The Institute for Strategic Studies.New Delhi,31/III-2/IV 67.

1) - Partecipanti.
2) - Riassunto della conferenza sui problemi della sicurezza dell'Asia tenuta dall'Indian Council of World Affairs e da The Institute for Strategic Studies.
3) - Riassunto della conferenza sui problemi della sicurezza dell'Asia tenuta The Yomiuri Shimbun e da The Institute for Strategic Studies.

The Institute for Strategic Studies

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International Conference on Asian Security Problems

Delhi, March 31 - April 2, 1967

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International Conference on Asian Security Problems

Tokyo, April 7 - 10, 1967

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There may be a participant from Pakistan.

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Indian Council of World Affairs
The Institute for Strategic Studies

Résumé of the Joint Conference on Problems of Asian Security

New Delhi
March 31st - April 2nd, 1967.

FIRST SESSION

(1) Threats to the Security of Asia

Mr. Buchan opened the first session by asking whether there was such a concept as "Asia".

Possibly the notion of Asia had emerged more realistically with the emergence of China. In any case, there were many divided countries and unresolved conflicts in Asia.

The prospect of strategic threats from China would cast a shadow over Asia. Territorial threats might have died out in Europe: but they could not be ruled out in Asia. Finally there was the internal problem in states with major problems of populations and poverty. China was more likely to be a beneficiary than an active agent of this kind. Anyway there was a wider spectrum of threats to Asia than to other continents: and in the face of appalling poverty vast resources might be tied up in containing these threats.

Prof. Sarabhai first referred to the agenda of the meeting, which contained the tacit assumption that China is the threat. But what was the contribution of China, Russia and Western Europe in producing insecurity in Asia?

The problem of insecurity was related to, first, unresolved conflicts between nations and, second, the arms race. In the worst, there was a tendency to look at nuclear proliferation as something which could be contained at the top. But large nations (and now even small nations) were helping to provoke the arms race increasingly around the world. We had to recognize the importance of conventional arms as wellas nuclear proliferation. If we observed the growing volumes of arms outside the power blocs, we were to recognize the danger of instability. Equally, much moderate opinion in Asia would be undermined if it was assumed that discriminatory arrangements like the NPT could be undertaken. All this showed that there was an amazing lack of sophistication in the treatment of non-aligned nations. Contingent alliances had to be worked through in relation to other conflicts in which the interests of the non-aligned were involved.

The discussion first turned to the difficulty of defining Asia as a unit with any kind of organic connection between its parts. Unlike Western Europe, which had been (and still was) an economic and historic unit, one had to be careful not to refer to Asia when one was really

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only thinking of one specific country.

Turning to possible or actual threats to Asian security, an Indian participant distinguished three categories of security problems: China, Western and Soviet power intervening in Asia, and internal Asian conflicts. In containing China, Indian and Western interests coincided; in inducing the West to retreat, Indian interests and China's coincided. India should neither accept nor reject the Chinese threat. She needed a broad dialogue with the Chinese. The Indians also needed a definition of what are the legitimate interests of the West in Asia. On this it could be said that as a principle Communism alone did not make for a legitimate right to intervene: it required Chinese aggression. To this was added that security should not be confused with internal changes in countries. An internal change did not necessarily mean a threat to security.

An American scholar asked how in view of the manifold quarrels in Asia the world was affected by these events. Politically, the major decisions were going to be taken in Asia in the next half century and therefore the non-Asian world had to be concerned about, and interested in, what was going on in that area. An Indian participant replied to this that if the Western powers had any stake in Asia, it was to create stable conditions. An intervention did not create stability. If we were really interested in Asian stability, we should recognize that the one thing that unites us was anti-colonialism. If American troops had landed in India in 1962, there would have been a polarization of views and a Vietnam situation. A Western participant suggested that Western intervention should be included for discussion as a threat to Asian security.

(2) <u>The problem of China</u>

The discussion on China and the Chinese threat was opened by an Indian participant. He defined as the aim of Chinese policy to unify and strengthen China economically, politically and militarily: and to achieve great power status. In pursuing the goal of super-power status, the Chinese had resolved to: first, weaken the United States and make her withdraw from Asia: second, capture the ideological leadership of the Communist world; third, gain the lead in the Afro-Asian world. This had led to

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to simultaneous confrontation with the United States, the Soviet Union and India. China's objectives in Asia were to create a satellite system on the plane of diplomatic relations. On the ideological plane, they aimed at the creation of literation movements in all possible countries. For the Chinese, India was the next great battleground of the revolution, which would decide the socialist fate of the whole world. As the Chinese had got nowhere in the earlier phase of their relations with India, they were now trying to advance their interests through their Pakistan policy. They knew that they must have access to the political mind of a country in order to produce a mass movement arising out of economic and social failure. In the military field, China was at present not effective with nuclear weapons. The bomb was politically useful to her as long as it was not used. If used, it would give rise to consequences which the Chinese were not prepared to contemplate.

How did we deal with this problem? General disarmament was unlikely: guarantees were no solution. There must be an Asian nuclear balance against China. If the rest of Asia decided to depend on outsiders, the Chinese would have a major advantage in political terms. If it was China against the outside powers, the Chinese would easily capture nationalistic sentiments in Asia.

This view was challenged later in the discussion: Once China had developed long range strategic weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union would be subject to a far greater threat than India.

An American scholar first commented on the ongoing cultural revolution in China:one conclusion we could draw from it was that the higher leadership of China was faction-ridden. There were at least six of these factions ranging from the old guerillas to the technocrats. The issue was modern revisionism or a return to a substantial measure of capitalism (by which a return is meant to the last years of the Kuomintang). Chinese foreign policy was the support of foreign domestic revolutions. It was above all to promote instability rather than insecurity. The tactics varied from one country to another. In 1965/6, there were several endorsed by Mao: Vietnam, US negroes, Dominican Republic, but not Somalia (because of China's

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relations with France). The speaker agreed in principle with what had been said about China's nuclear policy. The majority of the Chinese people wanted the enhancement of Chinese power and economic advances: and these had invariably been exceptionally popular. But in the rest of Asia there had been varied responses: apprehension had been growing after the third test.

On this last point an Indian scientist commented that it was frequently said that the explosion of an atomic bomb would bring prestige. One admired the sophisticated technology: but the prestige depended on fear and the international reaction was negative.

An American confirmed that it was remarkable that China had gained some prestige from the bomb; but it should be examined how much prestige she had gained and for what purpose. It remained to be seen whether China had become an independent nuclear power centre in Asia which will have any capacity to survive in a serious confrontation.

Regarding China's revolutionary policy, it was maintained that it did not just support revolution. In both Pakistan and Indonesia, more traditional diplomatic methods had been used. Equally, it was questioned whether China really cared about revolutionizing India. She was probably more interested in weakening or splitting India. Could China expand in Asia? a participant from Singapore asked. Her physical expansion was prevented by American presence. It was also sometimes wrongly thought that the oversea Chinese were natural agents for Chinese policy. This was not necessarily true, though if these Chinese minorities were discriminated against, they might well become supporters of subversion. There was another factor which helped to promote China's policy: the Communist parties. An Indian delegate therefore held that China had to be looked at as a part of a Communist system with all its ideological implications for Chinese revolutionary policy. However, the Sino-Soviet split had weakened the appeal of Communism to the underdeveloped world. China, it was stressed, was the enemy of the status quo, seeking to become a super-power. There were, however, different opinions on whether she was really interested in territorial conquest. She was interested in exploiting economic and political unrest and wanted any unstable situation (including Vietnam) to continue. The policy to be pursued

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by non-Communist Asian countries should therefore be a strengthening of nationalism, because only national self-assertion and sovereignty helped to survive China's economic and political pressure. One should, however, not underestimate China's problems. It was uncertain who would be the victor in the cultural revolution and what would happen to China after Mao would have disappeared. There were likely to be as great changes in China after the death of Mao as there had been in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death.

Some Indian participants expressed their concern about a possible rapprochment between the West China and its effects on Indian security. Could it be possible that the West would consider China to be no longer a security problem? The US might regard as China's legitimate interests what in fact affected India's territory and prestige. It was clear from the discussion that some Indian participants did consider a Great Power understanding with China as something which could damage India's position and make her still more vulnerable to Chinese pressure. Equally, the West was still inclined to underestimate China's armed forces. Was this merely wishful thinking or in order to prevent China's neighbours from reacting to meet China's military strength? Two American scholars emphasized that this danger did in fact not exist. It was true that the US had made an effort to change her policy in 1965 towards China fundamentally. The idea had been to lay the groundwork with the second echelon of the Chinese leadership. The purpose had been to recognize the regime and to accede to their legitimate aspirations.

In his concluding remarks the opening speaker stressed that China was both a nationalistic and Communist power. Parts of her success was due to this combination. Mao Tse-tung was not interested in a strong and united India, but wanted to cut her down to size by blocking her internal evolution and wrecking her stability in order to knock her out both as a political factor in Asia and a rival to China. The claim that China needed friendly neighbours sounded like an admission that there should be a chain of satellite states on China's border.

The first respondent pointed out that China would hardly be able to reach 1980 without a serious econo-

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mic crisis, even with the best of all leaderships. But she was unlikely to have such a leadership. There was a growing imbalance between the agricultural and the industrial development. Furthermore the problem of the internal distribution of wealth had not been solved yet. Since 1958, i.e. after the noticeable deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union, China had suffered a series of setbacks. Many Chinese might therefore come to the conclusion that Maoism is a bad form of Marxism.

One should be cautious with one's expectations concerning the chances of 'bridgebuilding' with China. She was neither the Soviet Union nor Europe, but had a remarkable cultural tradition of her own, with a tremendous self-pride and vitality. Consequently, a Sino-American 'rapprochement' would remain unlikely for a long time to come.

SECOND SESSION

The objectives and resources of the major non-Communist Asian powers

The second session was opened by Professor Kotani. According to him Asian problems are related to internal and external security, both of which were important. This applied also to Japan. He distinguished four categories of regional co-operation which his country engaged in: first, military co-operation with the United States and South Korea; second, the organization of regional conferences, mainly in the economic field, such as ASPAC; third, the development of a concept of a Pacific Economic Community (PEC), an Asian version of the EEC, which could be created by the five countries United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand; and fourth, to find ways of regional co-operation with communist countries, particularly China and mainly by means of trade. In this context the speaker referred to Japan's interest in Chinese raw material and to the growing competition with the United States, which forced Japan to find new markets. Japan's contribution to these various forms of regional co-operation rested, however, on two premises: first, on her continuing economic growth, and second, on her determination not to become again an imperialist power. Her military power should,

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therefore, always remain defensive. Thus, to make Japan a leading power in Asia could only mean: internal stability, the capacity to defend the country by its own means with a continuing American umbrella; the readiness to give greater economic and technical assistance, and the adoption of a more autonomous foreign policy.

The first respondent started off by pointing out that the Indian subcontinent could act as a bridge between different parts of Asia. Asia was faced with four main problems: the struggle against poverty and population explosion; the necessity of modernization; nationalism; and the problems created by external military and economic influence seeking to fill in the power vacuum in various parts of Asia. If the status quo in Asia was being maintained merely because of the influence of the external powers, then this could produce a situation of instability and growing resentment amongst the regional powers.

India was, from the territorial point of view, a status quo power; her immediate security problems stemmed from China and Pakistan, poverty and possibly great power hegemony. Australia was politically part of Asia and could as such become a stabilizing factor. Indochina had for quite some time been the hotbed of revolution, which might expand into neighbouring areas. China should not be isolated, but drawn into the wider Asian community.

An Indian participant said that until China was able to separate politics from economics, the chances for her co-operating with Japan would be very small. In his view the forthcoming revision of the US-Japan Treaty might be facilitated by Japan's growing interest in defence matters. But could Japan really have the best of all worlds, it was asked, i. e. prosper economically, open new markets, and compete increasingly with the United States, while at the same time spending little money for defence and security, which were so conveniently provided by the American umbrella? Would the US let Japan continue this path or rather ask for greater sacrifices?
An Australian scholar thought that Japan was in a better position than anybody to develop economically, while leaving her security to American protection. The United States was so committed to that that she could not withdraw. In addition, Japan's economy was so developed that it was now attractive to the Soviet Union and China.

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A British participant questioned this opinion. It was true that at present Japan was politically and militarily in a position to see all her interest defended by the US. But Japan was likely to want to have a more important political position. If she was going to be heavily committed to large markets, her trend would be to develop relations with already industrialized countries, where she would meet with competition. Equally, she would not be able to keep her military expenditure as low as it was now.

A Japanese participant agreed with the view Prof. Scalapino had expressed in his Encounter article, namely that Japan had enjoyed maximum gains for minimum risks. This could not go on forever; Japan would have to make greater sacrifices. The overwhelming majority of Japanese saw an identity of Japan's security interests with those of the United States.

Could Japan not consider closer co-operation with the Soviet Union? And what place did India take in Japan's foreign policy? - Indian participants asked. A British participant warned against the assumption that the development of technology could become a unifying factor in promoting Asian co-operation. European experience had shown the contrary and proven that it needed a political decision to bring co-operation and unity about.

An Indian participant pointed out the limitations to regional co-operation. First of all, it should be remembered that most Asian countries had more trade with the West than amongst themselves. Second, one should distinguish between investment and trade policies, since the former met with more difficulties because of differences of economic growth, costs, etc. This made free trade almost impossible. The third point was related to the size of the individual country. Bigger countries inevitably had more and different security problems than smaller ones, and they therefore found it difficult to co-operate with them.

It was then argued that there was some economic complementary between Japan and China, though the Chinese refused to accept this. The United States had all interest to keep her economic co-operation with Japan stable, but there would certainly be a growing competition between Japanese and Chinese export drives. Against this an Indian scientist held that there was a basic competitiveness be-

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tween India and Japan. Japan's even closer association with Western powers was looked upon by India as a kind of Trojan horse. But India should also develop relations with other countries than Pakistan and Malaysia only. How ambitious were the major Asian powers? To what extent did Indonesia, India etc. wish to play a major role in world politics? Did these powers match China in her ambitions? An Indian participant argued that as far as India was concerned, her ambitions did not go into the great power category. She did not want to be a countervailing power to China, but part of a system with other powers. A Japanese participant added that the possession of nuclear weapons did not make a country a leading power. In the Japanese view India seemed to be isolated. This view was countered by an Indian participant, who recalled that Japan because of her past still needed a better legitimacy as an Asian power. This she could get by better co-operation with ohter Asian and not Western powers.

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FOURTH SESSION

Nuclear weapons and the requirements of national defence

Prof. Wohlstetter introduced the session by first outlining the Chinese nuclear threat. While he did not want to minimize the threat, he wished to rule out any elements of surprise in the Chinese programme, emphasizing that the five tests did not catch Western intelligence by surprise and that the achievements and the rate of development were about as expected. Ballistic missile development appeared to stress development of a long-range capability, but they would not have a second-strike capability. Furthermore, first-strike effectiveness of the Chinese force could be minimized by a 'thin area' ballistic missile defence. In the 1950s neither the Soviet Union nor the United States had a second-strike capability. To acquire this was extremely painful and an expensive effort; it would be more so for the Chinese. In emphasizing the cost of even a small-nation nuclear force, Prof. Wohlstetter gave some estimates of the French programme, which averaged out to a cost of about $ 157 million per missile, with a survival probability that was extremely small.

Nevertheless, the threat to neighbouring nations in Asia was very real, and while the United States had a large growing interest in the safety of Asian nations, the protective commitments of the United States in this area had to be considered good, but not certain.

The first respondent presented some alternatives for India in the light of his interpretation of the Asian situation. Some thirty Asian states were involved, with Australia and New Zealand on the fringe. There was nothing common about these states, with diversity in race, languages, religion, etc. When talking of Asian security, it was something quite varied and far-ranging. This extreme diversity made for a natural tendency towards regional conflict so that defence thinking had to be designed, in the main, around localized conflict possibilities. Any attempt to consider defence arrangements in this area such as SEATO and CENTO as an analogy with an organization like NATO was naive.

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Aside from the local and regional sources of conflicts, the increasingly ambitious roles of the major powers added to the complexity of the Asian problem. The Chinese capability looked different in Asian eyes as opposed to the view of the sophisticated nuclear powers. Asians felt that the Chinese could effectively use their weapons, even in their primitive state, without giving offence to the United States or the USSR and that China might in a given situation 'hit them hard and quick and be done with it'; the other nuclear powers would not intervene. Consequently, one had to consider four possible resources of a nation like India. The first was to rely on the United States for her defence commitments, if this were possible. The second was to enter into alliances with other nations, which would involve joint use of conventional weapons. This alternative was felt not to be effective. The third was to produce nuclear weapons indigeneously. The fourth would be to join a major power block, but this did not seem very possible.

Other respondents expressed quite strong belief that, while it was accepted that an Indian nuclear capability remains modest, this was not an acceptable situation for India. Divers views were expressed that India was in undue haste to sign the 1963 partial test ban treaty, and that economic aid had been used as an instrument to induce India and other nations to sign the partial test ban treaty. Most of these views were given in quite strong terms, including an accusation that the NPT was 'a cosmic fraud', 'India should start moving', that 'India should be grateful to the French' for showing the way. Views were also expressed that the economic effort was not as great as Wohlstetter had indicated, that there were certain advantages in going into a bomb plus nuclear power programme and that bombs without elaborate delivery systems had their uses. Indian participants close to the Government expressed the view that nuclear weapons were primarily of political significance, and that what India needed was a strong economic and political base: without this a nuclear weapons programme would be a bluff. But there was a clear distinction between the reservations of some Indians about going nuclear at this time and the near unanimous opposition to signing the NPT in its present form. By and large, the arguments expressed by some non-Indian participants were restatements of the familiar reasons for not going nuclear.

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Some Indians argued, however, that the cost of the bomb was irrelevant, that India had to survive with dignity and that it was no business of others how India chose to provide for her survivability. It was undoubtedly the majority feeling in the Indian representation that the NPT was not a saleable commodity. The depth of Indian feeling was great on this issue, and this extended to other non-nuclear weapon states as well; at one point an Indian delegate expressed the thought that while they were being quite outspoken on the subject of acquiring nuclear weapons, 'Japanese silence' on this issue in general was 'more dangerous', to which one of the Japanese delgates responded that 'Japanese prefer a meditation to vocal discussion'. However, the Japanese focussed their comments on the practical elements of acquiring nuclear weapons. If their Government felt it should, this would appear to be most difficult for several reasons, involving the national attitudes, the extreme difficulty of gathering together the requisite number of scientists and technicians, the possibility of sabotage, the difficulty of finding a suitable location for bomb fabrication and finally the problem of a suitable test area.

The moderate Indian view as emphasized by an Indian delegate was that India's acquiring a nuclear weapon capability would put a stop to any hopes for a dialogue with Pakistan - and would commit India to a course of 'keeping up with China'.

FIFTH SESSION

The scope for regional co-operation

Discussion on the scope of regional co-operation in Asia was opened by Dr. Birnbaum. The essential question he said, was not whether outside observers see an Asian community of interest, but whether the Asians themselves perceive this. The overriding preoccupation of Asian nations was economic development, but the security aspect was now pushing to the fore. There existed an interrelationship between the two: minimum security was necessary; in most countries, however, creation of a viable economic structure was the best defence investment. In the abstract, military investments and economic develop-

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ment might be complementary rather than mutually exclusive, but in actual fact they did exclude each other in most countries.

Dr. Birnbaum listed two factors limiting Asian co-operation on security matters: first, the absence of a joint threat assessment; second, lack of internal preconditions for defence co-operation. The Middle East was a self-contained area and India felt threatened by China or Pakistan backed by China: Pakistan felt threatened by India backed by the United States; Japan was concerned about China and the Soviet Union, but saw no immediate threat to its territory; Indonesia's threat assessment was hard to make out. Pakistan was disillusioned about formal arrangements; Indonesia could not be considered a viable partner today; Japan was undergoing a change of mood, but still suffered from many inhibitions with regard to military co-operation; India might be thinking about regional security schemes, but the dominant feeling was still one of insularity. Dr. Birnbaum saw some possibility of closer co-operation between Japan and Korea. For the rest, he did not foresee a great deal of co-operation beyond economic and technological co-operation.

The superpowers were in Asia to stay, concluded Dr. Birnbaum. It was conceivable that they would dissociate themselves militarily or economically. The real question was which form their presence was to take. He would like to see a military disengagement accompanied by a strengthened political commitment.

Mr. Gupta basically agreed. He reminded participants of an Asian conference 20 years ago, when it was thought Asia could handle its own problems. India did not consider the Soviet Union as part of Asia. "No one who earns more than 150 dollars a year is an Asian". Regional co-operation might appear as another form of anti-white racialism. But Indians were not so insular, after all; they recognized the existence of Eurasia.

Regional co-operation could be imposed by a hegemonial power (cf. US-Latin America). But no Asian state was

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powerful enough to inspire or enforce allegiance; on the other hand, none was small enough to instill fearlessness. China might enforce an Asian Monroe Doctrine.

Mr. Gupta called attention to the basic dilemma caused by the Western presence in Asia. So long as the West was present, there could be no regional co-operation, but so long as there was no regional co-operation, the West could not leave the area. Asian military co-operation had to be ruled out for the moment. An Asian power balance without military power in Asian hands was a mere political contrivance and would not constitute a true countervailing power vis-à-vis China. Still, some more instituionalizing would be helpful. One vital task was to improve intra-Asian communications; closer communications were a sine qua non for integration. Another Asian participant contested the argument that Asian co-operation was not possible before the West left the area. On the contrary, he argued, co-operation ought to be secured now, while the West was present. Western presence gave the Asians time for economic development (in order to reduce tensions between the states of the region as well as to diminish the prospects of national liberation movements) and for the creation of regional institutions (in order to increase the bargaining power of the region). If Indonesia banked on the Maphilindo concept based on race and Indonesian hegemony, that would create further instabilities. In an economically viable South East Asia all major powers would have their legitimate place.

This led a British participant to ask whether the Asians wanted the West in Asia at all and, if so, under what circumstances. Today there was a great deal of ambivalence on this around the Chinese perimeter. But if Asia would not give the answer, the West would, and it might either lead to neo-isolationism or to totally new shapes.

The central balance of power would continue to operate between the United States and the Soviet Union, with a strange tripolar relationship involving China, but it would not necessarily keep the peace in South East Asia. He could imagine that India, now the guardian of the Himalaya, might take an increased interest in Burma and Western Asia; and that Japan, on the other end, might increase its stake in Korea and Taiwan. But what about the bottom of Asia? What about Indonesia? Or about Australia keeping the balance?

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An Indian economist argued that from a rational point of view there was much room for co-operation - for coordination of investment plans, for instance, etc. So far this had not materialized because there had not been any perception of an economic community of interest. The Colombo Plan had been more of a gleam in the eyes of Commonwealth enthusiasts than a framework for coordinated planning. India had indeed been insular by not giving more interest to the region; one obstacle arose from the fact that the existing trade channels were all leading outside the region. He did believe, however, in the possibility of joint investment planning and the development of common trade policies. The donor countries cooperated, but the recipient countries did not. Instead, they competed with each other: "Beggars cannot collaborate, they have to compete."

On the question of an Indian nuclear deterrent, the speaker said that an annual outlay of 1 billion dollars amounted to an 80 % increase of the military budget and roughly equalled India's balance-of-payments gap. For this reason he counselled caution.

In this connection the question was raised whether and how the acquisition of nuclear weapons affected prospects of future Asian cooperation. It would certainly raise not only the more fundamental problem as to the future relationship between the Asian middle powers and the external super-powers, but also that of the relationship amongst the Asian countries themselves. Furthermore, were nuclear weapons to reshape the policy of non-alignment? In this light of the discussion it seemed that the notion of an "Asian balance of power" had become a very remote prospect.

An even more sceptical view was taken by an Indian participant: He saw no point in the concept of regional co-operation at all. Why should India co-operate more closely with Indonesia? They did not really understand each other. India was under no moral or political obligation to look after South East Asia. The main problem was that of re-defining India's relation with the super-powers. Indian definition had evolved in the Fifties and did not work any longer.

The debate then turned to the possibilities of practical co-operation between Asian countries. Taking the case of

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Indonesia first, a British participant argued that Indonesia as a large and ambitious country with plentiful resources would inevitably get back to the Asian scenery. Presumably it would avoid the renewal of the Peking-Djakarta axis. Likewise, it would avoid too long a duration of the present honeymoon with the West. One would expect a "Nasserist" Indonesia to emerge, anti-colonialist and at the same time anti-Chinese. Two particular dangers would arise from this. If the anti-Chinese tendency gained the upper hand, this would pose a danger to Singapore; if the anti-colonialist trend prevailed, this would pose a menace to the area southeast of Indonesia.

An Indian participant submitted that relations between Pakistan and India were not hopeless; co-operation on the Indus Project and RCD was still going on. The Maphilindo idea held some promise, too. The trouble was that Asians knew too little about each other, they had to rediscover themselves. India had already invested in Iran oil while Iran had invested in Indian fertilizer industry, so there existed seeds of regional cooperation. The external powers should help both through internal agencies and bilaterally.

An Australian participant warned against overstating the role Australia could play. It was essentially a marginal contributor and could not take a leading role, only a supporting one.

With respect to economic co-operation, he pointed to the significance of ECAFE's experience. The samll Asian countries had consistently been suspicious that Japan and India would turn regional co-operation to their own advantage. India was too big and too demanding to take any other than the lion's share; the little states preferred to ask for aid directly. It was useless, therefore, to funnel foreign aid through regional co-operation organizations.

A Japanese participant found the Indian idea of tripartite co-operation between India, Japan and Australia quite novel. But he wondered what direction it was supposed to take, and whether it must not have some military significance, too. If so, it deserved serious thought and study. But was such tripartite co-operation compatible with India's policy of non-alignment?

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It was, however, pointed out that India's economic policy was undergoing an important change. It was not geared to the two power blocs any more; there were more bilateral relations with smaller countries like Italy, Japan, the Scandinavian countries, and the bilateral aspect would further increase. India ought to use her ordinance capacity for the neighbouring countries: they could supply raw materials in exchange for arms.

In winding up this discussion, an Indian participant stressed the need of a sober identification of the inter-dependent roles that both Asian and non-Asian countries had to fulfil. India, for instance, had always exported learning, now she could also supply hardware. There whould be a better balanced policy of give and take. Thus he did not look forward to a withdrawal of Western presence, yet that presence should not be manipulative but supportive.

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THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN

Résumé of the Joint Conference on Problems of Asian Security

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FIRST SESSION

Threats to the security of Asia / The problem of China

The opening speaker, Professor Kosaka, started off with an assessment of the Chinese threat. In his view China's nuclear capability was a serious threat for the foreseeable future except in terms of 'irrational' acts. The long-term effect of Chinese acquisition of nuclear arms upon her strategy was difficult to assess. It was, however, doubtful whether the European experience that nuclear weapons have an inhibiting impact on conventional warfare, would apply to the Asian scene. Most important for China's intentions and future policy was whether she would succeed in her programme of industrialization. A poor China was a dangerous China.

Professor Etoh distinguished between China's (a) long-term, (b) intermediate, and (c) short-term goals.

(a) was spelled out clearly in 1949 by Mao; it included the elimination of classes and the establishment of the great, harmonious communist society;

(b) was the construction of a socialist country with a great military and economic power;

(c) implied confrontation with 'US imperialism' and 'Soviet revisionism' as well as stabilization of relations with the peripheral powers.

In attempting to answer the question whether China is an aggressive power, Etoh pointed out that Chinese territorial claims were significant (Taiwan, Eastern Siberia, parts of Indochina, etc.), but that China lacked adequate resources for launching large-scale operations outside her own territory. China's strategic concepts were therefore basically defensive. Etoh perceived the Chinese threat primarily in terms of political infiltration. He did not think that military power was very effective in meeting this kind of threat.

Discussing Japan's future policy choices, he presented four possible options, without indicating a personal preference or any option as to which appeared to be most likely. They were the following: first, continued reliance on the American nuclear umbrella and prolongation of the American-Japanese treaty agreements; second, neutrality with modest armaments, viz. roughly the present military establishment, possibly turned into some kind of U.N. peace-keeping force; third, armed neutrality, implying a substantial rearmament including nuclear weapons; and fourth, unarmed neutrality.

In trying to assess China's present situation and its repercussions upon her performance in international affairs, the first respondent, Professor Lindbeck, emphasized that this vast country was in the midst of an unfinished revolution, which was designed to transform it into a unified and integrated society. He then enumerated a number of basic Chinese estimates (or misestimates) in terms of both strategies for economic development and likely outcomes of key developments in Asia and the world at large. In the early 1950s, the Chinese leaders had overestimated the gravity of the socio-politico-military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, which they envisaged as a long-drawn, perhaps permanent one. They also clearly overestimated the solidity of the Communist bloc. Thus the

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Chinese leadership gave the Soviet Union a leading role in the internal Chinese development process and became extremely dependent on Moscow with regard to both the goods and skills needed for China's own industrialization. On the other hand, they underestimated (a) the force and vitality of nationalism within the Communist sub-system, (b) the adaptability and flexibility of the colonial capitalist powers, and (c) the productivity of the capitalist societies.

After the rupture with the Soviet Union the only way open to China was self-reliance.
In the present turmoil it was very difficult to measure the exact nature of the Chinese threat.

There followed a discussion on how the Chinese threat was perceived in different non-Communist countries of Asia. Although a wide range of opinions was voiced as to the exact form the threat might take in the course of the coming decade, there emerged a consensus that

(a) for a considerable time there was likely to be a discrepancy between Chinese hostile intentions and China's capability to implement them;

(b) the most immediate danger would not arise from military aggression, but rather take the form of infiltration(agents, insurgents, co-operations with overseas Chinese, etc.).

In discussing the repercussion of the Cultural Revolution, most speakers felt that its impact on Chinese foreign policy had so far been insignificant. To the extent that it had influenced Chinese performance, it seemed to be in the direction of a decrease in activism. The decisive problem, however, appeared to be whether the Cultural Revolution and the forthcoming departure of Mao from the political scene will bring about a change in the basic intentions and strategies of Communist China. One American speaker believed that a reconciliation between China and the Soviet Union might be achieved within the next five years. To him the need to counter Chinese subversion was 'the easy problem'. 'The hard question' this observer of the Chinese scene formulated in the following way: 'What does the actual weight of Chinese military capabilities call for, once a "sensible" leadership emerges in China?'
A Japanese participant who had been in China during the Cultural Revolution, described his impressions: It was not marked by the tension and panic normally associated with Chinese upheavals. Respect for Mao was too strong. Mao's aims looked 50 years ahead or more. In seeking to eliminate revisionists from his followers, he was preparing for a long struggle with the Soviet Union and other powers; if the purity of the revolutionary movement was restored, it would be able to survive even foreign occupations (e. g. of Sinkiang by the Russians, of Peking by the Americans or Tibet by the Indians). The Chinese felt that the United States was the aggressor, not China; they had no troops outside their borders, while the Americans had half their forces (1 million men) in Asia.

A number of Japanese speakers finally suggested a search for closer Chinese-Japanese relations as a means to transform China into a working partner and draw her into the international community of nations, which ought to remain the ultimate goal.

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SECOND SESSION

The objectives and resources of the major non-Communist Asian powers

In this session the conference examined the objectives and resources of the major non-Communist powers in Asia. These were agreed to be Japan, India, Pakistan and Indonesia (although it was pointed out that South Korea and Taiwan also maintained large and powerful forces).

Indonesia was described as having gone through an experience in 1965/6 comparable to Germany's or Japan's at the end of World War II. Her aims were now inward-looking and the struggle to restore her economy would leave her little energy for an active external policy. It was realized that without good relations with the Western powers economic recovery would almost be impossible. But preoccupation with foreign affairs was discredited, in the light of Soekarno's failures. The present Indonesian Government was the best imaginable, particularly from Australia's point of view. But the situation was very unstable, following the huge massacres, and a move against East New Guinea could not be ruled out if a future regime wanted a rallying-cry for internal purposes. Indonesian acquisition of nuclear weapons had been mentioned, but no more.

Pakistan was not discussed. India was described as a status-quo power, at odds with two non-status-quo powers, China and Pakistan, which had made common ground against her. Her aim was peaceful co-existence with both, which should not be impossible; Pakistan and India had many ties of kinship, and Sino-Indian agreement could be reached if China was tactful and accepted India's right to an independent foreign policy. India's main concern was her own economic and social development; it was therefore vital for her to maintain her internal stability, territorial integrity, democratic system and sense of national identity. Her non-aligned foreign policy was designed to discourage great-power conflict and focus great-power attention on the needs of the underdeveloped world. But her dealings with the great powers were complicated by her fear that their search for world peace, which was of course in Indias interests, might tempt them to try to alter the status quo in the sub-continent, which she would not find acceptable. India's ideal was a polycentric Asia, based on particular areas of regional co-operation, e. g. S.E. Asia; this would permit a balance of power to emerge, which would prevent China's sphere of influence extending. The gap between popular aspirations and governmental capacities in Asia could only be bridged if governments could be changed freely and peacefully; the Western presence sometimes inhibited such change.

Japan's options in defence policy were defined as follows: first, continued reliance on American protection, whether on a bilateral basis as at present or on some wider grouping, e. g. with Taiwan and South Korea or with Australia and New Zealand; second, lightly armed neutrality, without nuclear weapons; third, heavily armed neutrality, with an option on nuclear weapons; fourth, unarmed neutrality, designed to avoid any danger of being drawn into great-power conflict. Escalation of the conflict between China and the United States was not expected, and their continued rivalry could benefit Japan, whose friendship would be sought by both sides. On the other hand, the dominant mood in Japan was insular and isolationist; her 300 years of isolation had been peaceful and prosperous, whereas her subsequent excursion into

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foreign involvement had ended disastrously in 1945. This led to a feeling in some quarters that the less military power Japan possessed, the more secure she would be; that neutrality would ensure great-power moderation towards Japan; and even (though this was a minority view) that a United Nations system of protection should be substituted for the American umbrella. Like Germany, Japan had pursued a peaceful policy for more than twenty years, while enjoying great political stability and economic prosperity. But she was unlike Germany a status-quo power; and her neighbours (Taiwan and Korea) had irredentist claims unknown to Germany's neighbours, which inhibited close political alignment on a regional basis. Other participants compared Japan with Britain; General MacArthur had also compared her with Switzerland, and this had been well received, but the comparison was described by non-Japanese participants as quite inapposite.

Some Japanese participants referred to Japan's fears that the Soviet Union and China might some day make common cause against her; and that the Chinese might be provoked into external adventure if contained too tightly by the United States (as Japan had been provoked by over-containment in 1941). But her basic national self-confidence was strong, and this could be an asset to Asia. There was no Japanese support for a revival of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere; Japan was now too prosperous to need such help, and the gap between her wealth and poverty elsewhere in East Asia would make close collaboration unattractive to other Asians. In the security field, Japan had an interest in the defence of South Korea. For political reasons, she could best pursue this by retaining her alliance with the United States and so enabling the American position in South Korea to be adequately supported.

But military co-operation between Japan and South Korea was on the way and should be promoted; South Korea spent more than 38% of her national budget on defence (compared to Japan's 10%), and her land forces contributed to Japanese security just as Japan's naval forces contributed to South Korean security. Wider Japanese participation in Asian security systems would be much more difficult, however, and might increase tension rather than decreasing it. Some Asian countries might feel threatened by Japanese power. Left-wing opposition was thus positively useful to the Japanese government, in providing justification for a passive role. Nevertheless, some Japanese participants did not rule out the possibility that Japan might play a role in future UN peacekeeping operations in Asia and perhaps elsewhere. This would be compatible with the Constitution and could probably be squared with the existing Self-Defence Forces Law. Like Canada (as a non-Japanese participant suggested), Japan might contribute particularly to the logistic and communications side of UN operations.

As regards the rest of non-Communist Asia, it was agreed that the main problems would continue to be internal modernization and external stability. The process of nation-building (which was of course already complete in Japan) would be vital on both counts, but might take another generation or more to complete. Mass communication made the new Asian nations less tolerant of slow progress than Japan and the European nations had been in their time. The fact remained that indigenious strength could only be built up slowly, on a basis of industrialization and increased administrative efficiency. Inter-Asian co-operation would be inhibited by rival nationalisms and by varying assessments of the Chinese threat. Too much faith could not be placed in the United

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Nations. Nevertheless, the Cultural Revolution was likely to give the rest of Asia a ten-year respite or so in which to organize itself against Chinese pressure.

THIRD SESSION

The interests and resources of the external powers

Dr. T. B. Millar, as opening speaker, started off with two questions: What was the role of the external powers likely to be, and what ought it to be? He rejected the idea that non-Asian powers should not intervene in Asia under any circumstances. There were many Asians, particularly Malayans, who were grateful that Britain did not withdraw completely from Asia. A phrase like 'Asian solutions to Asian problems' was a reaction to previous centuries when 'European solutions' were offered to Asian problems. Referring to the American involvement in Vietnam, he agreed that it would be unwise for the United States to bring arms and soldiers halfway around the world if there was another alternative to solve the problems Asia was faced with nowadays. In his view the external powers were involved in Asia because they considered this to be in their national interest. Times had passed when this could be expressed in terms of trade or investment only. The United Kingdom appeared to have decided not to make investment a factor of strategic evaluation. The use of British forces in Asia was limited because the situation requiring such use of force would have to be politically acceptable to British public opinion. Very few situations of this kind were conceivable. Any future contribution of Britain would be small and dependent on long-range transport across the Indian Ocean or perhaps from Australia. This kind of contribution would be undertaken (a) in order to meet old Commonwealth commitments and obligations, and (b) because of American economic and political pressure. None of the other European countries was particularly interested in participating in the security of the area, though they, and also Japan, could take advantage of this security provided by the United States.
France appeared to many Americans at least not to be very interested in an American victory in Vietnam, but rather hoped to be able to reassert her influence in that area after an American withdrawal. This attitude seemed to ignore that China was extremely unlikely to accept this, as a French-supported neutral Indochina was not in her interest. The Federal Republic was carefully selecting the nations to which she was giving aid on the basis of (a) efficiency and (b) diplomatic advantage for her own policy.

The Soviet Union was now widely engaged in a peaceful co-existence movement almost everywhere in Asia, except in Vietnam. But she probably wanted to see a settlement of the war, even if it was not entirely palatable to North Vietnam (as in 1954). The United States had to face a choice between a withdrawal or a further build-up. If one assumed that a settlement could be achieved in due course, then an American force would remain engaged in 'policing' actions in South-East Asia with the United States Navy as a force-in-being acceptable to both American and local Asian public opinions. If a settlement was not achieved before China developed ICBMs, then one could expect a greater and direct Chinese military engagement in North Vietnam and Laos (as one had had it in Korea).

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The United States had taken the role of a policeman and a 'power-balancer' in Asia, while employing the local forces as her mercenaries. The problem of US forces remaining in the area was far less serious than that of their leaving it. Why was the United States there at all? Ostensibly, to contain Communism or rather to contain China or prevent her from getting too powerful. Only the Soviet Union and Japan had the potential to act as a local restraint in China. India could possibly do it as well, but she had too many internal difficulties and was not interested in an external arrangement. But Japan was unlikely to use her potential unless she herself was subjected to some kind of pressure from China; the Soviet Union was not much concerned about Chinese influence expanding southwards. As long as China did not change her present policy, there was little chance of establishing a regional power-balance without the United States or without a heavily armed Japan. In winding up, the speaker suggested that China should be brought into the United Nations, though it should be assured that National China remained a member as well.

The first respondent was Professor K. Mushakōji. He agreed with many points Dr. Millar had made about the objectives of the external powers in Asia. He disagreed, however, with his view that the preservation of the status quo in Asia was one of these objectives. In Asia things had always been unstable and the expression 'status quo' was therefore not well chosen. He would rather prefer the word 'peaceful change'. The objective of not permitting China to establish a sphere of influence in Asia should and would not entitle the external or other Asian powers to establish a sphere of influence of their own under the disguise of containing China. The United States was certainly playing a role of 'power-balancer'. But this was not desirable for either the United States herself or Asia; one just had to accept it as a necessary evil'.

The speaker then argued that in his view there was a common conception in Europe and the United States that a threat in Asia might eventually become also a threat to their own security. This caused two different reactions: In order to avoid this, France was trying to de-solidarize herself from American policy in Asia; on the other hand, Australia thought to avert this danger by actively supporting the United States. The speaker doubted whether these two attitudes were really correct. Perhaps one could find a middle-course more appropriate to the situation.

As regards the Soviet attitude much depended on the cause of action the United States would pursue in Asia. As a 'power-balancer' the United States faced three problems: first, the danger of miscalculation in the form of either under- or over-involvement. In order to act as such a 'balancer' against China, the United States had made various commitments to Asian countries, including some anti-status-quo powers. By doing so, the United States blocked in some cases the process of 'peaceful change'. For this she would be hated by many Asians. She had thus become a de-stabilizing factor in Asia, which she could not overcome merely by getting the support of Asian countries. Furthermore, it was an open question whether stability could be obtained by establishing a reliable nuclear deterrent or by an effort to check the escalation of a regional conflict. It had now become clear that the crucial problem would remain how to control such a conflict.

The discussion was opened by an American official, who emphasized the readiness of his government to stay in Asia as long as the politico-military situation required it and

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as long as Asian countries such as South Korea wished. Even in case of an ABM deployment he thought that the American guarantee would remain sufficiently credible. This was challenged later by a European participant: he agreed that the United States could effectively contain China, but for him the crucial question still remained unanswered, namely whether China could be contained by military power or whether other forms of containment were required as well. An American participant, in taking up the question of nuclear deterrence of China, emphasized the need of a second-strike capability. But with a thin deployment of BMD the United States could also deter the first Chinese strike. This would be very effective and relatively inexpensive. There was, however, the question raised by a Japanese scholar as to how the United States could match the Communist ground forces in Vietnam by her naval and air forces alone. In the post-Vietnam period, the United States would do best to limit her military presence to naval and air power, which could deter China from launching any clear-cut aggressive actions. At the same time the American ground forces should be deployed only at the request of a legitimate government.

Referring then to Prof. Mushakōji's remarks on the danger of miscalculation, the American participant agreed that this danger existed. But he contested the view that the United States was making more dangerous miscalculations than China: the American Government was more susceptible to reasoning of its allies and to its critics inside the United States than were the Chinese. Although the United States supported the anti-status-quo Government in Taiwan, she had applied pressure on it not to use force against the mainland.

A Japanese scholar pointed out that Asia was not an entity, but had one factor in common: anti-colonialism. Based on such a concept, India had chosen a policy of non-alignment, whereas Japan had taken an entirely different line by entering into a close alliance with the United States. Therefore, the majority of the Japanese would not agree to the Indian view that Western intervention in itself was a threat to Asian stability. Other Japanese participants supported this view, though they remarked that the American over-involvement was due to the self-righteousness of the United States, which she was eager to project to her external environment. Consequently, she often tended to miscalculate the reactions of other countries.

A British participant challenged Prof. Millar's view on the American acting as a policeman. He pointed out that Mr. McNamara had precisely rejected this idea by stressing that the United States would come to the assistance of her allies only where and when they needed it. (Later Prof. Millar basically agreed with this and said that he had been thinking only in terms of the United States acting as a policeman in containing Communism.) The danger in present American policy was, however, that it tended to polarize Asia into a Communist and a non-Communist camp. One of the big questions was whether it was a desirable pattern of international relations in Asia to have an American-led coalition on the one side and a Chinese-led coalition on the other. Even if this were so, the question remained of how other Asian countries, which did not subscribe to either coalition, would fit into that bipolar pattern.

A Japanese journalist reported on his recent trip to South-East Asia. One thing that worried him, was the relative lack on the part of the United States in making best use of the political stability in great parts of that area. Americans

talked too much about instability and ignored indigenous factors which could contribute to local political stability. Cambodia and Thailand were enjoying relative stability because the United States had not toppled the traditional ruling bodies in a hasty attempt to democratize or modernize these countries.

A British participant believed that the United States' world position had been built on sympathy with virtually all anti-Communist forces, whereas Britain showed her sumpathy in terms of her ties with the Commonwealth nations. Both countries had, however, changed their policies several times: from a policy of non-involvement in a land war to a direct involvement in such a war (Korea), etc. With such an inconsistent policy the West had been a destabilizing force in Asia. Western policy should therefore become more consistent; this was more important than a continuing military presence. A Japanese participant replied that it would be very difficult for the external powers to maintain a 'consistent involvement': when the threat to Asian security was decreasing, the demand for American withdrawal would increase and the United States would probably have to take account of it.

An Indian participant pointed to one important difference between Japan and other Asian countries. In contrast to the latter, the Japanese were tremendously self-confident and economically and politically independent. These Asian countries were therefore in a very difficult position to accept or even welcome any kind of external intervention. The South-East Asian nationalism in particular was a peculiar thing; it was a nationalism of non-nations. When Japan was dealing with the United States, it was a dealing between two nations. When other Asians were dealing with the United States, the dealing was always between a superior power and inferior nations. He did not say that the United States had to withdraw from Asia now, but that she ought to realize that her continued presence was a source of 'irredenta' and consequently a destabilizing factor.

In reply to a question by an American official, a Japanese participant thought that if the Chinese threat did not decrease, this would create a very difficult situation. A British participant added that one never could know exactly when and whether a threat to one's security had decreased. Finally, a British official commented on the arguments that the Western involvement was detrimental to the stability in Asia or to a 'peaceful change'. This was true in the period of decolonization, but it was not a general rule. It was certainly wrong in case of a direct aggression. Britain was following a set of three principles: first, it was considered undesirable to follow Dr. Millar's principle of intervening in any conflict in Asia, and preferable to keep all great external powers as far as possible from a conflict between non-Communist countries; second, it was better to avoid intervention in domestic conflicts; and third, it was dangerous to go away altogether, leaving a vacuum for China to take advantage of. This would lead us to a strategy of peripheral, off-shore military presence.

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FOURTH SESSION

Nuclear weapons and the requirements of national defence

The Chairman suggested that under Point IV of the Agenda (as above) question (a) be skipped and a new question (f) be added: Is it in the interest of Japan and other Asian powers to sign a non-proliferation treaty, as it is being discussed in Geneva?

Mr. Saeki, as opening speaker, stated that the increased American commitment in Asia harmed the Asian countries' spirit of independence and paralyzed their morale. But Japan and India lacked the strength to replace the United States in deterring the penetration of Chinese Communist military power into the area. If countries around China could form an alliance and counter-balance against the Communist threat, it would be possible for the United States to reduce their commitment.

He then argued that the central instability in Communist China pointed toward a trend of decreasing threat to the rest of Asia, as the revolutionary spirit of China would decrease. The Cultural Revolution was a sign of this trend. China's possibilities for economic development were not very great. Japan's GNP was greater than China's and would grow at a faster rate (5 - 10 per cent compared with less than 5 per cent for China). China's conventional military forces were not first-rate, and their structure was primarily defensive. The real threats were subversive penetration and the nuclear threat. To stop subversion, economic development and domestic stability were necessary. A serious nuclear threat was still some time in the future, even if the tempo of Chinese nuclear development was more rapid than expected. By 1975, when China might deploy an ICBM system, the United States would probably have deployed an ABM system against it and obtained a credible deterrent. Chinese nuclear threat would not be serious to the United States and the non-nuclear nations of Asia for some time to come.

India and Japan could develop national deterrents, but Japan faced some difficulties with her nation sentiment and Constitution, whereas for India the most important thing was not nuclear weapons, but overcoming poverty. But as Chinese efforts were made more important than we had anticipated, Japan might be forced to renew her efforts in order to get away from total dependence on nations who have nuclear deterrent and thus raise the country's dignity, as well as decrease the technological gap in the race with China. While nuclear weapons were not the best means to achieve security, without them there was no assurance that our wishes for security would be fulfilled.

In discussing Japanese nuclear development, one should consider whether the purpose was to develop (a) a Japanese ABM; (b) a strategic missile to deter China; (c) tactical nuclear weapons. Without major technical break-through an ABM system could not be successful from a cost-effectiveness point of view. Japan's population was too dense and protection against fall-out would have to be provided.

Building strategic missiles would induce an arms race with China and it would not have great deterrent value.

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As for tactical nuclear weapons, they were not suitable for the defence of Japan. On the other hand, Japan could enter alliances with the United States and the USSR for her protection.

Mr. Bull, as the first respondent, started off by asking three questions: first, whether or not it was in the interest of Japan to develop nuclear weapons of her own; second, if not, what would be the alternatives; third, was it in her interest to sign a non-proliferation treaty and if so what kind.

As regards the first point, the speaker thought that Japan had no interest to acquire nuclear weapons now. They were needed to provide security, but at present the threat against Japan was not clear, and the United States was taking care of her defence. Furthermore, the example of Britain had shown that nuclear weapons were not a sufficient condition for great-power status, which Japan did not seek anyhow. If Japan went nuclear, she would deal a serious blow to current efforts to achieve arms control. While no country based major decisions on such considerations, Japan had more immediate reasons to hesitate: she could damage her relations with the United States, from which she received protection, though not unconditionally. Second, one had to ask what alternative policies were available to Japan: There really were no satisfactory alternatives to having one's own weapons if one was threatened and one could have them at an acceptable cost. Conventional rearmament or a Pacific type of an MLF or a Japanese ABM did not really make sense. As regards the third point, the charges against the NPT, the speaker confirmed that the Treaty did in fact discriminate in favour of existing nuclear powers. One could ask, however, whether Japan and India were not interested in maintaining a system in which the United States and the USSR had an important stake. A world order could not be based on perfect justice. Some countries had to act as trustees. World orders that lasted were those where the trustees acted, so as to attract support from outside. This should, however, not prevent the non-nuclear countries from trying to amend the text of the Treaty so as duely to take into account their interests. This meant for instance that it should impose not too rigid obligations and contain escape-clauses as well as procedures for easy revision and amendment. It should also not contain more discrimination than was inherent in the Treaty, for instance with regard to peaceful nuclear explosions, which nuclear powers should deny to themselves. Finally, it should offer some symbolic equivalent sacrifices on the part of the nuclear powers, without weakening them.

Commenting on these two opening statements, a Japanese participant expressed fear that a Japanese decision to develop nuclear weapons might foster nuclear proliferation and thus increase the danger of war by miscalculation. He expressed hope that non-nuclear countries could unite and exert their joint influence to help prevent the use for military purposes of nuclear energy. Another Japanese participant emphasized the great changes in Japanese public opinion. When the Partial Test-Ban Treaty was signed in 1963, there had been no Japanese opposition to it. At that time China had not carried out nuclear tests and American nuclear submarines had not called on Japanese ports. People now however felt that the Non-Proliferation Treaty draft was a shameful treaty - worse than the Washington and London Naval Treaties of the inter-war period. This change in public opinion could not

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be judged entirely in rational terms. There were also fears that Japan could not keep up technologically with other countries if it signed the NPT.

A third Japanese participant expressed the view that the possibility of China using her nuclear weapons to blackmail Japan had been dismissed too lightly. If Japan renewed the mutual security treaty with the United States, China could establish a missile-firing range at sea 150 miles from the coast of Japan. Surely all Japanese newspapers would then report the Chinese tests and then the Chinese could move the test range closer and closer to Japan. This would give all groups opposed to the US-Japan security treaty a chance to demand the abolition of the treaty. In his opinion a Japanese ABM system might help overcome Chinese blackmail.

A European participant also questioned whether the Chinese nuclear threat was not taken too lightly. One should consider not only Chinese work on an ICBM capability, but also the likelihood that China could develop before that a MRBM capability against Japan. Western Europe's similar experiences with Soviet MRBMs had shown that this was a real possibility - an analogy which was, however, contested by a British participant.

In this connection, a French participant stated that the French experience with an independently developed nuclear capability had led to the conclusion that both in terms of efficiency and cost this was a doubtful exercise, and Japan should therefore carefully study the French experience.

An American participant also rejected the analogy between China and Russia on the ground that China's conventional forces, however formidable they might be inside her frontiers, were not capable of being projected outside. In Europe the United States had to be able to deter a conventional Soviet attack by a nuclear response, which was more dangerous than to have to deter only nuclear attacks.

The question was then raised by a Japanese scholar whether the future leaders in Peking would understand the implications of American nuclear capability and be able to exert rational judgement on these matters. Would there be effective channels of communication at that time between Peking and Washington? As for Japan, although her policy should be based on the US-Japan security pact, she should not be buried in this security set-up, because in that case she could make no contribution to the security of the region. Japan should develop her capability for the peaceful use of nuclear power and her space technology, so as to be also able to develop nuclear weapons if circumstances forced her to do so. To support the idea of a denuclearized zone, as it had been suggested at the Delhi Conference, would not therefore be a wise policy.

It was stressed by a Japanese participant that his country's decision to develop nuclear weapons would have to take into account political factors such as its implication for Japan's relations with the United States and with non-Communist Asian countries. The United States did not favour proliferation and the Asian countries might fear a nuclear-armed Japan. Therefore it would be better if, instead of becoming the sixth nuclear power, Japan would wait to become the seventh or eighth.

A Korean participant objected to previous optimistic statements about the Chinese threat and suggested that Japan

should look at security problems not from a purely national point of view. He was joined by an Indian participant who said that his country had to consider the possibility that China might become more aggressive and that it had therefore to keep its nuclear option open.

A Japanes participant asked whether Japan's leadership would be capable of developing rational policies on the question of nuclear weapons. In his opinion three conditions would have to be fulfilled: first, it needed a proper assessment of the psychological value of such development, as China would use nuclear weapons to increase threats and the United States would stress the role of the umbrella she provided; second, rational policies would also be influenced by Japan's views on her future as a great power. Her GNP would increase more than China's and she would be the third largest industrial power in the world. This could increase the arrogance of the Japanese and make them want nuclear weapons in order to play a role in a regional context; third, the co-operative structure with the United States had defects. In trying to increase the credibility of the American deterrent, one would automatically create the basis for increased Chinese threats against Japan. As nuclear developments continued in China, Japanese opinions would become polarized; either in favour of the American umbrella or in favour of neutralization. If the leadership was unsuccessful in convincing the people of the value of co-operation with the United States, one would have to ask oneself about the policy to follow.

A Canadian delegate commented on the policy of his country and stressed that once a country had made the decision to go nuclear, it had to go all the way. Canada had never felt it had lost something by not going nuclear. Nor would Canada join the club of near-nuclear powers in order to put collectively pressure on the United States and Britain.

Another Canadian participant thought that the group of powers which decided consciously to forego nuclear weapons, could gather substantial power and could play an active part in the continuing improvement of world order.

In closing the Fourth Session the Chairman remarked that a generalized American guarantee required strategic consultation à la NATO, otherwise guarantee would be invalidated by conflicting demands. On another issue, he detected fear in Japan that in a nuclear crisis public opinion might panic. This had not been so elsewhere, in such crises like the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Popular opinion could take more pressure than was sometimes assumed.

FIFTH SESSION

1) The Non-Proliferation Treaty;
2) The scope for regional co-operation in Asia.

The final session of the Conference opened with a discussion of the projected NPT, and a number of Japanese participants began with a statement of their views. The first speaker considered that national security, rather than national equality, should be the determining factor: equality should be considered important only if security was not thereby affected. True equality was in any case impracticable, given the enormous nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the

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United States. On the other hand, any commitment undertaken by Japan would have to be a flexible one. No treaty could offer cast-iron guarantees against proliferation, or be absolutely and eternally binding. 'A free hand' was to some extent necessary, so the draft treaty should be carefully scrutinized to ensure that adequate provision was made for review. With that provision, he considered that Japan should support the treaty, whose effect on world opinion and the climate of international relations would be considerable.

Another Japanese participant pointed out that Japan had to view the treaty in the light of its technological and economic implications, especially in view of the probable development of the Chinese nuclear industry for peaceful as well as for military purposes. In spite of their national shortage of electrical power they had given an overriding priority to the production of enriched uranium, which had industrial as well as military utility. The research stage had now been passed, and China was now well into the industrial U36 stage. As in the case of the Soviet Union and the United States, Chinese nuclear development was only part of a general programme of industrial development, with commercial implications. Both Russia and the United States were interested in selling their nuclear wares to non-nuclear countries, which gave them a common interest in the status quo which Japan did not necessarily share.

A Japanese official outlined the way in which the mind of the Japanese Government was at present moving - though he emphasized that no decision had yet been reached. Since they abhorred the whole idea of nuclear war, they naturally welcomed the object of the treaty, and hoped that as many countries as possible would join it. It was particularly regrettable that neither France nor the People's Republic of China showed any intention of co-operating. But certain points should be made clear. The treaty should be regarded as the first step in a general programme of nuclear disarmament, and this principle should be written into the text. The life of the treaty should be limited, and it should be regularly reviewed in the light of the progress of general disarmament. Non-nuclear powers should not be denied the opportunity of developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The non-nuclear powers should have the power to amend the treaty by simple majority; nuclear powers should not retain any rights of veto over their decisions. Measures should be taken to prevent industrial espionage; and nuclear as well as non-nuclear powers should be liable to international inspection and supervision. Finally, there should be no foreign interference with the national security programme of any non-nuclear power. The treaty, in fact, should be regarded as second best to a general disarmament programme. It should be welcomed as indicating an easing of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. But the Japanese Government would not wish to see a situation develop in which the two super-powers, by virtue of their nuclear monopoly, could dominate the lesser nations of the world. Rather they should be considered as trustees for world order.

A fourth Japanese participant argued that if Herman Kahn was correct, Japanese production in the year 2000 might have overtaken that of the United States. But Japan's position as a power - indeed her survival as an industrial community - depended upon her keeping up in all branches of technological development. She could not afford to contract out of nuclear technology.

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An Indian participant informed the Conference that the Indian Government was likely to take a stand similar to the Japanese one. There was much support in India for a greater measure of continuing consultation among the near-nuclear powers. It was generally agreed there that proliferation was undesirable, but there was little inclination to sign the draft treaty as it stood. If no means could be found to protect India against a nuclear-armed China, she must keep open the option to provide herself with nuclear weapons; which made effective escape-clauses essential. Like Japan, she was alarmed at the prospect of a technological gap opening, in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, between herself and China. And like Japan, she regarded the treaty primarily as a first step to more general disarmament; which created a 'balance of obligations' imposing duties on the nuclear powers. In general, he could not accept the view expressed by Mr. Bull the previous afternoon, that a world order existed which rested on the co-operation of the two super-powers. The field of effective agreement between them was in any case small - witness their inability to provide India with a joint nuclear guarantee. The proposed treaty might indeed narrow the field of agreement rather than broaden it. In fact, the legitimacy of this so-called 'world order' had come under heavy attack, especially from France and China, and it was necessary to reconstruct it on a much broader basis. The proposed treaty provided an excellent opportunity to do this.

A French participant, while dissociating himself from the official attitude of the French Government, could not believe that it was desirable to consolidate the Russo-American condominium. The temporary nature of the treaty should be recognized, and it should be regarded as a means of maintaining pressure on the nuclear powers to work for some more stable settlement.

A German participant finally also welcomed the Japanese position. Germany, he said, would not let herself be stampeded into signing a document which had been contrived as much for its impact on American elections as for its probable effect on the world scene. Germany had a great interest in the development of her nuclear technology, which had made 'great progress' through adopting American fast-breeder reactor patterns and which was likely to develop further yet. The export possibilities were immense. For this reason Germany was likely to be adamant on the question of inspection and control. He stressed, however, that Germany did not want to keep a nuclear option open, whereas India and Japan did. Japan and Germany were close allies to the United States, which India was not. From where was leadership in such an alliance to come? The same point was later endorsed by a British participant, who felt that a community of non-nuclear power was a slender thread on which to build an effective world grouping. He could not visualize the circumstances in which, for example, Germany and Italy would give such an element in their policy priority over their membership of the Common Market or NATO; and other non-nuclear powers would be subject to comparable centrifugal pressures.

A Swedish participant, while agreeing that all had an interest in maintaining and improving the system of 'co-operative bipolarity' being developed between the United States and the Soviet Union, did not accept it as self-evident either that the proposed treaty would be conducive to such improved co-operation, or that such co-operation would necessarily increase the security of certain important non-nuclear powers.

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The signing of the treaty would not of itself lead tocloser co-operation; the Soviet Union had shown no sign of being prepared to enter into such co-operation on other cognate questions; the treaty indeed might be regarded as a substitute for closer relations rather than a preliminary to them. Such co-operation, even if it did occur, was not likely to improve the security of, e. g., India or Israel unless it was carried to entirely improbable lengths. The value of the treaty, in fact, was not likely to be considerable.

Referring to a series of Japanese criticism against the NPT, an American participant stated his reasons for believing that the treaty was not only unnecessary, but might provide a positive incitement to proliferation. No near-nuclear power was likely to develop nuclear weapons in the immediate future; but the treaty, by focussing attention on the question, had made them consider the option more seriously than ever before. It was natural enough that once a nation was called upon to surrender an option for ever, it should start thinking hard about escape-clauses. As for the idea that the treaty should be signed on condition that general disarmament then took place, this would do no more than provide an excuse for proliferation - as the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles had provided justification for German rearmament. And if such disarmament were achieved, would it create the 'equality' among nations which certain participants were demanding? And could the Chinese be trusted to abide by it? He feared that the conclusion of the treaty had now become an end in itself. If it were saved at the cost of encouraging proliferation, the price would be too high. Also answering a number of points which were raised against the treaty, a British official listed three reasons for signing the treaty. First, signing it would be a factor inhibiting non-nuclear nations from acquiring nuclear weapons; Second, pairs of antagonistic nations could take the decision simultaneously within a broad framework; and thirdly, the treaty would be a symbol of success for the non-proliferation movement throughout the world. He denied that the discussions which had taken place had stimulated pressure to proliferate. On the contrary, he insisted, if the negotiation of the treaty had not been taking place, pressure for proliferation would have been greater still. He stressed, however, that it would be most correct to speak of a treaty rather than the Treaty. The existing draft had been devised primarily to settle the complete issue of the arrangements for control of nuclear weapons within NATO. Further drafts might be expected to embody other points which arose. But he warned against any attempt to write unrealistic provisions into the treaty. To make general disarmament, with a time limit for implementation, a condition of agreement would be worse than useless. As to the question of inspection and safeguards, he agreed that this should be made applicable to all signatory states and not simply to the non-nuclear powers. The existing discriminatory provisions had been made solely because the Soviet Union refused to accept any form of inspection for herself. Other arrangements were possible. The United States and the United Kingdom might unilaterally accept inspection; or the whole matter of safeguards might be dropped altogether. The last solution seemed the most probable.

Turning to the prospects for regional co-operation in Asia, the opening speaker, M. André Fontaine, began by suggesting that the brief period remaining for the discussion of this question reflected the scepticism felt by the conference as a whole about its practical possibilities - a scepticism

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which he felt under no obligation to expel. The example of Europe was not encouraging. The peoples of Europe desperate-le needed unity and had entirely failed to achieve it in spite of ease of communications, absence of racial barriers and a rapid decline in linguistic and ideological barriers to the exchange of ideas. The contrast with conditions in Asia was huge. There the countries, divided by vast barriers of mountain and desert, were linked only by the sea. Two wars were currently raging, in Vietnam and in the Yemen. From Palestine to Malaya there were bitter border disputes. Differences in standards of living were immense, and every possible difference was exhibited in race, language and culture. Even in their fears the Asian countries could find no unity. On only two issues could they find common ground - the need to find and assert their national identity, and the need to accelerate their economic growth. The so-called alliances in Asia reflected no real community of interest. In CENTO only Asian powers were represented, Iran and Pakistan, of which the first was veering towards a position of Gaullism and the latter was now more an ally of China than of the West. In SEATO, Pakistan, one of the few Asian members, had virtually withdrawn co-operation. The only truly effective alliances in fact were the bilateral arrangements between the United States and individual Asian nations. The same situation applied on the other side, where no arrangements existed comparable to the Warsaw Pact or COMECON. As for the uncommitted countries, the Arab League was a by-word for internal strife. The only hopeful sign was to be found in the development of certain measures of economic co-operation, and European experience indicated that it was along this path that progress could best be made. Such arrangements were likely to be successful in inverse ratio to their strategic content. The only circumstances in which M. Fontaine could visualize the growth of military co-operation, would be in the event of a withdrawal of military protection by the United States or the Soviet Union, or its rejection as involving too great a risk. And were this to happen, M. Fontaine concluded, the nations of Asia might then choose an altogether different course.

Prof. Hidejiro Kotani, his first respondent, expressed himself in general agreement with M. Fontaine. Certainly under existing circumstances he did not see Japan entering into any military arrangements with her neighbours. It was forbidden under the Constitution, and would be unacceptable to popular sentiment. He indicated three views which commanded some support in Japan. First, there were those who believed that ultimately the increase in Chinese military power might make Japanese nuclear armament inevitable. Secondly, there were those who favoured some kind of regional co-operation, but feared that this would be valueless without a nuclear contest. Finally, there were those who considered that co-operation should be limited to South Korea, and even there take the form only of an economic contribution. He himself believed that military co-operation with Japan's neighbours was certainly feasible if it was limited to planning and joint exercises, and strongly favoured the establishment of such arrangements with South Korea. In this case he favoured such steps as exchange of intelligence, common use of base facilities, naval exercises, exchange of visits between naval and military personnel, and burden-sharing in industry. Japanese representation on the Truce Commission might also be desirable.

In the discussion, this view was strongly supported by a South Korean participant. He pointed out that the Korean peninsula

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had always been vital to the balance of power in Asia. But as a condition of such co-operation he considered it necessary that Japan should abandon her egotistical conception of her national interest. Particularly unacceptable to the people of South Korea was the Japanese policy of continuing to trade, not only with Communist China, but with North Korea. If acceptable conditions for co-operation could be established, Japan's contribution might take the form of light military industry. Korea would gladly furnish base facilities.

An American official drew attention to the major effort of co-operation which was already being achieved in South Vietnam, where help from South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, Malaysia and Laos had either been given or was expected. This, he suggested, could not be regarded simply as a transitory phenomenon which would leave no permanent results.

A British official expressed the hope that Japan would not fall into the insular attitude that the United Kingdom had so unwisely adopted after the Second World War. Japan might be in a position to give a lead in matters not only of economic, but of political co-operation, especially in South-East Asia.

Finally, an American scholar pointed to the surprising developments in Indonesia, where the army leaders, having intervened in 1965 to bring the country back to its declared position of non-alignment from the close relations which Dr. Soekarno had been cultivating with Peking, had begun to indicate an interest in regional co-operation in South-East Aisa to meet the threat of Communist China. This was visualized as extending to cover a broad range of activities, cultural and economic as well as military, with tne ultimate object of enabling the West to disengage its military presence altogether.
A Japanese participant expressed considerable interest in this as a long-term goal.

At this point the session had to be closed.