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"Consensus et conflits, notamment dans  
les pays en voie de développement"

LE CONSENSUS

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Ne pas citer sans autori-  
sation de l'auteur.

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## Le consensus

par Edward Shils

### Ordre et croyances.

Les croyances (ou opinions) possèdent un ordre interne ainsi qu'une structure sociale. Par "structure sociale des croyances", j'entends les rapports - interaction, filiation ou dérivation - entre les croyances d'un individu ou d'une classe d'individus, et celles d'autres individus ou d'autres classes d'individus. Si dans l'étude de la structure interne des croyances, nous nous intéressons à des propriétés telles que la cohérence logique, dans l'étude de la structure sociale des opinions, c'est la compatibilité réelle entre les actions des divers individus ou classes d'individus qui ont ces croyances, qui nous intéresse. Les actions, puisqu'elles sont liées aux opinions, à caractère à la fois cognitif et moral, présentent dans leur constitution une certaine corrélation avec les croyances. Pour cette raison, tout examen des diverses combinaisons de solidarité, de séparation et de conflit caractérisant toutes les collectivités humaines - Etats, Eglises, Partis, etc. - doit porter aussi sur la structure sociale des croyances. Les principaux termes d'une analyse de la structure sociale des croyances sont le consensus et le dissensus (ou désaccord).

### Définition du consensus.

Le consensus est une situation d'accord dans la structure inter-individuelle et inter-groupes des croyances existant dans une société donnée. J'entends ici par groupe tout ensemble d'individus, tel qu'une couche sociale, une tribu, une Eglise ou une secte, tout sous-système compris dans une société plus vaste. Il y a consensus lorsqu'une proportion importante des adultes membres d'une société donnée, et plus particulièrement une proportion importante de ceux qui ont le souhait et la possibilité d'influencer les décisions concernant la procédure et la substance de la répartition de l'autorité, du prestige, des droits, de la fortune et des revenus, et de toute autre valeur impor-

tante et rare au sujet de laquelle un conflit pourrait se produire, 1) sont en accord dans leurs croyances concernant les décisions qui devraient être prises dans ces domaines et au sujet de la portée des désaccords tolérables, et 2) ont également des sentiments d'affinité les uns avec les autres, ainsi qu'avec la société plus vaste à laquelle ils appartiennent. Il y a consensus lorsque sont acceptées les institutions par lesquelles des décisions non unanimes sont prises et exécutées. Il y a consensus lorsque des décisions "objectivement" privées sont acceptées pour des raisons autres que la crainte de la coercition qui sera exercée pour en obtenir l'acceptation. Au consensus correspond habituellement un bas niveau d'hostilité affective à l'égard des désaccords parmi ceux qui sont partie au consensus.

Les croyances au sujet desquelles peut exister un consensus comprennent à la fois des propositions cognitives et des propositions "appliquant" des normes morales concernant le caractère juste ou injuste de la répartition des rôles, des possibilités offertes et des récompenses accordées dans la société, et le caractère juste ou injuste des institutions d'autorité et d'ordre par lesquelles cette répartition est faite, conservée ou modifiée. Les croyances pouvant composer le consensus comprennent celles concernant les qualités dont doivent être dotés ceux qui détiennent l'autorité, et la qualification correcte de ceux qui reçoivent des quantités différentes des objets de valeur répartis inégalement; il en découle des croyances relatives à la légitimité des institutions par lesquelles sont choisis les détenteurs de l'autorité et les bénéficiaires des différentes tranches de biens et de services rares.

Le sentiment d'unité, qui est une composante essentielle du consensus, est une image cognitive primaire dans laquelle les frontières de la conscience individuelle, tout au moins jusqu'à un certain niveau, sont définies de façon à englober des symboles nommés ou anonymes de la société tout entière. Dans une situation de consensus macro-social, le sentiment d'unité se répand de ceux qui le possèdent, quelle que soit leur propre situation sociale, à des couches de la

population situées de façon très différente par rapport à la répartition des récompenses et des possibilités, et très différentes dans leur part d'exercice de l'autorité.

Les objets du consensus (ou du désaccord).

Les croyances consensuelles (ou dissensuelles) agissent dans l'esprit d'individus qui sont en interaction "face à face" et en concurrence<sup>(1)</sup> pour des valeurs rares; elles ont donc comme objet les collectivités comprenant ceux qui sont en interaction "face à face". C'est ainsi qu'entre ouvriers d'un même atelier, entre ouvriers et personnel de maîtrise d'une usine ou d'une firme, entre membres d'une assemblée appartenant à divers partis, entre membres de factions différentes dans un même parti politique, on trouve à la fois du consensus et du dissensus concernant la répartition des objets de valeur. Les croyances consensuelles (ou dissensuelles) portent également sur des répartitions macro-sociales dépassant le cadre de l'interaction "face à face". Le consensus agissant dans ces situations "face à face" est habituellement, mais pas toujours, "dérivé" de croyances dont le cadre de référence est macro-social; il y a probablement aussi une influence des jugements concernant les répartitions micro-sociales sur ceux concernant les répartitions dans le cadre macro-social.

Les croyances consensuelles (ou dissensuelles) relatives à la répartition dans le cadre vaste, éventuellement macro-social, ont habituellement pour objet des classes ou des couches; lorsqu'elles font référence à des individus, ce n'est pas en tant qu'individus, mais en tant que représentants de leur classe (les classes ainsi discernées et distinguées sont souvent caractérisées par leur position dans la répartition : riches et pauvres, éminents et obscurs, instruits et non-instruits, gouvernants et gouvernés, qualifiés et non-qualifiés, mais aussi par d'autres propriétés : ethniques, linguistiques, culturelles, etc., Noirs, Blancs, Ibos, Yorubas, Africains, Asiatiques, etc.). Les jugements consensuels ou dissensuels ne font pas nécessairement référence immédiate

à la répartition tout entière; ils peuvent faire référence uniquement aux classes ou couches dont font partie ceux qui ont un rapport "face à face" (micro-social).

Les croyances consensuelles (ou dissensuelles) d'ordre macro-social peuvent faire référence uniquement à la couche à laquelle appartient l'individu qui exprime ses croyances et aux couches situées plus haut dans l'échelle de répartition. On trouve des références aux couches inférieures soit lorsque ces couches expriment des revendications tendant à réduire l'avantage relatif des autres, soit lorsqu'un ou plusieurs membres d'une couche supérieure cherchent à accroître leur part ou à élever leur position, soit encore lorsqu'il s'agit d'un jugement sur le caractère juste ou injuste de la forme ou d'autres caractéristiques de la répartition.

Le nombre des individus en interaction "face à face" avec des individus situés loin d'eux dans l'échelle de répartition macro-sociale des revenus, du pouvoir, de la déférence, etc., est relativement faible. C'est pourtant à ces grandes échelles de répartition qu'est accordée une attention intense, c'est à leur sujet qu'on trouve des opinions "graves". Les individus sont capables de percevoir les dimensions approximatives de ces échelles de répartition vastes ou macro-sociales, et d'apprécier leur justice; c'est à ces échelles qu'on accorde la plus grande importance. Les individus, même ceux dont l'expérience, les connaissances et l'imagination sont limitées, sont capables de comprendre de façon vague leur propre situation ou celle de la couche à laquelle ils se sentent appartenir, dans cette vaste répartition macro-sociale. Les hommes sont capables de jugement au sujet de situations auxquelles ils ne participent pas de façon directe et active, et un grand nombre d'entre eux sont fortement portés à exprimer de tels jugements. Leur sensibilité intellectuelle et morale les incite à juger les échelles de répartition de leur société comme déterminant la qualité même de cette société, et comme déterminant les attitudes qu'ils devraient avoir à son égard. Le fait que les croyances au sujet de la répartition

sont fondamentalement des croyances au sujet du pouvoir, donc au sujet du charisma - lesquels appellent l'attention sur eux-mêmes et exigent des jugements de façon pressante - fait des modes de répartition macro-sociale des objets de croyances fondamentales. Tout jugement au sujet des modes de répartition qui affectent directement les intérêts, ou dont on pense qu'ils les affectent directement, est souvent justifié par des croyances au sujet des modes de répartition macro-sociale, c'est-à-dire de la justice telle qu'elle est pratiquée à l'échelle de la société.

Le centre de la société comme objet du consensus et du dissensus.

Au sens macro-social dans lequel il est utilisé dans ce rapport, le consensus concerne toujours le centre de la société, c'est-à-dire le réseau de rôles et d'institutions par lequel est exercée l'autorité souveraine, dans lequel sont incarnés et exhibés les emblèmes de la société et d'où est diffusée une partie importante de la culture. Le consensus est donc affirmé à l'égard de la forme de l'ensemble de la répartition des valeurs, ainsi qu'à l'égard du système institutionnel qui influence cette répartition; il comprend les occupants des rôles de plus grande autorité dans ce système institutionnel. Le sentiment d'identification essentiel au consensus macro-social comprend des éléments d'auto-identification aux symboles de ce centre.

Dans certains cas, certes, le système d'autorité prépondérant devient l'objet d'un consensus négatif largement partagé, même si dans de telles situations ce consensus négatif est inorganisé. Une telle situation paradoxale de consensus dissensuel est caractéristique de phases de transition dans lesquelles le centre a perdu une grande partie de son efficacité, mais semble encore assez cohérent pour exercer un pouvoir de coercition. "On ne croit pas" aux résultats de l'exercice de son autorité souveraine. Dans la mesure où un consensus assez général existe dans une société donnée, il renforce habituellement, à un degré plus ou moins grand, le système existant d'institutions d'autorité, et les modes de répartition qui leur sont associés<sup>(2)</sup>.



Un tel consensus, qui renforce le centre, peut contenir une part importante de dissensus avec le centre au sujet d'un grand nombre de problèmes particuliers. Lorsque le dissensus à l'égard du centre porte sur un trop grand nombre de problèmes, l'affirmation consensuelle du centre perd sa capacité de contenir le dissensus. Lorsqu'un grand nombre de croyances dissensuelles, individuelles ou de groupes, deviennent semblables les unes aux autres, nous pouvons donc parler d'un consensus dissensuel. C'est dans de telles situations que se produisent les révolutions, que les régimes abdiquent ou acceptent d'être renversés par des voies pacifiques, sinon constitutionnelles.

#### Etendue et portée du consensus et du dissensus.

En principe, la structure sociale des croyances d'une société donnée pourrait aller d'un consensus total entre tous ses membres adultes jusqu'à un dissensus total, et de là à un consensus dissensuel total; elle pourrait aller d'une situation dans laquelle chacun est toujours d'accord avec tous les autres sur tous les problèmes de répartition et en relation solidaire totale avec la société tout entière, y compris bien entendu son centre, à une situation dans laquelle personne n'est jamais d'accord avec personne, où chacun est en relation d'apathie ou d'antagonisme total avec chacun; et enfin, à une situation dans laquelle une société tout entière, exception faite de ceux qui détiennent l'autorité centrale, est en accord sur tout, y compris l'hostilité à l'égard du centre. Aucune de ces situations hypothétiques n'a la moindre chance de se produire dans la réalité.

Ces trois possibilités conceptuelles de consensus total, de dissensus total, de consensus dissensuel total, sont certes extrêmement improbables. Toute situation réelle, durable et fréquente, présente un mélange de consensus et de dissensus; dans toute société, les situations réelles sont des combinaisons. Les combinaisons possibles empiriquement varient quant aux problèmes au sujet desquels il existe accord et désaccord, quant aux ensembles de problèmes, quant à la proportion de la population ou de certains secteurs de la société qui se

trouve en accord au sujet d'un problème donné, quant à la stabilité des formes des secteurs consensuels ou dissensuels, quant à l'intensité des sentiments associés à l'accord ou au désaccord, quant à l'importance de l'accord ou du désaccord au sujet de certains problèmes ou de certaines combinaisons de problèmes. (Il existe des variations analogues concernant le sentiment d'affinité).

Même au sujet de problèmes sur lesquels on trouve le consensus le plus fort, on trouve inévitablement un certain degré de dissensus. Une part de ce dissensus est active dans le refus opposé aux opinions dominantes. Le dissensus actif (ou désaccord) est habituellement exprimé avec plus de netteté que le consensus. Le dissensus actif est net, plus encore peut-être que le consensus, pourrait être décrit comme un ou plusieurs sommets centraux, entourés par des cercles concentriques d'activité et de netteté moindres.

Dans les cercles les plus éloignés du centre, sur les collines les moins hautes, tout autour des sommets de consensus et de dissensus, on trouve les zones d'apathie. Nous pouvons décrire l'apathie comme une situation dans laquelle n'existent pas de croyances au sujet du centre, ou dans laquelle de telles croyances existent de façon très faible et intermittente, jusqu'au point d'être très rares et dépourvues de contenu émotif. Les apathiques sont ceux que "cela n'intéresse pas", plus encore que les ignorants. Ce n'est pas que rien ne les intéresse, mais simplement que les problèmes situés au centre de la société leur sont étrangers. A l'occasion, sous la pression de questions ou de circonstances, ils peuvent exprimer certaines croyances au sujet du centre. Mais laissés à eux-mêmes, et non soumis à la pression d'événements ou d'occasions très tangibles, ils ne produisent ou n'expriment pas spontanément de telles croyances.

Les apathiques à l'égard du centre constituent une proportion fluctuante des membres d'une société donnée. Ils sont à l'occasion portés à exprimer un dissensus ou un consensus parce que de telles possibilités existent en eux de façon latente, et parce que l'appartenance à

une société donnée signifie d'une façon ou d'une autre que de temps en temps chacun est touché par quelque manifestation du centre.

#### L'expression du consensus.

On constate le consensus dans les comportements régis par les croyances, dans les situations dans lesquelles, sans consensus, se produiraient des conflits, ou dans lesquelles ceux-ci seraient alors plus aigus. L'action consensuelle découle de l'adhésion commune aux lois, règles et normes. Elle est renforcée par l'attachement aux institutions qui promulguent et appliquent les lois et les règles, et par le sentiment, répandu chez les individus eux-mêmes, de leur identité commune ou de leur unité; leur perception des traits par rapport auxquels ils sont semblables réduit l'importance des différences à propos desquelles, sans cela, se constituerait le dissensus ou des sentiments hostiles. (A l'intérieur de certaines limites, ces trois éléments peuvent varier indépendamment les uns des autres. La force de l'un quelconque de ces éléments contribue cependant à renforcer les autres).

Ces trois composantes du consensus se manifestent habituellement sous leur forme négative; je veux dire qu'elles agissent de façon à limiter l'intensité et l'étendue du conflit. Il est rare qu'elles soient exprimées explicitement, sauf pour justifier l'imposition de limites sur des demandes incompatibles, au niveau des individus ou des collectivités, et qui ont déjà été exprimées. Elles sont rarement explicitées lorsqu'elles agissent de façon à empêcher la naissance ou l'expression de revendications potentielles. Le consensus existant dans le domaine de ce qui est postulé, de ce qui est accepté tacitement, on l'observe principalement dans ses conséquences : il réduit les conflits, lesquels, contrairement au consensus, sont d'habitude clairement perceptibles.

#### La mise en évidence des croyances consensuelles ou dissensuelles.

Le règlement de conflits particuliers entre individus ou entre groupes d'individus appartenant à des couches limitrophes et ayant entre

eux des relations "face à face", ou entre membres représentatifs d'entités telles que des partis politiques ou des syndicats, est souvent produit et justifié par référence à des normes et à des maximes dotées d'une validité plus générale, et acceptées de façon plus vaste et plus consensuelle. (La résistance à un règlement dans de tels contextes concrets est également justifiée par référence à de telles normes et maximes d'ordre général).

L'expression de croyances consensuelles est souvent l'oeuvre d'élites, d'autorités prestigieuses de la société civile ou d'entités particulières de représentants qui parviennent à leur rôle par un processus institutionnalisé de sélection ou d'élection, ou par d'autres processus analogues. Il en est de même des croyances dissensuelles. Le processus d'expression contribue à rendre les croyances plus actives, en les rendant plus contraignantes pour ce qui est de leur traduction dans les faits.

C'est dans les rencontres au niveau des élites que la structure inter-individuelle ou inter-groupes des croyances devient particulièrement significative pour l'ordre et pour le désordre d'une société donnée. Les élites de la macro-société, directement impliquées dans les institutions centrales et dans les systèmes culturels, sont particulièrement importantes pour le fonctionnement du consensus et du dissensus, parce que la structure sociale de leurs croyances affecte de façon tangible l'efficacité des institutions centrales, et qu'elles exercent une influence sur les autres membres de la société. Mais l'influence des élites micro-sociales sur ceux pour qui elles constituent des élites - une forte personnalité dans un cercle d'amis, un père dominateur ou un frère aîné dans un groupe familial, un ouvrier au comportement énergique dans une équipe de travail - affecte les croyances macro-sociales des membres de "base" de ce groupe.

Dans la plupart des groupes, les croyances macro-sociales sont moins visibles "à la base" qu'au niveau des élites. Incarnant ces croyances, les élites pourraient inciter à des comportements proches des

actions provoquées par les croyances, même si ces actions sont en fait dues à l'attachement à l'élite plus qu'à la force de la croyance éprouvée. Mais les élites pourraient aussi rendre les croyances macro-sociales elles-mêmes plus visibles, en les rendant plus claires dans la conscience de ceux qui les suivent. Les deux processus peuvent être simultanés et agir dans la même direction. Le résultat peut favoriser soit le consensus, soit le dissensus, soit même les deux à la fois.

Les croyances consensuelles concernant des objets autres que les modes de répartition et le centre.

Par définition, le consensus macro-social ne comprend pas des croyances telles que celles concernant l'ordre moral dans les relations personnelles, l'expérience et le jugement esthétiques, l'origine et la structure de l'univers, la nature et les pouvoirs de la providence. Il est néanmoins possible, et peut-être même probable, que lorsqu'il existe un consensus concernant de telles croyances, le consensus macro-social qui nous intéresse en devient plus probable et plus durable.

Jusqu'à la naissance de l'Etat libéral moderne, caractérisé par la pluralité des groupes religieux, par la pluralité des partis politiques, par la séparation des pouvoirs, par des institutions chargées de régler et de contrôler les conflits entre classes et autres catégories, les dirigeants ont tendu à penser qu'un consensus religieux était une condition nécessaire au consensus requis par l'ordre politique, c'est-à-dire à la paix civile. Cette conception a cessé d'être jugée vraie dans les régimes libéraux constitutionnels du XIXe siècle; le nombre des objets au sujet desquels le consensus était alors jugé nécessaire était faible. Il est néanmoins tout à fait possible qu'un certain degré de consensus portant sur des croyances autres que celles relatives à la justice ou à l'injustice de la répartition des objets rares et désirés contribue à créer et à maintenir le sentiment de l'unité, même vague, qui est une des conditions essentielles du consensus. Le mot selon lequel l'Angleterre est "le pays de cent religions et d'une seule sauce" contient peut-être une part de profonde vérité. Une certaine uniformité de goûts dans les couches de la population portant intérêt à la vie

politique et y participant a peut-être contribué au sentiment d'unité éprouvé par ces couches, et par là permis à un consensus macro-social au niveau de ces couches, de fonctionner en dépit de divisions au sujet de la politique, de la théologie et de l'organisation ecclésiastique, ainsi que de la répartition juste des récompenses et des possibilités.

Un consensus concernant les composantes de la culture qui ne se réfèrent pas directement aux problèmes de répartition macro-sociale, contribue vraisemblablement au consensus relatif à cette répartition, en cela qu'il renforce le sentiment d'affinité à l'intérieur de la communauté consensuelle, et rend donc les croyances dissensuelles moins sujettes à division et moins capables de produire des conflits.

#### Consensus et idéologie.

Une structure tout à fait cohérente de croyances abstraites ou générales concernant les domaines de la métaphysique, de la morale ou de la politique, et effectivement éprouvée, de façon explicite et systématique (c'est là ce que désigne le mot "idéologie"), peut affecter le consensus dans une société donnée, puisqu'on y trouve des jugements concernant des problèmes de légitimité, de répartition, de sélection, etc. Une situation de consensus largement répandu, dans laquelle une telle idéologie, engendrée de façon rationnelle ou affective, domine, de manière explicite et extensive, toutes les actions ou la plupart des actions, n'est nullement impossible. Une telle situation est néanmoins rare et a des chances de durée réduites.

Les hommes apprécient néanmoins leurs propres actions et orientations, ainsi que celles des autres, conformément à des catégories générales, et ces jugements généraux contribuent à orienter leur réponse immédiate face aux structures de faible ou grande ampleur auxquelles ils appartiennent. Les normes éthiques d'ordre général, les notions vagues relatives à ce que doit être une vie convenablement ordonnée, l'idée des vertus qui justifient la présence au pouvoir de certains hommes et leur valent la déférence, et d'autres récompenses et possibilités, exercent une certaine influence sur les actions concrètes face à certains

problèmes. Ces ripostes concrètes dépendent également de la répartition du pouvoir, perçue ou imaginée, de calculs d'avantage relatif concernant diverses options possibles, et bien entendu du sentiment d'affinité ou de son contraire.

Les croyances d'ordre général qui sont une composante de tout consensus, peuvent dériver, génétiquement ou historiquement, d'une idéologie; lorsqu'elles agissent dans un consensus réel, elles ne sont habituellement pas exprimées de façon claire ou ordonnées de façon systématique. Elles s'expriment parfois dans des maximes, parfois dans des termes tels que celui d'"équité", ambigus et sans contenu spécifique. De telles maximes et de tels termes sont souvent formulés de façon négative, pour condamner certains types d'action, sans préciser lesquels leur seraient conformes.

Le droit, le précipité le mieux cristallisé du consensus, ne constitue pas une idéologie, bien qu'il puisse avoir été influencé par des idéologies. Le droit présente un grand nombre de lacunes, et il n'est probablement jamais tout à fait cohérent au regard de la logique. De plus, les obligations et les prohibitions spécifiques contenues dans les lois et dans les arrêts judiciaires sont beaucoup plus différenciées que les croyances auxquelles "croient" ceux qui participent au consensus macro-social. Dans les sociétés dotées d'une constitution écrite, les croyances et les règles qu'on trouve dans la constitution correspondent dans une certaine mesure à certaines parties du consensus, mais cette correspondance n'est jamais qu'approximative et inégale.

Les structures de croyances consensuelles tendent par conséquent à être plus pluralistes : elles englobent plusieurs modèles de croyances qui ne sont pas totalement compatibles entre eux, mais qui peuvent coexister sans difficultés aussi longtemps que chacun d'eux n'est accepté qu'à l'intérieur de limites plus étroites que ne l'affirment expressément les croyances. C'est ainsi que dans les sociétés libérales de l'Occident contemporain, on croit que l'égalité et la liberté sont des critères très importants dans l'appréciation portée sur toute

politique et sur toute répartition, et que le degré de consensus au sujet de chacun de ces termes est très important, surtout si chacun est accepté de façon limitée. Liberté et égalité demeurent les signes vagues d'une direction ou d'une tendance plutôt que des impératifs spécifiques, et un consensus appréciable peut être maintenu entre les segments de la société qui inclinent vers l'un plutôt que vers l'autre, aussi longtemps qu'aucune des parties divergentes n'insiste sur l'observation totale des deux à la fois.

Les modèles de croyances dissensuels sont souvent plus explicites et plus systématiques, c'est-à-dire plus idéologiques, que les modèles consensuels, qui renforcent le système institutionnel central. Plus une structure de croyances est dissensuelle, plus elle a de chances d'être explicite et cohérente.

On pourrait dire que c'est même le caractère non-idéologique des modèles de croyances composant une structure consensuelle qui rend le consensus possible. L'ambiguïté des croyances et des termes centraux permet diverses interprétations, ceux qui sont à l'origine de ces interprétations divergentes conservant une certaine adhésion non seulement au terme ou à la croyance en question, mais aussi à un élément résiduel qu'ils partagent de façon consensuelle avec les individus dont ils diffèrent. Les efforts tendant à rendre plus explicites et plus systématiques les termes et les croyances peuvent conduire à une situation dans laquelle on accorde un poids plus grand aux éléments dissensuels, aux dépens de l'élément consensuel résiduel.

(L'analyse empirique de la structure du consensus se heurte aux mêmes difficultés que l'analyse empirique des croyances réelles des individus. A cause de leur caractère vague, ambigu et peu systématique, et de variations dans leur niveau d'abstraction, les croyances réelles sont difficiles à décrire : aussi les sociologues et les anthropologues ont-ils tendance à systématiser, à clarifier et à spécifier les croyances réelles, jusqu'à faire en apparence de ceux qui les ont, des philosophes ou des idéologues systématiques. Les postulats sont explicités,



les jugements d'ordre particulier sont présentés dans leur généralité : des croyances dont ils ne sont pas conscients sont, par un tel processus, attribuées aux individus. En procédant ainsi, les analystes déforment la nature du consensus et les mécanismes par lesquels il procède).

#### L'hétérogénéité interne des structures des croyances consensuelles.

Comme il a été dit plus haut, dans aucune société le consensus n'est jamais universel ou également partagé par tous les adultes. Il n'est pas non plus nécessaire, pour que le consensus contribue efficacement au maintien de l'ordre, que la participation soit universelle, ou que l'on constate des niveaux très élevés d'expression visible ou d'intensité du consensus. Aucun adulte membre d'une société donnée n'est bien entendu extérieur au système de répartition des rôles, des possibilités et des récompenses rares, et il en résulte qu'aucun adulte, à moins qu'il soit apathique au point de friser la paralysie, ne peut éviter de porter des jugements au moins sur le secteur de répartition qu'il perçoit dans son voisinage immédiat. Les jugements qu'il porte, même si leur cadre de référence est étroit, ne sont pas pris au hasard par rapport aux jugements courants dans la culture de sa société. L'intérêt qu'il porte aux modes de répartition vaste et aux problèmes de légitimité qui leur sont associés, peut être peu intense et peu fréquent. Faiblesse et intermittence sont compatibles avec le caractère consensuel des jugements.

Un des principaux foyers de concentration du consensus étant le système de répartition de la société globale, les personnes qui ne s'intéressent pas beaucoup, ou pas intensément, à la répartition dans le cadre macro-social, peuvent être considérées comme quelque peu marginales par rapport à la structure du consensus. Même si elles partagent les croyances générales au sujet de ce qui est "équitable", etc., le fait qu'elles appliquent ces croyances uniquement ou principalement à leur environnement immédiat et non à la société globale signifie qu'elles ne participent pas au consensus au même degré et de la même façon que celles qui appliquent avec une intensité et une fréquence plus

grandes au système de répartition macro-social les normes partagées de façon consensuelle.

A l'intérieur d'une structure de croyances consensuelle, certains des adhérents peuvent exiger avec intransigeance le respect des obligations découlant de ces croyances; ils peuvent également ne pas insister avec force sur l'application des directives normatives des croyances. De telles différences dans l'intensité de l'adhésion à une croyance particulière peuvent varier de façon appréciable dans une même structure de croyances : certaines des composantes peuvent être l'objet d'une grande insistance, d'autres d'une insistance moindre. De même, à l'intérieur d'une collectivité ou d'une société donnée, les partisans d'une certaine structure de croyances consensuelle peuvent manifester un haut niveau moyen d'intensité dans leur adhésion, alors que d'autres peuvent manifester un niveau d'intensité plus faible. Il peut exister des différences notables dans l'importance des croyances entre les différentes couches d'une collectivité ou d'une société, même si les croyances sont consensuelles. Il peut exister de plus, entre les différentes couches, des différences quant aux modes d'adhésion aux diverses croyances qui composent une structure. Certaines couches ou certains secteurs d'une structure consensuelle mettront l'accent sur une des croyances élémentaires; d'autres, sur une autre croyance. La structure des croyances consensuelle d'un groupe faisant partie d'une société, ou même d'une société globale, est donc très hétérogène.

Tout consensus comprend des croyances au sujet d'un certain nombre d'objets ou de problèmes, tels que les principes qui doivent régir la rémunération, la forme équitable de certaines courbes de répartition (égalité et inégalité), les prérogatives des propriétaires, les droits de certains individus ou de certaines catégories d'individus à occuper certaines positions dans certaines courbes de répartition, la valeur même de la communauté nationale, etc. Si nous considérons le "public" d'un consensus, nous trouvons que certains secteurs de ce public peuvent manifester un attachement intense à toutes ses croyances au sujet de

tous les problèmes; d'autres secteurs peuvent manifester un attachement intense aux croyances portant sur certains problèmes, et un faible attachement aux autres croyances; certains secteurs peuvent même n'être attachés qu'à un petit nombre de croyances et rejeter la plupart des autres. L'acceptation générale de certaines croyances peut lier le "public" tout entier dans un consensus partiel, dont le caractère partiel est fonction du degré auquel d'autres croyances sont rejetées, et des croyances contraires adoptées par des sous-secteurs partiellement dissensuels. C'est ainsi que dans un pays donné, il se peut que presque tous les citoyens acceptent la légitimité du système électoral et des autorités ainsi élues; il se peut qu'ils acceptent aussi une répartition des revenus particulièrement inégalitaire, mais qu'ils manifestent une forte dose de désaccord concernant la répartition de la déférence et la capacité de certains occupants de rôles d'autorité à agir de façon bénéfique au profit de la société tout entière.

Dans une société donnée, la composition du public consensuel varie. A propos d'un objet ou d'un problème, certains secteurs ou certaines couches, mettons les secteurs 'a' à 'n', peuvent se trouver en consensus assez homogène; à propos d'un autre objet, les couches ou secteurs 'c' à 'g' peuvent se trouver de même en consensus assez homogène, tout comme les couches ou secteurs 'l' à 's' par rapport à un troisième objet. Par rapport à un quatrième objet ou problème, tous ces secteurs ou couches pourraient partager un même consensus. Il y a donc chevauchement des divers publics, et le dissensus en est limité.

Dans les sociétés modernes, la vie politique au niveau des partis consiste en efforts organisés tendant à déplacer à l'intérieur d'une même structure de consensus partiel les frontières du dissensus partiel. Mais en même temps que ces efforts délibérés tendent à modifier la structure du consensus, nous trouvons un processus continu de modification des frontières. Des croyances au sujet desquelles il y avait naguère désaccord (par exemple, les droits des chômeurs à une aide publique) deviennent consensuelles; des croyances naguère consensuelles

(par exemple, celles concernant le droit à l'héritage) deviennent partiellement dissensuelles.

Ces modifications temporelles dans la structure du consensus ont pour origine en partie l'action des partisans de programmes partiellement dissensuels, en partie des changements démographiques et technologiques qui modifient la structure professionnelle, en partie la réalisation des potentiels dynamiques de certaines structures de croyances.

De telles variations dans le "public" du consensus, c'est-à-dire dans l'importance de la population qui y participe, illustrent aussi la cohérence et l'incohérence simultanées des structures de croyances que les individus introduisent dans une structure de consensus. Si chaque individu avait une structure de croyances parfaitement systématique, deux individus en désaccord au sujet d'une croyance particulière devraient logiquement se trouver en désaccord au sujet de toutes les autres. Réciproquement, si les structures de croyances étaient totalement incohérentes, il n'y aurait aucune stabilité dans le "public" du consensus de croyances relatives à un très grand nombre d'objets et de problèmes; l'accord constaté au sujet d'un problème n'aurait aucune chance d'entraîner un accord à propos d'aucun autre. Nous savons pourtant que toute structure de croyances consensuelle est portée en premier lieu par un "public" d'adhérents durable qui rassemble autour de lui, à propos de problèmes particuliers et de groupes de problèmes, des publics plus étendus et assez fluctuants, mais qui ne se trouvent pas là par hasard. Consensuels au sujet de la plupart des problèmes, certains sont en désaccord sur un petit nombre; d'autres, dissensuels sur la plupart des problèmes, sont en accord sur un petit nombre. Une stabilité approximative des "publics" découle du caractère ainsi déterminé des structures de croyances et de l'interconnexion empirique, lâche mais réelle, des objets et des problèmes .

#### La fonction du consensus.

Le consensus préserve l'ordre public : il réduit la probabilité de l'usage de la violence pour mettre fin aux désaccords; il accroît la

coopération non provoquée par la crainte du pouvoir coercitif du plus fort. Il agit ainsi a) en réduisant la probabilité des désaccords; b) en réduisant la portée des désaccords; c) en limitant l'intensité des émotions qui accompagnent les croyances, et en réduisant la rigidité de l'attachement aux objets à propos desquels existent des désaccords; d) en intensifiant la volonté d'accepter des modes pacifiques de règlement des conflits entre ceux qui ressentent leur affinité mutuelle ou leur identité.

Il n'existe pas d'harmonie naturelle des intérêts. Les hommes ont des propensions diverses, et les objets matériels et symboliques auxquels ils aspirent sont rares par rapport à la demande. Les "intérêts" sont donc en conflit. De plus, une société - et particulièrement une société vaste - différenciée selon la fortune et le pouvoir, les générations, les professions, la place dans la hiérarchie sociale, la culture, les attachements primordiaux divergents, tendra naturellement à manifester des croyances différentes concernant l'équité des actions des autorités et l'équité de l'ordre social. Là où il existe, le consensus agit de façon à freiner la réalisation des potentialités de division de ces "intérêts" et idéaux incompatibles.

Pour être efficace, le consensus dépend particulièrement du consensus des croyances des individus, dispersés dans la société, dans des classes, des régions et des professions diverses, qui s'intéressent assez souvent et qui accordent de l'importance à 1) la répartition macro-sociale des rôles, des possibilités et des récompenses; 2) aux décisions prises au centre de la société dans la mesure où ces décisions affectent la répartition ou sont affectées par elle; 3) aux institutions dans lesquelles sont prises ces décisions ou qui influencent la répartition. L'intérêt de ces individus peut prendre la forme d'une participation institutionnalisée aux décisions portant sur ces trois aspects des modes de répartition, ou celle d'un engagement au niveau des attitudes qui affectent l'action. Les "intéressés" agissent au nom des couches ou des collectivités engendrées par les modes de répartition,

ou au nom d'une organisation idéale; ils portent des jugements et cherchent à influencer les opinions et les décisions, de leur propre chef ou parce qu'ils sont autorisés à le faire en raison d'un arrangement institutionnel. Leur accord ou leur désaccord au sujet de problèmes particuliers peut produire l'harmonie ou le conflit dans le fonctionnement des institutions et dans les rapports entre couches et collectivités.

L'ordre public et la coopération efficace entre les diverses composantes de la société n'exigent cependant pas un consensus permanent au sujet de tous les problèmes, englobant tous les membres de la société, ou même tous les membres des élites. Il suffit, pour que l'ordre soit préservé, que les désaccords constatés au sujet de problèmes particuliers, à un moment particulier, se produisent à l'intérieur d'une matrice consensuelle. La durée de cette matrice consensuelle est assurée non seulement par les croyances consensuelles mais aussi, dans une large mesure, par l'existence d'un sentiment d'affinité répandu entre membres d'une même société. Ce sentiment d'unité se manifeste dans le sentiment d'affinité avec les personnes avec lesquelles un grand nombre de désaccords particuliers pourrait se produire. Des coalitions d'intérêts dont les frontières se chevauchent empêchent la désintégration de ce sentiment d'affinité. (Les clivages dus à la coïncidence des frontières entre coalitions d'intérêts, par contre, endommagent gravement ce sentiment d'affinité).

La capacité de l'élite politique au pouvoir à exercer sa coercition par le truchement d'un corps de fonctionnaires disciplinés est un autre élément important du maintien de l'ordre, mais il n'est jamais très durable lorsqu'il est isolé. Sans un fort renforcement consensuel, la coercition ne pourrait jamais être efficace par elle-même. Elle complète le consensus, et n'est pas l'autre branche d'une alternative. (Le pouvoir de coercition est lui-même générateur de consensus).

La genèse du consensus et son évolution.

La famille qui introduit dans la société chaque nouveau-né est le premier instigateur du consensus. A l'intérieur de la famille, l'enfant acquiert des attitudes générales et affirmatives à l'égard de l'autorité, qui sont les conditions préalables à l'intégration ultérieure dans un consensus centré sur les institutions d'autorité situées au coeur de la société. A l'école, l'enfant acquiert une partie de la culture de la société globale, des connaissances et des jugements au sujet de ses héros, des grands événements de son histoire, de son étendue territoriale. Tout cela contribue à former une certaine image de la société comprise comme un tout.

Les grands rituels collectifs qui évoquent des images de la société globale dans sa forme essentielle, renouvellent périodiquement le sentiment d'affinité avec cette société globale, et l'interaction répétée à partir de l'enfance avec des individus semblables, préserve et renforcent cette disposition générale à accorder une certaine validité à ceux qui parlent et agissent à travers le système institutionnel central ainsi qu'aux porte-parole du système culturel central. Une partie importante de la population indigène grandit ainsi dans une culture consensuelle qui accepte, à l'intérieur de limites de variations relativement étroites, le caractère juste des modes de répartition existants, les normes qui permettent de les juger ainsi que les institutions chargées de les maintenir et de les modifier.

Ce consensus approximatif n'englobe cependant jamais la population tout entière. Il subsiste à l'extérieur du consensus dominant certaines familles et certains secteurs - classes et groupes ethniques; peut-être en trouve-t-on plus encore sur ses bords.

Dans les sociétés relativement peu intégrées écologiquement ou par l'existence d'une autorité commune efficace, et dans lesquelles les décisions prises au centre n'affectent que de façon très intermittente et marginale certains secteurs de la société - par exemple des villages isolés ne participant pas à l'économie nationale - les membres de ces

secteurs peuvent se trouver complètement extérieurs à la structure du consensus, sans être activement dissensuels. Mais dans les sociétés modernes, dans lesquelles les gouvernements jouent un rôle si important pour ce qui est des modes de répartition, et dans lesquelles l'existence de systèmes de communications et de transports à l'échelle de la nation tout entière fait que certains traits du système institutionnel central entrent de façon de plus en plus apparente dans le champ d'attention même des apathiques et des individus sans instruction, l'éloignement total de la structure macro-sociale de consensus et de dissensus est un phénomène extrêmement rare.

Il existe forcément dans toute société vaste et relativement intégrée par rapport à la fois à son écologie et à son système d'autorité, des individus et des groupes qui rejettent la structure de croyances sur laquelle repose le consensus dominant, aussi complètement que cela est possible à des êtres humains vivant dans une société dans laquelle s'exerce sur eux une autorité, et qui ne peuvent échapper entièrement à l'influence du système culturel central ou rester totalement extérieurs au cadre écologique.

Toute société vaste et intégrée possède donc une culture dissensuelle aussi bien qu'une culture consensuelle. La culture dissensuelle repose sur des traditions religieuses, régionales ou de classes, aussi bien que sur la critique souvent renouvelée du système d'autorité et de répartition dont sont les bénéficiaires les occupants des rôles d'autorité et d'élites, critique à base éthique et métaphysique. Dans les sociétés modernes, cette culture est portée et élaborée par certains secteurs des classes intellectuelles. Elle fournit leurs objets et leur forme aux revendications de ceux qui souffrent de la répartition des revenus, du pouvoir, du prestige. Une société qui inflige à certains la détresse d'un sentiment d'exclusion et d'infériorité ne peut pleinement réussir à assimiler dans son consensus affirmatif ceux qu'elle a ainsi meurtris.



La force du système institutionnel central et la pénétration en profondeur du système culturel central provoquent néanmoins une forte ténacité des croyances qui composent le consensus. Ces croyances elles-mêmes se modifient cependant de façon progressive. De fait, le caractère traditionnel de la plupart des croyances rend possibles de tels changements, ce qui contribue également au maintien du consensus. L'ambiguïté inhérente aux croyances transmises par la tradition - la plupart des croyances consensuelles sont acquises de cette façon - accroît la flexibilité et permet la continuité lorsque les circonstances se modifient. Ces changements modérés dans la forme des modes de répartition du pouvoir, des revenus et du prestige, et dans l'identité des détenteurs des diverses positions, peuvent être supportés sans que se produise une forte diminution de l'adhésion aux croyances principales sur lesquelles repose un consensus. Si les perdants ne sont pas affectés trop gravement lors de ces changements, leur participation au consensus ne le sera pas non plus. La force des institutions centrales est un facteur important à cet égard. Si ces institutions conservent l'apparence de l'efficacité, les tendances dissensuelles ne gagneront pas en puissance. La croyance au "hasard", qui inhibe l'hostilité à l'égard du système institutionnel central, et la croyance selon laquelle la répartition correspond aux qualifications des individus, rendent les pertes plus supportables en les faisant paraître justes.

Lorsque des changements profonds se produisent, le consensus tend à être affaibli par le retrait plus profond et plus étendu de ceux qui sont gravement affectés par les changements. Les diverses possibilités d'interprétation que recèle toute structure de croyances consensuelle tendent dans de telles circonstances à engendrer des idées divergentes, dont la conciliation devient plus difficile. Il est également probable que des accroissements importants et rapides dans la quantité de récompenses reçues bouleversent la participation des gagnants au consensus jusque là dominant. Des gains rapides et importants tendent à élever le niveau des aspirations jusqu'à un point supérieur aux limites permises par les croyances englobées dans le consensus traditionnel.

Les changements technologiques révèlent de nouvelles possibilités de modification de la part d'objets de valeur possédée par les diverses couches de la population. Ceux qui aperçoivent ces possibilités, et qui en raison du pouvoir qu'ils exercent sur les ressources sont en mesure d'accroître leur part, chercheront habituellement à le faire. S'ils en sont empêchés par la rigidité de l'attachement des élites aux modes de répartition existants, et par la rigidité des structures de croyances de ces élites au sujet du caractère équitable de ces modes de répartition, un nouvel objet de croyances dissensuelles apparaît.

Les innovations technologiques engendrent également de nouvelles professions, dotées d'une nouvelle culture professionnelle. Ces nouvelles cultures peuvent contenir des croyances qu'il n'est pas toujours possible ou aisé d'englober dans la structure existante de croyances consensuelles, et cela amène également la création de nouveaux "publics" dissensuels.

En dépit des tensions auxquelles elle est constamment soumise, la structure consensuelle d'une société donnée possède une grande capacité d'adaptation et de durée. Même dans les périodes de désordre civil aigu, lorsque l'autorité naguère légitime a été renversée ou a fait preuve de faiblesse, la structure consensuelle n'est pas entièrement dissoute. La société ne peut jamais être réduite à un état de nature tel que l'imagine Hobbes. Même si la société a cessé de lier entre eux les groupes antagonistes, les secteurs de la population qui ne sont pas impliqués de façon intense et active dans le conflit civil peuvent conserver des sentiments consensuels les uns à l'égard des autres, ou tout au moins des sentiments beaucoup plus consensuels que ceux des groupes se trouvant en conflit violent. L'ébranlement de la société lors des situations de désordre civil aigu signifie que des élites violemment dissensuelles rivalisent activement pour s'assurer les instruments et les symboles de l'autorité ainsi que le contrôle des systèmes de répartition. L'adhésion persistante des secteurs de la population plus consensuels aux croyances antérieures, même si ces secteurs s'intéressent

moins intensément au centre de leur société et exercent donc une influence moindre en temps de crise, favorise le rétablissement d'une dose importante de consensus une fois la crise passée. Même les deux partis en guerre l'un contre l'autre se combattent habituellement au nom d'interprétations différentes d'une constellation de croyances partagées. Mais le sentiment d'affinité, d'attachement à la société tout entière, composante essentielle du consensus, a été déchiré si violemment que la similitude approximative des croyances a perdu son pouvoir de limitation.

L'ordre civil une fois rétabli, le consensus est lui-même rétabli progressivement. Ce ne sera certes pas exactement la même structure de croyances consensuelle qu'auparavant. L'élite nouvellement établie, légitimée par l'occupation des postes, introduira dans le consensus antérieur, délibérément et inconsciemment à la fois, certaines de ses propres croyances; les membres de la nouvelle élite seront eux-mêmes intégrés dans la structure consensuelle de ceux qu'ils gouvernent, structure qu'ils avaient eux-mêmes partagée précédemment, au moins dans une certaine mesure.

#### Le consensus dans les pays sous-développés.

Les pays économiquement sous-développés, auxquels fait défaut un centre tout à fait apparent, sont également sous-développés quant à leur consensus. Leurs structures de croyances ne se sont pas fondues au point que les institutions centrales soient jugées capables d'agir de façon équitable en répartissant récompenses et possibilités. Même si un centre est perçu, la croyance à sa légitimité n'est pas largement partagée.

L'image du "moi" collectif que l'on trouve dans les pays sous-développés est surtout primordiale - tribale, ethnique ou locale - ou religieuse, et non civile. Les membres de chaque secteur tendant à croire que ceux de chacun des autres secteurs sont incapables d'agir si ce n'est au profit de leur propre secteur, ils considèrent forcément comme nuisibles à leurs intérêts les institutions animées par eux.

L'état dissensuel des pays sous-développés illustre la relation entre le sentiment d'affinité et l'élément de croyance à la structure du consensus. La perception d'un lien avec d'autres personnes consistant dans la résidence sur un territoire étendu aux frontières définies, est une composante essentielle de la croyance selon laquelle de telles personnes peuvent agir de façon avantageuse, ou du moins innocente, pour les intérêts de chacun ou de ceux avec lesquels elles ont des liens primordiaux ou religieux.

Plusieurs facteurs importants permettent de rendre compte de l'inexistence ou de la faiblesse du sentiment d'affinité civile. La force de l'affiliation primordiale, fondée sur l'importance des liens de parenté dans les sociétés agricoles, inhibe toute propension à l'affiliation civile. Ces attachements primordiaux sont en fait portés à un état de méfiance active et combative par l'apparition d'une arène politique commune. Avant l'apparition de cette arène politique commune, l'efficacité de ces affiliations primordiales n'était qu'interne; vis-à-vis de l'extérieur, elles étaient latentes, leurs porteurs n'agissant pas dans une arène commune. La concurrence et le conflit politiques les rendent actives. Mais cette activation n'est pas compensée par un système institutionnel central imposant et contraignant. Les élections rendent actives des affiliations de portée très limitée. Les gouvernements au pouvoir entre deux élections successives ne sont cependant pas dotés d'une organisation assez pénétrante, et ne sont pas assez puissants dans leur action, pour susciter chez ceux qu'ils veulent gouverner la croyance en leur légitimité. Le simple pouvoir, même s'il est partiellement perçu comme légitime, engendre chez ceux sur qui il s'exerce une croyance en sa légitimité. Un gouvernement incapable de toute évidence de réaliser ce qu'il prétend réaliser, incapable de traduire sa volonté dans les faits, et dont la présence, dans l'action et dans les symboles, n'est pas continue, ne peut pas engendrer chez les habitants du territoire sur lequel il exerce une souveraineté théorique, le sentiment de l'affinité civile. Les gouvernements efficaces, même s'ils sont jugés injustes, engendrent la crainte révérencieuse qui se transforme avec

le temps en une croyance en leur légitimité. Les gouvernements faibles ou inefficaces, et de plus injustes selon les normes prépondérantes, ne peuvent engendrer cette crainte révérencieuse, et ne peuvent donc contrecarrer les affiliations primordiales, latentes ou actives.

Le haut degré d'analphabétisme de la population adulte des pays sous-développés, la brièveté et la rareté de sa participation au système national d'instruction publique, le caractère écologique discontinu du territoire national, rendent le centre de la société moins visible qu'il ne le faudrait pour favoriser le sentiment d'affinité civile. Cela est vrai de la masse de la population, mais aussi des élites issues de cette masse.

Les élites, et particulièrement, en raison de leur inefficacité, les élites politiques, ne croient pas elles-mêmes à leur légitimité civile. Elles continuent à vivre sous l'empire de leurs affiliations primordiales. Le sentiment d'une nationalité commune est probablement mieux développé chez les élites que dans la masse de la population, mais il n'est pas assez fort pour compenser les affiliations primordiales, exacerbées par le conflit d'aspirations et par la méfiance, aggravée par la concurrence pour les avantages rares.

Les sociétés modernes, vastes et avancées, engendrent et contiennent, bien entendu, une quantité considérable de dissensus. Mais l'action du dissensus y est limitée par une part de consensus fondé sur le sentiment d'affinité civile et par le centre puissant et prégnant de la société. Si les sociétés sous-développées doivent devenir des sociétés civiles, leur centre devra devenir plus puissant et plus prégnant, plus visible et plus efficace. Il faudra pour cela un processus d'intégration écologique, la participation universelle à l'éducation, l'institution d'une fonction publique compétente et un appareil puissant de maintien de l'ordre.

L'apparition accidentelle et occasionnelle d'une personnalité charismatique peut contribuer à ce processus, mais on ne peut pas compter sur elle, ni la provoquer délibérément. L'apparition d'un mouvement idéologique peut de même contribuer à engendrer le consensus, mais il n'est pas non plus possible d'y compter. Les attributs secondaires des personnalités charismatiques et des mouvements idéologiques sont stériles et n'affaiblissent pas les affiliations primordiales. De même, le bruit et la fureur des régimes totalitaires ne peuvent, si leur substance n'est pas présente, provoquer que l'apparence du consensus, sans sa réalité. Le consensus nécessaire au développement ordonné ne peut provenir que de l'intégration écologique de la création d'une culture commune par l'éducation, d'institutions gouvernementales centrales apparentes et contraignantes. C'est seulement par de tels processus que les sociétés sous-développées peuvent se doter d'un centre, et c'est seulement ainsi que le centre et la périphérie peuvent se rapprocher.

"Consensus et conflits, notamment dans  
les pays en voie de développement"

IDEOLOGIE, CONFLIT ET CONSENSUS :

NOTES PREPARATOIRES A L'ELABORATION D'UNE THEORIE

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Idéologie, conflit et consensus :  
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Idéologie, conflit et consensus :

notes préparatoires à l'élaboration d'une théorie

par Robert A. Dahl

I. Enoncé préliminaire des questions et des hypothèses, en langage vulgaire.

A. Deux questions connexes :

1. Constate-on dans les démocraties occidentales un déclin des idéologies ?

2. Les Américains (ou les Britanniques, les Suédois, les Norvégiens) sont-ils moins "idéologues" que les Italiens (ou les Français, les Hollandais, etc.) ?

B. Tentatives de réponse : hypothèses.

1. Les idéologies n'ont pas décliné et certes pas disparu dans les pays démocratiques occidentaux. Il y a déclin de certaines idéologies particulières. Celles-ci sont toutefois remplacées par d'autres idéologies qui, à certains observateurs, semblent moins "idéologiques".

2. Les Américains ne sont pas moins "idéologues" que, par exemple, les Italiens. Croire qu'ils le sont, est céder à une illusion, explicable par le fait que les Américains manifestent un haut degré d'accord au sujet d'une idéologie unique, alors que les Italiens (par exemple) sont divisés.

II. Clarification des concepts.

A. Définition : Le système d'opinions politiques d'un individu comprend ses idées concernant la structure, le contrôle et la politique des autorités gouvernementales (et notamment les siennes), les options possibles ainsi que ses préférences.

B. Les systèmes d'opinions politiques diffèrent, cela va de soi, selon leur contenu. Il est commode de se représenter le contenu d'un système d'opinions comme construit à partir d'éléments ou de composantes identifiables (par exemple de croyances s'exprimant dans des propositions telles que "la démocratie est la meilleure forme de gouvernement", "il faut que la démocratie bourgeoise le cède à la dictature

du prolétariat", "l'économie capitaliste est plus efficace que l'économie socialiste"). Des systèmes d'opinions politiques différents peuvent avoir en commun certains éléments (nous les appellerons les éléments communs). Les éléments particuliers sont ceux qui distinguent un système d'opinions des autres.

C. Les individus peuvent varier selon la richesse ou la pauvreté relative de leur système d'opinions politiques. Je vais désormais supposer tout simplement que nous disposons d'une méthode permettant d'identifier et d'énumérer les éléments des systèmes d'opinions politiques. Les systèmes riches contiennent un nombre d'éléments relativement élevé; les systèmes pauvres en contiennent un petit nombre seulement.

D. Les éléments des systèmes d'opinions politiques diffèrent également selon leur caractère cognitif et selon leur poids affectif ou émotif.

Caractère cognitif :

Poids affectif

Ouvert :

Grand

Faible

Sujet à vérification et analyse

Eléments ouverts  
mais fermes

Eléments flexibles

Fermé :

Non sujet à vérification et analyse.

Eléments fixes

Eléments fermés  
mais assemblés de  
façon lâche

1. Dans la mesure où le système d'opinions d'un individu donné comprend de façon importante des éléments flexibles, nous pourrions qualifier cet individu d'"ouvert", de "pragmatique", de "non engagé", d'"expérimentateur", et même de "scientifique". Dans un système, dans une situation ou dans un conflit politique où les éléments flexibles sont importants, le style de la vie politique peut être caractérisé comme pragmatique.

2. Lorsque dans le système d'opinions d'un individu, ce sont les éléments fixes qui l'emportent, nous pourrions qualifier cet individu de

"dogmatique, d'"obstiné", de "rigide" (il est vrai que Rokeach établit des distinctions entre ces trois épithètes). Lorsque dans un système, une situation ou un conflit politique, ce sont les éléments fixes qui dominant, le style de la vie politique sera qualifié d'idéologique.

### III. Hypothèses.

A. Quelques hypothèses d'ordre assez général, énoncées de façon relativement précise mais pas nécessairement opératoire.

1. Dans tous les pays, le nombre des éléments identifiables (la "richesse") des systèmes d'opinions politiques des divers individus est en corrélation particulièrement étroite avec 1) le niveau de l'activité politique de chaque individu; 2) le niveau ou le degré de ses intérêts politiques, et 3) son niveau d'instruction. Le nombre des éléments pourrait varier comme suit :

Niveau supérieur ("le plus riche")	Intellectuels s'intéressant à la vie politique Dirigeants politiques Activistes politiques très actifs Activistes politiques modérément actifs
Niveau inférieur ("le plus pauvre")	Electeurs qui se bornent à voter Abstentionnistes sans aucune activité

2. Le système d'opinions politiques de chaque individu comprend des éléments de force variable, c'est-à-dire à la fois des éléments fixes et des éléments flexibles.

3. Les éléments fixes et les éléments flexibles tendent à changer de façon différente :

<u>les éléments fixes</u>	<u>les éléments flexibles</u>
sont relativement peu fréquents	sont relativement fréquents
sont relativement brusques	peuvent être soit progressifs soit brusques
ne sont produits que par de fortes tensions	sont produits par des tensions faibles
produisent de fortes tensions	produisent des tensions faibles
ont un caractère "traumatique"	n'ont pas un caractère "traumatique"

4. Dans un ensemble donné d'individus dont les systèmes d'opinions politiques contiennent des éléments fixés communs, les différences au sujet des mesures et des décisions à caractère interne ne portent que sur les éléments flexibles. Il en découle que le style des discussions, des controverses et des décisions politiques est "pragmatique" : elles portent sur des questions de fait, sur des problèmes de méthode, sur la volonté de compromis; on constate une recherche active de solutions (dans le cadre des éléments fixes), etc., et une absence de conflits portant sur les "principes".

5. Dans un ensemble d'individus caractérisés par des éléments fixes différents, le conflit politique menace les éléments fixes. Le style des controverses et des décisions politiques y est donc "idéologique" : on y constate des conflits au sujet des "principes", une plus grande rigidité, un refus du compromis, etc.

6. Lorsqu'un ensemble d'individus caractérisés par des éléments fixes communs constitue un groupe ayant, à un certain degré, une identité commune, et que ce groupe se trouve en conflit avec des ensembles d'individus ayant des éléments fixés différents des premiers, le style de leur comportement politique cesse d'être "pragmatique" pour devenir "idéologique".

B. Nouvelle formulation des hypothèses initiales, en langage un peu plus précis, mais pas encore opératoire.

1. a) En Europe occidentale, b) parmi les dirigeants, cadres et activistes politiques c) qui ne sont ni communistes ni extrémistes de droite :

1.1. Il n'y a pas eu (depuis 1945 approximativement) une réduction significative du nombre des éléments fixes constituant les systèmes d'opinions politiques.

1.2. Il y a eu par contre une réduction de la particularité des éléments de leurs systèmes d'opinions politiques. Un système commun d'opinions politiques s'est répandu, dont les éléments fixes comprennent un fort attachement :

à la démocratie parlementaire,  
au suffrage universel,  
aux partis multiples,  
au gouvernement constitutionnel,  
aux changements pacifiques et non-violents,  
à la conciliation préférée au conflit,  
à l'enquête scientifique considérée comme une condition de  
l'action intelligente,  
à l'extension de l'action et de l'intervention publiques tendant à atteindre des buts de bien-être, de stabilité et de croissance économique,  
aux systèmes économiques mixtes, ni socialistes ni capitalistes,  
à la planification gouvernementale à court terme et à long terme  
à d'autres éléments, comprenant notamment (pour reprendre un terme utilisé par Rokeach) des systèmes d'incroyance :

refus du laissez-faire classique,  
refus du socialisme classique,  
refus du marxisme,  
refus des régimes autoritaires, des régimes totalitaires, des régimes à parti unique ou à parti hégémonique, etc.

1.3. Peut-être à cause de l'évolution décrite dans 1.2., il y a eu également déclin des différences entre les éléments flexibles constituant leurs systèmes d'opinions politiques.

1.4. Il y a eu également un fort accroissement de l'importance visible des éléments flexibles. Les discussions et les conflits portent surtout sur ceux-ci, et non sur les éléments fixes (et c'est cela qui est perçu comme "la mort des idéologies").

1.5. Le style de la vie politique est donc devenu beaucoup plus "pragmatique", et moins "idéologique".

2. a) En Europe occidentale, b) parmi les dirigeants, cadres et activistes politiques c) communistes :

2.1. Il y a un déclin de l'importance relative des éléments fixes.

2.2. Il y a un désaccord croissant au sujet des éléments fixes.

2.3. Il y a un accroissement de l'importance des éléments flexibles.

2.4. Néanmoins, beaucoup des éléments fixes des systèmes d'opinions des communistes demeurent différents de ceux des non-communistes et des non-extrémistes de droite.

### 3. Aux Etats-Unis :

3.1. Parmi les Américains, et notamment parmi les dirigeants, cadres et participants actifs, on constate un haut degré d'accord au sujet d'un grand nombre d'éléments fixes (la plupart de ceux énumérés dans 1.2., et d'autres plus spécifiquement américains, tels que le caractère sacro-saint de la Constitution des Etats-Unis).

3.2. Il y a des différences entre certains éléments fixes (par exemple la place des Noirs dans la société américaine).

3.3. La prépondérance des éléments fixes au sujet desquels il y a accord stimule des discussions, des conflits et des décisions politiques portant principalement sur les éléments flexibles. Le style de la vie politique est donc aux Etats-Unis "pragmatique".

3.4. Les éléments fixes des systèmes d'opinions politiques dominants acquièrent un maximum de visibilité lorsque les Américains font face à des adversaires qui ne les partagent pas. Depuis 1945, ces adversaires ont été le plus souvent, mais pas toujours, marxistes (habituellement marxistes-léninistes, et généralement communistes). Dans de tels conflits, le style de la vie politique américaine cesse d'être pragmatique pour devenir "idéologique". Les dirigeants politiques américains sont donc peu pragmatiques et très fortement "idéologiques" dans les domaines suivants : a) le communisme aux Etats-Unis, b) les problèmes internationaux, c) la politique et l'organisation économiques aux Etats-Unis et à l'étranger.

### 4. Dans les régimes démocratiques occidentaux (européens et anglophones).

4.1. On ne constate pas de différences significatives dans la fréquence des systèmes relativement riches d'opinions politiques entre dirigeants, cadres et participants actifs à la vie politique. Dans le reste de la population, les différences dans la fréquence des sys-

tèmes riches d'opinions politiques sont en forte corrélation avec les différences dans le niveau d'instruction et d'intérêt porté à la vie politique.

N.B.- Il paraît découler de 4.1. que, compte tenu des différences dans les niveaux d'instruction des deux populations, la fréquence des systèmes riches de croyances politiques devrait être plus grande chez les électeurs américains que, par exemple, chez les électeurs italiens.

4.2. Les variations trans-nationales dans la fréquence des systèmes relativement riches d'opinions politiques sont assez faibles entre individus ayant le même niveau d'instruction et le même niveau d'intérêt pour la politique, relativement fortes à l'intérieur de chaque nation entre individus à niveau d'instruction différent.

5. Si nous comparons entre eux les Etats-Unis, la Suède et l'Italie, nous constatons que :

5.1. Il n'y a pas beaucoup moins d'éléments fixes dans les systèmes d'opinions politiques des dirigeants, cadres et participants actifs américains que suédois; il n'y en a pas moins chez les Suédois que chez les Italiens.

5.2. Le degré d'accord au sujet des éléments fixes est plus grand chez les dirigeants, cadres et participants actifs américains et suédois que chez les Italiens.

"Consensus and dissent, with special reference  
to the developing countries"

MOBILIZATION AND POLITICAL CONFLICT:  
A THEORETICAL INQUIRY INTO THE STRUCTURAL BASES OF  
CONSENSUS AND DISSENT

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Mobilization and Political Conflict:

A Theoretical Inquiry into the Structural Bases of

Consensus and Dissent

by Samuel H. Barnes

A major component of politics is the relationship between elite and mass. The ubiquity of the relationship has been long and widely recognized; several system builders have made it the cornerstone of their analyses; under the guise of the study of authority, legitimacy, and stratification, it is firmly rooted in contemporary social science. For several scientific and nonscientific schools that focus on power in its several manifestations, the elite-mass relationship is the essence of politics; for others it is relevant but partial. It is important for all.

In this paper I will sketch out a radically simplified typology of patterns of elite-mass relationships and suggest that these patterns and their mutations through time offer an insight into the very complex and possibly idiosyncratic situations that confront the student of consensus and dissent. Although the hypotheses implicit in the paper could be operationalized and tested, I have not done so. My purpose is not to validate a theory but to suggest topics that exhibit promise for cross-national research. Since all aspects of elite-mass relationships cannot be considered, much less analyzed, I

will concentrate on the limited but crucial variable of mobilization.

### Social and Political Mobilization

Mobilization is the process whereby relationships that enable elite and mass to contribute actively to the achievement of unit goals are established and elaborated. The elite are those who make decisions for the unit; all others are mass.<sup>1</sup> Decision making in large units is a complex process, and there can be many different elites and many levels of elites. It is also important to note that the unit can be a polity, a subdivision of a polity, or a complex organization, as mobilization and elite-mass relationships may be present in all units. Society is a set of a very large number of such relationships. The polity is a vertical subset of society. The polity is thus not synonymous with society, and in this paper they will be separated analytically, with "society" including all of society not included in the "polity".

Two basic patterns of mobilization can be distinguished analytically--political and social.<sup>2</sup> The former exists when mobilization is achieved through relationships established solely or primarily for political purposes; social mobilization, on the other hand, is achieved through the proliferation of economic, religious, educational, or other relationships.<sup>3</sup> Thus mobilization by means of a political party apparatus always involves political mobilization, though it may

involve social mobilization as well; and mobilization through occupation or church is social, though it has political consequences. It is important to recognize that social and political components exist in all forms of mobilization, and though they can be distinguished analytically it is often difficult to do so empirically.

It is the argument of this paper that political mobilization results where social mobilization is inadequate. This is usually the case where, for various reasons, social institutions are ineffectual or absent. Structural and cultural factors sometimes inhibit effective social mobilization, even despite extended societal institutional development.<sup>4</sup> Low involvement in societal institutions facilitates political mobilization, as uncommitted individuals are more readily available.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, political mobilization may be the only effective alternative as social institutions are generally weakest among those who are least able to construct and sustain organizations, including political organization. Thus, competence often must be sought from the outside; and, as a consequence, political mobilization is almost always achieved by elites who differ in many ways from the masses they mobilize. Even when they originate in similar strata, elites often differentiate themselves from the mass, acquiring new attitudes and tastes along with their leadership roles. The weaker the existing social institutions of the masses and thus the lower their political competence, the weaker the constraints on leaders and hence the greater their freedom to opt for ideologies,

programs, and actions that are deviant from the existing order. It is not necessary that they be deviant, but this is often the case. Those who mobilize the previously unmobilized are seldom subject to the rigid selectivity of existing social institutions which tends to weed out those who threaten the status quo. For example, it made a great deal of difference in Western European countries whether the working class was mobilized by the churches--as was the case with the Christian trade union movement, and, to some extent, even the British trade union movement--or by free-lance intellectuals and leaders from within the working class. And it likewise mattered whether these latter had been influenced by the Russian revolution at the time mobilization patterns were established.

Whether mobilization that reflects societal rather than merely political inputs is radically inclined or not is a contextual question. That is, when segments of society change together and at the same pace, extremely unconventional inputs are less likely to appear.<sup>6</sup> But no society matures evenly. All exhibit discontinuities of various degrees and the size of these discontinuities largely determines the nature and extent of dissent. For if societal components are out of phase, widespread consensus is impossible. Extensive experience with common methods of resolving conflict combined with effective leadership of the polity can mitigate the effects of these discontinuities. But no system can insure consensus. What effective government can in

fact do is to prevent societal components, whether regions, classes, or cultural groupings, from getting greatly out of phase. This keeps components from feeling left out and hence reduces alienation.

However, control over social forces is a difficult thing. The polities that most need such control are seldom the ones best equipped to provide it. This is especially true of the developing polities, for it is here that discontinuities are likely to be greatest in the immediate future and the means of dealing with them least effective. Therefore, it is here that political mobilization is most likely to be superior to societal mobilization, as the existing social institutions are generally inadequate to provide the inputs required for political and economic modernization. Only in a modern society is social mobilization likely to give rise to modern politics.<sup>7</sup> Most contemporary states in fact have political systems that are much more modern than their societies; and all modern societies reflect the hand of the past in their mobilization patterns. In the absence of dramatic and revolutionary adjustments, mobilization patterns may change very slowly. Institutions are hardy creations. They may adapt, changing only what is necessary so that much that is anachronistic survives. Individuals may continue to occupy posts that are devoid of functional significance. Thus the industrial revolution, that grand simplificateur, has led toward convergence, while historical factors assure continued variation. Hence I am not suggesting any crude social or historical determinism. I am arguing that the

relationship between the polity and society affects the patterns of mobilization, patterns that in turn largely determine the structure of consensus and dissent. An analysis of a crude typology of polities will serve to clarify this point.

#### A Typology of Models of Polities

The typology of models of polities presented here consists of ideal types. The models demonstrate the reconstructed logic of the relationships existing within pure types rather than the central tendencies of existing systems.<sup>8</sup> The three types of systems considered are the authoritarian, democratic, and totalitarian. I explicitly reject the notion that any existing system approaches these types. All polities are mixtures, and it is the proportion and distribution of these types within a polity that effectively describe its nature. Proportion suggests that in principle polities can be described quantitatively in terms of the number of people who are encompassed by each type of relationship. Distribution refers to the highly significant fact that it is not numbers alone that determine the nature of a polity but their distribution in particular structures as well. Thus we must recognize that elite-mass relationships may be democratic within some groups and authoritarian within others. In the American South, or South Africa, for example, democratic relationships predominated within the white population while white-black relationships were authoritarian.

Perhaps the clientelistic should be added as a fourth type.

However, as there is little scientific analysis of this type above the level of the little community, a general analysis would be impossibly difficult and incomplete. Of course a theoretical analysis is not precluded but, unlike the ones that follow, it would be insufficiently grounded in reliable data.<sup>9</sup>

Authoritarian-- The distinctive feature of the authoritarian system is that it is not an effective mobilization system.<sup>10</sup> Authoritarian elites are content to control the periphery of mass behavior rather than attempt to mobilize masses. Their principal concern is to prevent masses from threatening continued elite dominance of the values of society, and legal systems, police, armies, and control of societal institutions such as the bureaucracy, church, educational system, and larger economic institutions have in the past been adequate for this. The authoritarian polity is a conservative, traditional polity in which change takes place gradually, and seldom at the conscious direction of men. Elite dominance is facilitated by the fragmented communications network of the polity. Most people are parochials, in Almond's and Verba's sense.<sup>11</sup> They are engaged mainly in agriculture, often of a dispersed, subsistence variety, and their ways and days are severely limited to the round of relatives and neighbors.<sup>12</sup> And even if they live in cities their social isolation in relation to the larger society is similar.<sup>13</sup>

There are often dualities present throughout the system. The "great tradition" of the elites may be cosmopolitan and sophisticated. A "little tradition", an oral, parochial, inward looking cultural heritage, may exist along side it.<sup>14</sup> Dual economies often exist, with a small modern, perhaps internationally oriented, economy of the cities coexisting with a rural, largely subsistence, economy in the countryside. There is often a deep gulf between the elite and mass deriving from their different values and standards of living. Often the elite is itself divided into a modern national elite and traditional local elites; the latter often serve as the linkage between the national elite and the mass.

Although national consensus may be fragile, this may not be readily apparent, for the highly visible national elites sometimes exhibit remarkable outward agreement on most public issues. The masses are not mobilized, and local elites are ephemerally inter-related. For this reason, a traditional system can be extremely fragmented and lacking in consensus and yet appear calm and stable. Local elites raise no fuss and are rewarded with a free hand in the local situation. As the elites are concerned primarily with protecting and extending their personal privileges they take little interest in what goes on at the mass level as long as it does not threaten them. If the masses are well indoctrinated coercion may not be widely evident, but it is always present in the background as a potential source of control.<sup>15</sup>



The pluralism of the traditional society, which is often along religious, caste, linguistic, and ethnic lines, is far different from that of a modern democracy. Indeed, the pluralism of the traditional society is of such a nature that it is not easily rendered compatible with democratic pluralism and social mobilization. For it is sometimes along lines that do not admit of easy political solutions or compromises. When, following establishment of democratic structures, inputs are fed into the political system from these social units they are likely to be divisive and incapable of absorption.<sup>16</sup> Social mobilization is likely to lead to disunity and even political breakdown, because the society, not being modern, will not give rise to the inputs needed for modernization. These inputs can come only from a limited sector of the polity, usually within the political elite, and can secure a mass base only through political mobilization. There is no inherent reason why modernization inputs cannot derive from elsewhere than the political elite, but it is a very common pattern for this elite rather than a social or economic elite to take the lead. Although there are good reasons for this, they lie outside the scope of this paper.

The traditional pattern is not viable in the present century. Few people are completely parochial today, and no contemporary elites are confronted only with passive masses. A certain amount of social mobilization is inevitable, and it is likely to lead to the articulation of demands and to the necessity for elites to achieve a new

relationship with the masses. Modernization of any kind gives rise to new claimants to elite status. These may not be easily absorbed into the existing elite; they may mobilize support and challenge the old elites. The traditional society is everywhere under attack, and its elites have many problems with which to cope.

Given the nature of modernization it is surprising that some traditionally oriented polities have been able to survive for so long. Authoritarian elites are obviously not without resources for combatting their opponents. Since they are interested mainly in control of the resources of the polity rather than in mobilization of the population they can be much more tolerant of opposition. Lacking ideological fervor, compulsive thoroughness, and, usually, high technical competence as well, they are often content to frustrate the designs of the opposition rather than destroy it. They can be selective, suiting the tactic to the particular case. Some opponents must be liquidated. Others can be bought off, exiled, pressured into silence, bribed with ambassadorships, and so on. The range of possible treatments is very wide. Considerable dissent can be permitted as long as the system itself is not directly threatened. Genuine concessions may be made. Individuals may be permitted virtually complete freedom. What is not permitted is a legitimate, organized opposition.

Although authoritarian elites sometime possess considerable consensus, more often they are agreed on little more than the desire to retain elite status. The potential for disagreement among rural gentry, entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, the military, and other groups is very great and contributes to the instability of authoritarian regimes. It is in fact one of the reasons for their tendency to rely on individuals who are outwardly strong men, able to maintain order among feuding barons. But the facade often masks chaos. Politics is largely a struggle for personal advantage. An official political party often exists, but since it is not very much interested in genuine political mobilization, which might lead in a totalitarian direction and threaten other elite groups not directly involved in running the party, the party tends to be merely one group within the elite, a competition for the spoils of dominance. As authoritarian leaders typically rule by balancing off groups and individuals, a totalitarian party might threaten the ruler and the system; hence the party may have a totalitarian form with a reality quite different. However, effective opposition parties are not permitted. There are some variants in which opposition parties exist, yet are not permitted to win elections, but they are not vital to this discussion of ideal-types.

The authoritarian system is inadequate to cope with problems of social change. Only by severely limiting innovation can elites ensure their continued dominance. The tendency for the authoritarian system to be transformed into or replaced by a mobilization system of either the democratic or totalitarian variety.

Democratic and Totalitarian Mobilization Systems--Few words arouse more emotion even among scholars than democracy.<sup>17</sup> Rather than debate what it "really means" I will discuss some implications of a particular interpretation of it. Elsewhere I have interpreted the strategic factor in democracy (that which distinguishes it from other systems and which must be present to effectuate it) as the existence of multiple autonomous communications channels and networks that unite elite and mass.<sup>18</sup> There must be multiple channels so that coalition building is possible. And channels must be autonomous (that is, not externally controlled) so that dissent can be communicated.<sup>19</sup> Such a system is a mobilization system: masses are integrated into communications networks whereby they are related to elites and they can together pursue unit goals.

Democracy is a system that requires high levels of political competence.<sup>20</sup> Complex communications networks are difficult to maintain; they require skills of a high order distributed widely throughout the population. This means, of course, that it is difficult for populations with low average levels of education and meager diffusion of modern skills to operate a system that functions democratically throughout. And it also means that as polities modernize--that is, as communications nets become more complex--it is necessary for elites to deal with the problem of mobilization. In the traditional society mobilization can be restricted, avoided, discouraged, frustrated; in the modern society elites must come to terms with demands

from below, either by finding ways to control them and channel them in the policy directions preferred by elites or by tailoring elite preferences to fit mass demands. The former is the totalitarian direction, the latter the democratic.

Several additional preliminary reminders need to be entered here. The first is the caveat that these are ideal types and are not meant as descriptions of any existing system. No system is completely totalitarian and none has achieved the thorough democratization envisaged by the democratic ideal type. Second, operationalization of these ideal types must take into account units of analysis. An actual polity is a combination of units that vary greatly in their internal structure. A thorough analysis of a polity would be necessary in order to describe its particular mixture adequately. All polities contain traditional, democratic, and totalitarian units. It is the predominance of one form or the other in the governmental sphere that enables us to place even tentative labels on a system. To label a system totalitarian, for example, and then to assume that it exhibits throughout the features of the totalitarian ideal type is a common intellectual error. Third, the particular mixture exhibited by a country reflects social realities as well as human will: achieving a particular system requires competence as well as desire, hence cannot be separated from the level of development.

Finally, it is necessary to point out that feedback exists in all mobilization systems, hence one is speaking only of general patterns when one says that in a democratic system elites alter policy to fit mass demands whereas in totalitarian systems the mass is mobilized for the pursuit of the goals of the elite. Leadership is an important intervening variable. In democracies masses usually defer to leaders for cues as to what policies the masses "really want". The neoliberal view of democracy is in fact that mass publics simply choose between competing groups of leaders. Empirical research demonstrates that most people do not hold opinions on most issues most of the time. Most policy demands originate within the elite itself. The view of democracy as elites simply implementing policies that somehow evolve from below cannot be taken seriously. There are a very large number of patterns of democratic elite-mass relationships. They all have in common that the general goals and policies pursued by the elites are congruent with the preferences of the masses as expressed in multiple autonomous communications channels, of which elections are an important and perhaps underrated example.

In totalitarian systems, elites develop methods for imposing their preferences on the mass. Indoctrination is one of the most effective of these, and when it has been carried out thoroughly there are likely to be few fundamental differences articulated in the goals and preferences of the elites and mass. When, so to speak, the totalitarian elite has achieved the society posited as its goal, the

need for a totalitarian political mobilization system to control mass inputs declines. Conditions for democratization are then present. Whether great strides in that direction are made depends upon other factors, and the most important concerns the mobilization machinery itself. In practice this means, what does the party do in a mature totalitarian system? Does it justify itself by continually redefining goals so that they are never achieved--the permanent revolution? Does it relax and enjoy the fruits of rule? We do not know.

Mobilization in the totalitarian system is, at least initially, primarily political.<sup>21</sup> If it is based on an ideology of modernization such as communism it tends to create through indoctrination, coercion, and industrialization a society that can itself provide inputs compatible with the ideology.<sup>22</sup> But as it seems to rise in nonmodern societies mobilization must be political, as a traditional society does not provide inputs conducive to rapid industrialization; hence the primacy of the political arises.<sup>23</sup> Political mobilization means political organization, and in the totalitarian type this means a very strong organization indeed.<sup>24</sup> Few organizations willingly fold up; they survive long after they are superfluous, though there is a tendency toward atrophy and increasing irrelevance for organizations that have outlived their usefulness.

Some totalitarian mobilization systems arise in reaction against the mobilization structures of others. They are, in fact, largely negative rather than ideological, and though they often have a

formal pseudo-ideology, it is not a guide to action, and is taken seriously primarily by the young, the ignorant, and the academic. Once their opposition is destroyed this totalitarian structure seems to crumble from within. It retains an outwardly monolithic structure that hides a vehement and frantic internal rat race for position, rewards, and power that is mitigated neither by conventional humanistic restraints nor commitment to a meaningful common ideology. Indeed, when the original enemy is destroyed the organization largely loses its *raison d'etre*. But the totalitarian apparatus is not disposed of easily. It can be used to keep the masses tightly under control, leaving the elites free to contest among themselves without the necessity of considering the masses. In this way, communist and reactive varieties come to resemble one another superficially. However, there are differences that derive from the nature of the societies. The communist variety alters society to fit elite perceptions, perceptions that through time come to be widely shared if vaguely defined. The elites who contest among themselves are in substantial agreement on many things, and the society they have mobilized has likewise through indoctrination and the elimination of opposition achieved considerable consensus.

This is not true of reactive totalitarianism. Neither German National Socialism nor Italian Fascism was a successful totalitarian system, though the former approached closer to that type than the latter, but both may be taken as actual polities that veered sharply



in the totalitarian direction, and they may be viewed as examples of reactive totalitarianism.

They were rendered possible by fear of the left on the part of several elite groups.<sup>25</sup> Italian Fascism began as little more than an effective organization for fighting socialists and communists. Its clumsy ideology was pieced together later, and its outwardly strong leadership masked the continued dominance of Italy by many traditional elites. Fascism provides the classic case of a traditional elite that opted for a totalitarian mobilization system when it could no longer dominate under the facade of democracy as the masses entered the system, and when the elite was confronted with an alternative mobilization system on the left. Having no goals of their own, the Fascist leaders easily came to terms with traditional elites, who actually feared mass mobilization. As a consequence, Fascist mobilization was a sham; it could not easily have been otherwise, for it would then have posed a genuine threat to the traditional elites.

National Socialism did not last long enough to permit confident analysis. It is difficult to separate features deriving from the system itself from those originating in the Second World War. But the early purge of the radical elements who took its specific goals seriously suggests that it might have gone the way of Fascism had not war played such a key role in guiding its policy. Nevertheless, it requires a deeper analysis than it can receive here.

## Society and Polity

The foregoing analysis demonstrates the importance of the relationship between the society and the polity. This relationship becomes even more central in the transitional stage of modernization. Modernization is growth in the size and complexity of the communication networks of a society, in effect, growth in the portion of the population mobilized. As stated above, this mobilization can be social or political; in the modern polity it is primarily social, in that the extent and complexity of the communications networks in the social sphere, especially in the economic sector, are almost certain to outpace the purely political in numbers and significance.<sup>26</sup> Simultaneously, however, the political networks expand too, so that in absolute terms political structures in modern polities are certain to exceed their traditional counterparts in size and complexity. It is only relative to the nonpolitical forms of mobilization that the political in modern society seems inferior; thus, in fact, considerable political mobilization is quite compatible with democracy if social institutions likewise grow and retain their autonomy. Of course, this is seldom the case in developing countries.

The political and social networks seldom expand at the same pace. It has been argued, for example, that in American history social development has outstripped political development and that in many respects the United States is an underdeveloped polity, which functions only because it receives inputs from a modern, developed society.<sup>27</sup>

It seems likely that in the contemporary world the polity will modernize first. Indeed, all polities today seek to modernize, and the political seems to be more amenable to immediate conscious manipulation than the nonpolitical. That is, it is possible to create a modern political framework and use it to force the pace of social change and, presumably, development. But this means that the political system is directing the social, that policy results more from "withinputs" from the governmental structure itself than from inputs from the society.<sup>28</sup> In fact, societal inputs are unlikely to be conducive to modernization if the society is not modern; they may in fact render modernization difficult or impossible.<sup>29</sup> It is true that some societies have modernized without extensive use of political mobilization, and the study of how and why they are able to do so merits high priority. It is probably possible to isolate and identify the particular pattern of structural and behavioral characteristics that facilitated this modernization.<sup>30</sup> The results of such an inquiry are likely to be discouraging for the future prospects of many contemporary developing countries. Some structural and behavioral hindrances to modernization can be overcome only with great difficulty. Furthermore, few polities today seem anxious to opt for the long and gradual process of modernization implicit in the societal approach.

This brief discussion of the relationship between societal and political mobilization perhaps suggests more of an either-or set of

alternatives than is necessary or intended. There are an almost infinite range of possible mixtures of patterns. One is perhaps optimum for any given system, but there is certainly no single universal pattern that is desirable. However, the particular mixture has consequences for innumerable aspects of public and non-public affairs. We turn now to the consequences for consensus and dissent.

#### Some Implications for Consensus and Dissent

Social change never proceeds smoothly throughout a society. The pace is uneven, and outcroppings of previous patterns remain in the most advanced polities. If these lack centrality and number, they are merely quaint reminders of the past, preserved as living fossils by the irregular march of progress. They appear as idiosyncratic statistics, "noise" if you like, unimportant for system behavior. Often, however, discontinuities develop that reflect sizable elements of the population, elements that occupy strategic positions in the society as a whole, especially in cultural and economic matters. The element that is alienated from the mainstream of society may as easily represent the modern as the traditional. It depends on the structure of the society, especially those aspects of structure relating to modernization; the success with which the political system has adapted to changes in the social system is crucial.

It is commonplace to speak of the breakdown of traditional patterns and their replacement. The fundamental question is, what kind of new patterns will emerge? There is a healthy number of alternative patterns possible. This preliminary inquiry into the impact of mobilization patterns on consensus and dissent can only suggest the existence of a strong relationship between the patterns of mobilization and patterns of consensus and dissent that develop in a polity. These relationships can be stated as propositions that can, in principle, be tested. They are offered as preliminary and very tentative generalizations in nonoperational language in order to demonstrate some of the implications of the analysis outlined in this paper. I wish to emphasize that they require considerable sharpening in order to give them an adequate formulation.

1. The more even the pace of social change the more adequate social, as opposed to political, mobilization will be and hence the greater the consensus. It is the discontinuities produced by change rather than the pace as such that weakens consensus, but it is more difficult to avoid discontinuities when change is rapid.
2. The greater the importance of social as opposed to political mobilization the greater the differentiation, specialization, complexity, and fragmentation of elites. Consequently, the probability of political consensus and the toleration of opposition and dissent are

increased, as no segment of the elite is able to implement a claim to total power by itself.

3. Extensive political mobilization reflects the failure of social mobilization as a means of uniting elites and mass. Political mobilization has a number of requisities, including a discontented and unorganized mass, unattached elites, adequate minimum levels of average political competence, and some unifying creed, ideology, formula, or program. If the discontented and nonmobilized mass publics are low in political competence, elite domination and totalitarian mobilization (in terms of the ideal types presented in this paper) are greatly facilitated, though political mobilization is probably impossible without some (unspecified) minimum average level of political competence. Democratic patterns of predominantly political mobilization are typical only of small groups or of groups of highly competent individuals.

4. The lower the levels of competence of the groups mobilized the greater the role of outside mobilizers and the more important the role of intellectuals and ideology in the organization. The more deviant the intellectuals, the more utopian the ideologies and the weaker the basis of consensus.

5. When a political mobilization system has the power to dominate others it will do so unless its hold over its membership is weak and is likely to be lost thereby or its elites are strongly socialized to reject the opportunity. Political mobilization by modernizing

elites is likely to be less tolerant of opposition and more likely to draw sharp boundaries between their mobilization structures and others. Reactive mobilization systems are likely to be more tolerant; once their major opposition is smashed they often lapse into patterns of social mobilization, or authoritarian elite-mass relationships, though the totalitarian facade may be maintained.

6. Complex, pluralistic, traditional societies break away from authoritarian patterns only with difficulty. Revolution is often required. The contemporary guide and blueprint for a modernizing political mobilization system is the Leninist model. Since its diffusion the number of alternatives has dwindled, though the number of variations on the Leninist model has increased. The Leninist model is especially appropriate for units of low political competence, as it provides strong leadership, an efficient use of limited resources, bureaucratic control both within and without the organization, extensive resocialization, clarification of goals, and induced goal achievement motivations. The Leninist model has been used by groups extending from communists to fascists.

7. The Leninist model, and political mobilization in general, are instruments for achieving change; when change becomes self-generating in the society, opposition has been smashed, and extensive resocialization has taken place, there is no need for the combat organization. It survives as one of several pluralistic groups because of its internal dynamics and organizational effectiveness, not its functional role in politics.

8. When political mobilization is widely and evenly spread, no system is able to dominate and the war of all against all ensues. Opposition is possible because no one mobilization system is able to dominate, but it is not viewed as legitimate; and of course there is no consensus. However, dissent may be permitted as a mutually advantageous policy.

9. Although discontinuities are reduced, the structure of political conflict may continue for a long time to reflect these dated divisions. Again, organizational dynamics are primarily responsible. Political mobilization systems may decay into electoral machines serving societal institutions, but the vocabulary and style of the combat formation may remain for a very long time.

10. In modern societies with modern politics the long range trend is toward social rather than political mobilization. This--the "red vs expert" debate--is true of all systems, communist as well as non-communist. Whatever the name given the evolving system, its decision-making process is likely to resemble the bargaining form of the corporatist democracy now emerging in many countries. The chief bar to this development is extensive political mobilization, which renders difficult the decentralized decision-making, compromise, and fragmentation of loyalties implicit in the pluralistic bargaining polity.



Footnotes

1. Elite and mass are used here as descriptive terms only. No assumptions concerning "the ruling elite model" are intended. See Robert Dahl, "Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," APSR, vol. 52 (June 1958), 463-69. Mass and mass publics are used interchangeably.

For a further introduction to the conceptual problems passed over here see T.B. Bottomore, Elites and Society, New York: Basic Books, 1964; Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class, New York: Random House, 1963; and H.D. Lasswell, The Comparative Study of Elites, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952.

2. To anticipate much of what follows--this distinction is related to Durkheim's mechanical and organic solidarity. Normative integration is the dominant mode of the former, and when it breaks down under the stresses of modernization, it can (seemingly) be recreated only by coercion, or totalitarian forms of mobilization. Functional interdependence, the basic pattern in organic solidarity, renders normative integration unnecessary, or at least more marginal. That is, the area on which consensus is necessary is greatly reduced, hence the seeming decline of ideology in the most advanced systems and its obvious continued presence in less modern systems. At one stage ideology may be a useful tool of integration, and is undoubtedly essential to political mobilization; at a more advanced stage, ideology interferes with growing functional interdependence, and is troublesome where social mobilization is the pattern. For Durkheim's views see The Division of Labor in Society (English translation, New York: Free Press, 1964). On ideology see the working paper prepared for the IPSA conference by Robert Dahl, "Ideology, Conflict, and Consensus: Notes for a Theory". See also Samuel H. Barnes, "Ideology and the Organization of Conflict", Journal of Politics, vol. 28 (June 1966), pp. 513-30.

3. See Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," APSR, vol. 55 (September, 1961), pp. 493-514.

4. The historical dimensions of some of these factors are discussed in Barrington Moore, Jr., The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. Factors associated with participation in politics, which is only one form of mobilization, are discussed in Lester Milbrath, Political Participation, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965; and Robert E. Lane, Political Life, New York: Free Press, 1959.

5. This is the argument of theorists of the mass society. See William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society, New York: Free Press, 1959; Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951; and Eric Fromm, The Sane Society, New York: Rinehart, 1955.

6. There is a widespread literature dealing with social change and political and economic development. A representative sample of some recent general theoretical works includes the following: Jason Finkle and Richard Gable (eds.), Political Development and Social Change, New York: Wiley, 1966 (a reader that serves as an excellent introduction to the literature); David Apter, The Politics of Modernization, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965; C.E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, New York: Harper 1966 (contains a very useful bibliographical essay); E.E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change, Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey, 1962; Moore, op.cit.; A.F.K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development. New York: Knopf, 1965; and W.W. Rustow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.

7. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Modernization: America vs. Europe," World Politics, vol 18 (April 1966), 378-414, especially 406-7.

8. This typology of patterns of relationships grew out of my interest in communications models of the polity. I am intellectually indebted to a number of sources, including but not limited to the following: Chester Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938; Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1953 and The Nerves of Government, New York: Free Press, 1963; Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, New York: Free Press, 1958, and Lerner and Wilbur Schramm (eds.), Communication and Change in the Developing Countries, Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967; Richard R. Fagen, Politics and Communication, Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1966; and Lucian W. Pye (ed.), Communications and Political Development, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

9. For a study that utilizes clientelism as a key theoretical concept see Jane Catherine Schneider, Patrons and Clients in the Italian Political System, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1965.

10. Unlike totalitarianism, authoritarianism has not received much separate attention as an analytically distinct political concept. See the pioneering work of Juan Linz: "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain", in Erik Allardt and Yrjo Littunen (eds.), Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems, Helsinki: Academic Bookstore, 1964; pp. 291-341; and "Opposition and Control in Authoritarian Regimes: Conceptual and Theoretical Problems," unpublished paper, 1965.
11. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 17-19.
12. Authoritarian political relationships exist in a wide variety of economic and social systems and at many, though not all, levels of modernization. Much of the analysis of these relationships has been carried out by anthropologists. It is important to note that an authoritarian polity, as defined herein, is quite compatible with forms of participatory decision-making at lower levels. Even so, tradition and social pressures are almost universally the principal method of control. For theoretical statements by an anthropologist see Robert Redfield, Peasant Society and Culture and The Little Community, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960. For a survey of relevant anthropological writings on polities see Ronald Cohen and John Middleton (eds.), Comparative Political Systems, Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press, 1967. Most readers dealing with development tap the variety of systems that I have collectively labeled authoritarian; see, for example, Finkle and Gable, op.cit.
13. The impact of rural values on cities is great everywhere as a result of massive rural-urban migration. A contemporary sociological study of an immigrant community in the United States is entitled, significantly, The Urban Villagers (by Herbert J. Gans, New York: Free Press, 1962).
14. This dualism has been commented on by most analysts of development
15. Moore emphasizes the element of coercion that exists, though often masked by societal values, in traditional societies. Op.cit., pp. 453-83. And, of course, so did Marx. What is most interesting from the point of view of this paper is what happens when elite and mass value systems are no longer similar in their justification of the dominance of the elites. Control replaces leadership and exploitation is the name given the function of the elites, which was formerly viewed as beneficent.
16. See Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay", pp. 405-406.

17. For analyses of the meaning of democracy see Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory, New York: Praeger, 1965; and Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956.

18. Samuel H. Barnes, Party Democracy: Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, chapter 13.

19. The crucial importance of structural independence of units in the control of elites is demonstrated by a number of studies, for example, Robert Michels, Political Parties, New York: Dover, 1959; S.M. Lipset, et.al., Union Democracy, Garden City: Doubleday, 1962; and Barnes, Party Democracy.

20. See The Civic Culture, passim; and Samuel H. Barnes, "Participation, Education and Political Competence: Evidence from a Sample of Italian Socialists," APSR, vol. 60 (June, 1966), pp. 348-53.

21. There is a voluminous literature dealing with totalitarian mobilization.

22. It is often pointed out that historical examples suggest that totalitarian modernization is wasteful and inefficient; it is often overlooked that the problem facing many countries is not whether something will be achieved efficiently but rather whether it will be achieved at all.

23. Edward Shils has pointed out why political mobilization is inimical to the toleration of dissent: "An intense politicization is difficult to bring into harmony with civility. Intense politicization is accompanied by the conviction that only those who share one's principles and positions are wholly legitimate members of the polity and that those who do not share them are separated by a steep barrier." "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States," reprinted in Finkle and Gable (eds.), op.cit., p. 355.

24. Phillip Selznick refers to the communist party as The Organizational Weapon, New York: Free Press, 1960. See also Gabriel Almond The Appeals of Communism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954. However, this model of the party is not empirically valid everywhere, as is shown by Sidney Tarrow, "Political Dualism and Italian Communism," APSR, vol. 61 (March 1967), pp. 39-53.

25. See Organski, op.cit., pp. 122-176.

26. Thus group theory is really a description of bargaining in a pluralistic democracy that is primarily socially mobilized, and is inadequate as an explanation of politics in other contexts. Or rather less adequate, as group theory has grave weaknesses even when applied to the United States. Compare, for example, David Truman, The Governmental Process, New York: Knopf, 1951, and Joseph LaPalombara, Interest Groups in Italian Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964.

27. Huntington, "Political Development: Europe vs. America", World Politics, vol. 18 (April 1966), 378-414.

28. "Withinputs" is the usage of David Easton in A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York: Wiley, 1966.

29. Robert Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom have discussed a similar problem as "conflicts between distribution of claims or stabilization, on the one hand, and resource development, on the other." Politics, Economics, and Welfare, New York: Harper, 1963, p. 132.

30. Several studies are important beginnings, especially Moore, op. cit., and Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, The Political Basis of Economic Development, New York: Van Nostrand, 1966; and Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (eds.), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964.

Summary

A simplified typology of patterns of elite-mass relationships is suggested, resting on the limited but crucial variable of mobilization, social and political. The relationship between polity and society affects the patterns of mobilization, which largely determine the structure of consensus and dissent; an analysis of a crude typology of politics - authoritarian, democratic, totalitarian - clarifies this point. In modernization, this relationship becomes even more central; a number of propositions are presented concerning the relations which develop between patterns of mobilization and patterns of consensus and dissent.

Résumé

L'auteur présente une typologie simplifiée des types de rapports entre masses et élites, assise sur une variable limitée mais fondamentale : la mobilisation, sociale et politique. La relation entre système politique et société agit sur les types de mobilisation, qui déterminent dans une large mesure la structure du consensus et des conflits ; l'analyse d'une typologie grossière des sociétés politiques - autoritaire, démocratique, totalitaire - permet de le montrer. Dans le processus de modernisation, cette relation gagne encore en importance ; l'auteur formule un certain nombre de propositions concernant les rapports entre types de mobilisation et types de consensus et de conflits.

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"Consensus and dissent, with special reference  
to the developing countries"

THE EVALUATION OF CONSENSUS AND DISSENT  
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

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## The Evaluation of Consensus and Dissent in Developing Countries

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In this paper, I do not propose to discuss at any length the specific problems of national integration in developing countries, or to evaluate their actual experiences in promoting consensus and discouraging (or controlling) dissent. My main purpose is rather to draw attention to some of the general difficulties we face in locating and analyzing consensus and dissent in these countries. It is hoped that some guidelines, however tentative, will emerge from the discussion.

Both in theoretical and descriptive studies of politics in developing countries, the notion of consensus has enjoyed considerable prominence. This seems to have been the result of one or more of the following assumptions:

- (1) that democracy is good, and that consensus is good for democracy; that a certain degree of consensus is necessary for democracy to work, and that many of the problems faced by democracy in developing countries are attributable to the failure to achieve this.
- (2) that consensus facilitates economic development, even if only by allowing governments to 'get on with the job' instead of wasting their energies on keeping their balance on a political tightrope;
- (3) that consensus produces, and is an indicator of, stability.

Similarly, we have become familiar with certain basic patterns of dissensus which prevail in developing countries, and the forms of dissent which they have tended to provoke. By and large, these are seen to be the results of such things as poor inter-elite and elite-



mass relations, the failure to establish governmental legitimacy and democratic norms, and the existence of an "oppositional mentality" or "anti-government reflex". As a corollary to the assumptions about consensus, they are generally characterized as being bad for democracy and inimical to economic development (often merely by undermining confidence in the regime and by discouraging investment). They are also seen to promote, and reflect, instability.

These views have not been unimportant in influencing our notions of the basic contours of politics in developing countries. Although they are unexceptionable in themselves there is some risk in not proceeding beyond the bald formulation so far attempted. Without labouring the obvious, we must, for a start, at least be aware that not all forms of dissent are bad or unconstructive, and that not all the cleavages which exist in developing countries have contributed to the problems faced by democracy and economic development. The assertion that "cleavage - where it is legitimate - contributes to the integration of societies and organizations"<sup>1</sup> is not without relevance to the actual experience of many developing countries.

Nor can all forms of consensus be expected to promote the three objectives mentioned - democracy, stability and economic development. There may, for instance, be general agreement in a society on the desirability of continuing its feudal structure or of enshrining religious orthodoxy. This agreement could in some ways provide the basis for stability (if only in the short run), but might seriously hamper the prospects of economic development. It could also lead

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<sup>1</sup> Lipset, S.M., Political Man (London, 1960), p. 21.

to an extreme intolerance of deviant views, and thereby balk the interests of democracy.

Judging from the literature, 'consensus' seems to refer to two kinds of agreement: agreement on 'fundamentals' and agreement on 'issues'. The first of these covers a fairly wide range, and appears to include agreement on matters like:<sup>2</sup>

- (1) the 'goals' of the society;
- (2) the 'norms' of political leadership;
- (3) the 'permissible choice of political means'; and
- (4) the 'basic norms about the ways in which differences can be settled.'

But it is not sufficient merely to identify the form of consensus, unless we wish to advocate consensus for its own sake or to assume that consensus must always have desirable consequences. More bluntly, we must be aware that when we talk of 'agreement on fundamentals', we say in fact mean 'the right kind of agreement' on 'the right kinds of fundamentals'. To take the four areas mentioned above, our evaluation of the part played by consensus as one of the essential underpinnings of democracy and economic development may not be the same if we were to find:

- (a) that the goals agreed on were 'bad' by our standards or that, by being vague or idealistic, they were incapable of attainment and hence likely to produce severe frustrations in the future;

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<sup>2</sup> These are all taken from a single source (Pye, L.W. "The Politics of Southeast Asia", in Almond and Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton, 1960, p. 118), but I consider them to be fairly representative.

- (b) that the accepted norms of political leadership were deficient, and unlikely to encourage responsibility;
- (c) that there was general agreement on not seriously limiting the permissible choice of political means; and
- (d) that there were few prescriptions as regards the means of settling differences, and that these means were judged almost entirely by their effectiveness.

Even where there is agreement on principles or fundamentals (e.g. that democracy is the best form of government), it does not always follow that this will be translated into a corresponding agreement on specific propositions that arise from these principles. As far as consensus on issues is concerned, two factors seem to be involved. First, is there general agreement within the polity regarding the relative importance of various issues? Are the same issues recognized by most people as being either important or unimportant, or is the situation one where some sections of the population consider certain issues to be very important while others consider the same issues to be irrelevant to the national interest? Although the recognition of issues as either important or unimportant does not have to imply agreement on these issues or on the kinds of solutions that are desirable, this aspect of consensus can possibly indicate the existence of a common evaluation of national political life and a shared awareness of the problems facing a country.<sup>3</sup> The

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<sup>3</sup> We are, however, still far removed from the situation envisaged by Lipset when he observed: "The more cohesive and stable a democratic system is, the more likely it becomes that all segments of the population will react in the same direction to major stimuli" (Political Man, p. 33. Emphasis added):

second factor involves the intensity of the cleavages which result from certain issues. Its relevance to the problem of consensus is based on the assumption that some differences are particularly difficult of reconciliation and thereby pose special problems for the development of a consensual basis for political activity.

What, then, are the cleavages most commonly experienced by developing countries? A quick inventory would reveal that most of them arise from racial, tribal, linguistic or religious differences, or from conflicts between traditional and modernizing interests and between religious revivalism and the needs of the secular state. The special importance that is often attached to these cleavages arises partly from the fact that collectively they represent one of the commonest features of political life in developing countries, and partly from the intense feelings that they have been known to generate.<sup>4</sup> Given the urgent problems of national unification faced by many of these countries, these cleavages fully merit the close attention they have received. They have exerted a considerable influence on the scope and content of political persuasion, and rendered different sections of the population amenable to different appeals. National

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<sup>4</sup> It is, of course, well known that religion, race and so on can also unify people not only at the national but also at the international level. Pakistan, for example, may have suffered more as a result of its linguistic, regional and other cleavages had it not been for the unifying influence of Islam. Despite their many differences the Arab nations are aware of their common identity as Arabs and Muslims.

The cleavages we are discussing can also be offset by other unifying factors, such as external threat, ideology and even rapid economic progress. At another level, tight political control can compensate for, and be legitimized by, deficiencies in social integration.

loyalties have consequently been difficult to promote because they have had to compete with other, essentially primordial, loyalties.<sup>5</sup> There have also been difficulties in defining national interests, and societies have, in consequence, tended to hold compartmentalised (and conflicting) rather than shared expectations of competitive politics and representative government. The problem has often been exacerbated by the tendency for political parties and pressure groups to reflect the existing cleavages by championing narrow communal interests, and to worsen these cleavages through the intransigent postures which at least some of them have adopted in performing this role.

Owing to the prevalence of the above cleavages, we are sometimes tempted to formulate generalizations about their role in the politics of developing countries. But such generalizations will have to take into account the following two points. First, we should not always expect racial, linguistic and religious rivalries to be of political importance simply because we see different racial, linguistic and religious groups living within the boundaries of the same state. Rather than being the unavoidable products of demographic factors, the cleavages under discussion arise only when the different communities involved regard themselves as being separate in important ways and when the fact of their being separate assumes a political significance. Two communities may differ in religion, language and race, but it is possible that only one or two of these differences (or even none of them) will assume any political significance. Some

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<sup>5</sup> Attempts to promote a single national identity may in fact intensify parochial loyalties by making individual groups more sensitive about their own special identities. The attempt to establish Hindi as the national language clearly produced this result in India.

differences may tend to be vastly overshadowed by others: race relations in the United States, for example, may not have been very different even if there were clear-cut religious differences between the Negroes and the Whites. Similarly, it is conceivable for communal antipathy to be based on economic or 'class' considerations, or to be perpetuated or 'justified' by them, even if other factors were not irrelevant in encouraging it. Thus, although there may admittedly be a relationship between political behaviour (party affiliation, attitudes on various issues, the vote decision and so on) and communal identity, we should not assume that this is automatic. A priori considerations may well be present, but more important are the hopes and fears which each community may have regarding its position vis a vis the others. The second point to bear in mind in making generalizations is that although communalism may be widespread in developing countries, it would be misleading to view it as a single phenomenon with constant characteristics. Of course communally divided societies have certain problems in common, but the precise nature of these problems varies from country to country while arising from the common fact of heterogeneity.

There is yet another observation which needs to be made in this general context. It seems to me that in discussing "religion and politics," "race and politics", "the language issue and politics", and so on, we may get confused as a result of having preconceived ideas about the legitimate boundaries of politics. It is one thing to assert that stability and compromise become difficult when religious, racial and other similar differences constitute an important basis for political identification. But this does not justify the lament, which occasionally accompanies this assertion, that political stability in

certain countries has been jeopardised because 'non-political' issues like religion and race have been allowed to dominate 'politics'.

One can certainly understand, and perhaps even sympathise with, the politician who says "let us not mix religion with politics." Nor are we unduly confused when a politician flatly pronounces: "Race is no longer a political issue in our country and we should not be misled by people who say otherwise". More often than not, such a politician is either making a recommendation (that people should not allow their racial differences to assume any political importance) or attempting to discredit his opponents, who may have used the existing racial differences to political advantage, by showing them to be irresponsible. But students of politics should know better than to make distinctions of this kind between 'politics' and parts of it. A political issue is any issue that has a political significance, and there is no room for distinguishing between 'normal' or 'genuine' political issues and issues which have been allowed to 'cloud' politics. Every issue that has a political bearing is automatically genuine and legitimate, regardless of our possible dismay over its consequences. Thus, when we study the place occupied by religion, race etc. in the politics of a country, it is important that we do so by viewing them as components of the political life of that country rather than as unwelcome intruders whose entry was possible only because of inefficient or dishonest guards at the gates. I am not arguing that politicians cannot, or do not, stir up religious, racial and other sentiments for their own profit and in the process give these sentiments a greater political significance than they may otherwise have had. Of course politicians may succeed in 'creating' the issues on which they hope to thrive, not only by identifying new problems and redefining existing

ones, but also by simplifying or making more explicit the choices before their people. But in the process of inquiring into the origins of political issues we should not form judgements about their legitimacy on the political scene. That would be to misunderstand the nature of politics.

There are good reasons for believing that the cleavages we have been discussing, and the forms of dissent they produce, arise partly from the influence exerted by certain ancillary factors. The most important of these is perhaps the communications network.

Poor communications, whether between different areas of a country, between different communal groups or between the ruling elite and the mass of the population, must have serious implications for the problem of national integration. The mere absence of contact can perpetuate the compartmentalization of a society and possibly heighten the fears, suspicions and misconceptions that may characterise not only inter-group relations but also attitudes towards the functioning of government. It could therefore be argued that for consensus to exist meaningfully at the nation-wide level, it is necessary for the population at large (or even just those whose agreement is taken to reflect consensus) to be aware of the issues on which they agree, and the reasons for their agreement. Presumably this would require some measure of participation in the political process;<sup>6</sup> but on the other hand there is the risk, especially during the early stages of competitive politics, that participation may itself provoke discord, especially if the channels which facilitate it (e.g. political parties) are themselves geared

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<sup>6</sup> At a minimum, this may be represented by nothing more than the existence of a process of political socialization and the population's exposure to it.



to conflict. The point nevertheless holds that the stability which consensus is taken to reflect will be apparent rather than real if the consensus in question involves nothing more than the absence of conflict, and, in this sense, could not be regarded as having 'developed'.

Not all sectors of the communication network, however, can always be expected to encourage the growth of a national consensus. This would be so particularly when the network as a whole is unevenly developed. In some developing countries the main sources of information in the rural areas may well be the local branches of political parties. Parties could, under these circumstances, perform the valuable role of keeping the voters informed about political events, the policies of the government, and the substance of the rivalry between them and other parties. But this channel of communication is bound to be both partisan and highly selective in its role as a conveyor of information; in the absence of other channels (particularly those which are not directly involved in political propaganda) it might therefore damage the growth of consensus by emphasising conflict and by giving people the impression that they are at odds with their political environment. This danger is further enhanced by the fact that there would tend to be a close link between the degree of political competitiveness in a country and the strength of this channel: where competition is keen, there will also be more intensive party activity and hence a greater volume of political propaganda. The emphasis on conflict, rather than consensus, would then be all the greater.

In our attempts to understand and analyse the problems of consensus, we often find it convenient to tune our ears to the voices of dissent. We do this partly because dissent is usually more explicitly articulated, and hence easier to recognize, than 'consensus'. But this

is not merely a device used by the lazy, since the scope and substance of consensus in any given context cannot be fully appreciated unless we also know the anatomy of dissent. It is, however, of great importance that in studying dissent we do not focus all our attention on those who voice it. Ruling parties often play a crucial role, not only by provoking dissent but by attempting to control it.

In ex-colonial territories, the attainment of independence was often accompanied by great optimism about the efficacy of future political activity. The underlying assumption of the nationalist movement was, not unnaturally, that "Once we are fully in control, nobody can stop us from doing what our people have always desired. The people will choose their own leaders, and the welfare of the nation can be promoted without interference and without restraints." In this period of sanguine expectations, there must have been the ever-present temptation for politicians to fantasize their roles as men who would collectively shape the destinies of their people. But the post-independence era has often turned out to be a period of learning that "we" do not all want the same things, and that "we" are committed to different, and often conflicting, goals. For those who inherited power, there has been the additional frustration of having to come to terms with the fact that their people are not always inclined to accept the good intentions of their leaders at face value, and are liable to resist changes even when they are initiated by those who hold their mandate.

Flushed with success and expectant about their power to do good, the ruling groups frequently tended to set about impatiently in their task of bringing about a wholesale and long-awaited transformation of their societies. Many of their societies' sensitive spots were

thus touched all at once,<sup>7</sup> and this in itself made it difficult to contain the sphere of political conflict. New interests began to coalesce and become articulate; the problems of consensus, many of which had been overshadowed by the high hopes which prevailed during the immediate pre-independence period, now began to surface. It is, however, not difficult to understand the reluctance of the ruling groups to attempt piecemeal social engineering: they are impatient that their societies should make up for lost time and in some cases continue to be confident that their people will be obligingly malleable in the right hands. Where appropriate, the further influence of ideological motivations should not be overlooked.

It is not only in the economic sphere that, as Alfred Marshall put it, "wants are related to activities": the political system, just as much as the economic system, is expected not merely to satisfy wants but also to produce them. Given the considerable discrepancy between what their societies are and what they would want them to be, many political leaders in developing countries must find it legitimate and desirable to use their power to establish political systems which will help to change their peoples' expectations. But once the chief concern becomes that of creating rather than satisfying wants, those responsible for governing will have to choose the political structures and policy objectives which they consider most appropriate; and actively propagate the values which they think justify them. For

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<sup>7</sup> These sensitive areas were often closely linked. The drive for economic progress and national unification (often the two main goals), for example, could not but impinge on well established traditional, linguistic, religious, racial and tribal interests. This inevitably broadened the scope and consequences of political decisions, and increased the public's involvement in politics.

tactical reasons they may on occasion find it advantageous not to make their goals too explicit, for fear of provoking opposition to these goals and of making it easier for dissent also to be more explicit and, possibly, more appealing. However, to the extent that social transformation is regarded as the main objective, many of the choices will tend to be made more or less on ideal grounds based on principles which are considered desirable. The problem is that principles are less likely to be pursued (or expounded) in a piecemeal fashion, and those advocating them are often not satisfied with piecemeal acceptance.

But it is one thing for governments to be caught in situations of this kind by being over-zealous or impetuous, and quite another for them to stimulate dissent through their own intolerance or through their unwillingness to isolate the differences between themselves and their opponents. I do not wish to deny the plausibility of the argument that the plight of opposition parties in many developing countries is at least partly the result of their own excesses, both in the claims they voice and in their tendency to dramatize dissent or to be conspiratorial. However, governments can also undermine stability and confidence by failing to distinguish between moderate or well justified opposition, and dissent in its more extreme forms. Being over-sensitive to criticism, they may brand all opposition as irresponsible and be energetic in trying to suppress all their critics. They may also actively propagate (often with the help of the mass media which they control) their own conception of the national consensus, and spare no efforts in condemning their opponents as disruptive men who are outside this consensus and who stand for policies which are harmful, or at least irrelevant, to the national interest. Although not always

explicitly formulated, this conscious propagation of the so-called national consensus must have the obvious (and presumably intended) effect of forcing the opposition to justify its claim as a legitimate participant in the political process. It can also be used to compel those who oppose the regime to make a special case for their right to enjoy democratic privileges: given the odds they sometimes have to contend with, this is not always an easy task. Under these circumstances, dissent as such may lose the viability which it must enjoy in a democratic society, and the proposition that it merits a democratic justification (in that it is implicit in, and can further the interests of, democracy) would become difficult to sustain. As this becomes evident, the more moderate forms of dissent may well be the first to disappear, because their advocates despair more easily, leaving only the extremist forms in the arena. This in itself must contribute to instability, and increase the stakes during elections. The moment governments cease to distinguish between opposition to some of their policies and opposition to all of them (and thereby misrepresent criticisms of individual components of their policy objectives as postures of complete defiance showing a total rejection of their policies), there also arises a failure to distinguish between opposition to the ruling group and opposition to the 'system'. Attempts to replace the existing regime may thus be associated with, as even be portrayed as, subversion.

From the above discussion, it would appear that in characterising a country's politics as 'stable' or 'unstable' we may, in part, be influenced by the relationship which exists between the government and its opponents: more particularly, by whether the opposition considers the rules of competition to be so unfavourable as to be not worth

adhering to. The question is really one of whether optimism (or pessimism) about the existing state of affairs and about the future is more or less evenly distributed among the various contending groups. Should most of the political actors who do not belong to the ruling group feel that they are denied the legitimate means by which to increase, or even to demonstrate, their strength, or feel that the legally prescribed means for doing so are inadequate or unfair, they may be tempted to exploit or create other channels without being too concerned about their legitimacy. By itself, this could indicate the abandonment of the constitutional struggle by the opposition, and reflect instability and a lack of consensus. Of some relevance here is the frequently-noted absence of the 'loyal opposition' in most developing countries. This could be traced to two important factors, both of which discourage responsibility and pragmatism among opposition parties. First, there has been the tendency on the part of governments to exclude their opponents from all decision-making, and thereby to confirm the impression that their own spheres and those of the opposition are mutually exclusive. Second, most opposition parties have not been encouraged by their actual experience to believe that alternations in power can seriously be expected. They therefore do not feel induced to regard themselves realistically as governments-in-the-making.

Opposition to the 'system' and not just to the existing regime is sometimes taken to be an indicator of the absence of consensus. While the reasons for this are not difficult to understand, I have not always felt that the distinction between the 'system' and the 'regime' has been clearly made. I have no wish to become involved here in exploring the possible connotations of the 'system', or to

suggest desirable ways in which it should be defined in this context. Let us, for convenience and for illustration, take 'the system' to mean 'the democratic system of government'. In a situation where the opposition oversteps the limits of democratic competition, what should we make of its 'deviant' behaviour? On the one hand, its actions could indicate the absence of any serious commitment to democracy, and perhaps even its opposition to democratic processes. On the other, we may find that it had been pushed into a hopeless position by being denied normal democratic rights, and that its actions were therefore only the natural (but perhaps unwise) response to a situation where democracy had already been perverted by others. Even if this were to be the case we may detect in the actions of the opposition a lack of confidence in, or commitment to democracy; but we should not always draw this conclusion. The dissent manifested may indeed have symptoms which we normally associate with opposition to the democratic system of government, but may have been aimed at the existing regime rather than at the system it claimed to represent.<sup>8</sup> For the student of politics, the problem of finding a suitable explanation may be made difficult when the regime under observation

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<sup>8</sup> I have no doubt, for example, that many military take-overs have received the wholehearted support of people subscribing to democratic ideals, including those not actively involved in politics. The reasons for this support may admittedly be complex and may include (especially in the case of the political opponents of the deposed regime) an important element of satisfaction at the removal (and even punishment) of the old leaders. Awareness of the autocratic potential of the new (military) regimes may be mitigated by the hope that they would be less corrupt and less purposeful in discriminating against particular groups, and the expectation that they would eventually surrender to civilian rule under conditions which favour fair competition.

gives at least some indication of being democratic, or when it is viewed as a 'good' regime by standards which are not essentially democratic.<sup>9</sup>

From a different point of view, however, the question of assigning blame (for the failure to keep political competition within democratic limits) is only of subsidiary importance. Regardless of the justifications which can be offered on behalf of either the government or the opposition, what is really important is that democracy as an ideal may come to be regarded with increasing cynicism both by those who feel that it gives too many opportunities to political adventurers and even to the enemies of democracy, and by those who find that it is being used as a respectable cover by governments which in practice are autocratic.

Finally, it is obvious that the scope for evaluating consensus and dissent must vary a great deal between competitive and authoritarian political systems. The nature of dissent in any society will be influenced not only by the cleavages within that society but also by the opportunities which exist for organized opposition. Thus, the earlier observation that dissent is usually better articulated and easier to identify may not always be applicable in autocratic or totalitarian regimes. Indeed, manifest political activity in totalitarian systems would tend to be supportive rather than oppositional, because dissent is denied a legitimate status.<sup>10</sup> This, however, is not to say that dissensus must always remain passive and latent; but active

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<sup>9</sup> One may, for example, have sympathy for a regime because it plays a 'commendable' role in world affairs, because it is friendly to one's own country, or because it is fighting a serious battle against (say communist) subversion.

<sup>10</sup> It is by no means curious that public demonstrations in democratic regimes are almost always against the existing ruling groups and their policies, while in totalitarian regimes they are against the enemies of the nation and its ideology.



dissent may tend to be sporadic and violent, or be woven into the conspiratorial activities of clandestine groups. Consensus (or, rather the appearance of consensus), on the other hand, is likely to be on more permanent display. This may partly be due to the fact that groups of various kinds are used for the purpose of demonstrating support and agreement. It would, however, be wrong to conclude that the only consensus which exists in totalitarian systems is a contrived or simulated consensus. The process of political socialization, by being more deliberate and homogeneous and by being more specific in its intentions, would be more likely than its less purposeful counterpart in democracies to instill a genuine enthusiasm among those who support the regime and its values.

Summary

The paper's chief aim is to draw attention to some of the difficulties faced by students of politics in locating and analysing consensus and dissent in developing countries. Consequently, the actual experiences of these countries in promoting national integration and political stability are not given much explicit consideration. An attempt is, however, made to evaluate certain major cleavages and their effects on politics. This is followed by a discussion of some of the manifestations of consensus and dissent.

Résumé

Le rapport cherche à appeler l'attention sur certaines des difficultés rencontrées par les politistes lorsqu'ils tentent de définir et d'analyser consensus et conflits dans les pays en voie de développement. En raison de ces difficultés, l'expérience réelle de ces pays quant à la promotion de l'intégration nationale et de la stabilité politique n'est pas examinée de façon explicite. L'auteur essaie toutefois d'identifier certains grands clivages et de préciser leurs effets sur la vie politique. Le rapport se termine par la discussion de certaines manifestations du consensus et des conflits.

"Consensus and dissent, with special reference  
to the developing countries"

NOTES TOWARDS A STUDY OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION

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## Notes towards a study of political institutionalization

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Political institutionalization is taken here to mean institutional movement, that is to say the movement by formation, or transformation, of political institutions. Political institutions are taken to mean the individual institutions which are a part of, and have a direct effect on, the functioning of the political mechanism of a given society, and by which such a society can be distinguished from other political societies. Finally, institution is taken to mean a specific, regular function in the complex behaviour of a society, once that society has acknowledged the purposes of that function by conferring authority and coercive power upon it. It should be added that the expression 'political institution' obviously refers to two types ; there are on the one hand what might be called the micro-political institutions : the entire range, or configuration of systems of institutions, or structures, grouped together ; representation, oligarchy, separation of powers are such micro-institutions. On the other hand there are micro-institutions, which are more specific, such as parliament, party and ombudsman.

The object of the study proposed here would thus be, on the one hand, to observe as closely as possible the essence and workings of political institutions, as distinct from social or any other kind of institutions. And on the other hand, to study those political institutions which have emerged or are emerging in our time, in one or more polities (either by the invention of new political techniques or by the adaptation to new uses of old ones) and which have changed, or are changing the pattern of relationships between the power holders and society.

Political institutionalization, political development, constitutionalization, and "institutionalizacion".

If the above attempts to define what political institutionalization is, a word may as well be said about what it is not.

First of all, it is not the same thing as political development. Political development has been defined quite elaborately as "a process whose goal is a political system which can provide for the functional requirements of long term persistence... (and) which includes social and economic changes but whose focus is the development of the governmental capacity to direct the course and the site of social and economic change".<sup>(1)</sup> The essential difference between the two concepts is that whereas political development is the purposeful striving towards the building up or the consolidation of a viable and coherent governmental system, political institutionalization is the more haphazard and unguided process of emergence or transformation of specific individual institution, which afterwards influence the political process and coalesce into broader systems of frameworks. In an oversimplified way it could be argued that whereas political development is characteristic of under-developed societies, political institutionalization continues in all kinds of societies.

For the purpose of this study, the concept of political institutionalization can also be contrasted with that of constitutionalization. Political institutionalization does not imply a number of things which are usually implicit in constitutionalization. It does not for instance imply the necessity of the production or elaboration of constitutional provisions or charters, or indeed of codification. More often than not the two go together. But in some cases codification precedes institutionalization; and in other cases institutionalization precedes codification, and it can indeed dispense with it. Secondly, whereas constitutionalization,<sup>(2)</sup> at least in the classical sense given to it in the nineteenth century, implies a further reduction of the power of coercion of the authority and an enlargement of the

freedom of the citizens, political institutionalization can most definitely assert or reassert the power of the government. What the two processes have in common is that both produce more order and reduce arbitrariness. But they can differ insofar as their impact on the relations between rulers and ruled is concerned. A corollary to this is that whereas in many contexts constitutionalization is also taken to mean a better circumscription of the separation of powers, political institutionalization can, on the contrary, show a trend toward the unification of power.

Finally, political institutionalization should be distinguished from institutionalization of a revolution, or in the Mexican word : institucionalización, which means something quite different. Generally speaking one means by this the consolidation or establishment of a set of reforms, or the implementation of the principles, announced at the outset of a revolution. In this general sense it is not too far from constitutionalization, but with the preliminary provisions inscribed in ideological texts, proclamations and constitutions alike. But in a more special sense it evokes the settling down and the routinization of the revolution. (It can also mean the 'step back' of revolutionary impetus. Thus : 'Institutionalizing a revolutionary movement appears to be the most critical phase in the revolutionary transformation of a people. This is a time of lost illusions, the time when the "revolution eats its children" and there is a quiet disclaiming of original revolutionary ideas' <sup>(3)</sup>.) The difference here is that political institutionalization does not apply only to the delayed applicability and realisation of provisions already announced. On the contrary it can be said that the more frequent case here is that in which the institution functions first and is afterwards sanctioned. Moreover political institutionalization is not always linked with the history of a revolution. It consists rather in the steady evolution of the institutions of political life, which continues its course across periods of revolution or of a stability alike, with the difference of rhythm which is natural between such periods.

Autonomy and asynchronism of the micro-political institutions.

It has been seen earlier in this text that micro-political institutions, as they form whole systems or frameworks or configurations, can not be easily separated from their background, and are less easily detached from the other, social, economic or other institutions, together with which they form that background. The institutions thus grouped are best seen as articulations of the coherent whole and would lose their character without its context.

But the micro-institutions observed as such are bound to reveal more autonomy and asynchronism. They live a life of their own outside the systems and frameworks and some survive several such systems. Political science does not lose sight of institutions other than those which under common names or broad definitions are believed to belong to this or that configuration. There are national, and there are regional forms. And there are transitional forms which may be not only more specific and more original than the 'micro-institution' typical of a system, but which indeed may be discovered afterwards to have been the origin of a new type of institution, and which if they endured, or if they spread, might well invalidate the main definition of the system which they allegedly characterize. Micro, or embryo institutions of systems which failed to materialize, or which have been lumped together in constitutional or social studies, clutter the graveyards of political history, unstudied and unknown.

We now have some appreciation of the impoverishment of political studies caused by the sweeping generalizations of ideologists and constitutionalists, and to a lesser extent of historians, on the political history of the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries in Europe and America. The fact that we turn with a revived interest to the study of, for instance, the Swedish Riksdag, the French Etats, the Swiss Gemeinde, the Liberum Veto, the States General of the

United Provinces, the Massachusetts constitution of 1780, or, from a different and more recent point of view, the French commune of 1870 illustrates the interest aroused by those only relatively stabilized patterns of power.

From this point of view, students of politics in the post war world face a double problem. They are more anxious than their predecessors to draw universally valid conclusions from the political information available. But they are aware that if their methods are too procrustean they will run the risk of overlooking essential differences, characteristic features, and specific symptoms of the different cultures, or even of the same cultures in constant change and evolution. Moreover, there is the additional danger of confusing cause and effect, original traits and their reproduction, the mutual influences between one kind of regime and another.

Indeed, whereas the political world after the first world war was characterized by the growing division between regimes attached to, or claiming to be attached to one or another groups of ideologies, the present age is one of willing or unwilling, conscious or unconscious interpenetration and mutual influencing of doctrines and methods. The spread of literacy, the extension of industrialization, the universalization of communications and the increase in the number of independent polities are responsible for this intensified political exchange. But at the same time most political regimes have their own specific and original characteristics. In the case of the "new states", the quest for originality and authenticity has been quite deliberate. Independence from political influences was to go together with independence from ideological influences.

In both the old and new states of the post second world war there has been a tremendous proliferation of political institutions. Some have developed within what used to be known as the 'blocs', in which the 'Western democracies' or the



"Eastern Communist States" each followed their own formulations. Some have arisen within the 'Third World' in which each nation attempted to define its own political principle. In this kind of race for purposiveness and originality numerous institutions appeared, survived, or disappeared again in rapid succession. The ideologists of these politics were expected to devise institutions which would on the one hand correspond as closely as possible to the needs and traditions of the nation concerned, and on the other would present a model to be followed by other politics. Political imagination ran riot in the 1940s and 1950s as it had in the 1780s and 1790s.

But for that very reason, many of these institutions could not form a lasting system, and they could best be observed as individual institutions, in their limited originality. Many of them were not, and could not be, born as a result of the slow adaptation of society to economic and technical evolution. They were born as the result of a deliberate, rational quest. Some remain; others have deteriorated and lost their significance; others have faded away; others are still emerging. But if the student of politics can find some genuine specimen, then it is worth his while to study all the various means of institutionalization. It is also fair to remark that the study of these asynchronic institutions should be also asynchronic. The search in the past for the forgotten or ignored specimen should embrace also the old - institutions alleged to have served as models : zadruga, panchayats or ujama. But this should go together with the quest in the future for yet undetected ones. <sup>(5)</sup>

#### Four examples of contemporary political institutionalization

There are by and large four main processes of political institutionalization taking place in the several parts of the world (and within them in practically all the politics they comprise). First there is the new institutionalization which is occurring in the western democracies arising from the adaptation of their political institutions to planning. Secondly, there is

the process going on in the communist countries which can be described as including re- and dis-institutionalization. The third process is the variegated institutionalization in the new states. And the fourth is the institutionalization taking place at the continental level of federal or quasi-federal new structures.

In the four examples which follow what is sought is to show the direct effect which the various processes of institutionalization have on the main patterns of political power in the different societies in which they are taking place.

A - Some political effects of the institutionalization of planning.

This is a vast example, and one of the best studied.<sup>(6)</sup>

The political operation of planning consists in bringing together in close collaboration, and by means of the services of teams of experts, of the government, the employers (private enterprises and corporations) and the producer-workers (industrial and agricultural). This is effected increasingly by established procedures of consultation and coordination. Committees, councils, commissions, all kinds of consultative organisms are being set up to check and coordinate the long term aims of industrial societies. This, however, also implies the establishment of a new network of political channels, at first complementing, but inevitably to some extent superseding the parliamentary channels of consultation in a democracy.

Such a supplementary expansion of governmental consensus affects parliament in two ways : first, it curtails the actual volume of parliamentary deliberation. The broad considerations and the ultimate decisions will still lie within parliament's exclusive competence. But in spite of the proliferation of its own preparatory commissions and committees, the actual material for discussion submitted to parliament is itself already the outcome of the preliminary consultation undertaken by the new non-parliamentary organs of the government. As a result, the

representatives in parliament of those interests which have already been consulted are already committed to certain policies which they have agreed upon. Secondly, and as a consequence of the above, the opposition is deprived of its spontaneity of action by the government's independent creation of consensus. The attitudes of opposition political parties in these conditions are also pre-conditioned by the attitudes already taken up, in the preliminary consultations, by the social and economic groups, whose political representatives the political parties are meant to be by tradition and organization. There is thus a change in the nature of the political intercourse and the new consensus brought about by the spreading of planning is responsible for the emergence of an entirely different pattern of power.

This is why the study of the new institutionalization should start with a thorough comparative examination of the amount of power allotted to the institution of planning in the various planning countries.

B - Institutionalization in communist states.

In the European communist states the process of institutionalization is going on actively (in contrast with communist China, in which efforts are being made to keep the revolution alive and to prevent it from being overlaid by state structures and bureaucratization). One cause of this trend must be found in the growing pressure of public opinion for an end to the arbitrariness which is now generally described as "Stalinism". As public opinion begins to re-form, new leading social groups demand the establishment of norms of behaviour and procedures of control binding on the organs of authority. Thus what public opinion is pressing for is institutional order, even if limited and circumscribed as it would be for instance under the label of 'socialist legality'. But a closer look at institutionalization in the European communist states suggests that what is happening there could be better described as either dis-institutionalization, or re-institutionalization.

The political doctrine of communism is founded on the assertion that once common ownership is established self-administration is to take the place of political competition, and direct management by the people replaces representation. Thus the old state, many of whose institutions were destroyed by the revolution, should itself naturally dissolve as society proceeds on its way towards total dis-institutionalization. According to communist theory, the moment when this dis-institutionalization begins in earnest arises when the society concerned enters the phase of socialism, i.e. when the transitional dictatorship of the proletariat is dismantled. The state, the remnants of former institutions and the existing ones, even the party, are expected to wither away. The uninstitutional, spontaneous administration by the people should start up within the communes, peoples' councils and peoples' assemblies set up by the revolution. Thus, although a new organization is being created, the essence of the change is that disinterested spontaneity should replace the intricate mechanisms by which previous social and political forms contained the conflicts of interests. The entire administration will eventually be reduced to the spontaneous participation of all. A double operation is therefore essential : total participation must be obtained; and all former checks and balances must be removed. Both in Russia, and in Yugoslavia, it is claimed that this stage is now being reached. Yet the state and the party will continue to exist for a long time, and the new, direct administration is expected to coexist indefinitely with the institutions of the state and the party.

Thus, the second process, which runs completely counter to the one described above, is what it is proposed here to call re-institutionalization. The socialist states have now entered the more stabilized economic period which follows on the period of overall industrialization, and in which the aim is no longer merely growth, but productivity. Parallel, as for instance in Yugoslavia, to the urge to de-institutionalize and to set in

motion as quickly as possible the new forms of social organization, there occurs an inevitable flow of political life into the older, traditional political institutions.

The re-emerging political process seems inevitably to reproduce some of the old patterns of political pluralism. Thus in most of these states there is a notable trend towards a revival of the judiciary and the legislative at the expense of the all-embracing executive, towards a definition of their respective spheres, and some degree of separation of powers. Constitutional courts and parliaments have shown a new activity. Improved means of representation are sought, for indeed representation is the pivot of the new political doctrine and practice in these states. Electoral laws are drafted and debated. Regular procedures of rotation are attempted in order to ensure a constant change of political personnel. This re-institutionalization leads to the formation of entirely new patterns of political relations.

#### C - Institutionalization of political dissent in the Third World.

Political life in the states of Latin America, Asia and Africa is characterized by a constant search for authenticity and a perpetual state of ebullition. So rapid is the rhythm of political action, and so frequent are the changes of government, constitution, and institutions, that there is a proportionally high output of political ideas and theories. Many of these changes arise from the deep-rooted desire of the political elites in these countries to discover, or re-discover, original and specific institutions of their own political culture, which should also be in theory at least, fitting instruments for the mobilization and modernization of the societies.

Many experiments have been made in these states, which even if they have not survived in the country in which they originated, and even if they remained façade-institutions, may nevertheless contain sufficient elements of viability in other settings and circumstances.

To take as an example only one very limited sector of the progress of political institutionalization, that of the articulation of organized political dissent, before, or in the absence of the functioning of a political opposition. Mexico, Tanzania and Pakistan have all experimented with some specific institutions in this field, which, whatever their ultimate value, and in whatever way they actually function in the countries concerned, are sufficiently ingenious to deserve further study. Indeed they deserve to be studied per se as original additions to the long historical roll of institutions which play an intermediary role in political societies on the way to, or as yet unable to achieve, an established parliamentary opposition.

The institutions referred to specifically here are the three sectors which have been created within the Partido Revolucionario Institucional of Mexico : the CIM of the workers; the CNC of the peasants; and the CNOP of the intelligentsia. Each of the three sectors, with its own separate organization and, if the expression can be used in this context, representation, has an independent organization; and these sectors are interlocked with the apparatus of the Party at the different levels of organization. In plainer political terms, this amounts to the institutionalization of permanent internal factions. In turn, these factions are more easily sub-divided into factions within themselves, as for instance the majority faction and the left faction (CROC) of the CIM.

In Pakistan, the institution of "Basic Democracies" introduced in October 1959, is a theoretical attempt to combine new forms of representation (the Union Councils are in many ways reminiscent of the old British parish councils) with the maintenance of a central, unified organism of political leadership and national mobilization. The councils are both deliberative and executive, and at the superior levels, the District Councils are in effect, or at any rate should be, the Pakistani version of local government. Again, in theory at least, the councils represent an attempt to allow the individual representative to make

up his own mind and form his own judgment on national and local issues, without the alleged interference of the political party machines and of the electoral organizations which, in countries with an insufficiently mature political personnel, may exert too strong a pressure on the individual members. Finally the Basic Democracies have been portrayed as modern versions of the old Islamic panchayats which were at the roots of the original native political culture of "counsel without parties or factions".

In Tanzania new procedures were institutionalized in 1965. The single party, TANU, presents rival candidates at elections and is pledged to employ a different personnel in party and state organs. This system is presented as a form of competition and basic separation of attributions within the framework of the one party state.

Further attempts could be made to assess whether such institutions are viable and enduring in certain types of political societies, or whether they should be regarded only, in general, as transitional stages in the evolution towards the establishment of pluripartism within a full parliamentary regime - regardless of whether this stage can or cannot be reached sooner or later or ever in the political society concerned.

#### D - Institutionalization at the continental level.

The new European institutions have been closely studied by many scholars and organizations. Moreover it can be argued that in this particular case the institutions themselves are studied more carefully than the political process which they must inevitably engender. Yet here, too, more recent studies of the decision-making process in the communities, and of the oppositional participation of social, economic and political groups in the communities, have successfully broken new ground. But it is generally admitted that political studies still lag behind in this field <sup>(7)</sup> and that much more remains to be done if the functioning of the European institutions is to be incor-

porated in the straightforward study of political science. Moreover European institutionalization is just beginning and can thus be studied with the close attention it deserves.

In guise of conclusions

These notes, and the study which they might herald, can be of use only if they are kept within the no-man's land of study to be found on the border line between constitutional studies and comparative specially political studies, especially system-analysis. Both these categories of studies flourish in our days perhaps more than ever before. But in between them there is a composite subject-matter, which, precisely because it is composite, and because it is at the border-line, is insufficiently explored from either side. That is, as these notes have attempted to show, the study of the effect of political changes on individual institutions, and of institutional movement on the political process. 'Les institutions', Benjamin Constant, used to say, 'doivent, quoi qu'on fasse, être en proportion avec les idées'.<sup>(8)</sup>

What is suggested here is that ideas too, our contemporary political ideas, should be in proportion with the institutions.



NOTES

1. Karl von Vorys "Towards a concept of political development" in New nations : the problem of political development. The Annals, Philadelphia, 1967.
2. "Il y a longtemps que j'ai dit qu'une constitution étant la garantie de la liberté d'un peuple, tout ce qui tenait à la liberté était constitutionnel, mais que rien n'était constitutionnel de ce qui n'y tenait pas". Benjamin Constant, Principes de Politique, Paris, 1815.
3. Veljko Rus, "Institutionalization of the revolutionary movement" in Praxis, Belgrade, 2, 1967.
4. 'Aucune institution politique ne porte en elle-même sa propre signification. Elle ne peut être jugée qu'à condition de la situer dans le régime où elle est appelée à jouer'. Maurice Duverger, Sociologie politique, p. 122, Paris, 1966.
5. Political science might be now in the position of following in advance the trends of political institutionalization, by keeping in step with the progress of forecast studies and of the new intellectual technology (decision theory, linear programming and cybernetics). Most long range forecasting studies agree that the four major future developments will probably be : the growth of population, the expansion of automation, the conquest of space and the search for the prevention of war. Each and all of these trends, as well as some others, are bound to influence the evolution of political societies in a manner varying from the structural modifications which they will have to bring about within each national sovereign state, to the major changes they will produce in the concept of sovereignty itself. Old institutions will be adapted; and new ones will appear in the intensified process of political institutionalization thus generated.
6. It is of course the case that the principal organs set up in Britain and France for instance (The National Economic Development Council, the Prices, and Incomes Board, the Department of Economic Affairs, and the Commissariat au Plan and the Conseil Economique et Social) have been amply studied. And though it may be recognized that French planning is both more advanced and more successful than British, yet it must be admitted that in both countries, the building up of the new structures and the transformation of the old ones which this presupposes have only just begun. The process will go deeper and spread more widely as the new social and economic activities progress, and the initial core of the new administrative units will expand accordingly.
7. See a summary of the situation by Roy Pryce in Government and Opposition, II, n° 3, April 1967.
8. Cours de politique constitutionnelle, Paris, 1819, Tome I, p. 142.

Summary

The object of the study proposed here would be on the one hand to observe as closely as possible the essence and working of political institutions as distinct from social or any other kind of institutions; on the other hand, to study those political institutions which have emerged or are emerging in our time and which have changed or are changing the pattern of relationships between the power holders and society. The notes stress the autonomy and asynchronism of the micro-political institutions. It also singles out four examples of contemporary political institutionalization : those of European integration and of planning in Western Europe, those of des- and re-institutionalization in the communist states and those of institutionalization of political dissent in the Third World.

Résumé

L'auteur propose d'une part d'examiner d'aussi près que possible l'essence et le fonctionnement des institutions politiques dans ce qu'elles ont de distinct des institutions sociales ou autres, et d'autre part d'étudier les institutions politiques apparues ou qui apparaissent à notre époque, et qui ont modifié ou modifient la structure des rapports entre les détenteurs du pouvoir et la société. La note insiste sur le caractère autonome et asynchrone des institutions micro-politiques. A titre d'exemple, elle décrit quatre cas d'institutionnalisation politique contemporaine : l'intégration européenne, la planification en Europe occidentale, la désinstitutionnalisation et la ré-institutionnalisation dans les pays communistes, l'institutionnalisation des désaccords dans le Tiers-monde.

Br/Consensus/5

"Consensus and dissent, with special reference  
to the developing countries"

IDEOLOGY IN NEW STATES : END OR BEGINNING ?

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## Ideology in New States : End or Beginning ?

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### I Introduction.

This brief paper, hastily prepared, is based on the findings of several previous empirical studies undertaken by the author dealing with ideological developments in the Middle East.<sup>1</sup> It relies also on a number of works examining the ideology of the Balkan countries before W.W. II, as well as on a variety of studies dealing with ideology in general and the political thought in the new nations in particular.<sup>2</sup> From a conceptual viewpoint the paper benefitted from Robert Dahl's, and especially Edward Shils' paper on consensus submitted to this meeting:

The scope of the term "ideology" used in this paper is a broad one since it tends to include political beliefs and social values likely to affect the thought process in the new nations. We have taken due account of various definitions of ideology ranging from the one in Webster's dictionary to the elaborate ones by L.H. Ganstin, Talcott Parsons, and naturally of K. Mannheim, but did not abide by any of them exclusively. These definitions, based largely on the political and social experience of the West failed, it seems to us, to explain adequately the birth cause, and especially the function of ideology in new nations. The more recent studies, though full of insight and knowledge, seem often to succumb to the author's views on foreign policy or his total commitment to uphold the virtues of liberal democracy and economy. In other words, these prior commitments, whatever their motives, often prevent the student of new nations from seeing the ideology in the third world within its own functional context. The ideological writings in the Middle East in particular have often been dismissed as being

"intellectually inadequate" or lacking substance even though these ideologies provided the justification for revolutions, change of regimes and radical economic policies in the region.

The different views on, and expectations from ideology is vividly dramatized on one hand by the dim opinion of some Western scholars (end of ideology school) who see ideology as impediment to rational social science and even economic development, and on the other, by the enthusiasm and predilection for ideology among intellectuals and leaders in new nations. "Today we should be determined on an ideological transformation" declared President Nasser of UAR in 1962. "Ideological transformation creates a driving individual. Everyone should consider himself responsible, the hopes that were achieved must be consolidated. ... For this purpose all efforts, all people and all qualifications (capabilities) should be mobilized".<sup>3</sup> Raul S. Manglapus, a Philippine senator, wrote: "But, it will be asked, what need is there of ideology? Did not pragmatism cure the ills of America?.... It is up to the Americans to draw the ideological possibilities out of their pragmatic experience but an Asian is perhaps entitled to a few expressions of hope. He hopes that the beacon will show the way to a sustained social revolution that will lift men to a level where they may begin to enjoy the freedom and the privilege to be spontaneous."<sup>4</sup> An immediate explanation for the apathy of some Western, and notably American scholars towards ideology, as C.B. Macpherson pointed out, may be the fact that their views were colored by their brand of liberalism permeated by possessive individualism, and be a view of society as a series of market relations among free individuals; the essence of freedom in this system being the lack of restriction from anything but self interested contractual relations.<sup>5</sup>

Consequently we have found it necessary to deal briefly with the problem of consensus and the theory of knowledge in the West in order to understand better the causes of ideological upsurge in the new nations. This upsurge seems to be rooted in political causes, namely the establishment of a modern political system, and is geared to serving its needs.

Consequently we would define tentatively ideology in the new nations as a body of ideas born from the special circumstances of the new nations, which are used to mobilize and reorganize society into a state, and to disseminate a modern political culture.

## 2. Ideology and Consent in the New Nations

Ideology in the new nations falls in the broader score of consent and dissent. Consensus has been defined (by Edward Shils in the present paper and his article on the subject in the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences) as being a condition of agreement among a large proportion of the adult members of society, especially those influencing decision making, with regard to the allocation of authority, status, rights, wealth and income and other important and scarce values about which conflict may occur. These members having affinity with each other would agree to accept the decision about these issues, and the range of disagreement. The above views presuppose the existence of a social and political system where the level of demands and functions, as well as the decision making process have reached an advanced degree of differentiation. They presuppose, moreover, the existence of a political culture and of individuals endowed with the necessary intellectual qualities capable of visualizing consensus and dissent in the same manner as in the developed political systems.

The affinity among members of society, sought by Shils, must be, at least to some degree a political affinity, since a mere religious, ethnic affinity could hardly suffice to produce a degree of consensus when faced with dissent provoking political decisions of the ruling body. The conditions for an ideal process of consent and dissent are either in the incept phase or do not exist at all in most of the developing nations. However, one may say that a rational, secular and politically orientated area or "modern" type of consensus is being created in the new nations within and around the political institutions of statehood. It seems to us that consent and dissent in new nations may be appraised better if envisaged as operating on two levels. The first level, which we shall call "traditional" for the sake of convenience, operates not on national but local or regional group basis and is largely apolitical. It is undifferentiated, prescriptive, and the agents of decision making have limited knowledge and ability to manipulate the political means in order to attain predetermined ends. The old imperial systems, despite their political propensity in a few fields (bureaucratic organization) were lacking the ability to manipulate power to reorganize and change fundamentally their society.<sup>6</sup> Even the empires with universal religious foundations lacked the institutions necessary to achieve wide consensus in politically differentiated fields. For instance, the theory of Caliphate in Islam established in the course of centuries a degree of consensus concerning the authority of the Caliph, the head of the Muslim community, but failed to regulate dissent concerning the same authority. Thus, while the consensus to obey this authority was secured on the basis of Koran and Sunna there was no institution (agreement) as how dissent concerning that authority could be regulated.

Hence, there resulted in the old Islam endless revolutions and disturbances. In the ultimate analysis the cause of these revolutions appearing outwardly as disagreement over the interpretation of some religious precept, actually expressed the failure of the system to manipulate political power for internal change and adjustment. This failure to regulate dissent stemmed from the fundamental belief that all dissent from the established religious-political system was opposition to God's will.

Consensus in matters of faith was reached through the ijma, that is the communal consensus. It was not expressed by the community as a whole but by the mujtahid, usually the ulema or scholars of law, who had a right, on the virtue of their knowledge, to form a judgment on matters of faith. Their judgment was deemed to represent the opinion of the entire community. Though the ijma was formally confined to religious doctrine in practice it could be used for wider purposes but always under religious legitimization. Thus, the consensual system in the old Muslim society was based on religion and could not therefore cope with problems of allocation of authority born from the existential needs of an ever changing society. Yet, despite the political and social changes occurring in the last century, segments of the Middle Eastern society like all other developing societies have retained in various degrees the "traditional" process of consensus.

Today the situation can be epitomized in a very simple practical question: how can a modern leader secure political agreement from a group whose view on consent is regulated by religious norms? The spread of education, industrialization can in the long run, bring some unity of view among these groups but could hardly institute overnight a new system of agreement.



The second level or area of consent (and dissent) in new nations develops around the institutions and processes associated with the establishment and function of the modern state. This is essentially a political process and is bound to color all the emerging relations, hence consent and dissent, with its own political spirit. It seems to us that the political organizations, notably the political party, is the main apparatus in which a new politically oriented system of consent and dissent is shaped. Ideology in turn, which is instrumental in the formation of parties in new nations, plays a vital part in establishing this new, that is political, arena of agreement around the modern state. Recep Peker, the Secretary General of the Republican Party during Turkey's one-party rule, was referring to the need for such an agreement when he defined the political party "as an assembly of individuals who hold similar views as to the administration of the state.... who have to trust each other and believe in each other in order to materialize their views regarding the policy of the government."

The intelligentsia, military and the bureaucracy play an essential role in establishing this new arena of consensus because of their special philosophy and upbringing, and especially their association with the modern state. Otherwise how would one explain the fact that some of the most conservative and even reactionary individuals in new nations have received as good a modern education if not better, than the "progressives" in power? The common viewpoint among the modern intelligentsia, regardless of their ideological differences, is the belief in the efficacy of political action. Political modernity calls for the "politicianization"

of all spheres of human activities and this depends on the existence of a modern political system, the modern state which decides in turn, the place and function of other systems likely to exist in a society.<sup>7</sup>

The small group of decision makers in the new states do establish among themselves the rules of agreement and occasionally of dissent, with the expectation that the rest of the citizens would conform to them. The scope of participation in decision making is not based on the abstract notion of individual will but the citizens' willingness and capability to accept the modern state and all that it stands for. If agreement on the latter issue is established then the terms of participation may be liberalized, provided that sufficient integration has been achieved and the new political (national) identity has emerged. The question of how to allocate authority, wealth and income is subordinated in the initial stages of statehood to the more fundamental need to create the economic, social and cultural foundations necessary to assure the survival of the system. These foundations in turn broaden and consolidate the arena of a "modern" system of consensus. All these are achieved through the manipulation of power. The vital problem, a fascinating one from the social scientist's viewpoint, is the manner in which the "traditional" concepts of consent and dissent are superseded or incorporated, as the case may be, into the modern one. I do not believe that the "traditional" and "modern" spheres of agreement and especially the methods used to achieve agreement and regulate dissent in each one of them are in perpetual conflict. Much depends on the actors' ability to find common points among the two so as to legitimize the goals as well as their own roles accordingly. For instance, the ijma or consensus forming institutions of Islam mentioned before, has undergone some subtle transformation in the modern Middle East. The intelligentsia has replaced

the ancient ulema as consensual agents but has preserved in large measure the idea that their opinion represented the wish of the community or the modern nation. Ataturk of Turkey claimed that his reforms were carried out step by step following the wishes of the nation as he sensed them. He described the modern reforms as representing a collective desire. Nasser of Egypt stated clearly that the duty of the intelligentsia was to "build a mighty structure for their homeland... direct their country towards a specific goal... by gain(ing) insight into the people's hopes and aspirations."<sup>8</sup> However, the legitimization of intelligentsia's power on the basis of the modern state and the nation and its modernistic secular goals has found limited acceptance, not only among the citizens at large but the intelligentsia itself. The failure resulted not from inherent opposition to the modern political system but inability to link the symbols and concepts rooted in the people's psychology and culture with the modern system. To large extent ideology plays a unique role in trying to establish a harmonious functional relationship among the culture symbols and values of the native society and the aspirations embodied in the state. The political system which has a supreme deciding position in the new nations may gradually convert, transform, persuade, absorb or liquidate (if not reconcilable) other groups and values in such a way as to enhance its own development. In doing so it broadens consistently the new sphere of consensus and may eventually establish the rules of dissent. The full emergence of an integrated nation ( a nation created by the state and not vice-versa) aware of its identity is the major foundation on which a truly modern process of agreement and dissent may occur. Ideology, in the broadest sense plays a crucial part in the establishment of the modern political system symbolized by the national state, in the creation of its political culture, new values, and whatever reconciliation

between "old" and "new" may be achieved. It is present throughout all stages of nation formation as a mobilizing instrument. In fact ideology is the founding bloc of the "political religion" in the new states, as David Apter called it,<sup>9</sup> and the justifying argument upholding the supremacy of the political system and the political consensus it represents.

3. The theory of knowledge and ideology in new nations.

Ideology may be viewed in relation to the theory of knowledge, its content and its function in order to appraise better the ideological upsurge in new nations.

- A. It seems to us that Max Weber and especially Karl Mannheim demonstrated the social origin of ideas and the role of ideologies largely in the context of Western political experience. They took for granted the existence of (a) a secular scientific mode of thought, (b) a well developed and fully integrated modern political system of (national state) and (c) a society made up of social classes conscious of their interest. It is true that Max Weber's study of other societies (e.g. Chinese intelligentsia) and of the genesis of social classes, as well as Mannheim's analysis of chiliasm provide occasionally excellent new insights into the political and thought process in general. But their views on ideology, especially Mannheim's, who regarded ideology as being incongruous with reality and as consisting of situationally transcendent ideas which never succeeded de facto,<sup>10</sup> are at odds with the constitutive function played by ideology in new nations. A brief analysis of the points (a)-(b)-(c) above may spell out the birth causes and function of ideology in new nations.

Reinhard Bendix has pointed out rightly that the Age of Ideology in the West began when critical questions were raised regarding man's ability to reason and to define and to realize the ends of his action.<sup>11</sup>

Francis Bacon's Novum Organum undermined scholasticism and opened the way to free observation and eventually to a rational science of society. This revolution of enlightenment occurs in most of the developing nations now, together with political social and economic change, and is to large extent generated and supported by the political system. Ideology is both, the result of this politically induced enlightenment and the vehicle for generalizing the idea that man has the ability to determine and achieve the ends of his action and the very organization of his society. Max Weber (and Mannheim) referred to the same problem in mentioning the "philosophy of consciousness" and a world that exists with reference to the knowing mind, as being the historical steps leading to the development of ideology in the West. "Consciousness" according to Weber expanded and incorporated the "folk spirit". Later the folk spirit became nationally and then socially differentiated and, thus, "class" substituted for "folk" and "ideology" for "spirit".

Mannheim regarded the emergence of social classes as an inevitable result of social differentiation. The developing nations, however, as will be mentioned later, seem to aim towards a classless society. In any case ideology in new nations is not the result of class consciousness but of man's newly gained belief to master his destiny and prevail over the physical environment.

Modern nations and statehood in Europe developed as is too well know, through a gradual process of social, economic and cultural growth and interaction. The European nations never experienced the impact of that complex process defined as the "colonial situation" by G. Balandier; a situation which generated most of today's new nations. Many of the new nations achieved independence through international action and the pressure of world wide ideological forces which facilitated the rise of internal movements of national liberation. Independence and statehood came before there was a

nation, a national culture and identity. These birth circumstances are reflected in the tendency of new nations to rely heavily upon world opinion, and to organize themselves for action in international bodies. They used ideology not only to secure a common line of action among themselves but also to propagate their ideology elsewhere in the world.

The state uses sovereignty and international recognition to consolidate its power at home. The new states, especially those of Africa, became better known abroad before the citizen at home was made aware of his new political identity. The international recognition facilitates the state's task in integrating the population into the system and in developing a national identity, unity and a political culture. The state assumes also wide responsibilities in the economic field. Thus the colonial background, the role of international community, as well as the task of developing rapidly a modern political system places the states in the new nations in a situation different from the European ones.

It is obvious that ideology is bound to have a different function in the new states. It is the formative element of modern nationhood rather than a weapon of class warfare as was the case during Max Weber and Karl Mannheim's life.

The cardinal point in Mannheim's thought is the acceptance of well established and politically conscious interest oriented social classes. (The "end of ideology" school goes one step further to claim that "class society has been superseded by "mass" society, and, that USA never knew classes as did Europe-) Well differentiated classes do not exist for the most part in the new nations. These nations lack the industrial and economic foundations, the liberal philosophy and the belief in the sanctity of private property, and confidence in the creative genius of the private

entrepreneur, all of which if present may facilitate the formation of a class society similar to that of the West. Leaders in many developing nations have rejected the idea of class society, often by condemning capitalism, and did not hesitate to annihilate based on ideological arguments, the capitalist groups. Some leaders, such as L.S. Senghor of Senegal spoke about a "community society" based on the activity of the group. The Arabs spoke about a cooperative socialism. "For Arabs" declared the editor of al-Ahram, the spokesman for the UAR government "it is a question of eliminating the contradictions between classes within a framework of national unity... while society evolves to form only one class in which each member occupies a place commensurate with his work without the impediment of any class barrier".<sup>12</sup> It may be possible for some new nations to go from a communal type of organization to a mass society of its own kind without experiencing the stage of class society. Socialism in new nations appears therefore not only as the ideology of economic sufficiency but also as the justification for "community society". Thus, the views held by Mannheim and many of his contemporary followers that ideology is intimately linked to the class organization of society and to economic conflicts stemming from it have no corresponding ground in the new nations. True, economic cultural political factors in ideal conditions similar to those prevailing in Europe in the past may produce a class society akin to that of the West. For the time being, however, the new nations seem to follow their own distinct pattern of development and nation formation.

In view of what has been said above the interest (reductionist, advantage) theory of knowledge which is at the basis of Mannheim's views

and of his school (including some apologists for end of ideology) has little relevance in the new nations. I believe that the failure to recognize the formative political function of ideology in its developmental context in the new nations has led many apologists for the "end of ideology," especially the sociologists, to fairly impressionistic conclusions.

Daniel Bell, for instance, while deploring the "uncritical application of ambient ideas, from European sociology to the vastly different experiences of American life" express bewilderment but does not explain the reason for which "the rising states of Asia and Africa are fashioning new ideologies with a different appeal for their own people"<sup>13</sup> It seems to us that Daniel Bell and other scholars of the "end of ideology" school formulated their views within the limits of the theory of interest.

They saw social tensions as the expression of unfulfilled expectations. The capacity of the social order to satisfy the demands for higher living standards and social mobility would lead in their views to the exhaustion of political ideas. Obviously, such factors account little for the ideological ferment in the new nations. The strains theory based on Durkheim's idea of anomy caused by social and cultural dislocation can be used partly to explain the rise of ideology in new nations.

It is interesting to note that the early social and political thinkers in the Middle East, Ziya Gokalp (Turk), Muhammad Abduh, Ali Abd Razing (Arabs) relied heavily on Durkheim in explaining the cultural dislocation of their societies and in proposing remedial action.

The strains theory points out to the motives, the psychological effects of dislocation but does not provide a plan of action as is the case of ideology in the nations.



Actually the logical conclusion one would draw from the strains theory is the restoration of social balance. This view would result in political conservatism as was the case with Gokalp and Abduh. Indeed, the cathartic (safety valve to drain tension) morale and solidarity building and advocacy (articulation of the strain forcing it into public notice) functions of the strains theory, even if broadened with the idea of "symbolic formulation" proposed by C. Geertz cannot explain fully the birth, as well as the dynamic and overwhelming political role of ideology in the new states. (Geertz, however, does provide excellent insights into the power of ideology to arouse feelings and following).<sup>14</sup>

Thus the two main branches of the theory of knowledge fail to encompass and explain satisfactorily the birth conditions and functions of ideology in new nations. Based on sociological and philosophical assumptions their disciples consider the political system as derivative, and thus fail to acknowledge the constituent and creative force of politics. Indeed, the major criticism of the "end of ideology" and implicitly of the theory on which it stands came from political scientists. G. Sartori, C. B. Macpherson, Joseph La Palombara have proved that even in the West ideology continues to have a significant role if considered in a broader functional frame of reference. In the new nations in particular the mystique of change and modernization is embodied in the ideology as "an action oriented belief system... explaining the world, justifying action, limiting policy choices, and creating social solidarity"<sup>15</sup> It is therefore necessary to enlarge the theory of knowledge by recognizing to ideology a constituent formative function within the political system of new nations. This ideology is born mainly from political conditions specific to the new nations and answers their needs.

4. Content and function of ideology in the new nations.

The constituent or formative political view of ideology places emphasis on function. Nationalism and socialism, the main branches of ideology in new nations can be understood not by comparing them to the European counterparts but by analyzing their role in the mobilization of society, in the establishment and consolidation of an independent modern state, in the creation of political identity and civic education.

National independence within a well defined territory, identification with that territory and the state, the development of a national political identity based on a community of feelings derived from affinity of history, culture, language, whenever feasible, constitute the backbone of nationalism. This nationalism is seldom the ideological outlet of an ethnic, social or religious group. It is the manipulative ideational means of the elite in control of government power, and answers not individual yearnings but the constitutive needs of the modern political system. It provides a new rationale and legitimization for authority largely, on behalf of independence, nationhood and development. Hence, nationalism seeks to integrate all the groups in the nation and create a sense of identity. Obviously there are great variations in the content of African, Arab, Asian nationalism. Yet, for the time being their common point is the subservience of nationalism to the state. One may relate nationalism also to the groups promoting it. It seems to us that the military, intelligentsia and bureaucracy are effective agents of modernization largely because of their role in establishing the state institutions and exercising state authority. Nationalism in the new nations is promoted by these elites and is determined by their association with and control of state.

Socialism in new nations is essentially an extension of nationalism into the social and economic fields. It is not born from class conflicts but from the search by state for an ideology of development. The state formulates its social and economic goals through socialism. A new division of labor, assignment of roles and responsibilities, the creation of sufficiency and ultimately of a participant society are some of the major goals of socialism. This socialism denounces capitalism, class differences, defends social justice and reforms chiefly as the consequence of the national struggle against colonialism and imperialism rather than the logical necessity of a doctrine. In other words socialism appears to be basically a response to a political situation. Thus, this socialism seems to be less "revolutionary" than its rhetoric may indicate.<sup>16</sup> It does acquire, however, new dimensions and a certain originality of its own in initiating and implementing development policies. In this capacity socialism may try to remove the obstacles to rapid development, such as the eradication of illiteracy while establishing a new system of production through state planning. Thus, even the development role of socialism is determined by the state.

In conclusion one may say that "nationalism" and "socialism" are misnomers in the new nations. These two ideologies in their original form represent various phases of European political and social experience.

Statism is the only major ideology in the developing states of Asia and Africa; nationalism is the political, and socialism the economic facet of one and the same ideology. This is well symbolized by the fact that the elites are often nationalists and socialists at the same time.

The functions of this statist ideology both, in its political and economic

expressions, may be summarized under the following points:

A. Mobilization.

The modern political system in the new nations- in fact the very state itself depends on its ability to achieve a broad mobilization involving all people in every field of endeavor. Everything which has been said about ideology in this paper is part of the general process of mobilization. The struggle for independence, the process of nation building economic development etc., are dependent on social and political mobilization. Ideology is the main cultural instrument of mobilization. It embodies the political credo of the modern state. The technique of mobilization involves the use of all means of communication with the purpose of indoctrination, education, planning, organization and conscription.<sup>17</sup>

B. Legitimization of Authority and Political Socialization.

Ideology plays a constituent role in the establishment of political authority of the state based on a secular rational view of society and of power. This authority involves both institutions and grass root consensus which are in turn the foundations on which the new sphere of consent and dissent is erected.<sup>18</sup> The leaders of new nations began their drive for independence challenging the authority of colonial powers, as well as their own communal and group chiefs who rose to power or maintained their position through alliance with the foreign rulers. The rejection of colonial-communal authority undermined considerably the primordial loyalties and attachments that had facilitated the acceptance of traditional authority and the subsequent need to establish a rational and secular authority was facilitated by the traditional chiefs, themselves. For instance the failure of monarchies to side with nationalists in the Middle East often ended with abolition of dynasties. The Ottoman dynasty which had struck

deep roots in its six hundred-year history was easily abolished by nationalists in 1922 because it had become the docile tool of occupying allied powers, and made the error of pitting religion against nationalism. The monarchies of Libya and Morocco survived chiefly because of their leadership in the struggle for liberation, even though their ultimate fate is not clear yet. The creation of a new system of authority and its legitimation is an immediate practical as well as a long range process of political socialization, that is the effort to devise the "means by which individuals acquire motives, habits and values relevant to participation in a political system".<sup>19</sup>

The new nations lacking institutions and political traditions necessary for socialization rely extensively on ideology to achieve it. Ideology serves also as the vehicle of authority legitimation. This authority is described as being exercised in conformity with the wish and spirit of society, and as serving the interests of the national community as a whole. It is described as being democratic because of its spirit and goal rather than formal rules and processes through which it is exercised. Finally, the legitimation of this authority is achievement oriented. In other words, the call to accept the authority of the modern state carries the implicit promise of material and moral betterment, all to be achieved under the direction of the state and its leaders.

C. Integration, identity and solidarity building and self-interpretation.

Ideology appeals to "primordial feelings" and reshapes them both through a differentiated use according to the functional needs of the modern system and amalgamation into the broader ideals of nationhood. The political (national) identity and loyalty superseding all other forms of identity and loyalty would not necessarily conflict with other loyalties held by members of society. This political identity, as implied before

repeatedly, though made up of various primordial elements is in the ultimate analysis something new and apart of its components. The relative success of some new nations in developing rapidly a sense of national identity may be explained through the leaders' ability to combine the "local" and primordial with "general" and "ideal" whereby the citizen sees some familiar elements of his culture embodied in the new system of which he is a part.

Integration, identity, solidarity and self-interpretation mentioned as being the function of ideology are closely interrelated. There cannot be integration without solidarity, identity and self-interpretation and vice-versa. It is therefore significant that history-actually the ideologically reinterpreted version of history-plays a significant role in developing a favorable image of the new nation. History is used to foster a pride in the national heritage and develop a sense of belongingness to a group, even though the supporting historical evidence may be very tenuous. Ideology uses history to gather arguments for persuading the would-be members of the nation that they lived in the past organized in tribal religious or communal groups without being aware of the fact that they were actually part of the same nation. The essence of nationalism and modernity, ideology would argue, is to become aware of one's "everpresent" national identity and accept the membership in the national state as a historical necessity. Thus, ideology seeks to create a broader sense of identity by claiming that the nation is both rooted in the society's past experience and represents the most advanced form of political organization. In order to reconstruct history and foster the feeling of belongingness to a land which was always an ancestral fatherland one needs to become part of a nation. "The Fatherland" says L.S.Senghor "is the heritage handed

down to us by our ancestors: a land, a blood, a language or at least a dialect, mores, customs, folklore, art- in a word, a culture rooted in a native soil and expressed by a race.... The nation groups such fatherlands together in order to transcend them. Unlike them, it is not a natural determination and therefore an expression of the milieu, but a conscious will to construct and reconstruct. Objectively, it is the re-structuration along the lines of an exemplary model or archetype. But to attain its objectives, the nation must inspire all its members, all individuals, with faith in nationhood over and above fatherlands... Far from rejecting the realities of the fatherland, the nation will lean on them or, more precisely, will lean on their virtues, on their quality of immediate reality, on their emotional strength... if the nation is a conscious determination to reconstruct the state is its major means".<sup>20</sup>

A strong sense of national (political) identity internal solidarity fostered by ideology are conditions for the survival of the state but also dynamic forces giving the nation an achievement orientation. In other words, the people imbued with pride in their nationality and aware of their unique creative abilities as proven by their ancestors in the past, are expected to achieve great deeds in the spirit of contemporary civilization. All these goals are promoted by ideology; its lack of objectivity may be compensated by its formative worldly goals.

D. Cultural rejuvenation, activism and Communication.

Ideology promotes the supremacy of reason, the virtues of science by making extensive use of modern media of communication, thus generalizing the latter's usage. Using subjective approaches akin to religiosity ideology attempts to secure acceptance for an organized, political way of existence which is often described as the modern way of life. Indeed subjective as it may be, "religiosity in the political sphere is used... to create a

system of instrumental means and secular objectives rather than theocratic ones"<sup>21</sup>

The supremacy of the mind advocated through ideology places a high premium on education and enhances the intelligentsia's position in society. But it is usually the poet and the writer turned ideologue and politician who exert widespread influence in generalizing the political culture of the national state. It is the poet and the writer who can use the symbols and the modes of expression of his native society and culture, often without being aware of it, in securing acceptance of and enthusiasm for the new system of political values.<sup>22</sup>

There is an intimate relationship between literature, ideology and politics in the nations. "Throughout history" says C. Wauthier in his excellent study of thought in Africa, "the demand for national independence has gone hand in hand with cultural revival" and goes on to stress the fact that cultural renaissance has become involved in the political struggle, that literature and writers are in most cases politically committed, and produced significant works because of that commitment.<sup>23</sup> I can say that the situation in the Middle East is similar.<sup>24</sup>

### Conclusions

The special birth circumstances, the vital functions performed in the establishment of the modern state and its political culture gives to ideology a unique place in the life of new nations. Ideology in fact is a constituent element of the nation. It is therefore logical to conclude that ideology in new nations is at the beginning stage of its development and shall be manipulated as a mobilizing instrument for decades to come.



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### Summary

Ideology in the new nations is a functional instrument of mobilization and political socialization. It is not born from social conflict or disagreement over the distribution of scarce values but from the search for national independence, identity and integration, development, as well as a new system of political-social values related to the establishment of a modern political system, and embodied in national statehood. Consequently the classical theories of knowledge (interest and strains theories) explaining the birth causes of ideology in the West need to be broadened and oriented towards functionalism if the birth circumstances, and especially the functions of ideology in the new nations are to be properly understood. Though not primarily a means for conflict resolution, ideology in new nations, helps establish a new arena of consensus (around the modern political system) whereby dissent may be institutionalized and rationalized. The new nations possess basically one single ideology related organically to developments in their respective societies: statism. Nationalism and socialism are the two facets, the first political and the second social and economic, of one single ideology which is born and functions, for the time being at least, according to the formative needs of modern nationhood.

### Résumé

Dans les nouvelles nations, l'idéologie est un instrument fonctionnel de mobilisation et de socialisation politique. Elle n'est pas engendrée par les conflits sociaux ou par les désaccords concernant la répartition des biens rares, mais naît de la recherche de l'indépendance, de l'identité, de l'intégration, du développement national, en même temps qu'un nouveau système de valeurs politiques et sociales, lié à l'établissement d'un système politique moderne, et s'incarnant dans l'état-nation. Les théories classiques de la connaissance (mettant l'accent sur les intérêts et sur les tensions), qui expliquent la genèse des idéologies en Occident, doivent donc être élargies et orientées vers une explication fonctionnelle si l'on veut comprendre correctement la genèse et les fonctions des idéologies dans les nations nouvelles. Bien qu'elle ne soit pas essentiellement un moyen de règlement des conflits, l'idéologie contribue dans les nations nouvelles à établir une nouvelle zone de consensus (autour du système politique moderne) permettant aux désaccords d'être institutionnalisés et rationalisés. Les nouvelles nations possèdent fondamentalement une idéologie unique organiquement liée à l'évolution des sociétés: l'étatisme. Nationalisme et socialisme sont les deux faces, la première politique, la deuxième sociale et économique, d'une idéologie unique, née et fonctionnant, du moins pour le moment, conformément aux besoins de formation des nations modernes.

"Consensus et conflits, notamment dans  
les pays en voie de développement"

CONSENSUS ET OPPOSITION EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE

A L'EPOQUE DU DEMARRAGE ECONOMIQUE

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S E P T I E M E   C O N G R E S   M O N D I A L

B R U X E L L E S

18-23 septembre 1967

## Consensus et opposition en Europe occidentale

### à l'époque du démarrage économique

par Léo Moulin

#### Argumentabo

Je défendrai les thèses suivantes :

1. Les régimes politiques qui fonctionnaient en Occident dans la première moitié du XIXe siècle étaient des régimes autoritaires<sup>(1)</sup>, issus de sociétés qui, pendant des siècles, avaient joui de régimes de droit, pourvus de franchises, de libertés et de privilèges, et garantis par eux. De ce fait, ils permettaient certaines formes d'opposition à l'intérieur du système, qui constituaient autant de soupapes de sûreté pour lui, et autant de facteurs possibles d'innovation et, par conséquent, de progrès.

2. Le consensus social<sup>(2)</sup>, le dénominateur commun à tous les membres de la société du XIXe siècle, était beaucoup plus grand que ne le laissent supposer les secousses, bien souvent violentes, qui marquent l'histoire de l'Europe à cette époque. D'où l'absence d'opposition révolutionnaire radicale ou, à tout le moins, sa profonde faiblesse et les échecs qui en résultèrent.

3. Le régime capitaliste initial engendrait sans doute des prolétaires; mais, pour diverses raisons qui seront expliquées, ceux-ci n'acquiescèrent une pleine conscience de leur condition et ne s'organisèrent qu'après que le régime économique en question eut dépassé le stade initial du démarrage.

A ce moment, l'idée d'une révolution avait déjà perdu une grande partie de sa fascination et, peut-être, de sa nécessité historique.

4. Cette absence de révolution a été l'un des facteurs fondamentaux, l'une des conditions sine qua non, du démarrage économique intense des Nations occidentales et, par conséquent, de l'avance prise par ces Nations dans ce domaine, et du bien-être général qui en est résulté.

Les régimes politiques du développement économique.

C'est un fait : les pays économiquement les plus évolués, c'est-à-dire les pays dont le revenu national réel par habitant est le plus élevé - les Etats-Unis, la Suède, la Suisse, le Royaume-Uni, la Belgique, la France, etc. - sont, soit des pays qui avaient fait leur révolution politique bien avant que s'amorce le démarrage économique - c'est le cas de l'Angleterre, des Etats-Unis et de la France - soit des pays qui ont fait l'économie d'une pareille révolution en adoptant très tôt un régime politique propre à permettre une évolution, si rapide soit-elle, et aussi révolutionnaire qu'elle l'est aujourd'hui. C'est le cas, par exemple, des pays scandinaves, de la Belgique, des cantons helvétiques, des Pays-Bas<sup>(3)</sup>. C'est le cas également de l'Allemagne, bien qu'elle fasse partie du groupe des grands Empires - l'Empire habsbourgeois, l'Empire russe et l'Empire ottoman - qui n'ont pas résisté au choc de la première guerre mondiale, et qu'elle ait adopté par la suite, durant plus d'une décennie, un système politique totalitaire démentiel. Mais en 1918, et a fortiori en 1933, le take-off de son économie était déjà depuis longtemps assuré; et malgré ses apparences, le système wilhelmien qui régnait en Allemagne avant 1914, était dans l'ensemble fort semblable aux régimes "libéraux" et "démocratiques" des autres nations d'Occident.

Par contre, l'Espagne, le Portugal et la Grèce ne font pas partie du peloton des pays européens économiquement développés; et c'était encore le cas, il n'y a guère, de l'Italie; mais, au moment où convergeaient en Europe occidentale, les signes annonciateurs de ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler (à tort, mais l'usage impose l'expression) la "révolution" industrielle, c'étaient des pays qui s'efforçaient encore de trouver une solution aux problèmes politiques, sociaux et économiques qui se posaient à eux dans le contrôle ou même l'abolition de toute forme d'Opposition, plutôt que dans son intégration dans un système politique équilibré.

En d'autres termes, ce qui frappe l'observateur, c'est le fait que, dans les pays protestants de l'Occident (car sur ce point je suis très weberien) qui devaient devenir les pays économiquement les plus évolués d'Europe, la densité du consensus socio-politique l'a très vite et définitivement emporté sur le dynamisme des ruptures oppositionnelles; et que l'accord s'y est noué très tôt sur le principe d'une Opposition pratiquée à l'intérieur de la Société, et conformément aux règles établies par elle, et non pas menée de l'extérieur et contre elle, sans aucun respect des règles établies, dans le but de la détruire et non de la faire évoluer. C'est pourquoi l'Occident n'a pas fait de révolutions (car on ne peut guère compter comme révolutions les secousses politiques somme toute superficielles et qui ne s'en prenaient pas aux principes fondamentaux de l'économie capitaliste, qui se sont produites en France notamment en 1830 et en 1848 ou en Allemagne en 1918 et en 1933), et ne connaît pas de partis ouvriers ou socialistes révolutionnaires. Même les partis communistes, qui d'ailleurs ont fait leur apparition bien longtemps après le "take-off" économique, n'y sont pas révolutionnaires.

Est-il possible d'en déduire que l'une des causes, facteurs ou conditions, du développement économique qui caractérise l'histoire des pays de l'Europe occidentale, est ce que nous appellerons, pour faire bref, l'existence d'un régime politique offrant des possibilités d'utiliser des techniques d'opposition socialement et/ou constitutionnellement reconnues et tolérées; faut-il croire au contraire que c'est le prodigieux développement économique de l'Occident qui a permis l'instauration d'un régime démocratique; ou ne devrait-on pas plutôt conclure qu'il existe des rapports dialectiques entre les principes de la démocratie "libérale" et les causes du développement économique, les uns et les autres faisant d'ailleurs partie d'une seule et même révolution socio-culturelle, la Révolution d'Occident, dont la face politique et la face économique ne sont que des aspects, et non peut-être les plus décisifs ?

Que les succès de l'économie capitaliste aient permis aux classes possédantes de se montrer plus libérales est en partie vrai; mais il est difficile de croire qu'ils furent à l'origine de la démocratie "libérale", et moins encore, qu'ils en furent la condition. Des régimes de droit pourvus de certaines possibilités d'opposition légale, l'Occident en avait connus, bien avant que s'amorçât le démarrage économique: citons le régime des parlements et des assemblées en Angleterre, aux Pays-Bas et dans les cantons helvétiques, sans oublier les communes italiennes et flamandes; les parlements de France<sup>(4)</sup>; et last but not least, les prodigieux régimes présidentiels tempérés, échafaudés par les ordres religieux au cours des siècles<sup>(5)</sup>.

Ces régimes pouvaient être "autoritaires" et conservateurs, et même rétrogrades; et, de fait, ils le furent souvent. Mais si "autoritaires", soupçonneux, policiers même, qu'ils aient été, aucun d'eux ne fut jamais "totalitaire". (Il faudra attendre le XXe siècle, et les processus de massification - industrielle, sociale, politique et culturelle - et de grégariation qui accompagnent sa naissance, pour assister à la montée de régimes de ce genre).

Les régimes "autoritaires" permettaient certaines formes d'opposition, partant certaines formes de mouvement et d'évolution. Insérés dans une société "ouverte" (au sens où Bergson entendait ce terme), ils n'étaient donc pas fatalement et toujours un obstacle dirimant, radical, insurmontable, à toute évolution postérieure, que celle-ci soit politique ou économique.

Et de fait, c'est sous des régimes "autoritaires" extrêmement traditionalistes et même conservateurs que non seulement sont nées les économies capitalistes, mais encore que se sont organisés les mouvements ouvriers et les forces radicales<sup>(6)</sup>.

Certains d'entre eux avaient même aboli la peine de mort et la torture<sup>(7)</sup>. Et tous, si sacralisés qu'ils se voulussent, pratiquaient certaines formes de "libéralisme" et de tolérance qui étonnent l'homme



d'aujourd'hui, accoutumé comme il l'est au spectacle de régimes autrement intransigeants.

C'est parce que l'Ancien Régime était, d'une certaine façon, indulgent, que les Philosophes ont pu poursuivre pendant un demi-siècle la destruction des fondements du Trône et de l'Autel<sup>(8)</sup>. On ne remarque pas assez que la plupart des écrits qui ont secoué et renouvelé les structures de l'Eglise - je pense en particulier aux Constitutions, bien souvent révolutionnaires, des ordres religieux - ont reçu l'imprimatur et le nil obstat des Autorités ecclésiastiques. Proudhon se maria étant en prison; et pouvant sortir certains jours de la semaine (on lui permit même de sortir le lendemain du 2 décembre 1851, date du coup d'Etat de Napoléon III), il en profita non seulement pour faire des enfants à sa femme, mais encore pour constituer devant notaire sa Banque du Peuple (30 juin 1849) et fonder un journal, La Voix du Peuple<sup>(9)</sup>.

Même en Russie, Lénine, frère d'un condamné à mort pour avoir essayé d'attenter à la vie du Tsar, obtint une bourse d'études et, tout suspect qu'il fût a priori, put fréquenter les universités de son pays<sup>10)</sup>. En 1917, il s'apprêtait à rendre "acceptable pour la censure russe", c'est-à-dire à publier sous le régime tsariste, il le dit lui-même dans sa préface, sa brochure "L'impérialisme dernière étape du capitalisme"<sup>(11)</sup> - ce qui prouve à tout le moins que cette censure si maladivement méfiante qu'elle fût, était susceptible, dans l'esprit du plus décidé de ses adversaires, de tolérer la publication de bien étranges brûlots.

On pourrait multiplier les exemples de cette espèce de tolérance faite d'aveuglement des classes dirigeantes, de confiance des gouvernants en la stabilité séculaire du régime, d'ignorance de la censure, de bêtise de la police, sans doute, mais aussi d'un certain respect "humaniste" de l'adversaire. Finalement, les régimes politiques de la première moitié du XIXe siècle ont laissé publier la littérature révolutionnaire et socialiste qui les malmenait furieusement, comme l'Ancien Régime avait laissé paraître l'Encyclopédie.

Notons encore que, d'une façon générale, la répression des mouvements sociaux et des insurrections politiques, des complots et des mutineries, fit relativement peu de victimes. Sans doute la sensibilité moderne supporte-t-elle malaisément les images sanglantes du passé. C'est tout à son honneur, encore qu'elle ait moins réagi, ou qu'elle n'ait réagi que dans un esprit partisan, à sens unique, devant les vastes massacres des génocides et des dékoulakisations, des guerres civiles et des Hiroshima.

Mais si légitime qu'elle soit, cette attitude de réprobation ne doit pas nous empêcher de constater qu'au total et compte-tenu de l'extrême dureté des moeurs de l'époque, sur laquelle nous reviendrons, le chiffre des victimes des régimes autoritaires du siècle dernier, y compris le régime impérial russe, fut relativement bas, si on le compare aux chiffres des régimes totalitaires.

Répetons-le : le prix de l'opposition n'était pas élevé au point d'abolir toute possibilité d'y recourir. Pour peu qu'on ait eu du goût pour la prison, il était possible de polémiquer longuement et durement avec le Régime : Blanqui et Proudhon en fournissent la preuve.

#### Le consensus général à l'époque du démarrage économique.

La sensibilité moderne est également fort frappée par la fréquence et la violence des troubles qui marquent la première moitié du XIXe siècle. Ceux-ci sont d'autant plus impressionnants qu'on les présente bien souvent comme l'annonce ou les grands ancêtres d'Octobre 17.

En réalité, outre que le fait soit loin d'être établi, la Révolution russe s'étant produite dans des conditions historiques totalement différentes de celles qui régnaient en Occident dans les premières années du XIXe siècle, il convient de se rappeler qu'il en va de l'histoire sociale comme de l'histoire des nations ou des individus : les incidents, les ruptures de rythmes, y retiennent seuls l'attention, si bien qu'on en vient à oublier ou, en tout cas, à perdre de vue, le trantran de la vie quotidienne, l'insertion de l'homme dans les routines sociales, l'intégration du groupe ou de la classe dans la société<sup>(12)</sup>.

Le XIXe siècle nous apparaît sans doute comme un siècle de tensions sociales violentes; mais si on en croit P.A. Sorokin<sup>(13)</sup>, l'index des "disturbances" (qui comprennent "revolutions, riots, revolts and civil strife") est moins élevé (766) en ce siècle de fer, qu'il ne le fut au XIIIe (882) ou au XIVE (827) et c'est à peine s'il dépasse le XVe siècle (748). En fait, du VIe siècle à 1925, on compte une "disturbance" tous les cinq à sept ans. Même des siècles aussi spirituellement homogènes que le XIIIe ou le XIVE siècles n'en sont pas exempts, que du contraire. Le XIXe siècle ne fait donc pas exception.

Certes le prolétariat se sentait traité comme un out group par la société industrielle naissante. Et de fait, à bien des égards, il l'était, plus sans doute que le popolo minuto ou les Jacques Bonhommes d'autrefois. Mais, faute du message marxiste qui devait donner un sens prométhéen à sa condition humaine, à son aliénation, à ses luttes et à sa libération et si grands que fussent son désespoir et sa solitude morale, il n'était pas un out-group sur tous les plans, ni toujours, ni radicalement parce qu'il n'avait pas conscience de l'être. Non seulement il restait encore fort attaché aux valeurs religieuses traditionnelles (dans les Iles britanniques, la révolution bourgeoise se produisit bien avant que l'idéologie laïque atteignît les masses ouvrières et les petites classes moyennes<sup>(14)</sup>), et en France, une religiosité diffuse continua, pendant longtemps encore, à imprégner la sensibilité ouvrière et à s'exprimer dans ses "Catéchismes" et ses liturgies<sup>(15)</sup>), mais encore il demeurait fidèle à bien d'autres valeurs, communes à la société tout entière : à la Monarchie, sinon toujours au Monarque, aux hiérarchies sociales, Noblesse et Patriciat, à la Nation.

Quel prolétaire des années 1820 ou 30, quel paysan (et l'immense majorité des nations d'Occident était encore rurale) récusait la formule de Nesselrode : "Autocratie. Orthodoxie. Nationalisme", pour peu qu'elle fût traduite dans un langage plus conforme à sa sensibilité ?

C'est d'ailleurs pourquoi tant de révoltes se firent aux cris de "Vive l'Empereur !" (en Russie)<sup>(16)</sup> ou en invoquant l'autorité du Roi

mal informé contre ses ministres et ses courtisans. En 1848, une chanson disait : "Napoléon, rentre dans ton palais. Napoléon, sois bon républicain"<sup>(17)</sup>.

Au fond, les travailleurs révoltés ne voulaient pas tant détruire la société traditionnelle qu'exiger d'elle que, conformément à ses propres principes, elle atténuât les maux que la fabrique leur infligeait et surtout qu'elle leur permît d'accéder, à leur tour, aux bienfaits qu'elle offrait : la liberté, le droit de vote, la démocratie, l'instruction généralisée, la dignité humaine reconnue et protégée, les lumières et, d'une façon générale, ce qu'on a appelé les idéologies du développement.

Ce n'étaient pas les prolétaires qui niaient la haute signification du Progrès; c'étaient quelques disciples attardés de Bonald ou de Maistre. Ce n'est pas eux qui mettaient en doute la force irréfragable de la Raison ou de la Science; c'étaient quelques ultramontains affolés. Ainsi, même dans les pires moments d'opposition, les prolétaires partageaient les croyances, les enthousiasmes et les illusions de la société tout entière. S'ils protestaient contre elle, c'était bien souvent à la façon de Luther s'adressant "du pape mal informé au pape bien informé", c'est-à-dire en respectant, autant que le leur permettaient une misère aussi noire et une déréliction aussi totale, son autorité fondamentale, ses dogmes et ses tabous. Ce que les constitutions des Jésuites appellent les substantialia primi ordinis, c'est-à-dire l'essentiel.

#### La bonne conscience bourgeoise.

On a décrit mille fois la condition des travailleurs durant les premières décennies de la révolution industrielle. Nous n'y reviendrons plus. Disons simplement que, partout, elle fut effroyable. Demandons-nous plutôt comment les possédants "expliquaient" pareille situation, car ces explications pourraient jeter quelque lumière sur ce que furent, en profondeur, consensus et opposition à l'aube du XIXe siècle

Avant toutes choses, il faut tenir compte, d'une façon générale, de l'incroyable dureté qui sous-tend l'action individuelle et l'énergie sociale de l'époque. La Révolution française a mis fin à une certaine douceur de vivre. L'épopée napoléonienne a familiarisé les esprits avec l'idée des grandes tueries, des guerres nationales et de la guérilla, avec l'image de combats sans merci, zoologiques. Ne citons qu'un fait entre mille : la pratique du chaulage des terres amena des Anglais à fonder une société destinée à exploiter les champs de bataille napoléoniens pour y récupérer les ossements<sup>(18)</sup>. La découverte du guano en 1840 mit fin à ce trafic.

Les hommes sont durs pour eux-mêmes, pour leur famille, pour leurs enfants. Ils sont durs parce que, même pour les classes possédantes - qui, à l'époque, sont presque toujours les classes dirigeantes - les conditions de vie le sont, à un point qui paraît presque incroyable pour nous. Même pour elles, le froid, le maladie, la vieillesse précoce, la saleté, la puanteur, les incommodités de toutes sortes, sont mmnaie courante. Faute de pouvoir être abolie ou même, bien souvent atténuée, la souffrance est admise et assumée. Les châtiments corporels sont le lot des enfants, qu'ils soient riches ou pauvres, les servantes sont souffletées, humiliées, jetées dehors. Au sein même de la famille bourgeoise, le raté, le failli, l'aventureux, le pauvre ou, tout simplement le moins-riche, sont honnis et méprisés. La société laisse au romantisme le soin de chanter le bagnard et la prostituée.

A cette effroyable dureté de l'époque post-napoléonienne, contribuent encore la brièveté de la vie et la haute mortalité infantile (qui rendent l'homme insensible à son propre sort et, bien entendu, plus encore à celui des autres); les pandémies, typhus, choléra qui dévastèrent l'Europe durant le XIXe siècle; la disette, sans cesse menaçante et qui s'abattit en 1848 encore sur l'Irlande et la Flandre, faisant mourir de faim des dizaines de milliers d'êtres humains; les arrachements atroces d'émigrations contraintes et forcées, fruits du désespoir, de la misère, des défaites politiques, des persécutions raciales ou religieuses.

Dans le Manifeste Communiste, Karl Marx a remarquablement décrit la rupture des liens sociaux qu'avait provoquée la "bourgeoisie" en jetant les fondements de la société industrielle : "Partout où elle est arrivée au pouvoir, la bourgeoisie a détruit toutes les conditions féodales, patriarcales, idylliques ... La dignité personnelle (je souligne), elle l'a muée en valeur d'échange et, à la place des innombrables libertés reconnues par écrit et bien conquises, elle a mis la seule liberté commerciale dénuée de conscience", etc.<sup>(19)</sup>.

Tout romantique que soit l'écriture de ce passage du Manifeste, et précisément parce qu'elle est romantique, elle atteste avec force combien violent fut le traumatisme résultant non seulement des conditions nouvelles de travail, mais encore et surtout de l'âpre nouveauté des rapports sociaux.

Certains, parmi les membres des classes possédantes, niaient que la situation fut aussi tragique qu'on la dépeignait et accusaient de pessimisme systématique, ou de sensiblerie, ceux qui peignaient d'aussi noirs tableaux (et sans doute y avait-il quelque chose de vrai dans cet argument - juste de quoi rassurer et rasséréner). D'autres affirmaient que la condition ouvrière était imputable aux moeurs déplorables des ouvriers, à leur débauche, à leur crapule, à leur imprévoyance, bien plutôt qu'aux conditions de travail : il s'ensuivait que, bien plus que dans une hausse des salaires ou un raccourcissement de la journée de travail, ils devaient mettre tous leurs espoirs d'améliorer leurs conditions de vie dans une réforme intellectuelle et morale. C'est d'ailleurs à cette époque que les caisses d'épargne, ces banques du pauvre, ces frugality banks, écrivait Bentham<sup>(20)</sup>, firent leur apparition. Aux ouvriers qui n'avaient rien à perdre que leurs chaînes, on proposait de se priver du nécessaire pour amasser quelque pécule, maigre substitut d'une sécurité sociale encore dans les limbes. (Le plus fort est que l'entreprise réussit au delà de tout espoir)<sup>(21)</sup>.

Ceux qui ne niaient pas l'horreur de la condition prolétarienne affirmaient qu'elle était le fruit de lois "naturelles", aussi inéluc-

tables que les lois qui régissent les mouvements des astres; que le travail était une marchandise, dont la vente et l'achat étaient soumis aux mêmes règles que les autres marchandises; qu'au demeurant la misère, mal nécessaire, était un élément du progrès social; et que de toute façon, le temps travaillait en faveur des ouvriers, le progrès économique étant la condition sine qua non du progrès social. On connaît l'antienne.

Quels que soient les arguments invoqués pour défendre les droits de "la nouvelle féodalité" (Villeneuve-Bargemont), ou, plus exactement, les conditions de travail imposées à l'époque aux prolétaires, ils ont ceci de commun qu'ils donnent une bonne conscience à ceux qui les invoquent ou plutôt révèlent la bonne conscience qui les anime lorsqu'ils appliquent les lois impitoyables du travail moderne aux malheureux ouvriers.

La misère, loi naturelle; le paupérisme, punition du vice; l'émigration, fruit d'une conception libérale de l'homme et des nations; la colonisation, application du darwinisme; la Nation, valeur suprême; le Sens de l'Histoire, la Révolution; ce sont là, socialement, de grandes forces pour qui veut réunir les conditions requises pour assurer un démarrage économique et notamment pour obtenir ce consensus omnium sans quoi rien ne peut se faire. Mais ce sont là des moyens qui, en principe, ne souffrent guère d'opposition.

Aussi, fortes de leur bon droit et de leur bonne conscience, les classes dirigeantes appliquèrent-elles sans faiblir les lois de la guerre sociale. Rarement, elles consentirent à céder devant l'émeute et à devenir ainsi ce que l'on appelait, en Belgique, "un gouvernement de la grande voirie"<sup>(22)</sup>. L'opposition - ouvrière, républicaine, socialiste, ou tout simplement libérale - fut durement matée, par les moyens que la loi donnait aux gouvernants. Est-on bien sûr qu'à l'époque du démarrage économique, elle-même ait eu bonne conscience? Ses hésitations, ses atermoiements permettent d'en douter.

L'incertaine conscience de la condition prolétarienne.

Nous avons dit que le régime capitaliste initial - celui du "take-off" - engendrait des prolétaires, c'est-à-dire ceux qui, en principe, devaient devenir ses propres fossoyeurs.

En fait, l'action des masses laborieuses ne commença à prendre sa pleine efficacité, qu'après que le régime capitaliste lui-même fut entré dans la zone que W.W. Rostow<sup>(23)</sup> définit comme celle de la maturité économique. Autrement dit, lorsqu'il fut en état d'assurer la continuation de son prodigieux essor, tout en passant du stade "individualiste" ou "manchestérien" qui avait été le sien initialement, au stade second d'une évolution qui devait l'amener à la situation présente, celle d'un régime de plein-emploi, de sécurité sociale, de loisirs et de hauts salaires.

On peut se demander pourquoi l'action des masses prolétariennes fut aussi tardive et, bien souvent, aussi incertaine.

J'en vois plusieurs raisons.

1) Notons, pour commencer, qu'à l'époque où Karl Marx écrivait Le Manifeste, les travailleurs de l'industrie, des manufactures et des usines de l'Angleterre n'intervenaient dans le total de la population active que pour un peu moins de 30 %, soit un pourcentage identique à celui des agriculteurs. En France, l'agriculture représentait encore 64 % de la population active en 1851; l'industrie et le commerce, 27,4 % à peine.

"Dans ce monde où l'on avait recensé près d'un million de domestiques et un demi million de vagabonds, écrit Kostas Papaioannou<sup>(24)</sup>, le prolétariat n'était encore qu'un noyau informe, à peine dégagé de la masse des artisans", et bien peu conscient de sa force future.

2) Une seconde raison, tout aussi forte, tient sans doute à la nouveauté absolue que constitua la condition prolétarienne. Sous la violence de l'impact, les victimes du nouveau régime industriel mirent quelque temps à se rendre compte de ce qui leur arrivait. Certes les épidémies, les disettes, les famines étaient depuis toujours les vieilles



compagnes de l'humanité (ce qui explique d'ailleurs en partie l'inertie des masses prolétariennes à l'aube de la révolution industrielle). Mais la misère qui s'était installée aux foyers des travailleurs, le paupérisme, était chose nouvelle et fut ressentie comme telle, même quelques dizaines d'années après son apparition. En France, Sismondi l'atteste, la notion de "prolétaire" devait encore être définie en 1837. Le mot est ancien, écrit l'auteur des Principes d'Economie Politique, mais la condition d'hommes n'ayant "aucune part à la richesse", aucune garantie d'existence, "aucun passé, aucun avenir ... vivant du travail de leurs bras", était proprement inouïe.

Les réformateurs sociaux, les philanthropes, comme il était d'usage de les appeler alors, furent d'abord tout aussi éberlués et ne surent que penser de ce cataclysme d'inhumanité. Il est significatif à ce propos que l'Angleterre qui fut le premier pays à subir le choc de la révolution industrielle, n'ait eu aucun grand doctrinaire de la pensée socialiste de la taille d'un Marx ou d'un Proudhon, ni aucun théoricien de l'action sociale du format de Saint-Simon, de Fourier ou de Blanqui : car il n'est pas possible de placer à côté de ces hommes, un Robert Owen qui n'est qu'hésitations et contradictions<sup>(25)</sup>.

3) Au demeurant, ces réformateurs sociaux, qu'ils fussent chrétiens<sup>(26)</sup>, libéraux ou socialistes, eurent peu d'audience, et d'influence, moins encore, durant les années décisives du démarrage.

Qu'étaient, aux yeux des prolétaires, un Saint-Simon, un Bachez, un Cabet, un Fourier, un Victor Considérant<sup>(27)</sup> ? Qu'étaient, à l'époque du "take-off", un Feuerbach (1842), un Stirner (1845), ou même un Marx (1848) ? Pas même des noms. Tout au plus, pour quelques intellectuels, étudiants ou autodidactes, l'équivalent de ce qu'étaient pour d'autres, un Auguste Comte (1842) ou un Kierkegaard (1843), c'est-à-dire fort peu de chose<sup>(28)</sup>.

Faut-il rappeler que le marxisme, seule doctrine qui marque une rupture radicale et révolutionnaire avec le régime politico-économique qui régnait dans la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle, ne s'épanouit lui-

même qu'après 1850 (le premier tome du Capital date de 1867); qu'il n'a commencé à influencer réellement la pensée et l'action des classes ouvrières, qu'après la mort de Proudhon (1864), de Lassalle (1865) et de Bakounine (1876); et que la première Internationale qui ne date que de 1865, agonisait déjà en 1876 ?

4) Le prolétariat manqua ainsi d'un modèle révolutionnaire adapté aux exigences de la société industrielle moderne. Il en fut donc réduit, pendant les années décisives du démarrage économique, à utiliser les vieux procédés périmés des jacqueries paysannes et des actions ludistes<sup>(29)</sup>, quand il ne retournait pas purement et simplement aux millénarismes des sociétés pré-industrielles<sup>(30)</sup> ou aux rêveries de l'anarchisme<sup>(31)</sup>. Parfois, il fonda ses espoirs et son action sur les principes de la société secrète, du complot et de la prise insurrectionnelle<sup>(32)</sup> du pouvoir à coups de barricades. Parfois encore, il recourut aux schémas des "journées" révolutionnaires à la façon de 1793.

Moyens les uns et les autres voués à l'échec<sup>(33)</sup>, ainsi que les travailleurs en firent maintes fois l'amère expérience.

5) Echouèrent également les innombrables tentatives owenites, fouriéristes, cabétiennes et autres, de fonder des "icaries" de tous genres<sup>(34)</sup>. Ces échecs n'incitaient guère les travailleurs à préparer par la violence l'avènement d'une société nouvelle, calquée sur des modèles aussi désastreux. Faute d'avoir en perspective un incipit vita nova, ils se tournèrent vers des solutions réformistes d'adaptation et de luttes légales.

6) En Angleterre, les revivals, véritables explosions d'émotivité collective coïncidant d'ailleurs le plus souvent avec les périodes de tension économique et sociale, en enseignant que "les conditions économiques étaient l'affaire du destin plus que d'un combat"<sup>(35)</sup> contribuèrent à détourner le prolétariat d'une prise de conscience qui l'aurait mené peut-être vers des formes d'action et d'opposition plus radicales. Ici encore, le dénominateur, chrétien dans le cas de l'Angleterre, com-

mun à toutes les classes sociales, resta important, et le consensus social en fut acquis et conservé d'autant plus aisément.

7) Autre facteur qui, en atténuant les tensions, les oppositions et les conflits sociaux, contribua à retarder la prise de conscience du prolétariat et à l'orienter dans des voies moins révolutionnaires : l'émigration<sup>(36)</sup>. De 1800 à 1850, l'Amérique du Nord passe de 6 millions d'habitants à 25. En 1845-1848, le nombre des émigrés varie de 200 à 300.000 par an. De 1841 à 1880, l'Europe enregistre 13 millions de départs (entre 1845 et 1850, 80 % des émigrants viennent des Îles britanniques).

Le phénomène est général et s'étend aux Etats-Unis aussi bien qu'aux terres d'Asie occupées par les Russes.

Il est hors de doute qu'un aussi gigantesque mouvement démographique a fait office de soupape de sûreté<sup>(37)</sup>. Plutôt que de recourir aux moyens révolutionnaires d'opposition, les prolétaires, les affamés, les vaincus politiques, les révoltés, les esprits les plus libres quittèrent l'Europe. Leur départ contribua à désamorcer la mèche de la révolution européenne.

8) Autre facteur encore : la découverte des mines d'or. On sait que la quantité d'or et d'argent ne suffisant pas aux besoins d'un trafic sans cesse croissant, on assista à une baisse générale des prix qui compromit les capitaux engagés dans les entreprises nouvelles. Les patrons firent pression sur les salaires de la main-d'oeuvre, accroissant encore ainsi sa misère<sup>(38)</sup>. La découverte de mines d'or en Californie, en 1848, et en Australie, en 1850, mit fin en partie à cette situation dangereuse. De 1493 à 1800, la quantité d'or importée en Europe s'était élevée, à en croire Woytinsky, à quelque 113 millions d'onces. De 1801 à 1900, elle passa à 374 millions (et à 477 millions, pour les vingt-cinq premières années du XXe siècle.

9) Même remarque pour les colonies et l'esclavage.

En 1842, le Dictionnaire politique (gauche radicale) peut écrire : "La colonisation est la forme la plus louable et la plus glorieuse de la conquête; c'est le moyen le plus direct de propager la civilisation". Et Marx met à l'actif de la bourgeoisie le fait d'avoir "subordonné la campagne à la ville, les pays barbares et à demi barbares aux pays civilisés, les peuples de paysans aux peuples de bourgeois, l'Orient à l'Occident" (1848). La "gauche" qui fut l'Opposition par excellence durant tout le XIXe siècle, a très longtemps été colonialiste.

Fr. Engels n'exagère qu'à peine, quand il écrit : "Les ouvriers jouissent en toute tranquillité, avec les radicaux conservateurs et les libéraux, du monopole colonial de l'Angleterre et de son monopole sur le marché mondial". Pareille situation privilégiée ne poussait évidemment pas les classes laborieuses aux manifestations du désespoir.

10) Un autre facteur encore contribua à créer ou à renforcer le consensus des nations occidentales : l'éveil des nationalismes qui se produisit précisément à l'époque du démarrage économique. Il est évident en effet que ces religions séculières que sont les idéologies et les passions nationalistes, nourries en partie par un romantisme lui-même le plus souvent tourné vers le passé, ou s'appuyant sur le principe de légitimité (comme ce fut le cas pour les Espagnols luttant pour les Bourbons contre les envahisseurs français)<sup>(39)</sup>, incitèrent les hommes d'un même pays à se sentir des liens communs, à oublier ce qui les séparait et, bien souvent, les opposait, pour ne retenir que ce qui les rapprochait. Ainsi, les plus pauvres trouvèrent dans la foi nationaliste un dérivatif - ou une explication - à leur misère. Au slogan "Les prolétaires n'ont pas de patrie", succédèrent les credo unanimes du nationalisme et, bientôt, du racisme<sup>(40)</sup>.

11) Last but not least, si la population crut considérablement, surtout en Angleterre, les progrès techniques absorbèrent aisément ce surcroît de main-d'oeuvre, si bien que la pression du chômage continua à s'exercer dans toutes les industries, rendant impossible toute augmentation de la production marginale et toute élévation des salaires (du moins jusque vers 1850-60).

Autre conséquence d'une moindre mortalité : l'âge moyen de la population masculine ouvrière s'éleva : il était, selon Jean Fourastié<sup>(41)</sup>, de 26 ans en 1750 (âge médian : 22); il était déjà de 30 en 1850 (âge médian : 26) pour s'élever à 38 en 1954. Pendant ce temps, le niveau de vie s'élevait<sup>(42)</sup>, la durée de la journée de travail tendait à diminuer, le nombre d'analphabètes pour cent ouvriers passait de quatre-vingt-cinq (en 1750) à quarante (en 1850), pour atteindre cinq (en 1954). Qu'on le veuille ou non, ce ne sont pas là des facteurs qui incitent un groupe social aussi naturellement conservateur que la classe ouvrière à faire une révolution.

Ainsi la période romantique de l'agitation prit fin. L'action ouvrière - politique, sociale, économique - déboucha non sur la révolution - c'est-à-dire sur des formes d'opposition radicale et totale - mais sur le réformisme et sur des formes d'opposition démocratique constitutionnelle et légale, sinon déjà institutionnalisée.

Les travailleurs s'organisèrent : l'Association anglaise des Mineurs date de 1841, l'Association nationale des Métiers Unis, de 1845. La coopérative de Rochdale voit le jour en 1844.

Le système de "pronunciamientos", des "putschs", des révolutions de palais, ne conserva de partisans que dans des pays comme l'Espagne, l'Italie, la Grèce, le Portugal, économiquement restés à la traîne. Pour les mêmes raisons, les masses demeurèrent fidèles aux diverses formes de l'action directe, de l'attentat terroriste, des oppositions explosives et violentes, entravant ainsi, nous le verrons, plus qu'elles ne le favorisèrent, l'essor économique<sup>(43)</sup>.

Dans les pays économiquement plus évolués - c'est-à-dire dans les pays où le démarrage économique s'était produit plus tôt - les travailleurs en se déprolétarisant, renoncèrent à ces méthodes, sinon toujours en théorie - les grands mots d'ordre quarante-huitards<sup>(44)</sup> ont conservé jusqu'à ce jour des fragments de leur auréole - du moins, en pratique. Non, cela va sans dire, à cause de la "trahison" des chefs socialistes - piètre explication pour un marxiste - mais en raison des conditions objectives économiques, sociales et politiques qui régnaient à la fin du XIXe siècle<sup>(45)</sup>.

Les conditions politiques optimales à tout démarrage économique.

Une bourgeoisie sûre d'elle-même, de ses droits et de sa force, des structures politiques à la fois souples et fortes, un Etat fort capable d'intervenir non seulement en matière de répression policière, mais encore en matière d'initiative économique (sans toutefois jamais être submergé par l'ampleur et la multiplicité de ses responsabilités), des masses prolétariennes résignées ou réduites à accepter les durs sacrifices qu'exige toute accumulation de capitaux, et plus enclines à recourir aux commotions populaires, à l'émeute, à l'agitation sporadique et éphémère, qu'à préparer la révolution : ce sont là, à n'en point douter, des conditions optimales pour assurer le démarrage économique d'une nation. Celui-ci exige en effet d'énormes masses de capitaux : de 1834 à 1836, le capital nominal des sociétés anonymes fondées en Angleterre s'éleva à quelque 135 millions de £; à près de 262 millions de francs (or !), le capital des sociétés fondées en Belgique entre 1834 et 1838. En France, les 749 sociétés anonymes ou en commandite fondées entre 1833 et 1837, firent appel à plus de 658 millions de francs<sup>(46)</sup>.

Ni les colonies, ni la grande propriété foncière, ni le commerce maritime, ni l'austère volonté des entrepreneurs de réinvestir leurs bénéfices, ne pouvaient assurer à eux seuls la continuité d'un flux aussi puissant. Le marché international des capitaux n'était évidemment pas en état, lui non plus, de le faire (ce n'est que vers 1840 que l'Angleterre commença à pouvoir exporter des capitaux).

Dans ces conditions, il était inévitable que le prolétariat, la paysannerie, les "petites classes moyennes", dussent contribuer, en subissant la privation de tout superflu et bien souvent même du nécessaire, à jeter les bases de la nouvelle société.

En termes économiques, cela se traduit par le sacrifice des secteurs des biens de consommation et des services, au profit de l'industrie lourde.

C'est ainsi qu'en 1861, avant même que fût fondée la Première Internationale, le réseau ferroviaire français comptait près de 10.000 km,

celui de l'Allemagne, 11.724, celui des Etats-Unis, près de 50.000, celui de la Belgique, 1.800, celui de la Grande-Bretagne, plus de 16.000. Et ce que l'on dit ici des chemins de fer pourrait être répété à ce propos des canaux, des routes, des usines et des bateaux. Les classes pauvres du XIXe siècle payèrent durement le prix d'un aussi prodigieux élan, en acceptant, bon gré mal gré, un niveau de vie extrêmement bas, avec toutes les conséquences que l'on sait. Il va sans dire qu'il ne pouvait être question de sécurité sociale, de pécule de vacances, d'habitations décentes<sup>(47)</sup>, moins encore, si possible, d'équipement électro-ménager. Si le droit d'avoir des enfants à son gré fut laissé au prolétaire (et encore, Malthus joue-t-il déjà les prophètes de malheur) c'est uniquement parce que la mortalité infantile était encore très élevée.

Quand on voit à quelles difficultés quasiment insurmontables se heurtent aujourd'hui les pays économiquement attardés, à quelles difficultés s'est heurtée l'Italie à la fin du XIXe siècle où l'industrialisation coïncida avec une période d'agitation politique qui devait l'entraver sérieusement<sup>(48)</sup>; quels terribles obstacles, enfin, a rencontrés le régime soviétique (qui pourtant était fort loin de partir de zéro)<sup>(49)</sup>, durant les vingt ou trente premières années de son existence, on peut se demander s'il existe d'autres moyens de réussir le démarrage d'une économie que ceux qui furent utilisés à l'aube du siècle dernier<sup>(50)</sup>, si le consensus, un consensus quasiment général, et presque religieux, quels que soient les moyens - religieux, politiques, sociaux - utilisés pour le créer et pour le sauvegarder, n'est pas une des conditions, nécessaires et non suffisantes, pour réussir dans pareille entreprise, et si, toute forme d'opposition systématique et anticonstitutionnelle, toute volonté de rompre radicalement le consensus, à moins d'être un moyen de préparer, mais au prix de quelles souffrances et de quels sacrifices, un consensus nouveau, plus serré, plus exigeant et par conséquent moins tolérant, n'est pas finalement un facteur de retard dans la mise en train des économies.

NOTES

1. Au sens où l'entend le professeur Linz, "Opposition and control in authoritarian regimes : conceptual and theoretical problems", International Political Science Association, Grenoble Round Table Meeting, septembre 1965.
2. Au sens où l'entend le professeur Shils, "Consensus", International Political Science Association, Bruxelles, septembre 1967.
3. L. Moulin, in La Belgique et l'aide économique aux pays sous-développés, Bruxelles, Institut Royal des Relations internationales, 1959, pp. 55-59.
4. B. de Jouvenel, "The Means of Contestation", in Government and Opposition, janvier 1966, pp. 161-167.
5. L. Moulin, Le monde vivant des Religieux, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1964. Du même auteur : "Policy-making in the Religious Orders", in Government and Opposition, octobre 1965, pp. 25-54.
6. K. de Schweinitz, "Industrialization, Labor Controls and Democracy", Economic Development and Cultural Change, juillet 1959, pp. 385-404.
7. Ce fut le cas de Catherine de Russie, après la lecture du livre de Beccaria (1764). Cf. Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, s<sup>v</sup> "Capital Punishment".
8. De même en Russie, dans les années trente et quarante du XIXe siècle. Cf. G. Weil, L'éveil des nationalités et le mouvement libéral (1815-1848), Paris, 1930, p. 399 : "Il était de bon ton, chez les gens cultivés, de pouvoir dire qu'on possédait les ouvrages interdits ... Malgré les vingt-deux censures spécialisées qui fonctionnaient dans l'empire, les disciples de l'Europe ... ne cessèrent jamais d'écrire et de faire des adeptes". Et p. 400 : "la littérature "illégale", livres russes imprimés en cachette (ou même circulant manuscrits) et livres étrangers ... pénétraient sans trop de peine en contrebande". On vit même un général russe, Kisselev, faire étalage d' "idées libérales et progressives" (G. Weil, op.cit., p. 396 et 166).
9. G. Lefranc, Histoire des Doctrines Sociales dans l'Europe contemporaine, Paris, Aubier-Montaigne, vol.I (1966), pp. 63-64.
10. Bertram D. Wolfe, La jeunesse de Lénine, Paris, Calmann-Lévy (1951). Sur ce qu'était la vie en Sibérie à la fin du XIXe siècle, les lectures, les travaux qu'elle permettait, cf. Lettres de Lénine à sa famille, présentées par H. Barbusse, Paris, Rieder, 1936.



11. Paris, Librairie de l'Humanité, 1925..La préface de Lénine date du 27 avril 1917, alors qu'étaient "venus les jours de liberté". Mais dans un régime totalitaire ou fasciste moderne, qui penserait à faire paraître l'équivalent de cette brochure ?
12. Ainsi que l'atteste la série des remarquables ouvrages consacrés à "la vie quotidienne" ("En Allemagne", "sous le Second Empire", etc.), par la maison Hachette.
13. Society, Culture and Personality, New York, Harper (1947), pp. 481 et sv. Cf. également Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, s. v° "Riot", "Revolution", etc.
14. Le chartisme fut présenté comme "l'interprétation du christianisme par la classe ouvrière".
15. P. Leroux écrit en 1840 : "Jésus réalisait la pensée de Moïse, il réalisait l'"Homme-Humanité", idéal du socialisme". J'ai encore entendu chanter, dans ma jeunesse, des chants ouvriers où il était question de "Jésus qui était républicain". La pratique religieuse a disparu dans les masses urbaines bien avant que commencent à s'atténuer les aspirations religieuses.
16. G. Weill, op.cit., p. 403. E.J. Hobsbawm, Les primitifs de la révolte dans l'Europe moderne, Paris, Fayard (1966), p. 135 et sv.
17. Au demeurant, les masses ouvrières restèrent longtemps attachées à l'empire de Napoléon III (qui marque le "take-off" de l'économie française) et approuvèrent vivement sa politique étrangère. Cf. J. Droz, L. Genet et J. Vidalenc, L'époque contemporaine. I. Restauration et Révolution (1815-1871), Coll. "Clio", Paris, P.U.F., 1953, p. 77.
18. Rob. Schnerb, Le XIXe siècle. L'apogée de l'expansion européenne (1815-1914), Hist. gén. des civilisations, t.VI, Paris, P.U.F., 1955, p. 13.
19. Oeuvres complètes de K. Marx, trad. J.Molitor, Paris, A. Costes, pp. 60-61.
20. G. Weill, op.cit., p. 361 et sv.
21. Sur toute cette période, l'ouvrage décisif continue à être celui de P. Mantoux, La révolution industrielle au XVIIIe siècle. Essai sur les commencements de la grande industrie moderne en Angleterre, Paris, Genin, 1959.
22. Fr. Van Kalken, Commotions populaires en Belgique (1834-1912), Bruxelles, Office de Publicité, 1936.

23. The Stages of economic growth, Cambridge, 1960.
24. Les Marxistes, Paris, Coll. "J'ai lu" (1965), p. 220. L'oeuvre de P. Bairoch, Révolution industrielle et sous-développement, coll. "Développement économique", Paris, SEDES, 1963 : contient une série de données originales et très éclairantes sur les mécanismes du développement économique en Occident.
25. L. Epsztein, L'économie et la morale aux débuts du capitalisme industriel en France et en Grande-Bretagne, Paris, A. Colin (1966). G. Lefranc, op.cit., p. 35 et sv. M. Collinet, "Les débuts du machinisme" (1760-1840), Le Contrat social, mai-juin 1965, pp.181-195.
26. J.-B. Duroselle, Le catholicisme social en France (1822-1870), Paris, 1950. R. Talmy, Aux sources du catholicisme social. L'Ecole de la Tour du Pin, Desclée et Cie (1963). H. Haag, Les origines du catholicisme libéral en Belgique (1789-1839), Louvain, 1950. G. Hoog, Histoire du catholicisme social en France, 1871-1931, Paris, Domat, (1946).
27. J. Droz, op.cit., p. 46.
28. Il est remarquable sans doute que la société ait vu surgir, pratiquement à la même époque, les Pères de l'athéisme moderne, de l'anarchisme, du marxisme, du positivisme et de l'existentialisme; mais c'est nous qui le constatons, grâce au recul de l'histoire.
29. Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, s. v° "Riot", "Mob", "Mutiny", "Agitation", etc.
30. E.J. Hobsbawm, op.cit.
31. L'échec final des anarchistes et des anarcho-syndicalistes, si émouvant qu'il soit à bien des égards, peut apparaître comme la démonstration par les faits des erreurs tactiques et stratégiques que comporte pareille prise de position. Cf. D. Guérin, L'anarchisme, Paris, N.R.F. (1965). A. Sergent et Cl. Harmel, Histoire de l'Anarchie, Paris, le Portulan (1949). Voline, La révolution inconnue 1917-1921, 1e partie, Paris (1947). Pour la période de l'histoire russe qui va de 1825 à 1905, cf. pp. 23 à 60.
32. Dans son Dictionnaire politique publié à Paris, en 1864 (donc sous Napoléon III), M. Block, s. v° "Insurrection", écrit que, grâce "aux concessions faites à la démocratie", "les masses ont, pour s'abriter désormais dans les luttes qui s'engagent entre elles et l'autorité, un rempart plus élevé que les barricades des carrefours : ce sont les droits chaque jour plus étendus dont l'usage pacifique et régulier est devenu comme une arme toujours braquée sur l'arbitraire et le despotisme". Sur l'état d'esprit de la classe ouvrière dans les

- années soixante et l'amélioration de son niveau de vie, cf. G. Duveau, La vie ouvrière en France sous le Second Empire, Thèse, Paris, 1946.
33. En partie par suite de l'armement répressif mis aux mains de l'Etat moderne, des moyens de communication dont il dispose et encore, en partie, en raison de l'"haussmannisation" des grandes villes (Paris, Vienne, etc.) sans doute; mais aussi parce que ces moyens d'opposition politique n'étaient plus adaptés aux conditions de la nouvelle société ni au type de travailleurs qui s'y développait.
  34. G. Lefranc, op.cit., t.I, p. 34 et passim.
  35. E. Hobsbawm, op.cit., p. 149 et sv. G. Weill, op.cit., p. 329 et 334.
  36. K. de Schweinitz, op.cit., pp. 385-404.
  37. En Amérique, par contre, c'est l'existence de terres libres (ou, plus exactement, libérées de la présence des Indiens) qui fit office de "soupape de sûreté".
  38. G. Weill, op.cit., p. 329.
  39. E. Hobsbawm, op.cit., p. 137.
  40. Sur le racisme de la "gauche", cf. D. Caute, La Gauche en Europe depuis 1789, Paris, Hachette, 1966, p. 18.
  41. La grande métamorphose du XXe siècle. Essais sur quelques problèmes de l'humanité d'aujourd'hui, Paris, P.U.F., 1961, p. 14.
  42. R. Schnerb, op.cit., p. 243.
  43. Même situation en Amérique du Sud. Cf. par contre, les Etats-Unis qui, pour provoquer leur démarrage économique, commencèrent par emprunter à l'Occident ses techniques (politiques notamment), ses masses d'hommes déjà formés, ses idéaux démocratiques et "libéraux" et jusqu'en 1914, ses capitaux.
  44. Dans sa thèse, Le vocabulaire politique et social en France de 1869 à 1872, à travers les oeuvres des écrivains, les revues et les journaux, Paris, Larousse (1962), J. Dubois établit fort bien la continuité de 1848, sinon 1793, à 1870. Une étude sur le vocabulaire 1967 des militants et des hommes politiques établirait aisément que, mis à part quelques mots techniques, comme "inflation" ou "récession", ou quelques mots nouveaux : "castrisme", "maoïsme", etc., il n'a guère évolué : des mots tels que "révolution", "prolétariat", "impérialisme", conservent leurs fidèles.

45. Sur ce que sont désormais les conflits, oppositions et compromis dans un pays comme la Belgique de 1966, cf. la belle étude du professeur Val R. Lorwin, publiée dans le Courrier Hebdomadaire du C.R.I.S.P. n° 323, 10 juin 1966. Sur "l'avenir de l'opposition dans les démocraties", cf. évidemment l'ouvrage que Rob. A. Dahl a consacré à la question (Paris, Futuribles, 1966), ainsi que le n° 2, janvier 1966 de Government and Opposition.
46. L. Epsztein, op.cit., pp. 36-39.
47. "La sécurité exige à la fois une certaine rigidité et une certaine égalité. La croissance implique au contraire une certaine élasticité, une faculté nouvelle de répondre à des appels imprévus, et une certaine inégalité". H. Guitton, "Le rapport entre le progrès du bien-être et le progrès humain", Bulletin International des Sciences Sociales de l'UNESCO, n° 2-1954, p. 203. Ceci dans une économie moderne, avancée, puissante ...
48. Al. Gerschenkron, "Osservazioni sul saggio di sviluppo industriale dell'Italia : 1881-1913", Moneta e Credito, 1er et 2e trimestres 1956, pp. 50 à 60.
49. Parmi les très nombreux ouvrages qui établissent ce fait, ne citons que Edm. Théry, La transformation économique de la Russie, Paris, 1914. Serge N. Prokopovicz, Histoire économique de l'U.R.S.S., Paris, Flammarion, 1952. Al. Gerschenkron, "The Rate of industrial growth in Russia since 1885", J. of Econ. Story, Suppl. VII, 1947. V.K. Yatsunsky, "Main features of industrialization in Russia before 1917", Première Conférence internationale d'Histoire économique, Stockholm, août 1960. R.W. Goldsmith, "The economic growth of Tsarist Russia, 1860-1961", Economic Development and Cultural Change, avril 1961. A. Kahan, "Entrepreneurship in the early development of iron manufacturing in Russia", Economic Development and Cultural Change, juillet 1962. A. Michelson, L'essor économique de la Russie avant 1914, Paris, 1965.
50. Même à notre époque, et pour un pays comme la France, "la révolution est moins sociale que démographique et économique" (Fr. Perroux, "Les problèmes sociaux dans la politique économique au niveau de l'économie nationale", Problèmes sociaux dans la politique économique, Société royale d'Economie politique, Bruxelles, t.I, 1956, p.411). "Les principales améliorations que la masse des travailleurs a obtenues ces années récentes, lui sont venues non pas de violences révolutionnaires, non pas de réformes de structure, mais bien plutôt d'un accroissement de la production économique". Que dire alors des pays à l'aube de leur démarrage économique !

Summary

1. The political regimes operating in the West in the first half of the 19th century were authoritarian regimes derived from societies which, for centuries, had known regimes of law, freedoms and privileges, and guaranteed by them. They permitted therefore certain forms of opposition within the system, which acted as safety valves and as possible factors of innovation, hence progress.

2. Social consensus, the common denominator of all members of 19th century society, was much greater than we are led to believe by the often violent commotions which characterize European history at that time. Hence the absence of radical revolutionary opposition, or at least its great weakness and the failures resulting from that weakness.

3. The initial capitalist regime did give birth to proletarians; but for reasons explained in the paper, the proletarians became fully conscious of their condition and organized themselves only after that economic regime had gone further than the take-off stage. The idea of a revolution had already by then lost much of its fascination, and perhaps of its historic necessity.

4. This absence of a revolution was one of the fundamental factors, of the necessary conditions, of the intense economic take-off of the western nations, therefore of their advance in this field, and of the general welfare which resulted from it.

Résumé : cf. p. 1.

Br/Consensus/7

"Consensus and dissent, with special reference  
to the developing countries"

CONSENSUS AND DISSENSUS IN GHANA

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SEVENTH WORLD CONGRESS  
BRUSSELS

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SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR A TYPOLOGY OF LATIN AMERICAN  
POLITICAL SYSTEMS \*

by Horacio H. Godoy  
and Carlos Fortin \*\*

Latin America and the Uses of Typologies.

Typology building seems to be a particularly popular activity among area specialists. This is certainly not surprising, since typologies are intellectual devices especially well suited for the meaningful organization of large masses of data. However, as applied to political area studies, typology construction seems to take on special characteristics.

From the viewpoint of political analysis, an area appears as a group of political systems that are regarded as a unit mainly in terms of their geographical position. This is not to say that other criteria are not superimposed on this one, or that this one is not related with other, more significant features of the systems involved. It is, though, to say that the political area specialist is generally confronted with the need to study, describe, analyse, and teach about, a reality which, whatever its degree of underlying unity, is still composed of independent and heterogeneous complex units, each of them exhibiting a more or less peculiar structure and history. For academic and other reasons, the scholar cannot hope to specialize on each and every one of the countries of the area, or teach separate courses on all of them. He is then compelled to resort to typologies as ways of organizing his universe of interest for purposes of his own understanding and that of his students. What is called for is a

classification that subsumes under relatively few types the concrete political systems of the area, the types being defined in terms of clusters of abstract variables. Often, the selection of the variables is done with more regard to their conceptual simplicity than to their analytical power, and usually no systematic reference is made to the concrete historical process underlying the relative position of each country in each variable, which is the only way to give meaning to the data. The end product, instead of an analytic and heuristic instrument is rather just a mnemonic and pedagogical device, an economic way of summarizing existing information with a tolerable degree of distortion.

It is suggested that a good deal of the current typological work on Latin America is of the latter kind.<sup>1</sup> But, does it have to be? That is, is it possible to build a typology of Latin American political systems which is of analytical and interpretive value? Although the following paragraphs will not offer an answer to this question, they will attempt an exploration of the conditions under which it can be answered empirically.

#### The General Methodological Orientation.

It has already been hinted that the kind of typology that is needed is one that attempts to capture the essential structural characteristics of the Latin American polities as they have emerged from their historical, social, economic, and cultural processes, rather than one that involves the simple ranking of the countries along abstract political variables in most cases derived from the study of other areas whose historical process and structural conditions are different. This does not exclude the use of abstract



variables in order to characterize the different systems; it only tries to locate those variables in their proper structural and historical context, given by the network of the relationships among themselves and with the rest of the social structure, and by the definition of the concrete social forces in operation within it. The overall characterization of each political system is not seen only as a combination of universal features in varying proportions, but rather as a dynamic complex of relations among essential political variables, and between them and the general social structure, -including the relationships among concrete social groups- which, as such, is historically determined. Once this is done, the structural similarities and differences placed in their comprehensive context can provide reliable criteria to classify countries and characterize types, if this is possible at all.

At this point it will have become apparent that a political typology like the one outlined above has to be closely connected with the problem of the development -economic and otherwise- of the Latin American countries, and that, consequently, it has to incorporate in one fashion or another social, economic, and other non-political features. The relevant question that a typology may help to answer is, How does the power process affect, and is in turn affected by, the total development of the Latin American societies?

In order to start approaching that question at least two kinds of inquiry seem to be in order. The first could be called cross-sectional, and would imply an attempt to characterize the present situation of the Latin American countries in terms of a set of variables regarded as basic for the operation of the whole of their political systems; the second could be called developmental,

and would involve an effort to redescribe the situation in terms of the tensions among social forces, including classes, political movements, interest groups, elites, and individuals, their transformation through time and the dynamics of it, and the interrelationship between them and the total situation of which the variables are regarded as convenient indicators. It will be noted that the two inquiries are really two sides of the same one, which can be separated for purposes of describing the procedure but not in its actual application. The distinction between the two intellectual operations recommends itself, though, insofar as it may help avoid the dangers of both naive historicism and abstract, a-historical formalism, and emphasize the combined use of quantitative variables and historical materials.

#### Cross-Sectional Analysis: The Basic Variables.

There is no dearth of proposals about internal political variables according to which Latin American countries can be classified.<sup>2</sup>

Strangely enough, however; it is rather infrequent to find references to variables external to the system but which, even on cursory inspection, appear as decisive for the structural definition of the Latin American polities. Thus, external dependence is generally neglected as a criterion to describe and classify Latin American countries.<sup>3</sup>

It is suggested that no adequate structural description of the Latin American countries can be made without systematically incorporating both internal and external characteristics, as well as the interrelationship among them. Basic structural variables

with the general interest more at heart, pinned their faith on mechanized agriculture, still not successfully tested in West Africa. Hopes of this kind (found in all modern political systems) are bound to remain at least partly unfulfilled; from the standpoint of the supporters, all political programmes have an aspect of the cargo cult about them.<sup>5</sup> While the failure, or postponement, of expected benefits may lead to a temporary reinforcement of beliefs, in the end a measure of disillusionment is bound to set in.<sup>6</sup> In multi-party régimes, the movement in and out of power provides a mechanism whereby such beliefs can continue to be sustained without rejecting the system itself; the possibility of a new President, or the next Prime Minister, represents the prospect of a New Dawn, at least for a substantial part of the electorate; even the cabinet reshuffle has its cathartic effects. In monarchical régimes a similar function is served by the natural turnover of royalty; a new ruler brings into being new hopes, 'a new Elizabethan age'. Indeed, in some societies, a new era began with every reign; the calendar was a calendar of kings. In others, the desire to instal a new ruler may have led to the extinction of the old.<sup>7</sup> But in one-party states, succession to high office can rarely be routinized; even open discussion of the problem is likely to be identified as potential rebellion. Consequently there is no such outlet, no safety valve, for the frustration that inevitably arises, not only out of the power situation, but also from the inevitable discrepancy between expected and actual returns.<sup>8</sup> In the absence of either institutionalised 'rituals of rebellion'<sup>9</sup> or anticipated changes of personnel, commitment (if not 'consensus') is bound to diminish with the passage of

time; the revolutionary momentum cannot be indefinitely sustained; slogans such as 'Nkrumah will never die' are no balm for incipient discontent.

The rise and fall of such a ruler's 'popularity rating' (or that of his government), the developmental cycle of support for change-oriented leadership, is concealed by the manipulation of ballots, by organised demonstrations and by people's inhibitions about openly expressing their views.

In many respects this progress of events, the disenchantment of the populace, exemplifies Frantz Fanon's model for the aftermath of independence.

'The bourgeoisie who are in power vainly increase the number of processions; the masses have no illusions. They are hungry; and the police officers, though they are now Africans, do not serve to reassure them particularly. The masses begin to sulk; they turn away from this nation in which they have been given no place..... Since [independence the] party has sadly disintegrated; nothing is left but the shell of a party, the name, the emblem, the motto.... Today the party's mission is to deliver to the people the instructions which issue from the summit.... After independence, the party sinks into an extraordinary lethargy. The militants are only called upon when so-called popular manifestations are afoot, or international conferences, or independence celebrations. The local party leaders are given administrative posts, the party becomes an administration... The party is becoming a means of private advancement' (1967: 137-138).

Fanon regarded this progression as characteristic of 'bourgeois' parties alone. The Convention People's Party was not of this kind, though for some it became a means of attaining bourgeois status: indeed, the system of stratification in Africa south of the Sahara hardly allowed of the growth of parties which were differentiated along lines of economically based classes. Orthodox Marxist attempts to apply class

analysis to Africa usually fail to recognize the quite different kind of productive relationships that existed in the pre-industrial systems, and that still exist today.<sup>10</sup> Neither here, nor in other spheres of social life, does the mechanical importation of European schemas have much to contribute to Africa. As far as Fanon's analysis is concerned, his idealistic viewpoint prevents him from isolating the general factors in the growth cycle of popular support that are common to all regimes, whether the parties are 'single' or 'multiple', 'bourgeois' or 'mass', 'progressive' or 'reactionary', 'left' or 'right'.

When the régime in Ghana ended, by sudden and unanticipated military moves, the reaction was powerful and immediate; consensus, at least about the immediate past, was overwhelming, and even ministers and confidants of the ex-President hastened to express their misgivings; at least in the towns, the masses enthusiastically celebrated their relief; the University became, overnight, a centre of vigorous discussion about the affairs of state, and has continued as such to this day (July 1967).

The reaction to the coup was primarily negative in the sense that it was directed first and foremost towards eliminating the faults of the past. 'What went wrong in Ghana?' was the title of a popular series of lectures, launched in March 1966 by the extra-mural department of the University. On the day of the coup itself, an element of spontaneous regression was very noticeable. I overheard a couple refer jokingly to their country as Gold Coast rather than Ghana, and there were shouts for the former opposition party (N.L.M.) until it was rumoured that Army policy was against all parties, not only the one which had recently monopolized political office.

This situation did not, of course, persist. Agreement about the past was accompanied by an increasing diversity of view about future action. Many constitutional flowers are now in bud. Some would reject political parties, single or multiple; others would retain military rule, and others stress the role of traditional rulers.<sup>11</sup> No doubt this plurality of belief, this condition of loose ideological structure will persist until the situation is crystallized, until opinion is mobilized, for example, by the formation of political parties that serve to polarize in simple binary form the current diversity of views.

If any new consensus were to develop this might be expected among the fairly homogeneous body of students at the University of Ghana, Legon. However, a recent survey<sup>12</sup> shows a considerable range of views even about something as basic as the return to civilian rule. 'About one third think civilian rule should come within eighteen months, but 43% think it will take at least five years or that no limits can be set' (p. 7). While students were in complete agreement about rejecting one-party rule, a tenth of the students rejected political parties altogether. As with the Chiefs, parties were seen as instruments of conflict rather than as bases of consensus.

The issues on which the students did show large measures of agreement, namely the desirability of a unitary constitution (76%) and a unicameral legislature (72%), were rather less significant than those on which they showed a great spread of opinion, or even a retreat from decision making. The desire for a prolongation of army rule was expressed before Dr. Busia's reminder of the dangers facing military governments, a timely reminder that

was quickly followed by an attempted coup on April 17th, 1967.<sup>13</sup> But the basis of this desire appears to be not so much a positive inclination to military government so much as fear of the alternative possibilities. Indeed, the same might be said for no-party proposals supported by the Chiefs, for as yet no-one knows what a no-party electoral system would look like. In putting this view before the Constitutional Committee, one of the supporting speakers said 'the chiefs did not have in mind that the country should stick forever to no-party government; they intended the system to be only a stop-gap, while the country was getting 'ripe' for party politics'.<sup>14</sup> This lack of certainty is also apparent from the fact that 25% of students gave no answer when asked 'What measures would you suggest for encouraging a stable and continuous democratic system in Ghana?'

The effect of relaxing the general pressure towards 'enforced consensus', of lifting the lid, can be seen not only in ideological uncertainty but also in restlessness to discipline of any kind; the more permissive atmosphere is more tolerant of protest and of dissent. The results of political decompression are most visible in the student population where 'revolts' have occurred both at the Universities and in the schools. The former were discussed by Professor A. Kwapong, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ghana, in his address to the Congregation on 18/3/67.

'Since the return of freedom to this country, we have witnessed a wave of restlessness and a sense of malaise among the young in our schools and Universities. In a way, this questioning of authority and restlessness have always been the natural condition of the young throughout history,

and we have all of us been young before. .... For the past six years, until the 24th of February, 1966, freedom of expression and conscience, and with this, freedom of the young to rebel had been effectively silenced. Now, with the removal of our frustrations and the return of liberty, there is the danger that the sudden access of this almost unfamiliar blessing may be taken by some for licence....'

These reactions against authority occurred at the Universities of Legon and Kumasi (where they led to the resignation of the principal) and in a number of secondary schools. It has been suggested that these activities were connected with the tightening up of entrance standards to the University. While educational advancement is certainly a matter of considerable concern (after the Army, the University is now the main avenue of social advance now that party politics are banned), the revolts started long before there were any announced or even anticipated changes.<sup>15</sup> And in the University at least, the aims of the students were domestic rather than educational or 'political'.<sup>16</sup>

In Ghana today there is continual exploration of alternative possibilities for good government. Many are in favour of a multi-party system, and they are backed by a good deal of legal thinking which, having been in the forefront of the early phases of nationalist endeavour, is now oriented towards those 'Western' forms in which they see 'the law' and themselves as most easily operating. All, however, are aware that a multi-party system can simply be a prelude to the establishment of a one-party regime by the victors. Nowhere in independent Africa has a regime allowed itself to be changed by means of the ballot box.<sup>17</sup> This situation does not arise from 'political immaturity' but from the rejection (primarily by political leaders) of specific ways of the transmitting of



office implicit in the electoral system. Unless these rules of the game are accepted by the participants, the result must be a one-party régime, either nominally (as in the regions of Nigeria) or legally (as in Ghana). When this happens, the only instrument of change is the Armed Forces.

It is the fear that the multi-party will be manipulated by those who don't accept its basic rules which makes many Ghanzians wary of a recourse to a political system where the party is the all-dominating institution it has so often become in Africa and elsewhere. But such hesitation is also motivated by the fear of a return to the violence of extra-electoral conflict that occurred between the C.P.P. (Convention People's Party) and the N.L.M. (National Liberation Movement) during the years 1954 to 1956.<sup>18</sup>

The discussion concerning the no-party state is a widespread reaction to one-party rule and the violence that marked the final years of two-party system. A recent example of this discussion is K.O. Adjei: 'No party system - a revolution in political thinking', The Ashanti Pioneer, 17/6/67; in 'Proper approach to party politics is needed', The Ghanaian Times, 17/6/67, H.K. Bidi Setsoafia advocates a return to party politics, but he does so very guardedly, giving sympathetic treatment to both the chiefs' case and to the suggestion put forward by Mr. Yaw Twumasi, University Lecturer in Political Science and editor of the influential Legon Observer, that 'perhaps the safest way to take in planning the future constitution of this country was to build on our chieftaincy, our institution which has for many years been practised in this country, than perhaps adopting again party politics which is completely foreign to us in Ghana'. In a situation of political reversal, where a new system of government and its operators have

been found wanting on grounds both of morality<sup>19</sup> and social organisation, it is not surprising that there should have been a renewal of interest in the chiefship and in churches.

It is considerations of this kind, combined with a general distrust of 'politicians' (which has increased since a plethora of commissions publicly revealed their private activities) that makes many people advocate a prolongation of military rule or express an aversion to party government. Such an attitude immediately raises grave problems. If parties are out, the main problem for an electoral system becomes the selection of candidates and the formulation and communication of alternative policies. The suggested solutions to the initial choice of candidates (the selection of the 'eligibles') vary between central nomination by Parliament or by temporary parties ('to be dissolved after the election') and local nomination by bodies of rate-payers, chiefs, trades unions, etc.

Such ideas, as yet adumbrated only in memos to Commissions, letters to the newspapers and in personal discussions, are countered by the constitutional traditionalists. These others believe that it was the party and the politicians who have failed, not the system itself.<sup>20</sup> As one journalist recently asked, 'If the party politics has succeeded in many other parts of the world, why should it not succeed in Africa?'<sup>21</sup>

An attempt to answer this fundamental question is an essential preliminary to the planning of any new governmental system. It is not sufficient to pronounce upon the necessity for, or the futility of, the 'Westminster model' without trying to analyse the particular difficulties involved. We

should begin by recognising the costs (as well as the gains) of the multi-party system. Such a system means nothing unless there is some oscillation between the parties; in a situation of 'pure' competition, the developmental trends we have already noted will ensure that such changes occur. If the opposing parties do not simply offer the electorate a change of personnel, but a change of policy as well, then it is clear that an element of discontinuity will be introduced into key areas of planning. The problem is a basic one for all socialist parties in an electoral regime, whether in Europe, Asia or Africa, and in just the same way the system often acts as a brake on unrestricted 'capitalism'. But continuity of planning and the mobilisation of national effort may be seen as having greater importance in those new nations where rapid development is the major aim of the ruling élites; and these ends the single party can more easily promote.

However, the principal threat to multi-party rule is not, I think, the planned economy. Nor (as I have remarked) is it a question of 'political immaturity'; there is nothing immature about wanting to consolidate one's power. Neither is it only a matter (as some of the present defenders of the multi-party system suggest)<sup>22</sup> of the venality of particular politicians. While the 'intellectual' politicians of present-day Ghana are certainly not 'rogues', the demagogic atmosphere of competitive politics will bring to the fore less conscientious contestants and less scrupulous tactics.

If the problem lay only on the 'political' level, it would be easier to deal with. But in a situation where superiors are traditionally offered gifts of solicitation and thanksgiving, where politicians (like Chiefs in

earlier times) can easily influence appointments to jobs, where these jobs are becoming increasingly scarce as the growth of education outstrips the capacity to absorb the educated in non-traditional occupations, under these conditions, support is easily bought by those who succeed in reaching positions of power. Moreover, those holding such positions, lucrative in terms of both salary and power, have little to fall back on when they relinquish their grip on office. In Britain, the defeated M.P. can retire to a company directorship or a trades union post; in West Africa, the return to become village schoolmaster or council clerk represents a great drop both in salary and status, and even these jobs may fall within the patronage of one's political opponents.

This general problem of developing countries crops up in a particular form in present-day Ghana. While the party machinery virtually disappeared overnight, the absorption into other jobs of former Members of Parliament, District Commissioners and Party Officials was a major social problem. In those areas in Northern Ghana with which I am personally acquainted, the majority of such individuals have returned to their former occupations, usually school teaching. But some had no substantial qualifications for a 'white-collar' job, and others have been unwilling to make the adjustment; these are either 'roaming' or 'farming', that is, sitting around the house. Clearly this category of ex-functionary represents a potential focus for dissatisfaction; even those among them who now express doubts about the previous régime cannot help regretting the glory it imparted to their lives. It was not surprising, therefore, that when the coup of Lieutenant Arthur on April 17th looked like being successful (he had captured the radio

and proclaimed his victory), some of these former officials openly celebrated the demise of the National Liberation Council, even though there was no suggestion that the new junta was more inclined to support Nkrumah than the first. Many of the individuals who engaged in this premature rejoicing were promptly placed under protective custody. Nevertheless, there is little evidence to show that the majority were primarily interested in the re-establishment of the previous régime. It was rather the re-occupation of their former positions; and they will be equally anxious to 'get their own back' when an electoral system offers them the opportunity.

The problems of party government in developing countries like Ghana, then, lie not so much in a lack of political education, nor in the failure to achieve consensus, as in the economic and social situation of the Third World. With the virtual absence of private employers, those who want jobs have to get them from government agencies; the educated exceed the employed. The temptations to manipulate are enormous and there is little institutional plurality to compensate, and few checks and balances to the exercise of politicians' power. Under such conditions we cannot visualize effective multi-party government of a western kind; while to many, the costs of one-party rule make this a yet less attractive proposition. The military provide the only ultimate sanction against the monopolisation of power, and, while they claim to regard their rule as only temporary (and indeed appear to act on this assumption) their first intervention is hardly likely to be their last.

The alternation of civilian and military rule will, I think, dominate the pattern of West African government over many years to come, and such a pattern will to some degree reflect popular demands, or at least receive the approbation of the masses. But the swing of the pendulum could be controlled, by trying to limit the role of political parties and of the military forces.

In suggesting that an attempt could be made to restrict the power and function of parties, we need to remind ourselves that there is, after all, no divine law that allows them to operate, everywhere, in a situation of unhibited competition; one could even legislate for a regular rotation between alternative lists (as in nineteenth century Portugal), a system which provides a considerable check upon the action of the political haves against the temporary have-nots. What would be the sanctions against a breach of the rules? Here one has to recognize the de facto role of the army in political systems of all kinds, but especially in the new nations. It would seem possible to allocate to the army (or perhaps a Supreme Court, backed by the Army) the function of preserving the agreed constitution. To specify the conditions under which the Army should intervene might at least limit its arbitrary role in government and make its interference less unpredictable than it is now in so many West African countries. To make this attempt is to recognize that, for any political system, while consensus is desirable, force is essential.

There are many reasons why academic observers of the Ghanaian scene, political scientists, historians, sociologists, failed to assess reaction to a coup, in particular the virtually complete disintegration of the party and its auxiliaries. To discuss all these reasons here would be unnecessary, but there is one point of general interest which is not easily sidestepped.

Academic observers from Western Europe and America have inevitably tended to extrapolate from their own cultural experience in analysing contemporary Africa. They have placed great stress on research into the growth of political parties, on electoral processes, on the development of consensus, and on other elements in the political system that strike a chord in their own tradition. They tend to make a rigid distinction between consensus as the instrument of politicians and force as the instrument of the military. A clearer appreciation of their own past and indeed present might have modified this view; so too would a recognition that a state organisation involves the control of armed force.

The idealist position over-emphasises the role of ideological consensus, and such a view is reinforced by the anthropological approach, recently imported into 'modern' political studies, that calls for an analysis of the 'political culture'. As in many 'anthropological' studies, culture gets reified, norms rigidified, social action homogenized, and 'models' acquire a specious generality and an unsanctioned authority.<sup>23</sup>

The situation in contemporary Ghana illustrates the ease with which apparent support can evaporate, especially following a change from a condition of 'enforced consensus'. One aspect of the reaction to political

decompression is a state of ideological restlessness, and a proliferation of solutions to the problems of social organisation. In Ghana, these preferred solutions do not derive primarily from any systematic ideology, but consist of attempts to arrive at 'more adequate' social arrangements by building upon certain pre-existing elements of organisation and belief, and trying to arrive at new combinations.

Just as western social science has tended to place too much stress upon consensus, as against coercion, so too it has given too much attention to ideology and belief as 'systems' on the group and individual level.

In the recent volume on Ideology and Discontent (ed. D.E. Apter)<sup>24</sup>, we are offered little by way of a definition of ideology, apart from the editorially approved statement of Erikson that it is 'an unconscious tendency underlying religious and scientific thought as well as political thought'.<sup>25</sup> Given the somewhat limited techniques that social scientists have produced to deal with conscious elements in verbal (and quasi-verbal) behaviour, it is difficult to see them making much headway with the unconscious. Indeed, another contributor finds the term 'ideology' so muddled by diverse uses that he substitutes 'belief system' defined as 'a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence'.<sup>26</sup>

In the last analysis, all behaviour of man and nature is 'functionally interdependent'. The question here is one of relevance. Too great a stress on the systematic aspects of beliefs, ideologies, societies and cultures renders incomprehensible the inconsistencies in behaviour



(on 'normative' and 'actual' levels), the contradictions between attitudinal elements ('personal' and 'group') and the developmental aspects of belief. The logic behind the internal dynamics of the changing situations that characterise Africa today lie not so much in functional interdependence of belief, nor in the coherence of culture, but in the conflicts within social structure and in the fact that on the folk level, beliefs are rarely as systematic, as consensual, as univalent, as they are presented analytically. Comprehensive ideologies, systematic structures of belief, these are social artefacts of strictly limited distribution, both within and across societies.

Appendix. The New Nations and the Problem of Succession.

In this paper I have referred to the problems raised by succession to high office when hereditary or electoral methods are abandoned in favour of a one (or no) party régime. Succession problems are critical in every political system, indeed, to continuing organisations of all kinds. But the position is aggravated in new nations by the lop-sided age-distribution of office holders. The disappearance of colonial administrators, the rapid educational advance, the many new jobs, political and other created by independence, all this has meant that most senior posts are held by young men and women. In northern Ghana few Members of Parliament and District Commissioners could have been over 45, since they represented the first generation of students trained to teach. In the University few members of staff are over 45. In the Army, a similar situation obtains. I do not wish to discuss whether the comparative youthfulness of office holders is in itself a factor leading to instability. But, insofar as it blocks

promotion for the next generation, it inevitably creates tensions. Not only will the new wave be unable to advance as rapidly as their predecessors, they will in fact be kept out of office longer than their equivalents in organisations with a more balanced age distribution.

The consequences of this fact can be far from trivial, whether among the military, the professors, the politicians or the administrators. One example of the underlying tensions was brought out at the trial of the leaders of the attempted coup of April 17th. There was little 'political' motive for this coup, apart from the desire for advancement. Lieutenant Arthur, leader of 'Operation Guitar-Boy' (the name in itself is significant), had been commissioned only in 1963 and was acting commander of a squadron of the Reconnaissance Regiment stationed on the Togo border. According to a report of his trial, 'he and other officers discussed national affairs, including unemployment and army promotion, and another officer remarked that the Army was top-heavy; Arthur seems to have felt that there were too many senior officers, some of them young, who were preventing others' promotion. He also thought the N.I.C. was amassing wealth and betraying the aims of the February 24 revolution' (West Africa, 13/5/67). Another of Arthur's intentions was to become 'the first lieutenant ever to seize power' (West Africa, 6/5/67). The whole plan of the operation followed closely upon the earlier coup of Colonel Kotoka, the dawn approach disguised as an operation, informing the troupes at the gates of the capital, the assault on radio, palace and airport, all demonstrating the strongly 'infectious' element in the series of military take-overs in West Africa.

But another way in which the attempted coup was to have followed the first lay in the projected re-organisation of the military hierarchy.

'On the formation of the new junta,' Arthur stated, 'I counted all Colonels and above out because I knew in the coup I would eliminate all of them'.

There was no question of discriminating on political or personal grounds: you simply remove the top echelons. Any army take-over is bound to lead to a re-shuffling of ranks on extra-military grounds, which disturbs the existing system of promotion in the organisation.

While this age-distribution of office holders is an intrinsic feature of the social structure of new nations at a specific stage in their development, certain steps can be taken to mitigate the potential conflict; these are (i) the temporary introduction of an earlier retiring age, (ii) the adoption of a rotational system, setting a specific time limit upon the occupation of any office by one man. Such measures are necessary not only to reduce conflicts deriving from succession - what I have elsewhere called the 'Prince Hal' situation, but also to lessen the administrative and intellectual inertia that can occur when men hold on to high office for too long in the face of ambitious subordinates.

NOTES

1. The Young Pioneers was the youth wing of the one-party, the Convention People's Party (C.P.P.).
2. Even here, the dropping of a paper into a box with a similar mark, cannot, as many numerical studies tend to assume, be taken as an equivalent act in different communities at different times. Voting is a social action whose meaning depends upon the particular situation; this fact presents a source of complication for cross-cultural psephology.
3. The 'balance of presentation' clearly differed from place to place, depending upon the local political situation, control of mass media, etc.
4. In this kind of a situation the reactions of foreign residents need to be treated with particular care; since their major ties (of kinship, citizenship etc.) lie elsewhere and since they are occupationally more mobile, they are freer to take risks in their comments; in any case, these would not have earned them detention, but at worst expulsion. Unlike a country's citizens, they always carry a return ticket in their pocket, a fact that conditions their assessment of the political situation.
5. See P. Worsley, The Trumpet shall Sound, London, MacGibbon and Kee, 1957.
6. See L. Festinger's work on cognitive dissonance, and in particular, L. Festinger, H.W. Riecken and S. Schachter, When Prophecy Fails, Minneapolis, 1956.
7. This is, of course, a central theme of Sir James Frazer's work 'The Golden Bough'.
8. See my discussion in Succession to High Office (ed. Goody), Cambridge Papers in Social Anthropology, Vol. 4, Cambridge University Press, 1966.
9. Gluckman M. Rituals of Rebellion, Manchester University Press, 1954.

10. This point is appreciated by Max Gluckman and Arthur Lewis. The latter comments:

'West African politics is not a Marxist-type struggle between haves and have-nots. Neither is it a struggle between a new modernising middle-class elite and a backward aristocracy.

West African society does not fit into the Marxist categories. The area is under-populated, so land is abundant, and in most tribes a man has a right to as much land as he can cultivate. Hence landlords, rents, oppressed peasants and landless labourers are rare..... Landlordism is not a political factor. Neither is capitalism.' (1965: 18)

The basic reason behind this situation is technological; nowhere in Africa do you find any great development of intensive agriculture because nowhere do you find the plough. The implications of this fact are rarely understood by those historians who talk of African 'feudalism', nor yet by those agriculturalists who want to jump straight from hoe to tractor. I have elaborated this point elsewhere, in a discussion of African productive technology before the coming of the petrol engine.

11. The Joint Standing Committee of the House of Chiefs submitted a memorandum to the Constitutional Committee who were hearing views on future political organisation. In presenting this statement the Adansihene advocated no-party government because of the 'inherent evils' of the party system. 'Western democracy was imposed on this country by a few educated people... our proposals can create for this country a government by consent without incurring the unsavoury features of party politics... He said although they recommended the banning of political parties, they were not against people with common political ideology coming together. The Chairman of the Constitutional Committee, the Chief Justice of Ghana, then asked them to reconsider this view' (Daily Graphic 23/6/67).

12. M. Peil and E.O. Odotei, 'Return to Civilian Rule (Report on a survey of university students)', The Legon Observer 2 (1967), 12, 7-9; a randomly selected 10% sample of 198 students were interviewed in February 1967.
13. See K.A. Busia, "One Year after the Coup", lecture delivered on March 30th, 1967, The Legon Observer, 2, 8, (14-27 April, 1967) "Military regimes are notoriously unstable. Africa has so far not shown any signs that her military régimes will be an exception to the historical pattern".  
Dr. Busia was commenting on a speech of Brigadier Afrifa and was in turn criticized by Professor Adu Boahen for wanting so swift a return to civilian rule.
14. Daily Graphic 26/6/67.
15. For example, the Asanteman Secondary School, Kumasi, was temporarily closed for a month (May to June 1967) following student violence. Students claimed that the Headmaster registered five students as private candidates for the G.C.E. examination, an allegation later denied by the African Examinations Council (Evening News, 19/6/67). The extent of the problem can be seen from the fact that two days earlier the Ghanaian Times reported the warning of Lt. Col. E.A. Yeboah, member of the Eastern Region Committee of Administration, against students' strikes and demonstrations (17/6/67). Conflict at Asanteman had developed over the year and was partly due to the measures introduced by a new headmaster trying to rectify a situation that had arisen under the previous non-graduate head. But, as at Nungua and elsewhere, an element of 'student power' was present; the freer atmosphere encouraged protest. Moreover, Nkrumah himself had been overthrown by force; and the process of 'destooling' a leader by pressure from below was and still is a widespread feature of the traditional sector of Akan life.

16. For example, in July 1966 the students at Akanofe Hall, Legon, wanted to use a room reserved for seminar staff as a television room and turned to activist methods when they were refused.
17. In 1967 Sierra Leone almost effected such a change, but a close finish in the electoral competition and a subsequent recourse to the army led to the collapse of the parliamentary system and its replacement by a military régime.
18. For a detailed account of these struggles see Dennis Austin: Politics in Ghana 1946-60, London, O.U.P., 1964.
19. There are those who are still interested in a secular socialist morality, but disillusion with the political representatives of such a view has gone far. A widespread attitude is that illustrated by the comment an electrician made to me on the day of the coup (February 24th) as he poured a libation from the E of the neon sign KWAME NKRUMAH, just ripped from the decorations of what is now known as National Liberation Circle: 'in this country it was socialism for the poor and capitalism for the rich'.
20. See, for example, the argument of J.K. Tawiah, a lawyer (Daily Graphic 26/6/67) and the Chief Justice's criticisms of the proposals put forward by the chiefs for a period of no party rule.
21. H.K. Bidi Setsoafia in the Daily Graphic 19/6/67.
22. See also W. Arthur Lewis, Politics in West Africa, London, Allen and Unwin, 1965: 'it may even be true that half the ministers in West Africa are rogues'. (p. 34)

23. The position is well presented by Edward Shils in his introductory paper on Consensus. Because of their vagueness, ambiguity, unsystematic character, actually held beliefs are difficult to describe and there is a tendency on the part of sociological and anthropological analysts to systematize, clarify and specify actually held beliefs to a point which makes the holders of such beliefs appear to be systematic philosophers or ideologists. (p. 17)
24. The Free Press, Glencoe, 1964, Vol. 5 of the International Yearbook of Political Behavior.
25. p. 21. Quoted from E.H. Erikson, Young man Luther: a study in psycho-analysis and history, London, 1958.
26. P.E. Converse, 'The nature of belief systems in mass publics', Ideology and Discontent, p. 207.



### Summary

Nkrumah's overthrow produced a surprisingly complete reversal of opinion, of belief, of consensus. In fact, in Ghana as in other one-party states, succession to high office could not be routinized; since there was no such outlet for the frustration arising from the inevitable discrepancy between expected and actual returns, commitment (if not consensus) is found to diminish with the passage of time. Nearly unanimous relief and agreement about the past did not, however, produce consensus about the future, and many different policies are advocated. Under the economic and social conditions prevailing in the Third World, effective multi-party systems are improbable, while to many one-party rule is yet less attractive. The alternation of civilian and military rule will probably dominate the pattern of West African government for many years; it is perhaps possible to specify under which conditions the Army ought to intervene. The events in Ghana should lead observers to ask many specific and more general questions, e.g. on the degree of reality of comprehensive ideologies and systematic structures of belief. An Appendix deals with the problem of succession in the new nations.

### Résumé

Le renversement de N'krumah a produit un changement étonnamment total dans l'opinion, les croyances, le consensus. En fait, au Ghana comme dans d'autres pays à régime de parti unique, la succession n'avait pu être institutionalisée; en l'absence d'une telle soupape de sûreté pour la frustration découlant du hiatus inévitable entre espoirs et résultats, l'engagement (sinon le consensus) perd nécessairement de son intensité avec le temps. Le soulagement éprouvé presque unanimement et l'accord concernant le passé n'ont toutefois pas produit un consensus quant à l'avenir, et les voies préconisées sont diverses. Dans la situation économique et sociale du Tiers-Monde, l'établissement de régimes de partis multiples efficaces est improbable, mais pour beaucoup les régimes à parti unique sont encore moins attrayants. Il est probable en Afrique occidentale que régimes civil et militaire continuent longtemps à alterner; il serait possible, peut-être, de préciser dans quelles circonstances l'armée devrait intervenir. Les événements du Ghana devraient amener les observateurs à se poser un grand nombre de questions spécifiques, en même temps que des questions d'ordre plus général, concernant notamment le degré de réalité des systèmes idéologiques vastes et des structures de croyances intégrées. Dans un Appendix, l'auteur traite le problème de la succession dans les états nouveaux.

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"Consensus and dissent, with special reference to the developing countries"

DEMOCRACY, CONSENSUS AND THE NEW STATES

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## Democracy, consensus and the new states

### I

Some fifty new states came into being in Asia and Africa in the last quarter of a century, and nearly all started with written constitutions that embodied the principles of Western democracy. The citizenry was freely to choose a parliament from among candidates named by rival political parties. A government of party leaders was to be answerable to this parliament, to control the bureaucracy, to command the armed forces, and to keep from meddling with the courts. Both parliament and government were to hold temporary mandates, subject to periodic recall by a majority of the voters. Such, with minor variations, were the principles proclaimed.

Often they yielded to a very different sort of practice. Rule by a single party, by military junta, or by a personal autocrat, and shifts from one such undemocratic form to another became common throughout Asia and Africa. Twice before a sizable group of new states had joined the world's political system all at once, a score of them in Latin America in the nineteenth century, and a dozen or so in Eastern Europe in the early twentieth. Each time, there had been a similar sequel of democratic proclamation and dictatorial practice. Once again, therefore, events posed sharply the question how democracy comes about and how it can endure.

To ask the question is apt to arouse suspicion, in some scholarly circles, of parochialism or prejudice. Such parochialism indeed is evident in certain evolutionary or functional schemes that purport to be universal but happen to feature the current Western reality as the most advanced "stage of growth" or as the "modular" manner of political functioning.<sup>1</sup> Let me confess that I find no great utility in any schemes of unilinear evolution or even of universal political functions.

But I submit that the scholar may as objectively search for the preconditions of democracy as for those of theocracy, of proletarian dictatorship, of Rousseauian city states, or of absolute monarchy. The question takes a teleological form: If democracy is to be the result, what must be the causes? But this phrasing does not vitiate the answer as long as the teleology remains explicit. Nor even does it tie the questioner to a particular moral position. Those who see democracy as a threat need to know as much about it as those who view it with fond hope. And those who do not care one way or the other might still wish to study it by indulging their idle curiosity.

Popular government, moreover, is today loudly proclaimed in all parts of the world. Autocrats such as Sukarno and Ayub speak of "guided" or "basic" democracy. Communist elites, having seized power by conspiracy, or armed uprising, or conquest, call their regimes "people's democracies," that is to say, "people's people's rule." When the goal is thus widely invoked among the political practitioners, surely it is not amiss for the student of politics to ask by what route or routes it may be reached.

## II

Three answers seem to enjoy wide currency. The first says that to create a democracy you must devise the proper constitutional rules and allow for some period of apprenticeship in their operation. It was the answer given, or implied, by most of the outgoing colonial rulers and by many of their independent successors in Asia and Africa. But it is an answer rather out of favor among the scholars. Political scientists for a generation or so have been on the rebound from the institutional-legal approach of their predecessors. Hence they tend to see in constitutions at best a reflection of deeper political, social, or economic realities, and at worst a somewhat irrelevant exercise in window-dressing.

A second answer, and this one supplied by many respected scholars, links democracy to such things as literacy and affluence. It asserts that a society cannot operate democratic institutions with much hope of success unless it has attained certain critical levels of education and of economic well-being. It is an answer that appeals to all those in the Madisonian and Marxian traditions who see in politics a surface manifestation of social and economic forces. At

times the link is expressed merely as a statistical correlation. Thus Lipset, in a widely quoted essay, divides the regimes of Europe and Latin America in the 1950's into stable dictatorships, unstable dictatorships, unstable democracies, and stable democracies. For each step along this continuum he observes an average increase in such social and economic indicators as literacy and per capita GNP.

Lipset himself is careful to speak of "requisites" rather than "prerequisites" and acknowledges that there is two-way interaction. Yet he frequently slips from the language of correlation into the language of causation, and in those passages democracy always appears as the effect.<sup>2</sup> And Emerson is probably right in stating that Lipset's criteria have widely "been assumed to be the preconditions" for successful democracy and that the "usually accepted list includes such items as mass literacy, relatively high living standards, a sizable and stable middle class, a sense of social equality, and a tradition both of tolerance and of individual self-reliance."<sup>3</sup>

A third answer commends itself to those who would explain political phenomena in terms of individual attitudes and opinions. It says that you cannot have a stable democracy unless there is widespread agreement among the citizens. The further question, Agreement on what? is likely to elicit two variants of this third answer. According to one school, there must be substantive consensus. The citizens, or most of them, must agree on those values they hold to be fundamental. According to the other school, consensus must be procedural. The citizens need not agree in any of their opinions, fundamental or derivative, except in their opinion of how their differences should be resolved. Or, as the cliché goes, they must "agree to disagree."

My purpose, in the remainder of this essay, will be to examine critically the second, and more particularly the third, of these answers, and to suggest an alternative set of hypotheses as to the origins of democracy.

### III

Iain Macleod, serving as Colonial Secretary in 1960, opened a conference at Lancaster House by expressing his wish to see Kenya become "a nation based on parliamentary institutions on the Westminster model and enjoying responsible self-government."<sup>4</sup> There may now be less optimism

about spreading the Westminster model, or any Western model, than there was in that great year of colonial independence. But Macleod's words may serve as a clear statement of the first, or constitutional, hypothesis about the origins of democracy. What would be some of the practical steps suggested by the two other assumptions?

Fatalism is of course one possible conclusion from the alleged socio-economic and attitudinal correlations. Countries that do not show the necessary social or economic accomplishments, it might be argued, should not try to become democracies since the attempt must prove futile. But in a more pragmatic mood one might conclude that to become a democracy a country must first, under some non-democratic regime, work up the proper degrees of affluence, literacy, or consensus.

The consensus hypothesis, for example, might suggest that a country can prepare itself for democracy by erecting a single party regime, by espousing a firm ideological doctrine, and by bringing about a Gleichschaltung of all organizations: in short, by inducing a forced-draft consensus. Such a policy has recently been dignified by the phrase "tutelary democracy."<sup>5</sup> It is a notion that cannot be dismissed out of hand in the light of Western precedent. In Britain or France, for example, it seems likely that democracy could only have come after the centralizing and leveling reigns of the Tudors, Stuarts, and Bourbons.

On balance, however, the concept of "tutelary democracy" seems somewhat misleading. Democratic developments in England are more properly dated from 1832 and 1867, or perhaps even 1688, than from 1485, and in France from Bastille Day rather than the Night of Saint Bartholomew. No one, certainly, has accused Henry VIII or Louis XIV of being democrats at heart. To say that Touré or Kenyatta must forge unity before they can allow dissent is another way, therefore, of saying that Guinea and Kenya will not be ready to embark upon democracy until their successors get around to steering a diametrically opposite course. Meanwhile one wonders just how "tutelary democracy" might differ from "tutelary authoritarianism."

One of the difficulties with the two hypotheses is that they assert a correlation between consensus (or affluence-cum-literacy) and democracy without explaining the precise steps that might bring about the connection.

The literacy and affluence hypothesis would lead one to anticipate a great democratic future for countries such

as Kuwait in the Middle East, as Argentina and Cuba in Latin America, or as South Africa, Ghana, Libya, or Congo (Kinshasa) in Africa. And the prospects for democracy in Germany in the 1930's would have exceeded any of these except Kuwait. Frankly, it is not a very plausible perspective.

One may of course demur, as Karl Deutsch and others have done, that exceptions, however glaring, do not destroy the significance of a general correlation. Indeed the exceptions, by pointing to other intervening variables, may turn out to be the most useful single bits of evidence. But this amounts to imputing to these unidentified intervening variables a more decisive influence than to those included in the original correlation.

#### IV

The correlation of affluence and literacy with democracy is attested by census returns and by estimates of national income. Similar data for communist and "developing" countries, though often less reliable, provide a convenient control group. Quantitative evidence for the consensus theory may be found in recent survey data, but with a significant limitation. Opinion surveys are an elaboration of straw polls, that is, they are themselves a by-product of democratic culture. Hence it is difficult or impossible to conduct them in communist or "developing" countries.

But the chief weakness of the two hypotheses would not be cured if Lipset were to account for such troublesome exceptions as Castro's Cuba, Nkrumah's Ghana, or Hitler's Germany; nor if Almond and Verba by some miracle were to extend their surveys to Russia, China, Egypt, or Haiti. The real difficulty is that all their measures refer to a single point in time. Like any momentary correlation, their statistics leave open the direction of causality. If A and B are found to vary together, this may indicate that A influences B, that B influences A, or that some third factor C influences both. (One may recall that Aristotle thought the arrow propelled by the rush of air in its wake.) More likely, each of the three connections may hold for part of the evidence. To get at causality, it must be shown that a given increment in A (or B or C) was followed by a corresponding increment in the other factors. In short, we need data over an appropriate span of time.

Historical statistics, of course, are not easy to come by. The art of census-taking, for example, has developed only since the nineteenth century--and Article 1, Section 2, of the United States Constitution makes it clear that censuses, too, began as a by-product of democratic voting. National income statistics were developed even more recently. But without having done any research in the matter, I would question whether the United States in the days of Jefferson or Jackson or Britain in the days of Gladstone would have ranked very high on many of Lipset's scales.

A fuller examination of the historical evidence might indeed show the link of literacy and affluence with democracy to be one of mutual interaction. Yet, the stronger flow of causality, I should suspect, is the reverse of what is often assumed. In Europe in the nineteenth century and in Latin America and other developing countries today, mass education has in part resulted from democratic pressures. One thing that newly enfranchised voters are ready to do with their greater power is to make sure that their children get a better education than was available to the parents. Similarly, it may well be that in the economic realm democratic pluralism releases productive forces that oligarchic regimes keep dormant. The issue in any case cannot be settled by comparing Britain, Sweden and Switzerland in 1960 with Basutoland and Swaziland in the same year. Rather, we need data for Britain, Sweden, and Switzerland in 1760, 1860, and 1960. The roots of democracy are best traced in countries where it has taken root.

With regard to democracy and consensus, I should venture to state the opposite connection more positively. Established democracies today display a high degree of consensus because their citizens have been able successively to conciliate, through democratic and representative procedures, the bitter issues that divided their forefathers. As a result, there has been a steady lowering of the temperature of conflict. In the United States, Hamilton won a victory, partly posthumous, over Jefferson; Lincoln (by force as well as conciliation) won over Jefferson Davis; and the New Dealers carried the day over the old-fashioned laissez-faireists. The remaining issues, no matter how deeply felt by the protagonists, are of smaller scope or lesser importance. A similar evolution can be traced in Britain, Sweden, and elsewhere.

One may note in passing that there is a notable difference between social and economic issues, which democracy has been able to handle with comparative ease, and issues



of community which have proved more troublesome. In the light of a century of subsequent experience, Marx clearly was wrong. In nationality he saw a cloak for bourgeois class interests. Religion he denounced as the opium of the masses. In economics, by contrast, he foresaw very real and increasingly bitter struggles that in the end would bring bourgeois democracy crashing down. But in fact, as Dahl and his associates have shown, democracy has fared best and has produced the greatest consensus where the major questions have been economic and social--in countries such as Britain and Sweden.<sup>6</sup> Instead, it has been the fight among religious, national, and racial groups that has proved most tenacious and has caused recurrent bitterness.

Nor are the reasons far to seek. On economic issues, you can in the end always split the difference. In an expanding economy, you can even have it both ways: the contest for higher wages, profits, and consumer savings can turn into a positive-sum game. But there is no middle position between Flemish and French as official languages, or between catholicism, Calvinism, and secularism as the basis of education. The best you can get here is an "inclusive compromise"<sup>7</sup>--a log-rolling deal whereby some government offices speak French and some Flemish, or some children are taught according to Aquinas, some to Calvin, and some to Voltaire. Such a solution entrenches the differences instead of resolving them, and it may well convert political conflict into a form of trench warfare.

## V

If consensus, and perhaps even affluence and literacy, are among the consequences of democracy, what then are its causes? Specifically, how (if at all) may it be expected to come about in today's post-imperial states? One of the drawbacks of the two hypotheses is that in stressing social, economic, and attitudinal factors they tend to gloss over some of the cultural and political difficulties that attend the introduction of democracy.

In the late-modernizing countries of Asia and Africa, and to a lesser extent in Latin America, traditional forms of oligarchy are challenged by modern, Western influences. Communication between local communities is sparse and intermittent. Current political boundaries and institutions are generally the product of a recent process of transition from colonialism. Each of these cultural features implies a characteristic difficulty for democracy.

Elections originated as a Western practice exported to the rest of the world; by participating in them, the traditionalists surrender to modernity. Universal suffrage and majority votes are corollaries of egalitarianism; by sanctioning them, the oligarchs give up hope of defending their traditional privileges. It is difficult to have citizens choose a government unless it is known how many citizens there are, and unless they understand some of the choices before them. Like other techniques of modern society, moreover, democracy combines continuity with change. Legislators commonly hold their mandates for three, four, or five years; and this injects into politics an element of uncertainty which late modernizing countries cannot easily face. Temporariness of rulers requires continuity among the citizenry: so that the government may change, the commonwealth must endure. But where amidst mergers and secessions (Egypt-Syria, Malaya-Singapore, Tanganyika-Zanzibar, Jamaica-Trinidad), amidst civil wars and rebellions (Katanga, Sudan, Kurdistan, the hills of Burma, the jungles of Vietnam)--where in the post-colonial world is such stability of territory to be found? "...the people cannot decide," as Ivor Jennings has put it, "until somebody decides who are the people."<sup>8</sup>

Temporariness of government also encumbers economic planning. How can a thirty-year program of industrialization be planned within boundaries likely to shift after three years by legislatures and cabinets that must quit office after five? The needs of the economy may make it seem wasteful to separate a country's rulers into three teams called government, opposition, and neutral civil service--the more so if a former colony (as many in Tropical Africa) has ventured upon independence with only a few dozen college graduates. The tendency in countries such as Mali and Guinea to merge government and single-party hierarchies is in part a simple measure of economizing scarce talent.

Sudden democracy may well seem like an open invitation to confusion. If the opposition's prospects hinge on the government's failure, why not provoke such failure with all available means of obstruction and sabotage? And yet, if the government must rule despite the opposition, why allow an opposition at all? As Robert Dahl has remarked, "one perennial problem of opposition is that there is either too much or too little."<sup>9</sup>

VI

From the difficulties that have encumbered democracy in many of the late-modernizing countries, we may turn to the positive factors that have promoted it in some. As indicated earlier, the preconditions of democracy are most readily identified in countries where it has in fact developed. Several themes are suggested by the experience of those Asian and Latin American countries (there are none in Africa) that have established relatively stable democratic systems (the Philippines, Ceylon, Lebanon, Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay) or have come close to it (Mexico, India, Colombia, Brazil, and Turkey).<sup>10</sup> These themes, moreover, have their parallels in the history of transition to constitutionalism and democracy in countries such as Britain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

There has been, first of all, a century to a century and a half of administrative and educational modernization-- not so much mass education as the training of an elite for public service. Secondly, there has been a stable geographic context for the political system throughout that period allowing for continuity within that tradition of public service. For even India and Turkey, by virtue of wholesale transfer of administrative and political personnel, continued the previous contexts of the British Indian and Ottoman Empires in a way that Pakistan and the Ottoman-Arab successor states did not. Lebanon is no exception, for even under Turkish rule it preserved a tradition of regional autonomy going back to the sixteenth century; as a result largely of foreign intervention it remained the only region to escape the effects of the centralizing policy of the late Ottoman Empire. Within this framework of geographic identity, a sense of community has had a chance to grow up, and as Karl Deutsch has pointed out, an effective sense of community tends to rest on complementarity rather than identity of values, not on agreement but on responsiveness.<sup>11</sup>

Thirdly, there has been a tradition, dating back one, two or three generations, of parties (in Lebanon of religious denominations) that formed some organic link between rulers and subjects. These organizations typically started as competing groups within some sort of oligarchy; but in their search for auxiliary forces they proceeded to involve ever larger groups in the political process.

A fourth historic condition is equally striking. There have been tenacious and bitter conflicts between major social or political groups over issues of profound concern to them. From time to time, especially in the early stages, these conflicts erupted into violence. But

in the end, the losers in any given round proved strongly enough entrenched, the winners sufficiently exhausted, or unsure of their victory, or far-sighted and generous, that the vital interests of no major part of the society were destroyed. It usually was helpful if the partisans in such early struggles found themselves geographically intermingled or if they were divided along several cross-cutting lines--for neat geographic separation encourages civil war and secession.

The issues and interests at stake varied widely. In the early party contests in India and Turkey, the graduates of the modern educational system confronted the more conservative elements in the imperial bureaucracy. In India and the Philippines, the struggle crystallized into one of nationalism vs. colonial rule. In Turkey the issues were at one time autocracy vs. constitutionalism, later centralization vs. federalism, and still later secular nationalism vs. religious dynasticism; by the 1950's the protagonists were the urban educated class on one side and commercial farmers and small-town professional people on the other. In Chile and Uruguay it has been mainly a struggle between entrenched agrarian interests and rising groups in commerce, labor, and the urban professions. In Lebanon it has been between denominational groups; for the inaccessible Mount Lebanon for centuries offered a safe refuge to persecuted minorities. In India since independence, it has been mainly among language and caste groups, the pattern of their alignment varying from state to state and district to district.

What is important are not the stakes of the contest or the identity of the protagonists, but the long-drawn and precariously balanced nature of the struggle. For democracy is essentially a matter of political form rather than of specific content.

This last observation has important implications. It suggests that it would be idle to look for a single standard path of democratic development. No two existing democracies have originated in the same way. Hence it seems unlikely that any future democracy will follow in the footsteps of its predecessors. It may be argued that a country can best spur its economic growth not by imitating the example of earlier industrialized countries but by making the most of its particular natural resources, of the unique talents of its population, and by fitting these accurately into the widest international pattern of specialization. Somewhat similarly, a country can attain democracy by honestly facing up to its particular conflicts and by devising patterns of accommodation uniquely suited to these.

Three of the developments just listed correspond rather closely to what in another context I have identified as the major political ingredients of modern nation-statehood: the growth of authority and public service, the establishment of a geographic identity for the state, and the growing demand for political equality and participation.<sup>12</sup> The fourth condition is the one that channels these developments into a specifically democratic direction.

It should not be assumed that any of these developments run their course inevitably or irresistibly. Indeed, the breakdown of the oligarchic constitutional systems in Chile, Argentina, and Colombia in the period between 1925 and 1948 is an example of a miscarriage of this sort of evolution. And yet, there is a likelihood that the first great compromise which established a close balance between rival forces will lead to a steady expansion of the active political community as each competing group tries to muster potential reinforcements. Universal political participation within a competitive system--in short, democracy--is the logical culmination of such a process.

## VII

Preparation for democracy must ex hypothesi begin under a non-democratic regime. But the logical starting point is not autocracy or oligarchy no matter how benevolent or "tutelary." Rather it is the conciliation of vigorously expressed differences of interest, of opinion, of policy. It is not even necessary (in fact it is at the start unlikely) that the protagonists agree on the applicable procedures. Nor is there any need for the protagonists, as a matter of opinion, to approve of specific techniques of conciliation--or indeed of conciliation itself--provided that, as a matter of practice, they apply them.

The parties to the constitutional settlement of 1688-1701 disagreed not only about the merits of substantive issues such as catholic toleration but also about the rules of the game, including the prerogatives of crown and parliament and Stuart vs. Hanoverian succession; but despite disagreement they devised a tolerable compromise. The Whig sponsors of the Reform Act of 1832 and the Swedish conservatives who voted for the reforms of 1907 and 1918 did not believe in widened suffrage as morally right; rather they accepted it as the lesser of several likely evils. Only after operating under democratic rules for a generation or so did their conservative successors come to believe in them. The process fits well into

Leon Festinger's theory of "cognitive dissonance" and of its resolution under social pressure.<sup>13</sup> The consensus hypothesis suggests that to establish democracy you first must have convinced democrats. It seems more realistic to contrive precedents for democratic practice first, and to allow time for the beliefs to adjust later.

In today's developing countries the crucial turning point may come in situations like those in Mexico in 1928-29, in Morocco in 1961, or in Lebanon in the 1860's. The Mexican caudillos had learned in two decades of intense turmoil that their unrestrained activities could lead only to civil war and to periodic assassination of any of them lucky enough to have seized the presidency. Hence they accepted Calles' invitation to form a party that would regulate their competition, that would establish presidential succession by negotiation and agreement rather than by murder. In Morocco, the king and the nationalist leaders who had jointly attained independence broke on major issues of domestic policy. But the popularity of each was strong enough that neither dared destroy the other; and the king compensated for his conservative domestic course by adopting some of the more "radical" foreign policies of the left-wing opposition. In Lebanon, the communal war of 1858-60 was followed by a compromise agreement that reinforced an earlier tradition of secular government.<sup>14</sup>

Clearly, the outcome of these single crises in countries like Mexico, Morocco, or Lebanon can at most supply the germ of the development of democracy. The full growth can result only from a number of further crises overcome with like success. In Mexico, four decades of orderly government followed upon the compromise of 1929, and major issues between military and civilian leaders and between church and state have been settled in the meantime. Yet the issue of social equality and political participation for urban workers and for the peasantry are today endangering the political order created by the PRI in the last thirty-seven years. In Lebanon, further compromises were devised in 1926 and the structure reaffirmed after the civil war of 1958.

A single major breakdown in the process of conciliation in any one of the countries may result in a miscarriage of the entire process. On the other hand, every crisis successfully overcome will provide important encouragement for the resolution of the next. The growth of conciliation and democracy is likely to be a slow upward spiral; their breakdown a rapid downward one. It

is in the hands of the protagonists in every successive crisis to set the spiral on its upward or its downward course. At any rate, the upward prospects are better in a system that honestly faces its tensions than in one that suppresses them in an artificial unanimity of demagogic propaganda and crude coercion.

### VIII

The foregoing reflections on democracy and consensus well accord with Bernard Crick's argument about the "master science" of democratic politics: "...it is often thought that for this 'master science' to function, there must already be in existence some shared idea of a 'common good', some 'consensus' or consensus juris. But this common good is itself the process of practical reconciliation of the interests of the various...aggregates, or groups which compose a state; it is not some external and intangible spiritual adhesive.... Diverse groups hold together, firstly, because they have a common interest in sheer survival, and, secondly, because they practise politics--not because they agree about 'fundamentals', or some such concept too vague, too personal, or too divine ever to do the job of politics for it. The moral consensus of a free state is not something mysteriously prior to or above politics: it is the activity (the civilizing activity) of politics itself."<sup>15</sup>

The basis of democracy is not maximum consensus but rather the tenuous middle ground between imposed uniformity (such as would lead to some form of tyranny) and implacable hostility (of a kind that would disrupt the community by civil war or secession). On the question of geographic identity there must be rather more than mere agreement or shared opinion. The context within which the political process is to operate must be taken for granted, must be above question and above opinion. On other matters, democracy depends not on consensus but on disagreement.

All the most characteristic procedures of democracy are forms of organized conflict and dissension: campaign oratory, the election of candidates, parliamentary divisions, votes of confidence or of censure. The essence of democracy is the habit of dissension and conciliation in a never-ending series of changing issues and changing alignments. Democracy is that form of government which derives its just powers from the dissent of up to one half of the governed.

Notes

1. See W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge University Press, 1956); James S. Coleman in Almond and Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 559-567.
2. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Doubleday, 1960), pp. 85-96; an earlier version of the essay appeared in the American Political Science Review (March 1959).
3. Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 278.
4. Quoted in George Bennett and Carl G. Rosberg, The Kenyatta Election (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 19.
5. See e.g. Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States (Copenhagen: Mouton, 1962), pp. 60-67.
6. Robert A. Dahl et al., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (Yale University Press, 1966).
7. For a classification of three types of compromises (splitting the difference, inclusive, and exclusive) see my Politics of Compromise (Princeton University Press, 1955), p. 231.
8. Sir J. Ivor Jennings, The Approach of Self-Government (Cambridge University Press, 1956), p. 56.
9. Dahl et al., op. cit., p. 397.
10. A series of three successive elections since independence, based on an inclusive franchise, open party competition, and an honest count, and at least one peaceful change of party control may be taken as rough criteria of "stable democracy." Israel and Japan meet the first of these criteria, but have been left out of the above account--the first because of its European-immigrant population, and the second because of its far greater degree of modernization compared to other non-European countries.
11. Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community in the North Atlantic Area (Princeton University Press, 1957).
12. D. A. Rustow, A World of Nations (Brookings Institution, 1967), chs. 2-4.



13. Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford University Press, 1957), especially ch. 8.
14. See Albert Hourani's perceptive essay in Politics in Lebanon, ed. Leonard Binder (Wiley, 1966), pp. 13-30.
15. Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics (rev. edn.; Penguin Books, 1964), p. 24. For a further spirited attack on the "mirage of consensus" see Otto Kirchheimer, "Private Man and Society," Political Science Quarterly, 81:1-25 (March 1966), esp. pp. 1-3.

Summary

Among the preconditions of democracy are said to be high levels of social and economic development (e.g., literacy and affluence), and of consensus. These assertions are supported by statistical data comparing socio-economic development in democracies and non-democracies, and by public opinion data from democratic countries. But contemporary correlations cannot settle what essentially is a question of historical causality. It seems probable that literacy and affluence and almost certain that consensus are among the consequences, not the causes of democracy. The key element in the development of democracy is the habit of dissension within a political community, and this tends to result from long-drawn political fights in which neither side wins and tolerance and pluralism get institutionalized. Democracy derives its just powers from the dissent of up to one half of the governed.

Résumé

Parmi les conditions nécessaires à la démocratie, on cite souvent l'existence d'un haut niveau de développement social et économique (p. ex., instruction et prospérité) et de consensus. De telles affirmations se fondent sur des données statistiques comparant le degré de développement socio-économique dans les pays démocratiques et dans les pays non démocratiques, et sur des données concernant l'opinion publique dans les pays démocratiques. Des corrélations contemporaines ne peuvent cependant pas donner la réponse à une question dont l'essentiel concerne la causalité historique. Il paraît probable que le haut degré d'instruction et de prospérité est une conséquence, et non une cause, de la démocratie; il est presque certain qu'il en est de même du consensus. L'élément-clé dans le développement de la démocratie est l'habitude du désaccord dans une communauté politique donnée, qui tend à résulter de très longs affrontements politiques dans lesquels aucune des parties ne l'emporte, et la tolérance et le pluralisme s'institutionnalisent. La démocratie tire ses justes pouvoirs du désaccord de moins de la moitié des gouvernés.

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"Consensus and dissent, with special  
reference to the developing countries"

THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL CONFLICT  
IN THE NEW STATES OF TROPICAL AFRICA

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## INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

Having assumed the burden of understanding political life in two and a half dozen unruly countries, political scientists who study the new states of tropical Africa must leap with assurance where angels fear to tread. We have borrowed, adapted, or invented an array of frameworks designed to guide perceptions of disparate events and Africa is now uniformly viewed through the best lenses of contemporary comparative politics with a focus on political modernization, development, and integration. Unfortunately, it appears that when we rely exclusively on these tools in order to accomplish our task, the aspects of political life which we, as well as non-specialists, see most clearly with the naked eye of informed common sense, remain beyond the range of our scientific vision.<sup>2</sup> In our pursuit of scientific progress, we have learned to discern forms such as regular patterns of behavior which constitute structures and institutions, but the most salient characteristic of political life in Africa is that it constitutes an almost institutionless arena with conflict and disorder as its most prominent features.

In recent years, almost every new African state has experienced more or less successful military or civilian coups, insurrections, mutinies, riots, political assassinations. Several of them appear permanently on the brink of drastic changes in the very definition of the territorial limits of the political community. With little regard for the comfort of social scientists, the downfall of the continent's most promising multi-party regime in Nigeria under circumstances approaching civil war was immediately followed by the demise of what many thought to be the continent's harshest one-party regime in Ghana.

More recent events in both countries indicate that military regimes are as fragile as their civilian predecessors. In general, the incidence of conflict and disorder appears unrelated to such variables as types of colonial experience, size, number of parties, absolute level or rate of economic and social development. Yet, in spite of the existence of every gap ever imagined by scholars concerned with development and modernization, and in the absence of the requisites most commonly posited for the maintenance of a political system, these countries persist.

In order to deal in an orderly manner with such disorderly countries, we must alter our vision. Our normal focus on institutions and their concomitant processes resembles the focus of the untrained eye on the enclosed surface, or figure, of an image. The naive observer sees interstices as "shapeless parts of the underlying ground. He pays no attention to them, and finds it difficult and unnatural to do so."<sup>3</sup> Like trained painters, however, we must force ourselves to reverse the spontaneous figure-ground effect in order to perceive "interstices," shapes which initially do not appear worthy of our attention, but are in fact fundamental to our perception of the surface under observation. To understand political life in Africa, instead of viewing political disturbances as the shapeless ground surrounding institutions and processes which define the regimes of the new states, we must try to view them as characteristic processes which themselves constitute an important aspect of the regime in certain types of political systems.

#### 1. Characteristics of African Political Systems

Blown-up stills of political development, modernization, or integration tend to make these processes appear similar regardless of what

is being developed, modernized, or integrated. Yet the same words will refer to very different things where, for example, national communities are being carved out of a more universal one and the stratification system is defined by an opposition between urban elites that control land and peasant masses, as against situations where many small societies devoid of this sharp differentiation are being amalgamated into arbitrarily defined larger wholes under the aegis of a recently educated elite drawn more or less evenly from the component societies that constitute the country. Hence, we must include background features in order to keep our images in proportion.

On the whole, African countries are distinguished from other Third World clusters by extremely weak national centers, a periphery which consists of societies until recently self-contained, and levels of economic and social development approaching the lowest limit of international statistical distributions. They continue to reflect the fact that their origins stem from a recent European scramble for portions of an international system or sub-system constituted by interacting tribal societies. Although the French, British, Belgian, Portuguese or German nets were sometimes cast over an area dominated by a single society or by a group of societies with similar characteristics, this was usually not the case at all. Within the administrative nets which later became states there were only a few decades ago a varying number of more or less disparate societies, each with a distinct political system, and with widely different intersocietal relationships.

Although the new political units provided a territorial mold within which social, economic, political, and cultural changes that accompanied colonization occurred, we are becoming increasingly aware that these processes, although related, did not necessarily vary



"rhythmically," i.e., at the same rate<sup>4</sup>; and that the rates of change varied not only between countries but also between regions of the same country. If we conceive the original African societies as sets of values, norms, and structures, it is evident that they survived to a significant extent everywhere, even where their existence was not legally recognized as in the most extreme cases of direct rule. Furthermore, the new set of values, norms, and structures which constituted an incipient national center did not necessarily grow at the expense of the older ones, as in a constant zero-sum game in which the more a country becomes "modern" the less it remains "traditional". Although many individuals left the country for the new towns, they did not necessarily leave one society to enter into a new one; instead, the behavior of a given individual tended to be governed by norms from both sets which defined his multiple roles and even mixed <sup>to</sup> define a particular role. Because the new center had nowhere expanded sufficiently at the time of independence, we cannot characterize what is contained within these countries today as a single society in the normally accepted sociological sense of the word, with its connotation of a relatively integrated system of values, norms, and structures. But since the new African states in reality do provide territorial containers for two sets of values, norms, and structures, the "new" and the "residual", with the latter itself usually subdivided into distinct sub-sets, it is useful to think of these sets as forming a particular type of unintegrated society which can be called "syncretic".<sup>5</sup>

The syncretic character of contemporary African societies tends to be reflected in every sphere of social activity, including the political. If we seek to identify their political systems by asking how values are

authoritatively allocated within these societies, it is evident that in every case the most visible structures and institutions with which political scientists normally deal, such as executive and legislative bodies, political parties and groups, the apparatus of territorial administration, the judiciary, and even the institutions of local government provided by law, deal with only a portion of the total allocative activity, and that the remainder must therefore be allocated by other means, by other structures. This is fairly obvious where some functional division of labor between "modern" and "traditional" institutions was provided for initially as part of the constitutional settlement at the time of independence, but it is equally the case where traditional political structures have no recognized legal or political standing, or even where they have been formally abolished, as in Guinea or in Mali.<sup>6</sup>

Without denying important variations in the degree of institutionalization of national centers in different countries, it is suggested that from the present vantage point, even the most prominent variations in political arrangements at the time of independence became superficial features of the political system since they were never firmly institutionalized. An examination of political parties, the best studied feature of the African scene, reveals such a wide gap between the organizational model from which the leaders derived their inspiration and their capacity to implement such schemes, that the very use by observers of the word "party" to characterize such structures involves a dangerous reification.

These comments may be extended to include constitutional arrangements, which in the absence of anchorage in supporting norms and institutions had little reality beyond their physical existence as a set of

written symbols deposited in a government archive; about the civil service, in which the usual bureaucratic norms are so rare that it is perhaps better to speak of "government employees" as a categorical group; of "trade unions," which are more by way of congeries of urban employed and unemployed intermittently mobilized for a temporary purpose, such as a street demonstration; and even of "the Army", which far from being a model of hierarchical organization, tends to be an assemblage of armed men who may or may not obey their officers. It is generally evident that the operations of even the most "modern" institutions in Africa are governed by values and norms that stem from both the "new" and the "residual" sets.

The societal environment shared by all the new African states thus imposes severe limits upon the range within which significant variations of regimes can take place. Whether we define political integration in terms of the existence of a political formula which bridges the gap between the elite and the masses, or in terms of linkages between the values, norms, and structures that constitute the political system, it is clear that the level of political integration was, at the time of the founding, very low throughout Africa. Hence, although we can refer to the existence of "states" and "regimes" in Africa, we must be careful not to infer from these labels that their governments necessarily have authority over the entire country, any more than we can safely infer from the persistence of these countries as sovereign entities proof of the operations of endogenous factors such as a sense of community and the ability of authorities to enforce cohesion against people's will. Persistence may only reflect the initial inertia which keeps instruments of government inherited from the colonial

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period going, as well as the inertia of claimants which assures in most cases that all the problems will not reach the center simultaneously; it may reflect also the absence of effective external challenges and even to a certain extent the protection provided by the contemporary international system which more often than not guarantees the existence of even the weakest of sovereign states born out of the decolonization of tropical Africa.

Under these generally shared circumstances, it is not surprising that the founding fathers of most African states behaved very much in the same way in order to achieve the dual goal of modernizing as rapidly as possible while maintaining themselves in office. Like any other government, they had to cope with the problem of managing the flow of demands while at the same time eliciting sufficient support.<sup>7</sup> They could obtain support in exchange for the satisfaction of demands (distribution); they could enhance support on the basis of the internalization by a sufficiently large proportion of the population of a belief in their right to rule (socialization, legitimacy); they could suppress demands by negative reinforcement, while at the same time punishing non-support (coercion and force). In the face of overwhelming problems stemming from the syncretic character of the society they relied increasingly on the latter techniques, thus contributing substantially to the escalation of political conflict.

Initially, the founding fathers of African states benefited from the sudden creation of a multitude of new political offices, from the departure of a number of colonial officials, from the expansion of administrative and state-directed economic activity which had begun during the latter years of welfare-state colonialism, as well as from

a prevalent sense that they had earned the right to rule through their leadership of protest movements and that they were the legitimate successors of colonial officials. On these foundations, many were able to construct adequate political machines based primarily on the distribution of benefits to individual and group claimants, in the form of shifting coalitions appearing either as a "multi-party system", or more commonly, as a "unified" party. In the light of the politicians' inability to maintain themselves in office for very long (except in a very few cases) and of the lurid revelations of their corruption and ineptitude which made headlines after their downfall, it is easy to forget that many of them were initially quite successful in developing symbols and organizations which could be used to channel support and to establish the legitimacy of their claim to rule in the eyes of their countrymen. Beyond this, they also benefited from the sort of inertia already referred to, whereby those individuals who were aware of the existence of country-wide political institutions simply accepted them as a continuation of what they were already used to, the colonial order, but with a welcome populist flavor. The inheritance of instruments of force (police, gendarmerie, small armies), usually among the more professionalized bodies and often under the continued supervision of European officers, provided a certain backing in case the political process failed.

## 2. The Shift from Power to Force

The shift to a new phase of political activity is related to two sets of mutually reinforcing factors, stemming from the interaction of the rulers with the syncretic society in which they operated. First of all, there was a growing gap between the leaders' ideological aspira-

ations and their capacity to implement the policies these aspirations entailed. Whether or not it is appropriate to speak of a "revolution of rising expectations" throughout the continent, there is little doubt that such a revolution has occurred among those responsible for government, in the form of a commitment to rapid modernization. The most obvious examples here are the "mobilizing" states, such as Ghana, Mali, or Guinea, in which this commitment was defined in a very specific manner to include the transformation of the syncretic society into a homogeneous society by eliminating the "residual" set of values, norms, and structures and institutionalizing the new set according to ideological directives; the creation of an all-pervasive state apparatus, including both an all-encompassing mass party which could function as a controlling organization in the Leninist sense and as an aggregative organization, and an effective Africanized bureaucracy; and a planned economy geared to the achievement of very high increase in the rate of total output, as well as economic self-sufficiency in which the State plays the dominant role. Whether or not they espoused "socialism" in this form, most other African leaders shared these aspirations, albeit in some modified form. Since African countries are farther behind in most of these respects than any other set of countries in the world, however, the result is that governments with the lowest load capability have assumed the heaviest burdens. But in the process of trying to raise the capability of their governments to achieve these goals, African rulers frittered away their small initial political capital of legitimacy, distributive capacity, inertia and coercion by investing it in non-essential undertakings, much as many of them did in the economic sector. A major source of the vulnerability of African regimes thus

stems from adherence to self-imposed ideological directives.

Secondly, even if properly allocated this capital was seldom adequate to deal with political difficulties stemming from the very character of the syncretic society, the circumstances of decolonization, and the characteristics of the new institutions themselves. This was most obvious in the case of the Congo, where challenges stemming from every direction occurred simultaneously and most dramatically within a few weeks after independence. Although elsewhere the challenges have been less extreme and have usually been spaced over a few years, while the countervailing power and force at the disposal of the government was somewhat greater, their cumulative impact has not necessarily been much less severe. Everywhere, African governments have been faced with some or all the consequences of the politicization of residual cleavages which occurred in the course of the rapid extension of political participation prior to independence; and of an inflationary spiral of demands stemming from the very groups whose support is most crucial for the operations of government. Since these processes are often discussed in the literature, only their major features will be noted here.

a. The Politicization of Primordial Ties:<sup>8</sup> Pre-existing distinctions between groups in Africa were usually supplemented by others stemming from the uneven impact of European-generated change. Often, by the time of independence, one tribe or group of tribes had become more urban, more educated, more Christian and richer than others in the country. Hence, at the mass level, old and new cleavages tend to be consistent rather than cross-cutting; camps are clear-cut and individuals can engage wholeheartedly in the disputes that occur; almost any issue can

precipitate a severe conflict; the history of conflict itself tends to make the next occurrence more severe; with few intervening layers of community organization, even localized conflicts rapidly reach the center. They tend to be particularly severe where there is an asymmetry between the old and the new stratification system within a single society or between complementary societies, as when for some reason serfs become more educated than their masters or when their greater number becomes a source of political power when universal suffrage is introduced.

At the level of the modernizing leadership, recruitment is usually fairly representative of the various groups in the country; common experiences insure a certain degree of solidarity which provides offsetting cross-cutting affiliations; and ethnic ties make an important contribution to national integration by preventing the formation of the sharp elite-mass gap that is common in peasant societies. But there is always a very great strain on the solidarity of the modernizing leadership because, regardless of their ideological orientation, political entrepreneurs who seek to establish or to maintain a following must necessarily rely on primordial ties to distinguish between "we" and "them". When it appeared that the shape of the polity was being settled rapidly, perhaps once and for all, a multitude of groups began to press their legitimate claims for the protection of their way of life, for a redefinition of the relationship between their own peripheral society and the center, and for a more satisfactory distribution of benefits. Many latent disputes were revived and flowed into the new arena provided by central institutions. Hence it is not surprising that even in countries where one party seemed to be solidly established



the leadership felt that their countries were less integrated than ever before. Where several ethnic-regional movements vied for power, and especially where participation was extended very suddenly, the consequences of these cleavages and ensuing conflicts upon the center were even more disturbing.<sup>9</sup>

In general, almost any difference between two groups can become politically significant, even if from the point of view of the ethnographer the two groups belong to the same cultural classification. Although each of the oppositions tends to involve but a small proportion of the total population, because of the very nature of the groups involved, many permutations are possible and contagion can set in. Suitable institutional arrangements such as various forms of territorial federalism, proportional or communal representation, and institutional quotas, are not easily designed in situations where primordial identities are as numerous and fluid as they are in most countries under consideration.

b. The Inflation of Demands: The second major source of challenge involves three crucial categories of individuals: civilian employees of government, men in uniform, and youths. Government employees, who include not only professional civil servants but also a large number of low-level, unskilled clerical personnel and manual workers employed in the operation of the governmental infrastructure (railways, harbors, road maintenance, and public works generally) usually constitute a very large proportion of those gainfully employed outside of agriculture. Promotions on the whole have been rapid because of Africanization and the vast expansion of government agencies; many programs of economic development have had as their major consequence a reallocation of national

revenue to the benefit of the managers, including both government employees and politicians; and government employees often constitute in terms of income and prestige the most privileged group in the society, after the politicians themselves. Yet, these very same factors have contributed to a process of acute relative deprivation. Because of their very occupation and training, government employees have internalized to a greater extent than most others the style of life of their European predecessors; they feel that on the grounds of native ability and training they are qualified to rule rather than merely to execute policies; rapid promotions only lead to higher aspirations among those who have already been promoted and among those left behind, while the rate of governmental expansion tapers off soon after independence. During the colonial period, government employees who vented their grievances against their employer were "good nationalists"; as they continue to do so after independence, they are a "selfish privileged class". The deterioration in the relationship between government employees and the politicians is relatively independent of the ideological orientation of the regime itself: in most of French-speaking Africa, government employees are "leftists" in relation to whatever the government's orientation happens to be at a given time; but in Ghana, under Nkrumah, civil servants constituted a sort of "rightist" opposition to the regime. Since in many cases personnel expenditures constitute two-thirds or more of the government's annual expenditures, any demands that require to be translated into resource allocation tend to create a major financial crisis.

The grievance orientation toward government extends also to those who are employed in the private sector, since even in countries that are not nominally "socialist", étatisme prevails; the private industrial or commercial sector is closely regulated since major firms usually

operate on the basis of government guarantees concerning manpower costs. So much of the workers' real income takes the form of benefits rather than money wages (family allocations, housing, etc.) that any sort of collective bargaining usually involves a modification of rules governing labor and leads to a showdown between the government and the unions. Finally, a similar process prevails among cash-crop farmers, for example, since marketing operations are managed or at least closely regulated by government. Demands in this sector are therefore necessarily and automatically "political", and governments are even viewed as responsible for controlling the fluctuations of world markets for tropical commodities, over which most of them have but a very limited leverage.

Men in uniform tend to act very much like other government employees. In the absence of institutionalized values and norms which transform men in uniform into a military establishment and a police force, officers and men are ruled by the norms that prevail among other groups; hence what has been said above applies to them as well. Furthermore, they rapidly find out that by virtue of their organizational characteristics and their control of certain instruments of force, they are indeed the best organized trade union in the country. As I shall point out below, this is not the only factor which has led the military to intervene in African politics; but it has helped set the mood for certain types of interventions and for the general relationship between the military and civilian politicians.<sup>10</sup>

As Lucian Pye has noted, "The non-Western political process is characterized by sharp differences in the political orientation of the generations", primarily because of a "lack of continuity in the circumstances under which people are recruited to politics".<sup>11</sup> In most African

countries, it was easy for a particular age-cohort to move from relatively modest positions in the occupational structure to the highest positions in both the polity and the economy. Within a single decade, clerks and elementary school teachers became Presidents, cabinet ministers, members of party executives, directors of large trading establishments, etc. But for the next generations, whose expectations are based on the experience of their predecessors, conditions have fundamentally changed. First of all, the uppermost positions have already been filled by relatively young men who see no precise time-limit to their tenure. Secondly, men with some education and occupational qualifications rapidly became much less scarce because of the huge growth of secondary and higher education during the post-World War II decade. Thus, there has been a manifold increase in supply while the demand has abruptly decreased. The result is that newer generations face an insurmountable glut which frustrates their aspirations, with very few opportunities for movement into alternative spheres of activity.<sup>12</sup> Hence, the phenomenon of inter-generational gap within the political sphere can be extended to almost every other institutional sphere, including especially the civil service and the military. It is exacerbated by the fact that the newer generations are usually in fact better trained and more highly qualified than their predecessors and hence have a very legitimate claim to take their place. To these discrepancies in recruitment must be added gaps in political socialization. In syncretic societies, the regime has very little control over the major mechanisms of socialization, the family and the primary group, and only partially over the educational structure. There is little likelihood that new generations will have a set of attitudes compatible with the requirements of the new order. This is particularly important given two factors: The rapid growth of a large

body of slightly educated, unemployed young urbanites; and the general shape of the demographic pyramid in which adolescents and young adults constitute a very large proportion of the total population. Intergenerational conflict is exacerbated by the fact that youthful discontent tends to be manifested not only by individual deviance from established norms, but also in the appearance of age-homogeneous movements and organizations, functional equivalents of the familiar youth gangs of industrialized societies, which tend to maintain in their own midst a distinctive sub-culture and to act autonomously in the political sphere.<sup>13</sup> "Youth" is thus transformed from a mere categoric group into a movement.

In concluding this brief review of the consequences of the politicization of residual cleavages and of the inflationary spiral of demands voiced by crucial groups in the society it is important to note that the two processes are seldom insulated from each other. Government employees, soldiers, or young men in the towns are also members of ethnic groups; yet, these several affiliations do not constitute the sort of web of group affiliation characteristic of "pluralist" societies. Hence, the two processes reinforce each other to produce recurrent, serious, and complex conflicts, which easily penetrate into the political arena because of the weakness of aggregative structures. But even if they do not immediately result in an increase in demands or in a withdrawal of support, they constitute serious disturbances from the point of view of governments engaged in building a nation since by their very existence they provide evidence that this goal has not been achieved.

The added weight contributed by these processes to the burdens of government is relatively independent of the wisdom or devotion of particular political leaders, factors which will not be considered here.

The difficulties of government in syncretic societies are so great, however, that the marginal consequences of human error, of weakness, and of sheer roguery --whose incidence among African politicians may be assumed to be about the same as among equivalent men elsewhere-- are vastly magnified. For example, corruption among government officials, which probably did not interfere with the industrial take-off of European countries of the United States (and perhaps even facilitated it), can have very damaging consequences where it diverts a large proportion of very scarce, non-expanding resources, away from the public domain into the pockets of a non-productive bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Impatience and arbitrary actions, which elsewhere may only lead to the discrediting of a public figure and to personal tragedy can be the sparks which ignite a major conflict.

Within a few years the two types of challenges discussed above strained the restricted distributive potential of the new governments and rapidly undermined the limited legitimacy of the founders. The center's weakness, hitherto hidden from sight, was unmercifully exposed, as when the value of the currency issued by a national banking system is drastically reduced when the credit pyramid, itself based on the productivity of the economy, collapses.<sup>14</sup> In the new situation, demands are expressed more vociferously; depositors knock down the gatekeepers and seek to invade the vault. Parsons has suggested that the system's response can be twofold: "First, an increasingly stringent scale of priorities of what can and cannot be done will be set up; second, increasingly severe negative sanctions for non-compliance with collective decisions will be imposed".<sup>15</sup> Political power, normally based on the overall social structure, gives way to force.

Although no African rulers ever abandoned completely their reliance on the techniques of machine politics to maintain themselves in office, illustrations of a trend toward the use of force abound and constitute by now a monotonous recitation of unpleasant but familiar facts of African political life: intimidation, exile, detention, or assassination of political opponents; modification of the electoral system to make competition either impossible or at least very costly to those who attempt to engage in it; reduction of the independence of the judiciary or creation side-by-side with it of dependable political courts; re-definition of loyalty into unquestioning obedience and sycophancy; use of the military, of the police, and of political thugs to bulldoze dissidents into passivity, and passives into supportive demonstrations; creation of additional quasi-military or quasi-police bodies to offset the questionable loyalty of the existing ones. Although coups which result in changes of government have attracted the most attention, the most frequent coups in Africa have probably been those initiated by an incumbent government against threatening individuals or groups (real or alleged), and those launched by a ruler or dominant faction against their associates.

Beyond its immediate unfortunate consequences for the individuals affected, the shift from power to force as a technique of government has serious long-term consequences for political life more generally in that it serves as the prelude to anti-government coups and revolutions, in the following manner:

a. In the process of shifting from power to force, governments tend to become over-confident in their ability to reduce the disturbing flow of demands by dealing harshly with their source. They become afraid that any concession might be interpreted as weakness and open

up a Pandora's box of claims. Hence, less change occurs altogether. Governments become less adept at discriminating between danger signals and tend to deal with even the smallest disturbances by expending a great deal of force.<sup>16</sup> But since the capital of force is small it becomes rapidly used up in relatively unnecessary undertakings, thus increasing the government's vulnerability to more serious threats.

b. When a shift from power to force occurs, it is accompanied by a change in the relative market value of existing structures. In the case of the new African states, the relative value of political parties and of civilian administrative agencies has undergone a sort of deflation, while the value of the police, of the military, and of any organization capable of exercising force, even by the sheer manipulation of large numbers of people in demonstrations and civil disobedience actions, has been vastly increased.

c. Although the shift to force represents an attempt to overcome deteriorating legitimacy and inadequate power, paradoxically it enhances the problem of the legitimacy of the rulers in the eyes of those to whom the implementation of force must necessarily be entrusted. As Parsons has indicated: "Most important, whatever the physical technology involved, a critical factor in socially effective force is always the social organization through which it is implemented. There is always some degree of dependance on the loyalties of the relevant personnel to the elements of the social structure ostensibly controlling them".<sup>17</sup> Attempts to balance one instrument of force which is thought to be unreliable by creating another merely modifies the problem of control of force by political means, but does not eliminate it. In fact, resort to this technique may exacerbate the very problem it seeks to overcome by antagonizing individuals identified with the relevant



institution.

d. When individuals and groups are deprived of the right and the opportunity of exercising power to express their demands, they have no choice but to submit to force or to use force themselves to express their demands. But when the government's capital of force is discovered to be limited, the latter alternative tends to be frequently chosen. Furthermore, since authority is personalized and the government is committed to a rigid course, specific demands tend to be translated into demands for a general change of rulers.

It is within the context of this inter-relationship between governments who rely on force and the remainder of the society that the growing frequency of military and civilian coups, successful or unsuccessful; of mutinies, large-scale and prolonged urban strikes or rural disturbances; of near-civil wars, insurrections, and revolutionary-minded movements, must be understood.

### 3. The Coup as a Political Institution<sup>18</sup>

The coup can be viewed as an institutionalized pattern of African politics on statistical grounds since in recent years it has become the modal form of governmental and regional change. More significantly, however, the coup is a normal consequence of the showdown between a government and its opponents who use force against each other in a situation where the force at the disposal of the government is very limited. This condition, which is met in most African countries, is most important because it distinguishes the conflict situation that tends to lead to a coup from others which tend to develop into some form of internal war as the result of extensive mobilization of support by both sides. In Africa, the government falls too soon for this to

occur; there is some evidence that governments even prefer to dissolve themselves than to fight. Coups determine who will rule, at least temporarily, but do not in themselves affect the fundamental character of the society or of its political system. The scope of the conflict is limited in relation to the society as a whole. Coups may be accompanied by some brutality but seldom entail more strategic forms of violence.<sup>19</sup>

As of mid-1967, the set of new states of tropical Africa could be divided into two sub-sets of almost equal size: those which had experienced at least one change of central government personnel as the result of a coup, and those which had not. But almost all the units in the second sub-set had experienced some serious challenge; some had withstood it only through external intervention on behalf of the incumbents; and it appeared equally likely that the next one, or the one after that, would be successful. As I suggested in the introduction, the incidence of coups appears to be independent of the quantitative or qualitative variables normally used to differentiate among African states. Attempted or successful coups are always justified by the initiators, and often explained by observers, with reference to the corruption, ineffectiveness, and arbitrariness of the incumbents, but it is impossible to distinguish any significant threshold beyond which these faults and weaknesses become intolerable and it would probably be impossible to demonstrate that the regimes of countries in which successful coups have occurred were, as a group, more vulnerable to these criticisms than others. Whether or not a coup occurs in a given African country at a particular time is related to specific and circumstantial features of that country's current political and economic situation, rather than to any fundamental and lasting characteristics

which differentiate that country from others on the continent. The most significant variable may well be the passing of time, a factor often neglected in studies of regime stability in the developing countries. Except in the most extreme situations, coups are more likely to occur after a few years of independence than initially because it takes some time for a government to use up its initial political capital and for opponents to test the government's strength.<sup>20</sup>

If the incidence of coups appears random, this is not true of the manner in which they develop. The atmosphere within which a coup is likely to occur can be created by almost any type of conflict situation, originating almost anywhere in the social structure, within the ruling elite or outside of it: but not every kind of showdown between the government and its opponents is equally likely to lead to the government's downfall. The government has to be physically threatened, which means that the initiators of the coup must be able to deploy force in the capital. Hence, successful coups usually involve two bodies of manpower: trade unions and the formal bearers of force, the Army and the police (including of course such bodies as the gendarmerie, where one exists). But these two bodies are related in an asymmetrical fashion: the unions cannot bring about the downfall of the government without the support of the Army (active or passive), while the Army can carry out a successful coup without securing any alliances. In the final analysis, then, the role of the Army is determinative. As one African journalist has put it, "the Army has established itself as a no man's land between the elite and the masses".<sup>21</sup>

Given the small size and organizational weakness of the military establishments inherited by most countries from the colonial era, few

students of African politics devoted much attention to its potential political role until this role became manifest. Yet, James Coleman and Belmont Bryce, Jr. indicated in one of the first essays on the subject that the Congo crisis of 1960, in which an Army which had recently shown every sign of disaggregation was able to act as the arbiter between the President and the Prime Minister, demonstrated "the determinative influence which a small military force could exercise in a situation in which countervailing institutions of power groups are absent".<sup>22</sup> How small "small" can be is now clear in the light of the successful interventions by the Togolese Army of 250 men in 1963 and by the Central African Republic's Army of 600 men in 1966, each of which was the smallest military establishment on the continent at the time of the coup. Perhaps the only reason for the slight delay in the Army's prominence was the fact that in some countries the uppermost levels of the Army were not Africanized until several years after independence, while in others the presence of European garrisons provided some protection against the African government's own military.<sup>23</sup> Even under these conditions, however, the determinative role of the military in political conflict should have been apparent to us much earlier: for example, the break-up of the Federation of Mali in 1960 involved initially a dispute between Senegal and Soudan over the appointment of the chief of the general staff, while the eventual showdown involved a clash between the pro-Senegalese gendarmerie (with the help of French Community officers) and troops under the command of the Soudanese Chief of Staff; the gendarmerie's action turned the tide in favor of Senegal.<sup>24</sup> In Senegal two and a half years later, President Senghor's control over a single battalion of airborne troops insured his victory over Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, who

had initially deployed the gendarmerie (with some Army support) against the President's partisans.<sup>25</sup>

Relationships between civilian governments and the military have steadily deteriorated, in keeping with the processes discussed in the preceding section. In addition, the government's very reliance on the military as an instrument of force brought about a transformation of the military outlook as officers became intimately acquainted with the seamy side of political life and were able to form an accurate estimate of the government's authority. Initially, the military tended to intervene against obviously weak governments such as the Congo-Kinshasa, Togo, the Congo-Brazzaville, or Dahomey; but later, even the strongest governments appeared to be much less formidable. Hence, there has been a steady escalation of the character of military interventions. Initially they took the form of strike-mutinies (to secure better pay, the removal of unpopular officers, better pensions for veterans, or an expansion of the Army) and referee actions (in the face of prolonged stalemate between contending politicians, or urban disorder resulting from strikes and demonstration). These early interventions usually led to the establishment of a compromise civilian government satisfactory to the military and to a return of the military to its barracks.<sup>26</sup> More recently, however, the military has tended to engage in wholehearted takeovers. Several of these have occurred after earlier referee actions failed to bring about the desired change; in others, a coup which appeared to be initially intended as a referee action was gradually transformed into a full-scale takeover when attempts to bring about a reconciliation among civilian politicians failed; in the light of these experiences, military leaders have become even less hesitant to establish military rule from the very beginning.

The institutionalization of the coup as an important means of government change in Africa stems not only from the internal characteristics of each country but also from the phenomenon of contagion. When African states first became independent, they were still isolated from one another, except when they formed colonial groupings, such as British East or French West Africa; international physical, social, and political communications were almost non-existent. Hence, during an initial period, disturbances in one country (Sudan, 1958; Congo-Kinshasa, 1960; Ethiopia, 1960) do not seem to have had any significant consequences for others, except when they occurred within one of the colonial groups (as in former French-speaking Africa from mid-1962 to early 1964, and in former British East Africa in January, 1964). More recently, however, the countries of the continent have become much more of an interacting international sub-system as denoted not only by the formation of the Organization of African Unity and other formal groupings that cut across former colonial boundaries, but also informal political ties and intervention by one country in another country's politics. Within this new context, waves of coups are more likely to occur. Although it is very difficult to show direct connections between events in Algeria (June, 1965), the Congo-Kinshasa (October), and the other countries in which military interventions occurred during the four months that followed, the first two did set the precedent for an escalation from referee actions to takeovers. For West Africa as a region, the links are much more specific. The military leaders of the Central African Republic, of Upper Volta, and of Dahomey have known one another since they served their apprenticeship together in Indochina; and although there is no evidence of concerted action, it is likely that for each of them the

promotion of the group as a whole creates new political aspirations. Beyond this, General Soglo of Dahomey has explained that his takeover in Dahomey was prompted by the fear that the elections scheduled for early 1966 might crystallize the North-South cleavage and result in disorder similar to that which prevailed among the Yoruba of neighboring Western Nigeria during recent elections, and about which Dahomeyans, many of whom are also Yoruba, were well informed.<sup>27</sup> Conversely, Soglo's success probably affirmed the resolution of Nigerian officers next door; their success in turn may have inspired their Ghanaian counterparts, with whom they share not only British professional traditions but also exposure to the disastrous consequences of political disorder gained while serving in the Congo with ONUC.

Within one country also coups engender other coups. The success of one set of claimants encourages others to try as well. Even the establishment of military regimes does not lessen the probability of future civilian or military coups, since the very characteristics of African armies insure that the solidarity of their leadership, the control they have over their own organization, and their authority over the society at large, are not likely to be much greater than what they were in the government they replaced.

#### 4. Force as an Instrument of Major Political Change

Both the ins and the outs in Africa have also attempted to use force in order to achieve more fundamental changes including the modification of political communities, the alteration of important aspects of the stratification system, and the transformation of regimes (in Easton's sense of "regularized method for ordering political relationships"): These attempts may be initiated by the original founders, by new governments resulting from successful coups, or by alternative

elites who seek to construct a competing system of authority while the government they oppose is still in place. Since these attempts usually involve the mobilization of extensive support, they tend to lead to an enlargement of the scope of conflict and may entail more strategic forms of violence. Except in a few specific situations discussed below, however, force fails to bring about major political change in Africa. In particular, political revolutions are unlikely to succeed because they entail prerequisites which are absent from the syncretic societies of contemporary Africa.

a. The Modification of Political Communities: Force is often invoked in Africa to bring about a redefinition of the territorial extent of the political community or of the internal relationship between some of its major components. Many countries contain regions that wish to secede, either to constitute an autonomous state or to join a neighbor. Such situations usually arise when one or more of the following features are present: an ethnic group which straddles two countries, one segment of which comes to believe that it is in the wrong country; territorially contiguous societies with asymmetrical status cultures, particularly in countries which straddle the borderline between Arabized Muslim and "Black" Africa; rich areas (with income based on mineral deposits or on an important export crop) which resent having their revenue reallocated on a national basis and are geographically in an eccentric position from the point of view of the larger unit.

The most prominent case is of course that of Katanga, where secession did occur and was accompanied by a clash of organized military bodies in the form of a small-scale war, because of the availability of non-Congolese instruments of force on both sides. By contrast, the



breakup of the Federation of Mali did not involve strategic violence, but only a show of limited force by the two sides. Many other countries have experienced small-scale versions of this phenomenon: border tensions, involving armed incursions or attempted subversion, are common. Because of the nature of African armies and of the terrain (especially the absence of land communications suitable to military movement between countries with different colonial experiences), however, it is unlikely that these conflicts will lead to international wars; attempts to alter the territorial definition of political communities will either succeed without much violence, or will result in recurrent but minor irritations.<sup>28</sup>

Conflict over the relationship of one or more relatively integrated and distinct parts of the political community to the remainder stems most commonly from the sequels of indirect rule, as in Nigeria and in Uganda. The constitutional settlement achieved under British leadership and supervision as a condition of the grant of independence, which provided for a loose form of federation approaching confederacy for all Nigerian regions, and between Buganda and the rest of Uganda, represented merely a truce in a protracted conflict because it could not be anchored in congruent political norms and structures. Although there are many other unsettled issues in both countries, conflict over the role of the North in Nigeria and of Buganda in Uganda have dominated political life since independence, with power rapidly giving way to force as a means of settlement. In Nigeria, the North attempted to preserve its identity by controlling policy-making at the federal level as the indispensable major partner in successive coalitions. Force was used by all sides to insure favorable results in critical elections. The new situation led to a first military coup in January, 1966. When the new

military government announced its intention of transforming the country into a unitary state --a decision which was interpreted in the Nigerian context as a fundamental change in the character of the political community-- the North resorted to force (attacks upon southern residents of norther towns) to obtain concessions. In August, 1966, a new military coup put an end to unitary government before it had even begun to function. The sequels have involved an extension of inter-regional conflict, including the breakup of the Army into regional factions, and the secession of the Eastern region in May, 1967.

In Uganda, Buganda long resisted all attempts by the national government to obtain control of the police on Buganda territory, organized a para-military body of veterans to occupy contested territory (in the "Lost Counties" dispute), and used force to intimidate Baganda whose political loyalty was not assured. Whatever the reasons which led to the strange government-initiated coup of February, 1966, in the course of which Prime Minister Obote assumed full executive powers, his decision to eliminate the offices of President and Vice-President (held by the traditional rulers of Buganda and Busoga respectively), the purge of pro-Baganda elements from the national army, and the eventual proclamation of an entirely new constitution without consulting the federal units, clearly constituted the prelude to an attempt to alter the most important features of the political community by force. Force gave way to the strategic use of violence in the next phase of conflict; and although the Obote government successfully repressed the Buganda uprising of May 1966, it is unlikely that this constitutes the end of the affair.<sup>29</sup>

Although such clear-cut cases are relatively rare, there are

numerous instances which involve similar sequels of quasi-indirect rule, as with the Mossi of Upper Volta or the Agni of the Ivory Coast. Related situations occur in countries that contain pastoral and/or nomadic societies which the colonial powers had been satisfied to contain rather than to rule, and for which the end of European presence represents an opportunity to return to a traditional way of life that includes internal feuding and raiding upon neighbors. These patterns of behavior not only involve violence in and of themselves, but often lead to violent clashes with the military and the police.<sup>30</sup> The conflict may be exacerbated by specific factors, as in Mali where the nomads are "white" while the new African government is "black," or by the nationalist ideology of the rulers of new states from whose vantage point successful containment alone is not a satisfactory solution.

b. Stratification Change: A few African countries deviate from the general pattern discussed in section (1) in that the territorial boundaries established by European colonizers coincided with the domain of a single unit whose stratification system included a clear-cut hierarchical organization of ethnic strata defined in relation to each other with a socially, economically, and politically dominant minority and a subordinate majority approaching the "plural society" discussed by M. G. Smith.<sup>31</sup> The introduction of the principle of legitimacy based on popular sovereignty and of opportunities to implement this principle by means of elections based on universal suffrage in such societies can have genuinely revolutionary consequences, as was the case in Rwanda and in Zanzibar.

In Rwanda, the pastoral Tutsi, who constituted approximately 15 percent of the population, ruled for four centuries over the agricultural

Hutu linked to them by an inheritable client-patron "contract" through a highly centralized administration headed by their Mwami, backed by their specialized warrior caste, and based on a monopoly of all cattle and land.<sup>32</sup> Although both the Germans and the Belgians ruled indirectly, reserving educational opportunities and administrative posts almost exclusively for the Tutsi elite, changes began to occur after World War II when the Hutu engaged in the cultivation of a new major cash crop (Arabica coffee) and were encouraged to attend Catholic mission schools. Although political participation was slowly extended by means of indirect elections in 1953 and 1956, its effects were initially mediated by fears of Tutsi retaliation; nevertheless, Hutu-led political organizations began to emerge by the end of the period. In 1959, following the death of the ruling Mwami, Hutu leaders organized a popular uprising against the coming to power of an extremist Tutsi faction which advocated immediate independence in order to forestall further political and social reforms. Many Tutsi fled the country at this time, and again in the midst of the serious violence that accompanied the 1960 and 1961 elections in which the Hutu party won a decisive victory. The new government went beyond earlier reforms and destroyed the basis of the stratification system by abolishing the old contract relationship and redistributing cattle. A large number of Tutsi still in the country were slain when Tutsi exiles forcibly attempted to reenter Rwanda in 1963; there have been repeated cycles of violence since then.

As a political unit, Zanzibar is composed of the island of that name and of Pemba. On the island of Zanzibar, the stratification system involved consistent cleavages between an Arab minority who owned most of the land and the revenue-bearing trees on it; and the Shirazi majority,

island Africans who lived on the land on a squatter basis; there were also some mainland Africans with ties to Kenya and Tanganyika. Cleavages were less consistent on Pemba, where the Shirazi were economically less differentiated from the Arabs. The British governed the island indirectly through the traditional Arab rulers but extended participation in the usual manner toward the end of the colonial period. The growth of political organizations entailed a mobilization of the various communities accompanied by the expected exacerbation of cleavages and ensuing disturbances. In the elections preparatory to independence of June, 1963, the Afro-Shirazi party (with support among Zanzibar Shirazi and mainland Africans on both islands) won 63 percent of the votes on Zanzibar alone, and a 54 percent majority on both islands together; because of the system of single-member constituencies, however, it failed to obtain a majority of seats, and the government was organized by the ZNP (with support among the Pemba Shirazi and Arabs on both islands), together with the smaller ZPPP. One month after independence, on January 21, 1964, insurgents broke into the police arsenal and armed themselves; the police offered minimal resistance, and the insurgents rapidly gained control of the island of Zanzibar. In the course of this coup and after a new Shirazi-dominant government was installed, large numbers of Arabs were slain, fled, or left under duress. Permanent change in the stratification system was thus brought about.<sup>33</sup>

In Zanzibar and in Rwanda, genuine revolutions were possible, with or without a coup, because the central feature which defined the stratification system and the character of the society more generally could be modified by force. But this is a rare situation in the new African states, found at the national level only in Burundi and sometimes in a

particular ethnic group within a country (as in Nigeria and others that contain Fulani societies with serf-like clients or captives).

The potential for drastic modifications of the stratification systems involving violence is thus present, but is unlikely to have the spectacular effects it had in Zanzibar or in Rwanda.<sup>34</sup>

c. The Second Revolution: Aside from the cases just discussed, there have been few attempts in tropical Africa to bring about rapid and profound changes in established political arrangements and in the underlying social structure by drastic means. The few radical-minded regimes established at independence have chosen survival over revolutionary purity and have bowed to necessity by curtailing their goals. Most coups have resulted in military rule, and the main concerns of general-presidents are rule of law, honesty, efficiency, and financial responsibility. Their institutional models resemble those of dedicated European officials during the last phase of colonialism. Yet, many members of newer political generations and older radicals who were bypassed by machine politicians during the first go-around have begun to view the original founding and more recent changes as abortive beginnings. Like the thinkers who launched a wave of political messianism in mid-nineteenth century Europe, they believe that the true revolution is yet to come. The shape it might take has been analyzed by Frantz Fanon, who believed that it would be based upon the total mobilization of the youthful sub-proletariat of the growing cities and of the neglected rural masses.<sup>35</sup> Two situations so far seem to approximate what African revolutions might entail, the aftermath of the Congo-Brazzaville coup of 1963 and the Congo-Kinshasa (ex-Leopoldville) rebellions that began in 1964.

With 65 percent of the school-age population in schools at the time of independence and with one-fifth of its population in three cities, but without much economic development, the Congo-Brazzaville experienced very early and in an unusually acute form the consequences of growing cities peopled by semi-permanently unemployed youths. Opportunities for employment probably even declined absolutely when Brazzaville ceased to be the administrative capital of French Equatorial Africa. Political life had long reflected a sharp antagonism between the Mbochi of the North and several related Bakongo groups, including the Lari (Balali), who had been a focal point for the activities of numerous religio-political protest movements such as Matswanism during the colonial era and provided basic support for the rise to power of a Catholic priest, Fulbert Youlou.<sup>36</sup> Having emerged as a strong man around 1960 after a period of coalition government, Youlou stepped up the construction of a one-party state in mid-1963 in the face of growing unrest stemming from unemployment, open corruption, ruthless elimination of opposition leaders, and his unabashed espousal of causes usually defined as "neo-colonialist". In the course of a confrontation between the government and trade unions in August, the Army, which only a few months earlier had been involved in a near-mutiny put down by the gendarmerie with the aid of French troops, shifted from support of the government to neutrality and eventually demanded Youlou's resignation. This time, French troops did not intervene and the government fell. A moderate provisional government, without direct Army or trade union participation, was immediately installed.

Except for the provision of a dual executive (President and Prime Minister), the other steps in constitutional reform and policy reorien-

tation in the economic and international fields since 1963 have merely brought the country in line with African "radicals" such as Guinea or Mali; on the ethnic side, the Balali (Lari) have been replaced as the leading political group by other Bakongo tribes. The more significant feature of political change is the apparent accountability of the new authorities to the "street", represented by the jeunesse. The lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18 immediately after the coup suggests that it was among young adults, who probably constitute the bulk of the urban population, that the new leaders hoped to find much of their support or, alternatively, that they were already dependent upon them. Although the youth was formed into an ancillary wing of the Mouvement National pour la Revolution, it appears that it is the youth branch which is the most powerful part of the organization. The major manifestation of its political role are the activities of the "revolutionary militia" whose major weapon seems to be terror, including a political protection racket backed by the threat of violence and occasional assassinations. The jeunesse as a whole was characterized in 1965 as a "curious mixture of revolutionary idealism and juvenile delinquency", which the government could barely control.<sup>37</sup> Although in the absence of additional information it is impossible to analyze the sociology of this movement, it seems that much of the ire of the jeunesse and of the new regime more generally has been directed at Catholic trade union leaders (including those who had participated in the initial coup), youth leaders, schools, and at the Church more generally. This would suggest that a rejection mood, akin to that which activated earlier messianic movements, underlies contemporary political life. The regime's future remains uncertain. Discontent among the Balali followers of Youlou, the inability of the regime



to solve fundamental problems of development and unemployment, factionalism among trade union leaders, have been reflected in sporadic anti-government riots, plots, and changes of leadership at the top. In June, 1966, the Army reacted to the growing importance of quasi-military political organizations by staging a coup; although this one failed, the next one might well succeed.

The loosely connected movements usually referred to as the Congolese rebellion which originated in Kwilu (near Leopoldville) and in Maniema (Eastern Congo) in 1964 can all be attributed to general factors which are not unique to the Congo, but exacerbated by the special Congolese situation.<sup>38</sup> They must be distinguished from dissidence elsewhere in Africa, however, not only by their scope and the massive violence engendered, or by their international implications and long-term consequences for the areas involved, but also by their clearly rural rather than urban character. The case of Kwilu is especially interesting in the present context because of the special ideological meaning it was given by its leaders and on the basis of which it was organized. As one study puts it, the Kwilu rebellion emerges as "a revolutionary attempt to correct some of the abuses and injustices by which large segments of the population of the region felt oppressed four years after official Independence and an effort to try once again to express and to concretely realize the goals and dreams promised by the 'First Independence of 1960'".<sup>39</sup>

Kwilu, a densely populated area inhabited by several different ethnic groups whose traditional political organization does not extend much beyond the village level, and whose adult males work mostly as palm cutters on European plantations, had a history of rebellion against the

Force Publique (1931) and of religio-political protest movements throughout the colonial period. When political participation was extended in 1959, A. Gizenga, P. Mulele, and C. Karitatu, representing different tribes, organized the Parti Socialiste Africain (PSA) whose socialism took the form of a "village paradise-on-earth". It was allied at the national level with the Lumumba coalition. After the Congo crisis of 1960, the PSA itself splintered; Gizenga, connected with the Stanleyville government of 1960-61, became the "imprisoned martyr"; Mulele left the country and spent some time in Communist China; while the more "moderate" Karitatu faction obtained control of the regional government when Kwilu became a province in 1962.

The growing discontent throughout the region in 1962-63, manifested by palm-cutter strikes and a resurgence of messianic cults, was channeled into an organized movement by Mulele upon his return in mid-1963. He established forest camps in which équipes, led by a President and a Commissaire Politique, and accompanied by a soigneur (healer), usually practitioner of traditional magic and medicine, were trained in guerilla warfare. The équipes formed the maquis; above them were the directions ultimately responsible to the centrale. Mulele also provided the movement with a rudimentary ideology which defined what was wrong, diagnosed causes, and indicated remedies. The culprits are the "Congolese colonialists" or retardataires who presently man government at all levels. The remainder of the society is divided into avancés (Mulele partisans) and réactionnaires (moderates, fence-sitters). The goal is to achieve a new society "conceived as a gigantic village made up of thousands of small villages in which the people find their own authenticity; all that they need materially; justice, creativity, and happiness in working the

soil together".<sup>40</sup> In order to achieve it, the avancés must destroy the retardataires and persuade the réactionnaires. They are bound to triumph if they obey their leaders and adhere to prescribed norms, including certain taboos which guarantee their invulnerability such as the prohibition against speaking French.

Support for the movement was generally drawn from Mulele's and Gizenga's own ethnic groups, the BaMbunda and the BaPende; it attracted much of the jeunesse, especially teachers and clerks who hoped to be rapidly promoted in the bureaucracy of the new state; ex-policemen dismissed because of a pay mutiny; and a variety of chiefs, lineage and age segments involved in local conflicts. The initial attacks of January, 1964, were planned, systematic, and well-controlled; they were aimed at religious, industrial, governmental, and educational establishments, but spared the ones considered friendly to the rebels (such as the mission schools which the leaders had attended). In the absence of outside communications, Mulele was able to persuade much of the local population that the revolution had already been victorious elsewhere; hence, in much of the area, after the initial uprising life tended to go back to normal within the framework of the "new society". Only later, after Europeans had been evacuated and the undisciplined Congolese Army advanced into the region did full-scale, indiscriminate terre brûlée violence occur. Although the Congolese Army was able to contain the Kwilu area as early as April, 1964, they still clashed with rebels at the beginning of 1966, and the present situation in the area is not very clear.

It is very likely that growing tensions and the availability of dissident leaders will contribute to the emergence of similar movements

elsewhere, that the activities of these movements will generate large-scale violence, and that participation in them will genuinely lift the spirits of those involved. But even if we combine Brazzaville and Kwilu, it is unlikely that movements such as these will be able to translate their revolutionary aspirations into the institutionalization of a new regime and of new social structures. African society does not have a center; its syncretic character insures that it cannot be turned upside down, or that if an attempt is made to do so, some groups will shift their relative positions but the society as a whole will remain very much as it was before. If the revolutionaries succeed in obtaining control of the government, they will resemble at best the radical-minded regimes created in the course of the "first revolution". If they do not succeed, however, they might give rise to a "vendetta morality" or become full-scale withdrawal movements which consume themselves in senseless violence.<sup>41</sup> In the final analysis, it is unlikely that even the most glorious dedication to force can broaden the limits of the range of variation imposed on political arrangements by contemporary African society.

### Conclusions

Seeking to overcome the parochialism of area studies, many scholars dealing with the politics of new states have hit upon the device of bringing up the foreground of the contemporary scene into sharp focus, extrapolating it from context, and blowing it up for leisurely contemplation. The background has been reduced to an indistinct blur called tradition which yields little interesting information. Patterns obtained in this manner from various landscapes yield an impression of

great richness of information; when compared, they suggest striking similarities which lend themselves to broad generalizations. But one may wonder whether the similarities stem from the phenomena observed or from the manipulations to which the recorded images have been subjected, whether the information used to generalize relates to the landscape or to the characteristics of the lens and of the film, and whether information obtained in this manner is most likely to foster the growth of our understanding.

Surely, we must learn the techniques of cinéma-vérité, using hand-held cameras that are a more direct extension of the observer's eye, suitable for obtaining intimate moving pictures of the varying patterns subsumed under the terms political development, modernization, or integration. Understanding of these processes will be achieved not by reducing them to a common denominator, but by comparing their manifestations in different settings. Political life in all the new states can be characterized by the weakness of institutionalized mechanisms for integration through regulation, coordination, and the formation of a value consensus. But the situation in most of tropical Africa is so extreme that studies which focus exclusively on incipient institutions almost necessarily exaggerate their importance.

Hence, I have tried in this essay to provide some balance by considering politics in the more general context of African societies and

by focusing on conflict as a major element of political life. Although the incidence of certain manifestations of conflict may be relatively random, political conflict is not a random process but derives a discernible structure from the characteristics of the society itself. Much more precision can be achieved than in this essay by operationalizing independent and dependent variables in a manner to obtain elements from which a comparative typology can be constructed. This is a vital task because, since various factors insure the persistence of most of the new territorial units even if institutional integration does not occur, conflict is likely to remain a salient feature of political life in tropical Africa.

The stress on conflict in this essay does not imply that no institutionalization is taking place, nor that the functions of conflict in a polity are wholly negative. Integration into a free society does not mean the total absence of conflict, but rather its containment within acceptable limits.<sup>42</sup> But progress in this direction requires an acceptance of the premise itself, of a view that conflict is an aspect of society, rather than wishful thinking about its permanent disappearance. From this point of view it is possible that most models used by both students and practitioners of nation-building are inadequate because they are based on erroneous notions of what constitutes a modern nation based on freedom. The major task is therefore one of ideological renewal, which will perhaps be facilitated by the experience of the first decade of independence. It is a burden which all of us must shoulder, and it is the most important way in which social scientists concerned with African politics can contribute to the future of the continent.

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the September, 1966, meeting of the American Political Science Association in New York City.
2. Discussing his methodology, Crawford Young has stated: "No particular model of political change has been adopted as a frame for the ordering of material as none yet evolved, in this opinion, provides a felicitous scheme for scaling the significance of the multifold facts pressing for the attention of the student of Congo politics." (Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965], p.602). I have discussed the general implications of the Congo for comparative politics in "A View from the Congo," World Politics, XIX, No. 1 (October 1966), 137-49.
3. Rudolf Arnheim, Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the Creative Eye (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), p. 230.
4. See the discussion in C. S. Whitaker, Jr., "A Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change," World Politics, XIX (January 1967), No. 2, 190-217.
5. The problem with which I am dealing here is akin to that of the "plural society" conceptualized by H. G. Smith in The Plural Society in the British West Indies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965). The word "syncretic" distinguishes the present societies from the "plural," which is a particular type involving super-ordination between components. I prefer it to the more passive "heterogeneous," because "syncretic" connotes that a

process of amalgamation and integration is being attempted.

6. For a further development of this point, see my book, Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), Chapter V. My reasoning here is deductive; but empirical evidence from micro-political studies of Ghana by David Brokensha and Ernst Benjamin, of Mali by Nicholas Hopkins, and of Tanzania by Henry Bienen, confirm the validity of the assumption.
7. Notions concerning the political system apparent here and elsewhere in this paper are inspired from the works of David Easton, but clearly lack the intellectual rigor of A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965).
8. For a general treatment of this topic, see Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," in Clifford Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963). Although every serious monograph on African politics has also dealt with the subject, it is unfortunate that no effort has been made to refine for Africa the comparative analysis of the phenomenon along the lines suggested by Geertz.
9. I have attempted to deal with this question in One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 407, 77, 128-34.
10. The most useful recent surveys of African military establishments are contained in the publications of the Institute of Strategic Studies (London). See in particular, M. J. V. Bell, "Army and Nation in Sub-Saharan Africa," Adelphi Papers, No. 21 (August, 1965) and David Wood, "The Armed Forces of African States,"



- Adelphi Papers, No. 27 (April, 1966). For an earlier essay, see James S. Coleman and Belmont Bryce, Jr., "The Role of the Military in Sub-Saharan Africa," in John J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 359-405.
11. Lucian Pye, "The Non-Western Political Process," in H. Eckstein and D. Apter (eds.), Comparative Politics (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 660.
  12. On patterns of recruitment of new elites and their consequences, see Rémi Clignet and Philip Foster, The Fortunate Few (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).
  13. Conditions under which the phenomenon occurs are specified by S. N. Eisenstadt, From Generation to Generation (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956).
  14. The analogy is drawn from Talcott Parsons, "Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process," in Harry Eckstein (ed.), Internal War (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 59-64.
  15. Ibid., p. 64.
  16. This proposition is related to Apter's suggestion that there is "an inverse relationship between information and coercion in a system." (David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965], p. 40).
  17. Parsons, Ibid., p.66.
  18. It is very difficult to analyze the patterns of coups because it is impossible to identify the components of the universe with which one must deal. If incumbent rulers are to be believed, attempted coups against the government are extremely frequent in almost

every African country; but what appear to be anti-government plots may in fact be only government-initiated purges. The present analysis is based exclusively on secondary sources. Unless otherwise specified, data are drawn from reports in West Africa (London), Afrique Nouvelle (Dakar), Le Monde, Selection Hebdomadaire (Paris), The Times (London), The New York Times, Jeune Afrique (Tunis), Africa Report (Washington), and Africa Digest (London). A more detailed analysis of military interventions was presented at the 1966 meetings of the International Sociological Association (Evian).

20. This point challenges the hypothesis discussed by Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, XVII, No. 3 (April, 1965), p. 427. His data are based on Fred R. Von der Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 65.
21. Justin Vieyra in Jeune Afrique, December 12, 1965.
22. Coleman and Bryce, p. 399.
23. The Congo crisis reminds us, however, that African troops can launch mutinies against their European officers.
24. William J. Foltz, From French West Africa to the Mali Federation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 176-83.
25. Victor Du Bois, "The Trial of Mamadou Dia," American Universities Field Staff Report Service, West Africa Series, VI, No. 6 (June, 1963), pp. 4-8.
26. See for example the analysis of Dahomey and the Congo-Brazzaville in Emmanuel Terray, "Les révolutions congolaise et dahoméenne de

- 1963: essai d'interpretation," Revue Francaise de Science Politique, XIV, No. 5 (October, 1964), pp. 917-42. A more detailed account of the process of escalation is presented in the paper cited in note 18.
27. Reported by Philippe Decraene in Le Monde, Sélection Hebdomadaire, June 30-July 6, 1966.
28. Intra-national and international conflicts involving Ethiopia and the Sudan are major exceptions; they are not considered here because these two countries are peripheral to the universe of post-colonial tropical Africa with which I am particularly concerned.
29. This account is based on the excellent analysis by M. Crawford Young, "The Obote Revolution," Africa Report, June 1966, pp.8-14.
30. Manifestations of this process in Uganda are discussed by Colin Leys, "Violence in Africa," Transition, V, No. 21 (Fourth Quarter, 1965), pp. 17-20.
31. See Note 5, above.
32. For background on Rwanda, see in particular Jacques Maquet and Marcel d'Hertefeldt, "Elections en Société Féodale," Académie royale des Sciences coloniales, Classe des Sciences Morales et Politiques, XXI, Fasc. 2 (1959); and Jacques Maquet, The Premise of Inequality in Ruanda (London: Oxford University Press, 1961). For more recent events, I have relied on Aaron Segal, "Rwanda: The Underlying Causes," Africa Report, IX, No. 4 (April 1964), pp. 3-8; and on an unpublished paper by Donald Attwood, graduate student in anthropology at the University of Chicago.
33. This account is based on Keith Kyle, "Coup in Zanzibar," Africa Report, IX, no. 2 (February 1964), pp. 18-20.

34. The political emancipation of Fulani "captives" probably contributed to the rise of the nationalist movements of Mali and Guinea in 1956-58.
35. See The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1965). For a more general discussion of Fanon's thought in the context of his life, see the author's "Frantz Fanon: A Gospel for the Damned," Encounter, November 1966.
36. For background on Brazzaville, see the works of Georges Balandier and also Jean-Michel Wagret, Histoire et Sociologie Politiques de la Republique du Congo (Brazzaville) (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1963). For an analysis of the 1963 coup, see Terray (Note 26 above).
37. Jeune Afrique, August 8, 1965. There is some evidence that similar youth groups helped bring Youlou to prominence in 1956 (Wagret, p. 65).
38. Succinct and well-balanced analyses of the Congolese Rebellion can be found in Marvin D. Markowitz and Herbert F. Weiss, "Rebellion in the Congo," Current History, April 1965, pp. 213-18; and M. Crawford Young, "The Congo Rebellion," Africa Report, X, No. 4 (April 1965), pp. 6-11. The present discussion of the Kwilu case is based on Renée C. Fox, Will de Craemer, and Jean-Marie Ribeaucourt, "'The Second Independence': a Case Study of the Kwilu Rebellion in the Congo," Comparative Studies in Society and History, VIII, No. 1 (October 1965), 78-105. The most comprehensive source of information on these rebellions is Benoit Verhaegen, Rébellions au Congo, Vol. I ("Les Etudes du C.R.I.S.P." Leopoldville and Brussels, 1966). This work became available too late to be fully consulted.

39. Fox et al, p. 78.
40. Ibid., p. 97.
41. For similar outcomes elsewhere see, for example, E. J. Hobsbawn, Primitive Rebels (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1965).
42. This view is inspired from Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), especially p. 318. See also my general argument in Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

Summary

To understand political life in Africa, instead of viewing disturbances as the shapeless ground surrounding institutions and processes which define the regimes of the new states, we must try to view them as characteristic processes which themselves constitute an important aspect of the regime in certain types of political systems. The paper examines, in succession, the initial characteristics of modern African political systems, the reasons for the shift from power to use of force, the coup as an institutionalized pattern of African politics, the uses and limits of force as an instrument of major political changes in the context of African society.

Résumé

Pour comprendre la vie politique en Afrique, il faut essayer de considérer les troubles non comme le terrain informe qui entoure les institutions et les processus des régimes des nouveaux Etats, mais comme des processus caractéristiques, représentant eux-mêmes un aspect important des régimes dans certains types de systèmes politiques. Le rapport examine successivement les caractéristiques initiales des systèmes politiques de l'Afrique moderne, les raisons du passage du pouvoir politique à l'usage de la force, le coup d'Etat en tant qu'institution de la vie politique africaine, les usages et les limites de la force en tant qu'instrument de transformations politiques profondes dans le contexte de la société africaine.

Br/Consensus/12

"Consensus et conflits, notamment  
dans les pays en voie de développement"

SYSTEME POLITIQUE ET MODELES DE POUVOIR AU BRESIL

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S E P T I E M E    C O N G R E S    M O N D I A L  
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## SYSTEME POLITIQUE ET MODELES DE POUVOIR AU BRÉSIL

par Candido Mendes

L'étude de la dynamique actuelle du comportement politique brésilien, visant à définir les conditions de prévisibilité de son évolution, peut être divisée en quatre chapitres principaux:

- I - L'énoncé des prémisses fondamentales qui caractérisent la formulation actuelle du problème du pouvoir au Brésil.
- II - L'étude des caractéristiques récentes assumées par l'alliance entre les technocrates et les militaires, responsables de la marche du processus politico-national, depuis avril 64.
- III - L'analyse du cours possible de ce régime, aussi bien dans l'hypothèse de la consolidation du "statu quo" dans le cadre d'un modèle politique nouveau, que de ses alternatives éventuelles.
- IV - Le résumé des indices de base méritant une étude afin d'établir des jugements de probabilité, quant à l'application des alternatives indiquées dans le chapitre précédent. Ces indices pourront être inclus comme des politiques variables dans une étude globale du tableau économique et social, qui conditionne l'organisation du processus décisive, à court et à long délai, dans la perspective brésilienne actuelle.



La prémisses initiale du présent travail concerne l'attitude assumée par le gouvernement brésilien actuel de se considérer comme un nouveau régime politique, résultante de l'arrêt du développement spontané du pays, et de la nécessité de le relancer selon un modèle capitaliste, commandé par une nette "élite de pouvoir". (1)

- A) - Neutralité relative envers les connexions d'intérêt et de dynamisme directement dérivées du changement de la structure économique de la collectivité.
- B) - Homogénéité sensible des qualités mentales de la classe dirigeante, pouvant arriver à l'idée de subordination effective de la vie sociale à des modèles et paradigmes.
- C) - Développement d'idéologies découlant de cette position de neutralité à l'égard de l'infrastructure, basé soit sur l'institutionnalisation de l'intervention

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(1) - La conception d'élite de pouvoir, malgré l'influence que puisse lui apporter l'expression forgée par C. Wright Mills ("The Power Elite", Oxford University Press, 1959), se rapporte à la catégorie d'éléments du processus de changement social dans les pays sous-développés. Ces éléments peuvent être para-idéologiques lorsqu'ils correspondent à l'action conjointe de diverses classes et groupes sociaux dans la transition; ils peuvent être idéologiques lorsqu'ils résultent d'un rapport univoque entre l'infra et la superstructure sociale, faisant d'une classe donnée le principal protagoniste du changement; finalement, ils peuvent être élites de pouvoir, dans la mesure où l'élément du processus ne s'identifie pas dans l'infrastructure sociale et est représenté à partir de sa situation de domination ou contrôle du plan institutionnel de la vie collective. Normalement, dans ce processus de changement, l'élite de pouvoir présenterait les caractéristiques suivantes.

~~qu'il est~~ cubite et contenu dans le processus poli-  
tique en termes de "salut", soit le ~~nationalisme~~ <sup>nationalisme</sup>. Les  
élites de pouvoir peuvent présenter un caractère équivoque  
ou univoque: dans le premier cas, elles sont typiquement  
représentées par d'étroites alliances technocratico-militai-  
res. Dans la dynamique des élites de pouvoir, la tech-  
nocratie constitue une sous-espèce classique, dans la mesure  
où:

- a) - elle exacerbe la vision paradigmatique du processus  
jusqu'au choix aprioristique des modèles et des options  
qui devront s'appliquer à sa perspective gouvernementale;
- b) - elle maximalise la perspective de neutralité ou de dé-  
sengagement envers l'infrastructure jusqu'à faire de la  
rationalité une instance toujours réductrice des con-  
flits et tensions de la propre élite dirigeante, qui  
tendent à transférer insensiblement vers un propre pôle  
technique non pas un instrument, mais le propre contenu,  
la propre substance des décisions fondamentales.

L'ouvrage de Amos Perlmutter, "The Politics of Emerging  
Arab Army Elites: A Comparative Demonstration" et les contributions que  
lui ont apportées les professeurs Nadav, Safran, Miron Weiner, Frey et  
Eisenstadt, sont particulièrement significatifs dans l'étude de ce concept.  
(Dixième réunion du Harvard-Mit Joint Faculty Seminar on Political Develop-  
ment, mars 1966 (Voir résumé des débats, Discussion Paper and Presentations,  
publication minéographiée, Harvard, 1966).

Dans le processus de regression politique, entre les éléments  
idéologiques et ceux d'élite de pouvoir, la transition comporterait encore  
une phase intermédiaire des éléments "Synocratiques", d'après l'expression  
forgée par A.F.K. Organski, dans "The Stages of Political Development",  
Knopf, 1965. Ce serait le cas de la supervalorisation nécessaire du com-  
mandement de la superstructure résultante de la perte du spontanéisme du  
changement social en fonction d'un processus de modernisation économique et  
sociale n'amenant pas à constituer ce que l'auteur appelle ses trois conflits  
de base, c'est-à-dire le choc entre les élites industrielles et agricoles,  
la tension entre celles-ci et les groupes qui en dépendent directement, et fi-  
nalement entre les bases de l'édifice social.

Ce groupe rejette l'idée d'être à peine un simple gouvernement militaire, dans lequel des Généraux, au mode typique des "juntas" latino-américaines, commandent la rotation permanente des oligarchies traditionnelles. Le régime se considère compromis par une vision réformiste de la réalité et cherche à modifier peu à peu le "statu quo", particulièrement par l'élimination, sur le plan institutionnel, de survivances de pouvoir politique héritées de structures obsolètes et dépourvues de toute signification sur le plan économique. Les réformes fiscales, introduites par cette élite de pouvoir visent à apporter des changements sensibles dans la distribution du revenu national, favorisant de nouvelles forces possibles et punissant les détenteurs de ressources oisives et les groupes parasitaires, qui prospèrent au dépens de la politique de favoritisme, caractéristique de l'ancienne structure. Toutefois, l'emphase des réformes est tout de suite modulée par l'impératif de la gradualité, le régime assumant le risque de contenir, ou même de réduire, le rythme d'accès à l'économie de marché des secteurs pondérables de la population, condamnés encore au niveau de subsistance. De la même façon, partant de la même prémisse et selon une parfaite orthodoxie dans le lancinement de modèles néocapitalistes, on a abandonné toute stratégie d'accélération du processus impliquant en nouvelles expansions du secteur public ou donnant à son développement une autre justification que celle de rôle subsidiaire pour la création de conditions dans le domaine de la libre entreprise.

D'un autre côté, le contenu des Actes Institutionnels n° 2 et n° 3 indique comment l'intentionnalité du régime, allant au-delà des solutions de fortune exigées pour le maintien de l'équilibre d'une élite de pouvoir, consiste à proposer un nouveau modèle politique, capable de servir de contrepartie stable aux options assumées par le Gouvernement, dans la direction de la vie économique du pays. Malgré la prévision de la caducité future des effets de ces actes, ils constituent une réforme politique irréversible qui, chaque fois plus, subjectivement, distingue le groupe dirigeant du pays d'un "salut militaire", où d'un gouvernement de transition, impatient de revenir aux formes classiques de la démocratie, où d'utiliser cette aspiration comme couverture idéologique pour la préservation d'une dictature stricte. Le modèle qui émerge des Actes Institutionnels peut être caractérisé comme une "technocratie", sous la forme d'un nouvel Etat autoritaire qui fournirait les

conditions institutionnelles pour réaliser la planification économique du pays, établie sur la base d'un centralisme extrême. Ce modèle fait ressortir non seulement la prédominance de l'Exécutif, mais aussi la rupture des derniers vestiges de négociation entre le Congrès et le Président, qui constituaient les règles classiques de l'équilibre institutionnel de la Fédération brésilienne. Les pouvoirs du Législatif de déformer la prévision budgétaire et de forcer l'allocation définitive des dépenses prévues dans la loi sur les moyens du pays ont disparu. De la même façon, le Congrès a perdu la possibilité de maximiser, par le conditionnement nécessaire (c'est-à-dire rétrocéder d'une coopération attendue et essentielle à un comportement donné), ses prétentions devant l'Exécutif, menaçant de lui retirer son concours dans le travail de la législation, en retardant ou en bloquant le passage de dispositions exigées par le développement, dans les changements de structure qu'il impose au pays. Le deuxième chapitre cherche à montrer les nombreux aspects de ce phénomène, soit dans la cessation de ces systèmes de freins et contrepoids reconnue aujourd'hui par le nouveau régime, soit par la proposition - dont les risques sont calculés - de réduire la participation populaire dans le processus politique national, ou de rechercher dans les mécanismes formels de la démocratie les conditions de légitimité du modèle de pouvoir actuellement établi dans le pays. Si l'on accepte, par exemple, les échelles de classification des nouveaux régimes politiques des pays en développement, tels qu'ils sont exposés par Martin Needler (2), on voit que le cas brésilien aujourd'hui présente la particularité de modérer simultanément les performances requises par les deux paramètres, d'étude politique de ces régimes, c'est-à-dire celui de la "légitimité" et celui de la "participation". Il convient de dire que notre cas est celui de docilité maxima, de la dimension politique, au contenu économique du projet de l'élite de pouvoir. Ce qui revient à dire

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(2) - Voir à ce sujet l'ouvrage de l'auteur "Political Development in Latin America: Instability, violence and evolutionary change" et la discussion ayant fait l'objet de la 12ème Réunion d'Harvard - M.I.T. Joint Faculty Seminar on Political Development, 10 mai 1966, minéographié, Harvard - M.I.T.

que cette dernière, une fois l'option réformiste admise, donne pour ainsi dire la priorité limite au rôle du développement national. Elle accueille au maximum les expectatives de sa contrepartie sur le plan politique, qui pourraient advenir comme corollaires inévitables de la plus grande nobilité et différenciation sociales créées par le propre développement. En contraste avec la gradualité avec laquelle il entrevoit son plan de réformes, le nouveau modèle politique apparaît comme étanche et discret, apte à la réalisation du centralisme autoritaire requis pour sa stratégie à court délai. Mais curieusement muet quant à la prévision des mécanismes de son propre réajustement, et à admettre son comportement comme une composante de la planification globale, si largement et arbitrairement ébauché dans le "programme-perspective" de cette administration. En un mot, les paramètres de la légitimité ou de la participation ne sont même pas ostensiblement inclus comme fonctions stimulantes du développement prévu, dans la planification gouvernementale, ni prévus au moment d'atteindre des étapes données de maturation des changements prévus dans le plan de la redistribution de revenus, et d'augmentation de la productivité, ou de changement de la structure d'application de la population active du pays. C'est-à-dire que, formellement, les Actes Institutionnels ne s'attachent pas à modifier leurs mécanismes actuels de limitation à ces fonctions politiques. Toutefois, dans la stratégie globale du Gouvernement, en particulier de son programme d'action économique, il est facile de percevoir le caractère fatalement provisoire de ces normes et leur modification obligatoire si le modèle néocapitaliste se consolide et que les réformes actuelles entrent dans une période de stabilisation qui permette, dans cette perspective ~~stabile~~ de pouvoir, la décompression des fonctions politiques sujettes aujourd'hui à une limitation définie.

#### L'HOMOGENEITE IDEOLOGIQUE

La seconde prémisse se réfère à la stabilité de cette technocratie et à l'extrême homogénéité de ses tableaux idéologiques.

Elle est en même temps civile et militaire, édifiée sur une division curieuse des pouvoirs de décision, comme en traite également le chapitre II. Cet aspect est la conséquence directe du fait que le mouvement d'avril a été mené par le groupe le plus expressif de l'Armée brésilienne, représenté par les généraux responsables de la création de l'École Supérieure de Guerre". L'identité profonde qui caractérise ce groupe, comme élite, résulte simultanément du fait qu'ils constituent le noyau des Forces Armées, subordonné à un rapide et intense changement d'influence culturelle - l'Armée brésilienne étant passée de l'influence française à l'influence américaine - et d'avoir été contraint à une "praxis" concrète de l'opération militaire, à une vaste échelle internationale.

Ces caractéristiques placeraient ce groupe dans la catégorie des "élites de pouvoir", responsables de toute une série typique de changements économiques et sociaux dans le monde Afro-Asiatique ou Latino-Américain au cours des deux dernières décennies. Elles trouvent quelques-unes des connotations typiques des Forces Armées en tant qu'agents de changement économique et social dans les pays sous-développés. (3)

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- (3) - Voir, sur le sujet en question: "The Military in the Middle East Problems in Society and Government, édité par Sydney Mettleton Fischer, Ohio State University Press, 1963; John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America, Stanford University Press, 1964; Edwin Liewen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, et Generals Presidents in Latin America, Praeger, 1961; George Lenzowski, Radical Revolutions in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, Some Comparative Observations on Ideologies and Practices, University of California, Berkeley, in Journal of Politics, février 1966, n° 1, vol. 28. Theodore Wickoff, The Role of the Military in Latin American Politics et L.N. McAlister, Civil-Military Relations in Latin America, in "The Dynamics of Change in Latin American Politics" édité par John. D. Hartz, University of North Carolina, 1965. Prentice-Hall.

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Réceptivité à l'influence externe, intensification des responsabilités internationales, stratification indépendante du cadre social interne, sont quelques-unes des composantes qui expliquent la formation d'élites dirigeantes, comme celle du nasserisme, en Egypte, du mouvement du Général Newynn, en Birmanie, ou du Général Kassen, en Irak. Dans ce sens, la vision du monde tracée par l'élite militaire de la Force Expéditionnaire Brésilienne répercuterait, sur le plan interne, en un mouvement indépendant et un souci des destinées nationales qui, malgré les profondes différences de perspective et de répercussion révolutionnaire, conserve des analogies puissantes avec le groupe de Colonels - pour ne citer que deux exemples - qui, autour de Gamal Nasser, sortirent de la guerre de Palestine pour tenter la réforme des structures sociales égyptiennes, ou auprès de Kemal Atatürk, et toujours dans le cadre d'une action au sommet, et à partir d'un groupe restreint et homogène, entreprirent la modernisation de la Turquie. L'expérience actuelle du monde Afro-Asiatique indique plusieurs formes de transformation de ce groupe inquiet des Forces Armées dans une classe dirigeante, en termes d'élite de pouvoir. Ce qui distinguerait peut-être dans ce tableau le groupe de la "Sorbonne", c'est la profonde originalité institutionnelle de l'instrument qu'ils idéalisèrent, pour conserver leur présence active sur le plan interne, concrétisé par l'Ecole Supérieure de Guerre. Dans certains cas ces élites militaires assumèrent par elles-mêmes, en groupe isolé, la conduite du processus politique et économique national, comme cela fut le cas en Birmanie. Dans d'autres cas, on assista à la transformation graduelle des propres militaires en technocrates: on observa leur formation professionnelle, intentionnellement spécialisée dans le domaine administratif, économique ou politique, les Colonels d'hier se révélant, sans uniforme, les "managers" d'aujourd'hui, comme cela se produit en Egypte. Dans le cas brésilien, il se produisit, au contraire, non la fusion des militaires dans le milieu technocratique-civil, mais l'arrivée de ces derniers au niveau d'une élite militaire de pouvoir, par la création d'un établissement synthétique, diligemment pourvu par l'Ecole Supérieure de Guerre. Pendant la dernière décennie, cette Ecole, sous l'inspiration et le dévouement continu des militaires de la génération marquée par la première manifestation militaire internationale du Brésil sur le théâtre contemporain, s'est consacrée à l'endoctrinement et à la discussion des problèmes

nationaux pour un groupe sélectionné occupant des positions de responsabilité et de commandement dans la société brésilienne, dans le domaine de l'action politique, économique, administrative ou éducationnelle. Dans ce cas, l'élite de pouvoir actuelle est composée, symétriquement, de personnalités qui passèrent par l'Ecole Supérieure de Guerre et appliquèrent strictement les principes enseignés lorsqu'ils eurent à faire face aux problèmes nationaux et rechercher les formules pour leur solution. Dans tout le panorama actuel des pays sous-développés, il est possible qu'on ne trouve pas un autre gouvernement, basé sur l'élite de pouvoir, où l'homogénéité de formation soit arrivée aussi loin et où la responsabilité idéologique dans la conduite des options gouvernementales soit, par conséquent, aussi forte. Cette homogénéité se reflète, fondamentalement, dans les a-priori à partir desquels le débat des problèmes nationaux est posé, ou dans le degré dans lequel (reflétant justement une position aristocratique et insulaire dans le tableau de l'intelligence brésilienne) s'est défini le niveau rigide pour la formation de croyances dans les propositions de principe adoptées par l'Ecole. Il ne nous incombe pas ici de faire une étude approfondie de la conséquence et du détail auxquels cette "élite de pouvoir" fut amenée dans la formulation et la solution des problèmes nationaux (4), il convient d'abord de pro-

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- (4) - L'ouvrage organique ayant peut-être formulé cette perspective de façon approfondie, avec toute sa rigueur logique et son envergure, pour étudier la doctrine de la sécurité nationale, est "Planejamento Estratégico", du Général Golberi do Couto e Silva, Companhia Editora Americana, 1955. Déjà, dans la phase d'adaptation des idéaux de l'Ecole Supérieure de Guerre, le mouvement d'avril se trouvant déjà en pleine vigueur, citons également l'article publié dans le Jornal do Brasil, août 1964, Supplément du Dimanche, du Général Meira Mattos.



céder à la compilation des a-priori, pour aborder cette thématique. Et c'est dans ce domaine particulier que l'École Supérieure de Guerre rencontre sa première connotation comme élite rigide de pouvoir. Pour ne citer qu'un exemple, il suffirait d'observer la thématique de la politique internationale et de voir combien elle est subordonnée au concept de sécurité nationale, ce qui est à son tour soumis à une vision géopolitique marquée et conséquente. Il n'y a pas lieu de débattre ici l'opportunité ou la propriété de ces faits mais il y a lieu de souligner que la contrepartie de cette extraordinaire honorabilité de l'élite dirigeante est la difficulté de son intégration avec les tâches essentielles d'une "intelligentzia" (5), - et d'un débat national qui exposerait, avec ces contenus, les conditions de ses positions intellectuelles.

D'un autre côté, l'honorabilité consista à abaisser, de façon excessive, le "toit" des croyances, dans la formulation des problèmes nationaux. A ce sujet, il suffirait de constater le passage rapide de positions opérationnelles à des affirmations dogmatiques, dans des thèses comme celle de l'inefficacité de l'étatisme brésilien, ou, au contraire, d'une confiance peut-être excessive, dans notre contexte, dans les systèmes de la libre initiative et dans l'expansion indiscriminée du secteur privé de l'économie nationale. Dans le domaine des croyances politiques, par exemples, le phénomène s'avère encore plus évident dans la mesure où la croyance dans les valeurs démocratiques a immobilisé ou bloqué leur proposition opérationnelle, laissant l'École inapte à résoudre le problème de l'intégration entre développement, légitimité et participation populaire. Le haut degré de raffinement de diverses mesures des Actes Institutionnels portent l'empreinte d'une méditation postérieure, comme si justement, seulement après le contact concret avec le pouvoir et le rapprochement de l'élite dirigeante, subordonnée à une préparation longue et intense, on faisait primer la position opérationnelle

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(5) - Sur la signification de ce terme, voir, en particulier "Le Problème de l'Intelligentzia", étude classique de Mannheim dans "Essays on the Sociology of Culture", Routledge-Kegan, 1962.

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sur la position dogmatique, et que le débat sur les prémisses puisse devancer l'application rigide d'une vaste arsenal préalable de solutions.

Toutefois, le signe le plus représentatif du degré atteint par l'homogénéité de ce groupe de pouvoir réside dans le fait d'avoir pu concrétiser sa propre attitude intellectuelle, de l'avoir transformée de méthode qu'elle était en attribut intrinsèque, d'avoir nécessairement transformé le débat de prémisses homogènes en une corrélation intellectuelle sans tensions, ni résistances, ni dialectique. En un mot, d'avoir pu, en recherchant une perspective rationnelle pour le débat, le limiter toujours à la logique interne du système érigé, qui ne ferait de cette prétention qu'un moyen de distinguer un système concret et marqué de positions, et non la garantie d'un débat approfondi du processus social et idéologique du pays. On verra comment, en fonction de cette prémisses, l'invocation de la rationalité, d'invitation au dialogue, se transforme en objet de culte, marquant, dans le groupe de l'élite de pouvoir, le groupe dirigeant formé par l'Ecole Supérieure de Guerre.

Elle a donc été conduite à une capacité de communication extrêmement réduite, obligée à manier la "rationalité" comme un instrument dégradé, de plateforme critique en idéologie d'un groupe social. Il faut cependant se méfier de la permanence de cette homogénéité. On voit poindre un antagonisme latent entre ses factions, militaire et civile, et cela surtout au sujet de l'opposition entre "performance" économique et sécurité nationale dans le processus de développement. Des disputes comme celle de l'exploitation du pétrole par l'Etat, ou de la majorité publique dans les compagnies minières ont déjà indiqué la possibilité de ces chocs au sein de l'élite de pouvoir. Il y a une nouvelle attitude nationaliste qui domine l'élément militaire, en dehors du groupe dit de la "S<sup>o</sup> bons" qui en est encore le plus réfractaire.

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Ce qui revient à dire que n'importe quel changement de pouvoir amènera à une condition plus aigüe dans cet antagonisme, maintenu, maintenant, dans les limites minima de tension.

### Le vide de pouvoir

La troisième supposition de cette étude est celle de considérer le dynamisme politique du pays comme dominé par un extrême vide de pouvoir en avril 1964. C'est ce qui explique comment un groupe aussi réduit ait pu contrôler de façon si intense le "processus" de décision national. Il est la dernière conséquence de la véritable érosion sociale découlant de l'inflation et du caractère anémique de la fin du gouvernement Goulart. Le manque de présence d'une articulation effective de forces sociales pour donner de la base aux formes de pouvoir peut être expliqué par les raisons suivantes :

a) L'érosion d'une bourgeoisie nationale capable de revendiquer, par elle-même, un rôle de premier plan dans l'accumulation nationale et, par là, de n'exercer qu'un rôle secondaire de l'épargne forcée, proportionné par l'Etat. Faute de cette condition, ce serait à ce dernier que reviendrait le rôle fondamental dans le développement. La bourgeoisie, donc, dans le gouvernement Goulart serait amenée à s'associer au secteur étranger, ce qui serait inviable à ce moment, face aux difficultés résultant de la législation sur la migration de capitaux. On n'aurait qu'à voir l'importance des prêts publics pour constituer, même, le "working capital" des entreprises privées, à l'épargne pour se rendre compte de sa faiblesse.

b) le manque d'un pouvoir de marchandage du secteur salarié dû au jeu spécifique, l'annulation de l'articulation du prolétariat, à cause des contrepositions entre l'économie de marché et l'économie de subsistance dans un régime colonial. L'économie de marché n'a pas réussi à absorber la majorité du secteur de subsistance qui compose encore la majorité de la population rurale. L'économie brésilienne ne présente pas de rareté, dans l'offre du facteur travail qui aurait pu lui donner un pouvoir de marchandage, ou accéder aux véritables nerfs de la décision nationale. La réserve de main d'oeuvre ainsi formée donc a toujours permis la dépression des salaires minima et la formation d'une disponibilité au niveau de subsistence.

au niveau de subsistance, capable de reabsorber les bras mis au chômage par les crises et les contractions au niveau industriel de l'économie. Ce qui signifie que la classe salariée n'a ni pouvoir d'achat, ni le pouvoir d'une organisation autonome aussi bien dans le processus d'absorption dans le domaine le plus dynamique du pays que dans celui de rejection de la main d'oeuvre qui relie le réservoir de chômage caché aux domaines dynamiques et industrialisés du pays. Dans les deux directions, ce dynamisme se décharge de manière isolée et inorganique, retirant au salariat toute opportunité de se composer et d'agir comme une force indépendante. La période Goulart a justement mis en évidence malgré les formes ostensibles du clientélisme politique, le manque intrinsèque de pouvoir d'achat et donc d'autonomie politique de cette classe et de plus sa dépendance des formes de comportement clientéliste et assistanciel pour pourvoir à son intérêt et son accès à de meilleurs niveaux de revenus. Même quand à la fin de cette période, on a enregistré un effort de libération des formations syndicales en fonction des anciennes structures clientélistes, les syndicats se virent encore exposés à l'action d'autres élites externes, exprimée par exemple dans l'acceptation des accords de commande venus des groupes estudiantins ou intellectuels, qui indiquaient le caractère hautement embryonnaire de son authentique organisation. Plus net encore est le phénomène de cette anomie des classes salariées dans les régimes coloniaux si l'on considère le prolétariat rural. Celui-ci est comme une imprégnation dans les réserves de l'économie naturelle ou de subsistance, petite étant la distance qui les sépare de cette position marginale, et pratiquement instantanée la possibilité de son retour au "statu quo ante" à n'importe quel moment de crise ou de contraction du secteur le plus dynamique du processus économique. Il serait inutile de demander à la super-structure un encadrement ou un support qui puisse contrebalancer cet engloutissement permanent dans les conditions de marginalité sociale où vivent les prolétariats ruraux dans les structures coloniales comme la brésilienne. Il suffirait de vérifier comment, à côté d'une couverture politique effective, ou subitement privées d'elle, les revendications prolétaires rurales des régions comme le Nord-Est ne pourraient se soutenir par la solidarité étant démunies de pouvoir économique d'achat et démantelées par les conditions permanentes d'excès d'offre de main d'oeuvre enregistré continuellement dans le pays.

c) L'absorption sensible des secteurs les plus dynamiques des classes moyennes par l'appareil gouvernemental et par l'expansion des entreprises d'Etat dans l'infra-structure de l'économie, dans l'industrie lourde et les diverses entreprises d'utilité publique. Cela revient à dire que ces groupes se sont naturellement vus incorporés au milieu social qui serait la meilleure base au régime de l'élite du pouvoir et à la domination effective de la technocratie.

d) Le manque de pouvoir effectif des vieux secteurs de grandes propriétés à l'exception de ceux de l'économie caféière. Pendant très longtemps, les propriétaires ruraux ont été soumis, dans le processus de développement, à une relative perte de leur position comparative dans la distribution proportionnelle du revenu national, étant donnée la redistribution du revenu provoquée par l'industrialisation. Les groupes liés à l'économie de la canne à sucre par exemple, ont représenté une manifestation exemplaire d'un pouvoir politique fantôme qui survit dans la super-structure, étant donnée la politique de clientèle et les formes de pouvoir héritées du vieux régime dans le processus des listes électorales. Déjà profondément minés durant le gouvernement Goulart, ils se sont vus pratiquement détruits par les réformes introduites durant la période suivante. L'économie caféière s'est enfoncée dans la forme classique de dépendance publique de l'activité économique dominante du pays par laquelle n'importe quelle nouvelle couche dirigeante trouve tout un système de subsides et de défense économique du pays disposé pour la satisfaction de ces intérêts dans le cas, naturellement identifié à l'organisation du secteur externe de l'économie nationale.

Ce vide de pouvoir a favorisé énormément l'alliance technocratique-militaire qui a établi de haut en bas, progressivement, un nouveau modèle d'organisation politique pour le pays et a pu avoir confiance en sa consolidation. On comprend mieux pourquoi on est arrivé à consolider cette situation initialement si fragile si l'on est attentif aux manèges habiles et inédits dans le pays, par cette nouvelle "élite du pouvoir" de toute une gamme de facteurs de contrôle sur le plan super-structural de la vie politique du pays. Parmi ceux-ci, on trouve les suivants :

1º) La limitation des canaux de communication politique (6) substantialisée dans les Actes Institutionnels nº 2 et 3. Ce qui

.../...  
 veut dire qu'ils ont centralisé toutes les conditions de la vie politique entre les mains du Président de la République et lui ont donné le pouvoir de les rendre plus souples ou plus rigides à son gré. La période qui a commencé en Avril 1964 n'est donc pas celle d'une dictature croissante et progressive, mais d'un régime d'avances et de reculs dans cette direction, qui permet au gouvernement de se servir comme d'une force de marchandage des moments d'assouplissement. On remarque aussi l'emploi pour la première fois dans le pays du "lessivage" sur la scène politique interne par l'entretien d'enquêtes policières-militaires inachevées, susceptibles d'englober dans ses labyrinthes les partisans de l'opposition au régime et de les transformer, du jour au lendemain, en politiciens marginaux.

2<sup>a</sup>) Le volume des contrôles et des pouvoirs gouvernementaux dans la vie économique du pays, originaires d'une longue tradition qui a toujours fait de l'Union, le centre de tout le pouvoir économique national. Sous cet aspect, l'histoire des gouvernements brésiliens peut être différenciée quant à l'importance et aux destinataires des aides, subsides et privilèges du secteur public au secteur privé de l'économie nationale. Mais non pas dans l'altération dans l'équilibre ou les proportions entre ces deux domaines, qui n'a jamais subi une seule régression dans le volume atteint par l'entreprise politique. Peut-être la meilleure démonstration du poids de cette tendance irréversible se trouve-t-elle dans l'impossibilité de la juguler, mise en évidence par ce gouvernement qui, peut-être plus que tous ceux qu'a eus le pays depuis 1930, est le moins sensible à la thèse de l'intervention de l'Etat dans le domaine économique national. Au contraire de ce qu'indiquerait sa philosophie, l'actuelle élite du pouvoir s'est rendu compte de l'énorme potentiel de consolidation de ses positions de contrôle dans la vie nationale provenant du maniement subtil de cet appareil depuis qu'il est utilisé dans une fonction d'arbitre qui l'aide à conserver la perspective neutre devant les chocs d'intérêts et des dynamismes de l'économie nationale.

armé aux casernes, que celle des noyaux résiduels de la droite brésilienne, attachés aux formes agressives du fixisme politique et économique en groupes dominés beaucoup plus par l'idéologie et par l'activisme des éléments civils plutôt que militaires. Indépendamment des stratégies de superficie, de l'intention des candidats ou du champ encore ouvert à la maléabilité des factions ou groupes dominants, la candidature Costa e Silva s'imposerait avec une force de gravité croissante et inévitable, dans la logique du système politique établi dans le pays et en conséquence de son propre succès comme une technocratie appuyée sur une alliance civile et militaire. Sur n'importe quel contenu personnel ou même d'une plateforme, elle est la légitimation de la dynamique naturelle du régime, à partir du moment où s'est paralysé le processus spontané de changement social brésilien, et où passe son inflexion reformiste à dépendre de la conservation de couches organisées, encore à l'intérieur de la forme représentative dans notre vie sociale, et dans lesquelles l'Armée assumerait le rôle paradigmatique et décisif.

La candidature, dans ce sens, s'identifie à la conquête et la consolidation de la couche militaire de la vie nationale, comme une représentation restaurée et renforcée, disposée à assumer une fonction compétitive et divergente dans l'exercice des compétences et du pouvoir dans lequel s'est constitué l'actuel Etat brésilien. Son ascendance s'identifierait à la protection de la défense de ce groupe dans le partage du revenu national, ou à l'élimination interne de ses discussions, exprimée aussi bien dans la diminution des compétitions inter-services, comme dans l'abolition de nouvelles compétitions de prestige ostensible, exprimées par le dédain du Ministère de la Défense. Il serait inévitable que cette politique de représentation soit reflétée dans la popularité de son connétable, en rendant perméables toutes les forces armées et, par les aspects de dénominateur commun d'une couche déterminée de la réalité nationale, lui prête un sens d'égalité, bien distinct par son style de communication du comportement classique de l'élite du pouvoir de la faction "casteliste". Il faut dire que cette candidature décharge intensément la polarisation idéologique de l'actuelle élite du pouvoir, en réduisant l'importance historique de sa plateforme rien qu'à l'admission ostensible du nouveau cadre institutionnel implanté dans le pays, après avoir assuré les assemblées nationales de la tradition des modèles politiques nationaux, avancés par les Actes Institutionnels successifs. Indépendamment de place programatique

Indices fondamentaux de l'actuelle évolution politico-globale du pays.

Le renforcement de l'alliance entre technocrates et militaires.

L'acceptation par les secteurs responsables de l'actuel processus politique brésilien, de la candidature Costa e Silva indépendamment des caractéristiques personnelles de l'ex-Ministre de la Guerre, indique un changement fondamental d'étape dans la compréhension de la fonction des Forces Armées dans l'organisation des modèles politiques contemporains de l'Amérique Latine. Le parallèle avec ce qui arrive aujourd'hui de façon analogue dans la plus petite des nations latino-américaines, le Salvador - lui aussi avec un gouvernement militaire-technocratique consacré par les urnes - montre comment aux deux extrêmes du continent surgissent les mêmes symptômes de changement de rôle des Forces Armées, passant d'une fonction modératrice et d'arbitre, à celle de prise de responsabilité ostensible dans la décision politique nationale. Et cela non seulement dans le sens d'un programme de développement, mais aussi dans celui de proposition de nouvelles formes de stabilité politico-sociale, destinées à présider les régimes issus de la crise plus ou moins généralisée de spontanéité de changement économique commencée dans les années 1950.

En un mot, la notion d'Etat national, qui paraît survivre dans le continent, comme de façon générale dans toutes les régions sous-développées, au dynamisme de la décade 1950, s'appuie sur l'altération de ce rôle des Forces Armées et dans le cumul de ses responsabilités comme couche dirigeante formée dans la dynamique traditionnelle des élites de pouvoir (7) de ces pays. La candidature de l'ex-Ministre de la Guerre se situerait dans la logique fatale de ce changement dans l'admission confessée qu'on devrait donner aux forces militaires l'opportunité de concourir avec les élites civiles dans le sens d'assumer formellement le gouvernement, au lieu de maintenir uniquement l'équilibre et la stabilité du processus politique national. Dans l'axe représentatif de ce changement, cette candidature contrasterait autant avec la perspective des militaires de la "Sorbonne", encore attachés à la vision salvatrice de l'adjudantisme classique et jalouse du retour de l'élément



par sa représentation rigoureusement objective d'une couche donnée de la vie nationale, c'est à dire l'Armée, cette candidature n'aurait aucune difficulté à se placer, formellement, à la suite de la précédente, dans cet élément formel comprenant, inclus, l'engagement de continuer les modèles économiques du gouvernement Castelo Branco. En un mot, l'actuel moment successorieel tire toute sa signification non de la polémique sur le contenu du programme ou sur le modèle politique alors défini par le pays, mais rien qu'en montrant le renforcement des conditions institutionnelles du régime qui cesse d'être le résultat de l'alliance entre élites individualisées et limitées au pôle civil et technocratique, pour assurer ostensiblement le caractère d'un gouvernement représentatif dans la vie politique brésilienne. On entend par cette dernière expression cette forme d'équilibre politique où le pouvoir disqualifie la nécessité d'exagérer les intérêts, contenus et aspirations nationaux en termes de représentation (au sens technique du terme) ou d'un engagement avec la totalité concrète des dynamismes politico-nationaux pour à sa place, l'identifier à la vision et à la perspective de ce même tout, assumée par une couche unique définie, ou même étanche, dans la collectivité. La candidature Costa e Silva fit comme légaliser cette homogénéité objective, faisant de l'Armée - comme on pourrait dire, dans d'autres régimes, du syndicat - le "pivot" dans l'expression d'Horowitz (8) de changement social. Ceci est le commencement de l'organisation d'un "establishment", faute d'un véritable ordre social, au passage entre deux structures sociales totales de vie, supposées par la transition et spécialement par la crise de changement spontané. Dans ce cas, ces formations composent, par leur aspect de donnée extraite d'effectivité ou organisation plus grande, l'axe de commandé de l'intérêt national comme premier pont jeté entre le vieux et le nouvel édifice social, postulé par le développement. Dans ce cas, des foyers comme ceux constitués par ces couches libres peuvent assumer le monopole de la représentation nationale et, dans la transition, s'identifier avec la suite matrice, ou le cocon pour la mise en ordre ultérieure de la vie sociale. En un mot, au contraire de ce qui arrive dans les économies développées, ces couches ne correspondent pas à une cellule rendue géante ou agrandie dans le tissu social, et destructrice de l'équilibre collectif, mais (en raison des déterminantes mêmes de la transition), dans le début de la greffe d'une continuité sociale entre les deux ordres. C'est dans ce sens que, par exemple, les nations africaines ou asiatiques, peuvent assister au noyautage de leurs nouvelles sociétés à partir du "Civil Service" de leurs classes moyennes ; ou des communautés rurales de

... \ ... symptomatique que, dans le cas brésilien, la perte des opportunités de changement social spontané, et l'essai de relancer le développement dans des modèles rigides, appellent au premier plan l'Armée comme véhicule de la continuité sociale du processus brésilien, et homologuent maintenant, avec la candidature Costa e Silva, l'alliance technocratique-militaire, dans un "establishment". Ou encore, dans un centre accordant par lui-même les conditions de légitimité de l'ordre social brésilien, non affecté de quelque préoccupation d'authenticité externe, et amené à étendre son terrain d'action par des procédés de co-optation et d'octroi de prestige (10).

D'un autre côté, cependant, il ne faut pas perdre de vue l'énorme difficulté qu'un gouvernement de représentation aurait pour se réaliser dans le pays sans que le processus soit dirigé par de forts cadres de commandement, dans lesquels une élite du pouvoir gagne une plus grande représentativité institutionnelle, célébrant son action politique, ou sa présence dans la deuxième phase de l'implantation de l'actuel modèle économique brésilien.

... \ ... Le passage du gouvernement Castelo à l'administration Costa e Silva caractérise, cependant, le cas contraire, avec la réduction, et non l'intensification des rôles de l'élite du pouvoir qui, autour du Président, a assuré la durée de l'actuel gouvernement technocratique du pays. Dans ce cas et à cause de la conduite personnelle et catégorique du propre Président de la République, garantissant la candidature de son ex-Ministre de la Guerre, il faut parler de l'action immédiate sur le processus brésilien, de sa vision personnelle et directe de la substance et des valeurs de la démocratie, peut-être déjà déphasée pour les "rationales" qu'il imposa au processus, et par la logique acquise, à ce point, par le gouvernement technocratique de fait dans lequel nous nous trouvons.

... \ ... Les déclarations actuelles du candidat Costa e Silva présentent ce concours de perte gratuite d'homogénéité idéologique et de désappareillage des mêmes conditions de l'élite du pouvoir", qui, répétions-le, seulement en se distanciant, permettraient le changement de représentation - d'un groupe défini de militaires, pour celui de l'Armée - qui serait la garantie de succès d'une interaction, entre l'exercice actuel (du pouvoir brésilien, et le processus social du pays. Ainsi, en dehors de la présupposition de continuité et de renforcement du "statu quo", il y a respectivement :

a) - Les critiques à la planification gouvernementale, à partir de thèses comme celle de son "humanisation" ou réduction de ses coûts sociaux, ce qui ne pourrait être avancé sans rendre vulnérables les prémisses logiques qui constituent l'épine dorsale de maintien de la plateforme centriste.

b) - L'inexistence d'un "staff" substitutif à l'actuel, dans le jeu de l'élite du pouvoir, l'effort de consolidation de la candidature Costa e Silva, se caractérisent par une hétérogénéité marquée de la nouvelle équipe gouvernementale, ce qui mine, après les données logiques, la deuxième condition requise pour un type de comportement politique de ce caractère, c'est à dire l'extrême uniformité et cohérence, dans le groupe détenteur du commandement d'un processus de changement social comme celui où se trouve actuellement le pays.

Dans les termes des règles actuelles de la légitimation du pouvoir brésilien établi par les diverses successions électorales du second semestre de 1966, ces contradictions, relativement inattendues dans la dynamique de succès d'un gouvernement de cette nature se verraient encore aggravées par les facteurs suivants :

a) L'éventualité d'une forte majorité d'opposition au Congrès National résultant des élections directes de Novembre.

b) La perte des conditions de coercition idéologique qui seraient requises par l'hégémonie d'un gouvernement de représentation en cherchant la candidature Costa e Silva, amplifierait sa représentativité aujourd'hui, en compensant sa marginalité à l'actuel groupe de pouvoir, avec un recrutement hétéroclite dans la composition de la nouvelle faction dirigeante.

L'inversion des rôles entre les militaires et technocrates dans le processus de décision nationale.

Un autre attribut constitutif de la présente situation brésilienne en termes de dynamique d'une élite du pouvoir est la tendance à l'inversion des rôles entre les militaires et les civils en ce qui correspond à la part d'options réelles, ou de contenu de la décision et celle strictement instrumentale ou destinée à lui donner une simple efficacité. L'analyse du travail de législation nationale dans les deux dernières années, et le rôle joué sur son initiative par le Ministère de la Planification montre comment s'est trans

féré chaque fois davantage entre les mains des technocrates le réel élément de décision dans le choix des modèles économiques nationaux, dans les nouvelles redistributions du revenu, les frottements entre consommation et épargne, dans la définition des limites entre l'économie de marché et de subsistance. Ou soit dans tous les problèmes cruciaux liés à l'occurrence des véritables tensions collectives. Les décisions instrumentales relatives aux processus d'articulation de la volonté du pouvoir, ou de la communication entre les unités formelles de commande politique sont devenues, à leur tour, chaque fois plus le champ d'action des militaires et même leurs projets les plus chers. Les nouvelles lois électorales et politico-partisanes, l'altération de la balance de pouvoir entre les Etats et l'Union, on peut le dire, proviennent directement d'un arsenal d'idées de l'intelligence des Forces Armées, et bien souvent représentent de légitimes innovations, dans l'élimination des vieilles formes de pouvoir national. Ainsi le meilleur exemple continue à être celui de la création du nouveau modèle politique basé sur l'hégémonie d'une faction dominante. Quant au parti majoritaire, on peut dire que le paradigme recherché fut celui du parti révolutionnaire institutionnel mexicain(11). Le régime diffère cependant, en n'admettant pas, comme dans ce pays, le fractionnement de l'opposition en d'innombrables petits partis politiques, ce qui est de règle avec une charge ultra-idéologique. L'actuel profil brésilien, d'un autre côté, dans sa préoccupation de créer un système rigide "situation-opposition" n'a pas admis la fixation de quotients équilibrés entre les deux groupes, tel que c'est encore en vigueur en Colombie. D'un autre côté, il s'est dérobé théoriquement à accepter la règle du parti unique qui a été la composante politique habituelle des nouvelles nations afro-asiatiques. On peut même dire que la spécificité actuelle du bipartisme brésilien est le caractère trompeur de la très forte polarité initiale de la faction dominante. Dans la mesure où aucun système de représentation prédéterminé, ni les conditions de privilège institutionnel des partis uniques, ne furent établis, on vérifie que les précautions prises pour assurer la domination du parti du gouvernement se limitent à l'étape de lancement du régime, sans aucune garantie institutionnelle qui avantage le parti gouvernemental dans le processus de rénovation électorale ou bien ait fait du modèle actuel un reflet dans cet aspect du centralisme autoritaire adopté dans le plan économique national. L'innovation la plus profonde du modèle, pourtant, a résidé en la création de mécanismes qui ont dé-

passé les contradictions entre la filiation locale et régionale des membres du congrès qui, pendant longtemps, et selon le vieux comportement politico-partisan, a toujours immobilisé ou distordu le travail de législation. C'est contre cet antagonisme qu'on a institué le régime de la sous légende, à l'intérieur de la formation partisane nationale, qui permit aux noyaux partisans du pouvoir de conserver sa dynamique de loyautés municipales, rendant possible en même temps l'alignement de ces représentants, dans le plan national, selon les exigences spécifiques du plan et du gouvernement fédéral.

### L'articulation possible entre technocratie et démocratie.

A côté du processus politico-électoral, l'évolution de l'actuel modèle politique brésilien laisse voir différents signes d'organisation capable de donner au régime de centralisme autoritaire une base politique pour le développement. Cette tendance se révèle dans l'effort pour vaincre les structures féodales du régime de clientèle dans l'attribution des recettes du secteur public de l'économie nationale, et dans le dessein d'atteindre à un processus réellement intégré d'instrumentation des décisions nationales. On a commencé à parer aux nécessités de rationalisation de la machine administrative par l'introduction de budgets-performance dans les ministères et les organisations régionales, le point culminant étant l'approbation par la suprématie inévitable du Ministère de la Planification à l'intérieur de l'appareil gouvernemental brésilien. D'un autre côté, pourtant, l'accélération de ces fonctions d'intégration ne fut accompagnée par l'établissement d'aucun mécanisme de diffusion de pouvoirs, ni d'un régime de freins et contrepoids de la décision gouvernementale démocratique (12). Quelques unes des institutions qui dans l'éventail de pouvoirs du pays, assuraient ce premier effet furent supprimées ou limitées, étant donné le présent appel à la performance et à l'efficacité dans le développement du plan fédéral. C'est ce que révèlent les nouvelles limitations actuelles du régime fédéral et de l'autonomie des Etats. Nous disons la perte de l'autodétermination locale dans les fonctions de défense par la dépendance aux indications du gouvernement fédéral dans les nominations des secrétaires d'état à la sûreté, ou le transfert à l'Union de quelques unes des compétences fiscales les plus importantes des Etats. Sous ce dernier aspect le changement s'est fait au moyen du transfert à l'union des activités de collecte et perception des impôts, le droit des états à leur réception étant conditionné sur la base de l'application

productive de ces ressources, et d'une performance effective dans leurs plans de développement. Ces exemples seraient peut-être suffisants pour montrer comment les Actes Institutionnels ont ramené le système fédéral brésilien à la condition d'instrument d'exécution du plan national, relativement décentralisé, ne constituant plus un régime qui "jure proprio", réunisse et harmonise une forme relative de diffusion du pouvoir national, dans le respect effectif de l'autonomie des états. A côté du centralisme, la technocratie brésilienne s'impose par le changement des fonctions du congrès dans la législation nationale. Au lieu de constituer un organisme de recherche d'accord, où les nouvelles ordonnances nationales représentent une opinion majoritaire, il tend à des fonctions typiquement homologatrices, de stricte indication de la tolérabilité des propositions de l'Exécutif. L'analyse du comportement des réactions du congrès aux messages de l'exécutif, chaque fois plus complexes et tendant à incorporer le panorama réglementaire dans la sphère légale, montre ce type de réaction limitée, réduit à une intervention minimale dans le changement du contenu de ces propositions. Le congrès n'a cependant pas cessé de garder le pouvoir de "lessivage" représenté par la menace de refuser l'approbation de normes qui puissent transgresser ces "index" comme on l'a vu à la veille de l'Acte Institutionnel n° 2, brandissant la menace de sa dissolution ou de son refus de coopérer avec l'Exécutif. On note encore, d'un autre côté que de telles innovations, responsables de l'apparition de la technocratie brésilienne si elles ont augmenté énormément le rendement des propositions de l'Exécutif n'ont pas encore créé les systèmes objectifs de limitation et freinage des centres de décision du pouvoir. On doit encore faire ressortir que les risques calculés actuellement dans la limitation du processus démocratique ne rencontrent pas de résistance externe sensible, ayant en vue, dans les actuels jugements internationaux de valeur relatifs à la gamme de systèmes politiques où se trouve le Brésil, la consécration de l'importance essentielle de relancement des tâches économiques du développement, et de l'acceptation, comme contrepoids à cette option, des entorses au modèle démocratique. Les résultats de la politique anti-inflationnaire ou l'amélioration de la productivité nationale compenseraient, de loin, dans ce sens, et spécialement joint à l'élite dirigeante des Etats-Unis, les limitations survenues à la légitimation du pouvoir et à la participation populaire, ou encore à l'apparition de processus unilatéraux de décision, exercés sur l'invocation de l'idéologie de la rationalité et sous le prétexte de l'inexistence d'alternatives pour le programme gouvernemental actuel.

## Rôles possibles pour le développement de l'opposition et du comportement idéologique.

Une des conséquences les plus sérieuses de l'implantation d'une technocratie - et de l'idéologie qu'elle présuppose - est la nouvelle distance, ou le dénivellement qualitatif qu'elle établit dans le pays pour la conduite de ses antagonistes politiques. Une des composantes fondamentales de la consolidation de ce régime, a résidé dans la disqualification des oppositions dans le sens de leur refuser les conditions formelles pour le dialogue et la création d'un climat de "réciprocité de perspectives". Il faut dire que la technocratie prospère sous l'invocation du monopole de la rationalité et son utilisation au bénéfice du "statu quo". Pour la première fois, ce n'est pas l'opposition et la gauche, mais bien le gouvernement qui émet une prétention aux conséquences profondes de son programme et retire des secteurs allégés du pouvoir l'avantage de capitaliser sur les inconséquences de tout programme qui se transforme en situation et politique concrète. La technocratie brésilienne a fait comme si elle avait inversé la charge de la preuve de la rationalité et permis la réjection "in limine" d'un dialogue avec la gauche sous l'allégation du manque de cohérences de ses postulats, son irrationalité même, et la domination d'une attitude strictement émotionnelle et passionnée. Ce n'est pas non plus le moment de développer la sociologie des contenus mentaux d'un groupe brusquement démis des postes de commande ou de l'attitude retourliste, ou immédiate, de compensation, qui domine ses premières réactions. Le refus d'admettre la situation d'éloignement continue du pouvoir, le désir de terminer dans l'immédiat ce que l'on a considéré comme un rapide interlude d'opposition, ont créé pour les gauches brésiliens l'incapacité totale de différer rationnellement leurs expectatives. Ils se sont au contraire acharnés à croire au changement immédiat de la nouvelle situation rien que par la force des choses ou par les contradictions que se trouvait comporter le "statu quo".

Une attitude aussi basiquement naïve et pleine d'illusions a marqué l'opposition, justifiant au premier moment la disqualification de sa critique et le renoncement à situer les données logiques et culturelles de la thématique gouvernementale. Ce changement d'attitude commence seulement à apparaître malgré les caractéristiques de rationalisation du régime et la haute teneur idéologique

dont il se trouve investi, fournissent une vaste matière première pour la constitution d'un débat fondamental sur les prémisses du système néo-capitaliste brésilien et sur les fondements culturels sur lesquels il s'appuie. Jusqu'à aujourd'hui pratiquement, le large débat sur l'opportunité et le sens de l'intervention de l'Etat dans le processus national de développement ou sur l'alléguée fatalité de la présente alternative en matière d'aide internationale, ou sur la virtualité des facteurs internes de développement, réalisables éventuellement à l'intérieur d'un autre cadre économique, ne s'est pas transformé en polémique d'avant-garde des oppositions nationales. On alléguera l'insensibilité populaire à ces thèses. Mais par là-même, la justification est affaiblie par le manque de compréhension des conditions du jeu politique quand il est formulé à partir d'une dynamique d'élite du pouvoir et non de régimes de participation et légitimité de masse. Transférant ses revendications aux hypothèses des conditions classiques de démocratie formelle - garantie des droits de parole, de liberté, d'expression, de réunion, etc... - la tonique des oppositions s'est concentrée dans le domaine où elle serait imperméable, à la sensibilité du statu quo devant les a-priori qui conditionnaient sa perspective de l'élite du pouvoir. Elle n'a pas manqué par là de déplacer cette inversion de la "charge de preuve" de rationalité dans le débat avec les couches dirigeantes. La gauche n'a jusqu'à maintenant même pas réussi à présenter des contributions positives à l'étude des alternatives pour le présent projet national avec la collaboration qui lui serait particulière, ou soit celle d'exposer le conditionnement entre le contenu et les acteurs dans la perspective gouvernementale et les inévitables limitations qui marquent avec les protagonistes du pouvoir sa prétention à l'exercice de rationalité et d'un comportement neutre du point de vue des factions intérêts et aspirations plongés dans la dynamique du développement. Mais encore à l'autre pôle, la gauche, dans ses tentatives d'interprétation de la réalité brésilienne découlant du mouvement d'Avril 1964, a prolongé sa perspective traumatique par l'appel aux stéréotypes et par la magnification des facteurs et éléments d'interprétation découlant des représentations conventionnelles du processus historique, à l'intérieur d'une vision marxiste acculturée comme celle de l'influence des pressions internationales ou de l'importance des marchés brésiliens dans la stratégie de l'évolution du capitalisme occidental comme on l'a vu par exemple dans la perspective des leaders restant de l'ancien parti socialiste brésilien.



D'un autre côté, la pragmatique qui pourrait découler de la doctrine sociale de l'Eglise, spécialement en fonction des nouvelles contributions provenant du conseil oecuménique ne s'est pas matérialisée dans une action chrétienne cohérente en faveur de certains composants sociaux et politiques du développement. Peut-être d'aucun autre pôle n'aurait pu surgir une plateforme incisive de défense des valeurs comme celle de la participation ou des formules de diffusion des pouvoirs qui viendraient à créer des pressions plus fortes contre l'autorité du centre docilement établi dans le sillage des modèles néocapitalistes adoptés dans le pays. Dans ce cas particulier, les possibilités d'action d'une démocratie chrétienne au Brésil se placent à une large distance des attitudes apparues dans d'autres pays d'Amérique Latine. Au Chili, par exemple, ce sont ces contenus qui ont donné au gouvernement Frey la base nécessaire pour rationaliser son expérience de développement sans payer les tributs d'une vision rigide de la politique de développement prisonnière d'une stricte élite du pouvoir.

D'un autre côté, à la droite du gouvernement Castelo Branco et justement en fonction de son programme de réforme, il faudrait prévoir la formation d'une défense "à outrance" du statu quo et du maintien de formes bien des fois parasitaires et privilégiées de la vie économique et sociale.

Sous cet aspect, la dénonciation toujours plus grande venant de ces secteurs de la lenteur du processus de démantèlement de l'étatisme brésilien auquel fut initialement associé le succès du mouvement d'Avril est significatif. Le "rationale" de cette position résiderait dans les thèses du "capitalisme sauvage" et de la nécessité pour le pays de vivre nécessairement la crise de réajustement aux lois naturelles du marché et aux agglutinations normales des formes de concentration du pouvoir économique et de défense des subsides traditionnels provenant du secteur public. Cette attitude s'identifie progressivement comme marginale à la dominante de l'administration encore que relativement dans le schéma gouvernemental comme le prouve le discours d'un de ses porte-parole actuellement au Ministère de l'Industrie et du Commerce. Elle apparaît cependant et à bref délai comme étant le plus suscep

tible de présenter une alternative à la direction actuellement im-  
posée à la politique nationale.

### CHAPITRE III

Le courant le plus probable et les alternatives éventuelles dans  
l'évolution actuelle du processus politique brésilien.

Consistance de la thèse gouvernementale et proposition de ses al-  
ternatives.

La prémisse générale du présent travail dans ce chapitre est celle de focaliser la consistance, en terms de processus, de la tentative d'intervention dans la vie politico-sociale du pays d'un programme réformiste de développement, tenté par une élite du pou- voir douée d'une homogénéité idéologique des plus intenses. On a pris soin, dans la section précédente, d'établir les connectifs logiques de ce programme lors de sa transformation en processus, et au moment d'établir les conditions probables de résistance ou d'acceptation à son dessein de changement du "statu quo" national. De l'analyse de ses perspectives d'altération, agencées dans le temps, découle la définition de ses instants critiques et la dépendance de stratégies déterminées où elle se trouve pour faire prévaloir son fort contenu programatique. Ces étapes sont essentielles pour définir dans les courbes de vigueur du régime, ses instants de plus grande fragilité, et ceux de succès de la somme de risques calculés assumés pour l'établissement final de son programme. On se doit, ainsi, de compléter la définition du contenu des thèses aujourd'hui dominantes par celle de ses éventuelles alternatives dans le sens de grouper d'autres séries logiques possibles que comporte l'évolution du processus politique brésilien. En un mot, il faut définir opérationnellement à partir de l'axe de la situation aujourd'hui dominante, le plus susceptible de prévaloir dans son évolution immédiate, quels seraient ses courants con- tiguës respectivement à droite et à gauche.

L'évolution la plus probable :

Formulation programatique de la thèse dominante.

On peut considérer comme "plus probable" dans la prévision à court terme de l'évolution politique brésilienne, l'inexistence de solution de continuité dans le choix des modèles et options économiques assumés par le gouvernement Castelo Branco. Il ne s'a

git pas seulement de rechercher les indices de cette orientation dans l'engagement pris par le premier gouvernement de la révolution comme une "planification-perspective" en plus d'un plan à court et moyen terme. Ce qu'il faut souligner renforçant cette prévision, indépendamment de la présomption de permanence des hypothèses du pouvoir politique, c'est que le gouvernement est arrivé à dépasser l'étape initiale, de plus grand risque dans les conquêtes des conditions de stabilité économique, conditions supposées pour atteindre l'efficacité du nouveau modèle néocapitaliste, choisi par l'économie nationale. On peut dire que les résultats de la politique du Ministère Campos font prévoir la réduction des tensions latentes entre "performance économique" et "sûreté nationale", tensions mises en évidence par exemple en Décembre 1964 dans la controverse sur l'opportunité de l'amplification des investissements étrangers dans l'exportation du minerai de fer brésilien. On souligne encore que la perspective de cette consolidation est amplifiée par le pouvoir d'achat dont jouit la présente équipe du Ministère de la Planification, dans le sens "ne pas avoir de rival ou de substitut" à sa médiation dans le domaine des négociations internationales et des ententes réalisées avec des sources de financement externes à l'économie brésilienne.

Certaine prévision sur le cours immédiat de cette politique doit avoir comme point de référence les propres phases du programme de l'administration Castelo Branco, à partir du moment où elle atteint l'étape essentielle, de chercher la relance de la politique de développement, et, à l'intérieur d'elle, la vision de la syntonie des changements à survenir dans le champ politique et économique. Du point de vue gouvernemental, le pays serait à la fin de la seconde étape d'une première période programmatique dans laquelle l'administration considère que les objectifs principaux de stabilisation ont été atteints (quoiqu'il existe encore un déphasage marqué dans ses effets sur le coût de la vie) et l'économie entre dans la pleine expansion des mécanismes fiscaux destinés à obtenir des changements significatifs dans la redistribution du revenu national. Après cette étape, liée à la politique de l'établissement d'un solide palier institutionnel pour la formation de capital, le gouvernement prétend vidanger les indices réformistes de son programme qui concernent le changement de quelques aspects des statuts basiques, tant de la propriété que des relations de travail. Ceci serait la phase critique, en termes de stabilité politique du régime en ce qui concerne la contradiction entre perfor-

mance économique et mobilisation sociale dans la présente dynamique gouvernementale. Cette étape, comme le montrent les initiatives inédites du dernier quadrimestre 1966, comporte déjà les premiers efforts d'abolition du profil assistanciel et clientéliste de la législation du travail, avec la dénonciation ostensible du caractère "obsolète" de la législation de la période Vargas. On ne cache même pas l'intention de modifier les institutions typiques de ce modèle de relations d'emploi, comme le droit à la stabilité, ou la réglementation des pouvoirs d'achats salariés, exprimés au plus haut point par le droit de grève, dans le sens de les subordonner à l'effort d'accroissement de la productivité, comme requis, par le rigoureux modèle économique néo-capitaliste.

Sur un autre pôle, la réforme agraire, en sommeil pendant toute la première étape (sous prétexte de nécessité de réalisation du cadastre de la propriété rurale, mais, probablement, pour être retardée jusqu'à la seconde étape du programme) est aujourd'hui poursuivie aussi à l'intérieur des mêmes prémisses. Elle est considérée comme un instrument de dynamisation de la productivité agricole qui apportera bon nombre de limitations et conditionnements à la classique structure prédatrice du complexe rural brésilien. Elle atteindra souvent, pour des motifs strictement économiques les mêmes objectifs recherchés par une politique qui donne toute priorité à la cohésion de l'usage "anti-social de la terre". Quoique la systématique actuelle de la réforme reste au dedans de la ligne générale du réformisme tenue par une élite traditionnelle de pouvoir, la circonstance de son articulation avec le programme intégré de développement ne peut pas, par un effet de science politique, cesser de lui donner un indice positif, comme élément de changement social réel, dans les prévisions pour les prochaines années. Plus important pourtant encore à noter est l'effet de somme algébrique qu'ont ces deux impacts de la politique d'accroissement de la productivité sur les conditions d'un éventuel appui populaire au régime. Ceci, dans la mesure où la destruction relative d'une structure oligarchique de la propriété rurale compenserait les nouvelles limitations à venir aux statuts du travailleur urbain jusqu'ici tenu comme intouchable, et symbole de sa promotion atteinte dans les années 1930. L'annulation judicieuse des impacts négatifs de cet effort de rationalisation économique pourrait se composer dans une perspective stratégique, socialement liée à un effort de réduction des déséquilibres régionaux du pays ce qui prendrait la

configuration d'une troisième étape du programme gouvernemental. Le développement une fois relancé en termes rationalisés, et soumis au choix de certaines formes d'accroissement de la productivité, le gouvernement se concentrerait plus intensément sur le nouveau modèle politique institutionnel, se confrontant finalement avec les problèmes cruciaux de la participation populaire et de la formalisation de ses modèles de pouvoir si drastique et périlleusement déferé au moment politique national présent. Une telle étape comprendrait le renforcement d'un pur mouvement syndical du Brésil, libéré des formes de survivance du régime clientéliste, inévitables dans la dynamique de l'état bureaucratique des années 1930; la formation de nouveaux partis politiques qui accompagneraient la différenciation sociale et économique revitalisée par le développement; la formation de nouveaux axes de diffusion de pouvoir et de décentralisation de la décision brésilienne qui est aussi la conséquence inévitable de cette différenciation.

#### Alternatives de droite.

Dans la présente caractérisation, on entendra comme de droite les régimes qui magnifient l'entropie du "statu quo", éliminant toute possibilité de changement ou même de rationalisation. En termes de structure de pouvoir, les acteurs susceptibles de ce protagonisme assurent typiquement le caractère d'une élite de pouvoir qui différera selon qu'elle est dominée ou non par un processus de raréfaction de son noyau, correspondant au degré toujours plus grand de dogmatisme et de formalisation de la réalité et justification de sa perspective "zélotique"(13) devant le processus historique du pays.

Du point de vue des acteurs responsables de cette conduite deux cas distincts peuvent s'imaginer dans les alternatives de droite :

a) La conservation d'un modèle mixte supposant le passage de l'actuel groupe civil dans la présente élite de pouvoir national.

b) L'homogénéisation de cette même élite sous un gouvernement strictement militaire.

... \ ...

Cette alternative supposerait l'échange du groupe technocratique actuellement représenté au Ministère de la Planification par une autre connexion d'intérêts dans la collectivité nationale, susceptible de s'intégrer aux actuelles prémisses du modèle néo-capitaliste brésilien. Une telle situation ne pourrait se trouver que dans le cercle des hommes d'affaires paulistes, aujourd'hui nécessairement liés à une nouvelle dépendance des cycles de capital étranger attiré dans le pays. Plus encore, cette faction trouve la couverture doctrinaire de la génération la plus vétuste des économistes brésiliens - celle du Professeur Eugenio Gudim - responsable du cadre de l'autre étape de libération économique déjà présentée par le proche passé du pays, ou encore par l'"intermezzo", Café Filho de 1955. En désaccord avec les aspects les plus dynamiques du régime Castelo Branco, cette pensée aujourd'hui enracinée dans les associations des classes conservatrices de São Paulo et de la Guanabara, offre, à ce régime, à bref délai, l'alternative programmatique de droite immédiate et possible. La perspective d'un capitalisme orthodoxe qui en résulte, à la cohérence d'une régression, fondée sur les opportunités immédiates de l'expansion économique du pays et l'assujettissement de l'appareil public à la création de stimuli et de faveurs pour l'augmentation de la dépendance internationale des investissements, qui veulent encore accourir au centre le plus dynamique de l'économie brésilienne. L'invocation de l'exemple argentin s'est présenté par force comme paradigme d'une politique qui abandonna toute intention de réordonner le processus économique national pour essayer de tirer parti des forces d'un "capitalisme sauvage". Ceci dans le but de vaincre la stagnation économique, bien qu'au prix d'un abandonner la modulation du nouvel élan de croissance du pays au cadre d'une décision nationale et d'une généralisation de ses bénéfices en termes d'une réelle promotion collective. Dans le cas brésilien la cohérence des buts de ce groupe ne serait pas accompagnée néanmoins d'une relative autonomie dans le dessin de ses intérêts ou de ses buts dans la vie politique du pays, dans une étape, où, par la profondeur du séisme inflationnaire ont disparu les perspectives d'un développement spontané, et l'idée de "rationalisation" est la base de tout l'effort localisé dans le fait de redynamiser la vie économique et nationale. L'ascension d'un profil à la "Alzogaray" dans la très civile actuelle alliance technocratico-militaire supposerait de la part des pôles

des forces armées la recrudescence de sa perspective moraliste et d'une plus élémentaire idéologie à laquelle il ne manquerait pas l'emploi profond de la thématique de subversion pour renforcer la stratification de l'ordre social et la suppression rigide des tensions sociales forcément avivées par ces alternatives.

#### L'alternative nasseriste.

Une autre direction de ce processus découlerait d'une rupture de la présente alliance technocratique-militaire résultant de l'emphase de la perspective nationaliste des forces armées, ~~littéralement~~ dans sa vision du développement tout comme liée à la sûreté du pays et au maintien de son auto-détermination. A l'actuel niveau de l'évolution du régime Castelo Branco, cette direction, supposant la disparition du pôle civil du régime actuel qui ne posséderait pas d'équipe substitutive et prendrait force dans une ascension complète des positions du pouvoir par les forces armées. Il faut dire que cette solution englobe aussi la diminution de l'emphase d'une plus grande dépendance des cycles d'investissements étrangers qui serait le dénouement naturel de l'hypothèse précédente. Si ce but donc, d'un côté implique la poussée à l'extrême de la polarisation de l'"élite de pouvoir", de l'autre il ouvre des opportunités à la revalorisation de l'autonomie du centre de décision nationale, dans le cadre néo-capitaliste aujourd'hui tracé pour le pays. En termes de sélection logique, cette direction des événements forcerait le groupe militaire émergent, dans le peu de son rôle "playing" à une conduite "manageriale" et à la valorisation des contrôles et de la marge déjà assumée de transférence à l'état de la décision économique nationale (15). Le modèle du nasserisme ne fut pas différent quand il a forcé le groupe des militaires responsables de la chute du gouvernement Farouk à assumer comme techniciens et comme détenteurs du pouvoir arbitral final des décisions, le contrôle de l'appareil économique égyptien dans une vision définie de changements de l'ordre social en vigueur. Il faut dire que malgré l'élan de confiscation de son début dans une opposition radicale aux formes ~~aggressives~~ du colonialisme économique, en premier lieu les capitaux anglais et français, la consolidation du nasserisme s'est identifiée à la perte des modèles socialisant originaux du régime, et à son inflexion nette vers un modèle capitaliste où est toujours plus subsidiaire la fonction de l'Etat. Cependant à la base de ce modèle, il y a eu l'ascension des contrôles de l'appareil économique

confisqué par des militaires nationalistes improvisés techniciens et capables d'un grand changement de rôles dans le cadre gouvernemental. Il faut dire que dans ce cadre les risques d'une polarisation excessive à l'intérieur d'un groupe unique, obéissant à un régime d'élite de pouvoir, ont été compensés par sa versatilité et son activité, dans son adaptation aux exigences objectives de compétence et de spécialisation réclamées par une effective plateforme de développement. En conséquence au mouvement d'Avril, on a assisté à l'investiture dans le cadre des services publics des autarchies et des entreprises industrielles de l'Etat d'une large proportion de militaires. Bien que la première vague ait reflué, une parcelle sensible de ce transbordement des effectifs techniques de l'appareil militaire dans le civil persiste encore. Néanmoins, il est significatif que la plus grande partie soit confinée au premier niveau de l'instrument du processus actuel de "decision making" brésilien. En effet, si la majorité des entités exécutives du secteur public - comme les chemins de fer fédéraux, les entreprises de transport maritime, la Petrobras, la Compagnie Sidérurgique Nationale, la F.N.M. - sont aujourd'hui dirigées par des généraux, la participation militaire au Ministère de la Planification et spécialement aux organes d'articulation entre la décision nationale et les entités financières de conditionnement et d'appui extérieurs est pratiquement nulle. Dans l'hypothèse de l'alternative nasseriste et à l'intérieur d'une polarisation encore augmentée de cette élite de pouvoir, ce groupe, pratiquement, ne ferait qu'accéder de ce niveau au bastion gardé aujourd'hui par les technocrates comme condition de leur alliance aux militaires. Ce qui, à première vue, paraîtrait néanmoins d'une extrême facilité institutionnelle - par la proximité avec laquelle les techniciens en uniforme entourent les planificateurs civils - comporterait la rupture du judicieux équilibre de compétences établi aujourd'hui comme une des bases du gouvernement Castelo Branco. Il y aurait à ce sujet une distinction qualitative entre le rôle échu actuellement aux militaires dans ce régime et celui auquel ils seraient appelés dans l'éventualité d'une alternative nasseriste. Et, paradoxalement, à réduire encore plus la viabilité de cette dernière option, on vérifie que le seul groupe capable de cette élévation des rôles, les militaires passant de l'instrument à la décision, est la faction "casteliste" non susceptible, par le modèle même qu'elle a donné à la présente élite de pouvoir, d'accepter une plus grande rigidité ou polarisation de son centre dirigeant.



## Alternatives de gauche.

Par alternatives de gauche, on entend les buts de changement qualitatif des structures sociales du pays, qui comprennent la substitution des modèles spécialement dans les proportions entre capital et travail, et dans la division de sphères entre le secteur public et le privé. Ce but, à ce niveau de perte de la spontanéité du changement social brésilien, pourra comprendre, inclus, une inversion des initiatives entre les plans de cette transition, les modifications des institutions politiques étant amenées à précéder l'altération des conditionnantes économiques jusqu'à aujourd'hui réputées comme prioritaires dans le développement national. Dans ce cas, le changement ne peut pas ne pas inclure l'hypothèse de violence, donnant lieu à une disruption sociale, et arrivant à l'anomie collective ou à l'éventuelle institutionnalisation du climat de guerre civile. On souligne, en premier lieu, qu'il devient très difficile d'imaginer un dénouement de gauche à la situation brésilienne présente sous quelque forme organisée. Peut-être le phénomène sociologique le plus marquant, mis en évidence par le mouvement d'Avril fut-il de caractère relâché et desarticulé des centres de gauche dans notre processus politique, constitué par les syndicats, ligues paysannes, mouvements étudiants, manifestations de l'opinion publique et réunions d'intellectuels.

On a déjà vu, dans l'étude des prémisses de ce travail, comment ce phénomène resulta de la situation de vide de pouvoir régnant à l'époque dans le pays, comme effet le plus significatif de l'érosion sociale causée par le processus inflationnaire. Par delà les indices objectifs variés, rendant vulnérables les diverses classes et groupes capables de cette action, il faut ajouter encore l'inexistence de quelque programmation, ou actions symboliques qui permettraient aux éléments de l'opposition de s'agglutiner pour une résurgence organisée à moyen ou long terme. On doit dire que du point de vue subjectif ou de l'"attitude" des gauches, règne encore un fixisme traumatique, qui a immobilisé sa perspective au moment de la chute du gouvernement Goulart, et n'a pas articulé les formations possibles de l'opposition aux nouvelles étapes de la réalité nationale, en prenant conscience du panorama, quoique contenu et limité, des redistributions du revenu, de remise en ordre de l'épargne ou de l'expansion économique dirigée qui ont caractérisé ces deux dernières années. Cependant, à l'intérieur de la méthodologie adoptée dans la présente étude, on doit explorer les conditions de

consistance effective de ces alternatives, à partir de leur configuration logique, dans la dynamique actuelle du pouvoir brésilien. On doit faire, ici, la distinction entre l'ascension de cette voie à partir d'une perspective d'élite, ou soit, d'un régime de gauche implanté à partir du sommet de l'édifice social actuel, ou de l'éventualité d'un changement par la base qui ne pourrait que s'identifier à une occurrence de disruption pour le processus politique brésilien.

Alternative de gauche à base d'élite de pouvoir : le modèle "Newynn".

La crise actuelle de développement spontané et de la perte généralisée des espérances nourries pendant la décade 1950 n'enregistre pas fatalement l'apparition de groupes militaires comme nécessairement associés à la création de systèmes neo-capitalistes profondément liés à la recrudescence des investissements étrangers. La Birmanie illustre l'hypothèse de montée au pouvoir en conséquence de l'échec du régime U Nu d'un groupe hautement homogène de militaires commandés par le général Newynn imbus d'une vision technocratique et aussi d'une perspective hautement idéologique, pour la conduite de la vie politique de ce pays. Celle-ci, cependant prit un caractère fortement socialiste n'hésitant pas à se prévaloir de mesures de confiscation radicales, comme on n'en rencontre pas de similaires dans les nations du Tiers Monde. Elles englobèrent un programme de nationalisation qui s'étendit jusqu'au réseau bancaire inclus (résolution à laquelle ne sont pas arrivés des gouvernements comme celui de la Guinée ou celui de Nkrumah) ; l'élimination des investissements étrangers ; le confinement du secteur privé interne en des termes plus drastiques que celui de quelques économies d'Europe Orientale ; l'utilisation systématique des réserves nationales de main d'oeuvre. Cependant dans le cas brésilien, le sentiment nationaliste des Forces Armées arriva difficilement à se transformer en une plateforme, ou même en une idéologie qui octroyât la cohérence ou la netteté d'options qui caractérisait son ascension aux commandes politiques comme une polarisation de gauche dans l'actuelle élite du pouvoir. Il en ressort encore que l'utilisation judicieuse des mécanismes de mutations et même d'expulsion de l'Armée éloigna complètement d'un plan d'action le petit groupe militaire susceptible de cette prise de position. En un mot, si la contradiction entre "sûreté nationale" et "performance économique" est le risque latent de l'actuelle alliance technocratico-militaire, la

capacité permanente qu'ont les forces armées de rompre le "statu quo" par une polarisation à gauche, se place au niveau le plus bas de la sériation logique dans les alternatives au régime Castelo Branco. S'il est possible, de la position nationaliste, d'extraire un modèle compatible à l'action économique à droite, à gauche nous rencontrons aujourd'hui un "non sequitur" rigoureux. En effet, les alternatives "Alzogaray" ou "Nasseriste", en termes de viabilité, seraient très supérieures à celles du modèle Newynn. Les deux, pourtant, ne constituent pas des idéologies conaturelles ou spontanées au groupe militaire, à l'intérieur de sa perspective nationaliste en fonction de la réalité brésilienne. Tellement que, ou ils s'aident, dans sa formulation, des élites civiles déphasées, ou ils arrivent à un modèle à partir d'une inversion des rôles dans son protagonisme d'"élite du pouvoir" : c'est comme techniciens et non comme militaires qu'ils embrasseraient l'éventualité nasseriste. Dans l'alternative de gauche au contraire, on remarque une contiguïté naturelle entre son attitude dans la phase spontanée de notre développement et la configuration d'un projet ou d'une idéologie conséquente dans l'étape de rationalisation. Mais c'est exactement à ce point que s'est fait le plus sentir l'exigence d'homogénéité idéologique de l'élite du pouvoir actuelle, seulement capable d'assurer les alliances actuelles du gouvernement Castelo Branco par la radicalisation interne des pôles de cette association. Il ne s'agit pas seulement, dans ce sens, de vérifier, au Ministère de la Planification et dans les autres organismes responsables de l'information économique de la décision nationale, la marginalisation, spécialement dans les rangs des générations de 30 et 40 ans, des professionnels et techniciens liées à une perspective moins orthodoxe dans la programmation du développement brésilien. Mais il s'agit de voir comme il serait très difficile dans le pôle militaire de trouver, en dehors du groupe de la "Sorbonne" des factions actives capables de transformer leur sentiment nationaliste en un programme et une vision cohérente de la réalité brésilienne et de ses perspectives de changement.

#### Alternatives de gauche : l'hypothèse de disruption.

Il faut considérer ensuite les alternatives de gauche déterminées par l'apparition de dynamisme à la base de l'édifice social. On ne peut les séparer, dans notre cas, d'une perspective de disruption englobant l'hypothèse-limite d'une explosion collective, et de la substitution radicale non seulement des cadres dirigeants,

mais aussi du modèle même de l'élite du pouvoir alors dominante dans le pays. Il faut dire que tout gouvernement qui en appelle à la solution finale de l'"élite du pouvoir", dans le processus de développement, aborde nécessairement une situation d'anomie (16), dans le cas de son insuccès, dans la mesure où le prix de son efficacité a résidé dans l'interruption de tout un système d'articulation entre la super et l'infra-structure sociale englobées dans ce changement. Mais encore on peut espérer ce dénouement quand l'élimination des principes de représentation (dans lesquels seraient présentés ces exigences d'infra-structure) serait remplacée par une préoccupation d'absolue homogénéité idéologique, qui réduit encore d'une façon permanente le cadre des acteurs et cautionne les expectatives d'adhésion sociale rien que sur les résultats finaux de leur action. Cela sans aucune transigeance "medio-tempore" ou préoccupation d'établir un consentement ou une participation durant les périodes critiques de sa planification. L'effort pour rendre absolue la teneur de rationalisme des actuelles décisions nationales a invalidé tout le rôle de l'intelligence où la création de véhicules de médiation ou transigeances entre les diverses formations d'infra-structure qui pouvaient revenir à un relatif agrateur politique dans le rôle garanti des oppositions ainsi que légitimés par le statu quo. En outre le manque pratique de distance entre "subversion" et "opposition" rend l'hypothèse de disruption dominante en n'importe quelle appréciation des changements de régime aujourd'hui au Brésil, en dehors des strictes dynamismes au sommet. Cela n'implique pas cependant ce qui peut réalistiquement être imaginé comme sa forte viabilité à court ou moyen terme. Ou mieux durant l'outillage des trois étapes déjà référées dans la séquence de l'administration Castelo Branco. Ce manque de viabilité s'explique par les divers obstacles apparus avec l'action des gauches en contrepoint à la solidification de l'actuel régime, à savoir :

a) La conservation du fixisme traumatique durant l'étape d'implantation des mesures de redistribution de revenu et de stimuli à la formation de capital, en obédience au nouveau modèle de développement adopté par le gouvernement Castelo Branco.

b) L'exposé dans la nouvelle stratégie de sommes "algébriques" qui conjuguent les aspects anti-sociaux et en même temps réformistes de cette administration, pendant la seconde période du castelisme, réduisant ou annulant son impact négatif sur l'opinion publique.

b) Le degré excessif de polarisation des nouveaux cycles d'investissements étrangers, attirés par la politique des stimuli fiscaux et augmentant comme effet latéral, la création d'espaces économiques non intégrés dans le pays. Ou mieux, donnant lieu à de nouvelles formes nodulaires et confinées de progrès, intimement dépendant d'afflux externes, et jusqu'à un certain point, créant des circuits étanches d'expansion, dans une forme d'économie d'enclave, et non d'articulation globale comme l'appareil producteur interne. Il convient, à ce sujet, de s'en référer aux épisodes actuels dans le monde afro-asiatique quand la nouvelle instabilité politique qui amena la chute des premiers gouvernements indépendants délimita, nécessairement, sur la carte politique, les régions privilégiées et les marginales de ce complexe. Dans ce sens, l'ébranlement actuel que ces régions présentent toujours provient d'une nouvelle répartition des forces politiques et économiques dans lesquelles au risque de l'unité nationale, ces centres prospères et de plus en plus déliés de l'ensemble, affirment leur dépendance accrue de certains circuits externes et fermés de capitaux.

c) L'éventuelle perte du rôle de l'Armée comme élément de retenue et d'équilibre permanent du processus social brésilien. Sous cet aspect se refléterait le fait que le présent gouvernement, comme déjà vu, a donné de l'importance à la première ascension ostensible de l'armée aux compétences civiles, comprenant toute entière la responsabilité frontale de ce groupe dans la conduite politique du pays, et dans son profillement devant les multiples connexions d'intérêts et de dynamismes de l'infra-structure de la société brésilienne. En un mot, opérant aujourd'hui la transition du régime colonial au dernier palier de cohésion possible pour éviter la généralisation de conditions d'anomie, ou soit, celle d'une étroite élite de pouvoir, ne peut fuir au prix d'abandonner d'autres mécanismes d'ajustage social qui lui étaient particuliers, comme celui de cette fonction modératrice exercée par l'Armée depuis l'avènement de la république. L'aspect régressif (17), dans lequel importe nécessairement toute la rationalisation dans le processus social, s'extrait justement de cette transférence de rôles de l'Armée, en cessant d'être "le grand muet" dans l'ordonnance distante et discrète du changement social du pays. La candidature de l'ex-Ministre de la Guerre se place ainsi, sociologiquement, au pôle opposé à celui de l'intervention limitée et contenue, par quoi, ces dernières 40 années, cette fonction arbitrale s'est fait sentir dans notre

c) Le maintien d'une attitude d'aliénation et de désinformation du contexte effectif politico-social actuel du pays, qui a créé, pour les groupes dirigeants traditionnels un éloignement encore plus grand entre leurs propres factions.

On expérimente aujourd'hui au Brésil, dans l'action des gauches cette position "objective" et "subjective" de marginalité, qui perd une position relative, comme un projet d'action compensatrice attardée, sur les attentes sociales de changement, intensément déferées par le régime actuel. C'est de ce point de vue que l'on comprend l'effet de cette marginalité et de ce retard sur l'opportunité des gauches de figurer, ou même d'emprunter un véhicule unique aux revendications sociales dans le cas où ces tensions atteindraient leur point de saturation. Il faut dire que le modèle de disruption dans ce cas gagne une forte probabilité pouvant amener la perte de la cohérence nationale, et même une manifestation de guerre civile. L'admissibilité de l'hypothèse de disruption continue dans le processus social brésilien s'appuie sur les facteurs suivants dont quelques uns sont apparus de façon inédite dans le processus politique brésilien à partir d'Avril 1964. Tous, il est nécessaire de le dire, n'ont de signification que dans le cas d'insuccès final du régime Castelo-Campos et de l'échec des mesures articulées dans les plans "quinquennal" et "perspective". Ce sont :

a) L'accélération des déséquilibres régionaux. C'est le risque implicitement assumé par toute thérapeutique pour relancer l'effort de développement appuyé sur la concentration des efforts réalisés au coeur économique du pays et, conséquemment, sur l'effet de radiation ou généralisation progressive de la politique "développer le développé". Malgré les efforts de compensation de cette inégalité, aujourd'hui presque tous concentrés dans le Nord-Est, et dans l'effet des nouvelles lois de stimulation essentiellement fiscale, on remarque que la priorité de cette politique pèse peu dans les premières étapes de l'implantation d'un système néo-capitaliste. Il faut dire que cette directive est de celles dont l'effet se fait le plus sentir dans les risques calculés qu'assume le régime, en termes de réduire l'emphase des aspects sociaux et politiques de ce changement de structure, devant le rétablissement des fonctions privées d'accumulation et l'accroissance de productivité, sur quoi s'appuie ce même système.

équilibre politique. On voit cependant l'évolution de notre processus, à partir de maintenant, dégarinée de ce facteur de modulations et de stabilité en inaugurant un nouveau gouvernement de représentation dans le pays, et en établissant un nouveau courant concurrentiel entre les cadres civils et militaires des élites brésiliennes.

d) Hyperfactionnalisme entre les divers groupes de la situation sociale anémique antérieure. L'évolution immédiate du processus brésilien souffre pour la première fois du siècle, de la mutation radicale des forces titulaires de la situation du pouvoir antérieur. C'est ainsi que survient de façon inédite dans le comportement de l'opposition, l'impact d'un exil généralisé et de l'éloignement du pays d'un des pôles de l'évolution de notre processus politique. Et il n'est pas nécessaire d'exagérer, en termes d'alienation l'effet qui s'engendre par là dans la cohésion de ces forces et dans sa possibilité de conjugaison dans une vision polémique mais non utopique, du changement social brésilien. Dans les contextes de sous-développement, et devant la vitesse même de la transition, et de la désactualisation brusque qu'elle impose aux cadres nationaux du sommet, les perspectives de l'opposition tendent à se fractionner rapidement et, par la perte inévitable de la véritable emphase des priorités de ce changement, se disperseraient en d'innombrables sous-factions brillantes et rigides.

e) Le nouvel "input" de radicalisme introduit dans le système politique par les processus discriminatoires d'une élite du pouvoir, dans le dessein de compenser la légitimation venue du processus représentatif par celle de "homogénéité idéologique". La création d'une très forte instance idéologique dans la possibilité de capacité politique des acteurs du processus social du pays - exprimée par les institutions nouvelles de la cassation et du développement scholastique de la notion de "subversion" - donnerait à cette modalité de gouvernement un instrument fondamental pour sa défense. Ou soit, un des mécanismes d'auto-raréfaction et cancellation permanente des instances polémiques, dans le débat sur les oppositions nationales. Il faut dire que la tolérance avec une réciprocity de perspectives dans la conduite du processus politique brésilien, et le délinéament de la conduite de l'antagoniste seraient tempérés par un nouveau rôle politique créé nécessairement par l'élite de pouvoir; l'invocation des exigences de pureté révolutionnaire à base d'un protagonisme abstrait - celui de la ligne dure - invoquée par les détenteurs effectifs du centre du

pouvoir pour maximiser sans préjudice de la flexibilité de son autre face de l'amplitude de sa base politique - les exigences d'homogénéité idéologique de la situation. En un mot, ces mécanismes ne feraient qu'institutionnaliser le radicalisme dans le processus politique brésilien, introduisant un facteur difficilement compatible avec les formes traditionnelles où s'assurait l'entropie ou même l'équilibre de notre évolution. Le plus important cependant est que l'introduction de ce nouveau palier de conflit dans le processus politique national transcende de beaucoup le plan des rivalités personnelles ou biographiques, pouvant envelopper l'institutionnalisation d'un climat de tension entre groupes et statuts, découlant nécessairement du changement substantiel de "role playings" dans le cadre des interactions fondamentales de super et infrastructure dans l'actuelle transition brésilienne.

#### CHAPITRE IV

##### Indicateurs possibles pour la prévision du processus politique brésilien.

Après avoir situé les caractéristiques de la présente élite de pouvoir; tout comme la configuration logique des alternatives pour son évolution, on doit établir la définition des indicateurs capables de saisir la prévision du cours du processus. Cette investigation suppose un plan méthodologique divisé en étapes comme suit :

a) Définition du schéma général des variables qui peuvent influencer le processus de décision de la présente élite de pouvoir.

b) Recherche d'indicateurs de la viabilité de l'actuel processus de décision, telle qu'elle ressort des variables exposées en a).

Une telle analyse parlerait au sujet de la recherche :

1) des niveaux de consentement atteints par l'actuelle politique gouvernementale ;

2) du degré des contradictions mises en évidence par sa proposition.

c) Configuration des éléments de contre-épreuve qui permettent du point de vue de l'"entropie acquise" par l'actuel système de pouvoir de mesurer sa fonctionnabilité, en termes de consolidation croissante, capable de vaincre les pressions externes, et de développer



l'exigence de marchandage dans un régime implanté à partir de l'hypothèse de vide du pouvoir résultant de la très forte érosion sociale due au processus inflationnaire. Donc les expectatives d'interaction entre la composante de marchandage et l'intégration du centre de décision sont dans ce cas assez faibles, permettant que se dessine comme forte polarisation le flux de transmission de la décision du centre à son cadre d'exécution. Elles renforcent encore énormément ce "trend", l'emploi par le même centre découlant de l'utilisation consciente et systématique d'autres mécanismes de coercition sociale qui accélèrent cet effet comme :

a) Le recours constant au "lessivage" sur la scène interne. C'est à dire la création d'un système effectif de paralysie réductrice des conflits et des représailles au système actuel de pouvoir, à partir du montage d'un mécanisme continu de menaces et de manifestation du potentiel éventuel d'action répressive détenu par le pouvoir. En un mot, par la création de conditionnements limite de ces antagonistes, la non utilisation judicieuse de force et rien que par la création d'un climat constant de possibilité de déflagration (19). Un des mécanismes fondamentaux de consolidation de cette élite du pouvoir dans un des premiers grands emplois stratégiques du lessivage sur le plan interne s'est trouvé respectivement dans la formation des enquêtes policières-militaires et dans l'appropriation "potentielle" d'un régime dictatorial mis en évidence par l'Acte Institutionnel n° 2. Grâce au premier de ces mécanismes le comportement de l'antagoniste à la situation présente se voit aujourd'hui sujet à une menace indiscriminée et vigilante du centre du pouvoir de l'utilisation du soupçon dans ces enquêtes, de caractère "Kafkaesque", comme un mécanisme de dissuasion maxima qui en même temps élimine la confrontation des partis en choc et les risques en découlant pour le centre de décision. Il est grandement probable que, dans le cours du gouvernement actuel, on assiste au gonflement et l'amplification de la phase policière-militaire de ces processus de lessivage sans qu'il y ait connection nécessaire avec ses conditions de viabilité en termes de processus judiciaire effectif, et encore moins de jugement. Cet emploi du lessivage est caractérisé par son utilisation systématique et habile dans un pouvoir absolu discretionnaire auquel de plus s'ajoute le propre centre ostensible du pouvoir, dans le sens de, par le soupçon, configurer les conditions symboliques de menace indiscriminée, et de peine maxima aux éventuels antagonistes du régime. Sa condition naturelle est l'enquête policière-militaire ouverte, ralentie, et

ses propres buts et comportements dérivés de son propre dynamisme.

#### A - Définition du Schéma Global des Variables qui Influencent le Processus de Décision Nationale.

Un processus de décision qui a comme acteur une élite de pouvoir se structure en fonction du degré dans lequel son centre de décision reçoit l'effet de conditionnantes données externes, soit les variables que nous cherchons. Elles permettent, à la façon d'un fluxogramme, d'établir tout le registre des diverses toniques par quoi ces composantes extrinsèques réagiraient sur le centre de décision établissant le passage entre la formulation idéale ou paradigmatique de la politique de ces centres et le cadre effectif en vigueur des décisions nationales. Dans la situation spécifique brésilienne d'aujourd'hui, les variables capables d'influer sur le centre de décision de l'élite de pouvoir seraient les suivantes :

1 - L'interaction extérieure respectivement en relation :

a) aux prémisses de décision du gouvernement américain d'actualité, spécialement en relation avec : l'attitude de l'administration américaine dans ses conduites comme la politique d'aide extérieure, l'absorption de l'excédent économique des Etats-Unis, le développement des pactes internationaux de sécurité, etc...

b) à la haute sensibilité au processus de "Image Building" à l'étranger et principalement aux Etats-Unis. Ce type de conditionnement, à quoi est extrêmement sensible une élite de pouvoir à haut contenu idéologique tend aussi à exercer un comportement de substitut dans le conditionnement des attitudes et conduites du centre de décision dans le cas de vacance ou disparition du rôle polémique dans les oppositions internes au régime.

2 - L'interaction entre polarisation et marchandage sur la scène interne du régime d'élite de pouvoir.

Cette seconde variable cherche à établir le degré de conditionnement du centre de décision par la marge où elle serait encore obligée de marchander dans la conquête de force pour ses décisions, suivant le degré de représailles et de conduite divisante que peuvent présenter des formations détentrices du pouvoir économique ou politique et non encore captées par l'actuelle élite de pouvoir. Dans les propres prémisses de cette étude, on a montré comme serait minime

ments, le considérer du côté opposé à celui du marchandage, soit à celui de la limite où l'absorption ou la polarisation de l'initiative du processus social par le centre s'ajuste à l'idéologie ou aux contenus des décisions de ce même soutien. Dans le cas présent l'interaction s'identifie au degré auquel les décisions transmises au processus social peuvent être considérées comme résultantes des options rationnelles et du degré où elles ont pu découler d'une considération adéquate du comportement "optimum" effectivement conféré aux divers facteurs compris dans l'accélération du processus de développement. Cette analyse comprend la recherche du degré de "neutralité" allégué par les acteurs de la situation brésilienne présente et comprenant deux sous-aspects principaux :

a) Le degré de conditionnement entre le contenu des propositions gouvernementales et la prémisse culturelle dont elles dérivent, sans perdre de vue, une fois de plus, le caractère extrêmement homogène, en parlant idéologiquement, de la présente élite de pouvoir.

b) Le degré d'irrationalité ou de propositions non cohérentes que pourrait comprendre l'actuelle plateforme politique, quelquefois sous le prétexte d'augmenter ses conditions de viabilité, ou encore sur un impératif stratégique.

Ces derniers indicateurs donneraient une idée de l'importance des "rationales" inclus dans le processus et des limites dans lesquelles le centre de la présente élite du pouvoir augmenterait ou diminuerait son appui dans l'actuel "statu quo". Les indicateurs de compatibilité mis en évidence en a) ci-dessus, montreraient le degré d'acceptation dans le régime brésilien des modèles et techniques transplantés de l'extérieur, et les limites dans lesquelles se distinguerait le degré de tolérance avec la généralisation d'un modèle néo-capitaliste et son exécution orthodoxe.

#### Indicateurs de viabilité du mécanisme de décision.

D'un autre côté les schémas de prévision politique dans l'actuel processus social brésilien devront prendre en considération, à côté des facteurs de distorsion ou de conditionnement, les indicateurs de viabilité exprimés dans la corrélation entre les limites ostensibles de consentement ou celles de tension dans lesquelles il s'insère selon que deviennent ostensibles les contradictions susceptibles de menacer la stabilité de l'équilibre actuel du pouvoir national.

transformation du processus politique de l'estructure relationnel juridique en mécanismes de discrimination et d'inventaire des protagonistes d'une éventuelle conduite d'antagonisme, et devenant par là, avec les poursuites symboliques nécessaires, les cibles de l'usage potentiel de la force dont s'investit le centre de décision.

b) Le contrôle absolu, par le centre de décision, non seulement de l'initiative des processus de communication politique, mais des conditions de son institutionnalisation utilisées dans le mécanisme de flexibilité et rigidité intermittentes, ce qui amplifie encore plus la commande unilatérale de l'élite du pouvoir sur le processus politique.

Il faut dire que, sous cet aspect, le protagonisme de l'actuelle élite de pouvoir place l'emploi du marchandage en faveur de la polarisation croissante du dynamisme politique brésilien. Ceci, par l'utilisation à fond de l'avance et du recul sur le chemin du pouvoir personnel. Le gouvernement a compris l'ampleur qu'il donnait à son protagonisme en retardant le lancer de toutes les dernières cartes du pouvoir dictatorial, à l'inverse de ce qui arrive normalement dans des situations analogues, c'est à dire atteindre tout de suite la position de rigidité maxima dans l'ascension d'un pouvoir absolu et personnel de conditionnement de la vie politique. Il faut dire que, dans ce sens, ayant en main la condition essentielle d'arriver à cette ultime limite, et ne le faisant pas, le centre du pouvoir augmente ses conditions d'hégémonie en transformant la conservation des règles restantes du jeu démocratique en une concession maxima de l'autorité. On renforce ainsi nécessairement la polarisation, suppléant à la conduite "personnelle limitante" de l'action des institutions dans une inversion curieuse des rôles, en face du mode avec lequel cette relation apparaît normalement dans un régime démocratique. Il faut dire qu'à partir de l'Acte Institutionnel n° 2, la "non entrée" du pays dans une situation-limite dictatoriale reste strictement soumise au "libre arbitre" de cette même élite du pouvoir, ce qui ne fait en termes de concentration ou diffusion de l'initiative du processus politique que magnifier les conditions de polarisation des acteurs actuels de notre régime politique.

### 3 - L'interaction entre polarisation et rationalisation.

Sachant que, dans le comportement politique qui a comme acteurs l'élite de pouvoir, le paramètre fondamental est représenté par la polarisation, il faut, pour définir son cadre réel de conditionne-

## 1. Niveaux de consentement.

La définition de ces indicateurs, devant être recherchée dans l'indispensable travail sur place de l'échantillonnage des secteurs représentatifs des diverses couches de la population nationale, permettraient de trouver le degré dans lequel le processus de réflexion sociale et de prise de conscience se réalise dans le sens de la politique avancée par le centre du pouvoir, ou en contraste et tension avec lui (20). Entre les amplitudes qui pourraient être dénombrées comme indicateurs de ces limites de consentement, nous rencontrerions les suivantes :

a) Degré de transférance de la "décision d'investir" nationale du cadre interne vers l'externe.

b) Degré d'extension du secteur public de l'économie.

c) Degré de l'influence des pouvoirs de contrôle sur les comportements basiques de production et consommation nationales (influence sur le coût de la vie, sur les conditions d'investissement de l'épargne moyenne, etc...)

d) Degré d'acceptation des redistributions de revenu imposées à la collectivité dans le sens de la vision adéquate de sa position en termes de subsides ou de perte relative de position dans le partage du revenu national.

e) Degré d'acceptation du secteur public comme substitut du privé dans la production de services et dans la création de conditions de promotions sociales.

f) Capacité marginale de privation et sacrifice dans la transférance d'efforts et d'épargnes pour l'exécution de conduites liées nécessairement et directement au développement.

g) Définition de l'échelle possible de priorités et de leur conflit dans la visualisation des avantages concrets par lesquels le processus de développement pourrait se matérialiser.

Ces deux derniers indices rendraient possibles au spécialiste de science politique d'établir ce qui a été appelé le "want-get ratio", c'est à dire, le niveau de stabilité sociale, ou de consentement qui peut être articulé comme la situation du développement croissant impliquant l'élévation inévitable du "standard" d'aspirations

de toute la collectivité. En un mot, ces indices établiraient les conditions d'entropie du régime défiée par le dynamisme double que peut être le résultat du processus de développement : le rythme des expectatives croissantes ou des croissantes frustrations.

## 2. Contradictions.

D'un autre côté, les possibilités de se garantir un modèle politique doté de viabilité sont comprises dans l'analyse des deux extrêmes de la corrélation consentement-tension. Ces dernières supposent l'identification des contradictions les plus importantes qui se trouvent aujourd'hui latentes dans le processus politique national. Ce sont :

a) Le degré de participation du secteur militaire et du civil dans la parcelle de revenu national allouée à l'appareil bureaucratique public.

b) Le degré d'expansion du secteur public face au privé, tenant compte du pacte de consentement mutuel classique de subsides entre les deux sphères et l'altération que leur aurait fait subir la politique gouvernementale actuelle.

c) L'exaspération possible des fonctions centralisatrices dans le schéma fédératif du pays, transcendant même le respect aux domaines de compétence des Etats comme unités d'exécution décentralisée de la planification nationale.

d) Degré d'absorption des contingents et de la réserve nationale de main d'oeuvre du secteur de subsistance par celui du marché. (Comme on l'a déjà dit, le flux contraire, de l'économie de marché vers celui de subsistance, n'aurait pas d'intérêt comme indicateur dans ce cadre de recherches).

Dans l'étude de ces tensions, et dans son échelonnement conséquent, on voit immédiatement la prédominance des tensions super-structurales, comme il ne pourrait manquer d'arriver avec les acteurs d'un processus politique à base d'"élite de pouvoir" et présentant un degré élevé de polarisation. Du point de vue de la transformation de ces tensions en dangers d'ébranlement du système, dans un seul cas seulement le conflit se place réellement dans une condition d'affrontement, c'est à dire qu'il ne laisse pas ses protagonistes contrôler eux aussi la règle du jeu de la tension par le contrôle de

ses données institutionnelles. C'est cela, exactement, de qui découle de la création d'un gouvernement de représentation, plaçant au delà d'une élite de pouvoir un groupe social univoque dans le contrôle politique national, dans la mesure où l'Armée assumerait ostensiblement le pouvoir. Il faut dire que dans cette hypothèse, la compétition avec le secteur civil dans le partage du revenu absorbé par le secteur public, dépend exclusivement de l'autolimitation des Forces Armées. Ou encore, dans un conflit d'une telle dimension que devient minime l'existence de barrières institutionnelles ou de solution de leurs tensions, en termes "extra-partis".

#### B - Indicateurs du degré de fonctionnalité du système de pouvoir actuel.

Enfin, la délimitation des indicateurs capables de définir une conduite susceptible de prévoir notre évolution politique suppose la mensuration de l'entropie conquise ou croissante de l'actuelle élite dirigeante, dans la mesure où elle réagit en système avec le processus social global du pays. En un mot ces indices mettraient en évidence le degré d'ajustage interne de ces acteurs de comportement politique au répertoire de fonctions qui attend de lui un régime définitivement dynamisé en "système" (21) de la vie sociale. De ce prisme, il faudrait observer que les indicateurs de solidité par eux mêmes, surgiraient de cet équilibre politique, indirectement, comme conséquence nécessaire du degré de vigueur que les objectifs ou le contenu programmatique de cette élite de pouvoir pourrait garantir. En premier lieu, néanmoins, l'émergence de fonctions dérivées de la configuration de ce nouvel axe de comportement politique, tous corollaires à l'existence d'une situation croissante d'intégration du protagonisme de cette élite de pouvoir à l'intérieur du dynamisme typique de l'un des sous-systèmes de la vie sociale. L'opportunité pour le présent régime de pouvoir d'engendrer ce type complexe et dynamique d'articulation avec le tout social, prend une valeur exceptionnelle pour tirer des jugements de prévision sur l'évolution politique nationale. Ceci, dans la mesure où disposant de la catégorie d'acteurs politiques la plus détachée des instruments d'articulation naturelle à la vie sociale, ou soit d'une "élite de pouvoir", le prouve bien, si l'on note des indices positifs dans ce sens, autant que ses perspectives de durée à moyen et long terme dans le processus politique national. C'est dans ces cas où si l'on tient comme vaincues les difficultés d'implantation de la première étape, de la même manière son effet se cautionnerait en pro-

fondeur sur les sériations conséquentes. De la consolidation s'en suivrait non seulement la reconnaissance d'une simple situation continuée d'entropie, mais, tout de suite, l'implantation d'un nouveau paradigme. Il faut dire, d'un nouveau module pour régir l'évolution de ce complexe social ouvrant un passage pour que se dénouent les autres fonctions connexes à la consolidation d'un système de pouvoir dans la mesure où il intervient réellement sur toute la vie sociale. En ce cas toutes ces interactions convergeraient pour présenter des indicateurs de la "fonctionnalité" ou "non-fonctionnalité" du système et, comme effet latéral et pléthorique, la contre-épreuve de la solidité du régime. Les indicateurs d'importance sur ce plan tous en dernière analyse montrant l'adaptation finale d'une élite dirigeante amenée comme figurante forcée d'un processus social affaibli par une situation d'intense anomie et de vide de pouvoir, seraient les suivants :

a) La résurgence du processus de différenciation sociale qui aurait comme "foyer-exemplaire" l'éventuelle organisation des communautés intermédiaires et spécialement de celle de l'autonomisation du mouvement syndical dans les classes prolétariennes.

b) L'intensification du processus de participation politique ayant comme foyer exemplaire l'expansion de la filiation partisane, l'extension du spectre sociologique et politique des options offertes, les candidatures à l'intérieur de ces partis et le degré de présence effective, ou d'audience de la collectivité au processus électoral.

c) La résurgence du processus de mobilisation et de prise de conscience nationale exprimé spécialement par le degré de tolérance des élites du pouvoir avec l'action des "intelligentzias", et leurs mécanismes de critique systématique de la "situation" et ses contenus idéologiques.

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RENVOIS :

6.- Dans le sens employé par Karl W. Deutsch, "The Nerves of Government", The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963, spécialement la partie III, "Communication Models and Political Decision Systems".

7.- Sur les élites de pouvoir révolutionnaires, de composition militaire, consulter spécialement outre les oeuvres déjà citées, Lord Kinross, Ataturk, Morrow, 1965 ; Safran, Egypt in Search for Political Community, Harvard, 1961 ; Dankwart Rustow, The Military in The Middle East et The Military in Turkey : Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, eds. Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, Princeton, 1964.



8.- Sur le problème essentiel de un "establishment" militaire lié au développement, consulter Irving Louis Horowitz, "Three Worlds of Development; The Theory and Practice of International Stratification", Oxford, University Press, 1966. Spécialement le chapitre 9, "The Military Pivot : From Revolution to Nation-Building". Il est intéressant de confronter la souplesse de perspective de Horowitz avec celle de David Galula, "Counterinsurgency Warfare : Theory and Practice", New York and London, Frederick Praeger, 1964, qui nie toute possibilité d'un contenu para-révolutionnaire aux mouvements militaires du Tiers Monde.

9.- Sur l'analyse comparée de ces divers secteurs responsables de la menée du processus de transition, consulter "Political Culture and Political Development", édité par Pye and Verba, Princeton University Press, 1965.

10.- L'expression représentation (portugais : estamento de l'espagnol : estamamiento) est ici employée en utilisant la dénomination de Max Weber, mais essentiellement dans le sens d'opposer des situations de pouvoir déterminées par des articulations d'infra-structure, soit essentiellement par la position de classe, d'où découleraient des facteurs distincts généralement superstructuraux et classables sous la désignation générale de "status". On a recours ici à l'expression "représentation" à l'intérieur de cette dérivation pour définir les modèles de pouvoir qui, aujourd'hui, dans les pays sous-développés, découleraient de la situation, en tant qu'acteurs du processus social de changement résultant de conformation de la super-structure sociale, comme l'armée, l'appareil technocratique ou le parti.

11.- Sur l'évolution de P.R.I., consulter spécialement le travail modèle de Robert E. Scott, "Mexican Government in Transition", University of Illinois, Urbans, 1964.

12.- Sur la dynamique profonde du système démocratique du gouvernement et la conservation ou non de ses caractéristiques essentielles dans les nouveaux régimes rationalisés d'aujourd'hui sur le continent voir les deux splendides travaux de Robert Dahl : "Who Governs?", New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966 et "Modern Political Analysis", Galaxy, Oxford University Press, 1962, 64.

13.- L'expression "zélotique" est ici employée dans l'acception que lui a donnée Arnold Toynbee in "A study of History" Vol. VIII lorsqu'il y analyse le comportement devant le processus social des élites conservatrices qui ont poussé à l'extrême leur divorce avec la vision concrète de la réalité et n'en ont appelé qu'à des mécanismes de formalisation de cette continuité sociale en des idéologies progressivement réductrices de cette même réalité et toujours plus contrées sur la recherche du "pur" dans la vie sociale, "pur" identifié à l'immobilité et à la fixité rigoureuse du "Statu quo".

14.- La désignation est collée au Ministre de l'Economie Argentine qui immédiatement après la chute de Peron s'est identifié à l'implantation rigoureuse d'un modèle capitaliste dans les limites d'un vaste démantèlement du secteur public et de la création d'un climat idéal de stimuli et privilèges pour la thèse de la libération complète des possibles "forces de marché" de l'économie argentine. Cette solution, dans le cas présent, représente une immédiate "alternative de droite" aux velleités d'un régime technocratique, lequel, pour quelques mois, et tout de suite après l'avènement du régime Lonardi-Aramburu a laissé la conduite de l'appareil économique du pays aux mains de l'économiste Raul Prebisch.

- 15.- Sur la dynamique interne du Nasserisme, le travail peut-être le plus clair continue à être celui de Anouar Abdel-Malek : "Egypte, Société Militaire", Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1962. Spécialement le Chapitre IV : "Anatomie de la nouvelle classe dirigeante".
- 16.- Sur le concept d'anomie, les travaux de Peter Heintz in "Anales", Santiago, 1964, vol. I, "Anomia Interinstitucional, Anomia Individual y Anomia Colectiva" et "El Problema de la Indecision Social en el Desarrollo Economico", sont d'une signification toute spéciale.
- 17.- Sur l'analyse des relations de progrès et régression entre le développement rationalisé et sa représentation politique, consulter spécialement l'essai de Samuel Huntington : "Political development and Political decay In "World Politics", mai 1965. Tout comme sa séries de conférences prononcées sous le même titre à la faculté des sciences politiques et économiques de Rio de Janeiro du 10 au 26 octobre 1965 dans son premier "Séminaire des Problèmes Internationaux" en connexion avec l'Institut Universitaire de Recherches de Rio de Janeiro.
- 18.- Utopique dans le sens de l'expression de Mannheim (par opposition à "conduite idéologique" proprement dite) soit de la défense de vigour de contenus et projets d'action sociale pas encore viables pour le statu quo et influent dans sa modification radicale.
- 19.- Cf. Thomas C. Schelling, "The Strategy of Conflict", Galaxy Books New York, 1963. Sur le même sujet voir aussi Kenneth E. Boulding : "Conflict and Defense" General Theory", Harper Torchbooks, 1963.
- 20.- L'étude sur les indicateurs de niveaux de consentement est en ce moment un des travaux essentiel de l'Institut Universitaire de Recherches de Rio de Janeiro, qui se propose d'appliquer au Brésil le schéma d'investigations "Bonilla-Silva" qui aujourd'hui vise à établir la première étude en profondeur du consentement populaire aux transformations imposées par le développement, ayant comme premier champ d'action le Venezuela. Cette étude commencée il y a déjà 2 ans, se déroule dans un schéma de coopération étroite entre le Massachusetts Institute of Technology et le Condes, de Caracas, dirigé jusqu'à sa mort prématurée en pleine fécondité de sa pensée par Jorge Ahumada, en fin 1965.
- 21.- Employé dans le concept consacré par Talcott Parsons ("Economy and Society", Free Press, 1965; "Structure and Process in Modern Societies", idem, 1964).

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"La théorie et la pratique  
de la représentation"

LA THEORIE ET LA PRATIQUE DE LA REPRESENTATION

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## La théorie et la pratique de la représentation

par A.H. Birch

### I. Introduction.

On peut définir la représentation politique comme un processus donnant à un nombre de personnes relativement réduit, les "représentants", la faculté de parler et d'exercer une influence au nom d'un plus grand nombre. Ce processus est présent dans les mécanismes politiques de toutes les communautés d'une certaine taille, mais ses formes institutionnelles varient de façon appréciable; seules certaines communautés accordent aux institutions représentatives une place suffisamment centrale dans leur organisation politique pour qu'on puisse dire qu'elles ont un système de gouvernement représentatif.

Dans la plupart des pays, ce sont les régimes autocratiques qui ont établi des institutions représentatives, et cela pour permettre à l'administration d'obtenir l'assentiment de groupes sociaux importants à des mesures fiscales, etc. En Europe occidentale, cette création des institutions représentatives s'est produite au Moyen-Age, et on a pu dire que "l'autorité du gouvernant médiéval ... était exercée normalement et constitutionnellement sur avis de personnes qui n'étaient pas simplement ses vassaux ou ses créatures mais, en un certain sens, sans doute vague et indéterminé, les représentants de la communauté"<sup>(1)</sup>.

Dans d'autres régions du monde, c'est plus récemment que ce phénomène s'est produit : au début du XXe siècle, il était encore en cours dans les territoires coloniaux dans lesquels des Conseils législatifs (c'est le terme utilisé par les Britanniques) ont été créés pour aider l'autorité coloniale à gouverner. Partout, dans cette phase, le représentant est essentiellement le porte-parole de certains groupes : il peut avoir été élu, mais ce n'est pas obligatoire; lorsqu'il est élu, il ne l'est que par une très faible minorité.

Ces institutions ont été transformées lorsque des classes ne participant pas activement au processus gouvernemental ont compris

qu'elles pourraient obtenir une telle participation par l'extension du droit de vote et par l'accroissement des pouvoirs de l'Assemblée représentative. Dans cette transformation, on a cessé de considérer le représentant surtout comme un délégué, pour le considérer surtout comme un élu. A cette étape, la discussion au sujet de la représentation est au coeur même de la vie politique, et l'idée de représentation est étroitement liée à d'autres grandes idées et aspirations, telles que la défense contre l'oppression, l'autorité consentie, l'égalité et la démocratie, la souveraineté populaire. Les controverses portent sur le caractère désirable ou non de la représentation des masses, et sur les conséquences probables de son instauration. S'il est vrai que partisans et critiques ne constituent pas deux catégories simples, la distinction essentielle entre les uns et les autres repose, semble-t-il, sur l'image différente qu'ils ont de la nature même de la société. Les partisans de la représentation des masses considèrent la société soit comme un ensemble d'individus égaux à certains égards, soit comme une unité organique dotée d'une volonté commune; ils croient qu'un système représentatif peut refléter de façon adéquate soit la somme des désirs des individus, soit la volonté commune de la société considérée comme un tout. Les adversaires de la représentation des masses voient la société comme un ensemble de groupes et de classes dont les intérêts économiques et sociaux sont trop différents pour qu'ils puissent être intégrés dans un système représentatif; cela est vrai des conservateurs, pour lesquels les classes inférieures (ou les indigènes) ne sont pas dignes d'obtenir une représentation proportionnelle à leur importance numérique; cela est également vrai des socialistes, pour lesquels dans une société capitaliste les institutions représentatives ne peuvent être qu'une façade derrière laquelle se poursuit l'exploitation des travailleurs par les propriétaires des moyens de production.

Ce type de controverses appartient désormais à l'histoire. Au cours des dernières décennies, il a été admis presque partout que le

suffrage universel est la seule base acceptable pour l'élection d'une assemblée représentative. Aucune forme de société politique ne peut être considérée comme légitime si des élections libres au suffrage universel ne sont pas une pièce centrale de son mécanisme : c'est là désormais un axiome. Un régime tel que celui de l'Afrique du Sud peut être durable et parfaitement efficace sur son territoire; les étrangers le considèrent généralement comme d'une valeur douteuse parce que son système électoral exclut des catégories importantes de la population. La représentation est désormais souvent considérée comme synonyme d'élection, et tout élu est appelé "représentant".

Cet usage présente une difficulté logique, car toute personne élue ne peut être considérée comme un représentant. Le Pape est élu, mais ne doit pas être considéré comme un représentant du Sacré Collège. Ceux des juges américains qui sont élus ne peuvent être décrits correctement comme les représentants de leurs électeurs. Il semblerait que les élus puissent être considérés comme des représentants uniquement si leur élection comprend l'obligation, même vague, de défendre les intérêts du corps électoral. Il s'ensuit que l'idée selon laquelle le représentant est un élu ne peut être séparée logiquement de l'idée selon laquelle le représentant est un porte-parole ou un agent, même si dans l'usage courant on peut distinguer ces concepts.

Cette ambiguïté nous suggère une des questions éternelles au sujet du rôle des représentants élus : dans quelle mesure l'obligation qui leur est faite de défendre les intérêts de leurs électeurs doit-elle être considérée comme une obligation d'agir comme les défenseurs directs des intérêts et des opinions d'une circonscription locale ? et dans quelle mesure doivent-ils faire usage de leur faculté de jugement pour déterminer les intérêts communs à la société tout entière ? Cette question classique a été étudiée à la Table ronde de Varsovie sur "Les problèmes de la représentation", où il est apparu qu'elle était liée à plusieurs questions fondamentales concernant la nature de l'intérêt général et le rôle des institutions représentatives. Certains théori-

ciens considèrent l'intérêt général comme devant être découvert ou élucidé, d'autres le considèrent comme devant être construit par un processus de négociation. Certains théoriciens voient dans la représentation un substitut à la démocratie directe, d'autres la considèrent comme un procédé permettant de conclure des accords et d'aboutir à des compromis qui n'apparaîtraient pas dans un régime de démocratie directe. Certains pensent que ce type de débat est démodé, l'apparition d'une discipline de parti stricte ayant réduit dans un grand nombre de pays la liberté de choix de chaque représentant<sup>(2)</sup>. Mais la discipline de parti ne prive normalement pas chaque représentant de toute possibilité de participation à la formulation de la politique de son parti; dans la plupart des pays, ce n'est pas à la mitrailleuse que la discipline est imposée; les obligations qui régissent le comportement des représentants continuent donc à poser des questions importantes.

Le moment est venu de faire état d'une autre ambiguïté d'ordre linguistique, résultant de l'usage du terme "représentatif" pour signifier qu'une personne est typique d'un univers. Un groupe réduit est dit représentatif d'un groupe plus important lorsqu'il reflète les principales caractéristiques de celui-ci; c'est le sens que les statisticiens donnent au terme lorsqu'ils parlent "d'échantillon représentatif". Les politistes en font de même lorsqu'ils se demandent si, en raison de sa composition, un comité exécutif est représentatif de l'ensemble des membres d'une organisation.

En pure logique, cet usage est distinct des autres, mais il arrive que la distinction s'estompe dans les débats politiques. Depuis Bentham, les "radicaux" tendent à supposer que dans un monde idéal, les membres d'une assemblée représentative constitueraient un microcosme de la nation tout entière. D'innombrables livres et brochures ont été écrits pour démontrer que ce n'est pas le cas dans la réalité, que les classes moyennes sont sur-représentées aux dépens des classes laborieuses, que certaines professions bénéficient d'une représentation

sans rapport avec leurs effectifs, que certains groupes raciaux ou religieux sont mieux représentés que d'autres.

Dans la réalité, un processus d'élection libre n'a aucune chance de fournir une assemblée qui constitue une véritable section du corps électoral, tout comme il est improbable que l'on puisse obtenir un échantillon représentatif en sollicitant des volontaires. Ce fait ne suffit pas à désarmer la critique, et l'idée selon laquelle un représentant devrait avoir des caractères identiques à ceux de ses électeurs continue dans de nombreux systèmes politiques à influencer la pratique. La "formule équilibrée" ("balanced ticket") telle qu'elle est utilisée aux Etats-Unis pour les candidats à la présidence et à la vice-présidence est l'exemple le plus familier d'une telle procédure, mais dans d'autres pays des questions de cet ordre ont provoqué des controverses violentes. Au cours des négociations qui ont précédé la partition de l'Inde, un des facteurs importants a été l'insistance de Jinnah affirmant que les Musulmans ne pouvaient être représentés que par des Musulmans, les Hindous que par des Hindous; cette argumentation est analysée dans l'un des rapports qui doivent être présentés au Congrès.

Ce type d'argumentation est souvent appliqué non seulement aux assemblées représentatives, mais aussi à d'autres centres d'influence et d'autorité politique. C'est ainsi qu'au Canada, où les membres du Gouvernement fédéral sont choisis par le Premier ministre, la composition du gouvernement est régie par des coutumes complexes qui assurent que tout gouvernement comprend deux ou trois Canadiens français, catholiques, originaires du Québec, un Canadien de langue anglaise originaire du Québec, un catholique d'une province autre que le Québec, etc. On trouve des conventions analogues dans beaucoup d'autres pays divisés selon des critères raciaux, linguistiques ou religieux. Même dans une société homogène telle que la miennne, on trouve une préoccupation constante au sujet de la prépondérance de certains groupes aux échelons les plus élevés de la vie politique et de l'administration : 85 % des



hauts fonctionnaires britanniques (administrative class) viennent d'Oxford ou de Cambridge, 15 % seulement des quarante-deux autres universités britanniques<sup>(3)</sup>. Il est normal que de telles préoccupations existent dans une société attachée à l'idéal démocratique. Si à l'avenir le monde devait être gouverné par les spécialistes du calcul électronique, les critiques se plaindraient sans doute qu'une proportion excessive de ces mathématiciens provienne de certains groupes sociaux et religieux, ou qu'il n'y ait pas parmi eux assez de fils d'ouvriers et de paysans.

Ce sont là quelques-uns des problèmes et des débats au sujet de la représentation, auxquels depuis des générations se sont intéressés les penseurs politiques. A notre Congrès, la discussion devrait porter sur trois grands problèmes :

(I) Que pouvons-nous dire des conditions nécessaires au fonctionnement satisfaisant d'un régime représentatif, défini comme le font les libéraux contemporains ?

(II) Que pouvons-nous dire de la théorie et de la pratique de la représentation fonctionnelle, qui n'a été institutionnalisée que dans un petit nombre de pays, mais qui existe presque partout, selon des formes et des pratiques dont la variété prête à confusion ?

(III) Que pouvons-nous dire de l'avenir probable de la pratique de la représentation dans le troisième tiers de notre siècle ?

Il m'appartient d'examiner brièvement les deux premiers de ces problèmes; je laisserai le troisième à mon collègue, M. Kroutogolov.

## II - Conditions nécessaires au fonctionnement satisfaisant d'un régime représentatif.

Le domaine d'enquête est vaste et hérissé d'obstacles; il convient, avant d'en débattre, et pour que la discussion soit utile, de commencer par définir les termes qui seront employés. Il nous faut 1) proposer une définition provisoire du régime représentatif; 2) préciser ce que nous entendons par le "fonctionnement satisfaisant" d'un régime représentatif.

Définition.

Nous pouvons essayer de définir un régime représentatif en disant que, dans un tel régime, une assemblée représentative joue un rôle central et décisif dans le processus par lequel est élaborée la politique et par lequel sont définies les règles. Une assemblée représentative peut être définie comme une entité dont les membres a) sont choisis par la communauté tout entière (habituellement, mais pas toujours, divisée en circonscriptions) et b) considèrent qu'il est de leur devoir d'agir dans l'intérêt de ceux qui les ont choisis et d'exprimer leur point de vue. Le concept de choix implique la liberté d'action, et celui de choix de représentants implique une élection, mais il y a certes plusieurs façons de procéder à des élections. Le devoir d'agir dans l'intérêt de la communauté et d'exprimer son point de vue est accepté universellement, mais les pays diffèrent dans une certaine mesure selon l'importance que les représentants sont censés accorder aux intérêts locaux et catégoriels. L'obligation de représenter les intérêts et les points de vue des gouvernés implique la nécessité d'une communication latérale libre dans la société considérée, afin que les intérêts et les points de vue puissent être exprimés et atteindre ainsi un certain degré de réalité publique. Elle implique aussi la nécessité d'une communication verticale efficace entre le peuple et ses représentants.

Il résulte de ces considérations que dans un régime représentatif efficace, les conditions ci-dessous se trouvent remplies :

- I) il existe une assemblée représentative dont les membres sont choisis librement par un procédé électoral dont n'est exclue aucune partie importante de la communauté;
- II) il existe entre les membres de la communauté des communications libres permettant l'expression de leurs intérêts et de leurs opinions;
- III) il existe un système de communications efficace entre les membres de la communauté et leurs représentants;

IV) les représentants estiment qu'ils ont le devoir d'agir dans l'intérêt de leurs mandants et tenir compte de leurs opinions;

V) l'assemblée représentative joue un rôle central dans le processus d'élaboration des règles et des décisions.

#### Fonctionnement satisfaisant.

Le concept de fonctionnement satisfaisant implique qu'un régime représentatif s'acquitte de ses fonctions gouvernementales tout en conservant son caractère représentatif. Les fonctions gouvernementales comprennent a) la protection de la sécurité de la communauté; b) le maintien de l'ordre et le respect du droit; c) la prise de décisions efficaces pour régler les autres problèmes auxquels la communauté doit faire face. Un régime représentatif qui s'acquitte de ces fonctions peut être considéré comme remplissant les conditions minimum du fonctionnement efficace.

A l'inverse, nous dirons d'un régime représentatif qu'il ne fonctionne pas de façon efficace dans l'un quelconque des cas énumérés ci-dessous :

I) lorsqu'il ne peut protéger la sécurité de la communauté (par exemple : Vietnam Sud);

II) lorsqu'il n'assure pas l'ordre et le respect du droit (par exemple : l'ex-Congo belge);

III) lorsqu'il ne réussit pas à prendre des décisions efficaces au sujet de problèmes cruciaux (par exemple : la IVe République à propos de l'Algérie);

IV) lorsque son régime électoral est sujet à des restrictions ou des distorsions telles que des secteurs importants de la communauté se considèrent comme non représentés ou comme sous représentés (par exemple: la Rhodésie);

V) lorsque les communications libres entre les membres de la communauté sont sujettes à des limitations graves d'ordre divers : censure, action de la police, obstacles sociaux;

VI) lorsque les représentants se coupent de ceux qu'ils sont censés représenter, ou agissent de façon corrompue dans leur propre intérêt, aux dépens de l'intérêt public;

VII) lorsque l'assemblée représentative cesse de jouer un rôle central, soit parce que le pouvoir se trouve concentré dans les mains d'un dirigeant ou d'un petit nombre de dirigeants (le Ghana sous N'Krumah), soit parce que l'assemblée ne sert qu'à ratifier des décisions prises dans des institutions autonomes ou non représentatives.

Lorsque les conditions minimales de fonctionnement satisfaisant se trouvent remplies, on peut chercher à apprécier le degré de succès. Cela implique des jugements fondés sur des valeurs politiques, mais peut-être deux critères sont-ils acceptables pour un grand nombre :

a) le système représentatif doit servir de filtre aux demandes et aux opinions, de façon à modérer et à combiner en un petit nombre de solutions alternatives, au sujet desquelles un débat puisse se tenir de façon significative, un grand nombre de points de vue différents;

b) le système représentatif doit fonctionner comme un organisme de recrutement, de sélection et de formation des hommes politiques, afin que les dirigeants qui se retirent ou qui deviennent impopulaires puissent être remplacés sans violence par des hommes politiques ayant fait leur carrière dans le système représentatif, et familiarisés avec son fonctionnement.

#### Conditions nécessaires au fonctionnement satisfaisant.

Un grand nombre des conditions nécessaires au succès sont inhérentes au système lui-même. Les électeurs, les cadres des partis et les hommes politiques doivent comprendre les conventions sur lesquelles repose le système pour que leur participation soit efficace. Il doit y avoir un langage commun des débats politiques, ainsi qu'un accord concernant la voie de communication adéquate à chaque type de problème. Il doit y avoir une participation étendue à la vie politique, non

seulement par des votes occasionnels, mais aussi par la participation aux activités des partis politiques et des groupes de pression.

Si de telles conditions sont nécessaires au fonctionnement du système, d'autres conditions peuvent être nécessaires pour qu'il soit reconnu comme légitime, et conserver cette reconnaissance. Dans les Etats nouveaux, il est particulièrement difficile à un système représentatif d'instaurer une tradition de légitimité : les représentants peuvent n'être pas reconnus comme tels par ceux de leurs électeurs qui ont voté contre eux; les liens entre électeurs et représentants peuvent être très fragiles; sauf s'il s'agit de liens d'affiliation tribale ou raciale; dans ce cas, le système représentatif peut échouer à mettre fin aux conflits tribaux et raciaux; toute sorte de facteurs peuvent paraître plus importants que les mécanismes constitutionnels dans le jugement que les citoyens portent sur leur régime.

Dans les Etats établis plus anciennement, un régime jugé légitime peut perdre la reconnaissance de sa légitimité si des groupes importants estiment qu'un parti disposant d'une majorité temporaire profite de sa présence au pouvoir pour changer à son avantage les règles du jeu. Toute mesure tendant à restreindre la liberté d'expression ou à gêner les activités des partis d'opposition susciterait naturellement de tels soupçons; il en serait de même d'une immixtion dans l'activité de la justice, ou d'une décision tendant à changer le système électoral. Dans certains pays, des cours constitutionnelles ont le pouvoir d'invalider de telles mesures, et aux Etats-Unis les arrêts récents de la Cour Suprême imposant le redécoupage des circonscriptions électorales ("reapportionment")<sup>(4)</sup> montrent comment un tribunal peut jouer un rôle constructif en insistant pour que des institutions représentatives se conforment à certains critères généralement acceptés. Un des sujets de discussion au Congrès sera le rôle que les cours constitutionnelles - qui ne sont pas des institutions représentatives - peuvent jouer pour défendre le régime représentatif, et la façon selon laquelle ce rôle est perçu par les citoyens.

### III. Représentation fonctionnelle.

Du point de vue de la théorie démocratique, le citoyen est en premier lieu un électeur ayant des opinions d'ordre général au sujet des problèmes de la vie politique, et rangeant les partis par ordre de préférence. Dans une autre optique, le citoyen est moins un individu qu'un faisceau d'intérêts, ayant des opinions au sujet des problèmes affectant ses intérêts. Il est patent qu'un grand nombre d'individus défendent leurs divers intérêts plus activement qu'ils ne jouent leur rôle d'électeurs. La politique gouvernementale en matière agricole ou au sujet de l'industrie sidérurgique affecte tous les citoyens, mais elle affecte directement les agriculteurs et les ouvriers de la sidérurgie; il est donc naturel que ceux-ci veuillent que leurs intérêts soient représentés directement. Les besoins de représentation des intérêts et des opinions sectoriels se sont accrus au fur et à mesure que s'accroissait l'intervention des pouvoirs publics dans les affaires économiques et sociales.

Dans les premières décennies de ce siècle, divers auteurs et hommes politiques, comprenant qu'une assemblée représentative générale ne pouvait s'acquitter de cette fonction, ont présenté des suggestions allant de l'institution du contrôle ouvrier sur l'industrie à la création d'un parlement économique. Ces suggestions sont généralement restées lettre morte. Nous avons assisté par contre à la montée progressive d'un ensemble complexe de procédures permettant au gouvernement de consulter les représentants des divers groupes et intérêts. Certains groupes organisés ont obtenu le droit d'être consultés; d'autres ont été institués par les autorités afin qu'ils puissent être consultés, et il existe une variété étonnante d'institutions comprenant à la fois des membres représentant des intérêts extérieurs et des membres représentant les pouvoirs publics.

Dans ce domaine, les représentants appartiennent à plus d'une catégorie. Le représentant d'un syndicat ou d'une association profes-

sionnelle négociant avec un ministère agit essentiellement comme un agent défendant les intérêts de son mandant, même si ses prétentions sont limitées par les vues qui prévalent au sujet de l'intérêt général. Le représentant d'une industrie ou d'un groupe qui siège dans un organisme officiel doit en principe agir dans l'intérêt général, même si ses relations personnelles et ses connaissances le rendent particulièrement sensible à la position du groupe qu'il représente. Nous trouvons ici la distinction entre pression sur les pouvoirs publics, constatée dans tous les pays, et représentation fonctionnelle, instituée dans un nombre croissant de pays, mais selon des modalités très différentes.

Divers problèmes méritent discussion, qui concernent la représentation fonctionnelle : 1) Quels intérêts demandent à être représentés dans les organismes officiels ? qui décide de la validité de ces revendications ? selon quels critères ? 2) Comment les représentants sont-ils choisis et nommés ? 3) Quelle relation existe entre le représentant et son "électorat" ? Le conflit traditionnel entre mandat libre et mandat impératif peut se présenter dans un contexte nouveau. 4) Quelles sont les relations, officielles et officieuses, entre les représentants fonctionnels et les représentants territoriaux ? Toutes ces questions, et bien d'autres encore, devraient être abordées au Congrès.

NOTES

1. R.W. and A.J. Carlyle, A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West.- (Edinburgh, 1928), vol.III, pp. 154-155.
2. Cf. M. Sobolewski, "Electors and Representatives : A Contribution to the Theory of Representation" (rapport ronéographié, PSA, 1966).
3. Pour une analyse de la théorie selon laquelle la composition du Parlement et d'autres organismes devrait refléter les caractéristiques de la nation, cf. A.H. Birch, Representative and responsible government.- (London, 1964), chap. 3 et 17.
4. Cf. Baker v Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) et Reynolds v Sims 377 U.S. 533 (1964).



"Théorie et pratique de la représentation"

LES INSTITUTIONS REPRESENTATIVES  
DANS LES PAYS SOCIALISTES

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Les institutions représentatives  
dans les pays socialistes

par M.A. Krutogolov

I. Thèses générales

1. Dans les pays socialistes, la période contemporaine se caractérise par le développement ultérieur de la démocratie socialiste, par la multiplicité des formes qui assurent la participation de plus en plus large des masses laborieuses à la direction des affaires de l'Etat et de la société. La ligne directrice du développement de l'Etat socialiste est l'élargissement global et le perfectionnement de la démocratie socialiste, en vue desquels on cherche à faire participer des masses laborieuses de plus en plus larges à la direction de l'Etat, à l'édification économique et culturelle, à l'amélioration du travail de l'appareil d'Etat et au renforcement du contrôle populaire sur son activité. Dans ce développement des pays socialistes, un rôle important est joué par les organes représentatifs, qui sont une organisation universelle du peuple tout entier et incarnent son unité. Les organes représentatifs sont les mieux placés pour faire participer les masses à la direction des affaires de l'Etat et de la société.

Il est notoire que le pouvoir d'Etat appartient dans les pays socialistes aux travailleurs, source unique de ce pouvoir. De ce fait émanent les principes de l'unité du pouvoir d'Etat et du pouvoir souverain des organes représentatifs, proclamés par les constitutions. "Tout le pouvoir appartient en URSS aux travailleurs des villes et des campagnes représentés par les Soviets des députés des travailleurs", stipule l'art. 3 de la Constitution de l'URSS. Le pouvoir d'Etat est assuré en Bulgarie "par des organes représentatifs librement élus et par le référendum", proclame la Constitution de la R.P.B. (art. 2). La réalisation du pouvoir des travailleurs par les organes représentatifs directement

élus est prévue par les Constitutions de la Tchécoslovaquie (art. 2), de la Pologne (art. 2) et d'autres pays de démocratie populaire.

Les constitutions socialistes ne se basent pas sur la "séparation des pouvoirs", mais supposent au contraire l'unité du pouvoir d'Etat qui, sans exclure le partage des compétences entre les différents organes d'Etat, exige le cumul des prérogatives les plus importantes de l'Etat entre les mains des organes de la représentation populaire, auxquels sont subordonnées l'administration ainsi que la justice. Les organes de la représentation du peuple constituent directement ou indirectement tous les autres organes d'Etat, et ces derniers leur rendent compte et sont responsables devant la représentation populaire.

Le rôle dirigeant des organes représentatifs dans le mécanisme d'Etat assure la collégialité de la direction, caractéristique des pays socialistes, et cette collégialité exprime la souveraineté du peuple, car les affaires d'Etat les plus importantes sont réglées par les représentants politiques élus par le peuple. Les organes représentatifs des pays socialistes possèdent tous les pouvoirs, cumulent les fonctions législative et exécutive. Ils peuvent non seulement influencer très sérieusement l'activité pratique de l'exécutif, mais y participer directement. Le cumul des activités des fonctions législative et exécutive est un des principes d'évolution des organes représentatifs du pouvoir socialiste en tant que "corporations actives". Nous voyons là une des voies les plus importantes du perfectionnement de la démocratie socialiste.

Les organes représentatifs des pays socialistes sont liés au peuple et reflètent sa volonté politique dans l'ensemble de leur activité. Ils ne créent pas, dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, une quelconque volonté nouvelle, autre que la volonté du peuple. Les organes représentatifs transforment en volonté d'Etat la volonté de ceux dont ils sont les représentants. De là

découlent leur subordination et leur dépendance à l'égard des représentés. La représentation du peuple apparaît ainsi comme une forme de l'expression de la souveraineté du peuple, et la souveraineté du peuple comme la source de la représentation populaire.

C'est dans cette direction qu'évoluent les institutions représentatives dans les pays socialistes. Leur rôle dans la vie étatique s'élève, et cela correspond pleinement au caractère des organes représentatifs, qui sont d'une part les organes d'Etat, formant sa base politique, et d'autre part les organes d'autogestion du peuple.

2. Les organes représentatifs ne sont pas seulement la base de toute organisation étatique dans les pays socialistes. Leur trait caractéristique est qu'ils sont en même temps les organes de l'autogestion populaire, institutions largement représentatives. Ces Assemblées ou Conseils sont élus directement par le peuple, ils sont formés de ses meilleurs représentants. Dans l'ensemble de leur activité, ils suivent les mandats des électeurs. Ils agissent sous le contrôle du peuple et lui rendent compte de leur activité. Les députés participent activement à l'édification du socialisme. Ils ne sont pas professionnels et cumulent leurs activités de député, donc la participation à la direction de l'Etat, avec leur métier habituel.

Les organes représentatifs sont aussi des organisations sociales qui unissent les masses les plus larges de la population et qui possèdent la plus grande autorité. Celles-ci unissent toute la population, tous les travailleurs des villes et des villages, toutes les nationalités. Il s'agit donc d'un cumul original des principes étatique et social. Les Conseils et les Assemblées des pays socialistes sont des organes populaires de pouvoir. Les principes fondamentaux de leur formation

et de leur activité, qui caractérisent leur essence démocratique, sont : la participation permanente et décisive des masses à leur activité, la publicité de leur activité, la collégialité de la direction, le centralisme démocratique, l'égalité des nationalités, la légalité socialiste.

Les organes représentatifs se sont révélés l'institution la mieux placée pour accomplir la tâche d'apprendre aux masses à diriger l'Etat et à organiser la production socialiste à l'échelon national. Et dans les conditions contemporaines, les organes représentatifs jouent pour des millions de citoyens le rôle d'une école de la direction étatique. Ils organisent et contribuent à développer l'énergie créatrice du peuple dans son élan vers l'édification du communisme.

C'est pourquoi il est tout à fait naturel que s'accroisse le rôle des organes représentatifs, ainsi que de leurs membres, dans les nouvelles conditions d'édification du communisme, quand le rôle de l'initiative et de la création des masses ne cesse de croître. Et les partis communistes et ouvriers des pays socialistes ont pris ces dernières années plusieurs mesures importantes destinées à augmenter l'autorité, à accroître le rôle et à améliorer l'activité des organes de la représentation populaire.

3. L'initiative des masses populaires dans la direction de l'Etat, leur volonté, exprimée directement lors de l'élaboration et de la prise de décisions étatiques, ainsi que leur participation directe à la réalisation de ces décisions et à l'exécution du contrôle populaire, ont pris une grande ampleur dans le processus de développement de la démocratie socialiste. Cette démocratie directe se développe de pair avec la démocratie représentative. Ces deux formes de démocratie sont les mêmes d'après leur essence sociale. Et Lénine parlait de la supériorité du système qui permet de cumuler les avantages du parlementarisme avec les avantages de la démocratie directe (Oeuvres complètes, Vol. 34, pp. 304-305).

On sait qu'à une démocratie représentative où les pouvoirs législatif et exécutif sont assurés par les représentants du peuple, sont propres un centralisme démocratique, une organisation bien établie. Mais cette forme de démocratie peut avoir ses insuffisances et, si le contrôle effectif des masses sur le travail des organes représentatifs et leur appareil exécutif n'est pas assuré, des éléments de bureaucratisme, de formalisme peuvent s'y manifester. La démocratie directe ouvre à tous les membres de la société des possibilités de travail actif. Mais on ne peut pas créer une organisation centralisée de la société, nécessaire à la production à grande échelle et que requièrent le socialisme et le communisme, en se basant uniquement sur la démocratie directe. C'est pourquoi dans les pays socialistes on cherche à exploiter les avantages de la démocratie représentative, ainsi que de la démocratie directe, à cumuler rationnellement ces deux formes.

4. Dans le système des organes des Etats socialistes, les organes suprêmes du pouvoir d'Etat, les institutions représentatives supérieures (Soviet Suprême, Assemblées populaires ou nationales), occupent une place toute particulière. En tant que porteurs directs de la souveraineté du peuple et de l'Etat, elles expriment la volonté des travailleurs, classe ouvrière en tête. Ces institutions détiennent la plénitude du pouvoir d'Etat. Elles établissent les principes de la politique intérieure et extérieure, déterminent les lignes directrices de l'édification économique et culturelle, règlent les problèmes les plus importants de la vie de chaque pays. Ces principes et ces lignes déterminent à leur tour l'activité de tous les autres organes d'Etat.

Les organes représentatifs supérieurs assurent la haute direction de l'Etat et le contrôle supérieur. Ils se trouvent en

tête de tout le système des organes d'Etat. Ils votent les actes normatifs qui forment la base juridique des actes de tous les autres organes d'Etat.

5. Les organes locaux du pouvoir d'Etat sont, dans les pays socialistes, une partie intégrante d'un système uni des organes représentatifs, formé selon le principe du centralisme démocratique, ce qui est un de ses traits caractéristiques. Le droit des pays socialistes ne reconnaît donc pas la division formelle des organes d'Etat en organes centraux et organes municipaux.

Les organes locaux du pouvoir d'Etat sont les organes les plus nombreux et les plus proches des masses. Ils sont liés à la population, connaissent ses besoins et ses aspirations, ses particularités locales. Un nombre important de députés (plus de deux millions en URSS par exemple) y sont élus. Ces députés représentent toutes les couches de la population, ils travaillent ensemble avec la masse des militants - ouvriers, paysans, intellectuels. Dans leur activité, les organes locaux du pouvoir d'Etat s'appuient sur les organisations sociales de masse, sur les fronts populaires, sur les organisations coopératives, etc. C'est pourquoi les organes représentatifs locaux sont en même temps les organes démocratiques de l'autogestion du peuple.

Dans les pays socialistes, l'organisation et le système des organes locaux du pouvoir d'Etat sont régis par le droit constitutionnel et non par le droit administratif. Il faut noter en même temps que dans les pays socialistes, les organes représentatifs locaux peuvent discuter même de questions qui sortent de leur compétence, y compris de problèmes de politique générale. Dans ce cas, ils envoient leurs suggestions à l'organe représentatif supérieur.

6. Les organes représentatifs socialistes assurent la direction politique ainsi qu'économique. Dans les conditions de la démocratie socialiste, le peuple, directement ou par ses représentants, dispose pour satisfaire les besoins croissants de la société des biens sociaux lui appartenant. L'Etat socialiste, avec l'aide des masses populaires, dirige les fonds de la propriété étatique, contribue par toute sorte de mesures au développement de la propriété coopérative, planifie le développement de l'économie nationale. Ainsi pour la première fois dans l'histoire, le peuple a reçu la vraie souveraineté. Et les constitutions de tous les pays socialistes proclament l'appartenance aux travailleurs de toute la plénitude du pouvoir d'Etat et de la propriété des moyens de production.

La propriété collective des moyens de production non seulement crée les conditions nécessaires à la réalisation de la souveraineté du peuple, mais rend cette souveraineté nécessaire pour l'économie. La gestion de la propriété socialiste est impossible, en effet, sans la participation des masses les plus larges, vivement intéressées par le progrès de l'économie nationale, auquel est liée à son tour l'augmentation du bien-être de la société tout entière.

Ainsi les réformes économiques en cours dans plusieurs pays socialistes ont pour but non seulement une meilleure utilisation des leviers économiques pour l'essor ultérieur de l'économie nationale, mais aussi un renforcement des institutions démocratiques : accroissement du rôle des organes représentatifs et élargissement de la participation des organisations sociales et des collectivités de travailleurs à l'édification économique.

Le rôle décisif des organes représentatifs dans la direction de l'économie découle du fait que l'économie socialiste est basée sur la propriété collective. En cumulant les pouvoirs



politique et économique, ils ont la faculté de diriger les processus économiques et sociaux. Dans les pays socialistes, les organes représentatifs gèrent la propriété d'Etat, ont à leur disposition la terre, les eaux et les forêts, les usines, les fabriques et les mines, les moyens de transport et les télécommunications, les entreprises agricoles d'Etat et la plus grande partie des logements urbains. Ils ont en même temps tous les moyens nécessaires pour influencer l'activité des entreprises économiques qui se trouvent être la propriété des coopératives agricoles et d'autres associations de travailleurs.

Dans les premières années de l'existence de l'Etat soviétique, Lénine a écrit que "les soviets doivent devenir les organes qui règlent toute la production de la Russie...." (Oeuvres complètes, Vol. 35, p.148). Cette idée de Lénine se trouve actuellement à la base de l'organisation de la direction économique des pays socialistes.

Les organes représentatifs votent les plans de développement de l'économie nationale, les budgets nationaux et locaux, et entendent les comptes rendus de leur exécution. Les parlements et les conseils locaux organisent eux-mêmes la réalisation des plans, cherchent à mettre en action de nouvelles ressources de l'économie socialiste, à assurer le progrès technique et à utiliser efficacement les découvertes scientifiques. Ils veillent à créer le plus rapidement possible la base matérielle et technique, à augmenter le patrimoine national, à élever le niveau matériel et culturel de leur peuple, à renforcer la défense de leur pays.

Cette activité des organes représentatifs est étroitement liée à la direction de la culture. Ces organes dirigent les écoles, les clubs et les maisons de la culture, les théâtres, cinémas, etc. L'Etat socialiste dispose d'une grande quantité d'universités, instituts et écoles. Ce sont les organes représentatifs qui planifient le développement de ces institutions d'études et de recherches et qui votent leur budget.

## II. Les organes du pouvoir d'Etat des pays socialistes en tant que représentants du peuple

Un des traits particuliers des organes représentatifs socialistes est leur caractère populaire. Cela se manifeste dans leur mode de formation - élections auxquelles participent les masses les plus larges de la population -, et dans le fait que les organes représentatifs des pays socialistes incarnent la concentration de toutes les forces politiques du peuple, dirigé par la classe ouvrière : ils représentent la population de chaque pays et expriment sa volonté.

Les principes du droit électoral. Les constitutions et les lois électorales des pays socialistes proclament le principe du suffrage universel, établissant que tous les citoyens et citoyennes sont électeurs et éligibles aux organes représentatifs du pouvoir d'Etat. Le droit constitutionnel des pays socialistes ne connaît aucun cens électoral, limitant les droits électoraux des citoyens. Dans la plupart de ces pays, seuls les aliénés et les individus privés de leur droit de vote par le verdict d'un tribunal (en URSS, cette dernière restriction n'existe pas actuellement) ne peuvent prendre part au scrutin. Dans les pays de démocratie populaire, il n'existe pas de restriction du droit électoral pour des raisons sociales; en cela, ce droit diffère du droit électoral soviétique initial, qui privait du droit de vote les éléments exploités. Cette différence est naturelle, et s'explique par les nouvelles conditions historiques.

L'application du principe du suffrage universel ne cesse de s'élargir. En Pologne, en Tchécoslovaquie et dans d'autres pays, la limite d'âge a été abaissée de 21 ans (en Hongrie, de 20 ans), à 18 ans. Actuellement, dans les pays

socialistes, tous les citoyens et citoyennes ayant 18 ans révolus ont le droit de vote. Quant à l'éligibilité, on l'obtient à 18 ans en Bulgarie, en Hongrie et en Yougoslavie, à 21 ans en Pologne (18 ans pour les élections aux conseils populaires), en Tchécoslovaquie et en R.D.A., à 23 ans en Roumanie. En URSS, on a le droit d'être élu à un soviet local à 18 ans, au Soviet Suprême d'une République Fédérée à 21 ans, et au Soviet Suprême de l'URSS à 23 ans; ainsi, les couches les plus larges de la population jouissent des droits électoraux.

L'égalité du suffrage s'exprime dans les pays socialistes en particulier par le fait que les circonscriptions électorales sont égales dans tout le pays, et que des groupes égaux de la population élisent le même nombre de députés. Les pays socialistes ignorent le "découpage électoral" ou la "géométrie électorale", et "le poids" de la voix d'un électeur est le même dans la capitale qu'en province. Ainsi, les circonscriptions pour l'élection au Conseil de l'Union du Soviet Suprême de l'URSS comptent chacune 300.000 habitants, et pour l'élection à l'Assemblée Nationale de la Bulgarie, 25.000 habitants. Ces chiffres sont fixés dans les Constitutions, et les gouvernements ne peuvent les modifier.

Les organes représentatifs du pouvoir d'Etat sont élus dans la plupart des pays socialistes au suffrage direct. Cela facilite la liaison et les contacts directs entre les électeurs et leurs députés, le contrôle des électeurs sur leurs députés, et augmente la responsabilité de ces derniers.

Le vote est secret, la législation le garantit par l'établissement d'isoloirs, et en sanctionnant sévèrement toute violation.

Présentation des candidatures : les constitutions et la législation des pays socialistes assurent le droit de présenter les candidats aux partis politiques et organisations sociales, ainsi qu'aux assemblées de travailleurs.

En URSS, le P.C.U.S. se présente aux élections en union avec les sans-parti. Dans les pays de démocratie populaire, les partis communistes et ouvriers se présentent aux élections en union avec les Fronts Populaires (Nationaux). On présente les candidats, ou les listes d'union au nom des différents partis et organisations. Lors de cette présentation, on tient compte du nombre des adhérents du parti ou de l'organisation, et de son influence dans la vie politique du pays. Toutes les organisations qui ont présenté leurs candidats, ainsi que tous les citoyens, ont le droit de faire de la propagande pour leurs candidats, à des meetings ou réunions, par la presse, la radio, etc.

Dans la plupart des pays socialistes, le scrutin est uninominal, quoique dans certains pays (Pologne, R.D.A.), il soit plurinominal. Le nombre des candidats peut être plus grand que celui des sièges; tel est le cas en particulier en Pologne, en R.D.A., en Hongrie et en Yougoslavie.

En URSS, la législation ne limite pas le nombre des candidats. Les différentes organisations et assemblées présentent d'habitude un ou plusieurs candidats pour chaque siège. Mais les organisations du Parti, de la Jeunesse Communiste, des syndicats, etc., se présentent aux élections non comme rivaux, mais en union. Après la présentation des candidats par les assemblées des différentes organisations de travailleurs, se réunissent les assemblées générales de la circonscription électorale. C'est notamment ici qu'on se trouve d'accord pour un candidat d'union de toutes les organisations sociales de la circonscription. A l'assemblée de circonscription sont représentées toutes les organisations ayant présenté des candidats, ainsi que d'autres, celles par exemple qui se sont bornées à discuter des candidatures déjà présentées. Tous les candidats et toutes les organisations sont ainsi représentés à l'assemblée

de la circonscription électorale. L'assemblée choisit par un vote le meilleur des candidats, et le recommande pour être porté sur les bulletins de vote le jour des élections. La pratique connaît des cas où certains candidats ont eux-mêmes retiré leur candidature au profit d'autres candidats, ce qui témoigne de l'unité politique et morale des Soviétiques.

Ce système de la présentation et de la discussion des candidatures conduit à ce qu'en règle générale les électeurs élisent les candidats d'union des communistes et des sans-parti. La non-élection est très rare. Il existe cependant des cas où les électeurs corrigent par leur vote les fautes commises lors de la présentation des candidatures. Ainsi, aux élections de mars 1967, n'ont pas obtenu la majorité absolue, et n'ont donc pas été élus, 119 candidats aux soviets des villages, 5 aux soviets des bourgs, 3 aux soviets des villes, 2 aux soviets des arrondissements.

Le système décrit ne conduit pas du tout à ce que tous les députés en URSS soient communistes, comme l'affirment parfois des observateurs mal informés. Près de 25 % des députés au parlement fédéral, par exemple, sont des sans-parti. Et ce chiffre atteint 53,88 % dans les soviets locaux.

Dans les pays socialistes, le peuple non seulement vote pour choisir ses candidats, mais aussi organise et dirige les élections. Par exemple, aux élections de mars 1967 en URSS, on a formé 2.226.090 commissions électorales, dont faisaient partie 9.049.189 personnes (parmi lesquelles 68,1 % de sans-parti).

Pendant la campagne électorale, on entend les comptes rendus des députés sortants, on organise des rencontres entre les candidats et les électeurs dans des assemblées et réunions. Dans la presse, à la radio et au cours de meetings, on discute des problèmes importants de politique intérieure et extérieure,

on critique les insuffisances dans le travail des organes d'Etat, on avance des initiatives et suggestions destinées à améliorer les conditions de travail, on précise les buts à atteindre. Les élections permettent donc non seulement la formation des organes représentatifs, mais en même temps l'évaluation du travail des députés sortants et des organes représentatifs dont ils faisaient partie, ainsi que l'établissement de leur programme pour l'avenir. Les électeurs donnent aux candidats un mandat impératif leur imposant des tâches concrètes.

Le jour du vote, dans les pays socialistes, la majorité écrasante des électeurs participent aux élections, l'absentéisme y étant inconnu, et donnent leur voix aux candidats de l'union des communistes avec les sans-parti ou Fronts Populaires. Il est intéressant de noter que le nombre des électeurs augmente sans cesse. Ainsi en URSS en 1917, seuls 37 millions de citoyens avaient été électeurs; en 1937, plus de 90 millions; en 1962, près de 140 millions; et en 1966, 145 millions. Non moins éloquents sont les chiffres sur la participation au vote. En 1926, aux élections aux soviets des villes et des villages, ont pris part 50,8 % des électeurs; en 1929, 63,5 %; en 1931, 72,1 %; en 1934, 85 %. A partir de 1939, ont participé plus de 99 % des électeurs. Ainsi pratiquement toute la population adulte participe aux élections.

Un autre principe important du système électoral des pays socialistes est la liaison étroite entre les députés - membres des organes représentatifs (suprêmes ou locaux), et leurs électeurs, ainsi que le droit de révocation des députés. Dans les pays socialistes, les députés ne sont pas indépendants vis-à-vis de leurs électeurs, ils sont au contraire responsables pendant toute la durée de leur mandat. Et cette responsabilité - le mandat impératif - est une des manifestations de la démocratie socialiste et une des conditions de la souveraineté des travailleurs. Les députés sont obligés de rendre compte périodiquement

de leur activité personnelle, ainsi que de l'activité de l'organe représentatif dont ils font partie. Cela permet d'établir le contrôle permanent des masses sur le travail des organes représentatifs. La pratique connaît des formes différentes de contrôle, dont les particularités sont exposées dans les différents rapports nationaux.

La révocation des députés. Les constitutions des pays socialistes proclament que les députés des organes représentatifs peuvent être révoqués par le vote de leurs électeurs avant l'expiration normale de leur mandat, s'ils ne justifient pas la confiance du peuple et n'assument pas leurs obligations. Les modalités de la révocation, qui intervient sous des formes différentes, sont fixées par les lois.

En Pologne, on révoque le député par un vote secret, organisé selon les mêmes modalités que l'élection. En Tchécoslovaquie et en Hongrie, la révocation a lieu par vote public, en assemblée des électeurs. La Bulgarie et la R.D.A. ont établi une procédure par laquelle l'initiative de la révocation revient aux électeurs, mais la révocation elle-même est décidée par l'organe représentatif dont fait partie l'intéressé.

En URSS, la loi du 30 octobre 1959 a concrétisé le droit de révocation des députés, proclamé par l'article 142 de la Constitution. Elle a fixé les motifs de révocation :

- 1) lorsque le député n'assume pas ses obligations;
- 2) lorsque le député a commis des actes incompatibles avec ses hautes fonctions.

L'initiative de la révocation appartient aux organisations sociales et assemblées de travailleurs qui peuvent, d'après la loi, présenter les candidats.

La révocation est décidée par les électeurs de la circonscription, réunis en assemblées d'usines, de fabriques, de kolkhoz, etc. Le vote est public. Toutes les organisations ainsi que tous les électeurs peuvent mener campagne pour ou

contre la révocation. La discussion politique permet dans ce cas de blâmer la personne qui a commis des actes indignes, et en même temps d'exercer une action éducative, morale et préventive.

La loi sur la révocation prévoit en même temps des garanties pour les députés, qui empêchent une révocation abusive. Un des ces garanties consiste en l'obligation pour les organisations sociales ayant pris l'initiative de la révocation, de communiquer au député intéressé les motifs de leur initiative, et dans le droit, pour celui-ci, de présenter des explications orales ou écrites sur les circonstances ayant provoqué la demande de révocation.

Les dispositions de la loi de 1959 ne sont pas restées lettre morte. Les électeurs soviétiques les utilisent comme un puissant moyen de contrôle sur leur député et, le cas échéant, n'hésitent pas à le révoquer. Dix députés ont été révoqués du Soviet Suprême de l'URSS pendant les Ve et VIe législature. On révoque également les députés des autres soviets; ainsi, en 1965, 350 députés ont perdu leur mandat dans différents organes représentatifs. Il faut tout de même noter que les cas de révocation sont exceptionnels, car en règle générale, les députés se montrent dignes de la confiance de leurs électeurs.

Le système électoral des pays socialistes prévoit le renouvellement systématique de tous les dirigeants, de tous les membres des organes du pouvoir d'Etat. La représentation du peuple dans les organes élus s'élargit de plus en plus avec le développement des principes démocratiques de la direction de l'Etat. Cela permet d'améliorer le travail des organes représentatifs et de faire passer par cette "école de la direction de l'Etat" de nouveaux milliers et millions de travailleurs. Ainsi, en URSS, à chaque élection aux Soviets, on doit renouveler au moins un tiers des députés. En pratique, ce chiffre est dépassé; par exemple, en 1966, les deux chambres du parlement fédéral ont été renouvelées comme suit : le Conseil de l'Union à 65 %



(482 députés sur 767 ont été élus pour la première fois), et le Conseil des Nationalités à 70 % (533 députés sur 750, élus pour la première fois). Le renouvellement systématique se pratique également dans les autres pays socialistes.

Les pays socialistes cherchent à assurer la représentation la plus complète de toutes les couches de la population, de toutes les nationalités et de tous les groupes, dans les organes du pouvoir d'Etat. C'est pourquoi le nombre des députés (surtout dans les organes locaux) augmente. Les députés des organes représentatifs forment la partie avancée et la plus active du peuple. Issus de toutes les couches de la population, ils reflètent fidèlement le corps électoral.

Les données suivantes caractérisent, par exemple, les organes représentatifs de l'URSS : au Soviet Suprême de l'URSS, élu en juin 1966, 46 % des députés sont des ouvriers et des paysans travaillant comme tels, 28 % des députés sont des femmes. Aux élections de mars 1967 aux soviets locaux, on a élu 2.045.277 députés. Parmi eux, 42,8 % sont des femmes; 29,6 % sont des ouvriers; 31,2 % sont des paysans. Au Soviet Suprême de l'URSS, on compte des députés de 57 nationalités; aux soviets locaux sont représentés plus de cent nationalités et peuples de cet immense pays.

En Pologne, dans les organes représentatifs élus en 1965, 57 % des députés sont des ouvriers et des paysans; 46,8 % des députés sont membres du Parti Ouvrier Unifié; 21,6 % sont membres du Parti Paysan Unifié; 2,5 % sont membres du Parti Démocrate et 29,1 % sont des sans-parti. L'Assemblée Nationale de Tchécoslovaquie compte 157 membres du parti communiste tchèque, 65 du parti communiste slovaque, 20 du parti socialiste, 20 du Front Populaire, 6 du parti de la renaissance slovaque, 4 du parti de la liberté, 28 indépendants.

Représentation spéciale des nationalités. Outre la représentation sociale, la représentation de nationalités différentes et la réalisation de leur égalité juridique et pratique, acquièrent dans certains pays socialistes une importance particulière. A cette idée est liée notamment l'existence dans les organes représentatifs suprêmes de deux pays socialistes - URSS et Yougoslavie - de chambres des nationalités, et en Tchécoslovaquie et en Roumanie d'organes représentatifs nationaux des Slovaques et des Hongrois.

La structure bicamérale du parlement fédéral soviétique reflète le contenu et le caractère de l'activité de cet organe suprême du pouvoir de l'Etat multinational soviétique. Une chambre du Soviet Suprême de l'URSS, le Conseil de l'Union, représente les intérêts communs de tous les travailleurs du pays, indépendamment de leur nationalité. L'autre chambre, le Conseil des Nationalités, représente les intérêts spécifiques liés aux particularismes nationaux des peuples différents et de leurs Etats nationaux. Le bicaméralisme du parlement soviétique est l'expression naturelle du démocratisme socialiste, de l'unité politique et sociale de la société soviétique, de l'égalité et de l'amitié fraternelle de tous les peuples de l'URSS.

Le Conseil de l'Union est élu par tous les citoyens de l'URSS, chaque circonscription électorale comptant 300.000 habitants. Mais le même système appliqué aux élections du Conseil des Nationalités, y amènerait une majorité écrasante de députés du très nombreux peuple russe, du peuple ukrainien, etc., alors que les peuples relativement peu nombreux, par exemple d'Estonie ou de Moldavie, seraient représentés par quelques députés seulement. Pour assurer une véritable égalité des peuples, égalité avant tout politique, on a prévu que le Conseil des Nationalités serait élu de la façon suivante : chaque République Fédérée y élit 32 députés (ce chiffre résulte

de l'augmentation de la représentation des républiques fédérées, décrétée en mars 1966), chaque république autonome en élit 11, chaque région autonome 5, et enfin chaque arrondissement national 1. Le nombre des mandats est donc établi indépendamment de la population. Les deux chambres du parlement fédéral sont absolument égales dans toutes leurs prérogatives, et aucune ne peut directement ou indirectement imposer sa volonté à l'autre.

Une chambre spéciale des nationalités existe également dans le parlement fédéral yougoslave. D'après la Constitution (art. 165), les députés à la chambre fédérale (une des six chambres du Parlement), élus par les parlements des républiques fédérées et des régions autonomes, forment la Chambre des Nationalités. Cette Chambre a des prérogatives spéciales dans le domaine de la défense de l'égalité des peuples de la Yougoslavie et des droits des républiques. La Chambre des Nationalités siège obligatoirement en cas de révision constitutionnelle. Elle peut se réunir aussi chaque fois que la chambre fédérale discute un texte intéressant les républiques fédérées. La Constitution prévoit aussi sa convocation à la suite d'une demande de dix de ses membres, de la majorité des députés d'une des républiques, ou du Président du parlement fédéral.

### III. Les organes représentatifs en tant que dirigeants de la vie de l'Etat.

1. Les institutions représentatives suprêmes des pays socialistes ont une large compétence dans les domaines les plus importants de la vie étatique. En tant qu'organes suprêmes de la représentation du peuple, ils possèdent tous les droits qui découlent de la souveraineté du peuple. Le Soviet Suprême de l'URSS,

les Assemblées Populaires (Nationales), sont les organes suprêmes du pouvoir d'Etat. Il n'y a pas, dans les pays socialistes, d'organes possédant des prérogatives supérieures à celles des institutions représentatives suprêmes.

Il est naturel que les gouvernements de ces pays aient aussi une compétence générale dans le domaine de l'administration. Ils dirigent et coordonnent l'activité de tous les autres organes exécutifs. Dans les limites de leur compétence, les gouvernements décident des actes de l'administration et jouent un rôle assez important dans la création du droit. Mais le trait caractéristique de leurs actes est qu'ils sont tous pris sur la base de la Constitution et des lois votées par les organes représentatifs, et ne peuvent en aucun cas les contredire. D'où, d'ailleurs, leur nom : "actes subordonnés à la loi".

Toute l'activité des gouvernements dans les limites de leur compétence passe sous la direction générale et sous le contrôle des organes représentatifs suprêmes. Le gouvernement socialiste ne possède pas de prérogatives qui lui permettent de mener une politique indépendante par rapport aux organes représentatifs ou contre eux. Le principe même du droit constitutionnel socialiste est la soumission de l'activité gouvernementale au contrôle du parlement.

Le vote de la Constitution et celui des lois - actes juridiques suprêmes - sont dans les pays socialistes de la compétence exclusive des parlements. En les votant, les organes représentatifs créent les règles de droit correspondant à la volonté des travailleurs, règles qui régissent les problèmes les plus importants de l'édification politique, économique et culturelle.

Au domaine législatif reviennent dans les pays socialistes les matières qui concernent la base économique (le régime juridique des entreprises industrielles, des coopératives

agricoles, etc.), la base politique (organes locaux du pouvoir d'Etat, etc.), les droits et obligations des citoyens (législation civile, pénale, du travail, etc.), et d'autres questions importantes. Les organes représentatifs suprêmes votent le plan de développement de l'économie nationale et le budget. Leurs lois sur le plan se présentent comme des programmes obligatoires pour tous les organes de l'Etat, les organisations sociales et les masses de travailleurs.

Les parlements élisent les autres organes suprêmes du pouvoir d'Etat (Praesidiums, Conseils d'Etat), qui leur sont subordonnés, et qui nomment les gouvernements et les procureurs généraux, élisent (dans la plupart des pays socialistes) les cours suprêmes. Tous ces organes sont donc subordonnés aux parlements.

Le contrôle du parlement joue un rôle important sur l'activité des différentes institutions d'Etat. Les organes suprêmes du pouvoir d'Etat (Praesidiums, Conseils d'Etat) et les gouvernements leur rendent compte périodiquement de leurs activités. Le contrôle sur le gouvernement s'effectue aussi sous forme d'interpellations, auxquelles des réponses doivent être données dans de très brefs délais. Par exemple, la Constitution de l'URSS (art. 71) a établi pour une telle réponse un délai de trois jours.

Les organes représentatifs utilisent également d'autres formes de contrôle : commissions d'enquêtes, de vérification, etc. En Pologne, la Diète a même créé une Chambre supérieure de contrôle pour contrôler de près l'activité administrative, économique et financière de l'administration d'Etat et de ses institutions.

Si les parlements peuvent donc contrôler et influencer tous les autres organes d'Etat, ces derniers ne peuvent en aucun cas influencer les institutions représentatives. Le gouvernement

ne peut pas, par exemple, poser la question de confiance devant le parlement pour obtenir l'approbation de son projet. Les ministres eux-mêmes sont d'habitude députés et, en tant que tels, sont subordonnés directement et personnellement aux électeurs et à l'organe représentatif dont ils font partie. Ainsi les parlements qui contrôlent tous les autres organes d'Etat dans les pays socialistes sont eux-mêmes contrôlés par les seuls électeurs, ne rendent compte de leurs activités qu'aux électeurs, au peuple qui est le souverain suprême.

Une des garanties de la suprématie du parlement dans le système des organes d'Etat est que les constitutions des pays socialistes n'accordent le droit de dissolution ni au gouvernement, ni à l'organe qui joue le rôle de chef de l'Etat. Et dans le cas prévu par l'article 47 de la Constitution de l'URSS, celui d'un désaccord entre les deux chambres, chacune d'elles étant l'égale de l'autre, et aucune n'ayant le droit de dire le dernier mot, il doit donc s'ensuivre la dissolution du Soviet Suprême; mais la compétence du chef de l'Etat - le Praesidium du Soviet Suprême - est limitée : il dissout le parlement et fixe la date des nouvelles élections, mais il ne peut ni refuser la dissolution, ni en être l'initiateur.

Les organes représentatifs suprêmes ont dans leurs compétences le règlement des problèmes les plus importants de la politique extérieure et, en particulier, des problèmes de la paix et de la guerre. Le caractère pacifique de cette politique est souligné par le fait que d'après les Constitutions, la déclaration de guerre ne peut être votée qu'en cas d'agression étrangère ou en cas d'exécution des obligations internationales sur la défense mutuelle contre l'agresseur.

2. Il est nécessaire, en parlant des organes représentatifs dans les pays socialistes, de noter le rôle et la compétence des organes locaux du pouvoir d'Etat, organes les plus

nombreux et les plus proches des masses, qui font participer ces dernières au travail de l'Etat et à l'édification du communisme. Comme il a déjà été dit, les relations entre les organes représentatifs supérieurs et locaux sont basées sur le principe du centralisme démocratique. On parvient, grâce à ce principe, à l'unité et à la coordination des activités de tout l'appareil d'Etat, à la sommation des intérêts fédéraux et locaux. Les problèmes importants de la vie de l'Etat sont réglés par les organes représentatifs suprêmes compte tenu des particularismes locaux, tandis que les problèmes de caractère local sont réglés par des organes locaux compte tenu des tâches fédérales. L'initiative locale contribue donc aux solutions fédérales.

D'après les Constitutions des pays socialistes, les organes représentatifs locaux possèdent de larges prérogatives dans des domaines divers. Sur leur territoire, et en se basant sur les actes des organes supérieurs, ils dirigent le développement économique, votent les plans et les budgets. Les conseils locaux commandent l'industrie locale et l'agriculture, règlent les problèmes de l'urbanisme, du transport, du commerce, etc. Ils dirigent les organes locaux de l'éducation et de la culture, de la santé publique et de la sécurité sociale. En même temps, les organes représentatifs locaux ont d'autres tâches importantes : ils assurent l'exécution des lois et autres actes des organes supérieurs, maintiennent l'ordre public et la légalité socialiste, défendent les droits et intérêts légitimes des citoyens, contribuent à la défense et à la sécurité intérieure de l'Etat.

Les organes représentatifs locaux participent donc à toutes les fonctions de l'Etat socialiste, ce qui souligne la réalité de leurs pouvoirs. Nous n'exposons ici qu'en lignes générales la compétence des organes locaux du pouvoir d'Etat. Dans chacun des pays socialistes, ainsi que d'ailleurs à chaque échelon, cette compétence a des traits particuliers, qui sont étudiés dans les rapports nationaux.

Les conseils locaux forment leurs organes exécutifs et possèdent donc leur propre appareil administratif. Les pays socialistes ignorent l'institution du représentant des autorités centrales - gouverneur ou préfet - et l'autonomie des organes représentatifs locaux n'est pas limitée par la tutelle administrative.

Les organes représentatifs locaux, au même titre que les organes suprêmes, sont des institutions actives, et non seulement délibératives. En sessions plénières, qui sont la forme la plus importante de leur activité, en commissions permanentes, les conseils locaux discutent et prennent des décisions, et les exécutent eux-mêmes.

Le degré de participation des masses les plus larges de la population à la direction des affaires de la société et de l'Etat permet de juger du caractère démocratique de tel ou tel régime politique. La participation maximale, permanente et effective, des masses à la vie de l'Etat, à l'élaboration des décisions, - telle est l'idée fondamentale de la démocratie socialiste. C'est pourquoi les organes représentatifs des pays socialistes s'appuient non seulement sur leurs membres - les députés - mais avant tout sur les très nombreux groupes de militants.

En URSS, le rôle important revient par exemple à 300.000 commissions permanentes des soviets où travaillent activement 1.640.000 députés et plusieurs millions de militants. Le travail de l'Etat est en URSS la besogne de millions. Plus de deux millions de citoyens sont élus aux soviets à tous les échelons. Le nombre des militants actifs autour des soviets dépasse 23 millions.



En Tchécoslovaquie, un citoyen sur 8 ou sur 10 travaille activement dans les commissions permanentes des organes représentatifs ou dans d'autres institutions d'autogestion. En Pologne, il y a plus de 6.500 organes représentatifs, comprenant 185.000 députés, autour desquels on compte des milliers de militants. Des millions d'individus participent au travail de direction des organes du pouvoir et de l'administration de l'Etat dans tous les autres pays socialistes et partout on cherche à donner des formes nouvelles à cette participation. On utilise pour ce perfectionnement l'expérience de l'Etat soviétique, qu'on emprunte d'une manière créatrice, on généralise la pratique du travail des différents organes représentatifs nationaux ou de ceux des autres pays socialistes, on se base surtout sur l'initiative et la capacité de création de larges masses populaires, sur le développement de la démocratie socialiste.

### Résumé

Dans les pays socialistes, la période contemporaine se caractérise par le développement ultérieur de la démocratie socialiste, par la multiplicité des formes qui assurent la participation de plus en plus vaste des masses laborieuses à la direction des affaires de l'Etat et de la société. Dans ce développement, un rôle important est joué par les organes représentatifs, qui sont une organisation universelle du peuple tout entier et incarnent son unité.

Les constitutions socialistes se basent sur le cumul des prérogatives les plus importantes de l'Etat entre les mains des organes de la représentation populaire, auxquels sont subordonnées l'administration et la justice. Les organes représentatifs sont des "corporations actives"; ils prennent les décisions et les exécutent eux-mêmes. Ils forment, directement ou indirectement, tous les autres organes de l'Etat, et ces derniers leur rendent compte et sont responsables devant eux.

Le trait particulier des parlements et conseils des pays socialistes est qu'ils sont non seulement organes du pouvoir d'Etat, mais en même temps organes d'autogestion populaire, largement représentatifs. Dans les pays socialistes, on cherche à exploiter les avantages de la démocratie représentative ainsi que de la démocratie directe, à cumuler rationnellement ces deux principes.

Une place toute particulière est occupée dans le système représentatif par les organes suprêmes du pouvoir d'Etat, Soviet Suprême et Assemblées Populaires (Nationales), qui sont les seuls porteurs directs de la souveraineté du peuple. Les organes représentatifs locaux, les plus nombreux et les plus proches des masses, sont une partie intégrante de ce système uni et formé selon le principe du centralisme démocratique.

Les organes représentatifs socialistes assurent la direction politique et économique; leur rôle découle de l'économie socialiste basée sur la propriété collective.

Br/Representation/1

"Théorie et pratique de la représentation"

LA REPRESENTATION DES INTERETS DES TRAVAILLEURS

DANS LE PARLEMENT YOUGOSLAVE

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La représentation des intérêts des travailleurs  
dans le parlement yougoslave

par Radomir D. Lukić

I

Le socialisme yougoslave est fondé sur le principe de l'autogestion des travailleurs, aussi bien dans les organisations de travail que dans les unités politiques territoriales. Ce principe est intimement lié à celui du dépérissement de l'Etat et du droit ; il implique, par conséquent, et rend nécessaire, une transformation profonde de l'appareil étatique, afin que celui-ci devienne beaucoup plus l'expression directe des organes d'autogestion que l'organisation supérieure qui leur dicte sa volonté. Se trouve ainsi posé d'autre part le problème de la structure du parlement, organe démocratique, qui doit être l'organe central du nouvel appareil étatique, au lieu des organes exécutifs - gouvernement et autres - qui étaient les organes centraux dans le régime du socialisme administratif ou bureaucratique.

La théorie et la pratique yougoslaves ont fait de sérieux efforts pour trouver une nouvelle structure de l'Etat, et tout particulièrement du parlement, qui correspondrait bien au socialisme démocratique et autogestionnaire. Des résultats intéressants et importants ont été obtenus, mais la tâche n'est certes pas encore terminée : certains affirment déjà que la transformation de l'Etat et du parlement n'est que commencée et qu'il faut l'achever par des mesures plus radicales.

En effet, on peut dire que - laissant de côté le problème général de la transformation de l'Etat et s'arrêtant au problème de la transformation du parlement, qui nous intéresse ici plus particulièrement - dans la structure actuelle du parlement yougoslave, on peut noter le croisement de deux principes structurels, dont le premier est ancien, classique, et le deuxième nouveau, proprement autogestionnaire.

Le principe classique est celui de la représentation du peuple, des citoyens comme tels, en tant que citoyens abstraits, égaux, individuels ; l'expression de ce principe est le suffrage universel, égal, direct. Le deuxième principe est celui de la représentation des travailleurs socialistes, pris non pas individuellement et abstraitement comme unités égales, mais organisés dans leurs organisations de travail, diverses et concrètes. L'expression de ce principe dans le système yougoslave est le suffrage spécial des travailleurs élisant leurs propres représentants.

Il est bien connu que le suffrage universel, égal et direct n'a pas réussi à représenter, comme il devait le faire, le citoyen abstrait et égal aux autres. Ce système a été utilisé par les partis politiques, qui s'en sont emparés, et il est devenu un instrument pour l'expression de leurs intérêts et pour l'établissement de leur domination, au lieu de celle des citoyens. Ce fait paraît confirmer l'opinion que les citoyens inorganisés, pulvérisés, ne peuvent pas s'affirmer comme facteur politique décisif, comme l'aurait voulu ce système.

Puisque, en Yougoslavie, il n'existe pas de système de plusieurs partis politiques qui luttent pour le pouvoir et qui ont besoin du suffrage universel pour s'affirmer, il apparaît que ce suffrage est en quelque sorte inadéquat pour servir de base à un nouveau système parlementaire qui ne connaît pas de tels partis. En partant de telles opinions, on a essayé de réformer le suffrage universel non pas dans son principe, mais dans sa réalisation. C'est ainsi que le système yougoslave de la nouvelle constitution de 1963 combine le principe du suffrage universel avec celui de la délégation de la commune. En effet, la commune est considérée comme l'unité fondamentale économique, sociale et politique dans le système yougoslave, qui, entre autres, porte aussi le nom de "système communal". Dans la commune, les citoyens

sont organisés d'une manière organique, et il semble naturel que la commune serve de base pour l'exercice de leur droit de vote.

Mais, malgré cette transformation du principe classique de droit de vote, il est clair que ce principe est resté en essence le même, et qu'il est différent du principe nouveau, basé sur le droit de vote des travailleurs organisés dans leurs organisations du travail. Le système yougoslave actuel représente donc un mélange de deux principes de suffrage différents, et le parlement yougoslave a donc lui aussi ce caractère mixte. Nous allons exposer brièvement la structure du parlement yougoslave, en partant de cette donnée fondamentale - sa structure mixte.

## II

Le parlement fédéral - "Assemblée fédérale" - comprend deux catégories de chambres (la structure du parlement de chacune des républiques membres est la même, mais nous ne parlerons ici que du parlement fédéral). Une des sortes de chambres est issue du suffrage universel ; l'autre, du suffrage des travailleurs. La chambre issue du suffrage universel est unique, et s'appelle le "Conseil fédéral" ; le suffrage des travailleurs élit quatre chambres différentes, qui se distinguent d'après les domaines qu'elles représentent: "Conseil économique", "Conseil de la culture et de l'éducation", "Conseil des affaires sociales et de santé", et "Conseil politico-organisationnel".

Le Conseil fédéral est élu selon un double scrutin : le député doit être élu d'abord par l'assemblée de la commune, puis par les citoyens eux-mêmes. L'assemblée de la commune élit le député comme son délégué, selon le principe de la délégation de la commune : c'est ainsi qu'est affirmé le principe communal ; mais les citoyens doivent confirmer l'élection faite par la commune, comme dans le système classique du suffrage des citoyens. C'est ainsi qu'on allie deux principes

différents - principe du suffrage "organique" et principe du suffrage individuel. Ainsi le Conseil fédéral représente aussi bien les citoyens pris individuellement que la commune, leur unité organique.

Quant aux quatre conseils représentant les travailleurs organisés dans leurs communautés du travail - ces conseils portent justement le nom générique de "conseils des communautés du travail" - ils sont élus exclusivement par les assemblées communales, sans vote direct des travailleurs. Il semblerait que ces conseils n'aient aucun lien avec ceux qu'ils doivent représenter - les travailleurs eux-mêmes. Pourtant, un tel lien existe - il y en a même trois.

Premier lien: les candidats à ces conseils doivent être acceptés comme candidats aux réunions des travailleurs des domaines correspondants, ces réunions étant tenues et organisées dans le cadre des organisations du travail. Second lien : les candidats doivent être eux-mêmes des travailleurs du domaine correspondant. Dans la grande majorité des cas ils appartiennent aux organisations de travail socialistes ; il est exceptionnel qu'un homme qui travaille seul, indépendamment d'une telle organisation, puisse être élu député (c'est, par exemple, le cas des écrivains ou des savants, en tant que travailleurs individuels). Enfin, le troisième lien consiste en ce que l'assemblée communale comprend elle aussi deux sortes de chambres de même que l'Assemblée fédérale. Or les membres des conseils des organisations du travail des assemblées communales sont élus directement par les travailleurs correspondants.

Malgré ce triple lien, il est pourtant évident que les chambres des communautés du travail de l'Assemblée fédérale ne sont pas l'expression directe de la volonté des travailleurs qu'elles doivent représenter. Elles le seraient seulement si elles étaient élues directement par ces travailleurs eux-mêmes, et dans le cadre de leurs organisations

de travail. D'après le système en vigueur, ils ne sont pas élus directement, mais indirectement par les membres de l'assemblée communale que ces travailleurs ont élus directement. Mais même cette élection indirecte elle-même est encore atténuée par le fait qu'y participent à titre égal les membres de l'assemblée communale élus par tous les citoyens d'après le principe du suffrage universel. Par conséquent, les députés des conseils des communautés du travail, qui, en principe, ne devaient représenter que les travailleurs, représentent en réalité aussi bien tous les citoyens, car ils sont élus aussi par les membres de l'assemblée communale élus par tous les citoyens. C'est la conséquence logique du principe selon lequel l'Assemblée fédérale est constituée des délégations des communes. C'est ainsi que le vote des travailleurs est lui aussi lié au vote communal, de la même manière que le vote général.

Voyons de près quels travailleurs sont représentés par ces conseils des communautés de travail. La Constitution précise (article 168) : "Le droit d'être élu au Conseil économique, au Conseil pour l'éducation et la culture ou au Conseil pour les affaires sociales et la santé appartient à tout travailleur ou membre des organes de gestion des organisations de travail du secteur d'activité correspondant, à tout membre des organes de gestion des associations d'organisation du travail, et à tout responsable syndical du secteur d'activité correspondant". Dans la pratique, cela signifie que ces conseils représentent les travailleurs des organisations économiques (entreprises), culturelles, éducatives, sanitaires, d'assurances sociales. Sont donc représentés les travailleurs du secteur socialiste, mais pas ceux du secteur privé - les agriculteurs, les artisans, membres des professions libérales, et ouvriers employés par eux. Cela découle du principe selon lequel ces conseils doivent représenter les travailleurs socialistes, c'est-à-dire ceux organisés, d'après le droit d'autogestion, dans les organisations de travail à caractère socialiste.



Quant au Conseil politico-organisationnel, il constitue une exception : il ne représente aucun secteur séparé du travail socialiste comme les autres conseils des communautés de travail, mais tous les travailleurs socialistes, sous un rapport spécial, celui de l'autogestion. En effet, "le droit d'être élu au Conseil politico-organisationnel appartient à tout membre des organes de gestion des organisations de travail ou des communautés, à tout membre des organes de gestion des associations d'organisations de travail, ainsi qu'à tout responsable des organisations socio-politiques, ou des associations dont l'activité porte sur les questions relevant du système socio-politique" (même article de la Constitution). Comme on le voit, ce conseil est une sorte de quintessence de l'autogestion : en lui doit être concentrée toute l'expérience d'autogestion des différents secteurs et catégories.

### III

Etant ainsi compliqué dans sa structure, le système parlementaire l'est aussi dans son fonctionnement. Conformément à sa double structure (deux sortes de chambres), il fonctionne selon le principe de la double compétence : en principe l'Assemblée fédérale ne tranche qu'avec l'accord de deux conseils, dont l'un est toujours le Conseil fédéral et l'autre celui des quatre conseils des communautés de travail qui est compétent pour le problème débattu. Une décision de l'Assemblée requiert donc l'approbation des deux conseils correspondants.

De cette façon il devient possible que les intérêts des travailleurs soient représentés et défendus dans l'Assemblée, puisque les conseils correspondants participent à la décision. Si les deux conseils compétents adoptent des textes différents, la Constitution prévoit une procédure compliquée, mais toujours paritaire, pour garantir un accord. Si l'accord n'est pas possible, les conseils sont dissous, et on procède à de nouvelles élections.

A cette règle de la double compétence il y a néanmoins des exceptions assez importantes, qui ne mettent cependant pas en danger la protection des intérêts par des conseils des communautés de travail. En effet, pour certaines matières d'intérêt général (affaires étrangères, armée, etc.) le Conseil fédéral est seul compétent. En revanche, les conseils des communautés de travail sont seuls compétents pour décider de certaines matières qui sont exclusivement de l'intérêt des organismes d'autogestion. Dans ce cas, les conseils agissent comme les conseils ouvriers d'autogestion des plus élevés du secteur correspondant.

Il convient de noter que le système fédératif yougoslave comporte encore un troisième facteur dans le processus de décision de l'Assemblée fédérale. Comme dans chaque fédération, les Etats membres sont représentés dans l'Assemblée fédérale. Ils élisent en nombre égal leurs délégués à un conseil spécial de cette Assemblée, le Conseil des nations. Les derniers amendements à la Constitution ont élargi la compétence du Conseil des nations et pratiquement dans toutes les décisions d'importance il est désormais égal au Conseil fédéral et aux conseils des communautés de travail. C'est ainsi que le système yougoslave devient un système à trois chambres ; mais cela ne nous intéresse pas spécialement ici.

Pour bien comprendre le jeu des compétences dans le système parlementaire yougoslave et les rapports de force et d'influence, il faut noter aussi que les rapports entre le parlement et le gouvernement (Conseil exécutif fédéral) sont régis par le principe de l'unité du pouvoir dans les mains du parlement. Cela signifie que le gouvernement est soumis au parlement, dont il n'est que l'organe exécutif. Il ne peut être question pour le gouvernement de dissoudre le parlement. Mais la Constitution donne au gouvernement une arme assez forte contre le parlement : s'il est en désaccord avec une décision du parlement, le gouvernement peut donner sa démission. Par sa démission, le gouvernement peut influencer

sur le parlement, et faire en sorte que celui-ci adopte son point de vue.

#### IV

Dans la pratique parlementaire yougoslave, les conseils des communautés de travail se sont affirmés comme les représentants et défenseurs des intérêts des travailleurs des secteurs d'activité correspondants. Bien qu'à l'élection de ces conseils participent aussi, comme on l'a vu, les membres de l'assemblée communale élus au suffrage universel, ces conseils se sont manifestés beaucoup plus comme les représentants des travailleurs du secteur correspondant que comme les représentants des communes qui les ont constitués par leurs délégations. Il y a une ligne de démarcation nette entre le Conseil fédéral d'une part, et les conseils des communautés de travail d'autre part ; assez souvent, ces conseils ont des vues différentes, et se trouvent en conflit.

Il est pourtant assez rare que ces conseils défendent les intérêts particuliers de certaines organisations de travail ; ils sont plutôt les représentants des intérêts généraux du secteur correspondant. Cela provient sans doute du fait que le lien qui unit ces conseils aux organisations de travail n'est pas direct, puisqu'ils ne sont pas élus directement par ces organisations. Bien entendu, dans la plupart des cas le député de ces conseils travaille dans une organisation du secteur correspondant, et il défend le plus souvent les intérêts de cette organisation ; mais il le fait parce qu'il en est membre, et non parce qu'il est élu par elle. Sans doute, est-il ainsi plus libre envers son organisation que s'il était élu par elle.

D'autre part, les organisations de travail d'un secteur donné (économie, éducation, etc.) représentées dans l'Assemblée fédérale par un député élu dans une circonscription électorale ne sont en aucune manière rattachées à une organisation qui les engloberait toutes pour qu'elles puissent comme telles entrer en contact avec "leur" député et l'influencer.

Les travailleurs de ces organisations votent individuellement pour les membres correspondants de l'assemblée communale, et ceux-ci élisent les députés. Par conséquent, chaque organisation de travail ou chaque travailleur entre en contact avec son député séparément, individuellement, ce qui affaiblit son influence et rend ce dernier plus indépendant d'eux.

C'est pourquoi les contacts entre les députés représentant les travailleurs et les organisations de travail sont irréguliers, et non suivis. Le député a derrière lui une poussière d'organisations de travail et de travailleurs, et c'est lui-même qui doit faire personnellement l'effort de synthétiser leurs désirs et volontés. Le député est le représentant des travailleurs d'une commune (ou plus souvent de plusieurs communes), mais ces travailleurs ne sont pas organisés dans le cadre de la commune (ou des communes).

C'est une des raisons, sans doute, pour lesquelles les organisations de travail et leurs travailleurs ne sont pas habitués à s'adresser en premier lieu pour la défense de leurs intérêts à leur député. Le plus souvent ils utilisent leurs organisations syndicales ou professionnelles pour traiter directement avec les organismes étatiques ou communaux qui décident de leurs intérêts, et notamment avec le Conseil exécutif fédéral, donc avec le gouvernement ; cela parce que le gouvernement conserve plus de pouvoir réel que le parlement et parce que, en tout cas, une décision n'a pas de chance d'être adoptée par le parlement si le gouvernement lui est hostile. Mais, s'il en est ainsi actuellement, cela ne signifie pas nécessairement qu'il en sera toujours de même. L'institution des conseils des communautés de travail est encore neuve, et il faut du temps pour qu'on se familiarise avec elle.

Nombreux sont les cas dans lesquels les conseils des communautés de travail ont énergiquement défendu l'intérêt des organisations de travail et des travailleurs respectifs, en s'opposant à l'opinion du gouvernement ou à

d'autres conseils parlementaires. Nous allons citer seulement deux cas parmi les plus récents, dont l'un est apparu pour la première fois dans la pratique parlementaire, et a une grande importance.

Le premier cas est celui du Conseil pour la culture et l'éducation. Pour comprendre son action, il faut tout d'abord remarquer que la situation de l'enseignement, et plus spécialement des écoles, est jugée insatisfaisante. Les écoles sont financées par le budget des communes ou des républiques, et on estime que leurs crédits sont trop faibles et trop incertains (ils changent d'année en année, au gré des estimations budgétaires, et ne fournissent donc pas une base stable au développement des écoles). Les traitements du personnel des écoles sont trop bas en comparaison avec ceux des travailleurs d'autres services de qualification analogue. L'autogestion ne peut pas se développer dans les écoles à cause de tout cela. Face à une situation aussi défavorable, le Conseil pour la culture et l'éducation a entrepris d'assurer une base économique stable et ferme aux écoles en général ; il a voulu notamment assurer par une loi qu'un pourcentage fixe du produit national irait aux fonds des écoles, indépendamment du budget, et serait mis à la disposition d'organismes constitués par des délégués des écoles elles-mêmes. Le produit national augmentant, les fonds des écoles augmenteraient aussi, et les écoles pourraient mener une politique à long terme sur la base des augmentations prévues.

Après trois ans d'action, le Conseil pour la culture et l'éducation a réussi dans son dessein : une loi a été votée, affectant un pourcentage fixe aux fonds des écoles, et instituant des communautés d'éducation qui en disposent, indépendamment des organes étatiques ou communaux. Il faut noter que les adversaires de ce système ne se trouvaient pas seulement au Conseil fédéral, élu par le suffrage universel, mais surtout au Conseil économique, représentant les entreprises économiques, ce système signifiant qu'on prélèverait une part fixe de leurs revenus pour la donner aux écoles. Mais il faut

noter aussi que l'accord s'est fait assez facilement : rares étaient ceux qui s'opposaient au principe lui-même. L'opposition invoquait plutôt la conjoncture économique, défavorable, demandant que des ressources aussi importantes que possible soient laissées aux entreprises. On plaidait donc pour l'ajournement de la réforme approuvée en principe, et non contre la réforme même.

Le deuxième exemple ne se rapporte pas à l'Assemblée fédérale, mais à une Assemblée de la République Socialiste de Slovénie, une des républiques-membres de la Fédération yougoslave : le Conseil pour les affaires sociales et la santé. Il nous faut tout d'abord rappeler que le traitement des assurés sociaux soignés dans les hôpitaux et autres institutions sanitaires est payé par les assurances sociales, et que celles-ci sont alimentées par l'impôt sur le revenu qui leur est affecté, et dont le taux est fixé par les assemblées des républiques. Plus ce taux est élevé, et meilleure est la situation des institutions sanitaires et de leur personnel, mais plus la situation des assurés, dont le revenu est imposé plus lourdement, devient difficile.

Voulant limiter les dépenses d'assurances sociales, le gouvernement (le Conseil exécutif de la République de Slovénie) avait proposé un taux d'impôt jugé trop bas par les institutions sanitaires et par les organisations d'assurances sociales. Le Conseil de la République, élu par le suffrage universel, vota la proposition du Conseil exécutif, mais le Conseil pour les affaires sociales et la santé la rejeta. Les tentatives de compromis n'aboutissant pas, le Conseil exécutif décida d'utiliser le moyen de pression dont il disposait : il donna sa démission, indiquant clairement qu'il ne pouvait pas prendre la responsabilité du relèvement du taux, demandé par le Conseil pour les affaires sociales et sanitaires. Il s'ensuivit une période de crise et d'activité politique intense. Le Conseil social et sanitaire tint bon un certain temps, mais, isolé et sentant que l'opinion

publique lui était hostile, il finit par céder. Le nouveau taux proposé par le Conseil exécutif fut voté aussi par le Conseil social et sanitaire, et le Conseil exécutif revint sur sa décision de démissionner. Tout rentra dans l'ordre.

C'est la première fois qu'un gouvernement démissionnait dans la Yougoslavie socialiste, et c'est la première fois qu'un conflit si âpre se produisait entre deux chambres. Cela est très important, du point de vue de la pratique comme de la théorie. Il est trop tôt pour tirer des conclusions d'un seul exemple, mais on peut dire dès à présent que l'opinion publique exerça une forte influence sur l'attitude des chambres. Un conseil des communautés de travail peut défendre avec succès les intérêts de ces communautés et des travailleurs correspondants, à condition d'avoir l'appui de l'opinion publique, sans cela, il se trouve isolé et son efficacité est atteinte.

## V

A la fin de cet exposé très élémentaire, on peut s'aventurer à jeter un coup d'oeil sur l'avenir. Cela est d'autant plus nécessaire qu'on a constaté, au début du rapport que le système yougoslave actuel est une sorte de mélange entre le système classique basé sur le principe du suffrage universel, et le système nouveau, autogestionnaire, basé sur le vote des travailleurs organisés dans leurs organisations de travail. Malgré la modification du principe classique du suffrage universel pour l'adapter en même temps au système communal et au système du suffrage autogestionnaire, il semble que gagne en vigueur l'opinion selon laquelle ces deux principes ne peuvent pas être harmonisés, et que le système mixte actuel n'est pas viable. De plus en plus on exige que le système du suffrage, et par conséquent la structure du parlement, soient basés complètement sur le principe du suffrage autogestionnaire, que le parlement tout

entier comprenne uniquement des députés élus par les travailleurs, c'est-à-dire par leurs organisations de travail. Le parlement doit constituer le sommet d'une pyramide dont la base est formée par les organisations autogestionnaires de travail. Le principe du suffrage universel doit être abandonné. En même temps on exige que le suffrage soit indirect, et plus intimement lié aux organisations de travail.

Il faut remarquer que les partisans de cette opinion ne cachent pas qu'il est très difficile d'imaginer un tel système à l'état pur. Ils se rendent compte en effet qu'il est difficile de négliger l'importance de la commune et du système communal. Le système électoral doit donc tenir compte, d'une manière ou d'une autre, de la commune, ce qui a pour conséquence que l'élection des députés doit se détacher dans une certaine mesure des organisations de travail. D'autre part, un tel système éliminerait le suffrage universel, un des droits des citoyens les plus profondément enracinés dans la tradition démocratique comme dans la conscience du peuple et des hommes. Nous-mêmes restons persuadés que le principe classique du suffrage universel ne peut, et ne doit pas, être négligé et que cela serait inutile et même dommageable pour les travailleurs eux-mêmes. Il faut trouver un compromis entre les deux principes. Cela ne veut pas dire, bien entendu, que le système actuel soit parfait, et qu'on ne doive pas le réformer ; tout au contraire : mais il n'est pas possible de préciser ici les détails des réformes souhaitables.



### Résumé

Le régime parlementaire institué en Yougoslavie en 1963 repose sur deux principes de représentation : celui du suffrage général - combinant le suffrage universel et la représentation des communes - et celui de la représentation des travailleurs organisés comme tels. Au premier de ces principes correspond, au Parlement fédéral, le Conseil fédéral ; au deuxième correspondent quatre chambres : le Conseil économique, le Conseil de la culture et de l'éducation, le Conseil des affaires sociales et de la santé, le Conseil politico-organisationnel (une structure analogue existe dans chacune des Républiques fédérées). Les décisions supposent le plus souvent l'approbation du Conseil fédéral et de l'un des quatre Conseils des communautés de travail ; le gouvernement n'est que l'organe exécutif du Parlement. Les conflits entre Conseils, ou entre certains Conseils et le gouvernement, ne sont pas rares, et deux cas récents sont étudiés dans le rapport. Parce qu'il n'est pas facile d'harmoniser les deux principes de représentation, certains préconisent l'abandon du suffrage général ; l'auteur préférerait une réforme du système actuel, sauvegardant le suffrage général.

### Summary

The parliamentary regime set up in Yugoslavia in 1963 rests on the two representative principles of general suffrage - combining universal suffrage with representation of communes - and representation of workers organised as such. To the first principle corresponds, in the Federal Parliament, the Federal Council; to the second correspond four chambers: the Economic Council, the Council of Culture and Education, the Council of Social Affairs and Health, the Political-Organizational Council (a similar structure exists in each Federated Republic). Most decisions must be made concurrently by the Federal Council and one of the four Councils of work communities; the Government is merely the executive organ of Parliament. Conflicts between Councils, or between certain Councils and the Government, are not rare; two recent cases are reported. Because it is not easy to harmonize the two principles of representation, some Yugoslavs advocate giving up general suffrage; the author would prefer a reform of the present system, keeping general suffrage.

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~~---"Theory and practice of representation"~~

"WHOM, AND WHAT, DO REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENT?"

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"Whom, and what, do representatives represent?"

by Leslie Lipson

In this paper, I propose to discuss four related aspects of a general theme:

- the space that is represented,
- the time period over which the representation extends,
- the representation of groups,
- the will or knowledge that is represented.

Part of the discussion will be normative, in the sense of concerning itself with the elucidation of principles which our practices ought to follow. But any assertion of normative criteria is influenced by considerations of what is possible and of what ordinarily happens in practice. A norm aspires beyond the normal, but cannot ignore it.

The history of political representation affords an example of a concept which has been translated into institutions and of institutions in turn whose growth has generated conceptual controversy. Both institutions and concept, in Western Europe, date effectively from the Middle Ages, during which epoch the representation was that of classes in the social hierarchy (e.g., the nobility), occupational groups (the clergy), or corporate

communities (boroughs and shires). The revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were conducted against a concentration of power in the form of royal absolutism (England and France) or against an oligarchic Parliament which imposed its authority on those whom its membership did not represent (the American colonies). The need to justify rebellion and then to legitimize the regimes of the victors provided philosophy with the occasion to proclaim the consent of the governed as the only rightful basis of governmental power. Except in the logic of Rousseau, who clung rigidly to the view that will is inalienable, the people was to exercise its sovereignty by periodically consenting to the election of representatives of whose authority it is the original author.

The practice of representation was further shaped in that period by the individualism which prevailed from the mid-seventeenth century until it was challenged by socialist thinking in the middle of the nineteenth. Granted that elected representatives should control the government in the people's name, the latter was conceived as an aggregate of individuals; and since all of these were posited to be equals, it appeared both reasonable and manageable, as the suffrage was extended, for the body politic to be carved up for electoral purposes into segments, as nearly equal arithmetically as possible.

Contemporary systems of representation in the western democracies still continue to a large degree this mixed inheritance from the conflicts and concepts of the past--a legacy from the association of medieval communities and estates with the king's government, from the subsequent overthrow of the latter, the ending of aristocratic privilege, and the attainment of universal suffrage. But the resulting ideas and institutions have now to be applied to other problems in another world, applied among populations of

unprecedented size by governments wielding ever broader powers within societies of increasing congestion and complexity. Locke's doctrine of consent, Rousseau's conception of an inalienable will, Jefferson's distrust of centralized power, Mill's formulation of individual liberty, need reinterpreting to fit the altered conditions of the last third of the twentieth century. Otherwise, they will only serve as abstractions, devoid of particular content.

To arrive at principles suited to today's circumstances and to devise practices in conformity with them, the fundamental question is this: whom, and what, do representatives represent? To say that they represent the people is not sufficient. This statement may have sufficed in an earlier age when the locus of supreme power, and the authority deriving from it, was itself in issue. But once that issue has been resolved in favor of the mass of the community, to affirm that the people rules, and that it does so through representatives who act on its behalf, is only the beginning of an answer. Such a simple formulation leaves off where the real difficulties begin. In what sense, does a small, finite number--normally, a few hundred--represent many millions? The microcosm cannot be an exact miniature of the macrocosm. That is beyond the bounds of possibility. It must seek to be a portrait, rather than a reflection. It must focus on the features which are significant and relevant, and omit or minimize the details which blur and confuse. The machinery of representation functions as a filter and the outcome is determined, in part, by the process.

This brings us, naturally, to the political starting-point, Whatever mode of representation a country employs is a choice between alternatives and that choice is itself an expression of a constellation of political forces. In order to pick a small sample of the citizens to represent the

whole, the latter must be subdivided into units which bear some relation to social reality and governmental practicality. What are those units to be? Except for certain elections to national offices (e.g., the presidency in the United States or in France under the Fifth Republic) the conventional unit of representation is a geographical district. In earlier centuries, representation corresponded faithfully to the fact that a country was an agglomeration of localities. Nowadays, however, when populations have increased, communications have improved, more governmental services are centralized, and social behavior tends toward greater conformity, localities are no longer as distinctly defined as used to be the case and their characteristics are less opposed. Even the contrast between urban and rural has become less sharp than formerly. Consequently the notion that a legislature is intended to serve as the national assemblage of local interests has diminishing validity.

Nevertheless, one should not exaggerate the force of this argument. No country on earth, fortunately, is internally homogeneous. Current tendencies toward socio-economic conformity are not obliterating all differences, but rather are narrowing the scale over which they extend. Hence, any system of national elections which uses territorial units as the basis of representation will reflect, to that extent, whatever diversities there are. What is crucial, however, is the size of the district that is chosen. The smaller the unit, the more likely that its particular characteristics will be emphasized. Where districts are larger, the features which are distinctively local will tend to be submerged in a more generalized pattern.

A representative cannot be entirely oblivious to the special interests of the voters who elect him and to whom eventually he must return for re-election.<sup>1</sup> If a large number of his constituents earn their living from

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<sup>1</sup> Except in some countries, such as Great Britain, where the representative need not reside in the district which elects him.

coal-mining or in textile factories, by wheat or dairy farming, they are entitled, through their representative, to have their voice heard in the formulation of national policy which affects their interests and he, of course, is politically obliged to speak on their behalf. Many districts, however, especially in a country whose social structure is intricate, will be mixed in character. The local pressure groups, special interests, or sub-cultures, will maintain some kind of equilibrium and, as Madison foresaw, will cancel one another out. Where that happens, the representative is undoubtedly freer to exercise his own judgment since what he represents is not uniform but multiform. A huge and homogeneous majority can treat a deputy as its delegate. But among a combination of minorities, a skillful politician can exercise some discretion.

The contrast between the systems of representation in two pairs of countries illustrates these generalizations. Switzerland and the United States belong to one type; Denmark and New Zealand, to another. In the two former, their social diversities are enshrined in an elaborate governmental structure, which not only distinguishes three concentric circles of jurisdiction and function (national, state or cantonal, and local), but also carefully reproduces two of these (as in Switzerland) or all three (in the United States) in the organs of the central government itself. Thus, both countries retain a genuinely bicameral national legislature, whose larger chamber reflects the distribution of the country's population (thereby representing local diversities), while the smaller house is formed from their amalgamation into the twenty-two<sup>1</sup> cantons or fifty states. The United States, however, goes still further in establishing a third house,

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<sup>1</sup> Or, in the interests of precision, should one say 'nineteen full- and six half-cantons'?

which consists of only one member whose constituency is the whole nation. In this sense, therefore, the House of Representatives, Senate, and Presidency, are the national replicas of the three levels of a federal union and of the differences in the space which their respective powers encompass.

Much less complex communities are Denmark and New Zealand. Although they possess internal diversities, these are neither as numerous nor as contrasted as among the Americans or the Swiss. Consequently, the system of representation conforms to the relative simplicity of the social patterns. Both New Zealanders and Danes have unitary states which are highly centralized. At the center, a unicameral legislature suffices. In the absence of sharp internal cleavages, as soon as universal suffrage was achieved, a second chamber would either have to duplicate the character of the first, or, if it was to differ, it could only end up by somehow being less democratic. That is why, within a few years after the end of World War II, both countries decided that their second chamber was superfluous.

Such differences in the structure of representative institutions, even among peoples which are equally democratic, indicate that the machinery may be fashioned to serve more than one need. A national election is the occasion when the citizens declare their preference for the general direction in which they wish their government to move. This provides the supreme moment--the solemn referendum that Woodrow Wilson once called it--for millions of voters to produce by their individual ballots a collective decision. But this decision, this declaration of will, is valid only for that moment and only as an expression of opinion on the men and issues then in the forefront of public attention. As each year passes, however, the political content changes. New problems emerge; old ones are modified;



priorities alter. Political leaders, too, whether in office or opposition, gain or lose in prestige, inspire more confidence or less. Eventually therefore, a legislature, which was representative of the time when it was elected, now ceases to be so. In fact, whenever a national election occurs and the result is a substantial shift in the prevailing majority, here is evidence that the outgoing legislature had become unrepresentative, at least during the final year of its term.

For how long can an elected group maintain its representative character? What are its obligations, both moral and political, to the voters in whose name it deliberates and decides? Are there some institutional means of keeping the representatives as representative as possible?

A partial answer to these questions may be found in the length of the representatives' term. In deciding what length is right, one has to strike a balance between opposite considerations. If a legislative body is truly to act in accord with the voters' wishes--assuming that they divide into a clear majority and a clear minority, which is not always the case--then the more frequently that elections are held, the more easily can the representative know and reflect the popular will. Carried to its logical extreme, this would mean annual elections at least, which is exactly what the Chartists were advocating in Great Britain twelve decades ago. But as often happens, what is correct, according to one principle comes into direct conflict with another. Legislatures and governments must sometimes adopt policies whose fruition requires several years or even decades. Besides the imperatives of the passing hour, there is also a long-range view of the national interest to consider. The elected persons, whose "never-ending audacity" so outraged Walt Whitman, cannot function efficiently under present circumstances if they must constantly return for a new mandate at intervals which are too

short. The institutional problem is to settle on a mean-point between excessive security and excessive jeopardy.

The various ways in which different countries have resolved this problem in practice are instructive. At one extreme is New Zealand which holds elections triennially. But in conformity with British tradition, the parliamentary term may be shortened by an earlier dissolution or lengthened by postponing the election. The former has occurred only twice in almost a century. The reasons for its rarity are simple enough. In the year immediately following a general election, no dissolution is needed because the people have so recently declared their will. Likewise in the third year, since the election will be taking place anyway, why trouble to advance the date? Only in the middle year of the three would any need arise for a dissolution before the normal time. This happened, however, only in 1881 and 1951. Conversely, Parliament has extended its own life three times. Two of those instances, during each of the World Wars, were authorized by agreement among the political parties. The third occasion was during the economic depression in 1934, when the governing Conservative coalition postponed the election until 1935 over Labour protests and was then suitably thrashed by the voters for misusing its power.

Plainly, the New Zealand system has the merit of ensuring a regular and frequent consultation of the voters' wishes. Yet this degree of frequency entails a corresponding defect. Every third year, the government in office is virtually compelled to propose some vote-catching measure which may or may not be intrinsically good. The temptation for politicians to dangle fresh carrots before their masters' noses is irresistible.

British practice offers a significant comparison with that of New Zealand. From 1715 to 1910 the life of a Parliament at Westminster was seven years;

in 1911, it was reduced to five. Earlier dissolutions are, of course, possible. These occurred notably in the early nineteen-twenties, when a temporary three-party system made it difficult for anybody to win a clear majority, and later in 1951 and 1965, when the party in power sought a larger parliamentary majority in order to govern effectively. During both World Wars, the parties agreed to postpone the election. Thus the Parliament elected in December, 1910, sat until the end of 1918, while the one chosen in 1935, the longest of modern times, was not re-elected until 1945. The average life of a Parliament since 1910 has been just under four years. Rarely does a Prime Minister wait until late in the fifth year to ask for a dissolution. If he does hold out until the last moment, hoping thereby to avert a probable defeat, the axe is likely to fall anyway, as Douglas-Home learned in 1964.

Since British constitutional practice permits only the Prime Minister to request the Crown to grant a dissolution, the party in office has this tactical advantage over the opposition. It can choose its date, either sooner or later, when the popular mood appears to favor the "Ins." Prime Minister Macmillan has provided an example of the skillful use of that power. At the time when he became head of the government, his party was at a low eb) both in and out of Parliament because of the debacle of Eden's Suez policy. Bye-elections and polls during 1957 and 1958 showed a clear trend toward the Labour party. Constantly the Leader of the Opposition, Hugh Gatskell, challenged the Prime Minister to dissolve Parliament and "go to the country." But Macmillan simply waited for the tide to turn in his direction, which finally happened with the economic upturn in the spring and summer of 1959. He thereupon called the election for early October and succeeded in increasing his majority. In other words, he gambled--

correctly, as events proved--on a long-term change. Yet in the short run, i.e., during his first two years as Premier, he and his government and party were unrepresentative of the national majority.

As befits so large and heterogeneous a society, the system of representation in the United States stands at the opposite extreme from the streamlined procedures which serve the needs of three million New Zealanders. It was noted earlier that the three elected organs of the federal government reproduce the three levels of the federal union. More than that, however, the variations in their terms of office are designed to encourage the persons elected to represent interests that may extend through different time-periods. Indeed, the structure of representation in the United States suggests a meaningful connection between the two aspects of time and space. The Representative, Senator, and President, are elected from constituencies varying in size from the congressional district to the state and from the state to the nation, and for terms, respectively, of two, six, and four years.

It follows from these contrasts that electorates of such different sizes will provide the elected person with different combinations of interests to represent, and that he, in thinking about re-election from the standpoint of his own political future, will be responding to factors of varying range and scope. Compare the insecurity of the Representative, unless he happens to be elected from an area with a permanent, one-sided, majority, with the relative security of the Senator. It should evidently be easier for the Senate as a body, combining six-year terms with staggered elections, to take a statesmanlike view of the nation's long-term interests. On the other hand, one can expect the House of Representatives to be sensitive to the immediate mood. Similar behavior does not emanate from two chambers so differently constituted. Nor should it. In fact, they represent genuine differences

both in space and time. Moreover, although the American system does not permit the flexibility of advancing or postponing the date of an election, an element of automatic responsiveness is reintroduced in the form of the biennial congressional elections of the entire House and of one-third of the Senate--a method of consulting the popular will with even greater frequency than in little New Zealand.

A word about the presidential term is also relevant here. With four years to serve, a President in a formal sense is more secure than a Representative, but less so than a Senator, though in reality the powers at his disposal, if he knows how to use them, make him stronger than both branches of Congress combined. Actually it has become normal for a President to seek and win a second term, so much so that in this century only two (Taft and Hoover) have failed to be re-elected. If one calculates the average presidential term, beginning with the inauguration of McKinley in 1897 and ending with the completion of President Johnson's term in 1969, it works out at exactly six years. Two Presidents were assassinated, while another pair have died in office. But it was one of the latter, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who broke a tradition of a century and a half by winning four consecutive elections and serving just over twelve years--a feat which has since been prohibited by constitutional amendment.

All in all, as practice indicates, four years appear the optimum term under contemporary conditions. Such an interval between elections strikes an appropriate balance between the representation of short- and long-run interests and between the needs for some change and some continuity.

There is yet another way in which the representative system attempts to reconcile these opposite aims. A citizen votes, not merely as an individual, but also as a member of various organizations (e.g., a church,

trade union, farmers' association, etc.) or as belonging to an unorganized, yet identifiable, cluster (e.g., the aged, university graduates, an ethnic or racial minority, etc.). These have social and political relevance because of the impact of their demands on government policy. If representation is to be meaningful, if it is to be, as certain theorists have claimed, a "mirror of society," it must somehow find expression for interests and groupings of this kind.

Intentionally, however, the reflection of such groupings is inexact. The reason is that the primary concern of government is with Man the Citizen, and secondarily with Man the Producer, the Consumer, the Protestant, the Graduate, and so on. Representation on a geographical basis does not lend itself too readily to the explicit articulation of ethnic or functional groups per se, except, as mentioned before, in the special cases where these happen to be regionally concentrated. Undeniably, it matters politically and makes a genuine difference if a special interest or minority group is concentrated or dispersed. Geographical distribution is directly related to political power, since persons who are scattered will ordinarily carry less weight than the same number assembled.

In the former case, if the group is identifiable and organized, it can bargain with the government on issues that affect it by threatening to switch its votes to the other side, and in areas of marginal loyalty this threat can have an effect. But a concentrated group exercises more leverage. For certain, it will control the local government of its area, besides influencing the national representation from that district. Examples abound, and come readily to mind, of persons who in this sense truly represent their area and its inhabitants, although nationally they are unrepresentative of the majority. In 1967, for instance, the case occurred in the United States

of Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, elected from the Harlem district of New York City, whom a large majority of the House of Representatives voted to expel on grounds of misuse of public funds as a committee chairman. Thereupon, he was immediately re-elected by the same district, receiving 85% of the votes.

A central legislature has the responsibility of attempting to elicit the national interest. The particular elements of which any country is composed are rightly represented there, but it is in order that they may be harmonized and united within a broader synthesis. No one has perceived with more insight than Rousseau this notion of the general interest of a whole community to be discovered and willed through the political process, although he denied this could be done by representatives and he was utterly self-contradictory about how the general will could be recognized and known. With Rousseau, the general will consists of a purely formal category precisely because the general interest is indefinable in terms of specific content. It remains an aspiration, and none the less important on that account. The common good is the goal, and politics the quest.

The question is: Can the representative system do anything to promote a closer approximation to this ideal?

In one respect, it can. Let us reconsider the point which is fundamental: Whom, and what, do representatives represent? Everybody will answer that they represent the citizens who voted for them, and, in an ultimate sense, that is, of course, correct. In the proximate sense, however, this is illusory. When many millions have voted with the result that a few hundred have been elected, what does it mean to say that so few represent so many? Realistically, the citizen who votes in a democracy with universal suffrage does so as a member or supporter of a party, i.e., of a

group organized for the capture and control of governmental power. In modern democracies, it is the parties which form the political clusters mediating between the state and its individual citizens. The party comes as near as anything does at the present time to filling the need which Rousseau discerned as basic. In order to win power, it must appeal to as many particular interests as possible and amalgamate them into a general interest. Admittedly, it does this imperfectly. Even the name "party" indicates that its following is no more than partial. But in a political system containing two or more parties, their successive tenure of office can promote the national interest by doing justice over the long run to all sides in turn. This system is not without its advantages in offering periodically at least some choice among measures and men. That is the dialectic, neither of Hegel nor Marx, but of democracy.

This view of the relationship between representative institutions and democratic goals leaves unresolved the ambiguity, noted earlier, which has been with us ever since Rousseau wrote the Social Contract. If a basic criterion of the democratic state is the discovery and declaration of the popular will, in what does that will consist?

Such a query bears closely on an age-old problem of political inquiry: how to justify the power of government. Two familiar answers are that it may be justified by virtue of knowledge or will. Its rightful exercise is then said to derive either from the superior knowledge that informs it or the superior will which inspires it, from knowing what to do or from wanting something done. Plato's philosopher-kings illustrate one doctrine; Locke's notion of consent, the other. Both concepts, of course, contain their difficulties. Since they are mortal men and therefore fallible, even the supremely wise must err at times. So, too, will the people--or else,



it may be so badly divided as to have no clear judgment.

Representative institutions inject an extra dimension into this problem. Placed between the will and the power, chosen by the former so as to guide the latter, are our representatives able to combine a knowledge of what the voters want with knowledge of what policy is best? One would like to be able to think so. But respect for experience suggests a note of caution before wholly assenting to this proposition. Any independent observer who is acquainted with the facts of political life can cite numerous instances of two contrasted situations. Sometimes, the majority opinion of the representatives is wiser and more enlightened than the majority of the public. On other occasions, the reverse holds true. In both cases, what one notices is that the representatives have failed to represent, since their viewpoint is either better or worse than that of the voters, but decidedly not the same.

Proof of this is offered continually in countries which employ the referendum and the initiative. Where these procedures are available, the voters have many opportunities to express agreement or dissatisfaction with what the elected persons have done or omitted. Some years back, the government of Sweden submitted to national referendum the question whether to convert the highways to driving on the right. It found that the majority preferred not to change its habits. More recently, the government introduced the change, without further reference to the people, thus bringing Sweden into conformity with continental practice. Switzerland is a highly democratic country--but only for its men, who refuse to vote favorably on referenda or initiatives to enfranchise women in federal elections. In California, the state legislature made it illegal to decline to sell or rent a house or apartment under circumstances that involved discrimination

against the race of the would-be purchaser or tenant. Later, this law was overruled by a majority of the voters on an initiative amending the state constitution. Still later, that amendment was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court as a violation of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. As for France, which has enjoyed a full share of elections and referenda since 1958, is it in fact governed today by the general will or by the will of the General?

Should the representative, then, represent what he believes the people want or what he himself believes to be best for them? This is not an easy question to answer unequivocally. If one always follows the former principle, one must occasionally vote in favor of some stupidity. If the latter, one would sometimes act as an authoritarian, doing "good" to others who do not see it in the same light. Since politics does not allow for universals, and since any valid generalization involves the calculus of alternative advantages and losses, for a democracy there should be no final doubt of the choice. The representative's duty is, assuredly, to act in conformity with the wishes of the majority who place him where he is-- assuming always that a majority did elect him and that its preferences are clear. Should either proviso be lacking, he is free to follow his own best judgment, as is also the case when issues arise after an election on which public opinion has not officially been tested.

If someone demurs that from time to time this prescription may mean the support by the representative of what is backward or even bad, I have great sympathy with this objection. But I am more worried about the implications of the alternative principle. Once you acquiesce in the representative substituting his own judgment for the declared will of a voting majority, you begin to depart from democracy and you start on the

perilous, downward, slope to dictatorship.

Our institutions cannot save us, the people, from ourselves. When we make mistakes, the remedy is for us to correct them ourselves. When the majority judgment is unenlightened, the solution is not to take refuge in the authoritarian regime of even the wisest, but rather to improve the education of the general public. No representative system, which remains faithful to its principles, can rise much above the level of the people whom it serves.

Summary

Our systems of representation embody various concepts and institutions which have been derived from the political struggles and revolutions of the past, but now have to be applied to altered conditions.

In general, the unit of representation continues to be a geographical district. This means that wherever a locality has a distinctive character--ethnic, economic, etc.--that will be reflected in its representation, and the representative will be obliged to voice its point of view. When the character of a district is mixed, which usually happens when it is larger, the representative is able to exercise more discretion because the pressures upon him tend to cancel one another out.

The time-factor is as important as that of space. There are long-run interests and needs to be represented no less than the short-run. A legislature is representative of the sentiments prevailing when it was elected, but can become unrepresentative with the lapse of years. The two-year term of a federal representative in the United States, or the three years of a New Zealand parliamentarian, contrast with the six years of a U.S. Senator. General practice seems to favor around four years as the optimum mean-point between the opposite excesses of instability or continuity. In this respect, the practice of the flexible British House of Commons approximates closely to the precise term of the American presidency.

In an ultimate sense, representatives represent the people voting as individual citizens. In a proximate sense, the latter are grouped into organizations or identifiable clusters. Of these, the most important for politics are the parties whose function is to unite the particular interests under a broader conception of the common interest. Parties inject some coherence and meaning into the representation of many millions by a few

hundred. Their alternation in office is the dialectic of democracy.

A dilemma confronts the representative who has to choose between what the majority <sup>wants</sup> and what he may believe to be best. Experience with the referendum and initiative proves how frequently a legislature is unrepresentative of the people, being sometimes more enlightened and sometimes more backward. The plain duty of the representative is to do what the voters want when a majority has clearly expressed itself. If what the latter want is stupid, the remedy is to improve their judgment by raising the level of public education.

### Résumé

Nos systèmes de représentation incorporent des concepts et des institutions légués par les luttes politiques et les révolutions passées, et qui doivent correspondre à des situations changées.

En général, l'unité de représentation demeure géographique.

Chaque fois qu'une localité a un caractère distinct - ethnique, économique, etc. - cela se reflète donc dans sa représentation, et le représentant devra exprimer son point de vue. Lorsqu'un district a un caractère mixte, et c'est généralement le cas lorsqu'il est étendu, son représentant peut bénéficier d'une plus grande liberté de manœuvre, les pressions qu'il subit tendant à s'annuler les unes les autres.

Le temps est un facteur aussi important que l'espace. Il existe des intérêts et des besoins à long terme, qui doivent être représentés aussi bien que les intérêts et les besoins à court terme. Une assemblée représentative des sentiments qui prévalent au moment de son élection peut cesser d'être représentative avec le passage des années. Si un représentant fédéral a un mandat de deux ans aux États-Unis, si un parlementaire néo-zélandais a un mandat de trois ans, le mandat d'un Sénateur<sup>américain</sup> est de six ans. La pratique semble favoriser le mandat d'environ quatre ans comme un point optimum, situé à mi-chemin entre les excès opposés de l'instabilité et de la continuité. A cet égard, la pratique de la Chambre des Communes britannique est proche, tout en restant flexible; du mandat précis d'un Président américain.

En théorie stricte, les représentants représentent le peuple participant au scrutin comme un ensemble de citoyens. En fait, les citoyens sont groupés en organisations ou en ensembles identifiables. Les plus importants dans la vie politique sont les partis politiques, dont la fonction est d'unir les intérêts particuliers dans une conception plus large de l'intérêt commun. Les partis instillent de la cohérence et de la signification dans la représentation de millions d'électeurs par quelques centaines de représentants. Leur succession au pouvoir est la dialectique de la démocratie.

Le représentant qui doit choisir entre la volonté de la majorité et la ligne qui lui paraît à lui-même la meilleure se trouve face à un dilemme. L'expérience du référendum et de l'initiative prouve qu'une assemblée est souvent non représentative - parfois plus éclairée et parfois moins éclairée que ceux qu'elle représente. Le devoir d'un représentant est de faire ce que veulent les électeurs, dès lors qu'une majorité s'est exprimée clairement. Si ce que veulent les électeurs est stupide, il convient d'améliorer leur jugement en relevant le niveau de l'éducation politique.

"Theory and practice of representation"

FUNCTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND THE DANGER  
OF COMPARTMENTALIZATION

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Functional representation and the danger  
of compartmentalization

by Herbert J. Spiro

"To represent" means to be there on behalf of someone. Any sensible discussion of the subject requires that we ask at least the following four questions: Who is where, on behalf of whom, to do what? (These questions, incidentally, more or less correspond to the Aristotelian causes, the material, the formal, the efficient, and the final.)

Until the rise of popular government in modern times, there was no genuine theory of representation, since the people who mattered themselves were where it mattered to be, to do relatively undifferentiated things. As notions of popular government -- government somehow based upon the consent of at least some of the governed -- were developing, in the eighteenth century, members of parliaments, who were at the seat of the central government, were beginning to be thought of as being there on behalf of at least a part -- usually the weightier part -- of the people of their district, estate, or other constituency. They were there to parlay with the central government -- usually the Crown or its agents -- on behalf of their constituents. Those subjects who had no one to speak to the central government on their behalf wanted the equal franchise for themselves for such general representative purposes.

Rousseau denied the possibility of representation in precisely this context. Ordinary citizens have their wills, which must somehow be brought into contact with the will of the government. But, "Will does not admit of representation: it is either the same or other; there is no intermediate possibility." No one can be at the seat of the central government, to parlay with it on my behalf, and do me

justice. Hence the English people lived under the illusion of a freedom that took on reality only when the voters exercised their wills to elect their representatives.<sup>(1)</sup>

While Rousseau denied the possibility of representation of will, Marx asserted that all power, including knowledge, is always applied for representative purposes. The power of a bourgeois democratic government is exercised by people who are there on behalf of the exploiting capitalist minority class. The rulers are not there on behalf of the exploited working majority class. Bourgeois democratic representation is therefore not enough, even if earlier systems of representation may have been more adequate from the Marxian viewpoint:

In earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold gradation of social rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, plebeians, slaves; in the Middle Ages, feudal lords, vassals, guild-masters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs.

But this rich articulation of precapitalist society was destroyed by capitalism itself. In other words, to the extent that representative institutions may have existed and operated in earlier historical stages, they had a great many different economic and social groupings to represent. Capitalism, however, "has simplified the class antagonism. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other - bourgeoisie and proletariat."<sup>(2)</sup> Previously, men belonging to different ones of the many layers in society could fulfill themselves through whatever work or non-work their station and its duties (or functions) demanded of them. They did not really need to have others acting on their

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(1) Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book III, chapter 15.

(2) Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (New York: International Publishers, 1932) p. 9.

behalf elsewhere. But since capitalism has destroyed this relative richness of opportunities to diversify and to fulfill oneself, since it has turned man into an economic animal and since it has alienated the individual through its peculiar division of labor, genuine representation becomes more necessary and, at the same time, more difficult to achieve under capitalism than under any earlier or later social system. Under capitalism, the goal of the working class must be to achieve class control of the instruments of production by their own representatives. According to the Marxian teaching, this control can be achieved only through the overthrow of the capitalist class by the Communist movement, which is highly representative of the proletariat and, because of this, of the future interests of the future classless society. In this interpretation, in other words, representation is viewed as a more important function under capitalism than it could have been in the more richly diversified and stratified previous social forms, or than it was likely to be in the less coercive future, when each human being would be giving and getting according to ability and need, through some apparently automatic mechanism which might actually eliminate altogether the need for representation - for having someone at the central government on behalf of others.

Through the revisionists, this current of thought ultimately experienced a confluence with another stream that also looked back nostalgically to the Middle Ages and beyond. Out of the confluence of Marxism and Christian Socialism emerged the advocacy of functional representation, in economic and other corporatist councils, and also such theories as (and some of the practices of) German co-determination (Mitbestimmung). The theoretical conclusions can turn out to be fairly drastic, as Professor Birch shows in his condensation of G.D.H. Cole's views of representation:

First, Cole maintained that true representation 'is always specific and functional': it is impossible to represent men as men /echoes of Rousseau/, but possible to represent 'certain purposes common to groups of individuals'. It follows, second, that elections based on geographical constituencies can only result in misrepresentation, and the best hope for democracy is 'to find an association and method of representation for each function' in society. This would involve, third, the replacement of Parliament by a 'system of co-ordinated functional representative bodies', each concerned with particular interests and activities. This plan would mean that citizens with a variety of interests would have a number of representatives, and Cole suggested that the familiar slogan 'One man, one vote' should be replaced by a new slogan: 'One man, as many votes as interests, but only one vote in relation to each interest.'(1)

Rousseau denied the possibility of representation because it involved will, and will emanates from the integrated human being. Cole apparently denied the possibility of representing men as men because, in his time, they were no longer integrated human beings but rather bundles, more or less, of loosely related interests, which, because they exist in a very multi-functional society, can be in conflict with one another within a single individual. Man is no longer integrated, as he was before genuine representation was considered either desirable or feasible. He disintegrates into conflicting interests and on top of that he is alienated. Modern industrial society makes this more or less inevitable. The best way to deal with it is a "system of co-ordinated functional representative bodies."

Of course, neither in Great Britain nor in most other English-speaking countries were formal economic councils or other functional representative bodies actually constituted, as they were in continental Europe. However, in almost all highly differentiated modern political systems did informal functional representation develop in fact.

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(1) A.H. Birch, Representative and Responsible Government (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1964), p. 109. The citations are from Cole's Social Theory (London, 1920). Italics supplied.

Special interest groups were organized, and individuals either actually belonged to several of these, or else they identified themselves with these organizations, or the latter claimed to speak for wider or narrower followings. "Lobbyists" or their functional equivalents spoke on behalf of their purported functional constituents to central bureaucracies and, equally important, to "the other representatives," i.e., those representatives who had a clearer historical claim to being there on behalf of others in order to parlay with the central government on their behalf.

In pre-modern societies arranged "into various orders" in "a manifold gradation of social rank," direct participation in the affairs of the individual's particular order or rank was possible and indeed usually encouraged. In contemporary complex "mass" societies, direct participation is no longer possible, for at least four related reasons: (1) Too many people are aware of and, therefore, interested in the policies of the many different groupings with which each identifies himself. (2) These people are aware and interested in too many different ways for any of them to make reasonable, "integrated" contributions to the affairs of any one of these many groupings. (3) There are too few central points at which the activities of the many individuals and groupings converge in ways sufficiently controllable, to subject their interactions to the influence of directly participating individuals. And (4) individual goals and motives are so complex and internally contradictory, that direct participation even if it were feasible would be thwarted by (to use a short-hand term) alienation.

These obstacles placed in the path of direct participation, combined with the difficulties inherent in contemporary schemes of "straight," i.e., non-functional representation, explain the frequent preoccupation of political theorists in the twentieth century with functional representation. The individual is no longer where it

matters. The points where it matters to be have become inaccessible to him. A variety of new-fangled schemes designed to enable him to make those who are at these central points more responsive and accountable to him have had only indifferent success. Neither local, nor regional, nor national electoral districts, in neither direct nor indirect elections, under neither single-member nor proportional representation schemes have usually achieved their historic purposes (in cases of arrangements perpetuated with little change over long periods of time) or the intentions of their designers (in cases of deliberately "engineered" electoral schemes of the last half century). The obstacles to direct participation and the failures of conventional representation explain the repeated advocacy of functional representation.

Of course, wherever partial systems of functional representation have been put into operation, they have not overcome the obstacles to direct participation or the difficulties inherent in non-functional representative schemes; on the contrary, they have occasionally aggravated these problems. That, however, is not the focus of the present critique of functional representation, which is concerned rather with the dangers of compartmentalization. Those on whose behalf others "are there" are threatened with compartmentalization of their personalities by functional representation.

Multiple functional representation of the kind advocated by G.D.H. Cole could lead to a situation in which the individual citizen, whose varied interests are being represented, would have a hard time keeping track of the activities of his various representatives. This already happens, of course, even under conventional systems of geographical representation at various "horizontal" levels. It also happens where a conventional representative system overlaps with one or more partial systems of functional

representation, as for example in those continental countries whose constitutions provide for economic councils, or in the Federal Republic of Germany where the institutionalization of the right to codetermination (Mitbestimmungsrecht) has given employees certain functional representation within large corporate enterprises without at the same time establishing industry-wide or federal organs of functional representation.

As it happens, the present critique was stimulated by the discussion of workers' participation in decision-making in economic enterprises, based partly upon the West German experience, which took place at the IPSA Round Table on "The Politics and Government of Economic Organizations," held in Jablonna, Poland, in September 1966. It seemed to me that that discussion initially placed excessive emphasis upon the participation of workers as workers in decision-making within economic enterprises, at the cost of neglecting the effects upon an enterprise and its employees of decisions made outside the enterprise (by persons who may be more or less representative of a variety of constituencies), and at the cost of neglecting also the workers' participation in making decisions, partly through normal channels of political representation, which will have indirect effects upon the enterprise employing them. In times of economic normalcy, it may appear both to industrial workers and to "political economists" that the individual worker is most seriously affected in his everyday life by decisions made within the corporation for which he works, and that, therefore, he ought to be given optimum opportunities to contribute to these decisions. In times of economic crisis, like that pervading the West German coal mining industry at present, the relative irrelevance of workers' representation on the corporation's governing boards becomes evident. Whether a particular coal pit will or will not be closed down, and what is to become of the consequently unemployed miners,

cannot be decided by management, union, or some industrial coordinating organization. It has to be decided by the governments involved, usually in consultation with interest groups like those mentioned. Paradoxically, the miner whose existence as specialized miner becomes most dramatically evident at such a time, at the same time also is treated more like a general citizen (and also makes more demands as such than ever before) except perhaps than when he is called upon to risk his life as a soldier.

Excessive, or even exclusive, preoccupation with the representation of specialized functions can lead one to forget the whole individual human beings who are believed to be performing functions or pursuing interests. This danger may help to explain the somehow uninspiring character of much of the literature on functional representation. A comment made by Karl Marx in quite a different context illustrates the point: "Theory ... argues ad hominem as soon as it becomes radical. To be radical means to take things by their roots. The root for man, however, is man himself."<sup>(1)</sup> To which one might add nowadays, "man in his total existence, not as a loose bundle of differentiated functions."

Who is where, on behalf of whom, and to do what? This last teleological question is the critical one that must be asked of proposals of functional representation. For what purpose do representatives represent? The functionalists would presumably answer: to give voice to the specialized functional interests of their constituents. If they agree, as most of them seem to do, that each person has several different functional interests requiring representation; and if, further, they go along with Cole's suggestion that the single national parliament be replaced by a "system of co-ordinated functional representative bodies"; then two questions about the nature of this co-ordination are raised: First, how will

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(1) Karl Marx, Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie.



co-ordination among the representative bodies be achieved? Second and of greater importance, how will the individual think about co-ordinating his various interests, including those that may be in conflict with one another? This is where the danger of compartmentalization arises. If representational co-ordination is relatively loose, the individual may tend to live his life in various compartments in such a way, that his activities in one of these are not integrated with or even related to his activities in another. Ultimately this can lead to the kind of "schizophrenia" that in fact characterizes some citizens - frequently even leaders - of contemporary political systems in periods of malaise. On the other hand, if representational co-ordination is excessively tight, the individual may subordinate all his varied interests to the one receiving the greatest emphasis at the level of national representation of functions; e.g., the Eichmann type. In both cases, the individual is broken up or compartmentalized, the wholeness of his being is destroyed, and the effects of this destruction are likely to have deleterious consequences far beyond the individual.

This suggests that, in a sense, Rousseau was right. Will does not admit of representation, at least not for very long. (A less explicit insight may account for the institution of recall, and of relatively short terms of certain elected officials, in the United States of America, especially in populist areas and eras.) If one's will is represented for a long period of time, and more particularly when the actions of various functional representative bodies are in conflict with one another, then the decisions of one's functional representatives are likely to have a compartmentalizing effect upon the represented. He may either try to divorce in his own mind his different functional interests from one another. Or he may feel that the conflict among his representatives places him under such

stress, that he finds it unbearable and seeks escape through withdrawal into non-participation. In this case, functional representation, originally advocated as a means of overcoming the modern barriers to direct participation, results in an end to all participation.

All men living in modern societies have interests that are in constant conflict with one another. The basic conflict arises, to state it in its most general terms, from two opposing interests that each human being has: first, the interest in the expansion of consciousness; second, the interest in some integration of the conflicting goals he pursues. Schemes of functional representation may further the first general interest, by generating new issues and new awareness of the possibilities of change. In other words, such schemes, by expanding politics, may contribute to the expansion of consciousness. Conventional non-functional systems of representation are more likely to further the second general interest, that is, integration of conflicting goals. (In this context, we should bear in mind that representation is performed not only by legislatures and parliaments, but by bureaucracies, judiciaries, monarchs, military, and literally all political institutions and personnel.)

In different political systems, and within one system at different points in time, either the expansion of consciousness or the integration of conflicting goals will be considered most desirable, in a constantly on-going dialectical process. In a period of stagnation and dormancy, the stimulation of awareness through the development of politics is often preferred. During a period of anarchic diffuseness, the integration or re-integration of conflicting goals will be sought in preference to their further proliferation. In every modern political system, at any moment in time, some members will prefer the first to the second, others the second to the first. Functional representation cannot aid integration and, to the extent that it leads to compartmentalization, it is unlikely to help the expansion of consciousness.

Summary

The modern theory of functional representation, in economic and other corporatist councils, stems out of the confluence of Marxism and Christian Socialism. It emphasizes that in industrial society, man is no longer an integrated individual; he disintegrates into conflicting interests, and a system of co-ordinated functional representative bodies becomes necessary. Such a system - and we have some actual experience - could however compartmentalize representation in a dangerous fashion; moreover, how is coordination to be achieved? Schemes of functional representation may further the expansion of political consciousness; conventional representation is more likely to further the integration of conflicting goals.

Résumé

La théorie moderne de la représentation au moyen de conseils corporatifs ou autres provient d'une conjonction du marxisme et du socialisme chrétien. Selon cette théorie, dans la société industrielle l'homme a cessé d'être un individu intégré ; il s'est désintégré en un faisceau d'intérêts contraires, ce qui rend nécessaire un système de représentation fonctionnelle coordonnée. Un tel système - et nous en avons des exemples - peut toutefois démembrer la représentation de façon dangereuse ; en outre, comment opérer la coordination ? Les systèmes de représentation fonctionnelle peuvent conduire à l'élargissement de la conscience politique ; la représentation de type traditionnel a plus de chances de promouvoir le rapprochement d'objectifs divergents.

Br/Representation/4

"Théorie et pratique de la représentation"

LE FONCTIONNEMENT DU SYSTEME REPRESENTATIF  
DANS LA CONFEDERATION SUISSE

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LE FONCTIONNEMENT DU SYSTEME REPRESENTATIF  
DANS LA CONFEDERATION SUISSE

par Erich Gruner

Selon la doctrine démocratique de l'Etat, le système représentatif, tel qu'il s'est développé en Europe et aux Etats-Unis depuis le XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, doit permettre à la population d'un Etat démocratique de désigner, grâce à des élections générales et libres, les organes législatifs centraux responsables; il doit assurer ainsi, de même, la mise en valeur de tous les intérêts, de toutes les opinions qui se trouvent dans le peuple.

Cette définition ne voile pas les dangers inhérents au système, qui peuvent l'empêcher de fonctionner comme la Constitution le prévoit. Nous pensons ici à toutes les possibilités qui existent de manipuler l'exercice des droits électoraux au profit de quelques groupes sociaux, économiques ou linguistiques, ou bien de limiter le choix des représentants populaires à certaines couches de la population : par des mesures juridiques, quand les députés ne sont pas dédommagés pour leur fonction, par exemple, ou par des obstacles d'autre nature lorsque l'ascension politique est impossible à l'une ou l'autre des couches populaires, socialement et économiquement, et lorsque les minorités linguistiques subissent une discrimination dans leur représentation. Il peut se produire aussi que les changements de personnel, dans la députation, soient limités parce que les partis, organisateurs de l'élection, empêchent le renouvellement des élites en manifestant des tendances à l'oligarchie et en coupant la base d'une participation véritable à la désignation des candidats.

Plus diverse et plus hétérogène est la population, plus grand est le danger de voir une majorité, ou une minorité importante, ignorer, voire même opprimer, les groupes minoritaires plus petits et d'un moindre poids. Mais l'autre extrême est tout aussi dangereux, qui, en assurant savamment une représentation trop forte à tous les groupes minoritaires, rend impossible la formation rapide et efficace d'une volonté nationale et donne libre cours à la manifestation d'esprits de clocher. On ne peut écarter

l'idée que la Suisse, Etat fédératif multinational et multiconfessionnel, est exposée tout spécialement à cette dénaturation. La "démocratie témoin", telle que la voit André Siegfried, est menacée de devenir une multitude d'entités étatiques lilliputiennes qui paraîtrait à un Gulliver - rappelons le Gulliver de l'Exposition nationale de 1964, qui posait à tous les visiteurs des questions embarrassantes - comme une pièce de musée des Antiques. Gabriel Almond<sup>1</sup> distingue la civilisation politique homogène et séculaire des démocraties anglo-saxonnes (et nord-européennes) de la "civilisation politique fragmentée" des pays d'Europe continentale, où de nombreux antagonismes sociaux, confessionnels, culturels et philosophico-religieux rendent tout équilibre difficile à établir ou bien, comme en Suisse, compartimentent à tel point la formation de la volonté politique que celle-ci souffre d'une inertie énorme et menace souvent d'étouffer sous le poids de réassurances réciproques multiples. Une autre particularité du système représentatif suisse provient du fait que l'efficacité de l'action des représentants populaires est limitée par l'existence de la démocratie directe qui accorde au peuple le dernier mot dans la législation. Dans l'Etat fédéral, seul existe en matière législative le referendum facultatif, dont le peuple fait usage très modérément en regard de l'ensemble de la législation. Alors que, depuis 1874, 871 lois ont été soumises au referendum facultatif, celui-ci n'a été saisi que dans 69 des cas (7,5 %); 23 lois ont été acceptées et 46 seulement ont été rejetées. 5 % environ des 871 lois seulement, donc, ont été repoussées par le souverain. Cependant, l'effet du referendum sur la législation va beaucoup plus loin. Il faut se rendre compte que, dans la plupart des cas, la menace seule du referendum influence déjà considérablement le contenu des lois. La pression sociale et morale que les partis et les groupes d'intérêts exercent sur les organes représentatifs contribue sans doute plus à dévaloriser la tâche des élus populaires que le referendum qui suit leur décision. Ainsi, pour citer un exemple d'actualité, un programme financier urgent tendant à créer des recettes supplémentaires indispensables a été saboté par les partis et les groupes d'intérêts avant de parvenir au stade

des délibérations parlementaires. Aucune recherche scientifique systématique n'a été malheureusement encore conduite sur la mesure dans laquelle des lois, qui n'ont ensuite été combattues par le peuple, ont perdu le caractère qu'elles avaient initialement, sur des points essentiels, et au cours des délibérations préliminaires, par le seul effet de menaces de referendum.

Mais jetons tout d'abord un regard sur la signification et la fonction qu'attribuèrent à la représentation populaire les fondateurs de l'Etat fédératif en 1848, et voyons ce qu'il en est advenu jusqu'à nos jours. L'Assemblée fédérale peut être considérée comme le centre de la vie politique suisse, à l'égal du Parlement anglais ou des deux Chambres de la Troisième République. Cependant, alors que le Parlement anglais, avec sa lutte entre parti gouvernemental et parti d'opposition, ou les Chambres françaises, avec leurs coalitions de partis, sont le tremplin de la lutte pour le pouvoir, notre système de gouvernement collégial empêche les forces politiques de se mesurer ouvertement au Parlement en vue de déterminer la politique du gouvernement. Le Conseil fédéral n'est en effet pas un Cabinet qui dépende de la confiance d'une majorité parlementaire et qui puisse être contraint de démissionner par un vote de censure. Il est certes élu par l'Assemblée fédérale, soit par les deux Chambres réunies. Mais c'est une exception, dans la longue histoire de notre Etat, que des conseillers fédéraux n'aient pas été réélus. Notre gouvernement ne peut donc pratiquement être renversé, et personne ne songe à demander la censure.

Avant l'introduction, en 1874, du referendum, et avant la forte expansion de l'administration fédérale, vers la fin du siècle, le poids politique du Parlement est fort respectable. Le Conseil fédéral, bien qu'il ne dépende pas d'un vote de confiance, est encore complètement dans l'ombre du pouvoir législatif. Mais, depuis lors, l'activité parlementaire se

trouve progressivement limitée par celles de l'exécutif et de l'administration et ramenée à un contrôle de ces deux dernières. Le travail législatif se réduit à un échange entre les pouvoirs. La politique tourne à l'administration, selon André Siegfried qui disait de notre pays qu'il était administré et non gouverné. Les contemporains ne voient dans le parlement, du moins au cours des premières décennies de l'Etat fédéral, aucune représentation des groupes sociaux ou économiques que l'on pourrait dénombrer en fonction de leur importance relative. Bien au contraire, la théorie de la représentation populaire démocratique souligne l'existence du peuple en tant qu'unité politique, ce qui est précisément en contradiction avec le principe antérieur de la représentation des cantons. On comprend cette insistance à vouloir faire de l'unité politique le fondement de la représentation populaire, lorsqu'on se souvient du rôle que les cantons ont joué jusqu'en 1848 dans l'ancienne Confédération. Le Pacte de 1815, issu de la réaction de 1814-15, prive la Suisse de la personnalité propre qu'elle s'était péniblement forgée pendant les années de l'Etat unitaire helvétique, et rétablit la souveraineté des cantons presque sans limitations. Il n'est donc pas étonnant que rien ne soit autant souhaité en 1848 que l'unité nationale, et que la représentation se fixe dans la négation de l'éparpillement de la souveraineté qui caractérisait, en le paralysant, le régime précédent. Le fédéralisme se voit rejeté dans la réserve que constitue, dans le système bicaméral, la représentation des cantons au Conseil des Etats. C'est au sein de celui-ci, dont le poids politique est alors de facto bien moindre que celui du Conseil national, de la représentation populaire à proprement parler, que doivent trouver légitimement leur terrain les revendications des minorités régionales, linguistiques et confessionnelles à être représentées. Le Conseil des Etats est bien un organe de la Confédération, mais qui n'est qu'une représentation adjacente des cantons, à côté de celle de l'ensemble du peuple<sup>2</sup>.

Revenons au Conseil national qui est, par conséquent, l'unique représentation véritable de la Confédération. Martin Drath<sup>3</sup> fait avec raison remarquer que l'idée de représentation est issue de la négation glo-



bale des conditions sociales et politiques existantes. A cause de la simplicité d'une revendication négative fondamentale de ce genre, et à cause de la force unificatrice qui provient de la lutte contre ce qu'on nie en bloc, la représentation apparaît facilement comme une unité, juridiquement et socialement, cela aussi en Suisse. C'est de cette époque que datent, selon Drath, les images simplificatrices du processus de représentation populaire. En effet, les députés, au nom du mythe unitaire d'alors, se sentaient véritablement chacun les représentants indépendants du peuple entier. Le phénomène n'était alors possible de facto que parce que l'unité était garantie par une couche sociale aisée et cultivée, qui exerçait la conduite des affaires politiques. On part ainsi, comme dans tous les Etats constitutionnels, de tendances sociales déterminées dont les défenseurs assumaient alors la fonction de la représentation populaire et considéraient celle-ci comme leur étant dévolue. L'unité du peuple entier découle alors ainsi naturellement de celle de la couche sociale et culturelle dominante.

Pour les fondateurs de l'Etat fédéral, le Conseil national constitue donc en premier lieu une chambre populaire représentant l'unité du peuple, appelée précisément à surmonter la dispersion des intérêts cantonaux que l'on connaissait auparavant. Sans doute reconnaissent-ils eux aussi que le peuple est représenté "pour ou contre l'état de choses existant". Mais pourtant, le peuple qui élit ses députés apparaît uni, parce que ces derniers représentent les tendances confessionnelles et politiques qu'il approuve dans sa grande majorité. Cela trouve une expression dans le célèbre article 91 de la Constitution fédérale de 1848, valable encore aujourd'hui : Les membres des deux Conseils votent sans instructions. Le commentaire de Burckhardt<sup>4</sup> sur cet article est caractéristique. Selon lui, les députés ne sont pas représentants du peuple en ce sens qu'ils sont les porte-parole de leurs électeurs, mais ils sont élus parce qu'ils sont d'accord avec leurs électeurs, ou parce que subsiste la possibilité réelle pour ceux-ci d'élire les personnes dont les convictions concordent avec les leurs, et, lorsque cette concordance cesse, de remplacer leurs députés par d'autres.

Le mode électoral, le système majoritaire à deux ou à trois tours, lui aussi est au service de l'idée d'une représentation uniforme du peuple. On entend exclure autant que possible de la représentation la partie des électeurs qui pensent autrement, à l'aide du système unilatéral des cercles électoraux et d'autres manipulations limitant la liberté des votations. En fait, cet état de choses contribue aussi à ce que des minorités politiques se désintéressent plus ou moins du scrutin. Nos connaissances sur les élections du temps du système majoritaire sont si minces - pour une part aussi du fait que l'on ne connaît pas du tout, avant l'introduction du referendum, le nombre des électeurs inscrits - que nous ne disposons d'aucun chiffre assuré sur la participation aux scrutins. A en conclure selon certaines données sporadiques, on peut toutefois admettre qu'elle oscillait entre 5 et 25 % lors des élections fédérales qui ont lieu de 1848 à 1875. A vrai dire, elle ne dépasse souvent plus 50 % même au XXe siècle. On ne s'inquiète pas non plus de savoir si en dehors de ces partis d'opposition, traités en quantités négligeables, on n'en arrive pas à ce que certains groupes sociaux ne participent plus aux votations. Il ne nous est certes pas possible de répondre à cette question, faute de connaître le déroulement exact des élections. On peut toutefois affirmer que, grâce au système majoritaire, le parti radical au pouvoir, qui avait gagné la guerre civile de 1847 et créé l'Etat fédéral de 1848, a conservé la majorité dans les deux Chambres législatives et au Conseil fédéral jusqu'en 1919, au moment où fut institué le mode proportionnel pour l'élection du Conseil national. L'effet du système majoritaire sur la sous-représentation des conservateurs, et particulièrement des groupes conservateurs réformés, est frappant; pour exemple, nous présentons les rapports de forces et les élus au Conseil national en 1884 ( entre parenthèses : pourcentages) :

<u>Partis</u>	<u>Electeurs</u>	<u>Elus selon système majoritaire</u>	<u>Elus selon système proportionnel</u>
Radicaux	187.000 (50,9)	88 (60,6)	73 (50,3)
Conservateurs catholiques	99.000 (26,9)	36 (24,9)	40 (27,6)
Conservateurs réformés	81.000 (22,2)	21 (14,5)	32 (22,1)
Total	367.000 (100)	145 (100)	145 (100)

Il ne faut cependant pas oublier, à ce propos, que les faibles chances données aux minoritaires de conduire leur parti à la victoire, provoque l'abstentionnisme politique. Ainsi, en 1884, sur 640.000 électeurs, seuls 57 % prennent part à l'élection.

Une grande partie des abstentionnistes doit s'être recrutée dans la classe des travailleurs, entre autre parce que les ouvriers sont exclus du scrutin par des obstacles légaux. Le droit de vote dépend encore, au XIXe siècle, du paiement d'un impôt sur la fortune, sur le revenu ou encore d'une taxe personnelle. Celui qui ne paie pas d'impôts, et c'est là ce que l'ouvrier ne peut que souhaiter pour des motifs financiers, perd son droit de vote. De nombreux travailleurs sont en outre exclus du scrutin par les dispositions très strictes relatives à l'assistance, aux faillites et aux délais en matière de paiement des impôts. Le pasteur zurichois Hirzel déclare en 1853, dans une conférence sur la question ouvrière donnée à l'Association des pasteurs : "Queul peut être l'intérêt de l'ouvrier pour l'Etat ? Il lui indiffère de savoir qui gouverne, pourvu que la fabrique marche, afin qu'il ait de quoi manger. Il ne connaît de l'Etat que les côtés négatifs ... en tant que percepteur d'impôts et responsable d'une police peu appréciée". Les travailleurs ne se sont donc que peu engagés dans la vie politique jusqu'au moment où, dès 1890, ils ont organisé leur propre parti et ont élu leurs députés comme représentants d'un parti de classe. Mais là encore, ils ne parviennent pas à obtenir une représentation équitable, le système majoritaire les empêchant d'exploiter toute leur force électorale. Il est à cet égard caractéristique

que le parti socialiste, à l'introduction de la proportionnelle, voit sa députation au Conseil national passer de 19 à 41 mandats, soit plus que double.

C'est seulement à ce moment-là que la question d'une juste représentation des différents groupes sociaux au Parlement est devenue actuelle en matière de discussion politique. C'est l'époque où les oppositions de caractère philosophique et religieux se trouvent, en politique, dépassées ou même remplacées par les oppositions de nature économique et sociale. A vrai dire, le jeune Etat fédéral connaît dès le début des groupements d'intérêts d'origine économique, qui sont les plus marqués en matière de politique ferroviaire. Mais ils sont soumis à des variations si fortes qu'il n'en résulte pas de groupements politico-économiques durables. En revanche, on est frappé de constater combien longtemps l'on s'en tient dans notre pays à l'unité en matière d'objectifs économiques, par exemple en ce qui concerne la politique commerciale, ceci par suite de la concordance des intérêts de l'industrie et de l'agriculture en matière d'exportation. C'est ainsi que les tentatives de noyautage des partis fondés spécialement sur une doctrine par des groupes d'intérêts économiques n'ont jamais pris dans notre pays, avant 1919, des formes aussi marquées que dans le Deuxième Reich par exemple. Cette prise d'influence y est si nette, tant chez les Deutsch- et les Reichskonservativen que chez les Nationalliberalen, en fonction des intérêts agricoles et industriels, qu'on croit avoir affaire, en Allemagne, à une représentation des classes. C'est ainsi que celui qui s'intéresse aujourd'hui à ce Reichstag en vient tout naturellement à se demander impérieusement si la structure sociale du peuple allemand se reflète bien - et comment - dans la composition du Reichstag sur le plan social<sup>5</sup>. A cet égard, deux faits sont frappants. Le premier est que les modifications profondes apportées par l'industrialisation du Deuxième Reich dans la structure des professions ne se reflètent que partiellement au Parlement, par exemple par l'accroissement marqué des représentants ouvriers. Le second est cependant que la représentation nettement exagérée de la noblesse et de l'agriculture au Reichstag, les

états les plus fidèles à la monarchie, provient manifestement de manipulations politiques.

Une telle tendance à la représentation d'intérêts professionnels ou de classe est certes beaucoup moins apparente en Suisse avant 1919. Et pourtant, on est en droit de se demander même chez nous si les modifications de la structure sociale et économique résultant de l'industrialisation se sont bien reflétées d'une manière quelconque dans la représentation parlementaire. Le choix de nos députés s'inspire-t-il nettement plus d'intérêts économiques que d'attitudes politiques à partir d'un certain moment ? Notre Assemblée fédérale est-elle même représentative de certaines structures de notre population ? Pour répondre à ces questions, nous comparerons l'évolution de la structure professionnelle du peuple tout entier aux changements de la structure professionnelle du Parlement, alors même que ces deux éléments ne peuvent se comparer que sous certaines réserves, par suite des lacunes de la statistique générale et des particularités de la statistique professionnelle pour ce qui est des parlementaires<sup>6</sup>.

Structure professionnelle de la population active de  
la Suisse de 1850 à 1960, en %

<u>Branches</u>	1850	1880	1900	1920	1960
Production du sol	57,4	42,4	31,0	26,1	11,7
Industrie à domicile	12,2	9,1	6,4	2,1	0,5
Artisanat	13,2	16,1	14,3	14,8	7,7
Construction	3,2	5,3	6,3	6,0	9,3
Industrie en fabrique	3,9	11,3	17,9	20,9	32,9
Commerce, banques, assurances			5,4	7,9	15,4
Hôtellerie		7,2	3,6	4,0	3,7
Transports	10,1	3,7	3,9	4,9	6,3
Services publics, sciences, arts, services privés sans économie mén.		3,5	4,2	5,4	8,6
Divers		1,4	7,0	7,9	3,9
Total ....	100	100	100	100	100

Structure professionnelle du Conseil national, en %

<u>Groupes professionnels</u>	<u>1848</u>	<u>1881</u>	<u>1899</u>	<u>1919</u>	<u>1960</u>
Agriculture	5,4	7,6	10,9	10,1	10,5
Artisanat et petits entrepreneurs	3,6	4,8	10,2	6,9	3,5
Industrie	8,1	13,8	8,8	4,3	) 9,0 <sup>1</sup>
Commerce, banques, assurances <sup>1</sup>	9,0	7,8	5,0	4,4	
Transports <sup>1</sup>		1,2	1,9	1,3	
Rentiers	4,5	4,8	3,4	0,5	2,0
Professions libérales	30,6	31,1	22,4	25,9	14,0
Profession principale de caractère public ou fonction politique	32,5	18,6 <sup>2</sup>	27,2 <sup>3</sup>	38,6 <sup>4</sup>	17,5 + 25,5 <sup>5</sup>
Services publics (fonctionnaires, maîtres et professeurs)	4,5	10,3	8,2	7,5	12,0
Divers <sup>6</sup>	1,8	0	2,0	0,5	6,0
Total ....	100	100	100	100	100

1. Inclus directeurs d'entreprises privées.
2. Dont 8 % de politiciens professionnels.
3. Dont 11 % de politiciens professionnels.
4. Dont 50 % de politiciens professionnels.
5. Politiciens professionnels, secrétaires et parti et d'association économique, journalistes.
6. Ouvriers et employés.

A cette réserve près, on peut cependant en tirer quelques conclusions importantes. La forte augmentation des représentants de la paysannerie par exemple, peut à n'en pas douter être mise en parallèle avec le net recul de la population paysanne. C'est en effet par une défense des intérêts professionnels que la paysannerie croit pouvoir compenser le mieux sur le plan politique sa position sociale minoritaire. Les arts et métiers ne sont pas parvenus à compenser de la même manière le recul de leur position, d'ailleurs moins marqué, en favorisant une représentation purement professionnelle. Quant à l'industrie, qui n'est bien entendu

guère représentée aux Chambres par des ouvriers mais presque exclusivement par des patrons, elle dénote une évolution inverse. Son importance s'accroissant dans l'économie nationale, elle estime pouvoir compenser le recul de sa représentation parlementaire en exerçant une influence indirecte par le moyen de ses associations économiques, c'est-à-dire ses groupes de pression. Il en va de même, encore que dans une mesure moins marquée, pour le commerce et les banques. Notre tableau est trop peu concluant en ce qui a trait à l'évolution des intérêts en matière de trafic, étant donné qu'il ne reflète pas les décennies antérieures à 1880, où dominent les "barons des chemins de fer". Ainsi donc, on peut dire en résumé que, exception faite des paysans, les éléments actifs de l'économie perdent au XXe siècle la possibilité, voire le goût, de s'assurer une représentation numériquement forte au Parlement.

En revanche, les professions politiques proprement dites, à savoir les avocats, les magistrats et les fonctionnaires, qui ne représentent pas un certain groupe du peuple mais qui, comme leur nom l'indique, ont une certaine affinité à l'égard de la politique de par leur position même, ne dénotent pas une perte de substance aussi marquée. Le groupe des politiciens de carrière du type moderne, des rédacteurs, des secrétaires de partis et d'associations commence alors une ascension politique qui n'a pas cessé.

Il n'est pas surprenant que le divorce croissant entre l'idéal unitaire de la représentation populaire et la division effective du peuple en classes et en groupes d'intérêts ait entraîné des débats fondamentaux sur le caractère de la représentation. Comme la fiction d'une représentation indépendante et supérieure aux intérêts particuliers était entretenue au premier chef par le parti radical dominant, et qu'elle était défendue en étroite relation avec le système électoral en vigueur, c'est précisément dans les discussions sur les systèmes électoraux que les dissensions

se sont manifestées. Nous en tirons les arguments principaux invoqués par le parti dominant, parce qu'ils projettent une lumière fort claire sur les fondements de l'idée de représentation. C'est Carl Hilty, le célèbre professeur de droit public de l'Université de Berne, qui en est le meilleur porte-parole<sup>7</sup>. Il est caractéristique que Hilty se réfère aux fondateurs de l'Etat fédéral de 1848, qui "voyaient en l'application inconditionnelle des principes selon lesquels la majorité est reine et un homme est aussi bon qu'un autre, le plus beau résultat de leurs efforts". Tenir compte, en droit électoral, des minorités, de façon à obtenir "une image photographique des groupes de population dans la représentation", conduit inévitablement selon lui à rétablir l'anarchie multi-souveraine qui régnait avant 1848, "l'ère de putschs" qui n'était rien d'autre que la réaction et l'affirmation de majorités de fait contre la prépondérance assurée par le droit à des minorités au pouvoir de 1815 à 1848 dans les cantons et la Confédération".

Une conception étrangement unilatérale des partis, dans l'Etat parlementaire, se cache derrière ces arguments. G. Leibholz, il y a plus de trente ans déjà, a attiré l'attention sur le fait que l'idée libérale de représentation populaire, telle qu'elle s'est développée aux XVIIIe et XIXe siècles, est en contradiction avec la constitution, en fait et en droit, des partis<sup>8</sup>. Hilty défend une conception du parti qui concorde avec l'idée libérale de représentation unitariste. "Le parti, écrit-il, est un moyen de conserver la patrie et les intérêts véritables de l'ensemble du peuple". De là découle naturellement la distinction entre partis autorisés ou non. Seuls peuvent être tolérés les partis "qui, de façon générale, sont en harmonie avec les buts poursuivis par l'Etat et avec la Constitution en vigueur". Les autres ne peuvent être autorisés, tels les monarchistes de Neuchâtel, les irrédentistes du Tessin, les sécessionnistes polonais ou alsaciens dans l'Empire allemand. Hilty, dans un sens plus général, voudrait exclure de la représentation tous les partis qui s'opposent à la "loi de l'unité nationale", donc les catholiques et les socialistes dans la mesure où ceux-ci sont ultramontains ou internationa-



listes. Il s'efforce tout particulièrement d'éliminer l'esprit de parti du processus de représentation, c'est-à-dire de protéger les électeurs contre le danger de devenir indépendants des décisions de comités, et ainsi de voir diminuer leur liberté de choix.

Précisant la pensée de Hilty, son successeur à la chaire de droit public de Berne, Walther Burckhardt, a plus tard accusé les partis de sortir des limites assignées à leur activité "lorsqu'ils donnent des consignes, par le canal de leurs organes irresponsables, à leurs députés au Parlement" et font de ceux-ci "leurs instruments dépourvus de volonté propre"<sup>9</sup>. Cette répugnance devant les partis politiques, qui s'oppose tellement à l'attitude anglo-saxonne, a une signification qui dépasse les considérations de personnes. Elle gît dans l'essence même du petit Etat suisse multistructurel, avec ses institutions fondées sur la démocratie directe. Il est frappant, par exemple, que la notion de parti soit très rarement utilisée dans la législation suisse, et qu'elle ne soit pas même évoquée dans la loi sur la proportionnelle de 1919, qui pourtant présuppose l'existence de partis. En effet, les candidatures ne doivent pas être déposées par des représentants du parti, mais par un "groupe de personnes jouissant des droits civiques" seulement. Le parti n'apparaît en tant qu'institution pour la première fois qu'en 1939 dans les règlements des groupes parlementaires de l'Assemblée fédérale<sup>10</sup>. Il n'est pas question, aujourd'hui encore, d'accorder aux partis la consécration juridique par un article constitutionnel<sup>11</sup>.

Walther Burckhardt n'est pas le seul à signaler que la démocratie directe est un obstacle pour les partis. Avant et après lui, de nombreux savants étrangers, des politologues anglo-saxons en particulier, ont évoqué ce phénomène : Robert C. Brooks<sup>12</sup> d'abord, mais surtout A.L. Lowell<sup>13</sup>. L'action du referendum sur la structure des partis nous intéresse cependant moins que son influence sur le système représentatif. Lowell constate d'abord que l'effet principal est de renforcer le sentiment d'indépendance du citoyen. En tant qu'électeur, certes, celui-ci manifeste une tendance telle à la stabilité, que "there is no considerable class of in-

dependent voters at elections". Au contraire, l'indépendance du citoyen suisse est d'autant plus éclatante, lorsqu'il exerce sa fonction de juge sur les lois : "The frequency with which the people reject the laws passed by their representatives shows that the number of independent voters at the referendum is very great, ... in ordinary times every one is an independent". De là, Lowell conclut ensuite avec raison : "The rejection of laws seems in fact to take the place of a change of party". Il joue ainsi avec le troisième maillon de la chaîne, à savoir que notre système de gouvernement ne connaît pas de changements entre opposition et gouvernement, mais aussi pas de changements de coalitions gouvernementales qui se forment au Parlement sur la base d'alliances temporaires entre partis. Ce qui est caractéristique du système suisse, et au sujet duquel Roger Girod<sup>14</sup> a présenté un rapport lors du dernier Congrès de science politique, c'est le gouvernement, à dosage partisan stable, de plusieurs partis, donc le gouvernement multipartite qui s'est instauré progressivement au cours des cent dernières années.

Cette constatation nous amène à l'articulation centrale qui relie l'idée de représentation unitaire et la nécessité, pour un Etat multinational, d'accorder à ses minorités une représentation équitable. Nous avons déjà dit que la "civilisation politique fragmentée" de la Suisse avait pour effet de compartimenter largement la formation de la volonté politique. Aux aspects négatifs invoqués, à l'inertie considérable qui en résulte, doit succéder maintenant le côté positif, la volonté délibérée de veiller à ce que personne ne soit brimé dans la représentation de ses intérêts. L'art politique qui permet aux Suisses de ne jamais négliger ce devoir, n'est pas seulement un mérite : la nécessité leur en est imposée par la nature même du pays. Car les frontières confessionnelles, linguistico-culturelles et régionales ne se recouvrent pas, mais se recoupent les unes les autres à tel point qu'il en résulte une multitude, angoissante presque, de lignes de forces, une collection de minorités en perpétuelle mutation. On pourrait paraphraser une phrase célèbre et dire : En Suisse, on est toujours en minorité envers quelqu'un. La conséquence en

est qu'aucune des grandes frontières confessionnelles, ethniques, culturelles, régionales ou sociales ne doit acquérir une prépondérance dominante en politique et dans la représentation populaire. On peut ainsi localiser les conflits d'importance, les circonscrire et les désamorcer, si cela est nécessaire, par l'intervention des personnes non engagées dans le conflit.

C'est sous cet angle seulement qu'on peut apprécier le problème de la représentation des minorités à sa juste valeur, et au delà des vérités élémentaires relevées auparavant. L'observateur superficiel se demandera avec raison si les minorités linguistiques, qui ne sont représentées dans les deux Chambres qu'à concurrence du quart des députés, ne sont pas ainsi inexorablement négligées, et s'il suffit que les Chambres délibèrent dans les trois langues officielles. En fait, pour aplanir les divergences, il faut plus : il faut, dans chaque cas particulier, faire preuve de volonté de concession réciproque, pour abandonner sur un point ou accorder quelque chose à l'autre camp. La législation, dans son ensemble, et par là aussi la représentation, doivent, sans que cela soit fixé d'une manière ou d'une autre par le droit, offrir à tout moment l'image de la richesse du pays en nuances. Numa Droz, l'un des conseillers fédéraux du XIXe siècle, a fort bien exprimé ce phénomène : "Presque toutes nos lois sont, plus que dans d'autres pays, le résultat des transactions entre les partis, les régions, les races"<sup>15</sup>.

Mais cette aptitude au compromis n'est possible que parce que les représentants du peuple, même au niveau suprême de la représentation nationale, se sentent toujours liés à la constellation politique qui caractérise leur patrie cantonale et locale, et apportent ainsi, par groupes cantonaux, au Conseil national aussi, une contribution marquée par les nuances locales. Ils ne font pas valoir seulement leur langue ou leur parti, mais d'abord la constellation politique spécifique de leur patrie locale. Il n'y a pas dans la représentation des députés de la Suisse catholique, mais des députés de régions du pays dans lesquelles les catho-

liques ou bien sont en majorité, ou bien forment un groupe respectable, ou encore sont tout à fait minoritaires.

La signification des partis dans la représentation en reçoit ainsi un éclairage nouveau, pour la deuxième fois. Les partis suisses ne sont en règle générale pas, comme dans les autres pays, des édifices monolithiques centralisés, mais de grandes associations faitières groupant des organisations cantonales, des congrès. Là, l'unité nationale doit être toujours reconstituée et les délégués de partis cantonaux majoritaires doivent tenir compte des avis de ceux qui représentent des groupements cantonaux minoritaires. Les catholiques de Suisse centrale et de Fribourg, par exemple, sont contraints de s'adapter plus ou moins aux revendications très différentes des leurs que présentent les catholiques qui vivent en diaspora, comme à Bâle, Berne, Genève ou Zurich. A la fondation du Parti populaire conservateur chrétien-social de Suisse, l'un des participants a remarqué ce phénomène de façon originale : "Nous ne sommes ni parti gouvernemental, ni parti d'opposition. Nous sommes un "Mixtum compositum". Notre parti national est composé des partis gouvernementaux de neuf cantons catholiques conservateurs, des partis minoritaires admis au gouvernement de six autres cantons, et de nos coreligionnaires politiques "in partibus infidelium" dans les dix autres Etats de la Confédération". Il compare ensuite la politique helvétique à un magasin de porcelaine, dans lequel les trois groupes doivent se comporter différemment : "Le premier doit être soucieux de ne rien briser, le second doit être prudent; quant au troisième, il peut casser la vaisselle".

Karl Bücher, l'économiste allemand de renom, a fait la très juste remarque qui suit, lorsqu'il enseignait à l'Université de Bâle : "L'Assemblée fédérale est pour ainsi dire un extrait de la vie, vingt-cinq fois différente, des partis dans les cantons, où les controverses, générales dans tout le pays, entre conservateurs-fédéralistes et démocrates-centralisateurs font et défont les groupes; où encore les membres de chacun des partis sont bien éloignés de suivre, dans les affaires fédérales, un programme commun et unique". La représentation nationale est ainsi

imprégnée à la fois par les attitudes variables des partis cantonaux entre le gouvernementalisme inconditionnel et l'opposition absolue et par les mêmes variations au sein du parti national. De plus, il faut mentionner la bipolarité des prises de position des partis cantonaux sur les problèmes cantonaux et fédéraux. Les radicaux vaudois s'opposent par exemple souvent à la majorité du groupe radical aux Chambres fédérales, bien qu'ils jouissent dans leur canton jusqu'en 1946 d'une prépondérance sans limites. Alors que dans leur canton ils sont centralisateurs avec intransigeance, ils défendent dans la politique fédérale des positions éminemment fédéralistes.

Le compartimentage et l'imbrication paraissent encore plus forts lorsqu'on y introduit en plus la démocratie directe, et l'attitude référendaire des partis suisses. Il n'y a pas que le citoyen à garder son indépendance : les partis conservent leur liberté d'action à l'égard des problèmes particuliers, et leur attitude diverge très souvent de celle que leurs représentants au gouvernement ont prise. Les partis passent sans autre à l'opposition, dans les votations, sur des projets gouvernementaux auxquels leurs représentants au gouvernement ont beaucoup collaboré, sans que cela conduise à une crise gouvernementale. Aucune étude générale de ce sujet n'a encore été faite. Roger Girod a pu cependant, sur la base d'observations isolées des conditions régnant à Genève, relever ceci<sup>16</sup> : Parmi les partis genevois qui ont au Conseil fédéral un représentant de leur tendance, et à l'occasion de quinze votations fédérales entre 1959 et 1963, les socialistes sont entrés en opposition deux fois seuls, et une fois avec un autre parti bourgeois, les partis bourgeois quant à eux une fois seuls, contre un projet du Conseil fédéral.

C'est dans la composition du Conseil fédéral que le principe de représentation est le plus uni à l'épreuve, parce qu'il s'agit d'une autorité collégiale. Comme il ne dépend pas de la confiance parlementaire,

il ne tire pas son existence d'une coalition formelle des groupes parlementaires; mais il repose sur les règles non-écrites qui se sont constituées progressivement au cours du développement de la formule multipartite. Il est impossible, du moment que le Conseil n'a que sept sièges, de tenir compte en pratique, avec une précision mathématique, des revendications de tous les groupes qui jouissent à bon droit d'une considération particulière. Cela a été un bonheur pour la Suisse que personne n'ait tenté de fixer dans un texte juridique quelque "droit" que ce soit à cet égard. Une certaine pratique traditionnelle s'est instaurée dans les trois domaines principaux des langues, des cantons et des partis. On essaie d'être équitable dans la diversité linguistique (74 % allemand, 20 % français, 4 % italien et 1 % romanche) en adoptant la répartition de cinq conseillers fédéraux alémaniques contre deux représentants des régions romanes (français, italien, romanche). Cette distribution s'est modifiée temporairement en 4/3 ou 6/1. Les conseillers fédéraux de langue romane ont été trente sur quatre-vingt au total (vingt-trois de langue française, six de langue italienne, un romanche), ce qui est supérieur à la répartition de deux à cinq en ce qui concerne les personnes. Quant aux années de fonction, on en tire un pourcentage de 33 %, chiffre lui aussi supérieur à la proportion 2/5.

Il est plus difficile de tenir compte équitablement des cantons, quoique la mobilité croissante de la population ait bien diminué l'importance de l'appartenance des conseillers à un canton d'origine déterminé. Il a été de règle jusqu'ici que les trois cantons les plus peuplés, Zurich, Berne et Vaud, occupent en permanence, ou presque, chacun un siège. La prise en considération des intérêts des partis fournit ample matière à controverse, parce qu'elle devrait s'accorder avec les critères de répartition linguistique et cantonale. La liberté de choix peut en être fortement réduite, car tous les partis ne sont pas implantés au même degré dans tous les cantons et dans toutes les régions linguistiques. Une répartition plus ou moins volontaire est en vigueur depuis 1959, qui correspond à peu

près aux rapports des forces dans le Conseil national (deux radicaux, deux catholiques-conservateurs, deux socialistes et un agrarien).

Nos conclusions nous amènent à dire que le système représentatif suisse ne fonctionne que grâce à une clé complexe qui assure à chacune des minorités sa part de droits et de responsabilités. Son mécanisme est aussi compliqué que celui de la montre suisse. Chacune de ses pièces détachées complète les autres et tourne dans une interdépendance telle que lorsque le moindre rouage ne s'emboîte plus correctement dans celui qui lui fait face, ou lorsque le moindre grain de sable s'y introduit, toute la machine s'arrête. On peut se demander si un système aussi perfectionné et ramifié que celui-ci a encore sa raison d'être et peut encore fonctionner avec la rapidité devenue aujourd'hui nécessaire, à l'heure où le monde s'organise en rassemblements supranationaux et paraît prêt à refondre les particularismes régionaux sans compromissions. On reproche par conséquent souvent à la Suisse de n'avoir pas su s'adapter à l'époque que nous vivons. Mais les grandes organisations supranationales, avec leur appareil administratif gigantesque, ne cherchent-elles pas parfois à esquiver le problème de savoir si la vie garde un sens, lorsque les individus et les petites communautés, dont enfin elles dépendent tellement, ne jouissent pas d'un minimum de liberté ?

Notes

1. ALMOND (Gabriel) - "Comparative political systems", in : Journal of Politics, vol. XVIII (1956), cité selon H. Eulau, S. Eldersveld/M. Janowitz (éd.) Political behavior (1956), p. 34 ss.
2. BURCKHARDT (W.) - Kommentar der schweiz. Bundesverfassung vom 29.5. 1875. Bern 1931, 3. Aufl., p. 657 s., 716 s.
3. DRATH (Martin) - Die Entwicklung der Volksrepräsentation. Bad Homburg und Berlin 1954, p. 7 ss, 21 ss.
4. BURCKHARDT (W.) - Op.cit., p. 716.
5. MOLT (P.) - Der Reichstag vor der improvisierten Revolution. Cologne 1963.
6. Il est exclu d'établir la structure professionnelle selon les différenciations aussi fines que celles que nous appliquons dans notre statistique parlementaire. Une difficulté supplémentaire en matière de comparaisons résulte des doubles professionnels. Ils ont été classés tous dans le groupe "Profession principale de caractère public ou politique".
7. Ueber die Anwendbarkeit der sog. Minoritätenvertretung bei den eidg. Wahlen. Bern 1883.
8. LEIBHOLZ (G.) - Das Wesen der Repräsentation und der Gestaltwandel der Demokratie im 20. Jht., 2. Auflage, Berlin 1960, p. 72 ss.
9. BURCKHARDT (W.) - "Ueber die Berechtigung der politischen Parteien", Politisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz. Eidgenossenschaft, ed. W. Burckhardt, 1914, Bd. 28. Bern 1915, p. 194.
10. LACHENAL (François) - Le Parti politique, sa fonction de droit public, en particulier dans le droit public suisse. Bâle 1944, p. 113 ss.
11. ZELLWEGER (Eduard) - "Bedarf das schweiz. Parteiwesen einer rechtlichen Ordnung ?" Jahrbuch der Neuen Helv. Gesellschaft 1967. Berne, 1967, p. 231 ss.
12. BROOKS (Robert C.) - Government and Politics of Switzerland. New York, 1928.
13. LOWELL (A.L.) - Governments and Parties in Continental Europe. Vol. II, p. 301 ss.



14. GIROD (Roger) - "Le Système des Partis en Suisse", Revue française de science politique, vol. XIV, 1964, p. 1114 ss; "Geography of the Swiss Party System", in Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems, Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology, ed. by E. Allardt and Y. Littunen, Helsinki 1964, p. 132 ss.
15. DROZ (Numa) - Etudes et portraits politiques. Genève, Paris, 1895, p. 94.
16. GIROD (Roger) - "Milieux politiques et classes sociales en Suisse", in Cahiers internationaux de sociologie 1965, vol. 39, p. 44 ss.  
Cf. Jean Meynaud ; Les Partis politiques vaudois, (Etudes de science politique 13) Montreal 1966, chap. VI : "Les partis et le gouvernement, Collaboration et opposition", p. 139 ss.

Résumé

Le divorce croissant entre l'idéal unitaire de la représentation populaire et la division effective du peuple en classes et en groupes d'intérêts a entraîné des débats fondamentaux sur le caractère de la représentation, les dissensions se manifestant surtout dans les discussions au sujet des systèmes électoraux et du rôle des partis. Dans la réalité, le système représentatif suisse ne fonctionne que grâce à une clé complexe qui assure à chacune des minorités sa part de droits et de responsabilités ; certains pensent, peut-être à tort, qu'un système aussi complexe n'est plus adapté au monde actuel.

Summary

The growing divorce between the unitary ideal of popular representation and the actual division of the people in classes and interest groups has brought about fundamental debates on the character of representation; the divergences being noticeable mainly in the discussions about electoral systems and the role of parties. In fact, the Swiss representative system works only thanks to a complex key which assures to each minority its part of rights and responsibility; some think, perhaps mistakenly, that such a complex system is no longer adapted to our present world.

Br/Representation/5

"Theory and practice of representation"

FROM FUNCTIONAL REGIONALISM TO FUNCTIONAL REPRESENTATION  
IN FRANCE: THE BATTLE OF BRITTANY

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From Functional Regionalism to Functional Representation in France:

The Battle of Brittany

by J.E.S. Hayward

It is the development of economic planning and the realisation that this could not be carried out solely by the central government but also required local action that has brought into focus and imparted decisive impetus to the twentieth century trend to expand government intervention. In conjunction with the need to reorganise the administration for its new tasks and the need to reorganise outdated local government structures to enable them to fulfil new functions, the socio-political pressures engendered by economic planning have forced the issue of regionalism - for long the subject of semi-antiquarian speculation - into the forefront of public concern. This new regionalism has accorded an increasingly prominent rôle to two kinds of specialist: the administrator who has acquired a techno-bureaucratic expertise and the representative or, more usually, spokesman of a special interest group. The emergence of each has fortified the development of the other. Where either the administrative or legislative institutions have failed to adapt themselves, they have lost effectiveness and power. The fear excited by the acquisition of some of this power by organised functional interests has led to a reassertion of the traditional rôle of the administrator, who has been equipped with the means to hold his own and then dominate the organised interests. Where these interests have been able to acquire a quasi-democratic recognition by virtue of their rôle in effectively representing a community, it has been necessary to weaken and discredit them so that they will be content to accept a subordinate rôle. They are reduced to functional cogs in the remodded administrative machine.

The thesis of this paper is that it is between these protagonists that much of the familiar struggle between bureaucracy and democracy is currently being conducted. It is in the attempt to concert their activities or to coerce each other that is to be found the staple of much of contemporary politics in industrial society. The issue of functional representation has re-emerged because of the desire of the interest groups to make representations on behalf of their constituents and increasingly to participate in the formulation and implementation of public policy of concern to them. For their part, the political and administrative decision-makers have, with varying

degrees of enthusiasm, sought to 'integrate' the representatives of economic interests into the consultative framework but have tried to avoid conceding to these functionally representative bodies the powers which they have succeeded in stripping from the traditional elected legislative bodies. By insisting upon legalistic distinctions which would allow only representative bodies recruited by universal suffrage to dispose of more than consultative status and arguing the dangerously divisive nature of having a number of elected regional assemblies, formal adherence to liberal democratic principles has been reconciled with the actual adoption of authoritarian-cum-bureaucratic practice. It is in this context that it can be asserted that "the critique of the way in which the Regional Economic Development Councils function has become in 1965-1966 the touchstone of democratic thought in France".<sup>1</sup>

#### French Regionalism and Functional Representation

In France, functional representation and regionalism have had a close connection, both of them sharing in the nineteenth and twentieth century revival of "intermediary bodies".<sup>2</sup> The Second World War seems to mark the turning point between a predominantly backward-looking, geo-historical regionalism and a more pragmatic type of regionalism based upon functional economic development and administrative necessity. A geographer, J.-F. Gravier, whose Paris et désert français of 1947 provided the bible of the regionalists, was already arguing for a revived regionalism in 1942 and making the point - more welcome under the Vichy régime - that "a community's representation need not necessarily be elective. Some functions confer the capacity to represent a group better than any vote".<sup>3</sup> However, it was his emphasis upon the traditional conflict between Paris, representing a congested centre, and the paralysis of the peripheral provinces, combined with the assertion that it was possible to colonise the whole of the provincial desert, that aroused Frenchmen from their fatalism.<sup>4</sup>

The close link between regional revival and economic planning did not come from the experts or techno-bureaucrats. Monnet's planners neglected the regional implications of their policies until prompted to do so by the regional economic expansion committees that began to burgeon in 1950 with the creation of the Comité d'Etudes et de Liaison des Intérêts Bretons, the C.E.L.I.B. These organisations, unofficial and voluntary associations for regional economic development until recognised by government decree in 1954

and fully officialised in 1961, were the principal manifestations of regional consciousness and owed their strength to support from both local authorities and economic interests, with the running usually being made by the latter. Whilst the Fourth Republic governments and the Planning Commissariat at first welcomed their creation, the reversion to a more authoritarian brand of government under the Fifth Republic led to an attempt to regain the initiative from these "private" bodies, with dubious claim to democratic legitimacy. The aim was fundamentally to restore the authority of the regional agents of the government, hence the standardisation of administrative regionalism and the concentration of power in the hands of a Regional Prefect.<sup>5</sup> The pressure from the regions was first contained by frequent reassurances and a few concessions. Then, with the 1964 decrees, the government sought to divide the interests which the expansion committees had united, to neutralise and domesticate the lively functional representative forces into the Commissions de Développement Economique Régionale (C.O.D.E.R.) and reduce the interests to their traditional rôle of competing suppliants for the piecemeal favours of the prefectural administration, accorded to suit the electoral interests of their political masters of the moment.

As early as 1960, an academic study of subject declared that "the policy of regional development contributed more to the transformation of the functional relations between central and local administration than to securing systematic decentralisation for the benefit of local authorities".<sup>6</sup> The administrative tradition, which the Fifth Republic had reinvigorated, preferred to deal with its "social partners" through committees that were specialised, sporadic and secretive, whose membership were the product of nomination rather than of election. By integrating the potentially obstreperous, autonomous regional representative organisations into an administratively dominant system, the mediators between regional economic interests and the government could be manipulated and converted into instruments of government policy, acting in the public interest.<sup>7</sup>

#### The C.E.L.I.B.: a Pioneer Regional Pressure Group

The spearhead of a revived French regionalism, based upon an alliance between the functionally representative economic interest groups, the official advisory bodies - chambers of commerce, agriculture and artisans - and the mass of local authorities, is generally

agreed to have been the Comité d'Etudes et de Liaison de Intérêts Bretons. The activities of the C.E.L.I.B. are to be traced in the pages of La Vie Bretonne and particularly in the editorials by its General Secretary, Joseph Martray. It is he above all who was able to turn the energies of the champions of Breton particularism away from the cultural and political back-water into which it had been channeled in the fifty years after the creation of the Union Régionaliste de Bretagne in 1898. Not ethnic but economic factors - deriving in particular from geographic "excentricity" and demographic exodus - were to be the driving force of the C.E.L.I.B., although the sense of being a distinctive race and culture undoubtedly gave Brittany a cohesion most other regions lacked.<sup>8</sup> Prior to the creation of the C.E.L.I.B. there had been no effective spokesman for Brittany's regional economic interests. Each of the Breton deputies received a multitude of separate pressures from a variety of Breton organisations. The C.E.L.I.B. was able, by the beginning of 1967, to unite, in addition to about 900 municipal councils, nearly 200 organisations, ranging from official representative bodies like the Conseils Généraux, Chambers of Agriculture, Commerce and Métiers, and Departmental Unions of the Union Nationale des Associations Familiales, to unofficial organisations such as the F.D.S.E.A.s<sup>anc</sup> the Trade Unions (the C.G.T. only since 1961)

The C.E.L.I.B. was a cadre pressure group and deliberately not a mass movement. It relied upon concerting the activities of its many member organisations, giving their short-term, piecemeal demands a longer-term, regional slant, which was particularly necessary in the case of the agricultural organisations. In return, they put their knowledge and strength at the disposal of the C.E.L.I.B. which co-ordinated their activities in the regional interest. It depended for its annual income of a quarter-million francs mainly upon the four member Conseils Généraux. The General Assembly, in which voting rights were proportionate to subscriptions, with local authorities predominating, elected a President, Vice-Presidents, a Comité Directeur and a General Secretary. In its heyday, the C.E.L.I.B. had five major arms: its political arm - the Commission des Elus; an economic investigation and planning arm - the Commission Régionale d'Expansion Economique; an industrial localisation arm - the Délégation à la promotion industrielle; a sales promotion arm - Comité interprofessionnel de propagande pour les Produits Bretons; and finally the Commission Culturel.

During the Fourth Republic, when the National Assembly sought to govern, the C.E.L.I.B. relied heavily upon its Parliamentary Commission and was frequently successful in its traditional pressure group rôle. Just before the January 1956 General Election, the Vie Bretonne declared, under the heading "since everything is decided in Paris, Brittany should count on its members of parliament to defend its interests", that although the C.E.L.I.B. had become "a sort of regional economic council, we continue to place prime reliance upon parliamentary action. . . . It is this Breton cohesion, this unity of our elected representatives and the interest group leaders which the other French regions envy us." <sup>9</sup> This "regional unanimity" resulted in the Breton parliamentarians' willingness to put the interests of the region before their loyalty to party or government. In an era of executive dependence upon a fragile majority in the National Assembly, this policy yielded results, although these were largely of an ad hoc character. <sup>10</sup> However, Martray, the C.E.L.I.B.'s General Secretary, had much more ambitious aims. It was through systematic regional planning rather than the extraction of piecemeal privileges that he hoped to obtain them.

#### The C.E.L.I.B.: a Pioneer of Regional Economic Planning

Its rôle as a pressure group served the indispensable function of attracting to the C.E.L.I.B. the support of the Breton interest groups. By February 1952 it could boast: "there is scarcely a single economic, occupational or cultural group which has not contacted it to ask it to champion their grievances". <sup>11</sup> By early 1952 the C.E.L.I.B., in conjunction with four Chambers of Commerce, had invited representatives of the Planning Commissariat and the economic departments to visit Brittany with a view to securing official collaboration in the preparation of a regional economic plan. <sup>12</sup> The time was propitious for this ambitious venture because the preparation of the Second Plan (1954-57) had just begun and Martray therefore reported to the C.E.L.I.B.'s Parliamentary Commission at the end of May 1952 on the need for a rapid study of the Breton economy which could be integrated into the Plan. All the relevant central and local government departments agreed to lend their assistance to the C.E.L.I.B., a substantial number of the 34 rapporteurs being officials. At a general meeting of the C.E.L.I.B. in March 1953 (described as a veritable "Estates General of Brittany") the draft plan was approved, leaving the details to a special Commission which, in conjunction with the Planning Commissariat, completed the First Breton Plan in July 1953. <sup>13</sup>



However, there was no official commitment to implement the Breton Plan and in early 1954, recognising that Brittany could not expect special treatment, Professor Phlipponneau (future President of the C.E.L.I.B.'s Regional Economic Expansion Committee) was already suggesting the need to remodel the National Plan on regional rather than sectional lines, becoming "a synthesis of the various regional plans".<sup>14</sup> This approach seriously began to worry the planners who saw the danger of their National Plan being reduced to a mosaic of regional plans, which it was assumed would be "cahiers de doléances". At this stage, the political centre did not feel it could do more than contain the pressure from a proliferation of local and regional pressure groups and so the decree of December 11th 1954 gave the prefects, with the government's concurrence, the right to recognise Regional Economic Expansion Committees and attend their meetings. It also prescribed the organisations which should be represented in the R.E.E.C. A Ministry of Finance circular made it clear that it was not necessary that "the various organisations or authorities which should be represented in these committees nominate or elect their representatives. . . It is essential that these representatives be chosen for their capacity and efficiency aimed at ensuring a greater freedom of discussion".<sup>15</sup> However, although C.E.L.I.B. pressure had played an important part in inspiring this official recognition of private and voluntary regional associations for economic development, many other parts of France were less active.<sup>16</sup>

Between the key decrees of June 30th 1955 which started the process of creating economic regions, and the decree of June 2nd 1960 standardising administrative areas, not only had France changed republics but an administrative anarchy of pluridepartmental ad hocery had been replaced by a functional regionalism, no longer clandestine but overt. The holding operation of the "regional action programmes", provided for in 1955, had quickly revealed itself to be a frustrating academic exercise, but it marked the recovery of the initiative by the central government, the regional plans being drawn up by government officials deliberately isolated in Paris and not by the R.E.E.C.s. Although Brittany was the first region to receive such a Plan in 1956, it was only a pale reflection of the original C.E.L.I.B. version. Many of the C.E.L.I.B.'s objections were ignored and it was shorn of the quantified investment targets which alone made it an operational document.<sup>17</sup> However, not until the Gaullist régime was firmly in the saddle could the policy of "centralising decentralisation" under the aegis of regional prefects begin in earnest.

### The Struggle to Recentralise Regionalism

The administration's regional development preoccupation was to restore the power of the prefects to reassert the authority of Paris, an attitude which was widely accepted by the mass of the administered, including the spokesmen of the economic development committees. "The Prefect is the boss . . . You become in practice his economic expansion head of department".<sup>18</sup> Such defeatist dependence upon the agents of the central government greatly facilitated the task of reimposing a reorganised prefectorial authority and the resistance of the C.E.L.I.B. in favour of a more decentralised and representative regionalism was therefore a threat as well as an irritant.

The choice of twenty economic planning regions plus the Paris district came under the premiership of Michel Debré; ironically, as in 1956 he had characteristically declared: "The division of France into twenty vast constituencies is part of a political system which is neither that of a Republic nor a Constitutional Monarchy, in short which is not suitable to a parliamentary democracy..". Regionalism is a state system appropriate to a feudal monarchy, a presidential democracy, a party dictatorship".<sup>19</sup> Inasmuch as the Fifth Republic was well on the way to becoming a sort of "presidential republic", such a type of regionalism had, no doubt, become "appropriate".

From December, 1959, via the "artichoke revolution" of 1960 and reaching a climax in the June 1961 Jacquerie, Brittany was the storm centre of a violent and spectacular mass agitation.<sup>20</sup> The C.E.L.I.B.'s achievement was to link the sectional exasperation of the Breton farmers with regional resentment at underdevelopment, profiting in return from the force de frappe which the irate farmers represented. Following Michel Debré's stormy but placatory visit to Rennes on March 1st 1960, the C.E.L.I.B. pinned its hopes upon the idea of obtaining a loi-programme for Brittany, an idea mooted in 1959 and launched in the conclusion to Pleven's Avenir de la Bretagne in 1961.<sup>21</sup> A year later, the draft loi-programme was unanimously adopted by the C.E.L.I.B. Backed by a recrudescence of peasant agitation and particularly by parliamentary pressure during the debate on the Fourth Plan, the C.E.L.I.B. appeared to achieve, on the night of June 21st 1962, its aim of committing the Government to present a loi-programme for all the underdeveloped regions of the West. In the words of the lettre rectificative to the Plan, "a statutory public investment programme will be presented to parliament during 1963" after the regional

economic expansion committees had been consulted. This amendment to the Fourth Plan, achieved by leading an alliance of the underdog regions, was based on the threat of the Breton deputies to put their loyalty to Brittany first in voting on the Fourth Plan. Martray stressed the C.E.L.I.B.'s capacity to force the Government into dialogue on equal terms. "This State, which prides itself on its authority, has shown us that it is only moved by force. . . . The responsibility is entirely the Government's which procrastinates, promises, cheats and defers as long as it is not faced by an irresistible pressure . . . until it has no choice except between repression and capitulation".<sup>22</sup>

In the 1962 general election, the C.E.L.I.B. extracted from 84 candidates in the five Breton departments a pledge to put the interests of Brittany before those of their party, it being implicit that this should go as far as voting a censure motion against their party in power if the region's interest required it. Under the guise of de-politicising regionalism, Martray argued that "political preferences should be restricted to the major general issues and parties should recognise in socio-economic matters, the representativity, authority and primacy of the occupational, interest and regional organisations".<sup>23</sup> However, the electoral victory of the U.N.R. in 1962, particularly in Brittany, where it captured three-quarters of the seats, deprived the C.E.L.I.B. of its capacity for parliamentary pressure, its Parliamentary Commission becoming completely inactive in 1964. When it became clear during 1963 that the Government presented the regionalisation of the national plan as a substitute for the loi-programme and the C.E.L.I.B. failed to mobilise its parliamentary and mass regional support for action, it was evident that it had shot its bolt.<sup>24</sup>

#### The Reform of Regional Economic Consultation

The regionalists had been lulled into a false sense of security by the decree giving them official consultative status in January 1961. They were condemned for engaging in "contestation" rather than "concertation" if they refused to allow the government and its regional agents to take the decisions. All that was wanted was their passive approval. Regional economic planning institutions, which had developed in an empirical manner, would have to be fitted into the framework of a system of local administration that was an integral part of the central administrative machine. The choice was between a reassertion of the bureaucratic tradition or a renewed attempt to decentralise and democratise the political process through regional economic planning. In

1961 Pleven (ex-Prime Minister and the C.E.L.I.B.'s first and only President) had declared with characteristic circumspection that the Bretons were "beginning to hope for a fundamental constitutional and administrative reform, which would transfer to regional organs: regional administrative offices, Regional Assemblies, Regional Executives, responsibility for developing the Breton region . . ." <sup>25</sup> More specifically, Martray, in his report to the C.E.L.I.B. annual general meeting in June 1962, declared that: "the C.E.L.I.B. only imperfectly foreshadows the genuine regional institutions which we lack and to start with the regional economic and social council, which is happily becoming increasingly accepted". <sup>26</sup>

The creation of regional versions of the Economic and Social Council was very much a political issue in 1963 because the Government was manoeuvring towards the creation of an "Economic Senate" along lines first mooted by de Gaulle in 1946. The national organisation of the Regional Economic Expansion Committees, the Conseil National des Economies Régionales (C.N.E.R.), was most reluctant to see this happen. Its General Secretary wrote in November 1963 that "the members of (Regional Economic Expansion) Committees should be much more the 'expression' of the regional economic and social movements than, strictly speaking, the 'representation' of these movements because, in the strict sense, representation . . . would be likely to lead to the choice of people who have neither the time nor the taste to become animateurs." As he had written earlier, the R.E.E.C.s were composed "non pas de mandataires mais de pionniers 'qualifiés'". <sup>27</sup> The C.N.E.R. expressed its "regret and anxiety" that it had been decided to create a new institution, the Regional Economic Development Commission (R.E.D.C.), rather than strengthen the consultative rôle of the R.E.E.C. It was especially concerned to preserve their freedom from administrative control, arguing that "le consultant ne saurait se substituer au consulté". <sup>28</sup> It suggested that the reorganised R.E.E.C.s should have 40-60 members and should be composed as follows: one-quarter representing local councils; one-quarter representing business, artisans and farmers; one-quarter representing workers; and "one-quarter representing the other sectors of economic and social life through people chosen for their special qualifications" either by the Prime Minister or through co-option by the other three-quarters, who should not be elected, although this would give them greater authority. <sup>29</sup> These suggestions were adopted in 1964 for the R.E.D.C.s by the Government.

The C.E.L.I.B. did not go down without a fight. Martray put out a press release threatening a boycott of this caricature of a Regional Economic Council if four C.E.L.I.B. demands were not met. These were: no Government nominees; and the R.E.D.C. must control its own agenda, its time of meeting and its own secretariat.<sup>30</sup> However, without its former force de frappe and with its U.N.R. deputies loyal to the Government, the C.E.L.I.B. was powerless. Professor Philipponneau's inference was to recognise the political character of the conflict and to press for the C.E.L.I.B. to throw in its lot with the newly emerged left-wing candidate for the Presidential election of 1965, Gaston Defferre, but Martray successfully led the resistance to this "political gamble", stressing that the C.E.L.I.B.'s rôle as a pressure group required it to be free from political ties to any party.<sup>31</sup> Whilst reiterating the need for an elected regional assembly to counterbalance the reinforced regional prefect, Martray declared that the R.E.D.C. fait accompli should, despite earlier threats, be accepted, infiltrated and used by the C.E.L.I.B.

The refusal to boycott the new form of economic consultation set the seal on the C.E.L.I.B.'s defeat and that of the whole regionalist movement on which it had been the spearhead. The only weapon the C.E.L.I.B. had left was to refuse to participate and thereby reject a new relationship based upon the supremacy of the administration in the political and economic service of the central government. But the pressures towards participation proved irresistible in the context of the preparation of the Fifth Plan, to which regions like Brittany desperately looked to provide the means of their economic revival. The price was loss to the Regional Prefect's mission of the formulation of the regional priorities, conceived in terms of national rather than regional preferences and requirements.<sup>32</sup>

#### The Regional Economic Development Council Experiment

It was above all the then Délégué à l'aménagement du territoire, Olivier Guichard, intimate of the Prime Minister and Gaullist grey eminence, briefly to become a Breton deputy in 1967 before being made Minister of Industry, who was the architect of the R.E.D.C.s.<sup>33</sup> One of his acolytes, the Prefect Paul Camous, who played a key rôle in the furtive incubation of the R.E.D.C.s, has presented the most pretentious defence of an institutional innovation that has received more brickbats than plaudits. "It is a rehabilitation of the very notion of the 'consultative'. The French have become accustomed to thinking

that to give advice is a useless act, because it has no real consequences . . . It is true that where an assembly having decision-making power co-exists with an assembly having consultative power, no balance is possible. The first obliterates the second. This, we have always witnessed the political assembly automatically triumph over the economic and consultative assembly . . . The regional formula has the advantage that there is no political assembly competing with an economic consultative assembly . . . This is the special feature of the formula. It is the first time that we have created a consultative assembly without having alongside it something which destroys the reality of the consultative . . . It would have been impossible to create an Economic Council alongside the Conseil général at the Departmental level, whilst at the regional level such a body naturally has its place".<sup>34</sup>

Far from wishing to deny the importance of rehabilitating the consultative function, the main reproach that can be levelled at the R.E.D.C.s is that they will not succeed in doing so because they are victims of what Professor Lavau has called their "disciplinary and repressive character".<sup>35</sup> In contrast to the Economic and Social Council, with which they are favourably compared by M. Camous, the R.E.D.C.s are the administration's consultative appendages rather than a para-parliamentary body with a constitutional and not merely decree status. (It is true that the R.E.D.C. is, both in its composition and its limited functions, the model of the kind of domesticated body to which the Gaullists would like to reduce the E.S.C. under the guise of increasing its importance.) Quite apart from the fact that many of the organised interests are far less able to stand up to the State's agents at the regional than at the national level, their regional organisations often being new and weak, the R.E.D.C., devised to prevent the possibility of C.E.L.I.B.-type resistance to the central government, has been deliberately subjected to the tutelary power of the Regional Prefect. Only he can call the R.E.D.C. into session, though it should meet at least twice a year. He decides the agenda, albeit after consultation with the R.E.D.C.'s bureau. He and his staff do the preparatory work for the R.E.D.C.'s discussions, which are limited by decree to advising upon the regional aspects of economic planning and in particular the regional segment of the national plan. The Regional Prefect participates in the R.E.D.C.'s deliberations to ensure that they do not exceed their prescribed functions. His staff provide the secretariat of

of the R.E.D.C., which has no budget of its own. Such is the confined and supervised situation, characteristic of the administrative consultative committee, about which many R.E.D.C. Presidents have protested vociferously. Taking advantage of the outcry by the local authority notables - many of whom are simultaneously national and local political leaders - against the regional reform's threat to their traditional power and influence, which was directed at their R.E.E.C. representative competitors rather than their much more formidable executive mentors, the Regional Prefects, the Government deprived the R.E.E.C.s of their consultative access to the Regional Prefect.

Governmental apologists in particular have stressed the fact that the membership of the new R.E.D.C.s overlaps to the extent of over 70% with that of the old R.E.E.C.s and that their Presidents are identical in fourteen out of the twenty regions. One of the exceptions is only nominal in that the Breton R.E.D.C. was presided over by Pleven, President of the C.E.L.I.B. and not its R.E.E.C. The Presidents of all the other R.E.E.C.s are ex officio members of the R.E.D.C. but the formidable Professor Philipponneau was deliberately excluded because he was persona non grata. The integration of Pleven and Martray into the new consultative process and the elimination of the more intransigent Philipponneau illustrates well the process by which the new institution was used to break up cohesive opposition to the Regional Prefect's domination, some old opponents accepting the new balance of forces and more pliable new "social partners" replacing the "unco-operative".<sup>36</sup>

Disarming regional opposition under the guise of de-politicisation has in fact led to increased involvement of politicians in regional economic development. Table 1 shows the contrast between the nominal and the actual composition of the R.E.D.C.s. Thus, whereas there is no official representation of members of parliament, 125 belong to R.E.D.C.s. Nearly one-third of all R.E.D.C. members are mayors and over one-fifth are conseillers généraux. Elected Chambres d'Agriculture, Chambres de Métiers and Chambres de Commerce provide over half the representatives of the farmers, artisans and businessmen.

Table I: A Comparison Between the Official and Actual Membership of the R.E.D.C.s\*

Category	Represent- ation		Category	Represent- ation		Category	Represent- ation	
	Offi- cial	Act- ual		Offi- cial	Act- ual		Offi- cial	Act- ual
<u>A. Elected indirectly in geographical constituencies</u>			<u>B. Elected indirectly or nominated from occupational constituencies</u>			<u>C. Other nominees</u>		
(a) National								
1. Deputies	-	72	1. Farmers	125	170	1. Social welfare organisations	105	105
2. Senators	-	53	2. Artisans	31	46	2. Family associations	-	15
(b) Local			3. Businessmen	135	230	3. University teachers	-	48
3. Conseillers Généraux	152	202	4. Employees	146	185	4. Other professions	-	68
4. Mayors	103	286						

\* This table is derived from figures quoted in R. Monier: Region et Economie Régionale, 1965, pp. 114-19, which gives a more detailed breakdown. See also Usine Nouvelle, 4.2.1965, p. 28 and P. Grémion: "La réforme régionale du 14 mars 1964", Correspondance Municipale, Nov. 1966, p. 10. See Monier, op. cit. pp. 116-17, for a table of the membership breakdown according to regions.



The representative character of the important element of indirectly elected functional representation which exists in the R.E.D.C.s has been questioned: in particular, the low turnout in the occupational elections to the Chambers of Commerce, Agriculture and Artisans. Thus the turnout in the Chamber of Commerce elections ~~was~~<sup>was</sup> 26% in 1961 and 25% in 1964. The main cause of this low turnout, particularly in large towns, appears to be the small number of contested elections. Thus in 1964, only one-fifth of the Chamber of Commerce elections were contested. Where Poujadist, Jeunes Patrons or Jeune Chambre Economique candidates stood in opposition to the outgoing list, the turnout increased.<sup>37</sup> Elections for the Chambers of Agriculture generally yielded a higher turnout, ranging in 1967 from 18.6% in the Sarthe to 77% in Loir-et-Cher. In Brittany, the turnout averaged about 50%.

The local authorities, the businessmen and the farmers in France have traditionally looked for help to the Prefects who control their access to the public purse. With the dismantling of the R.E.E.C.s as the functional focus of regional cohesion and owing to infrequent meetings of the R.E.D.C.s, the prefectural administration could return to its traditional separate and direct dealings with each interest. The organised interests strengthened their own regional organisations, to improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis the administration, the C.N.P.F. being worried about the danger of greater administrative intervention through the regional "miniaturisation" of the national plan. Although it was only in Brittany and the Pays de la Loire regions that the C.G.T. and C.F.D.T. at first boycotted the R.E.D.C.<sup>38</sup> - the C.G.T. participating from 1966 - nevertheless, as in the Planning Commissions of the National Plan, the trade union representatives were pessimistic about their ability to influence the proceedings of the ineffectual R.E.D.C.s. They are not encouraged by declarations like that of the President of the C.N.P.F.'s Commission des Problèmes Régionaux, M. Morane, that "the representatives of the trade unions must be present in the interests of a democratic dialogue. We will thus have a better chance of taming them".<sup>39</sup>

The R.E.D.C.s were consulted with such haste and their recommendations so fruitless that it was generally agreed that their share in the regionalisation of the Fifth Plan had been at best academic and at worst a

farce.<sup>40</sup> This point was confirmed with some brutality by the Regional Prefect of Brittany: "if the R.E.D.C.s imagined that their advice on the 'regional segment' (of the Plan) could lead to important changes, they were under an illusion. . . Only differences of detail are possible".<sup>41</sup> This was amply confirmed by the President of the Breton R.E.D.C. and of the C.E.L.I.B., Pleven. Summing up his views on the record of the R.E.D.C.s, he asserted that they were "a rather accurate reflection of the local, occupational and associational interests of the regions" and that despite their heterogeneity they had all managed to give their advice unanimously. However, because they had been repeatedly faced by governmental and administrative fait accompli, "the rôle of the R.E.D.C.s has been less than modest". Their rôle "consists essentially of sharing out penury, robbing Peter to pay Paul". He concluded that "in their present form the R.E.D.C.s do not have a long expectancy of life" because their members would refuse to be "givers of Platonic advice" and "this is why, from all sides, proposals for the reform or the replacement of the R.E.D.C.s are being suggested".<sup>42</sup>

Most of these schemes, which we cannot discuss here, revolve around the idea of establishing an elected regional assembly, with or without a separate regional economic and social council.<sup>43</sup> However, proposals for the election of a regional council by universal suffrage have been resisted because "in the prevailing view, it is necessary to define a mode of representation which guarantees the regional committees a certain standing whilst not over-stepping the threshold of representativity beyond which it would also be necessary to increase their powers. Such an attitude is in conformity with both the Jacobin tradition and the administrative tradition of public power. . . ."<sup>44</sup>

Both these traditions have found their most intransigent spokesman in Michel Debré. In Au Service de la Nation he thundered: "There is a modern form of regional particularism which is the channel for economic and social demands, whose violence they increase by emphasising their territorial nature. Once again, I ask people to reflect on what a group of Western Departments, with its capital in Rennes, would mean in the Nation's life. . . . Real parliaments, where local considerations would be elevated into high politics and play the bell-wether against central authority! Our history condemns such backsliding which is the negation of France".<sup>45</sup> This was the prelude

to an uninhibited advocacy of the universal primacy of Paris which condemns the rest of France to that colonial underdevelopment which had prompted the resurgence of regionalism. It would appear that like the Bourbons, the latter day "Jacobins" have learnt nothing and forgotten nothing. In 1664 - whose tercentenary was inadvertently celebrated by the March 1964 decrees on regional reform - Colbert concluded his investigation into provincial administration by advocating the reinforcement of the power of the Intendants. We are in a sense back where we started from.

Notes

1. R. Lafont: La Révolution Régionaliste, 1967, p. 45; cf. 219.
2. T. Flory: Le Mouvement Régionaliste français, 1966, Part I passim; J. Charles-Brun: Le régionalisme, 1911. See J.-L. Bodiguel: "Le régionalisme doctrine d'opposition", Citoyens 60, Dec. 1966, pp. 33-38. See also J. E. S. Hayward: "Solidarist Syndicalism: Durkheim and Duguit", The Sociological Review, 1960, pp. 30-33, 194-97.
3. J.-F. Gravier: Régions et Nation, 1942, p. 63. On the variety of regional reform projects up to 1944, see J. Bancal: Origines et avenir des circonscriptions administratives de la France, 1944, p. 317 et seq. See also B. Appert: Le Régionalisme administratif, 1938, pp. 206-10, 241-45; F. L. Closon: La Région, 1946, pp. 123-25, on early suggestions for functional representation.
4. Régions et Nation, p. 63; cf. Paris et le désert français, passim. See also M. Philipponneau: La Gauche et les Régions, 1967, pp. 38-39.
5. See especially S. Antoine: "Les régions de programme et la géographie administrative française", La Revue Administrative, July-Aug. 1960, pp. 357-61; L'Harmonisation des circonscriptions administratives, La Documentation Française, Recueils et Monographies, No. 42, 1962. See also the special number of Economie et Humanisme, No. 127, 1960, on "Aménagement régional et démocratie économique"; J.-L. Quermonne: "Vers un régionalisme 'fonctionnel'", Revue française de Science Politique, XIII, Dec. 1963, p. 854 et seq.; C. Roig, J.-L. Quermonne et al.: Administration traditionnelle et planification régionale, 1964; F. de Baecque: "La nouvelle organisation des services de l'Etat", Revue politique et parlementaire, July-August 1964, pp. 40-51; R. Monier: Région et Economie Régionale, 1965; P. Grémion: La mise en place des institutions régionales, 1965.
6. M. Duffar: Expansion économique régionale et droit administratif, 1960, duplicated Toulouse University thesis, p. 226.
7. Ibid, p. 240; cf. pp. 200-201. See also J. de Lanversin: L'Aménagement du Territoire, 1965, p. 125.
8. La Vie Bretonne, April 1951, p. 1, article by Martray entitled: "Régionalisme, Fédéralisme et Démocratie". See J. Martray: Le Problème Breton et la Réforme de la France, 1947, p. 15; cf. esp. Part 4. See also Y. Gicquel: Le Comité Consultatif de Bretagne, 1960, esp. p. 56 on Martray.
9. Ibid., Oct. 1955, p. 1; cf. R. Pleven: Avenir de la Bretagne, 1961, p. 196 et seq. See also La Vie Bretonne, Feb. 1952, p. 1; Jan. 1955, p. 1; Sept. 1957, p. 1. See also M. Philipponneau: La Gauche et les Régions, 1967, p. 43.
10. La Vie Bretonne, Oct. 1958, p. 1.
11. Ibid., Feb. 1952, p. 1; cf. April, 1952, pp. 1-2 and June, 1953, p. 1, article entitled "Un organisme d'union".

12. Ibid., April 1952, p. 1; M. Philipponneau: "La planification régionale en Bretagne", Bretagne Industrielle, April, 1952; M. Philipponneau: Le Problème Breton et le programme d'action régionale, 1957, pp. 111-12.
13. Ibid., June 1952, p. 1; Dec. 1952, p. 1; June 1953, p. 1; Oct. 1954, pp. 1-4. M. Philipponneau: Le Problème Breton, op. cit., pp. 113-19.
14. Ibid., June 1954, p. 2, report of a lecture by Philipponneau entitled "Plan Hirsch et Plan Breton". See also M. Philipponneau: Le Problème Breton, op. cit., p. 115; cf. 120 et seq.
15. Quoted by J. de Lanversin: L'Amenagement du territoire, 1965, p. 81.
16. Even at the end of 1960, shortly before they were accorded official consultative status, only 14 out of 20 regions (excluding Paris) had R.E.E.C.s - although only 4 departments did not even have a departmental economic expansion committee - and they did not exist in all regions until the beginning of 1962. (R. Monier: Région et Economie Régionale, 1965, pp. 59, 72.)
17. La Vie Bretonne, Dec. 1955, pp. 2-3; cf. M. Philipponneau: Le Problème Breton, pp. 133-34, 140 et seq. See also S. Antoine: "Les Régions de programme et la géographie administrative française", La Revue Administrative, July-August 1960, p. 357-61.
18. A. Boulle (a businessman and President of the Comité d'Action Economique de Loir-et-Cher): "Le Petit Monde des Economies Régionales", Economies Régionales, Dec. 1960, p. 27; G.T.: "Sur l'action des préfets dans la vie économique locale", La Revue Administrative, March-April, 1960, pp. 126, 128. See also P. Grémion, op. cit. p. 121; cf. ch. 3 passim. For further information on prefectural attitudes to regional reform, see the remarkable articles by J.-P. Worms and P. Grémion in the special number of Sociologie du Travail, July-Sept. 1966, devoted to "L'administration face aux problèmes du changement".
19. Quoted by J. Meynaud: "La planification régionale en France", Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie Solvay, 1958, No. 1, p. 15 note; cf. S. Antoine: "Réforme administrative et régions économiques", Economie et Humanisme, No. 118, May-June, 1959, pp. 16-23.
20. See F. H. de Virieu: La fin d'une agriculture, 1967, pp. 176-82; cf. S. Mallet: Le Paysans contre le passé, 1962. See also La Vie Bretonne, May 1960, p. 3; cf. July 1960, pp. 1-2; Spec. No. of July 1960 on "L'Agriculture Bretonne et ses problèmes", p. 6; Dec. 1961, p. 1.
21. R. Pleven: Avenir de la Bretagne, ~~p. 239~~ p. 239 et seq. On the use of lois de programme under the Fourth and Fifth Republics and their limitations, see P. Delvolvé and H. Lesguillons: Le contrôle parlementaire sur la politique économique et budgétaire, 1964, pp. 96-97. See M. Philipponneau: "Une loi-programme à titre expérimental", Vie Bretonne, Nov. 1961, p. 6; cf. Ibid., March, 1961, p. 3; cf. July 1959, p. 3; April 1961, p. 2; special no. of July 1961, p. 3; cf. 8, 16; Jan. 1962, pp. 24-26;

- April 1962, pp. 6, 21-23; July 1962, p. 8; M. Philipponneau: "Loi-programme et consultation populaire", June 1962, pp. 5-7. See No. 56 supplement April 1962, devoted to the draft loi-programme. See also M. Philipponneau: La Gauche et les Régions, pp. 62-65.
22. Vie Bretonne, July 1962, p. 11; August 1962, p. 1; cf. October 1961, p. 1; May 1962, p. 2; Oct. 1963, p. 7.
23. J. Martray: "Les problèmes régionaux dominant le scrutin en Bretagne", *ibid.*, Nov. 1962, p. 2; cf. pp. 1-11. See pp. 18-19 for text of letter sent to all candidates; cf. M. Philipponneau: "La solidarité régionale condition de tous nos succès", *ibid.*, pp. 5-6. See also July 1962, p. 9.
24. *Ibid.*, Oct. 1963, p. 1; Nov.-Dec. 1963, pp. 1-2; Jan. 1964, pp. 1-2; Feb. 1964, pp. 1, 4; April 1964, p. 4; June-July 1964, p. 4. See the speech by Pleven and the exchange between Ihuel and Pompidou in the National Assembly debate on 4-5th November 1965 on the Fifth Plan, Journal Officiel, p. 4442 and *ibid.*, 6.11.65, p. 4537.
25. R. Pleven: Avenir de la Bretagne, p. 236.
26. La Vie Bretonne, July 1962, p. 9; cf. 16-18 March 1959, p. 1. See also the article by M. Duhamel, a member of the President of the Economic and Social Council's cabinet since 1954 and regular contributor to La Vie Bretonne, in the same issue (p. 3).
27. G. Gauer: "La réforme des Comités d'Expansion", Entreprise, 9.11.1963, p. 15; G. Gauer: Les Comites Regionaux d'Etudes pour la mise en valeur de la France et leur Conférence National, 1955, p. 6.
28. C.N.E.R.: Avis sur l'institutionnalisation des C.R.E.E., Nov. 1963, p. 2, press release.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 3. See also Expansion Régionale, Dec. 1963, p. 37; compare article 1 of the decree No. 64-252 of 14.3.1964.
30. Le Monde, 6.3.1964 and 14.3.1964. Cf. La Vie Bretonne, March 1963, pp. 8 and 1-2, Feb. 1964, p. 4; cf. Oct. 1963, p. 9; March 1964, pp. 1-2, 5-7; M. Philipponneau: "La réforme régionale en Bretagne", Correspondance Municipale, Nov. 1966, pp. 36-38.
31. La Vie Bretonne, June-July, 1964, pp. 9-11; cf. 16-17, 22; M. Philipponneau: "Bretagne et Horizon 80", La Vie Bretonne, April 1964, pp. 5-7, 16; and "V<sup>e</sup> Plan et Horizon 80", *ibid.*, May 1964, pp. 5-12; cf. G. Defferre: Un nouvel horizon, 1965, pp. 130-32.
32. M. Philipponneau: "La réforme régionale en Bretagne", *op cit.*, pp. 38-39 and La Gauche et les Régions, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-23.
33. See P. Grémion, *op. cit.*, p. 120; cf. O. Guichard: Aménager la France, 1965, pp. 239-45. In a lecture to the Paris Association des cadres bretons, Guichard ironically gave the C.E.L.I.B. the credit for encouraging the

Government to establish the R.E.D.C.s (La Vie Bretonne, Feb. 1966, p. 11). See also J.-L. Quermone's comment in Administration traditionnelle et planification régionale, op. cit., p. 122.

34. Association française de science politique: "La région et la réforme administrative", Entretiens du Samedi, No. 2, June 1964, pp. 38-39. But see O. Guichard: Aménager la France, p. 244.
35. Ibid., p. 9.
36. See P. Grémion, op. cit., pp. 127-150; cf. M. Philipponneau: La Gauche et les Régions, op. cit., pp. 74-118. For the list of members of the Breton R.E.D.C. see La Vie Bretonne, Dec. 1964, p. 2.
37. Ministry of Industry: Note sur les Elections Consulaires, 1964, 18.1.1965, unpublished. On the relative representative character of R.E.D.C.s and Conseils Généraux, see M. Duverger: "La démocratie régionale", Le Monde, 9.6.1966 and M.-H. Marchand: Les Conseillers Généraux en France depuis 1945, 1966.
38. See J.-L. Bodiguel: "Les commissions de développement économique régional: composition, bilan at perspectives. L'exemple des Pays de la Loire", Revue française de Science Politique, June 1966, p. 485; cf. 472-92. Owing to an untypical anarcho-syndicalist leadership in Pays de la Loire, Force Ouvrière also boycotted the R.E.D.C. in that region. See A. Hebert's acid comments in "La participation des syndicats aux organismes officiels menace-t-elle leur indépendance?", Les Cahiers du Centre d'Etudes Socialistes, March 1966, p. 9.
39. Le Figaro, 19.5.1966, emphasis mine. On the Trade Union and business attitude towards and involvement in regional planning, see the articles in the Revue de l'Action Populaire, Dec. 1965 by R. Bonety: "Participation des syndicats à l'élaboration du Ve Plan" especially pp. 1202-03 and J. Morane: "Milieux patronaux et régionalisation du Plan", pp. 1213-19. See also M. Philipponneau: La Gauche et les Régions, op. cit., pp. 75-82; M. Philippe: "Les C.O.D.E.R. à l'heure des critiques", La Croix, 3.8.1966; J.-B. Eggen: "La Région n'est pas la province", Direction, Sept. 1964, p.855.
40. See the hyper-critical avis of the Breton R.E.D.C. at its June 1966 meeting and the unanimous resolution passed at its January, 1967, meeting (La Vie Bretonne, July 1966, pp. 3-4; cf. 1-2 and Jan. 1967, p. 10). For Fleven's views and the Regional Prefect's reply, see the speeches to the Breton R.E.D.C. on 14.2.1966 (ibid., Feb. 1966, pp. 9-11). For a business criticism of R.E.D.C. consultation, see the Fédération nationale du Bâtiment's opinion in Le Bâtiment, 26.2.1966. For a C.F.D.T. trade union view, see M. Philippe: "Les C.O.D.E.R. à l'heure des critiques", La Croix, 3.8.1966.
41. Printed in La Vie Bretonne, April 1967, p. 18; cf. 13-19. For the text of the Regional Prefect's Report and the R.E.D.C.'s avis on the Fifth Plan Guidelines for Brittany, see ibid., April-May 1965.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6; cf. 7. Earlier misgivings about the 1964 regional reform and the R.E.D.C. in particular were reported in Le Monde, by Plevin (31.3.1964 and 4.9.1964) and by two other eminent politician-Presidents of R.E.D.C.s, Chaban-Delmas of Aquitaine before the reform (11.12.1963) and Pflimlin of Alsace after it (4.9.1964).
43. See in particular P. Mendès-France: La République Moderne, 1962, pp. 202-08; Club Démocratie Nouvelle: Pour une décentralisation démocratique, 1964, p. 13 et seq. Démocratie Nouvelle, Sept.-Oct. 1966, p. 104 et seq.; M. Rocard: Décoloniser la Province, 1966, esp. p. 35; M. Philipponneau: La Gauche et les Régions, op. cit., p. 224 et seq. On the Gaullist scheme to create an "Economic Senate" and in general on functional representation at the national level, see J. E. S. Hayward: Private Interests and Public Policy. The Experience of the French Economic and Social Council, 1966, esp. pp. 18, 111 and Ch. 5 passim.
44. C. Roig in Administration traditionnelle et planification régionale, op. cit. p. 59; cf. 56-59.
45. 1963, p. 236; cf. 235-38.



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Br/Representation/6

"Theory and practice of representation"

ON FUNCTIONAL REPRESENTATION IN THE WEST

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On functional representation in the West

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Territorial (geographic) representation, conceived of as the only political representation, derived from a fiction of the relation between the sovereign nation and the individual elected by it - the Parliamentary representative. This fiction was implemented in various institutions of constitutional law in both the fields of civic liberties and of electoral law. Behind this fiction stood the authority of the revolutionary concepts of early French Parliamentarianism, connected with the names of Sieyès, with the famous dispute between Thomas Paine and Burke, with the writings of B. Constant, Gladstone and J.S. Mill, as well as a numberless host of liberal professors of constitutional law.

This political philosophy assumed that territorial representation of interests is the best and the only way of preserving the individual rights of citizens. Political representation in that traditional meaning of the term is usually connected with two problems : the general elections, and the guaranteeing of some form of political responsibility of the elected unto their constituents. It is, however, easy to see how devoid of any real meaning is the matter of representing isolated and unidentified interests of individuals, located in a territorial constituency.

The problem of the functioning of the representative system is considerably more complicated than would seem to result from an analysis of the "classical" politico-legal institutions. Such institutions are not

the only means for that purpose. One ought to speak of the problem of representation, not merely as a legal relation, but also as a sociological phenomenon.

The structural changes within capitalism have transformed the pattern of representation. The traditional representation had been accepted as the political representation of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

This political philosophy excluded representation of group interests unless they were also of a territorial nature provided for by the constitution (autonomous regions, segments of a federal system, local government). Such a fiction ignored that the citizen was a member of various organized groups and that he had consequently various particular interests the protection of which were of vital concern to him. The opposition to this fiction took various courses. From America there filtered into Europe versions of the theory of groups, while the old continent developed independently of these influences, certain pluralistic movements of its own, challenging the monopoly of territorial representation : I shall mention only English guild socialism and French syndicalism, which were related to each other.

All these currents expressed discontent with the maladjustment of the political structure to the needs of industrial society in which integration of interests must also be a process of their representation. So it was that, although radical pluralistic trends could not hope for an institutiona-

lization of functional representation, attempts in this direction were made in the period between the wars. Belief in the necessity of overhauling the system of representation was gradually maturing. An example of these transformations in political concepts was the establishment by the Weimar constitution of an institution set up solely for the purpose of representing economic interests. This was the Reichswirtschaftsrat (Economic Council of the Reich) which the right-wing parties intended as a counterweight to political representation organized on a territorial basis, a concession designed to take the steam out of the revolutionary moods among the masses with which the Soviet system was then extremely popular. For its part, the non-communist Left wishfully imagined that this institution would become an agency for the defence of working class interests. In actual fact it was found that the Reichswirtschaftsrat had no powers of decision, nor even any real say in decision-making, but simply issued technical opinions. As early as 1928, G. Leibholz rightly forecast that "social parliaments" could not replace political assemblies. (1)

Meanwhile, after the first World War, there was formed in France the National Economic Council, the brainchild of Léon Jouhaux, who had himself been inspired by French syndicalist ideas, mainly those of Proudhon. This Council was seen as a central advisory body serving the government and parliament as well. Like the Reichswirtschaftsrat, though for different political reasons, this French institution did not live up to the hopes placed in it. (2)

Ignorance of the experience of other countries, or a defective understanding of it, in short the lack of an adequate comparativist basis, was a barrier to both institutional reform and the development of a sound theory.

Apart from these institutional endeavours, a new character began to be taken on by the political parties, and also by the position of individual deputies who openly stepped into the shoes of spokesmen for particular interests. This process, which was clearly evident in England, did not take the same form everywhere. In the Weimar Reichstag, representatives of heavy industry and the banks sat on the right-wing benches. As such, their primary concern was to watch over the interests they stood for. J.K. Pollock wrote that in such a set-up, the political parties were the agents of these interests. <sup>(3)</sup> This was further encouraged by the system of proportional representation which made for political diversity and so opened the way to direct representation of organized interests in parliament, some parties in fact identifying themselves with these. French big business preferred to avoid the limelight, and its representatives seldom ran for parliament, choosing rather to act behind the scenes. Years later, these developments were summed up by Churchill in a famous speech in the Commons:

"Everybody here has private interests, some are directors of companies, some own property which may be affected by legislation which is passing and so forth... Then there are those people who come to represent public bodies, particular groups of a non-political character in the general sense, and there again we must recognize that as one of the conditions of our varied life... We are not supposed to be an assembly of gentlemen who have no interests of any kind and no association of any kind. That is ridiculous. That might apply in Heaven, but not, happily, here..." <sup>(4)</sup>

The European trends towards modernization of territorial representation could not have a counterpart in the USA because of its tradition of group interest representation in Congress and the executive. It can be said that the difference between the American and West European systems is that the former is a combination of territorial and functional representation.

The fascist corporate system (in both its Italian and German versions), which did away with not only parliamentary but all forms of representation (local government, trade unions), carried through a subordination of interests, under the pretence of their integration, to the establishment of the one-party state. However, the call for modernization of the system of representation must not be confused with this fascist episode in recent history. Modern industrial societies could not rest content with the traditional machinery of political decision-making and were bound to press for its overhaul along more up-to-date lines.

Over the last decades, as the sphere of government activity has widened, the idea has taken root that administration cannot consist solely of execution of the law, since it requires initiative and intervention in varied social processes not explicitly regulated by legislation, i.e. the making of decisions which are not clearly specified in the statute books. An administration which confined itself to execution of the law would have a restricted view of social processes and, as J.P. Cromer

observed, would not be able to treat organized interests with flexibility (5). In this respect we have seen a growth of the importance of all kinds of advisory bodies without which modern administration is inconceivable. In western countries practically every government department has an advisory committee which is consulted at various stages of government business. Furthermore there has been a general tendency to make these bodies provide the data for decision-making.

Committees have appeared not only at the level of the central administration but also lower down the ladder, where they are possibly of greater importance. The practice of using government committees as a channel of communication between the administration and interest groups has become so widespread that there are those who speak of the groups' right to be consulted. The latter are interested in obtaining advance information of government plans, in order to take counteraction if these are to their disadvantage, or support them if they are in their favour.

In recent years, ad hoc contacts have been giving way to a widely pursued practice of developing a legislative framework for the establishment of committees. These are not a one-way meeting ground. Far from it being only the interest group which acts upon the administration (presenting demands, collecting information), the administration is also interested in obtaining essential facts and uses the committees to pass on its suggestions to such groups - which are often of a binding nature - for the furthering of purposes going beyond their interests. The Federation of British Industries and the Trade Unions Council are represented on a number of government committees. Between 1939 and 1949 the number of such

bodies attended by the trade unions grew from 12 to 60<sup>(7)</sup>. In 1957-1958 the TUC sat on 65 government committees<sup>(8)</sup>. To take another example: the Howard League for Penal Reform is a government-recognized organization, and its views are invariably canvassed<sup>(9)</sup> on prison matters. It is a rule in Britain that the government holds consultations with the organizations concerned before introducing a bill in parliament. This is such a well-established procedure that if it is waived in exceptional cases, the motives are explained<sup>(10)</sup>.

Likewise, in France the government administration enlists the cooperation of interest groups on a wide scale. At present the dominant role in the French consultative system is played by the Economic and Social Council. Since 1958<sup>(11)</sup> the Council has become a central government agency (preparing recommendations, conducting inquiries), while under the Fourth Republic it was also connected with parliament. The Council acts on requests from the government which, however, in certain matters (the Plan) must consult it. In addition, the Council itself may take initiatives, its terms of reference including studies of certain complex problems, the results of which might provide leads for government decisions. For this purpose permanent sections have been set up<sup>(13)</sup>. Provision has also been made for the appointment of ad hoc study groups to investigate specific problems, which suggests an analogy with the British Royal Commissions.

The wide range of advisory powers which centre primarily around the drafting of the five-years plans is by no means the only feature of this thoroughly original French institution<sup>(14)</sup>. The status of the Council has been so framed as to make its membership include representatives of a



variety of interests nominated by the organizations concerned. Hence emphasis has been placed in the literature on the representative character of the Council. Thus it is not only an institution in the nature of a supreme and highly authoritative expert, but also something like a "clearing house of interests" in whose business the government may intervene directly (ministers often attend the plenary and section meetings). This dual nature has been stressed by many writers who see it as a channel used by the organized interests, to influence the government and by the latter to communicate with these over the heads of the political parties.<sup>(15)</sup> M. Prélot has even talked of the quasi-parliamentary character of the Council which makes for cooperation between various occupational groups and gives them a voice in the economic and social policy of the government.

A similar view of the Council, as a primarily representative body,<sup>(16)</sup> is taken by M. Bye, who contrasts it with other agencies of an analogous kind, mainly technical ones, which are chiefly concerned with preparing expert opinions. Bye concedes, however, that the sections are of a more technical than representative nature. This is a crucial point because it is there, not in the general meetings, that the brunt of the Council's work is done.

E. Roche<sup>(17)</sup> makes an even greater claim for the Council, considering it a constituent assembly. As far as giving opinions is concerned, it is largely tied by the government, but on the other hand, it is free to choose any problem for study and suggest solutions. The Council has urged the government to treat it as the "Estates General of Working France".

The problem is seen in more realistic terms by B. Bockel, who regards the Council as an advisory body of a technical cast because of the

great proportion of government experts in the sections which investigate topics of a highly specialized order (18).

It is worth quoting one more opinion coming from within the Council. In the contemporary state, the growing concentration of necessarily high-speed decision-making has magnified the role of expert advice. The virtue of the Council is that it has eliminated arbitrariness in the selection of advisers, since the overwhelming majority of its members are appointed by professional organizations, while the sections have complete freedom of choice in nominating their rapporteurs. At the same time regular working contacts with members of the government are a check to excessive bureaucracy, while for their part, the interest group representatives are kept within bounds by their continuing contact with experts and the necessity of proceeding on the basis of facts and figures. It is more advisable to have the Council linked to the government since association with parliament would foster suspicion and friction with potential competitors(19).

The dual nature of the Council and its powers form one of the instruments used by the government under the system of the Fifth Republic to consolidate its domination of parliament.

This is the main point. On the other hand, the representative nature of the Council is arguable : the large quantity of government nominees (seven per section), the organization of the representatives of each professional group and their number in the Council might be challenged. The largest workers' organization - the CGT - is patently subject to discrimination. A feature of its position, as Hayward has remarked, is the ghetto status typical of every organization with communist connections. (20)

It is not surprising, therefore, that the opposition has urged that the Council be attached to parliament.(21) The constitutional footing of the Council remains a matter of dispute which at bottom turns around one issue : should it be given a direct say in decision-making, the result of which would be to make it, in its public activity, more of a representative of the public interest than a lobby for particular group ? This case has been argued most notably by P. Mendès-France in La République Moderne (22) Earlier, however, Sauvy had shown that the advantage of the Council was its capacity for accommodating conflicting interests by providing a meeting ground where they blunted each other's edge.

It is revealing that the replacement of the Senate by the Council seems to be favoured by de Gaulle; this would be a way of pushing the parties even further into the wings.(23) Meanwhile the members of the Council and its leaders see its future in an expansion of the advisory system, and even in securing a monopoly of government consultation,(24) which ought to supplant the informal and ineffectual discussions between government offices and particular interest groups around the tables of various ministry committees.

In Italy, advisory committees have made little headway (the Social Council, modelled on the French institution, performs nothing like the same role). The administration collects the information it needs from the relevant organized groups. This system is so widespread that the controlling legislation may be regarded as a direct reflection of narrowly particular interests. (25)

As regards American practice, D.B. Truman has called the advisory committees "safety valves". A special role in the United States is played by the Council of Economic Advisors which is part of the President's Executive Office. This is a typical board of experts who do not represent any specific interests but are appointed from among leading academic economists. On the basis of its own inquiries the Council makes recommendations regarding the economic policies of both the President and government departments. (26)

In Sweden, there is a particularly highly developed system of cooperation between government organs and interest groups in various government committees, advisory boards, etc. This practice, which has become practically endemic in the capitalist democracies, has been called by some writers administrative pluralism. (27) It has led G. Heckscher to talk, in a Swedish context, of direct democracy. (28) This is an obvious overstatement, since we know on how many levels the representation of interests is pursued within a pressure group and how difficult it is for the economically weak to penetrate the decision-making centres.

Referring to America, D.C. Blaisdell considers that one of the means of compounding conflicting private interests would be to strengthen planning, expand advisory bodies and improve the state administration. (29) On the other hand, J.D. Stewart takes the view that the growth of the influence of interest groups and the administration's need to consult their opinion are a consequence of increased government activity. (30) These arguments are, however, complementary.

Drawing general conclusions from the American experience,

A. Leiserson emphasises that the significance of advisory bodies in which various organized interests are represented does not consist in identifying their formal powers but in the actual role which they play in the administrative process itself, and he distinguishes three stages in the work of such committees : 1) investigation of the situation and gathering of evidence by a group of staff employees with expert qualifications; 2) presentation of this material, and its discussion by the advisory committee; 3) drafting of a report and recommendations for the government department.<sup>(31)</sup>

Under state-monopoly capitalism, the growing intervention of the government in various areas of the economy and the increase in economic-administrative activity was bound in the nature of things to enhance the role of advisory committees since government departments had to tackle new tasks without sufficient experience to guide them. It is tell-tale that the rapid expansion of the administrative machinery, particularly during the period of the New Deal, brought with it the establishment of new advisory bodies.

A. Leiserson considers that the system of representative consultation entails a functional cooperation between the government and interest groups. In the course of such dealings the government foregoes its powers with regard to the citizen in return for an assumption of public responsibility by the interest groups.<sup>(32)</sup>

The move towards building up the status of advisory bodies as aids to the administration appeared in England during the first world war,

and was given momentum by the report of the Haldane Commission.<sup>(33)</sup> After the last war, the advisory committees serving the central administration agencies ran into hundreds.<sup>(34)</sup> The Colonial Office alone had some 20 such committees.<sup>(35)</sup> In France, under the Fourth Republic, the records of the government secretariat-general listed 4,700 advisory organs - 500 councils, 1,200 committees, and 3,000 commissions. Ninety per cent of these bodies were connected with the central administration.<sup>(36)</sup>

Where committees are set up at the initiative of the government the aim is to provide a forum for an exchange of views with the interest groups.

Within the advisory committees there are two opposed tendencies at work. Government officials seek to obtain not only advice and expert information but also backing for a particular policy which can then be more easily defended in public or in Parliament. In connection with this, Professor Wheare wonders whether the wide use of consultation by government departments will not leave the Commons a worse informed body, forced in consequence to rubber-stamp political decisions prepared not only by the government and its experts but also in the headquarters of the organized interests. He also fears that representation of particular interests may lead to losing sight of the public interest.<sup>(37)</sup> Close cooperation between government agencies and advisory committees puts parliament in danger of being presented with faits accomplis.

There is a different situation in the United States. The public hearings system, with its probing of the views of interested organizations, administration officials and experts, enables Congress to take a position

independent of the Executive, but this may in practice entail greater dependence on pressure groups. Advisory committees offer the opportunity of heading off the expected pressure on the government, and make it possible to prepare public opinion for acceptance of a new policy in some field and to avoid or temper public criticism on ticklish issues.<sup>(38)</sup> By inviting potential critics, whose qualifications as experts are known, the administration forestalls criticism, since advisory committee members are pledged to discretion and may not freely inform public opinion of their standpoint.<sup>(39)</sup> This may in certain respects curb the freedom of speech of pressure groups and inhibit them from appealing to public opinion.<sup>(40)</sup> In sum, it could be said that advisory committees on the whole strengthen the hand of the executive.

However, in those cases where the making of a policy emerges from the collision of different party views, the role of the advisory committees tends to be slight.<sup>(41)</sup> It is generally held that their influence is strong when the issues involve fairly narrow and specialized interests which are not in the centre of public attention or politically controversial.

In the political structure of the capitalist countries, advisory committees may be of service at every level of the process of government. They can assist in the framing of policy, in its administration, in revision of its original assumptions, and in pushing through an altered line.<sup>(42)</sup> A distinction should be drawn between strictly advisory committees used in the administrative process, and inquiry committees which help with the framing and revision of policy, although in many cases these two functions coincide. The policy-making stage is of key importance to organized

interests since the influence which can be exerted at this juncture may yield an act or decision to their advantage.

Although K.C. Wheare concludes from the British evidence that advisory committees are a link in the system of "government by committee",<sup>(43)</sup> it is hard to agree with him. These committees are bodies which reinforce the administration and form part of the machinery of government, but there are no organized links between them.<sup>(44)</sup> There seems to be more justice in the view held by H. Laski, who clearly emphasises the auxiliary nature of the advisory committees.<sup>(45)</sup> As bodies assisting the central organs of the administration, they enable the government to identify the currents flowing in various parts of society, make it possible to discover conflicting interests and give the whole bourgeoisie a chance of working out its position with regard to them. The task of the civil servants who sit on every advisory committee is to discuss the policy of their department with people from outside the administration who represent either specific organized interests or the point of view of experts unconnected with them.

In all countries where there is a developed system of advisory committees there has emerged a peculiar triangle of experts whose apex is formed by government experts while the base consists of the experts seconded by particular interests and by the so-called "independent" experts. After the issue has been thrashed out in this triangle it presents its seed : recommendations for a government bill or some other decision.

This organization scheme is a semi-official acknowledgment that the organized interest groups represent certain sections of society and that the government regards their representatives as responsible spokesmen for these interests.



The representation of organized interests in the highest representatives bodies with a view to making mandatory decisions or contributing to legislation proved, as we have seen, unworkable. But in this more modest form - communication of views and influencing of decisions through the medium of advisory bodies - it has persisted and is growing steadily.<sup>(46)</sup> This is all the more convenient, especially for organized capitalist interests, in that the meetings of the advisory bodies are confidential, which makes it possible to settle matters in a manner best kept out of sight of public opinion. The occasional suggestions that the advisory committees conduct their business in public or provide reports of their meetings have met with the opposition of both the administration and organized groups.

We can thus distinguish three systems of consultation : the French which is dominated by a central advisory body attached to the executive, the British scheme of "fragmented" advisory services at the disposal of the executive, and the American, which may be described as a mixed system, pursued chiefly in the form of public hearings or in the executive. The system adopted in West Germany converges with the American model.

The development of advisory systems presented here bears no hint of an evolution towards technocracy. The problem lies elsewhere. The "magic" of pure politics has long evaporated and the days of the

parliamentary orator or the parliamentary fixer are over. The politician must himself either possess considerable technical expertise in some crucial area of public life or surround himself with qualified advisors who also have a grasp of politics.<sup>(47)</sup> In the United States, the technocrats are recruited among outstanding industrial administrators and academics intellectuals; M. Wilson and many of his colleagues themselves have this kind of background; de Gaulle has drawn on the cream of the civil service. If the technocrat does not actually make political decisions, these cannot, in the present stage of the development of bourgeois society and the complication of the machinery of government, be sensibly arrived at without his help. Hence it is impossible to draw a line of demarcation between technocrats and politicians.

This exhausts the question of the role of the technocracy. On the other hand speculations about the displacement of politics by technocracy smack of mysticism. On this point I wholly agree with J. Meynaud who has questioned the views about the possibility of politics being swallowed up by technology.<sup>(48)</sup> This would predicate a total mechanization of the process of decision-making at government level, which is impossible. This is so because not all the motives of group behaviour are subject to control since the interaction nexus contains many obscure and even irrational elements which have to be taken into account in political decisions. How then can they be treated as technical decision? It is utopian to think so, above all in view of the profound social conflicts which show no sign of abating in the capitalist system.

The argument "politics or technocracy" is a purely verbal one. Laski's remark (49) that in a capitalist society the confidence of the owners of the means of production is of key importance to the government has lost nothing of its relevance.

Although the wide use of advisory bodies in the process of administration has made the decisions taken by the executive more thoughtful, there are not sufficient grounds for concluding that it has also entailed a radical change in the mode of government, as implied by the title of Wheare's well known study Government by Committee. Proceeding from the evidence of France, E. Roche was more cautious. In contrast with the legislative and executive branch of politics, the advisory arm is not an authority but a function cultivated by the government and parliament (the latter, it is true, in the French system, only in an auxiliary form).<sup>(50)</sup> The fact that the proliferation of advisory committees has led to issues being discussed expertly and rationally by people who are personally known to each other is incontrovertible. Some writers in America and Britain have used the term "the face-to-face society" to describe this development,<sup>(51)</sup> though in this case it does not match the continental legal concept of direct democracy, nor does it fit in with the findings of sociological studies of small groups, which after all do not pull the greatest weight or represent wider groupings. This relatively new method, which has gradually evolved over the past decades, makes it easier for the executive to find the middle ground among a host of varied tendencies; it is more in accordance with the common interests of the bourgeoisie.

However, the lack of a coordinating system and the comparatively narrow and specialized range of topics with which the advisory committees are concerned have prevented them from pushing into the background the normal political procedures for handling matters of great importance in which public opinion intervenes.

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If representation is to be understood as a process of integration of particular interests, the present practice has not foreclosed the question of attaching advisory bodies to the executive as the only natural and proper arrangement. The chief obstacle is a reluctance to reinvigorate the influence and role of parliament. An alternative solution would be to equip parliament with the necessary resources (including financial ones) and place the advisory bodies under its wing. This is the only way of curtailing the monopoly of information at present commanded by the executive.

To conclude : the present advisory system is an essential supplement to territorial representation. It might be termed advisory representation.

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Notes

1. M. Prélot ; La représentation professionnelle dans la Constitution de Weimar et le Conseil Economique National, Paris, 1924. Also H. Finer, Representative Government and a Parliament of Industry, London, 1923, Part II : "The German Federal Economic Council".
- 1a G. Leibholz ; Das Wesen der Representation, Berlin, 1960, pp. 184, 192.
2. L. Jouhaux ; "Le Conseil Economique du Travail", in Revue Internationale du Travail, n° 1, 1921; Y. Tedeschi, Le Conseil National Economique et l'organisation de la production en France, Paris, 1927;  
G. Dubost, Le Conseil National Economique, Paris, 1936. A concise history of the French Council in J.E.S. Hayward, Private interests and public policy, London, 1936, pp. 8 ff.
3. J.K. Pollock, Money and politics abroad, New York, 1932, p. 250.
4. Quoted from S.E. Finer, Aonymous Empire. A study of the lobby in Great Britain, London, 1958, pp. 40-41.
5. J.P. Comer, Legislative functions of national authorities, New York, 1927, ch. VII - VIII.
6. K. Loewenstein, Political power and the governmental process, Chicago, 1957, p. 359.
7. V.C. Allen, Trade unions and the Government, London, 1960, p. 34.
8. V.C. Allen, op.cit. pp. 41 ff.
9. J.D. Stewart, British pressure groups, Oxford, 1958, p. 71. The representatives of these organizations are treated as experts, but as "interested experts". That is why it would be erroneous to compare them with court experts, as J.H. Kaiser does dealing with the relation between the administration and the interests groups (Die Representation organisierter Interessen, Berlin, 1956, p. 270).
10. J.D. Stewart, op.cit., p. 17 ff.
11. Ord. 29.12.58, J.O. 30.12.58 and 9.8.62.
12. Art. 3.
13. Decree 19.1.61, J.O. 29.1.61.

14. The French Council had some influence on the Dutch and the Italian experiences in this field.
15. M. Duverger, Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel, Paris, 1956, p. 654 ff. M. Prélot, Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel, Paris, 1963, pp. 802 ff. L. Trotabas, "Le rôle de la représentation des intérêts professionnels dans la vie politique française", Annales de la Faculté de Droit de Toulouse, vol. VII - 1, pp. 161 ff.
16. M. Byé, "Conseil Economique et Social", Revue économique n° 6, 1962, p. 900.
17. "Rôle et avenir du Conseil Economique et Social", Revue politique et Parlementaire, nov. 1964.
18. A. Bockel, La participation des syndicats ouvriers aux fonctions économiques et sociales de l'Etat, Paris, 1965, p. 332.
19. This point of view was expressed by M. J. Mamert, Secretary General of the Council, in a conversation I had with him (May 25, 1966).
20. J.E.S. Hayward, op.cit., p. 38.
21. M. Byé, in spite of his reservations concerning a representative upgrading of the Council, draws similar conclusions (op.cit. pp. 915 and 917). A more clear cut position is Mr. Duverger's: "Réforme du Conseil Economique ou du Sénat", Le Monde 6-7 and 8 October 1964.
22. Paris, 1962.
23. J.E.S. Hayward, op.cit., "The prospects for reform".
24. E. Roche, "La démocratie de demain", Revue politique et parlementaire, 15.6.1964, and "La représentation des forces économiques", Revue des Deux Mondes, 15.7.1958. Also J. Mamert in the above quoted conversation; see also J.E.S. Hayward, op.cit. p. 108.
25. J. La Palombara, Interest groups in Italian politics, Princeton, N.J. 1964.
26. A.A. Berle, The American economic republic, New York, 1965, pp. 106 ff.
27. For instance, A. de Grazia, Public and Republic, political representation in America, New York, 1951, p. 234; O.H. Philips, The constitutional law of Great Britain and the Commonwealth, London, 1952, pp. 306 ff. J.H. Kaiser, Die Repraesentation organisierter Interessen, Berlin, 1956, p. 274 ff.
28. G. Heckscher, Démocratie efficace, Paris, 1957, p. 84.

29. D.C. Blaisdell, Economic power and political pressures, quoted in B.M. Gross, The Legislative struggle, New York, 1953, p.33.
  30. J.D. Stewart, op.cit. p.11.
  31. A. Leiserson, Administrative regulation a study in representation of interests, Chicago, 1942, p.182.
  32. A. Leiserson, op.cit., pp.161 ff.
  33. R.V. Vernon and N.S. Mansergh, op.cit. pp.20 ff. According to the authors, the number of advisory committees reached 600 before 1939.
  34. Advisory committees in British Government, London, 1960, p.10.
  35. K.C. Wheare, Government by Committee, London, 1955, p.47 and Part III.
  36. J. Meynaud, Les groupes de pression en France, Paris, 1958, p.212.
  37. K.C. Wheare, op.cit. p. 66.
  38. Advisory committees ... p. 106.
  39. K.C. Wheare, op.cit. p.65.
  40. A. Leiserson, op.cit. p.130.
  41. Advisory Committees ... p.107.
  42. K.C. Wheare, op.cit., p.45.
  43. K.C. Wheare, op.cit., especially Part III.
  44. Advisory Committees ... p. 105,107.
  45. H.J. Laski, A grammar of politics, London, 1950, p.375.
  46. A. Leiserson, op.cit., pp.10 ff pp.96 ff.
  47. M.H. Bernstein, The job of the federal executive, Washington D.C., 1958, p.130.
  48. J. Meynaud, Technocratie et politique, Lausanne, 1960, pp.7 ff, p.91. This standpoint was developed by the author in La technocratie, mythe ou réalité, Paris, 1964. Similarly M. Crozier, Le phénomène bureaucratique, Paris, 1963. La Palombara also argues against the cleavage between "politics" and "administration".
  49. H.J. Laski, Parliamentary government in England, London, 1938.
  50. Le Conseil Economique Français, Nuova Antologia, 1958, p.306.
  51. P. Laslett, "The face-to-face: society in philosophy, politics and society", Oxford, 1956, p.157.
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Summary

In many Western countries, representation is being modernized so as to help make decisions in an increasingly wide area of government activity. A survey of several Economic and Social Councils and of the role of advisory committees at various levels shows that far from depriving the political authorities of some of their functions, this development is usually initiated by them and serves their purposes. The threat of technocracy does not appear serious. An essential supplement to territorial representation, the present advisory system is one of "advisory representation".

Résumé

Dans beaucoup de pays occidentaux, la représentation se modernise de façon à faciliter la prise de décisions dans des domaines d'activité gouvernementale de plus en plus vastes. L'examen de plusieurs Conseils Economiques et Sociaux et du rôle de comités consultatifs à divers niveaux montre que loin de priver de certaines de leurs fonctions les autorités politiques, cette évolution leur est habituellement imputable, et sert leurs desseins. La menace de la technocratie ne semble pas grave. Complément essentiel de la représentation territoriale, l'actuel système consultatif peut être qualifié de "représentation consultative".



Ex/Representation/7

"Theory and practice of representation"

CROSSING THE FLOOR AND THE TENSIONS  
OF REPRESENTATION IN EAST AFRICA

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Crossing the floor and the tensions  
of representation in East Africa

by G.F. Engholm  
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Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania emerged into independence with relatively strong legislatures. The nature of the nationalist struggle for power during the colonial period had given the old legislative council a central position in the political system, and a mystique had grown round the idea of Parliament.

After independence there was a decline of the legislature in each of the three countries. And at least in Kenya and Uganda the decline was connected with the whole phenomenon of "crossing the floor in Parliament". But it would be a mistake to assume that crossing the floor was merely a symptom of the inefficiency of inherited political institutions or of the decline of Parliament and party affiliations. It is a contention of this paper that the device of crossing the floor in Parliament has sometimes served distinct and significant functions in the political systems of East Africa.

But before we define those functions it is important to define the status of Parliament itself on attainment of independence. And this can only be done by examining its relationship with the struggle for independence which had just triumphed.

I

In a sense the story of the nationalist struggle in each of the East African countries was a story of trying to increase African representation in the legislative council. Certainly during the concluding years of colonial rule the immediate ambitions of African leaders were oriented towards control of the legislature and its executive organ. The competitive struggles for power, later characterised by political parties operating

within a framework of simple majority and single-member constituencies, were often preoccupied with whether to maintain or eliminate some fancy franchise, or other aspects of constitutional engineering, which the Colonial Office had become so dextrous at producing. Power for the nationalist movement was conceived of in representational terms. The language of liberalism was strongly evident. The road to independence was supposed to be through a process of rapid democratisation and a widening franchise. As Julius Nyerere said to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations in June 1957:-

"We contend that the Tanganyika Government should make a statement to the effect that Tanganyika is going to be developed as a democratic state and that, since 98 per cent of the population of our country is African, this means naturally that Tanganyika is to become primarily an African state... We have also asked that ... a change should be effected within the Constitution to be symbolic of this intention to make Tanganyika democratic .... We suggested an increase in the number of African representatives in proportion to the number of non-African representatives ... We are opposed to the idea of a restricted franchise even if we had not a single European in the country or a single Asian...".

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See Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity: A Selection from Writings and Speeches (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 46-47).

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Nyerere himself was at this time basically a "gradualist" in his demands for greater democratisation. But his conception of African political progress was typically representational. That is one reason why much of the rhetoric of African nationalism in East and Central Africa was saturated with liberal democratic dicta. Nationalist demands were for "One Man, One Vote", "Unfettered Democracy", "Majority Rule" and the like.

It is this general ethos which gave the legislative council a special mystique in the colonial political system. Even when Tanganyika devised a new Republican Constitution a year after independence, with new strong powers for the President, one of the four basic principles of the Constitution was

declared to be the continuing "sovereignty of Parliament". In parts of East Africa members of the legislature possessed the privilege of displaying on their cars a large badge bearing the letters "M.P.". It also carried potentialities of influence and a gradual accumulation of affluence. The legislature, that central object of constitutional wrangles during the colonial period, had now momentarily become a symbol of power for those with a seat in it. The political elite in East Africa was, for the time being, the legislative elite.

For a while parliament continued to share the mystique which had been created by the exciting and liberating possibilities of self-government. Criticism of it was relatively slow to develop and in practice never took the form of root and branch condemnation of the legislature as such. But there were certain aspects of the "Westminster Model" which were "suicidal" for the model itself as soon as it was taken out of its native area. One of these seemed to be the institution of crossing the floor in Parliament. In Britain itself the right of the individual M.P. to change his Party without resigning his seat does not endanger the system. It is a right which has not disturbed the stability of political arrangements.

When the "Westminster Model" was exported elsewhere, it usually included among its parts this right of crossing the floor. But outside its native environment, with all the constraints and stabilizing influences, the right to cross the floor changed its character and was put to novel uses. Instead of being a rare occurrence marked by torment of conscience or by a nicely calculated opportunism, it assumed in East Africa a capacity to transform the political system as a whole.

A major aspect of the operation of any political system is the management of conflict. Crossing the floor in East African parliaments had an important role to play in conflict-management. Sometimes it served the purpose of internalising conflict within the ruling Party. This is best illustrated in Uganda's experience. In Kenya, on the other hand, crossing the floor in 1965 resulted in externalising what had previously been intra-party tensions. A third role of conflict-management overlaps with these other two. Crossing the floor has sometimes helped to mitigate

tension and narrow the area of possible clash between groups.

A useful approach is to take those three roles of conflict-management each in turn. And since the first was best exemplified in Uganda, it is to Uganda that we should look first.

## II

When independence was attained in Uganda in October 1962, the Government side of the National Assembly consisted of a coalition between Dr. Milton Obote's Uganda People's Congress (UPC, 44 seats), and the ethnically-oriented Buganda party, the Kabaka Yekka (KY, 24 seats). In Opposition was the Democratic Party (DP) with 24 seats.

Two forms of party fluidity were soon evident in the legislature, and the term "crossing the floor" is perhaps misleading in one of the categories. To switch from the Democratic Party to the UPC was indeed to "cross the floor". It was to move from the Opposition side to the ruling side of the House. But in fact the more interesting phenomenon, and perhaps the more significant in the long run, was the record of changing allegiances within the governing coalition itself.

Dr. Obote's Uganda People's Congress kept on growing. Initially its increasing strength owed less to its own appeal than to serious dissensions within the Kabaka Yekka movement and within the Democratic Party. Let us look at the latter first. On attainment of independence the DP Parliamentary group set out to be a serious and basically responsible official Opposition. But the leader of the Party had not succeeded in winning a seat to the National Assembly, and this rapidly led to a clear divergence between policy in the National Assembly and policy as unilaterally enunciated by the Party leader outside. The Party leader or president-general was Mr. Benedicto Kivunuka.

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Mr. Kivunuka held the Premiership under the phase of internal self-government on the eve of full independence.

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The official leader of the Opposition within Parliament, on the other hand, was Mr. Basil Bataringaya. While Mr. Bataringaya was carefully trying to build

the image of responsible Opposition within Parliament, Mr. Kiwanuka was indulging in a number of opportunistic tactics which cost the Party a good deal of popular respect. He even attempted to get the traditionalist institutions of Buganda to promote him as an indirectly-elected member from the Kingdom -- although his Party had declared itself opposed to indirect elections and to the powers of those traditionalist institutions.

The Parliamentary leader of DP, Mr. Bataringaya, had never commanded enough support within the party to wrest the overall leadership from Mr. Kiwanuka. The former's position therefore became increasingly untenable. A number of his colleagues in Parliament crossed to Dr. Obote's Party, in part out of genuine disenchantment with DP.

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The earlier phases of these events are traced in some detail by C. Gertzel in "How Kabaka Yekka came to be" and "Report from Kampala" both in Africa Report, October 1964.

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On December 31, 1964, Mr. Bataringaya himself crossed the floor and joined the UPC, taking five other DP members with him. Although there were calls that the rest of the Parliamentary group of DP should also cross, this was resisted. And the president-general of the party, Mr. Kiwanuka, declared a resolute resistance to the apparent trend towards a one-party system in Uganda.

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See Uganda Argus and Daily Nation, January 2, 1965.  
See also East African Standard, January 11, 1965.

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In the meantime the UPC had been gaining at the expense of KY also. And, as we indicated, it was not at first a case of "crossing the floor" so much as a change of allegiance within the governing UPC/KY Coalition itself. The twenty-four KY members of the National Assembly had all been indirectly elected -- twenty-one by the Lukiko (Buganda regional assembly) and three

by the National Assembly itself sitting as an electoral college. In the earlier phases the drift from KY to UPC seemed to be a reaction against the way in which the chiefs and other traditionalists in Buganda had successfully thwarted any hope of converting the KY movement into a modern political party or of using its moral assets as a means of bringing about major reforms within the Kingdom itself.

Ideologically, the KY members who joined the UPC appeared to be nearer to Obote's pragmatic brand of African socialism than to the conservative forces grouped round the Kabaka or King of Buganda. By joining the UPC the KY members were branded as traitors to the cause of upholding Buganda's traditions. But though elected by the Lukiko, they were not removable by the Lukiko. In any case the continuing coalition between KY and UPC perhaps helped to mitigate the sense of betrayal felt by those who had elected the defected KY members to the National Assembly.

### III

But then, in August 1964, Dr. Obote felt strong enough in Parliament to terminate his alliance with KY. The fourteen remaining members of KY at the time crossed the floor and sat alongside the DP opposition, though they seemed to make no attempt to enter into any kind of tactical arrangement with them.

Until this break-up of the alliance, those who joined the UPC from the ranks of its opponents did not seem motivated to subvert the UPC from the inside. But following the break-up of the alliance, and especially in the course of 1965, an entirely new political manoeuvre modelled on Trojan Horse tactics made its appearance, and had repercussions which culminated in the violent upheaval of 1966. Before independence Dr. Obote had made a deal with KY whereby as a quid pro quo for support in the National Assembly, the UPC was to refrain from opening up branch offices and recruiting members in Buganda. The indirect election of the 21 Buganda MPs by the Buganda regional assembly, the Lukiko, was part of the same deal. These MPs were originally elected as KY members.

Early in 1963 the understanding between the two parties was partially abandoned and a few UPC branches were opened in Buganda, principally in urban areas. Recruitment of Buganda into the UPC was slow mainly because Buganda nationalists were successful in portraying the UPC as an organization bent

on undermining the Buganda way of life. The UPC attempt to sensitize Ganda attitudes to a new set of centrally-oriented political goals was sufficiently alarming for the Buganda establishment to lead to a broad reappraisal of strategy. What evidence there is seems to indicate that a momentous decision was taken to try and subvert the UPC from within. By February 1966 the control of the Buganda regional branch of the UPC had fallen into the hands of a faction ostensibly supporting the UPC but apparently sharing its outlook with KY supporters. The Chairman of the Buganda regional branch of the UPC, Dr. Lumu, was a Minister in Dr. Obote's Cabinet. There were at least four other Ministers in the UPC Government who seemed to share political sympathies with KY.

Within Parliament the KY strategy had now apparently become one of trying to utilise the device of crossing the floor as a method of internalizing opposition to Dr. Obote. In July 1965 six out of the fourteen <sup>K.Y.</sup> members who sat on the Opposition benches crossed the floor and joined the Government majority. But how sound was the Government majority? Most of the sixteen former KY supporters were a doubtful proposition, and a number of ex-DP and UPC members began to examine their political "availability" as rumours of a plan to oust Dr. Obote gained ground.

The extent to which members had joined the anti-Obote bandwagon was dramatically revealed in February 1966. By an adroit manipulation of the parliamentary timetable, a motion was introduced in the National Assembly demanding a commission of inquiry into the disposal of certain ivory tusks and gold sent out of the Congo by the Stanleyville rebels. It was alleged that Dr. Obote, the Minister of Defence and the deputy Army Commander were implicated in this Congo "gold and ivory scandal". The person who introduced the motion and "led the pack" was a leading member of Kabaka Yelka, the late Daudi Ocheng. Obote was absent from the House touring in the north when the motion for a commission of inquiry was introduced. When the vote was taken those present in Parliament amounted to almost two thirds of the total membership of the National Assembly. "To the surprise of the outside world, all but one member of the National Assembly supported the motion -- and this included six Cabinet Ministers. That was perhaps Daudi Ocheng's



most dramatic moment of triumph. While it lasted it was also a vindication of KY's strategy of internalizing opposition to Dr. Obote by swelling the ranks of the disaffected within his own party.

The full account of Dr. Obote's recovery from this collapse of his party's unity under his leadership lies outside the scope of this paper. He came back to the capital

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See M. Crawford Young, "The Obote Revolution", Africa Report, June 1966; G.F. Engholm, "Buganda's Power Struggle", New Society, June 2, 1966; and G.F. Engholm and Ali A. Mazrui, "Violent Constitutionalism in Uganda", Government and Opposition, August 1967.

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and first assured himself of the loyalty of the security forces. In a dramatic move he then got the police to arrest five ministers when they assembled for a Cabinet meeting. He suspended the independence Constitution of 1962 and then replaced it with an interim one providing an executive president and eliminating the quasi-federal safeguards for Buganda which had formed part of the previous Constitution. Certain counter-moves by Buganda culminated in an army attack on the Kabaka's Palace in May 1966. The Kabaka fled from the country and sought refuge in England. In the meantime the six remaining KY members in Parliament, having refused to take the oath of allegiance to the new Constitution, lost their seats. And with Buganda in a state of emergency, and its loyalty in doubt, there was no question of holding bye-elections to replace them.

A striking omission in the new interim Constitution was the simple fact that no attempt was made to launch a one-party system. Smaller upheavals elsewhere in Africa had quickly been used as an excuse for eliminating all formal opposition. But Uganda's experience was different. The rump of the Democratic Party in Parliament was permitted not only to continue in existence but also to act as the most important remaining source of public criticism of the government. This was the more remarkable since Dr. Obote had taken advantage of Mr. Bataringaya's crossing of the floor the year before to declare that there would no longer be an "Official" Opposition in Uganda. This could easily have been a prelude to the abolition

of "unofficial" opposition as well, particularly considering Obote's public espousal of the one-party system as early as February 1964. Indeed, all those crossings of the floor in Parliament in the course of 1964 and early 1965 seemed to be carrying Uganda irresistably towards a one-party system. In January 1965 the national chairman of the UPC, Mr. John Babiiha, was asserting that only a one-party system could assure Uganda "social, political and economic stability and tranquility".

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Daily Nation, January 21, 1965.

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Yet a year later, when the UPC was in a position to take advantage of a state of emergency to launch a one-party state, it refrained from doing so. The whole idea of winning converts from opposition parties, and thus helping to liquidate them, had lost the great attraction it once had. The one-party system carried the danger of intra-party subversion -- and the device of "crossing the floor" was the Trojan Horse which could bring this about.

In June 1967 new Constitutional proposals were made in Uganda, to replace the interim Constitution which had been hastily introduced in the midst of the troubles of the previous year. The 1967 Constitutional proposals aimed to make the President stronger than ever. There were also stricter provisions curtailing civil liberties, including a new Preventive Detention Act. But again the centralisation fell short of outlawing opposition and setting up a one-party system.

It is not an exaggeration to say that a major factor which has saved Uganda from a one-party system for the time being is the use to which the device of "crossing the floor" was once put. Here was a practice which could easily have led to the emergence of a one-party system, as the losers deserted their parties to join the winners. But in Uganda the practice culminated in intra-party subversion and in a resultant disenchantment with one-partyism itself, at least when this is conceived in terms of open membership.

In August 1966 the UPC frankly admitted its new suspicion of party crossings. A statement issued by the national secretariat said that in order to prevent people joining the party for "ulterior motives", all kingdom and district assemblies would in future have to send applications for membership to the national secretariat. "Meanwhile, the national secretariat has appealed to the National Council to examine and screen members of other political parties joining the UPC in future," the statement said.

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See Daily Nation, August 22, 1966.

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The use to which "crossing the floor" in Parliament had been put had aroused suspicions about changing allegiances in the country at large. And the trend towards one-partyism in Uganda, which had seemed so irresistible in the second half of 1964, was now being thwarted by the dominant party itself.

#### IV

Kenya's experience with political parties has been, in some ways, even more complicated. But from the point of view of our analysis of conflict-management, what is of particular interest is the phenomenon of externalising ideological and personality clashes as illustrated by Kenya politics in recent times.

But first, let us trace the background to this phenomenon in the story of Kenya. Between May 18 and May 26, 1963, elections were held throughout the country as a prelude to self-government. The results were as follows:

House of Representatives	
Kenya African National Union (KANU)	64
Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU)	32
African People's Party	8
Independents	8

Senate

Kenya African National Union	18
Kenya African Democratic Union	16
African People's Party	2
Independents	2

On May 31 the Governor of Kenya, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, formally proclaimed the country's attainment of full internal self-government.

KANU was in power. A few weeks later, after discussions with the Ministers of the new Kenya Government, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies, announced in the House of Commons that Kenya would become independent on December 12, provided satisfactory progress was made at a Constitutional conference scheduled for the end of September.

The immediate points of issue between the parties continued therefore to be constitutional. KANU, the majority party, stood for a centralised, unitary state. KADU, an alliance of the smaller and

less secure minority tribes of Kenya, stood for a wide area of local autonomy in each region. The small African People's Party under the leadership of Paul Ngei was essentially a Party of the (sizeable and politically significant) Kamba tribe. The Kamba were related to the Kikuyu, and the APP leadership had more in common with KANU leaders

than they had with the dominant figures of KADU. But for a while Paul Ngei did lend some support to KADU's Majimbo or regionally oriented policies.

By September 1963, however, Ngei declared his disenchantment with the Majimbo policy and proposed to forsake the opposition and line up with the Government. In order to forestall any accusations of "betraying the Kamba masses", Ngei made it a point to give advance warning of his intention of crossing the floor while addressing meetings in the heart of Kambaland -- at Machakos and Kitui. By the 16 September the Kenya Gazette announced that the African People's Party had been removed from the register of societies as it had "ceased to exist". All the A.P.P. members of the House Representatives and the Senators had crossed the floor to join KANU.

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For some of the relevant background reports see East African Standard, September 7, 9, 12, 13, 17, 1963.

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The result of all this was that, unlike Uganda, Kenya approached independence with only two parties after all. Their deep differences in constitutional matters was taken to London to be thrashed out at the conference. The outcome of the conference was an attempt to reaffirm both KADU's Majimbo principle and KANU's desire for a stronger government. But on the whole this last constitutional conference prior to independence was more a triumph for the centralists than for the regionalists. The achievement of the regionalists had come earlier - when their influence helped to give Kenya the prolix and devalved constitution which accompanied the country into internal self-government -- a document which was the longest of its kind in the history of the British Empire and its dissolution. But the last constitutional conference prior to Kenya's independence tried to make amends for the centralists, though still leaving one or two matters unresolved.

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As it turned out, the most important of the unresolved issues was the North Eastern region and the future of the Somalis living there.

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The possibility of KADU crossing the floor to join KANU was raised soon after the constitutional conference. The governing party extended an invitation to members of the Opposition to cross the floor en masse. But after an important meeting of the KADU Parliamentary group in October 1963, Mr. Ronald Ngala, the leader of the Opposition, explained his Party's position on this matter with firmness. Asked if his party was in favour of "a united front" with KANU, Mr. Ngala said:-

"If united front means that the Opposition should cross the floor, then that is out of the question. But if it means that there should be agreement between the Opposition and the Government on delicate national issues, then that is the normal democratic way in which the party in power recognises the Opposition."

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See East African Standard, October 23, 1963.

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On December 12, 1963, Kenya became independent. It still had a two-party system, but pressures for the dissolution of KADU had been mounting. Some members had been crossing the floor already. Towards the end of November, for example, two defections from KADU gave KANU access to what had previously been "enemy territory" -- the Kalenjin areas. "There comes a time in the careers of politicians when they have to make an agonising reappraisal of their position," explained a defector.

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See East African Standard, 24 and 25 November, 1963.

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But it was not until nine months after independence that KADU's survival faced its worst test. The Government's proposals for a Republican constitution included proposals to reduce the powers of the seven regional authorities.

But the minority safeguards within the independence Majimbo constitution seemed to make it impossible for KANU to change the Constitution unless they got extra voting strength from at least some members of KADU, especially in the Senate. KANU asked the Opposition either to support the proposals or face a national referendum. It was expected that such a referendum would reveal much more clearly than ever how weak was the Opposition in the country and how "inflated" was its strength in the two Houses of Parliament. KADU was therefore rightly concerned about the risks involved in forcing the Government to go to the country at that particular moment.

Nevertheless, in early November, 1964, the KADU executive decided to stand firm against the Government on the Republican constitutional proposals. But at the eleventh hour a political confrontation was avoided. Two days before the Senate was due to vote on the Republican proposals, two Masai members and one Samburu crossed the floor. This was decisive. The crossings gave the Government its seventy-five per cent majority in the Senate to get the proposals passed. The meetings that Mr. Kenyatta had been having with the chiefs and elders of the Masai and Samburu had served their purpose. Three crossings in the Senate had spared the country the expense and possible risks of what might have been an acrimonious referendum.

The KADU executive soon met to reappraise the situation. They decided that it was now "obvious that the country has chosen to have one leadership under the new Constitution". At this time the vote in the Senate had not as yet been taken on the new proposals, but the Government now had the requisite voting strength. KADU decided that the time to cross the floor and join the Government was before the vote was taken. And so, on November 10, 1964, Ronald Ngala stood in the House of Representatives and solemnly announced his Party's decision.

"I have a full mandate to declare today that the official Opposition is dissolved. Kadu is joining the Government under the leadership of Mzee Jomo Kenyatta and the Opposition today will vote with the Government for the new Constitution in the Senate."

Mr. Ngala's voice was almost drowned by the cheering and stamping. And then stood a beaming Mr. Kenyatta and, to a tumultuous applause, he said:

"I welcome our brothers wholeheartedly ... I regard this day as a great day, not for Kanu but for the people of Kenya."

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See East African Standard, November 11, 1964.

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With the dissolution of KADU Kenya became what was called "a voluntary one-party state". In the scramble for position as independence approached the country had had three parties. On the eve of independence the smallest of the three crossed the floor to join the largest. Kenya therefore attained sovereign status with a two-party system. But floor-crossings again started eroding away the strength of the Opposition. And finally a decisive triple-crossing gave the Government the requisite strength for a major constitutional change. The KADU Opposition reappraised itself -- and decided to join the winners.

The One-party trend, which in Uganda was thwarted before it attained fulfilment, managed in Kenya to "go the whole hog". KANU became the only party -- at least for a while.

V

But was not this simply another instance of internalising opposition into the ruling group itself? Certainly suggestions of this kind were being made not long after KADU dissolved itself to join KANU. Mr. Oginga Odinga, then Vice-President of the country, remarked three months after



KADU's dissolution that former KADU leaders still had "KADU beliefs".

And yet Mr. Odinga's own remarks were the beginning of a new kind of split. Unlike the case of some of the KY crossings in Uganda, the KADU crossings in Kenya were certainly not an instance of infiltration. It was not a case of bringing opponents of the Government from the outside into the inner chambers of the Governing party. To that extent KADU crossings were not a simple case of internalising opposition to the Government.

And yet there is no doubt that Opposition to the Government within the Party became more marked following the merger with KADU. What was the difference? The answer to the question brings in the whole relationship between the one-party state and the problem of unity. It is true that the disappearance of KADU from Kenya's political scene led to internal dissension within KANU. But KADU did not cause this dissension by joining KANU. It caused it simply by dissolving itself. In other words, even if Mr. Ngalia and his colleagues of KADU had simply retired from politics after dissolving their Party, the dissension within the ruling party would still have reared its head simply because of the disappearance of a rival party.

This is one of the dilemmas facing African one-party states. A one-party system is often defended in terms of being an instrument for unity. And yet its own internal party unity sometimes depends on the stimulus of a rival party. The Tanganyika African National Union has so far averted the danger of "withering away". But the Kenya African National Union was faced with this risk as soon as it was deprived of the invigorating insecurity which came with a rival party. In an open letter to President Kenyatta in January 1966 the Organizing Secretary of KANU at the time, Mr. John Keen, complained bitterly of the rust, dust and cobwebs which were already covering the party machinery. He noted "the appalling situation of the party". There had not been a meeting of the party Secretariat since February 1964 or of the party executive council since 1963. Party debts totalling nearly £20,000 had not been paid. Full-time party workers had received no salaries for months, and electricity and telephones were sometimes cut off because the requisite

bills had remained unattended. Paul Ngei, who had dissolved his own party just before independence to become a leading member of KANU, echoed John Keen's sentiments in March 1966. Ngei told the Press:

"It is my opinion that the Party is not functioning ...  
I cannot see the Party dying like this when the Party  
is ruling the country."

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For a very useful background article to Kenya at that time see John Spencer, "Kenyatta's Kenya", Africa Report, Vol. II No. 5, May 1966. John Keen later resigned from his party office, and was detained by the Government.

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But it was not merely lethargy which ensued upon the launching of the one-party system in Kenya. It was also mounting dissension between factions within the Party. In the course of 1965 open clashes and exchange of political abuse between leading members of KANU became increasingly uninhibited. The leader of the discontented members of the Party became Mr. Oginga Odinga, the Vice President of the country and of the Party. Clashes between him and fellow Members of the Cabinet more loyal to Mr. Kenyatta became more publicly articulated.

Among the most loyal to Mr. Kenyatta were, in fact, the former leaders of KADU like Ronald Ngala and Daniel Moi. Indeed, when Mr. Kenyatta decided to relieve Mr. Odinga of his portfolio as Minister for Home Affairs, he then gave it to Mr. Moi. It was about that time that Mr. Odinga made suggestions that the KADU leaders who had crossed the floor had brought their KADU beliefs with them. To these accusations Mr. Moi said:-

"I would like to make clear to the public that KADU joined KANU and the Government sincerely, and has consolidated those forces who were, and are, loyal to the President of Kenya. The country will no doubt know who are loyal to the President and who are not. It is easy to speak, but what remains to be seen in practice is

what should be taken to be the true intent."

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See East African Standard, December 1, 1965

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It was indeed a significant paradox. The end of KADU had both strengthened the Kenya Government and weakened the ruling party. As we have indicated KANU was weakened when it lost the unifying effect of a rival party. The Kenya Government was strengthened when its own brand of political pragmatism found loyal support from former KADU leaders. To use the words of Mr. Moi again, "we joined the Government and the party to consolidate forces within them loyal to the President".

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Ibid.

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In the course of 1966 events in Kenya seemed to be heading towards an ultimate confrontation between Mr. Kenyatta's immediate supporters and the disaffected members of KANU around Mr. Oginga Odinga. Kenya's single-party system was merely an umbrella for genuine political clashes and open debate. As a newspaper of one of Kenya's neighbours noted in an editorial following a remarkable debate in the Kenya Parliament:-

"It is surprising that Kenya, a one-party state, should have a Parliamentary debate on a motion seeking to express confidence in the President and his government. And the acrimony of the debate, in which several members were ordered out and the Vice-President of Kenya walked out, comes as a surprise, despite the fact that it has been known for a long time that there were divisions in the ruling Kenya African National Union."

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"KANU's Split is Showing", Uganda Argus, February 17, 1966.

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This brief period was perhaps the golden age of liberalism in Kenya. President Nyerere of Tanzania had once said that the one-party system had the capacity to promote freer political debates than was possible in a two-party system. Party discipline, which often effectively curtailed the freedom of the individual legislator in a two-party system, could be dispensed with in a situation in which there was no rival party that might stand to gain by dissension within one's own party.

To put it in another way, a single-party system has no obvious alternative government which must be denied electoral advantage. Opposing factions are looser and changeable. If there is such a thing as a "shadow cabinet" it has not been institutionalised -- and is therefore more shadowy than ever. Precisely because the fear of giving "the enemy" an electoral advantage is less immediate and identifiable, dissension within the ruling party in a single-party system can be all the more uninhibited.

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For Nyerere's stimulating discussion of this theme see his Democracy and the Party-System (Dar es Salaam: Tanganyika Standard, 1962).

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But the best illustration of this vigorous debate within a single-party system has not, in fact, been Tanzania. It was Kenya in its period of vigorous liberalism within the single-party structure. Top Tanzanian leaders have never clashed as openly and frankly as top KANU leaders were clashing in 1965-6. Kenya as an "open society" attained the heights of candour in this short phase.

But then the device of "crossing the floor" brought the curtain down on this period. On April 14, 1966, Oginga Odinga announced his resignation as Kenya's Vice President. The impact was far-reaching. Two assistant Ministers resigned from KANU. And then eighteen members of

the House of Representatives and nine Senators crossed the floor to give Parliamentary existence to a new Opposition Party, the Kenya People's Union (KPU). Shortly afterwards the Minister of Information, Achieng Oneko, resigned and joined the rebels. It was not long before Oginga Odinga formally took over as President of KPU.

The risk of further floor-crossings seemed immediate. The ruling party reacted with resourcefulness. It is reported that at a meeting of the KANU Parliamentary group following Oneko's resignation Mr. Kenyatta angrily demanded that all those who had crossed the floor should be expelled from Parliament. The Speaker of the House pointed out that this would be unconstitutional. Mboya is credited with the alternative solution which was adopted --- that those who had changed parties should be forced to go to their constituencies and stand for election again. This move was apparently rationalised on the grounds that "having deserted KANU, the dissidents no longer represented their constituents."

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John Spencer, "Kenyatta's Kenya", op. cit.,

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But this too needed a constitutional amendment. Such an amendment was rushed through. Thirteen of the defectors, faced with the loss of perquisites, applied for readmission to KANU and publicly reaffirmed their loyalty to Mr. Kenyatta. They helped to get the constitutional amendment passed by the two Houses. But in spite of their renewed declarations of allegiance to the Party, the dissidents were told that they too would have to stand for re-election under the new law. On hearing this ten of the penitents crossed the floor once again -- and rejoined the KPU.

In June 1966 the "Little General Election" was held in Kenya in those constituencies affected by the floor-crossings. By that time twenty House of Representatives seats and ten Senate seats were involved. The campaigns were energetic and lively. And the issues which divided the

two parties were indeed partly tribal. But there were also more genuine clashes of ideology and policy-alternatives than have been evident in most African elections so far. There was a neo-Marxist theme in much of KFU's rhetoric which clearly distinguished the Party from its ruling rival.

Many of KFU's members in Parliament were not returned, including Bildad Kaggia, the Kikuyu Marxist. But the Party, however small, did survive the "Little General Election" and continued to follow the leadership of Mr. Oginga Odinga. After a brief exercise in single-party politics, Kenya once again had a rival Opposition party in Parliament.

At first sight this "externalisation" of opposition to the Government would seem to have served the cause of liberal politics in Kenya. The device of crossing the floor had given the country a two-party system once again.

And yet the total effect of the events of 1966 was in fact to reduce liberalism in Kenya. Mr. Odinga's group was larger and more powerful within KANU than it has become since then. The "Little General Election" had itself taken its toll. Many leading figures, who would have continued to command public attention had they continued to be in Parliament, have now fallen into oblivion. Achieng Oneko and Bildad Kaggia are two such figures. Had they and their colleagues not left KANU, there would have been no "Little General Election". And had there been no such election, the parliamentary opposition to Government policies would have been stronger than it is now. And Mr. Odinga's following --- within the ruling party but against the government --- would have been larger and more commanding. It is also just possible that in such circumstances there would have been no Preventive Detention Act as yet in Kenya. That, however, is a less solid

speculation. What the evidence does support is that crossing the floor in Kenya in 1966 resulted in giving the country an extra political party but at the cost of reduced candour in public debate and reduced effectiveness in challenging government policy. Kenya gained a two-party system and lost much of the liberalism of its politics.

## VI

But liberalism is tied to the doctrine of consent in government, and this in turn is by no means unrelated to the kind of party system a country devises. It is to these aspects of the question, and their bearing on mitigation of conflict in the political system, that we must now turn.

To the question "What is the connection between the party system and the principle of consent?" the liberal answer has tended to start from the premise that consent postulates an alternative. A people could not be said to have consented to be ruled by Party A unless there was an alternative party that they were in a position to vote for had they been so inclined. When therefore Mr. Ngala late in 1964 decided to dissolve KADU and join the ruling party in Kenya he was in effect depriving the people of Kenya of their right to an identifiable "shadow government". In other words, a liberal might have argued that Kenya's two party system had no right to commit suicide. The decision which Mr. Ngala and his colleagues had reached affected more than Ngala's own political future. It was arguable that by killing his own party Mr. Ngala had denied the country as a whole a potential alternative to KANU.

But perhaps it was not just Mr. Ngala who killed KADU. It was also all those members of his Party who had crossed the floor before he decided on dissolving it. This is where we need to look at the relationship between the doctrine of consent and the phenomenon of crossing the floor.

We should perhaps begin by taking note of the concept of composite consent. What is consented to after a free inter-party election is not simply which party should rule. The effect of the voting is not merely in determining which party is in a majority in the legislature but also which is in a minority and by what margins of strength the different parties are separated. The balance of forces which emerges after a free election is what enjoys the composite consent of the electorate as a whole.

In the last general election in Kenya on the eve of independence the composite consent which resulted was to a two-party system -- though with one party considerably stronger than the other.

It is possible to argue in general terms that every crossing of the floor is a distortion of the composite consent of the electorate since it modifies the balance of forces to which they had originally assented. The Uganda Parliament by the end of 1965 bore little relationship to the strength of the Uganda People's Congress at the last general election. The phenomenon of floor-crossings had inflated the strength of the UPC in Parliament and made it considerably stronger than its original electoral position would justify. The composite consent which emerged after the last general election has since sustained considerable distortion in Parliament, mainly because of floor-crossings.

Yet in Kenya in the first year of independence it was possible to argue that crossing the floor was by no means always a distortion of original consent. This was because of a prior distortion arising from constituency boundaries. In July 1962 a Commission had been appointed to delimit constituencies for the Lower House of the National Assembly. In January 1963 the Report was published. It became increasingly clear that the main result of the new constituency boundaries was a heavy weighting against Mr. Kenyatta's Kenya African National Union. Clyde Sanger, writing in The Guardian, assessed that the sizes of the 117 constituencies varied so much that in broad terms it seemed likely that



three votes for KANU would be worth only two cast for any other party -- Mr. Ngala's KADU, Mr. Paul Ngei's African People's Party or the secessionist Somalis in the Northern Frontier District. Mr. Sanger continued:-

"In other words K.A.N.U. could win 60 per cent of the popular vote and yet take only a minority of seats .... Electorates vary in size from Baringo East with 749 voters to Nakuru East with 47,017."

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The Guardian, February 20, 1963. See also Africa Digest, Vol. X No.5, April 1963, pp. 158-159.

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When in May the elections were held the results were not quite as bizarre as at one time had seemed possible. After all, KANU did emerge as the majority party. Nevertheless, KADU, with only one-fifth of KANU's electoral strength in the country, won the equivalent of half of KANU's seats (KADU had 32 seats in Parliament to KANU's 64). It is true that the system of single-member constituencies is not intended in any case to achieve the happy neatness of proportional representation. But in the case of Kenya's constituencies something approaching "neo-gerrymandering" had been at play. If therefore through a fault in the electoral arrangements KADU had got more seats in Parliament than was justified even by the canons of single-member constituencies, then crossing the floor had a restorative rather than distorting function. A few desertions from KADU made the legislature more representative rather than less. And the composite consent of the electorate was restored.

This is certainly one area of activity in which crossing the floor could serve to mitigate some of the frustrations of being underrepresented. When Clyde Sanger assessed before the Kenya elections that KANU could conceivably win sixty per cent of the popular vote and still win only a minority of seats, he appended a warning to this hypothesis.

He said:-

"If this happened it would not only be the perennial pessimists who would predict revolutionary violence."

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The Guardian, Ibid.

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Sanger was pointing precisely to the explosive risks of a certain scale of underrepresentation. But it was not Kenya which was soon to vindicate Sanger's theory of representational frustrations. It was Zanzibar. It is arguable that of all countries in former British Africa the one which needed floor-crossings most of all was Zanzibar between its last election in July 1963 and the actual revolution in January 1964. The results of the July elections had given the Zanzibar Nationalist Party twelve seats and the Zanzibar and Pemba People's party six seats. These two parties had formed the ruling alliance, holding eighteen seats in Parliament. The Opposition party was the Afro-Shirazi Party, with the remaining thirteen seats of the legislature.

And yet, in terms of support in the country, the governing coalition had won only 46 per cent of the popular vote. Through a predictable electoral fault in constituency boundaries, Zanzibar had once again a frustrated popular party in opposition, while a minority coalition held the reins of power. This was an anomaly which was predictable enough to have been rectified before the election -- had the departing British authorities possessed the will to do so. But they did not. The country therefore emerged into independence with a minority government.

In different circumstances this anomaly might have mattered less. But it just so happened that in Zanzibar the ruling minority government was too closely identified with a long-established Arab elite within the Sultanate. It is true that the Zanzibar Nationalist Party had more African support than naive external commentators sometimes assumed. The ruling coalition government would not have won forty-six per cent of the

vote if it was simply an "Arab coalition", for the Arabs were little more than a sixth of the population.

Nevertheless, although not all Africans were against the government, virtually all Arabs were for it. That is why the ruling coalition became so closely associated in many people's minds with the long-established Arab elite.

The Arabs were economically, especially in land-ownership, still very much a privileged class. By 1963 the Arabs could no longer maintain their economic status through armed might. That is why parliamentary control assumed a crucial significance. In the words of Michael F. Lofchie,

"Whereas the Arabs' position in the past rested upon their superior force as a caste of colonial invaders and upon an ability to use this force to dominate the economy, their security now depended upon the intrinsic stability of a parliamentary system".

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Lofchie, Zanzibar: Background to Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965) pp.270-271.  
See also The Times (London), July 17, 1963.

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If the Arabs had lost control over the parliamentary system, it is conceivable that no violent revolution would have been necessary. And how could they lose control over the parliamentary system? Presumably by losing that margin of seats in Parliament without which their parties in Parliament would not have been able to form a ruling coalition.

But given that a fault in constituency arrangements had already conferred an artificial majority on the coalition of the ZNP and the ZPP, the only hope lay in a post-electoral shift in the balance of parliamentary strengths. This is what leads us to one of the great "might-have-beens" in the political history of East Africa. It might not be too much of an

exaggeration to say that if three members of the ZNP/ZPP coalition had crossed the floor to join the Afro-Shirazi Party, the Zanzibar revolution need not have taken place. Sixteen seats in Parliament would have given the Afro-Shirazi Party a majority. And if this had happened between July 1963 and early December, the departing British authorities would have had to supervise a change of government following a shift in Parliamentary support. There might indeed have been some rioting here and there, but the violent revolution which occurred within a month of British departure might well have been averted.

It is difficult to be certain when one is speculating about what might or might not have happened in this or that set of circumstances. But if Lofchie is right that the stability of the parliamentary system was the Arabs' last protection against a rapid erosion of their privileges, those hypothetical defections in Parliament from the coalition to the Afro-Shirazi Party might well have averted one of the most brutal episodes in the recent history of East Africa.

#### Concluding Summary

We might again reiterate that increased representation in the legislative council was one of the earlier aims of nationalist movements in most British colonies in Africa. This phenomenon helped to acquire for the legislature a mystique which accompanied it into independence.

After independence the Westminster model, at first popular, was then rapidly discredited. And with the apparent decline of the organized effectiveness of political parties in much of Africa, the institution of Parliament seemed to be losing its centrality in African political systems.

And yet in East Africa one form of parliamentary behaviour had sometimes far-reaching implications for political arrangements at large. And this was, as we indicated, the phenomenon of crossing the floor. In Uganda the device of crossing the floor first took the country to the

brink of a one-party system. But then the dominant party took another look at what had been happening. Floor-crossing had, in part, been a form of infiltration --- and while it was taking the country to the brink of a one-party system its real aim to push the top leadership over the brink.

Uganda might still end up having a one-party system. But for the time-being the dominant party is certainly not speeding up the process. Both in 1966 and in 1967 the Party put forward proposals for sweeping constitutional changes. But in both cases the Government did not use the opportunity to push forward proposals for a one-party system. On the contrary, in 1967 the Government specifically affirmed that it had no special proposals to set-up a one-party state.

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This was affirmed by Minister Felix Onama, who had on previous occasions strongly attacked "Western-style democracy".  
See Uganda Argus, June 1967.

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It might therefore be argued that the utilization of crossing the floor as a "Trojan Horse" tactic had led to a situation in which the dominant party had become a little apprehensive about over-extending itself. Crossing the floor had therefore helped to create in Uganda, at least for a while, a distrust of one-partyism.

In Kenya crossing the floor had first before independence given the country a three-party system. Then the trend led to the liquidation of the APP --- leaving the country with a two-party system. And about a year after independence the self-dissolution of KADU gave the country a voluntary one-party state.

However, the disappearance of a rival party let loose within the ruling party the ideological friction and personal rivalry which had before remained subdued. The tendency culminated in a new wave of crossings in 1966 -- and the formation of the Kenya People's Party. This was a case of externalising opposition to Government. But while the

crossings of 1966 restored for Kenya a two-party system, it was at the expense of the more vigorous opposition and debate which had been possible from within the party.

Finally, we analysed the relationship between the doctrine of government by consent and the phenomenon of crossing the floor. In Kenya crossing from KADU to KANU might have helped to mitigate some of the frustrations of under-representation. In pre-revolutionary Zanzibar, however, what was significant was the floor-crossing which never took place -- the hypothetical three defections from the coalition to the Afro-Shirazi Party which alone would have given the latter the necessary majority to form a Government without a revolution.

It is these considerations which give the phenomenon of parliamentary defections in East Africa a depth of meaning which far transcends the apparently trivial motives which often inspire them. At times a mere symptom, and at others a catalyst or a cause, the phenomenon of crossing the floor has often been at the very centre of problems of conflict-management in the political systems of East Africa.

Summary: see p. 27

#### Résumé

La pratique du "crossing the floor" (surtout la défection de la majorité à l'opposition, mais aussi l'inverse) a joué en Afrique orientale un rôle important, freinant l'installation de partis uniques, et suscitant chez les dirigeants du parti majoritaire la crainte du noyautage. Les défections posent des problèmes à la théorie de la représentation ; en Afrique orientale, elles ont été au centre même des conflits au sujet de la représentation, et ont parfois contribué à leur solution.

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"Theory and practice of representation"

REPRESENTATION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

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## REPRESENTATION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS\*\*

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### I. The Reapportionment Cases

In 1962, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Baker v. Carr,<sup>1</sup> abandoned its formerly consistent position that legislative apportionment in the states was a "political question" inadmissible to the federal courts, and accepted the matter for adjudication. No standard for apportionment was presented in the Baker decision, that question being left to subsequent argument. Two years later, on successive "opinion Mondays" in June, 1964, the Court delivered no fewer than fifteen separate decisions that existing legislative apportionment schemes in the same number of states were unconstitutional. Two of the decisions, in particular, exhibit the Court's theory of representation, a theory which evoked a flood of comment, both favorable and critical, in the journals of law and political science and in the popular press.

In the leading case, Reynolds v. Sims,<sup>2</sup> the Court overthrew an Alabama legislative apportionment plan because, "as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause<sup>++</sup> [of the United States constitution] requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis." The fundamental principle of representative government in the United

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\*\* Adapted from "Representation and Apportionment," to be published by Parliamentary Affairs, and "Representation and Consent: The Reapportionment Cases in Retrospect," submitted for publication.

++ No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."  
14th Article of Amendment, Sec.1.



States, the Court maintained, "is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a state... As long as ours is a representative form of government," it continued, "and our legislatures are those instruments of government elected directly by and directly representative of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system." In support of its position, the Court cited a number of prior cases in which it had held that "the right to vote is personal" and "cannot be made to depend on where [one] lives."

In another decision in the series, Lucas v. Colorado,<sup>3</sup> the Court deduced a consistent, but politically more difficult, conclusion from its premise of the constitutional "right to equal representation." Less than two years earlier, the State of Colorado, by popular referendum, had adopted a so-called federal plan of apportionment, in which one house of the legislature was apportioned according to equal populations, the other primarily on geographic considerations. Despite its approval by an electoral majority, the Court denied the scheme, holding that "an individual's constitutionally protected right to cast an equally weighted vote cannot be denied even by a vote of a majority of the State's electorate..." This decision, more clearly perhaps than the leading decision in Reynolds v. Sims, affirmed the Court's intent to relate legislative apportionment in the states to a concept of the prior individual right of equal representation.

## II. The Academic Response to the Cases

Despite the conflicting political reactions which the reapportionment decisions of 1962-64 evoked among American scholars, it is apparent that one or more of three closely related assumptions underlay most of their comments, either explicitly or implicitly. These assumptions, which are political in nature but which have direct implications for the law, are: (1) that electoral procedures are the sole,

or at least the controlling, measure of representation in legislative assemblies; (2) that acceptance of an unqualified equal-populations standard of legislative apportionment must limit or preclude the representation of interests in legislative bodies; and (3) that, by adopting an equal-populations standard (or, by inference, any constitutional standard) of apportionment, the Supreme Court has taken the political course of constructing legislative assemblies. It is <sup>of</sup> a major interest to note that all three assumptions have been employed in bipartisan fashion, by both friends and critics of the reapportionment decisions. Thus, debate has generally centered, not on the empirical question of whether the principle of "one man, one vote, one value" will have any bearing on the process of legislative representation, but -- assuming that it must -- upon its constitutional propriety.

The identification of the electoral system, in particular the manner of apportioning electoral constituencies, as the control mechanism of political representation is rarely explicit, but is so frequently assumed as to seem a truism to a reader of the recent history and law of legislative reform in the United States. It appears in authoritative form in the Supreme Court dictum that the guarantee of equally weighted votes will secure "the fundamental principle...of equal representation for equal numbers of people."<sup>4</sup> It appears in a favorable interpretation of the reapportionment decisions of 1964 to mean that "representation of all the people is the only permissible objective of an apportionment system."<sup>5</sup> And it occurs in highly critical assessments of the Court's judgment -- in the statement that "the basic issue of these [reapportionment] cases is what kind of representation processes and institutions are required to assure a government that rests upon the will of the people...,"<sup>6</sup> and again in the declaration that "fair representation is the ultimate goal" toward which the Supreme Court must reach.<sup>7</sup> In one form or another, the assumption that representation is defined by, even contiguous with, the electoral device of apportionment, animates analysis of the Reapportionment Cases in paper after paper published in the United States since

the Baker decision of 1962.

The second assumption, that the equal-populations standard of legislative apportionment must restrain, perhaps even bar, the representation of interests in lawmaking bodies, appears almost as frequently as the first, and often as a quite explicit assertion. It springs, it appears, from the first assumption, that apportionment and representation are congruent procedures, and proceeds to the logical inference that the representation of qualities of interest must occur in direct relation to the apportionment of quantities of people or votes in the electoral system. Ergo, the brief concludes, legislative apportionment according to an equal-populations standard must deny the possibility that interests will be represented in legislative assemblies except according to their numerical weight.

The argument appears with elemental clarity in the statement that apportionment based solely on equal populations "will end centuries of experimentation with the design of democratic institutions which will accommodate within the same units of government a wide variety of interest groups."<sup>9</sup> It is conveyed in the observations that, because some interests may merit greater representation than others, "the principle of equality of individual representation can be only a partial guide to solution of the apportionment problem,"<sup>10</sup> and "may provide an insufficient standard of fairness."<sup>11</sup> The bipartisan appeal of the argument is wide and consistent. Professor Auerbach, for example, was correct in observing that much of the immediate opposition to the Baker and Reynolds cases issued from the belief that interests of one sort or another are proper objects of legislative representation, and that apportionment schemes should therefore be devised to accommodate them.<sup>12</sup> But he might also have observed that most of the advocates of the "one man, one vote" formula, those who welcomed the decisions in the Reapportionment Cases, have relied on precisely the same implicit assumption, that equality of the vote will somehow inhibit inequality of representation.

The assumed competence of the electoral system to control the legislative representation of interests is not simply a property of the detractors of the Reapportionment Cases, but has been a stock-in-trade of the American apportionment reform movement throughout its history.

The final assumption, that adoption of a firm constitutional standard of legislative apportionment in the states has thrust the federal judiciary headlong into the political activity of constructing lawmaking bodies, is logically dependent, it is argued below, upon the first two. The bitter complaint that the Court has indulged in "judicial prescription" has been expressed most poignantly, perhaps, by Professor McCloskey, following the announcement of Baker v. Carr but before the Reynolds decision: "... it is hard to see how the process of balancing these complexities [of geography, insular minorities, and other interests] could be reduced to anything resembling 'an exercise of reason'... It is equally hard to see how the judicial process thus conceived could differ from the legislative process..."<sup>13</sup>

But it would not be so hard to see, perhaps, if it were found that the first two assumptions noted above were without theoretical relevance or empirical foundation, and that the specter of judicial interference in the political process in the Reapportionment Cases were dissolved without their support. There are good reasons to insist, in fact, that the processes of election and representation -- i.e., the individual act of suffrage within some apportionment framework, on one hand, and the social relationship of representation, on the other -- are theoretically dissimilar, politically discontinuous, and, in the United States, constitutionally separable. Every available evidence in the long history of parliamentary institutions indicates, moreover, that the representation of interests and interest groups is a continuing and organic function of legislatures, regardless

of their electoral foundations, which suggests that the most likely effect of the Reapportionment Cases on the legislative process will be simply to create a "free market" of interest representation, functioning without statutory bias. When, finally, the reapportionment decisions of 1964 are related to the process of representation as it occurs within the political system, rather than to the curious myth of electoral creation which has so long dominated the conventional idea of representation, it becomes clear that, far from venturing crudely into legislative politics, the Supreme Court avoided the difficult questions of legislative composition and behavior with remarkable prudence.

### III. The Theory of Representation

A major source of confusion throughout the history of debate on apportionment reform has been the highly ambiguous use of the term "representative". The formal adoption of the title, Representative, in both federal and state constitutions in the United States symbolizes the conventional identification of an office with its function, of "my Representative" with "my representative." The confusion of terms may be of no practical consequence unless it obscures the rather obvious fact that my duly elected Representative, Senator, or Deputy may not be my representative in any positive or personal sense; he may, indeed, be actively hostile to my interests or, worse, wholly unaware of them. One of the greatest achievements of the parliamentary tradition has been the acceptance of the rule that authority adheres to the representative office, as constitutionally defined, and not to its transient occupant. Yet the question has not been clearly raised in political theory whether representation occurs as a function of formal office, as a perceived identity of interest between two or more persons, or as the product of an operational system. In no event, however, can it be accepted that representation is a simple statutory condition, structured and proportioned like a crystalline cluster and produced by the catalysis of an apportionment scheme in a brief moment of election.

Rather it is a process, continuous and changing, influenced by a wide variety of forces of which the electoral system is only one.

Empirically, representation is a perceived relationship,<sup>14</sup> and may be defined in the broadest sense as the authoritative exercise of power by one on behalf of others. It is, of course, a relationship involving two or more parties, the representative and the represented, thus social by definition and not something that is "possessed" by individuals, groups, or electorates, whether as a right or a convention. The casual use of such phrases as "right of representation" and "equal representation" synonymously with "right to vote" and "equal suffrage," a practice which is common in the United States, suggests that, beyond the citizen's right of electoral expression, even beyond his right to equal protection of the law, he has a further and consonant right to equal or proportionate attention from the lawmakers themselves. It is evident, in fact, that the thought is the essential, though tacit, premise of much of the literature of the reapportionment controversy, and the principal wellspring from which both the champions and opponents of equal voting rights have drawn support.

Attendant to the notion that political representation is a personal condition is the further vague belief that it is, or must be made to be, simple and direct, as it seems to be between attorney and client or guardian and ward. In a complex organization, however, a classification which obviously includes the political system, representation tends to be multiple and indirect, and the roles of the parties to the relationship are frequently ambivalent or even conflicting. There are probable grounds for assuming, in fact, that the instance of simple and direct representation is little more than an analytic model in any circumstance. Representation does not occur in isolation, but in some social context which is continuously influenced by the constraints of "third parties" in the system. In the case of the attorney and his client, to take the seemingly more simple case,

the relationship is moderated by law, professional standards, custom, and a variety of other constraints introduced by one or the other of the principals or their associates. Indeed, it is according to some regularized and commonly accepted system of constraints -- in law, politics, religion, or any other trustee relationship -- that the function of representation establishes its meaning and finds its justification in the first place. My representative -- my legal counsel or my legislative member -- is what he is, not because he responds in simple and direct fashion to my wishes and needs, nor even because he occupies a formal office, but because he acts responsibly within some sort of constitutional framework, i.e., a framework of norms and sanctions which we both accept as legitimate.\*\*

There is a difficulty, however, in settling on the truism that a representative relationship is subject to environmental influences. The statement is plain and for most purposes perfectly adequate: no one, probably, would question the assertion that a legislator's proper relation to his constituents had been corrupted because he took a bribe. But what is to be said of the legislator who casts his vote contrary to the seeming interests of his constituents because he has received an appeal from the Governor of his state, his political party, or one of his legislative colleagues, all of whom are legitimate participants in the system, yet once removed from "the people back home" in his electoral district? Or to compound the problem, how is the proper legislator-constituent relationship to be described when it is noted that one or another of the principals harbors social or political attitudes which are pathological to the constitutional tradition?

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\*\* The recent unhappy removal of Congressman Adam Powell from the U.S. House of Representatives illustrates the point with rare clarity. There is no question that Powell represented, with intense immediacy, the perceived interests of his constituents in the 18th congressional district of New York. Yet Members of the House felt obliged (an "obligation" not wholly free of racial bias) to judge whether his behavior was in conformity with the general rules of the game, according to which rules Powell had become a Representative in the first place.

Certainly there would be little point in arguing in these instances that forces alien to the process of representation had somehow confounded its proper execution. It is evident, instead, that such cognitive third parties are organically present in any representative undertaking, and that representation occurs functionally, not simply according to the mechanics of a contractual device, such as an election system, but as a variable of the whole political process.

The conclusion that emerges is that the role of the political representative is fashioned within an exceedingly complex system, one in which his assessment of himself, of those whom he represents, and of the various offices and elements of the system itself are all factors in his behavior. <sup>15</sup> Needless to say, the representative's perceptions of any or all of these elements may differ from those of his constituents, who in turn may differ widely among themselves. Some of the more obvious conditions which shatter the myth of simple and direct representation are noted at greater length below, although a single example may be cited at this juncture.

Universally among the world's constitutional democracies, political parties are interposed, in a sense, between electorates and parliamentary bodies, not just during campaigns for election, but continuously in and out of legislative sessions. The party is at times concretely on hand as a constitutional organ in the representative process; at other times, or in other systems, it is present as an attitude or commitment which is exhibited in the behavior of both lawmakers and their constituents. However their functions and powers may vary among political systems, the de facto existence of political parties must be acknowledged in any meaningful theory of representation. It is possible to consider them legitimate representative organs in their own right, as they have become in British practice, moderating and shaping, but presumed not to corrupt, the relationship between the people at large and their parliamentary bodies. Or they may be diagnosed as pathological to the body politic, as has often been done in the American tradition, and precautions



taken against them. In neither case, however, can the existence of political parties be reconciled with the simple belief that political representation can be a direct legislator-constituent bond pledged by arithmetic electoral ratios. The difficulty, unhappily, has been resolved in the breach by most students of reapportionment in the United States by simply ignoring it.

A further aspect of the theory of representation must be noted before turning to its operation in American politics. Representation has been defined as the authoritative exercise of power on behalf of others. If the relationship is not a straightforward and fixed condition between electors and elected, under what circumstances in a complex organization can it be said that the exercise of power is representative, i.e., invested with authority rather than being simply arbitrary or dictatorial? Power is representative when all or most of the parties to the relationship independently perceive the system to be legitimate which prescribes the use of power. This means, in the first place, that it is not just -- or even necessarily -- the particular legislator-constituent ties which satisfy the meaning of representation, but the general political system which fashions and justifies those same ties. Our quite detailed knowledge of the numbers, intensities, and configurations of electoral interests makes it obvious that a legislator could, at best, "mirror the views"<sup>16</sup> of no more than a handful of his constituents or their interests, even if he made the conscientious effort to do so. Yet only in unusual circumstances are a legislator's representative qualifications called into constitutional question in a stable political system, even by persons who voted against him or intensely dislike him. Most of us are quite prepared, because of our general confidence that the system is legitimate, to accept as properly elected Representatives persons who may not be representative of our particular interests at all.

But it means still more. It is not the political system as such, let alone a single element of it, such as an electoral or apportionment arrangement, which

supplies authority to the exercise of power; on the contrary, it is a tradition of legitimacy, a body of "operative ideals,"<sup>17</sup> which lends authority to the system and relevance to its detailed procedures. It means, to put the matter another way, that political representation is an element in an operative tradition of constitutionalism, which is the exercise of political power according to accepted standards of consent and restraint. If this were not the case, a legislative member who did not perform according to the conflicting expectations of his constituents, or a lawmaking body or procedure which failed to take account of the apparent character and interests of the whole electorate, would simply be without continuing authority. Without the prior assumption of legitimacy, furthermore, there could be no justification in the representative system for such practices as majority decision-making, whether electoral or legislative, partisan nominations and elections, partisan organization of legislatures, legislative committee organization, executive leadership in the legislative process, or even, of course, judicial review, all of which are formally "outside" the legislator-constituent relationship, and each of which is itself an apportionment device of sorts, designed to structure, abridge, encourage or restrain the lawmaking process.

"Every electoral system," Professor Mackenzie has aptly remarked, "is a sort of confidence trick. [They] only work because we believe they are going to work."<sup>18</sup> As fundamental as they have become to the existence of constitutional democracy, elections are neither more nor less than sanctions upon the political system, having the dual purpose of eliciting popular consent and providing peaceful continuity of leadership, but not causing representation or detailing representative behavior. It is not possible to argue -- and it is not, of course, the intent to do so here -- that elections bear no political relation to representation; they do so consistently, if quite indirectly, as discussed in the section below. The point is, rather, that electoral formulas alone cannot generate a sense of legitimacy; on the contrary; it is the tradition of legitimacy, sanctioned by popular elections, which gives utility and meaning to representation.

#### IV. The Process of Representation

The process of representation in the American political system -- indeed, in all political systems, and most evidently in the constitutional democracies -- is far more subtle and interesting than many of the advocates of apportionment reform have led us to believe. Because the literature on legislative apportionment in the United States, as well as that generally on the theory of representation, refers only to parliamentary bodies, it is necessary to begin an analysis of the system by honoring the nineteenth century fiction that lawmaking assemblies alone satisfy the requirements of representative government. \*\* How, then, can the role of the representative -- the legislator -- be described to accord with the observed behavior of lawmaking bodies, and what appear to be the principal influences upon that role?

In the most general sense, it is the responsibility of the legislator to act upon perceived human needs in keeping with certain constitutional constraints. Four practical considerations are implicit in this statement, however, which may not be immediately apparent. In the first place, the representative can act, if he acts at all, only on those needs which come to his attention. And many do not -- not simply for lack of communication, but because need itself is a matter of definition and perception. Secondly, the representative may perceive human needs variously in terms of individuals, functional collectivities, territorial jurisdictions, or ethical certitudes, but because his perceptions are rarely recorded and for the most part not public property, such distinctions are largely moral and

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\*\* It is one of the more interesting sidelights of the reapportionment controversy in the United States that a reform movement which upheld equalitarian and populist standards of representation could hail the Reynolds and Lucas decisions, delivered by an agency, the Supreme Court, which is hardly representative by those same standards. The point illustrates the long-standing need to reconsider the whole theory of representation, incorporating the rather obvious representative functions performed by elected and appointed executives, the courts, clientele-oriented administrative agencies, political parties, and even such quasi-public organizations as foundations, voluntary health and welfare agencies, chambers of commerce, etc.

semantic, not empirical, and thus not subject to statutory determination. Thirdly, the representative's sensibility to public needs varies, not simply according to the numbers of people who may have been allotted him by an apportionment commission, but also by the clarity and intensity with which such needs are made known to him, their compatibility one to another, and their legitimacy as he sees them in his moral or constitutional universe. Finally, the constraints upon the representative are multiple and inter-related, both statutory and political, and extend far beyond the immediate electoral and legislative machinery with which they are conventionally associated.

It is not so much the logic of an argument, however, as it is the strength of evidence relating to legislative behavior<sup>19</sup> which leads to a further conclusion, one which has been obscured in the theories of representation generally and necessarily ignored in judicial interpretation in the United States. Because the representative is able to act only on perceived needs, needs which vary in his observation by kind, clarity, intensity, and legitimacy, it follows that in the process of representation, as distinct from the law of elections, a legislator's "constituents" are essentially defined by his own behavior -- by his identification of certain sensible publics and his responses to them. That the law of elections is a factor in this process is, of course, perfectly clear, but it functions as only one of a large number of elements in the representative's psychological world. It is within the experience of every legislator that from one day to the next, and even simultaneously, he may be called upon to act on behalf of a specified individual, an organized group, a generalized class or category of persons, such as farmers or the aged, a district, region, or nation, or even some detached ideal such as "national honor," any or none of which may be directly related to the seeming interests of "the people back home in the district." Yet he returns to the people back home periodically, not to pose the conundrum of "equal represen-

tation," but to seek their consent to his behavior, asking, "How am I doing?" For he knows that their behavior, too, is not bounded by the territorial and numerical provisions of the election statutes, but subject to the same range of constraints as his own.

The assumption, therefore, that any apportionment system, which is a necessary yet quite arbitrary device for choosing members of a legislature, can be the dominant, let alone architectonic, force upon legislative behavior is as primitive a misunderstanding of the political process as it is possible to entertain. That apportionment plans do affect the legislator is obvious; they do so, however, not by an arithmetic redistribution of his sensibilities toward a jurisdiction or the persons who reside within it, but by altering his perception of the whole political system in a way that would be entirely unpredictable if its other major elements were not simultaneously taken into account. Far from simply reacting to the stimuli of his statutory environment, the legislator actively engages in the creation of constituencies and constituent interests, identifying, weighing, judging, selecting, and rejecting them, even imputing the existence of aspirations to people who cannot speak for themselves. The legislator, in short, is affected by the law, but is hardly a creature of it; it is his function to make public policy, rather than attempt to reflect electoral directives which, without his prompting, might not even exist in the first place. And it is this consideration, that a government must in some part lead rather than simply follow, that gives meaning and importance to elections as the machinery of consent.

Putting aside the somewhat abstract question of the role of the representative, attention should be drawn to some of the more obvious constraints within the political system which, in addition to apportionment, tend to modify the supposed relationship of "equal representation" between electors and elected. Several of these constraints are embedded in the statutes of election in the United States, others are found in the operating procedures of government, but all of them have roughly the same significance for the representative process as apportionment, itself,

functioning as de facto apportionment devices.

The most evident of the electoral constraints upon the representative relationship are the widely varying suffrage provisions for general elections among the various states. Except in pockets where Negroes are still effectively disfranchised, it is generally conceded that this matter presents no remaining problem for state and federal elections in the United States. Yet in recent years the Supreme Court has entertained questions of discriminatory impairment of suffrage rights by use of the literacy test, by congressional and assembly district gerrymandering, and, in the Reapportionment Cases, on the arbitrary basis of place of residence. On purely constitutional grounds, there is no reason to assume that the federal courts in the United States will not be asked in the future to look more closely at voter registration procedures and perhaps term of residence<sup>\*\*</sup> provisions, both of which have been widely used for patently discriminatory purposes. Further, given the circumstance that counties, municipalities, school districts, and other special election districts are, by American constitutional standards, "creatures of the state," there is a potential Pandora's box of litigation on questions of statutory discrimination in suffrage in local government in relation to property ownership, tax liability, both place and term of residence, literacy, and perhaps other standards. The point here is neither to predict nor encourage such litigation, but simply to make clear the circumstance that voters in the United States and elsewhere are "apportioned," not just according to their numbers, but frequently on the basis of their attainments, mobility, and solvency, as well.

Of a similar order, but on a considerably more confused plane, is the evident fact that nomination procedures are an organic part of the electoral process. The Supreme Court has recognized that primary elections in the United States are "an integral part of the election machinery" and thus subject to the same public regulation as general elections.<sup>20</sup> But nominating caucuses and conventions, which are used -- virtually without regulation -- instead of primary elections in many

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\*\* All states of the union require that a citizen be a resident for periods of six months to two years to qualify as a voter in all but presidential elections. Such provisions frequently disfranchise migrant agricultural workers.

states of the union, are also integral to the election process and influence the representative process in just as great degree. Although the matter seems to have little or no judicial relevance, there is no doubt that participation in any of the several nominating procedures, a privilege typically limited by law or party procedures to narrow categories of electors, is an act -- a "vote," if you will -- of greater political significance than that which is guaranteed to the population at large in general elections, and has a bearing on the subsequent outlook and behavior of the elected representative.

A final example of formal electoral constraints upon representation is that is that of legislative districting, a matter which has come before the Supreme Court in several recent cases. It is common knowledge, of course, that legislative districts can be gerrymandered, altering their socio-economic and partisan characteristics without substantially varying the numbers of people within them or distorting their configurations. The relative utility of large and small districts, single- and multiple-member districts, and demographically homogeneous and heterogeneous districts has recently been given some attention by political scientists, although no thorough assessment of their impact upon the representative relationship has yet been made. No great amount of evidence is required, however, to sustain the assertion that any of these statutory variables, and in particular the use of multi-member districts, can be used to affect the representative behavior of legislative assemblies in the same degree as the numerical apportionment of populations among electoral districts.

Most of the recent discussion in the United States about the techniques of legislative districting has rested upon the assumption that such electoral engineering or "legal gerrymandering" must be undertaken within the limits imposed by the doctrine of electoral equality which was addressed by the Court in the Reapportionment Cases. It is worth noting, however, that several deliberately biased electoral systems have been used for the purpose of increasing the formal parliamentary representation of centrist political parties in a number of European

countries, and have been pointedly urged for New Zealand<sup>21</sup> and tentatively suggested for the United States<sup>22</sup>, as a means of assuring a legislative majority to the political party which receives a majority of the popular vote. The introduction of any such device, the aim of which, in Professor Hogan's words, is to shift "some of the emphasis from representation as a function of election to representation as a function of government,"<sup>23</sup> is in one respect precluded in the United States by the judicial ruling in Reynolds v. Sims. As the state legislatures are perfectly aware, however, there is no current constitutional barrier, nor likely to be one in the immediate future, against the manipulation of demographic data in the construction of legislative districts as a means every bit as relevant as apportionment, itself, for the partial modification of the representative process.

Although the informal constraints upon the legislator in the conduct of his office are superficially less evident, they are perhaps of greater importance to the representative system than those just cited. The most immediate of these constraints is the legislative assembly itself. In order to make collegial lawmaking a practicable undertaking, it has been universally necessary to adopt extensive rules of procedure which, in a manner of speaking, apportion the time and attentions of the assembly member. Woodrow Wilson pointed out more than three-quarters of a century ago that congressional committees in the United States tend to assume the qualities of a whole legislative body, and are frequently dominated by chairmen possessing near dictatorial yet undisputed authority.<sup>24</sup> A lawmaker in the United States today is at once a member of a whole legislature, one of its houses, one or more committees and subcommittees, a party caucus or conference, and perhaps a study commission or two. Each of these organs is an operative constituency which the Member "represents" as a matter of duty, deference, or reciprocity. The general tendency of American legislators to specialize, becoming experts on agriculture, taxation, or the armed forces, while deferring to their colleagues on other matters, further estranges them from the innocent effort to provide "equal representation to equal numbers



of people." In addition to a host of other constituencies, a legislative body must also represent itself, not as a school of selfish interests, but as a means of preserving its powers and traditions, and of deflecting and structuring the demands of its other "outside" constituents.

Among those outside constituencies, finally, are a formidable array of organized centers of power and authority, both in and out of government, which bring varying degrees of influence to bear upon the representative process. The most evident of these in a presidential system of government is the person or office of the chief executive. Apparently due to the fact that the major elements of the theory of representation are European in origin, and thus related to the experience of parliamentary systems, the role of independently elected chief executives has never been properly considered in the theory of representation. The point need not be pressed that elected chief executives may be looked upon as representative figures in their own right; it is sufficient to make the commonplace observation that the President, the governor, and other elected state executives, as well as the mayor or city manager, are dominant powers in the legislative process, often exacting continuous and detailed representation from friends and foes alike in the legislative process. In addition, executive departments, departmental bureaus and independent regulatory agencies at all levels of government frequently maintain ex parte representative relationships with individual members and committees of legislative bodies. Even the constitutional courts are present in the legislative process, not as active petitioners, perhaps, but as a perceived restraining influence -- just as they have been in recent years in the United States in the matter of legislative apportionment.

Too much has been written on the continuing impact of private and quasi-governmental interest groups, including political parties, on both elections and the legislative process to require elaboration here. It is sufficient to indicate that their influence upon the representative process is probably substantially in excess of any electoral device, and that any theory of representation which does not take them into account is simply inadequate.

V. The Logic of the Reapportionment Cases

At this point in the discussion the three assumptions, noted at the outset, which have underlain so much of the debate on legislative apportionment in the United States both before and after the Supreme Court decisions of 1962 and 1964, may be reviewed. The first, that the electoral process, perhaps even the apportionment system alone, is the controlling measure of representation in legislative assemblies, seems to be utterly without foundation. The invention begins with a misconception of the meaning and function of representation, itself, ignores the great number of additional constraints upon the relationship between electors and elected, including several, such as legislative districting, suffrage limitations, and nomination and voting procedures, which also apportion the value of the vote, and finally assigns to the electoral process the impossible task of creating, rather than sanctioning, the legitimacy of the political system. The second assumption, that adoption of an equal-populations standard of legislative apportionment will limit or preclude the representation of interests, is equally without meaning. It rests on the same misconception of the representative process, the illusion that representation is wholly dependent on the electoral process, and that the terms of the latter can be made to occupy the legislator's attentions fully, immunizing him from other influences in the political system. The representation of interests, it is safe to predict, will go on apace in the state legislatures of the United States, just as it has in every parliamentary body in history, however apportioned. At most, the effect of the constitutional standard adopted in the Reapportionment Cases will be to alter slightly the rules of the legislative game, as indicated below.

But what of the third assumption, that the Supreme Court, by entertaining the substantive issue of legislative apportionment, has blundered into the political thicket of attempting to construct lawmaking bodies? It appears on first reckoning, in all events, that the matter of legislative apportionment is so meager an element in the complex political process of representation as to exonerate the Court on grounds of degree of culpability alone. But the answer to the question must be related to a

more fundamental consideration than that of degree of influence upon the political process; it must rest upon the argument, which the Supreme Court acted upon but did not clearly enunciate in the Reapportionment Cases, that the right of an individual to vote, on one hand, and the "right" of a person or interest to representation, on the other, belong to essentially different constitutional orders. It is the latter order, that of representation, which is the substance of the political process. For the Supreme Court to have made any attempt whatever in the Reapportionment Cases to accommodate any interest in the legislative process, whether geographical, economic, ethnic, or partisan, would have catapulted it headlong into the political questions, not simply of whether, but of which groups are to receive advantages in the legislative process -- questions which are at the heart of public policy determination.

There is an enduring democratic appeal, of course, to proposals which seek to guarantee to electoral or partisan majorities a proportionate majority in legislative assemblies, or to weigh the vote in such a way as to increase the influence of urban areas or racial minorities, for example, which have clearly suffered indignities in American state legislatures. But what, after all, is the measure of the validity of any claim to particular legislative attention which may be brought forward by an ethnic or cultural group, by a political jurisdiction, an industrial association, a fraternal society, or even, as Professor Dowse asks, <sup>25</sup> by a birdwatchers club? Under the circumstances, there was only one course available to the Court in the Reapportionment Cases -- a course which took into consideration the brute fact, evident beyond doubt, that the votes of some people were not equal in weight to the votes of others under the apportionment schemes of many of the states, but also honored the standing injunction against judicial intervention in "political questions." That course was to act upon the suffrage question in isolation, asserting once again the constitutional right of each citizen to participate equally in the electoral rite of consent, without reference to whether any citizen or his interest might come to the subsequent attention

of a legislature. And it was precisely this, no more, that the Supreme Court did in the Reapportionment Cases, despite the frequent ambiguity and extravagance of its language.

In Reynolds v. Sims the Court observed: "Undeniably the Constitution of the United States protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections..." The right of suffrage, further, "can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise." Thus the core of the matter, as stated in the Court's own words, is that "the weight of a citizen's vote cannot be made to depend on where he lives."

In Lucas v. Colorado the judgement was elaborated. "An individual's constitutionally protected right to cast an equally protected vote cannot be denied even by a vote of a majority of a State's electorate..." In summary, the Court declared in the Reapportionment Cases as a whole, the right to vote is "individual and personal," and cannot be infringed by act of a majority nor impaired by the accident of residence, whether the purpose is to achieve a balance of geographic interests, to accommodate sparsely settled areas, to encourage any political party or interest group, or to establish easily served electoral districts. In the final analysis, therefore, and despite sometimes distracting rhetorical digressions, the Supreme Court did no more (but certainly no less) in the Reapportionment Cases than add another rather cautious dimension to the generally conceded right of each citizen to cast an equal vote. While only "qualified" citizens may vote, the Court held (apparently reserving judgment on remaining suffrage limitations), the Constitution cannot permit impairment of the vote on the accidental basis of place of residence.

#### VI. The Implications of the Reapportionment Cases

Two further questions may be touched upon briefly. What will be the likely influence of the Reapportionment Cases on legislative behavior after the present period of active reapportionment has come to an end? And secondly, what is the logical

extension of the same cases for possible future judicial determination?

To the extent that apportionment systems act as constraints on the process of representation, an extent which has been minimized here, the withdrawal of statutory bias in favor of the so-called rural interest or any other political group will tend to foster a "free market" of representation in which individuals, collectivities, jurisdictions, and other interests can command legislative attention on a legally random basis. Whether such an outcome is desirable is pre-eminently a political question, and one that is likely to be debated at length as it becomes clear that the Reapportionment Cases will have little or no bearing on the legislative response to any particular public need, such as the social and economic equality of Negroes or the protection of consumer populations. For the effect of such a representative free market, as it tends to be in all free markets, will be to give greatest advantage to those who possess the greatest political skills and resources, which is to say the established, the prosperous, and the least scrupulous. It will provide roughly the same political advantage, to put the matter another way, as it has in the past to any interest or coalition of interests which has had the power to exact favoured treatment from American state legislatures, including, it should be noted, the coalition which in the past has supported or imposed unequal weighting of the vote.

Finally, contrary to the suggestion which has often been made that the federal courts must now attend to such aims as "effective majority rule" or the representation of minorities, the logic of the Reapportionment Cases seems to be otherwise. The likelihood is, in fact, that the Supreme Court has limited its future ability to weigh such political questions because of its defense of a purely "individual and personal" standard of discrimination in suffrage. The logical extension of the cases, rather, appears to be toward a further clarification of the right to vote as the question may arise with respect to primary elections, elections in local jurisdictions such as counties and municipalities which are considered "creatures of the state," or possible discrimination in voting on the basis of term-of-residence standards, property requirements, or voter

registration procedures. But whether any of these will be brought before the courts is still another political question.

Citations

1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
3. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
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### Summary

In 1964, the Supreme Court of the United States declared the constitutional principle that apportionment of members of the legislatures in the States must be based on equal populations in both houses. The Court construed the Constitution to guarantee an "individual and personal".... "right of equal representation" to all people (electors).

The implication of the Court's ruling that representation can be structured and controlled according to an electoral device such as legislative apportionment is misleading, however. Representation is not a right, but a perceived social relationship, and subject to a variety of constraints in the political system, of which the method of apportionment is among the least significant. The ruling will not significantly alter the process of representation in the United States, but does add a further dimension to the right to vote, the stipulation that the right cannot be impaired on the basis of place of residence.

### Résumé

La Cour Suprême des Etats-Unis a proclamé en 1964 qu'en vertu de la Constitution, le découpage des circonscriptions pour l'élection des membres des législatures des états devait, pour les deux chambres, reposer sur le principe de l'égalité de population. La Cour a donné de la Constitution une interprétation selon laquelle tous les habitants (électeurs) avaient un "droit de représentation égal".... "individuel et personnel".

L'arrêt de la Cour Suprême implique que l'on peut structurer et contrôler la représentation par des procédés électoraux tels que le découpage des circonscriptions; cette affirmation est erronée. La représentation ne constitue pas un droit, mais plutôt un rapport social perçu, et sujet, dans le cadre du système politique, à des contraintes variées, dont le découpage des circonscriptions est une des moins significatives. L'arrêt ne modifiera pas de façon appréciable le processus de représentation aux Etats-Unis, mais ajoute une dimension nouvelle au droit de vote : la stipulation selon laquelle ce droit ne peut être restreint en raison du lieu de résidence.



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Br/Representation/9

"Theory and practice of representation"

REPRESENTATION AND FUNCTIONAL REPRESENTATION :  
BASES AND OPERATIONS

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## Representation and Functional Representation:

### Bases and Operations\*

by Charles Aikin

Representative government can be described accurately, although broadly, as a phase of the organization of power in politically developed nations.<sup>1</sup> "Representation" is a generic term, for it is plural even though it is encompassed in a basic idea. That is clearly true today as governmental structures grow increasingly complex and the term "representative" acquires meanings far beyond roles assumed by legislatures and political executives.<sup>2</sup> However, in the most advanced governmental structure one identifies among the historic representative institutions modern functional representation.

Fragmentary evidence of a type of representative government was developed in ancient Rome; and during the Middle Ages representation was less scattered and was more considered.<sup>3</sup> Leaders, both secular and religious, were thought of as parts of a broad community, not apart from it. Moreover, during this time a process developed in which the Catholic cardinals assumed certain responsibilities that may be characterized as limited functional representation as the term is used today. Nor was the idea of equality and fairness a part of representation in early periods any more than it has shown itself so during the early modern period,<sup>4</sup> and extending into the 20th Century. In broad periods following the Middle Ages increasing efforts were made to curtail the wholly

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\* A continuing interest in theories of functionalism remains largely in the minds of political theorists. Functional representation -- in origin associated with functionalism -- came to life a little than half a century ago. Its early stress emphasized radical organizations. The current interests in functional representation, however, are not committed to either the right or the left; they emphasize the center. The idea of functional representation as presented in this paper -- along with representation in a broader sense -- deals with varying units of different sizes and functions drawn from a multitude of economic, social, political, philanthropic, and other interests.

independent exercises of authority by the representatives, a situation that has not entirely disappeared today.<sup>5</sup>

Despite time and place this concept of representation continues, and continues in many changing forms. Obviously, the roles of legislators and executives as representatives remain with us, but their tasks as representatives have, in major nations, declined in national significance. On the other hand, the skilled and thoroughly informed civil servants have gained in position; nor have they always subordinated themselves to political leaders. So it is with generalists, both political and administrative, as they have increasingly come to depend on the expanding role of skilled functionalists.

Governments have experimented with variations on old themes. Proportional representation, once thought of as a road to Mecca, has floundered.<sup>6</sup> Legislative representation by area or skill has offered much in theory, little in practice. The initiatives and referendums employed by some nations and states and designed to simplify and democratize the work of legislatures have experienced some gain, but hardly what the planners had anticipated.<sup>7</sup> In some communities the recall of public officials was adopted as a device to hold public officials in line with the wishes of the electorate. In small communities the instrument known as "the town meeting" has worked effectively under certain conditions, but the "small community" has declined.<sup>8</sup> The rotation or limitation of terms in office of public officials is an archaic device.<sup>9</sup>

A member of Parliament is in a weakened position when he is compared with one who has the skills of a separate, independent or quasi-independent, functional representative. In his position, the common Commoner can do the best he can, although few significant measures are seriously challenged in depth on the floor of the Parliament. Or, as R. T. McKenzie made clear, "Two great monolithic structures

(parties) now face each other and conduct furious arguments about the comparatively minor issues that separate them."<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, tradition aims to deny the Member careful guidance from his party. "It is held by all [sic] that the policies of a party cannot be imposed on its parliamentary leaders. What they accept is their own responsibility as members of Parliament, as Her Majesty's Government or Opposition. They are guided by the principle of parliamentary privilege: what is done in Parliament must not be subject to the coercion of bodies outside it."<sup>11</sup> Walter Bagehot's picture of the ideal representatives in Parliament, as seen around the middle of the 19th Century and as viewed by Sir Courtenay Ilbert, was that they were "the best of all governments, a safe, sober, cautious, middle-class government."<sup>12</sup> The Palmerstonian approach to Parliamentary representation certainly could not meet the functional representatives of today. But further, with regard to the Commons: "'Representative institutions,' said Mr. Lecky, 'will probably perish by ceasing to be representative.'"<sup>13</sup>

However, liberal, democratic, representative institutions as long understood may not always continue; representatives who are politically free as against those who are bound, by no means occupy the same position. The independent legislator, where he still exists, strives for freedom, or for such freedom of action he safely can maintain, and yet survive. "'Until now,' explained Sir George Saville, 'I have always been elected in Lord Rockingham's dining room; at last I have been for once called to Parliament by an actual meeting of the voters.'"<sup>14</sup>

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Functional representative institutions have never received the attention given to legislatures and political executives. In fact the term "functional representation" has never been fully defined, for this term covers a great array of

governmental and non-governmental institutions exercising many types of activities. Earlier it was mentioned that the Church of the Middle Ages witnessed and identified a special function that touched all believers. In law, the jury may have been similarly described, or would have been so classified had it occurred to anyone. The courts of the Law Merchant - and the roles of the merchants themselves, international in scope and specific in occupation - performed a representative function.

The classic pattern of representation in the western world of nearly a century and a half ago saw in Britain the strengthening of the representative, democratic processes as well as planting seeds that eventually would weaken the Parliament. Authority, formal or informal, because increasingly diffused. Moreover the great reform of the House of Commons in 1832, after a four-century delay, saw a significant recasting and enriching of the membership of the Commons. And the wise majority, with the persistent Sir Edwin Chadwick and his like-minded contemporaries moved the Parliament to provide understanding and needed reform. After the reapportionment of 1832 one social reform came tumbling after another: 1833, 1834, 1835, 1836, 1839, and on.<sup>15</sup> From almost the outset of these revolutionary reforms it became important to send inspectors into the field, and then report to Whitehall; and the seeds of a new breed were the beginnings of a new type of representative. The modern offshoots of these men are today, in part, some of the world's most able civil servants, no longer to be classified with either The Three Clerks or the representational functions of a somewhat earlier period.<sup>16</sup>

Before the turn of the 19th Century a powerful British bureaucracy had come into being; gradually significant phases of public policy began to shift from the Commons to the Cabinet and, further, to a partnership with the able politicians and top-level civil servants. Young (and later Sir)

Robert Morant, the most able of them all, created a revised educational system, and in 1902 he guided the measure through a Parliament largely opposed to it. But he was supported by the Prime Minister.<sup>17</sup>

As time passed and new representative civil servants moved up in the governmental service, they and their work became increasingly well known. However, some people strongly opposed such developments. In fact, several decades ago one of the highest British judges felt driven to publish his discontent, The New Despotism. But the Justice's case failed, even in the face of a subsequent parliament inquiry.<sup>18</sup> Thus today a somewhat enfeebled legislature may watch the development of a strong, new breed of representatives. And so it is that the politician cannot stem the growth and influence of governmental and quasi-governmental agencies. And many politicians understand and appreciate limitations on their earlier broad functions as representatives. The newer permanent representatives who have been operating in governmental ministries for more than half a century may -- and at times must -- defer to their parliamentary superiors. A Haldane knew when he should prevail; a Churchill, when he wished. Many of these newer representatives operate in special fields as they undertake specialized and important tasks. Some of these men by no means live wholly within socialized governmental compounds, for in this period of national crises and strife they need to communicate with their counterparts outside Whitehall; expertise crosses barriers and something approaching a further level of representation comes into being. Many of these skilled men must work in patterns in a type of socialism that is not a plan dreamed of by Karl Marx.

In the United States somewhat similar developments have taken place, stimulated in part by British experience. For a time, however, much of the field of experimentation took place in the states rather than in the national government. Successful experiments often were adopted by the

nation. As far back as 1887 the United States established a semi-independent national Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate the railroads, an action that was based on experimentation in the State of Massachusetts with the assistance of a number of skilled university professors. This was the beginning of a new, a fourth area of government,<sup>19</sup> and today there are a number of these agencies with thousands of other employees and staff members. The specialized area in which each commission operates is one concerned with the affairs of its agency alone. The commissioners are functional representatives; the represented, however, depend on the character of the various Commissions. If it is the Atomic Energy Commission, the represented are few indeed; the Federal Communication Commission is concerned with radio and television, and thus the represented includes a large proportion of the entire population. The quasi-independent character of the work of each of these commissions generally makes their work successful. The President exercises some, but little jurisdiction over them, the Congress supplies essential financing, and the courts have ceased to interfere with their work except in highly unusual situations. Changes will take place in the constitutional presidency, in the Congress, and in the courts; the statutory commissions are likely to survive to meet the nation's safety, security, comfort, and financial stability.

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Functional representation, once thought of as being limited to economic groups, now includes other individuals and groups.<sup>20</sup> Professor William A. Robson, in his excellent essay on "Functional Representation," defined the term and placed it in history, starting with the Middle Ages. He found many groups that fall within his classification, although the device of electing representatives was seldom used.

A classification of functional groups in Europe in the 20th Century incorporated syndicalism (with the support of the French radical, Georges Sorel) and guild socialism - neither of which groups made a significant step forward despite the fact that the latter was vigorously supported by S. G. Hobson, R. H. Tawney, Bertrand Russell, George Lansbury, G. D. H. Cole, and others<sup>21</sup>. Despite the fact that many publications of a "high literary quality" (sic) were issued, the English people were uninterested in dreams, for the stir among the ordinary subjects was "faint indeed."

The back bencher in Parliament whose role is (1) to vote following instructions from the Whip, (2) to vote once within every five years in support of his party, (3) possibly to debate and (4) to see slight prospect of his being selected to the ministry or shadow cabinet, finds such service a dulling experience. And in other entities and sometimes at another time the representative who can vote only for a single, pre-selected candidate, must find that service also dull indeed. One who stands for election, anticipating eventual leadership, may be, or at least become, an effective representative. "But today the average member of the House is at no real advantage as compared with the humblest of his constituents. Given equal intelligence, the latter has equal materials for the formation of a political judgment. He may indeed lack experience of administration; but so may his representative. The men who have the widest knowledge of affairs are generally found in the non-elected Chamber . . . . The most concentrated and effective argument even of Members of Parliament is frequently reserved for a letter to the Times, or an article in a monthly review."<sup>22</sup> However, the functional representative generally operates in a productive area. If not, his role may easily be terminated. And in their own special way, and in their long-established tradition, lawyer and client present the simplest relationship of representative and represented.<sup>23</sup>



Professor Carl Friedrich, in 1937, posed the question, "How can we explain the fact that legislation came to be considered the peculiar province of representative, popularly elected bodies, when in fact medieval representatives had little or no concern with legislation?" To that he responded:

"Because ever since the sixteenth century, legislation was believed to be the most striking manifestation of political and governmental power."<sup>24</sup> Yet, one must grant that the long span of time from the 16th Century into the 20th Century has seen the birth of complex forces and novel institutions that have successfully supplanted the formerly superior elected representative legislatures.

The term now in use - and used often in this paper - is descriptive of one of its roles, "functional representation;" and functional representation has assumed a mass of varied forms. Many such institutions are changing; some of them are fused into the government, others are independent but they are concerned with governmental activities.

In the united, relatively compact, Great Britain, one finds many functional representative institutions. In the fourth edition, 1938, of Sir John A. R. Marriott's English Political Institutions (first edition of 1910) he wrote: "A more advanced, though still 'constitutional,' school of reformers advocates the multiplication of representative bodies based not upon localities but upon vocations. In the Trade Union Congress, the Co-operative Congress, the Association of Chambers of Commerce, the Federation of British Industries perhaps even in the British Association for the Advancement of Science, the Church Congress, and the annual congresses of such bodies as Librarians, Teachers, Journalists, Grocers . . ."<sup>25</sup> Thus even half a century ago quasi-governmental and independent groups were understood and described as representative, and they were bringing their influence to bear in Westminster as well as in Whitehall.

Functional representation in America has been extensive and often complex. A total of all representative governmental units in the United States were listed in 1952: 116,743.<sup>26</sup> Numerous as they may be, and have been, the number of representatives within the nation are beyond calculation. Even the decennial census could hardly list them all, for such groups extend from even before the founding of the National Educational Association which was established more than a century ago to possibly on to a dozen other groups founded during the week. Some individual members of national and state legislatures are committed to a particular economic or other significant interest. The positions they occupy are not unlike those of independent governmental agencies or even some non-governmental representatives. Furthermore, legislators often join in a common, single endeavor, ignoring party affiliations. Somewhat earlier one of many powerful groups that was organized in the National Congress was known as the "Farm Block." It was in fact an economic, functional unit comparable to and associated with representative groups standing just outside legislative doors.

An able and powerful member of the national Congress concentrated his interests on one thing, the administration of the Navy. He acquired a status that was more of a functionalist than a general representative. His position was based on the fact that he was chairman of the committee dealing with Naval affairs. When a President invited him to resign from the Congress and serve in his cabinet as the Secretary of the Navy, he declined the invitation. He made it quite clear that he could manage his special interest to his full satisfaction and do so more successfully than he could do under the President. In fact, the Congressman served as Chairman of his committee for many terms while he dominated much of naval policy over a long span of time, and watched a stream of secretaries and under-secretaries enter the executive service, only to retire soon thereafter.

In times of both relative calm - and in crises of war - one has seen the character and scope of public, non-official participation in governmental operations. During the Second World War citizen-volunteers undertook serious responsibilities in special activities. Probably the most well-known unpaid civilian representatives were utilized in many hundreds of local boards across the nation. They were created to stem rising consumer prices. Their function was clear, easily understood, but difficult to administer.

Few of the social-economic semi-private programs were carried over after the War. However, demands on the part of civilians for representation in governmental activity continues, in peace as in war. ". . . it is perfectly clear that in the sense of the right to be heard, to be consulted, and to be informed in advance of emerging policy determination, group participation is a fundamental feature of democratic legislation and administration. When, therefore, group organizations press for representation in the official structure of administration, their desire reflects some deeper motivation, whether it be redress of grievances, desire for power, resentment over too limited participation, or fears of insecurity. . . . Specific representation for economic groups has been tried spasmodically in the establishment of regulatory tribunals. . . . The legislative method is to insert a statutory provision that members of the board or commission shall be appointed as bankers, workers, business men, and farmers, or with experience in defined occupations."<sup>27</sup>

To turn again to British experience, Professor Leiserson has referred to three particular significant governmental agencies. Of these agencies, the Port of London Authority has been of great interest well beyond the British Isles. This body of representatives "is composed of eighteen members elected by shipowners, merchants, rivercraft owners and Wharfingers, and ten members appointed by public authorities. Of the latter appointments, two are generally

representatives of union labor." The author continued: "The London Passenger Transport Board is appointed by an ad hoc independent body of appointing trusting trustees, composed of the chairman of the London County Council, the president of the Law Society, the president of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, the chairman of the committee of the Committee of London Clearing Banks, and a representative of the London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee. There are two common elements in British methods of appointment through group organizations: (1) creating a public agency to do a job without 'political' interference; and (2) deliberate representation of many interests in order to prevent any one line of conflict from predominating, thus producing a situation in which managerial responsibility must be recognized."<sup>28</sup>

At best, there can be included here only a brief further elaboration of American experience with regard to specific functional representative agencies among which are those on the borderlines between the government and independence, and also a great mass of other groups and influential individuals independent of the government except when they seek to gain something for themselves or for the public good. One authority expressed himself: ". . . any organization, no matter how remote from government, can be drawn into politics if its interests are affected by governmental policies..." And he continued: "The organization of political parties themselves is simply a larger piece cut from the same cloth as pressure groups."<sup>29</sup>

In an examination of specialized groups representative operations of interest to this study, the sharp distinctions among the many types of organizations are not always easily defined. For example, the cooperative California Prune Growers Association was established to further the economic benefits of its members. Several decades ago the Association took an active part in advising its members with regard to

the many propositions in the State's initiative and representative measures referred to the voters, measures with little or no concern to members of the Association with regard to pruned growing. As the growth of governmental functions in the United States expands and numerous groups become enmeshed in governmental operations, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish among the independent and quasi-independent governmental bodies. The nation's great labor federation, deeply concerned with the impact of government on its operations, established, sometime ago, a Committee on Political Education (COPE): AFL-CIO. The function of this by-product of the Union was scarcely created to engender abstract learning in their organization.

One may study the roles of such private organizations such as Parent-Teachers' Associations, Civil Rights groups, the American Bar Association and its many sub-groups, the American Medical Association, the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Farm Bureau Federation, Chambers of Commerce, Veterans' Groups, the one-time Anti-Saloon League, national Negro associations, highly organized and established presidential press conferences, church organizations including, for example, the relationships of the Catholics in the British Foreign Office, Automobile Associations, extreme leftist political groups, Americans for Democratic Action, the John Birch Society, and other unlimited groups. For example, an organization founded years ago in San Francisco, the Sierra Club, has had an interest in conservation with emphasis on the preservation of natural resources in California. However, many problems related to conservation have grown - to a struggle to preserve the Grand Canyon, threatened with draining the Canyon for irrigation, the protection of the great redwood trees, and many other projects - until now the Club is national in scope as it brings its strong impact on legislatures and executives, both state and national. The recognition of the organization as a body of national representatives in an

important crusade, acting in cooperation with sympathetic public officials, has given it all but governmental status.

Within the United States and in the separate individual states there are numerous discrete governmental entities. Their tasks often are narrow in object although sometimes wide in scope. Here are found functional bodies, representative in character, such as park districts, irrigation districts, school boards, the Tennessee Valley Authority to be mentioned below, highway and bridge districts, the Federal Reserve System, state supported colleges and universities, the Corps of Engineers and its rival in the Bureau of Reclamation, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with its limited and highly special charge, and many additional governmental entities. In this wide group are, of course, the above mentioned independent regulatory commissions - closely related to the Federal Reserve System - and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a force integrated in theory with the Department of Justice but, in fact, an almost autonomous - and wholly functional - agency, widely supported by masses of the represented.

The Tennessee Valley Authority has been in existence for thirty-five years. It was charged by the Congress to revitalize and strengthen a group of states in a major river basin. The Authority's original responsibilities were broad, but they grew larger with growing experience. The Authority was established to build dams, provide irrigation, improve the soil, produce electric power, limit pollution in rivers and to prevent floods. "Originally, many people within the Tennessee Valley and the governmental officials in the area opposed the creation of the Authority because of the fear that it would dwarf and dominate the state governments. But from the outset the T.V.A. has championed 'grass-roots' administration and has cooperated closely with state and local officials. Whenever possible it has delegated responsibility for functions to state and local agencies."<sup>30</sup> The functions involved in this experiment have beyond question succeeded. One significant

by-product has been the development of a greater interest on the part of the people in the Authority's district, primarily in increasing the democratic process. Today, this agency cannot be destroyed.

A somewhat different pattern has developed in an agency known as the New York Port Authority, which was founded in 1921. It is a classic and outstanding example of a unified functional representative body within a federal nation; an Authority that represents certain economic interests of the States of New York, New Jersey, and one that touches the interests of many states and the United States as well. The Authority, unlike the Tennessee Valley Authority, is based on a compact between the two states and with assent of the United States Congress.<sup>31</sup>

The immediate supervisor of the Authority is the executive director who administers all activities of the concern under the general supervision of a bi-state commission. Funds administered by the Authority exceed one billion, eight hundred million dollars. The Authority built, maintains and administers six inter-state bridges and tunnels, four airports, two heliports, six marine terminal areas, and a number of other terminals. The activities of the Authority are extensive, but the number of its functions are relatively few.<sup>32</sup> The director is responsible to the people of the two states collectively.

The responsibilities of managers assigned to inter-state compacts vary somewhat with different types of agreements. These compacts are by no means limited to economic affairs. Inter-state compacts have dealt with crime control, debt settlement, sanitation, conservation (including forest, water supply, oil, and recreation), and a determination of state boundaries.<sup>33</sup> The "treaty device," once in operation, has proved largely successful from this vantage point of the states, of the administrators, and as well, as for the people concerned. The responsibilities of the directors vary from one to another compact; the impact on the public depends on the service granted.

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Some institutional representative performances can always be successful when there are no provisions for appeals or reviews. Adolf Hitler, once his machine was established and operating, was shockingly successful - until outside forces destroyed his plans. Mussolini prevailed with no little success until shortly before his fateful day in Milan. Thus success can be bottomed on evil as well as good.

The work of the United States Supreme Court, as it is with all highest judicial tribunals rooted in the common law and British tradition, is, at least for the moment, always successful. The justices of the highest tribunals are not removed from their courts because of their special interests, broad or narrow, or the state of their minds. For the past three decades prior to 1937 the United States Supreme Court maintained a firm, if unfortunate, stand; yet the procedure was successful though painful. For the past three decades following 1937 the Court has maintained a liberal base and it is true, of course, the work of the Court has been successful. A wide but competing public followed what the judicial representative decided.<sup>34</sup> In viewing the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe, that court is always successful.

Operational management of the British House of Commons has been successful for centuries and many, although not all, students are firm in their conviction that that great institution succeeds in maintaining its historic position.<sup>35</sup> Practically no President in the White House, and so with any Prime Minister in Westminster, can fail to succeed in his work if he is surrounded by politicians, statesmen, and civil servants of the finest quality. The successes of special authorities and independent regulatory commissions, in their semi-freedom, are rarely successfully attacked by legislators.

There is a history of failures in the United States. The fragments of a Prohibition Party may remain, but it has entirely lost its influence. The single tax frightens no one;



nor, any longer, the fragments of the rising and falling of political radicals. In fact, a municipal humane society, due to wide-spread affection for pets, will survive, regardless of how poorly it may administer its responsibilities.

At times two or more governmental agencies compete fiercely, and often each survives - as an example, the United States Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation mentioned above. Each has solidified its position, working not only with the Congress but also with private groups of their creation. This is a device long used by political parties.

At times, well-established agencies are weakened because of a loss of face with either the congress or the president or both. During the long administrations of President F. D. Roosevelt two Cabinet members and, consequently, their departments suffered severely. With a change in the two departments, and the retirement of both individuals, the two departments acquired status again.

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The best known representatives, of course, are legislators, elected executives, and other political officers. Most of these people, in contrast to civil servants, lack the assurance of tenure in office. With regard to the representative civil servants, their success is not based on politics but rather it turns on their training, ability, skill, and sometimes friends.

The continued service of a permanent official will turn on the type of his work, future prospects, and salary - as well as on a determination on his part to serve as a distinguished public official. His service as a responsible representative in whatever functional area is assigned to him will test his professional qualities. The challenge for the non-governmental representative is more varied, for the wide scope of functions and the many forms considered here cannot easily be classified. Success in either case depends on careful planning.

FOOTNOTES

1. "...the representative government system is a primarily political system and the concept of representation is a primarily political concept... The common will of a nation could not constitute itself and make the community capable of political action, if there were no representative authorities to weld together the motley multitude of conflicting particular wills into an individualized common will." Gerhard Leibholz, "Parliamentary Representation," in Politics and Law, p. 68 (First published in The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 12, no. 4, 1945) Leyden, 1965. See also Eulau, Wahlke, Buchanan, and Ferguson: "... agreement about the meaning of the term 'representation' hardly goes beyond a general consensus regarding the context within which it is appropriately used. The history of political theory is studded with definitions of representation, usually embedded in ideological assumptions and postulates which cannot serve the uses of empirical research without conceptual clarification," "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," The American Political Science Review, p. 742. September, 1959.
2. "... the modern conception of representative government is built upon the idea that the many specific interests in the community-local, professional, commercial, and social, to mention only the more important divisions - can by argument and discussion be co-ordinated and compromised, by public scrutiny and criticism be scaled down to become compatible if not identical with the public interest, that is, the interest of the community as a whole. It is the task of the popular representatives thus to co-ordinate and criticize." Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy, p. 258, Boston, 1941.
3. During the 14th century, William of Ockham and, somewhat earlier, Marsilius of Padua, both argued for the development of representative control, and they described devices whereby representative structures could be used effectively. The late Professor F. A. Ogg took a different term: "Much study has been devoted to the origins of representative institutions, and scholars continue to disagree on the subject. But at all events it was in England that the representative idea first took root, and it was the upbuilding of Parliament on representative lines that has given that country its proud position as the mother of representative government." F.A. Ogg, English Government and Politics, p. 22, New York, 1929. John Austin in his

Law and Custom of the Constitution (3rd edition) wrote: "In fact the representative system had already begun, and the provisions of 1215 described an assembly of a type which was already passing away. The constitution of the shire, moot or county court had always been representative, and the practice of representation has been applied to the kingdom at large in 1213." Part I, p. 46, 1897. Frederic William Maitland, writing of 12th century England, said: "Thus taxation and representation were brought into connection - the individual is assessed by his neighbours, by a jury representing his parish, and so in some sort representing him." (p.68) "But representation does not necessarily imply election by the represented; representatives may be chosen by a public officer or by lot." (p. 71), The Constitution of England, 1911.

4. A more drastic interpretation of representative government was defined by Thomas Hobbes: "... all the rights at the representative's disposal are placed at his command" and all the burdens on the represented..." Hanna Pitkin, "Hobbes' Concept of Representation - 1," The American Political Science Review, June, 1964, p. 329.
5. An incident of interest may be found in the life of Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634), an eminent English jurist. Coke, in his distinguished position as Chief-Justice of the King's Bench and Privy Councilor, directly challenged the autocratic King James I by quoting to him a statement written by a great 13th century jurist, Bracton, to the effect "that the King should be subject not to man, but to God and the law." The domineering representatives of high or low position today would avoid such implied legal restraints whether the representative was a head of a nation, or a minor, entrenched civil servant.
6. "The proportional system can, therefore, be described as destructive of, and incompatible with, democracy... It was a tragic misunderstanding that, when most European states on the Continent adopted proportional representation, they did not realize that they thereby implicitly - and against their expressed will - called in question the classic system of parliamentary representation laid down in the Constitutional Charters." Gerhard Leibholz, "Democracy, Representation and the Electoral Issue," Politics and Law, pp. 56-57; (first published in The Dublin Review, Oct. 1943).
7. See the author's "The Initiative, the Referendum, and Representative Government" (International Political Science Association, Jablonna Round Table, September 23-24, 1966) which demonstrated something of the degree to which electors, in some circumstances and with regard to the character of certain measures, are representatives themselves. The methods suggested are drastic in varying

degrees. The one favored by doctrinaires of conservative instincts is that of the 'Referendum,' or the reference of legislative projects or Bills to the direct vote of the electorate... But the device, however well adapted to a political society like that of Switzerland, where the people have for centuries been habituated to the idea of direct democracy, is clearly repugnant to, if not consistent with, the principle of representative government." Sir John A. R. Marriott, English Political Institutions, Introduction, XXXVI, Fourth ed., Oxford, 1938.

8. A. Lawrence Lowell, Public Opinion and Popular Government, pp. 152-154, 1914.
9. Cf: Article XXII of the Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part "No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice..." Adopted 1951.
10. British Political Parties, p. 586, 1955.
11. Herman Finer, The Major Governments of Modern Europe, p.94, 1960. Cf. R. T. McKenzie, "... the institution of Parliament has survived almost unimpaired into the age of mass electorates and of mass parties. One of the few significant developments has been the decline of the independent Member of Parliament... and in addition, the diminishing freedom of action accorded to the independent-minded members of both of the great parties. As each parliamentary party has developed a vast, cumbersome, but highly organized appendage outside Parliament, the flexibility of parliamentary parties has undoubtedly declined." British Political Parties, p. 585, 1955.
12. Parliament, Its History, Constitution and Practice, p. 54, 1911.
13. Sir John A. R. Marriott, English Political Institutions, p. 226, 4th ed., 1938.
14. Edward Fischel, The English Constitution, p. 428. Translated from the 2nd. ed., 1863.
15. The developments that followed the parliamentary reform of 1832 played a most important role in the development and growth of what now is called functional representation. Following the elections came the Factory Act (1833), Poor Law Reform (1834), the Education Act (1833 and 1839), penal reforms (1835, 1865, and 1877, police reforms (1829, 1835, 1839, and 1856), the Registration Act (1836), a series of Vaccination Acts (1840 to 1871), and the grants-in-aid policy (1834). See the author's "The British Bureaucracy and the Origin of Parliamentary Policy", The American Political Science Review, Vol. XXXIII, Nos. 1 and 2, February and April. 1939.

16. See Samuel H. Beer, "The Representation of Interests in British Government: Historical Background," "The American Political Science Review, Vol. LI, September, 1957. Note particularly pp. 617 ff. with particular regard to 18th and 19th centuries' dealing with functional representation. Beer quoted Herman Finer: "Representative government is Party Government" which, in a limited sense only, is defensible. p. 647.
17. A brief note on Sir Robert Morant is found in Paul R. Wilding, "The Genesis of the Ministry of Health." pp. 164-166, Public Administration, Summer issue, 1967.
18. In June of 1931, the Committee on Finance and Industry (CMD. 3897. 1931 from the Report, Committee on Ministers' Powers, April 1932. CMD. 4060) reported: "The most distinctive indication of the change of outlook of the government of this country (U.K.) in recent years has been its growing preoccupation, irrespective of party, with the management of the life of the people. A study of the Statute Book will show how profoundly the conception of the function of government has altered." Part 1, par. 8, p.4.
19. The historical pattern of the United States - both the individual states and the nation - is to include all government activities in three divisions: the legislative, the executive, and the courts. The largely independent regulatory agencies executes functions that incorporate all three functions, softened by a 'quasi'."
20. "Functional Representation," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 6, pp. 518-522. New York. 1931.
21. G.D.H. Cole, "Guild Socialism," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences Vol. 7, pp. 202-204. See also "Georges Sorel," the Encyclopaedia, Vol. 14 pp. 262-263.
22. Sir John A. R. Marriott, English Political Institutions, Fourth Edition, pp. 227-228, Oxford. 1938.
23. "... the position of an English judge as to the authority of a representative in a legal proceeding: 'a solicitor is the functional representative of his client, but counsel is not, for counsel has the whole conduct of the case, and can act even against the instructions of his client'." John A. Fairlie, "The Nature of Political Representation," II, American Political Science Review, p. 456 XXIV, no. 2, April, 1940. Quoted: Per Brett, M.R. Greenwich Co. Registrar, 54 L.J.Q., 392.
24. Constitutional Government and Democracy, p. 262. 1937.

25. st Edition, 1910, page XXXVII. In an "Introductory Note" by G.P. Gooch in Foreign Policy from a Back Bench (T.P. Conwell-Evans, 1904 - 1918, Oxford. 1932) he suggested that the functional representative and his role may well be applied in the field of foreign affairs, British and abroad. As an unofficial representative he would easily be in the class of a medieval representative. He wrote: "But there is also room and need for the unofficial witness who has specialized in foreign affairs, who has discussed international problems on the spot with representative citizens of different countries, who has taken part in movements seeking to influence the Government in matters of foreign policy, and who has expounded his views in Parliament and the Press."
26. "A Bureau of the Census study in 1952 listed 116,743 "governments" in the United States, one national, and all the rest State, interstate, or local... Some of the characteristics of these units are of a perpetual character, right to acquire and dispose of property, officers popularly elected or appointed by public officials, power to levy taxes, to borrow money, to determine budgets, and fix charges without review by another government!." Paul H. Appleby, Citizens as Sovereigns, p. 54 (1962), included in American Law and Politics: The Creation of Public Order by Roland Young, p. 315, New York. 1967.
27. Avery Leiserson, "Interest Groups in Administration" in Elements of Public Administration (edited by Fritz Morstein Marx), pp. 297 and 306. 1959.
28. Avery Leiserson, see immediately above p.307.
29. William Goodman, The Two Party System in the United States, p. 337, 1956.
30. J. M. Burns and J. W. Peltason, Government by the People. 1952.
31. The American states are limited or quasi-sovereign entities operating within the Federal Union. The framers of the Constitution (in 1787) anticipated that possible arrangements, with the required assent of the national Congress. The Constitutional provision in point is: "No state shall, without the consent of Congress... enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power..." Article I, Section 10, par. 3. Interstate developments of minor significance are handled by the states alone, with neither the cooperation nor the support of the Congress.
32. A recent footnote to the discussion: On May 26, 1967 the New York Times quoted the executive director of the New York Port Authority to the effect that "He would 'totally

oppose public access to the books of his or any other authority'." The director "who has fought several court battles against opening the Authority's books to the general public, said there was no need for this, since 'our records are completely and entirely available to the Governors and the Legislatures of New York and New Jersey - every last scrap of paper'."

33. William Anderson, American Government, see ft. nt. #8, p.284. 1938.
34. Local Government Board v. Arlidge (1915), A.C. 120; 84 L.J., K.B. 72; 111 L.T. 905. See the excellent study of this decision by William A. Robson in his Justice and Administrative Law, a Study of the British Constitution, pp. 143-150. 1928. Compare the Arlidge decision with the decision in United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98. 1951.
35. "In short, the Cabinet has arrogated to itself, half blindly, a series of colossal responsibilities which it cannot meet, which it will not allow Parliament to tackle, and which are not met at all except insofar as they are assumed by the bureaucracy behind the cloak of Cabinet omnipotence." Ramsay Muir, How Britain is Governed, p. 105, 3rd edition. 1935.

### Summary

Governmental representation - a phase of organized power - is a generic term that one finds in many changing forms and in differing times and places. Its associated term, functional representation, cannot fully be defined, for the term covers a great span of governmental activities as well as non-governmental but politically oriented institutions that perform many types of activities. For example : the bureaucracy, the courts, specialized regulatory agencies, labor organizations and industrial and financial groups, some narrowly formed but active legislative groups, official and non-official educational institutions, political parties and appendages of such parties, special operative governmental districts, the church, established professional organizations, Negroes in the United States as well as their antagonists, doctrinaire reformers, conservationists operating within and outside government, and many other groups with interests ranging from agricultural organization to advanced scientific groups. In advanced democratic nations, these functional representative bodies existing entirely within the structure of government, as well as those functioning in connection with the government but without being an integral part of it, tend to strengthen some governmental institutions, to modify and even to destroy others.

### Résumé

La représentation politique ("governmental") - un aspect du pouvoir organisé - est un terme générique que l'on trouve sous des formes très variables à des moments et en des lieux divers. L'expression "représentation fonctionnelle", qui lui est associée, ne peut être définie de façon précise, car elle recouvre un grand nombre d'activités gouvernementales aussi bien que d'institutions non gouvernementales mais orientées vers la politique et dont les activités sont multiples. Quelques exemples : l'administration, les tribunaux, les organismes réglementaires spécialisés, les syndicats ouvriers et les groupements industriels et financiers, certains groupes parlementaires étroits mais actifs, les institutions éducatives publiques et privées, les partis politiques et les organismes annexes, certains districts gouvernementaux aux compétences restreintes, les églises, les organisations professionnelles, les Noirs américains aussi bien que leurs antagonistes, les réformateurs doctrinaires, les partisans de la conservation des ressources agissant à l'intérieur comme à l'extérieur du cadre gouvernemental, ainsi qu'un grand nombre d'autres groupements dont les intérêts vont de l'organisation agricole à celle de la recherche scientifique. Dans les nations démocratiques avancées, ces organes représentatifs fonctionnels, qu'ils agissent à l'intérieur de la structure politique ou en liaison avec celle-ci sans toutefois en faire partie, tendent à consolider certaines institutions gouvernementales, à en modifier ou même à en détruire certaines autres.



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"Theory and practice of representation"

INDIA : A CASE-STUDY  
IN THE  
IDEOLOGY OF REPRESENTATION

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION  
SEVENTH WORLD CONGRESS  
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India : a case-study  
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by B.C. Parekh

In any representative relationship there is some definite and identifiable person (or persons) who has an authority to speak and/or act on behalf of an identifiable body of persons for some common purpose for an agreed period of time. Difficulties begin to arise if there is a disagreement on any of these five conditions, viz., on who the representative is, who the represented are, what the extent of the representative's authority is, what the purpose of the representation is and, finally, how long the relationship of representation is to last. The aim of this paper is to examine and analyse the situation in India before the Partition with a view to illustrating the sort of difficulties that arise when the first condition - the commonly agreed criteria for identifying a representative - is absent.

In the period immediately preceding the partition of India the political scene was dominated by conflict between the Congress party, founded in 1885, on one hand, and the Muslim League, founded in 1906, on the other. These parties reflected different ideas about the nature and basis of political representation. The Congress believed that representation need not be and ought not to be on a communal basis while the League maintained that it should be. The Congress claimed to be a national party open to all religions

while the League was avowedly a communal party. One believed in free competition in all constituencies while the other was committed to the continuance of the system of communal representation which virtually guaranteed it a fixed minority of seats.

In the years of argument which followed the British authorities, while vacillating in their public statements about the principles involved, consistently accepted the viewpoint of the League when introducing reforms. The India Councils Act of 1909 introduced separate electorates and reserved seats for which only the Muslims could vote. The Government of India Act of 1919 retained communal representation for Muslims and extended it to the Sikhs, Anglo-Indians, Europeans and Indian Christians. The Communal Award of 1932 retained the system and extended it to the Depressed Classes. The 1935 Government of India Act gave Muslim electorates one-third of the seats in each House of the Central Legislature, reserved, as before, a few seats for Sikhs, Anglo-Indians, Europeans and other minorities, and continued to characterise the remainder of the seats as "General Seats" rather than as Hindu seats.

The elections of 1937 were a turning point. The League did very badly. In the subsequent ministries that the Congress formed in several provinces it refused to include League members unless they disavowed communalism and, in some cases, even joined the Congress. What is more, the Congress began to argue that it had "too long thought in terms of pacts and compromises between communal leaders and neglected the people behind them" <sup>1</sup> and that if only it had contacted the Muslims earlier and in a more systematic way it would have completely wiped out the League and other Muslim organizations. All these threw the League on the defensive and posed a serious threat

to its continued political existence. It now had to make desperate and organized attempts to win over the Muslims, and its success here depended on its ability so to redefine its political identity that it could be seen as a complete antithesis to the Congress. This it did in terms of a concept that was to dominate the subsequent political debate and result in the partition of India. While it had hitherto argued that the Muslims were a separate community entitled to certain constitutional guarantees to protect its interests as a minority, it now began to argue that they were a separate nation entitled to full equality of status with the Hindus.<sup>2</sup>

Once Jinnah, the unquestioned leader of the Muslim League, hit upon the bold, though rather questionable, concept of the nation he pursued its implications with ruthless logic.

(1) Muslims were a nation and therefore their interests were ultimately identical. This meant that there could be only one political party to speak for all of them. (2) As Muslims were a nation so were Hindus, who could also be represented ultimately by only one political party. (3) What was customarily called India was simply a myth perpetuated by the Congress to serve its interests or an artificial creation of the British and bound to disappear with the departure of British. As he said, "I have no illusions in the matter and let me say again that India is not a nation, not a country. It is a sub-continent composed of nationalities, Hindus and Muslims being the two major ones". He would not talk of Hindus in India or Muslims in India but only of Hindu India and Muslim India, and would refer to their conflict as

"international" and not "intercommunal" in character.<sup>3</sup>(4) The Congress was a political party just as the Muslim League was, and not a national movement as it claimed. It represented one section of the country as the Muslim League represented another. Further, it represented the Hindus exactly as the Muslim League represented the Muslims and was therefore a communal organization : its claim to be a nationalist or multi-communal organization could not be seriously entertained. Here Jinnah introduced a curious note of irony. The Congress had all along maintained that it was itself a nationalist organization while the Muslim League was a communal organization. Having argued that both Hindus and Muslims were nations Jinnah was now able to argue that he, as representing the Muslims, was as much a "nationalist" as Gandhi who represented the Hindus. Both alike were "nationalists" and there was nothing to criticize the other for.<sup>(5)</sup> Since both Hindus and Muslims were nations they were equal and entitled to equal representation in all political institutions. It was immaterial if Muslims happened to be fewer in number than Hindus. Muslims, he repeatedly insisted, were "not a minority but a nation" and to introduce the ideas of majority and minority was to introduce the concept of liberal democracy to a situation where they were no longer meaningful. "The Constitutional maladies from which India at present suffers" were due to the British attempt to impose a form of democracy that was suited to a homogeneous country where those who win a majority at an election govern the country and the rest unquestioningly agree. This was "very definitely not applicable to heterogeneous countries such as India where Hinduism and Islam represent two distinct and separate civilizations and are as distinct from one another in origin, traditions and manner of life as are nations of Europe". As "the whole concept of democracy postulates a single

people", which India was not, it followed that a parliamentary system based on the majority principle "must inevitably mean the rule of the major nation". The imposition of democracy, he concluded, was "the disease in the body-politic" of India. (6) The Muslim League not only could and did represent the Muslims but was the only representative of all the Muslims. Likewise the Congress represented the Hindus only and was alone their representative. Thus Indian political life could be neatly demarcated in the sense that each community was represented only by the organization composed of its members, conversely that every organization could speak only for its fellow-religionists. No attempt should be made by any party to represent members not belonging to the community from which it derived its main support. In short, all attempts at cross-communal representation or all claims to be above communities must be dismissed straight away as propaganda or self-deception.<sup>4</sup>

The Congress refused to accept these implications as it rejected the initial assumption from which they were derived. It insisted that not Muslims or Hindus but India was a nation, and that India was not multi-national but multi-communal. Hindus and Muslims and various other communities had lived side by side in India's villages and cities all these centuries without ever feeling that other were their enemies or oppressors. Besides, India as an entity existed long before the Muslims came, and if it existed as a nation then, it was absurd to argue that it ceased to be a nation afterwards. What is more, most of the Muslims were converted Hindus and their claim to nationhood was no more valid than that of Englishmen, who have been converted to Islam, to a Pakistan in England. Finally, what was a nation? and what were the criteria by which a nation was to be determined? Was South

India a nation ? Were Sikhs a nation ? Were Parsis a nation ? The whole concept, it insisted, was woolly and indeterminate and simply a slogan.

Even if it was granted that Muslims were a nation, it went on, this "fact" was politically irrelevant since what is relevant in political life is not religion but citizenship, which all Indians could have irrespective of their caste and religion. Gandhi defended this view with great force though he was involved in the unhappy situation of having himself introduced religious considerations into politics. When he asked Jinnah why he should be so much concerned with religion, the latter replied "but you yourself, when asked what your motive in life was, said 'purely religious'". Jinnah, of course, had failed to appreciate Gandhi's position which was that though man is fundamentally a religious being - the view he shared with Jinnah - he can and should conduct his political life without bringing in his religion. Others, mainly the socialists led by Nehru, were in a happier position and argued that what was really crucial in politics was the pursuit of economic well-being, which concerned all Indians alike irrespective of their religion.

Besides, the Congress went on, a government was to be judged by what it did for its people and not by how it was composed. The government of India had to promote the well-being of all Indians, and this it could do if it was mindful of its duties to all the people. There had to be a responsible rather than a representative government, a government that was aware of its responsibilities rather than a government that contained people having similarity of religion or interest to those electing it. The emphasis was on the duties of the government and the character of the men elected instead of on the rights of various sections and the representational similarity of those

elected. Gandhi was, of course, prepared to concede the demand for representation but only as a concession to minorities and not because he accepted the principle on which the demand was made.<sup>5</sup> Thus though the principle of representation had a place in political life it was to be ultimately subordinated to the more satisfactory principle of responsibility.

Finally, even if it was true that Muslims were a nation and felt alienated from the main body of the Hindus, it was surely the duty of the leaders to be above communal considerations and think of India as a whole. Leaders ought to stand for political ideals and not simply reflect popular prejudices.

As the Congress rejected Jinnah's initial premise and its political relevance on these and other grounds, it naturally drew opposite implications. Hindus and Muslims were not nations but communities that shared much in common. India was a political community and transcended them both while providing a common framework within which they and other communities could live and interact. She was thus a reality, a **historical**, emotional and political reality, and a greater reality than the separate communities she encompassed. Of this India, the Congress was the representative. Within this India, it went on to argue, there were various communities of which the Muslims were one. Again, these communities were represented by different political parties, and the Muslim League was the representative of the Muslims. As the Congress was the representative of all Indians or, at any rate, was constantly and sincerely trying to be one, it stood in an entirely different class from the Muslim League and such other avowedly sectional organizations. The distinction between the national and the communal organization was real and crucial and not



merely a matter of definition. <sup>5</sup> While the League was by its own declaration a communal organization, the Congress argued, it was itself a national organization. Any member belonging to it was a nationalist because only a nationalist could be admitted to it in the first instance. As it did have Muslim members they were "nationalist" Muslims, Muslims who looked upon the whole India as their home, as distinguished from "communal" Muslims belonging to the Muslim League. It was not a Hindu party like the Hindu Mahasabha. It had a fair number of members belonging to all communities, even though it was true that most of its membership came from the Hindus. Besides, it was acutely aware of its moral and political duties to other communities whose political support it was hoping to win and whose interests it had never ignored or treated as inferior to those of the Hindus.

Further, given the fact that it was striving to achieve the democratic political system of the British kind, the Congress argued, it must uphold the principle of majority rule. Of course, minority rights and interests must be safeguarded and this could be done through the constitutional devices like the guaranteed fundamental rights, reservation of seats, weighted representation, and allocation of places in government services. But ultimately the government had to govern and take decisions and could not therefore be continually hamstrung by deadlocks generated by the equality of representation. It was a curious democracy where a minority always got its way and where one's very understanding of democracy made government impossible.

The Congress position, so far as the question of representation was concerned, was thus summed up in the following basic thesis : the Congress was a national not a Hindu body, and thus represented the whole of India with

her various communities; it also therefore represented Muslims. While recognizing the Muslim League as a representative of the Muslims it was not prepared to admit that it was their sole representative. The thesis of the Congress brought it into fundamental conflict with the League whose basic thesis was that it alone represented the Muslims. On all other questions the Congress was prepared to compromise and even give way, but not on this one. It had, for example, rejected parity or equality of representation both on democratic grounds and on the ground of effective government, and had maintained that the objectives of any sensible government could be better secured through ensuring that power should lie in the hands of responsible, non-communal and "purely political" leaders. However, as the communal tension began to mount and as the Muslim League would not cooperate on grounds other than parity of representation, the Congress now agreed to accept it as the basis for forming the central executive. The executive Council formed under the Cabinet Mission Plan, for example, was to consist of 14 members, 5 belonging to the Muslim League, 6 to the Congress but of which 1 was to belong to the Scheduled Castes, and 4 belonging to four smaller minorities. Also, important portfolios were to be equitably divided. The Congress agreed to both. What it was not prepared to compromise on was its basic thesis; and the Muslim League, on its part too, refused to budge an inch from its central position that it alone represented all the Muslims. Negotiation after negotiation broke down, delicately and skillfully organized arrangements collapsed, an enormous amount of tension and ill-will were generated, and nearly all the available political time was taken up simply in debating the relevance and propriety of the representative claims made by each side just because the two parties would not compromise on this

point. This raises two important questions. Why would not either party compromise ? And was there not any method of resolving their disagreement ?

I would suggest that neither party could compromise because nothing less than their political identity was at stake. Jinnah had introduced the idea of nation to define the identity of the Muslim League. The very logic of its identity required him to insist that the representation of Muslims should be undivided and not shared by any other party. The Congress, for its part, had started with the idea of India, which thus had to be represented. The existence of India as a single country was the very presupposition of its existence. It looked upon all men living in India as Indians and requiring to be represented as Indians, and it was this function that it believed itself to be fulfilling. To have admitted that it was simply a Hindu organization would have been to destroy its political identity. On the other hand, the League claim that it represented only the Muslims was compatible with the position of the Congress since the latter asserted its national character and could easily admit that other parties represented only their own communities. What the Congress could not accept, given its view of its identity, was their claim to be the exclusive representative of their respective communities.

Jinnah had claimed that the Muslim League was the sole and exclusive representative of the Muslims. It was not incompatible with his position to say that the Congress was a non-Muslim, as a different from a Hindu, Organization. In fact he actually said this : "All the other minorities such as the Scheduled Castes, Sikhs and Christians have the same goal as the Congress. They have their grievances as minorities, but their goal and ideology is and cannot be different from or otherwise than that of a United India. Ethnically

and culturally they are very closely knitted to Hindu Society.<sup>7</sup> Thus Jinnah was prepared to admit the larger and not exclusively Hindu character of the Congress provided it did not claim to represent Muslims. While this negative condition was satisfied Jinnah did not mind what positive representative claims the Congress made. Given his view of the political identity of the League there was a necessary duality between the Muslims and the non-Muslims, and all that was logically required was the recognition of this duality and not any spelling out of the positive content of the negatively defined category of non-Muslims. The inevitable duality inherent in his political self-consciousness is very clearly seen in his statement dated 14th July 1945 on the Simla Conference. The claim of the Congress to nominate two Muslims as its representatives "went at the very root and the very existence of the Muslim League regarding its position, character and status". If we had accepted it, he goes on, "we would have emerged out of this conference minus everything, and we would have entirely betrayed our people. It would have been an abject surrender on our part of all we stand for, and it would have been a death-knell to the Muslim League".<sup>8</sup>

The question that now remains to be answered is whether it was possible for both parties to examine each other's claim and resolve their conflict. But before we go on to discuss it, it is of crucial importance to analyse the logical character of the claim made. When Jinnah claimed that the League alone represented the Muslims he was, in fact, making two different kinds of claims. At the first level it was a purely descriptive claim stating that the Congress did not command Muslim support. At this level it could easily permit an empirical check that could conclusively confirm or disconfirm the claim of either side. At the second level it was a much stronger claim that the League alone could represent the Muslims and that it was politically impossible -

impossible in terms of the logic of political life - for any other party really to represent them, and that if Muslims were found in any non-Muslim party they must be either fools or victims of self-deception or deception by others. It is obvious that this second claim followed from Jinnah's basic assumption that Muslims were a nation; it is, in fact, a necessary implication of the logic of his "nationalism". I shall call the first claim empirical and the second ideological.

The Congress contested both these kinds of claims, though it was particularly concerned to resist and reject the second. It sought to refute Jinnah's empirical claim in three ways. First, it argued that it had Muslim members in its ranks. Second, it argued that it commanded the loyalty and support of the Muslims as could be seen in the fact that it could get them to carry out its instructions and protest and demonstrate against and, in general, disobey the government. Its third and most important argument was to appeal to the results of the elections. Now the election of 1937 had conclusively shown that the Congress did enjoy Muslim support, though of a very limited kind, and that the League, on its part could not pretend to a much wider support. The really crucial event occurred in 1946 when elections were held all over India. They too, however, did not quite settle the controversy. The Congress retained its majority in the N.W.F.P. The League was not able to form a ministry in the Punjab, though it did capture every seat reserved for the Muslims in the Central Assembly and won 428 out of 492 Muslim seats in the provincial assemblies. Thus while they showed that the League alone of all Muslim parties represented the Muslims and thus established its claims vis-à-vis other Muslims parties, they left relatively unestablished its claim vis-à-vis the Congress.

On all these three counts the League was undoubtedly in a stronger position : it had a much larger Muslim membership, commanded greater Muslim loyalty, and had certainly done splendidly well in the 1946 elections. The Congress admitted all this and recognized the superior representative status of the League so far as the Muslims were concerned. Gandhi and Jinnah jointly signed a formula recognizing the League as "the authoritative representative of an overwhelming majority of the Muslims of India". Thus there was no basic disagreement between the Congress and the League in respect of their empirical claims. The Congress admitted that the League represented "an overwhelming majority" of the Muslims. The League on its part admitted, though rather derisively, that the Congress represented about 4 % of the Indian Muslims.

The crunch came about the ideological claim of the League. The Congress was simply not prepared to admit that its Muslim members were victims of Congress propaganda or of self-deception. Instead, it looked upon them as emancipated Muslims, Muslims who had resolutely refused to think in communal terms. It further looked upon its 4 % Muslim members as prefiguring the ultimate outcome if only it would have a chance to undertake nation-wide political education and get Muslims to think in national terms. To establish this view and to refute Jinnah's claim that only the League could represent the Muslims, the Congress had to question and refute Jinnah's ultimate premise that Muslims were a nation and that India was simply a fictitious entity. As has already been suggested in the earlier part of this paper the Congress rested its claim and its refutation of Jinnah on three main considerations : historical, normative, and political. Historically the Congress had offered a certain manner

of looking at and understanding the history of India. It had, broadly speaking, maintained that Muslims were newcomers and outsiders, that they were a body of Hindu converts, that the Hindus and Muslims had always lived in peace and that they had a great deal in common. The League rejected this understanding and asserted a different one. When, for example, C. Rajgopalachari compared Jinnah's demand to that for the proverbial division of the baby, Jinnah rejoined, "India is not the sole property of the Congress, and if the real mother is to be discovered it would be the Dravidians and still further the aborigines. It would neither be the Aryan nor the Musalman. The Aryan claim to India is no better than that of Musalmans except that they were earlier arrivals in point of time." Hindus and Muslims, he went on, had never really lived a common life and that "as a matter of fact Pakistan has been there for centuries".

At the normative level the Congress had hoped that, whatever one's understanding of the history of India, all Indians must strive to forge a prosperous and united India. Jinnah shared no such aspiration. The talk of national interest could only provoke from him an angry retort: "whose national interest? Which nation? Hindu or Muslim?" All talk of national interest was for him just 'the same song of Hindudom'.

At the political level the Congress had argued that religion and politics must be kept separate and that politics was an area of common citizenship in which one ceased to be a Hindu or a Muslim. Jinnah's reply was to dismiss as impossible a political consciousness that did not spring from and was not anchored in religious consciousness, especially in India where both the major contending parties belonged to religions that, in his view, were all-embracing and disallowed any distinction between religion and politics.

At this ideological level there was no meeting of minds. Each side asserted claims the other vehemently denied. Some kind of debate did follow at this level in which Jinnah tended to slip up. He was, for example, led to say the non-Brahmins of Madras were a nation. In another context when pressed by the Sikhs he was led to draw an untenable distinction between a nation and a sub-nation. On several occasions he was also puzzled about how to distinguish between a nation and a community and was pushed into unmeaning remarks such as that the Parsis and Anglo-Indians were communities and not yet nations. He was also rather confused on the status of the Scheduled Castes. He was, again, wrong in insisting that Hinduism and Islam did not permit the distinction between religion and politics. After all, several Hindus known to him were drawing this distinction and he himself once in his career had forcefully insisted on it. However, as he had turned the issue into an ideological one he simply asserted the claim of nationhood which the Congress, unconvinced as it had remained, denied. The result was that Jinnah kept on insisting that the League alone represented all the Muslims and would not allow the Congress to nominate any Muslim as its representative, while the Congress insisted that it could and did represent the Muslims and always nominated some Muslims as its representatives. The breakdown in understanding and communication was complete and no meaningful dialogue was possible.

But the dialogue had broken down only between the Congress and the League -- between the two bodies making representative claims -- and it was still open to the Congress to appeal directly to the Muslims over the head of the League. It did try but with little success. One of the reasons, in my view,



was the absence of a common political language that both the Hindus and the Muslims shared and in which an appeal could be made to both at once. As long as there was no feeling of a fundamental cleavage or estrangement between the two communities they were already on the same political length-wave and the role of language was not very important. But once the Muslims completely dissociated themselves from the rest of India and asserted their separate and unassimilable identity the question of a common political language became crucial.

Now the only nationally understood language available in India at the time was the language of the European liberals. It suffered, however, from several handicaps and could not serve Gandhi's purpose. It was a language understood only by a few and therefore of no use in appealing to a much wider audience that the very logic of the movement that Gandhi had embarked upon required. Besides, it was not a suitable vehicle for conveying the ideals that mattered so much to Gandhi and even to the liberals and socialists like Nehru and Narayan. They, for example, wanted not the greatest happiness of the greatest number but the growth and development of all; they emphasised certain moral and spiritual values rather than simple economic advancement, and took groups rather than individuals as the basic units of political life. Thus the language of European liberalism was not completely acceptable even to the Europeanised section of India. Finally, the Muslim League and its followers had completely rejected this language and its assumptions as not at all applicable to a "multi-national" society like India.

Once the language of European liberalism was shown to be ineligible as the language of national and cross-communal political debate in India no other political language was available. Except in the United Provinces Hindus and Muslims had lived side by side all over India, each in their own way, and had almost never had an experience of sharing common political life. Often they had acted against each other, but had rarely ever been partners in sustained and concerted political actions. Muslims were for the most part rulers and never felt sufficiently secure to encourage Hindus to take part in or be in any manner associated with political life. The major contact between them was at the commercial level where a common language did develop as is seen, for example, in the fact that many terms in the field of accountancy were contributed by Muslims.

Even after the arrival of the British the two communities continued to remain in their own wonted grooves, meeting only at the commercial level, in most of India except the U.P. where the cultural interaction, even integration, did continue. The British were rulers and not leaders and had no interest in providing a common framework of political life where two communities could meet, speak and act together and develop a national political consciousness and its appropriate vehicle of expression. True, such a framework did begin to emerge when, under popular pressure, the British government conceded more and more popular share in the exercise of power, and the two communities began to share common political life and experiences. However, this common political life was shared under the British tutelage and thus under the overwhelming predominance of the European liberal language. Besides, no sooner had a common political language begun to emerge than it was subjected to undue strain and destroyed in the barrage of communal and religious propaganda. 9

The absence of a common language could not but make all political communication between the two communities superficial and unmeaning. What the Congress tried to do in desperation was to use the familiar Hindu idioms and insist on investing them with national significance; or more commonly to use them and then immediately use their Islamic equivalents and thus use both Hindu and Muslim idioms alternately in the hope that each will appeal to the appropriate community. This, however, was not and could hardly be a substitute for a single common language, a language that involved no problems of translation and equivalence and that completely transposed the communication to a new level where the verbal and emotional associations of the sectionally based language had been thoroughly expurgated. It was a tragedy of the Congress and Gandhi that they were involved in the hopelessly paradoxical position of having to form and articulate their political identity in a language that signified and rested on the assumption of the absence of that very identity. They were attempting the impossible in trying to express their Indian identity in Hindu idioms.

Conclusion : As it is the disease that most clearly highlights ~~the~~ factors that contribute to health, it is the political pathology that sharply reminds us of the factors that conduce to the continued and peaceful existence of political communities. India's failure to continue as a single polity highlights three important factors that are central to any durable political community. First, once a section of the community begins to look upon itself as fundamentally different from the rest of the community and as having an identity that can be defined in complete separation from that of the rest of the community, the existence of that community as a single polity, becomes doubtful. On every

important question there are violent disagreements; interminable wrangles and shifting compromises which even then have no guarantee of enforcement. Of course, the majority community or the colonial power could use force, terrorise the minorities and liquidate their leaders; but violence, which breeds further violence and lacks the principle of permanence, could hardly be the basis of a durable society, though it could perhaps buy time for passions to cool and constructive proposals to emerge. Second, a community implies and depends on communication, and the political community implies and depends on a common political language whose existence, though not a sufficient condition, is certainly a necessary condition if it is to exist as a single community. An interesting paradox is involved here. A common political language is possible only when the various sections of the community have shared and enjoyed a common political life long enough; but, if they have, there is not much likelihood that a demand for a separate polity by any of them will be made or that, when made, it will be successful. Third, once an ideological manner of thinking - a kind of thinking where one idea is taken to be the key to everything and its logical implications, rigorously deduced, are turned uncompromisingly into political demands, so that the logic of an idea dictates the politics of the community - is introduced into politics, a situation is created where assertions replace arguments, faith replaces conviction, rigorous deductions replace tentative judgements, and certainty replaces probability. All issues are cast in the mould of dogmas and any meaningful debate becomes impossible. A system of representative government, which presupposes the possibility of a dialogue and rational debate between open-minded men, becomes difficult to sustain.

Notes

1. Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947, selected by Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai (Oxford, 1957) p. 422.
2. As the idea of nation had already been in the air for quite some time it is difficult to give the exact date when it was introduced into the mainstream of political debate. Jinnah introduced it in its full force in one of his best speeches on 22 March 1940. It is worth noting that he did not introduce it at all in his "The Deliverance Day" statement of 22 December 1939 where one would ordinarily expect it. Instead he is still talking of "truly popular Ministries", "patriotic Muslims", "Muslim minorities", "justice to minorities", etc.,. In any case 1940 marks the turning point. The Pakistan Resolution was passed at the Lahore session of the League during 22-4 March, 1940.
3. Gwyer and Appadorai, loc.cit., p. 441.
4. Statement by Jinnah on 27 June, 1946, retracting the League acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan, Gwyer and Appadorai, loc.cit., p. 615. See also Jinnah's stinging reply to Maulana Azad quoted by Choudhry Khaliqzaman in Pathway to Pakistan, p. 250. See also the perverse remark by Jinnah in his letter to the Congress President dated 2nd August 1938, ibid., p. 432: the "Muslims in the Congress do not and cannot represent the Mussulmans of India for the simple reason that ... as members of the Congress they have disabled themselves from representing or speaking on behalf of the Muslim community".
5. Speech at the meeting of the Minorities Committee, 13th November 1931.
6. See the letter of Subash Chandra Bose, the Congress President, to Jinnah, dated 25th July 1938, Gwyer and Appadorai, loc.cit., p. 430 f. See also his remark that not "faith" but "political principles and policy" were the qualifications for membership to the Congress.
7. Statement by Jinnah on the Simla Conference 14th July 1945. Gwyer and Appadorai, loc.cit., p. 565.
8. Ibid., 565 f. Italics added.
9. For a very stimulating analysis of the contemporary Indian political scene in terms of the concept of language, see "India's political idioms" by W.H. Morris-Jones in C.H. Philips, ed., Politics and Society in India, London, 1963.

### Summary

In pre-partition India, the Congress Party and the Muslim League made such conflicting claims about representation that no compromise between them was possible. The Congress wanted to represent all Indians, irrespective of religion, and denied that religion ought to be a legitimate factor of division. The League denied the existence of an Indian nation, and asserted its right to represent all Muslims living in India; the Congress was thus finally led to express Indian aspirations in Hindu terms. India's failure to continue as a single polity highlights several factors essential to the duration of a polity.

### Résumé

Dans l'Inde d'avant la partition, le Parti du Congrès et la Ligue Musulmane avaient en matière de représentation des prétentions si contraires que tout compromis était impossible. Le Congrès voulait représenter tous les Indiens, quelle que fût leur religion, et niait que la religion dût être un facteur légitime de clivage. La Ligue niait l'existence d'une nation indienne, et affirmait son droit à représenter tous les musulmans de l'Inde; le Congrès fut donc amené à exprimer les aspirations des Indiens en termes hindous. L'échec de l'Inde à persister comme société politique met en lumière certaines conditions de durée d'une société politique.

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"Theory and practice of representation".

PUBLIC POLICY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT :  
THE ROLE OF THE REPRESENTED

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Public Policy and Representative Government:

The Role of the Represented

by John C. Wahlke

Dissatisfaction with representative government is hardly new. Most representative bodies were born and matured in the face of opposition which denied both their legitimacy and their possible viability, specifically and generally. Where established, they have operated amid unfriendly attitudes ranging from the total hostility of anti-democrats, through the pessimistic assessments of such diverse observers as Lord Bryce, Walter Lippmann, and Charles de Gaulle,<sup>1</sup> to the friendly but often bitter criticism of reformers like U.S. Senator Joseph Clark.<sup>2</sup> To the views of these historical and contemporary pessimists, skeptics, and reformers there has lately been added mounting evidence from academic research and public opinion pollsters which seems to challenge fundamental tenets and assumptions of representative democracy.

But, as Gerhard Loewenberg has recently observed, the notion that we are witnessing "the decline of parliament...has never been based on careful inquiry into the function of parliaments in their presumed golden age, nor into their subsequent performance."<sup>3</sup> Neither has it been based on careful inquiry into the functions and roles of citizens, individually and collectively, in a representative democracy. It is the argument of this paper that representation theory and research should push beyond preoccupation with what David Easton has called "inputs of demand" into the political system,<sup>4</sup> beyond policy-making and legislative process studies, to



investigate the problem of support. For a good deal of the disillusionment and dissatisfaction with modern representative government reflects vague and ambiguous conceptions deriving from fascination with policy-making. Systematic examination of these conceptions may or may not lead to rejuvenated faith in representative democracy, but it should certainly suggest how political scientists might profitably begin to reformulate the concept of the democratic citizen's role and to identify the important questions about it which research should seek to answer.

#### 1. The Citizen's Role in Demand-Input Models of Representation

"No supporter of representative institutions would deny that the reflection of public opinion is one of their most important functions."<sup>5</sup> It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that theorists and researchers alike have for so long taken it for granted that the problem of representative government centers on the linkage between citizens' policy preferences and the public-policy decisions of representative bodies. Almost without exception, furthermore, they have conceived of the public side of this relationship in terms of "demands" and the assembly side in terms of "responses." Julius Turner, for instance, has said that, "the representative process in twentieth-century America involves . . . the attempt of the representative to mirror the political desires of those groups which can bring about his election or defeat."<sup>6</sup> Almond and Verba, in the course of explicating new dimensions of civic behavior (to which we shall return later in this paper),

recognize the making of demands as the characteristic act of citizens in democratic systems:

The competent citizen has a role in the formation of general policy. Furthermore, he plays an influential role in this decision-making process: he participates through the use of explicit or implicit threats of some form of deprivation if the official does not comply with his demands.<sup>7</sup>

We can appropriately characterize this conception, which has dominated practically all research in the field, as a "demand-input model."<sup>\*</sup>

a. A Simple Atomistic Model.

The oldest and most familiar conception of this kind grows out of simple notions about the importance of "popular sovereignty" and "popular consent" as the basis of legitimate government. It is closely related to Rousseauvian "direct-democratic" conceptions of government, and has been described by Almond and Verba as the "rationality-activist model" of the citizen.<sup>8</sup> In this view, to state it somewhat oversimply, the fundamental element in a representative system is the conscious desires and wishes of citizens, frequently examined in modern research on representation under the heading of "interests." Interests are thought of as constituting "policy demands" or "policy expectations," and the governmental process seems to "begin," in a sense, with citizens exerting them

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\*The term "model" is used throughout this paper in a very loose sense. Although the "models" to be examined are in no case mathematical or formal, they are in every case more than loose metaphors or analogies. Each represents the set of assumptions and implications underlying a conception of the representative process which is identifiable in the literature on representation.

on government. Government, in this view, is essentially a process for discovering policies which will maximally meet the policy expectations of citizens. Within this general conception, there are several points at which emphases or interpretations may vary in important respects, without violating the main assumptions. The critical assumptions in the simple atomistic conception and the points at which such variations may occur can readily be outlined.

In the first place, the interests which constitute the elemental stuff of democratic, representative politics are most often thought of in terms of specific policy opinions or attitudes, i.e., preferences or dislike for particular courses of government action. But it is also common to envision citizens holding less specific policy preferences, in the form of ideological orientations or belief systems.

Although "interests" are taken to be rooted in individual desires, they may be expressed in the form of either individual policy opinions (often aggregated by opinion analysts as "public opinion" or the opinion of some segment of the public, or organized group, or associational opinion, usually thought to be expressed on behalf of the individuals by group agents or spokesmen, or, of course, in both forms simultaneously.

Analytically, the core of the representative process is the communication of these various forms of interest to governmental actors. This is visualized as occurring in either or both of two principal ways. It may take place through constituency influence, i.e., the communication of aggregated individual

views by constituents to their "representatives." (The latter term theoretically includes administrative agency personnel, police officials, judges, and countless other governmental actors, but we shall deal here only with members of representative bodies.) Communication may also occur through group pressure or lobbying activities, conceived of as communication by group agents who are intermediaries between representatives and the aggregates of citizens for whom they (the group agents) speak.

The critical process for making representative government democratically responsible is, of course, election of the representatives. Elections are the indispensable mechanism for ensuring a continuing linkage between citizens' public-policy views (interests) and the public policy formulated by representatives (in cooperation, needless to say, with executives and administrators). The mechanism works in one or both of two ways. It may provide representatives with a mandate to enact into public policy at an early date the policy views expressed in the elections. It may also serve to legitimize, by stamping the imprimatur of citizen acceptance on, the policies most recently enacted by the representatives.

Since other conceptions of representation that we shall consider are derivative from the simple atomistic model just described, it is perhaps worth recapitulating it in the following skeletal fashion:

1. Interests (Policy opinions)
  - a. Specific, or
  - b. Ideological
2. Mode of Interest (Opinion) Expression
  - a. Individual (aggregated as "public opinion")
  - b. Organized group
3. Communication Mode
  - a. Constituency influence
  - b. Group pressure
4. Election functions
  - a. Mandate
  - b. Imprimatur

This is not the place to examine in detail the many respects in which available evidence seems to reveal citizens behaving in ways inappropriate to such a model. Most of it is well known in any event. Rather we shall merely indicate a few of the relevant propositions which seem too well established to ignore, and indicate briefly the kind of evidence on which each rests. There is no attempt here to inquire exhaustively into all aspects of citizen behavior implied by the kind of conception just sketched, or to amass and analyze systematically all the available evidence bearing on those few aspects which are mentioned. It is sufficient here merely to indicate the most obvious ways in which principles of observed behavior conflict with assumptions about the role of policy-demand inputs in politics.

(1) Few citizens entertain interests that clearly represent "policy demands" or "policy expectations" or wishes and desires that are readily convertible into them.

- a. (13 countries, 1957-1963) Never more than 16% and often less than 1% of the respondents in surveys gave politically referent answers to questions probing their hopes and fears.<sup>9</sup>

b. (USA, 1966) Asked to name the problems they personally felt to be the most important problems which the government in Washington should try to take care of, most respondents named broad current-issue topics like "racial problems," "national defense," etc. Moreover, in most instances (55%) the response was such as to indicate that the respondent had no clear notion about the kind of government action called for in order to deal with whatever he saw as a problem.<sup>10</sup>

c. (USA, 1936) At a time when citizens, primed by depression and New Deal ferment, might be supposed to have been as politically demanding as ever, 54% had no suggestions to offer, and no single suggestion was mentioned by more than 8%, in answer to the question, "Is there any legislation you would like to have the new Congress pass?"<sup>11</sup>

d. (USA, 1942, 1943) When asked, "If you were elected to Congress this fall, what laws would you want to have passed?" 47% had no opinion. When asked, "Can you think of any problem which you feel a Congressional Committee should investigate?" only 38% could think of such a problem, and no subject was mentioned by as many as 6%.<sup>12</sup>

(2) Few people even have thought-out, consistent, and firmly held positions on most matters of public policy.

a. (USA, 1956) About one-fourth of the respondents claimed familiarity with fewer than one out of every two issues presented to them. ("Claims" were taken at face value, and issues were formulated for them.)<sup>13</sup>

b. (France, USA, 1952, 1956, 1958, 1960) With respect to four different issue areas, "the level of [crystallization and polarization of opinion] is remarkably low in both populations . . . . [The] remoteness of both publics from most political and journalistic debate on such dimensions is obvious."<sup>14</sup> It is even likely that an attitude toward a policy-issue expressed in response to specific questions about the issue "represents haphazard reactions to items on which the respondent has never formed much opinion."<sup>15</sup>

c. (USA, 1962) "the detailed and technical aspects of the [1962 Trade Agreements Act]. . . . never entered the consciousness of the general public. In the public mind, there was at most awareness only of a general issue of 'high' versus 'low' tariffs."<sup>16</sup>

(3) It is highly doubtful that policy demands are entertained even in the form of broad orientations, outlooks, or belief systems.

a. (USA, 1956) At best some 11% or 12% of the population (15% or 16% of the voters) could be found behaving as either "ideologues" or "near ideologues;" answers devoid of all issue content were given by 22 1/2% of the population (17 1/2% of the voters).<sup>17</sup> Hence, "ideology of a sort that binds a broad range of human experience to dynamic evaluations of politics cannot be thought to be widespread in the American population."<sup>18</sup>

b. (USA, 1952, 1956, 1960) "Only about a tenth of the electorate by the loosest definition is found to be using the liberal-conservative distinction or any other ideological concept." It seems unlikely that response about policy formed part of a unidimensional structure of attitudes, represented stable opinions, exhibited ordered dimensions of any kind, or even a common reference.<sup>19</sup>

c. (USA, 1956) Factor analysis to detect clusters of opinion on policy issues reveals that "no well-defined widely shared ideology is used by the public to relate these issues to each other. Apparently people tend to view each issue independently of the others. . . . To a considerable extent, attitudes are compartmentalized."<sup>20</sup>

(4) Large proportions of citizens lack the instrumental knowledge about political structures, processes, and actors that they would need to communicate policy demands or expectations if they had any.

a. (West Germany, 1958, 1959, 1962) Well over half the respondents answered simply, "No," when asked whether they knew about the Bundesrat, and almost another one-third gave vague or wrong answers about what it is. Only 11% or 12% gave correct answers.<sup>21</sup>

b. (USA, 1952, 1954, 1965) Although elections for the House of Representatives have been held every two years on fixed schedule since 1790, barely a third of the adult population knew when Congressmen will be up for reelection or how many will have to run (all do): 1952, 37%; 1954, 11% (but the question was open-ended, "How many states will elect members of the House . . . this fall?"); 1965, 30%.<sup>22</sup>

c. (USA, 1952, 1954) Only about half the adult population knew its state has two U.S. Senators in Washington (55% in 1952, 49% in 1954).<sup>23</sup>

d. (West Germany, 3 länder, 1946) Barely one-fourth (26%) claimed to know what the purpose of the coming elections was, and almost 30% of those claiming they knew gave obviously inadequate explanations, in spite of the important constitutional functions of those elections.<sup>24</sup>

e. (USA, 1942-1946, various dates) Slightly less than half the American public any given year is likely to know the name of their Congressmen, and barely half is able to name at least one U.S. Senator from their state.<sup>25</sup>

f. (Washington state, 1953) Only 22 1/2% of the respondents could give the names of their state legislators.<sup>26</sup>

g. (USA, 1942) Within a few weeks following the American Congressional elections only half (51%) of the population could name the Congressman elected in their district.<sup>27</sup>

(5) Relatively few citizens communicate with their representatives.

a. (USA, 1946) As many as 14% claimed to have written or wired their Congressman or Representative at some time during their life.<sup>28</sup>

b. (New Haven, 1959) Twenty-four per cent claimed to have written or talked to their Congressman or Senator to let them know they wanted something done on a subject of interest to them.<sup>29</sup>

(6) Citizens are not especially interested or informed about the policy-making activities of their representatives as such.

a. (USA, 1946) Of the 55% who knew their Congressman's name, only about a third (19% of the total sample) claimed to know how he voted on any important issues or on what committee he served.<sup>30</sup>

b. (USA, 1942) Barely three months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, hardly one-third of the respondents claimed to know whether their Congressman had been opposed to or in favor of American entry into the war before it actually entered.<sup>31</sup>

c. (USA, 1965) Less than a fifth (19%) claimed to know how their Congressman voted on any major bills.<sup>32</sup>

d. (USA, 1958) Pressed beyond a claim to know and asked to demonstrate their knowledge, "only 3% of the



respondents [in SRC survey] could identify a single policy stand taken by their Congressman on any given major issue."<sup>33</sup>

(7) Nor are citizens much interested in other day-to-day aspects of parliamentary functioning.

a. (Sweden, 1944) When asked, "Do you remember anything that has happened in Parliament this spring?" 81% answered "Nothing."<sup>34</sup>

b. (Missouri, 1966) Only 46% of the people interviewed knew the state legislature had held a session that year.<sup>35</sup>

c. (Minnesota, 1965) Only 22% claimed to have "a great deal of interest in what is happening in the legislature" (28% claimed that shortly after the session), and 36% claimed "not too much interest" or "none at all" (32% after the session).<sup>36</sup>

(8) Relatively few citizens have any clear notion that they are making policy demands or policy choices when they vote.

a. (Elmira, N. Y., 1948, replicated in Iowa, 1962) Given the specific alternatives to choose among as bases for their balloting for U.S. Senator, substantial numbers (43% in the later study) claimed to vote for "the man himself" and 52% according to "the stand he takes on issues."<sup>37</sup>

b. (France, 1954) Forty-four per cent of the men and 46% of the women claimed to make their voting choice on the basis of current issues, compared to 44% of the men and 31% of the women claiming to vote on the basis of loyalty to an idea or a party.<sup>38</sup>

c. (Wisconsin, 1962) Of the 25% or so who claimed to have cast ballots on the basis of candidates' stands on the issue of sales- versus income-tax, probably about 85% were voting for the candidates of the party they normally identify with.<sup>39</sup>

d. (A Southern USA community, 1955) In spite of the most generous possible definition of "purposive voting," at most 41% of a local constituency sample were classifiable under that heading, i.e., as voting with a view toward some policy-connected purpose.<sup>40</sup>

None of this, of course, is new or surprising information.

But it is sometimes forgotten when working from slightly less

naive models of the representational system than the one sketched out above. Each of the alternative models familiar to students of representative bodies, however, must sooner or later reckon with these facts.

b. A Responsible-Party Model.

If attention is concentrated on the electoral parts of the representative system, it seems clear that, whatever else they are doing in the process, voters in most political systems are certainly choosing between candidates advanced by political parties. It is therefore easy to assume the electoral choice between party-candidates is the vehicle for making policy-choices and to derive logically plausible mechanisms by which that choice might be made. For such mechanisms of demand-input to operate, several requirements would have to be met. In the first place, there must be a party program formulated and it must be known to the voters. Second, representatives' policy-making behavior must reflect that program. Third, voters must identify candidates with programs and legislative records, and base their choices on reaction to them.<sup>41</sup> The arguments against the American party system and in favor of the British on grounds of systemic capacity for meeting these requirements are well known.<sup>42</sup>

In most American contexts, the failure of party and legislative personnel to provide appropriate policy cues makes the applicability of the responsible-party model dubious to begin with, no matter what voters might be doing. But there are also signs

of voter failure to respond appropriately to whatever such cues might be available. In one American state (Washington), for example, far less than half the public knew which party controlled either house of the state legislature at its most recent session (41% in the case of the lower, 27% for the upper house<sup>43</sup>). Shortly after the 1966 election in the United States, 31% of the electorate did not know (or was wrong about) which party had a majority in Congress just before the election; more striking still, 34% did not know which party had won most seats in that election and another 45% misinterpreted Republican gains to believe the Republican Party had won a majority!<sup>44</sup> Stokes and Miller concluded, with respect to public reaction to party at the national level, that party symbols are almost devoid of policy content, which is not surprising in view of what they call the legislative party "cacophony."<sup>45</sup> And Converse, in one of the few relevant studies using panel data, found that party identification was far more stable among American voters sampled in 1958 and 1960 than their opinions on any "issues."<sup>46</sup> We can only conclude, at least for the American case, that, with or without policy content, party symbols do not serve the American voter as the responsible party model would wish.

Of somewhat greater interest, however, is the situation in those countries where it seems more likely that party and legislative leaders provide voters the conditions under which they could, if they chose, behave as the responsible-party model would have them. Such is the case, for example, in France. It is therefore

not surprising to find that, in 1952, of the French public, between 33% (in the case of R.P.F. voters) and 69% (of the Communist voters) claimed "doctrine" or "program" most important in their party.<sup>47</sup> On the other hand, the editors of Sondages concluded, with respect to more specific questions asked at this same time about French voters' opinion concerning specific policy or program stands that, "Voters' opinion does not faithfully reproduce most diverse opinion. . . ." <sup>48</sup>

It is the British political system, however, which is usually cited as the classic example of the responsible-party model of representative party government. What does the evidence actually show with respect to the connection between voting and policy preferences of the British voters? Perhaps because it has been so commonly taken for granted that every General Election in Britain constitutes an electoral mandate or at least an unfavorable judgment on past policy performance, surprisingly little evidence is available. The most direct testimony is that cited by Mark Abrams with respect to findings from a nationwide survey of 1960. He reports that, given a question asking them to differentiate between the two major parties with respect to sixteen political ends or party traits, on only four of the statements did as many as two-thirds of the sample attribute a clear-cut goal to either party, and these were not stated in policy but in group ("middle class") or personal terms; on four, some one-half or more were unaware of any difference between the parties, and on the remaining eight, between 33% and 45% detected no differences.<sup>49</sup>

There is strong reason, then, to doubt the applicability of the responsible-party model even in Great Britain.

But the most persuasive reason for questioning that model is what we know about the phenomenon of party identification itself. For the mere fact that one political party (or coalition) is replaced in government by another as a result of changing electoral fortunes, together with the fact that voters are making electoral choices between parties, does not in itself demonstrate anything at all about the relationship between election results and the public's views about party programs or policy stands. There is abundant evidence, on the contrary, that in many political systems voters identify with a political party much as they identify with a baseball or soccer team. Many voters in many lands are better described as "rooters," team supporters, than as policy advocates or program evaluators. The authors of The American Voter have acquainted us with the importance of that phenomenon in the United States.<sup>50</sup> Of special interest here is their finding that, far from serving as a vehicle for the voter to express prior formed policy views, it is more likely that "party loyalty plays no small role in the formation of attitudes on specific policy matters."<sup>51</sup> More recent studies seem to show that party identification of German voters is in some respects similar.<sup>52</sup> The very great stability of party loyalties in Great Britain suggests strongly the operation of similar mechanisms there:

Not many people switch their votes in the course of their whole lives; therefore, the number changing in the short period between any two successive elections is necessarily

small. On this definition, only 4 per cent of the electors in the Bristol sample [Bristol Northeast, 1951] were floaters: . . . "53

It can hardly be said, then, that the responsible-party model solves for theories of representative democracy any of the problems encountered in the elementary atomistic model. If anything, it raises further and more serious ones.

c. Polyarchal and Elitist Models.

Historically, the awareness that few humans are politically involved or active was at the core of many anti-democratic theories. More recently it has been the starting assumption for various elitist conceptions of power structure, particularly at the level of local communities.<sup>54</sup> Still more recently the empirical accuracy of the assumption as well as the justifiability of "elitist" conclusions drawn from it have been questioned and subjected to empirical research.<sup>55</sup>

Our concern here is not with the general theoretical problems raised by such approaches, however.<sup>56</sup> It is rather with their implications for the demand-input conception of representative processes. The chief implication, of course, is that policy demands and policy expectations are manifested by a relative few and not by citizens in general. This implication is hardly to be questioned. Summarizing relevant knowledge on the point, one recent article notes that, "Most recent academic studies of public attitudes . . . indicate differences between the political attitudes of elite groups and attitudes reflected in mass samples."<sup>57</sup>

And Converse and Dupeux have said that, "It appears likely that the more notable [Franco-American] differences stem from the actions of elites and require study and explanation primarily at this level, rather than at the level of the mass electorate."<sup>58</sup>

But to what extent is the division into demanding elite and inert mass permanent and cross-cutting? To what extent is the "elite," operationally defined as the sum of politically demanding individuals, actually plural in character, i.e., composed of a plurality of separate, differentiated, and perhaps competing elites? These are empirical questions, to be answered in the first instance by examination of specific political systems, which will presumably display considerable variability in these respects. Unfortunately, there are few empirical studies definitively examining such questions. The pioneer effort of Dahl seems to lend strong support to the conclusion that (at least in New Haven) "elites" vary considerably from policy issue to policy issue.<sup>59</sup> A number of public opinion surveys and policy studies have led to the identification of different elites, variously identified as "policy constituencies,"<sup>60</sup> "attentive public policy publics,"<sup>61</sup> "issue publics,"<sup>62</sup> and "informed" or "expert publics."<sup>63</sup> And most of these studies, some more directly than others, seem to reveal the kind of pluralistic, "noncumulative," segmented rather than concentric, picture of elites suggested by Dahl.

The crucial question, however, concerns the extent to which and the mechanisms by which elites' policy-demanding activities are connected to the representational activities of the mass public.

One possibility is that there is competition for different policy satisfactions among different elites, that this competition is settled initially in the governmental process, much as Latham has described the group process:

The principal function of official groups is to provide various levels of compromise in the writing of the rules, within the body of agreed principles that forms the consensus upon which the political community rests. In so performing this function, each of the three principal branches of government has a special role.

The legislature referees the group struggle, ratifies the victories of the successful coalitions, and records the terms of the surrenders, compromises, and conquests in the form of statutes.<sup>64</sup>

What Latham leaves unsaid is how members of the voting public enter into this process "within the body of agreed principles that forms the consensus upon which the political community rests." Does it, by electoral decision, provide the ultimate ratification of policies formulated in the process of compromise among elites (groups)? At the very most, one might look for some "potential" power in the hands of the general public which it could use, if it wished, to ratify or reject policies and programs thus put before it. But all the considerations which made the simple atomistic and responsible-party conceptions implausible apply with equal force and in identical fashion against such an interpretation.

One other possibility is that "elites" are really elements in a representative structure, that the general public acts through individual membership in groups and associations whose leadership constitutes the various "elites" identified in opinion



research and studies of pluralistic orders. The notion that a common "interest" is the basis for group existence and that the promotion of that interest through governmental action is the basis of "policy demands" is central to so-called "group conceptions" of politics. Without denying the importance of associational membership and social pluralism in shaping the character of democratic society, if not the conditions of democratic politics, we must still question whether the facts justify conceiving of groups as representative vehicles for general citizen policy views. Even were it found that all groups did in fact function in that fashion, the majority of citizens in almost all countries would apparently remain unrepresented, since in very few do as many as 50% belong to "interest-expressing" groups.<sup>65</sup> Moreover, although there are remarkably few studies of the problem, all signs point to the belief that "representation of members' views" is a poor description of what associational spokesmen are doing when we actually find them making policy demands on public officials.<sup>66</sup> The more typical situation is probably that indicated by a survey of 1700 labor union members made in January, 1967, by John F. Kraft, Inc., for the AFL-CIO, in which member support for the association policy positions on some ten different issues ran from 94% to as little as 43%. Even more striking, however, is the fact that the agreement of members with association policy position is greatest on relatively minor public issues and relatively low on precisely those policies one would say are most directly connected to the "interest" of the group!<sup>67</sup>

<u>Policy Issue</u>	<u>% Members Agree with AFL-CIO Position</u>	<u>% Members Disagree with AFL- CIO</u>	<u>% Members DK/NA</u>
Water pollution control	94	4	2
Air pollution control	91	4	5
Truth in packaging	91	3	6
Truth in lending	91	4	5
Improved workmen's compensation	75	11	14
Expanded Medicare	74	12	14
Higher minimum wage	71	21	8
Federal aid to education	67	20	13
Repeal of right-to-work laws	54	23	23
Open housing legislation	43	46	11

Thus, whether we look for public participation through electoral choice among competing elites or for public representation through politically active voluntary associations, we encounter the same difficulties we have encountered before. So-called poly-archal or elite-democracy models are no more helpful in connecting policy-making to policy demands from the public than were the atomistic and party models.

## 2. The Responsible Representative

Demand-input emphases have tended also to color our views of what constitutes responsible behavior by elected representatives. Since the kind of findings just surveyed are well known, few modern studies consider Edmund Burke's "instructed delegate model" appropriate for modern legislators.<sup>68</sup> Most report without surprise the lack of connection between any sort of policy-demand input from the citizenry and the policy-making behavior of representatives. Buchanan, for example, comparing Congressmen's voting

in 1959 and 1961 on economic regulation measures and measures involving an increasing federal role in society with the results of Congressional election results in 1958 and 1960, found support for the conclusion that "a representative will not change his policy-making behavior because of the results in his own election."<sup>69</sup> Converse has said that government officials, in those (few) situations where they recognize public opinion, are prone to see it as "an entity to be guided, not to be guided by," and suggested that where they detect differences between mass public opinion, as revealed in polls, for example, and "vocal" or "visible" opinion they will profit from the discrepancy by widening their own discretion.<sup>70</sup>

Indeed, many studies of representative behavior proceed from quite explicit elitist assumptions, usually leaving implicit the further assumption that citizens will somehow have an opportunity to approve or reject the labors of the few at the next legislative election or in public opinion polls. One recent study, for example, asserts that,

It is well known that a very influential but small proportion of the population shapes the policy to which the remainder of the population merely responds. Public opinion data undoubtedly reflect primarily the latter.<sup>71</sup>

Such studies, however, more often put the burden of responsible representation upon the shoulders of morally responsible representatives than upon electoral or other mechanisms for insuring conformity between representatives' and citizens' policy views. Thus V. O. Key found that,

The longer one frets with the puzzle of how democratic regimes manage to function, the more plausible it appears that a substantial part of the explanation is to be found in the motives that actuate the leadership echelon, the values that it holds, in the rules of the political game to which it adheres, in the expectations which it entertains about its own status in society, and perhaps in some of the objective circumstances, both material and institutional, in which it functions.<sup>72</sup>

The conception of legislative roles developed by the authors of The Legislative System<sup>73</sup> can be interpreted in a loose sense as a conception concerning the representatives' "motives" that Key had in mind. The different role orientations described there can be viewed as norms concerning various segments of the linkage between citizens' views and representatives' decision-making behavior. While the emphasis may be upon the complexity of internal mechanisms and sub-system relationships through which representatives work, the focus is still primarily on the decisional capacity of the legislative system. The ultimate test of "representativeness," whether by Burkean "trustee" or "delegate" legislators, by representatives whose role orientation toward pressure groups is facilitative or by those resistant, or whatever other dimension of legislative role we choose to examine, is still assumed to be the match between legislative policy output and public or constituent policy wishes.

Most other empirical studies of representative behavior also accept the premise that conformity between legislators' actions and public policy views is the central problem of representative government. Most of them similarly envision some kind of role-conception or normative mechanism through which the agreement

comes about. Thus Jewell and Patterson argue that high concern of representatives for their constituency is plausible in spite of the fact that legislators have low saliency in constituents' eyes.<sup>74</sup> And Miller and Stokes suggest still more specifically that, in spite of these facts, "the idea of reward or punishment at the polls for legislative stands is familiar to members of Congress, who feel that they and their records are quite visible to their constituents."<sup>75</sup> A recent study by John Kingdon suggests one interesting mechanism through which the moral obligation to represent constituency views might work: what he terms the "congratulation-rationalization effect" leads winners of Congressional elections to have higher estimates of voters' interest and information than do losers, and to attribute less importance to party label and more importance to policy issues in voters' actions at their election than do losers. Therefore,

The incumbent is more likely than if he lost to believe that voters are watching him, that they are better informed, and that they make their own choices according to his own characteristics and even according to the issues of the election. . . . [he] may pay greater attention to the constituency than otherwise, because he believes that his constituents are paying greater attention to him than he might think if he had lost.<sup>76</sup>

Whatever the mechanism linking public views to legislative policy, the attempt to measure the relationship between citizens' views on policy and the policy actions of their representatives has challenged political research for some time. Julius Turner's early venture, comparing party and constituency pressures on U.S. Congressmen is well known.<sup>77</sup> Analyzing 1956 Survey Research Center

data, Boynton found that Southern Democratic Congressmen voting conservatively on social welfare programs did generally reflect the conservative views of their constituencies, although other data show also that their picture of constituency opinion is probably skewed in a conservative direction.<sup>78</sup> Crane, utilizing the opportunity of comparing a Wisconsin legislative vote on the establishment of "daylight saving time" with a subsequent public referendum on the same issue, found that 85% of the representatives voted in February (1957) as their constituents did the following April, but showed through relevant interview data with legislators that most of them were at the same time voting as they personally believed, or had no personal preference or competing instructions in the matter.<sup>79</sup> And Kingdon, in the study just cited above, found not only that Congressmen who had a high estimate of their constituents' information tended substantially more than low estimators to be in agreement with constituency views in their policy stands, but also that the Congressmen's agreement with majority opinion in their districts was substantially greater than agreement with the constituency opinion as a whole.<sup>80</sup> Perhaps the most promising approach to this problem, however, is that developed by Miller and Stokes and replicated and extended by Cnudde and McCrone, in which, by the use of path-correlation-coefficients (and in the latter case, a causal model) it is possible to compare representatives' votes in any given policy-domain to constituency opinion, representatives' personal opinion, and representatives' perceptions of their constituency's opinion, in order to determine

the proportionate contribution of each to his voting. The results, while in some respects striking, are nonetheless ambiguous. In brief, it is found that constituency policy views play a large role for Congressmen in civil rights issues, but a negligible role in domestic welfare issues and no role in foreign policy issues. Cnudde and McCrone seem, furthermore, to have demonstrated the primary importance of the Congressman's perceptions of his constituents' opinion in establishing whatever link there is from constituency through to legislative voting. That is, in civil rights issues, Congressmen appear to shape their attitude to fit the opinions they think their constituency holds.

From the standpoint of our understanding of representative government, the results of studies of the behavior of representatives are as unsatisfactory as the studies of citizen behavior seem disquieting. Many important questions are left unanswered, theoretically or empirically. Many of the findings upon which important conclusions depend turn out to be based on limited or ambiguous data. And often the differences on which theoretically important distinctions are based are found to be small. But above all, in spite of the fact that legislative policy decisions are universally taken to be the most important type of legislative output, we know almost nothing about the character, let alone the conditions and causes, of how they vary in content. We now turn briefly to this problem.

### 3. Explaining the Content of Policy Output

"Policies" have been described as the most important variety of political output, and legislative policy decisions are commonly understood to be the most important type of legislative output.<sup>82</sup> It has been argued, therefore, that a major problem for legislative research is "to achieve adequate conceptualization of legislative output, i.e., to specify the dimensions or variables of legislative output which are related to different consequences of that output."<sup>83</sup> So it is rather startling to discover that the term "policy" remains almost totally unconceptualized, i.e., that the literature provides "no theoretically meaningful categories which distinguish between types of policies."<sup>84</sup>

There is, however, a recent series of empiricist, i.e., nontheoretical inquiries into possible variations in public policy which tends still further to challenge the relevance of demand-input conceptions to understanding the representative process. Most of these studies utilize the readily available masses of quantitative data about American states to analyze relationships among policy outputs and many possible correlates. Variations in policy output have usually been measured by the amount of money spent by a system on different categories of substantive policy or program, such as public highways, health programs, welfare, etc. Political variables investigated have usually been "structural" in nature -- for example, degree of two-party competition, degree of voter participation, extent of legislative malapportionment, and so on. Socio-economic environmental (or "background")



variables have included such things as degree of urbanization and industrialization, or education level.

It is the general import of these studies that, with only rare and minor exceptions, variations in public policy are not related to variations in political-structure variables, except insofar as socio-economic or environmental variables affect them and public policy variations together. Variations in policy output can be almost entirely "explained" (in the statistical sense) by environmental variables, without reference to the variables supposedly reflecting different systems and practices or representation. The earliest such finding, by Dawson and Robinson, was that welfare policies (nine different items included under that heading) did not seem to vary from one state to another with differences in party competition but did vary according to differences in the economic environment (income, proportion of population engaged in non-agricultural occupations, proportion of population urban).<sup>85</sup>

Very similar analyses have extended such findings into other policy areas. A study by Hofferbert, for example, corroborated the Dawson-Robinson findings with respect to party competition and welfare policies, and went on to examine the effects of party competition on state aid to large cities, and the effects of mal-apportionment and divided control (different parties in control of executive and legislative branches) on both sets of policy variables, concluding that,

Structural characteristics and, if one prefers to give partisan variables a separate berth, the nature of the

party system and its operation do not seem to go very far toward explaining the kind of policies produced in the states. . . . [There is,] however, clear indication that there is a relationship between environment and policy. Remaining to be studied is the specific manner in which environmental forces are translated into policy.<sup>86</sup>

Another study found variations among states in their policies with respect to Kerr-Mills programs, right-to-work laws, state liquor monopolies, and state income-tax policy to be unrelated to differences in degree of malapportionment or to party competition.<sup>87</sup> John Grumm, looking for the policy consequences of "professionalization" of legislatures (salary, length of session, expenditures on legislative operations, number of bills processed), and applying more sophisticated techniques of analysis than the factor analyses most commonly used in the earlier studies, found almost no effect of these variables on policy (thirty-one different policy-indices, grouped into five policy sets), but did find effect from forty-eight environmental variables. Grumm concluded that the effect of legislative professionalization on policy output was meager and that, in any event, both policy output and professionalization seemed to be jointly affected by environmental factors.<sup>88</sup> Most far-reaching of such studies is Dye's examination of the effects of economic development (industrialization, urbanization, income, education) and political-system (party division, party competition, political participation, and malapportionment) on ninety policy variables in four different policy fields. His conclusion:

" . . . system characteristics have relatively little independent effect on policy outcomes in the states. Economic

development shapes both political systems and policy outcomes, and most of the association that occurs between system characteristics and policy outcomes can be attributed to the influence of economic development.<sup>89</sup>

It is possible, of course, that these remarkable findings are unique to the American political system. That such is not the case, however, is strongly suggested by Cutright's discovery that variations in the national security programs of seventy-six nations appear to be explainable directly in terms of economic-development level and to be unrelated to differences in ideology or type of political system (including differences between communist and capitalist systems).<sup>90</sup> There is a curious hint of similar findings in a study suggesting that changes in foreign policy do not seem to be associated with instances of "leadership succession" so far as voting in the U.N. General Assembly is concerned; that is, there is apparently substantial continuity of foreign policy in any given system despite changes in political regime.<sup>91</sup>

Such findings are consistent with but ramify well beyond theories of "incrementalism" in policy-making.<sup>92</sup> The notion of policy-change through small, incremental modifications in existing policy does focus attention on the possible stimuli producing incremental changes. But the policy-environment correlation studies imply that stimuli which have been thought to be policy demands are really just automatically determined links in a chain of reactions from environment to policy output, a chain in which neither policy demands, policy expectations, or any other kind of policy orientation plays any significant role. There is no

room, in other words, for any of the policy-related behaviors and attitudes of citizens which we examined in the preceding section of this paper to enter into the policy process.

Before lamenting that these arguments appear to reduce important democratic presuppositions to a shambles, best left to pedants and ideologues, one ought to note that they are just as damaging to much anti-democratic theory and to elitist criticisms of representative democracy. It is not only policy-opinions of citizens in the mass public which seem to disappear from the roster of policy determinants but policy opinions of elites and group leaderships as well. The broader implication is that "policy-process" studies whose aim is primarily to discover the political bases of policy decisions conceived of as choices between policy alternatives contended for by divergent political forces, or to explain why a particular decision went one way instead of another, must inevitably be fruitless. The task of theoretical reconstruction necessitated by these diverse assaults on accepted beliefs is therefore more formidable than it may have appeared at first glance. At the same time, it may now appear to convinced democrats to be a less sorrowful task than they at first feared.

#### 4. Toward Reconstruction of Representation Theory: The Problem of Support

The appropriate conclusion at this point is not that representative democracy is chimerical but that our conceptions of government, politics, and representation are somehow deficient. What the evidence indicates most clearly is that "policy making"

plays a different and evidently smaller role in the governance of society than we thought. Precisely what role we cannot yet say, for neglect to study the political consequences of policy making is "a practice very much in line with the tradition of political science."<sup>93</sup> Research on representation has tended toward preoccupation with the results of legislative roll calls and other decisions, or the results of elections and series of them. It has concentrated on the antecedents of legislative "output" and left unexamined the political "outcomes" which above all make output an appropriate object of political study.<sup>94</sup> It has explored the possible sources of variations as small as a few percentage points in the influence of "factors" influencing legislative and electoral decision, but ignored the relationship, if any, between legislative output and the incidence of discontent, riots, wars, civil wars, coups d'etat, revolutions, and decay or integration of human groups. Its focus has been determined by "political theories of allocation," in almost total disregard of the perspectives opened up by "theories of systems persistence."<sup>95</sup> This is an essential part of the point made by de Jouvenel in commenting that political science has not had the "dangerous" impact it might because it has so far been content to investigate only "weak political behavior."<sup>96</sup>

A plausible working hypothesis which directs the study of representation toward "strong political behavior" is provided by Easton's discussion of "support." Viewed from this perspective, previous studies are seen to presume that political systems stand,

fall, or change according to the "specific support" accorded them, the "consent" granted "as a consequence from some specific satisfaction obtained from the system with respect to a demand that the members make."<sup>97</sup> But the arguments above show that specific support, the support attaching directly to citizens' reactions to policy decisions, does not adequately describe the relationship between citizen and government. We must also recognize and take into account what Easton calls "diffuse support," the support constituted by "generalized attachment to political objects, . . . not conditioned upon specific returns at any moment."<sup>98</sup>

There is good warrant for the working hypothesis that,

Except in the long run, diffuse support is independent of the effects of daily outputs. It consists of a reserve of support that enables a system to weather the many storms when outputs cannot be balanced off against inputs of demands. It is a kind of support that a system does not have to buy with more or less direct benefits for the obligations and responsibilities the member incurs. If we wish, the outputs here may be considered psychic or symbolic, and in this sense, they may offer the individual immediate benefits strong enough to stimulate a supportive response.<sup>99</sup>

The plausibility of such a starting point has been intimated in a variety of ways. Edelman's instructive discussion of the importance of "symbolic" as compared with "instrumental" satisfactions deriving from the administration of public policies clearly argues for it.<sup>100</sup> More directly concerning representative functions, Thomas Antja has shown, with respect to the roles of agency spokesmen, budget officers, legislators, and citizens in budgetary process of American states that "what is at stake . . . is not so much the distribution of resources, about which state actors have little to say, but the distribution of symbolic satisfaction among the

involved actors and the audiences which observe their stylized behavior."<sup>101</sup> And Alfred de Grazia has discussed the ways in which "the election process is symbolic and psychological in meaning, rather than a device for the purpose of instructing delegates."<sup>102</sup>

That the problem of support is a proper springboard for representation research is suggested also by some commentators on the functions of representative bodies. Almost thirty years ago, T. V. Smith spoke of the "cathartic function" of legislatures, which by themselves appearing as scapegoats, harmlessly conduct away disaffections that otherwise "might well totalize into attacks upon public order."<sup>103</sup> More recently, Eulau and Hinckley have pointed out that representative bodies perform "such latent functions . . . as consensus-building, interest aggregation, catharsis for anxieties and resentment, the crystallization and resolution of conflicts, and the legitimization of decisions made elsewhere in the political system."<sup>104</sup> With respect to Great Britain, Beer has described the main parliamentary task as that of "mobilizing consent," "certainly not the representative function by which in greater or lesser degree the legislature brings the grievances and wishes of the people to bear upon policy-making."<sup>105</sup> And Patterson has asserted that,

A legislature is much more than a law-making factory. It is a symbol of representative, democratic government. Its symbolic 'output' may be related to the kinds of policies it makes, but it is related also to the representative adequacy of the legislature, to the respect citizens can have for individual legislators, and to the pride citizens can take in their legislatures.<sup>106</sup>

David Truman has drawn important implications from such a view for the behavior of representatives, arguing that the primary

skill lying at the heart of representative government is not substantive, technical skill, but in combination with that,

a special skill. This is skill in assaying what is asked or done in the name of substantive expertise and in reconciling or combining such claims or acts with the feasibilities that exist or can be created in the electorate, in the extra-governmental world in all its configurations.<sup>167</sup>

It is the role of the represented, even more than that of the representative, however, which is highlighted by focusing on the problem of support. If that is the starting point, then the immediate task is to identify the dimensions of support, to map its incidence in specific systems, and, through comparative analysis of support mechanisms in different systems, to formulate general statements about its conditions and correlates. This is hardly the place to make such a mapping even if there were sufficient data available to do it. But it is perhaps appropriate to sketch out some of the main features of the terrain suggested by the preceding discussion and by the very few studies which have begun to tackle the problem.

A useful framework for beginning the job of "mapping" is included in Easton's definition of support as affective orientation toward political objects -- political community, political regime, and political authorities.\*

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\* "Political community" refers to "some minimal readiness or ability [of a group of people] to continue working together to solve their political problems." (A Systems Analysis of Political Life, op. cit., p. 172). "Political regime" refers to the values and principles, norms ("operating rules and rules of the game"), and structures of authority (authority-roles) by which, over a period of time, authoritative decisions are made in the political community. (Ibid., pp. 190-211). Political authorities are the persons who occupy the authoritative roles at any given point in time. (Ibid. pp. 212-219).



a. Support for the Political Community.

With respect to support for the political community it seems invariably to be assumed that,

A basic prerequisite is that the population be pervaded by a national loyalty. Or perhaps, more accurately, that the population not consist of segments each with its own sense of separateness."<sup>108</sup>

Almond and Verba, whose concept of "systems affect" approximates the concept of support for political community, likewise appear to take for granted (at least in the five countries they studied) the existence of a nationality sentiment or similar community sense defining a political community toward which members respond with varying effect.<sup>109</sup> But what if no sentiment of political community binds together a group of people who are, in fact, being governed together (as is the case in many new African nations, to give an obvious example)? Or if segments seem increasingly to develop "each with its own sense of separateness" (as may well be the case in Canada or Belgium)? Can we be sure that "the sense of community must also be in part a product of public policy?"<sup>110</sup>

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(continued from page 33) Although I have borrowed the language and concepts of political systems analysis from David Easton, and freely acknowledge the enormous stimulating power of his contribution, I have not accepted his formulation in all respects. I am here using the term "support" itself, for instance, in a much less "purely analytic" fashion than Easton would wish.

The pressing task for the study of representation, it seems to me, is not to contrive systems of completely inter-linked, rigorously but abstractly defined concepts, which totally "cover" the theoretical universe of politics. It is to explain as wide a range of observable phenomena as possible. I do not think that the concepts of political systems analysis (or any others, for that matter) are in themselves "explanatory." They are pointers which tell us where to look for interesting and exciting material and how to organize our observations after we have looked there. They are nonetheless useful, indeed indispensable, for that.

If not "policy," what aspect then of governmental activity, and especially of representative bodies' activity, affects it? At this stage we can only wonder. But we can begin to find out by recognizing that one major dimension of political-community support is a sort of "pre-political" sentiment giving all segments of the community "a we-feeling. . . , not that they are just a group but that they are a political entity that works together and will likely share a common political fate and destiny."<sup>111</sup>

Another major dimension is suggested by Almond and Verba's typology of political cultures, comprising what we may interpret as the political roles of "parochial," "subject," and "participant." The authors' original formulation differentiates these three types primarily in terms of their relative participation in demand-input activities. There is justification even in the original formulation, however, for viewing these roles as differentiated also by the extent of conscious support for the political community, or "the gradation from 'public' to 'private'":

The overwhelming majority of the members of all political systems live out their lives, discover, develop, and express their feelings and aspirations in the intimate groups of the community. It is the rare individual who is fully recruited into the political system and becomes a political man.<sup>113</sup>

Viewed this way, the second component of community support, which might be labelled "political commitment," appears as an autonomously defined political variable, a kind of participation through sensitivity and alertness to political events and objects as well as participation in civic and political roles -- participation in politics per se (not necessarily in the sense of power

seeking, however), and not participation in primarily instrumental activities. It is a kind of "political interest," but,

. . . it is interest not in the form of gains in material well-being, power, or status, but it is rather in personal satisfaction and growth attained from active engagement in the political process.<sup>114</sup>

A number of familiar concepts might serve to define this second dimension of political-community support. Most of the phenomena usually treated under the heading of "political alienation," for example, represent an extreme negative value, ranking above only such anti-supportive positions as rebellion itself. "Political apathy," in a sense related to Almond and Verba's "parochialism," is more supportive than alienation but less so than "compliance." More supportive still is active "interest and involvement," although one must be careful to remember that support for the political community here is perfectly compatible (perhaps often associated?) with failure of support for regime or authorities. Beyond interest there is participation of varying degrees -- ranging from nothing more than sporadic voting to regular and intensive political communication, to participation in authority or other "trans-civic" roles.

Such a conception seems perfectly consistent with what we do know about the relevant behavior of citizens. For example, once depressing statistics about "low levels" of citizen interest take on quite different meaning in this light. The finding that "only" 27% of the American public could be considered politically active,<sup>115</sup> that during 1945 and 1946 sometimes "as few as" 19%

and "never more than" 36% of the American Zone population in West Germany claimed to be personally interested in politics,<sup>116</sup> that in 1958 35% of the West Germans had no interest at all in attending Bundestag sessions even if it cost them nothing,<sup>117</sup> or the countless similar readings of political interest and involvement in other political systems, must now, if there is no other different evidence on the point, be read not as signs of "apathy" or "negativism" but as probable indications of moderate support for the political community.

Furthermore, a number of bits of information which earlier seemed to indicate irrational failures of citizen demand-input behavior now become much more tolerable as indicators of symbolic satisfactions associated with participation levels of political-community support. It becomes understandable why, when only half the American public thinks it makes much difference at all which party wins the election, some two-thirds to three-fourths of them make a point of voting at all elections, whether or not they have any specific interest in them,<sup>118</sup> and almost nine-tenths of them (87%) think having elections makes government pay some or a good deal of attention to what the people think,<sup>119</sup> or why about two-thirds of the Dutch people in 1946 were not in favor of eliminating the right not to vote, but 84% of them insisted they fully intended to vote.<sup>120</sup> Although Almond and Verba consider these and related indicators under the heading of "input affect," meaning essentially demand-input ("the feelings people have both about those agencies and processes that are involved in the election of

public officials, and about the enactment of public policies"<sup>121</sup>), they seem much more intelligible viewed under the heading of support input.

b. Support for the Political Regime.

The situation is much the same when we come to the problem of regime support. Again there are strong hints of the probable utility of studying regime-support phenomena, but again fascination with demand-input concepts has prevented most researchers from proceeding in the direction in which a few point. Thus, for example, Anton has noticed, concerning the budget process, "it is not the document which creates satisfaction, but the process of putting it together. . . . [The] budget, as document and process, creates symbolic satisfaction built upon the idea that affairs of state are being dealt with, that responsibility is being exercised, and that rationality prevails."<sup>121</sup> Dye's conclusion after studying a voluminous array of the content of policy outputs, was that "The way in which a society authoritatively allocates values may be an even more important question than the outcomes of these value allocations. Our commitments to democratic processes are essentially commitments to a mode of decision-making. The legitimacy of the democratic form of government has never really depended upon the policy outcomes which it is expected to produce."<sup>122</sup> And deGrazia has said, more poetically,

. . . the whole process of representation becomes an acting out of a play in which the actors are independent within the limits of the state, the setting, and the changing

tastes of the audience. Their role is meaningful but it has no direct connection with the ticket the audience files for admission."<sup>124</sup>

On one major dimension suggested by these insights -- support for broad norms and values which apply to the political world generally, not differentially to specific civic and political roles, i.e., to "rules-of-the-game," or standards by which regimes are judged -- we have considerable information, but its meaning is ambiguous. How much consensus, in the sense of "agreement on fundamentals," may vary, and what is the effect of such variation, are questions which do not yet have clear answers.<sup>125</sup> Investigating them as one aspect of support might help lead to clearer ones.

The level of support for the institutional apparatus of government seems to be another major dimension of regime support, empirically distinguishable from generalized "agreement on fundamentals." Citizens are apparently able to dislike something or other about the actions of government and at the same time support its continuation institutionally unchanged, and their levels of support in this respect apparently fluctuate over time. An instructive example is the differences in French responses to identical questions put at different times concerning which political regimes seemed to be functioning better or worse than the French regime. From January, 1958, to January, 1965, the percentage saying each country named worked better than the French dropped in every case and the percentage saying the French regime worked better increased in every case.<sup>126</sup> Again, although 41% of a sample

in a small midwestern American city said, in 1966, that there were things Congress had done which they did not like (about some of which they claimed to feel strongly), only 20% of them thought any proposals for changing Congress should be given serious attention; although 44% said the city council had done something they particularly disliked, and only 20% thought the council was doing a good or excellent job, less than a third thought the form of government should be changed.<sup>127</sup> This perspective also leads us to view not as deviant, undemocratic views, but as probable indicators of probably normal regime support, the fact that more Americans think the majority of people usually incorrect in their ideas on important questions (42%) than think the majority correct (38%), or that Congress is thought more correct than "the people" in its "views on broad national issues," (42% as against 38%).<sup>128</sup>

In addition to generalized support for the political regime, which can usually be gauged by sentiment for changing it in any important respects, by attitudes and actions of hostility indicating its declining legitimacy, and numerous similar indicators, there is also differential support for different segments of the regime. The figures just cited concerning public trust for the collective wisdom of Congress bears also on this point. So do such public beliefs as that representatives should vote according to their own best judgment rather than the views of their districts (as 54% Americans responded at one time<sup>129</sup>) or that they should rely on "opinions of the country as a whole," rather than on opinions from their own district or personal judgment (as 40% Canadians responded in 1946<sup>130</sup>).

There are evidently at least two dimensions to the support for any institutional segment of the regime. A preliminary report from the Iowa Legislative Research project, using factor analysis of replies to questions about the state legislative institution, clearly identifies a dimension of "compliance" -- willingness to abide by decisions reached in the legislative system, regardless of the content (policy) in question -- and another dimension of "institutional commitment" -- a willingness to maintain the legislative system, even in the face of unsatisfactory performance.<sup>131</sup> It would seem logical that the same dimensions are relevant to the study of support for courts, executives, administrative apparatuses, or any other regime features.

c. Support for the Authorities.

So far as the concept of "support" has entered into public opinion and political research it has attached primarily to the object which Easton calls "political authorities." An indispensable feature of representative government by anybody's definition is elections which nominally, at least, decide who shall be incumbent in public office. Even if, as Schumpeter says, "democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them,"<sup>132</sup> elections still must be viewed as indices of support for authorities. What we have said earlier about the role of issues and policies in elections suggests Schumpeter's perspective is correct, although his interpretation may be in error.



The mobilization of consent (support) is a vital governmental function, and the fact (if it is a fact) that voters choose "only" among competing sets of men does not mean that elections, by demonstrating one dimension of support for authorities, are not contributing to the performance of that function. The question is, what other dimensions are important? Is sentiment expressed about governments-in-office to pollsters between elections a critical element in it? How does it relate to the support shown by polls administered by governmental authorities themselves? Perhaps because elections provide such an obvious gross indicator of one major dimension, there are few suggestions in the literature about others.

d. The Problem of Support and Representative Government.

The conceptualization of support sketched out here is only that. It is not a theory, nor even a few hypotheses. Indeed, it is not even a very complete conceptualization, since many important questions are left open -- how do we visualize support in a complex, multi-level, pluralistic government? What is the connection between support for local as against national (and, in federal systems, intermediate) authorities, regime, and political community? Between support for different segments of the regime at different levels? What is the relevance of the notion to supra-national and intergovernmental politics?

But even the sketchy outline here should suggest some areas where fruitful research might begin without waiting for the

conceptual millenium. Merely to provide descriptive mapping of support in specific political systems is an essential starting point. Who lends what kinds of support in what amounts? Preliminary findings of the Iowa study of legislative support mentioned above include finding a "pronounced tendency for support to be located in the higher social strata," and for education to affect the two dimensions of compliance and institutional commitment in different ways -- support of the compliance dimension seems to increase most markedly between grade school and high school, whereas institutional commitment seems to increase most markedly between high school and college.<sup>133</sup> How typical is this finding of other American states? Of political systems generally? Of national legislative systems? Of other institutional segments in Iowa or elsewhere? Only further research can answer such questions.

A "mapping" operation is an important part of a major study of public conceptions of constitutional courts in several lands being conducted by Professors Walter Murphy of Princeton and Joseph Tanenhaus of the University of Iowa. Although still in the early stages of analysis of only the panel data (1964 and 1966) for the U.S.A.,<sup>134</sup> results of their panel data for the U.S. (1964 and 1966) seem to diverge in some interesting ways from the legislative findings of Boynton, Patterson and Hedlund, and more drastically from some "commonsense" notions. As did the Iowa Legislative study, Murphy and Tanenhaus find only a fraction (approximately one-fourth) politically knowledgeable. Whereas in the

state legislature's case, however, "knowledge about the legislature, however minimal, is highly associated with legislative support, support for the Court was related inversely, if at all, to political knowledge. With respect to the less knowledgeable, Murphy and Tanenhaus conclude that, "all else remaining constant, carrying knowledge of the Supreme Court's specific work and constitutional responsibilities to the potentially inaccessible inattentive public would have little appreciable effect on the ratio of positive to negative supporters."<sup>135</sup>

These beginnings suggest that the explanation of patterns of support discovered by mapping what kinds of people display what level of support on what dimensions can proceed simultaneously with investigation of hypotheses about the causes and conditions of support and, perhaps, about the consequences of variations in support levels or support distributions.

An obvious question to investigate here grows out of the assumption we began by questioning. How do the substantive, policy actions of government, particularly representative bodies, affect the levels and location of support? What kinds of concern produce what kinds of reaction to what kinds of policy decisions? It is frequently said that, "Proposals for legislative reforms have usually had their roots in the advocacy of specific kinds of public policy."<sup>136</sup> Among the most striking patterns in the Murphy-Tanenhaus data about support for the Court is a strong association between policy concerns and support for the court, an association even stronger on the negative side (for non-supporters dissatisfied

on "policy" grounds) than the positive (supporters who like the Court's policy decisions). They also find close association between "diffuse" and "specific" support for the court. Their particular operational definition of "policy issues," however, makes it unwise to interpret these findings as firm evidence that "policy demands" or "policy expectations" in a simple demand-input sense are operative here, just as it seems unlikely that simple demand-inputs readily generate simple instrumental demands for legislative reform.

But what, then, does "policy" or "issue" mean in this context? The most promising clue is that provided by Converse and Dupeux, who find issues likely to be either "emotional-symbol issues involving some of the more gross group conflicts" (racial, religious, ethnic) or more complex questions about economic regulatory and similar domestic matters or foreign policy, on which there is little crystallized opinion.<sup>137</sup> Elsewhere Converse has pointed out that abstract questions about relations among parts of government, or similar ones, are much less central objects for the mass public than social groupings, and that "groups as attitude objects (groups qua groups) have higher centrality in the belief systems of the mass than of the elite."<sup>138</sup> The identification and classification of different issues as "valence issues," "style issues," "climate issues," and so on, as against "position issues" points in a similar direction.<sup>139</sup> But considerably more conceptual effort, as well as empirical research, seems necessary on this point.

What bearing has all this on representative government? Surely it does not suggest that to maintain representative democracy is more difficult, or that representative democracy is less desirable, just because it might seem to depend less on support deriving from mechanically satisfying demand-inputs than it does on the generation of support through quite different mechanisms. The question still is, how do representative bodies contribute to the generation and maintenance of support? In what respects and for what particular aspects of the task are they superior to non-representative institutions? These are questions to be answered by empirical research. And the only possible justification of the above suggestions about the dimensions of support is that they prove useful for empirical inquiry.

JW:lb  
8/16/67

FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>The best analytical surveys of representation theory are those of A. H. Birch, Representative and Responsible Government (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), and Alfred de Grazia, Public and Republic (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951). Bryce's views are expressed, for example, in Modern Democracies (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1921), Vol. II, 335-357. Lippmann's can be found in Public Opinion (New York: Penguin Books, 1946), especially 216-220. While General de Gaulle has, of course, not contributed formally to literature of this kind, Gaullist views are well known from various speeches, debates, and publication preceding the creation of the Fifth French Republic. They are conveniently discussed in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, The de Gaulle Republic (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1960), 124-131.

<sup>2</sup>Joseph P. Clark, Congress: The Sapless Branch (New York: Harper & Row, 1964); The Senate Establishment (New York: Hill & Wang, 1964).

<sup>3</sup>Gerhard Loewenberg, Parliament in the German Political System (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967), 1.

<sup>4</sup>David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), 112-113. For more extended treatment, see Easton's A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), 37-152. For briefer exposition, see his article, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics, Vol. 9 (1957), 383-400.

<sup>5</sup>A. H. Birch, op. cit., 171:

<sup>6</sup>Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress, Johns University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Vol. 69, No. 1 (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1952), 178. Italics added.

<sup>7</sup>Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), 214.

<sup>8</sup>Almond and Verba, op. cit., 474-475.

<sup>9</sup>Hadley Cantril, The Pattern of Human Concerns (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1965), 167-171. The figures (extracted from tables, pp. 169-170), are as follows:

Percentage of respondents  
giving political references

	<u>Personal hopes</u>	<u>Personal fears</u>
Brazil	--8	18
Cuba	158	158
Dominican Republic	98	98
Egypt	48	48
India	---	---
Israel	28	28
Kibbutzim	38	48
Nigeria	---	58
Panama	18	28
Philippines	---	18
United States	28	58
West Germany	18	88
Yugoslavia	---	---

The question asked was (Ibid., p. 23): "All of us want certain things out of life. When you think about what really matters in your life, what are your wishes and hopes for the future? In other words, if you imagine your future in the best possible light, what would your life look like then, if you are to be happy?...Now, taking the other side of the picture, what are your fears and worries about the future? In other words, if you imagine your future in the worst possible light, what would your life look like then?..."

<sup>10</sup>SRC Study 0504, Preliminary Code Book, 1967.

<sup>11</sup>A.I.P.O., Dec. 14, 1936, reported in Hadley Cantril & Mildred Strunk, Public Opinion 1935-46 (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1951).

<sup>12</sup>A.I.P.O., September 3, 1942; February 3, 1943. Reported in Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960), 173.

<sup>14</sup>Philip E. Converse and George Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," reprinted from Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XXVI (1962) in Angus Campbell, et al., Elections and the Political Order (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), 269-291. Quoted on p. 286.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 286.

<sup>16</sup>Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter, American Business and Public Policy (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), 81.

<sup>17</sup>Op. cit., 249.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 202.

<sup>19</sup>Donald E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," Reprinted from American Political Science Review, Vol. LVII (1963), in Angus Campbell, et al., Elections and the Political Order (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), 161-179. Quotation on p. 166.

<sup>20</sup>Robert Axelrod, "The Structure of Public Opinion on Policy Issues," Public Opinion Quarterly XXXI(1):51-60 (Spring 1967), 58.

<sup>21</sup>The question asked was, "Besides the Bundestag, there is also in Bonn a Bundesrat. Can you tell me what the Bundesrat does?" The results were:

	<u>June</u> <u>1958</u>	<u>May</u> <u>1959</u>	<u>July</u> <u>1962</u>
Right answers	12%	11%	11%
Vague or wrong answers	27%	31%	32%
No	61%	58%	57%

Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, eds., Jahrbuch für öffentliche Meinung, III (1958-1964), (Allenbach und Bonn: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1965).

<sup>22</sup>A.I.P.O. polls of June 7, 1952, March 3, 1954, and August 8, 1954, tabulated in Hazel Erskine, "The Polls," Public Opinion Quarterly, various issues and Gallup Political Index, Report No. 5 (October, 1965), reporting A.I.P.O. survey of Autumn 1965.

<sup>23</sup>A.I.P.O. polls of June 7, 1952, March 3, 1954, and August 8, 1954 in Erskine, op. cit.

<sup>24</sup>OMGUS September 3, 1946 reported in Cantril and Strunk, op. cit.

<sup>25</sup>One representative figure concerning identification of Senators is that from an AIPO poll of January 1945, in which 35% correctly named both Senators, 22% correctively named one, and 43% could not name even one. Some representative figures for identification of Congressmen by Americans are:

	<u>Correct</u>	<u>Incorrect or DK</u>
March 1942	50%	50%
March 1943	49%	51%
January 1946	46%	54%
August 1947	38%	62%
October 1965	43%	57%
March 1966	46%	54%



The last two sets of figures are from the Gallup Political Index, the first four from Cantril and Strunk, op. cit.

Dahl's New Haven study found that only 30% of the New Haven sample knew the New Haven district Congressman's name--13% gave wrong answers and 57% admitted simply to not knowing. (From ICPR New Haven Study Code Book.)

<sup>26</sup>Reported in Morris Showel, "Political Consciousness and Attitudes in the State of Washington," Public Opinion Quarterly XVII: 394-400 (Fall, 1953).

<sup>27</sup>A.I.P.O. Study No. 0283-0284, November 1942, reported in Cantril and Strunk, op. cit.

<sup>28</sup>A.I.P.O. May 29, 1946, reported in Cantril and Strunk, op. cit.

<sup>29</sup>ICPR New Haven Study Code Book.

<sup>30</sup>A.I.P.O. January 3, 1946, reported in Cantril and Strunk, op. cit.

<sup>31</sup>A.I.P.O. Study No. 0264, March 18, 1942, reported in Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>A.I.P.O. October 1965, reported in Gallup Political Index, Report No. 5 (October 1965).

<sup>33</sup>Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States (New York: Random House, Inc., 1966), 449.

<sup>34</sup>SGI June, 1944, reported in Cantril and Strunk, op. cit.

<sup>35</sup>David A. Leuthold, "Missouri Attitudes toward the Legislature and Its Reapportionment," Paper prepared for the Missouri Political Science Association Convention, October 8-9, 1966, 9 pp. mimeographed.

<sup>36</sup>Minneapolis Poll, July 1965, reported in the Minneapolis Tribune, July 11, 1965.

<sup>37</sup>Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954) and Philip H. Ennis, "The Contextual Dimension in Voting," 180-211 in William N. McPhee and William A. Glaser, eds., Public Opinion and Congressional Elections (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).

<sup>38</sup>Sondages, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1954), 55.

<sup>39</sup>Leon D. Epstein, "Electoral Decision and Policy Mandate: An Empirical Example," Public Opinion Quarterly XXVIII:564-572 (1964).

<sup>40</sup>William Buchanan, "An Inquiry into Purposive Voting," Journal of Politics 18:281-296 (1965).

<sup>41</sup>Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," Public Opinion Quarterly XXVI: 531-546 (1962). Reprinted in Campbell, et al., Elections and the Political Order, op. cit., 194-211.

<sup>42</sup>Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, Supplement, The American Political Science Review (September 1950).

<sup>43</sup>Morris Showell, op. cit.

<sup>44</sup>University of Michigan Survey Research Center Study 0504, Preliminary Code Book, Deck 02, Columns 51, 52.

<sup>45</sup>Stokes and Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," op. cit., 209.

<sup>46</sup>Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," 206-261 in David E. Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

<sup>47</sup>Sondages, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1952), p. 7. The relevant figures are as follows, in answer to the question, "What, in your opinion, is most important in your party: doctrine, program, party leaders, esprit, or cohesion of its members?"

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>SFIO</u>	<u>RGR</u>	<u>MRP</u>	<u>Moder-</u> <u>ates</u>	<u>RPF</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Doctrine	44	32	29	34	25	13
Program	25	26	25	22	31	20
Leaders	10	7	20	11	14	35
Esprit	4	12	9	18	15	11
Members' cohesion	5	5	2	2	5	7
Don't know	12	18	15	13	10	14
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., 14.

<sup>49</sup>Mark Abrams, "Social Trends and Electoral Behavior," reprinted from British Journal of Sociology XIII:228-242 (1962), 129-144 in Richard Rose, ed., Studies in British Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966). Quoted on 136.

<sup>50</sup>Op. cit., especially 68-75.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., 169.

<sup>52</sup>Werner Zölnhofer, "Parteiidentifizierung in der Bundesrepublik und den Vereinigten Staaten," 126-168 in Erwin K. Scheuch and Rudolf Wildenman, eds., Zur Soziologie der Wahl, Sonderheft 9/1965, Kolner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (Köln und Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1965).

<sup>53</sup>R. S. Milne and H. C. MacKenzie, "The Floating Vote," reprinted from Political Studies, III:65-68 (1955), 145-149 in Richard Rose, ed., Studies in British Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966). Quoted from 145.

<sup>54</sup>Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953). For a general commentary on this line of studies see Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).

<sup>55</sup>Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), especially Chapter 3; Who Governs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

<sup>56</sup>Such problems are discussed in "Electoral Studies and Democratic Theory: I. A British View," by John Plamenatz, and "...II. A Continental View," by Giovanni Sartori, Political Studies VI:1-15 (1958); Jack Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," American Political Science Review LX:285-295 (1966), and the reply by Robert A. Dahl, "Further Reflections on 'The Elitist Theory of Democracy,'" Ibid. 296-304; and Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967).

<sup>57</sup>Sidney Verba, et al., "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," American Political Science Review LXI:317-333 (1967), 318.

<sup>58</sup>Converse and Dupeux, op. cit., 291.

<sup>59</sup>Dahl, Who Governs, op. cit.

<sup>60</sup>Charles O. Jones, "Representation in Congress: The Case of the House Agricultural Committee," American Political Science Review LV:358-367 (1958).

<sup>61</sup>Bernard C. Cohen, "The Military Policy Public," Public Opinion Quarterly XXX:200-211 (1966).

<sup>62</sup>Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," op. cit.

<sup>63</sup>William C. Rogers, Barbara Stuhler, and Donald Koenig, "A Comparison of Informed and General Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy," Public Opinion Quarterly XXXI:242-252 (1967).

<sup>64</sup>Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), 35.

<sup>65</sup>Almond and Verba found, for example, that 57% of the Americans but only 47% of the English, 44% of the German, 30% of the Italian, and 24% of the Mexican respondents belonged to voluntary organizations other than a church, and that (The Civic Culture, p. 302), and even in these cases many of the organizations engaged in little or no political activity. The Civic Culture, op. cit., 302-303. Lipset refers to survey data indicating that somewhere between 40% and 50% of the adults in the United States, Germany, France, Great Britain, and Sweden belong to voluntary associations, and also emphasizes that, "This point bears further research in many countries." Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1960), 67n.

<sup>66</sup>The point is touched obliquely in Campbell, et al., The American Voter, op. cit., 306-331, but altogether in the context of voting and voter identifications with groups of various sorts. The discussion is valuable, however, for its identification of political salience of groups for their members, intensity of identification, and other important dimensions relevant to our general problem.

<sup>67</sup>Reported in a Special News Item by David R. Jones, New York Times, July 16, 1967.

<sup>68</sup>This model is discussed in John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson, The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), 267-286; Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review LVII:45-56 (1963), reprinted in Campbell, et al., Elections and the Political Order, op. cit., 351-372; and Donald E. Stokes, "A Variance Components Model of Political Effects," 61-85 in John Clauch, ed., Mathematical Applications in Political Science (Dallas, Tex.: The Arnold Foundation of Southern Methodist University, 1965), 62.

<sup>69</sup>William Buchanan, "An Inquiry into Purposive Voting," op. cit., 37.

<sup>70</sup>Philip E. Converse, "Comments," Journal of Conflict Resolution IX:328-333 (1965), 333.

<sup>71</sup>Joel T. Campbell and Leila S. Cain, "Public Opinion and the Outbreak of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution IX:318-328 (1965), 325.

<sup>72</sup>v. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), 537.

- 73Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, op. cit.
- 74Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States, op. cit., 351-352.
- 75Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," op. cit., 368.
- 76John W. Kingdon, "Politicians' Beliefs about Voters," American Political Science Review LXI:137-145 (1967), 144.
- 77Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress, op. cit.
- 78George Robert Boynton, "Southern Conservatism: Constituency Opinion and Congressional Voting," Public Opinion Quarterly XXIX:259-269 (1965).
- 79Wilder W. Crane, Jr., "Do Representatives Represent?" Journal of Politics 22:295-299 (1960).
- 80Kingdon, op. cit., 137.
- 81Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," op. cit., Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "The Linkage Between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model," American Political Science Review LX:66-72 (1966).
- 82David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, op. cit., 126; A Systems Analysis of Political Life, 353ff.
- 83John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), 25.
- 84Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities," Journal of Politics 29:94-108 (1967), 95.
- 85Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," Journal of Politics 25:265-289 (1963).
- 86Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relationship between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," American Political Science Review LX:73-82 (1962).
- 87David Brady and Douglas Edmonds, "The Effects of Malapportionment on Policy Output in the American States," Mimeo-graphed, University of Iowa Laboratory for Political Research Report, No. 3 (1966).

<sup>88</sup>John G. Grumm, "Structure and Policy in the Legislature," Mimeographed paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association, Dallas, Texas, March 26, 1967. Grumm's analysis utilized both factor analysis and causal modeling.

<sup>89</sup>Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966), 293.

<sup>90</sup>Philips Cutright, "Political Structure, Economic Development, and National Security Programs," American Journal of Sociology LXX:537-548 (1965).

<sup>91</sup>David H. Blake, "Leadership Succession and Its Effects on Foreign Policy as Observed in the General Assembly," Mimeographed paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, West Lafayette, Indiana, April 27-29, 1967.

<sup>92</sup>See, for example, Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964), 15.

<sup>93</sup>Eugene J. Meehan, Contemporary Political Thought (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1967), 180.

<sup>94</sup>Easton describes this distinction as that between "a stream of activities flowing from the authorities in a system" (outputs) and "the infinite chain of effects that might flow from an authoritative allocation" (outcomes). A Systems Analysis of Political Life, op. cit., 349, 351.

<sup>95</sup>Leon Lindberg, "The Role of the European Parliament in an Emerging European Community," 101-128 in Elke Frank, ed., Lawmakers in a Changing World (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice - Hall, Inc., 1966), 108. The same point has been made in John Wahlke, "Behavioral Analyses of Representative Bodies," 173-190 in Austin Ranney, ed., Essays in the Behavioral Study of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), and is indirectly made by Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States (New York: Random House, Inc., 1966), 528-531.

<sup>96</sup>Bertrand de Jouvenel, "On the Nature of Political Science," American Political Science Review LV:773-779 (1961), 777.

<sup>97</sup>Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, op. cit., 268.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., 272, 273. Easton himself later (p. 434n.) makes the much stronger assertion still that, "Under some circumstances the need for outputs to bolster support may be reduced to the vanishing point."

<sup>99</sup>ibid., 273.

<sup>100</sup>Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

<sup>101</sup>Thomas J. Anton, "Roles and Symbols in the Determination of State Expenditures," Midwest Journal of Political Science XI:27-43 (1967), 39.

<sup>102</sup>Alfred de Grazia, Public and Republic, op. cit., 170.

<sup>103</sup>T. V. Smith, "Two Functions of the American State Legislator," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 195 (1938), 187.

<sup>104</sup>Heinz Eulau and Katherine Hinckley, "Legislative Institutions and Processes," 85-189 in James A. Robinson, ed., Political Science Annual, Vol. 1 (1966), 85-86.

<sup>105</sup>Samuel H. Beer, "The British Legislature and the Problem of Mobilizing Consent," Elke Frank, op. cit., 31.

<sup>106</sup>Samuel C. Patterson, Midwest Legislative Politics (Mid-America Assembly on State Legislatures, Participants' Edition, 1966), 114.

<sup>107</sup>David B. Truman, "The Representative Function in Western Systems," 84-96 in Edward H. Buehrig, ed., Essays in Political Science (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), 90.

<sup>108</sup>Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, op. cit., 549.

<sup>109</sup>Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, op. cit., 101-105. Note that, in response to the question, "Speaking generally, what are the things about this country that you are most proud of?", there was considerable variation in the number of respondents not naming anything: Italy, 27%; Mexico, 16%; Germany, 15%; United Kingdom, 10%; and United States, 4%. The character of the question, and the fact that no related questions were asked, would make it unwise to interpret these percentages as inverse measures of the support for political community in these five countries.

<sup>110</sup>ibid., 551.

<sup>111</sup>Easton, Systems Analysis, op. cit., 332.

<sup>112</sup>The "participant" is "an active participant in the political input process," the "subject" hardly at all oriented toward input objects but positively (if passively) oriented affectively "toward the output, administrative, or 'downward flow' side of the political system," and the "parochial" detached from political roles of every sort, on both input and output sides. Almond and Verba, op. cit., 161, 19, 17 respectively.

- 113 Ibid., 143.
- 114 Peter Bachrach, op. cit., 38.
- 115 Julian L. Woodward and Elmo Roper, "The Political Activity of American Citizens," American Political Science Review XLIV:872-885 (1950).
- 116 OMGUS, October 26, December 13, 1945; January 31, June 7, August 9, September 3, 1946. Reported in Cantril and Strunk, op. cit.
- 117 Noelle and Neumann, op. cit., July, 1958.
- 118 49% and 51% in two separate polls in September 1946, for example. A.I.P.O. reported in Cantril and Strunk, op. cit.
- 119 Survey Research Center, 1966, SRC Study 0504, ICPR Preliminary Code Book.
- 120 NIPO, February 5, 1946, reported in Cantril and Strunk, op. cit.
- 121 Almond and Verba, op. cit., 101.
- 122 Anton, op. cit., 39-40.
- 123 Dye, op. cit., 300.
- 124 de Grazia, op. cit., 170. Italics not in original.
- 125 Key's discussion (op. cit., 30ff) of "supportive," "permissive," "negative," and "decisional" consensus is most instructive here. See also Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review LVIII:361-382 (1964), and James W. Prothro and Charles W. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," Journal of Politics 22:276-294 (1960).
- 126 Drop in % saying other regime better than France, 25% for G. B.; 28% for U.S.A.; 7% for Italy; 31% for West Germany; 16% for U.S.S.R. Increase in % saying French worked better: 15% for G. B.; 13% for U.S.A.; 1% for Italy; 14% for West Germany; 9% for U.S.S.R. Sondages, Vol. 26(1), (1966).
- 127 Iowa City Form of Government Study, 1966, Code Book. University of Iowa Laboratory for Political Research.
- 128 A.I.P.O. July 17, 1939, and August 8, 1939, reported in Erskine, op. cit. The remainder of responses in each instance were DK and NA.



129 A.I.P.O. November, 1938, reported in Cantril and Strunk, op. cit.

130 C.I.P.O. July 6, 1946, reported in Ibid.

131 G. R. Boynton, Samuel C. Patterson, and Ronald D. Hedlund, "The Nature of Support for Legislative Institution," 27 pp. mimeographed preliminary report, The University of Iowa, Laboratory for Political Research, August, 1967.

132 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 285.

133 Boynton, Patterson, and Hedlund, op. cit., 10, 21.

134 I am grateful to Professors Murphy and Tanenhaus for allowing me to use the manuscript of their forthcoming article in Public Opinion Quarterly, "Public Opinion and the Supreme Court: The Goldwater Campaign," and the draft of their report on "Public Opinions and the United States Supreme Court: A Preliminary Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court Legitimation of Regime Changes," a paper being prepared for a Conference on Judicial Behavior at Iowa City, Iowa, to be held in October, 1967.

135 Boynton, Patterson, and Hedlund, op. cit., 16. Murphy and Tanenhaus, "Public Opinions and the United States Supreme Court," op. cit., unnumbered manuscript page.

136 Jewell and Patterson, op. cit., 515.

137 Converse and Dupeux, op. cit., 289.

138 Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," op. cit., 234, 235.

139 The distinction between position and style issues is made by Berelson, et al., op. cit.; Stokes makes the distinction between position and valence issues, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," op. cit., 171; and Ennis, (op. cit., 201), uses the term "climate (of opinion)" issues.

### Summary

Most discussions of representative democracy are couched in terms of "demand input" models of representation, which assume that the citizen's role is primarily to stimulate or orient government action by exerting policy demands, and (or), corollary to that, to evaluate government's attempts to satisfy felt demands. From examination of several "demand-input models" of representative government, of conceptions of the representative's role derived from, and of several recent attempts to analyze governmental "policy outputs", this paper concludes that study of the generation and manifestation of "support" is a more fruitful approach to the study of representation than study of "demand inputs" or "decision making". Several dimensions of the concept of "support" are suggested as promising starting points for research.

### Résumé

La plupart des discussions concernant la démocratie représentative partent de modèles de la représentation établis en termes d' "input de la demande", fondés sur l'hypothèse selon laquelle le rôle des citoyens consiste essentiellement à stimuler ou à orienter l'action des autorités en présentant des demandes, et/ou, en corollaire, d'apprécier les tentatives que les autorités font pour satisfaire aux demandes perçues. Après avoir examiné plusieurs modèles de régimes représentatifs, en termes d' "input de la demande", les conceptions du rôle des représentants que l'on peut en tirer, et les tentatives récentes pour analyser les "outputs" gouvernementaux (c'est-à-dire les mesures prises par les autorités), le rapport affirme que l'étude de la création et de l'expression du "soutien" dont bénéficient les autorités, est une approche plus féconde à l'étude de la représentation que l'étude des "inputs-demande" ou des "processus de prise de décisions". L'auteur suggère plusieurs dimensions du concept de "soutien" comme des points de départ prometteurs.

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"Théorie et pratique de la représentation"

LA REPRESENTATION ET LA PLANIFICATION EN FRANCE

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## LA REPRESENTATION ET LA PLANIFICATION EN FRANCE

par Georges Lavau

### I. Réflexions sur la représentation

Quiconque aujourd'hui entreprend une réflexion sur la représentation est tributaire des excellentes analyses que le professeur Carl J. Friedrich a consacrées au problème 'Constitutional Government and Democracy notamment les chapitres XII et XX). C'est à partir de ces analyses que je présenterai quelques observations.

Trois points -parfaitement mis en lumière par Carl Friedrich - retiennent particulièrement mon attention :

1) la double nature que revêt, en fait, toute assemblée représentative puisqu'elle est à la fois une représentation d'un ensemble intégré (ou à intégrer) et une collection de porte-parole sectionnels;

2) la crise du mécanisme classique de représentation fondé sur des subdivisions territoriales procède du fait que la conscience de communauté fondée sur le territoire s'est affaiblie, dégradée, désintégrée (et qu'au surplus le "représentant" ne représente plus toujours en fait ce territoire);

3) la représentation s'analyse en une communication entre représentés et représentants, mais aussi dans une relation entre trois termes : la responsabilité du représentant devant les représentés, l'engagement des représentés par le représentant, l'influence exercée par les représentés sur l'action gouvernementale lato sensu.

#### A - Qu'est-ce que représenter ?

C'est parler et agir au nom et pour le compte de qui ne peut le faire directement, soit que ce représenté n'ait pas d'existence physique individualisable, soit qu'il lui soit matériellement et techniquement impossible d'intervenir directement et fréquemment, soit qu'il n'ait pas la capacité d'agir par lui-même. C'est donc en premier lieu

un procédé pratique de substitution de personnes. C'est aussi un procédé pratique pour donner à qui ne peut agir directement un moyen d'exercer une influence sur les actes qui échappent à son intervention.

En pure logique, le mécanisme de la représentation supposerait réunies un certain nombre de conditions :

a) les représentés doivent avoir approuvé leur représentation (Carl Friedrich en fait un élément essentiel de sa définition) l'élection (à la loi de laquelle se plie la minorité dont les candidats n'ont pas été élus) étant le procédé le plus pratique de concrétiser, par convention, cette approbation;

b) les représentants sont supposés avoir les "grâces suffisantes et nécessaires" pour interpréter les volontés et les intérêts de ceux qu'ils représentent et pour agir comme ceux-ci agiraient eux-mêmes selon une logique d'action qui reste à déterminer (logique de leur particularité d'intérêts, logique de la rationalité, logique de l'intérêt national, logique de la révolution sociale); ces "grâces" du représentant lui viennent à la fois de ce qu'il s'identifie quelque peu, par des liens de communauté plus ou moins intenses, avec les représentés, mais aussi de ce qu'il a le savoir et la compétence pour être capable de juger et délibérer;

c) les représentants sont en mesure d'exercer une influence réelle sur l'action gouvernementale au nom et pour le compte des représentés : "influence réelle" s'entend au maximum de la compétence de décider et de faire des choix impératifs, mais elle peut s'entendre de façon moins absolue comme une possibilité d'informer le contenu des décisions prises par des agents de la puissance publique; la possibilité d'exercer un contrôle sur les décisions peut être considérée comme un échelon moyen entre ces deux termes extrêmes;

d) l'intervention des représentants pour le compte des représentés ne se justifie pas seulement - ni surtout principalement - par l'avantage que les responsables de l'action gouvernementale tirent de la consultation et de l'information des représentants; elle se justifie

principalement par un droit (reconnu et régularisé) des représentés à collaborer à l'action gouvernementale.

Comme on le verra par la suite, aucune de ces conditions n'est rigoureusement remplie en ce qui concerne la représentation des groupes économiques et professionnels dans les organes de planification.

B - Représentation de qui, de quoi, par qui ?

Des êtres de raison peuvent être représentés : nation, peuple, common man. Mais, comme on l'a souvent fait remarquer, la représentation de groupes a historiquement précédé la représentation du peuple entier. Cette représentation des groupes peut elle-même être décomposée en diverses modalités : représentation d'intérêts sectoriels (commerce, agriculture, pêche, industrie, etc...), représentation de groupes sociaux (ordres, classes, salariés, patronat, classes moyennes, familles), représentation de terroirs (comtés, bourgs, provinces, communes, circonscriptions administratives).

Si, provisoirement, on écarte une acception rigoureusement juridique du terme "représentation" pour ne retenir que l'acception populaire et extensive de ce terme, si surtout on s'efforce de le percevoir à travers le sentiment qu'ont les gens d'être représentés à certaines occasions et pour certaines actions, on s'aperçoit que la position et le rôle de représentant sont en fait tenus par des personnes et des organes de caractère très différent.

Si l'on prend, par exemple, le cas de la France et qu'on passe en revue les divers groupes et intérêts pouvant être représentés, il est aisé de le vérifier.

Outre leur représentation officielle au Conseil Economique et Social, divers intérêts sectoriels ont bien conscience d'être d'une certaine façon et en certaines occasions représentés par les administrations centrales qui "administrent" ces intérêts. Lors des discussions budgétaires, les intéressés considèrent bien que, face au ministère des Finances et à la Direction du Budget, le ministère (ou une section du ministère) de l'Education nationale, de l'Agriculture, de

la Défense nationale, de la Jeunesse et des Sports, des Transports, etc..., défendent leurs intérêts et les représentent (bien ou mal).

Des groupes sociaux sont en fait représentés non seulement par les élus de toute nature, mais par les partis politiques, et aussi par certains services administratifs (les salariés par l'Inspection du Travail, les familles par les services de la Santé publique et de la Population, par exemple).

Les intérêts locaux et de terroirs sont représentés par les élus nationaux et locaux des circonscriptions, mais encore par certaines associations économiques et professionnelles locales ou régionales, par les comités d'expansion (locaux et régionaux), par les Commissions de développement économique régional (CODER). Si l'on veut aller au fond des choses, ils le sont aussi, d'une certaine façon, par les préfets des départements qui sont cependant au premier chef, par fonction, les représentants du gouvernement central dans leurs circonscriptions. Une récente étude sociologique sur la mise en place des institutions régionales en France en application du décret du 14 mars 1964 illustre parfaitement cette proposition en ce qui concerne le "préfet de région" et les préfets des départements : "Le préfet est en effet le point focal où converge la volonté d'expansion ou le désir de survivre d'un département. Les préfets qui sont réunis au sein de la Conférence Administrative Régionale ne sont pas seulement des hommes, ce sont des symboles... Comment et pourquoi les acteurs sociaux se reconnaissent-ils dans le préfet, chargé d'exprimer une certaine volonté générale ?... Le préfet de région se trouve dès lors investi d'une fonction symbolique : celle de représenter l'intérêt régional" (1).

S'agit-il ici de représentation au sens habituel du terme ? Si l'on considère la façon dont certaines administrations ou fonctionnaires du gouvernement central "représentent" des groupes ou des intérêts, il nous faut bien admettre les ambiguïtés nombreuses de cette "représentation".

a) Ces services et ces fonctionnaires sont d'abord les interlocuteurs ou les adversaires contre lesquels on revendique ou négocie et dont on essaie d'infléchir ou de contrôler l'action. Cela n'empêche cependant pas qu'on les perçoive aussi dans les rôles de porte-parole ou du moins de gestionnaires en charge de la défense d'intérêts sectionnels en face de tout pouvoir et de toute autorité exprimant une volonté de sur-ordination. Préfets et fonctionnaires des administrations centrales sont les lieux de combinaison de deux rôles (2).

b) La représentation se fait sans aucune approbation expresse des représentés. Il n'y a eu aucune investiture et il serait difficile de trouver trace d'une volonté de déléguer à ces fonctionnaires une mission de défense - ou même d'expression - d'intérêts. Tout à l'inverse, les représentés éprouvent à l'égard de ces fonctionnaires (qui sont "de l'autre bord") méfiance et hostilité latentes ou manifestes. En même temps cependant, de façon ambiguë et contradictoire, ces mêmes représentés (et surtout les mieux informés d'entre eux) ont assez claire conscience de la dualité des rôles de ces fonctionnaires; ils évaluent de façon plus ou moins exacte les phases du decision-making process au cours desquelles l'un de ces rôles peut prévaloir sur l'autre; et ils essaient d'en tirer parti.

c) C'est moins en raison d'un sentiment d'appartenance à une même communauté de valeurs, de coutumes ou de comportements que les représentés attendent du fonctionnaire une bonne représentation de leurs intérêts, qu'en raison de la certitude qu'ils ont que ces fonctionnaires ont la connaissance de leurs problèmes et qu'ils sont bien placés dans la machine politico-administrative pour les régler. Une fois de plus cependant, ce serait méconnaître la réalité des conduites que de négliger les liens de solidarité (et parfois de semi-complicité) qui s'établissent entre certaines administrations et leurs publics (3).

d) Dans les processus de représentation que nous analysons ici, les trois termes de la relation "représentés --- représentants" que nous dégagions au début de ce rapport (p.1, par.3) peuvent apparaître comme ténus et presque inexistants. En premier lieu, le fonction-



naire-représentant n'est pas formellement responsable devant ses administrés : ceux-ci ne peuvent rien contre lui; tout au plus, peuvent-ils lui opposer une résistance passive sous forme de refus de coopération et boycott de l'information (résistance qui, en certaines occasions et situations, n'est pas sans gêner certains fonctionnaires, les préfets notamment). En second lieu, les représentés ne prennent aucun engagement de considérer qu'ils se sont dépouillés de la moindre parcelle de leur pouvoir propre d'intervention du fait que le fonctionnaire les a "représentés". Ils entendent garder toute latitude d'opposition et de résistance; inversement, s'ils s'opposent, l'obéissance leur sera imposée et le fonctionnaire-représentant cessera de jouer les protecteurs et les avocats. En dernier lieu, il est difficile d'évaluer l'influence qu'à travers les fonctionnaires-représentants les "représentés" pourront exercer sur l'action gouvernementale : cette influence sera fonction de multiples facteurs sur lesquels les intéressés ont peu de prise. Notons cependant que, dans ce cas comme dans tous les autres cas de représentation, l'influence aura d'autant plus de chances de s'exercer que les intérêts en cause sont compatibles à la fois avec une décision rationnelle et avec quelque intérêt général.

Ces particularités de la "représentation" par les fonctionnaires suffisent-elles à écarter à leur propos toute idée de représentation ? Il ne le semble pas car, à bien y regarder, certaines de ces particularités et ambiguïtés se retrouvent aussi dans le cas classique de la représentation par une assemblée délibérante élue :

- l'élection est certes, par norme constitutionnelle ou légale, une investiture, mais c'est une investiture contestée aussitôt que donnée (non seulement par la minorité battue, mais même par la majorité qui a investi); aux yeux des électeurs, l'élu, par cette face de sa fonction qui en fait un rouage de la machinerie politique "à Paris", est un homme du pouvoir central et donc un adversaire latent; on sait bien que, représentant à la fois de la Nation, de sa circonscription et d'une constellation d'intérêts, il y aura en lui conflit de rôles; sans doute sait-on que, par la ré-élection, on dispose sur lui d'un

pouvoir de contrôle, mais on n'ignore pas non plus que ce contrôle est difficile à mettre en oeuvre et qu'il peut être plus ou moins neutralisé par l'appui que l'élu peut recevoir de son parti.

- L'élu est qualifié pour "représenter" à la fois parce qu'il est généralement un homme de plus grand "savoir" que ses représentés, et parce que ceux-ci reconnaissent en lui des liens d'appartenance commune. Là non plus cependant, il n'y a rien d'absolu qui l'en distingue fondamentalement du fonctionnaire-représentant. A l'égard de certaines questions et de certains choix, les publics (surtout les mieux informés) jugent très insuffisants le savoir et la compétence technique des élus; on soupçonne aisément que son aptitude à comprendre et à évaluer tel problème sera oblitérée par son engagement partisan ou par son intérêt électoral. D'un autre côté, les liens d'appartenance à une même communauté peuvent être distendus et sont loin d'exprimer toujours la particularité dominante des représentés : l'élu est perçu souvent comme un homme qui est d'abord solidaire d'une autre communauté (son parti, la profession politique, une communauté idéologique); dans la meilleure des hypothèses, c'est un homme qui doit constamment arbitrer - pour déterminer son action - entre une conduite d'avocat-tribun d'intérêts de groupe et une conduite d'agent d'autres intérêts collectifs.

### C - Les effets de la représentation

Qu'attendre du mécanisme par lequel une communauté ou un groupe s'en remet à un homme ou à un organe du soin de le représenter ? La gamme des pouvoirs que le représentant peut exercer au nom des représentés s'établit selon une échelle allant d'un maximum à un minimum (chaque degré supérieur n'étant pas exclusif du degré inférieur) :

- a) participer directement à une décision exécutoire impliquant un choix;
- b) exercer un contrôle-veto et une fonction tribunicienne;
- c) participer à un processus complexe d'élaboration de décisions;
- d) être obligatoirement consulté, l'avis recevant au moins publicité;

- e) être associé à l'étude et à la préparation des décisions;
- f) avoir le droit d'informer et d'être informé avant les décisions.

Certes, un régime ne serait que médiocrement démocratique et représentatif s'il n'admettait aucun organe électif à exercer des pouvoirs correspondant aux degrés a) et b) de cette échelle. En revanche - et la suite de ce rapport l'illustrera - cette représentation-là peut se révéler insuffisante et inopérante : il y a des actes de l'action gouvernementale pour lesquels ces degrés a) et b) sont difficiles à organiser; en toute hypothèse, il peut n'être pas inutile qu'ils soient complétés ou précédés par des mécanismes de représentation qui, faisant appel à d'autres organes, assurent une intervention correspondant aux degrés c), d), e) ou f).

Selon la théorie de la représentation qui est proclamée comme norme constitutionnelle et politique, et selon l'étendue des pouvoirs reconnus aux représentants, il est possible d'établir un catalogue des types d'organes représentatifs :

- Assemblée à pouvoir délibérant représentative d'une nation, d'un intérêt général;
- "Congrès d'ambassadeurs d'intérêts" (selon l'expression de Burke);
- Assemblée du type Tribunalat ou du type "banc de la défense";
- Chambre consultative représentative d'intérêts économiques et sociaux;
- Commission du type "Commission royale" chargée d'enquêter, de faire rapport, et en fait de recommander une action;
- Conférence réunissant des "intéressés";
- Club de discussions réuni à l'initiative des autorités qui ont le decision-making power.

Selon la doctrine constitutionnelle que l'on professe, on peut légitimement considérer que l'un ou l'autre de ces types n'assure pas une véritable représentation du peuple. Nous laisserons cette discussion de côté ici. En revanche, il est nécessaire de souligner que, pour l'un ou l'autre de ces types, la réalité et l'efficacité du pouvoir de représentation sont conditionnées par l'étroitesse du

lien entre les représentants et leurs mandants. Pour préciser les choses : des délégués syndicalistes ouvriers au N.E.D.C. ou aux Economic Development Committees, s'ils sont désignés par le General Council du T.U.C., ont plus de chances d'assurer une authentique représentation de la masse syndicale que des délégués de plusieurs confédérations syndicales françaises, non formellement mandatés par leurs confédérations, participant aux travaux des commissions du Commissariat Général du Plan. Cette différence de situation retentit plus ou moins sur la mesure dans laquelle les représentés se sentent engagés par les actes de leurs mandataires.

## II. La planification et les insuffisances de la représentation parlementaire

Tant d'analyses excellentes ont été consacrées à la nature juridique des plans français qu'il n'est pas nécessaire de reprendre ici le détail de ces analyses. On se bornera à rappeler succinctement quelques points essentiels.

Formellement, le Plan n'est qu'un rapport administratif annexé soit à un décret (1er et 3e plans), soit à une loi (2e, 4e et 5e plans), qui en sont les actes de ratification. Décret ou loi de ratification ne change pas la nature du plan qui reste un simple rapport. En toute rigueur, il n'a pas de force exécutoire et ne limite en rien le pouvoir discrétionnaire d'aucun de ses "exécutants", et pas même celui du Gouvernement et de l'Administration : les nécessités de la politique conjoncturelle peuvent à tout moment prévaloir contre les programmes du plan. Formellement encore, le Commissariat Général au Plan n'est rien d'autre qu'un bureau d'études du Gouvernement.

Quant aux effets du plan sur les décisions et les conduites des acteurs économiques, on ne peut en donner meilleure idée qu'en citant ici ce qu'en disait récemment un haut fonctionnaire du ministère des Finances dans un cours professé à l'Institut d'Etudes politiques de Paris :

"... il s'agit beaucoup moins d'impératifs que d'une sorte de compréhension réciproque des objectifs du Plan, permettant aux

industriels d'établir leurs propres programmes de production. Sans nul doute, il est des moyens d'action propres à la planification; par exemple, dans des opérations d'émission sur le marché des valeurs de quelque importance, le ministère des Finances demandera l'avis du Plan pour savoir si l'objet de l'émission, de l'investissement considéré, est bien conforme à la planification en général. Sans nul doute, il sera plus facile d'obtenir telle ou telle facilité, dans le domaine des crédits à moyen terme par exemple, si l'opération est préconisée par le Plan. Mais les moyens planificateurs sont extrêmement faibles en France...; il s'agit beaucoup plus d'une sorte "d'auto-intoxication"... , c'est-à-dire de tendance à répandre les objectifs du Plan dans toutes les branches... en ce sens que, dans presque toutes les branches de l'économie, on peut dire que les industriels responsables s'en sont inspirés, et souvent prennent leurs décisions en fonction de ses objectifs" (4).

Il faut s'arrêter ici un instant pour mesurer à quel point cette nature du Plan est étrangère à la nature des actes sur lesquels porte habituellement la délibération des assemblées parlementaires représentatives. Celles-ci, habituellement, élaborent des propositions ou amendent des projets qui, après le vote et la promulgation, ont valeur obligatoire et constituent de vraies décisions auxquelles il suffira, le plus souvent, de règlements d'application pour qu'elles reçoivent exécution. Telle est, avec le contrôle de l'action gouvernementale, la destination normale de la représentation parlementaire. Or la nature du Plan ne permet pas tout à fait au Parlement, même s'il est appelé à le voter et à le discuter, d'exercer à son égard un pouvoir aussi étendu qu'à l'égard d'une proposition ou d'un projet de loi.

Là n'est pas toutefois la raison principale dans laquelle réside l'inadaptation de la représentation parlementaire au mécanisme d'adoption du Plan. De nos jours, bien des parlements sont appelés à voter des textes dont la portée exécutoire est incertaine et constituent plutôt un cadre général indiquant, à la sollicitation du gouvernement, une orientation qui laisse aux autorités responsables une certaine latitude d'action quant aux moyens.

La véritable difficulté réside dans le contenu technique du plan et dans la nature des opérations par lesquelles il s'élabore.

La planification - telle qu'elle est conçue en France (et aussi dans une large mesure en Grande-Bretagne) - est une longue suite d'opérations dont les premières se situent indiscutablement et inévitablement dans les services et bureaux du Gouvernement et du Commissariat au Plan. Sur la base de directives gouvernementales très générales, l'I.N.S.E.E., la Direction de la Prévision au ministère des Finances et les services du Commissariat au Plan, procédant par approches successives, élaborent une série d'esquisses (E zéro, E1, E2) et dressent quelques schémas de variantes; dans le même temps sont incorporés à ces travaux les résultats des comptes économiques dégagés en cours d'année par la Commission des Comptes de la Nation, de même que sont aussi prises en considération certaines projections et prévisions sur le long terme (par exemple, pour la préparation du 5<sup>e</sup> Plan, les projections établies par le "groupe 1985"). Ces documents, ébauches, esquisses, présentent un degré de technicité inégal, comportent un degré de précision tout aussi inégal. Tout est à compléter par des informations supplémentaires (programmes des entreprises, programmes des administrations, situation de l'emploi, besoins en équipements, etc...). Il s'agit donc de recueillir des informations.

Mais il s'agit aussi de recueillir des avis car tout ce qui est ainsi esquissé doit être testé auprès de ceux que l'on peut considérer comme les principaux acteurs économiques intéressés par le contenu du futur Plan : ceux dont les décisions, stratégies et programmes d'action seront conditionnés par les prévisions et programmes du Plan. Il s'agit ici à la fois de les consulter pour recueillir leurs avis, pour les amener à coopérer à la collecte d'informations, mais aussi de les informer. Le but final n'est pas tant d'obtenir des "représentants" consultés qu'ils répondent des actes et des conduites de leurs "mandataires" (5). Le but final est bien plutôt d'essayer de persuader les "intéressés-associés-consultés" de la rationalité approchée des prévisions et des objectifs du Plan; si cette conviction est acquise, ou si du moins le processus d'élaboration a réussi à rendre moins suspectes les données et les bases des prévisions, on parie sur une disponibilité

plus grande des acteurs économiques et sociaux à l'égard des objectifs du Plan.

C'est eu égard à ce genre d'opérations que la nature et l'étendue des pouvoirs normaux d'un Parlement apparaissent trop fortes, disproportionnées, inadaptées.

Personne ne conteste (pas même les parlementaires) qu'au stade des directives et des esquisses préliminaires aux consultations, il s'agit exclusivement d'une responsabilité gouvernementale et administrative. Au stade ultérieur de la collecte d'informations (et compte tenu du genre d'informations souhaitées), c'est la qualification technique des parlementaires qui apparaît insuffisante. Ce ne sont pas non plus les députés et sénateurs qui sont les mieux placés pour recueillir sur les fonctionnaires, chefs d'entreprises, cadres syndicaux, salariés et agriculteurs, les informations recueillies à travers les travaux du Plan : des délégués désignés par ces divers intéressés sont mieux placés pour cela. Enfin, il n'est pas sans intérêt de recueillir l'avis des élus sur les prévisions et les objectifs du Plan : mais, d'abord, cet avis ne saurait être tenu pour suffisant et ne dispense pas de recueillir aussi celui, plus qualifié techniquement et peut-être moins mêlé de considérations politiques, des acteurs économiques et sociaux; ensuite, l'avis donné par les parlementaires ne remplirait pas son but de favoriser une attitude de compréhension et de disponibilité à l'égard du Plan de la part des intéressés et de leurs publics (6).

Les parlementaires apparaissent ici victimes de la nature des parlements et de toute la théorie classique du régime démocratique représentatif (surtout dans la variété que cette théorie a reçue en France).

Organe de la souveraineté nationale, le Parlement ne peut pas être limité à un simple avis : il doit arrêter des choix. Or le Plan, dans sa préparation, se nourrit d'avis; arrêter des choix ne peut se faire qu'à posteriori. Avant le 4<sup>e</sup> Plan, lorsque le rapport

du Commissariat approuvé par le Gouvernement était soumis, élaboré dans ses moindres détails et sans variantes, au vote du Parlement (et après que le Conseil Economique et Social eut déjà donné un avis technique), la "décision" à prendre par le Parlement était dans une large mesure dépourvue de portée pratique.

Politiquement, le choix du Parlement n'était plus entier en face d'un document très technique, très complexe, à l'élaboration duquel avaient été associés maintes commissions et groupes de travail : comment remettre en cause, dans un délai très bref et sans moyens d'études critiques appropriés, les choix contenus dans le Plan ? Et pour le faire, sur quelle représentativité s'appuyer dont on pût prétendre qu'elle était plus "légitime" que celle des commissions de modernisation et d'équipement ou du Conseil Economique et Social ? Techniquement, le choix du Parlement n'était pas plus ouvert : la possibilité d'amendements apportés soit au Plan lui-même, soit au projet de loi qui en porte ratification, se heurte à des difficultés juridiques et pratiques; seuls semblent pouvoir être admis les amendements qui modifieraient le contenu du Plan sans en affecter l'équilibre (et, même en ce cas, resterait à s'interroger sur la portée pratique de ces amendements puisque le Plan n'a par lui-même aucune portée contraignante pour le Gouvernement) (7).

Placé en face de telles difficultés (et, de surcroît, consulté trop tardivement jusqu'au 5e Plan), le Parlement français a parfois jugé, non sans raison, qu'il était plus conforme à la nature de ses tâches de saisir l'occasion du vote sur le Plan pour formuler des recommandations et des exigences générales relatives au Plan suivant (recommandations qui s'apparentent alors aux directives que le Gouvernement adressera à cet effet au Commissariat au Plan). C'est pourquoi la procédure adoptée en 1962 (et réellement appliquée pour le 5e Plan) constitue un progrès certain qui rend une certaine portée à l'intervention du Parlement. Ayant d'abord à se prononcer sur des options générales (présentées avec quelques variantes), le Parlement se trouve devant un choix qui est, politiquement et techniquement, plus ouvert; les amendements relatifs à ces grandes orientations se heurtent à moins d'objections. Le



progrès cependant ne lève pas toutes les difficultés et celles-ci réapparaissent - à peine moins grandes que par le passé - lors du deuxième vote du Parlement sur le Plan élaboré (8).

Des raisons d'ordre plus spécifiquement politique enfin expliquent que le Parlement français soit dans une situation embarrassée pour s'associer utilement à la préparation des plans.

C'est d'abord le fait que la majorité du milieu parlementaire est très pénétré de ce que François Bourricaud a justement appelé la "tradition whig" de la représentation parlementaire, tradition selon laquelle le contrôle à exercer par les assemblées doit consister avant tout, sous peine d'être privé d'efficacité, <sup>en</sup> un pouvoir de veto (9). Or, comme on l'a vu plus haut, non seulement dire "non" au Plan ou à certaines de ses parties est politiquement et techniquement difficile, mais encore il est d'une portée un peu mince de dire "non" à un Plan qui n'a pas par lui-même le caractère d'une décision et reste un simple ensemble de programmes dont le caractère impératif est très variable. Certes, en novembre 1965 le Sénat a-t-il repoussé le 5e Plan, mais ce n'était peut-être qu'un "geste politique" car les sénateurs n'ignoraient pas qu'en toute hypothèse la volonté de la majorité à l'Assemblée Nationale pourrait l'emporter sur la sienne.

D'autre part, le Parlement dans son ensemble, et chaque parlementaire individuellement, représentent la Nation et, à ce titre, ont le devoir d'appréhender les problèmes dans leur ensemble : d'un autre côté, élus d'une circonscription déterminée, les parlementaires étant aussi, comme l'a dit sans ambages un parlementaire français "porte-parole des aspirations d'une collectivité déterminée, ils se doivent d'en assurer la transmission à l'échelon du pouvoir central" (10).

Or à ce double titre - représentants de la Nation et représentants d'un territoire -, les parlementaires ne sont pas remplacés dans ces rôles par les délégués qui siègent soit au Conseil Economique et Social soit aux commissions de modernisation et d'équipement. Dans ces organismes en effet personne n'est désigné au titre de

"représentant" d'une collectivité territoriale; et cela même à la Commission Nationale d'Aménagement du Territoire qui est cependant chargée de préparer les projections régionales du Plan. Cette situation explique qu'à chaque débat des assemblées parlementaires sur le Plan la tentation soit forte pour les parlementaires de saisir l'occasion de ce débat pour se faire les avocats des localités et des régions en face des prévisions et des objectifs du Plan. Mais ils sont aussi obligés de se retenir sur cette pente, à la fois parce que les conditions du débat (d'ailleurs assez bref) ne le permettent guère et parce qu'ils doivent respecter leur rôle de représentants de la Nation dans son ensemble et de représentants de leur parti qui doit, plus ou moins, prendre en considération des cohérences d'ensemble.

La représentation des intérêts régionaux trouve d'ailleurs depuis 1964 son cadre institutionnel d'expression dans les commissions de développement économique régional (CODER); or celles-ci comprennent un quart au moins d'élus locaux parmi leurs membres; un parlementaire, à condition qu'il dispose aussi d'un mandat de maire ou de conseiller général, peut donc être appelé à faire partie d'une CODER, mais ce sera alors comme représentant d'une collectivité locale (présupposé en bien connaître les problèmes économiques et sociaux).

La nature des opérations de préparation des plans met en lumière certaines des impasses auxquelles une conception "forte" du "pouvoir souverain de décision" et du "contrôle" a conduit les Parlements : le Parlement se trouve paradoxalement désarmé avec ses pouvoirs trop forts. C'est pourquoi les parlementaires français ont bien compris que, pour exercer une influence adaptée à la nature des opérations de planification, ils auraient avantage - sans pour autant renoncer aux pouvoirs qu'ils détiennent actuellement - à être associés aux travaux de préparation du Plan dans les mêmes conditions que les délégués divers qui siègent dans les Commissions de modernisation et d'équipement et au Conseil supérieur du Plan. Cette revendication a souvent été présentée, mais jusqu'ici les gouvernements de la Ve République y ont opposé une

fin de non-recevoir, promettant seulement de tenir le Parle-  
ment/<sup>informé</sup>de la progression des travaux de ces organismes consultatifs (11).

C'est la dernière remarque à faire à ce sujet. Sans doute y a-t-il bien des raisons objectives pour lesquelles la représentation parlementaire est inadaptée à la procédure de préparation et de discussion des Plans et pour lesquelles d'autres formes de représentation complémentaires doivent être assurées. Il faut cependant ajouter aussi que, sous la Ve République beaucoup plus encore que sous la IV<sup>e</sup>, le gouvernement se montre très réticent pour élargir les prérogatives du Parlement ou pour faciliter sa tâche (12). C'est ainsi qu'il a, de propos délibéré, exclu les parlementaires des départements (en qualité de membres des assemblées centrales) de la composition des CODER; si, en fait nombre d'entre eux y siègent, c'est grâce au cumul des mandats nationaux et locaux et au fort enracinement local de certains parlementaires. C'est ainsi encore que, par un décret du 9 novembre 1960, la Commission des Comptes de la Nation, présidée jusqu'en 1958 par M. Mendès-France et comptant un grand nombre de parlementaires, a été très largement dé-parlementarisée : présidée désormais par le ministre des Finances, elle comporte deux sortes de sessions et se réunit sans présence de parlementaires au cours de ses "sessions normales" (13); ce n'est que dans sa session d'automne, lorsqu'elle est invitée à donner un avis sur le projet (élaboré lors de la session normale) de compte économique pour l'année, que la Commission s'adjoint les présidents et les rapporteurs généraux des commissions des Finances de l'Assemblée Nationale et du Sénat.

### III. L'association des groupes à l'élaboration des Plans

Avertissement : Après les excellents ouvrages de P. Bauchet ( La Planification française ) et de J. et A.-M. Hackett ( Economic Planning in France ), il serait sans intérêt de décrire ici la composition des commissions et des groupes de travail du Plan, et d'en exposer le fonctionnement. Nous n'analyserons pas davantage le problème de la représentation des groupes au Conseil Economique et Social, question qui n'entre pas exactement dans notre sujet. Nous nous

bornerons donc à un essai d'évaluation sur le genre de "représentation" organisée dans les organes consultatifs qui sont associés à la préparation du Plan.

Selon des évaluations très approximatives - et qui n'ont qu'une signification très relative - environ 3.500 personnes ont "participé" à l'élaboration du 5e Plan (sans compter les parlementaires et les membres du Conseil Economique et Social). Cette participation s'est faite à travers les commissions de modernisation et d'équipement (C.M.E.) et les groupes de travail du Plan, à travers les CODER et les groupes de travail de la région. Mais ce chiffre qui donne l'impression d'un foisonnement est très trompeur et ne révèle à peu près rien sur la nature de la représentation qui s'institue dans ces organismes.

La désignation, la composition et le fonctionnement des CODER sont sans doute plus formalisés que ceux des C.M.E., mais, dans les deux cas, un grand flou subsiste.

#### 1) Désignation et composition

Les membres des C.M.E. sont toujours désignés par arrêtés du Premier ministre. Officiellement, ces membres sont, ainsi que le précise le Commissaire général au Plan, "des personnalités choisies en raison de leur compétence et de leur autorité mais non ès-qualités" (14). Cette précision semble donc exclure de la façon la plus formelle toute idée de représentation par ces personnalités de groupes sectoriels ou de groupes sociaux. Il n'en est pas moins vrai aussi que, dans la pratique, la nomination juridique des membres des C.M.E. est toujours précédée, lorsqu'il s'agit de responsables d'organisations syndicales (et même, semble-t-il, dans le cas de chefs d'entreprise) d'une consultation formelle (bien qu'officieuse) des directions qualifiées de ces organisations syndicales et que les propositions faites par celles-ci ne semblent pas discutées par les autorités qui ont le pouvoir de nomination.

La situation n'est guère différente en ce qui concerne les CODER. Exception faite de deux membres de droit et des représentants des collectivités locales désignés par les conseils généraux, tous les membres en sont désignés par arrêté du Premier ministre et, quelle que

soit la catégorie au titre de laquelle ils siègent, c'est officiellement à leur compétence et à leur autorité et non à leur représentativité qu'ils doivent d'être désignés. En fait, ici comme pour les C.M.E., les "représentants" des activités économiques et sociales sont proposés au préfet de région par les organisations syndicales, économiques et professionnelles.

Au niveau de la région, une séparation organique relativement nette a été établie entre les organes qui expriment des intérêts de groupes (CODER) et les organes consultatifs qui ne sont composés que de fonctionnaires (Commission administrative régionale). Au niveau national, il n'en est rien : au Conseil supérieur du Plan comme dans les C.M.E. siègent des fonctionnaires en proportion importante (environ 20 % pour la préparation du 5<sup>e</sup> Plan). Cette particularité empêche d'attribuer aux C.M.E. dans leur ensemble la qualité d'organe représentatif de groupes.

Commissions de modernisation et CODER ne constituent qu'une faible partie du "personnel" qui participe aux travaux d'élaboration du Plan : il faut y ajouter les groupes de travail, dont les réunions sont beaucoup plus fréquentes (et plus laborieuses) que celles des commissions. Or une latitude considérable est laissée au Commissariat au Plan (et au préfet de région pour ce qui est des groupes de travail de la région), aux présidents et rapporteurs des C.M.E., ainsi qu'aux organisations syndicales, pour appeler à participer (et non à "siéger") à ces groupes de travail toute personne dont la coopération paraît utile. Si l'on ajoute que les membres nommés des C.M.E. ont reçu la possibilité de se faire assister d'experts et que le "personnel" d'un groupe de travail inclut aussi en fait les fonctionnaires et personnalités dont l'audition paraît utile au groupe, on constate qu'on est en face d'une plasticité et d'une in-formalité considérables. Il faudrait bouleverser beaucoup de notions pour voir là un système représentatif.

Les pondérations effectuées entre les différentes catégories de groupes appelés à proposer des membres des C.M.E. et des CODER, pondérations qui ne reposent qu'exceptionnellement sur le principe paritaire, et qui ont d'ailleurs varié, achèvent d'accentuer ce caractère plastique et informel.

Commissions de modernisation et d'équipement

<u>Catégories</u>	<u>1er Plan</u>	<u>2e Plan</u>	<u>3e Plan</u>	<u>4e Plan</u>
Syndicats de salariés....	77	34	52	114
Agriculteurs.....	19	21	22	20
Chefs d'entreprise.....	108	137	119	211
Fonctionnaires.....	118	184	201	202
Divers.....	113	133	170	254
Syndicats professionnels.	59	95	140	248
	<u>494</u>	<u>604</u>	<u>704</u>	<u>1055</u>

Les organisations syndicales de salariés ont périodiquement souligné l'infériorité de représentation dont elles étaient victimes (15). Si l'on compare la situation des organes consultatifs français à ceux qui ont été mis en place en Grande-Bretagne, il est aisé de constater qu'on s'est efforcé dans ce dernier cas d'assurer un caractère représentatif à ces organismes.

Le National Economic Development Council (N.E.D.C.) était, avant la réforme d'octobre 1964, une sorte d'organe souverain (bien que sans pouvoir de décision exécutoire) dont le bureau de planification (N.E.D.O.) n'était que le bureau technique : position rigoureusement inverse de celle qui existe entre le Conseil Supérieur du Plan et le Commissariat général. Même si le N.E.D.C. n'est plus aujourd'hui qu'un forum, il a conservé sa composition fondamentalement paritaire (6 représentants des employeurs, 6 représentants des syndicats de salariés) qui en fait un organisme de "tête-à-tête" entre les deux grandes forces de la vie économique. Il semble même que ce principe paritaire est en fait plus ou moins appliqué aussi au sein des Economic Development Committees, qui s'apparentent plus ou moins à nos C.M.E.

2) Disponibilité et aptitude à la représentation

En admettant provisoirement que les membres des C.M.E. et des CODER aient en fait une position de "représentants", il reste à s'interroger sur leur volonté de se conduire en représentants et sur leur aptitude à assumer ce rôle. Or cette volonté et cette aptitude dépendent de plusieurs facteurs parmi lesquels :

- la clarté et l'étendue de l'investiture donnée par les "représentés;
- moyens et informations suffisants pour pouvoir délibérer en connaissance de cause et oser engager les mandants;
- être placé dans une situation telle que l'on sache avec une relative clarté ce que l'on attend de vous, quel est l'enjeu de la délibération, et surtout avoir un "moyen d'échange" avec le consultant afin d'influencer son comportement.

De ces trois points de vue, les situations des divers représentés sont assez variables.

a) Aux C.M.E., plus encore qu'aux CODER, les divers représentants syndicaux ne sont pas formellement des délégués de leurs organisations. Ils sont perçus par leurs organisations à la fois comme des "observateurs" et comme des "porte-parole" qui peuvent se réclamer de l'organisation s'il s'agit de s'informer, d'affirmer une "position", mais qui doivent se montrer beaucoup plus circonspects s'il s'agit de s'engager et même d'avaliser des analyses et des prévisions. Les responsables confédéraux de la C.F.D.T. se sont exprimés sur ce point avec beaucoup de franchise en diverses occasions. Même s'ils affirment leur volonté d'"être les mandataires des intérêts des travailleurs à l'intérieur des organismes du Plan" (Lettre du secrétaire général de la C.F.D.T. à M. Pierre Massé, 20 février 1964), les motivations de la présence dans ces organismes sont plus complexes en réalité : c'est essentiellement le souci de recueillir une précieuse information économique et le sentiment qu'il n'est pas possible d'être absent de confrontations et de concertations où s'esquissent des programmes de première importance (16).

Elargissant leur appréciation à l'ensemble des différentes catégories d'acteurs qui siègent dans les C.M.E., MM. Bernard Gournay

et Pierre Viot énumèrent ainsi les composantes qui expliquent les comportements de ces représentants de groupes (17) :

- 1° passivité, prudence : on vient en observateur, pour savoir ce qui se passe, éviter qu'une décision ne se prépare contre vous;
- 2° scepticisme ("il est impossible de prévoir...");
- 3° désir d'utiliser le plan pour faire triompher des revendications : le plan considéré comme une tribune nouvelle;
- 4° intérêt sincère pris pour un travail de prévision jugé intéressant en soi, enrichissant et utile;
- 5° volonté authentique de participation à une oeuvre collective;
- 6° satisfaction d'amour-propre et de prestige;
- 7° crainte de trop s'engager, de perdre sa zone d'autonomie : elle est manifeste pour les syndicalistes ouvriers mais des réactions comparables apparaissent parfois parmi les représentants du patronat (crainte de donner des armes à l'Etat, aux concurrents et aux syndicats ouvriers), et aussi pour les administrations et entreprises publiques jalouses de leur indépendance.

Les membres des organisations syndicales ouvrières éprouvent une difficulté à se percevoir vraiment comme "représentants" des groupes dont ils se veulent les mandataires : "Lorsque le militant syndicaliste exerce sa responsabilité dans une commission d'élaboration du Plan, il n'a plus le sentiment qu'il est porté par les éléments de la base au niveau où se situe l'expression de cette revendication" (18).

Les difficultés - pour les salariés comme pour les autres catégories - s'accroissent avec la programmation en valeur, nouvelle dimension de la planification qui porte en germe une politique des revenus. A ce moment se pose avec beaucoup plus de brutalité la question de savoir si les représentants des groupes dans les organismes du Plan ont réellement reçu un mandat formel de leurs organisations syndicales ou professionnelles, quelles sont la représentativité et l'autorité réelles de ces organisations, si elles ont elles-mêmes qualité pour "engager" leurs ressortissants. Le problème s'est posé - et n'est pas vraiment réglé - même en Grande-Bretagne où cependant les membres de "Neddy" et les "little neddies" sont désignés par le General Council du T.U.C. et par les organes directeurs de la Federation of British Industries.



b) Les membres des C.M.E., des groupes de travail et des CODER ont-ils les moyens suffisants pour "représenter" valablement ? Sur le plan de l'information économique, la situation est très inégale suivant les groupes considérés et elle est généralement médiocre pour les CODER. En toute hypothèse, les représentants des groupes (exception faite sans doute de quelques chefs d'entreprise) ont le sentiment d'être placés à cet égard en situation d'infériorité à l'égard des très nombreux fonctionnaires et experts qui siègent dans les organismes du Plan et qui y jouent souvent un rôle prépondérant (avec l'accord, au moins tacite, des autres participants).

c) Les représentants des groupes - et surtout ceux des organisations de salariés - participeraient peut-être mieux s'ils savaient très clairement ce qu'ils font dans les organismes du Plan. Il ne suffit pas de répéter que le Plan est élaboré à la suite de "dialogues", de "concertations", d'avis. Il est trop clair que la part des éléments gouvernementaux et administratifs dans l'élaboration des plans (et de leurs tranches régionales) est une part écrasante. La réalité de toute la procédure d'élaboration est qu'elle est au premier chef une procédure administrative qui a été progressivement assouplie et enrichie par un réseau de consultations et d'informations qui permettent d'associer à la préparation du Plan par les fonctionnaires un nombre croissant d'intéressés (et non de véritables représentants). C'est sans doute une "procédure ouverte" (19) mais la présence dans les organismes du Plan d'"intéressés" et de "compétents" a une destination qui n'est pas la représentation de groupes; la vraie finalité de leur présence est :

- de réduire, grâce à cette présence, les erreurs techniques et psychologiques;
- de tenir compte des aspirations des groupes, comme aussi de pénétrer ces aspirations d'un peu de rationalité.

Il est vrai que les CODER, plus "représentatives" que les C.M.E., comptant en leur sein une proportion d'élus politiques qui se situe en moyenne à plus de 38 % de leurs effectifs, se montrent actuel-

lement peu disposées à accepter ce rôle de "collaboration" au profit des autorités administratives. Certaines d'entre elles, réunies en juillet 1966 pour donner un avis sur les tranches régionales, ont spontanément adopté l'attitude protestataire du Parlement, et réclament de véritables pouvoirs délibératifs (droit d'amendement réel, délais de discussion accrus, choix entre des variantes élaborées). Faute d'obtenir ces pouvoirs, les plus agressives d'entre elles en viennent, comme l'avait fait naguère le Parlement, à juger plus utile de peser sur les décisions de l'administration par des initiatives prises en amont des opérations de préparation du Plan : elles veulent délibérer sur les grandes orientations de la prochaine tranche régionale. Il est significatif qu'une "parlementarisation" même minime (ou une dé-fonctionnarisation) des CODER ait pour conséquence un comportement de type parlementaire.

Cette observation conduit à une des dernières raisons pour lesquelles la "représentation" ne paraît pas totalement réalisée dans les organismes du Plan. Pour "représenter", le représentant doit disposer d'un certain pouvoir sur l'autorité auprès de laquelle il représente. On ne représente pas seulement pour faire de la figuration et donner une caution; on représente pour négocier avec l'autorité devant laquelle est organisée cette représentation. C'est dire que c'est la disposition d'un moyen d'échange qui campe vraiment un représentant. Cela ne signifie pas qu'il n'y a pas de représentation sans pouvoir de veto; cela signifie seulement que le représentant doit pouvoir dire : "si je suis convaincu, si nous parvenons à une entente, j'aurai les moyens de modifier les conduites de mes représentés conformément à vos préférences. Si notre accord ne se fait pas, le groupe que je représente ne changera rien à ses conduites".

Or, de ce point de vue, la situation est très inégale entre les groupes patronaux et les groupes salariés dans la préparation du Plan. Les chefs d'entreprise ont un réel pouvoir de décision économique, les salariés n'en ont pratiquement pas. Les chefs d'entreprise s'expriment au nom d'intérêts particuliers en face du Commissariat

général qui s'exprime au nom de l'intérêt général. Ce dernier sera amené à déterminer la marge de négociation qui est possible avec les seuls détenteurs d'un pouvoir de décision qui peuvent "résister", puis il tentera de réduire cette marge à son profit par une allocation d'incitations qui ne devront pas cependant mettre en péril la cohérence générale du Plan. Dans ce jeu se précise alors la portée réelle de la représentation des chefs d'entreprise. En revanche, si aucun jeu ne s'institue entre le Commissariat général et les porte-parole des autres groupes du fait que ceux-ci n'ont pas de moyen d'échange contre les exigences de l'intérêt général que leur présente le Commissariat, leur "représentation" est faible (20).

Cette représentation des groupes, inégale et ambiguë, ne peut être que complémentaire de la représentation parlementaire; mais celle-ci ne peut plus ne pas être complétée.

NOTES

- 1) Pierre Grémion, La mise en place des institutions régionales, déc. 1965.
- 2) Ici encore, l'étude précipitée illustre ce propos : "... c'est dans les contacts sociaux que réside le vrai sens du métier préfectoral. Or, à ce niveau, le préfet intervient toujours comme un président dont la tâche première est d'éviter tout conflit, d'incarner en quelque sorte aux yeux de ses partenaires le souci de l'intérêt collectif... Le préfet se sent comptable de la prospérité de son département... Ainsi un des rôles non négligeable du préfet est-il d'exhorter les responsables... et de les exciter au bien" (pp.30-31).
- 3) C'est pourquoi les publics se sentent plus rassurés lorsque les services sont gérés par les fonctionnaires des cadres classiques de ces administrations.
- 4) André de Lattre, Politique économique de la France depuis 1945 (cours I.E.P. 1963-1964, fascicule I, p. 60).
- 5) Ou du moins il n'était pas jusqu'à ce que le Plan complète sa traditionnelle programmation en volume par une esquisse de programmation en valeur qui sera le soubassement d'une politique des revenus.
- 6) On pourra objecter, il est vrai, que, la consultation des assemblées politiques étant précédée par une consultation du Conseil Economique et Social, il serait inutile de soumettre les esquisses du Plan à des commissions de modernisation et d'équipement dont le caractère formellement représentatif des intérêts est beaucoup moins pur (et qui comportent un nombre élevé de fonctionnaires). Cette question sera abordée en III<sup>e</sup> partie.
- 7) Cette question a été excellemment traitée dans l'étude de Pierre DELVOLLE, Le Plan et la procédure parlementaire (P.U.F., 1964, pp. 42, 79-85).
- 8) Il convient cependant de nuancer : contrairement à ce qui a été parfois prétendu, les débats qui se sont déroulés à l'Assemblée Nationale à l'occasion du 5e Plan ont été dans l'ensemble de très bonne tenue et les groupes parlementaires ont fait un réel effort pour que les interventions des députés ne portent pas sur des problèmes locaux ou des critiques de détail. La revue France-Forum (n° 61, janv.1965) a publié un excellent débat à ce sujet entre un fonctionnaire du Commissariat au Plan et trois parlementaires, MM. Duhamel, Fontanet et Vallon ("Le parlement et l'élaboration du Plan").

- 9) "La différenciation du pouvoir et les problèmes de la représentation", Analyse et Prévision, n° 4, avril 1966, pp. 269-284. J'en cite ce passage : "Ce 'non' préalable à toute discussion, on l'adresse, comme on dit, 'au pouvoir', que l'on suppose transcendant et séparé, et la meilleure façon de le faire reculer, on affirme que c'est de lui 'barrer la route'. Il faut encore marquer ici, avec Tocqueville, que cette conception pour ainsi dire tribunicienne de la représentation, qui la réduit à un pouvoir de veto, est étrangère à la tradition anglaise comme à la tradition américaine... La première condition pour que le système de représentation fonctionne, c'est que les représentants soient mêlés aux affaires..." (p. 281).
- 10) Christian Bonnet, Assemblée Nationale, 2ème séance du 21 juin 1962, 1892.
- 11) V. Delvolvé, op.cit., pp. 43-45.
- 12) Il semble que c'est sur l'insistance du Commissariat au Plan, et aussi à la demande formelle du Conseil Economique et Social, sur le rapport de M. Halff, qu'a été faite la réforme de 1962 augmentant les prérogatives du Parlement pour discuter et ratifier le Plan.
- 13) Elle comprend alors le gouverneur de la Banque de France, les principaux directeurs de ministères économiques, huit membres du C.E.S., huit personnalités.
- 14) Lettre de M. Pierre Massé au secrétaire général de la C.F.D.T., 21 janvier 1964 (reproduite dans Formation, "Le Vème Plan" n° 65-66, annexes, p. 19). Il est vrai que l'auteur de la lettre ajoute : "Je tiens cependant, selon votre désir et selon notre pratique constante, à vous demander de bien vouloir me proposer vous-même les membres de votre organisation que vous souhaiteriez voir nommés dans les différentes commissions..."
- 15) Voir notamment Pierre Le Brun, Questions actuelles du syndicalisme, pp. 44-53 (éd. du Seuil, 1965).
- 16) René Bonety, responsable du secteur économique de la C.F.D.T., s'exprimait ainsi au colloque de Grenoble en mai 1963 : "La volonté première, ... c'est d'être présent là où il semble que l'intérêt de nos mandants fait qu'il est nécessaire d'exprimer leur point de vue... Le second aspect... recueillir des informations... Le fait pour les syndicalistes de chercher à accéder à ces informations économiques élargit bien sûr leurs responsabilités, mais

élargit aussi leurs dimensions..." (Voir "La Planification comme processus de décision", Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, n° 140, 1965, p. 87).

- 17) Colloque de Grenoble, "Les Planificateurs et les décisions du Plan" ibid., p. 72.
- 18) René Bonety, loc.cit., p. 88.
- 19) Gournay et Viot, loc.cit., p. 81.
- 20) Voir la communication de Gérard de Bernis au colloque de Grenoble, op.cit., p. 201-206.

RESUME

1. Les conditions théoriques de la représentation classique sont très rarement réunies et elles se prêtent peu aux divers procédés de représentation des groupes et des intérêts sectionnels. En revanche, si l'on observe la réalité des comportements et la perception des rôles de représentation, on constate que la notion classique de représentation subit une crise.
2. Les méthodes françaises d'élaboration du Plan, comme son contenu technique et sa nature, rendent très difficile l'intervention du Parlement dans l'élaboration, l'examen et le vote du Plan. La conception "forte" de la représentation parlementaire qui imprègne les assemblées politiques françaises s'adapte mal à la procédure d'élaboration du Plan. La représentation parlementaire doit donc être complétée.
3. Elle est complétée par des procédés très peu formalisés grâce auxquels un grand nombre de personnes "intéressées", "autorisées" et "compétentes" - dont la représentativité est variable - sont associées à l'élaboration du Plan. Celle-ci cependant reste la responsabilité fondamentale des représentants des administrations.

SUMMARY

1.           The theoretical conditions of classic representation are met very seldom, and they are ill-adapted to the various procedures of group and sectional representation. On the other hand, the observation of actual behavior and of representative roles as they are perceived shows that the classic notion of representation is undergoing a crisis.
  
2.           The French methods of planning, as well as the technical content and the nature of the plan, make it very difficult for Parliament to intervene in the making, the examination and the adoption of the plan. The "strong" notion of parliamentary representation which impregnates the French political assemblies is ill-adapted to the plan-making process. Parliamentary representation must therefore be supplemented.
  
3.           It is supplemented by very informal procedures according to which a large number of individuals - "concerned", "authorized" and "competent", with variable degrees of representativeness - are associated in the making of the plan. The main responsibility continues to lie, however, with the representatives of government agencies.



Br/Representation/13

"Theory and practice of representation"

CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS, PUBLIC OPINION,  
AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

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Like charity, representation covers a multitude of sins--and institutions and concepts. There is no a priori reason to restrict the notion of political representation to an arrangement by which an electorate freely chooses a delegate or set of delegates to express its interest in an assembly.<sup>1</sup> Indeed this apparently simple electoral scheme could include literally dozens of formal and informal patterns of behavior.<sup>2</sup> In a more general sense one might also speak of representation as including an arrangement by which some higher authority appoints to public office men who are members of particular subgroups of the public--members, for instance, of ethnic, political or occupational groups or residents of the various regions of the polity--and can reflect their general outlooks if not their specific interests.

Even if one conceives of popular election as essential to representation, one might still consider augmenting this system with an additional institution that could make more fully operational the idea of "virtual" representation. The problem of representing minority views is especially evident, though not necessarily more serious, where proportional representation is not used; and one might assign to an institution like the second described in the preceding paragraph--for example, the Seanad of the Irish Oireachtas--responsibility for protecting the interests of certain groups whose views might not be clearly articulated in the more popularly elected branch of the Legislature.

Moreover, one might also, again while accepting the primacy of an electoral system, want to establish an institution not elected by the public at large to assist in the process of representation by guarding the integrity of the electoral process itself so that citizens' choices would

be meaningful. Alternatively or additionally, one might create an institution to help make controversial decisions approved by a majority of the elected delegates more acceptable to the electorate as a whole or to particular groups within the community.

This list is by no means exhaustive, but it is sufficient to supply a set of foci around which to examine the judiciary's part in representation. In this paper we will analyze briefly the role of judges of constitutional courts, that is, courts possessing the power to invalidate legislative acts under a nation's fundamental law, as: (1) somehow "representative" of groups within the larger polity, (2) virtual representatives of "insular minorities," (3) protectors of the process by which representatives are chosen, (4) potential legitimizers of legislative decisions.

#### I. Courts as Representative Bodies

"Courts," Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter once observed, "are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society."<sup>3</sup> Certainly constitutional courts are not representative in the same sense as popularly elected branches of the legislature or even upper chambers like the British House of Lords. But, as we have already mentioned, representation admits of more than one interpretation.

A. H. Birch<sup>4</sup> has offered a threefold classification of political meanings of the term: "it can be said that a group of citizens can be represented in an assembly in three alternative ways: if one or more of the members of the assembly conceive one of their duties to be the protection of the citizens' interests; if one or more of the members have been elected by the citizens; or if one or more of the members are the same sort of

people as the citizens."

Judges of the highest national constitutional courts<sup>5</sup> are, in all cases with which we are familiar, selected by other government officials rather than directly chosen by the electorate. Even in Japan<sup>6</sup>, which may appear to be an exception to this rule, judges of the Supreme Court are initially appointed. Popular review of these appointments has resulted in the confirmation of each judge by a majority of about 90 per cent. Thus constitutional court judges hardly qualify as representatives in the sense of being popularly elected.

Neither do these judges qualify as representatives in the sense of having as their primary task advancing the interests of particular persons or groups. Certainly hardly any respected student of jurisprudence advocates such a judicial role, and the most cynical Legal Realists would probably agree that, even though given decisions may aid particular persons or groups, much more often than not judges look to the vague standard of the public interest rather than private advantage in making their decisions. But, precisely because the public interest is an elusive criterion, reasonable men will differ about how it is best achieved; and, to some extent, a man's social, economic, political, and geographic background may affect the manner in which he perceives the general welfare. Thus practical politicians may, to please members of their coalitions or the public at large and to increase confidence in judicial institutions, consciously try to staff constitutional courts with personnel of diverse background characteristics that are more or less shared by the various politically relevant groupings within the polity.

In this last sense, national constitutional courts typically display a large element of representation. In the United States, for instance, a tradition has grown up that there should be at least one justice from each of the major geographical areas of the country, and, in this century, that there be a Catholic and a Jew on the Court. In the nomination of Thurgood Marshall, it is likely that we have witnessed the birth of a new tradition, that of having a Negro on the Supreme Court. In Ireland it is accepted practice that there be one Protestant among the five Supreme Court justices and one among the seven High Court judges. In the Irish system this representation is ethnic and economic as well as religious, since Protestants are apt to be of English background, descendants of the old Dublin ascendancy, members of the upper economic stratum of society.

The Canadian Supreme Court, as Dawson and Ward remarked, "has had from the beginning a representative federal character."<sup>7</sup> There is a statutory requirement that three of the nine Supreme Court justices be from the French speaking Province of Quebec; and, since the Court usually sits in panels of five, these three judges are assigned--and so constitute a majority--to hear all cases coming from Quebec. By tradition the other regions, though except in the case of Ontario usually not specific provinces, will be represented on the tribunal. Normally one seat is allotted to the Maritime Provinces, two or three to Ontario, and the remainder to British Columbia and the Prairie Provinces.

In Australia the membership of the High Court has also tended to have a federal character, with Queensland, New South Wales, and Victoria dividing the seats among themselves. In terms of religion, the Australian

judges have been largely Protestant, but with a significant Catholic minority.<sup>8</sup>

Judges of the Bundesverfassungsgericht of the Federal German Republic are elected by the Parliament. Six of the sixteen members must be professional judges. The other 10 are drawn from lawyers who have had careers in universities, private practice, or public life. Each House of the Parliament elects half of the judges. The Bundesrat does so directly by a two-thirds vote, but the Bundestag uses an electoral commission, on which the various political parties are represented according to their parliamentary strength.<sup>9</sup> The result has been that German judges, as McWinney says, constitute "an interesting balance between prior judicial experience, government career service, professional legal practice, academic life, and direct political experience."<sup>10</sup>

Place of residence has also affected selection to the Bundesverfassungsgericht, as one would expect in a federal system using legislative election, especially where an institution like the Bundesrat whose members are ministers of Länder cabinets, chooses eight of the sixteen judges. The federal character of the German judiciary is, if anything, even more evident in the other federal courts. Each Land is entitled to representation on the committee that selects judges for the higher courts.<sup>11</sup>

Selection for the Swiss Federal Court has been described as a "voluntary system of proportional representation." The Federal Assembly formally elects the judges, but a tradition has grown up giving each party approximately the same share of seats as it has in the Assembly. Thus the actual choice is made in party caucuses, but the parties are not completely free. They must take into consideration not only legal competence but also such factors that are professionally--but not

politically--irrelevant as language groups. Table I, based on the research of Fred L. Morrison<sup>12</sup>, compares the primary language groups of the judges of the Federal Court in 1965 with those of the citizen population.

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TABLE I. Language Groups, 1965

Percent whose primary language is:	German	French	Italian	Other
Judges	61.5	30.8	7.7	---
Citizen population	74.4	20.2	4.1	1.3

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Due to the peculiarities of Swiss politics, proportional representation by party and by linguistic group tends to bring about a form of geographical proportional representation. Religious divisions are also salient in Swiss politics and Table II, again based on Morrison's research, compares the religious affiliations of Federal Court judges in 1965 with those of the general population.

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TABLE II. Religious Affiliations, 1965

	Judges	Citizen Population
Protestants	50.0%	57.7%
Catholics	34.6	41.3
Jews	---	.2
NA & others	15.4	.8

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The Swiss are probably unique in having such a system of proportional political representation on their constitutional court.<sup>13</sup> In neither the United States nor Ireland have the appointing authorities deemed it necessary to provide judicial representation of political views that differ

from those of the coalition in power. The parliamentary predominance in Germany of the CDU has given that party a majority on the Bundesverfassungsgericht; but, one may guess, proportional representation has been a factor in the election of judges from the SPD and the minor parties. Party representation has caused greater problems in Australia because Labour has so seldom controlled the government and because the Australian Bar has had relatively few Labourites, socialists, and radicals from whom a Labour government could choose. Of the 24 High Court judges appointed through 1965, only two were former Labour politicians, while a majority of the remainder had held public office under one of the other major parties.<sup>14</sup>

Because party officials have often misgauged a candidate's true ideology, because most judges have long tenure and have taken their supposed independence seriously, and because changes in party fortunes periodically bring different kinds of men to the bench, one can make a plausible case that judges of constitutional courts have in fact tended to represent not only many of the major subpublics of their respective polities but also a broad spectrum of political views. We do not care to press this point further now, though we think it is interesting and worth more thorough research and analysis than we have been able to give it.

## II. Courts and Minority Representation

Courts may also participate in the process of representation by affording a means of access to governmental power for those groups whose electoral strength and status position in the community are such as to preclude their having any meaningful role in choosing or influencing



legislators. Analyzing access in general terms, David Truman<sup>15</sup> asserted that it depends largely on three factors, the technical rules of the government agency to which access is sought, the social status of the group seeking access, and the group's size, degree of organization, and leadership skills. These factors, of course, can operate differently in different institutional environments; and, with a blindfolded goddess of justice the symbol of the judiciary in most western countries, one would not be surprised to see a small, low status group receiving a more sympathetic hearing before judges than before elected officials.<sup>16</sup> Courts, Mr. Justice Hugo Black once observed, "stand against any winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement."<sup>17</sup>

Whether Black's statement is normative or empirical, whether, that is, judges are really apt to defend the downtrodden<sup>18</sup>, is a matter to be proved rather than merely asserted. Indeed, a leading scholar<sup>19</sup> has argued that until rather recently the United States Supreme Court was more likely in cases of conflicts to protect minorities like slaveholders against slaves and wealthy financiers against unorganized workers than to protect the poor against the rich. Whatever the historical truth of this interpretation, certainly since 1937 many if not most American Supreme Court justices have been claiming that protecting the downtrodden is one of their chief functions. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone laid much of the jurisprudential framework for this kind of role. He suggested that legislation affecting "discrete and insular minorities" should evoke "more searching judicial inquiry" than ordinary statutes. In such cases, he said, judges should relax the usual rule presuming statutes constitutional.<sup>20</sup>

Justice Frank Murphy was more blunt: "The Law knows no finer hour than when it cuts through formal concepts and transitory emotions to protect unpopular citizens against discrimination and persecution."<sup>21</sup>

Because the term "insular minorities" is exceedingly vague<sup>22</sup>, one might also argue that this particular role could establish a judiciary that was supreme within the regime. That is certainly a possible result, though in most polities the parliament and/or the executive have sufficiently powerful weapons to use against the judiciary to make it unlikely that a court could for long set itself up in such a dominant role, unless it mirrored rather accurately the real as opposed to the proclaimed views of elected representatives and their constituents or unless those representatives and constituents had to focus their attention and energies on other problems.<sup>23</sup>

One could list a number of cases in many countries to show that constitutional courts have in fact protected such minorities. The Canadian and United States decisions upholding the rights of Jehovah's Witnesses, American cases protecting Negroes before black ballots and black power were significant political factors, and German rulings guarding splinter political parties against the major parties come most readily to mind.

### III. Courts As Protectors of the Electoral Process

Constitutional courts may also protect the integrity of the process by which representatives are chosen and by which constituents may make their views known and felt--in short, the rights of free speech, press, association, and the right to vote and to have that vote counted and counted the same as any other vote. Once again it was Harlan Fiske Stone

who in the United States most clearly articulated such a role for the Supreme Court.<sup>24</sup> In Canada Mr. Justice Ivan Rand and Mr. Justice Douglas Abbott have been even more explicit. Stone and his American colleagues could rely on written constitutional guarantees, but Canada has no Bill of Rights in its fundamental law. Nevertheless Rand<sup>25</sup> asserted that free speech was beyond the reach of provincial legislatures:

Whatever the deficiencies in its workings, Canadian government is in substance the will of the majority expressed directly or indirectly through popular assemblies. This means ultimately government by the free public opinion of an open society....But public opinion, in order to meet such a responsibility, demands the condition of a virtually unobstructed access to and diffusion of ideas. Parliamentary government postulates a capacity in men, acting freely and under self-restraints, to govern themselves; and that advance is best served in the degree achieved of individual liberation from subjective as well as objective shackles. Under that government, the freedom of discussion in Canada, as a subject-matter of legislation, has a unity of interest and significance extending equally to every part of the Dominion....Liberty in this is little less vital to man's mind and spirit than breathing is to his physical existence. As such an inherence in the individual it is embodied in his status of citizenship.

Mr. Justice Abbott accepted Rand's notion of the essential nature of the free exchange of ideas to a parliamentary system and went one step further. "Parliament itself," he said, "could not abrogate this right of discussion and debate."<sup>26</sup> Neither Rand's nor Abbott's views, however, were ~~fully~~ adopted by a majority of their colleagues.

While one can rarely find such clear outlines of a political philosophy guiding judicial decisions, one can easily find in the work of many constitutional courts rulings that do go far to protect the integrity of the political process. In the United States, the Supreme Court has most recently made the right to vote more meaningful by holding in a series of cases that electoral districts for both houses of state legislatures and for the national House of Representatives must

be substantially equal in population. Gerrymandering--at least certain crude kinds of gerrymandering--the Justices have said, is unconstitutional. The only acceptable formula is "one man, one vote."<sup>27</sup>

Ireland too has had its problems with reapportionment. In 1959, the Oireachtas passed a new electoral act redistricting the country. The government party, Fianna Fail, managed to protect its safe constituencies in the rural West at the cost of representation in Dublin, where the party was less sure of winning seats. The rationalization offered for having smaller populations in the western areas were a desire to have electoral boundaries conform to historic county boundaries and the great difficulties that deputies had in trying to maintain contact with constituents scattered over miles of countryside, a problem very different from that of deputies from Dublin, whose constituents might all live within a few dozen square blocks.

The leadership of Fine Gael, the larger of the two opposition parties, was apparently willing to accept the government bill with some changes, but a group of Fine Gael back benchers took their lost cause to the High Court. The trial judge<sup>28</sup> ruled that the differences in population within the districts--about one deputy per 16,500 inhabitants in Galway to one deputy per 23,000 in Dublin--were such as to violate the constitutional requirement that the proportion of electors to deputies "shall, so far as it is practicable, be the same throughout the country."<sup>29</sup> The government did not appeal; instead it adopted a fresh apportioning law and then referred it to the Supreme Court for an advisory opinion. The justices held this new statute constitutional.<sup>30</sup>

Freedom of speech, press, and association are equally basic as voting to the integrity of the political process, since these are the

means by which political ideas may be disseminated and achieve influence. Certainly the United States Supreme Court has decided many such cases in recent years, usually, though not always, upholding political freedom. The Bundesverfassungsgericht has handed down a potpourri of rulings on related issues.

Civil libertarians might not be pleased with the outcome of the Der Spiegel case and could make an argument that the Court had been over-protective in its rulings in the 1950's that the Neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party<sup>31</sup> and the Communist Party<sup>32</sup> were anti-democratic and therefore illegal organizations. The judges might respond that the Der Spiegel case resulted in a 4-4 deadlock on the constitutional issue of free press versus national security and that, in the Neo-Nazi and Communist cases, they were deciding in a political context in which democracy was a very fragile arrangement. Had they been operating in a political environment like that of Australia<sup>33</sup>, where totalitarian rule had never been known and Soviet influence was remote, they might have viewed the alternatives differently.

However one feels about the merits of these <sup>last two</sup> decisions, it is a plausible interpretation that their effect has been to further a free political process. So, too, has been the apparent objective of a series of related rulings. In 1957 the German Court declared unconstitutional the federal law allowing a tax exemption for contributions to political parties on the ground that this provision in fact gave greater aid to one group of parties, those whose interests were closest to big business.<sup>34</sup> In a decision also designed to protect the equality of political parties, the judges in 1966 invalidated a federal law subsidizing those parties represented in the Bundestag.<sup>35</sup> Among the more famous political

process cases has been that involving the federal government's establishment of a television station. The Bundesverfassungsgericht ruled this establishment unconstitutional, partly because governmental control of a national television station might result in news being slanted to favor the views of the party currently in power.<sup>36</sup>

There have been relatively fewer Canadian and Australian decisions, in part because of the absence of bills of rights in their "constitutions." Nevertheless, both the Australian High Court and Canadian Supreme Court have handed down important decisions in this area.<sup>37</sup>

#### IV. Legitimation

Judicial protection of the integrity of the political process, like judicial representation of minorities, presents many problems at least of logic if not practical experience. The most fundamental criticism of judges becoming involved in the political process is that one is presented with the anomalous situation of judge-made democracy, of popular government being maintained by an elite group who cannot be directly called to account at the ballot box for their actions. Judges no less than students of jurisprudence have been intrigued by this problem.<sup>38</sup>

At this time we can add little to what has already been written other than to note that, whatever the strains on idealistic notions of representative government, constitutional courts have frequently tried to help keep the political processes open and in fact have sometimes increased the probability that elected delegates would be chosen by fair and open elections. Whether or not a Court can save a country bent on self-destruction is not at issue here. We are concerned with whether Courts can help make democratic government more representative, and

we believe the evidence is overwhelming that judges can--just as the probability cannot be denied that judges may err and err badly when they try to play this role.

Affording some representation to minority groups and protecting the integrity of the political processes can be viewed as two facets of the larger work of a constitutional court in a political system, that of defining the rules of the political game and determining the boundaries of authority between competing public officials as well as the boundaries between governmental authority and individual liberty. Many decisions of constitutional courts draw precisely these kinds of jurisdictional lines. Logically, rule definition and boundary determination are similar though not identical functions. For the sake of brevity, however, we will treat them here as if they were identical.

In determining boundaries and defining rules, constitutional courts are often called upon to declare unconstitutional legislative and/or executive actions. A close analysis, however, of the work of the U.S. Supreme Court, and probably of most other constitutional courts, would indicate that the justices much more frequently declare contested action constitutional rather than unconstitutional. Practical politicians as well as scholars have speculated that in so doing constitutional courts help promote the stability of representative government by legitimizing controversial legislative and executive decisions. It is almost inevitable that there will be differences of opinion when a government chooses among public policy alternatives; and when policies touch vital interests or threaten to bring about significant changes in the political structure--that is, shifts in boundaries of authority--the political system will undergo serious stress.

This stress will be caused not only by differences in opinion about the respective merits of perceived alternatives but also about whether the government may, under its fundamental charter, take a given course of action. Those people who lost in the executive or legislative process, where a constitutional court is operative, may go to the judiciary and challenge the legitimacy of a particular policy. Judicial review, many observers have pointed out, may function as an alternative to armed resistance. Trial by law may thus substitute in the public sphere, just as it has in the private, for trial by combat.<sup>39</sup> Where advisory opinions are possible, the government itself may resort to this process and take the controversial decision to the courts in an effort to settle doubts about its propriety under the basic law.

Thus, one may hypothesize, by ruling legitimate controversial policies, constitutional courts help to quiet doubts and so promote acceptance of the particular public policy and the shifts in political boundaries that it brings about. As Edward Blake<sup>40</sup>, the Canadian Minister of Justice, said in 1890:

Ours is a popular government; and when burning questions arise, inflaming the public mind, when agitation is rife as to the political action of the Executive or the Legislature--when action is to be based on legal questions, obviously beyond the grasp of the people at large; when the people are on such questions divided by cries of creed and race; then I maintain that a great public good is attainable by the submission of such legal questions to legal tribunals with all the customary securities for sound judgment; and whose decisions--passionless and dignified, accepted by each of us is binding in our own affairs involving fortune, freedom, honour, life itself--are more likely to be accepted by us all in questions of public concern.

The logic behind Blake's conclusions may be unassailable, but there are many questions of fact involved. Are judges "passionless?"



This debate threatens to be an endless one. We pause only to note that to perform the kind of function just outlined it is probably less important that judges be passionless than that they seem to be, for the first question with which we are concerned here is whether a judicial decision actually does quiet doubts about the legitimacy of political action. Next is the question of whose doubts are resolved. Significant portions of the general public? Elite groups of private citizens? Executive officials? Legislators? We would speculate that the answers would vary over a wide range. Certainly without hard evidence it would be as unwise to claim that a decision of any particular constitutional court would forever lay to rest a political controversy as to assert that a constitutional court would have no impact on the views of the public at large or on particular subpublics.<sup>41</sup>

The answers to these questions are vulnerable to research and analysis, though the research is expensive and the analysis difficult. We have made a beginning, however small, by means of survey research. Because our analysis is not yet completed we shall largely confine our report here to the opinions of the general public rather than elite groups. We obtained most of our data from two surveys of national probability samples of the adult population of the United States, conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. The first of these polls, completed in November 1964, asked two questions about the Supreme Court; the second, completed in December 1966, asked more than a dozen questions.

If Supreme Court decisions are to have a high probability of legitimizing controversial policies for particular persons or groups of persons, four basic conditions must be met. First, the persons who are

to be influenced must be aware of the work of the Court so that they are likely to know about a potentially legitimizing decision. Second, these persons must believe that it is the proper task of the Court to make definitive interpretations of the Constitution. Third, while these people may be critical of specific rulings, they must approve of the over-all way in which the Court is operating. Last, they must trust the Court at least as much as the institutions whose decisions it is asked to judge.

Awareness. We tested public awareness of the work of the United States Supreme Court in several ways. In both the 1964 and 1966 surveys, we asked respondents whether the Supreme Court had done anything recently that they liked or disliked. The percentage of people who expressed views on the work of the Court was quite stable, 41.4 per cent in 1964, 47.5 per cent in 1966. In the 1966 survey we used several other questions to probe public awareness. In one set of inquiries we asked if the respondent knew the names of any of the justices currently on the bench. Six hundred and thirty-six of 1291 respondents (49.3 per cent) correctly named at least one justice, and another 60 mentioned who had recently left the Court. Goldberg or Frankfurter. Chief Justice Earl Warren, incidently, was the best known of the justices; 555 people mentioned him.

A third pair of questions probed less directly and more generally for public awareness. We first asked what the respondent thought was the main job of the Supreme Court. Like the other questions this one was open ended; but it was far more difficult to answer, and we had been warned by professional interviewers that our response rate would be low. In fact, however, 837 of the 1291 people in our sample, 64.8 per cent, did answer the question; and 513 of them gave a reply

that implied a constitutional court function--for example "decide on the constitutionality of laws," "interpret the Constitution," or "maintain balance in government." We also asked a follow-up question, how well the respondent thought the Court was performing that task. Better than 8 out of 10 people who answered the basic question were willing to give an evaluation, a total of 56.5 per cent of the entire sample.

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TABLE III

Awareness of the Court in 1966

Percentage of respondents who:

Recalled something Court had recently done they liked or disliked:	47.5
Knew the name of at least one justice:	49.3
Were able to give an answer to inquiry about job of the Court:	64.8
Were willing to express views on how well Court performing its job:	56.5

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Table III lists the results from the individual questions. We can say that while in general there is considerable public awareness of the Court's existence and also an awareness that the Court plays an important governmental function, only a minority, though a rather large minority, is sufficiently aware of the Court's work to name individual justices or to enumerate specific likes and dislikes about recent decisions. Undoubtedly only a very small fraction of this minority is acquainted in any detailed and highly sophisticated fashion with Court's operations. Even though the level of awareness seems rather low, it is not especially lower than the general political awareness in the United States or awareness of Congressional activities. For example, 75.6 per cent of those who could not enumerate specific likes

and dislikes about recent decisions also could not name the candidates for the national Senate or House of Representatives for whom they were eligible to vote in 1966 and 70.4 per cent could not identify a single issue that divided the two major parties.

More precise evidence that knowledge about political life is pretty much cut from a single piece of cloth is presented in Table IV. The coefficient of multiple correlation (R) between the number of likes-dislikes mentioned and the nine other variables in Table IV is .59. Most of this can be attributed to the political knowledge items alone (R. 1, 5, 6, 7, 8 = .54). The functional relationships can be expressed in the standard regression equation,  $X_1 = .202 (X_2) + .229 (X_5) + .078 (X_6) + .126 (X_7) + .260 (X_8) - 0.138$ . In other words, for each unit increase in the number of governmental problems identified, the visibility of the Court's specific decisions (in terms of likes-dislikes) increases by 20.2 per cent. The increase in Court visibility for each unit increase in the number of party issues identified is 12.6 per cent, for each unit increase in the number of justices named 26 per cent, and so on.

TABLE IV

Some Correlates (r) of Court Visibility, 1966

Variable Number	Subject	Number of Likes/Dislikes	Education
1.	Number of likes/dislikes	--	.37
2.	Number of government problems identified	.30	.32
3.	Party identification (low, Dem., high, Rep.)	.15	.16
4.	1964 Presidential vote (low, Johnson; high, Goldwater)	.23	.09
5.	Ability to name 1966 Congressional candidates	.32	.23
6.	Knowledge re party control of U.S. House	.20	.29
7.	Number of party issues identified	.28	.20
8.	Number of Supreme Court justices identified	.39	.25
9.	Alienation from government (high = strong distrust)	.31	-.35
10.	Education	.37	--

Political knowledge, as the second column in Table IV confirms, is positively related to formal education. 78.3 per cent of the college graduates and 70.2 per cent of those who had some college work specified likes and/or dislikes about recent Court decisions. The percentage plummets to 27.2 for people with less than nine years of schooling. Party identification is virtually useless in reducing the unexplained variance in ability to comment about particular aspects of the Court's

operations. The 1964 presidential vote and alienation from government are slightly more helpful. Variables not represented in Table IV can make additional, though modest, contributions to understanding the characteristics of those to whom the Court is visible.

Assigned Role. Responses to the inquiry about the job of the Court are quite revealing. The question was worded in such a way as to tax many interviewees' ability to articulate an intelligent answer, yet a very large majority did reply; and of those who did three out of five gave a "constitutional court" answer. We believe that had we asked respondents to choose from a set list of answers, an overwhelming number would have picked something like "interpret the constitution." But without any speculation whatever, we can say that a large majority of those who can respond at all about the role of the Supreme Court speak in terms of a constitutional court function and that this group forms a significant portion of the population as a whole.

Approval.

In both of our surveys slightly more than twice as many respondents made critical as favorable remarks in answer to our inquiry about specific likes and dislikes. Table V compares the critical and favorable comments from 1964 and 1966. Table VI breaks these comments down into several categories. It is worth noting that legislative reapportionment, a problem that has already seriously affected American politics and will probably have an even more dramatic effect during the next decade, excited almost no public attention either in 1964, when Senator Barry Goldwater made it a major issue in his presidential campaign, or in 1966, after some move toward

the Supreme Court's "one man, one vote" formula had been made in more than 40 states.<sup>44</sup> There has been, however, a noticeable increase in public concern about the Court's decisions in the field of criminal justice.

Criticism of decisions in particular fields, however, does not of itself imply disapproval of the Supreme Court as an institution. Moreover, criticism of specific decisions of the Court at a given moment in time does not imply dissatisfaction with the general way that a particular group of judges is functioning. It may well only be that our respondents, like many of their fellow men, are more apt to recall what they dislike than what they like. Certainly elected politicians have often expressed the opinion that their constituents always remember slights but never favors--a view that survey research in electoral behavior tends to support.<sup>45</sup>

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TABLE V

Total Number of Comments About U.S.  
Supreme Court, 1964 and 1966

	1964		1966	
	N	%	N	%
Favorable	268	29.3	310	28.8
Unfavorable	<u>647</u>	<u>70.7</u>	<u>765</u>	<u>71.2</u>
Total	915	100.0	1075	100.0

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TABLE VI

Number of Comments on Selected Issues,  
1964 and 1966

	Favorable				Unfavorable			
	1964		1966		1964		1966	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Civil Rights*	168	77.1	136	74.7	181	35.6	131	25.4
Rights of Crimi- nally Accused	6	2.7	21	11.5	47	9.2	148	28.7
School Prayers	27	12.4	21	11.5	253	49.7	232	45.0
Reapportionment	<u>17</u>	<u>7.8</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>.9</u>
Total	218	100.0	182	99.9	509	100.0	516	100.0

\* In context meant civil rights of Negroes.

In any event, our respondents were able to distinguish between their opinions about specific decisions and about the Court as an institution. More than twice as many respondents thought that the Court was doing its job "very well" as thought not very well--almost the reverse of the likes-dislikes figures. Table VII cross-tabulates responses to the questions about how well the Court is doing its job and likes-dislikes. One would not expect distributions like those in the cells of that table to appear as often as one time in a thousand in a random sample drawn from a population which contained no real differences on these matters.



TABLE VII

How Well the Court is Doing its Job  
v.  
Likes and Dislikes

	Likes only	Pro/con	Dislikes only
% saying Court does job very well	97 (N=76)	73 (N=103)	43 (N=259)

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Only a little more than half of the people who answered both questions and who expressed only critical views said the Court was performing "not very well." Thus there seems to be a reservoir of residual respect on which the justices may draw to get them through periods of unpopular decisions. The justices, however, should be wary of coming to the well too often, for the next sections of this paper indicate that this reservoir has a limited capacity.

Trust. So far our data at least appear to lend some to the hypothesis that for a large portion of the general public the United States Supreme Court can perform a legitimizing function. Data concerning the fourth condition, that the public trust the Supreme Court at least as much as the institutions whose decisions it judges, show this segment of the public is much smaller than that suggested by responses to the first three

sets of questions. In 1957 the American Institute of Public Opinion asked a national probability sample which they respected more, Congress or the Supreme Court. Replies were almost equally divided, with the Court having a slight edge.<sup>46</sup> We asked a similar question in 1966: "Which do you trust more, the Supreme Court or Congress?" We followed this with an intensity probe: "Do you feel strongly about that or not so strongly?" Table VIII presents the answers to the 1966 questions.

TABLE VIII

Trust Congress or the Supreme Court

Percentage Who Trust:

Supreme Court, strongly:	13.4
Supreme Court, not so strongly:	12.2
Pro-Con:	7.8
Congress, not so strongly	13.6
Congress, strongly:	20.5
DK, NA:	32.5

Of those who expressed a preference, 57.3 per cent said they trusted Congress more and 42.7 per cent said the Supreme Court. Since a difference of this magnitude cannot be attributed to sampling error, we are faced with the fact that a majority of the adult population that has an opinion has a greater trust for Congress than for the Supreme Court, a conclusion reinforced by a similar finding from a survey conducted in the state of Wisconsin.<sup>48</sup>

Still we think a few caveats are in order. First of all, preference for one institution does not necessarily imply lack of trust in the other, and it is worth emphasizing that about 40 per cent of our sample

did not choose between Congress and the Court. Second, the better educated half of our sample trusts the Court more than Congress. So too in answer to the query about how well the Court is doing its job, the better educated were more apt to say very well than were the less educated. Third, the group who prefer Congress include a rather large segment of those who are "anti-system," people whose political orientations alienate them from most of what has been going on in American politics over the last generation. Fourth, a significantly large minority does claim to trust the Court more than Congress. For them and an unknown portion of those who expressed no preference, the Supreme Court might perform a legitimizing function.

The Court Supporters. We must now confront a crucial question. What proportion of our respondents--and presumably of the adult population of the United States--meet not just one or two but all four conditions we laid down as necessary to provide a high probability that a Court decision would perform a legitimizing function? The number is quite small. Only about one person in thirteen in our sample satisfies all four conditions.

Before dismissing this group as too trivial to be politically important one should recall that even in democratic polities numbers cannot be always and automatically equated with power. <sup>48</sup> Moreover, making changes in the opinions of a small fraction of the public is not an unimportant accomplishment. After all, as Stanley Kelley has observed, <sup>49</sup> political campaigns "are waged to make marginal changes in political alignments."

Aside from the likelihood, which we mentioned earlier, that our use of open-ended questions presents the level of knowledge as being some--

what lower than it actually is, we would stress that this small minority meeting all four conditions forms a sizable portion of the politically attentive segment of our sample. No matter what criteria of knowledge one sets, a very small percentage of adult Americans qualify as politically attentive.<sup>50</sup> The figure may range as low as one out of eight or ten or as high as one out of every three or four.

Only about one out of every five of our respondents, a few weeks after a congressional election, could identify one important governmental problem and one policy difference between the two major parties and one candidate for the national Senate or House of Representatives for whom he had just been eligible to vote. In any case, the group that meets all four of the conditions we established is a large element of the attentive public, with the proportion increasing as the criteria for attentiveness are more rigorously set. The fraction would vary from about one-quarter to one-third.

#### V. Concluding Observations

The data presented in Part IV knit together the various representational roles of constitutional courts discussed in this paper. For knowledge of and opinions about a constitutional court by members of a polity are vital factors not only in any legitimating process but also in determining: a) Whether--and which--citizens will perceive that a court is staffed by men who, because of their backgrounds, are apt to give a fair and sympathetic hearing to various points of view; b) Whether--and which--minority groups will utilize the judicial process to protect their interests; and c) Whether--and again which--potential political activists will take advantage of judicial rulings helping to keep open avenues to political power. We hope, when we have completed

analyzing our American data, to join in a cooperative enterprise with scholars from other countries and carry out a series of studies about the role of constitutional courts in a number of political systems.

We mention here one additional finding that may be relevant to any trans-national research. In the other phases of our research, we have noted a high correlation between trust in government and reaction to the domestic policies of the Johnson administration on the one hand and opinions about the Court on the other. This might mean only that most American citizens have recognized that the jurisprudence currently being followed by their Supreme Court is liberal and closely congruent with the liberal programs of the "Great Society"; or it might be that Americans do not distinguish among the workings of the various branches of their government. If the first interpretation is correct, it would seem that, at this juncture at least, the Supreme Court, in declaring constitutional contested policies, would be more likely to reinforce the views of those already convinced or to remove only lightly held doubts rather than to convert many unbelievers. Of course, this is not a trivial accomplishment since reinforcing support of a regime is important of itself. Again, it is hardly denigrating to say that a Court decision might convert only a small fraction of the public.

The second interpretation, that Americans cannot or do not distinguish among the branches of their government, raises many fascinating and fundamental questions, not only for the judiciary but for all government officials and for democratic theory as well. In

particular, if citizens tend to think of government as a monolith, representation of the kinds we have been discussing--and others we have not discussed--would be important largely for elite groups who are politically sophisticated. Again, the work of the Court need not be considered trivial. The reactions of journalists, lawyers, civil servants, and even professors may trickle down and in a diffuse and indirect fashion shape the opinions of the general public and even more directly influence high ranking governmental officials, who are themselves, after all, usually politically attentive, interested, and active citizens.

## Footnotes

We would like to express our thanks to the National Science Foundation for funding portions of our travel and the survey of public opinion in the United States on which Part IV of this paper is based, and to the Ford Foundation and the American Council of Learned Societies for additional financial assistance. We are also indebted to Prof. Edward Tufte of Princeton University for advice and criticism.

1. Alfred de Grazia has written that: "Representation is a relation between an official and citizen that exists whenever an action of the official accords with the desires of the citizen." Politics and Government (New York: Colliers Books, 1962), I, 158. If one were to accept this definition at face value, it would be difficult to categorize any governmental arrangement as non-representative since inevitably many official actions--garbage collecting, traffic directing, for example--would accord with citizens' desires.

2. See especially John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy Ferguson, The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962).

3. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525, concur. op. (1951).

4. A. H. Birch, Representative and Responsible Government (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1964), p. 16.

5. Judges of many American state courts, including the highest constitutional courts, are often popularly elected.

6. The very best work in English on the Japanese court is by David Danelski of Yale University, "The Supreme Court of Japan," A Paper Presented at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

7. R. MacGregor Dawson and Norman Ward, The Government of Canada (4th ed.; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), p. 428.
8. See L. F. Crisp, Australian National Government (Croydon, Victoria: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1965), chap. 3.
9. A most useful study is Donald Kommers, "The Federal Constitutional Court of West Germany," A Paper Presented at the 1967 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists. A revised version of this paper will be published in the forthcoming work, Joel Grossman and Joseph Tanenhaus (eds.), Frontiers of Judicial Research (New York: John Wiley, 1968).
10. Edward McWhinney, Constitutionalism in Germany and the Federal Constitutional Court (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1962), p. 28; see also Kommers, op. cit. supra note 9, pp. 9, 14.
11. Prof. Kommers has generously supplied us with material here from his research.
12. "Judicial Process in Switzerland," unpublished Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1966, chap. 3.
13. For a study of Japanese practices, see James A. Dator, "The Life History and Attitudes of Japanese High Court Judges," 20 West. Pol. Q. 408 (1967).
14. Crisp, op. cit. supra note 8, chap. 3.
15. The Governmental Process (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1951), espec. pp. 265-70.



16. See Walter F. Murphy and C. Herman Pritchett (eds.), Courts, Judges, and Politics (New York: Random House, 1961), chaps. 7-8.

17. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).

18. Cf. Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: "it must be remembered that legislators are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts." M., K., & T. Ry. Co v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904).

19. Robert A. Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy," 6 J. of Pub. L. 279 (1957).

20. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Prof.

Alpheus T. Mason has brought Stone's thoughts together into a more coherent jurisprudence than the Justice had an opportunity--or an inclination--to do in his own lifetime. See especially Mason's books: The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1958), chaps. 5-6, and The Supreme Court: Palladium of Freedom (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1962).

21. Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, dis. op., 561 (1949). When he was on the Court, Arthur Goldberg gave a public lecture in which he extolled equality as one of the, if not the, basic doctrines of American constitutional law. "Equality in Governmental Action," 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 205 (1964). Prof. Philip Kurland has angrily attacked the Warren Court for what he sees as an uncritical acceptance of an egalitarian jurisprudence. "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of Government," 78 Harv. L. Rev. 143 (1964).

22. For a discussion of the problems here in relation to recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, see Walter F. Murphy, "Deeds under a Doctrine," 59 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 64 (1965).

23. For a discussion of the power relationships here, see Walter F. Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), espec. chap. 2.

24. Supra note 20.

25. Sarur v. Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, 306-307. See also Mr. Justice Rand's article, "Some Aspects of Canadian Constitutionalism," 38 Can. Bar Rev. 135 (1960); and his opinions in Birks and Sons v. Montreal, [1955] S.C.R. 799; and Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 285.

26. Sarur, supra note 25 at 326-328.

27. See espec. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Wesbury v. Sanders 376 U.S. 1 (1964); and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

28. O'Donovan v. The Attorney General, 1961 I.R. 114.

29. Constitution of Ireland, Article 16, sec. 2, para. 3.

30. In re Article 26 of the Constitution and the Electoral Bill, 1961, 1961 I.R. 169.

31. 2 B Verf GE 1 (1953). In this section we have relied heavily on Kormers, op. cit. supra note 9. See also Taylor Cole, "The West German Federal Constitutional Court," 20 J. of Pol. 278 (1958).

32. 5 B Verf GE 85 (1956).

33. Compare the Australian decision in Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth, 83 C.L.R. 1 (1951).
34. 8 B Verf GE 51 (1958)
35. See Kommers, op. cit. supra note 9, at pp. 29-30.
36. 12 B Verf GE (1961)
37. Australia: Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth, 83 C.L.R. 1 (1951). Canada: Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100; Samur v. Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299; Birks and Sons v. Montreal, [1955] S.C.R. 799; Switzman v. Elbing, [1957] S.C.R. 285.
38. Murphy and Pritchett, op. cit. supra note 16, chaps. 14, 17, and 18, have collected and annotated some of the most relevant writing. See also: Herbert Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law," 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1955); and Gerhard Leibholz, Politics and Law (Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1965).
39. See Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), espec. chaps 2, 6, 27, and 28.
40. Quoted in W. R. Lederman (ed.), The Courts and the Canadian Constitution (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1964), pp. 227-228.
41. Most of the studies with which we are familiar deal with the American political system. Some of these are collected and other cited in Murphy and Pritchett, op. cit. supra note 16, chaps. 15-16 and C. H. Pritchett and Alan Westin (eds.), The Third Branch of Government (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1963). See also Walter F. Murphy, Congress and the Court (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962);

41. (continued) Robert H. Birkby, "The Supreme Court and the Bible Belt," 10 Midw. J. of Pol. Sci. 304 (1966); and William M. Beaney and Edward N. Beiser, "Prayer and Politics," 13 J. of Pub. L. 475 (1964).

42. We have also, with the financial assistance of the Social Science Research Council, conducted reinterviews with about 10 per cent of our 1964 sample. These interviews are currently being coded.

43. See, for instance, Warren E. Miller and Donald Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," in Angus Campbell et al. (eds), Elections and the Political Order (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966).

44. See our forthcoming "Public Opinion and the Supreme Court: The Goldwater Campaign," Pub. Op. Q. (1968). Kenneth Dolbeare has made similar findings in a Wisconsin survey: Kenneth M. Dolbeare, "The Public Views the Supreme Court," forthcoming; as has John Kessel, "Public Perceptions of the Supreme Court," 10 Midw. J. of Pol. Sci. 167, 175 (1966).

45. See Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), espec. pp. 554ff.

46. American Institute of Public Opinion Press Release, July 28, 1957.

47. Dolbeare, op. cit. supra note 42.

48. See, for example, Samuel Stouffer Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1955), and Herbert McCloskey, Paul Hoffman, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and

Consensus among Party Leaders and Followers," 54 American Political Science Review 406 (1960).

49. "The Presidential Campaign," in Paul T. David (ed.), The Presidential Election and Transition 1960-1961 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961), p. 57.

50. For an interesting discussion of this problem see Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

Note also the comment of the authors of The American Voter at p. 543:

"We have, then, the portrait of an electorate almost wholly without detailed information about decision-making in government .... It is almost completely unable to judge the rationality of government actions; knowing little of particular policies and what has led to them, the mass electorate is not able to appraise either its goals or the appropriateness of the means chosen to serve these goals." For a more sanguine view, consult V.O. Key, Jr., with Milton C. Cummings, Jr., The Responsible Electorate (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).

Summary

The role of judges of constitutional courts is analyzed as (1) somehow "representative" of groups within the larger polity; (2) virtual representatives of "insular minorities"; (3) protectors of the process by which representatives are chosen; (4) potential legitimizers of legislative decisions. Data from two surveys of national samples, made in the U.S. in 1964 and 1966, could be the basis of transnational research on knowledge of and opinions about the activity of constitutional courts.

Résumé

Le rôle des membres des cours constitutionnelles est analysé en tant qu'ils sont (1) à certains égards "représentatifs" de groupes faisant partie de la société politique; (2) représentants virtuels de "minorités isolées"; (3) protecteurs du processus par lequel sont choisis les représentants; (4) agents potentiels de légitimation des décisions prises par voie législative. Des données tirées de deux sondages nationaux faits aux Etats-Unis en 1964 et 1966 pourraient fournir la base d'une recherche transnationale sur la connaissance et sur l'opinion que les citoyens ont de l'activité des cours constitutionnelles.

"Theory and practice of representation"

ELECTORS AND REPRESENTATIVES

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF REPRESENTATION

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## ELECTORS AND REPRESENTATIVES

### A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF REPRESENTATION

by Marek Sobolewski

In the theory of representation, the problem of the relation between electors and their representatives is the most fundamental one. The way in which it is resolved determines the content of the general theory of representation. That is obvious: representation means the relation between the subject represented and the representative acting on his behalf.

It is in this perspective that I shall discuss the problem in my paper; not as a marginal, detailed study on political behaviour in the frame of a single constituency, but as an introduction to the general theory of representation.

#### I

There are two old, classical concepts regarding the relation between the electors and their representatives: the concept of a "free mandate" and the opposite one of an "imperative mandate". In spite of much criticism of these rigid and formalistic notions, they dominate in fact both in the modern constitutions and in political science and political philosophy.

In most constitutions in the western world, the member of parliament is defined as the representative of the whole nation, and cannot be legitimately bound by any mandate or pressure coming from his electorate. This is not a purely formal statement, a form of juridical traditionalism; it still has important practical consequences. In Federal Germany, in 1958, the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional an attempt to organise a consultative referendum on atomic armament, because it would constitute illegal pressure on parliament, entitled to decide freely and independently



the policy of the country.<sup>(1)</sup> In France, in 1960, President de Gaulle refused to call an extraordinary session of parliament, arguing that the deputies were acting under the unconstitutional pressure of some professional organisations (the farmers' unions) while they were obliged by the constitution to act independently.<sup>(2)</sup>

The Marxist theory of government takes evidently the opposite view of the issue. It was Marx himself who made the famous statement, that in a capitalist state the electors are only entitled to decide every three or six years by whom they will be "ver-und zertreten im Parlament".<sup>(3)</sup> Since the time of Paris Commune the principle of responsibility of representatives to their electors and the right to recall the representatives constitute the firm bases of the socialist theory of representation, stated in every constitution of socialist countries to-day.

In spite of the essential rigidity of the respective constitutional principles and doctrines all over the world, the reality of political life takes on quite different features. In fact, even the detailed provisions of a constitution and the established constitutional practice often contradict the admitted principle of mandate.

In all capitalist states, notwithstanding the accepted principle of the free mandate, there are political parties, which steer and control the parliamentary behaviour of deputies. Rigid party discipline in parliament is no longer held to be contrary to the constitution. The principle of the free mandate protects the member of parliament only against the loss of his seat before the next election. It by no means gives him freedom of action and independence vis-à-vis the party leadership.

In many countries (e.g. in Federal Germany for the Landeslisten) only the political parties are legally entitled to present candidates for an election. In the parliamentary regulations only political parties (or large groups of deputies, which means the same) are entitled to participate in the organs of assemblies, to propose motions, etc. In Federal Germany, the same

Constitutional Court has declared invalid and null the mandates of the deputies from delegatized parties, in spite of the fact that formally they were the duly elected representatives of the whole Nation.<sup>(4)</sup> The idea of an independent representative of the whole Nation seems to be totally obsolete. I must agree with Professor Leibholz' statement that the modern western states are no longer representative in the classical sense,<sup>(5)</sup> but that they are party states: which makes the concept of the free mandate an anachronism.

The situation is not different with the concept of imperative mandate in the socialist countries. In Poland the constitution affirms the right to recall the deputies to the Diet. But in the 14 years of our constitution, the parliament has failed to enact the detailed provisions concerning the procedure of recall, and the deputies could not be recalled. The law governing elections to the local councils provides for the procedure of recalling the councillors; but the procedure is so complicated that it has never been applied, and in practice the councillors have been revoked in other ways (by decisions of the council itself). Moreover, the formal rights to propose recall belongs to the political parties or to the National Front, i.e. some sort of union of political parties and other organizations. Not the electors directly, but the parties, judge on the opportunity of recall of the representatives. It would seem that the situation in other socialist countries is different in detail but similar in general trends.

We may also conclude that the classical concepts of free or imperative mandate, notwithstanding the fact that they are accepted in constitutions and sometimes by political practice, are generally out of date. They do not give us any relevant information as to the real relation between the electors and their representatives; they are even misleading. Since we do not find such information in the legal provisions or legal doctrine, we have to find it by sociological analysis.

But we must bear in mind that while such analysis may elucidate the real relations between the electors and the representatives, it cannot change the constitutional, legal provisions concerning the status, the rights

and duties of deputies. It cannot be substituted for the legal definition of representation. It may at best, serve us as a basis for interpreting legal principles in a more reasonable fashion. (6)

In this paper I am concerned only with the elaboration of the theoretical basis for the sociological theory of representation. I am not concerned with the effects of this concept on the legal principle of representative government; that I have done elsewhere. (7)

## II

I may start with some preliminary remarks. In the political process of the modern state, the relation between electors and their individual representative - the deputy - is of minor importance. There are, of course, exceptions to the rule. In some particular situations this relation may be more significant; (8) that is generally supposed to be the case with elections of members of the Congress in the United States; that was supposed to be the case with the Radical Party in the third French Republic. In such situations the personal characteristics of the candidate weigh more than the party label, his responsibility to his constituency weighs more than party discipline. We may assume that in such circumstances local interests and local opinions on political issues may influence to a greater degree the course of national policy. But even that assumption is not always true. We know that often just the popular local notables enjoy a great margin of freedom and tolerance vis-à-vis their locality.

In most countries the individual representative plays a different political role. He is a symbol of his party. As we know from many electoral studies, the electors often do not know the name of their representative, not to speak of his personal opinions or characteristics. He is expected to represent the party programme. He is often an important source of information on the mood of public opinion to his party leaders. But his personal role in politics depends on his status in the party ranks, not on his relations with the constituency.

For the electors, the representative may play also an important function as an intermediary to the governmental offices. He has to intervene in these offices, to promote personal or local interests. In addition <sup>to</sup> public meetings, at which the deputy explains the policy of his party, such interventions forms the greatest part of his job. It seems that the situation in Poland also fits in this image.

Only the relation between the electors and their party has real political importance in the elections. When we speak about the mandate of the electors, we refer to the party, not to the individual representative to whom this mandate is addressed. I say 'party' and I mean that body in the political party which determines the political behaviour of party members in parliament and government; for the purpose of this study it is not important to indicate what kind of body that is.

Analysing further the relation between electors and representatives, I shall deal only with the relation between the electorate and the party.

### III

Apart from the discussion on the electorate mandate, we may take it for granted that every party seeks the approval of its programme, and that every party is compelled to respond in a certain way to public opinion. On the other hand, every party does possess a certain freedom of action, and is never totally dependent on the opinion of its electorate. I do not try to measure the relative strength of these opposite trends. I do not know if that is at all possible. I should rather enumerate groups of factors which stimulate each of these two opposite trends.

The freedom of action of the party, the possibility of tactical manoeuvre in face of the electors' opinions and demands, is based on several groups of factors. I am going to outline them only briefly, because their operation is commonly admitted and undisputed.

The first group is related to the nature of opinions on political issues held by the electorate.

A number of factors current in modern communities contribute to the fact that knowledge about public affairs as well as interest taken in them are, for the vast majority of the public, rather slight. In any case the rise, if there is any, in these indices does not keep pace with the growing activity of the State which results in an immense extension of the scope of public affairs. This makes impossible a sufficient spread of opinions on public issues as well as the formation of opinions which would be both sufficiently concrete and detailed. The same observation can be made on voters' familiarity with the party programmes and electoral platforms. In contemporary political science one speaks rather about the voters image of the parties than about their detailed orientation to party programmes and attitudes on particular issues. (9)

The operation of these factors enables the parties to build up their programmes in a very general and stereotyped manner. Thus, it is always possible to interpret the programme in many different ways, according to the demands of the moment. In such circumstances the party programme can be hardly viewed as a detailed and stiff mandate, if as a mandate at all.

The second group of factors promoting the party's independence in politics is connected with the nature of party identification.

In several voting studies it has been emphasized that the party identification precedes the voters' electoral decisions, and determines that decision. (10) The party preference, it is affirmed, is largely independent of the concrete electoral programme and even of the actual policy of the party. To use the formula of W.E. Miller, the party serves rather as a point of reference for its followers. (11) In establishing the sources of party identification one puts a great stress on irrational motivation.

The problem being of crucial importance, it certainly deserves further study as it has not been clarified sufficiently. What is certain, in my opinion, is that party identification is closely connected with the party image in the voters' eyes. That image is general enough to grant the party

great freedom of action. Once shaped, it shows itself to be of lasting value, and to a high degree independent of changes in the party's current policy. In this sense we may speak about traditional party affiliation, the party being a reference point to its supporters. But this tradition-rooted support has - as I see the problem - certain definite limits, which limit also the party's independence in face of the political opinions of its electorate. I shall discuss the problem later on more closely.

The third group of factors determining the party independence from the opinions and demands of its electorate is connected with the characteristics of governmental decision-making and popular perception of governmental policy.

The government has to decide on many questions which are never mentioned in electoral platforms, statements, etc.; on questions which were not foreseen, which have arisen suddenly in an unexpected way; on questions of a technical and specialised nature, on which the public has no ideas and no opinions. Consequently, the government (or better - the party in government) has a great freedom of decision on all these issues.

The government, too, notwithstanding the fact that there may exist a clear public opinion on some issue, could be forced by external pressures and circumstances to behave in a different way. No government, even one of superior powers, is immune to such pressures, which constitute the external limits for a virtually representative government.

Further, the government knows that even a very unpopular decision could after some time be forgotten or accepted as a fait accompli. Human memory is rather short, and a conservative attitude inherent in most social groups helps to validate ex post many decisions previously resented. It is only in the pre-election time that a government has to pay greater attention to public opinion, and does so in fact.

Last, not least, the government has to decide often against the mood of popular opinion in the very interest of the nation. There are many examples of popular opinion being false on a vital issue. Some necessary

measure could be very unpopular, as for instance the policy of raising the prices. But representative government does not mean only responsiveness to the demands of the people. It means also leadership, that is the obligation not to respond to popular but unrational demands. There is a chance that after a period of time and experience, the rightfulness of such a decision will be totally accepted by the people.

More generally, the operation of all these groups of factors constitutes a setting in which the principle of representation and representative government must be seen and interpreted. This setting excludes the interpretation of representation in terms of a detailed and ever-binding mandate for government. The notion of imperative mandate is totally inadequate to the modern political situation.

#### IV

I have previously stated as obvious the fact that the party is to a certain degree dependent on its electorate, on public opinion. Let us now examine the factors which cause that dependence.

I have accepted the view that the voters' party preference is determined by the party image. That image, as we know, is general enough to grant the party a great freedom of action. But it cannot be concluded from this statement that the party image and thus the party preference are totally independent of the voters' own political opinions. The greatest shifts in party preferences occur mainly in periods of strong political tensions and re-valuation of accepted values and opinions. This is clearly shown by American studies, the Civil War and the Great Depression of the 1930's being chosen as examples.<sup>(12)</sup> In Europe it was the period following the second world war; in France, in addition, the Algerian crisis (1958). This coincidence seems to indicate some deep connection between the voters' political opinions on crucial social and political issues and their party choice.

The same conclusion could be drawn from the analysis of the party changers and the floating vote. It is generally admitted that such voting behaviour is characteristic of people with the worst information, at the lowest level of education and interest in political life.<sup>(13)</sup> With no opinion of one's own on political issues, however general and vague, there does not exist a party image.

The most characteristic indices are brought by the large scale analysis of voting behaviour. I fully agree with Professor S.M. Lipset that however irrational and accidental may be the individual voting behaviour, group analysis indicates the existence of rationality in the voters' choice.<sup>(14)</sup> The workers tend to vote for the communist and socialist parties. They are greatly over-represented in the electorate of these parties. The middle class in Great Britain, as shown by J. Blondel, votes in a proportion of over 80% for the conservative party.<sup>(15)</sup> The correlation between the economic interests of the social groups and the party preference is obvious.

In spite of his unfamiliarity with the party programmes and the current political issues, the voter forms his party image not as irrationally as is often suggested. Behind his party choice there is a long-run observation of life and governments, his life experience.<sup>(16)</sup> Maybe that cannot be tested by polls, but for this only our present research technique is to blame.<sup>(17)</sup>

This rational correlation between the voters' political predisposition, party image and electoral choice is clearly perceived by the party leaders. I do not mean the elaboration of the party slogans and programmes, which is also correlated with the supposed political preference of the electorate. I mean that the policy options of the parties generally reflect the main preferences of their electorate, particularly in the field of economic policy. In the long run perspective we have seen how changes in the social structure and social status of the large groups of workers in the western countries have influenced in the last three decades the programmes and policy of socialist parties. To a considerable degree, as far as the attitude to the



welfare state was concerned, it has influenced also the options of conservative and liberal parties. That is also true in respect to particular issues, of special importance to the given social group. Let me pick just two examples. The French Radical party, before the second world war, was inclined to pass in government coalitions from the socialists to the moderate right. But as was shown brilliantly by F. Goguel, before each general election the Radicals withdrew from such coalitions and came back to their traditional socialist alliance. (18) In contemporary Italy the Communist party attitude towards religion and the Roman Catholic church is dictated mainly not by doctrinal premises, but by the attitudes held by the communist electorate in that country.

I should conclude this point by two statements. First: the policy of the parties is generally based on corresponding group interests and must be held in consistence with these interests and their perception by the electorate. In this respect the class interpretation of politics is still of the first importance, though it is not sufficient to explain all details of the politics of representation. Secondly: the dependence of the policy of the parties on the attitudes of their electorate is especially marked in issues of particular importance to the given group.

The next factor which contributes to the dependence of the party on the political attitudes of the electorate is the existence of pressure groups. The influence of pressure groups is very often opposed - as illegitimate, as particularistic by definition - to the legitimate influence of the electorate. It has been treated as a challenge to the influence of "public opinion". I am not convinced that this is the right approach. The members of pressure groups are part of the electorate. They express their special interests for which there was no place, or not enough place, in the party programme. They try to ensure the realisation of these interests. The action of pressure groups could be seen as supplementary to the representation by elections. To be sure, these are particular interests. But taken as a whole, they all represent strong and persistent interests of the electorate, which have to be legitimately taken into account by the representative

government. As they are mutually inconsistent, or even antagonistic, the government is in a good position to bargain and look for a compromise. But it is through the pressure groups that the electors have the best chance to influence the policy of government on the issues most vital to them. That is an unequal influence - quite true. That is why the western countries are still capitalist democracies, the influence of capitalist pressure groups being greater than the influence of the others. In individual cases this may undermine the principle of representative government, giving predominance to obviously minority opinions and demands. But in general the operation of the multitude of pressure groups serves to correlate better the action of government with the demands of the people interested in such action.

The last factor I should like to mention here is the willingness of the democratic government to respond to the demands of the public. We cannot deny that such an attitude does exist in democratic countries. It grows from the deep-rooted ideas on society and government, it is the result of long established and experienced traditions of democracy. It is also determined by the very fact, that modern government cannot be run without loyal and willing cooperation by the people concerned. This means also bargaining rather than enforcement as the method of government.

V

This short description of the situation which constitutes the background for the concept of representative mandate makes criticism of this concept legitimate. It seems obvious that the juridical theory of the imperative mandate, however desirable we may hold it, is unrealistic and utopian. The concept of the free mandate, however, is no more realistic. The whole theory of representation built upon either of these principles is not adequate to the political process of modern democracies.

The most important reason for the failure of this theory can be seen in its rather static formulation. The idea of representation is based on the concept of status: of the concordance between two separate and definite

qualities - the will of the represented and the policy of the representatives. In the classical concept there should be a rather metaphysical identity between the will of the Nation (volonté générale) and the action of representatives; In the modern concept there should be a real political identity between the will or opinions of the voters and the action of representatives; to use the famous words of M. Duverger, we have to deal with a model and his portrait or his photograph. (19)

The trouble is that in reality there exists neither the volonté générale nor the model to be photographed. The policy of a government must be, and usually is, coherent and uniform. But on most issues there is no uniform will or opinion of the people or the majority of the people. There are several mutually inconsistent opinions of different groups of people, and a mass of largely uninterested persons. There is a still changing diversity of interests, demands and opinions. If we ask with which opinion the policy of representatives has to be coordinated, the proper answer would be very difficult to find.

The governmental process in a democracy can be conceived rather as an exchange of views, opinions, pressures, between the government and different social groups. Every side tries to influence the other, to win it for his opinion. When we take a single issue, there is usually a group of people interested in it, more active than others and trying to influence the governmental decision. The government must take these demands into account. But it must also realise that the satisfaction of these demands could bring up other, concurring demands of the other group, though these demands do not even exist at the time.

The character of the political process leads me to the conclusion that representation has to be interpreted in terms of a process rather than in terms of a status. I would agree with the definition given by S.M. Lipset that representation is a system of actions which have "to facilitate interchange between authority and the spontaneous groupings of society"; a system which includes "most major attempts to influence authoritative decisions". (20)

In terms of a process, it is a process of interaction between various social groups and the government. The forms of interactions are highly differentiated. For the most part they are carefully organized and planned, but there is also a large margin for rather spontaneous interaction. The main established, institutionalized forms are the elections, the press campaign, the action of pressure groups and political parties, demonstrations, strikes, petitions. Every form is equally legitimate from the standpoint of representation, and no single one is by itself sufficient to achieve the aims of the process of representation.

The political aim of this process is to build up a popular consensus on governmental policy taken as a whole. That is the central idea of democracy, and practically the indispensable condition of every democratic government. The interaction leads to consensus through the creation of a certain similarity between the course of government policy and the attitudes of the people interested in it. There cannot be consensus without this similarity of views and attitudes as to the items of state policy. For people not very much interested in the issue, and for the judgment on the whole policy of the government, no more is needed than the similarity of basic attitudes and shared values. For those more interested in the issue a closer similarity of opinions is required.

Thus, political representation could be interpreted as a process of mutual interaction which creates the similarity of the policy of the government and the attitudes of the people, in the first place those more interested in the given action. The similarity does not mean identity or concordance. It has no relation to the "general will". The degree of similarity will vary in time, on different issues, and in the relation to different social groups. What is required from the representative government, is the continuation of the process of interaction, the opening of all possible channels of interaction and the resulting minimum degree of consensus to the actual policy of the government.

NOTES.

- (1) Though in the formal sense the judgment of the Court was based on considerations derived from the principle of federalism, the arguments concerning the theory of representation were largely discussed. See Die Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Bd.8, p. 116-118. See also my paper (in Polish) "The Parliament and the People in the Federal Germany", in Zeszyty Naukowe UJ - zeszyty prawnicze No. 6, Cracow 1959 (English summary).
- (2) See President de Gaulle's letter to the President of the National Assembly, Le Monde, 19.3.1960.
- (3) K. Marx, The Civil War in France (Pol.ed. Dzieła Wybrane, t.I, p. 489).
- (4) Die Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Bd.2, p. 72 ff, and Bd.5, p.392.
- (5) G. Leibholz, Der Strukturwandel der modernen Demokratie, C.F. Müller Verlag, Karlsruhe, particularly p. 13.
- (6) See my paper (in Polish, with English summary) "On the interpretation of constitutional principles and of corresponding legal concepts", in Zeszyty Naukowe UJ - zeszyty prawnicze No. 10, Cracow, 1963.
- (7) In my book Representation in the modern states of capitalist democracy, Cracow, 1962 (in Polish, with an English summary).
- (8) See, e.g., S. Rokkan, "The comparative study of political participation", in A. Ranney, ed., Essays on the behavioral study of politics. Urbana, Ill., 1962, p. 51.
- (9) For the attempt to define the notion of the party image see J. Blondel, La société politique britannique, A. Colin, Paris, 1964, pp. 79-80.
- (10) A. Campbell et al., The American voter, an abridgment, J. Wiley, New York, 1964, p. 73.
- (11) W.E. Miller, "Party preference and attitudes on political issues", in American Political Science Review, March 1953, p. 50.
- (12) A. Campbell, op.cit., p. 278.
- (13) J. Blondel, op.cit., p. 69.
- (14) S.M. Lipset, Soziologie der Demokratie, Luchterhand Verlag (German ed. of Political man), p. 307.
- (15) J. Blondel, op.cit., p. 54-56.

- (16) In this sense also A.H. Birch, Representative and responsible government, Allen and Unwin, London, p.186.
- (17) I agree with the criticism of current research techniques by D.E. Butler, The study of political behaviour, London, 1958, pp. 63-65.
- (18) F. Goguel, La politique des partis sous la IIIe République, Paris, 1946.
- (19) M. Duverger, Les partis politiques, 3e éd. Paris, 1958, p. 409.
- (20) S.M. Lipset, "Party systems and the representation of social groups", in European Journal of Sociology, No. 1, 1960, p. 51.

SUMMARY

This paper analyses the relation between the electors and their representatives on a broader basis of general theory of representation. According with the realities of the political process in most modern states, the notion of the political party is being substituted for the individual representative. Therefore I discuss the problem of the relation between the political party or government (i.e. the party in government) and its electorate as the proper problem of political representation.

Most constitutions and respective constitutional ideologies are still based on the two opposite notions of the "free mandate" and the "imperative mandate". Upon closer observation of the political process in modern democracies (capitalist and socialist as well) we are led to the conclusion that there are rather two opposite trends in the relation between the parties and the electorate, than two opposite situations to which the notion of "mandate" could be applied. The relative strength of each of these trends is difficult to measure, but we can identify the trends and their sources. It is the trend towards party independence in relation to its voters, and the second one, towards closer control of the electorate on the policy pursued by the party. In the paper I am examining briefly the sources of these trends and their manifestations. As a result I consider as obviously misleading to apply to the theory of representation a notion as rigid as that of "mandate" (either free or imperative).

Thus, I propose to define representation in terms of a process, including both of the mentioned trends. The relation between the electorate and the party consists in a process of interactions by which is created a certain similarity between the political attitudes, demands and opinions of the electorate and the attitudes and policy of the party. This similarity is created by various means and forms of interaction, not only in the electoral process. Once created this similarity serves as a basis for popular consensus to the policy of the government.

RÉSUMÉ

Le rapport analyse la relation existant entre les électeurs et leurs représentants sur la base plus large d'une théorie générale de la représentation. Conformément aux réalités du processus politique tel qu'il se déroule dans la plupart des États modernes, la notion de parti politique tend à se substituer à celle du représentant individuel. J'examine donc le problème de la relation entre le parti politique ou le gouvernement (c'est-à-dire le parti au pouvoir) et son électorat comme le véritable problème de la représentation politique.

La plupart des constitutions et des idéologies constitutionnelles correspondantes sont encore fondées sur les deux concepts opposés de "mandat libre" et de "mandat impératif". Un examen attentif du processus politique dans les démocraties modernes (capitalistes et aussi socialistes) nous amène à la conclusion qu'il existe deux tendances de sens contraire dans la relation entre les partis et l'électorat, plutôt que deux situations opposées auxquelles puisse être appliquée la notion de "mandat". Il est difficile de mesurer la force de chacune de ces tendances, mais on peut les identifier et en préciser les sources. Il s'agit de la tendance à l'indépendance du parti à l'égard de ses électeurs, et de la tendance à un contrôle plus étroit exercé par le corps électoral sur la politique pratiquée par le parti. Dans mon rapport j'examine brièvement les sources de ces tendances et leurs manifestations. Je conclus de cet examen qu'il est erroné d'appliquer à la théorie de la représentation une notion aussi rigide que celle de "mandat" (libre ou impératif).

Je propose donc de définir la représentation comme un processus englobant les deux tendances mentionnées ci-dessus. La relation entre le corps électoral et le parti s'analyse comme un processus d'interaction créant une certaine similitude entre les attitudes politiques, les demandes et les opinions du corps électoral, et les attitudes et la politique du parti. Cette similitude est créée par divers moyens et diverses formes d'interaction, et non seulement au cours du processus électoral. Une fois créée, la similitude sert de base au consentement populaire à la politique du gouvernement.



"Théorie et pratique de la représentation"

THEORIE ET PRATIQUE DE LA REPRESENTATION

EN ROUMANIE

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La proclamation, le 30 décembre 1947, de la république/roumaine , a marqué un moment historique de grande importance pour le développement de l'Etat roumain, tant du point de vue de son essence que du point de vue de sa forme de gouvernement. La lutte des forces sociales progressistes et démocratiques, ayant à leur tête la classe ouvrière et son parti - qui, par l'insurrection armée du 23 août 1944, a renversé la dictature militaire - fasciste, libérant la Roumanie du joug fasciste - a enregistré des succès remarquables contre les forces réactionnaires et conservatrices sur la voie du passage à un régime démocratique. Le 6 mars 1945 a été institué le gouvernement de large concentration démocratique et en novembre 1946 a été réorganisée la représentation nationale liquidée par le fascisme, une Assemblée de députés, le parlement démocratique du pays, étant élue. L'abolition de la monarchie et la proclamation de la République par l'Assemblée des députés, à la fin de l'année 1947, a constitué la conquête de tout le pouvoir d'Etat par les travailleurs, la transformation de la Roumanie en un Etat de type socialiste ayant pour tâche principale d'élever le peuple à un niveau toujours plus haut de civilisation et de culture, par le passage au socialisme.

De profondes transformations économiques, politiques et socio-culturelles se sont produites en une période historique courte, dont le résultat est la victoire complète et définitive du socialisme - la liquidation de l'exploitation et de l'oppression sociale et nationale - l'élévation du niveau de vie matériel et culturel du peuple tout entier, l'instauration d'un régime de larges droits et libertés démocratiques.

Les trois constitutions socialistes de Roumanie - de 1948, 1952 et 1965 - tout en reflétant successivement les transformations de la structure socio-économique, ont créé en même temps le cadre juridique fondamental pour le développement multilatéral de la société et ont marqué l'évolution de l'Etat et du droit dans la voie de l'extension et de l'approfondissement des principes de la démocratie socialiste.

La plénitude du pouvoir unique et souverain du peuple.

La Roumanie est une république socialiste, un Etat des travailleurs des villes et des campagnes où les relations de production socialiste sont généralisées, où est supprimée de manière définitive et sous toute forme l'exploitation, et où sont ainsi créées les conditions de la répartition selon la quantité et la qualité du travail fourni.

L'essence de l'ordre social et d'Etat est fondée sur le principe constitutionnel de la plénitude du pouvoir unique et souverain du peuple et l'organisation de l'Etat; ses fonctions, ainsi que le but même de toute l'activité sociale et d'Etat, sont l'expression de ce principe constitutionnel. Dès son premier article, la nouvelle constitution fait ressortir que tout le système de l'organisation de l'Etat et de l'activité de ses organes est basé sur ce principe, caractérisant la République Socialiste de Roumanie comme un Etat des travailleurs des villes et des campagnes. Les rapports entre les classes et les catégories sociales de la nouvelle société étant des rapports propres entre classes et catégories sociales sans caractère exploiteur, les termes de cet article " les travailleurs des villes et des campagnes " définissent le caractère homogène de la société, toute la nation, le peuple tout entier étant constitués de classes et couches sociales amies : la classe ouvrière, la paysannerie, les intellectuels et autres catégories de travailleurs, sans distinction de nationalité.

La signification politique et juridique du principe de la plénitude du pouvoir unique et souverain du peuple peut être mieux comprise à la lumière des transformations sociales, économiques et politiques réalisées au cours de la révolution. Le contenu de ces transformations a été déterminé par le transfert des moyens de production en propriété socialiste (d'Etat et coopérative). Le contenu économique du pouvoir du peuple est précisé par l'art. 5 de la Constitution, qui consacre la propriété socialiste des moyens de production comme base unique de l'économie nationale.

Les éléments qui définissent la plénitude du pouvoir unique et souverain du peuple sont mis en évidence par les principes de l'organisation de l'Etat, principes qui expriment la conception de l'organisation sociale-politique de la Roumanie socialiste. C'est la conception selon laquelle le but suprême de toute l'activité sociale et étatique est la protection effective de l'homme, les valeurs les plus hautes étant pour l'ensemble de la société, la vie et la liberté de l'homme, la garantie de ses droits fondamentaux - droits qui deviennent de plus en plus étendus et plus riches en leur contenu - l'affirmation multilatérale de la personnalité humaine ( voir l'art. 13 de la Constitution ).

A la différence des constitutions de l'Occident ( qui organisent l'Etat sur la base du principe de la séparation des pouvoirs ), la Constitution de la République Socialiste de Roumanie consacre le principe du pouvoir unique comme expression du pouvoir indivisible et inaliénable du peuple. Bien sûr, ce principe n'exclut pas, mais au contraire implique une organisation de l'Etat et une spécialisation fonctionnelle de ses organes, afin d'effectuer les formes fondamentales de l'activité nécessaire pour réaliser le pouvoir populaire unique : l'exercice du pouvoir, l'administration, la justice, la surveillance du respect de la loi. Chacune de ces activités est réalisée par une catégorie déterminée d'organes, mais qui ne constituent pas des pouvoirs distincts, car ils sont tous des formes d'organisation par l'intermédiaire desquels le pouvoir unique du peuple est réalisé. En Roumanie est donc supprimé l'antagonisme entre les gouvernants et les gouvernés, car le peuple, qui est le détenteur du pouvoir, l'exerce lui-même par des organes qu'il élit et contrôle.

La démocratie représentative. Il est évident que le facteur décisif d'une organisation démocratique est que le peuple détient la plénitude du pouvoir. Pour le réaliser d'une manière conséquente, il est aussi évident qu'une organisation étatique qui puisse assurer les conditions les plus favorables pour la participation des citoyens à la réalisation du pouvoir d'Etat est nécessaire. Dans ce sens, la théorie et la pratique politique en

Roumanie sont fondées sur la conception que la démocratie socialiste doit utiliser elle aussi les institutions représentatives. Mais à la base de l'organisation de la représentation il y a des principes nouveaux qui découlent de la corrélation de la conception politique socialiste avec les exigences concrètes de la vie dans les différentes périodes du développement de la société, le but final de tous ces principes étant le perfectionnement continu des formes d'organisation destinées à assurer l'activation politique des masses de citoyens et leur formation à la direction des affaires publiques et sociales.

Selon les termes de l'art. 4 de la Constitution, le peuple exerce son pouvoir par la Grande Assemblée Nationale et les conseils populaires. En Roumanie, la démocratie est donc représentative. Mais cette démocratie représentative présente certains traits qui lui sont propres, concernant spécialement les principes de son organisation et leur application, traits qui la caractérisent comme une démocratie représentative socialiste : l'existence de deux catégories d'organes représentatifs; les caractéristiques du système électoral; la nature juridique du mandat des députés; la position et le rôle des organes représentatifs dans le système des organes de l'Etat; le rôle du Parti Communiste Roumain en sa qualité de force politique directrice de toute la société; la démocratie représentative est complétée par l'entraînement des larges masses populaires à la direction des affaires publiques et à l'accomplissement des tâches complexes de l'édification de la société socialiste.

L'existence de deux catégories d'organes représentatifs. En Roumanie fonctionnent deux catégories d'organes représentatifs qui sont liés et subordonnés entre eux, formant le système des organes du pouvoir d'Etat : la Grande Assemblée Nationale et les conseils populaires. Distincts du point de vue de leur base électorale et, de là, par leur position dans le système des organes de l'Etat, ainsi que par leur nature et l'étendue de leurs attributions, la Grande Assemblée Nationale et les conseils populaires sont des

organes de même essence, organes qui, ensemble, donnent l'image de la réalisation du gouvernement représentatif. C'est justement en considération de cette essence commune que la Constitution précise que la Grande Assemblée Nationale et les conseils populaires constituent la base de tout le système des organes de l'Etat ( art. 4)

#### Les caractéristiques du système électoral.

L'instauration du pouvoir populaire a permis la suppression de toutes les limites du droit de vote qui existaient sous l'ancien régime et l'organisation du système électoral le plus démocratique de l'histoire de la Roumanie. Le système électoral a à sa base des principes nouveaux en ce qui concerne le droit d'élire et d'être élu, aussi bien que l'organisation et le développement de toutes les opérations électorales.

La Constitution et la loi électorale<sup>(1)</sup> prévoient que le vote est universel, égal, direct et secret.

L'exercice du droit d'élire et d'être élu député constitue la forme principale de la participation du peuple à la réalisation de son pouvoir d'Etat. Ce droit est assuré à tout citoyen ayant 18 ans révolus; l'âge exigé pour être élu est de 23 ans révolus. En ce qui concerne l'évolution du droit de vote, il convient de mentionner que la Constitution de 1948 a abaissé l'âge pour l'exercice du droit de vote de 20 à 18 ans. Le progrès de la société dans la voie du socialisme a déterminé en 1956 la suppression de la catégorie d'indignes au droit de vote (2) ( restriction qui, d'ailleurs, s'appliquait à un nombre réduit de personnes ). C'est ainsi que depuis 1956 ont le droit de vote tous les citoyens majeurs - sans considération de race, nationalité, sexe, religion, degré de culture, origine ou durée de résidence- à l'exception des aliénés et des débilés mentaux, ainsi que des personnes privées de ce droit pour une durée fixée par une condamnation judiciaire. (3) Il est important de mentionner aussi l'introduction du scrutin uninominal pour toutes les élections, scrutin qui rend possible l'existence d'une liaison plus directe, organique et concrète entre les électeurs et leurs candidats et ensuite entre

les électeurs d'une circonscription et leur élu (4).

Le rôle actif des masses populaires s'affirme aussi en ce qui concerne l'organisation de la direction et du contrôle de toutes les opérations des élections. Les nombreuses commissions électorales - territoriales, des circonscriptions et des sections de vote - ayant pour attributions l'organisation, la direction et le contrôle du développement des élections - sont formées des représentants des organisations des travailleurs, ainsi que de personnes désignées par les assemblées des travailleurs des entreprises, institutions, coopératives agricoles de production, unités militaires. Dans le cadre de ces commissions de vraies masses de citoyens participent à l'organisation des élections, à l'examen du respect des conditions légales concernant la proposition des candidats, à l'organisation des sections de vote, au contrôle du respect strict des dispositions légales sur les élections, etc... (5)

Pour apprécier le caractère du système électoral de la Roumanie, l'organisation de la proposition des candidats est d'une signification toute particulière. La proposition des candidatures est organisée de manière que les citoyens puissent désigner librement comme candidats aux élections les personnes dont le résultat de leur activité professionnelle et publique, ainsi que les mérites et la formation, les indiquent comme étant dignes et capables d'être leurs représentants à la Grande Assemblée Nationale ou aux conseils populaires. Le droit de proposer des candidatures est reconnu à toutes les organisations des travailleurs : les organisations du Parti Communiste Roumain, les syndicats, les organisations de la jeunesse, des femmes, les associations culturelles, et à d'autres organisations sociales. La proposition des candidats est faite, dans chaque circonscription électorale, par les organisations des travailleurs réunis en assemblées populaires, au sein des entreprises et organisations économiques, des coopératives agricoles de production, des institutions, des unités sociales, culturelles, des unités militaires, des villages et quartiers de villes. Pour chaque circonscription électorale les

assemblées peuvent proposer un ou plusieurs candidats. Tout citoyen ou organisation sociale a le droit de faire des contestations aux commissions électorales des circonscriptions, contre l'admission ou le refus d'une candidature. On peut donc affirmer que la proposition des candidats constitue une étape des plus importantes, en tant que première vérification et appréciation des candidats. Elle est publique et basée sur une large participation des citoyens qui apprécient avec un vif esprit de responsabilité les qualités de la personne dont la candidature est mise en discussion. En même temps, la désignation des candidats démontre la préoccupation qu'aux organes du pouvoir d'Etat soit représenté le peuple tout entier, considéré comme une réalité sociologique concrète ainsi que toutes les classes et toutes les catégories sociales, les hommes de tous les âges, les professions, etc... (6).

La loi exige pour la validité des élections la présence de la moitié plus un du nombre des électeurs et, pour être élu, le candidat doit obtenir au moins la moitié plus un du total des votes valablement exprimés. (7)

Lorsque dans la même circonscription électorale il y a plusieurs candidats et qu'aucun n'a obtenu ce quorum, la commission électorale déclare un ballottage entre les deux candidats réunissant le plus grand nombre de suffrages et décide de nouvelles élections.

Il est important de souligner que l'existence d'un seul parti en Roumanie - le Parti Communiste Roumain - ne constitue pas un obstacle à une représentation réelle. En effet, dans le processus des élections, le système de la représentation a été assuré dès le début et continue à l'être par la participation de toutes les classes sociales. Pour assurer cette participation, un rôle important revient au Front de la Démocratie Populaire, qui réunit toutes les organisations des travailleurs ( le Parti Communiste Roumain, les syndicats, les organisations coopératives, de la jeunesse, des femmes, des associations des hommes de science et des arts, ainsi que d'autres organisations sociales, représentant toutes les couches sociales )



Le Front de la Démocratie Populaire établit les tâches des nouveaux organes élus ( sous la forme du manifeste électoral du Front de la Démocratie Populaire ), tâches qui constituent le contenu du mandat des électeurs pour leurs élus. Les candidats des organisations sociales deviennent donc les candidats du Front de la Démocratie Populaire. (8)

#### La nature juridique du mandat des députés.

Les rapports entre les électeurs et les députés sont des rapports de représentation spécifiquement socialistes. Sans être impératif, le mandat des députés présente les traits caractéristiques de la démocratie représentative socialiste, découlant du principe que par l'élection des députés et donc par la formation des organes représentatifs le peuple n'aliène pas son pouvoir. Les organes représentatifs exercent le pouvoir, les députés participent à son exercice; mais son titulaire et détenteur unique est le peuple. Le corps électoral constitue un corps de volonté qui ne se limite pas à l'élection des députés, car il garde son rôle important après les élections et en permanence. En effet, le corps électoral exprime sa volonté en liaison avec l'activité des députés et des organes représentatifs en des assemblées publiques, qui organisées avec la présence des députés, avant et après les sessions des organes représentatifs. D'autre part, les électeurs vérifient l'activité des députés et, par leur intermédiaire, l'activité des organes représentatifs, en des réunions publiques qui ont lieu dans chaque circonscription électorale au moins deux fois par an. Cette obligation expresse, prévue par la Constitution, est scrupuleusement respectée, chaque député étant tenu de présenter des comptes-rendus sur sa propre activité et sur l'activité de l'organe représentatif auquel il appartient, et aussi d'informer cet organe sur les principaux problèmes débattus dans les réunions. (9)

#### La position et le rôle des organes représentatifs dans le système des organes de l'Etat.

Les organes du pouvoir d'Etat occupent la position dominante

dans le système des organes de l'Etat; et leur rôle s'accroît au cours du processus du perfectionnement de la démocratie représentative.

La Grande Assemblée Nationale, l'organe représentatif de tous les citoyens, est l'organe suprême du pouvoir d'Etat. Elle décide sur tous les problèmes à caractère général de politique interne et externe, exerce la direction suprême et le contrôle général de toute l'activité étatique, est le seul organe législatif. La Grande Assemblée Nationale, ainsi que les conseils populaires, exercent leurs attributions pendant toute la durée de leur mandat car les autres organes n'ont pas le droit de les dissoudre de même qu'ils ne peuvent décider en aucune manière la cessation de leur propre activité.

La Grande Assemblée Nationale a le droit exclusif d'exercer le contrôle général de l'application de la Constitution; elle élit et révoque le Conseil d'Etat et les organes supérieurs de toutes les catégories d'organes de l'Etat, contrôle leur activité avec droit d'annuler les actes illégaux (10); exerce le contrôle général de l'activité des conseils populaires. La forme générale du contrôle est le débat sur les comptes rendus que les organes soumis à son contrôle sont obligés de lui présenter. Aux dernières sessions, le Conseil d'Etat et le Conseil des Ministres ont présenté régulièrement des comptes-rendus de leur activité. (11).

La Grande Assemblée Nationale est l'unique organe législatif. La sphère de son activité législative est illimitée, car elle a le droit de légiférer sur la totalité du domaine des relations sociales, et la loi est son oeuvre exclusive. Mais, organe représentatif, donc organe qui exerce le pouvoir, la Grande Assemblée Nationale, a l'obligation de réaliser l'activité législative dans le respect des principes et des normes constitutionnels. C'est ainsi que, tout en consacrant la suprématie de la Constitution, la nouvelle loi fondamentale établit la règle que seule la Grande Assemblée Nationale décide de la constitutionnalité des lois (12). De même, la Grande Assemblée Nationale ne peut pas déléguer ses attributions législatives et n'a pas le droit de restreindre sa compétence au profit de l'exécutif.

Afin d'assurer la réalisation en permanence de quelques-unes des attributions que la Grande Assemblée Nationale exerce en session, spécialement les attributions de contrôle général, et d'émettre certaines normes juridiques à caractère urgent, <sup>il</sup> existe le Conseil d'Etat. Formé exclusivement de députés élus par la Grande Assemblée Nationale, le Conseil d'Etat est une expression concentrée de la Grande Assemblée Nationale correspondant à sa qualité d'organe suprême du pouvoir d'Etat. Mais, quoiqu'organe suprême du pouvoir, le Conseil d'Etat a une position différente de celle de la Grande Assemblée Nationale et il ne la remplace pas dans l'exercice de ses attributions. Il est qualifié par la Constitution d'organe suprême du pouvoir d'Etat ayant une activité permanente, subordonné à la Grande Assemblée Nationale, responsable devant elle de toute son activité et révocable, pour sa totalité ou pour chacun de ses membres, par la Grande Assemblée Nationale. Le Conseil d'Etat exerce en permanence les attributions qui reviennent habituellement au chef de l'Etat et, entre les sessions de la Grande Assemblée Nationale, il exerce la direction et le contrôle général de l'activité de tous les organes d'Etat (13), il nomme et révoque les membres du Conseil de Ministres (14), le président et les membres du Tribunal Suprême, les dirigeants des organes centraux de l'administration d'Etat qui ne font pas partie du Conseil des ministres.

Spécialement caractéristiques du point de vue de leur nature et de la modalité <sup>selon laquelle</sup> elles s'exercent, sont les attributions reconnues au Conseil d'Etat, d'émettre, entre les sessions de la Grande Assemblée Nationale, des décrets contenant des normes ayant force de loi. Ces décrets se distinguent des décrets-lois de l'Occident par leur nature, par la sphère des relations sociales qu'ils peuvent réglementer et par leur caractère temporaire. En effet, émis par un organe suprême du pouvoir d'Etat ( et non pas par le gouvernement ) leurs dispositions ont la force juridique des dispositions légales sans être toutefois des dispositions légales, en tant qu'oeuvre d'un organe subordonné à la Grande Assemblée Nationale. D'autre part, la sphère de réglementation de ces décrets est limitée ( 15 ). Enfin, les normes ayant force de loi contenues dans les décrets ont un caractère temporaire car les décrets doivent être soumis aux débats de la première session de la

Grande Assemblée Nationale, conformément à la procédure d'adoption des lois.

Il faut ajouter encore, pour avoir une vue exacte du processus de croissance du rôle de la Grande Assemblée Nationale, que si cet organe tient deux sessions par an - dont la durée est relativement réduite - la Grande Assemblée Nationale développe une activité permanente par l'intermédiaire de ses commissions permanentes. En effet, les commissions permanentes, dont les membres sont élus parmi les députés, ont une activité soutenue entre les sessions de la Grande Assemblée Nationale : elles ont le droit de préparer de leur propre initiative des projets de lois; elles peuvent entendre, périodiquement ou relativement à chaque problème, les informations fournies par les dirigeants de tout organe de l'administration d'Etat, de la Procuration et du Tribunal Suprême, concernant l'activité de ces organes; elles étudient les pétitions adressées à la Grande Assemblée Nationale par les citoyens, relatives à des problèmes d'intérêt général ou personnel. Mais une faculté des commissions permanentes qui montre aussi la croissance du rôle de la Grande Assemblée Nationale est celle d'étudier et de donner des avis sur les projets de décrets contenant des normes ayant force de loi, et sur ceux destinés à interpréter les lois, ainsi que sur d'autres textes qui leur sont transmis à cet effet par le président de la Grande Assemblée Nationale. Le fait caractéristique qu'il faut retenir est que la faculté reconnue au Conseil d'Etat de demander aux commissions permanentes leur avis sur les projets de décrets est devenue une pratique constante (16). De cette manière, les commissions permanentes ont l'occasion de vérifier deux fois les décrets contenant des normes à force de loi : sous la forme de projets de décrets et sous la forme des décrets qui sont soumis à l'adoption et transformation en lois par la Grande Assemblée Nationale.

Les Conseils populaires, organes représentatifs dans les circonscriptions administratives - territoriales (régions, districts, villes et communes rurales) sont des organes locaux du pouvoir d'Etat et elles ont, parmi leurs attributions principales, la direction de l'activité locale - assurant le développement économique, social-culturel et édilitaire des unités

administratives - territoriales dans lesquelles ils ont été élus - ainsi que l'organisation de la participation des citoyens à la solution sur le plan local des affaires d'Etat et sociales.

### Le rôle du Parti Communiste Roumain.

Une caractéristique importante de la représentation en Roumanie, qui assure la pratique d'une démocratie réelle, est qu'elle est réalisée dans les conditions du principe constitutionnel du rôle directeur du Parti Communiste Roumain dans tous les domaines de la construction socialiste.

En effet, ce parti réunit dans ses rangs les citoyens les plus avancés, des ouvriers, paysans et intellectuels ( au total 1.700.000 membres). Par toute son activité, il s'est affirmé le facteur politique fondamental, qui a assuré l'édification de la société nouvelle. Convaincu par sa propre expérience que ce parti exprime ses intérêts vitaux, le peuple le considère comme dirigeant unique de la nation roumaine socialiste.

Sa qualité de parti de gouvernement et de force politique dirigeante de la société implique sa grande responsabilité pour tout ce qui se réalise et l'oblige à prendre des mesures politiques et d'organisation nécessaires à la réalisation du programme adopté par toute la nation. La direction exercée par le parti est une direction politique, qui se réalise par des moyens propres au démocratisme. Le parti élabore sa ligne politique et établit les mesures nécessaires à sa réalisation par une consultation permanente des masses. Il ne se substitue pas aux organes de l'Etat, sa direction politique ne réduit pas le rôle des institutions représentatives. Au contraire, dans ses relations avec les organes de l'Etat, avec les organes représentatifs, il poursuit le perfectionnement des forces de l'organisation et de l'activité de l'Etat, l'approfondissement des principes démocratiques d'activité de ces organes, la participation toujours plus large des masses, de tous les citoyens, qu'ils soient ou non membres du parti. " Les grandes responsabilités qui lui reviennent en qualité de force dirigeante de la société - soulignait Nicolae Ceausescu, le secrétaire général du parti -

exigent du parti d'assurer l'élévation graduelle des masses au niveau de la conscience et de la responsabilité sociales de ses membres, de développer une action dirigée vers la transformation de tout citoyen en un militant actif pour le progrès de la société, pour la prospérité de la patrie ".

Aux organes représentatifs sont élus beaucoup de citoyens qui ne sont pas membres du parti. D'autre part, c'est la Grande Assemblée Nationale qui approuve et adopte en dernière instance les actes par lesquels est établie la ligne générale de la politique interne et externe de l'Etat.

La corrélation de la démocratie représentative avec l'entraînement des masses à la direction des affaires publiques.

La démocratie socialiste représentative de la Roumanie est complétée par l'entraînement des masses à l'activité de tous les organes de l'Etat et à la solution des problèmes complexes de la construction socialiste.

Parmi les formes d'entraînement des citoyens à l'activité de l'Etat qui ont une application de plus en plus extensive, on peut citer : l'activité des citoyens dans le cadre des organes auxiliaires des organes de l'Etat ( spécialement les commissions permanentes fonctionnant auprès des conseils populaires ) ; l'organisation de réunions en différents domaines d'activité entre la direction étatique et les cadres des professions; les débats publics sur les actes d'Etat à adopter; le soutien des organisations sociales à l'activité des organes de l'Etat, etc... .

Une ampleur spéciale a été donnée au système de large consultation des citoyens sur les plus importants problèmes internes et internationaux, sur les projets de loi et sur les mesures à prendre en vue d'assurer le progrès rapide et multilatéral du pays. Au cours des dernières années, par exemple, - et c'est une tendance qui s'accroît - ont eu lieu de larges débats publics, avec la participation d'un grand nombre de citoyens, sur les projets de di-

rectives du nouveau plan quinquennal, sur la Constitution, sur la loi sur les pensions ( 17 ), le statut des coopératives de production, etc... . L'adoption de ces actes par les organes compétents constitue l'expression en forme directe de la volonté, de l'esprit créateur et des intérêts du peuple tout entier.

Un aspect important de la démocratie socialiste est la corrélation de l'activité d'Etat et de l'activité sociale, l'entraînement des masses populaires à la vie politique et sociale par l'intermédiaire des organisations sociales, dont le rôle et l'importance augmentent dans la période actuelle. Il s'agit des organisations syndicales, de la jeunesse, des femmes, sociales et culturelles, scientifiques, techniques, sportives, etc... , qui réunissent un nombre si grand de personnes qu'on est en droit d'affirmer qu'aucun citoyen ne reste en dehors de ces organisations. Ces organisations agissent effectivement, ayant un rôle important aussi bien dans la formation des organes représentatifs qu'en ce qui concerne la réalisation des tâches nombreuses de la construction socialiste.

+ + +

Nous espérons que cet exposé de quelques aspects théoriques et pratiques de la représentation en Roumanie sera utile pour les débats du Congrès.

NOTES

1.-

La loi n° 9/1952 pour l'élection des députés à la Grande Assemblée Nationale ( avec les modifications introduites par la loi n° 7/1956), le Décret n° 460/1960 et la loi n° 3/1964 ainsi que le décret n° 39I/1953 concernant les élections des députés aux conseils populaires ( avec les modifications introduites par les décrets n° 609/1957, n° 449/1960 , n° 460/1960 et n° 963/1962 ) ont été remplacés par un acte normatif unique, la loi n° 28/1966 concernant l'élection des députés à la Grande Assemblée Nationale et aux conseils populaires.

2.-

Conformément aux dispositions des lois électorales de 1952 et 1953 étaient considérés indignes les anciens grands propriétaires fonciers, industriels, banquiers, grands commerçants et les condamnés pour crimes de guerre ou contre la paix et l'humanité. Mais ces restrictions n'étaient pas rigides, car elles s'appliquaient surtout aux éléments qui se manifestaient hostiles. D'autre part, les lois exceptaient de ces catégories de déchéance les personnes ayant des mérites spéciaux, par exemple les professeurs, les anciens combattants de la guerre contre le nazisme, les étudiants et les élèves, les personnes ayant une activité scientifique, technique et artistique etc...

3.-

Quelques données comparatives sont, nous l'estimons, significatives : le nombre des participants au vote était de 3.071.695 en 1937, ce qui représentait 1/6 de la population, tandis qu'aux élections de 1965, le nombre des votants était de 12.855.590, représentant 2/3 de la population ( environ 19.000.000 habitants ); aux élections de 1946 ont participé 7.859.212 citoyens, à celles de 1953 pour les conseils populaires, le nombre des électeurs était de 10 .252.513, aux élections de 1957 pour la Grande Assemblée Nationale ce nombre a augmenté à 11.533.690 et aux élections de



1961 il était de 12.417.800.

4.-

Les élections de 1948 ont été effectuées / <sup>sur</sup> la base du scrutin de liste. Ce scrutin a été remplacé par le scrutin uninominal dès les élections de 1953. Quant aux élections des conseils populaires, le scrutin uninominal a été introduit dès les premières élections ( 1950 ) à l'exception des conseils populaires des communes rurales ( le scrutin uninominal étant introduit aux élections de 1953 ).

5.-

Pour les élections des députés de la Grande Assemblée Nationale et de conseils populaires du 7 mars 1965 ont été organisées 156.260 commissions électorales dont le nombre de leurs membres s'est élevé à 520.000 citoyens.

6.-

Par sa composition, la Grande Assemblée Nationale est d'une manière effective et réelle l'organe représentatif de tous les citoyens du pays. En effet, au parlement sont représentées toutes les classes et catégories sociales, toutes les nationalités, de même que sont représentés tous les cultes et toutes les professions, donc tous les citoyens, de tout âge et sans distinction de nationalité, race, sexe ou religion. C'est ainsi que des 465 députés, 218 sont ouvriers ( 47 pour cent ), 58 paysans ( 11,5 pour cent ) et 193 des intellectuels ( 41,5 pour cent ); 67 sont des femmes - ouvrières, paysannes, intellectuelles; 85,6 pour cent sont des Roumains et 14,4 des représentants des minorités nationales; 234 députés travaillent dans les entreprises, transports, chantiers, unités agricoles, hôpitaux, institutions d'Etat; sont représentés au parlement tous les cultes religieux, les cadres de l'armée, les cadres de tous les degrés de l'enseignement, des activités dans les domaines de la culture, de la science et des arts; 185

députés occupent des fonctions de direction dans les organes centraux et locaux de l'Etat, des organisations du parti et des organisations sociales; 136 députés ont moins de 35 ans, 226 ont de 35 à 50 ans et 121 ont dépassé l'âge de 50 ans.

7.-

Aux élections pour les conseils populaires du 5 mars 1967, un nombre de 7 candidats n'ayant pas obtenu la majorité légale n'ont pas été déclarés élus.

8.-

L'existence du Front de la Démocratie Populaire contribue à la participation active des citoyens aux élections, ainsi qu'à leur vote massif pour les candidats proposés; aux élections de 1965, par exemple, du total des votes exprimés, 99,85 pour cent ont été accordés pour les candidats du Front de la Démocratie Populaire; à la Grande Assemblée Nationale et 99,68 pour cent aux candidats de ce Front aux élections des conseils populaires. Aux élections des députés aux conseils populaires des communes rurales ( qui ont lieu à chaque deux ans ), du 5 mars 1967, ont voté pour les candidats du Front de la Démocratie Populaire 99,58 pour cent du total des électeurs.

9.-

A ces réunions, ainsi qu'à celles convoquées pour la proposition des candidatures, les citoyens exposent leurs opinions sur les problèmes d'intérêt général. Ainsi, dans la période électorale de 1965 ont participé aux réunions publiques un chiffre d'électeurs dépassant 10.000.000, ont pris la parole plus de 500.000. électeurs et plus de 176.000 propositions ont été faites, dont 30.000 ont été résolus avant les élections.

10.-

En ce qui concerne le contrôle de l'activité du Tribunal Suprême, il faut faire distinction entre le contrôle de la Grande Assemblée

Nationale sur l'activité de jugement du Tribunal Suprême et le contrôle sur son activité d'interprétation de la loi. Considérant que, conformément aux dispositions constitutionnelles ( art. 104 ), les juges sont indépendants dans leur activité de jugement et ne se soumettent qu'à la loi, le contrôle de la Grande Assemblée Nationale sur cette forme d'activité du Tribunal Suprême est limité : elle entend les comptes-rendus concernant l'activité judiciaire afin de prendre par voie législative les mesures nécessaires. Quant aux décisions ayant caractère de directives, elles ne constituent pas des décisions à caractère judiciaire, mais des actes par lesquels le Tribunal Suprême aide l'activité des tribunaux tenant compte de la pratique judiciaire à la lumière des dispositions légales. Vu que le Tribunal Suprême fait dans ces cas oeuvre d'interprétation de la loi et que l'interprétation générale et obligatoire de la loi est, conformément à la constitution, une attribution exclusive des organes suprêmes du pouvoir d'Etat, la Grande Assemblée Nationale et, entre ses sessions, le Conseil d'Etat, ont le droit, dans l'exercice du contrôle, d'annuler ces décisions du Tribunal Suprême.

11.-

A la session de décembre 1966, le Conseil d'Etat a fait à l'occasion de la présentation aux fins d'adoption des décrets, contenant des normes ayant force de loi, un compte rendu de son activité. De même, le Conseil des Ministres a fait, à l'occasion de la présentation du projet de loi pour l'adoption du plan d'Etat de l'économie nationale pour 1967, un compte rendu de l'exécution du plan de 1966. De même, à la session de juillet 1967, le Conseil d'Etat et le Conseil des Ministres ont présenté des comptes-rendus spécialement sur la politique externe. Les comptes-rendus présentés par le président du Tribunal Suprême et le procureur général sont examinés au préalable par la Commission juridique, qui soumet à la Grande Assemblée Nationale ses rapports avant le commencement des débats sur ces comptes rendus ( voir art. 64 et 66 du règlement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale ).

12.-

La Constitution ne se limite pas à établir la règle du contrôle de la constitutionnalité des lois par l'organe qui est compétent pour les adopter, car les dispositions constitutionnelles, développées par le règlement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale, organisent un contrôle systématique et permanent de la constitutionnalité des lois. Pour l'exercice de ce contrôle, la Grande Assemblée Nationale utilise sa commission constitutionnelle qui, du point de vue de sa nature juridique, est une commission permanente, mais qui a aussi des traits propres résultant de sa composition et de son activité. La commission constitutionnelle comprend au moins deux-tiers de députés et au plus un tiers de membres élus par la Grande Assemblée Nationale parmi les spécialistes qui n'ont pas qualité de député. La commission constitutionnelle prépare les travaux concernant la constitutionnalité des lois, d'office ou lorsqu'elle est saisie par le Conseil d'Etat, le Conseil des Ministres, le Tribunal Suprême et le procureur général. En même temps, elle prépare des travaux lorsqu'elle est saisie par le Bureau de la Grande Assemblée Nationale, soit de sa propre initiative, soit à la demande des commissions permanentes. Enfin, elle étudie les observations relatives à la non conformité d'une loi ou d'une disposition légale avec la Constitution qui lui sont adressées par d'autres organes que ceux qui ont le droit de la saisir, par les organisations sociales ou par les citoyens, et rapporte à la Grande Assemblée Nationale si elle estime que ces observations sont fondées.

13.-

Entre la session de décembre 1966 et celle de juillet 1967 de la Grande Assemblée Nationale, le Conseil d'Etat a analysé aussi les comptes rendus présentés par le président du Tribunal Suprême et le procureur général, le Conseil d'Etat informant ensuite la Grande Assemblée Nationale sur cette activité à la session de juillet 1967.

14.-

Le Conseil d'Etat nomme et révoque le Conseil des Ministres, le Tribunal Suprême et le procureur général, au cas où des circonstances exceptionnelles empêchent la Grande Assemblée Nationale de se réunir.

15.-

Voir l'art. 64, § 2 de la Constitution.

16.-

La pratique, devenue constante, de la consultation des commissions permanentes par le Conseil d'Etat dans son activité d'émettre des décrets contenant des normes à force de loi a été soulignée dans le rapport présenté à la Grande Assemblée Nationale en juillet 1967, concernant les projets des lois pour l'adoption des décrets émis après la session de décembre 1966. Le rapport précisait que des 18 décrets émis par le Conseil d'Etat, 17 ont été examinés et rapportés par les commissions permanentes, les projets de décret étant mis en temps utile à la disposition des membres des commissions permanentes.

17.-

L'exposé présenté devant la Grande Assemblée Nationale le 28 décembre 1966, par le vice-président du Conseil des Ministres qui a soumis ce projet de loi, soulignait que des débats publics ont résulté 30.000 propositions d'amélioration du projet de loi - parmi lesquelles la plus grande partie, ayant un contenu semblable, visait les principales réglementations du projet, propositions dont la majorité a été acceptée : limite d'âge pour les hommes et pour les femmes ( surtout pour les femmes ayant au moins 5 enfants ), augmentation de la pension pour un long service dans la même institution ou entreprise, critères du calcul de la pension pour les travaux lourds, quantum de la pension d'invalidité, critères de fixation de la pension supplémentaire etc... ( Voir le Bulletin Officiel de la République Socialiste de Roumanie . Travaux de la Grande Assemblée Nationale, V-e législature, VI-e session, pp. 194-195 )

Résumé

Le rapport insiste sur les particularités de la démocratie représentative socialiste en Roumanie : la grande extension du droit de vote ; la participation des citoyens à la direction de toutes les opérations électorales ; la désignation des candidats par les électeurs, l'obligation des députés de présenter des comptes rendus aux électeurs et le droit des électeurs de révoquer le député élu par eux ; le rôle qui revient au parti communiste en tant que force dirigeante de la société, en ce qui concerne les élections ; la corrélation de la démocratie représentative avec la participation active des citoyens à la direction des affaires publiques. L'accroissement du rôle des organes représentatifs ainsi que du rôle des organisations sociales dans l'activité étatique constituent les tendances de l'évolution de la représentation en Roumanie.

Summary

The paper insists on the peculiarities of socialist representative democracy in Roumania: great extension of voting rights; citizen participation in the management of all voting operations; nomination of candidates by the voters; obligation for deputies to present accounts of their action to the voters, and right of recall; role of the communist party, as the leading force in society, in the electoral process; correlation of representative democracy with active citizen participation in the management of public affairs. The trends of representation in Roumania are to an increase in the role played in state activity by the representative organs as well as the social organizations.

29

Br/Int.Org./Gen./F

"Le rôle politique des organisations  
économiques internationales"

LE ROLE POLITIQUE DES ORGANISATIONS  
ECONOMIQUES INTERNATIONALES

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Le rôle politique de l'organisation internationale  
à vocation économique

Rapport général

Indépendamment de l'utilité indéniable que présentent les contacts entre chercheurs, il est souhaitable que les discussions ayant lieu au cours d'un congrès de l'A.I.S.P. puissent servir de stimulant à des recherches dans des domaines peu explorés mais potentiellement féconds, et faire progresser la réflexion en matière de concepts et méthodes. Ces intentions ont orienté la préparation d'un programme de discussion sur le rôle politique des organisations économiques internationales placé à l'ordre du jour de ce congrès par le comité exécutif de l'A.I.S.P. (un mémoire préliminaire élaboré après consultation de quelques spécialistes en la matière indiquait les trois sous-thèmes suivants: (a) l'organisation internationale et le développement politique; (b) les stratégies et pressions en vue d'une extension des tâches de l'organisation internationale dans le domaine économique; (c) les aspects politiques de l'organisation du système monétaire international).

Cette discussion prend la suite du débat initial qui avait eu lieu au cours du congrès de l'A.I.S.P. de 1964 sur le thème de l'étude comparative de l'organisation internationale, avec I.L. Claude comme rapporteur général. Le débat actuel devrait présenter des liens de continuité avec le précédent et aussi, nous l'espérons, un progrès certain et la promesse d'un intérêt renforcé que justifierait une continuation de l'attention portée au domaine de l'organisation internationale par le programme de l'A.I.S.P.

Dans de nombreuses branches des sciences sociales il s'est produit une évolution allant de l'approche utopique à l'approche scientifique.



L'étude de l'organisation internationale se trouve encore dans cette phase de transition. Ceux qui ont effectué un travail de pionnier dans ce domaine avaient un très haut degré d'engagement moral envers l'idée que l'organisation internationale pouvait servir de base à une remise en ordre du monde; et leur travail consistait non seulement à étudier l'organisation internationale mais encore à promouvoir activement son renforcement. Certains se révélèrent des optimistes incorrigibles, des fervents de la constitution, persuadés que des réformes juridiques pouvaient transformer le caractère des relations politiques, tandis que d'autres, par le biais d'une approche fonctionnaliste, tentaient de prendre de flanc les politiciens inspirés d'une conception de l'intérêt national en qui ils voyaient des ennemis de l'ordre mondial qu'ils désiraient instituer. A cause de ces deux tendances, les analystes sceptiques des affaires internationales ont considéré avec une certaine suspicion les études portant sur l'organisation internationale. Et à cause de leur propre engagement, les défenseurs ou les praticiens de l'organisation internationale se sont parfois montrés soupçonneux devant des essais de franche appréciation des processus politiques actuels de l'organisation internationale. L'on sent une sorte de crainte secrète devant la possibilité que l'analyse politique vienne à mettre en évidence la fragilité des organisations internationales et révèle à l'ennemi les secrets de l'art de la création de l'organisation internationale.

Il vaut mieux éclairer ces attitudes latentes afin de les dépasser. Au stade actuel de l'histoire des relations internationales, il devrait être possible de considérer les organisations internationales comme un élément bien établi de la politique mondiale; non plus comme un mouvement à défendre et à promouvoir, auquel les justes identifient leurs efforts visant à établir la paix dans le monde; mais plutôt comme des structures institutionnelles auxquelles participent la plupart

des éléments organisés de la politique mondiale et qui par conséquent reflètent dans une large mesure l'état actuel du monde. De même, un machiavélisme des justes, redoutant que les cachotteries politiques des hauts fonctionnaires internationaux envers leurs opposants nationalistes ne soient exposées au grand jour, n'est pas très fondé. Les processus politiques des organisations internationales sont peut-être plus ésotériques que ceux de certains systèmes politiques nationaux, mais il est douteux que de nombreuses ficelles du métier soient inconnues de ceux des représentants nationaux mêlés à ces affaires. Une compréhension accrue à travers une analyse politique objective pourrait aider à l'élargissement du contrôle des mandants sur ces processus; mais il semble difficilement soutenable qu'une telle connaissance suffise à détruire l'équilibre des pouvoirs au préjudice du développement de l'organisation internationale. Cependant, ces points de vue, maintenant admis par ceux qui étudient l'organisation internationale, sont d'origine récente tout comme l'étude scientifique de l'organisation internationale. A cause de ce caractère de nouveauté, les approches et les méthodes sont encore incertaines et il semble que de larges emprunts pourraient être faits à d'autres branches de la science politique, lesquelles ont elles-mêmes connu récemment une évolution rapide et révolutionnaire.

#### Les approches

Deux sortes d'approches fondamentales sont possibles pour l'étude scientifique de l'organisation internationale. La première consiste à examiner les processus de la création de l'organisation internationale et de l'établissement de son autorité et de sa légitimité. Ceci étant une extension scientifique des études "engagées" antérieures. Cette approche considère implicitement l'organisation internationale comme "une fin en soi", (tout comme a été considéré l'état-nation dans les études politiques) et pose la question de la manière dont s'acquiert

le pouvoir, des tenants effectifs du pouvoir (à quels organes ou à quels rôles est identifiée l'organisation) etc.

La seconde approche consiste à considérer le fonctionnement des organisations internationales en relation avec un autre système politique auquel il est relié, ou duquel il est dérivé. Trois autres types de systèmes répondant à cette définition viennent alors à l'esprit: (1) les systèmes politiques nationaux; (2) le système international (considéré comme étant le système politique dominant dans l'arène politique mondiale) et les sous-systèmes régionaux; (3) les sous-systèmes correspondant à des fonctions du système international telles que le contrôle des armements, le commerce mondial, les finances internationales, les communications, la météorologie, etc.<sup>(1)</sup>

Cette seconde approche considère l'organisation internationale davantage comme un moyen que comme une fin. Elle recherche la manière dont l'organisation internationale se heurte à la politique nationale ou au contraire est régie par elle, et le rôle qu'elle joue (à côté d'autres éléments) dans l'exécution des diverses fonctions du système international. L'accent est mis sur l'efficacité fonctionnelle et sur les changements à l'intérieur des systèmes nationaux ou internationaux auxquels sont liées les organisations internationales.

Les trois sous-thèmes et les mémoires préparés à l'occasion de ce débat correspondent à ces deux approches fondamentales et aux trois types de relations fonctionnelles mentionnées. La question de l'extension des tâches concerne les processus de renforcement des organisations. Les écrits concernant le développement politique examinent un problème posé par la relation entre organisation internationale et systèmes politiques nationaux. Les écrits de I.L. Claude et Gustavo Lagos traitent de cette relation à l'intérieur des systèmes internationaux et régionaux plus étendus. Enfin, sous le thème des aspects politiques

de l'organisation internationale en matière de commerce et de finances est traité le rôle des organisations internationales dans un secteur important du système international.

Ces discussions de l'A.I.S.P. pourraient apporter une double contribution à l'avance de l'étude de l'organisation internationale en dirigeant l'attention premièrement sur l'inter-pénétration de l'organisation internationale et des systèmes politiques nationaux, en tant qu'objet d'étude possible; et secondement sur l'utilité du concept de domaine spécialisé sectoriel (issue-area) en tant que moyen de définition des sous-systèmes politiques internationaux et à la lumière duquel l'efficacité fonctionnelle des organisations internationales pourrait être étudiée. Les deux champs d'études potentielles ont présenté jusqu'ici des difficultés conceptuelles considérables. Peut-être faudrait-il ajouter quelques notes brèves sur deux de nos sous-thèmes particulièrement importants: le développement politique et les aspects politiques de l'organisation internationale en matière de finances et de commerce. Ce sont là des domaines où les spécialistes de l'organisation internationale ont besoin de l'aide d'autres spécialistes, notamment en économie et en politique comparative.

#### Le développement politique

La notion de développement politique malgré sa valeur potentielle est extraordinairement compliquée. Elle soulève premièrement le problème de l'identité de l'organisation internationale et du système politique national en question (de quelles entités s'agit-il en fait?) et, en second lieu, le problème du critère <sup>de</sup> mesure du "développement".

Comme le fait remarquer Lucien Pye, la recherche de leur identité nationale est une caractéristique des nouvelles nations (mais également des quelques états plus anciens tel que le Canada). Elle est également vraie pour les organisations internationales, et se manifeste par une

incertitude en ce qui concerne leurs buts et les rôles qui agissent en leur nom (ou les incarnent). I.L. Claude a posé la question de l'identité de l'organisation internationale dans son rapport général au congrès de l'A.I.S.P. en 1964, mais sans lui donner de réponse; par contre, Walter Laves, dans son rapport à ce congrès a, en un sens, répondu à cette question sans l'avoir posée. Les institutions de la famille de l'ONU sont basées, écrit-il, sur une "idéologie démocratique" et leur rôle est d'aider à la construction de "démocraties viables". Dans ce but "elles" (ceci implique-t-il une certitude quant à leur identité?) devraient poser comme condition de l'envoi de diverses formes d'aide aux pays en voie de développement que les pays acceptent une aide au développement politique. Dans ce cas, la solution donnée au problème de l'identité de l'organisation internationale rend possible la détermination de critères normatifs en matière de développement politique. Une connaissance de l'identité précise comporte une connaissance des normes du développement. La relation existant entre l'organisation internationale et le système politique national peut alors être considérée comme une relation de variable indépendante à variable dépendante. Le développement de régimes politiques nationaux dans une direction démocratique donnée devient la tâche des organisations internationales; et le problème pratique qui se pose alors est celui des techniques, en d'autres termes de l'élaboration de programmes appropriés à la réalisation d'un objectif déterminé à l'avance.

Cependant, est-il acceptable de poser en prémisse l'identification du système onusien à une forme particulière d'idéologie démocratique? Ne serait-il pas également possible de considérer avant tout la coexistence concurrente de plusieurs idéologies des organisations internationales (e.g. libérale-démocratique, marxiste et populiste) chacune exprimant l'image que se fait de lui-même un groupe détenteur

de pouvoir à l'intérieur du système international, et dont la rivalité est la cause véritable de l'incertitude des organisations internationales en ce qui concerne leur identité (et par conséquent aussi en ce qui concerne leur autorité et leur légitimité) ? Plutôt que de prétendre à des identités, ne serait-il pas plus prudent de commencer par étudier les structures du pouvoir de diverses organisations internationales et leurs liens avec les idéologies dominantes de ces organisations ? En d'autres termes, de considérer l'identité de l'organisation comme un devenir plutôt que comme une donnée ?

Au niveau national, le problème de la création d'une identité et par conséquent de critères normatifs du développement politique, est tout aussi complexe et encore plus diversifié en pratique. Une série de types de développement avec un contenu normatif différent pour chacun (comme par exemple la typologie des régimes faite par Apter) serait un utile instrument d'analyse. Mais lorsque l'on considère la relation entre l'action par le truchement de l'organisation internationale et le système politique national, l'on constate une absence d'accord au sujet des critères normatifs acceptables aux différents types de régimes qui fait penser qu'avant de chercher des critères normatifs il vaudrait mieux chercher des critères se référant aux changements intervenus dans l'efficacité fonctionnelle des systèmes politiques (et qui pourraient être appelés des critères du système (systemic) comme opposés aux critères normatifs).

Ce ne serait pas suffisant de considérer le "développement" comme équivalent seulement d'une complexité croissante des systèmes politiques (la spécialisation grandissante des structures et des rôles qui sont indispensables à l'accomplissement des fonctions de l'état moderne (2); mais il serait nécessaire en plus de lier cette notion avec celle d'efficacité dans l'accomplissement des principales fonctions politiques; c'est-à-dire, dans la capacité du système de supporter un degré raisonnable de conflit interne sans s'effondrer. Toujours dans cette direction de pensée, les critères du système (non normatifs) pourraient être élaborés de manière à apprécier l'effet produit sur les systèmes politiques nationaux par certains types d'activités déterminées, exercées par des organismes internationaux. En pratique, ces critères pourraient se révéler plus utiles à l'élaboration de stratégies visant à promouvoir l'efficacité gouvernementale et la

participation politique que les critères normatifs dont certains, une fois traduits en politiques actives, peuvent se révéler dysfonctionnels en termes de développement.

Le préalable nécessaire à une élaboration de l'action internationale en faveur du développement politique qui tiendrait compte des critères du système est une compréhension meilleure de la dynamique du développement national et en particulier de l'interaction entre développement économique et développement politique. I.L. Claude (se référant à Max Millikan) a attiré l'attention sur certains effets déséquilibrants au point de vue politique de la croissance économique; cela dans le but non pas de plaider pour un arrêt à l'aide économique mais de poser la question suivante: "Comment obtenir un meilleur ajustement de l'aide économique au développement politique?". Malheureusement, ceux qui étudient l'organisation internationale ont rarement analysé d'une manière critique les assertions des politiciens selon lesquelles le développement économique allait entraîner la paix et la démocratie dans son sillage; et les économistes qui établissent le programme et les politiques d'action des organisations internationales ont tendance à ignorer les facteurs concernant le commandement (leadership) et les structures politiques des pays sous-développés. Il peut en résulter une dangereuse simplification. Les théoriciens de politique comparative pourraient chercher des réponses à des questions telles que: Quels sont les nouveaux rôles qui aux différents stades du développement sont susceptibles de faire avancer le processus de modernisation? Quelles sont les élites susceptibles de fournir des titulaires pour ces rôles? Comment l'organisation internationale peut-elle utiliser ses moyens d'alliance et de soutien aux groupes jouant un rôle stratégique dans le développement national? Quel est l'équilibre souhaitable pour le soutien international apporté à différents groupes d'élite (par exemple, a-t-on accordé trop d'attention à la formation d'administrateurs et pas assez au développement de chefs possibles pour les groupes d'intérêts professionnels organisés?).

Le mémoire de Gordenker fait débiter l'étude des voies d'influence (entre organisations internationales et systèmes nationaux) à partir du concept de l'accès (3). L'on pourrait certainement explorer cette approche d'une manière plus approfondie (l'étude de Max Belloff sur l'influence de l'organisation internationale sur l'administration nationale dans les cas de l'OECE et de l'OTAN, (New Dimensions in Foreign Policy, (Oxford 1961), suggère une autre approche quelque peu différente aux mêmes questions).

Il existe également le problème des différents types d'influence exercée par l'action internationale sur le système national. L'un d'eux est l'influence directe sur la formation de politiques et programmes nationaux (à travers l'assistance technique et les consultations). C'est le point le plus évident, mais peut-être le moins significatif en terme de changements de systèmes dans les politiques.

Un autre type d'influence, moins facile à évaluer mais peut-être plus significatif du point de vue du système, est le recrutement et la formation des élites, - influence qui peut s'exercer surtout par des moyens éducatifs -. Cette influence peut être à son maximum en ce qui concerne la disponibilité de chefs en puissance. Mais là où les chefs sont rares, l'augmentation du réservoir de dirigeants possibles peut avoir une répercussion à long terme sur le système. (Le "parti unique" peut être considéré comme un effort de maximisation de l'efficacité politique modernisatrice dans des conditions de rareté de compétences politiques. Un développement du réservoir de dirigeants disponibles peut alors accroître les possibilités de compétition politique). En attendant, certaines des compétences rejetées pourraient trouver un emploi et un havre temporaires et utiles au sein de l'organisation internationale, ainsi que le suggère Gustavo Lagos !

Il faudrait également soulever la question de l'effet de programmes d'éducation venant de l'extérieur sur l'orientation idéologique des élites dans les pays en voie de développement. Les communications faites au moment de la table ronde de Grenoble (septembre 1965) font penser que les essais d'influence idéologique par cette voie sont largement inefficaces. L'enseignement et la formation augmentent le nombre de personnes compétentes disponibles pour des rôles de participation et de commandement; mais elles agissent peu sur la détermination du contenu idéologique de cette participation(4).



Il existe un sens dans lequel la notion de "critère du système" applicable au développement politique peut avoir un biais normatif. On peut relever ce biais dans les idées saillantes engendrées par l'analyse "fonctionnelle" des systèmes politiques. Dans la mesure où les différents groupes sociaux sont capables de faire connaître leurs intérêts; dans la mesure où il existe suffisamment de personnes compétentes pour mettre en forme (articuler) ces points de vue et pour participer avec d'autres à l'agrégation des politiques possibles; dans la mesure où la culture politique engendre la confiance dans les relations entre les personnes et entre les groupes, et facilite ainsi la possibilité de l'organisation de groupes de pression; dans la mesure où de tels critères existent, un système politique sera non seulement plus efficace mais encore (dans un sens non-institutionnel) plus "démocratique".

Il est possible que l'un des problèmes critiques auquel peut se heurter l'action des organisations internationales est celui de la rareté de personnes politiquement compétentes, ou de dirigeants disponibles. Les organisations internationales sont en mesure d'exercer quelque influence dans la solution de ce problème du "réservoir" de dirigeants. Il est probable que leur action est plus efficace lorsqu'il s'agit d'accroître le nombre de "compétents" que lorsqu'il s'agit de les endoctriner avec une orientation idéologique particulière; elles semblent également mieux réussir lorsqu'il s'agit de fournir aux élites nationales, comme par exemple aux planificateurs du développement, le support psychologique et intellectuel de la solidarité professionnelle, plutôt que d'admonester les gouvernements avec des modèles de politiques à suivre. Ces possibilités, analysées d'une manière plus critique, pourraient servir de guide à l'élaboration des programmes des organisations internationales.

En conclusion, le développement politique ne doit pas être considéré comme un fait qui a lieu à l'intérieur d'un système politique national, mais comme une relation dynamique entre un système national et le système international. Les organisations internationales modèlent les régimes

nationaux et sont à leur tour modelés par eux. Entre eux s'établit une interpénétration. Les crises du développement politique au sein des jeunes nations provoquent la création de nouvelles fonctions pour l'organisation internationale et amènent un plus grand engagement mutuel entre les régimes nationaux et les structures internationales en croissance.

### Finance et Commerce

On peut attribuer le manque d'études politiques dans ce domaine à l'organisation de la vie académique plutôt qu'à une moindre importance du sujet. La disparition de l'économie politique en est probablement la raison principale. Les économistes et les politologues craignent de franchir les murs que les instituts universitaires ont édifiés autour d'eux. Ces frontières rassemblent les études stratégiques et les relations internationales pour les rapprocher de la science politique; c'est ainsi que le contrôle des armements représente un champ d'étude qui leur est commun.

Par contre, le domaine de la finance internationale qui, tout comme les armements, représente une composante matérielle du pouvoir de l'état, a été détaché du domaine de la science politique. Fort peu de contributions ont suivi et se sont greffées sur l'étude de Richard Gardner "Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy", en dépit de la richesse des événements intervenus depuis lors. Quelques économistes familiers avec les problèmes de négociation ont noté leurs opinions concernant le processus politique, mais peu d'efforts systématiques ont été faits en vue d'analyser les modèles d'interaction politique dans ce domaine.

Il serait bénéfique d'explorer ce sujet comme un domaine spécialisé représentant un secteur de la politique internationale, considérée comme un système politique. Le concept de domaine spécialisé (issue-area) semble

bien s'appliquer ici: son analyse pourrait servir d'exemple applicable ensuite à d'autres domaines...

La question préliminaire qui se pose concerne les délimitations du sujet: la finance et le commerce constituent-ils deux domaines distincts ou un seul? La réponse dépendra en grande partie de celle donnée à la question de savoir si la même stratification du pouvoir peut s'appliquer aux deux domaines et si les intérêts principaux mobilisent, d'une manière semblable, les forces à leur appui.

Si nous considérons le seul aspect financier, nous nous trouvons en face d'une variété de structures internationales à l'intérieur du système: le groupe de dix, le FMI, la Banque mondiale, l'OECD, et le groupe de travail No. 3 de son comité de politique économique, la Banque inter-américaine du développement etc. et (comme le montre Susan Strange) différents clubs de créditeurs et consortia d'aide. En outre, c'est un domaine qui est apparemment riche de possibilités de création de nouvelles institutions et dans lequel les origines institutionnelles devraient être expliquées à l'aide de l'analyse de l'ensemble du système.

La stratification du pouvoir semble ressortir clairement dans le système ainsi conçu. Les différentes structures remplissent les fonctions politiques de mise en forme et d'énonciation des intérêts (articulation) et d'agrégation de politiques. On peut même discerner les éléments d'une culture politique commune dans le domaine financier (les banquiers... des banques centrales attendent un certain comportement de la part de leurs interlocuteurs et il existe des pressions institutionnelles de conformisme à ces normes).

Les récentes négociations concernant la question de l'opportunité et des procédés d'une augmentation du volume des liquidités internationales illustrent un cas où la recherche de la solution à un problème se fait en dehors des institutions formelles. Une des solutions consiste en

l'élargissement du FMI mais les décisions fondamentales sont prises à l'extérieur du FMI. En fait, il existe un système de prise de décisions plus large qui dispose de différents instruments dont l'un est le FMI. La compréhension de l'équilibre des pouvoirs dans la prise de décision entraîne la nécessité de choisir le système de domaine spécialisé comme champ d'étude et non plus seulement le FMI.

Gerard Curzon, dans son étude sur le GATT, invoque deux raisons pour lesquelles les pays moins développés n'ont fait que de faibles interventions lors des négociations du Kennedy Round; l'une étant leur manque de négociateurs commerciaux compétents et l'autre étant la décision d'utiliser l'UNCTAD plutôt que le GATT. Est-il possible de lier les deux causes? L'UNCTAD peut-elle être considérée comme un équivalent fonctionnel du "parti unique" - la façon de maximiser les compétences politiques assez rare en donnant ce que les pays moins développés ont en abondance, c'est-à-dire la possibilité d'un soutien moral et de votes dans les assemblées internationales, afin d'épauler un secrétariat international qui concentre les compétences disponibles et qui peut en conséquence agir comme groupe de pression en faveur des pays en voie de développement dans un système de domaine spécialisé défini comme le commerce mondial?

L'utilisation du système de domaine spécialisé dans un secteur donné devrait permettre au politologue d'embrasser l'amplitude du pouvoir explicatif de l'historien et en même temps de l'intégrer dans un cadre qui pourrait être utilisé pour des comparaisons entre les systèmes de domaine spécialisé, afin d'obtenir des vues générales sur les processus de politique internationale et (suivant Dahl sur New Haven) de montrer quelles différences il pourrait y avoir dans la répartition des pouvoirs entre les différents domaines spécialisés.

Le désarmement et le contrôle des armements est un autre cas où le domaine spécialisé est le champ d'étude "naturel"; les institutions internationales sont beaucoup moins évidentes ici que dans le cas des liquidités monétaires.

Dans quelques autres cas, le domaine spécialisé peut ne pas apparaître aussi clairement comme étant le champ d'étude "naturel"; c'est ainsi qu'au départ il peut sembler plus évident d'étudier le BIT plutôt qu'un domaine spécialisé défini, par exemple, comme "la liberté d'association pour les syndicats". Mais, du point de vue analytique, la distinction entre institutions et domaines spécialisés est utile, puisque des études prennent ceci comme point de départ pour ne pas perdre de vue des questions qui ont une importance significative mais qui pourraient facilement échapper si l'on limitait trop étroitement le sujet en termes d'institutions (par exemple, l'action des organisations syndicales tant nationales qu'internationales du BIT; les politiques poursuivies par l'aide nationale bilatérale etc.).

#### Travaux futurs

Le libellé du thème basé sur l'organisation internationale porté à l'ordre du jour du congrès de cette année est plus restrictif que celui porté à l'ordre du jour du congrès de 1964; et la façon dont les rapporteurs généraux ont interprété ce libellé (non pas entièrement de leur propre initiative mais en tenant compte également de quelques discussions avec un certain nombre de spécialistes et chercheurs dans ce domaine) le limite encore davantage. Cependant, le problème posé par les méthodes et concepts dans l'étude des organisations internationales, et qui apparaissait déjà dans le rapport général de 1964 de I.L. Claude, reste présent. (Cette insistance étant nécessitée par la nouveauté relative de ce domaine.) Diverses réunions, y compris celles de l'AISP, ont permis d'identifier un groupe de chercheurs que le problème de l'organisation internationale intéresse; et c'est en maintenant ces contacts, pour lesquels l'AISP peut servir utilement de cadre, que l'éclaircissement des concepts et des méthodes de recherche pourra progresser. En outre, l'étude de la politique interne et des implications externes de l'organisation internationale peut revêtir une valeur pratique

en ce qui concerne la détermination de la politique à suivre et la création d'institutions dans le domaine de l'organisation internationale, parce que des chercheurs indépendants peuvent plus aisément étudier des sujets qui parfois inhibent les fonctionnaires internationaux tout en étant importants pour eux. Une poursuite du stimulant apporté par l'AISP en ce domaine pourrait donc présenter un intérêt non seulement académique mais également public. Il serait donc souhaitable que les participants aux discussions de Bruxelles se consacrent non seulement à une critique des mémoires présentés mais abordent également la question d'études ultérieures à faire dans le domaine de l'organisation internationale, à travers l'AISP.

Genève,

R.W. Cox

6 septembre 1967

Notes

(1) La notion de système international par secteur employée ici est semblable au concept de domaine spécialisé considéré comme un système politique préconisé par James N. Rosenau dans son mémoire "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy"

Rosenau a adopté à l'étude de la politique étrangère la vue pénétrante provenant de l'analyse faite par R. Dahl sur les diverses structures du pouvoir caractéristiques des divers domaines spécialisés dans la politique de New Haven, dans Who governs?, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1961.

(2) Voir par exemple Lester G. Seligman "Political Mobility and Economic Development" in Neil J. Smelser & Seymour M. Lipset (eds) Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966.

(3) Voir également Walker R. Sharp "International Bureaucracies and Political Development" in J. Lapalombara (ed) Bureaucracy and Political Development, Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1963.

(4) Voir plus particulièrement les mémoires de Jacobson et Gutteridge présentés à la Table Ronde de l'AISP à Grenoble. Cette découverte s'accorde avec celle de l'influence des niveaux éducationnels dans des entités politiques plus développées, cf. G. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 213, 502.

(5) Par exemple, J.R. Triffin, The World Money Maze, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1966.

"The political role of international  
economic organizations"

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AID

AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL STABILITY

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Economic development aid  
and international political stability

by Inis L. Claude, Jr.

In a preliminary memorandum for the sessions on "The political role of international economic organizations" at the Seventh World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Robert W. Cox, General Rapporteur, indicated that one of the themes for discussion might be "international economic organisation and political development." Elaborating on this suggestion, Cox observed that "The occurrence of a breakdown, or of recurrent instability, in the domestic political life of any country is likely to create disturbances in international relations with possibly dangerous consequences for world peace." The essence of the proposition is that there is a close relationship between national and international political stability. The implication is that international economic action may, by facilitating national economic development, promote national political stability, and thereby enhance the prospects for peace in international political relations. The purpose of this paper is to examine the putative nexus between international programs designed to promote economic development within national states and the stability of the international system. Does international assistance in economic development tend to promote world peace? If so, how may it conduce to that result?

Obviously, not all of the activities of international economic organizations are aimed at supporting economic growth or modernization in the developing countries, although a steadily increasing emphasis upon programs of this sort has been evident during the past two decades. Moreover, not all or even the major part of economic development aid is

channelled through international organizations; bilateral assistance programs have been and probably will continue to be vastly superior in size to multilateral programs. One should not expect to find uniformity of intention or expectation on the part of all those who demand, support, or conduct economic development assistance programs. There is not even a clear distinction as to purpose between all multilateral programs and all bilateral programs. Givers and receivers of aid may be actuated by different motivations. Various states may contribute to international programs for different reasons, and with different expectations as to results. A given state may initiate or support various programs with quite different purposes in mind for each case; its motives and expectations may change over time; influential participants in the policy-making process within the state may disagree as to the goals that should be promoted by, or the results that can be expected from, a program that they agree to support. It is impossible to formulate a neat generalization as to the consequences that are desired or expected--or achieved--by all those involved in economic development assistance programs. Incidentally, while this may be annoying to the academic theorist, it contributes significantly to the dynamic of the international economic assistance movement. In political life, the successful movement is the one that appeals to different people for different reasons, not the one that depends upon similarity of motivation to produce uniformity of action. International economic aid, bilateral and multilateral, flourishes today because of, not in spite of, the diversity of hopes and expectations attached to it.

Nevertheless, it can be said that one of the most prominent rationalizations of economic development aid programs is the claim that they tend to promote international peace and order. The popularity of this proposition is perhaps attributable to its ideological appeal more than to its

intellectual merits; it is, one might suggest, more compelling than convincing. In the realm of international organization, the essential criterion of legitimacy is relevance to the prevention of war; almost any multilateral program can be justified with, and hardly any can be justified without, the claim that it promises to promote conditions conducive to international peace. On the other hand, national foreign policy is customarily legitimized in terms of the criterion of national interest, and bilateral aid programs are therefore less likely than multilateral ones to be expressly or consistently described as efforts to contribute to world peace and order. However, commitment to milieu goals has become respectable in many national political systems; American political leaders, for instance, increasingly tend to justify expenditures for bilateral or multilateral aid programs on the ground that they serve the national interest of the United States by strengthening the foundations of world order. In any case, the requirement of ideological acceptability tempts both governments that request and those that grant economic aid to emphasize, in statements intended for external consumption, the general, global values rather than the narrow, national values that may be promoted by such aid. In ideological terms, it is understandable that India should insist that aid to India serves broader interests than the welfare of India, and that the United States should proclaim that American aid is a contribution to world order.

The intellectual case for regarding economic development assistance as an investment in international political stability, as distinguished from the ideological case for proclaiming it as such, is disappointingly underdeveloped. It tends to be stated vaguely, and to reflect intuitive judgment more than critical analysis. It bears the imprint of a familiar feature of modern thought, the

tendency to ascribe fundamental importance to economic factors in the shaping of politics. It reflects the view that war is a complex institution, deeply rooted in a network of systemic causes. Given this intellectual orientation, one is predisposed to recognize the plausibility of the proposition that the existence of economic deprivation and disparity in the international system makes for conflict in international politics, and that concerted effort to promote economic growth in the less-developed segments of the system may create the conditions of peace and order. Statesmen and scholars have developed a tendency to take this proposition for granted, and to assert it almost as if it were a self-evident truth.

A few examples will suffice to indicate the nature of the assertion that has become typical in recent years. In the Preface to the first volume of his memoirs, President Harry S. Truman declared: "We [Americans] knew that there could be no lasting peace so long as there were large populations in the world living under primitive conditions and suffering from starvation, disease, and denial of the advantages of modern science and industry."<sup>(1)</sup> His successor, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, suggested that a vigorous international effort in the realm of economic development would "create a great new source of hope for all those who share our conviction that with material betterment and free institutions flourishing side by side we can look forward with confidence to a peaceful world."<sup>(2)</sup> Adlai Stevenson declared that "This disparity in living standards between the rich and the poor is as great a threat to peace as the arms race..."<sup>(3)</sup> Every Secretary-General of the United Nations has expressed similar views. Trygve Lie stated "the basic conviction that poverty remains mankind's chief enemy," and held that the improvement of the economic welfare of the underprivileged masses of mankind was one of the most challenging tasks of the United Nations--"probably the most important, next to

maintaining peace, and an essential condition for reaching that highest goal."<sup>(4)</sup> Dag Hammarskjöld regarded the economic development activities of the United Nations as essential to "building the kind of world community in which ...[political and military] crises will no longer be inevitable," and insisted that the political work of the organization "would not by itself ensure stability and peace in the face of the dangerous economic and social vacuum created and maintained by the enormous gap which separates countries at different stages of development."<sup>(5)</sup> Finally, U Thant has repeatedly asserted his conviction that "the present division of the world into rich and poor countries is... much more real and much more serious, and ultimately much more explosive, than the division of the world on ideological grounds," and that the evils of poverty, disease, hunger, and illiteracy "menace the stability of Governments, aggravate tensions, [and] threaten international peace."<sup>(6)</sup>

These statements were made by men who have found it impossible not to believe that there is a connection between poverty and war, and between economic development and peace. It is one thing, however, to be forced to believe, and quite another to say why one believes in this linkage, and to explain how one believes that one thing leads to another. It is in this kind of reasoned analysis, the development of a causal chain, that the case for development aid as a means to world peace is particularly deficient. We have had too many declarations of intuitive conviction, and too few demonstrations of careful, critical reasoning.

In this intellectual situation, one can plausibly state the following formula, representing it as "the case": development aid leads to economic growth, which leads to political democracy, which leads to peaceful international behavior by the states involved in this process of change.

Implicit in this formulation is the view that economically underdeveloped states that do not undergo this process are likely to be trouble-makers on the international scene. This version of the case is labeled "the doctrine of indirect influence" by Edward C. Banfield, in an essay on "American Foreign Aid Doctrines."<sup>(7)</sup> This essay provides a vigorous critique of the formula. Banfield's skepticism is applied first to the proposition that external aid will necessarily bring about significant improvement in the economic situation of underdeveloped countries, then to the view that economic development, if achieved, will lead to freedom and democracy, and finally to the conviction that democratic regimes, if they should emerge, will function as peaceful members of the international system. Contrary to the suppositions embedded in the formula, he finds "much reason to expect that economic development, to the extent that it occurs, will prove incompatible with freedom and democracy," and argues that "Even if aid leads to economic development and even if economic development leads to freedom and democracy, peace may not be promoted." The latter point is buttressed by the observation that "Disparities in the wealth of nations do not cause wars: poor, pre-industrial nations do not attack rich, industrial ones. Nor does a high level of economic and political development give any assurance at all that a nation will not be aggressive if it can be so with impunity."<sup>(8)</sup>

A similar position is developed by Hans J. Morgenthau in an essay published in the same volume.<sup>(9)</sup> He notes the possibility that entrenched elites in countries receiving foreign aid may use it to strengthen the status quo rather than to promote economic development. If economic growth is successfully induced, political instability may ensue, even to the extent of the development of a revolutionary situation that may culminate in the establishment of a totalitarian, rather than

a democratic, regime. Morgenthau concludes that economic development may conduce to a belligerent rather than a peaceful foreign policy, under certain conditions; he denies the popular assumption that economic dissatisfactions lead poor nations to start wars, while rich nations are content to enjoy their wealth in peace. Arguing that most wars are politically rather than economically motivated, he suggests that national economic advance provides indispensable capability for waging war without diminishing the disposition for doing so.<sup>(10)</sup>

These are effective criticisms of the case for economic development assistance, as that case is understood and stated, preparatory to refutation, by Banfield and Morgenthau. Clearly, the critics are correct in denying that assistance will necessarily promote, or even be used with the intent to promote, development, and that economic growth and modernization, if achieved, will inevitably conduce to the creation and maintenance of stable democratic institutions. Even more--and this is the point with which I am primarily concerned--it is uncertain whether economic improvement can be expected to contribute to peace by removing states from the category of "have not" nations, presumably inclined to initiate war in response to their dissatisfactions and frustrations. There is no denying the point that the threat of aggressive war is typically posed by states with relatively advanced economies, not by the states most in need of development assistance. If the case for economic aid rests upon the supposition that poor countries are war-like, and will become less so as they grow richer, it has very little validity either as diagnosis of the problem of war or as therapy designed to promote the conditions of peace.

The conclusion to be drawn from the critiques presented by Banfield and Morgenthau, however, is not that the deplorable economic condition of much of the world has no tendency to produce international conflict and disorder, or that development aid may not serve the cause of peace. They have refuted one version of the case, one formulation of the relationship between the domestic condition of states and the stability of the international system. The case may be stronger than that particular version. The basic insight may be valid; the question is whether a more satisfactory way of explaining the postulated relationship can be found.

The body of thought about this problem that has developed in recent years contains ample materials for the construction of theoretical chains other than that one snapped by the critical tugging of the two writers whom I have cited. Using some of those materials, I should like to attempt the fashioning of a chain of explanation that may better withstand the strain of critical analysis. In so doing, I shall avoid the issue of the developmental effectiveness of external economic aid. Taking it for granted that assistance has variable and uncertain economic effects, I shall concentrate upon this question; if and when outside aid stimulates economic development, how may this improve the prospects for international stability and order? This involves, of course, the preliminary question as to how the existence of economically underdeveloped states poses a threat to world peace.

To establish the framework for dealing with this issue, I should call attention to four of the ways in which states may contribute to international conflict:

(1) First, and most obviously, a state may follow an aggressive military policy. That is to say, it may undertake aggression or conquest, direct or indirect, overt or camouflaged; it may deliberately initiate a military conflict.



(2) Second, a state may encourage an aggressor to disrupt the peace, by following a passive military policy. It may neglect to build up or maintain its power, fail to establish a clear and firm policy of resistance to aggression, and refrain from collaborating in the development of collective schemes to prevent or punish aggression. A state that is potentially able to exert substantial restraining influence upon aggressors but declines to do so, remaining weak, indecisive, or indifferent to the maintenance of world order, may contribute to the probability of war. This is, in essence, a policy that contributes to the causation of war by neglecting or failing to deter potential disturbers of the peace.

(3) Third, a state may engage in active provocation. I mean to suggest that it may incite attack upon itself by behavior that other states regard as incompatible with their interests or violative of their rights, or, at any rate, as intolerable. This is presumably what African states have in mind when they charge that the racial policy of South Africa is a threat to the peace--not that South Africa seems likely to attack them, but that its behavior may impel them to attack South Africa, or, more likely, that it may explode in domestic disorder in which other states will be inexorably driven to intervene. It may be that the problem of preventive war also fails under this heading; a state may promote such fear of its aggressive intent that its potential victim feels compelled to strike first.

Fourth, a state may pose the problem of passive provocation. What I have in mind is that a state may be so weak, so deficient in economic viability, so lacking in social cohesion and political stability, that it represents a kind of vacuum, virtually inviting the competitive intrusion of outside powers. It is a tempting target; its

vulnerability to subversion, domination, and exploitation makes it contribute, however innocently and unwittingly, to the disturbance of international relations.

In short, I am suggesting that states may promote international disorder by committing aggression, by failing or declining to discourage others from committing aggression, by provoking others to attack, or by tempting others to become embroiled in a struggle for domination of its own affairs. This analysis has a number of implications that seem worthy of emphasis. It suggests that states may contribute to international conflict not only by what they do but also by what they refrain from doing; passivity figures as prominently in the analysis as activity. It provides for the recognition of unintended and unavoidable as well as deliberate contributions to instability and disorder, thus indicating that states may be in some measure responsible for causing war without being guilty in the motivational sense. It suggests that threats to the peace may derive from weakness as well as from power, and thus from small states as well as from the giants of the international system. Finally, it offers an escape from the exclusive preoccupation with the concept of aggression that has so often characterized--and plagued--discussion of the problem of war and peace, by giving prominence to the alternative concept of rivalry.

Clearly, the element of the analysis most relevant to the issue with which I have set out to deal is the fourth: the notion of passive provocation. To deny that poor and underdeveloped countries represent a threat to the peace, on the ground that they are obviously incapable of launching dangerous aggression, is to miss the point by neglecting to move beyond the first phase of the analysis. Such a position fails to take into account the fact that starting a war is not the only way of causing a war. Shifting from the problem of active aggression to that of passive provocation, we see that

the danger is not that states of marginal viability will start a fight, but that they will be fought over--not that they are probable aggressors, but that they are potential objects of rivalry and arenas for intervention and counter-intervention. Such states endanger the peace not by their policy but by their predicament, not by posing threats but by presenting temptations to outside powers to compete for the privilege of filling the power vacuums that they represent.

It seems to me that the concept of passive provocation provides a key to the understanding of the relationship between national economic underdevelopment and international political stability that we set out to explore. Passive provocation is clearly a major phenomenon of our time. Rapid and widespread decolonization has brought into being an extraordinary number of new states, many of them small, most of them poor, and some of them desperately fragile--deficient in the essential elements of economic viability, social cohesion, and political stability. Given their questionable capacity to survive and sustain themselves as genuinely independent entities--"to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world," if I may resort to the language of the League of Nations Covenant--such states are not only in danger themselves but they also present a danger to the stability of the global system. The present-day international system is characterised by the extraordinary strength of the major powers and the extreme weakness of the mass of new states; this combination of features puts international stability in jeopardy, not so much because one great power or another may engage in aggressive attack as because two or more external powers may be sucked into competitive struggle for domination of chaotic situations.

I claim no originality in stating this insight; as I intimated above, the materials for this view of the matter lie scattered about in the literature. Barbara Ward has written that: "The poor states are under pressure from the hopes and expectations of their own people. If pressure turns to revolt, the temptation to ask for outside help is only equalled, in these ideological days, by the temptation to give it. Either way, we are back with the risks of escalation and nuclear war."<sup>(11)</sup> Our General Rapporteur, Robert W. Cox, in a Discussion Outline on "International economic co-operation and national political structures" for the IPSA round table at Grenoble, in 1965, noted that "In the developing areas of the world, centres of political instability have brought threats of conflict into the international system," and suggested that, from a long-term perspective, "the problem may be seen as one of strengthening national political structures, so that they may be capable of resolving local conflicts without involving external interventions which risk spreading conflict." In a widely noted address delivered at Montreal in 1966, the American Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, cited an impressive array of statistics to demonstrate the existence of "an irrefutable relationship between violence and economic backwardness," and argued that the high incidence of internal political upheaval in poor states endangers the security of all states by shaking the stability of the general system. McNamara concluded that "Without internal development of at least a minimal degree, order and stability are simply not possible."<sup>(12)</sup>

Moreover, the activities of the United Nations have in fact been directed more and more toward efforts to deal with the problems posed by passive provocation. The original concept of the trusteeship system involved the promise of pre-independence tutelage that might equip new states to function as stable and effective units. United Nations peace-keeping

operations, based upon Dag Hammarskjöld's formulation of the doctrine of preventive diplomacy, may be interpreted in some instances as attempts to control the internationally destabilizing effects of passive provocation. Finally, there is a case for regarding the technical assistance and economic development aid programs conducted by the United Nations and affiliated agencies as efforts to eliminate the causes of passive provocation, to help the more fragile states to achieve effective statehood and thus to reduce the vulnerability that invites external intervention. The Congo is the classic case; here, the United Nations engaged in peace-keeping to deal with the consequences and in state-building to cope with the causes of passive provocation that threatened to disrupt the precarious stability of international relations.

It should be noted that, as the economic programs of international organizations have been turned toward the problem of passive provocation, the conventional theory of functionalism has been stood upon its head. In its standard version, that theory envisages the gradual reduction of the sovereignty of states, the diminution of their separateness; it is a strategy for the merging of states, the undermining of the bases of their independence. Its typical expression is international regulatory activity, designed to promote the weaving together of hitherto separate entities.

The emerging developmental functionalism of our time, in contrast to regulatory functionalism, is a state-building enterprise, not a state-undermining project. It is directed toward making national sovereignty meaningful, not reducing it to meaninglessness. It is aimed at assisting states in achieving genuine and effective statehood, not at promoting their merger into larger groupings. Its task

is not to help peoples get over the idea of the sovereign, independent state, but to help them realize that ideal; it points not to integration, but to the hope of strengthening the stability of the international system in an era when the proliferation of national states is a fact of life and a process not likely to be reversed.

This inversion of functionalism reflects an appreciation of the potentially disruptive effects upon international stability that are inherent in the emerging situation, characterized by the formal independence of many new states of uncertain capacity to realize the implications of their statehood. It represents an effort to promote the political development of such states as stable and effective entities, thereby diminishing the prospect that their internal situations will be such as to stimulate international instability.

It must not be taken for granted that the infusion of economic assistance from outside, even if it succeeds in promoting economic growth, will necessarily conduce to social cohesion, national unity, effective government, or political stability. A cautionary note is implicit in a passage from an essay by Max F. Millikan, in which he stresses the danger that "out of the social and political conflicts within these /underdeveloped/ areas consequent upon the modernization process crises will be generated which, because of American, European, and Soviet bloc involvements of many kinds, will escalate first into limited war and then potentially into nuclear exchanges... As tensions and irritations mount and inflammatory incidents occur, the growing circle of parties to these disputes becomes increasingly committed by irreversible steps to an escalation of conflict..."<sup>(13)</sup> It should be noted that Millikan anticipates that the modernization process itself may produce domestic instability with dangerous international ramifications. He is undoubtedly correct; instability is not simply a product of economic stagnation, but

also an accompaniment and an effect of the process of economic growth. There is no magic formula for economic change that will lead directly to political stability, without an intervening period of political change that may be indistinguishable from political chaos. The case for external developmental assistance is essentially the argument that the striving for modernization will proceed in any event, and that aid may accelerate and facilitate the process, perhaps helping thereby to shorten and to mitigate the difficulties of the transitional period, and pushing toward the long-term objective of creating states that may function as stable members of the international community, contributing to rather than detracting from the stability of the larger system. This is a hope, not a certainty. Its justification rests upon the predictability of international disorder if constructive effort is not made to promote the improvement of economic conditions in the underdeveloped sectors of the world, and the conviction that investment in the capacity of poor states to become strong and healthy social and political entities may bring dividends to a world that stands desperately in need of peace and order.

Notes

- (1) Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Vol. I, Year of Decisions. (Garden City, N.Y.; Doubleday, 1955), p. x.
- (2) New York Times, August 27, 1958, p. 6.
- (3) Ibid., May 26, 1960, p. 34M.
- (4) In the Cause of Peace (New York: McMillan, 1954), pp. 142-143. Emphasis supplied.
- (5) Wilder Foote, ed., Servant of Peace: A Selection of the Speeches and Statements of Dag Hammarskjöld (New York: Harper and Row, 1962, pp. 306-307.
- (6) Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, 16 June 1961 - 15 June 1962, General Assembly, Official Records: Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. 1 A (A/5201/Add. 1), p. 3
- (7) Robert A. Goldwin, ed., Why Foreign Aid? (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 10-31.
- (8) Ibid., pp. 15-17.
- (9) "Preface to a Political Theory of Foreign Aid," ibid., pp. 70-89.
- (10) These arguments are developed in ibid., pp. 81-85.
- (11) Spaceship Earth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 54.
- (12) New York Times, May 19, 1966, p. 11.
- (13) "The Political Case for Economic Development Aid," in Goldwin, op. cit., p. 96. Emphasis supplied.



Summary

It is frequently asserted that the existence of economic deprivation and disparity in the international system is a threat to world peace and order, and, conversely, that economic development aid contributes to international stability. This proposition requires more careful analytical treatment than it has customarily received. How do poor countries endanger the peace, and how may economic development enhance the stability of the global system?

The notion that underdeveloped states tend to be driven into aggression by their dissatisfaction, while the rich are satisfied to enjoy their wealth in peace, is easily refuted; the major aggressors of recent times have been highly industrialized states, which are indeed the only states capable of mobilizing massive military power in this technological age.

This refutation does not necessarily invalidate the basic proposition. The problem is to reformulate the relationship between national economic development and international stability.

It is suggested that the concept of passive provocation may provide a key to the analysis. This is the proposition that a state may be so weak, so lacking in economic viability, social cohesion, and political stability, that it serves as an object of rivalry, stimulating outside powers to struggle for domination over it. Such states exist in large numbers, and concerted efforts to contribute to their economic development may help to eliminate their vulnerability as a source of instability in international relations. In promoting state-building activity, international organizations have inverted the conventional theory of functionalism, which stresses the weakening rather than the strengthening of sovereignty.

### Résumé

Il a souvent été affirmé que l'existence de grandes privations économiques et de disparités dans le système international constituait une menace à la paix et à l'ordre mondial, et réciproquement, que l'aide au développement économique contribuait à la stabilité internationale. Ces propositions méritent une analyse plus soignée que celle dont elles ont habituellement été l'objet. De quelle façon les pays pauvres mettent-ils en danger la paix, et comment le développement renforce-t-il la stabilité du système global ?

L'idée selon laquelle les pays sous-développés tendent à être portés à l'agression par leur insatisfaction, alors que les pays riches sont satisfaits de jouir en paix de leur prospérité, est facilement réfutée : les principaux agresseurs des derniers temps ont été des pays hautement industrialisés, les seuls d'ailleurs capables de mobiliser une grande puissance militaire à cet âge technologique.

Mais cette réfutation ne détruit pas nécessairement la proposition fondamentale. Il s'agit donc de formuler autrement la relation entre le développement économique national et la stabilité internationale.

Le concept de provocation passive peut fournir la clef de l'analyse : un état peut être si faible, si peu viable sur le plan économique, si dépourvu de cohésion sociale et de stabilité politique, qu'il devient l'objet de rivalités incitant des puissances extérieures à se combattre pour le dominer. Il existe un grand nombre de tels états, et des efforts concertés pour aider à leur développement économique peuvent contribuer à éliminer leur vulnérabilité comme source d'instabilité des relations internationales. En promouvant les activités de construction nationale, les organisations internationales ont inversé la théorie traditionnelle du fonctionnalisme, qui met l'accent sur l'affaiblissement plutôt que sur le renforcement de la souveraineté.

"The political role of international  
economic organizations"

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION INFLUENCE AND REQUESTS FOR AID

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International organization influence and requests for aid

by Leon Gordenker

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In the less developed world, international organizations have exercised, whether intentionally or not, a certain influence on the social priorities and plans of governments receiving assistance for development. The thrust of this influence can be found in a variety of actions and decisions, ranging from general recommendations on economic planning to specific decisions on such matters as the granting of a fellowship. The most superficial examination of this influence discloses that it varies in degree and in kind from one government to another and from one intergovernmental agency to another. The factors which produce this variation may be numerous and ephemeral. It is the purpose of this paper to isolate and examine one part of the process of securing and administering economic assistance from international organizations in order to identify some of the factors which produce or reduce the influence of international organizations.

Much of the data for this paper was drawn from extensive field observation of international organization field operations in Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia during 1965 and 1966. <sup>2</sup> Although each country has important particularities, certain generalizations nevertheless apply to all of them. All three countries have been administered by the United Kingdom and have broadly similar administrative practices and structures. One of them,

Malawi, the smallest in area and most densely populated, still employs British civil servants in senior positions and maintains a close and dependent financial relationship with the United Kingdom. Zambia and Malawi, once parts of the defunct Central African Federation, had some common experiences in the effort to gain independence. Neither they nor Tanzania, however, had attracted important numbers of white settlers (as did Rhodesia, the third member of the Central African Federation).

Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia unquestionably rank low on any scale of economic and social modernization (for reasons too complex to outline here), but one of them, Zambia, greatly outstrips the other two in natural resources whose exploitation brings in a large foreign exchange income.

One country, Tanzania, has had a long relationship with the United Nations and, before that, with the League of Nations because of its status as a Trust Territory and, earlier, as a League Mandated Territory. Tanzania also has had a slightly longer period of independence; it joined the United Nations late in 1960, as Tanganyika and later absorbed Zanzibar. Zambia and Malawi joined the United Nations late in 1964.

Tanzania has become one of the important African consumers of technical assistance and preinvestment programs in Africa. With a greater population than either Zambia or Malawi and with an economy that neither produces great amounts of foreign

exchange nor is easily expanded, it easily outstrips the other two countries in the size of its program. The following table indicates relative sizes of current programs supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

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	<u>Technical Assistance<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>Special Fund<sup>b</sup></u>	<u>Local Costs</u>	<u>Fellowships</u>
<u>Malawi</u>				
1965-66	\$ 659,000	\$ 3,826,500	\$ 1,203,000	\$214,800
1966-67	\$ 750,120			\$ 76,550
<u>Tanzania</u> (includes Zanzibar)				
1965-66	\$1,504,752	\$19,631,000	\$12,040,000	\$ 51,600
1966-67	\$1,689,000			
<u>Zambia</u>				
1965-66	\$ 605,000	\$11,114,100	\$ 7,730,000	
1966-67	\$ 783,000			

Sources: U.N. Doc. E/TAC/1.335 and DP/SF/Reports, Series B, No. 3.

Notes: a) Includes advisory services, etc., b) includes in-depth preinvestment projects. For distinction and official description, see U.N. Doc. DP/TA/L.10. Special Fund figures include local costs, which are shown separately.

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Both Tanzania and Zambia received assistance through multi-country or regional projects of considerable importance. The East African region, which includes Tanzania, furnishes a site for seven preinvestment projects. Zambia inherited participation in two projects from the Central African Federation, but as a result of the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence, both of them have been moved to Zambia.

Only one country of the three, Zambia, benefited from a loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. As with the regional preinvestment projects, this loan, made for the construction of the Kariba dam, also involved Rhodesia.<sup>3</sup> Tanzania has received modest grants from the International Development Association. Thus, the three countries have not been conspicuous as borrowers from the international lending institutions.

## I

The process of securing assistance involves steps up and down a national government hierarchy and a perhaps even longer progress up and down one or several international organization hierarchies.<sup>4</sup> The one necessary step for entry to this obstacle course is the official formulation of a request for aid--whether it is a technical assistance adviser,<sup>5</sup> a preinvestment project, an OPEX official, a fellowship for a civil servant to study abroad, or a loan or grant. The

initiation and formulation of such a request therefore relates crucially to the exercise of influence by international organizations. This paper will concentrate on the initiation and formulation of requests for international organization assistance.

Attention will be given to the related aspects of the process of initiating requests. The formal, legal relationship between the international organizations and member governments can perhaps most easily be dealt with. Around the formal relationship and the needs of administration have grown official decision-making structures in both the national and international realms. The active influential relationships between international organizations and member governments can most effectively be analyzed by the employment of the concepts of access.<sup>6</sup> By access is meant the ability of officials of international organizations to approach various national officials during the process of initiating and formulating requests and to exchange ideas and negotiate issues which arise.

## II

The formal, legal relationship of member governments to international organizations fits squarely into diplomatic and international jural experience. The member governments, as sovereigns, must seek and permit the functioning of international organizations. The organizations cannot force their



services on members. Although the international organizations may have a variety of services available, no government is compelled to seek or accept any or all of them. <sup>7</sup> The international organizations respond to requests related to specific projects. They meticulously reject requests that are not made on behalf of the government concerned and made in the proper form.

It follows that the initiation and formulation of a request for assistance belongs within the responsibility of the member government and that the international organizations have a reactive role in the relationship. This reaction does not, however, exclude the possibility of decisions by the international organizations. Not enough resources to honor all requests is available. Therefore choices must be made. These choices, formally made by governmental representatives, are of course prepared by international civil services. Some requests cannot be honored and others find approval only if they are altered in specified ways, suggested by the secretariats. Thus, the formal, legal arrangements open the way to offering rewards for certain kinds of development policies and penalize those governments which follow other policies. These rewards and penalties bear no such explicit designation. The official position maintains that allocations derive from technical considerations only.

In the territories of recipient governments, international agencies often have representatives. The most notable category

of these is the Resident Representative of UNDP, who usually assumes or pretends to the status of the senior official among those present from international agencies.<sup>8</sup> The government formally designates the channel through which the international organization official may conduct relations with the government. This may be the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or a technical ministry, depending on the particular circumstances and the nature of the agency involved. Any international organization representative, however, must have the agrément of the government. This traditional diplomatic approach emphasizes that on the formal, legal level, the personnel of international organizations operate at the pleasure of the host government.

In keeping with diplomatic practice, although the officials may have a minimum of "diplomatic" duties, agreements between the host governments and the international agencies provide for certain privileges and immunities. From the point of view of the agency, these equalize working conditions from one country to the next and offer some protection from arbitrary interference by the government. From the standpoint of the host state, these privileges mark out the international officials as a special group to whom a special legal regime applies.

Assistance provided by international agencies is the subject of a formal agreement between them and the recipient state.<sup>9</sup> Sometimes it is in a general, standing form and some ad hoc for specific projects. Such agreements spell out the nature of the assistance, the conditions under which it is

furnished, its duration and the conditions under which it may be discontinued or changed. Its negotiation provides an opportunity for mutual influence by recipient governments and international agencies.

In general, the outward form of relationship between an intergovernmental aid-giving agency and a recipient government resembles in some important respects the traditional arrangements made between sovereign governments for a cooperative venture. But both the subject matter and the institutional forms differ from the conventional model. The subject matter of the relationship typically involves the allocation of resources to which the recipient has contributed and for which it has a certain responsibility as member of the organization.<sup>10</sup> Rather than bargaining for resources legally possessed by another state, the recipient seeks aid to which it has a right provided it meets certain conditions which it may itself have helped design. Decisions on allocation of resources are formally made collegially by representatives of several governments, perhaps including the recipient. This differs sharply from the overt bargaining arrangement which is typical of government-to-government aid relationships. Finally, privileges and immunities granted officials relate to their functions, rather than to their status as representatives. Formally, they remain officials, not arms of a sovereign.

### III

The structures through which requests for international organization aid are developed lie principally within the national governments. The international organizations do not create structures which parallel the national government machinery at every level. The two structures meet formally and, to a considerable degree, in fact, at the level of the Resident Representative or other local representative of an international body, e.g. regional office of the International Bank or country representative of the World Health Organization (WHO).

The general pattern can easily be sketched. Initiatives for international aid develop in the normal governmental machinery in the course of planning or of operations. The rationale for such aid in all cases relies on a claim that the national government cannot otherwise procure the service sought or cannot otherwise undertake the project planned. Only after the aid request takes a form which satisfies the substantive ministries concerned does it come into the purview of the special national governmental machinery created for dealing with international agencies. This machinery often can be found in or related to the ministry or office which concerns itself with the national plan. It is charged with coordinating requests for technical assistance or preinvestment projects. Its officers are expected to know what sorts of projects fall within the interests of which specific

organizations and to separate the projects appropriate for bilateral programs from those which would prove most attractive to multilateral bodies. However, loans usually are handled separately by the Ministry of Finance or its equivalent. Usually requests for aid or loans may be forwarded only after a decision by the cabinet.

Despite the facility with which such structural generalizations can be made, specific differences among governments and their specific policies in fact may have special importance for the initiation of international aid projects. In the three countries where field data for this paper were gathered, these differences emerge in considering the nature of machinery, its place within the governmental hierarchy, the state of national planning and the character of the national plan.

Recently, full-fledged ministries, headed by ministers,<sup>12</sup> have undertaken planning functions in Tanzania and Malawi. In Zambia, the Office of National Development and Planning is an adjunct of the presidency and is headed by a permanent secretary. In all three cases, national planning has considerable prestige and importance in the governmental hierarchy.<sup>13</sup> In Tanzania and Zambia, the planning function is intended to include control of ministerial expenditures on the basis of specified projects outlined in comprehensive, published<sup>14</sup> plans. Both of these plans contain sectoral targets and look forward to structural changes in economy and society. They

not only list projects but also set out the economic and social relationship between them. They therefore incorporate the most important political goals set by the national governments.

The Malawi plan contrasts sharply with those of Tanzania and Zambia.<sup>15</sup> It is a short, 15-page document containing little elaboration of national goals and projecting social and economic change in only the most general way. Its economic analysis and statistical content<sup>16</sup> is far thinner than the other two. Most of the document consists of a list of projects which the government hopes to carry out. But this catalogue shows little evidence of close coordination to effect economic and social transformation. Rather it resembles a shopping list developed by ministries. It can be expected that some approach to a more rationalized plan will be made if the Ministry of Development and Planning grows stronger and more persuasive.

In Zambia and Malawi, the national planning mechanisms produce reports for national development committees, including government ministers. Their meetings have the effect of bringing cabinet level attention to bear on the plan revisions and problems of execution. In Zambia, a system of regional development committees, made up of key local personnel, is expected to extend knowledge of and garner support for the national plan. In Tanzania, the planning function either has been managed as part of the President's office under close

direction of prestigious ministers or has been an independent ministry headed by a political figure closely identified with the President. Thus in all three countries, the planning function certainly is not relegated to some obscure part of the bureaucracy by its very place in the general governmental structure.

Even the most rudimentary planning machinery by its nature has the effect of identifying specific development projects. Such identification represents a first step toward the initiation and preparation of requests for international agencies, which insist on tendering aid only to highly specific projects, rather than to needs for general support. Therefore, planning staffs tend to become involved, often crucially, in the international organization projects.

In Zambia and Malawi, moreover, the planning offices also have the task of coordinating foreign aid (with the exception of loans). Thus, the specialists on national planning, who coordinate ideas for development projects generated in ministries and who may control and inspect the execution of projects, also tend to become the most expert repository of information on and techniques for dealing with international organizations. They actually have formal responsibilities for framing requests and for maintaining liaison with local representatives of international agencies at the stage of requesting assistance. In Tanzania, where the planning and aid coordinating functions are separated, the latter are placed in the Ministry of Finance. There appears to be

close liaison between the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the treasury on aid matters. At the same time, a closer connection is maintained between efforts to secure international organizational financing and to obtain other sorts of aid, such as preinvestment surveys, which may lead to viable requests for loans, than may be true in the other two countries.

In some instances, the foreign affairs ministries have functions salient to requests for aid. They may advise on the sources to which applications are made. As one high official remarked: "Aid may have ties, but receiving it also may give us some political influence. We look to see if we can get any significant influence by taking aid from one donor rather than another." Furthermore, the ministries whose functions will benefit from successful applications may comment formally or informally during the process of developing requests. A great deal of value is put on coordination, so that requests go forward with as broad an agreement as possible in the governments and the civil services.

Although these governmental structures appear highly rationalized and articulate, mere description of their form tends to mislead. All three countries suffer from intense, if not debilitating, shortages of skilled manpower. Many high level posts in the civil services go unmanned or are occupied by very young men with little training and even less experience. Expatriate civil servants, some of them furnished by international organizations, head important offices and may



be the effective decision makers. The very process of planning is novel in these countries and its techniques often appear arcane and esoteric to the very officials who have to use them. The political leaders of the government frequently dislike planning itself as an exercise which does not produce "action."

As a result, if the governmental machinery were left to itself, its production of requests for international organization assistance, another field with its own esoteric practices, might remain sporadic and insufficiently great to use the opportunities offered. The requests which did come forward probably would be poorly framed and incomplete. One result therefore of the weakness of national governmental machinery is to encourage the international agencies to involve themselves deeply with the initiation of requests.

#### IV

Access for international institutions to national administrative and political structures is manifold, multi-directional, occurs at various levels and in general is free. It has an historical and policy background of importance. Continuing programs and precedents tend to open additional opportunities for access.

An important basis for access for international organizations was laid down in Tanganyika and Zambia even before independence. In the former, the International Bank

carried out and published a major economic survey of the country which constituted the first step toward a development plan. In Zambia, the United Nations and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) produced the first economic survey of breadth and depth.<sup>18</sup> It provided the government, which brought the country to independence, with an initial formulation of developmental priorities and projects<sup>19</sup> and served as the basis for a transitional national plan.

In addition to this close pre-independence association with the economic development planning of the area, the international agencies enjoy the benefit of generally receptive governmental policies. In all three countries, but especially in Tanzania and Zambia, political leaders and civil servants at all levels reiterate the doctrine that international organizations offer assistance that is both free of political implications and an alternative to bilateral aid. In addition, as a foreign office official in Dar es Salaam remarked, aid from international organizations fits into a non-aligned political stance even if more substantial amounts sometimes can be obtained from bilateral sources. National officials sometimes criticize what they consider the cumbersome procedures and limited resources of the international agencies. Nevertheless international assistance is seen as subjecting the national governments to less pressure and fewer conditions than bilateral programs at their best. The national officials, with the partial exception of Malawi where a strong connection with the

United Kingdom continues, usually claim that they would prefer to receive through international channels all or as much as possible of the economic aid proffered their governments.

The United Nations met a highly favorable post-independence attitude in the three countries with a special representational arrangement. In Tanganyika, after the conventional establishment of a U.N. Technical Assistance Board Special Fund Resident Representative's office, it was taken over in 1962 by George Ivan Smith, a high ranking official of the United Nations who had had primarily political experience, some of it in the Congo. He was styled Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and had responsibilities for UNTAB and Special Fund activities throughout East Africa. It was understood that as Personal Representative he would have access to the heads of government and to the ministers. Such a relationship in fact developed in Tanganyika, where Ivan Smith emphasized that his organization would do everything possible to meet governmental requests for aid. This attitude was expected to reinforce Ivan Smith's ability to consult with the government on broader questions of Tanganyika's foreign policy and its activities in the United Nations. It cannot be said, however, that the technical assistance and preinvestment projects which grew up represented a highly articulated program. While they fitted into the national plan, they clearly were shaped more in response to unconnected governmental requests than to stimulation and planning by the international agencies.

With the independence of Zambia, Ivan Smith turned over his duties in Dar es Salaam to a prestigious Ghanaian, A. L. Adu, who continued to supervise an undefined regional program in East Africa but without political responsibilities. Adu's experience in national administration and development programs and a proclivity for organization led him to seek a more organized international program. This task was in fact made easier as tentative requests from Tanzania began to exceed what it could expect to get. With Adu's resignation in 1966, the regional concept, which had not really been highly developed, weakened further and responsibilities for it were shifted to Nairobi.

Ivan Smith moved from Tanzania to Zambia at the time of the latter's independence. From Lusaka, he supervised another "regional" program, covering Zambia and Malawi, as well as Rhodesia, Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland. In this instance, as in Tanganyika earlier, the United Nations Secretary-General clearly attached some importance to providing access to the top level of the new governments during the immediate post-independence stage. Whether this access produced specific results in initiating TAB and Special Fund programs remains less than clear. Nevertheless, the priority given to political affairs seems to have strengthened the favor which international organization programs already enjoyed. It helped to establish a pattern of access to governments which was useful to Ivan Smith's successors,

although they avoided and disliked an overtly political role. One mark of this ease of access can be found in the fact that United Nations personnel were not included in the categories of foreign diplomats with whom Zambian civil servants may have only limited social contact.

Ivan Smith's successors--Adu and Gertrude McKitterick in Tanzania, Richard Symonds and Anthony Gilpin in Zambia--fitted more easily into the customary pattern of UNDP Resident Representatives. They kept closely informed on such political developments as the merger of Tanganyika with Zanzibar or the crisis arising from the unilateral declaration of independence by Rhodesia. But they did not use their access to the governments to discuss these developments outside of their immediate impact on the aid programs. Nor did they compile special political reports for the Secretary-General. They directed their main consultative efforts to the top civil servants, rather than to ministers and naturally showed much interest in the offices which coordinate requests for foreign assistance. This tended to put them in touch with planning activities of the governments.

Some of the Specialized Agencies have their own representation for Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia. These included the International Labor Organization (ILO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), FAO and WHO. In addition, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) has a sub-regional office in Lusaka,

and the United Nations International Children's Fund, the International Bank, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Food Program all were represented by officials stationed in or near the area. These representatives deal with the top officials in the substantive ministries whose work parallels their interests. Thus, the WHO representatives (one in Lusaka and one in Dar es Salaam) consider themselves public health advisers to the government and maintain steady contact with the top officials of the health ministries. At the same time, such representatives maintain some watch over the work of any technical assistance personnel or Special Fund projects with which their agency is involved. Thus, their access to the recipient governments does not depend on the presence or activities of the UNDP Resident Representative.

In some instances, the specialized agency representatives have been built directly into the governmental structures in such a way as to guarantee effortless access to the concerned ministry. In Tanzania, for example, the chief of mission for FAO also serves as a member of the planning unit in the Ministry of Agriculture and has been in charge of long-term planning. This arrangement implies constant access for the international organization to the area of governmental activity in which it is most closely interested. A similar but less close arrangement evolves from the execution of the constitutional mandate of UNESCO for the formation of a National Commission. The Secretary-General of this Commission in

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Tanzania, the only country which had one during the observation period, is an official in the Ministry of Education. Because he has special knowledge of the UNESCO program, he provides a natural and valuable point of contact for the agency's regional representative and his staff in Dar es Salaam.

Technical assistance and OPEX personnel actually at work also provide access for the international organizations. Technical assistance personnel make periodic reports on their work and therefore have at least formal and usually much closer contact with the UNDP Resident Representatives and representatives of their own agency. Knowledge of their activities tends to promote direct access to ministry officials. So does the appointment and training of a counterpart official (although such an appointment often either is not made or the official is poorly chosen<sup>21</sup>). While OPEX personnel do not make such reports, they and the technical assistance advisers as well usually feel some kinship with other members of the internationally-sponsored community and remain in close touch with it.

Such persons, moreover, often hold crucial positions in developing national plans and in putting forward requests for assistance. For example, the United Nations furnished economic advisers to the governments of Malawi and Zambia and the Director of National Planning in the latter country. At least three key officials in the economic affairs ministry and the treasury in Tanzania were furnished by the United

Nations during the period of observation. The mere fact that these were officials sent by international organizations tended to open direct access for the Resident Representatives to those who dealt with the definition and execution of the development plans which tend to produce international organization involvement.

Access for international organization representatives within the country is supplemented in two ways from the outside. First, all the organizations customarily send visiting missions of various sorts to member governments. Second, these governments participate in international conferences of many kinds.

In many cases, the governments request visits from international organization personnel. These visitors include experts who come for a short-time consultation on a narrowly defined subject. Or they may be summoned to help with the definition and drafting of a request for assistance. The International Bank, for example, has sent several missions, one of them to advise on the economic feasibility of the controversial project of a railway from Zambia to the Tanzania coast. Advisers on specialized problems, such as trade or transport, are available for short term assignments from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and have been requested occasionally in the three countries. A major revision of the terms of the Special Fund project for the Lower Shire Valley in Malawi produced a series of visits from FAO and International Bank officials.



Rather frequently--more frequently than local representatives sometimes enjoy--visiting missions grow out of initiatives at international organization headquarters. The International Bank, for example, has made comprehensive economic surveys of East Africa, primarily to inform its own staff but also to put its findings before the governments. Such surveys are taken seriously by member governments because they may later condition the success of loan applications. Moreover, the governments hope that developmental areas which might be suitable for investment at a later time will be identified. The UNDP also sends small missions headed by such high officials as Paul-Marc Henry, an Assistant Administrator. Such visitors, who have been received often in all three countries, consult with the head of government, concerned ministers and international agency representatives. As with the larger International Bank missions, the UNDP visitors, invariably described as "high-powered," have almost unlimited access to government personnel.

Some visits by high-ranking officials have as their main function the stimulation of interest in agency programs. Such "sales trips" involve consultations with officials in substantive ministries for the express purpose of acquainting them with the possibilities of benefiting from program changes and new emphases. Ministers, however, get assiduous attention in order both to increase the prestige of the agency in the view of the lower officials and to prepare a receptive

attitude or even to stimulate directives as to specific project applications. UNESCO is regarded by many national officials and representatives of other agencies as particularly skillful in establishing access for its officials on such visits. Every other year has seen a fleeting visit to the area from the Deputy Director-General. The UNESCO Regional Representative paves the way by securing formal governmental permission for the visit, preparing appointments and drafting background materials which include an appreciation of the local political situation, the state of the national development program and the situation of existing projects.

Such promotion and inspection jaunts do not always receive enthusiastic welcomes, especially when they take place with great frequency or seem to involve any pressure. In Malawi, for example, nine successive visits within the space of three months were scheduled by one agency, with the result that the weary government insisted on tightening its procedures for permission to visit in order to safeguard the time of its ministers and officials.

The same ministers and officials who receive the visitors from agencies often represent their governments at general and technical meetings convened by international organizations. The Minister of Agriculture and his chief officials, for example, usually make up the delegations to the FAO Conference, where they encounter international civil servants who but a few weeks before conferred with them in their own countries.

In a number of instances, the local representative of an international organization has been asked to help with the briefing of a national delegation preparing to attend meetings of his agency. On a few occasions, officials supplied by international agencies have been included on national delegations. This kind of access, which could be especially influential, does not appear to be ordinary practice. Conferences, dealing with more general subject matter than visits to capitals, provide access for the international organizations in a different context. At the same time, in informal gatherings specific national problems are reviewed and discussed, sometimes at the initiative of international officials. The access provided in this busy and often impressive international setting may have an important bearing on the atmosphere for specific projects at the national level.

Official programs and relationships often produce an informal counterpart. Senior international personnel visiting or working in recipient countries receive invitations to diplomatic and governmental parties and receptions. In this milieu, relaxed contact can supplement more official relationships. At all levels, personal friendships or at least comprehending acquaintances may develop and foster easy access. But in some instances, personal animosities which destroy ease of access spring from informal contacts.

This review of the access of international organizations to national governments indicates that a wide range of

opportunities for contact exists and is employed. The representatives of international organizations can approach national governments in a setting appropriate to discussion of general international policies or of the detailed issues in executing a project supported by international organizations. The atmosphere of such access reflects the generally favorable predispositions of the national governments studied here. It is maintained in part by the fact that programs of assistance are underway under international auspices and that others may still be within reach.

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Although it cannot be doubted that international organizations have broad and easy access to national politicians and administrators in the three countries on which this study is based, the process of creating and maintaining such access must be seen as complex and many-faceted. It ranges all the way from the highly formal and impersonal to the highly informal and personal. Moreover, it involves nationals and foreigners, people of widely differing cultures and formation and in view of the usual two-year assignment for technical assistance personnel and the frequent transfer of agency representatives, a shifting group of participants. The utilization by international organizations of such access, not surprisingly, is also exceedingly complex and not easily summed up in a single generalization.

The maze of relationships which could grow out of the involved and overlapping modes of access is conditioned by a number of highly particular features. In the first place, the national bureaucracies in the three countries studied are staffed only very thinly. The general shortage of trained manpower reduces the capacity of these countries, as other developing countries, to provide trained and broad-visioned civil servants. The civil servants who are available either are inordinately busy, if they are competent, or obstructively clumsy if they are less than competent in a polity which must use every man it can get. In any case, the international officials often must train and guide national civil servants through an unfamiliar bureaucratic labyrinth. In some instances, as in Zambia, some of the officials charged with coordinating foreign technical assistance have been sent on training courses to the international organizations and have come back strikingly more knowledgeable than their colleagues.

Second, the ministers, who normally would be informed by their civil servants and who might bring certain technical experience of their own to their offices, usually have had only the slightest acquaintance or none at all with the sophisticated planning techniques of their own governments and the arcane requirements of the international agencies. Before access can be turned into influence, these ministers too must go through a learning process. But this process varies from place to place, depending on local experience, and over time as the governing group acquires experience.

Thirdly, the international officials vary in experience, competence and goals. Officials with experience in high-grade administrations tend to seek tidiness and logic in the programs they administer. Thus, Resident Representatives in all three countries have expressed concern with the scattered nature of the programs they oversee and tend to seek coordination not only with the government but also with bilateral donors. This search involves yet another influence in the process of developing requests.

Furthermore, local problems beyond the experience and competence of international organization representatives may develop. Or such events as the Rhodesian declaration of independence or the revolution in Zanzibar can occupy all of the time of the best civil services and at the same time cause the redirection of the government's policies in unanticipated ways. The difficulty in making changes in a program which undergoes long bureaucratic processing may tend to reduce the access of international organization personnel to officials who have pressing decisions to make in order to form and carry out emergency policies.

Fifth, the intensity of concern with a particular country on the part of international agencies tends to vary with international political developments. Thus, the Rhodesian crisis immediately brought a flood of adjustments, new ideas and suggestions of new projects from international agency personnel. A UNESCO-sponsored educational training project,

for example, was withdrawn from the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in Salisbury and attached temporarily to the University of Zambia; both international officials and Zambian opposite numbers immediately began consultations aimed at making the temporary location a continuing one.

Finally, national governments also employ access to international resources in the context of short-run domestic controversies. Economic development stands out as a principal political goal in all three countries. If, as in Zambia, an articulated and agreed upon national plan is perceived by the government as an essential element in economic development, one way to get such a plan is through the employment of an energetic and skilled foreigner to direct the planning. Such a decision was made in Zambia and the Resident Representative cooperated with the government over a period of many months to frame a request, send it successfully through the screening process and locate the official who was eventually appointed. Assuming that the national plan whose drafting he directed proves a success, the government will have met a national political goal, improved its ability to govern and bettered the lot of its people. If the planning exercise in the end disappoints the government, it will produce few local enemies to let the contract of one expatriate run out.

Yet it remains exceedingly difficult to pinpoint the sources of initiatives and requests. In some cases, they come

from a conjunction of high-level international policy, as UNESCO's program to eliminate illiteracy, and local needs. It is hardly surprising that Tanzania has important training and planning projects in the educational field. In other cases, a technical assistance expert called in to advise on a narrow subject may suggest a broader project. In yet other instances, as in the five-year survey of the Kafue River in Zambia under a Special Fund contract, the rather academic results dissatisfied a practically-oriented government which successfully insisted that a demonstration irrigation project be arranged as a follow-up.

The most typical influence exerted by international organization officials in the course of their duties probably is represented by consultations aimed at formulating requests, rather than the outright suggestion of projects. It is a common practice for a Resident Representative and his staff to draft large parts or all of the series of requests which make up a national program to be submitted to UNDP in New York. Such drafting exercises obviously aim at putting the request in the required form and making it persuasive.

At the same time, such a request almost always is preceded by weeks of consultation as to whether it could fit within the guidelines set by UNDP, whether it could be handled within the annual target figure of expenditure in view of continuing obligations and competing requests from various ministries within the country. Such consultations



involve an influence, whether deliberate or not, on the national development plan, for priorities are accorded projects in part on the basis of the local representative's estimate of whether headquarters will approve them. The headquarters staff frequently urges revision of a particular request, thus providing yet another influence. In the case of a preinvestment project, the negotiations may carry on over several months and involve visits from experts from several distant agencies. All the international officials have organizational and personal points of view, which tend to be incorporated in the project. When the national representatives are few and inexperienced, they may well be overwhelmed by the quantity and expertness of the advice they receive. At the same time, they gain experience which may add much critical content to the next round of negotiations. And in any case, the national governments can have the last word as to whether or not they are satisfied.

Because international officials have been given and have developed access to national governments of a breadth and quality without any historical pattern, they find many opportunities to suggest and to shape requests for aid. The situations in which they can exert influence are as numerous as the kinds of access. Access varies with changes in personnel on both government and international organization sides, in international agency programs, in available funds and in priorities determined by international conflicts of many kinds.

Access takes place in a complex and sometimes discontinuous set of institutional structures. But it remains a continuing possibility which opens the way to the introduction of suggestions and ideas, proposals and offers. These create influences on the issues of economic development and change so crucial in the less developed countries.

### Footnotes

1. The term "international organization" includes all intergovernmental institutions which have a formal constitutional basis and are intended to exist over indefinite or long periods of time. This paper, however, deals only with the United Nations and international organizations associated with it and primarily with their field operations. These organizations include approximately all states in the world, although some of the suborganizations have restricted membership, e.g. U.N. Economic Commission for Africa.

2. This research was made possible through the generosity of the Social Science Research Council, the Center of International Studies at Princeton University and the Committee on Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences at Princeton University.

3. The future and status of the Kariba loan, needless to say, is less than clear at the moment.

4. See U.N. Doc. DP/JA/L. 10 and SF/PGL/1; Walter Sharp, Field Administration in the United Nations System (New York, Praeger, 1961), pp. 367-417; Yonah Alexander, International Technical Assistance Experts (New York, Praeger, 1966), pp. 22-50; Üner Kirdar, The Structure of United Nations Economic-Aid to Underdeveloped Countries (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 44-48; and United Nations, 15 Years and 150,000 Skills, Sales No. 65.I.18, Doc. E/TAC/153/Rev. 1, pp. 34-36.

5. Operational, executive and administrative personnel. These are senior civil servants who, although supported by the United Nations, work as national civil servants. See discussion in Kirdar, op. cit., pp. 67-83.

6. David Truman's discussion of access in the United States national context has some relevance to this paper. See his The Governmental Process (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 264-70, 321-51. His discussion deals primarily with national interest groups, but in some cases, international organizations can be considered as analogous to interest groups in the legislative process.

Walter Sharp in his essay entitled "International Bureaucracies and Political Development" in Joseph LaPalombara, Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 441-474, uses the term "impact" to cover not only access but also the results in terms of changes of policy. I am seeking here to elucidate the beginning of a process which may result in changes in governmental policy.

7. At first, some governments expressed fears that undue influence on matters considered sensitive might result from the enlargement of technical assistance and other field operations. As a result the earliest General Assembly resolutions made it clear that legally any government was free to reject aid and even to set certain conditions in accepting it. See

for example U.N. General Assembly Resolution 200 (III), which says inter alia "...technical assistance...shall (i) not be a means of foreign economic and political interference in the internal affairs of the country concerned and shall not be accompanied by any considerations of a political nature; (ii) be given only to or through Governments...(iv) be provided, as far as possible, in the form which that country desires...."

It never is clear precisely what the word "political" means in such a resolution, but it certainly does point to the possibility that any given government will strictly reserve some issues as subject only to its treatment. See also Kirdar, op. cit., pp. 25-28.

8. For account of the troubled development of this relationship, see Sharp, Field Administration, pp. 380-87.

9. Alexander, op. cit., pp. 51-57; Kirdar, op. cit., pp. 48-59.

10. All three countries studied here pledged modest contributions to the UN DP treasury. For 1966, for example, Malawi offered \$5,000, Tanzania, \$56,000 and Zambia \$9,800. U.N. Doc. DP/L.15.

11. Sharp distinguishes three kinds of national structures for dealing with international aid: the foreign office bureau; the inter-ministerial committee; and the independent office. Sharp, "International Bureaucracies...", op. cit., pp. 457-458.

12. Earlier, planning in Tanzania was in charge of a directorate of development and planning, placed in the presidency and headed by no less than three ministers of state.

13. This accords with the recommendations of international organizations which have emphasized the importance of planning and have strongly supported it. See, for example, U.N. Economic and Social Council Resolutions 984 (XXXVI) and 1079 (XXXIX), and for particularly sharp examples U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1710 (XVI) (which established the Development Decade) and subsequent documentation, e.g. U.N., Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The Development Decade: Proposals for Action, Sales No. 62.II.B.2, Doc. E/3613, pp. 14-24.

14. Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 2 vols. (Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1964) and Office of National Planning and Development, First National Development Plan 1966-1970 (Lusaka, Government Printer, 1966). For comment on the Tanzanian Plan, see Reginald H. Green, "Four African Development Plans: Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania," Journal of Modern African Studies, 3, 2 (1965), pp. 249-79, and Walter J. Keegan, "Tanganyika's Five-Year (1964-1969) Development Plan: Sober Realism or Buoyant Optimism?" in Tom J. Farer, (ed.), Financing African Development (Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1965), pp. 11-40. The Zambian

plan succeeds a transitional plan which was employed from shortly after independence until the five-year plan could be drafted. Central Planning Office, An Outline of the Transitional Development Plan (Lusaka, Government Printer, 1965).

15. Development Plan 1965-69 (Zomba, Government Printer, 1964).

16. Statistics in this part of Africa are notoriously unreliable. Therefore, experienced officials sometimes argue, with considerable persuasiveness, that sophisticated, quantitative economic analysis misleads more than it informs in such circumstances. This can be made into a defense of the "shopping list" approach to planning and to external aid.

17. IBRD Economic Survey Mission to Tanganyika, The Economic Development of Tanganyika (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961).

18. United Nations, U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N., Economic Survey Mission on the Economic Development of Zambia (Ndola, Falcon Press, 1964).

19. Central Planning Office, An Outline of the Transitional Development Plan, op. cit.

20. Late in 1966, a UNESCO representative was sent to Zambia. He declared his intention of securing the establishment of a National Commission there as soon as possible.

Technical assistance personnel furnished through UNESCO as part of UNDP commented that they could not see how their work would be affected by his presence.

21. Sharp, "International Bureaucracies...", op. cit.,  
p. 460.



Summary

This paper, based on field studies in Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia, concentrates on the initiation of requests for assistance from international organizations as a revealing part of the process of influence on member governments. It employs the concept of access to explore the relationships developed by international organization personnel with those of member governments.

The process of creating, maintaining and employing the high degree of access which has evolved is complex and many-faceted. Such access develops through formal-legal relationships, official decision-making structures and non-official contacts. Numerous and somewhat variant opportunities for access are built into the structures. Access is conditioned by the thinness of national bureaucracies, the often slight acquaintance with and sympathy for development planning on the part of government ministers who may also be ignorant of international organization affairs, the varied experience and outlooks of international officials, international political developments and short-run domestic controversies. It therefore proves difficult to pinpoint sources of initiatives and requests for aid. Typical influences exerted by international officials are represented by consultations regarding formulations of requests for aid, rather than outright suggestions of projects.

Nevertheless, international officials, employing unprecedented access to national governmental processes and leaders, find many opportunities to shape and influence requests for aid. Thus, they tend to influence crucial issues of economic development and change.

Résumé

Fondé sur des études faites en Malawi, en Tanzanie et en Zambie, le rapport analyse la présentation des demandes d'assistance aux organisations internationales comme un aspect révélateur du processus d'influence sur les gouvernements membres. L'auteur utilise le concept d'accès pour étudier les relations entre le personnel des organisations internationales et celui des gouvernements membres.

La création, la préservation et l'utilisation d'un haut degré d'accès sont devenues des processus complexes et multiformes. L'accès s'opère au moyen de relations formelles et juridiques, de structures de décisions officielles, de contacts officieux. Les structures contiennent des possibilités d'accès nombreuses et assez variables. L'accès est conditionné par les effectifs réduits des bureaucraties nationales, les connaissances et l'intérêt souvent faibles à l'égard de la planification en vue du développement de la part de ministres parfois également ignorants des organisations internationales, l'expérience et la mentalité diverses des fonctionnaires internationaux, la situation politique internationale, les controverses immédiates de politique intérieure. Il est difficile de localiser les sources d'initiative et de demandes d'assistance. Les fonctionnaires internationaux agissent notamment par des consultations concernant la formulation des demandes d'assistance, plutôt qu'en suggérant des projets.

Les fonctionnaires internationaux, utilisant des voies d'accès sans précédent aux processus et aux dirigeants des gouvernements nationaux, trouvent de nombreuses possibilités de formuler et d'influencer les demandes d'assistance. Ils tendent de cette façon à exercer une influence sur des aspects cruciaux du développement économique et du changement social.

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"The political role of international  
economic organizations"

THE MEANING OF MULTILATERAL SURVEILLANCE  
(OR THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CREDITOR-  
DEBTOR RELATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES)

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The Meaning of Multilateral Surveillance :  
(or the political implications of creditor-debtor relations  
for developing countries).

by Susan Strange

What kind of power do international organisations acquire by their ability to provide money to governments that need it ? How far does it extend, and what are its limitations ?

This is a key question for the further study of international organisation and must closely affect speculation about the prospects for international society and international politics. Here is one of the main growth points of international organisation in the last 20 years ; the number and variety of international banks and agencies able to offer financial patronage has grown and so, correspondingly, have the total funds at their disposal and indeed their opportunity for secondary financial influence on private sources of capital and credit. Popular mythology in rich and poor countries alike is in little doubt that he who pays the piper calls the tune, and that foreign creditors, whether governments or companies or banks, exert a sinister strong-pulling influence on the economy. The legend is easily adapted to international organisation, and it is already a familiar contention that international economic organisations have a major instrument of political pressure in their powers of surveillance over debtor countries.

I think that there are good reasons to doubt whether this is always or necessarily so ; and good reasons too why such doubts ought to be clearly voiced. For among people with a natural bias towards international organisation it is easy to argue that here at last, in the financial field, coolly insulated by its technicality from the hot breath of sweaty politicians, lies a chance for international organisation to undermine and outflank the pride of national sovereignty. Yet this sort of overselling of contemporary international economic organisations can surely be as misleading and dangerous as the overselling that once was current about the collective security system of the League

of Nations. Then, a wishful blindness to the impotence of the League seemed to atrophy the will to oppose aggression early enough by more traditional means. Similarly, now, overlooking the impotence of our new international economic organisations can lead to serious and possibly dangerous - certainly costly - miscalculation in the difficult and uneasy relationship between the rich North and the poor South.

A special need to examine more closely the real powers of international economic organisations arises because political scientists have so far left this field far too much to the economists. These in turn have made what some of them regard as poaching on their preserves more difficult by evolving (in alliance with national and international officials) a professional jargon which serves them as a useful shorthand but which also acts as an effective deterrent to discussion by the laity. Moreover, with a few notable exceptions, the judgment of economists is not sufficiently tempered with political realism and their interests often lie more in quantification and in the mechanics of an operation than in its significant political aspects.

Another weakness, if I may be allowed to say so, of the economists is that they are not much given to admitting when they have been wrong. (This is not the only respect in which they resemble the Roman augurs whose success depended on the diplomatic divination of entrails as the success of economic advisers depends on the judicious interpretation of statistical indices, seasonally adjusted).

The advice proffered by organisations charged with multilateral surveillance is framed mainly by economists, and it is difficult to argue that their score to date for correct diagnosis and treatment is anywhere near 100 per cent. This, however, is something which the politicians in government and the officials of international organisations know but do not want to draw attention to. The voice of a few economic journalists is easily drowned.

As an unorthodox but perceptive economic commentator, Nicholas Davenport, put it in the Spectator of June 16, 1967 : "One does not have to pay too much attention to the views of central bankers. They invariably get their economics wrong and they have a prejudice against all forms of government spending".

This has been very evident in the case of the United Kingdom which is supposed to be subject to the multilateral surveillance of the Bank for International Settlements as agent for the central banks which have supported sterling by temporary loans and by the Basle credit agreements. The BIS annual reports on the British economy have prescribed a blunderbuss medicine of more savings, more taxation, more investment and less consumption. But the deflationary 'stop' policies adopted by Mr. Callaghan, following in the steps of Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, have been no more successful in effecting a radical cure. Increased public saving from more taxation has only left less saving to be done privately. A plateau or freeze of wages only builds up a head of pressure for a big upward spurt when the check is taken off. I do not want to dwell too long on the British experience for mainly two reasons. First, the evidence that can be used is scanty and the guidance tendered publicly has been rather muffled out of deference to British prestige. Secondly, it is possible that because it operates a key currency with a special international role Britain is in a unique position, and it would therefore be wrong to draw any general conclusions about multilateral surveillance from her experience of it.

Two observations arising from it, however, may be worth making briefly and in passing. One, hinted at already, is that before advocating more multilateral surveillance, it would help to be convinced that the surveyors have, in cases already undertaken, been able to make a correct diagnosis and to prescribe the right treatment to cure the disease and not just to relieve the symptoms. The British experience leaves this a rather open question.

The other point to emerge is that the ward of multilateral surveillance is possibly in a rather stronger strategic position than it is in anyone's interest to admit. In the last prolonged British crisis, for instance, multilateral central bank assistance was forthcoming three times. The first was in an emergency, in November, 1964 ; the second, in September, 1965, followed a patched-up Declaration of Intent on the prices-and-incomes policy ; and the third, in July, 1966 was given when the government's deflationary measures had still not begun

seriously to bite, and was perhaps the most important of all because the central banks then assumed partial responsibility for pressure on the British reserves arising from any drawing down of the sterling reserves of overseas sterling area balances. The fact that the weakness of the debtor was unabated, so it seemed, had actually extracted not a diminished but a greater commitment from the creditors to assist. By deeds if not words, the acknowledgment (renewed several months ahead of time in 1967) was made that the stability and security of a key currency was after all a collective interest of the developed market-economy countries. In the circumstances, it was therefore possible for the British government to keep its guardians content with a series of policy lollipops - measures of apparent self-mortification but minimal economic significance, of which the most obvious was the cut in foreign exchange allowances for British holidaymakers abroad. The only apparent effect has been to put BEA in the red and to expand a flagging market for the cheaper package holidays beyond the dreams of their promoters.

As to the general question of multilateral surveillance, however, the main interest seems to be in its relevance to the problems of the developing countries, so-called. I would like to propose just two of the many possible approaches to the question which seem to merit further study and which seem to produce conclusions which fit with each other fairly well. One of these is to look critically at the negotiations which have recently taken place between certain debtor countries and international economic organisations, or less formal multilateral groupings, who may be said to exercise a power of multilateral surveillance over them.

The other is to refer back to the main patterns of creditor-debtor relationship in the nineteenth century and to estimate how these might be affected by the different circumstances of the twentieth century. For it is sometimes forgotten that concerted international action towards debtors was not invented by the World Bank, and that though the style then was more informal and temporary, the nature of the problem was often strikingly similar.

The debtor countries which I have chiefly in mind are countries which have been on, or near, the brink of default - India, Ghana, Indonesia and the U.A.R. They are not by any means the only ones subject to some form of multilateral surveillance. There are at present at least fifteen developing countries watched over by aid consortia and/or creditors' clubs <sup>(1)</sup>. And there are many more whose probable burden of debt-servicing and repayment will bring them, unless present levels of aid and trade are greatly changed, to the same situation in the course of the 1970's. But these four, because they have come so close to default, could be expected to show themselves especially vulnerable to the influence and pressure of multilateral surveillance.

India, it might be said, has actually proved its susceptibility by capitulating, after a change of Finance Ministers, to the World Bank's advice to devalue the rupee, and by adopting more accommodating policies towards foreign investment. But there are qualifications that have to be added before reaching broad conclusions about the effectiveness of multilateral surveillance. The advice to devalue, first given by the Bell Mission in the autumn of 1965, was not taken until nearly a year later and after much toing and froing between Washington and New Delhi. United States attempts to apply pressure by suspending aid after the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan war were as ineffectual as similar tactics in the Alliance for Progress. The only result (apart from the continued deterioration in India's payments situation) was that the IMF had to step in, in March 1966, with an emergency credit of \$ 187 million. The aid donors were then able to refuse India's first request for a moratorium on debt-servicing payments. But by the next meeting of the Aid India Club this spring it was becoming much more difficult to refuse rescheduling of debt and softer terms for new loans. Judging by the Indian example, multilateral surveillance of a debtor country's finances has little effect on its defence policies, even though these may have most devastating effects on its financial status. It also seems that the influence of the international organisations is being directed as much towards pleading for greater generosity and patience on the part of the creditors as for greater effort and discipline on the part of the debtor. Their primary concern (whether of the Bank in the case of India <sup>(1)</sup>) Aid consortia now operate for India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaysia, Nigeria, Tunisia, Colombia, Turkey and Greece : Creditors' Clubs for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Ghana and Liberia.



or the Fund in the case of Ghana) was at all costs to avoid the open and defiant declaration by the debtor of default on past loans. Thus, while they have exerted some influence on the debtor's financial policies, they have also helped to wring concessions from the creditors.

In the Indonesian case, the default had already occurred and membership of the Bank and Fund resigned. Negotiations have focussed on the terms on which Indonesia would return to the fold, resuming payments on old debts and thereby qualifying for new credits. These negotiations have demonstrated once more the reciprocal exercise of power between creditor and debtor. The creditors were able to agree amongst themselves on the terms for a rescheduling programme for past loans and to provide some \$ 160 million of new aid. The solidarity of the debtors was threatened less by the Soviet Union than by Japan which undercut the other aid-donors on interest-rates. An open rift however was finally avoided by raising the interest on part of the Japanese aid to the going rate and making the rest into a grant. There were parallel negotiations with dispossessed private enterprises such as Goodyear and Unilever in which the companies were promised the return of their former property in return for large new investments and an undertaking to provide more jobs for Indonesians.

A lenient attitude towards both India and Indonesia, sweetening quite lavishly the pill of multilateral surveillance, might be explained by the overriding United States interest in the political and military containment of China in South and East Asia. But this explanation hardly applied to Ghana, to whom also the creditors have shown a rather remarkable collective indulgence. Here, the removal of an extremist national leader provided the occasion for a rearrangement of debt which, it had been widely foreseen, was the only alternative to an open default. Twelve of Ghana's main creditors (but not including France), meeting in London at the end of 1966, agreed to defer for from 5 to 10 years the repayment of four-fifths of Ghana's foreign medium-term debt, and to give a further six-month grace period for the remaining fifth. It was further conceded that Ghana could ask for a review of the rescheduling arrangements in 1969. In the meanwhile, emergency assistance was forthcoming in aid, including a stand-by IMF credit in May of \$25 million,

designed to act as a secondary line of reserves while the government tried to restart economic growth.

Finally, there is the UAR -- the antithesis of India in refusing the medicine prescribed by an international organisation -- this time the IMF -- and of Ghana in remaining under the control of a national leader apparently heedless of the dangers of default. In this case, the remarkable feature was surely the slowness to anger and the reluctance to apply retribution of the IMF. A bitter quarrel with the United States over terms and quantities ended in the total suspension of American food aid to Egypt in 1966. This, followed by a shortfall in the cotton crop brought on a payments situation in which default on the repayment of an IMF credit was hardly unexpected. Yet, from December, 1966, when the UAR defaulted, until May, 1967, and the outbreak of the Israeli-war, the IMF took no action and threatened no reprisal. Once the war had started it could be conveniently blamed for the default, and the risk diminished of setting a bad example to other debt-burdened countries who might be tempered lightheartedly to follow suit.

Ghana and the UAR, as it happens, were two of the ten developing countries known to have made particularly heavy use of export credit finance, or, as the jargon has it, of suppliers' credit <sup>(1)</sup>. More than half Ghana's foreign debt in 1965 was thought to have been on suppliers' credits and though the corresponding percentage for the UAR was only 15 per cent, this was taking nearly a quarter of the country's debt-servicing payments. Like easy hire-purchase for the individual, suppliers credit is apt to inflate prices and to be relatively quickly due for repayment. For a developing country, it is rather like resort to the pop-shop for the less provident family in the days before social security -- a last refuge, admittedly expensive and risky, available when other sources of credit are exhausted.

Eight other countries noted in a recent International Bank survey <sup>(2)</sup> whose heavy use of suppliers credit was pre-empting a large

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(1) Suppliers' credit includes contractors' finance for special development projects. It mainly refers to imported goods having a foreign export credit guarantee.

(2) "Suppliers' Credits from Industrialised to Developing Countries". A study by the staff of the World Bank requested by UNCTAD. Washington, January, 1967.

percentage of their total debt-payments, were Brazil (63%), Chile (25%), Peru (52%), Korea (90%), Thailand (36%), Liberia (60%), Nigeria (53%) and Yugoslavia (19%).

The conclusion drawn by this study was that this easy and unregulated source of credit was going to necessitate new measures of international financial organisation amounting to a wholesale extension of multilateral surveillance. To anticipate dangerous situations like that of India, Ghana or the UAR, the survey suggested a pressing need for international agreement and action along three lines. First, the principles governing the supply of private credit to developing countries would need to be elaborated and agreed by the governments of potential creditor countries. Second, these principles would have to be put into practice in individual developing countries - implying, presumably, that the aid consortium device would have to be extended to more countries and to cover the questions, inseparable from aid, of terms and maturities of new loans. And thirdly, international organisations such as the Bank will need to collect more reliable and comprehensive information on the precise nature and structure of the foreign credit position of developing countries.

None of these measures will be achieved without difficulty, but so strong are the economic and political pressures behind export credit guarantee systems - even countries like India, Israel and Argentina now use them to push their overseas sales - that some corresponding defensive or regulatory measures by international organisations seem inevitable.

My point, however, is that this extension of machinery - assuming the difficulties are somehow overcome - must not be mistaken for an extension of power, or for a greater efficacy of multilateral surveillance. The special cases I have briefly referred to demonstrate rather sharply the two-way nature of the creditor-debtor relationship. However well-organised they may be, it would be foolish of the creditors to depend too much on their power to keep the debtor out of costly and self-destructive local wars, or to prevent the use of scarce resources for grandiose or ill-conceived investment projects or to restrict the unwise use of newly-devised methods of financing private foreign trade.

Indeed, if we think back, the history of the last two decades is particularly rich in instances where debtors in positions of extreme dependence have nonetheless been able to resist attempts by their creditors to dictate their policies or influence their attitudes. In practice - though often neither side is particularly anxious to draw attention to it - it has proved easier to attach strings to economic assistance than to make sure that they will not soon afterwards be detached and ignored.

The American Loan of 1946 to Britain and the conditions concerning convertibility and non-discrimination are one example ; the one attempt to carry out part of the bargain by Dr. Dalton in 1947 was so disastrous that the creditor thereafter had to give Britain a generous share of non-repayable Marshall Aid. Soviet Loans to China in the early 1950's provide another example. As soon as the debtor felt inclined, the unqualified acknowledgment of Soviet leadership in ideology and in the revolutionary alliance was abandoned. And in the process, more concessions, including new loans, were given by the creditor than by the debtor. Yet in both cases, the debtor had no one else to turn to. Nor, really, have the dependents of the United States in the Alliance for Progress which is actually founded on the supposition that the position of creditor carries the power to influence domestic economic and social policies and development. Yet its record to date has done little to confirm this assumption.

Indeed, the axiom of many business tycoons that you only achieve a secure success when you have borrowed so much that the bank cannot afford to see you go bust seems to apply almost equally to international relations - except that the bankers are less able to stop you going bust if you insist on it.

This interdependence is, of course, no new development. The helpless involvement of the United States (however reluctant) in the financial problems of India seems to parallel closely the equally helpless involvement of French creditors in Tsarist Russia before the first world war, when the observation was made that not even the Russians could be persuaded to drink enough vodka to provide the government with the tax revenues to repay the foreign bondholders. (Over half of the

revenues came from the sale of alcohol and the revenue of the railways, and the railways ran at a loss). As Herbert Feis wrote of French investment in Russian securities : "Once the sums loaned had grown great, they strengthened the necessity of making French foreign policy conform to Russian aims. Debtor and creditor were firmly bound to each other, but debtor, in this case, was the more exigent and the more aggressive in political plans".

The involvement today not only of the United States, but also of all the leading central banks of the world, in the financial plight of Britain might also - if one wanted to be unkind at Mr. Callaghan's expense - be compared with the general involvement of European creditors with the Ottoman Empire. There, too, the creditors had little choice in the last resort but to accept at face value whatever unconvincing professions of pious resolution the debtor cared to make. And the African debtors of today may well come increasingly to resemble the financial morass and slough of despond that was the Manchu Empire of China. The European creditors in Africa (as in China nearly a century ago) may easily find themselves drawn by their financial commitment into partial intervention in the financial administration of their debtors. This will not, probably, be ruthless enough to produce the necessary economic and social miracle. But it will, most probably, succeed in arousing the bitter resentment and rancour of the Africans - just as it did that of the Chinese.

Such comparisons, though, can easily be taken too far. What is perhaps more instructive is to consider the choice of alternatives which existed for nineteenth-century creditors, and then to assess what new alternatives are offered, or old ones denied by the different circumstances of our own time.

The creditor faced by a reluctant debtor is by definition in search of weapons of coercion ; these can be of three main kinds - forceful, financial or legal.

At first sight, one important change seems to be the disappearance of the gunboat in creditor-debtor relations. Yet in fact, the occasions before 1914 when naval or military force was actually used

to collect debts by force were quite few compared to the incidence of indebtedness. The Venezuelan blockade of 1902 is well-known and so are the occasions when the United States (until the time of President Hoover) used the Marines in Central America and the Caribbean. But elsewhere, the jealousy and strategic rivalries of the powers made it very difficult to use force for the collection of debt without setting-off an international crisis - as at Agadir. The reason often given then for not using force was that the private creditors of CountryX had only themselves to blame if they allowed their desire for profit to get the better of their prudence, and that the government would therefore leave it to them, or (in the British case) to the Council of Foreign Bondholders or even the Bank of England, to negotiate, but could not itself be expected to intervene. Now, when governments themselves are often major creditors (or guarantors of creditors), the reason given is that the use of force is intolerable to world opinion and against the UN Charter. But in both cases, I think, the more effective deterrent has been the sensitivity of the balance of power.

A second alternative, not often employed but extremely effective from a financial point of view, was the wholesale takeover of the debtor country. Two obvious instances were Egypt, taken over by the British in 1883 after the failure of an early attempt at international administration in the Anglo-French Dual Control ; and Morocco, taken over by the French in 1911 again after the failure of an essay at international control by a consortium of creditors. In both cases, the country had borrowed so much and gone through so many rescheduling arrangements for its past debts that it seemed incapable of ever getting out of the financial mire. The foreign occupation and takeover, once resistance had been overcome, was at least successful in restoring its international credit and giving it some financial stability.

By comparison with Egypt and Morocco, Portugal, which in the last quarter of the century reached much the same parlous state, was spared such humiliation mainly because it was protected by British sea-power from French or German intervention, and also perhaps because its former status of great European power inhibited the creditors from behaving towards it as they did to non-Europeans. Unable to get out of debt

and unable to borrow any more, it remained in a kind of stagnant pond of foreign debt until released by the revolution of 1911.

In Portugal, the third alternative open to 19th century creditors was tried but was not effective from the creditors' point of view. This course was the partial financial takeover by earmarking certain taxes -- usually customs revenues -- for the overdue repayment of foreign debt. The Portuguese resisted foreign representation on the tax-collecting body and this may have made it less effective. Another conspicuous failure of this policy was seen in China, even though the system there was taken to its extreme by the establishment of the treaty ports and the thorough administration of Chinese customs revenues.

Yet in other cases it worked well enough. The United States, for example, repeatedly resorted to it in the Caribbean and Central America where otherwise it was too easy for the debtors to use the latest revolution as an excuse for defaulting on past debts. It was also in fact the method used by the League of Nations in the 1920's in conjunction with the reconstruction loans given to Austria and Hungary. Even then, the scale of government spending and therefore the extent of indebtedness, was still very much more modest than it is today. The customs-house takeover in its various forms, therefore often proved a valuable regimen for financial convalescence. It put into the creditors' hands both a carrot and a stick, and if the debtor was not already too far gone in debt, it offered both the means and the incentive to rid the country of a tiresome but not-too-obtrusive foreign incubus.

The customs-house takeover, when it was successful, was usually backed up (even if not imposed) by superior force on the side of the creditors. But it was still essentially a weapon of financial, not forceful, coercion. The other financial weapon sometimes used by the creditors was, of course, the refusal to lend any more until the old debts had been more fully repaid. Then, as now, this was an alternative policy which called for considerable skill and finesse if it was to work. In the Portuguese case, for instance, and in many others, dealing in any more Portuguese securities was banned on all the main

exchanges in Europe ; but the effect as far as existing creditors were concerned was almost nil. Like a blockade or a strategic embargo or trade sanctions, it was a system only effective if watertight, but also a system highly liable by its very nature to have holes in it which destroyed its effect. The creditors had to stand firmly united and this, whether in private or public finance, is seldom easy. Or, the debtor will find ways to get round the ban - as the United States in the early and middle nineteenth century repeatedly did with her European creditors. When the Federal Government was excommunicated by the European creditors, the individual states began to borrow new loans in their own names ; and when these had been discredited as defaulters, the borrowing function was taken up by the railroads and by other kinds of private enterprise. This game in fact suited both parties, because there were strong interests on the creditors' side as well as on the debtor's which did not really want the flow of credit to be stopped.

In such circumstances, when the financial threat to cut off new supplies proved useless, the creditors of the nineteenth century had to adopt the fifth of the main policy alternatives - the open acceptance of a state of default. The private investors who had bought the bonds, or the banks or other institutions which had given loans, then had to write off their investment as a loss ; and would-be borrowers in the debtor country had to wait until circumstances again allowed them to seek foreign lenders, or else they had to open up new channels through which credit could flow.

It is here that the chief difference between our own times and the nineteenth century seems to lie. Acceptance of default as a hazard of the business of foreign lending has become very much more difficult, and the strategic bargaining position of the creditors in international financial negotiation and in international organisation has consequently been substantially undermined and weakened.

Whereas in the last century, even when the government of the creditor country had been involved in trying to prevent default by one of the means described above, if it failed, it could still turn its back on the situation and shrug off the misfortunes of the investors as a private matter. This was in fact a common experience and accounts for the



existence of such privately organised bodies as the Council of Foreign Bondholders. Now, it is the governments themselves who are the main creditors, whether as donors of foreign aid in the shape of loans, or as guarantors, through export credit systems, of a great deal of private credit to the debtor countries. The list of their debtor-clients is also now a very long one. And for a creditor government to admit that it has been a mug is not only politically difficult, it is also financially imprudent in that it is bound to encourage other debtors -- when they see that nothing terrible happens to the defaulter -- to follow suit. And beside them, counselling patience and forbearance, will now be the international financial organisations, the Bank and the Fund -- the former particularly dependent on the maintenance of confidence in the creditworthiness of the developing countries, even of those who are visibly on the brink of default. It is precisely this situation that we have seen in the case of the near-defaulters mentioned earlier. The close involvement of governments in international indebtedness and the creditors' consequent reluctance to allow default actually narrow very substantially the choice of policies open to the creditor countries and to the international organisations acting on their behalf.

Moreover, the catalogue of nineteenth century alternative policy lines shows other alternatives now denied the creditor. Neither the gunboat threat nor the customs-house takeover is any longer a feasible weapon against recalcitrant debtors.

Nor has much progress been made since the 19th century with development of legal weapons against a recalcitrant debtor or one which uses the power of the state against the foreign investor. The limitations of the recently ratified Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes and of the international Centre just set up in Washington under it are well known. The full international legal principle of consent is still paramount and use of the Centre's panels for conciliation or arbitration is entirely voluntary for all signatories.

The refusal of new credit as a financial weapon is the alternative which seems to be favoured by the World Bank study on supplier

credit quoted above. Its proposals for the collection of information on the financial position of debtor countries and for the formulation of more comprehensive principles governing the giving of credit have meaning only if they are liable to result in the uncreditworthy debtors being refused new loans until they have found means to keep up payments on the old. The deterrent, to be effective, must also be credible and convincing.

It is possible that eventually through the OECD, the Bank itself, or through the Berne Union of Credit Insurers some progress along these lines will be made. But it would be as well to bear in mind the fate of an earlier attempt to erect an international standard of conduct for creditor countries. In 1953, the major industrialised countries reached a firm understanding in the Berne Union that guaranteed export credits would not be given for periods longer than five years. The rush to set up or extend export credit guarantee systems in the early 1950's in order to establish bridgeheads in postwar export markets was threatening everyone with a dangerous and destructive trade war ; and the agreement to call a halt to any further extension of credit terms was general and backed by good intentions. But this unanimity very quickly foundered on the increasing use of tied-aid systems, first by the United States and then by Britain and other countries. Tied aid had always found favour with the U.S. Congress because generosity could then be excused as a good economic as well as a good political investment. The tied-aid programmes, however, offered credit for anything up to 20 years or more and on softer terms. The resentment from competing exporters in third countries was immediate and bitter, and the five-year understanding was put under intolerable pressure.

The experience is worth recalling to illustrate the difficulty with such general and far-reaching international agreements, of guarding against the unforeseen. One clear feature of the international economy over the last ten years has surely been the fantastically rapid evolution of new techniques and mechanisms for the international supply, distribution and marketing of capital resources. In less than a decade, in fact, a whole new market or series of markets had developed for Euro-dollars, Eurosterling, dollar certificates of deposit and other

short-term credit instruments. Governments have found that they can operate in these markets as buyers or sellers, yet none of them are able to govern and control them as they can their national capital markets. It is by no means certain, for instance, that creditor countries would be able to prevent a precarious debtor from using these new techniques (by borrowing heavily in Eurodollars, for example, as both Italy and Japan have safely and successfully done) in order to defeat an attempt by their international guardians to restrict their assumption of new debt. The Bank survey itself admits that not only it is difficult to collect adequate new data on certain debtor countries, but that the extent to which a country may have made use of certain types of credit is not always ascertainable. Besides the suppliers' credit taken - which can be fairly accurately assessed by the credit insurers - there is also increasing use made of buyers' credit. Through the closer integration of banks in international partnerships with worldwide resources, credit which has been denied to the exporter of machinery, say, from country A can be given instead to his customer, the importer in country B. The net effect on the indebtedness of country B is identical but it is much less easy to check up on it.

It may be that these developments in the technology of international finance - of which I believe we have still seen only a beginning - will eventually so far outgrow the political system of nation-states that it will stimulate a corresponding new growth of international organisation - just as the new frontier - busting technologies of transport and communication in the 19th century brought about the establishment of the first international public unions. But the difficulties - however irrationally based - encountered in the negotiations aiming at international monetary reform do not suggest that this will happen either quickly or easily.

Therefore, I should think it likely that efforts to improve the general international machinery for the supervision, or multilateral surveillance, of debtors and their debts will be doomed to a series of setbacks ; and even if an apparently effective system is achieved, it will meet with many disappointments. Meanwhile, in individual cases, the practise of multilateral surveillance by ad hoc groups which will

be both aid consortia and creditors' clubs will become very much more common and more sophisticated. These groups are likely to make increasing use of institutions, including regional development banks, which mask the real purpose of creditors with a disguise of shared responsibility - similar to copartnership systems in industry. Arrangements of this kind, developed in the Alliance for Progress and also by the French in the evolving institutions of the franc zone in Africa, will be copied elsewhere.

Such devices, however, if they are going to work, are likely to lead on to greater penetration of the debtor's administration by the agents of the creditors. At some point, therefore, a clash is probable between the political needs of the government and the financial wishes of the creditors. When the government of a developing country, for instance, wishes to make some impact on a mounting and explosive problem of urban unemployment, it will find itself in conflict with the creditors' insistence that government spending be cut and imports restricted. If the government bows to the multilateral surveillance, and the jobless start a riot, it is a short step to foreign military occupation - "temporary", of course, as it always is - and to a new kind of collective imperialism.

Or else, under strong and popular leadership, the debtor government may resist; the creditors then have no other weapon but that of financial stringency - a total refusal of new credit if they accept the default or otherwise a partial refusal. The debtor country, thus cut off from the international financial society, is sentenced (as Ceylon has found and the UAR may soon find) to a prolonged period of economic stagnation and squalor, providing the ideal conditions for the cultivation of a xenophobia directed chiefly against the rich white creditors.

The dilemma of independent squalor or multilateral tutelage for the debtor countries - neither of which is a consummation very actively desired by the creditor countries - is the inevitable result of their obsession with monetary equilibrium and balance, an obsession which probably has deep psychological roots in European and American culture. Beneath the surface, perhaps, lie the sense of guilt attached by Western puritanism to the state of debt, and the irrational attribution of moral values to the principles of double-entry book-keeping.

Whatever the explanation, the result all along has been an undue concentration on the problem of how to eliminate deficits downwards rather than on how to eliminate them upwards. Elimination of deficits has been interpreted far too generally to mean only action by the deficit country, applying thrift and economy to its foreign spending, by means either of deflation, devaluation or exchange control, and far too seldom to mean action by the surplus country to finance the deficit with more trade, more credit or more grant aid. In fact, as economists like Professor Triffin are able to explain to us, a deficit in international economics is like a vacuum in physics ; it no sooner occurs than it is filled, or eliminated. The only question is whether it is eliminated through the actions of the deficit or the surplus countries.

The recurrent appearance of North South deficits seems to me not only (as Professor Triffin has argued) desirable, but also unavoidable in present circumstances. When we consider the strength of the alliance in our international economy between the political interests in the poor countries pushing for faster economic development and the economic interests in the rich countries anxious to press credit on them in order to be able to take part in this development, it is obvious that the surplus countries are going to have difficulty in insisting that the deficits should always be eliminated downward and not upward.

Looked at in this way, it is hardly surprising that they will be tempted inexorably to practise either an economic or a political ruthlessness which they do not really intend towards the deficit countries. The simon-pure economists with their algebraic formulae and abstract jargon are not really able to spell out in full so that laymen can understand the political consequences of the policies now being pursued. What is needed is more political-economists who can identify the political forces involved in processes of 'monetary adjustment'.

Then, perhaps, it will be possible to gain from a new generation the political support now lacking for adjustment policies which will eliminate deficits upwards, in the surplus, creditor countries, rather than downward in the deficit, debtor countries. At present, all

we have is a slow trend towards softer loan terms, which, however, is arbitrarily speeded up in special cases like that of India, while other comparable developing countries suffer from the aid standstill. And on the trade side, we have only a halting movement in favour of trade preferences for developing countries - which, because of the small size and technical weaknesses of their manufacturing enterprises are still not enough to let them compete successfully with their Northern rivals. As everyone observes, it is all quite inadequate.

For my part, rather than a large increase in straight aid programmes which too easily engender both bitter ingratitude and improvident extravagance, I would much prefer to see a multiplicity of other devices used which deliberately disguised or supplanted the hated aid element. This is the essence of the IMF's compensatory financing activities which, like unemployment benefit, can more easily be accepted without resentment or loss of dignity as a matter of right. So, too, could an all-round increase in monetary reserves (in whatever form) as a result of general agreement on international monetary reform. So, too, could the 'brain-drain' compensation payments recently suggested by Professor Richard Titmuss for countries like the West Indies which have suffered heavy losses of human capital in the shape of skilled and semi-skilled men and women going to work in countries richer than their own. Another way of disguising aid to make it politically more acceptable is to devise systems which bypass to some extent the receiving governments and are made direct to the recipients as a matter of need (as in the case of some food aid) or as a deserved reward for effort, as by the payment (as I have suggested elsewhere) or export bounties to manufacturers in developing countries so as to stimulate and make profitable the expansion of industry. These are only a few possible means to the general end - and they have already taken me far beyond the limits of my subject. But the first step is undoubtedly to look ahead a little to the political consequences of our present international economic policies.

Summary

Popular mythology always attributes greater power to creditors, especially if they happen to be foreign, than they really possess. The growth of multilateral surveillance of debtors by their creditors does not necessarily mean that international economic organisations have acquired a new means of political pressure on the developing countries. On the contrary, it is arguable that these organisations have often served to influence the creditors in the interests of the debtors at least as much as the other way round.

The British experience is possibly a peculiar one because Britain has an international vehicle currency in whose stability and security there is an evident collective international interest, which seems to shift the balance of power in favour of the debtor. It is striking that the foreign central banks have been led to increase their support even though Britain has not been able to pull its payments as far or as fast out of deficit as its creditors wanted.

Four other cases deserving further study in this context are India, Indonesia, Ghana and the UAR, all of whom have been on or over the brink of default. In spite of their apparent weakness, however, all these countries have been treated by their creditors with remarkable indulgence and forbearance. While the debtors have demonstrated striking immunity from outside influence in military, political and trade and economic policies, the creditors have often been persuaded to provide more aid or more time to repay, or both.

As in military strategy, recent developments have actually reduced the number of 'conventional' options available to the strong in dealing with the weak. The debtor's customs revenues can no longer be earmarked to repay old debts as they often were in the 19th century. The gunboat, too, is out. The creditors' legal powers, in spite of the 1966 Convention, are no greater. And the threat to cut off new credit is rather less credible - because the closer involvement of governments makes a declaration of default both more difficult and less easily revoked - than it used to be. Meanwhile, the eagerness of poor countries to borrow for economic development is matched by the eagerness of rich countries to export to them and by the ingenuity of bankers in devising new credit mechanisms to bring them together. Inevitably, some poor countries get over-extended, and the demand is heard that international organisations should be used to investigate, supervise and if necessary restrict the borrowing of developing countries.

We can therefore expect more aid consortia, more creditors' clubs and more elaborate machinery for multilateral surveillance to develop over the next decade. What we must not expect is that it will work either evenly or satisfactorily. On the contrary, some of the less independent countries will probably find themselves subject to a kind of creeping collective colonialism. Others who resist this tutelage will have to suffer periods of economic stagnation and inertia which will benefit no one. This unwelcome dilemma will not be avoided by giving softer loans, but only by a radical change in trade and aid policies of which there is at present little sign.

### Résumé

La mythologie populaire attribue toujours aux créanciers, surtout lorsqu'ils se trouvent être étrangers, une puissance plus grande que la réalité ne le justifie. La montée d'un système de surveillance multi-latérale des débiteurs par leurs créanciers ne signifie pas nécessairement que les organisations économiques internationales aient obtenu un nouveau moyen de pression politique sur les pays en voie de développement. Tout au contraire, on peut soutenir que ces organisations ont souvent influencé les créanciers dans l'intérêt des débiteurs au moins aussi souvent qu'à l'inverse.

L'expérience de la Grande-Bretagne représente peut-être un cas particulier, la Grande-Bretagne étant dotée d'une monnaie internationale dont la stabilité et la sécurité justifient de toute évidence un intérêt international collectif; cela change apparemment l'équilibre des forces en faveur du débiteur. Il est frappant de constater que les banques centrales étrangères ont été amenées à accroître leur soutien, bien que la Grande-Bretagne n'ait pas été en mesure de mettre fin à son déficit aussi rapidement et aussi pleinement que le souhaitaient ses créanciers.

A cet égard, quatre autres cas mériteraient une étude approfondie : ceux de l'Inde, de l'Indonésie, du Ghana et de la R.A.U.; tous ces pays ont été en état de cessation des paiements, ou très près d'un tel état. Malgré leur faiblesse apparente, néanmoins, tous ces pays ont été traités par leurs créanciers avec une indulgence et une longanimité remarquables. Les débiteurs ont fait preuve d'une remarquable immunité à l'influence extérieure dans leur politique militaire, leur orientation politique, leur politique commerciale et économique; les créanciers ont souvent accepté de fournir une aide additionnelle, ou d'accorder des délais, ou de faire les deux à la fois.

De même qu'en stratégie, l'évolution récente a en fait réduit le nombre des options "classiques" ouvertes aux forts pour traiter avec les faibles. Il n'est plus possible d'affecter les droits de douane perçus par le débiteur pour rembourser ses dettes, comme cela se faisait souvent au 19e siècle; l'usage de la canonnière est lui aussi périmé. En dépit de la Convention de 1966, les pouvoirs juridiques des créanciers ne sont pas plus importants. Quant à la menace de couper les crédits, elle est plutôt moins croyable qu'elle ne l'était jadis, le fait que les Gouvernements soient plus profondément impliqués rendant une constatation de cessation des paiements à la fois plus difficile à faire et moins facile à annuler. De plus, le désir des pays pauvres d'emprunter en vue de leur développement économique répond au désir des pays riches de leur vendre des marchandises et à l'ingéniosité des banquiers, qui imaginent sans cesse de nouveaux mécanismes de crédit permettant de mettre les uns en rapport avec les autres. Il est inévitable que certains pays



pauvres s'endettent de façon excessive, et certains demandent que les organisations internationales servent à scruter, à surveiller, et en cas de besoin à limiter les emprunts contractés par les pays en voie de développement.

Nous pouvons donc nous attendre à la création dans les années à venir d'un nombre croissant de consortiums d'aide, de clubs de prêteurs, de mécanismes de plus en plus complexes de surveillance multi-latérale. Il est improbable que tout cela fonctionne sans à-coup, ou de façon satisfaisante. Tout au contraire, quelques-uns des pays les moins indépendants se verront probablement soumis à une sorte de colonialisme collectif camouflé. D'autres, qui résistent à cette mise en tutelle, devront passer par des périodes de stagnation économique et d'inertie qui ne profiteront à personne. Il n'est pas possible d'éviter ce dilemme en accordant des prêts à des conditions moins dures, mais uniquement par un changement profond de politique commerciale et de politique d'aide; on n'en voit guère de signe.

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"The political role of international  
economic organizations"

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE BY  
UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATIONS

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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE BY  
UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATIONS

This paper is intended as no more than a preliminary exploration into the role that the United Nations organizations can appropriately play in assisting newly developing countries achieve viable democratic political infra-structures. Although it has grown out of discussions at the headquarters of the organizations and in specific newly developing countries of Asia, the Middle East and Africa, the paper aims at some tentative generalizations rather than at prescriptions applicable in particular countries.

I

Introduction

One of the encouraging signs in international development assistance is the growing concern over its inadequate attention to the political infra-structures of newly developing countries. Much has been said during the last two decades about the growing economic gap between the so-called developed and underdeveloped countries. There have been frequent reminders of the serious gaps between the quantity of assistance needed and the amount that is being made available. Relatively little, however, has been said until recently about another kind of gap-- that between the capacity of the political systems of newly developing countries and the demands which nation-building has made upon them. A relatively low priority has been given in assistance requests and in assistance awards to means for strengthening government and administration

and for involving larger segments of the population in national development efforts. The agenda of this World Congress of the International Political Science Association is one indication of the growing recognition of a necessary new emphasis in assistance provided by the United Nations organizations. Other indications are found in warnings of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Directors General of the specialized agencies.

The extent of the gap between the capacity of political systems and the demands of nation-building tasks can be seen in virtually all newly developing countries. In some there has already been a political collapse accompanied by resort to violence. In most one observes common characteristics: representative legislatures are non-existent or very weak; a limited quantity of competent personnel is thinly spread through sprawling bureaucracies; turnover of leadership, both political and administrative, is rapid; decision making is congested through over-centralization; efficiency and commitment to public service seem not to be highly prized administrative values; implementation of national policies outside the capital suffers from structural, organizational and personnel weakness and local government institutions are underdeveloped; conscious efforts to mobilize the mass of people in the nation-building processes are largely limited to exhortation and attempted regimentation; and non-participation in civic activity as well as in productive economic activity is widespread. All these conditions are exacerbated by high rates of illiteracy, inadequate school facilities, inadequately trained teachers, and poorly developed universities.

These weaknesses in the political infra-structures are probably the most critical factors inhibiting progress in economic and social development. They are continuing obstacles to the effective use of external assistance of all kinds. They threaten the prospect for achieving viable democratic nations. They add uncertainty to the prospects for world peace.

There are various reasons why individual underdeveloped countries have neglected asking for assistance toward strengthening the political infra-structures. One basic reason is probably that traditional theories of development, emphasizing economic factors, have captured the thinking of national planners and governmental elites. Their own academic training has had this orientation and it has been reinforced by the thinking of most aid-giving agencies. Another reason is the hypersensitivity of newly developing nations in respect to their capacity for self-government. Is not capacity for self-government implicit in independence and sovereignty? It is clearly much easier for a government to ask for technical assistance in the areas of health, education, civil aviation or telecommunications--areas requiring knowledge and skills of which underdeveloped countries may claim to have been deprived--than in respect to politics and government, which depend upon knowledge, skills and attitudes that any independent nation almost by definition is supposed to possess.

The history of political development in more developed nations is often cited in newly developing nations as precedent for not wanting external political assistance. The political infra-structures of so-called "developed" nations, it is pointed out, are the accumulated result of both their own conscious effort and a good deal of historic accident. Every polity is sui generis and unique. Therefore, the newly developing nations should be allowed to go their own way and at their own pace.

This overlooks the fact that the developed nations borrowed from each other's experience and, more importantly, that rarely did they attempt developing their political infra-structures as rapidly as it is necessary for the underdeveloped countries to do if their development goals are to be attained at the rate they desire. There lies the weakness in this supposed historical analogy. There also lies the reason why external assistance in the political area is needed and can appropriately be requested.

It may also be that the newly developing nations have doubts whether the competence to provide such political assistance is available in sufficient quantities to warrant requesting it. This is indeed a valid question, given not only the highly complex nature of the process of political development but also the patent weaknesses in the political infra-structures of many of the more developed nations from which experts and advisers are recruited. None of these countries has been able, even to its own satisfaction, to cope with a host of organizational and administrative problems and to achieve a smoothly functioning system for citizen involvement. However, securing political development assistance from outside may not seem so difficult when one remembers that the task is not the engineering or blueprinting of complete political infra-structures. It is, rather, the providing of a wide variety of assistance that, cumulatively, will help provide the elements with which a nation can fashion its own preferred infra-structure. We shall identify some kinds of such assistance in the next section.

Meanwhile, there are special reasons why the United Nations organizations should properly be concerned with the need for strengthening political infra-structures and why they should press much more vigorously to include consciously designed programs for this purpose.

One reason is that this concern is a necessary complement to the<sup>r</sup> of these organizations concern with almost every other kind of assistance provided. Few of the goals of these technical programs can be attained without parallel development in the political infra-structure. The United Nations organizations as administrators of assistance funds deriving from voluntary contributions have a special responsibility to the donors to see that assistance provided is both efficiently and productively utilized.

A further reason for the propriety of U. N. concern with domestic political development is the necessity that nations become increasingly able to meet their responsibilities as members of the United Nations organizations. (This applies, of course, to all member states and not merely those in the stage of new development.) These obligations require capabilities that depend both upon proper governmental organizations and administration, and upon citizen understanding and productive participation in national decision making. Some of these obligations derive from the normative provisions found in the United Nations Charter, in the constitutions of the specialized agencies and in various declarations, conventions and resolutions adopted by the United Nations organizations. These standards bear particularly upon the relationship between government and the people.

## II

### A Focus for Political Development Assistance by United Nations Organizations

The objective of United Nations assistance for political development should be the achievement by recipient countries of political systems that permit the ordering and conduct of their affairs (in terms of defining

goals, deciding policies and proceeding to attainment of goals) to their own satisfaction and in keeping with their obligations as members of the United Nations organizations. More specifically it should be the achievement of viable democracies, i.e., of democratic political infrastructures within viable nation-states. The necessary democratic commitment in the assistance derives from two considerations: first, most of the newly developing nations, including both the newly independent and those that have long been sovereign, have opted for democratic systems. Many of them have had democratic experiences. They have not, it is true, always defined the kind of democracies they wish to develop, nor have they, through existing governments, indicated precise periods of time within which completely democratic systems are to be attained. Secondly, the United Nations organizations themselves are based upon a democratic ideology which is set forth in the Charter and specialized agency constitutions concerning purpose, procedures, and obligations of membership. It has been more explicitly reflected in major conventions, declarations and resolutions and in the language that describes both regular and technical assistance programs. Democratic ideology has predominated in program discussions of the General Assembly, the General Conferences and the respective executive or governing bodies of the individual organizations.

Given the democratic commitment, whether immediate or longer term, of most of the newly developing nations, it may be assumed that they will aspire to the attainment of certain characteristics generally associated with viable democracies:



- 1) that national governmental authority is accepted throughout the nation, that there is a high degree of national orientation in public policy and that a high degree of national political integration has been achieved;
- 2) that governmental authority at its various appropriate levels is capable of performing, with increasing predictability and efficiency, its required functions, including maintenance of domestic order and the provision of essential services;
- 3) that governmental authority is exercised with responsiveness to social change and responsibility to those who are governed;
- 4) that there is an increasing degree of people's participation in national decision making and in the transfer of authority to successive officials by orderly democratic processes;
- 5) that opportunities exist for individual initiative and growth within a pluralistic social structure;
- 6) and that the nation is able to function responsibly with other nations and in a manner consistent with its obligations under the United Nations Charter and specialized agency constitutions.

It would seem that the United Nations organizations can best contribute to the attainment of these characteristics in newly developing nations by offering kinds of assistance that will help in two important respects: (1) by strengthening of government structures, organization

and administration; and (2) by developing opportunities for civic initiative and capacities for responsible participation in the political process. But the United Nations organizations should not merely have this assistance available. They should actively and persistently promote requests for it. In some situations they should make the granting of other types of assistance, as for example in education, health, agriculture, telecommunications, etc., contingent upon acceptance of assistance to strengthening necessary elements of the political infrastructure, such as governmental administrative services, through which other assistance can be utilized effectively.

Before proceeding toward identification of kinds of assistance that can promote the foregoing objectives, three comments are appropriate.

(1) In the context of this discussion we should have in mind that almost every kind of assistance that raises the total level of human competence will provide help in the two respects previously noted. For example, educational assistance of almost any kind focused upon developing knowledge, skills, attitudes and institutions cannot but have some impact upon both governmental and citizen capabilities. Our immediate interest, however, is in assistance that can make more specific contributions in these two respects, as will be indicated below.

(2) Identification of the particular United Nations organizations by which a given kind of assistance can be provided is of less importance than that the help can or should come from some United Nations source. Nor are we immediately concerned with whether assistance comes under the United Nations Development Programme, or under so-called "regular" programs.

These distinctions are administratively very important but not in the context of this discussion.

(3) Finally, at the present stage it is not proposed to make a full catalogue of all relevant kinds of assistance now provided or to explore additional kinds that might be provided. We shall not attempt to identify specific nations for which particular kinds of assistance should be provided. We have for the moment excluded the essentially unique situations, illustrated by the Congo and Libya, in which a direct political role was designated for the United Nations. We have also excluded at this stage the highly important assistance provided for in the Charter in the form of peacekeeping operations that might, by assuring protection, provide newly developing countries with greater opportunity for uninterrupted political development and for relief from high military budgets.

What, then, are some kinds of assistance the U. N. organizations can provide toward promoting the two objectives indicated?

1. Toward strengthening government structure, organization and administration.

Almost all kinds of assistance including the most technical in such fields as education, health, telecommunications, or civil aviation have some effects on the status of the existing government. Receipt of external assistance of any kind affects the public image of the government and the degree of support which it can command. Certainly jobs created as the result of economic assistance, or improvement in health and general welfare, or increases in educational and professional opportunities resulting from technical assistance increase the stake of individuals in the political status quo. Such political by-products of all United Nations assistance, and also of other external assistance, are recognized by all

governments. As a result, governments have a special motive for "project shopping" that may not always be related to careful development planning.

Our concern, however, is with assistance that does more than merely reinforce any existing government. It is rather with assistance that makes a more specific contribution to the elements upon which effectiveness, competence, responsibility, etc., depend.

The nature of the weaknesses in government organization and administration and the kinds of assistance needed are readily identified. They have long been reflected in the assistance offered by the several United Nations organizations and they have frequently been referred to in the reports of the Secretary-General and the Directors General and in reports of expert advisory groups as well as in some of the governmental statements at international conferences. As noted earlier, it is not intended here to evaluate the impact of the assistance given in individual countries. It will suffice for the purposes of this paper to note some of the chief forms that this assistance can take.

- 1) Provision of specialist personnel to perform responsible administrative functions within governmental systems.  
This is the familiar task of OPEX assistance.
- 2) Provision of advisory and expert personnel for short term assignments focusing upon ways and means of improving governmental organization or administration including the development of viable local government. Assistance of this kind is provided both by the Public Administration branch in the United Nations and by the specialized agencies.

The latter tend to focus on the organization and functions of the ministries with which they work most directly:

ILO - Labor; UNESCO - Education; FAO - Agriculture; WHO - Public Health; UN - Social Welfare, Community Development,

etc. The regional commissions have also been active. In some instances the expert-advisers provide assistance in policy and program planning related to both subject ministries and central planning agencies (where these exist).

The IBRD has especially focussed upon providing planning expertise at the top or central governmental level.

- 3) Assistance in the creation, programing and staffing of training institutions or agencies has been provided by several of the organizations, some of the institutions being developed for individual countries, some on a regional basis and some internationally at agency headquarters--the latter notably by IBRD, UNESCO, and ILO.
- 4) Fellowships for training at the centers just mentioned, or for study abroad have been made available with a view to improving the quality of governmental administrators.
- 5) Seminars, conferences, group study tours abroad, and published reports and background papers have dealt with a wide variety of organizational and administrative problems at many governmental levels.
- 6) Complementary to assistance focussed upon governmental personnel and institutions is assistance to strengthen the teaching of public administration at universities.

Two methods of assistance deserve separate mention. One is the promotion of professional development, research, and training through non-governmental organizations such as the International Political Science Association, International Institute of Administrative Sciences, and Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration. The other is the potential impact upon government organization and administration resulting from effective and efficient administration of the U. N. organizations themselves in their relations with newly developing countries. (Certainly discoordination and poor administration by the aid-giving agencies can easily exacerbate existing inadequacies of newly developing governments.) A more direct and more limited impact for organizational and administrative improvement can be provided by U. N. enterprises such as the Mekong Valley, UNRWA, etc.

Finally, it needs to be noted that relatively little assistance has been provided by any U. N. organization in respect to the organization and operations of legislative bodies--obviously an area of far greater sensitivity than the general field of public administration.

In a more vigorous United Nations effort to assist in strengthening governmental organization and administration, the following conditions seem essential:

- 1) The assistance, in whatever form, needs to be purposefully related to the country's total development program so that governmental improvements may be achieved at points critical to the development process. It is essential that there be a national program effort into which the assistance may be geared if its impact is to be a continuing one.
- 2) The various kinds of assistance should be provided and utilized in a coordinated and mutually reinforcing manner.

- 3) The magnitude of the assistance should be large enough in terms of numbers of experts or advisors or fellows to have a noticeable and continuing impact.
- 4) The duration of the assistance, other than conferences, seminars, etc., should be sufficient to achieve the establishing of deep roots adequate to assure continuity of impact.
- 5) The competence of experts, advisors, etc., should be adequate, especially in respect to the cultural setting into which modernizing public administration influences are to be introduced.
- 6) The recipient country should give evidence of willingness to meet the counterpart obligations and of its intention to persist in the area of the assistance for a sufficiently long period of years to assure lasting results.

2. Toward the growth of opportunities for civic initiative and responsible participation in the political process.

The achievement of viable democracies depends upon much more than the development of appropriate governmental institutions and practices. It depends in particular upon the development of awareness of civic responsibilities, of appropriate relationships between government and people and of opportunities for effective civic participation in the political processes.

The achievement of this component in the political infra-structure is a matter of long-term evolution and development. It will come about

primarily through the cumulative impact of experience and a wide range of influences at many levels of the political process. It will be influenced by traditional patterns and experiences. In most of the newly developing nations, even those that have had extensive political experience, there are likely to be many years of sorting out what kinds of political systems and which political leaders they prefer. During this sorting-out phase many kinds of forces are likely to compete for power. Turbulence rather than stability and tranquillity may be in store not only for newly independent countries, but also for older but now newly developing ones.

What kinds of assistance can the United Nations organizations provide under these unclear circumstances? Only occasionally aside from public administration, is assistance to influence immediate developments in the political infra-structure likely to be appropriate for the United Nations or acceptable to the developing countries. It seems, therefore, that the assistance should predominantly be oriented toward having a future rather than an immediate impact. It should seek to have an impact of an essentially indirect character. It should fundamentally be of an educational character (not limited, however, to formal schooling).

There are certain kinds of assistance, mostly already provided by several of the organizations of the United Nations, that seem to have a particularly high potential for stimulating the growth of opportunities for civic initiative and for responsible participation in the political process. They are the kinds that focus upon developing knowledge, skills, attitudes and institutions that are essential ingredients for intelligent participation in an evolving democracy. For example, assistance in



establishing community development organizations, cooperatives, workers' education and trade unionism, small-scale industry, entrepreneurial training facilities, land reform, can make highly significant contributions.

Community development is essentially a program to promote the taking of initiative by people at the level of the community in which they live, rural or urban, to cope with problems of common concern such as health, education, sanitation, road building or land use and agricultural methods. These community level efforts are intended to be of a self-help nature, complementary to institutionalized efforts of national or local government. By their nature they may be expected to provide experience of a functional democratic character valuable in promoting wider civic participation. Community development efforts are usually also intended as a means of increasing national productivity and of relieving burdens upon central government. In the latter respect community development should be seen as complementary to local government development.

Cooperatives, especially in the underdeveloped economies of newly developing countries, can also provide a functional kind of democratic experience through membership and management activities. Their essence is self-help through cooperative participation in production and marketing or in credit facilities. There is a good deal of evidence, especially in newly developing countries, of the carryover of experience in cooperatives into political action at local and higher levels.

Workers' education programs in adult education, in literacy programs, at labor colleges, centers or institutes, or in on-the-job training are a means of promoting the responsible exercise of rights of freedom of association. Properly administered workers' education can contribute also to an understanding of the requisites for responsible participation of labor organizations in the nation's development process.

Assistance in developing competence in small-scale industry and entrepreneurship may promote political participation by multiplying the centers of individual initiative and providing incentives for active participation in the national development process.

Finally, land reform assistance designed to achieve land distribution which will provide incentives for greater individual productivity, can contribute to creating centers of individual initiative for active participation in national development including, again, its political aspects.

It is not asserted that all of these kinds of assistance necessarily or immediately have the effects suggested.<sup>1</sup> But it appears that by their nature and if imaginatively undertaken, they can contribute to the development and strengthening of elements important to viable democratic infra-structures.

Educational assistance, if its administrators, advisors and experts clearly recognize the role it can play in preparing citizens for civic participation, can make important contributions in the context of teacher training, educational materials preparation, adult education, rural education and literacy campaigns. Special attention to providing women with access to education will almost inevitably contribute to the breaking down of obstacles to their participation in the organized political processes.

At the level of assistance to universities much can be done by emphasizing the need of preparing students for future civic leadership, government service and other elite functions. A wider public service orientation by universities can do much to provide a climate in which students and professors will develop a greater awareness of their civic responsibilities. The study of law and public administration can be assisted to play an especially important role in the

Indeed, assistance in developing social science techniques for testing the contributions made, could be of great importance, as suggested later on.

universities of newly developing countries by developing professional attitudes and competence that will contribute to long-term national political development.

Assistance in the development of social science resources of principal universities can be of importance to the promotion of civic initiatives and participation. Through social science instruction the competence of university graduates to serve more effectively as citizen leaders as well as in government positions can be significantly raised. Understanding of the potential role of social science in analyzing the requisites for governmental policy regarding social, economic and political development problems can be one of the principal contributions university graduates bring to the political process. Social science research at universities as a public service can become an important resource upon which governments can draw in determining policies and in increasing the effectiveness of action related to national development. The leadership of universities in developing the social sciences can become an important influence toward inclusion of social studies in teacher training and in secondary schools. Altogether an increasing emphasis upon rational analysis in the broad areas of politics, economics and the social order can become an important modernizing influence upon the whole political infra-structure.

Assistance in the establishment, management and utilization of mass media of communications, especially radio and press, can play a vital role toward national unity in assuring nation-wide flow of information and contact in growing communications between government and the people. The development of professional standards in the training of journalists and reporters can fill a growing need in all countries for competent and dependable reporting about national affairs.

United Nations information centers have an important role to play in assuring a steady flow of information from the United Nations and its specialized agencies into each member state.

Assistance highly relevant to the development of democratic nations can also be provided through continuing emphasis in international councils, assemblies, conferences, seminars and similar gatherings upon human rights and the Conventions, Declarations and Resolutions that focus upon freedom of association, non-discrimination, etc.

The promotion of professionalism in the arts, sciences, education, medicine, engineering, etc., through assistance in specialized training can contribute to the creation of professional societies able to give voice at the political level to these new elites.

National commissions for UNESCO can probably also be of influence in increasing citizen understanding of and participation in various activities of United Nations organizations provided that they become something more than bureaucratic appendages of ministries of education. Through the national commissions for UNESCO closer contact can also be developed with international non-governmental organizations of a specialist character in the fields of education, science and culture with increasing communications between the people of newly developing countries and others throughout the world.

The U. N. Freedom for Hunger Campaign and UNICEF projects through their emphasis upon participation and self-help can contribute to political awareness as well as to the learning of skills important to political participation.

The kinds of assistance activities mentioned here are by no means a catalogue of what all the U. N. organizations are doing or might do by way of strengthening citizen participation in the political process. They have been selected in order to suggest the relationship between these kinds of assistance and the strengthening of the political infrastructures. They can contribute to broadening the total exposure of the population to participative experiences of many kinds and help develop a climate favorable to political participation. Few of them, however, can be expected to make such a contribution unless the assistance is purposefully focused and deliberately designed to have such an impact.

In part to provide this focus, important contributions to the effectiveness of political assistance can be provided by the periodic reports of the Secretary-General of the U. N., by the Directors General

of the specialized agencies and by the Administrator of UNDP. These, supplemented by opportunities for governmental representatives to discuss issues related to political development can do much to provide an atmosphere favorable to the orientation of U. N. activities toward political development.

In the preceding pages I have attempted to suggest a kind of strategy for United Nations assistance toward political development. The strategy recognizes the sovereign right of every nation to fashion its own political system and, therefore, must focus upon providing assistance that will enhance the resources upon which each nation can draw in its political development.

The conclusions as to what will actually contribute to political development have to be at our present stage of scientific knowledge a matter of common sense judgment based on limited evidence. Scientific research is urgently needed to establish a sounder basis for identifying the most effective kinds of assistance, but a more concerted effort by the United Nations need not await the results of such research.

### III

#### Some Problems in Increasing the Effectiveness of United Nations Assistance to Political Development

There can be little doubt that the development of the political infra-structure of most newly developing countries is proceeding at a dangerously slow pace. Many national political systems are precariously weak. Economic and social development plans are thereby threatened. The outlook for timely, peaceful political response to growing domestic demands for change is not bright; and in some countries the prospects for national viability are seriously threatened.

No one is likely to hazard a prediction regarding the future direction of the development of any specific country. Certainly few generalizations are likely to be valid for all newly developing countries, each with its unique background and present conditions. The accidents of history that have permitted established nations to achieve viability, are also not to be excluded in the future of newer countries. The nature of the accident certainly cannot be forecast! But, given a worldwide commitment through the United Nations to assist in the economic and social development of these nations, can help provided for their political development be made significantly more effective? Can the United Nations assistance have the degree of impact that seems to be required?

It is beyond the purposes of this paper to attempt to prescribe the amount or character of assistance the United Nations organizations should provide to specific countries. I would, however, like to suggest on the basis of recent observations in some Middle Eastern and African countries, some trends that should prevail in the assistance process if it is to be effective.

1. Assistance by the several United Nations organizations must be viewed, by the organizations and the aid-requesting countries alike, as an integral part of a total United Nations assistance effort. The major obstacle to this viewpoint is the degree to which the several organizations were originally given independent status. This was at a time when the granting of development assistance on either the scale or in the variety that is today required was not envisaged. Had it been foreseen, one may surmise that there would have been a searching inquiry into the possibility of putting all technical assistance into one agency--as the keeping of peace was firmly concentrated in the United Nations itself.

One means of promoting this viewpoint is to increase the concentration of development funds, by including some now found in various agencies' regular programs, under the United Nations Development Programme. At the same time there should be an increasing concentration of authority in the United Nations Development Programme Administrator and the U.N. Resident Representatives for the planning and supervision of assistance in all its major aspects and on an individual country basis.

Such a "unitary" viewpoint need in no way diminish the expert role of the specialized agencies and the technical assistance



branches of the United Nations itself. It will serve, however, to increase the likelihood that limited resources of the United Nations organizations are strategically allocated and that they are to a maximum extent coordinated in use. It should reduce the temptation for "project shopping" on the part of potential recipients. At the same time it should reduce the so-called "project selling" which seems still to be carried on in some underdeveloped countries by individual United Nations organizations.

2. Given an increased acceptance of this unitary viewpoint, it should be increasingly possible to emphasize in all assistance projects the "political component"--i.e., to include more consistently assistance for strengthening aspects of the political infra-structure that condition the success of any technical assistance project.

3. There needs to be an intensification of the current trend toward awarding projects that are large or massive enough and which involve commitments for a sufficient term of years to hold promise of having a significant impact. Except in very unusual circumstances the sending of single experts or advisors for short-terms tends to be wasteful and may leave no noticeable evidence of impact.

4. Given an increasing coordination of the resources available through the several United Nations organizations, more effective use of limited funds can be encouraged by more systematic evaluation of the performance both of the recipient governments and of the United Nations organizations. It seems also to be increasingly essential to have stronger "performance strings"

attached to aid agreements, combined with means for enforcing commitments. There are, or course, <sup>in this respect,</sup> difficulties inherent in the structure of the United Nations assistance system due to the fact that the creditor-debtor relationship is not as clearcut as, for example, in the case of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

5. More intensive efforts are required to increase the relevance of assistance projects to the actual conditions (economic, social, political, cultural) in the recipient countries. The selection of technical assistance personnel by the U. N. organizations and their proper briefing and orientation is especially critical for making meaningful contributions in the delicate area of strengthening the political infra-structure. Even more than has been the case to date, persons selected for this purpose require an understanding of and sensitivity for the culture in which they work. No one is satisfied with the current briefing and orientation process, which is fraught with administrative, financial and political problems. Because many newly developing countries feel themselves also ill-equipped to go about their own political modernization, and precisely because they have not subjected their own cultures to sufficient analysis, it might be useful for the U. N. organizations to provide more help in the development of national social science research centers, which can serve also as training centers for both national and visiting experts. With longer term projects and longer term appointments for experts, the investment of time for such further education of the <sup>U.N.</sup> experts would become economically more feasible.

6. Increasing planning of complementary relationships between bilateral, multilateral and private assistance is needed, along the lines now emphasized by UNDP and especially in the area of activities that can strengthen the political infra-structure. The relative advantages of the two sources for assistance are not always the same from the viewpoint of different recipient countries. But it is essential that the limited total <sup>external</sup> resources available are used in the most concentrated and coordinated way possible, taking into account the preferences of the recipients, of the U. N. organizations and of individual bilateral donor governments.

7. Increasing reliance upon non-governmental international organizations to provide assistance, especially in respect to such matters as community development, cooperatives or workers' education, is likely to prove desirable, the non-governmental organizations providing assistance themselves or as contractors for the United Nations organizations. There is an extensive reservoir of talent and good will available already, and it is being utilized in many countries for assistance complementary to the United Nations and bilateral assistance programs. It can significantly reduce the burden upon the headquarters of the United Nations organizations. At the same time it is an effective means for establishing long-term trans-national cooperative relationships between the peoples of needy and more developed countries.

These are some of the trends which should be increasingly evident in assistance from the United Nations organizations to

achieve a greater impact upon political development. However, the achievement of greater effectiveness in the kinds of assistance intended to strengthen political infra-structures is first of all contingent upon the wishes of the newly developing countries themselves and the intentions of the United Nations organizations.

Given the sovereign right of the recipients of assistance to determine what it is they need and given also the essentially domestic character of political development, many questions arise. Will the newly developing countries permit a more purposeful orientation in United Nations assistance of this kind? Will they accept a greater emphasis in allocations of assistance funds for those activities that can have a more immediate and significant impact upon governmental organization and administration and upon citizen participation? Are they willing to choose this kind of assistance at the expense of other kinds which may seem more tangible and more readily manipulated for reinforcement of existing power structures? Will they be increasingly willing to meet counterpart obligations in the form of personnel and equipment and make sufficiently long-term commitments? Will they be willing to forego the apparent short-term advantages of being able to shop among the miscellanies of assistance now available from various sources in favor of a tighter system that might produce better long-term results in national development?

The attitudes of the aid-receiving countries and the policies of their governments in respect to these questions are naturally difficult to predict. The answers will reflect the interplay of many dynamic political, economic and social forces, including <sup>the</sup> character of the leadership that emerges and manages to survive.

But what may one expect in terms of the intentions of the United Nations organizations? Will they increasingly recognize the fundamental importance of the political infra-structure and the potential relevance of certain of the kinds of assistance they can provide? Will they require that their assistance be given on the basis of a total country plan, and that assistance for political development must wherever appropriate be a purposeful part of it? Can they further relate their assistance in a complementary fashion to bilateral and private assistance? And will they be able to coordinate purposefully their several assistance contributions, reducing the fragmentary approach which encourages competition among themselves as well as project shopping on the part of would-be recipients? Will they also be able to concentrate assistance within larger and longer term projects and resist requests for isolated experts with inadequate resources and small prospects for successful impact? Will they be able to attract sufficient numbers of qualified and dedicated persons to engage in a considerably increased political development effort? (Many qualified persons appear to be unacceptable to some recipient governments because of previous experience with ex-colonial countries.) In all these respects considerable progress has been made by the United Nations organizations.

The critical question is whether these trends can be sufficiently intensified so as to affect the impact of the total assistance effort.

Whether the United Nations organizations can, in fact, move more quickly in these directions depends in large measure upon the administrative leadership in the United Nations Development Programme, the specialized agencies, and the United Nations. But the administrators are subject to influence by pressures from member states expressed in the policy

organs and through lobbying at headquarters. The policy organs are representative of all member states, donors as well as recipients, and the development of policies takes place within the larger context of world politics in which a multiplicity of issues influence final decisions. As previously noted, the assistance process in the United Nations organizations is not guided by the simpler creditor-debtor relationship that prevails in, for example, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Nor do assistance policies as easily emerge as in bilateral programs which are designed to reinforce the foreign policy objectives of the donors. Sometimes bilateralism encounters political sensitivities that reduce the effectiveness of assistance. But multilateralism, because it eschews domestic political involvement, also has inherent weaknesses.

The central question may, therefore, be whether the United Nations organizations and especially their administrators can effectively influence the recipient countries to focus adequately upon the problems of the political infra-structure and voluntarily seek help toward strengthening it. The answer may rest in part upon more effective evaluation procedures and in increased discretion for administrators to withhold assistance when this is warranted by inadequate development of the political infra-structure.

#### Conclusion

The strengthening of the political infra-structures of newly developing nations, for a variety of understandable reasons, has been seriously neglected in technical assistance programs. The consequences of weak political infra-structures are seen in continuing political instability of many nations and in the slow progress made by most of them toward attainment of economic and social goals. A more detailed study of

individual countries would reveal varieties not only in their political systems, but in the particular signs of political weakness.

The United Nations organizations, committed to providing development assistance, should give much more concentrated attention to this aspect of development. Because of the inherent nature of the national political development process, such assistance can best be focused upon strengthening government organization and administration and upon increasing the prospects for effective citizen participation. Some assistance in these areas has been provided, but it tends to be inadequate in amount, in duration and in the degree to which it is purposefully related to national development plans and to other kinds of external development assistance.

A clearer strategy in United Nations development assistance is needed in which much more adequate attention can be given to the attainment of political viability.

### Summary

The strengthening of the political infra-structures of newly developing nations, for a variety of understandable reasons, has been seriously neglected in technical assistance programs. The consequences of weak political infra-structures are seen in continuing political instability of many nations and in the slow progress made by most of them toward attainment of economic and social goals.

The United Nations organizations, committed to providing development assistance, should give much more concentrated attention to this aspect of development. Because of the inherent nature of the national political development process, such assistance can best be focused upon strengthening government organization and administration and upon increasing the prospects for effective citizen participation. Some assistance in these areas has been provided, but it tends to be inadequate in amount, in duration and in the degree to which it is purposefully related to national development plans and to other kinds of external development assistance.

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### Résumé

Pour de nombreuses raisons parfaitement compréhensibles, le renforcement de l'infra-structure politique des états nouveaux en voie de développement a été gravement négligé dans les programmes d'assistance technique. La faiblesse de l'infra-structure politique explique l'instabilité politique prolongée d'un grand nombre de pays ainsi que la lenteur des progrès de la plupart d'entre eux dans la réalisation de leurs objectifs économiques et sociaux.

Les organisations des Nations Unies, engagées à fournir l'aide au développement, devraient prêter une attention beaucoup plus soutenue à cet aspect du développement. En raison de la nature même du processus de développement politique national, une telle aide devrait être concentrée sur le renforcement de l'organisation gouvernementale et de l'administration, et sur l'amélioration des occasions de participation efficace fournies aux citoyens. Une certaine aide a déjà été accordée dans ces domaines, mais elle tend à être insuffisante, peu durable, insuffisamment liée aux plans de développement national ainsi qu'aux autres formes d'assistance extérieure au développement.

Une stratégie plus claire de l'aide au développement fournie par les Nations Unies est nécessaire. Une attention plus adéquate prêtée au problème de la viabilité politique devrait en être un des aspects.



"The political role of  
international economic organizations"

EDUCATION FOR DEVELOPMENT  
SOME POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF  
THE WORK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

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SEVENTH WORLD CONGRESS  
BRUSSELS

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## EDUCATION FOR DEVELOPMENT

### Some political implications of the work of international organisations<sup>o</sup>

Robert W. Cox<sup>oo</sup>

The relationship between international organisation and developing countries is one of interdependence : developing countries place hope in disinterested help through international agencies; and the needs of the developing world provide stimulus to the expansion of international organisation. Yet these two contemporaneous processes of political development - the growth of international organisation and nation-building in developing areas - may not always be in step. Education is a convenient viewpoint from which to examine this relationship, with its element of discord and of convergence of interest. Education is a prominent aspiration of governments and people in developing countries and is widely considered to be a most efficacious instrument for modernisation. This subject-matter limitation also makes it possible to focus on two international organisations; UNESCO as the agency primarily responsible for educational systems; and the I.L.O. because of its recent emphasis both on training in occupational skills and on the relevancy of the manpower factor for educational policy.

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<sup>o</sup> - This paper was written as a contribution to a special issue of International Organization on the theme of international institutions and economic development, which is being prepared under the editorial responsibility of Professors Richard Gardner and Max Millikan.

<sup>oo</sup> - Director, International Institute for Labour Studies. This Institute was created by the I.L.O. in 1960 as a centre for education and research. This article expresses the thinking of the author and in no way commits the I.L.O.

Executives heads of international organisations are concerned with the institutional continuity of their organisations, often with expanding the tasks and strengthening the authority of these organisations and sometimes with playing a role towards international integration. Their choices of activities and programmes tend to be made in relation to these primary political goals.

Governments of aid-receiving countries have a different perspective. They regard international organisations instrumentally in relation to their own primary goals, which vary with regimes, i.e. the preservation of the existing order of society or its transformation towards a vision of a future society. Economic development is also viewed instrumentally towards these ultimate ends. If one shifts from governments to population groups a greater number of goals come to light, for which economic development is instrumental.

Aid-giving governments view the economic development of less developed countries - and the activities of international organisations in this regard - from yet different perspectives : as means towards creating a friendly disposition on the part of developing countries; and towards avoiding dangerous disturbances in the international system for the security and stability of which they have both a special interest and a special responsibility.

Thus in considering the role of international organisations in the education and manpower field with reference to economic development, it is necessary to weave in and out of a complex web of goals. The choice of international organisation programmes, the way they are carried out is the product of a mixing and meshing of these differing goals.

The complexity is not reduced when the subject is approached from the standpoint not of goals, but of the way in which the relevant variables interact in the process of modernisation, seen from the national perspective. To consider human resources development (education and manpower) as the independent variable and economic growth as the dependent

variable would present an incomplete and possibly false view of the process. Both need to be shown in dependent relationship to politics and power<sup>(1)</sup>.

The set of domestic variables referred to below in considering the process of modernisation thus comprises four :

- 1) social stratification, and its implications for power relations amongst social groups;
- 2) political leadership;
- 3) educational policy; and
- 4) economic growth.

Amongst them a fifth is introduced - the influence of international organisations, in the effect of which we are particularly interested.

It is not possible to do more here than suggest an approach which would take sufficient account of some of the complexities mentioned. As a first step, human resources development is considered from the perspective of international organisation. As a second, the policies advocated by international organisations are viewed within the process of modernisation (with the aid of some loosely sketched models). Finally, some questions are put concerning the role of international organisation in relation to developing polities.

#### The International Organisation Perspective

The programmes of international organisations have grown in response to changes in the world environment - through demands from their memberships and initiatives seizing opportunities by international civil servants.

An early initiative was taken by the newly-appointed Director-General of the I.L.O. in 1948 and 1949 : to launch an 'operational' manpower programme. From one perspective, this may be seen as an institutional adaptation by the I.L.O to the post World War II environment.

The first target of the programme was European manpower; the programme could thus appear as an auxiliary to the Marshall Plan (the Soviet Union at that time was in a position of aloofness and sometimes hostility towards the I.L.O.). Subsequently, at the time President Truman initiated his Point 4 program, the I.L.O.'s attention shifted from Europe to the developing areas. The early manpower programme expanded into other fields of technical cooperation; but manpower activities continued to dominate, today accounting for about forty percent of the I.L.O.'s expenditures.

Trade unions became highly politicised in the Cold War, their international policies polarised on the issue of anti-Communism. The emphasis by the I.L.O. Director-General on manpower put to the fore a technical matter which, though it did not arouse the same emotional involvement as Cold War issues, was able to maintain trade union support as being useful and non-controversial. The programme also found favour with I.L.O. employer delegates and some governments, not only for its own merits, but because it represented a shift away from the I.L.O.'s traditional work of drawing up international legal standards of labour legislation. Western trade union supported warmly the standards approach as a means of legitimising their bargaining demands; employers opposed it (presumably for the reason unions supported it); and many governments, especially the growing number from the developing areas, considered that practical aid rather than more model laws was what they wanted. Manpower activities thus, for the I.L.O., represented an important area of consensus in an environment bedevilled with ideological and political conflict; and a significant expansion of the I.L.O.'s tasks. This development has been so important that it would be difficult to imagine the I.L.O. today sustaining sufficient support for the residue of its programmes (none of which have such a broad appeal as the manpower programme) and maintaining its place in the world, if its manpower activities were to cease<sup>(2)</sup>.

UNESCO's concentration upon educational development was a means to strengthen its authority and expand its task. The earlier period of

scattered activities sustained politically on a basis of "you support my project and I'll support yours", was succeeded by a definition of clearer organisational goals in the shape of a few major programmes. More forceful initiative by the UNESCO Director-General found ready allies in the national ministries of education in the developing areas, who could make use of this external pressure in addition to those of domestic groups towards a policy of educational expansion.

UNESCO introduced a new method, inspired perhaps by the methods used earlier by NATO and OEEC : the fixing of goals for expansion by representative regional conferences followed by periodic assessment of how far these goals are attained. Conferences of ministries of education were held in Karachi (for Asia) in January 1960; Addis Ababa (for Africa) in May 1961; and Santiago (for Latin America) in March 1962<sup>(3)</sup>. These conferences not only set targets - seven-year universal compulsory education for Asia by 1980; six years education for Africa by 1980; and six years for Latin America by 1970 - they were also occasions for education ministers and their officials to confront ministries of economics or finance with their claims for a larger allocation of resources, and to do so with the support of international organisation specialists, professors of economics and other "independent" experts. UNESCO also associated other international and regional organisations with these conferences, rallying support for the policy thrust<sup>(4)</sup>.

The World Bank, UNICEF and the U.N. Special Fund all came around to the view that education is a vital priority component in economic development plans qualifying for their financial assistance<sup>(5)</sup>; and this gave the UNESCO leadership the further argument that its promotion of planned educational expansion would help governments of developing countries get their share of the available finance, since education was "in" with the financial agencies.

Together with the systematic use of internationally organised pressures on national action through the institutional device of regional targets followed by evaluation, an educational development

ideology was elaborated, giving pre-eminence to the role of education as a motor of economic progress<sup>(6)</sup>. Many sources contributed to the elaboration of this ideology : a group of American scholars provided the reasoned basis for it;<sup>(7)</sup> American foundations threw their support behind efforts to work it out; the International Economic Association focussed professional interest upon the economics of education<sup>(8)</sup>; and OECD, the United Nations, I.L.O. and UNESCO officials put together from this emerging body of thought the rationale of their advocacy of education and training as the highway to development. UNESCO stood at the centre of this, using its social science arm to promote the elaboration of a development doctrine and methodology which was applied through an expansion of the tasks of its educational arm, and encouraging the endorsement of the doctrine by other international agencies whose concurrent activities could sustain the UNESCO drive.

The main tenets of this ideology are that investment in human resources is very likely to produce a higher return in terms of economic growth than investment in physical capital; and it is also socially more beneficial because it improves individual welfare and earning capacity<sup>(9)</sup>. Subsidiary propositions are that the content of education should be more scientific and technical so as to relate more to the needs for modernising the economy. Some readjustment of wage and salary differentials between different types of occupations is recommended to give incentive for the acquisition of technical skills over literary and legal education. The prevalent opinion amongst the professors, the international officials and the foreign aid program officials (though not amongst the political leaders of many recipient countries) gives preference to the expansion of secondary and higher education in those countries in the early stages of growth before attempting to bring about universal primary education; the reason being that shortage of sub-professionals, supervisors, technicians and managers creates bottlenecks for development and thereby also prevents expansion of employment opportunities for the less educated. And the I.L.O. has added as a qualification to unmitigated enthusiasm for the development

potency of education, that employment creating targets should be kept in place with school-filling targets : more jobs should be created as more people are educated and trained. Finally, economic development planning should be comprehensive so as to relate the planning of investment in education and training with manpower planning and the planning of investment in physical capital.

Without at this point considering the merits and criticisms of this ideology with reference to economic development, it is necessary to point out its attractiveness to the international organisations. Organisation leaders perceived in the 1950's that economic development was a challenge to their ability to bring about peaceful change in the international system. But it became clear once again - as it had been made clear in the aftermath of Bretton Woods - that the big powers were not prepared to place the very large sums required for any international programmes of economic development under the administration of international officials in structures that would be, much more than the Bretton Woods institutions, responsive to the wills of the less developed countries<sup>(10)</sup>. By the end of 1957, the SUNFED project for a capital development fund which had been the subject of pressures and negotiations during the mid-50's was shelved; and the substitute adopted by the General Assembly was the Special Fund, an agency with a lesser order of funds to deal in "pre-investment", to foster projects which would enhance the capacity of under-developed countries to absorb more capital (which might come through other channels)<sup>(11)</sup>. In the "pre-investment" concept, education and training had an honoured place. The educational development ideology gave greater qualitative importance to the kinds of things that the international organisations had left to do and enhanced their prestige vis-à-vis bilateral programmes which had much larger funds at their disposal.

Furthermore, the simple relationship posited between education and economic development, avoided many awkward questions concerning the will of governments to undertake population control measures or



fiscal, land or other institutional reform, and to deal with the economic consequences of attitudes bred of social tradition or of poverty. Such questions which lead straight to matters of social stratification and political leadership are embarrassing for international agencies which have to give the appearance, in technical assistance, of being servants to established regimes.

There can be little doubt of the success with which the educational development ideology was applied, from a UNESCO organisational standpoint. It lent support to and provided a rationale for a constellation of pressures towards the expansion of investment in education. The sum spent on education and training by international organisations has been rising through the 1960's. The same is true of bilateral aid programmes<sup>(12)</sup>. The proportion of national budgets in the developing countries devoted to education has been rising markedly more rapidly than their national incomes<sup>(13)</sup>. Education has been claiming successfully an increasing share of all resources available for development, national, bilateral and multilateral. It is a tribute to the leadership of UNESCO particularly that such an impressive impact could be made upon economic development policies throughout the world. From the standpoint of strengthening the effectiveness and authority of international organisation, this must be accounted a marked success. Whether it advances the cause of economic development is a separate question.

#### The Domestic Perspective of Modernisation

To this latter question we must now turn in order to provide a framework for assessing the interaction of international organisation activity with national situations. The framework should be broad enough to see the role and effect of educational and training systems in the context of modernisation. The simplest way to approach this schematically is to sketch out several models which state presumed relationships between the variables referred to earlier<sup>(14)</sup>.

Model X : the perpetuation of existing social stratification

In this model the educational system reflects and perpetuates the existing structure of power relations amongst social strata. Neither the social stratification nor the educational system is conducive to economic growth; but this has not prevented economic development occurring in some sectors<sup>(15)</sup>. The social strata may be expressed as follows : 1) a small group whose traditional power derived in the main from land and was buttressed by close association (through family connections) with religious and military institutions; 2) an urban "middle" stratum; 3) skilled manual workers committed and adapted to the modern sector; 4) an urban "marginal" stratum not fully adapted to "modern" culture, subsisting in unskilled trades or unemployed; 5) the traditional rural stratum.

During this century, the power of the urban middle stratum has grown at the expense of the traditional power-holding upper strata. This shift has been accompanied by adaptations rather than by revolutionary upheavals. The urban middle stratum, while deriving power from industry and commerce have not challenged the cultural values of the old aristocracy, which remain dominant. Their acceptance of these values - including a disdain for manual work - distinguishes this social group from the ascetic entrepreneurs of the "Protestant ethic". The old landowning family adapts too : it delivers its clients' votes to the political party run by urban "middle" elements in return for a free hand in local affairs. The church and the military broaden the recruitment of their elites to reflect the urban middle stratum's position of social and political power<sup>(16)</sup>.

In this social structure, education is the avenue of mobility; but the educational system operates to preserve rather than to change the structure. It is education in the old Western European tradition, with a high valuation to training for the "liberal" professions. The system functions primarily as a means of selection to entry into these professions and analogous occupations, i.e. pre-eminently government

employment. Educational expansion increases opportunities for upward mobility of urban middle and working class people.

Secondary school pupils come in their large majority from the upper and urban middle strata. For the most part, they study academic subjects, only a minority going to the commercial or industrial secondary schools which are regarded as "second class". The qualifications of secondary school teachers are also poor on the average, many being part-time teachers. The defects of the secondary school are carried over into the university : inadequate standards of scholarship, compounded by an absence of research, and the lack of a self-sustaining and mutually stimulating intellectual community. These are the consequences of a system in which teaching is a part-time occupation and where both the professor's chair and the student's diploma are valued more for the social status they confer than for the content of the educational process they symbolise.

Despite the fact that there has been a marked expansion of primary education in rural areas, this education is ill-adapted to rural needs. Its content is not patently relevant; it is not organised to take account of the exigencies of agricultural work; teachers are ill-qualified - and often enough appointment of teachers is a form of political patronage at the disposal of local magnates. The expansion of rural primary education may reflect an awakening demand on the part of rural populations or a quickened sense of duty on the part governments; but its inadequacies, the low average years of schooling and the high drop-out rate render it of little positive effect towards the improvement of agriculture; and in the case of those relative few who stick with it, primary education tends to be regarded instrumentally as a means of escape from rural work. Primary education is also not well adapted to the urban "marginal" group<sup>(17)</sup>. Expansion of existing educational systems does little to integrate these groups or make them economically more productive.

The output of the educational system is as ill-adapted to industrial development as to rural needs. Some countries close to this type have, it is true, experienced high rates of economic expansion in recent decades; but it would be difficult to attribute this to educational causes. In fact the reverse may well be the case; because those countries in which the urban middle stratum has been growing most rapidly (as a consequence of the expansion of education) have been least dynamic economically<sup>(18)</sup>. Calculations of the supply of "high-level manpower" for economic development which are based upon the output of the secondary schools and universities are thus unconvincing evidence of productive skills and aptitudes. Expansion of this type of education may be counter-productive. It might be more useful to find out more about the background of those whose aptitude and skill for industrial expansion have been demonstrated.

If, by and large, the educational system in this model functions so as to maintain prevailing value-patterns and the existing social structure, educational expansion creates dysfunctions. The urban stratum demands an increase in secondary education, supported by other aspirants to "middle" status amongst the better-off urban workers<sup>(19)</sup>. This in turn creates a demand for more government jobs, which may prove to be a drag on economic expansion and a stimulus to further misallocation of human resources (e.g. more teachers to train more students who in turn will demand more government jobs).

The personal conflict inherent for the secondary school and university student, between defense of his acquired social status and lack of constructive outlets, engenders unrest amongst students, politicising the universities. Student discontent is directed overtly towards demands for participation in the government of universities and includes implicitly an element of informal apprenticeship for selection to membership in the political élite. It tends to be anomic, radical in its attack on authority, but not to represent any consistent or fundamental challenge to the social power structure which, archaic as it

seems, has proven able to sustain extraordinary inequalities and tensions. If, however, the educational system were to produce a large and growing number of alienated "educated unemployed" there would be a possibility of this type of discontent crystallising into forceful social movements, i.e. providing leadership to awaken rural society and the "marginal" population in the towns.

#### Model Y : populist political leadership

This is a more volatile model, more characteristic of a newly independent country<sup>(20)</sup>. Social stratification is much more fluid than in model X. The educational system functions less as a preservative of previously existing social relations; on the contrary, high expectations are placed in it as an instrument for fashioning a new future society. However, education and educational expansion are ill-adjusted to economic development leading to a misallocation of resources; and also produce some seriously destabilising effects in the political system, at least in the short term.

The traditional structures of social authority vary considerably but in virtually all cases are sub-national, that is they refer to tribal or communal units smaller than the contemporary nation-state. The nation-state exists juridically, but the great task now is to give the people a sense of national identity. This task is being undertaken by a political élite composed of individuals of different backgrounds--often of humble origins with reference to the traditional social authorities, but sometimes combining the aura of high status in the old authority system with a new revolutionary role. This political élite has a strongly populist orientation uniting it and legitimating its power; and populist ideology determines its policy choices in nation-building.

Education is regarded by this élite as a major instrument of nation-building; and this valuation appears to be widely shared, creating a popular demand for expansion of, especially primary, educa-

tion<sup>(21)</sup>. The goal of universal primary education is seen as necessary to create the communications system of a modern society, enabling closer contact between the political élite and the population. It is also a requisite for the introduction of modern production processes. And it is an aspect of the "human rights" aspirations of populist nationalism towards overcoming inequalities.

Secondary and higher education are also regarded by the political and economic élite and those aspiring to join them as the channel of upward mobility. It was through the educational system that the present political leadership was recruited<sup>(22)</sup>. Civil service and public sector employers - and employers in some of the larger foreign-owned undertakings - make educational level the criterion of access to higher level jobs. The absence of a thriving private sector in which entrepreneurial initiative determines success, irrespective of the level of formal education, closes out alternative channels of upward mobility (A resulting aberration is an excessive emphasis on diplomas). Thus along with the populist demand for universal primary education, there is a demand from aspirants to elite status for the expansion of secondary and higher education.

Is the populist-led expansion of education changing the social power structure<sup>(23)</sup>? What happens typically, is a growth of tensions between the political élite which takes power at the time of independence and the élite of technicians and civil servants, and between these newly-established élites and the generation of students behind them<sup>(24)</sup>. The political élites' rapid rise to power has the effect of inflating expectations in the efficacy of education as a means of access to élite status. This inflation of expectations leads in turn to frustrations as secondary school and university graduates realise the positions of power are already pre-empted. The newer élite of technicians and administrators, especially those in the key economic sectors are better educated than the political leaders but subordinated and suspect. The politicians react, in defense of their acquired

positions, by resorting to the anti-intellectualist strain in populism. This further alienates the students in secondary and higher education. The economic technicians' problem may be at least temporarily resolved by a military takeover in which they come to share power with that other set of technicians - the army officers.

The commitment to rapid expansion of primary education, noble in moral intent, has some serious negative consequences. One, as in model X, is to drain off the potentially more able from rural communities, general education being regarded as incompatible with manual and especially agricultural work. This is one important source of a more general problem: the "unemployed school-leaver", i.e. those with a few years of primary education who aspire to clerical jobs which do not exist. For the economic system, the investment in production of these "school-leavers" is a misallocation of development resources. For the political system, they are a destabilising factor, prone to anomic out-bursts, readily recruited to demagogic messianist agitation. For the educational system itself, the effects are declining quality (from larger and larger classes and shortage of qualified teachers) and rising costs (exacerbated by the large proportion of repeaters in primary grades who in turn act as a block to learning by new pupils)<sup>(25)</sup>. The cost factor alone puts governments in the painful alternative of either abandoning the goal of universal primary education or of eliminating those pupils who prove unable to learn - either of which is offensive to populist aspirations.

Similarly, the expansion of secondary and higher education - in addition to the politically significant frustrations already mentioned - is also leading to the production of more graduates than can be absorbed by the economy<sup>(26)</sup>. One explanation for long popular is that education is of the wrong kinds, having a literary and legal bias when technical graduates are needed. But this is no longer a sufficient reason, because more emphasis has been given to the technical content of education; and now there appears the phenomenon of unemployed technical graduates, plus a "brain drain" of scientific specialists and

technicians from underdeveloped to industrialised countries. Another explanation lies in the inflated earning expectations of graduates. They demand salaries comparable to those offered to attract their predecessors the colonial administrators; but new jobs at this cost cannot be created in sufficient numbers by poor countries<sup>(27)</sup>.

Model Y poses a number of critical questions : Does an attempt to provide universal primary education conflict seriously in the competition for scarce resources with the initiation of rapid economic development ? Have the economic benefits of educating high level manpower been overstressed in recent development ideologies ? Does heavy emphasis on education at the early stages of modernisation involve serious threats to political stability ? The negative appraisal of educational expansion is probably most apparent in the short term. Long term perspectives may argue that economic disequilibria and political disorder are to some extent inevitable in the process of modernisation; but that the goals of modernisation will never be attained unless an informed and competent population is created through education. However, we all live in the short term - politicians especially.

Abandonment of educational expansion goals would be politically unrealistic for populist political leadership. Thus one should look for adaptations rather than reversals in policy. The political system adapts typically to the dangers of the "school-leaver" problem by introducing schemes of compulsory civic service, "youth brigades" and so forth. While this is offensive to the liberal conception of individual human rights, it is quite consistent with populist conceptions of human rights through collective action for national emancipation. The school system, too, adapts to the condition of society. Too great a load is placed upon it as an instrument of nation-building<sup>(28)</sup>. The culture of the school, derived from Western models and often taught by metropolitan teachers in the metropolitan language, is far removed from the culture of the family environment. There is nothing in daily experience outside the school to sustain the ideas taught in school. As a result



these ideas are not easily understood; they are mimicked<sup>(29)</sup>. And as schooling expands, pressures for "localisation" are greater; and the school system conforms increasingly to the cultural fragmentation of the nation. Only the secondary and higher schools - especially the boarding schools - can sustain modern cultural attitudes for the minority which passes through them. The gap between national élite and "localised" popular culture remains great. The school system is unable to provide the institutional framework for nation-building. This framework must be sought elsewhere, in the institutions run by the modernised élite - hence the recent prominence of the military backed by bureaucratic technicians who may appear as the combined institutional force strong enough to resist the disintegrating effects of traditional tribalism or communalism and newly induced anomic disorder and messianism.

Some of the problems raised by this model may be seen as questions of phasing, in the transformation and modernisation of societies<sup>(30)</sup>. It may be that the most propitious moment for expanding primary education is after urbanisation and industrialisation have proceeded some distance<sup>(31)</sup>. Then populations exist who can use general education more effectively to adapt to economic opportunities. By the same token, possibly more resources should be devoted to employment creation in the modern sector before there is a large-scale expansion in the output of secondary and higher education. An important intervening variable between education and economic growth is attitudes - towards work, towards what constitutes fair rewards, and towards the future of the nation and the individual's identification with it. Education without any change of the economic environment does not change attitudes but builds frustrations. Conversely, a change in the economic environment may create the conditions in which a change of attitudes can be constructively influenced by an expansion of educational opportunity. In this interim phase particularly, some forms of education may be both relatively cheap and especially propitious in helping to improve the economic environment : namely, apprenticeship, short sub-professional

training for secondary school-leavers, industrial training for adults on the job and some forms of practical training designed to turn peasants into farmers given in combination with investment in agriculture<sup>(32)</sup>. These do not create frustrations if they are geared, as they should be, to economic opportunities. The opportunities, however, may be limited to relatively small groups of workers who have become partially acculturated to the modern economic sector. The problem of effective penetration of rural populations remains paramount and unresolved.

Model Z : Modernization with alternative channels of upward mobility

A third development model is suggested by James Coleman on the basis of an analysis of Soviet, Japanese and Philippine cases<sup>(33)</sup>. It is interesting mainly for comparison. In these cases, a modernizing élite (the Communist Party élite in the Soviet Union in the early 1920's, the Samurai governing class in Japan in the early 1870's and the American colonial officialdom in the Philippines at the turn of the century) adopted mass education as an instrument for political unification, and for the creation of a technically competent population. They were successful in improving political communication between élite and population (though not uniformly in inducing conformity); and they avoided the problem of the "educated unemployed". They were able to do this because : 1) in none of these cases was education thought of as conferring a right to political élite status; 2) higher education was more flexible and practical in orientation, making for a closer adaptation to economic opportunities; and 3) there were auxiliary channels of upward mobility. In these respects, it may be added, the model presents analogies to the United States, just as it contrasts with Europe.

It is the third characteristic which is most remarkable in its contrast with the situations portrayed in models X and Y, where aspirations for upward mobility focus on the educational system. Coleman suggests that : "Comparisons of historical development of educational systems in modern societies strongly support the proposition that where

alternative channels of mobility exist, a politically dysfunctional intellectual proletariat is less likely to appear"<sup>(34)</sup>. Yet we may well ask whether the notion of alternative channels of mobility is not now becoming illusory even in industrialised capitalist countries. Is not the increasing technicity of all productive activity making educational qualifications a condition for upward mobility, not perhaps a substitute for but a necessary complement to entrepreneurial initiative? Does this not therefore mean that for lack of alternative channels of upward mobility, developing countries will have to solve through educational policy the problems of recruitment to the political and economic élites and the related problems of limiting the problem of an educated unemployed? Model Z shows that a determined modernizing élite can effectively use educational expansion as an instrument of mobilization; but it offers little hope that the political and economic dysfunctions of rapid expansion can be ignored.

#### Functionalism, pluralism and future opportunities

From the foregoing, it may be inferred that the official educational development ideology has been efficacious for strengthening UNESCO and the I.L.O.; but an analysis of education in the process of modernization suggests some politically destabilizing and economically constricting consequences of a simple, uniform policy of expanding education and training. In the light of this, can we envisage some better adjustment of the action of international organizations and of their institutional growth to the dynamics of national political and economic modernization?

More comprehensive planning could be the answer -planning which would relate educational expansion to the creation of employment opportunities, give preference to modes of economic development which create more jobs and seek means of integrating the "educated unemployed" into useful activities. Those scholars who have best contributed to the elaboration of the educational development ideology always maintained that action should be adapted to the specific situation of each country. The

technical international officials concerned are nearly all advocates of a comprehensive planned approach. "Comprehensive planning" is the key phrase in the revision of official ideology now going on within the technical departments of international agencies, where there is awareness of the dysfunctional effect of earlier simplistic enthusiasm<sup>(35)</sup>.

This is not, however, a matter amenable to bureaucratic problem-solving. There are structural difficulties in getting a proper fit between fragmented responsibility for international action and coherent domestic development policy. A coherent policy may be defined as the co-ordinated use of appropriate instruments at the national level to achieve feasible goals. The structure of international organization is such that separate agencies are each responsible for different instruments : UNESCO for the school system; I.L.O. for labour market machinery and on-the-job training; and FAO for rural extension services, for example. The political relationships inherent in international organization activity are such that the separate aims of government ministries and different local groups combine with particular international agencies to create pressures for the expanded use of certain instruments. Thus despite an intellectual acknowledgment on the part of international officials of the need for comprehensive planning, the political structure of international organization/national government relations is such that priority tends to be given to the chosen instruments rather than the coherent plan<sup>(36)</sup>. UNESCO in the nature of things is inclined to support expansion of existing educational systems; and so may sometimes lend its influence to domestic pressures for maintaining through these systems values inimical to economic development. Similarly, the structure of ILO political relationships inclines that organization to support programmes which benefit the relatively small but committed industrial worker group in developing countries.

To the extent that officials of the functional international organizations themselves prefer comprehensive planning (and deference to

priorities other than those of their own wares) they risk losing support of their particular clients. International bureaucracies, however, are so responsive to client interests that this is not likely to go very far. Comprehensive planning at the local level where local administrative structures are weak relative to the administrative structures of international organizations, may become complicated by the need for negotiation amongst organizational interests at the international level<sup>(37)</sup>.

The problem is not only one of structure; it links with the general ideology of international organization. The best formulated theoretical justification of the system of segmented responsibilities amongst international organizations is the theory of what can be called functionalist pluralism<sup>(38)</sup>. International organizations with functionally specific goals bring into their orbit functionally specialized technicians or interest groups at the national level. By promoting aims and projects in which these sub-national groups are interested, international organizations at the same time encourage pluralism within the nation and international integration. Internationalism is obstructed primarily by integral nationalism; the structure of world government will be created piecemeal by trans-national alliances of groups which are competing within each nation, which alliances in turn help to break down the unity of the nation-state. Extrapolated, the future political process of world government is envisaged as pluralistic, characterized by competition amongst constellations of functionally defined interests rather than competition amongst nations.

This is an ideology of international organization which accorded well with the reaction against Fascist totalitarianism in the 1930's and 1940's amongst a set of nations in which the elements for pluralistic competitive internal politics were already present. It accords less well with a world environment in which many newly-independent states are engaged in the task of nation-building. These states exist juridically prior to the people over whom they rule having found a sense

of identity as a nation. It is the task of the political élites of these countries to provide the symbols and the experience of collective action which will foster a national identity. They thus often try to suppress internal factionalism and the competition of political and economic interests. These are pre-nation states seeking to become nation-states, whose élites are promoting forms of integral nationalism and of socialism as means to that primary goal. And it is this nationalism which is providing a stimulus and driving force to the task expansion of international organization at the present time.

This radically changed environment calls for a reformulation of general international organization ideology. It is not necessary to abandon the goal of a pluralist competitive polity - this is a value choice which no set of circumstances can oblige anyone to abandon. But it is necessary, if one wishes one's ideology to be effective as a guide for action (which is the purpose of an ideology), to conceive this goal as attainable through strategies adjusted to a typology of different situations.

It is now becoming possible to define such typologies and their associated strategies as a result of recent studies in comparative politics of developing areas, which have helped to delineate the groups amongst which political competition occurs in countries at various stages of modernization and industrialization. One line of competition (noted above) in new nations is between the first generation political leaders and the technicians of the civil service. Within the civil service, concentrations of technical competency can also be described : economic management and planning attracts many of the best talents, other ministries get the less able or less qualified. The question posed for international organizations - in the perspective of a pluralist ideology - is whether it is not better at this stage of development to build on poles of strength in the national bureaucracies, encourage a sense of community amongst civil servants as a group under the leadership of their most able elements, rather than to act on assumptions concerning the desirability of promoting the intra-

bureaucratic competition amongst ministries for resources such as might be more appropriate to a later and more complex stage of industrial and administrative development. David Apter has argued that technicians, planners and scientists, even though in developing countries they are not typically advocates of liberal democracy, by their very functions demand and create supplies of information and encourage fuller communication between population and élite. They also demand freedom of scientific research and free debate on ideas in the scientific field<sup>(39)</sup>. These are first steps towards the conditions in which liberal democracy might be possible. Much could be achieved towards this rethinking of the ideology of international organization by a closer intermixing of the two channels of political science that have analysed, on the one hand, the politics of development, on the other, international organization.

At present, the governments of developing countries are supporting the creation of new international organization which cover the same fields as older organizations or combinations of older organizations but whose purposes are defined in terms of development problems (UNCTAD, UNIDO - a separate organization for science and technology was proposed but not created). There is a combination of motives : the belief that more organizations means more funds for development; the belief that the new organizations created by the votes of the developing country majority will be more responsive to that majority's will whereas the older organizations, by habit of mind and by structure of decision-making, are more responsive to the industrialized countries which were their creators; the opportunity to create within the international civil service as a whole centres of bureaucratic influence which will fabricate ideologies designed to upgrade the interests of developing countries and press these interests with vigour vis-à-vis the international financial agencies.

The older organizations, including ILO and UNESCO, have responded to these structural initiatives from the developing countries by

defending their competencies, expanding (or offering to expand) those of their activities that interest developing countries and expressing confidence in the efficacy of inter-organizational arrangements for coordination and planning (ACC).

The present state of the structural dialectic of international organization in relation to the function of economic development is one of tension between the older functionalism of ILO, UNESCO, and FAO and the newer functionalism of UNCTAD and UNIDO. No clean-cut synthesis is in prospect; but accommodations are made by negotiation between these differing conceptions. The direction of these accommodations will be determined in large measure by the constellations of environmental forces which lie behind each form of organization; and the most important question about a prospective shift in this respect which could have impact upon the structure of international organization concerns the possibility of closer understanding amongst industrialized countries of East and West as to policy for accelerating economic development of the poor countries<sup>(40)</sup>.

Finally, a remark about the programmatic counterpart to these structural questions in the specific area of education and manpower. The defects in the official educational development ideology derived from the insufficient account it took of the ways in which social stratification and political power shape education and limit economic development potential. Two questions which could be put as a preliminary to fixing the educational aspects of development policy are : 1) What is the emerging pattern of roles critical for modernization ? 2) How can the politically inarticulate groups be brought into participation in modernization ? These questions are both pluralist in their implications.

No attempt can be made here to suggest answers to these questions, answers which would in any case have to be grouped in relation to typologies of modernization. Some recent work in political science has focussed on the formation of career and entrepreneurial roles<sup>(41)</sup>. The



pattern of roles and role-formation determines the potential form of political competition or pluralism. Changes in the pattern of roles are very closely linked with changes in attitudes. Very little is known about this which is operationally useful, yet changes in attitudes and role-formation are critical determinants of change in social stratification and political leadership which in turn condition prospects for economic and political development.

Lucien Pye's study of Burma stressed how personality factors act as a block to development<sup>(42)</sup>. The deficiency of "associational sentiments" resulting from traditional upbringing preclude individuals from according each other the confidence necessary for innovative organization-building. E.C. Banfield's study in Southern Italy made analogous observations<sup>(43)</sup>. Oscar Lewis' studies in the "culture of poverty" suggest there may be common traits of personality which would obstruct the effective organization of poor people for common goals<sup>(44)</sup>. These studies all point up the importance of organization-building skills and begin to throw some light on the problem of arousing participation by the rural and the urban "marginal" populations. But very little is yet known about how this can be done. Very little attention has been given to the development of organization-building skills, compared with the efforts expended in training administrators and technicians. Concern for pluralism, however, would argue for some balance in this respect, especially at a time when civil servants are in many places allying with military administrators to oust the political entrepreneurs. Training for trade union leadership is one of-fering in this direction<sup>(45)</sup>. The problems of leadership in rural communities are more difficult for an international organization to come to grips with<sup>(46)</sup>. If, as suggested earlier, it is good policy to strengthen bureaucracies, it would also seem good policy to balance this with programmes to strengthen non-bureaucratic entrepreneurs (including political entrepreneurs). International organizations might devise programmes to reach these role-players<sup>(47)</sup>.

Such a programme implies the adoption by the international organization of an active transformist role which is certainly likely to encounter local obstacles. The extent to which an international organization can persist in its course despite such obstacles depends upon the strength of the alliance supporting its policies. This brings us back to the crucial question of East-West understanding on development policy. To be able to base an active transformist role upon such a consensus would enable international organization to sharpen the definition of its distinctive personality in world affairs. And it could be a step towards linking in an interacting and mutually sustaining way the processes of political development at national and international levels.

Revised text, 5 July 1967.

SUMMARY

Whereas hitherto political scientists have studied separately international organisation and the politics of developing areas, it would be fruitful to consider international organisation-building and nation-building as inter-penetrating processes. Education is a convenient viewpoint through which to examine their relationship, since it is recognised to be such a significant factor in political and economic modernisation. Two standpoints are taken successively : (i) that of task expansion of the two international organisations concerned with education and training; and (ii) that of the interaction of key variables in the process of modernisation (social stratification; political leadership; educational policy; and economic growth). Preliminary conclusions are that international organisations have been successful in expanding their own programmes and in promoting educational expansion in developing countries; but that policies of educational expansion which do not take sufficient account of political factors produce some politically destabilising and economically wasteful results. In a concluding section, these consequences are seen as linked - not just to particular policies of international organisation - but to their existing structure and functionalist ideology; and some suggestions are put forward as to how insights from the comparative study of political modernisation might be applied so that the structure and policies of international organisations might be fitted more closely to the patterns of nation-building.

NOTES

1. David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1966, p. 223, has distinguished between "modernization" as an early phase and "industrialization" as a later phase; "... it is important to consider the political rather than the economic variable as independent in modernizing societies because the ensemble of modernizing roles is not integrated by a dynamic sub-system based on rational allocation, as is the case in industrial societies. Instead the sub-system is usually the political group such as the army or bureaucracy (or in some instances, a religious body)."
2. The vigour of the I.L.O.'s defense of its acquired position as the international agency responsible for vocational training, management development, productivity improvement, etc. in the industrial field, when the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation was being created by the U.N. General Assembly is a token of this perception of a vital organisational interest. In the outcome, the I.L.O.'s competency was preserved. (U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2152 (XXI); the negotiations are reported in I.L.O. document G.B. 167/18/25 of 11 November 1966.)
3. Separate from this series but contributing to the same current of thought was the conference convened by OECD for countries of Western Europe and North America in October, 1961, which consecrated as part of the now conventional wisdom, the proposition that educational investment is good for economic growth.
4. The I.L.O. has more recently adopted the same method for setting regional goals for training and employment creation, beginning with the American region, see the "Ottawa Plan of Human Resources Development approved by a regional conference held in that city in September 1966. Similar "plans" for Asia and Africa are in preparation.
5. The views of Paul G. Hoffman as Managing Director of the Special Fund are in the pamphlet One hundred countries; one and one quarter billion people, 1960, esp. pp. 11, 31, 35; and in World Without Want, New York, Harper and Row, 1962, pp. 53-54. The World Bank approach is described in an article by George D. Woods (President) "Sow education aid, reap economic growth", in Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. I, n° 3, Summer 1966, pp. 37-42. The Inter-American Development Bank also stresses loans for higher education, linking this with its aim to promote Latin American integration by promoting a "common market of knowledge and talent", cf. speech by Felipe Herrera, President of the Inter-American Development Bank, 12 September 1966.

6. The term ideology is used to mean doctrine designed to produce action, an interpretation of realities intended as a guide for acting upon it. Ideologies may be limited in scope, e.g. to education and economic development or the role of international organisation in world politics, as well as comprehensive interpretations of historical change.
7. Especially Frederick Harbison and Charles Myers (following earlier work by Theodore Schultz) through the work of the inter-university Project on Labor in Economic Development, the studies of which were backed by the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation, N.Y. See Harbison and Myers : Education, manpower and economic growth. Strategies of human resources development, New York, Mc Graw-Hill, 1965. The most comprehensive interpretation by the Inter-University Project is in Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, F. Harbison and C.A. Myers : Industrialism and Industrial Man : Problems of Labor and Management in Economic Growth, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960.
8. E.A.G. Robinson and J. Vaizey (eds.) The Economics of Education, London, Macmillan, 1965.
9. Those who pursue the goal of educational expansion dispose also of a second line of attack. If it is objected that in some circumstances the economic growth argument does not justify greater investment in education, then education can be advocated as a 'human right'. This second line is, however, strictly speaking distinct from the educational development ideology.
10. The other issue area in which international organisation might have been expected to play a role with potential to change the international system was disarmament or arms control. But the prospects were even more bleak. The big Western financial contributors took the position that progress towards disarmament was a precondition for more economic development aid.
11. John G. Hadwen and Johan Kaufman, How United Nations Decisions are Made, Leyden, A.W. Sythoff, 1960, pp. 85-111; J.P. Sewell, Functionalism and World Politics. A Study based on United Nations programs Financing Economic Development. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 99-122.
12. E.g. the U.S. International Education Act, 1966, and the high proportion of French bilateral aid going into the export of teachers.
13. UNESCO : Chronicle, June 1966, Vol.XII, n° 6, p. 226.

14. This is all very tentative and subject to verification. The models which follow are drawn from some recent studies which include a broader set of variables than measures of manpower, education and economic growth. I am particularly indebted to James S. Coleman (ed.) Education and Political Development, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965.
15. Although the elements of this model are drawn in the main from studies about Latin American countries, the model is not meant to be a series of generalisations about Latin America. Its purpose is to suggest some relationships in terms of which particular situations can be analysed. In some respects, model X seems to fit other countries with long-established educational traditions and an absence of recent revolutionary upheaval in social structure, such as India; while at the same time certain developments in Latin America may have broken out of this framework. The volume published by the UNESCO Institute of Educational Planning, Problems and Strategies of Educational Planning. Lessons from Latin America, UNESCO, Paris, 1965, contains some articles which have been helpful in delineating the characteristics of this model.
16. Cf. John J. Johnson (ed.) The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962, esp. pp. 109-129.
17. Marshall Wolfe in International Institute of Educational Planning, op.cit., pp. 26-27.
18. Marshall Wolfe in IIEP, op.cit., p. 21.
19. Ibidem.
20. This model is drawn mainly from literature about some African countries; but the same comment has to be made as about model X, i.e. it is not intended as a generalised description but as an analytical construct.
21. Hadley Cantril, The Pattern of Human Concerns, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 1965, presents results of attitude surveys in some developing countries. One is struck by the cross-national differences in the extent to which education features in people's hopes for their country, e.g. for 47 per cent. of the Nigerian sample compared with 11 per cent. of the Indian and 6 per cent. of the Brazilian. Cantril finds a more general contrast between the Nigerians, "enthusiastic about the potentialities of their newly achieved independence and specially high in their hopes both for themselves and for their country", and the more "lethargic" Brazilians and Indians (pp. 70, 77, 85, 156).

22. Michael Debeauvais, "Education in Former French Africa", in James S. Coleman (ed.), op.cit., p. 85.
23. Aye Ogunskeye thinks, as regards Nigeria, that education may have some influence but is probably not decisive in supplanting the traditional tribal authorities. In Coleman (ed.), op.cit., p.140.
24. Coleman, op.cit., p. 27 ff.; S.M. Lipset, The First New Nation, New York, Basic Books, 1963, pp. 72-73; David Apter, op.cit., pp. 71 ff., 133 ff.
25. Cf. a series of articles in Le Monde by B. Girod de l'Ain, "L'école dans le tiers monde," esp., 28 November 1966.
26. Educational output in developing countries has, since the 1950's tended to increase substantially faster than GNP, which in turn has risen faster than wage-paid employment. See a forthcoming publication of the I.I.E.P. Manpower Aspects of Educational Planning : Problems for the Future.
27. Countries which want rapid economic development through planning need more administrators than were required to run a colonial territory in which governmental functions were much more limited. Education does not offer salaries or status sufficient to attract graduates; and so their surplus does little to diminish the shortage of qualified teachers. W. Arthur Lewis thinks the over-supply of educated people is a temporary thing. "In the long run the situation adjusts itself because the premium on education diminishes as the number of the educated increases. As the premium on education falls, the market for the educated may widen enormously. Jobs which were previously done by people with less education are now done by people with more education. The educated lower their sights, and employers raise their requirements." Cf. "Education and Economic Development" in International Journal of Social Science, 14 (4.1962) p. 687.
28. Coleman, op.cit., p. 22.
29. F.X. Sutton, in Coleman (ed.), op.cit., p. 67.
30. Cf. Burt F. Hoselitz in Coleman (ed.), op.cit., p. 543. "At certain periods investment in a given set of non-human resources and at other periods investment in human resources brings about a higher sustained growth of average income." Thomas Balogh is angrier : "It is quite illegitimate to claim that an educational system which in the framework of the United States has been accompanied by a certain rate of growth would, in a different framework, be accompanied by a similar growth rate which can be calculated on the basis of the educational status (assessed qualitatively) alone. Such a quantity of education in the feudal-aristocratic

- countries of South America, the colonial-aristocratic areas of British Africa, and the litterateur-colonial areas of French Africa would produce not merely no growth, but possible refusal to work on farms, an increase in urban unemployment, subversion, and collapse." The Economics of Poverty, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1966, p. 91.
31. Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1958, p. 60.
  32. See W. Arthur Lewis, op.cit., pp. 692-693, B. Hoselitz in Coleman (ed.), op.cit., p. 564.
  33. Coleman, op.cit., pp. 225-232.
  34. Op.cit., p. 231. Though no private sector offers alternative channels of mobility in the Soviet Union, the continual adjustment of the educational system to the needs of the economy and the planned management of labour supply avoided the creation of disaffected "intellectual unemployed". Coleman concludes that the real dilemma for the developing countries' leaders is that "they possess neither the disposition to emulate the Japanese or Philippine pluralistic example, nor the organizational and administrative capacity to pursue effectively the totalitarian alternative" (p. 232).
  35. Evidence of this "revisionism" is apparent in a new report, prepared through collaboration amongst technical secretariats, Report by the Secretary-General on the Development and Utilization of Human Resources in Developing Countries, Economic and Social Council, 43rd session, E.4353, Add.1, para. 107, p.18. The International Institute for Educational Planning, founded by UNESCO in 1963, has produced studies and sponsored discussions making for a critical reappraisal of the educational development doctrine.
  36. The "coordinated programmes prepared in concert by the international agencies through the Administrative Committee on Coordination are carefully negotiated between the central bureaucracies of the agencies. Their function is to provide a guide for orderly relations between the agencies and an assurance to ECOSOC that such relations are satisfactory and fruitful.
  37. The Report of the Secretary-General referred to contains this plea : "It is important that the international organizations avoid giving inconsistent and conflicting advice on the selection of priorities. There is a danger, if agencies do not cooperate closely, that an individual agency on the basis of its specialized knowledge of the urgency of needs in its own field might give advice which would deviate from, or be inconsistent with, that which would be appropriate if the total needs and resources of the country were



taken into account." The only structural proposal adapted to this problem is the reference in a footnote to the suggestion by the Administrator of the UNDP that there should be in each country a "cabinet" of agency field representatives under the chairmanship of the Resident Representative. What, one may well ask, is the cumulative bias which the "unplanned" influences of international organizations give to national development policies? Possibly to give more weight to social, humanitarian and welfare measures than would otherwise be the case. It should not, however, be inferred that more comprehensive planning of international action at the national level would reverse this bias to neglect humanitarian considerations.

38. Formulated by various authors. A notable contributor to the theory is David Mitraný, A Working Peace System : An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943. Functionalist theory has been critically reassessed by Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State, Stanford, 1964; and J.P. Sewell, Functionalism and World Politics, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1966.
39. David Apter, op.cit., pp. 175-176. It can also be argued that their professional solidarity with others in their field - not only at home but chiefly in the outside centres of learning from which they draw their models - moderates (in the sense of Mitraný's functionalism) the integral nationalism inherent in nation-building.
40. The 'older' functionalist organisations might play the role of broker in probing the possibilities of East-West consensus on development policy.
41. Particularly in David Apter, op.cit.
42. Lucien Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation-Building : Burma's Search for Identity, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1962, pp. 38-41, 52-55.
43. E.C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1958.
44. Oscar Lewis, "The Culture of Poverty" in Scientific American, October 1966, vol. 215, n° 4, pp. 15 ff.
45. Harold K. Jacobson, "Ventures on Polity Shaping : External Assistance to Labor Movements in Developing Countries", unpublished paper presented to a roundtable convened by the International Political Science Association, Grenoble, September 1965.

46. Marshall Wolfe in I.I.E.P., op.cit., p. 24 suggests the development of peasant organizations is a precondition for effective rural education in Latin America : "... as peasant unions and other mass organizations penetrate the countryside and as agrarian reform looms larger on the horizon, the educational planner is beginning to encounter more insistent and specific rural demands for education". And, op.cit., p. 74, "In most parts of Latin America this goal (effective rural primary education) seems to be within reach if there is a sufficiently strong and coherent demand for such type of education. This would imply the emergence of political leadership responsive to rural wants and anxious to secure rural support, on the one hand, and a certain degree of political and economic organization of the rural people themselves, on the other".
47. The International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, offers education for potential leaders in the social policy field. The Institute is in fact searching for better answers to the two questions : Who are the potential leaders ? What kind of education is good for them ? See my article in I.I.L.S. Bulletin n° 1, October 1966, pp. 8-21.

Résumé

Alors que jusqu'à présent les politistes ont étudié séparément l'organisation internationale et la vie politique des régions en voie de développement, il serait fécond de considérer la mise en place des organisations internationales et la construction des nations comme des processus qui s'interpénètrent. L'éducation fournit un point de vue commode à partir duquel on peut examiner cette relation, car elle est considérée comme un facteur significatif de la modernisation politique et économique. L'auteur adopte successivement deux optiques : 1) celle de l'expansion des tâches des deux organisations internationales agissant dans les domaines de l'éducation et de la formation; et 2) celle de l'inter-action de variables-clés dans le processus de modernisation (stratification sociale; direction politique; politique de l'éducation; croissance économique). Ces conclusions préliminaires affirment que les organisations internationales ont réussi à élargir leurs propres programmes et à promouvoir l'expansion de l'éducation dans les pays en voie de développement; mais que la politique d'expansion de l'éducation, si elle ne tient pas compte dans une mesure suffisante des facteurs politiques, produit des résultats qui tendent à une déstabilisation politique et constitue un gaspillage sur le plan économique. Le rapport conclut en considérant ces conséquences comme liées non seulement à des orientations particulières de l'organisation internationale, mais à sa structure même et à l'idéologie fonctionnaliste; l'auteur suggère des orientations permettant d'utiliser l'étude comparative de la modernisation politique de façon à mieux adapter la structure et la politique des organisations internationales aux modèles de construction nationale.

Summary : see p. 26.

"The political role of  
international economic organizations"

THE POLITICAL ROLE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS  
IN LATIN AMERICA

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The Political role of regional economic organizations  
in Latin America

By Gustavo Lagos (1)

I. INTRODUCTION

In a recent study (2) we have stated that the national political systems of Latin-America constitute "open systems", or boundless systems from a sociological point of view, which operate under the evergrowing influence of external elements that are some times beyond their control. We said that Latin American political systems could not be studied after the great changes which took place in the international context since the last world war, as if they were closed systems operating independently from the events that take place out of their national frontiers. We tried to suggest that the traditional distinction between the study of national politics and international relations does not match reality any more, and that it would be more sensible to study the national political systems trying to identify the relative influence of the internal factors -born within the political system itself- and that of external factors -born totally or partially out of the system and which act with the same or even more strength than the former in the definition of the system's state and its process. To date, they form a continuum that should be considered separately only for analytical reasons, to find out how the interactions between internal and external political factors are presented in a determined situation or period.

Following that line of thought we could say that a country is more or less "sovereign" or "independent" according to its capability to

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- (1) Gustavo Lagos is the Director of the Institute for the Integration of Latin-America (INTAL). The contents of this work reflect its author's personal opinion and do not express or commit, necessarily, the opinion of INTAL.
- (2) Gustavo Lagos "Factores externos e internos en la política latinoamericana in "Instituciones y Desarrollo político de América Latina", (INTAL, Buenos Aires, 1966).

control the influence of external factors within its political systems. This capacity seems to be fundamentally linked with the country's economic and political stature and its prestige, that is to say its real status, within the international system in which the country operates (3). Thus, a highly developed and militarily powerful country is subject to the influence of external factors just as an underdeveloped one is, with the difference that the former can control those factors and even neutralize them. On the other hand, a country with high real status is a source of external stimulation with regard to other national political systems, and can condition, in a higher or lesser degree, the country's politics and economy.

A group of developing countries can try to control the influence of external factors in its politics and economy through a process of integration of their economies which will enable them to rise their economic and political status and its prestige within the international system in which they move. They can try it, also, through the creation of international organizations which will provide advice or financing help in those fields of economic activity in which the inadequacy of the Nation State prevents an efficient individual action.

After 1945, Latin American countries have promoted, within the inter-american system and the U.N., the creation of a complex of regional economic organizations and have tried, through them, the accomplishment of necessary services for the joint functioning and developing of their economies. Among the principal of these regional economic organizations we can mention ECLA, the Inter American Economic and Social Council, within the OAS, the IDB, the Interamerican Committee for the Alliance for Progress, and in the field of economic integration, LAFTA and CACM.

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(3) For the concept of a nation's real status, see Gustavo Lagos, "International Stratification and Underdeveloped Countries", (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1963) and "La integración de América Latina y su influencia en el sistema internacional" in "La integración Latinoamericana: situación y perspectivas" (INTAL, Buenos Aires, 1965).

The object of this work is to analyze some aspects of the political role played by these regional economic organizations, considering their influence on the power relations within the inter-American or international system, and in internal politics of the States which they serve. We try to affirm that, by way of their action, the regional economic organisations generate factors which are external to the national political systems of their member countries, specially if they are underdeveloped, and that these factors condition their political decisions in the economic and financial fields, but that contrary to other external factors generated in other political systems, those born within a regional economic organization can be partially controlled in their origin by the participating States. We also want to affirm that these organisations fulfil some functions which enable a group of developing countries to increase their capacity to control the external factors generated in other national political systems, specially when the action of these organisations is directed to promote among them an economic integration process.

We see that the international economic organizations have turned into interaction fields for the political and economic forces of the States of the international system to which they belong, and have specially become centers of mediation in the conflict among the national power centers which compose them. Within a highly stratified international system, characterized by relationships of domination, the international economic organization serves as a mediation organ between the system's preponderant State and the rest of the member States. The internal power structure of some international economic organizations reflect partially that sociological reality. But at the same time, and this should be the ultimate reason for their creation, these international economic organizations have a liberating vocation, and, through their action, they contribute to democratize the international system.

In this work we shall particularly refer to the political role played by the regional economic organizations of the inter-american system which act in Latin-America, and to those which are created and act exclu-

sively within the latin-american sub-system. (4). In order to exemplify only, we shall some times refer to those regional economic organizations in which, in spite of the Latin-American countries being their members, same have but a minor participation in the make up of their decisions. Such is, for instance, the case of IBRD and the IMF.

We shall now analyze how some of these regional economic organizations have influenced the inter-American system's power structure, and the internal policies of the member countries. Afterwards we shall make a case-study that will enable us to analyze this influence of the regional economic organizations on the Latin American countries' becoming conscious of the necessity to carry out an economic integration process, and, concretely, their influence on the adoption of recent political decisions on this matter.

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- (4) This regional economic organizations can be classified, according to their functions, as: diagnosis and advise organizations (ECLA's case) whose essential function is the study of each nation's economic situation and that of the group of countries' and of the actual problems that may appear during the region's economic developing process and providing technical advice in different fields of economic activity; confronting organizations, in which the countries compare the objectives of their economic politics and development plans, and analyze their common problems aiming to sketch joint plans of economic cooperation (IAEcoSoc and ICAP cases); and financial organizations (IDB's case) whose main objective is to channel the multilateral financial help for the accomplishment of national or multinational economic and social development projects. Nevertheless, this classification simplifies reality, because, as a matter of fact, there is a crossing of functions among the different regional economic organizations which sometimes is the source of jurisdiction conflicts. It is necessary to add, to those already mentioned, the economic integration organizations, whose main function is that of helping the member states of the regional or sub-regional economic integration schemes in the conciliation of their interests, and in the preparation and execution of the integration projects adopted by the States. The particular interest that these organizations assume in Latin America, (LAFTA and CACM) resides on the fact that the power relations established in them are limited to the countries which compose the Latin-American sub-system, within the inter-American system.



I I. Types of political roles of the regional economic organizations in Latin-America.

Since the second world-war, the Latin-American nations have become conscious of their underdeveloped condition, and their subordinate position within a stratified international system. Within this context they have developed several international actions tending to rise their real status in the international system. We see in this work that, on one hand, the regional economic organizations have contributed to the definition of that situation of the Latin-American countries in the international system, and on the other, have been an instrument of those countries' action, tending to rise their real status in the International system. The hypothesis could be issued that the creation of the regional economic organizations for the carrying out of common interest services, has constituted in some cases a political act through which the Latin-American countries have re-affirmed their will of correcting the distribution of power within the interamerican system, in order to democratize it.

Thus the long negotiations that have preceded the creation of each regional economical organization in which the Latin-American countries appear as urging the dominating state to obtain its acceptance of a new economic organization within the interamerican system. This can be verified by searching the history of ECLA and specially the creation of the IDB.

It can also be seen that the creation process of the regional economic organizations has not followed a pre-determined plan, but it has been the answer to the inadequacy of the national states to carry out studies or render financial support in determined fields of economic activity, and it has also been the concretion of a new step towards the re-structuring of power relations within the interamerican system.

The creation of the IDB, for instance, was the answer given by the Latin-American countries to the verifying of their inadequacy to satisfy the growing needs of the external financing of socio-economic development

in an isolated way, and to attend, individually, to the international financing sources. But, on the other hand, the creation of IDB was the end of a long negotiation among the Latin-American countries and the USA during which the first were mainly looking for an organ over which they could exert some kind of control, and that would contribute to make the international credit system more democratic. In other words, for the Latin-American countries the IDB decisions could be considered as external factors generated out of each of the national political systems; but in a way, they could be controlled in their origin by these countries, being themselves represented in the Organization's center of decisions. They assumed the fact that their participation in the IDB's center of decision enabled them to control in a better way the orientation of that part of international financing when channeled through the Organization than when the financing was channeled through bi-lateral negotiations with the dominating state's credit sources, or when it was channeled through other international financing organization in which the Latin-American participation regarding decisions is small.

Thus, the creation of international economic organizations fulfills the need of satisfying services of common interest to a group of States in case that they cannot afford to satisfy those services individually, either temporarily or permanently.

Those services can be the supply of economic information, the realization of diagnosis over the whole or part of the commercial or economic activity of the member States, or the channeling of financial and technical assistance for the achievement of national or multi-national socio-economic development projects.

The services of an international economic organization can be rendered temporarily, and then the organization loses its former importance or starts to fulfil a new function, as long as the member States regain their capacity to act individually. This phenomenon could be observed in the European reconstruction process during the last post-war, when several organizations created specially to organize the reconstruction of European

countries, disappeared later or transformed their activities (the case of OECD, for instance).

In other cases, the services rendered by an international economic organization, obtain a permanent character; they are the result of the evergrowing complexity of the inter-relations among States on the economic and financial level, and they become indispensable for the good functioning of the international system. Let us think, e.g., of the services rendered by the financial organizations.

The economic organizations created up to date in Latin-America could apparently be classified as temporary, bearing in mind that a higher degree of economic development in the group of countries, will enable each of the national States to fulfill individually the functions they have recognized to those organizations. However, the complexity of the region's development process allows us to affirm that these organizations, under their actual or modified form, will render services to the system's group for a long time, and that, as long as the regional economical integration process keeps progressing, they will become the basis of the multi-national technical and administrative services required by the creation of the Latin-American Common Market. We mean that these organizations have a vocation for permanence which is at the same time source of the stability and prestige that they may attain in their area of influence, and of the political role that they have within the interamerican system and the national political system of each Latin-American country.

We shall now examine some of the main types of political role that can be identified, watching the action of these economic organizations during all the period that follows their creation.

- (a) The political role of regional economic organizations in the definition of the international situation of Latin-American countries, and in the formation of a conscience of a regional reality.

We said that since the second world war, Latin-American nations

have become conscious of their underdeveloped condition and their subordinate position within a stratified international system.

The vision of Latin-America as a region whose incalculable resources allowed it to afford such luxuries as political disorganization and the adoption of foreign ways of life by their aristocracies, suffers a radical change when the notion of development displaces that of rich and poor countries. While the latter concept emerged from the implicit idea that richness was something given and acquired once and forever, and this stressed the not-human elements of a country's economic potentiality, the concept of development introduced the dynamic notion of man's action over nature and his capacity to transform it and create, through science and technology, superior conditions of welfare and progress.

Due to this concept of development which enabled it to look at the world from the countries' viewpoint of capability to exploit their natural resources through science and technology, Latin-America suddenly found that, precisely, the foundation of its image of richness became the foundation of its image of poverty. As a matter of fact, within the static notion of rich and poor countries, Latin America's enormous natural resources constituted its wealth before the world's eyes; but the fact that these natural resources were not exploited enough due to the lack of scientific and technological development, constituted its source of poverty within the new dynamic notion.

Introducing the dynamic notion of development and the world's division in developed and underdeveloped nations is mainly, in Latin-America, the result of the action carried out by ECLA.

In a wordly scale, that action was also carried out by the UN through IAEco.Soc. Actually we know that the expression "Underdeveloped country" is comparatively recent. It was mainly the United Nations and its specialized agencies who coined it when the differences between these countries and the better developed nations became apparent. When the UN's Economic and Social Council discussed the creation of ECLA, in fact

all the conditions of underdevelopment were depicted but the word was not used yet, which is significant. Nevertheless, though it is difficult to establish the date when the term "underdeveloped country" was adopted all over the world, it may be affirmed that its use is only two decades old.

It is the action of ECLA in Latin-America, we said, that enables the different countries to become conscious of their true situation with in the international context. The creation of ECLA, accomplished after a long diplomatic quarrel against the opposition of USA and the Great Powers, represents the beginning of a new period in which Latin-America deepens its own conscience by means of analyzing its economic reality. ECLA's economic thought shows a new intellectual elite's capability to investigate Latin-America's reality with an intellectual instrument created by latin-americans. In the background in ECLA's thought, the basic idea is that the traditional economic theory originated in developed countries cannot be applied as an adequate instrument of analysis to interpret latin-american reality, unless investigation and comparison of the said theory with this reality does not prove the validity of its concepts. From this analytic attitude and from a systematic work researching latin-american reality, ECLA's basic economic concepts come forth, are spread out through the Continent in a decade, and constitute an original economic thought to interpret and analyze latin-american development phenomena from a regional viewpoint which outnumbers a strictly national approach. ECLA's work thus represents the first important and significant expression of a latin-american group's conscience: its auto-definition as a human group accomplished outside of any determined ideology or political movement.

From a political point of view, it is immediately after the second world-war that the latin-american countries start to perceive their reality as a region with common problems. As it were, a radical change takes place in the international sphere after the second world war, which will deeply affect Latin-America's position in the world's context. The USA and the URSS emerge as the world's centers of political, military and eco

conomic power. Only these two nations have enough economic stature to have the technological leadership with military purpose which enables them to prevail over all the other countries, provoking a general deterioration of the other nations' international status. As we said before, the technological revolution divides the world into developed and underdeveloped countries and areas, and Latin-America belongs to the latter. The creation of the UN puts the countries in an universal context and Latin-America, by comparing its characteristics with the rest of the world, starts to define its own features and common interests. For the first time within the world's power strategy the "latin-american group" is mentioned and the behaviour of such a group is tightly studied within the UN's block policies.

It is precisely during the proceedings tending to the creation of ECLA that the latin-american group is going to define itself, remarking its economic, demographic, social and political common peculiarities. In the Chilean Ambassador's speech proposing the creation of ECLA, the words "latin-american community" are already mentioned.

ECLA's action spreading out a regional reality's conscience, constitutes the initial impulse that will provoke a chain reaction resulting in the creation, during the late fifties, of the two basic schemes in which the latin-american economical integration process takes place: LAFTA and the CACM. The establishment of LAFTA and the CACM meant the creation of new technical staffs and new activity centers through which latin-americans became conscious of their own reality as a human group.

(b) The political role of regional economic organizations in the definition of a new sub-system within the international system.

The action of regional economic organizations, in the definition of a regional reality and an integrationist conscience, and the recognition of that reality by latin-american countries, has been put into practice by adopting common positions within the international context, and

producing concrete projects of economic integration, aiming to organize a new sub-system within the international system, and specifically within the inter-american system. In the decade of the sixties, the inter-relations among latin-american countries are intensified and that leads to an increase of exclusively latin-american meetings, specially on the subject of international trade (e.g. Alta Grecia's meeting, which enables the definition of a joint position that these countries will take at the Conference of Trade and Development organized by the UN in Geneva, 1964). After the recent meeting of American Presidents in Punta del Este (april 1967), it can be affirmed that the latin-american integration movement and the latin-american Presidents' decision of creating a Common Market from 1970 on, recognizes the real existence of two perfectly drawn sub-systems in the inter-american system: Latin-America, which includes all the OAS's member States (excepting USA) taken as a region whose economical, social and political interests can be clearly separated from the other great sub-system's interests, namely USA. The existence of the inter-american system means the recognition that the action to suit the interests of these two great sub-systems is possible and useful.

This fact constitutes a new element within the inter-american system, shown in the very words of the Declaration of American Presidents, where there are compromises taken by the "Presidents of Latin American Republics" and by the "Presidents of the OAS' member States".

Within this context, the Latin American development and integration process "relies essentially upon the self effort of Latin American countries", which receive "the complementary contribution of mutual help and the enlargement of external cooperation" within the "Alliance for Progress impulse" whose multi-lateral character" should be emphasized. "Integration should be fully at Latin-America's service" (from the Punta del Este Declaration).

At the same meeting, Latin-american Presidents decide to promote joint meetings at a ministerial level, of the participating countries in both the regional economic integrating schemes, LAFTA and CACM. Out

of this decision, latin-american Presidents have created a new center for the adoption of main decisions regarding the latin-american economic integration process, and open the way for the organization of gatherings at the highest level (eventually Heads of State) limited exclusively to latin-american countries participating in the integration process. This decision can be considered as one of the most important emerged from the Punta del Este meeting, and the best basis for the organization of the latin-american sub-system within the inter-american system. It is necessary to bear in mind that the Presidents have transferred to this new center of multi-national decision, the responsibility of adopting decisions regarding the type of juridical instrument which will finally enable the creation of the latin-american Common Market.

It is also easy to see, and each time more frequently, that at the regional economic organization's meetings, on either level, a true dialogue takes place, some times, between two speakers, one of which is the USA and the other the block of latin-american countries. Nevertheless it cannot be said that there always is a unitary expression from the latin-american countries, even when the tendency to adopt joint positions which will strengthen the negotiating power is every time more evident in the treatment of certain problems, specially those connected with the organization of international trade and financing's development.

(c) The political role of regional economic organizations as mediators between the principal Power and the rest of the member nations of the inter-american system.

We have affirmed that the inter-american system is characterized by the dominating position of one of the member States in the power relations with the rest of the system's States. The political and economical relations within the system have developed fundamentally between the system's main State, USA, and each of the other States. Those relations have been bilateral even when they were framed within some type of international organization. The conflicts of interests between the system's foremost pole and each of the other member countries have always resolved



on a bilateral basis. The creation of a complex of regional economic organizations has enabled, on one hand, to mediate those conflicts, and on the other, to multi-lateralize them. That is to say, each regional economic organization has, within its own sphere of competence, carried out a function as a frame work for the solution of economic interests' conflicts between the system's main State and the rest of them. Even though the bilateral relations are still alive, and in a great scale, the tendency can be observed to multi-lateralize the great negotiations with the USA in order to obtain new progress in the re-structuring of power relations within the system. A recent example is the already mentioned opposition between the latin-american countries and the USA, in which the first wanted a re-ordering of international trade and new basis for their economic development's financing; these characteristics were noticeable at the latest international negotiations, specially those preceding the Presidents' meeting, and the last IAEcoSoc. conference at Villa del Mar (June 1967).

The regional economic organization's role has been fundamental not only because it has provided a frame work for the mediation and multi-lateralization of conflicts between both the sub-systems acting in the interamerican system, but also because it has provided the technical basis and information over which the latin-american countries' joint position has been worked upon, when it was necessary. As a contrast, it can be noticed that the latin-american countries have continued, in their relations with the other industrialized countries, either on a bilateral level or within world-wide economic organizations where their power of decision is remarkably small. Such is the case of latin-american countries' participation at the GATT, for instance, or the latin-american negotiations before the CEE.

(d) The political role of regional organizations in the national political decision-making process, in the member countries.

This point refers to the regional economic organization's political role with regard to the latin-american countries internal policies, and in the decision-making process of their external policies.

The action of the international organization shows its influence in either an indirect or a direct way.

Directly, through the flow of technical knowledge, ideas and information that, born in study centers or out of the said organizations' decisions, penetrates up to a national level and has influence on the decision-makers of national political actions. Let us take as the clearest example the influence of ECLA's reports on the economical situation of latin-american countries, upon the elaboration of economic plans and decisions of these countries, or the influence of the flow of statistic data processed in that organization upon the same decisions. A direct influence is also put forth by the IDB's decisions regarding the financing of certain countries' socio-economic development projects.

Indirectly, the regional economic organizations can have influence on the technical definition of aspirations and/or socio-political ideologies. The fact that ECLA's thought has been issued apart from determined political ideas has permitted its spreading out over huge sectors of latin-american public opinion and its viewpoints have been adopted by a significant proportion of the political and intellectual new middle class groups, who see in ECLA's studies and plannings the most serious and fundamented approach to Latin-America's development problems.

What is valid in ECLA's case for concepts and ideas regarding industrial development, substitution of imports, deterioration of terms of trade and general modernization of economies, is also valid for the same organization and the IDB regarding regional economic integration as an instrument for the national development of latin-american countries, or in the case of FAO's latin-american regional Bureau regarding land reform. The regional economic organizations have become authors of concepts and ideas, related to the socio-economical development process, which have permitted to define technically socio-political aspirations and/or ideologies in which the political struggle is centered within Latin-America's national political systems.

The stability of the technical and executives staff of these organizations, provides one of the reasons for the regional economic organizations' political influence, for this enables them to accomplish their specific functions. When political and administrative instability characterizes most nations of the region, these organizations constitute an element of stability for rendering the technical services necessary for the good functioning of national administrations and to diagnose the social and economical situation of these countries.

If, as we have seen, the regional economic organizations are the result of a "vacuum of technical knowledge" and a growing inter-dependence of nations, at the same time they produce new "technical voids" and a greater inter-dependence.

They produce a new "technical vacuum" because through their studies and action they make the member countries face new problems and show them a reality that gets more complex every day. Thus they have more competences attributed to these organizations or directly show the need of creating new ones. This dynamic process is noticeable for anyone who studies the regional economic organizations' post war history, and the growing complexity implicit in the economic integration process, and the sub-system's adoption of a joint position in the world's context. Recently, a new organization for the promotion of exports was created, filling the need to coordinate individual efforts on this subject, which are far from being satisfactory.

They produce inter-dependence among nations not only as a result of what we say in the last paragraph, but -and this brings us to the subject of influence over countries' internal policies- as long as it becomes necessary to adopt, within each country, national positions to act in each regional economic organization, which makes it necessary to know the other countries' positions. For this reason several countries are simultaneously analyzing the problems that are going to be debated or studied in the organization. Let us think, for instance, in the preparation of a national position, or a report on the national economic situa-

tion before a IALCoSoc or ICAP meeting, in which the points of view or development national policies' of each member State are confronted. Nowadays in Latin-America, specially as a result of the economic integration process, Governments study or adopt their decisions not only regarding its relations with such and such country -specially USA- but also regarding the national positions of the latin-american sub-system's rest of the members, or at least those who have a preeminent position in it.

To the influence of regional economic organisations on the internal or external politics of each country -which will vary according to the activity of each organization- it must be added the personal influence that the main experts acting in these organizations may have, when coming back to their own countries after acquiring a professional experience that for its very nature not always it is feasible to reach at a national level.

We can affirm after this remark that the regional economic organizations can also become a source of training for national experts, which will enable them to lend skillful services to their own countries' public or private activity.

Observing Latin-America's case, we can find another bond between the regional economic organizations and the internal politics of their member countries. They become, in certain cases, a sort of political shelter for those national experts who find it impossible to act professionally in their own countries due to political reasons. It would be the case of some experts that in the last years have joined certain regional economic organizations as a consequence of the internal political process of their own countries.

The technical leadership of the regional economic organizations in some fields of economic activity, the flow of factual knowledge emerging from those organisations -exerting its direct or indirect influence upon the adoption of national decisions- their role in the technical definition of national socio-political aspirations and/or ideologies, the fact that they provide refuge for exiles, their action as training centers for a na-

tional elite, or as a source of personal prestige for national technicians or leaders, are some of the ways the regional economic organizations have of filling a political role within the national political systems and their power relations. These statements, some of which we have exemplified, could easily be the object of empirical comparison by someone investigating the action of these organizations in Latin-America.

We shall restrain, in this work, to make a case-study that will enable us to better exemplify our statements regarding the political role of regional economic organizations in the re-distribution of power within the inter-american system and the power relations within the region's national political systems.

III. The influence of international economic organizations upon the formulation of Latin-America's integration program.

Meaning to exemplify our previous statements, we shall examine a concrete case of latin-american countries' internal political decision, and that of the lot of them. We refer to the decision of the latin-american Presidents to create a Latin-American Common Market which will be substantially working in 1985, adopted in the OAS Heads of State meeting, which took place in Punta del Este, april 1967. This collective decision of the Latin American Heads of State was undoubtedly the result of national political decisions adopted previous to the meeting.

Punta del Este's political decision, which has in itself all the elements of a huge plan of action to push forward the region's economic integration process, is the result of a long creative process of an integrationist conscience in which all the region's economic organizations actively took part.

Actually, latin-american countries have accepted the need of economic integration as an essential instrument to advance with more speed in the social and economic development process, and to re-affirm their

political position and strengthen their economic relations with a world which tends to organise itself in continental-size blocks. Economic integration constitutes the essential instrument which enables them to join the world's economy and the wider political community of the world's nations.

The introduction of the idea of creating a Latin-American Common Market is the result of ECLA's initial action, and the reflection of the similar process started in Western Europe after the Schumann plan. Motivated at a national level by technicians and politicians, produces the first two integrationist schemes: LAFTA and the CACM.

On the other hand, the strain created between the USA and the latin-american countries, caused by the latter's reaction to post war USA's attitude considering Latin America as a natural and unconditionally, produce a conflicting international context which helps latin-americans to become aware of the common condition of their countries within the international system. The vexations inflicted to Vice-President Nixon in several latin-american Capitals represent an irrational expression of this phenomenon, as much as the Pan-American Operation proposed by Brazil is the translation of Latin-America's rational intent, acting as a human group, to attain a new definition of its relations with the USA.

Under these circumstances, the IDB is created, producing a new context within which team of experts recruited all over the region's countries is going to have the opportunity of exerting influence upon each other and to find due to living together and sharing work and aspirations, a reality that goes beyond their particular national groups. Thus a frame of interaction is created to secure the self definition and progress of the latin-american group, in an Institution whose importance grows rapidly, becoming, after five years of its creation, the main international public source of long term financing of latin-american economic and social investment projects. The fact that the IDB becomes at the same time a Bank for Latin-America's integration, having lent up to date more than a hundred million in credit and technical assistance to finance integrationist projects, constitutes the enlargement of an economical strategy initially

conceived in limited terms, expanding now to all aspects of economy and consolidating in an economic global strategy.

In the running decade, the global economic strategy of integration has progressed enough to express itself through new statements: 1) Latin-America's economic integration is recognized as one of the basic objectives of Alliance for Progress, in the Punta del Este Charter. 2) Latin-american Central Banks start an active cooperation process among each other, which in the case of Central America produces the creation of a clearing House and a Monetary Union, and in the case of LAFTA countries, the creation of a multi-lateral clearing device and mutual credits, in convertible currencies, through bilateral agreements between Bank authorities. 3) In the UN's World Conference on Trade and Development, Latin-America acts as a cohesive group, and, taking a leading position with regard to Asia and Africa's underdeveloped world, fights to obtain more equitable conditions for the trading of their basic commodities and export of manufactured articles. 4) In 1964 the IV Conference of LAFTA's member States adopts a wide global economic integration program, corresponding to the aims of a Common Market, or an economic community. To this purpose, basic economic policy rules are agreed, as well as a program regarding foreign trade, industrial development zonal policies, agricultural and livestock development, financing and monetary matters and coordination of development programs; 5) The CACM advances rapidly towards liberation of inter-regional trade, completed in 1966, and is progressing towards customs union and coordination of its development plans and policies, clearly adopting the aims of an Economic Community. 6) Both in LAFTA and CACM, studies are begun to achieve zonal integrations in the fields of basic industries, and regional under-structures. 7) The Governments of Colombia and Venezuela and Colombia and Ecuador, with IDB's help, start boundary integration programs.

It can be said, then, that during the decade of the sixties, a historical period starts in Latin America, characterized by the existence of an integrationist conscience, and a global strategy at a political, economical and intellectual level, which resembles the synthesis and projection

of a process started during the period of independence on the XIX century. At this stage it is easy to see the need of giving away the purely economical approach to latin-american integration, characteristic of the former stage -the fifties decade- in which ECLA had a decisive influence, and that, as we have seen, gave place to the creation of LAFTA and the CACM. Mr. Raúl Prebisch, whose thought and action had guided and directed a good part of the integrationist current during the preceding stage, as if to show a symbol and testimony of the exhaustion of integration's purely economic approach made a call to Governments in Mexico, 1962, asking them to adopt the political decisions necessary to secure LAFTA's progress. That same year, Mr. Felipe Herrera, IDB's President, made a speech in Bahia, Brazil, on the subject of "economic integration and political re-integration" in which Latin-America is considered as a great destroyed nation, and in which integration appears not only as an economic process, but as a political, social and cultural phenomenon, either for its proceedings or for its objectives. In this speech, famous today, integration emerges not only as an instrument of Latin-America's socio-economic development, but as an instrument that will enable latin-american peoples to build a new factor of creation and balance in today's inter-dependent world, supported by the great economic space of their Common Market and strengthened in their bargaining power with the rest of the world.

Mr. Prebisch's call and the global conception of integration presented in Bahia's speech by Mr. Felipe Herrera -that is, the heads of the two main regional economic organizations- start a forceful movement typical of this stage and which consists of a developing and intensifying dialogue between technicians and politicians in the formulation of the global conscience and strategy of the process of integration.

As an indicator of this dialogue, the Latin-American Parliament's organizers ask for technical advice to international experts at the organizing stage of the new institution. But what almost dramatically remarks the beginning and sense of this communication between technicians and politicians, is the letter from Chile's President, Mr. Eduardo Frei, to Messrs. Raúl Prebisch, Felipe Herrera, and the top executives of ICAP



and ECLA, Carlos Sanz de Santa Maria and José Antonio Mayobre, asking them to present, together, their points of view on the decisions that should be adopted to accelerate the economic integration of latin-american countries. The answer, dated in Mexico, april 1965, constitutes the already famous "Report of the four" addressed to the LAFTA member States.

President Frei's letter, dated January 1965, offers several questions as to the objectives and instruments of Latin-America's integration process. Fundamentally it asks if we can go on, trying to organize the development of our economies in small inclosures, condemning our continent to an increasing damage, without organizing a collective effort among peoples linked by affinity, indissolubly united by geography and culture, having to face other vast communities that multiply their progress precisely due to their unitary spirit. and it adds that every process as important as this one, requires political decisions at the highest level. President Frei addressed the four international experts bearing in mind their experience "in the organization they direct, the personal authority they invest and the knowledge they have shown of our Hemisphere's problems", and adds in his letter that facing the problems he raises, has thought "that a proposition made by impartial people of high technical quality, without national or political implications, would eliminate any difficulty or distrust, and would enable us to examine the problem in a positive and creative way, with the only benefit of the objective we are after and linked to which we see the destiny of our peoples".

Even if the four experts presented their report as a personal matter, the result was due to their experience in regional economic organizations and the contribution of the organizations' experts. The report affirmed that the formation of a great Latin-American Common Market "needs political decisions at the highest level without delay", both to concrete agreements and to attain a high support from the continental's public opinion. The report raised the idea of a Latin-American Common Market which would include all the region's countries, and that would serve as a collective instrument for the Latin-American nations' socio-economic development; would permit their access to the benefits and progress of

modern technology, would make it possible to express their historical personality before the rest of the world and join, as a region, the world's economy and the wider political community of the world's nations. It also raised the necessity of creating institutions powerful enough to reach the goals of the Common Market.

The great debate raised by the report in all Latin-America was the best sign of the fact that basically characterizes this stage: the fact that Latin America's integration process ceased to be a technicians worry exclusively, to become the fundamental subject of the political debate and the international policies of the member states of the interamerican system. With increasing intensity from this date on, the dialogue between the political and technical levels goes on, regarding the contents and meaning of the integration process, and the compatibility between that process and that of Latin-american countries' national development. This dialogue takes place, fundamentally, in the frame of regional economic organizations; it can refer to IDB's credit or technical assistance policies, to the elaboration of ECLA's studies, to the political or technical level ICAP and IAEcoSoc. meetings; it can also take place at the LAFTA organs for the preparation and adoption of decisions, and specially, at the meetings that the Foreign Ministers of the member States had in the latter.

It was at the 1965 IAEcoSoc. meeting that Argentina proposed the Heads of State conference for the Interamerican System's member States, in order to adopt at the highest level, decisions regarding the development and integration process of Latin-America. If we examine the period previous to the meeting, we shall find out that, together with the action of the States, there is a constant influence of the regional economic organizations through their technical reports which helps to a better definition of the contents of the running negotiation.

Foreseeing that his opinion was going to be required for the preparation of the Heads of State Conference, Mr. Felipe Herrera, IDB's President, gathers within this organization and ad-hoc working group which meets in Washington about the middle of 1966 to analyze once again the pro

blems and the perspectives of integration in Latin America's political, economic and social context preceding the Heads of State Conference.

Later, being the institution in charge of preparing the Conference, the OAS required from nine experts to form a committee (5) including representatives of the inter-american system's organizations, and the integration organizations; the elaboration of a report which would serve as a base and guide to the discussions at political level was also required. A comparison between the thesis of this report, and the works of the ad-hoc group gathered by the IDB, shows the influence that the IDB's internal technical report had upon the report of the Advising Committee formed by the nine experts.

The report of the special advisers had, in turn, a double influence: a) it served as one of the basic documents to organize the agenda of the President's meeting, up to a point that a comparison between that agenda and the recommendations contained in the report shows an almost total coincidence. However, due to difficulties in USA's balance of payments, it was not possible to include in the agenda certain subjects relating to the financing of development. b) the report contributed to shape USA's policies regarding Latin-America's economic integration. Since the already mentioned "Report of the four", USA's political point of view was defining itself and stressing in a line of support to the latin-american integration objectives, support that was initially expressed in the Punta del Este Charter that created the Alliance for Progress. That policy was widely discussed at the USA's Congress in September 1965 (6) and the expression of the new

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(5) The nine experts committee included the four international organization Heads responsible for the "Report of the four", besides the following international officials : Mr. Alberto Sola, LAFTA's Executive Secretary, Mr. Carlos Manuel Castillo, Executive Secretary of SIECA, Mr. Gustavo Guerrero, President of the Central American Economic Integration Bank, Mr. Alfonso Rocha, OCAS' General Secretary's Representative, and Mr. José A. Mora, General Secretary of the OAS.

(6) See USA's Congress publication: "Latin American development and Western Hemisphere Trade" - HEARINGS before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relationships of the Joint Economic Committee Congress of the United States - Eighty-Ninth Congress - First session, September 8, 9 and 10, 1965 - Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee.

policy was categorically issued in President Johnson's declaration at the Alliance for Progress 5th. anniversary, declaration which made perfectly clear that Latin-America's economic integration policies were the responsibility of Latin-America's own countries, and that this being well understood, USA provided full support.

When the date of the OAS Foreign Ministers meeting in Buenos Aires was close, in february 1967, to prepare the President's Meeting agenda, USA took for herself many of the ideas expressed in the "Report of the nine" and presented several documents bearing those ideas as an expression of its politics.

The political decision adopted by the Heads of State in Punta del Este is evidently, the result of a previous national decision taken by each of the participating countries, which makes it the formal result of these countries' sovereign will. However, analyzing the meeting's antecedents and specially what happens after the "Report of the four" in 1965, it can be affirmed that the said decision has been influenced by the regional economic organization and the personal action of its principal experts. This influence was exerted fundamentally by the definition of latin-american Countries' international situation, carried out in the studies made by these organizations, which enabled the national experts and politicians to become conscious of these countries' real situation in the international context, and of the need of carrying out in short terms the economic integration as a base for the organization of latin-american nation's subsystem. It was also exerted through the flow of information and technical knowledge which, emerging from those organizations, has penetrated the national media, and permitted to give a technical definition to the integrationist aspiration of vast areas in latin-american countries. It was possible to affirm at the President's meeting that all the technical studies were already made and the only thing missing was the political decision of the different States. And this argument was undoubtedly a strong argument to promote that political decision.

We have then observed in this case study the influence of the regional economic organizations upon the formation of national decisions

concerning the participation of Latin-American Countries in the regional economic integration process. To close this work we must refer now to the statement made at its introduction, meaning that the difference between the external factors generated in other national political systems and those generated in a regional economic organization, the latter can be partially controlled in its origin by the States participating in them.

This control is shown fundamentally in the case of those economic organizations that, due to the type of services rendered, are capable of exerting a direct influence upon the elaboration of the State's economic decisions. It is for instance the case of the Organizations that give technical and financing advice for the preparation and execution of national and multi-national projects of economic and social development. Thus, in the case of the IDB the Member States control the adoption of decisions through their representatives at the Bank's Board of Directors, and in the Governors Assembly meetings. It must be added to this internal control, the indirect one, exerted fundamentally through the analysis of the Bank's action in the confronting regional economic organization meeting, such being the IAEcoSoc.' case.

To this institutional control of the action carried out by a regional economic organization, should be added a sort of self control of the Organizations themselves, meaning that they recognize the existence of a border line to their possibilities of exerting influence upon those in charge of elaborating some national political decisions, and their impossibility to insist on a certain idea when it is openly rejected by the member States. In fact there is permanent dialogue between the regional economic organizations and the national States, which enables the latter to limit the influence of the economic organizations, specially regarding new ideas in the field of national and multi-national economic development.

In recent years, several examples can be found of ideas with high political meaning being rejected, though formulated by regional economic organizations, and of the non-insistence of these organizations to

their respect. The strongest example is related to the case-study we have examined, and it refers to the creation of institutions similar to those existing in the European Economical Community, able to guide Latin-America's integration process.

That proposal is expressed clearly and definitely in the "Report of the four" mentioned previously, and almost simultaneously, in a study prepared by ECLA containing general proposals for the advance of regional integration's process. The creation of this type of institutional devices would implicate attributing concrete competences to common Organs -that, though under control of inter-governmental organs would have a great power of initiative in the formulation of integrationist projects- has been ever since one of the central subjects of the debate on the program of latin-american integration at several meetings, and in a special way, in the LAFTA's Foreign Ministers meetings.

Notwithstanding the fact that the idea was taken and firmly supported by some of the LAFTA's member States, it provoked an increasing resistance in the Association's principal States. Facing this resistance, it was possible to observe at a certain point of the process of preparation of the decisions that would be approved later by the Presidents, that the principal regional economic organizations retreated tactfully in spite of being, up to that moment, the promoters of the idea. This retreat takes place at a moment when the group of advisers belonging to all the regional economic organizations summoned by the OAS, desists from including a chapter about the institutional aspects in the Punta del Este Chart.

In fact, at the President's meeting, no decision was adopted in this respect. Thus, the internal self control of the regional economic organizations worked, in the issuing of ideas capable of altering the power relations within the latin-american sub-system.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

As a preliminary conclusion to these remarks, we may point out that:

- 1) The study of the political role of the economic-type international organizations constitutes a fertile field for the investigation of inter-action between internal and external factors in the Latin-American national political systems, and in the inter-American system to which they belong.
- 2) The importance of the political role of the economic-type international organizations shows that the traditional distinction between a political science studying only national politics and a Science of International Relations analyzing only the "international matter" as such, does not match reality any longer. This indicates that the development of a Political Science and that of a Science of International Relations with real scientific contents, should increasingly pay attention to study areas like the ones sketched in this article.
- 3) We consider that there are some particularly significant fields related to the political role of economic-type international organizations, that should become possible study areas. They are the following:
  - a) United Nation's technical or specialized organizations' role regarding economic matters, such as ECLA and FAO, in the elaboration of such concepts as development, underdevelopment, land reform and structural reforms, and the political implications resulting from the spreading out of these ideas.
  - b) The inter-action between national and international experts and politicians, in the decision-making process of economic integration.
  - c) The impact of socio-economic development's ideology in the process of democratizing the international credit at a regional level (Inter-American Development Bank's case).

- d) The impact caused, by democratizing the credit at a regional level (Inter-American Development Bank's case), in the policies of world-wide credit organizations (World Bank's case).
  
- e) The distinction between economic-type international organizations considered as external factors as to the national political systems, and external factors of other kind.

These studies would enlighten the true nature of economic-type inter-national organizations and would contribute, consequently, to ease the conditions of the dialogue between international economic organizations and their member States.



### SUMMARY

The purpose of this paper is to analyse some aspects of the political role played by regional economic organizations in Latin America, considering their influence on the power relations within the inter-American or international system, and upon the internal politics of the states which they serve. The author states that these organizations generate factors which are external to the national political systems of their member countries, and that these factors may condition their political decisions in the economic and financial fields. But these factors born within a regional economic organization, contrary to other external factors originated in other political systems, can be partially controlled in their origin by the participating states. The author also states that regional economic organizations in Latin America fulfil some functions which enable a group of developing countries to increase their capacity to control the external factors generated in other national political systems, specially when the action of these organizations is directed to promote among them an economic integration process.

A specific analysis is made of the political role of regional economic organizations: a) in the definition of the international situation of Latin-American countries and in the formation of a conscience of a regional reality; b) in the definition of a new sub-system within the international system; c) as mediators between the principal Power and the rest of the member nations of the inter-American system; d) in the national political decision-making process in the member countries.

So as to exemplify his statements, the author examines a concrete case: the influence of regional economic organizations upon the formulation of Latin-America's integration program and, particularly, upon the decision of the Latin-American Presidents to create a Latin-American Common Market, adopted in the OAS Heads of State meeting, which took place in Punta del Este, April 1967.

Finally, among the conclusions, it is pointed out that the political role of regional economic organizations is a fertile field to study interaction between internal and external factors in the Latin-American national political systems and that the importance of such role shows that the traditional distinction between a political science studying only national politics and a science of international relations analyzing only the "international matter" as such, does not match reality any longer.

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## Résumé

Le rapport cherche à analyser certains aspects du rôle politique que jouent en Amérique latine les organisations économiques régionales, en tenant compte de leur influence sur les relations de pouvoir existant dans le système inter-américain ou dans le système international, et sur la vie politique intérieure des états qu'elles servent. Selon l'auteur, ces organisations donnent naissance à des facteurs extérieurs au système politique national des pays membres, et ces facteurs peuvent conditionner leurs décisions politiques dans les domaines économique et financier. Mais ces facteurs, nés dans le cadre d'une organisation économique régionale, et contrairement à d'autres facteurs externes, nés dans d'autres systèmes politiques, peuvent être soumis à leur origine à un contrôle partiel de la part des pays membres. L'auteur ajoute qu'en Amérique latine, les organisations économiques régionales exercent certaines fonctions qui permettent à un groupe de pays en voie de développement d'accroître leur aptitude à maîtriser les facteurs externes engendrés dans d'autres systèmes politiques nationaux, notamment lorsque l'action de ces organisations est orientée de façon à promouvoir un processus d'intégration économique.

L'auteur procède à l'analyse spécifique du rôle politique que jouent les organisations économiques régionales :

- a) dans la définition de la situation internationale des pays d'Amérique latine et dans la prise de conscience de la réalité régionale;
- b) dans la définition d'un nouveau sous-système à l'intérieur du système international;
- c) en tant que médiateurs entre la puissance principale et les autres pays membres du système inter-américain;
- d) dans le processus par lequel chacun des pays membres prend ses décisions politiques.

Pour illustrer ses propos, l'auteur examine un cas concret : l'influence exercée par les organisations économiques régionales sur la formulation du programme d'intégration latino-américain, et plus particulièrement, sur la décision prise par les Présidents des pays d'Amérique latine de créer un Marché Commun latino-américain, à la réunion des Chefs d'Etat des pays membres de l'O.E.A., tenue en avril 1967 à Punta del Este.

En conclusion, l'auteur fait observer notamment que le rôle politique des organisations économiques régionales est un terrain fécond pour l'étude de l'inter-action entre facteurs internes et facteurs externes dans les systèmes politiques nationaux en Amérique latine, et que l'importance de ce rôle montre que la distinction traditionnelle entre une science politique n'étudiant que la vie politique nationale et une science des relations internationales se bornant à analyser la "matière internationale" en tant que telle, ne correspond plus à la réalité.

### Résumé

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"The political role of  
international economic organizations"

ECONOMIC PLANNING AS A POLITICAL PROCESS  
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION  
SEVENTH WORLD CONGRESS  
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# Economic planning as a political process in developing countries

by

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In broad terms, economic planning may be said to have three types of political consequences: those that concern the choice of policies pursued by the government; those that relate to the structure of political institutions; and those that ramify throughout the non-economic segments of society as spillover effects resulting in changes in political pressures and affiliations. In turn, these diverse consequences may be viewed as flowing from (a) the economic philosophies of the planners; (b) the logic of the planning process; and (c) the distinguishing characteristics of the stage of economic development. Elaborate taxonomy would require further sub-divisions corresponding to the form of economic planning in question (indicative or mandatory, medium-term or perspective, centralized or decentralized) and to the origin and destination (national or international) of its effects. Given, however, the heterogeneity of underdeveloped countries and planning processes, such refinements must perforce be omitted in a brief note on the outlines of the problem.

## Objectives and the choice of policies

Economic planning can provide two distinct sets of criteria for choice - efficiency criteria and value criteria. The former belong to the traditional domain of the 'dismal' science and consist of the technical apparatus by which an economist can establish the most efficient means of achieving stated objectives. Value criteria, on the other hand, indicate how the choice should be made between alternative objectives which are both technically and economically practicable. The number of economists who would not accept Senior's view that they "should not add one syllable of advice" to their technical analysis is rapidly dwindling, but as the following observations of two eminent itinerant economic advisers show, economists' views of how influential their prescriptions for value criteria can be still differ widely. The first expresses the rather disingenuous optimism of the planner who would like his matrices to be uncluttered by political or social desiderata:

"Even with present knowledge, a team of economists selected, let us say, by the membership of the Royal Economic Society - and provided with unlimited legal powers - could maintain full employment without inflation; could produce a close approximation to an optimal allocation of resources and a fair approximation to an optimal rate of economic progress; and it could improve the income distribution at the same time" (Benjamin Higgins, What do Economists Know?, 1951, p.28).

The second is marked by a tinge of pessimism that originates in economists' increased interest in recent years in "investment in human capital" - the scale and quality of education (and administration) as a factor of economic growth.

"Last, what is very often overlooked, particularly by those of the Left, is that instruments of policy are also subject to boundary conditions, and that these conditions are rigorous in underdeveloped areas because of weaknesses in administration. To attempt strict import controls, for example, may only increase smuggling or corruption and demoralize the whole public service, reducing its total capacity to administer an economic program. Even if such limits do not hamper particular policies, they may restrict the combinations of policies that can be followed in various fields. Typically, there are two or three really good and selfless top administrators, and a score or so of capable young men, and these cannot be deployed on all fronts at the same time. It may be possible to tighten up income tax collection, or reorganize education, or operate import quotas, or expand public investment, or reform land tenure, or set up a statistical office, or nationalize the railways; one may even be able to do two or three of these things at the same time. But any economic program that implies doing them all simultaneously may prove to be just as unrealistic as one that requires, for example, more imports than can possibly be financed" (Dudley Seers, "Why Visiting Economists Fail", The Journal of Political Economy, August 1962, p.331. This subject is well surveyed in "Administration, frein ou moteur du développement?", Développement et Civilisations, No.29, March 1967).

The root of the divergences between the two is that the former has in mind the bounds of possibility within the 'stable general culture in Western Europe', to borrow Pigou's classic assumption,<sup>1</sup> whereas the latter views the listed policy objectives as part and parcel of the process of structural transformation of the economy as it moves towards the 'take-off' into self-sustaining growth. The question for both is not how the economist can predict and prescribe but rather how he can manipulate power to transform the social and administrative infrastructure in such a way as to ensure the success of his policy instruments. If highly centralized command planning of the Soviet (or Cuban) variety is ruled out as atypical of developing countries, the planner cannot acquire such power directly; he is therefore obliged to try to uncover the preference function (in other terms, the tolerable burden of additional present sacrifice of comfort as a means to future growth) of the government or even of the community at large, if frequent changes of government occur. But how can the latter be done in a developing country, where the absence of monetization in large tracts of the economy, and numerous market imperfections (of information, of mobility, of custom and administration), combine to reduce the usefulness of price-market signals as indicators of allocative efficiency? Moreover, the fact that in two important sectors of public expenditure - health and education - the market provides no price-signals at all from which private and social values can be inferred means that the planner will be tempted to impose his own values.

It is therefore at two discrete stages, at any rate of analysis, that conflict may arise between the economist's and politician's estimates of the political/social prerequisites for and consequences of successful planning. The first occurs at the point where the former's estimates of the economy's growth potential are confronted with the policy aims sought by the latter. In the dialogue of plan formulation with strong and articulate political leadership the planner will be explicitly told which policy objectives have priority. But the desiderata of the two interlocutors may be quite different: the politicians (even in an authoritarian system) have to balance economic objectives against non-economic aims in relation to power and consent; the planner is concerned with maximizing and for him the voter is primarily a producer, a consumer or an investor. Defence, public health and sanitation, prestige investments, income distribution may be accorded equal or greater weight than, say, the creation of import-substituting industries, or irrigation.

Time-horizons may also differ: the naive assumption that economic affluence will flow automatically from national independence (cf. the Congolese experience) can generate great pressure on the government to draw up development plans which will maximize the growth of income in as short a time as possible (cf. Ghana), whereas the planner is, by definition, concerned with creating the conditions for sustained long-term growth. In the typical circumstances of a developing country, where society's preference function is both difficult to ascertain and subject to rapid change, the planner is thrust, willy nilly, into taking decisions whose political consequences may be far-reaching but cannot be known precisely.

The second stage is when the planning agency sets out to articulate in a coherent plan the perhaps changed objectives that have emerged from the first confrontation. Like it or not, the planner will have to try to attach values to such economic variables as labour mobility, or the responsiveness of peasant farmers to financial incentives or co-operative ventures for the estimation of which econometric techniques are still primitive. In short, his economic reasoning will inevitably be conditioned by political assumptions, and his decisions - on the terms on which subsidized agricultural credits are granted, for example - may be pregnant with political consequences. Thus, in his admirable study The Process of Planning (in India), Hanson calls attention to the growing political power of "the substantial peasantry, the men who have done well out of land reform and government assistance to agriculture. These kulaks ..... often dominate the economic and political life of the villages and are likely, at least in the short run, to be the main beneficiaries of the democratic decentralization known as panchayati raj. ... In so far as they establish themselves as local elites, they contribute to the ossification of rural society. In so far as they succeed in resisting efforts to tax them, they hold back the process of capital formation in other sectors of the economy."\*

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\* Professor A.H. Hanson's work (published by the Oxford University Press, 1966) is an invaluable contribution to understanding, in the Indian setting, of the complexities of the subject-matter indicated in the title of this communication. See also G. Rosen, Democracy and Economic Change in India, University of California Press, 1966; and G. Etienne, L'Agriculture indienne, ou l'art du possible, Presses universitaires de France, Paris 1966.



planner, qua economist, is ill-equipped to deal. To the extent that planning is now virtually synonymous with the desire for development (and hence with the condition of underdevelopment), the question is not so much whether such ambiguities flow from any economic policy but rather what new forms they take when the government's redistributive powers are enlarged by planning.

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A crucial choice in the formulation of any national development plan is that of the rate of growth of gross national product or national income. There are many determinants of the feasible rate - the availability of foreign capital, the productivity of investment, the growth of population, etc. - but one of salient importance, and which illustrates the political implications of planning decisions, is the rate of domestic saving. In a developed market economy the capital market will provide a rough guide to society's time-preference between present and future consumption, and the government can assess (at the polling booths, ultimately) the tolerable level of taxation. In a developing country, on the other hand, where per capita income is typically low, the capital-market is imperfect and the degree of sacrifice in raising the domestic savings ratio is correspondingly greater. If, as is common, the economy consists of a traditional sector and modern (export-oriented) sector, the choice of a fiscal policy and rate of taxation which will yield more investment in the short run may stultify long-range aims by discouraging foreign private investment or by reducing incentives to and alienating the sympathies of the domestic private sector.

In sum, the flux of values and preferences which characterizes a developing economy, and the social and administrative reforms which are usually a prerequisite for sustained economic growth (income redistribution, land reform, dissolving of tribal or caste barriers, elimination of corruption, etc.), may reinforce the inherent conflict between the short-term political desiderata of the government and the long-range structural desiderata of the planners. Whether the conflict takes a mild or an acute form will depend in large measure on the urgency of short-term economic problems (a bad harvest, sudden aggravation of inflation, etc.) and on the capacity of the ruling group to thrash out

differences within its ranks, so that the economists have no direct access to the public forum of debate (contrast Cuban and Indian experience in this connection). In the early stages of austerity planning even tight party discipline is unlikely to suffice wholly to smother open debate in which the 'economists' may be identified as a distinct political group, notwithstanding their notorious propensity for shifting political affiliations and sharp divergences of diagnosis and prescription within their own profession. In this respect the industrialization debate in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, and contemporary disputes in China, clearly indicate how the 'spillover' effects of the planning process mentioned at the beginning can work themselves out in authoritarian systems. In its political manifestations, the conflict over desirable and possible options in a developing society is soon liable to become one of advocacy of a "war economy, sui generis" (in Lange's succinct and celebrated description of the Soviet-type economy) and of "democratic planning". What is optimal policy for the one form becomes distinctly sub-optimal for the other.\* Ideally, a democratic system should be able to resolve the conflict by ensuring (a) that adequate information is provided to the electorate on the different degrees and time-schedules of sacrifice and benefit attaching to the main 'options' of the plan; (b) that the political homologue of the national planning agency (e.g. the National Development Council in India) is fully representative of the principal economic interests in the country; and (c) that the preference function of the planners qua economists is explicitly distinguished from their political value judgements. It is difficult to satisfy all these conditions simultaneously. In India, for example, the Third Five-year Plan has been criticized in the following terms: "One effect of the present policy as it affects party controversy as well as plan implementation may be specially emphasized. The published work of the Planning Commission does not provide material about the limited number of alternative choices and their

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\* This point is put very eloquently by Hanson (op.cit., p.256): "In 'democratic planning' there is a conflict between the economic and political optimum. If this conflict were absolute one might as well dispense with democracy as soon as possible, because it would be doomed anyway. If, however, the conflict is less than absolute, it may be feasible to produce a plan which, while economically less than optimum, is sufficiently radical to effect a break-through, and which, while politically less than optimum, can be successfully steered, by a government which has acquired the requisite driving skill, through the shouting and gesticulating crowds of interest groups."

implications. It provides material on the alternative chosen and it is difficult for any outside body or individual to come out with another alternative ... Because real alternative choices are not clearly presented, parties can get away with false battle-cries and the electoral process has not sufficiently served to create public awareness about the implications of the plan choices."<sup>2</sup> The failure of the government or its planning agency to inform the electorate about the scale and timing of the social costs and benefits which the plan is expected to produce may therefore distort the channels of party debate and result in a lack of 'public participation' which can hamper its implementation.<sup>3</sup> But the timing and amount of information released during the plan-building process can be fraught with political consequences which may affect the feasibility of reaching the plan targets, partly by misleading external sources of development capital (e.g. the IBRD) as to the relative strength of competing political tendencies; examining India's Third Plan, Hanson says that "the bandying around of figures encouraged pressure-group politics rather than popular participation" (*op.cit.*, p.178). In short, a too early intermingling of the 'techniques' of planning with the 'politics' of planning. Yet here the temptation is strong to allow Figou's "stable general culture of western Europe" assumption to creep unnoticed into the reasoning. If a strong case can be made out for the provision of ample economic information on the basis of which democratic participation in plan-building can thrive, the fact has to be faced that the very technicality of the issues at stake precludes extensive popular participation. In Senegal, for instance, one envisages with difficulty the prospect of such information penetrating to, or circumventing, the level of the marabouts, who are strategically placed in the political and economic power hierarchy. Similarly, Yugoslavia's mixed experience in recent years with the devolution of many planning decisions to the level of the workers' councils of enterprises indicates the inflationary dangers inherent in a situation where the crucial consumption/investment decision is translated into the choice of higher or lower rates of personal earnings within a short time-span.

#### The planning agency as a political institution

The shortage of indigenous administrative and technical skills in developing countries is a commonplace. A planning agency can either engross too much of

the available expertise in plan formulation at the central level or it can rely on advisers imported from abroad. Both courses have obvious disadvantages. Of the two, the former is the more serious (many foreign-drafted plans soon become dead letters), particularly in large developing countries with a federal system of government. At the stage of plan formulation the preferences of the constituent parts (states, regions) can be transmitted to the planning agency by its political homologue. This is the practice in India, where, however, the states have no direct representation in the planning agency itself. Means must then be found for reconciling the centralizing tendencies of the plan-formulating agency and the centrifugal forces set in train by regions. India is not the only country to have found itself with a constitution whose architects provided for a division of powers between the centre and the states that impedes rather than facilitates planning - simply because the constitution-building took place before the adoption of planning.\* What counts, in the last analysis, is whether the farmer and the factory-manager will produce the amount and composition of goods and services on which the fulfilment of the development strategy of the plan depends. If plan-implementing responsibilities are divided amongst central ministries and regional or local administrations, failures of implementation may lead to an intolerable burden of plan-revision. Constant plan revision in turn can result in a reinforcement of centralizing tendencies (which theoretically imply more errors of plan-formulation) and ultimately in stronger pressures for a one-party system. Here again, the logic of planning may point in a direction - to a regional redistribution of employment and economic activity, of transport facilities, of the pattern of urbanization, of investment via the public sector - which may not reflect the political weights of regional governments and/or parties.

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\* Parallels between the dilemmas, if not between the remedies, are apparent in Khrushchev's unsuccessful decentralization of planning to regional economic councils instead of central ministries, in the 1957-1964 period. When the reformed system failed to live up to expectations it was briefly reinforced by a restructuring of the Party itself into industrial and agricultural branches. Both innovations were immediately discarded by his successors.

Problems of economic interdependencies (several branches may have to be developed simultaneously if economies of scale are to be achieved) and if technical indivisibilities (once a railway, or even a bridge, has been built alternative uses of investment funds are precluded) have greater political significance when there are both 'depressed' areas and a federal structure of government. In such circumstances even the administrative attractiveness of a one-party system may not in itself suffice to outweigh the pressure for decentralization.<sup>4</sup> In short, industrialization may provoke economic and social stresses on a scale which requires either the constant revision of the plan on account of failure of implementation or a recasting of the political framework. Alternatively there can be a combination of both, plan revisions proceeding pari passu with administrative reforms. In that case the price of the dilemma is likely to be increased reliance on foreign borrowing.

#### Regional integration and international commitments

Foreign economic relations are, notoriously, one of the least 'plannable' areas of economic policy. Indeed, at the First Conference on Trade and Development convened by the United Nations in Geneva in 1964, a recurrent charge addressed by the 'Seventy-seven' developing countries to the industrial powers was that "however realistic the plans drawn up by the developing countries may be, their achievement is hindered by the instability of international markets for primary products and by conditions restricting the access of primary commodities and semi-manufactures and manufactures to the markets of the developed countries".<sup>5</sup> Regional economic integration and firm bilateral trade and aid commitments are two means by which attempts are made to reduce the area of external uncertainty, while obtaining the familiar advantages of specialization, economies of scale, greater investment potential, etc. From the point of view of political constraints on planning, however, regional integration can increase the area of uncertainty, in two ways. First, by exposing national producers to increased competition, integration can accelerate the development of capital-intensive techniques in the modern sector of the economy, thus diverting resources from the elimination of unemployment and under-employment in the traditional sector. Second, by transferring the local pressures for development to a regional scale, integration may generate new political pressures for the attribution of 'prestige' industries.

Thus, the political difficulties of plan-formulation are aggravated by the appearance of new 'unknowns' - such as the degree of exposure and its effects - and the obligation to weigh national non-economic aims (independence of foreign policy, defence capacity, etc.) against the economic obligations of regional integration (co-ordination of national plans, constraints on the range of policy instruments, etc.). The work of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) in eastern Europe has provided in recent years interesting examples of the political dilemmas a developing country may then have to face.

### Planning and pressure groups

As soon as planning becomes more than indicative - as it can scarcely fail to do in a developing economy - it leads to a multiplication of controls in the form of licensing (foreign exchange, building), price ceilings for scarce materials, import regulations, etc. To that extent, economic planning has much in common with the regulating apparatus set up in the conditions of a war economy. Enclaves of privilege are the normal accompaniment of regimes of austerity, and pressure groups emerge either in defence of or through resentment at the administrative system in force. Latin America's experience of development planning abounds in examples of economic interests constituting themselves as organized pressure groups with ramifications throughout the party system. A by-product is the reduction in planning efficiency resulting from administrative corruption.

Another consequence of the artificial scarcities deliberately created by planning (for the domestic savings ratio cannot be raised without compressing consumption) is that the planners themselves are exposed to political pressures at the various levels of plan formulation. They may consequently become identified with the cause of a particular party, thus reducing their effectiveness in the provision of impartial information which is essential if planning is to be conducted by an open debate on the value criteria underlying the main options. Alternatively, the planners themselves, either by sharing a common economic philosophy or via the contagion of ideas (cf. the Brussels Commission) may slowly become an unobtrusive pressure group arguing for policies which weak political leadership may be unable to analyse or resist. Government by an aristocracy of economic planners without political responsibility is perhaps less likely than the direct assumption of power by military elites in countries when the logic of rigorous development

planning places too great a strain on democratic processes. To the former, at least, the research and analytical work of the international secretariats provides an antidote, by publicizing the failures and the successes and illuminating the options. There is, unfortunately, no guarantee that their reports will be read.

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NOTES

- 1 Economics of Welfare, Third Edition, 1929, p.21.
- 2 H.P. Paranjape, 'Political and Administrative Problems of Implementing the Indian Plan', Development Plans and Programmes (OECD, Studies in Development, No.1), Paris 1965, p.84.
- 3 In a single-party system analogous problems can be created by inadequacy of information. For long years in the Soviet Union the main option was a high investment ratio, financed by forced saving and directed primarily to heavy industry. When the options began to change in the late 1950s, those who had faithfully implemented the earlier policies were berated as 'metallurgical patriots' because of their continued attachment to an obsolescent option. In a sense, this constitutes a doctrinaire pressure group with a vested interest in conservative principles of plan formulation and implementation.
- 4 The difficulty of reconciling regional (i.e. republican) vested interests with macro-economic efficiency has been a major contributing factor to the series of reforms in Yugoslavia's system of economic management in recent years and was also in the background of the crisis in Party leadership that occurred in 1966.
- 5 Final Act, Preamble, paragraph 22, in Proceedings, Volume I.

Summary

Economic planning has broadly three types of political consequences : on policies, on institutions, and - via spillover effects - on political pressures and affiliations. The problems of developing countries enlarge the field for prescriptive action by economic planners and thrust them into a doubly sensitive political role. Intermediate between political decision-makers and the groups affected by their advice, the planners are at once partisans in the conflict between the short-term political desiderata of government and the long-term structural desiderata of the planners themselves; and vehicles for - or subjects of - pressures transmitted by regional, national or even international formations. Hence, the planning process becomes a political institution sui generis, since its economic effectiveness may readily be in opposition to its political subordination. When there are marked regional disparities in economic development and/or a federal system, the attempt to sterilize the political effects of the planning process may result in misallocation of resources or political strife (examples given). By rendering explicit not only the character of the main policy options but also, via its wider appeal to popular participation, the opportunity cost of "democratic" as opposed to "war economy" development, the planning process can favour the emergence of authoritarian institutions. International economic organizations - as sources of funds, technical assistance, advice or commitments - tend to multiply the non-party pressures to which the planning process is exposed, but can also increase the degree of popular participation in planning.



### Résumé

La planification économique peut avoir trois sortes de conséquences politiques : elle peut affecter l'orientation de la politique, les institutions, et, de façon indirecte, les pressions et les affiliations politiques. Les problèmes des pays en voie de développement élargissent le domaine dans lequel les planificateurs économiques peuvent avoir une action prescriptive et projettent sur eux un rôle politique doublement sensible. Intermédiaires entre les auteurs des décisions politiques et les groupes affectés par leurs conseils, les planificateurs sont à la fois partisans dans le conflit entre les désirs politiques à court terme du gouvernement et leurs propres souhaits structurels à long terme; et véhicules - ou objets - de pressions transmises par les formations régionales, nationales ou même internationales. La planification devient donc une institution politique sui generis, son efficacité économique pouvant facilement être en corrélation négative avec son degré de subordination politique. Lorsqu'il existe de fortes disparités régionales dans le développement économique, et (ou) un système fédéral, les efforts tendant à stériliser les effets politiques de la planification peuvent produire une mauvaise répartition des ressources ou des conflits politiques (le rapport en donne des exemples). En rendant explicite le caractère des principales options politiques, mais aussi, par son recours plus vaste à la participation populaire, le coût possible du développement "démocratique" comparé à celui du développement du type "économie de guerre", la planification peut favoriser l'apparition d'institutions autoritaires. Les organisations économiques internationales, en tant qu'elles sont des sources de fonds, d'assistance technique, de conseils ou d'engagements - tendent à multiplier les pressions non partisans auxquelles est exposée la planification, mais peuvent également accroître le degré de participation populaire à la planification.

"The political role of international  
economic organizations"

THE CREATION OF UNCTAD

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

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## The creation of UNCTAD

by Charles L. Robertson

### - I -

By any set of standards, the first UN Conference on Trade and development (UNCTAD I) was an "event". 2000 delegates from 120 countries and the Vatican met in Geneva for three months in 1964 with the more or less accepted purpose of deliberately re-orienting or re-structuring international trade so that a greater proportion of the gains from trade would go directly to the developing countries, while producing, as the latter put it, "a new international division of labor". At the same time the Conference was either to modify old institutions or create new ones to see to carrying out these tasks.

These purposes were forcefully stated by the nascent Group of 75 Developing Countries in a pre-Conference declaration, spelled out in an important pre-Conference Report by the Secretary-General of the Conference, Raul Prebisch, who thereby cast himself and his Secretariat in the unusual role of spokesman for a large segment of the Conference delegations. Finally, although in many cases grudgingly, it was publicly accepted by other delegations to the Conference.

At the close of UNCTAD I the delegates adopted a lengthy Final Act which, along with an enormous variety of substantive recommendations, also called upon the UN General Assembly to perpetuate the Conference, which would meet every three years, to create a Trade and Development Board to meet twice a year between Conferences, and to equip these two bodies with a Secretariat.

The "meaning" of this event, however, is still far from clear: whether UNCTAD I and its Final Act really represent significant potential change in the existing international

system and its organization and institutions -- whether, in the terms suggested for this panel, there was any real "task expansion". Both participants and onlookers attributed to the event enough interpretations to warn any analyst of the difficulties of understanding the meaning of UNCTAD.

For a majority of the delegations to the Conference and for many onlookers and commentators, it was an historic occasion -- the first real confrontation of North and South, symbolic of the new, fundamental structure of international politics, in which the problems of relations of industrialized rich and agricultural poor had replaced the problem of relations between Western capitalist and Eastern Communist. It was an occasion to redress the injustices perpetrated under colonial regimes, the moment at which the exploiter would pledge to return to the exploited what belonged to him by right. UNCTAD would begin to ~~apply in~~ practice what western political theory had taught since the time of Plato, that no political community could be stable if it contained extremes of rich and poor. And the world, finally, had become a single community.

Within the group who interpreted the event in this way were many who had hoped before the Conference that the occasion could be used to fill the gap created by failure to ratify the Havana Charter fifteen years earlier. The new ITO would take over and bring under one roof the functions that had been scattered around among the GATT and other organizations. It would, however, have a new orientation (the Havana Conference was on Trade and Employment, while this one was on Trade and Development), and like the General Assembly, be run by majority rule. GATT, in particular, was outmoded and inadequate and needed to be replaced. To delegates who felt this way, the Conference was therefore only a first step, and the Final Act's institutional provisions could only be treated as an interim solution.

Other participants saw the Conference quite differently. One French delegate argued that it was not so much a meeting between North and South or rich and poor as one between "dirigistes" and liberals. The world trading system in the past had been created on liberal lines by the capitalist powers. In the 'twenties and 'thirties state-trading had been treated as a peculiar exception. Now it was not only becoming the rule, but because prices and markets were organized domestically, a basic assumption of liberal trade theory with its comparative cost doctrine had come to be false : prices no longer accurately reflected costs. Therefore, at UNCTAD, the dirigiste ideas of the Common Market countries found receptivity among less-developed countries (LDC's) who accepted that rapid development called for a large measure of government planning and who recalled that western industrialization had taken place with tariff protection. The socialist countries, too, as state traders using long-run bilateral agreements, found a friendly reception, even if the volume of trade they could offer the developing countries was relatively small. Only the Anglo-Saxons, adhering to outmoded liberal shibboleths, were really out in the cold, and even they, according to this French diplomat, were beginning to see the light. (1)

One western delegate argued that the real significance of the Conference lay in its demonstration that the usefulness of the majority recommendation as a form of foreign policy pressure and influence in international organizations had come to an end through misunderstanding and misapplication. Since this was the primary pressure that could be used by poorer countries, they had -- in his view -- sustained an important but as yet unappreciated loss. UNCTAD resolutions were of no more value than General Assembly resolutions on, for example, South-West Africa.

To at least some of the western delegates, the Conference was something to get over with as soon as possible, far less

important than the pending Kennedy Round tariff negotiations to be held under GATT auspices. It might be quite true that foreign aid was not increasing in the quantities the LDC's wanted, but making adjustments in the pattern of trade might be even more difficult than increasing trade, since such adjustments often hit at well-organized domestic political interests. One high-level American official expressed the view that UNCTAD I was simply held because the trade-development link was à la mode at the moment. And another remarked that Undersecretary of State George Ball's speech was the only honest opening western one, because he offered nothing. The general feeling of American delegates was that their job was to bring other delegations back down to earth and show them what was politically possible. It was also their feeling, and other western delegates have substantiated it, that several western spokesmen made grand gestures and offers to LDC's secure in the knowledge that the Americans would block them. UNCTAD, therefore, was not, as the developing countries would have it, a move in the direction of the future, but a mere diplomatic and propaganda interlude after which delegates could get back to serious work.

For some of those who viewed UNCTAD I this way, the Conference and the organization would serve a useful purpose if they educated leaders of developing countries to the point of seeing there were no easy solutions and that organizations like GATT were more useful to them than they had realized.

To a few delegations, for whom the direct economic benefits of the Conference would only be skin, UNCTAD I was an opportunity to exercise more influence on the international scene than simple material power factors would have allowed them to do. As leaders within the Group of 75 (later 77) they could carry out a moderating function, plan tactics, and become essential counsellors to the diplomats of new states.

Finally, for some participants who foresaw few direct economic consequences from the Conference or even from subse-

quent work of UNCTAD institutions, both the Conference and the new organs would serve simply to spotlight continually the problem of development as it was affected by trade relations, and so doing, bring some pressure to bear on richer states to take individual, useful, long-run action. By producing some further appreciation of the dimensions of the problems, UNCTAD might make them modify their policies in other international organizations such as the GATT. The indirect effects of UNCTAD might be the most important ones. And among those who interpreted UNCTAD in this way were some who simply felt that it would be useful to have one center where all the activities in the international trade field being carried on by other organizations could be discussed in terms of their effects on economic development. The over-burdened General Assembly's Second Committee and the unrepresentative ECOSOC were not at present effectively performing this function.

Given these varied ways of interpreting the Conference -- both before and after it took place -- is it possible to arrive at a somewhat more valid assessment of its meaning in terms of task expansion in international organization? I have chosen to provide a partial answer by drawing from a larger study in preparation on how UNCTAD came into being. To survive, an organization needs some accepted purpose and broad support from its environment for that purpose; it needs to be able to expand its purpose and create further support if it is to have lasting effect on the environment. In looking at the pressures to call and create UNCTAD and the resistances to it, we can have some better appreciation of whether the original impetus is likely to peter out into futility, or whether the organization is going to have to work hard to gain acceptance of its purpose, or finally, whether it will have to devote organizational energy to creating new purposes to simply justify its existence and the resources devoted to maintaining it.

The 1963 Declaration of the 75 Developing Countries marked the birth of a new and massive caucusing group. In this first concerted act the Group stated that the forthcoming UN Conference must be an historic event, creating a new balance in world affairs. The Declaration is not evidence that this united group of developing countries brought about the Conference, but rather is a culminating point in a much more complex process. The prospect of the Conference brought the unity of the 75, and not vice-versa. The loose coalition that became an organized group emerged out of differing and not always complementary interests; the Conference came from a variety of pressures, the 75 acting together only once the Conference was assured and the preparations virtually completed. (2)

The slow build-up of pressure was complicated by its diffusion through the numerous organizations that play a part in the field of international economic relations and by differences in how to conceptualize the problem of development. In the first ten years of the UN the LDC's (often led by relatively advanced but largely agricultural exporters such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand and by Brazil and India) used the ECOSOC, the General Assembly and the Havana Conference to demand more international action or call for national action on the part of the developed countries. At Havana they introduced, for example, the chapters on commodities and on certain aspects of agricultural trade.

In the UN, technical aid programs got underway in the late 'forties, and the IBRD was asked to turn its attention to development rather than to reconstruction (and to ease its terms). The LDC's launched the ill-fated project of a multilateral capital development fund (SUNFED), to which the principal potential contributors would not subscribe (but to which



the newer developing countries have turned again and again), they pressed for commodity studies and agreements concluded under the auspices of the Interim Coordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements and the FAO; they created the Commission for International Commodity Trade under ECOSOC, which western states refused to join until its terms of reference were changed in 1958 (and the US changed its Secretary of the Treasury who adamantly opposed all commodity agreements). They launched the regional economic commissions, and in ECLA, under the leadership of Raul Prebisch, the Latin American states began to formulate a doctrine for development at considerable variance to what was widely accepted in the North.

Yearly discussions in the ECOSOC of the annual World Economic Survey gave the LDC's the chance to advance their views and they could repeat them in the General Assembly Second Committee. With support from the Communist countries after 1954, they obtained study after study from the Department of Economic and Social Affairs oriented to discussion and documentation of their problems, and the World Economic Surveys (particularly the 1955 one devoted to the whole first postwar decade) gave support to what became the framework for all discussion : in the decade since the end of the war, the western market economies continued to make a fluctuating, unforeseen, but definite progress; the socialist states seemed to do the same. But the less-developed countries, despite technical and capital aid, failed to share substantially enough in the gains in trade and economic development. The early view that stability in industrial nations would ensure stability in commodity markets had been shown to be false; expansion in the North did not seem to bring expansion in the South. There was something wrong with classical trade theory. (In fact, several countries in the South began to achieve relatively high growth rates. But a good part of the gain was swallowed

up by the newly-documented population growth, and the countries that achieved these growth rates continually faced balance of payments difficulties that forced them to curtail desired imports).

Obviously, only a few countries took part in pushing for the early moves to make the UN system more responsive to the desires of the LDC's. But by the mid-'fifties, as the two superpowers entered into the phase of "competitive co-existence" and mass admissions to the UN began, the clientele and potential leadership for such moves grew. The Asian-African caucus began to operate at the Tenth General Assembly, after Bandung, and the African caucus at the 1958 Thirteenth General Assembly after the Accra Conference of Independent African States. Conscious of these new groups, having its own economic grievances which it felt it could combine with those of the LDC's, the Soviet Union began a series of appeals for moves in the international trade field in 1954, when it introduced a resolution on the expansion of international trade and called for a world meeting of trade experts. It followed this in 1955 with an appeal for ratification of the Havana Charter, and from then on in each year one or another of the socialist bloc countries called for some such meeting, usually with an appeal for special attention to the needs of the developing countries. Meanwhile -- and partly as a result of the Soviet Union's tactics -- a series of reports on trade and trade mechanisms and principles for international trade began to emerge from the Secretariat in response to ECOSOC and General Assembly resolutions. Such resolutions and reports cost little and did not affect the workings of existing institutions in any way undesirable to their chief supporters, the western countries. Yet they focused attention more and more on the trade-development link, on the instability of receipts from commodity exports, the lack of growth of export industries in the less-developed countries,

the consequent balance of payments difficulties as they launched into development programs that also soon underlined the limits of import-saving substitution.

And slowly, in the late 1950's, the conditions for developing a unified viewpoint on the trade-development link and creating a coalition of caucusing groups on the issue emerged. In 1958 the President of the IBRD underlined the growing debt burden of numerous LDC's, and the fact that increases in their exports went only to repay earlier loans. In 1958 came the GATT "Haberler Report". By this time statistics accumulated purporting to show a long-run decline in the terms of trade of most developing countries. In the face of all these developments, the western countries made a number of accommodating moves throughout the UN system: the IDA and IFC were created partly as sops to the continuing demand for a multilateral capital development fund. The CICT was reorganized, the IMF began to study a compensatory finance scheme for countries in balance of payments difficulties. Under growing criticism of the unrepresentative nature of ECOSOC (whose expansion was blocked by the Soviet Union until such time as the People's Republic of China was seated), the regional economic commissions were given more autonomy, while in an effort to reanimate ECOSOC the 1960 meetings were held at the ministerial level.

Thus, as the new caucusing groups began to exert the influence that made the UN turn more and more to matters of decolonization and development, they received concessions in the aid and trade field that might or might not have some value for some of them individually, or for different groups of them. Substantively, they continued to receive more from individual aid programs of developed states. (On matters of this kind the LDC's used the UN to prod the rich, obtaining in 1960 General Assembly Resolution 1522 (XV) calling on the developed states to donate economic aid equal to one percent of the total of their gross incomes).

The linking of trade to development within the UN context was stimulated by a series of political factors.<sup>(3)</sup> The most important was certainly creation of the EEC and association of the Francophone African states. Latin American states reacted strongly and Brazil -- especially when its government began to move sharply to the left -- became a leader in the move for new trade actions. Here they found an ally in the US. Under the impact of Castro's rise in Cuba, the United States launched the Alliance for Progress and adopted many of the ideas developed within ECLA under Prebisch's guidance. While a desire to claim the benefits promised under the Alliance made Latin American countries cautious in affronting matters on which there was a strong US position, American officials had become genuinely worried about the Common Market's effect on their own exports as well as on traditional Latin American ones, so that both parties had reason to look to new moves in the trade field. In Africa, countries not associated with the Common Market feared both exclusion of their exports from the EEC area as well as the political difficulties association might make for African regionalism. To those concerned with "neo-colonialism" association was merely one more sophisticated form. In the years following 1960, when England prepared to apply for Common Market membership, Commonwealth countries that had long enjoyed preferential entry into the English market began to worry that this might be denied to them. There were therefore a series of groups, of countries with economic or political interest in discussing new trading arrangements.

This, then, was the background : Russian prodding, the entry of new states and creation of new caucusing groups, reports on trade and trade institutions, palliative moves in existing organizations, regional developments in Europe. Added to this was the view espoused by UN officials themselves.

Discussion at the 16th General Assembly in the fall of 1961 centered on trade and development. Philippe de Seynes, undersecretary for Economic and Social Affairs, opening the debate in the Second Committee, declared "not for a long time has the situation been so fluid nor the atmosphere so favorable to innovation". But he noted that most developments had taken place outside the UN. It should not be content with a residual competence. It must define a specific and effective role. Current developments, "characterized by the proliferation of multilateral undertakings of limited scope, made a systematic study of the overall perspective more essential than ever".

In the debate itself two resolutions were introduced, both on the importance of trade to development, both asking developed states to follow appropriate policies to help the less-developed, and suggesting that international meetings should be held to see what more could be done in the field of commodity exports. One came from the Latin American group, the other from the Africans and Indonesia, which had agreed to become co-sponsor if the resolution also asked the UN Secretary-General to prepare a provisional agenda for an international conference on world trade problems after consultations with governments of member states and with the assistance of a preparatory committee. The African resolution was withdrawn in favor of the Latin one, entitled "International trade as the primary instrument for economic development".

Every provision proved contentious. (For example, a phrase about developed countries' "recognizing their ... inescapable duty ... to accelerate..." development of the LDC's had to be changed to "reaffirming the recognized obligation ... to cooperate in accelerating ..." before the resolution could even be discussed. When it came to differences between developing countries, the term "efficient" used to describe producers raised serious difficulties. There were arguments between

those that used surpluses and those whose sales or prices might be hurt by them). The pattern that would govern debate much of the time over the next two years established itself here : the EEC countries insisted on toning down all references to deleterious effects regional groupings might have. The socialist countries, while approving the initiative -- particularly the demand for a trade conference -- deplored the fact that it failed to lay stress on the value of long-term bilateral trades, on the responsibilities of monopoly capitalism with its cyclical variations for the state of the LDC's trade, and the need for an ITO. (To these, after Khrushchev's speech to the 1961 General Assembly calling for total disarmament, there was always added that a key item for a conference must be the economic benefits which total disarmament would have for the poor countries).

The United States and Great Britain laid stress on the useful changes and new programs underway in old agencies, and pressed the Soviet bloc to accept undertakings equivalent in nature to those being asked of the capitalist countries.<sup>(4)</sup> They and other western countries argued that a general conference would have only the same kind of general results to be expected from the General Assembly Second Committee. They felt that suggestions for an agenda prejudged the issue of whether or not to have a conference.

The variations to be found among the LDC's up to this point continued : Latin Americans, with the notable exception of Brazil, were divided and lukewarm toward the idea of a conference; the Asians and Africans were by and large in favour of one.

Finally, the role of Yugoslavia should be mentioned individually. Marshal Tito, Prime Minister Nehru and President Nasser had exercised an informal leadership of the nascent third world. Belgrade and Cairo both held conferences calling for an international trade conference. At the UN in New York

and at the Preparatory Committee Yugoslav representatives were tireless. They played an undogmatic, mediating role, endlessly proposing acceptable formulas and compromises. Both in these early debates and the later ones it is hard to see how deadlock would have been avoided without the frequent Yugoslav interventions.

In the course of the debate Tunisia added an amendment requesting that the Secretary General canvass states to see whether a trade conference would be desirable and if so what items should be on the agenda. All the African and Asian states voted for it, all the Latin American and developed countries opposed it (apart from ten wide-spread abstentions). Once the amendment was accepted (45-36-10), the vote on the resolution as a whole was 81-0-11. The developed abstained : Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, Spain, UK, US, Belgium and France. When the resolution reached the plenary, the developed countries' opposition made itself felt. Without cooperation on their part, the proposed conference would obviously come to nothing. The LDC's therefore accepted separation of the two parts of the amendment -- i.e., the consultation, and the preparation of a list of possible items for an agenda. In this way the resolution presumably no longer "prejudged" the issue of whether there would be a Conference. Since the Secretary General would report in a year, any possible conference was deferred for that time, at which point the issue could again be discussed.

In closing the Second Committee debate de Seynes again clarified a Secretariat point of view that "the system of concepts and institutions which had served as a framework for the development and liberalization of trade was no longer entirely adapted to the present situation... The more consultations, discussions and negotiations developed within limited groupings, the more necessary it was that the same process should be

"intensified simultaneously within the only universal organization," whose aims were "the general liberalization of trade in favour of the underdeveloped countries". He foresaw an increased role for ECOSOC, but more, "a center within the Department of Economic and Social Affairs which could serve as a clearing house for all the activities being carried on elsewhere... There was every indication of a real need for a mechanism of that kind and for serious consideration being given to its creation".

The 1961 General Assembly was also the one to which came the heads of state. In the midst of a speech that touched on many subjects, President Kennedy spoke of a UN Development Decade. The idea, taken up and amplified within the Assembly, resulted in Resolution 1710 (XV) which, with an assist from within the Secretariat, then led to the now well-known 5 % annual growth rate figure for the developing countries, upon which the calculation of the famous "trade gap" then was based.

In 1962 the ECOSOC discussed the results of the Secretary General's survey. Several delegates had come straight from the Cairo Conference on Problems of Economic Development, attended by representatives of thirty-six states, whose final communiqué, among other mildly-stated recommendations, expressed the need for a world economic conference. The ECOSOC faced the expected results of the Secretary-General's survey. Asian and African states were in favour of the conference. Western and other developed countries were by and large against it. The socialist countries wanted it. The Latin Americans that answered were divided. As a result the ECOSOC voted for the Conference and the General Assembly sustained and amplified the decision (ECOSOC Resolution 917 (XXXIV) and G.A. Resolution 1785 (XVII)). The key to this was the American change of position. American Ambassador Adlai Stevenson strongly supported accepting the LDC demand, and convinced his government that continued opposition would be construed as simple negativism, would play into Russian hands, embitter developing countries, and in general be fruitless. (One LDC leader later



said "they were lining up support among less-developed countries "against the EEC for the Kennedy Round". The sequence of events hardly supports this interpretation. It was, rather, a matter of a general attitude).

By 1962, at the UN in New York, the American delegation appears to have come out of the isolation from other delegations that tended to characterize it during the 1950's. On this issue, however, other western delegations charge that the decision to accept the conference was made without consultation, and EEC delegations were displeased. Said one, "It was inevitable that "once a conference was accepted, little could be accomplished "at it, and another set of (useless) organizations would there- "fore have to be created". Yet once the US switched, other western and Latin American delegations had to follow suit, and UNCTAD was assured.

One incident reveals the uncoordinated and hesitant nature of western policy in the circumstances of the moment. At the same session of the ECOSOC that considered the Secretary-General's report and the resulting resolution on holding a conference, the US introduced a resolution asking the Secretary-General to name a Group of Experts charged with surveying the activities of existing organizations in the international trade field, to describe any overlapping, to see what lacunae existed, and to make recommendations for any desirable institutional change. The proposal represented an effort to delay further the possible creation of any new organization, and it was bitterly attacked as such. Temporarily shunted aside until the resolution for a conference was accepted, the Group of Experts idea then came back under discussion and the LDC's, supported by the Soviet Union, asked the Americans of what use it could be now. The latter answered that it had been introduced independently of the other and should still be accepted on its merits. It could produce useful material for Conference consideration.

This tactical, face-saving retreat did indeed produce meetings of a group who in turn delivered one of the most important Conference documents, which served as the basis for all further discussion institutional change and in which the basic UNCTAD idea was first set forth as one of four alternatives. (The others were for a new, all-embracing ITO, reinvigoration of existing organs, and a complete revision of GATT).

I will not try to summarize any of the further debates in the ECOSOC and General Assembly. For purposes of revealing the group pressures within the organizational context of the UN that finally led to UNCTAD in its present form, however, several points should be noted.

In the first place, the general reluctance of western states to be bothered with a conference forced the LDC's to temper demands that would be unacceptable to the major trading states. Newer African and Asian states pressed for more while older developing countries like Yugoslavia and India worked for compromises. The negotiations for British entry into the EEC and the start of the Kennedy Round played a major part in the timing of the Conference : the LDC's wanted it to be held before these negotiations created new politico-economic patterns, while the developed insisted that a conference, to be of any use, must be well prepared beforehand. (Collision with schedules of other major yearly meetings -- of ECOSOC, the General Assembly, the ILO, the WHO, etc -- places a frequently unrealized limit on flexibility in matters of timing, and strains the limited resources of smaller countries). The battle on timing was bitter; finally the western powers made it clear that they would refuse to come to a conference before 1964. French veto of British entry into the EEC (which also reduced the Kennedy Round's potential effect on LDC exports and therefore affected western strategy for the conference) diminished the importance of the matter of timing, on which most of the LDC's had agreed.

All through the debates the Russians and their bloc tried to put their familiar items on the agenda : trade discrimination, creation of an ITO, the uses of money saved by total disarmament. Time and again, LDC leaders blocked these, proposing instead ambiguous wording that they insisted would allow discussion of what interested the Russians. They had several motives : they wanted to be sure the west would participate, since it was to the west that most of the demands would be addressed; they did not want sterile Cold War debates; they could afford to block Russian demands, certain that the Russian would not now back out of a conference of such obvious importance to the developing countries. On this, the LDC's acted with near unanimity.

Spokesmen for Indonesia, Iraq and Pakistan emphasized another theme : for ten years there had been UN resolutions in the trade field with no concrete accomplishments; the UN had avoided trade. Now not only must it assume a central role, but, as the Indonesian delegate put it, the principle of one-state-one-vote must not be abridged when dealing with trade matters. (Significantly, one of the leaders of an older more advanced state still classed as less-developed said, at the time of the first statement of the Group of 75, "75 is too many ! They think that votes equal power!"). One after another the LDC spokesmen asked that the Conference create a capital development fund -- a manifest impossibility; one after another they attacked the EEC (while an occasional associated state defended it); one after another of the newest ones argued that the riches of the rich came from exploitation of the poor. The task of the Conference was therefore not to promote aid or aid disguised as trade, but to rectify an injustice of too long standing.

Launched and defended for tactical purposes as a commodity conference, by the fall of 1962 everyone accepted that it would inevitably have to consider virtually all fields of trade and finance. The debate in the General Assembly centered on a 28-power text whose sponsors were mainly Asian and Africa, but the spokesman was again Yugoslavia.

Deferring to the west, no resolution or agenda item ever mentioned creation of new institutions.

In 1963 the Preparatory Committee and the Group of Experts prepared the agenda for the Conference, and with the Secretariat, supervised preparation and gathering of the necessary documentation. The LDC's twice enlarged the Preparatory Committee, the first time simply to increase their overall representation, the second time to increase the number of Asian states. By mid-1963 it was clear that this was truly to be the LDC's Conference, but also that it was to be unwieldy and free-swinging. The list of agenda topics and proposals lengthened as LDC's at different stages of development and with different trade interests pressed their demands -- still individually. For example, Egypt still spoke of a reorganized CICT as the new trade organization. Some felt that the agenda had become a mere grab-bag. Others have argued that each item in the list represented a possible benefit to a different class of LDC. The naming of Raul Prebisch as Secretary-General of the Conference from among other possible candidates ensured that the Secretariat would have a particular point of view -- and that de Seynes' ideas of strengthening the Economic and Social Affairs Division of the Secretariat in New York would be passed over.

The plethora of indigestible documentation prepared for the Conference did ensure that Mr. Prebisch would play a pre-eminent role; his Report to the Conference summarized the LDC demands scattered through the other papers, with an emphasis, some charged, on measures that would help the more

advanced countries. And his document did become the center for discussion. His advocacy of an UNCTAD-type compromise to the thorny institutional issue helped to make it the most acceptable possibility. But even as late as the end of the Conference, people viewed it in quite different ways : some saw it as an interim step before the lengthy negotiations necessary for creation of an ITO, while others hoped it would be an innocuous solution which would leave untouched existing institutions and arrangements. (A reading of the Final Act will show that the wording on institutions did in fact remain vague. Nothing else would have been acceptable).

The groups of less-developed countries meeting in regional commissions and under their auspices also showed less than complete agreement among LDC's in the period before the Conference. Within the ECOSOC, General Assembly and Preparatory Committee, where elder statesmen could temper matters, there was no mention of an ITO in any LDC resolution or in the adopted agenda. But once off in Africa and Latin America (where the Brazilian government exercised the strongest influence, pouring out a stream of suggestions and studies), the differences came to the fore. The ECAFE resolution did not call for an ITO. But the African and Latin American ones, prepared at Niamey and Alta Gracia, did. According to at least one LDC spokesman, western opposition to any mention of new institutions provoked these statements.

The third meeting of the Preparatory Committee, concerned presumably with administrative arrangements for the Conference, established the composition of the Bureau. By this time -- and previous arrangements at the UN had done much to lead to this -- organizational arrangements and geographical and caucusing arrangements had become completely intertwined. To belong to the Bureau a country had to belong to a group, a complicated and specific formula having been worked out, so that groups formed at the UN were further solidified for the Conference.

The first sign of the Group of 75 came with its Declaration at the 18th General Assembly in the Fall of 1963. The forthcoming Conference had brought it into being. Western countries already met on economic questions at the OECD in Paris, but they, too, responded to the prospect of the Conference by organizing a working party to suggest common positions on agenda matters. Both groups operated in a relatively informal way. The western group, with a chairman, met twice and produced a broad report, but met only infrequently during the Conference (the EEC members, however, met almost every day). Within the 75, leaders emerged without being elected. A measure of discipline was accepted that impressed everyone. But tactics and strategy were not always discussed in detail, if only because of the size of the group and because so many different interests were frequently involved. (Thus, on the question of compromise on institutions at the end of the Conference, it appears that a large group within the 75 had thought the resolution voted was to be adhered to, while the negotiating leaders had considered it to be merely a negotiating position. When they returned to the Group with their compromise, they were bitterly accused of a sell-out, and it took hours to pacify the "extremists"). The main thing that appears to have held together a group that, for example, devoted much time to the idea of preferences for manufactured goods that could benefit only a few of them directly was not just mutual support for different demands but rather a common conceptual framework. To this, as spelled out by Mr. Prebisch, there was unquestioned adherence. There was the trade gap, deterioration in the terms of trade, the need for a new division of labor, and so on. And while, in fact, economists from the advanced countries (and analysts within the Secretariat itself) question the validity of these as a conceptual framework on which to hang policy and organization, it could not be brought into question at the Conference.

In turning to a brief commentary on the responses of the major trading powers to the demands for the Conference and then to creation of new institutions, only a few points should be added to what has already been said.

In the first place, all were sceptical, on the basis that if the will to act existed, it could already be exercised in existing institutions. If these did not produce suitable action, new ones would not either. In discussions on strategy for the Conference held by the OECD working group, the western countries constantly referred to work already being done or to the necessity to fit new action into the already proven framework of existing institutions.

In the second place, the fact that a conference was long championed by the Soviet Union for its own purposes automatically rendered the exercise suspect to the west. Only when the LDC's made it clear that they would keep the agenda free of the Soviet Union's major preoccupations did the Conference become acceptable to the west, and even the face-saving formulas of first, a commodity conference, then of lengthy work by a Preparatory Committee, then of particular wording of parts of the agenda dealing with the effects of regional groups, of the possibility of institutional change, etc... had to be accepted. When, in the Preparatory Committee, the meaning of the "Final Act" and its legal force came to be discussed (that such a discussion took place in the third meeting is itself an interesting indication of how little agreement still existed on the purpose and nature of the impending Conference) the westerners made sure that their position was clear : the Final Act would be merely a set of recommendations. Moreover, they repeated that the Conference could not alter GATT; because it was a legal agreement between Contracting Parties, only the Contracting Parties could alter it.

By the time of the Report of the Group of Experts in mid-1963, it seemed fairly certain that some form of organization would emerge from the Conference, more or less universal in membership. Voting within it was still open to question (and proved to be an almost fatal bone of contention at the Conference). But whatever else would be true of the organization, it would have power simply to discuss, study, and recommend. It could not, like GATT, involve a set of legal obligations and sanctions; all western countries felt that the accommodation of different trading systems side by side within one organization was impossible. GATT had been stretched to accommodate a few state-traders. But that was it.

The western powers were constantly on the defensive. They delayed, defended other institutions, hastened changes within them, opposed the possible duplication of activities that might result from new institutions, the possible hampering of work within existing ones, the diversion of effort. They took a fairly thorough beating on the occasions that they tried to say that LDC's should be more concerned with domestic policies: every LDC statement was prefaced with a declaration of its intention to continue to make every effort domestically but that what was needed now was the proper international environment, which only the western countries could provide.

In fact, a chief concern of western planners was to see that their countries not be blamed if the Conference failed -- and they were sure the Conference could not live up to advance billing the way it was shaping up. Thus, in spite of their coordination meetings at the OECD in Paris, each of the major western states spent time defending its own particular brand of international action: the US, foreign aid and the possible benefits of multilateral tariff reduction without full reciprocity; the UK, easier access generally, but with generalization of Commonwealth preferences: The French sponsored market organization and selective preferences and defended the import record of the EEC.



The latter two submitted proposals to the Conference. But in contrast to many of the papers from underdeveloped countries, regional organizations, private meetings and from the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, they were merely brief suggestions. The United States contributed none. And at both the Preparatory Committee and the Conference, many LDC representatives were angered; they had asked countries to submit proposals, and the very ones that should have done so did not.

- III -

In a paper already too long and filled with incident, I have not dwelt on the Conference itself. The substantive results were meager, the new organs diffuse in purpose and loaded down with studies to be made. Little was said about their relation to existing institutions; the chief exceptions were that UNCTAD incorporated ICCICA and the CICT and that a compromise was reached on its relationship to ECOSOC and the General Assembly. It reported to the latter through the former and it shared --but did not preempt -- their Charter-assigned tasks of coordination in the international economic field.

This account, I think, gives some indication that despite Mr. Prebisch's ability in providing synthesis and in publicizing key phrases that seem to indicate a shared purpose, there was not, at any point, a really clear applicable purpose animating the process. The phrases "trade gap", "new international division of labor" and so on, covered instead the widely divergent interests in obtaining some palliative action in one domain, a little readjustment in another, more aid -- and hopefully, but only hopefully, big results. It is significant that the western representatives fought bitterly against the phrase "a new trade policy for development", and wanted instead reference to "new policies". The wide variety of views cited at

the beginning of this paper are not just different views of a situation whose central meaning can more clearly be discerned in terms of international change. If any central meaning is to be culled from the events referred to in this paper, it is that UNCTAD had no specific purpose and task at its outset; it is still in search of a role.

This is not unique to UNCTAD as an international organization. But it seems to be an extreme case. Too many people and groups wanted too many different things. The most likely role -- that of serving as a coordinating center for the discussion of trade activities in other agencies insofar as they affect development -- is still shared out with ECOSOC and the General Assembly. If, to many participants, UNCTAD I was to be the event that would precipitate a transformation of the international economic system, to too many others it was not -- and therefore, it could not be.

What remains is that UNCTAD may take its place alongside other agencies to perform several useful functions -- which is hardly what spokesmen for the 75 had hoped for at first. It may seek to expand its role over time. If one looks at the original tactics that produced the Conference, the step-by-step means used to overcome western opposition, then perhaps UNCTAD as it stands can be seen as a first and halting step in a larger process, and those who accept it as an interim step before the next big one -- who view it as an organization that will lead to creation of a more comprehensive one -- may have their way. But for any foreseeable future, the evidence is against this. It is more likely to remain one limited agency among others in the same field. Although it may have an important role it is unlikely to have a preeminent one.

Notes

1. Guy de Lacharrière, "A propos de la Conférence des Nations Unies sur le commerce et le développement", Tiers Monde, Vol. 5, n° 20 (Oct.-Déc. 1964).
  2. Seasoned diplomats find much to speculate about on the effects of negotiations between large organized groups. It has been suggested that where two large groups first work out a position among their members and then negotiate, the results may differ considerably from what would happen if two major powers negotiate and seek support, modifying their compromises as they do so.
  3. Many western economists differ sharply with the analysis that came to underlie UN trade-development discussions. A perusal of Department of State Bulletin reports of US officials' speeches on the subject reveals emphasis, for example, on the idea that only when an extensive home market has given opportunity for economies of scale can an industry expect export.
  4. The UK actually prepared and presented a document listing actions equivalent to the GATT Plan of Action; it was purely for polemic and propaganda purposes.
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"The political role of international  
economic organizations"

THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE :  
PRESSURES AND STRATEGIES FOR TASK EXPANSION

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SEVENTH WORLD CONGRESS  
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The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade :  
Pressures and Strategies for Task Expansion<sup>o</sup>

Gerard Curzon<sup>oo</sup>

Whatever the cynics may say, an international organisation cannot exist for any length of time without a purpose. But an international organisation may start out with one purpose and end up with another. This is the extreme case. More frequently one finds international organisations adding a number of sub-purposes to their quiver with the passage of time. Rather less frequently does one see international organisations openly abandoning an original objective; quiet relegation to a dusty shelf is the preferred method.

"Task expansion" is here taken to mean the addition of a sub-purpose to an international organisation's central objective.

The pressure for task expansion may originate from within an organisation as a technical consequence of its normal work, or it may arise from new demands of its members, particularly when the composition of membership has changed substantially over a period of time, or again it may originate in the discovery of gaps in fields suggesting action at an international level.

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<sup>o</sup> - This study is part of a double paper : Mr. C.L. Robertson discusses similar issues which arise in the work of UNCTAD. The two authors have abstained from making a synthesis, preferring it to emerge from a discussion of the two contributions.

<sup>oo</sup> - The author of this paper is an economist, and approaches this political science subject with a great deal of trepidation. His only excuse for having accepted this task is his knowledge of a number of facts concerning the G.A.T.T. arising from previous research. He hopes that these facts will stand by themselves and serve as points of discussion.

The purpose of this paper is twofold. It will analyse some attempts at task expansion within G.A.T.T., and in the light of this analysis, will hope to show that such task expansion (or task contraction) as occurs is generally the result of economic or technical, but not political, considerations. It will be shown that when a technical problem assumes a political dimension exceeding G.A.T.T.'s terms of reference, the political discussions will take place in another forum. When this occurs it can be assumed that disagreement on how to proceed is rife. But in order to present a balanced picture, a final section will be devoted to the one area where task expansion in G.A.T.T. has resulted from power political influences : the problem of trade with the Eastern block.

Before proceeding further some myth-destroying has to be done. It has often been said that G.A.T.T. is a rich man's club, implying that it is exclusive and politically biased in favour of its wealthier members. G.A.T.T. was set up to reduce tariffs and eliminate discrimination in international commerce. As such, its purpose is very limited and technically precise. Any country which wishes to benefit from the rights of membership need but assume the required obligations inherent in the Agreement. G.A.T.T. is simply a Traders' Club, of little interest to non-traders.

Many poor countries are traders and there are definitely some rich countries which are not. But there is a high degree of correlation between rich countries and trading countries because world production and world income are largely created by the rich countries. It stands to reason that the countries producing the major part of the world's wealth should also be the countries causing the major part of the world's trade. But it cannot be over-emphasized that it is as traders, both rich and poor, that these countries formulate world trade policy, and not as "rich men".

Attempted task expansion : commodity control

Certain primary products and commodities present a knotty problem to international trade. For various reasons they are subject to wide price fluctuations. In such cases it is considered inappropriate to apply free trading principles to their international exchange, as it may cause undue disturbances and hardship. In fact, Article XX, paragraph h. of the General Agreement specifically lays down that one of the exceptions to the Agreement is : "any intergovernmental commodity agreement" which is not specifically disapproved by the Contracting Parties. This means that primary producing countries can, if they so desire, devise commodity agreements with a view to stabilizing price fluctuations and foreign exchange earnings, and G.A.T.T. will limit itself to examining the result. But unfortunately commodity agreements very rarely work because they require an immense amount of self-discipline on the part of producers, who must limit production in order to keep prices up, as well as close co-operation between often many producing countries' governments - a difficult objective to achieve.

G.A.T.T.'s indifference to the problem of commodity trade has come in for criticism because it is widely believed that primary producing countries are preponderantly poor countries and that as a result, the exclusion of trade in commodities is a way of excluding poor countries' trade from world trade arrangements. In fact not all primary producing countries are poor (about fifty per cent of the world's trade in commodities originates in the rich countries) and not all poor countries' exports consist of primary products subject to violent price fluctuations.

But it is instructive to reconstruct the original exclusion of commodities from G.A.T.T. rules, and to recapitulate subsequent attempts to re-introduce them, because one of the justifications for setting up UNCTAD was G.A.T.T.'s failure to enter the field of commodity control effectively.

Commodity arrangements were part of the International Trade Charter which was to supersede the General Agreement once ratified. With the failure of the Havana Charter to achieve ratification all that remained was the incomplete General Agreement. This is not to say that there were no group interests at work in the elaboration of those parts of the Charter that were later taken over in the Agreement. In fact the division of developed and developing countries was very noticeable. However, the latter were mainly represented by Australia, Brazil, Canada and India. In other words, the division was according to similar economic interests and significantly different from later groupings of underdeveloped countries, where political cohesion was often stretched to breaking point because of economic incompatibilities and where natural economic allies were scorned for political reasons.

It is fair to say that the original exclusion of commodities from G.A.T.T.'s range of interests was a deliberate decision uncoloured by political overtones, but as time went on the principle was questioned more than once, because commodity trade presents some very real problems - problems that have no solution except through international agreement.

One of the earliest attempts to re-introduce commodities (and partly also agriculture) into the Contracting Parties' work was the Special Agreement on Commodity Arrangements (SACA) in 1955. The fact that it did not command wide support, either from commodity exporters, or from commodity importers, seems to suggest that it did not correspond to a real need. A second major attempt to introduce commodities took place in the course of the Kennedy Round. But the recent negotiations on wheat, meat and dairy-produce have proved to be a part failure for the time being. Attempts to organize commodity trade outside the General Agreement, either within the framework of new bodies such as UNCTAD, or between the producing countries directly concerned, have hardly been more successful.



Evidence seems to accumulate that Gerda Blau of the F.A.O. is probably right when she says that the paucity of commodity agreements indicates that neither exporting nor importing countries have been willing to pay a large enough premium for the implicit insurance against the risk of large price changes. This suggests that it is not G.A.T.T.'s limited terms of reference, nor the existence of a predominant group of countries within the organisation, that accounts for the absence of effective task expansion into the field of commodity control; but rather the technical difficulties involved.

A new departure in the field of commodity control may occur in the future that could resolve these technical difficulties. It is currently being discussed whether rich countries might not use the technique of commodity agreements in order to transfer real wealth to the poor countries. This would mean that the responsibility for keeping prices at an "equitable", i.e. a level higher than the market price level, and the responsibility for administering and financing such agreements would pass from the producing to the consuming countries. This would be a political act, and if it ever occurred, it could be sanctioned by G.A.T.T. as one of the objectives of the New Chapter on Trade and Development has already indicated Contracting Parties' agreement to act in this sense.

The G.A.T.T. waiver procedure : task contraction

G.A.T.T. has puzzled observers because, probably unique among international organisations, it has a built-in mechanism for task contraction - the "waiver procedure". This allows Contracting Parties to "waive" parts of the Agreement after all other permitted exceptions have been found inapplicable. But, as in the case of the exclusion of commodity agreements from its spheres of interests, the use of waivers has been motivated on the whole by technical and not political considerations. Thus, in 1954, an early waiver permitting the United States to restrict trade in agricultural products has led to a

virtual exclusion of trade in temperate climate agricultural products from G.A.T.T. trading rules. The cause of this is the inapplicability of rules that are in conflict with domestic practice in most member countries i.e. one cannot let the price mechanism control production and consumption freely at an international level when this is not done at a national level.

#### The New Chapter on Trade and Development - Task Expansion

It is in this context that the G.A.T.T. is most frequently cited as acting in response to pressures from a group of countries previously not represented in the G.A.T.T. What this section hopes to show is that the G.A.T.T. Secretariat "discovered" the problem of trade and development in the early 1950's, and has been working on ways and means of solving it for about fifteen years. The fact that G.A.T.T.'s "New Chapter on Trade and Development" followed shortly on the creation of UNCTAD made some people think that it was a hastily drafted affair designed to recapture a field of activity that appeared to have passed into other hands. What UNCTAD probably did was to accelerate an already existing process, thus exercising a welcome influence. But the same forces that encouraged or retarded G.A.T.T. task expansion in this field were also at work in the creation of UNCTAD, with the dangerous possibility of a situation where these two organizations may be played off against each other.

The G.A.T.T. Secretariat was the first to raise in a meaningful way the twin problems of trade and development in the international context. The late Dr. Hans Staehle, the Director of the Trade Intelligence Division, working on Trade Statistics of 1952 and 1953, noticed what he described in International Trade 1954 as "the relative growth of trade with and among industrial areas, almost entirely accounted for by the rapid growth of trade in Western Europe, and the relative decline in trade between the non-industrial and industrial areas, accounted for by the failure of the value of export from the non-industrial areas to expand". This was the first statement relating to the decline of the poor countries' share in world trade.

These countries themselves had only noticed the absolute increase of their trade from one year to the next as part of the general increase in world trade. They had not noticed that as a group their absolute increase in trade value and volume went hand in hand with a relative decline when compared with the growth rates of the rich countries' trade and the world total.

Their first reactions to this phenomenon at the G.A.T.T. Annual Sessions in 1955 and following years were moderate. But the G.A.T.T. Secretariat, in its Annual Reports and Special Studies agreed that if developing countries' exports grew less fast than their import requirements (which as Staehle had shown, was particularly the case of the more successful 'developing' countries such as Brazil, Yugoslavia etc.) then their desire to limit imports by quantitative restrictions and other controls would increase. This would be in direct contradiction to the G.A.T.T.'s terms of reference i.e. "the reduction of trade barriers" throughout the world. The Secretariat considered it therefore a justifiable 'task expansion' for the Contracting Parties and put this newly discovered problem on their agenda.

A major initiative taken by the Secretariat in the second half of the 1950's was the commissioning of a special report by Professors Haberler, Tinbergen, Meade and Campus to propose answers to this problem. The conclusions of the Panel of Experts were to become a slogan of poor countries' demands in the field of international trade organisation within and without the G.A.T.T. for years to come : "The underdeveloped primary producing countries have an interest in obtaining from the highly industrialized countries aid and easier access to markets for their exports. The highly industrialized countries have an interest in the effects upon trade of these economic development policies of the underdeveloped primary producing countries. The only chance of a successful outcome is a negotiated settlement involving a gradual shift away from undesirable policies on both sides. This is without question to the long-term advantage of both; but it requires on both sides

a broad-minded approach as to the elements in their total economic and financial policies which they would be willing to make the subject of international discussion and negotiation"<sup>(1)</sup>.

The record of the G.A.T.T. Secretariat taking an initiative in 1954 which leads to clear cut recommendations for task expansion in 1958 is unchallengeable. From now onwards it becomes a slow process of definition as to what such a "negotiated settlement" should contain and who should give what. From 1961 onwards, when Ministers were called in to give clear cut political directives to further evolution it became evident that the issue was no longer one of a technical problem to be solved but of a political decision to be taken.

The E.E.C. concept of aid to developing countries was different to that of the United States, and that of the United Kingdom was at variance with both. The E.E.C.'s aid objectives were largely based on Francophone Africa through a French desire to direct such efforts into politically desirable channels for herself. To make French aid aims those of the E.E.C. was not difficult, for France alone of E.E.C. members had close relations with a large number of ex-colonies, and Belgium was willing to fall in. This meant geographic concentration of Francophone Africa and burden-sharing, through commercial policy measures, extended beyond France to all the Common Market area. Britain, on the other hand, for similar political reasons, supported the Anglophone African countries' attempts to penetrate the charmed circle of countries benefitting from growing trade with the Common Market, and hoped to bring this about by advocating a generalization of the Commonwealth-type preference. The United States finally, with their world-wide interests, could only entertain a solution on a universalist, non-discriminatory basis, hoping that the gradual elimination of tariffs and other barriers to trade would serve less developed countries' trade expansion.

These views were all in contradiction with each other and politically motivated. It should be mentioned in parenthesis that views

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1. Trends in international trade, Geneva, 1958, p. 127.

among the poor countries claiming easier access to rich markets are equally conflicting, since they are already divided into countries which already have preferential access and those which do not.

The discussion continues to this day - but not in G.A.T.T. The rich countries are trying to iron out their differences in the O.E.C.D. and it is said that some behind-the-scenes negotiating among poor countries takes place in UNCTAD and other corridors.

In the meantime it was agreed by the Contracting Parties to add a New Chapter of articles to the General Agreement which would make G.A.T.T. competent in the field of trade and development. This did not mean that the political differences were solved between them, but it did mean that the problem had been recognized. The New Chapter was the outcome of a Meeting of Ministers in May 1963, when as part of the Action Programme a "Committee on the Legal and Institutional Framework of G.A.T.T." was created to draft the additional chapter to cover trade and development. It was adopted in 1965 and substantially enlarged the objectives of G.A.T.T. to include the raising of standards of living and furthering the economic development of less developed countries.

It would be interesting to speculate in how far the politization of an originally technically conceived problem has been to the advantage or disadvantage of the poorer countries, or how far the duplication of some tasks by a new international organisation has helped towards an earlier completion of these tasks. No doubt Mr Robertson will touch on some of these problems but mainly, only time will be able to give us an answer.

What we wish to retain here is that the advent of UNCTAD seems to have had the consequence for the G.A.T.T. of causing it to return to some more technically precise issues.

In the field of tariff negotiation and removal of obstacles to trade the Secretariat once more took the initiative and tried to persuade the less-developed countries to play a more active role in the

Kennedy Round negotiation. In this they were relatively unsuccessful (in terms of what the less-developed countries could have obtained) for two reasons. In the first place the representatives of the LDC's were frequently not technically competent to deal with the complexities of a commercial negotiation like the Kennedy Round though the G.A.T.T. Secretariat, with the connivance of the developed countries, went a long way to help the less developed Contracting Parties and show each one where its negotiating strength lay. It could not go so far as to actually negotiate on their behalf. Lethargy, lack of knowledge, and lack of interest were frequently cited to me by people very close to the negotiation as being characteristic of many of G.A.T.T.'s less developed members (A Latin-American 'fonctionnaire' pointed out to me that these were the reasons why he failed to establish a Latin-American negotiating lobby similar to that of the Nordic Countries who, at a crucial moment of the Kennedy Round, negotiated very successfully as a block.)<sup>(1)</sup>

A second group of reasons emanated from the political decision of some countries to work through UNCTAD rather than through G.A.T.T. Though precise results were to be obtained in the Kennedy Round which could not be obtained elsewhere this knowledge either did not penetrate or was not considered of sufficient importance to change many countries' policies.

Though here again lack of knowledge has, no doubt, played its part in some of these decisions. Towards the end of the Kennedy Round a renewed interest in G.A.T.T. work by the less developed countries was noticeable.

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1. It may perhaps be worthwhile suggesting, as a field of research, the difficulties encountered by LDC's due to lack of trained personnel for international organisation work.

Other areas into which G.A.T.T. has entered recently in order to promote the trade of poorer members have been : the creation of a trade information and market research service for poorer countries' exports; the promotion of regional economic integration in Africa; and the organisation of commercial policy training courses for government officials from Contracting Parties. The first of these - the trade information and market research service - has been very successful and UNCTAD's Secretary General has asked whether it could not be run jointly by the two organisations. This question is under discussion. Similar developments have occurred in the regional integration field where again collaboration between the two organisations has been asked for and given in the context of the West African Common Market Project.

Summarizing, therefore, we find that task expansion initiated by the Secretariat in the middle 1950's for technical reasons is being pursued by the Secretariat as a technical task in the middle of the 1960's after some frustrating years of politization of the debate (1961-1963) when, by accident, or machiavellian design or a combination of both, the political element of the discussion was transferred to UNCTAD. In how far UNCTAD will be able to grow beyond the political issues and get from debate to action remains to be seen. But any action it initiates in the field of commercial policy - whether it be regional integration or tariff preferences - will inevitably have to be referred back to G.A.T.T., which embodies a number of rules to which the world's "trading" countries subscribe.

The technical commitments undertaken by G.A.T.T.'s Contracting Parties have not been affected by the creation of a new Trade Organisation, and they cannot be duplicated let alone superseded by it<sup>(1)</sup>.

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1. In the same way as the world's available wave-lengths cannot be distributed by two different international organisations.

Task expansion : trade with the East

The story of G.A.T.T.'s relationship and attitude to trade with the Communist Countries is a long one, and all I shall attempt is in the nature of a sampling of some relevant incidents, showing how these countries' relationship to G.A.T.T. has changed with the transformation of world power block relations. The Communist type of economic system fits into G.A.T.T. rules like a square peg in a round hole. Such trade as the Eastern European countries engage in is regulated by quantitative control, while G.A.T.T. rules outlaw the use of quotas to control trade except in very exceptional circumstances, and advocate regulation by the price mechanism.

In 1951, for obvious political reasons the United States suspended its G.A.T.T. obligations towards Czechoslovakia - then the only Communist Contracting Party. Though no other non-communist Contracting Party followed this example, the role of the communist state trading countries was to be practically non-existent until the second half of the 1950's. After 1956, and in particular in 1958 when Yugoslavia applied for associate membership, and in 1959 when Poland applied for accession to the Agreement, the attitudes of the Contracting Parties were amazingly flexible. Since, as stated, it is one of the G.A.T.T. tenets that only price differences should guide international trade, Contracting Parties had to become veritable contortionists in order to accept the Yugoslav and Polish applications.

These were, however, the years not only of the thaw but also of the increasing independence of the smaller Eastern European countries from Soviet Russia. Part of the independence sought by them was in the foreign trade field. Besides Yugoslavia and Poland, Rumania and Hungary showed interest in the G.A.T.T. system of world trade. The concern of the Soviet Union over these developments can only be measured by its pressing requests in the Economic Commission of Europe and the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations for the creation of a new World Trade Organisation. It was not until after many unsuccessful



attempts that the disappointing 1961 Ministers' Meeting of G.A.T.T. over development questions gave the U.S.S.R. the idea of associating with renewed emphasis the less developed countries with its request for a new world trade organisation<sup>(1)</sup>. Mr. Robertson describes these events in some detail in the companion paper on UNCTAD.

For our purpose, it is enough to retain the fact that changes in power-block structure - in this case the growing independence of smaller Eastern-European countries - led the Contracting Parties to turn a blind eye to many of the technical incompatibilities of these countries' economies with the rules or implied tenets of the General Agreement. Similar lenience was shown over the inclusion of Egypt in the work of G.A.T.T. and the retention of Cuba as a Contracting Party. In the case of Poland accession which normally has to take place on the basis of tariff negotiations was opened up for signature after the Kennedy Round on the basis of minimum import commitments. It seems fairly clear that political considerations played a major role in these decisions. In how far they affect these countries' trade or increase world welfare due to better allocation of resources remains a moot point. But the demonstration that political developments can have their influence on a technical organisation such as G.A.T.T. seems to have been made.

The only measure of the resultant task expansion until now is that Rumania and Hungary have sent trade officials to participate in Gatt Trainee Courses.

The examination of these four major problem areas of the G.A.T.T. cannot lead to any absolute conclusions. Some of the new tasks envisaged - commodity control and special trading rules for the poorer countries.

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1. From being mainly represented as a means of solving East-West trading problems, the proposed new world trading organisation became the way to solve the UDC's trading problems.

have been dropped for the moment as seeming technically not feasible : in the absence of political agreement among countries concerned. Others such as the linkage of economic development with trade expansion was fully accepted and advisory and consultancy work in these fields is in full swing. The excursion into State Trading problems seems to be a consequence of political developments and has perhaps been of less consequence to the organisation's work than any of the other new tasks. One is tempted to establish the hypothesis from this cursory examination of G.A.T.T. task expansion that the more technically precise, the more limited is the purpose of an organisation; the more agreement there is at the outset as to these aims, the more likely it is to succeed in their fulfilment: and the more unsuitable it is for task expansion other than into areas which are logical consequences of its technical work. If examination of other organizations, or Robertson's examination of UNCTAD leads us to the conclusion that the less well-defined an organisation, the more general its purpose; the less agreement as to how to achieve its aims, at the outset, the less likely it is to succeed in their fulfillment and the more likely it is that task expansion will occur, then there may be some basis of discussion for this hypothesis.

Summary

Task expansion, the addition of a sub-purpose to an international organisation's central objective, can be the technical consequence of its normal work, or arise from new demands of its members, particularly when the composition of membership has changed substantially.

This paper examines three cases of attempted task expansion within the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, and one case of task contraction. There is one clear case of task expansion having failed to occur : the extension of world trading rules to commodities in 1955; one clear case of new tasks being accepted : the changing of the rules of admission for state-trading countries (e.g. Poland); and one indistinct case of task expansion : the much discussed reaction of the Contracting Parties to the poorer countries' trading problems.

In the latter case, new tasks have been incorporated in the G.A.T.T.'s activities whenever they seemed compatible with its original terms of reference. But they were not included when the technically limited, but legally very precise, rights and obligations of Contracting Parties did not call for action in particular field (e.g. the use of the trade mechanism for the transfer of economic aid).

It is argued that task expansion is probably the more difficult, the more precise the original rights and obligations of member states are and is only possible in fields which are the technical consequence of the organisations work. When task expansion is called for, for political reasons, it is likely to spill over into organisations which are not so rigidly conceived or take the form of agreements which are not very different from existing practice (e.g. relations with state trading countries).

## Résumé

L'élargissement des tâches, c'est-à-dire l'adjonction d'un objectif secondaire à l'objectif central d'une organisation internationale, peut être une conséquence technique de l'activité normale de cette organisation, ou découler de nouvelles demandes de ses membres, notamment lorsque leur composition subit de grandes modifications.

Le rapport examine trois tentatives d'élargissement des tâches du G.A.T.T., et un cas de contraction. L'une des tentatives s'est soldée par un échec : c'est celle qui, en 1955, aurait voulu appliquer aux matières premières les règles du commerce mondial; dans l'un des cas, l'élargissement a été accepté : un changement des règles d'admission des pays à commerce étatique (tels que la Pologne); le troisième cas, difficile à classer, est celui des réactions, vivement discutées, des Parties contractantes, aux problèmes commerciaux des pays les moins fortunés.

Dans ce dernier cas, de nouvelles tâches ont été incluses dans les activités du G.A.T.T. à chaque fois qu'elles semblaient compatibles avec sa mission initiale. Elles ne l'ont pas été lorsque les droits et obligations des Parties contractantes, limités sur le plan technique mais très précis sur le plan juridique, n'appelaient pas une action dans un domaine particulier (par exemple, l'utilisation de mécanismes commerciaux pour le transfert de l'aide économique).

L'auteur pense que l'élargissement des tâches est peut-être d'autant plus difficile que les droits et obligations des pays membres ont été mieux précisés initialement, et n'est possible que lorsqu'il découle techniquement de l'activité de l'organisation intéressée. Lorsque l'élargissement est nécessaire pour des raisons politiques, il a des chances d'affecter des organisations conçues de façon moins rigide, ou de prendre la forme d'accords qui ne diffèrent guère des pratiques courantes (par exemple, les relations avec les pays à commerce étatique).

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Br/Neutr./Gen./F

"Neutralité, neutralisme, non-alignement"

NEUTRALITE, NEUTRALISME, NON-ALIGNEMENT

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## Neutralité, neutralisme, non-alignement<sup>(1)</sup>

par Jean Laloy

Les notions examinées sont si vastes et si peu déterminées qu'il est nécessaire de ramener la discussion à quelques points précis, sans se dissimuler que beaucoup d'aspects sont ainsi sacrifiés. Si le sacrifice est injustifié, les aspects sacrifiés reparaîtront d'eux-mêmes dans le débat, du moins on l'espère.

On pourrait, dans ces conditions, distinguer trois sujets principaux de discussion :

Problèmes de principe (ou d'idées) ;

Problèmes de fait ;

Problèmes d'avenir.

### I - Problèmes de principe ou d'idées

Il semble admis d'une façon générale que le neutralisme, aspiration ou mouvement, conduit au non-alignement, action politique. Celui-ci se distingue de la neutralité, idéal rarement réalisé. C'est donc le non-alignement qui est au centre du débat, non comme théorie pure, mais comme idée politique apparue dans certains pays d'Asie, d'Afrique ou d'Europe après 1945.

#### a) origines

Une première question à son sujet est celle de ses origines. Si la pensée de Nehru, et celle de Gandhi, sont à l'origine de la politique de non-alignement, cette pensée est-elle la seule source de la doctrine ? N'y a-t-il pas aussi une origine socialiste lointaine, mais décelable ? Les débats des premiers Congrès du Komintern sur la révolution en Asie n'ont-ils pas exercé d'effet ? L'idée d'une voie intermédiaire entre socialisme de type bolchevik et capitalisme de type

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(1) Note établie sur la base des dix rapports qui me sont parvenus.

manchestérien ne nourrit-elle pas certains dirigeants ? Il y aurait, dans ce cas, un aspect interne du non-alignement, l'idée d'un socialisme non nécessairement marxiste.

Une autre source socialiste du non-alignement est l'idée de la résistance à l'impérialisme. Il n'y a pas d'idée plus répandue que celle-là. Or, la notion d'impérialisme, au sens actuel, remonte en partie à Lénine. Il serait intéressant d'étudier les idées que se font de l'impérialisme, les différents Etats non-alignés, de même que leurs opinions publiques, et l'évolution de ces idées depuis la conférence de Bandoeng jusqu'à aujourd'hui. Il serait utile aussi de préciser la notion de politique de puissance, power politics, si fréquemment employée et si peu précise.

La question principale serait ici la suivante :

Aux yeux des gouvernements non-alignés l'impérialisme (ou la politique de puissance) est-il l'attribut de certaines grandes puissances seulement ou celui de toutes ?

b) fins

On pourrait ensuite envisager la question des fins que se propose le non-alignement .

Doit-il aboutir purement et simplement à une multiplicité de souverainetés nationales ? Doit-il conduire à une division du monde moins accentuée que jusqu'ici par la création de plusieurs groupes de puissances ? Doit-il déboucher sur une unité de type nouveau, non encore aperçue, mais en voie de création ? Conduit-il au contraire à une nouvelle révolution de caractère "anti impérialiste" et donc à de nouveaux conflits ?

On se heurte ici au caractère indéterminé de la notion de non-alignement. Peut-être doit-on se résigner à cataloguer pour l'instant les tendances, de façon à suivre leur développement.

c) phases

On pourrait enfin poser, comme c'est le cas dans plusieurs rapports, la question des phases diverses du non-alignement. Phase politique, phase économique, phase révolutionnaire se succèdent-elles ou sont-elles plus ou moins concomitantes ?

N'y a-t-il pas des domaines, comme l'économie, où l'unité se fait (contre les Etats possédants), d'autres où elle est beaucoup plus fragile (intérêts d'Etat, action "révolutionnaire", etc.) ?

Comment les phases qui résultent de ces actions ou interactions sont-elles à leur tour influencées par les événements (politique des grandes puissances, action de la Chine, etc.) ?

II - Problèmes de fait

La discussion ici pourrait porter sur trois sujets principaux : le non-alignement pur ; le non-alignement des alignés ; l'alignement des non-alignés.

Le non-alignement pur est sans doute la neutralité telle que la pratique la Suisse. Cette neutralité est juridique mais elle a des aspects politiques et même universels. Est-elle un cas unique ? Peut-elle servir de modèle ? Que peut-on en retenir ?

Le non-alignement des alignés est le mouvement qui tend à se développer à l'intérieur des groupes existants, dans l'espoir de multiplier les centres de décision. Ce mouvement est très caractérisé en Europe. Ne se développe-t-il pas en Amérique latine ?

Est-il aussi nouveau qu'on le dit ? N'a-t-il pas existé dès l'origine ? Comment se développe-t-il ? Où conduit-il ?

L'alignement des non-alignés désigne les mouvements de regroupement en cours dans le tiers-monde, sous l'influence des nouveaux rapports de force.



On pourrait examiner, dans ce cadre, l'effet des problèmes de défense sur la politique de non-alignement ; l'existence à l'intérieur du non-alignement de groupements politiques déterminés (groupe des pays arabes ; groupements africains ; Sud-Est asiatique, etc.) ; groupements idéologiques (extrémistes contre modérés ; révolutionnaires contre réformistes, etc.).

On se poserait en conclusion la question de savoir s'il n'existe pas, à l'heure actuelle, une multiplicité de mouvements en cours dont on ne voit pas bien le sens mais qui auront nécessairement un effet. Que reste-t-il dans ces conditions du non-alignement tel qu'il était conçu à l'origine ?

### III - Problèmes d'avenir

Le non-alignement peut conduire aussi bien à la neutralité pure qu'à l'engagement révolutionnaire.

Entre ces deux extrêmes, il existe une gamme infinie de positions possibles.

Dans quel sens pense-t-on que l'idée de non-alignement va évoluer ?

La tendance au règlement pacifique des conflits, au développement de procédures de prévention des crises, etc. qui est l'une des caractéristiques de ce mouvement, se maintiendra-t-elle ? Conduira-t-elle à des regroupements et à des unions plus larges ?

Verra-t-on, au contraire, sous la contrainte des événements, une fragmentation croissante, un non-alignement à l'intérieur du non-alignement avec ses conséquences, oppositions, conflits et finalement réapparition de la violence ?

On pourrait tenter de distinguer dans la discussion ce qui est souhaitable et ce qui est probable, établir un rapport entre les deux et en tirer une conclusion sur l'avenir du non-alignement.

A-t-il été un moment typique de la politique d'affranchissement qui a succédé à la guerre ? Est-il plus que cela ? Si oui, comment peut-il se survivre dans un monde de plus en plus différent de celui de ses origines ?

Notre sujet est peut-être le plus "brûlant" de tous ceux qui figurent à l'ordre du jour du Congrès, dans la mesure où il traite de problèmes immédiats de politique extérieure, à l'égard desquels chacun de nous se sent difficilement neutre ou même non aligné. Il nous faut d'autant plus éviter accusations, et mises en cause de la politique extérieure pratiquée par telle ou telle puissance, et garder à nos débats la sérénité qui peut seule les rendre utiles.

Br/Neutr./1

"Neutrality, neutralism, non-alignment"

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THE CHANGING PATTERN OF NEUTRALISM

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The changing pattern of neutralism

by Max Mark

As of this writing the Middle East has gone through a military contest and any settlement appears to be very remote. At a time like this when war seemed to have been the 'ultima ratio' even for small regional countries, when national passions make it impossible to see where one's own true interests are, when the great powers as 'in the good old days' jockey for positions, it must seem that neutralism is of utter irrelevancy. For we are tempted to say that the world is back at traditional power politics and old-fashioned nationalism. Thus, it requires a certain foolhardiness to assert the contrary.

Yet it seems to this writer that though scholarship cannot be immune to the events of the day neither should it be carried away by them. If some time ago we thought we had discovered the outline of a new world and the makings of a new form of international politics we have no right to abandon such thoughts under the impact of a single cluster of events. After all, we cannot expect the world to move evenly along a straight line.

It is with these considerations in mind that this writer will be bold enough to maintain that neutralism is relevant to our era, that it is a pointer to the future, that in effect it is a phenomenon connected with those vast historic changes which have occurred in relationship to power politics (that is the politics among nations of coercion and intimidation through the use or threat of use of force) and traditional nationalism. Neutralism is an expression of the post-power political and post-nationalist era in which we live, it is bound to undergo many changes, it would therefore be wrong to equate any particular phase with neutralism as such. Neutralism is both a reflection as well as a catalyst of the new age.

In a preliminary way we may state that non-alignment has been a consequence of neutralism. But since on account of the Cold War neutralism came into prominence in the form of non-alignment the essence of neutralism was at the time considered to be non-alignment. Consequently, 'neutralism' and 'non-alignment' have been used interchangeably though in a technical sense both terms have their distinct meanings (see below).

It will be argued that as against neutralism neutrality represents a phenomenon of the era of traditional power politics and of traditional nationalism.

When we speak about neutralism as being an expression of the post-power political and post-nationalist era we have to think in dialectic terms. Elements of power politics will operate among those who reject

it in principle and aspects of traditional nationalism will be found among those for whom it would bring no benefits.

There has been a tendency to identify neutralism with non-violence as if the new countries had been subject to immaculate conception. It is true that the moralism of some of the early leaders of the neutralist movement, particularly Nehru, tended to create the impression that neutralism involved the rejection of force, that the new countries of Asia and Africa were above using force among themselves and that because of this attitude they could have a beneficial effect upon those others for whom power politics has always been the stuff of international life.

It is also true that stung by such moralism many Westerners have gleefully focused upon the violence which frequently has occurred within Afro-Asian countries and upon the violence which from time to time has broken out among them.

Now the new countries, neutralist or not, are heirs to the age of power politics, they have their own regional conflicts which they only too often view in traditional terms and to which they apply traditional remedies (though the latter may be counter-productive). In regard to force their attitude is at best ambiguous. There is the memory of intimidation practiced against them by the colonial powers, but on the other hand many of them owe to force their colonial emancipation. Last but not least, once violence has been experienced as the foundation

of authority the possibility is that it will continue to be viewed as such even after emancipation. (1)

Yet having said all this the overriding fact remains that power politics is totally irrelevant to the problems of the new countries and neutralism expresses this. What is irrelevant to them is both the power politics of the traditional powers among themselves and the power politics of the new countries among themselves (though they may not always be aware of this irrelevancy). The interest of these countries is for a better life for their peoples and, therefore, these would in the long run find little satisfaction in the identification with the power of their countries even if they could muster any. This irrelevancy of power politics for the new countries meshes with the general decline of power politics about which we will speak later.

A similar ambiguity as in relationship to force exists among the new countries in relationship to nationalism. Emerging at a time when old established nation states try to overcome the limitations of nationalism it is hardly to be expected that the new countries could make

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(1) Interesting are Sartre's thoughts on the subject of violence. In a review article on Sartre's Colonialism et néo-colonialism (Situations, V.) they are summarized as follows: "the colonial regime has left a tradition of treating violence as the foundation of authority. For the colonial subject, violence is an integral part of the legal order. The symbol of the state is the soldier or the policeman, with whom the only communication possible is predicated on violence. After independence, it is difficult to uproot this attitude toward authority (or, better, toward the "authorities"). Further, the ex-colonial subject has learned by experience that violence is an effective tool for the achievement of his own ends. During the struggle for independence, violence proved a successful means (often the only successful means) of national achievement and self-realization." A.A. Fatouros, "Sartre on Colonialism", World Politics, vol. XVII, Nr.4, July 1965, p. 713.

nationalism a satisfactory frame of reference for their aspirations. Yet they are heirs to the age of nationalism and must be expected to exhibit in some degree and at some point certain of its features.

To come back to our introductory remarks, the assertion that we have entered the post-war political age must sound like bitter irony. With the armaments race so far unabated, with brute force used in many places, power politics appears to have reached an apogee. But what looks like an apogee may in fact be the beginning of a decline. At crucial junctures in history the two are close together.

That a new age should be ushered in by a last bright flickering of the flame of the old order is understandable if we appreciate the fact that people in their conservatism will try to apply old remedies to new problems under the principle that the less the old medicine works the greater the dose should be. Admittedly, only if a system is driven to absurdity will it be radically changed. (That under today's nuclear conditions this absurdity may coincide with universal destruction is a different matter.)

By now it is generally accepted that physical power in the relationship among the nuclear powers has ceased to be a means toward the achievement of national goals. The significance of physical power rests here in its non-use. But fear of escalation toward nuclear war limits the use of force by a nuclear power also in the pursuits of conventional warfare. (2)

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(2) "In a sense, the most powerful nations have, in the nuclear age, become the least powerful." J.W. Burton, International Relations, A General Theory, Cambridge University Press, 1965, p. 48.



More basic perhaps is the decline in the significance of the goal toward which physical power can be directed. We mean here territory. In the past physical power and territoriality have been twins.

Now, in an age of agriculture, possession of territory was of foremost importance, the greater the territory the more 'living space' a people had. In our age the standards of life of people are not determined by the extent of the territory they occupy but by their level of economic development. Belgium with a population density of 780 people per square mile has a higher standard of living than Brazil with 28.

Moreover, in today's world military victory does not bring any benefit. Given contemporary economic interdependence, if one advanced country defeats another it must restore its economy otherwise it would hurt itself. If an advanced country defeats a poor country it must do the same though for different reasons. If one poor country defeats another poor country there is no benefit either. With serfdom having gone out of existence, the victor cannot make use of the defeated enemy.

The decline in the significance of physical power shows also in people's attitudes toward it. From a high point in the middle ages, when physical valor was considered the highest virtue, when a nearly obsessional horror of cowardice existed, when death in battle was glorified and ruling elites watched jealously over the privilege of bearing arms, we have reached today a stage when wars are considered "dirty", death in battle viewed as a misfortune, peoples' qualities of mind and character appraised in terms other than military prowess and elites (professional people, students, etc.) are exempted from fighting.

What gives today's violence such a chaotic character is the fact that the awe for physical power has declined. What had made force in the past into a principle of order was the fact that people accepted the physically strong as a ruler by right. As has been pointed out by Sartre, the situation is at best ambiguous. Be this as it may, it is interesting to note that the people in formerly colonial countries have lost the awe for force as applied by the West.

Of particular significance for our understanding of the potentialities of neutralism is an appreciation of what has happened to the state as an institution.

I refer here to the transformation of the state from an institution of dominance into one of service. In older established states this was the result of a long process. Historically, the state started out as an organization of dominance and being an organization of dominance it was an end in itself. As long as the state was ruled by military elites its dominance, both externally and internally, rested on military power. With the rise of the bourgeoisie the internal form of dominance shifted to economic power, the external remained military. The emergence of the modern welfare state transformed the state internally from one of dominance into one of service. Internally the state ceased to be an end, it became means for the achievement of the good life. The question is, if the state has become means internally can it remain an end externally - or will not the needs of people in other (poorer) societies provide a leverage for the external transformation of the advanced countries.

While the old established states have gone through a long process of transformation along the lines indicated above, the new countries emerge at a time when service and not dominance is already considered the hallmark of the state.

This leads us to the meaning of nationalism today. Our argument is that we are living in the post-nationalist age. This statement can be challenged in the name of appearances which point in the other direction. If we look at first at the old established nation states, obviously, we cannot expect that an idea-force such as nationalism which has held sway for centuries will not decline along a straight road with signs at frequent intervals giving the mileage to the end of the road. Such a process must rather be expected to occur amidst much confusion and contradiction. At times the old will reassert itself with a vengeance - hence what we have come to call the revivals of nationalism. Again, we must view the decline of nationalism in dialectic terms. There will be a dialectic process between nationalism and the factors making for transnationalism. In the various "syntheses" of this process the old, because it is more familiar to us, will loom larger than the new. Hence, we will constantly be tempted to believe that in the end nothing has changed.

However, if we want to be more discerning, we will have to admit that the changes in external reality are having their impact upon traditional nationalism. We refer here to the fact that the nation state has ceased to be a unit of protection, that an interdependent international economy has arisen, that other societies do make claims, and make them loudly. While admittedly little constructive has been done in meeting

the security issue, in the economic field we have seen the rise of trans-national regional organizations, in the social field there has arisen something like an international social consciousness. In a psychological sense changes in nationalism have occurred. People are no longer concerned with glory, national honor, etc. In short, nationalism has become de-romanticized.

When we now come to the new countries, they emerge without the "thesis" of traditional nationalism. When we refer to their aspirations as representing 'nationalism' the term is perhaps a misnomer. <sup>(3)</sup> Most of the new countries have been artificial creations - they are successors to colonies which were carved out in response to the power constellations among the imperial countries. To create under such circumstances a national consciousness is not a very hopeful undertaking.

But what is more important - and really represents the crux of the matter - is that these countries emerge at a time when economics has become the test of politics. This has a special significance for the creation of new national loyalties. <sup>(4)</sup> In this connection it is good to remind ourselves that the basic national loyalty in the West predated the

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(3) Il n'est guère de mot plus fréquemment utilisé dans la littérature historique, politique et journalistique immédiatement contemporaine que celui de nationalisme. Il n'en est guère non plus qui révèle plus d'équivoques et plus d'ambiguïté." Raoul Girardet, "Autour de l'Idéologie Nationaliste-Perspectives de Recherche", Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol. XV, Juin 1965, No.3, p. 423.

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(4) The author has dealt with this aspect in some detail in his "Economic Determinants of the Character of Afro-Asian Nationalism", The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, vol. 20, No.4, July 1961, pp.425 ff.

age when economics had become the central concern of man or at least when such concern was considered the responsibility of the state.

By contrast to these earlier developments, the rise of the new countries in Asia and Africa takes place in an age when the very *raison d'etre* of social organization is considered to be its contribution to economic well-being. But the trouble is that government cannot fulfil these economic aspirations given the limited resources and the low level of technological development. This has special consequences in the formation of new loyalties. For once, economic development is in the foreground of concern, any loyalty which is to be created must find its justification in the benefits it brings. The irony is here that in order to get economic development a government must impose short-term sacrifices for the sake of long term gains. But in trying to impose them it must call upon a loyalty whose very formation requires the availability of immediate benefits. Not only is government instability to be expected as a matter of course, but to assume "national" consolidation is possible under such circumstances is misjudging the new reality.

If we ponder all these questions we must come to the conclusion that what we call Afro-Asian nationalism is something very vague. Perhaps all it represents is a movement for independence from foreign controls, a desire for self-respect after a long period of humiliation and a quest for a better life. But what is lacking is the well-defined orbit of fellowship within which the last two aspirations can be fulfilled.

But should we be surprised that a nationalism - if we wish to retain the use of the term - emerging in an era when nationalism as a historical force is losing its significance would exhibit such vagueness? And should we be surprised that the revolution in underdeveloped countries, since it reflects aspirations which only world-wide cooperation can satisfy, should refuse to be compartmentalized within boundaries which from the standpoint of this revolution must be artificial?

Suggestive of the new historical trend are the claims for economic help which the new countries make upon the economically advanced ones. These claims are more comparable to the claims of a proletariat upon its upper-class than to those of one "sovereign" country to another. The essence of real 'sovereignty' is: "I don't care whether you live or die, nor do you have to be concerned with what happens to me". The newly emerging countries may care very little what happens to the advanced countries but they certainly insist that these are concerned with what happens to them, particularly economically. True, this concern is supposed to operate on their terms and not on the terms of the countries from which help is being claimed. Here are a number of contradictions. But such contradictions are characteristic of times of transition when the old is dying and the new not yet born. In their demand for economic help the new countries signify the decline of nationalism, in their sensitivity to advice and criticism they manifest the prestige oriented posture of the traditional nation state at its best or worst. But this sensitivity should not blind us to the fact that the new countries are deficient in many essentials of nationhood.

Since the nationhood of the new countries lacks and will lack completeness it must be complemented by the assumption of responsibilities on the part of the advanced countries and by special ties among the new countries themselves.

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If, against this general background, we now want to come to grips with the meaning of neutralism, we will have to recall the highlights of its history, complementing our narrative by the projections we can make from past events.

Both history and projections will have to be understood as an interaction between the general opportunities which the post-power political and post-nationalist age with all its confusion and contradiction provides and of the special needs (psychological and material) of societies for which politics power/and traditional nationalism are devoid of any benefits.

It will be suggested that neutralism has gone through one phase and is now in its second and that the talk about the crisis of neutralism, about which we hear so much these days, identifies what should be considered the first phase with neutralism itself.

The first phase was dominated by anti-colonialist struggles, it was the phase of a moralist anti-power politics, it operated under the aegis of leaders who had been instrumental in the emancipation of their own countries, it was based upon an assumption that among non-Western countries force would not count, it saw its main role in the contribution toward world peace.

This phase stood under the spell of a single individual Nehru who, basing himself upon the alleged tradition of non-violence of his country, gave to the first phase of neutralism a certain style but also an ideological complexion. The ideological element received a special edge from the Cold War which coincided with the greater part of the first phase. Neutralism also had a certain air of self-importance by the assumption that the voice of the non-aligned would count in the power-political conflicts of the major powers.

Finally, in this first phase there was a clear-cut separation between the non-aligned and aligned underdeveloped countries because of the emphasis upon the anti-power political aspect of neutralism and the significance it received from the ongoing Cold War. There was also a strong anti-Western bias of the neutralist countries which, of course, set them apart from the Western aligned countries.

The Bandung Conference of 1955 was in a sense the matrix of neutralism as an official movement, though it was a meeting of aligned and non-aligned countries plus China which, if considered a center in her own right, would fit neither category.



Out of the 24 participants there were nine confirmed neutralists Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, Syria and Yemen, the positions of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia were ambiguous at that time. Then there were two Communist States, China and North Vietnam, and fifteen anti-Communist States, Ceylon, Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Pakistan, Philippines, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey and South Vietnam.

Interesting was the basic motivation of the five sponsors (Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan). It was their dissatisfaction with the Western Powers' failure to consult with them in decisions affecting the Asian countries. (Perhaps it should be pointed out here that out of 24 participants only six were African.) There was, secondly, their fear that American-Chinese relations would lead to a direct confrontation. But, "related to this, though apparently less well understood in the West, was the desire of the five sponsors to lay a firmer foundation for China's peaceful relations with the rest of the World, not only with the West, but equally with themselves and other areas of Southeast Asia peripheral to China (ital. in the original)".<sup>(5)</sup> There was the expectation that Communist China would be detached from the Soviet Union and would pursue a course more in line with good neighborliness than if she were a partner in the Sino-Soviet bloc.

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(5) George M. Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955*, Cornell University Press (Ithaca, New York), pp. 4/5.

The hope of China's cooperation was based upon her acceptance of the Five Principles (Panch Sheel) which were first adopted in the Sino-Indian Treaty on Trade and Communications with Tibet (April 29, 1954), and then reaffirmed by Chou En Lai at Bandung.

While on the one hand there were attacks upon Western imperialism at the Conference, there were similar attacks by some of the Western-aligned countries on the Soviet Union and China.

The Conference, in speaking about the promotion of World Peace, stated in its Final Communique "that the nations of Asia and Africa assembled here have a duty toward humanity and civilization to proclaim their support for disarmament etc." But it was Mr. Nehru who most eloquently pointed out that non-alignment was an important element in the reduction of international tensions. First he said "IF I join any of these big groups I lose my identity; I have no identity left, I have no views left ... If all the world were to be divided up between these two big blocs what would be the result? The inevitable result would be war. Therefore, every step that takes place in reducing that area of the world which can be called the non-aligned area is a dangerous step and leads to war." (6)

The Bandung Conference seemed to have created a certain spirit of cooperation among the countries of Asia and Africa, but at the same time the Conference brought also to the fore the difficulties in uniting

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(6) Kahin, op. cit. p. 66.

The second conference of non-aligned countries took place in  
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October 1964 in Cairo. The following countries were present at Cairo as  
full members: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon,  
Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazaville), Cuba, Cyprus,  
Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Mauritania,  
Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Lybia, Malawi, Mali, Morocco,  
Nepal, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria,  
Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia  
and Zambia. The observers were: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Finland,  
Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. Its stress  
was on economics, and most speakers emphasized economic development as an  
(10)  
overriding issue.

The second phase of neutralism, which I would call the pragmatic  
phase and whose beginning I would place somewhere around the end of 1962,  
had its character reinforced by the disappearance of the founder statesmen  
of neutralism who by the sheer force of their personalities projected a  
role on the world arena scene which was far beyond the resources of their  
respective countries. In the process extravagancies occurred which proved  
to be the undoing of some of them. A new group of leaders appeared to be  
more concerned with internal developments than foreign affairs, and we should  
add here, with internal developments of an evolutionary rather than revolu-  
tionary character.

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(9) Summary of Proceedings in Keesing's Contemporary Archives,  
Nov. 28 - Dec. 5, 1964, No. 20431.

(10) "The first (tendency at Cairo) was the importance ascribed to the Geneva  
Conference on World Trade. This perhaps indicates that the non-aligned have  
at least awakened to where, in the future, their real interests lie." G.H.Jansen,  
Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, Faber and Faber, London, 1966, p.391.

This inwardness reflected itself in the inactivity of the non-aligned countries on the international scene, beyond common efforts in the UN. The "Little Summit" meeting of the non-aligned countries between Mrs. Gandhi, Tito and Nasser in New Delhi in October 1966 remained nearly unnoticed.

Yet, while this pragmatic phase has been underway, another trend, which I would call the social revolutionary trend in neutralism, emerged.

The beginnings of this trend are connected with the establishment of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) at the end of 1957. It was set up as a non-governmental organization with the financial backing of the Soviet Union and China to be used by them to further their relations, particularly with the African countries. The stress of this organization has been on the evils of neo-colonialism and on the needs of social revolution and on the characterization of the United Nations Organization as an instrument of Western, particularly American, foreign policy.

Very soon the organization was involved in the Sino-Soviet quarrel and its unfolding became intertwined with the new form of neutralism. At the third conference of the AAPSO at Moshi in 1963 China made a bid for leadership of the peoples of Africa and Asia. The Chinese presented themselves as non-whites or "coloreds". They propounded the view that the "poorer nations of the world, mainly non-white, should unite against the richer, industrialized nations which are mainly white, including the Russians." The Chinese even tried to have the Russians expelled from the conference.

(11) Summary in Keesing's (Sept. 25 - Oct. 2, 1965), No. 20983.

The Chinese delegate Liu Ning-yi said: "The attempt to decide major problems of the world and to manipulate the destiny of mankind by one or two countries runs counter to the trend of our times and is against the interests of the people." This part of the speech was well received.

The Chinese-Soviet quarrel was also one of the main reasons for the abortive second Bandung conference which was scheduled for 1965 to coincide with the 10th anniversary of the first Bandung conference. (12)

Preceding the planned conference Marshal Chen Yi of China declared that the conference would be of no use unless it condemned U.S. imperialism specifically and concretely and not only in general terms as has been advocated by certain African and Asian countries receiving American aid. No representative of UN (U Thant had declared he would attend) should be admitted to the conference, since this would mean bringing the United States to the conference table. The USSR should not be invited because she was not an Asian country. The Second Afro-Asian Conference could be more meaningful than the First if it could adopt a resolution calling for the building of independent national economies by the African and Asian countries through self-reliance, free from all "imperialist aid", and with mutual economic cooperation on terms of equality and mutual benefit.

The Foreign Ministers Conference which was held in lieu of the full conference and which showed many absences (China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Congo (Brazaville), Guinea, Pakistan, Tanzania were absent) went through the motions of deliberations. The only

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(12) Events reported in Keesing's (December 11-18, 1965, No. 21115

interesting thing was the declaration by the Algerian Foreign Minister Bente-flicka that a clear consensus had emerged to have the USSR invited.

Earlier the Soviets had stated that the organizers of the conference should not feel obligated to invite them if this should prove to be embarrassing. While saying this, the Soviets nevertheless lobbied strenuously for the invitation.

The Tri-continental People's Solidarity Conference in Havana in January 1966 represented a crystallization of the revolutionary trend (13) in neutralism. It extended revolutionary neutralism to Latin America so that all underdeveloped countries became now subject to its appeals.

Though a conference of non-governmental country solidarity committees, it was made up of de-facto governmental delegations from the Communist countries and similar delegations from Algeria, Cambodia, Congo (Brazaville), Ghana, Guinea, Syria, Tanzania, and the UAR, and delegations from solidarity committees having no official support in their countries or even operating in exile.

In its declarations the conference linked social revolution with national liberation. It expressed support for wars of national liberation. It attacked the United Nations Organization as an instrument of imperialism. The conference ended by setting up a new organization, the Afro-Asian-Latin American People's Solidarity Organization (AALAPSO).

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(13) Proceedings in GRANMA, Special Supplement on the Tri-Continental People's Solidarity Conference, Havana 1966.

In assessing the political complexion of the conference we would be correct in stating that it represented a combination of Communists, Communist sympathizers, anti-Western non-Communist governments, various Communist front organizations and non-Communist radical liberation fronts. Within this combination the Communists are the most interesting group from the standpoint of neutralism.

At an earlier time when Communism represented a monolithic bloc the question could have been rightly asked, what does an organization which is so strongly influenced by Communists have to do with neutralism. Now, that the Sino-Soviet split has occurred and the policies pursued by the Soviet Union and China are being experienced also by Communists outside these countries as the policies of great powers serving their own interests, there is such a thing as a Communist neutralism. Communists refuse to become means for the ends of the Soviet Union or China. The Communists at Havana were also not very interested in the Sino-Soviet quarrel. They considered it quite irrelevant as to their own concerns. A note of piquancy was introduced when on the eve of the Conference Castro berated the Chinese for not living up to their commitments on rice deliveries. On the other hand, Castro has criticized the Communist Parties in some of the Latin American countries, parties which are sympathetic to the Soviet Union, for their caution and conservatism.

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What about the future of neutralism? Here the responses of the rest of the world, foremost of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China have to be considered. It will therefore be helpful if we briefly discuss the attitudes of these three toward neutralism.

Let us start with the Soviet Union. Prior to 1956 the term neutralism was not used there. After World War II, during the lifetime of Stalin, the newly independent countries were assumed to have remained puppets in the hands of their former masters. Thus, the independence of the newly liberated countries was dismissed. Burma, India, Indonesia and Egypt were labeled "semi-colonies" and local Communist Parties were called upon to engage in armed struggles.

Zhdanov reaffirmed in 1947 the traditional "two camp" theory according to which no middle road between capitalism and communism could exist. The goal would have to be people's democracies as way stations to Communism.

It was at the XX Party Congress in 1956 that Khrushchev abandoned the two camp theory and accepted the neutralist countries as members of what he called the "zone of peace". He said also this:

The liberated Asian countries are pursuing a policy of building up their own industry, training their own techniques, raising the living standards of the people and regenerating and developing their age-old national culture . . . . These countries, although they do not belong to the socialist world system, can draw on its achievement to build up an independent national economy and to raise the standards of their peoples. Today they need not go begging for up-to-date equipment to their former oppressors. They can get it in the socialist countries without assuming any political or military commitments (italics added).



The struggle of the peoples of the Eastern countries against participation in blocs is a struggle for national independence. It is not fortuitous that the overwhelming majority of countries in Southeast Asia and the Middle East have rejected the importunate attempts of the Western powers to inveigle them into closed military alignments.

The evolution toward the acceptance of neutralism was also difficult and ever tortuous in the case of the United States. Wellknown is the remark of Mr. Dulles in June 1965 that except under very exceptional circumstances neutralism was immoral and shortsighted. The reason for this position was that the Eisenhower administration in a sense accepted the Communist interpretation that neutralism was a way station toward communism.

Subsequently, a more tolerant attitude towards neutralism was taken by American policy makers. This was the result of the rise of centrifugal forces within Communism. It was one thing to be concerned with a country going Communist if this meant adding to the state power of the Soviet Union, it was another if such a country would have an independent communist regime. But what perhaps was more important was that the Soviet leadership seemed to be more concerned with trying to show the superiority of the Communist system over the capitalist in the form of economic competition than by fostering internal revolutions. Both countries then started to take similar positions in regard to neutralism.

In addition, now that the nuclear powers have delivery systems with intercontinental range, bases on foreign soils have become meaningless. They add to tensions without a corresponding increase in the

security of the super-powers. "The thermonuclear deterrent is promoting  
(14)  
a new isolationism on the part of the thermonuclear States."

Different from the attitudes of the United States and the Soviet Union towards neutralism is the position of China. China finds herself in an ambiguous position. On one hand she wishes to play the role of a great power, a co-equal of the Soviet Union and the United States and in this capacity she gives aid to other countries, on the other hand,  
(15)  
she wants to lead the proletarian countries against the advanced ones.

The Chinese have by and large taken a dim view of neutralism. Their attitude is that of the two-camp theory of Stalin's days. For them the decisive factor is not that of proving the economic superiority of the Socialist system but that of the militant struggle of the peoples of the underdeveloped world. The Chinese are against the psychology of peaceful co-existence because it deprives people of their determination to fight for their true independence.

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(14) Burton, op. cit., p. 101

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(15) "At first the formula was that the Chinese supported the aims of the independents - 'their cause is ours'. Next, they asserted that the independents needed Chinese support - 'our cause is theirs'. The final formula dealt with common experiences and interests, especially anti-colonialism - 'our causes are the same, but we have shown how to succeed'." A.M. Halpern, "The Chinese Communist Line on Neutralism", The China Quarterly, No.5, Jan.-March, 1961, p.99.

Now, if the pragmatic phase of neutralism should fail, it is obvious that we will witness an increasingly revolutionary situation, Yet, while this revolutionary situation in many ways may take inspiration from the Chinese revolution, whatever common front of countries will arise will be independent of China. These countries are bound to be distrustful of the powerful, including a powerful communist state. All have learned the lesson of Yugoslavia, theoretically so well put in the Draft Program of the League of Yugoslav Communists, published in March 1958 where it reads that should one communist state be permitted a position of dominance, the exploitation of one state by another would become possible.

As the underdeveloped countries, irrespective of their internal system, prove that they do not add to the state power of any of the three super powers, the way is open to have them neutralized, that is, to have by common agreement no foreign bases and no foreign troupes on their soil.

Such neutralization will be very much in the interest of the super powers because these areas are then removed from being places of possible nuclear confrontation.

The super powers will have then to compete in the underdeveloped countries not in terms of physical power but in terms of economic assistance. Their success will ultimately depend on performance and not on ideological professions. Given the pressures for rapid economic development in the underdeveloped countries also elites, ideologically hostile to a particular advanced country, will not forego the opportunity to make use of its resources. If we look at the development in Eastern Europe, we find a very pragmatic

form of economic cooperation with the West. Even joint enterprises between a Communist state and Western private capital has become possible. In this way, a neutralism which had started out as such only in the relationship between Communist China and the Soviet Union will have become a neutralism all around.

There is no doubt that the economic competition of the advanced countries, particularly the super powers, will have an aspect of selfishness. These countries will be more concerned with gaining influence for their own ends than to help the others. But at some point they will find out that the less a selfish motive in gaining influence is involved, the greater the influence is bound to be. Ultimately, the internal transformation of the advanced states into organizations of service, about which we have spoken before, will have assumed an interna/<sup>tional</sup> dimension. Hopefully, this interplay between the advanced and underdeveloped countries will lead to a world community.

Admittedly, this projection is one of a very long vista. In the meantime, we will unfortunately have to witness a host of crises many of which will have their origin in traditional power politics irrelevant as they will have become for all concerned, weak and strong alike.

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Perhaps at this point we can state the essentials of neutralism. Neutralism represents a rejection in principle by weak societies of power politics in an age when such rejection has a chance of success because of the fact that the significance of power politics also for the strong has declined. It amounts to a refusal by the weak to be used as a means for the ends of the strong. If anything, it is an attempt at reversal of the historical relationship between the weak and the strong by having the strong serve the interests of the weak. Neutralism is an attempt to shift international attention from power to poverty.

In a sense, neutralism is the external manifestation of the 'nationalism' of the newly emerging underdeveloped country toward the world as well as a tie of solidarity of the poor countries as against the rich. In this sense it is something of a class concept which could lend itself under certain circumstances to becoming a revolutionary mystique, subsuming the individual 'nationalisms' of the underdeveloped countries.

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(16) Relevant is the following quotation though its context is slightly different from the above: "Surtout la mystique révolutionnaire que beaucoup revendiquent n'est-elle pas susceptible de conduire à des prises de conscience de solidarités beaucoup plus larges: celles des peuples affamés contre les peuples matériellement repus, de sociétés prolétariennes contre les sociétés possédantes?" Girardet, op. cit., p.445.

In viewing the role of neutralism in the above light one must be careful not to idealize or romanticize the actual performance of every neutralist country. Neutralism does not immunize countries against committing follies as when they engage in regional conflicts among themselves, particularly when in the pursuit of such conflicts they permit themselves to become tools in the hands of the great powers.

Neutralism does not mean that a country cannot have more sympathy for one or the other competing political system, though what will appear to the main contestants as sharply drawn differences will look to a neutralist country a matter of mere detail.

On this subject Nehru had this to say in his Azad Memorial Lectures, delivered in New Delhi in February 1959:

"In spite of the manifest differences between the United States and the Soviet Union, there is an amazing similarity between the two super powers. They have both developed a high degree of industrial and mechanized civilization - they believe in the evergrowing power of the machine and its capacity to solve human problems ..... The real difference today is between the developed countries and those that are still underdeveloped." (17)

As to the meaning of non-alignment in its technical sense, it represents a policy, based upon the sentiments and attitudes of neutralism, not to join permanent alliances or blocs. Again, this does not mean that a non-aligned country when under pressure from one power will not lean on another for assistance. A non-aligned country can always operate under

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(17) Quoted in Indigram No.37, Indian Embassy, Washington, D.C.  
Feb. 25, 1959.

flexible arrangements because, as we have pointed out earlier, the interests of nuclear powers in permanent alliances have declined with their preference now being for operations on an ad hoc basis as a need arises. Given this situation, it turns out that an aligned country is not in a more favorable position than a non-aligned country. When India was under Chinese pressure she received help from the United States. Thus India, in the defence of her security interests, was not worse off with the West, though non-aligned, than would be Pakistan under similar circumstances though Pakistan is an ally of the United States.

Before leaving the subject of neutralism and non-alignment, a cavil should be entered against what would appear to me to be a misapplication of the term 'neutralism' as we find it often in the literature. Though concepts may mean what we want them to mean if they are to be good intellectual tools, they should not be used loosely. It would, therefore, not be helpful to use the term 'neutralism' in describing attitudes in developed historic nation states which might have a superficial resemblance to attitudes as we have described them in the paper.

A case in point would be the use of the term 'neutralism' to sentiments which had arisen after World War II in France. I am aware that  
(18)  
the term 'neutralism' came at first in vogue there. But in France it

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(18) For a history of the concept of neutralism (and neutrality) see Peter Lyon "Neutrality and the Emergence of the Concept of Neutralism", Review of Politics, Vol. 22, No.2, April 1960, pp. 255 ff.

expressed an attitude of je-m'en-fichisme. To apply the same term to a temporary weariness about the world in an old-established nation state and to attitudes resulting from long term aspirations of underdeveloped countries can only be misleading.

Turning finally, in deference to the topic of our section, to the meaning of neutrality, it should be pointed out first of all that neutrality represents a legal status. Its details are so generally known that it would be superfluous to deal with them here. What should concern us at this point is that this legal status has reflected the world of power politics. In a sense, neutrality takes power politics for granted, it just enables a country, with greater or smaller success, to contract out of it. Neutrality does not project a future without power politics. Neutrality does not make for needs of like-minded countries to form groupings for the common pursuit of neutrality. Neutrality has nothing to do with economic developments, with claims upon others for economic help. It does not reflect the limitations of traditional nationalism. For neutral countries have the same national self-centeredness as non-neutral countries. Finally, neutrality reflects political statics, neutralism represents political dynamics. Neutralism is a movement, neutrality a state of affairs. Hence it would be difficult to envisage that neutralism could find a formulation  
(19)  
under international law. This is as little conceivable as to have a

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(19) I do not share the expectation of Professor Freymond when he writes: "Peut-être l'expérience démontrera-t-elle aux Etats neutralistes l'intérêt qu'il peut y avoir à fonder leur politique sur un droit de neutralité dont les règles, pour avoir été élaborées en Europe essentiellement, n'en sont pas moins applicables aux relations internationales contemporaines." Jacques Freymond, "Neutralité et Neutralism", communication (28 Février 1966) to Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques in Revue Politique et Parlementaire, No. 755, Avril, 1966.



legal definition for let us say 'socialism'. To sum up, neutralism and  
(20)  
Neutrality have little to do with each other.

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(20) I would certainly beg to disagree with Professor Brecher's interpretation when he said: "In short, neutralism is a contemporary expression of the time-honored theme of neutrality." Michael Brecher, "Neutralism - An Analysis", International Journal, Vol. XVIII, No.3 Summer 1962, p. 225.

Summary

Neutralism represents a movement on the part of underdeveloped countries for the shift in international concerns from the politics of power to the politics of economic development. Neutralism is in a sense a class movement. It tries to unite underdeveloped countries in their dealings with the advanced ones. Neutralism must be expected to run through many phases and to exhibit many facets. Non-alignment is a policy, based upon neutralism, of not joining permanent alliances or blocs. Neutrality is part of the traditional world of power politics. It is a legal status and not a political movement. Neutrality has little in common with neutralism.

Résumé

Le neutralisme représente l'action de pays sous-développés en vue d'un passage dans les préoccupations internationales de la politique de puissance à la politique de développement économique. En un sens, le neutralisme est un mouvement de classe. Il cherche à unir les pays sous-développés dans leurs relations avec les pays avancés. Le neutralisme passera vraisemblablement par de nombreuses phases, et présentera des aspects divers. Le non-alignement est la politique, fondée sur le neutralisme, de refus des alliances permanentes et des blocs. La neutralité appartient à l'univers traditionnel de la politique de puissance ; elle est un état juridique, et non un mouvement politique. La neutralité a peu de choses en commun avec le neutralisme.

"Neutrality, neutralism, non-alignment"

THE IDENTITY OF INDIA'S NONALIGNMENT : THE NEHRU YEARS

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The Identity of India's Nonalignment: the Nehru Years

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"Only life itself with its bitter lessons forces us along new paths and ultimately, which is far harder, makes us think differently. Perhaps we may help a little in the process. And perhaps

'On rencontre sa destinée

Souvent par les chemins qu'on prend pour l'éviter!"

Jawaharlal Nehru, Toward Freedom.<sup>1</sup>

- I -

It is said that Hinduism is capable of accommodating a number of beliefs without losing its outward identity. This may be said of nonalignment as well. It is a protean international phenomenon today: the familiar term seems capable of accommodating a host of different national impulses and identities without much difficulty. Fortunately, with the many aspects it has assumed in different parts of the world, and the many definitions statesmen have encumbered it with, this paper is not concerned; but it is with the nature of this phenomenon as it nurtured on Indian soil: it seeks to interpret this phenomenon and to shape it to a recognisable identity, should this at all be possible.

The man who sired nonalignment was a Hindu - not very much of an orthodox one, yet sufficiently so to be led to enquire: "What is my inheritance? To what am I an heir?".<sup>2</sup> He gave himself an indeterminate answer over hundreds of pages of a book written in the solitude of prison life. Perhaps if he had not functioned for the rest of his time as head of government, he might have revealed his mind more explicitly on foreign affairs. As it is, we find a recurring inexplicitness in his views as independent India's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

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\* I would like to express my gratitude to the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, for a fellowship over a continuing period that has greatly helped me to contribute this paper.

He can, at times, lead us very close to illumination, only to obscure the light. Truth, sometimes, appears to lie almost on the surface, and then far away: we are made to see the scene, rapidly in succession, from both ends of a pair of binoculars. Few foreign ministers could at moments be so frank and revealing, so yielding of satisfying interpretations; hardly any who could be as mystifying. To take full measure of his thoughts and deeds, even in general interpretations, is an unenviable task; one must get away a great deal from Nehru before approaching him again, even then to admit that truth may best be approximated by allowing several interpretations to illumine each other as best they can.

Yet, to Indians struggling to find a national identity in a world which, after so many centuries of relative isolation,<sup>3</sup> seems so pervasive and alien, Nehru is indispensable study. The Indian fixation with Nehru is a necessary one: he is the Hamlet that sustains the play after all; and, in a paper that must limit its scope, he must be its central concern.

In the pages that follow an attempt is made to identify the nature of India's nonalignment chiefly in its relation to the country's security in international affairs. It is in such a relationship that nonalignment needs to be studied and will ultimately come to be judged. And in this connection, two basic questions need answering: (a) why was it that the issue of India's security evoked a particular type of response which came to be identified as nonalignment; and (b) what were the peculiar characteristics of this identity? These are necessarily broad enquiries meant to lead to certain general interpretations of India's participation in international politics. They will have served their purpose, if the answers they give help to illumine this behaviour, and make it more intelligible to Indians, as well as to those who are interested in India, and have a basic knowledge of its affairs.

If Nehru was a remarkable Indian, Gandhi was an extraordinary one. The influence of Gandhi on India's international affairs after he ceased to have much to do with them, has been greatly simplified, more so by those Indians who out of regard for him, have made such large claims in his behalf. Directly he seems to have contributed very little: his dedication was to an absolute form of non-violence, a doctrine for the resolution of conflict that has proved much too ambitious in international affairs, even in the restraining circumstances of the nuclear age; indeed, at critical moments it has proved even as ambitious for India's domestic politics. Yet Gandhi's influence on India's international affairs, after 1947, was pervasive, and perhaps can best be ascribed to a kind of diffusion of the elements of his personality through Nehru's "psyche".

In a general way, the influence of Gandhi on Nehru can be illustrated by several passages, some of them already well-known, from Nehru's eloquent tributes to him.<sup>4</sup> More significantly, from this paper's viewpoint, there occur on some obscure pages of Nehru's cogitations on India and the World, a few remarks which may help us understand the relationship between the two men as it came to affect India's future international relations.

In the passages which follow, Nehru is commenting on the "mockery" of Lloyd George's reference, in 1936, to European Fascist powers as the "have-nots", whilst his country ignored the "real have-not countries and classes" which were "being dominated over and exploited" in England's overseas empire. He goes on to say: "The status quo has to go throughout the world before war goes and the causes of war..... Ultimately, of course, this involves something more than a political or even social change; it involves a change in our habits and beliefs and instincts, and that is a terribly difficult process.....". Such changes he loosely designates as "the psychological process" and continues, "Few people will deny the importance of the

psychological approach and the attempt to convert others....." But "the psychological approach though admirable and worth stressing, does not..... seem to be quite enough. Something more is necessary to induce the recalcitrant groups to accept or submit to..... change. That something is pressure or some kind of coercion, and the bringing about of circumstances which make it more worthwhile for the vested interests to accept change than to suffer greater loss in an attempt to avoid it."

"The application of coercion immediately conflicts with the psychological approach. We are back again where we are. Is there no way out? Cannot that coercion be applied in such a way as to minimize the fear and the hatred and greed which accompany conflict and neutralize even the results of victory? Is it possible to have that psychological approach and yet have that coercion?"

"That I take it, is the real problem.<sup>5</sup>" It was a problem that Gandhi, by 1947, had successfully resolved (in relation to the British at least) through his satyagraha campaigns; but the problem was to continue to haunt Nehru in its international aspect, all his life: in its resolution, over the years, Indian nonalignment was conceived.

There was a great deal of Gandhi that appealed to Nehru, although there was much of him that he rejected. Perhaps the core of this appeal was Gandhi's attempt to wage a struggle against an "injustice" and simultaneously to counter the ill-effects of this struggle against an "injustice" and simultaneously to fight against oneself, for evil, to some extent, was endemic in any conflict, howsoever necessary that conflict might be in relative terms. We are not really concerned with deriving an indigenous source for such a view of the management of conflict. In fact, what seems rather obvious is the affinity of Gandhi's beliefs to Western European norms developed over several centuries; only, of course, Gandhi seems to have

seen with greater perception than many an intelligent Westerner of his time, that even a moral conflict requires to be fought in one sense and fought against in another. But this is something that might be seen as a development of an extension of some of the West's existing moral norms rather than as the creation of specifically Oriental ones. The influence of the indigenous Indian element was there, certainly, but it was far from being so straightforward an influence as it has been thought to be.

What attracted Nehru in the Gandhian approach, made him recoil from what he was to designate loosely as European power-politics. It seemed to him that the usual way in which European powers had managed their international relations was devoid of any attempt at the transformation of their attitudes (the "psychological process", he would call it) towards each other and towards the new forces that had emerged in Asia and in other dominated areas of the world. His analysis of international conflict was firm but simple. European nations managed their international relations essentially through coercion because they could not divest themselves of their interests in their overseas empires. As a result, each European nation feared the other, and they occasionally waged wars against each other because they felt these interests to be threatened. Such wars would continue to be fought by them unless this very system of "capitalist imperialism" (as he called it) was put to an end. Once this happened there would be little occasion for conflict between the European powers themselves, and between the various independent units of international society in general; the era of power politics (i.e. the exercise of sheer coercion in international relations) would come to an end, to be succeeded by that of mutual cooperation between them on free and equal terms. Coercion would be necessary, of course, but that coercion would be exercised in a totally different way; it would have to be exercised through the mutual association of free, socialist states under some form of world federation.<sup>7</sup>



One could substantiate Nehru's analysis of international conflict through numerous quotations; pages voicing these views occur scattered throughout his "works". But one very interesting and characteristic example, significant for the attitude of mind which underlies it (and Indian nonalignment has much to do with understanding attitudes of mind) occurs in the closing pages of his Discovery of India. Nehru is referring to events towards the concluding phases of World War 2:-

"Since the world happens to be round, every country is encircled by others. To avoid such encirclements by the methods of power politics, there must be alliances and counter-alliances, expansion and conquest..... We are witnessing today (Nehru was writing in 1944) the failure of the latest attempt at world domination. Will that lesson be learnt or will there be others, driven by ambition and pride of race and power, to try their fortunes on this fatal field?"

"There really seems to be no alternative between world conquest and world association; there is no choice of a middle course. The old divisions and the quest of power politics have little meaning today and do not fit in with our environment, yet they continue. The interests and activities of States overflow their boundaries and are world-wide. No nation can isolate itself or be indifferent to the political and economic fate of other nations. If there is no cooperation there is bound to be friction with its inevitable results. Cooperation can only be on a basis of equality and mutual welfare on a pulling up of the backward nations and people to a common level of well-being and cultural advancement, on an elimination of racialism and domination. No nation and no people are going to tolerate domination and exploitation by another, even though this is given some pleasant name. Nor will they remain indifferent to their poverty and misery when other parts of the world are flourishing. That was possible only when there was ignorance of what was happening elsewhere."

"All this seems obvious, and yet, the long record of past happenings tell us that the mind of man lags far behind the course of events and adjusts itself only slowly to them. Self-interest itself should drive every nation to this wider cooperation in order to escape disaster in the future and build its own free life on the basis of others' freedom".<sup>8</sup>

Very few passages in The Discovery of India are perhaps as significant in understanding India's future foreign policy as the one I have just quoted. Besides it is vintage Nehru - naive as it is sophisticated, vividly conscious of future trends as it is only very vaguely so of the significant part he himself is playing in hastening their pace. But, more significantly, this passage helps us to appreciate the international context in which Indian independence was conceived and fought. If anything is particularly significant about the Indian movement for independence it is this. It may then be useful to examine this passage more carefully, especially since Nehru's view of European power politics was to considerably influence the shaping of India's nonalignment.

What strikes one immediately is the strong distaste for what Nehru calls power politics and power politics were almost exclusively associated in his mind with alliances and counter-alliances (techniques of the balance of power, a little earlier in his pages, identified as such), with expansion, conquest and wars. As against this "diseased" picture of international life he points its great panacea: a world of free, cooperating states.

To anyone aware of Nehru's recognition of the League's failure, it comes as a great surprise that he should, as late as 1944, believe that states were capable of an almost free, cooperative association with each other, once they were independent: that he should posit it as a panacea for international relations appears to be more an act of faith than a postulate of reason. Yet, in his view, the League failed because it

succumbed to the power politics of the great powers; and most of them were vitiated in their relations with each other and the world because of the empires they had to safeguard. Once international relations ceased to be dominated by the system of empires the entire rotten paraphernalia of power politics would fall away to be substituted this time by another system of manipulating international relations; such institutions as a future League of Nations would then stand a fair chance of succeeding.<sup>9</sup>

This still appears a trite assessment for 1944; yet seen from another perspective his simplicity of mind appears less obvious. If the passage I have quoted above is read with others of a like nature it seems that in the very process of extending the nation-state system to India and to other colonial areas, he wants to ward off the adverse effects which this system engendered in Europe. In his view this could be done, as we have seen, through some supranational agency gradually evolving and functioning impartially for all "free" states alike, but this supra-national agency would be helped to evolve through the processes of democracy reaching their logical fulfilment by the progression in each of them from a state of mere "political democracy" to a state of "social democracy" as well.<sup>10</sup> And by "social democracy" he meant national socialisms.<sup>11</sup> The total impression that his thoughts convey is not a simplistic one: for the fight for India's independence was seen by him as a fight for its more responsible curtailment in the interests of "internationalism".<sup>12</sup> This was far from being a naive view in 1944: it remains a remarkably progressive idea more than two decades later. The question Nehru would have to face in the secret places of his mind, only three years later, was the specific political means by which, in the context of foreign affairs as they were at that time, India could move towards this goal and approximate it as best as possible - how a large, but relatively weak country's security could be maintained

through the creation of a suitable international environment, and one not adverse to most other nations as well - in a world that appeared to him to have reverted to the old order of power politics with new actors for old.

That India's independence was conceived in the spirit of a particular form of internationalism is revealing of the policies Nehru was to follow as India's first foreign minister. Yet, in a sense, the basis for such internationalism was as much laid by Gandhi as by Nehru.<sup>13</sup> Gandhi seems to have had a much cooler vision and judgment than Nehru's. He saw clearer into the British character and, indeed, into Britain's international relations than Nehru did. "An Englishman", he once told an English friend who campaigned strenuously for India's independence, "never respects you till you stand up to him. Then he begins to like you. He is afraid of nothing physical; but he is very mortally afraid of his own conscience if ever you appeal to it and show him to be in the wrong; he does not like to be rebuked for wrong-doing at first; but he will think over it and it will get hold of him and hurt him till he does something to put it right."<sup>14</sup> This seems a remarkably fair assessment to anyone who has tried to see Englishmen in the whole, except, perhaps, that the English may not respect you merely because you stand up to them, but because you stand up to them in a particular way. The story of how against much radical pressure, including that of Nehru,<sup>15</sup> Gandhi in the 1920's insisted on linking India's independence movement to the concept of equality within the British Commonwealth with a policy associated with that of the British and the Dominions, has been excellently narrated in Dr. Mehrotra's study on India and the Commonwealth.<sup>16</sup> What emerges from this account is Gandhi's attempt to remain in a very real association

with the British whilst waging a conflict against them. The Indian struggle was not seen by Gandhi as merely a step towards the disintegration of the British Empire but towards its transformation into a small international system: a body of free states linked to the general objectives of British and Dominion foreign policies in world affairs, leavened, as he felt they would be, by the type of struggle India was waging for her independence; but with the option of breaking away from this association should British foreign policy fail to live up to the hopes reposed in it. "The better mind of the world", he declared in December 1924, "desires today not absolute independent States warring one against another but a federation of friendly interdependent ones..... It should rest with Britain to say that she will have no real alliance with India. I desire the ability to be totally independent without asserting the independence". "My ambition", he wrote in 1928, "is much higher than independence."<sup>17</sup> Through the deliverance of India, I seek to deliver the so-called weaker races of the earth from the crushing heels of Western exploitation in which England is the greatest partner. If India converts, as it can convert, Englishmen, it can become the predominant partner in a world commonwealth of which England can have the privilege of becoming a partner if she chooses..... This is big talk I know"... but... "mine is an ambition worth living for and worth dying for. In no case do I want to reconcile myself to a state lower than the best for fear of consequences. It is, therefore, not out of expedience that I oppose independence as the goal."<sup>18</sup>

There is a great deal of moral verve in these passages, a sort of wonder at one's ethical discoveries and a feeling of standing responsibly on the edges of historical epochs. This is typically Indian. But there is genuine vision too. It was characteristic of Gandhi to try and fight an adversary, to preserve what was most worthwhile in him, while adjusting his vision, if possible by reasonable persuasion, and if not, by

personal sacrifice, in the hope that this would affect a human change in the adversary.<sup>19</sup> Gandhi's attempt, which ultimately "failed" because of the radical Indian opposition it roused, appears in perspective to be remarkably far-sighted. Although much of this must be necessarily speculative, it needs to be said that if radical Indian opinion and British suspicion and cautiousness had not frustrated the Gandhian attempt, it could have meant almost a new pattern in modern international relations: it would have meant a sobering restraint to national consciousness at the very inception of a new era of modern Asian nationalisms; this could have avoided all the dangers of a host of nationally-minded states living together in a shrinking world; it could have transformed with luck, with patience and foresight the great powers into the "great responsables" - at least, with the British example a most valuable precedent might have been established; it could have meant a coming closer together of the West and the East at a time when it was most likely that the East in its search for justice and liberty -- and most of all, equality - would not be able to escape the adverse effects of a most just struggle; it might have meant a cutting across of the divisions in the world instead of perpetuating the old ones and creating new ones of even a more rabid nature. If anything could have contributed more to a mitigation of "European power politics", which so repulsed Nehru, and prevented its proliferation in potentially as rabid a form, to the rest of the world, it could have been the sort of transformation of the British Empire Gandhi had in mind in the 1920's. For Gandhi saw much more closely than Nehru did that British foreign policy, sullied though it was, possessed characteristics that, in the subtly relative context of international relations, were not equalled in moral tone and motivation by many another great powers.<sup>20</sup> To continental states England was the "perfidious Albion" of Europe. It is not surprising that the charge of perfidiousness

should often have been levelled at Gandhi himself. Those who in political affairs refuse to part with moral values, however flexibly they conceive and try to apply them, and are called upon to pay a great part in the world, almost invariably appear "perfidious".<sup>21</sup> Gandhi understood better than Nehru did that it was in England's power and in her moral capacity to effect a far-reaching change in relation to her overseas Empire. For whereas Nehru characterised England's policy as being for long "based on a balance of power in Europe and opposition to any dominating power there," and yet could go on to say without qualification: "Always there has been fear of others and that fear has led to aggression and tortuous intrigues", Gandhi, as early as 1922, could see through the "fear" and the "aggression" and the "tortuous intrigues"<sup>22</sup> to write: "India's greatest glory will consist not in regarding Englishmen as her implacable enemies fit only to be turned out of India at the first available opportunity but in turning them into friends and partners in a new commonwealth of nations in the place of an Empire based upon exploitation of the weaker or underdeveloped nations and races of the earth, and therefore finally upon force".<sup>23</sup> A remarkable presaging of the future, but of a future from which the essence of Gandhi's conception was to whittle away.

This is not all there is in the literature on the subject to understand the international context in which Indian independence was conceived,<sup>24</sup> but it is sufficient for the purposes of this paper. Nehru, although he fought hard against Gandhi's view of India's relations with the British Commonwealth, was not unimpressed by Gandhi's vision. Basically he considered it sound, but the firm association in his mind of capitalism with imperialism,<sup>25</sup> his great attraction to the socialistic experiment to raise the lot of the poor (an aim he considered basic to India's struggle for independence)<sup>26</sup> and his desire not to tie a future foreign policy of India to a great European power like England's, and so to merely perpetuate the old system of power politics

instead of scuttling it<sup>27</sup> - these were impulses in the young Nehru too heady to be checked by Gandhi's cooler vision. Yet fundamentally, both were thinking in terms larger than the establishment and possession of national independence. Nehru fully understood and sympathised with Gandhi's attempt to limit India's independence in a certain direction even in the process of fighting for it.<sup>28</sup> Indeed, Nehru was to strenuously attempt this characteristically Gandhian exercise in the 1930's and the 1940's in a different way.<sup>29</sup> And, after 1947, he was to struggle in the same direction against great odds - those that independent power almost inevitably brings to the sort of man he was. It may seem ironical, but not very surprising, that his receptivity to the Gandhian ethos, in its generality, if not in its particularisms, was to involve Nehru in one of the subtlest manipulations of power the international world was to witness.

It would be difficult to convey the identity of Indian nonalignment without considering this Gandhian backdrop. Nonalignment is a curious growth; its character is determined (and will be increasingly determined) as much by the "spirit" with which it is worked as a political weapon as it is by the number of forces that bear on a country in a particular geographical area. Because the "spirit" with which a nonaligned policy is pursued is most difficult of definition, and involves a certain measure of value - judgement, such a policy often does not lend itself to firm characterization. I have tried, in a brief sketch, to convey the impulses which animated India's view of the world before she became independent. It is necessary now to examine the way in which, and the extent to which, this "spirit" took flesh and blood as a foreign policy, when Nehru at last came to grips with the world, as it was, in 1947.



III

It may help to clarify the discussion which follows, if this section begins by stating a series of inter-related assessments, before the rest of the paper goes on to show how they are derived. These assessments are: that India's non-alignment was a term used to indicate a foreign policy which, in some of its essentials, had a recognisable identity much before anyone could have been aware of the possible emergence of the Cold War, but that this policy found a particularly congenial applicability in the circumstances peculiar to that War; that, objectively seen, India's nonalignment, primarily as it functioned within this context, was a particular type of a balance of power policy, and that in its fundamentals it had great affinity to the policy England had pursued on the continent of Europe for most of the nineteenth century; that the policy's significance lay in the "identification" of its national interests with the interests of the (greatly expanded) international society of sovereign states, its national security with the integrity of this society as a whole; that Nehru did not show himself to be particularly aware of the basically coercive nature of his policy - its political dynamics or credibility - or felt it necessary to conceal these aspects as much as possible by stressing its role - sincerely conceived in all probability - as a protest against the old methods of power politics that had proved incapable of maintaining the peace in the past, and would do so in the future if allowed to operate as freely as they had hitherto done. Each of these assessments, it is hoped, will be clarified in the course of the following discussion of India's international relations between 1947 - 1962.

Even while the Indian National Congress was engaged in struggling against the British it was formulating a stand in foreign affairs (predominantly under Nehru's leadership) that bears a remarkable resemblance to India's foreign policy, even

as it is at present enunciated. By the 1930's one may say that India's foreign policy - or rather the elements that were to officially characterize it - had already emerged. Nehru's aim for India in foreign affairs seems to have been to avoid being drawn into any groups or configurations of power, and these were associated in his mind, from a very early date, with the old methods of managing international relations, methods of the defunct empires, which he labelled policies of the balance of power, or simply power politics.<sup>30</sup> India was to maintain her protest against such methods by refusing to tie her policy to the interests of any great power so that she was free to cultivate friendly and cooperative relations with all powers, especially those around her. Thus she was not going to tie her policy to Great Britain, for that might mean, quite automatically, a tie against Russia, towards which Great Britain, because of her empire in India and elsewhere might be hostile, but with which a truly democratic and independent India could have no quarrel.<sup>31</sup> From the records of his speeches and writings during this period (and he was almost the only spokesman on foreign affairs and had the approval of the bulk of the Indian National Congress) he appears to have visualised his policy of friendly and cooperative relations with all states as almost a new technique for the management of international relations. His picture of the world (even at the risk of repetition this needs to be outlined here) was one in which the impulse of the great powers for empire building had been opposed and removed; the world would then consist of a number of independent states having an equal status with each other by virtue of the fact that they were independent and sovereign. At the same time he believed that the system of national independent states, without any empires and extended to the rest of the world though it might be, was not viable in itself; technological and other factors had made each separate identity within this

system greatly dependent on the other, so that peaceful and friendly cooperation under some sort of world association or federation was inescapable.<sup>32</sup>

These were views not uncommon at the time among Western liberals and socialists. Yet there was one significant difference. Nehru was often to protest that even liberals and socialists in England, though advocating the most enlightened principles for their own country and for Europe and the West in general, seemed to acquiesce in the continuation of authoritarian rule in their overseas territories. He was often to make this complaint bitterly: he could hardly understand, he once said, how "an ardent apostle of peace, a champion of sanctions against Italy, who has received the Nobel Peace Prize, tells us in India that we are narrow-minded and perverted because we do not see the beauty of the British Empire and seek to walk out of it...."<sup>33</sup> Perhaps Gandhi, in the 1920's, may have understood what the Nobel Peace Prize winner was trying to say, and what Churchill always had in mind when opposing the dissolution of Britain's empire in India -- the Pax Britannica, of course. Churchill was as incapable of understanding Nehru as Nehru was Churchill<sup>34</sup> or, for that matter, all those liberal and socialist gentlemen, who appeared to him so blatantly inconsistent in the application of their views. For in Nehru's mind the British empire was not at all identified with a Pax Britannica or with any other sort of peace; only in opposing such convenient rationalisations did he feel that the old age of power politics, and the cynical manipulation of balances of power, could be brought to an end.

Again, had not one of the great liberal protagonists of world organisation - President Wilson - built his League of free, sovereign states by acquiescing in several European empires ruling over subject peoples?<sup>35</sup> There appears, then, to be a difference between Nehru's world view in the 1930's, out of which India's foreign policy was to develop, and that

of Western "liberal" opinion; consequently, for all its seeming identity to his own views he could not bring himself to trust it.

More than any another factor, it was his realization that even Western liberal and socialist opinion could discriminate between different areas of the world in the application of their views, that helped to keep alive in him his wary suspicion of the West.<sup>36</sup> He was convinced, even as early as in the 1920's, that independence for India could not be won, and a new order in world affairs would not emerge, through a constitutional fight against the British. He poured scorn on the former stalwarts of the Indian National Congress for believing that the British could be induced merely by persuasion to give up their vested interests in the Indian empire.<sup>37</sup> Coercion was necessary, but typically, even before Gandhi came, he shrank from employing terroristic methods.<sup>38</sup> When Gandhi expounded his doctrine of "satyagraha" as a means of forcing the British out, the young Nehru, almost overnight became its ardent supporter<sup>34</sup> - for here was a technique that peacefully, yet effectively, coerced; and peaceful coercion was more likely to bring about those significant psychological changes in the adversary that limited the adverse effects of the conflict and sanctified victory. In fact, if an off-hand definition of nonalignment was required, it could be given as peaceful coercion of both parties to the Cold War. And peaceful coercion, in Nehru's book of rules, did not appear to imply power politics - as we shall subsequently see.

The main objectives of India's foreign policy, as they were to be officially reiterated in the years ahead, had already begun to emerge by the 1930's.<sup>40</sup> They are much too well-known, and it would be tedious to elaborate on them here; many of them are common to the general objectives of most other nonaligned nations as well. But such officially reiterated objectives, though important ingredients of a

policy, cannot be confused with what I have called the political dynamics of a policy, its political credibility. It is to the gradual development of the political credibility of India's nonalignment that we must now turn.

Even were a politician aware of what really makes his policy work, he would be constrained, for reasons which are obvious, from divulging his knowledge. Nehru came very close to confessing this in an address to the Indian Council of World Affairs: "Now it is all very well to talk about foreign policy" he said, "but you will appreciate that no person charged with a country's foreign policy can say really very much about it. He can say something general about it; he can sometimes say something very specific about it when the occasion arises, but there are many things connected with it which are supposed to lie in what are called top-secret files. In spite of this they are not frightfully secret but still they are not to be talked about in public!"<sup>41</sup> Examples of such candour, however, are relatively few. But a warning he once gave, of a politician's need to observe silence about his thoughts, is revealing enough"..... Truth," he wrote, "is for an individual what he himself feels and knows to be true. According to that definition I do not know of any person who holds to the truth as Gandhi does. That is a dangerous quality in a politician, for he speaks out his mind, and even lets the public see its changing phases."<sup>42</sup>

Internally, in satyagraha, as we have seen, he had an effective long-range weapon against the British. But he appeared to be fully aware that the British, and all those other European powers who possessed empires, needed to be challenged not only from nationalist movements within their empires but from without also. Indeed, in his view, the entire system of "capitalist - imperialism" that they represented required to be opposed. In Communist Russia, by the very example of her socialistic orientation and the

economic strength she now possessed, he felt this system had found a formidable challenge. Nehru was enormously attracted to the socialistic experiment in Soviet Russia - but it was essentially an emotional attachment, not a doctrinaire one.<sup>43</sup> He had a peculiar syncretic theory about Democracy. I have referred to it earlier but it needs to be elaborated here. He believed that the forces of democracy, though they had been developing in the Western world, had become arrested at the stage of a mere "political democracy"; indeed, because "political democracy" conflicted with the interests of the capitalist classes an attempt was constantly made by them to curb even the measure of "political democracy" that already existed. The more extreme manifestations of such capitalist activity the European continent had been witnessing in Fascism and Nazism. As long as a nation possessed an empire it was merely a half-brother to Fascism, and the fight between them was a fight between half-brothers.<sup>44</sup> In contrast, Russia challenged this international system in many of its manifestations. Russia was a bastion of "social democracy", while capitalists prevented the West from moving in that direction. There were many things he did not like about Communistic methods, neither did he care for their rigid doctrines, and he often said so; but he perpetually interpreted the Russian experiment as broadly as possible; he glossed over the minutiae and saw the Russian Revolution in the large perspectives of History. What he saw Russia achieving for the common man in terms of his basic human needs, moved him enormously; and this emotional predilection induced him to make many excuses for Russia and to overlook many of his own protestations against the means used in that country to achieve what he regarded to be very worthwhile ends. In international relations he was alarmed every time there was a threat to Russian security; that threat was regarded as an attempt by capitalist states to perpetuate their international system, by encircling a powerful socialist state.

Many of the most dubious Russian moves in international relations were explained away by him, if not entirely condoned, as resulting from the fears of encirclement which had dogged the Russian regime ever since its establishment. Russian power was necessary to control Western power; should Russia succumb it would be enormously more difficult for colonial people to struggle out of their fetters.<sup>45</sup>

Here we have some elements of the political dynamics behind those large objectives he wished India to achieve in international affairs. In an already recognisable form, the policy of nonalignment is beginning to emerge when nobody at that time could have anticipated, with any certainty, the coming of the Cold War. But in seeing Russia's role in the way he did in the 1930's, and, indeed subsequently (although quite categorically he confessed himself shocked and pained by the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 and the moves Russia made following it)<sup>46</sup> Nehru appears to have shown himself to be entirely aware of the way in which power needed to be manipulated in international affairs if certain objectives were to be achieved. Was this not an indulgence in power politics after all? Would this not imply that power politics were more justified if used for the ends Nehru had in mind than those Western European nations had used them for? In international politics, then, it would appear that power politics were inescapable, but of course there were types and forms of power politics, and any normative assessment of a foreign policy had to be a relative one - often a very subtly relative one. Ideas of satyagraha, non-violence, and nonalignment - proudly believed by Indians to be their country's humane contributions to the world - were, indeed, humane contributions, but they were not, therefore, "a-power-political" ones. Yet the image of India as being opposed to power politics and balances of power, because she will have nothing to do with power blocs, is a persisting one. Doubtless it has a significant emotional appeal, for "power politics" after all were

the baleful indulgences of men who believed only in the survival of the fittest, not of those who advocated protection of the poor and the down-trodden.<sup>47</sup> India's has been essentially a "puritanical" reaction to international politics, but she had yet to learn that hers was not the first of such reactions in History, that changes in international politics occur over millenia and not over epochs, and that those who set out to seek brave new worlds in international affairs may find themselves doing very unbrave things. Nevertheless, when all this is said, it would be a profound pity if what was worthwhile in India's initial response to international politics, was to be discarded on some baleful tide of reaction, as naive in its "realism" as were certain aspects of the country's early "puritanism".

That Nehru's attitude, however, was not so jejun about the realities of manipulating power in international relations as it is sometimes believed to be is also evidenced by an article written by him on "The Defence of India" in 1931.<sup>48</sup> The article is valuable for it is one of those few instances where Nehru does not obscure the underlying political credibility of his thoughts. In fact, his straight-forwardness of expression, coming as it does from the pen of a man who always thought around issues than of them, almost startles - as, for example in the following passage: "If the domination of England over India ceases and India becomes free, what will be the reaction of other powers? It may be that some will covet her, but the master desire will be to prevent any other nation from possessing India. No country will tolerate the idea of another gaining dominion over India and thus acquiring the commanding position which England occupied for so long. If any power was covetous enough to make the attempt, all the others would combine to prevent this and to trounce the intruder. This mutual rivalry would in itself be the surest guarantee against an attack on India".<sup>49</sup> Nor



did he show himself to be particularly sanguine about Soviet Russia, in spite of seeing her as a challenger to Europe's imperial system, and in spite of making allowances on her behalf. In the same article he goes on to say: "Russia then remains the sole country that may threaten our freedom. She is grown and is in a favourable position to attack us. But it is a well-known fact that although she is strong and invulnerable in defence, she is weak in attack. The Soviet Government has made good against a host of external enemies and an abundance of difficulty and misfortune at home. These difficulties and enmities continue and it is exceedingly unlikely that it will embark on an aggressive campaign with so many dangers to face at home and abroad. Such a venture would inevitably expose Russia's flanks to a host of enemies who have long been waiting for a chance to swoop down on her."<sup>50</sup>

(It was typical of Nehru that he should see in the Soviet Government a bulwark of opposition against the West, that he should consider this as helping the cause of freedom in the dominated parts of Asia, and yet be wary of imperialist-Europe's challenge.<sup>51</sup> In the cold War, more than twenty-five years later, he was to take up the same attitude towards the United States). He concluded his cogitations on India's future defence by assuring his countrymen "that the position of Free India in the world would be a favourable one and the chances of external attack on her are remote", yet adding the warning, "we will have to prepare for all contingencies and devote ourselves to the speedy reconstruction of our defence forces."<sup>52</sup>

The article's implications (and here we are not really concerned with the merits of the views it expresses) are of some significance; for they reveal a state of mind Nehru would hardly be in a position to disclose with such frankness during the Cold War years. A free India, he appears to be saying, was secure by virtue of the rivalry of the

great powers in potential (if not actual) conflict over her, and through such a conflict, a free but otherwise susceptible India could achieve and maintain her security - of course if she knows how to play her cards well. Now it doesn't need much sophistication to describe this as a balance of power policy. It did not require the Cold War for Nehru to shape in his mind the political credibility that could underlie a future Indian foreign policy, although, as I shall soon be saying, the circumstances of the Cold War were particularly congenial to its more effective operation. Nor must it be imagined, at a hop, that Nehru was showing his "true colours" in denouncing power politics, on the one hand, and fashioning a balance of power policy on the other. Power politics were associated in his mind almost exclusively with the policies of empire-building, as is clear to anyone who has read through his writings and speeches in their entirety, and has tried to see what lay behind them. Nehru was not an empire-builder in a new guise - and one can be as categorical about this as one can possibly be. But he was concerned about protecting India's security in an international environment in which power politics, of the sort he envisaged, would conceivably continue to operate and would need to be coped with, until the emergence of a host of free states all over the world would mitigate their operation.<sup>53</sup> Although at present, because this host of free states leads a precarious economic life, Nehru might seem to be justified in some of the views he held; but in the long run, his belief, that power politics would be mitigated by the elimination of colonialism and the creation of a number of independent socialist states, and that these would evolve sensibly in the direction of a world federation, will appear an enormous simplification of the real issues that underlie international relations; and it is here that Gandhi, if indirectly, showed a greater degree of sophistication.

Two other pre-Cold War elements of the political credibility of Indian nonalignment need to be mentioned before this section concludes. "No nation and no people," wrote Nehru in 1936, "are going to tolerate domination and exploitation by another, even though this is given some pleasant name. Nor will they remain indifferent to their poverty and misery when other parts of the world are flourishing. That was possible only when there was ignorance of what was happening elsewhere!"<sup>54</sup> Here, indeed, is one of the most potent and abiding forces behind any policy of nonalignment. Nehru was among the earliest, and perhaps the most emotionally involved of Asian statesmen, to stimulate and organise the dissatisfaction of hundreds of millions of peoples and direct these pressures against a much smaller world of relative plenty. This is an ingredient of the political dynamics of any nonaligned country; and it is this element that will make states continue to say they are nonaligned much after there is nothing to be particularly nonaligned about. There is a certain heightening of human feeling about hungry mouths that is politically irresistible in an age such as ours. Nehru saw this clearly enough, in 1936, when he wrote as he did, and indeed, much earlier; and emotionally involved as he was he could rouse the feelings of millions of his countrymen some of whom had never glimpsed at the world very much beyond their mud-huts.

Finally, there was Nehru's optimistic belief that once the British were prevented from economically holding back India (and there was truth in this charge), the country had sufficient potential, and technical skill, to become prosperous in a relatively short time. "Give me an extra ton of coal," Bevin is supposed to have once urged his countrymen, "and I shall give you a foreign policy." Nehru often said much the same thing, once in power: by then he was to realize the full complexity of the economic problems

that faced his country. But in the pre-Cold War days, when India's policies were germinating in his mind, and he was laying their basis, his faith in his country and in his countrymen, made him confident that India had the means of supporting a foreign policy which, while protecting the country's security, could also work for "the larger good of the world!"<sup>55</sup>

#### IV

To support such an interpretation of Nehru's policies by means of a detailed analysis of the historical record is a large undertaking for a paper, more concerned with establishing some elements of a broader identity for India's non-alignment. But it forms an important concern of this paper, although its treatment must necessarily be general.

By 1944 Nehru had begun to gauge, quite accurately, the future configuration of power in international relations. His mood was one of considerably greater scepticism about Soviet Russia. "In physical and economic power", he wrote "there will be none to challenge it (the USSR) on the Eurasian continent. Already it is showing an expansionist tendency and is extending its territories more or less on the basis of the Tsar's Empire. How far this process will go it is difficult to say. Its socialistic economy does not necessarily lead to expansion for it can be made self-sufficient. But other forces and old suspicions are at play, and again we notice the fear of so-called encirclement;..... the tendency to expand if not in territory then in other ways is evident. No other country today presents such a politically solid and economically well-balanced picture as the Soviet Union, though some of the developments there in recent years have come as a shock to many of its old admirers."<sup>56</sup>

Nor did he seem without suspicion of the United States. "The U.S.A. and the Soviet Union", he wrote at this time,

"seem destined to play a vital part in the future..... All the evils of a purely political democracy are present in the U.S.A.; the evils of the lack of political democracy are present in the USSR."<sup>57</sup> Much of this, as usual, was hedged by a number of qualifications. Nevertheless he went on to ask: "Another era of imperialism, or an age of international cooperation, or world commonwealth, which is it going to be in the future? The scales incline towards the former and the old arguments are repeated but not with the old candour..... They used to be more frank about empire in the old days. Speaking of the Athenian Empire, Thucydides wrote:... 'If we are now here in Sicily, it is in the interests of our own security.... It is fear that forces us to cling to our empire in Greece and it is fear that drives us hither, with the help of our friends, to order matters in Sicily.' And again when he referred to the tribute of the Athenian colonies: 'It may seem wickedness to have won it; but it is certainly folly to let it go.'<sup>58</sup>

These passages in The Discovery of India are illuminating in themselves, and require only a few comments to set them in perspective:

Nehru saw the coming struggle between the USA and the USSR as a continuation of power politics of the sort that had led to the creation and maintenance of empires. He attributed the possible expansionist aims of both these great constellations of power to fear of each other: he believed that fear for their own security would drive them to attain positions of strength against each other, and that if no resistance was offered both, the old sorry tale of empire-building, empire consolidation and empire-justification would be repeated - if in a new form.<sup>59</sup> The slow and painful gains made by India (not to mention those made by other struggling nationalities over a period of more than sixty years could be wiped away in the headlong clash between two antagonists much

too powerful to be physically withstood.<sup>60</sup> India's was a voice of three hundred and fifty million people. If she did not, as yet, have physical might she had strength of a sort - the sort of strength he had clearly hinted at in 1931. If that strength had to be used for the international and national objectives Nehru had in mind - if it was used to oppose the power politics of the great powers and prevent them, in the search for their own security, to ride roughshod over peoples of other races with awakened needs for their own well-being and security -- then a policy was required that simultaneously threatened them both: one which took advantage of their fears vis-a-vis each other and which put up "equal" resistance to both by conveying to them the underlying political message implicit in a large, but relatively unstable country, following an independent course in foreign affairs. We are going to follow an independent policy, said Nehru; he, of course, could not spell out the underlying political message (and one feels he often wished to hide this message from himself)<sup>61</sup> if any of the great powers do not respect our independence our weight for what it is worth will be cast in favour of its chief antagonist. To be independent in foreign affairs, as Nehru could often afford to say, meant to be free to decide on a particular course at a particular time. This was enough to carry a message both antagonists understood.

But how did Nehru count on their respecting it? I have already outlined some of the elements of what I have called the pre-Cold War political credibility of Indian policy. In all probability they would have been operative even had international politics not taken the form they did in 1945.<sup>62</sup> But they became particularly applicable in the circumstances of the Cold War. It is true, of course, that Russia did not possess nuclear capacity to pose an ultimate threat to the United States until later. But it was common knowledge, even

in 1946, that Russia would not for long be without such weapons - in fact, Churchill was already speaking of the emergence of the "balance of terror". Translated crudely, this signified the incapacity of the great powers to use the ultimate weapon against each other; it also meant that it would be folly for either antagonist to plunge into war to achieve its security objectives, and that these would have to be achieved by means other than war -- by propaganda, subversion and so on. But propaganda, subversion and other such techniques of forceful and peaceful persuasion would of themselves have been unnecessary had certain vital geographic areas, to which the security of both super powers was tied, had not, to a great extent under India's early example, put up a particular type of resistance. This resistance, then, though it was not entirely a Cold War product, became excellently suited to Cold War conditions. War, or rather the prospects of war, between the super powers in resolution of their disputes, having become "unthinkable", another, most significant element, in the political credibility of Indian nonalignment had become available to it. It is not difficult to see why, after 1947, with India's independence and the stand she took up in foreign affairs, nonalignment caught on so rapidly. The political credibility of such a policy had pre-Cold War roots in almost every colonial territory. The Cold War strengthened these roots and now India was beginning to derive an independent international life from them. To be weak and yet to be independent in foreign affairs must be considered an almost irresistible impulse to most nations. Once such a large country as India, weak but strategically positioned, successfully kept up resistance to both the super powers, many if not all of the relatively smaller Asian nations could seek an almost ready-made formula - to work out their own destiny in the way in which their "history" and culture, and their internal power structures, dictated. This is to enormously simplify, of course, but it still remains valid to say that, coming as it did so early in the Cold War, India's contribution

to Asian nations was vitally a strategic one. In turn, the rapid spread of nonalignment reinforced India's strength vis-a-vis both the super powers and added yet another element to the political credibility and manoeuvrability of India's policy.

Policies, in international affairs, have a strange knack of recurring in different and sometimes unrecognisable forms. India's policies after 1947 take on an irony that might have amused the old gods in their armoured heavens. For India, after having got rid of the British, was manipulating a foreign policy which the British had followed on the continent of Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries, and which Nehru had characterised as "power politics". The fundamental resemblance seems inescapable. England's policy had often been referred to as a policy of non-intervention in European affairs. But her "non-intervention" had always been a loaded threat. As the perceptive Talleyrand once remarked: "Non-intervention is a word signifying much the same as intervention".<sup>63</sup> Non-intervention signified the power to effectively threaten intervention in pursuit of the foreign policy objectives of the country. Yet England's non-intervention had also a normative content, for she did not covet any territorial gains in Europe; in fact what concerned her most was that the European society of sovereign states (with their attached 64 empires) should continue to exist in that form on the continent. But after all did this not particularly favour England's predominant position in the world at large? Yes, and no. Yes, because this was so for most of the nineteenth century; no, because, among other considerations, England's predominant position in the world was not entirely held by force but, in part, by the willing consent of her white partners in the Commonwealth. England had permitted the idea of the European State-system to be gradually extended from Europe to certain of her overseas dominions. This, indeed, had been the cautious drift of her policy even with respect to India, as



Gandhi very early realised. She had not attempted to use her predominant position in the world either to attempt hegemony on the continent, or to maintain it over all her overseas territories.<sup>65</sup> There were, thus, normative aspects to her policy of non-intervention in European affairs, although these were, of course, associated with considerations of power arising from issues of her own security.<sup>66</sup>

Now this was an amalgam characteristic of Indian non-alignment as well. Of course the circumstances were much different; but the underlying similarity was fundamental. Did India really have England's power, through non-intervention, to effectively threaten intervention? If a country's power is interpreted in simplistic terms as deriving from armies and navies, then of course it seems ridiculous to compare England's position in international affairs in the nineteenth century to India's in the middle of the twentieth. But power can be derived by a nation from subtler circumstances.<sup>67</sup> India's strength, in the Cold War, was derived from a host of very unconventional factors, but predominantly it was derived from the nuclear balance of terror - the incapacity of the super powers of relying on war as a means for the resolution of their disputes, should this become imperative. As I have outlined earlier, the super powers would have to achieve their objectives by means other than war; in these circumstances a country like India could, by a policy of non-alignment in the Cold War, effectively threaten potential alignment without overtly saying so;<sup>68</sup> and it is paradoxical that the very weakness of nonaligned nations, their international, political and economic stability has given their Governments greater strength potentially to threaten alignment.<sup>69</sup> Since the balance of terror holds even today, there has been no occasion for India to spell out the underlying implications of nonalignment - implications which, quite naturally, Indian official opinion cannot admit, and which the country's unofficial opinion has not as yet understood as existing.<sup>70</sup>

Such a policy is aimed at maintaining the security of a relatively weak state intact against the possible pressures, stemming from the internecine conflicts, of overwhelmingly powerful states. Nehru said this often, of course not in quite the same way,<sup>71</sup> except perhaps on a few occasions.<sup>72</sup> His usual stand was that India did not wish to have anything to do with the power politics of the great powers.<sup>73</sup> In thus reconciling the underlying realities of his policy with his emotional antipathy against the international consequences of great power conflicts,<sup>74</sup> he has created an extremely potent myth in the Asian and African world - that of its dissociation from the power politics of the great powers. Under its cover a nonaligned policy can manipulate in a variety of directions, although at the moment because of the economic and political difficulties with which nonaligned countries are beset, such potentialities do not surface, and all nonaligned policies assume a monotonous sameness in outward identity. But in the years ahead much will come to depend upon the indigenous "ethos" of nonaligned nations,<sup>75</sup> and a study of such an "ethos" in different regions of the world is vital to some regulation, at least, of the international relations of the future.

To return, however, to question the extent to which India's security is protected by its nonaligned policy - what of China's invasion of India's territory? Apart from this the record of the policy seems to be fairly unsullied, for India, considering the circumstances, has had a remarkable degree of stability both in national as in international affairs, even when allowance to "Fortunas" has been made. I am generalizing broadly, of course, but this is all that this paper can do.

In connection with the Chinese incursions, the main charge is that because India could not adequately defend herself and had almost to ask for outside assistance, or at least to rely heavily on its being provided, her nonalignment

as a security policy, has proved to be ineffective. The charge has been spelt out in all its details since 1962:<sup>76</sup> yet it does not appear to have occurred to many that a nonaligned policy's "strength" has really very little to do with obtaining help from the great powers in cases of emergency. To subscribe to such a view is to be deceived by the propaganda of nonalignment, and to fail to perceive its basic pulls. To have been in a position to obtain assistance from outside in an emergency of this sort, and once this emergency was over, to be able to "revert" to a nonaligned stance, is surely not a failure of such a policy, but appears almost a vindication of it! It seems to one writer at least as very much an extension, rather than an eclipse, of nonalignment into an age in which the super powers, after check-mating each other and being checkmated in turn by nonaligned nations, over a decade and a half, are now evolving, albeit very cautiously, into the "great responsables" - something which the UN Charter set out to do and failed! This is primarily due, of course, to their realization of the need to keep the nuclear balance of terror stable; it is also due, in a significant part, to the pressures exerted on them by strongly nationalist feeling. But strongly nationalist feeling without an effective policy to support it produced, at best, the Mandates System of the League of Nations in the inter-war years. It was nonalignment that may be said to have organised strongly nationalist feeling, so that its pressures in foreign affairs could be made to be felt effectively on the two struggling giants. It was not merely the balance of terror that convinced the super powers that their security was tied to the independence of much weaker nations. Indeed, in a sense, quite the contrary.<sup>77</sup> It was because the phenomenon of nonalignment cast its shadow on them at almost the same time as the balance of terror did. It was the simultaneous occurrence of both that seems, for the time being, to have made the super powers look over their shoulders and have some concern for the extent, and sort

of ground they tread while struggling with each other for their own lives. In the nineteenth century England had at times to intervene in continental affairs to give aid to maintain the independence of certain European powers, and could then afford to withdraw into non-involvement again. In the mid-twentieth century, India can receive aid, in a crisis such as the calculated Chinese offensive<sup>78</sup> and still maintain her non-involved position in international affairs.<sup>79</sup> One can, of course, be too clever in assessments of this sort, but judged by the coldly calculating standards of national self-interest, this seems to mark an improvement on England's celebrated - and, on the whole, effective - policy of non-intervention in European affairs, if it seems to mark anything at all!

It is being said today that with the gradual diminishing of the Cold War, nonalignment is likely to lose its effectiveness. In some respects this seems a just observation. But nonalignment (that most diffuse of terms in the vocabulary of international politics today) has helped to generate and keep alive so much emotive force within a period of two decades, that Cold War or not, the great powers are likely to tread with much greater circumspection in the underdeveloped world, than they would have otherwise done. Besides, the Cold War, identified much too loosely with the balance of terror, may diminish, and this may help to stabilize the balance of terror -- but not necessarily to eclipse it. Nonalignment is more related to the balance of terror than it is to the Cold War as such; and, as we have seen in the case of India, nonalignment gained an added strength with the emergence of the balance of terror, but had its roots in the decades that preceded it. That the policy may survive the Cold War is not after all as inconceivable as it may seem to many today.

V.

What remains to be assessed is the "normative" identity<sup>80</sup> of India's nonalignment.

What sort of world had Nehru helped, at least in part, to bring into-being, and how did it conform to the normative objectives he had long held with such conviction? In relation to these, his achievement appears to have been a curiously mixed one, but otherwise it is fairly impressive. The world doesn't seem to be steadily moving in the direction of a world federation that could guarantee the security of all states alike; on the contrary, the number of diverse interests which have been created, and which will continue to grow rather than otherwise, seems almost a retrogressive step. But then, perhaps, in the vast perspectives of History, such a retrogressive step may come to be looked upon as a necessary stage in the growth of an effective world organisation, if not of world government.<sup>81</sup> It is true, of course, that Anglo-American opinion, and even policy, was developing in this direction much before Nehru appeared on the international scene, but Nehru considerably accelerated the pace wisely or otherwise, it will be for History to judge. History may, however, admit that the instrumentality through which this pace was accelerated was Nehru's creation; and although it was used, in part, against the West, Nehru will find his place in the Western European "cultural tradition"<sup>82</sup> in international relations, once the dust of contemporary politics settles, and History begins its reckoning.

Indeed, Nehru's significance will come to lie in the extension that his policies made possible (because of the form they took) of the Western European, and, more specifically, the Anglo-Saxon heritage, in international politics to the rest of the world. It is true, of course, that Europe had to be fought so that its political culture would not remain confined to the European continent.<sup>83</sup> Thus, it is not entirely

without appositeness that we find Nehru believing "the history of Athens" to be "full of the incompatibility of democracy with empire. . . No upholder of freedom and empire", he wrote, "could state his case so well and so eloquently as Thucydides said: '..... For through effort and suffering and on many a stricken field we have found the secret of human power, which is the secret of happiness. Men have guessed at it under many names, but we alone have learnt to know it and to make it at home in our city. And the name we know it by is freedom, for it has taught us that to serve is to be free. Do you wonder why it is that alone among mankind we confer our benefits not on conditions of self-interest but in the fearless confidence of freedom?'"<sup>84</sup> And, as appositely, Nehru went on to remark: "All this has a familiar ring in these days when freedom and democracy are so loudly proclaimed (Nehru was writing in 1944) and yet limited to some only. There is truth in it and a denial of truth. Thucydides knew little of the rest of mankind and his vision was confined to the Mediterranean countries. Proud of the freedom of his famous city, praising this freedom as the secret of happiness and human power, yet he did not realize that others also aspired to this freedom. Athens, lover of freedom, sacked and destroyed Melos and put to death all the grown men there and sold the women and children as slaves. Even while Thucydides was writing of the empire and freedom of Athens, that empire had crumbled away and that freedom was no more".

"For it is not possible for long to combine freedom with domination and slavery, one overcomes the other and only a little time divides the pride and glory of empire from its fall".<sup>85</sup>

Indeed, the normative identity of India's policies was not very different from that of England's nineteenth century policies on the continent of Europe. England, as we have seen, was interested in maintaining the structure of international society (which, at that time, in conception was

mainly confined to the European continent) and saw her own security as tied to that structure of international society that he had helped, in part, to bring into being. It was now truly an international society. In conception (with the possible exception of China), as in fact, it had extended to every part of the world, and in Nehru's view, it would have been a retrogressive step for any nation to move in the direction of dominating another, or, in other words, for the international society of sovereign states, in its new form, to suffer a setback anywhere in the world. For any such setback would ultimately threaten India's security - and not in the very long-run either. Such a disintegrative process once started, might rapidly snowball, so far as the majority of weak, underdeveloped states were concerned. It could lead to unprecedented anarchy and the eventual imposition of great power control (if not hegemony) in large areas of the world. Nehru, therefore, firmly linked his nonaligned policy to the maintenance of the structure of international society, and continually manoeuvred towards this end.<sup>86</sup> Hence the general, international orientation of his policy, his insistence on "panchshil", his preoccupation with Cold War politics and his attempts to bridge East-West differences when they threatened the general stability of the international system; hence also his association with the Commonwealth of Nations and his historic contribution towards its evolution.<sup>87</sup> Indeed, much of his tight-rope performances in the fluctuating crises of the Cold War, when analysed, can be traced to those larger perspectives of History in which from time to time he viewed the issue of India's security. In an earlier paper, I have tried to show how policies that were basically similar in intention in the long view, as Western and Indian policies were, nevertheless could take different forms, and, indeed, clash with each other.<sup>88</sup> It was surely simplistic in international relations to believe that should one's basic goals in foreign affairs coincide with those of other powers one should line up with

them in all circumstances, although it is perhaps as simplistic to believe that, under different circumstances, such alignments are nevertheless to be resisted.

Nehru's mind, however, could at times work at levels of generalized abstraction as well as with great practical subtlety. Hardly any Indian politician could match his historical vision or his world view. Even sophisticated Indian opinion seems to have been unaware of what he was trying to do in foreign affairs. But it is also possible that he was in danger of seeing contemporary international relations from too historical a viewpoint. There is both advantage and danger, in such an approach, to the man who wields power in international affairs; yet this was typical of Nehru and explains much that otherwise seems merely contradictory, just as it was typical of him to believe that coercion by itself even in international affairs,<sup>89</sup> was not as desirable as what he called, the "psychological approach", the attempt, as he put it, of converting others from their entrenched viewpoints. The nonaligned attitude in international affairs greatly attracted him for this reason: its type of coercion helped to change people's outlooks for the better. He was, as we know, repeatedly to interpret India's nonalignment as "a positive policy for peace"; till the last the old prejudice against power politics was not quite tamed by his own subtle manipulations of power in international relations.

Indeed, peace remained the great refrain of most of his speeches, and it was essentially in its spirit that non-alignment as a policy was manipulated. No one who has read through his statements, from the hopeful, spirited letters of his early days to those last, sad flounderings of thought and emotion, can fail to be moved by a concern that mattered always. Some, at least, of the naivete of mind he could show in his interpretation of events, much perhaps of his indecision and contradictoriness, may be attributed to this recurring



concern. The almost fierce cynicism with which Hyderabad and Kashmir and Goa are pointed out, is itself an indication of how much the world had given credence to his sincerity and wished its image to remain unsullied. Yet the spirit which animated "nonalignment", right from his early, passionate pre-independence days, to those last, disillusioned ones in office was retained with remarkable fidelity, and may prove of incalculable importance to India's international future. It has been said that the ancient Greeks were fortunate in possessing Homer and wise in using him as they did.<sup>90</sup> If this is said of Indians in relation to Gandhi and Nehru, in the years ahead, their great struggle, almost unique in India's political history, of mediating between political life and moral norms,<sup>91</sup> will not have been in vain.

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Summary: The main postulates of this paper have been summarized at the beginning of Section III, on pages 5-6. This paper is an essay on Nehru's conception and manipulation of India's nonalignment. I have tried to identify it as a policy conceived and manipulated for the security of India, and hope the paper has brought out the degree to which Nehru stretched the resources of his mind, and the potentialities of his country's position in international affairs (partly the outcome of these resources) to enlarge the conception of India's security, instead of circumscribing it to an unimaginative and vitiated view of the national self-interest. If international relations have at all moved towards a measure of civilization, it has been through such painful efforts of human aspiration and ingenuity as (to take one example) were Nehru's for almost half a century. It is also hoped that this paper has brought out the paradoxical nature of his achievement in the field of India's foreign relations.

NOTES

Although sometimes numbered at the end of particular sentence, citations refer to passages that have preceded and led up to it. The context in which the quotations occur has been indicated as well.

1. Nehru, Toward freedom, New York, John Day, 1941, p. 236.
2. Nehru, The discovery of India, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1966, p. 37.
3. Ibid., p. 358.
4. See, in particular, the following : Ibid., pp. 379-381; Ibid., pp. 445-446; Dorothy Norman, Nehru, the first sixty years, vol. I, London, Bodley Head, 1965, pp. Vii-Viii; Nehru, Nehru on Gandhi, New York, John Day, 1948, pp. ix-X.
5. These quotations have been rearranged and juxtaposed from Nehru, India and the world, Allen and Unwin, 1936, pp. 218-224.
6. See, J.V. Bondurant, Conquest of violence : the Gandhian philosophy of conflict, rev. ed., Berkeley, University of California Press, 1965. See also, The discovery of India, pp. 380, 475-476.
7. Nehru, Eighteen months in India, Allahabad, Kitabistan, 1938, pp. 159-160; Ibid., p. 14 : "I seek ... a more enduring and peaceful system from which the roots of violence have been removed, and where hatred shrivels up and yields place to nobler feelings. All this I call socialism"; Nehru in the New York Times Magazine, March 3, 1946; Nehru, Independence and after, 1946-1949, Delhi, Publications Division, Government of India, 1961, pp. 229-244; The discovery of India, pp. 511-512, 556.
8. Ibid., p. 574.
9. Nehru, A bunch of old letters, New York, Asia Publishing House, 1960, pp. 141-143.
10. Ibid., pp. 143-144 : "The rejection of democracy does not or should not come from the socialist side but from the other. That of course is Fascism". It would seem that Nehru while opposing Russian communism, British imperialism and European fascism, attempted to synthesize what was best in Russian communism with what was desirable in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. His yielding to Russian propaganda about "democracy" may not only have helped to contain the more menacing aspects of the Russian system, it has probably enabled

Russian leaders to struggle out of some of their more intractable dilemmas in international affairs.

11. Nehru, The unity of India, New York, John Day, 1941, p. 118 : "Nothing is so foolish as to imagine that exactly the same processes take place in different countries with varying backgrounds"; The discovery of India, pp. 547-551. Note especially the rather adroit check of Soviet Russia and the Communist Party of India : "While the Soviet Union was forging new links with national tradition, the Communist Parties of other countries were drifting away from it ... So far as it (the C.P.I.) is concerned, the history of the world began in November 1917 ...".
12. See, in particular, India and the world, pp. 62-63; Toward freedom, pp. 264-265; Press conference report in The Hindu, October 16, 1954; Nehru, China, Spain and the War, Allahabad and London, Kitabistan, 1940, pp. 57-58 : "The frontiers of our struggle lie not only in our own country but in Spain and China also"; Nehru, The discovery of India, pp. 445-447; Ibid., p. 504 : "... for the modern idea of nationality has been almost divorced from statehood ... The national state is giving place to the multi-national state or to large federations"; Ibid., p. 574.
13. Nehru often quoted Gandhi in this connection : "My idea of nationalism is that my country may become free, that if need be the whole of the country may die, so that the human race may live. There is no room for race hatred here. Let that be our nationalism!" : The discovery of India, p. 445.
14. Quoted by S.R. Mehrotra, India and the Commonwealth, 1865-1929, London, Allen and Unwin, 1965, pp. 122-123, from C.F. Andrews, Mahatma Gandhi's ideas, 1929, p. 249.
15. Nehru's opposition to Dominion Status is well summarised in the following passage : "Every one of us, I suppose, is in favour of a real commonwealth of nations. But why seek to limit it to a few countries and nations ? That means you are building up one group to oppose another group. In other words you are building on the conception of empire and one empire comes into conflict with another empire. That may reduce the danger of war within a group, but increases the danger of war between groups" : The Unity of India, pp. 271-272. Although his future foreign policy was to take advantage of the tension between two groups of nations he consistently appeared to sense a greater danger to India's security through a continuation of this tension than through its abatement. Hence the recurring normative overtones in his interpretations of India's nonalignment. See also Toward freedom, pp. 264-268.

16. S.R. Mehrotra: India and the Commonwealth, see chapter 6.
17. Quoted in Mehrotra, India and the Commonwealth, p. 133.
18. Quoted in Mehrotra, India and the Commonwealth, pp. 135-136.
19. See note 6 above.
20. Nehru's distrust of British foreign policy is illustrated by the following references : India and the world, pp. 62-63; A Bunch of old letters, pp. 144-146; The Unity of India, pp. 115-120, 297-300, 335-341. However see Toward freedom, pp. 264-268. Gandhi's early predilections for the British stand in international affairs is well illustrated by the cooperation he gave the British during the Boer, the Zulu and the First World Wars. See Gandhi, An Autobiography, London, Cape, 1966, chapters 10, 24, 38.
21. Some, at least, of the ambivalence of Gandhi's attitude towards India's security is dispelled by what Gandhi told his colleagues at the time of the Cripps' Mission : "Non-violence with me is a creed ... But it is never as a creed that I placed it before India ... I placed it before the Congress as a political method ... As a political method it can always be changed, modified, altered or even given up in preference to another ...". Quoted in Far Eastern Survey, March 22, 1943. In this connection, see also Nehru (quoting Liddel-Hart) in The discovery of India, pp. 475-476 : " 'History bears witness to the vital part that the prophets have played in human progress - which is evidence of the ultimate practical value of expressing unreservedly the truth as one sees it. Yet it also becomes clear that the acceptance and spreading of that vision has always depended on another class of men - leaders who had to be philosophical strategists, strike a compromise between truth and men's receptivity to it. Their effect has always depended on their own limitations in perceiving the truth, as on their practical wisdom in proclaiming it' ".
22. Ibid., p. 573.
23. See Mehrotra, India and the Commonwealth, p. 124.
24. Most of those Indians who played a role, however indirect, in India's movement for independence were ardent supporters of some form of "internationalism" - Roy in the 1820's to Gokhale in the first decades of this century. See William Theodore De Bary, and others, eds., Sources of Indian tradition, New York, Columbia University Press, 1958.

25. Nehru, Glimpses of world history, New York, John Day, 1942, pp.955-956; The unity of India, pp. 343-345; A bunch of old letters, pp. 508-510.
26. Nehru, Eighteen months in India, pp. 12-15; A bunch of old letters, pp. 362-363; The unity of India, pp. 117-120; Toward freedom, pp. 393-395, 400-402, 413-414.
27. Ibid., pp. 264-268; The unity of India, pp. 564-571; Nehru : "India's day of reckoning", Fortune Magazine, April 1942.
28. See note 13, above.
29. See Glimpses of world history, pp. 946-948 : A bunch of old letters, pp. 341-343; The unity of India, pp. 335-337; Independence and after, pp. 304-311; The discovery of India, p. 447; J.S. Bright, Before and after independence, New Delhi, The Indian Printing Works, 1950, pp. 520-524.
30. The unity of India, pp. 268-277.
31. Before and after independence, pp. 297-302, 308-314; The discovery of India, pp. 446-447; Amrita Bazar Patrika, March 28, 1946.
32. See note 29 above.
33. The discovery of India.
34. Nehru, the first sixty years, vol.1, p. 330; The discovery of India, pp. 512, 570-571.
35. See note 9 above; also Toward freedom, p. 355.
36. Ibid., pp. 306-308; Ibid., pp. 343-344 : "It is perfectly clear that in matters of imperial policy there is little to choose between Tory or Labour in England"; A bunch of old letters, pp. 43-44 : ("she" - Great Britain - "dislikes new imperialisms because they conflict with her old imperialism, and not because of any dislike of imperialism itself...").
37. The discovery of India; pp. 373-374, 375-379, 382; Toward freedom, pp. 265, 268-269; India and the world, pp. 57-59.
38. Ibid., pp. 133-134. See also The discovery of India, p. 381.
39. Nehru, describing Gandhi's effect on the hitherto frustated national movement in India wrote : "... Much that he said we only partially accepted or did not accept at all. But all this was secondary. The essence of his teaching was fearlessness and truth ... The greatest

gift for an individual or a nation, so we had been told in our ancient books, was "abhaya" (fearlessness)...". A perceptive Indian, will appreciate the relevance of these remarks and understand Gandhi's particular hold over the India psyche : he helped to loosen the Indian's excessively tenacious hold on life without removing it; Ibid., pp. 379-380; Toward freedom, pp. 309-311 : "I had willingly accepted the moral aspects of satyagraha as I understood it, within certain limits I admit. That basic aspect appealed to me, and it seemed to raise politics to a higher and nobler level."

40. Nehru : "It was with this background that the National Congress began to develop its foreign policy in 1927" : The discovery of India, p. 443.
41. Independence and after, p. 245 : (The address was given on March 22, 1949).
42. The discovery of India, p. 380.
43. The unity of India, pp. 117-120; The discovery of India, p. 534.
44. Nehru, Recent essays and writings, Allahabad, Kitabistan, 1934, pp. 72-73; Toward freedom, pp. 314-326; The discovery of India, pp. 511-512.
45. Eighteen months in India, pp. 12-13; The unity of India, pp. 297-300 : Nehru was considerably upset over the Czechoslovakian issue, and perturbed that Great Britain should "strengthen" the Nazis, instead of cooperating with a "progressive" country like Russia, in opposing them; Ibid., pp. 115-120 : "I had been considerably upset by the course of events in the Soviet Union ...". But, "... I was quite clear in my mind about her foreign policy. This had consistently been one of peace and, unlike England and France, of fulfilling international obligations and supporting the cause of democracy abroad. The Soviet Union stood as the one real effective bulwark against fascism in Europe and Asia." "The Marxian philosophy appeals to me in a broad sense, and helps me to understand the processes of history. I am far from being an orthodox Marxist - nor does any other orthodoxy appeal to me" - Nehru was writing in Feb.-March 1939; China, Spain and the war, pp. 129-133 : "There is no longer any ignoring of Soviet Russia. She has suitors galore ..." (This was written on May 30, 1939); The unity of India, pp. 306-312 : "Soviet Russia is at present a mystifying factor in the world situation ... The Russo-German Pact come as a shock and surprise to many ... There seemed to be too much over-reaching cynicism and opportunism about it." (Nehru was writing in September 1939). Yet even - in January 1940, Nehru was urging Gandhi in the following terms : "The position is likely to grow much more complicated soon if the western powers mobilise against Russia and their

intrigue with Italy succeeds. They will call it a holy war against communism and under cover of that not only try to strengthen their own Empire but break up the Socialist State of Soviet Russia. That would be a calamity from every point of view, quite apart from our agreement with Russian policy or not. I would beg of you to bear this in mind and to view Indian talks in this perspective". (Emphasis added) : see A bunch of old letters, pp. 424-425.

46. Nehru, Toward freedom, p. 370; The discovery of India, p. 444 : "Soviet Russia, the very emblem of internationalism, had followed a strictly national policy, bringing confusion to many of her friends and sympathisers". Nehru was writing in 1944; see also Nehru's article in the National Herald, January, 19, 1940.
47. Nehru, Independence and after, pp. 229-246.
48. The relevant parts of this article in Young India, Sept. 24 and Oct. 1, 1931, are conveniently found in Bimla Prasad, The origins of Indian foreign policy, Calcutta, Bookland, 1960, Appendix II.
49. Ibid., p. 281.
50. Ibid., p. 282.
51. Before and after independence, pp. 308-312 : "Obviously an invasion of India is a very big risk, not so much because of the strength of India, but because any such thing involves international complications, whether the invader is Japan or Russia". In fact, the invader was to be China, but it is remarkable that more than twenty years later the invader seemed to be deterred by such considerations.
52. See Prasad, p. 183; Nehru, The first sixty years, vol.2, pp. 259-260 : " 'Within ten days of taking office Nehru addressed to General Auchinleck a memorandum on the problems of India's defense, more especially in relation to foreign policy' ". Norman quotes from John Connell : Auchinleck ...
53. The unity of India, pp. 326-328; New York Times Magazine, March 3, 1946 : "It may be difficult to do away with power politics entirely, for they represent to some extent the reality of today trying to find a new equilibrium. But it is certainly possible to lessen their importance and to reduce the area of potential conflict". Independence and after, pp. 229-244 : "You cannot do without compromises, but a compromise is a bad compromise if it is opportunist in the sense that it is not always aiming at the truth. It may be a good compromise if it is always looking at that truth and trying to take you there."

54. The discovery of India, p. 574.
55. Ibid., pp. 446, 531-541, 569-570; Independence and after, pp. 354-361.
56. The discovery of India, p. 575.
57. Ibid., p. 582.
58. Ibid., p. 583-584.
59. Ibid., pp. 522-523; 559 : "Only two factors may come in the way : international developments and external pressure on India and lack of a common objective in the country"; 570-574 : "In England, America and Russia we revert to the old game of power politics on a gigantic scale". Nehru was writing in 1944.
60. Nehru, Independence and after, pp. 245-261; The discovery of India, p. 559.
61. Nehru repeatedly tended to glance off this "message" by emphasising the normative aspects of his policy. Thus, although at all times, he showed a most lively concern for India's security, when interpreting his policy he often side-stepped reference to this context and referred to that of "world peace". He was far from being insincere but neither was he being very ingenuous.
62. This must necessarily remain speculative. See however, The unity of India, pp. 297-300; The discovery of India, pp. 569-570.
63. Quoted by James Joll, ed., Britain and Europe : Pitt to Churchill, 1793-1940 (The British Political Tradition, vol.3), London, Kaye, 1950, p. 14.
64. This is, of course, when British foreign policy is seen in broad historical perspective. It may be possible to indicate individual cases to refute this view, but such refutations are often specious. India's policies, for example, if illustrated only by a special case or two, might appear equally misleading.
65. Even British policy in India, for all its reactionary overtones, remained basically a liberal one.
66. England's policy overseas has not only to be seen in a relative perspective, it has also to be seen in the context of those times. In the nineteenth century, empire - building was as "contemporary" as "the liquidation of colonialism" is today.



67. The unity of India, pp. 23-24 : "The strength of a nation is a relative affair, depending on a host of international and external factors. Most independent countries today are not strong enough to stop by themselves the aggressions of a Great Power ... Probably the United States is the only country so fortunately situated ... The others rely for their independence partly on their own strength, but more so on a combination of circumstances." Emphasis added; Independence and after, pp. 215-219 : "We might have been compelled by circumstances, but we are not compelled by circumstances to give up our independence ...".
68. In connection with the restoration of St. Mark's; Venice, Professor Forlati was reported as having said : "My ambition is to consolidate without anyone being able to see the difference on the surface." The Guardian, London, May 10, 1967. To one writer, at least, this seems relevant to an understanding of Nehru's manipulation of nonalignment; Independence and after, pp. 200-205 : "We are not going to join a war if we can help it; and we are going to join the side which is to our interest when the time comes to make the choice. There the matter ends." "We propose to keep on the closest terms of friendship with other countries unless they themselves create difficulties ..."; Ibid., pp. 210-219 : "We counted for something, not very greatly of course, more potentially than in actuality, indeed potentially, we counted for a great deal ..."; Ibid., pp. 229-244 : "If by any chance we align ourselves definitely with one power or group, we may perhaps from one point of view do some good, but I have not the shadow of a doubt that from a larger point of view, not only of India but of world peace, it will do harm. Because then we lose that tremendous vantage ground that we have of using such influence as we possess - and that influence is going to grow from year to year - in the cause of world peace"; Ibid., pp. 245-261; Nehru, India's foreign policy, 1949-1961, Delhi, Publications Division, Government of India, 1961, p. 35, p. 61 : "It may be that sometimes we are forced to side with this Power or that Power. I can quite conceive of our siding even with an imperialist Power - I do not mind saying that in a certain set of circumstances that may be the lesser of the two evils"; The Hindu, 16th August 1954 : "The world was watching India a great deal, what nearly four hundred million people thought and towards which side they leaned in world affairs"; Ibid., April 1954 : "When there is a substantial difference in the strength of the two opposing forces, we in Asia with our limitations will not be able to influence the issue" - of peace. "But when the opposing forces are fairly evenly matched, then it is possible to make our weight felt in the balance" : Nehru in a interview to "The Ceylon Daily News".

69. The "threat to align" must not be understood merely as a formal linking-up with one or the other side. It would be equally simplistic to regard such a potential threat as a form of blackmail.
70. This is not literally accurate. Where Indian opinion senses the existence of the political dynamics of the policy, it tends to regard the discovery - as indeed it then does Nehru - with excessive cynicism.
71. A bunch of old letters, pp. 508-510 : "From the economic or political point of view an isolated India may well be a kind of vacuum which increases the acquisitive tendency of others and thus creates conflicts."
72. The unity of India, pp. 23-24 : "Will an independent India be strong enough to protect herself from outside aggression and invasion ? If India is strong enough to gain her freedom from British imperialism, which has so long been entrenched on her soil, it seems to follow that she will also be strong enough to resist fresh aggression." This quotation continues to read as in note 67 above (Britain was fought by political, not military, means).
73. Independence and after, pp. 295-301; Ibid., pp. 339-343.
74. Ibid., pp. 229-244, 302-303; Before and after independence, pp. 520-524.
75. India's foreign policy, pp. 24-25 : "We do stand for peace and freedom ... Undoubtedly it has some substance, but a vague statement that we stand for peace and freedom by itself has no particular meaning, because every country is prepared to say the same thing, whether it means it or not. What then do we stand for ? ..." Nehru, seems aware of those nuances of human motivation in the manipulation of foreign policies that tinge them with such different identities whatever their formal identification. This is a theme, developed in relation to India's policies, in A.P. Rana, "The nature of India's foreign policy; an examination of the relation of Indian non-alignment to the concept of the balance of power in the nuclear age, India Quarterly, April-June 1966 : see especially, pp. 108-115.
76. Particularly so in India. Yet one feels tempted to speculate on the effect China could produce on the Indian public mind by suddenly agreeing to come to an amicable settlement with India : some sort of mass euphoria for China could well bloom overnight !

77. Today, the pressures organised by nonalignment are taken so much for granted it seems a little alarmist to suggest that the great powers, in their conflicts with each other, could expand over large areas of the world as they once did. But in an age dominated by the balance of terror such a possibility is latently more present, and would be morally more supportable, than was empire-building of the old sort. Also, a country can be aligned today and receive aid from the other bloc; moreover, its alignment need not curtail its independence. Yet, in relation to the weaker aligned nations at least, it needs to be said that had important countries like India, Egypt and Yugoslavia chosen to be aligned too, the former (i.e. the weaker aligned nations) would have had little scope to manoeuvre outside their blocs as they are doing today; in fact, they might have found themselves sovereign only in name. If the present structure of international society is oriented, as it is, in the "Anglo-Saxon tradition" in international relations (See note 82 below) it is not insignificantly due to the "unseen" influence (operating like some economic "invisible") nonalignment has exerted in world affairs.
78. Sometimes one suspects the Chinese to have been awfully hard-pressed by the silent erosion of their general objectives in foreign affairs, partly through Nehru's manipulation of nonalignment, to resort to the extreme action they took in 1962. Perhaps Nehru's comradely arm was much too disadvantageous, and had to be shaken off in a manner the Hindu Premier across the border could not choose to misunderstand.
79. See, in this connection, an interesting contribution by Rosemary Brissenden : "India, neutralism and SEATO", in George Modelski, SEATO : six studies, Melbourne, Cheshire, 1963, p. 242 : "With only the distant sanction of the United States military power a mutually satisfactory Asian defence system around India can be envisaged should SEATO prove an inhibiting factor in Asian development." However, such a view skips over a great deal of ground, much of it related to Indian attitudes towards the country's security.
80. Reference here is to those normative aspects of the country's policy which are related to India's security problems, although such a relationship may not be as apparent in individual cases of India's behaviour (concerning her security) during the Nehru years.
81. Retrospectively, indeed, it seems that the great empires of the past have played their part in the slow evolution of international order, for they have helped to diffuse elements of the metropolitan culture (evolved under conditions of security in the metropolitan areas) into the intractable field of international relations.

82. For the "evolution" of this "tradition" see A.B. Bozeman's "masterful sketch" : Politics and culture in international history, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1960. Its least luminous treatment, however, is of the Indian political tradition in its relation to the cultural. See also, Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., Diplomatic investigations : essays in the theory of international politics, London, Allen Unwin, 1966, in particular, Wight : "Western values in international relations", Hedley Bull, "The Grotian concept of international society" and "Society and anarchy in international relations".
83. The unity of India, pp. 335-341; Ibid., pp. 395-400.
84. The discovery of India, p. 584.
85. Ibid., pp. 584-585.
86. Before and after Independence, pp. 358-360 : "If one great power subjects another, the other follows suit immediately for fear that the former may gain an advantage, and so the mad race goes on." This "subjection", of course, could take several forms. It would appear that Nehru countered, by diplomatic means, the possible increase in influence of China in certain strategic regions of S.E. Asia. See, Ton That Thien, India and South East Asia, 1947-1960, Geneva, Droz, 1963, especially chapter 8 (India and Malaya). But note also : "For India's part while the Indian government approved of Malaya's membership of the Commonwealth and its acceptance of a military alliance with Great Britain, it discouraged Malaya from joining SEATO", Ibid., pp. 248-249. And, in connection with Nehru's response to SEATO, see Brissenden, op.cit. For a theoretical treatment of India's foreign policy in regard to these issues see, Rana, op.cit., especially, pp. 108-134. Nehru's views on expansion and subjection of peoples were most freely expressed in relation to European fascism. They throw light on the policies he was to follow, much more unobtrusively, after 1947. Perhaps some elements of the identity of India's nonalignment during the Nehru years are to be found in this disarming sentence : "The freedom on many other countries thus depends largely on the freedom of India. With India free, the old imperialism ends and world politics refashion themselves in new, stabler and more peaceful contest..." : New York Times Magazine, March 3, 1946.
87. Concerning the relationship between India's accession to the Commonwealth and India's nonalignment, Nehru declared on May 2, 1949 : "Our policy of nonalignment remains as it was. It has not changed in the slightest. It is to the interests of the Commonwealth that this should be so" (Emphasis added) : see Government of India, Information Services, May 5, 1949, p.1; Nehru, Independence and after, pp. 265-267 : "I have naturally looked to the interests of India, for that is my first duty. I have always conceived that duty in

terms of the larger good of the world. That is the lesson our Master taught us ..." Although Nehru refused to see the Commonwealth membership as binding India to any alliance, on a particular occasion he maintained a propos it : "If one country living in isolation does something that is dangerous to the other countries, the other countries have to intervene" and reinforced this statement by giving the example of a country "that allowed itself to become the breeding ground of all kinds of dangerous diseases", requiring the world "to come in and clear it up, because it could not afford to allow disease to spread all over the world" : Ibid., See pp. 265-281.

88. Rana, op.cit., pp. 121-134.

89. Nehru was particularly susceptible because on the one hand he feared History repeating itself in an almost mechanical way and on the other felt its direction could be substantially altered at too rapid a pace.

90. It may seem rather inappropriate to give the analogy of Homer. But I am referring to a passage in H.D.F. Kitto, The Greeks, Pelican, 1966, p.64, which, when read more fully, seems particularly apposite : "The ancient Greeks", Kitto says, learnt through their Homer "that the quality of a man matters more than his achievement; that violence and recklessness will still lead to disaster, and that this will fall on the innocent as well as on the guilty. The Greeks were fortunate in possessing Homer and wise in using him as they did."

91. See Gandhi, An Autobiography. Much of it could make for relevant citation. See also The discovery of India, p.58; Toward freedom, pp. 71-72: "The spiritualization of politics, using the word not in its narrow, religious sense, seemed to me a fine idea"; Independence and after, pp.229-244: "Perhaps there is no final solution ... except to try continually to bridge the gulf between the idealism and the practice... forced upon us by circumstances"; Ibid., pp.203-205, 253-261: "Protecting oneself unfortunately means relying on the armed forces and the like and so we build up, where necessity arises, our defence apparatus. We cannot take the risk of not doing so, although Mahatma Gandhi would have taken that risk no doubt and I dare not say that he would have been wrong. Indeed, of a country is strong enough to take that risk it will not only survive, but it will become a great country. But we are small folk and dare not take that risk. But in protecting oneself we should do so in such a way as not to antagonize others and also so as not to appear to aim at the freedom of others". Although Nehru had a tenable security policy, it was politically (not defence) oriented. His nonalignment must be understood as an attempt to avoid commitment, as much as possible, to a defence-oriented security policy, for fear that the sort of power politics that would then be generated would do the world grave harm, and would ultimately lead to subjection, in a new form, of Afro-Asian countries in the circumstances of the Cold War.

Résumé

Le rapport cherche à éclairer la conception que Nehru avait du non-alignement indien et la manière dont il a pratiqué cette politique. Selon l'auteur, il s'agissait d'une politique conçue et mise en oeuvre pour assurer la sécurité de l'Inde; le rapport tente de montrer à quel point Nehru est allé à l'extrême limite de son ingéniosité et des capacités de son pays dans les relations internationales (capacités reposant en partie sur les ressources intellectuelles de Nehru) afin d'élargir la conception de la sécurité de l'Inde, plutôt que de la limiter à une idée fautive et dépourvue d'imagination de l'intérêt national. Si les relations internationales ont progressé tant soit peu vers une pratique plus civilisée, c'est grâce à de difficiles efforts d'aspirations et d'ingéniosité tels que, à titre d'exemple, ceux de Nehru pendant près de cinquante ans. L'auteur espère que son rapport a également mis en lumière la nature paradoxale des résultats obtenus par Nehru dans le domaine des relations internationales de l'Inde.

English summary : see p. 38.

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"Neutralité, neutralisme, non-alignement"

LA NEUTRALITE DANS LE CADRE DES RELATIONS ENTRE  
PAYS SOCIALISTES ET PAYS OCCIDENTAUX

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LA NEUTRALITE DANS LE CADRE DES RELATIONS ENTRE  
PAYS SOCIALISTES ET PAYS OCCIDENTAUX

par Alexandr Ort

Le problème de la neutralité est devenu en Europe depuis un siècle une question d'une importance exceptionnelle au point de vue de l'évolution politique de ce continent, et par là même particulièrement intéressante comme matière de recherches tant des historiens et des juristes que des politologues. Bien que le problème de la neutralité se soit, ces temps derniers, présenté au premier plan même sur d'autres continents, il a conservé en Europe toute une suite de particularités, dont plusieurs se rattachent au développement particulièrement compliqué de chaque pays de ce continent et des rapports entre pays.

La neutralité européenne se rattache à une très longue tradition, avant tout dans le cas de la Suisse et, dans une certaine mesure, des pays scandinaves. La neutralité suisse est partie d'une situation exceptionnellement compliquée au centre de l'Europe, où se reflétaient avec une acuité particulière les intérêts des grandes puissances européennes. Les divergences entre la France et l'Allemagne, les relations complexes entre l'Allemagne et l'Italie, y compris le problème de la réunification de ces deux pays, et de plus les intérêts de chaque famille au pouvoir (Habsbourg et autres) ont conduit ce petit pays, dont la population comprenait des nationalités très diverses, à tenter d'assurer son indépendance par la voie de la neutralité. S'il est incontestable qu'un rôle important a été tenu ici par des facteurs économiques et autres, les influences internationales se situaient sans aucun doute au premier plan.

La neutralité scandinave est partie de conditions bien différentes, car ici n'existait pas une forte pression immédiate provenant des voisins; pour cette raison nous avons la possibilité d'examiner aujourd'hui, au point de vue de l'histoire, ce problème dans des cas concrets - il y a de grandes différences dans la position de chaque Etat scandinave, et plus



encore si nous leur ajoutons l'Islande - et de percevoir ainsi de nombreuses différences.

Nous ne voulons toutefois pas nous occuper d'histoire, mais de science politique, et pour cette raison il nous faut porter notre attention vers la période suivant la seconde guerre mondiale, quand le problème de la neutralité s'est trouvé en Europe dans une situation nouvelle, et s'est développé en relation avec l'évolution globale de la situation en Europe. Il semble que, sans prendre en considération les quelques années suivant immédiatement la guerre, l'on puisse discerner trois périodes pendant lesquelles se sont créées, pour ce problème, des conditions différentes :

1. Pendant la période de l'épanouissement de la guerre froide, prédominait la tendance à intégrer tous les plus petits Etats européens dans tel ou tel autre des blocs de puissance qui se formaient en Europe. Les conditions pour la neutralité ne donnaient que très peu d'espoir.

2. Des possibilités plus grandes sont apparues pour l'essentiel à partir du milieu des années 1950, quand d'une part l'exemple de l'Autriche et d'autre part la tendance à constituer entre les deux blocs une zone neutre ont créé des conditions presque idéales pour le développement de la neutralité.

3. Une nouvelle chute de la tension internationale, surtout depuis le début des années 1960, a créé une situation nouvelle. La coexistence pacifique et les perspectives de coopération de tous les Etats européens, sans égard à la différence des systèmes sociaux, ont à nouveau quelque peu refoulé le problème de la neutralité au second plan.

Si les problèmes des conflits de puissance perdent de leur importance, le problème de la neutralité sera moins pressant pour les petits Etats qu'à l'époque où pesait la menace immédiate d'un conflit armé. La coopération de tous attire les petits Etats aussi vers la coopération, et ils ne cherchent plus dans la neutralité la garantie de leur liberté et de leur indépendance.

## 1. La guerre froide et la question de la neutralité en Europe.

La paix attendue avec tant d'impatience a été accueillie par les peuples d'Europe avec la conviction que le développement ultérieur du continent éviterait désormais les conflits armés, et que l'intérêt des peuples portant sur la coopération et la paix serait pleinement respecté. La neutralité n'a pas été une question pouvant se trouver au premier plan des intérêts des Etats européens. La stricte neutralité qu'observait la Suisse, qui a même refusé de devenir membre de l'Organisation des Nations Unies nouvellement constituée en raison de sa neutralité traditionnelle garantie par le droit international, était considérée comme une curiosité, et certainement pas comme un exemple pour les autres petits pays européens.

La neutralité suédoise n'était pas non plus à cette époque mise en avant pour que les autres pays manifestent le désir d'exploiter son expérience. Il s'agissait plutôt d'une forme de survie à la guerre couronnée de succès, et la Suède n'a réussi que plus tard à mettre l'accent sur sa neutralité, à l'époque de la conclusion du pacte atlantique.

Par surcroît, la politique de neutralité bénéficiait d'une publicité plutôt défavorable : l'Espagne, mettant l'accent sur sa neutralité, voulait éviter d'être critiquée comme régime fasciste qui aurait dû être condamné, aux côtés de ses alliés réels, l'Italie fasciste et l'Allemagne nazie, en tant qu'initiatrice de la guerre. A l'Organisation des Nations Unies se sont manifestés de forts courants exigeant la condamnation du régime franquiste en Espagne. L'exemple espagnol jeta dans l'Europe de l'après-guerre un fort discrédit sur l'idée de la neutralité.

Seules la désagrégation de la coalition anti-hitlérienne, l'intensification de la guerre froide et avec elle la formation de deux blocs opposés en Europe, ont mis une fois de plus en évidence la question de la neutralité. Mais les conditions ne lui semblaient pas particulièrement favorables. C'est ainsi que la doctrine Truman, qui en 1947 était sans aucun doute l'une des plus importantes manifestations de la guerre froide en

marche, visait tant la Grèce que la Turquie, où les tendances à la neutralité avaient une tradition de non moindre importance. Pour ces deux pays la doctrine Truman n'était qu'un préliminaire à leur intégration au pacte atlantique, qui signifiait leur subordination à l'influence des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, donc la prise d'une position nette d'un côté de la barricade.

La pression faite par les Etats-Unis pour l'intégration d'autres pays européens encore dans un bloc unique n'a laissé de côté ni le Danemark ni la Norvège, qui jusqu'à cette époque aspiraient avec conscience à une position neutre de même que leur voisine, la Suède. Cette dernière a réussi seule à s'assurer la neutralité, tandis que la Norvège et le Danemark ont été obligés, quoique avec certaines réserves, à adhérer à l'O.T.A.N.

Vers la fin des années 1940, l'Europe s'est divisée en deux camps dont la centralisation était assez forte et, surtout pour les Etats les plus petits, il ne devait presque pas être question d'une prise de position indépendante. Seule la situation compliquée qui existait en Finlande a permis une prise de position quasi neutraliste entre les deux blocs, mais même cette position n'était pas d'un attrait particulier pour les autres pays européens.

La Yougoslavie s'est trouvée dans une position toute spéciale et unique. Après la guerre, la Yougoslavie s'est développée vers le socialisme, de même que la majorité écrasante des Etats en Europe Centrale et Sud-Est. Les divergences des communistes yougoslaves avec le reste du mouvement se sont manifestées aussi dans la sphère des relations interétatiques, et les pays de démocratie populaire et l'Union soviétique ont rompu leurs traités d'alliance avec la Yougoslavie. La politique étrangère yougoslave s'est depuis cette époque orientée vers une ligne indépendante "sans blocs", qui est devenue une sorte de neutralité.

Le cas de la Yougoslavie, de même que d'autres, montre qu'à l'époque de la guerre froide la neutralité était dans une certaine mesure imposée à certains petits pays, de même que leur intégration aux blocs.

L'exemple de la Yougoslavie est extraordinairement instructif du point de vue de l'analyse marxiste, car il démontre la possibilité de construire le socialisme sans l'assistance des pays socialistes, mais d'autre part il confirme que l'assistance mutuelle des pays socialistes leur permet de surmonter certaines difficultés avec plus de facilité que ne peuvent le faire les pays isolés.

La période de la guerre froide n'a donc pas créé pour la politique de neutralité des conditions pleinement favorables. Et cela comptait non seulement pour l'Europe, mais aussi pour les autres continents. Les efforts déployés par certains pays - par exemple l'Inde, l'Indonésie, l'Égypte, la Syrie et d'autres encore - pour prendre une position neutre dans la politique mondiale, n'a pas trouvé le soutien nécessaire, auprès d'aucune grande puissance mondiale. Cela n'étonne pas venant de la part des grandes puissances coloniales qui considéraient leurs anciennes colonies comme leurs biens, ou encore de la part des États-Unis d'Amérique, qui les considéraient comme facteurs importants de leur politique anti-soviétique; mais des erreurs ont été commises même par les pays socialistes. Si dans les premières proclamations de l'Informbureau on parlait encore de ces pays comme de pays démocratiques qui adhéraient ou sympathisaient avec les forces progressistes, plus tard ont été données des explications erronées, qui ne considéraient comme progressistes et démocratiques que l'Union soviétique et les pays de démocratie populaire d'Europe et d'Asie.

Ce n'est qu'après la mort de Staline que dans la politique étrangère soviétique et en même temps dans tout le mouvement communiste s'est mise à prévaloir la nouvelle appréciation de la situation internationale générale, ce qui était en rapport avec la consolidation des éléments dans la politique mondiale qui s'orientaient contre la politique de la guerre froide : par exemple la cessation de la guerre en Corée et au Vietnam, les relations économiques croissantes entre les pays ayant des systèmes sociaux différents, y compris la détente générale dans les rapports internationaux qui s'est manifestée le plus fortement dans "l'esprit de

Genève". Un rôle de non moindre importance a été tenu par les Etats asiatiques et africains qui ont posé, à la conférence de Bandoeng, les bases du "tiers monde" et de la politique de non alignement.

Depuis le milieu des années 1950, la guerre froide recule devant la poussée de la politique de coexistence pacifique, bien que cette appellation présentée et défendue par la nouvelle politique étrangère soviétique soit encore longtemps refusée. La réalisation de cette politique était toutefois incontestable, et son influence bénéfique a été accueillie par tous les peuples du monde. La détente internationale n'a pu être contestée par personne, et dans cette nouvelle conjoncture internationale se sont formées de nouvelles conditions favorables au développement des tendances à la neutralisation.

## 2. Détente internationale et épanouissement de la neutralité.

Depuis le milieu des années 1950, nous pouvons être témoins en Europe d'une nouvelle étape dans le développement des relations mutuelles entre les deux blocs. L'intervention réussie de N.S. Khrouchtchev dans les rapports soviéto-yougoslaves a permis une coopération plus étroite de ce pays socialiste avec les autres pays socialistes et, bien qu'existe encore toute une suite de différences, la Yougoslavie a peu à peu rejoint la famille socialiste. Cela a consolidé sa position internationale, mais ne l'a pas détournée de sa politique flexible de coopération étroite avec les jeunes Etats d'Asie et d'Afrique dans le cadre de la politique de non-alignement, qui est peu à peu devenue une politique de neutralité active et, de façon de plus en plus significative, une force favorisant la lutte pour la paix.

Le développement des sympathies pour la neutralité a été indubitablement influencé en Europe par la signature du Traité d'Etat avec l'Autriche, par lequel a été reconnue la neutralité de ce pays. La position spéciale de cet Etat de l'Europe centrale, situé entre l'Est et l'Ouest, définis avant tout au point de vue du régime social de chaque Etat et

moins au point de vue géographique, a sans aucun doute contribué à l'élaboration de toute une série de projets, dont l'idée de neutralité était le dénominateur commun. Qu'il s'agît des considérations britanniques sur le "disengagement" en Europe centrale, imposées à cette époque avant tout par l'opposition travailliste, ou de celles de la Pologne caractérisées d'une manière si significative dans le Plan Rapacki, tous partaient d'une idée commune : ils voulaient créer à la frontière entre les deux blocs existants, soit une zone neutre, soit tout au moins un territoire d'armement restreint, donc un facteur de détente. Ces idées neutralitaires répondaient pleinement pour l'essentiel à l'étape du développement des relations internationales, et correspondaient avec justesse au rapport des forces entre l'Ouest et l'Est.

Dans la seconde moitié des années 1950, personne ne doutait déjà plus que le rapport des forces entre les deux superpuissances eût changé, et que parler d'un monopole américain, qu'il s'agît d'armes nucléaires ou thermonucléaires ou de missiles, était une survivance. Seul celui qui ne voyait ou ne pouvait rien comprendre à ce qui se manifestait de nouveau dans la politique mondiale pouvait encore s'agripper aux anciens slogans de l'époque de la guerre froide qui montraient chaque jour qu'ils étaient dépassés.

Le processus profond de démocratisation dans les pays socialistes, après le XXe Congrès du Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique, a rendu bien plus difficile la propagande anticomuniste sur laquelle se basaient dans une large mesure la politique et la propagande américaines de la guerre froide. Personne, ou presque personne, ne croyait plus aux slogans sur les "menaces bolcheviques" ou "soviétiques", et s'ils existaient encore dans le vocabulaire politique de certaines grandes puissances c'était avant tout par crainte qu'un changement trop brusque ne fût considéré comme un renoncement à la ligne politique précédente, jugée douteuse.

Les efforts de détente internationale se sont manifestés dans la politique étrangère des grandes puissances et ont été favorisés pleinement surtout par les plus petits Etats d'Europe.

L'idée de création d'une zone de neutralité ou d'une zone d'armement restreint a surtout trouvé une oreille attentive dans de nombreux pays, dans les milieux politiques les plus divers. Les expériences relativement bonnes acquises par la formation des zones similaires aux frontières entre Etats dont les rapports mutuels furent pendant une longue période très tendus, ont conduit à l'idée de mesures semblables aux frontières réelles entre les Etats socialistes et l'Europe de l'Ouest, qui passaient quelque part en Europe centrale.

L'intérêt croissant que suscitait cette idée découlait de ce que de telles mesures pourraient incontestablement contribuer à la détente en Europe, mais aussi à rechercher la solution de la très complexe question allemande. Les tristes expériences de l'impérialisme allemand étaient encore trop récentes pour être totalement oubliées en Europe. La zone neutre en Europe centrale aurait sans conteste, de telle ou telle autre manière, touché même les deux Etats allemands, et cela était une garantie contre la menace éventuelle venant de l'Allemagne, dont le réarmement dans sa partie occidentale était mis très fortement en cause précisément dans la seconde moitié des années 1950.

De plus une telle zone aurait contribué vraisemblablement aussi à l'atténuation de la tension et à l'amélioration des rapports entre les deux Etats allemands, ce qui en fin de compte aurait dû se refléter dans les relations entre les Etats européens ayant des systèmes sociaux différents, et influencer favorablement l'ensemble de la politique mondiale dont la question allemande a été et est encore un des problèmes les plus compliqués.

L'idée d'une zone neutre en Europe, ou au moins d'un groupe de pays qui s'engageraient à une certaine diminution des armements ou même au désarmement, fut développée vers la fin des années 1950 dans toute une suite de conférences. La carte de l'Europe a été étudiée en détail, et du Nord au Sud ont été cherchés les Etats qui s'enchaîneraient et créeraient ainsi une telle zone. Le plan Rapacki touchait justement les parties les plus

sensibles et les plus difficiles. Au Nord il ne semblait pas trop difficile de faire pencher pour une telle idée, aux côtés de la Suède neutre, ses voisins le Danemark et la Norvège. En Europe centrale étaient officiellement neutres les Etats comme l'Autriche et la Suisse, et en direction des Balkans la Yougoslavie occupait la même situation; pour cette raison, ces pays ont défendu avec ferveur la réalisation du plan Rapacki.

Le plan Rapacki comprenait en dehors de la Pologne aussi la Tchécoslovaquie, qui favorisait cette idée dès le moment où elle a été exprimée, et les deux Etats allemands, la République Fédérale d'Allemagne et la République Démocratique Allemande. Si ces Etats renonçaient à l'armement atomique ou d'une autre manière limitaient leur potentiel militaire, cela signifierait tant une union territoriale des neutres scandinaves avec ceux de l'Europe centrale, qu'une très forte détente dans la politique européenne, pour laquelle l'ensemble des problèmes de l'Allemagne a toujours revêtu un caractère de grande importance.

Mais tous ces plans différents n'ont pas été réalisés. Sans doute, il y avait d'une part l'influence de certaines grandes puissances qui ne désiraient pas la détente dans les relations internationales, car la situation internationale tendue leur permettait d'expliquer plus facilement l'ampleur de l'armement et le maintien de bases militaires en territoire étranger. Les grandes puissances coloniales avaient aussi besoin de la tension mondiale pour la raison qu'elles pouvaient avec beaucoup plus de facilité masquer ainsi les problèmes grandissants dans les colonies, que les métropoles n'étaient capables de résoudre que par des guerres (Les tentatives de se servir de la guerre de la France en Indochine et de la faire participer à une croisade contre la Chine communiste, ou bien l'exploitation de la guerre d'Algérie pour attaquer les autres Etats arabes, l'Egypte en tête, en sont des preuves).

Si par l'entremise des métropoles les colonies agissaient dans l'ensemble contre la détente internationale, celles parmi elles qui se sont libérées du joug du colonialisme ont agi à l'inverse. Depuis la conférence



de Bandoeng a commencé à s'accroître rapidement l'influence et même l'importance du "tiers-monde", qui ne faisait que se constituer quant à son caractère territorial, mais au point de vue politique agissait bien souvent plus que ses forces ne pouvaient le permettre. Et c'est justement la rapide décadence du colonialisme qui s'est fortement manifestée vers la fin des années 1950 et a trouvé son point culminant dans "l'année de l'Afrique", quand dans l'année 1960 se sont libérées une grande majorité des colonies en Afrique, qui fait que le tiers-monde est réellement devenu une force tierce de la politique mondiale. Et c'était une force déployant des efforts de paix, refusant la guerre et l'armement. Ainsi s'est changé d'une manière significative le rapport des forces dans la politique mondiale, ce qui a créé de nouvelles conditions même pour le développement possible des tendances neutralitaires.

Au tournant des années 1950 et 1960 s'est peu à peu manifesté aussi un nouveau rapport des forces entre les deux super-grandes puissances. Les spoutniks et la conquête de l'espace n'ont permis à personne de douter que les forces des deux super-grandes puissances se soient fortement équilibrées. Le rappel du terme d'échecs "pat" date aussi de cette époque. Ce nouveau rapport des forces a créé des conditions bien plus favorables à l'essor des idées de coexistence pacifique et de développement de la coopération des pays ayant des systèmes sociaux différents, que n'aurait pu le faire la situation précédente.

Tant l'influence du tiers-monde observant une politique de "neutralité active", que le nouveau rapport des forces entre les super-grandes puissances, ont contribué en fin de compte à l'idée de paix. Dans cette harmonie des influences, on ne doit pas oublier les facteurs économiques, quand avant tout le rapide développement des forces de production dans les pays capitalistes avancés, très fortement influencé par la nouvelle vague de progrès technique, mais aussi l'essor du commerce avec les pays nouveaux-nés, ont contribué à la détente et à l'amélioration des rapports internationaux. L'intégration a reflété la première tendance et il s'avère que la

création d'un marché commun uniquement entre six pays d'Europe occidentale n'est plutôt qu'une mesure partielle sur la voie où agit le développement des forces de production.

Et ces changements profonds dans le développement international et dans la politique mondiale n'ont pas pu ne pas agir aussi sur les tendances neutralistes, qui précisément dans la période précédente se développaient avec promesse et activement dans toute une suite de pays et de régions, car elles n'étaient pas limitées uniquement à l'Europe.

### 3. Développement de la coexistence pacifique et affaiblissement des tendances neutralistes.

Il est clair que les conditions favorables au développement de la coexistence réellement pacifique offrent aux petits Etats des perspectives bien plus grandes et plus prometteuses que la neutralité entre des grandes puissances en dispute. Surtout l'influence grandissante du tiers-monde dans les relations internationales agit au profit du développement de la coexistence pacifique. La politique de la majorité écrasante des pays en voie de développement a favorisé la lutte pour la paix et pour la coopération économique du plus grand nombre possible de pays.

La politique mondiale a été très fortement influencée par la position prise par les pays en voie de développement et, de concert avec les pays socialistes, les pays en voie de développement ont créé une force qui influence d'une manière décisive le développement actuel. De plus, des conditions favorables sont créées pour cette politique dans les domaines économique et culturel.

L'évolution actuelle de la technique oblige tant les pays aux industries avancées que les pays en voie de développement d'établir des contacts et une coopération dans le domaine de l'économie, car il devient de plus en plus clair que sans coopération une marche en avant plus rapide est impossible pour les pays en voie de développement, et que sans une certaine division du travail, inséparable de la coopération, les condi-

tions ne sont pas non plus suffisantes même pour les développements des pays avancés (l'exemple de la Grande-Bretagne, à qui ses rapports économiques commerciaux imposent l'entrée dans la Communauté économique européenne, même au prix de certaines limitations dans ses rapports prioritaires avec le Commonwealth, le prouve).

De même la sphère de la culture revêt une importance toujours plus grande dans les rapports internationaux et dans la politique mondiale. Si l'on parlait auparavant des facteurs économiques, politiques et de pouvoir qui déterminent la politique étrangère de tel ou tel autre Etat, ces temps derniers on souligne de plus en plus le facteur culturel. Il suffit par exemple de nous rendre compte de l'importance grandissante de l'instruction dans les pays en voie de développement pour comprendre dans toute son étendue l'importance du facteur "culture", au sens le plus large. Et il n'est certes pas nécessaire de parler de l'importance de la langue, car les propositions de coopération les plus diverses des Etats francophones sont ces derniers temps la preuve la plus convaincante du rôle grandissant du facteur culturel. Son importance est confirmée par la réputation et par le rôle de l'UNESCO, qui oriente la majeure partie de son programme vers les pays en voie de développement aux fins de surmonter le retard culturel, car sans cette démarche il est impossible de compter sur un développement et des changements réels dans ces pays.

Ces deux facteurs, économique et culturel, agissent de concert au profit de la paix et de la coexistence pacifique des Etats ayant des systèmes sociaux différents. La politique de coexistence pacifique devient, depuis le début des années 1960, une partie toujours plus importante et prédominante de la politique mondiale. Sans l'agression américaine au Vietnam, il serait possible de considérer la coexistence pacifique comme un principe généralement adopté dans les relations internationales dans le monde entier.

En Europe le principe de la coexistence pacifique s'est acquis le soutien pour ainsi dire de tous les Etats. Et là s'est justement manifesté

l'affaiblissement des tendances de neutralisation, car la majorité des Etats neutres est devenue une force significative favorisant et développant la coexistence pacifique. La Yougoslavie, l'Autriche et même les pays scandinaves où les tendances de neutralisation sont les plus fortes, font sans aucun doute partie des Etats qui prennent position sciemment et intensivement pour le développement de la coexistence pacifique. Il semble que cette politique conquière une place de plus en plus importante dans la conception de leur politique étrangère, avant même la neutralité.

En relation avec cette question se présente au premier plan le problème des petits Etats. S'ils ont favorisé la politique de neutralité, leur rôle et leur influence sont restés assez limités, bien qu'en principe ils soient positifs. Dans la lutte pour la coexistence pacifique ils peuvent jouer malgré tout un rôle important : non seulement ils deviennent un exemple pour les autres, mais en coopérant ils peuvent créer en Europe une force qui d'elle-même peut influencer fortement sur l'évolution générale de ce continent.

La question de savoir si les petits pays peuvent jouer en commun en Europe le rôle des grandes puissances a sans aucun doute son noyau rationnel.

Si nous suivons le développement actuel en Europe, nous ne pouvons passer sous silence l'efficacité rétrospective de la coexistence pacifique quant à la politique étrangère de chacune des grandes puissances. Les tendances grandissantes de désintégration dans les groupements militaires existant encore en Europe, reflètent la détente internationale générale. La perspective de coopération des Etats européens ne peut, bien entendu, favoriser l'existence de l'O.T.A.N.; elle crée sans conteste des conditions favorables pour la garantie de la sécurité européenne qui, selon le texte du traité de Varsovie, mettraient un terme à l'existence de ce groupement militaire.

Il n'y a pas de doute que l'essor de la politique de coexistence pacifique affaiblit la position des milieux belliqueux dans les gouverne-

ments de chaque Etat, et favorise l'influence des forces progressistes et démocratiques. Et là nous voyons sans conteste la seconde face de l'influence positive de la coexistence pacifique. Il ne faut pas surestimer certaines des tendances à la désintégration dans les blocs qui existent encore. La paix et la coexistence pacifique en Europe pourront être garanties et pour de longues années uniquement si ces tendances bénéficient de l'appui d'un développement général plus progressiste et d'un processus de démocratisation dans chaque pays européen.

De plus, cette perspective de paix jointe au développement de la coopération et à une confiance croissante, peut créer en Europe un climat favorable pour résoudre la question allemande. Si nous jetons un regard vers le passé, nous voyons que les efforts des petits Etats européens en vue de la neutralité étaient bien souvent liés aux efforts pour éviter la pression de l'impérialisme allemand (le cas le plus typique était celui de la déclaration de neutralité belge de 1937, c'est-à-dire à une époque où l'Allemagne hitlérienne se préparait à attaquer toute une suite de pays européens et rapprochait ainsi le monde entier de la seconde guerre mondiale). Il est donc tout à fait logique que les tendances neutralitaires s'affaiblissent au moment où l'Europe développe une politique de coexistence pacifique et où se renforcent les perspectives de coopération fructueuse.

Il n'y a pas de doute qu'un tel développement allègerait aussi la situation des Allemands eux-mêmes. En Europe, où la majorité des Etats pourrait coopérer fructueusement, ne pourraient exister côte à côte deux Etats allemands qui ne coopèreraient pas. Et une telle coopération contribuerait certainement au développement des relations entre eux, sans lesquelles il est difficile de se faire une idée du rétablissement de l'unité allemande. Il est clair, d'autre part, que sans ce pas il est impossible de compter sur une garantie totale de la paix en Europe, car la division de l'Allemagne est artificielle et factice, et doit être tôt ou tard éliminée.

Restreindre le problème de la sécurité européenne au problème de l'unité allemande serait une erreur. Il n'y a pas de doute que l'impérialisme allemand a été le perturbateur de plus fréquent de la paix européenne dans ces dernières années, et que pour cette raison il faut une grande vigilance contre son renouveau. Mais les traités ne sont pas la seule garantie de la paix : c'est surtout le développement de la coopération pacifique qui crée entre chaque Etat un climat de confiance. La garantie de la sécurité européenne n'est pas pour cette raison l'oeuvre d'un pacte de garantie, par exemple entre les deux groupements militaires, bien qu'un tel pacte puisse avoir une influence positive et qu'il soit nécessaire de déployer des efforts dans cette voie. Ce n'est que le développement de la coopération multilatérale de tous les Etats européens qui peut donner des bases solides pour une sécurité européenne réelle, qui ne sera pas fondée sur n'importe quel équilibre des forces, mais sur la coopération de tous.

#### 4. Pour une coopération et une coexistence amicale en Europe.

Le très rapide essor de la coopération économique de nombreux pays européens, sans distinction des systèmes sociaux, ouvre au développement de la coopération européenne des perspectives prometteuses. L'initiative tchécoslovaque présentée à la Commission économique pour l'Europe à Genève est indubitablement un précieux apport dans ce sens, et montre les grandes possibilités qu'ont aussi les petits Etats de contribuer au développement de la coopération européenne, et par là même à la garantie de la paix et de la sécurité européennes.

Dans le domaine culturel nous sommes aussi témoins d'un développement positif, et il est possible de constater avec satisfaction que tant dans la sphère économique que dans la sphère culturelle prédominent toujours plus fortement les formes de coopération amicale des pays européens, et que disparaissent les survivances de l'époque de la tension dans les relations internationales. Le développement dans ces domaines est si positif qu'il se reflète aussi sur le domaine politique, où bien entendu se

maintiennent le plus longtemps les survivances de la période de la guerre froide.

Le développement des relations amicales entre les Etats européens met devant nous la question de savoir si l'idée de coexistence pacifique ne devrait pas être élaborée davantage. La coexistence pacifique compte encore dans sa substance avec les tendances et forces hostiles où il est nécessaire de tendre à des rapports pacifiques. La coopération crée toutefois des conditions favorables aux rapports encore plus développés, que l'on pourrait qualifier d'amicaux.

Il semble que le développement actuel aille de plus en plus explicitement dans ce sens : coopération et coexistence amicales. C'est sans conteste une devise à laquelle peuvent souscrire toutes les forces démocratiques et progressistes en Europe; leur influence grandit très rapidement tant dans les relations internationales que dans chaque pays en particulier.

Le développement paraît très prometteur dans une suite de petits pays européens. Leur rôle dans la lutte pour la coexistence amicale et la coopération peut être très grand, surtout s'ils réussissent à aller de l'avant dans cette question. Un front unique des petits pays peut très fortement influencer la politique mondiale au profit de la paix, même à l'encontre de certaines opinions, de certains intérêts de quelques grandes puissances.

Si la coexistence pacifique a affaibli les conditions favorables au développement des tendances neutralitaires, le développement de la coopération et la perspective de la coexistence amicale de tous les pays européens diminuent encore le degré de ces possibilités. Il n'est nullement nécessaire de le regretter, car la neutralité a toujours été plutôt un phénomène accompagnateur de la tension internationale, et pour cela son déclin peut être accueilli avec satisfaction s'il est lié à l'évolution des perspectives de paix, de coopération et d'amitié non seulement de tous les pays européens, mais de tous les Etats du monde.

Résumé

Le problème de la neutralité est étroitement lié en Europe à la tension ou à la détente. Dans la période d'après-guerre, dans la perspective de la coopération, le rôle de neutralité était minime. La guerre froide, avec sa tendance à consolider les deux blocs en Europe, ne laissait guère de place à la neutralité. Avec la détente en Europe, depuis le milieu des années 1950, de meilleures perspectives s'ouvraient à la neutralité. Mais dans la situation actuelle, où les possibilités d'une nouvelle coopération entre Etats européens se manifestent, la neutralité n'est plus aussi attrayante.

Summary

The issue of neutrality is closely linked in Europe with tension and détente. In the postwar period, when cooperation seemed possible, the role of neutrality was minimal. The Cold War, which tended to consolidate the two blocs in Europe, left but a small place to neutrality. With détente in Europe, since the middle '50's, better prospects were opened to neutrality. But at present, given the possibility of a new cooperation between European states, neutrality is no longer as attractive.



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"Neutrality, neutralism, non-alignment"

NON-ALIGNMENT AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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## Non-alignment and Nuclear Weapons

by Curt Gasteyger

To begin with an admission: in some respects this paper would have been written differently before the outbreak of the (third) Arab-Israeli conflict in early June 1957. Before that one could have argued with some conviction, though still little evidence, that one important reason for the non-aligned countries not to acquire nuclear weapons was the fact that in case of war they could ultimately rely on the (direct or indirect) protection of one, if not both, of the great powers, i. e. the United States and the Soviet Union. This may still be true in a number of cases and particularly in situations in which the interests of the great powers coincide or, at least, do not clash. They may then be able, either jointly or by separate action, to bring a potential or an open local conflict under their control or at least prevent it from escalating into a major war.

Although we can still be reasonably confident that the great powers have a vital interest in not letting an armed conflict get out of control once it has broken out, we have now witnessed how limited their capacities are to intervene effectively in such a war, let alone to stop it, if and when one belligerent party (or both) is determined to fight. This is a sobering and somewhat depressing lesson of the recent crisis. It clearly shows how much freedom of action

small countries have retained or regained under the global nuclear umbrella, on the one hand, and how little they can count on effective great-power intervention if they really need it, on the other hand. Such experience must give them second thoughts about the reliability of tacit or formal security guarantees and about the considerable value of military self-reliance. Thus Egypt and even more Israel might eventually come to the conclusion that because this is so, they should acquire nuclear weapons, as the safest means to ensure against another war. It is this prospect that lends particular importance to the relationship between non-alignment and nuclear weapons. It vindicates the correctness of the argument so consistently ignored by the Soviet Union that the danger of nuclear proliferation is incomparably greater in the non-aligned world than it is in Europe.

We shall examine the relationship between non-alignment and nuclear weapons under three different headings: first, the reasons for the acquisition of nuclear weapons; second, the implications of nuclear armament for a country's environment; and third, the wider problems of non-alignment, nuclear proliferation and international order. We shall not deal with the economic considerations, which play an important rôle in any decision concerning nuclear armament and would do so in particular in those countries which belong to the Third World.

In this paper the term 'non-alignment' will be used in its broader sense. It encompasses all those countries which are not members of a politico-military alliance. Consequently, it includes 'neutral', 'neutralist' and simply 'non-aligned' countries alike. This is, admittedly, an unsatisfactory definition in almost every respect. But it can be justified in view of this specific subject, since all these countries have one important negative element in common: they are not linked either bilaterally or through a multilateral (military) alliance with a nuclear power, which in most cases happens to be one of the great powers (Malaya and Singapore being among the few exceptions). The emphasis of the definition therefore lies on the word 'nuclear', because it implies that in any of the existing alliances some kind of a nuclear guarantee to the non-nuclear members is included, and it is precisely such a guarantee the non-aligned countries do not have. It therefore is of little significance whether they have concluded treaties of mutual assistance with other non-nuclear countries (as, for instance, the United Arab Republic has done) or whether they receive assistance from other (nuclear or non-nuclear) powers in terms of military equipment and training: neither affects their status as non-aligned countries by the above defined standards.

It can be claimed with some justification that this one single common element of non-alignment is a rather fragile basis for any further fruitful exploration of the subject. And indeed it is. One can easily see that the attitudes of the non-aligned countries towards nuclear armament vary according to their political environment, their geographic situation, their size and, consequently, the rôle they want, or have, to play in the international community. Most of them have therefore little more in common than their military independence from the nuclear powers and their self-reliance in matters of national defence.

Starting with Europe, we can see that even here most neutral countries find themselves in different positions. Austria had to forego <sup>in</sup> the state treaty of 1955 any option for nuclear armament; Finland's military policy will always be closely watched by her distrustful great neighbour. It has therefore little in common with the attitudes of Sweden and Switzerland; Yugoslavia again takes a different view on both nuclear proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Still, one can safely say that whatever these differences are, none of these countries would go nuclear for reasons other than those related to national security. The same also applies to Israel and South Africa. In other words: neither their size nor their foreign policy is such that these countries could expect to improve their international status or enhance their international rôle by acquiring nuclear weapons.

We are less sure whether this applies in the same degree to other non-aligned countries, particularly to those which have only recently acquired their independence. For reasons of international recognition and internal politics they might see in the nuclear status a welcome and useful attribute to their statehood. Such considerations are, however, more related to the future than to the present, given the high costs of nuclear armament and the limited degree of proliferation which has taken place until now. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that in the near future the possession of nuclear weapons may be considered more and more as a symbol and proof of national identity and independence. After all, both France and China have justified their nuclear armament on precisely these grounds. It is difficult to see why other countries with similar political ambitions should eventually not follow suit. If it is true that in order to gain stability the new states need as much international respect for their sovereign independence as they can obtain<sup>(1)</sup>, then one might expect them sooner or later to acquire nuclear weapons as well.

(1) Arnold Wolfers, "Allies, Neutrals, and Neutralists in the Context of U.S. Defense Policy," in: Neutrality and Non-alignment. Ed. by L.W. Martin, New York 1962, pp. 158/9.

The third category of non-aligned countries is the most important one as regards both their rôle in international politics and their attitudes towards nuclear weapons. It is only a small group, including India, the U.A.R. and Indonesia. In terms of size, population and potential economic and military strength, these countries can be counted as middle powers. For them the problem of nuclear armament is therefore not merely a question of security, but also of prestige. President Soekarno's announcement in 1965 that Indonesia would soon test her first nuclear device, was obviously less intended to deter the enemy than to bolster up the country's international status and internal cohesion. Equally, the possibility cannot be excluded that a defeated and humiliated President Nasser might follow this example in order to re-establish Egyptian leadership in the Arab world (leaving aside for once that in face of the arch-enemy Israel he would have much better reason to do so than had Soekarno). But more than any other non-aligned country India must look at the problem of nuclear armament not only from the point of view of security, important as it is. For many years India's civil nuclear technology has been the most advanced in the whole of Asia. In some respects this may still be so. In terms of international prestige, such achievement counted disappointingly little the very moment China had exploded her first nuclear device.

As public opinion seems to accept a country's nuclear status only when it has tested the 'bomb', India might sooner or later feel tempted to show the world that she too is fully capable of making it. In addition, she feels threatened by Chinese aggressiveness and there is a growing number of Indians who argue that India should go nuclear in order to meet this threat. To them no great-power guarantee can be a credible substitute to the actual possession of nuclear weapons, quite apart from the political question whether such a guarantee is reconcilable with her policy of non-alignment. It is precisely the prospect of 'living on borrowed strength' that many Indians find unacceptable and humiliating.

It is not the purpose of this paper to examine in detail the reasons which might or might not justify Indian nuclear armament. What is important in the present context is that to many Indians (and not to Indians alone) the possession of nuclear weapons has become identified with great-power status and seems to yield as much political prestige as military security. For a country like India, but also for smaller countries, the question of acquiring nuclear weapons has therefore become intimately linked with the question of their future rôle in international politics as well as the credibility and effectiveness of their policy of non-alignment.



This raises the question as to how nuclear weapons affect the policy of non-alignment. This again is part of the broader problem of the relationship between these weapons and foreign policy. It is not surprising that the views on this subject have considerably changed over the last fifteen or twenty years. They may change again if and when nuclear proliferation should continue. The great expectations about the political returns of nuclear weapons in the early days have gradually given way to a more sober appraisal of both their advantages and disadvantages. Surely, their possession constitutes a substantial asset in terms of defence and military power, at least to those countries that have acquired a second-strike capability. It may also add weight to a country's foreign policy and international status, although here the experience of Britain and even France calls for considerable qualifications. On the other hand, nuclear armament can also turn out to become more of a liability than an asset by limiting a country's freedom of manoeuvre and forcing it to abstain from actions that it would otherwise have taken did it not fear mutual annihilation. The international system may thus have become more secure under the conditions of nuclear deterrence. At the same time it has lost some of its 'flexibility' or 'fluidity' as the precondition for change.

The solution or settlement of conflicts now seems to become increasingly difficult the more areas are covered by this deterrence, which is an almost inevitable concomitant of nuclear weapons, on whatever level they are introduced into the international system. (So one could argue that the recent Israeli-Arab war might never have happened had both sides been equipped with nuclear weapons and with a certain degree of invulnerability. The resulting mutual deterrence would have contributed to 'freeze' the unstable situation and render either nearly impossible or highly dangerous any attempt by either side to change the status quo. Under present circumstances this would probably serve Israel's interests better than those of the Arab countries which resist any attempt of stabilizing or 'freezing' a situation they refuse to accept as permanent. A similar situation could arise in cases where a conflict exists between a pair or group of antagonistic states such as India and Pakistan.)

There is no doubt that the policy of non-alignment is going through a period of transition if not crisis. In a way it is related to the present crisis of the military alliances. They both stem from the fact that under the conditions of nuclear stalemate the great powers have basically accepted the status quo. This has not only substantially reduced the danger of any major war, but also led to a slackening of their struggle for, and rivalry in,

the non-aligned world. Under these circumstances the importance of being allied in order to secure protection against an aggressive great-power enemy has decreased, but so has the importance of staying out of this East-West conflict. A great number of new and non-aligned countries have for many years undoubtedly benefited by this conflict. It is therefore probably correct to say that 'their position is strongest when the two blocs are stalemated'<sup>(1)</sup>. It is only natural that they should have a direct interest in maintaining this situation. It provides them with some kind of 'check and balance system', which they can invoke if they feel too much exposed to the pressure of one power. Many non-aligned countries may therefore see not only advantages in the present détente between the United States and the Soviet Union. Having lost some of their attractiveness as the flattered objects of great-power economic competition, they may now even fear that the great powers could exert combined pressure on them in order to achieve a specific objective (as for instance the non-proliferation treaty) or for the sake of what the great powers think to be still more important than the particular interests of smaller countries: the prevention of a nuclear war (as for

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(1) Robert L. Rothstein, "Alignment, Non-alignment, and Small Powers: 1945-1965", in: International Organization, September 1966, p. 410.

instance in the recent Middle-East crisis).

The emergence of China as the third great power may change this present pattern of the international system again. But until this happens, the non-aligned countries (or at least some of them) will have to face the question of whether nuclear armament could be an answer to the present difficulties of non-alignment.

The first question which arises in this context is how the possession of nuclear weapons by non-aligned countries would affect their relationship with the great powers. The answer to this can only be tentative as we have no experience whatsoever in this field. All five present nuclear powers were in one way or another either members or leaders of an alliance system at the time they acquired nuclear weapons. The experiences of France and China have however shown that this decision led them into a growing isolation within the alliance. Leaving aside the question of who was responsible for this development, the important fact in the present context is that either country used its nuclear armament to opt out of an undesired military-political integration into an alliance (as France did) or to emancipate itself from what it considered a humiliating subordination to a nuclear-armed ally (as China did). This 'anti-alliance effect' of nuclear weapons was for both countries practically the same: militarily speaking, France

and China, while still profiting from the 'global nuclear umbrella', are now non-aligned countries. There is no evidence that they intend to give up this independent status, except perhaps in the extremely remote case of France joining a politically united Europe with its own nuclear force.

If the possession of nuclear weapons brings about such an 'isolationist' effect, one could expect that a further spread of nuclear weapons might work in favour of non-alignment rather than alliances. This could mean two things: first, that hitherto allied countries might choose a more independent policy once they have acquired nuclear weapons of their own. This could, for instance, be true of Japan, which in this case might wish to emancipate herself gradually from her one-sided dependence on American protection (incidentally a reason why China would probably welcome such a Japanese decision). Second, one can assume that a non-aligned country would acquire nuclear weapons in order to strengthen its independent position rather than to prepare the ground for any kind of alliance. Consequently, nuclear armament would be intended to make this country's policy of non-alignment both more credible and more permanent. At the same time such a step could force the non-aligned country as well as the great powers to re-define their mutual relationship in a way which places greater responsibility on the non-aligned's contribution to regional security and

stability and reduces the heavy preponderance of the great powers in that area.

Such development, desirable as it may be, is still a very remote prospect. It depends to a great extent on whether nuclear armament could not turn out to be more a liability and disadvantage than an asset to a non-aligned country. While it may hope to improve its security and make its non-alignment more credible and permanent by acquiring nuclear weapons, it may also find that such a step might create a situation which is either undesirable or even detrimental to its long-term interests. It could not only encourage or compel its rivalling neighbour to go nuclear as well, but also invite a great power (or both) to intervene directly in order to re-establish the power-balance in that area. This may be something that a non-aligned country precisely wants to avoid and which might limit its freedom of action more than it could have hoped to have gained by its nuclear armament.

Any non-aligned country will therefore have to examine very closely the possible effects of its going nuclear on both its own long-term interests and its environment. This is a difficult task as nobody can be sure about how his neighbour will react to such a far-reaching and important decision. Two things can however be predicted with some certainty: First, the nuclear armament of a non-

aligned country will not in any substantial way affect the global nuclear balance between the two great powers. And second, given the limited degree of proliferation at present, it will most certainly have a considerable impact on the political and military environment in which it happens. Obviously, the nature and scope of this impact very much depend on a series of factors, such as the 'why' and 'how' of a country's going nuclear, the nature of its foreign policy, the stability or instability of the country's environment, the existence of conflicts, etc. In an area where there are already nuclear powers and where nuclear deterrence works (as is the case in Europe), the impact would be incomparably smaller than in an area where such conditions do not exist. One can therefore assume that the consequences of a country going nuclear in a hitherto nuclear-free region (such as the Middle East or South-East Asia) are much more unpredictable and potentially dangerous than if Switzerland or Sweden did so. The argument that a certain amount of proliferation would reduce the number of 'nuclear vacua' in the world and therefore moderate the impact of nuclear armament by still more countries, is self-defeating. This is so because we are not at present so much concerned with what will happen in a world of twenty or forty nuclear powers. What is both more important and more imminent is the question as to how the world will survive the next stage of proliferation from five to, say, ten or twelve

nuclear powers. This stage is likely to be the most difficult and dangerous one, because many of the nuclear newcomers will be non-aligned countries which are part of politically, militarily and economically unstable areas with numerous actual or potential conflicts.

This is not to say that nuclear armament by a non-aligned country is always and under all circumstances undesirable or dangerous. As we have seen, it could improve the status and security of the given country; it may become an important factor in regional stability and it could serve as a means of creating a more satisfactory relationship with the great powers. In spite of these various possible advantages the acquisition of nuclear weapons is very unlikely to solve the more fundamental problems that most non-aligned countries are faced with. For countries like Sweden and Switzerland it does not really answer the wider question of how small neutral states can effectively defend themselves in the nuclear age. For most of the non-aligned countries in the Third World nuclear weapons do not offer any solution to their fundamental and complex problems of internal development and external stability. As their security depends more than anywhere else on both, they cannot go nuclear without taking into consideration the repercussions such ~~as~~ a step will have not only on their internal situation, but also on their international



environment. That is to say that nuclear armament is no more a matter of purely national concern (if it ever was), but has to be seen in both its national and international context. This growing interdependence between the internal and external implications is nowhere more evident and acute than in the Third World, where most non-aligned countries are to be found. This is so not only because the international system there is more volatile and more open to change than in the Northern hemisphere, but also because the internal situation of most countries is still unstable and vulnerable to any kind of social, economic and politico-military pressure.

Under these circumstances the costly and unpredictable experience of nuclear armament is (at least for a longer time to come) not only no answer to the numerous problems of these countries, but may on the contrary create new and very complex ones. By trying to achieve internal stability first, a non-aligned country may therefore contribute more to the stability of its environment, and consequently also to its own security, than by acquiring nuclear weapons.

In final analysis it seems therefore that it is not so much the nuclear problem that will determine the future policy of non-aligned countries and their place in the international system, but more their recognition of this intimate relationship between their internal stability and that of their environment, and of their security depending on both of them.

Summary

The attitudes of the non-aligned countries towards nuclear armament vary according to their political environment, their geographic situation, their size and, consequently, the role they want or have to play in the international community. The reasons for acquiring nuclear weapons therefore vary and so do the political, military and economic consequences of their acquisition for the country concerned, its environment and its relationship with the great powers, particularly as long as nuclear proliferation is still very limited. In spite of some advantages which nuclear armament could have for non-aligned countries, their status and security, it is very unlikely that it would help to solve their more fundamental problems: it does not really answer the problem of how small neutral countries can effectively defend themselves in the nuclear age, nor does it offer any solution to most non-aligned countries in the Tiers Monde of their complex problems of internal development and external stability. It is therefore not so much the nuclear problem that will determine the future policy of non-aligned countries and their place in the international system, but more their recognition of the interdependence which exists between their internal stability and that of their environment.

Résumé

Les attitudes des pays non-alignés à l'égard des armements nucléaires varient selon leur environnement politique, leur situation géographique et leur taille, donc selon le rôle qu'ils jouent ou qu'ils doivent jouer dans la communauté internationale. Les raisons qu'ils peuvent avoir de se procurer des armes nucléaires sont donc variables, comme le sont les conséquences politiques, militaires et économiques que l'acquisition d'armes nucléaires a pour chaque pays intéressé, pour son environnement et pour ses relations avec les grandes puissances, surtout aussi longtemps que la prolifération nucléaire demeure très limitée. Même si les armements nucléaires pouvaient présenter quelques avantages pour les pays non-alignés, pour leur situation et pour leur sécurité, ils ne contribueraient probablement pas à résoudre leurs problèmes fondamentaux : les armements nucléaires ne constituent pas une vraie réponse au problème de savoir comment des petits pays neutres peuvent se défendre efficacement à l'ère nucléaire, pas plus qu'ils n'offrent à la plupart des pays non-alignés du Tiers Monde des solutions à leurs problèmes complexes de développement interne et de stabilité externe. Les problèmes nucléaires ne détermineront guère la politique future des pays non-alignés et leur place dans le système international, qui dépendront davantage de la compréhension par eux de l'interdépendance entre leur stabilité interne et la stabilité de leur environnement.

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"Neutrality, neutralism, non-alignment"

NEUTRALITY, NEUTRALISM, NON-ALIGNMENT  
AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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Neutrality, neutralism, nonalignment  
after the second world war

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by Leo Mates

Neutral states have always been subject to great stress whenever a war happened close to their frontiers and particularly if they had close relations with the belligerent parties before hostilities opened. Neutrality, therefore, was never perfect, but neutral states frequently succeeded to satisfy more or less the two sides at war that their behaviour was in conformity with the law and customs defining neutrality.

Neutrality was in the past an option of a state in specific cases of high tension, threatening to develop into open warfare, or in the case of an outbreak of war. It was an option in a way similar to the freedom of choice of any state to declare war. After all, war was still under the Covenant of the League of Nations a legitimate instrument in international relations, provided certain procedures preceding the declaration of war were duly respected.

There have been cases, even as late as during the First World War, when States hesitated about which side to join in the war and adopted provisionally a policy of neutrality. There have been cases of withdrawing from a war, making peace with the other side and retreating to a position of neutrality. The legality of war and the political, economic and social conditions in the world of the era preceding the First World War permitted and even stimulated this kind of behaviour. War was a continuation of the legitimate diplomatic power-game, and neutrality was one of the possible types of behaviour according to customs in international relations.

Neutralism, in these circumstances, was not a lack of identity or a result of estrangement, but a consistent adherence to the policy of neutrality, based on self-interest, or on an enlightened self-interest counting on the results of this policy in the long run. Neutralism,

therefore, was compatible with maintaining the best relations with all former or future belligerents during periods of peace, that is when there was no war or high tension between them. There was no doubt about the "belonging" of the state practicing "neutralism" to the family of nations within which it was placed geographically, nor about the "acceptance" of the "neutralist" by his natural environment.

These general conditions, dominated by a general sense of belonging to one family, began to crack already at the outbreak of the First World War. Since then, the depth of the causes of war, the total character of warfare and the consequences which it brought to the general order in the world, introduced fundamental changes into the pattern of international relations. The advent of the Soviet Union on the international scene after the revolution of 1917 in Russia, contributed further and most decisively to this change.

Neutralism, even in its most perfected forms, and based on a consistent behaviour in the past, supported fully and universally by the neutralist state's own population, could not stand its ground in the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the other European States. In these new circumstances, neutralism could be maintained e.g. by Switzerland only because of its favourable geographical position. The same applied to other neutralists, who as a rule had no frontier with the Soviet Union.

The two sides considered themselves fundamentally opposed to each other in all questions connected with the internal order of society and concerning their role in the world. Irrespective of economic, diplomatic and other contacts crossing the new dividing line, the sense of "not belonging" remained dominant. As it is not the purpose of this paper to examine the content and significance of these differences and confrontations, this question will not be further discussed here.

When Hitler came to power in Germany, a new element of deep conflict developed within the sphere of the developed part of the world, outside the Soviet Union. This situation differed fundamentally from the one mentioned earlier ; while it was at first considered less significant, it caused ultimately the outbreak of the most bitter and most cruel of all wars in history, a war which brought the Western

States into alliance with the Soviet Union. The fundamental political conflict covering the whole field of internal and external policies created an unbearable tension between the Third Reich and the Western Democracies, despite the acceptance of essentially the same system of society by both sides. In fact, these similarities served as a basis for cooperation between the Western Democracies and Hitler's Germany until the mounting political tensions interrupted these dealings and a rapidly growing crisis finally led to the outbreak of the Second World War.

This brought the war closer to the borders of the neutralists, and their neutrality came under very strong pressures. Irrespective of the merit of the specific cases (Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, etc.), there was no doubt as to their feelings of belonging to the one or the other side. It could be said without the risk of exaggerating that the identification with one side in the war was at that time generally much stronger than during the First World War.

The belligerents on both sides accepted the neutrality of States which succeeded in maintaining this position after the opening moves of the war. This resulted again from a sober calculation of risks, costs and advantages. It would be exaggerated to state that Hitler respected the neutrality of, let us say Switzerland or Sweden, out of obedience to law. The respect of the "neutrality" of Spain, with her Blue Division on the Eastern Front, is an even more drastic example of inconsistency in principles, based on practical considerations.

The protracted and intense tension between the two camps headed by the United States and the Soviet Union, in the years following the end of the Second World War, affected even more deeply the totality of international relations. The content and scope of the political conflict out of which these tense relations developed cannot be compared with earlier cases of political strife in the international community, nor could the experiences of these past situations serve satisfactorily in the conditions prevailing during the Cold War.

The Cold War developed out of frictions between the main allies already during their cooperation in joint military actions against the

common enemy. The East-West relations worsened rapidly after the war in connection with some major problems of the new postwar situation. The bitterness of the war itself was carried over into the postwar conflicts between the two sides. Differences in the systems of society amplified the intensity of the conflict, and in this respect there was a continuation and amplification of the confrontation begun after the revolution of 1917 in the period between the two World Wars.

The struggle appeared to be irreconcilable and burdened with the gravest danger of open military conflict. With the years passing, the temperature rose and by the beginning of the 1950's the world was again close to the outbreak of a world war. The fighting in Korea particularly threatened to spread into a major conflagration.

In those circumstances, the general pattern of behaviour of nations in international relations changed again, and known definitions of terms describing them underwent important changes. The very term of peace, diplomatic relations, recognition of states and other fundamental categories in international relations did not longer have the meaning which people used to ascribe them in the past.

Even the apparently well defined term of neutrality lost some of its earlier content. The division between the two sides was not drawn only on the basis of different interests of states, but received a very strong ideological overtone, or rather reflected the profound differences between the systems of society and the patterns of the political and economic life on each side. Even states maintaining a very firm legal and diplomatic neutrality could not and were not considered neutral. They could not remain bystanders who do not take sides in the conflict; they identified themselves openly with one side.

Formally this might well have precedents in earlier situations, but the intensity of identification and the totality of the division introduced such differences in degree, that a really new pattern of neutral behaviour developed. When it was facetiously described in the corridors of the United Nations as neutrality "on this" or "the other side", the joke contained certainly more than half of the truth.

One of the ways to circumscribe, if not to define legally, the Cold War is to say that it was a prolonged tension causing profound and



prolonged disturbances in the established pattern of behaviour in international relations, influencing deeply the internal conditions and development of all nations as well.

Let us now turn to nonalignment.

Nonalignment became a current term with a specific meaning in international relations during this postwar period. It covers a type of behaviour which could be, and frequently is, associated with neutralism in a wider sense. Often neutralism, with some adjective attached to it, is used to describe the policies of nations which call themselves "non-aligned". In view of these differences in the understanding of nonalignment and the use of the term "neutralism" concerning it, we shall devote most of this paper to examining the specific nature of nonalignment as it developed after the Second World War.

Nonalignment developed under the influence of the Cold War and reflected basically a desire of some states to stay out of the conflict; but this is only part of the truth. In order to understand the political attitudes and the behaviour of the countries known as nonaligned, one must try to understand non-alignment in the light of the overall position of these countries in world affairs.

Nonalignment developed as the policy of less developed and recently established states in the first years after the Second World War. These countries, predominantly located in Asia and Africa, entered the world scene burdened with the disadvantages of weak and poorly developed economies, and more or less formidable problems of organizing new states. The heritage of the past, the lack of experience and the inherited structure of society, developed in times when the country could not develop independently all these drawbacks increased the problems of the new states.

It was quite natural that they should not want to align themselves and that, in some cases, they should consistently pursue a policy of nonalignment. The first expression of this attitude came understandably from the Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru. He stated, soon after he became Foreign Minister of India in the Provisional Government still headed by the Viceroy Lord Wavell, at a Press Conference in New Delhi

on 24 September 1946 : "In the sphere of foreign affairs, India will follow an independent policy, keeping away from the power politics of groups aligned against another" (1).

This attitude did not reflect a lack of interest in international affairs. In fact India displayed great interest in the important questions connected with postwar problems. Nehru expressed this explicitly speaking of India's future foreign policy. "She will uphold the principles of freedom for dependent peoples and will oppose racial discrimination wheresoever it may occur. She will work with the other peace-loving nations for international cooperation and goodwill without the exploitation of one nation by another" (2).

This statement foreshadowed the future policy of India, and of the other nonaligned countries with respect to positively defined goals concerning the colonial question and the problems of less developed countries. Nehru made also reference to the United Nations and pledged India's faithful adherence to the Charter. There can be no doubt concerning India's intention to pursue a positive and active policy already in those early days.

The same could be said about other countries and their Governments, either at the time of attaining independence, or in the moment of adherence to the policy of nonalignment. In all cases the two dominant elements were (a) the determination to stay outside the conflict between the two sides of the Cold War and (b) the pursuit of an active policy regarding the specific interests of the peoples in the colonies and the less developed countries, together with a general policy aimed at the maintaining of peace and the overcoming of existing tensions.

The policies of the nonaligned countries in the years that followed were more or less a faithful reflection of these postulates. The complexity of the problems forming the two basic pillars of the policy of nonalignment and the intricacies of actual situations in the era of intense Cold War conflicts made it sometimes extremely difficult to carry out a consistent policy in all practical cases. These difficulties were particularly apparent in the case of countries economically less developed and materially weak.

Nevertheless, the nonaligned countries remained surprisingly consistent even under strong pressures and in spite of the need to make occasional sacrifices concerning immediate interests, or even when it meant sustaining considerable losses. Doing so they were not inspired by the principles of neutrality or neutralism.

In practical behaviour as well as in theory, nonalignment did not coincide with neutrality. This particular feature caused sometimes honest misunderstandings and reproaches from observers and statesmen in other countries. The pursuance of the aims and purposes outlined as fundamental to the policy of nonalignment, rather than the insistence on neutrality, remained in most cases the basis for determining the attitude of the nonaligned. They felt that it was essential to act in full freedom from any obligation to follow the line of any bloc centre, but they never felt an obligation to avoid a similarity or even coincidence with the attitude of the one or the other side, if this happened as a result of their own evaluation of a given situation.

In other words, they would not permit the specific positions of the aligned countries to influence their own independent policy on a given question or situation. If they found that any, or all other positions were in conflict with their views, they would still normally hold on to them. This brought the nonaligned from time to time into opposition, and caused even friction and antagonism, with the one or the other power groupings. The incompatibility of this behaviour with neutrality never bothered them, and we find numerous statements of leading statesmen of nonaligned countries to this effect.

This particular pattern of behaviour of the nonaligned countries must be understood in the context of the whole outlook of these countries. There are perhaps fewer explicit statements on this subject than on the actual conduct of foreign policies, but it appears that the general outlook of nonalignment can be safely deduced from existing statements and the actual conduct of nonaligned countries throughout the years of the Cold War and after.

The nonaligned countries are the politically most active of the less developed countries, and also leading members of the family of the newly established states of Africa and Asia. The one exception is

Yugoslavia. But this exception is more apparent than real. Yugoslavia came into being only after the First World War and underwent a profound social revolution during the Second World War. By its own people, the state was after the war frequently referred to as the New Yugoslavia. It may then be agreed that this country also should be counted in a way as a "new" country. On the other hand, some of the basic problems of the "new" countries were among the main problems in Yugoslavia too, including the need to accelerate economic development and to industrialize rapidly. The differences with the other new countries were not negligible, but apparently the common denominator was more decisive, and Yugoslavia adopted soon after the war the policy of non-alignment as the fundamental line of international behaviour.

The position of the country in Europe, where she was the only nonaligned country in the sense of the word as understood among the other nonaligned, gave Yugoslavia certain advantages. She could in delicate cases of differences among the Nonaligned take positions which were completely, or almost completely, free of regional biases, and she was not involved in specific local problems and controversies with other less developed or nonaligned countries. Furthermore, Yugoslavia stood outside occasional Asia-Africa rivalries when the selection of a site or representation was considered in the whole nonaligned group. Finally the higher level of economic development and the structure of society, as well as the higher level of political organization, gave the country special distinction and advantages in comparison with countries of Asia and Africa.

Now returning to the main argument, let us try to define the motivation of the nonaligned countries in the definition of their general attitude in world affairs. First of all, they did not share the rapid technical development of the Twentieth Century and they faced internal problems which either were no longer relevant to the more developed nations, or were completely specific, and did not apply at all to the past or present realities of the nations of Europe and North America (3). Preoccupied with these specific problems of nation and state-building, overcoming poverty and fighting colonialism, they looked upon the conflicting positions of the nations of the developed

world, so to speak, from the outside. They did not identify themselves with the policies which were confronted in the Cold War. This is not to say that they did not have their views and sympathies or even affinities, but they could not and did not take the deep, involved and interested attitude that would lead to alignment and complete identification with one of the groups.

The adherence of some of the countries of the Afro-Asian area to the one or the other bloc came mostly as a result of considerations based on local expediencies or even in some cases on fallacious assumptions or hopes concerning advantages to be gained in this way, when it was not dictated by domestic policies and needs to maintain the established internal order. In fact, most of these affiliations proved to be very weak whenever the general or local situation changed. The fallacious expectation that the less developed countries and the developed countries, having such different political, economic and social problems, could form anything resembling a monolithic bloc, crumbled also under the pressure of divisive forces and influences.

The inability of the Third World to identify itself with the political struggles of the developed part of the world came at a time when the involvement in international relations became ever more intense, at a time when the relations with the outside world dominated more than ever the minds of people and when the identification with the common cause of ones group of nations was almost as strongly expressed as any other kind of loyalty, including that to one's own country, party or religion.

The marked estrangement of the less developed countries from the developed world, and the high degree of identification with international causes, created a wide gap between the "North" and the "South" of the world. The policy of nonalignment was the expression of this cleavage in the field of world politics. One could well say that the political thought of the Third World did not necessarily clash with the political thought of the developed part of the world, but it circled in a different orbit, around another center of ideological gravity.

This is, of course, a schematic picture and developments in reality did not always conform literally to this simplified picture.

But, on the other hand, it appears difficult to understand and interpret the behaviour and the motivation of the nonaligned countries unless these deeper roots of their whole attitude are given the right place in the analysis. It is also important not to interpret the specific place of the Third World in the international community as necessarily and always antagonistic to the developed part of the world. There is no evidence of a consistent hostile attitude of the nonaligned countries towards the developed countries, or towards any of them, on the basis of economic or general political differences. If there have been hostile attitudes, they can be explained as usual political conflicts of interests, such as occur in relations among nations everywhere. These conflicts were in most cases connected with the events of the Cold War and the tactical moves within this confrontation.

The nonaligned states did not expect to solve the basic problems of development and of their position in the world through a general and decisive clash with the developed countries. This was, after all, neither theoretically nor practically a sound proposition. In specific instances, though, they combined efforts to assist peoples struggling against colonialism or in any other circumstance when the equality, independence or integrity of one of the New States, or of any part of the Third World, was at stake.

The nonaligned countries did therefore oppose the efforts of the Chinese leaders in Peking to mobilize the poor countries of Asia and Africa into a general and decisive struggle against the rich countries. This theory of a so-called world-wide class struggle was occasionally looked at with some favour by a few of the statesmen of the non-aligned countries, but was always rejected in conferences of the statesmen of these countries <sup>(4)</sup>. This is significant because of the great effort of the Chinese leaders to influence nonaligned countries, and in view of the appeal China had for some of the countries in the Third World as a reaction to the lack of understanding for their specific problems in developed countries.

The high tide of acceptance of some attitudes similar to the views of Peking was the year 1964, the year marked by the sense of

frustration generated at the conference on trade and development in Geneva, because of the poor results of the conference concerning its main subject matter. The attraction of the views propagated by Peking waned in the following year and later, gaining somewhat after the demonstration of nuclear military power of China, and in connection with the development of the war in Vietnam.

These lingering and oscillating feelings towards China exemplify the inherent and deep sense of belonging together prevailing among the less developed countries, even in cases when in other respects there are strong reasons for disagreement. China, after all, is also a less developed country, although she has attributes of a Great Power as well. The surprisingly persistent and strong solidarity in the Third World, and the leading role of the nonaligned countries in it, are visible and practical expressions of the feeling of belonging together, of having this specific identity as a separate part of the world, decidedly distinct from the developed world.

The main connection felt with the political activities of the developed countries and the conduct of the Cold War was the concern for peace and international security. The less developed countries of the Third World, having no desire to be involved into the conflicts of the Cold War, could not and did not take a passive attitude in this respect. In fact, the activities of the nonaligned countries in this field, the efforts to overcome the prolonged confrontation of the two blocs, or at least to reduce the level of international tensions, received greatest attention everywhere. Nonalignment is generally better known and appreciated in the developed countries for these efforts than for the activities in the field described earlier, i.e. the improvement of the international position of their countries and of their internal conditions.

The activities directed against the Cold War, the endeavours to preserve peace and improve international peaceful cooperation, were of particular importance and received the highest priority in the whole spectrum of interests of the nonaligned countries in periods of increased tensions and crises. But, even on such occasions the attention given to immediate problems of international peace and security could not reduce

the interest in the other questions more closely connected with the internal problems of these countries. This was particularly the case at the Belgrade conference of nonaligned statesmen in 1961. The conference met at a time of high tension following the failure of the Summit meeting in Paris of 1960, which was doomed to failure after the espionage crisis caused by the U-2 flight of Captain Powers.

At the Belgrade Summit conference of the nonaligned countries, special attention was given to questions of peace and security and in particular to the renewal of contacts between the two Superpowers. But the Conference devoted even more time and space in the final papers to the more specific problems of the Third World (5). These other problems were, so to speak, a constant factor in the preoccupations of the nonaligned and the peace and security problems were more or less emphasized according to the situation. Furthermore, they were always treated in the context of prevailing activities of the two blocs and in accordance with the significance the Cold War tensions had for the problems of peace at a given moment.

To summarize, we can say that the Cold War and its effects upon the international scene gave impetus to the formation of nonalignment as a special trend in international relations, but was not the main underlying foundation of this policy. Nonalignment rested rather on the specific political, economic and social position of the underdeveloped countries in the modern world and was primarily inspired by the desire to overcome this position of inequality and achieve favourable conditions for the peaceful coexistence of all States, rich or poor, large or small.

In practice the two elements were frequently blended into a single action, but we can distinguish in the postwar history of international relations the rise and the strengthening of the role of the nonaligned countries in world affairs. They have, no doubt, played an important role in coordinating the activities of the less developed countries in the field of international economic problems and in particular in the efforts to improve the economic position of these countries by actions within the United Nations. They have, no doubt, contributed to the drive and spread of the anti-colonial movement. But



they have also played an important role in the overcoming of the high tensions of the Cold War.

Whatever the role of the nonaligned countries may have been in the solving of this or that specific crisis in the past years, there is one thing that should be accepted without hesitation. The nonaligned countries, by their mere existence, created a wide area in the world which was not and would not be directly and fully absorbed into the Cold War. The division of the world into two opposing military camps was thereby prevented. This facilitated and actively assisted the decrease in the intensity of the Cold War. The rise of the nonaligned countries to the position of an important factor in the United Nations in the late 1950's and early 1960's for instance, opened new possibilities for the world organization and contributed to the mitigation of East-West tensions.

During all these years the number of nonaligned countries grew as a result of the emergence of new countries along with the progressive dissolution of the former colonial empires. This coincided with the lessening of tensions and the beginning of an era of more cooperative contacts between the Great Powers formerly divided in the bitter strife of the Cold War. The behaviour of the nonaligned countries in these developments again did not quite correspond to the pattern of behaviour expected from neutrals.

In some instances in the United Nations they introduced motions and even obtained the vote of the majority of the General Assembly for resolutions which were not accepted by one or the other great power, or even occasionally by none of them. It became again obvious that nonalignment was not a position between the two camps, but a third position which stood on its own, irrespective of the positions of the still well defined two sides formed during the years of high tensions of the Cold War.

The gain in status of nonalignment and the important achievements in the economic and anti-colonial fields did, however, not advance rapidly enough the basic demands of the countries of the Third World or of its individual countries. In fact, the economic problems were usually aggravated after independence was achieved in most of the former

colonies. The rapid growth rate of the population in some of the more densely populated ones, intensified the anyhow grave economic problems.

This population explosion affected the less developed countries in two ways ; it aggravated the food problems in view of the rather low efficiency of agriculture and the lack of the enormous amounts of investment needed to increase production, and it also reduced the effect of the general growth-rate of the economy. Although the food problem, wherever it comes near the critical stage, is more immediate and alarming, the slowing down of the rise or even the stagnation of the income-per-head figure has for the future of a country a more ominous significance. Temporary food deficits can be dealt with easier than the worsening of overall conditions of the economy. A failing economy cannot produce results in agriculture, but a growing economy could later on take care of the food problem if immediate starvation is avoided by temporary foreign aid shipments.

This basic problem of the Third World, and numerous political and social problems, some of them national and others international or regional, have caused recurring crises in several countries of that part of the world. The efforts, partly successful of the countries of the Third World in the United Nations, have only slightly alleviated this situation. The international community has essentially failed to undertake adequate measures to cope with the mounting crisis in the less developed areas.

The increasing internal tensions and regional problems have created unstable situations in different parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Occasionally disorders have broken out and in a number of countries internal upheavals or coups have taken place. In some cases one or more of the Great Powers became involved in the disturbances. The nonaligned countries did more or less well and on a more or less wide scale assist or support the efforts of the less developed countries defending their independence and the right to cope with their own problems without interference from outside.

Acting in this way they have drawn reproaches that they follow an anti-Western orientation. These conflicts did not occur within the framework of the Cold War, they happened in a new era of fewer East-

West tensions, but more problems in the Third World and more frequent confrontations between the countries of the Third World and the Great Powers of the West. The nonaligned countries assumed in the new circumstances even more the role of the politically most advanced element of the less developed parts of the world. They stood in an ever more pronounced way as the protagonists of the demands and aspirations of these countries and represented them in political and other general confrontations with the developed countries (6).

The formerly dominant feature of nonalignment, the endeavour to reduce East-West tensions and bringing the two sides closer together, has thus faded into the background. The urgency to act in this field has not only temporarily, but apparently on a more durable basis, become less pressing. Nonalignment has therefore not lost significance in the eyes of the statesmen of those countries. They have always considered that their primary task is to solve the historic problems of overcoming the division of the world into poor and rich countries, into underprivileged and domineering nations. They were apparently aware that the ending of the Cold War was but an indispensable prerequisite which could not solve the problems of the world, although it may have saved peace and thus permitted the other problems to come to the fore.

In conclusion one could ask the question whether it is appropriate to call the policies described as "nonaligned", in view of the pre-eminence of positively defined goals and aims in the essential content of the term and the secondary role of the negative definition of not willing to be aligned? As a matter of fact, this formal question has occasionally been raised, but instead of changing the name, an effort to redefine the goals of "nonalignment" in the new circumstances has taken precedence.

First of all, the emphasis was placed on a broader concept of preserving peace and on a wider cooperation of peaceloving and progressive forces, rather than on the formal adherence or nonadherence to military alliances. The term of "coexistence" is now more frequently used to define this policy, while the term "nonaligned" remains more as a term describing the community of nations who worked together in the earlier days of nonalignment. The need for redefining the policy in

this way has been first explicitly stated by President Tito in his 1963 address to the General Assembly of the United Nations (7).

Since the 1964 conference of nonaligned statesman in Cairo and the Conference on Trade and Development convened by the United Nations in the spring of the same year, the activities of the nonaligned countries have mostly been focused around the fundamental economic questions of the less developed countries and the problems concerning crises in the Third World connected with interference from outside. The most significant examples are Vietnam and the recent crisis in the Middle East.

The basic orientation and evolution of the interpretation of nonalignment, as well as the specific economic and social profile of the nonaligned countries, may well be a cooperation between these countries and the neutralist countries of Europe. Neutralism and nonalignment are not nuances of the same basic attitude, but phenomena based on different social foundations, expressions of specific needs and strivings of societies and nations facing distinctly different problems, and trying to solve them in accordance with their different geographic, economic and political positions and their different social structures.

Occasional cooperation and understanding could be achieved only in questions concerning specific instances of efforts to reduce the tensions of the Cold War, inasmuch as the neutralists of Europe could find a common language and agreement with the attitudes of the nonaligned countries. General cooperation of the Neutralists has occasionally been sought by the Nonaligned but never insisted upon beyond a certain measure.

Footnotes

1. India Office Bulletin quoted in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, London 1946-1948, p. 8169.
2. Ibid.
3. The Commonwealth countries of the temperate zone (Australia, New Zealand) and South Africa, as well as Japan, have throughout the postwar period been also counted among the developed countries. The simplified expression of "Europe and North America" is to be understood as a symbol rather than a precise geographical definition.
4. Compare the debates and the final documents of the Cairo Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Nonaligned Countries in Review of International Affairs n° 350, November 1964, Belgrade.
5. Compare the debates and final documents in Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Nonaligned Countries, published by Jugoslavija, Belgrade 1961.
6. Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, March-June, 1964.
7. See Verbatim Records of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Vol. XVIII, pp. 1-4, New-York 1963 (1251st Plenary Meeting, 22 October 1963).

Summary

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Neutrality, neutralism and nonalignment are only apparently similar policies. Nonalignment has developed after the Second World War as the basic political attitude of an increasing number of "new" countries. It meant to them non-participation in the conflict between the East and the West, a position similar to the attitude of neutrals, but it also implied a positive attitude concerning the fundamental problems of the "Third World".

The Nonaligned could not and did not identify themselves with the one or the other side in the Cold War in view of their specific political, economic and social structures and problems as "new" countries. With the reduction of East-West tensions they have become more involved in the positive side of their general platform, the efforts to enhance their security and special interests, and they have had to face occasionally serious situations of foreign interference.

The term "nonalignment" may have thus become inappropriate, but it is still used by the Nonaligned, although sometimes only to describe the participants of the nonaligned movement. The policy is now more frequently referred to as the policy of coexistence.

Résumé

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Neutralité, neutralisme et non-alignement ne se ressemblent qu'en apparence. Le non-alignement s'est développé après la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale, comme l'attitude politique fondamentale d'un certain nombre d'états "nouveaux". Il signifiait pour eux d'une part un refus de participation au conflit Est-Ouest, position semblable à celle des neutres, et d'autre part une attitude positive concernant les problèmes fondamentaux du Tiers Monde.

En raison de leurs structures et problèmes spécifiques, politiques, économiques et sociaux, de pays "nouveaux", les non-alignés ne pouvaient s'identifier à l'un ou à l'autre camp. La réduction des tensions entre l'Est et l'Ouest les a conduits à mettre l'accent sur les aspects positifs de leur programme, à renforcer leur action tendant à accroître leur sécurité et à mieux défendre leurs intérêts ; ils ont dû parfois faire face à des interventions étrangères créant une situation grave.

Le terme "non alignement" est peut-être devenu impropre, mais les pays non-alignés continuent à s'en servir, parfois seulement pour désigner les participants au mouvement des non-alignés. Leur politique est plus fréquemment qualifiée de "politique de coexistence".

"Neutrality, neutralism, non-alignment"

NEUTRALITY. NEUTRALISM. NON-ALIGNMENT

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referring to neutralism as a foreign policy to use the label non-alignment. But this stipulation, or preference rather, has no sanction in popular usage which is now so muddled and variable that it is necessary to recognise that these are gross categories which attempt to designate varied and variable facts, and that neutralism and non-alignment are now often accepted as rough synonyms.

Ideological neutralism is present in overt or covert forms in all countries. For the desire to be dissociated from Cold War (meaning now — and much more urgently for some communist and some southern Asian states — the Sino/American Cold War as well as the original and now much mellowed Soviet/American Cold War), to remain uncontaminated by great power rivalries, or at least outside certain military alliances, can stem from so many motives, ambitions, or aspirations. Some obvious ones are: dislike of the dominant influence of the great powers in world politics, fears of nuclear war, the desire to act, or to prompt action by others, as conciliators, mediators, peacemakers. Neutralism can also stem from parochialism, isolationism, idealism or cynicism. It can thus be seen that the emotional well-springs of ideological neutralism are grounded in generally familiar aspects of human nature; but beyond saying this, the impact and importance of ideological neutralism depends so much on local conditions and possibilities, on enracinement, that these processes must be investigated individually — though not here.

In the late 1940's neutralism as a series of anti-governmental protest movements in Europe against military alliances had been politically ineffectual and had not affected fundamentally the foreign policy of any of the successful European neutrals of the second world war -- Sweden, Switzerland, Ireland and Spain. But from the early 1950's a new and more dramatic current began to emerge prominently on the world stage. This was the foreign-policy neutralism of most of the newly independent states of Asia (and later of Africa), principally pioneered by India, and demonstrating at times a desire to assert a corporate identity or at least to have meetings and consultations between potentially like-minded neutralist leaders. It is possible to trace the conference diplomacy of the non-aligned back to the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947, or, if one focuses on Pan-Africanism as having a non-aligned component, to invest this with an even longer genealogy, but this process really began in the mid-1950's, first notably at Bandung in April 1955 and at Brioni in June 1956<sup>2</sup> (when Tito, Nehru and Nasser met together à trois for the first time): Afro/Asianism and non-alignment were thus fully launched. There was from the mid-1950's a new and growing emphasis given to the term non-alignment, which now became preferred in popular usage, especially by those who wished to assert their independence of the Cold War rivals. Neutralism had already acquired connotations of passivity, of indifference to moral and political issues, whereas non-alignment implied a simple statement of fact: no formal alliances -- and then

oscillating as it does between various particularist prescriptions about the conduct of policy during war (on land and sea always, to which the 20th century added air and now conceivably space as theatres of war) to general injunctions to remain impartial or to favour, though without fighting, the just cause. But since 1945 it has been a rather sparse and uncertain literature lacking any clear definition of focus. This is easily understandable. For neutrality to be recognised and respected it must be presupposed that the distinction between war and peace can be made and maintained. This is difficult in an era of ideological warfare, of many cold as well as hot wars. However neutrality de facto, and perhaps even de jure, flourishes in an age of limited war. Whenever there is a limited war there will always be some neutrals, and the belligerents will always be concerned about the substance of the neutrality of their immediate neighbours and of the big powers. When an American government spokesman declared, in June 1967, that his government was "neutral in thought word and deed" in the then current Arab/Israel war, this unvarnished avowal lasted even less time before being disavowed by the self-same government than did Woodrow Wilson's similar statement in 1914. In time of general war the status of neutrality becomes very precarious, but has never yet entirely disappeared. There is now no broad measure of agreement as to what exactly is required to be genuinely neutral and belligerent states -- be they Israel and the Arabs in 1948, 1956 or

1967, or India and Pakistan in 1948 or 1965, or some other powers in the many other instances that could be cited -- attach some importance to the declaratory policies of the non-belligerents, though more of course to their substantive policies in relation to capabilities.

\* \* \* \* \*

Neutralization<sup>6</sup> means the institution of a status of permanent neutrality. Before 1955 it seemed as if it had become obsolete. It was a device recognised in 19th century international law by which great powers brought about a change in the status of small states, in an endeavour to remove small but strategically important territories outside the active sphere of international rivalries. It was also a way of indicating that the great powers by making or at least acknowledging a neutralisation agreement, intended, or at least declared their intention, to respect the independence of the neutralized state. Since 1955 there have only been two examples of the neutralising of states -- Austria in 1955 and Laos in 1962 -- and it is arguable whether Austria was in fact fully and formally neutralized just as it is questionable whether the neutralization of Laos has ever been any more than a paper agreement. It is often thought that the only adequate test of neutralization is whether the neutrality of the state concerned is maintained permanently or not. By this severe test there has been no successful neutralization -- save possibly that of Switzerland since 1815 and Austria since 1955. But a less onerous and

more realistic test is to ask if neutralisation was preferable to the other practical alternatives — usually meaning partition or continued war, internal and/or international. It is in such terms that the neutralization of Laos and schemes for neutralization in South East Asia<sup>7</sup> and elsewhere should be appraised. Neutralization is not a nostrum; it is a rare but occasionally possible way of immunising a small state from the worst scorbities of neighbouring and great power rivalries.

\* \* \* \* \*

It was in the mid-1950's, too, that the phrase, the notion, of le tiers monde was first launched<sup>8</sup>, though it was more than four years later, after nearly twenty new states emerged in Africa in 1960, that its English equivalent, the third world, became a standard catchphrase, and academics and other publicists began to write books<sup>9</sup> with this term in their title or argument. Even so, the third world was and is a somewhat ambiguous and variously interpreted notion. To some the phrase summarizes the fact of the non-aligned pulling together in concerted harmony, consulting and co-operating amicably on a wide range of matters of common concern, constituting "a vital new force in world affairs;" others invest in the phrase their preference for small powers and dislike of big powers and by extension see the third world as more virtuous than either of the other two worlds; others regard the third world as a cultural<sup>10</sup> or as an economic or an

ethnic-geographical category. (Thus raising such much debated questions as does the third world include all the poor, non-white, ex-colonial peoples and powers? Who decides, and how? Is Latin America in or not; what about Taiwan and Israel, Angola and Hong-Kong, Timor and Mozambique? etc., etc.). The third world, however described in detail, has its animities and animosities, its feuds and friendships, rather like the other two worlds. In general dire domestic disorders are more frequently encountered in the third world than elsewhere, and there will be no swift end to this. What is not so clear and simple, despite influential claims to the contrary, is that domestic disorders within new states always and necessarily beget international disorders.<sup>11</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

Neutrality, non-alignment, neutrality, even neutralization and the third world, continue to live among us in the unquiet life of public disputation: but, as Marc Bloch once wrote, "our verbal symbols are variable according to time or place; they become coefficients of emotivity leading to further equivocation." No-one, not even scholars, and especially not political scientists, should assume that their vocabulary has ultimately arrived at impassiveness.

NOTES

<sup>1</sup>In writing this paper I have drawn on and summarised some of my previous writings about this subject, in particular: "Neutrality and the Emergence of the Concept of Neutralism", Review of Politics, April 1960, pp. 255-68; Neutralism (Leicester University Press, 1963); "Non-alignment and the Cairo Conference", Peace News, 20 November 1964; "Neutralism and Polycentrism", Survey, Journal of Soviet and East European Studies, January 1966, pp. 35-42; A Primer of Neutralism (Frank Cass, London, forthcoming); "Neutralism and Nonalignments", chapter VII in War and Peace in South East Asia (OUP, forthcoming) and "New States and International Order", in The Bases of International Order, edited by Alan James (OUP, forthcoming).

I would also like to thank The Ford Foundation for financial support enabling me to attend this conference, and for a fellowship enabling me to travel and study in The United States, January-September 1967.

<sup>2</sup>See G. H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-alignment (London, Faber 1966) which is a lively, opinionated, sometimes acid, sometimes anecdotal, sometimes romantic study of the conference diplomacy of the two movements indicated in the book's title. The author is an Indian journalist and was formerly a diplomat.

I have deliberately festooned this very short paper with rather extensive references. Partly because with a general introductory paper as brief as this brevity is compressed almost into breathlessness and references can offer readers interested in the subject some prospect of greater intellectual respiratory satisfaction. Secondly, fairly extensive references serve to give the reader some idea of what seems to me to be the range and extent of the more important and interesting writings in English on this subject -- for it is a scattered and not particularly well known literature. Whether this is its just deserts is not my present concern. In the main I have not here made reference to single country studies. Very full bibliographical references are given on a country by country as well as on a general and topical basis in my A Primer of Neutralism (see note 1 above).

The two main non-aligned conferences up to date have been Belgrade 1961 and Cairo 1964. The official proceedings of the Belgrade Conference was published as The Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries (Beograd, Yugoslavia, 1961), pp. 344.

For the Cairo conference the fullest English version of the proceedings I know of is the special issue of Review of International Affairs

(Belgrade), vol. XV, number 350, pp. 105. Present portents do not suggest that there will be many more such conferences.

<sup>3</sup> I have discussed this theme in "India's Foreign Policy" in Foreign Policy Analysis, edited by F. S. Northedge (Faber and Faber, London, forthcoming).

<sup>4</sup> To my mind the most useful books on this subject that have appeared to date, in addition to those listed in my book published in 1963, are: Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., The Elephants and the Grass (Praeger, 1965); Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. (ed.), "Nonalignment in Foreign Affairs," Vol. 362. November 1965 special issue of The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Sciences; J. W. Burton (ed.), Nonalignment (London, 1966), and International Relations: A General Theory (Cambridge UP, 1966) especially Part 9; Paul F. Power (ed.), Neutrality and Disengagement (New York: Charles Scribners, 1964).

<sup>5</sup> Useful general surveys may be found in: Philip S. Jessup (ed.), Neutrality: Its History, Economics and Law, 4 vols (New York, 1938-6); N. Politis, Neutrality and Peace (Washington, 1935); Nils Orvik, The Decline of Neutrality, 1914-41 (Oslo, 1953), and Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law [Department of State, Washington, D.C., June 1963], vol. I, pp. 343-364.

<sup>6</sup> See Marjorie M. Whiteman, ibid., above, pp. 343-355, for further references.

<sup>7</sup> See Neutralization in South East Asia: Problems and Prospects. (A study prepared at the request of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 10 October 1966, Washington) (DC-)

<sup>8</sup> Probably first by the French Sociologist George Balandier. See La tiers monde, ed. G. Balandier (Paris, 1956).

<sup>9</sup> For example: Marie Rossi, The Third World (New York, 1964); Peter Worsley, The Third World: A Vital New Force in World Affairs (London, 1963); J. D. B. Miller, The Politics of the Third World (OUP, 1966); I. L. Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development (New York, 1966); T. Thornton (ed.), The Third World in Soviet Perspective (Princeton, NJ, 1965) and Charles Wolf, Jr. The Third World in United States Policy (Little Brown, 1967).

<sup>10</sup> Is neutralism "natural" to certain "cultures"? is a question sometimes asked. On this theme see A. H. Jansen, op. cit. on Hinduism and Buddhism; Ali Mazrui, Pax Africana (London, 1967) and F. A. Sayegh (ed.), The Dynamics of Neutrality in the Arab World (San Francisco, 1965).

<sup>11</sup> I have written much more extensively on this theme in "New States and International Order" cited in note 1 above.



Summary

Neutrality is a political neologism which when first coined in the late 1940's meant dissociation from the Cold War. Nowadays neutrality in some sense or other is almost ubiquitous, but this is mostly because in contemporary usage the term is so portmanteau and so often merely conveys imprecise imputations; non-alignment is often a synonym for neutrality but appears to be a little less mutable in meaning, mostly it is the currently popular descriptive label for the foreign policies of new states -- it is also a political neologism; neutrality has occurred in fact in every war throughout history -- neutrality is a political and a legal concept, but the rights and duties pertaining to the legal status of neutrality only became clearly recognized as such from the mid-18th century, they almost entirely disappear in time of general war, and there always have been (and probably always will be) controversies as to their precise content and importance, just as there always is about political neutrality; neutralization, the institution of a status of permanent neutrality, is a 19th century invention and is relatively rare, there have only been two -- rather different -- actual examples since 1945, but many more schemes and suggestions; the third world is a general and loose descriptive term, first coined in the mid 1950's and greatly gaining in popularity in the 1960's despite the patent divisions and disagreements among the non-aligned. The many ambiguities and controversies currently surrounding neutrality, non-alignment, neutralization, and other near congeners, are not merely, or even mostly, to be imputed to the inadequacies of these words: they are intrinsic to the complexities of the world these words try to describe.

Résumé

Le terme "neutralisme" est un néologisme politique qui, lorsqu'il fut inventé, vers la fin des années 1940, signifiait la volonté de se dissocier de la guerre froide. De nos jours, on trouve le neutralisme presque partout, dans un sens ou dans un autre, mais cela est dû surtout au fait que dans son acception contemporaine le terme est si vague et présente tant d'implications imprécises. Souvent synonyme de neutralisme, le "non-alignement" semble moins changeant dans sa signification ; c'est notamment l'étiquette actuellement courante que l'on applique à la politique étrangère des Etats-Unis, et c'est également un néologisme politique. Quant à la neutralité, elle a existé dans toutes les guerres de l'histoire ; le concept de neutralité est à la fois politique et juridique, mais les droits et les obligations afférant au statut juridique de neutre n'ont été reconnus clairement comme tels que depuis le milieu du 18<sup>e</sup> siècle, pour disparaître presque entièrement en tant de guerre générale ; il y a toujours eu, et il y aura probablement toujours, des controverses concernant leur contenu et leur importance, tout comme il y a des controverses au sujet de la neutralité politique. La "neutralisation" (institution d'un statut de neutralité permanente) est une invention du 19<sup>e</sup> siècle, relativement rare : nous n'en avons que deux exemples, assez différents l'un de l'autre, depuis 1945, mais les projets et les suggestions sont beaucoup plus nombreux. Les termes de "Tiers Monde", désignation assez imprécise et générale, ont été inventé vers le milieu des années 1950 et ont beaucoup gagné en popularité au cours des années 1960, en dépit des divisions et des désaccords évidents entre pays non alignés. Les nombreuses ambiguïtés et controverses au sujet du neutralisme, du non-alignement, de la neutralisation et d'autres termes analogues ne doivent pas être imputées uniquement, ou même principalement, à l'imperfection de ces termes : elles sont inhérentes à la complexité du monde que ces termes cherchent à décrire.

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Br/Neutr./7

"Neutrality, neutralism, non-alignment"

THE ALIGNED AND THE NONALIGNED IN A BIPOLAR WORLD

- Two Mathematical Models -

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION  
SEVENTH WORLD CONGRESS  
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## The Aligned and the Nonaligned in a Bipolar World

by Kinhide Mushakoji

### INTRODUCTION

Is it possible for nonaligned countries to survive in a bipolar World, where two super-powers are ruling over a multitude of smaller countries. This question may be answered in various ways, according to the point of view one takes, and also according to the circumstances in which the question is asked.

In order to be as objective as possible, one very good way to answer the question is to use a formal language, and to formulate the problem in the shape of a mathematical model. This approach, needless to say, is not meant to be taken for "the best way" to answer the question. An historical study of the past is necessary as well as an empirical survey of nonaligned countries, internal and external conditions. Yet, as a supplement to these studies, it may be good to try to find out, theoretically, whether, and under what conditions, nonalignment may be viable, and what role the countries adopting such a policy could play in a bipolar World.

The two mathematical models, one based on game theory, looking at the the problem of the static stability of the system, and the other, using the Markov process model, are presented as a starting point for a more detailed formal treatment of the problem of alignment and non-alignment in the bipolar World.

### A STATIC MODEL

#### 1) The Basic Scheme

In our model World, we have two kinds of actors; the two super-powers, and , and the multitude of the smaller countries  $\Delta$  , which is a set  $(s_1, s_2, s_3, \dots, s_n)$  of the n non-super-power countries in the World. We assume that, unlike many real-World countries, all actors in our model World are rational in the game theoretical sense of the term.

Our further assumption is that the super-powers, and , are playing a game of their own on one hand, and that they play another very special game with the smaller countries, . This latter game is played according to the following scenario:

The smaller nations en bloc, can choose among three strategies;  $s_0$ , which is a nonalignment strategy,  $s_1$ , which is to join the bloc, and  $s_2$ , which consists in joining the bloc. For the sake of clarity, we assume that the members of are identical and therefore interchangeable. Thus a partition of the smaller countries into three groups (or mathematically speaking, three mutually exclusive sub-sets of ) corresponding to the three strategies,  $s_0$ ,  $s_1$ , and  $s_2$ , can be defined as the proportion of the smaller countries choosing either one of the three alternatives. (In other words, we define the smaller countries as anonymous units, and we leave out the problem of finding which country belongs to which group.) This simplification enables us to treat a partition as a mixed strategy, with a value k

$$q_0 \cdot m_0 + q_1 \cdot m_1 + q_2 \cdot m_2 = k$$

where  $q_0 + q_1 + q_2 = 1$  and where  $m_0$ ,  $m_1$ , and  $m_2$  are the utilities of staying unaligned, joining the bloc, or joining the bloc under certain conditions.

The conditions in question are determined by the strategies of the two super-powers. We imagine that for each pair of the alternatives available to  $\Delta$  and  $\Omega$  , a certain utility for to stay unaligned, to join the bloc, or to align with the bloc, is univocally determined. This utility may be interpreted as an objective advantage for the smaller countries, but more interesting would be to see in it the sum of the side-payments paid by and to with various objectives, such as to induce the members of to join one of the blocs, or to stay away from the opponent.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>) We may conceive cases where threats and deprivation from cooperation by .

the super-powers would constitute negative utilities, yet we assume here that all the utilities are positive, since this does not alter the structure of the game.

Needless to say, we assume that in our model world there is a certain amount of uncertainty, so that both the super-powers and the small countries have to play safe and choose a minimax or a maximin strategy. This means for  $\Delta$  that the mixed strategy has to be optimal for  $k$ . In the case of the super powers,  $\Lambda$  and  $\Omega$ , the requirements are a little more complex, since they have to take care of three different matters. 1) The game between  $\Lambda$  and  $\Omega$  must be played so as to optimize both players' utilities. 2) In the game between,  $\Lambda$  and  $\Omega$  on one side, and  $k$  on the other, the super-powers have to hold down, as much as possible, the utility gained by  $\Delta$ .<sup>2</sup> 3)  $\Lambda$  and  $\Omega$  are interested in increasing the number of their allies and/or to limit the number of their opponent's allies.

2) The super-powers want to economize their side-payments, and they don't want the smaller countries to get too strong by putting them in a situation advantageous for them.

Now that we have described the essential characteristics of the model, let us say a few words about what we expect to find with it. As we have seen, this is a static model, so that the analysis focuses on the existence or inexistence of a solution for the game described in the model, its uniqueness, the stability of the solution and its conditions, etc. etc.. In other words, we are curious to find how the way the super-powers bestow their boon influences the pattern of alignment and nonalignment of the smaller countries. Whether the partition achieved can be a stable one or not, and whether non-alignment plays a stabilizing function in the system or not.

2) The Behavior of the Model

Let  $(\Lambda, \Omega, \Delta, M)$  be a game where  $\Lambda = (\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3, \dots, \alpha_m)$ ,  $\Omega = (\omega_1, \omega_2, \omega_3, \dots, \omega_n)$ , and  $\Delta = (\delta_0, \delta_1, \delta_2)$ . Let also  $(A_m, Z_n, D_3, M)$  be its mixed strategy extension. For any pair of mixed strategy by and ,

$$\begin{aligned} x &= (x_1 \alpha_1, x_2 \alpha_2, x_3 \alpha_3, \dots, x_m \alpha_m) & x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + \dots + x_m &= 1, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3, \dots, \alpha_m \in \Lambda \\ y &= (y_1 \omega_1, y_2 \omega_2, y_3 \omega_3, \dots, y_n \omega_n) & y_1 + y_2 + y_3 + \dots + y_n &= 1, \omega_1, \omega_2, \omega_3, \dots, \omega_n \in \Omega \end{aligned}$$

the following three values corresponding to the three alternatives of  $\Delta$ ,  $\delta_0$ ,  $\delta_1$ , and  $\delta_2$  are defined as follows:

$$M(\delta_0, x, y) = \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{0ij} x_i y_j$$

$$M(\delta_1, x, y) = \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{1ij} x_i y_j$$

$$M(\delta_2, x, y) = \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{2ij} x_i y_j$$

If we plot the above three values as a point in a three dimensional space, the point associated with  $xy$  is interpreted as the utility  $\Delta$  finds in the case  $xy$  is chosen by  $\Lambda$  and  $\Omega$ , where the first coordinate indicates the return to  $\Delta$  in case it chooses to stay nonaligned, the second when it aligns with  $\Lambda$ , and the third when it joins the  $\Omega$  bloc.<sup>3</sup>

3) The analysis we are using here is merely an application of the geometrical interpretation of a two-person zero-sum game. For further details, cf. R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions, New York, 1957. Appendix 4. pp.400-407.

Let  $(m_0(xy), m_1(xy), m_2(xy))$  be an abbreviation of  $(M(\delta_0, x, y), M(\delta_1, x, y), M(\delta_2, x, y))$ , then,

$$M = \{(m_0(xy), m_1(xy), m_2(xy)) \mid x \in A, y \in Z\}$$

is the set of all of the above mentioned points in the three dimensional space. It can be proved that this set constitutes a convex polyhedron.

Now, to make the mathematics of this analysis more easily understandable, let us take an example.  $\Lambda$  and  $\Omega$  are playing a game with two strategies for each of them.

$$\begin{array}{l} \Lambda \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \omega_1 & \omega_2 \\ 3, & 1, \end{array} \right. \\ \Omega \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \lambda_1 & \lambda_2 \\ 2, & 4, \end{array} \right. \end{array}$$

this gives four possible outcomes of the game;  $\lambda_1 \omega_1, \lambda_1 \omega_2, \lambda_2 \omega_1, \lambda_2 \omega_2$ .

For each of these cases correspond three values, one for the case in which  $\Delta$  chooses  $\delta_0$  (to stay nonaligned), one for the case  $\delta_1$  (joining  $\Lambda$  bloc) is chosen, and a last one for the eventuality in which  $\delta_2$  (joining  $\Omega$  bloc) is selected. Thus we may have,

	$\alpha_0$	$\alpha_1$	$\alpha_2$	$\alpha_3$
$s_0$	1	0	3	3
$s_1$	5	4	4	1
$s_2$	0	3	2	4

Fig. 1 gives an idea of the geometric representation of  $M$  in this example.




Fig. 1

Now, we have enough information about the model to proceed to the next step, and try to find whether there is a solution to this game. Clearly enough, what we are looking for is a value which is minimax for  $\Delta$  and maximin to  $\Gamma$  and  $\Omega$ . Considered from the side of  $\Delta$  and  $\Omega$ , the problem consists of finding a certain value  $v^*$  such that its maximum coordinate (i.e. the maximum mixed strategy) is not greater than any of the other point in  $M$ . This point, evidently, can be only a point whose three coordinates do not exceed  $v^*$ . Formally, such a point belongs to a set

$$\mathcal{N}(v^*) = \{ (m_0, m_1, m_2) \mid m_0 \leq v^*, m_1 \leq v^*, m_2 \leq v^* \}.$$

Graphically, this is equivalent to say that  $M$  touches  $\mathcal{N}(v^*)$  at some boundary point (or points), as in Fig. 2.






Fig. 2

It is easy to see that at any point on the boundary of  $M$  and  $N(v^*)$   $\Delta$  and  $\Gamma$  can hold  $\Delta$  to at most  $v^*$ , which is nothing else than the minimax strategy for the former players.

On the other hand,  $\Delta$ 's maximin strategy can be determined with the help of a plane separating  $N(v^*)$  and  $M$ : It can be proved that such planes exist for any two convex set such as  $N(v^*)$  and  $M$ . Now, it is not hard to realize that the coordinate of all the points lying on the right, back side or above the plane are greater than the coordinate of the points on the plane, so that a mixed strategy enabling  $\Delta$  to get the value  $v^*$  for all the points on the plane separating  $N(v^*)$  and  $M$ , would give it more or at least the same amount of side-payment. This is so, simply because  $M$  lies on the right, back, and top side of the plane in question.

Formally, the plane separating  $M$  and  $N(v^*)$  can be defined as,

$$P = \{(m_0, m_1, m_2) \mid q_0 m_0 + q_1 m_1 + q_2 m_2 = v^* \quad q_0 + q_1 + q_2 = 1\}$$

and since  $M$  contains points which coordinates are equal to or greater than the coordinates of the points in  $P$ , we have,

$$(A) (m_0, m_1, m_2) \in M, \quad q_0 m_0 + q_1 m_1 + q_2 m_2 \geq v^*$$

Hence, if  $\Delta$  chooses the strategy  $(q_0 \delta_0, q_1 \delta_1, q_2 \delta_2)$ , it can get at least  $v^*$  for all points in  $M$ . In other words, a partition of  $\Delta$  with the proportion  $(q_0, q_1, q_2)$  guarantees a gain of at least  $v^*$ , whatever course the game between  $\Delta$  and  $\Gamma$  may follow. Therefore, if there is only one such maximin strategy for  $\Delta$ , we may say that the partition  $q_0, q_1, q_2$  is stable, if all the players are rational.

Now, the uniqueness of the separating plane  $P$  is a rather difficult condition, and this makes a stable partition of  $\Delta$  very hard to obtain. As Fig. 3 illustrates for a two dimensional case where we find a separating line instead of a plane, there is an infinite number of planes separating  $\mathcal{M}$  and  $\mathcal{N}(v^*)$ , if the surface of either set does not fix the separating plane by sharing with it a sufficient number of points.




Fig. 3.a




Fig. 3.b




Fig. 3.c

Now, this can happen in only two cases; one case is when  $N(v^*)$  surface corresponds with the separating plane as in Fig. 3.c. The other case occurs when  $\mathcal{M}$ 's surface overlaps with the separating plane. The first case takes place if and only if one of the  $q$ 's equals to one. In other words, the system is stabilized in this case by having all the members of  $\Delta$  in one of the two blocs, or when all the smaller countries choose the nonalignment strategy. The latter case is possible only when there is a sub-set of  $\mathcal{M}$  such that all the points in it give the same return, which is maxi-min to  $\Delta$  and mini-max to  $\Lambda$  and  $\mathcal{B}$ .

If such an optimal set  $\hat{\mathcal{M}}$ , which we may call the optimal indifference plane exists, there is a unique solution to the game, and we have  $q_0$  non-aligned countries,  $q_1$   $\Lambda$  bloc countries, and  $q_2$   $\mathcal{B}$  bloc countries, for

$$q_0 m_0 + q_1 m_1 + q_2 m_2 = v^*.$$

This is a very important condition, because it means that stability can be brought to the system, only if  $(v^*, v^*, v^*)$  is such a point that  $\Delta$  cannot increase its utility by changing the partition. Therefore, the crux of the static model is this  $\hat{\mathcal{M}}$ , which presence in a sense encapsulates the game by a linear relation of the utilities of the three strategies.

In other words, stability is brought in the system, when  $\Lambda$  and  $\mathcal{B}$  are willing to pay to the members of  $\Delta$  side-payments according to a certain rule, i.e.: the sum  $\mathcal{B}$  is paying to  $\Delta$  for joining its bloc,  $m_1$  weighted by  $q_1$  should decrease exactly as much as the sum  $\Lambda$  is paying to  $\Delta$ ,  $m_2$  weighted by  $q_2$ .

weighted by  $q_2$  increases— given a certain level of  $m_0$ . This rule can be accepted by both  $\Lambda$  and  $\Omega$  if the utility each super-power finds in having a power bloc meets the weighted constant sum condition,

$$q_1 U_1 + q_2 U_2 = K (= v^* - q_0 m_0).$$

Otherwise, both super-powers would compete and pay more and more expensive side-payments to the smaller countries to attract them to their blocs, and there will be no optimal indifference plane to stabilize the game.

To close the discussion about the static model, let us add one point which is self evident, and yet important to notice. It is the fact that in the above equation,  $q_0$  should be greater than zero. Otherwise, the optimal plane would vanish, and we would have an infinite number of solutions. This is why we may say that the existence of nonaligned countries in  $\Lambda$  is indispensable for the stability of the system.

Now, in order to find what happens when a static stability cannot be achieved, we have to turn to our dynamic model.

## A DYNAMIC MODEL

### 1) The Basic Scheme

In this model, we continue to use the same kind of actors, but instead of dealing with their minimax strategies, and the optimal partition of  $\Delta$ , we try now to trace the dynamic process, where, we have seen, the smaller countries are forced to stay, as long as the system have not reached a stable state.


The dynamic model, therefore, deals with the transformation of the partition of  $\Delta$ , and in order to trace this process, we use a continuous-time Markov model. In other words, the partition, which in the static model took the shape of a mixed strategy with three pure alternatives,  $\delta_1, \delta_2$ , and  $\delta_0$ , is interpreted now as a system with three states, A, Z, and N, and the proportion of the smaller countries choosing either one of the strategies,  $q_1, q_2$ , and  $q_0$  in

$$(q_0\delta_0, q_1\delta_1, q_2\delta_2) = k$$

is reinterpreted here as the proportion of  $\Delta$  being at a given time in state A, Z, or N. Needless to say, state A represents alignment with the  $\Lambda$  bloc, state B, alignment with the  $\Omega$  bloc, and state N nonalignment.

Now, in order to represent the changing pattern of the  $\Delta$  partition, we have to introduce the concept of transition from one state to another, and we attribute to each transition path a given transition rate, which we assume to be constant over time. In this way, the role of the super-powers,  $\Lambda$  and  $\Omega$ , are represented in the dynamic model, as the manipulation of the transition rates.

We allow in the model, four transition paths; 1)  $A \rightarrow N$ , 2)  $N \rightarrow A$ , 3)  $Z \rightarrow N$ , and 4)  $N \rightarrow Z$ . This, naturally, does not exclude the possibility of a transition  $A \rightarrow Z$  or  $Z \rightarrow A$ . They are merely represented as two steps transitions,  $A \rightarrow N \rightarrow Z$  and  $Z \rightarrow N \rightarrow A$ . Thus graphically we have the following model. (Fig. 4)



As it is shown in Fig. 4, the transition rates are defined by means of the four parameters:  $a, z, \lambda,$  and  $\mu$ . The four values can be interpreted as follows;  $a$  and  $\lambda$  represent each  $\Omega$ 's influence on its own bloc,  $A$ , and the nonaligned countries,  $N$ , and  $z$  and  $\mu$  stand for  $\Omega$ 's influence on  $Z$  and  $N$ .

It is easy to see that the transition rate for  $A \rightarrow N$  and for  $Z \rightarrow N$  is  $1-a$ , or  $1-z$ , since the two transition rates are nothing but the proportion of the countries in either  $A$  or  $Z$  which do not stay in the same state. In the case of  $N$ , we have the opposite case where the countries staying in  $N$  are represented as the proportion not moving to  $A$  nor  $Z$ ;  $1-(\lambda+\mu)$ .

This dynamic model may seem to presuppose too much fluidity and transience to the alliance pattern of the small countries. It may be argued that, so far, not so many of the real World countries belonging to the power blocs have defected. Yet such a tight bloc adherence can easily be taken care of by the present model, as a special case where  $a$  and  $z$  are extremely high, or even one.

By means of this dynamic model, which takes account of various levels of tightness of the bipolar World system, we may study the influence of the four parameters on the final shape of the system, its stability, the viability of the nonaligned, and other dynamic characteristics of the behavior of the smaller countries in a bipolar world where they are exposed to the influence of the superpowers inducing them to join their blocs or avoid the opponent's.

## 2) The Behavior of the Model

The analysis of the behavior of the dynamic model is much simpler than that of the static one. We have only to set up the necessary equations, and solve them according to our need.<sup>4</sup>

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4) One archetype of the present dynamic model can be found in, Bernard P. Cohen, Conflict and Conformity: A Probability Model and its Application, Cambridge, Mass, 1963.

On the continuous-time Markov process and on the analysis used here, cf. James S. Coleman, Introduction to Mathematical Sociology, New York, 1964.

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As we can find easily from Fig. 4,  $q_1$  is related to two rates; the rate of input from N;  $\lambda$ , and the rate of output to N;  $1-a$ . Therefore we have,

$$\frac{dq_1}{dt} = \lambda q_0 - (1-a)q_1 \dots\dots\dots(1)$$

and  $\frac{dq_2}{dt} = \mu q_0 - (1-z)q_2 \dots\dots\dots(2)$

hold for  $q_2$  for similar reasons. As to  $q_0$ , the equation is a little more complicated, since two output rates;  $\lambda$  to A, and  $\mu$  to Z have to be taken into account. Thus

$$\frac{dq_0}{dt} = (1-a)q_1 + (1-z)q_2 - (\lambda + \mu)q_0 \dots\dots(3)$$

Now, with the help of the above three equations, we can analyse the behavior of the dynamic model.

First of all, we are interested in knowing about the relationship between the parameters and the bipolar balance between  $\Lambda$  and  $\Omega$ . This can be done by studying the behavior of (1) and (2), as follows.

Let us assume that the balance between  $\Lambda$  and  $\Omega$  is kept at a level where  $q_1$  is  $k$  time  $q_2$ , or other words that the bloc is  $k$  time larger than the bloc. Since

$$q_0 + q_1 + q_2 = 1$$

$$q_0 = 1 - q_1 - q_2 = 1 - q_1 - kq_1 = 1 - (1+k)q_1$$

putting this result in (1), we have

$$\frac{dq_1}{dt} = \lambda - \lambda(1+k)q_1 - (1-a)q_1 = \lambda - (\lambda(1+k) + (1-a))q_1 \dots\dots\dots(4)$$

therefore,

$$\frac{dq_1}{-(\lambda(1+k) + (1-a))q_1} = dt \dots\dots\dots(5)$$

Integrating (5), we have for the time interval  $t_0$  through  $t_1$

$$\frac{-\lambda(1+k) + (1-a)q_{11}}{-\lambda(1+k) + (1-a)q_{12}} = e^{t(\lambda(1+k) + (1-a))} \dots\dots(6)$$

Where  $q_{11}$  stands for  $q_1$  at time  $t_1$ , and  $q_{10}$  for  $q_1$  at time  $t_0$ .

Now, solving (6), we obtain the following equation.

$$q_{11} = \lambda - e^{t(\lambda(1+k)+(1-a))} (\lambda - (\lambda(1+k) + (1-a)) q_{10}) \dots \dots \dots (7)$$

Similarly, we have from (2)

$$q_{21} = \rho - e^{t(\rho(1+\frac{1}{k})+(1-z))} (\rho - (\rho(1+\frac{1}{k}) + (1-z)) q_{20}) \dots \dots \dots (8)$$

As to  $q_{00}$  and  $q_{01}$ , we can simply use

$$q_{00} = 1 - (q_{10} + q_{20}) \quad \text{and} \quad q_{01} = 1 - (q_{11} + q_{21})$$

For a sufficiently long time period,  $q_1$  approaches a limit which is the value of  $q_1$  when

$$\frac{dq_1}{dt} = 0$$

in this way, we find that

$$\hat{q}_1 = \frac{\lambda}{\lambda(1+k) - (1-a)} \dots \dots \dots (9)$$

Similarly, we have

$$\hat{q}_2 = \frac{\rho}{\rho(1+\frac{1}{k}) - (1-z)} \dots \dots \dots (10)$$

By comparing (9) and (10),

$$\frac{\rho}{\lambda} = k \frac{(1-z)}{(1-a)} \dots \dots \dots (11)$$

(11) means that in order to maintain the balance between  $\lambda$  and  $\rho$ , it is necessary that the ratio of input should be  $k$  times the ratio of output, if the balance is based on one side having  $k$  times more countries in its bloc than the other. This is very important because we may conclude from (11) that the larger the  $k$ , the more sensitive is  $\rho$  to  $z$ , i.e. if the  $k$  times larger bloc's discipline loosens by  $\Delta z$  so that more countries in the bloc get emancipated, there should be an increase in the attraction of neutral or nonaligned countries  $k$  times more important than  $\Delta z$ .

Now, from (3) we have the following limit value of  $q_0$ .

$$\hat{q}_0 = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{(1+k)(\lambda + \rho)}{(1-a) + k(1-z)}} \dots \dots \dots (12)$$

(12) indicates a very important characteristic of the model, i.e.  $\hat{q}_0$  vanishes only if  $a$  and  $z$  are one. Therefore, nonalignment is viable in this model world provided that both blocs are not monolithic allowing no defection of their members. Moreover, nonalignment chances increase more significantly when the larger bloc loosens its discipline, as is shown by the fact that  $q_0$  is  $k$  times more sensitive to  $z$  than to  $a$ . On the other hand, the greater the disparity of the two blocs in terms of the number of members, the more sensitive  $q_0$  becomes, to the attraction of the two blocs, as indicates the term  $(1+k)(\lambda+1)$ .

The overall behavior of the model is shown in Fig. 5. An interesting aspect of the model is that the stabilizing time which we have computed from (7)-(9) as

$$t_{stab.} = \frac{1}{(1+k)-(1-a)} \log \frac{1 - \frac{1}{(1+k)-(1-a)}}{k - \frac{1-a}{q_{10}}} \dots\dots\dots(13)$$

This time represents the length of the process of adaptation in the bipolar world, when a change in one of the parameters disturbs the equilibrium. therefore the smaller the stabilizing time the greater the stability of the system. Now, (13) tells us that this time is a function of the position of  $q_{10}$ , or in other words, of the difference of the original condition and the stable state  $q_{11}$ . On the other hand, the greater  $\lambda(1+k)-(1-a)$ , the shorter the stabilizing time, so that when  $k$  is large the attraction by the blocs becomes more stabilizing, otherwise it is the bloc discipline which helps to stabilize the system.

Another important aspect of the model is that for  $q_{10}$  smaller than  $\hat{q}_1$   $q_1$  and  $q_2$  increase and  $q_0$  decreases accordingly, i.e. bloc members get more numerous and nonaligned countries tend toward alignment. On the contrary, when  $q_{10}$  is greater than  $\hat{q}_1$ ,  $q_1$  and  $q_2$  decrease and  $q_0$  increases, so that the role of nonalignment becomes more important.






Fig. 4.a




Fig. 4.b

The behavior of this dynamic model, needless to say, cannot be expected to represent faithfully the behavior of the real world aligned and nonaligned countries, since the parameters in the real world are seldom held constant. Yet we may gain a better understanding of the mechanism of alignment and non-alignment, by studying the system holding constant the parameters as we have done here.

### Conclusion

We have studied, mainly from the point of the system stability, the static and dynamic aspect of alignment and non-alignment in a bipolar world system.

The static model, which we built on the assumption that both of the super-powers as well as the smaller countries were rational actors in the game theoretical sense, told us that unless stability was achieved by the absorption of all the smaller countries in one bloc, or the disintegration and extinction of the blocs, it was possible only when the weighted constant sum condition of the two power blocs was met.

The dynamic model, where we assumed that the two super powers were in a state of balance, so that the proportion of the size of the two power blocs was held constant, helped us in finding out what would happen if a static stability was not attained. We found in this way, that unless the two blocs' unity was so strong as to prevent any defection, the nonaligned countries had the opportunity to survive and flourish, according to the value of the parameters. We found also that the time necessary to attain a state of stability, depended on the original partition and on parameters such as the rate of attraction of the bloc actors.

The whole discussion, we admit, was focused on the action of the superpowers on the smaller countries, rather than on the behavior of the latter ones. What we were most anxious to find was whether nonaligned countries could survive in a bipolar world, and it seems that the answer is affirmative.

### Résumé

Est-il possible de conserver un statut non-aligné dans un monde bipolaire, dominé par deux super-grands ? La présente étude cherche à répondre, d'une manière aussi objective que possible, à cette question, en présentant le problème sous forme de deux modèles mathématiques. Un modèle statique utilisant la théorie des jeux, nous montre que l'existence de pays non-alignés est nécessaire à la stabilité du système, mais non suffisant, car les deux grands doivent évaluer l'utilité de gagner les non-alignés à leurs causes selon certaines conditions. Un modèle dynamique, d'autre part, analyse le processus de stabilisation grâce à un modèle markovien. Les conditions qui déterminent le nombre des pays non-alignés au cours de ce processus sont définies, et il est prouvé que le statut de non-alignement peut être conservé si les paramètres du système n'atteignent pas certaines valeurs limites.

"Neutralité, neutralisme, non-alignement"

LA NEUTRALITE SUISSE

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S E P T I E M E   C O N G R E S   M O N D I A L  
B R U X E L L E S

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## LA NEUTRALITE SUISSE

par Dietrich Schindler

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### 1. Origines de la neutralité suisse

Depuis le début du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, la Suisse poursuit une politique de neutralité. La formation de la neutralité suisse est à attribuer à des causes diverses. La première impulsion provenait d'une réaction due à l'effondrement de la politique agressive et expansionniste des cantons suisses au début du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle. Après conquête de leur indépendance, les cantons suisses se laissèrent emporter par leurs succès militaires à des conquêtes territoriales. Leurs victoires, à la fin du XV<sup>e</sup> siècle, sur Charles le Téméraire, les avaient élevés à la position de grande puissance militaire. La période des victoires toutefois fut suivie par les défaites des armées mercenaires suisses en Haute-Italie, et particulièrement à la bataille de Marignan contre le roi François I<sup>er</sup> de France. Ces défaites prouvaient que la Suisse, en tant que confédération incohérente de cantons, n'était pas à même de suivre une politique extérieure unie. Les intérêts particuliers de la politique extérieure des cantons comprenaient trop de divergences. La continuation de la politique d'expansion n'aurait été possible qu'au prix d'une union plus étroite et d'une direction unique. Mais les cantons n'y étaient pas disposés. Ils préféraient garder l'autonomie locale et renoncer à une politique étrangère active. Le début de la politique de neutralité suisse signifie par conséquent la victoire de la politique intérieure sur la politique extérieure.

un deuxième facteur a favorisé la neutralité suisse fut la controverse religieuse dont le commencement se situe à la même époque comme les défaites en Haute-Italie. Cette controverse divisait la Suisse en un camp réformé et un camp catholique. La Suisse n'aurait pas pu participer aux guerres d'origine religieuse de l'Europe du XVI<sup>e</sup> et XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle sans se déchirer elle-même, car toute participation aurait conduit à une guerre fratricide entre les cantons catholiques et protestants. Le plus grand bienfait de la neutralité suisse fut ainsi le fait que la Suisse n'était pas entraînée dans la guerre de Trente Ans, laquelle détruisit l'Allemagne. Depuis ce temps là, la renommée de la prospérité suisse s'est établie.

En troisième lieu, la neutralité suisse doit sa naissance à la formation de l'équilibre européen. Toujours la neutralité présume un certain équilibre des puissances. Depuis le XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, l'équilibre européen et la neutralité suisse constituaient

des constantes de la politique européenne. Aussi, la Suisse éprouvait-elle toujours une forte aversion contre toutes les tentatives d'hégémonie de certaines puissances européennes. Ses intérêts à ce point de vue se conformaient à ceux de l'Angleterre.

Un quatrième facteur favorable à l'institution de la neutralité suisse consistait dans sa situation géographique. Grâce à sa position au centre de l'Europe et aux percées alpines, la Suisse occupait une position stratégique importante. Aucune des grandes puissances n'aurait voulu laisser le territoire de la Suisse à une autre puissance. Ainsi les grandes puissances elles-mêmes étaient intéressées au maintien de la neutralité suisse. Il en résultait, en 1815, leur déclaration "que la neutralité et l'inviolabilité de la Suisse et son indépendance de toute influence étrangère sont dans les vrais intérêts de la politique de l'Europe entière."

Comme une dernière cause du développement de la politique de neutralité suisse il y a lieu de mentionner la vieille tradition de la neutralité à l'intérieur de la Confédération. Déjà à l'origine de la Confédération, la coutume s'est établie que les cantons non engagés aux conflits des autres cantons servaient de médiateurs entre les partis aux prises. En différents cas, des cantons s'engageaient par traité au rôle de conciliateur en cas de conflit parmi d'autres cantons. Le succès de cette pratique de médiation explique que, lors de leur entrée dans la Confédération, trois cantons s'engageaient à maintenir une neutralité permanente dans les affaires intérieures suisses et à servir de médiateurs dans tous les conflits. Il s'agissait des cantons de Bâle (entrée 1501), Schaffhouse (1501) et Appenzell (1513). Cette pratique de médiation à l'intérieur de la Confédération continuait jusqu'à l'adoption de la constitution fédérale, en 1848.

Il convient d'ajouter ici que le multi-linguisme de la Suisse n'avait pas d'influence sur la naissance de la neutralité suisse. A l'époque où la Suisse acceptait la neutralité comme maxime nationale, elle consistait encore uniquement de cantons d'expression allemande. Par la suite pourtant, la multiplicité des langues apportait une justification supplémentaire à la neutralité. Dans l'ère du nationalisme de la deuxième moitié du 19<sup>e</sup> siècle pourtant, les différents groupements linguistiques de la Suisse prenaient conscience de leur parenté avec leurs pays voisins. Il en résultait, pendant la première guerre mondiale, une division profonde entre Suisse alémanique et Suisse romande. Si la Suisse allemande penchait vers l'Allemagne, la Suisse française penchait vers la France. Seule la neutralité pouvait conserver la cohésion intérieure. Ici encore, c'était la politique intérieure qui nécessitait la neutralité.

## 2. La reconnaissance internationale de la neutralité suisse

Au Congrès de Vienne de 1815, la Suisse requit les puissances européennes de reconnaître sa neutralité permanente. Cette requête avait lieu après que la Suisse, par suite des guerres napoléoniennes, était tombée sous la domination française et devenue théâtre de guerre. Les années 1798 - 1814 représentent la seule période, depuis le début du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, où la neutralité de la Suisse subissait une interruption. Les puissances réunies à Vienne acceptèrent, le 20 mars 1815, une déclaration dans laquelle elles prévoyaient la reconnaissance formelle et la garantie de la neutralité permanente suisse aussitôt que la Suisse aurait rempli certaines conditions. La reconnaissance formelle était retardée jusqu'au moment où "la Suisse, en compensation des avantages qui lui étaient réservés, offrirait à l'Europe...une garantie suffisante de l'aptitude de la nouvelle confédération à maintenir sa tranquillité intérieure et par cela même à faire respecter la neutralité de son territoire." La Diète helvétique devait notamment s'engager d'accepter un nouveau pacte fédéral et de ne pas toucher aux nouvelles frontières des cantons. Après accomplissement de ces conditions, la Diète du 27 mai 1815 déclara son accession à la déclaration du 20 mars 1815. Après quoi, il fut procédé à la signature, le 20 novembre 1815, à Paris, de "L'Acte portant reconnaissance et garantie de la neutralité perpétuelle de la Suisse et de l'inviolabilité de son territoire" tel que les grandes puissances l'avait laissé prévoir. Ses stipulations décisives sont conçues ainsi:

"Les Puissances signataires de la déclaration de Vienne du 20 mars font, par le présent acte, une reconnaissance formelle et authentique de la neutralité perpétuelle de la Suisse, et elles lui garantissent l'intégrité et l'inviolabilité de son territoire dans ses nouvelles limites..."

"Les puissances signataires de la déclaration du 20 mars reconnaissent authentiquement par le présent acte que la neutralité et l'inviolabilité de la Suisse et son indépendance de toute influence étrangère sont dans les vrais intérêts de la politique de l'Europe entière."

La déclaration porte les signatures de l'Autriche, de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne, de la Prusse, de la Russie, du Portugal, de la Suède et de l'Espagne.

L'Acte de 1815 fut confirmé ultérieurement par le Traité de Paix de Versailles de 1919 ainsi que par les autres traités de paix conclus après la première guerre mondiale. En contrepartie la Suisse renonçait à la neutralisation, stipulée dans l'Acte de

1815 en sa faveur, du territoire avoisinante de la Haute-Savoie. L'article 435 du Traité de Versailles stipule:

"Les hautes parties contractantes, tout en reconnaissant les garanties stipulées en faveur de la Suisse par les traités de 1815, et notamment l'acte du 20 novembre 1815, garanties qui constituent des engagements internationaux pour le maintien de la paix, constatent cependant que les stipulations de ces traités....relatifs à la zone neutralisée de Savoie,.....ne correspondent plus aux circonstances actuelles."

Grâce à cette stipulation, le cercle des Etats reconnaissant de façon formelle la neutralité perpétuelle de la Suisse fut largement étendu.

En outre, il vaut la peine d'être mentionné que, selon une conception répandue et reprise d'ailleurs par la Commission du droit international des Nations Unies, la neutralité suisse constitue une institution du droit coutumier international. Dans son rapport annuel pour 1964, la Commission du droit international cite les accords sur la neutralité de la Suisse comme exemple d'un traité qui, par la reconnaissance générale dont il a fait l'objet, est devenu du droit coutumier international.

La portée juridique de l'Acte de 1815 est fort discutée, et cela tant pour les obligations de la Suisse que pour les obligations des puissances signataires. La confirmation de l'Acte de 1815 contenue dans le Traité de Versailles ne remédie pas à ces ambiguïtés.

Quant aux obligations de la Suisse, différents auteurs contestent que la déclaration de 1815 engage la Suisse en quoi que ce soit. Ils se fondent notamment sur le fait que la déclaration de 1815 représente dans sa forme une déclaration unilatérale que la Suisse ne signa pas et dans laquelle il n'y a nulle disposition obligatoire pour la Suisse. Cette conception est défendue, entre autres, par Paul Schweizer et Eduard v. Waldkirch. En conséquence, la Suisse pourrait renoncer unilatéralement à sa neutralité. D'après une autre conception toutefois, l'Acte de 1815 représente le dernier chaînon d'un engagement contractuel, auquel la Suisse serait tenue juridiquement. Selon cette conception, la déclaration du 20 mars 1815 aurait par conséquent le caractère d'une offre des Puissances à la Suisse, d'une offre que la Diète helvétique aurait accepté par sa déclaration du 27 mai. Cette déclaration était la condition préalable, suite à laquelle les puissances émettaient l'Acte du 20 novembre. Si l'on reconnaît cette conception, représentée avec certaines variétés par Karl Strupp et Denise Robert, la Suisse ne pourrait pas se dégager unilatéralement de sa neutralité. D'après une troisième conception, défendue entre autres par Camille

Gorgé, la Suisse pourrait renoncer unilatéralement à la neutralité, non cependant sans un avertissement donné suffisamment à l'avance aux puissances signataires de 1815.

Quant aux obligations des puissances signataires de l'acte de 1815, il y a lieu de distinguer entre les obligations résultant de la reconnaissance de la neutralité suisse et celles résultant de la garantie de l'intégrité et de l'inviolabilité de son territoire. Il n'y a pas de doute que les puissances, suite à leur reconnaissance de la neutralité suisse, sont obligées de s'abstenir de tout ce qui serait contraire à la neutralité perpétuelle de la Suisse. Il y a doute, en revanche, si en vertu de la garantie de l'inviolabilité du territoire nationale, elles seraient obligées d'assister la Suisse en cas de violation du territoire. Cette question est restée controversée et un cas d'application pratique ne s'est pas présenté. Le gouvernement suisse a déclaré à différentes reprises que les puissances n'auraient de toute façon pas le droit d'intervenir de leur propre initiative pour la protection du territoire suisse, mais exclusivement sur appel par la Suisse. Le Conseil fédéral suisse s'est prononcé comme suit: "La Confédération revendique pour elle seule le droit de décider si, et dans quelles conditions, il lui conviendrait de faire appel au concours des Puissances étrangères." La question si les puissances signataires, en cas de parail appel, seraient obligées d'intervenir en vue du rétablissement de l'intégrité du territoire suisse est restée indécise jusqu'à présent.

### 3. La neutralité suisse, la Société des Nations et les Nations Unis

L'établissement de la Société des Nations, après la première guerre mondiale, créa pour la neutralité suisse une situation nouvelle. La Suisse n'aurait pas pu entrer à la Société des Nations sans mettre en doute sa neutralité, car le Pacte de la S.d.N. engageaient en effet les Etats membres de prendre des sanctions contre les pays qui, en violation du Pacte, prenaient recours à la guerre.

Par conséquent, la Suisse demandait au Conseil de la S.d.N. de la libérer de l'obligation de participer à des sanctions militaires ainsi que de l'obligation d'admettre le passage de troupes étrangères sur son territoire. Le Conseil de la S.d.N. a accédé à cette requête par sa déclaration dite de Londres, du 13 février 1920. La Suisse cependant s'obligeait de participer aux sanctions économiques de la S.d.N. Dans sa déclaration le Conseil disait textuellement:

"Le Conseil de la Société des Nations, tout en affirmant le principe que la notion de neutralité des membres de



la Société des Nations n'est pas compatible avec cet autre principe que tous les membres de la Société auront à agir en commun pour faire respecter ses engagements, reconnaît que la Suisse est dans une situation unique, motivée par une tradition de plusieurs siècles qui a été explicitement incorporée dans le droit des gens...."

"En acceptant ces déclarations (du gouvernement suisse de participer aux sanctions économiques), le Conseil reconnaît que la neutralité perpétuelle de la Suisse et la garantie de l'inviolabilité de son territoire telles qu'elles sont acquises au droit des gens, notamment par les traités et l'Acte de 1815, sont justifiées par les intérêts de la paix générale et, en conséquence, sont compatibles avec le Pacte."

En se fondant sur cette déclaration du Conseil de la S.d.N., la Suisse entra dans la Société des Nations.

Le Conseil fédéral suisse était d'avis que la Suisse pouvait participer à des sanctions économiques sans violer la neutralité, car la neutralité, selon ses explications, avait une signification essentiellement militaire et ne comportait pas d'obligations d'un traitement économique égalitaire des belligérants. A l'occasion des sanctions économiques contre l'Italie, pendant la guerre italo-éthiopienne de 1935, la Suisse devait toutefois comprendre que la participation à des sanctions économiques compromettait gravement la neutralité. On ne peut pas exiger d'un Etat de considérer un autre comme neutre si celui-ci a décrété un blocus contre lui. C'est cette considération qui incita le Conseil fédéral suisse de prier le Conseil de la Société des Nations, en 1938, de libérer la Suisse de la participation aux sanctions économiques. Celui-ci a accédé à la requête, le 14 mai 1938, de sorte qu'à partir de ce moment la Suisse était libre de toutes les obligations de sanction.

Quand, en 1945, les Nations Unies furent créées, l'attitude envers les neutres était à tel point négative que la Suisse n'avait pas d'espoir d'obtenir une dispense de la participation aux mesures coercitives. La délégation française à la Conférence de San Francisco ne proposa-t-elle pas d'insérer dans la Charte des Nations Unies une disposition selon laquelle aucun Etat ne serait autorisé à invoquer un statut de neutralité pour échapper aux obligations que lui impose la Charte. Si cette stipulation ne fut pas acceptée, le rapport du Comité compétent indiquait néanmoins que la neutralité était incompatible avec la Charte des Nations Unies. Vu les expériences faites avec la Société des Nations en particulier, la Suisse n'était alors pas disposée d'entrer aux Nations Unies sans confirmation de sa neutralité. Elle en resta

par conséquent au-dehors.

L'attitude envers les neutres a considérablement évoluée depuis 1945. Le système de la sécurité collective s'avéra inapte au fonctionnement, par suite du conflit entre l'Est et l'Ouest. La bipolarisation du monde conduisait à un nouveau système d'équilibre, dans lequel la neutralité acquérait de nouveau de l'importance. En 1953, les Nations Unies devaient faire appel elles-mêmes au service des Etats neutres, à l'occasion de l'armistice en Corée. La Suisse avec d'autres Etats neutres fut requise de collaborer dans les deux Commissions neutres pour le rapatriement des prisonniers de guerre et la surveillance de l'armistice. L'Autriche, en 1955, s'engagea envers l'Union soviétique, dans le Mémoire de Moscou "de pratiquer une neutralité perpétuelle, de la façon qu'elle était appliquée par la Suisse". La même année, l'Autriche fut accueillie aux Nations Unies, après que quatre des cinq membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité et la majorité des autres membres des Nations Unies eurent reconnu formellement sa neutralité permanente. Bien que l'Autriche ne fut pas expressément dispensée de la participation à d'éventuelles sanctions, on peut estimer que les Etats ayant reconnu sa neutralité seraient obligés, dans le cas d'application de mesures coercitives, d'en libérer l'Autriche, car autrement ils agiraient à l'encontre de l'engagement pris par la reconnaissance de sa neutralité.

En face de la revalorisation de la neutralité intervenue depuis 1945, le moment pourrait paraître propice à la Suisse d'entrer maintenant aux Nations Unies. Si la Suisse n'a pas pris cette décision jusqu'à présent, c'est pour les raisons suivantes. D'abord il apparaît que, malgré l'attitude changée envers la neutralité, le Conseil de sécurité ou l'Assemblée générale ne libéreraient guère expressément la Suisse de son obligation de participer à d'éventuelles sanctions. La Suisse d'autre part, aujourd'hui encore, n'est pas disposée d'entrer aux Nations Unies sans une reconnaissance nette de sa neutralité. Le cas de l'Autriche représente un cas spécial qui ne peut guère servir de règle pour la Suisse. C'est par suite d'un heureux hasard que la neutralité autrichienne fut créée et reconnue au moment même de son admission aux Nations Unies. Grâce à la coïncidence de ces deux événements, l'Autriche peut faire valoir que sa neutralité devra aussi être respectée dans le cadre des Nations Unies. La Suisse, par contre, en entrant aux Nations Unies ne pourra pas s'attendre que sa neutralité, existant depuis des siècles, fera l'objet d'une nouvelle reconnaissance. Or, une adhésion non liée à une reconnaissance particulière de la neutralité signifierait que les obligations découlant de la Charte priment la neutralité. Le plus grand obstacle à l'adhésion de la Suisse est sans aucun doute le fait que la décision devra être soumise à la votation populaire et que l'opinion publique est extraordinairement sceptique quant à la néces-

sité d'une telle adhésion. S'il n'est pas établi de façon claire et nette que la neutralité permanente reste intangible par cette adhésion, il faudrait compter avec le rejet certain. Finalement, le gouvernement suisse ne considère pas l'admission comme urgente parce qu'il croit que la Suisse en tant que non-membre pourrait, en cas de conflit, rendre de meilleurs services à la communauté internationale que si elle était membre. En effet, il est apparu à différentes reprises que les parties d'un conflit n'étaient pas disposées d'accepter les services d'un Etat qui avait voté aux Nations Unies contre elles, ou même qui s'était seulement abstenu de voter.

Bien que la Suisse soit restée au-dehors des Nations Unies, elle a adhéré à presque toutes ses organisations spécialisées ainsi qu'au statut de la Cour Internationale de Justice. De plus, un grand nombre de Suisses fonctionnent comme experts au service des Nations Unies et de ses organisations spécialisées.

#### 4. Neutralité suisse et intégration européenne

L'intégration européenne a mis la Suisse devant des problèmes qui ne sont nullement résolus encore.

En ce qui concerne le Conseil de l'Europe, fondé en 1949, la Suisse hésitait longtemps avant d'y entrer. Bien que le statut de ce Conseil n'impose aux Etats membres aucune obligation susceptible d'empêcher la neutralité en cas de conflit, le Conseil fédéral suisse ne le jugeait pas opportun, de prime abord, d'entrer dans cette organisation. Décisif était, d'une part, l'orientation purement occidentale et anticommuniste du Conseil de l'Europe et, d'autre part, la tendance initiale de l'étendre en une union politique des Etats européens, avec des attributions supranationales. Seulement en 1963, la Suisse s'est finalement résolue à l'adhésion au Conseil de l'Europe, après que les ambitions politiques de cette organisation s'étaient révélées illusoire depuis longtemps et que les contacts à entretenir à Strasbourg étaient apparus comme précieux pour la Suisse.

Pour ce qui concerne les organisations économiques, la Suisse entra à l'Organisation Européenne de Coopération Economique (OCEE) à l'occasion de sa fondation en 1948. Bien que cette organisation, comme le Conseil de l'Europe, comprenit uniquement des Etats occidentaux, elle restait ouverte à d'autres Etats et n'avait au surplus pas d'objectif politique. Autrement problématique et irrésolu jusqu'à présent est le problème d'affiliation ou d'association de la Suisse avec la Communauté Economique Européenne. A cet égard, la

Suisse est placée dans la même situation comme l'Autriche et le Suède. Le problème provient, d'une part, que, du fait de l'abolition des frontières douanières entre les Etats membres et de la création d'un marché commun, l'interdépendance économique entre les membres devient telle qu'un Etat particulier ne saurait plus se dégager de la Communauté en cas de guerre sans compromettre son existence économique. Le problème de l'entrée provient, d'autre part, du fait que les Etats membres doivent céder à la Communauté des droits de souveraineté, et spécialement la compétence, importante pour le droit de la neutralité, de la conduite de la politique commerciale. En cas d'une guerre, le résultat serait que le Conseil des ministres de la CEE pourrait décréter des interdictions d'exportation dirigées exclusivement contre l'un des belligérants et que les Etats membres seraient tenus d'exécuter. Or, le droit de neutralité interdit aux Etats neutres, en cas de guerre, les interdictions d'exportation unilatérales. Afin de maintenir leur neutralité en cas de guerre, les Etats neutres permanents devraient par conséquent se réserver le droit de conduire eux-mêmes, indépendamment, leur politique commerciale avec les Etats tiers.

Après la première demande d'admission de la Grande-Bretagne, en 1961, les trois Etats neutres permanents (Autriche, Suède, Suisse) se sont mis d'accord sur un procédé commun à suivre. Ils sont arrivés à la conception que le maintien de la neutralité dépend des points essentiels suivants. 1. Les Etats neutres permanents doivent conserver la possibilité de fixer la politique commerciale avec les Etats tiers de leur propre initiative ainsi que de conclure en leur propre nom les traités commerciaux et douaniers avec les Etats tiers. 2. Les Etats neutres permanents doivent être autorisés, en temps de paix, d'entretenir un stock de ravitaillement suffisant pour permettre, en temps de guerre, leur existence autonome. En particulier, ils doivent avoir la possibilité de prendre certaines mesures de protection en faveur de leur agriculture. 3. Les Etats neutres permanents doivent se réserver le droit de pouvoir résilier, dans des éventualités exceptionnelles, la convention avec la CEE.

Les dernières années ont démontré que le caractère supranational de la CEE s'estompe. Plus qu'il s'estompe plus il sera possible de cadrer la neutralité avec l'appartenance à la CEE.

Tandis que dans les circonstances actuelles l'entrée sans réserve à la CEE serait inconciliable avec la neutralité, l'entrée à l'Association Européenne de Libre Echange ne soulevait pas d'objection concernant le droit de neutralité. La Suisse comptait parmi les membres fondateurs de l'AELÉ en 1959. Dans la zone de libre

échange, les Etats membres conservent la compétence, essentielle pour la neutralité, de conduire leur politique de commerce extérieure avec des Etats tiers. En outre, les stipulations de l'AELE laissent intacte la compétence des Etats membres à l'égard de l'agriculture, de sorte que les Etats membres sont à même de protéger leur agriculture en vue de la guerre.

Quant aux organisations de défense (OTAN et Union de l'Europe occidentale), la Suisse s'en est naturellement tenue à l'écart.

## 5. Traits caractéristiques de la neutralité suisse

Après l'exposé du développement et des problèmes essentiels de la neutralité suisse, voici quelques traits caractéristiques de la neutralité suisse, nécessaires à sa compréhension.

- a) La conception suisse de la neutralité est fondée sur le droit de la neutralité classique tel qu'il est codifié dans les deux Conventions de La Haye de 1907 concernant les droits et les devoirs des Puissances neutres. Presque toutes les communications officielles suisses au sujet de la neutralité se réfèrent aux droits et devoirs des Etats neutres selon le droit de la neutralité. La neutralité suisse acquiert ainsi un caractère éminemment juridique. Le Département fédéral politique a rédigé en 1954 une étude sur la "Conception officielle suisse de la neutralité" qui décrit la neutralité sous son aspect purement juridique, en énumérant les devoirs juridiques des Etats neutres permanents en temps de guerre et de paix (publiée dans l'Annuaire suisse de Droit international 1957, p. 195).

La doctrine suisse distingue entre le droit de neutralité et la politique de neutralité. Paul Guggenheim en décrit la différence comme suit: "Tandis que le droit de la neutralité fixe les obligations découlant pour l'Etat neutre du droit international général et du droit conventionnel, la politique de neutralité de l'Etat neutre se rapporte à un domaine libre de toute réglementation juridique et où les relations de l'Etat neutre avec les belligérants dépendent de son appréciation." (Traité de Droit international public, tome II, 1954, p. 500). Il est cependant caractéristique pour la conception suisse de la neutralité que la politique de neutralité aussi est axée dans une large mesure sur le droit de la neutralité. La politique de neutralité a comme but principal de permettre à l'Etat neutre le maintien de la neutralité en cas de guerre et de remplir les devoirs découlant du droit de la neutralité. Guggenheim écrit ainsi concernant la

politique de neutralité: "L'Etat qui désire conserver sa neutralité dans un conflit futur se gardera donc de prendre des engagements internationaux ou des mesures internes susceptibles d'entraver ou même d'exclure l'exécution des obligations juridiques découlant du droit de la neutralité." (p. 501).

Le fait que la neutralité suisse est basée sur le droit de la neutralité la distingue du neutralisme, qui est une attitude purement politique et pour lequel n'existe nulle norme juridique.

- b) La neutralité suisse est perpétuelle et s'applique à tous les conflits qui puissent jamais surgir entre des Etats étrangers. Elle est indépendante de toutes les changements politiques dans le monde. De même, elle reste indépendante en face de l'appréciation qu'elle rencontre dans le monde. Elle a connu des temps où elle jouissait d'un grand estime comme facteur de la paix, et d'autres où elle était considérée comme immorale, tel que s'était le cas, en partie, pendant les guerres napoléoniennes et pendant les deux guerres mondiales.

Le fait que la neutralité suisse est maintenue dans tous les conflits la distingue également du neutralisme. Le neutralisme signifie uniquement l'abstention dans le conflit idéologique entre l'Est et l'Ouest, mais non pas la neutralité dans d'autres conflits. La neutralité suisse constitue, grâce à sa permanence et son inaltérabilité, un élément de stabilité dans la politique internationale. En tout temps, l'attitude de la politique étrangère suisse reste calculable pour les autres Etats.

- c) La neutralité suisse était toujours une neutralité armée. De tout temps la conviction a prévalu en Suisse que la neutralité est sans valeur si elle n'est pas défendue militairement.

A travers les siècles la Suisse a maintenu le service militaire obligatoire. La préparation militaire appropriée de la Suisse était sans doute une des raisons auxquelles elle doit d'être restée exempte, pendant des siècles, de conflits étrangers. Le développement de nouvelles armes a rendu assurément, ces dernières années, la défense d'un petit Etat neutre de plus en plus problématique. Mais les expériences depuis la deuxième guerre mondiale ont prouvé que les possibilités n'en restent néanmoins meilleures que l'on avait d'abord supposé sous l'impression des armes atomiques et des engins téléguidés.

- d) Caractéristique pour la neutralité suisse est en outre le refus de toute neutralité morale et idéologique. La Suisse distingue

strictement entre la neutralité de l'Etat et les manifestations d'opinion de particuliers. Cette attitude répond au droit de neutralité classique qui, pour l'Etat neutre, ne connaît pas d'obligation de restriction de la liberté d'opinion du citoyen. La Suisse a repoussé avec véhémence la prétention de l'Allemagne nationale-socialiste que le droit de la neutralité interdirait aux citoyens de l'Etat neutre d'exprimer leurs sentiments de sympathie ou d'antipathie pour un des belligérants. L'antipathie envers le national-socialisme n'a quand même pas empêché la Suisse d'accomplir correctement ses devoirs de neutralité, à tous points de vue, envers l'Allemagne.

De même le fait que la population suisse se trouve être en grande majorité anticommuniste n'a-t-il jamais constitué un obstacle à la neutralité dans le conflit Est/Ouest. Certes, la prise de position unilatérale de l'opinion publique contre l'un des belligérants peut, dans certaines circonstances, devenir une entrave si, par exemple, la Suisse offre ses bons offices aux deux parties en guerre.

- e) D'après la conception suisse, la neutralité n'est pas seulement une attitude passive, mais elle comprend aussi le devoir des Etats neutres de mettre leurs services à la disposition des parties en conflit. Parmi les services que l'Etat neutre est susceptible de fournir compte d'abord le mandat de puissance protectrice. Durant la deuxième guerre mondiale, 35 Etats ont confié à la Suisse la représentation de leurs intérêts auprès des Etats ennemis. L'activité de la Suisse comme puissance protectrice continue à jouer un rôle important à présent. A fin 1966, la Suisse représenta un total de 19 Etats dans d'autres pays, avec lesquels les relations diplomatiques ont été interrompues. A l'occasion de la guerre entre Israël et les Etats arabes, en juin 1967, quelques mandats de protection supplémentaires sont venus s'ajouter. De plus, la Suisse s'est toujours mise à disposition pour n'importe quel autre service qu'elle était en mesure de rendre en cas de conflit. Ainsi, elle participait aux Commissions neutres pour la Corée, en 1953, se chargeait des transports de troupes des Nations Unies vers le Proche Orient, à l'occasion du conflit de Suez, en 1956, et elle offrait ses facilités pour les pourparlers de paix entre la France et l'Algérie en 1962. De même la Suisse a-t-elle toujours considéré comme son devoir de prêter tout secours humanitaire en cas de conflit. Significatif aussi est que la création de la Croix-Rouge se trouve en rapport étroit avec la neutralité suisse. La Croix-rouge fut fondée en 1863 à Genève, sur une initiative suisse. Encore aujourd'hui, l'efficacité du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge dépend de

la neutralité permanente de la Suisse. Le CICR est composé exclusivement de citoyens suisses, pour lui permettre d'agir comme intermédiaire neutre en cas de conflits internationaux. S'il avait une composition internationale, son efficacité serait entravée par l'appartenance au comité de ressortissants des parties au conflit. En différents conflits intervenus depuis 1945, le CICR a pu accomplir des tâches dont aucun autre organisme aurait pu se charger. La Suisse est donc persuadée que sa neutralité, en dépit des changements intervenus pendant ces dernières décennies, reste appelée à jouer un rôle dans le monde.



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Summary

Origins: The permanent neutrality of Switzerland developed mainly as the result of the following factors:

- the collapse of aggressive and expansive policy of the Swiss cantons at the beginning of the 16th century,
- the religious schism which split Switzerland into protestant and catholic cantons and made an active foreign policy impossible,
- the balance of power system in Europe,
- the geographical situation in Europe, especially the strategically important key position in the Alpine massif,
- the old tradition of neutral cantons which acted as mediators in inter-cantonal disputes.

International recognition: Switzerland's permanent neutrality was recognized by the European powers in a declaration of 20th November 1815. This declaration was reaffirmed by the peace treaties concluded after World War I. Swiss neutrality at present is considered to be a part of customary international law.

League of Nations and United Nations: Switzerland became a member of the League of Nations after she had been expressly relieved in view of her permanent neutrality from the duty to take part in military sanctions. After World War II she did not join the United Nations because she could not expect a similar recognition of her neutrality within the UN.

European integration: Switzerland joined the Council of Europe (in 1963 only) as well as the OEEC (OECD) and EFTA. Neither of those organisations affects neutrality. Like Austria and Sweden, she considers full membership in the European Economic Community incompatible with neutrality and is striving after a form of union with the EEC which takes account of the requirements of permanent neutrality.

Characteristics of Swiss neutrality:

- Switzerland practices a neutrality according to classical international law as codified by the two Hague Conventions on neutrality of 1907.
- Swiss neutrality is permanent and applies to all armed conflicts.
- Swiss neutrality has always been armed neutrality.
- Switzerland rejects moral or ideological neutrality.
- Swiss neutrality is not a purely passive attitude. On the contrary, it enables Switzerland to offer her services to the parties of any conflict (good offices, representation of foreign interests, humanitarian services, etc.).

Br/Neutr./9

"Neutralité, neutralisme, non-alignement"

"MAINS LIBRES" ET "VASTE PLAN" : LA LIBERTE D'ACTION  
COMME CLEF DE LA POLITIQUE EXTERIEURE GAULLISTE

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comme clef de la politique extérieure gaulliste °

par Pierre Hassner

Pour comprendre dans quelle mesure des termes tels que "neutralisme" ou "non-alignement" s'appliquent à la politique gaulliste, il faut les situer dans la perspective des rapports entre l'essence de la politique extérieure et celle du système international. Commençons, pour cela, par une citation dont on nous pardonnera peut-être la longueur :

"Que la France pourrait manoeuvrer et grandir. Ce serait une erreur profonde que de penser que tout peuple récemment constitué doive fatalement se référer, en qualité de satellite, à l'attraction de son plus proche voisin.

D'autres solutions sont possibles, qui seraient plus conformes au nationalisme farouche des Etats secondaires, celle-ci notamment : l'addition fédérale ou confédérale de tous ces Etats moyens tendant et même aboutissant à former un puissant contre-poids aux empires. Il n'y faudrait qu'une condition : cet ensemble ayant besoin d'être organisé, il resterait à trouver l'organisateur, ou, si l'on veut, le fédérateur, car rien ne se forme tout seul.

Le choc des grands empires, remarquons-le, pourra multiplier le nombre de ces menues puissances qui aspireront ainsi à devenir des neutres. Chaque empire éprouvera une difficulté croissante à maintenir son influence et sa protection sans partage sur la clientèle des nationalités subalternes. La liberté de celles-ci finira par être partiellement défendue par le grave danger de guerre générale qui résultera de toute tentative d'asservir l'une d'elles ou d'en influencer une autre trop puissamment. Le monde aura donc chance de se présenter pour longtemps, non comme une aire plane et découverte, non davantage comme un damier de moyens et de petits Etats, mais plutôt comme le composé de ces deux systèmes : plusieurs empires, avec un certain nombre de nationalités, petites ou moyennes, dans les entre-deux.

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° Une version plus développée de ce texte est publiée en allemand dans Moderne Welt de septembre 1967, sous le titre "Entspannung à la française".

"Un monde ainsi formé ne sera pas des plus tranquilles. Les faibles y seront trop faibles, les puissants trop puissants, et la paix des uns et des autres ne reposera guère que sur la terreur qu'auront su s'inspirer réciproquement les colosses. Société d'épouvantement mutuel, compagnie d'intimidation alternante, cannibalisme organisé !...

"Eh ! bien, dans cet état de choses, entre les éléments ainsi définis, ce tremblement et cette concurrence fourniraient justement le terrain favorable et le juste champ d'élection sur lequel une France pourrait manoeuvrer, avec facilité et franchise, du seul fait qu'elle se trouverait, par sa taille et par sa structure, très heureusement établie à égale distance des empires géants et de la poussière des petites nations jalouses de leur indépendance. Les circonstances sont propices à l'interposition d'un Etat de grandeur moyenne, de constitution robuste et ferme comme la nôtre ... Tout fâcheux abus de politique impériale et coloniale nous serait interdit par cette heureuse constitution qui ouvrirait la voie à la plus belle, à la plus active, à la plus fructueuse des politiques d'influence, car notre roi, maître absolu de son armée, de sa marine et de sa diplomatie, jouirait de l'indépendance nécessaire pour guetter, chez autrui, l'inévitable excès de la politique orgueilleuse à laquelle les Allemands, les Russes, les Anglais et les Américains ne peuvent désormais échapper.

"Cette période de guet, d'affût et de véritable recueillement pourrait être employée à un travail souterrain de correspondance, d'entente et d'organisation, pratiqué parmi les peuples de puissance secondaire, parmi les demi-faibles, affamés d'une sécurité moins précaire, aspirant à une existence mieux garantie. Chacun d'eux ne peut rien. Simplement coalisés, ils ne peuvent pas beaucoup plus, étant séparés l'un de l'autre par de trop grandes diversités d'intérêt. Une ligue à vingt têtes n'aurait au juste aucune tête. Il y faut une tête unique et puissante, pourvu que sa puissance ne soit pas un effroi. Il y faut la tête d'une France bien ordonnée...

"Nous n'aurions pas à chercher ni à convier; les Etats secondaires seraient comme chassés par la force des choses dans notre direction : nous les verrions s'enfuir vers nous. A nous donc de nous montrer assez vigoureux et d'être assez sages pour donner confiance, apparaître comme des protecteurs effectifs et non des tyrans. Cette ligue de menus peuples pourrait nous déférer son commandement militaire, et la politique éternelle des rois de France, volonté d'empêcher la Monarchie universelle ou l'accroissement excessif de telle ou telle coalition, recommencerait à rayonner efficacement de Paris. Comme jadis, en raison de l'infériorité numérique qui nous échet parfois sans nous procurer de désavantage réel, nous n'aurons peut-être pas sur la carte le

volume des plus grandes puissances : nous en aurons l'autorité morale fondée sur une force vive supérieure. Mieux que la Prusse ou le Piémont avant l'Unité, nous multiplierons nos valeurs par un habile emploi d'amis, de protégés, d'affranchis exercés et fortifiés par notre aide. Politique de générosité qui aura son intérêt propre autant que sa beauté, cette chevalerie nous élèvera à l'empire ...

"Et, si l'on est tenté de se croire isolé, qu'on se rappelle tout ce qui parle encore français et latin dans le monde, l'immense Canada et cette carrière infinie que nous ouvrent les Amériques du Centre et du Sud ! Ce n'est pas la matière qui se refusera à l'audace française. L'esprit français trouve à choisir entre d'innombrables objets."

A cette longue citation, comparons celle-ci :

"It is doubly absurd to see in de Gaulle's conception a will to a "third force". His line is harder than that of the United States, so as to protect Europe from the danger of new Yaltas. For the future, the purpose of a European center of power would not be to remove Europe from the cold war, but to accelerate the end of the cold war by precipitating a change in Soviet policy."

"If de Gaulle "threatens" U.S. policy by challenging U.S. leadership, at least he considers the Soviet menace real enough to push France into the atomic business and to oppose the current fashion of diplomatic flexibility. One may wonder whether U.S. policy and interests are not more threatened by those who pay lip service to U.S. leadership but who act as if the Soviets were no longer a revolutionary power and as if the East-West conflict were a thing of the past. To oppose de Gaulle may well bring aid and comfort only to neutralists or to those men of good will but little memory whose initiatives tend to give away to the Soviets through negotiations many of the things the Soviet Union has not been able to obtain through intimidation."

Si la seconde citation, due à Stanley Hoffmann, le plus brillant défenseur de la politique gaulliste, date de janvier 1961<sup>(1)</sup>, la première date de 1910; elle est due à Charles Maurras<sup>(2)</sup>

1910 n'apparaît-il pas plus proche de 1967 que 1964 ? Ce n'est pas un hasard si, en France comme ailleurs, les interprètes les plus nuancés, les plus raisonnables, les plus objectifs, ont toujours été ceux qui ont eu le plus de mal à prévoir les évolutions de la politique gaulliste : habitués à analyser une action dans le contexte de

la conjoncture globale actuelle ils ne pressentent pas assez l'avenir vers lequel s'oriente la diplomatie gaulliste parce qu'ils ne sentent pas assez le passé auquel elle se rattache.

C'est que celle-ci rompt radicalement avec la politique extérieure de la Quatrième République, qui recherchait une détente à l'intérieur de laquelle le rôle de la France serait accru, mais qui concevait cette recherche dans le cadre occidental et par l'intermédiaire de l'intégration européenne. Mais cette rupture avec la politique précédente n'est qu'un retour à une tradition plus ancienne, celle de la manoeuvre diplomatique, des combinaisons successives, des alliances de revers et des équilibres mobiles, tradition déjà appliquée en 1945-46 et empruntée à l'histoire de la diplomatie européenne en général et française en particulier. Aussi est-ce les partisans résolus soit de l'esprit communautaire, soit de la Realpolitik qui ont le mieux compris combien la Ve République s'attaquait à l'une pour revenir à l'autre, tandis que les observateurs qui cherchent à établir un bilan objectif et nuancé à un moment quelconque trouveront toujours, sous la IVe comme sous la Ve République, un mélange d'éléments empruntés aux deux modèles.

C'est ici que la citation de Maurras nous est d'un grand secours. Elle nous enseigne à nous placer dans une perspective dynamique, celle d'une diplomatie habituée à suppléer à la force par la ruse, à la dimension par la manoeuvre, à mettre le maximum de flexibilité et de dissimulation au service d'un grand dessein immuable et déclaré, mais qui doit lui-même aboutir à un ordre caractérisé par la flexibilité et la liberté de manoeuvre, au moins pour la France. Rien n'est plus clair à cet égard que les Mémoires du Général de Gaulle, et notamment les passages où il expose l'objectif de l'Europe de l'Atlantique à l'Oural, et la méthode consistant à "collaborer avec l'Ouest et l'Est, au besoin contracter d'un côté ou de l'autre les alliances nécessaires, sans accepter jamais aucune espèce de dépendance" (Tome III, Le Salut, p. 58). L'exposé écrit en 1959 des intentions de 1945.



non seulement éclaire les actions de 1966 et 1967 mais est éclairé par elles, dans la mesure où c'est vingt ans après que se présentent les circonstances attendues prématurément et que se réalisent les prophéties énoncées lucidement en 1945.

Toujours de Gaulle revient au rapport entre le "vaste plan" toujours valable et les circonstances toujours nouvelles. "Jugeant que l'effondrement de l'Allemagne, le déchirement de l'Europe, l'antagonisme russo-américain, offrent à la France, sauvée par miracle, des chances d'action exceptionnelles, il me semble que la période nouvelle me permettra, peut-être, d'entamer l'exécution du vaste plan que j'ai formé pour mon pays" (p. 40).

Ces chances d'action issues de catastrophes extérieures ont changé en 1967, mais l'art de les saisir, aussi bien que le plan lui-même, sont restés identiques. Aussi André Fontaine saisit-il exactement l'esprit de sa démarche (sinon nécessairement/<sup>la nature</sup> des rapports qu'il souhaite voir s'instaurer entre l'Allemagne et la Russie), lorsqu'il écrit dans Le Monde du 12 juillet 1967 : "Quand le chef de l'Etat parle de l'Europe de l'Atlantique à l'Oural, il exprime le fond de sa pensée la plus constante, à savoir que l'Europe doit appartenir aux Européens - ce qu'à ses yeux sont les Russes, communistes ou pas. Tandis qu'évidemment les Américains ne le sont pas. Une telle Europe ne peut résulter que de la coopération de ses membres, et notamment de ses trois principaux : la France, la Russie et l'Allemagne. La première ayant su, grâce à lui, se réconcilier avec les deux autres, il lui reste à réconcilier celles-ci entre elles. Une fois ce résultat obtenu, les Américains n'auraient plus de raison de se maintenir de ce côté de l'Océan. A son avis, la guerre au Vietnam, également impopulaire sur les deux rives du Rhin, offre une occasion d'y parvenir, étant sous-entendu que la France et l'U.R.S.S. constitueraient les deux piliers principaux de ce nouvel "équilibre". C'est ensuite seulement qu'on verrait s'il est possible d'y faire sa place à l'Angleterre".

Il n'y a rien, donc, de contradictoire à ce que tantôt le démembrement de l'Allemagne, tantôt le pacte franco-allemand, tantôt la fin de la guerre froide, tantôt l'accord avec Kossyguine contre l'entente américano-israélienne, tantôt le concert traditionnel des Grands, tantôt l'auto-détermination nationaliste des petits, tantôt l'Europe des Six dirigée par la France, tantôt l'action isolée de celle-ci, tantôt l'Asie, tantôt le Moyen-Orient, servent d'occasion, de prétexte ou d'instruments au grand dessein gaulliste. Dans ses Mémoires, après l'avoir indiqué une fois de plus, celui-ci ne dit-il pas : "Tel est le plan que je m'étais formé, sachant fort bien qu'en pareille matière rien ne s'accomplit jamais exactement comme on l'a voulu, mesurant ce qui manquait à ma politique de crédit au-dehors et de soutien au-dedans en raison de notre affaiblissement, mais convaincu néanmoins que la France pouvait dans ce sens exercer une grande action, prendre une grande figure, servir grandement son intérêt et celui du genre humain" (T.III, p. 58).

Le problème des rapports entre le permanent et le changeant, entre le but et les moyens, entre les objectifs et l'action, se trouve ainsi éclairé. Il ne s'en trouve pas pour autant résolu. La véritable question est celle de savoir si nous avons affaire à des moyens toujours changeants au service d'un but toujours identique, ou à une action permanente au service d'objectifs toujours changeants. Plus précisément encore, à défaut d'atteindre à chaque phase les objectifs qu'elle s'était fixés, l'action diplomatique ne devient-elle pas sa propre fin ? Pour reprendre les expressions du texte, le plus important est-il d'exécuter le plan ou "d'exercer une grande action", de "prendre une grande figure" ? Enfin, l'action et le plan sont-ils destinés, en dernière analyse, à servir avant tout, comme de Gaulle l'indique ici, l'intérêt de la France et celui du genre humain, ou bien, comme il l'indique dans Le fil de l'épée, la gloire solitaire du chef, ou encore, comme il l'affirme parfois, l'ambition collective de l'Europe ?

Autant il semble stérile d'opposer les unes aux autres les différentes déclarations ou les différentes phases d'une politique qui s'affirme elle-même fondée sur le secret et sur la surprise, autant les interprétations peuvent légitimement diverger quant aux deux problèmes soulevés par cette série de questions. Certains, comme Raymond Aron, insisteront sur l'aspect "ballet" d'une politique dont le principe essentiel est d'être toujours en mouvement, d'avoir toujours l'initiative, d'occuper toujours le devant de la scène; et ils s'écrieront comme Pierre Uri que la diplomatie gaulliste cesserait de n'être qu'une stratégie pour devenir une politique, le jour où elle se donnerait un autre but qu'elle-même. D'autres penseront que la succession d'initiatives et de péripéties est destinée avant tout à écarter les obstacles ou à éliminer les entreprises rivales qui s'opposent à la réalisation du "grand dessein". Quant à celui-ci, on pourra, selon les interprétations et selon les phases, le voir comme destiné à assurer le maximum de liberté d'action à de Gaulle lui-même, à la France à l'intérieur de l'Europe, à l'Europe à l'intérieur de l'équilibre mondial, ou à l'ensemble des nations qui composent ce dernier.

Là encore, cependant, une sorte d'harmonie préétablie ou de logique de la rationalisation inconsciente permet de retrouver une unité autour de la notion de liberté d'action et du principe selon lequel, de même que ce qui est bon pour la General Motors est bon pour les Etats-Unis, de même ce qui est bon pour le général de Gaulle est bon pour le genre humain. Premièrement le grand dessein, recherché par le jeu diplomatique, est précisément d'aboutir à une Europe et à un monde où ce jeu diplomatique puisse à nouveau se donner libre cours. C'est la politique de la flexibilité, par la flexibilité, pour la flexibilité. Comme l'écrit Raymond Aron : "Une stratégie qui se donne un but lointain, qui multiplie démarches et propos apparemment contradictoires, se prête à deux interprétations : le jeu pour lui-même, le jeu au service d'un grand dessein. Interprétations d'autant moins incompatibles que le retour à un système d'Etats nombreux, chacun seul maître de son

destin, signifierait l'extension planétaire du jeu, à la fois traditionnel et actuel, auquel la diplomatie française excelle" (Le Figaro, 6 février 1966).

D'où la réponse, analogue, à la deuxième question, qui nous ramène au texte de Maurras par lequel nous avons commencé. Ce système international fondé sur le jeu diplomatique, c'est justement, dans la conception traditionnelle, celui qui favorise le plus la France, à la fois parce que c'est celui où elle excelle et celui auquel elle a intérêt. Elle y excelle dans la mesure précisément où elle a à sa tête un stratège assuré de ne pas être gêné dans ses manoeuvres par un système collégial, un contrôle parlementaire ou une opinion publique souveraine; elle y a intérêt parce que de par son infériorité matérielle et quantitative, elle a intérêt à la guerre de mouvement plutôt qu'à la guerre de position, à la ruse plutôt qu'à la force, à la multiplication des combinaisons plutôt qu'à l'unité des blocs, des communautés, des camps et des alliances.

Bien plus : ce qui donne à sa politique à la fois son succès et sa fragilité, c'est qu'elle repose sur le fait que, cette liberté de manoeuvre dont elle fait le principe de son action et de l'ordre mondial qu'elle recherche, elle est seule à pouvoir l'exercer entièrement. Toutes les nations doivent être libres, mais certaines doivent être plus libres que d'autres. Si depuis 1962 les initiatives de la France se précipitent c'est parce que la fin simultanée de la guerre d'Algérie et de la crise de Berlin, l'apparition simultanée de la guerre du Vietnam et du schisme sino-soviétique, se combinent pour donner à la France une liberté d'action interdite aux Etats-Unis, à l'Union soviétique et à l'Allemagne. A long terme, l'idée de "l'Europe de l'Atlantique à l'Oural" est fondée sur l'amputation ou la neutralisation partielle des grandes puissances continentales, l'Allemagne par sa dénucléarisation, sa "décentralisation", nom poli pour sa division à la fois atténuée et consacrée, et par la surveillance de ses voisins, l'U.R.S.S. par son conflit avec la Chine et le problème

de ses "colonies" asiatiques - seule la France "nation aux mains libres" et fléau de la balance, pouvant les neutraliser l'une par l'autre et manoeuvrer pour se rendre indispensable à la fois à leur dialogue et à leur surveillance réciproque. D'où la contradiction ou du moins la difficulté du gaullisme, qui est celle même de toute conception de l'ordre international fondé sur le nationalisme : sa généralisation serait son échec. Mais peut-il réussir sans être suivi, être suivi sans être imité, être imité sans être dépassé ? Tout repose sur le postulat selon lequel l'entreprise de démolition du statu quo en épargnera certains traits essentiels, ou selon lequel aux liens universels du système actuel s'en substitueront d'autres qui auront le bon goût de ne pas s'appliquer à la France.

La conscience de cette difficulté explique certains paradoxes apparents de la politique extérieure gaulliste.

Si le principe essentiel est la liberté d'action, tout ce qui permet à la France de regagner celle-ci, et donc tout ce qui élimine ou relâche les liens qui l'attachaient, tout ce qui rend le système international plus flexible, moins bipolaire, plus polycentrique, en accroissant le nombre des combinaisons et donc celui des possibilités offertes aux puissances moyennes, est favorable à la France et favorisé par elle. En ce sens, les formules célèbres qui résument le fond de la politique gaulliste : "nation aux mains libres", "n'accepter jamais aucune espèce de dépendance", "boire dans son verre en trinquant aux alentours", "la France ne se refuse aucune possibilité" entraînent les formules sur le relâchement des blocs et la remise en mouvement du jeu mondial, bloqué depuis Yalta, qui elles-mêmes sont rendues possibles par la détente et s'inscrivent dans son cadre.

Deux réserves cependant : s'il est bon pour tout l'univers que la France ait les mains libres, il n'est pas nécessairement bon pour la France que l'univers entier ait les mains libres. Entre les deux conceptions opposées de la politique internationale : 1) rechercher le maximum de liberté d'action pour soi au risque de favoriser ainsi

la liberté d'action d'un adversaire éventuel, et 2) pour limiter la liberté d'action d'un adversaire éventuel, accepter de limiter sa propre liberté d'action en acceptant les mêmes liens que lui, de Gaulle choisit manifestement la première; mais cela ne l'empêche pas d'être conscient, en partie du moins, de ses inconvénients et de ses dangers et d'essayer de les limiter en cherchant à combiner les avantages des deux systèmes et à lier les autres tout en affranchissant la France. Dans cette mesure, la détente doit être limitée et sélective. Certains liens doivent être supprimés mais d'autres doivent ou être maintenus ou remplacer les premiers, au besoin par un renouveau de tension. Ainsi la France encourage l'Allemagne à l'imiter en reprenant sa liberté par rapport aux Etats-Unis, mais non à l'imiter jusqu'au bout en "ne se refusant aucune espèce de possibilité" y compris les armes nucléaires, "condition de l'indépendance nationale"; les liens nés de la défaite, des traités de Paris ou de la vigilance franco-russe furent brusquement rappelés dans la période 1965-66, succédant à la période 1964-65 qui avait, pour "engager le processus" ou bloquer la M.L.F., fait miroiter certaines tentations.

Cette conception sélective et révocable de la détente entraîne que le climat favorisé par la France puisse aussi bien selon les circonstances aller à contre-courant de l'atmosphère dominante ou au contraire l'encourager. Dans la mesure où l'objectif principal actuel de la France est de détacher les Européens, et en particulier les Allemands, des Etats-Unis et de se proposer pour remplacer ceux-ci, elle peut le faire soit en faisant de la surenchère sur le terrain des Américains (en émettant des doutes sur leur protection en période de crise, sur leur volonté de surmonter la guerre froide et le statu quo, en période de détente) soit au contraire en prenant le contre-pied de leur politique, en se faisant l'incarnation de la rigidité si les Etats-Unis veulent négocier ou de la réconciliation si la guerre du Vietnam empêche les Etats-Unis de jouer ce rôle.

D'où la nécessité de distinguer entre la politique de création de la détente et celle d'utilisation de la détente. Plus d'une fois, la France s'est trouvée amenée à combattre une politique qui était exactement celle qu'elle aurait souhaité appliquer elle-même, cela afin de créer les conditions qui lui permettraient d'être celle qui l'appliquerait. Pour pouvoir aboutir à une détente à la française il lui faut saboter la détente à l'américaine; mais pour pouvoir la saboter il faut d'abord qu'elle existe; or elle ne peut exister que malgré l'opposition française. La politique gaulliste excelle à tirer parti de ses propres échecs; il lui sera moins facile d'échapper aux conséquences de ses propres succès.

Cela pose le problème des rapports entre la détente à court terme et à long terme. Autrement dit : quel degré de tension ou de détente internationale aujourd'hui est considéré par la stratégie gaulliste comme le plus favorable à la création demain d'un système international qui donnerait à la France le maximum d'avantages en termes de liberté d'action par rapport aux autres puissances ?

Il nous semble que les réponses possibles comprennent deux certitudes précises et une hypothèse générale susceptible d'applications variables et incertaines.

Première certitude précise : du début à la fin, au niveau de la moindre manoeuvre tactique comme à celui du règlement d'ensemble éventuel du problème européen, non seulement le critère décisif est celui de l'indépendance (ou de la liberté d'action) et du rôle (ou de l'influence) de la France, mais il y a primat de la première, qui est conçue comme absolue, par rapport au second, qui est conçu comme relatif. D'où le danger de contradiction interne de la politique gaulliste. L'un des plus grands obstacles à la réalisation du grand dessein est l'inaptitude de son auteur à passer de la détente à l'entente et à la coopération réelles avec qui que ce soit, par refus de sacrifier sa liberté d'action non seulement sous la forme de la souveraineté, comme l'exigent une alliance et une communauté intégrée, mais encore sous

celle du secret et de la surprise comme l'exigent, dans une certaine mesure au moins, une alliance même de type classique et des engagements même de type commercial. De là vient également le danger que la détente, en relâchant tous les liens ne renverse la situation rêvée (liberté d'action pour la France, paralysie pour les autres) en son contraire. Du jour où les alliances et les traités actuels seraient annulés au profit du poids réel des différentes puissances, c'est la France qui risque de perdre la position privilégiée sur laquelle repose son exceptionnelle marge de manoeuvre.

Deuxième certitude précise : dans la phase actuelle l'objectif essentiel étant de s'opposer aux Etats-Unis et plus particulièrement de les expulser d'Europe, de détruire leur entente avec Bonn et avec Moscou, toute situation de détente ou de crise dans le monde sera jugée par rapport à cet objectif. L'opposition aux Etats-Unis n'a pas pour cause essentielle un jugement sur leur politique en tel ou tel endroit du globe; elle a pour base le fait qu'ils sont considérés par le général de Gaulle comme le grand obstacle qui doit être écarté pour permettre la réalisation de ses objectifs positifs. En ce sens le plus récent et le plus enthousiaste des apologistes de la politique extérieure gaulliste ne se trompe pas sur celle-ci quand il écrit : "Pour un pays comme la France la seule politique positive consiste à abaisser la Maison Blanche comme jadis nous dûmes, pour préserver le monde et nous-mêmes d'un autre empire à prétentions universelles, abaisser la maison d'Autriche qui était déjà plus forte que nous et que cependant nous abaissâmes"<sup>(3)</sup>.

Quant à la phase ultérieure et à l'itinéraire qui y mène, nous entrons dans le domaine à la fois le plus essentiel et le plus spéculatif, celui des relations triangulaires entre la France et les différents couples de puissances.

Personnellement, il me semble que l'approche de la diplomatie gaulliste se fait toujours en ces termes de compétition entre deux puissances pour l'allégeance d'une troisième, ou d'entente entre deux



puissances pour le contrôle d'une troisième, ou, vu du point de vue de la troisième, en termes de jeu de celle-ci pour s'interposer entre les deux autres et pour leur servir de balancier, d'arbitre ou de médiateur. D'une part sa conception s'oppose aux relations multilatérales où la France ne peut manoeuvrer à son aise, où elle doit abandonner une partie de sa liberté d'action; d'autre part la position de la France ne lui permettant pas de dominer par ses propres forces, sa conception lui interdisant d'avoir des amis et sa sagesse lui permettant de ne pas avoir d'ennemis permanents et de revendications directes, c'est essentiellement en exploitant les amitiés et les inimitiés des autres qu'elle peut exercer son activité. C'est donc avant tout pour les rapports entre les différents couples qui constituent ces "éternels triangles" que se pose le problème des avantages et des inconvénients de la détente.

Quand deux acteurs sont en compétition pour un troisième, une entente totale entre eux signifierait soit l'abandon de la compétition soit le partage de l'enjeu, difficilement concevable s'il s'agit d'un centre autonome de décisions. Tant que la compétition dure, ils n'ont le choix qu'entre précipiter une crise forçant le troisième à choisir entre eux, ou continuer le jeu avec l'incertitude et l'ambiguïté qu'il comporte. Evidemment encore, celui qui possède les plus fortes cartes et croit que le troisième se décidera en sa faveur a intérêt à précipiter la crise et à l'obliger à choisir; si aucun des deux n'est sûr de l'emporter, le troisième peut continuer assez longtemps à bénéficier de la faveur des deux. Si on envisage la relation à son point de vue, et si au delà du rôle d'enjeu on lui prête une ambition d'arbitre ou de médiateur, on aboutit à des conclusions analogues : l'intermédiaire (qu'il s'agisse du Tiers Monde; de de Gaulle, ou d'une agence immobilière ou matrimoniale) a intérêt à ce que les deux autres parties ne soient ni trop amis ni trop ennemis. S'ils sont en conflit total et refusent tout dialogue, la tâche du médiateur est rendue impossible; s'ils n'ont pas de difficulté à communiquer et s'entendent trop bien entre eux, sa tâche est rendue inutile et son bénéfice incertain.

Aussi craint-il à la fois qu'ils ne se séparent et qu'ils ne s'entendent par-dessus sa tête ou derrière son dos. Ainsi les Européens reprochent-ils aux deux Grands tantôt d'être au bord de la guerre tantôt au bord de Yalta, de même que les Afro-Asiatiques attaquent tantôt la guerre froide et tantôt la complicité des Grands, seul l'état intermédiaire, celui d'une compétition active mais indirecte, leur étant favorable.

Appliquons ces relations à la situation de la France et à son attitude envers la détente. On peut dire que la France, seule ou au nom soit de l'Europe, soit de l'ensemble des pays autres que les deux Grands, se conçoit avant tout comme participant en fait ou en puissance à quatre relations triangulaires. (Nous laissons de côté les relations avec la Chine ou le Tiers Monde qui, pour l'instant, ne nous paraissent compter qu'indirectement, dans la mesure où elles influencent la position de la France par rapport aux Etats-Unis, à l'Allemagne et à la Russie.)

Dans son entreprise anti-américaine, la France se conçoit comme en compétition avec les Etats-Unis pour servir d'interlocuteur à l'Allemagne et à la Russie. Dans sa conception d'un équilibre désirable, elle souhaite servir d'intermédiaire et d'arbitre entre la Russie et l'Allemagne en Europe, entre la Russie et les Etats-Unis dans le monde.

Dans les deux premiers cas ce sont l'Allemagne et l'U.R.S.S., objet de la compétition, qui souhaitent être en bons termes à la fois avec les Etats-Unis et avec la France. Celle-ci, dans la mesure où elle ne se satisfait pas de cette situation (qui favorise les Etats-Unis si elle maintient le statu quo, l'Allemagne et la Russie si elle les place en position d'arbitre), cherche à imposer un changement brutal. Pour éliminer les Etats-Unis il lui faut obliger l'Allemagne et l'U.R.S.S. à choisir entre eux et elle. Dans la mesure où elle espère (à tort jusqu'à présent) qu'elles se décideront en sa faveur, elle doit insister sur l'impossibilité d'être en bons termes à la fois avec elles et avec l'Amérique, et créer dans les relations franco-américaines

une tension telle que les Lübke ne croiront plus s'en tirer en unissant les mains de Johnson et de de Gaulle, ni les Kossyguine en faisant une halte à Paris sur le chemin de Washington.

Au contraire, dans la mesure où l'Allemagne et la Russie la reconnaîtront comme interlocuteur de première classe, elle se trouvera à son tour placée en position d'intermédiaire. Dès lors son problème sera à son tour d'éviter à la fois une rupture et un accord véritables entre les deux autres puissances.

Dans le cas des rapports entre les deux Grands, elle partage avec tous les autres pays, à des degrés divers, la crainte alternée que les Etats-Unis et l'U.R.S.S. ne s'entendent trop ou pas assez, et le souhait de constituer une force qui apparaisse comme un facteur soit d'équilibre soit de rapprochement. Les Européens non-neutralistes qui voudraient une Europe soit plus proche de l'Atlantique soit plus proche de l'Oural savent eux aussi qu'elle n'est possible que dans les situations intermédiaires. Mais ce rôle, qui exige d'être en bons termes avec les deux côtés, la France semble avoir essayé de le tenir à plusieurs reprises mais en avoir été empêchée soit parce qu'elle donnait la priorité à sa campagne anti-américaine, soit parce qu'elle demandait une représentation exclusive de l'alliance des petits et des moyens. En fait d'intermédiaire, l'élève roumain semble actuellement enregistrer plus de succès que le maître français. Aussi l'essentiel des efforts de celui-ci est-il en dernière analyse dirigé vers son rôle européen, qui offre un peu plus de plausibilité. Mais là encore il rencontre des dilemmes analogues.

L'essentiel de la politique française à long terme consiste dans la recherche du rôle d'intermédiaire entre l'Allemagne et la Russie. C'est par là que s'explique sa constante oscillation. A chaque instant elle se trouve en danger d'être trop proche de l'Allemagne au point d'inquiéter ou de ne plus intéresser la Russie (ce qui s'est produit dans la période 1962-64) ou trop proche de la Russie pour ne pas risquer d'inquiéter l'Allemagne (ce qui s'est produit en 1965-66).

Aujourd'hui la France a enregistré le premier succès positif de sa politique (autre que ses victoires négatives anti-communautaires ou anti-américaines) : elle réussit à être en bons termes à la fois avec l'Allemagne et avec l'U.R.S.S., préfigurant ainsi dans une certaine mesure l'Europe de ses rêves.

Mais ce succès est fondé précisément sur une situation d'intermédiaire qui est liée par essence à une phase de transition et qui ne peut survivre à une solution des problèmes dans un sens ou dans l'autre. Le jour où la guerre froide renaîtrait, ou plus simplement le jour où les Allemands se convaincraient qu'ils n'ont rien à espérer de l'U.R.S.S. au point de vue de la réunification, le rôle de la France disparaîtrait. Mais inversement, le jour où l'U.R.S.S. et l'Allemagne seraient réconciliées, le jour où l'U.R.S.S. envisagerait vraiment d'admettre la réunification de l'Allemagne, elles n'auraient pas besoin d'intermédiaire, elles auraient tout intérêt à négocier ensemble.

La France peut être utile pour faire les présentations, pour servir de caution (avec un succès jusqu'ici fort limité) à l'Allemagne fédérale auprès de l'Europe orientale ou (avec un succès plus réel) à l'ouverture à l'Est auprès du baron von Guttenberg. Elle ne pourrait pas jouer un rôle décisif dans le dialogue final s'il devait avoir lieu. Inversement, si l'U.R.S.S. souhaite vraiment le départ des Etats-Unis, ce n'est pas à la France qu'elle fera confiance pour contrôler l'Allemagne. D'une part, la France n'a pas objectivement intérêt à ce que sa propre entreprise réussisse. Comme l'écrivait l'Economist : "France's immediate aim seems to be to make itself indispensable as the honest broker between Russia and West Germany, hungering for unification. To keep this comfortable position, France clearly has more interest in stimulating the German appetite for unity than in satisfying it." (18 Juin 1966). Une Allemagne réunifiée dans une Europe des Etats où la Russie serait présente et les Etats-Unis absents, serait de toutes les solutions la moins favorable à la France. Mais d'autre part, bon ou mauvais, la France, qui peut tant pour détruire l'or-

dre ancien, ne peut rien de décisif pour instaurer le nouveau. Elle ne possède en fait aucune des cartes à l'aide desquelles elle tente d'ap-  
pâter ses deux partenaires. Elle suggère à l'Allemagne qu'elle est  
mieux placée que les Etats-Unis pour faciliter sa réunification et à  
l'U.R.S.S. qu'elle est mieux placée qu'eux pour empêcher l'Allemagne  
de redevenir dangereuse. En fait, elle ne peut ni procurer la réunifi-  
cation de l'Allemagne ni garantir sa dénucléarisation. Ses suggestions  
à cet égard n'ont un semblant de plausibilité que tant que les Etats-  
Unis sont là et que la France peut les accuser d'être responsables d'u-  
ne moitié du statu quo (division de l'Allemagne et de l'Europe) tout  
en bénéficiant du rôle qu'ils sont seuls à remplir pour son autre face  
(endiguement de l'U.R.S.S. et contrôle de la non-accession de l'Alle-  
magne aux armes nucléaires). Elle aurait visiblement intérêt à ce que  
l'ambiguïté se prolonge; en sortir ne peut aboutir que soit à une consé-  
cration du statu quo soit à une chute dans l'anarchie aux conséquences  
imprévisibles. On peut être sûr en tout cas que cette anarchie ne res-  
pecterait pas le système compliqué de liens dans lequel la France es-  
père que les autres Etats se laisseront emprisonner par la subtilité  
française.

C'est là, de manière plus générale, un défaut fondamental de la  
conception française de la détente. Il réside dans la double contra-  
diction consistant à vouloir faire jouer le rôle central à un pays qui  
n'a pas les cartes décisives, et à combiner le maximum de mobilité pour  
lui, et le maximum d'immobilisation pour les autres.

A certains égards et pour un certain temps, cela peut réussir com-  
me le système de Bismarck avec lequel la politique française présente  
tant de ressemblance. Mais d'une part, Bismarck aussi a échoué pour  
avoir voulu passer d'une Prusse aux mains libres et aux retournements  
inattendus à un système européen d'une fixité et d'une complication  
telles qu'il n'aurait eu de chance de se maintenir qu'avec Bismarck  
lui-même. La France d'aujourd'hui, <sup>est</sup> plus encore que la Prusse d'hier,  
condamnée à l'acrobatie par l'absence relative de poids matériel.

D'où son action précipitée qui transforme en initiatives immédiates et dangereuses des projets concevables à long terme. L'Europe de l'Atlantique à l'Oural est un concept de toute façon critiquable par ses postulats quant à l'absence ou à la présence américaine et russe. Mais il avait un sens s'il s'appliquait à une Europe occidentale unie, équilibrant une Russie et une Europe de l'Est transformées. Il n'en a plus guère si on remplace l'Europe occidentale par la France et la future Europe de l'Est transformée par la présente U.R.S.S. communiste.

La politique du suspense, la diplomatie-éclair, bref la politique extérieure nationaliste, peuvent avoir une grande efficacité négative et manifester le triomphe de la volonté et de l'indépendance contre le déterminisme des facteurs matériels et la cristallisation d'un statu quo inacceptable. Pour rebâtir un ordre stable et acceptable, et donc pour asseoir la détente sur des bases qui ne produisent pas demain de nouveaux conflits, l'acceptation d'un minimum de permanence dans les engagements et donc de limites à la liberté d'action est indispensable. La politique de non-alignement actif est excellente si, comme Méphisto, il s'agit essentiellement de dire non à tout. S'il s'agit de fonder "un nouvel ordre, un nouvel équilibre", il est douteux que l'enviable situation de "joyeux célibataire" international, se refusant à tout bien permanent pour ne se refuser aucune possibilité, volant de fleur en fleur dans le jardin des autres, puisse à la longue être maintenue. La sagesse des nations veut qu'à un certain âge, qui refuse de se résigner au mariage risque de se retrouver seul. Pour les grandes puissances (qui peuvent se défendre seules, dont l'influence peut s'exercer par la domination, et pour qui les alliances constituent surtout une source de risques et de complications) et pour les petites (qui renonçant à une politique active, peuvent espérer assurer leur sécurité par leur absence d'attraits comme de menaces pour autrui), cette situation peut aussi bien présenter des avantages. Pour une puissance moyenne dont l'influence comme la sécurité supposent un minimum d'ordre international, il est probable que le non-alignement mène à tout à condition d'en faire sortir les autres. Ce qui, tôt ou tard, revient à en sortir soi-même.

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2. Maurras (Charles), Kiel et Tanger, Paris, 1910 (Bibliothèque des Oeuvres Politiques).
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4. Cf. Hassner (Pierre), Les alliances sont-elles dépassées ?, Paris, 1966, Fondation nationale des sciences politiques (Série Recherches, n° 10), chap. I : "Victoire et défaite du Tiers-Monde".

### Résumé

Le principe essentiel de la politique extérieure du général de Gaulle est exprimé par la phrase célèbre de ses Mémoires : "Collaborer avec l'Est et l'Ouest, au besoin contracter d'un côté ou de l'autre les alliances nécessaires, sans accepter jamais aucune espèce de dépendance". Le problème qu'elle soulève est de savoir s'il est possible de contracter des alliances "sans accepter jamais aucune espèce de dépendance". Il est clair que le "jamais" est plus énergique que le "au besoin", parmi les deux objectifs permanents de la politique française : d'une part, le maintien de l'indépendance de la France, de sa liberté d'action totale, et d'autre part, l'usage de cette liberté d'action et son résultat - l'influence et le rang de la France; le premier, qui est absolu, a le primat sur le second, qui est relatif. Ces deux principes inspirent deux objectifs concrets qui visent au rétablissement de l'équilibre européen : éliminer les Etats-Unis d'Europe, et pour cela faire obstacle à leurs liens avec l'Allemagne et l'URSS; s'imposer comme intermédiaire entre ces dernières pour aboutir à une Europe fondée sur l'équilibre des Gaulois, des Slaves et des Germains, où les premiers compenseraient leur poids matériel inférieur par leur liberté d'action supérieure.

C'est à la lumière de ces principes d'action et de ces objectifs concrets qu'il faut juger les attitudes successives de la diplomatie gaulliste. Il apparaît que les termes de neutralité, neutralisme et non-alignement, tout en désignant des réalités voisines, ne s'y appliquent pas parfaitement. Contrairement à la neutralité classique, c'est une politique extérieure active qui cherche à remettre en question la structure du système existant. Comme le neutralisme positif et le non-alignement, elle cherche à exploiter l'équilibre bipolaire existant; mais, plus nettement qu'eux, elle cherche à lui en substituer un autre. Dans la définition et la réalisation de celui-ci, on se heurte à la difficulté de la multiplicité des combinaisons possibles. Le but recherché est le maximum de flexibilité pour la France et d'immobilisation pour ses partenaires. Cela suppose pour la France le rôle de balancier que l'Angleterre s'attribuait au XIXe siècle : pas d'alliances permanentes, mais des intérêts permanents. Faute de pouvoir occuper cette place, la France pourrait devoir sacrifier l'une des deux faces de sa politique, soit "les mains libres", soit "le vaste plan".



Summary

The fundamental principle of General de Gaulle's foreign policy is expressed by the famous sentence in his Memoirs: "To collaborate with East and West, in case of need to enter on one or the other side into the necessary alliances, without ever accepting any kind of dependence". The problem which it raises is that of knowing if it is possible to enter into alliances "without ever accepting any kind of dependence". The "never" is clearly more energetic than the "in case of need", of the two permanent purposes of French policy: on the one hand, preserving France's independence and full freedom of action; on the other hand, using that freedom of action and its result - France's influence and status; being absolute, the first purpose has priority over the second, which is relative. The two principles inspire two concrete aims tending to the re-establishment of the European balance of power: to eliminate the United States from Europe, and for that purpose to oppose their links with Germany and the USSR; to impose France as the intermediary between the latter powers, so as to attain a Europe founded on a balance between Gauls, Slavs and Germans, in which the first would compensate their lighter weight through their greater freedom of action.

The successive attitudes of Gaullist diplomacy ought to be judged in the light of these principles of action and concrete purposes. It appears that the terms neutrality, neutralism, non alignment, while referring to neighbouring realities, are not quite applicable here. Unlike classical neutrality, France's is an active foreign policy which seeks to question the structure of the existing system. Just as positive neutralism and non alignment, it seeks to make use of the current bipolar balance; but, more clearly than they, it tries to substitute another balance. In defining and creating it, one encounters the difficulty of the multiplicity of possible combinations. The target is maximum flexibility for France and rigidity for her partners. This implies for France the role of balancing wheel which Britain had taken upon herself in the 19th century: no permanent alliances, but permanent interests. Unable to occupy that place, France might have to sacrifice one of the two facets of her policy: either the "free hands" or the "vast plan".

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"Neutralité, neutralisme, non-alignement"

LES PERSPECTIVES ET LIMITES D'UNE POLITIQUE COMMUNE  
DES PAYS NON-ALIGNES

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Les perspectives et limites d'une politique commune  
des pays non-alignés

par Samaan Boutros FARAJALLAH

Quel que soit le jugement qu'on porte sur la politique de non-alignement, il est indéniable qu'elle est un phénomène important du champ diplomatique après la II<sup>e</sup> guerre mondiale. Il est aussi indéniable que, en vingt-deux ans, depuis 1945 (et surtout depuis 1955, l'année de Bandoeng), le non-alignement a profondément évolué en fonction des rapports de force, des développements technologiques, des crises économico-sociales, des querelles idéologiques, des bouleversements politiques au sein du "monde occidental" comme du "camp socialiste" et du "tiers-monde". Les espoirs, sans doute excessifs, que la politique de non-alignement avait éveillés ne se sont que très partiellement confirmés. Les pays non-alignés, ou qui se considéraient comme tels, ont constaté leur impuissance à propos de grands problèmes internationaux qui ont menacé, et menacent toujours, la paix mondiale, entre autre autres les problèmes du désarmement, de la guerre du Vietnam, du conflit sino-indien, du conflit israélo-arabe, etc... Est-ce à dire que le non-alignement, en tant que politique commune à plusieurs pays, soit condamné à disparaître ou à être frappé de paralysie totale ? Ses dirigeants ne le pensent pas et ne s'y résignent pas. Certains observateurs croient même que, en dépit de leur faiblesse économique et militaire, les pays non-alignés représentent l'espoir et la promesse d'un monde meilleur. <sup>(1)</sup> En tous les cas, un point important est à retenir : le phénomène du non-alignement est maintenant accepté par les puissances "engagées", mais beaucoup reste à faire pour le connaître et en comprendre les perspectives et les limites. Il faut toute-

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(1) HONTI, F.: "La mission des non-alignés", in Le Monde Diplomatique, Nov. 1966, p.1.

fois admettre que le phénomène du non-alignement est fort difficile à élucider : il ne se prête même pas à une analyse scientifique précise, ne fût-ce qu'à cause de l'imprécision même du terme "non-alignement" et des différentes conceptions et modes d'action qu'il couvre.

Le non-alignement est, en effet, un phénomène complexe, multiforme, parfois contradictoire, qui comporte différents courants et tendances en fonction des intérêts propres de chaque pays non-aligné. Une étude générale du phénomène du non-alignement aurait dû être précédée par des monographies concernant les pays non-alignés pris individuellement. Bien plus, il faudrait des études de cas dans lesquels les pays non-alignés avaient agi en groupe : le non-alignement est en effet, comme l'observe le professeur Léo HAMON, "une série d'attitudes qui ont chacune leur originalité".<sup>(2)</sup> Ceci explique fort bien pourquoi une étude des perspectives et limites d'une politique commune des pays non-alignés doit trop souvent s'en tenir à des généralités. Mais ces généralités ne sont pas sans intérêt puisqu'elles peuvent indiquer la tendance générale de la politique des non-alignés, ainsi que son rôle sur le champ diplomatique mondial.

#### Le conditionnement de la politique de non-alignement

Pour apprécier à sa juste valeur l'interaction d'une politique commune des pays non-alignés et du champ diplomatique mondial, il est absolument indispensable de mettre en relief les principaux objectifs de cette politique : il s'agit certes d'objectifs généraux communs à tous les pays non-alignés. Mais ces objectifs ne peuvent être évalués à leur tour qu'en prenant en considération les caractéristiques générales des relations internationales après la III<sup>e</sup> guerre mondiale.

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(2) HAMON, L.: "Non-engagement et neutralisme des nouveaux Etats", in Les Nouveaux Etats dans les Relations Internationales, sous la direction de J.-B. Duroselle et J. Meyriat, Paris, Colin, 1962, p. 358 (Cahier de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques).

Un des phénomènes les plus marquants de la période qui s'étend de la IIème guerre mondiale à nos jours est la résurgence des mouvements nationalistes en Asie et en Afrique aboutissant à la disparition de l'ère coloniale et à la naissance de plusieurs Etats indépendants. Ces jeunes nations, fières de leur nouveau statut d'indépendance, non seulement refusent d'être des objets de la diplomatie mondiale, mais aspirent à jouer un rôle de sujets actifs sur la scène internationale. Cette constatation de fait indique déjà un des objectifs les plus primordiaux de la politique de ces Etats, à savoir la volonté de poursuivre une politique indépendante de tout engagement politico-militaire qui les lierait d'avance à une ligne de conduite déterminée. Le non-alignement serait ainsi une manifestation de la poussée nationaliste en Asie et en Afrique, <sup>(3)</sup> d'où le caractère militant qu'il a eu dans ces débuts.

Mais il est évident, d'autre part, que l'accession à l'indépendance politique et la jouissance de "l'égalité souveraine" juridique n'est pas en elle-même suffisante pour permettre à ces nouveaux Etats d'assumer un rôle de responsabilité sur la scène internationale, ou tout au moins d'avoir la capacité d'atteindre leurs objectifs nationaux les plus vitaux. En effet, cette émancipation politique s'accomplit à un moment où l'indépendance totale devient un euphémisme dans un système international global de plus en plus complexe. Depuis 1945, c'est devenu un lieu commun de constater que le système international s'étend à l'ensemble de l'humanité, grâce à l'évolution technique dans tous les domaines, notamment dans ceux de l'énergie atomique et des communications. C'est le monde fini analysé avec tant de perspicacité par Raymond Aron dans son livre Paix et guerre entre les nations. <sup>(4)</sup>

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(3) Le non-alignement de la Yougoslavie est le fruit de circonstances tout à fait particulières à ce pays : dissident du camp soviétique, il continue de se réclamer du marxisme-léninisme.

(4) ARON, R.: Paix et Guerre entre les Nations, Calmann-Lévy, Paris 1962, Chapitre XIII.

Au sein de ce système universel se détache le rôle prédominant que jouent constamment les "grandes puissances". Certes, le concept de "grande puissance" est fluide et très relatif, puisque le nombre des grandes puissances varie d'une époque à l'autre et qu'il peut y avoir de grandes puissances à l'échelle régionale. Mais dans la société internationale d'aujourd'hui, le concept de grande puissance s'identifie à celui de puissance mondiale, c'est-à-dire se limite en fait jusqu'à présent aux Etats-Unis et à l'Union Soviétique, rivaux de par leur position de force et par l'opposition de leurs systèmes socio-économiques. C'est pourquoi on dit que le système planétaire actuel est caractérisé par la configuration bipolaire du rapport des forces. Certains auteurs considèrent que la prolifération de nouveaux Etats et la tension Est-Ouest constituent les traits les plus marquants des rapports internationaux contemporains.<sup>(5)</sup> Il faut, en réalité, en ajouter deux autres : le sous-développement économique et social et le développement des organisations internationales.

Un trait particulièrement frappant sur le plan socio-économique dans le monde des Etats se manifeste dans le fait que la classification traditionnelle entre "grandes" et "petites" puissances "s'entrecroise aujourd'hui avec une autre, toute récente, grosse de virtualités : celle qui distingue les pays et Etats développés des pays et Etats semi-développés et sous-développés".<sup>(6)</sup> Tibor Mende considère que, vers le milieu du XXème siècle, cette division est devenue "le principal facteur qui conditionne l'aspect de notre planète".<sup>(7)</sup> Ce trait essentiel des relations internationales contemporaines est aussi un des principaux thèmes de l'Encyclique Populorum Progressio promulguée par SS Paul VI au mois de mars 1967.<sup>(8)</sup> Les porte-

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(5) VISSCHER, Ch. de, Théories et réalités en droit international public, 3ème édition, Paris, Pédone, 1960, p. 419.

(6) TRUYOL Y SERRA, A.: "Genèse et structure de la société internationale", in Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International de La Haye, 1958, p. 597.

(7) Cité par Truyol Y Serra, loc.cit.

(8) Le Monde, 29 mars 1967, pp. 1 & 6.

parole des pays sous-développés n'ont pas manqué d'affirmer sans cesse l'importance de ce facteur et le considèrent même comme plus important que le conflit des idéologies.

Il ne s'agit certes pas de traiter ici de la complexité des problèmes que le sous-développement pose aux jeunes Etats mais plutôt de mettre en relief le rapport étroit entre la "question nationale", c'est-à-dire le statut de l'indépendance, et la "question économique", rapport qui nécessite de continus efforts d'aménagement de leurs relations internationales. Certains auteurs vont même jusqu'à affirmer que les problèmes socio-économiques des nouveaux Etats sont tellement importants et vitaux qu'on peut les considérer comme constituant la cause profonde des mouvements d'émancipation nationale.<sup>(9)</sup>

Le rapport entre la tâche primordiale de développement économique et la politique extérieure des nouveaux Etats se manifeste sous deux aspects connexes, politique et économique.

Le premier de ces aspects se rattache directement au deuxième facteur qui conditionne les relations internationales d'après la II<sup>e</sup> guerre mondiale, à savoir la configuration bipolaire du système international. On ne peut donc sous-estimer le fait que, de par la condition de leur sous-développement, les nouveaux Etats constituent un enjeu majeur politico-stratégique dans le champ des antagonismes entre "blocs". Ce caractère d'enjeu est encore accentué du fait que l'économie des pays avancés a abordé une nouvelle période à la faveur d'une conjoncture expansionniste à l'échelle mondiale. Elle est, en outre, caractérisée par la concentration en deux, ou plutôt trois, centres industriels compétitifs : les Etats-Unis, l'Union Soviétique et l'Europe occidentale. Il s'ensuit que - et c'est là le deuxième aspect du rapport entre le sous-

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(9) SPYKMAN, N.J. : "The Social Background of Asiatic Nationalism", in American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XXXII, n° 3, Nov. 1926, pp. 396-411; JACOBY, E.H. : Agrarian unrest in Southeast Asia, New York, Columbia University Press, 1949; BALANDIER, G. : Sociologie actuelle de l'Afrique Noire, Paris, P.U.F., 1955.

développement économique et la politique étrangère des jeunes nations d'Afrique et d'Asie - par nécessité économique, ces jeunes nations sont obligées d'entrer en rapport avec ces "pôles industriels".<sup>(10)</sup> Or, cette mise en rapport de sociétés inégales en puissance ne peut manquer de présenter des dangers pour les pays sous-développés puisqu'elle "donnerait lieu à de nouvelles formes de sujétion politique".<sup>(11)</sup> Ainsi, la puissance économique des "grandes puissances" qui implique en général leur influence politique sur les jeunes Etats qui se veulent non-alignés, peut remplacer la pression militaire traditionnelle ou la politique des alliances, comme on le verra plus loin. Le problème se pose donc aux jeunes Etats d'aménager leurs relations internationales de façon à participer aux avantages techniques et financiers procurés par les grands centres industriels, sans pour autant aliéner leur indépendance politique en se tenant en dehors de tout engagement politico-militaire avec l'un ou l'autre des deux "blocs" antagonistes. Pour atteindre cet objectif, ils peuvent recourir au "jeu de la bascule" en recevant l'aide financière et technique des deux "blocs" à la fois, afin de neutraliser leur influence, comme ils peuvent promouvoir l'aide multi-latérale par l'intermédiaire des organisations internationales. Ce qui est important à retenir est le fait que le développement économique des jeunes Etats d'Afrique et d'Asie est conditionné non seulement par leur infrastructure interne mais aussi par des incidences extérieures; d'où le lien étroit auquel nous avons fait allusion entre la "question nationale" et la "question économique", autrement dit, le conditionnement de la politique de non-alignement par la nécessité du développement économique.

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(10) Cf. l'intéressant livre de François PERROUX, L'Economie des jeunes nations, Paris, P.U.F., 1962.

(11) SAUVY, A., in Le "Tiers-Monde", sous-développement et développement, Cahier n° 39 de l'Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques, Paris, 1961, pp.9-10.



Ainsi, aussi bien du point de vue politique que du point de vue économique, aucun pays ne peut mener une vie isolée du contexte international actuel, d'où le non-sens de toute conception qui identifie la politique de non-alignement à une politique d'isolement. L'interdépendance des peuples est passée de l'ordre des idées idéalistes ou intéressées au domaine impérieux des faits. C'est devenu une constatation commune maintenant que "the most intransigent of nationalisms must live in a world of which inter-dependence has become a central feature; no state acting alone can guarantee its own security or assure its own well-being".<sup>(12)</sup> Cette constatation de fait indique déjà une limite importante de la politique de non-alignement de tout Etat pris individuellement, et, à plus forte raison, d'une politique commune de non-alignement, puisqu'au facteur de l'interdépendance des "grandes" et "petites" puissances s'ajoute le facteur de l'hétérogénéité des intérêts des petites puissances non-alignées.

Enfin, le développement des organisations internationales constitue - à notre sens - le quatrième facteur, à côté de la prolifération de nouveaux Etats, la bipolarité et le sous-développement économique, de cet "environnement" en fonction duquel s'établissent les relations extérieures de tous les pays qui s'attachent à la politique de non-alignement.

L'extension du système international intégral, c'est-à-dire englobant tous les aspects de la vie des collectivités humaines, aux dimensions planétaires, à laquelle nous avons fait allusion, a trouvé son expression institutionnelle dans le développement des organisations internationales de caractère universel ou régional, qu'elles soient gouvernementales ou non-gouvernementales. C'est d'ailleurs une constatation commune que de voir, après la IIe guerre mondiale, un processus d'intégration croissante des Etats dans des ensembles plus vastes qui

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(12) EMERSON, R.: From Empire to Nation, the rise to self-assertion of Asian and African Peoples, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1960, p.407.

prennent graduellement des formes institutionnelles plus ou moins stables et plus ou moins complexes. On dénombre actuellement plus de 1400 organisations dont plus de 130 organisations intergouvernementales.

Il n'est pas question de discuter, dans les limites de ce rapport, le rôle des organisations internationales, notamment des Nations Unies, dans l'orientation et la formulation de la diplomatie collective des pays non-alignés. Il suffit de constater que ces organisations offrent de nouvelles possibilités et de nouvelles perspectives à ces Etats. En effet, l'accession d'un nouvel Etat aux organisations internationales lui permet non seulement de prendre contact immédiatement avec un grand nombre de problèmes enchevêtrés qui se posent sur le plan mondial, mais lui donne aussi la possibilité de faire connaître ses propres problèmes. Bien plus, il est entraîné, par le fonctionnement même des organisations internationales, à prendre parti pour ou contre les thèses en présence formulées par les deux "blocs" antagonistes, si étrangères soient-elles à son intérêt national au sens étroit. Ajoutez à cela le fait que les organisations internationales, de par leur caractère institutionnel et leurs modes de vote, offrent le plus de possibilité aux Etats membres d'agir en groupe. C'est pourquoi on a constaté que ces organisations, et plus spécialement les Nations Unies, ont constitué le champ diplomatique le plus favorable aux comportements collectifs ou communs des pays non-alignés. Il faut noter toutefois que les possibilités qu'offrent les organisations internationales aux pays non-alignés sont limitées, à la fois par le caractère global du système international et par les limites qu'il impose à la liberté d'action des Etats, caractère et limites qui se répercutent sur les organisations internationales, qui ne sont que le reflet du système international et, d'autre part, sur les limites institutionnelles au sein de ces organisations (modes de vote et jeu de la diplomatie parlementaire).

Résumons-nous : la politique de non-alignement a été conditionnée par quatre facteurs essentiels, à savoir, les poussées nationalistes en Asie et en Afrique, la bipolarité du système international, le sous-développement économique et le développement des organisations internationales. C'est pourquoi l'appréciation des perspectives et limites de la politique de non-alignement, en tant que comportements collectifs de plusieurs Etats, doit tenir compte de l'évolution de ces quatre facteurs qui ont subi des changements substantiels dans le courant des vingt-deux années qui ont suivi la IIème guerre mondiale.

#### Non-alignement et "guerre froide"

On peut envisager deux méthodes pour l'étude des problèmes du non-alignement : la méthode historique descriptive, qui consiste à passer en revue les différentes manifestations de la politique de non-alignement pour en marquer les étapes et l'évolution, et la méthode synthétique qui consiste à prendre comme points de départ certains principes de cette politique pour en évaluer les applications à quelques cas d'espèce dans des domaines variés mais situés historiquement. La méthode historique, tout en étant plus exhaustive, n'est pas adaptée à un rapport limité. La méthode synthétique, par contre, exige moins d'espace et permet, en même temps, d'évaluer, d'une façon générale certes, la politique de non-alignement en prenant comme points de départ les objectifs essentiels de cette politique. Les quelques remarques qui précèdent nous indiquent déjà la voie à suivre. Nous avons déjà souligné que l'objectif primordial de toute politique de non-alignement (quelle que soit sa dénomination) était la poursuite d'une politique indépendante de tout engagement international dans le cadre de la "guerre froide". Cette indépendance se manifeste dans trois domaines principaux : les problèmes coloniaux, les problèmes du sous-développement, les problèmes politico-militaires propres à la "guerre froide". Il est évident que ces trois domaines sont étroitement liés les uns aux autres, et même enchevêtrés de façon telle que les

analyser séparément implique à coup sûr le danger de tronquer la réalité diplomatique. Cependant, nous nous attarderons uniquement à la dernière catégorie de problèmes concernant le domaine politico-militaire.

Nous constatons, en effet, que les problèmes de la colonisation classique n'ont plus l'intérêt qu'ils avaient avant 1960, à l'exception de quelques cas en Afrique australe. Si les jeunes Etats d'Asie et d'Afrique parlent encore de lutter contre le colonialisme, ils ne trouvent plus guère dans ce combat la base suffisante d'une politique internationale commune. Il serait illusoire, toutefois, de croire que la lutte contre l'impérialisme s'arrêtera le jour où il n'y aura pas de colonies. Les investissements étrangers, la possession du sol ou des usines par des individus ou des sociétés d'une autre nationalité, sont considérés comme une forme d'impérialisme (le néo-colonialisme). Mais la lutte anti-impérialiste dans ce nouveau contexte change de caractère: elle devient un élément inhérent à la guerre froide puisqu'il s'agit, pour les grandes puissances, de la domination des régions décolonisées, d'une nouvelle répartition des sphères d'influence et des richesses de la planète. On remarque alors que dans ce genre de conflits, les pays non-alignés trouvent beaucoup de difficultés à formuler une politique commune. Le cas du Congo en est le meilleur exemple jusqu'à présent. Le contraste est frappant entre l'attitude des pays non-alignés vis-à-vis des problèmes du colonialisme du type classique et ceux du néo-colonialisme. Pour la première catégorie de problèmes, ces pays ont réussi à former un front commun et ont eu une grande influence à l'O.N.U. (cf. par exemple les problèmes de Goa, de l'Irian occidental, d'Aden, de l'Angola, du Sud-Ouest Africain, de la Rhodésie du Sud, etc...). Il y a toutefois deux observations à faire: tout d'abord, l'action anti-colonialiste ne fut pas à proprement parler une action commune des pays non-alignés, mais plutôt une action commune des pays afro-asiatiques. La confusion vient du fait qu'entre les

deux groupes de pays, il y a chevauchement. En deuxième lieu, l'action des pays non-alignés vis-à-vis des problèmes du colonialisme classique a manqué d'efficacité pratique dans les cas où des intérêts occidentaux majeurs étaient en jeu. Le meilleur exemple actuel est celui de la Rhodésie du Sud : les sanctions décrétées par l'O.N.U. contre le régime d'Ian Smith n'ont pas eu l'effet voulu parce que les grandes puissances occidentales (le Royaume Uni et les Etats-Unis) qui ont des relations économiques très étroites avec ce pays, se sont montrées récalcitrantes à les appliquer. La faiblesse militaire et économique des pays non-alignés constitue donc une limite importante à l'efficacité de leur action diplomatique commune, même dans les cas où une telle action est possible. En ce qui concerne les problèmes dits du néo-colonialisme, les pays non-alignés (si l'on prend comme critère du non-alignement la liste des Etats qui ont participé à la Conférence de Belgrade de septembre 1961 et celle du Caire d'octobre 1964) n'ont même pas réussi à former un front commun parce que ce genre de problème se rattache directement à la lutte d'influence et de puissance des deux camps antagonistes.

Il n'est pas non plus dans notre intention de nous attarder aux problèmes de sous-développement économique des pays non-alignés. Ces problèmes dépassent en effet le cadre de la politique de non-alignement. Contentons-nous donc de quelques remarques très générales. Nous avons déjà souligné l'importance vitale du problème du sous-développement et de son rattachement au problème de l'indépendance nationale. Ajoutons même qu'il se rattache au problème de la paix mondiale. Le décalage de plus en plus accentué entre les pays "riches" et les pays "pauvres" est en effet une source de conflits internationaux préjudiciables à la cause de la paix. La Charte Nationale, qui contient le programme politico-économique de la R.A.U., affirme que le "conflit inévitable entre le retard et le développement constitue le second danger qui menace la paix mondiale; tandis que le premier danger réside dans la possibilité d'une guerre atomique soudaine".

Il est généralement admis que l'action concertée des pays sous-développés est l'une de leurs réussites les plus spectaculaires. Une initiative lancée à la Conférence économique du Caire en 1962 allait en effet aboutir à la constitution du "groupe des 75", qui rassemble l'ensemble du "tiers-monde", y compris l'Amérique latine. Ce groupe agit avec efficacité au sein des Nations Unies et de leurs institutions spécialisées et des diverses conférences internationales convoquées sous leurs auspices, et dont on trouve la manifestation la plus éclatante dans les délibérations de la Conférence des Nations Unies sur le Commerce et le Développement (U.N.C.T.A.D.), tenue à Genève en 1964 :

Les pays en voie de développement ... considèrent que la Conférence marque l'aboutissement des efforts soutenus qui ont trouvé leur expression concrète dans la Déclaration du Caire, la Charte d'Alta Gracia, les résolutions de Brésilia, d'Addis-Abéda, de Niamey, de Manille et de Téhéran, et surtout dans la Déclaration commune des 75 pays, formulée à la XVIIIème session de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies (A/5515). Tous ces efforts ont contribué à forger l'unité des 75 pays, fait saillant de la Conférence et événement d'importance historique ... (nos italiques). (13)

Si l'action commune des pays sous-développés - et au sein desquels les pays non-alignés - a pu paraître efficace, il ne faut pourtant pas surestimer cette efficacité. Si ces pays réussissent à faire adopter des résolutions de caractère général concernant le développement économique, ils sont incapables d'exiger l'exécution d'un projet déterminé si ce projet n'a pas l'approbation des principales puissances financières. On en a vu un exemple dans le problème de la création d'un Fonds Spécial des Nations Unies (S.U.N.F.E.D.) comme fonds de préinvestissement. (14) On remarque aussi l'absence, jusqu'à présent, de toute action

(13) "Déclaration Commune des Soixante-Dix-Sept Pays en Voie de Développement", in UNCTAD : Acte Final et Rapport, Document E/CONF. 46/141, Vol. I, pp.76-78.

(14) FARAJALLAH, S.B. : Le Groupe Afro-Asiatique dans le cadre des Nations Unies, Genève, Droz, 1963, pp. 373-390.

positive de la part de l'U.N.C.T.A.D. Bien plus, si l'on examine des questions économiques spécifiques (au-delà des principes généraux), nous constatons que les pays sous-développés sont loin d'être unis <sup>(15)</sup>: ils diffèrent sensiblement les uns des autres dans leurs structures économiques ainsi que par leurs attaches aux différents centres industriels mondiaux. Ce dernier facteur, plus spécialement, constitue une limite sérieuse à toute action collective des pays non-alignés vis-à-vis des problèmes politico-militaires propres à la guerre froide auxquels il faut nous attarder un peu. Quelles sont donc les perspectives et limites d'une politique commune de non-alignement vis-à-vis de ces problèmes ?

Il est évident que les problèmes politico-militaires de la guerre froide se rattachent tous au problème général de la sécurité et de la paix internationale. Or, le non-alignement se justifie, aux yeux de ses protagonistes, par le fait ou l'idée qu'il peut aider à empêcher la guerre et à promouvoir la sécurité et la paix internationales. Dans ce contexte, nous nous limiterons à discuter trois problèmes principaux : les alliances militaires, le désarmement et le règlement des conflits internationaux par les moyens pacifiques.

Un des aspects du non-alignement, sinon l'aspect capital, est l'opposition aux alliances, en temps de paix, dans le cadre de la guerre froide.

La politique d'opposition aux alliances en temps de paix n'est pas récente en soi; elle ne constitue pas en elle-même une marque distinctive du non-alignement. Historiquement, on distingue trois manifestations de cette politique. Tout d'abord, l'opposition aux alliances constitue l'essence même du statut juridique de la neutralité : c'est le cas traditionnel de la Suisse; ce fut aussi le cas de la Belgique entre 1839 et 1914; c'est aussi

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(15) FARAJALLAH, S.B.: Le Groupe Afro-Asiatique dans le cadre des Nations Unies, Genève, Droz, 1963, pp. 439-44.

le cas de l'Autriche depuis 1955; etc... D'autre part, certains Etats se sont opposés, à certaines périodes de leur histoire diplomatique, à contracter des alliances avec d'autres Etats déterminés. Cette politique était en réalité l'expression de l'antagonisme politico-militaire entre ces Etats. Ainsi, après 1871, la France ne pouvait s'allier à l'Allemagne à cause de la rivalité des deux Etats en Europe, d'une part, et de la question d'Alsace-Lorraine, d'autre part, tout comme il est tout à fait inconcevable, l'heure actuelle, de voir les Etats-Unis s'allier avec l'Union Soviétique, ou les pays arabes s'allier avec Israël. La troisième manifestation historique de la politique d'opposition aux alliances fut l'expression de l'isolationnisme. Ce fut le cas de la Grande-Bretagne, notamment pendant le dernier quart du XIXe siècle, lorsqu'elle pratiquait la politique dite de "splendid isolation". Ce fut aussi le cas des Etats-Unis jusqu'à la IIe guerre mondiale, à l'exception des alliances conclues en temps de guerre. Il faut remarquer, toutefois, que, dans ces trois manifestations historiques de la politique d'opposition aux alliances, il ne s'agissait pas d'une opposition de principe, mais plutôt de l'obligation d'un Etat déterminé (statut de neutralité), ou de sa volonté de ne pas contracter lui-même des alliances, mais il n'était pas opposé à ce que d'autres Etats y recourent en tant que procédés d'équilibre du système international. Ainsi, lorsque la Grande-Bretagne s'est vue obligée de faire face à la politique mondiale (Weltpolitik) de l'Allemagne, à la fin du XIXe siècle, après la chute de Bismark, elle cessa son opposition à l'alliance franco-russe en vue de tenir en échec l'orientation expansionniste des "puissances centrales". Bien plus, en dehors d'Europe, la Grande-Bretagne a eu recours à la politique des alliances pour préserver ses avantages coloniaux : ce fut, par exemple, le cas de l'alliance anglo-japonaise conclue en 1902 pour contrecarrer l'expansionnisme russe en Extrême-Orient. De même, avant la Ière guerre mondiale, la Belgique, juridiquement neutre, encourageait la conclusion d'une alliance entre la Grande-



Bretagne et la France, en vue de neutraliser l'antagonisme franco-allemand à son sujet.

A ces trois aspects traditionnels de la politique d'opposition aux alliances est venu s'ajouter un quatrième aspect introduit par les pays non-alignés. Ces pays, non seulement, refusent à contracter eux-même des alliances avec l'un ou l'autre des deux camps antagonistes de la guerre froide, mais ils sont opposés à la politique des alliances en tant que telle, même si elle est pratiquée par d'autres Etats.<sup>(16)</sup> Dans la dialectique des non-alignés, l'antagonisme des alliances est la cause de profondes tensions politiques qui aboutissent aux guerres, et dans le contexte actuel à la guerre nucléaire globale. Les alliances sont contractées en effet par anticipation d'une épreuve de force entre deux coalitions rivales. C'est pourquoi la politique des alliances imprime à la diplomatie une fixité dangereuse; dans les crises graves, les attitudes des deux blocs antagonistes sont fixées d'avance; à tout moment, la tension politique fondamentale oriente le débat vers une lutte de prestige et de puissance, ce qui la revêt d'un caractère passionnel qui la rend réfractaire au règlement pacifique. La politique des alliances tend ainsi à aggraver les tensions déjà existantes, puisqu'elle a pour enjeu une nouvelle distribution des éléments constitutifs de la puissance relative des Etats. Cela est d'autant plus vrai qu'il s'agit, depuis la fin de la IIe guerre mondiale, de tensions d'hégémonie, essence même de la guerre froide, qui ont pour enjeu la domination à l'échelle du globe. Les zones de friction se multiplient. Les pressions calculées sur les pays interposés entre les deux blocs antagonistes se développent et se diversifient avec plus d'intensité, de persistance et de subtilité, ce qui étend l'aire géographique des tensions internationales. Nehru n'a-t-il pas déclaré plusieurs fois que l'OTASE introduisait la guerre froide dans une zone

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(16) LISKA, G.: "The 'Third Party' : the rationale of non-alignment", in MARTIN, L.W. (editor) : Neutralism and nonalignment, N.Y., Praeger, 1962, pp. 80-86.

qui aurait pu et dû rester à l'écart du conflit mondial ? On trouve des déclarations semblables émanant du Président Nasser au sujet du Pacte de Baghdad (actuellement CENTO).

Trois autres arguments justifient aux yeux des non-alignés la politique d'opposition aux alliances. Tout d'abord, à l'âge des armes thermonucléaires de destruction massive, l'accession d'un petit Etat à une alliance militaire avec une grande puissance ne garantit pas sa sécurité, si l'on entend par sécurité le pouvoir de se défendre contre une autre puissance nucléaire. Il est même inutile, pour un petit Etat, de s'intégrer dans une alliance militaire pour se protéger contre la poussée communiste parce que les Etats-Unis, de par leur position de rivalité avec le camp communiste, se chargent, même à défaut d'alliance, de défendre tout Etat exposé à une agression communiste. En deuxième lieu, les alliances militaires aboutissent aussi aux tensions régionales entre les Etats membres d'une alliance et les autres Etats. Ainsi, le Pacte de Baghdad a introduit une grave tension entre les pays arabes du Moyen-Orient. L'OTASE, aux yeux de l'Inde, a permis au Pakistan d'adopter une politique plus rigide dans ses conflits frontaliers avec l'Inde et l'Afghanistan; il en est de même pour la Thaïlande vis-à-vis du Cambodge. En troisième lieu, les non-alignés affirment qu'il y a corrélation entre la politique des alliances et le colonialisme, à proprement parler le "néo-colonialisme". La Charte Nationale de la R.A.U. déclare que les pactes militaires "visent à transformer les peuples en satellites".

Quel que soit le bien fondé de ces arguments, on peut se demander si les pays non-alignés ont réussi à infléchir la tendance des grandes puissances à la pactomanie. Un simple regard jeté sur une carte du monde et des pactes en vigueur suffirait, s'il en était besoin, à montrer que le refus de s'insérer dans les alliances militaires des deux blocs antagonistes constitue chez les pays nouvellement indépendants, un phénomène fondamental : les pactes ne réunissent qu'une petite minorité des Etats

nouvellement indépendants. Mais plus significative encore est peut-être l'évolution de l'attitude observée en cette matière par les leaders des deux camps. Les alliances militaires ont perdu beaucoup de leur valeur à partir de 1956 environ, non pas à cause de l'opposition des non-alignés, mais plutôt à cause du changement radical dans la stratégie politico-militaire des deux blocs rivaux. C'est le camp soviétique qui a pris l'initiative de ce changement. A partir du mois d'octobre 1952, le bloc communiste entama sa nouvelle stratégie de guerre froide sous le vocable de "coexistence pacifique". Ce revirement se manifesta en Asie par la "Conférence pour la Paix des régions de l'Asie et du Pacifique" qui siégea à Pékin du 2 au 12 octobre 1952 et qui aboutit à la conclusion de l'armistice en Corée (27 juillet 1953) et aux accords de Genève (juillet 1954), mettant fin au conflit d'Indochine. Si les Etats-Unis, craignant une nouvelle offensive militaire communiste semblable à celle de la Corée ou d'Indochine, se sont empressés de créer l'OTASE par le Pacte de Manille (8 septembre 1954) et le Pacte de Bagdad (février 1955), il s'est vite avéré que cette mesure était anachronique et inefficace puisque la stratégie communiste avait changé de style. Ces pactes militaires furent créés pour faire face à une guerre froide qui avait déjà changé de caractère.<sup>(17)</sup> Les Etats-Unis furent peu à peu obligés, par la dialectique de la compétition, d'adapter la réponse au défi, "de ne pas opposer l'exigence occidentale d'engagement à l'offre soviétique de non-engagement".  
(18) L'aide économique et la dialectique de la subversion ont remplacé la politique des alliances. La question de savoir quelles sont les perspectives et limites d'une politique commune d'opposition aux alliances militaires, politique prônée par les non-alignés, devient par ce fait même une question oiseuse sans aucune portée réelle.

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(17) BRIMMELL, J.H.: Communism in South East Asia, London, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 286.

(18) ARON, R.: op.cit., p. 522.

Le deuxième aspect de la politique de non-alignement, dans le cadre de la promotion de la sécurité et la paix internationales, se manifeste dans le problème du désarmement.

Le problème du désarmement demeure le problème essentiel de notre époque. Il est évident que l'un des principaux soucis des pays du "tiers-monde" est le maintien de la "paix par le désarmement". Leur préoccupation se fonde sur deux raisons essentielles :

La première, commune à tous les hommes, est la peur de la guerre totale. Dans les conditions actuelles, aucun pays au monde ne peut garantir sa sécurité si le cataclysme se déclençait. De plus, chacun sait que les retombées radio-actives n'ont cure des frontières politiques. Cette raison suffirait à elle seule à justifier la volonté de "paix par le désarmement" prônée par les pays non-alignés.

La deuxième raison a une valeur d'appoint irréfutable de caractère économique : le désarmement général et complet, avec obligation, inscrite dans le traité, de verser un pourcentage fixe des économies progressivement réalisées sur les budgets de défense à un fonds international de développement paritairement géré, sous les auspices des Nations Unies, par les Etats donateurs et les Etats bénéficiaires. On a calculé qu'un prélèvement de 20 % sur les économies réalisées suffirait à permettre le "démarrage" des économies insuffisamment développées.

Cela étant, quelles sont les perspectives et limites d'une politique commune des pays non-alignés dans le domaine du désarmement ? A en juger par les résultats acquis jusqu'à présent, et ce, sur une période de vingt-deux ans, il semble bien que les perspectives sont fort minces et les obstacles presque insurmontables.

La position des pays non-alignés à ce sujet a trouvé son reflet dans les travaux du Comité des Dix-Huit Etats à Genève. Huit participants à ce comité - Birmanie, Brésil, Ethiopie,

Inde, Mexique, Nigeria, R.A.U. et Suède - ont déployé leurs efforts pour parvenir à un accord sur tous les aspects controversés du problème du désarmement. Le Secrétaire Général de l'O.N.U., U Thant, estime que la participation de ces Etats au Comité des Dix-Huit constitue un événement important. D'une part, on reconnaît ainsi que le désarmement est une question qui intéresse toutes les nations, grandes et petites, et non pas seulement les grandes puissances militaires. En outre, "les Etats non-alignés sont un important élément qui, par son influence modératrice et son rôle de catalyseur, aide à combler le fossé entre les positions extrêmes des deux camps".<sup>(19)</sup> La signature à Moscou, le 5 août 1963, du traité interdisant les essais d'armes nucléaires dans l'atmosphère, dans l'espace extra-atmosphérique et sous l'eau et la signature, le 27 janvier 1967, du traité sur l'usage pacifique de l'espace extra-atmosphérique, peuvent être présentées comme des appuis à la vue optimiste du Secrétaire Général. La réalité est, dans une bien grande mesure, assez différente. On sait que toute la question du désarmement - et notamment ses sous-produits, à savoir la cessation des essais atomiques et la destruction de l'arsenal atomique déjà existant - a buté contre le problème du contrôle international. Si les deux super-grands ont accepté de conclure les deux traités précités d'août 1963 et de janvier 1967, ce n'était pas uniquement ou même principalement sous la pression des non-alignés, mais plutôt à cause des progrès technologiques dans le domaine des moyens de détection des essais et, peut-être aussi, pour restreindre la diffusion des armes nucléaires (les essais souterrains exigeant une technique beaucoup plus avancée que ne possèdent les autres Etats, France et Chine y compris). C'est pourquoi, et malgré tous les efforts des pays non-alignés, il serait illusoire d'espérer qu'un traité de désarmement atomique intégral soit jamais signé, du moins

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(19) Introduction au Rapport Annuel du Secrétaire Général sur l'Activité de l'Organisation, 16 juin 1961 - 15 juin 1962, Document A/5201/Add.1, p.2.

dans un proche avenir, parce que le contrôle en est impossible et que les conséquences éventuelles de la fraude seraient démesurées. Les deux Super-Grands ne se sont jamais montrés disposés eux-mêmes à renoncer à leur monopole ou tout au moins à réduire massivement leurs stocks de bombes et de fusées, comme le leur ont déjà demandé les pays non-alignés. Le problème du désarmement se trouve donc toujours dans la même impasse à laquelle il a fait face dès le début. C'est pourquoi on trouve que le Secrétaire Général de l'O.N.U. a effectué une correction de tir à la fin de 1966 et il a changé sa vue optimiste de 1962 et 1963. Dans l'Introduction de son Rapport Annuel à l'Assemblée Générale, U Thant ne cache pas sa déception et son pessimisme amer.<sup>(20)</sup> Si l'on suit toutes les péripéties des négociations sur le désarmement, on est frappé de constater qu'aucun résultat positif ne peut être obtenu sans l'accord des Super-Grands. La volonté des Grandes Puissances serait donc une limite presque infranchissable à toute action individuelle ou commune des pays non-alignés. Toutefois, il ne faut pas croire que la volonté des Super-Grands soit omnipuissante à tous les points de vue. En effet, ils n'ont pas encore réussi à faire admettre leur projet de traité sur la non-dissémination des armes nucléaires. Mais l'opposition aux Super-Grands dans ce domaine n'est pas le monopole des non-alignés. Les puissances qui sont en train de bâtir leur propre force de dissuasion atomique, comme la France et la Chine, ainsi que les autres puissances de l'Europe occidentale, se sont montrées récalcitrantes, pour des raisons de sécurité, à accepter le projet de traité des deux Super-Grands. Dans ce domaine, on ne trouve même pas une opinion unanime au sein du groupe des non-alignés : certains d'entre eux, comme l'Inde (inquiète des progrès atomiques de la Chine) et les pays arabes

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(20) Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, June 16, 1965 to June 15, 1966, in UN Monthly chronicle, Vol. III, n° 9, October 1966, pp. 96-99.

(inquiets des efforts d'Israël dans ce domaine) ont émis des réserves sérieuses à l'acceptation du projet de traité sur la non-dissémination des armes atomiques.

En conclusion, on peut dire que le problème du désarmement ne constitue pas un terrain favorable à une action commune efficace de la part des pays non-alignés.

Finalement, le troisième aspect de la politique de non-alignement, dans le cadre de la promotion de la sécurité et de la paix internationales, et l'un des plus controversés, est celui du règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux dans le cadre de la guerre froide. Dans ce contexte, on peut distinguer trois courants principaux au sein des pays non-alignés.<sup>(21)</sup>

Quelques-uns voient dans le non-alignement une "troisième force" capable de contrebalancer les antagonismes des deux "blocs" rivaux, Communisme-monde occidental. Cette vue extrémiste, et d'ailleurs irréaliste, ne se trouve exprimée que dans les cercles non-officiels et militants. Les dirigeants des pays non-alignés ont tous rejeté l'idée de s'ériger en une "troisième force" qui ferait contre-poids à la guerre froide entre les deux camps antagonistes.

Cependant, l'idée de "troisième force" n'est pas tout à fait étrangère à certaines aspirations politiques des non-alignés. On peut considérer la création de "zones de paix" (areas of peace) dans la terminologie de Nehru, ou de "zones non-engagées (areas of disengagement) en Asie et en Afrique comme un sous-produit dilué de l'idée générale de "troisième force". Bien que les non-alignés évitent en général de parler de "balancing power", leur idée de créer une vaste zone non-engagée dans le conflit Est-Ouest sous-entend leur désapprobation de la division bipolaire du monde et le retour au système multi-polaire ou, plus précisément tripolaire. Tout au moins l'existence d'une vaste zone non-engagée qui s'étend aux Etats d'Asie, d'Afrique et, éventuelle-

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(21) LYON, P.: Neutralism, Leicester University Press, 1963, pp. 64-72.

ment de l'Amérique latine obligerait les deux camps antagonistes à "courtiser" ces Etats et restreindre aussi l'aire géographique de la guerre froide et, par le fait même, diminuer son intensité et sa rigidité. Cette idée semble aussi avoir effleuré la pensée de Dag Hammarskjöld: "The Organization in fact also exercises a most important, though indirect, influence on the conflicts between the power blocs by preventing the widening of the geographical and political area covered by these conflicts and by providing for solutions whenever the interests of all parties in a localization of conflict can be mobilized in favour of its efforts". (22)

Malgré tous leurs efforts, les pays non-alignés n'ont pas réussi à créer ces "zones de paix". Une proposition soviétique plus restreinte, émise au mois de mai 1963 et déclarant la région méditerranéenne zone dénucléarisée, ne fut pas concrétisée. Le problème de la création de zones de paix ou, simplement, des zones dénucléarisées, n'est réalisable qu'avec l'accord des Super-Grands parce qu'il est intimement lié au système d'équilibre bipolaire.

Un deuxième courant d'opinion au sein des pays non-alignés affirme un rôle plus vaste pour ces pays en vue de limiter la guerre froide. Ces pays croient, en effet, pouvoir imposer un arrêt à l'expansion du communisme beaucoup plus que ne le ferait le système de défense occidentale basé sur les alliances militaires ou les allégeances politiques. En demeurant en dehors des blocs et en entretenant des relations normales, sinon cordiales, avec les Etats communistes, les pays non-alignés encourageraient ces derniers à adopter une attitude ou une conduite moins agressive à leurs égards et éviter ainsi l'expansion du communisme par la force. Si un Etat communiste

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(22) Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1959 - 15 June 1960, Document A/4390/Add.1, p. 5.



attaquait un pays non-aligné, il perdrait toute influence et tout crédit politique. Cet argument semble sous-jacent à la conception neutraliste basée sur les "cinq principes de la co-existence pacifique" (Panch Sheel).

Cette conception est erronée pour deux raisons principales. Tout d'abord, elle est démodée, puisqu'elle ne prend pas en considération le changement de caractère de la guerre froide, qui utilise les armes de la propagande et de la pression économique beaucoup plus que la force militaire. En deuxième lieu, cette conception pêche par excès d'optimisme, puisqu'elle suppose que tout acte hostile d'un pays communiste à l'égard d'un pays non-aligné serait considéré comme acte hostile à l'égard de tous les pays non-alignés, ce qui n'est pas forcément le cas. Cette opinion semble d'ailleurs tomber en discrédit, surtout en Inde, après son conflit frontalier avec la Chine. (23)

Le troisième courant d'opinion au sein des pays non-alignés au sujet de leur rôle dans la promotion de la paix mondiale est la conception de "bridgemanship", à savoir combler le fossé qui existe entre le monde occidental et le monde communiste. C'est de loin la conception la plus répandue, la plus importante et en même temps la plus controversée.

La prétention des non-alignés à se poser comme les arbitres du conflit Est-Ouest a été discutée et évaluée par plusieurs observateurs de tendances diverses. Les non-alignés eux-mêmes croient jouer un rôle médiateur et, par conséquent, voient leur politique comme un facteur de paix. Les pays non-alignés peuvent "jeter un pont sur le fossé qui sépare les adversaires, en vue d'établir la coexistence pacifique entre les nations ayant des systèmes sociaux différents". (24) Le

(23) JANSSEN, G.H.: Afro-Asia and Non-alignment, Faber and Faber, London, 1966, Chapters : IX, X, XV, XVI, XVII & XIX.

(24) Discours du Président Nasser devant la Conférence de Belgrade : La Conférence des Chefs d'Etat ou de Gouvernement des Pays non-alignés, Belgrade, 1-6 sept. 1961, Publicističko-izdavački Zabod "Jugoslavia", Beograd, 1962, pp.41-53.

"camp socialiste" affirme des vues semblables. Les auteurs soviétiques affirment que "l'apparition des Etats afro-asiatiques sur la scène internationale a sensiblement modifié le rapport des forces en faveur de la paix".<sup>(25)</sup> L'opinion occidentale à ce sujet est plus nuancée. On trouve un large secteur d'opinion conservatrice qui assure que les pays non-alignés sont incapables de jouer le rôle de médiateur entre les deux camps antagonistes parce qu'ils sont enclins - à cause de leur passé colonial - à réfuter les intérêts de l'Occident, d'où leur accusation d'appliquer une "double mesure" (double standard) qui joue sur deux plans : favoriser le camp communiste à l'égard du camp occidental, d'une part (affaire de Hongrie en 1956) et accorder leur appui à un Etat neutraliste à l'encontre d'un Etat colonial (affaire de Goa en 1961). Ce point de vue semble découler du moralisme subjectif qui était en vigueur dans le monde occidental, surtout aux Etats-Unis, depuis 1945 jusqu'à la fin des années 1950 : tout ce qui émane de l'Occident est moral et tout ce qui émane du "régime totalitaire" du communisme est "immoral". Cette conception subjective oublie que le non-alignement consiste en l'indépendance de jugement et d'appréciation des faits politiques. C'est pour cette raison qu'il n'est pas une doctrine à laquelle on attache gratuitement ou non des attributs moraux ou immoraux. Le non-alignement est une série de comportement, c'est-à-dire une politique, et toute politique est essentiellement "amorale", c'est-à-dire fondée sur une appréciation des faits dans un contexte international donné et en fonction de la conception que chaque gouvernement se fait de l'intérêt national, pris dans un sens large, bien entendu.

L'autre courant d'opinion dans le monde occidental au sujet du rôle médiateur du non-alignement est plus nuancé. Il n'émet aucun jugement de valeur sur la moralité du non-aligne-

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(25) ETINGER, Y, et MELIKIAN, O.: Neutralisme et Actualité, Moscou, Editions du Progrès, 1965 (?), p. 3.

ment mais s'attache surtout à l'examen de la possibilité de son rôle de médiateur dans un contexte politique donné.<sup>(26)</sup> Théoriquement, les Etats non-alignés, agissant en groupe, peuvent jouer le rôle de médiateur dans les conflits de la guerre froide et contribuer ainsi à sauvegarder la paix internationale. En effet, aucun des deux blocs ne pouvant l'emporter sur l'autre sans guerre, il doit gagner les non-alignés à sa cause. Le groupe de non-alignés "n'est pas le tertius gaudens qui assiste, ironique, au débat ou à la lutte entre les deux Grands, mais l'objet même de ce dialogue ... Il est objet mais il est sujet aussi puisque les Grands, le plus souvent, ne peuvent employer les moyens avoués de force".<sup>(27)</sup>

Toutefois, ce rôle de médiateur est limité par deux facteurs importants : l'équilibre de force entre les deux camps antagonistes, d'une part, et la diversité des intérêts des pays non-alignés, d'autre part. On a déjà vu un exemple de l'échec du rôle médiateur des non-alignés dans le problème du désarmement qui se rattache directement à l'équilibre militaire des deux blocs. On en trouve d'autres exemples dans le domaine géopolitique. Il est certain que l'influence des non-alignés est minime, sinon inexistante, vis-à-vis des conflits qui surgissent dans l'aire géographique de l'influence exclusive des superpowers. L'échec des non-alignés dans le règlement de la question hongroise en 1956 et la question cubaine en 1962 sont des exemples notoires. Cette constatation est corroborée aussi par leur impuissance devant le conflit vietnamien et le récent conflit israélo-arabe. On peut objecter que le Vietnam et les pays arabes font partie de zones extérieures à l'affrontement direct des blocs. Ceci n'est pas tout à fait vrai. Les Etats-Unis considèrent que leurs intérêts vitaux sont engagés dans ces deux régions, surtout si l'on

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(26) LISKA, G. : "Tripartism : dilemmas and strategies", in MARTIN, L.W. (editor) op cit., pp. 211-238.

(27) ARON, R.: op.cit., p. 516.

prend en considération la montée de la puissance chinoise, d'une part, et la montée croissante du nationalisme arabe, d'autre part. Cette limite géopolitique est maintenant largement admise, même pour les Nations-Unis : "With its constitution and structure, it is extremely difficult for the United Nations to exercise an influence on problems which are clearly and definitely<sup>(28)</sup> within the orbit of present day conflicts between power blocs".

A ces limites se rapportant à l'équilibre des forces militaires et géopolitiques s'ajoutent d'autres limites, en ce qui concerne les zones extérieures à l'affrontement direct des blocs, dues aux divergences d'intérêts des pays non-alignés. En effet, avoir choisi l'option neutraliste n'implique en aucune façon pour les Etats non-alignés une nécessaire identité de leur politique. Le non-alignement a toujours été conditionné, sur le plan pratique, par les intérêts nationaux qui peuvent concorder et créer une situation de coopération de fait, mais qui peuvent aussi diverger et aboutir à une division de fait. Un Etat notoirement non-aligné peut se trouver, en fait, plus lié qu'un Etat membre de l'un ou l'autre des blocs militaires. Il peut être dans une situation si vulnérable, ayant un besoin vital d'aide étrangère, qu'il n'arrive pas à pratiquer une politique indépendante et n'arrive pas à se soustraire à la pression politico-économique exercée sur lui par l'un ou l'autre des Super-Grands. Les exemples en sont innombrables : citons, entre autres, le cas de la représentation de la Chine aux Nations Unies, celui du Congo et, tout récemment, le conflit du Moyen-Orient. Dans tous ces cas et bien d'autres encore les pays non-alignés n'ont pas réussi à agir en groupe homogène à cause de la diversité de leurs intérêts en fonction de leurs attaches économique-politiques avec les grands centres industriels mondiaux; c'est pourquoi ils sont sujets à des pressions diverses.

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(28) Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General, June 1959 - June 1960, op.cit., p. 4.

A cela, il faut ajouter deux remarques générales concernant les effectifs du groupe des non-alignés et son caractère informel. On sait que le nombre des non-alignés est en croissance continue : tout jeune Etat qui acquiert le statut d'indépendance se déclare, sauf circonstances particulières graves, non-aligné sur l'un et l'autre des deux blocs. Or, le grand nombre de ces pays rend difficile toute action commune concrète. C'est pourquoi on constate l'orientation récente de ces pays d'agir par cercles plus restreints : conférence de Colombo de 1962 au sujet du conflit sino-indien, réunion tripartite de New Delhi d'octobre 1966 entre Mme Ghandi et les présidents Nasser et Tito et les récentes visites du Président Tito à diverses capitales pour "coordonner" l'action des non-alignés à l'égard de la crise du Moyen-Orient. D'autre part, malgré son grand nombre, le groupe des non-alignés manque de consistance : il n'a pas la forme d'une organisation établissant entre les pays membres des liens permanents et surtout un mécanisme de consultation, d'où la fluidité des positions de ses membres. Mais il ne faut pas sous-estimer cette fluidité et la considérer uniquement sous son aspect négatif en tant que cause du manque de cohésion du groupe des non-alignés. En effet, cette fluidité peut être bénéfique pour le rôle médiateur des non-alignés entre les deux camps antagonistes. L'importance des non-alignés réside dans le fait qu'ils constituent des membres flottants dans le système bipolaire (floating vote), soutenant tantôt l'un, tantôt l'autre des deux camps et, le cas échéant, les rapprochant. Mais pour réaliser cet objectif, il faut que les positions des non-alignés soient diversifiées, autrement dit il faut qu'ils soient divisés sur eux-mêmes afin de permettre un débat fructueux entre les deux blocs et imprimer à la diplomatie mondiale une souplesse et une flexibilité propices aux compromis. Si le groupe des non-alignés était trop rigide, présentant un point de vue unique et une cohésion parfaite, il manquerait à sa mission de modérateur de puissance et de conciliateur. (29)

(29) RUSSETT, B.M. : Trends in World Politics, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1965, p.103.

Ce rapport semble s'être attaché à montrer les limites de la politique de non-alignement plutôt que ses perspectives. Ceci est vrai et découle directement de la réalité des relations internationales contemporaines. L'action des pays non-alignés est à l'origine de plusieurs résolutions des Nations Unies. Mais ces résolutions avaient un caractère tellement général qu'elles ne pouvaient avoir de portée pratique réelle. La stratégie militaire de la guerre froide, les aires géopolitiques des Super-Grands, la faiblesse militaire des non-alignés, leur dépendance économique des grands centres industriels, l'hétérogénéité de leurs intérêts nationaux, leur grand nombre doublé de l'absence de toute organisation ou du moins d'un mécanisme permanent de consultation, etc ... sont autant de limites à une politique de non-alignement pratiquée individuellement et a fortiori collectivement.

Est-ce à dire que la politique de non-alignement soit condamnée à l'impuissance ? Tel ne semble pas être le cas. Le non-alignement est devenu un fait dans la réalité internationale et présente un certain dynamisme qui a imprimé plus de flexibilité au système bipolaire mondial. Une inflexion dans l'attitude des deux camps se produit souvent, moins par une régression de leur propre antagonisme que par une différence de présentation de leur affrontement, introduite afin de conquérir les sympathies des non-alignés. Ainsi la politique de non-alignement a présenté et présentera encore une résistance aux tentatives d'universalisation du dualisme "communisme-monde occidental". Mais au-delà de cette valorisation de caractère général, il est aléatoire de s'aventurer à prévoir les perspectives futures du non-alignement comme politique commune à plusieurs Etats. Ceci est d'autant plus évident que la conjoncture internationale est en pleine transformation. Les rapports Est-Ouest s'améliorent sensiblement et les blocs militaires sont en voie de désintégration. La position future de la Chine dans le système d'équilibre international, ainsi que ses conflits déclarés ou latents avec

les Etats-Unis et l'Union Soviétique constituent autant de points d'interrogation pour le monde entier. Une chose est certaine : les relations internationales acquièrent plus de fluidité, les configurations militaires ou politiques assouplissent leur rigidité et, par ailleurs, ne sont pas éternelles. C'est pourquoi on peut dire que chaque situation nouvelle ouvre la voie à des développements neufs et difficiles à prévoir.

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### Résumé

La politique de non-alignement a été conditionnée par quatre facteurs essentiels : les poussées nationalistes en Asie et en Afrique, la bipolarité du système international, le sous-développement économique, le développement des organisations internationales. L'efficacité d'une action diplomatique commune des pays non-alignés, même dans les cas où une telle action est possible, est limitée par leur faiblesse militaire et économique. L'aide économique et la dialectique de la subversion ayant remplacé la politique des alliances, il devient inutile de se demander quelles sont les perspectives et les limites d'une politique d'opposition aux alliances. Le problème du désarmement ne constitue pas non plus un terrain favorable à l'action commune des pays non-alignés. La dépendance économique, l'hétérogénéité des intérêts nationaux, le grand nombre même des pays non-alignés sont autant de limites à leur politique. Le non-alignement n'en est pas moins devenu un fait important dans la réalité internationale, et a contribué à imprimer à cette réalité une fluidité nouvelle, qui rend l'avenir d'autant plus difficile à prévoir.

### Summary

The policy of non-alignment was conditioned by four major factors : the nationalist thrusts in Asia and Africa, the bi-polarity of the international system, economic underdevelopment, the growth of international organizations. The efficacy of a joint diplomatic action by the non-aligned countries, even in cases where such action is possible, is limited by their military and economic weakness. Alliance policies having been replaced by economic assistance and the dialectic of subversion, it becomes useless to ascertain the prospects and the limits of a policy of opposition to alliances. Nor is the problem of disarmament a favorable field for joint action by the non-aligned countries. Economic dependence, the heterogeneity of national interests, the very number of the non-aligned are as many limitations to their policy. Non-alignment has nevertheless become an important fact in international reality, and has contributed to give to that reality a new fluidity which makes the future all the more difficult to foresee.



"Neutralité, neutralisme, non-alignement"

NEUTRALITE ET NEUTRALISME

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## Neutralité et neutralisme

par Jacques Freymond

Au cours des vingt dernières années, dans la période historique qui s'ouvre à la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale, un terme nouveau est apparu, celui de neutralisme, qui est devenu d'usage constant, plus fréquent même que celui de neutralité, au point de lui être parfois substitué. L'objet de ce rapport est d'analyser la politique que le neutralisme entend définir et d'examiner dans quelle mesure elle se rapproche, ou<sup>(1)</sup> au contraire se distingue, de celle traditionnelle de neutralité.

Les neutres - est-il besoin de le dire - n'entendent pas être confondus avec les neutralistes. C'est ainsi qu'au lendemain de la signature du traité d'Etat autrichien, l'Arbeiter Zeitung de Vienne publiait, le 1er mai 1955, un article dont l'auteur marquait avec vigueur la distinction, et même l'opposition, entre les deux notions de neutralité et de neutralisme :

"Nous consentons volontiers, écrivait-il, à ce que l'Autriche soit soustraite au conflit des grandes puissances, à proclamer la neutralité de l'Autriche. Mais, dès à présent, il importe d'éviter des malentendus, de mettre en garde contre certaines confusions. Nous acceptons la neutralité, nous repoussons le neutralisme.

La neutralité consiste à ne conclure d'alliance militaire avec aucun des deux camps. Le neutralisme consiste à ne pas voir la différence entre les deux camps, la différence entre le monde libre de l'Ouest et celui de dictateurs communistes de l'Est.

La neutralité consiste à n'accorder de bases militaires sur le sol autrichien ni à l'Est, ni à l'Ouest. Le neutralisme, c'est la croyance erronée qu'on pourrait racheter la paix au prix de concessions politiques unilatérales, par une politique de faiblesse vis-à-vis des dictateurs.

... La neutralité, affirmait encore l'auteur de cet "article, consiste à défendre contre toute menace extérieure la liberté de notre pays et d'y maintenir la démocratie. "Le neutralisme consiste à abandonner par lâcheté la liberté "dans son propre pays, à trahir la démocratie".

Un an plus tard, M. Max Petitpierre, alors chef du Département politique fédéral, déclarait, au cours d'un exposé de la politique suivie par la Suisse lors de la crise hongroise :

"Les événements récents et les activités modestes qu'ils nous donnent l'occasion d'accomplir ne paraissent démontrer "que dans le monde actuel, il y a encore place pour une "neutralité comme celle de notre pays qui n'est pas une "neutralité morale, indifférente, qui est sans rapport avec "le neutralisme, qui n'est pas une fuite devant les respon- "sabilités, qui n'implique aucune abdication dans les juge- "ments portés sur les événements, qui ne se dérobe pas de- "vant l'action lorsque celle-ci peut-être utile à la cause "de la paix".(2)

Le neutralisme est donc assimilé ici à une neutralité morale et condamné de ce fait. Pour le chef du Département politique fédéral, la neutralité engage l'Etat qui a adopté et qui s'est fait reconnaître un statut de neutralité. Elle n'implique pas une neutralité de l'opinion qui menacerait un régime démocratique dans son essence. Le citoyen d'un Etat neutre doit rester libre de porter un jugement de valeur, d'affirmer ses convictions, d'exprimer ses préférences. (3) Le ministre responsable de la politique étrangère de la Suisse n'a pas hésité à user de cette liberté en condamnant explicitement la politique du gouvernement soviétique en Hongrie dans le discours même où il proclame la fidélité du gouvernement fédéral à la politique de neutralité. Il repousse la neutralité morale parce qu'elle fait le jeu du totalitarisme, et c'est bien là le reproche qui est adressé aux neutralistes.

Ce reproche est-il justifié ? Une incursion dans l'histoire du neutralisme nous permettra sans doute de serrer le

problème de plus près. Constatons tout d'abord que le terme est peu utilisé avant 1945. Peter Lyon, qui a publié en 1963 une excellente étude sur le neutralisme (4), a constaté (5), que le terme apparaît à la fin du XVIème siècle et qualifie une attitude d'indifférence, d'apathie ou de passivité, et cela en matière religieuse. Il signale à nouveau son apparition dans un ouvrage publié en 1861 (6) à Londres, où neutralism est opposé à denominationalism. L'édition du Webster de 1931 note : "Neutralism: neutrality (rare)". L'édition de 1965 est plus explicite : "A policy on the advocacy of neutrality especially in international affairs (as with respect to a conflict between world power)". Dans les deux cas cependant, neutralisme est assimilé à neutralité. Le Shorter Oxford Dictionary de 1956 définit neutralisme par "maintenance of neutrality" et le neutraliste comme "one who maintains a neutral attitude", expression qu'il fait remonter à 1623.

Le Dictionnaire de la langue française de Robert parle d'un néologisme : "Doctrine ou système politique qui tend à maintenir une nation dans la neutralité, à ne pas la lier par des alliances à l'un des groupes de belligérants éventuels". Sous "neutraliste", qu'il définit comme qui est "favorable, propre au neutralisme", il renvoie au Larousse universel de 1923, où l'on peut lire : "favorable à la neutralité". Enfin, Aldo Garosci, dans une étude sur le neutralisme, (7) affirme que ce terme a été utilisé en Italie au cours de la première guerre mondiale. (8)

De ces quelques références on ne peut donc guère tirer d'autre conclusion qu'une tendance générale à l'assimilation de neutralisme à neutralité. C'est donc du contexte historique dans lequel une politique dite neutraliste s'est formée que nous pouvons espérer dégager une définition.

Il est difficile de préciser quand le terme est apparu pour la première fois. Claude Bourdet, qui fut un des promoteurs du neutralisme, fait remonter son origine aux années 1947-1948. Mais il faut attendre l'année 1950 pour le découvrir dans Le Monde, très exactement dans le numéro du 5 avril dans un article de J.J. Servan-Schreiber consacré à l'avenir de la coalition atlantique et où il analyse ce qu'il appelle "les fondements du neutralisme". Le 8 juin 1950 paraît un numéro de L'Observateur entièrement consacré au neutralisme et qui constitue en quelque sorte le manifeste du mouvement.

Ce manifeste, comme d'ailleurs l'article de J.J. Servan-Schreiber et ceux qui lui succèdent sur le même thème dans Le Monde du printemps et de l'été 1950, sont l'aboutissement d'un long débat politique. Dès la fin de la guerre, et plus particulièrement dès qu'est devenue patente la rupture de la Grande Alliance et la formation de deux groupements antagonistes, de nombreux Français se sont interrogés sur la politique à suivre. La France sera-t-elle réduite au rôle de tête de pont américaine en Europe ? Doit-elle, dans la lutte qui oppose le communisme au capitalisme, prendre inéluctablement position aux côtés des Etats-Unis capitalistes ? N'y a-t-il pas de troisième voie ? Hubert Beuve-Méry, dès 1944, réfléchit aux possibilités d'échapper à l'alternative dans laquelle la division du monde en deux blocs tend à enfermer la France et l'Europe. Il n'est pas seul, d'ailleurs, car c'est bien le souci d'affirmer l'indépendance de l'Europe face à l'URSS et aux Etats-Unis qui occupe les militants du Mouvement européen. Mais si pour la plupart d'entre eux l'Europe unie doit rester partie intégrale de l'Occident et maintenir des liens étroits avec les Etats-Unis qui, par leur aide et par leur protection, lui donnent précisément la possibilité de refaire ses forces et de s'organiser malgré la pression soviétique, d'autres s'orientent plutôt vers une politique de neutralité. "La France, écrit Beuve-Méry dans Temps Présent

"du 5 avril 1946, la France ne peut, ni ne doit opter pour le  
"capitalisme américain dont elle connaît les défauts ... Elle ne  
"peut ni ne doit opter pour le totalitarisme russe qui serait  
"comme la négation de toute son histoire et de tout son être.  
"D'autre part, qu'on en convienne ou non, elle n'est plus en  
"mesure de soutenir seule ses idées et ses intérêts jusqu'à  
"l'acceptation délibérée de l'ultima ratio : la guerre. Pourquoi  
"dès lors ne proclamerait-elle pas sa neutralité et celle des ter-  
"ritoires de l'Union française ?".(9) Dès lors, le thème de la  
neutralité, de la neutralisation de la France et de l'Europe  
revient toujours plus fréquemment au fur et à mesure que se dé-  
veloppe le grand débat autour du Pacte Atlantique, non seulement  
en France, mais en Allemagne aussi d'où surgit, à l'intention des  
partisans de l'atlantisme, la formule élégante de ohne mich.

Le neutralisme ainsi se définit à travers la revendication  
pour l'Europe d'une neutralité qui la libère de la dépendance des  
Etats-Unis. Les neutralistes se recrutent essentiellement parmi  
les adversaires du Pacte atlantique. Or, en mettant l'accent,  
comme ils le font au cours de leur lutte, sur la critique du  
capitalisme, ils se voient rangés dans le même camp que les com-  
munistes par ceux qui voient dans les Etats-Unis un allié et un  
protecteur nécessaire de l'Europe menacée par l'URSS. A renvoyer  
dos à dos capitalisme et communisme, Etats-Unis et Union Sovié-  
tique, ils font, leur reprochera-t-on, le jeu de l'URSS qui  
cherche précisément à isoler l'Europe occidentale des Etats-Unis.  
Dans les circonstances où se trouve l'Europe, une orientation  
vers la neutralité a la signification d'un refus de participer à  
la lutte commune de l'Occident contre le "totalitarisme". Et ce  
refus est en soi un choix en faveur de l'un des deux camps. C'est  
parce qu'une neutralité européenne apparaît comme contraire aux  
intérêts de l'Europe et de la civilisation occidentale que ses  
partisans taxés de neutralistes par leurs critiques sont condam-  
nés. (10)

Le terme de neutraliste aurait donc été utilisé à l'origine dans un sens péjoratif. Claude Bourdet remarquera un jour qu'il s'agit là d'une création des adversaires du neutralisme. Etienne Gilson, dont on sait la participation à la tentative d'élaboration d'une politique de neutralité, déclare lui aussi qu'il n'est pas un champion du neutralisme et que s'il a lancé l'idée, il refuse le mot.

\* \* \*

C'est le même souci d'éviter d'être entraîné dans la dépendance d'un des deux "blocs" qu'on retrouve à l'origine du neutralisme des Etats extra-européens. Nehru, qui le premier eut à faire face à ce problème, affirma d'emblée sa volonté de ne lier l'Inde à aucun groupe d'Etats et de ne pas se laisser impliquer, comme il le déclare en septembre 1946 déjà, dans cette "politique de puissance ..." qui a causé les guerres mondiales et qui pourrait conduire à nouveau le monde à un désastre encore plus grave. L'Inde, libérée de la tutelle étrangère, entendait conserver sa liberté d'action. Ce refus de prendre parti révèle-t-il une orientation vers une politique de neutralité ? Nehru s'en est défendu. S'il lui est arrivé d'évoquer la neutralité comme une des politiques possibles pour son pays, il a constamment insisté sur la nécessité pour l'Inde de jouer un rôle actif et de fournir une contribution positive au maintien de la paix. "Lorsque la liberté est menacée, dit-il dans un discours prononcé à New York le 18 octobre 1948, lorsque la justice est en danger, lorsque survient une agression, nous ne pouvons pas et nous ne devons pas demeurer neutres". (11)

Nehru et d'autres responsables de la conduite des affaires indiennes rejettent en fait la neutralité, plus nettement encore le neutralisme qui, en temps de paix, révèle "une espèce de mentalité guerrière". (12) V.C. Pandit, dans un article publié par Foreign Affairs, en avril 1956, déclare que le terme

de neutralité n'a guère de sens lorsqu'il s'applique à la politique étrangère de l'Inde et il réproouve l'usage de celui de neutralisme qui, pour un Palme Dutt, a été créé par les porte-paroles des puissances impérialistes. On n'éprouve d'ailleurs guère plus d'enthousiasme pour le terme de "non-alignement".

Et pourtant l'Inde et son premier ministre Nehru se sont associés aux entreprises placées sous l'égide du "neutralisme" ou du "non-alignement". L'absence d'une conceptualisation n'a pas empêché la formulation d'une politique dite "neutraliste", dont se sont réclamés un nombre croissant d'Etats qui accédaient à l'indépendance. Nehru est devenu, malgré les réserves que lui inspirait toute définition trop précise de sa position, le père spirituel et l'apôtre du neutralisme. Il a conduit, aux côtés de Nasser et de Tito, le groupe des Etats "non-alignés". Le neutralisme, comme le constate son plus récent historien, Peter Lyon, s'est défini par l'action. La conférence qui s'est tenue au Caire en juin 1961, pour préparer celle qui allait rassembler à Belgrade les chefs des Etats non-alignés, a formulé les critères d'admission à Belgrade. Et, du même coup, elle a fourni une définition, assez floue d'ailleurs, de ce que certains Etats, ceux-là mêmes qui patronnaient la Conférence de Belgrade, entendaient par neutralisme. Quelles étaient les conditions à remplir pour être honoré d'une invitation ?

1. Suivre tout d'abord une politique indépendante, fondée sur le principe de coexistence pacifique entre Etats appartenant à des systèmes politiques et sociaux différents; ou, tout au moins, marquer une orientation claire vers une politique de ce type.
2. Fournir un appui aux mouvements de libération nationale.
3. Refuser toute appartenance à quelque système régional de défense collective si cela pouvait conduire à un engagement dans le conflit Est-Ouest.
4. Refuser tout traité bilatéral qui aurait les mêmes implications.





référer explicitement au droit de neutralité, tout au moins en ce qui concerne les règles applicables au statut de la neutralité permanente (16). Ce n'est certes pas qu'ils aient voulu délibérément l'ignorer. Mais le neutralisme - nous l'avons dit - s'est exprimé dans l'action et les comportements qu'il définit. relève de la politique de neutralité, c'est-à-dire, comme l'écrit Paul Guggenheim dans son Traité de droit international public, d'un "domaine libre de toute réglementation juridique... où les relations de l'Etat neutre avec les belligérants dépendent de son appréciation". (17)

L'objectif commun des neutralistes, c'est éviter toute implication dans la lutte entre grandes puissances. Le conflit Est-Ouest ne les concerne pas. Mais il fait peser sur chacun d'eux une menace permanente dont la satellisation est sans doute la plus pressante. L'abstention réduit les risques. Elle ouvre parfois même des perspectives intéressantes sur le plan économique.

Il s'agit donc bien d'une politique de neutralité dans un conflit donné, d'une politique de neutralité pratiquée dans l'état de "paix belliqueuse" ou de "guerre politique" qui caractérise les relations internationales contemporaines. Les comportements certes seront variables en fonction des circonstances et des intérêts de chacun des Etats. L'inclination générale vers les thèses révolutionnaires, qui conduit souvent à une synchronisation de l'action des neutralistes et de celle de l'Union Soviétique, est tempérée parfois par une réserve favorable aux Occidentaux. Ces fluctuations sont révélatrices du souci qu'ont les neutralistes de préserver leur indépendance et, plus encore, de conserver leur liberté d'action. Car - et c'est ici qu'ils se séparent nettement des neutres traditionnels - ils entendent jouer un rôle politique actif. Neutralisme pour eux n'est pas synonyme d'abstentionnisme politique ou de repli dans l'isolement. Il leur importe, au contraire, de participer à la conduite des affaires internationales. On sait le rôle joué dans la politique mondiale par l'Inde de Nehru. La R.A.U. s'est donné pour

mission de réaliser l'unité du monde arabe et n'a pas hésité à s'engager au Yémen dans une guerre longue et coûteuse. Elle a fourni un large appui aux mouvements révolutionnaires d'Afrique. L'opposition des neutralistes à des alliances bilatérales ou à des systèmes régionaux de sécurité collective ne vise d'ailleurs que les seuls groupements qui seraient liés à l'un ou l'autre des systèmes d'alliances occidentaux ou socialistes. Le non-engagement est compatible avec l'engagement au service de la cause neutraliste. Les Etats non-engagés ont cherché à se grouper sur le plan régional et à s'organiser même sur le plan mondial pour faire valoir leur influence face aux deux autres groupements d'Etats. Il est naturel, dans ces conditions, que tout en maintenant leur opposition à toute implication dans le conflit Est-Ouest, ils aient pris soin de marquer en quoi leur politique ne pouvait être placée sous le signe de la neutralité, utilisant pour se définir une gamme d'expressions telles que "neutralité dynamique", "neutralité positive", "neutralisme positif", pour s'entendre sur le terme de "non-engagement" qui ne les satisfait d'ailleurs que partiellement. (18)

Ces interprétations très larges de la politique de neutralité contrastent évidemment avec la conception plus stricte que les Etats traditionnellement neutres - et surtout ceux qui ont adopté un statut de neutralité permanente - se font de leurs droits et de leurs devoirs. La Suède, la Suisse et l'Autriche s'estiment en effet liées par le droit de neutralité tel qu'il est élaboré et codifié à travers le XIXème et le XXème siècles. L'expérience leur a enseigné que l'application du droit de neutralité en temps de guerre impose l'observation de règles très strictes en temps de paix. L'Etat neutre doit donc éviter de prendre des engagements qui pourraient créer une équivoque sur ses intentions. Il ne saurait conclure des alliances militaires, ni adhérer à un groupement d'Etats visant des objectifs politiques qui impliquent l'exclusion d'autres Etats. Cela ne signifie pas qu'il ne puisse reconnaître une communauté d'intérêts avec ses

voisins. Mais la collaboration qui s'établit normalement dans un cadre régional et même, du fait du développement croissant des relations internationales, sur le plan mondial, ne doit pas être poussée jusqu'au point de souscrire des obligations qui préviendraient l'application du statut de neutralité en temps de guerre. C'est ainsi que la Suède, la Suisse et l'Autriche ont estimé jusqu'ici qu'il ne leur était pas possible d'adhérer - mais tout au plus de s'associer - à la Communauté économique européenne dont l'objectif avoué, l'intégration politique de l'Europe, leur paraissait incompatible avec leur statut de neutralité. (19) De même, la Suisse n'a pu se résoudre à demander son admission dans l'ONU dont la Charte impose aux Etats membres des obligations jugées incompatibles également avec un statut de neutralité permanente. La Suède et l'Autriche en ont décidé autrement. D'ailleurs, le débat sur ce point reste ouvert en Suisse. Il a même rebondi récemment.

C'est souligner qu'il existe entre les Etats qui se réclament de la neutralité traditionnelle des divergences sensibles dans la conduite de leur politique de neutralité. Il est bien connu, en effet, que la Suisse s'est montrée plus stricte, plus restrictive dans ses interprétations que la Suède et même l'Autriche. Ce n'est qu'après un long délai de réflexion, et non sans hésitation, qu'elle a fini par demander son admission au Conseil de l'Europe.

Cette conception de la neutralité n'implique cependant pas un refus de participer aux affaires du monde. L'obligation de s'abstenir de prendre part à toute guerre impose certes une extrême réserve sur le plan politique en temps de paix. Mais elle n'exclut pas une coopération active à toute action visant, sur le plan économique ou sur le plan culturel, à renforcer la collaboration internationale. Il ne saurait être question d'énumérer ici les nombreuses organisations internationales auxquelles les Etats neutres fournissent une contribution, modeste mais positive,

ni de rappeler leur intervention à titre d'intermédiaires neutres ou de puissances protectrices. Il suffit de rappeler que pour eux, comme pour les Etats dits neutralistes, la neutralité n'est pas synonyme d'isolationisme, mais qu'elle impose une participation active à la vie de la communauté internationale.

En définitive, neutres et neutralistes sont peut-être moins éloignés les uns des autres qu'il ne paraît à première vue. Ce qui les sépare, ce sont les circonstances historiques dans lesquelles ils ont été amenés à élaborer leur politique. Les uns appartiennent à l'Europe occidentale, les autres - à l'exception de la Yougoslavie - se trouvent situés dans le Tiers-Monde. La neutralité des premiers se teinte d'une réserve très nette à l'égard du communisme, tandis que le neutralisme des seconds est marqué par leur opposition au colonialisme occidental. Ce qu'ils ont en commun, c'est leur souci de n'être pas, du fait de leur faiblesse, les victimes de la politique de puissance. Ils divergent avant tout dans leur interprétation de la politique de neutralité, dans le choix des moyens, dans leur évaluation de la marge de liberté d'action dont le neutre dispose.

Les neutralistes estiment possible de concilier leur neutralité à l'égard du grand conflit Est-Ouest et une politique active, dynamique et conquérante parfois, impliquant la participation à des alliances politiques et militaires régionales, et le recours à la force. Leurs convictions révolutionnaires leur font un devoir de soutenir les mouvements de libération nationale, ce qui les a conduits à des interventions dans les affaires intérieures de pays voisins et souverains. Ils considèrent comme normal d'organiser sur leur territoire des corps expéditionnaires et de prêter la main, par des envois d'armes et d'hommes, à des entreprises guerrières.

On ne devrait pas oublier cependant que le droit de neutralité ne s'est élaboré que lentement, qu'au XVIIIème siècle,

le passage de belligérants à travers un territoire neutre (20) et le recrutement de ressortissants neutres groupés en régiments pour le service étranger étaient considérés comme compatibles avec la neutralité. La livraison d'armes et de munitions par des neutres a été considérée au XIXème siècle encore comme licite. Il a fallu du temps pour que des limites soient imposées à l'activité politique des réfugiés sur sol neutre. Quant à l'application des règles du droit de la neutralité aux situations de guerre civile, il faut noter qu'elle est encore contestée, à tort pensons-nous, par la doctrine dominante. C'est à travers une longue pratique de la neutralité que le droit de neutralité a évolué vers des conceptions toujours plus restrictives et qu'un Etat comme la Suisse a cherché à s'y conformer de façon toujours plus stricte, de manière à rendre son comportement prévisible et calculable.

Peut-être l'expérience démontrera-t-elle aux Etats neutralistes l'intérêt qu'il peut y avoir, dans un monde où les conflits sont toujours plus difficilement localisables, à fonder leur politique de neutralité sur un droit de neutralité dont les règles, pour avoir été élaborées en Europe essentiellement, n'en sont pas moins applicables aux relations internationales contemporaines.

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Notes

- 1) Le neutralisme a été l'objet de nombreux travaux parmi lesquels nous citerons : John T. Marcus, Neutralism and nationalism in France, New York, Bookman Association, 1958; Peter Lyon, Neutralism, Leicester University Press, 1963; Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., The elephants and the grass; a study of non-alignment, New-York, 1965, cf. également Marina Salvin. "Neutralism in France and Germany", International Conciliation, New York, June 1951; R.A. Scalapino, "Neutralism in Asia", American Political Science Review, March 1954, pp. 49-62; George Ginsburgs, "Neutrality and neutralism and the tactics of Soviet diplomacy", American Slavic and East European Review, December 1960, pp. 531-559; Jacques Freymond, "The European neutrals and the Atlantic Community", International Organization, New York, Vol. XVII, 3, 1963, pp. 592-609; "Non-alignment in foreign Affairs", numéro spécial des Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science", November 1965.

Une étude du neutralisme implique également le dépouillement de périodiques et de journaux. Nous avons utilisé plus particulièrement Esprit, L'Observateur, Le Monde.

Parmi les sources, nous mentionnerons encore : Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 3 vols., Publication Division, Government of India, 1949-1957, et un certain nombre de recueils de documents et de publications officielles émanant de gouvernements africains et asiatiques. Cf. plus particulièrement : La Conférence des chefs d'Etat et des gouvernements des pays non-alignés, Publicistika-Izdavacki Zavod "Jugoslavia", Belgrade, 1962.

- 2) Réponse aux interpellations des Commissions des affaires étrangères du 5 décembre 1956.
- 3) Cf. à ce propos Paul Guggenheim, Traité de droit international public, Genève, Georg & Cie, t. II, pp. 540-541.
- 4) Neutralism, op.cit.
- 5) "Neutrality and the emergence of the concept of neutralism", in Review of Politics, April 1960.
- 6) Mathew Arnold, Popular Education on the Continent.
- 7) "Neutralism", in Grove Haines, European Integration, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1957, p. 196.
- 8) Peter Lyon, loc.cit., constate que le terme de "neutralism" est utilisé couramment à cette époque par la presse britannique pour décrire la politique italienne.

Notes (suite)

- 9) Cf. H. Beuve-Méry, Réflexions politiques, Paris, 1951, p.175.
- 10) Cf. à ce propos, "Neutrality", in The Economist, London, February, 10, 1951, pp. 300-301.
- 11) Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, New Delhi, The Publication Division, Government of India, 1954, t. II : 1949-1953, p.125.
- 12) Interview de Nehru, dans The Times, 7 juillet 1956, cité par Peter Lyon, Neutrality, op. cit., p. 122.
- 13) Cf. La Conférence des Chefs d'Etat et des gouvernements des pays non-alignés à Belgrade, op. cit., p. 271.279.
- 14) Cf. à ce propos Raymond Aron : Paix et guerre entre les nations, Paris, 1962, p. 500-506.
- 15) Relevons à ce propos que l'Union soviétique, après avoir marqué quelque réserve à l'égard des neutralistes, a fini par s'accommoder de cette politique dans la mesure même où elle entraînait un affaiblissement du camp impérialiste et constituait une étape dans l'évolution des neutralistes vers le socialisme. C'est dans le même esprit qu'elle a accepté la neutralité de l'Autriche. Cf. à ce propos, outre l'article cité de George Ginsburgs, Denise Bind-schedler, "L'Union soviétique face au droit international et à la neutralité dans la Suisse, l'URSS et l'Europe orientale", Revue économique et sociale, p. 121-142, Cf. également Gerald Stourzh, "Austrian neutrality, its establishment and its significances", International Spectator, La Haye, XIV, n° 5, 1960.
- 16) L'Inde, par exemple, a reconnu la validité des Vème et XIIIème Conventions de La Haye.
- 17) Paul Guggenheim, op.cit., t. II, p. 500.
- 18) Cf. à ce propos, N. Paramaswaran Nayar, "Growth of Non-alignment in World Affairs", India Quarterly, Vol. XVIII, n° 1, January-March 1962, pp. 28-57.
- 19) Cf. Paul Guggenheim, Organisations économiques supra-nationales, indépendance et neutralité de la Suisse, Rapport à la Société suisse des Juristes, Basel, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1963.
- 20) Si le "passage innocent" est interdit par le droit international (Cf. Vème Convention de La Haye, art. 2 et 5), il n'en reste pas moins qu'au cours de la deuxième guerre mondiale, un Etat neutre comme la Suède s'est résigné à l'autoriser.



Résumé

Le rapport analyse la politique que le neutralisme entend définir, et cherche à déterminer dans quelle mesure elle se rapproche, ou au contraire se distingue, de celle traditionnelle de neutralité. L'analyse linguistique ne fournit guère d'indications utiles ; c'est le contexte historique des années 1950 qui explique le sens du terme "neutralisme". Une définition, assez floue, du "non-alignement", se trouve dans les textes publiés à l'occasion de la conférence de Belgrade de 1961. L'auteur rappelle la distinction classique entre "droit de neutralité" et "politique de neutralité", et montre les divergences qui existent, dans la conduite de leur politique de neutralité, entre les Etats mêmes qui se réclament de la neutralité traditionnelle ; il s'interroge enfin sur l'intérêt qu'il peut y avoir pour les pays neutralistes à fonder leur politique de neutralité sur un droit de neutralité dont les règles lui paraissent applicables aux relations internationales contemporaines.

Summary

The paper analyses the policy which neutralism seeks to define, and strives to determine the extent to which that policy comes near to, or on the contrary is to be distinguished from, the traditional policy of neutrality. Linguistic analysis gives but few useful clues; the meaning of "neutralism" is best explained in terms of the historic context of 'the 1950's'. A somewhat vague definition of "non alignment" is contained in the texts published at the 1961 Belgrade Conference. The author goes back to the classic distinction between "law of neutrality" and "policy of neutrality", and shows the divergences, in the conduct of their policy of neutrality, among the very states which practice traditional neutrality; he finally raises the question of whether the neutralist countries ought not to base their policy of neutrality on a law of neutrality whose rules he considers applicable to contemporary international relations.

Br/Neutr./12

"Neutralité, neutralisme, non-alignement"

LE NEUTRALISME EN ASIE DU SUD EST

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I - Définition provisoire du neutralisme sud-est-asiatique

'Neutraliste' est une étiquette attribuée à un certain nombre de pays, pour la plupart anciennes colonies des puissances occidentales, qui préfèrent appeler leur statut, ou leur politique étrangère 'neutre', 'indépendant', 'non-engagé', et surtout 'non-aligné'. Il suffit de se référer aux discours officiels prononcés par les hommes d'Etat de ces pays, par exemple à la conférence de Bandoeng (avril 1955) : nulle part dans les textes on ne trouve le mot "neutraliste". Ou prenons la conférence de Belgrade (septembre 1961) : celle-ci s'appelait officiellement 'Conférence des chefs d'Etat ou de gouvernement des pays non alignés'. Notons aussi qu'à la conférence de Genève sur le Laos (1961-62), alors que la presse appelait les trois factions laotiennes 'neutralistes de gauche', 'neutralistes de droite', et 'neutralistes du centre', le communiqué de Zurich (22 juin 1961), signé par les chefs de ces factions, était intitulé officiellement 'Communiqué conjoint des trois Princes sur le problème de la réalisation de la concorde nationale par la formation d'un gouvernement d'union nationale', et que, si dans les textes officiels des accords signés par les membres de cette conférence, le mot 'neutralité' apparaît constamment, on n'y trouve nulle part le mot 'neutraliste'. Dans les accords de Genève de 1954, le mot 'neutralité' ne figure même pas dans les textes.

On pourrait être tenté d'appeler 'neutralistes' les pays ayant adopté les "cinq principes de la coexistence pacifique". Mais beaucoup de pays ayant approuvé les 'cinq principes' ne sont pas neutralistes, ni même neutres. On est donc finalement conduit à s'en tenir à l'étiquette 'non aligné', indépendant étant trop vague, et neutre trop précis, car l'indépendance est une notion politique générale, et la neutralité une notion juridique bien définie.

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x Dans ce rapport, "Sud Est Asiatique" comprend les pays suivants : Birmanie, Thaïlande, Malaisie, Cambodge, Laos, Viet Nam Nord, Viet Nam Sud, Indonésie, Philippines. Il n'y a pas actuellement de délimitation du Sud Est Asiatique universellement acceptée. Celle choisie est basée sur la situation géographique des pays en question.

Cependant, les journalistes, les publicistes, et ... les spécialistes de science politique persistent à utiliser le terme 'neutraliste' de préférence aux termes 'indépendant', 'non-engagé', 'non-aligné' ou 'neutre', et ce parce que le terme 'neutralisme' correspond bien à une certaine réalité : les pays qui se déclarent officiellement 'non alignés' pratiquent une politique étrangère qui, en fait, ne l'est pas. Si, dans ses intentions, leur politique n'est alignée sur celle d'aucune puissance ou aucun groupe de puissances, elle est, dans ses effets, alignée contre une puissance ou groupe de puissances, à savoir les Etats-Unis ou le groupe occidental. Aux yeux des observateurs occidentaux, c'est bien une politique équivoque. En fait, le mot 'neutraliste' est un mot du vocabulaire des pays occidentaux ou anti-communistes, et non des pays non-alignés ou communistes. Cette précision sémantique nous semble utile : elle nous rappelle la tendance des hommes d'Etat à rationaliser une certaine attitude, en proclamant une politique tout en en pratiquant une autre, légèrement ou même très différente, et celle des journalistes et publicistes à choisir des termes qui dissimulent ou du moins impliquent, un jugement, et plus particulièrement un reproche, une désapprobation, une certaine ironie, ou un certain scepticisme.

Cela dit, définissons provisoirement le neutralisme comme une forme de neutralité adoptée par la plupart des colonies émancipées, et caractérisées d'une part par une hostilité ouverte contre l'impérialisme, et d'autre part par le souci de n'encourir l'hostilité d'aucun pays, y compris des anciennes puissances coloniales, ou considérées comme impérialistes. Appliquée aux pays de l'Asie du Sud Est qui, jusqu'à leur émancipation, n'ont connu que l'impérialisme occidental, cette définition peut se lire ainsi : le neutralisme est en Asie du Sud Est une forme de neutralité caractérisée d'une part par une hostilité, déclarée ou non, à l'impérialisme occidental, et, d'autre part, par le souci de n'encourir l'hostilité d'aucun pays, y compris des pays occidentaux, anciennes puissances coloniales, ou considérés comme impérialistes.

Ainsi défini, le neutralisme est une forme de neutralité incomplète, apparente, et dirigée essentiellement contre les pays occidentaux.

Cette "neutralité" est affirmée avec force surtout dans le domaine idéologique, et prend la forme d'un refus d'épouser la cause des pays capitalistes (ou anti-communistes) ou communistes, et de la recherche d'une "troisième voie". D'où l'appellation "tiers monde" appliquée aussi à ces pays par certains auteurs.

## II - Historique du neutralisme en Asie du Sud-Est

Le pays d'origine du neutralisme est l'Inde, le premier pays asiatique colonial émancipé, le premier à adopter la doctrine du "non-alignement", et le premier à s'en faire le champion. Dès 1946, avant même le transfert officiel du pouvoir de la Grande Bretagne à l'Inde, le premier ministre indien, M. Nehru, qui était aussi ministre des affaires étrangères et devait le rester jusqu'à sa mort, en 1964, décida que l'Inde ne prendrait le parti d'aucun bloc, et en particulier d'aucun des deux blocs - américain et soviétique - qui commençaient alors à prendre forme. Il donna à cette politique l'appellation qui, depuis, a fait le tour du monde.

Plusieurs raisons poussaient Nehru à choisir cette voie, certaines secondaires, d'autres déterminantes. Parmi les secondes, deux prédominent. La première est la pression nationaliste du peuple indien. On pourrait la qualifier de 'revancharde' : inspirée par le désir de donner libre cours au ressentiment pour les torts matériels ou moraux que les Indiens croyaient avoir subi de la part de l'impérialisme pendant la période coloniale. La deuxième est la nécessité pour le gouvernement de résoudre les problèmes pressants de l'Inde, en pleine conscience que cela ne pouvait se faire sans l'aide, sans la sympathie, ou, tout au moins, sans la neutralité des puissances occidentales, y compris les ex-impérialistes. L'adoption du non-alignement, pensait-on, permettrait de concilier passion populaire et raison gouvernementale.

Ce qui est vrai de l'Inde est vrai aussi des autres pays sud-est-asiatiques, à mesure qu'ils devenaient émancipés du joug colonial. Comme l'Inde, tous étaient tiraillés entre un passé douloureux, un présent difficile, et un avenir incertain. Il n'est donc pas étonnant qu'ils se soient alignés sur la position indienne, à commencer par l'Indonésie, suivie vers 1950 par la Birmanie. Mais c'est l'occasion du règlement du

conflit indochinois, en 1954, qui devait donner une forte impulsion au 'non-alignement' dans la région.

Cinq pays asiatiques, sous l'impulsion de l'Inde, se réunirent à Colombo en avril-mai 1954 pour chercher les moyens d'aider à mettre fin au conflit indochinois, comme à empêcher d'autres conflits d'éclater dans la région sud-est-asiatique. L'addition des pays indochinois au groupe des 'non-alignés' était considérée comme la solution idéale. Par le canal de l'Inde, les 'puissances de Colombo', comme on les appelait alors, firent des démarches en ce sens auprès de la conférence de Genève, par l'intermédiaire de la Grande-Bretagne.

La première phase du processus était évidemment le désengagement des pays concernés. Il est clair que 'désengagement' ici voulait dire sortie du bloc occidental, puisque ces trois pays étaient 'protégés' par la France et, à partir de 1950, aussi par les Etats-Unis, 1950 étant l'année où la France recevait une aide militaire américaine pour l'Indochine. Il est donc naturel que les accords de Genève fussent basés sur le principe du 'désengagement' des pays d'Indochine (Laos, Cambodge, Viet-Nam), bien que ce principe ne fût jamais énoncé officiellement par la conférence. Ce "désengagement" devait être le résultat de l'application de trois règles : 1) indépendance complète de ces pays, 2) rejet par eux de toute alliance militaire et 3) non intervention des puissances étrangères dans leurs affaires intérieures. C'était bien, comme l'a déclaré M. Nehru, "une certaine neutralité". Les "puissances de Colombo" pouvaient donc se flatter d'avoir dans une large mesure réussi.

Cependant, ce n'est que dix mois plus tard, à la conférence de Bandoeng, que la deuxième phase, l'adoption du "non-alignement", fut amorcée effectivement, quoique partiellement. Deux des pays en question, le Laos et le Cambodge, épousèrent officiellement le 'non-alignement'. Par ce geste ils sortaient de l'Union Française et coupaient tout lien de dépendance ou d'alliance avec le bloc occidental. Au lieu d'une association avec la France et, à travers la France, avec le bloc occidental, ils déclarèrent que désormais ils pratiqueraient les 'cinq principes' de la 'coexistence pacifique' tels qu'ils avaient été préconisés et pratiqués par l'Inde. En particulier, ils rejetaient officiellement la protection de l'O. T. A. S. E.

La position des deux Viet-Nam était, par contre, ambivalente. Le Viet-Nam Sud ne rejetait pas les cinq principes, mais avouait ne pas pouvoir les pratiquer : il ne pouvait pas adopter la neutralité parce que son existence était menacée. Le Viet-Nam Nord embrassait les cinq principes, mais restait fermement dans le camp communiste. Quant à la Thaïlande et aux Philippines, ils rejetèrent fermement le non-alignement, et gardèrent intacts leurs accords militaires avec les Etats-Unis. Enfin, la Malaisie, qui n'était pas présente à Bandoeng, opta pour le non-alignement en devenant indépendante deux ans plus tard, mais tout en signant un traité de défense mutuelle avec la Grande-Bretagne, ce qui est assez paradoxal.

Une nouvelle impulsion a été donnée au neutralisme dans la région par la Conférence internationale sur le Laos tenue à Genève en 1961-62. Cette conférence aboutit à la neutralisation internationale du Laos. Depuis cette date, des efforts ont été faits, notamment par le général de Gaulle et par le Prince Sihanouk, pour étendre l'application de cette formule non seulement à toute l'Indochine, mais aussi à l'Asie du Sud-Est tout entière. Nous en reparlerons plus loin.

### III - Les formes du neutralisme en Asie du Sud Est

Si l'on compare la situation d'aujourd'hui avec celle existant au moment de la conférence de Bandoeng, on s'aperçoit que le neutralisme a considérablement évolué et est devenu très diversifié, parce que les pays neutralistes ont suivi des voies très différentes, qui les ont conduits parfois très loin de leurs positions originales.

La Birmanie, après une longue période de neutralisme "à l'indienne", est passée à un neutralisme 'pro-chinois' à partir de 1954, pour revenir de nouveau à un neutralisme plus neutre en 1966 avec le voyage du Général Ne Win à Washington en octobre de cette année.

L'Indonésie est passée d'un neutralisme modérément anti-occidental à l'origine à un neutralisme fortement pro-chinois et violemment anti-occidental, surtout anti-britannique, à partir de 1957, pour revenir de nouveau à un neutralisme plus neutre ou même légèrement pro-occidental avec l'arrivée au pouvoir, en 1966, du général Suharto.

Après une période de neutralisme 'à l'indienne', le Laos est

devenu neutraliste pro-occidental à partir de 1957, pour revenir à un neutralisme neutre à partir de 1960, et accepter finalement une neutralité reconnue et garantie internationalement en juillet 1962.

Le Cambodge, qui s'était imposé en 1955 une neutralité constitutionnelle, pratiqua en fait un neutralisme légèrement pro-occidental (car il acceptait une aide militaire américaine) jusqu'en 1957, date à laquelle il prit un virage pro-chinois et anti-occidental, plus particulièrement anti-américain, pour aboutir finalement à un neutralisme pro-français depuis le début de 1964, tout en cherchant à obtenir une garantie internationale de sa neutralité semblable à celle régissant le Laos.

La Malaysia, tout en se déclarant 'non-alignée', est franchement dans le camp occidental, par son association politique et militaire étroite à la Grande-Bretagne. D'autre part, elle n'a établi des relations diplomatiques ni avec l'Union Soviétique, ni avec la Chine communiste, et fournit une aide quasi-militaire au Sud Viet Nam dans le conflit qui oppose ce dernier au Nord Viet Nam.

Le Viet Nam peut être décrit comme un pays soumis à une pression neutralisante très forte. Le régime de neutralité ébauché à Genève en 1954 n'a pas pu s'y implanter à cause des pressions internationales particulièrement fortes, pressions favorisées par l'imprécision des textes des accords qui le concernent. Mais on peut dire qu'il est neutralisé négativement, en ce sens qu'il n'est entièrement ni dans un camp ni dans l'autre, étant divisé, et chaque partie se trouvant intégrée dans un des deux blocs antagonistes. Notons, d'autre part, que dans le Sud, 'l'attentisme' d'une forte majorité de la population peut être considéré comme une forme de neutralisme passif. Cela est probablement vrai dans le Nord également, et serait plus visible si le contrôle gouvernemental sur la population était moins effectif, comme cela avait été le cas avant 1954.

La Thaïlande est officiellement pro-occidentale, mais pratique en fait une sorte de brinkmanship neutraliste : elle a fait clairement comprendre aux Etats-Unis que le maintien de sa politique pro-occidentale dépendait de la capacité comme de la volonté américaine d'assurer sa protection, comme celle de l'Asie du Sud Est en général, et que si



cette condition n'était pas remplie, elle serait obligée de chercher un accommodement avec le parti le plus fort (comme en 1940, quand elle s'est alignée sur le Japon). Cet avertissement indirect était fait sous la forme d'un flirt avec Moscou au moment où la pression communiste au Laos était la plus forte, c'est-à-dire en mai 1961 : cette attitude explique en partie l'envoi des marines américains au Laos par le président Kennedy.

Un seul pays sud est asiatique a adopté un anti-neutralisme sans équivoque, et ce pays se trouve aux confins de la région : les Philippines.

#### IV - Motivations

##### a) les pressions internes

Les différentes formes de neutralisme adoptées par les pays de l'Asie du Sud Est s'expliquent en fonction des pressions internes et externes qui s'exercent sur ces pays, ainsi que de leur tempérament national et de la personnalité de leurs dirigeants.

Nous avons examiné plus haut les pressions internes qui s'exerçaient sur l'Inde, et suggéré que ces mêmes pressions s'exerçaient également sur les pays sud-est-asiatiques. Ces pressions varient évidemment selon les pays. Dans les pays où le colonialisme avait été plus accentué, la réaction nationaliste était plus forte, et les gouvernements de ces pays penchaient vers une politique neutraliste plus anti-occidentale, comme en Indonésie et en Birmanie, ou adoptaient une politique d'emblée anti-occidentale, comme au Viet-Nam. D'autre part, le neutralisme n'a pu émerger au Viet Nam parce que le nationalisme vietnamien, exacerbé par un colonialisme qui repoussait toute modération au moment où il était fort, et tout compromis quand il était faible, s'est tourné vers le communisme. Mais un extrémisme en fait naître un autre, et ainsi un contre mouvement anti-communiste s'est également développé.

Dans les pays où le colonialisme avait été ressenti moins fortement, la réaction nationaliste était moins violente. Tel est le cas du Cambodge et du Laos, qui avaient échappé à l'absorption par la Thaïlande et le Viet Nam grâce à l'imposition du protectorat français dans

la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle, au moment où ces pays étaient soumis de la part de leurs voisins à une pression maxima. Cela explique le neutralisme pro-français de ces deux pays. La situation est semblable dans le cas de la Malaisie, unifiée grâce à la Grande-Bretagne, et sauvée d'un effondrement sous la pression des communistes d'origine chinoise grâce à la Grande-Bretagne et aux autres pays du Commonwealth, en particulier l'Australie et la Nouvelle Zélande. Cela explique le 'non alignement' pro-britannique de la Malaysia une fois indépendante.

Dans les pays où le colonialisme occidental est inconnu, comme en Thaïlande et aux Philippines, le neutralisme est également absent parce que l'anti-occidentalisme n'existe pas.

Le tempérament national a également contribué à donner au neutralisme de chaque pays une forme particulière. Les Indonésiens ont tendance à être intolérants et querelleurs, ce qui a donné à leur neutralisme un caractère extrémiste, que ce neutralisme soit anti-occidental ou anti-communiste. Il en est de même des Vietnamiens. Les Laotiens et les Cambodgiens, par contre, sont plus pacifiques et accommodants, ce qui a donné à leur neutralisme un caractère moins extrême. Comme les Cambodgiens et les Laotiens, les Thaïs sont peu enclins à l'extrémisme ; ils sont plus pratiques, et ce tempérament joint à une longue pratique du brinkmanship neutraliste, les a conduits à jouer un jeu d'équilibre qui a fort bien servi leur intérêt national. Dans le cas des Malais, c'est le bon sens qui l'a emporté sur les considérations régionales et qui a tempéré le nationalisme : d'où une politique de neutralisme marginal. Le tempérament philippin, constitué d'un fond maure sur lequel se sont greffées les cultures espagnole et américaine, est peu enclin au non-engagement.

Il faut ajouter que les religions dominantes des pays en question jouent un rôle non négligeable dans le façonnement de leur neutralisme. L'Indonésie est dominée par l'Islam, le Viet Nam par le confucianisme, et les Philippines le sont par le catholicisme, ce qui explique la rigidité de leur politique. Le Cambodge, le Laos et la Thaïlande pratiquent le bouddhisme, et cela explique en partie leur tendance à pratiquer une politique plus accommodante.

La personnalité des dirigeants joue aussi un rôle dans

l'orientation du neutralisme des pays en question : Soekarno, ambitieux et passionné ; Ho-Chi-Minh et Ngo-Dinh-Diem, tous deux intolérants et rigides sur les principes ; Sihanouk et Souvanna Phouma, tous deux détestant et craignant leurs voisins vietnamiens et thaïs, et profondément attachés à la France à laquelle ils doivent en grande partie leur situation ; Pibul Songgram et Sarit Thanarat, tous deux maîtres dans le jeu d'équilibre et habiles à tirer le maximum de chaque situation pour leur pays comme pour eux-mêmes ; les présidents philippins, de Roxas à Macapagal, ayant tous une foi solide en l'alliance avec l'Amérique.

b) les pressions externes

Plus déterminantes peut-être que les pressions internes sont les pressions externes sur la forme et sur l'orientation du neutralisme des pays en question, en particulier les pressions des puissances en mesure d'avoir une prise directe sur ces pays, à savoir les Etats-Unis et la Chine communiste, l'une dominant les mers et les airs, et l'autre le continent.

Dans le cas de l'Indonésie, la pression chinoise se manifeste sous la forme d'une population chinoise forte de 2,5 millions vivant dans le pays, mêlée à un parti communiste de 1.750.000 membres, et d'autre part, dans l'intérêt qu'avait l'Indonésie, cherchant une "confrontation" avec la Grande-Bretagne et la Malaysia, à établir une alliance avec le géant chinois. La contre pression occidentale a sa source dans la dépendance économique de l'Indonésie à l'égard des puissances occidentales, comme d'ailleurs de l'Union soviétique, toutes engagées à partir de 1957 dans une lutte d'influence avec la Chine communiste en Asie du Sud Est.

La Birmanie est soumise à une pression chinoise encore plus forte, bien que sa valeur comme enjeu de la lutte internationale pour le contrôle de l'Asie du Sud Est soit moins grande que celle de l'Indonésie. Cependant, la Birmanie se trouve aussi dans la nécessité de rétablir l'ordre interne. Ayant une frontière commune avec la Chine, elle ne peut le faire que dans la mesure où la Chine s'abstient d'aider les rebelles birmans, du moins ouvertement et sur une grande échelle. C'est ce qui a donné lieu à la phrase souvent citée par les Birmans : "quand

la Chine crache, la Birmanie nage". La politique étrangère birmane est dominée par le souci de ne pas offenser la Chine. Si la contre-pression occidentale s'exerce aussi sur le plan économique, la pression chinoise est la plus forte, ce qui donne au neutralisme birman un caractère anti-occidental.

Le Laos se trouve dans une situation encore pire que la Birmanie. Là, les pressions externes sont multiples. Il suffit de compter le nombre de pays qui ont pris part à la conférence internationale sur le Laos en 1961-62 : il y en avait 14 ! Ce qui a rendu le Laos encore plus sensible aux pressions extérieures, c'est que celles-ci se sont exercées, par le canal des factions politiques laotiennes, à l'intérieur du Laos, et au sein même du gouvernement. La neutralisation internationale de ce pays en 1962 n'est donc que la résultante des pressions exercées sur le pays, de l'intérieur comme de l'extérieur. L'homme qui symbolise cette résultante est Souvanna Phouma, qui disparaissait de la scène politique laotienne chaque fois que l'équilibre était rompu, et réapparaissait toujours avec le rétablissement de cet équilibre. Soulignons que le Laos est peut-être le seul pays au monde où les pressions externes s'exercent à travers plusieurs couches, pour ainsi dire, et de plusieurs directions à la fois. La pression soviétique s'exerce par le canal de la Pologne et de Kong-Le (et après lui de Deuane Sipaseuth). La pression chinoise s'exerce par le canal de Hanoï, Souphanouvong, et le Néo Lao Haksat. La pression américaine s'exerce par le canal du groupe de Champassak, ainsi que de la Thaïlande. Et pour compliquer les choses pour les Laotiens, à l'intérieur même du groupe occidental, il existe une rivalité qui frise l'hostilité ouverte entre la France qui tient le coeur des Laotiens, et l'Amérique, qui tient leur bourse.

Par un coup de chance, le Cambodge a pu échapper à la division. Les accords de Genève ont préservé l'unité territoriale du Royaume Khmer, et, par son habileté, Sihanouk a su maintenir l'unité de son peuple. Mais les pressions de l'extérieur ne peuvent être évitées. Ces pressions sont exercées directement par le Viet Nam Sud et la Thaïlande, et indirectement par les Etats-Unis à travers ces deux pays. C'est d'ailleurs la double menace thaï et vietnamienne qui a incité Sihanouk à accepter ouvertement l'appui chinois, comme l'appui français. Sihanouk ne cache pas qu'il croit

que la Chine va dominer l'Asie, et il veut que son pays soit le dernier sur le menu chinois. En attendant il se tourne vers la France dans l'espoir que le soutien français permettra à son pays de reculer l'échéance, tout en constituant une certaine garantie contre ses voisins thaïs et vietnamiens et contre la pression américaine, comprenant fort bien que l'incapacité de son pays à résister à cette pression amènera la Chine à accentuer la sienne, et cela de façon inexorable.

Les pressions externes qui s'exercent sur le Viet Nam (Chine communiste, Etats-Unis) sont trop évidentes pour qu'on ait besoin de s'y étendre. Notons seulement que même si le Viet Nam le voulait, il ne pourrait, de par sa situation géographique, échapper à cette double pression. La prudence avec laquelle Hanoi a abordé la question des négociations de paix depuis 1965 à cause de l'opposition chinoise à tout règlement comme ses efforts évidents pour ménager la chèvre chinoise et le chou russe, ont été rapportés en détail par la presse. D'autre part, la pression américaine sur le Sud Viet Nam est aussi une force faisant dévier le Viet Nam du neutralisme. Cette pression a conduit en 1963 à l'élimination du président Diem, et surtout de son frère Nhu (soupçonné d'entamer des négociations directes avec Hanoi), en 1964 à l'élimination du général Duong Van Minh par le général Nguyen-Khanh sous le prétexte (accepté par l'ambassade américaine à Saïgon) que son rival allait succomber au neutralisme, depuis 1965, la prise en main de la situation ('take over') par les autorités américaines, avec l'installation au pouvoir du général Nguyen-Cao-Ky, ennemi absolu du neutralisme.

L'adoption par la Malaysia d'un 'non alignement' pro-britannique et pro-occidental s'explique en partie par la politique de "confrontation" de l'Indonésie. D'autre part, le facteur économique joue là un rôle important : ce pays exporte la majeure partie de son caoutchouc et de son étain vers la Grande-Bretagne et les Etats-Unis.

La Thaïlande, qui n'a pas de frontière commune avec la Chine, ne subit pas une pression chinoise directe, mais elle n'échappe pas à une pression indirecte de la part du Laos et du Nord Viet Nam. Il est clair qu'une victoire communiste en Indochine aurait des répercussions profondes sur la Thaïlande. On comprend donc que, pour cette raison, la Thaïlande se tourne vers les Etats-Unis et vers l'O.T.A.S.E. pour

obtenir une contre-pression à la poussée chinoise, et qu'elle ait rejeté le neutralisme, mais non pas d'une façon absolue, comme nous l'avons vu plus haut.

Seules les Philippines ne sont pas soumises à une pression directe chinoise. Mais étant un petit pays, ne disposant que de forces armées relativement faibles, surtout en ce qui concerne la marine et l'aviation, les Philippines ont rejeté le neutralisme en faveur d'une alliance militaire avec les Etats-Unis, alliance justifiée en partie par l'expérience de l'invasion japonaise et de la libération par les forces américaines.

#### V - Nouvelle définition du neutralisme

Nous avons suggéré plus haut une définition du neutralisme, en précisant que c'était une définition provisoire. Cette définition serait valable si l'on ne tenait pas compte de l'évolution de l'attitude des pays en question. Or, comme nous l'avons vu, ces pays ont pour la plupart abandonné leur position initiale. L'hostilité à l'égard des puissances occidentales s'est atténuée avec le temps ou sous la pression des nécessités, en particulier avec la prise de conscience de la menace représentée par la Chine communiste. Dans certains cas il y a eu même renversement d'attitude : le neutralisme anti-occidental est devenu neutralisme pro-occidental. Parler de neutralisme au Sud-Est Asiatique en 1967 est donc injustifié. Ou on ne peut en parler qu'au passé.

On pourrait donc redéfinir le neutralisme comme la caractéristique d'une politique que certains pays du Sud-Est de l'Asie ont voulu pratiquer, mais ont dû abandonner parce qu'elle est impraticable, à cause surtout des pressions extérieures. Cela ne doit pas nous surprendre, car en politique étrangère, intentions et action ne coïncident pas toujours. La situation internationale est fluide, et aucun pays ne contrôle entièrement les facteurs qui influencent sa politique. Nous pouvons donc définir à nouveau le neutralisme en Asie du Sud-Est comme une forme de neutralité que certains de ces pays ont voulu pratiquer mais sans succès ; cette forme de neutralité est caractérisée d'une part par une hostilité, déclarée ou non, à l'égard de l'impérialisme occidental, et d'autre part, par le souci de n'encourir l'hostilité d'aucun pays, y compris des pays coloniaux

occidentaux, anciennes puissances coloniales ou considérées comme impérialistes. Ainsi défini, le neutralisme est une forme de neutralité incomplète, apparente et à orientation variable. En fait, le neutralisme est une forme de politique d'équilibre des forces changeant de direction avec le changement des rapports de force.

#### VI - Perspectives du neutralisme dans le Sud Est Asiatique

On voit donc que si le neutralisme garde encore quelque valeur comme déclaration d'intention - formule du reste rejetée par les pays intéressés, comme on l'a vu plus haut -, comme politique, il est impraticable, mais cela ne serait pas vrai de la neutralisation, c'est-à-dire de la neutralité reconnue et garantie internationalement. Sans cette reconnaissance et garantie, la neutralité véritable d'un petit Etat est quasi impossible. Même avec cette garantie, elle est extrêmement précaire. C'est le cas du Laos, premier pays du Sud Est Asiatique, neutralisé internationalement. Puisqu'il semble exister un consensus d'opinion que le retour aux accords de Genève de 1954 et 1962 serait une base acceptable pour un règlement du conflit vietnamien, et éventuellement pour la stabilisation de la situation dans le Sud-Est asiatique, il est utile d'examiner ces accords en détail.

La conférence de Genève de 1954 aboutit à trois accords d'armistice séparés pour le Laos, le Cambodge et le Viet Nam, plus une Déclaration Finale. Pris ensemble, les quatre documents établissent les principes suivants : 1) évacuation des troupes étrangères ("étranger" inclut ici les troupes Vietminh au Laos, au Cambodge et au Sud Viet-Nam) ; 2) prohibition de l'introduction de troupes et de personnel militaire, d'armes et de munitions dans chacun des quatre Etats (les deux Viet Nam constituent en fait deux Etats) ; 3) défense à chacun des quatre Etats d'adhérer à une alliance militaire ou de permettre à une puissance étrangère d'établir des bases militaires sur son territoire ; 4) rétablissement de la paix intérieure dans chacun des quatre Etats par une promesse d'amnistie et de non-discrimination à l'égard des anciens combattants ; 5) engagement des puissances à respecter la souveraineté, l'indépendance, l'unité et l'intégrité territoriale des quatre Etats et à ne pas intervenir dans leurs affaires intérieures.

Notons que ces principes ont tous été violés (moins dans le cas du Cambodge que dans celui des autres Etats) et que cela a conduit à une reprise de la guerre au Laos et au Viet Nam. La guerre au Laos a abouti en 1961 à la réunion d'une deuxième conférence de Genève. La guerre au Viet Nam a engendré une pression pour la convocation d'une nouvelle conférence de Genève. La situation tendue au Cambodge a poussé le prince Sihanouk à réclamer une deuxième conférence, afin de donner à son pays un statut de neutralité reconnue et garantie internationalement, semblable à celle du Laos. Examinons donc de plus près ce dernier cas.

La neutralisation du Laos ébauchée à Genève en 1954 a pris une forme précise à la seconde conférence de Genève en 1961-62 - cette conférence aboutit à l'adoption de trois documents : une déclaration du gouvernement du Laos, une déclaration concernant la neutralité du Laos et un protocole concernant la déclaration de neutralité du Laos. Le premier, en date du 9 juillet 1962, est basé sur le communiqué conjoint de Zurich (22 juin 1961). Dans ce communiqué, les trois princes, Boun Oum (droite), Souvanna Phouma (centre), Souphanouvong (gauche), s'engagent 1) à appliquer les cinq principes de la coexistence pacifique 2) à n'adhérer à aucune alliance ou coalition militaire et à ne pas autoriser l'établissement de bases militaires étrangères sur le territoire du Laos 3) à n'autoriser aucune immixtion étrangère dans les affaires intérieures du Laos, à exiger le retrait des troupes et du personnel étranger, et à prohiber l'introduction des troupes et du personnel militaire étranger au Laos, 4) à accepter une aide inconditionnelle de tous les pays.

Ces différents points forment la base d'une déclaration du gouvernement d'union nationale présidée par le prince Souvanna Phouma. Cette déclaration, en date du 9 juillet 1962, précise, dans son paragraphe 2, que 'le peuple laotien est décidé à protéger et à assurer le respect de la souveraineté, de l'indépendance, de la neutralité, de l'unité, et de l'intégrité territoriale du Laos'. Elle devait être promulguée constitutionnellement et avoir force de loi. Elle demande également à tous les pays participants à la Conférence et à tous les autres pays de reconnaître la décision du gouvernement laotien et de s'y conformer, et de s'abstenir de toute action contraire.



Sur la base de cette déclaration, les Etats participant à la Conférence déclarent solennellement qu'ils respecteront la volonté du Gouvernement et du Peuple du Royaume du Laos, et demandent à tous les autres Etats de faire de même. Le paragraphe 2 énumère les actions que ces Etats s'abstiendront de commettre pour ne pas violer les principes mentionnés et le Protocole concernant la déclaration sur la neutralité du Laos décrit les diverses mesures d'application de la déclaration, en particulier l'abrogation du traité de l'O.T.A.S.E. pour ce qui est du Laos, la définition des pouvoirs de la Commission Internationale de Contrôle et de la procédure à suivre en cas de violation de cette déclaration.

Au moment où il est question d'un retour aux accords de Genève de 1954 et de 1962, et d'une extension de la neutralisation à toute l'Asie du Sud Est, l'étude du statut du Laos présente un intérêt évident. Malheureusement, il n'est pas possible d'en faire un examen détaillé dans le cadre de ce rapport. Rappelons seulement qu'en août 1963, au moment de la crise bouddhiste qui secoua le Viet Nam Sud, et où la pression américaine sur le gouvernement Ngo-Dinh-Diem était très nette, le général de Gaulle lança l'idée d'une neutralisation du Sud Viet Nam. En décembre de la même année il reprit cette idée dans une conférence de presse et suggéra qu'elle fût étendue à toute l'Indochine et à l'Asie du Sud-Est, suggestion qu'il devait reprendre un mois plus tard dans son discours de Phnom Penh. Entre temps, le gouvernement de Phnom Penh demandait la convocation d'une conférence internationale pour faire reconnaître et garantir la neutralité du Cambodge, tandis que le Nord Viet Nam, le Front de Libération du Sud Viet Nam et les pays communistes demandaient également une conférence internationale pour faire reconnaître et garantir la neutralisation du Sud Viet Nam.

Rappelons enfin qu'après avoir rejeté ces différentes propositions, le Sud Viet Nam, comme les Etats-Unis, ont changé de position et acceptent la convocation d'une conférence internationale pour régler le problème vietnamien sur la base des accords de Genève de 1954 et de 1962. Cette référence à la deuxième conférence de Genève est significative car elle suggère la possibilité d'appliquer au Sud Viet Nam le statut du Laos. D'autre part, les autorités américaines ont à plusieurs

reprises évoqué la possibilité pour le Sud Viet Nam d'adopter une politique de 'non alignement'. Rien n'est assez cristallisé pour le moment pour permettre de tirer des conclusions, ni de dire si, au cas d'une neutralisation du Viet Nam, le Nord Viet Nam le serait aussi, ni sous quelle forme les deux Viet Nam, comme les autres pays de la région, pourraient être neutralisés, ni comment leur neutralité pourrait être garantie internationalement.

Une conclusion peut être cependant offerte : l'idée de neutralisation de l'Asie du Sud Est attire sans doute non seulement les pays de la région, mais aussi les pays qui lui sont extérieurs. Mais la principale question est : comment garantir la neutralité des pays en question, surtout quand elle est soumise non seulement à des pressions externes mais aussi aux pressions internes, surtout quand à l'intérieur de chaque Etat les diverses factions alliées à des puissances étrangères, dont les positions idéologiques équivalent à un alignement sur certaines d'entre elles, sont engagées dans une lutte acharnée les unes contre les autres. En d'autres termes, la question est : comment éviter le neutralisme dans une région de neutralité ? Pour le moment, la question reste posée. Pour un avenir plus lointain, la réponse semble résider dans la compréhension par toutes puissances et factions intéressées du fait que, dans l'état actuel du monde, toute guerre finit par aboutir à un retour au statu quo, et donc est coûteuse et inutile. Mais il faudra que beaucoup de sang coule avant que cette réalité soit reconnue.

En ce qui concerne le Viet Nam, la réponse semble résider dans une reconnaissance des deux Viet Nam comme états séparés mais unis dans une confédération dans laquelle chacun gardera sa forme de gouvernement, tout en reconnaissant un président fédéral choisi d'accord commun. Ce président pourra être seulement le symbole de l'unité du pays, sans pouvoirs réels, comme la Reine d'Angleterre dans le Commonwealth. En plus d'un président commun, ces deux Etats pourront avoir un drapeau commun, une double citoyenneté (fédérale et Sud ou Nord vietnamienne), une monnaie commune et un certain nombre de commissions fédérales pour coordonner les services techniques communs (plan de développement économique, commerce, postes, communications, mouvements de personnes, etc.). Les puissances pourront reconnaître la confédération et avoir des relations

effectives avec l'un des Etats seulement. En ce qui concerne l'aide économique et les prêts, les puissances pourront accorder une aide à la confédération sur la base de 50/50, et une aide supplémentaire à l'Etat de leur choix. Il existe évidemment de nombreuses variantes de cette formule. Mais il n'en demeure pas moins que, toute unification étant impossible, cette formule confédérale, qu'on pourrait appeler neutralité double ou neutralité négative, représente la seule formule réalisable dans l'état actuel des choses.

En fait, en adoptant cette formule on ne fait que revenir à la situation existant pendant trois siècles avant 1802, quand les seigneurs Trinh et Nguyen régnaient sur deux Etats séparés tout en reconnaissant l'autorité nominale de l'Empereur Le (la "ligne de démarcation" était alors la rivière Gianh, sur le vingtième parallèle). Encore une fois, rien de nouveau ne semble exister sous le soleil. Ce qui s'applique à la littérature est peut-être applicable à l'histoire : tout est dit - ou inventé - et l'on vient toujours trop tard .... et ceux qui affirment que nous sommes plus sages ou plus intelligents que les générations passées auront beaucoup de mal à le prouver.

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" Neutrality, neutralism, non-alignment "

NEUTRALITY - NEUTRALISM - NON ALIGNMENT

A SWEDISH PERSPECTIVE

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Neutrality - Neutralism - Nonalignment

A Swedish Perspective

By Nils Andrén

I.

Sweden has not participated in a war since the fall of Napoleon I. It is, nevertheless, wrong to assume that Sweden has for more than 150 years pursued a consistent policy of neutrality. At the time of World War I the concept of neutrality was, however, clearly recognized as a basic doctrine of Swedish international behaviour.

The experiences during the crisis of 1914-18 served as a good illustration of the shortcomings of a legalistic interpretation of the rights and duties of a neutral country. The policy of neutrality, led by Hjalmar Hammarskjöld, was thought by many to favour German interests. According to the views of international law predominant at the beginning of the war, a neutral country was entitled to import goods freely and also to re-export them to belligerent powers, provided that the goods were inten-

ded for the civilian population. In application, such a trade policy on the part of Sweden would favour Germany. World War I became a total war in which all the resources of the belligerent nations were mobilized. The rights which a neutral country was entitled to claim according to the principle referred to proved unacceptable for the powers at war. The Western powers could not agree to a policy which made Sweden an open backdoor for goods serving the economy of the Central powers. Such Swedish exports reduced the efficiency of their naval blockade.

The foreign policy of Hjalmar Hammarskjöld hence created another tension i.e. between the policy of the Government and the demands that Sweden should conduct a more friendly policy towards the Western powers and particularly towards Britain. These demands, as internal issues, were based both on economic interests and on ideology. After changes of Government in 1917 a reorientation of the Swedish trade policy towards the West took place by the end of World War I.

The next phase in the development of Swedish neutrality was marked by its commitment to the principles of the League of Nations. Sweden's entry in the League of Nations meant at least in form a deviation from the deliberate policy of neutrality that had been conducted during World War I. The original character of the League as an organization of the European victorious powers underli-

ned, particularly during the first period of the League, the difficulty to combine membership with an absolutely strict neutrality. In this situation Sweden was anxious to display in several ways that it maintained its traditional foreign policy in spite of its membership of the League of Nations.

The deterioration of the international situation in the 1930's enforced a Swedish reconsideration of its position in relation to the League. In view of the evident impotence of the League of Nations Sweden declared in 1936, together with a number of other former neutral states, including Norway, Finland, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland and Spain, that it did no longer regard itself as bound by the rules of sanctions in article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. This declaration definitely marked a formal return by Sweden to the policy of neutrality, when it had become convinced that the League was not able to provide protection and support to small states in critical situations.

Sweden started a gradual build-up of its military strength in view of the increased international tension and also made some return faint-hearted efforts in conjunction with Finland in order to improve the mutual security of the two countries. These efforts aimed at sealing off the Bothnian Gulf from great power influence by fortifying the Åland Islands. In view of Soviet opposition Sweden decided, however, not to pursue the plan.

During the war Sweden managed, for reasons which need not be elaborated here, to persevere peace. Again, it proved very difficult to do so while fully respecting the principles established for the behaviour of a neutral state. During the "Winter War" between the Soviet Union and Finland (1939-1940) Sweden's position was on the whole non-belligerent rather than neutral. In the great power conflict Sweden had immediately declared that it would remain neutral. Germany's successes in 1940-41 led, however, to the complete encirclement of Sweden. Under strong pressure the country was compelled to make several concessions, especially on transit rights for German troops and material over Swedish soil. The most humiliating - and most disputed - of all the Swedish concessions to Germany took place in 1941 when a whole German division was transported from Norway to northern Finland. Not until Germany's military set-backs and the growing strength of Sweden's own defence preparations had increased her military power the transport concessions were discontinued, after a formal agreement in the summer of 1943. In the closing phase of the war some concessions had to be made to the other side..

## II.

These brief notes on Sweden's international experiences may here serve the purpose of stressing the obvious lessons for Sweden. Sweden had aimed at and succeeded in keeping out of two world wars. Her own chief instru-



ment had been 1) to build up relatively speaking strong defence arrangements to give credibility to her will and ability to defend herself, if attacked, and 2) to attempt to pursue a policy of neutrality. The relative success - peace retained but some limited concessions made to belligerent powers in difficult situations - definitely led her to believe that the principles adopted constituted a sound policy. This is important in order to understand her policy during the post-war period.

When Sweden tried to define the post-war conditions for her foreign policy an essential new element was added to her own experiences as a nation. This was the formation of the United Nations. Although not a Charter member - this title was reserved to those who had participated in the war against Germany and her allies - Sweden wanted to join the new organization for collective security as soon as possible. The commitments that she would undertake in doing so raised some problems as to their fundamental compatibility with her traditional principles of foreign policy.

Sweden was after World War II in a position which in some respects was reminiscent of the situation immediately after World War I. When Sweden joined the League of Nations, this was regarded as a new departure in Swedish foreign policy. Against the background of Sweden's cooling attitude to the League and the policy that Sweden had conducted during World War II, it is obvious that a decision

to join the United Nations must be looked upon as another new departure in foreign policy. In case of a future conflict Sweden must be prepared to abstain from neutrality to the extent that the Charter of the organization demanded. In view of the character of the Charter of the United Nations membership could impose more definite obligations than the previous affiliation with the League of Nations.

However, it seems that the Government was aware of the fact that the obligations which the new organization would impose on Sweden could hardly mean any serious danger for the country. It was stressed by the Government that in case of a future war the new organization could function only on the condition that all the permanent members of the Security Council co-operated. This limitation indicated that a division of states in special blocs or interests would in fact undermine the very existence of the new security organization. Sweden must for its part, both because of its own vital interests and because of idealistic motives, wish that such a political cleavage of the states in antagonistic groups would not take place. If, contrary to expectation, the Swedish Government said, a tendency would appear within the United Nations of a subdivision of the great powers into two camps, the policy of Sweden must be "not to let us be forced into such a group or bloc formation".

The possibility of a development towards a conflict between the leading world powers cautiously hinted at as

an undesirable development soon materialized with the "outbreak of the Cold War".

Confronted with this development the official Swedish attitude was unambiguous. In a Government declaration in February, 1948, it was emphatically underlined that it was in conflict with Swedish wishes and interests to choose sides by joining any great power bloc, "neither by an explicit treaty of alliance nor by tacit understanding on joint military action in the case of a conflict". It was also said that if the new security organization was undermined by political bloc formations or if it was otherwise paralyzed in its power of action, Sweden must have the liberty to choose the road of neutrality. Certainly, it was admitted that success for such a neutral policy did not depend on Sweden only but it was stressed: "we do not want by any advance commitments to deprive ourselves of the possibility of keeping out of a new war".

The efforts of the Western powers in 1948-49 to increase their security in view of the threat perceived from the Soviet Union and Russian counter-moves indicated growing great power interest in the North European area. Sweden tried to counter this development by making Denmark and Norway, together with Sweden into a non-aligned zone with neutrality in war as its chief purpose. This should be done by establishing a Scandinavian defence pact. The

Swedish offer included the following principles:

An attack against one of the three countries should be regarded as an attack against all. It should immediately release the obligation to provide military assistance. In the defence treaty the parties should declare that they would try to keep outside a possible war. The only exception from this rule would be if an attack against one of the three countries released the obligation to provide military aid under the treaty itself or if the Security Council of the United Nations had passed resolutions concerning sanctions. During a war in which the contracting parties did not participate they should consult each other concerning the application of neutrality rules and the maintenance of neutrality. The defence preparations should be related to the tasks undertaken by the parties according to the plans for a joint defence. None of the parties should during the duration of the agreement, which was proposed to be ten years, conclude a military treaty with a third power. The central theme, according to the Swedish view, was obviously that the defence alliance should be non-aligned.

The negotiations broke down, chiefly because Norway wanted a link with the Atlantic Security system that Sweden could not accept. Norway was primarily concerned to make sure of really effective outside aid in the event of aggression. This attitude reflected inter alia that Norway

conceived the actual threat as more serious than Sweden, and, also, that she (as well as Denmark) lacked means of defence and, for a long time, would have to depend on arms deliveries from other countries. In this situation the protection provided by the Swedish offer was regarded as insufficient.

For the understanding of Sweden's foreign policy the unsuccessful effort to establish a Scandinavian defence pact is important in two respects. The policy of neutrality did not exclude close cooperation with and binding commitments to other countries who were ready to share Sweden's foreign policy goals. Sweden's main concern was to avoid commitments to great power blocs. It was, then, a policy of non-alignment with a view not to rule out the possibility in advance of remaining neutral in a future war.

This attitude has been illustrated over and over again during the post-war period, especially in various conflicts in which the U.N. has been called upon to intervene and in European cooperation. For a summary of these events reference is here simply and briefly made to Nils Andrén, Power-Balance and Non-Alignment, a Perspective on Swedish Foreign Policy (Stockholm 1967). In the present paper two issues of importance only will be more fully treated. Both relate to the problem for a small country, conducting an independent foreign policy which, in matters of security is carried out in "splendid

isolation". The one is defence, the other is summarized as "the conditions of non-alignment".

### III

When Sweden chose non-alignment rather than to look for security by affiliation to a great power bloc, it was stated that this policy did not mean any relief in the defence burdens of the country. During the whole post-war period the need for a strong defence has always been regarded as a necessary prerequisite for non-alignment. From the very beginning it has been stressed that non-alignment as well as any other foreign policy does not afford complete security. In order to be effective, as far as possible, it depends upon a "total defence", which is "so prepared for war that it works towards preserving peace". The Swedish armed forces should have "such strength, composition and preparedness that an attack against Sweden would need such big resources and would take such a long time that the advantages to be gained by an attack cannot reasonably be regarded as worth the costs". These two quotations are taken from the "goals for the total defence" of 1963 and the "goals for the armed forces" of 1964.

The policy of non-alignment has made Sweden anxious to be as self-sufficient as possible both in food and in war materials. The existence of an efficient armament and aircraft industry, the products of which are inter-

tionally competitive, is supposed to add to the belief in Sweden's capability to carry out a foreign policy of non-alignment. This gives the industries an immediate significance for Swedish foreign policy. The same is true about defence research and of the industrial and technological capacity of the country in general. Limited import of weapons from other countries, however, has not been regarded as incompatible with non-alignment. The acceptance of this principle has enabled the Swedish authorities to balance possible economic gains against the strategic and political advantages of domestic production. There is only one important exception to this principle which so far has been of little practical significance. The exception concerns import of nuclear warheads.

On one particular point Swedish defence policy and the domestic defence debate have been of direct significance for crucial areas of international politics. This concerns the issue of nuclear weapons. The military started raising direct demands for atomic weapons for the Swedish armed forces already in 1954. In political circles the Conservatives immediately responded positively, while political opinion otherwise was undecided. During the following years a more clear pattern of opinions emerged. Among the bourgeois parties the attitude was on the whole positive, although not uniformly so. The most important fact of the situation was that the Social Democrats were profoundly split on the issue.

A committee was appointed within the Social Democratic Party in order to investigate the future policy in regard to atomic weapons. The committee reported in 1959 that they had agreed that at present Sweden should refrain from nuclear armaments. No research should be undertaken in order to facilitate rapid production of such weapons, should a positive decision be taken later. On this point, however, the report was rather ambiguous. Research to improve security arrangements against atomic weapons should be increased, and this should be done without regard to the possibility of reaching results which might be valuable for a future production of atomic weapons. Hence, the question was not solved. It was only postponed with the aid of a rather obscure compromise formula.

The motives given for the compromise were of direct significance for foreign policy. Reference was made to the negotiations between the great powers on a test ban treaty. In 1958 Sweden had supported the idea of such an agreement in the United Nations. It had declared that it was prepared to co-operate in an international agreement, both to reach a stop to testing of atomic weapons and to limit and abolish such weapons. In view of this declaration it must have been thought unwise to give up unilaterally the right to procure such arms, irrespective of the domestic possibilities for such a decision. Sweden's best argument in the



international test ban negotiations was based on the fear of the great powers of nuclear arms spreading to more and more states. If the great powers could reach an agreement, Sweden could abstain from nuclear arms but if they could not, it might - perhaps - be necessary for Sweden to procure such weapons.

Sweden's statement in the United Nations can hardly be looked upon isolated from the domestic situation. A peace offensive against nuclear weapons among other countries must have been regarded as a contribution towards resolving the serious differences of opinion concerning the nuclear armament of the Swedish defence. It may be left aside how strong this connection was between the domestic conflict and the proposal in the United Nations. In fact, it became nevertheless a foreign policy which contributed towards mitigating, at least temporarily, a serious domestic difficulty.

The nuclear threat has caused several international actions in order to limit tests of atomic weapons and to prohibit spreading of such weapons to other countries. Various proposals have been suggested in order to create regional nuclear free areas. The Polish Rapacki Plan of 1957 aimed at reducing tensions in Central Europe by prohibiting atomic weapons on both sides of the "iron curtain". Its primary aim was thought to be to prohibit the arming of Western Germany with such weapons.

Against the background of the long, abortive attempts by the great powers to reach agreement on nuclear disarmament or at least some tangible move in that direction the Swedish foreign minister (Undén) suggested (1961) in the U.N. the creation of a "non-nuclear club". This "Undén-plan" was circulated among the non-nuclear member state governments who were invited to state their conditions for participation. According to the Plan the non-nuclear states should take the initiative for a treaty on which the nuclear powers could not agree. This could be done by a declaration that the non-nuclear powers, on their part, would participate in a test ban, should a treaty to this effect be negotiated. The nuclear powers could perhaps more easily reach an agreement on a test ban, if they were faced with such a unanimous opinion from a great number of states.

As a matter of fact, this meant the same kind of pressure politics, possibly still subconscious, which was part of the Swedish compromise of 1959, however, this time in the form of a promise, not of a threat. The promise was to abstain from nuclear arms if the great powers could agree on a test ban treaty...

The attitude of the Swedish Government in its answer to the U.N. Secretary-General on the Plan was an evidence of the desire of Sweden to continue to exert pressure on the great powers. Sweden would, according to a state-

ment by its Prime Minister, reserve the right of procuring tactical nuclear arms as long as an international test ban treaty had not been concluded. In the Swedish reply conditions were raised which did not, however, include demands for a total international ban on nuclear weapons. However, the nuclear powers must reach an agreement to stop the tests. An agreement on a non-nuclear zone should be limited in time - the Swedish suggestion was five years. The agreement should cease to be applicable if one nuclear power were to attack states of a non-nuclear zone by nuclear arms. Sweden's acceptance of the Undén Plan on these conditions would be valid only if an agreement on a non-nuclear zone had been reached before the end of 1963.

This independent activity on an important international question has been followed up in the United Nations and in the disarmament negotiations which were opened in Geneva in 1962. In these negotiations not less than 17 nations participate, among them Sweden and also seven other states, not aligned with great power blocs. Within the group Sweden has because of its technological resources and know-how played a significant part.

The test ban treaty in 1963 - which was also acceded to by Sweden - raised high hopes in many Swedish circles concerned about the nuclear issue. The treaty left, however, the control issue unsolved.

The Swedish Government thought that the test ban agreement in Moscow could lead to further results in the efforts towards disarmament, opening the way for agreements on real limitations in armaments concerning both nuclear weapons and other types of arms. If these hopes were realized, the Moscow agreement was thought to have decisive importance for Sweden's attitude to nuclear weapons.

This meant that the possibility of Sweden procuring such arms remained open. Its future decisions were made dependent upon the further developments in the disarmament question after the test ban treaty. The pressure that such a Swedish attitude was able to exercise against the nuclear powers had always been weak and must gradually become even weaker. In fact, many other states had acquired or were on the point of acquiring nuclear weapons of their own. In such a situation a Swedish decision, one way or the other, must have little significance for the nuclear issue as a whole.

In January 1965 Sweden summarized its own programme concerning the international nuclear issue in the United Nations in three points which, it was emphasized, ought to be realised simultaneously. They included an agreement against the "proliferation" of nuclear arms; an extended test ban, prohibiting also underground tests; ban against production of fissionable material for

military purposes. A total test ban would restrict the development of the armaments of the nuclear powers and also obstruct the spreading of nuclear weapons. Powers which had not yet acquired such weapons would be completely prevented from carrying out practical experiments.

In order to contribute towards solving the control problem Sweden in 1965 declared itself prepared to establish on Swedish soil an advanced seismic station and also to be willing to allow its data to be available for the international flow of data. This undertaking reflected the opinion that the methods of seismic observations are now so refined that it is possible to detect also underground nuclear explosions. In 1966, a plan along these lines was offered for the consideration of the disarmament conference in Geneva.

Sweden's attitude to the problem of nuclear armaments for its defence has been marked by an obvious and consistent effort to retain the freedom of action of the country, i.e. to keep open the option of taking a positive decision in the future.

The identical U.S. and Soviet proposals in August 1967 on the non-proliferation issue has again increased the hopes in Sweden that an international solution of the issue will make it unnecessary for Sweden to make an

isolated national "final" decision for or against nuclear weapons, especially as there is a growing opposition in Swedish public opinion against a Swedish nuclear armory. In a statement published immediately after the publication of the U.S.-Soviet proposal the Swedish government declared: "It is now our hope that the member states at the Disarmament Conference will be able to agree on a final proposal for a treaty to be submitted as a recommendation to the pending U.N. General Assembly. As a participant in the disarmament negotiations in Geneva, Sweden is as a matter of course prepared to make constructive contributions towards forming the final proposal for a treaty with a view of making it efficient and acceptable to the largest possible number of states".

However, it is recognized as a weakness in the proposal that the control issue has been left out. A condition for success is also, as stated by the Swedish chief delegate in Geneva (Mme Myrdal), that there must be an indication that the nuclear powers are also willing to make some concessions.

#### IV

Summing up Sweden's policy of non-alignment this policy shall, according to official declarations, serve three distinct purposes:

- 1) By not being committed Sweden wants to avoid to be automatically involved in war: "non-alignment in peace with a view of neutrality in war".
- 2) By not being identified with the interests of any great power Sweden's foreign policy can contribute towards reducing tensions in Northern Europe. It is often stressed that this is an objective of primary importance. It is assumed to have facilitated Finland's development towards a "neutral" position and the NATO-membership of Denmark and Norway on minimum conditions (no nuclear warheads, no foreign troops stationed in peace-time).
- 3) Non-alignment has provided Sweden with a reputation for objectivity or disinterestedness which serves as a useful platform for contributions to the efforts towards reducing international tension - efforts which in the final analysis are thought to be important for Sweden's own security also.

The policy of neutrality of Sweden is not like that of Switzerland, under an international guarantee. Neither is it like that of Austria, which is in reality imposed by a peace treaty. The Swedish neutrality has been formed as an instrument to promote the interests of the country. Parliament has, by accepting a report from the Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1956, rejected the idea that Sweden should bind its foreign policy for every possible situation in an unforeseeable future under the guarantee

of foreign powers. The Swedish policy of neutrality is self-imposed and should not be bound by any international guarantees.

This does not mean that Swedish non-alignment is a policy which on principle should prevent Sweden from concluding agreements of a military character with other countries. A Scandinavian defence bloc, without alignment to any great power, was regarded to be within the framework of Swedish foreign policy principles already in 1948. It may be supposed that the situation would be judged in the same way if the conditions for an independent Nordic defence union were again to present themselves. In the Swedish public debate - with which we are in general not concerned in this survey - there has at times been some confusion as to the character of the Swedish foreign policy and the limitations which it is assumed to impose on Sweden's freedom of action. Non-alignment could mean that Sweden could be expected to choose, in an opportunistic manner, war or peace, should an armed conflict take place, affecting Swedish interest. The issue was taken up in a statement by Foreign Minister Undén in 1957, in which he argued that "neutrality" would be a better way of defining Sweden's foreign policy than "non-alignment". He admitted that the term neutrality was not quite satisfactory, as membership of the United Nations would not enable Sweden in all situations to follow the classical rules of neutrality under interna-



tional law. On the other hand non-alignment was an ambiguous term for the reason that it did not express a definite purpose to conduct a policy of neutrality in case of war.

However, in some quarters it had been emphasized "that a characteristic feature of our 'non-alignment' is that we, in case of war, are not committed to any specific course of action. It has been stressed that we are uncommitted not only in so far as we cannot be drawn into war by any allied power but also that we are free to choose the war as a policy which in some situations might suit us best. Those who put this interpretation on the Swedish policy of non-alignment evidently have placed themselves outside the area of agreement of the majority. It is a vital interest to our country that other powers conceive our policy as it is intended by Parliament and Government: as directed towards keeping the country outside a great power war". For this reason Mr. Undén regarded neutrality as a safer term than non-alignment.

This statement was not an official declaration. It was included in an article in a foreign affairs journal but may nevertheless be regarded as being fully representative of the official attitude. The statement did after all, not argue that Sweden would have to be neutral in any conflict. It made two clear reservations, the one for Sweden's obligations under the United Nations Charter,

the other by the indication that non-alignment meant an undertaking to preserve neutrality in a great power war. Rightly or wrongly, such a war has on the whole been regarded as the only practical menace to peace, at least as far as Sweden is concerned.

This leads to the conclusion that Sweden during the post-war period has been as restricted in its international attitude as if it had carried out a policy of neutrality under an international guarantee or if the neutrality had been imposed by a treaty. The explanation is primarily that the international situation has been completely dominated by the antagonism between two great power blocs in the cold war. In this situation Sweden's efforts have been to explain to both parties that non-alignment aims at preserving neutrality in war. In doing so it has felt that it must impose some restrictions upon itself in foreign relations. This has not only applied to official statements and decisions in foreign affairs but also to a certain extent to other expressions of opinion.

There was a dramatic instance of this idea when the Government explained why it had ceased to select the then Conservative leader Jarl Hjalmarson to serve as a member on the Swedish United Nations traditionally multiparty (Government and Opposition) delegation. In this context a declaration on principle was formulated concerning the expressions of opinion which the Government

felt could reduce the credibility of Swedish non-alignment (1959):

"If, without binding ourselves by undertakings made under an alliance, we nevertheless fervently and constantly take the part of one side in the political groups existing in our divided world, we should lose every chance we have of working for peaceful co-existence and the reconciliation of the peoples of the world. We should thus forfeit the chance to undertake an important and positive task which is otherwise a natural one for a country like ours.

In pursuing our policy we are, of course, not renouncing in any way our adherence to the democratic ideal. In the present world situation efforts to safeguard peace and to solve controversial issues between the nations presuppose normal relations and negotiations between states having different political and economic systems. To characterize these efforts as compliance is as good as proclaiming a lack of confidence in democracy's power to prevail; it points to weakness not to strength.

However, a deep and one-sided commitment, from another point of view, also has its own drawbacks and risks. Now that we have chosen a policy of neutrality, it is important that it is understood correctly and that our intentions inspire confidence. Intemperate attacks by in-

fluent politicians against the policies of other states tend to counteract the policy of neutrality to which we officially adhere. This is particularly true when representatives of neutral Sweden give vent to extreme views, apt to aggravate and fan the flames of existing divergences, just at a time when both East and West are seeking paths to further contacts and negotiations. This is not a question of limiting the freedom of speech, rather it is a question of gaining confidence in other countries for the policy for which we wish our country to stand".

In this context the quotation does not aim at judging the conditions which caused the statement or its role in the domestic game of power in Sweden, only to elucidate the official idea concerning the restraint necessary for responsible party leaders and Swedish United Nations delegates in order to preserve the credibility of the non-aligned policy.

The declaration of principle was made in a very special situation. It has not been interpreted as a muzzle neither on the opposition nor on the Government. On the contrary, the Government has stated that the policy of non-alignment does not prevent Sweden from expressing its opinions on international issues.

As a rule, however, such expressions have concerned

questions without direct connection with the bipolar great power bloc systems, for example, the British-French intervention in the Israeli-Egyptian war in 1956 (the Suez-crisis) and the issue of South Africa which is still current in 1967. In exceptional cases clear expressions of opinion have also taken place when one of the great power blocs has been involved. However, this has taken place only in situations when the domestic pressure of opinion has been very strong, for example during the crisis in Hungary in 1956 and the Vietnam crisis in 1965.

In the statement of principle just quoted, the idea that non-alignment must be combined with ideological neutrality, was definitely rejected.

This ideological issue was touched upon in a statement by the present Swedish foreign minister (Torsten Nilsson) in a speech in 1965, in which he also presented a Swedish interpretation of the term "neutralism".

"As I pointed out before, a policy referred to as a policy of neutrality may take varying forms. The standpoint represented by many of the new states in Asia and Africa differs in several respects from the Swedish standpoint. Their choice of designations for their policies is in itself sufficient to indicate differences.

Thus they commonly refer to themselves as "neutralistic". In so far as the concept of "neutralism" implies that the state in question is committed to some kind of ideological neutrality, it can obviously not be applied to a country like Sweden, with its firm anchorage in the ideas of Western democracy. If "neutralism" means that in principle one considers all military alliances bad and wishes to prevail upon other states to become neutral, then, too, it is not possible to designate Sweden as "neutralistic". We have no ambition to influence the alliance policy of other states or to put forward the Swedish policy as a model for others. The numerous countries which since the Second World War have freed themselves from colonialism have their historically rooted reasons for taking a "neutralistic" line. We well understand this in Sweden. But however strongly we may sympathize with the liberation of the colonial peoples, we cannot find that Sweden has any reason to adopt political principles that are an outcome of special problems of these countries".

Newspaper opinion in Sweden has during the major part of the post-war period been predominantly critical against the communist side in the cold war. The freedom of the press has been respected. The new freedom of the press legislation adopted in 1949 was passed partly as a reaction against the limitation in the freedom which was resorted to during World War II. It marked a definite

effort to preserve the independence of the press in view of feared or actual reactions by foreign powers.

One single attempt was made by the Government in 1964 to limit further the right to criticize foreign powers. It was rejected by Parliament. It concerned a widening of the protection against libel of foreign heads of state and diplomatic representatives in the country to be applicable also to foreign Governments. In actual fact, Parliament reacted strongly, by removing the special protection for heads of state and diplomatic representatives also in the Freedom of the Press Act. It remains however part of the Criminal Code.

Nevertheless, it is evident that a free and rather one-sided opinion in relation to great powers has in part made the efforts more difficult to make the policy of non-alignment credible in all quarters. The same effect may also be attributed to the participation of Sweden in regional West European co-operation, particularly in the economic field. The heavy balance in favour of the West which has ensued in both cases has demanded political correctives. This has been reflected in attitudes and statements which sometimes have seemed to be more critical of the Western powers than warranted by the facts of the situation.

The statement of principle of 1959 did refer not only

to the importance of preserving the credibility of non-alignment. It also underlined that Sweden, by its uncommitted position, has prospects of working towards peaceful co-existence and conciliation among the nations. The international usefulness of Sweden for various tasks as an uncommitted state has been a recurring motive in the arguments in favour of non-alignment.

Historically this is definitely a secondary motive for non-alignment. It is a result of this policy, not its cause. In order to make neutrality in war possible it should on the whole be sufficient to vindicate non-alignment in relation to the power blocs that have strategic interest in the Scandinavian area. In order to preserve and increase the usefulness and thereby also the international influence which has been the result of non-alignment between the two so far dominating global power blocs, an adjustment seems to be necessary also in the situation emerging when the bipolar power balance is undermined or dissolved. Tendencies towards such an adjustment have been noted in the role of Sweden when confronted with the Vietnam crisis. They are also reflected in the policy towards the underdeveloped countries. The activity of Sweden on the disarmament question seems to point in the same direction.

Sweden's non-aligned position has created new possibilities for Swedish international activity. This has affected



to a certain extent the very motives for this policy. It seems now to be equally important to remain free from international great power commitments in order to be useful as a mediator in peace-time as to retain complete independence in order to be able to be neutral in case of war. The idea that the uncommitted, in many respects privileged position of Sweden also imposes definite obligations of serving the cause of international peace has a firm support in Swedish public opinion and is increasingly reflected in the official policy of the country. An important effect of non-alignment has in this way been transformed into a primary goal.

This process of transformation means a change-over from the traditional Swedish policy of relative passivity in international affairs to a more active foreign policy. Such a policy puts new and in all probability also greater demands on realism and knowledge of the limits for Sweden's effectiveness as an actor on the international scene. It can also bring out new problems of political balance. Sweden will have to watch carefully for the parts in international organizations that are compatible with the policy of non-alignment, still remaining the condition for an active Swedish foreign policy.

It is not the present purpose to guess about the future but it may be pertinent to stress the importance for Swedish foreign policy - and for its success, as far as

it goes - of the simple bipolar antagonism that has marked the post-war period. It is no rash statement to maintain that the basic conditions in which Swedish non-alignment has operated are in a process of dissolution. In spite of the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are involved in a conflict in Vietnam - the Americans in actual physical presence, the Russians supporting at least morally and with war materials - it is obvious that the two superpowers are moving towards an increasing community of interest. The nuclear issue provides one obvious instance. Both the powers have reason to fear the further spreading of atomic weapons. To both powers China provides the main threat against their interests in this respect and against what they conceive as the conditions for maintaining peace in a global sense.

The possibility for a new and very different phase in world politics, marked by increasing Soviet-American understanding is today regarded as a realistic possibility if not yet even a fact. Such a development will remove Sweden and Northern Europe as a whole from the borderline of two antagonistic world blocs.

European integration- on the original EEC model or in accordance with the concepts of General de Gaulle - may in this situation assume a new political significance. What would (or will) be the Swedish response to a situa-

tion marked by a Washington-Moscow understanding with a suspicious Europe, growing in strength, between the superpowers? What will, in general, be the components of the international balance in such a situation? Will in such case non-alignment in the traditional sense of the last twenty years remain a useful instrument for Swedish foreign policy? It is easy to pose questions, especially when it is done with the irresponsible purpose of not suggesting answers to them.

LE POLITISTE ET SES PROBLEMES D'INFORMATION SCIENTIFIQUE

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## Le politiste et ses problèmes d'information scientifique

par Jean MEYRIAT

Parmi les sujets figurant à l'ordre du jour du Congrès de Bruxelles, celui-ci est de nature quelque peu différente des autres. Il s'agit en effet d'étudier non pas l'un des concepts ou des phénomènes politiques qui sont la matière habituelle du travail des politistes, mais les politistes eux-mêmes en train de travailler, leurs comportements devant une des catégories de problèmes qui se posent nécessairement à eux en tant que travailleurs scientifiques.

L'importance des problèmes d'information, et la difficulté croissante de les résoudre à cette époque où l'on parle couramment d'"explosion documentaire" sont assez évidentes pour qu'il ne soit pas nécessaire de les souligner. Elles sont maintenant très généralement reconnues. Toutefois, cette conscience qu'on en a prise n'a pas encore conduit à les analyser avec toute l'attention désirable; on se contente trop souvent de constatations banales ou de vœux pieux. Mais les uns et les autres sont inefficaces. S'il y a des problèmes à résoudre, il faut d'abord les inventorier, les poser avec rigueur et identifier les difficultés qui doivent être surmontées. D'où l'essai de mise au point ici proposé, qui s'appuie malheureusement sur un trop petit nombre de travaux antérieurs, mais qui pourrait être un appel à un effort de réflexion plus systématique.

**Précisons** que cette étude est d'orientation empirique, et non pas normative. Il ne s'agit pas pour le moment d'améliorer les moyens d'information dont dispose le politiste. Il faut d'abord analyser concrètement l'information

dont il dispose et celle dont il a besoin, les moyens par lesquels elle lui est transmise, l'usage qu'il en fait et les lacunes qu'il y trouve.

Nous proposons donc de formuler les problèmes rencontrés en fonction des usagers de l'information scientifique, et non pas en fonction des techniciens (notamment les documentalistes) qui ont pour fonction de faire parvenir plus facilement l'information à ceux qui l'utilisent. Les techniciens pourront ensuite tirer de cette étude des indications sur l'efficacité des techniques qu'ils mettent en oeuvre, et sur les demandes qui leur sont adressées pour les améliorer ou les modifier.

Il faut s'attendre à ce que beaucoup des problèmes que nous rencontrons soient de nature assez générale, et intéressent tous les "savants" quel que soit le domaine de la connaissance auquel ils s'appliquent, au moins à l'intérieur des sciences et disciplines dites sociales ou humaines, peut-être aussi dans les autres. Mais il faudrait discerner les aspects spécifiques que revêt ce problème universel lorsqu'il s'agit de la science politique. On pourra même essayer de caractériser les différences qui existent à cet égard entre les politistes suivant le champ de leur spécialisation, suivant leur nationalité (ce qui met en cause à la fois le niveau d'équipement du pays dans lequel ils travaillent, et la langue qu'ils utilisent), et suivant l'école de pensée à laquelle ils appartiennent. La comparaison entre des politistes placés dans des situations diverses peut permettre de mieux connaître les problèmes propres à tous les politistes.

Cette comparaison doit être facilitée par une réunion comme celle qui est prévue dans le programme du Congrès de Bruxelles. C'est à ce moment que des politistes de divers pays, et travaillant dans des conditions différentes, pourront échanger leurs vues et confronter leurs expériences sur la

place que tient dans leurs activités la recherche de l'information scientifique, sur la façon dont ils se procurent cette information, les instruments dont ils se servent pour cela, les difficultés qu'ils rencontrent et les améliorations qu'ils désirent.

Ce rapport introductif, destiné à ouvrir quelques chemins vers cette discussion, formule les problèmes en termes assez généraux. Il doit être établi avant que ne soient disponibles les rapports que différents spécialistes proposeront à la discussion sur des points plus spécifiques. Il fournit donc seulement un cadre indicatif à la réflexion, en mettant l'accent sur quelques-uns des problèmes qui se posent, mais sans avoir aucun caractère limitatif.

#### A - REMARQUES PRELABLES

Il convient sans doute d'abord de préciser l'étendue du sujet. Celui-ci, au prix d'une répétition, est plus explicitement formulé sous sa forme anglaise : le "politiste" (il faut bien en français employer, faute de mieux, un néologisme comme celui-ci) nous intéresse comme travailleur scientifique, et c'est son travail qui éclaire le sens de "l'information scientifique".

Le spécialiste de science politique se caractérise à la fois parce qu'il travaille dans un domaine déterminé de la connaissance, et parce qu'il appartient à une profession déterminée. L'information dont il a besoin en cette double qualité est "scientifique" non pas par ses qualités intrinsèques, mais par l'usage qu'il en fait.

Cette information qui lui est nécessaire peut avoir des contenus différents.

Elle concerne d'abord les objets qu'il doit étudier, c'est-à-dire les sociétés humaines dans toutes leurs activités et conceptions politiques. L'information sur ces sociétés est évidemment multiforme, et transmise par des supports



innombrables. Nous nous proposons de considérer uniquement quelques-uns des supports écrits de cette information. Une distinction peut ici être utile. Le politiste en effet, comme ses collègues dans la plupart des autres sciences sociales, utilise dans une proportion plus ou moins grande (suivant le sujet de son travail, suivant l'école de pensée dont il se réclame, suivant la méthode qu'il a choisie) des informations qu'il construit lui-même en tant que telles, en les dégageant de la réalité sociale par une méthode d'observation ou d'enquête appropriée. Mais dans presque tous les cas, il utilise aussi des informations qui préexistaient en tant que telles, et qui étaient déjà "écrites" sur un support fabriqué à cet effet (que celui-ci soit un livre, un journal quotidien, un film, une bande magnétique, etc..). Tous ces supports sont des documents. Dans la quasi-totalité des cas, le politiste utilise à la fois des informations fournies par des documents, et des informations directement dégagées par lui-même.

Elle concerne ensuite la discipline scientifique à laquelle se consacre le politiste, les outils et les méthodes de la science politique, ses projets, ses acquis et ses mises en question. Il s'agit ici de toute l'information sur tout ce qui "se fait", c'est-à-dire se pense et s'écrit, dans le cadre de la science politique. Elle couvre donc l'activité scientifique de l'ensemble des politistes, leurs publications, leurs travaux en cours et leurs projets de recherche. Si original qu'il veuille être, un politiste ne peut pas travailler sans savoir ce que font ses collègues, au moins ceux qui ont la même spécialisation que lui, et aussi bien ses contemporains (ou même ses disciples) que ses prédécesseurs. Cette information lui est fournie par des canaux divers, les uns plus formels, les autres plus informels. Des études ont été faites, non pas dans le cas des politistes, mais notamment dans celui des psychologues <sup>1)</sup>, sur la place relative que tiennent ces divers canaux; on constate des phénomènes de substitution des uns aux autres; sans doute les débutants utilisent-ils davantage les canaux

formels, et leurs aînés ou leurs maîtres les canaux informels; mais les uns ou les autres, souvent les uns et les autres, tiennent toujours une place importante dans les activités du travailleur scientifique. Une des fonctions essentielles d'un Congrès scientifique (et même d'un Congrès de science politique) est précisément de faciliter la transmission de cette information, d'élargir et de multilatéraliser les circuits qu'elle emprunte.

Elle concerne enfin la profession qu'exerce le politiste. Comme toute profession, celle-ci est organisée, a une certaine structure, une hiérarchie, un statut. Ses membres ont des obligations et des avantages; ils se plient à des règles ou des habitudes déterminées (par exemple en matière de recrutement ou d'avancement), ils respectent un certain nombre de conventions, ils aménagent leur carrière professionnelle d'une façon ou d'une autre, etc.; ils ont donc besoin d'une multitude d'informations sur ce cadre professionnel de leur vie scientifique. Là encore, les canaux par lesquels circule cette information sont divers. Remarquons à nouveau que les Congrès sont un des plus importants, du moins dans certains pays.

Mais, pour ne pas disperser la discussion de notre réunion de Bruxelles sur un trop grand nombre de problèmes, nous avons choisi de la limiter à une catégorie seulement parmi les sources d'informations qu'utilise le politiste : certains des documents écrits et publiés pour communiquer des informations déterminées. Il reste donc à énumérer les cinq sortes de publications retenues, qui elles-mêmes, bien entendu, sont fort loin de constituer la totalité de cette catégorie.

## B- LES REVUES DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE

1. Dans toutes les branches de la connaissance constituées en discipline scientifique, les périodiques spécialisés jouent un rôle essentiel pour la

communication entre ceux qui s'y consacrent. Il en est à cet égard de la science politique comme des autres sciences, et les périodiques rédigés et lus par les politistes sont nombreux.

Les plus importants d'entre eux, constituant une sorte de noyau central, sont ceux qui sont volontairement spécialisés, et dont la fonction exclusive ou principale est de publier des articles originaux, contenant les résultats d'une recherche ou les conclusions d'une réflexion personnelle. Ces périodiques sont en principe recensés parmi d'autres dans la Liste mondiale des périodiques spécialisés dans les sciences sociales, établie par le Comité international pour la Documentation des sciences sociales et publiée par l'UNESCO, dont la troisième édition a paru en 1966<sup>2)</sup>.

Il suffit de regarder l'index de cette Liste mondiale pour constater que les revues figurent, dans l'index des sujets, sous la rubrique "science politique" sont à peu près aussi nombreuses que pour les principales autres sciences sociales. On peut noter toutefois que, dans la plupart des pays, elles sont le plus souvent moins anciennes. Pour nous en tenir à l'exemple des Etats-Unis, dès le XIXème siècle, les principales disciplines (économie, sociologie, anthropologie) disposaient d'au moins une grande revue nationale, parrainée par la profession; alors que l'American political science review n'a vu le jour qu'en 1906. Il en est de même dans les principaux autres pays où l'édition scientifique est active, comme le Royaume Uni, l'Allemagne, la France, etc.. La Suède, où paraît depuis 1898 le Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift, constitue une exception notable.

Encore faut-il prendre des précautions pour utiliser cet index des sujets. La répartition des titres entre les diverses rubriques peut être discutée, et il serait intéressant d'analyser en profondeur toutes les incertitudes qu'une observation attentive pourrait révéler : la part une fois faite des défaillances humaines, on pourrait essayer d'identifier les ambiguïtés qui proviennent de l'imprécision du

sujet lui-même, et celles qu'introduit l'indétermination des revues.

C'est ainsi qu'on a eu quelque peine à répartir les titres entre les deux rubriques "relations internationales" et "science politique"; c'est peut-être une erreur que la revue nord-américaine World politics ne soit pas indexée à "science politique". Peut-être en revanche n'aurait-il pas été nécessaire d'indexer sous "science politique" la (française) Revue des études islamiques.

Autre sujet d'hésitation : comment répartir les titres entre les rubriques "science politique" et "sociologie politique" ? On a pris le parti de réduire au maximum cette dernière rubrique, qui contient finalement un seul titre, celui d'une revue italienne traitant principalement de philosophie du droit. Cela étant dit, il apparaît normal de voir indexées sous "science politique" 8 revues d'Amérique du Nord, et autant d'Italie et du Japon, 6 de France, 5 de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne... On s'attendrait moins à en découvrir 8 encore en Bulgarie, mais une seule au Royaume-Uni.

Quoi qu'il en soit, ces nombres ne sont pas négligeables. A cela s'ajoute le fait qu'ils étaient valables pour le début de l'année 1964, et que les nouvelles revues de science politique continuent à apparaître de plus en plus fréquemment. Dans l'Inde seule, qui avait vers 1960 une seule revue de science politique, 4 nouvelles ont commencé leur existence entre 1962 et 1967. Pour l'ensemble du monde, le nombre des nouvelles revues de science politique depuis 1964 s'élève à plus de dix, soit un accroissement de 12 à 15%. 3)

Au total, bien que l'on ne puisse pas procéder à une comparaison rigoureuse, on constate que, comme les autres sciences sociales, la science politique voit s'accroître le rythme de création de nouvelles revues, ce qui indique au moins que ce moyen de communication est toujours considéré comme un des plus nécessaires par la communauté des politistes.

2. Il faut en outre tenir compte du phénomène bien connu de la dispersion des articles : une certaine quantité seulement d'articles de science politique paraît dans le petit nombre de revues spécialisées, mais une autre quantité paraît dans un nombre beaucoup plus élevé de revues non spécialisées ou relevant d'autres spécialités.

On peut même penser que le phénomène revêt une ampleur plus grande en science politique que dans d'autres sciences sociales. Une raison en serait que la définition même de la science politique est particulièrement délicate et controversée. On a fait allusion plus haut à la difficulté de distinguer la "sociologie politique" de la "science politique". On constate encore que dans certains milieux, même "scientifiques", la science politique continue à être considérée comme une "discipline carrefour" ou une "discipline de synthèse", ce qui ne permet guère de la définir par différencé avec des disciplines voisines. Une autre raison en pourrait être trouvée dans la souvent médiocre élaboration conceptuelle de la science politique et dans la difficulté qu'elle éprouve parfois à se distinguer du traitement non scientifique des affaires publiques. Il n'y a pas de ligne de démarcation tranchée entre des articles de science politique et des articles journalistiques sur des problèmes politiques. Ajoutons à cela que de nombreux universitaires, politistes de profession, écrivent avec prédilection dans des journaux, ou même dans des organes politiquement orientés.

Au total, on pourrait appliquer à un grand nombre de pays ces remarques qui ont été formulées récemment à propos du Royaume-Uni : "Des études politiques sérieuses peuvent paraître dans presque tous les périodiques non spécialisés trimestriels, mensuels ou hebdomadaires qui ont été créés récemment"; et encore : "Le périodique de science politique le plus conforme à la conception universitaire traditionnelle est sans doute Political Studies... Si son style est scientifique et technique, elle s'inspire manifestement d'un esprit humaniste et les sujets qu'elle aborde sont remarquablement variés" 4).

On peut corroborer ces remarques par une analyse faite, à titre d'exemple, sur les articles de science politique parus en France en 1965. Aux fins de cette analyse, on a considéré par hypothèse comme relevant de la science politique les articles cités dans la Bibliographie internationale des sciences sociales, volume "science politique". En 1965, sur 4.156 références, 271 sont celles d'articles ayant paru dans des revues françaises. Celles-ci sont au nombre de 64; chacune d'entre elles a donc fourni en moyenne un peu plus de 4 articles. Mais la dispersion statistique autour de cette moyenne est assez grande. Parmi ces 64 revues, 30 sont répertoriées dans la Liste mondiale et sont donc des revues "spécialisées", soit en science politique, soit dans l'une ou plusieurs des autres sciences sociales. Ces 30 revues représentent donc une proportion assez importante (32%) des revues françaises considérées comme spécialisées dans les sciences sociales (90 dans la 3<sup>e</sup> édition de la Liste mondiale, plus 5 ayant commencé à paraître en 1964 ou 1965). Or, ces 30 revues fournissent 200 des articles considérées, soit presque 74% du total.

En revanche, les 71 autres articles viennent de 34 autres revues. Encore faut-il préciser que plus de la moitié, soit 39 articles, viennent de seulement 7 revues : une revue juridique traitant habituellement des problèmes politiques, une revue publiant sur une région déterminée du monde des articles relevant de diverses spécialités, et 5 revues mensuelles d'intérêt général contenant fréquemment des articles de niveau scientifique. Reste donc que 32 articles proviennent de 27 revues diverses qui en ont publié chacune un ou deux pendant l'année. Il faut ajouter qu'une proportion assez importante des 71 articles publiés dans des **revues** non spécialisées au sens de la Liste mondiale ont été écrits par des auteurs qui, au cours des récentes années, ont donné au moins un article à une des **revues** retenues par la Liste mondiale.

La dispersion que manifestent ces chiffres est donc réelle; elle est peut-être moins grande qu'on aurait pu en avoir l'impression a priori. Cette impression devrait être corroborée ou infirmée par d'autres analyses plus poussées.

3. Puisque le moyen d'expression le plus normal pour un politiste est d'écrire dans une revue de science politique, l'expansion de cette science provoque un accroissement considérable du nombre des articles écrits et proposés aux revues spécialisées. Il semble bien en effet que les responsables de ces revues reçoivent beaucoup plus de manuscrits qu'ils ne peuvent ni ne veulent en publier. Cette pression conduit à plusieurs résultats. Le volume de certaines revues augmente; certaines acceptent de paraître plus fréquemment. C'est ainsi que la Revue française de science politique, d'abord trimestrielle, est récemment devenue bimestrielle. Dans d'autres cas, des revues renoncent à une partie de leur contenu habituel pour faire plus de place aux articles. Ainsi, la même Revue française de science politique a cessé de publier dans chaque numéro un "Etat des travaux", comme elle l'avait fait pendant plusieurs années. De son côté, l'American political science review renonce, depuis 1967, à publier des bibliographies sélectives d'articles et de documents; elle en donne comme raison, entre autres, que le nombre de manuscrits d'articles qu'elle reçoit a augmenté de 50% depuis deux ans, qu'elle ne peut en publier qu'un sur cinq et que toute la place disponible dans ses pages sera bientôt retenue deux ans à l'avance. Nous ne disposons pas d'indications chiffrées sur le pourcentage des manuscrits refusés par la rédaction d'autres revues de science politique, mais il est très vraisemblable qu'il va aussi en augmentant.

Un des effets secondaires de ce fait est la multiplication d'autres types de publications, comme des séries de cahiers ou de fascicules reproduits par des moyens plus économiques que la typographie, dont une des fonctions est d'accueillir une partie des textes qui ne trouvent pas place dans les revues.

On peut se demander si cette augmentation ne s'accompagne pas d'une certaine

inflation, et si tout ce qui est écrit en vaut vraiment la peine. Il est possible que l'augmentation considérable de la quantité s'accompagne d'un certain abaissement de la qualité moyenne. Mais on manque de critères qui permettraient d'évaluer cette qualité de façon objective.

Il est vrai que les motivations qui poussent un politiste à écrire sont nombreuses. La plus normale est la volonté de communiquer les résultats de son travail et de sa réflexion. Mais il peut s'y ajouter, dans des proportions diverses, le désir d'agir sur les lecteurs et de faire prévaloir une orientation déterminée; celui de se faire connaître par la communauté scientifique, et d'y acquérir un "statut" aussi élevé que possible; celui également d'obtenir les récompenses que la profession réserve à ceux qui l'illustrent par leurs écrits. L'effet de toutes ces incitations combinées est plus fort que ne peuvent l'être les limitations "naturelles" que représentent le manque de temps du chercheur, la multiplicité de ses charges (des fonctions d'enseignant ou même d'administrateur s'ajoutant à celles de chercheur et d'auteur), son souci éventuel de la perfection. Il faut bien que s'y ajoutent des barrages supplémentaires, ceux que dressent les comités de lecture ou de rédaction, ceux aussi qu'oppose la limitation des moyens matériels disponibles, même dans les pays les plus riches.

Il faut remarquer que ces diverses forces s'exercent de façon très inégale suivant les pays. Les périodiques sont nombreux dans certains, rares dans d'autres. Leur diffusion est très inégale. Les langues qu'ils utilisent sont en nombre limité. Les auteurs de certains pays sont amenés à publier de préférence dans des revues étrangères, et dans une autre langue que celle dans laquelle ils ont écrit. La diffusion de leurs idées s'en trouve affectée. Il vaudrait la peine d'étudier de près les problèmes que pose l'existence de ces barrières linguistiques.

4. On peut essayer de dresser le portrait-type d'une "revue de science politique". Elle est de préférence trimestrielle, elle compte de 600 à 1.000



pages par an. Elle en consacre une bonne moitié à des articles, que chacune de ses livraisons contient au nombre de quatre à huit. Elle réserve souvent une certaine place à des notes de recherche, des essais d'ordre méthodologique, des discussions sur des hypothèses controversées. Elle s'efforce de publier, en nombre plus ou moins grand, des comptes-rendus critiques de livres (relativement) récents. Elle y ajoute parfois une section bibliographique plus informative que critique. Elle comprend enfin diverses sections ou rubriques donnant des informations professionnelles ou scientifiques.

Ce modèle est fort traditionnel, et ne diffère guère de ce qu'il était il y a 50 ans. Ni de ce qu'il est dans d'autres sciences sociales. Il apparaît que dans leur grande majorité, les responsables de revues de science politique consacrent davantage d'efforts à faire vivre la revue dont ils ont la charge qu'à inventer des formules nouvelles.

Il faut ajouter en effet que deux traits encore semblent communs aux revues en cause. L'un est qu'elles ont un tirage assez limité, qui ne leur assure pas une base financière très large (sauf peut-être celles qui ont la chance d'être l'organe d'une puissante association). La plupart doivent recourir à des subventions et à des contributions d'universités et autres organismes scientifiques. L'autre trait est qu'elles sont dirigées et gérées par des politistes bénévoles, qui acceptent cette charge comme une de leurs obligations professionnelles, et qui agissent par dévouement, poussés par le sens de leurs responsabilités envers la communauté scientifique plus que par le désir d'acquérir du prestige ou d'exercer un pouvoir. Mais à peu près aucun d'eux n'a la possibilité de consacrer tout son temps, ni même la partie la plus importante de son temps, à la revue qui lui est confiée.

Pour ces deux raisons au moins, on ne peut s'attendre à ce que ces politistes se transforment en "entrepreneurs", et à ce que les revues de science politique soient conduites avec le même souci de rentabilité que le seraient des entreprises.

Il est juste de remarquer que ce modèle traditionnel n'est pas universel; mais les exceptions sont peu nombreuses. Ce n'est pas ici le lieu d'en établir un palmarès.

Il faut toutefois mentionner l'existence d'un autre modèle qui tend à prendre une certaine importance : celui des recueils annuels d'articles. Plusieurs annuaires en effet présentent des caractères tout à fait semblables à ceux d'une revue, et rassemblent des contributions qui sembleraient pouvoir trouver leur place dans une revue. Mises à part leurs dimensions plus importantes, leur particularité la plus nette est qu'en général les articles qu'ils contiennent sont orientés dans un même sens, et développent un même point de vue ou une même méthode. Cette relative unité est souvent provoquée (ou renforcée) par la personnalité d'un homme qui dirige la publication.

Ce type d'annuaire existe bien sûr dans d'autres domaines scientifiques. Mais il semble qu'il en existe, et surtout qu'il s'en soit créé récemment, un nombre proportionnellement plus grand dans la science politique et des spécialités connexes (administration publique, relations internationales, etc..). C'est peut-être un reflet de la plus grande jeunesse et du moindre développement de cette science : des groupes de spécialistes, désireux d'avoir un moyen d'expression commun, n'ont pas la possibilité de créer une revue, mais se sentent capables d'animer un organe demandant un effort moins fréquent.

5. Les auteurs et les directeurs de revues écrivent et publient pour être lus. Dans quelle mesure et de quelle façon le sont-ils ?

Il est réellement difficile de le savoir. Les chiffres de tirage des périodiques nous donnent seulement une indication quantitative très partielle. Mais les efforts qui peuvent être tentés pour connaître les lecteurs et leurs comportements rencontrent beaucoup de difficultés.

Certaines revues ont essayé d'organiser des enquêtes auprès de leurs lecteurs pour prendre connaissance de leurs opinions, et de leurs préférences, de leurs demandes. Mais à notre connaissance le pourcentage des réponses obtenues par ces enquêtes a toujours été très réduit <sup>5)</sup>.

Les lecteurs semblent être le plus souvent des citoyens passifs. Une fois fait l'effort de s'abonner, ou de consulter la revue dans une bibliothèque, ils n'ont plus qu'à utiliser ce qui leur plaît et à laisser de côté ce qui ne les intéresse pas. Ils n'agissent pas comme s'ils considéraient qu'en intervenant dans la rédaction de la revue (en répondant à un questionnaire, ou en prenant l'initiative d'écrire au rédacteur en chef), ils pourraient contribuer à améliorer la qualité de la revue, à l'orienter dans le sens qui leur est le plus utile, et donc à tirer un plus grand profit du prix qu'ils payent pour l'obtenir.

Il est vrai que les revues reçoivent des lettres des lecteurs; mais le plus souvent ces lecteurs sont des auteurs passés ou futurs; et ils discutent avec un autre auteur plutôt qu'avec la revue elle-même. Leurs lettres concernent en effet le plus souvent un article ou un passage déterminé de la revue, et non pas l'orientation de la revue, l'équilibre de son contenu, sa politique éditoriale. Il semble donc que la majorité des lecteurs utilise la revue comme un recueil d'éléments séparés, plutôt que comme un ensemble ayant une unité.

Si cette hypothèse était vérifiée, elle conduirait peut-être à remettre en cause plusieurs habitudes couramment reçues en matière de communication scientifique.

6. A supposer que la revue spécialisée traditionnelle reste pour un temps encore le meilleur instrument de cette communication, il serait possible d'imaginer divers moyens pour accroître son efficacité. On pourrait être sûr que les rédacteurs en chef des principales revues y seraient disposés. Leurs recherches tendant à définir ces moyens seraient peut-être facilitées par la mise en commun de leurs expériences et par l'organisation d'une certaine coopération entre eux. C'est la voie qu'ont commencé à suivre une trentaine de rédacteurs en chef de revues sociologiques, qui se sont

réunis à cet effet en septembre 1966 en marge du Congrès Mondial de Sociologie qui s'est tenu à Evian<sup>6</sup>).

Mais le projet de toute amélioration ne peut être établi avec réalisme que si les lecteurs veulent bien y contribuer pour leur part. Il est nécessaire que les courants d'échange entre les producteurs et les consommateurs de revues scientifiques soient considérablement renforcés. Toute innovation exige un investissement et celui-ci n'est justifié que si l'on a quelque assurance qu'il répond à une demande.

C'est ainsi que plusieurs rédacteurs en chef s'interrogent sur l'utilité de présenter, en tête de chaque article, un résumé établi par l'auteur lui-même. Cette pratique, qui tend à se répandre dans le monde scientifique, est encore très rare s'agissant des revues de science politique.

Au cas où certains décideraient de publier de tels résumés, ils aimeraient savoir s'ils doivent le faire dans des langues étrangères, et lesquelles. Ils pourraient aussi envisager, si cela doit être utile à leurs lecteurs, de publier des sommaires de quelques autres revues de la même spécialité, peut-être même d'en résumer certains articles. Ils pourraient encore étudier la possibilité de se mettre d'accord pour procéder entre eux à une certaine répartition de la matière de façon à mieux spécialiser chaque revue et notamment à faciliter la tâche des politistes qui travaillent dans des pays dont l'équipement scientifique est encore rudimentaire.

## C - LES PERIODIQUES BIBLIOGRAPHIQUES SPECIALISEES

1. Comme toutes les sciences, la science politique possède un certain nombre de publications dont la fonction n'est pas de transmettre à la communauté scientifique des écrits originaux, mais de faire connaître l'existence ou le contenu de ces écrits. C'est pourquoi ces publications sont souvent qualifiées de "secondaires". Globalement, et en prenant le terme dans son sens le plus large, on

peut les appeler des publications bibliographiques.

L'équipement bibliographique propre à la science politique est comparable à celui dont disposent d'autres disciplines; mais il est relativement récent. Il va de pair avec le développement de la discipline dans les différentes régions du monde, c'est à dire qu'il est très inégal suivant les pays. Aux publications bibliographiques nationales s'ajoutent plusieurs importantes publications internationales.

Il est assez facile de caractériser les principaux types de ces publications, comme vont tenter de le faire les paragraphes suivants de ces rapports. On peut aussi connaître les intentions et les difficultés des personnes qui en ont la responsabilité, les services qu'elles se proposent de rendre et les questions qu'elles se posent. Mais il est beaucoup moins facile de savoir quel usage en est effectivement fait. Comme pour les périodiques primaires, dont nous avons parlé ci-dessus, les réactions d'utilisateurs de ces périodiques secondaires sont difficiles à obtenir. Il faut espérer à nouveau que la réunion de Bruxelles sera, pour un certain nombre de politistes, l'occasion de dire quel usage ils font de ces différents services bibliographiques, quel profit ils en tirent, quels reproches ils leur adressent; ou tout simplement encore, pour quelles raisons ils ne les utilisent pas. Ces informations pourront être très précieuses pour qui voudrait tracer le dessin d'un service bibliographique aussi efficace que possible.

2/ Le type le plus classique de publication bibliographique est celui de la bibliographie proprement dite, destinée à faire connaître l'existence des publications appartenant à un domaine déterminé.

La science politique dispose, depuis 1953, d'une bibliographie générale de ce type, en l'espèce le volume consacré à la science politique dans la Bibliographie internationale des sciences sociales, établie par le Comité International pour la Documentation des Sciences Sociales et à l'origine publiée par l'Unesco avant de l'être par

une maison privée. Cette bibliographie est annuelle, chaque volume signalant environ 5.000 publications de toute origine et en toute langue. Il semble que cela représente effectivement la plus grosse partie de ce qui se publie dans le monde et qui relève de la science politique.

Ce n'est pas ici le lieu de décrire ou de discuter les caractéristiques de cette bibliographie. Un aspect doit néanmoins être souligné : c'est qu'elle est une des quatre parties de la Bibliographie internationale des sciences sociales, les trois autres étant respectivement consacrées à la Sociologie, à la Science économique et à l'Anthropologie sociale et culturelle. C'est donc une partie d'un tout dont les éléments sont solidaires l'un de l'autre. Mais il a semblé qu'une publication unique pour l'ensemble des sciences sociales serait d'un volume trop important et contiendrait des titres trop divers pour être d'un maniement commode. Le Comité International responsable a estimé préférable de reconnaître que si "les sciences sociales" existent, en revanche le "spécialiste de sciences sociales" n'existe pas (ou très rarement); ce qui existe ce sont les économistes, les sociologues, les politistes... Par conséquent, on a destiné un volume à l'information bibliographique des professionnels de chacune des quatre sciences sociales qui le demandaient le plus explicitement. En même temps, on a essayé de faire en sorte que chaque spécialiste, ayant sous la main la bibliographie de sa propre spécialité, puisse facilement utiliser les bibliographies des sciences voisines, dont la sienne n'est séparée que par des frontières ténues. On a au surplus prévu qu'un nombre assez élevé de publications (environ 16% du total) serait signalé à la fois dans deux ou plusieurs des volumes de la bibliographie de façon à être porté à la connaissance de ceux qui travaillent dans des domaines voisins.

Il serait particulièrement important de savoir ce que les politistes, en ce qui les concerne, pensent de cette organisation : dans quelle mesure trouvent-

ils [utile de rencontrer, dans le volume "Science politique", des titres d'écrits de sociologues ou d'économistes, et dans quelle mesure se reportent-ils parfois à d'autres volumes de la Bibliographie internationale des sciences sociales ?

Une indication pouvant être utile ici est donnée par les chiffres de diffusion relatifs aux quatre volumes de la Bibliographie. On a calculé, en ce qui concerne les Etats-Unis, combien d'exemplaires des volumes pour l'année 1965 ont été vendus isolément, et combien ont été vendus en séries de deux, trois ou quatre volumes. Le pourcentage des volumes vendus isolément est de 27% pour le volume Economie, 19% pour le volume Anthropologie, 18% pour le volume Sociologie et seulement 9% pour le volume Science politique. Ces chiffres semblent faire apparaître que les lecteurs intéressés à la science politique sont ceux qui se contentent le moins facilement de la bibliographie consacrée à cette science, et ont le plus besoin de connaître les publications de disciplines voisines. Reste à savoir si les politistes considèrent que c'est là une qualité ou un défaut de la Bibliographie en cause.

3. En dehors de cette bibliographie internationale qui semble être devenue la source classique de référence pour la discipline, il en existe bien entendu beaucoup d'autres. On peut en distinguer plusieurs genres.

Plusieurs pays font l'effort de publier des bibliographies spécialisées nationales : celles-ci sont le plus souvent annuelles. Elles peuvent être consacrées seulement à la science politique, ou englober celle-ci dans l'ensemble des sciences sociales, comme la Bibliografia italiana delle scienze sociali. Elles peuvent paraître comme des ouvrages ou des fascicules indépendants, ou bien être "cachées" dans un périodique trimestriel ou annuel, comme l'Annuaire suisse de science politique. Elles peuvent aussi être consacrées à une seule branche ou un secteur spécialisé de la science politique.

Il serait utile de pouvoir comparer l'usage que les politistes font de ces diverses bibliographies, et celui qu'ils font de la Bibliographie internationale. Les principales variables à prendre en considération relèveraient d'une part des langues utilisées, d'autre part de la structure de chaque publication bibliographique et des voies d'accès qu'elle offre aux titres qu'elle contient (classification, index, annotations...)

4. Les politistes se voient également proposer un autre genre de service par des publications qui contiennent des comptes rendus analytiques des publications originales et non pas seulement leurs références bibliographiques. Là encore existe, depuis dix-sept ans, une publication internationale, International Political Science Abstracts / Documentation politique internationale, éditée par l'Association Internationale de Science Politique. Parmi les publications nationales d'"abstracts" de science politique, la plus typique est sans doute Pol. Dok. publiée à Berlin, et à New York (mais débordant largement la science politique) the ABS Guide to Recent Publications in the Social and Behavioral Sciences.

Dans l'esprit des institutions responsables, ces publications ne font pas double emploi avec les bibliographies. Elles se proposent en effet de donner suffisamment d'indications sur le contenu de chaque titre pour que le lecteur, sans être dispensé de lire les documents primaires, puisse choisir les documents primaires qu'il lui est utile de lire. Il faudrait savoir si tel est bien l'usage qui en est fait, et quels services en retirent effectivement ceux qui utilisent ces "abstracts".



Il faudrait également connaître les réponses des utilisateurs aux questions que ne cessent de se poser les rédacteurs des International Political Science Abstracts : ont-ils raison d'analyser seulement les articles publiés par des périodiques à l'exclusion des livres ou des contributions individuelles aux ouvrages collectifs ? Ont-ils raison d'analyser non seulement les articles parus dans quatre vingt dix revues spécialisées <sup>7)</sup>, mais aussi les articles de science politique parus dans un nombre limité de revues d'autres disciplines ou de revues d'intérêt général; et ont-ils raison de limiter ainsi la liste de ces autres revues ? Ont-ils raison de publier leurs analyses soit en anglais, soit en français, supposant que la grande majorité des politistes peuvent au moins lire un court texte écrit dans l'une ou l'autre de ces deux langues ? Ont-ils raison de publier des analyses entièrement rédigées, pour être facilement lisibles, et excluant les abréviations et les signes conventionnels ?

5. Il est vraisemblable que la source d'information bibliographique la plus fréquemment utilisée par les politistes est constituée par les sections de comptes rendus que contiennent la quasi totalité des revues de science politique.

On constate que, si la place occupée par cette section dans les diverses revues est variable <sup>8)</sup>, elle n'est pas négligeable. L'American Political Science Review, en renonçant récemment à sa rubrique de bibliographie informative, s'est proposé entre autres de pouvoir publier davantage de comptes rendus de livres. Cette même revue, et aussi la Revue française de science politique, ainsi que plusieurs autres, contient en réalité deux rubriques, dont l'une donne des comptes rendus assez développés et

critiques de livres plus importants, l'autre des comptes rendus plus brefs et plus informatifs d'un nombre plus élevé d'ouvrages récents.

Il est sans doute commode pour le politiste de trouver ainsi régulièrement, dans la revue qu'il a l'habitude de lire, des informations non seulement sur la parution de nouveaux livres, mais aussi sur leur valeur et leur intérêt. Toutefois, il est bon d'être attentif au fait que ces rubriques de comptes rendus ne rendent pas exactement les mêmes services que des bibliographies. D'une part, elles sont critiques, et par là même sélectives. D'autre part elles ne sont pas systématiques, car les seuls livres dont il est rendu compte sont ceux qui ont été envoyés à cet effet à la rédaction de la revue.

Diverses questions seraient à poser aux lecteurs à ce sujet. En particulier, trouvent-ils que ces comptes rendus sont réellement faits de la façon qui leur est la plus utile, ou qu'ils sont parfois l'occasion pour les auteurs de régler des querelles personnelles ? Sont-ils gênés par le fait que l'information qu'ils obtiennent est parfois relativement tardive, à cause du délai nécessaire pour obtenir un compte rendu d'une personne qualifiée, délai qui a tendance à être d'autant plus long que la personne est plus qualifiée ou plus illustre ?

6. Un autre genre qui est fort développé dans les sciences exactes ou naturelles, mais beaucoup moins dans les sciences de l'homme, est celui des bilans évaluatifs des publications récentes paraissant périodiquement sur une discipline ou un secteur de cette discipline, quel que soit le titre de ces "mises au point", généralement annuelles : "Annual review of...", "Advances in...", "Progress in...", etc..<sup>9)</sup>

Sauf erreur, la science politique n'avait jamais bénéficié d'un tel service, jusqu'à la parution, à la fin de 1966, du premier volume du Political Science Annual. Encore faut-il noter qu'à en juger par ce premier volume, il ne prend guère en considération que la production scientifique nord-américaine, malgré le sous-titre : "An international review".

Si l'on estime qu'il y a encore là une lacune dans la littérature spécialisée de la science politique, il serait intéressant de savoir si celle-ci est due au manque d'intérêt des politistes pour ce type de publications, ou seulement à des difficultés d'organisation ou de financement.

7. Bien que nous ayons annoncé que ce rapport traiterait seulement de certains types de publication apportant des informations aux politistes, il faut évoquer ici les perspectives de moins en moins lointaines de remplacement de ces publications, au moins partiellement, par d'autres modes d'information. Les progrès techniques récents, notamment ceux qui permettent d'utiliser les ordinateurs dans les travaux de catalogage, d'indexage et d'analyse des documents laissent entrevoir le moment où l'information scientifique sera transmise directement, rapidement et de façon continue aux politistes, sans que ceux-ci aient besoin de passer par l'intermédiaire de publications secondaires, encombrantes, lentes et toujours imparfaites. Des expérimentations sont déjà en cours, et des applications pratiques sont peut-être proches.

Il est certain que des innovations de ce genre transformeront radicalement les habitudes de travail et les méthodes des politistes, comme des autres chercheurs. Il n'est pas encore possible de le vérifier empiriquement, mais il n'est pas trop tôt pour y réfléchir, de façon à ce que l'adaptation nécessaire se fasse aussi progressivement et rapidement que possible. Il

n'est pas trop tôt non plus pour que les usagers, c'est à dire les principaux intéressés, entreprennent de formuler clairement leurs besoins et leurs désirs, pour qu'il en soit tenu compte dans l'organisation des futurs services d'information scientifique.

#### D - LES JOURNAUX

1. L'information fournie par les journaux est une de celles dont a besoin le politiste. Certes, elle n'a par elle-même rien de scientifique, on pourrait même dire : au contraire. Elle est en effet liée immédiatement à l'évènement, elle ne comporte par rapport à lui aucun recul et elle est fournie "au jour le jour". Mais elle est la trace ou la marque directe de l'évènement, ou de l'opinion sur l'évènement, ce qui sont des matières premières indispensables au travail du politiste.

Ces publications que sont les journaux se distinguent radicalement des revues de science politique dont il a été question plus haut, et il n'y a aucune substitution possible de l'un par l'autre. Cela est très évident si l'on considère leurs lecteurs. Celui qui n'aurait jamais l'idée de lire une revue de science politique lit régulièrement le journal, "son" journal, même s'il ne lit que cela. En revanche, celui qui lit des revues de science politique n'est en rien dispensé de lire et de consulter le journal, ou même plutôt des journaux.

2. Si l'on considère de plus près le contenu d'un journal, on constate qu'il est différencié. On y trouve en effet : des informations "immédiates", comme des dépêches d'agences de presse, des données statistiques ou autres; des textes de discours, de communiqués, de déclarations, d'interviews, de conférences de presse; des commentaires, prises de position,

éditoriaux; et même souvent des articles, exprimant une opinion personnelle sur une situation politique ou présentant de façon synthétique une série d'évènements politiques.

Certains de ces articles sont écrits non par des journalistes, mais par des universitaires, des hommes de science, voire des politistes. Pourquoi certains de ceux-ci choisissent-ils d'écrire dans des journaux ? C'est sans doute parce qu'ils désirent toucher un public incomparablement plus large que celui qui est atteint par les revues spécialisées, et aussi qu'ils ont l'intention d'éduquer ce public, d'agir sur des secteurs de l'opinion.

En tout cas, les articles qu'ils donnent à des journaux se distinguent fort clairement de ceux qu'ils écrivent professionnellement dans des revues spécialisées.

L'existence de tels articles (et quels que soient leurs auteurs) dans certains journaux introduit une continuité entre ceux-ci et des revues d'intérêt général, non spécialisées. En effet, beaucoup de ces articles sont tels qu'on pourrait les trouver aussi bien dans un hebdomadaire ou dans un autre périodique. C'est en somme un produit que le journal donne en plus, pour la satisfaction d'une partie de ses lecteurs. C'est peut-être, pour ces lecteurs, une raison de préférer ce journal à d'autres, précisément parce qu'il leur donne quelque chose en plus de ce qui serait son contenu minimum, ce contenu minimum étant l'information qu'on trouve dans le journal et nulle part ailleurs et qu'il a pour fonction de fournir.

3. Encore faut-il distinguer un certain nombre de cas particuliers. Différentes raisons peuvent faire que des journaux jouent, dans certains pays, un rôle plus important que celui de fournisseurs d'informations. Il se peut, que, dans de petites nations, le nombre des lecteurs possibles soit trop ré-

duit pour que se développent beaucoup de revues spécialisées, et qu'une partie au moins de leurs fonctions doivent être remplies par des publications d'intérêt général, et même par des journaux. Il se peut que le niveau d'éducation politique ou civique d'une collectivité soit assez élevé pour que la discussion des affaires publiques, même dans les journaux, revête un ton qui la rapproche des analyses que peut faire un théoricien. Il se peut que le régime politique ne soit pas propice au développement d'une véritable science politique, et que les articles des journaux soient le seul moyen d'expression pour certaines réflexions.

On peut penser encore à d'autres situations : il suffit d'avoir indiqué ici une diversité des fonctions que des journaux peuvent être amenés à remplir.

4. Les journaux étant ainsi une source d'informations nécessaire, pour de multiples raisons, au politiste, comment celui-ci y accède-t-il ?

Une difficulté évidente est le manque d'intermédiaires, comme le sont les publications secondaires dont il a été question plus haut. Celles-ci en effet signalent l'existence des publications primaires déjà élaborées, comme des livres, des articles, des thèses, des documents officiels. Mais elles ne servent pas pour atteindre la masse hétéroclite d'informations, souvent très menues et de forme sommaire, que contiennent les journaux.

C'est cette difficulté qui conduit un nombre non négligeable de politistes à découper plus ou moins régulièrement un ou plusieurs journaux, et à constituer pour leur propre usage des dossiers ou des archives de ces coupures. Cette méthode est proprement artisanale, et coûteuse en temps. L'obligation où se trouvent des politistes d'y recourir montre que l'équipement informatif dont ils bénéficient est encore incomplet.

Un degré supérieur d'organisation, permettant au total une notable économie d'efforts, est atteint lorsqu'une institution scientifique assume la charge de constituer des coupures de presse sur tous les sujets de son ressort, et de les mettre à la disposition des politistes. Malheureusement, l'investissement nécessaire est assez élevé pour que les réalisations de ce genre soient peu nombreuses.

Un autre outil dont l'utilité est certaine est constitué par des index détaillés du contenu d'un journal. Quelques grands journaux mettent ce précieux instrument de travail à la disposition du public : le Times de Londres, le New York Times, le Monde de Paris. Quelques hebdomadaires dans différents pays agissent de même, mais les difficultés à surmonter sont là sensiblement moins grandes. En ce qui concerne les quotidiens, nous craignons que la liste qui vient d'être donnée ne puisse pas être considérablement allongée.

Il faut enfin mentionner un autre obstacle que rencontre souvent le politiste lorsqu'il a besoin des informations contenues dans les journaux : c'est qu'il ne parvient pas à trouver ces journaux eux-mêmes, si ceux-ci sont étrangers. On ne peut pas attendre d'une personne privée qu'elle reçoive, et encore moins conserve, des journaux de beaucoup de pays. Il est donc indispensable d'utiliser les collections constituées par des bibliothèques. Mais celles-ci, trop souvent, s'intéressent peu à ce type de documents, reçoivent peu de journaux étrangers, les reçoivent irrégulièrement, les conservent de façon médiocre et les enferment dans des réserves éloignées d'où il devient difficile de les communiquer au lecteur. On rencontre ici un certain nombre de problèmes d'ordre technique. Des solutions peuvent certainement leur être trouvées; mais pour que les bibliothécaires et documentalistes les cherchent avec ardeur, il faudrait que les politistes (entre autres) leur fassent savoir avec force quel usage ils font des journaux, et comment ils désirent pouvoir les utiliser.

## E - LES PUBLICATIONS D'ORIGINE GOUVERNEMENTALE

1. L'évolution du monde contemporain tend à confier des tâches accrues aux autorités politiques, qui interviennent dans des secteurs de plus en plus nombreux de l'activité nationale. Une des conséquences en est que les pouvoirs publics, soit pour faciliter, soit pour faire connaître leur action publient des documents en nombre croissant et d'espèces de plus en plus variées. Il n'est certainement pas un Etat moderne dans lequel le gouvernement ne soit pas, de très loin, la plus grosse entreprise d'édition.

Ces publications sont particulièrement importantes pour le politiste. Elles le sont par leur objet, **puisque** elles concernent à peu près tous les aspects de la vie des collectivités nationales. Elle le sont aussi par leur origine, puisque elles sont un reflet direct du fonctionnement des organes politiques et du comportement des détenteurs du pouvoir politique, c'est à dire des matières privilégiées pour la science politique.

2. Un premier problème posé aux politistes par ces publications est celui d'y avoir accès. En effet, leur contrôle bibliographique est dans presque tous les pays particulièrement difficile <sup>10)</sup>. Une raison en est la dispersion de ces publications : s'il existe dans certains pays un service jouissant du monopole de publier les documents officiels, ce monopole n'est généralement pas effectif, et chaque ministère, chaque service, chaque assemblée publie ses propres rapports, ses bulletins, ses décisions. Une autre raison est que ces éditeurs d'occasion n'ont pas le souci d'assurer la rentabilité de ce travail en diffusant suffisamment leurs publications, et acceptent trop souvent que celles-ci restent confidentielles. Ajoutons que même dans les pays où existe l'obligation du dépôt légal, les bureaux et services officiels sont ceux qui s'y soustraient le plus volontiers; et même dans les bibliothèques nationales



les mieux organisés, on n'a pas la garantie de trouver toutes les publications officielles du pays.

Pour ces diverses raisons, il est difficile d'être informé de façon complète sur l'existence des publications officielles du pays où l'on se trouve, a fortiori des pays étrangers. Il est encore plus difficile d'en être informé en temps utile pour faire les démarches nécessaires pour les obtenir avant qu'elles ne soient épuisées ou stockées dans quelque réserve inaccessible.

Même dans un pays où l'équipement bibliographique est aussi développé qu'aux Etats-Unis, on ressent de façon aiguë cette difficulté, et on cherche les moyens de constituer des collections relativement complètes des publications officielles étrangères (1).

3. A supposer que le politiste arrive à consulter ces publications quand il en a besoin, il reste à savoir comment il peut en faire le meilleur usage.

Parmi ces publications, celles qui sont politiques par nature (par exemple les comptes rendus des débats des assemblées législatives) sont en nombre limité. La majorité sont de nature soit juridique, soit économique, soit technique. Il faut donc déterminer dans chaque cas l'information politique qu'elles peuvent contenir.

D'autre part, la réalité qu'expriment ces publications n'est pas la vérité objectivement définie, mais la vérité de l'organe politique qui en est l'auteur ou l'éditeur. Ces publications sont donc politiquement colorées, soit aux teintes du régime en place, soit à celles des hommes ou des partis au pouvoir, soit encore à celles de quelque intérêt national qu'il apparaît opportun de promouvoir. On pourrait dire qu'il n'y a pas de publications officielles qui ne soient chargées de quelque intention de propagande au bénéfice de leurs auteurs. Lorsqu'il s'agit des publications de son propre pays, le policiste n'a sans doute pas de très grandes difficultés à faire la part de cette intention, et à lire

entre les lignes. Il peut en aller bien autrement, lorsqu'il s'agit de publications étrangères. Un exemple caricatural de cette difficulté nous est offert en 1967 par les spécialistes de la politique chinoise, qui ne savent comment lire les textes qui viennent de Pékin, et dont les uns voient noir ce que les autres affirment être blanc.

4. Il faut également signaler ici l'intérêt que présenteraient pour le politiste, si elles lui étaient accessibles, les informations rassemblées sur les membres de chaque collectivité nationale par diverses autorités publiques : autorités fiscales, autorités militaires, etc.. Ces informations ne sont évidemment pas l'objet de publication. Néanmoins, il ne serait pas impossible qu'au moins dans certains pays elles puissent, sous une forme à déterminer, être mise à la disposition des chercheurs. Les politistes auraient un intérêt tout particulier à pouvoir accéder à ces trésors d'informations de première main et irremplaçables par d'autres.

#### F - LES PUBLICATIONS INTERNATIONALES

1. La prolifération des organisations internationales de toute espèce est une autre caractéristique du monde contemporain. L'Annuaire des Organisations internationales dans son édition de 1966-1967 en dénombre plus de 3.000.

Or, ces organisations publient beaucoup; c'est même l'une de leurs activités les plus certaines. Leur nature même, et le fait qu'elles possèdent des membres ou des sections dans des pays différents, les obligent à utiliser dans leur travail des procédures écrites qui engendrent autant de documents. Leurs fonctionnaires aiment en général cette situation, leur bureaucratie tend à être aussi lourde que ne le seraient celles de tous leurs Etats membres ajoutés les uns aux autres.

Nous parlons ici seulement des organisations gouvernementales. Les orga-

nisations non gouvernementales sont en effet en général de structure beaucoup plus légère, et posent des problèmes bien différents; c'est parmi elles que se rangent notamment les associations internationales scientifiques, comme celle de science politique. Mais les seules organisations inter-gouvernementales produisent régulièrement une masse considérable de documents. Ceux-ci fournissent évidemment un très grand nombre d'informations sur les organisations internationales elles-mêmes, dont l'étude relève de la science politique. Elles en fournissent aussi sur les affaires internationales dans lesquelles ces organisations interviennent : relations politiques, juridiques, économiques, culturelles, techniques...

Mais en outre elles donnent aussi quantité d'informations sur d'autres phénomènes qui peuvent être purement nationaux. Qu'on pense notamment aux nombreux rapports de missions établis par des fonctionnaires ou des experts de ces organisations dans tous les pays où ils sont envoyés, et qui peuvent porter sur les problèmes les plus divers. Quelques-uns de ces rapports sont publiés, mais la plupart restent inédits, et souvent même ne sont pas accessibles aux chercheurs. Un autre cas est celui de publications multinationales, c'est à dire celles qui fournissent des informations comparables d'une nature déterminée sur un grand nombre de pays : les annuaires de beaucoup d'organisations internationales sont ainsi des recueils normalisés d'informations d'origine nationale.

2. Diverses précautions sont nécessaires pour employer convenablement cette masse de papiers. On y trouve en effet des documents très divers, non seulement par leur nature mais aussi par leur intérêt. Certains sont des documents originaux et irremplaçables. Mais d'autres sont des publications de

seconde main, dont les éléments ont été fournis par des autorités nationales et ont souvent fait de leur part l'objet d'un filtrage. Les organisations internationales sont obligées d'accepter les informations qui leur sont données par les gouvernements de leurs Etats membres, et d'ignorer ce que ces gouvernements ne veulent pas faire savoir. Il serait intéressant à cet égard d'étudier la signification politique du silence de diverses publications internationales en ce qui concerne certains pays.

Enfin, un très grand nombre de ces documents sont purement administratifs, et n'ont pas d'autre fonction que de satisfaire aux exigences d'une procédure souvent lourde.

3. La richesse de cette masse documentaire crée une autre difficulté plus matérielle : c'est qu'elle est très difficile à contrôler bibliographiquement. Les organisations internationales elles-mêmes s'y perdent parfois, et leur système de publication est souvent très désordonné, propre à décourager le lecteur éventuel. En outre, elles ont de la peine à faire connaître elle-même ce qu'elles publient et par exemple à offrir au public intéressé des catalogues régulièrement établis. Il existe bien un index périodique des publications des Nations Unies; mais, depuis longtemps, on a renoncé à indexer en même temps les publications des institutions spécialisées, qui sont pourtant fort nombreuses et parfois importantes. En même temps, dans les bibliothèques, même si elles ont la qualité de dépositaires officiels pour ces publications, on a beaucoup de mal à les cataloguer régulièrement au fur et à mesure, et par conséquent à les mettre à la disposition des lecteurs.

## CONCLUSION

Ce rapport introductif a comme seul objet de proposer quelques points à la discussion. Il n'a pas traité le sujet de façon assez systématique pour qu'on puisse valablement en tirer des conclusions ayant quelque portée générale. Il suggère néanmoins quelques remarques que l'on peut présenter comme des hypothèses de travail tout à fait provisoires, dans l'attente d'une analyse plus approfondie.

a. Les moyens mis à la disposition du politiste pour faciliter son accès à l'information dont il a besoin se sont multipliés sensiblement au cours des vingt dernières années. Le politiste dispose maintenant d'un équipement documentaire qui est comparable à celui dont bénéficie le plus grand nombre des autres sciences humaines. Comme celles-ci, la science politique est à cet égard encore loin derrière les sciences exactes ou naturelles.

b. Mais cet équipement laisse subsister des lacunes, et ne satisfait pas à tous les besoins. Des catégories importantes d'informations, et de documents, supports d'informations, sont encore d'accès malaisé.

c. Cet équipement est fort inégal selon les pays et selon les langues. L'information provenant de certains pays demeure particulièrement difficile à obtenir, et circule mal dans la communauté scientifique. Le politiste travaillant dans certains pays rencontre plus de difficulté pour communiquer avec ses collègues, pour faire connaître ses propres travaux, pour accéder à l'information dont il a besoin.

d. Les instruments et les techniques utilisés pour communiquer l'information sont encore très traditionnels, et on n'utilise pas suffisamment dans ce

domaine les récents progrès technologiques. La responsabilité de cette insuffisance semble être partagée entre les documentalistes et techniciens de l'information, et les politistes eux-mêmes qui ne renouvellent guère leurs méthodes de travail.

e. Tout progrès demande la collaboration des usagers et des fournisseurs de la documentation, c'est-à-dire d'abord l'établissement d'un dialogue entre eux, nécessaire pour la meilleure connaissance de ce qu'est en réalité l'information scientifique.

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#### Notes

1. Voir les Reports of the American Psychological Association's Project on Scientific Information Exchange in Psychology, Washington, D.C., American Psychological Association, Vol. 1, 1963; Vol. 2, 1965; et cf. William J. PAISLEY, The Flow of (Behavioral) Science Information, a review of the research literature, Stanford University, Institute for Communication Research, November 1965, mimeo...
2. Liste mondiale des périodiques spécialisés dans les sciences sociales / World list of social science periodicals, 3e édition revue et augmentée, préparée par le Comité international pour la documentation des sciences sociales..., Paris, Unesco, 1966, 448 p. (Décrit 1295 périodiques.)
3. La Liste mondiale indexe sous "science politique" 88 périodiques; mais nous devons reconnaître qu'en appliquant des critères différents on aboutirait à d'autres chiffres. Il s'agit des revues qui traitent habituellement, entre autres, de science politique. Celles qui sont réellement spécialisées en science politique sont certainement en nombre moindre. Voir infra, note 7.
4. Donald MacRAE, "Royaume Uni", Revue internationale des sciences sociales 19(2), 1967, p. 276. Il s'agit d'un numéro spécial de cette revue, consacré par l'Unesco à étudier les périodiques de sciences sociales dans huit pays.

5. La Revue française de science politique a lancé une telle enquête en avril 1967; en trois mois, environ 5% des lecteurs y ont répondu. On notera que ce même pourcentage de réponses est présenté comme normal en l'espèce par P. Lengyel dans son "Introduction" au numéro (déjà cité note 4) de la Revue internationale des sciences sociales, p. 164.
6. Un compte rendu en est publié dans le même numéro de la Revue internationale des sciences sociales 19(2), 1967, pp. 293-295.
7. La liste récapitulative des revues régulièrement examinées compte, en 1967, 210 titres. Parmi ceux-ci 90 sont ceux de revues spécialisées : 35 étant consacrées à la seule science politique, 12 à la science politique en même temps qu'à une autre science humaine, et 43 à une branche de la science politique (administration, opinion publique, relations internationales...). Parmi les autres titres, 80 sont ceux de revues relevant d'une autre science sociale (sociologie, droit, etc.) et touchant occasionnellement la science politique; 40 sont ceux de revues générales. Bien entendu, tous ces chiffres résultent d'une évaluation dont l'auteur reconnaît qu'elle est subjective.
8. La place tenue par les comptes rendus de livres dans une revue peut se mesurer par le pourcentage du nombre total de pages (celles consacrées à la publicité commerciale étant exclues, même si elles sont paginées) que ces comptes rendus occupent dans les livraisons d'une année. En 1966, ces pourcentages s'établissent ainsi dans quelques grandes revues spécialisées : American Political Science Review, 19%; Western Political Quarterly, 27%; Political Studies, 25% (mais près de 50% si l'on fait entrer aussi en ligne de compte les "review articles"); Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 23%; Revue française de science politique, 28%. A titre de comparaison, on peut indiquer que le même calcul, fait en 1964 ou 1965, sur des revues de sociologie, donnait les résultats suivants : American Journal of Sociology, 23%; American Sociological Review, 29%; British Journal of Sociology, 22%; Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 15%; Revue française de sociologie, 21%.
9. Une liste de ces "Mises au point annuelles sur les progrès de la science et de la technique" est donnée par l'Unesco dans Impact, science et société 15(4), 1965, pp. 277-286.
10. Sur les aspects techniques de ce problème, voir Jean MEYRIAT, éd., Etude des bibliographies courantes des publications officielles nationales, Paris, Unesco, 1958, 260 p.
11. Voir DOCUMENTATION INCORPORATED, A Survey of the Acquisition of National Official Publications, Final Report to the Center for the Quantitative Study of Economic Structure and Growth of Yale University, Washington D.C., October 1961, 49 p., Appendices, mimeo.

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"The political scientist's problems  
of scientific information"

THE POLITICAL SCIENTIST'S PROBLEMS OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION

(WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES)

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The Political Scientist's Problems of  
Scientific Information

(with special reference to the developing countries)  
N. R. Dashpande (India)

The importance of scientific information in the pursuit of knowledge cannot be exaggerated. Scientific information poses two problems, one of gathering or collecting information and the other of using it. It has been argued that social scientists have been more concerned with gathering and analysing new data than in utilizing the data that has been gathered and recorded by others.<sup>1</sup> This trend perhaps reflects the emphasis on field work, empirical research and the general development of methodology in the social sciences. Such an emphasis is only to be welcomed by political scientists, particularly in the context of newer developments in the area of behavioral studies. Alongside of this, however, and more significant is the other important problem of the use of scientific information that may thus be collected or may have already been collected. This problem, involving the evolution of new methods and techniques to explore library resources and to control bibliographical data, has become all the more significant in this age of "information explosion."

The problems which the political scientists have to face in the matter of securing and using scientific information differ from

country to country, depending upon the stage of development of the social sciences generally in that country, the nature and extent of resources available to the academic community, the degree of sophistication attained by the scholars in the field and the extent of their communication within their own countries and with their counterparts in other countries. In general, the situation in this regard as it exists in the developing countries is materially different from that prevailing in the advanced countries. Basically, the developing countries are faced with difficulties of resources and organization, relative inflexibility of their academic structures, multiplicity of languages and lack of effective communication within the scholarly community. Against the background of these difficulties, the problem of scientific information acquires special importance for the political scientists of the developing countries because in their case such information in addition to its use for research, also stimulates general academic development.

#### Political Science Journals

The normal channels of communication between members of the political science fraternity are the Journals, some of which are usually sponsored by the Professional association of political scientists in the countries concerned. In a sense the Journal provides a fairly convenient barometer of the continuing progress of the political scientists in the field of scholarship; through its proper use the community of political scientists evaluates its own progress from time to time. Through the sophisticated techniques of

self-survey, journals in countries like U.S.A. have ascertained the responses of the scholars to their services, their felt needs and the improvements they seek. In the case of the developing countries, a basic survey of such a role of the Journals of Political Science needs to be undertaken to begin with.

Not all developing countries have professional associations of political scientists, nor do those that exist publish their separate Journals.<sup>2</sup> Learned articles, incorporating the results of research or conclusions of original thinking, are often published in Journals of Public Administration, Humanities and Social Sciences or separate University Research Journals. In India, the Indian Political Science Association publishes its own quarterly, the Journal of Indian Political Science, but articles on Political Science in India are published in a number of other Journals, the Indian Journal of Public Administration, India Quarterly, International Studies, the Journals of different Universities and magazines of long standing like Modern Review, Indian Review, etc.

Apart from the fact that many of the articles published in the different magazines, Journals and periodicals lack systematic documentation, the major difficulty which political scientists face in a country like India is the unevenness of the spread of these media in the country. The Indian Journal of Political Science works within a very limited financial budget and cannot, therefore, provide adequate opportunities for the growing body of political scientists to exchange ideas and communicate effectively through this medium.<sup>3</sup>

[The limitations on the resources and organization available to the Journal, and the periodic shifting of its office, create difficulties sometimes in maintaining the regularity of its publication.] But, because the political scientists look upon Journals as the normal channel for scholarly communication, there is a general trend towards increase in the number of Journals devoted to the discipline. Besides, the stress on empirical research brings into focus the need to study the problems of politics in terms of states and regions. The establishment of a number of colleges and universities in newer areas and the growing use of regional languages in education and administration also reinforce the tendency. As a result some new Journals of Political Science have appeared, for example in India, in different regions during the last few years.<sup>4</sup>

It is somewhat premature to generalise on the basis of this trend; time must elapse before the development can consolidate. But, the significance of the regional orientation of the new efforts in India cannot be ignored.<sup>5</sup> The development is welcome as it will stimulate further studies among political scientists of all levels. The difficulty arising out of multiple languages can be met through the publication of multi-language journals like Artha-Vijnana.<sup>6</sup> The real utility of the Journal will depend on its regularity in publication, good quality of articles and a link up through a national index into an inter-communicative network.

The problem of selection and evaluation of material that appears in Journals is always a crucial problem. But the dimension of the

problem in the developing countries is not the same as in the advanced countries. The number of journals in which articles in the field of political science are published in the developing countries is relatively small, and with a system of good indexing it should be possible for a scholar to have access to these journals and to get at the desired material. The difficulty which political scientists in the developing countries experience relates to the material that appears in foreign journals and to which they have no ready access. Even in India with its 64 Universities and a number of university-status institutes, this difficulty is commonly experienced. Not all important journals are available in the libraries, and in spite of the special grants offered during the Plan periods by the University Grants Commission, the universities are hard put to provide adequately, to replenish, their sections on journals and periodicals. There is lack of communication or lopsided communication between scholars in different countries. One of the consequences of this situation is the difficulty experienced by scholars <sup>in</sup> /country in following the language and style of articles in the field of political science published in some foreign journals.

Another aspect of the same problem of access to material in journals relates to the journals devoted to other disciplines. The appearance of separate journals for the different social science disciplines was an indication of the advance made by them in terms of scientific development. But with the methodological advances and the growth of inter-disciplinary focus on research in social sciences, it is becoming increasingly important for political scientists to learn from the work of sociologists, anthropologists, social psychologists and so on. What has been observed about journals in political science applies to the journals of the <sup>other</sup> /disciplines also. Since limitation of resources restricts the access to materials, it is

necessary to develop the 'abstracting' services as much as possible. The International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (Political Science) and the Abstracts provide access to a very few selected articles, especially from those published in the developing countries. The Southern Asia Social Science Bibliography, with annotations and abstracts, published by the UNESCO Research Center on Social and Economic Development in Southern Asia (Delhi) is also selective, but provides a wider coverage.<sup>7</sup> But even this service is now faced with the difficulty of finance.

### Bibliographies

The importance of bibliographic services from the point of new scientific information cannot be exaggerated. The science of bibliographic research is making great advances in the U. S. A. and in Europe,<sup>8</sup> the principal purpose being to systematically gather, analyse and organize "bibliographic information so as to aid the researcher in placing data in their proper context and in judging the availability relevance, reliability and comparability of a given source, as well as in controlling the data quality for purposes of comparison."<sup>9</sup> With incorporation of social science concepts and methods with those developed for physical sciences, and with advance in social science methodology, the difficulties with regard to evolving a scientific social science bibliographic system are likely to be got over and the use of machines for handling of bibliographic data facilitated. The discontinuation of bibliographies of articles and documents from the American Political Science Review from this year is significant as symbolising the impact of the technological revolution in the field of bibliographic services.<sup>10</sup>

While many journals often include bibliographic sections in their issues, some like the Journal of Asian Studies in the U. S. A. issue a special Bibliography number once a year. Though such a number has the

merit of providing annually a comprehensive bibliography for an area, to maintain such a service involves technical and financial layout which is not easily procurable. In India, the Political Science Journals do not provide any bibliography as such. India Quarterly lists the India books of the quarter in the field of social sciences in its issues, the International Studies includes an annual bibliography on India and World Affairs. Abstracts are published by the India Institute of Public Administration every month. Only very few abstracts of articles in the field of political science published in India receive attention in the international abstracts. The India National Scientific Documentation Centre (INSDOC) started publishing 'India Science Abstracts' because it was felt that the coverage of Indian documents in international abstracts was inadequate. The same situation would be developing in the field of Social Sciences. Abstracts can exercise effective bibliographic control of literature published in the country and provide feeder service to International abstracts.

Since limitation of resources including personnel, has restricted the scope of bibliographic research and services pertaining to political science scholars and/or administrators had to evolve their own bibliographic frameworks pertaining to their needs. A number of bibliographies, many of them annotated, have been published relating to particular problems or fields of political science, by scholars and institutions in the developing countries generally. <sup>12</sup> Quite often the research needs of (foreign) scholars have prompted such efforts and the bibliographies are comprehensive, including books, articles, etc. But, they are very useful for furthering study and research in the selected fields. The preparation of comprehensive and annotated bibliography on any particular field or problem, itself requires some experts and resources; but, this is how the data specialists are developed. Such a task would also stimulate development of interest in

particular areas and problems. The annotation, however, is an important element in such a service. Where a system combines abstracts of articles from selected journals with annotated bibliography of a variety of fields, the needs of many of the scholars would be fairly well met. It is, however, important to enable a scholar to obtain a copy of the article (or material) that is specially relevant to his interest at a minimal cost. It may be necessary to subsidize the supply of bibliographic services to political scientists in the developing countries at least for some time.

### NEWSPAPER USE.

The relevance of newspapers to the political scientists' problem of scientific information depends on the uses he makes of these, as a source of factual information, as an agency of public opinion, as a channel of communication and so on. A country like India has to face two basic problems with regard to newspaper material--storage and preservation, but, both these are technical problems. Multiplicity of languages adds to the dimension of the problems, but these have to be tackled by adoption of suitable technical devices like micro-filming etc. The use of newspapers for content-analysis has not made much progress in India so far, but this is a direction along which newspaper material may be increasingly used hereafter. Besides, newspapers are used for studies in Public opinion, Foreign Affairs and so on; and also as a medium to influence public opinion. In India, newspapers have the tradition of extensive reporting of Government documents, speeches of leading personalities, debates in political meetings, etc. which are always an important source of information to political scientists. The difficulty with regard to newspaper material is about locating it and about tracing its sources since the newspaper articles are rarely documented. The former can be met by a system of Index, the latter is more complex and requires closer acquaintance with the author or his writings. It is necessary to have more information about the writer, his background, influence at different levels of decision-making and any clues he gives to



sources of his information. The advancing reliance of bibliographic research should provide some techniques to meet the situations.

An Index of Periodical Literature can play an important role in the study and research activities of political scientists. It is necessary to be selective in the compilation of such periodical index, not in terms of language, but in terms of quality; and indexing as a criterion of quality may be suitably built into the process of compilation. Here a promising endeavor suffers for want of resources is well illustrated in the experience of the Indian News Index covering eight English dailies in India and published by the Punjab University Extension Library, Ladhiana.<sup>13</sup> Only the first volume of four issues covering 1965 was published and the publication had to be temporarily suspended to search for additional support.<sup>14</sup> It would certainly be worthwhile providing for the maintenance of a Periodical Indexing service and since a single Department or University is not likely to be able to cope up with the vast task, it may have to be taken up by a cooperative endeavor and financially underwritten by some foundation or Agency.<sup>15</sup>

#### Government Publications

Government publications have usually provided the raw material as well as points of reference to the political scientists in their scholarly pursuits. With the popularization of the concept of the Welfare State and the expanding network of government, the political scientists concern with governments' administration and implementation of policies has grown very fast. The growing interdependence of States and the growing impact of inter-state relations on the lives of citizens everywhere have been accompanied by growing realization on the part of governments of the need to secure popular acceptance, of government policies and programmes. As a result, governments put out publications in increasing quantities for political

education and propoganda. In many of the developing countries including India, which have accepted national planning as an instrument to achieve the goals of equality, liberty and justice, publications emanating from Government sources are increasing in quantity, making their selective use important for the political scientist.<sup>16</sup>

The political scientists' difficulties of selection with regard to government publications arise from the fact that these are not published with any regularity, they are neither properly indexed nor included in bibliographies published in periodicals,<sup>17</sup> and they are often delayed too long in publication.<sup>18</sup> Very often government presents important documents to members of parliament and these are very relevant to the political scientists' study of problems in public administration, government policy or foreign relations. There needs to be some device whereby such documents, as also the reports of various committees of legislatures or of those appointed by governments from time to time are properly indexed and incorporated in a bibliographical service,<sup>without such a device</sup> the political scientist would be denied knowledge of (or access to) a very important source of documentary information.<sup>19</sup> Besides, in many countries including India, there is restriction on the use of certain categories of government publications which are not supposed to be available to the public. There is information in the possession of government or administrative agencies which is not published, but which is in the nature of raw material for research purposes that may be of use to political scientists. Some economic or sociological information in the surveys undertaken by agencies in government or under the sponsorship of government is not published. If the universities or professional associations of the political scientists can have access to this material and permission to use it for academic research, the efforts devoted to the collection of such information would be amply rewarded.

### International Publications

In so far as the publications of inter-governmental organizations are concerned, with the coming into existence of the United Nations, documentation has proliferated on a big scale. This has opened up avenues of research into various areas of inter-governmental relations, but the problem of selection of relevant material and of easy access to it has also become very crucial. The U.N. has a number of depository libraries in the different countries where all U.N. documents are received. But, in many of the libraries in the developing countries, due to limited resources, the political scientists cannot get adequate services out of these documents. Besides, the location of these depository libraries at a few places distant from the many university centres works to the disadvantage of scholars working in those centres. Only through a scheme of travel grants or fellowships can political scientists make effective use of the international publications.

The principal use that a political scientist makes of intergovernmental publication, apart from its use as an authentic source of factual information, is for the study of the working of international institutions or any aspect of international <sup>cooperation</sup> or as a frame of reference for the study of any political institution or process. The problem of fundamental rights has often been studied with reference to the U.N.'s work in the field of the Human Rights, for which the U.N. itself provides a convenient reference through its Human Rights year books and other material. Such a convenient reference is not available for many other problem areas where the difficulty of access becomes a major handicap to research in these fields.

### General Observations

In substance, the political scientist's problems of scientific information in the developing countries are mainly those that arise out of limited resources and unevenness of development. While the political scientist's of these countries generally find difficulty in securing access to scientific information, particularly to information contained in foreign publications, the difficulty is felt more acutely by scholars in certain areas (not in metropolitan centres) than in others. Even the knowledge about material is not widespread, so the awareness of the difficulty is uneven. A greater awareness of the difficulty indicates the beginning of development which may become more uneven in the early stages of the process. This should not be allowed to mean denial of opportunities to those who seek them.<sup>20</sup> In the developing countries today, one finds a number of political scientists who are interested in promoting the scientific study of politics through newer methods and empirical research. Their number may be small but their role is important because they act as catalytic agents for the development of the discipline in these countries.<sup>21</sup> They have to maintain communication with the scholars in foreign countries as well as in their own. It is, therefore, necessary that the flow of channels of scholarly communication within the country and outside--which principally are the Journals and Periodicals--is well maintained.

The problems which the political scientists face in the developing societies are not peculiar to our discipline, though the fact that political science was somewhat late in developing as an independent discipline in certain countries like India may to some extent explain the extent of the problem as it exists there. But, most of the social sciences are faced with the problems of limited resources, uneven development, linguistic (or

cultural) heterogeneity and the lack of effective communication between members of the scholarly community. Besides, there is often the inhibiting influence of administrative attitudes on the academic work resulting from the rigid structuring of educational institutions.<sup>22</sup> Some of these handicaps will disappear with changing attitudes in the long-term process of development. But, immediately to meet the problems of scientific information it seems that all the social scientists in the developing countries will have to work in cooperation to utilise the limited resources to the maximum possible extent. Such a cooperation would be particularly valuable in developing the 'abstracts' and annotated bibliography services and in working out schemes for making material available evenly in the country through inter-institutional arrangements.<sup>23</sup> Only through such cooperation can the problems of multiplicity of language be also tackled and inter-disciplinary research stimulated in newer areas.

## NOTES

1. See Koh Hsueung Chun, "A Social Science Bibliographic System: Orientation and Framework." Behavior Science Notes I 3, p. 145.
2. The political scientists in the Philippines, for example, do not have a journal of their own. The Philippine Journal of Public Administration serves as forum for political scientists also.
- 2A. Important articles presenting the results of research or the conclusions of genuine thinking have been published in The Economic Weekly, now called the Economic and Political Weekly, Bombay.
3. According to its annual report for 1964, the Indian Journal of Political Science had 278 individual subscribers, 234 institutional subscribers (most of which include colleges and universities), 72 foreign subscribers and 326 enrolled through Central News Agency. The total budget for 1966 was Rs. 9,500.00 only (i.e. about \$1,266.00).
4. Thus, for example, The Political Science Review (Rajasthan University, Jaipur), Rajvidya (Universities of the four Southern States of India), Political Scientist (Ranchi University, Bihar) and the Indian Political Science Review (University of Delhi, Delhi) have appeared in the years 1962, April 1964, December 1964 and March 1967. Incidentally, these four journals are published in universities located in the North, South, East and Northwest regions of India respectively.
5. The Rajvidya seeks to bring to the notice of its readers the state of political studies in our region and other places, significant contributions to social studies by local and foreign scholars, books and periodicals of interest to students of government and politics and relevant

- information likely to enrich teaching and research." Rajvidya I, no. 1, p. 2.
6. The Artha Vijnana is a quarterly journal of the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Poona (India), started in March, 1959 and contains articles in English or in any Indian language. The articles in Indian languages are printed in Devanagari script and all articles carry English and Hindi summaries. The Journal is expected not only to "serve as a link between research workers at the Institute and their colleagues in India and abroad, but also contribute to the efforts of Indian scholars to build up a tradition of research work and communication through the media of Indian languages." See Artha Vijnana VIII 3.
  7. Among the periodicals covered by the International Bibliography of Political Science for 1963, only 28 are published in India; of these about half a dozen are directly related to fields of political science. The Southern Asia Social Science Bibliography published by the UNESCO Research Centre for the same year lists 65 Indian periodicals in the fields of all Social Sciences.
  8. Gurw, Ted and Hans Panofsky (eds.), "Information Retrieval in The Social Sciences: Problems, Programs, and Proposals." The American Behavioral Scientist, VII(10) June, 1964.
  - 11 Janda, Kenneth (ed), "Advances in Information Retrieval in the Social Sciences" Parts I and II. The American Behavioral Scientist, X(5 & 6), January and February 1967.
  9. Koh, op. cit., p. 146.
  10. American Political Science Review, LXI No. 1, p. 155.
  11. Indian National Scientific Documentation Centre, I, no. 1, January 1965.

12. Thus, The Indian Institute of Public Administration<sup>ion</sup>, the National Institute of Community Development, the Indian Council of World Affairs, etc. have issued separate bibliographies, some with annotations and abstracts, dealing with particular problems of their interest.
13. See, Indian News Index - A Quarterly Subject Guide to Selected English Newspapers of India; Panjab University Extension Library, Ludhiana (Editor: S.S. Lal).
14. See, Lal, S.S., "Indian News Index: The Story of an Experiment." South Asian Library and Research Notes, Vol. III No. 4, December 1966. Educational Resources Center, New Delhi,
15. Whether some of the surplus PL 480 funds in South Asia can be made available to a multi-national agency for such a purpose may be worth exploring.
16. A growing amount of literature put out by governments in the developing societies is meant primarily to inform public opinion and influence it thereby. This provides one of the bases for the study of public opinion agencies in modern states. But, apart from this the political scientist has to select, primarily with reference to his research interest and the effective utility of the material available, from the mass of government publications.
17. The India Journal of Public Administration does include in its issues a list of recent official publications of importance of the Government of India as well as the State Governments.
18. The Election Commission Reports in India, though fairly comprehensive, have taken some years after the elections to be available. The administration reports of the different departments of Governments in India have not been published with regularity. The proceedings of the



legislatures are generally published verbatim. But, committee proceedings are not often published. (In the Philippines, even reports of all committees are not published.)

19. The Indian Council of World Affairs brings out an annual publication: Documents on India, containing select documents on India's internal and external affairs. These include Government documents as also speeches and statements of important personalities. The first volume of documents for 1960 (with 81 on internal and 64 on external affairs) was published in 1965.
20. The claims of development and justice often conflict in the early stages of development and the policy-makers have a very delicate task in securing a balance between the two in the overall interest of the community. In the field of University education, the University Grants Commission in India attempts such a policy through setting up Advanced Centres of Study in certain subjects at particular University Centres while supporting the overall development of universities throughout the country.
21. Apart from the scholars working in the universities and university-status Institutes, special mention may be made of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in New Delhi which is giving a great impetus to empirical research and scientific development of politics.
22. The scholars have sometimes to work under conditions which do not stimulate greater effort in search after information. Library policies are decided by university administration and academic considerations are not often the decisive factor influencing administration decisions, whether in buying material or using it.

23. Since colleges and universities cannot all subscribe to the journals and periodicals, the system of inter-library loan arrangement is used by Indian universities and colleges in some areas for which purpose a union catalogue of such periodicals is prepared and maintained. But such a service can be really effective only when it operates over wider areas (which involves costs of postage, etc.), and is supplemented by abstracts and/or annotated bibliography.

As a footnote one may add that scholars in the developing countries get help and assistance in the matter of obtaining scientific information through libraries set up by foreign information services or foreign educational foundations. To mention about experience in India, the Asia Foundation, the United States Information Services, the American Studies Research Centre have enabled Indian scholars to obtain American publications including periodicals or to have easier access to them. The British council libraries provide somewhat similar facilities with regard to British publications. But such facilities, valuable in themselves, underscore the difficulties of the developing societies. In the first place, these activities tend to get limited in scope by the limited amounts of grants made by governments and foundations. Secondly, the operative effectiveness of these services is limited geographically to the area near the location of the centres (or libraries) which are a handful in the whole country; this leads to unevenness of access to material. The American Studies Research Centre attempts to meet this difficulty to some extent by providing travel grants and fellowships. Another method used to reach a wider audience is through the periodic publication and wide circulation of acquisition lists and facilities to readers to get material through inter-library loan service. Besides, the Centre gets xerox copies of periodical articles made in the U.S. when needed by scholars in India and sent to the centre library by airmail. It seems that for some more time, until collection of periodicals in microfilm is developed, reliance will have to be placed on available helpful services. The extension of such services in area and depth is one line for immediate consideration.

(In writing this note I have relied mainly on my experience of the situation in India. I had, however, the benefit of discussions with Dr. Remigio E. Agpalo, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of the Philippines; Dr. Ralph Pieris, Head of the Department of Sociology, University of Ceylon -- both Senior Specialists at the East-West Centre, and Dr. Richard Kozicki, South Asia Specialist, East-West Centre, Honolulu, for which I am grateful to all of them. For the views expressed in the note, I alone am responsible.)

Summary

A presentation of the Indian political scientist's difficulties illustrates those found in most developing countries; and actually in most of the social sciences: limited resources, uneven development, linguistic (or cultural) heterogeneity, lack of effective communication between scholars. To overcome some of these difficulties, the social scientists in the developing countries will have to work in cooperation to utilise their limited resources to a maximum extent.

Résumé

Les difficultés rencontrées par les politistes indiens illustrent celles constatées dans la plupart des pays en voie de développement, et en fait dans la plupart des sciences sociales : ressources limitées, développement inégal, hétérogénéité linguistique (ou culturelle), manque de communications efficaces entre spécialistes. Pour surmonter certains de ces obstacles, les spécialistes des sciences sociales des pays en voie de développement devront organiser leur coopération de façon à utiliser au mieux leurs ressources limitées.

Br/Information/2

"Le politiste et ses problèmes d'information  
scientifique"

LES JOURNAUX

Roland Ruffieux  
Université de Lausanne

ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE  
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## Le politiste et ses problèmes d'information scientifique:

### LES JOURNAUX

Roland Ruffieux, professeur à l'Université de Lausanne

L'usage par le politiste des cinq catégories de documents retenus par M.J. Meyriat, dans sa note préliminaire, présente des aspects communs qui relèvent de la méthodologie des sciences sociales (1). Il retiendront moins notre attention que les problèmes particuliers auxquels la recherche politologique doit faire face quand elle utilise la presse d'opinion et d'information. D'autre part, nous avons inclus dans l'information scientifique les principales opérations de la critique, considérant que le choix des documents s'opère en fonction de la technique qu'on va leur appliquer. L'éventail de ces techniques est assez réduit, comme on le verra, ce qui conduit le politiste à émettre des vœux pour que la situation s'améliore, au niveau de la documentation certes, mais surtout des moyens matériels qui l'alimentent.

#### Prééminence de la presse écrite parmi les moyens d'information

La singularité des problèmes d'information que la presse pose au politiste tient avant tout à la situation de la presse écrite dans l'éventail des moyens d'information: il n'est pas exagéré d'affirmer qu'elle est prééminente sous l'angle qualitatif et quantitatif. La remarque la plus élémentaire qu'il convient de faire concerne les rapports entre les journaux et l'opinion publique. Du moment que la tradition orale a perdu toute valeur dans la société industrielle en raison du perfectionnement des techniques de reproduction, c'est la presse écrite

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1) M. Duverger: Méthodes de la science politique, Paris 1959 (Collection "Thémis") pp. 143-307; R. Pinto et M. Grawitz: Méthodes des sciences sociales, Paris 1964, (Précis Dalloz), T. II, Livre III, pp. 467-537.

qui constitue la source principale des études sur l'opinion, la presse audio-visuelle n'ayant pas encore développé toutes ses virtualités, et les autres catégories de documents, cités par le rapporteur général, revêtant une importance très secondaire par les faits d'opinion. Quelle que soit la définition qu'on donne de l'opinion publique (2), elle a des rapports étroits avec celle de son principal support matériel: le journal. Citons par exemple G. Berger pour qui l'opinion publique est consciente, porteuse d'une intention de rationalité, différenciée, plus qu'une simple affirmation théorique et, pour tout résumer, indiscutablement sociale (3).

Cette fonction sociale permet d'établir une deuxième distinction entre les journaux et les autres documents utiles au politiste. Une des caractéristiques de l'actuelle société de masses est de substituer les relations secondaires aux relations primaires, le véhicule consistant dans les "mass media". A nouveau, on peut constater que revues, périodiques, publications gouvernementales et supragouvernementales relèvent également de la communication indirecte et collective mais que, seule, la presse d'opinion et d'information revêt la forme d'un langage social, au sens large du terme (4). Dans l'ensemble de la presse, les journaux ont perdu le monopole d'annoncer la nouvelle et d'énoncer une opinion au profit de la radio et de la télévision. Ils n'en conservent pas moins des avantages dont le caractère est déterminant pour le chercheur: leur extension - les pages du plus petit journal offrent toujours un espace plus grand que le temps d'une émission -, leur diversification et surtout leur permanence. Sur ce dernier point, l'avantage de l'imprimé est absolu par rapport à la tradition orale: comme le faisait remarquer A. Siegfried, "celui qui lit est maître de son rythme". L'avantage n'est que relatif vis-à-vis des moyens audio-visuels, relatif mais certain. P. Lazarsfeld a fait observer, à propos de la distinction entre journal et radio, qu' "on veut lire ce qu'on

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2) Voir à ce propos A. Girard: L'opinion publique et la presse, Paris, Institut d'études politiques, cours de 1958/59 (Les Cours de droit) T.I, pp;35-39. 3) L'opinion publique, phénomène humain dans L'opinion publique, Paris, 1957 (Centre de sciences politiques de l'Institut d'études juridiques de Nice), pp.11-23. Voir également le classique de W. Lippman: Public Opinion New York, 1922. 4) A. Girard: op.cit. pp.18-30.



a entendu" et B.Voyenne, qui le cite, ajoute, à l'égard de la télévision, qu' "on veut entendre ce qu'on a vu" (5) Les journaux ont donc sur les autres documents de presse (7) un avantage certain.

Un troisième caractère distinctif des journaux, par rapport aux autres moyens d'information inscrits au programme de cette réunion, concerne leur mode de production (8). L'industrialisation croissante de la presse, sa commercialisation sont une autre conséquence de l'avènement de la société de masses. Le phénomène s'explique également par le fait que le développement de la presse d'information et d'opinion s'est accompli surtout grâce à l'initiative privée et selon le principe de la libre entreprise. Dans une large mesure, elle continue à puiser son dynamisme à de telles sources, ce qui a permis à B.Voyenne de la définir comme

" une industrie de synthèse ayant pour objet la collecte, l'élaboration, le conditionnement et la vente des nouvelles, ainsi que de leurs commentaires." (9)

Ni les publications scientifiques ni les écrits officiels n'ont ce caractère commercial. On peut ajouter que l'organisation industrielle de la presse est également à mettre en liaison avec les progrès techniques constants accomplis depuis la découverte de l'imprimerie. D'autre part, la commercialisation de cette activité répond, de son côté, aux exigences culturelles accrues de la population. A cet égard, le journal a constitué et constitue encore un des meilleurs moyens de lutte contre l'analphabétisme, comme on le constate dans les pays neufs.

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5) La presse dans la société contemporaine. Paris, 1962 (Collection U), pp. 21-22

7) A ce propos, voir les chapitres consacrés aux moyens récents d'enregistrement des témoignages - cinéma, machines parlantes - dans C. Samaran e.a.: L'histoire et ses méthodes, Paris, 1965 (Encyclopédie de la Pléiade), pp. 802-819; 1390-1417.

8) Pour l'ensemble de la question, voir G. Weill: Le journal, origines, évolution et rôle de la presse politique. Paris, 1934, (L'évolution de l'humanité, 94) Meyer F.: Newspaper Business Management. New York, 1954, X - 438 p.

9) Op.cit., p. 30.

Une quatrième différence entre les journaux et les autres moyens d'information touche la place qu'ils occupent dans la vie politique. Elle est importante comme l'atteste le rôle joué par la presse dans la lutte pour l'établissement, puis le développement, des institutions démocratiques, plus précisément en ce qui regarde la liberté d'opinion et d'expression. Il en résulte que la presse d'opinion et d'information est la source privilégiée du politiste en raison même des liens étroits qu'elle entretient avec l'activité politique. Les revues de science politique et les périodiques bibliographiques spécialisées sont avant tout instruments de travail scientifique et, si leur valeur peut être inégale, l'intention qui préside à leur élaboration est généralement pure de tout calcul politique. Il n'en va pas de même pour les publications d'origine gouvernementale et internationale qui traduisent directement les opinions politiques des institutions qui les élaborent. Entre ces deux extrêmes, la presse d'opinion et d'information occupe une position échelonnée de part et d'autre d'un point d'équilibre idéal qui pourrait se définir comme une "objectivité passionnée".

C'est par l'effet de toutes ces distinctions et surtout de la dernière que la situation du politiste est singulière lorsqu'il utilise la presse comme source et base de son information. L'ordre démocratique, fondé sur le consensus et la loi de la majorité, repose sur la conviction que les actions doivent se déterminer moins par les choses que par l'opinion qu'on s'en fait. Le fondement de l'autorité repose dans l'opinion publique et la presse qui la reflète, par une multitude d'images partielles, contribue à fortifier ou à ébranler cette autorité. La presse participe donc à ce qu'on appelle l'empire de l'opinion (10). Cette situation place le politiste dans une situation particulièrement délicate, lorsqu'il utilise les journaux comme moyens d'information. La "politisation" inévitable de la presse exige qu'il redouble de précautions à tous les niveaux de la démarche critique.

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10) Rappelons que pour Locke, il y a une troisième loi de la société - celle de l'opinion précisément -; on a parlé également à son sujet de "quatrième pouvoir". La pensée de Pascal résume bien l'essentiel: "l'opinion est comme la reine du monde".

Une bibliographie tiraillée entre l'érudition et le commerce

La démarche préalable à toute recherche politologique est d'ordre bibliographique, la bibliographie constituant elle-même une opération critique. Dans le domaine de la presse d'information et d'opinion, il faut reconnaître que le politiste, loin de manquer d'instruments, est dans une situation d'abondance qui doit le mettre en éveil. Pour le spécialiste de bibliographie, le journal relève du genre des périodiques, c'est-à-dire de publications caractérisées par la discontinuité et l'indétermination du contenu établi en collectivité, par l'indétermination de la durée de publication, enfin par la régularité de la périodicité (11). L.N.Malclès le définit ainsi:

" (il) désigne de nos jours une publication d'information rapide, servant l'actualité "toute chaude" politique, scientifique, littéraire ou sportive. Sa périodicité est très rapprochée et va du quotidien à l'hebdomadaire dont la substance est plus dense et plus digérée. Il est souvent, en même temps qu'un informateur, un organe de propagande et un véhicule de publicité." (12)

Information, propagande, publicité, ces objectifs différents de la presse contribuent également à expliquer qu'il existe deux catégories parmi les bibliographies générales ou spéciales traitant la matière. Il y a, d'une part, les bibliographies à caractère historique ou scientifique, qui représentent des travaux sérieux, savants même " dûs à des spécialistes qui sont garants de leur qualité". En second lieu, on trouve les bibliographies à caractère commercial, qui sont produites par des agences de publicité ou des associations de presse, "inspirées par des intérêts pratiques commerciaux", en ce sens que l'exhaustivité n'est pas assurée et que les données fournies, souvent dans un but publicitaire, sont loin d'être absolument sûres (13).

Cette dualité risque de dérouter le politiste. On la trouve

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11) Les sources du travail bibliographique. Genève/Lille/Paris, 1950-58, T.I, chap.X Périodiques, pp.238-239.

12) Ibid. p.246.

13) Malclès:op.cit. p.243.

déjà dans les travaux sur la production internationale. Les synthèses de Bömer (14) et Dofivat (15) relèvent de la meilleure tradition bibliographique allemande. En revanche, la valeur scientifique de l'ouvrage de Vogelsang (16) est moindre: ce bottin édité par le Börsenverein de Leipzig a un caractère plutôt commercial. Il en va de même pour la plupart des bibliographies nationales qu'on peut également répartir entre les deux catégories, comme le fait L.N. Malcolès. Convient-il que le politiste se limite à la consultation des seules séries scientifiques? Nous ne le croyons pas. Tout d'abord, les bibliographies de la première série ont un caractère nettement historique qui les fait s'arrêter parfois au XIX<sup>ème</sup> siècle, comme le Hatin (17) pour la France et le Kirchner (18) pour l'Allemagne. Outre leur actualité, les bibliographies dites commerciales ont le grand avantage d'être souvent annuelles (19) et d'apporter des renseignements techniques et financiers que la bibliographie traditionnelle méprise. La meilleure solution réside donc dans la consultation des deux séries.

Ce n'est pas tout. Le politiste doit compléter ses recherches en remontant à la forme la plus générale de la discipline: la bibliographie des bibliographies. Dans l'ouvrage de H. Bohatta et F. Hodes, il trouvera une liste de bibliographies concernant les périodiques et les journaux (20).

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- 14) Bibliographisches Handbuch der Zeitungswissenschaft. Leipzig, 1929, 344 S.
  - 15) Handbuch der Auslandspresse. Hrsg. v. Institut f. Publizistik d. Freien Universität Berlin unter Leitung v. E. Dofivat. Bonn, Köln, 1960, XV, 907 S.
  - 16) Adressbuch der fremdsprachigen Zeitschriften und Zeitungen... Leipzig, 1927, XV, 544 p.
  - 17) Bibliographie historique et critique de la presse périodique française... Paris, 1866.
  - 18) Das deutsche Zeitschriftenwesen, seine Geschichte und seine Probleme. Wiesbaden, 1958. B.I. Von den Anfänger bis z. Zeitalter d. Romantik.
  - 19) Voir la liste chez Malcolès: op.cit. pp. 243 ss.
  - 20) Internationale Bibliographie der Bibliographien. Eine Nachschlagewerk ... Frankfurt, 1950, S. 73-87.

Une autre ressource quasi inépuisable réside dans les catalogues de bibliothèques, qui comprennent tous une division des périodiques. Est-ce à dire que la situation soit satisfaisante et la démarche facile? Nous n'oserions l'affirmer du moment que la bibliographie des périodiques fait encore le souci des spécialistes. La diversité des formules employées pour les répertoires, l'ampleur des fonds ne sont pas sans entraver la recherche et un spécialiste aussi éminent que L.N.Malclès a précisé quelle pourrait être la solution la plus pratique:

" Pour l'information courante: Un Annuaire national officiel, rédigé par un organisme habilité et faisant connaître régulièrement d'une part les périodiques vivants, de l'autre, les disparus de l'année, serait un instrument de recherches indispensable. Il pourrait présenter, à part, les nouveaux périodiques. Il séparerait encore les journaux quotidiens et hebdomadaires, des revues; le classement serait fait par titres avec tables systématiques et géographiques." (21)

A cette approche purement bibliographique, il est utile d'ajouter une information sur le journal, la presse, les agences et le journalisme. Dans le premier cas, au classique de Weill, on peut ajouter l'étude d'O. Groth (22). Pour l'entreprise complexe que constitue la presse, deux approches sont possibles: un manuel, par exemple celui de Voyenne, avec la présentation didactique; une monographie de recherche qui saisit l'ensemble de la presse mondiale en action (23). Pour les agences sur lesquelles la littérature abonde, signalons l'enquête de l'UNESCO (24) et, dans un genre tout différent, l'essai de Frédéric sur l'AFP (25). Enfin, les nombreuses études sur le journalisme peuvent faire l'objet d'un choix, grâce à la bibliographie de Cannon (26). Il importe de ne pas perdre de vue que cette information préalable est destinée à faciliter l'accès aux sources mêmes.

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21) Op.cit. p.

22) O.Groth: Die Zeitung. Mannheim, 1928-30, Bd. I-IV.

23) J.Kayser: Une Semaine dans le Monde... Paris, UNESCO, 1953, 131p. One Day in the World's Press. Fourteen Great Newspapers on a Day of Crisis. Ed. ... by W.Schramm, Stanford University Press, 1959, 133 p.

24) Les Agences Télégraphiques d'Information. Paris, UNESCO, 1953, 230 p.

25) Un siècle de chasse aux nouvelles ... Paris, 1959, 444 p.

26) Journalism. A bibliography. New York, 1924, 360 p.

Conservation des témoignages et conditions de l'heuristique

A qui manipule de nombreuses collections de journaux, une réalité saute aux yeux: la fragilité matérielle de ce type de document. Pour le directeur de bibliothèque, ce souci va de pair avec le volume croissant des collections. Sur ce point, il convient cependant d'apporter quelques nuances. L'expansion récente de la presse s'est accompagnée d'un mouvement de concentration qui a notablement diminué le nombre des titres, du moins dans les pays avancés. En général, les collections de la presse d'opinion du XXème siècle représentent un nombre d'unités bibliographiques inférieur à l'effectif des collections du siècle précédent où le taux de mortalité était beaucoup plus élevé. Les publications récentes ont plus de volume, en raison du développement de la publicité, mais la création de magasins spéciaux et surtout l'emploi des "compactus" remédient assez facilement à cet inconvénient. En général, le chercheur doit s'attendre à des lacunes d'autant plus larges qu'il remonte plus haut dans le temps: le politiste est donc moins défavorisé que l'historien.

Un autre obstacle, plus sérieux, tient souvent à l'organisation administrative des bibliothèques. Dans la plupart des pays, le seul institut à détenir l'ensemble des collections de journaux est la bibliothèque centrale. Cela tient souvent à sa fonction de conservatoire de la production nationale et, accessoirement, à la législation en vigueur concernant le dépôt légal. Ainsi la loi française du 29 juillet 1881 ne prévoit-elle la remise de quatre exemplaires seulement (27). Dans le cas de la Suisse, il n'y a pas de législation fédérale sur le dépôt légal et la Bibliothèque nationale en est réduite à prendre les journaux en abonnement. Ce qui frappe donc c'est la rareté des collections à double, même dans les bibliothèques centrales. Les chercheurs opérant dans les bibliothèques universitaires risquent de se voir réduit à quelques journaux importants. La situation est un peu meilleure pour les recherches effectuées dans des bibliothèques régionales sur la presse locale. Nous ne parlerons pas des

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27) art.10. Journal officiel du 30 juillet 1881.

difficultés que peut soulever l'état matériel des collections: numéros manquants, absence de reliure, non-conservation des éditions régionales, car elles touchent aux problèmes de documentation.

Pour une meilleure identification des journaux

Les conditions de l'heuristique ne sont pas très différentes pour les journaux et pour les autres catégories d'imprimés. Les difficultés commencent au niveau de la critique externe. Ni les fichiers ni les bibliographies ne permettent, en effet, d'identifier complètement les journaux. Les règles catalographiques sont celles des périodiques et les bibliothécaires se contentent de les appliquer: on ne saurait leur faire grief de ne pas pousser plus loin leur travail.

Or, le politiste a besoin d'autres données que les critères bibliothéconomiques habituels. Dans son remarquable ouvrage sur Le Quotidien français (28), Jacques Kayser a précisé les règles d'identification applicables à la presse au niveau de la critique externe. L'ancien directeur adjoint de l'Institut français de presse, qui a fait œuvre de pionnier dans le domaine, proposait que le classement géographique et historique - qui se dégage généralement des catalogues et des bibliographies - soit complété par une approche à la fois "personnaliste" et morphologique du journal. Dans le premier domaine, il s'agissait de dresser la fiche signalétique et le dossier de chaque journal. Cette fiche signalétique comporte quinze données, relativement aisées à déceler et fournissant l'état-civil de la publication. Elles vont des indications tirées du journal lui-même, en réponse à des exigences légales, à des données moins explicites, telles que la zone principale de diffusion (point 6), les caractéristiques exceptionnelles de la vie du journal (point 13), le lieu de conservation des collections (point 14), les fichiers ou dossiers (point 15). L'auteur reconnaît que cette fiche "conçue pour répondre aux besoins des chercheurs, diffère substantiellement de celle que pourraient concevoir, par exemple, des archivistes et des bibliothécaires" (29).

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28) Paris, 1963 (Cahiers de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 122), XII-169 p.

29) Id. p.39

Il applique ensuite sa méthode aux principaux quotidiens français parais-  
sant en 1963 (30).

Quant au dossier d'identité, qui constitue un autre aspect de  
la personnalité du journal, il comprend cinq parties qui reprennent les  
titres de chapitres du questionnaire établi et diffusé, quelques années  
auparavant par l'Institut français de presse (31). Ce sont, dans l'ordre,  
la structure juridique et financière, les conditions de fabrication, les  
conditions de distribution, l'organisation de la rédaction, la ligne et  
l'action politique (32). Les exemples donnés par J. Kayser soulignent la  
difficulté croissante d'obtenir des informations précises sur ces points  
si l'on ne dispose pas de possibilités de recoupement et même d'accès à  
des renseignements confidentiels. La démarche de l'auteur se poursuit par  
une analyse morphologique du journal et par des conseils méthodologiques;  
cette partie de l'ouvrage concerne plus les études de presse proprement  
dites que l'utilisation des journaux comme source de science politique -  
nous y reviendrons d'ailleurs plus loin.

Dans la préface au Quotidien français, P. Renouvin a souligné  
l'importance de cette "initiation méthodologique" (33) dont la portée ne  
se limite pas à définir des règles de critique externe. En soulignant le  
caractère réaliste de cette entreprise, on regrettera seulement que son  
auteur n'ait pu la mener à chef. C'est donc au "cahier de doléances" du  
chercheur de presse qu'il faut encore inscrire ces points. L'établisse-  
ment d'un fichier rétrospectif de la presse pour chaque pays, selon le  
modèle proposé par J. Kayser, en est un des plus importants. On peut ajou-  
ter la constitution de dossiers d'identité pour les principaux journaux  
qui sont utilisés par les politistes. Cela suppose que les instituts  
d'études de la presse reçoivent des moyens adéquats.

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30) Id. pp. 39-65.

31) Etudes de presse, nouvelle série, 1955, vol. VIII, n° 13, pp. 174 ss.

32) Le Quotidien français, pp. 66-75.

33) Id. p. XI



En employant le terme de critique externe, nous nous sommes référé à la critique historique dont

"les principes, dans ce qu'ils ont de général, ne diffèrent d'ailleurs pas de ceux de toute connaissance humaine, tels qu'on les trouve dans tout traité de logique et de psychologie." (34)

Il est bien évident qu'un travail sur la presse dispense de l'écotique - ou critique de restitution - pour accorder la priorité à la critique de provenance qui met en lumière la date, le lieu et l'auteur du témoignage, toutes circonstances qui, dans l'entreprise de presse, sont loin d'être aussi faciles à établir qu'il ne le paraît de prime abord. La distinction classique des historiens entre auteur et rédacteur retrouve, par exemple, toute son importance et le politiste pourra exercer sa sagacité pour deviner qui a rédigé tel éditorial signé collectivement, etc.

Un dernier aspect de la critique interne mériterait un long développement: celui du classement critique des sources. Comme on le sait, dans ce domaine, la plus grande innovation de la critique moderne est probablement d'avoir remplacé le choix empirique du "bon" manuscrit par le classement généalogique des manuscrits et la recherche des meilleures leçons, grâce au système des stemmas (35). Une méthode analogue pourrait être appliquée à la diffusion des nouvelles et à la genèse du commentaire. En effet, si les conditions techniques et financières de la production des nouvelles par les agences sont connues, la "réception" de celles-ci par les journaux et leur traitement demeurent mal connus. D'autre part, pour un grand nombre d'articles, les éléments d'information sont mêlés à des prises de position partisans: ce "mixage", qui tend à devenir la règle, n'a pas encore été vraiment étudié.

#### De l'exactitude des faits à leur intelligence

Tout invite donc le politiste à ne pas s'arrêter au niveau de la critique externe, si érudite soit-elle. Une raison est qu'il étudie

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34) R. Marichal: La critique des témoignages dans L'histoire et ses méthodes, p.1248.

35) Id. pp.1276 ss.

rarement la presse pour elle-même. Mais la principale demeure qu'il a besoin de retrouver la réalité sous l'enveloppe du document. On entre alors dans le domaine de la critique interne, celle de sincérité et d'exactitude. La démarche peut consister en une série de questions posées au texte analysé. Il s'agit d'établir si la présentation d'un fait politique par un auteur correspond bien à la réalité, si l'affirmation de telle opinion politique exprime la conviction sincère de celui qui la professe. On connaît la double série de questionnaires minutieux que Seignobos avait élaboré pour aboutir à l'objectivité (36). Il faut reconnaître d'emblée la difficulté qu'il y aurait d'appliquer au domaine politologique ces chefs d'oeuvre de "défiance méthodique" qui aboutissent d'ailleurs à des résultats négatifs.

Il serait toutefois excessif de condamner une telle démarche. En ce qui regarde l'exactitude des faits, le politiste aura beaucoup à tirer de la règle de concordance des témoignages indépendants quand il utilise la presse: il sera bon qu'il se défie de certaines sonnées chronologiques dont l'exactitude n'a jamais vraiment été établie. La démarche strictement positiviste de Seignobos aboutit, en revanche, à l'impasse, quand il s'agit du fait d'opinion. La sincérité de l'auteur devient alors une donnée toute relative puisque le journaliste est non seulement influencé par tout un environnement politique, mais qu'il est appointé pour "habiller" des opinions. Dans de tels cas, les six tests de sincérité de Seignobos (37) ne sont guère applicables.

A vouloir les utiliser, on aboutirait probablement aux "pages blanches" que Marrou présentait comme le produit de "l'histoire strictement conforme aux exigences positivistes". De même, Febvre et les tenants

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36) Introduction aux études historiques. Paris, 1909 (4ème éd.).

37) Les voici pour mémoire: l'auteur a intérêt à mentir; l'auteur a été placé dans une situation qui le force à mentir; l'auteur a eu une sympathie ou une antipathie pour un groupe d'hommes... ou pour un ensemble de doctrines ou d'institutions; l'auteur a été entraîné à mentir par la vanité individuelle ou collective; l'auteur a voulu plaire au public ou du moins a voulu éviter de le choquer; l'auteur a essayé de plaire au public par des artifices littéraires.

de l'école des Annales l'ont affirmé avec force, ce qui compte ce n'est pas seulement le fait physique, mais également l'intention qui rend l'acte " à la fois perceptible et intelligible ", selon la formule de R. Aron. Cette intelligibilité doit être le principal objectif du politiste dans sa démarche de critique interne, car la politique peut être éclairée par la connaissance des attitudes intellectuelles et morales, par la mise en lumière de l'environnement économique et social. La science politique peut donc largement profiter de la nouvelle orientation de la recherche historique. Marrou a brillamment démontré que c'est en fonction du présent que l'historien étudie le passé (38); il est tout indiqué au politiste de s'engager dans les mêmes voies, lui qui étudie le présent en fonction du présent.

#### Quelques exemples de convergence méthodologique

Dans toutes les sciences humaines, le rejet du positivisme rigide a conduit à multiplier les approches, parfois même interdisciplinaires(39): ce que la méthode perdait en rigueur, la méthodologie le regagnait en souplesse et en ingéniosité. La situation du politiste s'en est trouvée modifiée, comme celle des tenants des autres sciences sociales. Dans chacune d'entre elles, le domaine réservé tend à décroître au profit de zones de chevauchement où diverses approches sont possibles, concurremment ou même simultanément. Les études de presse représentent une de ces zones-carrefours qui peut être explorée au moyen de techniques fort différentes. Le politiste doit tenir compte de cette situation et même utiliser, pour sa propre démarche, les résultats que lui fournissent d'autres disciplines.

L'histoire d'abord. J. Kayser a souligné les lacunes qui affectent l'histoire de la presse française - son domaine favori de recherches - sa conclusion étant que la science politique autant que l'histoire en souffraient (40).

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38) De la connaissance historique, Paris, 1954. Le métier d'historien dans l'histoire et ses méthodes, pp. 1467-1540

39) Le bilan récent de J. Viet: Les sciences de l'homme en France. Paris, La Haye, 1966, insiste particulièrement sur ce dernier aspect.

40) L'histoire de la presse française, Etudes de presse 1955, 1er trim., pp. 9-11. L'histoire et la presse. Revue historique 1957, oct., pp. 284-310.

Il a prêché d'exemple et a su faire école dans les deux disciplines. La collection "Kiosque" réunit les avantages de l'érudition et de la vulgarisation; plusieurs de ses numéros sont excellents (41). A l'Université libre de Berlin, l'influence d'un Docteur a été également marquante et plusieurs hautes écoles allemandes s'intéressent à l'histoire de la presse (42). Le bilan n'est pas moins favorable pour d'autres pays, ainsi la Suisse (43). L'étude historique des journaux, l'analyse des courants et même des crises d'opinion sont devenues un thème habituel de l'historiographie nouvelle; on mesure le chemin parcouru en un quart de siècle. Seconde approche classique: le droit et les institutions politiques. C'est la liberté d'opinion et d'information qui fait l'objet des plus nombreuses études (44). Le statut juridique de la presse a également retenu l'attention (45). Troisième angle traditionnel: la géographie. Pour la France, les travaux d'A. Châtelain peuvent être signalés, (46); dans la préface à son essai "Le Monde et ses lecteurs sous la 7ème République", il écrit ceci:

" La répartition géographique des lecteurs a été notre premier souci. Nous pensons en effet qu'il est indispensable de savoir où se trouvent les divers lecteurs d'un journal. Cette géographie de la presse n'a guère retenu l'attention jusqu'alors. Et pourtant, elle est très voisine de la géographie électorale chère à André Siegfried ". (47)

- 41) A Grosser: Hitler, la presse et la naissance d'une dictature. Paris, 1959; R. Rémond: Les catholiques, le communisme et les crises, 1929-1939, Paris, 1960; L. Bodin et J. Touchard: Front Populaire 1936. Paris 1961; R. Barrillon: Le cas Paris Soir. Paris, 1959; C. Bellanger: Presse clandestine 1940-1944. Paris, 1961; C. Estier: La Gauche hebdomadaire 1914-1962.
- 42) Signalons deux exemples seulement pour Berlin: H. U. Magnus: Time. Studien über der amerikanischen Nachrichtenmagazine. Phil. Diss., 1962, 184 S.; H. Hano: Die Taktik der Pressepropaganda des Hitlerregimes 1943-1945... Phil. Diss., 1963, XVIII-143 S.
- 43) Signalons les études d'opinion en rapport avec la démocratie référendaire, ainsi notre article: L'entrée de la Suisse dans la Société des Nations. Analyse d'une décision. Revue suisse d'histoire, 1961(11), 2, pp. 157-192, et diverses thèses préparées à Berne sous la direction du professeur Von Greyerz. Du point de vue méthodologique, il faut signaler l'article remarquable de J. P. Aguet: Le tirage des quotidiens parisiens sous la Monarchie de Juillet. Revue suisse d'histoire 1960(10), 2, pp. 216-286.
- 44) Entre autres, R. Pinto: La Liberté d'Opinion et d'Information. Contrôle juridictionnel et contrôle administratif. Paris, 1955, 297 p.; Schramm W.: Responsibility in Mass Communication. New York, 1957, 392 p.; J. Bourquin: La Liberté de la presse. Paris, 1950, 622 p.
- 45) F. Terrou et L. Solal: Le Droit de l'Information. Paris, 1951, 440 p.; J. Kayser: Mort d'une Liberté. Techniques et politique de l'Information. Paris, 1955, 338 p.

Le passage méritait citation car on voit comment l'étude géographique de la presse a bénéficié de l'avancement antérieur d'un secteur voisin.

D'un autre côté, l'importance des méthodes nouvelles ne cesse de croître. La méthode statistique est celle qui a pris le plus d'ampleur, car elle est appliquée à divers niveaux. On la retrouve chez J. Kayser quand il entreprend l'étude morphologique du journal: le comptage des lignes, des surfaces et des rubriques, se double d'une analyse de la "mise en valeur" qui aboutit même à une formulation mathématique (48). Au lieu de porter sur l'imprimé lui-même, l'effort peut aussi se concentrer sur le public. On recourt alors à la technique des sondages, également de nature statistique puisqu'elle repose sur la loi des grands nombres (49). Le but est de découvrir "derrière la diversité des journaux, la diversité des publics", selon les critères les plus significatifs - sexe, âge, formation, profession, appartenance politique, etc. Les résultats permettent de dégager le comportement des lecteurs envers leur journal, la représentativité de celui-ci par rapport aux milieux sociaux. Mais le sondage peut pousser plus loin et chercher à analyser les conditions dans lesquelles s'opère la consommation du journal, par exemple le phénomène de la lecture (50). Dans ce domaine plus encore que dans le cas de l'étude statistique, la tâche excède les moyens du chercheur individuel et, seuls, des instituts peuvent l'entreprendre. Le politiste devra se contenter des études existantes, d'ailleurs assez nombreuses. Il faut cependant qu'il sache que la plupart des enquêtes sur l'audience des journaux sont entreprises par des organismes commerciaux d'études de marché agissant sur commande. Elles conservent donc un caractère relativement confidentiel et les questions posées ne sont pas toutes intéressantes pour la science politique.

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46) La Géographie du journal, Annales, Economies, Sociétés, 1955, pp. 554-558. Région parisienne et géographie sociologique de la presse. Bulletin de la Société d'Etudes historiques, géographiques et scientifiques de la Région parisienne, 1955, n°86-87.

47) Op.cit. p.6

48) Le Quotidien français, pp.131-164; L'étude du contenu de la presse, Etudes de presse, 1959, 20/21.

49) A.Girard:op.cit., pp.90-102; M.Duverger:op.cit. pp.143-220.

50) Quelques exemples d'enquête dans A.Girard:op.cit. pp.150-163, 168-179.

La multiplication des études de sociologie électorale a permis également d'appliquer aux études de presse de nouvelles techniques. L'histoire politique avait, en effet, mis en évidence l'action décisive de la presse dans l'élargissement du droit de suffrage. Une série d'hypothèses viennent tout naturellement à l'esprit des chercheurs pour la période récente: dans quelle mesure l'influence de la presse locale, déterminante dans les luttes politiques du XIXème siècle, s'est-elle maintenue? peut-on constater une évolution dans l'attitude électorale des journaux en rapport avec leur tendance générale à se dépolitiser? là où l'abstention augmente, faut-il y voir une conséquence de la dépolitisation de la presse? (51) La réponse à de telles questions exigerait de longs et coûteux travaux et les politistes n'en ont pas souvent les moyens. C'est la raison pour laquelle les études de presse n'ont pas évolué aussi rapidement que d'autres secteurs de la science politique. On peut s'en rendre compte en feuilletant, par exemple, les précieuses monographies que l'Association française de science politique et la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques consacrent aux élections. Ainsi, le volume consacré aux élections du 2 janvier 1956 (52) contient quatre études concernant la presse: J.Kayser applique ses méthodes à la presse de Paris et de province; A.Grosser étudie avec une grande finesse le cas de "L'Express"; J.Charlot examine l'attitude des milieux catholiques et J.M.Royer, celle des organisations professionnelles. Dans tous ces travaux, prédomine l'optique historique. Six ans plus tard, le Centre d'étude de la vie politique française consacre un volume au référendum du 8 avril 1962 sur l'Algérie (53). Les études de presse s'y réduisent à deux: la première est de J.Kayser et définit les positions de la presse quotidienne, la seconde est de J.Bourdain qui inventorie les hebdomadaires (54). En revanche, la radio et la télévision font l'objet d'analyses beaucoup plus poussées.

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51) Dans sa préface à La Presse de province sous la IIIème République, F.Goguel a énoncé quelques-unes de ces hypothèses, pp.VII-X.

52) Les élections du 2 janvier 1956. Sous la direction de M.Duverger, F.Goguel et J.Touchard, Paris, 1957, 505 p. (Cahiers de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 82).

53) Le référendum du 8 avril 1962. Sous la direction de F.Goguel. Paris, 1963, 228 p. (Cahiers de la Fondation nationale des sciences politique, 124).

54) Id. La presse quotidienne, pp.51-66; Les hebdomadaires, pp.67-80.

Comme on le voit, l'évolution des méthodes d'analyse de la presse est lente, même lorsqu'on considère un secteur aussi dynamique que celui de la sociologie électorale en France.

Un des domaines où l'analyse de la presse a tiré le plus de bénéfice des techniques nouvelles est indiscutablement celui de la psychologie sociale. Il faut signaler, à ce propos, que deux approches sont possibles. L'une adopte la perspective historique en cherchant à analyser, pour le long terme, les fonctions psycho-sociales d'une presse nationale (55). Dans l'autre cas, beaucoup plus fréquent, le champ d'investigation est très réduit et l'effort s'opère en profondeur, grâce à la technique d'analyse du contenu. Les études de ce genre sont très nombreuses dans les pays anglo-saxons (56); elles le sont beaucoup moins en Europe (57).

#### Voeux et desiderata

La situation du politiste, face à la presse d'opinion et d'information, est donc loin d'être entièrement satisfaisante: les lacunes ne sont toutefois pas de la même importance, suivant que l'on se place au niveau de l'heuristique, de la bibliographie ou de la critique proprement dite. De ce fait, les améliorations que l'on peut désirer sont assez diverses, ce qui donnera à la fin de ce rapport l'apparence d'un "cahier de doléances" aux revendications tour à tour excessivement limitées et largement utopiques.

En ce qui regarde l'heuristique, la situation dépend beaucoup du chercheur qui a toute latitude pour déterminer les limites de sa recherche. En bonne logique, il faut renoncer aux travaux dont les sources sont insuffisantes. Dans le cas de la presse dont l'histoire est encore à faire et les archives très lacunaires, les difficultés d'interprétation méritent d'être surmontées si le sujet est indispensable au progrès des études dans d'autres domaines de la vie politique. D'un point de vue plus général,

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55) Cf. M. Varin d'Ainvelle: La presse en France - Genèse et évolution de ses fonctions psycho-sociales. Paris, 1965, 253 p.

56) Outre le classique de B. Berelson: Content analysis in communication research, voir l'ouvrage récent de R. North e.a.: Content Analysis, a handbook ... Chicago, 1963.

on constate que l'état des sources de la presse ne peut que bénéficier du mouvement très net qui se manifeste partout en faveur d'une meilleure conservation, voire du sauvetage, des archives privées et surtout de la documentation du monde des affaires. Mais il faut que les chercheurs intéressés prennent, comme l'ont fait les historiens de l'économie et des faits sociaux, les choses en main. Car, parmi les entreprises, celles de presse laissent des traces documentaires plus périssables que les autres. Non seulement la continuité est moins assurée que dans l'industrie lourde ou les services publics, mais les cas d'épuration sont fréquents, en raison du changement de la "ligne" des journaux. Il semble également que le caractère "secret" des documents soit d'autant plus accentué, dans la mentalité des détenteurs d'archives, que le caractère politique du journal est plus net.

Au niveau plus banal du document et de sa conservation matérielle, la complétude des collections soulève des problèmes que le politiste ne peut ignorer. Les bibliothèques et archives ne sont pas toujours outillées pour s'assurer la conservation de toutes les éditions. Ce n'est d'ailleurs pas une sinécure là où les modifications de contenu concernent non seulement les éditions successives du même journal, mais ses éditions régionales. Il convient également de s'assurer que les suppléments et les pages de publicité soient collationnées avec le soin qu'elles méritent. L'inflation actuelle du papier ne doit pas excuser les coupes sombres que les conservateurs sont tentés d'opérer. Il est, en effet, possible que le politiste de l'avenir trouve un intérêt particulier à étudier cette publicité, qui lui révélera peut-être des liens avec les puissances économiques ou avec des groupes de pression idéologique.

Les bibliothécaires sont préoccupés du caractère périssable des journaux, comme de tous les documents qu'ils conservent. Les collections de presse, imprimées pendant la guerre ou en période de restriction, sont là pour le leur rappeler s'ils venaient à l'oublier. Cet état de choses a commencé d'encourager la création de filmothèques de sécurité; il doit aider à la multiplication des microfilms de recherche qui seront mis à la disposition des bibliothèques moins favorisées. Dans toute la mesure du possible, les fondations devraient aider à de telles actions de diffusion



de la documentation. Nous n'avons pas connaissance, sauf pour quelques cas isolés, de la réimpression - par procédé photostatique ou autre - de journaux d'information et d'opinion. En raison de diverses circonstances, l'opération est devenue courante pour les périodiques scientifiques et l'on ne peut que souhaiter la voir s'étendre au domaine qui nous occupe ici. De même, pour enrichir leurs sources, les politistes seraient heureux de voir les éditeurs et directeurs de journaux reprendre la tradition des mémoires où s'illustrèrent certains de leurs devanciers (58).

Au niveau de la bibliographie, la situation est ambiguë et risque de le demeurer encore longtemps. Il y a cependant quelques raisons de la voir s'améliorer. Tout d'abord la bibliographie scientifique de la presse est de moins en moins une affaire privée, de plus en plus le fait d'institutions publiques ou semi-publiques. Dans la mesure où se créent des instituts universitaires d'étude de la presse, ils pourront éditer des bibliographies mieux adaptées aux besoins de la recherche actuelle. C'est chose amorcée pour la France avec l'essai de l'Institut de presse pour la période 1944-1956 (59), qui peut être considérée comme un guide documentaire. Si l'on veut être plus ambitieux, on préconisera la création, pour une sélection de la presse française et internationale, d'un équivalent du Bulletin analytique de Documentation Politique, Economique et Sociale Contemporaine que la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques édite pour les périodiques scientifiques. Il faut enfin saluer l'initiative, prise quelquefois par les journaux eux-mêmes de publier un index de leurs articles. Cette habitude anglo-saxonne semble toucher maintenant l'Europe continentale et le projet du journal "Le Monde" revêt une importance considérable (60).

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58) Dans la bibliographie, de son essai sur Le Monde, A. Châtelain remarquait que M. Beuve-Méry serait le mieux placé pour écrire l'histoire de ce journal. Une de ses conférences en a donné un avant-goût: Du Temps au Monde ou "la presse et l'argent". Paris 1956 (Conf. des Ambassadeurs)

59) Recueil des journaux français 1944-1956 ... Paris, 1958

60) Le Monde. Index analytique 1965. A paraître ainsi que l'index analytique pour les années 1944-1964; la souscription a été récemment ouverte dans le journal.

Comparé à celle de l'heuristique et de la bibliographie, la situation apparaît encore moins favorable pour la critique. Tout d'abord et il faut le répéter avec l'espoir de convaincre, le fait que la liberté de presse est reconnue par tous les pays à régime démocratique risque d'incliner celui qui utilise cette presse comme source à la facilité: si le droit d'expression est reconnu, l'opinion doit certainement être directe et sincère. En fait, à l'Occident comme ailleurs, la distinction doit être faite entre le principe politique et la réalité. Les conditions économiques et psychologiques, dans lesquelles se place l'entreprise de presse occidentale peuvent être, dans certain cas, tout aussi contraignantes que les directives du parti unique dans les démocraties populaires. Comme on l'a dit, la démarche critique est ardue dès qu'on s'occupe de journaux, quelles que soient leur couleur ou leur objectif. D'autre part, les mécanismes de formation de l'opinion politique "claironné" par la presse sont beaucoup plus complexes que dans le cas où il s'agit de déclarations gouvernementales ou de programmes de partis: on peut soit "inspirer" la presse, soit l'utiliser comme un porte-voix. La note préliminaire de J. Meyriat a soulevé fort opportunément le cas des politistes-journalistes - ou journalistes-politistes. A notre connaissance, il n'existe, hors des Etats-Unis, aucune étude sur le sujet qui ouvre pourtant des perspectives fort intéressantes: dans quelle mesure, ces auteurs se contentent-ils de verser, dans les débats en cours, des éléments sous forme de jugements de réalité, donc d'informations; jusqu'à quel point, cherchent-ils à influencer sur le cours des événements et de l'opinion en portant des jugements de valeur, renforcés par un appareil scientifique? Voilà posé à l'échelon supérieur le problème de l'influence de la presse dans la formation des opinions politiques, qu'on retrouve au niveau du simple lecteur.

De tels problèmes sont de nature à démontrer, si besoin en était, que l'étude de la presse, et singulièrement des journaux, par les politistes est de nature à donner à la science politique une place plus large parmi les sciences sociales. Car, c'est dans cette catégorie de documents que l'on perçoit le mieux la dynamique du changement social qui préoccupe tant ceux qui s'occupent des sciences de l'homme à l'heure actuelle.

"Le politiste es ses problèmes d'information scientifique"

LE POLITISTE ET LES REVUES DE SCIENCES POLITIQUES

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S E P T I E M E C O N G R E S M O N D I A L  
B R U X E L L E S

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Je présume que mon rapport soit plutôt une base pour la discussion qu'une enquête proprement dite et c'est pourquoi il contiendra plutôt des thèses que des chiffres.

Le sujet, "les Politistes et les Revues de Sciences Politiques", se basera sans doute sur deux publications que je voudrais mentionner ici en premier lieu:

Il s'agit premièrement de la troisième édition de la "Liste mondiale des périodiques spécialisés dans les sciences sociales" préparée par le Comité international pour la documentation des sciences sociales avec l'assistance du Service d'Echange d'informations de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, à Paris, et publiée par l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'éducation, la science et la culture, et deuxièmement de l'enquête remarquable, qui a été inspirée par Peter Lengyel et publiée dans le n° 2 (1967) de la "Revue internationale des sciences sociales" sous le titre "Périodiques de sciences sociales", par CARLOS ALBERTO DE MEDINA pour le Brésil, DANIEL BELL pour les Etats Unis, JEAN MEYRIAT pour la France, Y.B.DAMLE pour l'Inde, KUNIO SAITO pour le Japon, GUILERMO BONFIL BATALLA et REBECCA MEDOZA NAVARRO pour le Mexique, JAN SZCZEPANSKI pour la Pologne, et DONALD MACRAE pour la Grande Bretagne.

Dans mes réflexions concernant les revues de sciences politiques je me suis basé sur l'enquête de Lengyel car je n'ai pas trouvé que les revues qui y sont étudiées diffèrent considérablement de celles traitées sous le nom de "sciences sociales" dans cette enquête.

Pour vous indiquer ma position je voudrais bien indiquer que j'ai également conçu ce rapport à la lumière de mes études prolongées sur les revues allemandes de sciences politiques et je présume que mes thèses peuvent être considérées comme *pars pro toto*.

Aux questions posées par M.MEYRIAT dans sa note préliminaire pour cette conférence, j'aimerais ajouter certaines autres suggestions, à savoir: Y-a-t'il une conception idéale de la communication rapide et efficace des connaissances scientifiques nouvelles. Si elle existe, est-elle réalisable? Quelle est le rôle des revues des sciences politiques concernant la communication de connaissances?

La réponse à la dernière question devra se formuler en fonction de celle aux questions posées dans la note préliminaire concernant la relation entre les abonnés et leur pays respectifs, ainsi que la spécialisation, la structure des revues, les exigences des lecteurs, des rédacteurs, des maisons d'édition et des comités de tutelle, les difficultés linguistiques ainsi que l'importance de revues d'autres disciplines scientifiques; j'y ajouterai encore quelques questions au cours de mon exposé.

Y-a-t'il une conception idéale de la communication rapide et efficace de nouvelles connaissances scientifiques?

Les nouvelles connaissances scientifiques, qui sont l'objet de l'information scientifique et ainsi l'objet de notre discussion d'aujourd'hui se présentent selon leur contenu comme le résultat des recherches d'un seul ou de plusieurs chercheurs, donc comme doctrine, comme enquête méthodique, ou bien comme sujet de controverse entre plusieurs chercheurs.

La forme sous laquelle elles se présentent est aussi multiple: en tant que dissertation, habilitation, exposé, rapport, tableau, etc.

Le support matériel de l'information scientifique peut être constitué par des journaux, des revues, des brochures, des livres, des publications commémoratives, des séries, et aussi les recueils officiels des organisations internationales par les discours prononcés au cours de séminaires, dans la radio et dans la télévision. Mise à part le contenu, la forme et le support, la présentation analytique du processus de la communication de connaissances doit tenir compte d'autres critères et en particulier:

du ou des nom(s) des auteurs,

le nom, la réputation, le programme et l'organisation de la revue, de la série, de l'éditeur ou d'une manière générale, du moyen de publication,

l'accessibilité aux informations scientifiques en vue de leur publication, le facteur temps qui est important pour le calcul de la perte du temps entre l'élaboration des connaissances en question, leur enregistrement sous une forme publiable (manuscrit), leur publication et leur diffusion aux personnes intéressées.

Le problème de l'orientation d'une information:

A-t-elle été publiée sous son titre correcte sur un support matériel approprié?

La question de savoir si une nouvelle connaissance peut être politiquement désirable ou non à un moment donné, peut être d'une importance particulière en science politique. - enfin les questions concernant la traduction en d'autres langues.

Les questions abordées par M.MEYRIAT au sujet des utilisateurs et de la structure de la revue sont des problèmes ~~partiellements~~<sup>secondaires</sup> et ils nous montrent déjà la voies vers la solution de nos problèmes.

J'aimerais vous présenter la constatation suivante: le processus de la communications des connaissances atteint un maximum d'efficacité au moment où chaque chercheur retrouve le plutôt possible la totalité des informations dont il a besoin.

Pour ce faire il est nécessaire de surmonter les obstacles tels qu'ils ont été signalés ci-dessus.

En politologie, le maximum d'efficacité du processus de la communication des connaissances dépend encore d'un facteur additionnel: ce n'est pas uniquement le chercheur mais aussi le politicien qui, en appliquant les résultats de la science politique au cours de ses activités, doit retrouver toutes les informations dont il a besoin; et là également, ce processus doit se dérouler le plus rapidement possible.

La multitude des informations est confrontée par les demandes très différenciées des divers chercheurs et politiciens d'une part, et d'autre part par la limitation de la capacité humaine. En outre, le nombre des informations à transmettre augmente constamment.

La multitude des informations et la limitation de la capacité humaine nécessitent la sélection des informations disponibles.

Je viens déjà d'énumérer certaines autres conditions qui sont nécessaires pour la satisfaction du besoin maximum en informations, et notamment l'absence des limitations de l'accès aux informations ainsi que la communication rapide des connaissances.

Une unité d'informations centralisée, et qui serait indépendante de l'enjeu politique, et en contact permanent avec les cadres scientifiques pourrait assimiler toutes les informations essentielles, les sélectionner, les emmagasiner, les dépouiller systématiquement et, le cas échéant, les fournir aux politologues et aux politiciens en fonction de la structure de leurs besoins en informations.

A chaque utilisateur d'une telle institution, devrait s'ouvrir la possibilité de pouvoir corriger la nature de ses besoins en informations et ainsi la structure du contenu des informations qui lui parviennent.

Les unités installées sur le plan national pourraient, en connection avec un service de traduction, rendre accessibles les sources d'informations en langue étrangères. La création d'un clearing international des unités d'informations nationales me semble imaginable.

La différenciation entre les divers supports des informations, comme par exemple la distinction entre journaux, revues, ouvrages, etc., ne serait pas nécessaire, et naturellement la discussion du thème de mon exposé non plus.

La solution que je viens de proposer permettrait la communication des connaissances le plus rapidement possible.

Un certain nombre d'unités d'information s'est déjà rendu compte des limites de l'efficacité des méthodes conventionnelles du traitement des informations depuis longtemps et se familiarise graduellement avec l'utilisation des procédés électroniques du traitement des données. Certaines institutions d'informations attachent beaucoup d'importance à la constatation que, dans leurs activités, il faut se baser sur les caractéristiques que je viens de citer, à savoir l'objectivité de la communication des connaissances, la nécessité de la sélection et la rapidité.

Si on tenait compte de ces facteurs on pourrait arriver à l'emploi rationnel de toutes les personnes qui s'occupent de la collecte du dépouillement et de la communication des connaissances scientifiques.

### Comment réaliser ces idées?

La réalisation d'un tel idéal rencontre des difficultés considérables. Les raisons en sont les habitudes du travail conventionnel, l'égoïsme, l'ignorance des possibilités techniques et, parfois il existe des arguments de nature politique.

Il ne sera jamais possible de réaliser le maximum en efficacité de la communication des connaissances.

### La fonction des revues scientifiques.

Il faut donc se poser la question: les différents supports des informations jouent-ils un rôle inégal quand il s'agit d'atteindre une solution optimale dans la situation actuelle!

Et, quand on répond positivement à cette question: ou en sont les revues de politologie?

Comme nous venons de constater, les informations qui se présentent par l'intermédiaire des divers supports comprennent les contenus les plus différenciés.

Une différenciation dans le contenu des informations de manière que les revues ne reproduiraient que les résultats de recherche tandis que les controverses critiques avec les confrères de la discipline seraient réservés aux ouvrages, n'est pas réalisable.

L'étude de cet aspect ne représente donc aucun pas vers la solution de notre problème.

Il en est de même pour la différenciation selon la nature des contributions. En d'autres mots les thèses sont publiées en tant qu'ouvrages aussi bien que dans des revues, les résultats d'un programme de recherche et les enquêtes sont publiés dans des revues, dans des ouvrages mais aussi dans les recueils des organisations internationales.

Encore une fois, nous ne sommes pas encore approchés d'une solution.

Ainsi je me dirige vers les catégories que je viens d'établir en vue d'une satisfaction optimale du besoin en informations: la totalité des informations, l'objectivité, la sélection, rapidité et possibilité de communication.

Quelle pourrait en être la contribution des revues scientifiques?



### Latitude Informativ

Comme nous avons déjà constaté aucune revue n'a une fonction spécifique au sujet de la promotion d'un contenu déterminé. Cependant, pour une revue, s'offrent beaucoup de possibilités: elle peut assurer une certaine publicité pour les jeunes chercheurs qui ne sont pas encore tellement connus (elle profiterait à la fois du nom et de la réputation des auteurs scientifique déjà connus), elle est en mesure de publier le résultat partiel de recherches en cours qui ne sont pas encore terminées et elle n'est pas obligée d'attendre la conclusion du résultat final,

elle peut publier certains chapitres de travaux complexes dont la production en ouvrage prendra beaucoup de temps,

elle accélère le processus de la discussion scientifique par la reproduction relativement rapide des thèses et antithèses,

elle est en mesure de publier plusieurs contributions au même sujet à la fois,

elle est en mesure de publier des raisonnements politiquement désagréables en conservant, le cas échéant, l'anonymat de l'auteur.

En outre, la revue offre beaucoup d'assistance utile au chercheur quand elle annonce et résume des ouvrages et des études spécialisées, quand elle publie des documents primaires importants et ainsi de suite. Presque toutes les revues scientifiques tiennent compte de ces possibilités. Il est évident que celles-ci constituent un enrichissement considérable du contenu des revues et que le chercheur en ressent un véritable besoin.

Une revue qui se trouve en liaison étroite avec une association scientifique ou un secteur universitaire - ce qui est certainement le cas pour la majorité des revues scientifiques - pourra facilement publier des informations qui intéressent le chercheur et qui sont très importantes pour son travail.

Il s'agit là de renseignements sur les personnes de la discipline en question, la vie interne des associations et des universités, les annonces et les rapports sur des conférences, bref, les informations qui ne sont pas facilement accessibles par les éditeurs d'autres revues.

Un effet réciproque doit être souligné spécialement: il révèle une importance considérable, si on juge la tâche des revues de sciences politiques:

Si la revue de sciences politiques doit communiquer des connaissances scientifiques aux politiciens, elle se trouve dans une position désagréable.

D'une part le politologue demande aux revues scientifiques spécialisées, qu'elles lui fournissent des nouvelles connaissances dans son domaine; d'autre part, le politicien érige le dépouillement des connaissances scientifiques et leur présentation sous une forme qui tient compte du fait qu'il est surchargé par son travail, qu'il lui reste peu de temps, qu'il doit s'occuper largement avec les divers aspects de la politique actuelle; il demande - donc des informations breves et intelligibles, et si possible le contenu en raccourci d'études longues et détaillées; car, il n'est pas politologue, il s'intéresse moins à la discussion des problèmes en détail qu'au résultat et justent quand il est provocateur.

J'en tire la conclusion suivante: plus le contenu d'une revue scientifique est intelligible, populaire et diversifié, plus rapide sera la communication et grand le nombre des lecteurs.

Pour ma part, je ne peux soutenir la constatation qui voit parmi les tâches des revues scientifiques outre la publication des connaissances des chercheurs de langue nationale, le publication abondante de connaissances en langues étrangères, c'est à dire des traductions.

Quelques aspects particuliers de la politologie exigent nécessairement la présentation de connaissances publiées en langues étrangères et cela se fait p.e. dans la plupart des revues qui traitent essentiellement la politique internationale. Les chercheurs qui savent des langues étrangères utilisent en général les revues spécialisées en langues étrangères.

Enfin, j'aimerais indiquer une caractéristique de la littérature de revues: le nom de l'auteur et sa contribution individuelle sont, de loin, moins importants que le nom de la revue et sa tendance, son programme et sa réputation. La valeur de l'actualité de la publication d'une contribution individuelle est douteuse si on n'assure pas à la fois l'accès permanent et facile à cette information.

### Objectivité

Chaque contribution ne sera pas publiée par chaque revue. Il existe des dépendances multiples: du rédacteur ou du comité de rédaction, de la maison d'édition, du comité de tutelle, du programme ou de la tendance de la revue. Des informations peuvent être supprimées pour des raisons très différenciées. C'est seulement là où il y a des revues différentes de la même discipline que cet inconvénient peut être compensé.

Si un auteur est contraint - pour des raisons réelles ou imaginaires - de publier sa contribution dans une revue spécialisée dans une autre discipline scientifique, cela signifie déjà un désavantage car une perte d'information y est comprise.

Là, où les publications scientifiques sont dirigées par l'Etat, ce désavantage de la perte de connaissances scientifiques est toujours imminent car l'autorisation de la publication des contributions dépend du jugement des institutions officielles. Cependant le jugement des ouvrages scientifiques par des autorités impose un certain scepticisme en vue de la capacité de jugement d'objectivité.

Ici il convient d'indiquer que des subventions trop généreuses ou la distribution permanente d'exemplaires gratuits peuvent donner une idée fautive de l'importance d'une revue.

#### Communication

A mon avis la communication des connaissances scientifiques n'est pas encore terminée quand l'on a publié quelque chose sous une forme quelconque, mais seulement si l'auteur et le rédacteur s'efforcent de communiquer leurs connaissances à l'utilisateur. Cela comprend une véritable tâche importante qui dans la plupart des cas n'est pas reconnue.

Nous avons déjà vu que les politiciens dans la plupart des cas ne sont pas atteints par les connaissances scientifiques car le caractère de leur besoin en informations est assez spécialisé.

Le chiffre d'éditions oscille dans la plupart des cas justement à la limite de la rentabilité. Presque toujours la rentabilité n'est atteinte que parce que des associations ou des universités donnent des subventions, ou parce que les collaborateurs travaillent pour la présentation de la revue par idéalisme et non par pour des raisons financières.

(D'ailleurs, la collaboration pour une revue scientifique n'est apparemment par tellement une question des possibilités financières mais plutôt une question de la réputation qui peut être acquise par une ou plusieurs publications).

Etant donné cette limitation de la diffusion la supposition s'impose que les connaissances scientifiques ne sont pas répandues parmi les politologues dans la mesure possible et utile.

Quand même la situation des revues est beaucoup plus favorable que celle des ouvrages: Les revues disposent presque toujours d'un nombre déterminé d'abonnés. Au moins dans le milieu des abonnés - les universités y appartiennent dans la plupart des cas - la diffusion est assurée et il est possible de retrouver plutard toute contribution.

Un autre avantage de l'abonnement se révèle dans la contrainte, qui n'est pas très sévère mais toujours utile, de lire ce que l'on a acheté.

Cela est un avantage exprès vis-à-vis de la monographie qui demande d'abord l'effort de l'acquisition, de l'achat.

La publication d'un article dans une revue qui ne correspond pas à sa spécialisation à son contenu peut être assez fâcheux pour le chercheur. L'article sera "perdu" pour ceux qui devraient le chercher dans une revue de la discipline en question. En outre, les abonnés de la revue dans laquelle l'article a été publié ne s'y intéresseront pas.

Une situation semblable existe quand la contribution est munie d'un titre qui - par des raisons de la politique, de l'éditeur ou du directeur de la rédaction - ne correspond pas à son contenu.

Etant donné que ces faux titres donnent une fausse impression sur le contenu il ne reste qu'à constater que, dans ce cas, l'auteur ainsi que l'éditeur n'ont pas accompli leur obligation de la communication rationnelle des connaissances scientifiques.

#### La rapidité de communication

La communication rapide des connaissances peut être considérée sans doute comme étant le facteur le plus avantageux d'une revue. Il est vrai que les quotidiens sont encore plus rapides mais ils reproduisent assez rarement des contributions qui méritent d'être appelées scientifiques. En outre leur rayonnement est assez limité. C'est la rapidité de la communication d'une revue qui la rend tellement attractive pour la politologie, étant donné que cette science s'intéresse à des questions d'actualité dont l'étude s'exige en suite à un événement d'actualité.

Etant donné que la fixation des fins de rédactions constituent des ruptures sensibles dans le processus de l'édition d'une revue; il me semble être assez douteux qu'il sera possible d'atteindre une certaine harmonie entre l'actualité et la qualité.

Si le comité de rédaction se base sur un nombre relativement élevé de contributions l'actualité en fera défaillance; et il n'est pas assez rare que le cas se produise où un auteur consacre plus d'un an pour élaborer une étude dont la publication dans une revue scientifique demande encore une fois 12 mois.

Leur enregistrement bibliographique dans une bibliothèque et le temps qui passe pour faire une analyse de l'article en question, la publier dans un bulletin analytique afin de contribuer ainsi à sa diffusion constitue une période qui se rapproche de celle d'une année. Cependant, cette période est toujours beaucoup plus brève que celle nécessitée pour un ouvrage.

Dans ce contexte, il me semble être possible d'accélérer le processus actuel de la communication des connaissances à l'aide de moyens auxiliaires techniques.

#### Problèmes linguistiques

Il existe aussi d'autres possibilités d'intervention par l'intermédiaire de moyens techniques au sujet de l'échange de connaissances scientifiques; enfin, l'emploi de moyens techniques semble être plus efficace que l'utilisation des moyens scientifiques. Les questions posées par la traduction automatique qui soit à la fois économique, rapide, et utilisable, n'ont pas encore pu être complètement résolues, mais des progrès énormes qui mènent vers la solution de ce problème ont été faits. Je suis convaincu que le temps n'est plus tellement loin où il sera possible de pouvoir utiliser des machines de traduction automatique dans le domaine de la politologie.

Quand cela sera achevé les articles qui se trouvent dans une revue en langue étrangère posséderont la même valeur informative que ceux d'une revue dans la langue maternelle pourvu qu'on les retrouve à temps.

#### Conclusions

Les auteurs ainsi que les rédacteurs pourraient contribuer à l'augmentation de la facilité de la recherche des informations. Je me permets de donner des recommandations à ce sujet, et je le fais, en guise de conclusion.

1. Les auteurs devraient essayer de publier leurs contributions dans des revues qui comprennent dans leur tendance le contenu de l'article.

2. Le titre d'un article devrait reproduire son contenu aussi exactement que possible. Des titres qui sont choisis pour des raisons de publicité ne devraient pas être utilisés. Les sous-titre devraient préciser et compléter davantage la description du sujet en question.
3. Les contributions devraient être munies de la date à laquelle elles ont été terminées par un auteur.
4. Les auteurs devraient faire des analyses et les envoyer pour être publiées conjointement avec l'article.
5. Les revues devraient reproduire ces analyses dans le sommaire qui se présente sous forme de manchettes.

Ainsi le travail assez fastidieux de la documentation pourrait être raccourci au profit d'une communication accélérée des connaissances scientifiques telle que c'est le cas pour un grand nombre de revues dans d'autres disciplines.

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Br/Information/4

"The political scientist's problems  
of scientific information"

USERS, DATA NEEDS, AND GOALS:

SOME INFORMAL THOUGHTS ON

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SERVICES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

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USERS, DATA NEEDS, AND GOALS :  
Some Informal Thoughts on  
Bibliographical Services in Political Science (+)

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by Lee R. Kerschner

I am in the peculiar position of not knowing why I am here. Late in August, I received a letter from M. Meyriat, secretary general, International Committee for Social Sciences Documentation, inviting me to take a more active role in the work of this session by presenting a paper on "specialized bibliographical periodicals". He drew my attention, in particular, to two things : the demise of the American Political Science Review's (APSR) bibliographical section and the rise of automated information retrieval systems. I have little expertise in either area. My chief qualification seems to be that I am an American political scientist with some interest in informational problems.

The paper has been further complicated because it was begun during the closing days of a rushed summer session at Georgetown University<sup>1</sup>, continued at a farm in Niederbayern, drafted in Zagreb and finally finished a few days ago in Namur. If not polished, it is at least "international", as befits this conference !

My first thought was, what could I do to make a contribution to the question of information flow in political science. Reluctant to turn to the literature (not the data) without a specific theoretical framework, I did what my friends in the technical world call "thumb-sucking". From this emerged a tentative decision to focus

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(+) This is a draft paper and is not to be attributed without specific permission of the author.



on the user. This is at least an area where I (and all of us) can claim some expertise.

At the same time, I decided to eliminate any role that would include a listing of "specialized bibliographical periodicals" or an evaluation of any of them. There are large numbers of sources that the political scientist can turn to for assistance in this area<sup>2</sup>. It seemed to be redundant to repeat the efforts of so many more qualified political scientists and bibliographers.

I called my friend Eric Boehm, head of the American Bibliographical Center in Santa Barbara, California, and asked for guidance. After an initial "Don't do it!", he provided some useful studies and advice and reconfirmed my decision to concentrate on the user. Calls to Evron M. Kirkpatrick, Executive Director of the American Political Science Association and Austin Ranney, editor of the APSR, elicited sympathetic support and some guidance. It became clear that now I would have to both work and turn to the literature.

Soon I was immersed in the problems of indexing, abstracting, and retrieval which are the hall-mark of the information specialist. I read political scientists/<sup>on</sup>library problems, and librarians on political science problems<sup>3</sup>. I did not see what I could add here: indeed it seemed that all that could be done would over simplify an extremely complex question. The political scientist who wishes an introduction to the problems should read the American Behavioral Scientist of June 1964, in particular the article by John S. Appel and Ted Gurr, "Bibliographic Needs of Social and Behavioral Scientists: Report of a Pilot Survey", as well as the ABS issues of January and February 1967 which are wholly devoted to questions of information retrieval. For an interesting treatment by a librarian, see Dan Bergen, "The Communication System of the Social Sciences", College and Research Libraries (July, 1967) 239-252, where he

attempts to relate the bibliographic problem to a system model of the entire informational process.

Since I have now rejected a role in a) evaluation of specific journals, b) discussion of problems of indexing and abstracting, and c) investigation of the more general problems of information retrieval, the reader may wonder if the rest of this is worth the bother? I don't know when you have come this far ....

The decision to concentrate on the user and ignore the technical problems of the bibliographical and information retrieval world was confirmed by exposure to the horrors of that world. The operational questions, "Who is the user?", "What are his goals?", "What are his data needs?", rarely seem to be asked. Complex discussions are held over the difficulties of indexing and retrieval as well as problems of automated abstracting services, such as the "General Inquirer"<sup>4</sup> but to what end - is seldom posed. With the exception of the article by Appel and Gurr, previously cited, little of the literature deals with the problems of the user. A shining exception to this general situation is the study of the American Psychological Association on problems of scientific information exchange in psychology<sup>5</sup>. The American Historical Association has also recently been engaged in some introspection about its bibliographical needs as well<sup>6</sup>.

There seems to be tacit assumption that there is one typical user, and he is perceived as an advanced researcher seeking the most sophisticated information retrieval system available. With this I strongly disagree.

A spectrum of users is the more probable situation. I have tentatively identified some of the possible points on that spectrum but would not care to defend my choices unto death! They may provide, however, some indication of the problem as I perceive it.

At one end of the spectrum; the end where much of the effort towards informational retrieval in its modern

garb seems to be focused, are the major research institutes, supported by large funds and modern equipment. Next are the major independent researchers; a minor portion of the political science community in numbers, they supply the vast bulk of the finished research. The researchers appear to fall into two categories, theoretical (t) and empirical (e) with correspondingly different informational needs.

The next two categories include the bulk of our profession, the University and College Professor. The former more concerned with research needs and course preparation requirements. Students, both graduate and under-graduate, are also users and of a unique type. Indeed, a more sophisticated analysis might require a spectrum of student types from the PhD candidate to the freshman major.

Although the vast bulk of political scientists reside in the United States, this conference is testimony to avoiding an excessively parochial attitude. There are political scientists in both "developed" and "less-developed" societies. They probably have different goals and data needs and represent two further categories. (I am aware of course that many of these categories may overlap).

Finally, lest we forget that some of our profession have been issuing a clarion call for a "policy science" there are the journalists and the practitioners of decision-making who are also possible users.

Table I, Users, Data Needs and Goals lists some eleven possible users with different goals and bibliographical or data needs.

TABLE I

## USERS, DATA NEEDS AND GOALS

USERS	GOALS				DATA NEEDS				
	research	maintain currency	course preparation	policy questions	literature	hypotheses	theories	refined data	raw data
Research institutes	X			X	X	X	X	X	X
Major researchers (t)	X				X	X	X		
Major researchers (e)	X						X	X	X
University professors	X	X	X		X		X	X	
College professors		X	X		X				
Graduate students	X				X		X	X	X
Under-grad. students			X		X				
Non-U.S. (developed)	X	X			X			X	X
Non-U.S. (un-dev.)		X			X				
Journalists				X	X			X?	
Practitioners				X	X			X?	

The question of bibliography and data needs has been complicated by the behavioral revolution. Clifton Brook has nicely summed up the situation<sup>7</sup> :

Thirty years ago the political scientist embarking upon a piece of research probably would have spoken of 'searching the literature'. Today he is likely to talk of 'data gathering' and the data he gathers - or attempts to gather - range far beyond 'literature'.

Nevertheless Brook continues, "The need for bibliographical control of 'literature' remains and has been intensified, both as a result of continuing traditional demands and as a result of demands stemming from the behavioral movement itself."<sup>8</sup>

Not all commentators see the change in the social sciences as clearly; for example a British librarian wrote :

The special importance of documentary and literary evidence in the social sciences is of particular interest in this connection. It is taken for granted that - in contrast to the natural sciences, where the documents tends to be of little intrinsic importance, and the literature is valued chiefly in respect of its efficacy in communicating the results of research and the implications of hypothesis - the social sciences give to both the documents and the literature an additional role as objects of research in themselves.

There exists, however, more than the neat dichotomy between literature and data that Brock draws. One can establish a spectrum of data needs running from "literature" in the conventional sense of the term through hypotheses, theories, and refined data to the raw data itself.<sup>10</sup>

It may well be that even the so-called traditional literature search is obsolete. The requirement today is not for the article per se as the unit but rather for the findings. Thus searching for findings may be in fact little different from data retrieval and ultimately subject to the same type of data systems. The General

Inquirer may well be typical of the contribution to be made in devising automated systems to convert "literature" to data. It may be a narrow spectrum indeed - a point of view supported by Ralph Bisco in commenting on data archives.<sup>11</sup>

He notes that data archives are more than mere banks from which data are drawn like dollars but are complex organizations which provide for the combination and manipulation of data from a variety of sources. Their potential for solution of research problems is well understood; the inclusion of refined data, tested hypothesis, and theories will make the boundaries between "literature" and "data" much smaller than they presently appear to be.

However, for the present period, it is still possible to grant the existence of differing data needs and of course different user goals. I have postulated four such goals, although there are without doubt many more. There is the goal of pure research, i.e. the verification of a particular theory or the creation of one. Other political scientists are attempting to maintain currency in a particular area or learning a new one; others are primarily concerned with course preparation and the provision of instruction to the undergraduate student. There are also our colleagues concerned with immediate policy questions.

Table I combines the universe of users with their probable goals and data needs and illustrates (not an empirical statement) the differing requirements that users might have.

Table II, Users and Journals, asks which of the bibliographical or data sources listed by Austin Ranney in his March 1967 APSR announcement of the discontinuance of the APSR bibliography section meets the needs of the various users. The APSR is also listed as a means of approaching M. Meyriat's specific question to me.

Table III, Journals, Goals and Needs, combines these same bibliographical sources with users goals and needs and asks once more what purpose do they serve ?

The tables are presented with a minimum interpretation because they are purely speculative. I have no empirical data to support my assertions, nor could I find any ! It is hoped that in line with the purpose of this session we can use the tables as a basis of discussion of the problems of bibliographical periodicals. The lack of empirical data on the bibliographical and data needs of political scientists has also been commented upon by others and again in the recent article by Clifton Brock. It is none the less depressing to note that we can discontinue services such as the APSR bibliography section and begin expensive programs such the Universal Reference Service without any data as to effect or needs in the discipline.

If the results of the APA study are any guide, the bulk of information flow may well take place long before any publication. For many of our users, at least the first three categories, inventories of publications may be utterly useless (see Table II). I find it hard to believe that major researchers in international relations find the heavily indexed but limited bibliography of published material in the Universal Reference Service's first volume of much use.

TABLE II

USERS AND JOURNALS

USERS	JOURNALS							
	APSR	IPSA	ABS-N.S.	U.R.S.	I.B.P.S.	P.A.I.S.	S.S.H.I	New Data Retrieval Systems
Research institutes								X
Major researchers (t)								X
Major researchers (e)								X
University professors	X		X	X				
College professors	X		X	X				
Graduate students	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Under-grad. students	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Non U.S. (developed)	X	X	X					
Non U.S. (un-dev.)	X	X	X					
Journalists	X							
Practitioners	X							



Alfred De Grazia defends the URS as being needed and not redundant to or similar services because, "The few creative scholars who do most of the consequential reading and writing will be most helped, ... for they will be able to call upon an instant service that will be many times as powerful as the old way of bibliographic research, ...."<sup>12</sup> Yet the APA study indicates that the major researchers in psychology tend to get their information through personal channels, reprints, conventions, etc. and rarely use the materials which, after a long time lag, finally appear in archival form. This if true for political science, would raise serious questions as to whether or not the URS meets the needs of the audience for which Dr. De Grazia says it is intended !

The present system of bibliographic control can be described as open-ended. There is absolutely no feedback to let any of the services know if they are accomplishing their jobs. One aspect of any new system must be to make it self-evaluative and self-adjusting so that decisions as to expansion, retraction, or change can be made rationally. I agree with Austin Ranney that the lack of complaints about the discontinuance of the bibliographical section of the APSR may indicate that it was playing a very minor role in the informational process but this feedback is a bit late. Unfortunately, the questionnaire sent out a year ago by the APSA just asked what features should be kept or discontinued and not: what do you personally use ? As to be expected, the vast majority of our colleagues voted for the status quo; so we know little more than before.

The Appel and Gurr sample of economists, psychologists, and anthropologists, wanted an ideal bibliographical system to include all new works, both in English and foreign languages, multi-dimensional indexing, descriptive abstracts, appear in a regularly published journal, and arranged in a disciplinary and sub-disciplinary manner.<sup>1</sup>"

This reveals a desire for a traditional mode of organization with a continuing emphasis on literature retrieval and standard categories. It is highly likely that most of the respondent did not know what else is potentially as Appel and Gurr conclude :<sup>14</sup>

Perhaps because of conflicting, changing, or undefined needs, most respondents do not really seem to know what kind of alternative bibliographic system they want. Only relatively few social scientists appear truly concerned about the matter. Clearly efforts should be made to provide social scientists with an awareness of the unique services and possibilities that new bibliographic techniques can provide. This kind of understanding seems a prerequisite if social scientists as a group are to develop attitudes that will permit effective approaches to bibliographic problems.

Present attitudes are still very traditional. Appel and Gurr note that the average social scientist is "much more likely to track down bibliographic materials through footnotes and journal bibliographies than to use special aids such as abstract journals, special bibliographic studies, research assistants or librarians."<sup>15</sup> Table I postulates that the bulk of political scientists still require literature searching as a major part of their activities. If this should turn out to be true, then the APSR may have had or the IPSA may still have a role to play for a large part of our audience. However, before M. Hurtig gets too excited, let us note that in the Appel and Gurr study 89 % of all respondents indicated that they did not know of the UNESCO international bibliographies or that they were not relevant or useful in their work.<sup>16</sup>

The automatic information retrieval advocates should not smile too smugly. There is little evidence to indicate that they are reaching a much larger audience. The rapid rate of expansion of data archives was outlined by Ralph L. Bisco in a recent article in the APSR but

there were no data to indicate the degree to which the archivers serve the entire political science community.<sup>17</sup> I don't for a moment doubt that they provide for the most productive members of the community as well as are the solution for future data problems. Yet surely there is reason to be concerned with the present day needs of the masses !

Mr. Joe Becker, Director of Information Sciences for EDUCOM assures me that its ultimate purpose is the "democratization of information". He argues that via a broad band of information services the "have-nots" will benefit first. It may be very probable that the broad band of information services that EDUCOM has<sup>as</sup> a goal will mitigate many of the problems between the haves and the have-nots.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, for the moment, neither the data archives nor EDUNET meet the needs of most of our colleagues. Likewise, one is entranced by Kenneth Janda's discussion of Selective Dissemination of Information at North-Western University in the recent article in ABS. In the same issue, Garfield and Sher describe ACSA (Automatic Subject Citation Alert) a commercially available SDI service for the individual scientist. The cost of such a service will be high but they as well as others talk of the need for the social scientist to begin to pay for his information.<sup>19</sup>

To what extent such a commercial process would increase the gap between the have's and the have-nots is at least debatable. Should the have's receive government subsidies for such services while the have-nots make do with increasingly less adequate traditional services - the gap will be severe. EDUNET notwithstanding.

URS hopes to offer a subscription and special order service to tailor bibliographies to user needs. This service if not exceptionally costly would broaden the probable universe of users; but even De Grazia sees cost as an inhibiting factor and thus many potential users are

likely to be excluded.<sup>20</sup> There still exists for now and perhaps for some time to come a need for a more mundane form of information dissemination.

Table II argues that the more traditional modes of informational services still serve the bulk of the profession. Significantly, it notes that the portion of the profession doing the advanced research is poorly served by any of the present modes and thus they must turn to the more sophisticated systems.<sup>21</sup>

When one compares the journals with the needs as in Table III, the vast gap in providing data as opposed to literature stands out clearly. However, in the rush to fill this gap by creating data reviewers, lets not leave out the vast bulk of users. Literature search is still needed.

The problem is obviously one of a complete system where the information flow of the profession includes not only the literature in the traditional form but also the increasing need for data archives. To even begin to evaluate the role of "specialized bibliographical periodicals" in this context seems to be meaningless. The study of the American Psychological Association demonstrates that the assumed characteristics of the profession may not hold and that the empirical study is essential.

One excellent by-product of the APA study has been a new role for Psychological Abstracts which should make it one of the most effective abstracting journals in the field. The IPSA might well wish to think of major modification in that direction.<sup>22</sup>

Even though the APA study of the role of Psychological Abstracts revealed mixed evaluations, it was uniformly true that foreign users consistently rated it very high and as their main source of information for the United States as well as frequently for their own country.<sup>23</sup> Which may give the APSR some pause for thought !

TABLE III

JOURNALS, GOALS AND NEEDS

JOURNALS	GOALS				DATA NEEDS				
	research	maintain currency	course preparation	policy questions	literature	hypotheses	theories	refined data	raw data
AFSR		X	X		X				
IPSA		X			X				
ABS-NS		X	X		X				
U.R.S.	X					X	X	X	
I.B.P.S.					X				
P.A.I.S.	X				X				
S.S.H.I.	X				X				
New data systems	X							X	X

The American Political Science Association and the International Political Science Association must take the lead in supporting a similar study. Fortunately, the Committee on Information in the Behavioral Sciences of the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences (USA), is chaired by a political scientist: David Easton. I was unable to talk with Professor Easton before I left the United States but Henry David, the Executive Director of the Behavioral Sciences Division of the NRC, NAS, assured me that their Communications Systems and Resources Report, now in the final stages of preparation, calls for an empirical investigation of data needs. Nothing less can be acceptable to the profession.

Speculation by M. Hurtig as to whether "the formula of the IPSA still has some years to go or is to be condemned" cannot be answered a priori by me or by another researcher. It is truly doubtful that much is to be gained in discussing this paper unless it is to further refine the tentative categories and questions to be asked. Who are the users? What are their various goals? What are their data needs? Do they differ as I have speculated? What criteria should be established for judging the presently available services? Should the community encourage some services or discourage others on the basis of these costs and benefits? Should user perception or present use be the only criteria? Do present users know what they can get? Can a system be devised that will meet all needs of all users? What do we do in the transition period?

The question of the use and future of "specialized bibliographical periodicals" is an empirical one. It can and must be decided on the basis of the best available information. Decisions to keep, reject, or expand present services or to create new and exciting complete data systems must be made on the basis of trade-offs between costs, benefits and needs. The ideal system may not be attainable but surely an optimal one for the whole profession is available!

Footnotes

1. I wish to thank both my students and the Department of Government at Georgetown University for their cooperation in those hectic days.
2. See for example :  
Eric H. Boehm, Ed. Bibliographies on International Relations and World Affairs. Santa Barbara, California, Clio Press, 1965.  
Ferguson, L. Specialized Social Science Information Services in the United States. New York, Bureau of Applied Research, Columbia University, 1965.  
Robert B. Harmon. Political Science : A Bibliographical Guide to the Literature. New York, Scarecrow Press, 1965.  
John Brown Mason. Research Tools in International Relations and Recent History : An annotated Guide. Fullerton, California, California State College, Mimeo., 1966.  
Carl M. White, Ed. Sources of Information in the Social Sciences. Totowa, New Jersey, Bedminster Press, 1964.  
The best single survey of the state of political science bibliography is the article by Clifton Brock, "Political Science", Library Trends, Vol. 15 (April, 1967) 628-647.
3. In Washington, D.C. , I talked with Dr. Ed. MacConomy, a political scientist and Assistant Director of the General Reference section of the Library of Congress and with the chief bibliographer Mrs. Helen D. Jones. They introduced me to still more of the library literature on the general problems of retrieval.  
See for example : Kenneth Janda. Information Retrieval : Applications to Political Science. Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1967.
4. Philip J. Stone, et.al. The General Inquirer : A Computer Approach to Content Analysis. Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1966.
5. American Psychological Association. Project on Scientific Information Exchange in Psychology. Washington, D.C. American Psychological Association; 1963 (Vol. I and II).
6. The proceedings of its Joint Bibliographical Committee, AHA, will soon be published by the CLIO Press under the general editorship of Eric Boehm.

7. Clifton Brock, "Political Science", Library Trends II, Vol. 15 (April, 1967), 629.
8. Ibid.
9. Peter R. Lewis, The Present Range of Documentation Services in the Social Sciences, ASLIB Proceedings, Vol. 17 (Feb. 1965).

10. I am not at all convinced that there is such a thing as "raw" data ; it would seem that all data are meaningful only in the context of some theoretical framework either implicit or explicit. But that is another set of questions.

11. Ralph L. Bisco, "Social Science Data Archives : A Review of Developments", American Political Science Review, Vol. 60 (March, 1966) 93-109.

12. De Grazia, ABS, Feb. 1964, p.-3.

13. Appel and Gurr, ABS, 1964, 53-54.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Bisco, APSR, 1966.

18. EDUNET, Wiley, 1967.

19. For example Alfred De Grazia, "We limit our capacities and our designs because the market for bibliographic materials is not yet willing to pay for the cost of their development and production", "Continuity and Innovation in Reference Retrieval in the Social Sciences", ABS, (Feb. 1967), 2.

Edward McCartan of the American Bibliographic Center East also stressed the need of the social scientist to be prepared to pay for quick information services. See also his Selective Dissemination of Information, What, Why, How. Washington D.C., CLIO Press, Mimeo, 1967, 1-30.

20. De Grazia, ABS, Feb. 1967, p.4.

21. See also William A. Welsh's description of the University of Georgia's TRIAL system in the January 1967 issue of ABS.

22. See :

Philip J. Siegmann and Belver C. Griffith, "The Changing Role of Psychological Abstracts in Scientific Communication", American Psychologist, Vol. 21 (Nov. 1966), 1037-1043. Also

American Psychological Association, "A Study of the Use and Current Operations of Psychological Abstracts with a View Toward Innovation", Project on Scientific Information Exchange in Psychology, Report # 15, December 1965.



For a further discussion see : William D. Garvey and Belder C. Griffith, "Scientific Information Exchange in Psychology", Science, Vol. 146 (Dec. 25, 1964) 1655-1659;

23. See the APA-PIEP Report ~~#~~ 15, 1965, 263 ff.