1967

IV. Internationale Wehrkunde.

München - 27/28 gennaio 1967

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3 - F. Zimmermann: Problems and alternatives of the German Defence (2 copie)

4 - L. Williams: The detente and the defence preparedness in Europe.

5 - T.C.Schelling: Europe and the framework of american defense policy

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IV. INTERNATIONALE WEHRKUNDE-BEGEGNUNG IN MÜNCHEN
4th INTERNATIONAL WEHRKUNDE ENCOUNTER
IVème RENCONTRE INTERNATIONALE DE LA WEHRKUNDE

Amerika und Europa vor Wandlungen in der Weltpolitik
America and Europe confronted with Changes in World Policies
L'Amerique et l'Europe devant les changements dans le monde

Freitag, Friday, vendredi, 27. Jan.

Ankunft und Unterbringung der Teilnehmer im Hotel Regina, Maximilianplatz; Anmeldung im Tagungssekretariat und Abendessen im Hotel Regina
Arrival and room-reservations, presentation at conference desk and dinner in Hotel Regina, Maximilianplatz
Arrivée et logement des participants, présentation au sécrétariat de la conférence et dîner à l'Hotel Regina

Samstag, Saturday, samedi, 28. Jan.

Frühstück, breakfast, petit déjeuner (Hotel Regina)

10.00 Eröffnungssitzung, opening meeting, première séance (Bayerische Industrie- und Handelskammer, Maximilianplatz 8/I)

Berichte über außenpolitische Tendenzen
Reports on foreign policy tendencies
Rapports sur les tendances de la politique étrangère

13.00 Mittagessen, lunch, déjeuner (Hotel Regina)

14.30 Zweite Sitzung, second meeting, deuxième séance

DR. FRIEDRICH ZIMMERMANN, MdB

Probleme und Alternativen der deutschen Verteidigungspolitik
Problems and Alternatives of the German Defence
Problèmes et alternatives de la politique allemande de défense

JEAN DE LIPKOWSKI, député

Europas Sicherheit aus französischer Sicht
Europe's Security from French Point of View
Sécurité européenne du point de vue de la France

19.45 Abfahrt, departure, départ (Hotel Regina)

20.00 Rathaus, City Hall, Hôtel de Ville:
Festessen, dinner, dîner (Straßenanzug, no black tie, costume de ville)
Gastgeber, host, hôte: Oberbürgermeister der Landeshauptstadt München, Dr. Hans-Jochen Vogel

Sonntag, Sunday, dimanche, 29. Jan.

Frühstück, breakfast, petit déjeuner (Hotel Regina)

10.00 Dritte Sitzung, third meeting, troisième séance

THOMAS C. SCHELLING, Harvard

Europas Aufgabe in der amerikanischen Verteidigungspolitik
Europe and the Framework of American Defence Policy
L'Europe dans le cadre de la politique de défense des Etats Unis

by a british author:

Entspannung und Verteidigungsbereitschaft in Europa
The détente and the defence preparedness in Europe
La détente et l'état de préparation à la défense en Europe

13.00 Mittagessen, lunch, déjeuner (Hotel Regina)

14.30 Abschlußsitzung, closing meeting, séance de clôture

HELMUT SCHMIDT, MdB

Deutschland und das europäische Sicherheitssystem der Zukunft
Germany and the future Security System in Europe
L'Allemagne et le système de sécurité dans l'Europe de démain

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In jeder Sitzung folgt auf die Referate die allgemeine Diskussion
The presentation of the papers is followed by the general debate in every meeting
Au cours de chaque séance la discussion générale s'ensuit aux exposés

20.00 Abschlußessen, closing dinner, dîner de clôture (Hotel Regina)

IV. INTERNATIONALE WEHRKUNDE-BEGEGNUNG IN MÜNCHEN
4th INTERNATIONAL WEHRKUNDE ENCOUNTER
IVème RENCONTRE INTERNATIONALE DE LA WEHRKUNDE

28./29. Januar 1967

TEILNEHMERLISTE
PARTICIPANTS
LES PARTICIPANTS

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Bonn

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stellv. Bundespressechef

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Wien

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Auswärtiges Amt, Bonn

Dr. GÜNTER BACHMANN, Ministerialdirigent
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Sécrétaire Général de l'U.N.R., Paris

KURT BECKER
"Die Zeit", Hamburg

WILLI BERKHAN, MdB
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Bundesverteidigungsministerium, Bonn

DIETER CYCON
"Stuttgarter Zeitung", Stuttgart

ALFONS DALMA
Wehrkunde, München

KLAUS DOHRN
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Centre Europeen de Documentation et d'Information,
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ARMIN HALLE
"Süddeutsche Zeitung", München

Dr. FRANZ HEUBL, Staatsminister
München/Bonn

PETER HORNUNG
"Sonntagsblatt", Hamburg

JOHANNES V. IMHOF
US-Embassy, Bonn

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Dr. FRED LUCHSINGER
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung", Zürich

ERNST-OTTO MAETZKE
"Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung", Frankfurt

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ADELBERT WEINSTEIN
"Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung", Frankfurt

LEE WILLIAMS, MP
London

Dr. GISELHER WIRSING
"Christ und Welt", Stuttgart

ARMIN ZIMMERMANN, Kapitän zur See
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Dr. FRIEDRICH ZIMMERMANN, MdB
Bonn/München

4th INTERNATIONAL WEHRKUNDE ENCOUNTER

PROBLEMS AND ALTERNATIVES OF THE GERMAN DEFENCE

Dr. Friedrich Zimmermann, MdB
President of the Defence Comitee

Munich, 28th and 29th January 1967

Since our last discussion forum a number of events have occurred within the frame of the Western defence system which put a definite end to all self-deception and even the most sanguine attempts at palliation. The analyses and predictions of those who foresaw that an adhesion to the original structure would spell the end of NATO, have been proved correct by hard and undeniable facts. The most spectacular occurrence of the last year was the logical decision of France to turn her back on an Atlantic integration which had, indeed, only been put into effect within that part of Europe which enjoyed the protection of the American World Power. While the one-sided decision of France to leave the organisation was generally regarded by the other member states as a shameful act of disloyalty, that step was, in truth, merely a symptom and by no means the cause of that process of disintegration which has begun to spread throughout the greatest military alliance of all times. An organism, which neither possesses the capacity nor the international prerequisites to adapt itself to a changing environment, cannot survive for long. It will waste away as soon as it is exposed to analien political climate or when shifting outward forces upset its inner balance.

NATO has failed to keep pace with the historical developments of the past 18 years. It was conceived in a moment when the unyielding confrontation of eastern and western world powers on European soil had resulted in a latent threat of war. It was a natural and intelligent political decision of the then American administration to offer a multilateral defence alliance to those medium-sized and smal states along the Western fringe of the Eurasian colossus which were ready to establish their own defences. The internal relations of this alliance were self-evident and were neither contested nor regarded as unjustified or even discrininating by any of its members. The discrepancy of power between North America and her European charges, who were called partners out of sheer amiability, was all too manifest. Nor would serious tensions in the western camp of defence hardly arise as long as the security interests of America and her friends on the Old Continent were almost identical. Behind the wide shoulders of American military power the war-scarred countries of West Europe revived and once more began the thrive. Besides, their active membership in the NATO-Club gave them the pleasant feeling of making ever more significant contributions to their own defence.

Such a situation all too easily tends to be taken for granted - and that by protectors and protected alike. In the course of their many years of military leadership in Europe, the Americans have gradually adopted the attitude that they are entirely able and justified to shape and guide the

the fate of the Old Continent in accordance with their ideas and changing needs. Above all among the smaller or weaker European allies there always have been and still are some who would rather be dependent on the political self-will of a powerful yet distant Uncle Sam than risking the embrace of their bigger neighbours at home in Europe. These are very likely the real psychological reasons of the opposition to reform which has - on both sides of the Atlantic - for so long thwarted any serious attempt to transform NATO gradually and organically into an American-European defence community.

How often have we heard the concept repeated, that political union was going to make Europe a pillar on this side of the Atlantic, which - together with its powerful military counterpart in America - could be relied on to support a solid bridge which would guarantee the security of the Western World. But how little has America done to further this project - particularly from that exact moment on when the European partner states had become strong enough to establish the basis of their own independence. The geostrategic position has meanwhile undergone a complete transformation so that Europe - which before formed the focus of American security interests - now merely fulfils a marginal function. This development has been irreversible ever since the safety-barriers of polar ice and oceans have been eliminated by intercontinental ballistic missiles (IBM's) and nuclear-powered submarines so that America and the Soviet Union now face each other directly along an extended front-line. This situation inevitably forced the two super-powers to come to an agreement. Every other government, which has accepted the responsibility for the existence of its country and the safety of its people, would under these circumstances equally have made it the primary objective of its policy to relieve existing tensions and to agree on common interests.

While a return to isolationism was out of the question for America, the problem of national security did come to acquire primary importance. America became aware of her geographic position as a continental island and strove to shape her political ties and commitments to her allies according to a new strategic concept. At this stage of development America turned to the West and began to build up a huge military force in the Pacific basin. Perhaps it was the traumatic shock of Pearl Harbour which suddenly reawakened and induced the Americans to concentrate more and more on its Asiatic flank where Red China began to emerge as a new center of power. The military involvement in Vietnam sheds a particularly dramatic light upon the

growing American commitment on the Asiatic theater. My impression is that most Europeans still fail to realise the full extent and impact of this development - probably because they are blinded by their wishful thinking that Europe continues to occupy a favorite position in Washington's decisions. But meanwhile the actual presence of America and an even more comprehensive political commitment in Asia are steadily increasing. The American sphere of influence spreads today from the Arabian Sea to Oxanien: protected by her powerful fleet and a number of important bases, the USA are extending their influence from the Philippines, to Indonesia and even to the Indian sub-continent. Australia and New Zealand are tending away from the Commonwealth and turning to America which has also found an ally in Japan. Probably it would be wrong to interpret the American shift of interest towards Asia only as the reflection of a policy to contain continental China. For America's advance across the Pacific bears a certain resemblance to that spontaneous quest of "new frontiers" whose real nature somehow defies complete rational explanation just as much as the actual motives of behind the historical migration of nations.

Whatever the reasons may be, we must take this aspect into account if we are to find clear answers to the questions of European security. The recent predominance of Asia in American foreign policy is only one phenomenon, for there are also certain indications that our transatlantic ally is becoming a bit tired of Europe. The vast potential of the American world power has found a new sphere of activity in Asia where its creative forces can be used to greater effect than in Europe. Here, on the Old Continent, America's interests are practically limited to two major objectives:

1° To eliminate as far as possible any threat to its national security resulting from an armed conflict with the other nuclear world power, the Soviet Union, and

2° To maintain the internal stability in the western part of Europe as a safe-guard for the continued preservation of a bi-polar state of balance.

The group of states this side of the Jalta-line with a total population of 300 million people whose living standards have reached a sound and satisfactory level, have become a very important economic factor for the ever expanding in-

dustry of the USA. Of course, this potential is by no means to be integrated in order to increase America's productive capacities, but rather figures indirectly as a suitable outlet above all for those branches of the industry which have developed out of the huge investments in modern technological research. On the other hand America is equally aware that Soviet control of West European industrial capacities might easily shift the balance of world power in favor of Moscow.

These factors must be taken into account to ensure a realistic evaluation of the American policy of detente in Europe. The maximum elimination of all risk and the preservation of the status quo, these are the two guiding principles of American policy in Europe. Their only disadvantage is that they are largely incompatible. For on the one hand the USA wishes to maintain its European sphere of influence, and on the other to reduce the military elements of its security policy because they might disturb the peaceful side-by-side with Soviet nuclear power. The American concept seems to be based on the theory that Moscow pursues a similarly conservative and basically inactive political strategy in and towards Europe. It is extremely doubtful, however, that the Soviets, who at the moment happen to be mainly interested in the political consolidation of their European possessions - would in the long run content themselves with a solution which might be described as a Condominion of World Powers on our European continent. Neither the political nor the military conduct of the Soviet Union furnish hope for such a possibility: the activities of the Communist organisations in the free part of Europe are as clear a reflection of an entirely offensive policy of co-existence as are Moscow's efforts to disarm West Europe while perfecting the military power of Russia and the Warsaw Pact countries.

The feeling of security among us West Europeans is gradually waning in view of the above-mentioned American tendencies which begin to affect the North Atlantic alliance and which might be classed as the three negative "D's": Dis-integration, Dis-engagement and De-nuclearisation. No one ought to be surprised that this unrest is particularly pronounced in Germany. The Federal Republic has placed implicit trust in NATO-security and has carried out the decisions of the defense alliance with a loyalty greater than that of any of the other members. Germany has always regarded a collective defence organisation, which is supported by an almost unlimited commitment of America on European soil, as the only real guarantee of her safety and still thinks so today. As long as the presence of American troops on German territory seemed beyond doubt, the Federal

Republic accepted one-sided revisions of American strategic concepts with far less criticism than for instance her French neighbor. In view of the nuclear dead-lock of the world powers Bonn never thought of questioning the validity of the slogan: Americans and Russians are not going to shoot at each other. As long as the revisions of American defence policy in Europe still seemed to be dictated by new developments of nuclear strategy instead of arousing the suspicion that they were actually prompted by the fundamental intention to decrease military engagement. Until then it had, after all, been safe to assume that the Soviet Union would not dare to make a serious threat or even to create an armed incident if this conjured up the danger of an escalating conflict with the other nuclear world power. But in view of Washington's more recent theory, according to which a side-by-side of the European spheres of influence of the two super-powers is to preclude a direct military confrontation, the security of West Europe no longer seems to me to be properly and sufficiently safeguarded. True, my friends and I never were able to share their opinions - but those German politicians who so strongly supported the MLF project most probably were prompted to do so by very similar apprehensions. I am sure that these men truly were not just trying to put a German finger on the nuclear trigger. For they, too, must have realised that the nominal joint possession of a nuclear fleet, in which the USA were to participate, would not have given any of the "shareholders" a real say in an emergency.

The main objective of the German supporters of MLF is more likely to have been the preservation and, if possible, strengthening of the ties between America and her NATO Partners. The fact that Washington has abandoned the MLF project, although this scheme might have served well as an instrument to preclude any European attempt at establishing nuclear independence, may be regarded as a rather ominous sign. For this decision has surely not been inspired by Washington's readiness to give the green light for an autonomous European nuclear force. Quite on the contrary: this means that the Americans have accepted Moscow's conditions for a non-proliferation treaty which - in the Russian view - is to perpetuate the status quo of European division under the supervision of the world powers. This objective the political strategists of the Kremlin hope best and most surely to achieve by encouraging America to proceed with a one-sided military dis-engagement in Europe and by simultaneously barring the way to independence and self-defence to us Europeans. The Russian hope that such a policy would produce the desired results in America can

only have been inspired by Washington's plain declaration to Bonn that the continued presence of US troops in the outposts of Europe depended on the unconditional fulfilment of all financial obligations within the frame of the Offset Agreement. From the fact that this statement was made in the eyes of the whole world the Russians could conclude that America's interest in Bonn was no longer so much inspired by security arguments but rather shaped by economic reasons. This hypothesis must have been confirmed by America's simultaneous announcement of its "Big Lift" strategy for the beginning of the 1970's.

Last year's meetings of the NATO minister council made it plain that America was decided to largely use NATO - which had been devised for collective defence - as an instrument to promote her policy of detente between world powers. At the same time the principle of integration in the European part of NATO, which had originally served to strengthen the military impact of the alliance, acquired the function of an instrument of political control. In the same degree that the common defence interests of NATO recede to the background, the political importance of this organisation as an American control institution emerges with ever greater clarity: the principle of integration is preserved in order to prevent the formation of national military forces - particularly in Germany - and to hinder the development of an independent European defence policy. Moscow reacted in typical manner to this change of American NATO policy by proposing a "European security system" which not only aimed at perpetuating the division of Europe and Germany but also at severing the ties between the Federal Republic and her western neighbors. It seems to be Moscow's plan first to exploit American detente policy in order to nip in the bud any attempt at establishing a European defence system, and second - once the Americans would have actually withdrawn from the European continent - to make us feel that the end of our security has come.

These are the constellations that will determine the outcome of the disarmament conference in Geneva next month. In behind-the-scene talks Washington and Moscow have discussed the various aspects of a non-proliferation agreement. Certain American comments make it seem probable that the nuclear powers have consented to most of the provisions so that the treaty will soon be submitted to the other countries for signature. This procedure strikes me as a rather doubtful reversion to a state of bi-polar world control. The other, non-nuclear countries very justifiably want to know what security guarantees they are to be offered in view of the incontestable fact that only the possibility of nuclear self-defence permits a nation to shrug off in relative safety the political or military threat of a big nuclear power.

What guarantees of nuclear deterrence can we Europeans expect from an America which - for fear of becoming involved in escalation - is already today very seriously weighing the advisability of gradually removing the nuclear weapons stationed here? I rather expect that some of the technically advanced countries will - for the sake of their independence and the protection of their territories - refuse to sign an agreement devised to exclude them from the atomic era.

The Federal Republic has already agreed to renounce to the production of nuclear war-heads and is entirely ready and willing to forswear all national control of atomic weapons. We are well aware that the relief of internal European tensions necessitates such a formal renunciation. But we owe it to the protection of our people to pursue a policy which will safeguard the highest conceivable degree of outward security. For us only that strategy is acceptable which will prevent any armed conflict on German soil. For even if such a clash on the territory of divided Germany could be limited to the use of conventional weapons and tactical nuclear arms, it would mean the ultimate end of national existence.

The developments within NATO therefore shoulder us with the grave responsibility of finding a new platform for our defence. All our deliberations will have to depart from the fact that only a collective system can offer us a tolerable measure of security. Moreover we must also bear in mind that in this epoch of revolutionising technological innovations an industrial state can no longer conceive its security policy in terms of its readiness and ability for defence. France was the only European country to have followed the example of the big world powers by investing its armament funds in modern scientific and industrial developments. If we want to preserve our cultural significance we must provide our industry and research centers with the necessary funds and make them internationally competetive by letting them share in our defence efforts. We have reason to suspect, however, that the non-proliferation agreement aims at imposing decisive restrictions on all such endeavors. Should that treaty, for instance, contain provisions excluding the non-nuclear countries from all scientific or industrial collaboration with the atomic powers in the field of nuclear armament, such clauses would provide an excellent argument to paralyse and close down entire branches of research and industry. In this context I have only to mention the vital connections between the electronics industry and nuclear energy.

The non-proliferation agreement can equally be expected to contain provisions which are even to prevent any "indirect" cooperation with atomic powers in all decisive aspects of

modern defence production. Without any doubt the nuclear world powers will also accord each other the right of controls whose exact scope and effect on the economic and lastly even the political freedom of action of the non-nuclear nations cannot yet be clearly imagined. But one thing is certain: the Soviet Union can be trusted to abuse a non-proliferation agreement as a license to interfere with all western defence projects, especially with those relating to the security of Europe. When one considers what influence on internal NATO matters Moscow has managed to gain during the preparatory discussions of the treaty - I only cite the problem of the "Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee" and its function - we may truly wonder what the future has in store for us.

Let me at this point only say that much about McNamara's idea of a "Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee": I do not believe that this institution will be anything but a platform for the Americans to inform the other members of the nuclear-strategic conceptions of the USA without granting the non-atomic countries the least influence on the Pentagon's planning. Although it is a very justifiable wish on our part to be at least consulted in the question of the use of atomic weapons on and from German territory, we must once more fear that our insistence on this veto right might serve as an excuse to de-nuclearise the Federal Republic.

It must be possible to prevent certain provisions of a non-proliferation agreement from jeopardising any effective European defence policy. The fact that German spokes-men have time and again underlined the necessity that Europe must be granted the right to opt, must not be interpreted as a wish of the Federal Republic to reserve itself as a sovereign state the right to join a European defence force. It is quite evident that a European atomic force is only conceivable as the defence instrument of a European Confederation, since any joint possession or authentic joint control of an exclusively European multi-lateral force is as impracticable as the Atlantic MLF would have been. The citizens of the Federal Republic - or else those of a re-united Germany - would merely, after having surrendered their national sovereign rights in the spheres of foreign policy and defence policy to a joint authority, participate in a European atomic force - just like any other member state of such a Federation would. If, on the other hand, such a possibility were to be excluded, this would put an end to all hopes for a United Europe. For after all both France and England, two countries without which a future European Confederation would be unthinkable, possess atomic weapons which they could be hardly induced to surrender unless the world powers did the same.

In order to approach our goal of creating a truly comprehensive European system which alone could abolish the division of our continent and thus of our own german nation, we must do everything that will serve to ease the strained relations with our eastern neighbors. But all our efforts in this direction must be based on a conception of Europe which takes sufficient account of the fundamental security interests of the western part of our Continent. The time has come for us to implement at last the provisions of the Elysée Pact of 1963: namely to agree with France upon a close military cooperation which must bring forth common concepts of defence strategy fitting into an over-all program of detente throughout Europe. In this endeavor we must and may be guided by the conviction that not only the interests of France but of free Europe and even the West as a whole will be served best by preserving, respectively restoring, for the 1970's the operational concept of "forward defence". Paris is planning to equip the French forces stationed on Federal territory with tactical nuclear weapons as soon as these will be available. Another alternative would be to agree with France on a two-key-system for long-range atomic weapons, which might be patterned on the agreement we have with America. The solution of such questions makes the development of a common strategy a vital necessity.

We must also discuss with France - and naturally with all other states which will decide in favor of a common defence policy - the ways and methods to buld up an effective European defence potential. In practice this goal could hardly be achieved without the aid of the industrial capacity of the Federal Republic. But it is also entirely conceivable that the Germans make their essential contribution to detente by reorientating the major portion of its defence budget toward the requirements of a European defence organisation and by adapting the structure of the Bundeswehr to the changed situation. It would not only be in harmony with a European defence policy, but also in the interest of a preservation of the essential significance of Europe through a more active support of her science and industry, if the Federal Republic decreased the operating costs of its armed forces and spent accordingly more on the development of modern defensive weapons-systems. While to date we have used only 30 per cent of our defence budget for sundry investments and have purchased most of our equipment from America, we ought to raise the proportion of investment expenditures to 40 % while lowering the operating costs to 60 %. All funds which could be made available by this measure would then flow into common development schemes and European defence production - a benefit both for technological progress on the whole and the security of the economic future of the European nations in particular.

A reduction of the Bundeswehr operating costs would necessitate a reorganisation of our defence system in order to satisfy the present and future demands of strategy. Quite a number of suitable suggestions have been offered for discussion in the recent past. All of them basically aim at shortening the period of obligatory military service, reducing the size of the standing army and raising the active period of temporary members of the regular forces from two to three years. This would permit the establishment of cadre-units which might serve for training and mobilisation purposes. This would enable the Bundeswehr to use a period of mounting tension for the reestablishment of the economised divisions in accordance with a mobilisation scheme.

There are still quite a number of alternate suggestions for a structural reorganisation of the Bundeswehr which might prove valuable within the frame of a European defence organisation. The essential point is, at any rate, that we must and shall arrive at decisions which will equally further our endeavors to achieve collective security in West Europe and to abolish all those tensions which at present split our land and continent.

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4th INTERNATIONAL WEHRKUNDE ENCOUNTER

THE DETENTE AND THE DEFENCE PREPAREDNESS IN EUROPE

LEE WILLIAMS, MP

Munich, 28th and 29 January 1967

The emergence of the balance of power has once again raised the spectre of a Russo-American collusive deal to stabilize the status quo in the interests of the two dominant powers. The view that a bipolar world is a more stable one than a world in which power is more evenly distributed has both its advocates and critics. Paradoxically though, the bipolar advocates have the advantage of pressing a case which conforms to the developments actually experienced in the course of the East-West arms race. It also conforms to the concept of 'one world' that was so strongly pursued by those idealistically prone American stamtesman who had finally rejected the policy of Isolationism' to embrace the doctrine of co-operation between the great powers. The step from isolationism to international involvement was, of course, an enormous step but the types of thinking that in fact underpinned both attitudes or policies are strikingly similar. In the latter case, the more idealistically inclined advocates of the policy of isolationism were sincerely convinced that if America avoided international entanglements then not only would she stay clear of war but by her example and precept the world would, in some undefined way, become actually safer and more stable. If a great power sought actually to avoid war then this would constitute a momentous decision which in kind was very different from the policy of appeasement since it entailed the acceptance of the view that your 'neighbours' quarrels not only did not involve you but were of no particular concern to you. In the latter case the advocates of international intervention held the position that involvement was actually the only way in which it was possible to erect a more "safe and stable world". This kind of thinking explains how, after the defeat of Hitler's Germany and of Japan in 1945, the USA concluded that the fact that the threat to peace had been removed would now enable a wartormented world to settle down to an orderly existence based upon Russo-American co-operation and political understanding.

With the coming of the central-power balance this much discredited view has been resuscitated in the context of such attractive connotations as international security, common interest in the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, and a check on the anarchic tendencies of a world of sovereign nation-states living in a 'state of nature". Historically the search for partnership with the Soviet Union based mutually upon a realization of common interests has always been a feature of US policy but, in the event, has, so far, always foundered on the rock of Soviet indifference or outright hostility to such a notion. At the present time, for example, the idea of a bipolar world or 'duopoly', frankly based on the hegomony of the two great powers, seems to many commentators a highly attractive prospect. (1)

This aspect of American thinking has the merit of providing defence planners and harassed diplomats with the hope that the search for a safe and less complicated world can be achieved without all the burdensome complexity of alliance-based diplomacy. (2) Indeed such an aspiration is, in a very obvious sense, a desire to return to Roosevelt's idea of a "one world" in which the world system of nation-states use the chosen instrumentality of the United Nations based upon the consensus of the four (later five) victorious powers. This implied that regionalism was a policy inconsistent with a world whose peaceful relations were dependent upon direct and good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. (3) Again this attitude was reflected in the indifference shown by the US to the projectes for European integration put forward during the war. The Atlanticis Europeanist divide was a far cry.

The Soviet Refusal:

In fact Roosevelt's policy collapsed but the American interest in military and economic regionalism was the direct result of the failure on the "one world" in the face of the idealogical opposition of the Soviet Union. In short, the Soviet Union was not prepared to play the role pre-determined for it by the U.S. State Department and in the face of this refusal Washington was forced to adopt a regional and, by definition, pro-European policy. The cause of the cold war and the resultant arms race undermined the straight forward political concept of a world living benignly under the influence of Russo-American good relations. But the impact of weapons technology emphasized that the bipolar world in fact existed, though not in the way envisaged by Roosevelt, but in the way envisaged by Stalin whose view of the matter was inevitably determined by his attachment to the class-war theory of conflict which - as in all matters conditioned relations between States. Yet by the late fifties the two super-powers, having perceived the danger of pre-emptive strike and of accidental war, were consciously moving towards a rational system of "peaceful co-existence" which would enable them to secure a greater degree of safety based upon a bipolar world. This development was the outcome of the balance of terror and was given expression by the U.S. Secretary, of State Christian Herter, when, in 1959, he sought to define the area of responsibility for both the super-powers underpinning the joint pillars of international security. Thus, the Soviet leaders would be responsible for the action of their Communist allies, and of course, the American would similarly undertake to restrain their allies, particularly the West Germans, from any precipitate action likely to lead to major conflict. The Summit Conference of 1955 and Mr. Khrushchev's visit to frankly based upon antithetical social systems whose military might was now oriented towards stalemate and in time total nuclear deadlock (4)

Developments within the Communist bloc were moving towards acceptance of such a view, especially since Mr. Khrushchev's definition of co-existence was intended to be much less an adequate idealogical justification for abandoning much of the rigid marxist view of conflict than a device to perpetuate the power dominance of the Soviet Union in an increasingly polycentric and multipolar world. The Communist world movement was threatening to fly apart and by 1960 the process had ineluctably begun to occur at a pace which highly alarmed the exuberent Khrushchev. Russian diplomacy struck a real note of accord with the growing American interest in disarmament and arms control. The meeting of the Ten-Nation disarmament Committee, though not without real moments of farce, was a reflection of the joint-power interest which both Russia and America felt about the arms race (5) Krushchev in 1957 was reported in Pravada to have said that "if the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could reach a concensus, this would constitute a basic solution". And in connection with the disarmament problem, Mr. Khrushchev went further in detailing a measure of agreement about the inspection problem which would frankly base any such agreement on a strong diminution of the sovereignty of the middle and smal nation-states under a disarmament treaty jointly backed by the two super-powers (6) Even the Soviet political offensive over West Berlin carried with it strong collusive aspects which in fact led to a crisis within the Western Camp. (7) Of course the nuclear test ban talks were the chosen vehicle for the unfolding of the collusive intent of the two super-powers. It was becoming apparent that the East-West detente imposed a great strain on the alliances since any attempt to control the spread of nuclear weapons by the same token stimulated national ambitions, markedly so in France and China. (8) The two super-powers were growing alarmed about the secondary nuclear arms race and as a result discovered a characteristic in common which "they could not or would not share with their respective allies: the final desision over peace or war". (9)

This power to decide the fate of the entire world was, however, severely circumscribed. Singly, neither protagonist could decide with any degree of certainty the fates of even Cuba or Albania. The closer to reality the "shadow condominium"(Dr. Coral Bell's phrase) became, the greater the difficulties are wellknown and the events of 1958-1962 over Berlin led to the Franco-German alliance. But even the Warsaw Pact Powers were to display fissiprous tendencies. (10)

The Soviet government invested the Warsaw Pact with a military significance after 1961 which it singularly lacked

prior to this since, at the time of its foundation in May 1955, it was merely a political device to offset the rearmament of Western Germany within the framework of the West European Union Agreements. But the increased importance of the Warsaw Pact countries in the military defence of the Soviet Union merely increased the political disaffection of its members. Indeed both Rumania and Bulgaria, the latter usually thought to be reliable, have shown a marked tendency to oppose the Soviet Union on important matters.(11)

The American Reaction:

In the face of these developments which had been triggered off by the conflict between the interests of the two super-powers in detente and the interests of their allies in getting greater Security and hence satifsfaction from the alliance arrangements themselves, the U.S. government in particular, like its counterpart the U.S.S.R., started to pay heed to those American scholars who were advocating a convergence of interests arising from the gradual socio-political similarity of the mammoth Russian and American societies. Of course the "convergence theory" was violently opposed and emphatically rejected by Soviet scholars whose interest in co-existence was limited to the avoidance of a major confrontation between Russia and American which could result in nuclear war. The actual impact of these theories on American policy is difficult to determine, and it is in any case not easy to prove a neat casual connection between the growth of the convergence theory and the course of policy actually pursued as between the great powers and as between America's key allies. (12). Yet it did raise fears amongst America's allies about the possibility of a American-Soviet reapprochement. The test must lie in what America has actually done since the balance of power became a decisive factor in international politics. In this context the partial nuclear test ban treaty and the Washington/Moscow hot line are somewhat monotonously advanced as conclusive evidence of incipient colusion. The convergence theorists argue that the Soviet Union and the United States are about to embark on a phase of "mutual discovery" in which both would discover just how complemtary their societies really are.

The Twin Conditions:

The essential prerequisites of the convergence theory related to the facile belief that industrialisation of society must in time lead to a grater degree of liberalization.

Therefore, the two super-powers were increasingly attractive suitors whose social systems were bedoming progressively alike in the face of encroaching old age. This doctrine was endorsed by the late John Strachey. He wrote: "Naturally the differences between them (the U.S. and U.S.S.R.) are still great. But the significant fact is that they are beginning to diminish. Apparently, huge, industrial, vigorous, highly organised communities such as these come to bear certain resemblances to each other, however you organise their productive and social life. It is a sobering and in some respects depressing conclusion. But it does carry within it one supreme gleam of hope. If the gospels being preached to us from the two great power-centres no longer ring in our ears with their old conviction, is there not a chance that such simple humble consideration as the need to stay alive may yet get a hearing?" (13)

The decisive factor, so this school of thought maintained, was the gradual socio-political convergence of Western and Soviet society as a result of a basic econnmic and technological advance which though founded on different idealogical grounds were both determined by the economic basis of society. That one was thought to be "capitalist" and the other "communist". With capital owned privately in the former, and publicly owned in the latter, was now discovered to be a semantic trick, a sleight of hand concocted by political theorists whose apriori reasoning had invented or rationalised a formidably impressive theory of conflict. Yet few in fact would push the argument so far, and in any event Soviet scholars rejected the new theory as a specious notion based upon a series of politically semi-literate assumptions. (14) The more modest interpretation of the convergence theory merely had it that the differences between the respective social systems were not as fundamental as at first supposed. And the major assumption related to the belief that the closed politically primitive societies of the communist world would in time approximate to the more sophisticated open societies. What they seem to envisage, in the words of Curt Gasteyger in his penetrating Adelphi paper, is "less a convergence than a one-sided development, bringing a dynamically moving East closer to a static West"(15) The theory has been taken by the social theorists beyond what strategists would consider proper. Undoubtedly there has been a certain convergence of strategic interests between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. since the emergence of the central-power balance can stand in its own right without the paraphernalia of the convergence theory which W.W. Rostow and the late John Strachey have done so much to propagante on the basis of such slender evidence.

The Crumbling Edifice:

The convergence theory has implications far beyond the relations of the two super powers and is a potent cause of mischief to the respective alliance systems. The major assumption about any degree of great power mutuality of interest is that it can be said to apply automatically to the allies of the two blocs. This belief ignores the very real difference between the respective positions of the member countries of the two alliance systems in a situation where the two super-centrepieces have reached a degree of accomodation. For example, the East-West detente has, in part, reinforced the strategic dichotomy between American and European policy over how far to pursue the detente policy. Even the exponents of the Atlanticist version of alliance policy have combined to reject a bipolar version of alliance policy which sees in Russo-American agreement a means of promoting their security without the need for alliances or dispite their existence. The issue seemed likely to be determined by how far either the Soviet Union and the United States were prepared to pursue bilateral contacts.

The American Attitude:

There is little doubt that the U.S. government, under President Kennedy in particular, did see the importance of stabilized deterrence and the need to achieve an accommodation with the Soviet Union. As we have seen earlier, the new U.S. strategic doctrines, and the experience of the Cuban-missile crisis, led to President Kennedy's new famous speech at the American University on June 10th, 1963, in which he set out his "strategy of peace". He said on that occasion: "Among the many traits that people of our two countries have in common, none is stronger than our mutual abhorrence of war. Almost unique among the major world powers, we have never been at war with each other. Today, should total war ever break out again, no matter how, our two strongest powers are in most danger of devastation... and even in the cold war... our two countries bear the heaviest burdens". Somewhat earlier in his speech he reminded his lesteners that "No nation in the history of battle ever suffered more than the Soviet Union suffered in the course of the Second World War". If world war should come again, all both sides had built, "all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first twenty-four hours". Yet, "we are both caught up in a vicious and dangerous cycle in which suspicion on one side breeds suspicion on the other, and new weapons beget counter-weapons". To move towards peace would "require increased contact and communication". In his speech

to the Irish Parliament eighteen days later he was even more explicit: "Across the guls and barriers that now divide us. we must remember that there are no permanent enemies. Hostility today is a fact, but it is not a ruling law". The supreme reality of our time is our indivisibility as children of God and our common vulnerability on this planet". (16). This speech led to a lot of speculation about the possible extent of the new found East-West detente and initiated a great deal of interest in a favour of a dialogue with Moscow which had for a long time been advocated by those anxious to revert to the opportunity of co-operation with the Soviet Union lost after the conclusion of the Second World War.

The feeling amongst some American strategists was that the two super-powers, now possessed of such enormous power, had really created the conditions of pax atomica which must result in co-existence increasingly based upon the mutual interests of the two powers mostly concerned.

The speech of course came at a time when America was beginning to find alliance diplomacy an increasing strain which had more than once impelled her to threaten "an agonizing reappraisal" of her foreign policy. Deep down in American policy lay the assumption that, compared to the complexity of alliance diplomacy, the polity of a straightforward deal with the Soviet Union was the better alternative if such a development was now feasible because of the Soviet Union's changed attitude. One British writer confidently wrote "that an alliance between Russia and the United States will then emerge has long been forseen: both states are satisfied with the existing territorial distribution of the world; both have nuclear armories and are happy to keep things as they are; both fear the outbresk of war and are troubled lest their revisionist allies drag them into one; the most natural thing in the world is for them to come together". (17) Some years earlier John Stratchey had observed "unless there does dawn upon the Russian and American governments and their allies (who are often even more intransigent than they are themselves) that some sort of ultimate common purpose exists between them, there is no hope for the world". He then postulated what common purpose could possibly unite these two powers at this stage in the world's development the Soviet and American governments can have one, and only one, common purpose. For no serious student of world affairs can doubt that unless they do discover that they have this one basic interest in common, they will both sooner or later perish in nuclear war. But if they do gradually discover the common purpose of survival they may yet unite their wills just siffuciently to enable the United Nations to keep some sort of order in the World". (18)

The same drift in Russo-American policy led another writer to see the slow emergence of what she called the shadow condominium. "Since the Cuba crisis, it has become more and more difficult to avoid viewing world politics in terms of what may be called the shadow condominium. "Shadow" is here used in the sense in which ohne speaks of the "Shadow Cabinet", or the shadow government of a society not yet fully sovereign". Basically "The condominium in question is that of the two dominant powers, America and Russia, and its basic function is their joint management of the central power-balance". (19)

Some American writers also turned predictably to the subject of Russo-American relations. Thus a former American diplomat could write: "Our two societies - American and Russian - which so recently were vowed to each other's destruction are now being drawn together by the recognition that virtually nothing is worth a nuclear war between us, ... once that admission was made ... the whole bloated context of our idealogical rivalry collapsed". (20)

This line of reasoning has undoubtedly much to commend it in terms of preserving international security but is the cause of equally undoubted alarm to some of America's allies. The potency of the Gaullist myth has increased in Europe in direct proportion to the spread of the notion that a bilateral deal was in the interest of Russia and America. The sphere of Russo-American co-operation is seen by some commentators to be severly limited in the short terms but open handed in the long term. The problem was the control of conflict: "On the one hand, there must be an intensive and steadily widening exploitation and experimentation with the whole arry of measures which may restrain or reduce the role of force. On the other hand, there must be an even more substantial comitment of resources and talent to the development of enterprises, of understanding and action which will provide common experience for citizens of the two siedes (i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union. (21)

The speculation about the nature of the unfolding detente and the degree to which it could be developed in the interests of the two super-powers increased by the same token the basic dilemma in American foreign policy. In the words of the Economist", "The United States does have two conceivable policies in the aftermath of the cold war. It can be leader of a united West and deal with Russia from

there. Or it can move towards an entente cordiale of the two great powers, who could have the hope to control everybody else - including the Europeans. So far the United States has chosen the first course, the emphasis on Western Unity. Will it always?" (22)

The United States government has in fact sought to reassure its allies about its intentions vis-a-vis Russia and in August, 1966, Mr. McNamara before a meeting of NATO Defence Ministers rebutted the idea that the U.S. was about to make substantial forde withdrawals from Europe. He deplored the "double standard" by which the U.S.'S European partners feel free to lecture Washington on the decline in the Soviet threat - but then bitterly complain about threatened U.S. force reductions on the basis of unconfirmed reports which have no foundation in fact. McNamara observed, "We believe that a threat remains, and we believe that it should be faced by an ever-stronger NATO". But it should be remembered that this statement must be seen also in the context of the European failure to contribute more forces to NATO and in the light of the U.S. threat to decrease its own contribution unless the European NATO members corrected their glaring "imbalance and inequities". There have been repeated demands in the U.S. Senate to return to the U.S. the 75.000 troops stationed in France plus an across-the board 10 per cent reduction among the remaining 400.000 American troops in Europe.

Understanding the Other:

Professor Thomas C.Schelling has contributed to a whole literature on the essence of conflict and is of the opinion that the U.S.S.R. has mastered the technique of understanding American expectations and reactions to a range of possible contingencies (23). His analysis is based upon a series of realistic assessements about deterrent policy but some of hie more simple minded compatriots have identified in Soviet policy vis-a-vis America the seeds of a transformation that fulfills the prophecy that the Soviet Union has adopted the American conception of political behaviour. The sense of mission in American foreign policy is never far from the surface and the belief in the educative effect that American policy must and ought to have on Russian policy was bound to lead to the conclusion that if this was successfully accomplished then the searing antagonism between them would diminish. This view was reinforced by the hope that its occurence was a necessity if disaster was to be avoided should a major nuclear war break out. The convergence of both Russia and America was seen as both inevitable and utilitarian: "Like the Ford and General Motors of international politics, America and Russia, have begun to realise that they have more in common with each other than they do with the host of petty rivals now challenging their authority." (24)

International Security

The stability of the balance of power became the major factor in determining the whole character of the bipolar world. The beneficial aspects ot that balance was the development of a common purpose which, thouth limited to the prevention of an untoward step towards nuclear holocaust, promised the spectre of a world in the image of the two giants but free of the dreaded fear of immediate vapourization. In the end man would prefer the whips of tyranny to the scorpions of anarchy and the two super powers would be a mild dynasty of enlightened self interest. The overriding importance of bipolarity could be seen in the way in which it compelled "each giant to focus upon crises, while rendering most of them of relative inconsequence. (25)

The notion of crisis management and of centralized nuclear war which were two inter-related aspects of the McNamara analysis as set out in his pronouncement of June 1962 at Annarbor were thought by Kenneth N. Waltz to be indispensable to any rational System of mutual deterrence. Nuclear proliferation had to be

prevnnted and, if need be, this policy should be pursued to the point of rupture with allies who denied its nececcity. Waltz was quite explicit: "By making the two strongest states still more powerful and the emergence of third powers more difficult, nuclear weapons have helped to consolidate a condition of bipolarity. It is to a great extent due to its bipolar structure that the world since the war has enjoyed a stability seldom known, where three or more powers have sought to cooperate with each other or have competed for existenve." (26)

The same theme received attention from John Strachey in his book but this time in the context of the development not merely of world order but perhaps of a world authority: "that two or more of the super-powers might pool their autority, for the one purpose of preventing the outbreak of full-scale nucelar war." Such a development, he surmised, "might take place either in the fairly immediate future between the two existing super-powers, Ameria and Russia... As they learned to co-operate in suppressing the nuclear capabilities of everyone else, they would almost certainly learn a certain toleration for each other". In his Fabian pamphlet he related this more specifically to a possible condominium unterpinning unternational stability, though fearing that it may soon pass: "Therefore the present period of the relative polarisation of world power - for good or ill - is likely to endure, not indeed indefinitely, but for some time. During this period, the opportunity arises of the emergence of an embryonic world authority, based on the discovery of a common purpose in survival by the American and Russian Goverments."(27) It is now time to consider the problem of bipolarity in terms of the immediate relations of the two powers concerned.

Super-Powers Conflict:

The nature of the conflict between Russia and America since the end of the second world war has represented a clash of widely diverging interests. This conflict proved to be a source of such dissension and danger because of the impact of nuclear technology and the fact that Russia was a-state-with-mission. America, too, was not entirely free of a sense of mission. Their respective social systems represent very different political and economic arrangements which, despite the degree of convergense identified by some, are diametrically opposed. But the conflict was not one involving an all-out attempt to impose a solution by one side or the other. As T.C.Schelling observes, the Russo-American struggle was a species of conflict which involved a considerable element of mutual interests (28). The realisation of mutual interests came of course late in the arms race when each side became vulnerable to the other's nuclear attack.(29)

The steady growth of their collective vulnerability gave added meaning to the bilateral dialogue in the field of arms control and disarmement. Indeed the history of the disarmement talks is a striking illustration of the bilateral approach which has often been obscured by the method chosen to conduct these negotiations. In relation to the nuclear test ban talks that the approach to the disarmement problem has not always been characteredeither by a clear dialogue or even a meaningful one. Yet the bilateral character of these talks has certain advantages, even if the principle of a direct Russo-American dialogue has been somewhat compromised by the activities of the Ten Nation Committee in 1960 and the Eighteen Nation Committee of 1962-66.(30)

Hugh Thomas complained of "the timidity of the Western position in 1960" and certainly the Western proposal of March of that year seemed contradictory and vague. There was not much evidence that either Britain or France had played a major role in determining the Western Disarmement posture and indeed the proposal to deal specifically with the means of delivery made by M.Moch was rejected by the U.S.Government. (31). The principle of equal representation for NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries which led to the setting-up of 10 Nation Committee in a sense confirmed the bilateral nature of the disarmement negotations. The feeble British and French sfforts to influence the disarmement talks merely emphasized the essentially bilateral character of the talks. Mention has been made of the proposal made by Monsieur Moch on the question of the background of a sitation in which France had no effective or credible means of delivery. When M.Moch was pressed to say whether France would agree to a cessation of nuclear production for war he seemd to reply that France would not agree to do su unless the USA, USSR and UK actually abandoned their stockpiles. In fact of course neither the French nor the British occupied a separate and independent position at these talks. This is still demonstrably so as the Eighteen Nation Disarmement Conference (ENDC) adequately confirm. This is little doubt that "the allies of the United States and the Soviet Union have played the role of proxies and the neutral States have taken part as mediators, no third state has as yet participated in a disarmement conference as a principal. There has been no equivalent in the post-war world of the 1932 World Disarmement conference, which was genuinely multilateral. (32). And in this regard Philip Noel-Baker seems to ignore the difference between the pre-war and post-war disarmement negotiations in his attempt to cast Britain in the role of a principal. He says of the 1932 Disarmement Conference ultimately met in February 1932; it was not till March 1933 that the British Government laid before it a comprehensive Draft Convention which Sir Anthony Eden had prepared. There was a

general consensus of opinion at the time that, if this had come at the beginning instead of at the end, the conference could hardly have failed; "had only this laudable desire for action and contribution found earlier expression", says Mr.Wheeler-Bennett, "the history of the Disarmement Conference might have been very different". But the British Government, like the French,took too long to make up its mind that disarming itself was better than allowing Germany to rearm; by the time it had done so, Hitler was in power, and the Conference was dead. (33)

Even if Mr.Noel-Baker were right about this there is little doubt that in the post-war period the British Government, unlike its predecessor in 1932, has accepted a minor role in negotiations which are now mainly bilateral in character. The curious fact is that themore Mr.Philip Noel-Baker stresses the importance of a possible British contribution to the disarmement negotiations the more obvious the bilateral character of the talks become. And the failure of the British to play any major or decisive part in these talks, or even attempt to do so, since the presentation of the so-called Anglo-French plan of June 1954, which in any case was a non-starter since the Americans rejected it, is a recognition if this fact. The bilateral character of the talks has in any event become even more marked since France has "declined" to come to Geneva in 1962 and when Communist China was not even invited to do so. (34). The really astonishing thing is that the multilateral attempt to get disarmement - which is required of member states of the United Nations - stands little chance of succeeding unless the tqo super-powers can agree on a measure of arms control or disarmement which then can be endorsed by all the proxy and neutral powers taking part in the process of negotiation without any real degree of consultation or discussion.

The proof of the pudding lies in the way that the few arms control or collateral agreements reached in 1963-64 were negotiated inside the ENDC on a bilateral basis.(35)

The Mutual feedback:

The present Russo-American detente does not merely rest on the few agreements so far achieved in the bilateral discussions of the present period 1963-64 which resulted in the partial nuclear test ban treaty (see Chapter XIV). It rests alike on an incedibly complex series of relationships. In fact just like a marriage its success is something more than the solemnization of a contract. It succeeds or fails on the basis of what the parties to the contract actually say and so. This is a sphere where actions are just as important as words and where intentions are just as important as capabilities. That Russia and America wish to limit their chances of a headlong collison is taken as axiomatic and this means that they would wish to extend their co-operation in order to avoid conflict. This means in effect that in the sphere of deterrence, limited war and "brinkmanship", or crisis diplomacy, they have a

vested interest in extending their bilateral relationship. This can be accomplished in many ways: the signing of treaties or public pronoucements, or even by way of covert and overt communication of intentions, either by accident or design, inadvertent or unconscions communications. (36) The process is the inevitable extension of a relationship based on mutual trestaint, respect and fear. It carries with it the reciprocal action of the type recently initiated by Mr.McNamara over the question of the development of a modest number of anti-balistic missiles by the Soviet Union. This example is worth examining in the context of the "continuouos process by which the USSR and the USA interpret each other's intentions and convey their own view about the arms race. (37)

Balancing the Terror:

In November, 1966, the US Defence Secretary announced that a multibillioj-dollar increase in nuclear missile spending to counter the development of a anti-missile system being installed around Moscow and Leningrad. This initiative was taken because, in the US Judgement, the attempt by the Soviet Union to erect a credible anti-balistic missile (ABM) was threatening to destabilise the nature of the balance of power established by the two super-powers over recent years. Therefore the US decided in the light of this development to spend some extra money on additional rockets. This meant recommending to Congress the need to back the procurement of the Poseidon missile, a submarine-launched weapons system superior in power to the Polaris. This if accomplished would enable the US to deploy the Poseidon missile in such a way as to overcome the ABM's by increasing the weight of the nuclear warhead and the variety of decoys and jamming devices carried by a larger rocket. The cost was unofficially astimated at 16 million which in the circumstances was a cheap way of counter-acting the Soviet ABM system which in contrast to the procurement of the Poseidon missile was a costly method of defence.

Mr.McNamara, in procuring a replacement of the Polaris in the shape of the Poscidon, will effectively restore the balance of power which a credible ABM system threatens to render unstable. It is at the moment considerably cheaper to procure the extra rockets than to invest large sums in adding to the expenditure on the proposed new Nike-Zeus interception systems. But it is worth recalling that muchthe most likely outcome of the latest American move will be to dissuade the Russians from building a large number of ABMs. If this turns out to be so then a further intensification of the arms race will have been avoided largely as a result of American policy. Should, however, the Russians seek to increase their ICBM echelon, in order to offset the extra American procurement thet the blame for such unnesessary development would lie with Moscow where development of new ABM has been untertaken

in a slightly provocative manner. It is true that hitherto both Russia and America have developed an ABM potential bot so far good sende has prevailed and neither side has sought so alarm the other by making such an interception system seen credible. Now at leat the Americans have grown slightly alarmed and have reacted in a restrained way by procuring an extra capacity to destroy Russian targets. The lesson of this is obvious. Neither side must seriously attempt to develop a credible ABM system and should this self-imposed restraint be ignored then one side or the other merely has to procure extra rockets at a fraction of the cost of the ABM system itself. Curiously enough we should welcome the advent of the relatively cheap inter-continental rockett which by its very nature will probably restult in the arms race between the super-powers reaching a state of total dead lock. This is the kind of action and response which is an essential part of a feed-back process upon which international security must increadingly depend. Yet the degree of politico-strategic sophistication required in order to convey this to an increasingly restive public opinion is probably quite a serious problem at least in Western Societies.

The Tacit Understanding

The tacit understanding involved in maintaining a system of mutual deterrence in principle applies to the whole rang of their relations. As T.C.Schelling has made plain, a policy of signals and feed-back is a relationship that involves a minimum of political difficulties for the powers concerned provided they are more or less of similar status and have a fair degree of concurring interests. In fact the overwhelming impression is that bilaretalism, though not an inevitable consequence of the "feed-back" process, is one that is welcomed by the two super-powers concerned. It has for the Soviet Union the enormous advantage of avoiding the political odium attached to an open deal with the U.S. in the face of Chinese charges of collusion and "capitalutationsm". Conversely the U.S. is spared the further complication of conductin her alliance diplomacy against the background of formal agreements with the Soviet Union. Yet the current position is a striking indication of the difficulties involved in conveying, as it were one's intentions simultaeneously to both adversary and friend alike. One's friend is convinced he is about to be "sold down the river" and one's enemy thinsk that some scheme is afoot to "do him down". Neither is entirely reassured and of course no effective way exists of allaying their anxieties on the basis issues affecting their security.

And perhaps a good example of this has been the American attitude in particular to the spread of nuclear weapons. The challenge implicit in the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries raises a profound threat to the stability of the bipolar world. Curt Gasteyger in his Adelphi Paper on the subject of the American strategic dilemma quotes Waltz's contention that "if the number of states is less important then the existence of nuclear power, then one must ask whether the world balance would continue to be stable where three or more states are able to raise themselves to comparable (i.e. with American and Soviet) levels of nuclear potency.... The existence of a number of nuclear states would increase the temptation for the more virile of them to manoeuvre... One would be back in the 1930's with the addition of a new dimension of strength which would increase the pressure upon status quo powers to make piece-meal concessions". (37) Gasteyger himself questions the validity of the three basic assumptions implicit in Waltz's argument, which are: "that the global balance is basically bipolar and stable; that it rests on two 'status quo powers', who behave more responsibly than would some of the nuclear newcomers; and that a multi-nuclear world is also a multipolar one and, therefore, politically less manageable". However, Gasteyger fails to develop his argument that the three basic assumptions are erroneous even though he asserts that the these assumptions 'can be easily challenged'. (37) But can they? Let us examine very briefly the validity of Waltz's three basic assumptions.

The First Contention

This relates to the belief that the global balance is basically bipolar and stable. Well, the first point to note is that over the last eighteen to twenty years the uncontrolled arms race has resulted in something like mutual stalemate. This effectively polarized the world into two huge military alliances in which the two-super-powers played a decisive and dominating role. Yet the distribution of military power was uneven, and the balance of power between these two super-powers always seemed to favour the U.S.A. The reason for this was essentially two-fold: one, that the U.S.A. was essentially a maritime power with an enveloping commitment stretching half-way round the globe; second, that the unfolding of nuclear technology favoured the U.S.A., because being first into this field and also possessing an experienced strategic airforce) the advantage of building a diversified deterrent system in which, finally, the advent of the solid fuelled rocket was to play a decisive role, meant that a strategy of "flexible response" (the deterrent theory of the stable balance of power) conferred on America a greater range of options"

than her major rival possessed. Thus Gasteyger is probably right in questioning the real nature of bipolarity which at times looks more like a euphemism for a prponderance of power in favour of the U.S.A.: But this is not to deny the existence of bi-polarity, which can be said to exist where two powers possess and exert enormous power in relation to other palpabley lesser powers even if the polar extremes are far from equal, and in relation to each other, the two super powers are in fact for from equal. The central point is that some of the lesser powers in the respective alliance systems are far from impotent and, for example, in 1957, Great Britain was a far from issignificant ally of America and actually possessed enough power to deter the Soviet Union without, at that time, American assistance.

However, curiously enough even though the balance of power cannot be said to rest on a mathematical equation, or even a rough approximation of real military strength, it can be thought of as basically stable. That is the so-called nuclear balance of power is one that cannot be upset very easily by a technological breakthrough or even by one that inherently favours the side or the other in achieving a successful pre-emptive blow. It is stable in the sense that neither side can win by simply striking first because both have the power - or capability - to retaliate. Of course it is the fear of retaliation in the face of the absence of a credible defence or interception system that constitutes deterrence. In short the global balance is basically polarized in the sense discussed above (that is, a balance markedly in favour of the U.S. which in terms of strategic delivery vehicles currently gives the U.S.A. 934 ICBMs and the USSR 300) and stable in the sense that Wohlstetter defined it (that is, the existence of a second strike retaliatory system on both sides). (39) The present balance of power, though not a balance of arms, is relatively polarized and stable.

The Second Contention

Waltz's second contention was that the "two status quo powers" behave more reasonably and responsibly than perhaps any potential new nuclear powers can be expected to. This belief may be more difficult to sustain and in any event rests heavily upon the supposition that the two super powers do in fact behave responsibly. This may be difficult to prove because any judgement about the "responsible behaviour" of the super-powers can be disputed not merely by an examination of the historical record but according to whether one considers the word "responsible" a synonym

for the word"cautions". It is true that by and large the super-powers have behaved cautiously vis-a-vis each other but that does not mean that they have always behaved responsibly either towards each other or towards other powers, especially those middle and smal ranking powers whose interests have been in conflict with them. It is the way of all great powers to consider smaller powers not merely deficient in power but deficient in political leadership as well. However, this widespread assumption is not supported by any considerable body of evidence. Perhaps some "status quo" powers have no great desire to change the status quo, especially if it is one that markedly favours them, but the attempt to change it by a "non-status quo" power is not necessarily irresponsible. After all, the status quo confers a degree of privilege on some and induces a degree of dissatisfaction in others. The desire to change it or defend it is not the cause of righteousness. The view that the status quo nuclear powers behave responsibly is a matter of judgement and the view that some potential nuclear powers might behave irresponsibly is a matter of speculation. But even the historical record shows that both super-powers are potentially as reckless as the pursuit of national self-interest inevitably dictates. That they have not been so reckless as some would expect is a matter of some moment and indicates the obvious truth that the two super-powers are indeed cautious in their dealings with each other. But since order must take priority over justice, the caution of the two super powers is by and large in the interests of us all. But the assumption that the present nuclear oligarchs behave more responsibly than possible nuclear newcomers is not one that can be sustained by the historical evidence, which is not to say that either super-power has in fact behaved incautiously or recklessly but that the concept of "resppnsible behaviour" is not entirely meaningful in the conduct of international relations. Yet in a sense what is being asserted by those who believe the nuclear oligarchs to be "responsible" is that they have mastered or come to terms with the essentials of second-strike nuclear deterrence. What, therefore, is the evidence that new or potential nuclear powers would behave more recklessly? The supposition is, of course, that Communist China is certainly in the category of an "irresponsible" nuclear power. But this may not be so, and certainly is a hypothesis of doubtful value. It is one thing to demonstrate that Communist China has a reckless regard for the efficacy of "wars of national revolution" but another to demonstrate that she actually is willing to embark on a reckless or bellicose nuclear policy. In fact the major Chinese justification for her nuclear polidy is of the conventional sort which in their respective ways apply both to British and French

deterrent thinking. "The high priority China attaches to developing nuclear capability may be explained in terms of the Chinese desire both to deter an American nuclear attack and to wield increased influence within the Communist world and within the third world of Afro-Asian-latin American nations. The Chinese may also see their nuclear weapons as a means for establishin Chinese hegemony in Asia? (40) De Gaulle would not dissent from the need of a similar justification for his nuclear weapons in which the deterrence of Russia is secured by an independent French nuclear capability.

Some potential nuclear newcomers like Israel and Egypt are thought perhaps capable of reckless conduct. Once again this is a highly questionable assumption but indeed it can be seen that if nuclear weapons were to spread to countries in potential conflict situations then the risk of nuclear war between them becomes a possibility even though in the short-term the development of nuclear weapons may inhibit actual violence which is now habitually indulged in. (41) Without endorsing the facile view that the world would actually be safer if some nations now threatening the status quo became nuclear powers, it cannot be said that potential nuclear powers are any more likely to behave recklessly than did America and Russia at the height of the cold war when both these powers were strongly motivated by a sense of idealogical as well as great power Cauvinism. At best the assumption that American and Russia conform to "behavioural patterns" different in kind from those expected of other potential great powers or middle-powers is a view firmly rooted in the sound and common-sense belief that both these powers are now conservative and cautious in the light of the nuclear stalemate that exists between them.

The Third Contention

The third contention under-pinning the notion of bipolarity is "that a multinuclear world is a multipolar one and therefore politically less manageable! This argument runs to the core of the present American dilemma. But is it true? In fact there are good grounds for doubting whether it is. Firstly, such nuclear proliferation as has so far taken place has merely emphasized the basic bipolarity of world power. Secondly, the gap between a super power and a second-class nuclear power is still quite enormous and, if anything, the advent of the ABM will further intensify this. Thirdly, the slow spread of nuclear weapons, though posing a threat to the monopoly of the nuclear oligarchs, is unlikely to lead to a multi-lateral configuration in the forseeable future. For example, as an earlier chapter suggested, the only long-term threat to the basic bipolar world would be the emergence of a "European centre of deterrence", which, though possible and perhaps desirable, is still remote from reality. In fact two contra-dictory impulses have worked towards a veritable increase in

bipolar alignments. The first impulse was the development of an independent deterrent system of the kind produced by first Britain and then France, which, whatever the motivation behind this development, actually added to the bipolar nature of the world by increasing the strategic nuclear means at the disposal of the Western Alliance. The second impulse which was initially hostile to the bipolar alignment related to the corrosive influence that, in principle, nuclear proliferation was expected to have on the Western Alliance (that is, the belief that the independent deterrent would reduce the need for American nuclear protection) which in fact developed in such a way as actually to increase American readiness to meet her European obligations (the McNamara thesis) and to an increase in American power so as to fulfil her obligations. The result was a slight intensification of the arms race and a further bipolarization of power. American became stronger and the necessary readjustments made by Russia, the nuclear tests of 1961 being a case in point further increased the essential nature of bipolarity.

Even if the above reasoning is false, it can be contended that if Europe should become a nuclear power in its own right, or if the Anglo-French deterrent did become actual, this new accretion of power would merely complement, (and perhaps reinforce), the American deterrent system and not supplant it or necessarily rival it. In short a multinuclear world does not necessarily mean a multipolar world. Neither France nur China in the short-term can acquire a nuclear deterrent credible enough to destroy the basic bipolarity of world power. It is true that the bipolar world never did consist of two towering super-powers whose economic and military power developed in vacuo. In fact quite the opposite was true. Both super-powers emerged because of their allies not despite them. Of course American depends on her allies to maintain a world role in a more obvious sense than does the Soviet Union and hence an essential feature of the bipolar world has been the relative importance of the alliance systems. A multinuclear world might lead to a multipolar one but there is nothing determinist about this and no inevitable trend towards such a development need come from a wider distribution of nuclear power. But since American policy is based upon postulates very different from those developed above, let us now see this against the background of the problem

of non-proliferation and the demands of maintaining the East-West detente. The paradox is of course that the more America and Russia emphasize the need for a manipulated bipolar world the more likely it is that they will release forces which will tend to undermine it. Nothing is more distructive of Alliance unity that the assumed commonality of purpose between the two giant centre pieces, whose constant references for the need to avoid reckless or precipitate action merely emphasizes the possibility that alliance interests might be sacrificed.

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(36) T.C. Schelling "Signals and Feedback"; Survival I.S. May-June 1965.

(37) Waltz, The Stability of a Bipolar World.

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(41) The present Israeli-Arab tension and periodic violence can be indulged in neither as yet fear that it will involve "unacceptable damage.

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IV. INTERNATIONAL WEHRKUNDE-ENCOUNTER

EUROPE AND THE FRAMEWORK OF AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICY

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It is exactly twenty years since the first of several events occurred that set the framework for the present American defense policy. Britain announced that it was financially unable to continue supporting the Greek government. The American response was the "Truman Doctrine", giving rise to the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty and propounding the basic premise on which American foreign policy was to rest for the next two decades - firmly for more than fifteen years and tentatively for the last three or four.

This premise was that the northern half of the globe was divided into two parts, one part Communist and one part not, the Communist part having a tightness of organization and discipline that the "free" or "Western" (or "other") part did not, a drive toward expansion without scruple as to means, a goal of total world conquest, a willingness to risk violence and to engage in it if necessary, and a capacity for never losing what once it gained so that, even if its foreign adventures alternately succeeded and failed, it would win when it succeeded and hold its own when it failed. In spherical geometry it is possible for a small circle to surround a large one; and though the Communist circle was the smaller one, the rest of the world felt threatened.

In quick succession the blockade of Berlin, the Soviet test of an atomic weapon, and finally the Korean War made national security the main business of the United States government, shattered the myth that fifteen billion dollars was the economic limit to the defense budget, converted American aid programs into "defense-suppprt" programs around the world, eliminated any hope that the defeated countries of World War II could remain demilitarized, and initiated an East-West arms race that was substantially untouched by later rhetoric about "general and complete disarmament".

As so commonly happens, the menace was oversimplified. Unity in the Communist world was taken for granted in America, while disunity in the Western world was always a problem; Soviet threats were credited absolutely, while the "credibility" of the American counter-threat was perpetually debated; and nationalism was expected to be smothered by Communist ideology throughout the Soviet bloc, while in the West an appealing successor to European nationalism was always an aspiration, never a reality.

We have learned a lot in those twenty years, and sometimes we have learned it slowly. First, we have learned that co-existence without major war is possible. We are now two-thirds through the decade of the 1960's, a decade at the beginning of which a noted scientific author proclaimed it almost a "mathematical certainty" that nuclear weapons, even if only by some kind of accident, would blow up the world within ten years. We have learned that the Communist world of the twentieth century is no more immune that a "capitalist world" (or a royalist world) to schism, invective, territorial disputes and even the acknowledged possibility of military engagement. We were slow in this country, terribly slow, to recognize the Sino-Soviet split for what it was, probably because we wrongly believed it couldn't happen, possibly because we were talked by our own propaganda into a monolithic image of the Soviet bloc.

We have learned that the underdeveloped world is extraordinarily difficult to influence, manipulate or control, by Americans with all of their money and armaments or by Russians with all of their money and armaments. It is nearly a decade since the entire Middle East seemed almost in the clutches of the Soviet Union, but the Russians find a Nasser as hard to clutch as we do. The stunning change in the politics of Indonesia during the past year and a half contradicted the forecasts of the most knowledgeable American experts, and proved that Communist political manipulation is capable of failing even on the very brink of success. And we've only recently recovered from a brief panic at the thought that a few hundred Chinese or Cubans with a few truckloads of machine guns and radio transmitters would, with cheap and subtle violence, subvert and then control central Africa and Central America.

And most extraordinary of all may be the discovery - a discovery important to social science as well as to foreign policy - that the countries that had Communist regimes imposed on them by Soviet force and subversion could become less, not more, ideologically Communist with the passage of time; could become less, not more, tightly integrated into a Soviet bloc with the passage of time; and could raise a generation under Communist rule that attests the durability of national identity and cultural continuity in a way that ought to enrage an old Bolshevik.

That important things are happening in Eastern Europe is documented by so many scholars, journalists and travelers whose interests range from business management to scientific meetings, from poetry and editorials to the way people talk

privately and in public, from the role of the party or the police to the role of the professional bureaucrat, that I am ready to accept their testimony, though I neither fully understand it nor can testify at first hand myself. Whatever its political significance - and I believe it to be enormous - what appears to be happening in Eastern Europe contradicts the expectations of some of the best social scientists in the West, many of whom are willing to acknowledge that they did not believe, ten years ago, that the process of "liberalization", or "modernization", could go so far, or that the vitality of national and regional cultures could flourish so.

Some part of this phenomenon is surely "de-Stalinization", and wholly welcome, though it is hard yet to tell whether it was an inevitable development, or a chance phenomenon related to the actual death of Stalin and the choice of his successor. Another part is the resurgence of nationalism, or even "localism", and is a miexed blessing. We may be the beneficiaries of the resurgence of an intense nationalism that embarrasses the Soviet bloc; but whether we should be more pleased at the long-term weakness of Communist ideology or somewhat apprehensive at the long-term strength of local nationalism, is not easy to say.

Still, what is happening in Eastern Europe drastically changes the premises of our foreign policy, our appraisal of Communist world, and the risks and opportunities that will confront us during the coming decade.

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We have learned some things, too, about our side of the Iron Curtain. One is that the nation, as a political and geographical unit, is not too small or politically obsolete to command the loyalty and interest of its citizens. Larger "communities" may be desirable, but not to fill some vacuum of national disillusionment. Another thing we may have learned - and here I risk the disagreement of many friends - is that regionalism is not the political-geographical wave of the future.

Regionalism was expressly allowed for in the United Nations charter; and for a decade it was the great hope for European unity. Sporadically it has been applied to Asia or Africa or Latin America - the idea being that geographical propinquity gives countries a great deal

in common, that neighborliness is the stuff of which federation is forged, and that a country's geographical location determines its interests and responsibilities toward other countries. For land warfare that may still be true; but in the age of jet travel, supertankers, satellite-relayed communications and the increasing similarity of consumption patterns among developed countries, the idea that Germany and the Netherlands, France and Italy, or Japan and Korea should form a "community" because they are close together in mileage on a conventional map, may be an obsolete idea. When people suggest that Britain should join the continent, in the present age one should ask, "Which continent?" An Englishman who breakfasts at home can as comfortably take lunch in New York as in Paris (though the lunch will not be as good); and the idea that Europeans should get together and accept responsibility for "European" problems may reflect an antique geography.

Some more things have happened. One is the abatement of the arms race. Money is indeed being spent on the war in Vietnam, and during the Kennedy administration there was marked improvement in the American ability to fight a non-nuclear war; but in strategic forces there is a striking correspondence between the American arsenal today and the goals laid down in President Kennedy's first defense-budget message of 1961. It is furthermore the first time in more than twenty years that American strategic weapons have not been obsolete by the time they were in hand. From the B-36 to the B-47 to the B-52, to the Atlas and Titan - until the Minuteman and the Polaris, the weapons procured were always inferior to weapons confidently expected in the near future. Sure, there are still qualitative improvements in the missiles, and we have a new all-purpose aircraft in production. Still, when we look back on the development of the atomic bomb and the thermonuclear bomb, the jet airplane and the missile, and the solid-fueled missile that replaced the cumbersome refrigerated-fueled early rockets, there has been no comparable great technological leap in the last half-dozen years.

This is partly a reflection of satisfaction; there is no desperate inadequacy in the present strategic arsenal. It may be partly a slowing down in technological development, a lull in the generation of technological spurts. (Space has been a military disappointment.). Whatever the cause, it has tended to quiet the arms race in the last few years.

And there has been some progress in the more explicit forms of arms control. The test ban of 1963 was heralded as a "first step". Nobody quite knew what second step might follow; but at least the treaty terminated an acrimonious negotiation, and in that modest way helped to ease relations. (It also inflamed Sino-Soviet relations beyond any possibility of concealment or pretense.) It now looks as though the United States and the Soviet Union may actually conclude a tentative agreement on a draft non-proliferation treaty. That would be a spectacular event. It would be spectacular not because it would stop proliferation, or even lead to a generally agreed treaty, but because the United States and the Soviet Union would have celebrated a common interest even while the Vietnamese war was going on, and without being pushed into it by the demands of public relations - even in the face of a good deal of opposition.

It may be premature to anticipate such an agreed draft. Still, the lack of rancor between the Soviet Union and the United States during the past couple of years, while they are on opposite sides of the war in Vietnam, is an extraordinary phenomenon. It leads me to believe, as I did not at the time, that the detente that began three or four years ago is probably a real one. It is going through an acid test, and seems to be passing it.

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Maybe the cold war is over. Maybe the basic premise of the Truman Doctrine, however valid in its time and for the decade that ensued, is now obsolete. This is a different world from that of 1957, when the British government abdicated its role in Greece and invited the United States to assume the leadership of the free world - a different world from that in which NATO was given a desperate mission in the aftermath of the Korean War. It is even a different world from that in which the Berlin Crisis festered and the Berlin Wall went up. (A helpful, though incidental, result of Khrushchev's retirement was the elimination of a Soviet leader who had an embarrassing personal record on the subject of Berlin and its "abnormal" status.)

But the world is not wholly different. The Wall is there. It is not many years since the Cuban Crisis. We in America were slow to recognize how the world was changing; we should avoid trying to improve our average by jumping to sudden conclusions on the basis of recent experience.

The problem for the United States government will be to avoid two extremes. One extreme is continued insistence on the "clear and present danger" that was perceived - I believe wisely, not necessarily correctly but nevertheless wisely - to menace Europe a decade ago. The other extreme is the belief that, if there is no clear and present danger, there is no danger at all. The problem is how to organize our defenses during peacetime. Since the founding of NATO, or at least since the stimulus of the Korean War, it has not been peacetime. The Atlantic Alliance was disciplined and unified by the threat of Soviet aggression; and that threat appeared so great that it took priority over other relations within the Alliance and other relations between the Soviet bloc and the Western Alliance.

Now it appears that, whether or not our judgment of the risks was correct during that early period, the risks are not now as great. Manifestly, the unity and discipline of the Alliance have been degraded by the reduced sense of alarm. For many years relations within the Alliance have been more important than strategy toward the Soviet bloc. This is natural, even correct. (And even if our policies have not been correct, the general change in the environment is undeniable.) It would not be wise, and surely would be ineffectual, to try to whip ourselves into a frenzy of alarm at a Soviet threat that just is not there. It would be equally unwise to leap to the opposite extreme, and to lose interest in the NATO defensive alliance just because the danger is not desperate.

The United States now has a twenty-years tradition of direct involvement in the defense of Europe, expressed in men, money, diplomatic involvement and some sharing of crises. It is furthermore a tradition that reflects an abiding American judgment that Europe is indeed the place where the crucial countries of the world are located. Whatever our present preoccupation with Southeast Asia, the American government's priorities have surely not changed with respect to which nations are crucial in the event of military challenge.

Still, some change is indicated in the <u>issues</u> that are crucial, even if not in the countries. For one, defense policy undoubtedly is judged, and ought to be judged, a degree less important compared with the <u>international</u> political development of the countries concerned. For most of twenty years the United States has been more concerned with the foreign policy, especially the defense policy, of

allied countries than with their internal political development. I do not like to name countries, but I think that Germany, France and Japan are countries whose alignment and whose participation in defense was considered of overriding importance. The internal development of those countries over the next ten years, and their roles in world affairs generally, are now more important to the United States than the character of their defense policies or their participation in defense alliances.

To say this leads to no simple change in policy, since foreign policies, defense policies, and internal policies are so closely connected. Still, to the extent that priorities can be assigned to objectives, the American government ought to be particularly interested in the internal political development of many of its allies, even more than in their contributions to potential defense. Such a judgment is partly a downward revision of the estimate of the external threat, partly a belated recognition of the importance of the internal developments of these countries. And this means that if there is a severe conflict between American strategic preferences and the internal health of those countries, or even the health of America's relations to these countries, American strategic preferences should not dominate.

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All this being said, we still have to ask what the framework of the European-American defense policy should be. The first thing to be said is that it should be European-American. The spirit of the North Atlantic Treaty is still valid; the common need and the common interest are still there; the twenty-years investment in common defense ought to be preserved. No diversion of American interest to the Far East or to the southern half of our own hemisphere can alter the fact that the destiny of the world is more bound up with the people and the political institutions on the European continent than in any other part of the world. The North Atlantic Treaty did not create an American commitment to Europe, it expressed a commitment; and though the specific dangers to which that treaty was oriented may have receeded, meeting such dangers as do arise is still as dependent on collective action as ever. Neither American nor European isolationism would provide a decent framework for defense; and pretending that Europe is a

political as well as a geographical unit, with interests and responsibilities peculiar to Europe as a whole, would be a reversion to an obsolete form of political geography.

The second thing to be said is that the defense framework is not enough. It never was enough; and inside the defense framework there have been many efforts at developing economic and political "communities". But what NATO never had was a foreign policy. Defense alliances are inherently conservative; their purpose is reaction rather than initiative; they have to identify an "enemy", and to focus on only the most vivid and commonly recognized dangers; and they become preoccupied with budgets, command structures, and the contingency of major enemy attack. During the first decade of NATO the problem of defense was an overriding one, the scope for diplomacy small. That is no longer true.

What is happening politically east of the Iron Curtain is becoming as important to those of us who live west of it as what is happening politically in our own part of the world. The possibility of progressively more "normal" relations across the Iron Curtain is an opportunity that no purely defensive framework can handle. Just as the character of the "community" west of the Iron Curtain has been in flux for a decade, so may the "community" east of the Iron Curtain be engaged now in a new kind of exploration, not necessarily deliberate but nevertheless real, the outcome of which may surprise old Bolsheviks and new party leaders, bureaucrats and diplomats, in those countries as much as they surprise us. Apparently neither we in the West nor the Communist parties of the East have a theory that accounts for the changes now going on or that predicts what happens when a bloc of countries that was originally committed to a suffocating ideology begins to show veriety and diversity and some capacity to outgrow ideologies, even party structures, that are unsuited to the times.

The new problem, then, is to find a defense framework that does not stifle diplomatic initiative and adaptability. Where we once needed a "forward defense" we now need a foreign policy even further forward. And it will not be a foreign policy based on the kind of unity and organization that NATO sought as a defense alliance. In the first place, that unity is just not there; in the second place, defense arrangements by their sheer size and physical requirements, their financial implications and their need for command structures, generate a kind of discipline and unity that

diplomacy itself can rarely display, at least among countries enjoying their full sovereignty. So we need a defense framework that can tolerate and acknowledge a degree of diversity, even "disunity", that earlier had to be deprecated.

But we are not starting over again. NATO exists. There will be and ought to be continuity between present and future; and there is no contradiction between the NATO that has existed and the defense framework that will be needed. Even if the demands of the next 20 years will bear little similarity to the demands of the past twenty, we have a going organization, a tradition to give us some confidence, and a potent defense force. The problem of adapting this force to the needs of the future will be difficult, but surely not as hard as it was to build it up to meet the needs of the past. The test of whether our twenty-years' investment will serve us well during the next twenty is whether we can cope not only with the reduced sense of danger and consequent relaxation on our side, but with the enriched diplomatic opportunities of the future.

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The United States will undoubtedly prefer to keep, and ought to keep, a sizeable body of its own troops in Europe. This need not be thought of, and I believe is not thought of, as the perpetuation of an asymmetry between the United States and Europe, but is simply a reflection of the fact that we have a common frontier to guard in Europe but do not in America. The troops will continue to serve the two parallel purposes they have been serving. First, to embody the American commitment to collective defense and leave the Soviet Union in no doubt that that commitment not only still stands but would be unavoidable in an emergency. And second, to strengthen the actual defenses and to provide a more flexible capability for responding to emergencies.

Let me emphasize this flexibility. It might be argued that American troops, once brought home, could still be returned to the European theater in case of emergency, perhaps in plenty of time to meet an actual defense need. This would be a risky strategy, useless perhaps against a sudden surprise attack from the East and perhaps too slow for any emergency that arose; but the risk of successful sudden surprise, unheralded by visible build-up or diplomatic escalation, is surely a low risk, and not all

crises escalate rapidly. So the risk might appear to be tolerable. A disadvantage, though, is that it necessarily makes a big crisis out of a little one; it involves a dramatic decision to move troops back into Europe; it cannot be done casually, and it runs the risk that returning too few troops will look hesitant, returning too many will look bellicose. It has some - not much, but enough to cause concern - of the character of "mobilization", of an enterprise that, once started, is hard to stop, with the necessity for choosing between the extremes of too much and nothing. It is also, though speedier in the coming era of plentiful air transport, a little slow if American participation is diplomatically required in even a small-scale military action. In a crisis that carries the danger of war, a crisis of escalating incidents and of small probes that, once successful, quickly enlarge to major commitments, speed is often worth more than numbers. Flexibility requires a highquality ready force, and one that can act without the need for politically cumbersome preparations.

A prerequisite for the continued presence of American troops in Europe is an adequate collective-security framework. If it becomes, or even appears, merely a German-American defense alliance, it will not only loose much of its purpose and much of its support but be positively unhealthful in the relations among NATO countries.

But the numberof American troops in Europe should not be read continually like a thermometer to see whether the American commitment is still a healthy one. We should not have to ignore the new technology of airlift, for example, just to avoid arousing apprehensions that if some troops leave the rest will not be far behind. Nor should we assume that the demand for American troops in Europe is independent of the number of Soviet troops stationed West of the Soviet border. We should let the Soviet Union enjoy a standing invitation to withdraw troops of its own with a view to some reciprocity. There are the familiar risks involved, but some of the rewards would be pretty substantial too.

Flexibility of doctrine and strategy will be at least as necessary in the future as it has been desirable in the past. I am afraid that "flexible response" became too closely indentified with the idea of a wholly conventional defense of Western Europe, a concept that many Europeans found expensive, implausible, and slightly suspicious.

That is not what I have in mind in calling for flexibility. Rather I have in mind that, even more in the future than in the recent past, our defense strategy must be based on acknowledged uncertainty about the location and character of emergencies may arise. The possibility of a massive deliberate Soviet attack has probably too much dominated our strategic arguments, if not our strategic planning. NATO strategy should be informed by the study of a wide variety of "scenarios", of potential military crises, deliberate or unintended, taking somewhat unpredictable courses. A single all-purpose military doctrine is not only unwieldy but always invites initial inaction, requires heroic decisions, and substitutes abstract principles for concrete problems that need to be solved. My impression is that what used to be called "Berlin contingency planning" was much more productive than big strategic arguments about nuclear decisions.

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Finally, our defense framework must make room for the strong likelihood, perhaps the certainty, that some of the big nuclear questions that have troubled the alliance will never be satisfactorily solved. Some problems just have no solutions. In nuclear matters, equality and inequality are both unsatisfactory; tightly centralized control and decentralized control are both unsatisfactory; and no command arrangements or ownership arrangements will disguise how unsatisfactory the division of nuclear responsibilities among us is.

The most we can hope for is that with some restraint, some self-discipline, some awareness of each other's sensitivities on these matters, we can avoid the kinds of theological arguments over abstract and legalistic principles that have exercised the alliance for the last half dozen years.

The critical question will be the German attitude toward nuclear weapons. Broadly speaking, I see three components of the German interest. One is strategic, it involves having an appropriate influence on the nuclear strategy of the alliance and of the United States, not as a matter of right or obligation or prestige but as a matter of being statisfied that nuclear plans are compatible with German interests. The second is the question of prestige, discrimination, equality, and all the symbolism that goes with nuclear possession. And the third is "the German problem".

The first, I think, is the least important but also the one most susceptible of practical solution. Whether or not the nuclear committee structure being established in NATO is going to provide adequate strategic consultation, at least we can work at it and hope for success. Anyway, great and dangerous errors in strategic nuclear policy are unlikely to be made for lack of coordination and consultation.

The second component - equality, discrimination and prestige - is one of those arguments that can go either way. If the Germans insist, and the rest of us encourage them to insist, that nuclear weapons are a kind of "sixth freedom", the birthright of a nation and the mark of its sovereignty, the sign of its equality in the community of nations and the mark of its technical process, then I am afraid that nuclear weapons will indeed come to possess precisely these qualities and make non-possession a stigma. On the other hand if a country of Germany's size and importance, of Germany's undoubted technical prowess, making the contribution to defense that Germany is making, noticing the expense and the embarrassment and the divisiveness that goes with nuclear "prestige", can choose to be indifferent, can refuse to consider itself unequal, can declare implicitly or explicitly that the possession of nuclear weapons is a bad bargain, then maybe it will be nuclear armament, not Germany, that loses prestige. (In the technology of the future, nuclear weapons may be much easier for a nation to possess than a trained, disciplined army with good moral and good commanders, loyal to the country und neutral in politics; a first-rate army division will command more admiration than a missile with a nuclear weapon in its nose and no place to go.)

On the third component, the "German problem", I am hesitant either to take a position or to give advice to the distinguished participants of this conference. Perhaps you will allow me the liberty, though, of quoting the Hon. Gerhard Schröder, writing as Minister of Foreign Affairs somewhat over a year ago. "We frequently find", he said, "an outdated image of Germany in Eastern Europe... characterized by mistrust and fear, based on recollections of the era when the national socialist megalomania raged with particular brutality in Eastern Europa... Our first task must be to see to it that the east European countries approach the Germany which we represent without mistrust or apprehension... For the frightful image of a militarist and revanchist Germany is a cheap and useful means of binding the East European countries to the Soviet Union... What will require more effort will be to convince the East European countries and the Soviet Union itself that a united Germany would serve their national interest better than the maintainance of a permanent source of tension in the heart of Europe, that Germany does not represent a danger to their security."

I should like to leave implicit the conclusions I draw from these eloquent remarks, but it might be unfair to Mr. Schröder. For he also said, "We shall not spare efforts to dispell mistrust and fear and thus to relax tension in Europe, but we cannot achieve this by practicing self-denial." (My underline.) Since I want to draw an important conclusion about the value of self-denial, I hope that I correctly interpret this last-quoted remark as referring only to what he expressly montioned: the status quo in Europe, the right of self-determination for all Germans, and the restoration of German unity. The value, in this very context, of nuclear self-denial is something that I hope, and actually expect, will continue to appeal to most Germans.

If that is so, then I foresee that the nuclear issues that have caused the alliance so much trouble and embarrassment in recent years, and that are presently subdued by a combination of fatigue and other pressing business, may remain in the present comparatively happy state of "tolerable dissatisfaction".
