Institut Atlantique

Conference on East-West Relations

Roma - 21/23 ottobre 1966

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6 - K.A.Jelenski: Ideocratie et rationalité, universalité et polycentrisme.

7 - R.Strausz-Hupé: Change in the East: perceptions and metaphors.

8 - J.Leich: The United States and west european exchanges program with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

9 - T.W.Wolfe: Soviet military power and european security

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The Atlantic Institute
L'Institut Atlantique

October 5, 1966

CONFERENCE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS, ROME, OCTOBER 21-23, 1966

MEMORANDUM TO PARTICIPANTS

This is to bring you up-to-date and inform you of some of the details concerning the Atlantic Institute's Conference on East-West relations in Rome, October 21st, 22nd and 23rd, 1966.

The Institute has been most fortunate in obtaining the facilities of the Villa Lubin in the Villa Borghese in Rome for our meetings. CIT, the Italian Tourist Agency, has put their hotel and travel reservation services at the disposal of participants, and if they have not already been in touch with you, you will be hearing from them shortly.

The Conference will open on Friday, October 21 at 9:30 A.M. and will close on Sunday, October 23 around 6:00 P.M. You are cordially invited to be the guest of the Institute at a welcoming dinner on the evening of Thursday, October 20. We will advise you of the time and place of this dinner at a later date. On each of the three days we plan to have a morning session from 9:30 A.M. to 12:30 P.M. and an afternoon session from 3:00 P.M. to 6:00 P.M. Luncheons will be provided for the participants on October 21st, 22nd, and 23rd at a restaurant near the Villa Lubin or at the Villa itself. The program of meetings will be as follows:

October 21

9:30 - 12:30 Speakers

Michel Tatu	Soviet Union
James Brown	Balkans
Leo Labedz	Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany
Klaus Mehnert	The Communist Camp

3:00 - 6:00 Group Discussions

24 quai du 4-Septembre, Boulogne-sur-Seine, France
Tel. 825 51-40 Cable: Atlinst-Paris

October 22

9:30 - 12:30 Presentation of 4 papers

Pierre Hassner	Impact of Eastern Diversity on Western Unity
Richard Löwenthal	Discussant
Thomas W. Wolfe	Soviet Military Power and European Security
Jean Laloy	Discussant
Michael Kaser	Policy Factors in East-West Trade
John Montias	Discussant
K.A. Jelenski	Ideocracy and Rationality, Universalism and Polycentrism
Pietro Quaroni	Discussant

3:00 - 6:00 Group Discussions followed by Plenary Session

October 23

9:30 - 12:30 Speakers

Richard von Weizsäcker	German Reunification
Zbigniew Brzezinski	Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the Years to Come
Max Kohnstamm	The Future Shape of Europe

3:00 - 6:00 Plenary Session and General Summary

We are forwarding to you under separate cover an annotated bibliography, as well as copies of the four papers which will be discussed on the second day of the Conference, and also a study contributed by Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupé. We shall also send you prior to the meeting a list of all those participating.

If you have any further questions about the arrangements for this meeting, please do not hesitate to get in touch with us.

Walter Dowling
Director General

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The Atlantic Institute
L'Institut Atlantique

East-West Conference, Rome, October 21-23, 1966

Participants as of October 14

FRANCE

M. Léo Hamon
M. Pierre Hassner, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques
M. Konstantin Jelenski, Congrès pour la Liberté de la Culture
M. Jean Laloy
Docteur Jean-François Lemaire, Secrétaire Générale des Clubs Réalités et Perspectives
M. Pierre Mahias, Secrétaire Général, Association Françaises pour la Communauté Atlantiqu
M. Michel Tatu, Le Monde
M. Marc Ullman, L'Express

GERMANY

Mr. Harry Hamm, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
Professor Richard Löwenthal, Universität Berlin
Professor Klaus Mehnert, Institut für Politische Wissenschaft
Professor Klaus Ritter, Director, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Dr. C.G. Ströhm, Editor, Christ und Welt
Mr. Stephan Thomas, International Department, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker, President, Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchentag

GREECE

Professor Efstathios E. Papanicolaou, Advisor to the Minister of Economic Coordination

ITALY

Mr. Paolo Calzini
The Honorable P. Campilli, President of the National Council of Economy and Labor
The Honorable Attilio Cattani, President, Olivetti-General Electric
The Honorable Franco Mario Malfatti, Undersecretary, Ministry of Industry and Commerce
Professor Rodolfo Mosca, University of Florence
The Honorable Egidio Ortona, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Honorable Pietro Quaroni, Director RAI-TV
Professor Altiero Spinelli, Director, Instituto Affari Internazionali
Dr. Vittorio Valletta, President and Director General, F.I.A.T.
The Honorable Mario Zagari, Undersecretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

24 quai du 4-Septembre, Boulogne-sur-Seine, France
Tel. 825 51.40 Cable : Atlinst-Paris

NETHERLANDS

Dr. Ernst Hans van der Beugel, K.C.M.G., Vice-Chairman of the Netherlands' Institute for for International Affairs
Mr. Jerome Heldring, Nieuse Rotterdamse Courant
Mr. Max Kohnstamm, Vice-President of the Committee on Action for the U.S. of Europe

TURKEY

Mr. Nuri Eren, Secretary General, Economic Research Foundation, Istanbul

UNITED KINGDOM

Mr. Alan Booth, Commission of the Churches on International Affairs
Professor Michael Kaser, St. Antony's College, Oxford
Mr. Leopold Labedz, Editor, Survey
Mr. Roy Pryce, Director, Center for Contemporary European Studies, University of Sussex

UNITED STATES

Dr. Richard V. Allen, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace
Mr. Frank R. Barnett, President, National Strategic Information Center
Mr. James Brown, Radio Free Europe, Munich
Mr. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, U.S. Department of State
Professor James Christoph, Director, Atlantic Community Studies Center, Ohio State University
Mr. E. Russell Eggers, Vice-President and Representative, Chase Manhattan Overseas Banking Corporation
Mr. Thomas J. Kane
Mr. Robert T. Kleiman, The New York Times
Mr. John F. Leich, The George Washington University
Professor John M. Montias, Department of Economics, Yale University
Mr. John Richardson, Jr., President, Free Europe Inc.
Professor Robert Strausz-Hupé, Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania
Colonel Thomas W. Wolfe, The RAND Corporation

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Mr. Robert Luc, Political Director, Council of Europe
Mr. Erhart Poincilit, Director Trade Branch, OECD
General Niemer Tufte-Johnsen, Commandant, NATO Defense College

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The Atlantic Institute
L'Institut Atlantique

EAST-WEST CONFERENCE, ROME, OCTOBER 21 - 23, 1966

A Short Bibliography

For the convenience of those persons invited to the Atlantic Institute's Conference on East-West problems who are not specialists in this field, the Institute staff has selected a few particularly interesting articles and documents:

An article by J.F. Brown issued in Survey of January 1965 provides the general reader with an overall view of the developments which have taken place in the various countries of Eastern Europe since the war.

In the economic sphere, a pamphlet published by PEP in May, 1965 exposes very clearly the specific problems and difficulties which beset "East-West Trade."

In the special issue of Survey of January 1966 among many valuable contributions devoted to our subject, one can single out the exposé by John Pinder on "EEC and Comecon."

In the September 1965 issue of East Europe, Michael Gamarnikow, in an article entitled "Eastern Partners for Western Businessmen," quotes a few most interesting examples of collaboration between various state-owned enterprises of certain Eastern European governments and Western businesses.

The French reader will find in Esprit, January 1966, an article by Fejtö on the subject: "l'Est Européen et le conflit sino-soviétique."

Theo Sommer in the July 22nd and 29th issues of the Zeit has grouped under the general title "Thoughts on Germany" a history of German ideas on the re-unification problem which is of particular interest to the non-German reading public. For this reason a translation into English is appended. People especially interested in the German question will find in this article a copious bibliography on the subject.

24 quai du 4-Septembre, Boulogne-sur-Seine, France
Tel. 825 51-40 Cable : Atlinst-Paris

An article by Paul-Henri Spaak in Le Figaro, "La detente passe par Bonn," also appended, sets out with clarity certain views common in most countries allied with Germany.

While the present Vietnam conflict seems to preclude spectacular American initiative toward Eastern Europe in the immediate future, Zbigniew Brzezinski in the April 1965 issue of Encounter and in his book Alternative to Partition describes the broad lines of what could be "Peaceful Engagement: a Plan for Europe."

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Finally the German reader will find a short annotated bibliography, in German, kindly contributed by Professor Klaus Mehnert.

Olivér von Gajzágó, Die Problematik der Integration im Rahmen des Rats für Gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe, in : Osteuropa; 9/ 1964, S. 617-624 und 10/1964, S. 712-723.

Die Schwierigkeiten der Integration innerhalb des Comecon liegen vor allem in der Problematik der Partnerschaft zwischen einer übermächtigen Grossmacht und mehreren kleineren Mitgliedern, und zwar in wirtschaftlicher wie in politischer Hinsicht. Die Konfrontation mit nationalen Problemen hat die einzelnen Regierungen nach der Konsolidierung ihrer Herrschaft gezwungen, gerade im Interesse der Aufrechterhaltung der kommunistischen Herrschaft nach nationalen Lösungen dieser Schwierigkeiten zu suchen, so dass heute (im Gegensatz zur Entwicklung in der EWG), zumindest was das Verhältnis zur Sowjetunion angeht, mehr ein Auseinanderstreben der wirtschaftlichen Einheiten im Comecon zu beobachten ist, als ein fortschreitendes Zusammenwachsen zu einem geschlossenen Wirtschaftsblock.

Rudolf Urban, Die "verlorene Zeit" - Die literarische Entwicklund in der Tschechoslowakei seit 1958, in : Osteuropa, 11/12, 1963, S. 772 - 784.

Nach sieben "verlorenen Jahren" (seit Beginn der Enstalinisierung in der Tschechoslowakei) fordern die Schriftsteller die Möglichkeit der Auseinandersetzung mit der politischen und literarischen Vergangenheit, während die Partei die Verzögerung des Tauwetters rechtfertigt und auf der Loyalität der Schriftsteller besteht.

Günter Bartsch, Djilas und Kołakowski - Demokratischer Kommunismus und kommunistische Demokratie ?, in : Osteuropa, 5/1965, S. 289-295 und 6/1965, S. 385-392.

In der nachstalinschen Zeit haben sich M. Djilas und L. Kołakowski besonders um eine qualitative Reform des Kommunismus bemüht. In seiner Analyse des Stalinismus kommt Djilas zu dem Schluss, dass Stalinismus und Sozialismus unvereinbar sind und dass die Demokratie eine unabdingbare Voraussetzung des Sozialismus darstellt. Zur Verwirklichung des sogenannten "menschlichen Sozialismus" forderte er : erstens Rechtsstaatlichkeit, zweitens Meinungsfreiheit und drittens Respektierung politischer Minderheiten. - Kolakowskis Auftritt begann mit dem Anschlag von 48 Thesen an das Schwarze Brett der Universität Warschau, die negative Definitionen des Sozialismus beinhalteten und das Grundmotiv des polnischen Revisionismus dar-

stellten; er fordert nicht Sturz, sondern Reformation des kommunistischen Systems mit dem Ziel einer kommunistischen Demokratie, die sich auf demokratischen Kommunismus gründet.-

Die Frage, wieweit der "intellektuelle Kommunismus", als deren Vertreter ausser Djilas und Kołakowski auch Havemann, Bloch und Lukács angesehen werden können, in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem "institutionellen Kommunismus" nicht nur reformerisch, sondern auch qualitativ verändernd wirksam werden wird, kann noch nicht beantwortet werden.

Michael von Berg, Auswirkungen der EWG auf den Handelsverkehr zwischen EWG-Ländern und kommunistischen Staaten, in : Osteuropa-Wirtschaft, 3/4, 1963, S. 161-179.

Seit Abschluss der "Römischen Verträge" 1957 richteten sich ständig mehr oder minder heftige sowjetische Angriffe gegen die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, die als Übereinkunft der Monopole, Banken-und Industriekartelle bezeichnet und der vorgeworfen wird, sie betreibe handelspolitische Diskriminierung gegenüber den sozialistischen Ländern und errichte künstliche Handelsbarrieren. Hinter dieser Polemik steht die Befürchtung, dass mit dem schrittweisen Inkrafttreten der EWG-Verträge eine Stagnation bzw. ein Rückgang in den Handelsbeziehungen der Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft mit Drittländern (in diesem Fall mit Ländern des Ostblocks) eintreten werde, eine Befürchtung, die sich durch die Gemeinschaftsregelungen zur Überwachung der Importe aus Staatshandelsländern teilweise schon verwirklicht hat.

Werner Gumpel, Das Verkehrswesen im Integrationsprozess der Comecon-Staaten, in : Osteuropa-Wirtschaft, 2/1963, S. 81-101.

Das Verkehrswesen der osteuropäischen Staaten wird fest in die vom Comecon betriebene wirtschaftliche und politische Integration dieser Länder einbezogen, die ohne Koordinierung der nationalen Verkehrs- und Transportsysteme gar nicht möglich ist. Sie erfolgt über eine gegenseitige Abstimmung der Entwicklungspläne für das Verkehrswesen im Rahmen der Koordinierung der Volkswirtschaftspläne. Seit Juni 1958 betsteht eine ständige Kommission für Fragen des Transportes, deren Sitz Warschau ist. Voraussetzung für die Verwirklichung einer hochgradig integrierten sozialistischen Grossraumwirtschaft ist die Aufrechterhaltung der politischen Bindung der Comecon-Staaten an die Sowjetunion, ihr Ziel ist eine weitgehende wirtschaftliche Unabhängigkeit vom westlichen Ausland, die jedoch ungeheuere Investitionen in das Verkehrswesen bedingt, z.B. für die Koordinierung des Gütertransportes per Eisenbahn und für den Ausbau

der Binnen-und Seeschiffahrt.

Klaus Mehnert, Westwind über Osteuropa, in : Osteuropa, 1/1966, S. 3-17.

Die Staaten Osteuropas (westlich der Sowjetgrenze) haben den Eisernen Vorhang ein Stück gehoben, erstens um mehr an der wissenschaftlichen und technischen Entwicklung des Westens teilzunehmen und zweitens um ihre jüngste devisenbringende "Industrie", die Touristik, aufzubauen. Die Folge ist, dass der Westwind stark über Osteuropa weht und viele Ideen und Wünsche mit sich bringt, die dem Regime sehr missfallen. Die Wirkung des Westens wird noch durch den vom Verfasser so genannten Schlüsselloch-Effekt verstärkt : Was man nur durch das Schlüsselloch sehen dar, erscheint besonders attraktiv.

La détente passe par Bonn

Paul-Henri Spaak

Le problème de l'unification allemande est, sinon le seul qui se pose en Europe, du moins, et de loin, le plus important. C'est l'état de division de l'Allemagne et toutes les conséquences qui en découlent qui nous empêchent de pratiquer comme nous le voudrions, c'est-à-dire jusque dans ses extrêmes conséquences, une politique, de coexistence pacifique que l'évolution des pays communistes rend aujourd'hui possible et désirable.

L'Allemagne fédérale se trouve dans une position difficile. On comprend les hésitations de ses dirigeants tiraillés par des impératifs divers: nécessité de maintenir leur alliance avec les Etats-Unis qui, seule, peut assurer leur défense en temps de querre; désir de consolider leurs bonnes relations avec la France, condition nécessaire de la paix en Europe et, dominant tout le reste, leur volonté de réunifier leur pays.

Pendant quelques années, la politique étrangère de l'Allemagne fut un très grand succès. Le chancelier Adenauer, l'un des rares hommes d'Etat qui - sachant sacrifier les petits avantages de l'immédiat à des vues ambitieuses sur l'avenir - en fut l'heureux responsable...

L'incontestable succès de cette politique est pourtant incomplet. L'objectif premier de la réunification reste à réaliser. Or il apparaît que cet objectif essentiel demeure, malgré le temps qui passe, toujours aussi éloigné. Aujourd'hui, la politique allemande se heurte à un obstacle qui semble infranchissable. Depuis près de vingt ans, le problème de l'unification n'a fait aucun progrès et, dans l'état actuel des choses, il est insoluble. Les deux camps, l'Est et l'Ouest, occupent des positions de départ tellement différentes, ils s'y tiennent avec une si totale intransigeance que toute possibilité de compromis paraît impossible.

Il est évident qu'il est illusoire pour les Allemands d'espérer que la réunification de leur pays puisse venir d'un accord entre les Russes et les Occidentaux. Il paraît également évident que c'est une maigre consolation que de leur faire miroiter la solution de leurs problèmes dans une Europe qui irait de l'Atlantique à l'Oural. Sans prétendre que c'est là une vision absolument chimérique, à jamais irréalisable, il est réaliste de croire que ce n'est pas une solution très prochaine. Il faut donc chercher autre chose. C'est des Allemands eux-mêmes que dépend la solution de leurs problèmes. Durant ces derniers mois quelques progrès, encore très faibles, mais encourageants parce qu'ils indiquent une volonté de sortir de l'immobilisme, ont été faits. Les socialistes de l'Ouest ont raison d'accepter le dialogue avec les communistes de l'Est.

M. Barzel a raison de lancer des idées nouvelles, même si elles ont peu de chance d'être acceptées. L'essentiel, c'est de chercher le résultat au-dela de controverses habituelles, avec des arguments autres que ceux utilisés jusqu'à maintenant.

Si les Allemands de l'Ouest veulent que l'opinion publique des pays occidentaux les s outienne dans cette voie nouvelle, ils devraient avec courage prendre des positions claires sur deux problèmes: celui des frontières et celui de l'armement nucléaire.

Je suis convaincu qu'un peu d'audace en ces deux matières ferait heureusement progresser leurs discussions.

Est-ce que, d'ailleurs, le problème des frontières se pose encore? Est-ce que la thèse occidentale en cette matière répond encore à la réalité? Est-ce qu'il y a quelqu'un qui croit qu'il est encore possible de revenir sur ce que les faits ont consacré depuis tant d'années? Est-ce qu'il est raisonnable de prétendre que le problème ne peut être résolu que lors de la conclusion d'un traité de paix?

Dans la réalité, la reconnaissance des frontières ne constitue plus pour les Allemands de l'Ouest un véritable sacrifice. Refuser d'y consentir, croyant ainsi garder un atout en vue de futures négociations, est une illusion. Une franche reconnaissance de la réalité serait, j'en suis convaincu, infiniment plus profitable.

En matière nucléaire, dissiper toute équivoque

En matière nucléaire, il faudrait aussi que les Allemands dissipent toute équivoque. Ils répètent souvent qu'ils sont les seuls à avoir accepté certaines restrictions en la matière. Ils demandent que d'autres les accompagnent dans cette voie. En cela, ils devraient aller plus loin. Ils ne devraient pas poser des revendications qui relèvent du simple prestige en demandant des modifications dans l'organisation de la défense atomique de l'Europe.

Il semble qu'ils peuvent logiquement **re** clamer deux choses. La première: être parfaitement informés de toutes les mesures qui sont prises par les Américains pour la défense de l'Europe. La deuxième: qu'aucune arme atomique, tactique ou stratégique ne soit employée sans leur consentement sur leur territoire.

Personne ne peut légitimement leur contester ce double droit. Les travaux actuellement en cours à l'OTAN, en le leur assurant, doivent leur donner toute satisfaction. A cela devrait se limiter leur désir. Toute demande supplémentaire de leur part éveille à l'Est de profondes inquiétudes. Jamais si autre chose leur était accordé

on ne pourrait espérer conclure l'indispensable traité sur la non-diffusion des armes nucléaires et jamais on ne pourrait convaincre les pays de l'Est que l'on ne s'engage pas dans une politique qui permettrait un jour à l'Allemagne de posséder son arme atomique propre.

Sans aucun profit réel pour la défense de l'Europe et, par conséquent, de l'Allemagne, des revendications allemandes peu raisonnables sont de nature à rendre beaucoup plus difficile toute politique de détente en Europe. Nous sommes en droit de leur demander de ne pas insister ... de contribuer aujourd'hui à la politique de rapprochement qui s'impose entre les pays de l'Ouest et ceux de l'Est, à apporter leur contribution propre par l'acceptation des frontières et leur renonciation à toute demande en matière atomique. Ainsi, j'en suis convaincu, ils assureraient les conditions nécessaires à leur réunification et ils contribueraient utilement à la paix en Europe. Ce serait tout bénéfice pour eux et pour nous.

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POLICY FACTORS IN EAST-WEST TRADE : A SURVEY OF CURRENT DEBATE

by

Michael KASER

East-West Conference, Rome, October 1966

24 quai du 4-Septembre, Boulogne-sur-Seine, France
Tel. 825 51-40 Cable : Atlinst-Paris

I. INTRODUCTION

II. THE NEGOTIABILITY OF EAST-WEST TRADE

(a) The size of the transactions

(b) Policies on embargo

(c) Quantitative restrictions

III. TECHNIQUES SPECIFIC TO EAST-WEST TRADE

(a) State-trading and most favoured-nation treatment

(b) Bilateralism and multilateralism

(c) Long-term agreements

(d) Joint ventures

(e) Credits

I. INTRODUCTION

East-West trade has been, and remains, sufficiently small a part of the commerce of both groups of partners to permit decisions on its expansion to be weighted heavily by political considerations. Economic factors are, however, emerging in the East which would tend to enlarge the trade, and which pose the question of its political negotiability. The Soviet declaration (in the text of the 1966-70 Plan) of its intention to raise the efficiency of its own resources by more exchanges with the industrialized West comes after two major checks to economic integration within what Stalin in 1952 called "the socialist world market". The first was the defection of the socialist states which were economically least developed - China, Albania and, in a limited manner, Rumania. The second was the construction of the plans for coordinating the eastern European economies through Comecon and for multilateral payments between them. Among those other states of eastern Europe the devolution of economic management (save only in Rumania) is generating a demand for foreign trade which has so far been restrained or obscured by tightly-centralized planning.

Of the western countries which could supply this increased demand, the United States maintains strict controls over eastern trade while the preponderant official view elsewhere is that exchanges should develop solely as commercial advantage indicates. This attitude is qualified in the Federal German Republic by the absence of diplomatic representation in the East other than in Moscow and by the special problems of intra-German trade; the French Government has made determined efforts - including the complete abolition of import quotas - to promote trade with the East. For the United Kingdom, the development of East-West trade has had an adverse effect on its balance of payments : in particular, its deficit with those

countries has rapidly increased, and, in general, heavy Soviet purchases of grain have depressed its terms of trade. Policy differs also among western governments on the accordance of state-guaranteed credits for transactions with the East. At the one extreme such credits are not provided in the United States, and, at the other, are available for up to 15 years (from date of contract) in the United Kingdom.

For the intergovernmental groupings of the West - principally EEC, NATO and OECD - the prime policy choice would appear to be whether to coordinate policy, and, if so, whether, on the one hand, the approach to the East should be through those agencies or bilaterally, and on the other hand, whether negotiations should be encouraged through the medium of Comecon.

The political effects of a unified western approach might be considerable, but the opportunities for government initiative in this field are diminishing as business interests in such trade increase. There is nevertheless a significant economic gain from multilateral negotiation on the expansion of exchanges between state traders and market economies. The equivalent of a tariff reduction or of liberalization can probably best be found in commitments to increase imports by the state-trading countries, but if these are undertaken bilaterally the increment may be at the expense of third parties. Techniques for such discussions have been reviewed both in GATT and in ECE.

Not only trade but payments have hitherto been strongly bilateral in East-West relations. Sterling has become the sole currency effectively convertible in such exchanges, and in present conditions the British government can hardly be prepared to tolerate the burden indefinitely. Increasing trade between the East and the developing countries, where currency inconvertibility is the rule on both sides, and which could in some cases be settled by trade with western developed economies,

is a further argument for multilateral financial institutions. The ECE Multilateral Compensation Procedure has regained vigour from the impact of the developing countries on East-West payments, and the Bank for International Economic Cooperation has been authorized by its members (identical with those of Comecon) to approach both developed capitalist and developing states in this respect and to require some of its own subscriptions to be paid in convertible currency. In the longer term, the moves on both sides might best be consummated by eastern membership of the IMF.

To attenuate the group isolation of the East and to abandon discrimination by the West may be expected automatically to reduce international tension. Before this political element, common to all these facets of East-West trade, could be exploited, however, a number of specific issues would have to be resolved. It is to the detail of these questions that this paper is devoted - in Part II to the strategic and political contentions on embargoes and quotas and in Part III to the special trading techniques involved.

II. THE NEGOTIABILITY OF EAST-WEST TRADE

(a) The size of the transactions

The significance of East-West trade for the policies of the Atlantic powers lies principally in its present insignificance to their economies. Trade diminished for political reasons - the division of Europe at the end of world War II and the deliberate limitation of Eastward commerce by the strategic controls of the Korean War and of Westward commerce by Stalin's autarkic concept of 'two world markets". Despite the expansion of East-West trade in Europe in the last decade, the exchanges are still small enough to leave little room for reduction short of embargo : as a tool of political negotiation,

therefore, bargains may be struck on increasing trade (which involves the willingness of Eastern partners to buy and sell more), but there is little reverse scope as sanctions (which can be applied unilaterally). The share of the East in the global trade of the West is much smaller than that of the West in the global trade of the East; in general, the products taken by the West could be replaced from other sources with less costly adjustment than products taken by the East; and any increments are more valuable to the East than to the West in terms of domestic resources saved. The absence, on the western side, of interests vested in really substantial trade (British imports of soviet timber and intra-German exchanges may be exceptions) tends to allow wider scope than usual for objectives to be formulated through specifically political assessment.

The trade is finally also small in relation both to that of the eastern partners before their adoption of central planning and to the current size of their national products. (1). Thus far the governments of market economies need not be deterred from proposing an expansion of trade with the East by a likely lack of response from their business communities. The scope for governmental initiative tends to vary inversely with the volume of actual trade. It is thus highest in the case of the United States whose Eastern trade is minute : questionnaires to American businessmen by the Senate Committee on foreign Relations in 1964 revealed that "most believed that there was a substantial potential for selling more

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(1) See T. Zotschow, Osteuropawirtschaft, N°. 1, 1960, p. 71.

goods to Communist countries ..... A great many felt that the Government's current policies ..... had failed to give proper guidance to the business community from a public policy standpoint". (2). It appears to be lowest in the case of the United Kingdon, a relatively large trader with the East : an enquiry at the same date by PEP (Political and Economic Planning) in Britain showed that "most industrialist agree that, apart from (an arms embargo), exports to Eastern Europe should be treated as trade like any other ..... The normal assumption, shared by industry and government, is that all trade is a good thing". (3).

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(2) United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, East-West Trade : a Compilation or Views of Businessmen, Bankers and Academic Experts, Washington, D.C., 1964, p. 3 (referred to below as U.S. Senate views).

(3) PEP., East-West Trade, published as Planning, N°. 488, May 1965, pp. 127 & 125 (referred to as PEP).

In 1965 the U.S.S.R. and the seven countries of eastern Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, Hungary, Poland and Roumania) disposed of 63 per cent of their exports among themselves and 17 per cent to Western Europe, Japan and North America (OECD members) - 20,5 per cent if Yugoslavia and Finland are added to the latter. (1). The "East", as the first group may be termed for this study, took less than 3 per cent of the exports of the second group, the "West". The "East" is coterminous neither with the membership of Comecon (the council for Mutual economic Assistance), which since 1962 has excluded Albania and included Mongolia, nor with the countries variously referred to as "communist", "socialist" or "centrally-planned" (reference to which can cover mainland China, Cuba, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam and Yugoslavia). The recent variance from the Comecon group in aggregate trade statistics must be trivial (2) and a justifiable comparison can be made of the "East" with the two trade groups of the "West", the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). In 1959 sales to other members ("intra-trade") accounted for 60,3 per cent of Comecon exports, 33,0 per cent of EEC exports and 18,0 per cent of EFTA exports. As each trade group developed its system of internal preference - Comecon by plan coordination, the other by tariff cuts - intra-trade rose rapidly until 1964 : in Comecon to 64,0, in EEC to 43,2 and in EFTA to 22,0 per cent.

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(1) Yugoslavia and finland are the European states not covered by the present definitions. The East and West relations of Yugoslav trade and payments are very fully treated by R. Campbell, Yugoslavia and the world market (dept. of Economics, Indiana University, 1966, privately circulated in advance of publication).

(2) Mongolia has issued only index numbers of its commerce and the latest Albanian trade breakdown by country is for 1963

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In 1965, however, growth levelled off in EEC and EFTA (43,5 and 22,2 per cent respectively) and reversed in Comecon (62,7 per cent). The weak trade between the Western groups and comecon strengthened slightly over the period as a whole, as the following figures show, but for each flow 1961 or 1962 had been a better year.

Percentages of total exports

	1959	1965
EEC to Comecon	2,8	3,0
EFTA to Comecon	3,4	3,7
Comecon to EEC	6,7	7,2
Comecon to EFTA	6,3	6,3

In absolute terms, in 1965 the East bought goods worth $1.42 bn. from EEC members and $0.96 bn. from EFTA, selling in return $1.43 bn. and $1.35 bn. respectively. The EFTA deficit with Comecon was attributable wholly to that of the United Kingdom, the special position of which requires brief consideration.

Most Eastern countries have tended to run an export surplus with the U.K. partly to finance invisibles (shipping, insurance and banking services) but largely to buy elsewhere for sterling (notably primary commodities in the Sterling Area). In 1963 the Eastern surplus of £ 48.8 mn. was accrued by

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(2) ../..

The United Nations Statistical Office (from whose Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, June 1966, Special Table B and Table 52 the above data are drawn) estimates Albanian trade from the returns of its partners

Bulgaria (£ 1.6 mn.), Czechoslovakia (£ 4.6 mn.) and the U.S.S.R. (£ 35.4 mn.), offset by small deficits (£ 2.5 mn. in all) with Albania, Eastern Germany and Hungary. By 1965 only Albania and Hungary had left a deficit (and this was down to £0.9 mn.) and the overall Eastern surplus reached £ 108.4 mn. ($303.5 mn.) British efforts to narrow the gap had some effect during the first six months of 1966 when it totalled £ 34.6 mn. (with the Soviet surplus down to £ 18.6 mn., against £ 73.5 mn. for the full year 1965, but the Polish surplus at £ 10.1 mn. little below its 1965 rate of £ 24.1 mn.).

It is a measure of the contrast between attitudes to East-West trade that U.K. exports to the East have tended to run at about half its imports from that group, while U.S. exports are generally double its imports, and that, over the past decade, the U.K. volume of exports to the East has been three times that of the U.S. In 1965 U.S. exports to the East were only half per cent of its total - the lowest share of any western (i.e. OECD) country (the next lowest being Ireland at 0,7 per cent). At the other extreme, Austria, Greece, Iceland, Turkey and, if intra-German trade is included, Western Germany, are the OECD members with the highest share of exports sold to the East. In that year only Austria and Iceland took more than 10 per cent of their imports from the East. Detailed statistics by country are given in the Appendix Table.

(b) Policies on Embargo

Although western trade never fell under an embargo as complete as that still exercised by the United States towards mainland China, North Korea and North Vietnam, North American exports to the East virtually ceased at the height of the Cold War : in 1953 the U.S. sold a mere $1.8 mn. and Canada only $0.5 mn., though the rest of OECD sold $768.5 mn. in that year and the U.S. and Canada imported $49.2 mn. from the East.

An embargo is operated on military goods by NATO members other than Iceland, but including Japan, through the Consultative Group Coordinating Committee (Cocom) (1) and more items are prohibited by the U.S. Government. "We have a concept", declared the then Secretary of the Treasury, to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1964, "that anything that would help to strengthen the economy of the Soviet bloc was helping them strategically, but the Europeans never agreed with that. Their concept of strategic is only something that is directly relevant to military strength".(2). Senator Symington ironically commented that in the last resort about the only "non-strategic material" was bubble gum, (3) and the President's Special Committee the following year found that "gains from non-military trade with the United States are unlikely to release additional resources for Soviet military

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(1) For a brief description of Cocom see N. Padford and G. Lincoln, The Dynamics of International Politics New York, 1962 pp. 429-30; a fuller history is in preparation by G. Adler-Carlsson, who has published a preliminary survey in Osthandel in Theorie und Praxis (ESTO Heft 2), Graz, 1965 esp. pp. 19-22.

(2) Statement by the Hon. D. Dillon, Hearings before the Committee on foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington, D.C., 1964, p. 216 (referred to below as U.S. Senate, Hearings).

(3) Ibid, p. 217.

expenditures ... The U.S.S.R. has an advanced weapons technology and a military production capability that is virtually independent of its external economic relations". (1). The Committee warned however that "the mere existence of ... differences in trade restrictions is sometimes cited as sufficient cause for changing U.S. licensing controls to conform to those of Western Europe and Japan ..... It is also true that our business firms are at a disadvantage in communist markets in competing with West European firms. Commercial considerations however, have not been the determining factor in framing U.S. policy on this subject and should not be now". (2).

By virtue of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1951 (the "Battle Act"), whereby U.S. aid must be terminated to any country exporting strategic goods to the East (except by Presidential sanction), the U.S. embargo can in theory be extended to many other countries than Cocom participants, but in practice the divergence of policy lies in the wider embrace of the embargo by the U.S. than by the major Western European producers (Belgium, France, Italy, Switzerland, the U.K. and Western Germany); Sweden is formally unaffected. Only a few goods embodying a high technology not employed outside the United States are in fact denied the East, and American business opinion seems to favour alignment with the Cocom minimum.

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(1) Report to the President of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with East European Countries and the Soviet Union, Wahington, D.C., 1965, p. 9 (referred to as President's Special Committee).

(2) Ibid, p. 5.

Of those whose views were sought by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1964, "many were of the opinion that the only practical effect of our strict control system was the loss of considerable business to our allies and that the system was of no practical value in preventing buildup of the military or economic potential of the Russian bloc". (1). This view has been expressed by other U.S. writers. (2). On the other hand, a group predominantly of businessmen, the Research and Policy committee of the Committee for Economic Development, reporting in 1965, accepted that the U.S. list should exceed that of Cocom. "We want to prevent gains in a form or amount that would be of particular military-political value. This principle is recognised in the embargo of NATO on export of military goods and of some other goods." (3). It desired, moreover, that the West should consider an embargo on "high level non-military technology and know-how, or equipment embodying it",(4) a proposal diametrically opposed to the consensus of business opinion found in the corresponding British study : "they were in general strongly against any further

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(1) U.S. Senate, Views, loc. cit.

(2) E.g., R. Steel, The End of Alliance-America and the Future of Europe, London, 1964, pp. 77-8; Steel is a former U.S. Foreign Service officer.

(3) Committee for Economic Development, East-West Trade : a Common Policy for the West, New York, 1965, p. 18 (referred to as CED).

(4) Ibid, p. 36.

regulation or restriction of the trade, whether at national or at international level". (1).

The contention that embargo should extend beyond strictly military goods is based on three inter-related arguments of which the first is that technology or products with a high development cost might, in the competitive process, be sold at a price well below the outlay which the Eastern purchaser would have to incur to evolve the technique or good independently. (2). By itself, this is no more than a denial of the gain from trade, but it is endowed with strategic significance by the second proposition that savings by the U.S.S.R. in civilian research and development enhance the military output of that sector. (3). The furthest extension is that "by selling to them goods and services of any nature - whether wheat or our technologically advanced machinery and equipment, it is argued that we help them to solve some of their pressing internal problems and make it easier for them to use their limited resources for building up their military power". (4) Embargoes on commodities for reasons other than the

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(1) PEP, p. 169. Both reports refer to consultation with each other in drafting (CED p. 7, PEP, p. 114). Similar groups joined with CED from France, Germany, Italy and Japan and did not dissent from the view cited.

(2) CED, p. 37.

(3) See A. Buchan, NATO in the 1960s, 2nd ed., London, 1963, pp. 13-14; W. Kaufman in W. Kaufman (ed.) Military Policy and National Security, Princeton, N.J., 1956, p. 256; and statement of Hon. L. Hodges, Secretary of Commerce, in U.S. Senate, Hearings, pp. 60-63.

(4) Cited as one of two extreme views, each of which are "persuasive elements", by President's Special Committee, pp. 8-9.

limitation of economic potential are trivial but should be mentioned : in the immediate post-war period the U.S. Government prohibited the import of Soviet crabmeat on the grounds that it was produced by "slave labour" (of Japanese prisoners-of-war) and the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 prohibited U.S. imports of Soviet furs. (1).

The case against the major embargoes, advocated to limit defence and production potential, is that they are ineffective or that it cannot be made effective without total denial (an end generally rejected but sought by a few on purely political grounds) (2) and that their results are solely short-term. On ineffectiveness, Schelling observes that "the Soviets may get just as much technology out of highly-fabricated consumer goods as out of industrial equipment or items of military application. And, of course, they get most of it through freely available magazines and journals anyhow". (3). On limitlessness, Mosely points out that "the subsittution of imported consumer goods for domestic production allows the Soviet Government, in theory, to divert additional resources to either industrial growth or strategic production". (4). "The longer the period of time", comments Berliner, " the greater the opportunity for the enemy to accomodate to the embargo and the greater the potential disadvantages to the nation imposing it ... I am not prepared to argue that (export

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(1) U.S. Senate, Hearings, pp. 234-5.

(2) E.g., Kleberg, Jr. in CED, p. 40.

(3) T. Schellings in U.S. Senate, Views, p. 290.

(4) P. Mosely, Ibid, p. 281.

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(1) U.S. Senate, Hearings, pp. 234-5.

(2) E.g., Kleberg, Jr. in CED, p. 40.

(3) T. Schellings in U.S. Senate, Views, p. 290.

(4) P. Mosely, Ibid, p. 281.

controls) should be eliminated entirely ..... but they should be regarded as exceptional, rather than normal policy". (1). Even a partial embargo cannot be complete without coincident limitation by other major exporters; (2) or perhaps total blockade. (3). Attempts to gain alignment on a stricter embargo have been widely cited as a cause of serious difficulties with other NATO powers. (4). Further, "despite the ineffectiveness in economic or military terms of U.S. unilateral controls, there is reason to believe that their application is a significant contributor to an atmosphere of tension in our relations with the U.S.S.R.". (5). Of the 125 replies from U.S. businessmen, chosen because of their interest in East-West trade in the Senate enquiry, 105 favoured an expansion of trade and only 9 declared that it should not rise. (6). Finally, analysts of strategic studies seem to be broadly agreed that the crux of the East-West confrontation lies in military capabilities, not in comparative size of the civilian

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(1) J. Berliner, Ibid, pp. 219 and 221.

(2) See W. Diebold Jr., Ibid, p. 237.

(3) See G. Kennan, Ibid, p. 263 or G. Grossman, Ibid, p. 248.

(4) E.g. in Ibid, : H. Jacobson, p. 257, Kennan p. 267, C. Kindleberger, p. 270, K. Knorr, p. 272, D. Marx, p. 274, and Schelling, p. 291.

(5) I. Frank, Ibid.

(6) Ibid, p. 3.

economies seen in "competitive coexistence". (1).

An embargo has also been considered as a possible response to violation of a prospective arms control agreement, (2) but other supporting instruments are required (preclusive buying, or pre-emption, financial controls, etc...), which can only figure in the implied context of economic warfare.(3).

(c) Quantitative restrictions

Between embargo and trade liberalization lie a variety of limitations to imports from and exports to the East. Such quantitative restrictions on imports have any of three objectives - to prevent "undue reliance" upon an import, the supply of which could be halted for political reasons (or in war), to protect the importing economy from the "market disruption" which may be feared either from "dumping" or from

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(1) See, for example, H. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, London, 1960, p. 97 and The Troubled Partnership : A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance, New York, 1965 : and S. Huntingdon, The Common Defence, New York, 1961, p. 203; the opposite view is expressed by R. Lowenthal in A. Wolfers (ed.) Changing East-West Relations and the Unity of the West, Baltimore, 1965.

(2) M. Bornstein, Journal of Arms Control, July 1963, pp.203-18

(3) Ibid, pp. 204-5 and 217; see also Kindleberger in U.S. Senate, Views, p. 268.

the displacement of traditional suppliers, and to establish a quid pro quo for negotiating trade or other agreements. Quantitative restrictions on exports may either be mitigated embargoes - that is, intended to limit eastern access to specific items (chiefly of indirect strategic significance) - or bargaining counters for commercial or political treaty-making.

Restrictions of the imports of Soviet oil is the major example of a severe limitation generally applied by western governments (except Italy) and is attributed both to the inhibition of "undue reliance" and to the protection of traditional suppliers, among whom developing countries predominate (and whose foreign earnings should, it is argued, be secured). (1) The substantial western imports of tin come also in the category of defending less wealthy countries, but the majority of commodities exported by the east compete with those of the west as here defined (OECD membership), e.g. coal, aluminium, ferrous metals, temperate foodstuffs, timber, furs.

The United States operates the strictest export licensing procedure of any western country, but since decisions are in the hands of the Executive, there can be considerable year to year variation : thus in 1962 the U.S. Department of Commerce approved export applications to the East for goods totalling $49.6 mn., but denied almost as many ($48.9 mn.), while in 1963 it accepted $139.1 mn. and refused only $4.5 mn. (2). The United Kingdom transferred much of its imports from the U.S.S.R. to open general license in 1959, leaving only

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(1) See Bornstein, in D. Abshire and R. Allen (eds.), National Security : Political Military and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead, New York, 1963, p. 137.

(2) U.S. Senate, Hearings, p. 237.

about 10 per cent under quantitative restriction, the quotas being defined in conjunction with annual negotiations within the five-year trade and payments agreement. With the other eastern states, some import licenses for the agreed quotas are still applicable. In 1964 the U.K. Government offered liberalization (i.e. removal of quantitative restrictions) to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the U.S.S.R. (all but the two latter accepting) in return for undertakings on the prices of their goods in the U.K., on access to their markets for U.K. products, and on the use of incremental earnings to buy in britain. With eastern Germany, in the absence of diplomatic recognition, quotas are negotiated by the Federation of British Industries and the East German Chamber of Foreign Trade. Annual trade agreements fixing quotas are standard West European practice; these may be protocols within a longer-term treaty, usually for three or five years (notably Belgium-Luxemburg, Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Italy). Non-governmental agencies are employed in the absence of diplomatic missions (e.g. that of March 1966 between the respective chambers of Commerce of Albania and Greece, resuming a trade halted since the war). In january 1966 the French Government unilaterally abandoned all import quotas on eastern products, as a consequence of which imports from the East in the first six months of 1966 were 31 per cent above those in the same period of 1965; exports rose by 37 percent. Because bilateral licensing arrangements and exemptions vary widely in Western Europe, there have been some proposals for coordination - the German Federal Government, for example, is particularly anxious for a common front on trade with Eastern Germany, (1) an unofficial American

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(1) The Times (London), 21 January, 1965.

committee has proposed an intergovernmental Committee on East-West Trade attached to OECD (1), and the corresponding British study called for concerted action, but only with a view to derestriction, so that "all Western markets for a given product are opened up at the same time". (2). The EEC is almost certain to coordinate its policy towards eastern Europe since the July 1966 agreement on free trade in agricultural goods, to be finalized with the last industrial tariff cuts by July 1968 : all members have the appropriate denunciatory power in their trade agreements with the East (the "EEC clause") (3).

The use of quantitative restrictions (or of cognate elements in trade negotiations, e.g. on most-favoured-nation treatment or on credit (4) beyond the assurance of equivalent commercial advantage either bilaterally or multilaterally to secure commercial advantage is regarded as wholly proper by all parties on both sides. In the particular conditions of East-West trade counters are required for reciprocity. If consensus is to be found among business circles throughout the West, it is that trade concessions should not be used by governments to derive strictly political benefits, and that negotiations should be conducted with each country separately rather than with the East as a unit.

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(1) CED, pp. 20-21.

(2) PEP, p. 172.

(3) For a discussion of recent and likely relationships of the East with EEC and with EFTA see J. Pinder, Survey, January 1966, pp. 108-117.

(4) See part III sections (a) and (d), below.

The question of the specific features of commerce with the East which justify special trade negotiations is discussed in part II; the present section examines the views expressed most strongly in the U.S.A. and Western Germany that a political return can be envisaged. "The United States initiated its controls for political reasons, and should be ready to revise them when it is in the national interest to do so, "stated the President's Special Committee on East-West trade; (1) a respondent to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations declared that "abandonment of restrictions ... would prevent us from making maximum use of trade as a means of influencing Soviet policy;" (2) and a spokesman of the Federal German Government - which has gained successes in the barter of trade concessions for political objectives - described its trade deals as its "trumps". (3). The discussion concentrates exclusively on the American debate, where it is at its acutest. Elsewhere, as just indicated, governments and commentators tend to regard the trade as strictly economic. (4).

For the President's Special Committee, "the time is ripe to make more active use of trade arrangements as political instruments in relations with communist countries" : it recommended three groups of concessions to be gained, apparently in order of priority. (5). The first set were directly

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(1) President's Special Committee, p. 5.

(2) R. Tucker in U.S. Senate, Views, p. 293.

(3) The Times (London), 19 March 1965.

(4) See, among others, A. Buchan and P. Windsor, Arms and Stability in Europe, London, 1963, pp. 56-7.

(5) President's Special Committee, pp. 10-11.

commercial and would hence find general support among western traders : satisfactory commercial arbitration, procedures to avoid dumping and market disruption and the settlement of financial claims (including those for lend-lease deliveries). The second set were indirectly commercial : establishment of trade and tourist promotion offices, travel conditions for commercial representatives improvement of consular relations and copyright agreement. The third set were non-economic : library and government information services, embassy quarters, the establishment of consulates, the cessation of radio-jamming and cultural and technical exchanges. For one member of the Committee this did not go far enough. " Trade relations with the Soviet Union and its European satellites should be viewed as a tool of our Nation's foreign policy. Therefore the Report should have placed greater emphasis on the political aspect of this issue ... There should be no expansion of trade ...without political quid pro quo concessions". (1). It may perhaps be observed that the dissenter was the trade union member of the Committee and this militant view appears to be particularly held by the spokesmen of organised labour in the United States.

Political responsiveness has long been cogently argued by Brzezinski, appointed, in May 1966, a member of the President's Policy Planning Council. (2). In an early version

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(1) Statement by N. Goldfinger (Director of Research, AFL-CIO), Ibid, pp. 21-22.

(2) See Z. Brzezinski, Peaceful Engagement in Europe's Future, New York, 1965, pp. 29-33; in U.S. Senate, Views, pp. 229-30; and Alternative to Partition, New York, 1965, pp. 153-58.

of this proposal, he saw the most suitable variable on the U.S. side as liberalization of quotas, and opposed the use of credits (as inherently aid, which no political reason qualified) (1), but subsequently he defined his "spigot" as also covering credits and most-favoured-nation treatment. (2).

Many specific concessions which he suggested were later included in the lists of the President's Special Committee, but in general he believed that rewards in trade liberalization should be offered when Eastern European countries "gained some independence from Soviet control" or liberalized their domestic system, all within a climate of expanding trade to widen the range of contact with the West. Nutter (who was Economic Adviser to the Goldwater Presidential Campaign) similarly advocates the relaxation of trade restrictions "solely in return for important concessions that moderate the nature of the communist system and policies".

These concessions could be economic or political (3) "Whereas Brzezinski described the reciprocal advantage to be sought as "marginal", Nutter unrealistically hoped for much more substantial gains - e.g. "full international convertibility of the rouble" or "any concrete act that curbed the expansion of the Communist world". He was joined in a desire for similar bargains in concert with Western Europe by Mikesell (4). Both based their proposals on the view that the Eastern

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(1) U.S. Senate, Views, loc. cit.

(2) Peaceful Engagement in Europe's Future, loc. cit.

(3) W. Nutter, in U.S. Senate, Views, p. 286.

(4) R. Mikesell, Ibid, p. 279.

need for western goods was greater that the counter-demand. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee which received these proposals had the contrary standpoint strongly argued by other academic experts (1) and by the majority of businessmen consulted (2); there was nevertheless one of the latter in favour not only of political bargaining but of tightening trade controls. (3).

A less controversial policy objective lies in the proposition that East-West trade offers opportunity for loosening the dependence upon the U.S.S.R. of the other eastern European states. Firstly it may permit the latter severally to "enlarge their bargaining power vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. and the whole Soviet bloc, a process, that is assisted by the growing divisions and discords within world communism". (4). Kennan sees U.S. policy-makers divided on the "general question of whether one wishes to make it easier for these countries to achieve a measure of independence and flexibility in their foreign economic relations, looking not only eastward but also westward for their opportunities; or whether it should be the western objective to deny them, wherever we can, access to Western markets ... This last policy, naturally tends ... to convey to them that ... they have no choice bur to stick closely to the Soviet Union" (5). Pryor, advocating the same

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(1) See Kennan, Ibid, p. 264-5 and Schelling, Ibid, p. 290

(2) Ibid, pp. 5-186 passim.

(3) H. Kearns, Ibid, pp. 180-5.

(4) G. Grossman, in R. Goldwin (ed.) Beyond the Cold War, Chicago, 1966, p. 161. Seen similary, A. Bergson, in U.S. Senate, Views, pp. 224-5.

(5) Kennan, in U.S. Senate, Views, p. 261.

"increased inter-dependency of the Europe and commercial nations on us", observes that the Soviet embargo on Albania and the sharp fall in trade with China might have been interpreted in Eastern Europe as signifying the political precariousness of commerce with the U.S.S.R. (1). Poland and Rumania, by increasing their trade with Albania after the Soviet rupture of relations in 1961, were the only members of Comecon to demonstrate unwillingness to participate in politically-motivated policy on intra-trade; it has been suggested nevertheless, that these relations were desired by the U.S.S.R. to prevent Albania falling into such destitution that it could only have turned to the West, as Yugoslavia had done after the general Eastern embargo of 1948. Occasional use of economic pressure on Finland and Austria is relevant (2) and it seems to have made similar moves in withholdings commitments to deliver equipment and iron ores to show its antipathy to Rumanian economic policy in general and the Galati steel project in particular. (3). Montias has documented a number of failures to implement Comecon treaties on specialization, but finds that most exhibitions of discord in economic relations were attributable to strategies of development and not to political nationalism of the sort that had plagued the

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(1) F. Pryor, Ibid, pp. 288-89.

(2) See Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition, op. cit, p. 64; and H. Aubrey, Coexistence : Economic Challenge and Response, Washington, D.C., 1961, pp. 163 and 229.

(3) J-P. Saltiel, Cahiers de l'ISEA, December 1965, pp. 111-3, and J. Montia, Soviet Studies, October 1964, p. 139-40.

region before the war. (1). The separation of Eastern Germany from Comecon was, in particular, not desirable on economic grounds. (2).

At least one academic respondent in the Senate Committee enquiry of 1964 sought the instigation by trade dealings of "nationalism and independence within the bloc so as to reduce the significance of the bloc as a cohesive political and military force", (3) but Brzezinski considers that "it would be shortsighted for the West to ride the tiger of nationalism in the hope that it would threaten only the Soviet-dominated world; the tiger could endanger all of Europe". (4). The President's Special Committee stressed that "we are not interested in fostering animosities among European communist nations ... (but seek) to create an atmosphere in which they will inevitably find that their interests are more and more linked to peaceful relations with the Free World". (5).

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(1) Montias, Journal of International Affairs, N°. 1, 1966, pp. 62-3 and 67-8.

(2) Brzezinski, Foreign Affairs, April, 1963, p. 522, and Peaceful Engagement in Europe's Future, op. cit., p. 28; for a case supporting the political status quo in East Germany see H. Apel, The Centennial Review, Winter 1966, pp. 95-111.

(3) Mikesell, in U.S. Senate, Views, p. 278.

(4) Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 11, In Alternative to Partition, op. cit., p. 137, he observes that "we should not actively discourage the occasional acts of nationalist self-assertion".

(5) President's Special Committee, pp. 11-12.

Like others, the Special Committee believed that contact with market economies through trade would foster decentralization of domestic management (and perhaps also political liberalization), (1) and some see the obverse - the devolution of economic systems leading to an expansion of trade with the market economies. (2).

Following its own - still limited - economic reforms, the Soviet Government in the text of the Five-year Plan (1966-70) announced a clear change of policy "to use more fully the advantages of the international division of labour", with specific reference to "the industrially developed capitalist countries." "At the very least", observed an official contributor to a U.S. Congressional enquiry, "the above declaration must be read as a recognition of the considerable potential value which the markets of the industrial West can contribute to the future development of the Soviet economy". (3). In its turn the U.S. Government has expressed its readiness to adopt a flexible trade policy towards the East to acknowledge or evoke postures diminishing tension between the two sides. (4) Nevertheless, as Grossman concludes, "it is

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(1) See Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 31; Grossman, op. cit., p. 171; Jacobson, in U.S. Senate, Views, p. 257.

(2) See Grossman, op. cit., p. 170; Kaser, The World today, March 1966, pp. 104-5, and Comecon : Integration Problems of the Planned Economies, London, 1965, pp. 122 and 170-1.

(3) L. Herman, in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, New Directions in the Soviet Economy, Washington, D.C., 1966, p. 938. (referred to below as U.S. Congress, New Directions)

(4) Statements by President Johnson on 3 May 1966 and by the Secretary of State and by the Secretary of Agriculture in U.S. Senate, Hearings, pp. 24 and 118. Alignment by the U.S. with other OECD members on Eastern trade restrictions

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easy to list our assets for dealing with the East; it is hard to employ them imaginatively and effectively". (1). The trading components of negotiation are examined in the following part III of this paper.

III. TECHNIQUES SPECIFIC TO EAST-WEST TRADE

(a) States trading and most-favoured-nation treatment

Studies on state trading in general and on its particular use in the Soviet Union form a very considerable literature, which is almost certainly larger than those on all other foreign-trade techniques used by the Eastern European economies. Indeed, the significance of the other instruments in the context of East-West trade arises chiefly from their deployment by government commercial agencies. The erection of a state-trading monopoly was as early an act in the economic history of post-war Eastern Europe as it was of Soviet Russia after the October Revolution; Gerschenkron rightly concluded that "economic planning of the type practised in Russia is not feasible without the use of a foreign trade monopoly." (2). Only as methods of internal planning

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(4) ../.. is assumed by Herman, op. cit., pp. 941 and 945, in making trade projections.

(1) Grossman, op. cit., p. 171.

(2) A. Gerschenkron, Economic Relations with the U.S.S.R., New york, 1945, p. 18, cited by F. Holzman in H. Rosovsky (ed.) Industrialization in Two Systems : Essays in Honor of Alexander Gerschenkron, New York, 1966, p. 240.

change has modification come to those for external economic relations. In Yugoslavia the decentralization of economic management was followed by the introduction of competition among foreign-trade enterprises to the point that in 1966 the country was admitted as full member of GATT. The reforms currently in progress in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, Hungary and Poland accord or envisage some devolution of decisions on external transactions to the enterprise associations which are the chief beneficiaries of decentralization for domestic procurement and marketing. Some such firms are already operating de facto as autonomous commercial corporations, e.g., the Rodopa livestock-produce trust in Bulgaria and the Skoda group (operating through the Motokov export agency) in Czechoslovakia. The demonopolization of foreign trade is an important, though not an essential link in the interaction - on which part II of this paper concluded- between western trade initiative and the progress of eastern orientation towards a market mechanism. In the U.S.S.R. the limited enlargement of the autonomy of the enterprise which accompanied the recentralization of national economic management in October 1965 has not transferred any external transactions to the enterprise or groups thereof ("unions" or "firms"). In fact the regional economic councils (sovnarkhozy) abolished in 1965 seem to have had - informally at least, (1) greater power of initiative on foreign trade than the present Soviet enterprise. In Albania and Rumania the monopoly of the Ministry of Foreign Trade is unaltered.

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(1) See D. Donnelly in A. Nove and D. Donnelly, Trade with Communist Countries, London, 1960, p. 115 and Nove, Ibid, p. 22.

The accord of inter-enterprise competition in buying or selling abroad is considered, even by those governments most committed to a domestic market-environment, strictly in the context of efficiency either in placing sales advantageously (1) or in buying abroad to keep down the prices of home manufacturers. (2). One of the two primary reasons for the Soviet establishment of a foreign-trade monopoly in 1918 was efficiency, notably as enhancing the bargaining power of the new state on capitalist markets; (3) the other reason was as a "blanket" control, for a government implementing the crude measure of "War Communism" was loth to rely on licenses, permits, exchange restrictions or conventional tariffs. The sophistication of economic administration in Eastern Europe has long passed the point where state monopolies are needed as facile preventives against contraband, but has not yet brought a price system which can properly activate a selective tariff.

The amendment of present trading practice in Eastern Europe can be expected as attitudes there change on efficiency and control, but enterprises undertaking trade will remain state agencies operating within an economic and political system more centripetal - so far as can now be judged - than

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(1) See, for example, the speeches by the Czechoslovak Minister of Construction, Rude Pravo, 10 November 1965, and by the Chairman, the State Planning Commission, Ibid, 3 August 1966

(2) This has from the start been a major tenet of Professor Sik's proposals for reform in Czechoslovakia.

(3) See A. Baykov, Soviet Foreign Trade, Princeton, N.J., 1946, pp. 10-11.

that of Yugoslavia today. It took Yugoslavia seven years from the Declaration of 25 May 1959 to convince the Contracting Parties to GATT that its trading corporations (still fewer than 400) and its tariff system could function as in a market economy. (1). Poland, whose desire to associate with GATT was acknowledged in a Declaration of 9 November 1959, is still far from acceptance. Agencies - and in particular those with monopoly rights over specified products or services -may be dismantled for the better functioning of the nationalized economy, but without necessarily altering the substance of state trading.

The crux of state trading as a problem in East-West trade is that decisions to import are not solely influenced by relative costs plus customs duties. The majority of Eastern European countries have a tariff formally applicable to the purchases of state agencies, but the latter do not in practice extend their buying to that limit implied by prices and duties, and can impose or augment tariff protection by a re-sale margin; trade will not take place in any given commodity unless an explicit decision is made to import (or to export). This procedure - which nullifies tariff barriers, and hence the reciprocation of most-favoured-nations (MFN) treatment by a market economy - the Eastern European countries have aggravated by constraining exports to the value needed to make essential imports, the latter defined by current needs and availabilities in physical-unit balancing, and not, over time, adjusted by rational investment criteria. Although simplistic material balances are no longer the crucial determinant of trade offers and requirements, (2) the volumes to be admitted or dispatched are by no means yet price-and-tariff determined.

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(1) See G. Curzon, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy, London, 1965, p. 303.

(2) The shortcomings of which are described by Holzman, op. cit., pp. 239-41.

The plan for imports is not necessarily subject to change by an increase in their competitiveness nor is a fall in eastern costs a cause of enlarged offers. The problem of state trading is, of course, neither new nor confined to East-West relations. It was one of the economic instruments used to finance armament expenditure by Nazi Germany, (1) and both the Havana negotiations which elaborated the Charter of the abortive International Trade Organization and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) sought to extend to state trading the non-discrimination required under MFN treatment or in the application of quantitative restrictions. "Nowhere, however, was the problem of implementation of such a rule discussed, as its practical application escapes control". (2). When the Contracting Parties to GATT first reported on their use of state trading, their extent was revealed as surprisingly large and the information provided appears to have been used for counterproposals on tariff reductions in the Dillon Round of 1960-61. (3). The United Arab Republic (Egypt) is fully state-trading, but was provisionally accepted into GATT in 1962.

The first country to negotiate a safeguard with the U.S.S.R. on its offer of MFN treatment was the U.K. A Commercial Agreement had been concluded in April 1930 allowing MFN treatment to Soviet imports, but, after according preferences to the Commonwealth and Empire in 1932, the U.K. feared that "monopolising foreign trade, the Soviet State could regulate prices of exportable articles at its own discretion ... If the resolutions of Ottawa were not to be thwarted, a new

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(1) For a comparison of Nazi and Soviet trade policies towards Eastern Europe, see, Aubrey, op. cit., pp. 225-9 and 235.

(2) Curzon, op. cit., p. 291.

(3) Ibid, p. 293.

arrangement must be reached". (1). The U.K. also felt impelled to denounce the agreement to negoriate an enlargement of Soviet purchases : the present British trade deficit with the U.S.S.R. is no new phenomenon, for it had been occurring in each year since 1921. A provision "unprecedented in history" was written into the Agreement made in February 1934 to allow the U.K. to withdraw MFN treatment for any good which the U.S.S.R. was selling at a price to frustrate the Ottawa preference or "detrimentally to affect the production of such goods in the United Kingdom". (2).

By their membership of GATT, western countries accord each other MFN treatment. Czechoslovakia had become a member of GATT before embracing its full state-trading system, but only the U.S.A. has formally suspended its obligations to that country (by a unilateral declaration of 27 September 1951). The U.K. grants MFN treatment to all eastern countries but only Poland has MFN treatment from the U.S.A., and other countries are treated in some cases under "anti-dumping" rules. The President's Special Committee agreed that the eastern nations, other than Poland, are thus put at a severe disadvantage which they would be prepared to negotiate upon if the President were accorded the authority. (3).

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(1) The Prospects of British Trade with the Soviet Union, Monograph N°. 1 of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London, 1934, p. 3.

(2) Ibid.

(3) President's Special Committee, p. 16.

That Committee followed now-standard practice in proposing as the equivalent a commitment to increase imports by an agreed percentage, as did the CED report (1). Originally formulated by Baron von Platen, of Sweden, to the ECE, it was the basis of Poland's reciprocity in seeking admission to GATT, and was commended by the First Meeting of the ECE Ad Hoc Group of Experts to Study Problems of East-West Trade (September 1963). (2). The Second Meeting of that Group (December 1964) suggested "the review at periodic intervals ... to determine whether the results are mutually satisfactory in bringing about the growth of total trade at the rates desired and with a satisfactory commodity composition". (3).

Margins implicit in state-monopoly trading (as "concealed protection" on imports and "dumping" on exports) are negotiable in GATT like quantitative restrictions, but, as the First ECE Group rightly observed, "effective reciprocity or mutual advantage should be measured in terms of concrete and comparable results" and much therefore must depend on the interpretation of the trade consequences of concessions on each side. Holzman even concludes that "precise equivalence is unknowable". (4).

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(1) CED, p. 24.

(2) UN document, E/ECE/TRADE/140 para. 24. M. Domke and J. Hazard, American Journal of International Law, January 1958 pp. 55-68 suggest that such agreement was implicit in prewar negotiations on MFN with the U.S.S.R.

(3) UN document, E/ECE/TRADE/ 162 para. 7. Both meetings are discussed in detail by R. Nötel, Economia internazionale, N°. 4, 1965, pp. 10-17 and the first in PEP, pp. 162-4.

(4) Holzman, op. cit., p. 263.

A procedure which avoids such measurement but nevertheless furnishes some quid pro quo by the state trader has been suggested by l'Huillier. Eastern partners would indicate the total value of intended exports to the West over a specified period and commit themselves to purchases of equal value; these imports would be freely competed for by western countries up to the guaranteed quota. (1). This involves questions of multilateral trading that are discussed in section (b) of this part.

A final factor in state trading which causes concern in market economies is the potentially enhanced bargaining power arising both from the monopoly (or more usually monopsony) of the eastern partner and from its state authority. The PEP report concludes on the first element that "there is no doubt that ... Eastern European trade organizations ... play off one supplier against another" but finds only rare evidence that they "use government machinery to bring pressure to bear on their western trading partner (e.g.) ... the granting or withholding of visas". (2). It justly observes that if the monopoly position conduces to large orders, the real bargaining strength in eastern buying lies in size, while in their

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(1) J. L'Huillier, Problems Relating to the Expansion of Trade Between Free Enterprise and Collectivist Economies, Paris, 1960 (document 102/1 of the International Chamber of Commerce), cited by Curzon, op. cit.

(2) PEP, pp. 135-6.

selling "there are always alternative western sources of supply". (1). The occasional disparity between a large eastern agency and numerous, smaller western businesses has led some American commentators to seek retention of special controls (2) or a monopolistic western intermediary. (3). There is also some bargaining strength inherent in the eastern regard for exports as needed only to pay for imports, while western partners are interested in both. (4) Such views do not appear to be echoed in western European business whose major deals with the East are by consortia or by the largest firms for very substantial contracts, e.g. Renault, Courtaulds, ICI, Fiat to name only a few ; in the case of the latter , the agreement to build a vast motor-vehicle plant is, at $800 mn., the largest in the firm's history. (5).

It has already been observed that state trading is not uniquely an East-West problem, and that the UAR was admitted to GATT while a state trader. Many developing countries employ government agencies or marketing boards for their exports and, in stringent balance-of-payments conditions, have introduced some form of foreign-trade planning. The creation and consolidation of the UN Trade and Development Board, after the UN Conference on Trade and Development in 1964, despite the lack of success attending many eastern initiatives

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(1) Ibid, pp. 136-7 and 142; see also Holzman op. cit., p. 254.

(2) H. Berman, in U.S. Senate, Views, p. 226.

(3) R. Campbell, in Ibid, p. 232.

(4) Holzman, loc. cit., and l'Huillier, op. cit.,

(5) The Times (London), 16 August 1966.

therein, has in fact accorded state trading and foreign-trade planning formal international recognition. (1).

(b) Bilateralism and multilateralism

If western partners individually negotiate on MFN equivalent in trade-expansion clauses, there can be no certainty that the bilateral increment of exchanges is not at the expense of third parties, and hence contrary to the general equality implicit in the MFN treatment offered to the other. (2). It was for this reason that L'Huillier proposed, as already noted, that the commitment of the eastern partner be open to all western partners. The other of his proposals for the expansion of East-West trade was similarly multilateral, viz., that western partners should in concert offer convertibility among themselves of eastern earnings, under some sanction (for which he proposed restriction of credits) in the event of eastern imbalance. Nove has suggested a common western policy on quantitative restrictions to prevent bilateral negotiations resulting in market disruption of the western partner or the expansion of eastern shares in particular goods at the expenses of other western states. (3).

If MFN equivalents could be negotiated with a group of western nations (EEC, EFTA, OECD, NATO or even GATT) the eastern commitment would be so widely spread that the

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(1) Nötel, op.cit., p. 20.

(2) Holzman, op. cit., p. 264.

(3) Nove, in Nove and Donnelly, op. cit., p. 37.

expansion of trade would almost certainly be dictated by commercial considerations alone. (1). Hungary has been foremost in proposing that the other negotiating agency should be Comecon. The Hungarian Foreign Minister raised it in his London talks in 1965 (2) and the Chairman of the Hungarian Economic Association later declared that "multilateralism and general external convertibility was an indispensible element of the more intensive economic relations to be developed between Comecon and the Common Market". (3).

Progress towards such a goal is, however, scarcely possible when both East-West and intra-Comecon trade is highly bilateral and when the eastern currencies are inconvertible, and - as a consequence of both - not held at all in the West and exiguously (as "transferable roubles") in the East.

An analysis by the Secretariat of the ECE has shown that in 1964, 68 per cent of the trade of the 19 countries of West Europe with the 8 countries of the East was bilateral (the Federal Republic of Germany was the most bilateral - at 84 per cent - and the U.K. low at 52 per cent, though not the lowest (Ireland 25, Portugal 48 per cent). (4). In their turn, the eastern countries are still more bilateral in intra-trade than with the west : Holzman calculated for 1958 that 91 per cent of Soviet trade with eastern partners was bilateral, against 74 per cent with western partners. (5). Comments

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(1) Holzman, op. cit., p. 265; Nove, in Nove and Donnelly, op. cit., p. 36.

(2) Mr. J. Petér, The Times (London), 3 July 1965.

(3) Professor I. Vajda, Ibid, 4 March 1966.

(4) Economic Bulletin for Europe, Vol. 17, N°. 1, pp. 51-2.

(5) Holzman, op. cit., p. 248.

by western European governments on proposals of the First Meeting of the Ad Hoc Group "toward achieving a greater degree of multilateralism in trade and payments" revealed that the U.K. was much more hesitant than it had been earlier on advocacy of multilateralism with the east, and that the Netherlands, Austria and the Scandinavian countries strongly supported it. Greece, Italy and Spain were severely cautious on multilateralism. (1).

The reserve expressed by the U.K. reflects concern at the substantial deficit of that country with the East. (2). Substantial use of those earnings has been made in the rest of the Sterling Area : indeed, Australia's increasing trade surpluses with the East have, in a recent study, been described as "providential" in tackling the balance-of-payments problem of a rapidly industrializing nation greatly dependent on primary exports. (3). Transfers to other currencies have nevertheless made sterling the money most heavily convertible by eastern partners -mainly direct to other western sellers but in some cases via other eastern traders : Hungary is an operator in "switch" deals second to none, and Rumania has notably used sterling to settle on eastern markets.

Because France and Belgium have almost as high a share of multilateral trading with the East as the U.K. (only 53 and 55 per cent was bilaterally balanced in 1964), their

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(1) Nötel, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

(2) See part II, section (a)

(3) J. Wilczynski, Economic Record, December 1965, pp. 329-52.

francs would be in a similar position had not both kept overall deficits with the East much lower than the British (with surpluses in some years).

A resolution of the Bank for International Economic Cooperation (created within the framework of Comecon) (1) in October 1965 authorized negotiations on clearing with western central banks and was reportedly followed in July 1966 by a decision to require one-third of subscription to the capital of the Bank ($100 mn. out of $330 mn.) to be available in convertible currencies or gold.

The suggestion has been made that the west should not encourage agreements with the Bank (as with Comecon itself) for fear of strengthening Soviet control over other members through the agency. This view seems not only short-sighted, but at variance with the record of members' autonomy in the Bank itself (over Polish insistence on a convertible tranche in clearing balances), in Comecon (the Rumanian dissension of 1962-4) and in other eastern agencies (e.g. the Warsaw Treaty Organization in 1966). Nevertheless, limited convertibility in intra-trade and in East-West payments if attained, could better be regarded as a step towards eastern entry into the International Monetary Fund.

A solution to East-West payments bilateralism on a scale broader than the European or Atlantic communities is

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(1) See the Bank's report on its first year of operation, La Banque Internationale pour la Coopération Economique 1964, Moscow, 1965, esp. pp. 1-8; Kaser, op. cit., pp. 136-9 and in Projet (Paris), July 1966, pp. 820-23.

the more indicated by virtue of the heavy bilateral payments of the inconvertible currencies of developing countries. Both eastern and western states have balances in such currencies which could be more widely cleared to mutual advantage. It is highly significant that in its nine years of activity (1957/58 to 1965/66) non-European countries accounted for 45 per cent of the circuits arranged by the ECE Multilateral Compensation Procedure and that, as European use of the dispositions declines, developing countries have employed them increasingly. (1).

(c) Long-term agreements

The eastern preference for bilateralism has been accompanied by a desire for long-term trade agreements, and for the same reasons - to assure the continuity of projected supplies in a plan system that, until the recent beginnings of reform, has in effect made rigidity into a virtue. The convertibility of eastern currencies would require the deeper penetration of western price relationships into the national economies (because sales are not geared to specific purchases and the plan would hence have to be seriously concerned with relative domestic prices); long-run bulk contracts for specified goods fend off value calculations still further from the national plan.

The desire for such agreements by eastern partners may be diminished by their domestic reform. The Soviet inclination for long-term arrangements (2) was officially

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(1) UN Document E/ECE/629, para. 6.

(2) E.g., as expressed to a delegation of the Swedish Banks Association by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade, Ekonomisk Revy (Stockholm), April, 1964, p. 40.

re-iterated at the XXIII Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in March 1966 - in connection with its approval of the Five-year Plan - and the U.S.S.R. has concluded contracts to 1968 for Canadian grain. There are, on the other hand, western complaints on the lack of continuity among eastern partners both as sellers and as buyers. (1).

(d) Joint ventures

The eastern prohibition of private foreign investment on their territories inhibits the establishment of relationships which would promote the continuity of trade, and, more importantly, prevents that flow of capital which should be a consequence of the demonstration of opportunities by trade. Neither does labour migration across frontiers tend to equilibrate (as it has so notably done within EEC) East-West or intra-East disparities in current costs.

Until recently, the many uncompensated nationalisation measures (chiefly in 1917-18 in the U.S.S.R. and 1945-48 in the rest of eastern Europe) would have ruled out western interest in such investment. Since 1960 the rate at which western claims have been settled in bilateral negotiation has been significantly increasing (with the U.S.S.R. only in relation to territorial acquisitions since 1939, because no responsibility is accepted for Tsarist debts or the revolutionary expropriations), and a clear eastern readiness for limited investment projects has appeared.

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(1) See PEP, 140-1 and 145-6.

Equity participation in an enterprise located in an eastern European state would seem to be excluded on ideological grounds (though this might not extend to western public corporations), but has already begun to be accepted among the eastern countries themselves. A joint Polono-Hungarian company to process coal slack was established in 1962 and a Bulgarian-Hungarian company for engineering and food-processing was set up in 1964. Generally, however, an eastern country investing in another provides funds for a plant owned by the host state and is repaid at fixed interest from production.

The joint venture in an East-West basis is typified by the abortive Krupps negotiations with Poland. The German firm offered to place contracts with a Polish state-owned plant for vehicle gear-boxes : Krupps would have helped to set up the enterprise with patents, expertise and equipment, while the Polish corporation was to have furnished the site, buildings and labour. It appeared a reasonable bargain between a company restricted by labour-shortage in western Germany but with an expanding business, and the Polish enterprise, in an under-employed economy and needing market outlets. In effect the general plan is to farm out contracts to state-owned enterprises in eastern Europe and at least three other joint ventures have been mooted - a Swedish engineering firm is reported to be interested in sub-contracting engineering components in Poland, Rumania to turn over a furniture factory to work exclusively for the American market, and Hungary to establish a micro-motor plant for U.S. enterprises. The President's Special Committee had concluded - before any such offers were in fact made - taht "The possibility of a private U.S. firm establishing a subsidiary or entering into a joint venture in the U.S.S.R. is beyond our present vision; it may not be so far-fetched in some eastern European countries". (1).

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(1) President's Special Committee, p. 14.

On his visit to the U.K. in February 1966 the Rumanian Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Birladeanu, made a general invitation to western firms to set up plant in Rumania to produce goods for export to the West, the enterprises remaining Rumanian property. (1).

(c) Credits

Credits at commercial rates (where applicable, with government guarantees) are another, if limited, form of western investment in eastern Europe. The extent to which such capital flow should be furnished has been a matter of acute controversy within the West.

It is generally agreed that aid, in the sense of that provided by most western states to the developing countries, is not to be offered to eastern European states (not, as elsewhere in this paper, counting Yugoslavia); some receive small help in the form of United Nations Technical Assistance, but this is of course far outweighed by the aid of the east to the developing countries. It is, except in the United States, open to any individual or corporation to make loans to any eastern government or state enterprise as it thinks best. The American exception relates to the Johnson Act (1934) which prohibits a U.S. citizen from offering loans other than short-term commercial credit to any country defaulting on its financial obligations to the U.S.A. Exceptions have been made for the Export-Import Bank and in favour of members of the IMF and IBRD (whence Yugoslavia escapes).

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(1) The Times (London), 10 February 1966.

Long-term commercial credit to the East is thus illegal for a U.S. citizen or agency (other than the Export-Import Bank). Holzman believes, however, that "the Johnson Act is a hypocritical veil to hide behind. The question should not be : should we allow the Russians to be granted loans ? but, rather, on what terms ? These terms can of course, be prohibitive". (1). In fact the defaults for which the eastern nations are held responsible are largely World War I debts and Lease-Lend obligations. The former ought reasonably to be written off. Only the U.S.S.R. has not come to agreement with the U.S.A. on Lease-Lend, despite Mr. Kosygin's reported proposal that the U.S.S.R. would be willing to make a partial payment in settlement (2) (Stalin's administration had offered $300 mn. to meet the U.S. claim for $800 mn. but Khrushchev had rejected U.S. proposals for negotiations (3).). The balance of claimed default totaled $72 mn. (surplus-property disposal and claims against expropriation) in 1963 (4) just under the value of U.S. imports from those countries that year and less than half its exports thither.

The crucial problem arises, however, in government guarantees for long-term commercial credit, a guarantee

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(1) In U.S. Senate, Views, p. 253.

(2) The Times (London), 20 November 1964.

(3) U.S. Senate, Hearings, pp. 211-2.

(4) Ibid, pp. 29-30.

generally expected by business in such circumstances, and, accorded for about 75 per cent of all credits for equipment. (1). Of OECD members (defined as the "West" in this paper), Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S.A. are represented by their appropriate institution on the "Berne Union", founded in 1934 to discuss terms offered for credit under government guarantee. (2). The Union consensus on supplier-credit schemes was the desirability of a limit of 5 years for repayment (with 7 years for supply of ships or jet aircraft). The fact that this view - not in any case, binding on its members- had been expressed led to severe criticism, chiefly from U.S. sources, of governmental institutions exceeding the 5 years limit. (3). French credits of 7 years have been accorded; in May 1965 the Federal German government announced that credits of 8 years would be available to all save Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union; and the U.K. system of financial guarantees (not of the type covered by the Berne Union) introduced in 1961, allows loans generally of up to 8 years (and in special cases up to 12 years from date of commissioning or up to 15 years from date of contract). Japan, which has now risen to second place among the market-economies partners of the U.S.R., also allows loans well above five years but is not represented in the Berne Union.

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(1) See Ibid, pp. 185-6 and 354; PEP, pp. 148-9.

(2) Ibid, p. 184.

(3) Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition, op. cit., p. 68; and in U.S. Senate, Views, p. 230; Marx, Ibid, p. 274; CED, pp. 27-30.

These guarantees concern only major plant or ocean-going ships which form a small part of total U.K. trade with the east, but it is undeniable that there has been some lengthening of other western credits as a consequence. This has naturally been exploited by eastern partners, who can play off western tenderers on credit offers. The Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Vneshtorgbank told a Swedish mission in 1964 that credit of at least 10 years was wanted for complete plant, and that "we never refuse credits when they are granted on favourable terms". (1). When Mr. Mikoyan visited the U.S.A. in 1960 with Mr. Khrushchev he told the Secretary of the Treasury that for trade with the U.S. to be "substantially expanded, it would have to be on a long-term, low-interest credit basis. We made it perfectly clear that this was not possible, at least until they had settled the lend-lease debt". (2) Mr. Kosygin's administration seems however to have become more selective in its acceptance or long-term finance. (3). Government views on their guarantees to commercial credit to the East range, therefore, from a refusal to grant any by the U.S., to a broad acceptance of five years by most western European administrations and of seven to eight years by France and the U.K. The western European, Canadian and Japanese view is that credit should be allowed where it is standard practice, without making a special case out for sales to the East.

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(1) Liljefors, op. cit., p. 40.

(2) Hon. D. Dillon, in U.S. Senate, Hearings, pp. 211-2.

(3) H. Heiss, in U.S. Congress, New Directions, p. 920.

In normal trade between developed countries commercial credit will be accorded by both sides, and repayments of old credit, with interest, will substantially offset new loans. In the case of East-West trade two features make for a heavy net payment by the West. The items on which credit is available (plant and equipment) predominantly flow from West to East, although, there is something of a reverse flow if Finland counts as the West (e.g. the $60 mn. Soviet loan to the Finnish State steel enterprise Rauturuukki, repayable over 15 years, to which was added $8 mn. by a loan floated in London by Hambro's Bank in 1964). Secondly, trade is expanding rapidly and amortisation and loan charges are very small in relation to new commitments. The East in general is in the position of Yugoslavia a decade or so ago and it should not be forgotten that, when the repayment burden became severe, governmental intervention became necessary among western partners to take over the commercial loans which had no state backing.

This experience may well have prompted some of the American critics of present credit policy to fear that heavy lending now could "put their creditors under substantial pressure to accept unwanted commodities in lieu of defaults and could amount to a subsidy for their economies". (1). "We want to avoid creating conditions in which a Western country may be tempted to give concessions in order to obtain repayment of a debt". (2). "In the case of the smaller European nations such as England (sic) and others, credit to the Soviet Union can give the Soviet Union dangerous blackmail potential". (3). The rejoinder to this view among the creditor nations (notably France, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and the U.K)

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(1) President's Special Committee, p. 16.

(2) CED, p. 29 (this paragraph was one from which the European and Japanese collaborating committees dissented).

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is that the East - as here defined - has proved itself punctual and honest in all previous repayments, and that the same commercial safeguards are taken as with the much larger volume of credits to other destinations.

Patently, similar arguments apply to the denial of credits as to embargoes or trade controls : if the gain from trade is to be restricted, so much the more should credit. Both stem from the view that a retardation of eastern potential for growth or eastern credit programmes is desirable : in this lies the essence of the western debate on East-West trade, and the response is exclusively political. President Johnson's announcement on 3 May 1966 that he had instructed the Secretary of State to submit to Congress draft legislation easing restrictions on trade with the East was couched in terms of favourable political objectives. In the cost-benefit analysis of international tension the economic additive is small, but only the strongest can ignore it entirely.

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(3) ../.. Brzezinski, in U.S. Senate, Views, p. 230; see also his Alternative to Partition, op. cit., pp. 58-68.

APPENDIX TABLE

Share of Eastern Europe in OECD Members' Trade in 1965

	Percentage of Exports	Percentage of Imports
Canada	3,5	0,5
U.S.	0,5	0,6
Japan	2,5	3,4
Austria	15,3	10,8
Belgium-Lux.	1,5	1,9
Denmark	4,2	4,0
France	3,0	2,6
Germany	3,3	3,4
Greece	22,8	9,0
Iceland	11,5	16,0
Ireland	0,7	1,6
Italy	4,6	6,0
Netherlands	1,6	2,0
Norway	4,4	3,1
Portugal	1,1	1,3
Spain	2,5	2,3
Sweden	3,9	4,1
Switzerland	2,8	2,2
Turkey	14,5	10,0
U.K.	2,4	3,8
Total OECD members	2,7	2,9

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IDEOCRATIE ET RATIONALITE, UNIVERSALITE ET POLYCENTRISME

par

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Une bande dessinée dans un grand journal américain m'a révélé, mieux que tout commentaire politique, une certaine transformation de l'opinion publique américaine à l'égard du communisme européen. Un général américain y informait le héros qu'à la faveur de la guerre du Vietnam les Chinois avaient mis au point un plan démoniaque: ils introduiraient des bombes atomiques en pièces détachées aux Etats-Unis et en URSS et les feraient exploser à distance, afin de provoquer une guerre entre les deux pays.

Cet épisode n'est après tout pas autre chose qu'une transposition, en termes de mythologie populaire, de la célèbre lettre adressée par le Comité Central du PCUS aux partis communistes du monde en Mars dernier, à la veille du Vingt-Troisième Congrès. "Les dirigeants chinois - disait cette lettre - ont besoin d'une longue guerre au Vietnam, afin de maintenir la tension internationale et de représenter la Chine en tant que forteresse assiégée. Il y a toutes les raisons de croire qu'un des buts de la direction chinoise dans l'affaire du Vietnam est de provoquer un conflit militaire entre l'URSS et les Etats-Unis. Comme ils disent eux-mêmes, ils ont besoin d'un conflit entre l'URSS et les Etats-Unis afin d'observer du haut d'une montagne les tigres s'entredévorer".

L'URSS aurait-elle abdiqué, en faveur de la Chine, ses aspirations universalistes, pourtant inscrites dans son idéologie, pour devenir "un pays comme un autre" dans un monde polycentriste, voué à la coexistence nucléaire? Les conséquences de l'escalade américaine au Vietnam sur le dialogue Est-Ouest prouvent qu'il est impossible de l'affirmer. L'URSS ne veut ni ne peut désavouer la nature idéocratique de son régime. Mais les contradictions entre ses intérêts nationaux et son idéologie existent désormais en politique intérieure ainsi qu'en politique extérieure.

Ces contradictions sont devenues évidentes depuis que le rapport secret de Khrouchtchev a mis en cause l'infaillibilité du parti, depuis que le conflit russo-chinois a mis explicitement fin à l'unité du monde communiste. Elles ont donné lieu, pour les observateurs occidentaux, à deux thèses voisines et pourtant distinctes: celle de la fin de l'idéologie en URSS et celle de la convergence possible des régimes soviétique et occidental.

La thèse de la fin de l'idéologie date de "L'Opium des Intellectuels" de Raymond Aron, publié en 1955. On a trop souvent oublié, dans la discussion qui suivit, qu'Aron définissait l'idéologie comme "la mise en forme pseudo-systématique d'une vision globale du monde historique". D'une idéologie ainsi définie (Aron utilisait aussi le terme de "religion séculaire"), le stalinisme était de toute évidence la forme extrême. Il s'agissait donc là d'autre chose que de ces idéologies que postulait implicitement Emile Durkheim en affirmant que "toute société est un ordre moral" et dans lesquelles Raymond Aron voit "la mise en forme d'une attitude historique ou d'une hiérarchie des valeurs" (1). Rien ne permet de croire que le monde communiste va renoncer au marxisme-léninisme en tant qu'idéologie officielle. Mais il est certain qu'en Union Soviétique et avec plus de force encore dans les démocraties populaires certaines thèses essentielles du marxisme-léninisme ont été, depuis la mort de Staline, mises en question et que le système ne présente plus cet aspect de fausse cohérence qu'il avait à l'époque stalinienne. Les débats dans la science, la philosophie, la sociologie, la littérature et les arts comportent une révision du marxisme-léninisme qui le rapproche des principaux courants de la pensée rationaliste occidentale. Je me propose d'illustrer cette érosion idéologique sur plusieurs points cruciaux. J'enticiperai en disant que les thèses du marxisme-léninisme écartées de la discussion à l'intérieur du système et conservant la rigidité de dogmes sont celles qui fondent la légitimité de la "mission historique" du parti: son monopole du pouvoir.

Cette limitation nous mène directement à l'autre thèse, celle de la convergence possible entre les régimes soviétique et occidental. Celle-ci s'inscrit

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(1) Raymond Aron: "Trois Essais sur l'Age Industriel", Collection Preuves, Plon 1966.

d'une part, dans une certaine tradition de raisonnement historique qui prévoit, depuis des siècles, que tout fanatisme idéologique est voué au déclin. On y reconnaîtra le cycle de la décadence dynastique de Platon, la dégradation des élites, prévue par Pareto, de "lions" en "renards", le "Capoue" des anciens et "l'embourgeoisement"des modernes. Ce qui a conféré une actualité nouvelle à ce scepticisme un peu désabusé, c'est l'avènement d'un nouveau type social universel, dont l'analyse la plus précise est due encore à Raymond Aron et qu'il a baptisé société industrielle. Des régimes qui se voulaient irréductiblement hostiles l'un à l'autre, l'Union Soviétique et les démocraties occidentales, ont édifié des industries dont les techniques de production se ressemblent, ce qui tend à rapprocher de plus en plus leur infrastructure technique et administrative. Or, si Raymond Aron refuse explicitement de conclure qu'il en suivra inévitablement la désintégration du régime politique et du monopole idéologique du côté communiste, de nombreux commentateurs ont identifié démocratie et bien-être et semblent croire que le totalitarisme, lié à la phase d'industrialisation primaire accélérée, ne peut résister à la prospérité. Zbigniew Brzezinski a très judicieusement décelé dans ce raisonnement une forme de marxisme vulgaire: le type de régime politique et d'idéologie serait fonction du degré de développement des forces productives.

Je me propose de traiter séparément les deux thèses de la "fin de l'idéologie" en URSS et de la convergence possible entre les deux régimes, dans l'espoir de démontrer que si la révision de l'idéologie semble admise dans des domaines aussi importants que la science, l'économie, la philosophie et la littérature, la croyance que le parti continue à exiger est la croyance dans le parti, celle précisément qui limite la thèse de la convergence.

Je me bornerai à dessein à examiner dans ce papier l'évolution des idées en URSS. Dans les autres pays de l'Est les mêmes problèmes se posent à la fois d'une façon plus spectaculaire et avec moins d'acuité. En 1945, les "progressistes" européens croyaient que l'Histoire avait offert à sa fille aînée, la Russie, l'Europe de l'Est en don permanent. A la lumière de la déstalinisation et du polycentrisme il est clair maintenant que l'empire soviétique a subi en Europe de l'Est une défaite historique. L'URSS n'a pas réussi à russifier ces peuples ni à les convertir au marxisme-léninisme. Le caractère spectaculaire du révisionnisme polonais ou hongrois en 1956 représentait ainsi une réaction à une période

relativement courte de contrainte. La révolte de ces intellectuels a exercé une grande influence sur les intellectuels soviétiques, mais c'est en URSS seulement que la "désidéologisation" a pour cadre un pays formé par l'idéologie et où celle-ci est plutôt renforcée qu'affaiblie par la solidarité nationale.

Sur certains points essentiels, le marxisme-léninisme, sous sa forme présente est sur la défensive en URSS. (1)

Le Matérialisme dialectique représente la base de la philosophie soviétique, car il est censé répondre à toutes les questions liées à la nature de la réalité et la nature de la connaissance. Les découvertes de la science moderne - en particulier dans les domaines de la physique, de la logique et de la mathématique - sont difficilement conciliables avec les catégories "marxistes" de la matière, de l'espace et du temps. Longtemps entravés par les dogmes du matérialisme dialectique, les savants soviétiques ont, depuis une dizaine d'années, revendiqué la primauté de la science sur la philosophie.

La théorie de l'exploitation de Marx forme la justification politique et morale de son système. Or, cette théorie est basée sur la notion de valeur-travail, inconciliable avec la notion de rareté et avec le raisonnement marginaliste sans lesquels une économie moderne ne peut assurer une distribution rationnelle des ressources. Les économistes soviétiques ont élaboré maintenant des théories qui admettent implicitement le caractère anachronique des instruments conceptuels de Ricardo et de Marx.

Le matérialisme historique, théorie d'un mouvement déterminé de l'histoire et de "lois objectives de développement social" est l'oeuvre maîtresse de Marx. Il en convient lui-même, dans une lettre de 1852 :"Ce que j'ai fait de nouveau: j'ai démontré 1°- que l'existence des classes est liée aux phases particulières du développement de la production; 2°- que la lutte des classes mène nécessairement à

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(1) Pour une discussion plus ample de ce sujet, voir Daniel Bell: Marxism-Leninism: a Doctrine on the Défensive (The "End of Ideology" in the Soviet Union?); dans "The Appeals and Paradoxes of Contemporary Marxism", Frederick Praeger, New-York 1966.

la dictature du prolétariat;3°- que cette dictature elle-même n'est qu'une période de transition qui précédera l'abolition de toutes les classes et la société sans classes." (1)

Si dans chaque domaine la doctrine marxiste-léniniste a été d'abord mise en question par la praxis, ceci est par excellence le cas du matérialisme historique qui, par ses composants de déterminisme et de volontarisme, est censé à la fois représenter une route toute tracée et guider ceux qui la suivent. Or, il est clair que l'analyse marxiste ne correspond pas aux développements de l'histoire au vingtième siècle. C'est sur ce terrain que l'idéologie soviétique est confrontée par les problèmes les plus ardus, car ils comprennent le développement du capitalisme, l'infaillibilité du parti (le rôle de Staline et de Khrouchtchev), le polycentrisme à l'intérieur du camp.

Je ne vais pas discuter dans ce papier la révolte dans la littérature et dans les arts qui, commencée en Pologne et en Hongrie autour de 1956, s'est communiquée à l'URSS et qui est l'aspect le plus connu du "dégel". Les théories de réalisme socialiste et la mainmise jdanovienne sur les arts ne sont nullement essentielles à la doctrine marxiste-léniniste et ne représentent qu'une face du stalinisme. Il faut cependant tenir compte de l'énorme importance de la revendication, par les écrivains "libéraux", du droit à décrire la vie soviétique telle qu'elle est et non pas telle que l'idéologie l'a voulue. D'autre part, le fait que le conflit entre les "durs" et les "libéraux" en littérature soit en quelque sorte "institutionalisé" (depuis plusieurs années les uns et les autres disposent de leurs propres revues) préfigure peut-être une forme de pluralisme qui pourrait s'étendre à d'autres domaines. Enfin, c'est bien le procès Siniavski Daniel qui a provoqué, non seulement des protestations sans précédent dans plusieurs partis communistes, mais aussi un appel de vingt-cinq écrivains, artistes et savants soviétiques parmi les plus prestigieux qui se sont adressés directement au Comité Central pour qu'il ne permette pas le retour aux vieilles méthodes de répression.

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(1) Cité par Sir Isaiah Berlin: "Karl Marx: his life and environment", Oxford University Press.

Il va sans dire que la liberté intellectuelle est plus frappante encore dans d'autres pays de l'Est. Je vais me limiter à en signaler un seul exemple. L'écrivain hongrois Ivan Boldizsar, qui joue depuis des années un rôle "officiel" dans la vie littéraire de son pays, a consacré, dans le dernier numéro de "The New Hungarian Quaterly" (été 1966) un article aux récents colloques d'intellectuels de l'Est et de l'Ouest. Il y définit le terme d'intellectuel de la façon suivante:

"Ils conservent leur indépendance intellectuelle, ils insistent à voir les deux côtés de chaque problème, ils ne préconisent aucune solution exclusive et ils sont tous voltairiens dans le sens que, même s'ils combattent ce que dit l'adversaire, ils sont prêts à lutter jusqu'à la mort pour défendre son droit à le dire."

"Nos lecteurs - continue plus loin Boldizsar - pourraient croire, avec certains participants à nos colloques, que cette définition est applicable en Occident, mais non pas au délégués plus ou moins officiels de l'Est. Heureusement, il apparaît de plus en plus clairement des récents colloques internationaux que ma définition de l'intellectuel s'applique tout aussi bien aux intellectuels des pays socialistes de l'Est."

Laissons pour le moment de côté les réserves que cet optimisme ne peut manquer de susciter: le fait même qu'un représentant effectivement officiel d'un pays socialiste puisse définir le rôle de l'intellectuel non seulement d'une façon non-marxiste, mais conforme au plus pur idéalisme libéral est assez révélateur.

Le Matérialisme dialectique, la Science et la Philosophie - Le matérialisme dialectique se veut une vision du monde scientifique, dérivée directement de la science. Engels, qui concevait la dialectique comme "la science des lois les plus générales de tout mouvement", pensait que la philosophie allait se résoudre dans la science une fois que savants et historiens utiliseraient la dialectique. La distinction entre le matérialisme dialectique et les sciences a été en effet l'objet de nombreuses controverses en URSS. Plusieurs questions se sont, dès le début, posées: Dans une société établie sur la base d'un socialisme scientifique, la philosophie a-t-elle une raison d'être? Quelle est la nature du matérialisme marxiste? Quelle autorité finale doit décider de l'issue des controverses philosophiques? Dans les années 1920, les marxistes positivistes, soutenus par de nombreux savants et techniciens, déclaraient, en se basant sur "L'Anti-Dühring" d'Engels, que la philosophie devait céder la place aux sciences naturelles et historiques qui en seraient en

quelque sorte la somme implicite. Ils étaient opposés par les représentants de l'héritage philosophique dérivé de Hegel et de Lénine, dirigés par le philosophe Abram M. Deborine, qui devaient remporter une victoire décisive en 1929. C'était le triomphe du programme philosophique de Lénine (qui se réservait le droit de critiquer non pas les concepts scientifiques en tant que tels, mais les conclusions épistémologiques de la physique moderne) sur la tradition scientiste d'Engels.

Mais, une fois établi que le matérialisme dialectique avait le pas sur les sciences, pouvait-on laisser les philosophes décider du matérialisme dialectique? En 1931, le Comité Central du Parti accusa Deborine et ses partisans de séparer la philosophie de la politique, la théorie de la pratique et d'éliminer le principe de la "partiinost" de la science et de la philosophie. Dès lors, les philosophes "professionnels" n'eurent plus aucun rôle dans le développement du marxisme-léninisme.

Dans la théorie marxiste, on ne voit pas clairement quel est le rôle de la science, pourtant un des concepts de base de la doctrine. Le marxisme est bien "scientifique", mais la science, en tant qu'activité théorique et pratique, a longtemps été considérée comme subordonnée aux forces économiques et matérielles. Lénine n'a jamais explicitement affirmé la "nature de classe" de la science - il ne faisait que dénoncer la philosophie "officielle" au service des régimes bourgeois (dans la tradition de la critique marxiste de l'idéalisme). A partir de 1931, le stalinisme nia la base objective de la science, qui fut assimilée à la superstructure. Les savants "bourgeois" furent dès lors accusés de servir un complot destiné à réconcilier la science et la religion. La physique de la relativité était coupable de nier les fondements absolus de l'espace et du temps. La physique des quanta, d'introduire la subjectivité dans la description de la réalité.

Si l'on tient compte du fait que la théorie de la relativité était honnie en URSS jusqu'en 1954 et que les physiciens soviétiques étaient tenus à dénoncer rituellement "l'Einsteinisme réactionnaire", la bombe et les spoutniks prouvent abondamment que les déclarations verbales n'avaient pas de poids déterminant sur les laboratoires et les usines. En effet, tous les experts occidentaux sont d'accord sur ce point, les savants russes n'emploient la terminologie du matérialisme dialectique qu'en hommage à la philosophie officielle de l'Etat, tout en utilisant la méthodologie scientifique commune à toute la tradition occidentale. Un des meilleurs

spécialistes de la science soviétique, Maxim X. Mikulak déclare: "Dans aucun des ouvrages techniques de savants soviétiques lus par moi, je n'ai pu découvrir l'emploi de lois de la pensée dialectique ni d'une méthodologie caractéristique du matérialisme dialectique." (1)

Il est pourtant certain que le matérialisme dialectique, utilisé par les staliniens , a empêché le développement de certaines branches de la science. Le cas le plus notoire est celui de l'agronome T.D. Lysenko qui a tâché de discréditer la génétique pour des raisons idéologiques. Il y en a d'autres, en astronomie, en agriculture, en physique même. L'illustre physicien soviétique P. Kapitsa déclarait en 1962 que le matérialisme dialectique soviétique avait rejeté la cybernétique, la théorie des quanta, la théorie de la relativité et avait commis d'autres erreurs encore. "Si les Soviétiques avaient accepté la primauté des philosophes en 1954 - écrivait-il - ils n'auraient pu conquérir le cosmos."

Le programme du Parti de 1961 a finalement introduit une nouvelle définition de la science: la recherche théorique et la recherche appliquée n'y sont plus considérées comme faisant partie de la superstructure, mais définie comme "forces productives" et "facteur essentiel dans le développement des forces productives". Ce qui peut nous paraître en Occident comme des joutes verbales scolastiques prend un tout autre poids sous un régime qui a si longtemps considéré le "Diamat" comme le fondement même de sa philosophie. Désormais, si la science fait partie des forces productives plutôt que de la superstructure, ses activités et ses découvertes sont en quelque sorte légitimisées à l'intérieur même de la doctrine. Comme dans la tradition occidentale, c'est la théorie qui devra être conforme aux normes et aux découvertes de la science, au lieu d'imposer à celle-ci un cadre dogmatique. L'académicien S.L. Sobolev n'a-t-il pas dénoncé, dans un célèbre rapport, "ceux qui parlent de théories scientifiques idéalistes et matérialistes"? Tandis qu'un observateur aussi qualifié que A.J. Ayer écrivait en 1962, après avoir donné une série de conférences à la Faculté Scientifique de Moscou: "Le prestige de la science est si grand qu'il s'agit à présent pour les philosophes d'adapter

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(1) "Survey", Londres, Juillet 1964.

leurs principes philosophiques à la théorie scientifique courante plutôt que du processus contraire".

Lewis S. Feuer, de l'Université de Chicago, qui a fréquenté pendant plusieurs mois les membres de l'Institut Philosophique de l'Académie des Sciences de Moscou, est convaincu, bien que tous les philosophes soviétiques l'aient assuré être des matérialistes dialectiques, que toute une variété de philosophies différentes émergent en Union Soviétique et qu'elles continuent à être classées sous la dénomination de "Matérialisme dialectique" dans un équilibre instable. "En Union Soviétique - écrit-il - il existe la contrepartie de chaque mouvement philosophique en Europe Occidentale ou en Amérique. Si l'on éliminait la philosophie planifiée, il faudrait s'attendre à la floraison de courants divers".(1) Parmi les jeunes philosophes soviétiques, Feuer a trouvé trois courants principaux: le réalisme scientifique, l'existentialisme et le pragmatisme. Les philosophes "scientifiques" pensent, avec Bertrand Russel, que seule la structure de l'univers physique peut être connue. Les existentialistes découvrent le jeune Marx des "Manuscrits" et la notion de l'aliénation. Ils se sentent plus concernés par les problèmes de la vie individuelle que par l'idéologie de la lutte des classes et ils découvrent Berdiaeff et Soloviov. Les pragmatistes cherchent à approfondir la notion marxiste de la "praxis" et se sentent attirés par Pierce et par Dewey.

Valeur-travail et économie rationnelle - La notion marxiste de valeur-travail, dérivée de Ricardo (la valeur d'échange d'une marchandise est égale à la quantité de travail humain socialement nécessaire pour qu'à une époque donnée un travailleur moyen produise un échantillon moyen de cette marchandise) est à la base de la notion de la plus-value (valeur produite par le sur-travail non payé et appropriée par le capital) qui, elle, donne lieu à la théorie de l'exploitation, unique justification politique et morale du système édifié par Marx (vu qu'il a rejeté comme "idéalistes" tous les arguments éthiques ou émotionnels en faveur de la révolution).

Les Soviétiques ont par conséquent érigé la théorie de valeur-travail en dogme. Dans la première phase de leur planification, quand l'économie était

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(1) "Survey", Avril 1964.

entièrement subordonnée à l'administration centrale, il était encore possible de concevoir un plan établi en termes de matériaux, avec des prix arbitraires. Mais à mesure que l'économie devenait plus complexe, il était de plus en plus difficile de n'accorder de prix qu'au seul travail, sans prendre en considération le sol et le capital. En accord avec la théorie de valeur-travail, les économistes soviétiques voyaient dans le taux d'intérêt purement et simplement une forme d'exploitation, en se refusant de le considérer comme un mécanisme qui détermine la rareté du capital et sert à le canaliser vers les voies les plus productives. D'autre part, les planificateurs soviétiques doivent désormais prendre en considération l'allocation rationnelle des ressources, et celle-ci impose à toute économie moderne de reconnaître la rareté, d'admettre le raisonnement marginaliste, et par conséquent de se servir du prix comme indicateur.

En simplifiant, on pourrait dire que l'Union Soviétique doit choisir entre deux alternatives, toutes deux inconciliables avec la théorie valeur-travail. La première alternative, connue sous le nom de "libermanisme", du nom du professeur E. Liberman de l'Université de Kharkov, consisterait à reconstruire en fait les mécanismes du marché en accordant aux directeurs des entreprises la liberté de choisir la combinaison la plus favorable de travail et de capital afin d'arriver à la production demandée par le plan central. La deuxième alternative, associée au nom du professeur Kantorovitch, un des inventeurs du système de programmation linéaire, serait de recourir aux ordinateurs afin de combiner rationalité par rapport à la consommation finale et planification centrale sans recours au marché, ou plutôt à travers la reconstruction électronique d'un marché idéal. Cette deuxième méthode permettrait, il est vrai, de réconcilier planification centrale autoritaire et rationalité. Mais ce n'est encore qu'une réconciliation théorique, car si l'humanité dispose dès à présent des procédés mathématiques et des ordinateurs, il faudrait attendre quelques dizaines d'années avant d'obtenir toutes les données nécessaires qu'exigerait un plan économique de cet ordre de grandeur. L'introduction de cette école mathématique, sans doute plus conciliable avec le système politique que la reconstruction d'un mécanisme de marché, n'est pas moins dangereuse pour la théorie marxiste, car elle reconnaît la rareté et non le travail comme source de valeur et adopte le raisonnement marginaliste.

Les économistes soviétiques conservateurs s'en rendent compte. L'un d'eux, Gatovsky, accusait ouvertement L.V. Kantorovitch "de ré-examiner la théorie marxiste de valeur-travail", car "les systèmes marginaux d'évaluation sont construits, non pas en termes de travail social dépensé, mais mesurés à l'étalon d'"utilité marginale", c'est-à-dire de l'utilité de la dernière unité d'un produit donné qui satisfait le besoin le moins indispensable de l'acheteur" (1). Un des membres de l'école mathématique soviétique, Nemtchinov, écrivait récemment que l'on ne peut arriver à l'efficacité dans une économie socialiste qu'en se basant sur des prix relevés sur un marché compétitif installé sous les auspices d'une sorte de planification indicative, ou, alternativement, à l'aide d'ordinateurs; ou encore, par un mélange des deux systèmes. Dans les trois cas, la théorie marxiste de valeur-travail s'écroule.

Paradoxalement, si les nouvelles techniques sont inconciliables avec la théorie de valeur-travail, ce n'est qu'à leur aide que l'Union Soviétique pourrait abolir l'argent et réaliser ainsi la condition primordiale de cette deuxième étape du communisme dont l'avènement a été promis avant la fin du siècle par le troisième programme du PCUS. En effet, si un "marché électronique" doit tenir compte des facteurs hérétiques de la rente et du taux d'intérêt, ce ne seront là - comme l'a remarqué Peter Wiles - que des facteurs-fantômes, et si la doctrine en sort affaiblie, les institutions pourraient enfin prétendre à incarner son destin historique.

Le Matérialisme historique et l'avenir du Parti - La théorie marxiste-léniniste repose sur un schéma de développement social qui assure la victoire finale et pour ainsi dire automatique du socialisme sur le capitalisme, dont l'économie devait entrer dans un état de crise permanente et impossible à résoudre. Il est inutile de répéter ici toutes les évidences qui infirment cette analyse.

Le capitalisme a échappé à la paupérisation progressive; il a non seulement maintenu, à travers l'action de l'Etat, de hauts taux de croissance

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(1) Cité par Alfred Zauberman, "Survey", Juillet 1965.

économique, mais depuis 1945, le succès des économies occidentales qui ont ignoré les dépressions et les crises, a été sans précédent. D'autre part, aucune révolution du type marxiste n'a succédé au capitalisme dans sa phase développée, tandis que les révolutions communistes ont eu lieu dans des pays sous-développés, grâce à la paysannerie et non à la classe ouvrière.

Les contradictions se sont multipliées depuis la mort de Staline. Sa dénonciation par Khrouchtchev a implicitement mis en question l'infaillibilité du Parti et ce dogme central a été encore affaibli par l'élimination de Khrouchtchev lui-même. Les phénomènes du développement économique et social liés à la notion de société industrielle mettent en question la nécessité de la primauté du Parti à l'intérieur de l'URSS et de chaque pays communiste développé. Le polycentrisme a aboli la primauté de l'URSS en tant que modèle de développement social.

C'est dans la perspective du matérialisme historique que se pose le problème central, le noyau même de la doctrine soviétique: la prétention à remplir une mission historique (réaliser le communisme) à travers un instrument légitime (le "rôle dirigeant" du Parti). C'est dans ce domaine que le Parti est le plus vulnérable, car il doit maintenir sa légitimité en dépit des "erreurs" du passé, et en précisant désormais son rôle dans l'avenir. C'est encore dans ce domaine qu'il doit affirmer son universalité, minée par le polycentrisme.

Or, il est clair que la doctrine est inutilisable en ce qui concerne le passé. Le poète polonais St.-J. Lec a exprimé ce dilemme par un aphorisme frappant: "J'observe avec respect cette flaque de boue: hier elle était neige blanche."

Pour être fidèle au matérialisme historique, il faudrait expliquer la tyrannie stalinienne en termes de superstructure issue de la base économique sous-jacente. Mais ceci mettrait en cause le système social soviétique. D'autre part, si l'on voulait prendre au sérieux l'affirmation de Khrouchtchev que le stalinisme est dû au caractère de Staline, il faudrait aussi affronter la psychologie de ses victimes et de ses collaborateurs, et par conséquent adopter une méthodologie non-marxiste. Une analyse de ce type est bien entendu possible et

elle a été pratiquée en Occident avant le rapport secret de Khrouchtchev. Ainsi, l'anthropologue anglais Geoffrey Gorer (1) expliquait le stalinisme par le caractère russe: les enfants russes sont très étroitement serrés dans leurs langes, ce qui prédisposerait le caractère national russe à des cycles de soumission et de violence, d'apathie et de manie de persécution, d'avidité "orale" et d'abstinence. Nathan Leites (2), lui, a élaboré le concept d'un "caractère bolchévique" qu'il attribue à ces désirs subconscients: fascination par la mort et impulsions homosexuelles latentes. J'ai choisi ces exemples extrêmes pour démontrer qu'il n'est pas impossible d'étudier le stalinisme en termes caractérologiques. Mais il faut alors s'éloigner de Marx davantage encore que ne le fait Max Weber lorsqu'il analyse le capitalisme en termes d'éthique protestante: il faut aller jusqu'à Freud. Bien entendu, une telle analyse mettrait, elle aussi, en cause, par un autre biais, le caractère totalitaire du système. Les Soviétiques se trouvent ainsi paralysés par rapport à toute forme d'analyse approfondie du stalinisme. Pour épargner à la fois la doctrine et les institutions, il faut s'en tenir aux "erreurs" de Staline ...

Impuissant à justifier le passé, le régime soviétique est amené à souligner son caractère téléologique, mais on ne précise pas l'avenir sans risque. L'utopie socialiste a longtemps été une justification lointaine d'une production à tout prix et à n'importe quel prix. Telle la ligne imaginaire de l'horizon - elle s'éloignait à mesure qu'on était censé s'en rapprocher. On vivait dans l'obsession du productivisme quantitatif et dans l'espoir du socialisme rêvé par Marx sans concevoir l'intermédiaire normal de l'élévation du niveau de vie. Le présent était toujours sacrifié à un avenir indéterminé. En 1956, le philosophe polonais Leszek Kolakowski poussait ce cri de détresse: "Je ne croirai jamais que la vie morale et intellectuelle de l'humanité suit les lois de l'économie, que c'est en épargnant aujourd'hui que nous pourrons avoir davantage demain; que nous devons sacrifier des vies maintenant afin que la

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(1) Geoffrey Gorer and John Rickmann: "The People of Great Russia", Londres 1949.

(2) Nathan Leites: "A Study of Bolshevism", Glencoe, Ill. 1954.

vérité triomphe un jour, ou que des crimes puissent paver la voie à la générosité!" Khrouchtchev a finalement admis le présent en souscrivant à la nécessité du bien-être et parmi les objectifs de la planification soviétique la satisfaction des besoins rejoint aujourd'hui le volume de la production. En instaurant le bien-être, en abolissant la terreur et la coercition, le régime soviétique a été amené à recourir aux promesses et à préciser la chronologie utopiste. Le nouveau programme d'Octobre 1961 du PCUS (il n'est pas sans intérêt de rappeler qu'il n'est que le troisième dans l'ordre et que les deux premiers datent respectivement de 1903 et de 1919) déclare que "la base matérielle et technique du communisme sera construite à la fin de la deuxième décade (1971-1980)" et qu'à ce moment "la société soviétique s'approchera de l'étape où elle pourra introduire le principe de la distribution selon les besoins". Ainsi, pour la première fois, le régime soviétique prend le risque d'être jugé, à une date relativement proche, sur ses réalisations.

Le polycentrisme pose à l'idéologie soviétique des problèmes encore plus graves. La doctrine de l'unité indestructible du camp socialiste reposait sur le dogme de l'infaillibilité de la direction soviétique. La destruction de celle-ci ne pouvait que saper celle-là, même si l'éclatement du camp est dû à des facteurs qui existaient déjà en puissance à l'époque stalinienne. Le polycentrisme est un phénomène complexe comprenant à la fois le conflit russo-chinois et l'autonomie croissante des pays d'Europe de l'Est, qui date de la révolte polonaise et hongroise de 1956, révolte liée à la déstalinisation. Le conflit russo-chinois est probablement antérieur et en fait le monde communiste avait deux centres dès 1950. Mais le polycentrisme est devenu un fait irréversible du jour où chacun de ces centres a voulu s'approprier le droit d'interpréter une doctrine universelle.

Le "communisme national" est après tout un phénomène si récent que le terme même nous semble encore contradictoire. Pour les pères de la doctrine, pour Lénine, même pour les "aparatchiki" staliniens (du moins à un certain niveau de leur conscience) il ne pouvait y avoir de doute que la victoire du communisme à l'échelle mondiale signifierait la fin des nationalismes, la réalisation de la société universelle et de la vision de Marx dans laquelle la société remplacerait

l'Etat. Il est inutile de rappeler ici l'érosion graduelle du caractère internationaliste du mouvement communiste. Même après la révolution russe, lorsqu'il est devenu clair que le communisme ne serait pas réalisé selon les prévisions de Marx, une conception internationaliste réservait à chaque nouvel Etat communiste le droit d'accession volontaire à l'Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes, conçue non pas en tant qu'Etat géographiquement délimité, mais fédération de tous les Etats communistes. Ce principe fut même la dérisoire justification de l'annexion des Etats Baltes. Le premier écart de cette ligne de conduite fut, après la dernière guerre, la conception des "démocraties populaires". Le caractère tactique de cette nouvelle forme de "communisme national" semblait pourtant clair: ne s'agissait-il pas de donner aux partis communistes des pays satellites le temps nécessaire pour utiliser les thèmes nationalistes à seule fin de préparer leur adhésion éventuelle à l'Union?

L'idéologie marxiste-léniniste est ainsi impuissante à appréhender les problèmes posés par le polycentrisme. Dans une étude intitulée "Etapes de développement du système mondial socialiste" (1), l'historien Sanakoev est amené à se réclamer de "la formation des républiques soviétiques - l'Ukraine, la Bielorussie, l'Arménie, (etc.)" qui "ont commencé à élaborer les formes et les méthodes de relations entre nations souveraines d'Etat à Etat basées sur les principes d'internationalisme prolétarien", mais il ne peut, pour des raisons évidentes, mentionner cet autre Etat socialiste - la Chine. Les mots d'ordre successifs de l'internationalisme expriment à eux seuls à la fois l'évolution de la doctrine marxiste-léniniste et l'enjeu de la polémique russo-chinoise.

La Première Internationale adoptait, il y a un siècle, le cri de guerre de Marx: "Ouvriers de tous les pays, unissez-vous!"

Lénine, arrivé au pouvoir dans un pays sous-développé, élargit le mot d'ordre et ce sera: "Ouvriers et peuples opprimés de tous les pays, unissez-vous!"

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(1) "Novaïa i Noveïcha Istoria", N° 4, 1965, cité par Leopold Labedz, "Survey", Janvier 1966.

Staline, qui transformait tous les moyens de la doctrine en fins, utilise l'internationalisme pour consolider son propre pouvoir: "Un internationaliste - déclare-t-il en 1927 - est celui qui, sans réserve, sans hésitation, sans conditions, est prêt à défendre l'Union Soviétique."

Les Chinois déclarèrent dans leur lettre du 14 Juin 1963 que vu l'existence de plusieurs Etats communistes, "la pierre de touche de l'internationalisme prolétarien pour chaque parti communiste est s'il défend résolument ou non l'ensemble du camp socialiste". Les Soviétiques répliquèrent en invoquant comme preuve de l'internationalisme "l'attitude envers le système socialiste mondial et son unité" - cette "unité" devenant dans le nouveau Grand Schisme l'équivalent du "filioquae" de l'ancien.

Le véritable mot d'ordre des Chinois serait pourtant plutôt: "Peuples opprimés de tous les pays, unissez-vous!" C'est l'implication de ce passage du "Jen-min Jin - pao" du 15 Décembre 1962 (1): "Le Marxisme-Léninisme enseigne que la seule majorité qui compte dans le monde sont les gens qui décident du cours de l'histoire et qui représentent plus de 90% de la population du monde. Bien que ceux qui vont à l'encontre des intérêts de base de plus de 90% de la population du monde peuvent lancer des cris et se démener à tel endroit ou telle conférence, ils ne représentent certainement pas la véritable majorité. Leur "majorité"n'est qu'un phénomène factice et superficiel; en fait ils sont précisément une minorité, tandis que la "minorité" qu'ils attaquent est essentiellement la majorité.

On voit combien cette nouvelle forme d'idéologie est éloignée de l'axiome élémentaire de Marx et d'Engels, pour qui le socialisme ne pouvait être issu que de la lutte des classes entre le prolétariat et la bourgeoisie et devenait inconcevable en l'absence de ces classes. Lénine, avec sa théorie de l'impérialisme et son "volontarisme", avait admis la notion des "peuples opprimés", mais il retenait l'essentiel de la théorie marxiste de la révolution. Pour les Chinois, le prolétariat est clairement remplacé par les peuples sous-développés du Tiers-Monde.

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(1) Cité par Melvin Croan, "Survey", Janvier 1963.

Limites de la convergence: de la soviétologie à la sociologie - l'Union Soviétique était, jusqu'au début des années cinquante, considérée comme une société fondamentalement "autre" par ses partisans autant que par ses adversaires. Les marxiste-léninistes sont d'ailleurs toujours tenus, du moins en théorie, à soutenir cette altérité essentielle. Pour eux, le socialisme doit marquer la fin de la préhistoire, ils ne peuvent donc pour des raisons doctrinaires, admettre qu'il soit un régime entre autres, qu'il puisse représenter une espèce de société moderne dont le capitalisme serait une autre version. Les observateurs occidentaux croyaient, eux aussi, que l'Union Soviétique était un régime à part, mais sa particularité consistait à leurs yeux dans son caractère totalitaire. Cette théorie a été exprimée avec une logique qui semblait alors implacable par Hanna Arendt dans son célèbre livre "The Origins of Totalitarianism" (1951). Il suffit de rappeler ici que d'après cette théorie, une forme nouvelle de société, différente des tyrannies ou dictatures du passé, a été crée en Allemagne nazie et en Russie stalinienne. Les traits nouveaux du totalitarisme consisteraient en premier lieu dans l'élimination de toutes institutions intermédiaires ou secondaires entre le "chef" et les masses. Le chef règnerait par la terreur, en dehors de tout contrôle légal ou politique. On aboutissait à un modèle sociologique d'un régime imposé par la force à un peuple, régime entièrement étanche et cohérent et qui ne pouvait se permettre le moindre changement, au risque de s'écrouler. Si la vision marxiste-léniniste aboutissait à la société sans classes, l'analyse totalitaire tendait à voir l'avenir en termes de "1984" de George Orwell.

Il est clair que nous sommes aujourd'hui aussi éloignés de l'utopie que de l'apocalypse. A tous les niveaux d'analyse, de la sociologie au journalisme populaire, on tend à présent à souligner davantage les ressemblances entre les régimes soviétiques et occidentaux, que leurs différences.

A l'origine de la thèse de la convergence il y a sans doute le thème Russie-Amérique. L'Amérique a été la première société industrielle développée et son aspect technologique fascinait la jeune révolution soviétique, qui voyait le communisme comme la somme des soviets et de l'électrification. Lénine s'intéressait non seulement à Ford et au taylorisme, il demandait aux Russes de brosser leurs dents "comme les Américains". Staline, lui, voulait "rattraper et dépasser

l'Amérique". En plein stalinisme, un émigré russe, Pitrim A. Sorokine, écrivit un livre intitulé "Russia and the United States" (1941) où il insistait que la seule analyse correcte de l'Union Soviétique était de la voir en termes d'une grande société industrielle comme les Etats-Unis. Il allait jusqu'à déclarer que seuls des idiots pouvaient attacher de l'importance à ce qui n'était à ses yeux que des différences mineures entre ces deux pays.

La thèse de la convergence (ou d'une certaine homogénéité) des deux régimes est plus acceptable pour les Occidentaux que pour les Soviétiques. Pour les marxistes-léninistes, le trait essentiel de leur régime est le système de propriété des instruments de production. Les Occidentaux tendent à identifier le leur avec la démocratie et la liberté. Les théories pour lesquelles le socialisme et le capitalisme ne sont pas des systèmes sociaux successifs (ni même peut-être des systèmes sociaux à développement propre et unilinéaire), mais deux aspects d'un seul processus sous-jacent, se basent sur des faits qui ne préjugent ni du système de propriété, ni du régime politique, ni du degré de liberté des citoyens. Il s'agit là d'une analyse qui souligne certains impératifs communs à des économies en voie d'industrialisation et de rationalisation, qui mènent vers certains traits communs de développement et de structure sociale.

Bien que ce mode de pensée soit en principe "neutre" à l'égard du système de propriété, il est, répétons-le, incompatible avec le marxisme-léninisme. Ainsi, lorsque M. Khrouchtchev disait au Président Kennedy que les petits-fils de celui-ci vivront sous un système socialiste, il souscrivait entièrement à sa propre idéologie. Par contre, lorsque M. Kennedy répliquait que les petits-fils de M. Khrouchtchev vivront sous un régime de liberté, c'est-à-dire sous un régime de type occidental, il ne tranchait pas nécessairement sur le mode de propriété des forces de production dans ce qui est aujourd'hui le monde communiste. Un autre homme d'Etat occidental, le Dr. Adenauer, aurait, lui, déclaré au même M. Khrouchtchev: "Dans cent ans, on ne parlera plus ni du capitalisme, ni du socialisme". Or, cette déclaration, qui semble symboliser la thèse de la convergence des deux systèmes et leur faire la part égale, est évidemment incompatible avec l'idéologie soviétique tandis qu'elle n'est pas contraire au mode de pensée occidental, vouée à une société de bien-être, à une structure pluraliste et à une tradition libérale, mais qui ne s'identifie pas nécessairement au système de propriété capitaliste.

C'est la raison pour laquelle les théories qui tendent à nier le caractère particulier et unilinéaire des systèmes sociaux socialiste et capitaliste ont revêtu, tour à tour, un caractère "pessimiste" ou "optimiste" selon qu'elles étaient exposées par des hommes qui avaient placé tous leurs espoirs dans le socialisme ou qui avaient identifié le système soviétique avec le totalitarisme. Il n'est pas sans intérêt de constater que, si la plupart des théories de "convergence" ont leur origine dans les idées de Max Weber sur la bureaucratisation de la société, ce sont les communistes déçus qui ont, les premiers, diagnostiqué une évolution du système socialiste non pas vers le capitalisme, mais dans une direction commune avec lui. Cette analyse du système soviétique en tant que collectivisme bureaucratique est d'ailleurs à la base du révisionnisme des années 1950; elle constitue l'essentiel du livre de Milovan Djilas "La Nouvelle Classe" et elle a influencé les vues des jeunes Polonais et Hongrois en 1956. Cette théorie part de l'argumentation de Trotzky selon laquelle, malgré la nationalisation des biens de production, l'Union Soviétique sous Staline a cessé d'être un Etat ouvrier et a dégénéré en une forme de "collectivisme bureaucratique".

La théorie de la "nouvelle classe" a eu son précurseur dans un socialiste polonais peu connu ou oublié, Waclaw Machajski. Celui-ci prévoyait, dans un petit livre intitulé "L'évolution de la Social-Démocratie", publié en 1899, que, dans la société socialiste à venir, telle qu'elle était préparée par les partis révolutionnaires existants, les ouvriers continueraient à être exploités, cette fois par une nouvelle classe de dirigeants professionnels. La théorie du socialisme - écrivait-il - n'a pas été élaborée dans l'intérêt véritable du prolétariat, mais "dans l'intérêt d'une armée croissante de travailleurs intellectuels et d'une nouvelle classe moyenne". Il prophétisait que la révolution entreprise au nom du socialisme finirait dans une forme de capitalisme d'Etat où techniciens, administrateurs et intellectuels "constitueraient le grand monopole d'Etat en usurpant collectivement un nouveau statut privilégié au détriment des ouvriers manuels". Le remède proposé par Machajski - plus tard condamné par Lénine - était une forme de révolution permanente liée à une distribution égalitaire de revenus.

Le premier livre qui dénonçait la permanence d'un système de classes dans la société soviétique était "La Bureaucratisation du Monde" (1939), par

l'ex-communiste italien Bruno Rizzi, dont les idées ont été rendues célèbres par "La Révolution des Managers" de James Burnham. D'après Rizzi, le monde est à la veille de la dernière guerre en pleine mutation "managerielle" qui a déjà élevé au pouvoir une nouvelle classe. Ni capitaliste, ni socialiste, cette nouvelle classe perpétuerait néanmoins l'esclavage du prolétariat. Elle peut apparaître sous maint déguisement: stalinienne en Russie, nazie en Allemagne, fasciste en Italie et, sous une forme diluée, dans le "New Deal" américain. "Ce n'est plus la bourgeoisie la classe exploiteuse qui touche la plus-value - écrivait Rizzi - mais c'est la bureaucratie qui s'est décerné cet honneur. A notre sens, en URSS, les propriétaires ce sont les bureaucrates, car ce sont eux qui tiennent la force entre leurs mains".

Cette forme "gauchiste" de critique du système communiste est reprise dans la "Lettre ouverte au Parti (1) des deux jeunes communistes polonais, Jacek Kuron et Karol Modzelewski, condamnés en 1965 à 3 et 5 ans de prison respectivement pour "élaboration et diffusion d'écrits nuisibles à l'intérêt de l'Etat polonais". Kuron et Modzelewski écrivent: "La nationalisation des moyens de production n'est qu'une forme de propriété. En fait, tout appartient à ceux à qui appartient l'Etat. ..... A qui appartient le pouvoir dans notre Etat? A un seul parti monopoliste - le parti communiste polonais".

Une autre forme d'analyse qui a influencé la discussion contemporaine sur la convergence des systèmes met davantage l'accent sur la croissance économique que sur la bureaucratisation. Nous en trouvons une variante chez des marxistes occidentaux qui estiment que la dictature totalitaire, ayant accompli l'industrialisation de l'Union Soviétique, a, de ce fait, préparé la voie de sa propre évolution vers une démocratie socialiste. Le socialiste autrichien Otto Bauer écrivait en 1931: "La dictature terroriste va être surmontée et détruite à mesure que le niveau de vie des masses est amélioré. Le régime soviétique peut être démocratisé". (2) Le représentant le plus connu de cette forme d'analyse est sans

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(1) Instytut Literacki, Paris 1966.

(2) Cité par Melvin Croan: "Prospects for the Soviet Dictatorship: Otto Bauer", in "Revisionism", edited by Leopold Labedz, London 1962.

doute Isaac Deutscher qui - sans nier le caractère oppressif, cruel et totalitaire du régime stalinien - a toujours insisté que la dictature totalitaire a été le prix que la Russie a dû payer pour l'industrialisation, et que l'industrialisation préparera, à son tour, le chemin vers une démocratie socialiste.

Pour des marxistes comme Deutscher, le stalinisme préparait (à travers l'industrialisation) les conditions du socialisme. La croissance économique de l'Union Soviétique sous le stalinisme donna lieu en Occident à un autre type d'analyse, qui tend également à voir dans le caractère totalitaire de l'URSS un phénomène transitoire. Ce type d'analyse, dont la base a été posée par Colin Clark dans "Conditions of Economic Progress", est associé à la théorie des phases de croissance de W.W. Rostow. On sait que pour Rostow toute société doit traverser plusieurs étapes de développement allant de la société traditionnelle à l'ère de la consommation de masse. Rostow associe le communisme à la phase cruciale de son schéma, celle du "take-off" (décollage), qui marque le passage à une croissance cumulative et soutenue. "Le communisme - écrit-il - est une forme particulièrement inhumaine d'organisation politique, capable de lancer et de soutenir la croissance dans des sociétés où, pendant la phase des conditions préalables, il ne s'est pas créé une classe commerçante, nombreuse et entreprenante, et une entente politique suffisante entre les dirigeants et la société".(1) A l'inverse de la théorie marxiste, cette définition est applicable aux pays où la révolution a été victorieuse et à la majorité des pays sous-développés. C'est à cet ordre de raisonnement que l'on doit attribuer l'opinion qu'un régime économique et politique de type soviétique est plus efficace dans une phase initiale de développement et le fait qu'aux yeux du Tiers-Monde le prestige de l'Union Soviétique a été dû - du moins pendant un certain temps - à une efficacité économique supposée plutôt qu'à des raisons révolutionnaires.

Relevons que si toutes ces analyses ont en commun de conférer un caractère transitoire au communisme totalitaire, seule l'analyse marxiste du type deutscherien prévoit explicitement une démocratisation de l'Union Soviétique une

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(1) Cité par Raymond Aron: "Trois Essais sur l'Age Industriel".

fois l'industrialisation accomplie, et encore s'agit-il là de l'espoir que la démocratie ouvrière, tributaire du rêve marxiste de la société sans classes, soit réalisable. Ni les théories de bureaucratisation, ni celles liées aux "phases de croissance" de Rostow ne postulent l'autodestruction du parti unique à l'âge industriel (ni même à l'ère de consommation de masse) sous l'influence du bien-être. Les théories occidentales de développement semblent pourtant, par leur caractère unilinéaire, associer la forme totalitaire du communisme à une phase particulière du développement, et c'est cela sans doute qui a inspiré Raymond Aron (qui a tant contribué, par sa théorie de la société industrielle, à populariser la thèse de la convergence), à démontrer qu'il n'est pas facile de dire quel type de régime ou de politique répond le mieux aux exigences d'une phase donnée. Pour Aron, le mérite du régime soviétique par rapport à la croissance n'est pas dû à des raisons d'ordre économique, mais politique. D'autre part, Aron ne trouve pas du tout qu'un régime de parti unique soit inconciliable avec le type de société industrielle: au contraire. Le type idéal d'une société industrielle comporte la différenciation des rôles, le règne des compétences, la diversification des secteurs industriels et des activités individuelles, mais elle tend plutôt à pulvériser les classes. Dans ces circonstances, estime Raymond Aron, le monopole du parti constitue une des solutions idéales typiques au problème du gouvernement des sociétés industrialisées - sociétés de légitimité démocratique, administrées par des compétences, mais dénuées de personnel politique désigné par la naissance ou la capacité (la capacité politique étant différente en nature des capacités techniques ou professionnelles qui, elles, trouvent bien entendu dans la société industrielle le terrain de développement idéal).

Le fait même que l'Union Soviétique soit une société industrielle présuppose déjà, néanmoins, une forme incontestable de convergence. Nous en voyons la preuve dans le fait que, dans l'étude des phénomènes de la vie soviétique, la "Soviétologie"cède le pas à la sociologie. Alex Inkeles et Raymond A. Bauer

ont déjà démontré dans "The Soviet Citizen" (1) que le meilleur moyen de prédire les attitudes, les valeurs, les orientations des citoyens soviétiques est de se baser sur ce que l'on sait des hommes occupant des situations comparables dans des sociétés occidentales. En particulier, les nombreux aspects de la stratification sociale en URSS ne peuvent être expliqués qu'en termes de systèmes sociaux industriels développés.

Le professeur Inkeles déclara même récemment qu'il considère le modèle sociologique totalitaire de moins en moins applicable à l'Union Soviétique, et il proposait de le remplacer par deux autres modèles: le modèle de "développement" (qui traite de problèmes communs à toutes sociétés en voie de développement) et le modèle de la société industrielle. Il concluait ainsi: "Je sais que ce que j'ai dit de l'avenir de la soviétologie pure me place un peu dans la position de ce premier ministre qui fut accusé de devenir premier ministre à seule fin de détruire l'Empire de Sa Majesté. Je le regrette en tant que soviétologue, mais en tant que sociologue je n'ai pas d'autre choix". (2)

Ceci nous ramène à notre point de départ. C'est l'existence d'une société "autre" qui a donné lieu au développement de la soviétologie. Dès qu'il apparaît que les meilleurs instruments d'analyse de la société soviétique sont ceux que nous utilisons pour nous connaître nous-mêmes, il est au moins établi qu'il existe, entre les deux formes de régime, un langage commun.

La lutte des classes et la bombe - L'attitude des dirigeants soviétiques à l'égard du monde "capitaliste" a été pourtant la plus affectée par un fait, qui se place en dehors des considérations idéologiques, en dehors même du développement social et économique de l'URSS: celui de la coexistence nucléaire. En réponse à la lettre des communistes chinois du 14 Juin 1963, le Comité Central du PCUS déclare: "La bombe atomique n'adhère pas au principe de classe: elle tue tout le monde".

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(1) Harvard University Press, 1959.

(2) "Survey", Juillet 1966.

La découverte de ce simple fait a amené l'URSS à transformer sa conception des relations internationales qui, même chez un pragmatiste comme Staline, était dictée par des considérations idéologiques, par l'universalisme de la doctrine (1). Le marxisme traitait les relations internationales en fonction du développement des forces productives et de la lutte des classes. Pour Lénine, les relations internationales sont issues de la nature même de l'impérialisme. Or, les spécialistes soviétiques déclarent maintenant explicitement que la période où la nature de l'impérialisme déterminait à elle seule les relations internationales, est historiquement surmontée. Cette nouvelle conception a été dictée par la découverte qu'il ne peut plus exister,dans le monde contemporain, de puissance dominante unique. Après la dernière guerre, les Etats-Unis auraient "hérité" la première place de la Grande Bretagne. Or, si la perte du monopole atomique par les Etats-Unis leur a fait perdre leur position d'hégémonie mondiale, ils sont toujours en mesure d'empêcher l'accession à cette hégémonie de tout autre Etat (y compris l'URSS). Les idéologues soviétiques définissent cette situation comme "nouvelle, troisième étape de la crise générale du capitalisme" et ils en déduisent deux séries de faits:

1/- Le système international n'est plus dominé par une puissance unique. Il y a maintenant deux puissances mondiales dominantes: les Etats-Unis et l'URSS. On connaît l'importance de la terminologie en URSS. Le système international était traditionnellement défini par les soviétiques par le terme de "distribution des forces". Depuis 1962, ce terme a été remplacé par celui d'"équilibre des forces". En parlant de l'URSS et des Etats-Unis, les commentateurs soviétiques utilisent maintenant rituellement les termes suivants: "les deux plus grandes puissances du monde" ou "les deux géants mondiaux".

2/- Depuis le XXII° Congrès, les Soviétiques ont admis l'existence du polycentrisme dans le monde occidental. On reconnaît que les Etats-Unis ne peuvent plus diriger à leur guise la politique de leurs alliés européens, tandis que ceux-ci ont gagné une influence accrue sur la politique américaine. Ceci est une transformation remarquable de la vieille tradition bolchevique qui percevait les relations

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(1) Je suis redevable, pour la discussion de la conception soviétique de relations internationales, à l'article de W. Zimmerman "Russia and the International Order", "Survey", Janvier 1966.

internationales en termes strictement hiérarchiques. Des pays "économiquement soumis à l'impérialisme américain" pourraient même entraîner les deux puissances mondiales dans une guerre et les commentateurs soviétiques ont insisté sur le fait que la question de guerre ou de paix n'est plus exclusivement un problème de relations entre les chefs des deux camps.

Idéologie et Politique - Les problèmes politiques contemporains les plus importants - réunification de l'Europe, désarmement atomique, aide aux pays du Tiers-Monde - sont subordonnés à une entente entre les pays développés: les Etats-Unis et l'Europe Occidentale d'un côté, la Russie et les pays d'Europe de l'Est de l'autre.

Si les Soviétiques restent idéologiquement commis à interpréter le conflit international présent en termes de lutte entre le capitalisme et le communisme, si l'opinion publique américaine reste attachée aux notions de défense de la liberté contre la menace totalitaire, la dichotomie démocratie occidentale-communisme totalitaire, qui commandait la guerre froide, appartient au passé. Au moment de la révolution hongroise, l'Occident a définitivement perdu tout espoir de repousser le communisme par la force (si jamais cet espoir fut sérieusement entretenu). L'URSS a appris de son côté au moment de la crise cubaine de 1962 qu'elle ne peut pas davantage imposer par la force des solutions contraires à l'intérêt de l'autre puissance mondiale. Misant sur l'érosion idéologique et sur les transformations sociales dans les pays communistes, sans s'attendre à un brusque changement de leur organisation sociale et politique, l'Occident ne représente plus une menace directe pour le communisme. Le communisme a perçu son potentiel révolutionnaire et ne représente plus, de son côté, de menace sérieuse pour les pays développés de l'Occident. Les partis communistes en Europe occidentale cherchent des alliances avec les catholiques ou avec les socialistes et ils n'ont aucune chance électorale sérieuse, à moins de se convertir au "réformisme".

Si le problème des relations du monde occidental avec la Russie et les différents pays de l'ancien bloc oriental est en premier lieu un problème politique, il n'est pas sans intérêt de constater que la question de l'érosion de l'idéologie communiste et celle d'une possible convergence des deux systèmes assument une importance diverse selon le choix des options possibles.

L'évolution des régimes communistes européens semblera relativement peu importante à la section de l'opinion politique américaine qui estime que les Etats-Unis doivent s'engager profondément en Asie et se retirer de l'Europe, ainsi qu'aux "néo-isolationnistes" américains (bien que ni l'une ni l'autre politique n'aurait été concevable sans le sens de sécurité accrue en Europe, dû précisément à l'évolution du communisme).

Elle n'aura qu'une importance relative du point de vue de la position atlantique "classique", qui subordonne tout à l'unité, à la solidarité et à la force de l'Occident. Certes, même dans cette optique, l'unité occidentale n'est plus considérée comme un simple bouclier, mais plutôt comme un aimant qui pourrait attirer certain pays de l'Est européen; c'ést pourtant là une politique essentiellement statique, valable pour ses partisans, quelles que soient les perspectives de changement à l'Est.

La politique dite "gaulliste" qui préconise la réunification de l'Europe à travers le retrait des deux grandes puissances, pose un cas particulier, car elle a à sa base non pas la reconnaissance d'un fait nouveau (la "désidéologisation" du communisme européen), mais une tendance à nier l'importance des idéologies en général. Le général de Gaulle trouve "contraire à la nature des choses" que les alliances soient déterminées par des considérations idéologiques et non géo-politiques. La politique extérieure de tous les Etats est pour lui depuis toujours fonction de l'intérêt national et non pas de la nature des régimes. Il faut reconnaître que l'éveil des nationalismes dans les pays ci-devant satellites confirme à bien des égards ce scepticisme classique. En tout cas, les problèmes idéologiques et de développement global ne peuvent être que secondaires pour les partisans du principe de restaurer et de perpétuer l'indépendance des Etats.

Les perspectives de l'évolution intérieure du communisme sont bien plus importantes pour les Américains et pour les Européens qui, souhaitant la réunification de l'Europe et craignant à la fois la renaissance du militarisme allemand et des chauvinismes en Europe orientale, maintiennent que l'Alliance Atlantique et l'intégration de l'Europe occidentale sont des conditions indispensables pour toute négociation avec la Russie, pour la solution du problème allemand, pour créer

des conditions de paix stables en Europe. Les solutions de cet ordre, préconisées entre autres par Zbigniew Brzezinski dans son livre "Alternative to Partition" et, d'une perspective plus européenne, par André Fontaine, ont le mérite de poser la réunification de l'Europe comme le "Grand Dessein" de notre temps, et d'accepter, à cette fin, la désirabilité d'une alliance atlantique plus souple.

Finalement, l'évolution du communisme est déterminante pour les partisans d'une politique à long terme, dont le but serait de former une solidarité entre tous les pays développés du monde. Le professeur Brzezinski définit ainsi cette politique, qu'il voudrait voir adoptée par les Etats-Unis: "Encourager une éventuelle formation d'une plus lâche communauté des nations les plus développées du monde, y compris non seulement le Japon, mais aussi la plupart des Etats communistes européens, afin que les conflits présents entre ces nations développées puissent être graduellement transformés en une amorce de coopération, visant en particulier le Tiers-Monde. La volonté des dirigeants soviétiques de participer à une telle coopération augmentera à mesure qu'ils se rendront compte que l'unité occidentale, d'une part, ne donne pas d'opportunité à l'expansion communiste et que, d'autre part, elle ne pose pas de menace hostile aux Etats communistes existants, tandis que le chaos qui augmente dans le Tiers-Monde, à la faveur des divisions du monde développé et exploité par les Chinois, peut, ou bien forcer l'Amérique et la Russie dans un conflit direct qu'elles ne souhaitent pas, ou bien donner lieu à de nouveaux systèmes politiques qui soutiendront Pékin dans sa campagne anti-Moscou".(1)

Il est évident que ces deux dernières perspectives, celle qui envisage la réunification de l'Europe non pas contre l'Amérique ni sans elle, mais avec sa participation active, et celle qui souhaite poser des fondements à une communauté globale de nations développées, sont pour l'instant compromises par le tour qu'a pris la guerre au Vietnam.

En un sens, cette situation nouvelle confirme certains avantages du polycentrisme occidental. Dans un essai intitulé "Polycentrisme, Ouest et Est", Pierre Hassner disait déjà que nous devrions, dans notre monde polycentriste, profiter

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(1) "Survey", Janvier 1966.

des avantages que peuvent donner les relations multilatérales: "Les trois niveaux national, européen, atlantique - écrivait-il - auraient chacun un rôle spécifique à jouer dans une optique occidentale largement conçue... Le cadre atlantique offre les conditions militaires de sécurité et les conditions économiques d'un engagement pacifique aujourd'hui, et un jour celles d'un règlement négocié. La communauté européenne offre une base solide de stabilité, un centre d'attraction et à longue échéance la perspective de transformer le problème politique par la dévaluation de la nation-Etat. Les différentes nations peuvent établir à travers leurs contacts quotidiens les liens qui servent à préparer les initiatives collectives et les transformations à longue échéance".Dans cette conception, le dissentiment exprimé par le général de Gaulle de la politique américaine au Vietnam assure du moins une continuité de ces échanges nécessaires et rendus difficiles momentanément au niveau russo-américain.

Enfin, si la guerre au Vietnam semble paralyser en ce moment toute possibilité d'initiative atlantique commune en Europe, il n'est peut-être pas hors de propos de s'interroger sur le sens de l'engagement américain en Asie du Sud-Est à la lumière de l'évolution idéologique et sociale du communisme polycentriste.

L'argument principal pour continuer la guerre au Vietnam est que le retrait des Etats-Unis ouvrirait toute l'Asie à l'influence chinoise. Il serait plus logique de s'attendre à ce que les partis communistes d'Asie profitent du conflit russo-chinois pour s'assurer une certaine liberté de manoeuvre, en suivant l'exemple des pays de l'Europe de l'Est. L'évolution du régime communiste en Corée du Nord confirme d'ailleurs cette attente. Incidemment, rien ne semble plus éloigné du caractère que l'on attribue aux peuples du Sud-Est asiatique que les slogans de la "révolution culturelle" chinoise. Les trois pays qui se sont totalement émancipés de la tutelle soviétique sont ceux où la révolution a été gagnée à l'intérieur et non pas importée par l'Armée Rouge: la Yougoslavie, l'Albanie et la Chine. Il y a une vingtaine d'années, les Yougoslaves représentaient, à l'intérieur du bloc soviétique, la position équivalente à celle de la Chine aujourd'hui. Une des raisons majeures de la rupture Tito-Staline était la pression des Yougoslaves pour que l'URSS adopte une politique plus "aventuriste" à l'égard de l'Occident. Aujourd'hui, la Yougoslavie est le pays le plus "révisionniste" de tous les pays

communistes, le plus avancé sur le plan de réforme économique, le plus libéral sur le plan culturel et idéologique, le plus ouvert à l'influence occidentale.

D'autre part, l'évolution générale du Tiers-Monde semble contredire certaines craintes récentes. Il y a quelques années encore, il semblait que s'il y a une perspective de la fin des idéologies dans le monde développé, ceci n'est sûrement pas le cas pour le Tiers-Monde. Il est vrai que le centre de gravité de la confrontation Est-Ouest n'est plus en Europe, mais en Asie du Sud-Est, dans les Caraïbes et en Amérique Latine, en Proche-Orient et en Afrique. Mais le temps d'un neutralisme militant à prétentions socialistes et universalistes d'un Soekarno ou d'un N'Kroumah est passé et l'on voit apparaître des nationalismes neutralistes, préoccupés davantage par le développement économique intérieur que par des idéologies. La période de la fascination du Tiers-Monde par le communisme en tant que formule magique d'industrialisation a été plus courte que ne le pensaient les observateurs occidentaux. Les évènements en Egypte, au Ghana, en Algérie, en Indonésie semblent indiquer que les tendances au totalitarisme utopique cèdent le pas à un dirigisme nationaliste et pragmatique. Sur le plan du conflit Est-Ouest, il est utile de rappeler que la majorité des pays du Tiers-Monde qui adhèrent apparemment au socialisme ont toujours demandé aux deux grandes puissances de coopérer et non pas de se battre: le profit qu'elles tirent de leur rivalité serait anéanti par un conflit direct.

Le fait même que l'on ait introduit dans le langage politique courant le terme de "polycentrisme occidental" prouve tout le progrès accompli par l'Occident sur la route de l'unité, car l'histoire de l'Occident est essentiellement "polycentriste". Dans les perspectives mêmes d'intégration occidentale - fédération européenne, communauté atlantique - un pluralisme de structure est sous-entendu. Si l'on veut dépasser le stade du nationalisme, c'est précisément à cause des dangers que celui-ci présente pour la tradition pluraliste et libérale de l'Occident.

Le contraire est vrai pour le monde communiste, voué à un universalisme monolithique. Le polycentrisme communiste a ébranlé l'unité politique et l'unité idéologique du camp. Il y a aujourd'hui autant de "marxismes" que de centres indépendants de pouvoir dans le communisme mondial.

En ce sens, quelles que soient les difficultés que peut poser la nouvelle situation polycentriste à la solidarité occidentale, et en particulier aux relations entre l'Europe Occidentale et l'Amérique, le polycentrisme ne peut que jouer, à longue échéance, en faveur de l'Occident dans son ensemble.

K. A. JELENSKI

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7

CHANGE IN THE EAST: PERCEPTIONS AND METAPHORS

by

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It would be surprising if, in an epoch of world wide and revolutionary change, significant changes had not been occuring in the political, social, and economic structure of the East Central and East European peoples. The scientific-technological revolution does not respect political systems and ideologies. Yet, the implications of changes within the communist orbit to East-West relations in general and to the security of the United States and Western Europe in particular are not readily discernable. The problem of assessment is complicated by the fact that the changes themselves are, in part, the result of an East-West interactive process. Western Europe, reinforced by the United States, has long influenced events in East Central Europe. Similarly, the Soviet Union has acted on Western Europe and the United States either directly or via Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the other associated or "allied" nations of East Central Europe.

In recent years, the volume of East-West transactions in trade, loans, technical assistance, travel, tourism, and cultural contacts has been increasing at a considerable rate -- perhaps not as fast as world transactions in general but fast enough to alter profoundly the psychological climate of the East-West confrontation. Many leaders in Western Europe believe

the Cold War to be over. De Gaulle, who always professed to view the conflict of opposing ideologies as the foam and froth of the historical current, told the Soviets on the occasion of his June 1966 visit to Moscow that France would like to see "the start of the implementation of new relations with the so-called Eastern European states, toward détente, entente, and cooperation." De Gaulle's policy is premised on the assumption that the Soviet threat to Western Europe is greatly diminished, if in fact, it has not disappeared. Acting on this premise, De Gaulle has engineered a de facto French withdrawal from the military structure of NATO -- the primary security organization of the West.

Assumptions that Westerners make regarding future Soviet behavior are directly related to their perceptions of the changes that have transpired in East Central Europe and in the Soviet Union. Soviet military capabilities to threaten Western Europe and the United States have grown progressively since the founding of NATO. But Western perceptions of the Soviet threat have fluctuated. They were high during the Korean War they dropped during the post-Stalin thaw, culminating in the 1955 Geneva Summit meeting. They rose again as a result of the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolution. Following the first Sputnik, the Soviets began a sustained diplomatic offensive against the West, expressed through a series of ultimatums demanding that the Western allies get out of West

Berlin. The Soviet offensive reached its peak and ended in the resolution of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

Even while the Soviets pursued their diplomatic offensive in Europe and the Middle East, the yeast of change fermented in East-Central Europe. Following Khruschchev's speech denouncing Stalin at the 20th Party Congress, the tight grip the Soviets had fixed on their Eastern satellites was challenged by the riots in Poland and the Hungarian Revolution. The Poles succeeded in wresting a measure of independence from the Soviet Union; the Hungarians were forced back into submission by Soviet tanks. Some pressures for change were dammed, but others flowed irresistibly. There began what many Western observers today perceive to be a trend in the East toward greater national independence, toward communist polycentricity and, in the last resort, a better deal for the average man. The rate of change accelerated during the Sixties. When the Sino-Soviet dispute erupted in open polemics, and when, after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union embarked on a policy of apparent détente with the West, the West launched itself on the search for new insights and theories wherewith to account for these shifting trends.

Hard evidence confirming the substance of any given trend is difficult to come by. Even more difficult is the task of relating identifiable

changes with the perceptions of political leaders in East Central Europe, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and the United States regarding the significance of these changes. If all these leaders have one characteristic in common it is reluctance to state basic assumptions explicitly and simply, rather than implicitly and metaphorically. It seems obvious, however, that Soviet leaders have a far easier task of gauging changes not only in their own country but also in East Central Europe than do their Western counterparts. Consequently, their perceptions of these changes may be more valid and their potential for influencing developments far greater than those of Western leaders. Yet, what the latter perceive, rightly or wrongly, to be the significance of change in East Central Europe cannot help but influence their assessment of West-East relationships in general and Soviet intentions and capabilities in particular.

It would appear, then, that one of the most crucial and far-reaching implications of any and all trends in East Central Europe is their effect on Western perceptions of the Soviet threat. If, for example, it could be shown that the changes taking place in East Central Europe indicated a major transformation in the character of Soviet control -- in, let us say, the direction of greater autonomy -- this conclusion is likely to reinforce the belief that the Soviet Union had committed itself to a policy of long-term, if not permanent détente. If meetings between the Soviet

Union and the East Central European countries within the Warsaw Pact and COMECON took on the character of consultation between allies rather than unilateral Soviet dictation, the communist threat toward Western Europe could be assumed to have been diminished -- the fact notwithstanding that changes in military-technology and strategy might have annulled the significance of inter-allied consultation.

Similarly, if a prolonged struggle were to be waged by the governments of East Central Europe for independence from the Soviet Union, the assessment in Western capitals of the Soviet threat might be premised on the assumption that the Soviet Union had enough trouble within its own camp and no time to engage in plots outside its own borders. In the Western mirror image the Soviet threat might, again, be diminished.

If this be the case, the most crucial issue is how to distinguish between changes which originate spontaneously in the Soviet orbit that may run counter to Soviet desires and those which are in accord with Soviet wishes. On purely domestic grounds, the Soviets may find it advantageous to disengage from the day-to-day operations of East Central European politics. The Soviet influence over the foreign and security policies of the East Central European countries probably differs in degree and kind. It is more difficult to determine just how independent East

Central European governments are with respect to matters other than those of local concern. Under certain circumstances, the Soviets may wish the East Central European governments to appear to act independently. Or conversely, the Soviets may not be able to control in every respect the decisions and actions of the lesser communist governments.

II

Western perceptions of increasing East European independence, real or imagined, from the Soviet Union -- by Soviet consent or without it -- cannot but affect significantly the Western image of the Soviet Union, especially if reinforced by a Soviet policy of détente. To a large extent, this image conditions the psychological readiness of Western peoples and governments to provide for the timely defense of their vital interests against possible Soviet encroachments in the future.

Several times during the past two decades the Soviet Union has sought to convince the West that it wants a genuine détente. The present period of avowed détente has been the longest. Yet, on the eve of the 23rd Party Congress, held at the beginning of April 1966, the Kremlin circulated a 10,000 word letter to East European communist parties in refutation of Peking's charges that the Soviets had become "revisionists."*

*Reprinted in Die Welt, March 21, 1966, p. 6.

The following passage seems fraught with meaningful operational implications:

> The success of the struggle of the working class for the victory of revolution will depend on the extent to which it and its party learn to employ all forms of struggle, peaceful and nonpeaceful, legal and extra-legal, and on whether they are prepared for the swiftest and most surprising replacement of one form of struggle with another.*

Since Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Kosygin, like all communist functionaries, are not given to speculative effusions, this passage must be taken as a pragmatic statement: the acquisition of strategic superiority might terminate a policy of détente.

Thus change within the communist world should be apprehended as a function of East-West power relationships. Though much has changed in both camps, that power relationship has changed little -- certainly, not as yet significantly. Indeed, a significant change in the power equilibrium -- the stable balance of deterrence -- be it by the default of one of the parties to the balance, be it by a unilateral military-technological break-through, would profoundly alter the now perceived patterns of political and social change. A termination of this power dialogue now seems unlikely. All now likely steps that might be taken towards arms control, will not alter its dialectic. Certainly, a treaty on the prevention of nuclear proliferation will affect it little -- and probably even that little, from the point of

*Ibid. Emphasis added.

view of those opposed to all "destabilizing" weapons acquisitions, not necessarily for the better.

A recent study* ponders the paradoxical question of whether nuclear weapons can be politically useful even if they are never used. The authors recognize that the Soviet Union's difficulty in achieving strategic parity, "not to speak of some form of superiority, depends in no small degree on the magnitude and success of countervailing efforts of the United States."

Strategic inferiority compels the Soviet leaders to act cautiously in foreign policy. The Soviet leaders, however, have made every effort to avoid the appearance of inferiority, "short of actually procuring the necessary strategic forces." The authors recognize that unforseen technological developments might reduce the costs of "catching up" so that the Soviet leaders might find "irresistibly attractive the prospect of strategic parity or superiority." They suggest that "the stabilizing and politically equalizing effects of United States strategic superiority are often overlooked by those who contend that strategic parity is a pre-condition for reaching a stable understanding with the Soviet Union and ending the cold war," and that "the advent of a mutually acknowledged

*Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

state of strategic parity would signify to the Soviet leaders a major improvement in the relative strategic position of the U. S. S. R. and a deterioration in that of the United States. "

Some Western strategists contend that decisive strategic superiority is no longer attainable, and that lesser forms of superiority are meaningless (not credible), wasteful ('overkill'), and potentially dangerous (provocative). These contentions notwithstanding, there is, the study concludes, historical evidence that the Soviet leaders would value highly the political advantages conferred by "ambiguous forms of strategic superiority, " even though they fell far short of a manifest capability to strike first without suffering substantial damage in retaliation.

It is quite possible that a long-term period of apparent détente would provide the most useful psychological environment for a Soviet search for "ambiguous forms of strategic superiority. " Since the political utility of strategic power is intimately related to a nation's psychological preparedness to use its military potential and to accept the consequences of such action, the effect of current and future developments in the Soviet block on Western perceptions of the Soviet threat -- hence, on the Western psychological posture -- becomes one of paramount importance.

III

The principal causative agent of what is called the détente and what should better be called a surcease of communist expansionist pressure, has been the resistance to that communist expansionist pressure by the Western countries under the leadership of the United States. The West's strategic superiority contained the Soviets in Europe; the initatives of the United States, supported by Great Britain and Australia, contained Chinese expansionism in Asia. Had Western resistance not accomplished this purpose, both the Soviet Union and Red China would have exported their insoluble internal dilemmas into world politics. Both would have been absorbed in the exploitation of their foreign conquests. The issue of how to advance best the cause of the World Revolution would not have arisen. Both would have looked outward and not at one another. Both were stopped in their tracks. Both were forced to grapple with their respective insoluble domestic problems and, in the case of the Soviet Union, with the insoluble domestic problems of the Communist Satellite States. Here we find the true cause of communist polycentrism, the Sino-Soviet rift -- and the détente.

If the above hypothesis is a correct one, then it follows that the disintegration of the Western Alliance not only invites the resurgence of communist expansionism but also eases the difficulties in the way

of the restoration of communist solidarity.

The philosophers of communism have begun to discover that dialetics does not stop with communism but operates within the communist system as it does within any other socio-economic system. From the point-of-view of those who are looking in, namely ourselves, the salient question is as to whether the socio-economic changes within the communist world diminish or enhance communist expansionism? It is here that the views of Western experts on Soviet and Chinese affairs diverge most notably. To say the least, the evidence for adjudging this question is ambiguous -- as ambiguous as are the foreign and domestic policies of both the Soviet Union and Red China. One thing is certain: the loosening up, real or perceived, within the communist sphere has been paced by a very real disintegration of the Western Alliance. There might be a corelation between these two phenomena. This corelation might be accidental; then again, it might derive from a conscious strategy pursued by the communists.

An example that illustrates the ambiguous consequences of communist polycentrism and of the détente, is the profound change in the German mood. It seems that some of the assumptions on which, ever since the lifting of the Occupation Statute rested the United States German policy, are no longer valid. The net result of the last few years development,

as far as Germany is concerned, is the weakening of Germany's ties with the West and the strengthening of Germany's ties with the East. To say this might be heresy: Is there not a special American-German connection? Yet the fact remains that in all German political parties ever louder voices call for a rapprochement with the Central European Communist states and with the Soviet Union.

It is implausible that the Soviets take seriously French nuclear power or believe that they can achieve the neutralization of Germany without American agreement. It is much more likely that the Soviets believe that a United States, tied down in Asia and fed up with the divisions and laxness of Europe, will be receptive to the offer of a German settlement along the Rapacki model -- especially when, for reasons of their own, the Germans themselves will embrace this model.

IV

Among the ambiguities to which the détente has given rise perhaps the most disturbing is the ambiguity of language that pervades the West's discourse on the meaning of political change. One of the most beneficial causes or consequences of the détente is said to be the "liberalization" which is said to pervade communist societies. Not least among the purposes of the "bridges" that are to span the Cold War battlefield is to foster and speed that "liberalization."

Exactly what is it that we want to "liberalize" or expect to "liberalize" itself within the communist states? If we talk about economic "liberalization," do we mean that the respective national economies will become more efficient or more consumer-oriented, or do we mean that changes in the economic structure will, as a matter of course, give rise to significant changes in the political structure, not to speak of the power political posture of the Soviet Union? Only to raise these questions is to expose some of the logical gaps in the designs, thus far disclosed, for East-West "bridges."

But these ambiguities -- products of cognitive dissonance -- need not be fraught with fatal consequences. By far the most conspicuous and ominous inconsistency of the détente is the continuation and acceleration of the military-technological race. In this field, there is no "relaxation." The Soviet military budget has steadily increased. The American budget is being sapped by the expenditure of the Vietnamese War and the unwillingness of the Administration to face up publicly to the uncooperative attitude of the Soviets in matters of arms "stability." Yet even so, the Administration's estimates of additional requirements -- the Improved Capability Missile to overwhelm the deployed Soviet ABM defenses -- convey a most unambiguous message: There is nothing static about the military balance. Whatever equilibrium there is is a dynamic one.

We are falling behind; and our strategic superiority, which was the decisive factor in Cuba, is being eroded. The cohesiveness of the Western Alliance is being eroded apace. While we rejoice in the tree-of-change in bloom, its roots might already have died.

8

The Atlantic Institute
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THE UNITED STATES AND WEST EUROPEAN EXCHANGES PROGRAM WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

by
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I. PERSPECTIVES ON UNITED STATES EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

Along with their normal diplomatic contacts, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are today linked with the United States and to the West in a widespread complex of inter-governmental, group, and individual relationships and contacts which have arisen and developed -- at times with official encouragement -- despite substantial political antagonisms and restrictive measures imposed from each side.

From the United States' point of view, the most important intergovernmental relationship in this complex is the U.S.-Soviet Exchanges Agreement, first signed in 1958. This agreement marked the beginning of a progression of bilateral and multilateral undertakings which has accompanied the hesitant but consistent process of thaw in the Soviet bloc during the past decade, and which includes the so-called "hot-line" agreement, the Test Ban Treaty, and the U.N. Resolution banning nuclear weapons in orbit. By 1958, pressures within the Soviet Union for increased contact and interchange with the capitalist world, arising from technological needs and a recognition of implications of the nuclear and space age for international relations, began to outweigh traditional concerns for absolute internal physical security.

The exchanges agreement permits and regulates the flow of a mixed bag of scientists, technical specialists, teachers, students, performing artists, exhibits, and magazines on a reciprocal basis, and comprises a small but highly significant portion of the tons of books and documents, hours of radio broadcasts, thousands of tourists, correspondents, businessmen, and other travellers who are moving back and forth between the two countries.

This network of cross-border contacts is still impeded by a great variety of politically and economically motivated restrictions, barriers, and stumbling blocks. Passports are difficult to obtain in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, entry into the United States for Communist Party members is a complicated procedure, censorship in the East is still widespread, and some radio programs are jammed. The opposition of organized American veterans and labor groups and of some ethnic groups from Eastern Europe to any exchange at all with communist countries has also been an inhibiting factor.

On the economic side, tourism for Soviet and East European nationals is hampered by a lack of foreign exchange, a factor which also affects their imports of newspapers, magazines, and books, even when these are allowed by the censor. United States restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have discouraged the export of Western technical methods and products. Business relationships have at best been difficult to arrange.

The exchanges agreement with the Soviet Union is unique as far as the United States is concerned. With no other country in the world are American technical, scientific, educational, and cultural exchanges regulated by formal international executive agreement. This is not the case for the Soviet Union, which customarily regulates its cultural and other exchanges with both capitalist and socialist countries by detailed international agreements. United States exchanges with the East European countries are on an ad hoc basis or covered by written understandings between private and semi-private organizations on each side, such as the respective national scientific academies. With Roumania there has been ever since 1960 a biennial exchange of letters establishing an "arrangement" to facilitate exchanges on a governmental and private level.

The first United States exchanges agreement with the Soviet Union was negotiated in the autumn of 1957 and signed in January, 1958. The agreement is for two years and has been regularly renewed, most recently in March of this year, 1966. Exchanges with post-Stalin Eastern Europe began a little earlier, with the invitation of the Polish government late in 1956 to the Rockefeller Foundation to revive its pre-war program of study grants for Polish doctors, biologists, and agronomists. Exchanges with the other East European countries began at a considerably later date, as travel restrictions were lifted, and the Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, and Roumanians began to spill out of their countries in greater and greater numbers to seek that contact with the West of which they had been deprived for over twenty years.

II. CONTENT OF UNITED STATES EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE[1]

The current U.S.-Soviet exchanges agreement provides for the exchanges of delegations and specialists in technical fields and science, in agriculture and public health. American graduate students, language teachers, and professors in other disciplines are to spend a semester or an academic year in the USSR, and vice versa. The agreement includes exchanges in the performing arts, such as the American Ballet Theatre and the Bolshoi Ballet; it provides for

the showing of two exhibits in each country during the two year period, encourages joint athletic events and tourism, and permits the U.S. Information Agency's monthly magazine, Amerika, to be put on sale in the Soviet Union in exchange for the privilege of distributing an equal number of copies of Soviet Life in the United States.

Detailed arrangements for exchanges of students, professors, scientists, and atomic scientists are not prescribed in the agreement but are left up to the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants, the American Council of Learned Societies, the National Academy of Sciences, and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, to be negotiated with the appropriate Soviet Academy or Ministry.

Neither trade, commercial visitors, nor reciprocal air rights are mentioned in or covered by the U.S.-Soviet agreement.

In the case of the East European countries the exchange activity is in large part a function of the day-to-day diplomatic relationships. As a rule there are no government-sponsored exchanges with Hungary, with whom the United States does not have normal relations. Large United States holdings of counterpart funds in Polish currency help to maintain a more active exchange program with that country.

Private foundations have played a more important role in the United States exchanges with the East European countries than with the Soviet Union. Between 1957 and 1964 both the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations have operated substantial programs in Poland and Ford has recently undertaken a major task in financing the visits of Hungarian humanists, natural and social scientists to the United States. The Rockefeller Program in Poland was discontinued in 1964, following a reorientation of the Foundation's overall policy. By this time most of the leading doctors and biologists in the country had benefitted from the program. The Ford Polish program included grants for political scientists and humanists as well as natural scientists. Since the first two groups tend by nature to be more controversial politically than doctors or biologists, the Ford Foundation found itself in continuing arguments with the Polish authorities who prevented the Foundation from exercising a free choice in the selection of its grantees. In 1962 the program was discontinued as a direct result of these disagreements. These difficulties appeared to have been successfully avoided in the case of the Ford Hungarian program.

The United States and Poland reached an agreement in 1958, whereby 30,000 copies of the Polish-language Ameryka are sold in Poland, while an equal number of copies of the English-language Poland are put on the newsstands in the United States.

During the current year, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences has signed agreements with the Polish, Roumanian, and Czechoslovak Academies for exchange visits of up to 40 man-months per year, for the exchange of publications, and for the exchange of information on research programs.

U.S. Exchanges with Bulgaria have been minimal and with Albania non-existent. U.S. trade with Bulgaria is the smallest of all the East European countries. Americans' share in Bulgaria's tourist boom has been practically nil. Diplomatic relations were suspended for nearly a decade in the 50's; and Bulgaria is the only country which still jams both the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe. Since the United States does not recognize the existence of a separate East German State, exchanges with East Germany are a diplomatic, logical, and practical impossibility. The U.S. exchange program with Yugoslavia is atypical, and tends more to follow the pattern of exchanges with Western Europe.

III. OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES EXCHANGES PROGRAM WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

Just as the American exchanges agreement with the Soviet Union springs from a collection of disparate interests, so the various aspects of the United States exchanges program with the Soviet Union and with Eastern Europe have differing and at times conflicting objectives, which do not immediately suggest a coherent whole.

Ekaterina Furtseva, Minister of Culture of the USSR, addressing the 23rd Party Congress of CPSU last spring said :

"Everyone is well aware that cultural exchanges contribute to the understanding of peoples and to the struggle for peace of the whole world."

This may or may not be true. In any case it is a vast oversimplification of a very complex phenomenon. One of the principal problems here is that the attainable objective of improving the ability to understand the rationale for various moves of a great power has been confused with the idea that exchanges can lead to a growth of affection, sympathy, or appreciation for individual or group behavior in one

country on the part of visitors from another.

A thorough study of the attitudes of visitors travelling to the Soviet Union and vice versa still remains to be undertaken. There are indications that travel among all nationalities, particularly short term visits, may tend to reenforce stereotyped prejudices in the visitors toward the host country.[2] In the case of longer term visits, the visitors, both American and Soviet, in some cases seem to be able to isolate their appreciation for specific professional or intellectual aspects of life in the host country from a more generalized antipathy toward the country's foreign policy and economic system.

Most qualified observers agree that the impact of travel abroad on Soviet citizens over a longer period of time is substantial, in some cases even traumatic, in terms of correcting distortions learned over a long period and of arousing a questioning attitude toward their own information, education, and propaganda services. Admittedly, however, this type of impact is difficult, if not impossible, to measure; and its traumatic aspects in particular deserve study in depth to determine what role they play in the development of new attitudes.

A few general and definable goals are to be found in all exchange programs, both American and those of other countries.[3] For example, each country seeks to create and project a favorable image of itself among the populace of the host countries and to offset negative propaganda. The United States wants to demonstrate both its technological and material progress, which has continued despite Marxist predictions to the contrary, and its cultural and artistic achievements. The USSR seeks to establish its image as a peace-loving, cultured, and technologically superior nation and social system.[4]

Furthermore, exchanges are as much a part of a nation's educational policy as they are a part of its foreign policy. The United States and other countries need experts in each others' political, cultural, and social systems, who can correctly interpret the intentions and capabilities of their neighbors and perform a reflective and stabilizing function. It is through exchanges that this training can be best ach9eved. Such experts are needed to correct misapprehensions, whether their origin be ideological, psychological, or power-political, before they become miscalculations and lead to fatal mistakes of judgement. The process of mutual education for mutual benefit spreads into all fields: the natural and social sciences, fine arts and humanities, trade opportunities, control of disease, improvements in physical communication, and the like.

Finally, exchanges, particularly among great powers, with the personal contact, exchange of information, and reassurance through knowledge or experience which they imply, are elements in a peaceful world order; while secrecy, exclusiveness, suspicion, and closed societies usually accompany an increase in armaments and the development of new weaponry.[5] In addition, they may open a channel of communication which could be maintained in times of strained relations. As will be seen later, there has been relatively little correlation between exchange activities at any one time and the day-to-day stresses of international intercourse.

While it is true that the objectives listed above apply to the United States exchanges with Eastern Europe as well as to the Soviet Union, their application to Eastern Europe falls within quite a different context of historical and diplomatic relationships and perspectives.

In Eatern Europe the United States seeks to re-establish the traditional historic, cultural, and ethnic ties, and to promote a peaceful evolution toward national independence and internal freedom ... "to build bridges across the gulf which has divided us from Eastern Europe", as President Johnson said at Lexington, Virginia on May 23, 1964.

Americans approach Eastern Europe with a background of more than a century of sympathetic contact and mutual concern, springing from an assumption of shared values and historical experience quite unlike the overtones of potential rivalry and inherent suspicion which have characterized American attitudes toward Russia, both Tsarist and Bolshevik. In Eastern Europe, nearly everyone over 40 years of age was educated in a culture fundamentally pro-American and Western in political orientation. Thus the educational and image-building problem is much less challenging here than in the case of the Soviet Union. However, other factors complicate the picture. Many East Europeans in all generations share a genuine and long-standing fear of Germany, now the United States' principal continental ally. Soviet "peace propaganda", directed against the United States, falls on more receptive ground in war-ravaged Eastern Europe, particularly Poland. Current French policy, to the extent that it calls for a decentralization of military alliances may very well evoke a sympathetic echo in Eastern Europe.

United States educational objectives in Eastern Europe run parallel with the political. The need for American knowledge and expertise about Eastern Europe is not as urgent as in the case of the Soviet Union. The U.S. educational objective is

rather to disseminate -- through exchanges -- modern economic and political ideas which the Eastern Europeans can make use of in their efforts to liberalize and rationalize their economies and social structures.

Here the objectives of the United States and of the East Europeans appear to coincide. The urge in Eastern Europe for modernization and the realization that this can only come from the West has built up a strong pressure for exchanges. In their own interests, and in part in response to this pressure, the East European governments have accepted the need for exchanges, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, even when this has meant condoning the importation through exchanges of political and social concepts they would far rather have excluded.

To a degree, United States exchanges with Eastern Europe are a means of reaching the Soviet Union as well. Eastern Europe, with its residue of Western values and slightly greater freedom for critical and creative thought can probably increasingly serve as a channel of communication and interchange of ideas between the two blocs. More East Europeans travel abroad than do Soviet citizens, yet more Soviet citizens go to Eastern Europe than to the West. Here they come into contact with ideas, economic innovations, and ethical and esthetic challenges which penetrate in this fashion into the solidities and stolidities of the Soviet system.

IV. EXCHANGES AND PERIODS OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION *

Exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union have at times been regarded as a harbinger of Soviet-American relations. If the number of exchanges is increasing, there is a popular impression that relations between the two countries will improve. If a major exhibit or theatrical performance is suddenly cancelled or postponed, this seems to foreshadow a deteriorating or crisis situation in the relations between the two countries. Closer examination, however, shows that there is no hard and fast direct correlation between the level of exchanges and periods of international tension. We shall consider a few examples.

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* I am indebted to Mr. Eric Stevenson, now General Counsel of the Peace Corps, for his kindness in allowing me to make use of the extensive research he has done on this particular aspect of the United States -- Soviet exchanges, as well as on many other facets of the program.

Before October, 1956, a handful of exchanges were underway between the United States and the Soviet Union, which had been arranged on an ad hoc basis prior to the negotiation of the first agreement of 1958. These exchanges were immediately suspended by the United States following the Soviet intervention in Hungary as a demonstration of American disapproval. However, as early as January, 1957, exchanges were renewed and arrangements concluded for the visit of Soviet meteorologists, pedagogues, and nucelear physicists to visit the Soviet Union during the early part of the year.

The first exchanges agreement was signed in January 1958. In the summer of that year, Soviet-American relations took a sharp turn for the worse, with the Middle East crisis, the tension over the off-shore islands in the Formosa Straits, the execution of Imre Nagy, and the harassment of Boris Pasternak. None of these events seems to have had any effect at all on the exchanges program, which increased in quantity and variety during this time. If tourism can be considered as a popular barometer of relaxed international relations, it is interesting to note that during this period the number of American tourists who visited the USSR rose to a new high of 12,000 a year, figure which has been more or less constant ever since. 1959 was marked by the Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Kozlow visits to the United States and the Nixon and Harriman tours of the Soviet Union, an era of pronounced good feeling.

The U-2 affair in the late spring of 1960, likewise had no effect on the on-going exchanges between the two countries, although it did cause the cancellation of the planned state visits of President Eisenhower to the USSR and the then Air Marshal Vershinnen to the United States. While Khrushchev continued publicly to endorse the exchange programs, a campaign was mounted to discourage contacts between Soviet citizens and exchange visitors and tourists by characterizing them as spies and trouble-makers. 1961 marked another period of deterioration, with the construction of the Berlin Wall and the resumption of nuclear testing. It was at this point that the Soviet Union established the Institute of Soviet-American Relations with the ostensible purpose of stimulating exchanges. In fact, however, the effect of the Institute's actions has been to exploit visiting Americans for political purposes, and to attempt to bypass the reciprocity requirements of the U.S.-Soviet exchanges agreement.

The war in Vietnam has had a measurable effect on Soviet-American exchanges, although perpaps less than might have been expected under the circumstances. Planned meetings

have been postponed, exhibits and theatrical performances postponed, and participation in athletic events demonstratively withdrawn. The Vietnam war has not been cited in each case as the specific reason for the breakdown, but it has supplied the backdrop for the entire chain of events. Nonetheless, in March, 1966, despite escalation of the war, a new two-year exchanges agreement was signed by the United States and the USSR, the scope of which is approximately the same as the preceding agreement.

The war has had its impact on the United States exchanges with the East European countries as well, particularly Poland and Hungary, although with the former the war cannot be isolated from other factors such as the Church-State conflict and the repression of the intelligenzia. The Vietnam war has been cited by the Hungarians as a major aggravating factor in preventing the normalization of Hungarian-American relations.

From the foregoing analysis, one could conclude that while exchanges as such do not necessarily contribute directly to the improvement in the international atmosphere, once they have been established in a period of détente, they acquire a momentum and resilience of their own which has enabled them to survive subsequent periods of increased international tension.

V. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AMERICAN AND WEST EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE IN EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

Soviet exchanges policy toward Western Europe would indicate that she still regards Europe as the primary area of political action and challenge. Within the past few years, the USSR and Eastern Europe have had more exchanges with Western Europe than with all the rest of the world combined, despite their increased efforts in the underdeveloped countries in the face of mainland Chinese competition.

The West European response to this Soviet cultural drive has been energetic and, to a limited degree, coordinated. None of the programs of the West European countries are comparable in scope or size to the U.S.-USSR program; and no private West European programs have approached the dimensions of the Ford and Rockefeller programs for East European countries.

The West European countries have generally placed more emphasis on the teaching of their national languages and literature than has the United States in its cultural and educationa approaches to the world at large. The traditional attitudes of Europeans of the East toward those of the West are

based on less tangible but more ancient ties. Moreover, the facts of geography dictate that many more East Europeans, particularly in the student category, will come to Western Europe, and vice versa, than will for some time be the case with the United States.

The United Kingdom's exchange program with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, operated by the semi-official British Council, resembles but is somewhat smaller than that of the United States. Proportionately, the Council's effort for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is comparable in size to what the Council has done with all of Western Europe. Like the United States, the U.K. has a biennial agreement with the Soviet Union; and the Anglo-Saxon countries have shared similar political problems in the implementation of the agreement, such as an imbalance as between natural and social scientists, restrictions as to travel and access to archives; and Soviet efforts to control exchanges through front organizations.

Again like the United States, the U.K. has no formal agreement with the East European countries. The British Council's long experience in Eastern Europe has probably allowed more long-term exchange situations to arise than has been the case with the United States. For example, the Council sponsors full-time lecture-ships in English at eight East European and Soviet Universities. About 2,300 visitors came to the U.K. from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe under British Council sponsorship in 1965. This is very close to the total number of exchange visitors from the area to the United States.

The French exchanges program for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as for other parts of the world, centers on the promotion of the teaching of the French language. France has written agreements with the Soviet Union and the East European countries, and has been more successful than the United States or Great Britain in arranging for resident professorships in the host countries. Sponsored student exchanges with the USSR and with the larger East European countries run to as much as 100 in each direction. This is more than twice as many students as those covered by the program of the American coordinating group, the Inter-University Committee, with each of the countries in question. In addition there is probably a greater flow of un-sponsored East European students to France than to any other Western country.

Italy's exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, although smaller in scope than the French or British programs, show an unexpectedly wide variety in subject matter. While architecture, music, and other fine arts understandably occupy

a prominent place, scientific exchanges and exchanges in atomic energy research have occupied important positions in Italy's programs with the Soviet Union and Poland. All the Italian programs, like the French exchanges, are based on written intergovernmental understandings. Italy extends her hospitality to tens of thousands of visitors from Eastern Europe each year, who come to study, absorb, and admire the ancient values of Italian culture.

The German Federal Republic has diplomatic relations and a formal cultural agreement only with the Soviet Union from among the countries with which this paper is concerned. German trade missions in Poland, Hungary, Roumania and Bulgaria promote cultural exchanges on an ad hoc basis, and a considerable exchange of scientific personnel takes place in Czechoslovakia. The negotiation of any cultural agreements with these countries has foundered in recent years on the so-called "Berlin clause", whereby the Federal Republic has insisted that any international agreements it concludes must also explicitly cover West Berlin. This position has been unacceptable to the Soviet Union and its allies and may in due course block renewal of the Federal Republic's cultural agreement with the USSR.

Despite these formal difficulties, however, it would appear that the Foreign Office in Bonn actively encourages cultural and educational exchanges with the East European countries, particularly in order to forestall the establishment of any monopoly in the representation of German culture in this part of the world by the Soviet Union. The historic role of Germany in Eastern Europe, and the burden of the events of the war years have combined to make the Federal Republic especially conscious of the opportunities and limitations of its policy and possible actions in this area.

VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

From these remarks it will be clear that a number of lines of research and study of the impact of East-West exchanges could usefully be pursued. Some sytematic work on the effect of international travel on individuals has been done in the United States at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and elsewhere; and Frederick Barghoorn at Yale is compiling data on the impressions and reactions of American participants in the U.S.-Soviet exchanges program. To my knowledge, no comparable study has been made either in the United States or in Europe for participants in exchanges with the East European countries. If

the cooperation of research institutes in Eastern Europe could be secured in making such a survey, the technical difficulties would be far less substantial. This may not, however be politically feasible.

On the European side also it would be extremely interesting if a particular political or economic concept could be traced as it made its way in recent years from Western Europe to Yugoslavia, perhaps to Poland or Czechoslovakia, and then to the Soviet Union. Another useful line of enquiry would be to determine if and in what way the exigencies of trade between Eastern and Western Europe are affecting the economies of each country, and to what extent sales representatives, buyers, and other business negotiators act as a channel of cultural exchange as well, transmitting more humane, liberal, and rational concepts of economic and social organization.

All these factors point to the development of a greater degree of openness to a social structure in which a greater freedom of choice can be exercised, and finally to the likelihood that once the countries of Eastern Europe in particular have embarked upon a course in this direction, it will be a most difficult and complex maneuver to attempt to reverse the trend.

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Thoughts on Germany - A History of Ideas on Reunification

by Theo Sommer

Thirteen years have passed since the end of the East German rebellion of June 1953, and five years since the erection of the Berlin Wall. We have not, in this time, come one step closer to unifying our divided land. The old consolation that unification will come because it must come is not taken seriously any more by anyone, even by those who, each year, with pathetic voices, have glorified the 17th of June. The government rightly announces "Our past policies have not yet led to success. But the way that the German Federal Republic and her allies have chosen is the right way. It must be continued." The people, however, if this way is at all clear to them, think more realistically about the chances of attaining their goal. Public opinion polls clearly point out that the wish for reunification has intensified over the years, but that the belief in its success becomes more and more doubtful. The gap between hopes for the future and expectations for the future becomes greater and greater.

There is no cause to interpret these facts in an alarming way. When there is doubt, so is it nothing more than realism. The majority of West Germans know what they hope for, but they also realize the factors and circumstances that work against their wish. They do not live with illusions.

There are generally three views prevalent in West Germany today, even though they are not always formulated with adequate acuteness of thinking.

The first view is never questioned: War cannot and must not be the solution to the German question. In our world, nuclear weapons forbid even the thought of such a solution. By the atom, the concept of "victory" has become meaningless. There would be no victor, no vanquished - only mutual extermination. War is, therefore, in the context of rational political thought, out of the question.

In view of this, the old saying of international law is painfully true - that peace serves justice better than justice serves peace. Discord because of differing views on justice would be an apocalyptic catastrophe; injustice must be accepted, endured for the sake of peace; it can only be mitigated; it cannot be removed entirely. Atomic weapons hinder solutions; they freeze the problem; temporary conditions become permanent conditions. The last sanction of power serves only to maintain the status quo, not to change it. Therefore, there will be no more "rollback", neither à la Dulles nor à la Khrushchev. And therefore the example of Poland, which

after one and one-half centuries of dismemberment and partition, once again was unified, can afford the Germans little hope or comfort. Poland achieved her unity as a result of a World War; this very road is closed to us.

The Germans realize this very well. The enforced renunciation that they promised their allies in 1954 was not based on mere compulsion but on this deeper understanding. The Bonn Peacenote of March 25, 1966, containing a bid for a mutual non-offensive declaration with the East European people was a clear - if unduly late - confirmation of this attitude. No one in Germany wants a war.

The second view is not as clear, although just as widely recognized in Germany. As by the atom the concept of "victory" has become void of meaning so the ideology renders pragmatic compromise more difficult. This also differentiates German from Polish division: their ideological and sociological background. Whether Krakow was Austrian, Prussian or Russian did not make much of a difference if one looks at it from the point of view of the ruling system; the people would have perceived only unimportant, meaningless differences. Today, however, there have come into being, in East and West, various social structures; within the rivalry of the systems, the social order has become a decisive criterion and has almost gained a sacrosanct character. The different systems are based on different ideologies; ideological compromise, however, does not exist as long as the ideologies remain uncorrupted and popular. Frontiers would let themselves be displaced, if it is a mere question of a square kilometer. They would be walled up as soon as they are separated by different "Weltanschauungen." The Elbe is, however, in Krushchev's work, a holy frontier.

Both of these views gave rise to a third, which is seldom talked about, but which no thoughtful contemporary can evade - all parties of the Bundestag have failed in their attempts for reunification.

This is true for the CDU which, at first, followed the concept of "politics of strength". They attempted to integrate West Germany into the Western world and tried to mobilize the combined potential of the West for reunification. The West was to be so strong - and Germany wanted to give its military share by joining NATO - that the Kremlin would resign and give up East Germany in face of such superior western power. It was not a bad idea, but it failed because Moscow was ruled not by orphans, but by men who had the same idea of "politics of strength", from their point of view. In the East-West stalemate, the idea of reunification through greater strength suffocated.

Failure - this is also true for the SPD. It endeavored to reunify the country through just the opposite means. SPD was against too strong affiliation and commitment, military and economic, with the West. To the contrary, it wanted Germany to stand apart from two power blocs and set it up in a Garden of Eden of neutrality in Central Europe. At that time, one spoke of disengagement. This concept also had its logic. Certainly, however, one cannot always rely on logic in politics. The plan for disengagement failed because the Elbe became, to the Communists, a holy frontier.

Thus, the old policy of the CDU was chafing at the atom, the policy of the SPD was chafing at ideology, the policies of the FDP were lost somewhere in the middle. Today, there is no direct way to reunification. Since the Berlin Wall, this has become clearer, year by year.

Today, once again, people in Germany are reflecting on Germany - reflecting about a policy which, on one hand, uses the atomic patt for a political offensive, and on the other hand, can corrupt Communist ideology. Old fictions are being discarded. Many things are being put in question that, for many years, were taboo. They are turning away from the simple legal aspect and are initiating a road toward a creative policy.

It may have been a mere coincidence that the impulse for a debate in Germany over reunification came from the exterior. The fact is that the first suggestions setting up a system were made by two American professors. Henry A. Kissinger of Harvard went back, mutatis mutandis, to the concept of an offering of "peace within the precincts of the castle" which had been rejected by Khrushchev in the summer of 1962, when Adenauer went to Moscow. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Sovietologist from New York's Columbia University, proposed a different concept. He does not want to accept the German Democratic Republic for a given period, he would rather isolate and blockade them - this in the framework of a political program that strikes at the kernel of reassociation with East Europe. The vehicle of peaceful engagement - the peaceful reinvolvement of Europe's separated halves - should be a grandiose undertaking of assistance, a kind of new Marshall Plan. These two proposals did not find very much success: Kissinger, because his ideas appear too synthetic, and Brzezinski, because his thoughts, so far as they concern Bonn's policies toward East Berlin, are too easily adapted to the orthodoxy of the dogma of sovereignty, whereas the SPD, during the election year, was careful to express divergent opinions.

The reflections on Germany, however, began soon from another source as well. On April 24, 1965, the Bavarian FDP in Munich published a memorandum "The German Question". The author was Ambassador Fritz Oeller, with assistance from Thomas Dehler. It proceeded from six theses. The four most important are:

- The German question today is no longer to be solved alone on the the basis of the responsibility of the Allied Powers of the Potsdam Conference of August 1945;

- German reunification today is only conceivable in the framework of world-wide agreements on political, military and economic matters, but certainly not with the presentation of a "status quo ante";

- Neither the states of the East bloc nor those of the West are interested in a restoration of the national unity of Germany. The fear of a rearmed, strong Germany is still evident and tends to reduce their interest in reunification;

- From the point of view of the Bundesrepublik, the reference to the four-power responsibility and the pressure for initiative by our allies is not enough. More and more it becomes necessary to develop own initiatives and concepts which might serve as the basis for negotiations on German reunification, in the framework of world-wide détente. The policy of the small steps alone, as welcome as it may be, is certainly not sufficient.

After an analysis of the Allied Powers' policy on Germany, the Oellers memorandum recommends: the abstinence of the German Federal Republic in any nuclear activities as well as with regard to MLF, ANF, or force de frappe; no military integration of the EEC states; taking up diplomatic relations with the East European states, and flexible interpretation of the Hallstein doctrine; stronger and more normal relations with East Germany, without recognition of any kind of the DDR. When establishing a German concept for reunification, the following points would have to be considered: the limitation of arms and a nuclear free-zone in Europe; the separation of the German Federal Republic from NATO and the separation of the German Democratic Republic from the Warsaw Pact, after creating a new European control system comprising USA and USSR; a system of non-aggression pacts and security treaties; the right of self-determination for the newly united German people; military status of the united Germany; determination of a permanent frontier; a peace agreement with reunified Germany.

The Oellers-Dehler memorandum touched upon all the factors prevalent and important in Germany today. Principally, the desire for a draft peace treaty with more significance than a recapitulation of already existing proposals, and which would have at least publicity value - even if not having any value for immediate reunification - and which would also clarify the military status of reunited Germany, her Eastern borders and the manner of her integration in the context of an overlapping European-American security system.

Indeed, in the preamble of the constitution, the whole German people is invited to achieve unity and freedom in free self-determination. Germany, however, was not defined with regard to its territory, and it is left open whether Germany, in this context, was at all considered as a territorial concept. In any case, the most determining aspect in the preamble bid for reunification was not the territorial one, but the "will of the German people to maintain their national and political unity". Should one day our two great desires for national and political unity, on the one hand, and the territorial integrity of Germany as an object of international law, on the other hand, come into irreconcilable competition, then the bid for reunification on the principal priority of the national and political unity of the German people must be respected.

Of course, the opinion of a reporter is not binding for the policies of a government. Even so, the echo to this statement, as with the reaction to the EKD memorandum, has brought to light that, considering all the shrill arguments in certain circles, the broad public does appreciate, if not even share, an attitude of reason and renunciation in order to promote reunification between the Rhine and the Oder. That Germany, if it ever is to be unified, must accept, by and large, the East frontier, is not disputed by any serious German politician; it is only still controversial when this can be admitted openly. The same is true for the non-nuclear status of a reunified Germany. Here, the will of total renunciation is even more unequivocal. The question is only whether negative commitments in this direction should be made now, or whether it would not be more advisable to "be paid by the East for renunciation of atomic weapons in all-German money".

Also in this respect, realism is trump. Everything that is connected with atomic warfare meets with skepticism and aversion. Insofar, Wilhelm Wolfgang Schütz, the director of the trusteeship of Udivided Germany, expressed an opinion which is widely spread, "Arguments against a German atomic power are present in every Capital. Nothing will change in this respect for a long time, neither in the East nor in the West. Is it not, then, in the interest of German politics that the German Federal Republic be on the top of the nonatomic powers, instead of on the edge of the atomic powers? It is of no use at all to German policy that, rightly or wrongly, the impression was given that the Federal Republic was actually looking for her own nuclear-weapons, in spite of all agreements and assurances."

Schütz' memorandum also belongs in the list of unorthodox publications. It begins with the lapidary sentences "A political strategy for reunification is indispensable. Until now, it has been missing." He then presents such a strategy - a grand reform of German politics. In some detail, one might quarrel with Schütz. But, in the core, his approach complies with everyone's beliefs and thoughts who demand more dynamics and imagination in German foreign policy.

II Turning Away from the Old Dogmas

Apart from the international aspects of the German question, its inner-German aspect has gained more and more attention. This is not surprising because at present it is not very likely that any initiative in foreign policy may promote reunification. A scheme is necessary for the day when the German question will be brought up again, but time is not yet ripe for that. This means: until that day, we need an interim policy which would bring about relief for the 17 million people across the Elbe, or which would at least prevent that Germans in East and West become more and more estranged.

There will be nobody who has any illusions about what is possible, although the spokesmen of a "policy of small steps below the sill of recognition" this side of the Elbe have often enough been reproached for their illusionism, whereas, on the other side of the Elbe, they have been reproached for their "counter-revolution in slippers". In the meantime, however, the simple thought seems to gain ground in the Bundesrepublik: if there is still a long time to go till reunification, then we have to do all we can in order to prevent that only the East Germans have to pay the price for the separation.

Erich Müller-Gangloff, Head of the Evangelical Academy in Berlin, has gone farthest in this direction. Following the steps of Karl Jaspers, he demands "end of reunification" and "an alternative to reunification". In his book "Mit der Teilung leben" he writes:

> Reunification is not a credible aim of present German policy. The division of Germany is not only the consequence of a war which we initiated and which we lost and which has brought the armies of the two hemispheres into our country; the separation is, moreover, the inevitable consequence of 20 years of a policy which has deepened the ideological contrasts between the victorious powers, instead of mitigating these contrasts. There is no price conceivable which would even approximately counter-balance the value of the DDR for the Soviet Union... At last, we have to begin thinking about non-reunification, i.e., a concept which can lead us out of the self-inflicted cage of a line of thinking which has become senseless, and into a future of minimal hopes.

Radical Analyses

Gangloff's motivation is influenced by the strong conviction that, from the historical point of view, Germany has gambled away its national unity; that it has no more right to claim reunification; that there will be no all-German future, just a common German future against the background of permanent separation. In this he differs from Karl Kaiser, a young German scientist working at Harvard University. Kaiser, in a remarkable analysis, writes crystal-clear:

> The immediate task for the political leaders of the Bundesrepublik should not consist in attaining what up to now they had considered their dominating and most urgent aim: reconstitution of a united Germany in freedom. The present constellation of power in Europe and in the world excludes this possibility for the near future.... The actual problem is to promote freedom of the individuals east of the Berlin Wall and of the Iron Curtain, to maintain the feelings amongst all Germans that they belong together, and to create, in the realtions between East and West, conditions which make possible a rapprochement.... It remains to be examined if the Bundesrepublik and her allies should make the first step towards a new policy on Germany by starting from the assumption that liberalization of the East German régime in the future is their most pressing aim.... Since the gap widens each year, the policy of renouncing inner-German contacts may well become a de facto recognition of the German division....

Walter Euchner, Gert Schäfer and Dieter Senghaas, 3 young Germans specialized in political science, have expressed their views just as radically as far as analysis is concerned and even stricter as far as form is concerned; their book, published by Enzensberger, is called "Katechismus zur deutschen Frage". They say: "A political concept is superfluous when it reflects the wishes of its originators, but not the difficulties which hinder the realization of these wishes." Instead of total and perfect suggestions for solution, they demand "rationality of non-codified and non-codifiable political actions, viz, the unilateral gesture which presupposes common interests and which expresses the expectancy of an adequate reaction; the symbolical testing of such reciprocity as a pars pro toto; the tacit agreement; the calculated risk of détente; the attempt to reverse the mechanism of military growth: constructive escalation." And they realize this: "It is not possible to guarantee these steps in advance by a treaty, this would not be in their nature. They are only codifiable - if at all - post festum."

The program suggested by the German catechists is reflected in the sentence: "The interests of the populations of both German states - as far as they

are clearly to be discerned - require peaceful stabilization of the situation in Central Europe." They do not believe that putting together the two German states to one single state would be possible at present nor in the near future. A realistic policy for Germany must, in their opinion, aim at establishing the most intimate re l tionship possible - in the economic, cultural and personal sphere - between the Bundesrepublik and the DDR; such relationship, if stabilized, could be the forerunner to a future political unity.

A policy of cooperation with the DDR should take the place of the present policy of the Bundesrepublik which claims the right to be the only recognized German state. This means that the Bundesrepublik should discard with its political, legal and military doctrines, recognize the DDR and renounce its territorial claims; the DDR, on the other hand, would have to respect the status of Berlin, guarantee free access and give up the doctrine according to which Berlin is on DDR territory, furthermore, renounce to a formal diplomatic recognition by the Bundesrepublik, including exchange of Ambassadors. These time-table catechets think little of an arrangement by means of a peace treaty. They think it is still appropriate to approach the confederation of the 2 German states with skepticism. "A premature federative construction without any political background could do more harm than good. Such a confederation would be useful not for bringing about the desired effect, but for sanctioning what has been achieved. This will take a good while."

In some respects, Theodor Eschenburg goes even further. He does not only speak of respecting the DDR, but he even thinks it indispensable to finally recognize it. His argumentation is full of good reasons and, therefore, escapes simplification in mere phrases. The core of this argumentation is the statement that the Bundesrepublik, in view of the latent threatening of West Berlin, will not be able to avoid accepting the Eastern theory of two states, thus taking away the basis for their theory of three states.

At this point, Eschenburg breaks through the "Maginot line of thinking" which Günter Kartkopf, Director of the Berlin Senate for Federal Affairs, had pilloried at the end of February 1966. Hartkopf warned of the danger of an all-German euphory; he explicitly underlines that the frame within which we can politically move is more than restricted. He stresses the "pre-era of the small steps" and demands "merciless clearing of the all'German lumber-room" as basis for any further steps of reintegration. He also demands:

> Let' s begin not to put legal questions in the foreground when dealing with the question of how to come to an agreement with the Germans in the middle of our fatherland. Our legal claim is, morally and also from the point of view of international law, well founded; but it should not be continuously pushed in the foreground, because neither politically

> nor otherwise does it bring us any further. What we need is a clear concept for the steps to be taken during the pre-era, for the small steps themselves, and for the grand concept of re-unification. Here, the politically responsible ones are called upon to find a line, to tell us what we want, how we want it and how much it will cost us.

Hartkopf is a man of the FEDP; however, also within the SPD there are similar thoughts. Herbert Wehner, during the election year 1965, had tried to push these thoughts in the background, but in this attempt he failed; thereafter, during the debate about the exchange of speakers, he vigourously headed the group of those who, within his party, demanded an active policy on Germany. The resolution taken by the SPD-Landesparteitag in Schleswig-Holstein on January 22, expresses this thought with a certain precision: "The positions of the respective governments in a split Germany are at present more incompatible than ever. The attitude of the Bundesregierung, often anxiously withdrawing to long-abandoned grounds of cold war, has the inherent danger of an isolation in foreign policy. The East German state is more and more being entangled with the East block; therefore it is gaining, in the East block and in some parts of the world, political scope.

Political Fictions

"It is only in the Western part of our country that we Germans have the possibility of examining in open discussion the situation of our people and deciding upon measures for improving that situation. If we don't have the courage to admit that our former attitude cannot be maintained, then we ourselves restrict our possibilities Assertions that we want to maintain the unity of the people will, then, be nothing but empty declamations..."

It was inevitable that the topic of Germany penetrated not only the intellect of the intellectuals, but also the imagination of the imaginative. The Kiel professor for International Law Eberhard Menzel was the first to take a step in this direction - with an imaginary retrospective from the year 1985, which he presented in Berlin in November 1965 during a meeting of the Berlin Evangelical Academy. Out of the retrospective of fiction, Menzel drew up a plan for reunification which the Bundesregierung, however, had only adopted after throwing over an authoritative government which had ruled in Bonn for several years:

> ... The new government, upon instruction of the Parliament, declared its willingness to deal with all political questions; abandoned all empty formulae maintained hitherto and agreed to sign a non-aggression agreement. In this newly created favourable atmosphere, the government succeeded in evading the spectre of a

peace treaty. An extensive series of treaties on the new formation of Europe was set up, including agreements on the military safety system.

These treaties brought about changes in military agreements installed the US and the USSR as guaranteeing powers and settled measures for inspection and control, imitating the plans of the Arms Control, as in vigour in the Sixties, against surprise aggression.

Of special significance was the agreement reached between the Big Powers concerning plans for German reunification. The American proposal of 1959 concerning joint technical commissions was, with a few modifications, adopted. Some sub-committees convened under allied chairmanship, others were composed of even numbers of representatives of both parts of Germany; there resulted a variety of organic formations each of which was specialized in a specific topic of negotiation. One important factor was that the principle of self-determination was acknowledged as a decisive criterion. It was agreed that within 10 years a plebiscite should be held. Thus, both parts of Germany were to determine freely about the national reunification.

This arrangement of 1980 resulted in a rapid improvement of the relations between the 2 parts of the population, all the more since the political leaders on both sides reduced their propaganda to a large degree. There were special agreements on free access and unhindered travelling of visitors; press and publishing restrictions were abolished and official funds for news agencies were restricted; a political amnesty was proclaimed. Ideological reserves became less accentuated, especially since the Bundesrepublik had overcome a period of authoritative ruling. The common factors were stressed more than the dividing factors. The ten years were considered as a period of mutual trial.

Thus, it is true that in 1985 the decision on reunification had not yet been taken, however, the road to definitive settlement was now paved...

The idea seemed to be in the air - otherwise, it cannot be explained why Rüdiger Altmann (who once had written a critical farewell-song to the Adenauer era and who, afterwards, had coined for the second Bundeskanzler the slogan of "Formierte Gesellschaft") at the same time developed a similar idea, though more

detailed, which he also presented in the form of retrospective political fiction. On March 1, 1966, his political fiction "Der deutsche Bund" was broadcast in the 3rd program of the NDR (*) television; on April 20, one day before the stock-taking talks of the party leaders with Chancellor Erhard, the broadcast was repeated by the first program in the whole territory of the Bundesrepublik.

There is no doubt that the long years of stagnation in thinking are gradually coming to an end. It is a striking fact that new ideas are being brought up, above all, by the press and by men of political science and by politicians within FDP and SPD; so far, CDU/CSU has contributed little but phrases; of the latter party, only Johann Baptist Gradl has caused some attention by putting ideas, which were not new at all, at least into new words, and Rainer Barzel had made a temporary advance into the field of concreteness. The assumption is, however, not true that the readiness for a re-calculation of the German bill is only to be found at the esoteric fringes of the universities and the Parties.

As a proof for this assertion, we give hereafter some excerpts from a speech made, on January 11, 1966, by the Vice-President of the Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag and Vice-President of the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce, Alwin Münchmeyer. In his closing remarks, the German banker states:

> Our principle of a German state is based on an incontestable right; it is in logical consequence of this that, again and again, it has been demanded that West Germany should be the sole qualified speaker for the whole of Germany. There is no doubt that this point of view submits us, on the one hand, to continuous blackmail and, on the other hand, it is considered a nuisance, not last by our friends.
>
> <u>New Realism</u>
>
> This would not do any harm and should not impress us in the least, if only we had the feeling that with this attitude we would approach our aim, i.e. reunification, and, especially, to be of help to the people in the East zone. But do we not have reason to ask ourselves from time to time whether this is really the case? If - I want to leave it open for the moment - it is not possible to give a positive answer to this question, we should also examine the following possibility: If one assumes - as I suppose we have to - that, as time goes by, some of our friends will accept the theory of the 2 states and that in the end

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* Norddeutscher Rundfunk

we'll be quite alone with our concept of one single state, and if, on the other hand, one starts from the reflection that our primary desire must be to secure in the East Zone living conditions compatible with human dignity, then we may consider to start a new initiative, perhaps as follows:

At first, we would define our indispensable demands, e.g. esp. disappearance of the Wall, free interchange of people and thoughts and guarantee that in the future no new hindrances will be put up.

Then, we would make it clear to the world that we would be ready, in case that these demands are being fulfilled, to take the factual condition of 2 states as the starting point for future negotiations on reunification. I think it is conceivable that this formulation would not restrict the scope of an effective policy on reunification, but, to the contrary, that it would release it.

All in all, one assertion was incontestable in 1966: Germany has started anew to think about Germany. A new realism is spreading which made it possible for Franz Josef Strauss to say bluntly: "I do not believe in reconstitution of a German national state, not even within the frame of the 4 occupation zones." The unification of the 2 Germanies in the frame of a national state he thinks to be "rationally, and measured by the experience of history, unfortunately not possible in the near future." There are many others who share his views, but they lack the carelessness to express their opinions so openly. One might almost say that there is already a secret consensus on the question of the aim of German policies. One might put it like this: the aim of the German policy must be to bring about reunification or to create conditions which make reunification superfluous or which render its absence bearable.

So far, this knowledge has not been condensed into a political program, nor is there a man visible on the German stage who would link his name to this theory. However, a switch in attitude is taking place in Germany. Something fundamental has been stirred up, a new development is on the way. Theoretically, there are at least three men who are likely to adopt this policy which would be "Gaullist" towards the East, "Atlantic" towards the West and German in the very unpathetic sense that it would not be afraid of contacts with Communist Germans. One of the three men is Rainer Barzel, Deputy Head of the CDU. For a long time he has been busy mitigating the opinions of others, but one day he will want to define his very own opinion and, in spite of all his oscillations in the past, nobody can reproach him for lack of realism. A second man is Helmut Schmidt whose impetuous

political temperament certainly tempts him to take the lead, breaking through sterility to activity. The third of these men is, surprising as it may be, Franz Josef Strauss. A common characteristic of the three is some pragmatism, even opportunism. Of all three of them it would be conceivable that they direct their boats into the current of a new majority opinion, once the direction of that current becomes discernable.

However, it takes two sides to establish a new policy for Germany. And for the time being it does not look as if in East Berlin it were already possible to turn away from the old dogmas. On the other side of the Wall, too, doubts and anxiety render any initiative towards a reshuffling of the inner-German relationship difficult. That there are such initiatives has been proved by the Apel case as well as, in the spring of 1966, the arguments which took place within the Politbüro on the question of the exchange of speakers. It is now the time for West Germany to prepare itself for the day when the SED leadership will adopt a sensible course.

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SOVIET MILITARY POWER AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Thomas W. Wolfe

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Introduction

Today, some twenty years after the end of World War II, the politics of Europe are again in flux. Although one can hardly predict what the future will bring, there is a growing presentiment that it will work substantial changes in the status quo which settled upon a divided Europe during the past two decades of East-West Cold War.

Throughout most of these two decades, the life of Europe was dominated by the East-West confrontation. Each half of a partitioned Europe, as George Kennan has put it, fell under the political and military influence of a super-power peripheral to Europe proper. The bipolarity of power in postwar Europe was brought home above all by the emergence of mutual U.S.-Soviet nuclear deterrence, which, following a transient phase of American atomic monopoly, served to stabilize the military division of Europe and tended to immobilize its politics as well.

In the meantime, however, the postwar status quo was being slowly undermined by forces of change at work both in the West and in the East. The revival of nationalism,

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or what has sometimes been called the process of polycentrism, was probably the key element in the gradual breakdown of bipolarity on both sides of the European dividing line. Ironically, the reassertion of nationalist interests in the politics of Europe was perhaps made possible, more than anything else, by the nuclear stalemate between the superpowers, which seemed to many people to dispel the danger that another great war might arise in Europe.

At any rate, although the old rigidities and tensions of the Cold War era have by no means disappeared, it has become generally recognized today that the opposing political-military alliance systems led by the United States and the Soviet Union are evolving into something new, reflecting important if not fundamental shifts in the political climate of Europe on both sides of the river Elbe.

The present paper, to come now to its purpose, is not intended to explore such sweeping questions as the possible paths of future European development, nor the complex influence of interacting Soviet and American policies upon Europe's destiny. Rather, the paper has a much more modest aim: to examine the military dimensions of Soviet policy toward an evolving Europe.

It goes without saying, of course, that the military dimensions of policy are but one aspect of the seamless web of political, economic, strategic, and other considerations out of which Soviet policy -- or that of any state in the modern world -- is woven. At the same time, there is at least one cogent reason why the bearing of Soviet military power and posture upon the problems of Europe merits close attention. Not only did the Soviet military

threat to Europe, as perceived in the past, have a great deal to do with bringing a Western defense alliance into being, but much of today's preoccupation with the future fate of NATO turns upon the assumption that the character of this threat has now changed. It therefore seems appropriate to try to sort out some of the politico-military considerations upon which this assumption rests.

Time-wise, the paper is addressed most closely to relevant Soviet military policy developments during the latter years of Khrushchev's rule and since his successors came to power in October 1964. However, the author has felt it necessary to begin with a review of the earlier postwar years under Stalin, for the Cold War decisions of that period have left a lasting mark even today on the Soviet military posture toward Europe.

Stalin's Military Policies in the Early Postwar Years

Among the immediate consequences of World War II which went far toward shaping the postwar environment of Europe was the penetration of Soviet military power into Central and Eastern Europe and the employment of this military presence to serve a Soviet political strategy aimed at goals beyond the defeat of Nazi Germany. As Stalin had put it to a Yugoslav visitor in April 1945:

> This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise.[1]

In postwar Europe, as the Soviet Union set out to consolidate its share of the victory over Germany, it became apparent that this prescription had indeed been

put to work. Besides the obvious task of securing the Soviet position in occupied Germany, the Soviet armed forces were used to garrison other parts of Eastern Europe and to pave the way for subsequent absorption of this region into the communist fold.

Since the Western allies, for all practical purposes, had acquiesced in the early postwar period to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, and had moreover largely demobilized their own wartime forces, one might have thought that relatively modest Soviet forces would have sufficed to safeguard Soviet gains and to shield the process of revolutionary takeover in Eastern Europe. On the contrary, however, the Soviet Union chose to keep very substantial forces under arms.

Precisely what the actual over-all level of the Soviet military establishment may have been in the early postwar years remains a matter of some controversy.[2] Nevertheless, it is quite clear that a large combined-arms force of Soviet ground troops and tactical support aircraft was left in place in occupied Germany and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Numbering around 30 divisions and well upward of a half million men, the equivalent of a Soviet wartime Front, this forward deployment of Soviet military power at the threshold of Western Europe was to remain relatively constant in size thereafter, being reduced only marginally during the next two decades.

It was this visible Soviet military presence in Europe, backed up by additional forces of substantial though perhaps exaggerated size in the bordering territory of the USSR itself, which initially gave rise to deep-seated concern in the West that an "imbalance of forces" existed that

might prejudice the postwar security of Europe. Why then should Stalin have decided to keep under arms what seemed like unreasonably large forces, when a less formidable image of Soviet military power might have allayed Western concern and helped to alter profoundly the climate of post-war relations between the Soviet Union and her wartime allies?

There is no room in this brief account to explore the roots of Stalin's motivation in the early postwar years when, as McGeorge Bundy has described it, Stalin seemed bent on squandering the "reservoir of good will" he had inherited from the wartime years of partnership with the West.[3] However, one may identify several factors that seem to have conditioned his military policy decisions.

The frame of mind which led Stalin to interpret every defensive move in the West as confirmation of ingrained hostility to the Soviet Union was probably one of the chief factors that underlay his decision to maintain large military forces. A desire to stake out a protective belt of territory to cover the Soviet Union's traditionally vulnerable frontier with Europe was probably another factor that led him to keep strong Soviet forces deployed in Central and Eastern Europe. Stalin's reluctance to remove these forces from their wartime lodgement may also have rested on the belief that local resistance to satellization of the area would otherwise present serious problems. Another key element in Stalin's perception of the postwar scene was the prospect that American involvement in Europe might threaten not only the Soviet Union's wartime gains, but also its prospects for future political advance.

After the militant pressures of Soviet European policy during the so-called Zhdanov period in 1947-48 had foreclosed any possibility of American disengagement from postwar Europe,[4] two considerations tended to become paramount on Stalin's military agenda. The first was to find a way to deter the United States from either exploiting potential unrest in Eastern Europe or from reacting in a dangerous fashion to Soviet political moves calculated to play upon divergencies within the West. The second was that of breaking the Western nuclear monopoly and providing the Soviet Union with modern arms, an effort calling for heavy commitment of Soviet scientific and industrial resources.

The first of these problems, that of imposing adequate restraint upon a powerful opponent like the United States, posed serious difficulties for Soviet policy, particularly when the U.S. atomic monopoly was accompanied by an advantage in strategic delivery forces that seemed likely to persist for some time. From the Soviet viewpoint, the United States was inherently hostile, and any restraint on its part therefore would be largely the result, not of American good will, but of the price the Soviet armed forces could exact in the event of war.

However, since the continental military power at the disposal of the Soviet Union was ill-suited to bring direct pressure on the United States, an alternative solution was necessary. It was sought in the large combined-arms forces of conventional character that the Soviet Union had conveniently at hand. Lacking as yet the means to adopt a strategy of nuclear deterrence, a concept which had already gained wide acceptance in the United States,[5] Stalin was obliged to rely on Russia's traditional theater forces as the primary instrument of Soviet military policy.

Although the task of inhibiting the United States from exploiting its nuclear status was also approached through other avenues, such as systematic use of the Stockholm Appeal and the worldwide Peace Movement,[6] Stalin's main recourse lay in the concept of "hostage Europe," under which the threat of Soviet landpower against Europe was conceived as the counterpoise to U.S. nuclear power. This circumstance was to have a number of far-reaching political and military consequences which Stalin may not have foreseen.

In contrast with the U.S. military posture, which enabled the United States to practice deterrence during the early years of the nuclear age by the threat of strategic retaliatory attack against a few vital centers in the Soviet Union, the Soviet military posture lent itself to deterrence only if the threat of Soviet invasion and occupation of Western Europe were made to seem credible. Thus, whether he preferred it that way or not, Stalin could hardly afford to deflate military programs and preparations which would give substance to the threat of a Soviet sweep across Europe.[7] Rather than helping to keep Europe weak and disunited, however, this Soviet stance led to growing affirmation of political solidarity among the countries of Western Europe and the United States, and gave additional impetus to the planning for the common defense of Europe which had brought NATO into being in 1949.

The priority placed by Stalin on the role of the combined-arms forces in the European theater did not mean, of course, that Stalin was indifferent to the military-technical revolution which ushered in the nuclear age.

Indeed, he came early to recognize the need for breaking the U.S. atomic monopoly and for developing capabilities which would pose a direct threat to the American homeland. As the record testifies, Stalin bent great efforts to make the Soviet Union a nuclear power. These included both weapons development programs and a diplomatic-propaganda campaign to avoid international constraints, such as those implied by the Baruch proposal, upon unilateral Soviet atomic development activities.[8] In August 1949, well in advance of expectations in the Western world, the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic device, and four years later, its first thermonuclear device. Credit for initiating parallel programs of research and development that ultimately gave the Soviet Union aircraft and missile delivery systems of intercontinental range must also go to Stalin.

Development of the Soviet Military Posture Up To Stalin's Death

The years from 1949 to Stalin's death in 1953 brought important developments in the Soviet military posture, but at the same time they illustrated that requirements for theater warfare in Europe still had first call on Soviet military resources and planning. As new programs were undertaken to modernize and improve the Soviet military establishment[9] -- a process that picked up tempo coincident with the Korean War and the beginning of serious efforts in Western Europe in 1951 to organize an integrated NATO force under General Eisenhower -- the Soviet forces deployed against Europe were among the first whose re-equipment and training received attention.

The "ready-made spearhead" of these forces, to use Field Marshal Montgomery's description,[10] was composed of 22 divisions and a supporting tactical air army in the Soviet group of forces in Germany (GSFG), and another eight divisions with tactical air elements in the two smaller groups of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe -- a northern group based in Poland and a southern group including the Soviet occupation forces in Austria and along the lines of communication through Hungary and Rumania. An additional though less visible force of some 50 to 60 Soviet divisions was estimated to stand behind this forward spearhead in the western military districts of the USSR itself.[11]

Interestingly enough, the continental orientation of Soviet military preparations remained in evidence after nuclear weapons were initially introduced into operational Soviet forces in the early fifties. Although it later became known that Soviet energies at that time were also being devoted to development of modern heavy bomber aircraft (such as the "Bison" jet bomber and the "Bear" turboprop bomber[12]) that could directly threaten the United States once they began to appear in operational units of the long-range air arm from the mid-fifties onward, the bulk of the initial Soviet effort to fashion a nuclear-delivery capability in Stalin's time went into delivery forces that were equipped and trained essentially for Eurasian operations rather than intercontinental strategic missions.[13]

Parallel to the strengthening of the Soviet military posture against Europe during the latter years of the Stalinist period was the process of rebuilding the armed

forces of the Soviet Union's East European satellites. In the first postwar years, the fortunes of the badly disorganized national armies of the East European countries were at a low ebb.[14] By 1949, with communist regimes firmly established in these countries, Stalin evidently decided the time had come to rehabilitate their military forces, perhaps in line with a general plan to add the military potential of Eastern Europe to that already opposing NATO, or at the least in order to begin integrating the satellite armies more closely into the Soviet system of control in Eastern Europe.[15]

On the whole, the buildup of the East European forces on the Soviet model can be regarded as a process far from complete at the time of Stalin's death. Although these forces by 1953 attained a strength of around 1,500,000 men, providing a total number of divisions estimated variously at from 65-80, perhaps only about half were sufficiently well-trained and equipped to be of some combat significance.[16] Moreover, their reliability as well as their efficiency posed a major question mark. While military integration of the Eastern bloc countries made some progress under the bilateral arrangements which prevailed at this time, it fell notably short of the objectives to be set after the Warsaw Pact came into being, as we shall see later in this paper. For all practical purposes, the Soviet Union up to and beyond the end of the Stalin era counted essentially upon its own military forces to carry the burden of any military undertakings in Europe in which the Soviet Union might become involved. At the same time, it must be recognized that Stalin did set in motion important changes which led during the next decade to development of a meaningful East European military potential.

Before leaving the subject of Soviet military developments of the Stalinist period, two other major undertakings initiated by Stalin merit mention. One of these was an ambitious naval expansion effort. Its main feature was a submarine construction program which by 1953 gave the Soviet navy an underseas fleet in excess of 300 submarines,[17] and which seemed to be Stalin's response to the new strategic problem of interdicting sea communications between the United States and Europe in the event of war. The naval expansion effort under Stalin also included a major program of surface ship construction, centered mainly on building up Soviet strength in cruisers and destroyers.[18] However, this incipient challenge to Western surface dominance -- which, incidentally, did not include plans for competing with the West in aircraft carrier forces[19] -- failed to materialize fully, for the surface construction program was curtailed sharply not long after Stalin's demise.

The second major undertaking in question was the effort initiated under Stalin to strengthen the Soviet Union's air defense system, known as the PVO.[20] Given the vast destructive possibilities of strategic air attack posed by the advent of nuclear weapons, it had become obvious in the postwar period that urgent measures were required to improve Soviet air defenses, which were rudimentary at best at the close of the war. Under Stalin, intensive effort was put into jet fighter development and production in the late forties and early fifties, with the result that by 1951 about 20 per cent of Soviet fighter units were re-equipped with jet types of the famous Mig design, while by 1953 the changeover was virtually complete.[21] At the

same time, serious attention was devoted to overcoming the technical backwardness of the Soviet electronics industry, upon which the creation of a nation-wide radar warning network and other facilities for a modern air defense system would heavily depend.[22] During the latter part of the Stalinist period, steps were also taken to extend the outer perimeter of the Soviet early-warning and defense system into the countries of Eastern Europe -- adding a new air age dimension, as it were, to the historic role of this region as a buffer zone against possible invasion from the West.

New Policy Style Under Khrushchev

Stalin's passing in 1953 brought no basic changes in such Soviet Cold War objectives in Europe as achieving the neutralization of Germany, blocking the further build-up of NATO defenses, and preventing potential defections from the East European bloc. His demise did, however, open the way for notable innovations in the style and manner in which Soviet policy objectives were to be pursued, while in the field of military affairs, it released an internal debate over nuclear-age concepts that was to stimulate important changes in Soviet military preparations under Khrushchev.

Some signs of innovation in the conduct of Soviet European policy began to appear even before the transitional succession struggle between Malenkov and Khrushchev was resolved in the latter's favor in early 1955. These took the form of a series of Soviet proposals in 1954 for a collective security system embracing both Western and Eastern European states, but tentatively excluding the

United States except in an "observer" role.[23] Aimed in the first instance at preventing ratification of the EDC treaty, these proposals looked toward the abandonment of NATO as the price for a peace treaty that would settle the future status of Germany. As in the case of previous attempts to work out the terms of a peace treaty,[24] the inability of the Western powers and the Soviet Union to resolve the problem of a divided Germany again led to a deadlock that was to remain essentially unbroken throughout the subsequent decade of Khrushchev's rule.

Following the failure of Soviet efforts to forestall the inclusion of West Germany in NATO defense arrangements -- a development made possible by the Paris Agreements of October 1964,[25] despite French rejection of the EDC two months earlier -- Soviet diplomacy in Europe struck out upon several new paths in 1955 under the energetic leadership of Khrushchev. Talks on Austria were revived, leading to conclusion of an Austrian State Treaty in May 1955. In return for Austrian neutrality, the Soviet Union gave up a forward military base in Central Europe, but also reaped the strategic dividend of driving a neutral wedge some 500 miles deep between West Germany and Italy, in effect splitting the area of Western defense in two.[26] Simultaneously with signing of the Austrian State Treaty, which some Soviet commentary pictured as an example for West Germany to follow,[27] the Soviet Union also moved to bring the Warsaw Pact into formal existence. This step, taken in avowed response to West Germany's entry into NATO, had the incidental effect of providing a new legal basis for the presence of Soviet military forces in Hungary and Rumania, including most of the forces to be withdrawn from Austria under terms of the State Treaty.

Along with these moves, Soviet diplomacy under Khrushchev displayed another facet of its new style in the summer of 1955 when the Geneva summit meeting was convened to discuss the problems of Europe. Although neither the "friendly" exchange at the summit nor the ministerial conference that followed in the fall of 1955 yielded tangible progress on such problems as German reunification, a European Security Treaty, or disarmament, the atmosphere of détente which emerged at Geneva was to persuade many people that the Cold War has passed its peak. Under the influence of the Geneva thaw and other developments of the mid-fifties, such as the opening of an intensive round of East-West disarmament negotiations and Soviet announcement of unilateral troop reductions in 1955-56,[28] sentiment grew in Western Europe that not only the rigors of the Cold War but the Soviet military threat to Europe had finally begun to subside.

Even the tensions which accompanied the Suez crisis and the surprising defiance of Soviet authority in Hungary and Poland in the fall of 1956 did not dispel the notion that Soviet policy under Khrushchev offered hopeful prospects of liquidating some of the worst Cold War obstacles to East-West understanding. The impact of de-Stalinization upon the communist regimes of Eastern Europe further helped to sustain the belief that a mellowing of Soviet policy had set in, although it was at the same time apparent from Soviet reaction to the Hungarian revolt, as in the case of the East German uprising three years earlier in the summer of 1953, that Soviet controls in Eastern Europe would be enforced, when necessary, by Soviet military power.

General recognition that the Geneva interlude was not the harbinger of a lasting thaw in Europe came with the resumption of pressure tactics by Khrushchev, beginning in the latter fifties after he had fully established his political primacy at home by quashing the so-called "anti-Party group." The pressures which Khrushchev chose to exert took primarily two forms, both of which again cast the shadow of Soviet military power across the European scene.

The first of these, following upon the heels of the Soviet Union's initial ICBM and Sputnik launchings in the autumn of 1957, was a systematic effort to press Soviet successes in missile and space technology into the service of Soviet politics.[29] Observing the concern aroused abroad by the image of the so-called "missile gap," Khrushchev evidently came to the conclusion that a vigorous missile diplomacy in Bolshevik hands might over overawe the West and induce it to accept Soviet terms on a variety of disputed international issues. In any event, this instrument of Soviet policy was employed on repeated occasions until the Cuban crisis in the fall of 1962 dramatically demonstrated its inadequacy. Thereafter, Khrushchev displayed little disposition to invite further tests of will, although he did not fall entirely out of the habit of brandishing his missiles.

The second instance of renewed Soviet pressure tactics under Khrushchev, in part related to the first, came in November 1958 when Khrushchev laid down a deadline demand for radical changes in the four-power status of Berlin.[30] This demand, accompanied by the threat that the Soviet Union was prepared to seek an independent

solution of the Berlin problem, precipitated a lengthy crisis which was to endure at varying degrees of intensity for the next four years, subsiding only after the Cuban missile showdown and other converging difficulties at home and abroad prompted Khrushchev during the final year or two of his tenure to seek a breathing spell in Soviet relations with the West.

Military Problems and Reforms of the Khrushchev Era

Without attempting here to elaborate upon the evolution of Soviet European policy under Khrushchev in its entirety, let us turn now to the major considerations that seemed to shape Soviet military policy and posture as the Khrushchev era unfolded. At the outset of his administration of Soviet affairs, Khrushchev faced at least two broad problems in the defense domain. One of these was to check the further strengthening of NATO, especially plans for closer association of West Germany with the defense of Europe. The other, partly an outgrowth of the increasingly global character of Soviet competition with the United States, was to adapt Soviet military thinking and force posture to the nuclear-age revolution in the technology of warfare, a process which had only been partially carried out in Stalin's time.

The first of these problems, as we have seen, proved no more susceptible to solution than in Stalin's day. Although Soviet diplomacy under Khrushchev certainly sought through a variety of avenues to undermine Western resolve to strengthen NATO and to prevent a German contribution to the defense of Europe, it failed to achieve either objective. Not only was the portent of a stronger NATO

driven home by the beginning of West German rearmament in 1955, but within the next two years Khrushchev was also confronted with such further steps to increase the military potential of the Western alliance as the decision of the NATO Council in May 1957 to incorporate American-owned and controlled nuclear weapons in the NATO arsenal in Europe. This development, which threatened to cancel out the deterrent value of Soviet conventional superiority in Europe upon which Stalin had heavily relied, was doubtless among the factors which persuaded Khrushchev to feel that a major overhaul of the Soviet armed forces, to include greater reliance on nuclear firepower, was necessary: which brings us to the second broad problem on Khrushchev's military agenda -- a problem which the present writer has referred to elsewhere as "that of wrenching a traditionally conservative Soviet military bureaucracy out of its accustomed groove and forcing it to reorganize in line with the technological facts of life."[31]

The military reforms undertaken during the decade in which Khrushchev found himself the chief architect of Soviet military policy and strategy affected not only the Soviet Union's military stance toward Europe, but its global strategic posture as well. It happens to be germane to our present subject that many of the most vexed issues in Soviet military theory and planning during the Khrushchev period arose precisely around the relationship between continental theater warfare in Europe and strategic operations of global scale.

The relative weight which should be accorded these two dimensions of warfare was, for example, a continuing

source of contention between those advocating priority allocation of resources to the traditional combined-arms theater forces (general purpose forces) on the one hand and to the newer strategic forces (offensive and defensive) on the other. Much of the military theoretical debate which sprang to life in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death[32] turned on the question of the kind of war for which the Soviet armed forces should be equipped and trained to fight. As the authors of a widely-publicized Soviet work on military strategy put it, the essence of the debate was whether a future war would be "a land war with the employment of nuclear weapons as a means of supporting the operations of the ground forces," or whether it would be on the other hand "a fundamentally new kind of war in which the main means of solving strategic tasks will be missiles and nuclear weapons?"[33] Underlying these considerations was the equally controversial issue whether Soviet military preparations should be aimed primarily at deterrence or at improving Soviet capabilities to fight a war if deterrence should fail.

Later, we shall look more closely at specific trends in Soviet thinking on the probable character and likelihood of theater warfare in Europe. Suffice to say here, with respect to the military policies pursued by Khrushchev from the late fifties to the time of his downfall in October 1964, that they resulted in an appreciable shift of resources from theater to strategic forces, and that they were accompanied on the conceptual level by a similar shift from almost exclusive preoccupation with continental land warfare to a new emphasis on the problems of inter-continental strategic war. These tendencies were plainly

disturbing to some professional military men, particularly among the old-line commanders whose careers had been forged in the great land campaigns of World War II. Throughout Khrushchev's tenure, his policies met with varying resistance from conservative-minded marshals who felt among other things that his "one-weapon" emphasis on ballistic missiles was being carried too far. While it is not our purpose here to retrace the history of Khrushchev's sparring with his military critics, the details of which have been recorded elsewhere,[34] it should be borne in mind that the military policies adopted by Khrushchev were sometimes as much a product of the need to strike a satisfactory compromise with internal opposition factions as of his own direct preferences.

The measures taken under Khrushchev with regard to the Soviet theater forces seem to illustrate this point. Had the logic of Khrushchev's preferences prevailed, his idea of substituting nuclear firepower for manpower -- a preference explicitly advanced in his well-known military policy presentation to the Supreme Soviet in January 1960[35] -- might have been translated into measures for wholesale dismantling of the conventional theater forces, including those deployed in Europe. As it turned out, far less radical measures were actually taken.

Several troop reductions did occur under Khrushchev and from time to time there was some minor thinning out of the theater forces deployed in forward positions in Central and Eastern Europe.[36] The personnel cuts in the latter forces, however, were largely in connection with organizational reforms and did not alter their significance as a combat "spearhead" poised against NATO Europe. For

the most part, the paring back of the oversized theater forces establishment was accomplished at the expense of second-line formations based in the interior military districts of the Soviet Union.

Moreover, while this retrenchment was going on, the basic integrity of the ground forces and their supporting tactical air armies -- which together comprised the combat backbone of the theater forces -- was kept intact, and the validity of the combined-arms doctrine under which they operated was emphatically reindorsed. The most radical reform which did occur -- and here was the heart of the compromise between Khrushchev and the professional advocates of strong theater forces -- was a series of programs, taking up where Stalin had left off, to modernize the theater forces by equipping and training them for fast-moving operations under nuclear conditions. In the process of "nuclearizing" the theater forces, as described in 1961 by Marshal Malinovskii, the Soviet Minister of Defense,[37] stress was placed on developing greater battlefield mobility and firepower, while dependence on the massive use of conventional artillery which previously characterized these forces was supplanted to a considerable extent by tactical missiles employing nuclear and other mass destruction warheads.

In short, rather than reducing the theater forces to a small appendage of the Soviet military establishment, limited essentially to mopping-up operations in the wake of nuclear blows delivered by the strategic striking forces, the net effect of Khrushchev's programs was to leave these forces both with enhanced capabilities for conducting theater warfare on a nuclear basis and with a continuing

role as a central element of Soviet military power. Lest it be supposed that all parties were pleased with this outcome, however, let it be observed that some of Khrushchev's military critics continued to suggest that he had gone overboard in streamlining the theater forces, especially in the event that these forces should be called upon to conduct extensive conventional campaigns, for which their increasing reliance on nuclear firepower might leave them poorly prepared.[38]

As the legatee of Stalin's unfinished efforts to raise the Soviet Union to full-fledged status as a global nuclear power, Khrushchev devoted a good deal of attention to the further development of Soviet strategic delivery means and a concomitant politico-military doctrine to go with them. First presiding over the introduction of modest numbers of intercontinental heavy bombers into the Soviet strategic air arm in the mid-fifties, Khrushchev next turned to the setting up of a strategic missile force, the creation of which was hailed in 1960 as due to his personal initiative.[39]

Here too, however, despite the obvious partiality he displayed toward the strategic missile forces, Khrushchev was unable in practice to accomplish what he may have had in mind for this favored element of Soviet military power. The logic of his position called for exertions which would have given real <u>substance</u> to the <u>image</u> of preponderant Soviet missile power upon which he sought to trade politically. For a variety of reasons -- technical, economic, perhaps bureaucratic, and not least, because of the determination of the United States not to relax its own efforts to stay ahead in the strategic power

competition -- the Soviet Union under Khrushchev failed to convert its early missile technology into an operational ICBM inventory of superior size. Toward the end of the Khrushchev era, according to informed Western estimates, the Soviet Union possessed on the order of 100-200 operational ICBM launchers, compared with several times that number in Western hands, while in heavy bombers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles -- the other major long-range delivery systems of the early sixties -- the West also enjoyed much greater strength.[40]

In effect, then, Khrushchev was obliged to settle for a second-best position in intercontinental strategic forces, and it was left to his successors to decide whether to commit Soviet resources to a strategic force buildup of sufficient scale to offer promise of upsetting this strategic power relationship. In one respect, however, Khrushchev's missile programs did match the substance with the image of imposing preponderance. The case in point concerns medium- and intermediate-range missiles (MRBM and IRBM), which also are included in the strategic missile forces along with ICBM units. Under Khrushchev, the Soviet Union deployed large numbers of these missiles in the western regions of the USSR, targeted against the NATO European area. This MRBM-IRBM force, which attained a strength of about 750 launchers by the end of Khrushchev's rule,[41] posed a threat against Western Europe which understandably seemed no less menacing than the earlier spectre of a sweep across Europe by Soviet land armies.

The task of defending the Soviet Union against possible strategic attack, which had remained far from solution at the close of the Stalinist period, was another

problem which demanded continuing attention in Khrushchev's time. A major reorganization of the air defense system in the mid-fifties, followed by introduction of more advanced fighter aircraft and of surface-to-air (SAM) missiles to improve Soviet all-weather defenses against bomber attack, were among the measures undertaken during the first half of the Khrushchev decade.[42] In the early sixties, as the advent of strategic missiles promised to change the character of the contest between modern offensive and defensive means of strategic warfare, the Soviet Union embarked upon research and development programs in the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) field. At the time Khrushchev left the scene, the Soviet Union had already claimed a "technical solution" to the anti-missile defense problem,[43] but the actual deployment of ABM defenses apparently awaited decisions by his successors.

Soviet naval preparations under Khrushchev produced several notable changes from the Stalinist period. As previously mentioned, Khrushchev, who on various occasions expressed his low esteem for surface ships, cancelled the navy's major surface construction program soon after Stalin's death. Later he relented to the extent of authorizing the commissioning of a number of missile-firing surface ships. The principal effort during Khrushchev's regime, however, lay in the submarine field. The underseas fleet was further modernized and enlarged to more than 400 submarines, including a number of nuclear-powered types.[44] A start was also made toward building up a force of missile-launching submarines similar in function although inferior in many other respects to the U.S. Polaris subs.[45] Strategically,

the introduction of submarines capable of delivering nuclear warheads at targets in North America meant that in addition to its previous mission of interdicting sea communications between the United States and Europe, the Soviet submarine arm had acquired the new task of contributing to the intercontinental strike potential of the ICBM and long-range bomber forces. Along with emulation of the U.S. Polaris example to improve Soviet strategic delivery capabilities, the Soviet Union under Khrushchev also showed acute awareness of the need to cope with the Polaris threat itself, toward which end anti-submarine warfare (ASW) measures were given increased attention.[46] Finally, in the Khrushchev period steps were taken to improve the Soviet Union's capabilities for amphibious landing operations,[47] a field in which it lagged far behind the West and one which was of growing importance if the Soviet Union should contemplate engaging its own armed forces in distant local conflicts in the third world.

Soviet Military Policy Under the Brezhnev-Kosygin Regime

When Khrushchev's rule came to a sudden and unexpected end in October 1964, his successors faced, amongst a host of other problems, the question of whether to accept or reject the main features of his handiwork in the realm of Soviet defense policy and posture. Although there has since been renewed criticism, in retrospect, of some of his strategic ideas,[48] there has been no outright repudiation of the military policy course Khrushchev sought to chart for the Soviet Union. Indeed, his military reputation seems to have suffered less thus far in Soviet commentary than his role in Party and economic affairs. As concerns

the Soviet military establishment, Khrushchev's successors in the main have not tampered basically with the organizational structure nor the professional command of the armed forces he passed on to them, which in itself is a kind of tacit endorsement of his stewardship over Soviet military affairs.

At the same time, however, the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership has made some contributions of its own to the development of the Soviet military posture -- in part perhaps building upon programs laid down earlier, and partly in response to the trend of events, such as the heightening of conflict in Vietnam since early 1965. With respect to military expenditures, for example, the new regime has halted the slight downward trend of the 1964 and 1965 budgets with a modest increase in the overt military budget for 1966,[49] and perhaps larger undisclosed military allocations also have been made.[50] Appropriations for scientific research have been stepped-up,[51] and, as made evident among other things by public display of new families of weapons, the Soviet military research and development program has been pushed even more vigorously than hitherto.[52]

In the case of decisions affecting the operational strength and deployment of the armed forces, as distinct from efforts to broaden the Soviet Union's technological base, the new leadership seems to have taken several steps which for one reason or another were left up in the air in Khrushchev's latter days. One of these, attended by comparatively little fanfare, evidently was a decision to accelerate the deployment of ICBM's. As indicated by informed accounts in the U.S. press in mid-1966,[53] the

number of operational Soviet ICBM's had been increased by that time to more than 300, mostly in hardened sites, as compared with a deployment of less than 200 ICBM launchers during the entire Khrushchev period. What the ultimate size of the Soviet ICBM program will be remains uncertain at this writing, but the implication is that the new Soviet leaders have decided upon a larger strategic force build-up than their predecessor found himself in a position to undertake. Also, as emphasized in Marshal Malinovskii's report at the 23rd Party Congress in April 1966, "special importance" has gone into developing mobile land-based missiles (of medium range) for the strategic missile forces, and long-range bombers have been equipped with air-to-surface missiles permitting "standoff" attacks.[54]

Another step which would bolster the Soviet strategic posture, and which was held in abeyance under Khrushchev, relates to ABM deployment. Although the precise status of the Soviet ABM program is still a controversial question, a spate of reports in the Western press in 1966 referring to the start of ABM deployment around such cities as Leningrad and Moscow[55] suggests that the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership has decided to venture beyond Khrushchev's last position on this matter also.

A third fluid area of decision at the time of Khrushchev's political demise, in which the new regime seems to have firmed up its own mind, concerned the question of further over-all reduction of Soviet troop levels. Influenced no doubt by the Vietnam crisis, which argued against the wisdom of continuing Khrushchev's periodic program of unilateral troop cuts, the new regime quietly dropped the subject of further reductions after a February

1965 press conference at which Marshal Sokolovskii had aired the question.[56] Sokolovskii at that time said the over-all strength of the Soviet armed forces was 2.4 million men, the objective once set (in 1960) by Khrushchev. Subsequent Western estimates have put the number of Soviet troops under arms at slightly in excess of 3 million.[57]

A few more words should be said at this point about the bearing of the Vietnam conflict upon Soviet military activities under the new regime, a question upon which the strained state of Sino-Soviet relations also impinges. Although the present Soviet leadership has gradually increased its support of Hanoi's military effort during the past year-and-a-half, especially by furnishing SA-2 missiles and other air defense materiel,[58] it has not sanctioned the formal commitment of Soviet military forces to the war in Southeast Asia. Presumably, in the interest of avoiding a direct confrontation with the United States, the Soviet leaders would prefer to keep their military involvement limited to furnishing equipment, technical advice and training to Hanoi's soldiery, although they have spoken of permitting "volunteers" to participate,[59] which would be something less than formal intervention. Beyond experimenting with volunteers, even if they were to be employed on the scale once tried in the Spanish Civil War, the Soviet leadership's room for maneuver would seem to be constricted not only by the risk of major escalation, but by the fact that geography makes direct Soviet intervention difficult. Charges of Chinese refusal to cooperate in the overland shipment of Soviet aid to North Vietnam have pointed up this difficulty.[60]

With regard to China, the Soviet Union evidently has had to consider military problems potentially a good deal more serious than interference with shipments to Vietnam. Earlier this year, for example, the Soviet leadership reportedly felt obliged to castigate Peking for telling the Chinese people that "it is necessary to prepare themselves for a military struggle with the USSR."[61] Although an outright military collision between the two communist powers is perhaps only a remote possibility, the new Soviet regime has doubtless been obliged to reassess its military preparations with such a contingency in mind. In this connection, according to Peking's allegations, there has evidently been some redeployment of Soviet forces in the Asian regions bordering China.[62]

So far as Europe is concerned, however, neither the Vietnam conflict nor friction with China seems to have counseled any significant redisposition of Soviet military power deployed against NATO Europe. To be sure, there have been recurrent rumors in recent months that Soviet forces in East Germany might be reduced, perhaps in connection with internal rearrangement of Warsaw Pact affairs.[63] Thus far, however, such moves have not materialized, and no evident Soviet interest has been shown in impromptu hints from some Western officials that the times might be propitious to consider the idea of reciprocal troop withdrawals.[64] For the Soviet leaders to take up this idea, of course, would be to leave themselves vulnerable to Chinese allegations of "collusion" with the United States to ease the European situation and permit the transfer of American troops to Vietnam.[65]

Sensitivity to Chinese criticism, however, has probably no more than an incidental bearing on Soviet military deployments in Europe. The main factor seems to be that despite the demands of the war in Vietnam and the Soviet Union's increasing stake in Asian affairs generally, priority still applies to maintaining the Soviet Union's European power position and its ability to deal with the political and military problems of Europe, not the least of which, in Soviet eyes, is that of keeping a resurgent Germany in check. Indeed, the present Soviet leaders have kept their sights fixed in this direction. As one of these leaders, Aleksandr Shelepin, took pains to point out during a visit to Hanoi in January 1966, by way of suggesting to the North Vietnamese that they should rely mainly on their own resources to oppose the United States, the Soviet Union must continue to bear in mind its own "heavy commitments" in Europe.[66]

Soviet Thinking on the Likelihood and Nature of War In Europe

Under both past and present Soviet regimes, the Soviet Union's military preparations have necessarily been influenced to an important degree by the views of its leaders on the likelihood and nature of a major war -- a war which, by Soviet definition, would involve a clash of the rival military coalitions confronting each other in Europe. Let us, therefore, look briefly at Soviet thinking on these questions.

In Khrushchev's time, despite periodic airing of tendentious charges that the West was preparing a

"preventive" war against the Soviet camp, the Soviet leadership apparently came around to the view that there was little danger of a deliberate Western attack on the Soviet Union, short of extreme provocation which it was the business of Soviet "peaceful coexistence" policy to avoid.[67] The question whether Khrushchev himself was "adventuristically" inclined to risk war represents the other side of the coin. His behavior, with the possible exception of certain stages in the development of the Berlin and Cuban crises, argues that he was basically cautious, although a more ominous picture of his intentions has sometimes been painted.[68]

Since the present regime came to power, there has been a growing tendency to re-evaluate the danger of war. It has taken several forms. One has been the appearance, especially in the military press, of criticism aimed at the propensity during the Khrushchev period to over-emphasize the possibility of preventing war while down-grading the possibility of the outbreak of a new war.[69] Another has been revival of theoretical argument that war has not outlived itself as an instrument of politics, and that it would be politically damaging to succumb to the doctrine that "victory in nuclear war is impossible" -- a doctrine which spokesmen of the Khrushchev period, like General N. Talenskii, are accused of having promulgated.[70] As the Vietnam situation grew progressively more tense in 1965-66, both military and political commentary in the Soviet press took up the theme that the "aggressive character of imperialism" is increasing, making it the "most important duty" of the Soviet party and other Marxist-Leninist parties "not to permit an under-evaluation of the

danger of war."[71] The new leaders themselves have periodically expressed concern that the danger of a major new war has increased in light of the international situation.[72]

The critical question, however, is what distinction should be made between Soviet declaratory utterances on the likelihood of war -- which serve various purposes of internal argument and external propaganda -- and the private convictions of the leadership. The present writer would be inclined to believe that the incumbent Soviet leadership still considers a major war between the rival systems to be unlikely -- if not thanks to benign Western intentions, then because of a combination of Soviet deterrent military power and the political forces generally described as the "world peace movement." A qualification should probably be added with regard to Soviet concern that a local war, such as Vietnam, might get out of control, or that the policy of a resurgent Germany might one day draw the United States and the Soviet Union into war. In the latter case, especially, the Soviet leadership appears to labor under a fixation which generates fears that go beyond what a rational calculus of the German military potential in the nuclear-age world would justify. The constancy of this concern, expressed in the dogma of West German "revanchism," rather than any concrete alarm about the likely outbreak of war, seems to have been the common denominator upon which each postwar generation of Soviet leaders has based its determination to prepare the Soviet Union for a possible war in Europe.

Turning now to Soviet thinking on the character of such a war, and the concepts which accordingly should guide the preparations of the Soviet armed forces, several

points stand out in the trends of the past few years. First, one should perhaps note the inherent dilemma, still essentially unresolved since the strategic debate of the Khrushchev era,[73] which arises from an awkward gap between Soviet military conceptions of theater warfare in Europe and the criteria which have of necessity informed the judgment of the political leadership.

The central conception common to Soviet military theory has been that a war in Europe would be fought within the framework of a general war, a conflict likely to commence with, or quickly escalate into, large-scale strategic and tactical nuclear exchanges by both sides. A detailed doctrine has been laid down for conducting the European theater phase of such a war, which we shall touch upon in a moment. However, nowhere in the body of Soviet military theory is an answer proposed to the problem of isolating a European war from the larger external strategic context in which it is presumed to take place.

On the other hand, it is precisely this problem which requires an answer if the criteria of the political leadership are to be met for a strategy for the conquest of Europe, or even for lesser objectives in Europe through military action. Only if the Soviet leadership were to become convinced that the United States would not honor its commitment to employ its full external war-making capacity in the defense of the NATO countries could the Kremlin calculate with assurance that a war, once started, would remain confined to Europe. In an important sense, therefore, European security rests upon this Soviet dilemma. Putting it another way, although the Soviet leaders may continue to hold Europe hostage by virtue of the military

power at their disposal, their own country and its vital resources are in turn hostages to Western strategic power.

With respect to the waging of theater warfare itself, Soviet theater doctrine as it has evolved in the past few years emphasizes the need for prompt seizure of the initiative and rapid offensive exploitation, in contrast with Stalin's improvised World War II formula of strategic defense followed by a deliberate counteroffensive buildup. The principles adopted for the survival of Soviet theater forces under nuclear conditions are essentially the same as those prescribed for rapid defeat of the enemy -- surprise, a continuous offensive developing rapidly throughout the depth of the theater, and presentation of only dispersed, fast-moving targets by mobile tank, motorized rifle and airborne units.[74] These requirements have placed a high premium upon development of an effective command and control system, in which various shortcomings have been indicated by Soviet professional commentary with respect to both personnel and equipment.[75]

In light of the emphasis within NATO since the early sixties upon a strategy of "flexible response" designed to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe, which in turn poses the critical question of a possible Soviet re-assessment of the risk of nuclear warfare being touched off by a military engagement in Europe, great interest attaches to precisely what tendencies have been shown in Soviet thinking to upgrade the possibility of non-nuclear operations on a substantial scale.

Some signs that a shift in Soviet thinking might be taking place began to appear before Khrushchev's ouster in the form of professional statements on the need to

improve theater capabilities for either nuclear or conventional operations.[76] Under the new regime, there have been further indications of a doctrinal reappraisal of the possibility of nonnuclear theater warfare, the implication being that the theater forces must be better prepared for situations in which it might not be expedient to bring Soviet nuclear power to bear. Marshals Rotmistrov and Malinovskii, for example, have suggested that hostilities might not automatically involve use of nuclear weapons. The latter, in September 1965, slipped an interesting four-word proviso into some remarks directed mainly toward the problems of nuclear warfare when he said: "Success not only in battle but in war as a whole will depend on nuclear-missile weapons -- if they are used."[77]

Other military spokesmen have commented that Soviet military doctrine does not "exclude" the possibility of nonnuclear warfare or of warfare limited to tactical nuclear weapons "within the framework of so-called 'local' wars."[78] One Soviet theorist, General N. Lomov, linked this point specifically with "the American strategy of 'flexible response'." As this strategy attests, Lomov wrote in November 1965, local wars "can take place even in Europe." Such wars, he said, "are fought as a rule with conventional arms, though this does not exclude the possibility of employing tactical nuclear weapons."[79]

It should be observed, however, that Soviet professional military opinion has by no means swung in unison away from previously held views on the improbability of purely conventional or limited tactical nuclear operations in Europe. Writing in August 1965, for example, a military commentator, General V. Zemskov, discussed the notion of "waging a local

nuclear war" in the European theater with these words: "It is obvious that a war in Europe, which is saturated with nuclear weapons and missiles, would immediately assume the broadest dimensions."[80] An article jointly authored in the spring of 1966 by Marshal Sokolovskii and a colleague also illustrated that the doctrinal re-appraisal sought by such "traditionalist"-minded leaders as Marshal Rotmistrov was not going undisputed.[81] The article offered a strong defense of the "modernist" position, emphasizing the decisive importance of strategic nuclear weapons in modern war and restating the same author's earlier (August 1964) argument that a nuclear war would "inevitably" be short.[82] The article made only passing mention of the possibility of nonnuclear warfare, and stressed that the responsibility of Soviet strategy is to properly plan for the use "above all of missile-nuclear weapons as the main means of warfare."

More to the point perhaps than this evidence of divided military opinion, there has been no advocacy of doctrinal reappraisal from the political side of the house. To date, no high-echelon political leaders have chosen to challenge Khrushchev's frequently-voiced conviction that if war should break out in Europe, neither side can be expected "to concede defeat before resorting to the use of all weapons, even the most devastating ones."[83] Again, however, one must bear in mind that Soviet declaratory positions do not necessarily tell the whole story. Expressions concerning the dubious prospects for limitation of a European war, intended partly for deterrent effect, may be subject to change under various contingent conditions. Should the private views of the Soviet leadership

come to admit a higher expectation that war on a European scale might be conducted on a nonnuclear basis -- and in this connection the example of an intensified conflict in Vietnam without nuclear escalation may influence Soviet thinking -- then a number of basic considerations affecting Soviet policy would doubtless arise.

The prospect of reduced risk of a nuclear confrontation in Europe, for example, might well dispel some of the caution which has strongly colored the Soviet outlook upon military conflict in this region. This, in turn, could call for reassessment by the Soviet leadership of its political stance toward Europe, leading perhaps to the belief that stepped-up pressure for solution of outstanding problems could be more safely applied than hitherto.

Evolving Character of the Warsaw Pact

Among the factors affecting development of the Soviet military posture toward Europe, the Soviet Union's military relations with its Warsaw Pact partners in Eastern Europe have taken on increasing importance in the past decade. As we noted earlier, Stalin laid the groundwork for rebuilding the East European armed forces during the last few years of his life, and the Warsaw Pact military alliance itself was formally created under Khrushchev in May 1955. For most of its first five years, however, the Warsaw Pact appeared to be mainly a Soviet political answer to the inclusion of West Germany in NATO, rather than a serious effort to integrate the military activities of the Eastern bloc countries and to draw upon their military potential.[84]

In this period, when the path to closer military cooperation between the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact partners was hardly smoothed by crushing of the Hungarian rebellion and the events in Poland in 1956, the East European armed forces were largely left to mark time. Except for Soviet help to further improve local air defenses, little was done to raise the military potential of these forces, which in fact were reduced in over-all strength by about one-third from the level of 1,500,000 to which they had been built in the Stalinist period.[85]

Beginning around 1960, however, a distinct change took place in Soviet policy toward the Warsaw Pact, marked by fresh efforts to strengthen the collective efficiency of the Pact forces. Programs were undertaken to reequip the East European forces up to Soviet standards, to establish integrated command arrangements for conducting joint warfare in the European theater, and numerous joint field exercises were held.[86] Many of these exercises included joint operations under simulated nuclear conditions, in keeping with a new Soviet policy inaugurated around 1964 of furnishing potential nuclear delivery systems to the East European countries in the form of tactical missiles with ranges up to 150 miles.[87] Although nuclear warheads for these missiles presumably have been kept in Soviet hands, the acquisition of delivery systems together with nuclear training activities represented significant steps toward possible nuclear-sharing in the future, and gave Soviet diplomacy a standby countermeasure to any moves NATO might make to adopt the MLF or other nuclear-sharing schemes.

The measures taken in the early sixties to make the Warsaw Pact a more meaningful multilateral instrument not only had the political purpose of promoting greater cohesion within the Pact in the face of growing "polycentric" tendencies in East Europe,[88] but also provided Khrushchev with a useful rationale for his efforts to reduce the Soviet Union's own theater forces, on the grounds that a larger share of the military burdens and costs could be borne by the East European allies. The theater-forces "lobby" among the Soviet marshals seems not to have embraced this rationale with enthusiasm, for it obviously cut into their own vested interests. On the other hand, however, some Soviet military professionals had evidenced concern about the ability of the Soviet Union, in the event of war, to mobilize and deploy large-scale reinforcements to Europe under nuclear conditions.[89] This problem could not be solved by a massive advance buildup of Soviet forces in East Europe without serious political complications, not to mention the economic burden of maintaining such forces over a long period. There was, therefore, a solid professional argument to be made for greater reliance on the Warsaw Pact forces already "normally" in place in the European theater.

Under Khrushchev's successors, the main lines of Soviet policy towards the Warsaw Pact have remained essentially unchanged. In particular, the process of joint training and modernization of the East European forces, commensurate with their enlarged responsibilities, has gone forward. Today these forces total over 900,000 men, organized in some 60 divisions, of which about half are at combat strength and readiness, according to Western

estimates.[90] Poland, with ground forces of about 15 divisions and the largest air force in East Europe (nearly 1,000 aircraft), has emerged with the strongest national armed forces among the non-Soviet Pact members, followed by Czechoslovakia with an army of 14 divisions and an air force a bit smaller than that of Poland. The East German armed forces, while smaller than those of the other Pact countries and mustering only six divisions, are among the best-equipped and have often received new items of ground armament and aircraft from the Soviet Union before the others.[91] Four of the East European countries have naval forces, those of Poland again the largest. Taken together with the Soviet forces deployed in East Europe -- which consist of 20 divisions in East Germany, four in Hungary and two in Poland, plus sizeable tactical air elements and tactical missile units -- the aggregate Warsaw Pact forces in Europe today represent a rather impressive military potential.

From the Soviet viewpoint, however, the fruits of the new policy course toward the Warsaw Pact have not been entirely sweet. While the military efficiency and capability for joint action of the East European components undoubtedly have been improved, the political aim of tightening bloc unity and cohesion through military integration seems to have gone awry, just as it did when the same end was sought through economic integration plans under CEMA.[92] Instead of being bound closer to Soviet policy interests, the East European regimes have tended to press for a more influential voice in Pact matters affecting their own interests, such as the sharing of economic and military burdens, and the formulation of alliance strategy.

In the fall of 1965, Khrushchev's successors responded to pressure from East European leaders for Warsaw Pact reforms by recognizing the need for reorganization to deal with "urgent problems."[93] At a series of meetings in the first months of 1966, leading up to the eighth session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in Bucharest in July, efforts were apparently made to meet the problem of reorganization, and especially to handle Rumanian objections to prevailing Pact arrangements.[94] Rumania, which had been the first to jump the traces in the economic field, also took the lead in challenging Soviet control of military affairs. It was widely reported that in addition to their earlier footdragging and expressions of dislike for military pacts in general, the Rumanians had now refused to share the costs of supporting Soviet forces in East Europe and were proposing such radical measures as removal of these forces except from Germany, rotation of Pact command to non-Soviet officers, and consultation on any use of nuclear weapons.[95]

This flurry of intra-Pact meetings, parallel in time and perhaps in spirit to the impact on the Western alliance of de Gaulle's renunciation of military arrangements within NATO, apparently led to no resolution of the vexed issues. No announcement of a Warsaw Pact reorganization was forthcoming, although declarations were issued at the Pact session in Bucharest proposing East-West talks on collective security in Europe, as well as offering "volunteers" for Vietnam, where U.S. policy was condemned.[96]

One thing pointed up by these apparently abortive efforts to settle the Pact's internal difficulties was the increasing regional differentiation within the Warsaw

alliance. The "northern tier" of countries -- Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union -- already identified as the "first strategic echelon" of the Pact, now seemed set even further apart from the southern group: Hungary, Bulgaria, and especially Rumania. Indeed, the fact that only military leaders of the northern quartet, including a powerful contingent of top Soviet marshals, met in East Berlin in June, gave rise to speculation that measures were afoot to formalize a special relationship amongst this group.[97]

Both military and political considerations seem to account for the emergence of regionalism within the bloc. The territory of the three East European members of the northern tier lies directly in line with what in wartime would be the main axis of a Central European campaign. These countries are also most immediately affected by the German question. In Soviet eyes, their adherence to Moscow's interests may seem more certain that that of other Pact members by virtue of their concern over the so-called "German threat." The GDR and Poland, however, may well differ on the terms of any future settlement of the German problem.

Growing evidence of the sort cited briefly here certainly suggests that the Warsaw Pact is evolving into an alliance beset with the familiar interplay of coalition politics, rather than a compliant instrument of Soviet policy. It would be wrong, however, to jump from this to the conclusion that the Soviet Union had ceased to exercise a predominant role in the affairs of the Warsaw bloc. The residual animosities of the Cold War, skillful Soviet play upon East European fears of a resurgent Germany,

and above all, the Soviet military presence in East Europe, continue to place limits on the ability of the Warsaw Pact countries to shape their own policies independent of Soviet interests.

For Western Europe, this seems to mean that it would be premature to count upon dissolution of the Warsaw alliance as the happy answer to the problem of European security, however comforting it may be to witness the ferment within the Warsaw Pact at a juncture when the Western alliance is experiencing its own internal difficulties. The notion that a time of troubles within the opposing alliance systems has cancelled out the reasons for their existence seems to be an easy way of sweeping the real problems under the rug.

NATO's existence has rested essentially upon the need to insure that Soviet military power would not be used against Europe. It has met this need thus far; indeed, the prospect that Soviet military power might be so employed seems to have steadily diminished during NATO's lifetime. Paradoxically, however, even as the threat of its use against Europe has declined, Soviet military power itself has grown. The Warsaw Pact military potential today is greater than when the Soviet Union alone shouldered the military responsibilities of the Eastern bloc. Therefore, until the basic issues which underlie the division of Europe and which gave rise in the first place to steps for the common defense of the West are brought closer to political settlement, it would seem that Europe's security will continue to call for collaborative measures to insure that the threat of Soviet military power remains immobilized.

NOTES

1. Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, trans. Michael B. Petrovich, Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., New York, 1962, p. 114.

2. According to figures given retrospectively by Khrushchev in January 1960, Soviet forces, not including security troops, had been reduced by 1948 to 2,874,000 men from a wartime peak of more than 12,000,000. Western estimates have put the over-all size of the Soviet armed forces at around 4,000,000 or more in the 1947-48 period.

3. McGeorge Bundy, "The Test of Yalta," Foreign Affairs, July 1949, p. 618.

4. For useful discussions of this turning point period in the postwar evolution of U.S. and Soviet policy in Europe, see: Marshall D. Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, pp. 13-51, 255-259; Louis J. Halle, "The Turning Point," Survey, January 1966, pp. 168-176.

5. See, for example, Survival in the Air Age, Report by the President's Air Policy Commission, Washington, D. C., January 1948, p. 12.

6. Shulman, op. cit., pp. 80-104; J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1962, pp. 64-65; Robert D. Warth, Soviet Russia in World Politics, Twayne Publishers, Inc., New York, 1963, pp. 403-408.

7. See Malcolm Mackintosh, "Disarmament and Soviet Policy," in Louis Henkin, ed., Arms Control, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1961, pp. 143-144.

8. See Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1964, pp. 232-233.

9. The first major reorganization of the postwar Soviet forces was undertaken in 1948. This program served to reconstitute the forces organizationally after the prior period of demobilization had left them still basically equipped with World War II materiel. It was followed by a second major round of programs beginning in 1951-52 which not only included further organizational changes but also the introduction of new equipment of postwar design. It is this second major phase of postwar reorganization that is referred to here.

10. Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, "Statement on Current Soviet Military Capability," April 20, 1964. Text in U.S. News and World Report, June 4, 1954, p. 45.

11. Montgomery, loc. cit., p. 45; see also Drew Middleton, The Defense of Western Europe, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1952, pp. 34, 61.

12. Robert A. Kilmarx, A History of Soviet Air Power, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1962, pp. 252-253. The nicknames for Soviet aircraft such as "Bison," "Bear," "Badger" derive from a descriptive system of identification adopted by NATO, and are not employed by the Soviets themselves.

13. The aircraft with which these initial delivery forces were mainly equipped -- IL-28 jet light bombers in tactical aviation units; TU-4 piston medium bombers copied after the U.S. B-29 and later TU-16 "Badger" jet medium bombers in long-range aviation units -- were best suited, in view of their range limitations, to bring nuclear firepower to bear against Europe and overseas U.S. bases around the Eurasian periphery.

14. Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Military Establishment," East Europe, September 1965, pp. 2-12; The Soviet Takeover of Eastern Europe, Center for International Studies, Cambridge, Mass., 1954, especially Chapter VI.

15. E. Hinterhoff, "The Military Potential of the Warsaw Pact," East and West, Vol. II, No. 7, 1956, p. 22.

16. Garthoff, East Europe, September 1965, p. 13; J. M. Mackintosh, "The Satellite Armies," in B. H. Liddell Hart, ed., The Soviet Army, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1956, pp. 441-448.

17. Wilhelm Hadeler, "The Ships of the Soviet Navy," in M. G. Saunders, ed., The Soviet Navy, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1958, pp. 143, 159; Jane's Fighting Ships 1953-1954, London, p. 312.

18. David Woodward, The Russians At Sea: A History of the Russian Navy, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1966, pp. 227-229.

19. Woodward, op. cit., p. 205; Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publisher, New York, 1958, p. 202.

20. Asher Lee, "Strategic Air Defence," in Lee, ed., The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1959, pp. 117-122.

21. Kilmarx, op. cit., pp. 227-230; Marshal Montgomery, U.S. News and World Report, June 4, 1954, p. 45.

22. Lee, in the Soviet Air and Rocket Forces, pp. 120-122.

23. These proposals came first at the Berlin conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers in January-February 1954, and were variously modified, including at one point a Soviet offer to join NATO, in March, October and November 1964. See Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 78, 85; Warth, op. cit., pp. 424, 427.

24. The last notable attempts to reach a peace treaty settlement under Stalin had been in June 1949 (at the sixth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers) and in March 1952, when a Soviet proposal was made dropping previous insistence on a totally disarmed Germany, and offering the prospect of unification in return for neutralization and foreign troop withdrawal. There has been considerable controversy over the seriousness of this proposal, but it has sometimes been represented as a missed opportunity to reunify Germany. See Shulman, op. cit., pp. 191-194.

25. For two quite different commentaries on this successful effort to surmount French failure to ratify the EDC, see: Timothy W. Stanley, NATO in Transition: The Future of the Atlantic Alliance, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1965, pp. 48-50 and Richard J. Barnet and Marcus G. Raskin, After 20 Years: Alternatives to the Cold War in Europe, Random House, New York, 1965, pp. 34-35.

26. See William Lloyd Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria, Siegler and Co., Bonn, undated, circa 1960, pp. 162-163.

27. Ibid., p. 165.

28. Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1949, Vol. I, Department of State, Washington, D. C., 1960, pp. 630-639, Vol. II, p. 780; Joseph Nogee, "The Diplomacy of Disarmament," International Conciliation, January 1960, pp. 256-257; Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, pp. 233-244.

29. For a detailed treatment of Khrushchev's efforts to exploit Soviet technology for political purposes, see Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1966, especially pp. 35-103.

30. For a penetrating study of the crisis precipitated by Khrushchev's speech of November 10, 1958, see Hans Speier, Divided Berlin: The Anatomy of Soviet Political Blackmail, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1961.

31. Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 268, footnote 6.

32. See H. S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union, rev. ed., Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1962, pp. 4-63.

33. Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii et al., Voennaia Strategiia (Military Strategy), 2nd ed., Voenizdat, Moscow, 1963, p. 367.

34. Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, pp. 30-37, passim. See also Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy: A Historical Analysis, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1966, pp. 45-62.

35. Pravda, January 15, 1960.

36. According to Soviet claims, the troop reductions initiated under Khrushchev in 1955 resulted over the next 1½ years in a cut of 1.8 million from the 1955 level of 5.7 million. An additional cut of 300,000, bringing the total down to 3.6 million by 1960, was made in the 1958-59 period, according to Khrushchev's figures. The third reduction program under Khrushchev, announced in January 1960 was intended to reduce the manpower level from 3.6 million to 2.4 over the next couple of years, but it was suspended during the Berlin Crisis of 1961 when only about half of the projected 1.2 million cut had been made. Khrushchev's last reduction proposal was aired in December 1963; no figures were given, but presumably the objective was to resume the interrupted program of January 1960, aiming at 2.4 million. For further discussion of this issue under Khrushchev's successors, see infra, pp. 26-27.

With respect to thinning out of the theater forces deployed in Europe, no aggregate Soviet figures were ever given on how many troops were withdrawn from Eastern Europe as a result of the Khrushchev reduction programs. Piecemeal

Soviet statements on withdrawals which were to be made in 1955 and 1958 add up only to around 80,000 -- not a very impressive dent in the estimated strength of more than 500,000 troops deployed in Eastern Europe at the beginning of Khrushchev's tenure. (See Documents on Disarmament, Vol. I, p. 638; TASS report, Pravda, January 7, 1958; Khrushchev speech at Warsaw Pact meeting, Pravda, May 27, 1958.) Currently estimated Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, as given in the Western press, come to about 480,000). (See The New York Times, May 17, June 12, 19, 1966.)

37. Pravda, October 25, 1961.

38. See the present author's Trends in Soviet Thinking on Theater Warfare, Conventional Operations, and Limited War, RM-4305-PR, The RAND Corporation, December 1964, pp. 41-48.

39. Marshal Malinovskii, Pravda, October 25, 1961.

40. The Military Balance: 1963-1964, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, November 1963, p. 34. The Western advantage in heavy bomber forces was more than 3-1 and that in submarine-launched ballistic missiles more than 2-1, with the rate of Polaris buildup considerably greater than in the comparable Soviet category.

41. Ibid., p. 3.

42. Kilmarx, op. cit., pp. 262-267; Lee, in The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces, pp. 124-129.

43. Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii, et al., Soviet Military Strategy, 1st ed., translated with Analytical Introduction and Annotation by H. S. Dinerstein, L. Gouré and T. W. Wolfe of The RAND Corporation, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963, p. 345.

44. The Military Balance: 1963-1964, p. 6.

45. Ibid., p. 7; Woodward, op. cit., p. 230. Among the comparative shortcomings of the Soviet missile-launching submarines, one may note that they carry less than five missiles compared with 16 by the Polaris, and that only some of them can fire their missiles while submerged.

46. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 185.

47. Wolfe, Trends in Soviet Thinking on Theater Warfare . . . , pp. 99-105.

48. See, for example, Marshal P. Rotmistrov in Kommunist, No. 4, March 1965, p. 21; Colonel I. Sidel'nikov, Krasnaia Zvezda, September 22, 1965. See also infra, pp. 33-34.

49. Pravda, December 8, 1965.

50. This is suggested by Kosygin's remarks at the 23rd Party Congress that defense allocation in light of the international situation prevented "corresponding" increases of substantial scale in economic investment. The announced military budget increase of 500 million rubles does not in itself appear to qualify as a "substantial" impediment to other investment, leaving the inference that actual military increases may have been larger than announced.

51. The published appropriation for scientific research in 1966 was 6.5 billion rubles, compared with 5.2 billion in 1964, Khrushchev's last year.

52. See the present author's The Soviet Military Scene: Institutional and Defense Policy Considerations, RM-4913-PR, The RAND Corporation, June 1966, pp. 96-97.

53. The New York Times, June 9, July 14, 1966; Technology Week, June 13, 1966, p. 8.

54. Krasnaia Zvezda, April 2, 1966.

55. See, for example, Missiles and Rockets, April 4, 1966, p. 7, May 2, 1966, p. 12; Technology Week, June 20, 1966, p. 16; The New York Times, April 23, May 11, June 26, 1966; The Washington Post, April 21, 1966.

56. For a discussion of the Sokolovskii press conference and its bearing on the troop reduction issue, see the present author's "Military Policy: A Soviet Dilemma," Current History, October 1965, pp. 205-206.

57. The Military Balance: 1965-1966, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, November 1965, p. 2.

58. The New York Times, April 14, 25, 1966. See also Wolfe, Soviet Military Scene, pp. 111-114.

59. Brezhnev spoke of prospective "volunteers" as early as March 1965 (Pravda, March 24, 1965) and they were mentioned several other times prior to the Warsaw Pact offer of volunteers, "if requested," in July 1966.

60. The Washington Post, December 23, 1965, March 22, 1966.

61. The New York Times, March 20, 24, 1966.

62. See remarks on this question to a group of Scandinavian journalists by Chinese Deputy Premier Chen Yi, The New York Times, July 21, 1966.

63. According to some of these rumors, stimulated by the attendance of many high-ranking Soviet officers at a meeting in East Berlin in early June, the Soviet Union was thinking of withdrawing five of its 20 divisions in the GDR. The Washington Post, June 16, 1966.

64. See comment by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara during testimony before the Senate subcommittee on national security on June 21, 1966. The Washington Post, June 22, 1966.

65. Peking Review, No. 8, February 18, 1966, p. 10.

66. Pravda, January 10, 1966.

67. Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, pp. 115-117.

68. For example, in the controversial Penkovskiy Papers, Doubleday, New York, 1965, especially pp. 212-216, 243-258.

69. The opening of this criticism came with an article by Major General K. Bochkarev and Colonel I. Sidel'nikov in Krasnaia Zvezda, January 21, 1965.

70. Two of the most comprehensive attacks on the "fatalistic doctrine" that nuclear weapons have invalidated war as an instrument of politics and made victory impossible were by Lt. Colonel E. Rybkin in Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces), No. 17, September 1965, pp. 50-56 and Colonel I. Grudinin in Krasnaia Zvezda, July 31, 1966. See Soviet Military Scene, pp. 90-95.

71. General P. Kurochkin in Krasnaia Zvezda, July 9, 1965; Fedor Burlatski, in Pravda, June 24, 1965.

72. See, for example, Brezhnev speeches, Pravda, September 11, 1965, March 30, 1966; Suslov speech, Pravda, October 31, 1965; Kosygin speech, Krasnaia Zvezda, July 1, 1965, and his interview with James Reston, The New York Times, December 8, 1965.

73. See previous discussion, supra, pp. 17-19.

74. A more detailed examination of Soviet theater warfare doctrine, with documentation, may be found in Trends in Soviet Thinking on Theater Warfare . . . , pp. 17-40.

75. Ibid., p. 27.

76. Ibid., pp. 41-48.

77. Radio Volga broadcast, September 8, 1965.

78. Colonel General S. Shtemenko, Nedelia, No. 6, January 31-February 6, 1965.

79. Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 21, November 1965, pp. 16, 18.

80. Krasnaia Zvezda, August 3, 1965.

81. Marshal V. Sokolovskii and General M. Cherednichenko, in Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 7, April 1966, pp. 59-66.

82. Krasnaia Zvezda, August 25, 28, 1964.

83. Pravda, March 8, 1961. See also Khrushchev's later comment to Lord Thompson, The Sunday Times, London, August 16, 1964.

84. See the present author's "The Warsaw Pact in Evolution," The World Today, May 1966, pp. 191-192. For more detailed treatment of the same subject with documentation, see also the author's The Evolving Nature of the Warsaw Pact, RM-4835-PR, The RAND Corporation, December 1965.

85. Documentation on the East European troop cuts from 1955-60 may be found in The Evolving Nature of the Warsaw Pact, p. 35, footnote 25.

86. Ibid., pp. 7-9.

87. Ibid., p. 10; Garthoff, in East Europe, September 1965, p. 14.

88. On the "polycentric" trend in East Europe, see, among others: Richard V. Burks, "Perspectives for Eastern Europe," Problems of Communism, March-April 1964, pp. 73-81; John M. Montias, "Communist Rule in Eastern Europe," Foreign Affairs, January 1965, pp. 331-348; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1965, pp. 1-48.

89. Voennaia Strategiia, 2nd ed., p. 417; Major General V. Reznichenko and Colonel A. Sidorenko, Krasnaia Zvezda, February 12, 1964.

90. The Military Balance: 1965-1966, pp. 6-8; Garthoff, East Europe, September 1965, p. 14.

91. The Evolving Nature of the Warsaw Pact, p. 9. For more detailed breakdown by country, see The Military Balance: 1965-1966, pp. 6-8.

92. See Richard F. Staar, in Current History, October 1963, p. 215; Theodore Shabad, The New York Times, September 17, 1965; Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 13.

93. See Brezhnev remarks, Pravda, September 30, 1965.

94. Besides the top-level Political Consultative Committee session in July, these meetings included a conference of Pact defense ministers in Moscow in May, a foreign ministers' meeting in Moscow in June, and a gathering of military leaders of the four "northern tier" Pact countries in East Berlin in June, plus a notable exchange of public declarations by Brezhnev and Ceausescu in Rumania in May. See The New York Times, June 7, 12, 13, 18, and July 7, 1966.

95. For a sampling of these reports see The Washington Post, May 17; The New York Times, May 17, 18, 19 and June 12, 1966. It should be noted that sifting of fact from rumor in many of these reports, which were based largely on leaks from Rumanian officials, is difficult.

96. The New York Times, July 7, 9, 1966; The Washington Post, July 8, 1966.

97. The New York Times, June 13; The Washington Post, June 13, 1966.