THE INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

Résumé of the

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on

THE CHANGING EUROPEAN-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP

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THE CHANGING EUROPEAN-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP

FIRST SESSION — FRIDAY 5 MAY

Agenda — The changing climate: détente in Europe and in Soviet-American relations: changing alliances: the effects of developments in Asia upon Europe.

In his address of welcome Senator Gronchi drew attention to the broader considerations underlying the topics of direct concern to this conference:

(1) the slow undermining of the international institutions and alliances which only recently seemed to challenge the years;

(2) the growing power of China and her determination to make this felt in Asia and perhaps on the world scene;

(3) the difficulties in the way of attempts to stop the arms race and move on from the balance of power towards a state of peaceful co-existence based on the humanitarian ideal of modern man;

(4) the risk of local wars, which persist here and there, degenerating into major international conflicts.

Why was the Atlantic Alliance today so profoundly shaken? The Alliance was born as an instrument of military defence and its Article 2 has remained a mere verbal expression. As the exigencies of defence have appeared less acute, the psychological tension of the cold war has become intolerable in Europe and we have seen both the growth of a sincere desire for respite, finding expression in neutralist sentiment, and the reawakening of a sense of national pride and consciousness. As a meagre consolation we may observe that the Warsaw Pact has been undermined by similar collective states of mind. However, this did not relieve men of intellect and of conscience of their duty to bring their minds to bear on present realities and future dangers.

Thanking Senator Gronchi, Mr. Buchan expressed his satisfaction that this fifth annual European-American conference was able to be organised in co-operation with the Italian Institute of International Affairs. He recorded a special word of thanks to all those concerned on the Italian side - and in particular Signor and Signora Spinelli - with the preparation of the conference.

Dr. Gasteyger (opening speaker) said that the most important development from the point of view of Europe was the change in the international system we had been living with since World War II. Not that the confrontation between the two powers had disappeared, although it had undergone remarkable modifications:

what had changed was the international context within which countries see each other. The shift from mere co-existence to a more fruitful co-operation has affected the relationship between the two great powers themselves and, equally important, between Europe and the great powers.

Disintegration of the alliance systems has made the international system more flexible but at the same time more fragile, more vulnerable to competitive rivalry and suspicion even between allied countries. Sometimes we seemed to have a better idea of how to handle relations with the communist countries than among ourselves. We might be in a transitional stage from cold war to a more peaceful and co-operative system. But there was no certainty as to where the present détente would lead. Certainly the spirit of integration was fading: at least in the political and military fields, integration was now considered a left-over instrument of the cold war which stood in the way of a rapprochement with the East. However, no-one has so far been able to offer a real alternative to it except a return to old-fashioned bilateralism as a means of conducting relations inside and outside alliances. The upshot has been a growth of nationalism, an emphasis on the defence of national interests, and less willingness to compromise. This has been noticeable particularly in the Common Market, but also in the broader framework of the alliance. The recent tripartite negotiations about the offset costs were a case in point. The decision to withdraw some 35,000 American and 6,000 British soldiers from Germany was neither disastrous nor basically wrong. He was however concerned, first of all because it constituted a unilateral Western move with no assurance of reciprocity from the Soviet side; secondly because further reductions seemed likely to follow; thirdly because the decision seemed influenced more by financial than by political/strategic considerations; fourthly because it seemed to be based on an over-estimation of strategic mobility - certainly strategic mobility, had improved and would improve further, but the political implications of physical presence could not be ignored. To call withdrawal (as it had been called by an American spokesman) merely "redeployment" was to underestimate the political effects of such a move: nobody has said to what extent this reduction will weaken the political commitment beyond repair. Finally the question arose as to the place of the Bundeswehr in the loosening framework of the alliance: it would become even more conspicuous in size, and he thought Germany would have to fit into the general process of adapting military forces to a changing political environment.

Turning to the change in relations between the great powers and Europe: he saw the United States as more inclined than the Soviet Union to reappraise her European policy, for various reasons:

(1) The U.S. has always considered her military presence in Europe temporary in character and flexible in size.

(2) The U.S. has incomparably wider commitments in the world than the S.U. could ever expect to have; moreover, domestic pressure to reduce the cost of her military commitment to Europe was likely to grow.

(3) The U.S. could not again be tempted to try to take direct responsibility for Europe's political and economic integration and to press her allies into the forms she thought best for Europe, for Atlantic partnership, and for herself. She has come to realise that the American-European relationship is basically so strong that the U.S. can afford to let Europe shape itself and that the American aspiration to have a strong Western partner is more likely to be realised if the nature of the process is argued out in Europe rather than in Washington. Certainly it would not be wrong to assume that Europe no longer comes high on the list of American prime interests. But Europe's place has changed and might change further. The shift of emphasis from the military/political

field to still closer co-operation in the economic field seemed a natural and inevitable result of changes on both sides of the Atlantic. Even a partial success of the Kennedy Round was likely to accelerate the process. Perhaps a breakthrough would be achieved in Atlantic economic relations. But this could have an adverse political effect by promoting a greater community of interest against the U.S.

The nature of the Soviet commitment appeared to remain basically unchanged. The S.U. has always been a Europe-centred power and, unlike the U.S., has never ceased to influence European politics on both sides of the Iron Curtain. She has been more concerned about developments in West Europe than was the U.S. with those in East Europe. The Soviet preference for pressure or influence through bilateral relations, advocated by Stalin, has remained basically unchanged; this explains the deep distrust of any form of supranationalism. However, the growing divergencies in both alliances seemed to vindicate the Soviet preference for a bilateral approach, particularly vis-à-vis France and Britain. What the S.U. did not envisage was a situation in which her former satellites could exploit this bilateralism to their own advantage. The Soviet military posture in Europe has reflected this unchanged interest. Even as the threat of its use against Europe has declined, Soviet military power itself has grown. A possible explanation, besides the excessive security-mindedness of the S.U., was that Soviet power measures itself by American standards. It exceeds by far what is necessary to influence any potential European adversary. Therefore Soviet influence will still be centred on the military and political field: economically it will hardly have any effect on Europe. The Soviet Union was far less interested in any far-reaching change in the present military and political situation in Europe than the U.S. She recognised that East European countries were more vulnerable to change than the Western democracies, as recent developments in Eastern Europe seem to confirm. The way some of these countries, particularly the D.D.R. have reacted to the West German policy was significant; perhaps the hasty conclusion of treaties of friendship between East Germany and her neighbours was a mark of the painful process of adaptation East Europe is going through rather than a new phase of anti-Western and anti-German policy.

Touching on the changing relationship between the super powers, he was surprised to see how little the war in Vietnam had affected the Soviet-American relationship in Europe. There were various reasons, for instance the unwillingness of the two powers to let this conflict spill over into other areas and make a solution even more difficult. However, any idea that the S.U. should co-operate in damping down the conflict in Vietnam in compensation for the maintenance of the status quo in Europe including the division of Germany seemed highly unrealistic. The S.U. would hardly be in a sufficiently strong position to act as a guarantor of stability in Asia as it does in Europe. The S.U. would be threatened by the growing Chinese nuclear capability a long time before the U.S. would be. The S.U. must thus become increasingly afraid of an American/Chinese rapprochement and conversely anxious to maintain a basic understanding with the U.S. - a consideration she would doubtless keep in mind when deciding about the possible deployment of BMD. This may also apply to the non-proliferation treaty: European reactions to the negotiations in Geneva still reflected considerable anxiety that Soviet/American bilateralism may lead to some great power agreement at Europe's expense. He summed up by quoting from Marshall Shulman in Foreign Affairs for April 1967:-

"From the viewpoint of Western Europe, increased contacts in a climate of reduced tension offer an opportunity to soften the

ideological barrier, to wean away the East European states, and to prepare the ground for a European settlement. From the Soviet point of view, the expectation is that these increased contacts will provide leverage to prod the West European states toward a loose coalition against the United States. What is in question is not whether there should be increased contacts between Eastern and Western Europe - for these are irresistible in the present tide of politics - but whether there can be enough co-ordination and political consciousness in the management of these contacts so that the effect will be a strengthening of European independence rather than fragmentation and subordination"

Prof. Halle (first respondent) did not disagree with Dr. Gasteyger. He proposed to take a more distant perspective involving a longer time range and also a greater credibility in presenting the issues and the problems. He saw the great issues of the three great crises of the 20th century as fundamentally balance of power issues. The first crisis was the threat to the balance of power and the establishment of hegonomy by the empire of Kaiser Wilhelm, which led to World War One. The second great crisis was the threat of the Adolf Hitler empire to upset the world balance, and again a world wide conflict ensued, the result of which was to put down the threat and to restore in some degree the balance of power which had been threatened. The third was caused by the threat of Stalin and Stalin's empire to upset in the same fashion the European and the world balance of power. And again there was a great international conflict which we call the cold war and which, no doubt because of the presence of nuclear weapons, was cold, but could in a formal sense be regarded as World War Three. He believed that this third crisis had been surmounted: the Stalinste threat no longer exists in any practical sense and the third war has had the same outcome as the two preceding wars - recalling Dr. Gasteyger's argument that the confrontation between the two super powers has not disappeared, but the issue over which they confronted each other has largely disappeared.

A balance of power and the stability we associate with it, if not satisfactorily re-established, has nevertheless been re-established to a greater degree in the aftermath of the cold war than was true in the aftermath of the first and second world wars. This had certain implications. One result has been the tendency of the two camps to lose their normal cohesion, to tend in the direction of fragmentation. From the point of view of the West this tendency represented in some degree what Dulles referred to as the liberation of the satellites. If the status of some East European countries today (chiefly Poland, Hungary and Rumania) were contrasted with the period 1949-56 when we really could talk of slave-states and puppet states of Moscow, the change was revolutionary; but it has taken place gradually. In the absence of some great intervening crisis or accident East Europe would go towards the restoration of the independence of states, and this was implicit in the ending of the confrontation. When a crisis is over, there is always a tendency for states to return to their traditional security considerations which may have been overriden during the crisis by their crisis pre-occupation. The Sino-Soviet split should be viewed in the context of traditional national pre-occupations. For normal strategic reasons, Russia and China have always been very bitter rivals, very dangerous to each other when powerful; consequently with the crisis over, they have reverted to the traditional rivalry which goes back to the 18th century and the Russian expansion in Asia, and which did not disappear even in the early and middle 1950's when we did not talk about a Sino-Soviet split. The two countries share over 4,000 miles of frontier, part of it at least of an iron curtain type. The difference, and a dangerous one, in one sense between this frontier and the iron curtain frontier in Europe was that on one side a teaming population exists

at a very low level of subsistence, while on the other side is empty land. The great conflict for as long as he could see in the future would be this traditional conflict between Russia and China. With the recovery of her traditional power China will become dangerous to Russia in a sense that the U.S. and Europe no longer are.

In terms of traditional security attitudes the U.S. and China would be friends: traditionally to the U.S., going back to the 1880's Japan was the great rival of China on the one side and of the U.S. on the other. In 1945, however, the defence and security of Japan became a United States responsibility. Today, with the U.S. commitment all over Asia more or less permanent, we could not expect a reversion to the traditional Sino-American friendship. It still remained true, however, that China was a much greater menace to the S.U. than she was to the U.S., and this would be a factor in determining the future shape of international relations.

Finally he had always wondered whether the problem of German unification existed on the scale that we have supposed. After a great upset like a world war the tendency was to think of returning to the status quo ante. But this never happened; a new normalcy always took over from the normalcy we remembered. He supposed we would always have two Germanys, but they may come into a very close and fruitful association, ideally as part of a European association. In a sense there have been two Germanys before: perhaps from now on there would be three Germanys. Moreover he had always been impressed by the fact that the passion for reunification was not as great among Germans in private as in public. Perhaps during the debate we should consider the wisdom of continuing to exaggerate this problem.

Several members of the conference commented on the idea of "détente management" implicit in the opening speech. For one Italian speaker a criterion was to hold fast to the perspective of supranational organisation. For the West Europeans to acquiesce in the trend towards a greater assertion of national identity would be to act against their own best interests. In particular the German problem would be more difficult of solution: the concept of three Germanys was feasible only if the value of national sovereignty were depreciated, otherwise the Germans would never rest content with an international order based on sovereign states in which they alone would not be a nation.

Another Italian speaker pointed to the fact that over the last 20 years we have witnessed a number of wars that were not waged and a number of peace treaties that were not concluded; the very strange aspect of this détente was that we have so far been unable to settle disputes either by force or by agreement, particularly in Europe. Détente management should therefore be directed towards finding points on which agreement might be concluded. We faced the risk however of being overtaken by events; past attempts to negotiate agreement on general or particular measures of disarmament have usually been overtaken by an acceleration of the arms race; support for non-proliferation did not become widespread fast enough to crystalise in the form of a treaty at the time of the test ban agreement, when renunciation of a nuclear option could have been presented as a logical counterpart to the suspension of tests by the nuclear powers.

A French member of the conference argued that any attempt to manage détente - which he now saw as primarily an intra-European trend - was more likely to lead to paralysis.

A Canadian member of the conference interpolated a more pessimistic thought: consideration of the détente ought to include some estimation of the Soviet success in bringing about a more divided Europe than existed three years ago. Traditional Soviet policy is conducted in terms of a balance of power; but within that its business is conducted, directly or indirectly, through the communist parties. We could not afford to consider only the military threat and its reduction and leave out the calculation of what is happening in Western countries in terms of their national society.

Concern about the lack of political cohesion following upon the disintegration of alliance systems and its implications in terms of Europe's ability to influence the world balance of power was voiced by a third Italian speaker. He did not see Europe as high on the list of United States priorities; but the Europeans have partly brought this on themselves by their failure to maintain the drive towards integration which would enable them to realise the idea of partnership with the United States. Europe could not be bracketed with Latin America or Africa or the Middle East: in the recent past Europe has played a major role in helping to establish a certain world order, and even after two world wars he could not accept that she should exert no influence outside the area. European economic recovery was already unquestioned. But Europe also needed stability, and a stable relationship with the U.S. The present state of relations between members of the alliance ought to be more of pressing concern to the U.S; nationalistic sentiment and nuclear ambitions in Europe would not just disappear with the passing of de Gaulle. He saw no real alternative to the old answer of Atlantic partnership or even integration.

For an American member of the conference, these arguments underlined the need for greater clarity about our perspective on the future in this changing climate and about our priorities. He agreed with Professor Halle that the desire for greater independence and greater influence on the part of the individual states was normal, in the sense that this is the way things are organised now. But this judgement ignored the fact that history has moved on: we are all <u>inter</u>dependent. Therefore stable relationships, whether between Europe and the U.S, the United States and the Soviet Union or advanced countries and under-developed countries, must be based on a new order transcending the pattern of the nation state.

The question of the priority between seeking détente in the sense of real co-operation with the Soviet Union and attempting to build a more viable structure in Europe and with the United States was no less relevant. We ought to be more realistic: he saw no evidence yet of a Soviet disposition to co-operate on a real basis. He favoured a dual policy of maintaining a basic unco-operative approach to the Soviet Union while at the same time responding positively to any particular willingness to collaborate on their part. To the extent that the Soviet Union has been forced to adapt to conditions created by the West, a pre-condition of real progress towards détente would be the construction of some kind of international order of which the Soviet problem was only one aspect.

However, he foresaw a period of great difficulty in the relationship between the United States and Europe, because the disparity in the degree of influence which the two can exert must, inevitably, be a source of friction. If the idea of European unity were dead, the long-term effects would be very damaging; but if the aspiration for partnership voiced by the previous speaker truly reflected European sentiment the friction could be managed.

A British member of the conference saw not so much dissociation between the European countries as a change of gear, the natural consequence of the relatively easier road we are travelling. There has been undoubtedly a weakening of links, although in relation to the United States and Europe the difficulty was not so much about partnership as an aim as about the conditions for achieving it. This did not apply in the edonomic field, however: their basic interest in economic growth has been the main reason for the Western European countries' survival in the cold war, and in a political context that was unlikely to change very rapidly, the nature of the economic relations which were being built up all the time became highly important.

A second British speaker found the growth of economic interdependence between Europe and the United States more and more striking: the heavy increase in American investment in Europe could be seen as a new form of American commitment at a time when the old-fashioned form of commitment, troops, is less necessary. On the other hand he agreed that European-American political relations would go through a difficult period: this was partly because the unifying factor in Europe, at least on the level of public opinion, was going to be a loss of confidence in the United States.

Taking up Professor Halle's reference to the German problem, a German member of the conference believed the idea of three Germanys could be acceptable to his countrymen: the desire for reunification (as expressed in public opinion polls) has never been so high in Germany, but neither has the number of people who do not expect it to happen. A growing sense of realism dominated official policy and conditioned public statements by German politicians. His personal view had long been that the aim of German foreign policy should be to bring about reunification, or alternatively to create the conditions that would make it superfluous or its absence tolerable. But while there was no yearning for the status quo ante, the Germans did wish to have an influence in shaping the new normalcy.

This raised an important consideration in relation to détente: progress towards co-operative co-existence rather than antagonistic co-existence did not depend on the West alone. The Federal Republic was willing to undertake a process of détente vis-à-vis East Germany, as well as Eastern Europe; the DDR was however in no mood for détente at the present time. If the East German inflexibility remained unmodified, he failed to see how the whole process of intra-European détente could move very far. He wondered what the implications of such a basic incompatibility might be for French policy; would de Gaulle consider that the need to accommodate East Germany for the sake of the détente must override his understanding with the Federal Republic, or would he be prepared to jeopardise his détente policy rather than estrange the Federal Republic?

A second German speaker echoed the caution about the degree of détente actually achieved. What we call détente was an atmosphere of greater confidence in European public opinion, both Eastern and Western, about the possibilities of peaceful development, while the immobilism of the super powers has allowed the small and medium powers greater political freedom of action, those furthest from the scene of conflict (such as France and Rumania) having profited most. He considered the erosion within each of the alliance blocs a favourable development; but it was more likely to lead to a 'Europe des patries' than to a federation.

This peaceful evolution depended however on two main "if's" first, maintaining the over-all balance of power which works on Europe. He saw a danger of unilateral and too hasty action on the Western

side upsetting this equilibrium: France loosening her ties with Nato, Britain and the United States announcing their prospective reductions instead of seeking a balanced bilateral reduction of forces in Europe, the neglect of the need to maintain public confidence in the balance of capability (which he considered as important as the actual figures of hardware). The second "if" related to Germany: if the West were to lead the German political leaders to believe that German reunification at some stage was no longer a common Western aim, the effect on German public opinion would be disastrous. The only possible solution may prove to be the establishment of three Germanys: but to state this publicly now could only drive Germany back into nationalism.

Following up the line of argument about the relationship between the military balance and the increasing political and diplomatic activity, an American speaker posed the question of the role of military power in the new kind of international order that may be developing as the old order changes somewhat. Historically order in Europe has depended on a stable military balance of the states in the area. But the international order we now had in Europe was a bipolar system, organised in two alliance systems dominated by the two super powers. With the relaxation of tension between these two blocs, political polycentrism has emerged both within and between them. Was this greater political activity and with it the new forms of organic economic interdependence a semi-permanent state of affairs, or a sign of transition to a new structure of the military basis of international order in that area? Given the political difficulties and frictions that occur in this state of affairs, and not least the new ferment of discontent with the super powers who are left with the manipulation of the military balance, it was arguable that a new structure of military power should be conceived to accommodate these political and military changes. If so, the European potential must be visualised in military terms, as well as political and economic terms. Personally however he could not see grand designs clearly enough to take the chance of deliberately undermining the system of order we have for the sake of creating another system.

Perhaps the central task for Nato in the future, therefore, was to make politically acceptable a system of international order dominated militarily by two powers, for the sake of maintaining the military balance on which order ultimately depends. Under these circumstances we had to recognise the limited extent to which any state can achieve something dramatic on the political and diplomatic plane by political movement. This applied particularly to Germany: for Germany to expect too much from her new policy towards the East could only lead to frustration.

A British member of the conference felt that the discussion had brought out the two different meanings of détente: the traditional postwar one of an easing of tension and negotiation of a series of arms control agreements between the two blocs, which can only be brought about as the result of Soviet-American détente, and the more recent idea, notably propounded by the French Government, that in an immobile Soviet-American relationship we may get an intra-European détente, with a quite different relationship growing up between the East and West European countries without very much reference to the super powers. However, although détente in its secondary meaning had political and economic attractions for many in East and West Europe, it was inherently unlikely to go very far because the Eastern States, in terms of their resources of economic and military strength, are so much more dependent on the Soviet Union than the Western States are on the U.S. The extent to which Soviet policy has been able to hamper the German policy towards the East in recent months was indicative of the difficulty in getting this separate diplomacy carried on.

An Italian member of the conference argued that although the confrontation has shifted from the military to the political arena the struggle for supremacy would be no less intense. The problem was, therefore, to identify the areas where political difficulties could most easily be exploited. An area of particular concern to Europe was the Mediterranean: he feared that the tremendous Soviet military aid effort in various Middle Eastern and North African states as well as the Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean was designed to create an opportunity for political confrontation with the United States. Because of the European dependence on Middle Eastern oil, the economic consequences of such a confrontation would be serious for Western Europe; yet because of Europe's political disunity she would be unable to bring influence to bear in any crisis in the Mediterranean area.

The interaction of developments in Asia and elsewhere was taken up by another Italian: it made no sense to treat European problems in isolation. He held that a worsening of the Vietnam crisis could affect the Soviet assessment that China posed a greater long-term threat to her than the United States did; moreover in such a case she would feel obliged to protect her position in the communist world.

Supporting Professor Halle's view of China as a greater long-term threat to the Soviet Union than to the United States, a participant from the Netherlands maintained that the United States did not have the right priorities: the Soviet Union was well aware of the potential threat from China and was jockeying for position in Europe so as to have her hands free so far as Europe is concerned when the threat matures, while the United States concentrated too much on the Chinese threat in the short term at the expense of European problems.

In reply to this last point it was argued that throughout its history the United States has oscillated between a Europe first and an Asia first policy - and so has the Soviet Union. The United States was now in a period of reaction against her long involvement with Europe; this was compounded by a certain feeling that the Europeans do not understand world problems, and Vietnam in particular, from the United States point of view.

SECOND SESSION FRIDAY 5 MAY

Agenda Changing European and American interests

1. The Control of Nuclear Proliferation

Dr. Wagner said that although it was difficult to raise objections to a NPT without being misinterpreted, he wanted to present a balance of the advantages and the disadvantages of the proposed draft as we know it.

To talk about the advantages meant primarily to appraise the purpose of the treaty, to prevent the spread. Here the difficulties began. The treaty would prevent neither an increase in the arsenals of the present nuclear powers nor the development of new categories of nuclear weapons. The only spread which would be prevented was the emergence of new atomic powers which might decide to exercise a nuclear option. This objective might be a good one. But it was rather odd to assume that these countries which have already acquired nuclear weapons could be relied on to act with wisdom and caution while taking it for granted that those countries not yet in possession would make great mischief once they possess them. Either nuclear weapons bestow wisdom, as the holding of a crown was formerly held to do, in which case every state should be allowed to acquire them; or, if this is not so, the nuclear have's do not deserve greater dignity than the have-nots. He agreed there might be a greater risk of war being fought with nuclear weapons if new nuclear powers emerge. But the desire for nuclear weapons was not as widespread as the sponsors of the treaty seemed to assume. The treaty was tailored to fit all potential nuclear powers, while it would have sufficed to restrict it to those potential powers which have the intention to go nuclear.

Considering the high cost of nuclear weapons, many potential powers would seem willing to renounce nuclear weapons of their own provided their security can be guaranteed by other means. Did the sponsors imagine that the loyalty of the signatories to the treaty would always prevail over their security interests, or that the latter would be met by the treaty? India and Japan, for example would feel that their security vis-a-vis China was assured by the treaty if it contained a credible security guarantee by the U.S. or jointly by the U.S. and S.U. But if the non-nuclears were given a guarantee by the nuclear powers against nuclear blackmail they would probably renounce a nuclear option, irrespective of a treaty. And if not given a guarantee, or if they did not find it trustworthy enough, they would not let themselves be prevented by the treaty in the long run from developing their own weapons. Quite a few non-nuclear powers attach importance to a clause permitting renunciation of a treaty, or at least its revision, after a certain period of time. The critical point might be reached once China is able to hit the U.S., thus putting American determination to defend any Asian country against China to the test.

On the other hand it might be wrong to restrict the advantages of the treaty to its declared objective. To the United States, Britain and France the treaty has already served the purpose of permitting an easing of tension between East and West. Moreover the U.S. attaches much emphasis to progress in détente so as to

postpone or avoid the development of an ABM system: negotiations for a treaty might therefore be an appropriate means to postpone the deployment of ABM systems both in the U.S. and S.U.

The drawbacks of the treaty had already been discussed at some length and rather passionately in the last few months. First, the treaty would once more confer prestige on the nation stage: at the very least it would freeze all attempts to transcend national sovereignty. Only the nation state is allowed to dispose of nuclear weapons: federations are not endowed with this right. This was not written into the treaty, but the S.U. was known to interpret the treaty in such a way. Her main interest in the treaty was in thwarting groupings such as a European nuclear community including the Federal Republic. It would also be very difficult to reconcile the treaty with Euratom. Apart from the control problem, within the Europe of the Six we would fall back to a stage successfully left behind because a new discrimination would be introduced between the Six and France by the necessity for special control on the borders between France and the other Five.

A more serious problem for the non-nuclears was the guarantee against blackmail, which he had already mentioned. A non-nuclear state could be protected against blackmail by an atomic power only by a security guarantee from another nuclear power or some form of nuclear sharing. Much would depend, therefore, on the feasibility of such arrangements - guarantees which a power might be willing to give without formal arrangements would lose credibility. A third disadvantage was the alienation within the Western alliance. The treaty could almost be an ingenious invention by de Gaulle to demonstrate his argument that the U.S. attached more importance to coming to terms with the S.U. than to maintaining the cohesion of the Western alliance. Although the treaty has not generated the estrangement between the U.S. and some of her allies, it has exacerbated it. Soviet-American tension would be replaced by tension between big and small states.

The U.S. should also remember European suspicion as to what extent the treaty may be designed to protect American economic interests. This led to the fourth disadvantage, the possibility of the treaty impeding or restricting scientific and industrial development. To some extent this could not be avoided, since it was difficult to distinguish between nuclear fuel elements to be used for peaceful purposes and for military ones. Thus any activity in the nuclear sector must be screened, regulated and controlled, and this would necessarily result in privilege for the nuclear vis-à-vis the non-nuclear powers. The latter may also suffer economically: if it is not sure whether certain installations in the range of Euratom will become subject to control measures, such installations will be built in France where they would not be under control exercised by the IAEA. This would result in economic benefit for France. However the S.U., who has succeeded in refuting any idea of safeguards on her own territory will benefit even more, because nuclear development in one industrially important part of the world will be restricted to an extent which cannot be forecast. And in the long run China also will benefit.

Dr. Wagner felt that at present the drawbacks were more obvious and more certain than the advantages. However, this did not suffice to reject the entire treaty. Owing to the need for preserving peace in the world, a treaty might be considered worthwhile if there were only a ten per cent chance of reaching its objective. It would also be worth considering other means to reach the same goal. The implications of a universal treaty have not been appraised from the beginning. Such a treaty would be signed by the S.U. for reasons very different from those of the U.S. and U.K. It would be fair to say that the U.S. apart from preventing proliferation by means of the treaty, wishes to improve

relations with the S.U., making allowance for a deterioration of her relations with the allies; the S.U. wishes to spoil relations between the U.S. and her allies, making allowance for an improvement in relations with the U.S. This difference may ultimately lead to a violation of the treaty.

For this reason he advocated extending the discussion to consider what should be done should the S.U. and U.S. fail to agree on a treaty. Obviously we should try to seek better means to prevent nuclear proliferation. From the very beginning some German opinion has argued that it would be better to conclude regional security arrangements, i.e. for the Middle East or for the neighbouring states of China. To be effective such measures would require a high degree of political drafting and would be less perfectionist than a universal treaty. But they would be more realistic and stand a better chance of preserving peace in the world.

Mr. Beaton (first respondent) said that the treaty was obviously one important element in any attempt to control nuclear proliferation. While not formally tabled as a text, it had been agreed by the U.S. and S.U. and was a major international initiative; it could not lightly be dismissed for that reason. But he considered it an extraordinary document to ask countries to sign: it grouped states in a formal way - to which governments would be asked to give their consent - which was highly discriminatory. In a classic sense it was an unequal treaty: it was obviously discriminatory against Germany, Canada, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands (looking round the conference table) in the sense that all these countries were physically capable of developing nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. Equally, however, most of these countries were prepared to dismiss the idea from their minds without serious consideration. This could not be said of Germany and Sweden, or India and Japan, for different reasons: in each case signing of the treaty would nominally sign away an option which may at some future date become important to the government. This argument was not really between Europe and the U.S; it was between the status quo powers and those who are being asked to make a substantial sacrifice and who one day might become anti-status quo.

Looking at the European situation, from the British and French view we should not under-rate the importance of a treaty as a means of creating an ambiguous and complicated international context related to nuclear weapons which would make it possible for them in some kind of political structure to resist as long as they wish the creation of institutions which control their nuclear forces. This general position of a treaty with an element in domestic political argument was also most important for those countries - Germany, Canada, India, Sweden and Japan were the dramatic examples - which are developing the ability to develop weapons but obviously have strong reasons for not making them. For a government which is reluctant to go ahead, to be able to say "we have signed a treaty" is potentially an important element in their internal debate.

On the other hand so far as he knew, no country had taken the decision beyond the five which would be recognised by the treaty. Therefore it was not clear what the treaty would be controlling. The most important thing going on now was the signing of a large number of contracts under which facilities will be built in an increasing number of countries; these facilities will produce plutonium and will thus confer a physical option on many countries which do not now possess it. All powers had a common interest to find a means of making a plutonium spread safer than it is now.

The other common interest was to find a means of ensuring guarantees to any country in the world against the kind of attack to which they would respond with nuclear weapons if they had them: an overwhelming conventional attack or a nuclear attack. Personally he felt that apart from formal guarantees, every country in the world was guaranteed against any such attack by the fact that it would be an outrage against the international order. The guarantee structure achieved in the American alliance, particularly in Nato, was very important for the proliferation issue: it not only exists but is seen to exist. We must find ways of developing institutions which can demonstrate this on a world scale. Non-aligned countries present a difficult case, because of their doctrinal objection to treaties and institutions. Possibly means could be found to do this through the U.N. Security Council if the great powers really decided that the system as originally founded has a function, not in trying to use the institutions against each other but in exploring common ground to see what can be done with common interests. Because of the improper hopes placed in the Security Council when it was impossible for the U.S. and S.U. to work together on anything, we were blind to the opportunities which now exist in a changed climate. He considered the problem of nuclear blackmail as over-rated: it has been tried, notably by the S.U. but it had the disadvantage that threats could prove empty, as Khrushchev's were.

The discussion was more concerned with the disadvantages than with the advantages of the treaty, the principal reservations being expressed from the European side about the problems of guarantees, the descriminatory aspects (including control provisions) and the effect on inter-alliance relations.

The first speaker, from Italy, was highly critical. To the disadvantages listed by Dr. Wagner he added the lack of any element of disarmament. Vertical proliferation would be permitted to go ahead freely (indeed France would be free of certain existing legal restrictions) while the non-nuclear powers would be giving away their strong bargaining position, the threat of exercising a nuclear option unless the nuclear powers agree to some measure of nuclear disarmament. Not only were the control provisions discriminatory, they had been strengthened in each successive draft. Discrimination may be inherent in nature but it was a bad thing to make it systematic. The handling of this treaty by the United States revealed how little she understood of the feelings of her allies after 20 years of very close relationship.

He strongly disagreed with Mr. Beaton that every country enjoys a guarantee even if no formal guarantee exists. In any case, why should a nuclear guarantee be any more respected than conventional guarantees have been in the past? A nuclear guarantee would be much less credible, because of the greater risk to the guarantor. In the end, the best security was that provided by a country for itself: a united Europe could never accept an American guarantee as a <u>permanent</u> solution.

Pursuing the point about guarantees, an American speaker maintained that experience proved otherwise; Berlin was saved by the existence of the U.S. nuclear guarantee, even though it may have made no sense for the U.S. to start a nuclear war over West Berlin. The difference in comparison with a conventional situation was that only the smallest risk of incurring nuclear retaliation dare be taken.

A German member of the conference argued that Berlin was the only place that could be defended only by nuclear weapons; everywhere else the United States is trying to get away from the automacity of the use of nuclear weapons. A guarantee was not enough without an institutional infrastructure - and this practically amounted to an alliance. But at this point the doctrinal obstacles mentioned by Mr. Beaton arose.

A Swedish participant held that the credibility aspect of a guarantee tended to be considered too much in the abstract. A U.S. guarantee to India or Japan against China was fully credible today. The problem would arise when the Chinese could credibly deter, not just hit, the U.S., because of the threat to the U.S. of unacceptable damage.

A Canadian participant added that the question of a guarantee from the U.S. was not a factor in the Canadian decision not to exercise the nuclear option that has been open to her for the past 20 years: because of geography, Canada would inevitably suffer in any Soviet-American exchange.

A British member of the conference objected that the bargaining power referred to by the first speaker had not so far proved effective as a brake on the arms race. Moreover there was confusion in this argument: many who complained about the U.S. and S.U. being permitted to develop new deterrents also wanted these as a form of guarantee: this applied particularly to the Indian case. Nor had there been any suggestion from the European side that the U.S. should drop her nuclear guard vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

A second Italian member of the conference found the question of ABM deployment highly relevant to the guarantee problem: development by only one super power would invalidate any guarantee offered by the other super power; if both super powers deployed ABM systems the position would be even worse because all other powers would be utterly at their mercy. A Belgian speaker shared this pessimistic view. Moreover those states most intent on building up their nuclear capability would not adhere to the treaty. From the European point of view, if we wanted to create a real Europe it would be essential to keep open the nuclear option.

For a German participant it was a fact of life that with or without such a treaty, nuclear guarantees were bound to decline in value in the sense of a country being able to protect another country against a nuclear power of considerable vulnerability to its own nuclear strike forces. ABM deployment would hasten this decline; if a potential aggressor could mount a conventional attack, just using nuclear weapons as a fleet in being, the decline would be even faster. He agreed that the United States is trying to get away from a strategy of automatic nuclear response. And although he feared the prospect, he thought many medium non-nuclear powers would tend to follow the line of argument of the first Italian speaker which, he agreed, led ultimately to the Gallois thesis.

On the point about alienation he felt the treaty had not yet done all its harm to inter-alliance relations. He strongly suspected that domestic considerations were the main motivation for American enthusiasm for the treaty at this stage: less than three years ago the most important goal of United States policy was the MLF, the concept of sharing nuclear responsibility with her European allies. At the moment more important allies of the United States felt discriminated against by the treaty than would benefit from it.

A second German member of the conference considered some of Dr. Wagner's reservations beside the point. Underlying all the argument was economic interest: the basic interest for the Federal Republic was to ensure that the American deliveries of fuel on which the German reactor programme depends would be able to go on uninterrupted and that the drive to sell fast breeder reactors together with their fuel elements (after she reached that stage in 1979-80) would not be hampered. Her main fear was of American inspection, since most techniques have been derived from American patents and

American inspectors would be able to detect the improvements which have made German reactors competitive. These considerations strengthened the belief that the treaty was only one instrument in a vast array of tools to ensure the American technological as well as military monopoly.

A Swedish speaker redressed the balance of the discussion by restating the main arguments in favour of the treaty: (1) the treaty would, if signed, be a significant step towards non-proliferation even if it were limited to non-dissemination. (The Swedish delegation had suggested that because of the difficulties of combining non-dissemination with non-acquisition a start should be made with a non-dissemination treaty which would be easier to negotiate) (2) In terms of domestic political debate it would strengthen the hand of those governments which did not wish to exercise a nuclear option, as Mr. Beaton indicated. (3) As a symbol of the possibility of closer American-Soviet co-operation in world affairs in general, it would be worthwhile for those countries whose security would be primarily affected by a return to East-West tension. If a treaty did not materialise, he agreed with Mr. Beaton that other means would have to be sought. The most urgent need seemed to be a check on the transfer of fissile material at this point in time, because once the era of plutonium plenty dawned the whole situation would change.

A British speaker pointed to the impossibility of legislating for all the problems that would arise during a treaty of unlimited duration. Inevitably questions of guarantee, or of the use of the treaty for commercial advantage, or of dealing with the discrimination between weapons and non-weapons states would arise and there must exist the possibility of evolution otherwise the very options the treaty was designed to damp down would be strengthened. And this meant having a process for revision. This consideration applied particularly to Mr. Beaton's argument about the impact of the treaty on the domestic political debate in countries such as India. The European powers did themselves much harm by arguing in particular terms and failing to recognise proliferation as a world problem. Although the Soviet Union used to be primarily interested in the European aspect, she has now become very interested in the Japanese and Indian and even in the Middle Eastern aspects of proliferation.

A Norwegian member of the conference said the essential point was the importance attached to non-proliferation: a number of governments in the world were still in doubt on the basic issue. Assuming everyone agreed that non-proliferation was terribly important, there seemed to be a misunderstanding on what the treaty was about. It was not meant to close the nuclear door, it was a modest and fragile effort to reverse the present trend. The treaty would lead to nothing if, after signature by a great majority of nations, the arms race between the super powers continued, if China were not brought into the picture at some point, if nuclear blackmail should succeed in some area of the world, if certain countries obtained unfair industrial advantage, etc.

Commenting on the various objections raised, the speaker reflected that complaints from Europe would have been louder if no control provisions had been included in the draft. The industrial espionage argument was unconvincing: the fact was that when a country attempted to sell reactors specifications were called for which went far beyond anything required under the IAEA system. Control was a matter of accounting to keep track of the movement of plutonium in the world. Moreover he found the idea of a permanent technological advantage to Germany in the field of fast breeder reactors inherently improbable. Doubts about the American monopoly in the supply of enriched uranium were on stronger ground, although it should be possible for the United States to spell out a firm commitment. If the Germans and Italians

were so concerned about the IAEA safeguards, why were previous opportunities not taken to raise objections, i.e. when the latest revision of these safeguards was agreed upon? Moreover there had been consultations in Nato on the whole question.

It was possible that the Soviet Union's main interest was to create inter-alliance problems. On the other hand serious alliance problems would be created if a country like Germany should make it too obvious that it wanted to keep open a nuclear option. He felt that the tone of the discussion bore out the argument of the previous session that whatever may be said or done, friction between the United States and Europe was inevitable.

An American member of the conference considered it a mistake to concentrate on the undoubted political motive in the United States that led to the treaty and overlook the deeper motives which make up the political policy. The feeling that proliferation is a dangerous thing was understandably particularly acute in the United States: she would be the first to get involved in a nuclear war, she had had to deal at first hand with the problems of managing nuclear weapons, had arrived at a fairly stable nuclear balance with one nuclear power after a very painful effort. How could she be sure of doing this with several such powers? The prospect of many Cuba missile crises was not a happy one. Looked at from this point of view, perhaps a good many of the acknowledged disadvantages of the treaty could be swallowed for the sake of the long-term objective, provided the treaty was considered an effective instrument. The biggest advantage of the treaty was that it established some additional deterrence; it would help those in a particular country who were opposed to proliferation by making a decision more difficult; it universalised the problem. Over the long run a treaty would probably not facilitate the management of the distribution of nuclear power; but in the short run, five or six years, the deterrent efficacy of the treaty probably outweighed the disadvantages of formalising an inherently unsatisfactory solution.

This line of argument was endorsed by several non-American members of the conference. The final Italian speaker was convinced that when it came to the point, if the United States and Soviet Union were in favour of the treaty the other states would adhere to it. However, in the longer term proliferation could be avoided only if the hegonomy were made tolerable, if at least one of the super powers were able to offer to all those nations willing to participate a process leading in the end to co-responsibility. The U.S. had made a start in this direction; it would be dangerous for her and Europe if she abandoned it.

THIRD SESSION SATURDAY 6 MAY

Agenda Changing European and American Interests.

2. The evolution of East-West relations in Europe.

Herr Schmidt started with the assumption that both super powers would in the coming years and in the 70's orientate themselves even more to S.E. Asia than they had done hitherto and that they would tend to stabilise the present status quo in Europe more strongly. This would permit even greater freedom of action (although limited action) for the medium and small powers. At the same time there would exist in Europe what von Weizsäcker has called co-operative bipolarity between the super powers, and antagonistic bipolarity. The NPT project was an example of co-operative bipolarity, a crisis would be an example of antagonistic bipolarity, etc.

Public opinion in East and West Europe alike believed, and would continue to believe, that any risk of a serious conflict in Europe has receded, that the experience of the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuba crisis of 1962 has both in governments and leading elites led to the understanding of the intolerable risk which a conflict between them would mean. This has created a feeling of security in Europe, although perhaps this feeling was greater than the security itself. Many people were taking initiatives: unfortunately, those who had taken the lead in European initiatives 10 years earlier (the Poles) have now become the most conservative in European affairs. Of course, all European countries were aware that their relative range of freedom was based on the stability of the system in Europe. They needed to stick to their respective military alliances. But they also tended to feel freer from Moscow and Washington, and both super powers would even further lose their grip over their partners or satellites. All this amounted to a process of re-nationalisation in Europe, both East and West, a growing sense of national identity. De Gaulle alone has not fostered this. In East Europe the trend was based on anti-German accents, but also on anti-Soviet and anti-Russian attitudes which were not expressed too openly. In both halves the idea of belonging to Europe as a whole was growing again. On the other hand, the drive towards integration which was rather strong, both in West Europe and in the Comecon, in the 50's has become weaker: many leading communists and economists in East Europe were now thinking in terms of economic necessities, getting closer economic relations and exchanges between their countries and the West European countries. Czechoslovakia and Rumania were examples of this trend.

In the 70's Europe would get a chance to regain something of its own political identity, not through any great political conversion or integration, but just through a changed attitude of mind in both public opinion and governmental opinion. Of course, the coherence among democratic states would remain strong and among communist states even stronger; on the other hand they would have the feeling of belonging together, whether in a Western-type or a communist-type state.

The Bucharest declaration was one of the most interesting documents for the development which he saw in Europe over the next 5-10 years: it revealed the many different thoughts and tendencies at work.

In Europe as a whole, he saw no real interest at any level in German reunification to change the situation in Central Europe. If there were any such prospect, the idea of 75 million Germans in 1975 would become a nightmare for many people in the West as well as in the East. It was, however, necessary to understand that the will of the Germans to consider themselves one nation has not withered away. Even Ulbricht was obliged to pay tribute every month to this feeling of national identity: he still talks of a German nation. Some communists in East Germany were starting to talk of the DDR nation, but on the whole they talk about a German confederation which is their way of saying that they still long for reunification. Unless the Germans themselves did something about their problem, nothing would be done in the next 10 years or so. The natural tendency for any other country would be to circumvent the central European question by pursuing détente and leaving everything as it is. On the other hand, this development of relative, but growing, autonomy for European states would naturally confer an increasing range of options upon both Germanys, and West Germany might try to make use of this in order to bring about a situation out of which some prospect for reunification could be created 10 or 20 years hence.

He expected collective security in all of Europe to become a major preoccupation for the next 5 years. The West would be wise to prepare itself for what the Soviet Union has called a European security conference: this was bound to come, in this way or another, just as political discussions and visits between East and West were bound to come. The West ought to think and write about it to make the subject more and more familiar. In a sense it was inevitable that the old ideas of the mid-50's would be back in the press and on the conference tables in a new guise, at least in the 1970's.

He held it essential both to keep the balance of power in Europe and to make people believe that the balance of power is kept. But this did not mean maintaining the present level of armaments on both sides. How to effect a reduction while maintaining the balance would be one of the central preoccupations over the next years: whether controls were necessary, and, if so, how they should work. Non-aggression pacts between the Warsaw Pack and Nato were hightly unlikely - member states of both systems would more probably start the discussion officially. This year or next West Germany might be successful in starting such a discussion by offering seriously an exchange of non-aggression declarations or signing non-aggression pacts with the Eastern countries, including the border territories, and denuclearisation in Central Europe, especially in the DDR and West Berlin. Undoubtedly, the Eastern policy conducted by the new Government since December last year had suffered a set-back, but he did not believe this would last very long. Much depended on Bonn maintaining a stable course: it was no secret that, despite the seemingly united grand coalition, differences within the two parties persisted. On the other hand, it would help this Eastward policy if feelings towards the U.S. were getting cooler. Recalling a point made in the first session, there should be more realism about a more united Europe being more anti-American than hitherto. He regretted this tendency, but it had a bearing on the German situation.

Asked about a co-ordination of policy towards Western Europe on the part of the Eastern states, Herr Schmidt saw a considerable effort on the communist side: Moscow and East Berlin in January and February were rather effective in telling the Czechs and the Hungarians that they must not take up diplomatic relations and enlarge their economic exchanges with West Germany. At the same time, he was convinced that economic exigencies would override political objections. The overriding reason for the Czechs, for instance, wishing to come to better relations with Western Europe in general and Germany in particular was economic.

Mr. Thomson (first respondent) thought everyone would agree in general terms with Herr Schmidt that the basis of everything was the necessity for maintaining the balance of power. Without disagreeing with him as to what the tendency of events will be, we ought to be suspicious of direct line projection into the 70's. He wanted to suggest one or two things that he thought might happen to make changes in the picture which we should not like. In this situation outlined by Herr Schmidt, in the 70's we would get a position of growing contacts between East and West and a general content with the status quo politically except in Germany. These two things may come into conflict with each other. Yesterday the question had been posed as to what the French Government might do if they found their attitude towards West Germany incompatible with their wish for growing détente with the East. He did not wish to predict which of the suggested alternatives the French Government would choose, but there would be alternatives, and European governments would have to take decisions about these. There would be trade temptations, as well as political temptations, to give greator priority to Eastern Europe. Probably the trade links between West Germany and the East would be an important element in the German reunification policy, and conflicts could arise there. There could be conflicts between Europe and the U.S. over policy towards East Europe and also towards the S.U. These might arise simply from people going different ways without much attempt at co-ordination. They might be intensified by differences of opinion that have nothing to do with Europe. A present certain hostility exists in Europe towards U.S. policy in Vietnam, and he could well imagine this sort of thing occurring again the the 70's, in a more intense form. Serious strains may come about through European monetary problems: he could imagine a pattern which would cause a gulf between the U.S. and West Europe at a time of difficulties in relation to European security conferences, discussions about relations with the DDR etc., and this would give the S.U. the opportunity of combining either with the U.S. against West Europe or with the West Europeans against the U.S.

Prediction was not enough. We needed to try and define our interests, see where we have common interests, understand where the differences are, and from that try to work towards a policy. For example, we may not all agree on the means of solving the German problem, but we must agree on the need to solve it. There could be two different situations, depending on whether we had a common Western policy towards the German question or a number of bilateral policies towards the German question. He thought there would have to be a common policy, otherwise splits within Western Europe and between Western Europe and the U.S. would be virtually certain to come about. Moreover, there seemed absolutely no prospect of producing a reasonably satisfactory solution to the German problem (meaning satisfactory to Bonn as well as others) without some link between the German problem and European security questions. These by definition included a great many other countries than the two parts of Germany. He even doubted whether anything satisfactory in the German situation could be achieved without at least the acquiescence of the S.U. To achieve that, a much bigger negotiation (not necessarily a great conference) would be required: he suspected that this would be a matter of years; it would take place in different stages and different fora, but both the S.U. and the U.S. would have to be brought in. Therefore, we had a definite interest in a common policy. But that did not mean acting as a bloc the whole time: a common policy can quite often most effectively be carried out by 2, 3 or 4-partite moves.

Several members of the conference pursued their argument of the opening session about the tendency towards re-nationalism. An Italian participant saw three factors in Western Europe tending in the the opposite direction: in deciding to enter the Community, Britain

had embarked on a process of de-nationalism; de Gaulle's European policy was unlikely to last beyond his lifetime; the Community itself had proved itself rather tough in fighting nationalistic tendencies. He saw more re-nationalism in Eastern Europe; on the other hand the economic measures they are essaying would lead to greater integration with the countries around them. So far, with the exception of Yugoslavia, they have retained control of their monetary systems and tried to continue on the basis of bilateral balances; but if liberalisation of trade continued, convertibility of their currencies would have to follow, and this would at least lead them away from economic nationalism. For the East Europeans, the central problem was the German problem; from this point of view the attempt to get more formalised relations on the part of Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany was normal and would continue.

He supported Mr. Thomson: any solution of the German problem must involve all the European countries, in particular the super powers, and be part of a security system in Europe. The new Bonn policy of envisaging reunification as a consequence rather than a pre-condition of détente was therefore very sensible. On the other hand, Bonn was at fault in maintaining the Hallstein doctrine - the problem of Yugoslavia would make Bonn's position more complicated year by year. Nor was it feasible to reserve certain questions for decision at a peace treaty: we have had another war since 1945 and Germany is now the ally of the United States: she could not sit on the opposite side of the table to the four "allies".

A second Italian speaker recalled that some degree of organisation among the West European states and between them and the United States had long been considered important in order to be in a stronger position to change détente into a more durable relationship with the East. He felt that the organisation of a stable relationship within the West should at least move in parallel with the organisation of a stable relationship with the East. And this led back to the fundamental problem of discrimination within the alliance.

Pursuing a question about suitable instrumentalities for co-ordinating these East-West contacts on a European level, a Swedish member of the conference suggested that the only existing institution which seemed likely to be generally acceptable was the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe. He favoured a multiplicity of bilateral contracts, which would have their own dynamism, but at some point these contacts ought to be co-ordinated, as Mr. Thomson suggested, because of the need for common policy when an agreement has to be negotiated.

A German member of the conference saw the trend in Western Europe as a corrected swing of the pendulum rather than a move from one extreme of supranationalism to the other extreme of nationalism. The necessities of economic co-operation and the reality of something like a European dream were in the background and might gain in importance after de Gaulle's passing. Therefore, he could not accept Herr Schmidt's direct line projection: moods are important, as well as facts, and both could be changed. Herr Schmidt had not allowed for an in-put of political will. Moreover, if he were right about the longing for a sense of <u>European</u> political identity, this seemed to contradict his thesis of re-nationalism. A new impetus towards a European political entity would offer a counterweight.

A Swiss participant took up Herr Schmidt's reference to a European security system: the Soviet proposal for a conference offered little more than a vague scheme of mainly bilateral co-operation on the basis of the status quo and a permanently divided Germany - an echo of previous proposals dating back to the Berlin Conference of 1954. On the other hand, he thought the East Europeans would be

rather unahppy about a security system excluding the United States, since an American withdrawal from Europe would tilt the balance in favour of the Soviet Union and expose them to renewed Soviet pressure.

Secondly, he found it difficult to know where the undoubted Eastern interest in expanding economic relations with the West could lead to politically. Eastern Europe was far less independent of the Soviet Union than Western Europe was of the United States. He feared we should find ourselves at the limit of détente and on the brink of upsetting the balance which permitted this evolutionary process to get under way.

Finally, how could we be so certain of the appeal of re-unification to East Germany? The nascent nationalism in Eastern Europe, the beginning of a certain pride in the achievements of the DDR, the weakening of the attraction of the Wirtschaftswunder, would not necessarily work in favour of unity; moreover, the rising generation in the DDR may not feel so strongly as those who have family links with the Federal Republic.

The strongest support for Herr Schmidt's analysis came from a French member of the conference. He saw no justification for thee argument that the trend towards re-nationalism might be reversed. Re-nationalism in the sense of a desire to reaffirm their political identity and independence was a fact and had nothing to do with economic interdependence which was on a different level. He agreed with Mr. Thomson that a common policy was desirable - but experience has proved how difficult this was to achieve.

He was less pessimistic about the German problem. He saw no possibility in the foreseeable future of one single German state in the sense of the Third Reich; but we could not envisage over 20 years perhaps something like a German community evolving with the détente as part of some institutionalised arrangement between East and West? One reason for the French support of the new Federal Government's policy was because it seemed to lead in this direction.

On the point about a European security system, he agreed that a system would probably need the close association of the United States and the Soviet Union; but this did not apply to a security conference.

An American participant argued that in a Europe which was not organised on the basis of sovereign states the idea of a united Germany would probably be less frightening than Herr Schmidt suggested; but by the same token, in such a Europe, and with a liberalised régime in the DDR, the restoration of one single German state may be less essential to the German mind. The American interest was probably not basically in the reconstitution of Germany, but it was in the removal of the problem of reunification as a source of resentment and frustration among the Germans. Any solution that would remove that resentment would be satisfactory from the United States point of view; but the status quo was not satisfactory.

Replying to various points raised, Herr Schmidt said his picture reflected his judgment of what would happen rather than his personal preference; in any case it was a pleasanter picture than the Europe of the late 1950's or early 1960's. He quite agreed that the Hallstein doctrine should be abolished and did not think this would prove a major difficulty; but he did not expect a public declaration. In regard to the point about the younger generation in the DDR, he was convinced that the younger generation in both

parts of Germany were more fervent than their elders in their will for reunification, although they did not expect it to happen in the short term, and he did not believe this would change. But he saw no reason why the solution envisaged by the French speaker should not evolve, and he thought the Germans would accept it.

Changing European and American Interests

3. The Place of Asia in American and European Policies

Mr. Chapin said it should be borne in mind that Asia had for sixty years or more loomed larger in American than in European thinking. Reviewing American-Asian policy in the post-war period, we should note first the disappointment and frustration that resulted from the civil war and collapse of the Nationalist régime. The United States had counted heavily on being able to work with a friendly China to keep Asia peaceable. Secondly, American policy towards China since 1950 could be explained as an extension of the containment policy that was originally developed to check the expansion of Soviet influence in Europe. Containment was applied to communism generally and not much distinction was drawn between Chinese and Soviet versions of it. Indeed, in many ways the U.S. was as concerned about the spread of Soviet influence in Asia as she was about China's, for example the growth of Soviet influence in India and Indonesia. This was also the period of numerous American pacts and American condemnation of neutralism as immoral. The most striking aspect of the American attitude towards China in recent years was the considerable modification of notions about containment: it has become more specific, i.e. it is concerned more with Chinese expansion than with Communism; furthermore, it has been profoundly altered by the American acceptance of the need to reach some kind of accommodation with China, and this at a time when relations with China are at their nadir. All this implied that the United States has come to regard China as a problem that has to be settled within an Asian power balance arrangement.

Thirdly, since the Korean War, the United States had expanded the indentification of its own security to much of Asia, particularly as European power receded. We could all recall Dean Acheson's pre-Korean definition of the American security position in Asia as one that extended from the Aleutians through Japan to the Ryukyus. The Secretary of State would wish to define that line today. The United States now has proclaimed herself to be a Pacific power and considers her security almost as closely tied to Asia as it is to Europe. The fourth point was that since 1950 the United States has always regarded China as a greater threat to world peace than have Europeans. The U.S. regards China as more expansionist and credits her with a greater capacity for mischief than do Europeans.

In regard to European attitudes, Europe was unhappy about Vietnam and had always had misgivings about the American attitude towards China. The United States was far too involved generally in Asia for Europe's liking. Containment, when it was applied to Soviet and Communist expansion in Europe was well understood and warmly supported. Europe quickly saw the hand of the Soviet Union in the North Korean mission and recognized the implications of Korea for its own security - but it has not been inclined to see any threat to its own future in Vietnam. There was a psychological problem here too. Europe had always seen itself as the centre of the world balance of power. It could not yet comprehend the extent to which Asia, which until the

outbreak of World War II was to a large degree an extension of the Western power system, had now become a focal area of the world balance of power - an area far too big and populous to be subject to external power understandings alone. But it was also an area so divided that it was hard to see how an Asian power balance could be reached, unless the external powers continued to exert a strong influence.

He touched briefly on the Asian policies of the three European countries that remain most involved in Asian affairs - Britain, France and the Soviet Union.

Britain was now the only European power that still maintained a military presence, but it was clear that she did not anticipate an indefinite stay. She regarded her commitments as limited - Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong, and such obligations that might arise from Seato. But perhaps her influence rested chiefly on her strong Commonwealth ties, the dominant position she occupied in Asia until the war, and her commercial interests. She had an important responsibility as co-chairman of the Geneva Conference of 1962. Britain has generally supported American policy in Asia although often with strong reservations.

France's recognition of China in January 1964 marked a step to assert French independence of the United States and to strengthen French influence in the Far East, even an attempt to assert French leadership of Europe in Asian affairs. France might be said to be the only West European country today with Asian "ambitions". Moreover, she was the only West European country that actively champions an approach to the conflict in South East Asia. Her proposals of course have generally not been to American liking. France advocates a neutralized Indochina - including a unified Vietnam - "guaranteed at the international level". The way France would go about this has caused more difficulties for the U.S. than the objective itself. She anticipates that China will exercise hegemony in S.E. Asia and accepts this with few misgivings. She believes the United States cannot suppress the Communist insurgency in Vietnam by arms and regards an attitude of cool disapproval of American military action as the one that best serves her aims in Asia.

He thought we must also consider the Soviet Union a European power, despite the fact that she is Asia's largest country. Since the Cuba crisis of October 1962 and, perhaps a year or so earlier, there seemed to have been a gradual and cautious Soviet disengagement from South Asia. The U.S.S.R clearly wishes to maintain a strong influence in Asia, but not at the cost of risking a nasty clash with the U.S. She has suffered some serious setbacks in Asia, e.g. Indonesia, which despite heavy Soviet aid, was steadily drawing closer to China. For a time the U.S.S.R seemed to be withdrawing from Laos completely. Her concern about China needed no comment. She had a very ambivalent attitude towards Vietnam: certainly, a serious defeat for the United States would not altogether serve Soviet interests. Finally, Tashkent, could be considered a watershed in Soviet policy towards South Asia. It was designed to enable the U.S.S.R to avoid involvement in the troubled sub-continent while limiting the possibilities of Chinese intervention. It was recognition that turmoil and upheaval in Asia are not necessarily in the Soviet interest.

Summing up American policy in Asia as it had evolved since the defeat of Japan - the collapse of Nationalist China - the military involvement of the Korean War and later in Indochina - the numerous alliances - the slow change of emphasis from "containment of Communism" to "containment of China with some accommodation or reconciliation", we could say that the aim of American policy was to achieve a balance of power, including the

external as well as the regional powers, that holds promise for lasting peace and freedom from coercion. Almost anything he might say about U.S. objectives in Vietnam - to establish the principle that Communist aggression in Asia can no more be tolerated in Asia than it is in Europe and the search for some accommodation with China - was subsumed by that broad objective. He did not think this was an objective with which Europeans could seriously quarrel.

Dr. Birnbaum (first respondent) proposed to concentrate on European policy and attitudes, specifically towards China and Vietnam, although it could be argued that the major long-term interests of Europe in Asia are of an economic nature, trade and aid, and that this is what he should be talking about. He noted with interest Mr. Chapin's reference to a modification in the American approach to containment as applied to S.E. Asia: he said that China rather than communism was seen at issue. Dr. Birnbaum took this to mean power politics rather than an ideological approach. It could, of course, be argued that the U.S. effort in Vietnam has been explained to the U.S. public and to the world as the need to stop communist aggression or to prove that the Chinese design for nationalist domination is a failure: Mr. Chapin said that the U.S. objective was to establish the principle that communist aggression can no more be tolerated in Asia than in Europe. This reasoning was usually criticised in Europe because it did not seem to take into account one very basic fact, the fragmentation of the communist world which was one of the basic determinants in assessing the character of the Chinese threat. The American containment policy may have become more sensitive, but it still appeared to many Europeans far too sweeping in its judgment of the basic motives behind Chinese policy. Europeans did not believe in a Chinese master plan for the under-developed world: to many Europeans in responsible positions, it even seemed an open question whether a basic aggressive intention on the part of China existed: some argue that except for the massive American presence on the mainland relatively independent communist entities would have emerged in Asia as in Eastern Europe; others draw the parallel with the experience of the cold war period and argue that the U.S/China conflict has been unnecessarily aggravated by what they conceive to be a mutual misconception of basic intentions. Mr. Chapin mentioned as a recent trend a search for some kind of accommodation with China: he had noted on a recent visit to Delhi that Indian officials were appraising this trend and were quite appalled at what it might imply for their own security. But this development seemed unnoticed in the West: the prevailing notion was still that the U.S. was trying to isolate China whereas the correct approach would be to try to fit her into the community of nations as the Europeans have done by recognizing China.

European apprehension about the possible outcome and repercussions of the conflict in Vietnam related to: (1) repercussions on world stability at large; (2) repercussions on the American commitment to Western Europe. On the first aspect, while the possibility of world war and a nuclear holocaust could not be excluded completely, he did not personally take this too seriously. Vietnam revealed how far up the ladder it was possible to go without great risk of conflict between the major super powers. The second aspect was fear that the conflict might reach limits of violence and lead to hazardous developments not fully under the control of the principal actors and in this way jeopardise the détente in Europe itself by inducing a basic switch in the atmosphere which was considered a pre-condition for the political evolution in Europe many of us would hope for.

There appeared to be two contradictory lines of reasoning, both leading to the same type of conclusion: (a) that an American over-commitment to Asia existed and this was detrimental to the U.S.

commitment to Europe simply because of the erosion of the credibility of the commitment to western Europe; (b) that in the wake of a frustrating American experience in S.E. Asia there might be a trend towards disengagement or neo-isolationism in the U.S. itself which would have an erosion on the U.S. commitment itself, not just the credibility of that commitment. Personally, he had no doubt that at present the first line was the prevailing one. The Europeans did not really fear being abandoned. What they feared was mutative American thinking about the future of East-West relations, wondering whether she was in Europe simply because of the limitations of the power to engage herself imaginatively in all parts of the world... Therefore they might welcome Johnson's speech of October 1966 because it seemed to usher in a new period of genuine U.S. interest in some of the problems of East-West relations in Europe

An Italian participant added to Dr. Birnbaum's analysis that the main concern in European minds was that the East-West relationship in Europe could never be stabilised while a large area of unsettled relations existed in South East Asia - Vietnam itself for many Europeans was only a geographical expression. He did not see how the problem of Chinese expansionism could be dealt with by ignoring China's existence: - the United States was at fault in not recognizing the parallel between the position of China today and that of the Soviet Union after 1917.

Commenting on Mr. Chapin's reference to the motivation for French policy in Asia, a French member of the conference could not accept that the French desire - normal to any government - to exert influence amounted to "ambitions" in the area. The main reason for exchanging diplomatic representatives with China in 1964 was to keep fully informed and be on the spot. Nor was it a question of accepting Chinese hegemony: the French Government accepted as a fact that a country of China's size and importance would inevitably play a major role in Asia and that no important Asian conflict could be settled without bringing China in.

France did have interests in Vietnam - economic interests and also a psychological and moral interest which the Vietnamese seemed to reciprocate. But she was interested in Vietnam also because the conflict was not a purely local affair but held dangers for world stability and perhaps for world peace. That was the reason for her public disagreement with American policy.

Dr. Birnbaum's contention that the Europeans did not believe in a Chinese master plan for the subversion of under-developed countries was challenged by a Netherlands participant. The Chinese were on record (i.e. the famous Lin Piao article of September 1965) - the only question was whether this plan was short-term or long-term; he believed the latter.

So far as the Netherlands was concerned criticism related to the <u>implementation</u> of United States policy: first that the United States plays the anti-communist card too much and the anti-nationalist card too little, thus allowing the communists the monopoly of national liberation movements; secondly, that too little tendency is shown to co-operate with those powers in Asia itself whose interest might be much more at stake, even on a short-term basis, than the American. The answer could not be to welcome support from any quarter so long as it was not accompanied by advice. On the other hand if the U.S. did try to co-operate with Japan and India in an Asian policy it would be very difficult to persuade those countries to remain non-nuclear for ever.

A British speaker pursued the effect of the British interest in Asia on British relations with Europe and on European-American relations. On one side the argument was heard that by and large Britain's prospective partners in the Common Market were not greatly interested, or did not wish to be involved in, events outside Europe, so why should Britain not emulate them and shed her extra-European commitments; on the other side was the argument that this situation would not last: looking to the 1970's, if a truly European point of view developed with closer integration, this view would be expressed on events in Asia and elsewhere and from this standpoint the British presence, position, experience and knowledge of events outside Europe would be of common benefit to the whole of Western Europe. British official thinking had not yet come down firmly on one side or the other.

In respect of European-American relations, he had no doubt that (a) any U.S. Administration would be inextricably involved with large areas all around the world and, (b) the U.S. involvement in non-European problems would continue to be a cause of unhappiness and friction in Europe. He was sure the Europeans would wish to influence United States policy: the question was whether they would choose to work for a separate policy from that of the United States, or to emulate the traditional British policy of trying to influence the United States by working with her.

A Canadian participant commented that Asia was closer to Europe geographically than to the U.S. The same forces in Britain working for withdrawal were very strong seven or eight years ago - but when the challenge came it was noticeable that Britain was both prepared and able to make a very substantial and highly successful effort in Asia. In general, however, the West European countries were in the happy position of being able to ignore a large range of security issues because other nations would have to deal with them and take decisions. Looking to the 1970's, even though the Asian picture was complicated by the incompetent use of force going on in Vietnam, he saw no escape from the reality of the intelligent (i.e. minimum necessary) use of force in Asia as in many other countries - and if Europe did not become enmeshed, that would be through taking the line of leaving everything to the U.S.

An Italian speaker held that the economic aspect of relations with Asia should be viewed in the broader context as relations between developed and under-developed countries. It was not a question of an American attitude or a European attitude. Despite the best efforts of OECD, none of the aid objectives of the past decade have been met because of the total failure of the developed nations to reach the beginning of agreement on policies to be followed in a co-ordinated way.

Leading back to the first Italian speaker's argument, he suggested that trade would provide a bridge to lead China out of her present isolation: anyone trying to improve trade with China now was treated as a friend. Despite the anti-American propaganda barrage, China's real grudge was against the Soviet Union because the latter abandoned China half-way when she was offering economic assistance.

Taking up Mr. Chapin's comparison between European reaction to American policy in Vietnam and in Korea, an Italian member of the conference suggested that apart from objective reasons (the aggression was clearer in Korea, and American policy more restrained), the European reaction reflects a general estrangement from the United States, several reasons for which had already been suggested. This attitude itself deepens the estrangement in turn. It would be the more difficult therefore, to bring American and European attitudes into harmony. He agreed that the only European power which could

conceivably influence American policy in Asia would be Britain - although he doubted whether Britain still had the power to make herself heard or to support a common policy in Asia.

A British speaker said it was quite clear from a recent visit to Asia that Vietnam was a European and to a lesser extent an American, crisis of conscience. He was inclined to support Mr. Chapin's view that the strong European feeling about Vietnam reflected a sense of sorrow that the true centre of international politics has moved away from Europe to the U.S.

FOURTH SESSION SUNDAY 7 MAY

Agenda: Changes in the strategic and technological environment:

Mr. Stanley (first speaker) said he would argue that none of the three factors listed would be major environmental changes in Nato. Taking the last first, there was a reasonable assumption that the American commitment to the defence of Europe would continue unchanged for two main reasons: (1) that it was as clearly in the American self-interest as it had been for more than 20 years to avoid having Europe controlled by the S.U. in a way which would adversely affect the over-all balance of power; (2) that however we may see the future world order, turbulence and instability were likely to be endemic and some pattern of co-operation between the U.S. and Europe would be highly desirable, and the U.S. commitment to Europe was a solid under-pinning on which this must rest. The question of force levels related to the question of whether détente, like a hare, had still to be caught or whether we had seen the end of the cold war. Whichever may be the case, the facts of the Soviet military posture must be taken into account. These facts were that the S.U. has an increasing number and hardening of ICBMs, and had made improvements to her tactical air forces. Attention had already been drawn to the growing Soviet presence in the Mediterranean. There appears to be a real increase in defence spending on their part. Personally he found these facts, which were generally accepted, hard to square with the broader notions of détente. Four possible explanations at least for the Soviet policy could be put forward: they might be genuinely afraid of Nato military power; they might be unwilling or unable to risk rocking the boat of their relationships with East Europe and feel that any change in their posture would do that; the bureaucratic momentum of inertia (vested military interest) may simply keep up a momentum towards higher spending; finally, there was always the hypothesis that some elements in the Soviet leadership continued to feel they could maintain a strategic advantage against Western Europe at least, and may want to use it for political purposes as they have a number of times in the past. The problem in Nato was that this Soviet military posture represented a very formidable threat indeed on the capability side, whereas those voting for defence budgets if voted in terms of the "intention" component of the threat and thereby discounted these capabilities. On present evidence Nato minus the U.S. was going to spend of the order of 100 billion dollars over the next five years. On the other hand according to various estimates, to match the Soviet posture at all levels this figure would have to be increased by at least 50 per cent, if not 100 per cent, to provide a full range of capabilities. Clearly nothing like that order of magnitude increase was going to be on the cards.

At the risk of sounding optimistic on the outcome of a meeting to be held the following week in Paris; he thought we may be on the threshold for the first time in many years of bringing at least a general strategic concept and force levels into some kind

of balance. There was a growing recognition that the ultimate deterrent is that of massive nuclear warfare, but that since it increasingly takes on the character of mutual suicide to be credible there have to be some rather stout links in the escalation chain. To make the nuclear guarantee to Berlin viable in 1961 it was found necessary specifically to reinforce the American forces in Europe. It was now being found that a guarantee must be credible on the lower level before it can be credible on the higher level. He saw a growing concensus that Nato cannot have a large-scale conventional option, that we are basically relying on a nuclear deterrent, but in order to work it must be based on a hot combat capability. Assuming agreement on a quantitative fix on Nato force levels at about their present levels, albeit with some widely recognised need for their qualitative improvement, the question of British and American redeployment was relevant. Dr. Gasteyger's reference to withdrawals needed to be put in perspective. The number of aircraft, though a significant proportion of the more modern fighter bombers, was only about 10-11% of the U.S. Tactical Air Force in Europe including the Fifth Fleet and only about 6% of the allied TAFs in the central region. If redeployment were a euphemism for reduction, this was the most expensive reduction in history! A great deal of money was being spent on keeping these forces available for bringing back to Europe quickly, exercising them together etc. The reasons for the action would be clear to the conference - the analogy to the technique of blood-letting to avoid a haemorrhage. He believed that with strategic mobility, taking into consideration that a change in the political environment would surely precede a military attack, it would be possible to carry out this redeployment without basically changing the form of substance of the American commitment or changing the force levels to which he had alluded.

With regard to Ballistic Missile Defence everyone present would be aware that an ABM is not a unique system which exists or does not exist, but a collection of hardware and concepts, various kinds of radar and missiles and tracking systems and computer systems, a lot of which have been on the shelf for a long time. These could be put together in a wide variety of ways, cost and effectiveness. The McNamara view, which had received great publicity, was essentially that the balance will remain with the offence. An ABM system can be deployed predominantly for population protection, or to protect deployment of missiles, against either a heavy attack (hundreds of missiles with very sophisticated penetration aides) or a light attack. The cost would be of the order of 10-50 billion dollars upwards. There would never be 100 per cent certainty of effect, and of course the difference between the estimated effectiveness and 100 per cent can represent a great amount of damage for missiles that get through that are targeted on population centres. The United States view at the moment was that ABM deployment was not worth while for population protection; whether it was valid for missile defence depends on technical development; whether worth deploying against a light attack from communist China depends on the kind of forces China may develop.

Turning to the European aspects, Mr. Stanley admitted that the history of U.S. consultation in Nato was not all it might have been. However, the ABM was an encouraging exception to this. The nuclear planning group met in Washington this spring in the middle of the Vietnam debate in the Pentagon and Congress on what the U.S. would do. McNamara was very frank in discussing the classified technology and policy involved, as he had been in any document etc. inside the U.S. government. As a result the wider aspects (wider than the U.S.) were going to be studied in Nato. The implications would be considered not only for Europe but for Nato as a whole

on the assumption (i) of no ABM deployment, (ii) of deployment only in North America, (iii) deployment in North America and Europe. At least the problem was being looked at, and in his judgment, in a proper form. In regard to force levels, European members of the conference wondered first of all why the decision was announced prior to the full consideration in Nato (as opposed to tripartite consultations) and secondly whether the redeployment of American forces marked the beginning of a long cyclical process.

In reply to the first question it was said that technically only proposals for American and British redeployment had been made. These proposals would lie on the table until the December Council meeting and come into effect as part of Nato's first five-year plan in calendar year 1968. The handling of this issue by the press had been responsible for considerable misunderstanding. The risk of further reductions was treated seriously by American members of the conference. It was argued however that the real danger to the Administration's aim of stabilising force levels would come from a round of comparable reductions on the European side. So far as public and Congressional opinion was concerned, the balance of payments factors that were decisive for Britain did not weigh most heavily; the fundamental problem was the feeling that the United States was being asked to defend a Europe which is not very active in defending itself. The feeling that the French had pulled out, the slackening off of the German defence expenditure, the period of service problem - all this added up to a sense that the burden was disproportionate. Given the prosperity that exists in Europe, the relative level of GNP devoted to national defence in comparison with the United States did not seem to indicate any great strain on the European economies. It was not reasonable to expect the U.S. to produce virtually the whole of the nuclear deterrent and a large share of the ground forces too. If the Europeans took the American redeployment as the signal to make even less effort, a spiralling down reduction on the American side could hardly be avoided.

A Canadian participant added that the weariness with maintaining a commitment in the absence of reciprocity, already nascent in his own country, would intensify in the face of a trend towards European force reductions. The forces deployed by Canada in Europe are relatively small, but they are among the most efficient and well equipped. A second Canadian participant maintained that division-counting was a very crude method of assessing equality of sacrifice. The real factor in the comparable sacrifice argument was that the United States does have the final say on what happens in Europe on forces and, he would argue, she could not afford to get into a position wherein in some situation she did not have the final say. Her commitment must be decisive enough to make sure that when it counts she can maintain control.

A British speaker had sympathy with the American argument. But for his own Government, any other decision would have been impossible. Britain contributes a larger percentage of GNP to defence that any continental European country except Portugal but gets less back from it. Obviously the danger of unravelling in Europe existed. The best way to prevent this would be a co-operative effort to streamline and reduce costs. A common European organisation for the research and development and production of arms would be very difficult to achieve, but it was worth aiming at: perhaps we could go even further and aim at a European defence organisation.

Following up the argument about a comparable effort in terms of GNP, a German speaker maintained that a country with a small GNP per capita could not afford to spend as much in proportion on defence as a rich country with a much larger GNP per capita. He regretted that there had never been a general solution of the offset problem: it was ridiculous to offset the French costs in Germany to a higher degree than those of Britain and the United States. It was equally ridiculous for the United States to expect the Germans to solve her offset problem by buying more American hardware than they needed.

As the opening speaker remarked, a big nuclear guarantee was not enough without adequate forces on the spot to deal with local incidents. The presence of local forces was particularly important from the standpoint of maintaining public confidence in security. Since the tripartite talks began, strong pressures had emerged in both main German parties to reduce defence spending and to reduce the period of conscription to 12 months. Essentially he felt that this redeployment, like the NPT, meant a change in defence posture and strategy mainly for reasons of American domestic political argument. The key question was, should it become clear that the U.S.S.R. did not reciprocate in any way, would the U.S. government be willing and able to stop any continuation of their troop reductions?

A Swedish member of the conference expressed the concern of all those interested in a broader European security system about at least the risk of a rather uncontrolled reduction of forces on the Western side without any explicit co-ordination with the Warsaw pact or the Soviet Union.

While agreeing with his Swedish colleague, a Norwegian member of the conference considered these reductions more important from the psychological than the military point of view. But the mistake had been over the years to identify the American presence in Europe with the force levels decided on in 1952. Six divisions was an accidental figure. NATO had never had the forces to implement its strategy. Political leaders would be wiser to try to get public opinion to accept such reductions as normal instead of attaching religious significance to force levels which are unsatisfactory anyhow.

This led a second German speaker to ask why in that case force level figures should be regarded as sacrosanct by any member of the alliance. And if everyone was going to act independently, no-one should be surprised if the Germans did too. Psychological factors apart, the temptation would be very strong to join the trend and scale down the Bundeswehr to, say, eight divisions. The advantages to Germany would be two-fold; the combat readiness and effectiveness of a streamlined Bundeswehr could be radically improved; and it could be backed up by a militia-type static defence force which would be a means of making use of the million or so reservists. Some opinion in Germany might see such a militia as something of a national force.

An Italian member of the conference objected that discussion of Nato force levels always tended to be concentrated on the central sector. Warnings about the danger of reductions could be more pertinently directed towards the Mediterranean area, where all the available evidence pointed to a build up of Soviet forces.

The point about the sanctity of numbers revealed to one British participant just how political the issue was. He hoped the American withdrawals would be limited by their keener appreciation

than the Europeans of the Soviet danger; if the American forces went down below a certain level it would be very difficult psychologically to maintain them at all. However, rational strategic argument alone could never deal with the irritation in the United States or the questioning of Europe.

He felt that maintenance of a fruitful European-American link in defence of the whole Atlantic area depended on the introduction of new political factors. One factor might be a publicly changed assessment of the Russian posture, in response to the signs of a build-up in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. Another factor might be a European movement towards common armaments production and a defence organisation, as already suggested.

Another British member of the conference added that the European members of the alliance faced some radical thinking about defence management over the next ten years as the result of trends in defence economics. Because of their separate national overheads problems such as the increasing share and cost of procurement in defence activities and the rising cost of manpower weighed more heavily on them than on the United States. If they were determined to maintain their national forces there would have to be some radical redeployment in the central area to get better value out of a given number of troops.

While expressing agreement with much of the argument from the European side American participants felt that insufficient attention had been paid to strategic mobility as a new factor influencing American thinking on force levels. The U.S. was considered by many to be on the threshold of a quantum jump in the ability to move forces quickly. A good case could be made for the possibility of maintaining a substantial combat capability and a reinforcement capability without having all assets on line.

It was stressed that while there was no ideal substitute for forces in place it would be a mistake to consider mobility a façade for withdrawal. A great amount of money and effort would be put into the rephasing: stockpiling of heavy equipment in Europe, the availability of airlift, the reorganisation of forces in the United States were all part of this. Looking further ahead, if this concept would be embodied into an effective system, one great disadvantage - the distance of the United States from Europe - would be overcome from the point of view of an agreement with the Soviet Union on a balanced withdrawal of forces.

The problem of mutuality was important: it had been posed during the tripartite discussions and would be considered by the wider membership of the alliance. But there was genuine disagreement on some aspects of the quantitative threat. Furthermore no serious study seemed to have been made, at least by the U.S. government, of the reactions which could reasonably be expected from the Soviet side to various Nato dispositions. Simply to play the numbers game was meaningless. From the political point of view, although this re-thinking about force levels has taken place quite independently from consideration of the NPT or of any basic change in Soviet behaviour, an unfortunate impression has been created by their all arriving on the scene at the same time.

The final speaker in this part of the discussion said that the reservations of people in Europe concerned with central security about the concept of mobility were due partly to concern about the effects of rapid redeployment on the management of crisis and partly to bad experience in earlier wars about estimates of requirements

going wrong both in crisis and in operations. On the other hand he thought rapid reinforcement capacity would have great relevance to the possibility of trouble in South Eastern Europe, where it was most likely to occur during the next decade.

Discussion then turned to the political and psychological impact on Europe of ABM deployment by the Soviet Union and in consequence the United States.

Recalling the possible postures outlined by Mr. Stanley, a British member of the conference could find no argument in favour of deployment against China: if China was not going to be deterred, as the Soviet Union has been, by the American nuclear arsenal he doubted whether an ABM system would make much difference. Personally he doubted the effectiveness of the ABM for population defence, for this was true for the United States, the Soviet Union and Europe. He did see the validity for missile defence; on the other hand it was difficult to be sure that the other side would regard it as no more than additional protection; and if both sides had hardened missile sites already, do they need to be hardened still further?

However, Soviet deployment has started and he expected it to continue, and he expected that the United States would therefore respond. From the point of view of the impact on Europe, it was important that U.S. deployment should take place only in response to Soviet deployment. It was also extremely important that the U.S. response should be a mix of missiles and improved interception aids and civil defence measures that would show that the U.S. is matching, but not over-matching, what the Soviet Union is doing.

Apart from giving another turn to the spiral of rising defence costs and the arms race, if it appeared that the U.S. was stepping up the race the political effects in Europe would be extremely unfortunate.

While he believed that all the psychological effects in Europe would be adverse; if the United States presented this deployment skilfully, and especially if there were a lively hope of an East-West understanding that would allow the cessation of deployment, these psychological effects need not be very serious.

On the question of how far things have progressed on the Soviet side, a second British participant said it was clear from Soviet statements over the past four or five years that they were very interested in ABM technology (he thought this derived partly from their traditional interest in defensive systems, the artillery being the dominant arm of their forces in the sense that navies were to maritime powers). So far what appears to be a close defence anti-aircraft system has been deployed around Moscow and perhaps Leningrad. The question remains open whether they are going for an area system, like their elaborate air defence system constructed in the early 1950's: but there is no doubt that they regard this as technically possible and politically valid. During Kosygin's visit to London he was asked whether the Soviet Union considered ABM deployment a step towards a new spiral in the arms race. He replied that the U.S.S.R. see an ABM system as having basically a defensive effect, and building up defence did not increase the arms race but could help to keep it at a certain level.

The first British speaker added that the point at which anti-aircraft defence shades into something to be used against cruise missiles or high level aircraft can become blurred. Certain weapons have a dual capability. Undoubtedly the Soviet Union has done and is continuing a lot of research work on ABM; but he had no reason to suppose they have come up with anything very good.

An American member of the conference said this was not the main consideration for the U.S. BM defence is like a ceiling: even if 100 per cent effective, this means only up to a certain level of saturation. Against forces below the level of the ceiling the degree of effectiveness of the system is important. But to the forces that can go beyond the ceiling it is not: the relevance of Soviet deployment to the U.S. capability lay in the consequent jacking up of forces on both sides.

A French participant fully agreed that for Europe an ABM system would not be effective enough to justify cost. However the political and psychological aspects of deployment were by far the most important; he believed deployment would have de-stabilising effects by modifying the present status quo. He did not exclude a Soviet-American agreement not to go ahead with deployment: it is always easier to reach an agreement not to arm than to disarm. On the other hand he was not hopeful of the U.S.S.R. agreeing to such a step so long as the Vietnam conflict hampers a further improvement in relations between the two countries.

Two Italian members of the conference did not share the rather optimistic British view of the likely effects on Europe. It was argued that technological advance was bound to reach the point where the already highly effective Nike-Sprint system would be able to ensure 100 per cent security against incoming missiles. Already the fall-out problem, necessitating a very expensive shelter programme, is well on the way to being solved. No matter what the cost, American public opinion would demand absolute security if it were available. Assuming the Soviet Union would be able to reach the same point, both countries would become invulnerable.

This would undermine the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Europe at a time when the imbalance between the super powers and the other states and between European states and the U.S. would be more marked, since deployment would drive both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to increase their number of ICBMs. It would be a step back towards nuclear bipolarity, and the old fears about the imposition of hegemony would be intensified. Viewed in combination with a non-proliferation treaty, the increasing irrelevance of the French and British and to an extent also the Chinese nuclear forces, the result would be a heightened sense of impotence and resentment vis-à-vis the super powers and increasing pressure for neutralism. It would become far more difficult to make politically acceptable the politico-military capability of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in the world at large, as well as in Europe.

An American member of the conference maintained that it was not possible to judge where the ceiling can be or how good the present hardware systems are - but the effectiveness is not 100 per cent. It was true that even present anti-aircraft systems have potential BMD capability - ranging from marginal to insignificant, although this may improve over time. But at the upper end he could only repeat McNamara's view that crediting the Soviet Union with all the technology that we admit for ourselves, we are "absolutely confident" of being able to overwhelm that defensive system. The speaker was sure of an equal Soviet confidence in being able to overwhelm any defensive system the U.S. could construct.

A second French representative wondered, since a non-proliferation treaty would be an example of co-operative bipolarity, whether the Europeans would be more worried by a further agreement over their heads not to deploy ABM systems or by the element of

competitive bipolarity involved in a return to an intense arms race as the result of deployment. And was it conceivable to have both these aspects of competition and tacit agreement between the two super powers, or was ABM deployment more likely to have an adverse effect on prospects for the NPT?

Pursuing a question about the possibilities for building a system in Europe, a British member of the conference said that Western Europe has a higher population density than most of the United States except for the two seaboards. The shorter flying time from the Soviet Union to Western Europe would complicate the intercept problem, even though medium range missiles may fly at a marginally slower speed than ICBMs. Assuming the technical problems could be overcome, the order of costing would be the same as for the United States: 40 billion dollars for a system that would have a notable effect on the level of casualties for city populations, which would suggest a 20 per cent increase in European defence budgets.

Another British speaker suggested that the major difficulty would be as much political as technical: an ABM system for Europe would require central control - it would hardly be possible to defend one European country apart from the rest. It would be realistic to speak of nuclear rather than conventional warheads for the defending missiles, so the problem of proliferation would be involved, as well as control.

A German participant could not see the Europeans foregoing the possibility of nuclear BM defence if the United States went ahead. This already impinges upon the Geneva negotiations. The German Government is trying to keep that defensive option open: not that it is considering a German or even a European system, but the question of discrimination becomes very important in this context. Personally he considered that to proceed with ABM deployment would kill the NPT.

It was reported that this sentiment is held in India and Japan Japan too. An American member of the conference confirmed that those lobbies pressing for ABM deployment in the U.S. are interconnected with those groups who advocate another round of tests to prove the workability of the system.

This led to the consideration whether a technically significant difference could be drawn between ABM missiles and offensive ballistic missiles; it was suggested that in any case the Russians would never accept such a distinction so far as a German defensive option was concerned.

FIFTH SESSION SUNDAY 7 MAY

Agenda Changes in the strategic and technological environment:

2. The problems of technological co-operation. The future of the Atlantic Alliance.

Signor Albonetti said the problems of technological co-operation related to the "technological gap" so much under discussion in the past year or two and which was in turn a problem of economic development. The technological gap in a sense could be considered a false problem, at least from the economic point of view, because there is statistical proof that the economic gap between Europe and the U.S. is not increasing. Drawing attention to tables which had been circulated, he said that quantitatively, in terms of GNP per capita, manufactures, export of manufactured products and share of international trade, from a statistical point of view there is a gap in all these figures. But from a dynamic point of view this gap is narrowing. His argument was summed up in six points.

(1) The consequences of the technological gap for economic development and increased productivity are for the time being negligible and most probably will remain so in the coming years;

(2) The technological gap between Europe and the U.S. is limited to certain sectors, especially space, aviation, electronics, nuclear power in certain fields (specifically enrichment of uranium) and does not have a general application:

(3) In the last twenty years, despite the technological gap and the gap in research which exists between Europe and the U.S. the rate of economic development, productivity growth and the rate of growth of exports have been higher in European countries than in the U.S. European national competitiveness has increased more than that of the U.S.

(4) The principal negative consequences which the technological gap between Europe and the U.S. could bring lie above all in relation to Europe's political and economic independence vis-à-vis the U.S. and S.U.

(5) Given the causes of the technological gap which exists in Europe vis-à-vis the U.S. (military secrecy, industrial secrecy, the relative dimension of research projects, etc.) significant results are not to be expected from any increase in collaboration with the U.S.

(6) The principal solution for the technological gap between Europe and the U.S. is to be found in greater concern for growth of productivity and for European co-operation in research and development through certain well-defined projects within equally well-defined sectors.

This last point led to the core of the subject, the problems of technological co-operation. During the morning reference had been been made to the increasing cost of procurement. European technological co-operation sprang precisely from the inescapable fact that our national states find it increasingly difficult to produce

essentially by themselves certain major systems. He did not think certain European states, especially Britain and France and perhaps tomorrow Germany and Italy etc. would be ready to give up completely their capability in certain advanced sectors such as aviation, electronics, the nuclear sector and space. If we admitted that, and took the example of the bilateral co-operation in the aviation field between France and Britain (which he believed would be extended towards Germany and Italy,) then we discover both the broad scope and the necessity for increasing co-operation in the technological field.

Two kinds of solution were possible: one more institutional, the creation of a kind of technological community with a special budget, or a European defence authority for the procurement of weapons; the other more pragmatic - defining certain projects in certain fields. Personally he favoured the second approach. If we were able to organise a few projects we should find that the problems of technological co-operation could be solved to a great extend. It was clear also that the sectors eligible for this kind of co-operation were those in which the European national resources were not adequate to develop such projects due to the risks and the cost and the resources, human and technical, involved: aviation, space, the nuclear field in all its aspects, and electronics. The case for co-operation on other items such as tanks, or air-ground, air-air, ground-air missiles, was not so over-riding as long as national states had the physical and economic resources to develop them nationally; moreover past experience had not been encouraging.

Existing possibilities for international co-operation in the aviation field included a supersonic plane, an air bus, the v.g. aircraft, the jaguar training type aircraft, a VTOL plane. For space we already had a multilateral organisation, Eldo. In the nuclear field, extensive talks were in process among Europeans to build an isotope separation plant for civil purposes, even though major problems of a political and technological nature were involved. In electronics, so far there had been some bilateral co-operation between the Fench and British although there was still a question mark whether wider co-operation would not be called for to increase the technological posture of our countries as a whole. He repeated his grave doubts about the possibility of the European countries bearing upon the technological gap without international co-operation...

Signor Albonetti's approach was welcomed by both European and American members of the conference.

A German participant suggested that the influx of American capital to Europe, often resented as a new kind of American imperialism, would help the European companies to close the gap in the sense that lack of capital for investment may be the real handicap. However, recalling McNamara's reference to the managerial gap as being more important than the technology gap, he felt the urgent need for a new form of co-operation between American and European firms: American insistance on taking over the management of joint companies in Europe has done a great deal of harm to European-American relations.

A Canadian member of the conference pointed out that his country had had to face this problem for a very long time. So often a choice had to be made between pursuing a certain rate of development (what we call the gap is rather a craze for development) or retarding this by imposing controls, or of seeking some inbetween position. There was no ideal solution, but Canadian industry has succeeded in certain cases in retaining a measure of control at board level. Bilateral mechanisms had been invented which smoothed many of the day-to-day problems, although where feasible voluntary arrangements were preferred.

A Belgian member of the conference observed that for Belgium, as a small country, multilateral arrangements would be more advantageous than bilateral arrangements.

A British speaker agreed about the political harm of American company practice. But he felt that it was partly the Europeans' own fault if management did pass out of our hands: the Japanese have successfully operated a very tough policy, permitting no more than minority holdings by foreign investors in their companies and retaining managerial control.

Another important reason for examining the scope for a more comprehensive form of co-operation on defence technology in Europe was the harm caused by the European fear that their political action would be further circumscribed by reliance on the United States for advanced weapons or by such things as the F104 arrangement.

However, recalling the Belgian speaker's point, we soon came up against the problem of the intra-European balance of power. 80% of the defence procurement resources are spent in three countries: Britain, France and Germany; well over 90% of the R and D resources in Europe are spent by the same three countries, with Britain and France taking the lion's share. To envisage a system of European defence procurement in which the smaller countries or indeed Italy would not feel dominated by the Big Three would require a very intelligent form of international institution.

From this point of view, Signor Albonetti's project by project approach was the right one. Looking at the opportunities in the 1970's for co-operation on major systems (especially aircraft) he felt we should not attempt to set up a European defence production agency, but should keep the objective in mind of eventually producing co-operatively as many systems as are economically worth while over the next 15 years. Thinking back to the morning's discussion, he suggested that we may find the over-riding argument for technological co-operation in defence in Europe was not economic saving so much as standardisation.

Future of the Atlantic Alliance

Mr. Thomson said that despite all the difficulties and things said, we were not seeking to alter the alliance beyond recognition, but to reform and alter its character. It was important for all of us that the alliance should have a future. The future would be different from what we have known, because most of the big problems of the next decade would take place outside Europe: trade and aid, food and population, a modus vivandi with China and East Europe, the emergence of Japan as a great power, the Indian decline into even further weakness.

Looking at these problems, our main tasks will lie in the creation of order. Our own sense of community will be an essential element for success. There were many considerations which make for community. But others were making for discord. Two were obvious: (1) the difference of scale between the U.S. and other members of the alliance, which we had already discussed a good deal, and (2) the strength of nationalist feeling. But those two things we could do something to correct and he had no doubt that the extension of the Common Market was the most important of the corrective measures we could take, although even that would not entirely do away with either of the problems in the next 10 years.

The real dangers however stemmed from the actual and potential differences of interest between different members or different parts of the alliance. Many differences had come out during our discussion on the NPT and on troop reductions. International monetary questions may be a future source of difference. Competing in trade with Eastern Europe will have political and economic consequences. Whether or not the Kennedy round is a success, there will be frictions in the 1970's, between commercial and agricultural members of the alliance and between Europe and the U.S. and differences about how to approach the problem of UNCTAD. Also problems will arise involving the German situation, and policy outside the alliance - Africa and the Middle East etc. He would like to discuss what should we do about this situation. The obvious thing was to say we should have a common will. He proposed to take just one part, the institutions and sympathies which work within the alliance divided under headings of defence, politics and economics. If we could get this right, it would provide the soil and the climate which is necessary for the encouragement of a common will.

He was sure NATO would continue throughout the next decade - there were far too many common interests between the allies to think otherwise - and in something like its present shape. But he expected important changes: e.g. a form of a European defence organisation. There were many possible ways in which this could be organised and he did not wish to go into detail. But it would be something like national units under integrated command and logistics and a common budget. He believed such a force would be assigned to NATO, either connected, or separate with a linked system for some form of European co-operation in a R and D and productions of weapons.

This would provide a better balance between the U.S. and Europe within the alliance than exists now. Also it would help to bring NATO up to date: it would produce the standardisation and streamlining mentioned in the previous discussions. He hoped this could be done in such a way as not to push the U.S. out of Europe.

On politics: Alastair Buchan had put forward some valuable ideas for crisis management within the alliance, essentially involving a special group for this purpose sitting in Washington although there could be other groups, composed of only a small number of members of the alliance, to deal with specific problems of particular concern to them. Some groups already exist, e.g. the Berlin contingency group. But he could see others: for instance on the problems of the southern flank. He could imagine NATO countries combining to discuss problems outside the NATO area: e.g. Italy, U.S. and U.K. could plan for the dangerous situation emerging in the horn of Africa. He did not suggest that the groupings should be exclusive; and NATO should be kept informed.. But small groupings tend to work more effectively. However, on the really big problems, and the biggest is the German question, the whole alliance would need to be involved. He was convinced that we could only deal with our problems with common policies. But he was not able to offer a definite proposal about how we should evolve them. One possibility would be that the NATO agenda should be widened to include this sort of thing. On the other hand OECD does exist and it discusses a lot of these things. On the day to day running OECD does a good job. But it is less effective in the fundamental policy discussion, which is the point at which the alliance must come together. Decisions on the very big issues can only be reached at the Foreign Minister level: he could conceive of the Ministers coming together under a different heading, a cap fitting over the existing institutions of NATO and OECD, and this body, perhaps with an enlarged membership on occasion when the agenda warranted it, could also discuss the increasingly important economic problems.

Mr. Bowie (first respondent) very much agreed with Mr. Thomson's analysis. In an objective sense the need for common action was overwhelming. But the divisive factors were very real also and Mr. Thomson had mentioned the central ones, the disparity in power which produces a difference in perspective on the world, the Americans tending to look in global terms and the Europeans in more limited terms, and the revival of nationalism in the sense of a desire for greater independence in local affairs which he saw as the result of a reduced fear from the Soviet Union. He did not see any way out in the short run of the dilemma which this poses. The critical issue was the structure of Europe and the capacity of Europe to act as some kind of entity, the only way in the long run to overcome the disparity and to change the outlook of Europe on the world.

The alliance would therefore seem rather rickety for some time to come. The question we all faced, particularly over the next 5 years, was how to mitigate the effects of this situation. One of the best ways would be to try to recreate some sense of perspective on the longer term relationship. Politically the need was to cast this in ways that suggest the perspective of an emerging Europe. He supported the idea of a European joint production activity and arrangement in the defence field, if only to give a feeling that there are things which can be done in this stage. He was not pessimistic about the ultimate emergence of a united Europe or the working together of the various units provided that the people who have power really focus on the most important aspects. But undoubtedly we shall have to face very severe stages of turmoil and bad feeling. The question was whether we let these feelings take over or whether we try to bring them under control.

Endorsing the approach of both speakers, an Italian member of the conference stressed the need for institutions; institutions are the means to surmount problems if some common purpose exists. And these institutions must be, if necessary by stages, supranational. He agreed with Mr. Bowie that one of the most important aspects of the long-term perspective was a united Europe. But we could not wait for the construction of Europe before organising our common purpose on the Atlantic level. He did not see why the procedure adopted in the European communities should not be adapted to the Atlantic level - perhaps with a European clause.

It was suggested from the American side that because of resistance to the supranational idea in some quarters, it would be wiser to use other means towards this end. What is important is operation, and it would be possible to devise corporate patterns which were supranational in reality. A useful form of operating agency for a joint Atlantic effort would be the existing international agencies, such as the International Bank.

A German participant supported Mr. Thomson's idea of a European grouping within the alliance - although this would have to be in very close contact with the U.S. This might be a solution to a challenge to the alliance which he did not think the West had foreseen: the bilateral treaties recently concluded in Eastern Europe, widely regarded as a means of preventing the Eastern states from establishing links with the Federal Republic, are also part of a network of bilateral treaties within the Eastern bloc which could when completed offer the Soviet Union the political choice of renouncing the Warsaw Pact, say in 1969, and calling for the dissolution of blocs all over the world.

A Netherlands participant supported the idea of special groupings as a matter of expediency, although because of the intra-European power problem referred to earlier the smaller powers would not have much influence. And he feared the German problem would become more difficult.

A French member of the conference, as a supporter of the alliance, felt both reassured and disturbed by the opening speeches: he was not sure how far the consensus that we should work on a community basis was in tune with present realities and the likely course of events. He saw the disruptive tendencies as much more powerful than the will to act in common. Of course everyone wants to keep Nato and the Common Market. But what counts politically is the priority given by the most important states to Nato and European integration and to solving questions like the German problem within the alliance framework - and he did not see this priority as very high. The strongest trend he could see was towards bilateralism.

A Swiss member of the conference suggested that since the trend did seem to be towards looser forms of co-operation, with the consequence that the automacity of alliance decisions will be superceded by the more complicated process of national decision-making, perhaps we should try to find means of making Nato politically and militarily more flexible, for example by putting more emphasis on military co-operation for crisis rather than war, and adapting the machinery to the development of strategic mobility. If the trend towards more nationalism and bilateralism was inevitable, NATO was still one of the multilateral instruments which provided an institutional framework for Europeans to influence American policy.

A Swedish speaker said it could be argued that the loosening of ties within Nato has been conducive to an improvement in contacts with Eastern Europe. On the other hand a minimum level of cohesion within the West is a necessary pre-condition for any permanent improvement of relations between East and West - and the loosening of ties has somewhat weakened the minimum level of cohesion. Therefore a strengthening of Western unity was essential, but there was a difference between Western unity and Nato as such.

A Danish speaker pointed to the problem of the relationship between Nato and public opinion. From the Danish point of view, any attempt to add any new element to strengthen alliance cohesion would antagonise public opinion, which believes that NATO is just melting away.

An American member of the conference pursued a line of argument from a previous session that in the absence of any other structure the chief task of Nato would be to make bipolarity politically acceptable.

He found it difficult to anticipate such bipolarity with its disparity of state between the United States and the Europeans lasting foreseeably for ever. But he could not yet see anything better - a European entity of some sort able to take a more independent position in the world. The risk of that being anti-pathetic to the U.S. would be worth the achievement of such a new basis of order in that area of the world. But it would need to have its own military power; and the main intractable obstacle to a European military entity would be the need for a shared nuclear control. This would be very hard to share equitably - even more difficult than between one supreme and lesser powers. Furthermore

he did not know how to reconcile the vision of a European entity in relationship with the United States (and the same applied to the formulas for greater integration in the Nato framework) with the general objective of resolving the central political source of the cold war, the division of Germany. At some point we would have to face up to the relationship between our objective for Western unity on the one hand and the resolution of the German problem.

A British member of the conference agreed with the observation that the quickest way to develop the European idea at this stage would be on an anti-American basis. But since he did not think that such a process would be manageable, he would be unwilling to try. And even if it were possible to build a coherent European partner not on this basis, then the second consideration raised by the American speaker would come into view, the problem of close military and political relations between two big-power combinations.

He would prefer to see a more functional study of relationships, including intra-European relationships. And he supported those who felt that a trend towards bilateral dealings will make a multinational instrument like Nato even more necessary. Lack of machinery in the past for co-ordinating bilateral approaches has led to war.

The final speaker saw the European desire for national entity as anti-American only in the sense of a parent-child relationship. The Europeans want to stand on their feet: it will be a test of American maturity not to react too strongly. It will also be a test for the Europeans to understand that they cannot behave really independently in pursuit of their interest any more than the United States is able to do. Like everything else, this had to be managed, and he did not despair. But it would take time, and sympathy on both sides.

Senator Gronchi then drew the proceedings to a close.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

CHAIRMAN:	
Senator Giovanni GRONCHI	Former President of the Italian Republic
Dr. Achille ALBONETTI	Director, Division for International Affairs, Comitato Nazionale per l'Energia Nucleare
Mr. Leonard BEATON	Editor, The Round Table, London
Dr. Karl BIRNBAUM	Director, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm
Professor Robert BOWIE	Counsellor, State Department, Washington
Mr. Jens BOYESEN	Norwegian Research Establishment, Kjeller
Mr. Alastair BUCHAN	Director, Institute for Strategic Studies, London
On. Giulio CAIATI	President Defence Commission, Chamber of Deputies (Christian-Democrat)
Ambassador Attilio CATTANI	President, Olivetti General Electric, Rome
Mr. William CHAPIN	U.S. Foreign Service (Research Associate I.S.S. 1966-7)
Colonel Pietro CORSINI	Head, Department Military-Political Affairs, Ministry of Defence
Mr. Gordon CREAN	Canadian Ambassador to Italy, Rome
Général Baron A. DEL MARMOL	Commandant, l'Ecole de Guerre de Belgique, Brussels 1961-63
Mr. François DUCHENE	The Economist, London
Minister Carlo GASPARINI	Vice-Director of Political Affairs, Foreign Office, Rome
Dr. Curt GASTEYGER	Director of Programmes, Institute for Strategic Studies, London
Minister Cesidio GUAZZARONI	Vice-Director of Economic Affairs, Foreign Office, Rome.
Professor L.J. HALLE	Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva
M. Pierre HASSNER	Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris (Research Associate I.S.S., Summer 1967)

Dr. L.G.M. JAQUET	Secretary-General, Netherlands, Institute of International Affairs
Admiral Angelo LONGANESI-CATTANI	Ministry of Defence
Senator Pietro MICARA	Member of European Parliament
Dr. Umberto MORRA	Secretary-General, Società Italiana per l'Organizzazione Internazionale
Dr. Nils ØRVIK	Professor of Political Science, Oslo University
Professor Robert OSGOOD	Director, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research
~~Dr. Klaus RITTER~~	~~Director, Foundation of Science and Politics, Munich~~
Dr. Paolo N. ROGERS	Director of International Relations, Olivetti Company
Herr Helmut SCHMIDT	Chairman, Parliamentary Social Democratic Party, Bonn
Mr. Erik SEIDENFADEN	Warden of the Danish College, Cité de l'Université de Paris
Dr. Theo SOMMER	Foreign Editor, Die Zeit, Hamburg
Mr. Altiero SPINELLI	Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Dr. Timothy STANLEY	Head of NATO Force Planning Section, U.S. Mission to NATO, Paris
Mr. John THOMSON	Head of Planning Staff, Foreign Office, London
Professor Jacques VERNANT	Director, Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, Paris
Senator Paolo VITTORELLI	Vice-President, Socialist Senatorial Group
Dr. Wolfgang Wagner	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Bonn

Pena

5/7 maggio Perugia

Discorso introduttivo di Gronchi

SENATO DELLA REPUBBLICA

La mia prima parola è di benvenuto a quanti hanno accolto l'invito del nostro Istituto; in primo luogo agli amici di altri paesi il cui intervento è più altamente significativo, per il sacrificio di tempo che esso ha loro imposto.

Nessuno di noi pensa che questo breve incontro possa esaurire i complessi problemi che i mutamenti profondi maturantisi negli spiriti e nelle cose si presentano con volto grave e preoccupato alla nostra coscienza.

Ma il solo fatto che si sia sentito il bisogno e l'utilità di un confronto di idee e di giudizi è per me altamente significativo e di buon auspicio. Tanto più significativo, non vi sembri un paradosso, perchè l'incontro si svolge fra uomini che non sono legati direttamente a responsabilità di governo. I politici attivi e, più, i membri dei governi sono legati a posizioni e compiti che menomano la libertà del loro giudizio, almeno nella espressione pubblica, e la stessa loro coscienza critica - quando esista dotata della incisività necessaria - subisce la remora delle responsabilità collegiali, di governo e di partito. Il resultato dei loro contatti è perciò quasi di regola un compromesso che può, occorre riconoscerlo, rappresentare un gradino di progresso verso la soluzione od almeno una pausa necessaria a non pregiudicare il raggiungimento, ma non è il metodo più adatto a render chiara all'uomo della strada nei singoli paesi il vero aspetto dei fatti e la loro essenza più profonda.

La nostra speranza ed il nostro sforzo sarà di portare un modesto ma convinto contributo a questa chiarezza, che è il solo modo democratico di creare nella opinione pubblica la coscienza dei problemi, della loro portata ed urgenza.

Dico urgenza, perchè è certo che se volessimo procedere anco-

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ra a tentoni nel presente periodo di disorientamento per contrasto di impostazioni concettuali e di interessi costituiti, senza vedere i pericoli che la discordia cela nel suo grembo, noi provvederemmo assai male a quel progresso nella giustizia e nella pace, che sono i decantati ideali delle democrazie.

I fatti sono dinanzi a noi:

- il logoramento delle istituzioni internazionali e delle alleanze od intese che parvero sfidare gli anni;
- la crescente potenza della Cina e la sua determinazione di farne sentire il peso nel continente asiatico e forse nel mondo
- le difficoltà, che non accennano a comporsi, contro un arresto della corsa agli armamenti e la sostituzione del pericoloso equilibrio di potenza con la progressiva creazione di una convivenza pacifica, basata sugli ideali umani e civili dell'uomo moderno;
- i focolai di guerra che qua e là persistentemente si manifestano e possono da un momento all'altro degenerare in conflitti di incalcolabile gravità.

In questo panorama di crisi generale si inquadrano i problemi che ci riguardano più da vicino, come la crisi della alleanza atlantica e dei rapporti fra Stati Uniti ed Europa, le questioni connesse con un effettivo graduale disarmo, che sono appunto i temi proposti alla discussione in questo incontro.

Non siamo i primi ad occuparcene e preoccuparcene, né pretenderemo ad originalità di esami critici e di soluzioni. Anzi, molti di voi hanno ripetutamente dato validissime e significative testimonianze di interesse a questi problemi. Ma libere discussioni, come quelle che stiamo per intraprendere, possono efficacemente servire a ridurre di dimensione il vuoto che mi pare di scorgere, più o meno profondo, nei nostri paesi, fra le classi dirigenti e l'opinione pubblica, cioè in definitiva le masse popolari senza le quali nessuna soluzione duratura può essere raggiunta. E' il contributo che la cultura porta alla politica,

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la cultura che mette in valore preminente gli ideali umani e civili e dimensiona, nella sua capacità di obiettive valutazioni, la spinta degli interessi.

La crisi generale che sta dinanzi a noi, è un fatto di coscienza più che di interessi: perchè l'Alleanza atlantica è oggi scossa così profondamente? la ragione più vera è che essa nacque soprattutto come strumento di difesa militare ed il suo art. 2 rimase pura espressione verbale; cosicchè quando le esigenze della difesa parvero attenuarsi presero forza l'insopportabile tensione psicologica della guerra fredda, il sincero desiderio di tranquillità, l'inventato pacifismo neutralista, il patriottismo, sempre dormiente in noi, del prestigio nazionale, e così via.

Si può constatare per magra consolazione che uguali e simili stati d'animo collettivi hanno minato la massiccia compattezza del Patto di Varsavia. Ma il "male comune" non dispensa gli uomini di intelletto e di coscienza dal riconoscere come realtà potenziali i pericoli del futuro.

Ecco perchè non risponde ad un obbligo di convenienza, ma ad una aspirazione intimamente sofferta, augurare con sincerità di spirito qualche fecondo resultato a questo nostro incontro.