

- 1 - W.B.Ballis: Soviet Foreign Policy toward developind states: Egypt, a selected case study.
- 2 - F.C.Barghoorn: Prospects for soviet political development: evolution, decay or re~~v~~olution?
- 3 - M.W.J.M.Broekmeijer: The origins of the split between the Soviet and Chinese Communist World.
- 4 - P.Calzini: The relations of the Ussr with Communist States in connection with the German problem.
- 5 - A.Gyorgy: Soviet-East european relations, 1917-1967: theoretical perception and political reality.
- 6 - S.Hook: The human costs of revolution.
- 7 - H.Kapur: A half-century of societ policy in Asia.
- 8 - K.Kiga: Withering of marxian economic thought in fifty years of the soviet economy.
- 9 - W.Klatt: Fifty years of soviet agriculture
- 10 - R.Kolkowicz: Heresy enshrined: idea and reality of the Red Army.
- 11 - E.Kux: The threat of "Bonapartism" - The party and the army.
- 12 - R.C.Kwant: Fifty years of interaction between philosophy and politics.
- 13 - R.D.Laird: The politics of soviet agriculture: 1917-1967, and the futere.
- 14 - K.L.London: Soviet foreign policy: fifty years of dualism.
- 15 - K.Mehnert: The Soviet Union and the Germans.
- 16 - B.Meissner: Power elite and intelligentsia in Soviet Society.

- 17 - L.Schapiro: Fifty years of soviet law.
- 18 - O.Schiller: Structural changes in soviet agriculture 1917-1967 in the light of a changing agrarian policy.
- 19 - H.G.Skilling: The party, opposition and interest groups: fifty years of continuity and change..
- 20 - K.C.Thalheim: The goals of soviet economic policy.
- 21 - R.C.Tucker: Paths of communist revolution: 1917-1967
- 22 - C.C.Van den Heuvel: War and peace in communist thinking
- 23 - T.W.Wolfe: Soviet military policy at the fifty-year mark
- 24 - C.A.Zebot: Fifty years after the October Revolution:  
Institutional erosion of totalitarian rule  
through economic reforms.

## P a r t i c i p a n t s :

Professor Oskar Anweiler	(Germany)
Professor John Armstrong	(USA)
Professor William B. Ballis	(USA)
Professor Frederick C. Barghoorn	(USA)
Generalmajor Dr. A.A.J.M. Broekmeijer	(Netherlands)
Director Isolo Calzini	(Italy)
Professor M.Kamil Dziewanowski	(USA)
Professor Robert A. Feldesser	(USA)
Professor Andrew Gyorgy	(USA)
Mr. C.C. van den Heuvel	(Netherlands)
Professor Sidney Hook	(USA)
Professor Masamichi Inoki	(Japan)
Professor Ben Jacobs	(USA)
Dr. Eugene Kamenka	(Australia)
Professor Harish Kapur	(India)
Professor Kenzo Kiga	(Japan)

Professor Roman Kolkowicz	(USA)
Professor R.C. Kwant	(Netherlands)
Dr. Ernst Kux	(Switzerland)
→ Professor Roy Laird	(USA)
Professor Dietrich A. Loeber	(Germany)
Professor Richard Löwenthal	(Germany)
Professor Kurt London	(USA)
Professor Malcolm Mackintosh	(Great Britain)
Professor Klaus Mehnert	(Germany)
Professor Boris Meissner	(Germany)
Professor Richard Pipes	(USA)
Professor John C. Sanness	(Norway)
Professor Leonard Schapiro	(Great Britain)
Professor Otto Schiller	(Germany)
Director H. Gordon Shilling	(Canada)
Professor Karl O. Thalheim	(Germany)
Professor Robert C. Tucker	(USA)
Dr. Thomas Wolfe	(USA)
Professor Cyril A. Zebot	(USA)

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Mr. Orchard	(Great Britain)
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Mr. Polansky	(USA)
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Professor Nicholas Vasleff	(USA)
Ambassador Eiji Kajima	(Japan)
VLR I Dr. Erwin Wickert	(Germany)
Dr. Parker D. Symann	(USA)

P R O G R A M

Sixth Conference on World Politics, Berlin, 1967

- September 4th, 9.00: Session 1 The Periods of Soviet History:  
1917 - 1967  
Papers to be Discussed: Pipes, Lowenthal  
and Kapur
- September 4th, 15.00: Session 2 Soviet Internal Politics: Ideology  
Papers to be Discussed: Hook, Kwant,  
and--if comes--Kamenka
- September 5th, 9.00: Session 3 Soviet Internal Politics: Party and State  
Papers to be Discussed: Barghoorn,  
Mackintosh, Kux; Meissner, Skilling,  
van den Heuvel
- September 5th, 15.00: Session 4 The Soviet Economy  
Papers to be Discussed: Laird, Thalheim,  
Schiller, Klatt and Kiga
- September 6th, 9.00: Session 5 Soviet Society  
Papers to be Discussed: Feldmesser and  
Schapiro
- September 6th, 15.00: Session 6 Soviet Culture and the Arts  
Papers to be Discussed: Anweiler and  
Hayward
- September 7th, 9.00: Session 7 Soviet Relations with other Communist-  
ruled Countries: Asia and East Europe  
Papers to be Discussed: Gyorgy, London,  
Jacobs and Broekmeijer
- September 7th, 14.00: Sightseeing-Tour through West-Berlin by bus
- September 7th, 19.00: Reception of the Senat of Berlin
- September 8th, 9.00: Session 8 Soviet Foreign Policy: The West  
Papers to be Discussed: Calzini and  
Mehnert
- September 8th, 15.00: Session 9 Soviet Foreign Policy: The Third World  
Papers to be Discussed: Armstrong,  
Ballis and Inoki
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## SCHEDULE OF SESSIONS

September 4th, 9.00

### Session 1: The periods of Soviet History: 1917 - 1967

Chairman: Mr. Mehnert

Rapporteur: Mr. Löwenthal

Papers: Mr. London - SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: FIFTY YEARS OF DUALISM  
Mr. Pipes - THE SOVIET PERIOD IN THE CONTEXT OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

September 4th, 15.00

### Session 2: Ideology

Chairman: Mr. Folsom

Rapporteur: Mr. Jacobs

Papers: Mr. Hook - THE HUMAN COSTS OF REVOLUTION  
Mr. Kamenka - SOVIET PHILOSOPHY 1917 - 1967  
Mr. Kwant - FIFTY YEARS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS

September 5th, 9.15

### Session 3: Party and State

Chairman: Mr. Inoki

Rapporteur: Mr. Kamenka

Papers: Mr. Barghoorn - PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:  
EVOLUTION, DECAY OR REVOLUTION?  
Mr. Jacobs - POLITBURO ACTORS IN THE FIRST AND FIFTH DECADES OF  
THE SOVIET POWER  
Mr. Kolkowicz - HERESY ENSHRINED: IDEA AND REALITY OF THE RED ARMY  
Mr. Kux - THE THREAT OF "BONAPARTISM" - THE PARTY AND THE ARMY

September 5th, 15.00

### Session 4: Economy

Chairman: Mr. Armstrong

Rapporteur: Mr. Laird

Papers: Mr. Kiga - WITHERING OF MARXIAN ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN FIFTY YEARS  
OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY  
Mr. Klatt - FIFTY YEARS OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE  
Mr. Laird - THE POLITICS OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE:  
1917-1967, AND THE FUTURE  
Mr. Schiller - STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN SOVIET AGRICULTURE  
1917-1967 IN THE LIGHT OF A CHANGING AGRARIAN POLICY  
Mr. Thalheim - GOALS OF SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY

September 6 th, 9.15

Session 5: Society

Chairman: Mr. Hook  
Rapporteur: Mr. Skilling

Papers: Mr. Feldmesser - SOVIET SOCIAL STRATIFICATION  
Mr. Loeber - 50 YEARS OF LEGAL RULES "FOR INTERNATIONAL USE"  
Mr. Meissner - POWER ELITE AND INTELLIGENTSIA IN SOVIET SOCIETY  
Mr. Schapiro - FIFTY YEARS OF SOVIET LAW AND POLITICS  
Mr. Skilling - THE PARTY, OPPOSITION AND INTEREST GROUPS  
IN COMMUNIST POLITICS

September 6th, 15.00

Session 6: Culture and Arts

Chairman: Mr. György  
Rapporteur: Mr. Barghoorn

Papers: Mr. Anweiler - SOME RESULTS OF THE EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
IN THE USSR 50 YEARS AFTER THE REVOLUTION

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On this evening there will be a chance to go to the opera. There are tickets available for "Falstaff"

September 7th, 9.15

Session 7: Relations with Other Communist States

Chairman: Mr. Kapur  
Rapporteur: Mr. Kux

Papers: Mr. Broekmeijer - THE ORIGINS OF THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT  
Mr. György - SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN RELATIONS, 1917-1967: THEORETICAL PERCEPTION AND POLITICAL REALITY  
Mr. Tucker - PATHS OF COMMUNIST REVOLUTION: 1917-1967

At 14.00 you are invited to take part in a bus-tour through West-Berlin. After that sightseeing-tour there will be a reception by the Senat of Berlin at the Congress Hall for all Participants and Observers. It begins at 17.30. There will be a chance to see East-Berlin on September 9th, 10.00 - 13.00. Please enlist at the Conference bureau.

September 8th, 9.15

Session 8: Foreign Policy: The West

Chairman: Mr. Löwenthal  
Rapporteurs: Mr. Kolkowicz, Mr. Loeber

Papers: Mr. Calzini - THE RELATIONS OF THE USSR WITH COMMUNIST STATES  
IN CONNECTION WITH THE GERMAN PROBLEM  
Mr. van den Heuvel - WAR AND PEACE IN COMMUNIST THINKING  
Mr. MacIntosh - THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY CONCEPTS AND  
THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION  
Mr. Mehnert - THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GERMANS  
Mr. Wolfe - SOVIET MILITARY POLICY AT THE FIFTY-YEAR MARK

September 8th, 15.00

Session 9: Foreign Policy: The Third World

Chairman: Mr. London

Rapporteur: Mr. Broekmeijer

Papers: Mr. Armstrong - SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST  
Mr. Ballis - SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS DEVELOPING STATES:  
EGYPT, A SELECTED CASE STUDY  
Mr. Inoki - SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE ASIAN POINT OF VIEW  
Mr. Kapur - A HALF-CENTURY OF SOVIET POLICY IN ASIA

September 8th, 20.00

Final dinner at the Hotel Berlin for all Participants and Observers.

### Topics of Papers

- Anweiler, Oskar: Results of the Pedagogical Development in the USSR
- Armstrong, John: Soviet Policy in the Middle East
- Ballis, William: Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Selected Developing States
- Barghoorn, Frederick: Prospects for Soviet Development: Evolution, Retrogression or Revolution?
- Broekmeijer, M.W.J.M.: The Origins of the Sino-Soviet Conflict
- Calzini, Paolo: The Relations of the USSR with Communist States in Connection with the German Problem
- Feldmesser, Robert: Soviet Social Stratification
- Gyorgy, Andrew: Soviet-East European Relations: Unity and Diversity in the Bloc
- Hayward, Max: Cultural Developments in the Soviet Union Over the Last Fifty Years
- Van den Heuvel, C.C.: Changes in Communist Thinking on War and Peace in Fifty Years
- Hook, Sidney: The Balance Sheet of the Russian Revolution
- Inoki, Masamichi: Soviet Foreign Policy from the Asian Point of View
- Jacobs, Dan: A Comparison of Politbüro Actors during the 1st and 5th Decades of Soviet Power
- Kamenka, Eugene: Soviet Philosophy 1917 - 1967
- Kapur, Harish: A Half-Century of Soviet Foreign Policy
- Kiga, Kenzo: The Withering of Marxian Economic Thought During Fifty Years of the USSR
- Klatt, Werner: Fifty Years of Soviet Agriculture
- Kux, Ernst: The Threat of Bonapartism: The Party and the Army
- Kwant, Remy: Fifty Years of Interaction Between Philosophy and Politics in the USSR
- Laird, Roy: The Politics of the Kolkhoz-Sovkhoz System
- London, Kurt: Soviet Foreign Policy: Fifty Years of Dualism
- Lowenthal, Richard: What Happened to World Revolution?
- Mackintosh, Malcolm: The Development of Soviet Military Concept and Thought Since the Revolution
- Mehnert, Klaus: Soviet Union and the Germans
- Meissner, Boris: Power Elite and Intellegentsia in Soviet Society
- Pipes, Richard: The Soviet Period in the Context of Russian History
- Schapiro, Leonard: Fifty Years of Soviet Law and Politics
- Schiller, Otto: Fifty Years of Soviet Agrarian Politics
- Skilling, H.Gordon: The Party, Opposition and Interest Groups in Communist Politics
- Thalheim, Karl: Goals of Soviet Economic Policy

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD DEVELOPING STATES:

EGYPT, a selected case study

by

William B. Ballis

PRELIMINARY DRAFT

Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Developing States:

Egypt, a selected case study

by

William B. Ballis

A few years ago, a leading British authority on Soviet policy in the Middle East wrote, "It is at least permissible to suppose that Russia's ultimate aim is still what it was over a century ago-- the establishment of Russian, or, if you like, Soviet political economic and cultural influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf." (Col. G. E. Wheeler, "Soviet Policy Towards the Near East," Islam and Communism, Jaan Pennar, editor, New York City, A conference sponsored by the Institute for the Study of the USSR, June 25, 1960, p. 32), While this statement might still indicate the long range objectives of the USSR in the Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf. This paper will concern itself with a description and analysis of the policies of the Soviet Union toward one country in the Eastern Mediterranean, in fact the largest in population, over 31,000,000 (1967) and the most revolutionary in theory and policy, i.e. the United Arab Republic, formerly called Egypt. When the Egyptian revolution of 1952 took place, Moscow at first, regarded the military coup in Cairo as something which was staged by Western influences. The official Soviet account of this referred to "a group of reactionary officers connected with the United States, with General Naguib at the head "instigating the coup. (Soviet Encyclopedia, Second edition, Vol. 15, p.460, 1952). The Soviet Union was not sure of the direction in which this revolutionary movement would turn. Soviet ideology had insisted that the Middle East like other parts of the Asian and even African world would become transformed as a result of a breakdown of colonialism and imperialism (see Levin, Selected Works, Vol. XI). Egypt, historically, had been one of the dramatic examples of the remnants of a Western supported, politically influenced, and economically dependent state. The conspicuous activities of the Egyptian monarch, King Farouk, a prototype of the modern playboy



had been widely publicized. What the Soviet Union did not realize was that there was brewing within Egypt a revolution which not only was at first supported by certain Western influences but later developed into an anti-Western revolutionary movement. The July 23, 1952 revolution in Egypt which the young officers using General Naguib as their leader brought into power a political group known as the Revolutionary Command Council was not heralded by the Soviets. General Naguib had been the hero to the Egyptians in the 1948 war in Palestine. When General Naguib took nominal control, he announced that the army had to take over "to force a return to constitutional life and to purge the army of corrupt elements." He also declared that the army had no intention of interfering in politics. This declaration has been proven false with the subsequent history of the country. As a result of the military takeover, King Farouk abdicated and left the country. Subsequent to the revolt, Naguib assumed on February 10, 1953 sovereign powers for the transitional period. The political power center was the Revolutionary Command Council. The Revolutionary Command Council of which Nasser was a member consisted of a dozen officers who had carried out the coup d'etat. At first the Revolutionary Command Council considered itself as the agency to see that the revolution was carried through but actually it developed into an organization for the control of the country. The Revolutionary Command Council in order to make certain its authority banned political parties, including the Moslem Brotherhood which it had first associated and then later eliminated. Perhaps the most significant development in the Revolutionary Command Council in these formative months was the decision to remove General Naguib from the leader symbol position in Egypt and to substitute for him Col. Nasser. Nasser had actually been the directing head of the officers' movement which generated the coup d'etat on July 23, 1952. On February 25, 1954 Naguib resigned from his office as president and prime minister after differing with eleven of the other members of the Revolutionary Command Council. Because of later internal opposition to this action, particularly in the Sudan, Naguib was restored for a short time as president of the Republic with Nasser as prime minister and Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. In April 1954, however, Naguib again resigned the office of Prime Minister. On June 23, 1956, four years after the coup d'etat, Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser was confirmed by plebiscite as President of Egypt. He had been serving also as Prime Minister. Naguib was after this completely out of the picture.

George Lenczowski, a distinguished American scholar in the field of Middle Eastern studies has categorized the development of Egyptian politics since the revolution of 1952 into four phases! (George Lenczowski, "The Object and Methods of Nasserism", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, pp. 63 - 76.) Egyptocentrism (1952-1954); the Pan-Arab phase, 1955-1958; the Domestic Socialist phase, 1958-1961, and the Pan-Arab Socialist phase - 1962 -.

In the Egyptocentrism phase, the Egyptian Revolution took place and after the "on again, off again" routine of Naguib, Nasser, Naguib and finally Nasser, the Revolution was made permanent and its leadership consolidated.

The Soviet Union at first held mixed feelings about the course of these events. Ideologically speaking, the doctrine on which the USSR operated was based on Lenin's idea of imperialism which he defined as "moribund capitalism." This moribund capitalism" was in turn based on the necessity of colonial markets for the maintenance of the metropolitan states. The Leninists believed that if Communists were successful in taking over the governments of the colonial states, the metropolitan states, denied raw materials and markets in the former colonies, would disintegrate. Colonies in the Middle East and states in that area, dependent on European powers were the place where Soviet doctrine had focussed for the anti-colonial revolution. Stalin in his famous lectures, the Foundations of Leninism delivered in April 1924, at Sverdlovsk University stated this doctrine as follows:

"It was tacitly assumed that the victory of the proletariat in Europe was possible without a direct alliance with the liberation movement in the colonies that the national-colonial question could be solved on the quiet, 'of its accord', off the highway of the proletarian revolution, without a revolutionary struggle against imperialism. Now we can say that this anti-revolutionary point of views has been exposed. Leninism has proved, and the imperialist war and the revolution in Russia have confirmed, that the national question can be solved only in connection with and on the basis of the proletarian revolution, and that the road to victory of the revolution in the West lies through the revolutionary alliance with the liberation movement of the colonies and dependent countries against imperialism. The national question is a part of the general question of the proletarian revolution, a part of the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The question is as follows: Are the revolutionary potentialities latent in the revolutionary liberation movement of the oppressed countries already exhausted, or not; and if not, is there any hope, any basis for utilising those potentialities for the proletarian revolution, for transforming the dependent and colonial countries from a reserve of the revolutionary proletariat, into an ally of the latter?

Leninism replies to this question in the affirmative, i.e. it recognizes the existence of revolutionary capacities in the national liberation movement of the oppressed countries, and the possibility of using these for overthrowing the common enemy, for overthrowing imperialism. The mechanics of the development of imperialism, the imperialist war and the revolution in Russia wholly confirm the conclusions of Leninism on this score.

Hence the necessity for the proletariat of the 'dominant' nations to support-resolutely and actively to support--the national liberation movement of the oppressed and dependent peoples.

This does not mean, of course, that the proletariat must support every national movement, everywhere and always, in every individual concrete case. It means that support must be given to such national movements as tend to weaken, to overthrow imperialism, and not to strengthen and preserve it. Cases occur when the national movements in certain oppressed countries come into conflict with the interests of the development of the proletarian movement. In such cases support is of course entirely out of the question. The question of the rights of nations is not an isolated self-sufficient question; it is part of the general problem of the proletarian revolution, subordinate to the whole, and must be considered from the point of view of the whole." <sup>1</sup>

This ideological statement served as the guidepost of Soviet policy towards the Middle East for almost thirty years. With British and French power in the Middle East until World War II, the Soviet Union did not manifest any concrete operational interest in the Middle East. In the back of Russian foreign policy objectives, the image of Russia as a Mediterranean power had loomed for over a century. Russian interest in the Middle East was thwarted by Britain and France in the Crimean War ending in 1855. The British in 1914 and later in 1945 dangled before

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<sup>1</sup> J. V. Stalin, Works, Volume 6, 1924, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953, pp. 145-147.

Russia when Britain was allied with Russia against the prospect of having an outlet on the Mediterranean but this was never effected. During and after World War II first French and then British power crumbled in the eastern Mediterranean. This left a power gap which was later filled by the USSR. Soviet political power has had over the last fifty years two main foreign policy objectives: One is that the national security of the USSR - "the socialist fatherland" as it was called more in the times of Lenin and Stalin - must be preserved against all enemies, present or future. The other is that the foreign policy of the USSR should promote as much as the security of the USSR will permit, the world socialist system and the destruction of "capitalism" and "imperialism."

In Soviet foreign policy strategy towards the Middle East, the Soviet Union inherited the phobia of Tzarist Russia that British imperialism was threatening Russian national interests on its southern flanks. The Crimean War with Russia and Britain as the main adversaries was fought chiefly over the issue of Russia's southern expansion into the Middle East. Tzarist Russia and Great Britain came to terms over spheres of interest in Iran in the early twentieth century and in 1914 in a secret treaty Russia got the British promise of receiving Constantinople as the spoils of the joint war against Turkey. In the post World War I period, the Soviet Union renouncing the claim to Constantinople and other Turkish centers proceeded to join causes with the Turks against the British "imperialist" in the position of favoring a closed Straits. Soviet expansion in Iran manifested itself during and after World War II. The USSR was contained in 1946 by UN action in stopping the Soviet contempt to take over Northern Iran.

With the power vacuum caused by British withdrawal in the eastern Mediterranean and the concomitant decline of the British Navy at the end of World War II, the Soviet Union moved more actively in the Middle East in the post World War II period. It was not until after Stalin's death in 1953 that the USSR began to play an active role in Middle Eastern politics. The Comintern as early as the nineteen twenties, however, did give some attention to the revolutionary movements of the Middle East, as in the Baku Conference of the Toilers of the East in 1920, but it was not until the middle of the nineteen fifties that the USSR affirmatively began to work with some opposition leaders in the Middle East.

With the withdrawal of British influence in the post World War II Middle East and the inability of the United States to fill the gap politically (by failing to build a lasting northern tier of defenses

against communism through the Bagdad Pact), the Soviet Union had the good fortune to be welcome into the Middle East as no power had previously been. What had been a non-socialist Arab national liberation movement developed into a tool of Soviet expansion. This has been the pattern previously in some undeveloped countries, as in Outer Mongolia in the twenties. As has been previously pointed out, the USSR did not view favorably at first the Naguib-Nasser coup in Egypt. In 1954, a Soviet writer on Egypt described the Nasser government as "madly reactionary, terrorist, anti-democratic demagogic."<sup>1</sup> By February 1955, the Soviet Union implicated a new policy toward the Arab countries. Molotow indicated this in his report to the Supreme Soviet at that time:

"Auspicious facts have lately marked the relations between the Soviet Union and the Arab countries with the exception of Iraq .... It is presumably known in the Arab countries that the peoples of the U.S.S.R. entertain friendly feelings for them, and that in the Soviet Union they had, and will have, a reliable support in the defense of their sovereignty and national independence."<sup>2</sup>

At this time the USSR looked upon the bourgeois national revolutionary movements of Arab countries as the necessary preliminary phase of a socialist revolution. The bourgeois revolutionary movements shared with the USSR a common opposition to colonialism and imperialism. These movements first concentrated on the removal of western rule in their respective countries. The July 1952 revolt in Egypt removed King Farouk who was regarded as a puppet of western powers. Soviet interpretation of this revolt later characterized the leadership of the revolt, of military officers, intellectuals and civil servants as non-capitalist but petite-bourgeoisie. The real revolution in the argument of the Soviets must be a national independent revolution based on economic and social liberation. This would entail a socialist revolution.

In the period between the first Egyptian revolution of 1952 and the second manifestation of revolt, culminating in the Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal, the accent was on political independence and agricultural reform. With the 1956 manifestation, economic independence became more accentuated and the role of the "exploitive" western powers diminished.

<sup>1</sup>-----  
Quoted in Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959, p. 262.

<sup>2</sup>Pravda, February 9. 1955.

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On May 21, 1961 Nasser promulgated the Charter of the United Arab Republic. The Charter defines in considerable detail the nature of Egyptian political and social democracy<sup>1</sup>. It points out the independent position of Egyptian socialism.

"To recognize the presence of national laws governing social action does not mean to accept ready-made theories and take them as an adequate substitute for national experience. The real solution to the problems of our people cannot be imported from the experiences of another."<sup>2</sup> The theory of Egyptian democracy is outlined further. "Political democracy cannot be separated from social democracy." This is the first principle. The second principle is, "Political democracy cannot exist under the domination of any one class." The third principle is that the Arab Socialist Union "created by the cooperation between those representing the people and the driving force behind the possibilities of the Revolution and the guardian of the values of true democracy." The fourth principle is that "Popular organizations, especially cooperatives and trade unions, can play an effective and influential role in promoting sound democracy." The fifth principle of Egyptian democratic socialism states that "Criticism and self-criticism are among the most important guarantees to freedom." This statement is amplified by a significant amendment, "The most dangerous obstacle in the way of free criticism and self-criticism in political organizations is the infiltration of reactionary elements." The sixth and last principle on democracy presented in the Charter states that "The new revolutionary conceptions of true democracy must impose themselves on the factors influencing the formation of the citizen -- foremost among which are education and administrative laws and regulations." This sounds mocus but in discussing further the role of education, the Charter develops the interpretation

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1 The Charter, Cairo: Information Department United Arab Republic.

2 Ibid., pp. 35-36

of education as being the reshaping of the citizens in terms of the revolution. Furthermore The Charter further defines the laws as being "redrafted to serve the new social relations brought in by political democracy reflecting the social democracy."<sup>1</sup>

From what just been listed, one cannot defer that Egyptian socialism is the same as Soviet socialism, although there are some common ingredients such as criticism and self-criticism and a state oriented educational and legal system.

While ideology is a significant factor in explaining Soviet behavior both at home and abroad, other factors and forces perhaps play even more leading roles in appraising Soviet foreign policy towards the Middle East and particularly towards Egypt. To be sure, Moscow would probably like to see a socialist Egypt, if not a socialist Middle East in the Soviet sense but Moscow would settle probably for primacy of Soviet power in the area. Even the relationship between Moscow and the Egyptian Communist Party bears out the point that not ideology but power politics makes a better explanation for action. The Egyptian Communist Party was never a large party. Established in 1919, dormant in the twenties and thirties, revived in the forties and reorganized in the fifties as the United Communist Party, the Egyptian Communist Party did not have a broad mass base. The party did in the fifties follow the line of emphasizing the national liberation struggle. The Egyptian Communist Party had a difficult time in the fifties. Several hundred members of the Party were put in prison during this period because of political warfare being carried on not between Moscow and Cairo but between the Chinese Communists and the Syrian Communists against Nasser.<sup>2</sup> Egyptians Communists did occupy major positions in organs of communication and policy building. As Walter Lacquer said in 1958:

"It is probably no exaggeration to say that most of the writers in the influential Egyptian dailies and weeklies are Communists who

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1 Jaan Pennar, "Moscow and Socialism in Egypt," Problems of Communism, September - October, 1966, Vol. XV, No. 5, p. 42.

2 Ibid.

were arrested and imprisoned at one time or another between 1950-1955. They have to a large extent created today's political climate in Egypt."<sup>1</sup>

Communist theorists did attack in the early sixties Nasser's socialism. A leading Czech Communist writer put it this way:

"Once independence is won a struggle for the subsequent character of a state sets in. Discrepancies between the national bourgeoisie and the working class tend to become increasingly sharper. It becomes evident that the exploitative nature of the bourgeoisie as well as its class limitations make it impossible for this sector to conduct a fight for the conclusive liquidation of the imperialist influence and for the effectuation of maxims of the national liberatory revolution all the way - until victory is won. As an example, in one salient question, namely, that of the future trend in these countries, the stance of the national bourgeoisie as such begins to realize that rapid economic advance cannot be ensured by capitalistic methods, this bourgeoisie speaks of non-capitalistic ways and sometimes even of building socialism. Yet the measures it proposes to ensure economic progress in effect supports a strengthening of capitalism."<sup>2</sup>

A further insight into the attitude of Soviet ideologists in the early sixties on the nature of the Egyptian revolution is given by R. Avankov and Georgy Mirskiy as follows: "In the U.A.R. power is firmly in the hands of a group of officers of middle bourgeois provenance. The social base of the regime remains narrow and the masses of the

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1 Walter Lacques, "The Prospects of Communism in the Middle East," in Tensions in the Middle East, ed. by Philip W. Thayer, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1958, p. 301.

2 E. Palondy, "Build-up of the Anti-Imperialist Front," Rude Pravo March 21, 1962, quoted in Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ed. Africa and the Communist World, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963, p. 225. For another Communist theoretical attack on Egyptian socialism, see V. Mayevsky in an article in Pravda, July 12, 1962 in which he objects to Nasser's religious bases of socialism, and his denial of class conflict. Mayevsky criticizes Nasser's socialism as an alternative to the dictatorship of the proletariat.



people are as before prevented from participation in deciding the destinies of their country."<sup>1</sup>

When Khrushchev accepted Nasser's invitation in the spring of 1964 to visit Egypt, Nasser then ordered the release of the remainder of the jailed Egyptian Communists. The Communist Party disbanded in 1965; its members joined the Arab Socialist Union and the united front of the national liberation movement. The Soviet press commented in an article this event in Egypt as follows:

"All Communists have been released from jail, and instructions have been issued to find them jobs. Many of them have found employment in the civil service, others are working on newspapers. Books by Communists and Marxist classics are now on sale."<sup>2</sup>

While the Communist Party's separate position in the Egyptian revolutionary movement has been modified in recent years, Soviet political influence has increased. Before considering the recent aspects of Soviet political influence, it might be worthwhile to review the course of Soviet political relations with Egypt.

In 1954, Egypt sent trade missions to European countries to solicit economic assistance. At this time, Nasser's line was that Egypt was part of the West. He thought of the USSR as a potential aggressor in the Middle East and he was apposed to Egyptian Communism.<sup>3</sup> At the end of 1954, Egypt changed its orientation from the West to the East. In 1955, Nasser went to the Bandung Conference and joined the neutralist camp. This naturally pleased the USSR.

In the meantime while Egypt did not in 1954 get the USSR to respond favorably for industrial and other assistance, Egypt on March 17, 1954 decided to raise its Legation in Moscow to an Embassy. The USSR reciprocated.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Mirovaya Ekonomiki i Mezhdunarochnyye Otnosheniya, No. 4, 1962, quoted in David Moreson, op. cit., p. 124.

<sup>2</sup> Georgy Mirsky, "United Arab Republic: New Stage," New Times, December 1, 1965, p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> See David J. Wallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1961, p. 390.

<sup>4</sup> The New York Times, March 22, 1954

When Molotow announced in February 1955 a change in Soviet Foreign Policy in the Middle East, already mentioned, the Soviets opened the door to Nasser, who believed he had been rebuffed by the West in requesting industrial and military supplies on credits favorable to him.

During the Geneva Summit Conference of July 1955, Dimitri Shepilov, Editor of Pravda who later succeeded Molotov as Foreign Minister arrived in Cairo to attend to the thirtieth anniversary of the July 23 Egyptian Revolution. Shepilov brought with him Soviet industrial and military experts who worked out with Nasser the first big Soviet-Egyptian agreement. Nasser had hoped that he could play off the West against the Soviet and vice versa and add to his total aid economic and military build-up. One of the other results of the Soviet visit to Cairo was that Nasser had accepted Shepilov's invitation to visit Moscow.<sup>1</sup> Daniel S. Solod, the Soviet Ambassador to Cairo, had been very instrumental in paving the way for Shepilov's visit and for the arms negotiations. Solod announced on December 17, 1955 that he would return to Moscow to head up the Middle East section of the Soviet Foreign Office.<sup>2</sup> On December 26, Moscow reported that Solod's successor in Cairo would be Yevgeni D. Kiselev.<sup>3</sup>

In early 1956 it was apparent from reading the Soviet press that Egypt was not an anti-socialist country. The Soviet press stopped mentioning the imprisonment of Egyptian communists. And Internal Affairs, the leading Soviet foreign policy periodical in English published by Moscow praised Nasser's Constitution.<sup>4</sup>

While Cairo regarded Israel as Egypt's enemy of the first magnitude and western imperialism as the second, Moscow did not view Israel as the prime enemy of the Arab world. In the spring and summer of 1956, Arab-Israel tension mounted and Arab-Western conflict over the Suez Canal increased. In Moscow on August 24, 1956 Khrushchev remarked at a Rumanian reception in Moscow that if Egypt were attacked over the Suez

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1 The New York Times, July 22, 1955 and The Times (London, August 10, 1955.

2 The New York Times, December 18, 1955.

3 Ibid., December 27, 1955.

4 International Affairs, (Moscow), No. 2, February 1956, p. 122.

Canal, "the Arabs would not stand alone; there would be volunteers."<sup>1</sup> On September 12 the newspaper Sovietskaya Rossiya hailed Egypt's rejection of the 18 nation proposal for international control of the Suez Canal as "another blow against colonialism." This proposal had been worked out by a group of canal users with the Soviet Union and Egypt abstaining. The fury over the Canal increased. On September 15, 1956, the USSR charged that the Western powers planned to seize the Canal by "an act of aggression" in violation of the UN Charter and of Soviet security interest.<sup>2</sup> The Western powers were not able to work out an agreement over the Canal with Egypt. Anthony Nutting who was British Minister of State in the Foreign Office published in July 1967 a book which argues that Britain, France and Israel met in advance and plotted the Suez drive "to gain physical control of the Suez Canal."<sup>3</sup> Be this as it may, the end of the action in 1956 was the failure of this plan because of the attitude of the United States and the action of the United Nations in requiring the withdrawal of British, French and Israel forces from occupied territories in Egypt. The Soviet Union did at this time send notes to the western powers and on November 5, 1956 announced that it was prepared to use force to "crush the aggressors and restore peace" to the Middle East.<sup>4</sup> On November 10, 1956 the Soviet Union said it would allow "volunteers" to go to Egypt to fight the "agressors" if Britain, France and Israel would not withdraw their forces from Egyptian territory. The Soviet statement was phrased in the following way: "leading Soviet circles" declared that they "will not raise abstacles to the departure of Soviet citizen volunteers"<sup>5</sup> for Egypt if Great Britian, France and Israel failed to pull out.<sup>5</sup>

With the swift movement of US and UN actions, the Suez crisis was temporarily halted and on November 16, 1956 it was reported from Moscow that the Soviet campaign to send volunteers to Egypt suddenly came to a halt.<sup>6</sup>

1 N.Y. Herald Tribune, August 25, 1956.

2 The New York Times, September 16, 1956

3 Ibid., May 3, 1967

4 Ibid., November 7, 1956

5 Ibid., November 11, 1956.

6 N.Y. Herald Tribune, November 18, 1956.

The Soviet position in the outcome of the Suez war of 1956 was that the USSR saved the day for the cause of peace. The Soviet line was summarized a year later in a publication of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

"The clear and firm position of the Soviet Union in the defense of Egypt, its determination to take an active part in the restraining of the aggressors, in the restoration of peace in the Near East, in averting a new world war, proved to have a sobering influence on the ruling circles of England and France and to have played a decisive role in the cessation of hostilities." 1

The results of the Suez affair of 1956 contributed greatly to the favorable image of the Soviet Union in Egypt. The Soviet Embassy in Cairo under the direction of Ambassador Kisselev became an ever increasing fulcrum in the balancing of Soviet political and economic relations. Visits to the USSR for high Egyptian officials were arranged. Nasser's deputy Abdel Hakim Amer went to the Soviet Union in November 1957. At a farewell reception he gave at the Egyptian Embassy in Moscow, Amer said with Khrushchev present:

"Your army is struggling for the sake of universal peace. But our army in the Middle East is trying to defend the Arab people looking forward to freedom and to save them from the yoke of imperialism and Israel, the tool of imperialism. These are the reasons uniting us. We are now two friendly nations, two friendly peoples and two friendly armies." 2 Though Amer expressed what he thought the Soviets would like to hear, Egypt did not appear as close to the USSR as the Soviets would have preferred. Cairo by the end of 1957 seemed to be drifting away somewhat from Moscow.

The next spring, Nasser went to the USSR on an eighteen day official visit. He arrived in Moscow on April 29, 1958. At this time, Nasser was playing a more coy role in his effort to win economic support from both the USSR and the USA. It was the time when many Egyptian communists were jailed, as has been pointed out. To Nasser, the main conflict in the world was not the East-West conflict,

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1) Suetskyi Vopros i Imperialisticheskaya Agressiya Protiv Egipta, ...  
Moscow: Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Institute of World Economics and International Relations, 1957, pp. 101-102 quoted in Dallin, op. cit., p. 418.

2) The Egyptian Gazette (Cairo), November 17, 1957.

but the conflict between the newly developing nations of the Arab and African world against the forces of colonialism. This has been the consistent Egyptian line down to the present. In May 1966, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the UAR, Dr. M. H. El Zayyat, informed the present writer that it was colonialism and imperialism of the West in the Arab and African world which Egypt was opposing. This line is extended to the Egyptian opposition to Israel, to Great Britain and now to the United States.

When Nasser was welcomed on April 29, 1958 in Moscow at the beginning of his Soviet visit he did not denounce western imperialism as he did on later occasions. On May 15, 1958 Nasser departed from the Soviet Union and issued a communiqué in which he said that both governments are for peaceful coexistence, both governments condemn colonialism and "both governments confirm their resolve to strive for a further development of economic and cultural cooperation between their countries for their common good." 1

A few months later, the USSR dispatched to Cairo on an official visit the First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, N.A. Mukhitalinov. On September 24, 1958, it was reported from Cairo that at a Soviet reception honoring Mukhitalinov the Egyptian Vice-President, Abdel Hakim Amer, called the Soviet Union the best friend of Egypt. 2 It was later reported from Cairo that Nasser told Mukhitalinov that he was not going to allow the revival of the Egyptian Communist Party. 3

The attitude was in part the result of Nasser's concern over the course of events in Syria in the preceding months. In 1957 the USSR had begun to build up a bastion in Syria through shipments and through help to the Syrian Communist Party. The Syrian Communist Party had infiltrated into the young officer elite unlike in Egypt. The young Communist oriented officers took over many leading posts in the Syrian government in August 1957. The Soviet Union was giving considerable support to this Communist oriented group. Turkey and Syria were on the break of war. American diplomats were expelled from Syria. Anti-communists in Syria agitated for a merger of Syria with Egypt to save Syria. Egypt had landed troops in Syria on October 13, 1957. On

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1) The New York Times, May 16, 1958

2) The New York Herald Tribune, September 25, 1958

3) The New York Times, September 28, 1958

February 1, 1958 Nasser promulgated the merger of Syria and Egypt into the UAR. This was a bitter pill which Moscow had to swallow. Khrushchev had no other choice because he already had too much invested in Egypt. This is possibly why when Nasser visited Moscow in April 1958 that he seemed a bit restrained in his usual praises of the USSR. Nothing was said publicly about Syria. Nasser still distrusted indigenous Arab Communist Parties which might be supported from the outside and were opposed to Nasser's plan of Arab unity and control.

Another Middle East political development in 1958 which complicated Soviet-Egyptian relations was the Soviet influence in Iraq. Iraq was the scene of a political upheaval in the summer of 1958 which put Iraq out of the US-British sponsored Bagdad Pact and opened the door for Communist bloc influence. The program of Arab unification under Nasser was being challenged by leftist leaders of Arab countries such as the banned Syrian Communist leader, Khaled Baghash. Baghash spoke at the XXI Congress of the CPSU in January, 1959 advocating a more loosely federated Arab state than what Nasser had instituted in the UAR. In his report to the XXI Congress Khrushchev supported Arab Communism and took issue with Nasser. Nasser's press in Cairo criticized Khrushchev for this position and Moscow-Cairo relations became less ardent. In the spring of 1959, the Soviet Union opposed Nasser's efforts to incorporate Iraq into the UAR. On March 20, 1959 Nasser criticized Khrushchev's position as advanced at the XXI Party Congress as putting Communist minorities in the UAR and other Arab countries to crush Arab nationalism. 1 Though there was this cooling between Moscow and Cairo in political orientation, Soviet economic assistance to the UAR continued, as will be discussed later.

Often when relations between the USSR and an important country are desirous of improving, the Soviet Union will send in a new ambassador. In late July 1959, it was announced that after three years in Cairo, the Soviet ambassador, Yevgeni D. Kiselev would return to Moscow. 1 Kiselev had been present during the Suez conflict, the negotiations over Aswan, and the economic agreements over trade which will be discussed presently. Kiselev was replaced by Vladimir Yerofeyev. 2

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1) London Daily Telegraph, July 27, 1959

2) The New York Times, August 7, 1959

The problem of improving Soviet-Egyptian relations was recognized on both sides in the fall of 1959. In early November it was reported from Cairo that one of Nasser's military clique, Major Saleh Salem, the editor of the Government newspaper, Algomhouria, would go to Moscow to interview Khrushchev. 1 Though the initial steps were made in this period in the Aswan Dam project and other massive Soviet aid programs in Egypt and though there were some Egyptian visitors of distinction to the Soviet Union, political relations between the two countries were not extremely cordial. The Soviet press still accused Nasser of mistreating jailed Egyptian Communists. 2 The World Marxist Review attacked the Cairo policy towards Communists and the Soviet Journal Sovremennyi Vostok published in Moscow a stinging criticism of Nasser calling his government a "dictatorship" and chastising him for allowing western capital to enter Egypt. Pravda on May 31, 1961 denounced the anti-Soviet statement of the Cairo press.

An Egyptian Parliamentary delegation visited Moscow in May 1959 and when its members returned to Cairo in June, reports of their conversations with Khrushchev were released. Khrushchev is reported to have told the Speaker of the Egyptian National Assembly, "We can hardly have confidence in your Nasser when he is losing his grip on the country and not solving his country's problems." 3 Khrushchev is also reported from Cairo to have said:

"You probably believe I want to turn you from Arab nationalists to Communists. Of course, I don't want to do this now. But I feel that some of you present here will turn Communist the future." 4

In the summer of 1961, Moscow became more friendly in its press treatment of Egypt. Pravda on June 17, 1961 said that the Soviet Union "values the friendship with the United Arab Republic and wants to develop that friendship and strengthen it further." It was reported from Cairo that Egyptian newspapers gave full play to this Pravda statement. 5

In July 1961, Nasser promulgated measures nationalizing the economy and reforming the land tenure system. These pleased the USSR. Georgy

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- 1) The Times (London), November 2, 1959
  - 2) London Daily Telegraph, May 24, 1961
  - 3) The New York Times, June 8, 1961
  - 4) Ibid., June 10, 1961
  - 5) The Times (London), June 19, 1961

Mirsky, a leading Soviet writer on Egypt, wrote: "There is no denying that no other non-socialist country in Asia or Africa has ventured on such radical reforms... The state sector, which in the U.A.R. plays a much bigger part than in any other economically backward country, is being very substantially extended and strengthened." 1

Soviet writings in 1962 welcomed the establishment in Cairo of the National Congress of Popular Forces to adopt the UAR Charter, already mentioned. The Charter provides for only one political party or group - the Arab Socialist Union. This means the suppression of the Communist Party as a party. But Soviet writings at this time did not refer to the suppression in the UAR of the Communist Party. 2 In other words, the fair weather flag was flying and the Soviet position was not to embarrass Soviet-Egyptian relations on this question. As for the Soviet attitude on Nasser's attempt for Arab unity Soviet writers still expressed the general concern of the USSR for a pan-Arabic union. As pointed out before, the USSR has always looked unfavorably on federative movements - like Pan-Balkan, Pan-Turanian, Pan-Arabic, etc. Two leading Soviet writers put it this way:

"At a certain stage, Arab nationalism was a militant slogan, an inspiration to battle against imperialism. But later (particularly in Syria) the UAR ruling circles' interpretation of Arab nationalism showed its limited character and its negative aspects. The attainment of real unity of the peoples of the Arab East with equal rights, is a complicated historical process, and the mere launching of the slogan of Arab nationalism is far from sufficient for the creation of a stable political and economic community." 3

Massive amounts of Soviet economic and military aid poured into Egypt in 1962 and 1963. In June 1963, Khrushchev sent his son-in-law, Aleksei I. Adzhubei, the editor of Izvestiya, on a visit to Egypt where on June 3, he was received by Nasser. 4 A few days later Nasser's deputy, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, the Vice-President of the UAR, arrived in Moscow and was a personal guest of Khrushchev at his dacha. 5

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1) New Times, (Moscow), No. 4, 1962, p. 121.

2) David Moreson, The USSR and Africa, London: Institute of Race Relations and Cultural Asian Research Centre, London: Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 121.

3) R. Avakov and Georgy Mirsky, Narodny Azii i Afriki, no. 4, 1962, p. 50, quoted in Moreson, op. cit., p. 122.

4) The New York Times, June 4, 1963.

5) Soviet News (London), June 10, 1963.



Accompanying Amer were the heads of the Egyptian Air Force and Air Defense Force. It is possible that the purpose of the visit was to make good the military equipment the Egyptians lost in the fighting in Yemen. 1

A little more than a year later Amer visited again the USSR. This time, he attended the November 7 celebration of the Russian Revolution. 2

In the late spring of 1964, five months before he was dismissed as Prime Minister and First Party Secretary in the USSR, Khrushchev paid a sixteen day visit to Egypt. Arriving in Alexandria on May 9 he kept up a devastating pace of activities in the wilting Egyptian heat. To a mass rally on May 10, Khrushchev congratulated the youth of Egypt for following Nasser's leadership: "We fight together for the complete eradication of imperialism," he said. 3 The next day, Khrushchev spoke to the National Assembly of the UAR and took the Arab position on the dispute with Israel over the waters of the Jordan River. 4 On May 13, Khrushchev went up the Nile to Aswan and in a dramatic ceremony cast two granite stones into the Nile as the old course of the river was closed by a copper dam. 5 While at Aswan, Khrushchev conferred on Nasser the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. This incident was later used in anti-Khrushchev attacks as charging that Khrushchev exceeded his authority to do this. By the Soviet Constitution only the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet awards titles and decorations.

Khrushchev made several significant statements during the remainder of his visit to Egypt. Some of these statements were made without the prior approval of his top colleagues in Moscow. 6

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1) The Times (London), June 20, 1963

2) The Egyptian Gazette (Cairo), November 13, 1964

3) The New York Times, May 11, 1964

4) Ibid., May 12, 1964

5) Ibid., May 14, 1964

6) See for an analysis of this aspect, : Uri Ra'anani,  
"Moscow and the Third World", Problems of Communism, Vol. XIV,  
January-February 1965, p. 27.

In Port Said May 19, 1964 he said that the USSR had stood by Egypt during the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 and added further: " We served the aggressors an ultimatum that, if war operations did not stop, we would give Egypt our full support." 1 Khrushchev did, however, insert several discordant notes on other occasions when he took Nasser to task for emphasizing the Arab unification movement rather than stressing the revolutionary aspects from a proletarian instead of a national base. On May 20, 1964 at a reception for Cairo labor leaders Khrushchev was reported to have said to Nasser: "You are calling for Arab unity. I want to say that we Russians understand the question of unity in a broader fashion, - I not based on people's nationalism but based on working class forces." 2

In the early fall of 1964, immediately before Khrushchev's dismissal and shortly before Vice-President Amer's trip to the USSR (incidentally, Amer was also a recipient of the title Hero of the Soviet Union), the Egyptian Prime Minister, Aly Sabry, accompanied by his wife visited the USSR. They were met by Khrushchev and his wife. Khrushchev said to Aly Sabry on that occasion:

"We have always been ready to render assistance to the friendly Egyptian people in building a new society. The great Lenin, the founder of our state, left us a legacy of sharing experience with the peoples who won their independence and set out on the road of independent development .... We are opening up new and broad horizons for close cooperation between two friendly peoples." 3

When Khrushchev was dismissed as Prime-Minister and First Party Secretary in October 1964, the Egyptian leadership was naturally somewhat uneasy about the course of Soviet policy. Khrushchev had committed massive amounts of economic and military aid, as will be shown, and had made many warm expressions of Soviet friendship for Egypt. About two months after Khrushchev's dismissal, the USSR sent a high delegation of Supreme Soviet Deputies, led by A.N. Shelepin, a member of the Secretariat and prominent Soviet leader. 4 Just as Shelepin's visit in 1964 was equally significant. Under Khrushchev, Shepilev

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- 1) The New York Times, May 20, 1964
  - 2) The New York Herald Tribune, May 21, 1964
  - 3) Soviet News, (London), September 16, 1964
  - 4) The Egyptian Gazette, December 13, 1964

had been the personal link with Egypt. A strong possibility is that he might have been too much identified with Khrushchev's policies in giving extensive economic aid to Egypt and even was the key figure in awarding Nasser the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. But be that as it may, Shelepin like his boss of former times did everything as Khrushchev did on his visit. He spoke at mass rallies, addressed the Egyptian National Assembly and visited Aswan. 1 (Kosygin did the same on his visit in May 1966.) Top military and economic personnel continued to extend influence with visits to Egypt in 1965. 2 Soviet ambassador Vladimir Yerofeyev was replaced by Dimitry P. Pozhidayev. 3 The most significant movement during 1965 was Nasser's trip to the USSR in late August and early September. On August 27 he arrived in Moscow for five days of talks. At a Kremlin dinner, it was reported that Nasser denounced the US attacks on North Vietnam. 4 At the dinner in the Kremlin honoring Nasser, First Secretary L. I. Brezhnev spoke of the common friendship of the USSR and the UAR in the struggle against imperialism. 5 In Brezhnev's words:

"I should like to emphasize once more today that the peoples of our country, their government and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are the loyal and reliable friends of the peoples of all countries and continents, including the peoples of the Arab East, who are struggling against colonialism and neo-colonialism and for a new and better life...."

In the course of his speech, Nasser said that the relations between the USSR and the UAR are "an example of international relations of a new type". He talked the Soviet language of threats to peace by saying, "First there is the danger of a return to the policy of force exemplified by the daily recurrence of undisguised attacks of North Vietnam."

At a Soviet-Arabic Friendship Rally at the Kremlin on August 31, A. I. Mikoyan, then Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, spoke in glowing terms about Nasser and the political and economic accomplishments of the UAR. He commented on "the UAR's noble

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1) The Observer (London), December 20, 1961

2) See the Egyptian Mail (Cairo), March 20, 1965 and May 15, 1965 and the Egyptian Gazette (Cairo), April 4, 1965

3) The Egyptian Gazette (Cairo), June 17, 1965

4) The New York Times, (August 28, 1965)

5) For complete texts, see Current Digest of Soviet Press, Vol. XVII, No. 35, pp. 18-22.

role in giving every possible support to the Yemeni people's struggle and to the search for a means of peaceful settlement of the situation in Yemen." He reiterated the previous Soviet position against prolonging the UAR's fight against the Yemen Royalists. He talked of the liberation struggle in Africa and Asia as follows:

"True to the principles of proletarian internationalism, the peoples of the Soviet Union are making a large contribution to the Afro-Asian people's struggle of liberation. It is perfectly understandable that the common interests of the Asian as well as of the African peoples, incidentally are not alien to us."

Nasser in his reply spoke of the economic and social achievements of his regime. He talked about the obstacles in the way of attaining the objectives of the Egyptian "people's struggle". In his words, "Probably the greatest difficulty is the fight for Arab unity. Now this struggle has for the first time become progressive in substance, which has given rise to a united aggressive front of colonialism and reaction against it." He talked also about threats from the outside world which does not want a unity of Arab nations. He formulated his opposition to Israel as follows:

"There are also threats from Israel. I should like you, brothers and friends, to know that our hostility toward Israel is not racial in nature. There has never in the history of our religion been any case of anti-Semitism with regard to Jews residing in our countries. It is the establishment of Israel that is a manifestation of aggressive racism, which colonialism is using to establish a base in the heart of the Arab world to hamper the unity of the Arab nations, threaten their security and divert their forces for the repulsion of danger instead of channeling them in the interests of peaceful economic construction."

In the joint communiqué issued on September 1, at the end of the Nasser visit mention was made of a common attitude on "imperialism" in the Near East. The communiqué reads as follows:

"The governments of the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic condemn the imperialist policy being carried out in the Near East. The Soviet Union expresses its complete support of the Arab people's struggle against this policy as well as of the inalienable legal rights of Palestine Arabs."

Attacks were made in the communiqué on West German, British and US policies in the Middle East.

The next most significant development in Soviet-UAR relations was the visit almost nine months later of Kosygin to Cairo. This was a return visit to Nasser's Moscow visit. In the meantime, Soviet relations with Syria were moving closer. Soviet aid to Syria was increasing. In 1965 and 1966, Moscow played a leading role in the affairs of the Syrian Communist Party. 1 The Soviet Union was also committing itself to large scale economic and military aid programs to Syria.

For some time, the union of Syria and Egypt in 1958 into the UAR had been rendered asunder in 1961, though Egypt still continued to use the name United Arab Republic. One of the purposes of Kosygin's visit to Cairo in May 1966 was to try to convince Nasser to stop his opposition to Syria's form of Arab socialism. The Russians were also concerned over Nasser's threatening bankruptcy because of his costly involvement in the war against the Yemeni royalists.

Kosygin, not only Soviet Prime Minister but also a trained engineer and responsible head of Soviet industry, obviously wanted to look first hand at the results of the hundreds of millions of dollars of Soviet investment in Egypt. Soviet Ambassador D.P. Pozhikayev's large compound on the Nile was bustling with activity during the eight day visit from May 10 to 18, 1966 of the Soviet delegation. The composition of the Soviet delegation testifies to the extent of the purposes of the visit. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, Soviet Minister of Power and Electrification Naporozhny, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers' State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations Skachkov and Admiral Gorshkov, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, were the senior officials accompanying Kosygin. Foreign affairs, naval affairs, hydroelectric projects and finances must have been on the agenda for the talks.

Kosygin visited the dam of Aswan. Before going to the Aswan dam, Kosygin visited Halwan, the industrial complex south of Cairo where he saw iron, steel and coke plants, built with Soviet help, in operation. A Soviet writer accompanying Kosygin wrote of the Aswan visit:

"One of the most stirring moments in the Soviet delegation's tour was naturally the visit to the construction site at the Aswan High Dam,

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1) See Jaan Penner, "The Soviet Road to Damascus, "Mizan, Vol. 9, No. 1, January-February 1967, p. 27

that titanic project without equal in the world. Its history is well known, as are the efforts the Egyptian people had to exert to realize their age-old dream of harnessing the Nile. This became possible thanks primarily to the assistance of the Soviet Union, which provided the necessary credits, supplied the equipment and sent specialists, in a word, shared everything it could with its Egyptian friends in a brotherly and disinterested manner."<sup>1</sup>

This glowing account of the assistance of the Soviet Union by a Pravda writer illustrates the image the USSR was attempting to develop about its Egyptian aid program. Kosygin's visit to Egypt was also used to foster Nasser's image as a successful and approved recipient of Soviet help as well as to increase the favorable image of the USSR not only in Egypt but also in other developmental states of the Middle East and Africa. The present writer was in Egypt during most of Kosygin's visit. Wherever Kosygin went, Nasser accompanied him. It is difficult to say how much of the Nasser Chariema rubbed off on Kosygin but Kosygin took his share of praise by the enthusiastic popular demonstration. Signs in Russian and Arabic were everywhere: "Long live Soviet-Arabian friendship". One of the highlights of Kosygin's visit was his speech to the Egyptian National Assembly.<sup>2</sup> Kosygin lashed out at "the imperialists", without specifically naming them.

"The imperialists, in an alliance with local reaction, count on dividing the progressive and democratic forces. They resort to armed aggression and attempts of antirevolutionary coups, economic expansion and ideological sabotage... Such is the situation in the Near East."

Kosygin also attacked the efforts of "reactionary circles of the Near and Middle East" to create an "Islamic Pact" which, he said, has its purpose to hinder the socio-economic reforms of a number of Arab countries. He went on to say, "The Soviet Union is well acquainted with the great work done by President Nasser and the government of the UAR in strengthening unity among Arab peoples." He also endorsed the UAR policy in the Yemen up to a point. In Kosygin's word, "The Soviet Union supports the position of the UAR in the Yemen question. We also

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<sup>1</sup> Victor Mayevsky, "Visiting Friends on the Nile", International Affairs (Moscow), July 1966, p. 22

<sup>2</sup> Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, pp.3-4

welcome the striving of the leaders of your /UAR/ government to find ways of settling the situation in the Yemen that will guarantee its independent, democratic development."

On Israel, he said as follows: "Your /UAR/ country also plays an important role in the struggle of the Arab peoples to solve the Palestine problem. We understand the ardent interests of the Arabs in this problem and we favor its settlement on a just basis. As before, the Soviet Union has a sympathetic attitude toward the struggle for the restriction of the legal, inalienable right of the Palestine refugees."

In the joint communiqué released on the last day of the Kosygin visit, May 18, 1966 Soviet foreign policy on the Middle East was restated:

/Both/ "sides gave careful consideration to the situation in the Near and Middle East and condemned imperialist policy, which is a source of constant tension in this area. The Soviet Union expressed its complete support for the struggle of the Arab people against this policy of the imperialist forces that are attempting to revive military-colonialist blocs in the Arab East and to dismember the forces opposing colonialism and neocolonialism. The Soviet side completely supported the legal and inalienable rights of the Palestine Arabs."

While the communiqué went on to mention the "situation that has developed in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula" the communiqué did not specifically mention the war in the Yemen.

Apparently, Kosygin was not successful in getting Nasser to terminate this war which was bankrupting Egypt. Much of the activities of Kosygin's visit to the UAR was identified with reviewing the large amount of Soviet economic and military assistance to Egypt. An unclassified American Embassy Cairo compilation dated December 23, 1965 of all economic assistance to the UAR since 1952 gives the amount as \$3,288,000,000. Of this amount, the USA has given around \$1,232,000,000 of which over one billion dollars worth has been for surplus agricultural commodities under Public Law 480.

Up to the end of 1965, the Soviet Union had committed a total of \$824,400,000 in aid, not including \$111,200,000 in commercial credits. Eastern European countries including Yugoslavia have given

or have agreed to give \$534,500,000 for industrial projects and Communist China up to 1965 committed itself to give \$84,700,000. None of these figures include military assistance expenditures.

These figures put the Communist countries' aid programs on about the same total amount as the US economic assistance up to 1965. Since then Communist aid has been preponderant. The form of the economic assistance is, however, considerably different - for the US food, for the Communist countries industrial and military equipment. It was not until 1953 about the time of Stalin's death that the Soviet Union and Egypt had considered a trade agreement.<sup>1</sup> This trade agreement was signed in March 1954. Just before it was signed an Egyptian economic mission arrived in Moscow on January 17, 1954 to ask the USSR for technical aid<sup>2</sup> and to buy in rubles instead of dollars or pounds sterling.<sup>2</sup> On March 9, 1954 in Cairo, the USSR, Egypt and<sup>3</sup> Rumania signed a \$8,500,000 cotton for petroleum barter deal.<sup>3</sup> On March 27, 1954 in Cairo, Egypt and the USSR signed a trade agreement calling for the exchange of \$14,350,000 worth of goods.<sup>4</sup> The list of Soviet goods to be exported to Egypt included industrial equipment, tractors and agricultural machinery, autos, trucks, iron and steel products. The Egyptian goods to be sent to the USSR were cotton, rice, rayon yarn, leather and skins.<sup>5</sup> This Soviet-Egyptian trade offensive coincided with Vyshinsky's diplomatic activities at the UN where he applied the Soviet veto in a Security Council resolution calling upon Egypt to raise<sup>6</sup> its restrictions on Israeli ships from using the Suez Canal.<sup>6</sup>

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1 The Financial Times (London), Januar 15, 1954

2 The Times (London, January 18, 1954

3 The New York Times, March 10, 1954

4 Ibid., March 28, 1954

5 Soviet News (London), April 2, 1954

6 The New York Times, May 14, 1954



The following year, 1955, saw a great increase in Soviet economic and military assistance to Egypt. Negotiations on the arms deal began in late May and by the end of July the USSR through Shepilov's visit to Cairo had consummated the Czech-Egyptian arms deal. Estimates of the amount of arms went as high as a quarter of a billion dollars.<sup>1</sup> After the arms deal, Soviet economic and technical assistance to Egypt greatly increased. The USSR agreed to assist Egypt with a nuclear laboratory "for work concerned with the peaceful utilization of atomic energy."<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps the most dramatic aid project in which the Soviet Union participated in Egypt has been the Aswan Dam. The original plan for the dam was drawn up by a German engineering firm Hochtief-Dortmund in 1955 and the main financing was to be shared with Angol-American capital in an Egyptian partnership.<sup>3</sup> The Soviet Union was not part of the original plan to build and finance the dam.

Before Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956, thereby taking an anti-Western approach, the USSR was not particularly interested in the Aswan Dam. The Egyptians were trying in 1955 to get financial aid from Washington and had hopes of getting further aid from London. Nasser's tactics were to play off the Americans against the Russians and vice versa, thereby increasing with each move the amount of financial assistance to build the dam. The Egyptian Ambassador in Washington in October 1955 announced that the Soviet Union had offered a loan of \$200,000,000 to finance the dam! This cannot be documented on the Soviet side. In December 1955, the Angol-American commitment was made to build the first phase of the dam.<sup>4</sup> In the summer of 1956, the Egyptians carried on further negotiations for financial support from the US which planned to use the World Bank for part of the transaction. Egypt thought that the US was going to come through with support for the dam but Secretary of State John Foster Dulles withdrew his offer to help finance the dam. Dulles was concerned over the Arms Deal

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1 See Dallin, op. cit., p. 399

2 Kessing's Contemporary Archives (Bristol), 1955-56,

14697 B

3 Keessing's op. cit., 14486B

4 Ibid., 14630A

which mortgaged most of the Egyptian cotton crop and therefore made a huge loan as required for the dam unsound as to repayment. He was also concerned about Egypt moving closer to the Communist bloc. Shortly afterwards, Egypt nationalized the Cana. On July 29, 1954, the USSR announced that it supported Egypt's nationalizing of the Suez Canal but did not commit itself to financing the dam.<sup>1</sup> On August 1, Radio Moscow said<sup>2</sup> that Egypt had never sought Soviet aid on build- in the dam.

It was not until 1958 that the USSR agreed to finance the dam. This came only after a very intensive economic aid and trade program in 1956 and 1957 which cemented further Soviet-Egyptian ties.

In the summer of 1956 there was a stepping up of Soviet economic and technical and as well as the shipment of arms.<sup>3</sup> Pravda announced on September 6, 1956 a new Soviet-Egyptian trade agreement which provided for "the sale of 200,000 tons of wheat by the Soviet Union for six million Egyptian pounds. The Soviet Union will use the sums obtained from the sale of wheat to buy Egyptian goods, including cotton and rice."<sup>4</sup>

At the beginning of 1957, Soviet economic and cultural relations with Egypt increased. On January 19, the USSR opened in Cairo a large trade fair.<sup>5</sup> The Soviet bloc was attempting to counter the US aid program in the Middle East. On January 21 the Moiseyev dance ensemble left Moscow for performances in Egypt.<sup>6</sup> Not all Soviet propaganda was successful. At the Soviet Trade Fair in Cairo, the Egyptian Government cancelled the Soviet film festival because the propaganda was too strong.<sup>7</sup>

Not everything went smoothly also in economic relations.

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1 The New York Times, July 30, 1964

2 Ibid., August 2, 1954

3 Laqueur, op. cit., p. 236

4 CDSP, VIII, No. 36, October 17, 1956, p. 9

5 The New York Times, January 20, 1957

6 Soviet News, January 25, 1957

7 The New York Times, January 23, 1957

In June 1957, Soviet Ambassador Kiselev was recalled to Moscow for three months. Difficulties were developing on the amount of Soviet wheat and oil exported to Egypt. The Soviet Union was concerned over being charged in Swiss francs for the use of the canal by Soviet ships.<sup>1</sup>

Cultural relations between the Soviet Union and Egypt continued to expand. On October 19, 1957, the USSR signed with Egypt a cultural cooperation agreement which provided for exchanging professors, writers, artists, students, films and sports.<sup>2</sup> In December 1957 Egyptian cultural leaders visited the USSR and further details were worked out for film festivals, libraries and radio broadcasts.<sup>3</sup> Stipends were allocated for Egyptian artists, scholars and scientists to visit the USSR and arrangements were made for the Bolshoi Ballet to visit the UAR.<sup>4</sup>

When the Egyptian Defense Minister, General Abdel Hakim Amer, visited Moscow in November 1957, it was apparent that the USSR was going all out to assist Egypt in its industrialization. The largest loan ever given by the USSR to a non-communist state - a credit of 700,000,000 rubles - was announced.<sup>5</sup> It was apparent that there was no cooling in relations between the two countries in spite of minor differences over the positions of Egyptian communists and an ideological divergency over the nature of the revolution in Egypt. Pravda reported that political, economic and cultural ties had been growing steadily in size and strength.<sup>6</sup> Members of the Soviet bloc were supplying 80% of Egypt's imports. Increasing numbers of Egyptian students were attending Moscow University.<sup>7</sup>

As a result of the Soviet economic offer during General Amer's visit to Moscow, it was announced in November 21, 1957

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1 The New York Times, June 5, 1957 and The Times (London) September 6, 1957

2 The Egyptian Gazette (Cairo), October 20, 1957

3 Izvestiya, December 14, 1957

4 The Egyptian Gazette (Cairo), December 15, 1957

5 Keessing's XI (1957-58), 15906D

6 Pravda, November 18, 1957

7 The New York Times, November 19, 1957

that Egypt's Minister of Industry would go to the USSR to work out details of several Egyptian five-year-plan projects, to be financed under the large loan. Among them were marine workshops, a drydock, an auto assembly plant, building materials plants, etc.<sup>1</sup> The Minister of Industry arrived in Moscow on January 6, 1958 and on January 29, 1958 signed with Soviet Minister Pervukhin the economic and technical cooperation agreement spelling out in detail the previous agreement signed in November.<sup>2</sup>

In the winter and spring of 1958, cultural relations flourished. The Soviet Minister of Culture Nikolai Mikhailoff visited in Cairo, accompanied by a two weeks performance there of the Bolshoi Ballet.<sup>3</sup> While in Cairo, he signed again a USSR-UAR cultural agreement, exchanging students, scientists, other missions, and the teaching of Russian in Egyptian secondary schools.<sup>4</sup>

A few days thereafter, Nasser arrived in the USSR (on April 29, 1958) on a state visit and in a joint statement with Khrushchev expressed "complete satisfaction with the development of<sup>5</sup> economic and cultural cooperation" between the two countries.

In the fall of 1958, the UAR Deputy President, later Prime-Minister and just promoted Field Marshal, Amer made a second visit to the USSR. At a reception in Moscow for Amer, Khrushchev said in comparing Soviet economic aid with western aid that western aid was planned to weaken the independence of the recipient countries<sup>6</sup> and to "squeeze out the last drop of juice" for imperialism.

Khrushchev said at the same reception, "We will not help the imperialists so that they can further rob and impose a

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1 The New York Times, November 22, 1957

2 Soviet News (London), January 30, 1958

3 The New York Herald Tribune, April 6, 1958

4 The Egyptian Gazette (Cairo), April 11, 1958

5 Pravda, May 16, 1958; CDSP, X No. 20, June 25, 1958, p.3

6 The Times (London), October 22, 1958

perpetual yoke on the Arab people."<sup>1</sup>

While Amer was in Moscow, the USSR agreed on October 23, 1958 to "participate" in the construction of the first stage of the Aswan Dam.<sup>2</sup> The Soviet Union committed itself with a credit of 400,000,000 rubles at 2 1/2% repayable beginning in 1964 when the first stage of the dam was to be completed.

By the end of 1958, the USSR had committed to the UAR over one half billion dollars in credits, including one hundred million for the first stage of the dam but not including the hundreds of millions rubles for equipping the Egyptian and Syrian armies with Soviet arms.

The first Soviet engineers for the dam arrived in Cairo on March 11, 1959<sup>3</sup>. It was not until 1960 that the first real construction work was started on the dam. The record of work progress at the dam the first two years of construction was not impressive.<sup>4</sup> Much was projected into the dam as a symbol of Soviet-Egyptian friendship. While the economic advantages of the dam in the form of the doubling of the electric power of Egypt as well of arable land, reclaimed from the desert by irrigation, the dam became a prestige item. "For the Russians it was the greatest single symbol of Soviet technology and capacity to aid developing countries; for Egypt, it was the symbol of the revolutionary progress, one of the first and greatest of its creative designs."<sup>5</sup>

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1 The New York Times, October 22, 1958

2 Ibid., October 24, 1958

3 J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 240

4 For a technical amount of the dam construction, see (no author) The High Dam, Miracle of the XXth Century, Cairo: United Arab Republic, Maslahat al-Isti 'tamat, 1964

5 Tom Little, The High Dam at Aswan, New York, The John Day Company, 1965, p. 100. See also Asuan-Simbol Sovetsko-Arabskoi Druzhby, Prebyaniye Pervago Sekretarya Tsentralnogo Komitela Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR Tovarithch a.N.S. Khrushcheva v Obedinennoi Arabskoi Respublika, 9-25 Maya, 1964, Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1964.

The early dam construction period coincided with a deterioration of political relations between Moscow and Cairo, aggravated by Nasser's imprisonment of Egyptian communists, his friendship with Tito, his pursuance of the cover of non-alignment and continued Egyptian criticism of Soviet building methods and equipment, and delays in machinery deliveries. Building a dam in terrific heat with unskilled labor forces of another culture and having to cope with different geologic problems than encountered in Soviet dam building naturally resulted in uncompleted work schedules. "The top flight of Russian and Egyptian engineers were getting along worse instead of better."<sup>2</sup> The Soviet chief engineer, Komzin<sup>3</sup>, was recalled in July 1962 and replaced by Aleksandrov. A lagging schedule compelled the Russians and the Egyptians to get closer together. They formed a joint committee to work on the project requirements. The present writer visited the dam in 1966 and was impressed with the difficult working conditions. By 1966, these had been surmounted. In conversations with Soviet engineers, the present writer deduced that they were satisfied. While the heat was oppressing and their social conditions (lack of recreation facilities and a large enough Russian environment) their living conditions in air-conditioned apartments and their higher pay than received in the USSR were offsetting inducements to make the Russian technicians and engineers productive. They did have Russian kindergartens and schools for their children and clubs and cinemas for themselves. The Russians stayed apart from the Egyptians after working hours and very infrequently were seen in town. On the engineering side, one of the serious difficulties which they presented to the Egyptians in their work procedures was their practice of referring all basic decisions to higher authorities in Moscow. A leading Egyptian engineer on the dam told this to the present writer in 1966 at Aswan.

To facilitate the transportation of Soviet personnel and materials for the dam and other Egyptian aid projects on January 15, 1959 the USSR inaugurated the first regular shipping service

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1 See Little, op. cit., pp. 95-117

2 Ibid., p. 109

3 His account of the dam is in I. Komzin, Svet Asuana, Moscow: Izalalestvo Tz K. VLKSM. Molodaya Ivardiya, 1964. It is a rabbling account of his reminiscences.

between the Black Sea and the Middle East.<sup>1</sup> Transport lines were extended when in October 1959 the USSR established a regular shipping line between Soviet Baltic ports and the UAR.<sup>2</sup> In addition to transportation by sea, the USSR established regular air service to the UAR. On September 11, 1958 the USSR signed with the UAR an agreement to open regular air service in October.<sup>3</sup> Then in Cairo on November 17, 1958 the UAR signed with the USSR a civil aviation agreement between MISR AIR and Aeroflot.<sup>4</sup> And on December 5, 1958 the first Soviet TU-104 airliner took off from Moscow inaugurating the first regular air service to Cairo.<sup>5</sup> Items began appearing in the foreign press in the late spring and again in the fall to the effect that the USSR was willing to build the whole dam instead of the first phase which was to end in 1964.<sup>6</sup>

In the meantime reports appeared on the delivery of all sorts of industrial equipment to Egypt under the loan agreement- a textile plant from Tashkent, a petroleum refinery from Astrakhan, etc. In 1956, Egypt imported three tractors from the USSR, in 1959, one thousand tractors. In the first nine months of 1959, Soviet exports were 20 million rubles above the same period in 1958 and Egyptian exports to the USSR 70 million rubles over the same period in 1958.<sup>8</sup>

In early 1960 the UAR announced in Cairo that the USSR had agreed to finance the second stage of the Aswan dam.<sup>9</sup> In February the Vice-Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations released a statement that the USSR would give economic aid to the UAR, not counting the dam, in more than one hundred

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1 The New York Herald Tribune, January 17, 1959

2 Soviet News (London)

3 The Times (London, May 27, 1959 and The New York Times,

November 2, 1959

4 Soviet News (London) September 12, 1958

5 The Egyptian Gazette (Cairo) November 18, 1958

6 Soviet News (London), December 8, 1958

7 Ibid., November 16, 1959

8 Ibid.

9 The New York Times, January 19, 1960

industrial projects.<sup>1</sup> The same month, Cairo announced that the USSR was loaning the UAR 1,150,000,000 rubles at 2 1/2 % for the construction of the entire dam.<sup>2</sup> The Soviets cut this amount to 900,000,000 rubles to build the dam when they made the formal announcement on August 27, 1950<sup>3</sup>. The three stages of the dam construction were: Stage 1 - building open channels to divert the Nile around the construction area by constructing copper dams. This was finished on May 1964, Stage 2 - building the main dam, forming Lake Nasser. This was to take six years and be finished in 1970. Stage 3 - the installation of hydroelectric generation equipment and the construction of irrigation canals. This going on presently. The dam is to have twelve turbines each with a capacity of 175,000 kilowatts. The installation of all turbines is scheduled to be completed by 1970. By the end of 1967, three turbines will be installed. Work on the dam is now considered to be 80 % completed.<sup>4</sup> Further economic agreements between the USSR and the UAR were signed in 1960. On September 8, 1960 a technical aid agreement to build railway and other industrial enterprises including a nitrogenous fertilizer plant were signed in accordance with the USSR-UAR basic agreement of October 28, 1957.<sup>5</sup> In September 1960, a shipyard building agreement was also signed in accordance with the USSR-UAR agreement<sup>6</sup> of January 29, 1958 for Economic and Technical Cooperation.

On the military supplies question, Soviet aid continued. Marshal Amer flew to Moscow on November 30, 1960 to negotiate the procurement of new military equipment.<sup>7</sup> Such aid was forthcoming: During

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1 Soviet News (London), February 22, 1960

2 The New York Herald Tribune, February 8, 1960

3 See Soviet News (London), February 2, 1961

4 The New York Times, March 28, 1967

5 Financial Times (London), September 9, 1960

6 Soviet News (London), September 13, 1960

7 New York Herald Tribune, November 30, 1960



1961, 1962 and 1963, economic and cultural ties between the two countries continued to increase. On January 27, 1962 the two countries affixed their signatures to a protocol amending the January 1958 agreement for building more industries and plants.<sup>1</sup> In January 1963, the two countries signed a protocol to the Aswan agreement for the final designs on the dam and for the equipment for stage two of the dam.<sup>2</sup>

The year 1964 in Soviet-Egyptian relations was illuminated by Khrushchev's visit to Egypt. Shortly before the visit, Nasser released all political prisoners who had not been tried, including several hundred Communists.<sup>3</sup> This prepared the way for a red carpet treatment of Khrushchev. While Khrushchev did not always see eye to eye with Nasser on the ideology of revolution in the Middle East, as has already been discussed, he did react favorably by loosening once more the Soviet money bags. At a farewell dinner in Cairo given to Khrushchev Nasser announced that the USSR was granting Egypt a new loan of approximately \$280,000,000 for the second five-year plan to begin in 1965. This loan would finance 10% of Egypt's second five-year plan. The main projects for which the Soviet aid were to be given were the iron and steel plants at Helwan, south of Cairo and the chemical plants at Aswan. When the building of the High Dam at Aswan is completed, silt which formerly flowed down the Nile and replenished the soil of the farms will be stopped by the dam. Therefore, the electricity generated by the dam will be used to make fertilizer for fields left unfertile by the dam. This new loan of \$280,000,000 in addition to \$500,000,000 in economic aid including \$400,000,000 of equipment and technical aid for the Aswan Dam plus over \$1,000,000,000 in military aid placed a very heavy economic commitment of the USSR in the UAR.<sup>4</sup> This is a little higher estimate than the one given earlier as of December 1965 by the American Embassy Cairo.<sup>5</sup>

After Khrushchev's visit to Cairo, Prime Minister Aly Sabry of the UAR visited Moscow in September 1964 to sign the new loan agreement promised by Khrushchev on his Cairo visit.

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1 Keessing's, XII (1961-62), 18736A

2 African Recorder, II (1962-63) No. 4, 403A

3 The New York Times, March 20, 1964

4 Ibid., May 25, 1964

5 Ibid., January 4, 1965

On September 22, 1964, Khrushchev and Aly Sabry signed the \$250,000,000 loan agreement for Soviet economic and technical assistance.<sup>1</sup> This agreement was ratified by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on December 22, 1964.<sup>2</sup> In December 1964 in Moscow another trade protocol was signed between the USSR and the UAR about foreign trade exchange between the two countries with an 20% increase in trade in 1965 over 1964.<sup>3</sup>

On December 30, 1965 a new USSR-Egyptian trade agreement for 1966-1970 was signed in Cairo. It provided for almost a 50% increase in trade between the two countries, with the USSR sending machinery and equipment, metals, oil, coal, lumber, etc., and the UAR exporting cotton, rice, fabrics, footwear, fruits and vegetables.<sup>4</sup> On February 22, 1966, the USSR and the UAR signed an oil refining and aluminium production agreement.<sup>5</sup> The amount of Soviet aid to the UAR in 1965 totalled \$255,000,000 including aid given by other East European Communist States.<sup>6</sup> Soviet aid has in 1966 outrun US aid. Even the importation of grain from the outside has now passed from the US to the USSR, making the UAR dependent for the first time on the USSR for its dietary needs. The people of the UAR eat about 4,500,000 tons of grain each year. They raise only 1,500,000 tons.<sup>7</sup> The rest has to be imported. Furthermore, Egyptian rice which used to be an important item in the Egyptian diet is exported to the USSR to pay for debts incurred from industrial and military imports.

On the cultural front, the USSR has used in Egypt all the usual Soviet techniques of promoting the image of the USSR before the developing countries. Beginning in 1954, Ulanova and the Bolshoi ballet have danced several times in Cairo. The Moiseyev Dance

1 Soviet News (London), September 23, 1964

2 The Egyptian Gazette (Cairo), December 23, 1964

3 Financial Times (London), December 14, 1964

4 Soviet News (London), December 31, 1964

5 Ibid., February 25, 1966

6 US Department of State, Research Memorandum, Unclassified, RSB-50, June 17, 1966, p.4

7 John K. Colley, "Egypt seeks to cut Aid Drops", The Christian Science Monitor, January 24, 1967

Ensemble has also appeared several times. Soviet scholars and scientists have exchanged with Egyptian counterparts. Many Egyptian students went to study in Soviet institutions of higher learning. In 1959 when relations were strained politically between the two countries, Nasser withdrew in August of that year some 650 students, most of whom had scholarships from the USSR. They withdrew because of difficult living conditions and excessive subjection to Communist propaganda.<sup>1</sup> This misunderstanding was patched up in the fall of 1959 and the new USSR-UAR cultural cooperation agreement for 1960 saw an increase in the exchange.<sup>2</sup> Each succeeding year or alternate year has seen the signing of a new cultural pact. With the building by the Soviets of so many industrial complexes in Egypt and with the decrease of American and Western European influence in Egypt, the number of Soviet specialists, technicians, scientists, teachers, etc. has increased. More Egyptians are also being trained by the Soviet Union.

A US government unclassified report states as follows:

"In the technical-educational field, the Soviet effort in the UAR continued to be massive during 1965. At least 24 vocational centers financed large part by Soviet credits and employing large numbers of Soviet instructors were operating in the UAR in 1965, training some 7.400 students at one time. On the more academic side between 60 and 80 Soviet professors and instructors were estimated to be teaching at UAR universities, and Russian language courses continued to be offered both at the Soviet Cultural Center and at government sponsored educational institutions."<sup>3</sup>

While English is still the second language of Egypt (even Nasser uses English with foreigners) this does not stop the Soviet Union from reaching the Egyptian leaders. English is used by the Soviet Union to communicate with the revolutionary and technical leaders.

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- 1 London Daily Telegraph, October 3, 1959 and Christian Science Monitor, October 19, 1959
- 2 The Times (London), November 23, 1959
- 3 US Department of State, Unclassified Research Memorandum, RSB-10, January 25, 1967, pp. 34-5

In Cairo in 1966, the present writer visited a large Soviet bookstore offering thousands of books published in Moscow in English at very low prices. Most of these books were on technical subjects but many also were Soviet propaganda works. During Kosygin's visit to Cairo in May 1966, prices of all books in the Soviet Bookshop were reduced by 50%.<sup>1</sup> The Soviets have tried to establish special Russian language schools for Egyptians but most of the younger scientists, engineers and intellectuals want to learn English, so the USSR is teaching English in Soviet run schools. The books used are all printed in Moscow. Perhaps one of the most effective media of creating a pro-Soviet image in the UAR is from the large amounts of Soviet economic and military assistance which has been given to Egypt.

While Nasser has not accepted Soviet communism as his working formula, he, nevertheless, has rejected the Western system of liberty and democracy. On August 6, 1966, Nasser in a speech in Cairo is reported to have said: "The process of liberty and democracy according to Western patterns would not meet our case, for we wish to change the face of the old society".<sup>2</sup> He added further that there was an inevitable clash between the UAR and Western interests and a lasting friendship with the East. He said that Western powers have a "hostile attitude toward revolution and Socialism because they have interests in this area - either monopolistic, financial or political interests owing to their old ties with reactionary powers." <sup>3</sup> This, he continued, makes Western powers opposed to any revolutionary change towards Socialism. While Nasser is anti-Western in his advocacy of a kind of authoritarian socialism, he cannot be regarded in 1917 as a Moscow satellite. Perhaps, his status might be compared to Tito's whose country Nasser believes he is using as a model. In the words of a distinguished writer on world Communism, "In many ways, Nasser's new 'Arab Socialism' has clearly been modeled on Yugoslav ideology and

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1 See advertisement in The Egyptian Gazette (Cairo) May 15, 1966, p.2

2 The New York Times, August 8, 1966

3 Ibid., August 9, 1966

practice and Yugoslav advisers were reported to have played a major role in drawing up the Egyptian program" <sup>1</sup>.

While Nasser might have had Yugoslavia as his model, the parallel stops there. Yugoslavia is unaligned; the UAR is the center of an Arab power coalition. Yugoslavia is not embarked on an aggressive foreign policy of joining with allies in a common endeavor of adding territory; the UAR is. Yugoslavia, though receiving some economic and military assistance from the USSR, has relied more on Western assistance, trade and aid. The UAR, though once having had considerable Western aid, military assistance and trade, has become more dependent on the USSR economically and militarily.

Since the UAR has been committed to an aggressive foreign policy of writing the Arab world against the "royalist forces of reaction" present in it and against the "vertiges of Western colonialism and imperialism in the Middle East," the UAR has come up with a different posture in foreign affairs from European authoritarian socialist states.

This involves partly the posture of the UAR towards Israel and the attitude and position of the USSR on that relationship. As has been pointed out previously, the USSR uncategorically sided with Egypt in the Suez Crisis of 1956. Perhaps it can be argued that with the sudden arming of Egypt by the Communist Bloc, the USSR contributed to that crisis. Between the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the USSR continued to invest over \$1,500,000,000 in military supplies and equipment of the UAR. The USSR therefore had a financial military stake in the UAR of no mean amount. Considerable part of this military stake was allocated by Nasser to fight the Yemeni Royalists. This undoubtedly concerned Moscow and as discussed previously was a reason for Kosygin's visit to the UAR in 1966. Cairo's relationship with Damascus was another problem concerning both Kosygin and Nasser. Moscow having invested heavily in Syrian rearmament was concerned lest Syria might become overly aggressive and involve Cairo. The upshot of Moscow's concern was that six

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<sup>1</sup> William E. Griffith, "Yugoslavia" in Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ed. Africa and the Communist World, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963, pp. 120-121

was that six months after Kosygin's visit, Cairo and Damascus signed on November 4, 1966 a mutual defense agreement establishing a joint command over Egyptian and Syrian armed forces.<sup>1</sup> Moscow thought that this would put the restraining hand of Nasser on the trigger happy finger of Syria pointed at Israel. This did not occur. In the spring of 1967 when the crisis erupted along the Israeli frontiers, the Soviet Union found itself in a position of adding additional fuel to the conflagration. Not only did the USSR send warships out to take stations along the Eastern Mediterranean but also through speeches in the UN, it took a very strong position, insisting that the forces of colonialism and imperialism were creating an upheaval situation in the Middle East. Shortly before the outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities in June 1967, a UAR National Assembly delegation visited the Soviet Union. The joint communiqué at the end of the visit referred to Middle East and indicated the Soviet position:

"Exchanging opinions on the situation in the Near East, the two sides noted that the source of tension in this part of the world is the incessant intrigues of imperialism and reaction aimed at striking blows against the national liberation movement in the Arab world and arresting its further development. They resolutely condemn the provocations of the imperialists and their agents against the Syrian Arab Republic and republican Yemen and declare their solidarity with the struggle of the Syrian and Yemeni peoples. The two sides condemn the increasing aggressive actions of Israel against the Arab countries and declare their support for the legitimate and inalienable rights of Palestine Arabs."<sup>2</sup>

The impact of Soviet policy on Egypt was evidenced in this part of the communiqué:

The Arab side expressed its high appreciation for the consistent struggle of the Soviet Union against imperialism and colonialism and for peace and the development of international co-operation, as well as for the great and unselfish assistance and

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1 The New York Times, November 5, 1966

2 Pravda, May 16, 1967. CDSP XIX, No. 20, June 7, 1967, p. 20

support rendered by the Soviet Union to the peoples of the developing countries."<sup>1</sup>

In a statement made by the Soviet government on May 24, 1967, further emphasis of the Soviet identification with the Arabs was indicated.

"For decades the Soviet Union has rendered comprehensive assistance to the peoples of the Arab countries in their just struggle for national liberation, against colonialism and for the upsurge of their peaceful economies."<sup>2</sup> When hostilities did break out between Israel and the Arab states in early June, the USSR published a declaration accusing Israel of aggression against the UAR, promising firm support for governments and peoples of the UAR, Syria, Algeria, Jordan and other Arab states, and demanding that Israel cease hostilities and withdraw her forces to a cease fire line.<sup>3</sup>

The Soviet government brought in its top personnel to plead the Arab case in the UN where Kosygin was dispatched. To work out a new arrangement with Nasser after the UAR lost so much Soviet military supplies and equipment, Podgorny was sent post haste.

At the UN General Assembly, Kosygin demanded on June 19, 1967 that Israel forfeit the Arab territory it took and compensate the victims of the war which he said Israel had begun with the help of "outside imperialist" circles.<sup>4</sup> Before Kosygin's speech, there was dismay in the Arab world that the USSR had let the Arabs down by not taking up arms in their behalf and by agreeing with the West for a cease fire in the Middle East.<sup>5</sup>

While the Soviet premier was pleading the Arab cause in the UN, Soviet president Podgorny was on his way to Cairo via Pula, Yugoslavia where he conferred with Tito. Podgorny's promise to Nasser when he arrived in Cairo to rebuild the destroyed UAR army and air force with supplies and equipment calmed the Egyptian press.

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1 Idib.

2 Pravda, May 24, 1967, CDSP, XIX, No. 21, June 14, 1967, p. 29

3 Pravda, June 6, 1967, CDSP, XIX, No. 23, June 28, 1967, p. 3

4 The New York Herald Tribune, June 21, 1967

5 The New York Times, June 8, 1967

which had in the previous days expressed the disappointment of the Arabs, that the USSR's support of the Arabs could have been stronger.<sup>1</sup> It was later reported in the foreign press that Podgorny had agreed to replenish by over half the equipment destroyed by or lost to the Israeli in the six day war. Accompanying Podgorny to Cairo was Soviet Marshal M.V. Zhakharov, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, who stayed there for a while after Podgorny departed. When Podgorny left Cairo, the communiqué issued by the Soviets stated: "The talks dealt with questions involving the Near East situation in connection with Israel's aggression against the UAR and other Arab states..."<sup>2</sup> Podgorny returned to Moscow again via Yugoslavia where he talked once more to Tito. Tito had gone to Moscow on June 9 for a hastily summoned meeting of Europe's principal communists to try to do something about the collapse of Nasser's military machine. Nasser seemed in the late summer of 1967 as firm as ever to keep going the struggle against Israel. In his first radio and television address he said, "the struggle in this case will be hard and long, very hard."<sup>3</sup> He held open the door of settlement by saying, "we shall never slam the door to a political settlement" and added that he was willing to confer with the US. He still talked of further military struggle and said that if Egypt had to choose he would "be no less determined than the people of Vietnam."

It is apparent that the USSR has decided to stay with Nasser, disappointed as the Soviet Union must be with the swift defeat of the Arab states by Israel. There are still liberation wars to be sponsored by the USSR and there are other areas of the Arab world which the USSR regards as ripe for Soviet power entrance. The Soviet commitment to the UAR has become irrevocable. Nasser is still the strongest Arab leader, though weak and inefficient his military machine is. It has often been said that the power over the purse strings is the decisive power over people and government.

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1 The New York Herald Tribune, June 21, 1967

2 Pravda, June 25, 1967, CDSP, XIX, No. 25, July 12, 1967, p. 18

3 The New York Herald Tribune, July 24, 1967



Since the economy and military strength of the UAR is becoming increasingly dependent on the USSR, the USSR will have a great lever to direct the political and military affairs of the UAR. For some time, responsible economic analysts have been prophesying the economic collapse of the UAR. With the curtailment and final dropping of UA aid in 1966-7 and a foreign debt of from \$ 1,300,000,000 to \$ 1,800,000,000<sup>1</sup>, the economic outlook for Egypt then looks very dim. This problem coupled with a population increase of 2.7% almost unmatched anywhere in the world has put the country in an economic quagmire. (The per capita income is under \$ 100 a year.) With the debacle of June 1967 with Israel and the concomitant losses of so much military goods, the only recourse of the UAR is still to turn morse in the direction of the USSR if the UAR wishes to fulfill her economic plans of industrialization and agricultural modernization as well as to maintain the largest and most modernly equipped (next to Israel) military machine in the Middle East. The USSR has an investment not counting destroyed and restored military equipment alone in the UAR more than \$ 3,500,000,000. While this is quite meager compared with the US investment in Vietnam, nevertheless the Soviet Union is gambling for higher stakes than just the survival of Nasser. The USSR wants to be a permanent power, politically, economically and militarily in the Mediterranean. On July 25, 1967, the Commander of Allied Forces, Southern Europe, US Admiral C. D. Griffin, said that "Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean appeared to be permanent and was steadily increasing." 2

In the meantime, it is to the interest of the Soviet Union to bring the Arab-Israeli conflict to a halt. The Soviet Union therefore has been working in that direction at the same time it has also been continuing to present the image to the Arab world that it stands solidly behind their cause, short of more direct military confrontation with Israel.

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1) "Nasser Asks for Time," The Economist (London), Vol. CCXXI, No. 6428, November 5, 1966, p. 589

2) The New York Herald Tribune, July 26, 1967

While the Soviet Union thrives on dissension and division throughout the non-communist world, it wants no open hostilities and still believes that the Soviet ends of a world socialist system can be achieved by strategy and means short of total war. 1 It is apparent that in the present conflict in the Middle East as in the outcome of events in Vietnam, a large and decisive decision will have to be made on the Soviet desire for a detente with the West and on the importance of this detente for the security growth and welfare of the Soviet state. 2

The desirability or possibility of a detente with the West will not however change the long range power objectives of the Soviet Union whether they be in Southeast Asia or in the Middle East, there appears to be a line of Russian policy which transcends that even of the fifty year old history of the Soviet Republic.

James Reston in summing up the thinking of Washington analysts in the summer of 1967 in appraising Soviet intentions in the Middle East, put it this way:

"But they are sure of one thing: Moscow has not forgotten its historic objectives of influence bases and, if possible, control over the area from the eastern Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, and this in the long run, they may seem to be saying, may prove to be at least as important as 'the spirit of Glassboro' or President Johnson's rise in the popularity polls." 3

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- 1) See Benjamin Shwadrin, "The Soviet Union in the Middle East, " Current History, February, 1967, p. 116
  - 2) See William B. Ballis, "Relations between the USSR and Vietnam, " R.A. Rupen and R. Farrell, Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Dispute, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967, p. 56
  - 3) James Reston, "Moscow and Mideast: Yesterday", The New York Herald Tribune, July 10, 1967

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PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:  
EVOLUTION, DECAY OR REVOLUTION?

by

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PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:  
EVOLUTION, DECAY OR REVOLUTION?

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I. Definitions and Analytical Framework

Political forecasting is one of the most beguiling, yet hazardous forms of intellectual speculation. It is, however, an exciting sport of the mind. The difficulties of predicting the shape of things to come arise largely from what most scholars will probably regard as unavoidable defects in our understanding of the present and the past. The tentativeness and modesty dictated by this sobering thought are reinforced by our knowledge of the conspicuous lack of success of political analysts in predicting major developments, perhaps especially in respect to the Soviet and other communist political systems, where of course there are well known problems of information and of bias. We have been surprised, not only by such spectacular but not necessarily insignificant individual actions as the defection of Stalin's daughter, Svetlana, but by the timing, scope and magnitude of great events, such as the ouster of Khrushchev, the course of de-Stalinization, or the Sino-Soviet rivalry. To mention another, rather timely example, were we sufficiently aware of the burgeoning Middle East crisis, and its implications for Soviet-Western relations? More comforting is the high and well justified degree of agreement, in the opinion of experts, regarding the probable impact of a major succession crisis in the USSR, which has been largely verified by the outcomes of the Stalin and

Khrushchev successions, although even in respect to these matters, the specific events that triggered the crises were unpredicted, and indeed remain obscure.

Despite all difficulties, however, the attempt to perceive the principal alternative lines of future Soviet political development is entirely appropriate. Even if our effort to foretell the future fails, it may help us to better understand the present. By linking present trends to emergent possibilities it may alert us to opportunities and challenges in the international arena. The urgency of the enterprise is underscored by the conviction that without forecasts of the future we are condemned to unnecessary ignorance. Refusal to engage in forecasting constitutes an abdication of intellectual responsibility which in itself could furnish the basis for a prediction of future fumbling. Such blindness can, as already indicated, engender passivity. It can also pave the way to violent and irrational over-reactions to the unpleasant surprises from which, knowledge of the past tells us, the future will not be free.

The expectations incorporated in this paper are cautiously and it is hoped realistically optimistic, both with regard to the applicability of the methods of analysis employed and in respect to the long-term or at least the intermediate-range domestic and foreign behavior of the USSR. This paper argues that adaptive evolution, rather than political decay or revolution, is the most likely outcome of the trends presently perceptible in Soviet political life. It is committed to the view that beneficent changes in the condition of the Russian people are probable,

provided that Soviet-Western relations remain relatively stable, and that Western societies continue to prosper. The terms adaptive evolution, political decay and revolution are used herein as distinctive, but not necessarily mutually exclusive, in meaning. Moreover, the dominance of one or more of these patterns at any particular time does not completely preclude some elements of coexistence with the others. In fact, it is probably true that in all societies and all political systems elements of successful adaptation, or evolution, are usually commingled with patches of disintegration and decay. As for revolution, its latent spark is ever present. The interaction of many factors in a society's internal and external environment, including its political culture and ideology, as well as technological and scientific innovation, generational differences, the rate of economic growth, the results of past wars and the threat of future wars, and the training, experience, courage and skill of political leaders and their assistants, influence the interplay of patterns of political development.

Thus, political forecasting must be of a contingent nature if confusion and oversimplification are to be avoided.<sup>1</sup> It is hypothesized that an adaptive, evolutionary path of political development in the USSR is more likely to prevail than is either decay, or revolution, and further -- although this is peripheral to our main concern -- such an outcome is likely to foster Soviet policies that will be beneficial in

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<sup>1</sup>A contingent approach was applied by Zbigniew K. Brzezinski in his useful study, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration," in Problems of Communism, Vol. XV (Jan.-Feb., 1966), pp. 1-15.

terms of world peace and human welfare. It is further assumed that this relatively favorable, non-revolutionary outcome is heavily dependent upon a continued rise in the quantity and range of goods, services and amenities available to the Soviet citizenry and wholly dependent upon the avoidance by the United States and the USSR of nuclear conflict. Thus, the expectations underlying this paper are based upon assumptions which might be regarded in some quarters as overly optimistic. However, the paper also makes some pessimistic assumptions, envisaging a continued sharp political rivalry between the two superpowers, as well as a high degree of unrest and instability in the underdeveloped countries.<sup>2</sup>

The study of political development has both empirical and normative aspects. From an empirical, value-free point of view, it is concerned with the structures and activities by which a political system copes with the stresses and strains encountered in the internal and external environments in transactions the outcome of which determine whether it flourishes, or disintegrates. If a system disintegrates, it is either transformed, by internally generated forces, into a new system, more or less within the boundaries of its predecessor, or is absorbed within those of formerly external systems. Political development thus involves, among other things, the successful surmounting of the major "crises" of identity, legitimacy, participation, distribution and "penetration."<sup>3</sup> The ability of a political regime to deal creatively with these formative experiences is both dependent upon, and determinative of, such political system capabilities as the

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<sup>2</sup>In general, the author shares the perspectives regarding contemporary international developments, especially in the "third world," which are set forth in Marshall D. Shulman's study, Beyond the Cold War (New Haven, 1966).

<sup>3</sup>Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston, 1966), pp. 62-67.

"extractive," or coercive, the "regulative," the "distributive," the "symbolic" and the "responsive." These system capabilities, in turn, are involved in the performance of the political "conversion" functions of interest articulation and interest aggregation by which a polity mediates between itself and the society, as well as by the functions of rule-making, rule-application and rule-adjudication, and, finally, the system-maintenance and adaptation functions of political socialization and elite recruitment.<sup>4</sup>

Unlike Marxism-Leninism and some non-Marxist schemes of analysis, the system and development theories referred to above are relatively un-culture bound.<sup>5</sup> Modern empirical political theory does not attempt to evaluate systems primarily in terms of their approximation to particular formal institutional patterns. It does, however, seek to explain why some systems are more, or less, responsive than others to individual or group demands for freedom of expression or wide distribution of consumer goods and services. Thus, theoretical analysis can perhaps facilitate mutual understanding among members of systems with different traditions and different backgrounds of historical experience. It stresses what is common to political life but does not ignore differences which reflect diverse experiences.

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<sup>4</sup>Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston, 1966). See also David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York, 1965) and Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York, 1963). The analytical frameworks developed by Pye, Almond, Deutsch and Easton have all been considerably influenced by the work of Talcott Parsons and other "social system" theorists.

<sup>5</sup>A statistically ingenious but rather ethnocentric approach to political development is offered by Phillips Cutright in his article, "Measurement and Analysis of National Political Systems," American Sociological Review, Vol. 28, No. 2 (April, 1963), pp. 253-64.



Until recently a weakness of political systems and development theories has been their lack of attention to revolutionary movements, especially those led by communists, and in particular to the analysis of political orders established as a result of communist revolutions. However, in the opinion of this author, students of communist systems can make good use of the macro-analytical schemes developed by Almond, Pye and others, provided, of course, that they do not uncritically transplant categories from non-communist to Soviet-type systems. Particularly valuable for our purposes, perhaps, is the general approach to revolution developed by Chalmers Johnson.<sup>6</sup> According to Johnson, to maintain its equilibrium, and function effectively, any society must keep its established pattern of values and shared norms and expectations in a state of synchronization with the structures by which the division of political, economic and social labor necessary to maintain it is, in its circumstances, effected. On this view, the synchronization between value patterns and societal division of labor is constantly threatened by new ideas, originating either within or outside the given society, and also by environmental changes which, by forcing adaptations of structure, can create discrepancies between values and established patterns of social action. If a society's political elite proves to be incapable of carrying out the adjustments and reforms needed to keep its values and the environment in balance, disequilibrium, or even revolution, may occur. In Johnson's definition, revolutions, in distinction from less fundamental

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<sup>6</sup>Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston, 1966).

changes, such as rebellions, are social changes effected by violence, directed against established authority. Johnson views revolution as endemic to society, but as "always avoidable if only the creative potentialities of political organization can be realized."<sup>7</sup> Anticipating the subsequent argument a bit, it may be said here that the evidence indicates that the Soviet political elite has sufficient skill and cohesiveness to prevent a revolutionary breakdown of the USSR.

Relating development theory to the theory of revolution, we may say that development is, most of the time, evolutionary but that when this "normal" pattern of evolutionary development breaks down, revolution results. Following the revolution, a new, and usually painful, effort of reconstructive development begins. A revolutionary regime must usually tackle, more or less simultaneously, the difficult problems of creating a sense of identity, establishing its legitimacy, and organizing participation in the political process by the citizenry. With its attention focused on the surmounting of an endless series of crises, it tends to develop coercive at the expense of responsive and distributive capabilities. Its leaders, acutely conscious of their own revolutionary political origins, are obsessed with fears of counter-revolution which, in the case of communists, is perceived as the danger of the "restoration of capitalism." Revolutionaries' expectations of internal and external violence are high, and they seek to impress upon their party cohorts, and the populations under their control, the need for "vigilance." However, a successful

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., XIV.

revolutionary regime eventually succeeds in establishing a new equilibrium, based on a synthesis of its revolutionary ideology with the traditional political culture of the society it governs. If its program of economic development is successful, and if the international situation is not excessively unfavorable, a working synchronization of value patterns and the new division of labor is established. In other words, a successful revolutionary regime evolves and develops adaptively.

It must be admitted that the above interpretation is based mainly upon analysis of the experience of the USSR, although it is somewhat descriptive of the French Revolution of 1789 and perhaps of Chinese communist experience. As a generalization it is somewhat narrowly based. Moreover, the characterization of Soviet political development as adaptive-evolutionary presents some difficulties. How, it may be asked, can Stalin's agricultural collectivization and dekulakization measures or his great purges of 1936-1938 be subsumed under the category of evolution? Our difficulty in answering such a question forces us to admit that probably no existing set of system and development concepts is fully adequate. Perhaps the development of the Soviet system under Stalin should be characterized as both coercively evolutionary, and revolutionary, while the post-Stalin Soviet system should be regarded as having assumed a more "responsive," evolutionary line of development. It is useful to remember that a social revolution can last a long time, and that in some respects it may go on for generations, while in other respects it may have ended and even have been succeeded by counter-revolutionary developments. In any case, it will be assumed that Soviet political

development since the bolshevik revolution of 1917 has indeed been evolutionary. This judgment rests upon a definition of evolutionary development as development initiated by and controlled by the established political authorities and as compatible with the institutions and practices established by the political leadership. On this view, Stalin's "revolution from above" was a successful, although extremely coercive pattern of adaptive evolution. Obviously, it is possible to recognize that despite its wastefulness of human and material resources, the Stalinist pattern of development was successful, without in any way condoning Stalin's use of methods which are abhorrent to those reared in the ethos of Western constitutional democracy. Unless we understand the achievements and appeals, as well as the moral outrages, of Stalinism, we cannot understand either the contemporary Soviet Union, which was largely Stalin's creation, or the appeals of communism to some of the revolutionaries in the disequilibriated social systems of today, who, like their counterparts in pre-communist Russia, are determined, at all costs, to eradicate the stigma of backwardness. Even more immediately relevant to the concerns of this study than the international implications of the successful evolutionary development of the Soviet system to date, is the reinforcement of our belief in the probability of its future stability derived from recognition both of the success of the Stalin model and the high degree of continuity between it and the more relaxed, rational and responsive Soviet system of today. This is not to say that Stalin's success guaranteed that of his successors. Indeed, in many ways it created problems for them, for example, by establishing rigid, now partially obsolete, patterns of socialization and education,

and patterns of elite recruitment which tend to inhibit the development of creative and independent personalities. Also, as is well known, Stalin destroyed talented individuals who could have made a great contribution to the political, economic and cultural life of Russia.

The pattern of change within continuity in terms of which Soviet development is here viewed poses many problems, most of which cannot be considered in this brief essay. However, it should be emphasized that in calling attention to continuity, we are not seeking to create the impression that a restoration of the coercive Stalinist pattern is likely. We envisage, rather, continued controlled responsiveness and probably fitful progress toward increased representativeness in Soviet political institutions. Increasing attention is likely to be paid to the elementary aspirations of the Soviet citizenry and, perhaps, to the values, customs and norms of the international community. Progress will probably be slow and not necessarily coherent or consistent. Positive developments in some fields may at times be accompanied by regressions and relapses in others. Changes in behavior and mood, which have already been significant, will probably continue to be more rapid than changes in political structure or ideology. Ideological changes will, in all probability, be exceptionally slow and difficult, for the CPSU's claim that it has the right and capacity to rule Russia is still heavily dependent upon the justificatory and explanatory functions of the official political creed, Marxism-Leninism. However, Marxism-Leninism is a treasury of contradictions and can, hence, and fortunately, be interpreted in many and varied ways. In the remainder of this article

the attempt will be made to apply, elaborate and substantiate the foregoing concepts and speculations, by relating them both to new factors in the overall situation of the USSR, and to ongoing developments and changes in the performance of such functions as interest articulation and aggregation and political communication, elite recruitment and political socialization.

## II. New Influences and Styles in Soviet Political Life

For purposes of compression it will be necessary to regard the entire post-Stalin era as, more or less, a unit. However, some attention will be paid to the considerable differences in substance and style which distinguish Khrushchev's flamboyant, somewhat fatuously optimistic, "populism" from the sterner, more elitist, but equally reformist course adapted by his businesslike and professedly scientific collective successors.<sup>8</sup> Probably the two most important changes in Soviet life since the death of Stalin were the reduction in the role of the security police from the major instrument of a dictator's rule over the communist party to that of a semi-legal agency of the oligarchical party leadership as a whole, and the attempt to reform the "command" economy by incorporating into its basically unaltered structure such features as increased use of monetary and "moral"

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<sup>8</sup>Post-Khrushchev conservatism was particularly apparent in the sphere of adult political socialization where it involved, among other things, a reduction in the enrollment in the network of "political enlightenment" courses and seminars from 36,000,000 in 1964 to 12,000,000 in 1966-1967, and a corresponding elimination of non-party students from the program. See Ellen Propper Mickiewicz, Soviet Political Schools (New Haven, 1967), pp. 9-13.

incentives, greater responsibility and initiative for plant managers, and some gingerly borrowed techniques of the Western market economy. Other significant, and well known, developments included a partial "secularization," if one may use that term, in Soviet intellectual life, accompanied by tendencies toward the development of "interest group" politics, as well as the partial reopening of Russia to Western and other non-communist cultural influences. In self defense, however, the Soviet authorities also proclaimed a campaign against "ideological coexistence." In the new setting, the creative elements of society, previously completely dominated and cowed by the party apparatus and the police, began, at first very timidly, to think independently, and even, in effect, to claim for themselves the role of junior partners in deciding the nation's destinies. The new moral climate was the product not only of a tyrant's mortality, but also of the steady maturing, increasing specialization and differentiation, and outstanding achievements of Soviet society in the spheres of economic and scientific productivity, so dazzlingly manifested in outer space, but visible and impressive both to Soviet citizens and foreigners in such diverse areas as education, public health, sports and many others. The new stirrings in the public life of Russia were the product also of forces and situations even more significant, perhaps, for the future of Soviet society, than any of the changes in leadership, policy or organization referred to above. Indeed, these larger forces, which operate across organizational, institutional, and status boundaries, may be bringing, or may already have brought, Soviet society into a

state of at least partial disequilibrium. There certainly is nothing approaching a revolutionary situation. There is at least some significant evidence, however, especially in the increasingly critical and independent attitudes of Soviet writers, that the major developmental crises, especially that of legitimacy, were not resolved as fully and finally as Stalin may have thought they were. Soviet history since Stalin, in particular Khrushchev's efforts to create a "functional" communist party and much in the criticism thereof -- without mentioning Khrushchev by name, of course -- by his successors, indicates at least temporary confusion, and perhaps waning confidence, about the role and mission of the party in Soviet society. Perhaps more than ever before, the leadership of the CPSU considers it necessary to justify its status, roles and functions before the Soviet public. Of course, the party's efforts to seek wider and deeper public support represent progress, from the point of view of the values of the Western, "civic," political culture, but they also indicate an increasing lack of "fit" between old institutions and values on the one hand, and new attitudes, generated by a changing environment, on the other. What are some of the major environmental factors which appear to have shaken up a once rigid society?

Important in the setting and tone of Russian political life today are not only the increasing saliency of new influences but the fortunate disappearance of old ones. For some years now Soviet life has been characterized by a <sup>slow</sup> reduction in tension and anxiety producing pressures and deprivations, and by the gradual fading out of traumatic memories. Although it would be a mistake to attribute the horrors of Stalinism



solely to the struggle of the Soviet Union for national security in an international environment of "capitalist encirclement" or to the hardships of rapid modernization of an underdeveloped economy, there is no doubt that these unfavorable factors in the international and domestic environment helped to blight the lives, darken the memories and envenom the outlook of the Soviet people. The costs of modern technological development, national power and international influence, achieved, in competition on terms defined, largely, to be sure, by Moscow, and in rivalry with, the industrialized West were higher and the consequences harsher, for the peoples of the USSR, than the struggle for national greatness had been for those of the Russian empire.<sup>9</sup>

Of course, the beneficent impact on Soviet life of the current partial decompression should not be exaggerated. International instability, the Soviet-American arms race, the Sino-Soviet rivalry, and a Soviet economic policy which still heavily emphasizes heavy industry and military production at the expense of a rapid rise in mass consumption persist, and exert their painful pressures. The massive and steady pressure of chauvinistic, anti-Western propaganda, as well as the vigilance and harshness of a still very powerful police machine, also inject elements of tension and anxiety into the political life of Russia. Anti-Western propaganda is an important instrument of policy, but its most ominous aspect is the evidence it

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<sup>9</sup>Theodore H. von Laue, Why Lenin? Why Stalin? (New York, 1964), offers perhaps the most stimulating presentation of the thesis that both the bolshevik revolution and the oppressive rule which resulted from it, can be traced to interactions between the efforts of the imperial Russian, and Soviet, leaders to achieve power and respect in the world, and the "pressures of global politics."

furnishes of the persistence of attitudes inappropriate to an era in which Soviet Western cooperation is imperative if the cold war is to be truly ended.

Despite the persistence of ideological preconceptions, which to many in the West seem obsolete, there does seem to have been in recent years a perceptible dissolution of the Stalinist siege mentality. This waning of fears and obsessions, together with continued rapid economic development, and increased access to foreign ideas, how-how, and patterns of conduct, fosters empirical and rational thinking at the expense of fanaticism and dogma. The new empiricism and cosmopolitanism both coexist with and infiltrate the still dominant Marxist-Leninist ideology. For example, at least a temporary modus vivendi has been achieved between, on the one hand the official philosophy, and on the other, empirical social science, which the party wishes to use for its own purposes, but which is developing a life and sphere of competence all its own.

The more pragmatic, individualistic and in some cases sophisticated attitudes referred to above, which seem to "bourgeois" Western observers to be signs of increasing normalcy but which to the "Maoist" faction in Chinese communist leadership circles represent treasonable revisionist deviations, are, of course, most attractive to the younger, more highly educated and most privileged strata of the Soviet population. We must be careful not to assume that the new sophistication has captivated the minds of all segments of either the Soviet intelligentsia or of Soviet youth, even student youth, and we must also guard against attributing to Soviet intellectuals, including

young Soviet intellectuals, anything approaching homogeneity of outlook.<sup>10</sup> Unfortunately, the relatively free thinking young intellectuals of Moscow, Leningrad, perhaps of the "science city" of Novosibirsk, and such other relatively Western-oriented centers as Odessa and Tbilisi, represent, probably, islands in an ocean of parochialism and chauvinism.

That there is a "conflict of generations" in the Soviet Union and that, from the official point of view, the state of mind of many youths leaves much to be desired is apparent from numerous statements made by Soviet leaders at party and Young Communist League congresses and plenary session meetings and from frequent articles in Pravda, Kommunist and other major publications.<sup>11</sup> Concern over the moods of youth, including young party members, was indicated by inclusion in a resolution adopted by the Twenty-third CPSU Congress of a demand for "a serious improvement in the Marxist-Leninist education and the ideological tempering of party members, especially young communists." In this connection, it is interesting that about 3,000,000, or almost one fourth of the entire membership of the CPSU are either candidate probationary members or full party members of three years' standing or less.<sup>12</sup> An interesting aspect of the multi-

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<sup>10</sup>On the wide range of ideas, attitudes and outlooks among Soviet intellectuals, particularly in the field of literature, see Timothy McClure, "The Politics of Soviet Culture, 1964-1967," Problems of Communism (March-April, 1967).

<sup>11</sup>See, for example, the speech of YCL leader Sergei Pavlov to the League's Fifteenth Congress, in Komsomolskaya Pravda, May 18, 1966, or the article by Moscow Party First Secretary N. G. Egorychev, in Kommunist, No. 2, March, 1965, expressing concern, among other things, over the "disorienting" effect on the morale of Soviet youth allegedly caused by Alexander Solzhenitsyn's depiction of the Stalin era in his novel One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.

<sup>12</sup>Mickiewicz, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

faceted problem of youth attitudes in the Soviet Union is the indication that the USSR has not been spared the problems of discontent and disorientation among young people which can be a byproduct of industrialization and urbanization. Brezhnev, in his main report at the Twenty-third Party Congress in 1966 expressed satisfaction that only 24.6 per cent of the Soviet population consisted of collective farmers, while the remaining 75.4 per cent were factory, office and professional workers and their families.<sup>13</sup> However, other Soviet sources indicate that urbanization has created discontent, especially among rural youths who, dissatisfied with the quality of life in the countryside, move to the small cities, there perhaps to become more discontented than ever or even to succumb to delinquency.<sup>14</sup>

It is prudent to assume, and the available evidence indicates, that Soviet youth is patriotic and basically loyal to country and political system. However, it is clear that Soviet youth is also increasingly critical, restive, and sometimes bored or disaffected. As Khrushchev pointed out in his speech to the Twenty-first Party Congress, in 1959, contemporary Soviet youth which, said Khrushchev, had not experienced the horrors of capitalism, grew up under conditions very different from those which shaped the outlook of their elders. Probably, due to

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<sup>13</sup>23rd Congress of the CPSU (Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, n.d.), p. 61.

<sup>14</sup>See, for example, the "sociological" items in Literaturnaya Gazeta, July 23 and July 26, 1966 and in Politicheskoe Samoobrazovanie, No. 7, July, 1966, pp. 122-26. The latter item notes that the vast majority of school graduates in a village where a study was made leave the village because of its "backwardness of culture and daily life."

propaganda efforts to keep alive memories of World War II and other wars in which Russians defended their homeland against foreign invaders -- the "liberating" aspects of Russian invasions of other countries are also stressed -- and to the intensified glorification in recent years of "revolutionary traditions," memories of World War II, and perhaps even of the revolutionary years, are more vivid in the minds of Soviet young people than World War II or the great depression of the 1930s are to American youngsters, but for the majority in both countries these events must seem ever more remote and shadowy.

As has only too sketchily been indicated above, the increasing irrelevance of much in the experience of those who now rule the Soviet Union to the concerns of the younger generation may render the tasks of the moulders and shapers of public opinion more and more difficult in the future. It seems not unreasonable to suppose that increasing skill and growing material rewards will be required, from now on, to elicit from Soviet citizens not only ideological fervor but perhaps even the level of obedience to authority necessary for public order and economic efficiency.

Conjecture about the probability of increasing difficulties for the Soviet political machine in keeping political inputs and outputs synchronized is based not only upon awareness of ferment among the "golden youth" of Moscow but also on evidence that even ordinary "toilers," throughout the vast Russian land, in their capacities both as producers and consumers, are increasingly critical and demanding. The rebirth of public opinion among the "masses" is not only significant as a source of pressure to

which the top political leadership apparently feels it should, and must, respond, but for its potential as a "constituency" for oppositionist intellectuals, especially those writers and critics who advocate policies of "levelling up" to alleviate the lot of Russia's underprivileged.

Every few days, it seems, an article or editorial in a major Soviet newspaper or magazine appears, which is in some way related to the problem of rising expectations among workers and even among that most disadvantaged segment of Soviet society, the collective farm villagers. Some of these items are caustically humorous. For example, one reads of <sup>a</sup>town with commercial air service -- but no surface transport from the airport -- and almost no dentists.<sup>15</sup> Other <sup>items</sup> /express pride in ongoing progress, while admitting it has not been sufficient as yet.<sup>16</sup> Related, but more specifically political, items criticize the failure of government officials to respond to citizens' letters or press criticism.<sup>17</sup> Shortcomings in the performance of party executives, which aggravate political apathy, are often criticized. According to a speech by an important Armenian party official, some factory, farm and scientific research institute party organizations of Armenia hold only one or two meetings a year, and very few party members speak at the meetings that are held.<sup>18</sup> Very recently,

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<sup>15</sup>N. Mironov, in Pravda, May 17, 1967.

<sup>16</sup>Article in Pravda Ukrainy, April 29, 1966, reporting that the Ukraine had forty dry cleaning and dyeing factories--and that its public service enterprises offered three times as many services as three or four years previously. Also typical was Izvestiya's editorial, Sept. 17, 1965, "Service to Everyday Needs, in the Center of Attention."

<sup>17</sup>Item in Pravda, June 30, 1965, from its Erevan correspondent.

<sup>18</sup>Report of speech by A. Shaginyan, in Kommunist, Erevan, March 4, 1966.

the necessity of regular public appearances by party leaders, to explain party policies, and to give the citizenry an opportunity to put questions to their leaders, has been articulated.<sup>19</sup> Some recent political articles have stressed the value of the "personal touch" and the necessity, if the active support of ordinary people is to be obtained, that agitators and propagandists possess the skill and information needed to field tough questions.

Of course, such indications of increasing pressures from below, and concern about dealing with them, do not mention factors even more troublesome than demands for more and better goods and services, or for leadership efforts to implement "party democracy." In addition to these important aspirations, there have been, in recent years, episodes revealing that some Soviet citizens, including some workers, are bitterly alienated. There have been illegal strikes, there have been demonstrations, and there have been cases of flight and desertion. It is impossible to evaluate the scope and significance of these anomic or subversive outbursts, but they are evidence of at least some, perhaps serious, disequilibrium in Soviet society. Awareness of this disequilibrium helps us to understand the pattern of cautious and controlled responsiveness on the part of the Soviet authorities.

The context within which the drama of Soviet political development is played out is almost infinitely rich, and brevity forbids mention, even, of all relevant environmental factors. However, a number of

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<sup>19</sup>See, for example, Partiinaya Zhizn, No. 5, March, 1967, editorial on "Speeches to the Toilers by Leading Officials," pp. 3-7.

influences which will probably play a significant role in future developments can be briefly discussed. Whether or not the Kosygin economic reform proves to be fully successful, it seems likely that the gross national product of the USSR will continue to grow at a rate of at least five per cent a year. By 1980, Russia may enjoy something approaching a "Hoover" standard of living, and, ten or fifteen years later, an "Eisenhower" standard. There is of course no certainty that the Soviet leadership and elite will increasingly follow welfare state policies, but one does not have to be wildly optimistic to think that they will find it in their interest to move in this direction, provided, of course, that the necessary efficiency and productivity are forthcoming. Today all of the peoples of the world are, increasingly, participants in a universal civilization characterized by ever-rising aspirations for material and intellectual satisfactions. In principle, the Soviet Union has always been committed to a welfare state policy. Both the Khrushchev and post-Khrushchev leaderships reaffirmed this commitment, not only symbolically but to a substantial degree in terms of organizational measures and allocation of resources. The Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership, in particular, inaugurated sensible policies not only in the field of industrial reform, but also in agriculture, foreign trade and technical and scientific exchange with the West, calculated not only to improve the international image of the USSR but also to raise the standard of living of the Soviet people, beginning, of course, at the level of the most energetic, capable and loyal elements. The aspects of this communist welfare state policy which augur well for



the constructive evolution of Soviet Russia include an unprecedented willingness on the part of the authorities not only to permit, but even to encourage, a relatively frank discussion of deficiencies in many fields of administration and performance, and an increasing eagerness to listen to and learn from "bourgeois specialists."<sup>20</sup> It appears that the most competent and enlightened elements in the Soviet intelligentsia, especially in scientific circles, are most enthusiastically committed to policies of involvement in the international economic and cultural community, but such policies are also supported by powerful elements in the top political leadership. No doubt leaders committed to the Soviet version of liberal-internationalist policies have to face criticism in high regime councils.<sup>21</sup>

A Soviet policy of "sharing the wealth" at home would not necessarily assure a policy of accommodation abroad. However, rising living standards have often been associated with liberal and reasonable domestic and foreign policies.<sup>22</sup> It seems reasonable to assume that, given increasing prosperity and a growing distributive capability and given, also, a

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<sup>20</sup>P. Abroskin, S. Kamenitser in an article on "Leninist Principles of Administration in Action," in Kommunist, No. 6 (April, 1967), point out that Lenin was not ashamed to employ "bourgeois specialists" at high salaries, under the control, to be sure, of "the workers." See p. 64.

<sup>21</sup>This is indicated in such press items as F. Burlatski, "Nauchnye osnovy politiki partii," Sovetskaya Belorussiya, Sept. 6, 1966, stressing the necessity of an empirical, pragmatic approach to public affairs, especially in economic policy, and sharply criticizing "skeptics" who cling to outmoded dogmas. I wish to express my appreciation to Professor Sidney I. Ploss for bringing Burlatski's article to my attention.

<sup>22</sup>Outright, op. cit., offers interesting evidence of connections between economic development--as well as non-involvement in international conflict--and democratic political development.

tolerably favorable configuration of international affairs, the Soviet Union might move much more significantly than it already has toward increasing responsiveness and permissiveness in both domestic and foreign policies.

It would be beyond the proper scope of this essay to explore in detail the complexities of the international environment. However, it should be noted that the structure of international relations since World War II has provided a setting more propitious for the eventual working out of mutually advantageous relations between the Soviet Union and other great powers than did the far more anarchic pattern of the inter-war period. At the very least, bi-polarity in the essentials of the world power structure makes for a measure of stability.

The Damoclean sword of nuclear destruction hangs over our world, to be sure, but as Winston Churchill once predicted it would, consciousness of this sobering reality has produced in the two major nuclear powers at least, a disposition to refrain from reckless or irresponsible behavior. On the whole, since the period of readjustment following, and resulting from, World War II, the West has succeeded in denying to the USSR both victories and enemies.<sup>23</sup> On the Soviet side, there has in recent years been an increasing tendency to substitute, in analyses of world politics, the concept of the "world revolutionary process" for the traditional, more inflammatory and

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<sup>23</sup>Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, on the final page of The Soviet Bloc (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), identified the denial of victories and of enemies as the key to the erosion of ideology in the Soviet bloc.

activist slogan of "world revolution."<sup>24</sup> Moreover, the conduct of the world power struggle is now perceived by Moscow mainly in terms of economic influence and ideological-cultural competition. However, as Moscow's role in the Tri-Continental Conference in Havana, in 1966, and its aftermath, showed, the desire to exploit and, perhaps, a feeling of obligation toward, the "national liberation" struggle of radical movements in underdeveloped countries, remain salient in Soviet foreign policy, and, at least formally, confidence in the ultimate collapse of "imperialism" persists.

In spite of ideological dogmas, Moscow seems increasingly disposed to accept the long-term existence of "capitalist" states as a fact of international political life and even, as in the case of Sino-Indian relations, has given some measure of support to a non-communist state under pressure from a communist state. Further development of the expectation that the USSR and the non-communist nations could cooperate in building an international order in which conflict would normally be adjusted by processes of peaceful change would, of course, facilitate similar moderate and rational approaches to the internal political development of all countries, although it would be naive to suppose that even such a salutary trend could do much to abate the passions engendered by the ongoing revolution in the underdeveloped countries.

There is an intimate connection between unrest in the underdeveloped lands and the survival of a "two world" psychology in Moscow,

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<sup>24</sup>See, for example, Stroitelstvo kommunizma i mirovoi revolyutsionny protsess (Moscow, 1966).

although the latter is not necessarily dependent on the former. Instability in the underdeveloped countries certainly does, however, provide temptations for the Kremlin. It fans the fires of Soviet chauvinism and messianism by furnishing apparent proof of the validity of major Leninist doctrines regarding the inevitable decline of "imperialism." Thereby, it also strengthens the hand of orthodox elements in the party apparatus and even in the intelligentsia, which is by no means free of nationalist and even chauvinist moods. However, we can hope that the attractions of trade and cultural relations with the West, and increasing realization of the frustration involved in fomenting revolutions, in competition with Communist China, in the "weakly developed" countries, to borrow a Soviet term, will strengthen tendencies toward moderation and responsibility in Soviet relations with these areas.

A few words should be said, in concluding this section, about the role of political succession as a factor in Soviet political development.<sup>25</sup> Since the death of Stalin the succession problem, always a latent factor, has become an active, perhaps an increasingly important one. The succession problem is always a difficult one, pregnant even with possibilities of political earthquakes, in any state which is neither a constitutional democracy nor a monarchy. It is perhaps more protean in its complexity and probably more explosive in potential when the dictatorship is one that grew out of a victorious revolution.

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<sup>25</sup>Almost everyone who has speculated about the nature and future of Soviet politics has something to say on the succession problem, but the basic study is Myron Rush's valuable book, Political Succession in the USSR (New York, 1965).

In a dictatorship of revolutionary origin normal conflicts of interest may be compounded by ideological passions. The relative stability of Soviet politics since the overthrow of Khrushchev may cast doubt on the validity of these observations, but we cannot yet be sure that they are entirely invalid. In any case, even assuming that ideological disputes are no longer a serious divisive force in a bureaucratized Russia, conflicts of interest will almost certainly continue to render succession crises -- which are bound to recur as long as no legal and binding rules determining succession exist -- embarrassing and dangerous to the political leadership elements, and to the elite as a whole. However, from the point of view of advocates of interest group and institutional autonomy, succession crises can be a boon. There is no doubt that the factional strife which they unleash and stimulate weakens central controls and increases the maneuverability and bargaining power of reformist factions and <sup>of</sup> the latent, often ad hoc segmental groupings striving to wrest from the political authorities agreement on conditions and rules under which they can function in accordance with the standards and criteria of their professions and callings, as they, rather than the rulers, understand them. Barring the rise of a new Stalin, the loosening up of the social and political system inherent in this situation can be expected not only to provide leeway for the kinds of group pressures and bargaining referred to, but also to keep alive aspirations in some elite circles for fundamental constitutional reforms. In the latter connection, it is not without interest that some Soviet diplomats, in the months after Khrushchev's ouster, told American colleagues that

"next time" a change of supreme leader occurred it would be handled "better," by which they may have meant <sup>that</sup> the process would bear less resemblance to a palace coup and be conducted more openly and "legally."

### III. Toward a More Responsive Soviet Polity?

The concept of responsiveness is used very broadly here, to denote the willingness and ability of the Soviet political authorities to pursue policies, particularly in the allocation of material resources, which, in their opinion, satisfy both the requirements of the citizenry and the long-term needs of the community. Since the Soviet leaders are not dependent for their tenure of office upon popular elections, they can afford to pay less attention to public opinion than the leaders of constitutional democracies. Presumably, the top-level decision-makers of a dictatorship, whether it be a tyranny or an oligarchy, will be heavily influenced by state, as against community, interests. To a considerable degree, in practice, this means that they will be influenced by their own rather narrow interests as professional rulers, rather than by the variegated and diffuse interests of the people as a whole. It is not surprising, then, that philosophic critics of dictatorship, and of elitism generally, are pessimistic about the future of the Soviet political system, and about prospects for real improvement in political relations between the USSR and the Western democracies.<sup>26</sup> It seems to

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<sup>26</sup>An eloquent and thoughtful but perhaps excessively pessimistic presentation of the outlook referred to above is Bertram D. Wolfe's article, "Reflections on the Future of the Soviet System," The Russian Review, Vol. 26, No. 2 (April, 1967), pp. 107-28. In this writer's opinion, Wolfe focuses his analysis too narrowly on the purely institutional aspects of political change in Russia and underestimates the significance of the changes which have occurred in Soviet political life, despite the persistence of CPSU rule.

this writer that it is possible to be prudently vigilant about Soviet intentions and capabilities and also clear in perceiving moral and esthetic defects of dictatorship, without abandoning hope for evolutionary development in Soviet Russia, ~~and pursuing policies which take this alternative, among others, into account.~~ This evolution could, conceivably, eventuate in some form of constitutional democracy. More likely, at least for the foreseeable future, it will fall far short of the parliamentary goal which this writer of course regards as desirable, but will produce behavior which conforms considerably more closely to Western standards than that of the USSR does at present. This tentative prediction is based not only on evidence that men seek, whenever possible, to increase their freedom of choice but also upon consideration of the extensive reforms which have taken place in the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin. It rests heavily upon the belief that, within the context sketched in the preceding section of this essay, these reforms will probably generate still further reforms and demands. What began as tinkering with the Soviet system may end in its fundamental transformation.

This exposition will deal, first, with political implications of some of the major post-Stalin reforms, in economic, cultural and political spheres. Consideration will also be given to changes in elite recruitment, particularly at the level of leading party and state organs, which are rendering these bodies more representative than they have hitherto been of the Soviet elite as a whole. In addition, our attention will be turned to developments affecting the articulation and aggregation of factional and group interests which, like the increasing representativeness of the

decision-making bodies, are bringing increasing diversity to the Soviet political process, and perhaps are portents of more vigorous pluralistic trends. Finally, it will be interesting to examine a range of proposals and demands, both legitimate and illegitimate, which, if implemented, might lead to radical alterations in various aspects of the Soviet system.

The impossible task of describing in detail, or even of listing, the numerous and significant Khrushchev and post-Khrushchev reforms, which have affected virtually every sphere of Soviet life, will not be attempted. Instead, some general characteristics of these "outputs" of the political system will be identified and an effort will be made to relate them to political "inputs" of demands upon and support for the political system. Excessively limited though they are in many ways, the reforms involved big enough efforts, dislocations, and risks to justify the assumption that Khrushchev, Kosygin, Brezhnev and others who initiated or at least sponsored them, regarded them as necessary for the improvement, and perhaps the preservation, of the communist regime. The big zig-zag course of the reforms and the multiplicity of agonizing reappraisals which have accompanied them, indicate that "conservatives" and "dogmatists" in the CPSU apparatus and in other crucial segments of society and, to a lesser degree, even the top leaders who staked their personal lives and fortunes and the future of the communist cause, on the success of the reforms, had many misgivings about their potential for unsettling and disintegrating consequences, particularly in the event that control of their execution should slip from the hands of the party leadership. In broad terms, the necessity of positive reforms of all kinds followed logically from the



overwhelming agreement among Stalin's successors that it was absolutely necessary to replace the "negative incentive" of terror by a more positive pattern of rewards and incentives which might make life more pleasant, or at least more bearable. Stalin's system had not only made life nasty, brutish and short but it had condemned the mass of the population to dire poverty and had made it impossible even for the privileged few of Soviet society to enjoy anything like a "European" way of life. Hence, a keenly felt need for improved industrial and agricultural efficiency and for a rise in the quantity and quality of goods, ranked second only to a desire for personal security as a motive for reform. If successful, the reforms might invigorate Soviet society, and bring about the replacement of apathetic conformity to the commands of authority by enthusiastic support and creative citizen participation in public life. Such, at least, seems to have been the vision which inspired Khrushchev's drive for the "full-scale construction of communism" and his slogan of the "state of all the people." Today, almost three years after the ouster of Khrushchev, it is clear that his successors are as committed as he was to reform. Indeed, the reform efforts of the Brezhnevs and the Kosygin, the Podgornys, Polyanskis and Demichevs, are, at least in principle, more fundamental and serious than those of Khrushchev, which tended to be excessively focused on administrative reorganizations and evangelistic slogan-mongering. His successors have at last begun to undertake basic reforms of process and structure, especially in the ailing agricultural sector, and also in the structure of wages, in prices, and in many

other important fields.<sup>27</sup> The current introduction of a five-day week in industry is another important post-Khrushchev reform. However, if one were to attempt to rate the respective contributions made by Khrushchev, and his successors, to reform, the palm for boldness would probably have to go to Khrushchev, who after all created the framework of receptivity to new departures within which his successors operated, and also instituted many specific, important welfare measures, such as the extension of social security coverage to the collective farm peasantry.

Reform was necessary, but it created problems of incalculable and possibly illimitable dimensions. Perhaps only a tyrant can with impunity repudiate past policies. Khrushchev's reforms challenged the myth of Stalin's infallibility. They also threatened the even more vital myth of the infallibility of the party. On a less lofty but not insignificant level, breaking of precedents could be and was attacked by Molotov, for example, as inexpedient and, in effect, heretical. It is not surprising that, in order to justify himself and rally support for his innovations, Khrushchev felt compelled to smash the Stalin idol and to substitute for the "cult" of Stalin a new Lenin cult, symbolized by Khrushchev's order abolishing the celebration of the anniversary of Lenin's death and replacing it by celebration of the anniversary of his birthday. This

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<sup>27</sup>For a positive appraisal of Brezhnev's agricultural reforms, particularly guaranteed remuneration for collective farmers and increased democracy in collective farm management, see Abdurakhman G. Avtorkhanov, "A New Deal for Collective Farmers?", No. 452 (April 25, 1967) of Institute for the Study of the USSR, Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union, and for the Khrushchevian background to these developments, which helped to make them possible, see Sidney I. Ploss's important pioneer study, Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia (Princeton, N.J., 1965).

change of symbolism, which has been retained by Khrushchev's successors, took place within the framework of reaffirmation of the doctrine of the infallibility of the party, which had been somewhat obscured during the era of "the cult of personality of J. V. Stalin."

Both Khrushchev and those who removed him from power were determined not to permit reforms, whether in policy, organization or doctrine which might undermine the twin pillars of communist rule, namely the unrestricted sovereignty of the party leadership and the unquestioned infallibility of Marxism-Leninism. Have they been trying to square the circle?

It is probably impossible to determine whether or not the dilemma of non-subversive reform in the USSR is insoluble. The difficulties are certainly formidable. For example, can the goals of the regime, in terms of welfare and even of efficiency be achieved without granting a degree of autonomy to industrial enterprises and to labor, which would diminish the role of the party to an intolerable degree?<sup>28</sup>

Despite the cautious control exercised by the party leadership over political outputs, input patterns, particularly in the sphere of interest articulation, have been significantly altered. A pattern, which might be described as contained diversity, or limited pluralism, has begun to emerge. In connection both with the promotion and the implementation

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<sup>28</sup>The voluminous Western literature on the Soviet economic reform is replete with such questions. See, for example, Part I of "New Directions in the Soviet Economy," Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 89th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C., 1966), or such recent interesting studies as Gregory Grossman, "Economic Reforms: A Balance Sheet," Problems of Communism, Vol. XV, No. 6 (Nov.-Dec., 1966), pp. 43-55, and Alexander Erlich, "Economic Reforms in Communist Countries," Dissent, May-June, 1967, pp. 311-19.

of many major reforms, brisk and businesslike discussion of issues was aired in the press.<sup>29</sup> To be sure, even Stalin's political monolith was not without both symbolic and real dimensions of diversity. There was always the facade of a nominally democratic and federalist constitution, and also a range of party-controlled "representative" organizations, such as trade unions, the YCL, and the various "unions", of writers, artists, composers, and other professionals. More important, of course, was the informal, largely illegitimate diversity of conspiratorial and subterranean factionalism. Something new, however, was added to the patterns of interest articulation and, to some extent, of aggregation, in the post-Stalin era. An astonishing range of opinions was aired in the mass media, and presumably an even greater variety and intensity of opinions was expressed in unpublished discussions, both official and unofficial. One interesting example of a bold but permissible public expression of opinion was the article by the factory economist, O. Volkov, in Pravda for August 23, 1964 which not only advocated that profit be used as the key economic index of performance for enterprises, but also urged that manufacturing and trade organizations be "maximally independent" in bargaining for delivery and sale of their products and that they be, to a certain extent, independent in determining

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<sup>29</sup>For a fuller presentation of the general patterns of interest articulation, similar in approach to that sketched here, see Chapters II, V and VII of Frederick C. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR (Boston, 1966); also the valuable works of Ploss, op. cit.; Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership (Baltimore, 1966); and Peter H. Juviler & Henry W. Morton, eds., Soviet Policy Making (New York, 1967).

prices. That Volkov was really advocating bargaining -- he did not actually use this term -- is indicated by the fact that he pointed out that in the socialist economy there existed a market, cleansed, to be sure, of the imperfections of the capitalist market -- which could perform, much better than the capitalist market, the functions of controlling the quantity, quality and variety of goods. Of course, the economic reform of September, 1965 reaffirmed at the Twenty-third Party Congress in 1966, did not go nearly as far in the direction of liberalism as the Libermans, the Volkovs, the Aganbegians, the Birmans, the Kantoroviches and other advocates of the predominance of "economic" over "administrative" methods of economic leadership, desired.<sup>30</sup> The reform, as adopted, and as carried out thus far, has represented a compromise between the preferences of the "liberal economists," and their party leader and economic planner allies and supporters, and those more conservative administrators who desired to utilize improved cost accounting and incentive methods and other economic indicators and controls, not to do away with "democratic centralism" and the principle of "the unified state apparatus of planning and administration of the national economy" but to render these principles, as a writer in Kommunist in the spring of 1967, put it, "more flexible."<sup>31</sup> The

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<sup>30</sup>An extraordinarily interesting analysis of the groups and issues involved in this dispute, which traces it to shortly after the death of Stalin and indicates that the partial victory achieved by the opponents of extremely centralized administrative controls can be credited to Kosygin, was the distinguished economist A. Birman's article in Novy Mir, No. 12, December, 1965.

<sup>31</sup>L. Abalkin in Kommunist, No. 6 (April, 1967), p. 78. Interestingly enough, the title of Abalkin's article is "Economic Laws, Interests and Methods."

economic debate, which, although it is more muted than before the adoption of the 1965 reform, still goes on, represents an example of what the British scholar Ronald Hingley, referring to the better known and less complex but perhaps not less significant ferment in literature, has described as a condition of "officially tolerated feud."

Unfortunately despite the leadership's concessions, in practice, to diversity, it still clings in the sphere of doctrine, to the myths of the possibility and desirability of complete agreement on social goals and the means of achieving them. Certainly the increasingly frequent but still not very numerous references in official Soviet sources to professional or other interest or opinion groups continue to be somewhat condemnatory. In a very important Pravda article published in 1965 the authoritative theoretician and central committee member, A. N. Romyantsev asserted that "groupism" (gruppovshchina) was incompatible with the proper behavior of Soviet intellectuals.<sup>32</sup> Since Romyantsev, who in characterized by Timothy McClure as a "moderate conservative," was actually advocating a substantial measure of increased autonomy for intellectuals, it would appear that his warning was directed not so much against vigorous freedom of expression as against actual or potential efforts of factions, especially in the field of literature, to do something that very few, if any, party executives, even the most open-minded and reformist, could be expected to favor, let alone to advocate,

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<sup>32</sup>Pravda, February 21, 1965.

namely, to organize associational, even if only segmental, interest groups which might challenge the party's claim to be the final arbiter among all competing demands and aspirations in Soviet society. To put the matter somewhat differently, one might interpret the kind of sophisticated orthodoxy championed by Rumyantsev as a reminder to intellectuals that the political leadership was not only determined to carefully control, while broadening, the articulation of interests, but was particularly concerned lest groups other than those designated by duly constituted authority make any move<sup>at all</sup> toward the drafting of programs, or the creation of organizations, for the aggregation of interests. The boundaries between permissible and impermissible individual or group discussion, lobbying and other forms of interest articulation are rather fluid and they can shift. In the field of literature and the arts, for example, the relative reasonableness of the Rumyantsev line was at least partially undermined by a "conservative resurgence" which began in the fall of 1965 and produced the notorious Sinyavski-Daniel trial, the new statute of September, 1966, providing for fines or deprivation of freedom for "circulation of known falsehoods derogatory to the Soviet state and social system," and other unfortunate administrative, legal and quasi-legal acts of repression.<sup>33</sup> However, this show of teeth did not appear to be a mortal threat to the creative autonomy of writers, artists, social scientists and natural scientists who were courageous enough to remain true to their convictions and also shrewd enough and

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<sup>33</sup>The "conservative resurgence" is traced in considerable detail and with impressive documentation in McClure, op. cit., pp. 36-41.

circumspect enough to conform at least to the letter of the law and to refrain from rashness in expressing their attitudes toward official doctrines and the prerogatives of the party leaders. Partly because the party thought that a measure of flexibility and tolerance paid dividends, in the form of performance by intellectuals and professionals which was useful to the regime, and partly because the intellectuals displayed considerable solidarity, courage and resourcefulness in resisting official pressures, the post-Khrushchev leadership has, like Khrushchev, usually employed persuasion and cajolery rather than repression to keep intellectuals more or less in line. Some sort of tacit bargaining process seems to have involved in the situation of the last few years, in which loyal but relatively unorthodox poets such as Andrei Voznesenski were permitted to travel extensively in "bourgeois" countries and in which, to mention another characteristic episode, Ilya Ehrenburg chose to be absent from the country during the dreary May, 1967 congress of the Union of Soviet Writers. Immediately after the congress the world learned of Solzhenitsyn's courageous demand that censorship be abolished in the USSR, on both aesthetic and legal grounds. Among the many curious aspects of the contemporary politics of Soviet literature of which no more than mere mention can be made is the opportunity that the Sino-Soviet conflict has afforded to safely voice unorthodox ideas, disguised as criticism of Maoist extremists.

A considerable portion of our limited space has been devoted to the political aspects of Soviet literature because, as Victor Zorza pointed out in June, 1967 the Union of Soviet Writers, the official organization



set up by the party in 1932 to control the writers, actually contains within its membership an "unofficial opposition".<sup>34</sup> Unlike incipient interest groups in other fields, the unorthodox writers -- by no means fully homogeneous in outlook or cohesive in group structure as has already been indicated -- are in general, as Zorza notes, "divided into a Right and a Left wing, each with its own press organs, its own ideology, and its own supporters at the centre of political power and throughout the country". Although Zorza's formula seems a bit oversimplified, it is, in this writer's opinion, generally correct, and is particularly useful in raising the question of the links between segmental, or professional, groupings, and the major factions at higher levels of the political system. Generally, signals from on high, reflecting divided counsels, and resulting, perhaps, from a leader's effort to gain support in intelligentsia or even in mass opinion, have acted as "catalysts" for the formation and functioning of lower-level opinion and pressure groups.<sup>35</sup> Specific data on the communication links and patterns referred to above are very hard to come by, but scattered wisps of evidence, gathered by alert foreigners, combined with inferences from the Soviet press, leave little doubt of their existence. Apart from such episodes as the denunciation of D.T. Shepilov in 1957, or the sudden dismissal of Rumyantsev as editor of Pravda shortly before the arrest of Sinyavski and Daniel, one learns of assistance given by employees of party and government agencies in the smuggling out of Russia of texts of confidential documents. One

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<sup>34</sup>Victor Zorza, "The Unofficial Opposition", Manchester Guardian Weekly, June 1, 1967.

<sup>35</sup>The term "catalyst", as used in this context, was suggested to the author by Miss Anastasia Shkilnyk.

hears from knowledgeable foreigners that members of various intellectual groupings communicate openly at their favorite Moscow clubs, and that still more unorthodox, "underground" intellectuals keep in touch, in semi-clandestine fashion, in brief encounters, for example, in theater lobbies.

From time to time, Pravda, Kommunist, Partiinaya Zhizn, and other important publications accuse "some comrades," or "some people," of such "petty bourgeois, anarchistic denial of the role of leaders" in Soviet life as would be involved in the setting up in the Soviet Union of non-communist parties, "financed by foreign capital and serving foreign interests." At times, the party press has accused some people of seeking to serve the bourgeoisie by "hiding under the flag of non-partisanship." Apparently, the only high party leader who has been openly accused, in the post-Stalin era, of offering a "platform," broader than that of the party, presumably in league with dissident intellectuals, was the forgotten and unfortunate Dmitri T. Shepilov, in 1957.<sup>36</sup> On a much more subversive, or "anomic" level, there have of course, especially after the Hungarian uprising, and in connection with the Sinyavski-Daniel affairs, been protest manifestations by students, even including street demonstrations.

One can only conclude that if neither Khrushchev nor his successors have been able either to fashion sufficient uniformity of opinion in the top political command or to elicit voluntary harmony among Soviet

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<sup>36</sup>For some remarks on the role of Shepilov and related matters, see Frederick C. Barghoorn, "Soviet Political Doctrine and the Problem of Opposition," Bucknell Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 (May, 1964), pp. 1-29.

writers, powerful and perhaps durable trends are at work.

The revived role of literature as the conscience of Russian society of course transcends merely political concerns. It is unfortunately not possible to discuss here the broadening and deepening, in a very real but unfortunately, limited, sense the humanization, of Soviet life which has been one of the best results of this widening of horizons and perspectives. Suffice it to say that post-Stalin literary and artistic life have furnished evidence not only of a salutary quickening of intellectual life, but also of the beginning, at least, of a process which may eventually cleanse the Russian intellectual atmosphere from the suffocating miasma of the bolshevik syndrome.

Breaking the shackles of the "general line of the party" might, or might not, mean the abandonment of Marxism as the dominant philosophy of Russia. It would certainly mean a strengthening of the empirical and humanist links between Soviet thought and both Russian thought of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the full heritage of Western culture. It would require the discarding of a mass of intellectual rubbish and stale formulas which choke and paralyze intellectual inquiry. It would permit and require clear thinking and honesty in history, the humanities and the social sciences. While this list of prerequisites reminds us of the immensity of the tasks facing Russians who struggle for intellectual freedom, we can be encouraged by the progress already

made and we must respect the sacrifices which have been offered in this struggle.

If writers and artists are, to some extent at least, protected against official repression for the reasons already adduced, and also because the USSR is more sensitive to public opinion, especially that of communist intellectuals, in Italy and France, in Eastern Europe and generally wherever propaganda advantage can be gained by a semblance of liberality, than it was under Stalin, natural scientists must be treated with special respect, and even pampered, because national power depends so heavily upon the quality of their work -- which in turn is influenced, directly or indirectly, not only by the facilities furnished to them but by their personal relations with the authorities and other non-material factors. To a greater and greater extent, Soviet natural scientists are wresting control over research institutes from party administrators and, as a recent study notes, they have already "received authority to work as they wish."<sup>37</sup> There is a significant link between the struggle of Soviet writers and artists for freedom of expression and that of Soviet scientists for freedom of inquiry. Because of their great prestige and influence and also because many of them are connoisseurs of arts and letters, Soviet scientists have, on a number of occasions, been willing and able to blunt the force of political pressures against unorthodox or experimental practitioners in these fields.<sup>38</sup> Another significant

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<sup>37</sup>See p. 157 of Loren R. Graham, "Reorganization of the USSR Academy of Sciences," in Juviler and Morton, op. cit.

<sup>38</sup>On the link between natural scientists and "abstract art" and modern Soviet writing, see, for example, Chapter XIX of Albert Parry, The New Class Divided (New York, 1966).

indication of the link between the interests of scientists and other intellectuals may be perceived in the fact that the letter sent to Brezhnev before the Twenty-third CPSU Congress, pleading that Stalin not be rehabilitated, numbered prominent scientists, as well as writers, among its signers.

Some features of the moving equilibrium in today's Russia between adaptive policy outputs, and input demands, reflecting a changing environment, have been at least identified. Among the many categories missing from our inventory, on the input side, are the broad range of anomic and, at least from the Kremlin's point of view, subversive activities by, or on behalf of writers and artists, which are known to have taken place in recent years, although information about them is tantalizingly incomplete. We do not know nearly as much as we would like to, for example, about the causes for the CPSU's repressive actions in connection with such highly publicized affairs as those involving Boris Pasternak, Joseph Brodski, Andrei Sinyavski and Yuli Daniel, and less, little, or nothing, about hundreds of lesser disturbers of official ideological tranquillity.

Almost entirely unrepresented in the foregoing discussion of trends in the developing Soviet pattern of interest articulation are reform proposals which, although legitimate, judging by their sponsorship and their access to the official media of communication, have no affect on public policy and indeed, judging by what we can learn regarding their puzzlingly abortive history, may have had no impact at all. It is not

suggested, however, that proposals, perhaps launched as trial balloons, and not implemented, are necessarily unimportant. They may, indeed, be indicators of predispositions, which although as yet not strong enough to elicit action, may someday become powerful forces. This surmise reflects both those aspects of the writer's experience in the Soviet Union and his gleanings from others with experience in that country, which, taken together, indicate that there is not such a complete lack of even rather fundamental alternative models to the present political system, as we sometimes think.

While it is probably true that political creativity and imagination are feeblar in the Soviet Union than in any of the world's large nations, and far feeblar also than in some small countries such as Communist Yugoslavia, travelers' reports indicate that many Soviet intellectuals are favorable disposed to economic and social changes which might, if acted upon, have important political repercussions. These include the introduction of private enterprise in retail trade, some branches of light industry, and perhaps in agriculture.

This writer never encountered a Soviet citizen who advocated replacing the one-party political structure of the country by a multi-parti system, or even a substantial institutional liberalization within the framework of the communist party dictatorship. However, that some Soviet citizens in relatively high positions think along such lines, was indicated by the speech given by Mr. N. Arutyunyan, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, at the Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of

Armenia, in 1966.<sup>39</sup> Arutyunyan is reported to have advocated nomination for the Soviets -- the context of his speech indicates that he was referring to local Soviets -- of more than one candidate, on the ground that electoral competition would increase the "political activity" of voters and the sense of responsibility of deputies to the electors. Although Arutyunyan wrapped himself in the mantle of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy by including in his speech ritualistic statements about the superiority of "Soviet democracy" to its "bourgeois" counterpart, the liberal and indeed radical implications of his proposal were clear. Unfortunately, nothing was done to implement it and it was not echoed at the Twenty-third CPSU Congress which began a few weeks later. It also had no effect on the 1967 elections to the republic soviets. It is interesting to speculate about some of the possible reasons for a proposal that, in the Soviet setting, was a bold one. The Armenians, and also the Georgians, have a less despotic and a more cosmopolitan and individualist political culture than the Great Russians who dominate the Soviet Union. There is also in these countries -- as in the Baltic region, too -- resentment against Moscow's imperious interference in local affairs. Perhaps the Armenians, in particular, are more receptive than other peoples of the Soviet Union to the reformist and revisionist influences emanating from Yugoslavia, and to a certain extent from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and other Eastern European countries where new ideas are either being tried out in practice or at least being talked

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<sup>39</sup>Kommunist, Erevan, March 5, 1966, p. 4. The full text of Arutyunyan's speech was not published, and it is possible that it was even more innovative in spirit than appears from the published report.

about.<sup>40</sup>

Mention of Arutyunyan's proposal brings to mind the area of Soviet life in which, in proportion to the importance of the issues involved, adaptive evolution has probably proceeded most slowly, namely, that of political and legal institutions. The ticklishness of the problems involved in this sphere are indicated by the fact that some five years after the establishment in 1962 by Khrushchev of a commission to propose reforms in the constitution of 1936 -- which, incidentally, until March 5, 1953 was often referred to in the press as the "Stalin constitution" -- this commission, headed since December, 1964 by Leonid Brezhnev, had not reported. It would not be quite correct to say that complete stagnation has prevailed in recent years in the development of the formal structure of Soviet political institutions. The regularization, and the modest revival of and increase in participation, in political life effected at the upper, and to a certain extent the intermediate and lower levels of party authority, have radiated influences facilitating similar changes in the soviets, the ministries, the law enforcement agencies and the other institutional structures of the system. The powers of the Supreme Soviet and lower soviets, and in particular the functions of the standing committees of soviets at all levels, have become somewhat more significant. There has been an interesting revival of discussion of issues of constitutional law, for example, in connection with the powers of standing

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<sup>40</sup>In connection with the above speculations, the articles by Morton Schwartz, "Czechoslovakia: Toward One Party Pluralism?" Problems of Communism, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Jan.-Feb., 1967), and H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups in Communist Politics," World Politics, Vol. XVIII, No. 3 (April, 1966), are of interest.



committees of the Supreme Soviet.<sup>41</sup> In law, the reformist impulses of 1957-58 have ebbed, but Khrushchev's successors did away with some of the worst features of "legal populism."<sup>42</sup> Although post-Khrushchevian progress toward legal liberalism has been marred by some retrogression, aspects of which have been mentioned, an encouraging degree of freedom of public discussion among legal scholars and administrators has continued — however, as in the past, enthusiastic liberals in this field, as in others, are likely to be criticized for allegedly putting "group interests" above the "public interest."<sup>43</sup> Also, unlike many other professionals, Soviet lawyers have not been permitted to form a professional organization, even of the innocuous, party-controlled variety available to writers, journalists, and even sociologists.

If progress toward the development of representative political institutions has been conspicuous by its absence, there has been some progress toward rendering the decision-making bodies of the party and the state somewhat more representative than they were in the past. The significance of this pluralistic development is limited, however, by the control exercised over the state, cultural and scientific agencies by the party, and by the particularly crucial functions of control over the party central committee exercised by its secretariat, now headed by

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<sup>41</sup>See, for example, the review of the literature by L. Mandelshtam, in Izvestiya, July 30, 1966.

<sup>42</sup>See, for example, Albert Boiter, "Comradely Justice: How Durable Is It?" Problems of Communism, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (Mar.-Apr., 1965). The best general discussion of Soviet legal reforms is in Harold J. Berman, Justice in the U.S.S.R. (New York, 1963), esp. in Chapter 2. See also Barghoorn, op. cit., Chapter IX. The contribution by Professor Leon S. Lipson to the symposium on Prospects for Soviet Society, to be published soon under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, will be very valuable.

<sup>43</sup>"Some" legal scholars were accused of putting "group interests above the public interest," in Kommunist, No. 12, (August, 1964), p. 71.

General Secretary Brezhnev. A recent analysis of the results of elections to the CPSU Central Committee and to the central committees of republic party organizations since 1954 reveals that there has been a reduction in the strength of the representation of professional party functionaries in these bodies, as well as a reduction of the representation of the police agencies. However, party officials still constitute the largest single group and, as for the police, it would certainly be premature to write them off as a major factor in Soviet politics because of a decline in this sort of representation. In some ways, manifested for example in their glorification in the mass media, as in the cases of exaltation of the exploits of Richard Sorge and Rudolf Abel, the police have scored a comeback since Khrushchev -- even in fact, since the last troubled years of Khrushchev's rule.

Surprisingly enough, the 1966 party elections did not give representation in the central committee to any of the men directly associated with the economic reforms, but "for the first time in post-war period the ministers in charge of light, consumer-goods industries have been given a significant place among the party elite."<sup>44</sup> In terms of representation

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<sup>44</sup>Jerry Hough, "Groups and Individuals," Problems of Communism, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (Jan.-Feb., 1967), pp. 28-35. This article, and Hough's study, entitled "In Whose Hands the Future?" in ibid. (Mar.-Apr., 1967), as well as the article by Boris Lewytzkyj in ibid., No. 1, provide valuable data on the composition and recruitment of the Soviet elite. For background, see John A. Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite (New York, 1959), and Barghoorn, op. cit., Chapter VI. Useful elite studies have been prepared in recent years by, for example, Michael P. Gehlen, and, in as yet unpublished form, by Jaroslav Bilinsky. The major elite study being readied for publication by Seweryn Bialer will add greatly to our knowledge of the dynamics of Soviet society.

of the literary and scientific intelligentsia in the party central committee, recent developments have been mixed, but perhaps on the whole encouraging. On the negative side of the equation, one must note the failure of the Twenty-third Party Congress to re-elect Ivardovski as a candidate member of the central committee -- this was balanced, however, by failure to re-elect some conservative writers to their positions. A clearly positive trend is revealed in the increasing representation of distinguished Soviet scientists both in the party central committee and in the high councils of government. Thus, the aerodynamicist Mstislav Keldysh, in 1961, became both president of the USSR Academy of Sciences and a member of the CPSU Central Committee. The October, 1965 session of the Supreme Soviet elevated to the post of Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers the outstanding physicist, Vladimir Kirillin. In April, 1947, the atomic physicist Mikhail D. Millionshchikov, was elected to the ceremonial post of Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Another well known, distinguished, scientist-educator in the Central Committee is Minister of Higher Education Vyacheslav P. Elyutin.<sup>45</sup>

Even more important than the trends referred to above are the problems of the general political perspectives of the "World War II generation," to use Hough's expression, who are now increasingly well represented in the central committee and in leadership and administrative work at the oblast level, and the problem of turnover which, for biological reasons, "must be faced in the next five years."<sup>46</sup> Hough is of the opinion

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<sup>45</sup>Izvestiya, April 12, 1967. For a breakdown of the Supreme Soviet deputies by social status, occupation and other characteristics, see Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR (Moscow, n.d.), pp. 3-4.

<sup>46</sup>Hough, "In Whose Hands the Future?" pp. 21, 24-25.

that the emerging leadership probably does not have a "neo-Stalinist" orientation. This view, which seems to be well founded, tends to cast doubt on the possibility that a conservative coalition led by such men as Mikhail Suslov and Aleksandr Shelepin might overthrow the moderate Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgorny leadership. Such a disaster will probably be less and less likely as the better educated, more open-minded men now in Soviet higher educational institutions or in junior executive positions come increasingly to dominate Soviet political life. As T. H. Rigby pointed out a few years ago, "About two-thirds of the middle jobs are now occupied by young men in their thirties and late twenties, and I suspect that many of these, particularly in the larger cities, feel they have more in common with the Evtushenkos and Voznesenskys than they have with their superiors in the apparatus."<sup>47</sup> Rigby had in mind general cultural trends, but one might also mention as a positive factor the effort -- which, to be sure, will bear fruit only slowly -- to train Soviet officials in at least the rudiments of modern management methods, and to reduce the ideological-hortatory element in the general political training of officials. A very wide range of special courses and programs, to help both party and state executives, and of course production executives, engineers, planners, economists and others adjust to the conditions created by economic reform has been announced or reported in recent years.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>47</sup>T. H. Rigby, "Western Experts and Soviet Reality," Quadrant (Melbourne, Australia, Winter 1963), p. 13.

<sup>48</sup>See, for a recent example, the CPSU Central Committee decree "Concerning Permanently Operating Courses for Re-training Leading Party and Soviet Cadres," in Partiinaya Zhizn, No. 2 (January, 1967).

At least something of the spirit of American business administration and industrial engineering methods are beginning to permeate Soviet administrative life, and this can be very useful. Of course, neither inferences based upon apparent developments in the recruitment and composition of the Soviet elite nor, for that matter, speculation based on other grounds, can completely invalidate the hypothesis of a "conservative restoration" in the event, for example, that the economic reform failed disastrously, or a serious deterioration occurred in the international situation.<sup>49</sup>

A full study of the relationship between elite recruitment and Soviet political development would, of course, require a degree of elaborateness and detail inappropriate here. The same can be said of emerging developments in the related process of political socialization and indoctrination.<sup>50</sup> On this vital subject, which has, unfortunately, been badly neglected, only a few impressionistic speculations will be offered. Socialization, in the Soviet Union, as in all other political systems, is only partially successful. Although Stalin, and to a lesser

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<sup>49</sup> That the problem of "representation" of various occupational and other groups in party decision-making bodies is a matter of perhaps increasing concern to the party leadership has been indicated in a number of articles in major Soviet journals. See, for example, F. Petrenko, "Principles of Party Democracy," Kommunist, No. 18 (Dec., 1965), pp. 36-42.

<sup>50</sup> Much valuable insight and information on some aspects of this subject is contained in Mickiewicz, op. cit., passim. See also Barghoorn, op. cit., Chapters III, IV and V and, in particular, the very valuable article by Jeremy Azrael, "Soviet Union," in Education and Political Development, James S. Coleman, ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1965), pp. 233-71.

degree Khrushchev, attempted to convert the school and even the family into pliable instruments of the party, it is obvious that neither achieved much success in creating the "new Soviet man." Growing specialization and stratification in the structure of society, and increasing "feedback" from the international environment, make it unlikely that this goal will be achieved in the future. Precisely among the most highly placed elements of the bureaucratic, artistic and scientific elite, it is possible, probably increasingly so, for parents to shield their children from the most numbing effects of the extremely conformist Soviet pattern of formal education. Both reports brought back by Western social scientists in recent years and evidence contained in the Soviet educational and social science journals furnish grounds for thinking that the schools and other major instruments of socialization are likely, in the future, to put less emphasis upon rote learning and other features of the traditional Soviet upbringing pattern and to gradually shift to methods and patterns capable of stimulating at least a measure of individuality, independence and initiative. Among other factors which probably encourage such a trend the increasing role of science and scientific methods of thinking in Soviet life probably bulk largest.

#### IV. Conclusions

In the political development of the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin the proponents of adaptiveness and innovation have won some important victories over the defenders of traditionalist orthodoxy. There has been some movement away from the participatory subject culture

toward a pattern bearing some resemblance to the civic culture of the modern polities and the mature industrial societies of the West. In this writer's opinion there will probably be further progress toward the "knowledgeable society" that Robert E. Lane sees developing in the United States. However, this progress may be slow. It may occur in fits and starts and it may be subject, from time to time, to reverses. In the USSR, as elsewhere, the pull of the past is strong and we should not impatiently expect a speedy solution of the formidable problems posed by the Russian cultural heritage and by unfavorable environmental factors.

The traditional political culture of Russia was centralist and authoritarian. Both "definitions of situations," and "standards of behavior," to use the language of Chalmers Johnson, were reshaped, but also in some ways reinforced, by the triumph of the revolutionary "goal culture" of Leninism-Stalinism. Russianized Marxism took on the manipulative-coercive, mobilizational, plebiscitarian-elitist traits of the still dominant if no longer completely unchallenged or unshaken official doctrine of Soviet Marxism. The tenacious grip on the Soviet mind of the bolshevik syndrome, with its obligatory optimism, its intolerance, its moralistic self-righteousness, its contempt for "creeping empiricism" and its missionary zeal is the product both of adverse circumstances and of massive, systematic indoctrination. Moreover, resistance to innovative and liberalizing reforms springs not only from emotional and intellectual commitment to established doctrines and rituals, but also from the deeply rooted habits and vested interests of incumbents of elite statuses who feel that their privileges and prerogatives are

threatened. Deprivational changes, ranging from annoying losses of relative prestige all the way to the humiliation of redundancy and retraining, or perhaps even worse, could befall various elite groups if rapid and fundamental reforms of the economic, political and cultural life of the Soviet Union were instituted. The establishment of a "socialist market economy" would require a reorientation of attitudes and a restructuring of the activities of the CPSU as a whole, and in particular it would considerably affect the role of the party apparatus. Many members of the apparatus who presently perform supervisory and coordination functions in industry, agriculture and construction would be drastically affected. Fundamental economic reform would also impinge sharply upon the functions of state economic officials, plant managers and other executive and professional personnel employed in the sphere of material production. Obviously, the replacement of the present regime of party dictatorship by a multi-party system with provision for legitimate, open opposition, would deprive thousands of professional party functionaries not only of their jobs but even perhaps of much of the meaning and purpose of their lives. "De-ideologization" -- the latter objective is often attributed by Soviet propagandists to the policies of the "imperialist" governments of the "bourgeois" West -- would affect not only editors, journalists, teachers in the "political enlightenment" institutions and other professional communicators, but also the political police, one of whose principal functions continues, as the Sinyavski-Daniel affair demonstrated, to be the ferreting out and punishment of ideological heresy.



The powerful vested interests of Soviet society will not give up their positions without a struggle.

However, the balance of forces /<sup>may be</sup> gradually shifting toward groups whose patterns of activity and professional concerns generate attitudes permeated by rationality and empiricism. Institutional changes are usually preceded by intellectual changes. The re-examination of values by intellectuals is creating predispositions which may eventually undermine the traditional Soviet political system. Gradually, parochialism and fanaticism will wane. Neither ideology nor political structure, however, are likely to be swept aside by revolution, which is not likely to occur, anywhere, in a modern industrial society, given the resources of productivity and communication which modern technology places in the hands of political authorities, and the ~~resulting~~ capabilities of governments for satisfying the material needs and the psychological aspirations of the majority of the citizens whom they govern. Of course, revolution, preceded by decay, is not impossible if Soviet leaders prove to be far more stupid than their record to date indicates they are likely to be. In their partly open and partly behind-the-scenes bargaining with the Kremlin, Soviet innovative and creative intellectuals and professionals have already achieved considerable freedom to present their views and defend their interests. As a result, there has been some modest progress in Russia toward a wider shaping and sharing of values, to borrow a phrase from Harold D. Lasswell. This progress augurs well for the future. Of course, the position achieved to date by Soviet intellectuals, and by the citizenry in general, vis-a-vis their guardians and watchdogs,

is a poor thing by Western standards, or by those of communist Yugoslavia. It is difficult to believe that the creative and productive elements of Soviet society will be content with the partial progress achieved to date. The impulse for further reform must be very powerful. National interest and national pride, as well as an awakened appetite for freedom of initiative and inquiry, impel both party and intelligentsiya to heed the imperatives of economic and administrative rationality and of free and unfettered intellectual criticism. The dilemma of Soviet reform, however, consists in the contradictions between the freedom required for its fulfillment and the authoritarianism, dogmatism and elitism inherited from the past. Existing practices and structures, and the official ideology which legitimizes them increasingly serve as barriers to the completion of the modernization of Russia. Yet to modify, still more to discard old practices is immensely difficult. The example of Yugoslavia, however, is encouraging to those who conceive of social change in piecemeal, or incremental, rather than in cataclysmic, "all or nothing" terms. Yugoslavia, a country ruled by Marxists, which has made considerable progress toward economic rationality, the rule of law and ideological coexistence with the West, furnishes a model of ideologically legitimate social transformation. It also, to be sure, has encountered problems in its reform efforts and its relative powerlessness and lack of authority may limit its appeal to the proud and imperious Russians. Whatever assortment of indigenous and external models may guide the future transformation of Soviet society, it seems likely that the Soviet political system will continue to <sup>or</sup> adopt, more

or less successfully, to pressures arising in the intrasocietal and extrasocietal environments.

If it does not, the consequences could be dire, both for Russia and for the world. A reversion to Stalinism could cripple an increasingly sophisticated economy and undermine needed support for the regime among reformist Soviet intellectuals and professionals, some of whom might become revolutionaries. The tender shoots of Soviet-Western accommodation would wither. There is, thus, a connection between the growth of a reformist and cosmopolitan outlook inside Russia and the interests of the world community. The transformation of the USSR is of course the responsibility of the Soviet people. It can perhaps be facilitated, however, by informed concern in the outside world and by realistic and imaginative statecraft, which seeks to keep international tensions to their irreducible minimum, while remaining receptive to opportunities for mutually satisfactory adjustments of common problems.

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THE ORIGINS OF THE SPLIT BETWEEN  
THE SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST WORLD

by

Dr. M.W.J.M. Broekmeijer.



THE ORIGINS OF THE SPLIT BETWEEN  
THE SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST WORLD

When we speak about the Communist Bloc, we think about the Soviet Union, the East European countries, China and the two small communist Asian countries North Korea and North Vietnam.

The expression "communist bloc" suggests a certain uniformity because Marxism-Leninism is the basic doctrine of the communist parties in the various countries. But I doubt very much whether the Chinese - since the establishment of their party - had any use for the Soviet communist doctrines or had accepted Marxism-Leninism unconditionally.

Sun Yat Sen (1866 - 1925) was the first true propagandist for the revolution in the early stage of the Reform Movement which started in 1898. He was familiar with many European ideas, but he did not support any particular revolutionary program. He studied the aspects of democracy, socialism and nationalism. Though he was a Christian he took from all these ideas what he thought would be acceptable for a revolutionary program well tuned to the Chinese society and circumstances. His main purpose was to overthrow the Manchu dynasty and to establish a parliamentary form of government. He realized that the Chinese people would need a certain political guidance and that the unification of China would be a time-consuming affair as a result of the presence of the Western powers, the rivalry between the scholar-bureaucrats and the warlords. In 1894 Sun Yat Sen organized a small revolutionary group in Hawaii. In 1905 he established the Chinese Covenant Society (Chung Kuo Fung Meng Hui) with many branches among the Chinese in Europe.

The fundamental aims were the establishment of a republic which would control the whole Chinese territory and the equal distribution of land.

Of all the leaders of the many revolutionary groups Sen was the only one who had in mind the establishment of a republic, a unified country and land reform. From 1916 - 1926 China was plagued by chaos created by warlords who tried to rule the whole country.

Sun Yat Sen was unable to achieve a solid position though he had several constructive ideas for China's future political and social development.

Intriguers in his own organization undermined his movement, furthermore he lacked a military force to strengthen his position.

In later years his early doctrines were modified by others and a number of young radicals took over the doctrine of socialism and improvement of the living conditions of the poor masses. The same can be said about his views on nationalism. These radicals sympathized with the Soviet Union, not because they accepted Marxism-Leninism as a basic doctrine, but because the Soviet Union was the country where a revolutionary regime succeeded in coming to power.

Although Mao went to Moscow in 1950 in order to get assistance from the Soviets, it does not prove that the Chinese saw Stalin as "the" great leader of the Communist Movement. In the eyes of the Chinese Stalin was the leader of a revolution which the Chinese wanted to execute in their own way and for which they needed military and economic help. The cohesion between the two was the fight against what they called the capitalist countries and the capitalistic

system.

Russian aid to China meant in the first place a weakening of the position of the Western countries in the East. In this respect one should keep in mind that even in the mid-1930's Mao did not introduce Marxism-Leninism unconditionally but developed his own theories which of course resembled the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism in many points. Both wanted the revolution of the poor masses against the bourgeoisie and in the case of the Chinese also against the privileged Europeans in their country.

Soviet communist agents were very active in China in order to turn the revolutionary movement into a pro-communist organization in the style of the Soviet Union.

In my opinion the considerable number of so-called Chinese communists who joined the Kuomintang were not communists in the Western sense. They were supporters of a sinicized revolutionary movement of which the doctrine - as far as one really can speak of a Chinese communist doctrine - was only partly similar with that of the communist party.

In the nationalist movement were two factions - the communists supported by the Russian agents and the anti-communists.

Chiang Kai Shek, leader of the non-communist group, sent the Russian advisors home, but avoided a complete break with the Chinese pro-communist elements. He opposed the Russian communists but accepted the sinicized revolutionaries.

In 1927 the Chinese communists established a separate government in Hankow and then Chiang Kai Shek struck hard.

The mass of the population was not interested in politics. We can see this throughout Chinese history. As in the past the elite occupied themselves with the various "schools of thought" but now influenced by the ideas the Chinese students - who had studied abroad - brought home. Many of these "schools of thought" tried to sinicize the foreign ideas and doctrines, or tried to prove that these ideas could be traced back in early Chinese culture and tradition. These Chinese regarded their society and culture as the oldest and most developed civilization in the world, as a civilization that already in the past produced thoughts as laid down later in Marxism-Leninism. There are many examples in history which prove that the Chinese looked at the Europeans as barbarians. As a result thereof, up to 1930 many Chinese intellectuals, who studied abroad, tried to prove that the various Western revolutionary ideas were known in Chinese philosophical schools long ago and tried then to present them in a more contemporary form.

Generally speaking the Chinese intellectuals had not forgotten that in the past Russia had tried to acquire parts of Chinese territory. However they saw in the Soviet government and methods an example how to get rid of a much disliked regime and to put an end to foreign domination. They had a considerable respect and sympathy for the revolution in Russia and they looked forward to the sinicized revolution that would change the situation in China.

In 1921 Sun declared after a meeting with the Russian envoy Joffe in Shanghai that communism was not suitable for China but he agreed to co-operate with the new, but small Chinese communist party.

Here again we see a distinction Sun made with regard to doctrines but not to revolutionary tactics. Sun's party was reorganized with Soviet support and re-named Kuomintang or nationalist party. Both, the communist party and the Kuomintang received a lot of support in the various towns.

The communist party was established in Shanghai in 1920 and one of the few members was Mao Tse Tung.

Mao Tse Tung never learned a foreign language; he was unable to read the books

of Marx and so to study the communist doctrines, though he was well educated at the school in Ch'angskia where he was influenced by Left Wing ideas. Mao had only very few short translations of the writings of Marx and Lenin at his disposal.

Chou en Lai came under Left Wing influence when he studied in Paris. His knowledge of the communist theories came out of the French Left Wing pamphlets. But at that time he never studied the books of the communist theorists. The sympathy Mao Tse Tung and Chou en Lai felt for the Russian revolution was based on appreciation for this revolution and on a vague knowledge of Marxism-Leninism.

Both became leaders of the Chinese communist party. The foregoing explains why the Chinese communist party cannot be compared with the communist parties in other countries. In this light it is understandable that in the period 1945 and some years later the Russians looked upon the Chinese communists not as real supporters of the idea of establishing international or world communism. China was ruled by the Mandarin system till in the early past; foreigners had a very privileged position. After the nationalist take-over in the period 1926 - 1930 Chiang Kai Shek freed the army from communist influence and crushed the warlords who refused to integrate into the nationalist army.

In the eyes of the Chinese communists Chiang Kai Shek was very closely related to the financial circles and had a well-working administration which resembled the former Mandarin bureaucracy very much. Only two facts were in his favour namely that he made much progress towards the abolition of special foreign privileges and his attempts to regain control over Manchuria.

The majority of the Chinese people living in the rural areas suffered continuously from the activities of the warlords and from the Mandarin bureaucracy which was responsible for the heavy taxation of the peasants. The civil service became the most distinctive and political feature of the Chinese civilization, the rural population had no say in politics. The "scholar"-class co-operated with the landowning class. The term "gentry" is usually applied to that part of the Chinese society which combined academic qualification with land property. The "gentry" lived a life of great leisure, they formed a large part of the civil servants. The top of the civil service, the Mandarins, used their position to acquire an enormous wealth.

This explains why the mass of the people - the peasants - distrusted the bourgeoisie and especially the rich people in the towns.

Chiang Kai Shek had considerable economic successes, but only the "gentry" benefitted from them, so it was impossible for him to create an internal unity in China. In the period 1931 - 1937 the civil war with the communist continued. Mao Tse Tung, himself a farmer's son, was able to build up his image as the leader of the rebelling rural population. He had to give up the idea that the revolution would be a movement of the middle class intellectuals and urban proletarians. However, I doubt, whether he really had the intention to follow in this respect the Russian example at any time.

Anyway, this forced him to turn to the peasants for support. At the time, however, the peasants would have nothing to do with the Marxist idea of state-ownership of land. One of the most important ties binding the communists was the dislike the rural population felt for the "gentry" the Mandarins and the military. Another tie was to take away land from those who owned a large piece of land and distribute it among the peasants who did not own anything. The communists camouflaged their aim of complete state control of land by telling the peasants that the government would only control private property and the rent tenant-farmers would have to pay.



After the total take-over the communist regime published a "Common Program" which was no more than a vague statement of basic aims. Five years later in September 1956, plans for increasing the growth of the communist society were laid down in a constitution. As I mentioned before the character of the Chinese communist party differed completely from that of the European communist parties. We see this when Mao Tse Tung writes: "Under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party, these classes unite to create their own state and elect their own government so as to enforce their dictatorship over the henchmen of imperialism. The landlord-class and bureaucratic capitalist class, as well as the reactionary clique of the Kuomintang, which represents these classes and their accomplices<sup>x)</sup>. This attack on the landlords and the bureaucratic class - the Mandarins - is the salient point in the line of the hatred against the bourgeoisie in the towns. Even the revolutionary elements amongst the élite were being distrusted! The Moscow-Peking Alliance was only based on the tactics of revolution and not on the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism. Mao Tse Tung needed only the psychological and material support of the U.S.S.R. He once said: "Do you seriously think that it was possible for us to come out victoriously without the Soviet Union? Decidedly not". He needed the economic and military aid of the U.S.S.R. to strengthen his position. Loyalty to the U.S.S.R. and rejection of Titoism was necessary to safeguard this aid. The rejection of any form of national communism can be explained by the fact that China aimed at Chinese-influenced Asian communism - a sinisized Asian communism. Mao Tse Tung tried to build up his own satellite-system, North Korea and North Vietnam being the first countries to fit in this system. Furthermore China planned to bring Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Birma, Malaysia and even Indonesia into its sphere of influence. In the past a number of these states were for some time vassal states of the Chinese empire, and the aim of China is still the restoration of the Chinese empire. Communist world universalism fits only too well in the old idea of China's Messianic role based on its ancient old civilization. In this light we can understand that - now the Chinese communist regime has been established and is able to go its own way - close co-operation with the U.S.S.R. is not a necessity anymore. On the contrary the U.S.S.R. has become more an obstacle because the U.S.S.R. is not willing to relinquish its influence in the Asian communist countries and parties. Russia has become China's rival in Asia. More and more we can speak of Maoism instead of communism based on Marxism-Leninism. There is no need to cite the numerous superficial statements made by Mao. Only from time to time he refers to the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism, he does this to cover the fact that Chinese communism has nothing to do anymore with the original doctrines. At the moment China does not receive any significant Soviet aid and their relation with regard to the tactics of the revolution have become less important. Now China introduces itself to the developing countries as the real revolutionary power, which has faced the same problems in the transition from an agricultural country into an industrialized country, whereas the U.S.S.R. was an industrial country, which stressed the hegemony of the urban and industrial proletariat. The difference in economic growth, which influenced the role and the position of the Communist Party also widened the gap between China and the U.S.S.R.

x) Mao Tse Tung. On Peoples' Democratic Dictatorship, Peking 1950.

China may be afraid that its interest will be damaged by the changes taking place in the Soviet Union because the difference in economic, military, diplomatic and propagandistic means between the two countries are so great at present. I cannot emphasize too strongly that the difference in growth and modernization are other basic elements for the present tension between the U.S.S.R. and China.

Chinese communism or at the moment better called Maoism - with its specific character because of the "Proletarian Peasant Revolution" - is an agrarian revolution. The peasant movement led by Mao Tse Tung was the driving force of the revolution and aimed at the establishment of Soviets in the rural areas. The Russians and the Comintern were of the opinion that the industrial proletariat should form the leading force in the revolution in which the rural population would only play a secondary role. Lenin also insisted on the hegemony of the proletariat. Mao distrusted the industrial proletariat and fully relied on the revolutionary peasants. Because of the high percentage of illiterate people among the peasants Mao Tse Tung could not use the only vaguely known doctrines of theoretical communism, tuned to a literate European urban proletariat. So Mao's doctrines had a typical Chinese character inspired by Chinese aspirations.

The process of changes in the traditional agricultural society started in the Soviet Union much earlier than in China. Furthermore there was no explosion of population in the U.S.S.R. The Soviet economic potential did not hamper the growth to economic maturity with the exception of a certain degree of technological backwardness.

In the Soviet Union there did not exist a certain distrust of the urbanized people; on the contrary communism in the Soviet Union received its main support from the proletariat and from a part of the élite in the towns, whereas the rural population played only a secondary role.

The Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. paid full attention to education and the number of high school educated and university-taught people increased enormously within a relative short period. As a result thereof the technological gap between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. decreased.

With such an increasing percentage of educated people in all fields, the Soviet society became technically ready for the era of high mass-consumption. After the initial economic development in the Soviet Union a period of sustained if fluctuating progress followed; modern technology is extended over the whole front of economic activity.

It is the logical consequence of the growth to maturity as explained by W.W. Rostow in his book "The stages of economic growth". (Cambridge, 1960). Today Soviet people respond actively to concrete and tangible ameliorations in their way of life, rather than to unrealistic, vague and Messianic goals. Once the people are realizing that prosperity for all is within reach, they do not get enthusiastic to slogans of world communism anymore. The Communist Party, however, cannot drop the idea of monolithic world communism.

The Russian people remember the titanic exertions and sacrifices in World War II and do not like to spoil the brighter future which becomes visible.

As a result of the enormous increase in education too much Soviet people think that it is just plain logic not to risk again massive destruction. The Soviet national economy has now reached the stage of industrial maturity and at that stage it is understandable that full attention is being paid to the increase of efficiency. The enterprise, as the basic economic unit, has got greater independence and scope for initiative. Contrary to past ideas, now the idea is

accepted that under specific conditions a disparity might take place between the interests of the society, working collectives and individual workers. The high level in education and skills of the Soviet working force created problems for the Communist Party and the bureaucratic system. There was a cry from the intellectuals for liberalization of the economic system. It started with Liebermann and Leontiev, who propagated that full attention should be paid to the cost-price. This was not aimed at a change of the doctrines, but at a perfection of the efficiency of the Soviet production in order to create the possibility for increased economic development. The technocrats, who now played an increasingly important role in the Soviet Union disliked to be hampered by the poorly working bureaucratic machinery of the Communist Party. Simultaneously as a result of the increased number of educated people, there came a strong demand for housing and durable consumer goods, followed by a demand for diversification in order to meet the various tastes of the people. It forced the leaders of the Kremlin not to give more priority to the production of capital goods and defence production. The increase of the influence of the intellectuals, technocrats, and of the non-Party members on the internal economic policy, forced the Communist Party to loose gradually the reins. This had also a certain influence on the foreign policy of the communist regime. The same tendency as well as the gradually falling back on the traditional national sentiments, can be observed in the European communist countries. However, as these changes were the same in all the European communist countries and the adapted views on the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism did not differ too much, there came no split between the Soviet Union and the European satellites. Economic change has political and social consequences and for that reason the stage of economic growth is an essential factor in the relations between the Soviet Union and China. The Chinese traditional society persisted for a certain time to go side by side with the advanced Soviet society for economic reasons and accepted the Russian role of a quasi-colonial power.

China, notwithstanding the establishment of a number of industries and some technological show pieces (like the nuclear weapons), is still at the outset. The relative importance of the Chinese industrial activities in connection with the economy as a whole is very small. China still is an agricultural country and the explosion of population prevents the income per capita from rising. China lacks the capital which a modernization requires. Most of the working capital must come from a rapid increase in output achieved by higher productivity in agriculture and the extractive industries. This is at present the main bottleneck in Chinese economic development.

Modernization requires also a new élite, a new leadership, an enormous amount of well-experienced technocrats. Most of these Chinese intellectuals and technocrats have studied abroad and most of them are the children of the hatred bourgeoisie. The Chinese communist party distrusts the technocrats as the latter are of the opinion that modernization of China in the technical and economic sense can never be obtained as long as the internal policy of the Communist Party is based on the traditional doctrines of Mao Tse Tung. One could say that the former bourgeoisie is wiped out, but that the technocrats have replaced them. The forces depend on the efforts of the technocrats in order to obtain more sophisticated weaponsystems. They realize that they do not get any modern weapon by cultivating and handling Mao's thoughts. The new élite and many military leaders are well aware of the fact, that to a certain degree they have to supersede in social and political authority the rural population in order to get the required capital for modernization. The income above

minimum level of consumption in the rural areas is now wasted by inefficiency. Mao Tse Tung and the other communist old-timers distrust the new élite and have tried to safeguard the power of the Communist Party and of the mass of peasants by launching the cultural revolution. Instead of loosing the reins in order to accelerate modernization and economic development, they are trying to pull the reins. They fear that liberalization, modernization and the use of sophisticated technological systems will weaken the position of the Communist Party. They say that the élite, technocrats and military, who look for technological and economic progress are revisionists, just like the leaders of the Kremlin. The position of the Communist Party, the too slow improvement in the economic field, the deficiency of the bureaucratic system and the Chinese foreign policy do not allow any weakening of the power and influence of the Communist Party. The loosening of the reins by the Soviet communist leaders is the biggest threat for the position of Mao Tse Tung. This is another, not to underestimate factor, which has influenced the split between the Soviet and Chinese communist world.

Mao Tse Tung could not accept Marxism-Leninism in China as it would not fit in Chinese conditions.

Marxism-Leninism was born in the industrial society of Europe, but in China there was a semi-feudal and semi-colonial situation for which the European communist doctrines were not suitable. That created the problems Mao Tse Tung had to overcome. The Comintern consistently demanded the Chinese communists to let the industrial proletariat direct the peasant movement. We find this principle again in a statement at the 6th Comintern Congress: "The spontaneous guerilla warfare of the peasants in various provinces and districts ..... can be a starting-point in the nationally victorious mass-revolt only on the condition that it is carried on in alliance with a new revolutionary tide among the proletariat in the cities". x)

Lenin and Stalin always insisted on the hegemony of the proletariat, but Mao Tse Tung could use only his poor peasants as the main force of his Chinese revolution. When Mao Tse Tung marched to Ching Kangshan with his revolutionary army, consisting of peasants from Hunan province, miners from Hanyang and a number of rebels, there was no industrial proletariat existing in that province. All later events in China show that the basic difference of social stratification between the Soviet Union and China, forced Mao Tse Tung to develop a "Chinese Marxism", which had not very much in common with European Marxism, except the name "Marxism". The superficial contacts of Mao Tse Tung with Marxism-Leninism and the complete different character of the Chinese and Russian society have resulted in a Chinese communism with a unique shape and explains why Mao Tse Tung at the present looks more and more at the Soviet Union as a hostile power.

To him Russian communism and Chinese communism are two complete different revolutionary systems and for that reason there is no sense in camouflaging the controversial ideas. The doctrines of Marxism-Leninism will be cited still less and the "thoughts of Mao Tse Tung" will replace them. This all explains the complete estrangement not only between the two "socialist states" but also between the two "Communist Parties".

The difference in stage of economic growth between the U.S.S.R. and China is steadily increasing. Mao Tse Tung hardly can tell his people that the increasing gap is due to the failure of the Chinese economic system and the misuse of the intelligentsia.

x) C. Brandt, B. Schwartz and J.K. Fairbank, A documentary History of Chinese Communism, London, 1952, p. 162.

As a result of the agrarian policy, agriculture is unable to provide adequate fields for the development and growth of the non-agricultural sector, especially for industrialization. Notwithstanding the few technological showpieces, China is hampered by the lack of the starting capital accumulation for an emerging industrial sector. Mao Tse Tung will never admit that his economic policy is a failure. Therefor he blames the Soviet Union for the introduction of what he calls "capitalistic methods". The principle that the intelligentsia has to work for months in the rural areas, doing the most primitive work, in order to bring the élite closer to the rural proletariat, means an enormous waste of the intellectual energy. When the staff and the engineers of a factory have to leave their work to do peasant's work, it means that the industry cannot work efficiently and the building up is retarded enormously. This system is an idea of Mao Tse Tung, which in no way can be justified by any doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. It is the idea of a man, who overstresses the importance of the peasant proletariat and fears the advanced ideas of the intellectuals in the towns.

In the case of China with its explosion of population the changes in the economic field, particularly the growth of the national income per capita, leave a too small margin for impressive economic growth in the country as a whole. The forces, which create economic progress, especially in the industrial field, expand too slowly and for that reason cause a disharmoniously developed economy.

The point is that it requires much more than a few industrial successes to enter a period of massive industrialization. The misuse of the Chinese élite and technocrats prevents the supervision in social and political authority from the old rural political leadership to the technocrats and managers.

The Chinese national economy constantly went through major reshuffles, land-reform, socialization, communization, followed by a retreat from communization and afterwards by the failure of the Great Leap Forward.

The would-be marriage of Russian and Chinese communism lasted to 1956, when it became clear to Peking that the U.S.S.R. showed a distinct preference for aid to other Asian countries like India and reduced the aid and assistance to China. This fact, the Great Leap Forward and the Commune, lead to an open change in Chinese policy. From then on China should be the model for the whole communist world, as President Liu Shao-Ch'i wrote in the international magazine, World Marxist Review (October 1959).

However, during the second Five Year Plan we could observe in China one failure after the other and the Cultural Revolution means another step backwards in Chinese economic development.

At an early stage of the revolution the U.S.S.R. has chosen - for political reasons - to bear the costs of a low-productivity agriculture and strove for a concentration of capital and technology in sectors other than manufactured consumer goods.

Besides the basic differences in the methods of creating a communist regime, the increasing gap in economic development is one of the most important origins of the split between the U.S.S.R. and China.

There exists also another reason for the split between the two major communist blocs and that is the dream of a restoration of the old Chinese empire. Mao Tse Tung cannot agree with the fact that large areas of the former Chinese empire are in the hands of foreign power. He also dreams of a Chinese Monroe doctrine. All the former vassal states of Asia have to be brought back under China's supervision. He is not willing to accept the fact that many Asian countries have become completely independent. They belong to the Chinese sphere of

influence! The Soviet Union wants at the present more than ever before to consolidate its influence in Asia. Already in 1938 Mao Tse Tung said during a Communist Party meeting at Yen-an: "We must not cut off our whole historical part".

The more or less bizarre relationship between the U.S.S.R. and China since 1917, due to the difference in view mentioned before, is not the only reason for the present split. In this respect I am thinking about ethnic, geopolitical and strategic factors, influencing the attitude between the two powers. Since the end of the nineteenth century Russia has acquired more than 900,000 square miles of former Chinese territory and is not willing to give any square mile back, especially not at the present.

At the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 Russia recognized Eastern Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan (Northern Sinkiang) as China's sphere of influence. In 1858 by the Treaty of Aigun the Russians forced China to cede the whole area north of the Amur River. By the Treaty of Peking of 1860 Russia received a large part of the Ili region of Chinese Turkestan, but it could also expand its territory to the coast of the Pacific Ocean. In 1912 Russia declared that Outer Mongolia, although granted internal autonomy, was a part of China. Recently the U.S.S.R. signed a Treaty for Military Assistance with Outer Mongolia, although Mao declared in 1936 that Outer Mongolia automatically should become a part of China after the communist victory. x)

The discussions Mao Tse Tung and Khrushchev in 1954 with regard to the Chinese territorial claims had no result. On the contrary, the U.S.S.R. tried to safeguard and to reinforce its position by all means and the Pact with Outer Mongolia was part of this policy. On July 10th, 1964 Mao Tse Tung blamed the U.S.S.R. at an interview with a delegation of the Japanese socialist Party for the territorial ambitions in Asia and Europe. The Soviet military aid to India during the Chinese border incidents created a lot of discontent in China. The way in which the U.S.S.R. tries to safeguard its position as an ally of North Korea and North Vietnam is another thorn in the Chinese flesh.

From an ethnic point of view the people of Inner and Outer Mongolia are no Chinese, while the people of the Ili-Kazakh district in Sinkiang are Eastern Turkistani. This creates tension on ethnic grounds and proves that the ethnic ties are stronger than the ties based on communist doctrines. The U.S.S.R. will never be willing to cede for example the port of Wladiwostok or the rich mineral territories in the Amur area to China. From the moment the leaders of the Soviet Union realized that the Chinese looked for an independent Chinese foreign policy, Moscow reduced its aid and assistance to China. It did not want to cede its position as the big power and leader of the communist world nor to share this position with China.

The strategic communications China was building up to Sinkiang, Tibet and to Mongolia were not at all appreciated by the U.S.S.R. Here we see, that ethnic and pure territorial controversies between the Soviet Union and China played a role in the split between the two.

In the former Chinese areas, now in the hands of the Soviet Union, very rich mineral resources have been found; they form a big share of the strategic economic potential (raw materials and industries) of the U.S.S.R. The Russian policy with regard to China aims at an encirclement or damming of Chinese influence. The very thinly populated Russian territory east of the Ural could rather easily be overflowed by the Chinese masses. For this reason and from a geopolitical as well as a strategic point of view the U.S.S.R. prefers a not too strong Chinese neighbour.

x) Quoted in Red Star over China, by E. Snow, Modern Library, New York, 1944.

p. 96.

The loss of such very important strategic economic areas west and north west of Sinkiang, but also the loss of the strategic important port of Wladiwostok is unacceptable with regard to the Soviet Union's power of authority. Outer Mongolia, North Korea and North Vietnam, but even independent South and South East Asian countries form very much appreciated buffer zones for the U.S.S.R. We may conclude from the foregoing, that the origins of the split between the Soviet Union and China are much more complicated as one may think on first sight. The tactics of revolution and the Communist Party's organization, with its monopolistic position of authority, were the only factors they had in common. The controversies with respect to ethnic, economic, strategic-economic, geopolitical and strategic aspects; and last but not least the completely differing even competing foreign policy, form the basic elements, which caused the split between the Soviet Union and China.

# THE RELATIONS OF THE USSR WITH COMMUNIST STATES

## IN CONNECTION WITH THE GERMAN PROBLEM

by Paolo Calzini

The so-called German Problem dates back, like so many other unsolved political questions, to the beginning of the Cold War. It was during that phase of fast shifting relationships between the Soviet Union and the Western powers that Germany was divided into two as part of the more general division of Europe. Any possibility that Germany might have continued to be the basis of collaboration between the allies as it was during the wartime period because of their common interest in keeping its political and economic potential under control was speedily extinguished. Soon after the war the USSR and the Western powers started to compete, each incorporating its own Germany into its own sphere of influence, and gradually recasting its role into that of a firm ally. This was the origin of the partition of Germany which thus took place, not so much as a planned policy but as the result of the failure of a policy that was quite unrealistic. The partition was imposed on the Germans before they could develop a consistent policy of national interest.

By 1949, after the first Berlin blockade and the halt in economic reparations from the Soviet zone to the USSR, the separation of the two German states was formally proclaimed. From this moment on, there is a series of steps on both sides to try and give both real and formal recognition to each of the two German states as viable units within own respective alliance.

Moscow's decision to accept the division of Germany was not, however, taken in 1949 and we must wait until 1955, or perhaps even 1957, before speaking of a definite Soviet policy on the subject. Before making this firm decision in favour of separate Germanies, and Ulbricht's regime in the Eastern part, it is quite likely that Soviet leaders entertained the possibility of reunification.

There are many reasons why Moscow could have contemplated a united Germany, under certain conditions of course (neutralization, non-adherence to the Western alliance, etc.) In Eastern Germany the situation was very difficult because of the political instability of its Communist regime and the weakness of its economy due among other things to previous reparations. It could be considered more of a liability than an asset to the Socialist camp. But nor had Western Germany yet had its "economic miracle" and recovered the status of an important power. If the price for stopping West German rearmament and its entry into the Western alliance was to be the reunification of Germany, it could have been paid, it seems, without too much risk. The position of the Soviet Union in Europe as a whole, implanted firmly as it was in Eastern Europe where it could be formally sure of its allies, appeared to be strong enough not to be endangered by such a development.



The most famous formal initiative by Moscow along these lines was taken by Stalin in 1952. It was flatly refused by the Western powers. In retrospect, some observers have made the point that this may have been the last chance to reunite Germany before it was too late. Of course, had the West agreed to discuss the Soviet proposals the results may still have been negative, but this could not have been forecast with certainty. Even later, apparently, Beria and then Malenkov did make some discreet but unsuccessful approaches to the West for a solution of the German Problem, based on the dissolution of Eastern Germany and reunification.

As to the exact date when Moscow definitely abandoned the idea of reunification, there are different opinions among the experts. For the majority the decision in favour of a "separatist" policy was decreed in 1955 as a direct result of the integration of Western Germany into the Western alliance. This last step towards rearmament and the complete and formal integration of the Federal Republic in the Western alliance is seen as the determining factor in the Soviet decision. The German Democratic Republic was formed as a suzerain state and subsequently admitted as a member of the Warsaw pact that had just been formed. In the same year diplomatic connections were resumed between Western Germany and the Soviet Union, thus formally accepting the policy of separate Germanies. (Some observers point to the year 1957 as being the opening of a completely new line of policy for the Soviet Union, mostly as a result of the events in Hungary and Poland which convinced Moscow of the necessity of consolidating on a new basis the Eastern bloc.)

The period from 1956 - 57 up to the early sixties can be defined as the first phase of the Khrushchev administration, militantly intent on reinforcing the political and diplomatic position of the Soviet Union both in Europe and in the world as a whole. During this time Moscow acquired a sense of superiority towards the West for a variety of reasons and took action in those sectors where the West for a variety of reasons and took action in those sectors where there was some chance of success. Clearly one of the main objectives in its European policy was the stabilization of the situation in Eastern Germany and possibly even a shift in the balance of power in the region.

The Soviet Union, while doing its best to discredit the Bonn regime, concentrated on giving Ulbricht not only political-diplomatic backing but also substantial economic aid. This operation was very difficult for the Soviet Union owing to the fact that the partition of Germany had come about in far more favourable conditions for the West than for the East. The armed intervention to suppress the rebellion in Berlin in 1953 is only the most dramatic of a whole series of actions taken by the Soviet Union to bolster up the weak and discredited regime in East Germany.

This policy was continued with, in spite of the fact that Khrushchev's "new course" in the Soviet Union, and in some at least of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, was increasingly moving away from the Stalinist schemes of the German Communist regime. The complete absence of local power groups with revisionist tendencies, systemically liquidated by Ulbricht, made it impossible for Moscow to press for any effective liberalization in Eastern Germany. There was, in fact, at that time no other workable alternative for a Communist regime in that country.

Had it not been for the continued help of the Soviet Union and its armed presence in the country, the regime of the GDR would certainly have dissolved through internal pressures during these years. The recurrent economic crises and its political instability made Eastern Germany the most vulnerable part of the Communist system. In such circumstances, small wonder that the relations between Moscow and Pankow were characterized by the complete dependency of the latter on the former. In every sense the German Democratic Republic was merely the object of policy; it lacked even the status of formal equality that other Communist regimes enjoyed after 1956 in their relations with Moscow.

Notwithstanding its internal Stalinism, Ulbricht's regime managed, throughout the whole period, to keep strictly in line with the Soviet Union's international policy. Some leanings towards the Chinese radical positions, apparent from certain contacts made and public demonstrations in the late fifties, were formally repudiated by 1961 making of the GDR the staunchest ally of Moscow in the ensuing controversy.

While it was reinforcing the position of the GDR through bilateral action, the Soviet Union was carrying out a number of political and diplomatic initiatives vis-a-vis the West, in order to obtain formal recognition of East Germany's international status. From 1958 to 1961 it adopted a very aggressive policy on the German front: a series of blockades of West Berlin provoked some of the worst crises of the Cold War. What the Soviet Union wanted, it seems, was not so much the neutralization of West Berlin - though Pankow was very concerned about it - as the formalization of the status quo in Germany.

The continuous pressure on the city and repeated threats of a separate treaty with East Germany were used by the Soviet Union to try and obtain a general peace treaty with the participation of the Western powers. Only in this way could the status of the German Democratic Republic have been guaranteed as a sovereign state, with its territorial boundaries and political regime universally recognized. A special clause in the treaty, moreover, would have allowed Soviet intervention, with the approval of the West, should there have been any developments considered dangerous to Soviet security in the region. But, of course, the conditions for such a treaty did not materialize.

Soviet policy on Germany during these years was naturally influenced by its fear of the strengthening and rearmament of Western Germany, with all the risks involved. The whole policy, then, remained one of stopping such a development and in particular to block the accession to nuclear weapons, based on American-German agreement. The attitude towards Western Germany during these same years was, on the whole, very rigid. Projects of confederation between the two Germanies and the perspectives of agreement became more and more vague, only going to show the lack of real interest on the part of Moscow in resolving the division of Germany.

In spite of the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1955, there were no signs of progress in the relationships between Moscow and Bonn. Apart from obvious tactical moves and propaganda it would seem that the Soviet Union felt strong enough to stop, through political pressure, Bonn's access to nuclear armaments. Any alternative policy

for example making a direct deal with Bonn on the German problem to achieve its detachment from the Western alliance, would have been highly unrealistic under the conditions prevailing at that time. Certainly, a very important factor was the predominance of Adenauer in the German Federal Republic and his personal conviction of the need to integrate Western Germany in the Western alliance as the surest way of achieving, eventually, the reunification of Germany.

During the whole of this first period, the German problem remained a basic reason of cohesion among the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European regimes. In varying degrees, due to the difference in their territorial and political situations, all the Eastern countries shared the common fear of Western Germany as a potential menace to their security. The impact of the war was much stronger in the East than in the West and Moscow had no difficulty in capitalizing on this to achieve a common anti-German policy. Thus all these countries strictly followed Moscow's official line on Germany.

Poland, because of its special interest in the matter, came out with a specific initiative, the Rapazky Plan - of course, agreed upon with the Soviet Union. The Plan, although limited to regional and strategic concepts, was certainly an interesting move. But it was an isolated move. There was nothing of importance in the form of independent initiatives on Germany from the other Eastern countries. On this problem as in many other the power position of the Soviet Union was so overwhelming in the region, and the confrontation with Western Europe so direct, that there was little space left for autonomous initiatives of its allies.

In this situation even the differences in political attitudes between the more advanced Eastern countries and the GDR were kept limited and overshadowed. The upsurge of liberalizing tendencies in Eastern Europe, notably in Poland, in 1956 introduced some difficulties in their relations with Eastern Germany. In the wake of these events there had even been some idea in Warsaw of favouring the eventual liquidation of the Ulbricht regime, provided that the Oder-Neisse boundary could be guaranteed. But after this, despite the fact that the reasons for disagreement persisted, the Gomulka regime did align itself with Moscow in backing the GDR. The over-riding concern for security which conditioned Poland's attitude was shared to a greater or lesser extent by the other Communist regimes (a special case was Yugoslavia who had very difficult relations with the GDR, but of course its position was on the periphery of the Communist camp).

An additional element in unifying the common line on Germany was without doubt the very rigid attitude adopted by Bonn towards the East. The Hallstein Doctrine, and the persistent claim for boundary revision advanced by Western Germany together with its rearmament policy, provided arguments for the unity of the Communist camp on Germany.

After 1961, the culminating year of Moscow's militant line, the Soviet Union started up a much more cautious and flexible policy on the German Problem. The failure of the rigid line pursued up until then was only too clear, and a new more realistic approach to the problem had to be evolved. This development should of course be

considered in the broader context of the change in the general Soviet policy in the early sixties, as a consequence of its loss of relative power on the international level. With the gradual weakening of Soviet political and diplomatic initiative, due to a number of economic and political causes, the previously defined objectives in the German Problem were also reduced. Now, the "legalistic" approach to obtain formal recognition of the Pankow regime through a general peace treaty is rapidly substituted by a policy that aims at a de facto consolidation of the status quo. This was undoubtedly facilitated by a new element in the situation, the construction of the Wall in Berlin in the summer of 1961, which definitely isolated the GDR from the West, with very significant socio-economic and psychological consequences.

The new Soviet attitude was clearly stated by Khrushchev in early 1963, at the SED congress: by adopting "defensive measures" in Berlin, he said, the problem of a general German treaty had lost its importance. At this point the Soviet desire seemed to be for more limited objectives, such as a solution for West Berlin under United Nations guarantees in order to create a condition of peaceful co-existence between the two German states. As for German reunification, this remained a long-term perspective, to be carried out when conditions in West Germany would be ripe for Socialist development. In practical terms the new Soviet line implied the decision not to indulge in thoughts about reunification but rather to continue on backing with all its strength the increasingly evident economic and social progress of the GDR. With the signing of a friendship treaty in the summer of 1964, along the lines of similar agreements with its allies in Eastern Europe, Moscow solemnly sanctioned its commitment to pursue this policy.

Such a commitment did not, however, deter Khrushchev from playing the apparently contradictory game of a renewed direct approach to Bonn. Fear of German accession to nuclear armaments and the temptation to create dissensions within the Western alliance through a direct deal with Bonn were now clearly manifest as an important factor in Soviet policy. The rapid resurgence of Western Germany as a power in its own right on the European continent naturally increased these tendencies.

In the last year of Khrushchev's administration in 1964, the Soviet Union took new steps to enter into more direct contact with West Germany in order to come to some sort of limited agreement with it. Adjubei's visit to Bonn in the summer of that year was part of this new policy line for a change in relations between the two countries, not only at the commercial level but also the political. However, the possibility of a "new Rapallo", advanced in some circles at the time, seems grossly exaggerated. But it cannot be excluded that in the new circumstances there could have been some effective new agreement between Moscow and Bonn under the sponsorship of Khrushchev, should the initiatives have been continued.

While the Soviet Union carried on with its cautious - and, at times, ambiguous - policy on the German front, after 1961 the movement towards "de-satellization" started gathering force among the Eastern camp. This process, facilitated by the decreasing authority of Moscow in the region, began to influence the stand of these countries on the German Problem. It is interesting to note the first signs of a difference in attitude between some of the Communist regimes and the Soviet Union, as well as between the Communist regimes themselves.

Still a very limited phenomenon it was indicative of a trend which would have become increasingly evident later on.

Naturally it was the GDR which, because of its particular position, was bound to maintain the most conservative attitude at the prospect of changing the policy towards the GFR. Pankow's declared aim of maintaining a common front of the Eastern bloc under Soviet leadership on the German Problem resulted, however, in being made more and more difficult by the increasing desire of autonomy in foreign policy of the other Eastern European countries. The reasons for disagreement became evident when the GFR exchanged trade missions with all the Communist regimes (except for Czechoslovakia). These agreements, aimed at improving the economic relations, traditionally fruitful, between East Europe and Germany, did in fact sanction the inclusion of West Berlin in the West Germany currency area. This clause flatly contradicts the "three German states" theory officially maintained by Pankow and had the result of provoking strong, but ineffective protests from the latter.

The case of the "West Berlin clause" was in effect only the most striking of numerous frictions between the GDR and its Communist allies. The very conservative attitude of Eastern Germany in cultural and political matters frequently lead to dissension with countries such as Czechoslovakia and Poland, in spite of the declared friendship between them.

It is not only in its relations with other Eastern European countries that the GDR began to have some difficulties. With the Soviet Union, too, even if at a very reserved and indirect manner, no less important reasons for contrast developed. The contacts between Moscow and Bonn in 1964 evoked considerable suspicions in Pankow and in other Eastern capitals, fearful of a possible Soviet-West German deal. The Khrushchev initiative created particular apprehension in the GDR where the possibility of even a limited detente between Moscow and Bonn was considered a highly dangerous development.

The fall of Khrushchev in October 1964, while it might have afforded Pankow a sigh of relief because it put an end to such an initiative, did not alter the general trend of Soviet policy. Towards the GFR the basic attitude is unchanged. One of the main preoccupations remains the possible acquisition of nuclear arms by Bonn. In 1965 it was stated that should this happen some common nuclear security arrangements will be worked between the Warsaw Pact members to realize a sharing of Soviet nuclear monopoly, a development which Moscow would certainly not welcome, it appears clearly, in spite of the guarantee of employment monopoly through the Warsaw Pact.

In general terms Moscow now seems to have reinforced its conviction that for the time being there are no prospects of any dramatic breakthrough in the international field. The new leadership makes it clear that the Soviet Union is in favour of a limited detente with the West in order to reassess its internal situation, and to strengthen the cohesion of the Communist camp.

One of Moscow's growing difficulties is the coordination of the foreign policy of the European Communist countries: the failure to transform the Warsaw Pact in an effective political instrument attests to this. While approving of their newly formulated diplomacy as encouraging the detente with the West, the Soviet Union voiced its concern that it might cause new divisions within the alliance. In this respect already in 1965 the Soviet leaders were apprehensive

lest the contacts between the Eastern countries and Bonn adversely affected the possibility of a favourable solution of the German Problem. They are obviously aware of the risk that an improvement in East-West relations involving the GFR could lead to the isolation and, eventually, even the liquidation of the GDR.

That the Soviet preoccupation were well-founded becomes evident in the autumn of 1966 with the opening of the West German diplomatic offensive aimed at the creation of diplomatic relations with the Eastern European countries as a first step in isolating the GDR within its own alliance, and in perspective eliminate it. Bonn's initiative clearly demonstrates that even on the German Problem marked differences of attitude were developing in the Eastern camp. That which, in the first postwar phase, was a basis of strong cohesion in Eastern Europe with the Soviet Union is gradually but evidently becoming an element of division. The Communist camp at this point appears split on the question of relations with the FRG along new geo-political lines into two opposing groups. The southern group of nations manifest a fairly homogenous attitude in favour of establishing diplomatic relations with Western Germany, for a number of reasons - no frontier problems, a positive public opinion, strong economic incentives. On the other hand, the countries of the northern tier, which have very definite frontier problems with West Germany, take a very negative stand. There the economic incentive, although certainly important, is not sufficient to overshadow very strong political preoccupations. (Only Czechoslovakia, which is in fact a special case, shows some signs of wavering in its attitude.) The reasons for the Polish attitude are clear to understand. For Warsaw, a united Germany on its frontier is an intolerable prospect, even with a strong Russian guarantee. Moreover, a tough anti-German attitude is a sure policy for maintaining public support for the regime.

It is even easier to understand the GDR's attitude towards an initiative aimed at eventual elimination. As in the past, Bonn's policy is fiercely resisted and every effort is made to obtain the necessary solidarity from its allies. This time, as was not the case even a few years previously, the GDR has sufficient power and prestige to insist on its own stand. With a population of only 17 million, East Germany has become the second industrial power in the Eastern bloc and an indispensable trading partner of the Soviet Union. Its regime, even if still unpopular at home, has achieved a greater degree of consolidation. In a process somewhat parallel to West Germany's earlier success, East Germany has moved from being a mere object of policy to being, at least to a certain degree, the subject of policy. Just as in the West the influence of the GFR has significantly increased so, in the East, has that of the GDR, even if on a lesser scale and in a different way. Moreover, Pankow's position has also benefited from the shrinking, and hence the Europeanization of the Communist camp after the Sino-Soviet schism, which reinforced the relative weight of all its members.

It is therefore likely that the very rapid reaction towards the West German initiative, which prevented the conclusion of diplomatic relations with Bonn (the only exception Rumania), was largely due to the lobbying of the GDR. Not only does Pankow succeed in concluding a series of bilateral mutual assistance agreements with its neighbours but, with the strong backing of Warsaw, it manages to force the Soviet Union to work out a common front towards the Bonn offensive.

The GDR having made a dramatic issue of the obvious risk of division in the Eastern camp on the German Problem, the Soviet Union decides to intervene with all its political weight.

The hammering out of a common policy at the Communist conference at Karlo Vinary on the issue of diplomatic relations with Bonn does not mean, however, that the unity is anything other than a temporary achievement. (This agreement indeed was due in considerable measure to the limited policy of the German Federal Republic which lessened the possibility of its proposals being accepted.) The German Problem seems destined to remain a central issue in the Communist alliance, increasing its dynamic influence within the camp. With the resurgence of the two German states, the relevance of the problem will increase, because of the traditional importance of Germany in this region. For the Soviet Union, this issue, which is central to its whole European policy, is likely to become even more urgent with the revival of the autonomy of the Germans themselves, however this may be conditioned in the West and in the East.

Within Eastern Europe the basic differences in attitude towards West Germany are still very marked, apart from any formal temporary agreement and would emerge clearly should Bonn launch out a fresh initiative on a more realistic basis. If this should happen there is a very real possibility that a dangerous rift would develop between the northern and southern groups in Eastern Europe. If Romania's example were to be followed by other countries, it is difficult to predict what the reactions would be from the Poles and East Germans. It has been suggested that one effect would be the creation of special relations between these two countries and possibly Czechoslovakia. In the event of it being impossible to obtain a general assurance from the Communist alliance the GDR might push towards such a federation in spite of the considerable political and economic obstacles.

The potential of this general state of affairs, although not so dramatic as some observers assume, undoubtedly throws a grave responsibility on the Soviet Union as the leading power in the region. The German Problem is becoming without doubt an important factor in forcing Moscow to learn to live with a "divergent unity" within the camp. Not only must Moscow clarify the ambiguities of its own policy but it must also reconcile this same policy with the different positions emerging in Eastern Europe. This being said, the power and influence of the Soviet Union will still be decisive in any eventual solution of the German Problem. The survival of Berlin depends on the Soviet Union and in spite of its increased power East Germany is still conditioned in its policy by the will of Moscow. In fact both its Eastern allies and Western opponents, above all West Germany, are very well aware of this situation.

In this situation it is generally accepted that the Soviet Union will, for the time being, refrain from any radical step on Germany either in agreement with Washington and the West or through a bilateral deal with Bonn. Moscow, it seems, remains basically in favour of the status quo and therefore of the two Germanies solution. Russian power and prestige in the GDR has become so great that there are no reasons whatsoever for her to abandon her German ally. The prospect of a reunification made possible by the weakened position of the Soviet Union within its own alliance and by its conflict with China appears today very remote. The fact that the overall balance of power at the world level remains unfavourable to Moscow, as recent developments in the Middle East have confirmed, does not alter her status of super-power in Europe.



If the possibility of reunification on the above-stated basis seems remote, that of a direct agreement with the GFR - as is rumoured from time to time - is highly unrealistic. There are too many obstacles on both sides to such an accord. The Germans are militantly anti-communist, have no illusions about Moscow's intentions, and would reject any solution which might very well make them dependent on the Soviet Union. The Russians, for their part, would have good reasons for entertaining the idea of such an agreement with great reluctance. Of course, the prospect of combining Soviet-German resources and capabilities, historically one of Lenin's aspirations as a decisive condition for world communism, must still today be in the minds of the Soviet leaders. Furthermore, the spectacular economic and technological progress of the GFR has gained for it the deep respect of the new technocratic elite in the Soviet Union.

Whatever the prospects of this agreement may have been in the past, they now seem highly unlikely. Today, as has been pointed out, it is doubtful whether Moscow would welcome the possibility of a united Germany even as a member of the Warsaw Pact. To handle such a powerful country would probably be beyond the capacities of the present Soviet regime when one can see the problems they have in dealing with a less important country like Rumania.

Another argument which would militate very strongly against such an agreement would be the attitude of the East European countries who would certainly come out very strongly against it. It would, as they know very well, put them at the mercy of the two European super powers, the Soviet Union and the new united Germany, thus destroying the present equilibrium, however precarious it may be. The East European countries could certainly not welcome the departure of the United States from Europe which such an agreement would certainly entail.

The spectre of a new Rapallo is too haunting for too many of these countries. Poland, for example, and Czechoslovakia would find themselves in a worse situation than before the world war, when their status was at least formally guaranteed by England and France. This explains the reaction of Warsaw to any hint of a change in the status quo in the region through a bilateral arrangement between Bonn and Moscow. The declaration attributed to Gomulka that the policy of the Soviet Union on Germany cannot leave Warsaw out well expresses Polish feelings on the subject. The GDR is of course a special case as such a solution would mean its gradual - if not immediate - absorption within a unified Germany. Even among the southern group of nations few could contemplate lightly a solution which might lead either to a division of the region into two spheres of interest or a tough competition to achieve this end.

The absence of any easy solutions to the German Problem and the Soviet Union's obvious reluctance to embark on any new vigorous policy do not, however, mean that Moscow's position is a completely static one. The Russians are perfectly aware of the contrasts in the Western camp on Germany and will certainly not refrain from exploiting them. Moscow, through limited manoeuvring, can hope to play on the FRG's feeling of isolation and anti-American sentiments to encouraging a loosening of Bonn's Atlantic ties. By keeping the door open to West Germany the Soviet Union can maintain the Western Alliance, already subject to rifts and contradictions, in a state of uncertainty.



This attitude, however valid as a tactical expedient on a short-term basis, provides no solution to the German Problem. The question is a much more fundamental one, requiring the drawing up of a new Soviet strategy for Europe which includes a workable solution for Germany, generally acceptable to both East and West.

It is<sup>a</sup> difficult and complex task, which can be carried out only gradually, but it would seem the only guarantee of achieving that minimum degree of security in Europe that Moscow apparently needs at present. An unstable situation in Central Europe, with the GFR pushing for an autonomous solution to the problem of reunification, could have very dangerous consequences in Eastern Europe. Such apprehensions should now be sufficiently strong to lessen the traditional Soviet fear that a formal settlement in Europe which would eliminate the potential German threat would at the same time strengthen the centrifugal tendencies in the Communist camp.

For the moment, excluding as very unlikely any dramatic initiatives, Moscow could go along with some limited improvement in the relations between Bonn and Eastern Europe without too much risk. The possibility of bilateral relations between the Communist regimes and the GFR that are acceptable within the Eastern alliance would certainly improve the general atmosphere. It could be the point of departure for a more general European agreement, involving both the Soviet Union and the United States, which seems today the most realistic approach to the German Problem. But this of course will depend on many other elements in the relations between East and West, like the course of the Vietnamese war and the prospects of a signature of a new proliferation treaty. Of course, such a development would also depend on the evolution of the GFR's foreign policy and would imply some very difficult problems in its relations with some countries of the Communist camp, like Poland and the GDR.

The problem of the GDR is of course the most complex and it is difficult to imagine, under present conditions, Pankow agreeing to a policy of even limited détente with Bonn. Apart from understandable and objective reasons for such an attitude, the influence of people like Ulbricht (the same could be said of Gomulka in Poland), who are dominated by outworn political formulas, represent a formidable obstacle to an evolution of policy. But should Bonn undergo a notable shift in its attitude towards the GDR, there might be a development ~~in development~~ in the East German regime that would help towards a more general détente in the relations between the members of the Warsaw Pact and the GFR. But this, of course, is highly speculative.

The basic condition for a more realistic political approach on the part of Moscow remains always a reassessment of the Communist alliance and a rethinking of a new common diplomacy. Having gradually evolved over the past few years from a tight, highly centralized system to a looser form of alliance, the Communist nations must now strive to achieve an effective system of pluralistic alliance. But this, of course, is a much more complex and therefore slow process in the East, than it has been in the West, because there exists less solidarity between the individual countries. It is only, however, by striking a balance between the autonomous tendencies of the Eastern European countries and the need for coordination of their international policies that the Communist camp will achieve a new stability. Such a stability is a necessary pre-condition for any durable agreement with the West for the solution of the German Problem within a new system for European security.

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SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN RELATIONS, 1917-1967:  
THEORETICAL PERCEPTION AND POLITICAL REALITY.

by

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Phase I. 1917-1938

The Interwar Years:

Danubian Aloofness and Soviet Revolutionary Intentions\*

During the interwar years relations between the Soviet Union and the various European states passed through several stages. In this brief summary four phases will be discussed, each distinguished from the other by changes in Soviet foreign policies, Comintern policies, as well as in Eastern and Western European policies toward the Soviet Union. The interrelationships between the Soviet Union and its Eastern European neighbors displayed, on the whole, a considerable amount of continuity because these connections were essentially of secondary importance to the parties involved.

Except for the first years of its existence when it was preoccupied with frontier wars and boundary settlements, the Bolshevik regime focussed its attention on relations with Western, and not Eastern Europe. Soviet diplomatic activities in Eastern Europe were designed to neutralize the area through a variety of pacts and agreements so that it would constitute a barrier in preventing, or at least in delaying, "counter-revolutionary" aggression from Western Europe.

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\*The first draft of Part One of this paper was researched and prepared by Mrs. Rebecca Cohen, a Ph.D. candidate in Eastern European studies in the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies of The George Washington University.

Bolshevik foreign policy, as we know, was conducted on more than one plane<sup>1</sup> and while the Narkomindel pursued its essentially defensive relationships with legitimate governments, the Comintern, at least in the early years, frequently worked at cross purposes obstructing or undermining traditional foreign policy *processes*. In terms of revolutionary as well as diplomatic aims, the Eastern European countries were not considered nearly as important as Germany, France, Italy or China. Only in Czechoslovakia was there a legal Communist party through which the U.S.S.R. could channel its operations. The Comintern actually ruined some promising situations in Danubia and the Balkans, largely through its failure to come to grips with that outstanding characteristic of interwar Eastern European affairs: an exuberant and wholly undisciplined nationalism.

In addition to the relative aloofness which had pervaded Soviet-Eastern European relations between the wars, nationalism provided the other major and recurring theme. On the Soviet side, nationalism became an increasingly important policy guide and, indeed, it dictated most of the treaty relationships of the U.S.S.R. with its Eastern European neighbors. Conversely, the rhetoric surrounding the peacemaking in Eastern Europe had left the new and dissected states all the more intoxicated with the politics and

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<sup>1</sup>For an excellent analysis of the continuing "political schizophrenia" characteristic of Soviet foreign policy, see Kurt London's paper: "Soviet Foreign Policy: Fifty Years of Dualism," to be presented to the Sixth International Conference on World Politics, West Berlin, September 4-8, 1967.

romanticism of national self-determination and ethnic vindication. Thus in the decade after the war each of the Eastern European countries concentrated its foreign policy energies on securing its position against real or imagined threats from hostile neighbors. However, only in the cases of Rumania, Poland and the Baltic states was Soviet Russia directly one of these hostile neighbors and, therefore, of primary foreign policy concern. These five border states perceived the Soviet menace first in terms of a traditional imperial threat against their territory or their existence. Yet, for each of them, as for the other Eastern European states, Bolshevism was also considered to be a danger and it was for this reason that the Soviet Union was on the one hand a constant force in Eastern European politics while, on the other, it was only a background factor of complication with which no state, except Czechoslovakia, would consider entering into normal diplomatic relations.

Interwar relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe can be divided into four distinct periods each marked by changes in Soviet policies and in the general ideological climate of Europe. The first, from 1917 to 1921, was a period of revolutionary and violent change in both Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. The second period, from 1922 to 1929, was one of consolidation and relative stability. In the third, stretching from 1929 to 1934, <sup>the</sup> rise of menacing new dictatorships and the

political consequences of a worldwide economic depression were being felt throughout Europe. Finally, from 1935 to 1938, the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe were reacting to the direct and open threat of Nazi power and to the ominous shadow of an impending world war.

During its first years the Bolshevik regime was plagued by civil war, foreign intervention and bitter border wars. Its efforts at establishing normal relations with neighboring powers were confined to negotiating peace treaties in order to be able to stabilize one front while in reality concentrating on another. In late 1919 peace was negotiated with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland. By 1921 treaties had been concluded with all of Russia's neighbors except Rumania.

During this period the hopes of world Communism were pinned on a revolution in Germany. Revolutionary prospects nevertheless appeared to be good in Eastern Europe as well and a few abortive attempts were made to exploit the postwar social upheaval there. These attempts failed--in Germany, Hungary, Austria and Poland--largely because national allegiance proved stronger than class grievances when the chips were down. The Soviets would have liked to help Béla Kun when Rumanian troops were threatening, but they were in effect too weak to do so. The conclusion of the Soviet-Polish war without either a Bolshevik rising in Poland or counter-revolutionary success in the U.S.S.R. marked

the end of an era and the beginning of a period of correct, if not cordial, relations between the new Soviet state and its European neighbors. It was no accident that the Soviet-Polish, Soviet-Persian, Soviet-Afghan and Anglo-Soviet trade treaties were all signed in February and March of 1921. Once Great Britain broke the ice, commercial relations were established between the U.S.S.R., and Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria.

During these years, both domestically and internationally, the Eastern European states were adjusting to the peace settlements. For some of them, like the Baltic states and Rumania, this meant finding ways of avoiding total or partial reabsorption into the Soviet Union, while for Poland it brought an adventuristic war; for the other states it involved coping with more or less active peasant- and workers' parties which were emulating the Soviet Union and pressing for social change. By the mid-nineteen twenties most of the Eastern European states had passed through the most radical stages of social and political upheaval, and a period of stabilization, sometimes producing counter-revolution, as well as increasing prosperity was about to begin.

During the remainder of the 1920's the Eastern European states set about establishing alliances with one another and such interested outside parties as France and Italy, either to defend or to challenge the status quo. This decade in Eastern European



history was unique in that both the Soviet Union and Germany were too weak and preoccupied elsewhere to enjoy their traditional positions of influence and rivalry in the region. Most of the Eastern European states seemed to take this new situation for granted and concentrated upon building elaborate alliances against each other rather than trying to cooperate in insulating the area against a recurrence of traditional encroachments from East or West. The Little Entente treaties binding Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia to each other, formed the most durable grouping of powers in the region, as long as their differing attitudes toward Russia and Germany were not of crucial importance. On the other hand, the revisionist states of Hungary, Bulgaria and Austria, having remained in isolation for a few years, were eventually linked to each other, in various revisionist groupings such as the Rome treaty of 1934 sponsored in particular by Italy.

Meanwhile the Soviet Union, which no longer viewed itself as the accidental home of the first of a series of revolutions but rather as a great socialist bulwark, was securing its own defense through diplomatic channels. Unlike France, she was seeking ~~protection~~ against Western Europe first through relations with Western Europe rather than through a fragile buffer zone. The Soviet objectives were to preserve peace and to establish commercial ties with the capitalist West. The gravest danger was considered to be a united front of anti-bolshevik capitalist states which

might engage in concerted economic or military activities at the expense of the weak young Communist state. Hence, the Soviet Union began with Rapallo (and with the military agreements reached the previous year) an uneven relationship with Germany which was used by each for its particular advantage until its climax in the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939. The continuation of Germany's isolation from the other major capitalist powers was, however, purchased at the expense of the remnants of the German Communist Party which staged a final unsuccessful attempt at insurrection in 1923. Hopes for revolution in Europe had by this time been discarded along with the belief that only extended revolution could secure the future of world socialism. Instead, the labors and devotion of Communists the world over were concentrated increasingly on sustaining and securing the Soviet state against capitalist aggression.

In keeping with changes in Soviet domestic and diplomatic policies, the theories and activities of the Comintern changed in the 1920's. The decision to split the European socialist movement and to impose conditions for membership in the Comintern brought all Communist parties under closer Kremlin control and were, thus, another aspect of the growing importance of Soviet nationalism over revolutionary internationalism. Most of the decade constituted, in Comintern terms, a period of temporary stabilization in the capitalist world and, consequently a period

of consolidation and preparation for Communist parties purged of rightist socialist elements.

Comintern activities in the Balkans in the 1920's provide a revealing illustration of the drawbacks of the rigid party line with its insensitivity to nationalist feelings and its crude rebuff of potential socialist or peasant party support. They also provide an example of the curious ability of extreme left and extreme right wing organizations to use one another's support to achieve their respective ends.

Because it enjoyed diplomatic relations with none of the Balkan countries, the USSR had no source of influence in the area except the Comintern. Titulescu was the one real friend of Russia in the Balkans but no attempt was made to settle the Bessarabian question, and thereby establish normal relations with Rumania, in the hope that Bulgaria or Yugoslavia might be courted instead. An important opportunity for gaining influence in Bulgaria was, however, lost in 1923 when the Communist Party allowed the Stamboliskii forces to be overthrown in a rightist coup rather than cooperate <sup>ing</sup> with infantile socialists. After the Sophia Cathedral incident in 1924 the once strong Bulgarian Party experienced a low point in its influence; even the USSR felt obliged to disassociate itself from Bulgarian Communist activities.

More interesting was Comintern policy toward the volatile question of Macedonia and the consequent loss of opportunities in Yugoslavia and Greece. Coveted by Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia,

and divided into pieces by the three, Macedonia was an emotional issue in Balkan politics. To the extent that the Macedonians themselves desired to be united, the area provided a test for the Comintern's nationality theories. Somewhat strangely, since it was considered to represent an issue of national self-determination, Macedonia never had its own Communist Party. After the peace settlement the majority of Macedonian Socialists joined the Serbian party while the faction that favored autonomy joined the Bulgarian supported Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization.

The Second Comintern Congress in June, 1920, decided to support national bourgeois independence movements as a step toward socialist revolution, but ~~this~~ support was not to be given at the expense of more purely Communist aims. Applied to the Macedonian question, this ruling meant that the Comintern supported the Bulgarian party's stand in favor of Macedonian autonomy (an unquestionably nationalistic stand from the Bulgarian point of view) while it discouraged the Greek and Serbian parties from supporting the popular policies of their bourgeois national governments in favor of retaining what they held of Macedonian territory. After the Chankov coup, the Bulgarian Communist Party sought to regain some of its popularity by staging a campaign for Macedonian autonomy. The Comintern again supported its Bulgarian members and during 1924 and 1925, with Stalin's personal intervention, forced the Greek and Yugoslav parties to compromise themselves seriously by

advocating autonomy. Abandoned only in 1935, this short-sighted Comintern policy also weakened the Balkan Communist Federation of Serbian, Greek and Bulgarian parties which had been active since 1910 and made the Soviet Union even more unpopular in the capitals of Greece and Yugoslavia. Nineteen ~~twenty~~-four also witnessed a short-lived collaboration between the Bulgarian Communist Party (which a year earlier <sup>had</sup> refused to support its peasant party cousin) and IMRO, the very organization which had helped Chankov suppress the Communist Party. Based on a mutual desire for Macedonian autonomy and a predisposition toward terrorist activity, this liaison ended when the right-wing Bulgarian government threatened to withdraw its financial support from IMRO.

By 1928 the trends of the twenties reached their climax. Within the Soviet Union Stalin was firmly in control and the drive toward building socialism in one country went into high gear with the introduction of the first Five Year Plan. Thus, the Soviet Union was even more interested in guaranteeing peace and in securing good commercial relations with the capitalist world. Since Germany was no longer isolated within Europe, the Narkomindel, where Litvinov's influence was overshadowing Chicherin's, made more extensive efforts to secure in Eastern Europe collective security arrangements as a backstop for Soviet European policy. Litvinov attempted to supplement the earlier arbitration agreements and disarmament proposals with treaties embodying concepts of

neutrality and non-aggression. His efforts, however, resulted only in pacts with Turkey and Lithuania. A modicum of success was, nevertheless, achieved in 1929 with the signing of the Litvinov Protocols.

The Comintern became ever more an instrument of Soviet national policy rather than of an international revolution. Its first and only comprehensive program adopted in 1928 defined more clearly than ever before the obligations of foreign parties to the Soviet Union and explained the applicability of specific Soviet experience to revolutionary situations abroad.

The closer the links between the exiled and illegal Communist Parties of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the more unpalatable their activities became to the individual national regimes. Anticipating a new stage of crisis and war in the capitalist world, the Comintern program still prescribed a tactic of united front from below and no cooperation with bourgeois-democratic or socialist elements. ~~Thus perpetuated~~ <sup>ed</sup> the isolation of Communists from potential allies on the political left in Germany and Eastern Europe and open <sup>ed</sup> the way during the depression years and afterward for intensified persecution of their representatives by the various right-radical regimes. At the same time, since it became more damaging and embarrassing for governments to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union, by the time the shift to popular front tactics was endorsed in 1935, too much damage had already been done for it to have much meaning in Eastern Europe.

The ultimate economic and political consequences of the depression in Eastern Europe were to erode the last vestiges of that order and prosperity which had been slowly and painfully established during the previous ten years. Right-radical dictatorships in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Austria became more firmly entrenched and the way was paved for the emergence of extremist organizations like the Iron Guard and the ~~Arrow~~ Cross.

Early in the depression years, however, France's influence was temporarily bolstered and with her encouragement a series of labored efforts were made to include the Soviet Union in collective security arrangements in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union was responsive to the first French suggestion for a non-aggression pact in the summer of 1931 and agreed to the French condition that similar pacts be signed with her major allies in Eastern Europe, Poland and Rumania. Poland in turn insisted that all Russia's neighbors be included while Rumania flatly refused to participate until her claim to Bessarabia was recognized. After tangled negotiations, Rumania agreed not to stand in the way of pacts with the other border states which were signed in 1932. Of particular significance was the pact with Poland because in it the Soviet Union refused to assist a third party, by implication Germany, in an attack. These treaties were followed in 1933 by another series, this time including Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania, recognizing Litvinov's definition of aggression. Within

a year, however, the conditions for the inclusion of Soviet Russia in the Eastern European defense network were gone and the logical next step, an "Eastern Locarno," was frustrated by the rise of Hitler. The only concrete results of these complicated negotiations were Russian entry into the now almost meaningless League of Nations, and bi-lateral treaties of alliance with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935. Far from pleased with the entry of the Soviet Union into their ranks, the status quo powers, Poland, Yugoslavia and Rumania, strongly disapproved of the two alliances.

The peak of French influence and the most cordial period of Soviet relations in Eastern Europe had, thus, occurred in the few years between 1931 and 1935. The rise of Hitler, the introduction of a new German economic program in Eastern Europe and the growing timidity of France and Britain gradually witnessed a shattering of the fragile links between the various Eastern European governments. Instead, these countries relied more and more on frantic individual efforts to secure themselves against external enemies at the expense of their neighbors, and ultimately at the expense of their cherished independence. With the reoccupation of the Rhineland and a further retreat of France under <sup>Blum</sup>Blum, German influence became predominant and Eastern European politics deteriorated into a feeble series of reactions to German initiatives. The latter included parallel campaigns to make bolshevism the great bogey and to isolate Czechoslovakia--all this facilitated by the record of Comintern behavior and a crescendo of anti-capitalist ranting in the Soviet Union.



The Comintern's popular front policy did little to make the Soviet Union more acceptable to Eastern European governments. It distinguished between bourgeois-democratic and fascist or aggressive regimes and even if the Eastern European governments did not fall neatly into the latter category, they were all, except for Czechoslovakia, nurturing closer diplomatic relations with Germany or Italy. Part of the new Comintern policy was to prepare the forces of revolution to take advantage of an inevitable war. Consequently, Comintern agents and emigré groups continued to be trained in the Soviet Union and shuttled back and forth between Moscow and the Eastern European countries to agitate among the masses.

The Anschluss and Munich episodes are well known. They represented a serious blow to enduring Soviet efforts to secure peace by preventing cooperation between Germany and the other capitalist states of Europe and by erecting a system of collective security. By joint agreement the capitalist states seemed to be directing aggression eastward where Russia's frontiers were left exposed by her failure to secure an effective buffer. In the succeeding months, the Soviets tried to salvage what they could by negotiating alternatively with the old, but increasingly dangerous, favorite: Germany, and the unreliable peace camp: France and Britain. The capitalist world would be divided regardless of which negotiations succeeded and in the end the choice hinged upon which side could offer to the Soviets their secondary, stop-gap,

interest--a buffer zone along their vulnerable Western frontiers. France and Britain had little bargaining power while Germany could offer the Soviets a restoration of the Tsarist empire and with it more control over Eastern European pathways to their frontiers. On the whole, the bitter diplomatic frustrations which surfaced during the Anschluss, at Munich and finally reached a climax in the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939, clearly proved that both Soviet and Eastern European political activities were largely self-defeating during the two decades of the interwar period.

Phase II. 1945-1949The Post-War Years: Stalin's "Revolution From Above"  
and the Takeover of Eastern Europe\*

"Soviet political ideology," recently observed Frederick C. Barghoorn, "is the product of the experience of an elite which was forced to perform many very difficult tasks under difficult conditions and in an excessively short span of time. Soviet ideology was the doctrine of an elite which made a revolution in the wrong country, under unfavorable conditions."<sup>1</sup> Indeed, Stalin's views on war and revolution, which in many ways set the stage for the turbulent world political scene of the nineteen forties and early fifties, reflect the rigid and blind conservatism of a Soviet political elite accustomed to, and forged in the fire of, both ideological hardship and militant political realities. They have affected the tortuous political evolution of postwar Eastern Europe in an all-pervasive and frightening manner.

In Stalin's perspective, Danubia and the Balkans were an essential, even inevitable sphere of influence, a cordon sanitaire,

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\*Within the scope of this paper only certain highlight aspects of this period can be covered. The war-revolution theory and the "takeover" process are merely two case-studies selectively treated.

<sup>2</sup>See F. C. Barghoorn, "Observations on Contemporary Soviet Political Attitudes," Soviet Studies, July 1966, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, p. 68.

developed to buttress the shaky and vulnerable Western border zones of European Russia. In order to prevent future wars, his brand of revolution would have to be exported to all of the Eastern European countries. The suspicious dictator frequently pictured imminent military threats from the West, accompanied by the specters of "intervention" and "restoration" suggesting the return of an oppressive Capitalist order in Russia. The Soviet leader turned to history, and liked to dwell on past defeats suffered at the hands of invading Swedish armies, of Napoleon's invasion of 1812, and of Hitler's attack of 1941 which after all had almost succeeded.

In these Soviet nightmares Eastern Europe was portrayed as a strategic base exploited as an ancillary power-complex by the ultimate enemy, the Anglo-American world. Attacks would presumably be mounted and offensives launched from the Danube Valley or the Balkans by the Western "warmongers." The Soviet citizenry was therefore constantly reminded of the dangers of imminent war. As early as 1925, at the 14th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, Stalin had stated (and thereafter frequently repeated) that: "Two chief but opposed centers of attraction are being formed, and in conformity with this, two directions of gravity . . . throughout the world: Anglo-America and the Soviet Union." If, however, war originated from a Westerly direction, Eastern Europe could be used by the Soviet strategic planner as a momentary shock-absorber, a vulnerable "in-depth" buffer zone which would allow the U.S.S.R. some geopolitical elbow-room, a Wehr-Raum or military defense zone

enabling it to delay as well as exploit an explosive Central European situation and subsequently to build up Soviet strength in such key areas as East Germany, Poland, Rumania, the Baltic States and even in Finland.

#### War Leads to Revolution

In the perspective of post-World War II Soviet-East European relations, Stalin and the Stalinoid types of the newly emerging satellite states viewed wars and revolutions as inextricably interrelated phenomena. Wars occurred in the external relations of nations, while revolutions appeared primarily as internal political events. In this context World War II was regarded by Stalin as the first step toward a successful revolution in Eastern Europe with a concomitant strengthening of its proletariat and an inevitable destruction of its prewar capitalist systems. Eastern Europe's poor and downtrodden proletariat, he cynically pointed out, could only benefit from the ravages and destruction of such a war. It had little to lose and a great deal to gain in stark contrast with the entrenched, prosperous and successful prewar socio-economic elites of the region which were now earmarked for careful and methodical destruction by the newly imported Muscovite Communist leadership-groups.

War and revolution thus emerged hand-in-hand on the political landscape of Eastern Europe. Long before Khrushchev's highly publicized and globally applicable endorsement of "wars of national

liberation," Stalin employed and exploited the concepts of "liberation campaigns," "anti-colonial" conflicts and "anti-imperialist" struggles waged or carried out in Central Europe and the Balkans. To the consternation of the far more sophisticated and considerably less cynical peoples of this region, his essentially contradictory views miraculously transformed the inevitable evil of war into a "purifier," a process which would accelerate the development of new "revolutionary and progressive" forces in the various Eastern European states. Stalin's galloping schizophrenia pictured war, on the one hand, as a repulsive imperialist evil clutching Eastern Europe while, on the other hand, <sup>(le)</sup>portrayed it as a glorious "revolutionary" struggle for all of its peoples. Such were the dialectics of Stalin's "inevitable war" theory as they affected the postwar course of Soviet-East European relations.

#### The Stalinist Revolution as a Theoretical Perception

Having rejected the Marxist thesis that proletarian revolutions could break out spontaneously, Stalin and his ideological coterie substituted for it the less revolutionary, far more cold-blooded and militant concept of staging an interrelated series of carefully prearranged and prefabricated revolutions in Eastern Europe. In this "shatter-belt" of the old continent, the Muscovites felt, Communist uprisings could only succeed if they were assisted by the power of Moscow, and unless the Red Army were in a position to exercise direct control over the

territory involved. Revolutions "from below,"<sup>3</sup> in the Stalinists' considered opinion, could never be carried out effectively by popular movements or genuine mass demonstrations. On the contrary, in order to succeed in the peculiar power-constellation of the geopolitical zone immediately to the West of European Russia, they must be imposed by careful planning and brute force "from above."<sup>4</sup> Prerevolutionary calculations for such Stalinist operators as Ulbricht, Gottwald, Rákosi or Pauker definitely excluded the consideration of such irrelevant factors as the spontaneous mood, instantaneous popular action or expressions of mass opinion of the Eastern Europeans themselves. The cautious planning of the chain-reaction of revolutions must rest in the hands of a small and conspiratorial professional elite. Such revolutions may fail, however, Stalin warned, if "there is no revolutionary party of the proletariat sufficiently strong . . . to take power in its own hands."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>For a further discussion of the revolutions "from below," see the author's article: "Die Rolle des Nationalismus in Osteuropa," Osteuropa, February-March 1966, pp. 113-127.

<sup>4</sup>The Stalinist revolutions "from above" are analyzed in some detail in various contributions of Eastern Europe in Transition, ed. by Kurt London, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. See esp. the author's article on Nationalism, pp. 3-18.

<sup>5</sup>Cited with editorial comments by George A. Morgan, "Stalin on Revolution," in The Soviet Union, 1922-1962, A Foreign Affairs Reader, ed. by Philip E. Mosely, N.Y., F. A. Praeger, 1963, p. 237 et seq.

Thus, for Eastern Europe proper, the successful interplay of two major forces was deemed essential by the Soviet planners. One requirement was the existence of at least the nucleus of a fairly strong Communist Party, operating either legally (as in Czechoslovakia) or, in countries where Communism was outlawed (which was everywhere else in Eastern Europe), through the instrument of small, fanatical and highly trained underground groups. The second prerequisite was the massive presence of the Red Army which had always played a central role in the Stalinist planning of such revolutionary "national uprisings" amounting actually to carefully premeditated military seizures of power. The Red Army was to promote the decisive support of Communist groups everywhere, but particularly in the Eastern European areas adjacent to the U.S.S.R. Such support would then produce the political and military takeover of individual Eastern European countries which occurred during the 1944-1948 period of Soviet expansion, clearly illustrating the application of Stalin's revolutionary theories.

Political Reality:  
The Takeover of Eastern Europe

On the whole, Stalin's views on revolution were reflected more in their practical execution than in fanciful theory. To discuss the "takeover process" is merely to state in other terms that from Communist China to the Elbe river in Central Europe,



Stalin was instrumental in successfully exporting his own brand of revolution. Thus, despite intriguing local variations on the theme, the end-product was everywhere Soviet rather than Communist. Consequently Stalin's postwar empire was ruled by the same techniques which, on the home front, had already become painfully familiar (throughout at least two decades of steady experimentation) to all Soviet citizens. Rather than describing at length the individual techniques of this total dictatorship--ranging from police terror through purges, economic exploitation to rigid political indoctrination--this paper will attempt to systematize the unsystematic and examine three key "takeover" theories which attempt to scrutinize the same problem from different perspectives. Essentially, to paraphrase Professor Hugh Seton-Watson's felicitous statement and expand on it somewhat, post-World War II Soviet intervention in East European affairs has been of four major types: the application of military force; direct political action or at least the threat of it; various forms of indirect political action, and economic action.<sup>6</sup>

#### A) The "Chronological Sequence" Theory

One approach to the Soviet takeover process stresses the chronological interrelationships and tries to find a common denominator among the Eastern European victims of Stalinization

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<sup>6</sup>See his From Lenin to Malenkov, The History of World Communism, N.Y., F. A. Praeger, 1953 ed., esp. pp. 253-266.

on that basis. The 1944-1948 period is consequently divided into four sub-phases during which, horizontally speaking, approximately the same events had taken place in the various countries.

Phase One: Liberation (1944-1945)

Using the Soviets' extravagant and misleading phrase, the first period is politically the simplest to describe: the Red Army swept through Eastern Europe in lightning-like fashion, and exploited its crude military influence to put "friendly" regimes in power and to integrate at least the foreign policies of the Danubian and Balkan countries with those of Moscow.

Phase Two: Retribution (1945-1946)

Although this brief "interlude" witnessed primarily the punishment of foreign and domestic war criminals, it foreshadowed a suppression of the anti-Communist opposition, a liquidation of its leaders and, as characteristically concomitant features, a drastic limitation in the freedom of the press and the key political rights of free speech and assembly. It cannot be argued that the wholesale punishment meted out to Nazi and other fascist war-criminals was unjust. It is equally correct to stress, however, that under the guise of war-crimes trials many innocent anti-Communist political figures were carefully liquidated by the various Ministries of the Interior which were, by and large, already Moscow-dominated Communist organizations.

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<sup>7</sup>For a further discussion of the chronological theory in general, and of this point in particular, see Governments of Danubian Europe by Andrew Gyorgy, N.Y., Rinehart, 1949, esp. Chapter II, pp. 37-68.

### Phase III: Engineered Disruption (1946-1947)

This period can be aptly summed up as one of endlessly recurring domestic crises (invariably fomented from the outside) setting the stage for the inevitable Communist party coup and the ultimate violent seizure of power. The principal item in this third phase, indeed a prerequisite for the operation of a long-range Communist formula, was the pressure to gain control of key posts in the coalition- and national-front governments temporarily prevailing throughout the area. This process involved, beyond the highest priority Ministry of the Interior controlling the entire police-system, such other sought-after political prizes as the Ministries of Information, Education, National Defense and Foreign Affairs. But we must emphasize that throughout this short-lived phase, despite the clearly "engineered disruption," the coalition governments were carefully maintained and their principal functions scrupulously observed until the moment arrived when a former minority dramatically transformed itself into a full ruling majority.

### Phase IV: Monolithic Communist Party Control (1947-1949)

The logical last step in this chain of events was the removal and liquidation of all actual or potential opposition. The ~~emergence~~ of the truly monolithic phase implied the establishment of total control by local Communist party leaders, primarily of the non-native or Muscovite variety. The "takeover"

process was now completed, the "people's democracies"--better known to posterity as a series of abject Stalin-created satellites--were born, or rather launched by the tremendous power and overwhelming central authority of the U.S.S.R.<sup>8</sup>

#### B) The "Decisive Election" Theory

Professor C. E. Black's useful account of the role of key elections in Eastern Europe carries the "chronological sequence" approach a considerable step further.<sup>9</sup> As a final confirmation of their seizure of power, suggests Black, Communist leaders everywhere insisted on holding general elections. These also heralded the introduction of new Constitutions which had been hastily drafted to legitimize the new regimes. By that time the temporary "people's fronts" had served their purpose and were tolerated only as "part of the trappings of the transition period to full socialization."<sup>10</sup>

In the overall context of the takeover process, these general elections were decisive in two different directions. First of all, the voters were subjected to direct compulsion to join in

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<sup>8</sup>A perceptive analysis of these stages is to be found in Franz Borkenau's monumental European Communism, N.Y., Harper and Brothers, 1953, esp. Chapter XIX on the "Popular Democracies," pp. 484-516.

<sup>9</sup>See his excellent discussion entitled, "Confirmation of Communist Control" in "People's Democracies--Eastern Europe," in European Political Systems, edited by Taylor Cole, N.Y., A. A. Knopf, 1959, 2nd ed., esp. pp. 775-779.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 776.

a mass vote of confidence expressed vis-à-vis the newly emerging and already predominantly Communist regime. Secondly, the overwhelmingly favorable percentage of the vote was then used to accelerate the destruction of the very "coalition" government (or popular front) for which the vote itself was originally planned and which was supposed to be buttressed by the mass expression of a "free" public opinion.

The specific results of these crucial plebiscites were the following:

Plebiscite Elections: Eastern Europe

	<u>Decisive Communist- Controlled Elections</u>	<u>People's Front Majority (Per Cent)</u>
Yugoslavia	Nov. 11, 1945	89
Albania	Dec. 2, 1945	93
Bulgaria	Oct. 27, 1946	78
Rumania	Nov. 19, 1946	80
Poland	Jan. 19, 1947	90
Hungary	Aug. 31, 1947	60
Czechoslovakia	May 30, 1948	89

Three countries formed an exception to this general pattern, as Professor Black observes. These were Czechoslovakia, Finland, and East Germany. In the first case the Communists of the country, working hand-in-glove with Soviet officials, had to resort to an open threat of force while in the second the successful resistance of the Finns to Communist pressure frustrated and postponed indefinitely the holding of "decisive" elections. East Germany, in turn, had to be treated differently

from the beginning and as occupied territory (in West German parlance: SBZ or Sowjetische Besatzungs Zone) and only the fragment of a once-larger state did not qualify even for such mock-plebiscites as characterized most of the neighboring satellites.<sup>10</sup>

### C) The "Four Area" or Functional Takeover Theory

This interpretation of the takeover process emphasizes a substantive and functional breakdown of this complex phenomenon rather than stressing chronological or electoral details. It suggests that played against the ominous and permanent background-music of a strictly secret-police patterned occupation (in the best Stalinist sense of this term), four parallel sub-processes ~~were~~ put into operation along simultaneous lines. These ~~were~~ the following, placed in a tentative order of importance:

1) Politically speaking, several of the more prominent opposition forces, particularly the groups of urban middle class liberals, peasant parties and the Socialist parties, had to be destroyed or at least silenced and gradually forced into a minimal degree of passive cooperation. While this goal was accomplished only with the greatest difficulty in such countries as Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (in which traditionally

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<sup>10</sup> The plebiscite elections, on the whole, were chronologically not the first after World War II. As second, or "follow-up" spectacles they were used as acts of confirmation of Communist control in the newly promoted "people's democracies." For excellent commentary, see Black, op. cit., pp. 776-777.

powerful anti-Communist elements held out in firm opposition for brief periods of varying duration), the destruction of the political opposition was easier to carry out in Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia. There the anti-Communist forces had either been disastrously weakened by World War II or pro-Communist and pro-Russian forces proved to be more numerous. The habitual techniques accompanying the politics of this takeover ranged from fraudulent elections through political assassinations and mass-kidnappings to a ubiquitous police terror. The entire procedure was subjected to a careful threefold scrutiny and supervision consisting of a Red Army marshal or general, a well-trained non-native, truly "Muscovite" leader, and a legion of Soviet civilian "occupation experts."

2) In the realm of economics, the Soviet Union exacted particularly harsh tributes from its would-be satellites. Stalin demanded heavy war reparation payments for their participation in the war against Russia. There was a wholesale dismantling of industry and the physical removal of entire factories (including their labor and management personnel) to Russia. In the 1945-1949 period, this ruthless dismantling process removed about 10 billion dollars' worth of goods and products from East Germany alone. "Joint companies" were established between the Soviet Union and the satellite by which the Russians gained control of all resources and industries which could contribute to Soviet military and

economic strength. High on the list of these resources were the uranium deposits of Czechoslovakia and East Germany, the bauxite of Hungary, the oil and petroleum products of Rumania; and control of the Danube River. Stalin's revolutionary blueprint required the weakening of a country's economic base to the point where the politics of Communism could be forced upon a defenseless and demoralized population despite its anti-Communist feelings.

3) Culturally, the "takeover" process involved equally drastic measures. A direct challenge to organized religion, particularly of the Roman Catholic Church, was one of the first steps taken by Stalin's local Communist forces. The fight against religion was most bitter and protracted in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia where a large majority of the population was Catholic. Despite the confiscation of her large land estates, parochial schools, seminaries, and even her churches, the Church was not silenced. Following a series of viciously false trials of leading Cardinals and Archbishops, throughout Eastern Europe, there was a temporary lull in the bitter Church-State relations, a moment of truce but never a permanent accommodation between the two antagonists. Other religious groups fought equally spirited battles against the frightening impact of atheistic Stalinism. The small Jewish colonies of Eastern Europe acted as temporary barriers to the "takeover"; and the Protestant Church of East Germany was particularly noteworthy in its unyielding resistance



against the encroachments of the puppet regime of Walter Ulbricht in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany.

Another aspect of Stalin's postwar "revolution" was the intensive drive toward Russification throughout Eastern Europe. For the youngster in grade school and for undergraduates, and graduate-students through the Ph.D. level in the Universities, Russian language and literature became compulsory subjects. Thousands of Soviet "specialists" swarmed over the occupied countries and sought to transform their educational, technical, administrative, and governmental patterns to conform to the Soviet model. A Russian form of Communism was imposed upon the satellites and, despite tremendous national variations (particularly in non-Slavic and anti-Communist Hungary, Rumania, and Finland), all of them were gradually forced into the Stalinist mold. The mold was a comprehensive one; the same elements were soon apparent in each satellite. Rule over each country was exercised by a small clique of "Muscovite" Communists; and Stalin's own favorite and inimitable style of architecture was a common sight. Larger-than-life reminders of the leader--Stalin in picture, bas-relief, and statue--appeared everywhere. Last, but certainly not least,

4) a military "takeover" always formed a part of the establishment of Soviet control. Local armies were demobilized and carefully purged of all non-Communist elements. New, and

politically pliable, officers were given the more responsible command positions while top-level assignments were held by officers from the Soviet Army. A network of Soviet "Chiefs of Armies" developed throughout Eastern Europe: Stalin's trusted emissaries who were strategically located to enforce the dictator's military demands.

One of the notorious military occupation "specialists" was Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, a World War II hero of the Red Army. In November 1949, Stalin dispatched Rokossovsky to Warsaw to be Poland's Minister of Defense and Chief-of-Staff of the Polish army. Rokossovsky, in the uniform of a Soviet Marshal, was declared by governmental edict to be a Polish citizen. The Poles regarded Rokossovsky as an "outsider"--he was born in Poland, but had been taken to Russia when he was less than a year old--and they resented his holding the powerful political-military posts of their country. Similar Rokossovsky types were active during this era of all-out Stalinism (approximately 1949-1953) in the neighboring Central-Eastern European countries. In East Germany, Marshal Grechko was responsible for the bloody suppression of the June 17, 1953 rebellion. Equally sinister was Marshal Konev, the trouble-shooter of the Soviet military, who presided over large-scale army purges in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. This type of rule was established over half of the European continent; and through the victory of Chinese Communism it extended over at least one-third of the Asian continent.

Phase III: 1950-1967

Deepening Conflict Between  
Ideological Perception and Political Reality

In the past two decades one of the most salient features of the Eastern European landscape has been the immensely close interaction-pattern between domestic and foreign issues. Primarily in order to divert attention from their rapidly multiplying domestic problems (both economic and political), the various Communist regimes of the area have frantically focussed on foreign developments. In turn, these external factors, particularly in the form of crisis-developments, have exerted a significant impact at home, on the domestic life and internal ideological evolution of the once-satellite nations of Danubia and the Balkans. These focussing and re-focussing processes have been particularly obvious during the last few years of the Stalinist period when the satellites of Eastern Europe were in a truly dependent state and, in turn, they have asserted themselves dramatically in the "New Course" era of Khrushchev's initial rule and the post-1956 years which have gradually witnessed the evolution of these countries into more-or-less vigorous ex-satellites.

This intricate interaction of domestic and foreign considerations affects equally the perception-level of regime-developed

and promulgated party-lines as well as the firmer foundations of popularly accepted political realities. Take the American involvement in Vietnam as an example. The artificially construed official perception publicized by the various Communist regimes abruptly rejects all American policy-advances toward Eastern Europe stating that: "You cannot build bridges here, and destroy them in North Vietnam at the same time!" Angry anti-American campaigns thus tend to organize diversion from the vicissitudes of the home front to the foreign shadow of the "imperialist aggressor." The popular reality-view of Vietnam is entirely different. It can be briefly summarized as follows: "We like the West and admire America. Furthermore, we are Europeans and who cares what happens in an obscure part of Asia!" Thus the popular reaction tends to be totally different from the regime's view: wherever possible, a basic friendliness and spirit of hospitality shines through the opaque communications-curtains.

We shall now turn to an examination of three major and persistent domestic issues, keeping in mind both the "interaction" or "organized diversion" concept and the sharp dichotomy between perception and reality.

#### 1) Generational Change

The theoretical postulate in this context is deceptively simple: there is no conflict and there can be no disharmony between the succeeding generations in a Marxist-Leninist society.

The image of a successful relay race is conjured up, one in which the batons of Communist ideology and Marxist practice are smoothly passed on from fathers to sons. In defense of this inter-generational harmony viewpoint the time factor is often stressed as a supporting argument, namely that after more than two decades of Communist rule, a large sector of the population has acquired a vested interest in the continuation of the system with ever fewer opposing forces and operational problems to upset members of an increasingly indoctrinated society. To some extent this point is well taken. The longer Communism survives in Eastern Europe, the more sporadic and atomized will be popular and social resistance to it.

The level of actual reality is far different from the harmonious structure of theoretical perceptions. Throughout the entire region there is a convulsively obvious generational change consisting of an ever-widening communication gap between the "old stalwarts" and members of a new avant-garde. There is indeed a mute confrontation between components of the original "revolutionary" generation,<sup>12</sup> and the new, current "post-revolutionary" age-group, the children of the "New Class"--so to speak. The sociological symptoms of this clash are manifold; juvenile delinquency,

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<sup>12</sup>The term "revolution" is used here in a narrow Stalinist sense. These revolutions were far from being massive popular explosions, they were rather artificially planted Communist movements forced upon captive peoples by the occupational might of the Red Army. Thus they were truly revolutions from above.

drunkenness, looting, the stealing of state property, and immoral behavior are the characteristics of a process of social erosion. They denote a growing sense of frustration on the part of this "posterity" with lagging political and economic progress. In a recent radio-broadcast a Hungarian author bitterly blamed the "post-revolutionary generation" for having given up their ideals and for turning bourgeois:

The young man . . . who watched the world and humanity, and who wanted to become an intellectual . . . has turned into a narrow-minded, uninteresting adult who does not care about anything that happens in either East or West, not farther than, perhaps, 500 kilometers from him. . . . His seemingly broad outlook is, in reality, narrow-mindedness and provincialism.<sup>13</sup>

The author then goes on to analyze some of the preconditions for shaking the new generation out of its "withdrawn" state into a more conscious, creative and united posture. Is there a solution for this particular ill of a Communist society? A partial possibility exists indeed; since active loyalty (defined by one writer as an "active stand for the cause and concrete deeds") is too much to ask for, the concept of passive loyalty is being debated in countries like Hungary or the USSR. Even this becomes an optimum goal since reality will usually stress more the passivity than the loyalty of this generation. "Agree and ignore," could be a motto for this pattern of behavior.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>Gyula Fábián: "Meditations" on Radio Kossuth, Budapest, Feb. 13, 1967; analyzed in Hungarian Press Survey, Radio Free Europe, N.Y., Feb. 28, 1967, pp. 2-5.

<sup>14</sup>This discrepancy further enhances the Communist Party versus non-party masses dichotomy. The Communist ideal is a far cry from sordid reality. "A Communist," states a recent Hungarian article, "has to agree actively, meaning that at his own post he contributes with active deeds and work to the implementation of Party resolutions." Népszabadság (Budapest), February 21, 1967, in an article by Jenő Faragó on: "Upholding the Banner for Communism."

## 2) Varying Patterns of Nationalism

The past decade and a half of Soviet-East European relationships has been increasingly affected by two major patterns of nationalism. Indeed, the Communist societies of Europe present today a fascinating mixture of traditional and novel types of nationalism. Of the former, three dominant varieties seem to be in existence, namely political, religious and romantic, while among the latter we shall briefly review the economic and utopian sub-patterns. Since the author has examined political and religious forms of nationalism elsewhere in some detail,<sup>15</sup> we must turn here first of all to a sketching of the romantic, nineteenth century or ante-diluvian<sup>16</sup> category.

"Romantic" nationalism directly affects the ideological and strategic position of the U.S.S.R. both in the northern and southern tiers of Eastern Europe. It asserts itself on the political landscape simultaneously in at least three different directions.

First of all, by clinging to the grandeur of a more majestic "glorious past," it tends to revive old and sensitive nationality

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<sup>15</sup> See especially "The Role of Nationalism in Eastern Europe: From Monolith to Polycentrism," in Eastern Europe in Transition, ed. by Kurt London, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966, pp. 3-18, and the author's introductory chapter: "Eastern Europe in Historic Perspective," in Eastern European Government and Politics, by V. Benes, A. Gyorgy and G. Stambuk, Harper and Row, 1966, pp. 1-22.

<sup>16</sup> Diluvium in this case denotes the onrush of the Communist flood-tide after 1944. The post-diluvian (or utopian) form of nationalism is at present only a hypothetical mirage for the average Eastern European.

issues. Recent references to "Macedonian Chauvinism" again project, for example, the age-old specter of this irredentist and truly revolutionary problem area.

As a second possibility, touchy linguistic cleavages again begin to raise the question of certain particularistic trends in regional nationalism, divided within itself, and thus adding fuel to the fire of smoldering Balkan and Danubian conflicts. The reemergence of an old Serb-Croat linguistic feud was succinctly covered by The New York Times recently:

The call for discipline has grown out of a campaign against Communists suspected of promoting regional nationalism. In Zagreb it was announced today that 15 party members had been expelled and 24 disciplined for having signed a manifesto calling for more emphasis on the Croatian language.<sup>18</sup>

Finally, 19th century nationalism is quite capable of arousing, and then of accelerating, certain geopolitical issues which had lain dormant for the first two decades of post-World War II Communism, but which have suddenly displayed a potentially explosive territorial menace. Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bukovina come to mind here immediately, but other conflict-zones could easily enter into the limelight in the foreseeable future.

These expressions of "romantic" nationalism were truly unheard of and unimaginable as long as Stalin lived and Stalinism held forth. Today they are potentially "all there," and threaten to become inconveniently post-diluvial in terms of Soviet plans,

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<sup>18</sup>The New York Times, April 20, 1967.



intentions and expectations in Eastern Europe. This brief summary cannot encompass all the variations on the theme of Eastern European nationalism. What is, however, important to observe is that these multiple patterns have only recently come into their own again--with the relative, but relentless weakening of the fabric of an alien-imposed ideological system. In effect, to the delight of the Western social scientist, there seems to be a direct correlation between the deterioration of a central, controlling authority and the slow re-emergence of native political forces and endemic socio-economic drives.

Economic nationalism, currently one of the most powerful motivating phenomena in Eastern Europe,<sup>18</sup> is itself the result of two factors working in close combination:

- 1) certain specifically local circumstances (dissatisfaction with their own and Soviet leaders, etc.), triggering off fundamental and long-term popular complaints, and
- 2) a set of globally existing conditions, namely the sweep of a worldwide "revolution of rising expectations" which has emerged in Eastern Europe in recent years in a vigorous fashion similar to that of Africa, the Middle East or Latin America. While the Eastern European variant is generically similar to such economic waves of revolutions everywhere else,

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<sup>18</sup>This pattern of nationalism has inevitably produced economic reforms in Eastern Europe. "The Year of Economic Reform" throughout Communist Europe was 1965; it is ably analyzed by Gregory Grossman in his "Economic Reforms: A Balance Sheet," Problems of Communism, November-December, 1966, pp. 43-55.

it has certain special and distinctive features of its own since it is, after all, an economic revolt under the umbrella of Communist ideology. By definition Communism and genuine popular mass-aspirations conflict rather than coincide in purpose or ultimate fulfillment.

Within this frame of reference, the economic nationalist, be he of Rumanian, Hungarian or Yugoslav national background, is apt to define the current stage of his country's socialist development as based on a national "community of economic interests," on a large degree of "economic autonomy," on a hopefully high degree of industrialization and--wherever possible--on a more-or-less subtle resistance to Soviet plans for dictated economic integration (viewed here as semi-colonial subservience).<sup>19</sup> The ultimate goal is obvious to all: it is the projection of the image of an economically unified and relatively independent state.

The phenomenon of economic nationalism is also confronted by the perception versus reality dichotomy. The theoretical (party-line) dictate suggests the need for and the Communist acceptance of the primacy of the supra-national interests of a

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<sup>19</sup>These phrases are taken primarily from Rumanian sources, such as Constantin Vlad: "The Evolution and Role of the Nation in Socialism," Contemporanul (Bucharest), No. 31, 1966, with detailed comment in Rumanian Press Survey, Radio Free Europe, Munich and New York, No. 650, 22 August, 1966. See also the excellent unpublished paper by Prof. Karel Holbik, "Aspects of Rumania's Economic Development," pp. 1-11. (Paper read at a Chicago Conference on April 21, 1967.)

Socialist world system, a modified and up-to-date version of an Eastern European "Socialist Commonwealth." Simultaneously practical political realities increasingly demand the placing of the ex-satellite's activities and operations within the framework of an independent national economy. These two extremes are almost impossible to reconcile; it is clear, however, that throughout the past few years economic nationalism has already erupted in at least subtly anti-COMECON, if not in directly and openly anti-Soviet trends, moves and aspirations.

Utopian nationalism, the other non-traditional pattern, is anxious to reconcile a nation's loftily defined set of national interests with the long-range goals and glowing promises of Marxism-Leninism. In this context a nationally oriented utopia is carefully meshed with an apocalyptic future vision of a Communist world in which the contradictions of the "world and society" will be absorbed and all forms of class struggle peacefully resolved, even while the country's "national history will be newly born, . . . and the history of humanity aims at new things."<sup>20</sup>

While the type of nationalism we are discussing here is extremely ambitious in scope and ubiquitous in its existence, it is utterly impossible to visualize such a two-dimensional reconciliation of what, on the one hand, the Communists call

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<sup>20</sup>See Hungarian Press Survey, Radio Free Europe (Munich and New York), January 25, 1967.

"Socialist patriotism" with the mandatory spirit of "Socialist internationalism" on the other hand. This self-contradictory double goal indeed confirms Anatole France's well-known aphorism that "History is not a science, but an art."<sup>20</sup> Applying it more closely to the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, here is the crux of the "built-in" problem from the perspective of the colonial power, the U.S.S.R. Essentially supranational in orientation, the current Soviet overlordship or "stewardship" must incorporate a sufficient scope and variety of concrete national interests into its institutional bases to satisfy even the most deviation-prone member of the alliance system. Whenever such satisfaction is not forthcoming, as is obviously the case of Rumania, such diverse Soviet endeavors as WTO and CEMA have failed and Soviet acrobatics have proven incapable of meeting the complex criteria involved here. Conversely, Bulgaria, still a dispirited satellite, as well as the far more significant component of the Northern Tier, East Germany, have obediently followed the dictates of this internal antagonism--and thus stand at the other end of the spectrum from Rumania. Steadily rationalizing their own problems and increasingly concerned with

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<sup>20</sup>We are confronted here with modern Communism's ceaseless "Operation Rewrite." Evaluation, as one Hungarian historian recently phrased it, of the "historical past must change in accordance with the interests of the momentary power." See Hungarian Press Survey, Radio Free Europe (Munich and New York), December 15, 1966, esp. p. 3.

their overall relationships to the U.S.S.R., Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia would probably stand at the midway (50 point) level on this dubious spectrum of Soviet-directed loyalties, from the dual perspective of national aspirations vis-à-vis Communist international organization.

Summing it up briefly, this pattern of Utopian nationalism is both highly optimistic in nature as well as flexible in its ultimate expectations. It is firmly based on the popular assumption that the status quo is unsatisfactory,<sup>22</sup> and proceeds from there to hope both for a return to a pre-Communist national spirit and to a post-Communist (post-diluvian) ideological renaissance. Communist operators, of course, aspire to a Marxist version of utopia. A Hungarian ideologue recently suggested that the ultimate ideal image of the Danube basin will be a "changed world," where people will have "attained their rights, their common ideals in the socialist revolution," set their aims clearly and have "created the preconditions for a brotherly coexistence."<sup>23</sup>

3) Last, but certainly not least among major domestic issues, we must stress the myriad psychological implications

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<sup>22</sup> Complaints abound specifically about the Soviets' cultural backwardness. "Are these the people who want to be leaders of the world?," incredulously ask the Poles or Hungarians. The answers to this question are uniformly depressing throughout Eastern Europe.

<sup>23</sup> See István Szirmai, "Our Party Policy Liberated the Forces of the Intellect," Népszabadság (Budapest), February 12, 1966, p. 1 et seq.

of a widespread popular feeling of ideological "fatigue" or "erosion" which has strikingly emerged throughout this region in recent years. People are desperately tired of Marxism-Leninism and genuinely sick of the incessant din of daily propaganda surrounding Communist doctrinal pontifications. The rejection of ideology cannot be frank and open: its results resemble rather that sentiment of "internal emigration" which had characterized certain anti-Nazi German intellectuals in the early Hitler period. Well articulated in an article in Neues Deutschland by a leading East German poet, Paul Wiens, who is also chairman of the Berlin chapter of the DDR's "Writers' League,":

. . . This does not mean, however, that I would like to end every poem with the formulation: "Besides, I approve of our society!" Tenaciously repeated declarations of creed and love, even if expressed in imaginative variations, soon get on everyone's nerves.<sup>24</sup>

Placed in the context of the "perception versus reality" conflict-area, there is the excitingly communicated official party-line concerning a second, possibly even opposition-, party and ultimately free elections. These perceptions are articulated for the "foreseeable future" especially in such countries as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Hungary. Writing recently in Pravny Obzor, a Slovak scholar has publicly argued that some representative government based on free elections is a

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<sup>24</sup> See Neues Deutschland, September 18, 1966, as analyzed by Dorothy Miller, "The First Annual Conference of the East German Writers' League," RFE Research Bulletin, November 9, 1966, esp. pp. 2-3; emphasis added.

sine qua non for a just socialist society. "Public participation in government," he stated specifically, "must reflect the popular will, and the popular will can best be expressed by free elections."<sup>25</sup>

In Yugoslavia numerous voices have been raised in favor of massive internal ideological liberalization in the form of a second party and free elections. Praxis, the revisionist Zagreb philosophical bimonthly, has repeatedly urged that an "organized political grouping" be created as a "second Party," even if it were not much more than a small group gathered around the editorial board of a periodical (i.e. Praxis itself). The crux of the notorious Mihajlov case and the true reason for the protracted persecution of the young author (sentenced in April 1967 to a further four and a half years in jail) was not so much his attempt to launch a new periodical but his thesis that "there would be no real liberalization in Yugoslavia as long as the party held a monopoly of power. The solution . . . was to have an opposition party and an opposition press."<sup>26</sup>

Existing Communist realities obviously and sadly contradict these loudly claimed perceptions. Not only does Mihajlov's Djilas-style "publish and perish" treatment underscore practical

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<sup>25</sup>See Michal Lakatos, "Some Problems of Socialist Democracy from the Viewpoint of the Citizen's Position in Our Society," Pravny Obzor, No. 3, 1966. For detailed comment, see "Czechoslovak Writer Calls for Free Election," Czechoslovak Press Survey, April 20, 1966, pp. 1-2.

<sup>26</sup>See Richard Eder, "Mihajlov is Given New 4½ Year Term By Belgrade Court," The New York Times, April 20, 1967, pp. 1 + 14; emphasis added.

reality, but in addition the recent, March 19, 1967, Hungarian elections may also serve as a useful case-study. In these elections 340 single-ticket candidates were elected to parliament, and in the nine elections where there were "unofficial," second candidates the official candidates won in every case. Not one of the nine "special" contestants made it. In the final analysis, Communist Party electoral lists won in 349 out of 349 cases, and while the mere fact that nine "non-official" candidates were in the running might be interesting to note, one qualified observer rightly suggested that: "the election played up with a great deal of excitement, was in fact a repetition of ancient comedies."<sup>28</sup>

Such reactions are not confined to the urban white-collar intelligentsia, but are symptomatic also of the more youthful next generation and of such other significant categories as the skilled industrial workers and the rising group of non-Communist technocrats who have come to occupy important positions in economic life. Silence, boredom, apathy, indifference and attitudes of remoteness from the tortuous daily battles of ideological--or partisan--politics are some of the emotional variations on this popular theme.

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<sup>28</sup> See News From Hungary, Free Europe, Inc., New York, N.Y., March 31, 1967, p. 1, under title: "Not a Single Opposition Candidate is Elected Deputy."



## Changing Problems in Foreign Policy

### A. Polycentrism and the Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute

Before turning to specific factors of disunity, one important generalization must be kept in mind. While the latitude in action or mobility of the individual Eastern European states has increased since the death of Stalin, and was certainly further affected by the revolutionary events of 1956, this mobility is still forcefully restricted and circumscribed in the three key fields of military, economic and foreign policies. On the whole, there is much more elbow-room for the satellites in domestic than in foreign relations. "Domesticism," the ability to navigate on one's own initiative and momentum in domestic matters, is an increasingly meaningful phrase in Soviet-East European relations. Thus "polycentrism," implying one's own brand of non-internationally minded Communism, has in recent years evolved primarily into a domestically oriented term. Polycentrism cannot, at least at this writing, be defined as a concept affirming national independence since the "independent" actions and policies of the Eastern European countries are severely curtailed and restricted by Soviet-controlled foreign, military and economic policies. There is indeed a temptation to set up slogans applicable to the current situation on two parallel levels:

- a) in the foreign field, unity over diversity; bloc-relations over polycentric Communism,
- while

b) in domestic affairs, diversity over unity; polycentrism over bloc-loyalty.

Since we are compelled to draw tight lines around the recent phenomenon of Eastern European diversity, it must also be admitted that many of the regional changes we witness there are little more than cleverly contrived optical illusions.

Proceeding now from this narrowed down definition of polycentrism, we must stress a few of the major factors militating against bloc-unity in its operational context. At the present time essentially three major forces seem to be working toward an acceleration of latent polycentrism, both of the institutional as well as the ideological variety.

The first of these is the obvious weakness of Moscow as a once-dominant, but now increasingly powerless, guiding center of world Communism. The inability to direct, to impose its will regardless of consequences, is particularly evident in the CPSU's relationships with the French and Italian Communist parties, but it also surfaces in the faltering and ambiguous connections with Cuba, Yugoslavia and Albania. The independent and often even truculent postures of these leaderships clearly reflect the prestige- and power-decline of the CPSU hierarchy. In turn, the internationally weakened position of Brezhnev and Kosygin affects not only their westward dialogues with such fellow-Communist leaders as Luigi Longo or Waldeck Rochet, but also

indirectly further weakens their eastward rapport with such as Kádár, Gomulka or even Ulbricht.

A closely related second power-factor is the tremendous pull of the European Common Market which, as a case-study of runaway Capitalist prosperity and organizational accomplishment, has exerted a pervasive impact on all Eastern European countries as well as on the uneasy neutrals poised on ECM periphery, namely Austria and Finland. Despite Kosygin's rudely applied pressure on the Austrian government and the Soviets' effective vetoing of Austrian membership in the EEC, for such geopolitically speaking suitably located countries as Yugoslavia or Hungary, EEC membership at some future date would loom as both a profitable and desirable expectation. In the meantime, the CPSU's negative attitude toward the Common Market continues; it will probably keep Finland out of the Western organization as well. Nevertheless, the magic attraction of the Inner Six (soon to be substantially enlarged anyway), is bound to generate further and considerable divisive forces within both the Northern and Southern Tiers of Eastern Europe--forces that for primarily economic reasons (capitalist wealth vis-à-vis Marxist-Leninist shabbiness) are inescapably headed in the direction of weakening the military infrastructure of the region.

Third, and last but not necessarily least, the fear of a resurgent West Germany (especially of the precedent-breaking

Kiesinger-Brandt coalition government) can assume unexpected directions as far as the national interests of Soviet foreign policy are concerned. This anxiety and deep-seated concern with the "Colossus Again" complex may well lead the Greeks, Dutch, Danes, Norwegians, Belgians and even the French to "link up" in some shape or form with the Czechs and Poles, in particular, to prevent by joint and collective efforts the future realization of any pattern of West and East German reunification. The polycentric impact of such an all-European movement could only weaken the Communist movement in general, and the Eastern European power-position of the U.S.S.R. in specific terms. Thus the fear of Germans, and more directly the latent European suspicions of Kiesinger's Ostpolitik, may in the long run tend to weaken rather than strengthen the Warsaw Pact system. In the short run, however, the specific fear of the Federal Republic is clearly bound to cement and weld together the strategic Northern Tier nucleus of WTO: the Poles and Czechs in close alliance with the U.S.S.R., and including also, more for tactical reasons, the East Germans. These are the nations, after all, which have suffered most directly and considerably from the wartime record and behavior of Nazi Germany.

Our discussion of polycentrism would not be complete if we did not briefly consider certain background-forces subtly and indirectly working against the phenomenon of Communist polycentrism. There are at least three factors asserting themselves against

any major institutional and/or ideological linkage between East and West. The first of these, in order of current importance, is the war in Viet Nam. The war in Viet Nam, as Marshall D. Shulman observed:

introduced a qualitative leap forward for the Soviet Union in Western Europe, partly because of the unpopularity of the American position in Viet Nam, but even more because the war occupied so much of our attention and energy. . . . The Soviets have intensified their efforts to weave a network of technological, trade, cultural and political relationships with the major countries of Western Europe, as well as with Canada and Japan.<sup>20</sup>

The seriousness of an all-Communist bloc reaction to the entire Viet Nam issue cannot be minimized. The continuing and escalating American war effort has both qualitatively and quantitatively transformed an originally "red herring"-type problem into a truly divisive issue. Not only has the fairly uniform reaction to Viet Nam solidified on a temporary basis the variegated membership of the East European bloc but, as thoughtful observers have pointed out, even after a settlement of this Southeast Asian conflict, East-West (more specifically U.S.-East European) relations are not likely to return to the friendlier pre-Viet Nam (say 1963 or early 1964) status-quo. The Soviet leadership, making the most of this anti-polycentric and Communist unity-building argument, has angrily equated the Johnson administration

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<sup>20</sup>See his excellent "'Europe' Versus 'Détente'?", in Foreign Affairs, April 1967, pp. 389-402, esp. p. 395.

with war and conquest in Asia while wistfully identifying the late President Kennedy with policies of peaceful accommodation.

As a secondary, but not insignificant factor of geostrategic impact, the time element has probably been the most basic and unpublicized fact of life militating in favor of closer U.S.S.R.-East European relations. Well over two decades of "colonial rule" have left an indelible impact on these societies and have influenced, in particular, the life and educational pursuits of their younger generations. Given another fifteen or twenty years of Soviet-Communist political patterns, despite the gradual loosening of the colonial bonds, it will be most difficult to shake off and reduce to a minimum the long and corrosive impact of cultural Russification and a Communist political ideology. Thus, while obvious and primitive in its influence, the time-factor has certainly favored the U.S.S.R. ever since its most recent appearance in Eastern Europe in the 1944-1945 period. The steadiness of a violently anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist propaganda, carried out on a distinctly saturation level of mass-communications' intensity, also had a great deal to do with bringing above the surface and into the open certain latent anti-Western, and again more specifically anti-American, trends and tendencies.

Beyond the Viet Nam issue and the time-factor of cohesion, there looms an almost equally important political-governmental link between the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. This consists in

the proliferation throughout the entire area of major Soviet governmental and political institutions. It also implies an intricate network of interconnecting "national" Communist parties which are more-or-less slavish imitations of the structure of the CPSU, with parallel administrative procedures and personnel policies. On the whole, during the past 22 years the U.S.S.R. has "succeeded first in transplanting and then in proliferating Soviet Russian governmental, bureaucratic, police repression, and economic patterns of operation in a wholesale manner."<sup>28</sup>

Clearly, the anti-polycentric and pro-U.S.S.R. forces of Communist cohesion have derived considerable benefit from the basic fact that Eastern Europe's local replicas reflect, as variations on a general theme, many similarities and instinctive duplications of the Soviet original.

Turning now specifically to the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute, during the first five or six years of its emergence into the open the disruptive conflict between these two Communist giants has had a fourfold influence on Eastern Europe. It has presented these countries with the following alternatives:

1) to support Communist China unequivocally to the point of precipitating an open break with the U.S.S.R. This dubious choice was made only by Albania which severed relations with the Soviet Union in the 1960-1961 period;

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<sup>28</sup>For a further discussion of this point, see particularly Chapter I, "Eastern Europe in Historic Perspective," in V. Benes, A. Gyorgy and G. Stambuk, Eastern European Government and Politics, (Harper and Row, 1966), esp. pp. 10-12.

2) to gain an area of political maneuvers and material advantages by playing off one of the major ideological antagonists against the other. Attempted in a modest way by several of the East European countries, this alternative was exploited only by Rumania which has played the bribery-bargaining-exploitative game with acrobatic skill and great national satisfaction, while

3) the majority of Eastern Europe's ex-satellites chose the course of pledging complete loyalty to the U.S.S.R. in the hope of gaining sizeable political rewards and economic concessions thereby. Although Bulgaria has been the most loyal to the Soviet Union, Hungary, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia have certainly echoed this policy in its military, economic and diplomatic aspects, insisting in turn on a "most favored satellite" treatment from the Muscovite leadership. By now all of these countries, except Albania, have either directly or indirectly profited from the Communist camp's internecine power struggle. Finally,

4) the lone outpost of a truly Balkan independence emerges in Tito's Yugoslavia. This country's foreign policy posture can only be described as a "plague on both your houses" approach to the problem punctuated with occasional pro-Soviet noises, but with an essentially aloof attitude toward the day-by-day vicissitudes of the dispute itself. Although Yugoslavia nominally favors the



Soviet side, its diplomats are primarily intent on going through the "correct" motions of support rather than taking a substantive side in the conflict. Indeed, a cleverly contrived isolationist aloofness would be the most appropriate descriptive term categorizing the Titoist posture. It is truly non-aligned in the context of Tito's frequently enunciated foreign policy dictum of the nineteen fifties and early nineteen sixties.

B. U.S.-East European Relations:  
The Impact of American Foreign Policy

At the conclusion of our paper, certain new East-West stirrings must be recorded in the expectation that a massive rapprochement between the two may alter somewhat the future course of Eastern European politics. Theoretically the lines of approach were generously drawn in President Johnson's New York speech of October 7, 1966, which stressed a theme of flexibility in Western approaches to the Communist East and talked specifically in terms of "bridge building" and "peaceful engagement." In actual practice, however, both the German Federal Republic and France have taken much fuller advantage of the increasingly liberalized atmosphere of Eastern Europe. In trade policies, cultural exchange and even in formal diplomatic relations Chancellor Kiesinger's coalition government, and in commercial and political matters General de Gaulle's Fifth Republic have successfully undertaken the widening of existing bridges as well as the vigorous construction of new ones. These

bold and important Western initiatives have not only helped to weaken Moscow's control over the once-homogeneous Communist nations of Eastern Europe, but also tended to accelerate the latent mellowing processes and polycentric trends typical of the new European Communisms everywhere.

A leading expert on Eastern European affairs has outlined three alternative courses for American policy in Eastern Europe.<sup>21</sup> The first of these harks back to the 1940-1950 period and seems to be dictated by the realities of the Cold War of the immediate post-World War II era. Its actual policy-lines involve a stepped up pattern of economic and political warfare against the "satellites" (the permanent assumption being made here that once a satellite, always an Eastern European satellite!), a ringing declaration that captive peoples must be freed and that such an aggressive policy on the part of the West would by necessity require the maintenance of large military establishments in Europe on a continuing basis. Conversely, this policy practically dictates the reduction of trade and cultural relations with the Eastern bloc to a minimum, foreseeing even their eventual complete discontinuation.

The second policy-line attempts to draw a distinction between Eastern Europe proper and the U.S.S.R., intending to weaken their

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<sup>21</sup>See John C. Campbell, American Policy toward Communist Eastern Europe: The Choices Ahead, U. of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1965, especially Chapter VI, pp. 83-107.

connection and ultimately to lure away the individual countries of Danubia and the Balkans from their Soviet "colonial protector." Emphasizing the budding national independence of the "ex-satellites," the hopeful expectation is to create ultimately a series of Finlands, Yugoslavias or even neutral Austrias and to involve them in both European Common Market and UN activities. The goal clearly is to expand the scope of Western influence in Eastern Europe without necessarily antagonizing the Soviet Union. 21

The third approach would treat the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe alike assuming a general "easing of tensions," an infectious and overall spirit of "peaceful coexistence" without drawing sharp distinctions between the Soviet and Eastern European patterns of Marxism-Leninism. This view obviously insists on a strong contrast between the U.S.S.R. and East Europe on the one hand, and a truculent Communist China (unalterably opposed to the very spirit of "peaceful coexistence") on the other. As a governmental policy, this line would attempt to take, even if only temporarily, advantage of the growing ideological hostilities created by the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Obviously, there are no quick and easy solutions for such a complex problem-area. The Johnson Administration seems to follow a policy which combines the second and third courses. Despite the

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22 For a thoughtful discussion and commentary of these policy alternatives, see especially Michael B. Petrovich's "United States Policy in East Europe," Current History, April 1967, pp. 193-199 and 243-244.

unpleasant and continuing reality of our Vietnam venture, we have not given up nationally the pursuit of "building bridges" in Eastern Europe or of engaging peacefully in the cultural and commercial affairs of the region. We do this not as a result of softness toward Communism, but as a matter of practical, national foreign policy considerations. As Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski recently articulated it: "We should strive increasingly to shape a community of the developed nations . . . an Eastern Europe which will gradually begin to stand on its own feet and engage in sub-regional integration more independently of the Soviet Union while in turn retaining its ties with the Soviet Union. . . ." <sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> See his "Crises Blur Reality of Slow Basic Change," The Washington Post, July 9, 1967, p. B.2. For an earlier excellent analysis, see Foy D. Kohler, "East-West Relations: Shaping a Stable World," Department of State Bulletin, No. 1436, January 2, 1967, esp. p. 11.

THE HUMAN COSTS OF REVOLUTION.

by

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### THE HUMAN COSTS OF REVOLUTION

To speak of the human costs of revolution already presupposes that revolutions are not merely natural events. For although natural events like earthquakes and storms may take a great toll in human life and suffering, we do not reckon these consequences as costs. Costs are the result of human actions. Although we may not be aware of the costs or ignore them, they flow from intended actions - individual or collective.

That is why it is perfectly intelligible to raise questions about the validity and justification of revolutions - social or political. All the more so when theories of revolution abound designed not merely to explain revolutions but to bring them about. Reflections about revolution therefore are not like reflections about chance, love, death and other tragic happenstances of experience which are unaffected by whatever conclusions we reach about them. They contribute to a climate of opinion that may have fateful consequences for the living and the still unborn. To be sure individuals, even an entire generation, may be caught in a revolution just as they may be caught in a storm in whose making they have had as little to do. But until the weather is brought under control, it remains a natural happening in a way that no revolution is. For revolutions are made by men even if not by all men who are affected by them.

The 50th anniversary of the Russian October Revolution is an appropriate occasion for an assessment of the rationale of social revolution, of the gains and costs of those measures of revolutionary violence undertaken to bring about not the Bolshevik program of a socialist society, for this is still in the limbo of the unrealized, but the incontestable complex social changes that differentiate pre-Revolutionary Russia from the Soviet Union today. Such an inquiry is difficult but not impossible to make. The questions related to it certainly make sense. We ask similar ones about many different things. Looking back on the past we assess important actions in the light of what is presently known not in order to determine whether we would perform them again if time were reversible, but whether, assuming that they were not inevitable, that they were genuine choices, they were justified by their consequences, whether, in short, the gains or the glory or the freedoms won were worth the pains or the agony or the freedoms lost. An experience may be justified by its consequences even though we have no desire to live it over again. Unless such judgments can be validly made there can be no such thing as wisdom in human affairs. Or foolishness for that matter. Regret about the past may be vain particularly if it has no bearing on future conduct. But judgment about the past is so much a part of the business of living that whoever foregoes it has lost all sense of direction or purpose or has become a creature of other people's purposes.

What is true of the small crises in personal experience is also true of the great crises in history. Only those who regard the world of historical events as completely irrational or in Hegelian fashion as a pattern woven by the Cunning of Reason can forswear judging it.

- With respect to -

With respect to the Russian Revolution we can nonetheless rule out as illegitimate the negative judgments that stem from three different sources. There is first of all the class of judgments that condemn the October Revolution on grounds of pacifism or opposition to all war and a fortiori to civil war which is usually the most barbarous kind of war. The difficulty with the pacifist is usually on solid empirical ground when he argues that the costs of war are too high to justify any of its alleged benefits. But he overlooks the very real possibility that a revolution may be undertaken to prevent war. To the extent that it succeeds in forestalling a major war without precipitating bloodshed on as great or greater scale in a civil war, a revolution would be pragmatically justified - other values for the moment taken as being equal. If all the Bolsheviks had done was to take Russia out of the First World War (and Kerensky now believes his great mistake was not to do so after the Komilov revolt), it would be hard to find a reasonable ground of condemnation for October especially if their separate peace had been upheld in a national referendum and they had abided by the results of the elections for the Constituent Assembly. It is one thing to charge the Bolsheviks with unintelligent and unnecessary use of violence in consolidating their power, in industrializing the country, and in collectivizing agriculture. It is something else again, and far from legitimate, to condemn them a priori for the use of violence, since a similar condemnation would have to be made of any and all their political rivals. It would have required violence, even if not very much, to prevent the Bolsheviks from seizing political power violently.

The second type of negative judgment which must be disallowed comes from those individuals who have suffered an inconsolable loss as a result of the revolution. Most human beings are prepared to count the world well lost for the sake of some loved ones. And if among the faces of the dead are the faces of those who have been loved, this is sufficient in the scale of personal values to condemn the social action that precipitated it. We cannot expect detachment in such situations although we should praise it highly whenever it is found. The survivors of a revolution are not the best judges of its social justification even when they bring authentic testimony of the weight of its human costs. We recognize this in other areas. The grieving parents of a child, raped and slain by an ex-convict with an unsavory record, are not the best judges of a parole system or of the wisdom of capital punishment. By the same token the beneficiaries of revolutionary change cannot expect us to judge the events merely by the change it produced in their social status without considering other social costs and especially whether this change of status might have been achieved in less costly ways.

The third class of negative judgments about the October Revolution which must be ruled out as a priori are those derived from acceptance of the premises of orthodox Marxism. This may appear surprising to those unfamiliar both with doctrine, and with the form of the question posed to which we are seeking an answer. The question posed is whether the industrialization and modernization of the Soviet Union which followed the October Revolution required the totalitarian system established by Lenin and Stalin and its various degrees of terror. One increasingly popular answer is that those costs are comparable to those paid in England, Japan, Germany and other European countries for their industrialization and modernization. And since these costs are accepted almost as a matter of course by liberals, it is the veriest sentimentalism to indict the Soviet Union and other Communist countries embarked on the same social program of modernization for moral callousness and the systematic brutalization of man.

- The Marxist rejects -

The Marxist rejects the whole question out of hand as irrelevant to the problem: when is a revolution justified? For according to him this problem has actualité in modern society only when industrialization and the phenomena integral to it, already has occurred. For Marxists the political revolution which marks the development from capitalism to socialism already presupposes that the industry and technology, without which socialism spells merely the socialization of poverty, have developed. To the extent that the costs of revolution are calculated, in the eyes of the Marxist they refer only to the advisability of the immediate political action of taking and keeping power. The question for a Marxist is not whether the costs of revolution are to be weighed against the benefits of industrialization, but only whether the existing forms of industry are to be socialized through due legal process or by the extra legal act of revolution.

This way of posing the problem begs all the important questions. It ignores the fact that the orthodox Marxist dogma according to which no social order disappears until all the potential productive forces within it have been actualized, has been proved to be a myth. The Bolshevik-Leninists succeeded precisely in doing what the theory of historical materialism declared to be impossible. The industrialization of the country did not prepare the way for the revolution but the revolution prepared the way for industrialization. By jettisoning Marx, the Bolshevik-Leninists gave sense to a question which had no significance on Marxist premises. It is a question that has become focal in every underdeveloped country striving to modernize itself and tempted to adopt totalitarian methods to achieve that modernization. It is a question that didn't exist for Marx because for him no underdeveloped country could be ready for socialization. Underdeveloped countries could only become less underdeveloped by following in the path of the more developed which showed them the face of their future.

Leaving aside the context of Marxist presupposition, the problem is a genuine one for any country convinced of the desirability of industrialization and aware of alternative routes and costs by which it may be reached. It is in connection with this problem that the discussion of the costs of the Russian Revolution has acquired an additional interest. Some of those who have been critical of Soviet developments have argued that these costs have been of a dimension which renders any attempt at a rational assessment of this period grotesque. Others who have been critical believe that a rational assessment can be made, and that in the light of the costs of industrialization in other countries, as well as the alternatives open at various times to the Communist leadership of the Soviet Union, these costs were much too high. Both forms of criticism have been rejected on several grounds by writers who claim to be not altogether sympathetic to Communism.

It has been argued that the costs of industrialization in the Soviet Union are comparable to the costs of the industrial revolution in Great Britain, Japan and Germany. The inevitable references to the conditions of the English working class as discussed both in Engels' early work and in Marx's Capital are introduced. It has also been argued that the costs of revolution have been unfairly computed insofar as the costs of normalcy and the status-quo, and even of reform and gradualism, have been ignored. If millions have starved under a given regime and are expected to starve if it is preserved, it is morally inadmissible to indict a revolution designed to change the system that permits starvation on the ground that the victims are counted in their hundreds of thousands. Finally, it is pointed out that there is an historic injustice in condemning even the excesses involved in implementing the program of social revolution in the light of the excesses committed in the past in the name of freedom and even of tolerance.

- It is asserted -



It is asserted that there is a legitimate sense in which the red terror is an answer to a white terror. The latter even if not so intense and dramatic as the former has endured for a longer time. What are these considerations worth - especially in their bearing on the assessment of the Russian Revolution or of any other revolutionary transformation of an underdeveloped country by violent, distatorial and terrorist methods?

## II

The first striking but pervasive confusion in computing the costs of social transformation in the Soviet Union is to speak of the terror under Lenin and the horrors of the Stalin regime as if they were necessarily involved in the processes of industrialization and collectivization. The costs of the industrial revolution in England and other countries are measured in terms of crowding, lack of hygiene, disease, malnutrition, physical discomfort, long hours, child labor, and other privations of a similar order. These costs were the object of bitter criticism. A great deal of the data dramatically used by Marx comes from the reports of the official factory inspectors. The alleviation of these hardships of the industrial revolution became the active object of parliamentary and trade union activity. Before Marx's death many of them had disappeared. There were no mass purges, deportations, executions, and forced labor concentration camps for millions.

The costs of the industrial revolution in the Soviet Union were to some extent already paid for in the pre-revolutionary regime whose social welfare legislation was in some respects in advance of some western countries. But the dislocation of the population after the Civil War, the government monopoly of employment and housing, and the absence of free and militant trade unions restored some of the old conditions and introduced others. Nothing comparable to the phenomenon of the Briziporni, the hordes of wild children, resulting from the deportation of their parents, which I myself observed in Moscow in 1929, developed in other countries as incidental to their industrial revolution.

But all of these costs of the expanded industrialization of the Soviet Union were as nothing compared to the political excesses of the regime. The millions of casualties of the continued civil war waged by the Kremlin against the Russian population had nothing to do with the processes of industrialization except to hamper them. The claim made by some Western apologists including the Webbs that the organized terror by the regime was necessary for the expansion and functioning of industry - that the Russian workers had to be driven to a modernized economy against their own will - not only violates the assumptions of every democratic variant of Marxism but sets on its head the simple truths about the pre-requisites of industry. During the purge years when hundreds of thousands were sent to death camps on grounds of industrial sabotage, it was clear that the regime was equating industrial errors and mistakes with crimes - and particularly crimes against the state, in short, with treason. As subsequent revelations have confirmed, under such circumstances hardly anyone could be found who was willing to take the initiative, to assume the chance and risk of fresh and original judgment. Almost everyone played it safe, marked time while he protected himself behind a barrier of documents that spread the responsibility and shared it with others similarly engaged in a protective avoidance of industrial leadership. If anything can make the political terror worse than it was, it is the fact that it had no industrial rationale whatsoever. It involved the sheer and immense waste of human and material resources.

- All one need -

All one need do to test this is to select some of the specific outrages committed by the Communist high command, especially Stalin, and to inquire what industrial purpose it served. If a victim of the Moscow Trials confesses that he organized a group to sabotage machinery or to put glass or tacks in butter what possible effects could his punishment have on those producing machines or butter except to limit production by more conscientious effort to avoid furnishing any pretext for the charge of sabotage.

What possible bearing on the costs of industrialization did myriads of crimes have from the Katyn massacre to the murder of Ehrlich and Alter, leaders of the Jewish Bund, as agents of Hitler? Not a single one of the incidents reported by Khrushchev in his speech before the XXth Congress of the Communist Party as indicative of the type of "breaches of legality" of which Stalin, in complicity with his opportunistic detractors, was guilty, in any way furthered the industrialization and modernization of the Soviet Union. In no other country of the world was political murder on such a vast scale among the methods by which the industrial revolution was brought to pass.

### III

There is something odd about the comparison between the costs of industrialization in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, and the costs of industrialization in Western countries. What is odd about it is that a series of events which no one agency or institution willed is being compared with a series of events which was the result of a deliberate program or policy. Although the events that constituted the industrial revolution in the West were voluntary, their costs were unintended in the sense that no one agency or institution initiated the industrial revolution. The costs of industrialization in the West were not any less for not being willed. But the moral responsibility was less - it was limited to the range of actions open to the community when the unintended consequences of the unintended industrial revolution unrolled themselves in time.

The industrialization undertaken in Communist countries was a consequence of deliberate decision. It was willed together with its costs in the face of various alternatives ranging from postponement of the execution of an overall plan to plans of a more modest scope and pace of realization. An intelligible choice, aside from its wisdom, is a choice made among viable alternatives in the contemporary spectrum of realistic possibilities. Its justification must be grounded on the differential consequences of pursuing one course of action rather than another. A policy that requires a reign of terror to implement it, if justified, can be grounded only on the evidence that this is the only way to avoid what is sure to be a greater reign of terror. But by no stretch of common sense can it be justified on the ground that some state of affairs, which like the industrial revolution in England, was not the outcome of a policy, had led to an equal or greater amount of suffering and evil in the past.

There is a surprising moral callousness in some of the assessments of the costs of the Russian Revolution which stems from a failure to realize that any social action that is willed carries with it a degree of responsibility that cannot be ascribed to actions that are not willed. The question is not one of miscalculating the effects of a specific policy. The error consists in what is being taken as the basis of the calculation. In discussing the calculus of revolutionary violence, Mr. Barrington Moore Jr. writes:

- "... one has to weigh -

"...one has to weigh the casualties of a reign of terror against those of allowing the prevailing situation to continue, which may include a high death rate due to disease, ignorance - or at the other end of the scale, failure to control the use of powerful technical devices. (The 40,000 deaths a year in the United States due to automobile accidents come to mind here. What would we think of a political regime that executed 40,000 people a year?)" \*

Presumably, the author believes, in answer to his question, that we would think equally poorly of such a regime. Presumably, if the political regime executed only 20,000 people a year it would be only half as bad as if it executed 40,000, and half as bad as a regime which has 40,000 traffic accidents! Accidents and executions are put on the same moral plane!

But this is absurd. Its absurdity can be brought home by considering the parable of the magic carpet. Suppose we were offered a modern version of a magic carpet which required neither oil or gas to take us where we will at speeds of our desire. It could be rolled up and stored in a closet, was accident proof and unaffected by technological obsolescence. Compared to it our automobile would be a very crude contraption. All the ingenious inventor wants for it is the lives of 10,000 people. Having read Mr. Moore, he argues: "If you are prepared to pay the price of 40,000 lives for such an inefficient and costly machine as the automobile why do you hesitate to pay me my reasonable price?"

The answer is obvious. Even if the accident rate is not likely to diminish in the future, we would not regard ourselves as benefactors of mankind if we paid the asked-for price for the magic carpet, but as murderers, because it would be our deliberate decision that would make us responsible for their deaths. There are many other reasons on which to ground our refusal to cancel out the distinction between accident and murder but this one is sufficient. The assumption that our action is limited to a choice between accepting the accident figures of the past and deliberately destroying human beings in order to avoid future accidents is, of course, one that is easily challenged. Once we permit assumptions of this grim kind to stand, then the door is open to any fanatical savior or wilful political adventurer to try to introduce a reign of terror in order to eliminate the errors and accidents and evils that are bound up with ordinary human bungling. In the world of historical reality, of course, there is no guarantee that accidents and wars would be less when freedom, and especially freedom of criticism were sacrificed on the altar of efficiency. Some of the greatest follies of past dictatorships, often fatal to them, could have germinated only in an atmosphere where the cults of efficiency or personality or party infallibility silenced dissent.

#### IV

There is another point of great importance ignored by those who compare the evils of the industrial revolution in the West with the evils of industrialization in Communist countries. This is the difference which the presence of political democracy makes. It was because of the processes of political democracy that the costs of the industrial revolution in Western countries were exposed, diminished and controlled, and some of its greatest evils abolished. The reports of the English Factory Inspectors, to whose moral integrity Marx paid a tribute his own theory of morality cannot account for, led to the social welfare legislation that brought the excesses of the industrial revolution to a halt. And that they were excesses can hardly be doubted. The

- The reports -

\* A Critique of Pure Tolerance, by Wolf, Moore, Marcuse (Boston, 1965) p. 76

- Not for release

The reports naturally centered around illustrations that were extreme rather than typical. A free press, a free literature, and an unmuzzled Parliament proclaimed the evidences of industrial inhumanity to the entire world.

The actual costs of the industrial revolution in Communist countries have gone largely unreported, partly because there were no agencies independent of the government to describe them or facilities for distributing eye witness experiences and partly because the outrage of the political terror dwarfed the sufferings and privations of ordinary life. There were no reporters on the scene to write up what happened to the hands of the child silk-workers in Tashkent or, to give an account of the lives of those "lumber workers" in the Northern forests, except escapees and refugees whose revelations were discounted or dismissed as prejudiced judgments reflecting only their personal experiences.

Even if there were some way of making an objective estimate of the sufferings of human beings in the past and in the present, there is something absurd in justifying the evils of today by reference to the allegedly equal or greater sufferings of yesterday. Comparisons of this kind are worse than useless to the extent that they distract us from recognizing that intelligent choice is always between the evils of alternative courses of action in the present. Whatever the evils of yesterday were they are beyond our control.

To make comparisons with evils of the past, and to attempt to guide present action in their light, sometimes leads to an acceptance of the dogma of collective responsibility in its most pernicious form. It is bad enough to hold all members of a group collectively responsible for actions of some individual members of that group unless the members of the group were aware of those actions and in a position to control them or at least condemn them. But it is monstrous, and a source of great and continuous cruelty in world history, to hold a present generation responsible for the sins of omission and commission of its ancestors.

This cruelty is sometimes concealed in the echoes of rhetorical denunciation of the evils of the past. Thus even Mark Twain, misled by some French historians, in speaking of the excesses and cruelties of the "red terror" of the French Revolution declares that it was nothing but a reply to or a consequence of "the white terror" begun with Louis XIV and which continued for a longer period and with a greater loss of life than the terror of 1793-5. But Louis XIV and those of his courtiers who counseled him had long since mouldered in their graves when Marie Antoinette and her entourage, as well as thousands of French workers and peasants, were guillotined.

The very doctrine of collective responsibility and/or guilt is self-defeating in its moral absurdity since the descendents of the victims of any action justified by the dogma can invoke it to initiate a contemporary massacre. If terror against the Jews is justified by the alleged terror of their ancestors of the present day terrorists then terror against their children would be waged by the descendents of their victims. This can only set up a never ending cycle of hatred and bloodshed. Some Irish terrorists are still revenging themselves upon the English for the crimes of Cromwell. This makes as little sense as would an apologia for Cromwell's excesses on the ground that the Irish are not without guilt since, after all, they wiped out the indigenous population of Ireland.

In an attempt to find a rationale for the appeal to force and violence in the settlement of complex contemporary problems, some American demagogues have

- argued that -

argued that the alleged "genocide" of the American Indians by the settlers provides a warrant for direct action against the descendents of the settlers. The latter presumably have no moral standing in history to protest against such revolutionary violence today since they have benefited from its exercise in the past. Actually, even those who invoke this argument have also benefited by it whether they are white or black or red. Where would they be, what state would they be in if America had not been colonized? There are probably more Indians alive now than when the American Continent was discovered. The rights and wrongs of the policies of the settlers cannot be discussed here - the wrongs far outweigh the rights - but these wrongs were compounded on both sides by the immoral doctrine of collective responsibility which made one Indian village or white settlement guilty for actions committed by other villages or settlements.

It is this concern for past rights and wrongs which bedevils so much of contemporary history and prevents an intelligent approach and resolution of problems in the present. The legacy of the past and the consciousness of the past weighs too heavily on the whole complex of Israeli-Arab problems. And not only in the Near East. One can mention the Far East and Central Europe as well. Wisdom requires an adoption of something like a statute of limitations upon the drive for absolute historic justice, and the substitution of a policy of limited peaceful gains. There is no such thing as absolute justice in this world. The evils Hitler, and not only Hitler, did the Jews in Europe will never be atoned for or repaid, and the only good reason for remembering what he did is to avoid in the present and future the kind of thought and action that led him to his unspeakable barbarities.

From this point of view, the assessment of the Russian October Revolution, as of all other Revolutions, must be primarily in terms of the possibility of other alternatives that could have been considered and taken. The misdeeds of Ivan the Terrible and the cowardly weakness of Nicholas II do not mitigate the actions of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin. The only justification of their purges and terror, based on the unlimited rule of force, was that there were no other alternatives that could be taken. Although one can establish this for some phases or some actions, by and large every decisive turning point in the history of the Soviet Union from the forcible dissolution of the Constituent Assembly to the forcible collectivization of agriculture, to the Moscow Trials, the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and the resumption of the cold war against the United States and the West could have been avoided without any threat to its justifying principles of freedom and welfare. The incontestable fact remains that the working masses of the Western democratic world have secured for themselves a greater freedom and a higher welfare at a far lesser cost than "the tears, sweat and blood" paid by their Russian brothers for their present lot.

A HALF-CENTURY OF SOVIET POLICY IN ASIA.

by

Prof. Harish Kapur.

A HALF-CENTURY OF SOVIET POLICY  
IN ASIA

From the spate of Soviet literature that is available, it is evident that the Soviet leaders have displayed a continuous doctrinal interest in Asia since the Bolshevik Revolution. From an ideology applicable to European societies, they had transformed Marxism into a revolutionary strategy relevant to countries far removed from the preliminary stage of industrialization. From a theoretical concept which aimed at the radical distribution of wealth, it had been converted into a movement aiming at the creation of wealth through the coercive power of the State. And from an ideology which was to inspire revolutions in Europe, it had been evolved into a concept which inextricably linked the consummation of revolutions in Europe with the success of revolutions in Asia.

But despite the manifestation of deep doctrinal interest in Asia, Europe occupied the principal place in Soviet operational diplomacy during the inter-war period. In fact, so overwhelmingly important was this factor in Soviet practice that one can venture to suggest that Soviet policy towards Asia, in many ways, was influenced by Soviet requirements in Europe. A hardening of Soviet policy towards

Europe, for example, invariably led to the embarkation of revolutionary offensives in Asia; a change to a policy of moderation in Europe very often culminated in the implementation of a soft policy in the Asian colonies; even when Soviet Russia had turned to Asia with deep interest in the twenties, she had apparently done so with the primary aim of creating revolutionary situations in Europe by putting its rear in jeopardy.<sup>I</sup>

This subordination of Asia to Europe was dictated by a number of concrete and objective factors. In the first place, the first communist revolution had been successful in relatively underdeveloped Russia when, according to all marxist prognostications, it should have sparked in the industrially developed countries where despite the existence of appropriate conditions for continuous economic development, the modern labourer continued to sink into "ever-increasing misery." Such an unexpected development, obviously due to a fortuitous combination of circumstances, was bound to create, in the Soviet marxist view, serious obstacles<sup>to</sup> the successful attainment of socialism in Russia, unless of course a communist revolution could be successfully staged in an advanced European country which could assist her in reaching the high economic level that was considered as an indispensable condition for the success of socialism. Therefore during the first few years after the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet leaders were pre-occupied with the task of manoeuvring communist

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I For details about Soviet policy in Asia in the twenties see Charles R. McLane, Soviet Strategies in SouthEast Asia, (Princeton:1966); Harish Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917-27. A Study of Soviet Policy towards Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, (London: 1966)



revolutions in Europe; even when it became apparent, by the middle twenties, that the original hope of revolutions in Europe had vanished, consequently resulting in the adoption of the concept of "socialism in one country", a general conviction, nonetheless, persisted among the Soviet leaders that the successful completion of a socialist society in Soviet Russia was hardly attainable considering the difficult task of economic development that faced the country. The Asian leaders, still far removed from their goal of political independence and economic development, could scarcely be expected to perform such an important function. In fact, one could venture to suggest that communist revolutions in these countries would have hindered the development of Soviet Russia, for she would have, in this case, felt obliged, for the sake of international solidarity, to come to their assistance, thereby diverting what appeared to be limited Soviet resources.

Second, the Soviet leaders did not look to Europe only with expectancy and hope. They also dreaded the undermining of their own revolution through attacks originating from that continent; such a fear, perhaps, was not unfounded, for some responsible European leaders had publicly manifested their displeasure at the developments in Russia; and many more had announced their intention to destroy the revolutionary Government

before it acquired all the characteristics of a stable regime. In fact, an effort to this effect was made by the Allied powers before 1918-1920, when troops belonging to some of them landed in different parts of Russia. Evidently this military initiative did not succeed as it was half-hearted and consisted merely of a series of confused and un-coordinated military efforts which lacked any centralized planning. But it was obvious that had the Allied powers really showed determination in their intervention efforts, had they effectively coordinated their plans, it would have been possible for them to destroy the Russian Revolution. Nonetheless, despite its failure, the intervention, coinciding as it did with the Russian civil war, came as a great shock to the Soviet leaders, reinforcing them in their conviction that the leaders of the capitalist countries of Europe were out to destroy their revolution.

Third, during the inter-war years, Soviet Russia, despite her geographical position both as a European and Asian country, was still a regional power who did not possess the necessary military and political power to undertake effective actions in areas which happened to be distant from the heart of Russia; and the heart of Russia for the Bolsheviks was situated in Europe, for it was in this area that there existed the core of Russia's industrial-military complex.

Fourth, the Soviet Government and the Comintern—with the exception of Lenin—were dominated by Europeans who never succeeded in ridding themselves of a bias in favour of Europe, and felt that their obligations to Asia were satisfied with the occasional adoption of theoretical formulations. At the second congress of the Comintern, for instance, where Lenin's national and colonial thesis figured prominently, most of the delegates displayed a conspicuous lack of any genuine interest in the question and appeared to be eager to pass on to the other items on the agenda.<sup>1</sup> For these revolutions in Germany and France were more real than upheavals in India and Indonesia. Even Lenin, who had projected Asia on the European oriented Comintern congresses, was hesitant in assigning a predominant role to Asia. While accepting the revolutionary potentialities of Asia, he, however, continued to maintain the original marxist point of view that socialism was possible only in countries which were industrially advanced.<sup>2</sup>

Immediately after World War II, Europe continued to hold Soviet interest. For it was on that continent that the aftermath of war had brought in its train economic dislocation, political instability and the consequent hope of revolutionary upheavals. Almost half of Europe had come under Soviet control, and the communist parties of France and

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1 M.N.Roy, M.N.Roy's Memoirs (Bombay: 1964) p 384

2 V.I.Lenin, Speech to the All-Russian Executive Committee, April 1918, Oeuvres Vol 27 (Paris: 1961) p305

and Italy had become powerful factors in the political lives of their countries, thereby generating a new hope of kindling revolutionary fires in the heart of Western Europe. But within first two or three years after the war, the Soviet hope of exercising significant influence in Western Europe proved illusive. For despite the existence of massive communist parties in France and Italy, Western Europe, with United States assistance, rapidly asserted its determination to remain non-communist. And within a short period of time, a significant stabilization emerged in Europe, irrevocably limiting the range of Soviet manoeuvres to minor shifts of orientation in one country or another. This stabilization had resulted from a combination of factors: the firm resistance of the Western world to Soviet probes in its direction, the balance of mutual deterrence in the strategic weapons field, and the miraculous economic growth of Western countries.

#### Soviet Russia turns to Asia

In contrast to all this, the Asian continent was seething with discontent. Almost all the countries there were undergoing profound revolutionary changes. The decolonization process, to which the Soviet leaders had been giving their support since the revolution, had

irrevocably set in, making <sup>SOME</sup> countries independent and assuring the independence of others. But even more significant for the Soviet Union were the events in China where the Chinese Communist Party, relying principally on its own strength, had successfully staged a popular revolution in 1949.

In the <sup>Face</sup> of such unprecedented developments, it was hardly possible for the Soviet Union to ignore Asia. For it would have virtually meant the abdication of hegemonial role to Communist China who had already arrogated to herself the leadership of the Asian world. In addition to this, there were other developments that encouraged Soviet Russia to turn to Asia: all the factors that had necessitated the intense growth of Soviet interest in Europe, during the inter-war years, had either disappeared or had undergone an important evolution. First, Communist revolutions in advanced countries of Europe were no longer considered indispensable for the success of communism in the Soviet Union. A series of five year plans had transformed the country into an advanced industrial nation, making it possible for the Soviet leaders to boldly and confidently prognosticate the possibility of attaining communism within the national borders of their own country, thus rendering

invalid the original concept that communism was not possible in the Soviet Union without revolutions in advanced European countries. Also, the Soviet Union came out of the war with the undisputed status of a world power, taking over the place of such countries as England, France and Germany who had been considerably weakened as a result of the war, and who had no hope of re-acquiring their pre-war status. Furthermore, they no longer regarded Europe with the same fear as they had done during the inter-war years. They no longer dreaded an attack from Europe as they had effectively brought Eastern Europe under their military and political influence, thereby obtaining an element of security unknown during the preceding years. At the same time, the hope of communizing Western Europe either through indigenous revolutions or alternatively by Soviet military pressure had also disappeared leading the Soviet Union to become a fervent advocate of status quo in Europe.

Obviously faced with the development of new factors, the Soviet Government could not any more assign Asia a secondary role as it had done in the past. It could not any more permit its requirements in Europe to determine its policy in Asia. But the communization of China led the Soviet leaders to adopt an unrealistic policy towards non-communist Asia. For them the revolutionary developments in China were a convincing proof

that communist revolutions were round the corner. All that was required for their successful consummation, in their view, was a political support to these movements. And this, as we know, was openly given. Appeals were made, statements were issued from Moscow and through the Cominform, calling upon the Asian communist parties to seize this opportunity to violently overthrow the newly independent Governments of their countries.

Responding to this belligerent line, the Asian communist parties openly and blindly raised the flag of communist revolt without making a rational assessment of the political situations in their countries, and without seriously analysing the chances of their success.

The net result of all this revolutionary din was simply disastrous. Almost all the Asian Communist parties were crushed and isolated from the mainstream of political life. Undoubtedly for the Soviet Union, this was a serious setback. For not only her capacity of exercising important influence over the continent had significantly diminished, but even her image of a great friend of Asian nationalism, so sedulously projected since the Bolshevik Revolution, was tarnished. Even the nationalist leaders, who had in the past favourably looked

upon Moscow and had considered Soviet leaders as champions of nationalism, openly manifested their serious disappointment; some of them even did not hesitate to condemn publicly the policies of the Soviet Union. Thus, the first time that the Soviet Union had seriously turned towards Asia, she found herself more isolated than ever before; and instead of obtaining a further diminution of Western influence in Asia, she was now confronted with the serious prospects of its increase and its consolidation.

#### Change to Moderation

Such a serious setback made it imperative for the Soviet leaders to re-examine their policy; and it must have become evident to them that their assessment of the Asian political scene was influenced by the dichotomic situation in Europe rather than the veritable political reality existing in the area. In the first place, the Asian leaders and their political parties were apparently too strong and too deeply rooted among the people of their countries to be overthrown by artificially created revolutionary upheavals. And the Communist parties, though strong enough to create confusion in their respective countries were



not effective enough to actually take over the reins of power.

Second, many of the Asian leaders, having been impressed, at some stage of their lives, by the Soviet revolution of 1917 had openly and firmly proclaimed their intention of introducing a much more far-reaching socialistic pattern of society in their countries than had ever been intended by the non-communist leaders of the West. Obviously this was in many ways a unique situation, and a contemptuous identification of it with capitalism had not only shown the measure of Soviet dogmatism, but had also exposed the lack of Soviet intellectual sophistication needed to understand new trends, new thoughts and new movements.

A rapid change was therefore brought about in Soviet ideological thinking and policy towards non-Communist Asia. Although evidence of change had begun to appear during the last few months of the Stalinist epoch, real signs, however, became clearly evident only after Stalin's death. Instead of striving for immediate control over these areas, Soviet diplomacy now strove to deny them to the West by slowly and subtly drawing the nationalist leaders in a loose coalition of anti-Westernism. The new trend in Soviet policy was therefore identified as "working with the national bourgeoisie", and it was more concerned with influencing the orientation of these leaders in world affairs than by overthrowing them by revolutionary action on the part of the local communist parties.

But how could the Soviet leadership influence the orientation of the Asian leaders? How could it make them turn to the socialist world?

What could it do to make them less dependent on the West? The situation in Asia being what it was in the middle fifties, it was obviously not possible to pursue diplomatic action which would encourage the entire of non-communist Asia to simultaneously turn to Moscow; for the Asian countries were seriously disunited in their international outlooks. Some were non-aligned, whereas the others had allied themselves with the West.

In these circumstances, it was decided to adopt a clearcut attitude of supporting non-aligned nations in their conflicts against the aligned or Western nations. India was supported against Pakistan on Kashmir; Afghanistan was given unconditional support against Pakistan on Pakhtoon movement; the Arab world was encouraged against Israel; and Indonesia was given complete Soviet support against Holland on West Irian.

By jumping into the maelstrom of Asian politics, by supporting the non-aligned nations against the ones that were aligned, by morally and materially assisting those Asian nations who had serious difficulties with the West, Soviet Russia had jettisoned the disdain manner with which she had viewed the Asian problems in the past.

Such a policy brought fruitful results for Soviet diplomacy. A

fund of goodwill rapidly surged up among the Asian nations who only few years earlier had viewed with great scepticism some of the policies that were expounded by Moscow. For instance, The Khrushchev-Bulganin visit of 1955 to India during which they had categorically given their support to India on Kashmir, the Indian public opinion took a rapid turn in favour of the Soviet Union.<sup>I</sup> Similarly the Soviet decision to side with the Arab world against Israel, and to extend support to Nasser during the Suez crisis of 1956 was a great break-through for the expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East.

By throwing her diplomatic and political weight on the side of one nation against the other, Moscow perhaps was aggravating international tensions, but this admittedly was an important means of establishing effective footholds in Asia.

But such diplomatic actions, though effective for enhancing the Soviet image among the non-aligned nations, was not enough to make them orient themselves towards Moscow. For these nations were inhibited in their goal to disengage from the West due to their excessive economic dependence on the ex-colonial powers. Practically all their aid came from the West, and almost all their trade was geared to the Western

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For details see G.D. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, Communism in India, (Berkeley:1959) p 460

markets. Many nations were aware of this serious disadvantage, but they could hardly take any action to remedy this situation in view of the total non-cooperation on the part of the communist world to develop any significant economic relations with Asia. But after the death of Stalin, and with the inauguration of a friendly policy towards the non-aligned countries, the development of economic relations with these countries became a key lever of Soviet foreign policy. Important credits were given to these countries, trade was encouraged and technical assistance was offered. For example Soviet credits to India, the UAR and Afghanistan constituted 35 per cent of all investment that was expected for economic development of these countries between 1956-1961.<sup>I</sup> Trade between these countries and Russia had also taken the great leap forward. For example in 1961, one third of Egyptian exports and slightly under one twelfth of Indian exports were geared to socialist countries.

In contrast to this policy of moderation towards the non-aligned countries, Soviet Russia continued her belligerent line against those who were aligned to the West. Military threats were made to these countries, warnings were given, and oppositional elements were encouraged to rise against the existing Governments. But all this was of no avail, for such a policy did not lead any of these countries to forsake their

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I V. Rymalov, La collaboration économique de L'URSS avec les pays sous-développés, (Moscow: 1961)

relations with the West. If anything, the Soviet threats only encouraged them to turn more and more towards their Western allies to seek even firmer ties with them than they had before.

#### The Sino-Soviet Dispute and Asia

With the explosion of the Sino-Soviet dispute by 1960, the international situation underwent an important change. The International communist movement which had so far managed to maintain—with the exception of Yugoslavia which had hardly any effect on the movement—a facade of monolithic unity under Moscow's leadership was seriously disrupted. Communist China belligerently criticised Soviet policy on problems of international relations, defiantly challenged Moscow's claim to leadership of the international communist movement, and unhesitatingly declared that Soviet Russia no longer belonged to the anti-imperialist front. The differences between the two countries escalated into a dispute spreading in all directions and on all points. The ferocity with which the two Communist giants are today striving to undermine the position of each other is as striking as the ferocity with which they had indulged in indigestible encomiums for each other during the previous period.

Faced with such an unprecedented situation, the Soviet Union had to re-examine her overall policy towards the Asian countries. Although the original Soviet objective of seeking a diminution of Western influence

in Asia continued to pre-occupy the attention of Soviet diplomacy, it was however no longer the only objective. The containment of Chinese Communist influence was added to it. Obviously this was a difficult task for the Soviet Union, for she now had to formulate a strategy which had to take into account the containment of "rightwing" America and "leftwing" China--a task by no means easy for a country which had hitherto been accustomed to formulate a relatively simple strategy solely directed against the West.

Therefore, in response to the new situation, Soviet diplomacy formulated a new policy which was even more flexible, more dexterous and more far reaching than the one that had been formulated at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist party. And what is even more significant, it appeared to respond very effectively to the widely different political situations that Asia was faced with at that time.

First of all, Soviet policy of extending moral and material support to the non-aligned countries was further intensified. Economic and military assistance was poured into these countries, and every effort was made to bring them even closer to Moscow in their diplomatic orientation. However, on one particular point, Soviet policy underwent an important change: in some areas, Moscow now avoided, as far as possible, of openly siding with one Asian country against the other. In the Pakistan-Afghan dispute on the Pakhtoon question, the Soviet

Union did not openly side with Afghanistan as she had done before. On the Cyprus issue the Soviet Union retreated from their previous position of open and unconditional support to the Cypriot Government against Turkey. And in the Indo-Pakistan dispute on Kashmir, she now adopted a posture of neutrality. In fact, during the Indo-Pakistan conflict of September 1965, the Soviet leaders moved further. That is to say, instead of simply limiting their efforts to the development of relations with India and Pakistan, they began to display anxious concern over the manner in which the relations between the two countries continued to deteriorate; and they now began to consider that the advancement of Soviet interest on the Indian sub-continent as well as in Asia was closely linked with the improvement of relations between the two countries. Such an attitude finally led to the opening of an important diplomatic offensive to bring the two countries together to discuss and resolve the issues that divided them. And, as we know, these efforts were successful in getting Ayub Khan and Shastri to meet in Tashkent. Soviet contribution to the success of the conference was undoubtedly very significant; in fact it would be no exaggeration to suggest that without the active participation of Kosygin in the discussions, the formal agreement would never have been reached. This was the first time that the Soviet leaders had neither manifested a disdain neutrality over the whole issue, nor had they taken sides in favour of

one nation against the other.

Perhaps the most significant change in Soviet diplomacy was towards some of the aligned countries who were either contiguous to Soviet territory or were not far from it. Despite considerable Soviet pressure in the past, the leaders of these countries had acquired certain political stability and had shown surprising immunity from revolutionary upheavals. Therefore, instead of thoughtlessly continuing the belligerent line, a policy of moderation was now pursued. Pressure on Iran, for example, was decreased, the long standing border problem was resolved, and important economic initiative was taken. Propaganda offensive against Turkey was abandoned, stress was laid on the close relations that had existed between the two countries during the time of Kemal Pasha, and some support was extended to Istanbul's views on the Cyprus question. Pakistan's disengagement from the West was encouraged, economic relations were developed, and a neutralist attitude was adopted on the Kashmir issue. And Japan was tempted by important economic contracts to turn to Moscow.

Such a policy, it is evident, resulted in the considerable improvement of relations between Moscow and these countries. With all of them important economic agreements were concluded, and with some—Iran and Pakistan—even the question of military assistance was broached. But it



would be an oversimplification to attribute all this exclusively to the expression of moderation in Soviet policy or to the dexterous manner in which the Soviet leaders had reacted to those countries; for it is most unlikely that small nations would change their attitude towards the big nations simply because the latter have become more friendly and more flexible to changing circumstances than they had been in the past. Important changes in a country's policy are also due to the fact that the international situation has evolved or because political conditions within the country have undergone important changes, necessitating the formulation of new policy. Pakistan had begun to show important signs of moving away from the West because of the apparent reluctance on the part of the United States and Great Britain to give unconditional and complete support to her against India on the Kashmir question. Admittedly there is evidence to suggest that the West perhaps was more sympathetic to Pakistan's point of view than that of India, but it would be nonetheless difficult to produce evidence of complete support of all that Pakistan did to attain her objectives in Kashmir. Turkey too had become disappointed with the Western countries on the question which concerned her directly. The Western posture of neutrality, for example, on the whole dispute between Greece and Turkey on Cyprus, and the United States decision to withdraw her out-dated intermediate missiles from

Turkish territory were two important factors that led Istanbul to *disengage*

I For details see, Harish Kapur, "The Soviet Union and Indo-Pakistani Relations" International Studies Vol 8 July-October 1966, New Delhi

some extent from the West. Iran had begun to see advantages of being less dependent on the West. And Japan had once again become a major power eager to play an independent role in international affairs.

The Soviet Union, there is no doubt, has made great strides among the non-aligned and to some extent the aligned countries of Asia by laying stress on non-military factors. Her influence on many Asian countries today is as important and as effective as that of the United States. Considering the fact that Moscow had seriously embarked on the policy of gaining political influence in Asia only about a decade ago, its success on that continent is indeed remarkable.

But what about areas where limited military conflicts have broken out or where the "national liberation struggles" against the Governments, openly allied to the West, have been initiated by political forces known for their pro-Soviet proclivities? Is it possible, in such instances, for the Soviet leaders to adopt the same policies that have been formulated towards the types of Asian countries mentioned above? Obviously this is not possible, as the pursuit of such a policy would be tantamount to a virtual abdication of Soviet influence in the violently explosive areas, and a brutal exposure of Soviet inability to accept the role of a world

power for which she has been so sedulously striving since World War II. Furthermore, the Soviet influence among the revolutionary forces would inevitably diminish, and she would become even more vulnerable to the Chinese Communist charge of indifference towards revolutionary wars. In such cases, therefore, the leaders are obliged to give a military inflection to their policies—particularly where the Chinese Communists are active in their revolutionary endeavours. But the military inflection that has so far been given to Soviet policy has either taken the form of belligerent verbal declarations or, alternatively, it has manifested itself in the giving of important material aid to Soviet friends. The Soviet Leaders, it must be noted, have been careful in avoiding a direct embroilment of their armed forces <sup>IN</sup> such conflicts. During the Korean War, the Soviet Union—though willingly extended material support to Communist China and North Korea—was careful in avoiding a direct embroilment with the United States. And, yet, when one examines the history of the period, one is struck by Soviet complicity in the origination of the war. At the time of the Suez crisis in 1956, the Soviet leaders supported Nasser, but publicly threatened to send volunteers to the Middle East, only after the crisis was practically over. In the Congo, the Soviet Union preferred to operate through the

United Nations despite direct appeals from Patrice Lumumba. Even in Vietnam, which appears to be an important bone of contention between Peking and Moscow, Soviet embroilment--from all the evidence that is available--is limited to economic and military assistance. However, it would appear, from the numerous declarations emanating from Moscow, that the Soviet leaders are determined to go much further than they have permitted themselves in the preceding wars of such a nature. Nevertheless this appears unlikely, considering the physical distance that separates the two countries, and the serious logistic problem such an intervention would create for the Soviet armed forces. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that even when the Soviet Union, on her own initiative, had created a situation of formal confrontation between herself and the United States, a policy of retreat was invariably adopted once U.S. determination to resist had become apparent. In an attempt to drive the Western powers out of Berlin in 1948-49, Stalin created the Berlin blockade, halting all rail, road and river traffic. But in the face of unexpected Western determination to air-lift food, fuel and other necessities of life to Berlin, the Soviet leaders gave in and transferred the whole dispute to the council table. Unquestionably, this was one of the greatest tactical defeats suffered by Soviet foreign policy since World War II. Soviet retreat from Cuba in 1962 was even more conspicuous; for in this case, the Soviet leaders--faced by American determination--rapidly withdrew the missiles they had installed

on Cuban territory. This was undoubtedly another very humiliating situation for Moscow. Whatever may have been the reasons that had led the Soviet leaders to stage such a conspicuous and humiliating withdrawal, the fact that such an action was undertaken is an important evidence of Soviet cautiousness in so far as direct military involvement is concerned.

Soviet Russia, thus, has so far avoided any direct military confrontation with the United States. What will be the future Soviet attitude towards situation that have been discussed above, it is of course difficult to predict with any exactitude. But if the past is any guide to future Soviet actions, one could venture to suggest that circumspection would continue to govern Soviet military policy.

### Conclusion

During the inter-war years, Europe occupied the principal place in Soviet operational diplomacy despite the manifestation of considerable doctrinal interest in Asia. But since World War II—particularly after the death of Stalin—Soviet interest in Asia has continuously increased. Every year, since 1959, the world witnessed greater and greater Soviet involvement in the Asian game of politics. And today, there is

no doubt, that the continent of Asia has come to occupy a central place in Soviet diplomacy. Most of the Soviet aid, technical assistance and political endeavours appear to be directed towards that continent; and most of Soviet speeches and declarations on Foreign Policy appear to be concerned with Asia and other areas of the third world.

Such an important shift from Europe to Asia is understandable. In Europe, it is no longer possible for the Soviet Union to make any diplomatic headway, to increase her own influence or break some of the diplomatic deadlocks that still continue to haunt Europe. Despite the disengagement of France from the United States, despite the remarkable defreezing of economic and cultural barriers between the two blocs, Europe, politically and militarily, still remains partitioned with no scope for the Soviet Union to advance her political cause on the other side of the barrier. Furthermore, it is hardly possible for Moscow to attract non-Communist Europe by her economic development and social advancement; for Western Europe is more advanced and more affluent than the socialist bloc. If anything, it is the European countries of the West which are inspiring economic and political changes in the socialist countries.

Asia, on the other hand, is different. there, it is still possible for Moscow to make further headway, for the political lines are not

drawn and the Asian countries do not have any reason to consider that they have nothing to learn from the socialist experiment that has been carried out in the Soviet Union. This manifestation of deep interest in Asia has resulted in the considerable increase of Soviet influence on that continent. So much so that one could even say that Soviet influence in Asia is as great as that of the United States. Perhaps even more. But this increase in Soviet influence in Asia has been obtained only after the Soviet leaders had finally abandoned all efforts to Communize Asia, only after they had softened Leninist formulas, and had finally accepted non-Communist varieties of socialist doctrines forcefully expounded by non-Communist leaders. Asia, in fact, has become such an important factor in Soviet diplomacy, that it is deeply influencing Soviet policy towards the West. Since the unrelenting Chinese criticism of Soviet leadership as insufficiently militant, possibilities of substantive settlements with the West in Europe appear to have diminished. Any dealing with the "imperialists" are exploited by the Chinese as "capitulationism", thereby effectively inhibiting Soviet leadership's desire of seeking a detente with the West.

While the conflict in South East Asia has made it difficult for the Soviet Union to take any steps to bring about substantive improvement of relations with the West, they have not, strangely enough, inhibited Moscow from continuing a moderate policy towards the majority

of non-Communist countries of Asia. In fact Soviet relations with these countries continue to develop on an even keel precisely because of Soviet moderation. However, in those areas where conflict exists--such as Vietnam-- the Soviet Union has given more militant meaning to her ambiguous doctrine of support for "wars of national liberation" which sanctions Soviet military assistance. Although the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the Chinese charge of lack of enthusiasm for local revolutionary developments have led the Soviet Union to intensify her military assistance in Vietnam, Moscow continues to practise restraint so far as its operational policy is concerned. Nonetheless, it must be admitted that the revolutionary upheavals, now complicated by Peking's rampagous hostility, has brought many risks that the Soviet leaders could not have imagined when they launched themselves on the Asian scene after 1953.

Harish Kapur



WITHERING OF MARXIAN ECONOMIC THOUGHT  
IN FIFTY YEARS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY

Kenzo K i g a

# WITHERING OF MARXIAN ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN FIFTY YEARS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY

Kenzo Kiga

## A. Dictatorship of the Proletariat at the Expense of Agriculture and Peasantry

### 1. Foreword

Since Lenin's successful Revolution 50 years ago, it has been the official opinion of the Soviet Union that the development of its national economy has been marching along the road to Communism as predicted by Marx and Engels. Certainly, it was a fact that the Bolshevik revolutionary movement led by Lenin had been most strongly influenced by Marxism, and that the ideal which he intended to realize in Russia by revolution was a Marxian Communism.<sup>1</sup> This fact was made evident by the many policies for revolutionary changes which Lenin after the seizure of political power immediately put into practice, such as the nationalization of land, industrial enterprises, etc., the establishment of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, the Gosplan, etc.

On the other hand, it is also a fact that government and economy in the Soviet Union have not always been developed in accordance with the predictions of Marx during the course of the 50 years since the Revolution, and that leaders of the Soviet power have often acted against the Marxist doctrine. They nevertheless insist that they have followed the path of Communism based on Marxian thought.<sup>2</sup> In the cases where they have acted contrary to the propositions of Marx, they have often expressed the different propositions in their own language, and insisted that such propositions are consistent with Marxian thought, that they are a creative development based on a correct interpretation of Marxism.

Similarly, during the 50 years which the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union have controlled the Soviet economy, Marx' economic theory has, on the one hand, served as guiding principles, while they have been rejected on the other. For instance, the abolition of the private ownership of means of production was in agreement with the Marxian theory, and the negation of the system of competitive market economy also was in keeping with the thought of Marx. However, at certain times during the 50 years, in spite of the progress made in planning, the market economy was allowed to revive.

What were the circumstances which secured the adherence of Party leaders to Marxism and what caused their deviation therefrom? In other words, what were the principles by which actions of the Party were ideologically controlled? The task of this paper is to conduct a study by limiting it to the dictatorship of the proletariat, forms of ownership, control of means of production (centralized planning), and the conception of prices as a means of accounting and control.<sup>4</sup> These problems are the three special features of the Soviet socialist economy, which simultaneously expose the difficulties intrinsic in the Soviet economy.

### 2. Lenin

One of the important characteristics of the innovations which Lenin planned and tried to realize, when the Communist Party assumed political power in the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat, was the seizure also by the Party of control in the economic fields. The result was his economic policies of the rapid industrialization of the country and the discriminating treatment of agriculture and peasantry.

Lenin justified his interpretation of Marx and his own actions by using the language of Marx' Critique of the Gotha Programme. For Lenin, the Bolshevik Party represented the working class, and his mission was to exterminate class enemies and to establish socialism. For him the dictatorship of the Bolsheviks was nothing but the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeois class. There was no contradiction between the two, and the Communist Party was defined as the "leading vanguard of the proletariat."<sup>5</sup> Party leaders were the most authoritative and powerful, richest in experience, with heavy responsibilities. They had to play the role of the vanguard of the proletariat to educate and enlighten the workers and the most backward strata of the peasants.

On the basis of such an idea, the Communist Party was able to secure an omnipotent position for itself, and consequently, orders of the Party in the guidance and control of the national economy became ipso facto orders by the proletariat and for the proletariat.

At the time of the Revolution, Russia was an agrarian country and the peasants formed the predominant part of the population. Because of this Lenin was obliged to form his own opinion on the relationship between the Soviet power and the peasantry for Marx had nothing to teach him in this respect. Lenin adopted a policy to attract the peasants tactically to the side of the Bolsheviks. This policy was the liberation of the land for them, and it was enforced immediately after the Revolution and was enthusiastically welcomed by the peasants who were hungry for land. No doubt his policy contributed greatly to the consolidation of the Bolshevik power. On the other hand, it also fostered small landholders all over the country, which was a first step to the building of socialism, but was the source in subsequent years of many difficult problems in the economic policy of the Communist Party.

The dictatorship of the proletariat has been the position common for Lenin, for Stalin, and for the present rulers of the Kremlin. In politics and economy the peasants have been treated as a secondary class in the name of collaborators or allies of the proletariat, and were rated lower in priority than the industrial workers. For this attitude, however, the Soviet regime did not owe anything to Marxian doctrines. As a result of the Soviet policy of its rapid industrialization, especially of the construction of large-scale industries, the peasants had to be relegated to a subsidiary position. This evaluation by the Soviet regime of the peasants' interest and agriculture as lower than the interest and industry of the proletariat, however, was in accord with the Marxian ideology, for the development of productive power, namely large-scale industries, is an important element of Marxian economic thought, and has been a traditional policy of the Communist Party since Lenin's days. Thus the peasants and agriculture since the outset of the Revolution have posed a problem to the Soviet authorities with their policy of socialization -- which may be expressed as Soviet power plus industrialization -- to be realized by means of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and this problem cannot be solved by the Marxian economic thought.

As is well-known, Lenin made effort during the period of War Communism to march along the road to socialization by requisitioning provisions. Failure in this policy, however, has caused subsequent retreat from socialism.

In March 1921, the decree on the "Food Tax" was promulgated. On that occasion, Lenin emphasized that the measure would be transitional, that it was recognition of a revival of capitalism, because small managements, small producers of commodities, and free local trade would be allowed to revive, that agriculture in the future would be mechanized and carried out on a large scale, and that as long as the main sectors of large industries were under the control of the Soviet power, there was nothing to worry in the development of the proletarian State.<sup>6</sup>

According to Lenin, no socialist revolution was likely to succeed in Russia, an agrarian underdeveloped country, whose population was predominantly peasants,

unless compromise was made with them. In capitalist countries, on the other hand, a class of wage-earning agricultural workers had been formed during scores of years, and they could be relied upon socially, politically, and economically, at the time of direct transition to socialism.

Lenin unequivocally defined the New Economic Policy as a retreat to capitalism, admitted War Communism to have been a political error, and discontinued transition to production and distribution under Communist principles. With due respect to the principles of small peasants, small managements, and personal interest of the peasants in agriculture, he recognized a revival of capitalism, and insisted upon the necessity of many years' strenuous preparations for transition to socialism.

Lenin's concession to the peasants through the N.E.P. and his abandonment of the initial design for Communism were due to his recognition that the stability of the Soviet regime was being threatened. The most serious of his concerns at that time was the maintenance of the regime in a stable condition. For a dictatorial government, maintenance of power, above all other purposes of policy, should take first place in its leaders' thoughts. The N.E.P. was the first and significant example of submission of Communist ideology to capitalist influence. Lenin, however had an excuse and hoped that the temporary retreat to the N.E.P. would mean a time for the preparation of an advance that had to come. He thought that in a country of petty producers and small peasants, more time, at least a decade, would be necessary for large-scale socialist production to gain a final victory, or even more time under the prevailing condition of devastation.

### 3. Stalin

The N.E.P. was given up much earlier than Lenin had expected. Then Stalin started his forced industrialization, and this caused a clash between the industrialization policy and the interests of the peasantry.

Defining the tasks of the Party at the Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927, Stalin referred to two measures. One was the promotion of industrialization at all costs, and the other was an expansion of the socialist sector and the liquidation of capitalist elements in the national economy. According to Stalin, when compared with the rapid progress in the nationalized industry, agriculture was not planned, but mostly left at the mercy of natural forces, this being characteristic of production by small units. Stalin thought that the best way for agricultural development could be found in large-scale management on the basis of common cultivation of land and mechanization of agriculture -- to be realized gradually, without compulsion, and by constant persuasion and object lessons.

Two years later, Stalin impetuously started his drastic policy of collectivization of agriculture, the reason being the disputes about the procurement of grain which arose between the Government and the peasants. In spite of the recovery of production in agriculture under the N.E.P., Government procurements were much smaller than planned, and it was difficult to export grain for the importation of industrial machinery.<sup>11</sup>

The relatively well-to-do stratum of peasants grew to create an effective opposition to the procurement policy of the Government, and Stalin made it the main objective of his agricultural collectivization to annihilate the class enemy of capitalist elements, that is, the anti-revolutionary peasants and N.E.P. merchants. At that time, the most important elements opposing the Soviet power, in Stalin's view, were the influence of that stratum of peasants growing in Russian villages and Bukharin, Rykov, et al., who supported that stratum.<sup>12</sup> He felt the danger of these enemies to the Soviet power becoming too serious, and this was the reason, at its later stage he changed the course of the N.E.P. in opposition to Bukharin, although at the initial stage, Stalin, in compliance with the N.E.P. policy, had opposed Preobrazhensky group's policy of drastic industrialization or protection of nationalized industries.<sup>13</sup> The independent management of agriculture on the basis of collective labor and large-scale and systematic procurement by contracts in advance for the supply of grain. Stalin even insisted that his collectivization of agriculture was closely connected with the construction

of industries which would supply machines and tractors to agriculture, and that both industry and agriculture would be developed simultaneously and rapidly. 14 Stalin expected that the kulaks would oppose his policy of taking the maximum amount of surplus grain from the kulaks in order to secure foreign exchange necessary for the development of industries. 15

The growth of production which Stalin had expected from the collectivization of agriculture did not materialize. But "socialist agriculture" which was agriculture managed under the influence of Marxian economic thought made two important contributions to the construction of a socialist industry. One was the absorption of labor from agriculture into industry, and the other was that agriculture whose produce was procured by the State at low prices served as a source of investment in industrialization. Throughout Stalin's era, agriculture was treated as a source of capital and labor force for industrialization, and the peasants' standard of living was kept at a low level, their subsistence being maintained more or less by work on the private plots attached to their living quarters.

#### 4. Khrushchev and Thereafter

Up to the present time, the leaders of the Party have not been satisfied with the collective form of agricultural management. This is because of the private plots on the one hand, and of the management itself in a co-operative form on the other. This form has worried the leaders ideologically. In spite of the common knowledge that private plots are obstacles to the collectivization of agriculture, they have not been abolished for the reason that the Government has not been so lenient towards the peasants as to allow them to maintain life solely by the income from kolkhozes. It is a well-known fact that at the present time produce from the private plots, such as potatoes, vegetables, eggs, and some livestock products cover a large part of supplies at the market. Naturally, both Stalin and Khrushchev wished to reduce or abolish the private sector which persisted in agriculture. They thought, however, that it was more expedient to postpone the abolition until the time when income from the common management of kolkhozes would become more remunerative than the reward from labor on private plots would bring about. 16 This is a retreat before the peasants from the ideology of nationalization.

The present leaders of the Kremlin have made another ideological retreat by extending special favor to the management of private plots, that is, the Government of Kosygin has released private plots from the burdens and restrictions imposed during the Khrushchevian days, and has encouraged the peasants to pursue their private interest. 17

One of the most important tasks for Khrushchev during the ten years of his administration was the improvement in the productivity of agriculture. Measures enforced by him, such as the cultivation of virgin land in Kazakhstan, the corn campaign, frequent reorganizations of the administration of kolkhozes, and others, were intended to improve the backward agricultural situation which had become a serious obstacle to the development of industrialization. The idea remained in his mind that kolkhoz agriculture was always a means to amass an investment of money for industry. Agricultural machines were sold to kolkhozes at relatively higher prices than to sovkhoses; retail prices of industrial products sold to peasants were higher than those for urban centers; orders given to kolkhozes for the State procurement of agricultural produce was very severe. In his last years of power, Khrushchev proposed the application of the pension system to members of kolkhozes, which, however, was much more unfavorable to them than to industrial workers. Khrushchev raised the procurement prices paid by the State for agricultural produce so as to give material incentives to the peasants. His purpose, however, was to stimulate production, and not to raise the living standard of the peasants.

For the purpose of improving productivity, Khrushchev's successors in the

Kremlin have the same idea as Khrushchev of increasing capital investment in agriculture. But there is the difference that the present leaders have inaugurated a policy to recognize more autonomy to kolkhozes by reducing the quantity of procurement and lightening the burden of detailed central directives. The words of Brezhnev, Secretary General of the Party, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party in March 1965, are worth noting that differentials between prices charged to industrial and agricultural consumers should be eliminated. 18

It seems that relegation of agriculture to a position ancillary to industry for its development is being now reflected upon. In recent years, reforms have been adopted to respect the economic interest of the peasants and to stimulate their will to produce (such as increased investments in agriculture, raise of procurement prices, reduction of obligatory delivery quotas, granting of premium prices, reduction of kolkhoz taxation, etc.). Such reforms mean that agriculture has become an industry not profitable for the Government to extract accumulation. 19

The future of Soviet agriculture cannot be hopeful, if the idea of the large-scale collective management and the centralized material production planning (the procurement plan) is adhered to. Under the present productivity of agriculture, it would be more economical to import agricultural produce than to grow it in the country. The firm belief of the Soviet leaders in autarky, however, is stronger than any care for the advantage of international division of labor. On the other hand, the opinion is gaining ground that more regard should be paid to the autonomy of kolkhozes and that they should be released from the control of centralized production planning. 20 Here lies a way for kolkhoz system to get rid of Marxian ideology.

## B. Nationalization of Means of Production and Centralized Planning

### 5. Lenin's Conception

The second characteristic of the Soviet economy under the influence of Marxian economic thought is negation of the private ownership and private management of means of production. Neither Marx nor Engels had much to talk about the form of ownership to replace private one. Marx uses the term "common property" for the form of ownership in Communist society. In the Critique of the Gotha Programme, he uses the expression: social ownership founded upon common property of means of production. 21

It is not clear what common property (Gemeingut) and siccak iwersquo (gesellschaftliches Eigentum) means in concrete terms, for State ownership, co-operative ownership, or any collective ownership may be covered by the above expressions. Naturally, the form of administration of means of production may vary as well as the form of ownership. Administration by the Government, that by an association, or by local selfgoverning body is consistent with the conception of social ownership. Certainly, Marx did not think of nationalization in a Communist society, as in that society, according to him, the State should wither away, and he seemed to have thought that instead an association should be formed. 22

Marx, however, may well have thought that in a transitional period to a Communist society, the revolutionary government, that is the State, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, should control and administer the entire means of production. In his Communist Manifesto of 1848 Marx states that the proletariat, which has grasped the power of political control, will "use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible." 23

In fact, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, after having acquired control of the political power, declared the nationalization of land and other major means of production, which may well be said to have been the first target of the

proletarian revolution, and consistent with Marxian ideology. The revolutionary government, however, was unable to learn from Marx by whom and how the means of production which had already been brought under its control should be administered. The dictatorial government, therefore, had to establish a new organ for administration and a new formula of economic administration.

The idea of guiding the industry of the whole country under a comprehensive plan for the entire national economy seems to have been in the mind of Lenin. The idea of planning entertained by the revolutionary government was reflected in the establishment, immediately after the Revolution, of the Supreme Council of National Economy (December 1917), the Goelro, the State Commission for Electrification (February 1920), and the Gosplan (February 1921). It appears, however, that Lenin had only an elementary understanding of the planning of the national economy. His favorite expression about unified economic planning was, "Accounting and control" by the whole people of production and distribution<sup>24</sup> on the condition that large-scale enterprises like those under capitalism should have developed.

In the background of Lenin's approval to the daring attempt at the marketless economy, towards the end of War Communism, may have been his primitive understanding of the management of the national economy. An enterprise may guide and control its shops under the single plan by accounting and control, and each enterprise in an industry is a part which can be similarly controlled. So is each industry a part of the whole national economy, which may control such industries. Lenin, therefore, may have thought that all the industries of the national economy could be managed under one single plan for the whole country by "accounting and control"

As a matter of fact, if a government which has taken over political power and means of production by violence from the bourgeoisie wants to set up an economic system to replace the evil one of markets and anarchic competition, it is no wonder that the economic system should take the form of one managed by a plan under the guidance of the Government.<sup>25</sup>

After the failure in the first experiment on marketless economy, Lenin did not give up hopes for one entirely. On the basis of the fact that small farming units were overwhelmingly numerous in Russia, he explained the setback to the N.E.P., but at the same time, he tried to lead such petty bourgeois managements, for which he had permitted freedom of trade, to socialized and joint labor in a collective form. He thought that the first question to be settled for this purpose was to show them the advantage of large-scale production and the superiority of large-scale managements. Immediately before the transition to the period of N.E.P., the Gosplan was formed on February 22, 1921, on the basis of the Goelro plan. The Gosplan made it its purpose to draw up a unified economic plan for the whole nation and general supervision over the realization of this plan.<sup>26</sup>

## 6. Stalin

It was to Stalin's merit that he characterized the socialist economic system with centralized planning. One of the features intrinsic in Stalin's centralized planning was that targets of production plans were given in terms of physical quantities. When production on the nation-wide scale is planned in the center and is to be put into practice, a plan for the mobilization of material resources should of necessity be drawn up for the fixing of concrete targets of production and the allocation of amounts of investment.

In the Soviet Union, the Government itself is the investor and simultaneously the party which gives orders to production enterprises. As its target of production, each enterprise is given the kinds and quantities of products, with the indication of their monetary values. As a result, an official standard will grow for the technical plan that from a certain quantity of material and equipment a certain amount of products should be obtained. The indication of a production plan in terms

of money only means that the accounting of inputs necessary for the fulfilment of production targets and control over the fulfilment will be facilitated. 27

The rapid industrialisation plan which Stalin wanted to fulfil generalized the practice of measuring the production results of the individual enterprise in terms of its target of physical volume. This practice diffused the command economy which was like the wartime programme for the mobilization of materials. Under this plan an effective distribution of material resources is left to the political decision of the planning authorities. The target set by Stalin was to increase investment -- or in Marxian terminology accumulation of capital -- and to recognize absolute priority for development especially that of heavy industries -- or the production sector of basic means of production. Why was the first priority given to this sector? One of the reasons was that Stalin wanted to promote an autarkic industrialisation of the Soviet Union, without recourse to any division of labor with capitalist countries. Moreover, he thought that all kinds of industries should be based on the development of fuel and energy, iron and steel, and machine building industries. These were industries indispensable also to the production of munitions. 28

The priority given to the development of heavy industries, before the light industry was not in accordance with Marx' or Lenin's doctrine of the law of expanded reproduction. It was, first of all, for the sole purpose of building the basis of Soviet industrial production, and constructing autarkic industrialization, including munitions industries. For this purpose, it was inevitable to increase investments and to suppress consumption. As a means of facilitating industrial investments, exchange rates between agricultural produce and industrial products were set favorably for the latter.

Special features of Soviet planned economy were born during the years of Stalin by such methods as centralized physical planning, political priority for the allocation of resources, rationing of inputs, and compulsory saving. Such methods naturally made it difficult to measure reasonably the relative importance of natural resources, capital, and products to the respective demands. This difficulty is one of the main reasons for the serious self-criticism of the centralized system of the planned economy during the Khrushchevian days.

The centralized system of the planned economy of the Soviet Union is based on the nationalization of means of production, State management, and the ideological distrust of anarchic production in the market economy. On such a basis is built the guiding principle of the economic dictatorship by the Soviet power -- restriction of the consumer's sovereignty. Under the above system, the political objective set by the Soviet power appeared to have been achieved up to the latter half of the 1950's by rapid industrialization and rapid growth of national income. However, towards the end of the 1950's, or when the Seven-Year Plan was started, however, economic defects which existed in the planned system began to grow, that is, imbalance between demand and supply, lag of agricultural production behind the development of industry, inferior quality of products which gives rise to disappointment among the consumers, lack of stimulation for technical progress and for cost-saving effort, etc. The growth of these defects seems to have caused the Soviet economic leaders to get rid of the influences of the Marxian economic thought. For a discussion on this subject, the writer will have to raise the third point which characterizes the Soviet economy, namely, the question of economic accounting and criteria for allocation of resources. In other words, the question of the non-Market economic mechanism in the Soviet Union, in particular, the functions for the prices of producer goods -- wholesale prices -- will have to be taken up.



## C. Changes in the Planned Economic System

### 7. Functions of Prices

The Stalin Government imposed upon itself a long-term task of rapid development of certain sectors of industry, and pursued the objective of mobilizing the necessary resources for this purpose. It tried to carry out planning, execution and supervision of plans, and evaluation of the results, without having recourse to the mechanism of the market economy, but under an administrative structure built on the basis of the Government's political power. For the purpose of attaining this task, it was necessary to set in order both arrangements for the allocation of material as well as human resources, with priority to sectors which the Government considered to be important, and the mechanism of stimulation and supervision for the accounting and the efficient utilization of the resources.

At the outset of the planning period, the prices which prevailed during the period of N.E.P. were made official prices, and taken as the basis of accounting. Each enterprise was given production tasks in accordance with its capacity. In enterprises, prices no longer played any part in demand and supply arrangements, but they became means of settlement of deliveries and receipts of resources between enterprises, and also a means of computing costs for each enterprise.

In keeping with the planning of the movement of goods, the movement of money also was planned. Official prices and directives concerning delivery of goods and movement of money became important factors of the fulfilment of plans coming from the center. The right of allocation of major material resources was concentrated in the hands of the central authority, and so was the right of distribution of monetary funds. 29

It was actually impossible, however, for the Central Government to give directives to an enterprise concerning all the details of its disposition of resources, nor was it possible for drawn-up plans to direct an enterprise in every detail of inputs and production. Consequently, it was necessary for the enterprise which carried out a concrete plan and an administrative organization which exercised direct control over the enterprise, to make decisions and choices to some extent by themselves, and they were in fact endowed with such competence. But in order to fulfil, or overfulfil their tasks, enterprises often resorted to illegal methods in making their own choices.

For those in charge of drawing up plans in such a system, official prices meant indicators of the allocation of resources. The Government wanted to achieve its objective of industrialization at the least expense possible and the Government required of the enterprises to attain the production targets at expenses smaller than the amounts indicated as the standard. Economy of expenses was not considered by the enterprises as necessary for the fulfilment of the targets, but in drawing up detailed plans and making decisions within their competence, so that success indicators would become favorable to them, price were an important criterion for the decisions. 30

Although the Soviet Government adhered to the ideology of planning, there were two aspects in which it may either have been obliged to allow market-like allocation to function or have found this more expedient. One was the allocation of labor between industries, and the other was that of consumer goods among the consumers. As for labor, its attraction to working places with monetary incentives was the method generally adopted. The Soviet authorities explained its wage system ideologically by using the expression that at the first stage of Communist society

labor would be rewarded by its quantity and quality. The choice of consumer goods was left to the consumers by fixing official prices in which their demands had been taken into consideration, provided that production of such goods was fixed in advance not by the consumers' demands, but by Government planning. If the supply of consumer goods on the market, therefore, did not correspond to the amount of the money to be spent by the consumers, there was inevitably a shortage of goods.

Through the system of official prices, the Government has absorbed funds for investment. Larger parts of both liquid assets and fixed assets were accumulated in the hands of the Government and enterprises in the name of profit. Profit was computed at a certain rate of production cost, as if it was part of expenditures, and formed an element of the prices. The Government and enterprises did not like to think of profit in the light of the productivity of capital. Besides, interest on capital in fact accrued only on working capital which was supplied to enterprises through the Central Bank. Interest on capital was not included in expenditure.

In any economic system, labor is the main item of production cost. In this sense, the fact that labor is evaluated in accordance with its productivity makes it the most reasonable element for forming prices in the Soviet Union. The Marxian theory of value that labor alone should create value, however, generalized the method of computing expenses in disregard to the productivity of capital. The same theory of value also disregarded the concept of utility in fixing prices, and therefore almost no consideration was paid to adding the meaning of opportunity cost to prices.

Prices were used as a means of taking account of costs, and the planning authorities therefore, made average costs of production in respective industries as standard prices, and by applying a single price list all over the country, they aimed at measuring the efficiency of the production of individual enterprises. All these circumstances made prices in the Soviet Union unsuitable for use as indicators of choice for the economically effective allocation of resources. On the other hand, the practice to include profit in expenses as a means of accumulation distorted the general meaning of costs.

These unrealistic prices were adopted during the whole period of Stalin's rule, and the Soviet Government was able to proceed with rapid industrialization which was its aim. The Government pursued a long-range plan of construction, giving special priority to basic industries by the mobilization of human as well as material resources. As a result, efficient allocation of resources for a short term was not carried out, and only a secondary consideration was given to fulfilling the people's demand for consumption. It may well be said that for the Government the supply of consumer goods only meant costs for the industrialization and investment. The Government did not ignore economizing on costs, but it believed that basic industries must at all costs be constructed. As long as it was within the competence of the Government to mobilize both materials and funds, a long-term fixing of prices was a condition convenient for the accounting of costs, as well as the preparation of plans and control over their execution.

If labor is a general and main expense for production, such an expense necessary for the production of labor, that is, the supply of daily necessities, forms a more fundamental expense. The Government under Stalin, however, was successful in reducing this production cost as far as possible and investing capital and labor in industries.

During the period of Khrushchev, however, industrial growth at the sacrifice of the peasants alone was found difficult. Agriculture was going to become an industry not profitable enough for the Government, and necessity arose to seek sources of the accumulation of capital within the industries themselves.

#### 8. Khrushchev and Thereafter

The Government under Khrushchev began to think that industrial growth could be raised by eliminating the waste which <sup>10</sup>it had ignored before, by securing a higher

efficiency of each production factor, and by adjusting the existing imbalance between the industries. The Government was aware that centralized planning had caused much waste, that resources had been allocated to purposes outside the plan, or efficiency raised for purposes not intended. In keeping with the development of industry, enterprises were increased in number and their products multiplied in kind; the Governments's plans for the allocation of resources became more complex, and centralized plans would not entirely agree with the actuality of the enterprises which carried them out. Frequently, plans would be revised or new ones added. As technical difficulties in preparing such plans grew, difficulty in making economic choices would increase proportionately, and the central planning authorities would feel the growing importance of taking these matters into consideration as a comparison of profitability concerning increased opportunities for investment, as well as efficient use of scarce resources.

One of the measures for overcoming such difficulties is the decentralization of plan-making authority. Already in 1955 during the premiership of Bulganin, the number of indicators for national economic plans was reduced, and enterprises under All-Union Ministries were transferred to Republic Ministries. In 1957 under Khrushchev, the authority to control was divided in accordance with the territorial principle of economic control.

The decentralization of authority and reduction in the number of central indicators may not always mean a simplification or curtailment of planned control of the national economy. They simply mean transfer of authority, with the confusing result that many new controlling organs draw up plans and set indicators for their own interests, thereby disrupting on the one hand the unity of the whole planning and disturbing on the other the autonomy of the enterprises which are executive organs of their plans. It is a fact that the Council of National Economy which was established by Khrushchev not only was unable to achieve any effect of the decentralization of authority, but even relieved control from the center. This was the situation up to 1965. 31

A new formula for economic control proposed towards the end of the Khrushchevian days and enforced under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime differs from the previous decentralization of authority in that it intends to reduce the scope of the centralized plan and enlarge the autonomy of the enterprises. Previously, authority to prepare plans was merely transferred from one position to another. 32

The expansion of the scope of autonomy for individual enterprises slackens the traditional centralist discipline over the use of money as well as goods and materials, increases the competence of each enterprise to freely dispose of the money it controls, and enlarges the freedom of the enterprise to buy and sell physical goods. The importance of the role of prices as indicators for choices must be increased, as will inevitably influence the allocation of resources. It will be necessary, therefore, fundamentally to revise the mobilization of material resources, the concentrated line of command, and the role of prices in accounting, all of which have been the traditional features of the Soviet planned economy. The question will remain how to combine and coordinate influences of the market economy, which will follow the revision, still keeping the traditional features. The new system of planning and industrial administration reserves to political decision of the center such matters as the amount and direction of new investments and the kinds and quantities of the products given to each enterprise as its target for production. On the other hand, it intends to leave to decision of each enterprise care of looking for the resources and labor power necessary for the execution of the target. Here the characteristic centralism of planning is being maintained by the new system, but the guidance and supervision (encouragement and penalty) to be exercised by the Government at the time of the execution are to a great extent left to the autonomous action of the enterprise itself. This is indeed the main objective of the new system. It presupposes that if enterprises are allowed to pursue profit they will exert efforts to economize on expenses, to improve the quality of the products, and to raise the efficiency of capital. According to the draft concerning

the system, the success of an enterprise should be measured by its rate of profit, and the interests of the enterprise and its employees geared to the rate of profit. As for the production target, the draft designates not only the quantity to be produced, but also the quantity to be sold, and holds the enterprise responsible for the sale. Thus the maintenance of a short-term equilibrium during the execution of the plan is left at the discretion of the enterprise.

The purposes of this renovation may be achieved if the prevailing official prices are revised, for, in order for the rate of profit to be a success indicator, a price system would have been established in which, under given prices, some profit above the costs should be guaranteed for every enterprise. Moreover, the new prices should reflect scarcity value so that they may be able to perform the function of efficient resource allocation.

According to Sitnin Chairman, of the State Price Committee, the prime objective of the Government's revision of prices consists in fixing official prices at a level at which certain rates of profit can be secured for enterprises. At the same time, he says that adequate prices should perform the functions of improving the quality of the products, stimulating production, and accumulating investment funds. 33 For the present Government, however, it would be impossible to reorganize the price system so that prices may perform all these functions. For instance, enterprises of textile industry have obtained high profits at the prevailing prices, while the meat processing industry has been operated at a loss. It may answer the purpose of the revision, if prices can be cut for the former and raised for the latter. But the Government is unwilling to revise retail prices. Hence the policy is not to change the price levels according to the said objectives without exception, however, unreasonable they may be.

Another example is coal. The production cost of Donetz coal is low, and that of Moscow coal is high. The Government, however, does not fix one uniform price for coal of the same quality. It fixes different prices for the respective coal mines. In this case, the Government does not give up the principle of price formation by an average cost in the industry, but makes it the policy to apply the "accounting price" to the enterprises which need production cost higher than the average. As for the difference in the cost of extraction between oil and gas, the Government is considering fixing marginal prices and charging rent for the difference in the production cost between superior and inferior enterprises.

Thus the Government policy of revising prices has not boiled down to guaranteeing profit, for the Government takes into consideration a balance between new prices and the existing retail prices and those of agricultural produce, or the influence of the new ones on the production cost of other industrial products. Moreover, in cases where profit is guaranteed, its rates are not uniform.

It is typical of the Government's way of thinking that it still regard the main function of prices as being an instrument for the execution of the Government plans, without recognizing them to be a regulator of production. Up to the present, the Government has made accounting by using prices, and enforced savings by means of them. The future prices are expected by the Government to perform the same function.

One of the most important meanings of the economic reform now under way, however, must lie in the reform of the command economy which has been the deep-rooted evil of central planning, by extending freedom of autonomous choice to each enterprise. Even if the scope of such freedom is limited, prices' function of resource allocation must be recognized in a working production plan, which has been prepared by the enterprise itself using the rate of profit as a success indicator. Moreover the enterprise should be provided with funds which it is free to dispose of, and the result must be the formation of a kind of competitive market among enterprises for transactions in their products.

but the Government is not prepared to accept the situation in which the so-called "law of value" plays the role of the regulator of production. Danger is apprehended from an acceptance of such a situation that the Government may even have to give up the power to command the national economy. Furthermore, the probable result may be contrary to the Marxian teaching of the ideology of socialism and mean surrender to the "anarchic market economy." As can be seen, the fatal shortcomings of the Soviet economy are wasteful use of materials, inefficiency of capital, and various imbalances in the economy, and one of the fundamental causes for such shortcomings is the system of the command economy and the fact that prices are merely a means of technical accounting of expenses, not being an economically meaningful one for comparing expenses and for making decisions among different uses. As a result, prices may cause economically wrong choices to be made at the preparation of a plan, and wrong success indicators to be shown as the plan has been executed. Prices under the new system, which intends to take the rate of profit, that of interest, and the quality into consideration may be more reasonable than the existing ones which have disregarded these factors. But the consideration is not sufficient to be called reasonable. The political arbitrariness is still attached to the whole price system. Uneven rates of profit, accounting price, average cost principle in each branch of industries, etc., are the elements which result from the command economy of central planning and which deprive the price system of its economic rationality.

So far as the governmental authorities retain the right to form prices and do not give them the allocative function, the deep-rooted irrationality of the planned economy would be unavoidable.

The leaders of the Kremlin seem to regard an economic reform accompanied by aspects of the market economy as a way to improve the efficiency of central planning, but not as a reform of the central planning itself. Do they believe ideologically in the superiority of central planning, or think that such planning is necessary for the maintenance of the Soviet political power? Or, are they prepared, if necessary, to accept, for example, the Yugoslav system of the market economy, or thinking that they may take the way of liberalization even further?

## 9. Conclusion

The fundamental problem which the Soviet economy is facing today after 50 years appears to be how to break the slackening of the growth of productive power of the national economy. Since the days of Lenin, development of productive power of large-scale production and industrialization has been the supreme order, which is in keeping with the main proposition of the Marxian economic thought, and the successive leaders have boasted of the results of the economic development, using the term: development of productive power. A rise in the standard of living for the people has always been postponed as fruits for the next generation. Agriculture has been a means of accumulation of the capital necessary for industrialization, and the peasants are nothing but hens laying eggs which can be used for capital. In the minds of Party leaders there has been a fear that too much feed may only mean more expense which would spoil the hens. The present situation, however, is different. Instead of supplying capital to industry, agriculture is rather requiring it from the latter. The hens have ceased to lay eggs, but wish to receive more feed. And in this respect, the Government is obliged to revise its ideology of upholding the development of industrial productive power as the first prerequisite.

The structure of central planning has certainly fortified the power of the Party, and contributed to the development of basic industries. The diagnosis of Marx was utilized, when the planning system was established, that the market economy meant anarchic production and that pursuit of profit was not bound with production for the consumers' life.

If the leaders of the Party were more loyal to Marx, they should have been more enthusiastic in excluding from the economic planning system lower forms of

socialist ownership and relations connected with commodities and money. They are realists, however, not devoid of the knack to expediently reform ideology, and this can be seen, for example, in the introduction of the labor market, the consumer goods market, and the kolchoz market into the planning system. The leaders explained that these markets would disappear when a Communist society was realized, but tried to inculcate upon the people that at the transitional stage approaching Communism these markets were necessary and would be strengthened and utilized.

A difficult situation for the leaders, however, soon came, for the law of a further development of productive power in socialism has begun to be inapplicable to their country.

The leaders of the Party have been convinced that the causes obstructing the development of the centralized planning system are inherent in the system itself. But they do not want to dissolve the system, as this is a case of ideological bankruptcy, and is likely to weaken the economic foundation of the power of the Party. They may be prepared, as in the past, to revise ideology for the sake of power. Future trends of economic decentralization and the market economy may well be thought to be determined more by the balance between the political power and the economic rationalization of the planned economy, rather than by ideology.

State administration of industry and agriculture, as well as the central planning system, may be further loosened, if it is necessary for an improvement of economic development, but not to the extent that the economic liberalization threatens the dictatorial power of the Party.

The leaders of the present Government seem rather timid and conservative at the experiment of the new economic reform, in the sense that it is quite contrary to the principles of the Marxian planned economy, although the leaders' words give us a revolutionary impression. They do not appear to care about loyalty to the Marxian economic thought. They cling to the ideas of State ownership of means of production, of the centralized planning system, and of prices as a means of accounting and control, because, it seems to me, they believe that these measures are necessary for the strengthening of their political power, or at least for not weakening it, but not because they are necessary for the realization of Marxian Communism.

#### Notes

1. Lenin's State and Revolution, Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 199, Moscow, 1952, is his most representative work, showing how deeply he was influenced by the thought of Marx.
2. "Socialism, which Marx and Engels scientifically predicted as inevitable and the plan for the construction of which was mapped out by Lenin, has become a reality in the Soviet Union" (The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1962).
3. For instance, Lenin's proletarian revolution was entirely different in character from Marx' revolution. According to Marx, the ripening of capitalism was a sine qua non of proletarian revolution, while Lenin with his theory of different stages of imperialism tried to justify proletarian revolution in countries where capitalism had not ripened. Stalin opposed the world revolution of Marx and Lenin, and advocated socialism in one country only. As his reason, he pointed out the imbalance in the development in capitalist countries and growth of internal contradictions in imperialist countries (Stalin, On the Foundation of Leninism). Khrushchev named all people's state, and denied Marx' class state and the withering away of the state. If denial is too strong a word, at least the withering away

of the states has been postponed indefinitely, and a new idea of all people's state has been introduced after the dictatorship of the proletariat. According to him all workers are equal and there is no class rule in the Soviet Union (Khrushchev at the 22nd Party Congress).

4. Wiles, Peter, The Political Economy of Communism, 1962, Chapter 3, has acted as an incitement to this paper on the Marxian peculiarities of the Soviet economy.  
Wagenführ, Günther, Das Sowjetische System und Karl Marx, 1960, elucidates the Soviet economy at the present time in comparison with Marxian economic thought.

This paper does not deal with the contribution (or lack of contribution) of Marxian economic thought to the management of the Soviet economy. The interesting papers of Bornstein, Morris, "Ideology and the Soviet Economy" in Soviet Studies, July 1966, and Berliner Josef, "Marxism and the Soviet Economy" in Problems of Communism, Sept.-Oct., 1964, deal with the influence of Marxian economic thought in a rather negative way, and the writer is generally in agreement with them. Berliner, however, looks for the cause of the economic theory of the Soviet type in the backwardness of the Soviet economy, and evaluates the influence of Marxian thought lower than the writer does.

5. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th Russian Edition, 1941-51, Vol. 31, pp. 24, 36. The theory of proletarian vanguard by Lenin was defined more dogmatically by Stalin (Collected Works of Stalin.) Japanese Edition, Vol. 6, p. 106).
6. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 32, pp. 191, 206, 264.
7. Ibid., p. 194.
8. Lenin confesses that the people's economic resistance which spread in the spring of 1921 was more serious and much more dangerous than Kolchak and Denikin put together (Lenin, ibid., Vol. 32, p. 160).
9. Stalin, Collected Works, Vol. 10, p. 297, for the Fifteenth Party Congress.
10. Stalin, ibid., p. 306.
11. Dobb, Maurice, Soviet Economic Development since 1917, 1948, p. 213; Pollock, Friedrich, Die Planwirtschaftlichen Versuche in der Sowjet Union, 1917-1927, 1929 (Japanese translation).
12. Stalin, Collected Works, Vol. 12, pp. 10, 15.
13. Stalin, ibid., Vol. 12, p. 62.
14. Details of discussions by Soviet economists on industrialization at the time of N.E.P. are available in Ehrlich, Alexander, Soviet Industrialization Debate, 1924-1928, 1960. As for the change of Stalin's attitude, see Ehrlich, "Stalin's View on Economic Development" in E. Simmons, ed., Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought, 1955, pp. 81-99).
15. Stalin, Collected Works, Vol. 12, p. 62
16. In his Economic Problems of Socialism in the Soviet Union, 1952, Stalin pointed out the fact that the produce supplied by private plots was being traded, and said that when it was eliminated, the kolkhoz property would be raised to the level of all people's property. He was of the opinion that the elimination should be carried out gradually and in keeping with the development of industry. Khrushchev, on the other hand, never thought of reorganizing private plots throughout his tenure as leader. The Programme of the Communist Party (1961) stated that the development of kolkhozes would make private plot cultivation spontaneously unprofitable for the peasants, and postponed the solution of the problem to the future. In this case, economic expediency took precedence over ideology.

17. Decision at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party in September 1965.

18. Karcz, Jerzy, "The New Soviet Agricultural Programme" in Soviet Studies, October 1965, pp. 129-161. This interesting article shows that although the prices of agricultural produce have recently been raised, minor kolkhozes are unable to raise enough income to cover the production cost. Under the present system, they are not able to improve themselves and to escape the grip of poverty. The Government's investments in agriculture have not attained the planned targets. Nor has agricultural machinery been fully renewed.

The words of Brezhnev have been taken from Karcz, p. 156.

19. According to Sitnin, enterprises processing livestock products are managed actually at a loss or at a very low profit. The authorities, however, do not intend to improve the situation by a revision of prices planned for 1967-8. This may mean that the Soviet agricultural system is at a standstill (The Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, No. 43, 1966.)

A recent report on the economic accounting system of sovkhoses reveals the difficulty in maintaining the accountability of agricultural managements. This situation has exposed the fact that, in spite of repeated statements to the contrary, sovkhoses have been maintained by State subsidies. Only 390 successful sovkhoses will attain perfect balance in their economic accounting this year. A large majority of other sovkhoses cannot be maintained without subsidies (The Pravda, April 15, 1967).

20. For instance, Venzher, "Characteristics of the Collective-Farm Economy and Problems of Its Development," (English Translation), in Eastern European Economy summer 1966. Venzher insists that the management of kolkhozes should become independent of centralized planning. In fact, owing to the dogmatic thinking which prevails in the Soviet Union, there is no exchange markets for commodities nor any control of means of production. Venzher pleads that kolkhozes should be authorized to manage industrial activities.

21. "Die genossenschaftlich, auf Gemeingut an den Produktionsmitteln gegründete Gesellschaft," Marx und Engels, Ausgewählte Schriften Bd. II, S. 15.

22. "Eine Assoziation worin die freie Entwicklung eines jeden die Bedingung für die freie Entwicklung aller ist," Marx und Engels, ibid. Bd. I, S. 43.

In his letter to Bebel (March 1875) Engels says that "Gemeinwesen" or the French word "commune" should be used (ibid. Bd. II, S. 34).

23. Samuel Moore's translation, 1888.

24. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. 2, p. 304. "Given these economic premises it is quite possible, after the overthrow of the capitalists and the bureaucrats, to proceed immediately, overnight, to supersede them with the control of production and distribution, the keeping account of labor and products by the armed workers by the whole of the armed population .... "Accounting and control" -- that is the main thing required for "arranging" the smooth working, the correct functioning of the first phase of communist society."

25. Marx' idea about the planned economy is not clear. Measures to be taken by a revolutionary government established in an advanced country are enumerated in the Manifesto of the Communist Party. In general, they are confiscation of land and property, abolition of inheritance, concentration and monopoly of credit by the State, increase of nationalized factories, cultivation and improvement of land under a common plan, nationalization of means of transportation, etc. Nothing is said about planned management, nor is anything made known about the relations between the method of nationalization and "the association of free individuals" which was his final and ideal society.



On the other hand, Engels talks of plans frequently.  
In his "Herrn Eugen Dühring's U m w ä l z u n g d e r W i s s e n s c h a f t e n"

and "Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von Utopia nach Wissenschaft," he writes/  
"Anarchie innerhalb der gesellschaftlichen Produktion wird ersetzt durch planmäßige  
bewusste Organisation. Eine gesellschaftliche Produktion nach vorherbestimmtem Plan.  
Die Verwaltung von Sachen und die Leitung von Produktionsprozessen."

26. Pollock, ibid., p. 314 (Japanese translation).

27. The planned economy of the Soviet type is called the "command economy." Peter  
Wiles stresses the fact that, under such a ~~system~~ money is passive, and prices  
are used for accounting and control, having no function of allocation (cf.  
Wiles, Peter, The Political Economy of Communism, p. 107).  
Wiles says that Marx' labor theory of value is a cause in the Soviet type of  
economy for the preparation of a plan, taking the production of intermediate goods  
as its target. Certainly, Marxian economics was inclined to material thinking  
and the labor theory of value was a product of such thinking (Wiles, ibid.,  
pp. 64-5).  
Stalin's planned economy was set up at the time of extreme inflation, and this  
fact may have encouraged the thinking of stressing material plans, holding  
plans in money as being secondary. As Grossman points out, prices under the  
command economy were those of a seller's market. Demand was not elastic to  
prices and income (Grossman, Gregory, "Industrial Prices in the USSR" in  
American Economic Review; Proceedings XLIX, No. 2, May 1959, p. 50),

28. Stalin, Collected Works, Vol. 12, pp. 142, 250. In his article "The Year of  
Great Change" (October 1929), Stalin said that he would transform the Soviet  
Union into a "country of metals," and that unless heavy industries were not  
developed, no construction of any industry was possible. At the Sixteenth  
Party Congress he described the menace of imperialism vividly, and Spulber  
points out: "The Soviet emphasis on power, steel, and machine building was an  
obvious and unavoidable choice for a shattered, isolated economy ....."  
(Spulber Nicolas, Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth, 1964, p. 76).

29. A detailed analysis of the role of money and that of command under the Soviet  
command economy is given in Grossman, Gregory, "Gold and the Sword: Money in  
the Soviet Command Economy" from Industrialization in Two Systems:  
Essays in Honor of Alexander Gerschenkron, 1966, pp. 204-235.

30. On prices' functions of accounting and distribution, see Campbell, Robert,  
Accounting in Soviet Planning and Management, 1963, Chapter 2 in particular.

31. By the reform of 1955, production targets for by-products of enterprises, for  
instance, were transferred to the competence of the Ministries. The target of  
each Ministry for the capital repair of fixed funds was made a matter to be  
decided by the Ministry itself. About 15,500 bureaus and sections, or about  
one-half of the entire number, and 5,600 parallel administrative organizations  
were abolished. See the Industrial Economy of the Soviet Union, edited by  
Arakelian and Borobieva, 1956. Again in 1955, the number of the indicators to  
be recognized in comparison with the previous year, under the national plan  
for economic development, was reduced by 46%, and the kinds of industrial  
products by 52% (Japanese translation, p. 100).

32. The special features of the draft of reform presented in the name of  
Professor Liberman are a reduction of plan targets and extension of the scope  
of decision-making in enterprises. Opinion opposing the Liberman reform is  
based on the grounds that the centralized planning system should not be destroyed.  
Liberman and economists who support his reform program always explain that the  
plan is not to deny centralized planning, but to reinforce it. In September 1965  
the present regime of the Soviet Union published a plan for reform of the  
industrial administration structure. According to Baibakov, Chairman of the

Gosplan of the Soviet Union, the reform would increase the importance of the Gosplan, and a centrally unified, but not decentralized plan would be scientifically drawn up (The Pravda, October 29, 1965).

According to Liberman, a plan is good enough as a guideline, with value form, not with physical indices. The best criterion for a plan is not growth itself, but the rate of the growth (The Pravda, November 21, 1965).

33. Kommunist, No. 14, 1966. Sitnin, "Economic Reform and Revision of Wholesale Prices of Industrial Products."

FIFTY YEARS OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE.

by

Dr. W. Klatt.

FIFTY YEARS OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE.

The Soviet Union enters the fiftieth year of its existence with the biggest grain harvest ever gathered in Russian history. Brezhnev and Kosygin have been most fortunate in having been able to announce, at the end of last year, a bumper crop. The official statement speaks of more than 170 million tons, but this figure has to be deflated a good deal so as to bring it down to the after-harvest weight at which crops are measured in the Western world. However, even at 135 million tons The Soviet Union ought to be able, after having met all normal requirements at home and in Eastern Europe, to put some 15 million tons into reserve. This surplus should go a long way towards meeting, in the next few years, such unforeseen crop failures as those which occurred in 1963 and 1965 and which, during the last three years, forced the Soviet authorities to spend altogether close on \$ 2,000 million of foreign exchange on grain imports. This year a similar amount is paid out in domestic currency as a bonus to home producers. The burden to the exchequer is far from negligible, but the saving of foreign currency will be most welcome.

Throughout Russia the benefits of this fortunate crop result will be felt. Not only will the farming community have a substantial rise in earnings, but the consumer will enjoy the increased supplies of livestock produce that will result from feeding more grain to farm animals. Most important of all, foreign exchange, not needed for importing cereals, will be available for the purchase abroad of industrial equipment, spare parts and know-how. Thus the Russian grain harvest of 1966 will indirectly contribute to bringing work and income to industries not only in Russia, but also in the Western world. What better way could there be to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the revolution! At long last the Soviet grain problem seems to have been solved. Or has it?

Ever since the fateful autumn of 1917 have the Soviet leaders been preoccupied with grain. Starting with the Central Committee Plenum of November 1929, on the eve of mass collectivization, time and again the grain problem has been said to have been solved. Yet, in the 25 years that followed this statement more than one leading personality has lost his post, if not his head, over the question of the country's grain supplies. Considering that nowadays more than half the value of the annual farm output of Russia is derived from animal products, one might think that more attention should be devoted to this aspect of the farming industry especially since the industrial consumer wants to reduce his intake of carbo-hydrates from cereals and to improve his diet by getting an increased supply of meat and dairy produce. But the situation has rarely been comfortable enough to allow the Soviet leaders to forget that all too often the fate of the Nation has been determined by bread alone.

Approximately three-fifths of the country's arable acreage is still under grains, and half the food intake is consumed in the form of bread, flour and cereals. Almost half the population lives in villages, and at least a third of the labour force is employed in agriculture. Out of the season there is still much idleness in the countryside, whilst at the peak of the season students have to be rushed to the land - no longer virgin - to harvest its often meagre grain crop. The rhythm of life in the country is still master of the capital. The patterns of food and farming resemble those of the underdeveloped parts of the world rather than those of the highly industrialized nations among which Russia now ranks - at some distance - behind the United States.

There thus exists a dichotomy in the social and economic pattern of Russia that merits some moments of reflection at the end of the first five decades of post-revolutionary development, during which Russia has failed to become the truly equalitarian society of which its revolutionary leaders had dreamt. There is no way of telling how things might have developed, had the mood of change spread to Central and Western Europe in the manner in which it was anticipated by the Bolshevik leadership. To conclude from the absence of this development that 'socialism in one country' and the 'socialist transformation of the villages', i.e. the permanent revolution from above, had become historical necessities, with Stalin "operating within the logical consequences of Leninism" (1) would amount to falling victim to the concept of historical determinism.

Had Lenin survived the Kronstadt mutiny long enough, his pragmatic mind might have prevailed over his party's revolutionary endziel, and his now economic policy, instead of serving as a temporary expedient, might have become the opening phase in a process of industrialization - "at the pace of a tortoise" - as Bukharin had suggested. Moreover, had the revolution led to a genuine alliance of workers and peasants and thus to democratic rule instead of democratic centralism, there might have been Western cooperation instead of hostility. In that case, Russia might for some time have been obliged to ~~exchange~~ the surplus product of its grain economy for Western farm requisites and industrial equipment. In fact she exported in desperation, at the height of its agrarian crisis in 1931, "the five megatons of grain that were followed by five, or so, megadeaths in the next two years". (2)

Leaving aside for the moment the sacrifices in human lives and happiness, the end effect might not have been very different from what we now see: a mighty world power that has moved, within fifty years, from fifth to second place among the industrial nations of the world. Almost certainly its farming industry would be more closely integrated with the urban sectors of society than is in fact the case today. One final speculation: a steadily industrializing country, governed by majority rule rather than in the name of permanent revolution, might have deprived Hitler of the allies that he succeeded in gathering at home and abroad as the crusader against what he was able to present as a world-wide revolutionary menace.

It would be legitimate to interject here that speculation about the past seems idle - were it not for the possibility that a different course might be taken in similar circumstances at some time in the future. For the man of the future can have the benefit of hindsight and might thus be blessed with a choice of alternatives that seemd absent in the distant historical past. It is for this reason, and not for the sake of showing up the errors of the Bolshevik revolution, that its fiftieth anniversary calls for a critique of its agrarian policy.

Throughout Soviet history, the approach to the farming industry has been marked by a lack of rationality which has not affected other sectors of the Soviet economy to anything like the same degree. This lack of rationality may be explained to some extent by the very nature of agriculture which the Marxist school and its followers have never handled very happily. It would be wrong to suggest that agriculture follows patterns of behaviour that are different from those observed in other spheres of human endeavour, but it has certain characteristics that are absent from the environment of other industries.

Farming, unlike industry, has to take into account space and weather as limiting factors. In normal conditions the cost of haulage is more decisive in determining farm sizes than certain economies of scale. In Soviet Russia the amalgamation of farms has been carried out without regard to the cost of transportation. As to the effect of weather and distance on labour, the farm hand, who mostly works without a roof over his head and without a superior at close quarters, operates with a measure of freedom of decision that is most unusual in the case of the industrial worker of corresponding grade. The larger the farm, the greater the need to delegate decisions to the individual. Under communist conditions the tendency is generally to do the opposite. Also, in agriculture - unlike industry - the producer, besides being a consumer of his own product, is mostly also a processor of finished products. He is therefore able to alter the pattern of production, utilization and marketing in many ways and thus to evade public controls far more effectively than the industrial producer who rarely is a consumer of his product. Thus in agriculture, far more than in industry, a relationship of mutual trust is needed between the producer and the State. None of these characteristics of the farming industry have been taken properly into account during the last fifty years of Soviet agricultural history. It seems doubtful whether they are fully understood in Russia even today. If they were, the conclusion would be inescapable that the existing system has to be dismantled rather than amended. The political consequences of such a recognition would be momentous indeed.

In the final analysis, the misunderstandings about the role of agriculture in modern industrial society and the resulting failures of agricultural policy throughout five decades of Soviet history can be traced to a doctrinal concept that was based on a methodological error. The Marxist school and its followers have always insisted that small-scale farming, as they defined it, was economically backward, and that the peasant cultivator was therefore bound to be tied to politically reactionary forces hostile to the industrial working class. Had they measured farm performance in the same way as production in industry, they might have discovered that farms that are small in terms of acreage can be large, modern and progressive enterprises when considered in terms of capital input and in output per man. In other words, it is the degree of intensity that matters and not the acreage - and any economies of scale have to be seen within this context.

The inter-relationship between the size of the farms, according to acreage, and the intensity of farming, in terms of input and output, has never really been understood by any of the Soviet leaders. As a result of this methodological error, throughout their history they have found themselves in the position of making enemies of the owners of large farms whilst antagonizing at the same time the small men in the villages. The Marxist school have never differentiated between the various forms of farm performance and have therefore never gained an understanding of the role of the intensively farming owner-occupier or tenant in a modern industrial setting. Whereas in industry the Marxist school has supported developments which are not altogether different from those in capitalist society, their agrarian concept flies in the face of all historical precedent. It is not surprising that this has created very special problems. The lack of understanding of the agrarian question emerges from one of those frequently quoted statements by Lenin on the subject: "The peasant as a toiler gravitates towards socialism and prefers the dictatorship of the workers to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The peasant as a seller of grain gravitates towards the bourgeoisie, to free trade, i.e. back to the 'habitual' old 'primordial' capitalism of former days." (3)

In fact, the peasant cultivator does nothing of the sort. Lenin's concept of the peasant's role in Russian society was little more accurate than the romantic picture of the 'naively socialist' villager that the narodniki had.

The Russian intellectuals, whether social revolutionaries or bolsheviks, were strangely ignorant of the lives and views of four-fifths of their fellow countrymen. But whilst the social revolutionaries had the utopian vision of a socialist society created on the basis of rural communes, Lenin was primarily concerned with the revolution itself, which after 1905 he saw in two stages. At the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution he saw the peasantry tied to the industrial proletariat. Thereafter he expected the peasants to renounce the revolution and to desert the industrial proletariat. At that stage Lenin saw the bolsheviks dividing the farming community against itself, using the poor villagers against the rich peasants. This dual task of the proletariat was regarded by Lenin as the essence of the bolshevik programme. He never considered the possibility of a gradual continuation of the process that had set in with the Stolypin reforms. He consequently never believed in a genuine, lasting alliance of interests between the producers and the consumers of the daily necessities of the Nation. Thus the conflict of interests between the minority of industrial workers and the majority of villagers stood godmother to the bolshevik revolution of 1917. This was very nearly strangled by its own contradictions.

Lenin had never thought of the immense tasks which a successful revolutionary party would have to face in the years following the revolution. But as the strategist of the revolution he adjusted his Party's programme to changing circumstances. After a life-long controversy with the social revolutionaries he adopted their programme in the decree of 26 October (8 November), 1917, which authorized the seizure of the land by those on whose support the success of the October revolution depended. This decision sealed the fate of the provisional government and of the social revolutionaries who had gained 21 million votes - against the bolsheviks' 9 million - in the elections to the constitutional assembly, but who had been unwilling to give their consent to the transfer of land without compensation.

Lenin alone understood the mood of the revolting soldiers and peasants. The creation of large farm units, as anticipated in his Party's programme, could await the completion of the revolution and the consolidation of the bolshevik regime throughout the land. Once more Lenin's political pragmatism was to prevail over Party dogma. After the years of war communism, during which the towns had declared war on the countryside and had seized the stocks of grain instead of encouraging its production, the sailors of Kronstadt mutinied in March, 1921. Being mostly country lads, they demanded, inter alia, the right of the peasants - their fathers, brothers and cousins - to keep their own live-stock and to farm their own private plots. In the face of the rebellion Lenin saw the force of the sailors' claim and he gave way. Once again he postponed the amalgamation of individual farms and allowed, as a temporary expedient, the uncontrolled exchange of goods in the name of the new economic policy. Nobody will ever be able to say with any degree of certainty how Lenin might have handled the emergence of a new agricultural bourgeoisie, the lack of a regular exchange of foodstuffs against industrial consumer goods, and the ensuing 'scissor crisis', had he retained his mental and physical capacities beyond the end of 1922 when he suffered a severe stroke. Thirteen months later, following his death on 21 January, 1924, the internecine war between the leaders who took over from Lenin broke into the open.

The controversy over the agrarian question provided one of the central issues of the conflict. In the debate between those in favour of rapid industrialization, such as Trotsky and Preobrazhensky, and Bukharin, who spoke of the peasants as an active force in the revolution, Stalin - for a time - remained uncommitted, keeping to a middle course between the extreme factions. But after a period of destruction, it was Stalin who destroyed the peasantry as a coherent social force. Lenin's support for voluntary association was thrown to the winds. In the process of primitive socialist accumulation Stalin sacrificed the peasants in the interest of the most determined effort of industrialization the world had yet seen.

The year 1967 is not only the fiftieth anniversary of the bolshevik revolution. It is also the fortieth anniversary of the adoption by the fifteenth congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of the resolution that set in motion the collectivization of Russia's peasant farms and the liquidation of the kulaks. This is described in the official Party history as equivalent in its consequences to the revolution of October 1917. In its course the villagers were classified in a manner as crude as the statistics on which it was based. The confusion and demoralization caused reached stupendous dimensions. By 1932 the procurement of grain was more than twice as large as in 1927, though the harvest was a good deal smaller. By 1933, half the country's livestock had disappeared. The most moving, yet most authentic, record of this operation and the hunger and purges and deportations it brought in its wake has been preserved in the files of the headquarters of the Communist Party at Smolensk, which were captured by the invading German army and later taken to the United States. (4)

It is not to be wondered that Stalin, when questioned by Churchill about this phase of Soviet history, described it as a struggle more difficult and dangerous than that against Nazi Germany. The consequences of this operation have been recounted before. (5)

On the eve of the second world war hardly any land remained in private hands. The opposition of the peasants had been broken, large-scale deportations had taken place and irreparable damage had been done to the farming industry. Even within the framework of the collectives the peasants continued to be treated as enemies of the State rather than as vital members of a new industrial society. They had every reason to feel outcasts. Twenty-five years later, at the time of Stalin's death, farming was where it had been in the days of the Tsars. Admittedly, horses had been replaced by tractor power, thus freeing a large acreage formerly under fodder crops for the production of food. Even these modest results had been achieved only at great cost in men and animals. The results were particularly disappointing in livestock farming. The number of productive livestock was one-tenth smaller than before collectivization was introduced. In the meantime the human population had grown by almost one-fifth. Milk yields and carcass weights, like grain yields, had remained unchanged. As a result, the Nation's diet was smaller in volume and poorer in composition at the time of Stalin's death than it had been a quarter of a century earlier. The farming community was much worse off than it had been before collectivization began. Whereas industrial production had recovered from the devastation caused by the German invasion, the supply of farm products continued to lag behind. The cleavage, created when forced industrialization and collectivization had driven the two sections of Soviet society apart in the early 'thirties', had widened rather than narrowed.



The ten years of Khrushchev's rule were largely taken up by attempts to remedy this situation. During his time of office he made close on two hundred speeches exclusively concerned with agriculture. Every year the leader of the second largest industrial nation in the world spent a month touring the countryside, criticizing shortcomings and suggesting remedies. Nearly every plenary session of the Central Committee had farming on its open or secret agenda. Yet, when Khrushchev was removed from power, his successors had nothing good to say about his agricultural policy. Posterity is likely to be more impartial and to balance his failures against his achievements. There were many of both. In the technical sphere, Khrushchev started three major campaigns: the reclamation of the virgin lands in Central Asia; the introduction of maize as a feed grain and a green fodder; and the abolition of ley farming, i.e. putting grassland under the plough.

At the same time, major changes were made in the administrative sphere. These included the abolition of the machine tractor stations - in Stalin's days considered an essential ingredient of collectivized agriculture - and the transfer of the equipment of the MTS to the collectives. He further eliminated the agricultural ministries as controlling organs of the farm industry and limited their responsibilities to research and advisory services. Finally, he divided the Party along 'lines of production', agriculture being assigned to a special department with the object of involving the Party directly in the affairs of the countryside, whilst giving the Party's first secretary direct access to regional and local cadres. Much of this was done in a highly unorthodox manner, and some of it was undone when it proved impracticable.

In the economic sphere there were also major innovations. The farming industry, which for a quarter of a century had been the chief, if not the only, source of capital accumulation for investment in industry, was granted a growing portion of the exchequer's funds. Moreover, increases in farm prices and agricultural wages and reductions in taxes and delivery obligations resulted in an increase of 50 per cent in the disposable income of the farming community. As one quarter of the collective farmer's cash income had to be re-invested, rural living standards at the end of Khrushchev's reign, though improved by comparison with the dismal level attained in 1953, were still substantially below those of the industrial workers, who in turn had a considerably more modest standard of living than their counterparts in Western industrialized society.

The technological changes also yielded limited results only. The extension of the acreage in Central Asia resulted in a substantial, though precarious, addition to the supply of grain. When the reserves of the soils in Kazakhstan were exhausted, the effects were most damaging. The maize campaign provided supplementary fodder for the dairy herd, but the maize silage failed to provide the plant protein badly needed in the production of animal protein. The ploughing-up of grassland was designed to remedy this shortcoming, but it was denied its full success owing to the lack of fertilizers. Khrushchev's farm policy falls into two clearly distinct periods. During the first five years, up to 1958, he was remarkably successful, mobilizing the untapped, but readily available, resources of the country. During the second half of his reign his short-term remedies failed. The crop disaster of 1963 which made necessary a cut in pig numbers by 30 million, or over 40 per cent, and an import of over 10 million tons of grain - an all-time record - was the revenge of Nature for the mistakes committed in the past. It showed how vulnerable Soviet agriculture remained in spite of all the improvements made during a decade in which the farming industry received more public recognition than at any other time since the October revolution.

Whenever technical or economic measures proved to be insufficient, Khrushchev turned to organizational remedies and relied on the lead which the Party cadres were supposed to provide throughout the countryside. He never recognized the fundamental errors underlying the Party doctrine; or if he did recognize them, he was unable or unwilling to draw the necessary conclusions. He probably committed his most serious error when - from a doctrinal posture - he began to interfere with the private plot, the only sector of the farm economy that could legitimately claim satisfactory results. Whilst it may never be possible to establish, with any degree of certainty, the reasons for the removal of Khrushchev in October 1964 from his position of leadership in both the Party and Government, there can hardly be any doubt that the failure of his farm policy played a role in the Party's decision to depose him.

In the event, the ten years of agricultural policy under Khrushchev yielded an increased, though precarious, supply of food and fodder, without getting anywhere near the ambitious targets set for 1965. The diet, still overburdened with carbo-hydrates and short of animal proteins, continued to lag behind that of the United States which for ten years provided the yardstick of things supposedly within reach in the Soviet Union. The distance between the two countries was as great in the level of output as in that of consumption. At the end of Khrushchev's reign the farming industry of the United States produced, with one-fifth of the Soviet farm labour force on an area equal to two-thirds of the Soviet sown acreage, a volume of farm products approximately three-fifths larger than that of the Soviet Union. Yields of all major crops, as well as milk yields and carcass weights, were at best half as much in the Soviet Union as those attained in the United States. Productive livestock per head of the Soviet population was only four-fifths of the corresponding figure in the United States. Russia's lag was particularly great with regard to the labour requirements in agriculture. In Khrushchev's own assessment, five to seven times as much labour as in the United States was needed in arable farming in the Soviet Union, and up to sixteen times as much in livestock farming. At the end of Khrushchev's reign the pattern of farm productivity, like the pattern of food production, was that of a backward country. Yet, in the industrial and military sphere Russia could legitimately claim to be the second most powerful nation in the world. There is no reason to think that this dichotomy will disappear as a result of the policy of consolidation, following a temporary retrenchment, on which Khrushchev's successors have embarked since 1964.

The first measure of any consequence taken by the new leadership was the restoration to its previous size of the private plot belonging to members of the collectives and rural and urban workers, which was reduced - on Khrushchev's insistence - since 1956. Other concessions followed. Many of the new measures amounted to a continuation of Khrushchev's policies - by different means. Others were of an altogether different nature. The 'urgent measures for the further development of Soviet agriculture', introduced by Brezhnev at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee held in March 1965 have not been without effect. The announcement of fixed grain delivery quotas for a period of six years, the payment of a bonus of 50 per cent for above - quota deliveries, the increase in purchase prices for livestock and animal products, the increase in farm investment, and the introduction of a moderate pension for retired members of collectives are likely to have created an atmosphere in the countryside more favourable than has existed since collectivization was introduced forty years ago.

The gradual introduction of a guaranteed monthly pay for members of collectives, at rates corresponding to those enforced on State farms, which was announced at the twenty-third Party Congress in the spring of 1966 was the most important innovation of the new leadership. If this promise is in fact kept, it ought to remove one of the chief grievances of the collective farmers.

For forty years past they have not been granted financial rewards for taking the kind of risks for which farmers in the Western world feel entitled to claim a return; nor have they been eligible for a minimum wage, as it applies in the case of workers on State farms and in industry. They have thus had the worst of both worlds. At long last this is to be put right - fifty years after the revolution that took place in the name of equality for the workers and peasants of Russia.

One major promise has yet to be fulfilled. The Third Kolkhoz Congress, which is to pass a new farm charter in place of the outdated one of 1935, has still not taken place. It was first scheduled for early in 1959, but it was repeatedly - and even recently - postponed for reasons not stated. As the commission charged with drafting the new agricultural model charter has not yet released its findings, the results of this conference cannot be anticipated with any degree of certainty. If the liberal critics of present farm policies were to gain ground, substantial improvements in the structure and performance of agriculture could result. If the traditionalists hold their ground - and this seems more probable in present conditions - no startling changes are likely to occur. Although realism and hesitation are seemingly taking the place of the irrationalities and ambitions of the past, there remains a serious lack of understanding of the role of agriculture in the national economy and the place of the farmer in modern society. Brezhnev and Kosygin remain captives of their own and their Party's political past. Basically the erroneous views adhered to during the first five decades of Soviet rule persist, and the peasants continue to be regarded as politically expendable, even if - as a matter of expediency - they are temporarily treated with more concern than in the past.

In the meantime the air is full of proposals from various sources as to the ways and means of improving the performance of the farm industry, of increasing the standard of living of the rural community and of integrating it with the rest of Soviet society. So far agriculture has been largely excluded from the structural changes that have been introduced, experimentally and on a limited scale, in the industrial sphere. Brezhnev and Kosygin, like their predecessors, have shown no sign yet of wishing to interfere with the structure of the farm industry or the pattern of farm operations. This unwillingness to introduce basic changes has not prevented various authors from putting forward more or less drastic proposals, but nobody has yet succeeded in challenging effectively the basic concepts that underlie Soviet farm policy.

This is not to say that no attempts are being made to improve the performance of the farm industry. On the contrary, the latest efforts are directed at turning the State farms at long last into profitable enterprises. But things move slowly. Two years ago Brezhnev urged that State farms should move to full economic accounting (khozraschet), but so far many of them continue to receive public assistance for their capital investment programme and yet end up with substantial losses on current account. Any improvements in technical, economic and administrative matters are bound to help in reaching the targets set for 1970, the end of the current plan. Although these goals are more modest than those originally set by Khrushchev, they will be far from easy to reach.

Certain setbacks cannot be ruled out, since the input of farm requisites is not yet large and varied enough to counterbalance the fluctuations in yield which are still a mark of Soviet farming. In fact, an increase in five years of 25 per cent over and above the current level of farm production would be no mean feat. On the consumption side strict limits are set by the fact that even the cost of the present, somewhat monotonous, diet absorbs half the working class family's income. Unless industrial wages are raised more than in recent years or retail prices are lowered substantially - and there is little likelihood of either -, the intake of food will not increase or improve dramatically. (6)

With regard to the fundamental issue of the structure of farming, changes on both State farms and collectives remain subjects of unofficial debate rather than official action. The most controversial issue is that of the role of the individual and his family in agriculture as against that of the State and its organs. Here the discussion on the significance of the 'link' (zveno), which has flared up in the past whenever there was an opportunity of challenging the authority of central and local party organs, has been revived. In its most extreme form it represents a rejection of the concept of collective operations under Party direction; but extreme views are rarely uttered. For the time being fairly moderate experiments are advocated. Limited areas of cropland are being allocated for a certain period of time to a team of farm workers or members of collectives so as to counter the indifference which is the most prominent feature of the 'Farming Anonymous Inc.' that rules the Soviet countryside.

The need to arouse the interest of the operating farmhands became urgent when more and more of them abandoned their place of work in the unattractive conditions of Central Asia. It was thus not surprising that Zhulin, the most vocal advocate of the link system, originally recommended small operational units for the farms in the virgin lands. It is not without significance that the traditional areas of peasant farming, where the family zveno was the normal unit of operation, have so far not been found suitable for this kind of innovation. Komsomolskaya Pravda, the Party organ whose task it is to cater for the young in town and country, has provided a platform for these proposals, whilst the official organs of the Party and the Ministry of Agriculture have shown little enthusiasm for experiments which are bound to interfere with the pattern of things that is to the liking of the bureaucrats.

Whereas Soviet industry begins to accept innovations such as measuring success in terms of sales and profits, no Nemehinov or Liberman has yet risen from the ashes to which Stalin burned the countryside some forty years ago. Venzher, who courageously stuck out his neck when it was still dangerous to do so, is once again among those in the forefront of the campaign in favour of liberalizing the farming industry. He wishes to see prices and market forces take the place of central planning and State procurement, but so far he has not met with the response from official quarters which in industry is taken more or less for granted nowadays. The sinews of the agrarian fabric remain fully stretched; they leave little room for slack. This is why Brezhnev and Kosygin, not unlike Khurshchev before them, prefer to limit their reforms to the area of technical and administrative detail and to leave more fundamental changes in the structure of Soviet farming to an unspecified date in the future.

Russia is entering a period charged with emotion, and an over-generous gesture could damage beyond repair the sluices of carefully controlled public opinion and private sentiment. Not only heroic achievements will be remembered in October 1967.

Among the demonstrating young men and women there will be all too many unable to find the graves of their fathers on which to place flowers - on the day when the flags will flutter over the platforms from which the achievements of five decades will be celebrated. The present leadership hope to avoid answering for the hecatombs which were the price of these achievements, but they will not be able to defer indefinitely the moment of reckoning. On the day when a full account is given, Soviet agriculture will no longer be what it is today. One day the mammoth State farms and collectives as we know them now will have become a matter of the past.

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- (2) O. Hoefding, Soviet Collectivization and China's Great "Leap". Conference on Soviet and Chinese Communism. Lake Tahoe, California, 1965.
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HERESY ENSHRINED:  
IDEA AND REALITY OF THE RED ARMY  
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I  
INTRODUCTION

In charting the revolution of the proletariat, the Communist party's assumption of power, and the creation of a Communist society, neither Marx, Engels nor Lenin came to grips with the problem of the military and its role in such a post-revolutionary society. While they contemplated various "models" of such an armed force, both for revolutionary and post-revolutionary purposes, they were in agreement on one fundamental axiom: In a "Communist society no one will even think about a standing army. Why would one need it?" (1) The existence of a standing, professional army in a post-revolutionary society was viewed by them as an anathema, a heretical concept which contradicted and violated some fundamental tenets of the ideology.

Yet, we have come to know that this heresy, the idea of a professional army in a "classless" communist society has become a bald reality. Moreover, the Soviet military establishment has progressively assumed a larger role in the state and society, influencing and shaping important aspects of Soviet social, political and economic life.

It is the purpose of this paper to briefly trace the genesis of the early 19th century utopian ideas about the revolutionary armed forces, the transmutation of these ideas and the emergence of a post-revolutionary armed force in the Soviet Union which has little in common with the original "models." It is not the intent of this paper (since it would be foolish to do so) to exhort the Soviet and other communists for having failed to live up to a remote and utopian idea born out of powerlessness, inexperience with political realities, ideas that were aimed at destruction of established state orders rather than the maintenance of them. Rather, the intent is to indicate: a) that the initial distrust of the 19th century socialists toward professional armies was borne out by events; b) that Soviet Communist Party leaders continue to be concerned with the role of professional military in their state; and c) that no satisfactory solutions have been devised for the thorough integration of the military professionals into the Party-dominated political system.

The dilemma of the Soviet Communist Party may be seen as a larger problem of dictatorial and autocratic political systems of our times. The essential characteristics of such authoritarian systems are internal coercion and external militancy, and to achieve these postures the ruling elites had to maintain strong security organs and large military establishments. A vital difference, however, between the internal instruments of coercion and the military institutions in such states is that the former are usually organically part of the ruling Party's apparatus and intensely loyal to the dictator or faction, while the latter, though not necessarily disloyal, seek to disassociate themselves from the Party apparatus and its controls, to cultivate their own professional

and institutional values, and to remain aloof from politics and larger society. Communist Party leaders have found this propensity of the military a source of grave concern. Indeed, their inability to make the military a fully integrated part of the Party-dominated system illustrates a vital defect in the structure of one-party autocratic systems.

## II

### UTOPIAN IDEAS: "VOLKSAUFSTAND" AND "BEWAFFNETES PROLETARIAT"

A basic axiom of early socialist views on the historical dialectic and class conflict was that the coming revolution of the oppressed lower classes will be achieved through a massive uprising of the people. In this they echoed the slogan of the French Revolution 'Levee en masse,' expecting the armed people to sweep away the decadent and oppressive monarchical-bourgeois state and usher in the millenium. In their utopian zeal the early socialists and social-democrats saw little need for an organized, professional army of the revolution, since a professional army was by definition an instrument of one class for the exploitation of another. And indeed, to Marx the monarchical-bourgeois state was synonymous with its army, which "is the organized power of one class for the exploitation of others," (2) and that state was best exemplified by "the barracks and bivouac, saber and musket, mustache and uniform." To Marx, therefore, the Volksaufstand was going to be the vehicle for sweeping away the despised oppressive institutions of the state, including the army. Moreover, he maintained that in a future socialist society, which will be by definition classless, there will be no need for a professional army, since all means of production will be in the hands of the workers, negating any class differentials, and therefore negating the need for any instrument of oppression by one class over another.

These utopian visions, however, were severely shaken in their first test with reality: the revolution of 1848. The defeat of the Paris uprising by the regular troops of General Cavaignac and the routing of the revolutionaries in the Baden uprising of 1849 forced Marx and Engels to draw some hard lessons about the future of the revolution. They came to realize that "armed people are not yet soldiers ... and most of all, (they) understood the great importance of proper military equipment." (3) Engels also observed that while the Paris uprising failed, it held out much longer against a superior enemy, while the popular uprising in Baden failed miserably, where "everything was in disorder, every good opportunity missed." (4) He concluded that the proletarians of Paris had been better organized and were used to coordinated behaviour because of their factory training and life, while the revolutionary liberals of Baden were marked by "brave stupidity," uncoordinated action without any central leadership.

The events of 1848-1849 led Engels, who had set upon a program of self-education in matters of war and armies, (5) to reject the idea of a proletarian force which will come to power "through the use of modern means of war and modern military art." (6) However, once having realized the necessity for organized revolutionary action by a well-equipped proletarian vanguard, Engels and Marx continued to equivocate on issues involving the role of the armed force in a socialist society, the attitude of the revolution toward the 'old army', and



the strategy and tactics of a revolutionary force.

It was not until after the failure of the Paris Commune in 1871 that Engels and Marx finally and firmly rejected the 'liberal' ideas of the social democrats and established several principles on the role of war, army and the revolution; principles which were to guide Lenin almost a half a century later:

- (1) Rejecting the continued adherence of the social-democrats to the idea of Volksbewaffnung, Engels and Marx strongly supported the idea of a class-based revolutionary force, the Bewaffnetes Proletariat (armed proletariat).
- (2) Engels and Marx disdained the social-democrats' idea on the use of the existing armies of the state for the purpose of the revolution (after they have been indoctrinated and persuaded by revolutionary ideology) and instead urged the destruction of the existing "bureaucratic-military machinery" as a necessary first step in destroying the monarchical-bourgeois state.

The role of the armed forces in a post-revolutionary, socialist society, however, was left undefined. Engels had rejected some of the ideas of the social democrats such as separation of the state and the army (along the lines of church-state separation) in a socialist society, and instead talked equivocally about closer integration of the armed forces and the Party. It was this problem, the nature and role of the armed forces in the post-revolutionary socialist society, that was to plague Soviet leaders, and one which has failed to become thoroughly solved.

### III

#### THE REVOLUTIONARY CRUCIBLE

What Marx and Engels had bequeathed to the Russian revolutionaries, and what therefore links them rather intimately in this context, is: a) the idea of the deliberate use of power and organized violence for revolutionary purposes; b) the idea that "war puts a nation to the test ... (it) imposes a death sentence on all social institutions which have lost their validity" or in Leninist rephrasing of the old Clausewitz maxim that "war is simply a continuation of politics by other (i.e. violent) means;" c) the idea that a revolutionary armed movement should be class-oriented, based on the proletariat, rather than on mass-conscription of the people; and d) the idea that the army of the ancien regime must be demoralized and destroyed as a functioning entity, to be replaced by a revolutionary, proletarian vanguard.

However, Lenin had to learn the bitter lessons on his own, just as Marx and Engels had to do more than a half a century earlier, about the uselessness of unorganized and unprofessional revolutionary forces when faced with professional soldiers of the oppressive regime. In 1903 Lenin was still adhering to the notion that a "standing army is an army that is divorced from the people and trained to shoot down the people." He reiterated that "a standing army is not in the least necessary to protect the country from an attack of the enemy; a people's militia is sufficient." (7) However, two years later he changed his mind, as a result of the uprising of 1905: "... great historical questions

can be solved only by violence, and the organization of violence in the modern struggle is a military organization." (8)

While the 19th and early 20th century socialists and communists were contemplating the role and nature of the armed forces in a future revolution, the events of October suddenly brought the Bolsheviks face to face with the reality of a revolution becoming victorious and with the near intractable problems of running a state. Here ideas and reality clashed and in the process created the Red Army, an institution that is as remote from the utopian notions of the 19th century thinkers as it is in some ways from the traditional military establishments of other large states.

In 1917, as contemporary Soviet writers see it,

Lenin and the Communist Party did not yet have a thoroughly formulated view of the methods and forms of the military organization of the proletarian state and of the principles of its military structure. (9)

Of one thing, however, the Bolsheviks were persuaded; the need to demoralize the old Russian army, so that it would be useless to the Provisional Government in the fight against the revolutionaries. They therefore concentrated their major effort within the army on undermining the will to fight, by promoting disobedience, spreading pacifist ideas, and otherwise stirring up the soldiers' imagination with simple, appealing slogans. Lenin's and Trotsky's political and psychological adroitness in so exploiting the mood and needs of the masses of the peasants in the army accelerated the corrosion of morale that was already underway. Mass desertions, fraternization with the enemy, and disobedience plagued the old Russian army, and the damage was only intensified by the futile disciplinary efforts of Kerensky and by Kornilov's brutal executions among disobedient units. In the fall of 1917 the Russian army ceased to exist as a viable military organization. To guard against the possibility of a revival, the Bolsheviks passed the decree on gradual demobilization in November 1917, which was followed by decrees on the introduction of the elective command principle and equalization of ranks. The combined effects of these measures was to reduce the army in numbers and remove the aristocratic and bourgeois officers from positions of authority. (10)

Having thus destroyed the old army, the Bolsheviks had to replace it with another military force if they were to be able to resist the onslaught of the counterrevolutionary forces. The existing Red Guards, although they had been adequate to deal with the garrisons of Petersburg and Moscow during the October Revolution were "incapable of opposing enemy armies" because of "insufficient numbers ... and the absence of proper centralization (of authority)." (11)

The new Red Army was at first far from the formidable military machine it was to become, for the Marxists' traditional distrust of standing professional armies as well as the near-anarchic condition of the country, caused its founders to proceed cautiously. The plan was to decentralize the army, using the principle of voluntary recruitment and elected commanders. However, the divisive forces within the military--parochial interests, lack of centralized authority, multiple Party Committees and Party cells, and friction between officers and enlisted men--nullified all efforts to make the army into an effective fighting force. Consequently, in the "breathing pause" (*peredyshka*) afforded the Party by the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty with Germany, Trotsky, with Lenin's approval, undertook to remove the internally corrosive and

destructive elements from the Red Army and to transform it into an efficient professional force. Enjoying a broad mandate from Lenin, Trotsky sought to introduce some sweeping changes into the Red Army, and caused thereby widespread debates on the proper role of the Red Army, and also incurred the wrath of many of his rivals in the Party.

The many views and proposals advanced in the discussions over form and function fell into two main categories. The crucial question that divided them was whether the Red Army was to be a truly "revolutionary" army based on ideological tenets, or whether it should be a professional army unaffected by ideology. Advocates of the former favoured: a) a minimum of centralized control and maximum reliance on local Party control for military units (that is to say, a territorial militia as opposed to standing professional cadres); b) the abolition of rigid discipline, ranks and traditional military virtues, and their replacement by a system in which commanders were elected and orders might be questioned; c) voluntary recruitment as opposed to compulsory service; d) local, rather than central, control of Party organizations and political organs in the military units; and e) revolutionary military doctrine in place of orthodox strategy.

By contrast, the proponents of a professional army of standing cadres advocated hierarchic organization, strict discipline, and centralized control in a military institution that would operate according to traditional strategic concepts.

The main protagonists in the debates were Trotsky and his followers on the one hand, and the opponents of Trotsky's ideas, who centered around Stalin, on the other. Trotsky had proposed two stages of development for the military organism he was seeking to build. In the first, under pressure of counterrevolutionary threats within and without the Soviet Union, the Party was to disregard ideological formulas and create a military force capable of fending off the enemy. In the second stage, after victory and internal stabilization, the Party would be free to create, at a more leisurely pace, a truly revolutionary army guided by ideological imperatives.

For the first stage, Trotsky urged rigid centralization of the military, the inclusion of officers from the old Russian army (voenspetsy), strict discipline in the units, the abandoning of the election of the commanders, compulsory military service and orthodox strategy. In the second stage he proposed transforming the Red Army into a territorial militia, by decentralizing authority, minimizing the role of the political commissars and doing away with the controlling power of the military over the secret police and political organs within the army.

Trotsky's recommendations for the first stage of the Red Army's development were based primarily on the urgency of the military situation and the acute need to preserve and expand the newly won Soviet power. His rationale for the second stage was similarly pragmatic:

Since the overriding problems, once the regime had consolidated its power and repulsed external and internal enemies, were economic, Trotsky argued the economic advantages of a part-time arrangement, by which proletarians and "near-proletarians" could continue to work in factories and villages while spending part of their time in military training-- an arrangement, he pointed out, that would accord more nearly with the model of the socialist system.

Though Trotsky's proposals had the support of Lenin, they generated widespread dissatisfaction and opposition both among the military and the Party. This opposition consisted of divergent groups, the most prominent among them being the circle that gathered around Stalin. The latter, though a fervent advocate of a centralized standing army, saw his own position threatened by Trotsky's growing power, and found it expedient, therefore, to attack him on the grounds that he would destroy the revolutionary army by including officers from the old army and adopting orthodox strategy. Other factions in opposition to Trotsky were those who interpreted the communist ideology very literally and opposed any measures tending toward militarization, the centralization of military authority and orthodox strategy.

The widespread uncertainty and disagreement on the role of the Red Army was temporarily abated at the 8th Party Congress, which met from March 18 to 23, 1919. The decisions of the Congress were: a) that the Red Army was to have a "definite class character;" b) that it was to include military specialists; c) to abolish the principle of elective officers; d) that the army should be highly centralized; e) that the army will be for the duration of the civil war a "standing and regular" one; thereafter it would take on the form of a militia; and f) that the role of the military commissars was to be enhanced. (12)

While the 8th Congress thus strongly affirmed Trotsky's intention to create a professional military force, and laid down some of its basic features, many members of the Party continued to criticize and oppose its decisions. Until 1925, at the next five Party congresses and on other major occasions, the Party continued to suffer from the heated dispute over the definition of the Red Army. It was during this turbulent period that the eventual outline of the structure, internal organization and political role of the military were developed. The utopian proposals of the Left Communists, the Bukharinites, the "Military Opposition" and others fell by the wayside, and the Red Army came to reflect essentially a synthesis of the ideas of the two main protagonists in the conflict.

The basic agreement between Trotsky and Stalin that made it possible to arrive at a synthesis of their divergent viewpoints was on the immediate need for a disciplined and centralized professional army. But Trotsky envisaged a gradual changeover to an ultimately more "revolutionary," ideologically oriented army, whereas Stalin and his supporters rejected that aim in favour of a permanent standing army. Trotsky, even though he introduced the political commissars into the Red Army, thought of them as playing only a limited role in the long run, while he favoured increasingly wider functions for the intra-military and local Party organizations. Stalin, on the other hand, viewed the central political organs not only as playing a vital role during the formative period but as permanent instruments by which the Party leader could keep the military under close control.

It might be said that the Red Army form emerged out of the crucible and turbulence of the Revolution due mainly to three central factors:

a) Trotsky's capacity for pragmatic improvisation under stress; b) Stalin's vast personal power designs, combined with his practical understanding of statescraft; and c) the conditions that prevailed at the army's birth--the political and military threats to the new Bolshevik government--which persuaded Trotsky and other Party leaders to shelve ideological preference for a people's army in favour of the more effective organism.

IV

ABANDONMENT OF UTOPIA: IMPERATIVES OF POLITICAL REALITIES

If anything, Stalin was even more distrustful of professional military establishments than Trotsky, and his advocacy of a standing, centralized army did not bespeak the militarist or martinet in him. Having created the Red Army, and having ousted or destroyed his rivals, Stalin was faced with the complicated task of retaining full political controls over the military while extensively expanding its technical base, and professional expertise. Stalin introduced strong political controls from the very beginning; he denied the commanders full authority (edinonachale) and, he strengthened the security organs' authority in the military establishment. The military did win concessions from Stalin, but these were intended to keep the army loyal to his regime and to make it more proficient; they were far outweighed by measures and practices which resulted in severe curtailment of professional freedom, authority and institutional self-esteem. Although the military emerged from the early post-revolutionary period with several gains, it found itself the captive of the Party elite, living in an "atmosphere of an armed camp surrounded by enemies." (13) Its official role in the Soviet state, as it evolved in the early years, was to unquestioningly execute the policies and directives of the Party; to protect the state and the regime and to put down challengers to the Party's hegemony within and without; to accept and tolerate the presence of Party functionaries in its midst even at the expense of interference with military efficiency and authority; and to be a citizen army, penetrated with egalitarian virtues while performing in a disciplined, effective manner.

It was becoming clear, however, that the Stalinist model of a submissive, malleable and "faceless" army was in many ways, and different ways, as unworkable as some of the utopian schemas of the 19th century. What he failed to perceive was the fact that institutional and professional values were taking root in this essentially guild-like and closure-prone military society, and that certain values took hold among the emerging officer corps which transcended those of the communist ideology. When these "alien" characteristics, however, became noticeable in the late 1920's and in the 1930's, Stalin's distrust of the military intensified and his attempts to control it became marked by near paranoia.

Let us briefly look at the evolving Soviet communist model of a military institution and compare it with the "objective reality:"

Although the Party came to distrust most institutions and individuals, its apprehensions are unique in the case of the military because of the latter's structure, function, spiritual values, and above all, certain inherent characteristics. First of all is the vast physical power, the weapons, equipment, men and logistic means at the military's disposal. Second is the fact that the military mechanism, with its closely integrated organization, responds to a few commands and can therefore, in theory, be rapidly mobilized for action over large areas of the country. Third, the military tends to be a closed group, and as such breeds elitist values; sharing the experiences, the schooling, and the jargon common to their career, its members are cliquish, with a strong sense of solidarity. Finally, its officers are trained to command, to demand obedience, and to respond to a chain of command.

Indeed, as the Party leaders realized, many of the Red Army's characteristics were those of all large professional military establishments, regardless of their political-social environment: a) high professionalization and demands for professional autonomy; b) a professional ethos, including strict codes of honour and discipline; and c) an organizational structure whose levels of authority are easily discernible and stable.

As these institutional characteristics and propensities of the military developed they clashed with the Party's idea of the military as an open institution, one easy to penetrate and manipulate. While the Party was attempting to alter these characteristics it found its efforts less than successful, short of some very radical measures; and it generally refrained from such radical measures lest these endanger the military's viability. Yet, the Party was also generally unwilling to accept their unchecked existence. This dilemma created difficult choices for the Party, which accents this contradictory situation by denying the military and actual autonomy while firmly demanding from it the kind of results that could be achieved best if such professional autonomy were granted. It is almost as if the Party leaders hoped to be able to create not only a "new man" but also a "new institution," which they expect to be sui generis in terms of organization, structure, and values, and yet to resemble other orthodox military establishments in performance.

The contradictoriness and incompatibility of certain basic characteristics of the military and the features that the Party would have it exhibit become readily apparent if one juxtaposes them as follows:

<u>"Natural" Military Traits</u>	<u>Traits Desired by the Party</u>
Elitism	Egalitarianism
Professional Autonomy	Subordination to Ideology
Nationalism	Proletarian Internationalism
Detachment from Society	Involvement with Society
Heroic Symbolism	Anonymity

That the military traits in the left column are indeed "natural" can be seen in the fact that they have tended to emerge whenever the military has been in a position which permitted it some freedom from the coercive controls of the Party (in the early 1930's, during World War II, and in the brief period of Zhukov's tenure in the Ministry of Defense).

The incompatibility between the Party's ideal model of a thoroughly politicized instrument of the socialist state (which must also be military effective and disciplined) on the one hand, and the military's "natural" tendencies toward orthodoxy on the other, creates frictions and tensions between the two institutions which have continued to disturb Party and governmental politics until the present.

Faced with this inherent incompatibility with the military professionals (an incompatibility which was viewed in exaggerated and paranoid ways by Stalin), leaders of the Party have in the past four decades undertaken a variety of measures intended to keep the army "contained" without vitiating its capabilities or viability. The intensity of this policy of "containment" varied according to the internal strength of the Party, the relative security of the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the threat of war or internal Party power struggles on the other.

Faced with the spectre of "capitalist encirclement" Stalin was forced to provide the Red Army with massive supplies of modern weapons and equipment, to give the military professionals a broad mandate to integrate the new weapons and equipment efficiently into the growing army, to train commanders and soldiers and, generally, to provide a powerful shield against the gathering external threat to the state. However, he remained wary of the military's tendency toward elitism and exclusiveness, a propensity that grew with its professional renaissance. So overwhelming did this distrust become that, at a time of acute danger of war in Europe, Stalin struck at the military in the massive purges of 1937.

Throughout his reign, Stalin, it appears, looked upon the military as a giant on the Party's leash. Hemmed in on all sides by secret police, political organs and Party and Komsomol organizations, the military's freedom of action was most of the time severely circumscribed. Whenever there was an external threat, or when the Party was internally divided, the Party would slacken the leash and toss scraps to the military in form of concessions and freedom to articulate their grievances. When the crisis had passed, the leash was tightened again, and many of these recently won privileges were rescinded.

However, the Red Army was progressively gaining a corporate image, a sense of apartness from the Party-prescribed norms and processes for its existence. As long as Stalin's terror machine was in operation, the military was not able to develop an active elite and spokesmen for its interests, nor was it afforded an opportunity for articulating institutional views, objectives and ideals. However, with Stalin's death and the division in the Party leadership that followed, the control mechanisms were weakened, and the military's own interests and values emerged into the open.

## V

### AFTER STALIN

The death of Stalin signaled the end of the military's very submissive role in the Soviet state. In the succession struggles of the middle 1950's the military assumed a major balancing role, directly or implicitly throwing its not inconsiderable support to certain personalities or factions within the Party and assuming thereby an active role in Soviet politics. Moreover, in the person of Marshal Zhukov broad sectors of the military found their spokesman. Zhukov took advantage of the Party's internal troubles to rid the military establishment of political organs' pervasive controls; he introduced strict discipline and the separation of ranks; he demanded the rehabilitation of purged military leaders and the punishment of their tormentors; he called for better pensions and higher living standards for the military; and he moved the military out of its social and political limbo and into the limelight. Above all, he dared to express in public opinions on major military issues that often deviated from the prevailing Party line. The relationship between the Party and the military changed from its previous benefactor-client form to one of a more equal distribution of roles. This relationship has become transformed into a dialogue of institutions, some of whose conflicting vital interests and values are in a constant process of adjustment.

The military's remarkable striving to free itself of ideologically and politically derived fetters generated deep concern in the Party apparatus, whose members could only watch helplessly while Zhukov sought to destroy a control mechanism which has been carefully and meticulously built up during the preceding four decades. As long as the Party leadership was locked in power struggles for the domination of the Party and the state, the military enjoyed a relative freedom to set the historical record straight, to increase their authority, to reshape the internal structure of the armed forces and generally to flex its muscles. However, after Khrushchev finally asserted his own dominating role in the Party, by getting rid of the "anti-Party Group" in 1957 with the help of the unwitting Zhukov, the apparatchiki were ready to deal with the spectre of Bonapartism in the Soviet Union. The Party's fears of the military's excesses are candidly reflected in the following remarks at the XXII Party Congress:

A dangerous anti-Party line and the Bonapartist policy pursued by ex-Minister of Defense Zhukov were nipped in the bud by the decisions of the (October 1957 Central Committee) plenary session. How serious the situation was can be seen from the extent to which the role of the military councils, political agencies, and Party organizations had been undermined and vitiated; absolutely all Party criticism of shortcomings of behaviour and performance of commanders of all grades was forbidden in the army; the Party basis of one-man command was thrown overboard; arrogance, rudeness, arbitrariness and intimidation were rife in the treatment of subordinates; dissension between commanding officers and political workers was cultivated. Party life and the work of political agencies were administered by fiat and were reduced to purely educational activity. The Main Political Administration was slighted and downgraded ... There was a growing drift toward unlimited authority in the army and the country. (14)

While it is questionable if Zhukov and the military had Bonapartist designs on the state, there can be little doubt that he used his authority as Minister of Defense to profoundly alter both the internal balance between military and political authority and the broader relationship between the Party and the military. To the ultra-suspicious minds of the apparatchiki such a development harboured dangers to the Party's hegemony in the state, and they therefore set upon some sweeping reforms to purge the military community of these dangerous ideas and practices. (15) In instituting these socio-political reforms the Party sought to: a) minimize the conditions that breed elitism by forcing egalitarian, collectivist procedures and values on the military community; b) to "open up" the military community to the impartial and not necessarily sympathetic scrutiny of civilian Party organs; c) to deprive the officers of their automatic authority as commanders and force them in most instances to reclaim it from the collective authority of the party organizations in their units; and d) undermine the officers' security by exposing them in an intensified form to the ritual of kritika/samo-kritika including the ignominy of criticism from the professionally and militarily lower-ranking Komsomols.

Both Zhukov's ouster and Khrushchev's ambitious plans to reform the officer corps were made possible because a large number of ranking military leaders who were Zhukov's personal enemies lent their support to Khrushchev and sought ultimately to replace Zhukov and his followers in the officer corps. These members of the so-called Stalingrad Group, (16) at the time a strongly pro-Khrushchev faction, did indeed achieve their objectives but only at the price



of renewed political controls and the sacrifice of some of the military's gains in professional autonomy and institutional independence.

In recent years, however, despite the setback suffered with the ouster of Zhukov and the reform military program of Khrushchev, the military has been advancing toward greater professional and institutional freedom. The reasons for this growing military strength lie less in deliberate attempts to oppose Party controls, or in renewed Zhukovism, but rather in the profound changes in social and political conditions in the Soviet Union, in the changing international and strategic environment, and in the imperatives of modern military technology: a) The officer corps is gradually being transformed from a body of interchangeable commanders with minimal skills into a group of more sophisticated, self-assured younger specialists; b) Individually and collectively, these technocrats are becoming indispensable to the effective maintenance of increasingly complex military weapons and equipment; c) The Soviet Union's extensive political-military commitments, both to the countries of the bloc, the underdeveloped world and vis-a-vis the West, would be severely compromised by any serious crisis in the relations between the Party and the military, making accommodation imperative; d) A perceptible moderation in the Party's methods of ruling and a general easing in the social life of the Soviet Union has permitted the ascent of the professional managers, technocrats and scientists, among others, as well as of the officer corps, which is becoming a professional group par excellence; and e) A growing anti-militarist, pacifist trend in Soviet society has prompted the Party to try to enhance the military profession by paying greater tribute to officers and granting them concessions.

Moreover, the movement toward emancipation among former satellites and the split between the Soviet Union and Communist China contain a strongly nationalistic element. As Moscow's ideological and economic hold over these dissenters weakens it may yet fall to the military to halt or even roll back the divisive trends in the Communist camp. And finally, a corollary of the increasingly nationalistic orientation of the bloc countries is that the Soviet military is gaining stature as a major patriotic entity and symbol of the power of the CPSU.

The cumulative effect of these and other developments has increased the military's internal role, one which they view as an active partner in policy making in affairs which affect the security of the state. While it is unlikely that the Marshals and generals seek Bonapartist objectives, but rather professional and corporate autonomy, they do not feel bound to refrain from criticizing Party policies when such policies are seen to be destructive to the welfare and security of the nation. As an example of such public criticism by military people of official policy, one can cite very recent demands by officers for a more adequate role in shaping strategic and economic policy as they affect the military establishment; demands for more authority to dispose of strategic forces and weapons, which the Party jealously guards as its own prerogative; exhortations to modify foreign policy into a more militant form, rather than one of blind adherence to detente with the West. These public criticisms by the military finally forced the Party leaders to respond in public and attempt to set the military straight by clearly asserting the Party's legitimate rights and authority to manage and control the military establishment: (17)

Both World War I and World War II demonstrated that the leadership of an armed struggle could not be left in the hands of the military command alone.

Attempts to divorce politics from war and to prove that in a modern war the political leadership has possibly lost its role (has been decidedly refuted by logic) ... On the contrary: If the missile-nuclear war becomes a reality, the role of political leadership in it will grow substantially.

The military was lectured that "the time is long past when a general could direct his troops standing on a hill" and that "Marxists-Leninists do not assign the roles of generals absolute importance." The Party maintained that "the influence of brilliant generals was even at best limited to adapting the methods of warfare to new weapons and to new forms of combat." The military was also told that "because of their destructive properties, modern weapons are such that the political leadership cannot let them escape its controls."

The military turns a deaf ear to these exhortations and admonishments of the Party leaders, clearly rejecting such views as exemplified in Khrushchev's statement that "I do not trust the appraisals of generals on questions of strategic importance" and arguing instead that "persons who dress up their superficial and primitive conclusions by referring to ... 'strategic farsightedness' and who lack even a remote knowledge of military strategy, must not be tolerated." (18)

## VI

### PROSPECTS AND PERSPECTIVES

It is one of history's ironies that Communist parties, which in principle condemn standing professional armies as an evil force of suppression, cannot do without such professional armies once they themselves have achieved political power, and indeed depend on the military to maintain them in power. Of course, there is nothing surprising about this turn of events, for political control of a state is impossible without some form of a military force. What is relevant, however, is the communist party's difficulty in finding a very stable form of "coexistence" with this necessary instrument of policy.

It is important to distinguish between two kinds of problems in the communist attitudes toward their military professionals: a) The need for ideological correctness in rationalizing the existence of a professional army. This is a relatively easy task, achieved by maintaining the doctrinal fiction of the eventual withering away of the state, of which the military is an important factor, and of the superfluity of a professional army in a classless society. Stalin devised the formula that the maintenance of a professional army was made necessary by the threat of "capitalist encirclement" and Khrushchev used the following rationale: "We are devoting great attention to our army only because we are forced to do so. Since the capitalist countries cannot think of existing without armies we must also have an army." (19)

Such avowed misgivings about the maintenance of professional armies, however, have been largely rhetorical statements for the sake of ideological continuity and legitimacy. A much more serious problem, however, is: b) the Party leaders' apprehension about the military's behaviour and intentions within the present political structure of the state. This concern is genuine and pressing and stems from the Party's uncertainty about its ability to exercise constant and effective control over the "experts in violence," with their well integrated

organization, whose institutional interests and values diverge in important ways from those of the Party. The latter, to state the problem in its simplest terms, is a group of "experts in violence" of a much broader scope, who cannot tolerate any significant opposition to their hegemony within the state. Yet, while the Party's fears of the men who carry guns, fly the planes, man the missiles and command the obedience of millions of soldiers is real enough, they are finding themselves today more dependent on them than in the past.

The Party's strategy toward the military has been one of containment, divisiveness and integration: a) containment, by imposing multiple shackles on the military community and by a ceaseless process of indoctrination; b) divisiveness, by selective cooptation of certain trustworthy military leaders from the top hierarchy into positions of power and prestige, seeking thereby to prevent the military community from developing a focus, direction and institutional identity of its own; and c) integration, by denying the military a sense of apartness from society, and by the establishment of multiple links between the military and larger society.

The objective of this strategy is simple, and was best described by a terse statement of Mao: "Our principle is to have the Party control the gun and never to allow the gun to control the Party." The success of this strategy is considerable, and has always enabled the Soviet Party leaders to maintain their authority in the military and to reinstate it whenever such authority was temporarily weakened. However, the growing political and military commitments of the Soviet state, the lessening "charisma" of Party leaders, the diminished role of the terror machine, the imperatives of modern technology, among others, have favoured the heightened professionalization and institutional loyalty of the officer corps. These developments present the Party leaders with a dilemma, which results from a delicate balance between two conflicting motivations: the desire for hegemony within the state and the need to maintain a strong military-political posture before the rest of the world. This balance is far from impossible, if the Party leaders feel secure enough to trust the military to the extent of allowing them a modicum of corporate autonomy and a role in shaping defense policy. This the Party fails to do because it assumes that generals cannot be trusted. In this mistrust, the Soviet Party leaders seem to reflect Engels' vitriolic comment on the earliest military professionals who had joined the revolutionary movement of 1848:

This military pack ... hate each other violently, are jealous like school-boys of each other's smallest awards, but when it comes to people in mufti (vom "Zivil") they are all united. (20)

One is tempted to employ the terminology and the deterministic formulas of the communist dialectic to describe the evolving role of the military in the communist state. One could say that the Party has created the Red Army in order to use it for the furthering of its political and ideological interests. Having "given birth" to the Red Army, the Party found itself progressively more dependent on it for internal and external reasons. As the Soviet state assumed a larger and larger international political and strategic role, so did the Party's dependence on the military grow, along with the latter's strength and influence. One may also speculate on the future "synthesis" of these "antithetical" forces, in which the two might merge, with the army "militarizing" the Party and the military becoming even more "politicized." Such an eventuality would signal the ultimate death of the idea of the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat (an idea that was moribund at its inception) without changing very much the political realities of the Soviet state.

# NOTES

- (1) Cited in R. Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and Communist Party, Princeton University Press, 1967, p. XVIII.
- (2) In Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Works, Moscow: Marx-Engels-Lenin Institut, 1951, p. 43.
- (3) Reinhard Hoehn, Sozialismus und Heer, Bd. 1, Berlin: Gehlen Verlag, 1961, p. 43.
- (4) Ibid.
- (5) Marx, who had known even less about military matters than Engels, urged the latter to keep him informed on his progress and to send him books and materials which might help him (Marx) in advancing his own knowledge. Among his reasons given to Engels, he mentioned the fact that he needed the occasional 10 pounds earned by writing articles on the subject. See ibid., p. 61.
- (6) Ibid., p. 52.
- (7) "To The Rural Poor," Selected Works, Lawrence & Wishart, Ltd. London, 1936, vol. 2, p. 281.
- (8) "Revolutionary Army and Revolutionary Government," ibid., Vol. 3, p. 313.
- (9) KPSS i stroitel'stvo Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR, 1918-iiun' 1941, Moscow: Voenizdat, 1959, p. 11.
- (10) Kolkowicz, op. cit., p. 37.
- (11) KPSS i stroitel'stvo ... op. cit., p. 11.
- (12) KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soiuza: sbornik dokumentov, 1917-1958 Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1958, pp. 49-63.
- (13) Carl J. Friedrich and Z.K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, New York: Praeger, 1956, p. 281.
- (14) XXIII s'ezd: stenograficheskie otchet, 1962, Vol. 3, p. 67.
- (15) Among the statutes and regulations of the reforms were: Statute on Military Councils (April 1958); Statute on the MPA (April 1958); Statute on the Political Organs (October 1958); Changes in the Instructions to the Party Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, (April 1958). The last item refers to the change in Paragraph 2 of the original Instructions issued in April 1957, during Zhukov's tenure as Minister. See Kolkowicz, op. cit., pp. 139-142.
- (16) The Stalingrad Group consists of officers who allied themselves with Khrushchev during the battle of Stalingrad, where the latter served as political supervisor of that front, and who had risen with Khrushchev to top leadership in the Soviet military establishment. For details see "The Rise of the Stalingrad Group: A Study in Intramilitary Power Politics," in Kolkowicz, op. cit.
- (17) Krasnaia zvezda, January 5, 1967. See also Krasnaia zvezda of January 24, and April 6, 1967.
- (18) Marshal M.V. Zakharov, Chief of the General Staff, February 4, 1965.
- (19) Pravda, February 16, 1958.
- (20) Engels in a letter to Marx, cited in Hoehn, op. cit., p. 44.

THE THREAT OF "BONAPARTISM" - THE PARTY  
AND THE ARMY

by

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The specter of "Bonapartism" has haunted the Communist leaders from the beginning of their movement to the present day as the "danger from within" that threatens their rule. Of course, "Bonapartism", as most of the Marxist concepts, was always an ambiguous term and did not only signify the threat of a military coup d'état or a "breach of the Party's democratic and collective Principles" by a despotic personality, with or without "cult". In essence it expresses the fear and obsession of Marxists with a possible perversion of the revolution. Marx, in his earliest studies of the French revolution, grasped the dialectics of failure within a revolutionary movement, and the "Weltgeist zu Pferde", Napoleon Bonaparte, became for him the personified antithesis of counterrevolution<sup>1</sup>). In his brilliant study, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte", Marx 1852 viewed the coming to power of Napoleon III as an irritating contradiction and an exception to the rule of Historical Materialism. This "military dictatorship", based on power aspirations and national interests, did not fit into his conception of class struggles between bourgeoisie and proletariat. The possibility of a failure of revolution, as it occurred in 1794, 1830, 1848, 1871 or 1905, has to this day remained a knotty problem indeed to all Marxists, certain of their knowledge of the iron laws of history and its irrevocable progress towards progress towards Communism. This was exactly the point of departure for Trotsky's criticism of Stalin's "Thermidorian" and "Bonapartist tendencies" or for Mao Tse-tung's recent "cultural revolution" in China.

From the beginning of the Marxist movement in Russia, "Bonapartism" became a subject of fierce controversy. Right after the Second Party Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party in July, 1903, in Brussels, Martov together with Trotsky, accused Lenin and his Bolshevik faction of "Bonapartism of the worst type", and Lenin retaliated promptly with a like accusation against his opponents. According to Lenin's definition, "Bonapartism" implies "acquiring power by formally legal means, but actually in defiance of the will of the people (or of the Party)"<sup>2</sup>). For Lenin, "Bonapartism" became synonymous with all opposition to the "will of the Party", that is, Lenin's own will, Stolypin's reforms, the Duma

or Kerenski's Provisional Government <sup>3</sup>). The "danger of Bonapartism" during the Kornilov affair in September 1917 was the rallying-cry for Lenin's followers and the signal for the October revolution.

The Bolshevik's take-over in October 1917 did not banish the ghost of "Bonapartism", that rose in a new guise whenever the ruling Party faced a crisis or as a byproduct of internal power struggles within the leadership. Trotsky's struggle with Stalin over the succession to Lenin in the Twenties, Stalin's great purge in the late Thirties or Khrushchev's struggle against the anti-party group and Zhukov's ouster in 1957 were inextricably interwoven with accusations and counteraccusations of "Bonapartism". How dangerous this old threat really was during these upheavals, is difficult to ascertain, since it was always one of the Party's leading groups that kept the upper hand, and the winner always insinuated "Bonapartist tendencies" to the losers - not to mention the simple concealment or outright falsification of the relevant documents. That "Bonapartism" can be more than a tool for polemics and can actually convert a Communist system is proved by the recent power struggle between army and Party apparatus in China. Lin Piao's successful military coup d'état seems to give the Soviet leaders more cause for alarm than all the other excesses of Mao's "cultural revolution" <sup>4</sup>).

#### From Revolutionary Ideals to Conventional Practice

The Communist leaders always represented themselves as fervent "anti-militarists", none of them ever had either a classical military education or battle experience - except Engels as a Prussian cadet and a participant of the civil war of 1849. Nevertheless, all of them played their part as major military theoreticians and strategists, Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung even became supreme commanders of great armies and won decisive wars. In Marxist theory, the proletarian revolution should not only abolish the "exploitation of man", but also break down all state power and do away with all kinds of military machines, and instead establish a "People's army" or proletarian militia, which fights and produces at the same time. In practice, the Communist take-overs in Russia, Eastern Europe, China or Cuba were followed by the building up of tremendous conventional armies and the militarization of the whole population, not by arming it, but by creating an atmosphere of permanent mobilization against enemies

within and without. The army did not die away, but remained the "instrument of the ruling class", in this case the Communist elite, and it was used in fact more to keep this "class" in power and for internal control than for the spread of world revolution.

The dichotomy between Communist theory and practice became one of the reasons for an uneasy relationship between Party and army within a Communist system, for true believers an army could only be like a mistress, who can never belong. On the objective level, this contradiction was expressed by the question of an effective Party control of military power on the one side, by the problems of army influence upon the Party on the other. As long as the expression of Communist power remains a function of military might, control of the Party and influence of the army have to stay in a delicate balance, as it was in fact during fifty years in the Soviet Union. Of course, when we speak of "army" and "Party" within the context of the Soviet system, we have to keep in mind, that in reality there was never anything like a homogeneous entity of the one or the other with identical interests, an all-embracing esprit de corps and a unity of opinion or singularity of purpose. In the military for instance we can identify different groupings and orientations, the old competition between the services, the power struggle between commanders and commissars, the conflict between the generations of old and young cadres, national and regional differences, cliques around certain leaders, various schools of military thought and not a few personal ambitions. The relationship between army and Party is more an interaction of different groups within each structure, than a clearly defineable division or subordination of "pillars of power".

The "danger of Bonapartism" was in the past not so much a question of a real military coup, of a total abolishment of Party control or of the change from Party dictatorship to military dictatorship. "Bonapartism" became a more or less real danger only in connection with faction- and power struggles within the Party, when one or more factions were looking for army support and for a decision outside of the Party organs. Sometimes the "army" did play a definite or even decisive role in intra-party struggles, as it happened during Stalin's fight against Trotsky, the purge of Beria in 1953, Khrushchev's move against the anti-party group



or, according to some speculations, in connection with Khrushchev's ousting in 1964. The army was rewarded for its support - at least the army leaders siding with the winning faction were - but in most cases it was put back again into its place as a servant of the Party. Only once in Soviet history, as far as one knows, parts of the army came out openly against the Party; that was during the Kronstadt revolt of 1920, and the trauma of Kronstadt, as much as the trauma of Budapest, is still haunting the Kremlin leaders<sup>4a</sup>).

### The Coming of the Commissars

The decisive problem of demolishing a "bourgeois military machine" was solved in Russia without effort on the part of the Bolsheviks. As early as 1917 the Tsarist army was in a process of dissolution and the downfall of the Tsar and the defeat of Kerenski's summer offensive speeded its disintegration. With some clever conspiratorial moves the Military Revolutionary Committee under Trotsky usurped from the Provisional Government and the Soviet Executive the control of the "civil war weapon" by taking command of the military units of the Petrograd garrison. Together with the workers' Red Guards they became the decisive power instrument for the Bolshevik take-over in the October revolution<sup>5</sup>). Following the February revolution Lenin had proclaimed the abolishment of standing armies and their replacement by a national militia and the universal arming of all people as the aim of Bolshevik policy<sup>6</sup>). In the first days of October, the "utopian vision of the army of the socialist future, in which no discipline was required, because comradeship and loyalty to the revolution took its place", influenced the Bolsheviks attitude<sup>6a</sup>). In keeping with the romantic ideas they abolished all military ranks on December 29, 1917, and introduced the election of officers by the troops.

Lenin, in power, reversed his military policy completely and, Lenin in power, reversed his military policy and, to replace his tactics of undermining the Russian army and his peace propaganda, he began - with the assistance of Trotsky - to build up a Bolshevik army with all the characteristics of a conventional military apparatus. On December 20, 1917, an All-Russian Collegium for the organization of the Worker-Peasant Red Army was set up,

and by a decree of the Council of Peoples' Commissars on January 15, 1918, the "new army" came into being as a "bulwark of Soviet power" and a "backbone for the coming socialist revolution in Europe"<sup>7)</sup>. This decree installed the Council of Peoples' Commissars as the supreme military organ and established for direct leadership a Commissariat for Military Affairs with Trotsky as Peoples Commissar and head of the Revolutionary Military Soviet (Revvoensoviet)<sup>8)</sup>. In fact, the actual leadership and control of the army was assumed by the Party, as stated by Lenin in the Central Committee resolution of December 25, 1918:

"...that the policy of the military department, as of all other departments and institutions, is pursued in strict accordance with the precise directives given by the Party in the person of its Central Committee and under its direct control."<sup>9)</sup>

The first attempt, to recruit the Red Army on a voluntary basis, with the workers 'Red Guards as nucleus did not succeed; only 150,000 volunteers joined its ranks.

In a decree written by Trotsky, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on April 22, 1918, introduced universal compulsory labor and military service for all citizens from 18 to 40 years of age<sup>10)</sup>. An All-Russian Staff was organized - which in 1935 became the General Staff of the Soviet Army. And on September 16, 1918, a new order - the "krasnoye znamya" was created. Lenin himself ridiculed the "partisan spirit" of the earlier days and ordered the drafting of former Tsarist officers as "military specialists" into the ranks of the Red Army, so as to build up a regular mass army according to Trotsky's proposals<sup>11)</sup>. Trained officers, military surgeons and administrators were conscripted for service, all in all 48,000; and they constituted about 75 per cent of the new cadres<sup>12)</sup>.

As in other sectors of the new order established by Lenin, a dualistic system was also established within the army, and the commissars had to control the professionals. The rank and responsibility of all the reestablished "bourgeois specialists" in administration, industry, higher education, financing, military affairs etc., were determined by their professional knowledge and efficiency, as in all bureaucratic systems, according to

Max Weber. The position of the Party secretaries and political commissars in the bureaucratic apparatus on the other hand was a function of their faith and subordination to the Party. This dualistic system, the "bureaucrats" on the one side, the Party "apparatus" with its "charismatic" justification on the other became the fundamental characteristics of the emerging Soviet system.

On April 8, 1918, Lenin ordered the introduction of military commissars - "voyenkomy" - on regional and local levels as "political organ of Soviet power in the army". The top of the hierarchy of commissars became an All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars, which was reorganized September 2, 1918, into the Political Section and May 26, 1919, into the Political Administration (PUR) of the Revvoensoviet <sup>13)</sup>. The Political Administration as the operative center for all political activity within the armed forces was headed by a member of the Central Committee and functioned as a department of the Central Committee Secretariat, controlled by the Orgbureau <sup>14)</sup>. The PUR established and controlled the political department (politotdyel) in the military units, schools and establishments and appointed the commissars. In October 1919 special political leaders (politruk) were sent to companies and other lower units for propaganda and agitation <sup>15)</sup>. The commissars were instructed to direct all Party work in the army, to carry out political propaganda and education among the peasant recruits and to control the commanders. At the same time they were personally responsible for the reliability of the commanders and the "revolutionary discipline" of the soldiers; they had a voice in all tactical decisions, had the right to countersign all orders and were empowered to arrest unreliable officers on the spot <sup>16)</sup>. Trotsky characterized this division of power and labor between commissars and commanders:

"The military specialists will direct the technical end of the work, purely military matters, operation, work and combat activities. The political side of the organization, training, and education, would be entirely subordinated to the representatives of the Soviet regime in the presence of its commissars." <sup>17)</sup>

A party-political apparat within the army came into being, which was independent of the civil Party apparat. This highly centralized hierarchy of commissars had its own chain of command and appointments and did not care very much about the rules of "democratic centralism" and the election of committees and functionaries. To stiffen discipline and to propagate Communist ideas, a special Party organization within the army was established on January 10, 1919, consisting of Party cells in regiments, with the purpose of absorbing all the independent committees, thwarting the centralized command. These Party cells had to help the commissars to maintain discipline, but were not allowed, "to interfere with the activity and the orders of the commanding staff" <sup>18)</sup>. It took Trotsky more than one year to mold the local Red Guards and the independent partisan detachments into a centralized Red Army, which by March, 1919 amounted to 1,5 million men and at the end of the Civil War to 5,5 million men under arms.

#### Kronstadt Revolt and Faction-struggle

The victory against White Guards and foreign intervention, even the retreats from Finland, the Baltic states and Poland gave the new army the training it needed. At the end of the Civil War the question of the Red Army's reorganization became acute. Economic reasons compelled a drastic demobilization of the troops, and within the Party a fierce struggle over leadership and organization in the army came into the open. During the Civil War, the intra-party opposition against Trotsky's disciplinarian measures was not even suppressed by Lenin's backing of his selfconscious comrade in arms. At the Eighth and the Ninth Party Congresses in March, 1919, and April, 1920, a heated dispute broke out over Trotsky's direction of military affairs. The changes from War Communism to peace and the New Economic Policy was accompanied by a reemergence of the "military opposition" as an ambiguous coalition of varying aspirations. As an undercurrent of the "workers opposition" the so-called "Detsists" came out against the centralization of the party-political apparat in the army and wanted instead the election of Party bureaus in the army units and the right for them to elect and control commissars and commanders and to reorganize the whole army into

a peoples militia <sup>19)</sup>. At the Ninth Party Congress Trotsky, who was now in charge of economic affairs, advanced plans for militia force on a territorial bases, which at the same time would be production units, but no steps were taken to carry them out.

When these decisive problem of military and production organization came in for discussions at the Tenth Party Congress in Marek, 1921, the Kronstadt Revolt broke out. On February 28, the sailors in the Kronstadt navel base rose against the Bolsheviks and demanded, "in view of the fact that the existing soviets do not express the will of the workers and peasants", new elections of "soviet without Bolsheviks"- Lenin's definition of "Bonapartism" as a rule "in defiance of the will of the people" was now turned against him by his faithful supporters during the October revolution. On March 18, Kronstadt was stormed by troops under the command of Trotsky and Tukhachevskaya, and the delegates of the Party Congress acted as commissars. The spontaneous and popular "revolt of the proletariat against the dictatorship of the proletariat" was crushed by force. The Kronstadt uprising gave Lenin a pretext to introduce at the reassembled Congress the famous "Resolution on Party Unity" which called for the "immediate dissolution of all groups with a separate platform, on pain of immediate expulsion from the Party". In three secret sessions of the tenth Party Congress, the opposition was accused of "army syndicalism" and their proposal for a "militia formation" was defeated and a reorganization of the army on conventional lines accepted <sup>20)</sup>.

The Succession struggle after Lenin's death between Trotsky and Stalin developed into a fight for leadership in the army. In the Civil War, a group of new Red Commanders emerged, like Frunze, Tukhachevski, Yegerov, Timoshenko, Yerenenko and others, and they took over the positions of the old "military specialists". As faithful Communists, they found the tutelage of the commissars superfluous. In a letter to the Central Committee in February, 1923, some of them suggested the abolishment of the commissar-system and the introduction of "yednonachalye", unity of command. Step by step this controversial measure was executed and the commanders took charge of military affairs and political work. The commissar-system was slowly

abolished, and the war commissars were supposed to become party leaders in the units, subordinated to the commanders and confined to cultural-educational work.

The army Communists, with the Political Administration under Antonov-Ovseyenko as their centre, put up resistance against this erosion of their powers and sided with Trotsky in his struggle against Stalin. The founder of the Red Army was accused of imagining himself or wanting to act a "Bonaparte", and of plotting a military coup <sup>21)</sup>. Stalin, with the support of some of the Red Commanders, was able to tear the control of the army from his opponent, by skilfully bringing the centralized leadership of the army's political apparatus under his own control. In September, 1923, Stalin won his first breakthrough with his and his followers election into the Military Soviet, in January, 1924, Antonov was relieved by Bubnov as chief of PUR, in January, 1925, Frunze became Trotsky's successor as the head of Revvoan-soviet and Peoples Commissar. Stalin succeeded in this power struggle by drawing the army into the intro-party conflict; because of this experience he later took every precaution against the possible employment of these tactics against himself. He took care, that his newly-won instrument of army-control, the Political Administration, became the right of the military department of the Central Committee Secretariat, subordinated to him as Secretary General <sup>22)</sup>.

After Trotsky's ousting, Stalin in spring, 1926, a ~~purge~~ of Zinovievs supporters in the Leningrad command and in the Baltic fleet (as Lashevich and Zof). A military reform was initiated, to reorganized the Civil War army into a standing army of 562,000 men, serving from two to four years, combined with a territorial militia. The decisions regarding the modernization and mechanization of the armed forces according to Frunze's "unified military theory" for an offensive strategy in a "war of machines" <sup>23)</sup> gave an great impetus to Stalin's plans for industrialization and collectivization <sup>24)</sup>. New steps for strengthening "yedinonachaliye" in May, 1927, -- for instance by abolishing the former right of political leaders to countersign all orders of the commanders -- brought a new wave of "army opposition" to the fore, that spread from the Tolmachev Military-

Political Academy, the high school for commissars, to the Byelorussian and Ukrainian military districts.

This "army opposition" was connected with the widespread discontent in the country against collectivization and its negative effect on the "peasant sentiments" within the army<sup>25</sup>). This development, the growing influence of the army and the Red Commanders on the one hand, Stalin's rise to personal power on the other, was analyzed by Trotsky as a direct step "from the Bolshevik to the Bonapartist phase"<sup>26</sup>).

### The Purge of the Red Commanders

Stalin's victory over his intra-party opponents and the successive purges in the army made the military establishment into a willing tool of Stalin's rule. The last vestige of the militia ideology - the territorial system - was abolished in 1934, and the army, based exclusively on the cadre-system, expanded to 4,2 million men in 1937. The change of ideological orientation from "proletarian internationalism" to "socialist patriotism" and the revival of Russian history and the military tradition of Suvorov and Kutusov coincided with the vested interests of the army leaders. Stalin's "revolution from above" produced a "new class" of party-apparatchiks, bureaucrats and managers, and the Red Commanders too became members of the Soviet "Establishment". Their elevated social status within the new class society was expressed by higher pay and by the reintroduction on September 22, 1935, of military ranks for commanders and political leaders<sup>27</sup>). The full circle from October, 1917, with the Red Guards' egalitarian and world-revolutionary fervor to the establishment of a Soviet national army with a cast-conscious officers' corps and revived Tsarist traditions had apparently closed<sup>28</sup>).

The successful organization of a modern army was suddenly interrupted by Stalin's great purge, which like a deadly infection seized upon the military leaders, who not so long before had been distinguished with gold braids and marshals stars. The reasons for Stalin's willful destruction of a military apparatus, created by himself and shaped to fit his own purposes, will probably never be fully explained. At the Plenary Session of the Central Committee

in February-March, 1937, Stalin developed his thesis of the "sharpening of class-struggle" and he initiated a resolution, calling for the "demasking of all 'enemies of the people' and 'deceitful persons'". It is said, that Molotov in a speech at the Plenum "openly called for a mass liquidation of military cadres, accusing their members of opposition against the developing fight against all 'enemies of the people'". The organs of NKVD "fabricated after the Plenum the version of a 'counterrevolutionary military fascist organization' within the armed forces". At an enlarged session of the Military Soviet in June, 1937, Stalin on the basis of this falsified evidence requested the "total liquidation" of military leaders for treason <sup>29</sup>).

On June 11, 1937, the arrest and trial of a group of military leaders was announced. The victims of the so-called "Tukhachevski affair" the Deputy Peoples Commissar for Defense, Marshal Tukhachevski, the Commander of the Kiev military district, Yakir, of the Byelorussian district, Uborevich, of the Moscow district, Kork, and the First Deputy Peoples Commissar and chief of the Political Administration, Gamarnik (who committed suicide at his arrest) were accused of a conspiracy to carry out a coup d'etat, plotting and espionage on behalf of Germany and Japan. They were convicted and shot on the same day <sup>30</sup>). In the third Moscow Trial, as a kind of justification for the army purge, Vyshinski attempted to involve tukhachevski in the "Trotskyists conspiracy" and accused him of posing the "danger of Bonapartism and military dictatorship" <sup>31</sup>). After the June session of the Military Soviet a mass purge of military leaders was ordered, which above all struck at the political functionaries in the army and the cadres of the air force and the armoured troops. Thousands of commanding officers were ousted from the Party and arrested.

The majority of the Civil War veterans (the Tsarist non-commissioned officers, to whom Trotsky had promised the marshal's baton and who in fact in 1935 became marshals and generals and pampered members of the "new class") were liquidated, and vacancies created for the social ascent of new cadres (the non-commissioned officers of the Civil War), who



could than Stalin for their new positions. At a meeting of the army politruk's in April, 1938, Mekhlis, since December, 1937, the new chief of PUR, warmed up the old accusations of the Twenties against an "army opposition" and asked for a "bolshhevization of the army". A second wave of the army purge followed, and in 1938 the chief of the General Staff, Marshal Yegorov, the Commander of the Air Force, Alksnis and the leader of the Far East army, Marshal Blukher became "victims, of the cult of personality" <sup>32</sup>). At the beginning of this sweeping army purge, in May 1937, the "collegiate system in army leadership" was reestablished and endorsed on August 10, 1937 by a Central Committee resolution. The military commissars again came into existence, and in the military councils the Party secretaries of Union Republics and provinces made their appearance as commissars (Khrushchev, at this time secretary of Moscow, became a member of the military council of the Moscow military district). The Party apparatus, seized direct control of the army and became the greatest beneficiaries of Stalin's great purge.

The unsatisfactory performance of the "rebolshevized army" in the Finnish war and the difficulties encountered by the system of dual leadership under combat conditions caused a new reform. In August, 1940, the Central Committee abolished the military commissars and reinstalled full "yedinachaliye". The Main Political Administration was downgraded into the Main Administration for Political Propaganda, and the political leader in an unit became deputy commander for political tasks (Zampolit) <sup>33</sup>). This newly-won influence of the army found its expression at the Eighteenth Party Conference in February, 1941, when 18 army leaders were appointed to the Central Committee. At the same time, the opposition grew against Stalin's handling of military affairs his nepotism in filling posts and his blindness to Hitler's plans against Russia; Beria initiated a new purge with the arrest of Vannikov, the Peoples' Commissar for Armament.

Hitler's attack in June, 1941 found the Soviet Army unprepared for this onslaught and weakened by permanent purges. As a first measure, Stalin took to the old methods and on July 16, 1941, reinstalled the military commissars, who were expected "to play the same role as they did during the Civil War against

foreign intervention"<sup>35</sup>). The opposition against the commissars in the fighting units compelled Stalin, to abolish the commissar-system in October 1942 and to give sole responsibility to the commanding officers <sup>36</sup>). The hated Mekhlis was replaced by Shcherbakov as head of the Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R. Not to abdicate all the influence of the commissars turned Zampolity, 142 of them were promoted to the rank of general. Russian patriotism, hatred of the Germans and pride of the army in its victories supplanted more and more the rigid patterns of Communist indoctrination. To get rid of this dangerous spirit and to reestablish full control of the Party, Stalin after the end of the war instigated the "purge of the heroes"<sup>37</sup>). The famous victors of the Berlin battle, Marshal Zhukov was removed from the Central Committee and sent into exile as a precautionary measure against a dangerous reappearance of "Bonapartism".

#### The Army's Involvement in Soviet Politics After Stalin

The death of Generalissimo Stalin in March 1953 led with the emerging "Thaw" to new changes in the army-party relations. In increased emphasis on professional expertise in the formulation of defense policy caused a progressive involvement of the army leaders in Soviet politics. The contest between Party and army shifted from the question of political control - the cause for uninterrupted disputes and permanent purges in the Twenties and Thirties - more and more to problems of military policy and armament in a nuclear age. Not more commissars, but rockets and atomic bombs now stood at the center of army-party relations. The Cold War and the development of new weapons posed new problems for the Soviet Army and their complexity lent the opinions of the military specialists in forming the Party Leadership's decisions more and more weight. A new pattern emerged, that groups of army leaders who held different opinions on military theories, technics and strategy allied themselves with factions within the Party Presidium whose attitudes differed in a similar way. The Party factions - more loosely knit alliances with changing affiliations, than organized groups with their own apparats and platforms - used "their" marshals as professional

experts for proving their line in Presidium decisions, the marshals on the other hand expected support from "their" apparatchiks and Party managers in the intra-army struggle and a representation for their interests at the top.

Even before Stalin's death, the growing importance of nuclear weapons gave rise to the military, who also in an obscure way became involved in the sinister events of Stalin's last days. In the great change of guards in March, 1953, Zhukov made a come-back as First Deputy Defense Minister. In the summer of that eventful year the army had a decisive hand in the purge of Beria and his secret police <sup>38</sup>; and Zhukov assumed the place in the Central Committee, vacated by Beria's expulsion. In the following power struggle over Stalin's succession and Khrushchev's fight against Malenkov's new course, the preference for consumer industry and the new spirit of coexistence, the army leaders sided with the First Secretary, who was willing to reward them with the inauguration of their rocket-program. One of the marshals, Bulganin, in February, 1955, succeeded Malenkov as Premier, and Zhukov was installed as Defense Minister. Eighteen army leaders were promoted, six to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. The military side used its newly-won influence to stress the rehabilitation of the "victims of the personality cult" from its own ranks and initiated the process of destalinization by rewriting the history of the Second World War from 1953-on. Khrushchev in his secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 carried favor with the army leaders by criticizing Stalin's role as military leader and putting all praise on the marshals. Zhukov became a candidate of the Party Presidium, and eighteen high-ranking officer members of the influential Central Committee.

Khrushchev, in the ensuing power struggle in early 1957 against the anti-party group of Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich (joined by Bulganin and Voroshilov), won the support of Zhukov by giving in to his demands for a further reduction of Party control in the army and a "comprehensive Strengthening of the authority of the commanders"<sup>39</sup>). After the successful ousting of the anti-party group in June 1957, Zhukov was rewarded with his

promotion to full member of the Presidium - the first military leader to be in this position at the top. Shortly afterwards, Zhukov's spectacular rise to power came to an abrupt halt, and on October 27, 1957, he was removed from his post as Defense Minister and Marshal Malinovski became his successor. At an enlarged Plenary session of the Central Committee at the end of October, Zhukov was accused of "pursuing a policy of curtailing the work of Party organizations, Military Councils and of eliminating the leadership and control of the Party, its Central Committee and the Government over the army and navy". Zhukov, it was said, tried not only "to implant the cult of his own person in the Soviet Army", but also "proved to be a politically deficient figure, disposed to adventurism both in his understanding of the major tasks of the Soviet Union's foreign policy and his leadership of the Ministry of Defense". By unanimous vote he was ousted as member of the Party Presidium and the Central Committee, and Zhukov himself accepted with "deep respect" the "comradely criticism of my mistakes as in the main correct" (40). The "danger of Bonapartism" had once again been averted and the Party's control in the army reasserted.

Nevertheless, when Khrushchev in 1960 proposed a drastic reduction of army strength and a revival of the territorial system, he was compelled by the reaction in Party and army to shelve these plans silently. In the following dispute over the new Seven-Year-Plan, there seem to have been some supporters from the military for the "steel eaters". Again at the Twenty-First Party Congress, Khrushchev's vehement attacks on old Marshal Voroshilov were quietly ignored by the army speakers. The resignation of Marshal Zakharov as chief of General Staff in spring, 1962, can be interpreted as a sign, that not all army leaders agreed with Khrushchev's plans for sending rockets to Cuba, and some later hints disclosed, that they also became upset by the way he handled relations with China. These probably were some of the reasons, why the military members of the Central Committee supported Khrushchev's expulsion at the October Plenum, 1964.

The new leaders Brezhnev and Kosygin were very careful not to antagonize the military establishment with "harebrained

schemes", as Khrushchev had done. On the contrary, they followed the proposals of the army and decided at the Twenty-Third Party Congress in 1966, "to strengthen the country's defense capability", and the Supreme Soviet voted for higher defense allocations in the budget. At the Congress, more military leaders than before were elected to the Central Committee - but none of them was promoted into the decision-making Politbureau <sup>41</sup>). In each case, the voice of army leaders became louder and stronger, and in the open discussion about the employment of anti-rockets they made their influence felt <sup>42</sup>). They did not restrict their voice to purely military matters, but presented their view on internal and cultural matters too <sup>43</sup>). Again and again the military leaders complained, that the liberal trends in art and literature and the growing unrest among the Soviet youth would undermine the discipline and consciousness of the recruits, and they were most outspoken advocates for restrictive measures <sup>44</sup>). It seems, the Soviet military leaders were more worried by the effects of technization and of social change, - connected with the drafting of better educated recruits and the growing specialization in combat training - upon their army, than by all the difficult questions of weapons, armament control and strategy in a nuclear age. The Party ideologists are giving a helping hand in dealing with the problems of the younger generation by a revival of the propaganda for "patriotism" and the conjuring up of a new "imperialist threat". At the same time, these ideologists repeat the demand for part-political leadership in military affairs under conditions of a modern war <sup>45</sup>).

#### The Army as the Mainstay of Reaction

Does the threat of "Bonapartism" still exist in the Soviet Union? Is there a kind of Russian Lin Piao (or Suharto) waiting in the wings? Is it possible, that Moscow too many undergo developments similar to those in Budapest, Djakarta or Peking, where students and officers joined in a new "revolutionary potential"? The old Marxist concepts of social and political changes as the work of class forces based on production relations is evidently out of tune with our world on the move, and Party

ideologists have a hard time to explain the series of military take-overs in Asian and African non-capitalist countries <sup>46</sup>). Revolutions, as recent developments prove, can break out, when the normal and smooth "circulation des élites" does not function properly and at the same time the reservoir of aspirants for elite-positions grows out of all proportions - and the "majors" (not the "colonels") are eager to become "generals". The development of such a revolutionary situation in the Soviet Union is emerging more and more clearly, and the comparison of the present system with the Tsarist regime visa-vis the Russian "intelligentsiya" in the late 19th century seems not to be too farfetched. The reform Communism and the "enlightened" totalitarianism of the Twentieth Party Congress of 1956 turned, ten years later at the Twenty-Third Congress into a restorative Communism and "reactionary" totalitarianism. There is the tendency within the Party to defend the positions of a middle generation of functionaries against the growing aspirations of the "young Turks". This is clearly the reason for the correction of the Party statutes with the abolishment of the "rotation-system" for party cadres and the introduction of greater restrictions for Party membership. The composition of the newly-elected Central Committee from the most firmly entrenched Party apparatchiks, is proof enough for this segregation of the Party apparatus. At the same time, the restauration of the Politbureau and of the post of General Secretary for Brezhnev confirmed only the reactionary character of the present Party-line and the growing petrification of the Party-system.

The army, at least its higher echelons, is not only a part, but the mainstay of this "Establishment". As it was the army, who pressed after 1953 for destalinization, it are nowadays military voices too, who came out in Favor of an "objective evaluation of Stalins role" <sup>47</sup>). The apparent identification of the army with the Party makes it difficult to imagine that one of the marshals may aspire to the role of a "Bonaparte" - to say nothing of the age or the personal stature of possible military pretenders. It is therefore very doubtful, that "Bonapartism" will raise its head in the form of a take-over by the present army leaders. As

we tried to point out in the short and superficial review of the last fifty years, the "danger of Bonapartism" depends on the effectiveness and cohesion of the leading core of the Party and its ability to control the whole society, including the army. "Bonapartism" may appear again, as a real threat or a psychological justification for purges, in connection with an outbreak of new power- and succession-struggles within the Politbureau. There is no insurance against a situation in which a vehement and protracted struggle between factions could erode the strength of the Party and force the army, as the only remaining organized power-structure to take over, or, that a new pretender for one-man-rule wins the army's support and attempts to repeat in a "latter-day bourgeois" Soviet society, what Marx depicted so clearly in "The Eighteenth Brumaire" in terms of a similar social formation in France hundred years ago. "Bonapartism", in its theoretical implications, if not in its concrete form, remains a challenge to Marxist-Leninist ideology and Communist Party rule, because it is a constant reminder, that in history and society forces can erupt, propelled by the "will to power", "national interests" or "elite aspirations", which do not fit into the prospects of a Communist future.

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Notes:

- 1) Karl Marx, "Kreuznacher Exzerpte 1843", in Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, Band 1, 2. Halbband, Berlin 1929, pp. 118ff.
- 2) V.I. Lenin, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back", in Sochineniya (2nd edition), Moskva 1929, vol VI, p. 298.
- 3) V.I. Lenin, "The Beginning of Bonapartism", 1.c., XXI, p. 60f. In "Lessons of the Revolution", 1.c., XXI, p. 75, Lenin wrote: "Bonapartism is a name applied to a government which endeavors to appear non-partisan by taking advantage of a highly acute struggle between the parties of the capitalists and the workers. Actually serving the capitalists, such a government

dupes the workers most of all by promises and petty concessions."

- 4) P.N. Fedoseyev, "Marxism and Mao Tse-tungism", Kommunist, No. 5, March 1967.
- 4a) Marshal I.S. Konev wrote in his reminiscences, "The Combat Glory of the Soviet People", Krasnaya Zvezda, May 20, 1967 about the suppression of the Kronstadt revolt and praised the role of the Central Committee as a "genuine combat staff", and the leading role of the "leninist Party" as a "decisive prerequisite for our victory". In a curious way, the junior Kremlinologists in Peking interpreted the appearance of Konev's article just the day after the announcement of Semichastny's removal as chief of KGB as proof for "internal contradictions" and an "acute power struggle" in the Soviet leadership (Peking Review, No. 24, June 9, 1967, p. 37f). In fact, since the Twenty-Third Party Congress a lot of articles and speeches dealt with the topic of Kronstadt and the Tenth Congress.
- 5) V. I. Lenin, XXII, p. 573f.
- 6) V. I. Lenin, XX, pp. 121, 139.
- 6a) Leonard Schapiro, The Origin of the Communist Autocracy, London 1956, p. 235.
- 7) Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voyny v SSSR, Sbornik dokumentov, Institut Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS, Moskva 1960, vol. 1, pp. 99f, 783f.
- 8) 1. c., pp. 121, 151. The collegiate system was from the beginning a principle of military leadership. It was more a means for controls and checks, than an effective instrument for teamwork. The Revvoensoviet established also his organs in the armies and front Military Soviets, consisting of the commander and two commissars. The supreme power in military affairs was concentrated on November 30, 1918, in the Council of Workers and Peasants for Defense "for the mobilization of the forces and resources of the country in the interest of defense", with Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin.



- 9) KPSS o vooruzhennykh silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza. Sbornik dokumentov 1917 - 1958, M. 1958, p. 47. This resolution was reaffirmed by the Plenary Session of the Central Committee in October, 1957, to justify Zhukov's removal, Pravda, November 3, 1957.
- 10) Iz istorii..., pp. 125f and 129.
- 11) V. I. Lenin, "All up in arms against Denikin!", Circular letter of the TSK RKP (b) to the Party organizations, in: Poloce sobranie sochinenii (5th edition), vol. 39, pp. 44, 480.
- 12) Iz istorii..., p. 144f.
- 13) 1. c., p. 123
- 14) 1. c., p. 784
- 15) Partiino-politicheskaya rabota v krasnoi armii (mart 1919-1920), Dokumenty, M. 1964, pp. 38 and 50.
- 16) Iz istorii..., p. 130ff
- 17) D. Fedotoff White, The Growth of the Red Army, Princeton 1944 p. 77.
- 18) Iz istorii..., p. 172f.
- 19) Yu. P. Petrow, Partiinoye stroitelstvo v sovetskoy armii i flote, M. 1964, p. 129.
- 20) Petrow, 1.c., p. 125 and Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, London 1960, pp. 203 and 211.
- 21) Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed, London 1959, p. 95, 161
- 22) Petrow, 1.c., p. 306.
- 23) M.W. Frunse, Ausgewählte Schriften, Berlin 1956, p. 25.
- 24) A Five-Year-Plan for strengthening the Red Army was prepared in 1926 and accepted April, 1927, at the Sixth Soviet Congress with the declared aim, to put the building up of industry, transport, government and labor reserves into the service of a rapid strengthening of the military preparedness of the Soviet Union, see KPSS i stroitelstvo vooruzhennykh sil SSSR, (1918-iyun 1941), M. 1959, pp. 266, 277.
- 25) KPSS i stroitelstvo, pp. 287, 291; Petrow, 1.c., p. 265ff.

- 26) L. Trotsky, "Pismo Druzyam", October 21, 1928, in Deutscher, l.c., p. 485.
- 27) KPSS i stroitelstvo, p. 354 - Pravda, November 12, 1935 announced the following promotions: Voroshilov, Budenny, Blukher, Yegorov, Tukhachevski to Marshal of the Soviet Union; Kamenev, Yakir, Uborevich, Belov, Shaposhnikov to Army Commander 1st Rank; Dybenko, Levandovski, Dubovoi, Fedko, Kork, Kashirin, Sedyakin, Alksnis, Khalepski, Vatsetis to Army Commander 2nd Rank; Gamarnik to Army Commissar 1st Rank.
- 28) Boris Meissner, Russland im Umbruch, Der Wandel in der Herrschaftsordnung und sozialen Struktur der Sowjetunion, Frankfurt 1951.
- 29) Petrow, l.c., p. 299.
- 30) Lev Nikulin, Tukhachevskii, M. 1964, p. 189f and L. Schapiro, l.c., p. 424.
- 31) Sudebnyi otchet po delu antisovetskogo "pravo-trotskistskogo bloka", Moskva 1938, p. 208.
- 32) Petrow, l.c., p. 302f.
- 33) Zbigniew Brzezinski, Political Controls in the Soviet Army, New York 1954.
- 34) Petrow, l.c., p. 332.
- 35) P.P. Andreyev, B.S. Telpukovski, Kommunisticheskaya partiya v PERIOD VELIKOI OTECHESTVENNOI VOINY, M. 1961, p. 20
- 36) l.c., p. 68.
- 37) Boris I. Nicolaevsky, Power and the Soviet Elite, London 1965 p. 213.
- 38) the controversy between army and secret police dates back to the founding of the Chka in December 1917. The main reason for antagonism in the army against the secret police are its Special Sections of the Main Administration of Counterintelligence within the army units, see Brzezinski, l.c., p. 54ff.

- 39) Krasnaya Zvezda, January 25, 1956, see Merle Fainsod, How Russia is ruled, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, p. 482ff.
- 40) Pravda, November 3, 1957
- 41) See Ernst Kux, "Die neue Sowjetführung", Neue Zürcher Zeitung, April 23, 1966, No. 1784.
- 42) Thomas W. Wolfe, "Die sowjetische Militärpolitik unter Breschnew und Kosygin", Schweizer Monatshefte, Juni 1967, p. 21 ff.
- 43) At the Fifteenth Komsomol Congress in Moscow on May 20, 1966, Army General A.A. Yespishhev, chief of the Main Political Administration, voiced serious complaints against modern works of arts and literature, and he was supported by Marshal Gretchko, at present Defense Minister (see Komsomolskaya Pravda, May 21, 1966.
- 44) See Marshal R.Ya. Malinovski, "You are the Heirs of Glory", Komsomolskaya Pravda, September 8, 1966. Malinovski wrote about these problems in the Bulgarian Army-paper Narodna Armiya, February 8, 1967:
- "Youths who are not accustomed to military discipline sometimes talk about an 'oppression of man's will' in the army. This is an incorrect and harmful opinion. It is not a question of oppressing the will but of training the will to make it united and purposeful. Without this we cannot achieve success in contemporary combat. This is military discipline. It is extremely important to understand this from the very first days of service."
- See also Marshal M.V. Zakharov, "Problems of Training Military Cadres - To Seek New Paths, To Raise the Quality of Training", Krasnaya Zvezda, April 14, 1967.
- 45) In Krasnaya Zvezda, January 5, 1967, Major General V. Zemskov wrote "If the rocket-nuclear war becomes a reality, the role of political leadership in it will grow substantially". Somehow connected with this noticeable tendency to strengthen Party leadership was probably the abortive attempt, to promote Party secretary Ustinov into the vacant post of Defense Minister after Malinovski's death (see Tanyug, April 6, 1967).

- 46) See for instance V. Kudryavtsevm "The Heating Up of the Struggle in Africa", Izvestiya, March 5, 1966.
- 47) In the battle of the memoirs, in which the anti-stalinists got the upper hand after 1953, there is now a significant trend towards a "restalinization". Krasnaya Zvezda, January 23, 1967, came out against M. Gallay's reminiscences in Novy Mir, No. 9, 1966. Krasnaya Zvezda. May 30, 1967 criticized Admiral N. Kuznetsovs memoirs as a lopsided approach and wrote: "The Supreme Commander in Chief, Stalin, displayed great firmness, on the whole directed military operations correctly, and had many merits in this field".

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FIFTY YEARS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS.

by

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FIFTY YEARS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS.

The Soviet-Union is, to a certain extent, the realization of one of Plato's dreams: a state, guided by philosophers. There are, of course, important differences between Plato's dream and the communist reality. Plato's philosophers who rule the state, are enlightened by ideas which are infinitely superior to the ambiguous objects of worldly perception and because of this the philosophers have to take the lead. The real light descends from above to the darkness down below. Marxist philosophers, on the contrary, do not believe in transcendent ideas. Philosophy only reflects the light which comes into existence in human practice. The marxist philosopher is so humble as to admit that he completely depends on practice; there the light usually is implicit and hidden and it has to be revealed by the philosopher. Philosophy is the self-awareness of human practice and it is, consequently, of very great importance; the humility of the philosopher, therefore, is more apparent than real. The most important difference, however, between the visions of Plato and Marx is that Plato's vision has remained a dream, while the vision of Marx has become a reality, although not exactly according to the ideas of Marx.

The interaction between marxist philosophy and political practice is the subject of this paper. This interaction does not take place between two totalities, but between a part and the totality to which the part belongs. In the marxist view human practice is the whole of which philosophy is a part. We usually make a distinction between theory and practice and consider practice to be an application of theory. The marxist notion of practice, on the contrary, is a comprehensive notion which covers the whole field of human activity. It involves all human activities also the theoretical ones, and even the world as the field of practice. Russian philosophers often emphasize that their reflection is a form of revolutionary practice. The marxist philosopher makes himself unacceptable were he to say that philosophical reflection is cut off from practice. Every philosophy is in danger of having some notions which are so all embracing that ultimately they mean nothing (1); the marxist notion of practice is such a notion.

The object of this paper is a unique phenomenon: a state which pretends to proceed in the light of a philosophy. There have been theocracies, i.e. human communities which were guided by religious leaders. But apart from the communist states I do not know an example of a human community which admits to be guided by a philosophy.

Not everybody will admit that philosophy in the Soviet-Union really plays such a role, if at least the word 'philosophy' is understood in the strict sense. It is common in the United States to call one's fundamental outlook on things his 'philosophy'. Politicians, businessmen, and even sportsmen, speak of their 'philosophy'. But then this word does not mean an intellectual discipline, but rather a fundamental outlook which guides man in his activities without being expressed in concepts. Everybody admits that the marxists have their philosophy in this sense, but then also Johnson, Wilson and De Gaulle must be said to have their philosophy. The marxists pretend to be guided by a philosophy in the strict sense, i.e. by an explicit philosophical doctrine. Not everybody admits this statement. Several people even deny that Karl Marx was in the first place a philosopher. He may have studied philosophy at the German universities and he may have written philosophical essays during his early years, but when he organized the international associations of labourers, when he wrote the Communist Manifest and The Capital, he was in the first place a man of action and an economist; his philosophy had disappeared in the background.

It is true that Marx from 1848 until his death was engaged in inquiries in the field of economics, but he remained a philosopher when doing so. He had arrived, with Hegel, at a dynamic conception of human life. According to Marx man does not have an eternal nature, but he is a being which actualizes itself in a continuous interaction with the world. This interaction with the world, however, is not, as Hegel said, a way towards the spiritual state of the self-awareness of the mind. Man's exteriorization is not an alienation which is transcended in a final interiorization. It is precisely in his exteriorization that man actualizes himself. Man actualizes himself in the interaction with the world, by actualizing a humanized world. He accomplishes his 'social self-production' (2) by labour. The world of labour is, it is true, the 'realm of necessity' and this 'realm of necessity' has to serve the 'realm of freedom' (3). But the world itself is also the place of the 'realm of freedom'. Man must transcend the 'realm of necessity', but not the world. This is one of the reasons why Marx called himself a materialist. Man's economic interaction with the world, i.e. the 'realm of necessity', is the all-conditioning basis of his existence. Marx studied the field of economics, not as one of the many possible subjects of scientific research, but as the all-conditioning basis of human existence. Marx' interest in the field of economics is born from a philosophical conception and even in his inquiries in economics he remained a philosopher. This is one of the ambiguities which has always been present in the discussions between Marx and his empirical opponents. Marx was competent in economics and he often knew more about this science than his opponents did; he could meet them on their own ground. He had an open eye to the facts and made the impression of being an empirical scientist. But first and foremost he was a philosopher; he was interested in economics for a philosophical reason. His economic concepts have a philosophical dimension.

Marx himself explicitly states that he used a philosophical method when writing The Capital. Dühring had written a critical review on the first part of this book and concluded that Marx had used the dialectical method of Hegel. On March 6, 1869, Marx wrote a letter to Kugelmann about this critical review and in this letter he says that Dühring ought to know better: "He knows very well that my method of developing the subject is not the one of Hegel, since I am a materialist and Hegel is an idealist. The dialectical method of Hegel is the fundamental method of all dialectical thinking, but only after it has been purified from its mystical form and this exactly characterizes my method" (4). The Capital, therefore, has been written according to a philosophical method. Marx mentions this again in another letter to Kugelmann of June 27, 1870. F. Lange had written that he was amazed that Marx and Engels still used the method of Hegel, notwithstanding the fact that important writers had rightly declared that Hegel was dead and buried. Yet Lange admits that Marx moves himself in economical matters with an amazing freedom. Lange does not see, according to Marx, that this freedom of movement is just another expression for the method of handling the matter, i.e. the dialectical method (5). The matter Marx writes about, is economical, but the method he uses is philosophical. There is no reason why we should not believe Marx on this decisive point. This is one of the reasons why scientists did not feel at ease when reading The Capital; they were right, because in this book there is something more than their scientific approach. Little in The Capital can explicitly be called philosophy, but the entire book is permeated by philosophy.

Notwithstanding the just mentioned freedom of movement, Marx' books, according to his own expression, had the character of a totality, of a coherent unity. At a certain moment Engels became impatient, because the preparation of the first volume of The Capital lasted longer than he expected and he asked Marx to send him at least the parts which were ready for print. Marx refused to do so. "Whatsoever shortcomings my books may have", he answered, "they have the merit

of being 'an artistical totality'. He was able to achieve this perfection because of his way of working: he never allowed a book to be printed until he finished it and could overlook it in its entirety. An author who works according to the historical, empirical method can round off each part of his book before starting another. Marx, however, worked according to the dialectical method and in order to do so, he had to overlook the whole (6). It is remarkable that Marx spoke of 'an artistical totality'. He was, indeed, sensitive to the style of writing. When reading again the text, he sometimes noticed that some part of it had been written during a period of illness; he then felt the need to rewrite such part (7).

In a discussion with Michailowski Lenin has warned against a superficial misunderstanding of Marx' dialectical method. Michailowski identified this dialectical method with the use of the famous 'triads' of Hegel: thesis, antithesis, synthesis. With this superficial scheme one could approach everything, while demonstrating nothing. Lenin did not deny that Marx sometimes used the 'triads', but this is, according to Lenin, only a superficial cover of the real dialectical approach. As an idealist, Hegel had to oppose the mind and its exteriorization as thesis and antithesis and he had to transcend this opposition in the synthesis. Marx has never accepted this way of thinking. He accepted the dialectical opposition, but situated it in the density of material life itself. The real antagonism does not exist between the mind and its exteriorization, but between the different aspects of material reality, and it is there that the antagonism must be transcended. The real antagonism usually is more complicated than the 'triads' of Hegel (8).

Marx gave an example of such a real antagonism. Human labour has a twofold character, according as it expresses itself in the use-value and in the exchange-value; Marx worked this out in the first volume of The Capital. In a letter of August 24, 1867, Marx wrote to Engels that this fundamental antagonism helped him to understand all the facts (9). We now see the difference between the philosopher Marx and the empirical economists. Both the philosopher and the economist may speak about the same reality using the same terms. For the economist the terms used are just possible models of expressing the economic facts, but for Marx they are basic concepts which make the capitalistic alienation understandable. Marx understood the attitude of mind of the economists, but they did not understand his approach and they could not criticize him, therefore, in a way which could impress him.

The philosophy of Marx is, as we already said, implicit in his mature works. There are two forms of explicit marxist philosophy, firstly the explicit philosophy of the young Marx which precedes the period of The Capital, secondly the explicit philosophy which has been formulated after this book has been written. The latter has been formulated mostly by Engels and by followers of Marx. Why did Marx not explicitly formulate the philosophy of his mature period? There seems to be a quite simple reason: he had no time for it, since he was too much involved in his inquiries on economics and in practical action. It is doubtful, however, whether this answer is sufficient. It is quite possible that Marx was not very much interested in making his philosophy explicit. This would be in agreement with his famous statement that philosophy must be destroyed in order to be actualized. This statement means that philosophy should not remain a system of abstract ideas, separated from the development of real life. Ideas become, according to Marx, idealistic as soon as they are separated from real life. The implicit character of the philosophy of The Capital is quite in agreement with these statements. Marx' philosophy has become a light which guides him in the analysis of the real facts. Consequently a dogmatical philosophy, formulated in eternalized statements, is not in agreement with the attitude of Marx. The separation of philosophy from practical life would mean the death of philosophy. If this interpretation



is true, then the implicit state of Marx' philosophy in The Capital would not be a failure, a defect, but rather the real strength of his philosophy. It would be the 'Aufhebung' which at the same time is the actualization.

But an explicit philosophy has both preceded and followed the implicit philosophy of The Capital. It is well-known that there is quite some difference between the two philosophies. The philosophy of the young Marx is open and dynamic. There is no systematical theory of knowledge in Marx' early works; but the statements about knowledge we do find, point more to the direction of the phenomenological interpretation of knowledge than towards Lenin's realism. Since we live in a humanized world, Marx says, we do not know what a world without man could be; we must go to the Australian coral-islands in order to find a world without man (10). Marx, moreover, condemns the existing economic system because it alienates the human person. He adheres to a humanistic way of thinking, which excludes that the human person could ever be absorbed into a system (11). It is quite understandable that several to-day's philosophers admire the young Marx, because he has anticipated several questions which now are in discussion. It is also understandable that representatives of the official marxist system are more or less embarrassed about the works of the young Marx. It is not excluded that Marx would have been one of the most severe critics of to-day's official marxist philosophy.

How did the official marxist philosophy come into existence? It has been formulated, at least to some extent, by Engels and Lenin and it has been dogmatized by the philosophers of the Soviet-Union. When Marx speaks of a dialectical movement in the things themselves, he means the things which are present to man, the things of the humanized world. It is not a dialectical movement which precedes man, but one in which man is actively involved. Engels and Lenin speak of a dialectical movement in matter itself, also in matter which precedes man. The dialectical movement of matter produces man and continues itself in the dialectical development of human history. It is quite doubtful whether this is in agreement with the thought of Marx. The affirmation of the dialectical movement in matter which precedes man implies the realistic theory of knowledge which later on has become a part of the official marxist system. One who affirms that there is a dialectical movement in matter itself, implicitly affirms that he knows this movement, that it is reflected in his knowledge. This already implies philosophical realism. Lenin has worked out this realism. Human knowledge, he says, is a mere reflection of data which are independent of man. Marx did not mean this when he wrote that being (Das Sein) determines human consciousness (Das Bewusstsein). He rather meant that man's real being in the world, within a human society, determines the reflective ideas of the human mind. Engels and Lenin are at the origin of the official marxist philosophy with its well-known dogma's: matter is; matter is dynamic; the movement of matter is dialectical; the dialectical movement of matter produces man; the dialectical movement of history is a continuation of the dialectical movement of matter; the movement of matter is reflected by human consciousness etc. We have no right to make Marx responsible for this dull philosophy which is of no interest to western thinkers and boresome to eastern students who are indoctrinated in it.

How is it possible that this system maintained itself during a rather long time? Philosophy is so dynamic that it does not explain the long and undiscussed continuation of a system. Doubt belongs to the inner nature of philosophical reflection. When a system during a long time escapes to philosophical doubt, this can only be explained by other factors. We find an example in the perseverance of neo-thomistic philosophy in the catholic church from the beginning of this century until late in the fifty's. This was due, not to the inner strength of this philosophy, but to the authority of the church which protected its philosophy. In the same way the stubborn resistance of the official marxist

philosophy to philosophical doubt is due to non-philosophical forces, i.e. to the interaction of this philosophy with political life. The marxist philosophy has become a matter of political interest, since it has got the task to justify the existence of the marxist order.

This task seems to be quite alien to a philosophy which bears the name of Marx, because his own philosophy was a severe criticism of the existing order and he himself refused to give a description of the new communist order. In his early works he sometimes ventured to anticipate the future, but he became ever more cautious on this point. He restricted himself to the criticism of the existing capitalistic society. In this society he discovered elements which had outgrown it, i.e. the new, social forces of production and the proletarian worker. Marx recognized in them the forces and the people of the future. He spoke of the future in so far as it was present. Criticizing the existing state of affairs, Marx indicated some constituent elements of the future, without describing the future itself. Yet Marx prepared the way for the function marxist philosophy obtained later on, viz. to justify the existent society. He prepared this new function by exaggerating the evil elements of capitalistic society. He did not describe them as unfavourable aspects which could be corrected. He called them an absolute evil which had to disappear. They could not be corrected by a slow evolution, but they ought to be abolished by a radical revolution. Calling the existing situation black, Marx prepared the future in which his followers would call the new situation white. In this way marxist philosophy became an ideological justification of a present state of affairs. Such ideological justification was alien to the mind of Marx, and yet he prepared the way for it. His absolute condemnation of the present prepared the ideological justification of the future.

The most essential function of Soviet-philosophy is to be an ideological justification of the marxist present, and it is implicitly contained in one sentence of Marx: "With this establishment of the new (communist) society the prehistory of humanity takes an end" (12). The capitalistic society belongs to the prehistory of degeneration and alienation. The communist society transcends this prehistory. The communists have ended the period of alienation and have started the real history of mankind. It is of essential interest to marxists, to maintain that capitalistic society belongs to the prehistory of evil and alienation, that they themselves have escaped from this state of affairs. This is not an empirical statement, but an absolute philosophical judgement. Marxists cannot be real marxists without this philosophy. They need this philosophy in order to remain what they are, or rather, what they think they are.

Marxist philosophy remained open as long as it functioned as a critical analysis of the past, but it became a closed system when it became an ideological justification of the present. As a critical analysis of the past it was a thought which prepared a radical change; as an ideological justification of the present it became a philosophy which had to maintain the existing order. The revolutionary philosophy developed into a protection of the results of the revolution. Hence it had to grow into a conservative philosophy and a conservative philosophy necessarily is static.

It has lasted quite some time, however, before the dynamic, revolutionary philosophy was transformed into a static system. Lenin contributed, as we have said already, to its stabilization, by formulating the so-called marxist theory of knowledge, the rather simplistic and uncritical realism, but also by his conception of the party. Marx conceived the party as the proletariat which has become aware of its situation and of its mission; the party is the organized proletariat. But Marx was in favour of a free discussion within the organized proletariat. The proletarian meetings originally were characterized by free, vivid and fervent discussions. Lenin, on the contrary, favoured a strong

centralization of the party; the party had to be guided by a relatively small number of professional revolutionary leaders who would have to take the lead, both in planning and in action. Those leaders must have an influence on a larger circle of followers. So the party had to be concentrated around a small elite. The action of all the members of the party had to be controlled. Lenin transformed the party into a kind of military organization and in this way he prepared, without intending to do so, the dictatorship of Stalin. It is quite understandable that such a party had to establish its ideology, but Lenin himself had no time to keep order in ideological affairs after the outbreak of the revolution, neither had Stalin during the first period of his reign. The free and fervent discussions on philosophical affairs continued, therefore, during a rather long time, but it is clear that they had to be ended. The existing communist society needed an established philosophy.

It is impossible, of course, to give here an account of the development of Soviet-Russian philosophy. We only point at a few facts which indicate the political influence (13). During the first years after the revolution there was a large amount of freedom in philosophical teaching, but in the autumn of 1921 all the so-called idealistic philosophers were replaced by materialists; there was a kind of expurgation of the 'false' elements at the universities. After this a long quarrel took place between those who favoured a mechanistic and those who favoured a dialectical interpretation of materialism, between I.I. Stepanov and A.K. Timirjazev on the one hand and A.M. Deborin on the other hand. Deborin was winning at first, but then a middlegroup presented itself, under the leadership of M. Mitin, P. Judin and V. Ralčevic. The question was decided by Stalin in an interview; an official condemnation of the two extremes from the side of the central committee of the party followed. The reason of this condemnation is quite remarkable: the mechanistic interpretation of materialism was considered to favour revisionism and to deny the revolution, to be right-winged; the dialectical interpretation of materialism was considered to deny the established order in the Soviet-Union and to be left-winged. The war had to be conducted on two fronts, against the extreme right and the extreme left, and so the middle position was accepted, also in philosophy. The political motives of Stalin determined the philosophical choice. The same happened again after the famous discussions on language. Is language an element of the superstructure and is it, consequently, determined by the development of the economic infrastructure? Or does it play a role of its own? At the time of this discussion Stalin felt the need to accentuate the national motives. He had to consider the national feelings of the Russians. In his famous articles on language Stalin emphasized that Russian language did not essentially change with the revolution, that, consequently, there was continuity between the past and the present. Language is not determined, therefore, by the economic infrastructure and it does play an important role of its own. Stalin's choice was determined by political motives and after he had spoken further discussion was impossible. It is quite remarkable that the leader of the Soviet-Union himself felt the need to intervene in philosophical questions. There have been many other interventions in philosophical questions, but the examples given suffice.

In such way the official interpretation of the marxist doctrine was slowly fixed. It is quite understandable that the need was felt to have a kind of manual of the official doctrine. This manual was published in 1958; it is entitled Osnovy Marksistskoy Filosofii (14). It contains all the dogma's of Soviet-Russian philosophy. There was some discussion after its publication, but only about minor affairs, such as the arrangement of the matters and the incompleteness of some parts. But it was no longer possible to deny any of the essential theses of the book. It is a kind of state-philosophy.

Now we will try to describe the interaction between philosophy and politics in the Soviet-Union. Which influence does philosophy have on politics? Which influence do politics have on philosophy?

A. The influence of philosophy on politics

1. Influenced by philosophy the marxists easily use in political affairs the terms 'true' and 'false'. They themselves pretend to have understood the real development of history and hence to be right; the capitalistic countries are wrong. There may be failures in the Soviet-Union, but they are incidental mistakes of the true system. If there are favourable aspects in the western world, they are incidental merits of a false world. Their philosophy offers to the marxists an ideological and aprioristical justification of their politics.
2. Since communists think in the light of their philosophy, they are insufficiently open to empirical facts. It is well-known that social and political sciences are insufficiently studied in the Soviet-Union. Marxists have thought they did not need these sciences, since they have their philosophy. A remarkable example is the failure of the agricultural policy in the Soviet-Union; it was decided in the light of philosophy what the agricultural workers are, but their real attitude was not recognized.
3. Marxists usually exaggerate the ideological aspects of their mutual disagreements. It takes them a long time to arrive at the real questions, since a philosophical screen covers them. The marxists seem too involved in philosophical discussions, even when national interests are at stake. This makes it difficult to know what is going on between communist countries. The terminology marxists use in accusing one another does not facilitate their discussions, but rather is an obstacle; the so-called interpretation of marxism-leninism confuses the issue. Marxists discuss politics like divines theology.
4. Marxists are hampered by their philosophy in their contacts with western politicians. They are a priori diffident towards them. During the last years of the second world war and the first years after the armistice there was quite some benevolence of western politicians towards the Soviet-Union, but Stalin simply could not believe it. This is one of the reasons of the outbreak of the cold war.
5. Marxists are aggressive in their foreign policy on account of their philosophy. As long as they believe to have the true system, they must be convinced that the others are wrong and they must feel the need to impose their truth. Although they have renounced force as a means to impose their truth, they feel obliged to maintain the ideological conflict. The communist order is not only their interest, but also their truth.
6. Marxists uphold the one-party-system and they must do so as long as they believe in themselves. Their party cannot be a party, next to others, but it is the party, the organization which is in harmony with truth. They call their one-party-system a democracy, because the true people, i.e. the organized proletariat, rules. The ruling of the party is identified with the ruling of the people.
7. The communist philosophy hinders the discussions between marxists and people of the west, because the communist notions are loaded with an aprioristical philosophical meaning. In this connection we only need to think of the notions freedom, suppression, party, democracy, state, tactics, ideology; one needs a marxist dictionary in order to be able to speak with marxists.

B. The influence of politics on philosophy

1. Philosophy is considered to be of political interest, since it is the ideological justification of the existing order. It is, consequently, favoured and protected as a political interest.
2. Philosophy in the Soviet-Union is controlled by the political powers which need a stable system of thought. This system is taught at all the universities; deviations from the system are not allowed. Consequently this philosophy obtains a stability and a generality which it would never attain of its own accord. People adhere to it, not because they are convinced of its truth, but because it is the established doctrine. The philosophical system is adhered to with an unphilosophical certainty.
3. Philosophy is charged with tasks it cannot fulfil. It must justify the ambiguous existing political order. It must control scientific life. Scientists are forbidden to propose hypotheses which do not agree with dialectical materialism. Philosophy must intervene in biological and sociological questions. Political powers impose all these tasks on philosophy.
4. Political powers take away the freedom of thought which lies at the origin of every real philosophy. Consequently philosophy in the Soviet-Union often no longer is a real philosophy. Young people with a courageous and enterprising attitude of mind do not go in for philosophy; they rather prefer to study science which hardly can be controlled by the political powers. The danger is quite real that philosophy is studied by people who have a servile attitude of mind. Philosophy seems to be strengthened by the political powers, but as a matter of fact it is weakened by them. Since the time philosophy in the Soviet-Union is under political control, its doctrine and history have become of little interest to western scholars.
5. In this way philosophy becomes an instrument of suppression. It is taught to young people in order to make them think the way the politicians want. Philosophy, instead of favouring the freedom of mind, becomes a threat to freedom; instead of favouring the critical attitude of mind, kills it. Philosophy does so, not by its own inner force, but as the embodiment of political suppression. It becomes the object of hatred of those people who are in favour of freedom.
6. The marxists have rendered a bad service to Marx, by describing him as the anticipator of their system. The real Marx had to be discovered by western scholars.
7. Philosophical and practical questions usually are intermingled in the Soviet-Union. This is quite understandable, because philosophy is supposed to justify a practical state of affairs. A philosopher who does not realize the practical impact of his theoretical points of view, puts himself into danger. A philosopher who remains in the abstract order, is easily accused of idealism. Marxists speak of idealism, as soon as the ideas are far removed from practice. We often find, therefore, philosophy in a hidden state. In the discourses of the Soviet-leaders there is usually quite some philosophy hidden. On this point the Communist Manifest of Marx and Engels is a classical example.
8. Political scientists can study the western political situation without paying attention to western philosophy. They need not be aware of existentialism, phenomenology, linguistic analysis etc. But when they study the political situation of the Soviet-Union, they must be interested in marxist philosophy also, since the Soviet-politicians make use of philosophy in order to maintain and strengthen their position.

We have summarized in a few points the interaction between philosophy and politics. But all the preceding statements presuppose marxists who believe in themselves, i.e. marxists who believe in the truth of their system and who really believe that they have solved the fundamental problems of the organization of human society. These two elements are essential to the marxist 'faith': the truth of their system and the final and adequate character of the solutions it offers. The question must be raised whether the marxist politicians really are believers. They pretend to be believers, but it is not impossible that they only pretend to be so, that they make use of the ideology as a useful instrument, without believing in it. It can hardly be doubted that Lenin believed in marxism, but did Stalin really believe in the truth of the system until the end of his life? When he intervened in ideological, philosophical questions, he stressed the points of view he needed in his practical policy. He introduced the national point of view in the international ideology of marxism at the moment he needed it. Was Stalin mainly the practical politician and was his ideology, instead of being an enlightening truth, a mere instrument of power? We cannot answer this question, because we do not know the personal background of the explicit statements of Stalin. The most probable answer is that Stalin believed in the marxist ideology, but that he became even more aware of the fact that practical life confronted him with problems which did not find an adequate answer in the ideology.

The period of Stalin was at the same time a period of dictatorship and of indoctrination. It is quite understandable, therefore, that the break with this period was a protest both against the dictatorship and against the indoctrination. The indoctrination was one of the most important instruments of the dictatorship. After Stalin there was a movement towards freedom; freedom of action, however, cannot exist without freedom of thinking. Where the movement towards freedom had its best chances, the protest against the indoctrination was also very strong. The group of Yugoslavian thinkers who have organized the conferences of Korčula and who have published the review Praxis still say they are marxists, but they reduce the marxist doctrine to a few basic ideas and they practically reject the system. They want to be independent of the politicians; philosophy must be free from political interventions. It is quite probable that in almost all the communist countries the indoctrination is felt as a burden by an ever increasing number of people. If there were real freedom, the official system probably would be undermined everywhere. The marxist belief is becoming unreal and to a high extent it is artificially maintained by political power. But the politicians still do maintain the system, even Tito. The publication of Praxis has been forbidden.

The interaction between philosophy and politics officially still exists (15), but it is rapidly weakening. Marxist policy becomes more practical and less theoretical. How can we explain this development? Firstly the marxists have experienced, during the Stalin era, the dangers of the indoctrination; the identification of political interests with ideological truth has appeared to be a threat to freedom. Secondly the marxists have become aware of the fact that practical interests can cause divisions between themselves, that the doctrinal unity does not offer any guarantee of political unity. The Russian-Chinese conflict and the oppositions in the eastern block have made this quite clear. The influence of the doctrine appears to be much smaller than marxists formerly imagined. Thirdly the marxists are ever more confronted with practical questions which exceed their ideology. They thought their doctrine offered them the key to solve all practical questions. But life appears to be more varied than the doctrine. The inadequate character of marxist doctrine becomes ever more evident. The value of the communist doctrine and its help in solving problems has been extremely exaggerated and the marxists themselves now become aware of it. The period of interaction between philosophy and politics, which has been described in this paper, is rapidly coming to its end.

We have to greet this development with joy. We do not desire that marxist philosophy disappears from the philosophical field. It is a philosophy which offers many highly valuable points of view. But this philosophy will prove its real value only when marxist philosophers can think freely and critically, when they are free of political influence. It will be useful that marxist philosophers continue to reflect on political questions, but they should do so from a critical distance. They should not be abused to justify political interests. They should become critics of their system, just like Marx was a critic of the system he lived in. Such a development will be useful also for the politicians, who will be more free to view practical interests, just as practical interests. The negotiations with the west will then be much easier.

The interaction between philosophy and politics officially still exists. Is it wishful thinking to say that this official existence is to an high extent unreal? I hope that the subject of this paper largely belongs to the past. The marxist realization of Plato's dream has been unfavourable both to philosophy and to politics (16). The philosopher ought to reflect on the real questions of real life, but he ought to do so from a viewpoint which is not determined by practical interests.

## Notes

- (1) "C'est précisément cette apothéose du travail qui m'inquiète. Une notion qui signifie que tout ne signifie plus rien". Paul Ricoeur, Travail et Parole, in Histoire et Vérité, Aux éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1955, p. 185.
- (2) "In der gesellschaftlichen Produktion ihres Lebens..." Karl Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Vorwort, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1958, p. 13.
- (3) "Das Reich der Freiheit beginnt in der Tat erst da, wo das Arbeiten, das durch Not und äussere Zweckmässigkeit bestimmt ist, aufhört; es liegt also der Natur der Sache nach jenseits der Sphäre der eigentlichen materiellen Produktion". Karl Marx, Das Kapital, Dritter Band, Dietz Verlag, 1957, p. 873.
- (4) Marx-Engels, Briefe über 'Das Kapital', Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1954, pp. 159-160.
- (5) Ibid., p. 276.
- (6) Ibid., p. 127.
- (7) Marx wrote this on November 12, 1858, in a letter to Lasalle which has been published in Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1958, p. 230.
- (8) W.J. Lenin, Was sind die 'Volksfreunde', Werke, Band I, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1961, pp. 156-157.
- (9) "Das Beste an meinem Buch ist 1. (darauf beruht alles Verständnis der facts) der gleich im ersten Kapitel hervorgehobene Doppelcharakter der Arbeit, je nachdem sie sich in Gebrauchswert oder Tauschwert ausdrückt; 2. die Behandlung des Mehrwerts unabhängig von seinen besondern Formen...". Marx-Engels, Briefe über 'Das Kapital', Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1954, p. 144.
- (10) Marx-Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1957, p. 42.
- (11) "... indem die Erde aufhört, ein Gegenstand des Schachers zu sein, und durch die freie Arbeit und den freien Genuss wieder ein wahres, persönliches Eigentum des Menschen wird". Karl Marx, Zur Kritik der National-ökonomie, in Kleine ökonomische Schriften, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1955, p. 94.
- (12) Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, p. 14.
- (13) This development has been described by Gustav A. Wetter, Der dialektische Materialismus, Verlag Herder Freiburg, 4.Auflage, 1958, pp. 149-268.
- (14) J.M. Bochenski has published an excellent summary of this book: Die dogmatischen Grundlagen der sowjetischen Philosophie, (Stand 1958). Zusammenfassung der 'Osnovy Marksistskoj Filosofii', D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland, 1959.
- (15) I.A. Seleznev, lieutenant-colonel of the Soviet-army in 1964, published a book about the ideological war. It has been translated and published by the Swiss Eastern Institute, Bern under the title Krieg und ideologischer Kampf. It is interesting to read this book; the whole indoctrination is still there.
- (16) "Au lieu d'unir leurs vertus, philosophie et politique échangeaient dès lors leurs vices: on avait une pratique rusée et une pensée superstitieuse". Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signes, Gallimard, Paris, 1960, p. 11.



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THE POLITICS OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE:  
1917-1967, AND THE FUTURE.

by

Prof. Roy D. Laird.

THE POLITICS OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE:  
1917-1967, AND THE FUTURE. (a)

During the first half century of communist rule in the Soviet Union, probably more than in any other state at any time in history, politics has dominated agricultural affairs.

Near the close of Tsarist rule, peasant needs and desires produced the major forces shaping the course of events. The failure to respond adequately to those forces made possible the Bolsheviks' seizure of power in 1917. Subsequently, peasant and agricultural demands stimulated Lenin's adoption of the NEP in 1921. Still later, agricultural considerations were central to the means Stalin selected for bringing the NEP to a close at the end of the 1920's. Moreover, Stalin industrialized the U.S.S.R. primarily by extracting the economic price of this action from the peasantry, a feat made possible by the political institutions he imposed on the countryside. After Stalin, Khrushchev came to power primarily through his promise to solve agriculture's grave problems by political means; yet, the major reason Khrushchev lost his position surely was because he failed in agriculture. Near the close of the half century, the new leadership of Brezhnev and Kosygin decided to increase investments to levels unprecedented in Soviet agricultural development, but as of early 1967: Stalinist political institutions still dominate rural Soviet Union.

In 1913 more than 80% of the Russian population was rural. By 1966, although more peasants than accounted for by the rural population growth had gone to the cities, and thus only 46% of the population was classified as rural, the absolute reduction of the rural population had been relatively small - from 130.7 million in 1913 to 107.1 million in 1966 - when contrasted with that of other societies which are highly industrialized, which have much smaller rural populations in proportion to their urban populations. (1) (b)

Since World War II the U.S.S.R. has been recognized as the world's second greatest industrial power; yet, whereas Tsarist Russia had been a major exporter of grain, the drought of 1963 was to dramatize the magnitude of the Soviet agricultural problem, as 1963 was but the first year, of many to come, that the Soviet Union imported large quantities of grain. Indeed, a projection of future needs made by this author implies that the U.S.S.R. can be expected to remain a net importer of foodstuffs for the foreseeable future. (2)

Agriculture remains the most important Soviet domestic economic problem. Causes for this state of affairs rest in history, economics, and geography, but probably more than any other factor, political demands on the rural U.S.S.R. may be credited with the disappointing advances in food production. Politics has been defined as a matter of power, "who gets what, when and how," but as used here politics encompasses also the particular demands of institutions of rule and the beliefs that may guide governmental decision makers - i.e. sources of authority, that can influence the actions of a First Secretary of the CPSU

or a chairman of a collective farm, which go beyond the mere exercise (or threat) of force that is implied in many definitions of politics.

Unlike the urban setting, where most workers live in at least two quite separate environments (e.g., that of their work and that of their off-duty hours), agriculture universally tends to be a comprehensive single way of life. Whatever the economic system, most farms not only are basic production units, but they are also primary social units at the same time. However, where collectivization has been established, the farm unit of a Soviet kolkhoz, an Israeli kibbutz or a Mexican collective ejido encompasses the primary unit of local government as well. Obviously, therefore, a comprehensive analysis of agriculture in any society, but particularly one supporting a collectivized agricultural system, requires the combined talents of an economist, a zoologist, an agronomist, a political scientist, and perhaps the special knowledge of several other intellectual disciplines as well; yet, for reasons outlined above, a review that concentrates on the politics of Soviet agriculture seems to be of particular value at the time of the 50th anniversary of the Soviet system.

#### Lenin and the Third Revolution

Most existing descriptions of the events of 1917 tend to concentrate on only one, or at most two, of the three revolutions that occurred in 1917, that is, on the downfall of Tsardom in the spring and the successful seizure of the central reins of power by the Bolsheviks in the fall. Far too little attention is given to the third revolution of that year, without which the other two revolutions could not have been possible. Surely, Tsardom would not have fallen when it did if the predominantly peasant army had not decided that it no longer could support the old regime. Surely, Bolshevism would never have come to power had not a peasant (largely spontaneous) revolution occurred throughout the countryside. Starting early in the year, in region after region the peasants arose, cast out the landlords, seized the land and burned the manorhouses. True, the end of centuries of Tsarist rule and the beginning of the Soviet experiment in communist rule were momentous happenings. Moreover, the "Bolsheviks" genius for organization and the Russian defeats during the 1914-1917 war also were determinant factors over future events. But the die for 1917 surely was cast with the inadequacies of the 1861 emancipation; certainly the course became unchangeable when the "Stolypins" of 1906-11 proved to be too little and far too late. The peasant seizure of the countryside was the major revolution, whereas the Bolshevik takeover marked only the beginning of a highly tenuous, largely urban adventure. Indeed, even in the cities the Bolsheviks were not assured of control until after three years of civil war, and the rural areas remained predominantly peasant dominated until the early 1930's and Stalin's successful "revolution from above."

After the brief 1918 "honeymoon," War Communism broke into the open, and again peasant attitudes were the key to the outcome. Of course, peasant allegiances were divided between the Reds and the Whites. Moreover, many undoubtedly wished a plague on both of the warring houses. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks hardly could have triumphed had

not they succeeded in identifying in many peasant minds the Red cause with the peasant seizure of the land. Bolshevik slogans and initial Soviet legislation supported the peasants' actions while, in contrast, and often with justification, many peasants identified the White forces with those elements that would reinstate the landlords. (c)

#### The "Peasant Brest-Litovsk" (4)

Although limited peasant cooperation with the Reds had been the key to the defeat of the Whites and the interventionists, some of the new leaders wanted to carry the revolution to the countryside in 1921. However, as early as March of 1919, Lenin found it necessary to admonish some of the more zealous comrades for attempting to force collectivization upon the peasants, when he believed that pragmatic economic and political needs required quite another tack. (5) Grave declines in production, both in the cities and the countryside (complicated by a worsening of the peasants' terms of trade, Trotsky's famed scissors crisis), stimulated Lenin's decision to relax controls over agriculture and adopt a "New Economic Policy" that would encourage greater food output. Perhaps, however, an even more important consideration was Lenin's recognition of the potential peasant strength as a possible counter-revolutionary force. Until 1921 the peasant and Bolshevik revolutions had worked in tandem, but if peasant conditions had not been greatly improved a new peasant unrest could well have spelled doom for Bolshevik rule.

Lenin believed that the eventual success of the communist experiment demanded bringing communism to the countryside as well as to the cities. As expressed in his famous assertion "Communism is the Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country," his position was that electrification would provide "a large-scale industrial basis" in agriculture, whereby machine production means and industrial management methods would enable the construction of rural communism. (6) Collectivization was Lenin's ultimate goal, but one that he believed could be achieved only voluntarily. Unlike many other communists, Lenin saw that without the peasants' recognition of the (asserted) superiority of industrial farming, the will necessary for successfully operating the farms would be absent.

Lenin repeated the importance of voluntary collectivization time and again. (7) (d) What might have been the course of agricultural policy had he not died in 1924 can never be known. Yet, the Leninist NEP that existed from 1921-1928 prescribed two Russia's. The urban industrial centers were nationalized, socialized, and brought under close political control. In contrast the countryside was adjusting to a landlordless system in a relatively anarchical political setting.

#### Stalin's "Revolution from Above"

By 1928 the first major crisis in agricultural production was past. Similarly, industrial output was advancing rapidly. The time was ripe for a major policy change. Stalin, intent upon pushing industrial growth at the most rapid rate possible, envisaged collective farms as the best possible means of extracting the maximum amount of investment capital from the countryside. Therefore, probably for more than any other reason,

collectivization was economically motivated. Nevertheless, powerful politico-ideological considerations must also have been involved in his decision to forcefully collectivize the countryside. More than a decade had passed since the revolution in the name of communism, and yet agriculture remained outside of the "socialist" sphere. Stalin could hardly announce the launching of a drive to build "socialism in one state" when the great bulk of the citizenry existed in a "capitalist" rural setting. More importantly, although some of the peasantry were subsequently to describe the NEP as the "golden age of Soviet rule," (8) until some means of peasant controls was devised, their enormous potential as a source of future political opposition remained. If, however, Bolshevism could design the institutions of rural organization, perhaps the dangers of future peasant opposition could be eliminated. Whatever the thinking of the time, forcing the peasants onto the collectives not only greatly enhanced the extraction of their capital for industrial construction, but it also satisfied the ideological need to communize the countryside, and the kolkhozy provided the ideal means of capturing political control over the peasantry. (9)

Forced collectivization was not without its dangers. As implied in Stalin's famed "Dizzy with Success" speech in 1930, perhaps the drive could have boomeranged, providing the base for organized peasant opposition. Thus, while forced collectivization initially depended upon the revival of hard to control "Committees of the Poor," final success awaited the invention of the Machine-Tractor Stations as the key to maintaining control over the kolkhozy. (10)

Lenin originated the "Committees of the Poor" during War Communism, for this struggle would have been lost if the grain necessary to feed the Red Army had not been successfully requisitioned from the peasantry. Lenin, ingeniously devised the "Committees" as the prime collection agent for this task. Who better than the hungry and jealous neighbours of a more fortunate peasant could know the location of his hidden grain? In a desperate final attempt to salvage Tsardom, Stolypin had wagered, and lost, on a policy of promoting the "sturdy and the strong" element of the peasantry as a base of support for the government. Lenin, in turn, saved Bolshevism by sending a relatively small handful of disciplined comrades into the countryside to harness the forces of the needy (and the drunken). Later, Stalin employed the same divide and conquer means for bringing the peasants into the kolkhozy. More than a decade of persuasion had failed to advance socialized agriculture. Surely, no army could have been found to successfully herd the peasants onto the farms. However, peasant "Committees of the Poor" set upon the kulak turned the trick. Some of the victims of the drive had been relatively rich peasants who had exploited the labour of poorer peasants. But many of the peasants branded as kulzks were little or no better off than the rest. Some peasants undoubtedly became targets of the drive as a result of a neighbour's wish to settle an old grudge. Stalin's man-made famine was the major price that was paid. Millions lost their lives, but the tactic was enormously successful. "Committees of the Poor," however, like most instruments of revolution, were only temporary instruments unsuited for continuing the rule once the battles were won.

The invention of the MTS had preceded forced collectivization, and this instrument solved the problem of bringing party rule to the rural U.S.S.R. Party discipline depends upon keeping membership to a relatively small select group. Thus, in the early 1930's the Party could not afford to send the millions of members to the countryside that would have been necessary to man politically some quarter of a million collectives. However, the MTS numbered only a few thousand, and their monopoly over the farms' major equipment offered the instrument of control over the key means of agricultural production. The Party could, and did, afford the manpower to create strong political units in the MTS. (11)

#### Kukuruza and Personality

Other than the amalgamation of the kolkhozy into ever huger farms, from the early 1930's until 1958 no major change occurred in the system of rule over the countryside. During the Second World War, Moscow apparently encouraged the rumour that a major relaxation of controls over the farms would follow victory. However, one of the first major post-war programs was designed to recapture the parcels of kolkhozy land that the peasants had added to their private plots during the relaxed conditions of the War. Stalin retained his monopoly of power until 1953, yet, strangely, with his famed agrogorad scheme Khrushchev captured the leadership in agriculture three years before Stalin's death. Hopefully, future revelations will indicate whether or not in promoting the building of cities on the farms Khrushchev really believed for a short while that the Soviet economy could afford the enormous cost of rebuilding the countryside so that the peasants would enjoy all of the amenities of city life. Such a transformation surely would have taken at least a decade, and the price surely would have put an end to rapid industrial growth. Whatever the ebullient Khrushchev's initial intent, however, his scheme to build agrarian cities served to defeat Politburo member Andreyev's implications that the zveno (link) example should be universally adopted. During and after the War some of the farms had virtually divided themselves into small, independent production units of a few hundred hectares for which zveno, comprising a half dozen or so individuals, were responsible. According to Andreyev, farms which had created zveno were achieving significantly higher production results than the balance of the large farms, where the work was still organized in large brigades. Nevertheless, Khrushchev (with the aid of Stalin) silenced the pro-zveno forces, and they were not to be heard from again until the 1960's.

Amalgamating the large collectives into the huge new Leviathans was the necessary first step of creating the agrogorads, and before it became clear that the rural cities were not to be built, a nation-wide drive to unify the smaller farms was well under way. By 1958 the average farm was several times larger than it had been in 1949. As a result, the total number of agricultural kolkhozy was reduced from some 240,000 to less than 70,000 - and to 36,300 by 1966. (12)

As noted earlier, the Party could not afford to staff a quarter of a million farms. By 1958, however, virtually every farm had a party member chairman and a party unit. In a single drive in the early 1950's, 20,000 comrades were dispatched from the cities to offer themselves as

candidates for posts as farm chairmen. As a result the MTS became a redundant instrument of rule, and in a single speech Khrushchev sent them on their way to oblivion. (13)

Stalin's "revolution from above" had captured control over the farms through the MTS outposts, but as long as the party presence remained outside of the farms, the link between the peasants and Moscow remained indirect. Therefore, Khrushchev's amalgamations provided the means for welding the final link in the bureaucratic chain of command that was the key to the Stalinist system of rule in the cities. Prior to 1958 the sovkhozy were distinguishable from the kolkhozy because they afforded a guaranteed wage and direct on-the-farm party leadership. After 1958, although the collective peasants were yet to receive a guarantee of a stable income, they too joined the single hierarchy of rewards and punishments that now encompassed the whole of society. The promise of the 1917 revolution to socialize the entire society was now fulfilled, and in this writer's opinion, 1958 was not only the completion date of the 1917 revolution, but also the beginning of a new era of "mature" totalitarian rule. (e)

Short of refusing to abandon "all (economic) priority" to industrial construction, both Stalin and (especially) Khrushchev exhibited serious concern over the need to increase food and fiber production. Stalin stayed in Moscow, created commissions, and published an occasional tract. Khrushchev, however, built his career on promises to solve agriculture's problems by amalgamation, corn growing, and new land's campaigns and by offering the inspiration of his personality in hundreds of speeches delivered on tours that criss crossed the countryside numerous times. His faith in corn (maize) as the "queen of the fields" earned him the nickname of "Kukurunik." He implied in the mid-1950's that the harvests from the once "virgin lands" of arid Kazakhstan would solve the grain problem. Such were the major, low cost, economic aspects of his policy, but a catalogue of his total efforts will reveal that he inherited from Stalin a conviction that the major key to agricultural success lay in the political realm of finding the correct managerial scheme for the farms. Amalgamating the collectives, promoting the superiority of the sovkhoz administrative form, bringing city party "volunteers" to the farms as chairmen, changing about ministries and agencies in Moscow, abandoning the MTS, and his final major act of erecting Territorial Production Administrations to recapture some of the MTS advantages were all primarily political moves that were accompanied by volumes of words that might have been summarized as follows:

"The kolkhozy and sovkhozy are the world's most advanced form of agricultural organization. These farms provide the prototype of the huge industrial farms of the future. At present the relationships between the farms and Moscow need improvement. Similarly the internal production organization of the farms needs strengthening. Nevertheless, the correct formulas for collectivized administration will be discovered in the near future, and when they are our farms will prove to be the most efficient agricultural forms in the world." Indeed, as each new administrative reform was announced, Khrushchev heralded it as providing the final breakthrough. Unfortunately, it proved to be only tinkering with the machinery that had little or no positive effect.

### The Zveno and the New Leadership

True, as of mid-1967 the new leadership has refrained from attempting to make technological decisions in Moscow, when efficiency demands that such decisions be made on the farm. Khrushchev's penchant for issuing directives to cultivate in a certain manner here and to sow a particular crop there (i.e., his revival of "the cult of personality") has not been repeated, but this is not enough. In the early 1960's a most hopeful indication that needed administrative reforms might be tried was provided by the publication in Ekonomika gazeta, Komsomolskaya pravda and Ekonomika sel'skovo khozyaistvo of a series of highly favourable reports on renewed zveno experiments. Perhaps the long delay in the promulgation of the New Model Charter for Agricultural Artels (promised in the fall of 1964) is a reflection of the strength of the zveno advocates on the commission charged with writing a new Charter. But, Soviet press reports after late 1965 imply that the zveno advocates are destined to be defeated again. (15)

Brezhnev has asserted that some of the farms created out of the amalgamations are too huge, (16) but neither he nor any other major leader has commented on published results asserting that experiments in breaking farms down into zveno units has resulted in several fold production increases. On the contrary, key party figures in the provinces have damned the zveno reports as misleading and have vigorously argued that adopting the zveno universally would be an unacceptable retreat to rural capitalism. (17)

Perhaps new scientifically solid studies in social science will be followed by fundamental administrative reform in agriculture. Certainly, a blue-ribbon scientific commission's report, that past claims coming from Lenin Hills were false, does seem to spell the end to Lysenkoism and to promise that political-biology and political-agronomy will no longer dominate the agricultural natural sciences. (18)

In the Social science realm, however, the nature of published studies on optimum farm size, (f) and the unscientific condemnations of the zveno experiments imply a continuation of political domination as usual. Indeed, the lack of a social science tradition and cadres in the U.S.S.R. may prove to be particularly costly to the future of Soviet rural reform.

### Control Needs vs. Timeliness of Production Decision-Making

One of the first acts of the Brezhnev and Kosygin leadership was the momentous decision to pour greatly increased investment into an intensification campaign, a move designed to increase yields per hectare in established agricultural regions. Therefore, a significant change in economic policy seems to have been made. Unfortunately, however, the benefits received from the new investments can be expected to be disappointing. Economists have established that capital wisely invested in land and labour are three essential determinants of production efficiency, but surely there is a fourth, equally crucial, factor that is particularly important in agriculture, that is, time-less of production decision-making. Without land there is no place to grow food, without labour the harvests cannot be gathered, without



capital fertilizer cannot be purchased, and without timely decision-making all economic investments may be made in vain. The vast majority of the world's farms not only are primary production units, but also they are living units for farm families. Unlike farms in most other societies, however, the kolkhozy and sovkhozy also encompass the primary unit of local government as well as the place of work and the home. In other societies there is great overlapping of economic and political factors in agriculture, but on the Soviet farms, economic and political decision-making are totally integrated in the same farm administration that is responsible not only for the production achievement on thousands of hectares, but also for governing the affairs of some 2,000 people who live on the average kolkhozy. (20) The Soviet farm managers' need to devote much of their effort to exercising political control in the name of a central will surely is one major drain on production efficiency.

Efficient industrial production demands rigid adherence by managers and workers to the rhythm of increasingly automated production units. Such demands seem quite compatible with the additional bureaucratic rigidities imposed by the administrations created to direct the machines' operations. Collectivized agriculture in the Soviet Union has attempted to adapt the industrial management scheme to the farms. However, nature's rhythm can be capricious, refusing to supply the controlled environment, so essential for the constantly repeated production patterns of efficient urban industry.

Successfully responding to unpredictable changes in the seasons or unanticipated changes in plants and animals is the essence of efficient agricultural production. Therefore, timely sowing, harvesting, and caring for animals is often in defiance of the best laid plans, because some crucial element of the work environment has changed. The controlled conditions of a modern industrial plant can allow a manager to make crucial production decisions, even though he is a continent removed from the scene. However, Khrushchev worked serious harm on agricultural production by attempting to impose Moscow-made decisions on farms in Kazakhstan and Latvia when, in fact, even the chairman of a huge kolkhoz in these areas could not have all of the instant knowledge necessary to efficiently run his own farm, without delegating much authority to men on-the-spot in the fields and the barns.

The political, economic, and geographical environment of the United States is quite different from that of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the discovery by American social scientists that there are definable limits to farm sizes of various types and that management, above land, labour, and capital, can be the most crucial determinant of success surely carries universal lessons, which are related to another serious drain on Soviet agricultural efficiency. The changing demands of nature and the peculiar needs of growing things are universal; therefore, whether in the U.S. or the U.S.S.R., if the cows have broken into the corn management must give first priority to driving them out and repairing the fences. If a kolkhoz chairman has insisted that all changes in work orders must come from him, and he is ten kilometers away in his office, great losses can occur before the men are found to collect the cattle and mend the fences. True, because most of the contingencies involved have been brought under control, modern

poultry production has been successfully transformed into what is essentially a highly efficient, enclosed industrial operation. However, with all the advances that the industrial revolution has brought to farming, most agricultural operations remain out of doors and cannot be effectively industrialized until man finds the means of imposing the close tolerances on nature (thus most of the countryside) that he builds into his machines and factories.

Human caprice can have much more impact on the strictly production side of agriculture than it does on the carefully planned operation of an assembly line. An automobile worker may take the day off to go fishing, and his work is taken up by another employee, but a farmer's neglect of his fields for even a day, at crucial seasons, could make the difference between profit and loss in a whole year's work. As long as the assembly line operates, an auto worker can be virtually certain that tomorrow, and a year from now, he will be fitting doors to car bodies. On a farm, if it is harvest season, the day's plan may be to harvest grain, but if a heavy rain hits, not only will combines be unable to operate, but the fluctuating demands for maintaining the highest level of production efficiency may require that the farmer turn to finding dry storage for recently delivered fertilizer. Yet, the choice of a particular task at a particular time must be made from a long list of possible priorities, since (for example) the same rain might also be of great value in refilling a depleted stock pond, if an hour or two can be spared to repair a damaged levee.

Viewed from the outside, farms seem to reflect the placid rural scenes often painted by landscape artists. And most of the time most of the work is tedious routine. Yet, the absence of someone capable of instantly responding to a rapidly changing situation can be disastrous. Surely, a huge, bureaucratically organized, farm that imposes piece-work or a straight salary remuneration on the workers who are directly responsible for the plants and animals is not capable of responding most efficiently to the changing environment of agricultural production. Given new chemical and mechanical aids, the average size of the American farm continues to grow, yet factors that have been described here are surely key to a finding that the huge corporate farms seem to be losing ground to the relatively smaller, independently managed operations. (g)

The success of a Scottish crofter or an independent Polish peasant farmer can be crucially influenced by governmental action. Political decisions affecting prices could cause such a farmer to sell his sheep and turn to poultry raising. However, within the bounds of their farms, relative success or failure in production is determined primarily by the farmers' skill as managers in balancing the potential of their land against changing natural conditions. For such farmers there exist challenges, opportunities, and frustrations in their work that are largely nonexistent for the industrial worker or for either the hired hand on an American corporate farm or a peasant in an kolkhoz brigade. (i.e., most kolkhoz and sovkhoz operations are organized into brigades of some 100 individuals). Land, labour, capital, and timeliness in decision making are determinants of agricultural success. The Soviet Union has the land (although poorer than that in most Western states) and the labour. Since 1964, the decision to increase significantly

agricultural investment implies that adequate levels of capital may be forthcoming. But the average kolkhoz chairman or sovkhoz director remains saddled with making production decisions that should be made by the peasants dealing directly with the plants and the animals. Therefore, not only is the Soviet peasant denied the satisfaction of personal initiative in his work but, as stressed above, many decisions crucial to efficient production are made too late, or not made at all. This researcher has interviewed numerous state and collective farm managers in Poland and Mexico (the collective ejido), asking whether the peasant workers participate in the day-to-day production decision making and the answer invariably was a variation of one manager's response: "Of course not, they're incapable, they do what they're told."

With such limited exceptions as the modern broiler industry in America (and some huge specialized grain growing operations, under particular economic conditions) where conditions are comparable to the situation in industrial production, there is little evidence to support the claimed potential superiority of the huge American corporate farm operations (shown to be declining in import) (22) and the bureaucratized kolkhozy and sovkhozy. Indeed, even on grain farms in north-central Iowa, a study indicates that yields per acre fell off in farms over 880 acres (360 hectares) because of a lack of "timeliness in operations." (23) In 1965 the average sovkhoz incorporated 24,600 hectares (7,600 sown) and the average kolkhoz 6,000 hectares (nearly 3,000 sown), (24) and average yields remained significantly lower than might be expected from Soviet soil and climatic conditions. In contrast, a zveno of some six individuals whose level of income depended directly on the yields from a few hundred hectares and/or the produce from a few hundred animals, would probably utilize the advantages of on-the-spot decision-making. Such a production unit would be expected to clean the fields of weeds, make certain that the cattle did not get into the corn and see that available irrigation water is applied when most needed, and achieve higher yields than a brigaded kolkhoz. Under the kolkhozy, however, a peasant's income is dependent not only on the efficiency of scores of fellow brigade members. His own work is valued in labour-days (trudodny), but the actual cash value of that elaborate piece-work unit at the end of the year is beyond his direct control. Under existing conditions his daily tasks are bureaucratically assigned, and (for example) although the best interests of the farm might be served by his leaving a tractor to repair a break in an irrigation ditch, every hour spent in such activity would be that many hours less applied to his labour-day earnings.

The above illustrations are presented in economic terms, because they reflect the cost in efficiency that is paid for an agricultural system that was designed primarily to meet political (i.e., both control and ideological) demands, and only secondly to meet production needs. Moreover, since the kolkhoz-sovkhoz system was first of all political in design (although with a primary economic goal in mind), these Stalinist institutions still carry the administrative tendency to regard strict discipline to the central political will as a more important criteria of managerial success than output. Put another way, while the private farmer in America or Poland is primarily interested in economic success, and economic success is also important for a kolkhoz chairman

and a sovkhoz director, since a Soviet farm manager carries the additional burden of being the key local political leader he must be constantly aware that his professional security primarily depends upon pleasing superior political authorities, outside of the farm.

#### Past Successes and Possible Future Changes

Ironically, in virtually every realm but output and labour efficiency the kolkhoz-sovkhoz system can be judged a resounding success. Peasant sacrifices deserve primary credit for the impressive industrial build-up. The system can boast of embodying a communist prescribed administrative form. Although the peasants may be regarded as the least socially developed element of Soviet society, they hardly provide any nucleus for a future revolutionary force. Thanks to Khrushchev, the kolkhozy amalgamations served to complete the task of bringing the whole of society under the single bureaucratic hierarchy of controls. Moreover, Lenin believed, and most of his successors (along with many non-communist urban Western leaders) seem to believe, that the foreseeable future encompasses the wholesale adaption of industrial practices to farming. Lenin believed, and many of his Tsarist forbearers believed, and seemingly most of his successors (along with many in the West) believe, that bigness and the best tend to go together in agriculture. Beyond communist ideological tendencies in this direction, there is a traditional Russian gigantomania that seems rooted in visions of limitless steppes. Huge farms and extra large machines and equipment go along with such views. Unfortunately, in these political-ideological successes and demands, lie reasons why Soviet policies for at least several more years can be expected to continue to seek for output improvements within the present framework, in spite of implications that a parallel reduction in size of the production units and a removal of centrally imposed politics from the farms is indicated.

Perhaps the new Agricultural Constitution that is past due in the 50th anniversary year will champion the independent zveno (or some other equally revolutionary organizational reform) as the ideal means for stimulating increases in production efficiency. However, the prices implied for such a change surely would be infinitely higher than those to be paid for the decision to experiment with Professor Liberman's idea of substituting profit for plan as the prime measure of industrial success. For example, opening up the Pandora's box to introduce the zveno surely would reveal the need for enormous investments in great quantities of smaller machines and in the construction of new agricultural buildings. On the ideological side, considerable verbal gymnastics would be required to sell such units as an advance towards communism. Most of all, such a reform would seem to be totally incompatible with the system's demands for tight central political controls over the whole of society.

Great change has been introduced in Soviet society in the post-Stalin years and in this author's opinion economic need must eventually dictate a major overhauling of the kolkhoz-sovkhoz system. At the earliest, however, such a change surely will not come until after the leadership learns how disappointingly small returns are received from the new investments in agricultural intensification during the 1966-70 five year plan. New machines will be made available, large new

areas of land will be irrigated, and increasing quantities of fertilizer will be sent to the farms, but the shortcomings of the old system will block much of the value that might be realized from such assets, because the kolkhozy and sovkhozy are designed primarily to respond to Moscow's political lead and not to the timely making of production decisions in response to nature's changing demands.

Near the end of his bumptious career as the U.S.S.R.'s first peasant, Khrushchev made two observations that were highly revealing of the cost of the kolkhoz-sovkhoz political system. In the process of his campaign to encourage a several fold increase in the production of much needed fertilizer, he noted "our leaders treat fertilizer as if it were a burden," and that in his travels about the country he often saw huge piles of that precious commodity just lying out on the ground along the railroads. (25) Fertilizer that is properly cared for and applied is gold for the farm manager whose primary concern is production efficiency. Obviously, to an outside observer, however, kolkhoz chairmen who leave scarce fertilizer lying out in the weather are basing their decisions on other than that of maximizing yields per hectare. Similarly, drawing upon his agricultural visit to America, Khrushchev observed that rayon technical officials offered the kolkhozy the same benefits received by the American farmer from his county agent. (26) Unfortunately, however, such an assertedly comparable Soviet official can, if he feels the need, impose his will on the farms, and the history of Soviet collectivization is full of examples of well meaning outside authorities insisting on having their way, often in ignorance of on-the-farm conditions that render such demands as nonsensical or, sometimes, harmful. On the contrary, perhaps the main key to the enormous success of the American county agent is that the farmer can take or reject the agent's advice, acceptance being determined by the farmer's judgment of his particular needs and the degree of confidence he has come to have in his county agent. Unfortunately, these differences still exist, for the agricultural system initiated by Stalin and brought to its logical extreme by Khrushchev, remains essentially intact as of mid-1967.

Finally, if the observations made here are essentially correct, whereas communist institutions of rule have proven to be quite compatible with industrial growth, decades of agricultural experimentation have resoundingly demonstrated that the kolkhoz-sovkhoz system is incompatible with production efficiency. Thus, as the late, great Naum Jasny so rightly observed nearly two decades ago, the kolkhozy were, and in our opinion still are, "The Achilles Heel of the Soviet Regime." (27)

NOTES

- (a) As reflected in the footnote citations to previous writings by this author, most of what is presented here is either a condensation or an extension of observations previously made in earlier attempts to follow the course of change on the Soviet agricultural scene.
  - (b) Indeed, when compared with the rural population in 1897 (106.2 million) there has been a slight increase in rural population. (3)
  - (c) Twentieth century communists are much more than just agrarian reformers. Indeed, once power is seized, industrialization at the highest possible speed tends to become the primary objective. Nevertheless, the basic pattern that was established in 1917, has been repeated in subsequent revolutionary takeovers. China, Yugoslavia, Viet Nam, and Cuba were all predominantly peasant societies that have followed revolutionary paths similar to that of Russia in 1917.
  - (d) For this reason alone, Yugoslavia's and Poland's decision to retain predominantly private agricultural systems can be described as much more correctly Leninist than the forced collectivization paths followed by the U.S.S.R. and most other communist states.
  - (e) The post-Stalin abandonment of terror as a key instrument of rule is perhaps the most important element in the achievement of what can be regarded as "mature totalitarianism." However, if such a system may be described as one in which "the ruling philosophy that guides the regime embodies an attempt to encompass every facet of human existence, and... has in fact, achieved a notable level of success in enmeshing... all its citizens in a single bureaucratic web," (14) this achievement in the U.S.S.R. awaited 1958 and the full entrenchment of the party on the farms.
  - (f) In effect these studies only compare huge farms with huge farms, thus they imply that very large farms are the best. (19)
  - (g) There is a false myth that huge, industrial farms occupying thousands of acres, are taking over in American agriculture when, in fact, the manager-operated farms (i.e., modern successors to the old family farms) seem to be in the ascendancy. The latter tend to be two or three times larger than the some 160 acre family farms of the 1930's. (21)
- (1) Narodnoe khozyastvo SSSR v 1965 godu (Moskva: gosstatizdat), 1966, p. 7.
  - (2) Roy D. Laird, "Soviet Agricultural Output in 1980: An Appraisal," Ost Europa Wirtschaft, No. 2, June 1965, pp. 90-104.
  - (3) Narodnoe khozyaistvo... 1965..., Op. Cit.
  - (4) David Ryabanov is credited with originating this description of the NEP. See, Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge), 1953, p. 97.

- (5) V.I. Lenin, "Report Delivered at the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)," March 23, 1919, Selected Works, Vol. VIII (New York), 1943, p. 178.
- (6) V.I. Lenin, "Report Delivered at the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets," December 22, 1920, Ibid. pp. 247-78.
- (7) See, for example, V.I. Lenin, "Preliminary Draft Theses on the Agrarian Question," Collected Works, Vol. 31, April-December 1920 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House), 1966, p. 162 and his "Speech Delivered at the First Congress of Agricultural Communes and Agricultural Artels," December 4, 1919, Ibid. Vol. 30, p. 196.
- (8) Fedor Belov, The History of a Soviet Collective Farm (New York: Frederick A. Praeger), 1955.
- (9) J. Stalin, Leninism: Selected Writings (New York), 1942, pp. 169-74.
- (10) See, this author's (and his students) The Rise and Fall of the MTS as an Instrument of Soviet Rule (The University of Kansas Publications Governmental Research Series, No. 22, Lawrence), 1960, especially pp. 14-16 and 68-74.
- (11) Ibid.
- (12) Narodnoe khozyaistvo... 1965..., Op. Cit., p. 257.
- (13) See, Roy D. Laird, Collective Farming in Russia: A Political Study of the Soviet Kolkhozy (Kansas), 1958, pp. 113-141.
- (14) Roy D. Laird, "Some Characteristics of the Soviet Leadership System; A Maturing Totalitarian System?" Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 1, No. 1, February, 1963, pp. 29-38.
- (15) See, in particular, V. Boronsky's report on an unfavourable study of the zveno made by the Ukrainian academy, in the series on "Progressive forms of labour management, and payment of labour," Ekonomika sel'skovo khozyaistva, No. 10, October, 1965, pp. 37-51.
- (16) "O neotlozhnykh merakh po dol'neishemu razvitiyu sel'skovo khozyaistva SSSR," Doklad... L.I. Brezhneva... 24 Marta 1965 godu, Sel'skaya zhizn, March 27, 1965, pp. 2-4.
- (17) See, for example, A. Strelyany's article in Komsomolskaya pravda, October 15, 1965, pp. 2-3.
- (18) G. Platonov, "For Adherence to Party Principle in Science," Oktyabr, No. 2, February 1966, pp. 144-72. See, the remarks by V.K. Shcherbakov.
- (19) See the series of reports on studies of optimum farm size in the 1963-64 issues of Ekonomika gazeta.
- (20) In 1965 the average kolkhozy supported 421 families, therefore the estimate of some 2,000 people per farm rests on an assumption that there were somewhat more than 4 persons per farm family. See, Narodnoe khozyaistvo... 1965..., Op. Cit., p. 257.

- (21) See, John J. Brewster and Gene Wunderlick, "Farm Size, Capital and Tenure Requirements," (in Carlton F. Christian, ed., Adjustments in Agriculture: A National Basebook, Ames), 1961, pp. 196-228.
- (22) Ibid.
- (23) Ibid.
- (24) Narodnoe khozyaistvo... 1965...; Op. Cit., pp. 406 and 425.
- (25) Pravda, September 18, 1963.
- (26) Pravda, March 7, 1964, pp. 1-6.
- (27) Naum Jasny, "Kolkhozy, the Achilles Heel of the Soviet Regime," Soviet Studies, Vol. II, No. 2, October, 1951, pp. 150-ff.



SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY:  
FIFTY YEARS OF DUALISM.

by

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Prefatory Note

This draft paper is a pilot study for a major work on the dualistic strategy and tactics of Soviet foreign policy during the half century since the Bolshevik takeover. The study attempts to prove its thesis with a few examples from the history of Soviet foreign relations and thus to weld theory and practice into a significant pattern. It is a preliminary attempt to investigate this complex and fascinating phenomenon, written without benefit of the research in depth for which there was no time. At least two years are required to assemble, study and analyze available source material.

Soviet scholars, of course, are aware of the schizophrenic division of Soviet foreign policy into national and revolutionary levels which distinguishes this dualism from that of noncommunist policies, all of which work on different levels when national security requires. It seemed to me that a beginning should be made with a study of Soviet dualism as a continuing phenomenon which might explain not only the role of doctrine in Soviet political thought but also the oscillations of Soviet political behavior which have puzzled the world for decades.

At the risk of protesting too much, I want to make it clear that I regard this essay as unfinished and inadequate for the enormously complex topic to be explored. But it is, I hope, a means to stimulate thought and discussion.

K.L.L.

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I. Ideological Premises

The dualistic road of Soviet foreign policy began soon after the victory of the Bolshevik revolution. It has remained, during its various periods and many oscillations, a remarkably continuous phenomenon throughout the half-century of Soviet rule. Obviously, such political schizophrenia is inherent in the inevitable contradiction of the concurrent roles of the Soviet Union as a nation state and as a revolutionary power. It must remain a nation within the traditional framework of the meaning of this term until, as communist ideology proclaims, the "transition to communism" has been successfully achieved on an international scale; at the same time, its world revolutionary commitments must continue. It is led by a communist party which determines the course of Soviet internal and external policy and believes itself to be the vanguard of the international conspiracy against the same noncommunist states with which it maintains political and economic relations.

Inevitably, during the contemporary stage of world history, the principles of national foreign policy more often than not

are incompatible with the goals of international communism. The attempts by Kremlin leaders to camouflage this dualism have been, on the whole, successful because of the failure of non-communist governments to familiarize themselves with the body of doctrine which is inadequately called Marxism-Leninism. This is not saying that all Soviet foreign policy decisions are based solely on ideological precepts. Traditional goals are involved as well and must be weighed against revolutionary designs although it is necessary to keep in mind that Soviet policy should not be interpreted as an extension of Tsarist foreign policy. Thus it is imperative to discern the extent to which inherited goals are made to serve ideological purposes. Even discriminating policy makers familiar with the jungle of communist scholasticism often are hard put to separate revolutionary intent from old-fashioned power gaming. Furthermore, mere power politics and personal conflicts among the leadership are not primary determinants of foreign policy decisions.

For the Bolsheviks, the clash of tradition with revolution posed no problem. In their early history, they were political iconoclasts who broke with the concepts of a tradition-minded law of nations, as they adopted the thought of Marx and Engels and followed Lenin's implementation thereof. We have heard of these principles ad nauseam but it is indispensable to recall them briefly if we wish to explore the whys and wherefores of the rationale of schizophrenic Soviet foreign policy.

The men who created the Soviet Union have claimed that the tools of dialectics enabled them to predict future developments in general terms. They analyzed situations, events, complications and crises with what they believed to be "scientific" laws of the "objective" forces of history. This was made possible through the tool of dialectical materialism, revealing the drama of contradictory social systems as they have developed since the beginning of life. Within these systems, opposite elements struggle for predominance. In modern times these opposites have crystallized into socialist and capitalist antagonists whose beliefs and aims are irreconcilable. Armed with this weapon of Marxist dialectics, the leaders of the revolution were convinced that they alone had the correct perception of the future which would inevitably be theirs. Lenin's work "Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism" extended the concept of the internal class struggle by applying it to the international arena and placing responsibility for war on the nature of capitalism. There can be no question that this Leninist thesis, first published in 1916, has directly or indirectly dominated or influenced the thinking of communist foreign policy makers ever since. It is obvious that the belief in these principles forecloses a pursuit of "normal" international relations.

During the half century of Soviet rule many changes have occurred and the men in the Kremlin have acquired a more sophisticated approach toward the conduct of foreign affairs. But

the modifications in Soviet government, economy and society, introduced as necessary adjustments to new conditions, have not eroded the fundamental concepts of the Soviet leadership or modified their views of capitalism and imperialism. The most important adaptation to new conditions resulting from nuclear technology is the rejection of Clausewitz' tenet that war is the continuation of policy by other means. The nuclear threat is understood in the Kremlin, and the only actions still permissible are self-defense against aggression and "wars of national liberation." But in the latter event, risks must be avoided which could lead to an escalation of local conflicts into larger--and possibly nuclear--hostilities. World revolution as a concept has not been abandoned by the Soviet leaders but, since the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, it need not necessarily be achieved through a bloodbath. Under the cloak of "peaceful coexistence" the struggle for a victory of "socialism" can be pursued by cold war measures in the political, economic, social and cultural areas.

Some scholars have stated recently that the Soviet Union has become a status quo nation. Were this true, the USSR would be considered no longer a revolutionary power but rather a traditional nation state. This writer has seen no convincing evidence to that effect. On the contrary, "Soviet foreign policy accepts change as a permanent feature of the historical process"<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Alvin Z. Rubinstein (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 14.

and it will continue to be so conceived so long as dialectic reasoning remains an essential part of the communist belief system. Perhaps it is dialectics that has led to political dualism not only in policy making but also in the political substance. For example, the much advertised desire for a relaxation of tensions goes hand in hand with the ideological struggle which, as Suslov has frequently stated, will continue even though "peaceful coexistence" has become a major Soviet strategy.

As a result of this peculiarly communist logic, the Soviet double standard which started with Brest-Litovsk and has continued during the past 50 years is now deeply ingrained not only in the older leaders but also in their successors whose knowledge and understanding of the nonideological states are very shaky. The political and psychological climate of a closed society and the built-in antagonism to Western political and societal concepts seem to have perpetuated themselves even among those leaders whose interpretation of the Marxist-Leninist gospel is less fundamentalist than that of the old Bolsheviks.

It is essential to keep in mind these premises for the double standard of Soviet foreign policy when we consider some concepts and examples (of necessity highly condensed) of dualism in foreign affairs during the most significant periods of Soviet history.



## II. Soviet Concept of International Law

Law is the product of society. It grows out of the traditions and customs of the people who are subject to its rules, whether by free acceptance or by imposition. A nation's legal institutions reflect its political philosophy, economic organization, religion (if any), and moral concepts. Historical developments play a role in nonrevolutionary societies; genuine revolutions tend to break with historical continuity.

The similarities between the laws of the nations of the Western world are greater than their differences: their cultural genealogy goes back to Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian sources. Similarly, international law, first codified by the Dutchman Hugo Grotius in the 17th century, generally is based on these sources. So great has been the attraction of a universal law of nations that even non-Western countries have consented to Western concepts of international law regardless of whether or not they have adopted domestically Western methods of political and social organization. Although international law for all practical purposes is not enforceable and although its principles were frequently violated, yet on the whole, the law of nations provided a universal platform on which to build relations among countries.

With the victory of the Bolshevik revolution, this legal one-world concept was ended. The leaders of the revolution

denigrated a law created by bourgeois class states. But they were in no position to disregard this law and thereby isolate themselves from the rest of the civilized world. Their legal dilemma grew out of a political quandary:

If international law was socialist, it could not have antedated 1917 and could not bind capitalist states; if it was capitalist, it could not bind the Soviet Union; if it was above class, it implied renunciation of a fundamental Marxist thesis.<sup>2</sup>

The first Comintern Congress in 1919 had set the stage for this dilemma by proclaiming the fundamental antagonism of the proletarian dictatorship toward bourgeois democracy. This virtual declaration of war against noncommunist societies seemed to imply rejection of the code of private and public international law which, after two centuries of wrangling, had just become an accepted fact as the 19th century yielded to the twentieth.<sup>3</sup>

However, it did not take the Bolsheviks long to realize that they lived in the world and not outside of it and that they must develop a Soviet legal concept which would relate to existing international law without compromising Soviet ideology. This was a difficult task, and the history of Soviet thought on international law is full of oscillations. Could a universal

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<sup>2</sup>Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 6-7.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Jane Degras (ed.), The Communist International 1919-1943, Vol. I: 1919-22 (London and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 7-24.

international law embrace both socialism and capitalism? Could devotees of the class struggle submit to laws written by class enemies even if it served their interest to be protected from international lawlessness? Clearly, the existence of international law could not be denied, even though it was created by bourgeois states, albeit prior to the Bolshevik victory. The communists could not reject it altogether and become international outlaws..

The first communist textbook on international law, published in 1924, states that relations between Soviet Russia and the imperialistic states, large or small, depend on the view of the class structure of these states which is part and parcel of the official Soviet doctrine, applied both to building up the structure of the Soviet republic and its concept of international relations.<sup>4</sup> But if international law is the product of class states, and if there exist such opposite economic and political systems as capitalism and socialism, the question remains whether the universality of the law can be admitted even though without such recognition there can be no international law. In the beginning of Soviet history, this question was answered with a "temporary compromise between two antagonistic class systems."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>E. A. Korovin, Mezhdunarodnoye Pravo Perekhodnogo Vremeni (Moscow: State Publishing House, 1924), p. 32. See also M. Chakste, "Soviet Concepts of the State, International Law and Sovereignty," American Journal of International Law, 43 (1949), p.24.

<sup>5</sup>J. N. Hazard, "Cleansing Soviet International Law of Anti-Marxist Theories," American Journal of International Law, 32 (1938), p. 247.

World revolution then still seemed imminent and the time span of the compromise was to be short. In fact, a few years later, even the concept of compromise was denied and substituted with the concept of struggle between the two systems of international law.

By the time Stalin had consolidated his position, repudiated Trotskyism and proclaimed "socialism in one country," the need for a new formulation of the Soviet concept of international law arose again because the need for more or less normal trade relations had become vital for the survival of the Soviet state. It was based on the uniquely dualistic principle of cooperation and competition. This implied recognition of the universality of international law. Yet the need for a socialist international law has never ceased to occupy the minds of Soviet jurists even when it was recognized that "contemporary international relations and the cooperation of states with different systems must be regulated by the same universally recognized norms of international law which are binding for all subjects of the law, no matter to which system they adhere."<sup>6</sup>

Written while Stalin was still alive, this statement sounds oddly reasonable. It must be analyzed in light of the fact that the class character of law was not to be forgotten. This dialectic situation could not help but develop policy of dualism to a point

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<sup>6</sup>Editorial on "Peaceful Coexistence of Two Systems--The Main Foundation of Contemporary International Law," Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo, 1952, No. 4, p. 7.

of scholastic absurdity. On the one hand, the idea of cooperation, i.e. adherence to universality, was championed; on the other hand, the concept of competition between the old and new system of international law was promoted. It is interesting and significant that the twofold Soviet concept of sovereignty relates to the dualism of international law. On the one hand, state sovereignty is regarded as a protective shield of the Soviet state and society; on the other hand, national sovereignty is held to be the legal basis for an aggressive self-determination which might be used to defend the doctrine of national liberation (and, in this connection, the national liberation wars).

This dualism of Soviet interpretation has the advantage of legally protecting the Soviet and other communist states from outside interference, while at the same time advancing a revolutionary interpretation of self-determination throughout the world. It is the key to understanding Soviet political strategy. A further consideration must be deduced from this position: the Soviet leaders have serious mental reservations toward any international organization whose members are divided by profound ideological differences, as their relations with the League of Nations and the United Nations demonstrate.

Khrushchev's elevation of the "peaceful coexistence" doctrine from a tactic to a strategy under which "international law must be interpreted and developed to service the interests of peace

and socialism" has succeeded in consolidating many views and interpretations of international law. It combines cooperation with competition and propaganda.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, peaceful coexistence "is the Soviet political and legal formula for international relations during the present epoch."<sup>8</sup> The dualism contained in the term was succinctly expressed by Khrushchev in his speech of January 6, 1961, when he claimed that "the policy of peaceful coexistence . . . is a form of intense economic, political and ideological struggle of the proletariat against the aggressive forces of imperialism in the international arena."<sup>9</sup> Previously, the Statement of the 81 Communist and Workers Parties of December 1960 had stipulated that:

. . . the policy of peaceful coexistence is a policy of mobilizing the masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace. . . . In conditions of peaceful coexistence favorable opportunities are provided for the development of the class struggle in the capitalist countries and the national liberation movement of the people of the colonial and dependent countries.

Another indication of dualistic Soviet interpretation of "peaceful coexistence" was contained in Leonid Brezhnev's Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Twenty-third Congress of

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<sup>7</sup>See B. A. Ramundo's pioneering work Peaceful Coexistence: International Law in the Building of Communism (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 8.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 215 ff.

<sup>9</sup>N. S. Khrushchev, "For New Victories of the World Communist Movement," Kommunist, No. 1 (January 1961) as quoted by R. V. Allen, Peaceful Coexistence (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1966), p. 80.

the CPSU in which it was stated that the course of the Party and the state in foreign policy

. . . has been guided by the vital interests of the people of the Soviet Union and by a desire to ensure peaceful conditions for the building of communism and socialism in the countries of the world socialist community and to prevent the unleashing of a fresh world war.<sup>10</sup>

In terms of international law, "peaceful coexistence" is eminently suitable to serve the dual purposes of Soviet attempts to create a "socialist international law" and, at the same time, to convince noncommunist governments with the help of traditional diplomacy and propaganda that the Soviet concept is superior for the preservation of peace (though not for the prevention of cold war). Since the states of the Western alliance, including Japan, are politically far too sophisticated to accept this strategy, the main efforts of the Kremlin are directed toward the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, in part through machinations in the United Nations. Thus the Soviet leaders have succeeded, with the help of their international jurists, in formulating a double-purpose doctrine of international law which serves them admirably in their formulation of foreign policy. In fact, this concept is far more sophisticated than that of the Lenin-Stalin era during which the peaceful coexistence slogan was tactical in nature. At the Twentieth Congress of the

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<sup>10</sup>Cf. Moscow News, Supplement, April 2, 1966, p. 4. See also Allen, op. cit., p. 82.

CPSU in 1956, Khrushchev proposed a unity of opposites which would combine ideological with pragmatic elements of party and state policies. But his name was not mentioned in the Theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU: "On the 50th Anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution," published in Pravda on June 25, 1967, which made it clear that the foreign policy of the socialist countries:

. . . is aimed at consolidating all anti-imperialist, peace-loving forces and at fighting the forces of reaction and war. An integral part of it is the course set toward peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. This course is aimed against the unleashing of a new world war by the imperialists, against international provocations and the export of counter-revolution, at the creation of conditions favorable for the implementation by the peoples of their sacred rights of independently determining the road of development of their countries, at the development of mutually advantageous economic and scientific-technical cooperation, and at cultural exchanges between all countries.

And in conjunction with this combination of contradictory goals, the dualistic concept of war is emphasized again:

While condemning predatory imperialist wars Marxist-Leninists consider as just and support those wars which are waged in defense of the people's gains from imperialist aggression, wars for national liberation and wars of the revolutionary classes repulsing attempts by reactionary forces to retain or restore their domination with the help of arms.

This division between "just" and "unjust" wars has been part of Soviet foreign policy doctrine throughout almost half a century and is a particularly apt demonstration of the Soviet concept of international relations.



### III. Early Bolshevik Foreign Policy

The early Bolshevik leaders were strictly internationalist in outlook. Taking their clue from the decree of the French National Assembly of April 20, 1892, they looked upon themselves not as the citizens of Russia but as leaders of the world revolution. This attitude was reflected in the institution in charge of relations with foreign countries, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of which Leon Trotzky was the first Commissar. He summed up his view of the job by stating that he would "issue a few revolutionary proclamations to the peoples of the world and then shut up shop."<sup>11</sup> He dismissed Russian diplomats abroad, deputized a few unqualified individuals, and reportedly visited the office only once during his tenure.<sup>12</sup> One could say that the only period during which Bolshevik policy pursued a single-minded purpose was that between the October Revolution and the second round of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. The "Decree on Peace," issued by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets one day after the Bolshevik power seizure and appealing to the belligerents on both sides, fizzled. No revolutions occurred elsewhere. When armistice negotiations between the Germans and the revolutionaries led nowhere, the Germans began a new offensive, penetrating deep into Russian territory. In order to save the revolution,

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<sup>11</sup>E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966), Vol. III, p. 28.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

the Bolsheviks signed an extremely unfavorable armistice in March 1918. In this context it is revealing that Soviet dualism allows for flexibility and retreat. In commenting on the Brest-Litovsk peace, Lenin said to the Seventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party: "We must know how to retreat. . . . If you cannot adjust yourself, if you cannot bring yourself to crawl on your belly in the mud, you are no revolutionary, but a chatter-box. . . ." <sup>13</sup>

Since then, preoccupation with the success of world revolution and concern over national security have remained the essential ingredients of dualistic Soviet foreign policy. It had become clear that a weak state would be unable to protect itself against the hostile forces of "imperialism," that its security must be safeguarded by making it stronger politically, economically and militarily. Trotzky became People's Commissar for War and the sophisticated Georgy Chicherin replaced Trotzky as Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Chicherin, although a confirmed Marxist, began to shift slightly away from revolutionary aggressiveness towards diplomatic coexistence. But then allied intervention, limited as it was, made such a position impossible.

Moreover, the success of the German revolution in November 1918 and the fall of the monarchy was not tantamount to communist

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<sup>13</sup>Jane Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. I: 1917-1924 (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), pp. 57-58.

takeover. In early 1919, two of the most prominent representatives of the Spartakusbund, which became the first Communist Party of Germany, were assassinated (Wilhelm Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg). The social democrats in power outlawed the party which went underground. A revolution in Germany had been the great hope of Lenin but now, in his words, it had become a Kerensky type of revolution, totally unacceptable to him. Thus Soviet policy once again veered towards an unadulterated communist stance. Since Russia was completely isolated, shunned by the rest of the civilized world, such reaction was to be expected. It is perhaps more than coincidental that the establishment of the Third Communist International (Comintern) took place at this time (March 1919) and that it appealed to the proletariat of all countries to stand behind the Russian Soviets. These propaganda efforts were unsuccessful.

The second Comintern Congress of July/August 1920, in an optimistic mood after the initial successes of the Red Army in the war with Poland, adopted the conditions of admission to the Comintern. Together, they were a blueprint for organization of international communism. They also set forth the communist aspects of foreign policy. From then on, the Soviet concept of relations with bourgeois nations as devised by Moscow was imposed upon Comintern members, not all of whom accepted it with alacrity.<sup>14</sup> This

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<sup>14</sup>For example, the German communist Paul Levi in a pamphlet Unser Weg (Our Road) wrote that "the Executive Committee of the Comintern acts like the Cheka projected beyond the Russian frontiers. (Degras, The Communist International, op. cit., p. 218).

revolutionary stance neither helped Soviet Russia to break out of its isolation nor invigorated the rather desperate economic situation. Abroad, a communist attempt to seize power in Germany ended in catastrophic defeat. Lenin, the revolutionary fanatic, could be pragmatic when necessary. To give the economy a breathing spell, he created the New Economic Policy which the West wrongly interpreted as a return to capitalism. With the help of a political adjustment to prevalent conditions, which did not diminish Comintern activities, Lenin sought to break out of isolation.

Although a trade treaty prohibiting political propaganda was signed with Britain in March 1921, the Comintern blithely continued its subversive anti-British activities. In September 1921 the British accused the Soviets of having violated the provisions of the Trade Agreement. The Bolsheviks were allegedly carrying on hostile propaganda against the British Empire in Afghanistan, aiding Indian revolutionaries against the British government, giving financial aid to a well-known Indian anarchist, pursuing a policy hostile to British interests in Persia, setting up schools in Tashkent for training Indian natives in anti-British propaganda, supporting Turkish nationalists, still then nominally at war with the Entente Powers, with money and munitions, etc. The Soviet reply denied the accuracy of these claims and admonished the British government not to identify the activities

of the Communist International in the areas involved with the actions of the Soviet government. While some members of the Soviet government were also members of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, they were so only in their individual capacity.<sup>15</sup>

At the Genoa Conference of April 1922, Russia and Germany, the one-time outlaws, were reinstated as great powers (against France's vote) but the Conference failed to achieve its predominantly economic purposes. However, during the Conference, using an Easter recess, the German and Russian delegates met secretly in Rapallo and signed a treaty of considerable significance. The historic importance of this agreement lay not only in its overt and covert provisions. It ended the isolation of the two ostracized powers. Germany, in Bolshevik eyes, was considered then--and is considered now despite its division--a country of prime importance. Lenin had always looked to Germany because of its advanced industrial capabilities and its revolutionary potential. This potential was overestimated then as is West German power now. Rapallo may seem to have been a success of Soviet Russian (traditional) diplomacy. But the Comintern Statement of May 19, 1922, referring to the Rapallo Treaty, made clear that it had no love for the German "bourgeois-menshevik" government and regarded it as temporary: "The German working class will one day inevitably conquer power in their own country.

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<sup>15</sup>Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. I, p. 258.

Germany will become a Soviet republic. And then, when the German-Russian treaty brings together two great Soviet republics, it will provide such unshakable foundation for real communist construction that the old and outworn Europe will not be able to withstand it even for a few years."<sup>16</sup>

Chicherin and Joffe had done well by Soviet Russia, but not too well for Comintern purposes. Zinoviev, then still a very influential man in the Comintern, was more concerned with the consequences of Rapallo for international communism than with its world political implications. A schism was developing between Chicherin the diplomatist and Zinoviev the revolutionist and between their respective organizations, the Narkomindel and the Comintern. Radek, the representative of the Comintern in Germany, unsuccessfully tried to reconcile the two positions. By the end of 1922, Lenin had suffered his first stroke. Stalin, at that time, remained in the background. There were many crosscurrents in both the Soviet government and the Comintern; lacking Lenin's guidance, policy toward the German government and the German Communist Party oscillated wildly. Trotzky and Zinoviev prevailed over Radek. As a result, the German KPD leaders, after mapping their strategy under Soviet guidance, led a major uprising in October 1923 which collapsed. The KPD was outlawed once again but permitted to resume operations about

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<sup>16</sup>Degras, The Communist International, Volume I, p. 347.

four months later. For the Russians a lesson was to be learned:

At long last the Bolshevik leaders abandoned the mirage of the German revolution. Never again were the expectations of an early revolution in Germany allowed to override the normal considerations of foreign policy. Never again would the Comintern pursue an independent policy of its own.<sup>17</sup>

Rather, under Stalin's leadership, there would be an amalgamation of state and party considerations, forged in the Politbureau. And as the years passed, Stalin would strive to make the Soviet Union strong both as a nation, as the center of world communism and, after the war, as the leading power of the "socialist camp." The foreign policy of the USSR would remain two-pronged.<sup>18</sup>

After Rapallo, the failure of the German communist uprising and the European proletariat's general lack of success in achieving a victorious revolution, the position and influence of the Comintern changed imperceptibly. At the Fourth Comintern Congress in November 1922, it became clear that the Bolshevik revolution's achievements in overcoming seemingly unsurmountable difficulties at home and abroad had to be credited to Soviet power rather than to international machinations of an organization set up to promote world revolution. Lenin, who previously had complained that the Comintern should be international rather than Russian, kept silent

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<sup>17</sup>E. H. Carr, German-Soviet Relations Between Two World Wars, 1919-1939 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), p. 76.

<sup>18</sup>Cf. Elliot Goodman, The Soviet Design for a World State (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 169.

on this issue. The fact was that the Comintern inevitably became a Soviet-directed institution. After Lenin's death in 1924, and Stalin's takeover not long thereafter, it remained a suitable instrument of Soviet communist and foreign policy. Indeed, "henceforth the policy of Comintern would be fitted into the framework of Soviet foreign policy instead of Soviet foreign policy being fitted . . . into a framework of world revolution."<sup>19</sup>

New stratagems and organizational attempts were made to enhance international communist intrigue such as the establishment of the Profintern (Red International of Trade Unions) and the introduction of "united front" tactics, presumably to supplement or implement Comintern directives. In any event, the years of European consolidation, including the de jure recognition of Soviet Russia by most industrial nations (except the USA) could not help but keep Comintern aspirations on a low level, the more so since the Bolsheviks, determining the country's foreign policy, were now in strong enough a position to decide whether to use national or communist foreign policies or a combination of both.

What was true in Europe was no less true in Asia. Russia is both a European and an Asian power. The interests of the Bolsheviks in the Far East were secondary only to those in Europe. The dualistic course followed by Moscow in China, tempered by the influence of Comintern policy, created a

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<sup>19</sup>E. H. Carr, op. cit., p. 446.



situation which would have repercussions long after the events of the twenties and thirties. The Soviets had been successful in re-establishing themselves in the Far Eastern territories. The intervention was over and, more important, an autonomous Outer Mongolian republic had come into being in late 1921. Previously, in 1919, the Kremlin had officially given up Tsarist claims on China although it soon retreated from its original concessions concerning the future of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

The establishment of Sun Yat-sen's regime in Canton which was warring with the central government in Peking--then still universally recognized--did not prevent the Soviets from approaching Peking. The central government, however, did not succumb to Bolshevik blandishments nor did it accept Moscow's proposals. The Soviet missions to Peking failed, but cooperation began between Moscow and Canton. The Soviet Russian representative A. A. Joffe, a Comintern agent, reaffirmed to Sun on January 26, 1923, that the principles proclaimed by the Bolsheviks on September 27, 1920, concerning the abandonment of Tsarist privileges in China were still in force, that neither communism nor the Soviet system were applicable to Chinese conditions, that the Chinese Eastern Railway question could be solved by Sino-Russian negotiations and that Russia had no imperialistic designs on Outer Mongolia.

In September of the same year, Michael Borodin became Sun's political adviser. He organized the Kuomintang (KMT) along communist party lines. But, although communists tried to infiltrate it, the KMT never became an arm of the Russian party. The Chinese Communist Party had been established in 1921 but Stalin considered it too weak to be useful and encouraged its members to adopt the "popular front" tactic and to seek individual membership in the KMT. When Sun died, Chiang Kai-shek took over. This radically altered Sino-Soviet relations. Chiang did not propose to tolerate communist subversion and gradually sought to wipe it out. After the 1927 massacres of communists, Stalin was compelled to break relations with Chiang, only to restore them two years later, when Japanese forces invaded the Chinese mainland.

This greatly oversimplified picture of an extremely complex and often confused situation is projected for the purpose of demonstrating the Soviet technique of carrying out simultaneously both state and communist foreign policies on different levels and for different purposes. National security considerations vis-à-vis China had been traditional in Russia. After the revolution they still loomed large with the difference, however, that the Soviet leaders almost certainly regarded communist sympathies as a safeguard and, therefore, tried to inject communist bacteria into the Chinese body politic. Sun Yat-sen was a politically naive man and undoubtedly an idealist;

Joffe and Borodin took advantage of this state of mind. Chiang managed to hold off communist influence for some years but he did not possess the wisdom and strength to cleanse his government and prevent it from eventual disintegration and defeat at the hand of Mao Tse-tung's forces.

#### IV. Nazism versus Bolshevism: National Security or Revolution?

In 1933, when Hitler came to power, Germany left the League of Nations. Japan followed suit. The Soviet leaders correctly regarded this as a danger signal and earnestly considered a policy reversal toward the League. It may be useful to review briefly their position vis-à-vis that organization between 1919 and 1933.

In the early years of the revolution, the League was called a "monstrous world-wide trust" which would exploit the world;<sup>20</sup> an imperialist instrument consisting of a temporary association of capitalist states for the double purpose of endangering the security of the Soviet state and stopping the advancement of the communist world revolution; an effort to crush the democratic forces of the proletariat. Lenin called it "an alliance of world bandits against the proletariat."<sup>21</sup> The orthodox Bolsheviks

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<sup>20</sup>Bukharin and Prebrazhinsky, Azubka, Moscow 1919, p. 92, as quoted by E. R. Goodman, The Soviet Design for a World State (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 378.

<sup>21</sup>K. W. Davis, The Soviets at Geneva (Geneva: Librairie Kündid, 1934), p. 4.

regarded the League as opposed not only to the proletariat in Russia but also to the working masses within the imperialist states. In their "Appeal for the Formation of the Communist International," Lenin and Trotzky opposed the "hypocrisy" of the League which was organized to "strangle the revolution."<sup>22</sup> And Chicherin added that it was "a league of capitalists against the nations."<sup>23</sup> As late as 1927, Stalin remarked to a delegation of foreign workers that the Soviet Union could not take part in the League of Nations "because it (the Soviet Union) is against imperialism, against the oppression of the colonies and dependent peoples."<sup>24</sup>

The substantively most important objections were threefold: first, that Soviet Russia could not associate itself with a group of states of entirely different social structures; second, that sanctions could be undertaken against Russia with the goal of destroying communism; third, that Soviet Russia regarded the mandate system as an exploitation of colonial peoples. However, this criticism did not prevent Soviet representatives from participating in some international conferences organized for the League and dealing primarily with humanitarian, health and communications problems. Yet, despite the fact that the failure of the Comintern to produce revolutions had led to a gradual lessening of its importance and, further, that the Soviet economy

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<sup>22</sup>Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. I, p. 136.

<sup>23</sup>Degras, op. cit., p. 117.

<sup>24</sup>Degras, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 274.

needed a breathing spell very badly, no appreciable progress was made toward a change in Soviet policy toward the League. Only when Nazism became rampant did Stalin look to the League as an organization that might possibly "retard or prevent the outbreak of war" and in December 1933 he added: "It is not impossible that we shall support the League, notwithstanding its colossal defects."<sup>25</sup> Finally, on September 18, 1934, the USSR requested membership and was admitted. At this occasion, Maxim Litvinov introduced the Soviet concept of international law as based on "peaceful coexistence of different socio-political systems at a given historical stage."

It appears that, under internal and external pressures, the Soviet leaders were willing to cooperate with the "imperialists" and accept the idea of collective security. They did this, no doubt, with many mental reservations. Without the Nazi-Fascist and Japanese threats, it is doubtful that they suddenly would have been so cooperative. But due to their strong feeling for formal legality, mingled with tactical reasons of their system, their attitude toward the League during the period of their membership was correct and their "record in the Council and the Assembly, and conduct towards the aggressive powers were more consistent with the Covenant than those of any other great power."<sup>26</sup> Even

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<sup>25</sup>Degras, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 45.

<sup>26</sup>F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), Vol. II, p. 585.

so, it must not be forgotten that their objectives were focussed primarily on securing a common front against Nazi-Fascist aggression. When they felt they were making little progress toward this goal, their disappointment, in conjunction with other factors, probably contributed to their decision to conclude a nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany in August 1939. "In no sphere was the basic dualism between national and revolutionary policies revealed more clearly than in the contacts between Russia and Germany, and in none were its repercussions more lasting."<sup>27</sup>

Three months later, the Red Army invaded Finland. In December 1939, the USSR was expelled from the League for launching a war in disregard of the Covenant. Immediately, the previous Soviet hostility toward the League was restored.

It is necessary here to remember that the 1934 decision of the USSR to join the League cannot be separated from the change of communist policy by the Seventh Comintern Congress of 1935. Moscow's policy reversal had to be explained and codified in international communist terms. In that meeting, the Bulgar Georgi Dimitrov, who was elected General Secretary by the Congress, emphasized the need to use all means to vanquish capitalist imperialism. He called for subversion, citing as an example the technique used by the ancient Greeks to conquer Troy: the wooden horse. As the USSR had joined a "front" of sorts in the League,

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<sup>27</sup>M. Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, Vol. I (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 56.

so the communists should enter popular fronts, cooperating with all anti-fascist parties. France serves as a good example as it pioneered with a popular front government. The communists not only tried to improve their relations with the Catholic Church but also sought allies among the socialists and even beyond the moderate left. The Franco-Soviet Pact of May 1935 helped this development as did communist-socialist "cooperation" in the Spanish Civil War.<sup>28</sup>

Although chiding the social-democratic leaders for their lack of revolutionary spirit, Wilhelm Pieck declared that "the idea that all bourgeois parties were Fascist (must be) denounced as a total misconception."<sup>29</sup> The working class was "exhorted to cherish every scrap of bourgeois democracy until it could be replaced by proletarian democracy."<sup>30</sup> The establishment of "Popular Fronts" was approved so long as it was understood that ultimate communist leadership remained the goal. There was also a good indication of the use of the technique, so well used by the Soviets in World War II, of combining national feeling with the doctrine of class conflict. Thorez of France, Browder of the United States, and Dimitrov of Bulgaria introduced this aspect: international interests, according to Dimitrov, could be defended

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<sup>28</sup>This episode offers a particularly good demonstration of the sordid techniques of eventual takeover by communist cadres of all noncommunist elements.

<sup>29</sup>M. Beloff, op. cit., p. 190.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

by national forms of the class struggle, and "proletarian internationalism must, so to speak, 'acclimatize itself' in each country in order to sink deep roots in its native land."<sup>31</sup>

This, in a sense, was a greater break in Leninist doctrine than the pragmatic change of policy vis-à-vis the League of Nations and the subsequent Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

The use of nationalist tendencies by the Soviet leaders has been much misunderstood in noncommunist countries. The appeal to the love of country has been subtly exploited by the Kremlin whenever necessary. But nationalism under a communist regime differs from that of other countries, for Soviet "patriotism" combines the attachment to the motherland with that of the system under which it lives and is equated with "proletarian internationalism." The amalgamation of communist doctrine with Soviet nationalism, or of internationalism, with the Soviet commonwealth is like the two sides of a coin: the imprint on each is different but together they produce one coin. The Seventh Comintern Congress, perhaps more than any other communist congregation, contributed to this rather unique conceptual merger which eventually became official Soviet policy at the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

From the Comintern point of view, this was, of course, a tactic and nothing else. The newly advocated Popular Fronts were

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<sup>31</sup>Beloff, op. cit., p. 192.



to help the united front of the proletariat in its anti-fascist endeavors. But the Kremlin's schizophrenic policies, veering between international communism and Soviet state interests, continued with emphasis on one or the other, as conditions warranted. However, while state or security interests may have had primacy during certain periods, they remained suffused with doctrinal thinking from which no Soviet leader regardless of age can separate himself.

#### V. The War: 1939-1945

The German attack against Poland and the subsequent declaration of war on Nazi Germany by France and Britain were interpreted by the Kremlin--and by communists all over the world--as an "imperialist war," a conflict that might lead to exhaustion of the belligerents and cause revolutions similar to those in Russia of 1917. Hoping against hope that he might not be directly involved, Stalin embarked on a policy of territorial expansion in Eastern Poland, the Baltic States, Finland, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Further plans for an increase of Soviet spheres of interest which eventually was to give the USSR access to the Indian Ocean were negotiated between Berlin, Tokyo and Moscow but never signed.

In September 1940, when the Soviet Union was invaded by German armies the war immediately became "just" and "patriotic."<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>The writer had some first hand experience in communist "interpretation" of war when he taught at the College of the City of New York. Prior to the German invasion of the USSR, two of

Communist doctrine distinguishes between "imperialist aggressive, predatory wars . . . and defensive wars which the people are compelled to undertake in self-defense against aggression or intervention or counter-revolution. . . . Such wars, naturally, have the sympathy and support of communists, as of all honest and progressive people."<sup>33</sup> Lenin's theory of differentiating between imperialist wars, i.e. conflicts between capitalist states/ and wars in defense of capitalist aggression against socialist countries dominated the thinking of the Stalin era. Thus the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 between Germany and Poland, Britain and France was regarded and labelled as an inter-capitalist, imperialist war. Only after the Nazis had attacked the USSR and the Western powers became allies of the Soviet Union did Moscow change the label of imperialist aggression to that of a defense against fascism. Later on, World War II became the "Great Patriotic War." It is significant that Soviet dualism expresses itself with particular clarity in the interpretation of war.

While the war went badly, the East-West alliance prospered. But when it became clear after the British-American invasion of

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his students, obviously Marxist-Leninist oriented, had condemned the war as "imperialist." After June 22, 1940, they kept quiet for a day and then, in a complete turnabout, supported the war as "just."

<sup>33</sup>V. Kuusinen et. al., (eds.), Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1963), p. 462.

North Africa in November 1942 and the Nazi surrender at Stalingrad in February 1943 that the fortunes of war began to favor the Allies, political issues involving the opposing views came to the fore again. Adherence to very general principles such as the Atlantic Charter was favored by Moscow as well as by Washington and London, but specific political issues could neither then nor later be resolved. They were bound to cause trouble after the end of the war. It is significant that while the Western leaders were primarily concerned with winning the war militarily, Stalin, even in the darkest days of the conflict, never forgot the political problems that would arise after a victorious end of the hostilities. These considerations became paramount when it was certain that the Allies were winning. The schism between the political concepts of the Western and Eastern allies was best illustrated in the debate about the future of Poland. Other controversial issues were territorial and political aspirations of Stalin in Finland and Eastern Europe, post-war Germany, the status of Japan and China.

The much debated Yalta agreement granted concessions to the Soviet Union the full meaning of which became evident only later. Stalin received, for all intents and purposes, the key to Eastern Europe. "Not until later was it realized in the West that Hitler's tyranny had been replaced by another."<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>34</sup>G. von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia (New York: F.A. Praeger, rev. ed., 1960), p. 379.

Soviet imperialism, guided by both raison d'état and ideology, attempted to advance the frontiers of "socialism" as far as possible. Its territorial expansion after World War II provided it with more space in depth, either annexed or left to rule by loyal communist vassals in accordance with Moscow's party line. The development of nuclear arsenals stopped further acquisition of territory but not the attempts to subvert "noncommitted" areas or the infiltration of political life in other countries. Stalin was an ideological imperialist. He never lost sight of the need to strengthen his nation but neither did he forget the fundamental principles on which it was built: to make the Soviet Union an unbeatable bastion of world communism. It is true that his successors did not approve of many of his policies and adjusted theirs to the nuclear age. But they stuck to the fundamentals. They continued the cold war which Stalin had initiated after 1945 and for which almost certainly he had prepared his plans even while his armies and those of his allies fought a common enemy.

#### VI. Stalin's Cold War (1945-1953)

The war was won and the Soviet Union was on its way to becoming the second most powerful country in the world. More than that: with the acquisition of dominance over Eastern Europe and the subsequent victory of Mao Tse-tung's forces over Chiang Kai-shek, Moscow became the center of the "world socialist system."

Flushed with their new status, convinced that Marxism-Leninism was the wave of the future, the communists resumed the struggle against "imperialism" full scale. The undeclared cold war broke out. It was an East-West seesaw battle with failures on both sides but, perhaps, the more serious ones were suffered by the Kremlin. The attempt to annex Azerbaidjan from Iran failed. So did the communists in the Greek civil war. American policy stiffened considerably with the adoption of the "containment" policy. Zhdanov countered by pronouncing that the world was now split into two hostile camps. The Cominform was established to conduct a well coordinated campaign against the "capitalists." The Berlin Blockade was set up but ended in failure. All these frantic efforts appear to have been heavily motivated by ideological considerations. Clearly, raison d'état was subordinated to revolutionary activities which, however, were largely unsuccessful in Western Europe despite the growth of the communist parties in France and Italy.

At that time, the United States still possessed the monopoly of the atomic bomb. It concentrated its efforts to rehabilitate Europe as well as Japan. Such extraordinary projects as the Marshall Plan did not help Moscow's designs to create unrest or, worse, revolutions. Like Lenin in the early twenties, Stalin waited for a major conflict between the "imperialists." When it did not occur and when the East-West stalemate in Europe hardened, Stalin launched a "peace campaign."

The Soviets had not invented this stratagem. It had been started in Paris in March 1948, by the "Combattants de la Liberté," led by Yves Farge, a communist opponent of de Gaulle. It was directed against "neo-fascists" and collaborationists. It did not begin as a "peace" organization but became such in August 1948 when the Polish communists staged the "World Congress of Intellectuals for Peace." The Cominform took up the idea and helped spread it. Peace meetings were held in both communist and noncommunist countries. Important peace congresses were arranged in New York and Paris. The establishment of NATO, feared and bitterly opposed by the Soviets, became one of the primary targets of these congresses. The main attack was directed against the Western governments which allegedly prepared for a new war. Of all communist front organizations, the "World Peace Council" (WPC) probably was the most successful in that it gained a great many noncommunist members. At least 80 countries opened branch offices; the entire organization was under Moscow-directed communist leadership and strictly followed Soviet policies.<sup>35</sup>

With Suslov in charge of the communist and Molotov of the state aspects of the campaign, the communist and workers parties were ordered to give priority to the "struggle for peace." Next the cooperation of all sympathizing elements of the populations

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<sup>35</sup>See M. D. Shulman's excellent chapter "The Peace Movement as an Instrument of Diplomacy" in his Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised (New York: Atheneum, 1963), pp. 80 ff.

was sought to fight anti-communist governments and try to replace them, by constitutional procedures, with "peace-loving" governments. This campaign was marked by hostility to America and Britain which were "preparing for war against the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union was pursuing a policy of peace."<sup>36</sup> Under organizational direction of the WPC and with the political and financial support of the Kremlin, the campaign was steadily intensified and broadened to encompass anyone who was for "peace" and, therefore, by implication not anti-communist.

Particularly relevant is the comparison of Molotov's Peace Campaign policies with those of Suslov. Molotov, conjuring "peaceful coexistence" as the basic Soviet policy, warned against imperialist war threats and demanded an ever more effective struggle for "peace," eschewing pacifism and suggesting the preparation for any military or political eventuality. His emphasis on military and ideological preparedness on the one hand and peace on the other is one more example of Soviet dialectics. Suslov, accusing the West of an unholy alliance of rightists and warmongers, mapped out a program of intensification of the Peace Campaign, supported by a combination of peace-supporting heterogeneous elements in a "united front from below" so as to tighten the unity of the workers. Moreover, he likened the peace movement to the "struggle for national independence," thereby creating a

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<sup>36</sup>J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 64.

potent political weapon which was used against the bourgeois governments and became influential throughout the "third world."<sup>37</sup>

This state-party dualism on two fronts seemed formidable at the time but repressive Soviet policies in Eastern Europe, stimulation of extreme violence in Greece, continued harrassing tactics in Berlin, obvious Soviet support of the extremely hardlined French Party (which attempted to sabotage the unloading of American weapons for France)--all these actions, combined with a steady stream of shrill and intimidating propaganda, did not have the effect Moscow had expected. The Stockholm Peace Appeal of 1950 climaxed with the campaign for collecting signatures, most of which were secured from behind the Iron Curtain. It was designed to counter Western military strength and, especially, the U.S. monopoly on the atomic bomb which, while publicly denigrated by Stalin, presumably worried the Politbureau and compelled it to assign priority to both the collection of information (including espionage) and the development of nuclear and space technology.

The World Peace Council was only one of the mushrooming communist front organizations charged with providing a facade for spreading the Soviet-communist party line among the various professional and vocational organizations which have come under direct or indirect Soviet control. These fronts were active both as national and international bodies. Different from popular or united fronts, they were actually propaganda outfits

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<sup>37</sup> Cf. Shulman, op. cit., pp. 118-120.



but also undertook operational duties which directly affected the countries in which they were active. Apart from the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) probably was the most important front because it could interfere through its members in the economy of noncommunist countries through strikes, civil unrest and riots. It also served to reinforce leftist opposition parties and stimulate infiltration for purposes of subversion and espionage in noncommunist labor organizations.

A relative of the extinct Profintern, the WFTU was created in 1945. Russian, American, British, French and Latin American labor unions joined. The first General Secretary was Louis Saillant, a prominent French communist; thus from the outset, communists led the organization. Only after several years did the noncommunist members recognize the character of leadership and purpose of the WFTU. They quit in 1950. Since then, the WFTU served as an uninhibited propaganda organ for Soviet foreign policy and therefore implemented dualistic policies rather than caring for the wellbeing of its affiliate branches. "The WFTU's 'unity of action' campaign consists of appeals and invitations to its rival internationals for cooperation on such general problems as peaceful coexistence, opposition to the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and resistance to productivity drives in the West."<sup>38</sup> West Germany and colonialism also came

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<sup>38</sup>G. E. Lichtblau, "The World Federation of Trade Unions," 26, Social Research (1958), p. 26.

under constant attack. As in the case of the World Peace Council, so the WFTU eventually became identified with communist aims which deprived both organizations of their original reputation of legitimacy.<sup>39</sup>

In addition to these two, there were other fronts, such as for students, women, and the professions. In advanced countries, their influence has remained limited even though some are still not generally recognized for what they are: instruments of Soviet propaganda among the intellectual circles. They have had somewhat better success in the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America where they serve the purposes of the Soviet state and party. Since the early sixties, however, they have been hampered by the Sino-Soviet conflict and have been attacked by Peking which is trying to set up rival organizations.<sup>40</sup>

During Stalin's cold war, "peaceful coexistence" was no more than a tactic to be used whenever opportunity arose. His Peace Campaign and the creation of other front organizations served as important implementers of a policy which attempted to prevent the cure of social and economic illnesses of the noncommunist world. Moreover, it was Stalin's belief that wars between the capitalist

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<sup>39</sup>Cf. Bernard S. Morris, "Communist International Front Organizations, 9, World Politics, No. 1 (October 1956).

<sup>40</sup>For a brief survey of front organizations see I. Phelps-Fetherston, Soviet International Front Organizations: A Concise Handbook (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1965).

powers were inevitable; "peaceful coexistence" predominantly applied to relations between the USSR and the imperialists--for the time being. He undoubtedly agreed with Lenin that an eventual clash between socialism and capitalism was unavoidable but he was unwilling to accept such a clash in the atomic age as his policy in the Korean conflict proves. He carried on the fight by proxy and subordinated revolution to national security.

Before he died, Stalin controlled or heavily influenced the Eastern European states (except Yugoslavia), East Asia and communist parties all over the globe. Almost all these states and parties did his bidding. Soviet foreign policy, as created by the Politbureau, garnered much help and impetus from the parties which carried out Stalin's wishes even if they were against the better interests of their own countries. It is doubtful that this tight political organization of the "monolith" has had a precedent in known history.

#### VII. The Dualism of Khrushchev's Peaceful Coexistence

Khrushchev came to power in 1954. He immediately sought to modernize Stalin's sterile policies. In 1955, he made a pilgrimage to Belgrade to patch up the quarrel with Tito; he signed the Austrian State Treaty which had long been under consideration; he established diplomatic relations with West Germany although the basic problems of Germany's division and the suspicions against that country remained strong; he engaged in summitry;

and a few months later restored Porkkala to Finland--all in the name of "peaceful coexistence." The dualistic policies in these concessions were not apparent but the continuation of Soviet political dualism became quite clear in 1956 when Khrushchev ushered in a new era of Soviet communism at the 20th CPSU Congress which was to bring about important changes in the Kremlin's conduct of international relations. It ended Stalinist communism and the cohesive force of the monolith--but it did not end communism. It successfully fused policies of national interest with those of communist internationalism adapted to the nuclear age.

One might say that the primary significance of the 20th Congress was its confirmation of "peaceful coexistence" as a basic political strategy. It is important to realize that the "peaceful coexistence" policy which dominated Soviet policies from here on--much to the discomfiture of the Chinese communists--is one of the prime examples of a dual approach in the formulation of Moscow's national and revolutionary policies. "Peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems," in Soviet interpretation, is an amalgam of traditional and revolutionary policies, Narkomindel plus Comintern, so-to-speak, or the two sides of the same coin. It is deceptive for the uninitiated because it appears to signify peace and accommodation; there is nothing in its trademark to indicate the continued struggle underneath the hopeful appearance.

The evolving nature of this struggle, however, constituted a change brought about by the nuclear stalemate for which no Marxist-Leninist doctrine existed. In addition to the denigration of Stalin, Lenin's expectancy of inevitable war was modified, as was the belief that revolution must necessarily be violent. This modification of an old ideological principle brought political benefits not only to the "socialist camp" (Red China excluded) and the communist parties all over the world. For, even though the 20th Congress' revelations ushered in the era of polycentric communism, they paid dividends in the improved attitudes of many noncommunist nations towards a presumably more moderate and realistic Soviet leadership.

The immediate aftermath of this apparent liberalization was the rebellion in Poland and the uprising in Hungary against their Stalinist leaders' reluctance to adapt their policies to Khrushchevian reformism. The events in Poland remained self-controlled; those in Hungary did not. The Kremlin did not hesitate to intervene when it appeared that Imre Nagy wanted more independence than the Soviets would allow. "Peaceful coexistence" did not seem to work within the socialist family, and the impact on the world of the Soviet slaughter in Budapest was deep. It would have been even deeper had not the Suez affair of 1956, resulting from John Foster Dulles' ill-advised policy, diverted world opinion. Moreover, the subsequent alienation of the Arab

world from the West made it possible for the Kremlin to pursue an old Russian dream with increasing vigor, namely, the penetration of the Middle East. To view such policy in the Soviet era as purely nationalistic or even imperialistic would not be accurate. If it were, it could not have succeeded in a world that had just emerged from an era of imperialism and still was very suspicious of it. Soviet national interests were matched with the message of socialism and national liberation. Thus "Arab socialism" was encouraged and, regardless of the fact that Egyptian communists were incarcerated, the growing trend of the Middle East toward socialism greatly stimulated the readiness of Moslem nations to accept help and friendship from a Marxist-Leninist, anti-religious state.

Khrushchev's visit to the United States seemed to confirm his estimate that the terms of "peaceful coexistence" and "relaxation of tensions," could be used to advantage by skilled diplomacy. The natural tendency of President Eisenhower to foster peace and improve relations between the two great super powers was exploited by Khrushchev. In his statement on September 28, 1959, after his return from America, Khrushchev gave credit to the President for his efforts in the pursuit of peace. But this propagandistic statement which did not seem to be dualistic at all, was quickly discarded when at the Paris conference of March/April 1960, realizing that he could not expect Western concessions, Khrushchev seized the U-2 incident to torpedo the summit. Subsequently,

the rosy picture of the American President became tainted in Soviet propaganda, and a belligerent language replaced the friendly references to the "spirit of Camp David" the existence of which was the result of American gullibility and perhaps an expression of the deep longing for an end of East-West antagonism.

The Sino-Soviet rift which contributed to Khrushchev's political downfall and greatly affected Soviet relations with other parts of the world, especially the countries of the "socialist camp," is a telling example of inter-communist dualism. Its basic reasons are both doctrinal interpretation and power-political disagreements.<sup>41</sup> Narrow dogmatic concepts and crude behavior in international affairs on the part of Red China stood against the far more sophisticated "peaceful coexistence" policy of Moscow. The theses of the 20th CPSU Congress were too advanced for the thinking of the Chinese communist fanatics. But the quarrel which became public record in 1960, forced the Soviet Union to be more permissive toward the Eastern European countries and to increase political activities, economic assistance and weapons deliveries in some countries of the third world. This policy was unsuccessful in Indonesia, suffered a setback in the Middle East and did not get far either in Africa or in Latin America, with the sole exception of Cuba. While underplaying

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<sup>41</sup>K. London, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict," Current History (October 1966) p. 206 ff. See also the same author's "Vietnam: A Sino-Soviet Dilemma," 26, 1, The Russian Review (January 1967).

the communist aspects of its efforts and trying to hide its political aspirations--which had become practically one and the same--Moscow emphasized its role as a humanitarian nation led by a humanitarian (communist) party and simultaneously launched a new propaganda campaign against the Western "imperialists" and "colonialists." It would be difficult indeed to analyze Moscow's state policies without assessing the impact of communist doctrine on these policies.

Khrushchev's Cuban interests which climaxed in an adventure leading to the brink of nuclear war in 1962 are another example of a two-pronged strategy. The prospect of creating a communist state 90 miles from the coast of the United States seemed an alluring opportunity. Equipped with medium range missiles, it would create a serious threat against U.S. security and thus be useful as a quid-pro-quo in any major quarrel between Moscow and Washington. Moreover, as a communist-ruled state, Cuba would be an outpost of revolution in Latin America and serve as a military and ideological base in the struggle against American "imperialism." But when Khrushchev embarked on his dangerous scheme of exporting rockets, he went much farther than he had gone in Berlin and elsewhere. It was not in the Soviet national interest to engage in a nuclear war with the United States at that time. The attempt, thanks to President Kennedy's strong position, was abortive. ~~It~~ was a setback for both the Soviet state and party, but primarily



for the latter, when the rockets had to be removed--but Castro remained in power. Indeed, Soviet influence waned in Latin America in favor of Castroism. Perhaps Castro dreamed of assuming the leadership in Latin America as the leader of the Caribbean and Latin American communist movement. Since the Soviet party had become a socialist vanguard by reputation but not in fact, Castro may have planned to establish his own vanguard in the southern hemisphere.

#### VIII. Soviet Policies Toward the Third World

"National Liberation" and self-determination in theory and practice have had a long and rich history which began even before the victory of the revolution, at least in Lenin's mind. The development and application of these theories by Lenin and Stalin to the "colonial and semi-colonial areas" offer a classic example of dualism and show a double standard of implementation inside and outside the USSR. Stalin had once written about "Marxism and the National Question," proposing the right of national minorities to secede or, if they did not, to be granted recognition of their autonomy. The promise was never kept, and the resolution on the national question, as adopted by the prerevolutionary All-Russian Conference of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party of May 12, 1917--which was never abrogated--remained empty words. However, Soviet propaganda in later years, presenting the USSR as the supporter of "national liberation movements," has

been generally successful. Its effectiveness has varied and somewhat diminished as some developing nations have acquired greater political sophistication. On the whole, however, it still appears attractive particularly to those countries which once were part of European controlled empires and thus had had no right to determine their future. It will take some time for those countries to realize that the chief efforts of Soviet foreign policy is focussed on the creation of a third--neutralist--camp which would become eventually a Soviet sphere of interest.

In May 1925, Stalin outlined the revolutionary premises for national liberation in colonial countries. They consisted of political organizations for the purpose of winning over the working class "to the side of communism" against the bourgeoisie and imperialism and "to ensure the hegemony of the proletariat." But the 1928 Comintern Congress established a new line: only communists could direct national liberation movements. Again, in 1935, the Congress reverted to a more opportunistic line by replacing the "united front from above" with the "united front from below." At that time, the world political situation did not favor radical measures nor were Soviet internal conditions very promising.

When Khrushchev took over, he developed the three camp theory, adding the third, that of the developing nations, to Stalin-Zhdanov's two. In the aftermath of the war, more and more

former colonial areas became independent nations, still resentful of their former dependent status under colonial masters. Consequently, Soviet policies catered to their pride of newly acquired sovereignty and to the appeal of communism it added economic aid. This dual approach was at least partially successful--so long as Moscow's emissaries did not become too obvious in their efforts at infiltration, as was the case in Guinea or the Congo.

The United States as the strongest of the Western powers has acquired, among some quarters, the reputation of a "colonial" power mainly because of its alliance with the former colonial empires of Europe. All "colonialist" nations were considered to represent an exploitative capitalist system which, to many third world leaders, is unsuitable for the economic development in a society without middle class, without technological know-how and without political education. On the other hand, the USSR has no record as a colonialist power even though there had existed, since Tsarist times, internal colonialism with which Stálin tried to deal as the "national question." Moreover, communism, or "socialism," appeals to the poverty ridden masses of Asia, Africa and Latin America who want to have a new lease on life and do not believe they can obtain it from the West.

Khrushchev's political vision vis-à-vis the third world expressed itself in action geared to offset the economic strength of the United States. The concept of "neo-colonialism" was

coined and successfully incorporated in the dictionary of communist policies toward the underdeveloped countries. His successors, the new "collective leadership" under Brezhnev and Kosygin (a Khrushchev-Bulganin parallel) have continued his policies but, on the whole, have not been altogether successful. They have failed to achieve their major objectives in Africa and Asia; in Latin America they play second fiddle to Castro.

The Soviet policy makers' great interest in the third world is not only their goal of direct involvement in these areas so as to replace Western influence, but also to set the third world against the West, and to deny the rich resources of Asia and Africa to the West--a policy already suggested by Lenin at the Baku Conference of 1920. Of particular importance are the Soviet attempts to penetrate the Middle Eastern region, the strategic link between Europe and Asia. Above all others, Egypt has remained the priority target. When the USSR extended recognition to the new State of Israel in 1948, Soviet relations with the Arabs cooled. However, after the Bandung Conference of 1955, Moscow changed its policies and began to establish more persuasive political and economic bonds with Egypt, while the United States refused to help Egypt build the Aswan dam.

Nasser's closing of the Suez canal in 1956 resulted in the brief Anglo-French-Israeli war against Egypt. Moscow took advantage of this situation and since then has maintained close relations

with Nasser regardless of the fact that he jailed Egyptian communists. Nevertheless, Khrushchev, at the 21. CPSU Congress of 1959, had complained about the campaign of anti-communist elements against communists "who are wrongly accused of contributing to the weakening or splitting of the national effort in the struggle against imperialism."<sup>42</sup> This position created some strain in Soviet-Egyptian relations, and it is interesting that this may have been the result of communist policies gaining over national policies. Khrushchev had stated that "the Soviet Union has not interfered and does not intend to interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries," but he then added that "we cannot, however, fail to make clear our (view) that a campaign against progressive forces is being waged in some countries under the false slogan of anti-communism."<sup>43</sup> In this case, dualism, to say the least, was uncoordinated and contradictory.

Soviet policies in the Middle East have caused an even heavier involvement shortly before, during and after the June 1967 Arab-Israel war. The Arab defeat, the loss of billions invested by the Soviets for armament, primarily Egyptian, and the Soviet stand against Israel have forced the Arabs still closer to the Soviet camp. The Kremlin's dualistic policies

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<sup>42</sup>Excerpted from Khrushchev's Report to the 21. Congress of the CPSU in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D. C., January 29, 1959.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

in that area present a contrast between the "spirit of Glassboro" and the tough statements by Soviet Ambassador Fedorenko in the United Nations and by Premier Kosygin in his General Assembly speech and in his U.N. press conference. There is a revealing "unity of opposites" of Soviet strategic interest in the Middle East and communist interest in achieving an acceptance of "socialism" by osmosis, thereby overcoming local nationalism as well as Islam.

We have no clearer account of Soviet-communist policy toward the developing countries than that laid down in the CPSU program adopted at the 22nd Party Congress. It reveals better than most other statements the closely interwoven state and party policies, the dualistic approach of the USSR toward the third world:

The CPSU considers fraternal alliance with the peoples who have thrown off colonial or semi-colonial yokes to be a corner stone of its international policy. This alliance is based on the common vital interests of world socialism and the world national-liberation movement. The CPSU regards it as its internationalist duty to assist the peoples who have set out to win and strengthen their national independence, all peoples who are fighting for the complete abolition of the colonial system.<sup>44</sup>

#### In Conclusion

The policy makers of nations, capitalist or socialist, use (or abuse) many kinds of dualism. A misanthrop probably would claim that double dealing is the stock in trade of the

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<sup>44</sup>As quoted by O. Kusinnen (ed.), Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, op. cit., p. 430.

men in charge of foreign relations. This has been so since nations began, and there seems little hope for the dawn of an age of political goodness.

This essay does not deal with those duplicities of traditional foreign policy making which lie hidden under the cloak of diplomatic respectability. It does attempt, however, to focus a spotlight on the dualism of communist-ruled states which, with the help of modern technology in weapons and communications, seeks to combine the traditions of foreign relations and international law with the iconoclasm of the communist gospel as interpreted by the pragmatic ideologists of the Soviet Union and the irrational dogmatists of China. "The duality of the Soviet Union as a state and as a party has long been recognized, and its behavior has always betrayed a certain amount of political schizophrenia,"<sup>45</sup> writes a sovietologist of repute.

But, while it is true that this recognition is of long standing, some changes in both the USSR and the international communist movement which have occurred since 1956 have tended to obscure the progressive merger of the two sides of Soviet foreign policy because they are no longer organizationally distinct. As a result, some nations' appraisals of Soviet intentions have become somewhat euphoric. Moreover, since the rites of Moscow's secular religion are no longer as demonstrative as they once were,

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<sup>45</sup>V. V. Aspaturian, The Soviet Union in the World Communist System (Stanford: Hoover Institution Studies, 1966).

the prevalent view is that ideology is eroding and communism deteriorating. In the writer's view, this interpretation is as faulty as is that of a Soviet foreign policy expressing solely Russian national interest.

In half a century of quick living, with events of consequence occurring year after year, conditions are bound to change. Had the Soviet Union not changed, it would have become sterile and brittle; that danger existed in the later years of Stalin's reign. But change it did. Khrushchev's reformism initiated a new era, discarding much which was useless; retaining what was considered essential. It is these changes which have led many observers to believe that they are fundamental and indicative of an evolution away from revolution. But we only have to look to the continuity of Soviet dualistic foreign policy to realize that they are not. At best--not yet.



Berlin 1967

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GERMANS.

by

Prof.Dr. Klaus Mehnert.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GERMANS.

The book on the relationship between the Soviet Union and the Germans has not yet been written, and - as far as the present author knows - is not to be expected even in this anniversary year of 1967, although this relationship is one of the major topics of the first fifty years of the USSR. Of course, there exist many monographs, as well as some memoirs; some of them will be mentioned later on.

As to the author, he has been connected with the subject of this paper since his early youth. Although his - German - parents left Russia in 1914, most of their friends and of his relatives remained there through the First World War, the Revolution, the Civil War, and - after they reached Germany eventually - had much to tell about the events themselves and also about their effect on the Germans in Russia and on German-Russian relations. That German property was just as much confiscated by the revolutionary government as the property of Russians, that the German (Weimar) Government was obliged to recompense its citizens for their losses in Russia, that an uncle was - as a German officer - connected with the Brest-Litowsk negotiations, that one of his parents' closest friends, Gustav Hilger, played a considerable part in two decades of German-Soviet relations - all that made the question treated in this paper an almost daily matter of this author's boyhood. Small wonder that he paid more attention to it than most of his age group, that he read much and early about it, that he selected Russia and the USSR as the chief subjects of his studies at the Universities of Berlin and California, that - for many years after 1929 - he visited the Soviet Union regularly every year and, as a result, knew most Germans and also some Russians connected with Soviet-German affairs.

Yet, the author will resist the temptation of writing his own account of the story. Nor will he present, in a brief conference paper, the story as such. Rather will he try to answer the question: What in the story of these fifty years of Soviet-German relations is relevant today? Very much is, of course, just past history, if not anecdote, and hence without significance for our day. There are however, so it seems to the author, nine factors which affect in our time the attitude of the USSR toward Germany (and vice versa), and with them this paper will deal.

1. Germany and Lenin

There might have been a revolution in Russia if there had been no Germany (even this one may doubt, looking at the close intellectual and political relationship between the two countries), but without Germany there surely would not have been the Lenin whom history knows. Lenin's entire intellectual and revolutionary history is closely linked with the intellectual and revolutionary development of Germany. That was true before he went to Germany and especially after his first visit there, in 1895. During his Siberian exile (1897 to 1900) his friends arranged subscriptions for him of Die Frankfurter Zeitung and Archiv für Soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik. Apart from some Russians, with G.W. Plechanov and L. Martow leading, Lenin's most important teachers, friends, and foes were Germans. In checking the two volumes of indices to Lenin's Works (1) one can find at first glance (and confirm by inches), that among the most frequently mentioned names of political and social thinkers or doers are (in addition, of course, to Marx and Engels): - in this order - Karl Kautsky,

Rosa Luxemburg, Eduard Bernstein, Karl Liebknecht, August Bebel, Philip Scheidemann, and many others, as well as Feuerbach, Hegel and Kant. In Germany and in the two German speaking neighbouring countries, Austria and Switzerland, Lenin spent most of the time during his years abroad.

True, we know that Lenin's political Weltanschauung was not exclusively of German-Marxist origin, that a number of Russian traditions and schools of thought have been part of his mental make-up. But also among the Russians most often named in Lenin's writings those influenced by Marxism and German thought are by far in the majority. No precise percentage can be given, naturally, but it is this author's opinion, that German thinking with its various ramifications takes first place in Lenin's thinking. Khrushchev was quite right when in 1955 he reminded Chancellor Adenauer in Moscow that, after all, the man who was so much responsible for the shaping of the USSR, Karl Marx, had been a German. ("... dass Sie Marx in die Welt gebracht haben und Engels auch! Wenn schon, denn schon. Wenn schon gekocht, dann auch selber essen!") (2)

A direct responsibility the government of the Kaiser took upon itself when it transported Lenin and other Bolsheviks, including Grigory Sinoviev and Karl Radek, through Germany to Sweden (and Russia) in the spring of 1917, enabling him to overthrow the Russian government, in order to knock Russia out of the war and thus to free German troops for the Western front. To what extent the German Government had supported Lenin's movement financially before and after the journey of the "sealed ear" is still not completely clarified (and may never be), but there is no doubt that German money has been involved, and it is equally clear that Lenin did not feel in the least obliged to the Imperial German government for its aid. (3) The shadow of being a German agent however has been on him for a long time and has not entirely disappeared to this day.

Of the following events we can omit, from the point of view of today, the last phases of the German-Russian war as well as the Treaty of Brest-Litowsk; these were episodes which left no lasting traces. To be sure, in Brest the Soviet Government ceded the Western territories of the Tsar's Empire, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Ukraine, Transcaucasia, but the former five might have obtained their statehood and independence also without Brest (though probably not without the war with Germany) and the latter two were to lose it again.

## 2. Russian and German Marxists Split

Lenin's intellectual and political development occurred in a constant Auseinandersetzung with the German Social Democrats, which grew gradually into conflict and finally into open hostility. This process, so decisive for the future of Russia, her relations with Germany and the world revolutionary movement in general, has been much discussed and described. (4)

Today we possess a new insight into this split, due to the split of two other Marxist brethren, the Russian and the Chinese Communists. In reading the attacks from Peking against Moscow, particularly since 1962, (5) one is struck by the extraordinary similarity of Mao's anti-Soviet vocabulary with Lenin's anti-SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) vocabulary forty-five years earlier. There is even an entire chapter which accuses the Soviet leaders of being "Disciples of Bernstein and Kautsky", (6) that is of following today the road of the SPD which Lenin abhorred.

There is also the fact that the very term Revisionism which the Chinese constantly hurl against Moscow is but an echo of Lenin's accusations against the German comrades (7); these lost in the process the prerogative of being called comrades, just as the Russians have lost it in the eyes of the Chinese today. In Lenin's view the German SPD had lost its revolutionary fervour to become an organization of reformers, even traitors; and as far as the Maoists are concerned, exactly the same is true about the Soviet leaders of today.

Lenin spoke then about an eastward movement of the revolutionary center, and the Maoists have made this same thesis part of their ideology. Lenin was right then, as Mao is now. The reason, of course, is not that "the East wind prevails over the West wind" (as Mao said in November 1957 in a speech to the students of Moscow) but that the radicals of underdeveloped Russia then were more radical than those of highly developed Germany and that the radicals of underdeveloped China today are more radical than those of the highly developed, largely saturated, Soviet Union.

Friedrich Ebert, the sober leader of the SPD, with his strong sense of responsibility for his country and for peace in general, the man who said (before taking office as the first Chancellor of the German Republic in November 1918) that he did not want a social revolution, because he "hated it like sin", was just as different from Lenin, as the techno-burocrat Kossygin is from Mao.

The split of 1919, when Lenin founded the Communist International in opposition to the SPD-led Socialist International, brought about a deep hostility. We still feel it today, after almost half a century, characterized especially in the names of the two men who are in charge of the two halves of this much tormented city of Berlin - Willy Brandt and Walter Ulbricht. All through the years of the Weimar and again of the Bonn republic, the German Socialists have been the most bitter enemies of the German Communists whom they considered - with much justification - the Russian Communists' Fifth Column in Germany.

### 3. The German Right and Moscow

During the Weimar period of Germany it was not the Socialist Left but the German Right, especially the German Reichswehr, which was looking for contacts and even for allies in Bolshevich Russia. The German Right was traditionally anti-West and became even more so after the Treaty of Versailles of 1919; it was also - as a result of the territorial losses in the East - anti-Polish. For these reasons it was inclined to look toward Russia - even toward Bolshevich Russia. One of the German Rights' major prophets, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck (a German, inspite of his Dutch name) had published, in the years 1906 to 1914, Dostoyevsky in German, 23 volumes in all, explaining specifically that the Germans needed this anti-Western Russian as a counterweight against Western influences. (8) To give an ideological foundation to this strange bedfellowship, the West was painted as decadent while the Russians were among the "junge Völker" (young nations). (9)

The German National Bolsheviks, as some of them called themselves, did not leave much of a mark on German-Russian history, because Lenin was not interested. He did not follow the lead of Karl Radek who - in Berlin and in Moscow - was pleading for cooperation with the German nationalists of the Right, just because they were anti-Western and thus essentially anti-capitalist.

What Radek advocated with regard to Germany, Stalin and his successors later adopted concerning a number of countries: alliances with anti-Western bourgeois nationalists - starting with Chiang Kai-shek (1923-27) and still practising it with Nasser. Lenin understood, of course, the political implications for Russia of the German nationalists opposition to Versailles and the Western powers but he did not think much of the political weight of the anti-Western German rightists.

Yet, the infatuation of German rightists with anti-Western Moscow has left some traces to this day, although - due to changed conditions - in a different version: the present day German nationalists, through their mouth piece, the NPD (National Democratic Party of Germany), have been demanding close political cooperation with anti-Western Peking. The USSR itself, as a status quo power, in control or in possession of large German territories, does not exercise much attraction on German nationalism today.

A much more effective and lasting form of understanding between German nationalism and the Soviet Union was the long, though secret cooperation between the Reichswehr and the Red Army. Much has been written on the subject - the clandestine affairs in this world make always more fascinating reading than those which are being carried on in the open. Today we know the forms and the extent of this cooperation. (10) Fear makes things appear larger than they really are, as one might translate the Russian proverb U strakha glaza veliki. The fear of German rearmament made German-Soviet military collaboration appears larger than it was in actual fact. But it was big enough. For the young and threatened Soviet State it was important that Germans built armaments plants in the USSR and for the Reichswehr it was most valuable that its officers could be trained in Russia with weapons forbidden to Germany - planes and tanks. Many years later Göring and Guderian were to say that the arming of Hitler's Wehrmacht after 1935 could not have proceeded so quickly without the long years of preparation on Soviet territory. (11) If this statement is correct, as it may well be, then the Reichswehr-Red Army deal has had very significant consequences indeed.

Another effect of this deal has by now practically disappeared: the close personal links of German and Russian officers, although I know a high officer in the Bundeswehr who still remembers with some enthusiasm and a good deal of warmth the year of training which he spent in Russia in the early thirties. (Hitler ended the military cooperation with the USSR in the year he came to power, in 1933.)

But not many have been left - on either side, and too much has happened since. Still, the two revolutionary heroes of the Soviet Union, Voroshilov and Budyenny, turned on a friendly smile always and spontaneously whenever I reminded them, during visits to Moscow since 1955, of those far away times and ties.

#### 4. Rapallo

While German-Russian military cooperation was a fact of considerable consequences, the Treaty of Rapallo was more a myth than a political force. The main significance of this treaty, concluded on Easter Sunday 1922, has been symbolic. The two countries, the pariahs of Europe, as Lloyd George had called them, had found the way to each other. The contents of the treaty itself were harmless enough, nor were there any secret clauses to it. Still the name of the small Riviera resort where the treaty was hurriedly signed stands to this day for German-Russian anti-Western collusion, if not conspiracy.

It was largely due to this attitude of the Western powers, Great Britain and France in particular, that the treaty obtained a significance quite out of proportion with its wording. Rapallo is still a political term, like Munich; the big difference being, of course, that Munich did have profound consequences while Rapallo did not.

The mere fact of mutual diplomatic recognition, brought about at Rapallo, would not have meant very much (it did not twenty-three years later, in 1955). That it did have some consequences (surely more than after 1955), was largely due to a German diplomat who by his remarkable personality and willpower was able to create the image of something close to a German-Soviet alliance (that did not exist) and to set a style of political relationship which was to last until 1941. Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, an eccentric and most difficult man to work for, succeeded - during his six years in Moscow - to establish excellent contact with the leaders of Soviet foreign policy, the Foreign Commissar Gheorgy Chicherin in particular, both of them being fond of work at night and of aristocratic mind and background.

Brockdorff-Rantzau established the tradition of a close, frank and, if need be, tough relationship between the German Embassy in Moscow and the Soviet Government, a tradition which was continued by his successors, Herbert von Dirksen and Count Werner von der Schulenburg (Rudolf Nadolny, the man in between, left in a quarrel with Hitler and Foreign Minister von Neurath after a very brief stay, but he too adhered to this line).

Needless to say, none of these noblemen had the slightest sympathy for Bolshevism and for Stalin, but they were all fascinated by their job, by the phenomena of the Russian revolution and the Soviet State, and devoted to their assignment which was the establishment of close relations between their fatherland and the growing giant in the East. This became also the attitude of their staff members. Most of them the present author has known for decades, some have made a name for themselves: General Köstring, long time military attaché and symbol of excellent relations between the military; Gustav Hilger (Moscow-born like Köstring), the soul of the German Embassy and close personal friend of many prominent Soviet leaders, including Mikoyan, author of a book on German-Soviet political relations as Köstring was of one on German-Soviet military relations (12); J. Herwarth von Bittenfeldt, now German Ambassador in Rome; Fritz von Twardowski, later Ambassador to Mexico, still active in Bonn; Otto Bräutigam, after the Second World War Consul General in Hongkong, now retired but participating in the German discussion on Ostpolitik, with emphasis on improving relations with the USSR; Peter Pfeiffer, now head of the world wide cultural activities of the Goethe Institut in Munich, and, of course, Otto Schiller, after 1934 (and again after 1956) German agricultural attaché, known to everybody as ~~Kolkhoznik~~ or Otto Mikhailowich, now professor at Heidelberg and, as Vice President of the host society, participant of this conference.

On the whole, the German Embassy during the almost two decades prior to the invasion of the Wehrmacht into Russia, was the most competent and devoted of all foreign missions in the Soviet capital, and only during the brilliant Bullitt-Kennan-Bohlen-Durbrow period of the US Embassy (after 1934) did it have a serious rival. Even under Hitler, Schulenburg managed to keep this spirit alive, and after 1955 when, during the Adenauer visit to Moscow, diplomatic relations were resumed, the tradition was quickly revived - under Ambassador Wilhelm Haas (after his retirement President of the German Society for the Study of Eastern Europe, the host of this conference), Hans Kroll (a particularly articulate advocate of German-Soviet rapprochement, of whom a book on the

subject is about to appear), Horst Gröpper (now Ambassador to Turkey, who had the bad luck of serving in Moscow during a phase of sub-zero relations between Bonn and Moscow) and Gebhardt von Walther. The last two, incidentally, had served in Moscow under Schulenburg, and Walther has carried on his difficult task very much in the spirit of his murdered superior - with great charm and hospitality in spite of strong tensions between the two governments.

The Brockdorff-Rantzau spirit affected also the German correspondents in Moscow, of whom Paul Scheffer and Arthur W. Just were the most famous, while Baum, the excellent long time representative of the German news agency was less known to the general public. (Baum committed suicide in 1943, out of despair over Hitler's Eastern policy). The spirit of friendly, though critical understanding came to life again after the Second World War in the person of Hermann Pörzgen, who had worked in Moscow in the Schulenburg days and who, in spite of hard years in Soviet prisons from 1944 to 1955, returned to Moscow (for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) in 1956, now the undisputed dean of German correspondents in the USSR.

Even the Russian and East European studies at the German universities fitted into this picture of critical understanding. The men who set the pace in this respect were Otto Hoetzsch, professor of Eastern European history, and his Russian history colleague, Karl Staehlin, both at the University of Berlin. Berlin was, during the twenties and early thirties, a center, perhaps the center of what now is known as Sovietology - it had many students now scattered all over the world, several reviews (such as Osteuropa, Zeitschrift für ost-europäische Geschichte, Ostwirtschaft) and a good deal of cultural exchange. A bibliography of books and articles on the Soviet Union printed in German outside the USSR, which was published in Berlin in 1932, included 1900 titles. (13)

In 1925 numerous German scholars, including noted scientists such as Max Planck and six university presidents, participated in the 200 years' celebration of the Academy of Sciences (then still in Leningrad). In the following years two Soviet Weeks were held in Berlin, one on natural sciences (1927) and one on Russian history (1928), both attended by famous Soviet scholars, the latter for example by M.N. Pokrovsky and S.F. Platonov; in 1929 a German Technical Week was organized in Moscow. (14) (Activities of this kind came to a stop after Hitler's ascent to power and have not been resumed in West Germany after 1945).

The Germans who were active in these contacts were not "pinks"; in fact, Otto Hoetzsch was a respected member of first the Deutschnationale (Hugenberg), then the Jungkonservative party, both quite far to the right. But they considered the Soviet Union a fact of life, of great interest in general and to the Germans in particular.

##### 5. The German Communists

From the start and to this day the relationship between the Germans and the Soviet Government has been adversely affected by the presence in Germany of a Communist Party. This, of course, can be said of almost any other country's relationship with Moscow. But the Germany of Weimar was for obvious reasons particularly unstable and therefore her CP of special importance. Lenin's hope to win "the German proletariat" away from the SPD to the KPD (Communist Party of Germany) did not materialize. The SPD remained, ever since Bismarck and until now, the party of the German working man. The KPD's emphasis and

violence and revolution did not endear it to a nation that was not very revolution minded. Its ill-fated uprisings, particularly in 1923, as well as the revolutionary activities of its predecessor, Spartacus, made it unpopular and suspected. Yet, the KPD was at times one of the biggest vote getters among the vote conscious Germans, and, during the depression years, the party obtained between 4.6 (1930) en 6 million (1932) votes - in a Germany which at that time had close to 6 millions of unemployed and many more millions of under-employed.

This is not the place to discuss the attitude of the Germans in general toward democracy; but there is no question that the German labourer has a long democratic tradition, because it was he who fought - successfully - for an enlargement of his democratic rights, against Bismarck and against Wilhelm II, thereby identifying his cause with that of democracy. Lenin's anti-democratic attitude, his emphasis on a conspiratorial elite with which to lead "the masses", the unpleasant sight of a dictatorship which was precisely not of the proletariat but over the proletariat or rather of the selfestablished party rulers over everybody also including the party, the many accounts of violence, terror and destruction during the revolution, the civil war, the collectivization, the purge - all this repelled the great majority of the German workers; they also resented the obvious servility of the KPD under Moscow's orders. Sooner than more remote proletariats the German working class understood that, beginning under Lenin and much more so under Stalin, the KPD was but an auxiliary of the Kremlin, that Stalin was her boss not Ernst Thälmann, that it acted not in the interest of the German workers, not even of the party itself, but of Moscow's foreign policy - official and otherwise. At a time when nationalism was in the air, the very "masses" whom the KPD wooed, began to turn away from her, to vote (and march) for the man who aroused their nationalistic passions and in addition promised "socialism", bread and security. While the SPD on the whole succeeded in holding its members and voters, many a desperate KPD voter turned to Hitler and Goebbels.

A major blunder committed by Stalin added to the estrangement between KPD and SPD. In 1924 he declared: "Social democracy and Facism are twins", (15) and he has reiterated this misanalysis until the bitter end. As a result there could be no question of anti-fascist cooperation between the two Marxist parties of Germany. Disunited they stood and separately they were destroyed by Hitler's liquidators. In April 1933, weeks after Hitler had come to power (with the Reichstag burned, the KPD leaders in prison or dead, the SPD just about eliminated), the Central Committee of the KPD branded the SPD "the main support of the capitalist dictatorship" and the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) proclaimed the time had finally come to put the last nail in the coffin of the SPD. It was George F. Kennan who proclaimed Stalin's responsibility for the failure of the Weimar Republic. (16)

In the concentration camps and in exile there occurred some cooperation between German Communists and Socialists, but hardly had Hitler been defeated and dead, when the old struggle was resumed. Wolfgang Leonhardt and some others who were in Berlin during the first phase after the end of the Second World War have told the story of the new split (17) as a result of Walter Ulbricht's efforts of monopolizing the control over the left wing in Germany and over state power in the Soviet Occupied Zone. Had it not been for Ulbricht and his like, there might have emerged in all Germany a united left party, as there did emerge a united Christian party, comprising Protestants and Catholics who, after all, had fought each other for over four hundred years while the division between



Communists and Socialists had lasted only a quarter of a century. As a result the SPD, under the tough leadership of Kurt Schumacher, turned out to be the Communists' most dangerous foe in West Germany, and also the Soviet Occupied Zone many of the staunchest and most determined opponents of Ulbricht's rule were men from the SPD.

One is tempted to ask the question: What would have happened if Lenin in 1919 and Ulbricht in 1945 had not split the German Socialist movement, or, for that matter, if Mao in the 1960ties had not split the world's communists? But no answer need be given to hypothetical inquiries.

#### 6. German business helps building Soviet industry

The economic cooperation of the two "pariahs", built on a number of agreements the first of which was concluded in May 6, 1921, was slow in starting. A number of attempts were made which came to naught. At first the Russians were willing to give economic concessions to German (and other) firms; but being extremely suspicious of "foreign capitalists" they held them in a very tight grip which prevented their effective operation. One such example was the huge forest and lumber concession MOLOGALES (from Mologa, a river which flows into the Volga, and les = forest, lumber); it ended in failure - like all the others - due to basic disagreements between the Soviets and the German concessionaries. The relative greatest success was achieved by the mixed German-Soviet air transport company DERULUFT.

Chief obstacle to trade was the Soviet trade monopoly, still functioning to this day although with some modifications. It gave to the Soviet government an advantage over its foreign partners - a state monopoly versus innumerable foreign firms. The German side later countered the Soviet move by forming, in Berlin, the Russland-ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft (Russia Committee of German Industry), which tried to coordinate some of the German firms' activities; it also provided them with relevant information to help them avoid unexpected traps. The German government gave, from 1926 on, guarantees to German firms which sold goods to the Soviet Union on credit. This operation worked well; the Soviet government could not fail on a single payment without at the same moment losing all creditability.

It was only during the early thirties that German-Soviet economic cooperation reached large proportions. At that time two factors coincided: The enormous pace of Stalin's industrialization and the depression in the West which forced German firms to look for orders in countries not affected by it. In February 1931 one of the most illustrious industrial delegations ever to travel abroad from Germany went to Moscow; it included, among others, the representatives (often the heads) from Krupp, Klöckner, Vereinigte Stahlwerke, Demag, Borsig, AEG, MAN, Otto Wolff. During that year Soviet orders in Germany reached almost 1000 million German marks, while goods worth about 750 million marks were delivered to the Soviet Union. German specialists by the hundreds went to the USSR to work on Soviet projects, enough to force the German Embassy in Moscow to open a school for their children. Gustav Hilger remembers that, during his vacation in Germany, representatives from two hundred firms visited him in Berlin in the course of ten days to enquire about exports to the USSR. (18) In the midthirties the present writer, when visiting the huge Soviet factories of the First Five Year Plan, marched - so it seems to him now - miles and miles between machines with German labels.

Curiously this economic cooperation continued after Hitler came to power in 1933. Hitler's government granted the Soviets large credits which were scrupulously repayed. It is well known that huge Soviet shipments were on their way to Germany when the Wehrmacht started its invasion of the Soviet Union on that early June morning in 1941.

#### 7. From Eisenstein to Yevtushenko

Outside of the USSR there was no country where Russian and Soviet cultures were more highly estimated than the Germany of the 1920ties which at that time was the intellectual clearing house of the world, a position which she has lost in the thirties and fourties and not yet regained in the sixties. At that time there was no UNESCO to record year by year the statistics of cultural exchange among nations, but to those who have lived in the Berlin of the Weimar period it seems that the city was the show window of Russian art and literature. German intellectual life was sufficiently vigorous not to be afraid of foreign influences - from Russia or anywhere else.

The Soviet theatre - including that of Stanislavsky and Meyerhold - was on frequent tournées in German cities; Soviet films - at that time worth applauding - were shown to large audiences with great success, with Eisenstein the favourite (and *The Road to Life* - *Putevka v zhizn* the last of the great productions). Soviet literature was much translated (and read!): Sholokhov's *And Quiet Flows the Don*; Gladkov's novels of "Socialist construction"; Ilya Ehrenburg's innumerable works; Aleksei Tolstoy's "Peter the First"; much of Gorky (although his main oeuvre was dated from before the First World War). Zostchenko's satirical short stories, especially the collection under the title "Sleep faster, comrade!" were favourites of the German public, as were the caustic novels of Ilf and Petrov. Many of these authors later on found the way into other parts of the West. A number of non-communist German (and Austrian) publishers specialized on Soviet authors: Rowohlt, Zsolnay, Kiepenheuer, List, Wolff.

At the same time the Russian classics - in music and literature - had their renaissance, partly due to the many refugees from the Russian bourgeoisie and aristocracy who had made their home in Germany and who brought a good deal of Old Russia with them. The Don Cossacks were among the many artists who had their earliest triumphs in German concert halls.

Some people may have found the way to Communism through Soviet art. But with the great majority this was not true; they saw in it the spiritual emanation of a strange but great revolution, and while few of them approved the revolution, least of all its brutality, they were fascinated by its artistic expression. The post-Wilhelminian Germany was hungry for experimentation, and while it lead the world in painting with its powerful school of Expressionism, it was willing to learn from everybody including the Bolsheviks.

The decline of Soviet culture under the frost of Stalinism made itself felt at a time when the Germans started the banning and burning of books and hence remained more or less unnoticed save to the specialist. This decline began with the resolution of the Central Committee of April 23, 1932, and the founding of the Soviet Writers Union shortly afterwards. The Second World War was not conducive to cultural influence. Many treasures of art and history were destroyed, although not so many willfully as Soviet propaganda would want the world to believe; Lev Tolstoy's estate, Yasnaya Polyana, was respected, not desacrated by its German occupants - the burial of some German soldiers near

Tolstoy's grave seemed desecration to the Soviets, but surely was not meant to be so by the Germans who buried their comrades.

After the war was over, the Russians were in possession of a large part of Germany, including intellectual and historical centers such as Weimar and Potsdam, Wittenberg and the Wartburg, Leipzig and Dresden. They then had a extraordinary chance for the exertion of their cultural influence on the Germans, and they used it to a large extent, but, as far as one can judge from the West, with rather modest success. From friends and relatives in the other part of Germany this author knows that, at first, the Germans showed a remarkable willingness to devoure, after years of cultural seclusion and barrenness, anything that was offered to them from abroad, that there existed a genuine desire to know many and, if possible, favourable facts about the new masters. But the old saying held true again: "Too much of a good thing".

Perhaps one can compare the ill effects of overexposure to foreign propaganda in the Soviet occupied areas of Germany after 1945 and in China after 1949. At first: much eagerness to absorb and learn - language, literature, music, history, even ideology, and then: all the signs of overeating - satiety, lack of appetite, and finally revulsion. Something of this nature also happened in the Western occupied zones with regard to American, French, British culture, but less drastically because the overfeeding was not so deliberate and also the fare was much more varied. For the Germans of the Soviet Zone it did not take long to realize that what they were being fed was plentiful but very monotonous (except, of course, for the classics, who remain popular to this day, although they too have suffered somewhat from the "too much of a good thing"). Apart from Gorky and Mayakovsky it was Socialist Realism all day long, at any rate until the midfifties. By the time the post-Stalinist literature and art began to trickle in, the novelty of the whole thing had worn off.

In West Germany interest in Soviet literature was low after 1945; and with good reason, while the classics were much read, with Nikolai Leskov experiencing a vogue not known before. Things changed in the post-Stalinist era; recent Soviet novels and poetry are appearing in increasing numbers and editions. In 1965 West Germany alone published 59 titles of belles lettres translated from the Russian. (19)

The following statement is not meant to be paradoxical: There seems to be in West Germany today more genuine interest in Soviet culture than in the Soviet Occupied Zone; precisely because nobody tried to push it down the West Germans' throat, these are more relaxed about it. But in either part of Germany interest is far below that of the twenties. Yevgeny Yevtushenko is, without doubt, the best known and most popular Soviet author in the Federal Republic, especially among the young generation, partly due to his personal appearance in German lecture halls which were always filled to overflowing.

#### 8. The Black Years

Hitler, his attack against the USSR in 1941, the dreadful occurrences of the following years, in short: the black years of 1941 to 1945 - and their aftermath - are by far the most important item on the list of events since 1917 to affect present-day German-Soviet relations. Centuries of good relations, of "traditional friendship" even, the alliance in the War of Liberation against Napoleon, Bismarck's emphasis on cooperation with Russia, dozens of German-Russian royal and princely marriages, more than a century of mutual cultural stimulation (from Schiller to Rilke), of scientific collaboration (since Lomonossov) - all this was completely overshadowed if not altogether cancelled

by the horror of those years.

The great majority of all grown Russians have personal memories of the war - suffering, fighting, fleeing, marching; so have millions of grown Germans, including the women of the areas overrun by the Soviet armies towards the close of the war. There is no need to dwell on this.

But one remarkable fact is to be stressed: Out of all this hardship and pain there emerged - a miracle! - on the whole a surprisingly friendly feeling of the Russians towards the Germans and vice versa. Hitler, Fascism, the SS, the prison guards, the generals and the capitalists were wicked and dreadful, as were - for the Germans - Stalin and Stalingrad, stockades and mock trials, lootings and rapings. But "Ivan" - he is allright, a tough fighter, a good natured chap, beastly one minute and generous the next; hardly a German, after going through hell in Soviet prisons and labour gangs, has bitter words for the Russian people, and surely nothing but praise for the camp physicians, especially the women doctors. And "Fritz"? He is allright too, also a tough fighter, ingenious and methodical, cruel and pedantic, but in his way just. Tens of thousands of Germans have travelled as tourists in the USSR without experiencing unfriendliness on the part of the population.

There is a similar phenomenon with one more important German neighbour, France. But that is not quite such a miracle, because the French have not been as "verteufelt" (painted as devils) by Hitler as have been the Russians.

#### 9. The Two Germanies

The one most lasting effect of Hitler's Ostpolitik is the truncation of the German Reich before and in Potsdam - with Moscow taking over part of East Prussia, including Königsberg, and giving vast areas of Germany to Poland - up to the Oder and Neisse line, with rump Germany subdivided once more along the Elbe and Werra rivers, and West Berlin cut off from West Germany.

It is this truncation of Germany which is by far the most important and burdensome inheritance from the Hitler era weighing on the relations between the USSR and the Germans. But not all aspects of this truncation are of equal weight. To start with the one which is relatively least onerous: Northern East Prussia. It is hard for the German to acquiesce to the loss of the "city of the kings", where Prussian kingdom started and Kant thought, but it is equally hard for them to imagine that his part of the Reich, formally handed to the Russians in Potsdam by their fellow victors, will return to the German colours. It is not in the first place of Königsberg that the Germans think when they speak of their nation's future.

It is quite different with the areas given in Potsdam to Poland for administration. Millions of Germans from Silesia, Danzig, Pomerania, Brandenburg, East- and Westprussia have not abandoned hope that somehow somewhere they will return to their homes. Yet, while they realize, that it is Russia rather than Poland which is responsible for their flight and expulsions, they are inclined to think more of the Poles than of the Russians when they deliberate the difficulty of ever seeing Breslau and Posen. They consider the Polish state as something to stay, as something in itself, and not just a satellite of Moscow.

What makes German-Russian relations almost hopeless for the time being is, however, neither Königsberg nor the Oder-Neisse-Line but Ulbricht's regime and the pressure - somewhat relaxed at this time - on West Berlin.

This or that person in Germany might speak up for "two German states", even this or that group, perhaps eventually even this or that party. But the Germans as a nation will never accept their division as a lasting fact and, as long as Walter Ulbricht, equally unpopular in both parts of Germany, is in charge there, they will consider not Ulbricht but the Kremlin to be the obstacle to reunification or at least liberalization in "the other Germany".

To Moscow on the other hand the German desire for reunification appears as revanchism and revisionism (revision of the frontiers, that is) and therefore aggressivism. To the men in the Kremlin the Part of Germany temporarily ruled by Ulbricht is a state by itself, like Switzerland or Austria, and therefore any open desire for German unification a "threat of aggression". It is, for the present, impossible to say, how this gap can be bridged. Moscow is so fearful of German reunification that it does its utmost to "verteufeln" the Federal Republic. No Soviet leader opens his mouth on any subject under the sun - on Vietnam or the Israel-Arab conflict or whatnot - without attacking the West German Government bitterly and profusely.

For the moment there is not much that West Germany can do to change matters. One might even doubt whether Bonn-Moscow relations would improve if Bonn were to recognize East Berlin as another German capital of another German state. Quite likely the Kremlin would scent in such an action nothing but an ominous sign of West German intents to bring about German reunification by other means than those employed hitherto without success. After all, when Bonn did what the Soviets had urged it to do for many years, when it tried to improve its relations with Eastern Europe, when it succeeded in exchanging ambassadors with Rumania, the Kremlin did everything in its power to prevent other Eastern European capitals from following Bukarest's lead.

It is the basic disagreement over the future of the German nation that separates Germans and Russians today, and the disagreement with regard to German-Hungarian etc. relations is but a result of this. As long as this fundamental disagreement continues, it is hard to imagine an improvement of German-Russian relations.

The present author knows quite well that it was Hitler who started all this. But Hitler is dead for more than 22 years, and Ulbricht is alive, and Ulbricht is what he is because he is backed by Moscow.

FOOTNOTES

- (1) W.I. Lenin, Werke, Ins Deutsche übertragen nach der vierten russischen Ausgabe. Berlin, Register, 2 Bände. 1964. 696 and 378 pp.
- (2) Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1953-1955. Stuttgart 1966. 556 pp., p. 519.
- (3) Z.A.B. Zeman (ed.), Germany and the Revolution in Russia. London/New York/Toronto 1968, 1958. 157 pp., and W. Hahlweg, Lenins Rückkehr nach Russland 1917. Leiden 1957.
- (4) For a good summary see Dietrich Geyer, Lenin und der deutsche Sozialismus, in: Werner Markert (ed.) Deutsch-russische Beziehungen von Bismarck bis zur Gegenwart. Stuttgart 1964. 236 pp., p. 80-96.
- (5) For the most important anti-Soviet statements from Peking in 1963 and 1964 see: Zentralkomitee der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas, Die Polemik über die Generallinie der internationalen kommunistischen Bewegung, Peking 1965. 657 p.
- (6) ibid. p. 404-409.
- (7) For a useful collection of Lenin's writings between 1899 and 1923 against Revisionism see: W.I. Lenin, Gegen den Revisionismus. Eine Sammlung ausgewählter Aufsätze und Reden, Berlin 1959. 610 pp. The contents of this book now form the anti-Soviet bible of Peking.
- (8) Introduction to vol. I, Dostoyewskij, Sämtliche Werke. München 1906 ff., p. 1.
- (9) Meeller van den Bruck, Das Recht der jungen Völker. München 1919. 120 pp.
- (10) For a good summary see F.L. Carsten, The Reichswehr and the Red Army, in: Survey, Oct. 1962, Nos. 44-45, p. 114-132.
- (11) Ernst Köstring, Profile bedeutender Soldaten, Frankfurt am Main (no year). 334 pp., p. 47.
- (12) Gustav Hilger, Wir und der Kreml (English edition: The incompatible allies), Frankfurt am Main/Berlin 1955. 322 pp. - Köstring see above.
- (13) Klaus Mehnert (ed.), Die Soviet-Union 1917-1932. Berlin/Königsberg 1932.
- (14) 50 Jahre Osteuropa-Studien. Zur Geschichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft zum Studium Osteuropas und der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde. Stuttgart (1964). S. 8-15.
- (15) J.W. Stalin, Werke, Berlin 1952, vol. VI, p. 253.
- (16) George F. Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin. London 1961. p. 291.
- (17) Wolfgang Leonhardt, Die Revolution entlässt ihre Kinder. Köln/Berlin 1955. 557 pp.
- (18) Hilger, p. 231.
- (19) Buch und Buchhandel in Zahlen 1966. Frankfurt am Main (no year) p. 95.

## Power Elite and Intelligentsia in Soviet Society

Boris Meissner

### I. The Formation of a new Elite and the Transformation of the Social Structure in the two Bolshevik Revolutions.

The "February Revolution" deprived of their social status and political power those members of the top-level bureaucracy and the officers' corps who, since they were mainly of aristocratic origin, were looked upon, like the nobility, as the chief supporters of the czarist regime.<sup>1)</sup>

By far the greater majority of the State and Zemstvo bureaucrats<sup>2)</sup>, together with a large number of the newly-developing Soviet and trade union organizations, ranged themselves on the side of the liberaldemocratic forces, the main supply base of which was the intelligentsia

1) On the social structure of czarist Russia see, K.H. Ruffmann: Der soziale Strukturwandel in Russland bis zur Oktoberrevolution (The Transformation of the Social Structure in Russia up to the October Revolution), in B. Meissner: Sowjetgesellschaft im Wandel. Russlands Weg zur Industriegesellschaft (The Transformation of Soviet Society. Russia's Way to an Industrial Society), Stuttgart, 1966, p. 9 et seq.

2) According to the population census of 1896 these numbered 151,345 (permanent civil servants 53,096; employees 98,249). Officers and military officials numbered 52,471. In 1906, 25,429 persons earned over 2,000 Rb. yearly as State employees (top-level bureaucrats), 65,775 between 1,000 and 2,000 Rb., and about 100,000 under 1,000 Rb. L.K. Erman: Intelligentsia v pervoy russkoy revolyutsii (The Intelligentsia in the First Russian Revolution), Moscow, 1966, pp. 13 - 14 and 27.

The close links between bureaucracy and intelligentsia found expression in the formation of joint "Soviets of the Deputies of the Working Intelligentsia."<sup>3)</sup>

In the course of the violent transition from the bourgeois-democratic to the proletarian-socialist revolution, Lenin demanded the destruction of the existing machinery of government including the abolition of the civil service and a standing army. He substantiated this point of view in greater detail in his well-known book "The State and the Revolution", written in the autumn of 1917.

On the other hand he was realistic enough after the "October Revolution" to see that the Bolshevik Party could not dispense with co-operation with the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia. He therefore decided to content himself during the transition period with "filling the most important key positions", which, in addition to the Ministries, also included the National Bank. The mass of the bureaucracy and intelligentsia were, however, not prepared to co-operate voluntarily in this.<sup>4)</sup> Lenin first succeeded in crushing the opposition of the bureaucrats with the aid of the Cheka, and then, in the course of the civil war, in bringing over to his side large numbers of the intelligentsia

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3) See L.I. Smirnova: O Sovetakh deputatov trudovoy intelligentsii (On the Soviets of Deputies of the Working Intelligentsia), in M.P. Kim, P.A. Zhilin, V.P. Naumov (editor): Iz Istorii Sovetskoy Intelligentsii (From the History of the Soviet Intelligentsia), Moscow 1966 p 197 et seq.

4) See M.P. Iroshnikov: Sozdaniye sovetskovo tsentral'nogo gosudarstvennogo apparata (The Formation of a Soviet Central State Organization), Moscow-Leningrad 1966, p. 151 et seq.



and also the corps of officers.<sup>5)</sup> While, owing to the difficulties in the food situation, the numbers of workers in industry dropped by half (1.5 million in 1920-1921 compared with 3 million in 1917), the number of white-collar employees rose by over 60 per cent (2.4 million in 1920, as against 1.5 million in 1913).<sup>6)</sup> The body of white-collar employees, which had absorbed the old bureaucracy, was comprised for the greater part of those members of the former social upper stratum ("Lishentsy"), whose civil rights had been curtailed. Lenin was strongly in favour of employing those bourgeois specialists who had belonged to the old intelligentsia. In a publication ("Successes and Difficulties of the Soviet Power"), which appeared in March-April 1919, he wrote:<sup>7)</sup>

"We must take possession of the entire culture left behind by Capitalism and build up Socialism from it. We must take possession of the whole of science and technology, of all knowledge and art. There is no other way of building up the life of communist society. This knowledge, technology and art, however, lies in the hands of the specialists, and is lodged in their brains.

This is the assignment in all fields, therefore. It is contradictory, just as the whole of Capitalism is contradictory,

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5) In 1921 one third of the corps of commanding officers of the Red Army consisted of former czarist officers and military officials. See N.I. Luchenko: *Sovetskaya Intelligentsia* (The Soviet Intelligentsia), Moscow 1962, p. 6.

6) See P. and Y. Petrov: *Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Sowjet-Union* (Economic Development of the Soviet Union), Berlin 1926, p. 69.

7) V.I. Lenin, *Werke* (Collected Works), Vol. 29, p. 55. See also S.A. Fedyuikin: *Sovetskaya vlast' i burzhuaaznye spetsialisty* (The Soviet Power and the Bourgeois Specialists), Moscow 1965.

very difficult, but able to be resolved. Not for the reason that in about twenty years' time we shall have educated newly-minted communist specialists, the first generation of the communists without fault or blemish; no, allow, me to say that we must organize all this here and now, not in twenty years, but in two months, in order to contend with the bourgeoisie, with bourgeois science and technology all over the world. It is here that we must conquer. To force the bourgeois specialists into our service through the pressure of the masses is difficult, but possible; and if we do this we shall conquer."

At the same time Lenin strove to entrust political and economic leadership functions to workers, minor employees and peasants, upon whom the Bolshevik Party could better rely, thus enabling them to up-grade into the intelligentsia ("Vydvizhenchestvo"). In January 1921 the proportion of former workers among the top executives of the economy was 61.6 per cent, that of minor employees and other categories 7.7 per cent. These included many metal workers. By the beginning of 1924, 51.1 per cent of the presidents, and 29.6 per cent of the administrative personnel of the industrial trusts, were former workers<sup>8)</sup>. The ratio of former workers among the presidents of the metal and textile trusts was still higher (77 per cent; 62 per cent). Among the political top-level functionaries the ratio of former workers rose during the same period to 25 per cent, that of peasants to 3.7 per cent. The efforts to fill the "leadership cadres" with members of the Communist Party, and to some extent with persons of proletarian origin who were not party members,

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8) Figures according to G.P. Andreyuk: Vydvizhenchestvo i yego rol' v formirovanii intelligentsii 1921-1932 (The Upgrading Trend and the Part it plays in the Formation of the Intelligentsia 1921-1932) in Kim-Zhilin-Maumov, loc. cit. p. 11, 17.

was intensified still further after Lenin's death. It was to reach its full development when Stalin's "Revolution from above" started in 1928-1929.

In view of this trend it is hardly correct to say that the existing government machinery was completely smashed after the October Revolution, although it was extensively reorganized, partly in respect of its outer fabric and partly of its internal structure. The development of a new "power elite" went hand in hand with the replacement of the former top-level bureaucracy by Bolshevik professional revolutionaries, who for the greater part had belonged to the old intelligentsia. Among the top executives of the economy, on the other hand, former workers, who for the greater part had joined the Bolshevik Party only after the October Revolution<sup>9)</sup>, outnumbered the "bourgeois specialists". Altogether, the latter were few in number and by no means all party members. The inferior educational background of the jumped-up proletarians made it imperative to entrust large numbers of the petty bourgeois with leadership functions in order to build up the economy; and above all to rear a new intelligentsia at the universities and advanced technical schools.

Both processes were effected by the second Bolshevik revolution which was triggered off by Stalin in 1928-29, the goal of which was to speed up industrialization within the framework of an overall planned economy. Through total socialization the petty bourgeoisie was thrust into the social group of the employees and workers. Since at that time it was customary to combine these two different social categories under the general name "Proletariat", from the Soviet point of view the petty bourgeoisie had now become prole-

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9) At the end of the NEP period, the jumped-up proletarians included 80.4 per cent party members and 19.6 per cent non-party members. In 1927, the 440,500 communist employees included 184,000 former workers and 56,000 former peasants. See Kim-Zhilin-Naumov, loc. cit. p. 28.

tarianized. What the Bolshevik leadership overlooked was that artisans comprised only one part of the Proletariat, and that the State employees, in so far as they did not come from the former upper stratum, differed only slightly from the petty bourgeois in their social awareness and mode of living. Only when a former member of the petty bourgeoisie became an artisan, did he become proletarianized. In his case this process generally took longer than with a peasant. He did not become proletarianized, however, if he was forced to give up his previous private employment in order to become a State employee. The assumption of new functions in the administrative field or the organization of the production meant just as great a rise in the social scale for some of the petty bourgeois as for workers who, as "practical intelligentsia", were entrusted with leadership functions. By the end of the first Five-Year Plan the number of these "Vydvizhentsy" was to rise to almost one million.

In the course of the first two Five-Year Plans, the total numbers of the white-collar group, which in 1928 amounted to 3.9 million, was to rise to 9.6 million, fed by a growing stream of graduates from the universities and advanced technical schools, the greater number of whom came from proletarian families, and by the process described above of incorporation of large numbers of the petty bourgeois.<sup>10)</sup> Between 1926 and 1937 this group increased considerably more rapidly than that of the workers. After 1931, the white-collar employees who had detached themselves as a special social group from that of the workers, came to be referred to in toto as the

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10) See B. Meissner: Der soziale Strukturwandel im bolschewistischen Russland (Transformation of the Social Structure in Bolshevik Russia), in Sowjetgesellschaft im Wandel (The Transformation of Soviet Society), loc. cit. p. 83.

"new intelligentsia", the "working intelligentsia" or the "socialist people's intelligentsia".<sup>11)</sup> The flex point of this trend, which was linked with the up-grading of the members of the "old intelligentsia" who were incorporated into the new group on a basis of equality, was Stalin's programmatic speech before business functionaries on 23 June 1931.<sup>12)</sup> Stalin said that no "ruling class" has ever been able to manage without its own intelligentsia. Accordingly, the workers must "create their own intelligentsia trained in production technique", while at the same time behaving with care towards the "old intelligentsia". In the same speech Stalin called for the abolition of frictional labour supply and of deviation from the party line. Work was to be paid for on the principle of results, and personal responsibility in the organization of production was to be increased. Under these auspices the introduction of "uniform directory power" (Yedinonachaliye), i.e. one-man management, in industry and other sectors of the economy, in 1929, acquires special significance.<sup>13)</sup> This enabled a closely-knit "leadership hierarchy" to form within the Soviet planned economy which became the initial point for the growth of differentiation inside the "new intelligentsia".

The social up-grading of large numbers of white-collar employees, and therefore of the intelligentsia, resulted on the one hand from the natural cleft between manual work and brainwork, and on the other from the effects of industrialization, especially in its planned form, upon the social strata. Bolshevik party leadership had encouraged this up-grading by doing away, in 1935, with the condition imposed in 1928, that the body of students newly admitted to the universities and advanced technical schools should include a "core of workers" which

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11) See Molotov's report of 28 January 1935, in Sowjetunion 1935 (The Soviet Union 1935), Moscow-Leningrad 1935, p.82; J. Stalin: Fragen des Leninismus (Questions of Leninism), 11th edit., Moscow 1947, pp. 637 and 730.

12) New Conditions - New Tasks in Economic Reconstruction", in Stalin, Questions of Leninism, loc. cit. p. 402 et seq.

13) See Meissner, B.: Die Entwicklung der Ministerien in Russland (Development of the Ministries in Russia), Europa Archiv, 3rd Year, 1948, p. 1204).

was first fixed at 65 per cent and later raised to 70 per cent.

At the beginning the bolshevist party leadership displayed a certain reserve towards the new intelligentsia. A change began to take place only after the second generation began to infiltrate more strongly and Stalin, in a speech to the graduates of the Army Staff College on 4 June 1935, coined the much-quoted phrase: "The cadre are alone decisive". But for ideological reasons even he was not prepared to accord them the rank of a "class". In his report of 25 November 1936 on the draft of a new federal constitution for the USSR, Stalin defined the Soviet State as a Socialist State of Workers and Peasants, and described the "working intelligentsia" as a detached, intermediary social stratum. Although possessing the same rights as the workers and kolkhos-farmers, it did not represent a class, even though it had very important functions to perform in the socialist society.

Stalin said:<sup>14)</sup>

"The intelligentsia has never been a class and cannot become one. It was and still is an intermediary stratum, recruited from all classes of society. In the old times the intelligentsia was recruited from the nobility, from the bourgeoisie, in part from the peasantry and only to a very slight extent from the workers. In our times, in Soviet times, the intelligentsia is recruited mainly from the ranks of the workers and peasants. But however it may be recruited and whatever character it may bear, the intelligentsia is still an intermediary stratum and not a class."

Considering that by 1937 this group, together with its family members, already comprised 14 per cent of the total population, thus almost equalling the "liquidated" class of the "capitalists" in 1913, Stalin's line of argument was not at all convincing. The Bolshevik party leadership itself regarded the new intelligentsia as identical with the body of white-collar-employees,

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14) Stalin, Questions of Leninism, loc. cit. p. 636

the greater part of whom came from the petty bourgeoisie. Neither in respect of their social function nor of their social awareness, were they comparable with the old intelligentsia which displayed predominately intellectual traits and looked upon itself as an Order consecrated to the Revolution or to reform. <sup>15)</sup>

It may be that Stalin was conscious of these differences, but considered that the times were not yet ripe for the inclusion of the intelligentsia in the Constitution as an independent social group.

The "Great Purge" of 1936 to 1938 brought about a complete change in the social make-up of the Bolshevik party, to the advantage of the intelligentsia.

The liquidation of Lenin's fellow-combatant, most of them intellectuals, was accompanied by a widespread repression of the proletarian element in the party as a whole. In 1939 membership of the party totalled 2.3 million, of which the intelligentsia constituted 20 per cent. After the war this ratio rose to almost 50 per cent, while that of the workers, which in 1930 had amounted to 65.3 per cent, had dropped during the same period by more than half.

Judged by their educational level, already 54 per cent of the delegates to the 18th Party Congress of the CPSU (B) in March 1939 belonged to the intelligentsia. <sup>16)</sup> Stalin took this development into account by causing the equality of rights of the

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15) Lenin put the intelligentsia on a par with the literati.

See V.I. Lenin: Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 8 p. 309.

16) Figures according to B. Meissner, *Russland im Umbruch; Der Wandel in der Herrschaftsordnung und sozialen Struktur der Sowjetunion* (Changing Russia. The Transformation of the System of Rule and Social Structure of the Soviet Union), Frankfurt on the Main, 1951, p. 10 et seq.

intelligentsia with the two other classes, and the abolition of all former restrictions on admission, to be formally laid down in the Party Status adopted by the 18th Congress of the CPSU (B).<sup>17)</sup> This amounted in practice to the constitutional recognition of the leading social position of the intelligentsia vis-à-vis the workers and kolkhos-peasants. The term "Proletariat" was dropped and the party was declared to be the leading force of "the entire Soviet people" and not only of "the working masses".

## II. The Distinction between Top-Level Bureaucracy and Intelligentsia on the one hand, and the Group of White-Collar Employees on the other.

Developments in Soviet society since 1939 have been characterized by a growing differentiation among the various major social groups, caused chiefly by progressive industrialization. In the late Stalin period this was for a time concealed by the trend towards a class state.<sup>18)</sup> Part of "destalinization" was an effort to open up Soviet society from within by abandoning Stalin's policy of isolation, thus admitting a certain pluralism of the social forces. The appearance of a number of interest groups, combined with the rediscovery of sociology, revived discussion on the nature of the groups of white-collar employees and intelligentsia. According to the official class structure of Soviet society, which from the social aspect possesses only a limited value as evidence, the only recognized "classes" are those of the workers and kolkhos-peasants. The third major social group which on ideological grounds was not accorded the title of a "class", manifests itself in two forms, that

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17) See Brunner, G.: Das Parteistatut der KPdSU 1903-1961 (Party Statutes of the CPSU 1903-1961), Cologne, 1965, pp. 35-36

18) See Meissner, Sowjetgesellschaft im Wandel (The Transformation of Soviet Society), loc. cit. p. 49 et seq.



of the white-collar employees and the "intelligentsia". The decisive criterion of distinction between the white-collar employees as a group and the group of the intelligentsia is not the functions they perform, but the difference between work which is predominantly either physical or intellectual. In the comments on the results of the Soviet population census of 1959 this was expressed as follows:<sup>19)</sup>

"The employment of workers is understood as being employment which calls in the main for an expenditure of physical activity, and the employment of employees that which demands in the main an expenditure of brainwork."

Looked at from the official Soviet statistic point of view, the employees form a separate social group which coincides with that of all "brain workers" (20.5 million). The census of 1959 revealed that the employees numbered 19.7 million. The remainder probably belong to the "worker" category. In recent Soviet writings the group of white-collar employees are designated as a stratum (sloy), although the application of social stratification to Soviet society was formerly rejected. This term probably does not hold good for the employees as a whole, who, together with their family members, comprise one fifth of the entire population. Soviet sociologists, however, do not as yet dare to speak of several strata within the employee group. In part the term "intermediate stratum" (prosloyka), dating back to Stalin, is still used for the "intelligentsia". Before the war, as shown by Molotov's remarks at the 18th Party Congress of the CPSU in March 1939, the intelligentsia was still bracketed with the white-collar employee group. This ceased to be the case in official statistics after Stalin's

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19) See Itogi vsesoyusnoy perepisi naseleniya 1959 goda.

SSSR Moscow 1962, p. 10

20) See the composition of the Soviet Intelligentsia between 1926 and 1959 given by Meissner, Sowjetgesellschaft im Wandel (The Transformation of Soviet Society), loc. cit. p. 96-97.

death.<sup>20)</sup> In 1959, only 15.7 million (77 per cent) of the "brain workers", i. e. the white-collar employees in toto, were accounted as belonging to the intelligentsia. The remaining 4.8 million (23 per cent) were distributed among employees professions which mainly had to do with the third-ranking category of public services. The Soviet Sociologist Semyonov<sup>21)</sup> is also of the opinion that all those who pursue an occupation in the "service work" (trud obsluzhivaniya) should be classed as employees who do not belong to the intelligentsia. As distinct from the official break-down, he also classed among them the 2.9 million office workers, thus including the lower bureaucracy.

However Semyonov does not go so far as to distinguish the intelligentsia from this special group of white-collar employees and designate them as a separate stratum. Rather does he emphasize their common traits, which unite them in one stratum and which are the outcome of the "non-physical" work peculiar to both groups. As "non-physical" workers (rabotniki nefisicheskovo truda) they are basically differentiated from the workers and kolkhos-peasants, who are the physical workers (rabotniki fisicheskovo truda). Rutkevich, on the other hand, considers as intelligentsia only the specialists with university or advanced technical school training, and not all gainfully employed persons who in the main perform brain work.<sup>22)</sup> Thus in

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21) See V.S. Semyonov: Ob izmeneniy intelligentsii i sluzhashchikh v protsesse razvernutovo stroitel'stva kommunisma (Changes taking place in the intelligentsia and the employees in the course of the comprehensive building up of Communism), in: Sotsiologiya v SSSR (Sociology in the USSR), Moscow 1965, Vol. 1, p. 416 et seq.

22) See M.I. Rutkevich: Izmeneniye sotsial'noy struktury sovetskovo obshchestva i intelligentsia (Changes in the Social Structure of Soviet Society and the Intelligentsia) in: Sotsiologiya v SSSR, Vol. 1, loc. cit. p. 393 et seq.

contemporary Soviet terminology the intelligentsia, as separate from the employee group, may be further sub-divided in the broad and narrower sense.

On the basis of the statistics of the 1959 population census, Semyonov divides the "intelligentsia" into the following groups: <sup>23)</sup>

- |  |             |
|--|-------------|
| 1) Leading cadres of the government and economic administration,<br>the party and other social organizations | 2.4 million |
| 2) Technical and economic intelligentsia   | 5.0 million |
| 3) Scientific and cultural intelligentsia  | 5.3 million |

Thus in 1959 the intelligentsia in the broad sense comprised 12.7 million, i.e. 60 per cent of the entire white-collar employees. At this time the total number of specialists amounted to 8 million. Therefore, the following did not belong to the intelligentsia (in the narrower sense):

- a) The leading cadres and subordinate bureaucracy without university or advanced technical school education
- b) Foremen and highly-qualified skilled workmen, i. e. the "workers' Aristocracy", with employee status
- c) Intellectuals without university or advanced technical school education.

The total number of specialists has meanwhile mounted to 12 million (position as per 15 November 1965), of which 4.9 million have attended university, and 7.1 million an advanced technical school <sup>24)</sup>. An exact break-down of gainfully-employed specialists into professional categories and sectors of the economy or administration clearly demonstrates that the strength of the Soviet leadership

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23) Sotsiologiya SSSR, Vol. 1, loc. cit. p. 418.

24) Narodnoye khozyaystvo v 1965 (The National Economy of the USSR in 1965), Moscow, 1966, p. 573

cadres lies in the spheres of engineering and technology, medicine and education. The considerably lower numbers of economists in comparison, and the far too few lawyers, cannot fail to have a detrimental effect upon an industrial society which aims at a higher level of maturity.

Economists comprise only 1/8 of the specialists employed in the entire economic sphere, and lawyers only 1/7 of all specialists working in administration. Contemporary Soviet leaders appear meanwhile to have become conscious of the shortage of economists, but less so of lawyers. Political economists and industrial managers cannot be produced as rapidly as is needed by a national economy which is undergoing a second industrial revolution and which shows a heavy pent-up demand in many sectors. The type entrusted with responsibility in politics, in public administration and the organization of production, is still that of the graduated engineer, the total number of whom has meanwhile risen to 1.6 million.

The "power élite", which includes both top-level bureaucrats and the corps of officers, coincides to a lesser degree with the intelligentsia (in the narrower sense) than is generally assumed to be the case. What is often overlooked is that the top-level bureaucracy is only a sub-group of the "leadership cadres", which in 1959 numbered 2.4 million. The number of top-level bureaucrats among these was 400,000, about half of whom belonged to the "party bureaucracy". Other bearers of high-ranking government offices (lawyers, economists) numbered about 250,000.

The greater part of the "leadership cadres" consisted of the 1.7 million economic managers who may be regarded as the actual elite of the economic and technical intelligentsia. The prestige élite at the head of the scientific and cultural intelligentsia, consisting of writers, artists and scientists, forms the other group of the intelligentsia (in the narrower sense). Since it comprises a higher

ratio of university graduates it carries more weight than is generally assumed. The top-ranking bureaucracy is recruited, for the greater part, from the technical and economic intelligentsia. This, however, does not help to remove the interest conflicts between the power élite and the managers of the economy. The top-level bureaucracy differs from the economic managers both as regards its composition and its functions. In the first place it still consists today for the greater part of persons of proletarian or peasant origin, with an educational background which is far inferior to that of the normal member of the intelligentsia. Secondly it includes a number of "specialists" who joined the party before the war, most of whom have not enjoyed a thorough specialist training.

### III. The Nature and Class Character of the Top-level Bureaucracy and the Intelligentsia

The basic difference between the top-level bureaucrats and the intelligentsia lies primarily in the fact that the power of the former rests upon the ruling positions they hold, while that of the latter is rooted in the authority and prestige inherent in the social leadership functions they perform.<sup>25)</sup> The basis of authority, as well as of prestige, in modern industrial society is specialized knowledge. This is as true in the Soviet Union as anywhere else in the world, although Soviet industrial society has not yet entirely shaken off the egg-shell of its development. In the Soviet Union it is primarily the specialists with university or advanced technical school training who possess that specialized knowledge which an industrial society needs in the nuclear age. Even if they do not occupy positions of power, their social functions are so crucial that they can influence, at the side of those exercising actual power, the determination of the social

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25) On the sociological importance of distinguishing between social leadership (Führung) institutionalized power (Herrschaft) see Meissner: The Transformation of Soviet Society, loc. cit. p. 107.

rules and sanctions of society. Ability based on specialized knowledge is not, however, the only avenue to the top positions in society. Another essential requisite is the ability to get ahead; here personality, adaptation to the social rules prevailing within society, and personal connections are all important factors in the selection and promotion process, quite aside from the question of performance.<sup>26)</sup> This way of getting ahead is practised to a far greater degree in the hyper-bureaucratized Soviet society, with its totalitarian single-party system, than in democratic industrial societies. Contributing to the individual's success in this connection are a knowledge of ideological doctrines and power techniques, and recognized service in the organization on the one hand, and party patronage under the "nomenclature system" on the other.<sup>27)</sup> The key position of Soviet top-level bureaucracy rests primarily upon this type of ability to get ahead. The greater measure of power is not the only factor by which it differs from the western power élites. It represents a foreign body in the fabric of the élite structure of an industrial society, since it does not submit, or only to a very limited degree, to the economic rationality that is characteristic of an industrial merit society. The goal of promoting the conditions for existence and growth in keeping with the community's requirements, is only of secondary importance to it. Its primary objective is the consolidation and expansion of its power base.

Through its absolute monopoly of power and unrestricted control over all the means of production, it is in a position to divert a disproportionately large share of the national product to this objective, and at the same time to secure a higher personal income for its members. Thus the ruling group derives considerable personal

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26) O. Dreitzel: *Elitebegriff und Sozialstruktur* (Elite Concept and Social Structure), Stuttgart, 1962, p. 75 et seq.

27) See B. Lewytsk: *Die Nomenklatur. Ein wichtiges Instrument sowjetischer Kaderpolitik* (The Nomenclature System. An Important Instrument of Soviet Cadre Policy), Osteuropa, 11th Year, 1961, p. 409 et seq.

advantages from its power of disposition over state offices and therefore also of state property.

These advantages would be reduced if a larger proportion of the national product were to be diverted to economic investment and mass consumption. As a result, there is a sharp conflict of interests within the "leading cadres" between the power élite and the managers of the economy who aspire to a greater recognition of economic factors, and to a consolidation and expansion of industrial autonomy as well as of "personal property". Even deeper is the conflict of interests between the ruling élite and the prestige élite which seeks to enlarge the sphere of individual freedom through curtailment of the omnipotence of the State. The value concepts of Soviet society are in some instances more strongly shaped by the intellectual influences emanating from this prestige élite than they are by the accomplishments of the managers of the economy or the standards set by the ruling power élite and the bureaucracies dependent upon them. This fact is clearly borne out by a sociological study conducted by the Philosophical Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1961-62, which deals with the value concepts and aspirations of an élite group of Soviet youth.<sup>28)</sup> The managers of the economy, and most members of the prestige élite hold state offices which place them in a ruling position. Nevertheless, they are much closer to the other strata of Soviet society than is the power élite whose core is markedly parasitic in character. Thus we are justified in speaking of an antagonistic conflict of interests between the greater part of the power élite and the other strata of Soviet society. By reason of the fact that the technical intelligentsia forms the base group for the greater part of the top-level bureaucracy, so to speak, this conflict is far more pronounced in the case of the "creative intelligentsia".

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28) See G. Wagenlehner: Die empirische Sozialforschung in der Sowjetunion (Empiric Social Research in the Soviet Union), Moderne Welt, 6th Year, 1965, p. 410 et seq.

Can the ruling top-level bureaucracy (Hochbürokratie) be considered a "class" from the sociological viewpoint? Are we justified in speaking of Soviet society as a "class society"?

These questions can only be answered on the basis of a class theory which takes into account not only the peculiarities of totalitarian rule, but also the changed conditions of a developed industrial society.

Neither of these considerations are to be found in the class theory of Karl Marx <sup>29)</sup>, upon which Soviet sociologists constantly fall back.

This theory is, moreover, fragmentary in character, since the last chapter (52) of Volume 3 of Marx's "Capital", entitled "The Classes", was left unfinished owing to Marx' death. Its significance consists above all in the fact that it draws attention to the reciprocal relations existing not only between the pattern of ownership and the social system, but also between the power structure and the social structure.

Marx defined classes as politically organized social groups, determined by their awareness of a common class status and the common class interests resulting therefrom. The ultimate criterion in determining class differences was the extent to which they shared in, or were excluded from, private ownership of the means of production, and the corresponding distribution of power which makes it possible to lay hands on the products of labour and thus to exploit the workers.

According to Marx, the inevitable outcome of this unjust situation is class conflict, which takes the form of a deliberate showdown between two groups of conflicting interests and which triggers off a revolutionary transformation of the existing social structure.

The weakness of Marx's class theory lies above all in the fact that power is not only a resultant of private ownership, and that changes in the social structure cannot be attributed to class conflicts alone.

As Dahrendorf has aptly put it, to define power in terms of ownership is to define the general by the particular.

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29) See R. Dahrendorf, *Soziale Klassen und Klassenkonflikt* (Social Classes and Class Conflict), Stuttgart, 1957, p. 5 et seq.



Control over and therefore power of disposal of the means of production, which is not necessarily directly bound up with the title to ownership, is only one special case of power.

Lenin's definition of classes, which is to be found in his essay "The Great Initiative", written in 1919, proved considerably more realistic. He writes: <sup>30)</sup>

"Classes are the term for large groups of people differing from one another through their place in a historically determined system of social production, through their relationship to the means of production (to a large extent fixed and formulated by laws), through the role they play in the social organization of work and consequently through their way of reaching social prosperity and the amount of this which falls to their share. Classes are groups of people, of which one, owing to the different places they occupy in a given system of economy, is able to misappropriate the work of the other for its own purposes".

Lenin's definition of classes is aligned to a far greater degree than that of Marx to the place, and therefore the rank, of the individual social groups within the framework of a given social system. It is clearly borne out by his definition that as long as conditions of power continue to exist in the Soviet Union, a similar system of placing and ranking of social groups will be found there too, which will manifest itself as class stratification. The only question is whether the class structure of the Soviet Union is dualistic or tripartite. If Marx's conception of class is examined critically in the light of the insights it provides, it would seem obvious to take power as the decisive criterion for establishing the actual class structure. This is the path followed by Dahrendorf in his theory

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30) W. I. Lenin, *Ausgewählte Werke* (Selected Works), Vol. II, East Berlin, 1953, p. 570.

of power and conflict. <sup>31)</sup> Dahrendorf begins with the assumption that in an industrial society a number of power organizations exist which are more or less interlocked together. Within each of these power organizations there will be two groups:

1. A group which holds power and is therefore interested in maintaining the existing power structure, and consequently in preserving the social status quo;
2. a second group which is excluded from power and is therefore interested in transforming the existing power structure.

Dahrendorf, therefore, does not assume, as Marx did, that possession or non-possession of private ownership in the form of means of production is the decisive criterion of class formation, but a share in, or exclusion from, positions of power. Owing to the unequal allocation of institutionalized power, Dahrendorf assumes that a division into two groups exists in every society.

As a result of the dichotomy of ruling positions and the concomitant social roles involved, two classes will always confront each other as the representatives of opposing interests, i. e. of conscious policies. <sup>32)</sup>

Applying this class theory to the Soviet Union, all those who hold official ruling positions, i. e. not only the power élite, but the whole of the intelligentsia, would form a closed "ruling class", confronted as opponents by their subjects, the popular masses. This conclusion certainly does not correspond to actual social conditions in Russia, which present a considerably more differentiated picture. The actual conditions can only be understood if a clear difference is drawn between institutionalized power (Herrschaft) and social leadership (Führung). The question of the actual class structure of Soviet society may therefore be answered in the

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31) See Dahrendorf, *Soziale Klassen und Klassenkonflikt* (Social Classes and Class Conflict), loc.cit.p.159 et seq.

32) See R. Dahrendorf: *Zu einer Theorie des sozialen Konflikts* (Concerning a Theory of Social Conflict), *Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik*, Tübingen 1958, p. 84 et seq.

following way.

If we take as the point of departure not only the distinction between positions of power and leadership, but also the possibility of being excluded from both positions, it is possible to arrive at a threefold division of society and thus at a tripartite class structure. In this case the "ruling class" is comprised of those who hold ruling positions which are not at the same time leadership positions within the meaning of the élite structure of modern industrial society. This means that only the core of the top-level bureaucracy is to be looked upon as the "ruling class". All those who hold purely leadership positions on the other hand, regardless of whether or not they also hold ruling positions, form a second class, which occupies an intermediate position between the rulers and their subjects.<sup>33)</sup> This second class, which is closer to the rest of the popular masses than to the actual power élite, includes by far the greater part of the intelligentsia, and in particular the managers of the economy and the prestige élite. Whether in this case the remaining social strata may be considered to constitute a third class, or whether it is more correct to differentiate between an urban and a rural proletariat, may be left unanswered at this point. There is certainly no denying that social tensions exist not only between the rulers and their subjects, but also between the intelligentsia and the popular masses. These latter are, however, mainly "non-antagonistic" in character.

In evaluating the possibilities of social change under the conditions of totalitarian rule, it is irrelevant in the last analysis whether the intelligentsia is viewed as a distinct class, or whether its top group is looked upon as a counter-élite. In either event, the intelligentsia must be regarded as the force pushing the reform efforts associated with "destalinization", which are in part openly directed against the party bureaucracy as the nucleus of the "ruling class". The conflict of roles which marks the existing of the intelligentsia has, to be sure, prevented it from up to now developing that dynamic force, that would have enabled Soviet society to embark upon a post-totalitarian phase of evolution.

33) The bureaucracy in the narrow sense can be regarded as belonging to the ruling class, but not, however, each and every office holder, as Dahrendorf (Zu einer Theorie des sozialen Konflikts, loc. cit. p. 84/85, Note 14) obviously assumes.

#### IV. The CPSU as Representative of the Interests of the Ruling Power Elite <sup>34)</sup>

The social fabric of the CPSU reflects the changes in structure which have come about in the successive development phases of Soviet society. What was originally a dedicated and disciplined order, consisting mostly of intellectual professional revolutionaries with a strong proletarian element, has become a mass party headed by a cadre of bureaucratic professional politicians. In the party as a whole the body of white-collar employees and the intelligentsia predominate.

#### Social Breakdown of the CPSU 1917 - 1967 (in percentages)

	1917	1921	1924	1927	1930	1934	1956	1961	1964	1966	1967
Workers	60.2	41.0	46.0	56.0	65.3	?	32.0	34.5	37.3	37.8	38.1
Peasants	7.6	28.2	24.6	22.0	20.2	28.5	17.1	17.5	16.5	16.2	16.1
Intelligentsia and other employees	32.2	30.8	29.4	22.0	14.5	?	50.9	48.0	46.2	46.0	45.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

If the educational level of the CPSU is taken as the base, the ratio of the employee group and with it of the intelligentsia is considerably higher.

#### Educational Structure of the CPSU 1956 - 1966 (in percentages)

	1.1.1956	1.1.1962	1.1.1965	1.3.1966
University graduate training	11.1	13.7	15.0	18.2
Incomplete university training	3.6	2.9	2.6	
Advanced technical school training	11.3	27.2	17	30.9
High school education	10.8		13.1	
Total of advanced education	36.8	43.8	47.7	49.1

34) This chapter is based upon the following works of the author:  
 - Russland im Umbruch (Changing in Russia) p.10 et seq.; Die soziale Struktur der KPdSU (The Social Structure of the CPSU), Osteuropa, 16th Year, 1966, p.599 et seq. These also give the Soviet sources of the statistics.

Unfinished high school education	29.5	28.4	27.9	27.5
Total secondary school education	66.3	72.2	75.6	76.6
Primary school education	33.7	27.8	24.4	23.4
Total	100	100	100	100

The fully-trained party members (at least high school graduates) who on 1 Jan. 1967 composed 50.5 per cent, i.e. half of the party is nearly equivalent to the intelligentsia (in the broader sense)<sup>35</sup>.

Those party members with incomplete secondary education (minimum seven classes) are for the greater part white-collar employees. It may safely be assumed that the ratio of communist white-collar employees today is about 60 per cent and not 45 per cent.

The ratio of specialists with university or advanced technical school training increased between 1956 and 1965 from 26 per cent to 34.6 per cent. At the end of 1956 the communist specialists comprised 28 per cent of a total of 6.3 million specialists; by the end of 1964 the respective figures were 35.5 per cent and 11.3 million. Thus one third of the intelligentsia (in the narrow sense) are members of the party. Of primary importance is the fact that the ratio of university graduates, who together with the top-level bureaucrats (mostly not university trained) form the upper stratum of Soviet society, increased between 1956 and 1965 from 11.1 per cent to 15 per cent. It may be assumed that this percentage has meanwhile risen still higher. It is interesting that of the total number of university graduates the ratio of communist specialists is higher than the proportionate ratio of communist specialists with advanced technical school training. In 1956 it was 34.8 per cent of 2.3 million university graduates, and in 1965 39.1 per cent of 4.6 million. At least two-fifths of the university graduates, who form the actual nucleus of the Soviet intelligentsia, are members of the party. Among the rest of the party leadership the ratio of white-collar employees and intelligentsia is naturally higher than in the party

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35) See *Partiynaya zhizn'*, 1967, No. 7, p.6

as a whole. This is already apparent from official statistics which since the late Stalin period give no figures for production workers.

Social Breakdown of Delegates to Party Congresses 1924-1966  
(in percentages)

	1924	1927	1930	1934	1952	1956	1959	1961	1966
Workers	63.2	71.0	71.2	60.0	7.6	18.5)		22.3)	
including:						)		)	
Production workers						) 31.4		) 34.3	
11.4	18.4	17.7	9.3			)		)	
Peasants						)		)	
5.4	5.7	6.7	8.0	7.8	13.8)			10.6)	
Intelligentsia and other employees	31.4	23.3	22.1	32.0	84.6	67.7	68.6	67.1	65.7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The statistics of the educational levels bear out the fact that the percentage of intelligentsia and other employees among the party delegates was in actual fact considerably higher.

Educational Level of Party Delegates 1924-1966 (percentages)

Level of Education:	1924	1930	1934	1939	1952	1956	1959	1961	1966
University training									
Advanced technical school education	6.5	7.2	10.0	31.5	66.5	64.5	61.1	72.8	79.5
High school education	17.9	15.7	31.0	22.5	18.7	12.4	12.2	?	?
Total	24.4	22.9	41.0	54.0	85.2	76.9	73.3		

The number of congress delegates with high school education at the last party congress is not given, in order to conceal the fact that since 1961 practically all delegates to party congresses have come from the intelligentsia (in the broader sense) and thus belonged to the employee group. Probably the percentage of 85.2 attained under late Stalinism in 1952, rose still higher in 1961 and 1966. Of the 3,248 (65.7 per cent) delegates to the 23rd Party Congress designated as intelligentsia, 2,315 (46.8 per cent) came from the power élite and the bureaucracies dependent upon it, 704 (14 per cent) from the economic managers and 229 (4.6 per cent) from the prestige élite and other groups.

Under the head of the ruling power élite who this time provided almost half of the delegates to the congress, the individual sub-groups were represented in the following numbers:

Composition of the Power Elite at the 23rd Party Congress of the CPSU in 1956

	Absolute Figures	Percentages
Party functionaries	1,204	24.4
Government and economic functionaries	539	10.9
High-ranking military	352	7.1
Mass organizations	126	2.5
Cultural functionaries	94	1.9
Total	2,315	46.8

The party bureaucracy which is to be regarded as the body actually responsible for totalitarian rule, predominated also at this party congress with one quarter of all delegates.

Whereas among the delegates to party congresses the power élite and the intelligentsia (in the narrow sense) are to a very large extent identical, this appears to be hardly at all the case with members of the party committees, and still less so among the hierarchy of party secretaries and full-time party officials, concerning whose social background and education no official statistics exist. <sup>36)</sup>

Social Breakdown of District and Town Committees <sup>37)</sup> (Percentages)

	1961	1965
Top-level bureaucracy	26.3	24.2
Intelligentsia	27.5	30.9
Other employees	8.3	8.5
Total of employees	62.1	63.6
Workers and Peasants	37.9	36.4
Total	100	100

36) Out of 200 members and candidates of the Political Office of the CPSU and the offices of the 14 non-Russian central committees, allegedly 107 have enjoyed a university or advanced technical school education; out of 139 first secre-

Of the 30.0 per cent of intelligentsia on the district and town committees (including the revision commissions), 22.5 per cent belonged to the technical and economic intelligentsia, and 8.4 to the scientific and cultural intelligentsia. An analysis of the social composition of the Central Committee and the Central Revision Commission, which were elected by the 23rd Party Congress of the CPSU, shows clearly the preponderance of the top-level bureaucracy over the intelligentsia (in the narrow sense).<sup>38)</sup> Among the full members of the Central Committee who belong to the ruling power élite, the number of state and economic functionaries, as well as of party ideologists and cultural functionaries, increased between 1961 and 1966. The ratio of the Foreign Service has also risen. The importance of party organizers and high-ranking military has, on the other hand, relatively decreased. The absolute number of Comsomol and trade union functionaries has diminished.

From the ratio of top-level bureaucracy to intelligentsia (in the broader sense) among the rank and file of the party, among the delegates to party congress and among the 195 full members of the

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taries of the party committees at the Republic, Province and District levels, 84. See B. Lewytsky: Generations in Conflict, Problems of Communism, Jan-Feb. 1967, p.39, Note 6.

Lewytskyj is right when he points to the inferior specialist training of the older top-level functionaries, a fact insufficiently taken into consideration by Z.K. Brzezinski and S.P. Huntington: Politische Macht USA/UdSSR (Political Power in the USA and the USSR), Cologne, 1966, p. 181 et seq.

37) Figures according to partiynaya zhizn' 1962, No.1, p.53; 1965, Nr.10, p.17.

38) See B. Meissner: Parteiführung und Parteiorganisation (Party Leadership and Party Organization), Osteuropa, 16th Year, 1966, p. 439 et seq. (Special Number: The 23rd Party Congress of the CPSU).



Central Committee, it may be seen clearly that the CPSU is primarily a body representing the interests of the actual power élite and that the technocrats, in so far as they do not belong to the top-level bureaucracy, can show only a slender power base.

Ratio of Top-Level Bureaucracy to Intelligentsia in the CPSU

Intelligentsia in the broader sense (exclusive of the military)	Total in millions	Ratio of party rank and file (per cent)	Ratio of congress delegates (per cent)	Ratio of members of the Central Committee (per cent)
	1959	1961	1966	1966
Top-level bureaucracy	0.4	2.1	40	81.1
Technical and economic intelligentsia	7	24.7	14.2	2.1
Scientific and cultural intelligentsia	5.3	10.7	4.6	2.1
Total	12.7	38	58.8	85.3

The top-level bureaucracy (exclusive of the military) which, while constituting 2 per cent of the entire party, made up almost 40 per cent of the members of the party congress, is represented on the Central Committee with 81.1 per cent (!) of the full members. The economic managers and the technical and economic intelligentsia, who, while constituting 25 per cent of the entire party still provided 14.2 per cent of the congress delegates, are on the other hand, represented on the new Central Committee by only 2.1 per cent (!) of members. While it is true that the prestige élite and the scientific and cultural intelligentsia in general provide a higher percentual ratio of members of the Central Committee than of delegates to the party congress, they carry less weight, since they are almost exclusively writers, artists and scientists who act as auxiliaries to the official party cultural functionaries. It is remarkable that the "workers' class", which is alleged to lead the whole of Soviet society, provides a still lower ratio of Central Committee members than do the leadership groups

of the intelligentsia. It is only just over 1 per cent.

At the 23rd Party Congress of the CPSU the sociological effects of the Kosygin economic reform became apparent, by which the power position of the state and economic bureaucracy was greatly strengthened in relation to the party bureaucracy. This has restored the situation which existed prior to 1957. The industrial managers appear only as secondary beneficiaries of this development, which so far has not increased their influence on the policy-making process. The right of the prestige élite to greater social influence was indeed contested by the party. Several progressive Soviet writers, among them the liberal Tvardovski and the conservative Surkov, were removed from the Central Committee. Thus nothing has been changed in the actual class structure of the party. The economic reform has resulted in a better balance within the top-level bureaucracy and has at the same time strengthened the position of the power élite as a whole. As the state and economic bureaucracy has gained influence, the "party organizers" who predominate in the party bureaucracy have been reduced to their control function. The 23rd Party Congress revealed the effort of the "party ideologists", through stronger emphasis on ideological control, to preserve the primacy of the party bureaucracy and to give new confidence to the full-time party apparatus.

Whereas the supreme party leadership is recruited from the top-level bureaucracy, the intelligentsia is the key social group in the rank and file of the party. The conflict arising out of the party leadership's absolute monopoly of power is intensified by the conflict of generations resulting from the considerable age difference between the leadership and the rank and file. An age analysis shows that today 2.5 million (20 per cent) party members are under 30 years of age, and 4.6 million (53 per cent) are less than 40 years old. Most of the top functionaries, however, come from the older age groups of the middle generation (51 to 60 years of age) and the old generation, which together make up only 22.1 per cent of the entire party. The younger generation, compri-

sing over one half of the party rank and file, has no representation in the top leadership at all. This group consists in the main of communists who joined the party in the "destalinization" period, i. e. after 1956, and who today comprise 47.1 per cent of the party as a whole.

In the intelligentsia (in the narrow sense) men and women are about equally represented. However, the influence women have in the leadership of the party is remarkably weak. Although women make up 20.2 per cent of the total party, and constituted 23.3 per cent of the congress delegates, only 5 (2.6 per cent) are full members of the Central Committee. No woman is now included in the supreme party leadership.

All of these statistics demonstrate that the gap between the top-level bureaucracy and the intelligentsia, far from diminishing, has widened in recent years.

V. Development Trends in Soviet Society under Breshnev and Kosygin.

Under Khrushchev's successors social conflicts have become still more intensified. This is borne out not only by the show trials of the Soviet writers Sinyavski and Daniel and the criminal proceedings taken against other pregressive writers, but also by a study entitled "Russia's Path to Socialism", which appeared in the underground literary periodical "Phoenix 66", issued under the editorship of the poet Galanskov, which is directed against the class dictatorship of the bureaucracy. The political significance of the anti-totalitarian Soviet writers who are also the avant-garde of the progressive intelligentsia, is, above all, that they give expression to the inarticulated opinion prevailing among the ranks of Soviet society, and thus perform a quasi "parliamentary" function, since there is no body which really represents the people in the Soviet Union. This idea has also been expressed in another way by Yevtushenko who, in an interview which appeared in "Borba" on 5 September 1965, said: "In Russia the writers have always formed a government of the intellectuals. In contrast to an official government - whether here or elsewhere - this is always stable. It is not subject to dissolution, and exposed neither to attack nor death. A head of state can be assassinated - but no one can ever kill this government!"

In view of the tensed atmosphere, Brezhnev's and Kosygin's reluctance to accord more extensive rights to the factories and kolkhoses, and the fluctuations in their cultural policy, are to be understood. That the keynote of the 23rd Party Congress was one of strict orthodoxy was, therefore, not due alone to the typically Russian bureaucratic apprehension of the stirrings of independent intellects. This keynote found expression not only in a reversion to the traditional marxistleninist dogmas, but also to the emotional world of Soviet patriotism.

The much-feared restalinization, against which the party leadership was warned by 27 outstanding representatives of Soviet literature, art and science, did not come about.

The offensive which had been launched at the end of 1965 by those who sought to restore Stalinism was soon brought to a halt by the opposition, not only of the liberal ant forces, but also that of the moderate conservatives. "Destalinization" was not withdrawn at the 23rd Party Congress. The strength of the social groups interested in this movement made withdrawal impossible. It was, however, perceptibly checked. What mattered to Khrushchev's successors was to recover complete control over those intellectual forces which had been released by the two waves of destalinization in 1956 and 1961. The halt called to destalinization made itself felt most in the literary and artistic spheres. The anti-stalinist "disclosure" literature threatened to undermine totalitarian one-party rule and to disturb the positions of those functionaries who had risen to power under Stalin, especially the party organizers who were preponderant in the existing party leadership. It further helped to disclose the close links between Soviet totalitarianism and militarism, which was frowned upon even by those high-ranking officers who had objected to Stalin.

After all, even those party ideologists who do not follow the ultra-conservative line of a Suslov are still interested in a more intensive clamping-down of the controls in the fields of social science and the arts, since, as the priesthood of the party, they need a mission which justifies not only their activities, but also the right to existence of the party itself. The retrogressive trend, therefore, was most pronounced in those parts of the Central Committee report which referred to cultural policy and the party. Since this "Party Congress of the Apparatchiki", the reins have been drawn in more tightly in the spheres of literature, art, social science, and all thrusts against the intensification of the censorship have been

repelled. These efforts to tighten up the total controls "from above" are confronted by an increase in the centrifugal forces in Soviet society.

The power élite is no more a unified body than is the intelligentsia (in the narrow sense). Distinctions must be made not only between the various sub-groups of an institutional or occupational type and their placing at different administrative levels, but also between the special positions they occupy in the autocratic-totalitarian system of rule, and their access to the actual holders of power. In the case of a State composed of a number of nationalities, such as the Soviet Union, national membership also plays a special part. In addition to the general specialized élites, there are a number of interest groups which try to exert an influence upon political and social developments.<sup>39)</sup> The fundamental conflict in Soviet society, which lies between the ideological and organizational totalitarian claims of the party, and the development requirements of a modern industrial society, finds expression in the struggle between the progressive and the reactionary elements in Soviet society. At the same time, minor social frictions come to the surface, in which the different strata and interest groups play a part. Finally note should be taken of the constant conflict of roles existing between those sectors of the intelligentsia who hold state offices. All these conflicts help towards a gradual social transformation. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that this development indicates that totalitarianism of the Soviet communist type is already coming to an end.<sup>40)</sup> As long as the ruling bureaucratic

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39) See H. Gordin Skilling: Interest Groups and Communist Politics, World Politics, April 1966, p. 435 et seq.

40) The despotic degeneration of totalitarianism into late Stalinism may no more be regarded a normal case of totalitarian one-party rule than the despotic form of absolutism as that of an absolute monarchy. On the structural elements of post-despotic totalit-

class possesses the will and the power to exercise control over the autonomous social processes and forms of social spontaneity which it has itself encouraged in the interests of technical progress, society - in spite of a certain relaxation - remains subjected to totalitarian rule. There is still a possibility for the rulers in the Kremlin to build their domination more upon the intelligentsia (in the narrow sense) and thus to check the fundamental social conflict. This would necessitate considerable sectors of social life being emancipated from the control of the top-level bureaucracy.<sup>41)</sup> If this were carried out at the right time, the decision, while not signifying the end of communist one-party rule would finish off the totalitarian regime. This is a venture which alone can solve the growing conflict between the totalitarian state and a society which is on its way towards emancipation. It is, however, one which the present oligarchic leadership in the Kremlin, which looks upon itself to a greater degree than did Khrushchev as representing the ruling bureaucratic class, is neither willing nor able to enter upon.

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40) arian one-party rule of the Soviet communist type see B. Meissner: Wandlungen im Herrschaftssystem und Verfassungsrecht der Sowjetunion (Changes in the Government and the Constitutional Law of the Soviet Union) in Boettcher-Lieber-Meissner: Bilanz der Ära Chruschtschow (A Balance Sheet of the Khrushchev Era), Stuttgart, 1966, p.166, et seq. *ibid*: Totalitarian Rule and Social Change, Problems of Communism, Nov-Dec 1966, p. 56 et seq.

41) If such a development were to be combined with increased liberalization, it would mean the transition from the totalitarian to an authoritarian system of rule.

FIFTY YEARS OF SOVIET LAW

by

Prof. Leonard Schapiro.



FIFTY YEARS OF SOVIET LAW

This paper makes no claim to present a history of Soviet law and legal institutions. Its more modest aim is to consider the rôle which has been assigned to law by Soviet leaders in their society, at different periods, as part of their general policy; and to consider in the light of this experience what trends in this respect might become evident in the future.

The law and the lawyers have never been held in high esteem by marxists. There were several good reasons for this. In the first place, law was regarded, with some justification, as essentially a product of bourgeois society: it had grown up as an essential concomitant to the capitalist mode of production, for the efficiency of which it had been indispensable. Once socialism has been achieved, so marxists believed, new considerations for the regulation of human relations arise, and these were often conceived of as belonging more to the sphere of management and administration than of law. As between men in capitalist society the clash of interests had to be resolved by the law courts, with all the panoply of subtle rules and distinctions, and the battle of lawyers. So far as the proletariat in capitalist society was concerned, the legal system represented merely one more form of oppression and exploitation devised by the owners of the means of production. None of this, marxists believed, would be necessary, at any rate on the same scale, when once exploitation of man by man had been abolished. The utopian optimism of Lenin, in State and Revolution, comes readily to mind: -

Man, under socialism purged of the "original sin" of capitalism will live with his fellows in simple harmony, obeying rules of his own making without any need for coercion. Moreover, law, along with the state, was destined to wither away when once the exploiting class had been eliminated, and the classless society had come into being.

In the case of Russian marxists there was a further factor: the comparative weakness of legal tradition in Russian political thought generally - if we discount the slender stream of liberalism personified by, say, B.N. Chicherin. Russian marxist thought, in particular, Menshevik as well as Bolshevik, is totally devoid of any notion that the individual could ever stand in need of protection against his own state, the future socialist state. If he was a friend, he would have nothing to fear; if an enemy, then he would not deserve consideration.

And thus one of the first acts of the Bolshevik government was to sweep away the Courts, the Bar and the entire legal system of the old order. The new order had no need for the professional lawyer - whether on the Bench or at the Bar. Revolutionary Tribunals of the People would resolve disputes in the new society, acting on the basis of their "revolutionary conscience" to guide them. Perhaps some echo of Robespierre stirred in the minds of these early utopians. The Law of 22nd Prairial had, after all, stated that "the proof necessary to condemn the enemies of the people is any kind of document, material, moral, verbal or written, which can naturally obtain the assent of any just and reasonable mind. Juries in giving their verdict should be guided solely by what love of their country indicates to their conscience; their aim is the triumph of the republic and the ruin of its enemies".

In practice, some professionalism soon began to seep back even in the early years of the new Soviet state. But the main impetus to devise a new system of courts, law and procedure came from the New Economic Policy inaugurated in 1921. The Soviet

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state was now seeking to attract foreign concessionaires, and it was recognized that it would be hard to persuade the capitalist entrepreneur to invest in Soviet enterprises, unless he could be assured that fixed rules of law and procedure existed in the revolutionary state, and that these rules would be administered by properly constituted courts. Quite apart from attracting the foreigner, the New Economic Policy envisaged a long period of quasi-capitalist relations between Soviet citizens, who were now to be permitted to salvage socialism by means of private enterprise. It was logical enough once capitalism was recognized - if only temporarily and with strict limitations - as a feature of Soviet life for some time to come ("for long and in earnest" as the phrase went at the time), that law too should return. For the legal theorists of this period law and socialism still remained basically incompatible - in the sense that law, under socialism, could only be a temporary phenomenon, destined to wither away along with the State. But capitalist law could be adapted, in the conditions of the New Economic Policy, to socialist society. The various codes of the RSFSR, enacted in 1922, thus came to form the basis of much of Soviet law until after the death of Stalin.

But if NEP was a socialist adaptation of capitalism, the legal system which developed alongside it, bore very strong marks of the revolutionary thought underlying the Soviet system. The legal veneer lay, in fact, rather thin on the substance of the revolutionary dictatorship which knows no law or limit - of which Lenin spoke so often. Lenin's attitude to law was always ambivalent. The revolutionary in him despised legal formalities - the grand sweep of history could be left to depend on "lawyers' tricks". Revolutionaries could not afford to be too delicate in their methods - they were not running a girls' school, and so on and so forth. It is true that Lenin was also a very tidy and orderly man, and it is for this reason that his correspondence while in office abounds in little notes to the Vecheka calling for the observance of some rule or other which had been violated. Not that the purpose should be defeated by the rule: what Lenin wanted was both the result and the formal decency. "We cannot, of course, give you written authorization to arrest Socialist-Revolutionaries", he wrote to the Elets Communists in July 1918, "but if you arrest them . . . you will be doing good revolutionary work, and we in the centre . . . will only praise you for it". Thus, when the need arose in 1922 for some kind of Code of Criminal Law to replace the Revolutionary Conscience of the early years, Lenin was anxious that no sentimentality should creep into it. It would be deceptive, he wrote on 17 May 1922, to Kursky, the Commissar of Justice, for the new Code to promise the abolition of terror. "The paragraph on terror must be formulated as widely as possible, since only revolutionary consciousness of justice and revolutionary conscience can determine the conditions of and application in practice". But a code of criminal law of which the application in practice is determined by something as arbitrary and unpredictable as "revolutionary conscience" is, in fact, no code at all. Indeed the Code of 1922 is so extensive and imprecise in its definitions that it could easily become, as it did, the basis for arbitrary terror - it survived in force until after Stalin's death. Lenin's draft became the basis of Article 58, and its many sub-sections, on which the Ezhov purges were founded: "Propaganda, or agitation, or participation in an organization, or co-operation with organizations, having the effect (i.e. the propaganda or agitation) of helping in the slightest way that part of the international bourgeoisie which does not recognize the equal rights of the communist system coming to take the place of capitalism, and which is endeavouring to overthrow by force, whether by intervention, or blockade, or by espionage, or by financing of the press, or other means - is punishable by death or imprisonment".

Indeed, the overriding principle of arbitrariness or expediency was preserved both in the Criminal and the Civil Codes of the RSFSR of 1922. This was exemplified in the principle of "analogy" embodied in both Codes. So far as crime was concerned,

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the judge was empowered to convict and sentence a "socially dangerous" person even if he had not violated any provision of the Code. In such a case the judge was directed to find some act or omission specified in the Code, which though different from the act or omission of the accused which he considered "socially dangerous", was "analogous" in its nature. Arbitrary power could hardly go further. In the case of civil actions, a judge was authorized by the Civil Code of the RSFSR of 1922 to refuse to apply a provision of the Code in every case where, in the judge's view, the enforcement and application of the law would result in a decision which was out of keeping with the basic aims and purposes of the new Soviet society.

Running through the whole of this legislation was the notion, fundamentally different from that of either the Roman Law or Common Law systems, that the State and not the individual was the source of all individual rights. The Common Law, for example, starts from the principle that the individual is endowed with capacity to enter into any relations with his fellows, unless they are specifically prohibited by the law, or unless his legal capacity has been restricted by the law. The totalitarian basis of Soviet society is nowhere better illustrated than in Article 4 of the Civil Code of 1922: "For the purpose of the development of the productive forces of the country, the RSFSR has granted legal capacity (the capacity of having legal rights and obligations) to all citizens who are not restricted in their rights by sentence of the Court." The individual is thus conceived of as a blank, without rights, until the State confers them upon him. Moreover these rights are conferred for a specific purpose - the development of the productive forces of the country - and are only conceded by the state within the limits required for this purpose.

This basic philosophy of the state, as a totality of power and capacity, granting rights to the individual within certain limits and for certain specific purposes, (and, moreover, to an individual who is otherwise in law a citizen without any rights whatever) was also to some extent evident in the Bill of Rights which formed part of the RSFSR Constitution of 1918. An introductory clause recites that the "basic task" is the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry, and the complete suppression of the bourgeoisie and of exploitation and the "installation of socialism under which there will be neither division into classes nor a state authority." Moreover, certain individuals and groups "who use their rights to the detriment of the interest of the communist revolution" were deprived of the benefit of the Bill of Rights.

It may be observed that this outlook became even more evident in the Constitution of 1936, in which there was no longer any mention of the withering away of the State - a doctrine which was viewed with disfavour by Stalin (and indeed, by Lenin, after 1918). The purpose of the civil rights of the citizen, and the function of the State as the sole source of these rights, is nowhere better illustrated than in Article 125. Under this article the citizen is "guaranteed by law" freedom of speech, press, assembly and public meeting. But these rights are conferred upon the citizen "in conformity with the interests of the working people and in order to strengthen the socialist system" - a provision which enables the party, as the sole spokesman of the working people, to fix the limits within which the rights conferred are to be exercised. Moreover, these rights are "ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stores of paper, public buildings," etc. There is no judicial review in Soviet law and no method of enforcing constitutional provisions through the courts. But even if there were, this latter provision would enable the state to argue that the obligation of the state had been carried out once and for all when the Revolution placed in the hands of the working people the facilities recited in Article 125 - a fiction which no Soviet citizen would ever be allowed to challenge.

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That the arbitrary element was fully developed in the legislation of 1922 became evident during the period of Stalin's rule. After the mid-twenties repressive police action increased to the extent that victims were reckoned in millions where hitherto they had been reckoned in thousands. Yet very little was considered necessary in the way of basic change of the legal structure. A few sub-paragraphs were added to Article 58 of the Criminal Code of 1922: this article served the terror faithfully in any contingency that its authors were led to devise. Both the powers of the procurators and those of the security organs were somewhat expanded in 1934, - in preparation for the high peak of the Ezhov terror which Stalin only felt confident enough to launch in mid-1936. There were, apparently, some secret instructions as well, to which dark references have been made after Stalin's death, but which have never been published. Yet, here again little change of principle was called for. The procurators from the start of their existence remained under strict control of the party, as indeed they still are. There have been many changes of detail in their powers and organization in the course of forty five years; their basic duty was, and is, to protect the individual from the illegal actions of officials; and to protect the state from illegal actions of individuals. The balance between these two aspects of their basic duty, the extent and manner in which it has been neglected or carried out, have always depended on the will of the ruling party.

Similarly, the practice of Soviet, and other, historians of treating terror as something invented by Stalin in 1934 which only lasted until 1953, should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the system of virtually unrestrained arbitrary action by the security authority, the Vecheka, was fully established in the first years after the revolution. When it was set up in December 1917, the Vecheka was designed for investigation only, but almost immediately assumed powers of disposing of cases without trial, frequently carrying out executions. A number of provisions in the course of 1919 designed to limit its powers remained a dead letter. Forced labour camps date from April 1919. Finally, on 21 March 1921 illegality was "legalized" in the sense that the Vecheka was empowered to impose administrative sentences of up to five years forced labour on persons "recognized as dangerous to the Soviet structure," - a provision which did not have the effect of limiting in practice the Vecheka's power either to carry out executions or to deport for longer periods than five years.

So far as the lawyers were concerned, their reaction to the increase of arbitrary illegality under Stalin was twofold. The theorists comforted themselves with several variants of the doctrine that both the state and law were destined to wither away in the comparatively near future. This doctrine was strongly disapproved of by Stalin and became heretical, except in the form devised by Stalin, which postponed the "withering away" till the Great Kalends - in other words, until such time as "capitalist encirclement" ceased to exist. The main exponent of the doctrine of withering away of law, E.B. Pashukanis, retracted his views as early as 1930 in response to Stalin's pronouncements on the subject made at the Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party. But he remained until the end of 1936 Deputy People's Commissar for Justice and Chairman of the Legal Institute of the Communist Academy. A man of courage and integrity, he endeavoured to lead the second main reaction of the lawyers to illegality, - a movement to reform the criminal law. In the course of 1936 he became the author, as leader of a group of academic lawyers, of a new draft code of criminal law, which was designed to form the "basic principles" of the criminal law which the new constitution, then in preparation, made the responsibility of the All-Union government, under Article 14. This draft code, among other provisions, excluded the death penalty, and provided for a much milder regime in the forced labour camps. Pashukanis was arrested and shot. All-Union "basic principles" were in the event not enacted until

25 December 1958, and the 1922 Code remained in force.

A new theoretical pattern for arbitrary illegality was then devised by A.I. Vyshinsky, one of Stalin's principal agents in establishing and consolidating his personal despotism. He devised a formula for the definition of Soviet law which satisfied two political requirements: the need to proclaim to the Soviet citizen that the law was here to stay and to the world outside that the Soviet Union operated according to strictly defined legal norms; and the need to ensure that Soviet lawyers, - if any of them still had the courage to do so - would never again challenge the arbitrary power of the party, and of its traditional instrument of terror, the security authority, the NKVD. In its original form, Vyshinsky's definition read as follows:-

"Law is the aggregate of the rules of conduct expressing the will of the dominant class and established in legal order, as well as of customs and rules of community life, confirmed by state authority, the application whereof is guaranteed by the coercive force of the State to the end of safeguarding, making secure and developing social relationships and arrangements advantageous and agreeable to the dominant class."

In substance, although Vyshinsky himself has fallen into posthumous disfavour, the current definition of law is not greatly different and expresses in its main elements the nature of what is now called "socialist legality." (The replacement of "dominant class" by "the whole Soviet people" raises certain doctrinal difficulties - against whom or what does "the whole people" safeguard anything? - but they cannot be discussed here.) The main elements are: first, law is positive it owes its existence to the authority of the state, and not to any antecedent natural law; second, law is one of the instruments of rule: as the bourgeoisie uses law in its own interests; so the proletariat uses law for its interests; and third, law exists for a particular purpose - not for justice, not for order, but for the better promotion of a particular social system. It is this latter provision which justifies the continuing officially recognized subordination of law to the policy of the Communist Party.

The main change since Stalin's death is more in the realm of practice than either in theory or in legislation. The most important change has been the recognition of the principle of nulla poena sine lege and of the supremacy of the courts in the sphere of penal procedure. These principles were embodied in a series of Statutes on the All-Union Bases of Law adopted on 25 December 1958, and have since been re-enacted in the new Union-Republican Codes of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure. In practice this signifies the virtual abolition of sentences by administrative action - there are still some administrative sentences, in spite of the legislation of 1958, and there are ways of penalizing the recalcitrant without going to the courts which are not legally regarded as "penalties". But in the main the extensive use of administrative measures against hundreds of thousands, which was the central feature of Stalin's rule, is no longer possible. There have been other important improvements. "Analogy" has been abolished. The rights of the accused have been defined and extended. Definitions of crimes have been made somewhat more precise - though they are still very far off, in this respect, from the standards adopted by mature legal systems. The security authority, the KGB, still participates in the preliminary investigation of crimes. But it is no longer autonomous in this sphere of activity, but is subject to the general control of the Procurators.

The changed rôle of the Procurators illustrates most clearly the limited rôle of law in Soviet Society. A State of 24 May 1955 defined their powers more extensively and in greater detail than before. There is ample evidence that they have been

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discharging their duty of safeguarding the individual citizen from illegal and arbitrary activities by officials and by the courts with much greater zeal than at any time in their history. But this has not been due to their increased powers, but to the fact that the Communist Party, under whose close directives they operate, has allowed them to exercise the functions which the law has placed upon them. (Their powers, on paper, were not so very different at the height of Stalin's régime of terror from what they are now.) On occasions, when some flagrant illegality is, for party political reasons, committed against an individual through the agency of the courts the Procurators remain prudently silent. Thus, when some years ago a man was shot for an offence for which the law in force at the time when the offence was allegedly committed did not prescribe the death penalty, the Procurators did not intervene. Indeed, it was on the demand of the Procurator, on appeal, that the flagrantly illegal (by Soviet law as well as by the practice of civilized nations) penalty was imposed. In a word, Soviet is tolerated law: the legal rule and practice will only be applied so long as this is "advantageous and agreeable to the dominant class" (to quote Vyshinsky) as decided by the Communist Party.

This nature of the Soviet legal system, fifty years after the Bolsheviks seized power, can be illustrated both positively and negatively. On the positive side, all judges, like the procurators, remain under party control and, except on paper, enjoy no independence from control by the party. In other words, the judiciary remains dependent upon the executive, in the traditional manner which has characterized all tyrannical governments. On the negative side may be listed three factors. The first is the weakness of a legal tradition in Soviet (not so much in pre-1917) Russia, the absence of well-rooted legal mores. As reports now occasionally reaching us indicate, a trial judge (like the judges who presided over the trials of Brodsky, or of Siniavsky and Daniel) will often be totally ignorant of the rudiments of judicial behaviour. Defending counsel are often pusillanimous and ineffective. The public media and the public can be mobilized without difficulty, when required by the Party, to turn the trial into a grim farce. Secondly, there is no judicial review in Soviet law: the individual has no redress in the courts when the constitution is violated. And thirdly, the individual has no legal redress against disregard of the law either by officials or by the Courts. He can appeal to the procurators: his success will depend on the extent to which the procurator is allowed by the Party to carry out in practice the duties which the law imposes upon him.

What of the outlook? It can be argued that tolerated law is a contradiction in terms, that unless law is certain, independent and universally applicable, it is not law at all. As against this view, some would contend that all legal systems have grown up on the basis of long habit and tradition; and that if toleration of the law increases - as it obviously has in the Soviet Union since 1953 - then in time it will become so well established as to make violations of legal order very rare. It is not the function of this paper to offer predictions. But two factors may be noted in this survey of fifty years which could operate in favour of the establishment of something in the nature of the rule of law in the future. One factor is the attitude of the lawyers, or at all events of the academic lawyers. They have kept up, within the limitations of Soviet conditions, a steady pressure for reform of the law in the direction of legal supremacy. The legislation of 1958 owed much to their efforts. They continue to put forward demands, which, if accepted, could be far-reaching in their consequences: - effective safeguarding of the rights of the accused, for example; or the institution of something akin to a jury system in criminal trials, with the jury as the sole judges of fact, and hence of innocence or guilt; or the institution of a civil action for damages by a person injured by the illegal or unconstitutional act of an official. Thus, a

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jury system would go a very long way towards undermining the power of the party to control a criminal trial. The right of civil action in respect of an illegal act would (if the experience of England is any guide) make officials more resistant to pressure from the Party. None of these proposals may ever even be considered by the authorities; but, the mere fact that they are being made is already an indication of a change in the climate of Soviet legal opinion.

The second factor which may, in the long run, operate in favour of the rule of law, is the growing interest of those who are responsible for industrial and economic progress in efficiency. Nothing but the strict rule of law can provide the certainty, predictability, self-reliance in action and uninhibited dissent and discussion upon which, in the last resort, economic and technical progress depends. How long it may take those responsible for the Economic management of the country first, to realize this simple fact which the tradition of fifty years has laboured hard to obfuscate; and secondly, to find ways and means of asserting their interest in legality against the vested interest of the Communist Party in arbitrariness and illegality, is another matter. Should the Party decide to sacrifice efficiency to dogma, tradition and its own lust for power it will not be the first time in Soviet history that this had happened. But it is a measure of the extent of the erosion of Stalin's system of rule that the assertion of a demand for the rule of law against the Party can even be contemplated as a possibility.

STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN SOVIET AGRICULTURE  
1917-1967 IN THE LIGHT OF A CHANGING AGRARIAN POLICY.

by

Prof.Dr. O. Schiller.



Structural changes in Soviet agriculture  
1917 - 1967 in the light of a changing agrarian policy

In the analysis of the agrarian policy of communist regimes, two different stages can clearly be distinguished: the initial stage immediately after the seizure of power which, due to given circumstances, may continue for a number of years and the second stage in which the so-called socialistic transformation of agriculture is performed. In the first stage the agrarian policy of communist regimes is determined by the revolutionary slogans used before the seizure of power in propaganda or in underground activities. It cannot be avoided, therefore, that structural changes which are the result of such an agrarian policy, do not correspond to the conceptions of convinced communists with regard to a socialist pattern of agrarian structure. Communists can follow these conceptions only in the second stage. But even then they have to admit certain concessions in view of their dogmatic aims, concessions which are necessary to meet the most urgent and vital requirements of food supply of their own population. This antagonism between dogmatic aims and pragmatic concessions towards vital economic requirements is also at present a typical feature of the agrarian policy of communist countries.

In Russia, at the time of the October Revolution, an agrarian structure existed which was still mainly characterized by the features of the traditional feudalistic agrarian order. This traditional order, however, had undergone some changes in connection with the gradual materialization of Stolypin's agrarian reforms announced in 1906. For the years of the First World War there are no precise statistical data available. To characterize the agrarian structure at the time of the October Revolution one has to use the data relating to the last pre-war years. According to this data 152 million hectares in the 50 provinces of the European part of Russia in 1905 were in the possession of landlords or non-peasant landowners and 215 million hectares in the possession of the peasants, 80 million hectares being in the hand of well-to-do-peasants, the so-called kulaks. Taking into account, however, only the agricultural land, the percentage of the peasants' land of the total land was much higher because a great part of the landlords' land was forest land. Furthermore about 40 million hectares of the landlords' area was used by the peasants in the form of tenancy. The average size of landownership in 1905 was 534 hectares for the land of aristocratic families, 655 hectares for the land of non-aristocratic landlords and approximately 12 hectares for the land of the peasants.

Stolypin's agrarian reform did not result in great structural changes, at least as to the size structure of operational holdings. Firstly these reform measures resulted in a structural change of ownership holdings since they aimed at a gradual abolition of the old Russian field community called Mir. Until the October Revolution more than 2 million peasants were freed from the ties of community ownership on land. Another 2.3 million peasants held their land as private property without special application on the basis of the new legal provisions. Furthermore approximately 3 million peasant farmsteads did not belong to the field communities before Stolypin's reform.

- This means -

This means that at the end of the pre-communist time less than half of about 13-14 million peasant farmsteads of European Russia were bound by the rules of the Mir communities with periodical redistribution of land. This statement is of some importance because it is often believed that owing to the old tradition of community property on land the Russian peasants were mentally well prepared for the collective use of land afterwards introduced by the communist regime.

Already in the first days of the October Revolution the communist regime issued a decree by which the landownership of landlords was immediately abolished without any compensation. The rights on land were basically regulated by the law of February 19, 1918. Not all the land of the expropriated landlords was distributed among the peasants for individual use. Part of it remained under state administration. There are no exact data available about how much land owned by landlords was distributed in connection with the October Revolution amongst the peasants for individual use. Furthermore this distribution of land was not carried out in a regulated way but mainly by way of the so-called black redistribution. This is another reason why no exact data are available for this procedure. According to an approximate estimation at that time about 50 million hectares in the European part of Russia were transferred to individual use of the peasants. This means that for an essential part of the agricultural land a fundamental change in the size of operational holdings has taken place, namely the transition from large-scale farming in the form of private large-scale farms into peasant small-scale farms. It has to be borne in mind, however, that even before the October Revolution approximately half of the agricultural land of the landlords was leased out to peasants. For this part of the agricultural area only a change of ownership rights has taken place but there was not much change in the size structure of operational holdings.

After the October Revolution came the turbulent years of civil war and communist experiments on the line of so-called War-Communism. At that time neither the boundaries of the territory under the communist regime were definitely fixed nor were the conditions on the territory ruled by the communist regime in any way stabilized. The changes in the agrarian structure which took place at that time can only be described in broad lines. It was certainly not possible to think of a total transformation of the agrarian structure in accordance with communist or socialist conceptions, i.e. to carry out a socialization of agriculture. Agricultural production at that time was based almost exclusively on the small-scale peasant farm. Its productive potentiality was greatly reduced by rigorous measures of compulsory delivery executed at that time by the communist regime. Only a very small sector of agriculture was under state administration, namely old state lands and some former private large-scale farms not redistributed amongst the peasants. State farms at that time cultivated less than 5 per cent of the total agricultural land.

In this sector, too, the first experiments were made with the establishment of collective farms. A relatively small number of so-called agricultural communes had been established in former private large-scale farms using their buildings. The methods adopted in these communes were really communistic in accordance with the economic principles of that time, usually called War Communism. The greatest part of the agricultural communes established by small groups of former participants of war or partisans could only be maintained by permanent state subsidies. Their part in the total agricultural production was very small.

- But also -

But also in the peasant sector of agriculture at that time certain structural changes took place. Due to the disastrous economic conditions a certain de-urbanization had taken place, i.e. a certain migration of the urban population to rural areas. The pressure of rural people on land increased therefore. The number of small-scale farms increased and their average size gradually decreased.

Furthermore in the peasant sector of agriculture at that time some other changes of agrarian structure evolved with partly unfavourable consequences. The population at that time increased by 2.2 per cent per annum on an average and since there was almost no progress in industrialization, the additional population of the yearly increase remained for the most part in the agricultural sector. The percentage of agricultural population out of the total population at the end of this period was not less than at the beginning, i.e. it was approximately 80 per cent (81.6 per cent in 1928). In absolute figures this means an increase in agricultural population of about 10 million persons. The number of peasant holdings increased from 16.5 million (1918) to 25.6 million (1928) and the average size of holdings went down from 7 ha to 4 ha (4.3 ha in 1928).

But in the same period in the peasant sector of agriculture a certain differentiation had also taken place because it was possible for the active elements of the peasantry to increase the size of their holdings. Some scope for such increase of size was possible owing to the fact that it was permitted to take on lease unused state land, nor were there any restrictions on an increase of private animal husbandry, for which neighbouring state lands could also be used as pastures. In this way a new upper strata was re-established - partly out of the old upper strata of peasantry - resulting in a new size group of peasant farms of some economic strength, the so-called kulak farms.

No doubt such development was not in accordance with the conceptions of the ruling communist regime. When the New Economic Policy was abolished with the start of the Five-Year-Plans an entirely new course of agrarian policy was also initiated at the same time, characterized by compulsory collectivization. The main motivation for this change of agrarian policy was said to be the necessity to fight the kulak peasants. It was argued that these were counter-revolutionary elements representing who, at that time lived in a Soviet village, would like to say that one could not observe any conscious and active counter-revolutionary activity in the upper strata in the villages. Again the alleged sabotage of compulsory deliveries, especially the grain deliveries, was probably not an organized political action but mainly the result of the fact that economic and price conditions existing at that time were no stimulus for the peasant to produce more than needed for his and his family's consumption.

The new course of agrarian policy, started in 1929, also resulted in a fundamental change of the agrarian structure. This is the most radical change of agrarian structure to have occurred in any country of the world until that time. Within a very short period of time, less than 5 years, the Soviet Union was transformed from a country with prevailing smallholdings into a country in which the agricultural area is almost exclusively operated by large-scale farms. Theoretically the process of collectivization of Soviet agriculture was concluded only at a later date. In Soviet statistics a residual group of individual peasant farms has been quoted until quite recently. But from the statistical data given for them it is evident that most of them existed on paper only, i.e. they were fictitious peasant farms.

- Since in 1934 -

Since in 1934 87.4 per cent of the land in the peasant sector of Soviet agriculture was operated in the form of collective farms it can be stated that the process of collectivization was for the most part concluded after a short period of 5 years.

For the structural change of Soviet agriculture these 5 years were of decisive importance. At that time the institutional framework for collective agriculture was also developed to its - for the time being - final forms. In the initial stage of collectivization an intermediary form also existed, a form in between individual and collective farming, namely the so-called co-operative for the joint use of land or (with the Russian abbreviations) TOS. In adopting this transitional form the peasant holdings which up to that time were typical for Soviet villages continued to exist, whereas with the transition to the so-called artel these peasant holdings disappeared, except for a very small remnant of subsidiary private plots and private livestock. With the introduction of the "model by-laws of the agricultural artel", the so-called "Stalin model by-laws" the artel became the only valid institutional form of collective farms and this way identical with what is usually called the kolkhoz farm.

The agricultural communes mentioned above were abolished at that time as well or else transformed into ordinary kolkhoz farms.

The result of this rigorous process of transformation of Soviet agriculture must be examined with regard to the changes in its size structure. It was a natural consequence that in the initial stage the operational units of collective agriculture were of a relatively small size. The chairman of the managing committee of the new kolkhoz farms, i.e. the actual farm managers, at the beginning were mainly ordinary peasants elected by the members.

Certainly they did not have any experience in managing large-scale farms. The larger the size of the operational holding the greater were the difficulties for these new managers of Kolkhoz farms confronted with entirely new tasks.

In those parts of the country where relatively small villages exist, usually one entire village settlement was made one collective farm. In the large villages of the steppe regions of the South East European part of the country quite often more than one collective farm was established in a village. After the completion of the phase of compulsory collectivization Soviet agriculture in 1934 consisted of a total of 241 000 collective farms which were established from 25.6 million peasant farms existing before. This means that on an average approximately 100 individual peasant farms were amalgamated to form a new collective farm. On an average at that time there were approximately 400 hectares sown area in a collective farm (421 ha in 1934).

The question is what changes took place in the state sector of agriculture at that time. In 1928 the share of the sovkhos farms of the total sown area was approximately 1.5 per cent and the average size of these farms was about 1200 ha sown area. Up to 1940 the share of the sovkhosy in the sown area increased to 7.7 per cent and the average size of sovkhos farms to 2800 ha sown area.

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1) The author is of the opinion that for the purposes of comparison the "sown area" is the most appropriate criterion. Other criteria as "total area" or "cultivated" and "cultivable" area may be neglected for our purposes.

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- As already -

As already mentioned, since the beginning of collectivization a small number of the former individual farms remained untouched, namely the subsidiary private holdings of the kolkhoz peasants. The size of private plots - not privately owned but privately used - was restricted to  $1/4$  to  $1/2$  ha, in exceptional cases up to 1 ha, and private animal husbandry in these subsidiary plots of land is also restricted by the provisions of model by-laws to, for instance, one cow, two sows, etc. It should be mentioned that the subsidiary private holdings of kolkhoz peasants were not introduced later on by the Stalin model by-laws of 1935, as is often believed, but existed from the beginning of collectivization, as can be seen from the first model by-laws of 1930.

This means that in Soviet agriculture a private sector still exists besides the state sector and the collective sector. Due to its remarkable efficiency which is much higher than in the two other sectors up to the present time the private sector plays an important role in the supply of the Soviet population with food-stuffs. It is significant that nearly all kolkhoz peasants make use of their right to have a subsidiary private plot of land and private animal husbandry. The number of subsidiary private holdings is therefore nearly the same as the number of households of Kolkhoz peasants. This number in the last pre-war years (1937-1940) was approximately 18 million. By the annexation of former Polish and other territories of Eastern Europe where individual peasant farms prevailed the number of peasant households in the post-war years increased considerably. In the years from 1950-56 this number remained more or less stable at approximately 20 million households. Only in the last decade their number has gradually decreased. At present (1965) there are approximately 15.4 million households of peasants with subsidiary private holdings.

The size of the subsidiary private holdings of the Kolkhoz peasants by the provisions of the by-laws are restricted to a relatively narrow limit. Therefore with regard to the average size in the course of time only minor changes evolved. It is not possible to give exact data on this, because that part of the private sector which does not belong to the kolkhoz peasants but to other professional groups (sovkhoz workers and other rural or urban owners of private livestock) is not shown by Soviet statistics separately. But it is remarkable that the average size of all subsidiary private plots in the initial stage of collective agriculture (1938) was 0.49 ha, in 1955 0.29 and in 1962 0.26 ha. Again with regard to private animal husbandry there are not many changes to be noted. In 1940 there were only 0.68 sows in one subsidiary holding, in 1935 0.56 and in 1962 0.59. The figures show that the keeping of more than one cow, which by the model by-laws is admitted for certain regions specializing in animal husbandry, is restricted to a relatively small number of exceptional cases, because otherwise the average number of cows per private holding would be higher.

It is well known that in 1964 by a new legal provision the right was given to kolkhoz farms to modify to a certain limit their by-laws by a decision of the general meeting. Theoretically therefore, it is possible for the norms for the size of subsidiary plots and for the number of animals as defined in the model by-laws to be exceeded. Obviously the kolkhoz peasants have only in a very restricted way made use of this right, because the statistical data on the average size of the subsidiary private plots and the private animal husbandry do not show corresponding changes.

- The new course -

The new course of agrarian policy after 1929 resulted not only in compulsory collectivization of the peasant sector of agriculture but also in intensified activities in the state sector of agriculture. It was the time when new sovkhos farms were organized on a large scale which - in distinction to the old sovkhos farms established in former private large scale farms - specialized in certain branches of production, such as grain production, dairying, the fattening of cattle and pigs, the production of poultry and eggs, etc.

By this specialization, which is a typical feature of the new sovkhos development it was also possible to exceed the size of farms that up to that time had been normal. Convinced communists are often inclined to believe that the greater the farming units the better the requirements of modern technique can be met. But no doubt, for the so-called economies of scale, there is also an upper limit. This is especially true of agricultural enterprise where a flexible adaptation to natural factors which, like especially the weather conditions, cannot be determined beforehand, is of greatest importance, for the success of management. The idea to fix also an upper limit for the size of farming units at that time was not earnestly considered by the Soviet leaders.

With the establishment and guidance of new sovkhos farms special organisations, the so-called trusts, were charged, as for instance, the Sernotrust, with the establishment of grain farms, the so-called grain factories. Some of these grain sovkhosy established by the Sernotrust in the steppe regions of South and South-east Russia, were of very great dimensions. They were typical of the then prevailing trend to have the size of farms made as large as possible. As an outstanding example of grain factories the sovkhos Gigant in the neighbourhood of Salsk in the Don region became well-known at that time. By additional land allocations the size of this grain sovkhos finally increased to more than 200 000 ha.

Only when as a result of such exaggerations the economic disadvantages and deficiencies of oversized farms became quite obvious were some counter-measures carried out. Stalin himself condemned the so-called "gigantomania". Oversized sovkhos farms were subdivided into smaller units by developing their sectors or departments into independent sovkhos farms. There was similar experience also with the sovkhos specialized in animal husbandry where by the establishment of oversized farms not only the managerial difficulties of non-surveyable units but also the increased danger of diseases had unfavourable consequences. At that time certain norms for the size of sovkhos farms were fixed which should be exceeded only in exceptional cases.

During the war time essential changes in the size structure of Soviet agriculture obviously did not occur. For understandable reasons there are no statistical data available for these years. Only in the private sector of agriculture were there possibly some changes because during the war time the Soviet authorities did not strictly oppose the tendencies of Kolkhoz peasants to enlarge their private plots and private animal husbandry beyond the prescribed limits. In many places, therefore, private plots were expanded by arbitrary measures of kolkhoz peasants. After the war special laws were enforced by which all such enlargements of private plots over the legal norm had to be cancelled. That it had become necessary to enforce such legislation shows, however, how strong the tendencies of kolkhoz peasants to enlarge their private plots were at that time.

- By the -

By the incorporation of new territories in Eastern Europe in 1939 and 1940, i.e. of territories with prevailing peasant farms their share in the total agricultural area has increased to nearly 10 per cent. But this share was diminished again when in the first years after the war agriculture in the new territories was collectivized in a relatively short period of time. As early as 1953 there were almost no peasant farms within the new boundaries of the Soviet Union.

Even in the first years of the post-war period a new process of structural change was started, namely the establishment of large-scale kolkhoz farms. The result was a new significant change in the size structure of Soviet agriculture. In the course of this action small kolkhoz farms were systematically amalgamated to larger operational units. This was the case especially in the regions of central and northern Russia, where up to that time relatively small kolkhoz farms existed. Similarly as in these districts several villages settlements belong to one administrative village community, now also some kolkhoz farms were put together to form one large-scale kolkhoz unit. This measure was started in 1950 with the result that even in the course of one year, the number of kolkhoz farms went down to nearly one half, namely from approximately 250 000 to 123 000 farm units.

In the following years the amalgamation of kolkhoz farms continued so that the number of kolkhoz farms decreased from year to year. Finally in 1965 the astonishingly small number of only 36 300 kolkhoz farms existed. Correspondingly the average size of kolkhoz farms increased permanently and reached approximately 2800 ha sown area in 1965. This average size evidently shows that in many cases the dimensions of kolkhoz farms were much higher than is reasonable from the managerial point of view. The author has mentioned this fact in publications of former years and has expressed the view that, perhaps, one day a retrograde development may take place.

It is astonishing that in spite of the previously mentioned bad experience in the initial stage of the gigantomania in establishing agricultural large-scale farms, similar tendencies were promoted after the war without hesitation. The revival of gigantomania was especially to be felt in the state sector of agriculture. During the Khrushchev era two measures of agrarian policy were working in this direction. Firstly the "new lands campaign" in the steppe regions of northern Kazakhstan and southern Siberia and secondly the systematic enlargement of the old sovkhos farms by allocating to them additional land out of the state fund or by increasing their livestock through new investments. In the "new lands campaign" preference was given from the beginning to the sovkhos form of farm enterprise instead of the kolkhoz form. The regions where the new lands were reclaimed are sparsely settled areas, where formerly almost no permanent settlements existed, but where the land was used for nomadic animal husbandry. There were, therefore, only restricted possibilities of increasing the sown area by expanding the land use of already existing kolkhoz farms. If for this purpose a new resettlement of people on the land was necessary in most cases the sovkhos pattern was better suited because the new settlers mainly belonged to the younger generation. Enlisted by the Komsomol they came for the most part from urban environments so that not much of the old peasant tradition was existent in them, which in the old-settled areas still plays an important role amongst the kolkhoz population.

By these processes the number of sovkhos farms has increased considerably since the beginning of the "new lands campaign", i.e. since 1954.

- In the meantime -

In the meantime also the average size of sovkhos farms has also gone up essentially. In 1955 there were some 5100 sovkhos farms in the Soviet Union, with an average sown area of 5000 ha, while in 1965 the number of sovkhos farms was around 11 700 with an average sown area of approximately 7600 ha.

As a consequence of this development the share of the sovkhos sector in total agriculture production increased considerably. In former years without much change about 10 per cent of the total sown area belonged to the sovkhos sector, but from 1954 this percentage increased rapidly. This was also partly due to the fact that for a certain period of time, namely from 1957 to 1962, an interesting process was going on which has been mentioned only incidentally in Soviet literature, namely the so-called sovkhosization, i.e. the transformation of kolkhoz farms into sovkhos farms. It is significant that, according to the latest data, in 1965 47 per cent of the sown area belonged to the sovkhos sector while in certain branches of production this percentage is still much lower, as, for instance, in meat production with about 30 per cent.

The considerable increase of the sovkhos sector, which probably will continue in the years to come, is furthermore encouraged by the fact that the mutual approach of both forms of agrarian policy, has already made considerable progress. It may be stated that up to the present time it is mainly an approach of the kolkhoz form towards the sovkhos form, not an approach vice versa. The wage system of the kolkhoz farms, for instance, has been changed by the payment for the final redistribution of profits. But in practice this new system results in many cases in the kolkhoz peasants being paid in a similar way and with similar rates as the workers in sovkhos farms. The dissolution of machine tractor stations, started in 1958, and the purchase of machinery by the kolkhoz farms also resulted in the status of the kolkhoz farms becoming more similar to that of sovkhos farms.

The considerable increase of the Sovkhos sector in Soviet agriculture should be well considered in analysing the unsatisfactory accomplishments of the Soviet agrarian system. We are accustomed to use arguments which mainly refer to the peculiarities of collective farming as compared with individual farming. It has to be taken into account, however, that for an essential part of Soviet agriculture, namely for the sovkhos sector, another yardstick has to be used, namely the comparison with other state farms of which a few examples also exist nearly everywhere in non-communist countries. By this comparison it becomes evident that the unsatisfactory accomplishments of Soviet agriculture are not only due to the typical deficiencies of the kolkhoz system, but to general deficiencies of the Soviet system, i.e. deficiencies which in a similar way also exist in other branches of the Soviet economy.

The basic questions of an economic reform which have been under discussion in the Soviet Union for the last few years and which have already led to some practical measures are also of great importance for the further development of the size structure of Soviet agriculture. The fact seems to have been acknowledged that the dogmatic point of view to have the operational units of agricultural enterprises made as large as possible and directed by central planning and central administration does not lead to satisfactory economic results. Already under the regime of Khrushchev measures of decentralisation had been tried as well which later on, however, were restricted again.

- New experiments -



New experiments are made with a reorientation of enterprises from the criterion of planfulfilment and gross production to marketed production and profits achieved. Furthermore, more emphasis is laid on the principle that at the present phase of development material incentives for the accomplishment of work have to be promoted by all means. In this connection the question has also been raised whether the size of agricultural enterprises is in accordance with the requirements of the new orientation. For the first time, therefore, the question of the optimal size of an agricultural enterprise was recently been discussed in a more or less undogmatic way in Soviet literature.

While in former years it was difficult to discuss this question with Soviet agricultural economists at international conferences<sup>1)</sup> nowadays such discussion seems to be possible. There are some interesting recent Soviet publications in which it is frankly admitted that a number of sovkhoz and kolkhoz farms are oversized and cannot work in a profitable way due to this deficiency.

Thus, for instance, Rumiantseva states in the "Journal of Agricultural Economics", No. 5, 1965, that the "great differentiation in the size of kolkhoz farms is not only based on objective reasons". It is, as well, the "consequence of the subjectivism with which the local authorities have decided the question of amalgamation of Kolkhoz farms". As a result "there are at present many oversized kolkhoz farms which are difficult to manage". Rumiantseva says that, for instance, in Kirov province (oblast) there are kolkhoz farms comprising more than 35 village settlements. Only 20 per cent of the kolkhoz farms in that province are of the normal size. Half of the Kolkhoz farms of the Kirov region are said to be subsidized. The conclusion of the author is that "the superiority of the large-scale farm as compared with the farms of smaller size is obvious only up to a certain size limit". The author states therefore, that "the very large farms often are less effective than farms of smaller size.

These statements are quoted literally because it is significant for the present situation in the Soviet Union that even convinced communists may come to such conclusions. The leading institute of agricultural economics, the "All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Agricultural Economics" (VNIIESCh) and the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Science of the Soviet Union, have worked out together a study on the questions of the optimal size of agricultural holdings.<sup>2)</sup> In the concluding chapter of this book the question is also discussed how to carry out the transition to the envisaged optimal sizes of agricultural enterprises.

The author had the opportunity to discuss these questions with his colleagues in Moscow last year and learned that here and there already a reduction of the size of oversized kolkhoz and sovkhoz farms is going on. It is true that in Soviet literature, as far as one can see, this interesting process has not yet been described. It is, however, significant, that according to the data of Soviet statistics in the last two years for the first time the total number of agricultural enterprises increased as can be seen from the following figures:

- 1) See Proceedings of the International Conference of Agricultural Economists, London, 1966, page 457.
- 2) The optimal size of agricultural holdings and their internal subdivisions, Obolenski, Kotov and others, Publisher Kolos, Moscow, 1965.

year	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
kolkhoz farms	39.700	38.800	37.600	36.300	36.500
sovkhoz farms	8.570	9.176	10.078	11.681	12.196
total	48.270	47.976	47.678	47.981	48.696

To deal with the question of the optimal size of agricultural holdings in a pragmatic way is obviously a typical feature of the new course of Soviet agrarian policy. Another symptom of this pragmatic point of view is the fact that in recent times the question has been discussed whether a subdivision of large-scale farms into relatively small working gangs or links may be advisable. The question is to what degree the independence of such working gangs may go without contradicting the still valid principles of farming in large-scale units and of collective organisation of agricultural work.

Experiments are being made with the organisation of small working gangs or mechanized working links of not more than 4 - 6 workers. The report of Saglada on such an experiment in a Ukrainian kolkhoz farm has been mentioned in the Soviet press and also another experiment in a sovkhoz farm in northern Kazakhstan carried out by the chief agronomist Shulin. Both reports were also given much attention in the press of Western countries. A description of the discussion which is going on in the Soviet Union on the basic question of working gangs has been given by R. Laird in "Osteuropa-Wirtschaft", Vol. XI, No. 4, 1966.

In connection with this new development in Soviet agrarian policy in Western circles the question has also been discussed whether in the Soviet Union a return to individual farming would be possible in a similar way as this happened in former years in two other communist countries, namely Yugoslavia and Poland. The question was raised whether this could not be considered as a final remedy for the permanent shortcomings of Soviet agriculture. In former publications the author has expressed the view that such development can hardly be expected not only for political but also for practical reasons. But for our subject of discussion this question can be left aside.

As a final conclusion it may be stated that great changes in the size structure of Soviet agriculture are not to be expected in the time to come. It can be assumed that in connection with the reduction of dimensions of oversized sovkhoz farms the number of large-scale farms may increase in a certain way and the average size may go down. It can also be assumed that the mutual approach of both forms of farming enterprise may continue in a way that the part of the state sector out of the total production may increase further on and after some time there may be not much difference between the state sector and the kolkhoz sector. Although at present the private sector is being promoted to a certain extent it has to be assumed that its share in the total production of agriculture will gradually decrease.

The development of size structure of Soviet agriculture in the last 50 years since the October Revolution has shown that in the change of time an agrarian structure has evolved which is typical of the economic and social order of a communist country. But this agrarian structure up to the present time has not led to satisfactory accomplishments in production which could be compared with the accomplishments of advanced non-communist countries.

THE PARTY, OPPOSITION AND INTEREST GROUPS:  
FIFTY YEARS OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE.

by

Prof. H. Gordon Skilling.

THE PARTY, OPPOSITION AND INTEREST GROUPS:  
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A striking paradox of Communist politics is the ceaseless flux of change beneath an appearance of changeless continuity in the forms and structures and in the communist theory of political power. In spite of a succession of constitutions and even more frequent amendments of the party's own statute, the general structure of Soviet political institutions and of political processes, as it exists in 1967, is not in its essential features unlike the order which emerged from the revolutionary events of 1917. There is now, as there was then, a single centralized and largely monolithic party which enjoys a monopoly of political power and controls the representative institutions, the mass organizations and the media of communications, and seeks to direct and mould all aspects of society, the economic and spiritual as well as the social and political. None the less beneath this surface uniformity, it is clear, there have been profound shifts in the way the system has actually operated at successive stages of Soviet history.

One could almost hazard a paraphrase of the old French saying: "plus c'est la même chose, plus ça change!" Certainly it is appropriate to speak of a succession of Soviet political systems, from the Leninist, through the early and the mature Stalinist, to the Khrushchevian and post-Khrushchevian, each manifesting a distinctive style and substance of its own. (1) When one takes into account the other communist states of Eastern Europe, one encounters an even richer diversity, as these systems, once modelled on the Soviet prototype, and still retaining the essentials of the old system, have in practice worked out many variations on the common theme.

Our awareness of the variety of communist politics has been dulled by the long existence of the mature Stalinist system in the Soviet Union and its imposition, full-blown, on Eastern Europe during the years 1944 to 1948. In spite of the Yugoslav exception after 1948, it was easy to identify communist politics with the forms and procedures characteristic of mature Stalinism and to ignore or minimize the possibility of alternatives. All communist systems, including even the Yugoslav, were classified as totalitarian dictatorships, and as such, were assumed to exclude group conflict and opposition, except at the very highest level, among rivals for top leadership. Even after 1953, the totalitarian concept continued to blind Western observers to the possibilities of change and diversification in politics and in particular to hinder them in observing the emergence of new features. Only recently has it been widely recognized that policy-making in communist states, including the Soviet Union, more and more takes place within a context of sharp group conflict; (2) and still more recently that oppositional tendencies, never totally absent from communist policies, have assumed more vigorous and varied forms. (3)

Communist theory and practice have traditionally denied the legitimacy of any form of opposition or autonomous group activity. The doctrine of the proletarian dictatorship, as developed by Lenin and Stalin, conferred on the so-called party of the working class the exclusive authority to exercise political leadership and denied to other parties and groups the right to share this power or to counteract it.

At the same time the principle of democratic centralism assigned supreme authority to the top party leaders and required disciplined obedience by all lower officers and members.

As interpreted by Lenin, these theories led to the banning not only of "opposition" in the form of organized groups seeking to replace those in power, but also "dissent" in the form of criticism of policies adopted or proposed by these leaders. (4) Carried to its extreme conclusion by Stalin, this strategy led eventually to the complete elimination of opposition in almost every form. (5) At the most, passive resistance or revolutionary conspiracy remained as its sole vestiges. In Eastern Europe this theory and practice was introduced in its full form after 1948, when complete communist power was everywhere established and the people's democracies were identified as forms of the proletarian dictatorship. Any opposition and any group activity, inside or outside the party, was henceforth regarded as disloyal and impermissible.

In the years since Stalin's death, there has been no basic change in the structure of the communist political systems, nor has the attitude of the leaders towards opposition in the abstract been essentially modified. Communist doctrine still rejects the rights of autonomous groups to articulate interests distinct from those of the party, and still assigns to the party the exclusive right to aggregate, and even to articulate, the interests of all social groups. (6) Even in Yugoslavia, where the position and role of the party has been significantly modified, the idea of a multi-party system, or of an opposition party, has been explicitly rejected. Where other parties exist, as in Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, they are loyal supporters of the ruling party and do not express basic opposition to it. Even in Poland, where other parties may in a limited degree express group interests and seek to influence public policy, they do not compete with the ruling party for power and do not form a political opposition. (7)

In the USSR, needless to say, any such political competition is ruled out, and indeed any "narrowing of the role of the party, any restriction of its functions," is explicitly rejected. (8) In no communist countries is genuine opposition inside the party permitted, and the existence of factions with "separate platforms" is forbidden. (9)

None the less in the USSR and in all the communist countries of Eastern Europe, with the exception of Albania, there has been a noticeable rise in activity by interest groups and the emergence of political tendencies that can only be called "oppositional." Leonard Schapiro, in his foreword as editor to the first issue of the journal, Government and Opposition, referred to "the tentative process of loyal dissent" becoming apparent in one-party states. (10) Although the party retains its dominant position and the making of policy continues to be highly centralized and authoritarian, with power resting in the hands of a few rule-makers at the top, political interest groups have been able to find means of articulating their own and others' interests and of expressing conflicting views on public policy. Especially in the phase of deliberation prior to the formal making of the final decisions, and also in the later period of implementing it, such interest groups may interpose their own viewpoints, presenting alternative policies for consideration, and endorsing or criticizing, sometimes opposing, the carrying out of policies already resolved upon.

This development reflects a subtle but significant change in the attitude of the party to society and social groups, and in its conception of the process of decision-making.

As we have noted, there has been no relaxation of the party's monopoly of political power and no admission of the desirability of political opposition as such. It is, however, no longer assumed that the party alone, and infallibly, knows the public interest and that all individual or group interests must be automatically and without question subordinated and sacrificed. There has been an increasing recognition that in a heterogeneous society some conflicting interests will exist and that there will even be clashes between partial individual and group interests, and the broader national interest.

It is understood that public policy, if it is to be realistic and well-based, should take these conflicting interests into account and should represent to some degree a reconciliation or synthesis of them. The party increasingly performs the role of an aggregator of conflicting interests, rather than the exclusive articulator of its own conception of the national interests. (11) This is not to say, of course, that the party passively accepts partial or conflicting interests, but in imposing its own decisive views, it takes into account opposing concepts of the public interest as well as partial group interests.

Moreover, public policy, it is increasingly recognized, must be "scientific," in the sense of being based not merely on Marxism-Leninism, but also on the findings of scholarship and science on the matters under discussion. As a result, the party has tolerated and indeed deliberately encouraged wide-ranging debates among experts on certain policy issues such as economic reform or legal revisions. (12) This kind of discussion, permitting the expression of oppositional viewpoints on specific issues, is, needless to say, subject to strict limits, which will be discussed later. It has, however, created a new climate of policy-making, and without altering the essential forms of political action, and in particular the leading role of party, has subtly and significantly modified the actual working of the political system.

It is necessary to define more precisely the exact meaning of "political opposition" within communist states. Some Western scholars have proposed a relatively simple dichotomy between "orthodox" and "unorthodox" dissent, (13) "dissent" and "opposition", (14) or "control" and "contestation." (15) If such a classification is to be used, it must be understood not as a clearcut demarcation of two sharply opposed forms, but as a continuum stretching between two extremes, one seeking to change and improve the system, the other rejecting it absolutely. It may be more useful to employ a fourfold classification, distinguishing several distinct types of oppositional tendency. In the first place, "integral opposition" involves overt or covert disloyalty to the system, and if expressed in action, may take such forms as revolutionary conspiracies designed to overthrow it, or lesser forms of resistance such as sabotage or underground activity. (16) Carried on normally by anti-communist forces, it may also be manifested in the alienation of youth, the "inner migration" of intellectuals, or the rejection of communist doctrine by the religious. In the second place, "fundamental opposition" involves opposition to, or severe criticism of, a whole series of the key policies of the regime, without, however, a rejection of the system itself. Usually expressed by communists, it may take the form of resistance on the part of key interest groups, such as the party apparatchiki or the writers, who may divide, as we shall see later, into "hard" and "soft," "conservative" and "reformist," camps. In the third place, "factional opposition" is conducted by individuals or groups within the highest organs of party and government, although support may be sought in broader social and political groupings.

Although by definition identified with disloyalty to other leaders and often embodying fundamental ideological rights within the ruling elite, as between "nationalist" and "proletarian internationalist," or "leftist" and "rightist," this type of toplevel opposition also does not represent opposition to the system as such. Finally there may be opposition to specific policies of the regime, without a rejection either of the system, or of its incumbent leadership and their basic policies. (17)

The chief exponents of "specific opposition" have been the professional groups, such as economists, lawyers, social scientists, educators, natural scientists, writers and journalists. In the main this is a "loyal opposition," seeking to change or influence public policy by criticizing established policies, or suggesting alternative measures or future courses of action. Although sometimes linked with, and even promoted by, toplevel factional struggles, this form of dissent is normally designed not to secure power but rather to influence the actions of the existing power-holders.

It is not assumed that all of these oppositional tendencies will always be present in communist systems. Indeed it can hardly be sufficiently emphasized that the individual communist systems will differ greatly with each other, and from one period to another, in the types of opposition predominant, and in the intensity and the forms of the various kinds of dissent. Moreover, the oppositional tendencies present at any time in a given country cannot be sharply marked off from each other, and may to a considerable extent overlap or be combined. In particular opposition attitudes and behaviour will vary with changing conditions. Specific dissent may develop into fundamental or even integral opposition, and may merge with factional conflicts among leading groups. Integral opposition may recede with leadership changes and policy shifts, and with increased opportunities for the expression of specific opposition. As will be discussed below, much will depend on the attitude of the ruling group towards opposition of varying forms, with intolerance of specific opposition generating fundamental or integral opposition.

Analysis is rendered difficult by the wide differentiation of the development in the communist countries, with the special circumstances and the peculiar traditions of each more and more affecting the course of events. There is in fact a wide spectrum extending from Albania, where no basic change in the traditional Stalinist system has occurred, and coercion prevents all forms of opposition, to Yugoslavia, where the Stalinist system of the early post-war years has been modified since 1948 in fundamental ways and opposition of certain kinds is permitted and encouraged. Between these extremes, each of the other countries has evolved a particular variation on the theme of de-Stalinization, least pronounced in the case of Rumania, East Germany and Bulgaria, most marked in the case of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. (18) The differences are not, however, clearcut, nor are they fixed and changeless, but on the contrary smudgy and ever-shifting, so that the analysis of a single country, and still more, generalization concerning them all, confront serious difficulties, likely to be aggravated in the future as the individuality of each country becomes more pronounced.

Generalizing from differentiated and zigzag courses of development, one can say that integral opposition, after an initial outburst in Hungary, has everywhere declined, or at least does not usually express itself in overt action of serious proportions. A significant exception is the case of the Polish Catholic Church.

Factional opposition, after intense activity in the early years of de-Stalinization, especially in Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria, has also declined and has assumed more moderate forms. Fundamental opposition, again after an initial flourishing in the Polish and Hungarian crises, and in Czechoslovakia, in 1963, has also subsided. On the other hand, specific opposition, extending over a whole range of issues, has greatly expanded, as the regimes have permitted and encouraged the expression of conflicting interests and opinions, and various occupational groups have taken the opportunity of expressing themselves vigorously on matters of public policy.

It should be clear that the forms of political opposition described differ profoundly from those characteristic of non-communist states.

In Western democracies, where opposition is an integral and legitimate part of the political system, opposition is normally institutionalized and based on constitutional foundations, and manifests itself primarily in competing political parties and in parliamentary or electoral procedures which guarantee the expression of dissent and opposition. (19) Political opposition of this orderly and peaceful kind is, however, a rare phenomenon in political experience, and governments have traditionally sought to suppress or contain it. (20) In other than democratic countries, opposition has normally been forced to assume a variety of non-legal or illegal forms and to express itself in other than formal and institutional manner. The crucial feature of opposition in communist systems is the absence of an institutionalized opposition expressed and guaranteed in constitutional principles or political custom. (21) In particular, this is manifested in the absence of two or more major and competing parties, and in the limited degree of economic, social, cultural and political pluralism. Although opposition in the sense common to Western democracies does not therefore really exist, oppositional tendencies have found other modes of expression, usually outside the normal channels of governmental action and deliberation.

Needless to say, revolutionary or conspiratorial forms of integral opposition are strictly curbed by law and by force. The advocacy of integral or even fundamental opposition by peaceful means is, however, also not tolerated and can express itself only through subterranean channels. In varying degrees of vehemence, "hostile" ideas or domestic "enemies" within and outside the party are bitterly denounced, and are often linked with outside "enemies," such as the Vatican or Radio Free Europe, or the imperialist bourgeoisie generally. Factional opposition is also taboo, and must take place secretly, at the top-most level of the party, among the high command of the presidium and secretariat. Although the Central Committee may in some cases have come to play a significant role in this respect, there is as yet no evidence that this process of leadership conflict is likely to be institutionalized through a more genuine electoral or deliberative process within the party organs. Although purge of the old type is not as "permanent" a feature of communist rule as once assumed, and is not usually accompanied by such draconic penalties for the defeated, factional struggle still remains a highly informal and non-legitimate process of conflict, with the rival factions representing a weak surrogate, in a one-party system, of political parties within a multi-party system. Such non-institutionalized forms of conflict are likely to provide the framework within which other forms of group conflict will take place, with the leadership factions continuing to perform significant functions in articulating and amalgamating the interests of social groups whose support they seek in the interests of their own struggle for power.



Changes in the context of decision-making have been least pronounced in the functioning of the representative assemblies and the mass of societal organizations. In the absence of genuine representative or legislative bodies, there is little opportunity for interest groups to function through the Assemblies or for oppositional tendencies to be expressed in these bodies. The Supreme Soviet, for instance, or the party's Central Committee, are so constituted that certain social and occupational groups receive representation. In neither body, however, are the representatives selected by specific social groups, or authorized by the latter to express a group position. Moreover, none of these organs, so far as can be seen, are influential in the determination of policy. Perhaps in a modest way certain group interests may be articulated in these representative organs, with members of the Central Committee voicing different opinions on subjects under debate, and deputies expressing regional and functional interests. The increasing role being given to committees of the Soviet, and the practice of bringing in, for consultation with the committees and with the Soviet Presidium, experts in various fields, sometimes formalized in advisory committees, may bring professional groups closer to the locus of decision-making, although not as authorized spokesmen of the groups to which they belong.

In some countries of Eastern Europe, there has been criticism of the inactivity of parliaments, and changes have been introduced to make the legislature and particularly its committees places of active and critical discussion. Plenary sessions have become longer and more business-like; committees are more active; questions time has been introduced; the parliamentary responsibility of ministers has been proclaimed. The assemblies continue, however, to be the scene of unanimous approval of proposed legislation and do not offer a locus of serious opposition or a medium for articulating diverse interests and opinions. Only rarely, as for instance, in Czechoslovakia, in June, 1965, is there a divided vote, and in that case the legislation was passed with the clause opposed by a majority unchanged. In the Polish Sejm, however, the legislative committees play an important role in the discussion of legislation. (22) Opposition is sometimes expressed in the plenary session, notably by the Catholic deputies, and negative votes are sometimes recorded. In Yugoslavia, the assembly is an even more active arena of debate and of opposition, and the defeat of proposed legislation has from time to time occurred. In an even unique in the communist world, the government of the Slovene Republic was on one occasion compelled to resign as a result of an adverse vote, although it resumed office shortly thereafter. (23)

Efforts to invigorate the assemblies are likely to remain abortive as long as the elections themselves simply endorse the dominant position of the ruling party and exclude competition by opposition parties. In no country of the region have such parties been permitted to take part in electoral contests. A minor element of competitiveness has been introduced in Hungary and Rumania, in the form of the legal possibility of multiple candidacies for office. This has so far not led to frequent electoral conflicts. Where other parties do exist, as in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, East Germany, and Poland, they are in all cases allies and partners of the ruling party and not in any sense parties of opposition. At the most they may give a modest expression of the interests of certain social or religious groups. Even in Poland elections are not competitive, but constitute what a communist theorist has called "semi-plebiscitary" or "consent" elections. (24)

As a result of the fact that there are more candidates than seats to be filled and voters may express preferences in voting for certain candidates and certain parties, the elections provide "an opportunity to criticize the government policy by lowering the electoral acceptance of this policy." (25) In this way, Wiatr concludes, "the consent elections do not decide who will rule the country, but they influence the way in which the country will be ruled." (26)

In Yugoslavia, where no other parties exist, but a kind of national front in the form of the Socialist League plays a significant part, elections have also assumed a somewhat different character in that recently the number of candidates have considerably exceeded the number of seats to be filled.

As a result, at least a personal competition for office takes place, although this does not represent opposition in terms of policy. (27)

Traditionally lacking in communist systems has been an effective system of parliamentary control of the executive power. The danger of "uncontrolled power" has been recognized, and the need for a more powerful public opinion as a check on the abuse of power has been stressed. (28) Recent attempts to fulfill this function of parliamentary opposition in the form of "question time" in the Assembly or a more vigorous criticism of administration by deputies may have had some results, however minimal. Extra-parliamentary "control" of official actions, through the press and special organs of popular control, have also been emphasized in recent years and may have accomplished something. Paradoxically, however, the chief source of criticism of executive arbitrariness or failures of administrative action has been the party itself, especially its top leaders and its organs, the Central Committee and the apparatus. This has been, of course, a traditional device characteristic of the times of Stalin as much as the post-Stalin period and represents a kind of "control from above" quite different from the control from below characteristic of more democratic societies. Even in Albania for instance, the Central Committee in an open letter in March, 1966, censured the bureaucratic elite of party and state. (29) It is a curious paradox of communist systems that an important agency of "opposition" is the ruling party itself, which assumes the functions of supervising the actions of the executive or even leading figures of government or party and subjecting them to criticism. (30)

Similarly, the mass societal organizations, and the broad social groups which they purportedly represent, have not been able to find any effective means, except in a most informal manner, to express their interest through autonomous and overt political action. Broad social groups, such as the workers and peasants, the nationalities or the religious denominations, are undoubtedly politically relevant in the sense that their needs and wants are in some degree or other taken into account by political leaders, and increasingly so in the post-Stalin period.

Certain important groups, such as the peasants, and even collective farm chairmen or factory directors, find themselves in somewhat the same position as, say, the consumers in a Western democracy, possessing no formal institutionalized way of pressing their demands on the government. Even where mass societal organizations do exist, as in the case of the industrial workers, or the youth and women, these associations are in the main not able to express or articulate autonomously the interests of the social categories concerned but are designed rather to transmit the party's conception of the "real" group interest, or more often the national or party interest to which the group interest is to be subordinated or sacrificed. (31)

Even the intelligentsia has not on the whole been able to conduct political activity as a whole class or stratum, but can act only through groups representing the occupational interests or opinions of particular segments of the intelligentsia.

True, in the changed climate since Stalin's death, there is some evidence that the mass organizations, especially the trade unions, sometimes provide a setting for the expression of a distinctive social group interest. (32) Moreover, some of the political interest groups among the intelligentsia may articulate broader group interests, when, for instance, liberal writers express the interests of certain nationalities, or of the peasants, or of the intelligentsia as a whole. (33) As time goes on, the broad social groups may become better able to express their own group interests within existing organizations or even to form new associations for this purpose.

In most East European communist countries there has been outspoken criticism of the mass organizations for their lack of representative character and their lack of activity in the defence of group interests. (34) There have been frequent statements, official and unofficial, of the desirability of more vigorous expression of group interests by these organizations and of consideration of their special interests by the party in working out public policy in relevant spheres.

In most countries, special efforts have been taken to broaden the authority of the trade unions in particular, and to encourage them to become more genuine representatives of the interests of the workers, especially at the local level, and to serve as consultants and advisors of the government and party at the national level. How far these principles will be applied is difficult to estimate, especially as the trade unions remain in all countries under the general direction of the party and are not regarded as independent pressure groups. In Yugoslavia, however, the trade unions have become much more independent and representative of the workers' interests, and have on occasion exerted a considerable influence on the course of legislation. The national plan for 1965, for instance, was rejected by the trade unions and had to be revised extensively before parliamentary approval. Moreover, strikes have occurred on more than one occasion and have been treated by the authorities as legitimate forms of opposition action.

Apart from Yugoslavia, the most notable action has been taken in Hungary with the issuance in June, 1966, of a joint resolution of government and trade unions on the role of the latter. The trade unions are increasingly thought of, in Hungary at least as having a dual function, taking account not only of the general interest as embodied in party and government decisions, but also of the more partial and restricted interests of the workers. Conflicts of interests are therefore to be expected and are supposedly not to be automatically solved, as in the past, by the subordination of partial to general interests. Similarly, the trade unions are expected to serve as transmission belts operating in two directions, providing information needed by the rule-makers on the attitudes of the workers, and funnelling policy decisions and directives to the masses. This is not to say that the authorities will necessarily accept the workers' views of their own interests, or that the unions can be allowed to neglect the general interest. Indeed, as first secretary of the Hungarian trade unions has explained it, the trade unions "represent and protect the individual interests of the workers on the basis of the interests of society as a whole." (35)

A more striking phenomenon has been the rise of activity by what may be called "political interest groups," acting sometimes outside, sometimes within the formal structure of political power, and normally seeking to influence and penetrate that structure in favour of their objectives. (36) Paraphrasing David Truman, we may define as such a group persons who possess certain common characteristics and share certain attitudes on public issues, and who adopt distinct positions on these issues and make definite claims on those in authority. (37) In the first place, "occupational interest groups" may be distinguished, formed a. by certain persons that occupy key positions in the power structure - what we may call "official" or "bureaucratic" groups, namely, the party apparatchiki, state bureaucrats and managers, security police officers, and the military, and b. by certain "professional" persons among the intelligentsia, such as the writers, economists, lawyers, educators, and natural scientists. It is assumed that each one of these broad occupational categories (bureaucratic or professional) may have certain common interests or attitudes, and may press these upon the top rulers. At the same time, within each of these classifications, "opinion groups" may be distinguished, having shared viewpoints on specific public issues which are more significant for their behaviour and for Soviet politics than the common interest of the whole occupational group.

Each of the two principal categories of groups, the "occupational" and the "opinion" groups, may be further broken down into a complex web of sub-groups, reflecting divergent aspects of occupational affiliation or outlook. Scientists, for instance, may be classified according to various criteria: institutional affiliation (Academy of Sciences, universities, other institutions); regional level of activity (all-Union, Union-Republic, provincial or local); official or non-official employment (party apparatus, government department or non-official institutions); geographical location of employment (Leningrad, Moscow, Novosibirsk); scientific field (biology, geography, etc.); function (pure scientists, technologists, governmental administrators); rank or position (full or corresponding member of the Academy, or research employees), and so on. Each opinion group may also be analyzed as a complex network of sub-groups, exhibiting a wide variety of viewpoints. For instance, among the economists or writers, it may be possible not only to distinguish "reformers" or "liberals," and "conservatives," but also to make narrower distinctions within these categories, with differing degrees of liberalism or conservatism. Moreover, opinion groups, within the military for instance, may be based not on a liberal-conservative dichotomy, but on other criteria such as differing views of war strategy.

There is then a complicated patchwork of intersecting and overlapping groups; these may in turn form complex group alliances which give each other mutual support in defence of common interests. There may be, for instance, alliances of differing professional or bureaucratic groups, based on a common regional (e.g. Siberian) or ethnic (e.g. Ukrainian) interest, or a common functional interest (e.g. agricultural). A kind of military-industrial complex allying the military, heavy industry and the party apparatus, may perhaps be identified. (38) Within several professional and bureaucratic groups, there may be opinion groups which cut across occupational lines and link together, say, the liberal writers, artists, scientists, and lawyers, in a common front on one or more issues. (39)

Brzezinski has proposed a scheme for analyzing the spectrum of opinion in Soviet politics ranging from the systemic left (radical reformists) to the systemic right (reactionaries), and including in the mainstream the left, centrist and right. (40)

A striking feature of political interest groups in communist politics is that normally they are not formally organized, but are more often loose groupings of like-minded or like-interested persons. The paradox of the Soviet or communist context is that such informal groupings are more likely than organized groups to be active exponents of common attitudes and to assert demands for government or party action; in fact such groups may come into existence because organized groups, such as the Union of Writers, do not perform these functions adequately. The more highly organized groups, such as trade unions, or the youth league, express only in a limited degree distinctive interests of their own or of the social groups which they are supposed to represent. Although an interest group is not able to set up a formal organization of its own, it may work within a legitimate officially established organization, if one exists, and seek to use it to defend distinctive group interests. A whole occupational group, such as the writers, or a segment of it, may for instance express their views through the Union of Writers. In the same way, an interest group may be able to express its interests within official institutions, say, the professional interests of all scientists through the Academy of Sciences, or the views of like-minded persons, say, the conservative military, through the journals of the Armed Forces. In such circumstances, the winning of key organizational positions, such as the editorship of a journal, or an office in the leadership organs, take on great importance and the struggle may sometimes assume certain democratic aspects in the form of electoral rivalry.

Group theory in the West has tended to emphasize, or treat exclusively, private associations or so-called pressure groups, such as trade unions or farm organizations and to exclude elements of the governmental structure. In the Soviet context, where the final making of decisions rests largely in the hands of a very small group of leaders at the apex of the system, there seems little reason to exclude group conflict at the next lower tier, i.e. at the highest level of the party and state structures. Certain official or bureaucratic groups, such as party apparatchiki, state bureaucrats, managers and the military, who possess, in varying degrees, official authority, are likely to have their own occupational group interests and their own views of the general public interest, and may sometimes press these on the ultimate decision-makers. Within these power-holding occupational groups, as in the case of non-official groups, there are also likely to be rival and conflicting viewpoints on public policy, reflecting perhaps regional or functional considerations, or ideological criteria. Moreover, the professional groups, for instance writers or economists, often straddle the line between those who hold offices endowed with official powers and those who have influence without office. Some economists for instance, work for government departments, or in party institutions; others are employed in the Academy of Sciences, the universities or individual factories. In so-called private organizations, such as the Union of Writers or the Academy of Sciences, certain apparatchiki enjoy a good deal of semi-official power, greater than that of the rank and file, and perhaps sometimes equalling those with formal authority in government or party.

Increasingly, both party and state have enlisted the services of professionals from the fields of scholarship in advisory capacities, thus bringing them closer to "officiality" and smudging the boundary between official and non-official groups.

Although these groups are close to the strategic locus of decision-making and may therefore have a greater opportunity to press their views on the top leaders, the professional groups, because of their technical expertness, their indispensability to the ruling circles in framing policy, and their own access to influential media of communication, possess substantial influence. A most striking feature of the post-Stalin scene in the USSR and in all the European communist countries has been the rise of the intellectuals as a force capable of articulating not only their own professional interests but also the interests of broader social groups and of society as a whole. It would be a mistake to assume that the increased activity of the professional interest groups is simply a product of an official decision to widen the scope of consultation and the degree of freedom of discussion. Although official actions resulting from de-Stalinization have created an atmosphere more favourable to group activity and even opposition, the professional groups themselves, taking advantage of this, have often expressed more radical opposition views and, as a result, been subjected to official criticism and restrictions.

For instance, the writers and journalists, during the critical early years of de-Stalinization in Hungary and Poland, emerged as a powerful force seeking an acceleration of the process of liberalization and constituted a radical opposition to the existing regimes. In the case of Hungary the literary community, together with other sectors of the intelligentsia, formed the spearhead of the subsequent revolution. Although the revolt was crushed, the liberal writers continued to act as an opposition, at first refusing to write for publication, and later acting as spokesmen for greater freedom of expression. Similarly, the Polish writers, and intellectuals generally, without taking the road of violent revolt, were in large degree responsible for the events of October, 1956, and continued to express their own views vigorously thereafter. Even with the reversion of the regime to stricter control of literature and the arts, the writers on more than one occasion defended their interests and protested against government actions. (41)

In Czechoslovakia, at a later stage, the writers and journalists became a significant political factor, pressing, in their associations, and in their journals, for de-Stalinization and greater freedom of expression, and in some cases directly challenging the government and individual leaders. (42) The most celebrated case was the courageous attack by the Slovak journalist, M. Hysko, on the Prime Minister, Široký. Although he was sharply censured by no less a person than the President and First Secretary, Novotný, the removal of Široký testified to the effectiveness of his opposition. Most significantly, his article had been published in the organ of the Slovak Communist Party, Pravda, which, on that and on other occasions, served as the vehicle of oppositional attitudes. Other literary periodicals, in particular Literární noviny and Kulturní život, continued for years to be a thorn in the flesh of the regime, publishing critical articles dealing with all aspects of Czech and Slovak life, and bringing down on their heads torrents of official censure. (43) A crucial aspect of this struggle was the membership of the editorial boards of these journals and the executive committees of the literary associations. In spite of repeated condemnation and changes in leading personnel, the periodicals persisted in their oppositional attitudes.

Similarly, social scientists and other scholars have played an important role in the political life of certain countries.

As in the case of the writers, lawyers, economists, sociologists, and even historians and philosophers have constituted influential interest groups in their respective fields. "Opinion groups" within these occupational categories, conservative as well as liberal, have voiced conflicting opinions and thus constituted important oppositions of varying kinds. In particular the economists have played a significant role in criticising the older planning system in advocating economic reforms, and often in complaining about the slowness of the reforms officially adopted. Sharp cleavages have manifested themselves on the nature of the reforms among the economists, and between economists and bureaucratic groups. Similar controversies among historians, in the course of a more objective re-evaluation of the past, have often had direct political relevance. Lawyers have been less influential, but have actively contributed to the discussions of legal reform. The rise of the discipline of sociology has introduced a new and important element in scholarship capable of serving as an instrument in the formation of policy. A unique feature of certain countries, as distinct from the Soviet Union, has been the part played by philosophers in the expression of dissident views and the advocacy of greater freedom of discussion. Indeed a common point made by scholars in many fields has been the need for greater liberty of expression, in some cases going as far as a demand for absolute freedom.

Space prevents extensive analysis of the methods and channels employed by interest groups in articulating their interests and, where necessary, expressing dissent. To a considerable extent, in so far as the discussions are conducted within the administrative institutions of party and state, the clash of opposing viewpoints takes place behind the scenes and is not subject to scholarly analysis. To some degree, there may be efforts similar to what we know as "lobbying" in the West, when professional and even bureaucratic groups privately seek to exert influence on the appropriate bureaucratic office, either in the party or the state. There is likely also to be a good deal of tension, and action and counter-action, between party and state offices, between individual departments of government, between central and regional agencies and even between central administration and the local government agencies.

Most striking, however, has been the emergence, in a previously unknown degree, of public discussion, either in the main organs of communication, the newspapers, and to a lesser extent on radio and television, or more surprisingly, in the scholarly and cultural media, such as journals and conferences of scholarly associations, the literary journals and associations, or the books and plays of the writing community.

It should be clear that opposition of the kinds we have been discussing differs greatly from what would normally be regarded as legitimate opposition in a democratic political system. Such dissent has perforce to operate within strict limits, although not as strict as has customarily been assumed and was once the case. The party's monopoly of the instruments of coercion prevents violent revolutionary opposition and after the fiasco of Hungary, a resort to force is not likely to occur, except in the eventuality of a serious future crisis. Moreover, although the coercive power of the regimes is exercised more lightly than in the past, and not in the form of outright terror, its presence still inhibits non-violent opposition of a fundamental or integral kind. Similarly, the nature of the electoral system and the domination of a single party rules out effective parliamentary or electoral opposition.

The centralized and unified nature of the party sets strict limits on the functioning of factional opposition and usually blocks them in realizing their objectives. This does not entirely exclude the possibility of the replacement of leaders by oppositional groups through the secret processes of Politburo intrigue. The party's continuing claim to exercise total control of society, including the organized interest groups, circumscribes the overt autonomous action by such groups, although it does not entirely prevent it, as for instance in such cases as the Czechoslovak writers' associations. The establishment of a single official theory, Marxism-Leninism restricts the expression of oppositional views and requires a high degree of doctrinal conformity in voicing dissent. There is, however, some latitude for various interpretations of the official doctrine, for instance in matters of economic reform, so that divergent viewpoints are not entirely excluded.

The Party's monopoly of the means of communications also do not rule out the expression of diverse views on even sensitive issues such as literary or scholarly freedom, economic or legal reform. The party, while paying homage to the idea of freedom of discussion, never fails to stress that this freedom cannot be an absolute one, and that criticism, or dissent, must be conducted within the framework of Marxism-Leninism and the general party line and cannot extend to include "bourgeois" or "anti-communist" views. If necessary, the party can resort to "administrative" measures, such as the closing down of a periodical, the removal of an editor, public censure of an offending critic, expulsion from the party, dismissal from posts held, or in the most extreme cases, arrest and trial. This in turn may sometimes lead to continued resistance by the person in question and perhaps protests by his colleagues. In some cases the expression of dissent may escape the control of the party and involve dissident views sharply opposed to the party's line. As in the case of the cultural periodicals in Czechoslovakia, a running battle may go on for some years, with the editors resisting heavy attack but not giving in to steady pressure.

How the process of opposition will develop in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the future is difficult to predict. Due to the difference of national background and the relative shortness of communist rule in the countries of Eastern Europe, the evolution of opposition is likely to exhibit features very different to those of the Soviet Union. Whatever occurs indeed is likely to vary greatly according to the country, as the national traditions become more and more influential factors in the political culture of each communist country. The tradition of the monolithic party and of the party's monopolistic position is, however, likely to die hard and to continue to set strict limits on the expression of opposition. If present trends continue, however, there is likely to be expanded opportunities for non-governing interest groups to express dissent and to influence public policy through private pressure and public discussion. The party is likely to remain the main mechanism of political control and rule-making, but its role will increasingly become that of an agency of conciliation and harmonization. (44)

There has been some speculation in the West of the possibility of the emergence of a kind of political pluralism and of an institutionalization of opposition in the Soviet Union and Eastern European communist countries. (45) Even in communist countries there has been occasional suggestions of this kind, in particular that made by the Czech philosopher, Strinka, when he deplored the weakness of individual dissent and argued strongly for an institutionalized form of opposition. (46)



Certainly there are possibilities of greater parliamentary participation in policy-formation, as has occurred in some degree in Yugoslavia, of more effective parliamentary control of executive action, of electoral competition among persons sharing similar views, and of greater influence on decision-making by organizations such as the trade unions and other professional associations within their spheres of interest. Suggestions along these lines have been made with increasing frequency in the communist world, and the measures moving in this direction have been introduced. The likelihood of the emergence of an advanced form of pluralism in the form of an effective multi-party system or even a fully democratic exploration of policy alternatives, with wide opportunities for dissent, seem, however, to be remote.

NOTES

- (1) Robert Tucker's comment on Z.K. Brzezinski, "The Nature of the Soviet System," Slavic Review, XX (Oct. 1961), 379-80.
- (2) See my "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," World Politics, XVIII, No. 3 (April, 1966), pp. 435-51. Cf. Carl Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964 (Baltimore, 1966), Introduction, and Sidney Ploss, Conflict and Decision-making in Soviet Russia. A Case Study of Agricultural Policy, 1953-1963 (Princeton, 1965), Introduction and Conclusion.
- (3) See in particular the special issue, "The Dead End of the Monolithic Parties," Government and Opposition, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Jan. Apr. 1967), pp. 165-80, and ensuing articles in the same issue. See also two earlier articles by Jerzy J. Wiatr and Adam Przeworski, "Control without Opposition," ibid., vol. 1, No. 2 (Jan. 1966), pp. 227-39, and Ghita Ionescu, "Control and Contestation in some One-Party States," ibid., pp. 240-50. See G. Ionescu, "The future of the monolithic party," International Conference of Futuribles, Paris (April, 1965), mimeo. A fuller study by G. Ionescu will be published shortly, The Politics of the European Communist States (London, 1967). As this was not available at the time of writing, all references are to Ionescu's already published works. In his forthcoming book, however, he has modified some of the concepts and definitions quoted here. See my chapter on Opposition in Communist East Europe in the forthcoming volume by Robert Dahl, "Emerging Oppositions."
- (4) See Leonard Schapiro, "'Putting the lid on Leninism,' Opposition and Dissent in the communist one-party states," Government and Opposition, 2, 2 (Jan. April, 1967), pp. 181-203. See the fuller treatment in his book, The Origin of the Communist Autocracy, Political Opposition in the Soviet State. First Phase, 1917-1922 (London, Cambridge, 1955).
- (5) See Robert V. Daniels, The Conscience of the Revolution Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia (Cambridge, 1960).
- (6) F.C. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR (Boston and Toronto, 1966), pp. 13, 20-21.
- (7) The Polish sociologist, Jerzy J. Wiatr has called this a "hegemonical party system," rather than a one party system strictly. See his "One-party Systems - The Concept and Issue for Comparative Studies," in Transactions of Westermarck Society, Vol. X, E. Allardt and Y. Littunen (eds.), Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems, Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology (Helsinki, 1964), pp. 281-90.
- (8) Pravda, February 20, 1967.
- (9) In Hungary, for instance, the existence of "separate platforms" or "factions" within the party was explicitly rejected by the party daily newspaper, Nepszabadsag, May 16, 1963. Cf. the views of the Czech leader, Hendrych, (Rude právo, Feb. 10, 1967) that there can be "different opinions on different problems, but not 'representatives of different ideologies.'" In Poland, in 1964-65, university students, J. Kuron and K. Modzelewski, were expelled from the Party and later imprisoned for opposition activity, including an open letter condemning the entire Polish system.

In 1966 Prof. L. Kolakowski was expelled from the Party for a speech severely criticizing the regime's failures since 1956 (The New York Times, Nov. 1, 5, 1966). The Czech leader, J. Hendrych, has written that there can be "different opinions on different problems," but not "representatives of different ideologies" (Rudé právo, Feb. 10, 1967).

(10) Vol. 1, No. 1 (Oct. 1965), pp. 1, 3.

(11) Cf. an elaboration of this theme by the Czech scholar Z. Mlynář, Věda a Život, No. 1, 1965. Mlynář has described the leading role of the party as involving "the conscious embodiment of the interests of the whole society in its entirety, but also the deliberate harmonization of these interests." See his article, "Problems of Political Leadership and the New Economic System," Problémy mira i sotsialisma, No. 12 (December, 1965); p. 98. Hendrych, in his article cited earlier referred to the party as "the bearer of the general social interests" (Rudé právo, Feb. 10, 1967).

The Polish scholar, Wiatr, has referred to the party as "the forum of the expression of the non-antagonistic classes of interests of various socialist strata of the Polish society," and as "the platform where the divergent interests of the socialist society collide." Although the struggle of class interests takes place outside the party, the "resolution of conflicts which harmonize the interests of workers and their allies" takes place within the party and is guaranteed by intra-party democracy. See Jerzy J. Wiatr, "The Elements of the Pluralism in the Polish Political System," The Polish Sociological Bulletin, No. 1, 1966, pp. 22-23.

(12) Z. Mlynář, in an important article already cited, rejected the "effort to solve these problems without discussions and controversies, without democratic deliberation of various possible alternatives, without serious scientific and theoretical elaboration of the perspectives of development." (P. 93).

(13) Brzezinski and Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (New York, 1964), p. 105.

(14) Schapiro defines "opposition" as "an organized political group, or groups, of which the aim is to oust the government in power and to replace it by one of its own choosing." Dissent on the other hand seeks "merely to criticize, to exhort, to persuade, and to be listened to." (Government and Opposition, 2, 2, pp. 182-83). Ionescu defines contestation as "the anti-system, basic and permanent postulates of any opposition on the grounds of fundamental dichotomic differences of opinion and ideologies." (Ibid., I, 2, p. 241).

(15) Ionescu and Wiatr use the concept of "control" in this connection. Ionescu defines "political control" as "non-constitutional and non-institutional direct participation in, and influencing of, the decision-making processes in a non-parliamentary society by forces, groups and agencies indispensable to the running of that society (Ibid., p. 240). Wiatr and Przeworski define control in the political sense as "the possibility of influencing those who hold power in such a way that they take into account the interests of groups exerting this control." (Op. cit., p. 231).

- (16) This is close to what Robert Dahl refers to as revolutionary "structural opposition." See Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, p. 342. Cf. the somewhat awkward term, "contestation," employed by Ionescu, "Control and contestation in some one-party states," cited above, p. 241.
- (17) This is comparable to Alex Nove's "dissent within consensus," Government and Opposition, 2:2 (Jan. April, 1967), pp. 175-76. Cf. the term "orthodox dissent," in Brzezinski and Huntington, op. cit., p. 110.
- (18) See the author's Communism National and International (Toronto, 1964).
- (19) Robert A. Dahl (ed.), Political Opposition in Western Democracies (New Haven and London, 1966).
- (20) Ibid., pp. XI-XII, XIV.
- (21) See Jerzy J. Wiatr and Adam Przeworski op. cit., Vol. 1, No. 2, (Jan. 1966), pp. 227-39, and Ghita Ionescu, op. cit., ibid., pp. 240-50.
- (22) See V.C. Chrypinski, "Legislative Committees in Polish Lawmaking," Slavic Review, XXV, 2 (June, 1966), pp. 247-58.
- (23) East Europe, 16: 1 and 2 (Jan. and Feb. 1967), pp. 28 and 37 resp.
- (24) Wiatr and Przeworski, op. cit., pp. 238-39. A fuller analysis of Polish elections is given by Wiatr in his chapter on "Elections and Voting Behaviour in Poland," in A. Ranney (ed.), Essays on the Behavioural Study of Politics (Urbana, 1962), pp. 237-51. See p. 239. For further discussion of the Polish system, see Wiatr, "One-party Systems" cited above, pp. 287-89; Wiatr, "The Electoral System and Elements of Pluralism in a 'One-Party' System: Poland," Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology, International Sociological Association, 1962, Vol. IV, pp. 381-86.
- (25) Wiatr, in Ranney, op. cit., p. 251.
- (26) Ibid., p. 239.
- (27) This has been called Yugoslavia's "1 1/2 party system" (The New York Times, May 29, 1966). See R.V. Burks and S.A. Stanković "Jugoslawien auf dem Weg zu halbfreien Wahlen," Osteuropa, 17, 2/3 (Feb. March, 1967) pp. 131-46. For further discussion of elections in communist countries of Eastern Europe, see my book, The Governments of Communist East Europe, pp. 130-34.
- (28) For instance, see the articles by Miroslav Jodl, a Czech sociologist, in Literární noviny, November 13, 1965, and Jan. 22, 1966. Cf. also the Polish discussion in 1965 of Adam Schaff's book, Marxism and the Individual and of his concept of the power elite and alienation under communism. The Slovak, M. Lakatoš, has written of the manipulation of the ruled by the rulers and urged genuinely free elections as a means of preventing this (Právní obzor, No. 3, 1966, also translated in East Europe, 15, No. 6 (June, 1966), pp. 22-23.
- (29) Christian Science Monitor, March 31, 1966.
- (30) The daily organ of the Hungarian People's Front, Magyar Nemzet (August 28, 1966), used this as an argument that an opposition party was not necessary. Criticism, it declared, is "the essence of opposition." In Hungary, the Party and the government criticize everything at all times, where things are not going as they should and thus "supply the checking and criticizing functions of an opposition."

- (31) See Emily Clark Brown, Soviet Trade Unions and Labor Relations (Cambridge, 1966), especially Chap. XI. Cf. her article, "Interest and Rights of Soviet Industrial Workers and the Resolution of Conflicts," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 16, 2 (Jan., 1963), pp. 254-78. Brown concludes that although the unions are expected to protect the interests of the workers more than in the past, they still function more as "arms of the government or party, carrying out policies established above, than as independent agencies representing the workers and their interests" (her book, p. 277; cf. pp. 80-85). They act "more like sections of a government department of labour than as independent trade union centres" (her article, p. 319).
- (32) This is particularly true at the factory and regional level of the trade unions. At the national level, the trade unions are consulted on labour legislation and even issue, with government or party, joint decrees, but it is difficult to determine whether and to what extent they express a distinctive workers' interest in this activity. See Brown, "Interests and Rights," pp. 258-59, 261 ff., 277, and her book, pp. 139 ff. For a controversy over the role of Soviet Unions, see the article by Paul Barton (Problems of Communism, IX, 4 (July-Aug., 1960), pp. 18-27, and the ensuing discussion (*ibid.*, IX, 6, Nov.-Dec., 1960), pp. 38-47).
- (33) Certain writers have directed attention to economic difficulties on the collective farms (Solzhenitsyn), or to the continued existence of anti-semitism (Evtushenko).
- (34) Z. Mlynář (Rudé právo, Aug. 16, 1966). The same writer, in the international communist organ, argued that these organizations should not serve as mere transmission belts operating in one direction only (Problemy mira i sotsializma, Dec. 1965, p. 97.) The Polish writer, Wiatr, has written of the dual function of various interest groups, serving not only as "pressure groups," which "represent the interests of their groups vis-à-vis the Party and the government," but also as "mobilizing groups," which mobilize their members to the tasks put forth by party and government. (Polish Sociological Bulletin, cited above, p. 24).
- (35) S. Gaspar, Nepszabadsag, December 2, 1966.
- (36) For fuller discussion see H.G. Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths forthcoming book, "Interest Groups in Soviet Politics."
- (37) David B. Truman, The Governmental Process, Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York, 1951), pp. 33-37.
- (38) Shulman, op. cit., p. 43.
- (39) See e.g. the letter of Sept., 1966, to the Central Committee, opposing the rehabilitation of Stalin, which was signed by leading writers, scientists and artists.
- (40) "Evolution in the USSR," p. 10. Barghoorn also refers to a liberal-conservative continuum (op. cit., pp. 180-81), with certain occupational groups tending to one or other extreme.
- (41) For instance, the 1964 letter to the government of 34 writers protesting censorship and paper restrictions.
- (42) See my book, Communism, National and International (Toronto, 1964), Chap. 7, for a detailed discussion of these events.

- (43) See the Central Committee resolution on the cultural periodicals, Rudé právo, April 4, 1964, and subsequent official denunciations extending up to the present. In early 1966, the party organ, Život strany (no. 1, Jan., 1966) had to refer again to "disquieting tendencies" in these periodicals and to charge them with failing to eliminate their shortcomings.
- (44) See the discussion on the future of monolithic parties in the special issue of Government and Opposition, cited in (2) p. 1, my book, The Governments of Communist East Europe, concluding chapter.
- (45) Z. Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?" Problems of Communism, XV, 1 (Jan. Feb., 1966), pp. 1-15.
- (46) See Julius Strinka, "On Reticent Dogmatism and Revolutionary Dialectics," Kulturny Život, No. 48, Nov. 6, 1965. Integrated Power" must be balanced, he wrote, by "integrated criticism," if the latter were to become effective. A similar view was expressed by an anonymous Czech, in a Western journal, where he argued the necessity of a genuine political opposition. "The Art of Survival. A Czech Writer Looks Back," Survey, No. 51 (April, 1964), pp. 83-84. Strinka's argument was explicitly rejected by M. Marko, Nová mysl, Nov. 29, 1966.

## THE GOALS OF SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY

by Karl C. Thalheim, Berlin

The fundamental goals of the economic policy of a country can be determined by quite different factors; among them there are standing in the first line especially factors of a policy of welfare, of interests, of power, and ideological factors. Which of these in a particular case have the greatest weight, depends on the historical situation as well as on the character of the problems arising, and on the political structure of the country: in a parliamentary democracy points of view of welfare and of particular interests will prevail, in authoritarian and totalitarian states a policy of power will regularly play a leading part.

This is particularly true for the Soviet Union. Soviet economic policy was, however, for a long time characterized, besides of this, by an unusually great importance of ideological determinants; it is a question, nowadays widely discussed in western science and institutions dealing with public opinion, whether or not, and to what extent, these ideological ties have slackened today. I shall come back to this point later.

The decisive goals of Soviet economic policy may be divided into three fundamental categories:

- 1) Creation of a "socialist" economy, with the final aim to develop it into a "communist" economy.
  - 2) Creation of the greatest possible economic, and especially industrial, potential, with "predominating development of heavy industry" and with the greatest possible increase in the rate of economic growth.
  - 3) Realization of an efficient central planning both of economic development on the long view (perspective plans) and of the current economic process (operative plans).
- This central planning has to secure the realization of the goals mentioned under 1) and 2) as well as to do away with the "anarchy of the capitalistic way of production", as pretended by marxism-leninism.

Within the three goals mentioned above, ideological influence is most manifest with the first; its root idea is the general refusal, developed by classical marxism and taken over by Soviet communism, of the "capitalistic" economic system, which is based on individual property in the means of production and, in close connection with this, on private enterprise. The final goal here is not so much an economic one than one concerning social structure: the "capitalistic society of exploiters" is to be replaced within the first period by the "socialistic" society, according to the principle formulated by Marx, "everybody according to his abilities, to everybody according to his achievements". In the second period this society is to be replaced by the communist one, in which the principle rules, "everybody according to his abilities, to everybody according to his needs"; it is to be (as has again been proclaimed in the program of the CPSU of 1961) a society of complete equals. The total abolition of individual property in the means of production and of any economic activity related to the individual seems to marxism-leninism to be an absolute pre-condition for the realization of such socialistic economy and society.

The second fundamental goal, the realization of a maximum economic potential and of maximum rates in economic growth, is, it is true, to some extent also ideologically determined, but here other factors, mainly of political power, play a role which in reality is much more significant. The following two elements are of an ideological kind:

1) As did classical marxism, so Soviet communism maintains that a system of centrally planned economy on the basis of "socialistic" property in the means of production is the progressive economic system, the one by far superior to "capitalism"; in it the "fundamental contradiction between conditions of production and productive forces", characteristic for "capitalism", was eliminated. The economic/consequence of this pretended superiority must be a considerably higher working productivity, which, in its turn, creates the conditions for a particularly quick economic growth. The "coming up with and leaving behind the developed capitalistic countries", arising as a final function as early



as soon after the revolution of October 1917, must accordingly also be taken as the proof for the truth of the maintained superiority of the economic system.

2) The realization of complete communism with a distribution "according to the needs" presupposes an elimination of the scarcity in goods necessary for the satisfaction of demands (at least inasmuch as, according to Khrushchev's formula, "the reasonable needs of a culturally fully developed human being" are concerned). This is possible only along with a tremendous increase in production and productivity; which had indeed been expected by Marx and Engels and by Soviet communism. Here, however, the possibility of a conflict as to the final aims becomes clearly visible: maximum economic growth demands maximum investments, which can only be carried out together with a corresponding limitation of current consumption; this, however, is in contrast to the communist aim of a supply for the broad masses of the "working population", a supply growing richer and richer, and more equal, already in the present, and beating the standard of living in the "capitalistic" countries.

Indeed, for this second basic goal of Soviet economic policy increase in the potential of power of the Soviet Union was for a long time absolutely determinant. As long as the Soviet Union, as the only communist country, found herself faced with a world where she reckoned with the possibility of an attack, this potential of power was first of all a potential of defense. Along with this, however, the idea of an expansion of the world revolution from the very beginning played an important role, the significance of which multiplied with the opposition to the USA rising after World War II. To the problem of a potential of power in the aspects of economic policy a new aspect was added after World War II, by the extension of the Soviet sphere to the East and Southeast European satellites.

In the third main goal, the realization of an efficient central planning, ideological foundation plays an equally important part in marxist criticism of the capitalistic system. It has been taken over by Soviet political economy without a change, but made coarser in some respect. In view of the fact that nowadays in a number of western countries,

too, certain forms of planning are being applied, it must be stated that Soviet planning in the form developed in the Stalin era is the purest realization of imperative planning (as opposed to the methods of indicative planning, applied in the west), which means that it is to a very high extent an economy of compulsion and command. The superiority of this imperative planning over an order based on a free market system was held in the Soviet Union, and is held even today as an undisputed dogma. Only in the most recent period of development reforms of this system have been started, which will be mentioned later.

Along with the ideological-dogmatic justification of this type of central planning, however, real factors play a role, too: the aim of maximum growth, mentioned in the second place, and particularly the realization of a certain structure in this growth, i.e. predominant development of heavy industry, were to be attained most easily just in this way. Finally there must be mentioned an aspect of interest -- as seen from the interests of the communist Party, dominating the state -- : the Party's monopoly of power is best secured in the field of economy by an imperative central planning; for it enables the respective groups of Party leaders to determine not only the aims of economic activity, but also its actual course, and far into the details. By which positions are also secured to political functionaries which without central planning they would hardly get into.

With regard to the different periods in the development of Soviet economic system, considered in the aspect of the three fundamental goals of Soviet economic policy as mentioned above, it is obvious that in the first phase, that of war communism, there could virtually be realized only the first main goal, socialization, and even this only apart from agriculture, on which still more than three-quarters of Soviet population were living. Even though at that time the collective organization of agriculture was clearly recognizable as a final aim, yet the policy of "mytchka", pursued by Lenin to secure the revolution, made a radical abolition of individual farming impossible. What was possible, however, was the complete socialization of what was outside agriculture, the "commanding points",

as Lenin called them, (mainly big and middle industry, banking, transport, and foreign trade), and only in the sector of small and smallest enterprise "capitalistic" relics remained. The aim of maximum growth, in a time of heaviest recession in production and extraordinary difficulties in supply, (for which Bucharin and Varga by their analysis of the "period of transformation" tried to furnish a theoretical explanation), had to remain a far-away phantasmagoria. For the realization of a central planning other than sketched out on paper, in this period neither the theoretical nor the conditions in organization were there.

The period of the "Novaia Ekonomicheskaja Politika", on the introduction of which the Soviet leaders had to resolve in spring 1921 because of the imminent collapse of Soviet economy, meant a pace back in the realization of all three fundamental goals. The NEP not only meant the temporary renunciation of socialization in agriculture; beyond this there had to be admitted small private enterprise in industry, small trade, and commerce, even though the size of this sector of private economy must not be overrated. In view of the economic potential it was on the whole only possible to restore the pre-war standard. Central planning, too, did not get beyond its beginnings; it is true, however, that during this period the conditions in organization were created on which Stalin then could build up the specifically Soviet planning system.

Starting with the beginning of the first five-years' plan in 1928, the Stalin era brought the full realization of all three main goals. Full socialization was rapidly and almost noiselessly carried through by the elimination of small private enterprise, which had preserved, or regained, its status during the period of the NEP, methods of taxation playing a considerable part in the process. More difficult, by far not so noiseless, and connected with much greater sacrifices and losses, was the forced introduction of collective organization into agriculture at the beginning of the thirties, making almost completely disappear individual farming within the first half of the decade. As early as at the end of the period of the first five-years' plan the aim of socialization was thereby as good as completely reached. The remainder of small individual farming and craft enterprises was a negligible quantity of no importance. Only the

"auxiliary economies" of the kolkhozniki still represented a sphere (of quickly growing importance for the supply of the population) though not of private property, but still of economic activity carried on under one's own responsibility and without subordination to planning orders.

The organization of central planning was fully built up at the beginning of the first five-years' plan, although during the following 25 years of Stalin's rule it was again and again submitted to alterations. The instruments, too, of which planning made use, were developed in their decisive forms. Fully comprehensive planning of all economic processes by central authorities soon proved, it is true, incompatible with economic variety; a certain delegation of decisive competences to the enterprises as the units in which the realization of the plans had to be carried out, was therefore inevitable. In the final phase of the Stalin era this (certainly very limited) decentralization was further developed by an increasing emphasis on the khozrschot principle and by the treaty system.

Clear beyond any doubt became now the aim of maximum growth, to which with the greatest consistency and with extreme disadvantage for the standard of living of the population were sacrificed all aims of welfare. (Things were different in the fields of education and health, which cannot be dealt with here). That this economic growth was exclusively destined to build up Soviet industry with "predominant development of heavy industry" and including those sectors necessary for industrial development, in particular mining, is too well known to be specially emphasized here.

Central planning made possible a concentration in the process of growth, according to the aims set up by the Party management, and consequently an extraordinarily strong growth where concentration had been approved of. Such concentration, however, necessarily meant a falling behind in other fields, among them in the Stalin era first of all in the industry of consumer goods, house-building, and -- which later on turned out to be dangerous -- in agriculture. These branches did not develop at all according to the growth of Soviet population and to the shifts in

the population as to location and occupation, caused by the process of industrialization.

The one-sided emphasis that was put on the aim of growth had yet another effect: the main social goal originally proclaimed by Soviet communism, the realization of a communist society, was more and more removed into nebulous distance. A realization, however approximate, of the aims concerning growth presupposed, besides of an occupational shifting from agriculture to industry and to the other non-agricultural branches, a considerable increase in working productivity. This was, in contrast to the original hopes of communist ideology, not to be attained merely by transformation of the conditions of property and the appeal to "socialist consciousness"; to this end, direct use of the "material interestedness" had to be made. This, however, meant increasing material differentiation, to the justification of which Marx' formula was resorted to, that in the period of socialism (Marx speaks of the "first phase" of communism) distribution had still to go on after the principle of efficiency; it does not seem likely, however, that Marx should have thought of material differentiation as carried to such an extent as was actually reached in the Stalin era.

A second fundamental declination from the social aims of communism, which were sacrificed to the economic aim of maximum growth, was the compulsory character, more and more manifest, of the working constitution during the Stalin era. The camps for hard labor, which, along with their political importance as instruments for securing the position of the rulers, became an integrant element of the Soviet working constitution, may be said to be the most frightful failure of the Stalinistic system, if compared with Marx' aim of a "higher form of human freedom".

If we still add that the efforts toward a maximum of economic growth made necessary a very high rate of investments and accordingly a very low, and very slowly rising, standard of consumption of the population, the character of an economic policy subordinating all other aims to the forced building-up of the economic potential becomes sufficiently clear. It is, however, undeniable that thereby at the beginning of Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union a po-

tential was created which, in spite of heavy losses, -- although with considerable help from the western allies -- secured the economic basis of warfare. -

In the aspects of "continuity and change" an attempt is to be made in the following lines to deal with the aims of economic policy that have been pursued during the almost one and a half decades since Stalin's death by the succeeding Soviet leader teams from Malenkov to Khrushchev and then to Brezhnev - Kosygin. With regard to the first main goal, that of socialization, there can be stated nearly perfect "continuity", and "change" only to a very modest degree. The most important case of "change" was the dissolution of the MTS under Khrushchev and the sale of their machinery to the kolkhozes; according to the original terminology this would have meant a transformation of socialistic property from the "higher" into the "lower" form. Pointing the other way, however, was the transformation of the greatest part of production enterprises run by trade cooperative societies into state enterprises, the spread of sovkhoses, with the share of the kolkhozes on the decrease, and Khrushchev's attempt to diminish the auxiliary economies of the kolkhozniki in favor of the kolkhozes. This attempt, it is true, has been stopped after Khrushchev's fall; yet even the present team of Soviet leaders unchangeably stick to the principle of exclusively "socialistic" property in production means.. It was still during the Stalin era that this principle was transferred to the East and South-east European states that had come under Soviet influence. There is only one remarkable exception: the re-admission of individual farming enterprises in Poland.

Now as before there was full agreement about encouragement of economic growth being the central task of economic policy and economic planning. No Soviet leader underlined it so much as did Khrushchev, who wanted, in particular by the seven-years' plan of 1959 - 1965, to create the conditions necessary for the "coming up with and leaving behind" the USA. In reality, however, the following remarkable changes have taken place, as compared with the Stalin era:

1) Failures in reaching unrealistically high aims -- failure of the 6th five-years' plan, which had to be prematurely stopped in 1957; important aims not attained in the seven-years' plan, although in comparison with the 6th five-years' plan this was more careful already -- caused the Soviet leaders to set up more realistic aims for the growth and the extension of the potential.

2) The dangers connected with the unbalanced growth in the Stalin era have been recognized. Even though industrial growth is now, as it was before, the main goal of the Soviet leaders, yet considerably higher investments are assigned now for agriculture, which is not in the last place to be explained by the serious failures in agrarian policy during the period of the seven-years' plan.

3) Certainly, high and increasing rates of investment as a pre-supposition for the growth to be reached, remain an explicit aim. But the present Soviet leaders realize that, in setting up the planning aims, they have to give more weight to the supply of the Soviet population --for economic reasons as well as for political and social ones. Along with an extension of the basis for food supply by measures aiming at an increase in agrarian production, housing, production of industrial consumer goods, and development of service enterprises are of considerably greater importance today for the setting-up of the planning aims.

4) During these last years not only in Soviet political economy, but also within the leading group of the Soviet Union insight has been growing that it is not so much maximization that counts in economy, but optimization, i.e. reaching the best relation possible of effort and effect. For decisions in economic policy to be made in the future, and among them decisions concerning investments in particular, this may prove important. The question will be essential in how much the idea of optimization will be able to prevail against politically determined aims, often contrary to it.

Connected with the gradual expansion of the idea of optimization are the changes in the field of planning. Influence of some weight is also exercising the progress made by Soviet political economy, which to a considerable extent is making efforts today to develop a methodology and theory of planning, after getting rid of the prohibition still pronounced by Stalin in his last paper "Economic problems of socialism in the USSR". There are no doubts as to the truth of the principle of central planning -- in contrast mainly to the development in Yugo-Slavia; however, whereas in the Stalin era the realization of this principle, such as it looked then, was in all its essential features considered to be obligatory and not open to discussion, there is a readiness today to admit a variety of realizations. The attempt made by Khrushchev in the "great reform of administration" in 1957, to solve the problem of the notorious defects and weaknesses of planned economy as it was, by means of a regional decentralization of economic administration (creation of the sovnarkhozes) having failed, the problem is now the transfer of decisive competences from state authorities to the enterprises (particularly known in the west as "Liberman discussion"). The present team of Soviet leaders is moving very carefully -- partly in the form of experiments limited to certain enterprises -- in the direction of such decentralization. What hitherto has been realized of reforms is about on the same level as the so-called "New Economic System of Planning and Management of the National Economy of the GDR", and so considerably falls behind what the groups of progressive reformers in Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary are aiming at with regard to decentralization of decisions and transformation of the planning system. In the hesitating attitude of the Soviet leaders there are not only ideological obstacles playing a part, originating in Stalinistic political economy, but also the fear that the Party's monopoly of power might suffer from a far-reaching decentralization, and the fear of the more extensive consequences for the planning system in general, which might result from reforms of a more fundamental kind.



One last word about the goals in the field of foreign economic policy. The attempt made in the period of NEP to mobilize foreign capital and foreign enterprisers' experience for the building-up of Soviet economy by granting "concessions", soon failed. The "building-up of socialism in one country" in the Stalin era had -- in part deliberately, in part owing to circumstances -- to be pursued to a great extent under the banner of autarchy. Certainly, the Soviet Union could not quite do without importation as a supplement to the own production; exportation, however, was considered a necessary evil, necessary in order to secure the equivalents for importation, which was important for the fulfilment of plans. Consumer goods were as much as not imported at all during that period.

A new situation arose when after World War II great parts of East Central Europe and South-east Europe were drawn into the immediate sphere of political influence of the Soviet Union. The latter was thereby for the first time able to build up a foreign trade of importance to her, with countries of the same economic system, as to all these countries the specifically Stalinistic economical system had been transferred. To a centrally planned national economy this meant a decrease in the economic risk of foreign trade, with certainly an increase at the same time of the political risk, as is illustrated by the evolution of Soviet commercial relations to Yugo-Slavia in 1948, and to China later on.

In fact, the formation of the economic "east block", for which a top organization was created in 1949 as the "Council for Mutual Economic Help", at first manifested itself mainly by the development of foreign trade between the states belonging to the block; rather soon a share in this of the intra-block trade was reached of about 75 % on an average. Up to 1956 the Soviet Union made rather unscrupulous use of her predominance in the east block in order to manage the economic conditions of this foreign trade --

in particular the Terms of Trade -- in her own favor. The events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary then caused her, however, to take considerably more care in this respect.

In the following years -- partly under the influence of the economic successes of the EEC -- the desire of the Soviet Union became more and more manifest to establish a real economic integration within the east block, in particular also by a division of labor between the member states, mainly in industrial production. As a necessary condition for this, decisive competences were to be transferred to the organs of the Council for Mutual Help, such/as they did not possess within the former structure of the council. These intentions of the Soviet Union, however, have so far been unsuccessful because of the obstruction of Rumania. The Soviet Union has since laid the stress of her efforts in foreign trade on the development of the economic relations with those countries of the block which are of particular importance to her as furnishers, first of all the GDR. Long-term commercial treaties, synchronized with the perspective plans, have been, and are still, to the Soviet Union an important instrument in foreign economic policy.

The development of foreign trade also to non-communist countries has more and more been recognized in the Soviet Union during these last years as being a useful supplement of the own production, and, in order to make it possible, the Soviet Union makes efforts to extend her exportation into these countries as well (e.g. mineral oil). It is, however, very likely that the main stress in Soviet foreign trade will lie, as it used to, within the east block.

If one tries to survey the evolution of Soviet economic policy during half a century and to sum it up in the aspect of "continuity and change", one will have to state that in spite of all alterations in the different phases, "continuity" has proved stronger than "change". Within the last years, it is true, changes have become more rapid and more intense. This is connected not in the last place with a growing maturity of Soviet economy and society. There is no doubt that this process is not at its end, but will continue. But it must be left completely open, in how much the Soviet Union will be able to succeed in realizing the further development into a fully communist economy and society, as was announced once more and with great emphasis in the Party program of 1961.

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PATHS OF COMMUNIST REVOLUTION: 1917-1967.

by

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PATHS OF COMMUNIST REVOLUTION: 1917-1967

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I.

That the revolution of October, 1917 was of huge importance in the national history of Russia needs no arguing. With the approach of its fiftieth anniversary, it is natural that its impact upon various aspects of Russia's development should be scrutinized. The present essay addresses itself to a different but related task. It is concerned with the Russian revolution as part of a larger historical process. In the fifty years since it occurred, there have been successful communist revolutions in thirteen other countries which, together with Soviet Russia, collectively comprise about a third of the globe's land surface and population. In these pages, I want to consider Russia's October as one of fourteen communist revolutions of the twentieth century. The subject is the comparative politics of communist revolution.

Classical Marxism, i.e., the thought of Marx and Engels, projected the communist revolution as a universal phenomenon. The goal it foresaw for Weltgeschichte was a planetary communist society wherein man everywhere would

realize his essential creative nature, having overcome by the socialization of private property the alienation endured in the course of history. Although the arenas of proletarian communist revolution would be national, the revolutionary movement would not and could not be confined to one or a few major nations but would overflow national boundaries owing to the emergence in the bourgeois period of large-scale machine industry and a world market linking all countries. Thus the Communist Manifesto spoke of the communist revolution as occurring initially in "the leading civilized countries at least." In a first draft of the document, Engels had written that "the communist revolution will not be national only but will take place simultaneously in all civilized countries, i.e., at any rate in Britain, America, France, and Germany."<sup>1</sup> The communist revolution would be no less universal than its historical predecessor, the bourgeois revolution, for the world that the proletarians had to win was one that capitalism itself was fast transforming into a socioeconomic unit.

Not surprisingly, the theory of the world communist revolution underwent significant modification in the movement of thought from classical to communist Marxism, or Marxism according to Lenin. In 1915 Lenin laid down "uneven economic and political development" as an absolute law of capitalism, and deduced from it that a communist revolution was possible

first in several or even in one capitalist country taken singly. He added: "The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and organized its own socialist production, would stand up against the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states." <sup>2</sup> In the wake of the Russian revolution of February, 1917 which overthrew the Tsar, Lenin's party attempted to enact this revolutionary scenario. After taking power in October, however, their efforts to raise revolts in other countries had little success, the revolutionary outbreaks in Hungary and Germany were abortive, and the venture in revolutionary war in Poland in 1920 ended in failure. A Communist International was brought into existence under Russian auspices to promote communist revolutions in other countries, but the latter showed little sign of materializing.

Despite this fact, the Russian communist mind held tenaciously to the view that the Russian revolution was no mere national event but represented the beginning of a world revolution. "This first victory is not yet the final victory," declared Lenin in an address on the fourth anniversary of October. "We have made a start. When, at what date and time, and the proletarians of which nation will complete this process is not a matter of importance. The important thing is

that the ice has been broken; the road is open and the path has been blazed." <sup>3</sup> Even in his very last essay, written in March, 1923 in the shadow of approaching death, Lenin optimistically maintained that "the whole world is now passing into a movement which must give rise to a world socialist revolution." Significantly, however, what now sustained his confidence in the final outcome was not the immediate prospect of a communist revolution in "the counter-revolutionary imperialist West" but developments in "the revolutionary and nationalist East." In the last analysis, he wrote, the upshot of the struggle would be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China, etc., accounted for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe: "And it is precisely this majority that, during the past few years, has been drawn into the struggle for emancipation with extraordinary rapidity, so that in this respect there cannot be the slightest shadow of doubt what the final outcome of the world struggle will be. In this sense, the complete victory of socialism is fully and absolutely assured." <sup>4</sup>

The universalistic significance of the Russian revolution remains a basic postulate of communist ideology at the present time. In the opening words of the new Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, adopted in October, 1961: "The great October Socialist Revolution ushered in a new era in the history of mankind, the era of the downfall of capitalism and the establishment of communism." The communist

revolutions in Asia and Europe following the Second World War are viewed as a continuation of a world revolutionary process initiated in Russia at the close of the First World War; and the process itself is depicted as one that is destined to embrace the entire world ultimately. The Soviet literature on the fiftieth anniversary of October stresses this theme heavily, and is replete with denunciation of Western scholars for refusing to acknowledge the "world-historical" character of the Russian revolution. Thus, the author of an editorial in the journal of party history dismisses as erroneous the opinion of the American historian Robert V. Daniels that "the Russian Revolution was not a national instance of a presumed international trend toward proletarian revolution, but a distinctive national event" and that "With all its international trappings and designs, Communism remains a specifically Russian movement, a product of Russian society, Russian ideas, the Russian revolution, and Russian power." The Soviet writer affirms, in opposition to such a notion, "the indisputable fact that the experience of the first victorious socialist revolution has universal significance, that certain features of the October revolution reflect basic regularities of social development inherent in our epoch." <sup>5</sup> And the "Theses" of The C.P.S.U. Central Committee on the fiftieth anniversary state simply: "The October revolution marked the beginning of the transition from capitalism to socialism throughout the world." <sup>6</sup>



These contentions raise a series of important theoretical questions that are still in need of clarification and solution. Was the October revolution the Russian expression of a revolutionary process that is not specifically Russian even though it occurred first in Russia and has been heavily influenced by this fact? Was it the national Russian form of a wider communist revolution going on in the contemporary world? If so, is the communist revolution to be seen in universalistic terms, as a developing world revolution? What generalizations can be drawn concerning its nature on the basis of the fourteen communist revolutions that have occurred? And finally, is it possible to construct a typology of communist revolutions, with special reference to the manner in which communism comes, or has come, to power? Recognizing that definitive treatment of these questions is beyond the scope of the present essay, I should like nevertheless to outline some answers and reasons for offering them.

## II.

Although it originated in Russia and bears a host of Russian birthmarks and influence, communism is not accurately described as a "specifically Russian movement." The familiar analogy with the history of religions remains relevant. A religion that arises in one nation and reflects its spirit can nevertheless spread and take root elsewhere; and it can do this even though it may initially spread through conquest and forcible conversion. So too with communism as an ideological movement professing "Marxism-Leninism" as its credo. Russia's communist revolution was the first and in some ways the precondition of others still to come, and its leaders have striven incessantly to play a hegemonic role in communist revolution wherever it occurs. The spread of communist revolution beyond Soviet borders in the wake of the Second World War was assisted and in numerous countries even engineered by the Soviet Union. Yet the non-Russian communist revolutions cannot be satisfactorily explained as a mere cover for Soviet imperialism or Russian expansion. Communist revolutions enlist indigenous forces in the societies concerned and tend to develop -- even when initially imposed from without, as in Rumania -- an internal dynamic of their own. There is thus some truth in the Soviet thesis that Russia's communist revolution was only the beginning of a larger process of revolutionary change taking place in the twentieth century, that it was no mere national Russian phenomenon. This does not,

however, imply that the communist revolution is destined to become world-wide. In order to pass judgment on that question, it may be of use to inquire into the character of communist revolutions.

It has often been noted -- and remains notable -- that communist revolutions have not occurred on the model projected by classical Marxism. For Marx and Engels the revolutionary overthrow of bourgeois society was something inherent in the very dynamics of capitalism as a mode of production based on wage labor and the drive to maximize profit. Their argument is complex and need not be repeated here in detail. Suffice it to say that capitalist economic development, in Marx's view, necessarily brings a proletarianization of the masses of factory workers and a progressive worsening of their living and working conditions. Marx formulates it as the "absolute general law of capitalist accumulation" that "The accumulation of wealth at one pole of society involves a simultaneous accumulation of poverty, labour torment, slavery, ignorance, brutalization, and moral degradation, at the opposite pole -- where dwells the class that produces its own product in the form of capital." <sup>7</sup> At the postulated point in this process where conditions become wholly intolerable, the masses of workers revolt and the communist revolution occurs with the seizure and socialization of private property. Thus, classical Marxism envisaged the communist revolution as a revolution of capitalist breakdown occurring in the most advanced stage of

development of the capitalist system. This was the assumption underlying the expectation of Marx and Engels that communist revolutions would come first in the countries of Western Europe where capitalism was most highly developed.

History has diverged in two fundamental ways from their theory. First, capitalist societies, instead of suffering self-destruction in a proletarian upheaval, have gone through a process of self-modification that Marx would not have thought possible and for which his theory in any event made no provision. In violation of the "absolute general law of capitalist accumulation," the industrial worker has won improved conditions and has become more and more integrated into the society rather than more alienated from it. Capitalist economies have evolved into post-capitalist mixed economies with self-stabilizing tools of fiscal regulation and planning. Although significant communist movements still exist in some of these societies, Italy and France in particular, what prospects they may have of coming to power do not derive from the dynamics of capitalist development. No communist revolution has taken place on the classical Marxist model, and no such revolution seems likely. Indeed, societies that have experienced thoroughgoing capitalist development appear to be among the least likely prospects for communist revolution.

If classical Marxism erred in projecting the communist revolution in a form in which it would not occur, it likewise erred in failing to foresee it in the form in which it would

occur. The communist revolution has not come about as a revolution of capitalist breakdown; large-scale industrialization has been among its consequences rather than its causes. It does, however, show a certain general pattern. With but two exceptions (Czechoslovakia and East Germany), the typical habitat of communist revolution has been a country of pre-capitalist or at most semi-capitalist economic formation, and one which shows a tendency to stagnate in its further economic development and modernization. It has been a country heavily populated with peasants and dependent upon agriculture, although usually with at least a small industrial working class and some development of modern industrial economy; a socially and politically as well as economically backward country, with very sharp class divisions and political institutions of traditional authoritarian complexion. Finally, it has been a country with chronic social unrest and a radical intelligentsia ready to furnish the leadership of a mass-based revolutionary movement to overthrow the old order in the name of national renovation and development. Russia and China are both classic cases in all these respects.

The communist revolution -- insofar as we can draw a generalization concerning its nature on the basis of these facts -- is a revolution of under-development, and this in two senses: (1) it typically comes about in the setting of under-development just as described; and (2) it becomes,

after the achievement of power by the communist movement, a long-term effort to overcome the country's under-development, a revolution of modernization. The communist revolution is not the sole or necessary form of the revolution of under-development. In some countries, particularly since the end of the Second World War, there have been attempts to carry through such a revolution under non-communist nationalist leadership, which, however, usually borrows some aspects of communist experience and organizational technique. The most that communism might reasonably claim is to have been so far the most influential and in certain respects the most efficacious form of the revolution of under-development. Its notable disadvantage lies in the peculiarly great difficulty that it experiences in coming to power. In the Arab Middle East, for example, the revolution of under-development has proceeded -- where it has proceeded at all -- under nationalist rather than communist auspices, not because the nationalist political forces can carry it through most successfully but because no indigenous communist movement has been capable of competing with nationalist revolutionary groups in the contest for power.

### III.

? P | A further general observation concerning communist revolution relates to international war as its chrysalis. If, in a flight of fantasy, we imagine the leading representatives of the capitalist countries coming together in secret conclave around the year 1910 to organize a long-range conspiracy for the prevention of communism, it is easy to see in retrospect what could have proved a simple but quite effective conspiratorial formula: no war. For without the two world wars of our century, it is not at all certain that any communist movement anywhere would have come to power. The fabric of Russian government, economy and society was so strained by the First World War that Bolshevism, under the inspired leadership of Lenin and Trotsky, was able to manoeuvre itself to power in the chaotic conditions that ensued with the deposition of the Tsar. It is notable that when news of the February revolution reached Lenin in Switzerland, he immediately saw it as a revolution engendered by the war; and in one of the last of his writings, he still spoke of the Russian revolution as "the revolution that broke out in connection with the first imperialist World War."<sup>8</sup> Moreover, if the initial communist revolution took place in Russia as a result of the First World War, communism came to Eastern and Central Europe, China, Korea, and Vietnam as a direct outgrowth of the Second World War. On the one hand, Soviet occupation of neighboring lands at the

war's end created conditions in which communist regimes could come to power. On the other hand, the war so strained the fabric of some societies, most notably China's, that communist revolution could take place in the aftermath independently of Soviet help.

The organic connection between international war and the spread of communist revolution became an axiom of Soviet thought in the Stalin era. Should a new war come, Stalin declared in his report to the seventeenth party congress in 1934, it would be a most dangerous war for the bourgeoisie: "And let not Messieurs the bourgeoisie blame us if some of the governments near and dear to them, which today rule happily 'by the grace of God,' are missing on the morrow of such a war." <sup>9</sup> Still earlier, in a speech delivered to a closed session of the party Central Committee on January 19, 1925, Stalin had envisaged the policy that the Soviet Union should follow in event of a new European war. He observed that conditions were maturing for such a war, and urged that everything be done to strengthen the Soviet army. Then he went on: "Our banner is still the banner of peace. But if war breaks out we shall not be able to sit with folded arms. We shall have to take action, but we shall be the last to do so. And we shall do so in order to throw the decisive weight in the scales, the weight that can turn the scales." <sup>10</sup> In the latter part of the 1930's, Stalin attempted to make events unfold according to this plan by seeking an agreement with



Hitler. He knew that the Nazi-Soviet pact of August, 1939 would unleash war, but calculated that it would be a long-drawn-out war between the Axis states and the Western allies, a war in which the U.S.S.R. would remain free to "throw the decisive weight in the scales" at a time of its choosing. Stalin's error -- an error made by many at the time -- lay in over-estimating the strength of France, whose swift defeat in 1940 laid Russia open to the invasion that duly followed. <sup>11</sup> But in spite of this terribly costly miscarriage of Stalin's plans, Russia emerged victorious and communist revolutions took place in numerous countries in the aftermath. The link between international war and the spread of communism was thus still further strengthened in the Stalinist mind, and many Soviet pronouncements in Stalin's last years warned that a third world war would witness the final collapse of the capitalist system. Furthermore, Stalin insisted in his final work, Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. (1951), that wars would remain inevitable, as Lenin had written, so long as "imperialism" continued to exist. "To liquidate <sup>the inevitability of</sup> war," he concluded, "it is necessary to eliminate imperialism." <sup>12</sup>

✓ The notion that world communist revolution can continue in peaceful international conditions is a post-Stalinist innovation in Soviet party doctrine. At the twentieth party congress in 1956, the Leninist-Stalinist thesis

on the inseparability of imperialism and wars was finally revised, wars were declared to be avoidable calamities in the nuclear age, and the novel idea was put forward that international peace and coexistence might prove propitious for the further spread of communist revolution. "Socialist revolution is not necessarily connected with war," proclaims the new Soviet party program in this connection. "Although both world wars, which were started by the imperialists, culminated in socialist revolutions, revolutions are quite feasible without war." This proposition is accompanied by the thesis -- also promulgated at the twentieth party congress -- that a communist revolution can, and if possible should, take place by a peaceful parliamentary path. Under favorable conditions, asserts the party program, the working class can "win a solid majority in parliament, transform it from a tool serving the class interests of the bourgeoisie into an instrument serving the working people, launch a broad mass struggle outside parliament, smash the resistance of the reactionary forces and provide the necessary conditions for a peaceful socialist revolution." <sup>13</sup> In various Soviet statements during the Khrushchev era, the Hungarian revolution of 1918-1919 and the communist conquest of power in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948 were cited as historical examples of communist revolution without civil war; and under-developed countries with parliamentary institutions were described as the most likely con-

temporary proving-grounds for communist revolution by the peaceful path. Since the fall of Khrushchev, the doctrine of peaceful communist revolution has been de-emphasized in Soviet writings but not repudiated. It is noteworthy in this connection that the Central Committee's "Theses" for the fiftieth anniversary of the October revolution reaffirm "the possibility of using, in the transition to socialism, diverse -- peaceful and non-peaceful -- forms of struggle, depending on the concrete relationship of class forces in this or that country..." 14

The new Soviet doctrine on the possibility of peaceful communist revolution proved highly controversial in the international communist movement, and has been one of the central issues in the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute that began in the aftermath of the twentieth party congress. The leader of the Chinese communist revolution, Mao Tse-tung, who had once written that "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" 15 and continued to believe it, undertook to defend Leninist-Stalinist orthodoxy on the methods of communist revolution against Khrushchevite "revisionism." During the conference of world communist leaders in Moscow in November, 1957, he took a stand on this issue against the effort of the Soviet party leadership to secure adoption of the twentieth-congress line as the general line of the world communist movement. In a then secret memorandum to the

C.P.S.U. Central Committee outlining views on the question of peaceful transition, the Chinese delegation declared:

"We must fully utilize the parliamentary form of struggle, but its role is limited." Using Lenin's line of argument in The State and Revolution, the Chinese memorandum stressed that a communist revolution necessitated the destruction of the old state machinery, for which purpose it would not be sufficient to gain a majority in parliament. Hence the communist movement should be prepared to use armed force against the class enemy at the critical juncture of the revolution where power changes hands. In not a single country was the possibility of peaceful transition of any practical significance, and it would not be advisable to place much emphasis upon this possibility in a document published for the guidance of communist parties. <sup>16</sup>

When the controversy came into the open in the early 1960's, the tone was more acrid. The concept of the parliamentary road was now denounced by the Chinese leadership as "parliamentary cretinism." Violent revolution was said to be "a universal law of proletarian revolution." History, argued the Chinese, offered no precedent for peaceful transition to communism. Soviet claims that the October revolution was "the most bloodless of all revolutions" were totally contrary to historical facts and a mockery of the martyrs who shed their blood to create the world's first communist state.

The Hungarian revolution of 1918-1919 was by no means a non-violent affair or model of peaceful transition, although, as Lenin himself had pointed out, the young Hungarian communist party had committed the fatal error of not being sufficiently decisive in the use of force at the critical moment. Nor was the "February event" of 1948 in Prague describable as a "peaceful" conquest of power. And contrary to the tales of the Arabian nights being spread by Khrushchev and his ilk, conditions were not now maturing for peaceful transitions to communism. To win a majority in parliament or enter a coalition government owing to electoral success would only be an invitation to the kind of repression that overtook the Chilean communist party in 1946. Acceptance of the revisionist line against armed struggle had cost the Algerian communist party a position in its country's political life, and it had led the Iraqi communist party to disaster in the anti-communist coup of 1958. To sum, "To realize socialism through the 'parliamentary road' is utterly impossible and is mere deceptive talk." 17

Granted its revolutionary assumptions, the Chinese position is a strong one, just as Lenin's was in his debate with the Social Democrats a half-century ago. If the political essence of a communist revolution is the creation of a one-party state rule by communists, it is hard to see how it could take place by a peaceful parliamentary path. For the previously dominant non-communist political forces could hardly

be expected to submit peacefully not merely to a temporary loss of power but to permanent exclusion from the possibility of regaining it by peaceful means. In order for non-violent communist revolution to become a real possibility, it would be necessary to devise so insidious a technique of revolution by subversion that the forces being overthrown would hardly be aware of this fact before it was too late to resist. The fifty-year history of communist revolutions contains no instance that would exemplify such a pattern or point to its feasibility.

If peaceful parliamentary transition to communism is unlikely in the extreme, how are we to explain the Soviet espousal of the idea? It can be interpreted as a means by which a no longer radical and indeed post-revolutionary Soviet leadership tries to reconcile a continued verbal commitment to world communist revolution with a foreign policy whose real first objective is the peace and security of the Soviet Union.<sup>18</sup> Since the further spread of communist revolution would not, on this view, be a serious concern of the Soviet leadership, the unfeasibility of the peaceful parliamentary path would not stand in the way of its espousal in theory. Alternatively, it may be that some Soviet leaders are inclined to see peaceful transition to communism as a more than marginal possibility in historically unprecedented conditions presently taking shape in certain parts of the world, such as the Arab Middle East. They may envisage the revolution of under-development eventually coming into communist receivership

in certain countries where nationalist forces have begun it and where Soviet political influence has been built up through economic and military assistance, diplomacy, etc. Such a strategic conception may be implicit in a Soviet suggestion that "in present circumstances the question of the possibility of transition to socialism (i.e., to communism -- R.C.T.) under conditions of a multi-party system has topical significance for a number of countries." <sup>19</sup> The local communist party would, in other words, seek participation in a coalition government committed to carrying through the revolution of under-development; and once it had achieved a foothold in power, it would strive -- with judicious Soviet assistance on the side, or with Soviet protection -- to manoeuvre its way to dominance, thereby bringing the revolution from the stage of so-called "national democracy" to that of "people's democracy," i.e., to communism.

Such, in any event, is one construction that might reasonably be placed upon the Soviet writings in question. Whether the indicated tactics of revolution by political manoeuvre would have much chance of being applied successfully in practice is another matter. To form a reasoned opinion on this and related questions, it will be useful to examine the various paths that communist revolution has taken in the past.

#### IV.

With respect to the manner of coming to power, the fourteen successful communist revolutions fall into three classes. Russia's communist revolution is in a class by itself. Those in Yugoslavia, Albania, China, Vietnam and Cuba belong to a further class, that of revolution by armed struggle; and those in Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, East Germany and Czechoslovakia fall into still a third class -- the imposed revolution.

The October revolution was a seizure of power by armed insurrection, carried out in the capital and other main centers at a time of grave national crisis when the government lacked effective control, conditions were chaotic, and masses of people were in a revolutionary mood. The taking of power came at the climax of a period of intensive political preparation during which the Bolsheviks endeavored to stir up revolutionary sentiment with slogans like "land, peace, and bread," to cultivate mass support in the soviets and the country at large, and to isolate their left-wing competitors, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. The revolutionary coup was thus the culminating event in a political process that involved mass agitation and propaganda, manoeuvring for position in the soviets, and organization of insurrection.



The relation of town and country, of worker and peasant, in the Bolshevik revolution calls for special attention. In his final written comment on the revolution, Lenin spoke of certain "peculiar features" that distinguished it from earlier revolutions in Western Europe and foreshadowed the pattern the revolution would take in "passing to the Oriental countries." One was the fact that it combined the "peasant war" with the working-class movement under the special emergency conditions created by the World War.<sup>20</sup> The "peasant war" was the upheaval in the countryside during which peasants seized and divided up the remaining landed estates. The encouragement of this action by the Bolsheviks was one of the decisive factors in their revolutionary success, and the agrarian upheaval itself was undoubtedly an essential element of the October revolution. Yet the countryside was, at least initially, the "rear" of the revolution; the major cities, above all Petrograd and Moscow, were its "front." The revolutionary-minded industrial workers, although only a small minority of the Russian population, nevertheless constituted, along with elements of the armed forces, the spearhead of the Bolshevik movement's mass support, and the main urban centers were the strongholds of revolution. In this sense and to this extent, the October revolution was "proletarian," as it claimed to be. Without the "peasant war" as its companion-piece, it would very probably not have survived in power. But without the working-class support that it received in the chief cities, it could hardly

have taken place.

The events of 1917 represented, to a remarkable degree, the fulfillment of a vision of Russian revolution that Lenin had harbored since the turn of the century when he wrote his seminal work, What Is To Be Done? There he contended that socialist revolution would require long preparation and leadership by an elite party consisting chiefly of professional revolutionaries, who would inculcate revolutionary ideas in the popular mind by propaganda and agitation. The party was thus conceived as the veritable lever of future revolution. But Lenin did not envisage this revolution in Blanquist terms as a conspiratorial coup d'état to be carried out, as it were, behind the back of the people. The revolution itself, which would ensue after a series of prior revolutionary outbreaks alternating with periods of calm, would be a mass affair culminating in a national armed insurrection against the Tsarist regime. It would draw its motive force from large numbers of non-party people -- workers and others -- who would engage in massive insurgency under the guidance and inspiration of the revolutionary party.

St. Petersburg's "Bloody Sunday" in January, 1905 touched off a series of revolutionary outbreaks which did not subside until 1907. This revolution of 1905-07 was perhaps the most spontaneous large-scale insurrectionary movement to be seen in the twentieth century before the Hungarian uprising of 1956, and it influenced Leninist revolutionary thought pre-

foundly. First, it revealed that the peasantry -- which Russian Marxists had hitherto tended to view as a politically inert force and a support for Tsarist despotism -- actually possessed a far-reaching revolutionary potential. This in turn brought Lenin to his audacious conception that in a backward country like Russia, which had not yet experienced its "bourgeois revolution," it might be possible to create in the course of such a revolution a "revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry." Here was a crucial component in the developing theory of communist revolution as a revolution of under-development. Further, the 1905 revolution reinforced Lenin's assumption that the final assault upon the old order would come, if ever, at a time of mass revolutionary action and excitement. It confirmed him in the belief which he expressed years later by saying that "revolutions are made at moments of particular upsurge and the exertion of all human capacities, by the class consciousness, will, passion and imagination of tens of millions, spurred on by a most acute struggle of classes." 21

In the years between the first and the second Russian revolutions, Lenin elaborated this belief into a theory of the "revolutionary situation." For a Marxist, he wrote in 1915, it is beyond doubt that a revolution is impossible without a revolutionary situation, although such a situation can exist without necessarily giving rise to an actual revolution.

There were three principal symptoms of a revolutionary situation. First, a crisis of the policy of the ruling class, creating a crack into which the discontent of the oppressed classes can penetrate. Second, an aggravation of the sufferings of the oppressed classes beyond the ordinary level. Third, a tendency of the latter, by virtue of the first two factors, to engage in mass revolutionary action. These views on revolution, added Lenin, "were confirmed particularly graphically for us Russians by the experience of 1905." <sup>22</sup> Nor did he ever abandon them. Indeed, in Left-Wing Communism he formulated it as the fundamental law of revolution," which had been confirmed by all revolutions, including three Russian revolutions of the twentieth century, that "Only when the 'lower classes' do not want the old way, and when the 'upper classes' cannot carry on in the old way -- only then can revolution triumph. This truth may be expressed in other words: revolution is impossible without a nation-wide crisis (affecting both the exploited and the exploiters)." Such a crisis, he went on, is characterized by the fact that at least a majority of the class-conscious, politically active workers fully understand that revolution is necessary, and that the ruling classes are going through a government crisis which draws even the most backward masses into politics, weakens the government, and makes it possible for the revolutionaries to overthrow it rapidly. <sup>23</sup>

It was just such a situation that Lenin saw emerging in the spring of 1917, in large part because of the Provisional Government's unwillingness to take Russia out of a war which had become a no longer tolerable burden for masses of the people. "Russia at present is seething," he wrote in early April, pointing out that "one of the chief symptoms of every real revolution is the unusually rapid, sudden and abrupt increase in the number of 'ordinary citizens' who begin to participate actively, independently and effectively in political life and in the organization of the state."<sup>24</sup> This is what led him to espouse a maximalist revolutionary policy of no support for the Provisional Government in the "April Theses" that he put out immediately upon his return from Switzerland to Petrograd. The dominant trend of opinion in the Bolshevik leadership on the spot was initially resistant, but yielded to Lenin's forceful advocacy of the revolutionary slogan, "All power to the Soviets!" And the further unfolding of events showed the soundness of his perception that Russia was in the midst of a true revolutionary situation which, if properly taken advantage of by the Bolshevik party, could eventuate in a far more radical revolution than the one that had taken place in February.

In presenting the new doctrine of communist revolution by a peaceful parliamentary path, Khrushchev and others have pointed out that for a time in 1917 Lenin believed that the Russian revolution might take place peacefully within the context of an assumption of state power by the revolutionary

soviets. It is true that in his pamphlet "On Slogans," written in July, 1917 when the Bolsheviks were under severe harassment by the authorities, Lenin advocated abandonment of the slogan, "All power to the soviets," on the ground that it was a slogan for "a peaceful development of the revolution," which had been possible at first but was so no longer.<sup>25</sup> But it is highly questionable whether Lenin ever seriously envisaged a revolutionary consummation without violence. Although revolution to his mind was essentially a process of political warfare against a form of society represented and upheld by the existing governmental regime, he appears to have taken it for granted that the final decisive battle -- the actual taking of power -- would involve armed violence. Not even in a time of crisis, he wrote in the above-mentioned article of 1915, would the old government "fall" without being "dropped."<sup>26</sup> In The State and Revolution, on which he worked in August and September of 1917 while in hiding, he corrected Marx's allowance for the possibility of a peaceful revolution in England and America by saying that conditions permitting such a development had changed in those countries since Marx's time; and he formulated it as a general principle that: "The replacement of the bourgeois by the proletarian state is impossible without a violent revolution."<sup>27</sup>

Lenin's preferred title for the violent consummation of revolution at the point where power changes hands was "armed insurrection." In "Marxism and Insurrection," one of his series of secret letters to the party Central Committee in September

and October of 1917 urging a coup without further delay, he laid the theoretical groundwork. Marxism was distinguished from Blanquism, he argued, not in rejecting the insurrection as a means of revolution, but rather in its insistence that successful insurrection must rely not simply upon conspiracy and not simply upon a party but upon a whole class, and indeed upon the rising revolutionary spirit of the people. Further, insurrection must be launched at the crucial moment in the history of the growing revolution, when revolutionary ferment in the popular ranks is at its height and vacillations in the ranks of the enemies and half-hearted friends of the revolution are strongest. Such a crucial moment was now at hand, he went on. And shortly afterwards, in another communication to the same effect, he quoted Marx on the principal rules of insurrection as an art: (1) Never play with insurrection, but see it through to the end; (2) concentrate a great superiority of forces at the decisive point at the decisive moment; (3) once the insurrection has started, act with the greatest determination and take the offensive; (4) try to take the enemy by surprise; and (5) strive for daily successes, even if small. The success of the Russian and world revolutions, Lenin concluded, will depend on two, three days of fighting. <sup>28</sup> So far as the Russian revolution is concerned, events shortly afterwards proved him right.

V.

"The world-historic significance of the October revolution," assert the Central Committee's "Theses" on its fiftieth anniversary, "lies in the fact that it pointed out the paths, uncovered the forms and methods of revolutionary transformation, which have acquired an international character." 29 This claim does not find support in the facts of the historical record. October was the classic communist seizure of power, but it was destined to be a lonely classic, the only successful case of its type in the half-century of communist revolutions that it inaugurated. This of course is not to deny that communist revolutions outside Russia have in very many important ways profited from the Russian heritage, Leninist revolutionary theory in particular. Yet the paths taken by the communists of other countries in acquiring power have greatly diverged from that of the first communist revolution. Some of the serious setbacks of communism have occurred as a consequence of unsuccessful efforts to emulate the October pattern. And the other thirteen successful communist revolutions have in no instance replicated this pattern.

Among the reasons why the October pattern has not repeated itself in other countries, one merits particular attention. The fact is that a "revolutionary situation" in Lenin's sense is an exceedingly rare phenomenon in social history, especially in the highly complex "bourgeois" societies of the present age. Lenin saw revolution as an elemental movement involving



millions, occurring at a time of "particular upsurge" when masses of aggrieved humanity were driven by unusually harsh adversity into an insurrectionary mood which could find outlet in action owing to a partially incapacitating crisis at the top of society and government. Such times of revolutionary crisis have occurred in modern societies, as in Russia in 1905 and 1917, but only as a result of an unusual combination of circumstances inevitably involving an element of fortuity. Lenin himself recognized this when he wrote in Left-Wing Communism in 1920 that no amount of propaganda and agitation alone could win over the broad masses to a position of support for the revolutionary "vanguard." "For this the masses must have their own political experience," he went on. "Such is the fundamental law of all great revolutions..." The World War had provided this "political experience" in the immediate past, but what would do it in the coming period? Surveying the post-war scene, Lenin found social life in many countries "crammed full of inflammable material" needing only a spark to be kindled into revolutionary conflagration. Yet he admitted that no one could foretell "what immediate cause will most serve to rouse, kindle and impel into the struggle the very wide masses who are at present dormant." <sup>30</sup> Subsequent history suggests that he may have overestimated the inflammability of the masses in modern society; they have not proved, on the whole, so susceptible to large-scale revolutionary excitement. Ironically, one of the very few true popular upheavals of the ensuing per-

ism occurred in communist-ruled Hungary in 1956, where all the elements of a revolutionary situation in Lenin's special threefold sense of the term were for once present.

Although it did not produce revolutionary situations like the one that came about in Russia in 1917, the Second World War created new opportunities for communist revolution. It might be said to have produced a new kind of revolutionary situation characterized not by rebellious movements of urban masses but rather by the breakdown of indigenous established authority -- particularly in rural areas -- under conditions of enemy occupation. The Japanese invasion and occupation of large parts of China in the 1930's and subsequently of much of Southeast Asia, and the German invasion and occupation of Eastern Europe and the Balkans in the early 1940's provided the setting. Under these conditions, it became possible for communist revolutionary movements to reconstitute themselves as resistance movements, and to embark upon a piecemeal takeover of the country by military means, particularly guerrilla warfare. The classic case is of course that of China, and Mao Tse-tung, who led Chinese communism to power, is the foremost theorist of communist revolution by armed struggle. With variations growing out of the peculiarities of their national settings, the war-born communist takeovers in Yugoslavia, Albania and Vietnam also exemplify this pattern, and the Cuban case -- although a special one in important respects -- is closer to this category of communist revolution than to either of the other two.

A statement of Mao's in 1938 concerning the Chinese prospect forms the best starting-point for a comparison between the October pattern and revolutions of the Chinese communist type: "Basically the task of the communist party here is not to go through a long period of legal struggles before launching an insurrection or war, nor to seize the big cities first and then occupy the countryside, but to take the other way round." <sup>31</sup> A difference of relation between town and country, and therefore between worker and peasant, is involved. Instead of a "peasant war" as a companion-piece to the effort to take power in the chief urban centers, with workers as the revolutionary shock-force, we have here a pattern of communist revolution in which the countryside becomes the principal revolutionary arena in the early stages, and in which peasants therefore are the main social base of the revolution. Only in Mao's third strategic stage of revolutionary war, when the guerrilla warfare predominating in the previous two stages of strategic defensive and strategic stalemate gives way to regular warfare in the strategic counter-offensive, do the large cities come into the center of the picture. Their capture is the "final objective of the revolution." <sup>32</sup>

In the earlier stages, the communist-led resistance movement seeks not simply to carry on warfare in the countryside in the manner of historical peasant wars of the roving insurgents type, but to establish so-called "revolutionary

base areas" to function as the rear of the movement. This is obviously facilitated by the presence in the country concerned of extensive mountainous, forest or jungle regions difficult of access to regular troops, and it is notable that all five of the successful communist revolutions of this type have occurred in countries that possess such regions. In the Chinese case, the communist forces established a base area at Yen-an after the Long March, and then, in the 1937-41 period, created large guerrilla bases in each of the provinces of north China. In Yugoslavia, Tito's Partisan forces in the fall of 1941 established a base area in northwest Serbia which became known as the "Uzhice Republic." Later that year they retreated into the relatively primitive mountain areas of Bosnia. In Albania, the communist guerrillas under Enver Hoxha operated in the mountains that cover most of that small land.

In the October revolution, the taking of power preceded the revolutionary transformation of the socio-political order in the country. In the type of communist revolution now under consideration, the revolutionary transformation takes place, or at any rate begins, in the protracted process of conquering power and becomes one of the most important means by which power is extended. The socio-political revolution develops in the liberated base areas, where the communist movement seeks to build not only military strongholds but also enclaves of a new society and polity. Not only are new organs of public authority created, such as the "people's councils"

that the Yugoslav communists set up in their base areas and the "democratic governments" that were formed in the north China guerrilla bases. Schools, newspapers and other social institutions are established under communist auspices. Self-defense corps and so-called "mass organizations" for peasants, youth, women, children and other groups are founded as means of enlisting people into participation in public life under communist guidance. All this serves the needs of "political mobilization" which Mao described as the promotion of anti-Japanese resistance by telling the people about the political objectives of the war, viz., the ousting of the Japanese and the building of a new China. <sup>33</sup> Thus, military operations go hand-in-hand with a piecemeal process of nation-building. Guerrilla warfare creates a territory for political mobilization of the populace, which in turn augments the communist resistance forces and makes it possible to expand military operations into new areas. The results are most impressive in the Yugoslav and Chinese cases. By February, 1945, Tito's Partisan army consisted of fifty-four divisions numbering 800,000 troops. By the time of Japan's capitulation in 1945, one-fifth of the population of China was living in the communist-controlled revolutionary base areas. When the communist government was officially proclaimed in China on October 1, 1949, this marked not the beginning of the communist revolution there but the climax of one that had been in progress for upwards of a decade. <sup>34</sup> The com-

munist-Kuomintang civil war of 1947-49 had been no more than a last act in the drama, the completion of a revolutionary takeover that had already been largely accomplished in the period of anti-Japanese resistance and its aftermath.

As best shown in the Chinese case, communist resistance movements face a difficult problem with regard to agrarian policy in the revolutionary base areas. In December, 1939, Mao declared that since the peasantry was the main force in the Chinese revolution, it must be given help in overthrowing the feudal landlord class. Distribution of the landlords' land among the peasants was one of the programmatic measures of the revolution in its ongoing "new-democratic" or pre-socialist phase. On the other hand, he likewise stipulated that private capitalist enterprises should be preserved and that "rich-peasant economy should not be eliminated."<sup>35</sup> The policy actually followed by the party during the period of the anti-Japanese war was a moderate one of reducing rents and interest owed by the peasants to the landlord. Radical measures of land redistribution were avoided for fear of alienating large elements of the very peasant population that the resistance movement looked to as its prime source of recruits and general support. As Chalmers Johnson puts it, the economic policies of the communists during the Sino-Japanese war were designed to create maximum unity for national defense.<sup>36</sup>

Chinese communism, like the other communist movements that have come to power by the road of war-time resistance, built

its mass following among the peasants (and other strata) primarily on the basis of an appeal to nationalism, the patriotic desire to liberate the country from the foreign invader. The political mobilization of the Chinese peasants after 1937 proceeded chiefly in terms of the anti-Japanese slogan of "national salvation," and the Partisans appealed to the Yugoslav peasants with patriotic anti-fascist slogans mainly aimed against the Germans. In both instances, the communists took a more militant stance in the resistance than their rivals (the Kuomintang and Mihilovic's Chetniks), engaging in bold operations which provoked from the foreign occupiers harsh reprisals that in turn helped destroy the remaining fabric of the old society and made the peasants all the more amenable to patriotic mobilization. In war-time Albania, the communist guerrillas used patriotic anti-fascist slogans similar to those of the Yugoslav Partisans. After the defeat of Japan, the Vietnam communists espoused Vietnam nationalism against the French; and more recently have done so against the Americans. The Castro movement is exceptional among the guerrilla movements that have won power both in the fact that its communist alignment came afterwards and in the circumstance that there was no foreign occupation against which to mobilize the population. There was, however, a history of American domination of the country and an oppressive Cuban regime which could be identified with American influence; and political mobilization of the Cuban lower classes in the post-revolutionary period has relied hea-

vily upon the slogan of Cuban national independence against "Yankee imperialism."

So far-reaching is communism's identification with nationalism in this pattern of revolution that an actual fusion has been hypothesized. Noting that both Chinese and Yugoslav communism was legitimized by the nationalistic credentials established by the communist parties during the resistance, Chalmers Johnson suggests that the resulting Chinese and Yugoslav governments are the "offspring of indigenous nationalism" and that in both cases the communist ideology "serves as the theoretical expression of these nationalisms." <sup>37</sup> Such an interpretation appears unnecessarily extreme, and overlooks the alternative possibility that we have to do here with movements of authentic communist ideological affiliation which at the same time have identified themselves with national goals in the process of winning power and retained a strong nationalist orientation subsequently. In this connection, it must be pointed out that in the Russian revolution we see a very different relationship of the communist movement to nationalism. Here communism came to power on an anti-war platform. Far from identifying itself with Russian national aims in time of war, the Bolshevik movement used the slogan of revolutionary internationalism. From the outbreak of war in 1914, Lenin advocated revolutionary defeatism, the transformation of the international "imperialist war" into a series of revolutionary civil wars inside the warring countries, his own included. "Defensism" became a Bolshevik term



of opprobrium for Russian socialists who supported the national war effort. Only in the post-revolutionary period, and particularly under Stalin, did Russian communism take on a pronounced Russian nationalist orientation.

A final comparative observation has to do with the role of armed force in communist revolution. Where the main form of struggle is war and the main form of organization is the army, as in China, the notion of revolution by armed struggle can easily become an obsession. Whoever wants to seize the political power of the state and to maintain it must have a strong army, declared Mao in 1938, and he went on: "Some people have ridiculed us as advocates of the 'omnipotence of war'; yes, we are, we are the advocates of the omnipotence of the revolutionary war, which is not bad at all, but is good and is Marxist." Observing further that everything in Yenan had been built up by means of the gun, he added: "Anything can grow out of the barrel of a gun... With the help of guns the Russian communists brought about socialism. We are to bring about a democratic republic. Experience in the class struggle of the era of imperialism teaches us that the working class and the toiling masses cannot defeat the armed bourgeois and landlords except by the power of the gun; in this sense we can even say that the whole world can be remoulded only with the gun." 38

It is difficult to picture Lenin recognizing this as an authentic voice of Marxism, or agreeing with the implied view of the Russian communist revolution. As noted earlier, armed

insurrection is a vital ingredient in the Leninist theory and practice of communist revolution. For Lenin, however, the revolutionary process was fundamentally political rather than military in nature. It was the politics of taking power in a society brought by an unusual combination of stresses to a state of turmoil and incipient breakdown. In harmony with his essentially political vision of the revolution, Lenin saw the armed insurrection itself as "a special form of the political struggle."

39 It was the coup de grace that the revolutionary movement would have to administer to the regime it sought to replace, an episode of planned violence at the conclusion of the political struggle. But what about the place of the civil war in the Russian revolution? It is true that shortly after the Bolshevik seizure of power, Russia became the scene of a three-year bloody civil war in the course of which the revolution took to arms, created its Red Army under Trotsky, and defeated the forces which took the field against it. If the Russian revolution is viewed as a social epoch, the civil war of 1918-1921 must be considered an integral part of it. However, the civil war, important as it was historically, was not an element in Lenin's strategy of revolution. It was forced upon the Bolshevik regime by the efforts of various forces in Russia, aided from abroad, to overthrow it. From a Leninist point of view, especially as shaped by the Russian experience, the need to wage a protracted armed struggle to preserve the power won by revolution is a contingency with which every communist movement must reckon. But such an armed

struggle is not seen as either inevitable or desirable, and the gun barrel is not seen as the sole significant source of revolutionary power. To this limited extent, the post-Stalin Soviet theory of a peaceful path can claim an authentically Leninist ancestry.

## VI.

In both patterns of communist revolution examined above, the revolution is basically an internal process in the country concerned. This is not to deny that the Soviet Union rendered significant assistance (along with some disservices) to the communist revolutions in countries like China and Yugoslavia. But the assistance was not decisive; at most it was supplementary, and the revolutions in question could have taken place without it. Like the Russian revolution in its time, these revolutions fundamentally made their way on their own. In contrast, the communist regimes in Mongolia, North Korea, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia did not come to power in basically indigenous revolutions. These communist revolutions were imposed from outside. In all instances save the first, they were engineered by the Soviet Union under conditions of military occupation or domination arising out of the Soviet victory in the Second World War.

Although Marxism-Leninism has contemplated the revolutionary war across national boundaries as one possible form of just war (and the Soviet march into Poland in 1920 stands as an

historical example of this form of action), the doctrine assumes that the country invaded would be in the throes of an internally generated revolution or "revolutionary situation" at the time. The forcible imposition of communist revolution upon a country from outside not only lacks sanction in Soviet ideology but has many times been explicitly disavowed as an aim. In Stalin's famous statement to Roy Howard in 1936, "The export of revolution is nonsense." Yet without ever admitting it, the Soviet Union has practiced such "nonsense" on a large scale. Insofar as conditions in that primitive nomadic country permitted, communist revolution was engineered in Outer Mongolia following the military conquest of the area by the Soviet Union in the early 1920's. In 1939-40, not long after Stalin's remarks to Roy Howard, the communist system was forcibly installed in Soviet-occupied eastern Poland and the three Baltic states. And in the aftermath of the Second World War, Soviet satellite regimes of "people's democracy" were established in North Korea and in Eastern and Central Europe, wherever Soviet power predominated.

The devastation and dislocation of war did much to destroy or greatly weaken the prewar socio-political order in Eastern Europe. Although revolutionary situations in the Leninist sense did not exist at the war's end, it was widely accepted among the peoples and political parties that restoration of the status quo ante was out of the question and that social change was in order. Yet the communist movements in these countries

had little chance of coming to power independently on the tide of change. It is true that communism had not been a negligible indigenous force in prewar Eastern Europe. Communist movements of varying strength had existed in spite of domestic repressions and the loss of many of their leaders in Stalin's purges of 1936-38, and they carried on underground activities during the war. The Polish communist party, which had been formally dissolved in 1938 at the height of the Soviet purges, was reconstituted in 1942 and played a part, although a relatively minor one, in the Polish resistance movement. In Czechoslovakia, where communism had shown real strength in the democratic pre-Munich period, underground communists were active in the Free Slovakia resistance movement in 1944. But nowhere in Eastern Europe (outside of Yugoslavia and Albania) did local communists achieve a politically commanding position under war conditions. Only in Czechoslovakia, through a combination of favorable circumstances, did they emerge at the war's end in great strength. There the communists gained control of key posts, including the ministries of interior (police), agriculture and information; and the communist leader Gottwald became premier after his party polled 38 per cent of the vote in the parliamentary elections of May, 1946, the first held after the war. Significantly, however, Czechoslovakia, from which the Soviet army was withdrawn in December, 1945, was at the beginning of 1946 the only country in the region not yet under total or near-total communist domination.

In Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and East Germany, where Moscow was in a controlling position because of the continued presence of its military forces, communist rule was imposed in a process which showed local variations but was everywhere the same in basic pattern. The communists sought to enlarge their popular support by taking charge of land reform or, as in Poland, by exploiting the large patronage opportunities inherent in the postwar resettlement of Poles in the western lands detached from Germany. Meanwhile, under Soviet direction and with Soviet assistance, they acquired strategic positions in the coalition governments initially formed, and drove for ascendancy. Uncooperative political forces, such as the peasant parties that enjoyed strong support in a number of these countries, were pressured, harrassed, and simply terrorized in the process. Non-communist leaders like Maniu in Rumania, Petkov in Bulgaria and Mikolajczyk in Poland were imprisoned, executed, or hounded out of their countries. Social Democratic parties were deprived of their autonomy and eliminated as possible rivals through forced mergers with the communists in communist-controlled united worker parties. Public organizations were purged of leaders not amenable to communist direction. Gradually the coalition governments were transformed into pseudo-coalitions dominated by the communists, and then into opposition-free regimes on the Soviet model.<sup>40</sup> These communist revolutions from above were completed in all essentials by 1947-48.

Although not occupied by Soviet forces, Czechoslovakia was ringed with lands that were and had no access to effective assistance from the non-communist world. The Soviet military presence on its frontiers, significantly activated at the time, formed the backdrop for the communist action of February, 1948 in Prague. With the backing of Premier Gottwald, the communist Minister of Interior ignored an instruction from the majority of the cabinet that he stop packing the police with communists, whereupon ministers belonging to two of the government parties resigned in protest. In the ensuing cabinet crisis, the communists, acting by both constitutional and extra-constitutional means, sent armed detachments of workers into the streets and put pressure on President Eduard Benes, then an old and sick man, to form a new government of predominantly communist complexion. After he yielded on February 25, the communist takeover of all power in Czechoslovakia proceeded swiftly. As noted earlier, post-Stalin Soviet writings have cited this as an example of communist revolution by the peaceful parliamentary path. It is true that no civil war occurred. But the coup de Prague, which bears a certain resemblance to the pattern of so-called "legal revolution" by which Hitler's National Socialist party took power in Germany in 1933, involved the ruthless application of political coercion and a scarcely veiled threat of armed violence. To call it a "peaceful" revolution would unduly stretch the meaning of that word, and to speak of its path as "parliamentary"

should not obscure the fact that it led immediately to the suppression of parliamentary democracy in Czechoslovakia.

One other feature of the imposed communist revolution as it developed in Eastern Europe after the Second World War was the satellization of the communist regimes that arose. Stalin, then at the apogee of his dictatorship, demanded not only communist regimes but dependably subservient ones. Communist governments of relatively independent persuasion, pursuing their national paths of communist development, were no more acceptable to him, if not less so, than non-communist governments. Accordingly, the Soviet authorities made every effort from the very outset to guarantee Soviet control over the emerging communist regimes. Thus, Soviet advisers were installed in key positions in the police, army and other ministries of the governments, and the countries concerned were placed in relations of economic dependency upon the Soviet Union. To ensure cooperation by the local communist authorities in these and similar measures, political responsibility was entrusted as much as possible to thoroughly reliable communist cadres, typified by Matthias Rakosi and Walter Ulbricht, who had spent the war years in Moscow. Initially, however, these "Muscovites" shared positions of power with communist leaders who had worked in underground resistance movements in their own countries during the war, men like Gomulka in Poland, Kostov in Bulgaria, Rajk in Hungary, and Patrascanu in Rumania. Tendencies towards what later came to be called "national communism" were present in the latter group.



Although not at all anti-Soviet and no less serious and rigid in their communist ideological convictions than others in the movement, some communist leaders who had stayed in their countries were inclined -- like Tito -- to resent Soviet tutelage and dictation of their policies, to place a high priority upon the interests of communism in their own national context, and to adapt the Soviet communist pattern in various particulars to local conditions.

In the new phase of the East European revolution signalized by the creation of the Cominform and by Moscow's anti-Tito declaration of June, 1948, Soviet control over the newly established communist regimes was tightened. Stalin's move against Tito was probably intended not merely to provoke the overthrow of the Titoist leadership group in Yugoslavia but also to inaugurate a systematic campaign against national-communist tendencies in Eastern Europe. In the wake of the unexpected failure to force the change in Yugoslavia, the campaign developed into a general purge of "national communists" in other countries of the area. In Soviet-engineered purge trials, Kostov, Rajk and others were condemned for alleged "nationalist deviationism." In a typical accusation, the Bulgarian communist leader George Dimitrov (a "Muscovite") attributed to Traicho Kostov the "shameful assumption" that Soviet interests might ever be opposed to Bulgarian interests. The purges of commun-

ists in 1948-52 consolidated the position of the "Muscovites" in the East European regimes and generally underscored Soviet dominance in the area. Even the fact that communist revolution had been made possible by the presence of the Soviet army was openly acknowledged and emphasized. Thus, the preamble of the new Polish constitution adopted in 1952 stated: "The historic victory of the U.S.S.R. over fascism liberated Polish soil, enabled the Polish working people to gain power, and made possible the rebirth of Poland within new just frontiers." 41

Satellization of the regimes created by the communist revolution in its Soviet-imposed version would not appear to have been something necessarily inherent in this pattern of revolution. But owing to a number of factors, chief among which was the personality of the man directing the process, Stalin, revolution could not be exported after the Second World War without the newly established political enterprises being treated as Soviet property. Not only were communist regimes forcibly imposed upon countries where communism was not strong enough to come to power on its own; a whole system of measures was carried out to prevent these regimes from, so to speak, "nationalizing" themselves by developing policies that would reflect the special needs and circumstances of their countries. This went against the current of tendencies inevitably present within those regimes themselves irrespective of the political fortunes of this or that leader of "national-communist" leaning.

It added to the stigma of foreign origin the onus of continued foreign dependency. Consequently, the post-Stalin relaxation of Soviet dictatorship at home and abroad has been accompanied by an independence movement of varying strength in countries where communism was imposed at the war's end. Even without the Yugoslav example to inspire it, this movement would undoubtedly have emerged when conditions made it possible. The results have so far been mixed. In spite of that, they suggest the hypothesis that communism in power, regardless of how it acquires power, has a tendency to turn into national communism.

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A priori schemes of world history aside, the future of communist revolution is no more scientifically predictable in the present state of knowledge than is the future of any other major political phenomenon of our time. However, the comparative study of communism and communist revolutions does suggest some tentative general conclusions that bear upon future prospects:

1. The fact that communist revolution has spread to about a third of the world in its first fifty years does not imply that it will spread, in time, to the remaining two-thirds. There is no good reason to believe that something which could be called a "world communist revolution" is in progress.

2. Neither, on the other hand, would it be justified to assume that no more communist revolutions will take place anywhere. Communist movements of varying strength and vigor exist in over eighty non-communist countries. Depending upon internal and external circumstances, some may be or become sufficiently strong to represent potential regimes of communist revolution. Yet in no instance, with the possible exception of South Vietnam, does this now appear an inevitable or overwhelmingly probable eventuality.

3. The communist revolution is likely to preserve its character as a revolution of under-development. Any future communist revolutions will probably occur not in developed industrial countries with advanced social and political institutions but, as in the past, in under-developed countries where economic progress is slow or stagnant, where society is divided into a privileged minority and a disadvantaged peasant majority, and where authoritarian government prevails. There is no law that the revolution of under-development must take place under communist auspices. Non-communist leadership of it is possible, particularly with encouragement from influential non-communist powers. However, the prospect for such leadership (and such encouragement) remains highly uncertain.

4. So far as communism's path to power is concerned, none of the three historical variants considered above can be automatically ruled out as a future possibility. But for var-

ious reasons, neither the path of Russia's October nor the pattern of imposed revolution appears very likely to furnish a model in the future. In under-developed countries, the communist road to power through armed struggle and identification with nationalism may prove the highroad. Nor should communism's discovery of new roads to power be excluded, although reasons have been cited here for not expecting the "peaceful parliamentary path" to be one of them. A future possible path, which may have been foreshadowed in the Castro revolution in Cuba, is that of "communism by conversion," where a movement of predominantly nationalist and leftist complexion takes power and subsequently opts for Marxism-Leninism and communist political affiliations.

5. Owing in part to the tendency of communist movements and regimes to acquire a nationalist coloration, communism in power, contrary to the founding ideological prophecies, has not proved a cohesive force internationally. The spread of communist revolution beyond Russia has led to growing polycentrism and to diverse inter-communist divisions and discords, of which the Sino-Soviet conflict has been the most serious. The disintegration of international communism is in some sense a symptom of crisis. But it should not be assumed that this development is in all respects detrimental to communist movements not yet in power. It may, on the contrary, be of assistance to some of them, by compelling them to rely more upon their own efforts and to chart their own paths, and by helping them to escape the crisis

of foreign inspiration and dependency. The future prospects of communist revolution are not necessarily harmed by division in the communist world.

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15. Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy," Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1954), Vol. 2, p. 272.
16. The Chinese memorandum was published in Peking in 1963 after the controversy had come into the open. The text of it appears in "The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the C.P.S.U. and Ourselves" (Peking, 1963), pp. 58-62.
17. These quotations are taken from "The Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchev's Revisionism" (Peking, 1964), which contains the fullest systematic presentation of the Maoist position on the question of peaceful transition.
18. For an extended interpretation along these lines, see the writer's "The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements," American Political Science Review (June 1967).
19. P. N. Fedoseev, "Velikii rubezh v istorii chelovechestva," Izvestia, April 30, 1967. Italics added. Fedoseev, it should be mentioned, did not say or imply that the political regime of communist revolution would remain effectively "multi-party" following the transition. A facade of pseudo-multipartyism



could always, of course, be maintained, as it is now in certain communist-ruled countries, e.g., China. It is noteworthy in this connection that the C.P.S.U. Central Committee's "Theses" for the fiftieth anniversary of October explicitly reaffirm the doctrine that the regime born of communist revolution is a "proletarian dictatorship," which in Leninist language means communist-party dictatorship.

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21. Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder, Selected Works, Vol. 2, p. 629. In The State and Revolution, Lenin writes that the Russian revolution of 1905-07 was "undoubtedly a 'real people's' revolution, since the mass of the people, the majority, the 'lowest social ranks,' crushed by oppression and exploitation, rose independently and put on the entire course of the revolution the impress of their demands, of their attempts to build in their own way a new society in place of the old society that was being destroyed" (Selected Works, Vol. 2, p. 167).
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of the post-Stalinist Soviet use of Lenin's references to a "peaceful development of the revolution" to support the doctrine of peaceful transition, see Khrushchev's speech at the Sixth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Izvestia, January 14, 1963.

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35. Mao Tse-tung, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," Selected Works, Vol. 3, pp. 87, 96-97. See also his subsequent statement in "On New Democracy" (Ibid., p. 122): "In the rural areas, rich peasant economic activities will be tolerated." These statements presuppose a fourfold classification of the rural population into the landlord class, the rich peasants or rural bourgeoisie, the middle peasants, and the poor peasants (Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. 3, pp. 88, 92-93).

36. Peasant Nationalism, p. 19.
37. Ibid., p. 181. Elsewhere Johnson speaks of "the nationalistic basis of communism in the independent communist states" (Ibid., p. 179) and states that "Communism and nationalism were fused in wartime China and Yugoslavia as a result of the identification of the CCP and YCP, respectively, with the resistance movements of the two countries..." (Ibid., p. 8).
38. Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy," Selected Works, Vol. 2, pp. 272, 273.
39. "Advice of an Onlooker," Selected Works, Vol. 2, p. 133.
40. For a detailed country-by-country description of the process, see Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (New York: Praeger, 19 ), especially chapter 8.
41. Ibid., p. 373. Italics added.

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WAR AND PEACE IN COMMUNIST THINKING.

by

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## War and Peace in Communist Thinking

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The future will be determined to a considerable extent by Communist thinking on war and peace. This consideration should form an incentive for the Western world to make a serious study of Communist ideology, in so far as it is concerned with this subject. Certain factors will have to be taken into account, which are of importance for the correct interpretation of Communist ideology in the field of war and peace. There are four factors concerned here, the first two of which are connected with the significance of ideology in Communism, the third with the interpretation of ideology and the last with the Communist mistrust of the West.

In the first place it should be stated that there has been a lessening in the significance of the Communist ideology for the practice of Communism. Ideological erosion, or whatever name is given to this process, is beginning to play an increasingly marked role in the Communist countries. Various factors have contributed to this development, but it is not necessary to go into them here in more detail. That the Communists themselves also realise this is proved by the repeated warnings against ideological infiltration from the West, which is directed at impairing Communist ideology. Although there is but little evidence of any erosion of ideology in the cadres of the Communist party, this development is certainly in progress there and is, in fact, inevitable when even Soviet philosophers are taking an ever more critical line on Marxism-Leninism. What is written in the official handbooks and textbooks of Communism

is being taken less seriously than in the past and is more relativised. Formerly there were always convulsive efforts to fit the facts to the ideology, whereas now one frequently sees the reverse: the ideology adapts itself to new conditions.

A second factor which merits attention here is the increasing significance of the hidden role of Communist ideology. In the past the Communists always proudly declared that they never concealed their aims. The policy of "peaceful co-existence" has drastically altered this state of affairs. The struggle for peace has become the noble cover for the class struggle and the ideological struggle. "Peaceful co-existence" has become the new name for Soviet-Communist strategy. This new dogma is much more opaque than the old doctrines. Behind the various pronouncements in the field of "peaceful co-existence" one must take into account propagandist aims and attempts to weaken the capitalist world by peaceful means. In this connection attention may also be drawn to the propagandistic significance of the Communist use of words such as "peace" and "disarmament". The Communists repeatedly urge that for propaganda and agitation purposes the words peace and Communism should be mentioned in the same breath, in the hope that the terms will increasingly become identified with one another. Moreover, efforts are being made to get certain terms, such as "peaceful co-existence", more widely accepted, in the belief that the adoption of a term could be the first step towards acceptance of the idea.

A third factor is closely connected with the foregoing. Terms such as war, peace and disarmament have their own meaning for Communism. This has already frequently led to serious misunderstanding between East and West. Many future difficulties could be spared on both sides if the parties involved in negotiations - especially when treaties are to be concluded - were first to ask one another for definitions and interpretations of the terms occurring most frequently. The ideological significance of the Communist terms would then be

evident and also the fact that these terms can never really be fully understood without knowledge of the ideological framework into which they fit. What the Communists mean by the word war can only be understood when one knows what the Communist dogma is concerning war. This dogma is in turn incomprehensible without knowledge of Communist ideology as a whole.

A fourth factor which must be taken into consideration is the Communist world's deep-rooted mistrust of the West. Many Communists still live in the expectation of Western aggression, even those who are critical of their own system. They can produce a great deal of evidence to support their attitude: allied intervention in 1918-1920, the German offensive in the Second World War, the creation of the N.A.T.O., encirclement by Western military bases, the rearmament of Germany. All these phenomena make them feel that it is not at all unlikely that the United States and the Federal Republic should once again attack the Soviet Union.

This attitude also explains Soviet incredulity when Americans attempt to convince them that the U.S.A. will never attack without previous provocation. On the other hand, the Russians do not understand why the West is afraid of Soviet aggression. If the West does not attack, there is not the slightest reason for this fear. Moreover, they are in general not inclined to designate as Communist aggression actions, such as the Soviet intervention in Hungary in the autumn of 1956, which are clearly seen as such by the West.

#### Peace in Communist Thinking

One will search in vain in official handbooks and textbooks on Communist ideology for a definition of the term "peace" which is at all comprehensive, whilst the term "war" is clearly defined. Remarkably enough, even the dogma of "peaceful co-existence" is scarcely

mentioned in these books. What does receive attention in them is the "struggle for peace", but this subject is considered more from the aspect of war than of peace. In this connection reference is made to the danger which imperialism constitutes for peace, to the role of the working class in the defence of peace and to the possibilities of preventing wars.

The reason why Communist ideology is so summary in its reflections on peace probably lies in the fact that for Communism peace is only possible in a world which has become entirely Communist. As long as capitalism and imperialism exist, peace is inconceivable; not until the last remnants of them have been eradicated is there the guarantee of real peace in the world. Until such time there is little point in giving extensive consideration to peace, but it is certainly worthwhile to do everything possible to further the struggle for peace. The Communist countries, the Communist parties, the international and national front organisations are enlisted to promote this end in many different ways.

Since for Communism peace is closely connected with the final objective, the world Communist society, it is not surprising that in the official ideology peace is described in a positive sense in the chapter on the Communist society. In the well-known textbook on the underlying principles of the Communist ideology, which has been translated from Russian into German under the title "Grundlagen des Marxismus-Leninismus", published by Dietz Verlag, Berlin 1960, the chapter on the Communist society contains a section on "peace and friendship, co-operation and rapprochement between the nations". In order to do justice as far as possible to the sparse pronouncements on peace in Communist ideology, the most important passages from the section referred to are given below:

Vorausschauend schrieb Karl Marx über den Kommunismus, dass, "im Gegensatz zur alten Gesellschaft mit ihrem ökonomischen Elend und ihrem politischen Wahnwitz, eine neue Gesellschaft entsteht, deren



internationales Prinzip der Friede sein wird, weil bei jeder Nation dasselbe Prinzip herrscht - die Arbeit!

Wir sehen, dass auch heute in den Beziehungen zwischen den sozialistischen Ländern, unabhängig von ihrer zahlenmässigen Grösse und ihrem wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Entwicklungsniveau, das Prinzip der Gleichberechtigung der Nationen herrscht. Durch den Sieg des Kommunismus wird dieses Prinzip auf eine neue, höhere Stufe gehoben und die faktische Gleichheit der Länder gewährleistet, in denen die neue Ordnung errichtet wurde. Schon beim Übergang zum Kommunismus werden sie sich alle dem Niveau der Fortgeschrittenen nähern und mehr oder minder gleichzeitig in die kommunistische Ära eintreten.

Die Herausbildung des sozialistischen Weltsystems hat eine enge Zusammenarbeit und gegenseitige Unterstützung der befreiten Völker mit sich gebracht. Der Kommunismus bedeutet weitere Festigung und Entfaltung dieser Zusammenarbeit. Er eröffnet die Möglichkeit, die Wirtschaft und die Kultur aller Völker noch weit mehr einander anzunähern, um ihre rasche und erfolgreiche Entwicklung zu sichern.

Und welche Werte könnten geschaffen werden, wenn man die Mittel, die für das Wettrüsten verausgabt werden, wenn man die Kraft der vielen Millionen Menschen, die von den Armeen und der Rüstungsindustrie beansprucht werden, für den Aufbau einsetzte!

Von gewaltigem Nutzen für die Völker wird auch die ökonomische Annäherung der kommunistischen Länder, die Entwicklung ihrer Wirtschaft zum kommunistischen Weltsystem sein. Die umfassende Kooperation und die Spezialisierung erschliessen neue Möglichkeiten zur Einsparung menschlicher Arbeit und zur Erweiterung der gesamten Produktion. Auf dieser Grundlage wird sich das Tempo der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung enorm steigern.

Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten erschliessen sich im Kommunismus auch für den kulturellen Aufschwung der Menschheit. Die ihrer Form nach nationalen Kulturen der verschiedenen Völker werden immer mehr von dem gemeinsamen kommunistischen Inhalt erfüllt werden. Ihre Annäherung auf

dieser Grundlage wird der gegenseitigen Bereicherung und der Entwicklung der nationalen Kulturen einen mächtigen Auftrieb verleihen und in der Perspektive zur Herausbildung einer einheitlich, zutiefst internationalen, wahrhaft allgemein menschlichen Kultur führen.

Die Wissenschaft wird sich überaus schnell entwickeln, denn es wird möglich sein, die Anstrengungen der Wissenschaft zwischen einzelnen Nationen und später auch innerhalb der ganzen Welt zu koordinieren. Unendlich vielfältig werden die Kontakte zwischen den Menschen der verschiedenen Länder und Nationalitäten werden; sie werden sich gegenseitig besser kennen, werden voneinander lernen und sich immer mehr als Mitglieder einer die ganze Menschheit umfassenden Familie fühlen.

Man kann sagen, dass der Kommunismus dem Begriff "Menschheit" selbst einen neuen, hohen Sinn verleihen wird, da er das jahrtausendlang von Zwietracht, Hader, Konflikten und Kriegen zerrissene Menschengeschlecht in einen einheitlichen, weltumfassenden Freundschaftsbund verwandelt."

From this quotation it is evident that there is scarcely any question of a positive doctrine of peace. Nor is there any yet to be found in the numerous publications of the last few years on "peaceful co-existence". This deficiency will make itself increasingly felt in Communist circles, now that "peaceful co-existence" has become the official policy towards the capitalist world and "peace" the principle propaganda theme.

#### War in Communist Thinking

War has always occupied an important place in Communist thinking. Until the idea became accepted that wars could be avoided, war had always been considered as inherent in capitalism and, therefore, as long as capitalism continued to exist, unavoidable. Hence the amount

of attention which is given to this subject in Communist ideology, so that one is justified in speaking of a Communist doctrine of war. Whenever the Communists have spoken of the "struggle for peace", as they have so readily done recently, this has really been a new name for the old doctrine of war.

The various elements of this doctrine must in the first instance be sought in the writings of Lenin. In his many works he is particularly concerned with the causes and nature of wars. According to him wars are the result of imperialism, especially as the latter develops erratically (cf. Lenin "Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism", 1916). He divided wars, under which heading revolutions and civil wars are also to be included, into unjust and just wars. The former are waged by the imperialists with the aim of conquering and subjugating other countries. Just wars are waged by oppressed peoples or classes against imperialism. The above-mentioned views of Lenin are included in the official Communist ideology. There is one very important point on which a different view is now taken, namely that of the "inevitability of wars". According to Lenin wars were not only caused by imperialism, but were the unavoidable result thereof. Although it may be assumed that he began to have doubts about this towards the end of his life - as was also the case with Stalin - it was not until 1956 that the doctrine of the inevitability of wars was given up.

At the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in February 1956, Khrushchev declared that there was no such thing as a fatalistic determination of the inevitability of wars. Five years later (5th January 1961) in a speech for higher party cadres and scientists he gave a classification of different types of war (cf. Vraagstukken van Vrede en Socialisme (Problems of peace and socialism), January 1961). He distinguished between world wars, local wars and national liberation wars. His views may be summarised as follows:

As far as world wars are concerned, although the capitalist countries are divided amongst themselves, they are afraid to start fighting one another and they must keep watch on the Soviet Union. Under existing conditions it is therefore unlikely - though always possible - that there should be wars between the capitalist countries. They are more inclined to prepare to wage war unitedly against the socialist countries. The power of these countries constitutes, however, a serious obstacle for the imperialist states. Thus the peoples can prevent a war, provided they unite all their strength to this end.

Local wars can develop into world wars, hence the necessity for Communism to take the same attitude in these cases. The Suez conflict in 1956 was a local war. Thanks to the action of the Soviet Union, the capitalist countries' aggression was defeated.

National liberation wars usually begin as uprisings of colonial peoples against their oppressors and develop into guerilla wars. These wars are inevitable as long as colonial powers continue to subjugate nations. Examples of successful national liberation wars are:- the struggle against the French in Vietnam and Algeria, and against the Americans in Cuba. The Communists support these wars whole-heartedly and to the utmost.

The abandonment of the doctrine of the inevitability of wars was naturally a very important moment in the history of Communist thinking on war. The continual preaching of the inevitability of war contributed to an attitude which was orientated more towards war and struggle than to peace and peaceful means. The idea of peace was shut out of the mind - this would only be possible after the war had been won. No attention could be given to reconstruction until the process of destruction had been accomplished. A human type emerged for whom war was inevitable and therefore a reality. In order to be as well prepared for this as possible, an aggressive attitude had to be fos-

tered. When, therefore, it is suddenly proclaimed that war is no longer inevitable and the Communists are exhorted to take part in the struggle for peace, it is only natural that a certain inner confusion should result. Nor did this confusion fail to occur and it has contributed to a split in the Communist ranks which is still continuing up to the present day. In the vanguard of the opposition is the Communist Party of the Chinese People's Republic.

An important question which arises here is that of how the Soviet authorities motivated their new tenet. They did this by declaring that the balance of power in the world had changed in favour of the forces of peace, which would increasingly gain the ascendancy. It may be assumed however, that the real reason lay in the growing realisation that an atomic war could have very serious consequences for the Soviet Union. But this can never be openly admitted since in the struggle between Communism and capitalism Communism can never be the loser. Instead they painted war in the blackest colours, especially as regards its consequences. Why should one wage such a war, if it is possible to achieve the ultimate aim by peaceful means, thus without great damage and destruction and long delay? A second reason for the abandonment of the doctrine of the inevitability of wars is probably a psychological one. After the Second World War there was more than ever a universal desire for peace - the world must now be finally finished with war. World Communism has made use of this desire by establishing a world peace movement. In such a movement there is naturally no room for belief in the inevitability of wars.

Since the abandonment of the doctrine of the inevitability of wars, Soviet Communism is preaching the "struggle for peace". In the textbook "Grundlagen des Marxismus-Leninismus" quoted previously, guiding lines for the struggle are given (pp. 533-551). The working classes must join with the farmers and the intellectuals in this struggle, and even with representatives from capitalistic and military

circles, who are increasingly coming to realise what is at stake.

They must set about the achievement of their goal in a tactical way and try as far as possible to concentrate under their leadership all movements which are striving for peace. Should the danger of an atomic war actually arise, then they should take political action to compel the existing governments to go out of office and to have them replaced by a peace-loving government.

In following these directions one cannot help feeling that this is more a question of a political-psychological struggle to weaken the countries of the West than a real struggle in aid of peace.

#### Content of Peaceful Co-existence

Although "peaceful co-existence" has for many years been the recognised foreign policy of the Soviet Union towards the capitalist world, it has not yet attained to a place in the official Communist ideology corresponding to its significance. In "Grundlagen des Marxismus-Leninismus" it is dealt with in little more than a page (pp. 548 and 549). In order to get to know the ideas behind peaceful co-existence one must refer to speeches of Khrushchev, party resolutions, the new programme of the CPSU and articles in leading party papers.

For the very reason that the above-mentioned text-book makes such limited reference to "peaceful co-existence", it is interesting to examine the definition given there. From the numerous definitions given by Khrushchev, the following has been selected:

"Ihren elementarsten Ausdruck findet diese Politik im Verzicht auf den Krieg als Mittel zur Lösung strittiger Fragen. Doch der Begriff friedliche Koexistenz erschöpft sich darin durchaus nicht. Ausser der Verpflichtung, keinen Angriff zu unternehmen, enthält er auch die gegenseitige Verpflichtung aller Staaten, ihre territoriale

Integrität und Souveränität in keinerlei Form und unter keinerlei Vorwand zu verletzen. Das Prinzip der friedlichen Koexistenz bedeutet Verzicht auf Einmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten anderer Staaten, um ihre Regierungsform oder ihre Lebensweise zu verändern oder aus irgendeinem anderen Beweggrund. Die Doktrin der friedlichen Koexistenz sieht gleichfalls vor, dass die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen den Ländern auf voller Gleichheit und gegenseitigem Nutzen der Partner beruhen. (N.S. Chruschtschow, Über die friedliche Koexistenz, Moskau 1959 S 6/7 russ.)"

When they expand on the theme of "peaceful co-existence" the Communists usually point to 4 elements:

1. States with different social systems peacefully co-existing.
2. Economic competition.
3. Ideological struggle.
4. Promotion of world revolution.

sub 1. This proposition emanates from the necessity to prevent war, which can no longer be tolerated as a means of settling contradictions. There should be no interference in the internal affairs of other countries. There must be an attempt to cultivate better economic and cultural relations with other countries.

sub 2. Economic competition must take the place of military confrontation. This peaceful rivalry will show the world which system is to be preferred, the conservative, capitalist system which is doomed to perish, or the progressive, socialist system which is focused on the future. This struggle will be won by the socialist system, because it is the best system for the promotion of prosperity and the cultural well-being of mankind.

sub 3. Peaceful co-existence and economic competition do not, however, imply ideological co-existence. On the contrary, the struggle must be continued here unabated. Capitalist ideology and Communist ideology are fundamentally opposed and it is therefore the task of Communism to carry on this struggle without concessions or compromises.

sub 4. Peaceful co-existence does not eliminate the world revolutionary aims of Communism; on the contrary, it promotes them, since it is a form of international class struggle between the socialist and capitalist camps.

When one asks oneself why Communism has arrived at the new doctrine of "peaceful co-existence", the following reasons would seem to be the most likely: a war with the capitalist world should be avoided; trade with the capitalist nations is a necessity; the final goal can be attained more easily and advantageously and in a less dangerous way by peaceful means.

"Peaceful co-existence" is a remarkable mixture of conflicting elements. On the one hand co-existence and collaboration are being striven for, on the other hand irreconcilability and conflict. Ideological irreconcilability and class warfare would not seem to form a very suitable basis for peaceful co-existence and co-operation. It has been found in practice that when Communists have these inconsistencies pointed out to them, they usually have no answer.

#### Peaceful Co-existence and Disarmament

Before going more closely into the question of the real significance of "peaceful co-existence", some attention should be given to the question of disarmament in Communist thinking. In the past Communist views on disarmament were conditioned by Lenin's way of thinking, who was against simultaneous disarmament of "capitalism" and the "working class". Capitalism should be disarmed first and the proletariat would only proceed to this step after world conquest had been achieved. "Peaceful co-existence" also brought changes in views on disarmament. In their proposals for general and complete disarmament the Soviet Union now urge the destruction of the means of starting war and, in the first place, the means of mass annihilation. The



essence of their propaganda is the prohibition and complete abolition of all nuclear weapons and of all means by which the latter are conveyed to their targets. This programme should be carried out in three phases. In the meantime all sorts of measures will have to be taken which will further the execution of this programme.

A very important point in the Soviet conception of disarmament is the supervision. On the question as to whether the Soviet Union are in favour of supervision of disarmament, they give the following answer:

"Yes. Supervision of disarmament and not supervision of armament. Hence the fundamental difference in the Soviet view at the disarmament discussions from that of the Western countries. All the projects of the Western powers stress the introduction of supervision of permanent weapons. In effect that means reconnoitering the balance of power at each phase, prompted by the desire to await the most suitable moment for an attack, instead of a really serious desire to bring about disarmament. In the Soviet draft agreement for general and complete disarmament each step in the elimination of a certain type of weapon is accompanied by measures for strict international supervision." (Cf. De Sowjet-Unie - een encyclopedisch handboek (The Soviet Union - an encyclopaedic handbook). Pegasus, Amsterdam, 1965).

It is obvious that just as much as the Communists want to prevent war, so they will also strive to do away with the weapons which make such a war possible. The fact that they are themselves prepared to co-operate on this fits in with the assumption that "peaceful co-existence" is the best way to the realisation of world communism. They therefore act on the principle which has for years formed the basis of the disarmament negotiations between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A.: the security of the parties concerned will be guaranteed by both parties alike through the maintenance of balance in armament.

Significance of Peaceful Co-existence for Peace

The question which, in the framework of this discussion, would seem to be particularly important is the following: What is the real significance of the Soviet conception of "peaceful co-existence" for peace? After what has been written above, there is no need to go any further into Soviet-Communist views about this. Chinese Communism repudiates the Soviet conception of "peaceful co-existence" - as will be shown below.

In non-Communist circles there are also widely differing views, varying from total acceptance to total rejection. In the latter case "peaceful co-existence" is often seen as a large-scale deceptive strategy, the aim of which is to lull the Western world to sleep and get it to disarm, so that - when disarmament has gone far enough - it can be taken by force by surprise. Between the most extreme views there are various points of view which take into account both the positive and the negative aspects of "peaceful co-existence". In general it can be said that there has recently been less emphasis on the dangers and more emphasis on the positive possibilities of "peaceful co-existence". For those who are inclined to see "peaceful co-existence" in the first place as a dangerous and undermining strategy, this minimising of the dangers forms new proof of the validity of their tenet. There are also warnings against "peaceful co-existence" to be discerned in scientific circles. A Staff Member of the "Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace - Stanford University - California" last year wrote a book which contains a wealth of quotations from prominent Communists on "peaceful co-existence", and the aim of which is to warn people against the great danger thereof. (Cf. Peace or Peaceful Co-existence? by Richard V. Allen, American Bar Association, Chicago 1966).

"Peaceful co-existence" unquestionably has its positive aspects. In the first place the change in Communist thinking about war, which is no longer considered inevitable. One can surely speak of progress here, even if the motives are more determined by opportunism than by a genuine desire for peace.

Secondly, "peaceful co-existence" contributes to the intensification of relations with the capitalist countries. These contacts can help to tone down the hostile picture of the West which prevails in the Communist world. Ideas from the Western world penetrate the Communist world and can further the liberalisation process there. When Khrushchev introduced his "peaceful co-existence" he undoubtedly saw this as the best Communist strategy for this period. He did not, however, sufficiently appreciate that he was forging a double-edged sword. His belief in the superiority of Communist ideas was such that he was not particularly apprehensive of the infiltration of Western ideas. How great a danger this is now considered is shown by the repeated warnings against ideological infiltration. "Peaceful co-existence" has opened the door to an exchange of ideas, which works more in favour of the West than of the East.

The West can make use of this situation for the furtherance of peace. Time is a favourable factor here. A movement which proclaims to advocate peaceful means for the achievement of its goals, will ultimately be influenced itself by this message and by these means.

#### Chinese-Communist Views on Peace and War

Chinese-Communist views on peace follow to a considerable extent the old Soviet conception. Peace is inconceivable in a world in which capitalism and imperialism exist. Not until they have been totally destroyed and Communism has conquered the entire world can there really be any question of peace. Nor can disarmament take place until

imperialism and capitalism have been completely exterminated. There is therefore little point in devoting theoretical considerations to peace. The battle must first be won and for this purpose all resources must be mobilised and there must not be too much indulgence in dreams of peace.

It is not easy to arrive at an accurate appreciation of Chinese-Communist thought on war and the struggle for peace. Firstly because, more than is the case with Soviet Communism, a distinction must be made between words and deeds. Compared with very aggressive speeches and articles, foreign policy is often found to exhibit a certain degree of caution. Secondly, in order to interpret the Chinese views, one is sometimes dependent on Russian indictments, which are, of course, often prejudiced.

However, from all this it can be seen in which direction Chinese Communist thinking on war is moving.

Up to the time of Stalin's death the Chinese faithfully followed the official views of the Soviet ideology. There were differences, though these were not on matters of principle, but were more concerned with the different forms which war can take. Chinese Communism has above all developed the conception of "revolutionary war", both in general and in respect of China. Mao Tse-tung describes it as follows:

"Revolutionary war, whether a revolutionary class war or a revolutionary national war, has its own specific circumstances and nature, in addition to the circumstances and nature of war in general. Therefore, besides the general laws of war, it has specific laws of its own. Unless you understand its specific circumstances and nature, unless you understand its specific laws, you will not be able to direct a revolutionary war and wage it successfully.

China's revolutionary war, whether civil war or national war, is waged in the specific environment of China and so has its own specific circumstances and nature distinguishing it both from war in general

and from revolutionary war in general. Therefore, besides the laws of war in general and of revolutionary war in general, it has specific laws of its own. Unless you understand them, you will not be able to win in China's revolutionary war." (Selected works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume I, Foreign languages Press, Peking 1965, p. 180).

The Khrushchev period saw the beginning of the difficulties with the Chinese People's Republic, at first scarcely noticeable, later increasingly obvious. Reproaches turned into accusations, which became increasingly serious, until they led to the present rift which would seem to be unbridgeable. When one tries to discern from these accusations the difference in outlook between Soviet Communism and Chinese Communism, the following picture emerges:

The Soviet Union accuses China of rejecting "peaceful co-existence" and of considering armed force as the only means by which the goal can be attained. It is, however, not as absolute as it is stated here. China considers "peaceful co-existence" as but one aspect of the foreign policy of the socialist countries, not as a policy which must be carried out all along the line. It must be assessed case by case; it is at present impossible to engage in peaceful competition with the U.S.A., but with a country such as France it is possible.

Nor does China take a very enthusiastic view of peaceful economic competition, considering that there are more important things to see to at the present moment: a revolution gains more from an armed than from an economic struggle. The Soviet Union is therefore accused of undermining the task of revolution in the capitalist countries and reference is made to Lenin, who maintained that a peaceful revolution would be very rare.

Nor do both parties agree on the inevitability of wars. The Soviet Union's accusation that China considers all wars inevitable is not accurate. China maintains that a world war is not inevitable, but that, besides national liberation wars, local wars are also inevitable, and that it is the task of Communism to bring about these

wars - if necessary by doing it themselves. Nor does China believe, as does the Soviet Union, that a local war can grow into an atomic war. The expression "paper tiger" is frequently used in this connection. The U.S.A. would surely shrink from putting their atomic power into action in a local war.

As far as a third world war is concerned, China has declared itself against it, but in the other hand the Chinese are at great pains to show in all sorts of ways that they are not frightened at the prospect and that in the last resort such a war would be to the advantage of Communism. In Lin Piao's well-known article in the People's Daily of 3rd September 1965 (Long live the victory of people's war!, Foreign Languages Press, Peking) he says the following just before the end:

"U.S. imperialism is preparing a world war. But can this save it from its doom? World War I was followed by the birth of socialist Soviet Union. World War II was followed by the emergence of a series of socialist countries and many nationally independent countries. If the U.S. imperialists should insist on launching a third world war, it can be stated categorically that many more hundreds of millions of people will turn to socialism; the imperialists will then have little room left on the globe; and it is possible that the whole structure of imperialism will collapse."

#### Outlook for the future

Although thinking on war and peace never determines entirely what will happen in this realm in the future, it does in any case exert a significant influence on policy concerned with these questions. There is therefore an essential difference between thinking of the inevitability of wars or of the possibilities of avoiding them. A world movement which principally and continuously thinks in terms of

war and revolution is in a sense engaged in evoking them and causing them to materialise. If, on the other hand, thinking is directed towards peaceful ways and means, then the chances of peace are considerably greater.

Up to 15 years ago Soviet Communism really only thought in terms of war. Peace was in the far-distant future, only to be brought about after the establishment of the world Communist society. Since then "peaceful co-existence" has come on the scene and thinking has been emphatically concentrated on this possibility, which may more or less be seen as a transitional stage towards peace. Some advantages of this have already been stated. Though one must be careful not to overestimate the advantages, one must above all not underestimate them. Continual pre-occupation with peace must almost certainly lead eventually to realisation of the necessity for more intensive and scientific study of this question. One cannot be continually engaged in the "struggle for peace" without indicating how this peace can be realised and developed. The old ideology will probably play an ever lessening part. In the first place because, since 1956, the old doctrine of war has in fact almost been abandoned, even though the new tenet is regarded as a supplement to, and enrichment of Marxism-Leninism. In the second place because the significance of the ideology as the guiding principle in practice is decreasing.

Further, much will depend on the reactions of the West. One can carry out a policy which arouses opposition and struggle, but one can also develop a policy which as it were urges the Communist world further along the path of peace. This must naturally not lead to unnecessary weakening of one's own position. Both in the Western and in the Communist world the need to co-operate constructively in working for peace is becoming increasingly apparent. In assessing the possibilities of this cooperation both parties are still too much misled by negative statements about one another, the significance of which they tend to overestimate. The Soviet authorities are, for ideological

reasons, bound to continue to refer to capitalism as the enemy which must be destroyed. Representatives of Western governments are obliged to continue to point to the possibility of Soviet aggression in order to justify the necessary defence measures. In the meantime, however, the process of increasing contact and greater co-operation is developing, a development which would seem to justify more optimistic expectations.

With regard to China the situation is much more difficult. Here the old theories on war are still predominant. This ideology has not yet become subject to erosion. The dispute with the Soviet Union, relations with other Communist countries and parties, the war in Vietnam, relations with the West, the reverses in the Third World and the developments in their own country have not contributed to any relaxation in Chinese Communism.

Those who read the article of Lin Piao quoted above are confronted with a frightening aggressiveness which seems to constitute a serious danger to world peace. The assertion that Chinese rhetoric and Chinese deeds are two different things may have a reassuring effect, but certain internal developments are not conducive to making the objective observer very hopeful. It sometimes seems as though China is preparing for an unavoidable conflict with the U.S.A. With this end in view all possible resources must be mobilised and the people must be psychologically prepared. It often appears as though the experience of Vietnam has convinced the Chinese authorities that the Americans must lose a war against China. These dangerous views probably constitute the most serious threat to world peace at the present time.

Fortunately there are also more hopeful signs. The increasing internal protests against the present Chinese administration are also protests against the aggressive course of Mao Tse-Tung and his followers. Not only intellectuals, but also others, are becoming increasingly rebellious against the regime. Even though they may not



reject Communism as a system, they are, however, striving for radical changes. They want modification of the authoritarian administration, liberalisation in various fields and contacts with other countries. The Chinese authorities will have to take these growing needs into consideration.

The West will have to follow this development closely and make use of all possibilities of exerting a favourable influence. Here too time is an important factor. The old regime will have to make way for a newer and younger administration, the forces of moderation will be on the increase, intellectuals and younger people will be less willing to conform, contact with abroad will be increasingly necessary. Along these lines a process can develop corresponding to that in the Soviet Union. The task of the West is to further effectively this development.

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SOVIET MILITARY POLICY AT THE FIFTY-YEAR MARK

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## Soviet Military Policy at the Fifty-Year Mark

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The past half-century has seen the growth of the Soviet Union into one of the world's two strongest military powers, with an industrial-technical base commensurate to superpower status in the modern world. The Soviet armed forces themselves have not only met the supreme test of a great war, but through fifty years of sometimes turbulent Soviet history they have remained the obedient instrument of the successive Party leaderships that have controlled the destinies of the Soviet state. These are no mean accomplishments, and the present Soviet leaders may be pardoned if, as the Soviet Union prepares to celebrate its fiftieth anniversary in November, they tend to look back with pride and satisfaction at the military aspects of Soviet growth and development.

At the same time, however, the present collective leadership under Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin can scarcely avoid giving sober thought to tasks and problems in the military field that bear upon the future path the Soviet Union may follow in the years ahead. Indeed, as the Soviet Union has evolved into a more mature and complex society, placing subtle new demands upon those who direct its policies at home and abroad, so the problems of creating modern military power and of using it to political advantage have become more difficult and intricate.

In Stalin's day following World War II, Soviet military policy had been oriented in a relatively straightforward way toward two primary tasks: the first and most urgent, to break the American nuclear monopoly; the second, to hold Europe hostage to preponderant Soviet conventional military power while the first was being accomplished. Comparatively little attention was given under Stalin to a number of more subtle problems, such as determining the political utility of military power in the nuclear age and developing a body of strategic thought responsive to the changing technological and political environment of the modern world. It was left largely to Khrushchev in the decade or so after Stalin's death to preside over the process of incorporating the new weapons of the nuclear-missile age into the armed forces, along with appropriate concepts for their use.

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This proved, for various reasons, to be a somewhat painful process. For one thing, Khrushchev found himself wrestling with the paradox that even as technology invested military power with an ever-increasing destructiveness and coercive potential, constraints upon its use also grew apace, tending to multiply the risks and narrow the opportunities for turning military power to political advantage. Although this was a universal paradox confronting not the Soviet leadership alone, it had particularly damaging effects upon the doctrines of a Marxist-Leninist leadership elite schooled to take a tough-minded view of force and violence as agents of revolutionary sociopolitical change. It led to revision of such Leninist tenets as the inevitability of war between the rival systems, helping to persuade Khrushchev that a new world war was too dangerous to serve as the "midwife" for another round of Communist advance, and that even lesser forms of revolutionary conflict might escalate into a large nuclear conflagration which could jeopardize the Soviet system itself.

In the immediate area of military policy, Khrushchev's role as revisionist and reformer likewise had a painful impact. The organizational and conceptual reforms which he imposed upon the Soviet military establishment were, at least in the eyes of conservative-minded elements among the marshals, too radical to be swallowed easily. Eventually, but not without generating a good deal of resistance, Khrushchev's military philosophy, based on the primacy of strategic deterrent power, won out. However, the military programs he sponsored had the side-effect of neglecting what many of his Soviet critics considered to be the need for "balanced, all-round strengthening" of the armed forces; moreover, even with respect to the strategic nuclear forces he favored, Khrushchev's programs tended to emphasize the image of strategic power at the expense of substance, and by the end of his rule the Soviet Union still found itself in a "second-best" strategic posture vis-à-vis the United States.

This then, in briefest outline, was the background against which Khrushchev's successors took over the responsibility for Soviet military policy. During the three years since Khrushchev was removed from office in 1964, Soviet military policy under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime has moved through an initial "standpat" period of reappraisal into what may be described as the regime's own response to various major issues confronting it. Some of these are new problems growing out of developments like the war in Vietnam or the Middle East crisis and others, as we shall see, are mainly holdover issues from the Khrushchev era, set perhaps in a new context.

Before taking stock of specific developments in the field of Soviet defense posture and policy under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, one should perhaps make the general observation that there has been no radical change of direction in Soviet defense preparations or in the strategic philosophy underlying them since Khrushchev left the scene. That is to say, the post-Khrushchev period to date has been marked by no major organizational and theoretical reforms in the military domain comparable to what followed the death of Stalin. What has happened, rather, can be regarded as an effort to broaden Soviet military capacities in fields which suffered some neglect under Khrushchev's programs, while at the same time retaining the central feature of his military philosophy, the essence of which was to place primary emphasis on Soviet strategic nuclear-missile power.

In this process, prompted perhaps by a belief of the present leadership that it must provide itself with a wider range of military options and divest itself of the political liability of having only a second-best strategic posture in future crisis situations, somewhat more attention has been given to strengthening the substance which stands behind the image of imposing Soviet military power cultivated by Khrushchev.

Although the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime may ultimately find that many of the military policy problems on its agenda will remain essentially intractable, nevertheless the steps it has taken thus far are having significant effects on the Soviet defense posture and upon the military power relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. Furthermore, changes in the Soviet Union's strategic position have been accompanied by revival of internal discussion, and sometimes argument, over the doctrinal and policy implications of Soviet military development, as well as by airing of questions pertaining to relations between civil and military authority, all of which not only testifies to the vitality of the issues involved, but also suggests that a new chapter in the evolution of Soviet military policy has opened under Khrushchev's successors. Let us turn now to some of the pertinent developments of the past year or two, beginning with a brief review of the question of defense claims upon Soviet resources -- a perennial problem sharpened by the new regime's commitment to an ambitious program of domestic economic reform and improvement.

#### THE RESOURCE ALLOCATION ISSUE

Although the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime started out with the apparent intention of holding a ceiling on military expenditures, as indicated by its adoption of a 1965 military budget slightly smaller than Khrushchev's for the preceding year,<sup>2</sup> it rather soon became evident that the new leadership was to find no easy way out of the everperplexing problem of economic-defense priorities. The details of early contention around the issue of resource allocation may be found in a previous article by the present writer;<sup>3</sup> here, suffice to say that military spokesmen first surfaced the issue with a series of theoretical arguments in 1965 implying that one-sided emphasis on war deterrence, as practiced under Khrushchev, could lead to neglect of all-round strengthening of the armed forces and to questioning of "the need to spend large resources on them".<sup>4</sup>

At about the same time that military writers were suggesting that there are no ruble-saving shortcuts to Soviet security, divergent views also showed up within the political leadership, with some leaders espousing resource priority for internal economic development while others stressed the need for further strengthening of Soviet defenses to meet the threat posed by a deteriorating international situation.<sup>5</sup> The extended crisis growing out of the war in Southeast Asia tended during 1965 and 1966 to buttress the position of the latter in the internal policy debate over economic-defense priorities. That they were gaining ground was indicated by a five per cent increase in the military budget for 1966 -- to 13,4 billion rubles -- and by Kosygin's observation at the 23rd Party Congress in April 1966 that "aggravation of the world situation" had adversely affected Soviet plans for economic development, preventing the Soviet Union from making "a substantial reduction in military expenditures and correspondingly greater capital investment in peaceful sectors of the economy".<sup>6</sup>

By the beginning of this year, it became still more clear that arguments for larger defense expenditures had prevailed, even at the cost of some setback of investment in other sectors of the economy. There was, for example, another increase in the published military budget for 1967 -- to 14.5 billion rubles, a boost of about eight per cent. These figures, it should be noted, are what the Soviet Union has chosen to announce publicly. Actual military expenditures, part of which are buried under other budgetary headings, are generally somewhat higher -- at least one-third higher, according to competent Western estimates.<sup>7</sup>

As matters stand today, the supposition that military requirements are actually taking a bigger bite out of Soviet resources than the published figures indicate is strengthened by delay in ratifying the new 5-Year Plan for the 1966-1970 period. The guidelines for this plan were issued in early 1966 and discussed at the 23rd Party Congress in April 1966, where Kosygin said the plan should be ratified within four or five months by the Supreme Soviet. However, at this writing more than a year later, only the current year's plan has thus far been approved, suggesting that unresolved difficulties of resource allocation between military-space programs and civilian sectors of the economy are still being threshed out.<sup>8</sup> As we shall see later, one of the defense questions which has complicated Soviet planning appears to center around deployment of an ABM (missile defense) system, an undertaking that will involve very substantial new expenditures at a time when other investment will also have to be stepped up to meet the economic goals of the 5-Year Plan.

#### THE POSSIBILITY OF GENERAL WAR AND ITS POLITICAL UTILITY

It goes without saying that the urgency accorded Soviet military preparations depends in no small way upon what the Soviet leadership thinks about the likelihood of a major war in today's world, as well as the question whether war in the nuclear age has become obsolete as an instrument of policy. On the first issue, there has been a marked tendency in Soviet media since early 1965 to sound the theme that the "aggressive character of imperialism" is increasing, making it the "most important duty" of the Soviet Party and other Marxist-Leninist parties "not to permit an underevaluation of the danger of war".<sup>9</sup> The new leaders themselves also have expressed concern that the danger of war has grown in light of U.S. "aggression" in Vietnam.<sup>10</sup> The critical point, however, is what distinction to make between Soviet declaratory utterances on the likelihood of war - which serve various purposes of internal argument and external propaganda - and the private convictions of the leadership.

Any opinion ventured on this subject is bound to be speculative. The present writer would be inclined to believe that the incumbent Soviet leadership still considers a major war between the rival systems to be unlikely - if not thanks to benign U.S. intentions, then because of a combination of Soviet deterrent military power and the political forces generally described as the "world peace movement".<sup>11</sup> A qualification should probably be added, however, with regard to Soviet concern that a local war, such as the one in Vietnam, might get out of control, or that the policy of a resurgent Germany might one day draw the United States and the Soviet Union into war.

With regard to the second question posed above, it is a matter of some interest that doctrinal ferment has again arisen in the Soviet Union around the issue of war as a policy instrument. As one may recall, during Khrushchev's tenure there had been a definite tendency to admit that nuclear war was likely to be militarily unmanageable and that Lenin's dictum on war as a continuation of politics was obsolete.<sup>12</sup> Since the fall of 1965, however, beginning with an article by Lt. Colonel E. Rybkin in the semimonthly journal, Communist of the Armed Forces,<sup>13</sup> this view has been frequently challenged. The Rybkin article attacked by name such prominent Soviet writers as General Nicolai Talenskii for having spread the "fatalistic" doctrine that it is no longer possible "to find acceptable forms of nuclear war". While agreeing that nuclear war would create great havoc and that one should do everything possible to prevent it, Rybkin asserted that one should not succumb to the doctrine that victory in nuclear war is impossible. To do so, he said, "would not only be false on theoretical grounds, but dangerous also from a political point of view."

He went on to argue that victory was feasible provided a country conducted a nuclear war so as to minimize damage to itself. According to Rybkin, there are two complementary ways to do this. One way lies in achieving "quick" defeat of the enemy, "which will prevent further destruction and ~~destruction~~ and disaster". The other lies in "the opportunity to develop and create new means for the conduct of war which can reliably counter the enemy's nuclear blows," an apparent reference to ABM defenses. At the same time, Rybkin warned that attainment of the requisite military posture would call for great effort, without which it would be a dangerous mistake "to assume that victory was reliably assured" simply because of the "innate superiority" of the Communist system.

These views have been echoed in part by other military writers, but there has also been pointed criticism of certain aspects of Rybkin's argument. For example, in July 1966, Colonel I. Grudinin joined the attack on the "no-victory" notion promulgated in the Khrushchev era by people like Talenskii, but took Rybkin to task for adopting ideas which smacked too much of "bourgeois" theorizing about modern war.<sup>14</sup> In particular, he argued that Rybkin had strayed from Marxist-Leninist analysis by pragmatically stressing the material balance of forces, or what in the Western idiom might be called "hardware factors," while failing to give sufficient weight to the ideological advantages of the Soviet system.

Still another military theorist to be heard from on this subject was Lt. Colonel V. Bondarenko, who, writing in September 1966, argued that the key to victory lies in a massive and imaginative research and development effort to assure military-technological superiority.<sup>15</sup> Asserting that a properly-managed research program should avoid the dangerous mistake of concentrating merely on improvement of existing weapons, he advanced the thesis that new breakthroughs in weaponry "can abruptly change the relationship of forces in a short period of time". A further contribution to the discussion stimulated by these various military theorists appeared early in 1967 in an unsigned editorial in Red Star.<sup>16</sup> Noting that writers like Rybkin had taken a "creative, independent approach" to problems of modern war, the article stated at the same time that he and Grudinin had unfortunately skirted some of the changes to be taken into account under nuclear-age conditions. Although the article itself reiterated doctrinaire claims of Communist victory if war should come, its main



emphasis lay upon the need for "anti-imperialist forces" to oppose nuclear war "as a means for resolving international disputes", thus seeming to imply that theorizing on the prospects of victory should not be carried too far.

The revival in the Soviet Union of theoretical argument about modern war as a policy instrument does not necessarily mean that a hard-line element has begun to urge a current policy shift involving much higher risk of war than hitherto. The central point stressed by the various military theorists cited above seems to be not that the present "correlation of forces" would offer a good prospect of Soviet victory if war should occur, but that future changes in the power relationship between the Soviet Union and its adversaries might do so. This suggests, in turn, that Soviet military theorists may feel that the programs being carried out by Khrushchev's successors have improved the prospects of reversing the strategic power balance between the Soviet Union and the United States, making it worthwhile to reopen what had tended to become a closed chapter of discussion at the end of the Khrushchev period. Let us look next therefore at some of the steps taken under the present regime to repair the Soviet Union's strategic position.

## BUILDUP OF STRATEGIC FORCES

Although Khrushchev's successors evidently came into office dissatisfied with the strategic balance as it stood under Khrushchev, it was by no means clear at the time what they proposed to do about it. Their initial approach did indicate, if nothing else, a determination to improve the technological base upon which any effort to alter the balance in Soviet favor would ultimately depend. Appropriations for scientific research were stepped up, 17 and, as made evident among other things by public display of new families of weapons, 18 the Soviet military research and development program was pushed even more vigorously than hitherto. It was only after the new leaders had been in office for a year or two, however, that it gradually became apparent that they had committed themselves to a substantial buildup of Soviet strategic delivery forces

As indicated by informed accounts which began to appear in the U.S. press in the summer and fall of 1966, an accelerated program of ICBM deployment was underway in the Soviet Union. 19 By the beginning of this year, according to some of these accounts, the number of operational ICBM's had reached around 400 to 450, and deployment was continuing at a rate of more than 100 a year. 20

These figures compared with a total deployment of less than 200 ICBM launchers during the entire Khrushchev period. Not less significant than the rapid growth of numbers was a shift to new types of missiles in dispersed and hardened sites, in contrast with the ICBM force of the Khrushchev period, much of which consisted of early-generation missiles of "soft-site" configuration. In short, the rate of operational deployment of ICBM's not only was stepped up after Khrushchev's departure, but the qualitative character of the ICBM force also had been improved.

Meanwhile, as emphasized in the late Marshal Malinovskii's report at the 23rd Party Congress in April 1966, "special importance" has been attached to developing mobile land-based missiles for the strategic missile forces, 21 a step which would further diversify the Soviet Union's strategic delivery potential. The same report pointed out that the Soviet Union continues to count upon the additional contribution to its strategic delivery capabilities provided by long-range bombers equipped with air-to-surface missiles for "standoff" attacks against enemy targets and by missile-launching submarines. 22

What the ultimate size and character of the Soviet strategic forces may be remains uncertain. It does seem clear, however, that the familiar situation of the past two decades in which the United States enjoyed marked strategic superiority over the Soviet Union is changing, and that a new correlation of forces could emerge in the next few years. The precise nature of a new strategic balance is not predictable, but if the programs undertaken by the present Soviet regime continue, a situation of "parity" or perhaps even some margin of "superiority" might be attained by the Soviet Union, depending in part upon what response the United States chooses to make.

A great deal of controversy, into which we shall not enter here, attends the questions of what constitutes "parity" or "superiority"; indeed, the point at which it becomes militarily meaningless to exceed a major nuclear adversary in numbers of weapons, megatonnage, or other attributes of strategic forces is something on which views differ widely not only in the United States, but apparently in the Soviet Union as well. 23 Whatever the military merits of the argument may be, however, the political implications of the strategic force equation are another matter. And it is in this regard that any substantial change in the previous strategic balance will be likely to pose far-reaching questions in the realm of Soviet policy. For example, in an environment of acknowledged strategic parity or superiority, will the Soviet leaders feel more secure and be inclined to play a more responsible and prudent status quo role in international politics? Or, ~~will they~~ be prompted to seek fresh political gains from a more

favorable correlation of forces, leading to pursuit of more aggressive policies which could introduce new elements of turbulence into international relations? Only the future holds the answer to such questions.

#### THE ABM ISSUE

Another step taken by the new regime to bolster the Soviet strategic posture, and one which was held in abeyance under Khrushchev, relates to anti-ballistic missile defenses. As made known late in 1966 by the U.S. Government, 24 after some months of speculation in the press that ABM defenses were being installed around such cities as Moscow and Leningrad, the Soviet Union has embarked upon deployment of an ABM system -- the extent and effectiveness of which is still a matter of considerable debate in the West. 25 According to some accounts, it remains unclear at the moment whether the system is confined to Moscow alone, or whether another system covering a larger geographical area is also a part of the current ABM deployment. 26 Speculation about the effectiveness of ABM measures taken thus far by the Soviet Union has been further heightened by public expression of differing opinion on the subject among Soviet military officials. 27

Why the present Soviet regime decided to deploy an ABM system and to claim a significant Soviet advantage in this field is not altogether clear. The Soviet leaders were undoubtedly aware that "first deployment" of ABM's has been widely regarded in the West as a step which could "destabilize" the strategic environment and set off a new round of the arms race. In light of the earlier example of the "missile gap" which in the late fifties and early sixties greatly stimulated U.S. missile programs and had the net result of placing the Soviet Union in a relatively unfavorable position with respect to strategic forces, one might have supposed that the Soviet leaders would think twice about stirring up an "ABM gap" psychology. However, Soviet predilection for building strategic defenses, combined with possible overcoming of earlier technical obstacles in ABM development, seemingly prevailed over the economic costs and the risks of stimulating the strategic arms race in the judgment of the present leadership.

Whether this decision will hold up in the face of American efforts to persuade the Soviet government to reconsider its ABM policy remains to be seen. 28 At this writing, nothing concrete has emerged from the exploratory U.S.-Soviet talks initiated in late February 1967, apart from signs that the U.S. initiative may have aroused fresh internal policy debate within the Soviet government. 29 However, by agreeing to explore the matter, and by suggesting that any future negotiations should also take up the issue of strategic delivery forces in which the United States still enjoys a putative numerical advantage, 30 the Soviet leaders at least seem to be giving second thought to the possibility of improving the Soviet Union's relative position via the arms control route, rather than banking solely on a further unilateral buildup of Soviet offensive and defensive strategic forces.

#### THE QUESTION OF PREPARATION FOR CONVENTIONAL AND LIMITED WAR

Under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, steps taken to bolster the Soviet strategic posture 31 have been accompanied by fresh attention to the possibility of non-nuclear warfare in various potential theaters of conflict, including Europe. Reflecting in part the pressure from some professional military leaders to achieve better-balanced forces than those inherited from the Khrushchev period, and in part perhaps a reaction to such nonnuclear conflicts as those in Vietnam and the Middle East, there has been a tendency to recognize more explicitly than hitherto that Soviet forces must be prepared for a wide range of situations involving either nuclear or conventional operations. 32

With increasing frequency over the past year or two, Soviet military spokesmen have departed from the once standard litany of immediate strategic nuclear escalation, suggesting that hostilities involving possessors of strategic nuclear arsenals might not automatically call them into use. As some military men put it, Soviet military doctrine does not "exclude" the possibility of nonnuclear warfare or of warfare limited to tactical nuclear weapons "within the framework of so-called 'local' wars," which could "take place even in Europe." 33 Another writer -- without, however, mentioning Europe -- stated that Soviet military doctrine today calls for the armed forces to "be prepared to conduct world war as well as limited war, both with and without the use of nuclear weapons." 34

Among the more recent expressions of the view that nuclear weapons should not be treated as "absolutes," especially in theater force operations, was that by Marshal I. I. Yakubovskii, newly-appointed commander of the Warsaw pact forces, who asserted in July 1967 that the efforts of the Party and the government had improved "the capability of the ground forces to conduct military operations successfully with or without the use of nuclear weapons." 35

Although there has clearly been recognition that the theater forces should be better prepared for situations in which it might not be expedient to bring Soviet strategic nuclear power to bear, this does not mean that reliance upon Soviet nuclear arms, in either a military or political sense, has been abandoned by the new regime, as some Western observers have tended to conclude from such articles as that by Yakubovskii. 36 Not only does the continuing large Soviet investment in a strategic force buildup testify to the contrary, but even proponents of better-balanced forces still concede priority to capabilities for conducting general nuclear war. 37 Indeed, some Soviet professional opinion has insisted that any war in a place like Europe "would immediately assume the broadest dimensions," 38 while such a well-known military authority as Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii has upheld the view that the responsibility of Soviet strategy is to properly plan for the use "above all of missile-nuclear weapons as the main means of warfare." 39 In an article in early 1967 not long before his death, Marshal Malinovskii, the Soviet Defense Minister, stated categorically that in Soviet defense planning "First priority is being given to the strategic missile forces and atomic missile-launching submarines -- forces which are the principal means of deterring the aggressor and decisively defeating him in war." 40

On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that the present Soviet regime, in surveying such policy commitments as those which it has taken on to back the Arab nations in the Middle East imbroglio or to support elsewhere what are known in the Communist lexicon as "national-liberation struggles," can scarcely afford to ignore the military implications of such commitments. One of these implications would seem to be that the Soviet Union must give further attention to the maritime-air-logistic elements of power needed to project its military influence into local conflict situations without having to invoke the threat of immediate nuclear holocaust, a requirement congenial to the arguments of those who urge better-rounded forces. As a matter of fact, the present regime has moved in this direction, building on measures initiated in the Khrushchev era to improve Soviet amphibious and airlift capabilities, to train the reactivated marine forces (naval infantry) in landing operations, and to secure base arrangements growing out of Soviet military aid programs abroad. 41 The dispatch of Soviet naval units, including special landing vessels, to the Mediterranean in connection with the Arab-Israeli crisis was a conspicuous example of this trend. 42 How far the Soviet leadership may be prepared to go, however, either in actually committing its own forces in local situations or in investment of the resources necessary to make such intervention effective, remains among the critical questions on its agenda.

## THE VIETNAM CRISIS AND SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

The unresolved war in Vietnam has posed for the Soviet leadership a somewhat analagous policy problem, which is further complicated by the strained state of Sino-Soviet relations. Although the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime has gradually increased its support of Hanoi's military effort during the past couple of years, especially by furnishing SA-2 missiles and other air defense materiel, it has not sanctioned the formal commitment of Soviet military forces to the war in Southeast Asia, 43 Presumably, in the interest of avoiding a direct confrontation with the United States, the Soviet leaders would prefer to keep their military involvement limited to furnishing equipment, technical advice and training to Hanoi's soldiery, although they have occasionally spoken of permitting "volunteers" to participate, which would still be something less than formal intervention. Beyond experimenting with volunteers, however, the Soviet leadership's room for maneuver would seem to be constricted not only by the risk of major escalation, but by the fact that geography makes direct Soviet intervention difficult. Charges of Chinese refusal to cooperate in the overland shipment of Soviet aid to North Vietnam have pointed up this difficulty. 44

With regard to China, the Soviet Union evidently has had to consider military problems potentially a good deal more serious than interference with shipments to Vietnam. In the spring of 1966, for example, the Soviet leadership reportedly felt obliged to castigate Peking for telling the Chinese people that "it is necessary to prepare themselves for a military struggle with the USSR." 45 Since that time, Sino-Soviet relations have grown still more inflamed in the climate of Mao's "cultural revolution," amid rumors of frontier clashes and mutual military precautions in the border territories of the two countries. 46 Although an outright military collision between the two Communist powers is still perhaps only a remote possibility, the new Soviet regime doubtless has been obliged to reassess its military preparations with such a contingency in mind. In this connection, according to Peking's allegations, there has evidently been some internal redeployment of Soviet forces in the Asian regions bordering China. 47

Neither the Vietnam conflict nor friction with China, however, seems to have counseled any significant redistribution of Soviet military power deployed against NATO Europe. For the Soviet leaders to consider troop withdrawals in Europe while the war in Vietnam continues would, of course, leave them vulnerable to Chinese allegations of "collusion" with the United States to ease the European situation and permit the transfer of American troops to Vietnam. 48

Sensitivity to Chinese criticism, however, probably has no more than an incidental bearing on Soviet military deployments in Europe. The main factor seems to be that, despite the war in Vietnam and the Soviet Union's increasing stake in Asian affairs generally, priority still applies to maintaining the Soviet Union's European power position and its ability to deal with the political and military problems of Europe, not the least of which, in Soviet eyes, is that of keeping a resurgent Germany in check. Indeed, Soviet spokesmen under the new regime have reemphasized that the main focus of Soviet interest continues to lie in Europe, where, as the Kremlin sees it, the emergence of a closer U.S.-Bonn axis within NATO allegedly constitutes the greatest threat to Soviet security. 49

## SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE WARSAW PACT

The military role of the Warsaw Pact in Soviet policy has changed considerably since the Pact was created in 1955, largely as a diplomatic counter to West Germany's entry into NATO. Originally the Pact played little part in Soviet military planning, which was predicated on the assumption that Soviet theater forces would bear the burden of any military undertakings in Europe in which the Soviet Union might become involved. Around 1960-1961, however, Khrushchev instituted a new policy of closer military cooperation with the East European members of the Pact, aimed both at improving the collective military efficiency

of the Warsaw alliance and at tightening its political cohesion in the face of "polycentric" tendencies in East Europe. 50

This policy has been continued under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. In particular, the process of joint training and modernization of the East European forces, commensurate with their enlarged responsibilities, has gone forward. Today these forces total over 900,000 men, organized in some 60 divisions, of which about half are at combat strength and readiness, according to Western estimates. 51 Taken together with the Soviet forces deployed in East Europe -- which consist of 20 divisions in East Germany, four in Hungary and two in Poland, plus sizeable tactical air elements and tactical missile units -- the aggregate Warsaw Pact forces in Europe today represent a rather impressive military potential.

From the Soviet viewpoint, however, the fruits of the new policy course toward the Warsaw Pact have not been entirely sweet. While the military efficiency and capability for joint action of the East European components have been improved, the political aim of tightening bloc unity and cohesion through military integration seems to have gone somewhat awry. Instead of being bound closer to Soviet interests, the East European regimes have tended to press for a more influential voice in Pact matters affecting their own interests, such as the sharing of economic and military burdens, and for the formulation of alliance strategy. Rumania, first to jump the traces in the economic field, also has taken the lead in challenging Soviet control of military affairs. 52 Partly perhaps as a response to Rumanian recalcitrance, but probably more because the focus of Soviet political and strategic interest is directed toward Germany, a rather marked regional differentiation has emerged within the Warsaw alliance between countries of the "northern" and "southern" tiers. 53

In sum, there is growing evidence that the Warsaw Pact is evolving into an alliance beset with the familiar interplay of coalition politics, rather than representing a fully compliant instrument of Soviet policy. It would probably be wrong, however, to jump from this to the conclusion that the Soviet Union has ceased to exercise a predominant role in the affairs of the Warsaw bloc. The residual animosities of the Cold War, skillful Soviet play upon East European fears of a resurgent Germany and, above all, the Soviet military presence in East Europe, continue to place limits on the ability of the Warsaw Pact countries to shape their own policies independent of Soviet interests.

#### POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONS UNDER THE NEW REGIME

Finally, to complete this survey of Soviet military policy today, a few words are in order on the state of political-military relations, an area of recurrent tension in the 50 years of Soviet history, 54 and one which has taken on new significance in light of special problems generated by the nuclear age. Broadly speaking, these problems fall into three categories: those of maintaining political control over the armed forces in time of crisis and amidst the hazards which a nuclear-missile world may hold; those of meshing industrial-military planning to cope most effectively with the resource-consuming appetite of modern weapon systems; and those of balancing military influence on Soviet policy formulation against the need of political authorities to call increasingly upon the professional expertise of the military leadership.

Signs that all of these questions are alive in the Soviet Union have cropped up under the present regime. An unusual amount of attention, for example, has been given to the command and control problem under nuclear-age conditions, ranging from its technical aspects 55 to the need for creating the "necessary politico-military organs" to insure coordinated leadership of the country in emergencies, taking cognizance of the fact that "modern weapons are such that

the political leadership cannot let them escape its control." 56 Lessons drawn from mistakes committed by the Soviet leadership prior to and in the initial stages of the last war have been cited also to make the point that under modern conditions, especially in the event of war beginning with a surprise blow, the leadership's "correct and timely evaluation of the situation prior to a war, and the reaching of initial decisions" have taken on greatly increased significant<sup>57</sup>

The enhanced importance under modern conditions of tying together more effectively the economy and the planning and procurement of weapons for the armed forces has been a theme sounded frequently in Soviet writing, often with undertones of civil-military competition for resources. 58 A suggestion that this issue might be creating pressure for restructuring of traditional Defense Ministry arrangements along more civilian-oriented lines than in the past arose following the death of Marshal Malinovskii, the Defense Minister, in March 1967, when there was a spate of rumors in Moscow that his successor might be Dmitri Ustinov, a Party civilian with a long career in the management of defense industry. 59 Had Ustinov taken over the post customarily occupied by a military professional with command prerogatives over the armed forces, it seems likely that rather sweeping organizational changes would have followed, perhaps with the effect of giving the professional military even less immediate influence on resource decisions than it now possesses. As it turned out, however, the regime shielded away from such a radical step, if it had in fact seriously contemplated it, and after a delay of about two weeks Marshal A.A. Grechko was appointed in April 1967. His background as Warsaw Pact commander for seven years and his record as a middle-of-the-roader among the Soviet marshals made him an appropriate choice for the job, especially if the regime wished to avoid a controversy which might have exacerbated the issue of military influence upon Soviet policy.

That this issue too remains a live one under the present regime seems to be indicated by the reappearance in print of what was a familiar dialogue in Khrushchev's day between advocates of the case for a growing military share in the formulation of military doctrine and strategy and defenders of the principle of Party dominance in all aspects of military affairs. Marshal Sokolovskii, an eminent spokesman during the Khrushchev era for more professional military influence upon the strategic planning process, was one of those who again pressed this viewpoint. By way of getting across the point that strategic planning in the nuclear age demands a high level of military expertise, Sokolovskii in April 1966 cited the American case where, according to him, "direct leadership" of the top strategic planning body, the National Security Council, "is exercised by a committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," even though its nominal head is the President. 61

The other side of the argument, to be sure, was also emphatically restated. Following a Central Committee plenum which met in closed session in December 1966, a series of forceful reminders of the Party's supremacy in military affairs appeared in the Soviet press. Among the most trenchant of these was an article in early January 1967 by Major General Zemskov, who argued that solution of the complex tasks of modern war involving great coalitions and the energies of whole societies "falls completely within the competence of the political leadership." 62 And as if in direct rebuttal of Sokolovskii, the article pointed out that the need for a single "supreme military-political organ" through which the political leadership would exercise its role had been recognized not only in the Soviet Union, but in other countries like the United States, where "the National Security Council, headed by the President, is such a supreme governmental military-political organ."

It would hardly be warranted, however, to suggest that sparring of this kind over the respective roles of the professional military and the Party betokens a serious challenge to the policy prerogatives of the latter. The very fact that the Party can summon advocates for its view at will from within the military establishment indicates as much. In short, so far as the evidence of the post-Khrushchev period permits one to judge, the Soviet political leadership still enjoins the last word, as was the case during the first half-century of Soviet history.



## NOTES

1. For discussion of this initial period of policy reappraisal, see the author's "Military Policy: A Soviet Dilemma," Current History, October 1965, especially pp. 201-202.

2. The announced 1965 military budget was 12.8 billion rubles, about 500 million rubles less than Khrushchev's 1964 defense budget.

3. See Current History, October 1965, pp. 202-205. See also the author's The Soviet Military Scene: Institutional and Defense Policy Considerations, The RAND Corporation, RM-4913-PR, June 1966, pp. 62-72.

4. Colonel I. Sidel'nikov, "V. I. Lenin on the Class Approach to Defining the Character of War," Krasnaia zvezda (Red Star), September 22, 1965.

5. For details, see Current History, October 1965, pp. 204-205.

6. Pravda, April 6, 1966.

7. See, for example, J. G. Godaire, "The Claim of the Soviet Military Establishment," in Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, December 1962, pp. 35-46. See also article by Timothy Sosnovy, who argues that buried expenditures may be again as large as the published military budget, "The Soviet Military Budget," Foreign Affairs, April 1964, pp. 487-494.

8. Among other problems holding up approval of the Plan was apparently that of working out a pricing system for the economic reform program under which increasing numbers of Soviet enterprises are to be converted to a system using profitability as a criterion of economic performance.

9. For typical examples see General P. Kurochkin, "Strengthening of Aggressiveness -- A Characteristic Trait of Contemporary Imperialism," Krasnaia zvezda, July 9, 1965; Fedor Burlatskii, "Lessons of the Struggle for Unity," Pravda, June 24, 1965; Marshal R. Malinovskii, "October and the Building of the Armed Forces," Kommunist, No. 1, January 1967, p. 32.

10. See speeches by Brezhnev, Pravda, September 11, 1965, and Izvestia, October 24, 1965; by Kosygin, Krasnaia zvezda, July 1, 1965; by Suslov, Pravda, October 31, 1965;

Kosygin interview with James Reston, The New York Times, December 8, 1965; Garbuzov in Pravda, December 8, 1965; Brezhnev speech at the 23rd Party Congress, Pravda, March 30, 1966.

11. For an elaborate Soviet analysis of how the combination of Soviet military power and "peace forces" abroad act to prevent a world war, see Major General N. Ia. Sushko and Colonel S.A. Tiushkevich, eds., Marksizm-Leninizm o voine i armii (Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army), 4th Edition, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1965, pp. 83-91.

12. For discussion of the debate on war as an instrument of policy during the Khrushchev period, see the present author's Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1964, pp. 70-78.

13. "On the Essence of World Missile-Nuclear War," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces), No. 17, September 1965, pp. 50-56. Rybkin, although not widely known outside the USSR, is author of an earlier book in which he also argued that modern war, no matter how destructive, is bound to have politically significant consequences. See Voyna i politika (War and Politics), Voenizdat, Moscow, 1959, pp. 25-26.

14. "The Question of the Essence of War," Krasnaia zvezda, July 21, 1966. Among other accounts critical of views expressed in the Khrushchev period on the unsuitability of Lenin's dictum on war and politics by such people as Talenskii, V. Zorin and N. Nikolskii, see: N. Ia. Sushko and T. R. Kondratkov, eds., Metodologicheskie Problemy Voennoi Teorii i Praktiki (Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Tactics), Voenizdat, Moscow, 1966, pp. 33-34.

15. "Military-Technical Superiority-- The Most Important Factor in Reliable Defense of the Country," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 17, September 1966, pp. 7-14. For a detailed analysis of the Bondarenko article, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Argument for Superiority: A New Voice in the Soviet Strategic Debate, N-419(R), Institute for Defense Analyses, Washington, D.C., January 1967.

16. "On the Essence of War, " Krasnaia zvezda, January 24, 1967. See also Bernard Gwertzman, "Russians Debate Nuclear 'Victory'," The Washington Star, February 21, 1967.

17. Published Soviet allocations for scientific research have risen as follows: 1963 -- 4.7 billion rubles; 1964 -- 5.2; 1965 -- 5.4; 1966 -- 6.5; 1967 -- 7.2. Pravda, December 11, 1962; December 17, 1963; December 8, 1965; Izvestiia, December 16, 1966. A substantial amount of spending for military research is evidently included in these figures. See discussion in Nancy Nimitz, Soviet Expenditures on Scientific Research, The RAND Corporation, RM-3384-PR, January 1963, pp. 12-14.

18. For accounts of Red Square displays of new equipment, see: Pravda, November 8, 1965; Krasnaia zvezda, November 10, 1965; The New York Times, November 8, 1964, May 9, 1965, November 8, 1965.

19. Among such accounts, see "Russian Missiles Estimated at 400," The New York Times, June 9, 1966, Hanson W. Baldwin, "U.S. Lead in ICBM's Is Said To Be Reduced by Buildup in Soviet Union," ibid., July 14, 1966; William Beecher, "Soviet Increases Buildup of Missiles and Deploys a Defensive System," ibid., November 13, 1966; Beecher, "A New Round on Missiles," ibid., December 18, 1966. See also: The Military Balance, 1966-1967, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, September 1966, p. 2.

20. Richard J. Whalen, "The Shifting Equation of Nuclear Defense," Fortune, June 1, 1967, p. 87; George C. Wilson, "New Arms Spiral Feared," The Washington Post, April 9, 1967.

21. Krasnaia zvezda, April 2, 1966. For subsequent claims that Soviet development of a mobile, solid-fuel ICBM is among the factors upon which alleged Soviet military-technical superiority rests, see the previously-cited article by Colonel V. Bondarenko in Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 17, September 1966, p. 9, and Colonel S. Tiushkevich, "The Modern Revolution in Military Affairs: Its Sources and Character," ibid., No. 20, October 1966, p. 23.

22. As is the Soviet custom, Malinovskii gave no figures for the size of the Soviet Union's long-range bomber and missile-launching submarine forces. According

to recent Western estimates, the Soviet Union possesses about 200 heavy bombers (M-4 "Bisons" and TU-95 "Bears," some of which are used as tanker) and about 35 submarines capable of firing an average of three ballistic missiles each. In addition, about 40 submarines are equipped to fire cruise-type winged missiles, which could be used against land targets but which probably have a primary mission against the adversary's naval forces. See The Military Balance, 1966-1967, pp. 3, 5.

23. For a recent U.S. example of such controversy, see the account in The New York Times, July 12, 1967, of a study by The American Security Council sponsored by the House Armed Services Committee, together with an answering statement by the Department of Defense. In the Soviet case, long-standing doctrinal commitment to the goal of both quantitative and qualitative superiority has sometimes been at odds with the view that amongst major nuclear powers "Superiority has become a concept which has no bearing on war." See G. Gerasimov, "Pentagonia, 1966," International Affairs, No. 5, May 1966, p. 28.

24. The first official U.S. cognizance of "considerable evidence" that the Soviet Union was deploying an anti-ballistic missile defense system was given by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara in an interview on November 10, 1966. The New York Times, November 11, 1966. Among earlier analyses of Soviet ABM activity, see: John R. Thomas, "The Role of Missile Defense in Soviet Strategy," Military Review, May 1964. According to one estimate attributed to American officials in early 1967, the Soviet Union had spent up to that time from \$4 to \$5 billion on development of its ABM system, compared with something over \$2 billion spent by the United States on development of the Nike-X missile defense system. See Hedrick Smith in The New York Times, January 29, 1967.

25. See, for example: Hanson W. Baldwin, "A New Round Begins in the Battle of Sword vs. Shield," The New York Times, November 27, 1966; Henry Gemmill, "The Missile Race," Wall Street Journal, December 14, 1966.

26. For discussion of the question whether the second system represents a defense against missiles or aircraft, see: Hanson W. Baldwin, "Soviet Anti-missile System Spurs New U.S. Weapons," The New York Times, February 5, 1967; and articles in The Washington Post, February 22, 23, 1967.

27. For several years, Soviet military leaders have publicly advanced claims for Soviet ABM progress, varying from outright assertions that the Soviet Union had solved the ABM problem to more guarded statements like that of Marshal Malinovskii in April 1966 that Soviet defenses could cope with some but not all enemy missiles. In February 1967, the conflicting pronouncements of several Soviet military men on this subject assumed new interest in light of the opening U.S.-Soviet dialogue on halting a potential ABM race. Two Soviet officers, Generals P.F. Batiskii and P.A. Kurochkin, took the optimistic position that Soviet ABM defenses could reliably protect the country. Shortly thereafter, two other prominent and senior military men, Marshals A.A. Grechko and V.I. Chuikov, voiced the more sober view that the Soviet Union did not yet possess defenses capable "in practice" of intercepting all incoming enemy planes and missiles. For press accounts of these statements, see: "Russians Say Anti-missile System Will Protect Them From Attack," The New York Times, February 21, 1967; "Russians Concede Missile Net Flaw," ibid., February 23, 1967; "Soviet Cities Vulnerable, Red Defense Chief Says," The Washington Post, February 23, 1967.

28. U.S. hopes of persuading the Soviet Union to agree to a mutual "freeze" of some sort on ABM deployment were voiced by President Johnson in his State of the Union message on January 10, 1967. Since then, diplomatic soundings on the matter have proceeded in a climate of alternative doubt and cautious optimism about the prospects of reaching an understanding. The general Soviet tone, set by Kosygin in an interview in London on February 10 and again during his visit to the United States in June 1967, has been on the cool side, although the Soviets have not closed the door to possible negotiations. See: "Kosygin Is Cool to Missile Curb," The New York Times, February 10, 1967; "Soviet ABM Shift Denied," The Washington Post, February 18, 1967; Transcript of Kosygin News Conference at the UN, The New York Times, June 26, 1967.

29. Among such signs was publication of a Pravda article on February 15, 1967 in which Kosygin was made out to be more receptive to the idea of an ABM moratorium than his London remarks warranted. Two days later Western news agencies reported that the article written by F. Burlatskii, had been repudiated by Soviet sources who claimed that the regime's position on ABM negotiations

was negative, as would be made clear in a new article. The article did not appear, suggesting an internal policy hassle. In March, a strong statement of the military case for going ahead with the ABM program appeared in a Red Star article stressing the importance of strategic defense measures. Both the article and its timing suggested an attempt to influence the policy debate over ABM. See Lt. General I. Zavyalow, "On Soviet Military Doctrine," Krasnaia zvezda, March 31, 1967.

30. See Hedrick Smith, "Soviet Would widen Talks Asked by U.S. on Missiles," The New York Times, February 22, 1967; Kosygin Press Conference, ibid., June 26, 1967. The U.S. margin over the Soviet Union in intercontinental strategic missiles, according to published figures reflecting the situation as of October 1966, was around 1,450 land- and sea-based missiles for the U.S. against about 470 for the Soviet Union, a ratio of about 3 to 1. See George C. Wilson article in The Washington Post, April 9, 1967.

31. In addition to steps discussed in the text, two other matters with potential implications for the Soviet strategic posture are worth mention. One was Soviet interest in development of an orbital delivery system, as evidenced both by statements of military officials and parade display of a large missile (SCRAG), claimed to have orbital capability. The other was renewed public emphasis on civil defense preparations, accompanied in January 1967 by reorganization of the civil defense system. See the author's The Soviet Military Scene, p. 101; Colonel General V.F. Tolubko interview in Trud (Labor), November 17, 1965; Raymond H Anderson, "Soviet Places a New Emphasis on Civil Defense," The New York Times, November 23, 1966; Marshal V. Chuikov, "The Soviets and Civil Defense" The Business of All and of Each, Izvestia, June 15, 1967.

32. It should be noted that arguments urging better preparation of the Soviet theater forces for conventional operations had begun to appear even before Khrushchev's political demise. See the present author's comments in Current History, October 1965, p.206..

33. See Colonel General S. Shtemenko, Nedelia, No. 6, January 31-February 6, 1965, and Major General N. Lomov, "The Influence of Soviet Military Doctrine on the Development of the Military Art," "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 21, November 1965, pp. 16, 18. Other military

writers, in discussing the possibility of postponing or limiting the use of nuclear weapons, made the familiar Marxist-Leninist point that this would depend on the class interests and political goals of those involved. See Colonel V. Morozov and Lt. Colonel E. Rybkin, "Problems of Methodology in Military Affairs," ibid., No. 4, February 1967, p. 93; Sushko and Kondratkov, eds., op. cit., pp. 107-108.

34. Colonel N. Kozlov, "The USSR Armed Forces in the Period of Building Communism," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 4, February 1967, p. 80.

35. "Ground Forces." Krasnaia zvezda. July 21, 1967. See also Major General V. Reznichenko. "Trends in the Development of Modern Battle," ibid., June 28, 1967.

36. See, for example, Victor Zorza's interpretation. "Soviet Defense Shift Seen," The Washington Post, July 22, 1967.

37. See, for example, Sushko and Kondratkov, eds., op. cit., p. 299; Reznichenko in Krasnaia zvezda, June 28, 1967.

38. Major General V. Zemskov, "The Escalation of Madness," Krasnaia zvezda, August 3, 1965.

39. Marshal V. Sokolovskii and General M. Cherednichenko, "On Contemporary Military Strategy," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 7 April 1966, pp. 59-66.

40. Kommunist, No. 1, January 1967, p. 34

41. See the present author's, The Soviet Military Scene, pp. 121-122.

42. See "Soviet Is Sending 10 More Warships to Middle East," The New York Times, May 31, 1967; Hanson W. Baldwin, "Soviet Naval Power," ibid., June 2, 1967; "Soviet Warships To Visit 2 Egyptian Ports Today," ibid., July 10, 1967..

43. For a discussion of the Soviet Union's gradually increasing military aid to Hanoi see The Soviet Military Scene, pp. 109-124

44. Ibid., pp. 112, 173.

45. Ibid., pp. 137, 174. See also The New York Times, March 24, 1966.

45. See Victor Zorza, "Soviet Press Clamors Over Chinese Military Threat," The Washington Post, November 10, 1966; "Chinese Report Soviet Border Clash," ibid., February 14, 1967; Charles Mohr, "Observers Speculate That Tensions Along the Soviet-Chinese Border May Be Rising," The New York Times, February 21, 1967.

47. See remarks on this question to a group of Scandinavian journalists by Chinese Deputy Premier Chen Yi, The New York Times, July 21, 1966.

48. For a sample of such Chinese allegations, see the Peking Review, No. 8, February 18, 1966, p. 10.

49. See Gromyko's remarks before the United Nations General Assembly in New York on September 23, 1966, The New York Times, September 24, 1966. Other Soviet commentary, such as a radio broadcast by Mikhail Stepanov in September 1966, has cited the need to strengthen the Warsaw Pact forces in Europe as a "shield against U.S.-German aggression", on the grounds that despite the war in Vietnam the main focus of U.S. military strategy has not shifted from Europe to Asia, and therefore it would be an error to accept assertions in the Western press that the "situation in Europe has stabilized and there is no threat there to world peace." Moscow radio broadcast, September 6, 1966. These assertions were part of a general Soviet propaganda broadside in the fall of 1966 and early 1967 against the alleged threat of a new Bonn-Washington axis. See, for example, M. Voslenskii in Krasnaia zvezda, September 13, 1966; Anatoli Antonov commentary, Moscow broadcast to North America, September 26, 1966; General M. Kazakov, "Fraternal Alliance," Pravda, May 14, 1967.

50. For a discussion of this policy shift, see the author's "The Warsaw Pact in Evolution," in Kurt London, ed., Eastern Europe in Transition, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Md., 1966, pp. 207-225.

51. The Military Balance, 1966-1967, pp. 6-8; Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Military Establishment," East Europe, September 1965, pp. 13-14. For a critical analysis of the much-publicized Warsaw Pact joint field exercises, which auestions their military utility mainly on the grounds that they have been conducted by relatively small formations of Pact forces, in contrast with the NATO



practice of wide-scale unit participation in annual exercises, see Stanley Dziuban. The Warsaw Pact Maneuvers: Proof of Readiness or Psychological Warfare? N-369(R), Institute for Defense Analyses, August 1966.

52. See the present author's Soviet Military Power and European Security, RAND Paper P-3429, August 1966, pp. 38-41. Among reported Rumanian demands was that command of the Warsaw Pact forces be rotated to include non-Soviet officers. A delay of some three months in appointing Marshal Yakubovskii to succeed Marshal Grechko as Pact commander in July 1967 tended to bear out speculation that the command issue had arisen within the Pact.

53. The "northern tier" countries -- East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union -- have frequently been alluded to by Communist sources as the "first strategic echelon" of the Warsaw Pact. These, of course, are the countries most immediately involved, politically and militarily, with the question of West German aspirations in Central Europe. In the Vlatva joint exercise in Czechoslovakia in September 1966, Hungary for the first time participated on a token basis with the other northern tier countries, while Poland did not directly take part.

54. For an exhaustive treatment of this question, see Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1967.

55. See Tiushkevich, in Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 20, October 1966, pp. 22-23; Sushko and Kondratkov, eds., op. cit., pp. 69, 243-265, 279. In the latter volume, it was stated that technical innovations in command and control constitute the third major stage in the military-technical revolution of modern times, the first two stages being the introduction of nuclear weapons and of missiles, respectively.

56. See Major General V. Zemskov, "For the Theoretical Seminar; An Important Factor for Victory in War," Krasnaia zvezda, January 5, 1967, See also Grudin, ibid., July 21, 1966, Lt. General Zavyalov, ibid., March 31, 1967.

57. Marshal A. Grechko, "25 Years Ago," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Military-Historical Journal), No. 6, June 1966, pp. 10, 15.

58. An emphatic statement of the need to work out a coordinated "military-economic policy" to insure weapons

production in "properly substantiated proportions" appeared in an April 1967 article by Colonel A. Babin, who also stressed strict Party control of such "complex tasks." See "The Party -- leader of the USSR Armed Forces," Krasnaia zvezda, April 6, 1967. A more recent treatment of the question, with emphasis upon "correct and effective use of resources" to "insure solution of all military-economic tasks," was offered by Colonel Ia. Vlasovich, "Modern War and the Economy," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 12, June 1967, pp.27-33. See also: Malinovskii in Kommunist, No. 1, January 1967, p. 34; Sushko and Kondratkov, eds., op. cit., p. 79; Zavyalov, Krasnaia zvezda, March 30, 1967 (first of two articles).

59. See Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Kremlin Looking for a McNamara To Rule Its Brass," The Washinton Post, April 23, 1967; Raymound H. Anderson, "Soviet Affirms Party Rule Over the Military Forces," The New York Times, April 7, 1967.

60. At the same time Grechko's appointment to succeed Malinovskii was announced on April 12, it was also made known that three other officers had been elevated in the Defense Ministry hierarchy. They were Marshal Yakubovskii and Generals S.L. Sokolov and I.G. Pavlovskii, men in their middle fifties. This move had the effect of introducing younger blood into the top military echelon, which has been dominated by an over-age generation of World War II marshals.

61. Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii and Major General M. Cherednichenko, "On Modern Military Strategy," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 7, April 1966, pp. 62-63. Another example of the tendency to stress the importance of the military contribution to doctrine and strategy may be found in the book edited by Sushko and Kondratkov, Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice, pp.93-95.

62. See previously cited article by Zemskoy, Krasnaia zvezda, January 5, 1967. Another emphatic restatement of the thesis of Party supremacy appeared in Colonel Babin's article in Krasnaia zvezda, April 6, 1967. For a discussion of the similar dialogue in Khrushchev's day, see the author's Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, pp. 100-109.

Fifty Years After the October Revolution:

INSTITUTIONAL EROSION OF TOTALITARIAN RULE  
THROUGH ECONOMIC REFORMS

by

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Fifty years after the October Revolution, the Communist party rule in the Soviet Union and its erstwhile satellites in Eastern Europe is undergoing a series of changes whose import seems to transcend mere reshuffling of organizational alternatives within the totalitarian political system that has been the hallmark of all Communist regimes emanating from the October Revolution.

On the surface, the emerging changes appear to be limited to the organization of the economy. Yet, to the extent that current "economic" reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe consist of real shifts in economic decision-making (allocation of scarce resources) from the political center to individual enterprises and to market-like relations between the producers and users of various outputs, the emerging changes are as much political as they are economic. For, any increment in the decision-making power by individual producers and users of scarce resources subtracts that much from the decision-making (allocative) power of the political center of Communist regimes.

To be sure, political decisions in Communist-ruled countries still are and may long remain authoritarian or dictatorial in method, but if their scope is being significantly reduced, political dispositions will fall short of encompassing the entire social spectrum of the ends-means relations, which is what totalitarianism means. This, in my opinion, can be the only reason why doubts are beginning to emerge as to whether, in consequence of the incipient economic reforms, the Communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe should continue to be classified as totalitarian.

I therefore submit that current "economic" reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are in need of a more thorough analysis from the viewpoint of their actual and potential (dynamic) impact on the political nature of Communist systems. One of the main questions that should be approached by the symposium FIFTY YEARS OF THE SOVIET UNION is: Are current economic reforms in the Soviet Union and its former satellites in Eastern Europe indicative of a real, even if irregular and uneven, transformation of the totalitarian social system as originated by the October Revolution of 1917 towards a genuinely pluralistic social order characterized by institutional limitations to the use of centralized political power.

#### Genesis of Current Reforms

Significant changes are taking place in the economic systems of the Communist-ruled countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Not that life under Communist rule was standing still before. But there is a difference. In the Stalinist era and even in the Khrushchevian period life had to adjust to, seek to evade, or be tolerated to deviate from, the rigidities of Communist doctrine and the whims of government

fiat. Now part of the adjustment is being shifted into adapting government policies and official institutions, even the Communist doctrine itself, to the growing requirements of life. In 1965 Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union initiated such new reforms while other Communist governments in Eastern Europe were preparing similar changes. Yugoslavia that had begun changing its economic system already in 1952, launched another economic reform in 1965 which was designed to complete the transition to a "socialist market economy".<sup>2</sup>

Since the Communist regime in Yugoslavia has been the originator and pace-setter of systemic changes in Communist regimes, it is worth-while to recall the genesis of Yugoslav reforms in relation to the current reforms in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

Until Tito's expulsion from the Cominform, in 1948, because of his national stance and regional ambitions, the doctrine and practice of Yugoslav Communism were no less Stalinist than in the Soviet Union itself.<sup>3</sup> In their economic aspects, both the Soviet and Yugoslav versions of Stalinism were characterised by centralized planning and command management of all production and distribution, measured in arbitrary prices, reflecting the preferences or fancy of the autocratic leadership of the Party.<sup>4</sup>

After Tito had been expelled from the Stalinist fold, his Party and regime had to find a new identity which would differentiate them from Stalinism yet preserve their Marxist orthodoxy, gain broader domestic support while securing international respectability and Western aid. Thus was initiated, in 1950, a doctrinal and institutional overhaul of the Yugoslav Communist system that is now coming to a head in another major change announced in July 1965.

With Khrushchev's first visit to Yugoslavia in 1955, a series of attempts were undertaken to effect reconciliation between Moscow and Belgrade. The resulting rapprochement was more in the nature of political accommodation than composition of doctrinal differences.<sup>5</sup> Khrushchev was a political pragmatist, not an ideological innovator. He relaxed internal and international tensions. But the changes he introduced in the economic system of the Soviet Union were on the administrative surface and did not reach the doctrinal roots of Communism.

It was not until the publication in Pravda, in September 1962, of Y. Liberman's article suggesting a measure of self-management of the Soviet economy through partial autonomy of enterprises and some influence of consumers on the production of consumer goods, that a truly doctrinal question began to be aired in the Soviet Union. For a year, in 1964-65, some Libermanism was practiced in selected plants. It was only in September 1965, however, under Khrushchev's successors, that Libermanism was in principle accepted by the Communist party and translated into a comprehensive government policy. This first substantial reform of the economic system of the Soviet Union since 1928 that went into effect in January 1966, had been preceded by an even more far-reaching reform decision in Czechoslovakia. Thus three broadly similar, yet quite distinct economic reforms are now under way in Communist countries.

Since it was the Yugoslav party that initiated this doctrinal ferment, it will be useful first to assess the Yugoslav reforms and then to compare them with the incipient changes in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

### Titoist "Revisionism"

In dealing with the evolution of the Communist doctrine and practice, it must be remembered that its founder, Karl Marx, was primarily a critic of the early European capitalism and that he only sketched a sweeping philosophical outlook for communism. According to the Marxian historical dialectics, mature capitalism was to be replaced by a "proletarian" socialism as the necessary transition to the ultimate stage of a classless and stateless society of pure communism. The operational dynamics of post-capitalist evolution which Marx had postulated had to be invented by Lenin and Stalin as they were successfully coping with the problem of "guiding" the first post-capitalist society in the Soviet Union.

According to Lenin, the socialist state, which is the "dictatorship of the proletariat", was to "wither away" in the ultimate stage of communism when the post-capitalist society would have outgrown all traces and consequences of class divisions and overcome all scarcity in production <sup>7</sup> - a faraway vision for a Communist regime that had seized power in a country whose capitalism was very far from being mature by Marx's definition. Stalin later amended the Leninist position with two further propositions. First, during the socialist transformation and transition to communism the "dictatorship of the proletariat", that is of the Communist party, would have to be strengthened, not diminished, because of the sharpening of the remaining class antagonism. Second, because of the "capitalist encirclement" of the Soviet Union (since the end of World War II of the Communist-controlled Eurasian heartland) the state could in fact not wither away anywhere until Communist rule had been established everywhere <sup>8</sup> - a heroic expectation for even the most fervent Marxists. Such was the state of the official Communist doctrine when Tito was expelled from the Cominform.

The doctrinal innovation of Titoist "revisionism" was contained in the more hopeful, if doubtful, proposition that the state and Communist party itself were to begin withering away already during the period of socialist transition to communism. <sup>9</sup> In thus giving a new operational interpretation of the basic Marxist evolutionary scheme, Titoism in fact repudiated not only Stalinism but Leninism as well.

The Titoist version of the "withering away" process was to take place through increasing self-management of economic enterprises and other social institutions by the corresponding "workers' collectives" and through territorial self-administration of public services by the "communes" (enlarged municipalities). The Communist party itself was to begin withering away by assuming an "educational" role, although Party members retained key positions within the remaining jurisdiction of the government as well as in the organs of institutional self-management and territorial self-administration. In fact, however, the society's self-rule in enterprises and municipalities was further limited by the government through its continued administrative interference, fiscal dispositions of the bulk of the national income, and by key investment decisions.

The operation of this economic and political system in gradual transformation had two basic flaws. First, the central government used its vast administrative, fiscal, and monetary powers for uneconomical ("political factories") in the undeveloped "South" of the country

(the bulk of Yugoslavia) at the expense of modernization and expansion of industry in the more developed "North" (mainly in the Republic of Slovenia), where a much higher labor productivity kept the marginal efficiency of capital well ahead of that of the "political" investments in the "South". Thus not only was the "North" penalized by the uneconomical investments in the "South" but Yugoslavia as a whole thereby failed to maximize its national product.<sup>9a</sup> The government also administratively depressed the prices of agricultural, mineral, and basic materials output as well as those of electricity, fuels, and transportation.<sup>10</sup> The idea was to lower the costs of supplies to new industries and living costs in new industrial centers, but the distorted price structure impaired the output in the low-price branches.

A second major weakness of the evolving Yugoslav economic system originated with the "self-managed" enterprises themselves. In the obvious wish to improve the standard of living through income distribution on the enterprise level on which they had some influence, the organs of "workers' collectives" in individual enterprises added to government-generated inflationary conditions through systematic wage escalation in disregard of the low productivity of the politically misstructured economy.

### The New Reform

The combined damage from the two sets of cumulative mistakes was to some extent offset by Western aid to Yugoslavia which up to 1960 amounted to some two billion dollars. As this aid was coming to an end while competition in foreign markets, on which Yugoslavia's economic development importantly depends, grew fiercer, it became clear that the distorted pattern of economic development and management would have to be radically corrected. A half-hearted attempt to this effect was made in 1961 but it failed, although it was backed by another installment of Western aid. Underutilization of inefficient industrial capacities and accompanying unemployment grew larger in spite of mounting inflation while short-term foreign indebtedness approached unmanageable proportions of about one billion dollars. A radical remedy finally became unavoidable. It was announced on July 24, 1965.

The new reform aims at improving economic efficiency by correcting the politically distorted structure and operation of the Yugoslav economy. Because the difficulties in response to which the current reform was undertaken admittedly had their root cause in political interference with a supposedly self-managing economy, the new reform aims at reaffirming and strengthening the self-management principle of the original revision of the Yugoslav political and economic system in the early fifties.<sup>11</sup>

Essentially, the current reform consists of three elements. First, the arbitrary system of prices is being restructured so as to mirror more closely the actual scarcities of various resources at home and price relations in world markets as reflected through a new, more realistic rate of exchange of the Yugoslav currency (from 750 to 1250 dinars to a dollar). There has been a substantial administrative increase in agricultural and raw materials prices as well as in transportation rates. However, since other prices have not been rolled back, this reform measure actually resulted in an overall price increase of about 23 per cent. It was this contrived inflation together with the

uncontrolled inflation of the preceding years that necessitated the devaluation of the currency by 66 per cent and a part of the total reform package. The thus revised price structure is gradually to be exposed to unobstructed influence of changing demand-and-supply conditions in domestic and international markets, but the general price freeze of March 1965, antedating the reform, is still in force for most prices. Administrative price control thus continues to deprive the supposed "socialist market economy" (even) in Yugoslavia of its essence -- a self-working price mechanism. Imports have been liberalized and subsidies eliminated. Wages and salaries too are to be subjected to market scrutiny in accordance with the underlying productivities, a difficult problem which still has not been solved. Second, the fiscal share of the government in the net product of enterprises was to be reduced from 49 to 29 per cent by eliminating the enterprise income tax and by shifting the turnover taxes from production to trade. This is a major fiscal reform which has enhanced potential profitability of individual enterprises while reducing government funds for politically motivated industrial investments and subsidies. Third, each individual enterprise now must justify its existence through market-tested efficiency (profitability) of its operations. In addition to paying their own way, enterprises are now also responsible for their own investment which they will have to accumulate from their sales revenue or from bank loans. Business banks must now be established and financed by enterprises themselves, not by fiscal appropriations. Only a special investment fund for major development projects will continue to be financed from the government budget. Short-term lending for the working capital of individual enterprises is also being handled by commercial banks of each enterprise's own choosing. Inefficient enterprises are to be contractually integrated with efficient ones, if possible, or liquidated, if necessary.

In summary, the new Yugoslav reform aims at restoring real self-management and self-responsibility of individual enterprises within the framework of a genuine price system connected with world markets. The government attempts to limit its authority over the economy to the exercise of the more customary government functions in a decentralized market economy such as procurement of non-marketable public goods (traditional public finance), guiding economic development by providing economy-wide information and coordination for major investment decisions (indicative planning), preventing monopolistic distortion of market relations, securing financial stability (monetary and fiscal policies), etc. The Yugoslav "social plan" is now little more than a forecast of major economic indicators and suggestion of desirable economic policies.

If the new Yugoslav reform is consistently carried through, as it appears it will be, Yugoslavia will then indeed be the first Communist-ruled country with a real market economy within which production and investment will take place in self-managed "socialized" enterprises supplemented by a good many small but private undertakings in farming, services, and artisan manufacturing. The ideological character of the new Yugoslav system, free of Stalinist centralism and Leninist dogmatism, will be reduced to its early Marxist bones: Socialized property of the productive assets of major enterprises, continued political monopoly of the Communist party with a supposedly decreasing scope, and the remaining evolutionary goal of an ultimate communist society. But even these remaining ideological tenets are becoming questionable. The Yugoslav institution of "social property" under enterprise management now differs from the corporate business property in the West mainly in that in Yugoslavia there are (as yet?) no individual workers' shares of enterprise capital which could be



individually transferred through sale or inheritance. The political monopoly of the Communist party has not only been reduced in scope by the extent of enterprise self-management but has been somewhat eroded even in its reduced political sphere since candidates for elective offices are no longer being selected directly or exclusively by the party forums. And the evolutionary goal of social development towards a Marxian-style communist society is not being taken very seriously by anybody; it still serves, however, the important purpose of ideological justification for the "leading role" of the Communist party.

### Reform in Czechoslovakia

The kind of damage to a nation's economic and social progress that can result from a rigidly centralized management in a Communist-command economy has been dramatized in the case of Czechoslovakia. Before the war the country had by far the most developed social system and industrial economy in all of Central-Eastern Europe. After less than twenty years of a totalitarian Communist rule there are today, for example, only one third as many factory managers with higher education per enterprise in Czechoslovakia as in Yugoslavia<sup>12</sup> which started far behind Czechoslovakia. By 1963, the Czechoslovak industrial output and national income, instead of growing, actually registered a general decline of about one half percent of their 1962 performance, not to mention the distorted composition and poor quality of output reflecting arbitrary preferences and inflexibility of centralized management. Shoddy goods were piling up in unsold inventories.<sup>13</sup>

It is against such a background of tangible failure that a relatively far-reaching reform of the Czechoslovak economic system was announced in January 1965.<sup>14</sup> After preliminary testing in 1965, the reform went into general effect in January 1966, and is expected to be fully implemented by 1968.

In the new system a national economic plan will continue to determine major new investments for general and regional economic development. Beyond this, the plan will control aggregate relationships between total consumption, saving, and investment, between total demand for, and supply of, all the goods and services, and the balance of international payments. These economic functions of the government will be exercised by means of fiscal and monetary controls and with a substantial measure of government jurisdiction over prices. The new price system will consist of three categories. Most important prices will be directly determined by the government (basic consumer goods, machinery, basic materials and energy). Then there will be prices for which the government will set upper and lower limits (for the so-called standard goods), the actual price to be left to contractual determination between the suppliers and their customers; the purpose is to permit higher prices for new or improved goods while reducing the prices of outmoded goods. Finally, there will be free market prices for the remaining, less important goods.

Within such a more flexible framework of centralized decisions and controls individual enterprises are to manage the production of specific goods on the basis of contractual relations with their customers and suppliers. Inside the planned limits, enterprises are to be permitted to select their own input requirements in search

of better productivity or in response to contractually determined or market-indicated changes in the quality or quantity of specific goods. An enterprise's freedom of firing its employees and the latter's freedom to change employment will, however, remain subject to trade union consent. But there will be no employees' management of enterprises as in Yugoslavia; enterprises will be run by government appointed directors.

The proceeds from the sale of output of each enterprise are to be distributed in a manner reflecting true costs of production, including profit as a measure of, and incentive for, efficiency.<sup>15</sup> The government as the actual owner of all the productive assets is to collect interest charges on both the fixed and working capital of each enterprise as well as repayments of loans and an enterprise income tax. A portion of each enterprise's after-tax income is to be retained in its autonomous investment fund for technological improvements. The remainder goes into the enterprise's remuneration fund, out of which each enterprise will pay to its employees nationally regulated basic wage rates (differentiated by economic sectors and labor categories) as well as additional rewards according to specific productivity contributions within the enterprise.

While the Czechoslovak reform undoubtedly represents a real departure from the Stalinist principle of a rigidly centralized command economy, it appears to remain well within the boundaries of the Leninist concept of a "socialist" economic system. Except for limited contractual relations between enterprises and a measure of consumers' influence on the production of consumer goods within the limits set by the central plan and enterprise management, there will be no real withering away of the state within the modified Czechoslovak system. The Communist party remains firmly in control of the government. The government retains ownership over all the productive assets and remains in control of economic development. Current production is in charge of government appointed managers ("politically conscious individuals") subject to government controlled prices and other requirements of the government plan.

The Czechoslovak reform stops considerably short of the Yugoslav system of a "socialist market economy". In both cases self-management of enterprises is the mainspring of economic decentralization. But there are three important differences. First, the extent of enterprise self-management of outputs and inputs is to be more limited in Czechoslovakia.<sup>16</sup> Second, Czechoslovak enterprises are to operate in markets with prices under extensive political control by the government. And third, while Yugoslav enterprises are entrusted to self-management by the community of their own employees, Czechoslovak enterprises continue to be government owned with government appointed directors. Yet, with further liberalization of these restrictions, the emerging Czechoslovak system of directorial self-management of enterprises could become a real challenge to the Yugoslav system of employees' self-management which has suffered from its built-in weakness for wage inflation. There can be no challenge from Czechoslovak agriculture, however, until its rigid collectivization is relaxed as it has been in Yugoslavia.

## Economic Changes in the Soviet Union

In September 1965, the Soviet Union itself initiated a significant reform of its own economic system.<sup>17</sup> In preparation for it, the new Soviet leadership first undid a reform Khrushchev had introduced in 1957. Without enlarging the autonomy of plant managers, Khrushchev rearranged the political administration of the Soviet command economy. For this purpose Khrushchev split the territorial party organization into separate industrial and agricultural branches. He also abolished most of the central ministries in charge of specific industries and replaced them by regional economic councils (Sovnarkhozi) in charge of territorial subdivisions of the economy. Now the political administration of the Soviet economy is again centralized within a re-unified party organization, reestablished industrial ministries, and the central planning agency (Gosplan).

After having re-centralized the political planning and management of the Soviet economy, the new reform somewhat narrows its scope by granting a measure of independence to the directors of individual enterprises. Central economic plan continues to prescribe the size, structure, and development of the nation's production as before. The difference is in that the efficiency of individual enterprises will hence be measured by the value of the output sold rather than merely produced as before.

The productive tasks and expected achievements of individual enterprises in terms of their outputs, prices, wages, interest and profit is still to be handed down by the central plan in the form of eight success indicators. But the enterprise management now has some discretion in the selection of specific outputs and inputs through contractual relations with its customers and suppliers. This is the decentralizing core of the Soviet reform in that it requires some market-like relations as an element of the system's operation with greater efficiency. To further stimulate enterprise efficiency in implementing the still centralized government economic plan, funds for autonomous investment by enterprises and for productivity bonuses are to receive larger allotments from the realization of planned profits of individual enterprises than from their excess profits. This is expected to impel the enterprises converted to the new system<sup>18</sup> not to understate their productive capacities for planning purposes -- a general practice before the reform.

While investments as well as current production still are predominantly government determined, interest on invested capital is now charged to enterprises, and an as yet undetermined amount of new investment funds and all working capital allotments are in the nature of repayable credits rather than straight budget grants as before the reform. This new financial arrangement, intended to spur the efficiency of individual enterprises, should also act as a limitation on the arbitrariness of the central economic plan.

A new price system is to be worked out this year by the central planning agency. It remains to be seen to what an extent and how the new price system will reflect actual supply-and-demand conditions and their changes, since prices will remain in government hands. With this proviso in mind, it is possible to conclude that with the new reform the Soviet economic system too is beginning to extricate itself from the shackles of Stalinist economic centralism but that

it remains even more squarely within the confines of Leninism than the new system in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet central plan will be tighter and enterprises will have a lesser measure of self-management on the basis of market-like relations than in Czechoslovakia. In both countries, agriculture remains unchanged institutionally. The Communist party and its government still remain in tight control of the Soviet economic system.

### Reasons for Change

The original Yugoslav reform in the early 'fifties was essentially a political consequence of the Tito-Stalin split. It was condemned by other Communists as an extreme form of doctrinal "revisionism". Yet these same Communist governments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union now seem to be following the Yugoslav lead toward a "socialist market economy". What is the explanation? The most outspoken attempt at justifying this change was made by the Czechoslovak reformers.

According to the promoters of the Czechoslovak reform, a decentralized "socialist market economy" becomes a necessity when possibilities for "extensive" economic development have been exhausted.<sup>19</sup> Before this point is reached, the chief task is simply to maximize total production by mobilizing previously unused resources into more or less obvious, but politically determined production priorities. This can most effectively, if not most efficiently, be done by the Stalinist method of economic centralism. But when the bulk of resources have already been committed to production, further progress depends on their ever more careful use. The task then becomes to minimize inputs per unit of output. And this cannot be done without recourse to a genuine market mechanism through which actual producers and users of scarce goods enter into direct demand and supply relations. Only such a market mechanism can indicate true comparative scarcities of various inputs and outputs as well as comparative usefulness of their alternative uses, and provide the needed incentives for such economizing.

The "extensive" development argument used by the Czechs is of course an oversimplification that helps to justify the unpleasant Stalinist past and to rationalize their belated turn toward decentralization. For the primary historical reason for Stalinism in all Communist countries was clearly political. Rigorous centralism was imposed by doctrinal dictates of radical transformation of the entire social system and its painful consolidation into submission to the totalitarian "dictatorship of the proletariat". If there was a more specifically economic reason for Stalinist centralism at the time of its inception, it was the lack of independent business acumen and managerial skill on the part of the politically trusted members of the new ruling class when they replaced the eliminated private entrepreneurs and managers.

It is true, however, that by the time when comprehensive centralized planning and management were systematically introduced in the Soviet Union, in 1928, it had already occurred to its rulers that what their revolution had conquered was not a "mature" capitalism of a developed economy as envisaged by Karl Marx but only very fragmentary beginnings of it, with the bulk of industrial development still lying ahead. Thus the Soviet economic system under Stalin came

to be characterized as an extreme form of "state capitalism" with the task of carrying on basic industrial development instead of merely administering the "socialist transformation" from capitalism to communism according to Marx.<sup>20</sup> The need for massive reconstruction and the resumed anti-Western course after World War II reinforced and prolonged this Stalinist system in the Soviet Union. Similarly centralized systems were then imposed also on the newly conquered countries in Eastern Europe and Asia that faced their own varieties of combined reconstruction and development agendas together with the radical transformation and consolidation of their newly imposed social and political systems.

It is this mixture of the doctrinal precepts of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism and non-Marxist historical circumstances that the promoters of the economic reform in Czechoslovakia now rationalize as conditions of "extensive" economic development which, according to them, called for prolonged Stalinist centralism. While the argument is not a particularly good one for Czechoslovakia, which was heavily industrialized before the Communist take-over,<sup>21</sup> it fits better the rest of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and is almost tailor-made for Communist China.

In this sense, the grain of truth that the "extensive" development argument does contain helps to explain not only the continued Stalinist centralism in Communist China but also the tardiness and slowness of economic decentralization in the Soviet Union and other Communist-dominated countries in Eastern Europe. Until its current reform, Yugoslavia itself was an exception to the centralist pattern of Communist economic management more in its doctrinal modifications and institutional appearances than in fact. The further reform in Yugoslavia and the incipient economic decentralization in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, on the other hand, can be viewed as indications that the Communist-ruled countries in Europe have in fact reached, or are approaching, the end of their conditions for "extensive" economic development and must now face decentralization as an economic necessity.<sup>22</sup> Only a massive mechanization of agriculture could now reveal substantial "unused resources" in the form of further surplus of rural manpower.

Yet, the original fact remains that it was the largely undeveloped Yugoslavia of 1950 that "anticipated" the "necessity" of "market socialism" while the developed Czechoslovakia must have felt it long before she finally decided to recognize it in 1965. It is worth recalling also that until their recent consecutive reforms, Communists everywhere used to extoll the model of centrally planned command economy as uniquely Marxist and in every respect superior to any market-oriented economic system.

#### Outlook for Marxism

Whatever the variety of reasons that prompted each of the three representative Communist reforms, an analytical comparison of these reforms permits the conclusion that an incipient "socialist market economy" carries within itself the dynamics of its own expansion. Even if a return to the total centralism of the Stalinist command economy were still politically feasible, economic improvement can now be had only through a better utilization of market relations. This much Communist reformers are now admitting themselves.<sup>23</sup> The Yugoslav case,

in particular, indicates that the decentralizing process tends to continue until some "natural" balance is approached between the working of the "non-political" market mechanism (to indicate the ongoing changes in demand and production and the corresponding changes in terms of exchange and distribution), on the one hand, and the "political" guidance of the economy (for supplementary information, coordination, stabilization, and implementation of specific social goals), on the other. Although the evolution in Yugoslavia from its original reform in 1952 to its current reform has been irregular, it has clearly been in this direction.

Presumably, such a balance is not identical in all societies but depends on their differing degrees of cultural and technological development. It would seem that the higher the degree of development, the greater is the potential contribution the market mechanism can make without, however, ever becoming self-sufficient. The failure to perceive the changing relationship between different degrees of development, on the one hand, and the corresponding organization of the economy, on the other, was responsible for the almost unlimited role assigned to the market mechanism by the early classical liberalism. Similarly, Marx's belief in a perfect human society to emerge at the end of post-capitalist evolution carried him away into postulating a spontaneous laissez-faire in an imaginary communist society free of scarcity and therefore with no need for an allocative mechanism or government. Stalinist economic centralism, on the other hand, was based on precisely the opposite assumption that the "transitional" socialist economy was inherently unable to benefit from any degree of decentralization through the use of the market mechanism.

It now can, I think, be concluded that the ongoing economic reforms in Yugoslavia as well as the less far-reaching ones in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, fifty years after the October Revolution, have initiated a significant institutional erosion of Communist totalitarianism. The dynamics of this erosive process cannot be predicted but it undoubtedly is pregnant with still greater erosive possibilities.

This brings us to the remaining two questions. How far will the decentralizing development in Communist-dominated countries go? How far can it go and still remain Marxist? Let us try to approach these questions in the case of Yugoslavia whose "socialist market economy" has evolved further than in any other Communist-controlled country.

Even assuming, as we now may, that the current, second major reform of the Yugoslav economic system will be carried out in accordance with its declared intention and scope, the bulk of productive property will still remain "socialized", the remaining political power will still be the monopoly of a single and exclusivist Communist party, and officially there will still be the expectation of further evolution toward a utopian society of pure communism. Since these are the essential three elements of Marx's conception of the post-capitalist evolution, it would appear that the new Yugoslav system would still be essentially Marxist. But will it remain so?

It could already be argued that the increasing use of the market mechanism with the attendant development of economic and social pluralism (on top of a vigorous national and cultural pluralism in Yugoslavia <sup>24</sup>) would make the de jure "socialized" enterprises de facto owners of the productive assets under their autonomous self-management.<sup>25</sup> Whether there will be further expansion of personal

productive property and entrepreneurship in farming, services, and artisanship, where direct socialization has proved unworkable, remains to be seen. There are some signs to this effect. <sup>26</sup>

On the other hand, there are no indications so far that the supposedly withering-away political monopoly of the Communist party is giving rise to an effective political pluralism <sup>27</sup> instead of just continuing interminably to "wither away" in the ideological expectation of a scarcity-free and stateless communist society. With further development of the "socialist market economy" this problem too will have to "secularize" its remaining doctrine by divesting it of its ultimate myth. <sup>28</sup> When this will have happened, the Marxist contradictions between socialist democracy and oneparty dictatorship and between the actual political society and a utopian stateless society will be resolved. But not just yet, not even in Yugoslavia.

### One-way Convergence

To this examination of the impact of current economic reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on the nature and future of the Communist system fifty years after the October Revolution, three additional points may be added for further reflection.

First, there are serious obstacles to a consistent implementation of Communist economic reforms. There is the obvious difficulty of carrying out any major institutional change anywhere. In Communist systems there are in addition special difficulties stemming from the deeply vested attitudes and interests of political and economic bureaucracy throughout the system, including enterprise managements. These may be termed the pragmatic obstacles to the reform.

Second, to the extent that the reforms are being implemented, they will, as their sociological by-product as it were, strengthen the evolving social pluralism. This development could at some point profoundly scare the hard core of the party of the political implications of a more vigorous social pluralism. Thus the party could yet become the decisive obstacle to the ultimate success of the reforms. One should not forget that the party does not really "love" the reforms. It only reluctantly permits them because it sees no other alternative. The example of Aleksander Rankovic in Yugoslavia should serve as a warning. The inherent fear of political implications of the reforms may be termed the ultimate political uncertainty of economic reforms.

Third, the talk about the "convergence" of the two opposing systems (for which I myself am somewhat responsible <sup>29</sup>) is more in the category of psychological semantics than descriptive of reality. For in fact Communist reforms signify a one-way return, even if slow, to the market principle and social diversity which are two fundamental characteristics of Western societies. But there is no symmetrical "convergence" of Western societies toward some original characteristics of Communist systems. Social welfare supplements to the market mechanism as well as the macro-political guidance of the economy are developments that originated and evolved in the West either long before any Communist system came into being -- social security measures -- or quite independently of the laborious working of Communist command economies -- monetary, fiscal, and structural policies.

This latter group of Western economic policies is a natural concomitant of mature market economies. The progress of Yugoslav economic reforms already reveals that their one-way "convergence" in fact now includes these policies which are to them as new as is their reliance on the market mechanism. When this is fully realized by Communist reformers, it may become yet another obstacle to the implementation of the reforms -- a sort of ideological inferiority complex.

#### NOTES

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1. For the debate on this question see Hugh Seton-Watson, "Totalitarianism Reconsidered", PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, No. 4, 1967, pp. 53 - 58.
  2. See F. W. Neal - W. M. Fisk, "Yugoslavia: Towards a Market Socialism", PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, No. 6, 1966, pp. 28 - 37 and criticism of it in C. A. Zebot, "Views on Yugoslavia", ibid. No. 2, 1967.
  3. V. Meier, "Yugoslav Communism", in W. E. Griffith, COMMUNISM IN EUROPE. Cambridge, Mass.: 1964, pp. 19 - 28; and Ch. Zalar, YUGOSLAV COMMUNISM. A CRITICAL STUDY. Washington, D. C.: 1961, pp. 23 - 176.
  4. V. Zekovic and S. Novakovic, EKONOMIKA JUGOSLAVIJE. Beograd: 1964, pp. 169 - 74, and 196 - 99; and for Czechoslovakia O. Sik, "Problems of the New System of Planned Management", CZECHOSLOVAK ECONOMIC PAPERS, July 1965, p. 20. -- As indicated in the introductory paragraph to this paper centralized planning in fact never succeeded in controlling all economic relationships. There were many evasions and deviations, some undetected and some detected, some punished and some tolerated. The aim, however, remained to blueprint and command all production and distribution. Under Stalin, detection was massive and punishment harsh. Under Khrushchev, toleration was wider but death penalty for economic crimes was reintroduced.
  5. For a detailed account see V. Meier, op. cit., pp. 23-64
  6. H. Schwartz, THE SOVIET ECONOMY SINCE STALIN. Philadelphia: 1965; and C. A. Zebot, THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITIVE COEXISTENCE: CONVERGENCE THROUGH GROWTH. New York: 1964, pp. 23-44.
  7. V. I. Lenin, STATE AND REVOLUTION, in M. I. Goldman, ed., Competitive Economic Systems: A Reader. New York: 1964, pp. 235-37



8. G. Lukas, in a Letter on Destalinization published in NUOVI ARGOMENTI, 57-58, 1965, asserts that Stalin's doctrine of capitalist encirclement "belongs to the past". Yet, the new Khrushchev doctrine of "peaceful coexistence", which has been hailed as a basic departure from Stalinism in Soviet international relations, may better be described as an updated version of the traditional "capitalist encirclement" doctrine. While apparently renouncing direct military intervention, the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" did not exclude other forms of support of Communist subversion anywhere. By including into the concept of "peaceful coexistence" the idea of "wars of national liberation", interpreted so as to encompass Communist-controlled insurrection against any non-Communist government, Khrushchev somewhat embellished the Stalinist practice but in fact increased strategy options for world-wide attempts at Communist takeover. The new "polycentric" structure of the Communist camp now adds further flexibility to this policy. When the Soviet Union itself stays officially aloof, there is always a Cuba, a North Vietnam and, of course, China ready to intervene.
  
9. See on this the Yugoslav Constitutions of 1953 and 1963 in Ch. Zalar, op. cit., pp. 177 - 224, and STATISTICAL POCKET BOOK on Yugoslavia. Beograd: 1963 and 1964, pp. 161 - 192.
  
- \* 10. B. Krajger in the address to the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia, July 24, 1965, announcing the new economic reform. POLITIKA, Belgrade, July 25, 1965, pp. 1 - 4.
  
- \*9a Toussaint Hocevar, THE STRUCTURE OF THE SLOVENIAN ECONOMY 1848 - 1963 New York: 1965, pp. 262 - 72.
  
11. B. Krajger, op. cit.
  
12. H. G. Shaffer, "Czechoslovakia's New Economic Model", in PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, September - October 1965, p. 40n.
  
13. J. Goldman, "Fluctuations and Trend in the Rate of Economic Growth in Some Socialist Countries", in ECONOMICS OF PLANNING, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1964, pp. 90 and 96; and O. Sik, ECONOMIC PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Prague: 1965, pp. 1 - 15, -- The failure of the Stalinist-type management of the Czechoslovak economy was publicly confessed in the "Theses for the Preparation of 13th Party Congress" to begin in May 31, 1966. According to the Associated Press summary of these "theses" of December 22, 1965, "The former system of Stalinist-type centralized planning and controls has prevented fundamental changes and caused "losses of many thousands of millions of crowns". Furthermore, "traditional methods of management neglected consumer demands for better assortment, quality and range of production. 'This has resulted in a weakening of the workers' interest in production and led to material losses in trade'" (See "Czech Party Admits Imperilling Economy", THE NEW YORK TIMES, December 23, 1965, pp. 1 and 12.)
  
14. J. Kosta, "Czechoslovak Economists Discuss Ways of Improving the System of Planned Management", CZECHOSLOVAK ECONOMIC PAPERS, January 1965, pp. 139 - 48; O. Sik, op. cit. and "Problems of the New System of Planned Management", op. cit.
  
15. The concept of profit in the emerging "socialist market economies" remains ambiguous. In Yugoslavia, autonomous enterprises are to be in control of that part of their sales revenue which is left after deductions and payments for materials and energy used in production,

depreciation of, and interest on, fixed capital as well as repayment and interest on short-term borrowings. The residual is called "net income" out of which wages and salaries are paid with the remainder going into the enterprise's own funds. By Western criteria only the last item would constitute profit. The reason why in Yugoslavia wages are considered part of enterprise's net income is that enterprises are presumed to be managed by their own employees. But a similar accounting framework is now used also in Czechoslovakia even though its enterprises are not managed by their own employees.

16. But neither was enterprise autonomy actually "large" in Yugoslavia upon its first reform. Thus it should be interesting to compare the incipient autonomy of Czechoslovak enterprises by the end of 1967 with that of Yugoslav enterprises in 1953. Barring political obstacles such as the first Yugoslav reform encountered in 1954, 1958 and 1961, the evolution of the "socialist market economy" in Czechoslovakia could be much faster than it was in Yugoslavia between 1953 and the current reform.
17. A. Kosygin's report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, PRAVDA, Moscow, September 28, 1965.
18. By the end of 1967 about one half of all industrial enterprises in the Soviet Union are expected to be converted to their new status as envisaged by the reform. On the host of difficulties concerning this transition see Keith Bush, "The Reforms: A Balance Sheet", PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, No. 4, 1967, pp. 30 - 41.
19. O. Sik, ECONOMIC PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, op. cit., pp. 4 - 10; J. Goldman, op. cit., pp. 88 - 89. Similar arguments are used by Yugoslav economists in their ex post explanations of "administrative" planning and management prior to their first economic reform, i. e. from 1945 - 52. See V. Zekovic and S. Novakovic, op. cit., p. 171. For a similar view of the root cause of the new Yugoslav economic reform see n. 22 below. -- The shock-indicator of the approaching dead-end of the "extensive" development opportunities in all of the three reforming countries was provided by a sharp slow-down of their economic growth in the early 'sixties. In Yugoslavia the slow-down was apparent already in 1961 when, in April, the annual rate of growth of industrial production sank to one percent (N. Cobeljic in EKONOMIST, Beograd 1963, no. 1, p. 64). In the Soviet Union the rate of growth dropped to 2.2 percent in 1962 in 1962 and 1963 (H. Schwartz, op. cit., p. 42). And, as reported above, there was a global decline of the social product in Czechoslovakia of one half of one percent in 1963.
20. O. Lange, "The Working Principles of the Soviet Economy", in A. Bergson, ed., SELECTED READINGS IN ECONOMICS, Harvard University, 1960, p. 107. According to Lange, the Soviet economy under Stalin had two overriding objectives, to raise the Soviet Union "to the position of one of the world's leading industrial nations" and "to secure the economic basis for effective national defense". See also B. Horvat, TOWARDS A THEORY OF PLANNED ECONOMY. Beograd: 1964, pp. 4, 79 - 80, and 82 - 83.
21. O. Sik, ECONOMIC PLANNING AND MANGEMENT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, op. cit., p. 4; and H. G. Shaffer, op. cit., p. 32.

22. This was specifically admitted by E. Kardelj, then President of the Yugoslav Federal Assembly, in a lengthy TV-interview of December 22, 1965. Like the Czechoslovak reformers, Kardelj interpreted the current economic reform in Yugoslavia as a deliberate transition from its past "extensive" method of economic development to a market-oriented "intensive" management. Kardelj supported his interpretation with telling evidence. In 1953 - 56, 89 percent of Yugoslavia's economic growth was due to increased employment and only 11 percent to improved productivity. In 1957 - 60 the two percentages were still 59 and 41 respectively. Only in 1961 - 64 the ratio turned in favor of productivity (65 percent). The expected target for the productivity contribution to economic growth in the first five years following the new reform is 65-70 percent which, if achieved, would indeed put Yugoslavia among the developed economies practicing a very "intensive" method of economic management. According to Kardelj, there were two principal shortcomings of the abandoned "extensive"-centralist method of economic development of the Yugoslav economy: much of the increasing employment went into make-work "occupations", and centralized investment decisions favored too many projects without a reasonable prospect for comparative advantage. (See BORBA, December 24, 1965, p.5).
23. B. Horvat, op. cit., p. 225; O. Sik, ECONOMIC PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, op. cit., pp. 16-25; V. Zekovic and S. Novakovic, op. cit., pp. 212 - 13; A. Bajt, "Planning in Conditions of Self-management", DELO, July 18, 1965, p. 3; A. Kosygin's report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, op. cit.; Y.G. Liberman as reported by T. Shabad in THE NEW YORK TIMES, November 22, 1965, p.44; and the decree of the Soviet government of October 4, 1965, concerning the new status of Soviet enterprises as reported by TANJUG on October 22, 1965. Actually, statements to this effect can be found in almost all reform pronouncements and comments by political leaders and professional economists in all the countries concerned.
24. National and cultural differences are, of course, important determinants of modern history regardless of ideological and political systems. According to Viktor Meier, however, these factors are now gaining the upper hand in the evolution in Eastern Europe. "The logic of a 'special' Communist development is giving way to one that is inherent in all authoritarian regimes, whereby ever-increasing importance is placed on national particularities and traditions .... The forces which shaped the political and intellectual life of the individual countries in the pre-war period are slowly coming to the surface once again . . . . It is not in workers' self-government nor primarily in the new economic system, but rather in the national question, that the key to the future of Yugoslavia lies". (Viktor Meier, "Changing Realities in Eastern Europe", PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, No. 4, 1967, pp. 58-59).

Perhaps it would be worthwhile to undertake a major study of the interplay between these national factors and the exigencies of economic development as the two most powerful co-determinants of the ongoing evolution in Eastern Europe. An interesting hypothesis suggests itself for verification or rejection: Evolution has so far progressed the most in Yugoslavia, less so in Czechoslovakia, and the least among the three representative cases in the Soviet Union. On grounds of economic development alone it should be the other way round. Is the opposite sequence due to the reversed order of relative magnitude of national-cultural differences inside each of the three countries?

25. The fact that each enterprise must pay an "interest" charge even on that portion of its capital which has been invested from its own internal funds maintains the appearance of general social ownership, yet may financially be less onerous than Western property taxes. The fluid state of much of Yugoslavia's productive property is reflected in a request by the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia to the Federal Assembly that it prepare supplementary legislation on property relations and the rights and obligations from contractual relations. According to the Court, "organizations and citizens are today in doubt whether they are entitled to certain property rights and, if so, to what extent, and whether they can rely on courts for the protection of these rights". BORBA, December 20, 1965, p. 4.
26. M. Kramberger, "Unexpected Benefits from the Reform", NASI RAZGLEDI, Ljubljana, August 28, 1965, p. 323; and a report on deliberations of the Commission of the Central Committee of the League of Yugoslav Communists concerning private agricultural production, DELO, Ljubljana, October 20, 1965, p. 2.
27. There are, of course, various shades of differences, sometimes deep ones, among Communists themselves, in Yugoslavia, because of its national and cultural pluralism, perhaps more so than elsewhere. This, however, is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for an effective political pluralism. For the latter to be operative, at least two, mutually independent political organizations, even if both "socialist" as M. Djilas had suggested, must not only exist but also be able to compete in free elections.
28. See C. A. Zebot, "Needed: A Secularized Marxism", AMERICA, October 16, 1965, p. 439.
29. See Cyril A. Zebot, THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITIVE CO-EXISTENCE: CONVERGENCE THROUGH GROWTH. Op. cit.

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