goal of her people: reunification. What every government in Bonn must guard against is the pursuit of one of these main aims at the expense of the other. Under the new Coalition government the Federal Republic has finally explicitly accepted the view that détente with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, including East Germany, is a precondition for any progress in a long-term process which may eventually lead to some kind of reunification. Once the relaxation of East-West tensions in Europe is no longer conceived as a bargain counter for steps towards reunification but as a necessary preliminary to the latter, the long suppressed, genuine West German interest in stabilizing the military environment in Central Europe could come into play. Thus, disregarding for a moment the still prevailing internal inhibitions -- specifically within the ranks of the CDU/CSU -- the main limiting consideration for Bonn with regard to arms control agreements in Central Europe would seem to be the concern to avoid the legalization of Germany's division.[13]

Finally, there is France, whose primary preoccupation seems to be with the restoration of Europe to a position as independent as possible from super-power influence. As for the two roads to European security the French Government has been among the main proponents and practitioners of what was labeled above as the indirect road, i.e., the development of cooperative

ties with individual East European countries as a means to the reconciliation and unification of the whole Old Continent. This reconciliation in de Gaulle's view would both require and facilitate progress with regard to the German question, although not necessarily the unification of East and West Germany in one unitary state. Thus, while paying lip service to German reunification, the French seem to be primarily interested in the amelioration of the German problem in order to eliminate (a) the main legitimation for super-power presence and influence in Europe; and (b) the block to further rapprochement between Eastern and Western Europe which the unresolved situation in Central Europe constitutes. If these aims could be achieved by measures that would make the continued division of Germany just bearable to the German people the French are likely to be satisfied.

The direct road to European security on the other hand has hardly found any support in the French Government. No doubt this is partly due to the less exposed position of France, which gives her more freedom to be relatively complacent about conflict control in Central Europe and security measures in general. But the main reason for the negative French attitude seems to be the fact that at least the initial steps along that road are usually conceived in terms of agreements between the existing military alliances.[14] This in de Gaulle's view would reinforce the hegemonial position of the super-powers in Europe, whereas his aspirations run in exactly the opposite direction.

III

Thus we come back to our earlier question: what, in view of these preoccupations and priorities of the main powers in the West, is the scope for a coordinated Western approach to the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states? As for the compatibility of the West German efforts with those of the United States and Britain, there should be no major difficulties at least during the earlier stages of an East-West rapprochement. The previous conflict of priorities between détente and reunification having been resolved in favor of the former, the West German Government may become increasingly aware of the need to lend credibility to its declaratory policy of reconciliation by adopting distinctly non-provocative military postures and by exhibiting a sincere interest in regional arms control measures. Thus there may emerge -- in fact it is discernible today -- a basic consensus between Washington, London and Bonn with regard to the desirability of promoting European security by arms regulations in Central Europe. Even with regard to negotiating procedures with the Warsaw Pact countries the earlier West German reservations, due mainly to the concern about a possible up-grading of East Germany's international status, seem to be fading away. In fact both Chancellor Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Brandt have recently advocated that the alliance systems themselves should be oriented toward the new tasks of East-West reconciliation in Europe.[15] These suggestions seem to fall very well in line with ideas expressed by Zbigniew Brzezinski of the Policy Planning Council in the U.S. Department of State. In January, 1967 he surmised that after the earlier stages of "confrontation" and "exploration of bi-lateral relationships" the West was on the eve of a third phase -- "trying to build, multilaterally, an East-West relationship." In the security field this, in his view, could mean extending cooperation to the alliance systems themselves "in order to reduce the level of the confrontation."[16]

To the extent that differences still exist between the Federal Republic and the Anglo-Saxon Powers with regard to East-West relations in Europe it would seem to be in the realm of long-term perspectives rather than immediate policy choices. Bonn is apt to insist with greater vigor than anybody else in the West that Western policy toward the Soviet Union and her allies be conceived in a perspective that goes beyond the relaxation of tension. It must remain a basic preoccupation of a West Germany allied to the West to emphasize vis-à-vis her partners that genuine stability in Central Europe cannot be achieved without removing the causes of tension in that part of the world.[17]

It is clearly far more difficult to envisage a closer "coordination" between French policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the efforts of her Anglo-Saxon partners in this field. Yet, is a harmonization altogether unthinkable?

For reasons indicated above France is not likely to participate in nor to support any scheme for conflict control and/or arms limitation in Central Europe that would be based on the existing military organizations. On the other hand the French conception of a European rapprochement and ultimate unification clearly envisages regional arms limitations in Central Europe -- specifically in the nuclear field. Thus, while there is some evidence of a positive French attitude toward regional arms control in Europe in a long-term perspective, the participation of France in the early stages of a system for conflict control and arms limitations would hardly seem to be critical. On the Western side these initial steps would have to be worked out primarily between the United States, West Germany and possibly Britain.

As for the efforts to promote European unification by an active policy of bilateral contacts and cooperation with individual

countries in the East, France is likely to remain suspicious of all "coordinating" schemes smacking of American hegemonial influence or interference. But if our earlier assumption about the inter-dependence between the two roads to European security is correct,[18] the French Government at some point is going to reach the conclusion that no further progress toward European reconciliation can be achieved without concrete steps forward in the field of security arrangements. Then, if not earlier, the French Government will probably become interested in participating actively in efforts to stabilize the military environment in Central Europe. At that juncture, the American attitude is likely to be of decisive importance. Should the United States in this situation insist on military structures in Europe that were similar to NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in the sense that they would contain distinct features of super-power predominance, then American-European attempts to find common ground will probably come to nothing. It is, however, conceivable that the United States would be sufficiently flexible in its reaction to contemplate a common Western plan which in its ultimate stages would hold out the prospect of a European security structure without super-power domination but with some type of American-Soviet reassurance against the overthrow of this European sub-system. France may then not only be willing to participate in a search for new European security arrangements together with the Americans but also be inclined to accept some measure of overall coordination in the further development of bilateral and multi-lateral cooperation between Eastern and Western Europe.

Thus, ideally, a division of labor between the main Western states could emerge along the following lines:

Stage 1: a) The United States, West Germany and Britain evolving some plan for a relatively crude system of conflict control and/or arms limitations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact;

b) France and West Germany together with a number of other West European states[19] elaborating a strategy for the further development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation across the dividing line in Europe.

Stage 2: a) Elaboration of the main elements in a Western plan for a European security system by the Western European Union and the United States in cooperation;

b) tighter West European coordination of cooperative efforts with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (participation may include all countries belonging to the Council of Europe).

Stage 3: Working out of an overall Western plan for European security and cooperation (all states participating under Stage 2 a) and b).

Stage 4: Negotiations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for a European system of security and cooperation (U.S., U.S.S.R. and all European states).

Obviously, these four stages should not be conceived as watertight compartments: in practice they would necessarily overlap. Thus, the scheme is meant only as a general guideline indicating where, in the opinion of the author, the emphasis should lie in each phase of an evolutionary process. The sounding out of Soviet and East European attitudes, for example, would have to be going on all the time and might conceivably reach the level of preliminary negotiations early in the process. Similarly, although the United

States would be actively involved in the coordination of Western plans for cooperative efforts across the dividing line in Europe only in the third stage of this scheme -- when the linkage between security measures and East-West cooperation should be tackled -- mutual consultation and orientation within the Western alliance on all aspects of East-West relations in Europe would necessarily have to be undertaken all the time. Finally, there are a number of non-Communist states in Europe that do not belong to the Western alliance. Their participation is envisaged under Stage 2 b) and 3 as a possibility, but it may obviously pose a problem both to the alliance and to themselves, specifically in Stage 3, when security measures would be discussed. On the other hand, it should be obvious that some of the countries in question may be able to make important contributions to East-West reconciliation in Europe. Most likely, however, their role would have to be limited to active participation in Stage 4.

* * *

In conclusion, it may be necessary to emphasize that this essay does not purport to be an exercise in prediction. The author is sceptical enough to realize that the chances that events will conform to the above scheme are slim at best. What has been attempted here is to demonstrate that it is not altogether inconceivable, provided sufficient determination and perseverance can be mobilized in the West. This, however, presupposes a sense of common purpose among the Western States that at present is patently lacking and has so far been attained in any alliance only in times of war or in the face of an immediate external threat. The European issues confronting the Western Alliance today may seem less urgent and tangible than the military challenges of former years; yet the stakes may ultimately be as high.

Footnotes

1. Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1968-72 Defense Program and 1968 Defense Budget, January 23, 1967. Mimeographed.

2. Cf. "Declaration on the Strengthening of Peace and Security in Europe," endorsed by the Political Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, Bucharest, July 5, 1966 (Agerpress), pp. 9-10.

3. See recommendation no.144 adopted by the Assembly of the Western European Union on December 15, 1966; A/WEU, 12th sess., 2nd part, December 1966.

4. Cf. Willy Brandt, "Détente over the Long Haul," originally published in Aussenpolitik, August 1967; English translation in Survival, October 1967, p.312. See also Erhard Eppler, "Eine Funktion für die Deutschen," Die Zeit, October 27, 1967 (European edition).

5. See WEU Assembly, Recommendation No.144, December 15, 1966; as quoted above note 3.

6. The following "partial measures" were suggested in the Bucharest Declaration: "The dismantling of foreign military bases; the withdrawal of all troops from the territories of other states within the national frontiers; the reduction in the framework of commonly agreed limits and terms of the numerical strength of the armed forces of both German states; measures meant to remove the danger of a nuclear conflict; the creation of denuclearized zones and commitment taken by the powers in possession of the nuclear weapon, not to use this weapon against the states participating in such zones and others; discontinuing flights of foreign aircraft with nuclear bombs over the territories of European states and entrance of foreign submarines and ships loaded with nuclear weapons in the ports of these states." "Declaration on the Strengthening of Peace and Security in Europe," op. cit., p.9.

7. Ibid.

8. Cf. Georg R. Bluhm, Détente and Military Relaxation in Europe, Adelphi Paper No.40, September 1967, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, p.2.

9. Those familiar with the mood of the East European elites will have to recognize the validity of this point. Cf. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Toward a Community of the Developed Nations," Department of State Bulletin, March 13, 1967.

10. See e.g., Richard Löwenthal, "Der Einfluss Chinas auf die Entwicklung des Ost-West Konflikts in Europe," Europa-Archiv, 10/1967, p.346; Gerhard Wettig, "Die Europäische Sicherheit in der Politik des Ostblocks 1966," Osteuropa, No.2-3, 1967, pp.106-111.

11. See Brzezinski, op. cit., p.418.

12. See Statement on Defense Estimates 1967, Cmnd 3202, p.4, where the mutual scaling down of force levels in NATO and in the Warsaw Pact is recommended as conducive to the freeing of economic resources and the emergence of a greater feeling of security on both sides as well as a better general climate for tackling the main economic problems of the European continent.

13. Cf. Willy Brandt's statement on the readiness of the Bonn Government to conclude agreements about the renunciation of the use of force "also with the other part of Germany." "Die DDR beim Namen nennen?" Interview with Willy Brandt in Der Stern, No.43, October 22, 1967.

14. Cf. Curt Gasteyger, Europe in the Seventies, Adelphi Paper, No.37, June 1967, p.15.

15. Cf. Summary of Kiesinger's lecture before the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik on June 23, 1967, Europa-Archiv, 18/1967, pp.683-684; see also Brandt's article in Aussenpolitik, August 1967, cited in note 4. Brandt warned against bilateralism being allowed to prevail in East-West relations.

16. Brzezinski, op. cit., p.419.

17. Cf. Brandt, "Détente over the Long Haul," op. cit., p.311-312.

18. Cf. supra, p.7.

19. The role of Italy and other West European states has not been discussed in this paper. It should be obvious, however, that specifically in the realm of trade, technology and cultural contacts

the importance of middle powers and small states for the promotion of East-West cooperation in Europe may be very significant indeed.

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13

DÉTENTE OR DETERIORATION

Projections on future East-West relations

December 1967

Frans A.M.Alting von Geusau

The world, as it enters 1968, not only looks different from the one entering, say, 1951 amidst the Cold war. The situation also differs from 1963, beginning under the hopefull signs of a détente gradually easing the cold war.

Recent developments in Vietnam, Soviet-American relations and the arms race, at least challenge one of the common premises for our discussion.

It is now questionable whether the assumption still holds valid "that the Vietnamese conflict will be ended by some formula reasonably satisfactory to the US and the USSR". It appears more likely that a solution will be sought by which American satisfaction increases inversely with Soviet satisfaction. The Vietnam war will thus further disturb the delicate balance of terror between the US and the USSR, already seriously upset by the outcome of the latest Middle-East war.

As a consequence, the unhappy Vietnam war, rather than being incidental in Soviet-American relations, will increasingly determine general Soviet policy in the future.
In Washington also, the prudent policy of bridge-building towards the Soviet Union appears to have come to an end.

The Soviet space-bomb and the American decision to deploy an A.B.M. system, are now seriously hampering further progress in achieving non-proliferation.

It thus appears likely that this new phase in the arms race will further diminish chances for the policy of arms control, introduced in the early sixties.

Whatever the outcome may be of the American involvement in Vietnam, American defense policy towards Western Europe will probably further loosen its commitment to intervene directly in a European crisis. American policy - Dean Rusk indicated - may increasingly stress the need for a European Defense organization as a means to enhance Western Europe's capacity to defend itself. Its underlying assumption that a Europe uniting along Monnet lines shall again be willing to become a partner of the United States in a post-gaullist era, also needs reappraisal. Even after de Gaulle, the U.S. shall have to reckon rather with "gaullism" as a long-term trend than a passing nuisance. In the future, Western Europe appears likely to assert itself rather as

an independent force than an equal partner. At the same time it appears unlikely that the process of federalizing in Europe -the Monnet approach- will be relaunched in the near future. The process of economic cooperation will further acquire an autonomy of its own, without contributing to a solution of present political division and conflict in Western Europe.

The basic argument forwarded in this paper is that, unless significant policy changes are occuring, the actual gloomy picture of world developments represents a new long term trend rather than a temporary problem.

For my part, I would propose five specific assumptions to replace those still commonly held:

1. The Vietnam war, as it is presently being waged by the United States, will further diminish the chances for any significant rapprochement between the U.S. and the USSR in the years to come.
2. As a consequence significant agreements on arms control measures will be jeopardized by new steps in the arms race.
3. NATO will further desintegrate as an organization for defense purposes without transforming itself into an instrument for East-West détente and arms control.
4. The trend in Western European countries to assert themselves against the United States without achieving unity among themselves will continue.
5. As a consequence, the present uneasy status quo in Europe will remain and no further progress towards détente in Europe can be made.

In the following pages I shall attempt to clarify these assumptions and analyze their implication for future developments. A final section shall discuss requirements for reversing the present and unfortunate trends in East-West and Atlantic relations.

The evolution in Soviet American relations.

The evolution of Soviet American relations since the second world war can be subdivided into five more or less distinct periods:1945-1947; 1947-1955;1955-1962; 1962-1967, and the present.

During the first period, American policy was largely dominated by the illusion that postwar cooperation in the framework of the U.N. was viable. The Soviet-Union, while not being uncooperative in Yalta and in drafting the U.N. Charter, soon returned to "those attitudes of suspicion and hostility toward the West which it had consistently and openly expressed before it entered into the wartime alliance against Nazi Germany" [1].

This Soviet policy, combined with its efforts to consolidate its positions in Eastern Europe, caused a fundamental change in American foreign policy. The new American policy, formally inaugurated by Truman's declaration of March 12, 1947 (the so-called Truman doctrine), found its paramount expression in the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4,1949. Rejecting the original thesis that collective security could be reached with the USSR in the United Nations, the US henceforward adopted the thesis that it ought to be organized against the Soviet Union outside the United Nations.

Its formula for Western Europe became: atlantic regional security combined with economic recovery in Europe and enhanced by European political unity. This series of American reactions against perceived Soviet intentions in turn hardened Soviet policy and further increased its suspicion. The cold war, as this situation came to be labeled, was a Soviet American confrontation over Europe mainly, until approximately 1955. Between 1954 and 1957 a number of events were taking place,which again changed the pattern of Soviet-American relationship.

From 1954 onwards the American nuclear monopoly was rapidly being replaced by an Soviet-American equilibrium.It resulted in an unprecedented arms race between the two political giants.

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1). SHULMAN, Beyond the Cold War, New Haven 1966, p.3

At the same time, the post-Stalin regime started to shift its emphasis from Europe to the Afro-Asian world. Since the UN package deal of December 1955 - the admission of 16 new members to the world organization - both powers became increasingly confronted with the impact of decolonization and the non-alligned countries upon their mutual relations.

The slight détente in Europe, marked by the agreement on Austria's reunification and the I.A.E.A. was counteracted by the Western agreement on admitting West-Germany to NATO. The new western formula-after the rejection of EDC - of increasing security also without political unity, further freezed positions with respect to Europe.

It was not until 1962 that a new and significant change in Soviet-American relations accurred. The disappearance of the Berlin crisis marked at least a tacit and temporary acceptance of the status quo in Europe. The shaky Laos agreement opened the possibility of further agreement on accepting the world of diversity outside Europe. And last but not least, the Soviet-American confrontation over Cuba inaugurated a new era in which the balance of terror could be converted into a basis for arms control rather than a further arms race.

The outcome of the Cuban crisis, however, also affected the two systems internally. It sharpened the Sino-Soviet conflict and the Franco-American opposition, giving rise to more diversity inside the two blocs and to political polycentrism under the cover of military bipolarity.

Since 1962, the international system appears to present itself as a delicate and multi-dimensional balance of forces. These balances can provide the take -off for pragmatic solutions in each area for reducing tensions inherent in each of them. Inversely, increasing tension in one of them risks to set off an escalation process which may ultimately get out of control. In this context, the present Vietnam policy of the United States comes into play. In this context also, the evolution of the Vietnam conflict cannot be seen as an isolated conflict. As integral part of world developments its outcome shall either contribute to détente or revive world tension.

The changing objectives of American policy over the past few years therefore increasingly risk to jeopardize détente and to contribute to increasing tension. If American policy thus continues along its present lines, the following evolutions in East West relations appear likely:

1. Soviet-American relations will further deteriorate, without any chance for agreement also on matters outside the South-East Asian situation.
2. In non-European crises - like the latest Middle East war - the US and the USSR will continue to avoid direct confrontation. They will, however, both be unwilling to contribute to easing tension and devising solutions for such conflicts. On the contrary, an increasing tendency to support their own "Clients", will engender new open conflicts with a built-in danger of escalation.
3. The Vietnam conflict will uphold the American policy of isolating China in world politics. In doing so, China will continue its present revolutionary policy and the forced build-up of a strong nuclear force. This policy in turn will strengthen those in the US who are pressing for further improving the American ABM system and its general nuclear capability.
4. Although China appears capable to bypass the Soviet Union after 1975, the above development will first of all be seen in Moscow as an increasing American threat, thus further reducing the chances for arms control.
5. A continuing struggle in Vietnam will further decrease Atlantic cohesion, without concurrently diminishing cohesion among Warsaw pact members.
6. As a consequence the present balance of terror may well erode into two opposite directions. On the global level, Soviet suspicion will increase in the face of growing American preponderance. On the European level, the USSR may be tempted to seek gains in the face of a growing imbalance at the expence of Western Europe.

In both respects, the erosion of the balance of terror will heighten tensions in the international system.

Arms Control or Revived Arms Race

The Russian orbital weapon and the American decision to deploy a limited ABM system suggest that arms control has already become the victim of a deteriorating world situation. When we make an attempt to see the present stalemate over a non proliferation treaty in the ENDC in its political context, the prospects are not promising. The story of disarmament negotiations since the war has been a sad one until 1962, notwithstanding the mounting pressure in the UN to abolish nuclear weapons before reaching agreement on any measure to organize peace.

This mounting pressure in itself expressed the reversal of the conception written in the UN Charter. According to this Charter, arms regulation should follow collective security. Since the nineteen fifties and especially due to the nuclear arms revolution, nuclear disarmament was given first priority.

It was however only after the Cuban crisis that a first step towards arms control could be agreed upon. The political détente following the crisis - and not only the advance in the technology of detection - provided the political climate for a limited test ban agreement. A non-proliferation treaty combined with a comprehensive testban and eventually a promise by America and Russia not to develop ABM systemsappeared to be the logical next step towards arms control.

Such a step, it appears to me, still more requires a climate of political détente than did the first testban agreement. Political détente though is necessary both for having the US and the USSR agree to take those further steps the smaller powers ask for, as for having these smaller powers agree to forego the nuclear option.

The present two-way erosion of the balance of terror is significantly dimishing the chances for reaching such agreement. The absence of agreement on non-proliferation will in turn contribute to further tension. This gloomy picture appears all the more likely if we project possible developments on the screen of Soviet and American intentions in this respect.

The major objective of Soviet non-proliferation policy has always been to prevent Germany from either becoming a nuclear power on its own or decisively influencing the use of nuclear

weapons.

The expected further desintegration of the Atlantic alliance - whether a consequence of Vietnam, of a growing European drive for independence, or of both - may well lead to exactly that situation, the Soviets now like to prevent. It appears likely that a growing feeling of insecurity in Western Europe and its desire to play a greater role in world politics, will converge to advocating some kind of a European nuclear force. Quite paradoxically, Soviet symphaty for de Gaulle's NATO policy is promoting this trend. Any European nuclear arrangement, however, will be explained in the East as a measure of German nuclear armament, and thus contribute to increased tension.

The American non-proliferation policy especially aimed at bridge-building with the USSR and at preventing proliferation in Asia, is becoming increasingly incompatible with its present Vietnam policy. Recent developments at least suggest that bridge building with the USSR cannot proceed concurrently with bridge-destruction around Hanoi. The arms race between the US and China may well result in a chain reaction of Asian countries going nuclear.

As a result the favorable climate for furthering arms control seems to have passed, without any credible chance for preventing a revived arms race.

Further decline of NATO?

"Alliances in the past - Brzezinski is quoted to write in a forthcoming article[2] - " were designed to wage war; in recent times they have helped to deter war; in years to come they must concentrate on promoting peace".

In a nutshell, this quotation defines the basic problems with which NATO is faced today.

An alliance concluded to wage war can afford to show little cohesion in peace-time.

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2). International Herald Tribune. Tuesday, December 19,1967.

The capacity to deter war depends on a strong and militarily unified organization in times of peace supported by a high degree of coordination in defense policies. A partnership for peace - the new objective of NATO - requires a high degree of political cohesion.

Evaluating NATO's present status in the light of past evolution, the prospects are not promising.

During the initial period 1949-1952, NATO has been able to evolve from a traditional alliance into a modern deterrence organization. At that time, the cold war made the interests of its major partners converge on a concurrent development of a strong Atlantic defense system and a high degree of European political unity.

The decision to improve cooperation in non-military fields - on the recommendation of the 1956 report of the three wise men - was as much a reaction against lack of political cohesion as it was an agreement on the need for new initiatives to meet a new situation. Since 1956, political consultation has been fruitful in a number of typical cold war situations. It has invariably failed, however, in these non-cold war situations in which political cohesion would have been necessary to prove the vitality of NATO as a partnership for peace.

After 1962, the cohesion has further eroded, affecting also, and increasingly, the policies to be adopted towards the members of the Warsaw pact.

It is interesting to remember in this respect that political disunity in NATO , notwithstanding its military organization, far exceeds the signs of disunity now apparent among Warsaw pact members.

The expectation that NATO may become an organization for "promoting peace" therefore appears to me as no more than an intellectually brilliant illusion. I would rather fear that NATO will gradually fall back into the traditional-type alliance to wage war, if the world situation continues to deteriorate as the foregoing analysis suggests.

Integration in Western-Europe?

The persistent crisis in the European integration process, further exacerbated by the recent second conflict over British entrance into EEC, will neither promote "Atlantic partnership" nor help further East-West détente.
To some extent the outcome of the Kennedy-round may be seen as symptomatic for the coming years. In the GATT negotiations, EEC has shown sufficient ad hoc unity for challenging the US. It has failed to forge sufficient unity for promoting internal integration and a harmonious development of world trade.

This trend may also appear in the polictical field. Western Europe may be able - together with the impact of the Vietnam situation - to reduce American interest in Europe. It will remain unable however to become a relevant negotiating party in East-West arrangements. The outcry for independance from the United States will not result in greater unity to promote détente. For the Soviet Union such evolution will present both a temptation and a danger. It might tempt the Kremlin leaders to support those European policies which tend to further desintegrate the Atlantic alliance. At the same time, the absence of Atlantic cohesion and of European unity may have the effect of driving West Germany to seeking national solutions by way of an increasingly nationalistic policy. This latter policy will be seen as an increasing danger for its security in the USSR, and thus jeopardize détente.

Maintaining the European status quo

The best we can hope for in the predicted deteriorating world situation on all levels, is that an uneasy status quo can be maintained on the European continent.

However gloomy the prospects may be for further détente, the facts of the nuclear age will make armed conflict most unlikely to erupt in Europe. Whatever policies European statesmen may adopt, "the policies of the United States and the Soviet

Union with regard to Europe are likely to remain the most stable elements" [3].

The increasing global tension and West-European attitudes towards non-proliferation, preclude significant progress on arms control in Europe. At the same time, the German problem will remain unsolved for a long time to come.

A significant process of political détente thus appears unlikely to occur in Europe. In the years to come bilateral economic and cultural contacts will gradually increase between Eastern and Western Europe. In the present political context and in view of their expected bilateral character, no influence will be exerted on the possibility for real détente.

Alternatives to deterioration

Peace, the late President Kennedy has said, "is a process - a way of solving problems". It is a process in which we should focus "on a more practical, more attainable peace - based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions - on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interests of all concerned" [4].

It has been my assumption, throughout this paper, that the East-West balance of terror has provided - since 1962 - a breathing space in the arms race, enabling policy - makers to plan and promote a process of peace. The recent deteriorating world situation indicates that time is running out for such initiatives. If we go on allowing time to run out, the present

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3). GASTEYGER, Europe in the Seventies. Adelphi Paper nr.37. June 1967. See also his analysis of liberalization in Eastern Europe and of German policy. My general agreement with that analysis makes it superfluous for me to deal with those two topics.

4). Address at American University in Washington. New York Times June 11, 1963.

policies based on the adagium: si vis pacem para bellum, war will be unavoidable in the end.

New and concrete initiatives are therefore required to reduce the terror of the balance instead of permitting its erosion.

The following alternative policy - measures therefore appear to be vital for reversing the recent trends:

1. The US government should take the initiative - instead of talking about negotiations - to de-escalate the Vietnam conflict.
2. The unfortunate view point of dividing the world into communist and anti-communist regimes, equalizing the latter with free - peoples should be replaced by an acceptance of the world of diversity in the sixties.
3. Assuming that a policy of isolating China increases the danger of conflict, measures should be initiated to reduce China's isolation in world politics.
4. A speedy conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty is essential for further progress towards arms control. If a choice is to be made between ABM and non proliferation, or between a European nuclear force and non proliferation, the latter shall be required for the sake of peace. Instead of dreaming about their future role as a world power, Europeans should make this continent a pilot-area for arms control by devicing policies for denuclearisation and European -wide security.
5. NATO should be maintained as a deterrent organization to guarantee the American commitment to the defence of Western Europe, and to assure American participation in any negotiation concerning the German problem.
6. A separate Atlantic body should be created to consult and possibly coordinate bilateral economic and cultural relations with Eastern European countries.

   In case such a body could also deal with arms control proposals, it might eventually play a role in fostering political détente and in promoting an ECE type consultative East-West body.

   Such an Atlantic organ should maintain close contact with ECE in its initial phase.

7. The member states of the European communities, finally, have reached the point where a fundamental reappraisal of their objectives has become vital. Instead of focusing on forming a new world power, they should contribute to promote an "evolution in human institutions" by which European-wide relations can be so organized that peace can be better achieved in the changed world of the Sixties and the Seventies.

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