The Institute for Strategic Studies.Eighth Annual Conference.Vienna,2 X 66.

1) - Programma.
2) - Committee I :The place of East and West Europe in a changing world.(P.Quaroni).
3) - " :Prospects and limits of East-West relations (J.Laloy).
4) - Committee II :The changing role of military alliance and new requirements for secutity in Europe (Beaufre).
5) - " :The role of Great Britain in European security (P.Kirk).
6) - " :Small Countries and European security (A.Snejdarek).
7) - CommitteeIII :The future of Germany in a changing Eoropean context (H.Schmidt).
8) - " : Germany and European security.A polish view (M.Tomala).
9) - CommitteeIV : China and the evolution of the alliance in Europe (R.Lowenthal).
10) - " : Non-allignment and East-West relations (L.Mates).
11) -

PROGRAMME

Friday, September 30th

4.30 p.m. – 6.00 p.m.	Conference assembles, Palais Palffy
6.00 p.m.	Opening of the Conference
6.15 p.m.	*The Future of East-West Relations*— Dr. Josef Klaus
7.15 p.m.	Reception by the Austrian Chancellor, Ballhausplatz
9.00 p.m. – 10.15 p.m.	*The Soviet Union and the Future of Europe*— Acad. V. M. Khvostov

Saturday, October 1st

9.30 a.m. – 10.45 a.m.	*The United States and European Security*— Prof. Carl Kaysen
10.45 a.m.	Coffee
11.15 a.m. – 12.30 p.m.	*Western European Integration and East-West Relations*—Rt. Hon. Edward Heath
1.00 p.m.	Lunch at the Rathauskeller
2.30 p.m. – 6.00 p.m.	Committee Discussions; see details below (Tea at 4.00 p.m.)
7.30 p.m.	Dinner at the Hotel Intercontinental (for those not attending the Opera)
10.00 p.m.	Dinner at the Hotel Intercontinental (for those attending the Opera)

Sunday, October 2nd

9.30 a.m. – 12.30 p.m.	Committee Discussions; see details below (Coffee at 11.00 a.m.)
1.00 p.m.	Lunch at the Hotel Intercontinental
2.30 p.m. – 5.30 p.m.	Committee Discussions; see details below (Tea at 4.00 p.m.)
5.30 p.m. – 6.00 p.m.	Concluding Plenary Session
6.00 p.m.	Conference closes

Committee Discussions

	Saturday	*Sunday*	
	2.30 p.m. – 6.00 p.m.	9.30 a.m. – 12.30 p.m.	2.30 p.m. – 5.30 p.m.
Committee I *Chairman:* Mr. John Holmes	**Europe in a Changing World** *The Place of East and West Europe in a Changing World*— Sr. Pietro Quaroni	*Alternatives to Partition in Europe*— Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski	*Prospects and Limits of East-West Relations*— M. Jean Laloy
Committee II *Chairman:* Dr. Karl Birnbaum	**Military Alliances and European Security** *Small Countries and European Security*— Prof. Antonin Snejdarek	*The Changing Role of Military Alliances in Europe*— Paper by Gen. André Beaufre	*The Role of Great Britain in European Security*— Mr. Peter Kirk
Committee III *Chairman:* Mr. John Heldring	**Germany and European Security** *Germany and European Security: A Polish View*— Dr. Mieczyslaw Tomala	*The Future of Germany in a Changing European Context*— Herr Helmut Schmidt	*The Security of Germany and the Security of Europe*— Prof. Henry Kissinger
Committee IV *Chairman:* Prof. Jacques Vernant	**The Interest of the Great Powers in Europe** *China and the Evolution of the Alliances in Europe*— Prof. Richard Lowenthal	*Europe and the Great Powers*— Dr. Bruno Pittermann	*Non-Alignment and East-West Relations*— Mr. Leo Mates

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Palais Palffy, Vienna

September 30th—October 2nd, 1966

"Western and Eastern Europe: The Changing Relationship"

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Rt. Hon. Edward Heath (Britain)

Leader of the Conservative Party since July 1965. Member of Parliament for Bexley.

Educated at Balliol College, Oxford. Served in Royal Artillery 1939-46: Lt. Colonel. Minister of Labour, October 1959 - July 1960. Lord Privy Seal, with Foriegn Office responsibilities 1960 - 1963. Secretary of State for Industry, Trade, Regional Development and President of the Board of Trade, 1963-64.

Author of "One Nation - a Tory approach to social problems", 1950.

Carl Kaysen (USA)

Director, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton.

Educated at the Universities of Columbia and Harvard; Professor of economics, Harvard University 1957-61; Deputy Special Assistant to President Kennedy for National Security Affairs 1961-63; Littauer Professor of Political Economy, Harvard 1963-66.

Vladimir M. Khvostov (USSR)

Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Director, Institute of History.

Head of Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1945-57; Chair of International Relations, Academy of Social Sciences, Central Committee of the CPSU, 1946-54; corresponding member, Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union, 1953-64.

Author of "Sorok let borby za mir" Forty years of struggle for Peace, 1958; Co-author 1st and 2nd Vols. "Istoriya diplomatii" A History of Diplomacy; The Causes of World War II, 1959; and History of the CPSU. A Textbook, 1959.

*** *** *** *** *** *** ***

General André Beaufre (France)

Director, Institut Francais d'Etudes Stratégiques, Paris.

After World War II Deputy to Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny in Indo-China; Commander of the French forces in Suez, 1956; Deputy Chief of Staff, SHAPE, 1958; French representative on NATO Standing Group in Washington.

Author of "Introduction à la Stratégie", 1964, Introduction to Strategy; "Dissuasion et Stratégie", 1964, Deterrence and Strategy, 1965; "L'OTAN et l'Europe", 1966.

Zbigniew Brzezinski (USA)

Policy Planning Council, Department of State, Washington.

Educated at McGill University and Harvard University; Research Fellow at the Russian Research Center, Harvard 1953-1956; associate professor of government, Center for International Affairs 1956-60; associate professor of

P.T.O.

public law and government at Columbia University 1960-62; Director, Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University 1962-66.

Author of "The Soviet Bloc-Unity and Conflict", 1962; "Ideology and power in Soviet policy", 1962; "Political Power: USA/USSR" (with Samuel P. Huntington), 1964; "Alternative to Partition", New York 1965.

Peter Kirk (Britain)

Conservative Member of Parliament for Saffron Walden, Essex.

Educated at Trinity College, Oxford and Zürich University. Conservative Member of Parliament for Gravesend Division of Kent from 1955 to 1964.

Member of UK delegation to the Council of Europe and Assembly of WEU; Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Army, 1963-64.

Henry A. Kissinger (USA)

Professor of Government, Harvard University, Faculty member, Center for International Affairs.

Educated at Harvard University. Lecturer, Dept. of Government 1957-59; Director, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, New York 1955-58; Director, Special Studies Project, Rockefeller Brothers Fund 1956-58. Consultant to various governmental agencies, incl. National Security Council 1961-62.

Author of "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy", 1957; "The Necessity for Choice", 1961; "The Troubled Partnership", 1965.

Jean Laloy (France)

Professor, Ecole Nationale d'Administration and Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris.

Minister plenipotentiary; Director, European Office and Assistant Director for Political Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris.

Author of "Entre Guerres et Paix - 1945 - 1965", Paris, 1966.

Richard Lowenthal (Britain)

Professor, Free University of Berlin (Otto-Suhr-Institut for Political Science).

Educated at the University of Heidelberg. Correspondent on Foreign affairs to the Observer, 1954-58; Research Fellow at Harvard University, 1959-61.

Author of Ernst Reuter-A biography; and "Chruschtschow und der Weltkommunismus", 1964; World Communism - The disintegration of a secular faith.

Leo Mates (Yugoslavia)

Director, Institute for International Politics and Economy, Belgrade.

Studied technical sciences at the University at Zagreb. After World War II editor-in-chief of the Yugoslav News Agency TANYUG; Counsellor at the Yugoslav Embassy in London; Assistant Foreign Secretary in Belgrade, Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia at the United Nations in New York, Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States, Secretary General of the President of the Republic and President of the Commission for Ideological and Political Work of the Socialist Alliance.

Dr. Bruno Pittermann (Austria)

Chairman, Austrian Socialist Party and Leader, Socialist Parliamentary Group.

Educated at Vienna University. Member Austrian National Council (Parliament) since 1945. First Secretary, Chamber of Labour, Vienna from 1945; Vice Chancellor of Austria, 1957-1966.

Pietro Quaroni (Italy)

President of Radiotelevisione Italiana, Rome.

Entered diplomatic service 1920; Italian Ambassador to Moscow, 1944-47; Paris, 1947-58; Bonn, 1958-61; London 1961-64.

Author of "Ricordi di un ambasciatore", 1954, Memoirs of an Ambassador; Diplomatic Bag, 1956.

Helmut Schmidt (Germany)

Member of the Bundestag; Deputy Leader of the Socialist Democratic Party.

Educated at University of Hamburg; Senator (Minister) for Domestic Affairs, Hamburg 1961-1965.

Author of "Verteidigung oder Vergeltung", 1961, Defence or Retaliation, 1962.

Dr. Antonin Snejdarek (Czechoslovakia)

Director, Institute of International Politics and Economics, and Professor of History at Charles University, Prague.

Previously Secretary at the Institute of History, Czech Academy of Sciences. Specialised in problems of European Security and Germany.

Author of Self-determination - good slogan in bad hands, Prague, 1961.

Dr. Mieczyslaw Tomala (Poland)

Deputy Director, Polish Institute for International Affairs, Warsaw. For several years Research Associate at the Polish Institute for International Affairs (with particular emphasis on German problems); then Counsellor, Polish Embassy in East Berlin from 1958 until his present appointment.

Dr. Alfred Zehnder (Switzerland)

Born and educated in Moscow, Russian and Swiss baccalaurea; educated at the Universities of Zürich and Hamburg. Joined Swiss diplomatic service in 1925; 1954 Secretary General, Swiss Foreign Office; Swiss Ambassador to USSR (1957-1961); to Canada (1961-63) and the USA (1963-65).

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INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

8TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE : THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP

COMMITTEE I

Saturday 1st October Afternoon

The Place of East and West Europe in a Changing World

PIETRO QUARONI

What has changed, or is changing in the world?

First: the steep decline in the relative importance of Europe. In 1914 the six main leading European powers could start a war without seriously taking into consideration the possible reactions of the United States; in 1962, at the time of the Cuba crisis, the decision for war or peace was purely between Washington and Moscow: the European powers, irrespective of whether they were the United Kingdom or Luxemburg, were only allowed to live in suspense.

This is not to be forgotten: when we speak of Eastern and Western Europe - by Eastern Europe I mean the minor communist states of Eastern Europe. Politically Russia does not belong to Europe - we must always have in mind the limited importance of what they can do amongst themselves.

Second: the nuclear stalemate. We all knew, more or less, that the United States were already well aware that the destructive capacity of their nuclear armaments was so enormous that an all-out nuclear war could no longer be considered a realistic way of solving international problems. But we did not know whether the Russians shared the same opinion: the Cuba crisis has shown us that they do too.

This is the most tremendous change in foreign politics that has ever taken place. We know the history of mankind for about seven thousand years;and we know that we have, most of the time, spoken of peace although knowing, at the back of our minds, that at a certain point the gordian knots of foreign policy were going to be cut by the sword. Now we know than an all-out war is ruled out and that we are only allowed as an eventuality local wars limited in space and scope.

The trouble is that while we know this, the working of our every-day politics has not adapted itself to the new situation. We go on in our conventional foreign policies as if at a certain moment - as before - it were possible to resort to war: we go to the brink, we have a good look at the precipice and then we draw back. Minor powers have realized this radical change in foreign policy more than the two Great Powers, but even they are often inclined to act as if things were still as before.

That is why, while I am rather optimistic about the possibility of maintaining peace, even a limited peace which may be simply no war, I certainly do not believe that we are going to enjoy a quiet life. I am afraid we shall have to go on from one suspense to another.

Does it mean that I think that we are not going to have a major war any more? Of course I cannot rule out one hundred per cent the possibility of a major nuclear war: we must always make allowances for human stupidity, which is great. Moreover it is precisely this minimal grain of madness which we cannot rule out that gives a certain amount of credibility to the nuclear deterrent. If we were one hundred per cent sure that our leaders are perfectly sane there would be no more use for nuclear deterrents.

This situation of a balance of power, by the way, is the only reasonable way ever invented for maintaining peace. Some people go on repeating all the time that armaments are the cause of wars. I do not believe it: the danger of war arises when one power, or a group of powers, believe that their superiority in armaments is such that they may risk a short victorious war, that is when the balance of power no longer exists. The longest period of peace which Europe has known, 1815 - 1914, was the consequence of a solid balance of power: we had wars in that century too, of course, but they were limited in space, time and scope.

Since the first world war we have been accustomed to think in terms of total war, total victory and total peace: the only conceivable end to war must be unconditional surrender; peace must cover all possible eventualities: it must be fool proof.

Whether this totality in war and peace is possible under any circumstances is a matter for discussion. Certainly it is incompatible with the concept of a balance of power: a balance of power does not admit any other solution but compromise, and accepting that certain questions must be left unsolved because, at least for the time being, the only way of solving them would be a war.

Third: The rift between Russia and China. In fact this parting of the ways has not changed things to any great extent for the United States. The confrontation between America and China which is going on in the Far East would have occurred just the same. The first act of this confrontation, the war in Korea, took place at a moment when Russia and China seemed to be the best of friends. To what extent Russia and China acting together might have influenced the course of events in South East Asia might be a matter of philosophical speculation: certainly the split between the two major communist powers has not been to the advantage of Russia, or China.

Russia, like any other Power, does not like the idea of a two-front war. Possibly, when the communists took over in China, the Russians thought that, with this, their eastern areas were secured. Now they have to split their military forces to cover two fronts: and it would not be surprising if somebody, in Moscow, is not already speculating on the possibility of a Sino-American alliance against Russia. To our eyes the idea seems obviously absurd: but does it look equally absurd to Russian eyes?

But chiefly this conflict paralizes Russia. The Russians have been accustomed, for nearly fifty years now, to being the furthest to the left in any political set-up: now suddenly they find themselves bypassed on the left. They were utterly unprepared for this eventuality and they do not know how to react.

The object of this ideological struggle is the leadership of world communism: the Chinese challenge is not only external, it is internal as well. Refusing the invitation to participate in the XXIII Party Congress, the Chinese Communist Party concluded the letter by saying: "we know that 90 per cent of the people, including the U.S.S.R., are with us". 90 per cent is certainly a gross exaggeration, but for a certain percentage it is true.

If one believes in the tenets of communism, there is no doubt that the Chinese are right and the Russians are wrong: the leaders of Russia, in so far as they are dedicated communists, must feel that too, and this sets limits to their freedom of choice. One of the characteristics of Russian foreign policy has been its absolute lack of inhibition: if it suited them they could, at any moment, change their position through 180 degrees. Now they cannot do it any more: they are inhibited by the reaction of Mao in his role as repositary of the traditions of Lenin; and they must consider how other communist parties may react to the criticism of Mao.

The other communist parties, whether on this side or that side of the iron curtain, represent votes in a possible oecumenic

council of communists; and as voters they must be cared for, just as any M.P. has to care about his constituency.

That is why the Moscow - Peking rift has given the minor communist countries of Eastern Europe a certain, limited, possibility of movement.

I do not think it is possible to try to analyze positions an and possibilities in West and East Europe unless we have clearly in mind the work within which they are bound to operate and the limits of what they can do.

At present there is, I think, one point on which Europeans on both sides of the iron curtain agree: they would like coexistence to have a wider and sounder basis. They know too well that should there be a war between Russia and the United States, they would all be involved in it; and they do not at all enjoy the idea of becoming targets for nuclear missiles from both sides.

For historical and psychological reasons we are all Europe-centred; therefore we think that the key to a more soundly based coexistence lies in Europe, and more particularly in the solution of the German problems: the unification of Germany, the frontiers of Germany, the nuclear armament of Germany. These are certainly important problems that weigh heavily on the general set-up of European politics, but from the point of view of coexistence they are not decisive.

America and Russia could coexist perfectly well even if Germany were to continue being divided, her frontiers juridicially unsettled, and even, I believe, if Germany were allowed a certain amount of sharing in nuclear problems as foreseen by the MLF or the ANF or the McNamara committee.

The obstacle to coexistence is a different one.

In an interview granted to Lippman a few years ago, Khrushchev asked whether he thought agreement between the United States and U.S.S.R. possible on the basis of the status quo, answered: "yes, provided you accept that the struggle of the colonial peoples against their oppressors, is the status quo."

More recently Kosygin said substantially the same thing in an interview granted to Reston. And the resolution of the XXIII Congress of the Communist party of the U.S.S.R. says: co-existence is not possible in the struggle between the oppressed and their oppressors.

From the point of view of communist doctrine, this is perfectly logical: but the equation revolution - status quo, or

coexistence - revolution, cannot be accepted by the Americans, nor, if we think about it soberly, by any country of the Western world. In other words it would mean the green light for communist subversion in the whole of the third world: that foreign intervention is admissible to suppress a revolutionary movement from the right, but not against revolution from the left; that America, for instance, in order to practise coexistence ought to intervene in Indonesia and in Ghana to put Soekarno and Nkrumah back in power.

The theory of Lin-Piao, the revolt of the villages of Asia, Africa and South America against the cities of the Western world, is not substantially different from what Lenin more or less said: "the road from Moscow to Paris passes through Shanghai and Calcutta". The only difference - an important one in the eyes of the Russians - is that the Chinese want to lead this revolt instead of the Russians, and that they include Russia amongst the cities which must be besieged and brought to capitulation.

Both Western and Eastern Europe would like to see the end of the war in Vietnam: they are both afraid that the war in Vietnam might escalate and involve Europe too: they both think that European questions are far more important than South East Asia. But here the similarity of their views stops. Eastern European governments, being communist, must say and think the same things as the Russians. In Western Europe there is an old undercurrent of pacifism which considers any war a crime, an undercurrent of belated resentment of America's criticism, which in different degrees embarrasses the governments and makes it difficult for them to see the real point of the war in Vietnam.

Lin-Piao has said squarely: "Vietnam for us is a test-case"; a test of the dogma that the guerrilla warfare of the people, strengthened by the ideology of communism, is invincible.

If the test is passed in Vietnam, it is going to be repeated wherever possible; and the possibilities are certainly not lacking. If the test is failed, the Chinese and the Russians will have to reconsider their theories.

But if Vietnam is a test-case for China and Russia it becomes a test-case for the Americans too., and for the Western world. It is the confrontation of these two tests which gives it world-wide importance and therefore also makes it important for Europe.

Should the Americans leave Vietnam to the tender mercies of the Vietcong we would certainly hear, from both sides of the

iron curtain, that now the road is open for coexistence. Such an illusion would last for weeks, perhaps for months, but certainly not longer; after that the two super powers would again be at loggerheads, only somewhere else.

We can only progress towards real coexistence if the Vietnam war ends in a compromise: it does not matter if the compromise is somewhat more in favour of the Russians or of the Americans, so long as it shows that the Russians have begun to realise that their theory status quo - revolution does not make sense politically.

Can Eastern and Western Europe do something to help bring about a compromise on the Vietnam war? I am afraid not. At the present moment, Hanoi, Peking and Moscow do not show the least intention of negotiating: negotiating in the sense of a reasonable compromise, that is. I do not think any European country has the possibility of influencing any of the above mentioned capitals.

So the possibilities of the European powers, Eastern and Western alike, are strictly limited to European questions. These questions are certainly very important for us but less important if one looks at them from a more oecumenical point of view. The world is no longer centred in Europe and it never will be again.

As far as Europe is concerned, the most important problem is without doubt the reunification of Germany.

In 1945 the Russians and the Americans were faced with two alternatives: either to go to war for the domination of Europe, or to divide the continent between themselves: wisely they chose the second alternative. So Europe is divided along a line which runs across Germany. The partition of Germany is the result of a war which has not been fought; and as things are now it could be undone only through a war.

I would like to qualify what I have said: there has never been a real agreement between Russia and America about this partition of Europe, not even a gentlemen's agreement. It is only a fact, the consequence of facts, arrived at, but never agreed: most of the important agreements in history have been reached like this.

As things are now, it cannot be solved through negotiation. Eastern Germany is not only a glacis for the defence of the U.S.S.R. and her European allies, not only for the Russians a very important element of Comecom: it is also part of the Communist system which for obvious reasons cannot be returned to "capitalism" again.

There is much talk about what the Germans, or the West in general, might do in order to ease tension between ourselves and Eastern Europe: recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, a more active and flexible policy towards the minor communist powers, no nuclear armaments for Germany etc., etc. I do not say that some of these things might not be useful for improving the atmosphere; but they will not help towards a solution of the German problem.

The U.S.S.R. does not like the Atlantic Pact, this is a well known fact: if she really wanted to wreck it, the easiest way would be to offer the Germans reunification in return for the neutralization of Germany. If such an offer were made, I wonder if a single German statesman would dare to say no. But such an offer has never been made, because the Russians are not ready to pay the price.

Reunification, by way of a mere confederation of the two Germanies cannot be taken as a serious solution because it seems practically impossible to conceive of a common foreign policy, for instance. Real reunification means free elections in both Germanies to decide whether and how they want to unite. Now we know, and the Russians know too, that elections in Eastern Germany, if not rigged, would give an overwhelming majority to the non-communists. And the Russians are not ready to accept that: they have been constantly repeating that the reunification of Germany is conceivable only if the "social conquests" of the people of East Germany are safeguarded: which means in other words that East Germany must remain communist.

This most important European question, therefore, can only be solved by Russia: European countries, both West and East, can at best only try not to complicate a question which is already difficult enough; more they cannot do.

The general situation in Eastern Europe is certainly more fluid today: the iron grip of Stalin exists no longer. In various degrees in the different countries there is a limited progress towards liberalization, more marked in the economic than in the political field. They do not speak exactly the same language any more, and there are divergent views on various important issues.

I do not believe in the theory of "gradual convergence" of East and West Europe, not only because I consider it as a mere wishful thinking and because there are fundamental obstacles to such a "convergence".

For instance I hesitate to call the theories of Libermann in Russia, or of Sik in Czekoslovakia, liberalization in our sense of this word since all the present reforms must take place within a framework which is meant to remain communist. I do not want to discuss here the limits and characteristics of this process of liberalization; the important fact is that the minor communist states of Eastern Europe began to adopt this new economic policy only after it had been accepted by Moscow.

Of course the national way to socialism, in politics as well as in economics, is certainly bound to lead to differentiation in the internal development of the various countries: they will probably all stay communist, but the pattern will no longer be identical.

All this is undoubtedly true; but there are limits, and very substantial ones.

One of the most devilishly clever things from the Russian point of view, which Stalin did, was the shifting of Poland towards the West by a few hundred miles. I do not know whether the Poles have really given up thinking about their former Eastern territories ceded to Russia; certainly they have no intentions of giving up their newly acquired territories. I do not want to discuss here the historical rights - historically speaking, in a continent like Europe, you can prove almost anything; no doubt there were a very large number of Germans in the area, and they had to be forcibly evacuated in order to make room for the Poles coming from the former Eastern Poland.

Similarly, on strong Russian advice, at least, Czekoslovakia has sent across the frontier practically all the German population of the Sudeten.

All this has created a tremendous German complex, both in Poland and in Czekoslovakia: Even if the Germans should officially accept the Oder-Neisse frontier and stop speaking about the Heimatrecht, I do not think it would change the situation much: Poles and Czechs will never believe, at least for many generations to come, that the Germans are sincere and they would go on fearing them. Unfortunately events before and during the Second World War have given both countries proof that the West cannot do much in order to protect them from the Germans; the only country which can act is Russia; and so this German problem ties them to Russia, and they are terrified at the idea that Russia's policy may change.

We all remember the shiver which went down the spine of Czechs and Poles when Adzubei visited Western Germany. How can we expect them to have a foreign policy of their own really independent from Russia?

Then there is Eastern Germany: of course Ulbricht wants to remain in power - who does not want to remain in power? But what happens to them, should Russia give up her policy of let us call it containment of Germany? So we cannot expect Pankow to feel and be independent.

So here you have the three most important countries of Eastern Europe who are bound to Russia for reasons of political survival. They may not like the Russians, but that does not change things much: they may put some airs of independence in smaller things, but they cannot change the fundamental issues.

The situation for Hungary and Rumania may be different because they have no "German complex" nor do they fear for their security. Last but not least: none of the communist parties in these countries feels really secure.

The East German revolution of '53 and the Hungarian one of '56 would both have swept away their communist governments if Russian troops had not stepped in to restore law and order. It is not too difficult to imagine what might have happened in Poland, also in '56, if the Poles had not had to reckon with the presence of the Russian army.

The situation of the minor communist countries of Eastern Europe reminds me terribly of the Italian princes before 1859. They resented too Austrian interference and high handedness; and they were trying, as much as they could, to assert their independence. But they knew that if they could not, in the last resort ask the Austrian army to intervene, their chances of keeping their thrones were very slender.

In this sense the situation, in my opinion, is worsening, not improving. The economic liberalization, however limited, raises new problems and in particular a basic one. To what extent is it possible to give independent authority and initiative to the management of enterprises without touching the cornerstone of any communist regime, the absolute control of the party over anything which goes on in the country?

Yugoslavia has been in many respects the ice-breaker of East European communism: the national way to socialism started in

Belgrade. And they are still far in advance. It is possibly too early yet to assess the real significance of what has happened at the recent party congress in Brioni; but if we take things at their face value - and it may be more than a face value - they seem to have accepted the logical consequences of the new economic policy - I hesitate to call it liberalization - submitting the party to the authority of Government and Parliament instead of the other way round.

Will it stay, will it succeed? We cannot say yet. Anyhow it is like an alarm signal: the new economic policy leads, inevitably, to a downgrading of the authority of the party, and the party functionaries.

Are the other Eastern countries ready to follow, can they do so without creating trouble at home?

Is Russia going to allow them to do it? I am afraid that here too the lead can only come from Moscow. And I do not think anything of this sort is likely to happen in Russia in the near future.

We must not exaggerate the real importance of this slight breeze of non-conformism which is blowing over Eastern Europe. The Russians seem to have become much wiser than they were at the time of Stalin: their rule is more lenient and flexible. I do not want to say that the Russians do not have their difficulties in managing their Eastern European friends: the split with China ties their hands to a large extent. But fundamentally the situation there is still under Russian control and is likely to remain so for quite a number of years.

The grip of Soviet Russia on Eastern Europe is still very strong: a real change in the Eastern European situation is only thinkable if something happens in Russia which may force her to loosen her grip. It may be a change at the summit in Moscow - there are certainly strains within the party at top level, it may be a sharpening of the conflict with China. In any case events which the West, Europe or America or both, may exploit - if they are able to - but cannot influence.

All this does not mean that we, Western Europe, should simply give up Eastern Europe. We must certainly go on trying to expand our contacts as much as possible. They are eager for cultural contacts with us, let us reciprocate: we have nothing to lose and nothing to fear in this confrontation. If they want to expand trade, credits and other facilities for their industries, let us

give them too as much as we can. Tourism too ought to be encouraged: it gives great possibilities for human contact which is always very important.

But we ought to be very careful not to stress the political aspect of what we may be doing: unfortunately, we do this to a considerable extent.

First of all it is not realistic: even if it could be a policy, we can only hope to gather in the harvest after a very long time. Moreover if and when we stress the supposed political background of our economic or cultural action we will inevitably only push the Russians to apply the brakes that are still in their hands.

The relations between Western and Eastern Europe are to a very large extent conditioned by the relations between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.: this is certainly true for Eastern Europe, but it is true also for Western Europe. Neither of us is independent enough and important enough to be able to condition effectively the policy of the two super powers. We may discuss as much as we like whether the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R. belong or don't belong to Europe: their influence on European politics is nevertheless a fact, a very important fact, which cannot be altered by speeches or gestures.

The greatest contribution which the powers of Europe, both East and West, could make towards peace and a tolerable form of co-existence between Washington and Moscow, is to try not to add to the instability of the world with our questions, our ambitions, our susceptibilities, which may loom very large in our eyes but are not as important as all that. In this, I am afraid, Western Europe behaves worse than Eastern Europe.

I fear that my analysis of the possible role of Western and Eastern Europe in the changing world of today is not very encouraging, but I think it is fairly realistic on the whole; and the most important thing for a foreign policy is to be based on realities, on hard facts and not on wishful thinking.

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WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE : THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP

C O M M I T T E E I

Sunday 2nd October — Afternoon

Prospects and Limits of East-West Relations

JEAN LALOY

Introduction: THE IDEA OF EVOLUTION

East-West relations are at present characterised by a contradiction. In the West as well as in the East we see many factors of change which are tending to shake up the order which was fixed in 1945. At the same time, beneath the weight of the risk involved in any modification of established situations, the positions taken up at the end of the war remain frozen.

The international world of 1966 resembles, at least in the northern hemisphere, the industrial world of 1840. Innovating forces (technical, intellectual, social) are coming up against unadapted structures. Violent crises still remain to be feared.

In this situation, and seeing the risks of solutions by force, many people think that the only way out of the deadlock is through a progressive evolution in the moral, intellectual and structural field. Little by little mental attitudes would be modified and the states, instead of demanding absolute freedom would, like the body of employers of the 19th century, agree to lay the foundations of a certain order by limiting their claims.

There are a number of reasons for the present popularity of the idea of evolution:

(a) If the use of force is no longer the ultima ratio, it is necessary to seek a ratio which might be less brutal.

(b) The world of today, despite its absurdity, is a little less irrational than the world of the wars of 1914 and 1939. The regimes confronting each other are founded, in various ways, on a certain idea of reason,

not merely on resentment or the search for prestige.

(c) Technical development opens up so many horizons, and sometimes such strange ones, that the old methods of foreign policy no longer seem adequate for the task.

(d) The opposition between East and West involves such vast problems that brute force cannot settle them.

Most of these explanations, each of which is partially true, are bound up with one central fact: international relations are tending to move away from the instinctive state (prestige, glory, gain) and are beginning to be suffused with reason, moral and political awareness, and universal values. This phenomenon, already noticeable before 1914, was apparent in the Russian revolution of 1917, in President Wilson's policy of 1918, in the European idea from 1930 onwards, in the development of the Commonwealth between 1920 and 1960, in numerous achievements since 1945. However different these movements may have been, each in its own way has been inspired with the idea of an order transcending the old sovereign entities, of a developing international organisation.

This process, which seems typical of the second half of the 20th century, is encountering strong resistance. On the one hand national sovereignties of the classic type submit to common rule only with great difficulty. Sovereignty, the privilege of the strong, does not abdicate of its own accord. On the other hand the states controlled by communist parties have an even more uncompromising concept of sovereignty than states of the classic type: they do not recognise any common rule, even of an ideal kind, between themselves and the others.

Therefore evolution towards a more peaceful society is far from being a necessary process. In itself it is nether sure nor probable. At the same time it is necessary, in the sense that failing it one can see little way out of the present blockage. Uncertain yet indispensable, the idea of evolution tends to dominate people's minds to some extent everywhere.

Starting from the idea that the sources of conflict are still great but that these conflicts are in certain conditions open to less stupid solutions than those of the past, let us examine, from the point of view of East-West relations,

I. the appointed aims of both sides from the hoped-for evolution;

II. the changes already in process in international relations;

III. future prospects.

I THE APPOINTED AIMS OF BOTH SIDES BY MEANS OF EVOLUTION

At the present moment, no positive common aim exists between East and West. The communist leaders, almost to a man, still consider their aims to be of a different nature from those of the rest of the world. Correspondingly there exists in the West a school of thought according to which whatever comes out of the East must be bad. However, as the years have gone by, these uncompromising judgments have undergone some modification, whether by reason of events or whether by the natural play of the diversity of opinions and analyses.

A. The appointed aims of the East by means of likely evolution

Although at the present time there is no common view of international problems on the part of the Eastern countries, it is possible, taking Moscow as the centre, Peking as the left (although also on the right) and Belgrade as the right (although also on the left), to present the following outline.

The basic idea is of an evolution, more or less necessary, more or less spontaneous, more or less automatic, leading societies - not without violence - stage by stage into a new form (completely new according to some, more or less new according to others) in which the contradictions between classes and nations will be resolved. The movement is conceived as the result of pressure from below and a fit of conscience at the top. But whatever the conditions, it exists by itself; it is almost always conceived as the ultimate reality, concealed by events. Whence the habit of "unmasking" the adversary (and sometimes of "unmasking" oneself) by discovering the secret motivations for action, the hidden forces which operate beneath (and therefore above) the will of individuals.

In the concept as set out by its proponents the driving force of evolution is the conflict between classes, not nations. The national aspect is disregarded. In theory it is deemed due to be transformed of its own accord after the revolution has succeeded. Between now and then, it reflects the contradiction of a society not yet transformed; it has no value of its own. This outlook casts great obscurity over international relations, whether after the advent of "socialism" or during the "transitional period" when "socialism" has triumphed in some areas but not everywhere. The end is clear - the transformation of society, if not of humanity. The means are obscure. Must this transformation come about all at once, as was believed in the beginning, or by successive stages? If, as everyone admits today, we are following the second hypothesis, what type of

relationship is being established between the "liberated" sector of humanity and the rest of the world?

On this point central to any study of East-West relations we see a wide range of theses in the East, from the most evolutionary and least intolerant to the most violent and fanatical. (1)

On the right wing of the Communist Movement (Yugoslavia) a trend is emerging in favour of a peaceful evolution of relations with the non-communist world. This trend is not purely pacifist, it does not entirely renounce violence or force, but it limits the use of force and renounces it so far as propagation of the system is concerned. The latter should spread itself very slowly, by virtue of a sort of general inevitability of socialism and develop in growing diversity, ranging from socialism of the Scandinavian type to socialism of the communist type, including all types of African, Asian or other forms of socialism. Even in this very mild concept tinged with reformism there remains:

(a) an essential difference, that is to say a world which is communist and a world which is not;

(b) in consequence a greater or lesser degree of heterogeneousness between the "communists" and the others which finds expression in affirming the sovereignty of the new type of state.

The "peaceful coexistence" accepted by the USSR since the mid 1920's, but formulated in 1956, occupies a central position (in both senses of the word) in this picture, although this position is capable of several interpretations. According to the ideas set out in 1956, the USSR occupies a special place in the world. She is the first socialist state by virtue of chronology, but this chronology confers upon her an unquestionable political and ideological primacy. Originally conceived as the model for international relations, the Federation of Soviet Republics has not ceased to strengthen the concept of the sovereignty of the state as much as of the party. They do not have to account to anyone but themselves. It follows from the nature of things that no common rule applies permanently both to the Soviet Union and to the rest of the world alike. International law derives from the will of states, not from an order of reasoning superior to the movement of societies. The Soviet state and party are humanity's guide along the road to scientific socialism.

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(1) The following remarks are concerned with thinking among the leadership, not with public opinion which is difficult to ascertain.

A fundamental difficulty in relations between the USSR and the rest of the world (including even the "socialist states") results from this concept. The USSR is of a different order, of a nature apart, at the same time unique of its kind and universal in its design.

This basic heterogeneity is more or less tempered by the theory of peaceful coexistence. This is based on the idea that total war can and must be avoided, that, in consequence, revolutionary changes must come about through means other than force alone, and that therefore a certain diversity in the socialist regimes is possible and even tolerable.

But the doctrine thus defined, however much it may be put to account, does not do away with the essential difference between the USSR and the rest of the world. It mitigates its effects. It takes account of certain given facts of the present situation. But it does not admit the possibility of a common evolution of societies, whatever their regime may be, in terms of imperatives or values dominating all of them and not belonging by right to any one of them. Evolution leads to communism, not to its being overtaken. Thus "peaceful coexistence", at an equal distance from peace (in diversity) and war, (unity by force) continues in an intermediate zone where force must be avoided if possible but may be used if necessary. This doctrine does not allow of envisaging the homogeneous evolution of humanity towards a future other than socialism of a more or less Soviet type. The universal character of the USSR finds fulfilment not beyond itself but within itself.

There would seem no point in describing the extremist form of the same ideas which are at present defended not by China but by a certain faction grouped around the present leader of China, Mao Tse-tung. These ideas are a caricature not only of Marxism but even of Stalinism and tend to ridicule Marx as well as Stalin, not to mention Lenin. So far as one can gather from the present Maoist fury, it derives from several sources, one of which is incontestably national and even racial fanaticism, the other being the intolerance peculiar to the idea of an inevitable revolution whose torch passes from hand to hand, and from West to East, according to the epoch; this idea, if not Marxist, is at least derived from Marxism as propounded by Lenin and in turn by Stalin.

Thus wherever one looks towards the East one finds affirmed the idea of an evolution which is necessary yet controlled,

automatic yet voluntary, inevitable yet uncertain, to which certain parties (controlling certain states) alone have the key. Resulting from this conception there is a profound division between East and West, due neither to socialism, collectivism nor marxism as such but to the idea of an insurmountable difference between certain societies and others, from which is born the idea of total inequality. In these conditions it is difficult to base international relations on a common principle.

Is it possible to arrive at a conception more receptive towards the evolution of contemporary societies? That depends on the West as well as on the East, and on Western ideas about the same subject.

B. The appointed aims of the West by means of likely evolution

There is no Western political thinking as such. However, a certain number of trends can be distinguished among the multiplicity of opinions.

(a) The realistic factor

According to this trend, which is strong in all countries but which finds expression particularly in France at the present time, evolution is taking place in the sense of a return pure and simple to national state entities. The great states which as it were overflowed their borders at the end of the war have been compelled little by little to withdraw to them by the re-emergence of intermediate states. Ideology is only a mask for ambition. Force remains the basis of international relations. The more forces are interwoven, the greater the stability. Nature has the last word. There are different peoples, like different species. With each his own master, all will be calm.

Less radical versions of this thesis exist. In particular these stress the necessity, in order to avoid the fanaticism which too often fires ideas, of coming back to policies based on the defence of interests. None of these versions recognises the sacred nature of the nation state. They accept its transformation as possible, but they do not think this will come about before a very long period of time.

The realistic or traditional factor envisages an evolution which will lead Russia (Soviet only in name),

China (revolutionary principally in words), etc., back again with the other nations into a grouping of the whole whose rules would be defined pragmatically, with each defending his national interests on the basis of a sort of political natural philosophy.

(b) Ideological factors

At the other extreme we find the twin but opposing factors of anti-communism and communism.

Communism, principally a French and Italian phenomenon, is undergoing the repercussions of the present crises in the movement. It is threatened by revisionism and is defending itself by exercising discipline. Discussion on the future of Western societies is hardly developing at all, at least not in public.

Anti-communism, inspired mainly by the tyrannical aspect of the parties in communist states can hardly concede that evolution is possible in these parties or states. It wants them to disappear, but does little to define the means by which this is to be brought about. Latent in numerous sectors of opinion, anti-communism finds little echo in responsible intellectual or political circles. Its fate depends to a great extent on events, on the outcome of the current crises.

(c) Rational factors

A number of tendencies underline the sweep of the changes which are in process in political societies, in the era of the achievement of mass education.

Several strands may be distinguished:

(aa) The convergence of regimes

Drawing inspiration from, but falsifying, analyses relating to "industrial society", certain people believe that little by little the Eastern regimes will become liberalised while those in the West will accept a certain degree of collectivisation. Ultimately the differences between them will disappear. This theory is generally rejected when it speaks of such a convergence taking place necessarily. It is accepted within certain limits, but few people believe that an analogy relating to economic

structures, even supposing that it should work out, is adequate for resolving international problems.

(bb) Scientific rationality

At a more profound level, another sector of opinion thinks that the great phenomena of the age, the discovery of atomic energy, population upheavals, the development of social sciences, will bring into view little by little a new type of solidarity capable of supplanting ancient rivalries. Rationality, whether inherent in human relations or resulting from scientific discovery, will gradually supercede the primacy of instinct and will allow the present differences between cultures nations or regimes to be transcended.

This sector has given birth to initiatives like the plan for a world atomic energy agency, disarmament plans, suggestions for arms control or for common exploitation of space, etc.

(cc) The socialist factor

Western socialism, represented principally in Europe, wants to secure a change in international relations, not by means of the supposed triumph of one class but by a series of reforms both within states and in the international order so as to avert conflicts of any kind, social or international. This organisation and pacifist tradition is unfortunately weakened by the lack of homogeneity in the socialist movement in the West.

The socialist factor holds possible a return of Eastern socialism to the liberal tradition which is inseparable, in its view, from true socialism.

(dd) The supranational or European factor

Quite close to the social democratic factor, taking certain ideas from the scientific factor, strongly influenced by the ideas of European Christian democracy, the supranational factor has developed since 1950. It looks towards the creation of community-type institutions acquiring under various forms the functions which national states cannot perform. Although strongly regional by origin, this factor does have a general

bearing. It seeks to extend its influence beyond the European system in the West, in particular towards the East, and it does constitute an undeniable attraction for the countries of Eastern Europe.

Its idea is less of modifying regimes than of superimposing certain institutions on them, creating by their very existence habits of co-operation and tolerance.

Thus from the diversity of political doctrines some major options emerge. While in the East, especially in the USSR, they do not yet envisage more than a possible successful conclusion to the movement of societies, in the West three major types of evolution are held possible: a return on the part of all to traditional forms; the triumph of liberal democracy; growth on the part of all towards more rational ways of organising international society.

The first and third types endeavour to envisage solutions applicable to East and West alike. In the majority of cases the changes will be imposed just as much on Western societies as on the others.

This question of the possible end of the evolutionary process is important. Either one considers that only "the others" must change, or one accepts that the transformation, more or less profound according to circumstances, applies to everyone. In the first case, progress towards peace will remain slow and difficult. In the second, we may hope for a way out of present problems.

II. CHANGES IN PROCESS

The idea of a solution to major international problems through the evolution of societies and relations between them is not a theoretical one. Its chance comes from the fact that effectively over the past 21 years many things have changed in the East, in the West and elsewhere.

It is necessary to try to appreciate at the same glance what is changing and what remains constant, because it is the relationship between these two aspects which allows of judgment. I will confine myself here to some preliminary remarks, designed mainly to fix the limits of discussion.

A. Changes in the East.

(a) Relations between communist states

Within the group of communist states there have been spectacular changes. Instead of the monolith (or at least the appearance of one) of 1945, we discover a diversity of trends, whether along the line of national division of whether according to the three-way division of the communist movement (left-centre-right). Even within each of the states we see, according to the branches or type of activity, diverse tendencies being formulated, doctrinal rigidity in one field not excluding flexibility in another. To a great extent this decompression is the consequence of the Sino-Soviet conflict, but its results could be reversed only with difficulty. Even if China and the USSR returned to more normal relations (which cannot be ruled out), massive unity would be re-established only with difficulty.

The crisis in the communist world has not however led to disintegration. In order to remedy the total absence of inter-party organisation the USSR has sought, not without success, to strengthen both bilateral relations at the party level and multilateral relations at the state level, especially in Europe in the military field. Furthermore strong solidarity exists if not between the parties at least between the party leaders in Europe.

Thus we establish the existence of a balance which is always in motion between the demands of reality (most often in its national form) and the demands of (ideological) unity. Crises remain a possibility. On the other hand we cannot see any tendency towards a regrouping of the East European states as a counterbalance to the USSR. Finally, all the regimes, whatever their complexion, continue to defend themselves (in varying degrees) against outside influences. The evolution, however profound it may be, remains controlled. The crucial position of East Germany, her vulnerability and her difficulty in adapting herself, are one of the greatest checks to a more pronounced evolution.

The same features are to be found in relations between the Soviet Communist Party and the communist parties of the non-communist countries. Relativity and mobility have become normal occurances. But the links remain solid.

(b) Relations with the under-developed world

After remarks to be expected about "a peaceful zone", about "national democracy", etc., the USSR has accepted the fact of the diversity of kinds of socialism in the states "freed from colonialism". They continue to classify states according to their degree of fidelity to the general lines of Soviet policy policy, but they also take into account many matters of fact. The need to build a barrier against Chinese monomania is by far the most important. Hence the importance of agreements like the Tashkent agreement of January 1966.

In this way a more realistic and pragmatic view of international problems, which could in the long-term have an important effect on Soviet doctrine, is penetrating little by little the political concepts of the USSR and her allies. This effect will however be rather slow. Most of the time the countries concerned are in effect preoccupied less with the evolution of the USSR than with their own immediate interests. Blunted by a vaguely pacifist and progressive vocabulary, their impact on the communist world is difficult to assess.

(c) Relations with the Western world

The essential phenomenon here is the nuclear balance and the resultant necessity of redefining militant concepts everywhere where they risk leading to the use of force. This phenomenon has a great bearing. In the long run and save for unforeseeable contingencies it will undoubtedly be decisive. But great efforts are being made to prevent the danger of total destruction from completely eroding the concept of indefinite struggle between the imperialists and the others. It is partly to this end that "peaceful coexistence" has been defined. Here, too, the evolution is far from being completed.

We may wonder, in particular, whether it is true that the war in Vietnam alone prevents a rapprochement between the USSR and the United States. Even in a world without war, we should doubtless for a very long

time see developing complex relationships of "cooperation in rivalry" or "rivalry not without cooperation" which would be far from purely peaceful.

The transformation is far from complete. But it is indisputable. It is held in check by a political doctrine, the prerogative of a minority with immense means of modern power at its disposal. But this doctrine is itself weakened. There again, the outcome depends not only on the East but also on the West.

B. Changes in the West

(a) Relations between Western states

These relations are characterised by the multiplicity of groupings or organs associating the various states for various tasks - military, economic, cultural or political.

This phenomenon is perhaps more important than the crises which in certain cases disturb the functioning of these organisations.

We cannot however be unaware of the crisis in the Atlantic alliance. It derives from a number of causes and it is followed attentively in the East. If France has adopted an attitude of increasing reservation, there are also tendencies towards a diminuation of the military effort in Europe which are making themselves apparent in Great Britain and the United States and are reacting upon German opinion. Without doubt the outcome of the crisis depends less upon strategic considerations (the possibility of transporting troops rapidly, etc.) than upon the judgment delivered on the alliance. Can it or can it not be used to help bring about a peaceful change in international relations? If the answer is positive, modifications will be necessary, but the modified body ought to be preserved.

Other questions arise in Europe (the role of Great Britain) and in America (the position of Canada, the regrouping of the Latin American states).

Generally speaking the Western system, despite its weaknesses, has, over 20 years, seen develop a number of structures, more or less new, more or less original, allowing an evolution which if not always harmonious has at least nearly always been peaceful. These observations are not without relevance to the German problem.

(b) Relations with under-developed countries

The critical period of decolonisation has ended without disaster. Important progress is even to be noted in relations between the former metropolitan countries and their former colonies. Formidable questions are still extant, however, of which the crisis in the Commonwealth is a typical example but which also affects other countries. The problem of relations between the United States and Latin America is far from settled.

Over and above these difficulties, the more general problem arises of the too slow development of backward countries. This is a question between South and North rather than between West and South.

From the political standpoint, recent years have seen the fragmentation of the third world. The apparent unity of Bandoeng has come to the end of its life. India, Japan, several Asian and African countries distrust China more than the Western countries, including the United States. The war in Vietnam impedes this development to a certain extent, but does not impede it completely. If all states would like to see an end to the war, they would not all like the outcome to be victory for one of the adversaries, in fact China.

The essential fact, against which China is in revolt, is that the end of colonial domination, if it has given rise and is still giving rise to formidable troubles, has by no means involved a decisive disruption of the world balance to the advantage of the East.

(c) Relations with Eastern countries

In this field, the changes have been limited. The territorial position resulting from the war still holds, even when the demarcation lines are fortuitous as in Korea or provisional as in Germany.

The balance-sheet of ten years of negotiation is less impressive than the number of hours of meetings and negotiations of all sorts. Two serious crises, in Berlin and in Cuba, have been averted. But little progress has been made as a result. The treaty of August 1963 remains an isolated instance.

Present initiatives are being directed towards the development of commercial and cultural exchanges. Sometimes certain reductions of the forces facing each other in Europe are envisaged, or even a new status in which the European states would be free from alliances. But these ideas have hardly been developed. The present tendency is rather towards the tacit acceptance of the status quo for a long period.

Thus on both sides the changes in process have not yet reached the level at which East-West relations are sited. The tendency towards a change in international behaviour is held in check, in this field, in the East by the ideological justification of power and in the West by the inertia of a boundless pragmatism.

III. FUTURE PROSPECTS

The present situation is marked on both sides by a greater fluidity. In the West the colonial empires have disappeared, but without any ensuing catastrophe. In the East the absolute dominance of the USSR has become relative, but the system (except in the case of China, which is difficult at the moment to assess objectively) has held together. It would be normal in these conditions to be tempted to try to establish also between East and West the fluidity which exists within each of the systems.

It must be admitted that the attempts made up till now have not brought forth much result.

Efforts inspired by the realistic point of view have been undertaken by almost all the Western states. Visits, negotiations, divers offers have been put forward in turn by the United States, Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic, Italy, and many others. These efforts have concerned either the USSR or the countries of Eastern Europe.

From the rational point of view numerous suggestions have been put forward, particularly in the field of disarmament. Certain results can be recorded, but compared with the hopes, particularly with those aroused by Kennedy's experiments, these results are very Meagre.

At the present time two types of experiment with detente are in process. One, at the disarmament conference, is the continuing quest for an agreement on certain measures of stabilisation of

existing nuclear forces. The other, symbolised by French policy but practised by almost all the Western states, can be summarised in the formula: through detente to understanding, through understanding to cooperation. We are seeking, on the basis of national realities, to get round ideological obstacles so as to substitute little by little for the present cut-off of a network of relations, proceeding from which one could conceive of solutions.

From the Eastern side, efforts at renewing relations are no greater. Present policy is the same as it was ten years ago: to sanctify the status quo in Europe under cover of "European security"; to stabilise nuclear relations with the United States; to legalise in this way the actual situation resulting from 1945.

We could examine the real chances of evolution contained in policies of this kind. In certain cases they can lead to temporary phases of detente. But they hardly affect the root of the difficulties. They would affect it more if they gave themselves broader objectives, while perhaps accepting that these cannot be achieved speedily. Instead of placing the German problem in parentheses they should place it in the forefront, not with the hope of solving it immediately but with a view to preparing for its solution. The difficulties would increase, but the prospects would broaden and policy would assume proper dimensions.

(a) Questions of principle

Taking the analyses outlined above, it is established first of all that no common principle exists on which to assess international relations. The long-term aims are not of the same nature and hardly can be. Should be therefore stop at this point?

If it is true that total war is a catastrophe to be avoided, and that sovereignty will not of its own accord produce stability, we can seek to define a principle valid for the transitional period.

The search for this principle could give rise to various studies or researches, in the West, in the East, and then between East and West. Study groups could be set up. These would not be governmental and their primary task would be to clear the ground. Their inspiration could be as follows: if total war must be avoided, and everyone is in agreement on this (even no doubt Mao and Lin Piao), all wars should be avoided, or, at any rate, as many wars as possible. Wars (and crises)

can only be avoided by accepting in some way or another the idea of an international order. It may be embryonic, it may be confined to limited understandings; but once agreements have been concluded it exists independently of states and ideologies. The strengthening of this order is the task for the present period. To strengthen the order is to resolve disputes. To resolve disputes is to accept the peaceful change of situations. To accept the latter is to envisage international institutions to this end.

Undoubtedly we cannot go so far at a first attempt; the discussions at the disarmament conference show the difficulty there is in envisaging principles of this nature. But discussion on the basis of peaceful change would be more profitable, even if it came to nothing, than discussion on the basis of the status quo, even if it reached a successful conclusion.

At the same time as this research would be carried on, a whole series of problems would come to light; I shall only mention the principal ones here.

(b) The problem of war

If we want to prevent war, the present negotiations are quite inadequate. On the one hand the proposed solutions are limited to stabilising the nuclear balance, on the other hand crises and wars have not ceased to occur.

At the same time as we speak about disarmament we must provide for the negotiation of political agreements bearing on the course of our behaviour in case of crisis - the period of time to be accepted, the reactions to be foreseen, the means of negotiation to be envisaged, etc. It is not a question of repeating the experience of the Geneva protocol of 1924, but of undertaking by agreement to observe certain rules; in this way there would be established among the great nuclear powers a sort of probation period before deterrence would be called directly into question. Agreements would naturally be open to all.

If considerations of this sort should make headway, we would no doubt be led to envisage certain permanent institutions. To begin with these would be no more than study groups. Later on they could become consultative. Beyond this, they would be written into the United Nations Organisation.

Before setting these mechanisms in motion in relations between East and West, they could first be used within the existing groups. There is no lack of disputes between either Eastern or Western states. Rules of procedure, less improvised than in the past, could be tried out. If they were successful, we could, at a later stage, apply them to East-West relations. In this way the reciprocal process of change which seems the most effective in the long term would be set in motion.

Such a task will be very difficult. It involves crossing a real threshhold. But even if we did not succeed, something would remain from the enterprise. At any rate other negotiations or attempts in process on which it would cast some illumination, would be made easier.

(c) The problem of inequality of opportunity

For all those who envisage evolution as a way out of present difficulties, the question of contacts between East and West is fundamental. Failing in fact a free circulation of ideas, the evolution could be if not blocked, at least slowed down indefinitely.

In so far as there is not as between East and West equality of opportunity in this field, a basic obstacle remains in the way of any progress.

Perhaps no complete solution to this problem exists. But it is difficult not to raise it. There too studies should be undertaken so as to define at the same time some principles and a certain number of means of applying them. Rather than invoking liberty, we could begin on the level of objectivity and try to see how, in the East and in the West, liberty could best be served.

(d) The problem of treaties and agreements

In a world where evolution is taking place rapidly, no treaty lasts unless it can be adapted. If we want to adapt a treaty we cannot wait until everyone has consented. It would be a good thing to make provision already at the time of signature of a treaty for a supervisory and advisory organ to recommend the necessary adaptations at the proper time.

Would not the Atlantic crisis have been averted if we had made provision for an organ of this sort? What would the German problem be if an organ grouping Germany and the principal powers responsible had been in existence for studying forecasts and recommendations? In the event of disarmament agreements being reached, a supervisory commission will be all the more necessary as technical progress unceasingly modifies the area of application of these agreements.

If we could reach agreement on the principle of such organs, an important change in international behaviour would result whose effect, in the long run, would make itself felt in relations between East and West. Here, as in the other cases, trials could be attempted first of all within the two systems before envisaging them at the most delicate level, that of East-West relations.

(e) European problems

The question of evolution in Europe is still shrouded in obscurity. Neither the limits of Europe, to the West or the East, nor the na ure of the states which are to make it up, nor the manner in which it is to be organised have been defined. Among the questions arising one of the foremost is whether or not Europe can encompass both liberal and communist states at the same time. If it can, the European institutions will of necessity be very restricted; if it cannot, Europe will remain limited to Western states and the question will arise of their relations with the others.

Problems of defence are no less complex. Can Europe defend herself on her own? And against whom? Should she become organised? What place should be given to nuclear weapons? What value do they have in a European framework? So many ticklish problems!

All these problems are complicated by the German problem. What place should Germany be given? What status would be suitable for her? How can agreement be reached? There is material for a great many labours, numerous and difficult enough to discourage many spirits.

Perhaps we should see our way more clearly if we concentrated research on the German question. For example one could picture Germany with her essential rights restored, provided that she were to participate in various ways in several types of community. One of these, based on the limitation of armaments, would unite her with certain Eastern states. Another, of a political and economic nature, would maintain the links created within the European Economic Community. So long as disarmament has not been achieved, a community extending as far as the United States - but no doubt different from the present pact in its practical arrangements - would ensure the necessary balance in Western Europe as a whole.

It cannot even be claimed that the problems posed by suggestions of this kind have been mentioned in outline, These suggestions are intended to illustrate the idea that one of the essential tasks is to bring about the peaceful change of situations in dispute.

Prospects for the development of East-West relations exist. There is no need to emphasise the obstacles which remain. They are tremendous. In the East as in the West, in order to make progress it will be necessary to shake off a great deal of inertia. It is therefore unlikely that we shall get very far along this road.

If we were to try to do so, it would not be by doing away with existing organs in West or East but by making use of them so as to be able to go beyond them one day. The efforts being undertaken at the present time to develop bilateral relations should also be maintained and developed.

All present efforts would be pursued. But they would be complemented and as it were crowned by a more systematic effort designed to modify, by mutual consent, certain basic facts which have blocked all progress so far.

Perhaps it will be judged wiser not to go beyond the stage we have reached so far and to confine ourselves to talking about disarmament, about reciprocal reductions in troop strengths, about the stationing of nuclear weapons, about controlling troop movements, about eliminating foreign bases, about no nuclear rearmament of Germany, about trade and culture.

There is no certainty that at this level the limits would not be reached even more quickly.

Between pure pragmatism and the views inspired by ideology, there may perhaps be a middle way, close to what is real but open to the influence of ideas. The prospects for an improvement in East-West relations may be envisaged in a great many ways. The one suggested here endeavours to find a middle path between the indefinite maintenance of the status quo and the triumph of one camp over the other, the only prospects which have been open so far. It is from this point of view that it is worth appraising.

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WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE : THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP

COMMITTEE II

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The changing role of military alliances and new requirements for security in Europe

GENERAL BEAUFRE

I The role of military alliances has always been first and foremost to combine the forces of several nations so as to counterbalance another nation or group of nations whose superior power seemed to constitute a danger. It was a defensive, and sometimes an offensive, alliance system.

The Atlantic Alliance as originally conceived was in conformity with this concept: a shattered Europe constituted an area of weakness which had to be strengthened by a visible expression of solidarity with the United States. The Atlantic Alliance led to the organisation of the Warsaw Pact as a mark of Soviet solidarity with the countries of Eastern Europe which had just been liberated from the Nazi grip. Thus we were trying to cure a deep-seated political instability by establishing a stable military equilibrium.

Subsequently the character of the Atlantic Alliance altered appreciably as a result of German rearmament and the development of nuclear weapons. German rearmament, held indispensable for replacing in Europe the forces which France had had to engage first in Indochina and then in Algeria, posed a special problem: so soon after a terrible war unleashed by hitlerism, the prospect gave rise to many reservations, in the West as much as in the East. Therefore this rearmament had to take place within a system which could guarantee allies and adversaries against a resurgence of German nationalism. This guarantee was achieved by the American policy of integration of the German forces within the command system of the Alliance. So the military alliance acquired a very special political meaning.

The development of nuclear armaments also in turn brought about fundamental changes, due to the intrinsic characteristics of these weapons. In each of the opposing alliances a great nuclear power - the United States and the Soviet Union - was in possession of all, or nearly all, the nuclear armament. Because of this the alliance lost its democratic character based on agreement between theoretically equal partners. The domination of the great nuclear power made itself plain, but with less and justification as the tension between East and West, after numerous ups and downs, tended to seem much less acute and to evolve towards a rapprochement in fact. But all the rather half-hearted attempts to mitigate the nuclear predominance of the great atomic power ran into technical difficulties which were practically insurmountable. The problem of sharing nuclear responsibility remained unanswered.

Meanwhile, if the military balance of power had forced a stalemate in Europe, the latent tensions resulting from the immediate post-war situation remained. Germany, still divided, felt herself threatened by the Soviet pressure which she experienced, particularly in Berlin, and aspired after reunification. Poland and Czechoslovakia, heirs to considerable former German territories, remained apprehensive about a revanchist spirit taking hold of Germany again. The East-West detente, the result of a complex strategic and political evolution, did not resolve the difficulties within Europe which the system of opposing alliances was helping to prolong.

II This is the complex situation in which France took it upon herself to open the debate on the problem of NATO. It was in fact obvious that a number of important questions called for a precise and specific answer. Let us look at them in turn.

(1) <u>Taking into account the political and strategic evolution, are military alliances still indispensable in Europe</u> ?

The answer is clearly in the affirmative.

(a) The political detente has not yet gone so far as to make us feel secure against any reversal of this trend, particularly with the present crisis in Vietnam.

Moreover this political detente has not settled any of the problems resulting from the immediate post-war situation: the division of Germany, the division of Europe, the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. So long as these problems remain, it will be necessary to maintain on both sides a defensive system guaranteeing the Federal Republic on the one hand, Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany

on the other hand, against any possible threat. This guarantee is of a less urgent nature than it was a few years ago, but it is still of the same interest.

(b) The strategic evolution has brought about a system which is at present completely stable. This situation, which results from the existence on both sides of nuclear strike forces which are virtually invulnerable, is not likely to change in the near future. But in consequence there will be the risk of conventional conflicts becoming a possibility once again, a risk which prescribes the maintenance of an effective minimum of conventional defence.

(c) The world strategic balance results from the existence of the American and Soviet nuclear forces. For this balance to operate in Europe, it is necessary for the USA and USSR respectively to be associated with the groupings of European powers.

(d) In conclusion, the military alliances in Europe no longer constitute the political axis of the European powers. But they do still play a security role which is indispensable so long as the problems of Europe are unsolved.

(2) <u>In this environment, what sorts of crises are the European defensive systems likely to face</u> ?

In the present atmosphere of detente, the hypothesis of a major premeditated military attack, from either East or West, is highly improbable. That would require a complete transformation of the political as well as the strategic situation.

On the other hand the fear remains that the local tensions existing in central and eastern Europe might give rise to more or less unintentional incidents which circumstances could cause to escalate to a dangerous level. It would seem preferable therefore to take the hypothesis of crises as an eventuality to be borne in mind. This justifies the study of means for avoiding such crises and for managing them at the lowest level if they should come about.

The mechanisms to be put into operation might possibly include a system for speedy consultation between the eastern and western powers.

(3) <u>Since the danger in Europe results essentially from the tensions produced by European problems, how can we seek to solve these problems</u> ?

If the status quo in Europe is maintained indefinitely,

it can only make matters increasingly difficult. We must seek to put an end to the division of Germany and of Europe. Only by this means shall we cease to have a Europe founded on the cold war.

But at the same time neither must German reunification lead to the reconstitution in the centre of Europe of a powerful state which could become a source of unrest, in particular by seeking to recover her 1939 frontiers.

Only one perspective seems likely to satisfy both these conditions: the perspective whereby Europe would regain her unity and whereby she would constitute a political entity large enough for the whole of Germany to be included and balanced within it, that is for the future Europe to include among others Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Hungary. This could only hope to be brought about after a rather lengthy period of evolution, but it is the one result capable of bringing peace to Europe once and for all.

(4) What conditions must the military alliances fulfil in order not to impede this evolution ?

In the Europe of today, the military alliances only act as reciprocal guarantees against serious fortuitous incidents or major reversals of trends. These guarantees which are indispensable - above all from the psychological point of view - ought not to preserve the deep-seated hostility which characterised them in the 1950's. NATO must not look to the East like a Western war machine run by the United States, just as the Warsaw Pact must not look to the West like a communist bloc war machine run by the Soviet Union.

In order to bring this about, it would be desirable for a political and military detente to develop between the states of Europe and, correlatively, for the direct military hold of the United States and the Soviet Union on Europe to be relaxed to an appreciable extent, without however the credibility of their strategic protection being weakened as a result.

This presupposes that the United States and Soviet Union continue their policy of detente and make some disengagement from Europe the token of their rapprochement.

(5) What conditions must the military alliances fulfil so as to help make the European perspective a reality ?

From this standpoint, it would be infinitely desirable for both the eastern and western military alliances to contain a

purely European component, distinct from the system of defence in common with the major ally.

This would be a way of bringing about a condition which is essential for the European states, eastern and western, to become fully aware of the political and strategic problems which are special to them. Moreover this could also be the way towards preparing for their eventual reunification after the pending European problems have been solved.

III Conclusions

These concepts may perhaps seem Utopian at the moment, because they are still very far from present realities.

Nevertheless a profound change is working itself out in Europe. This present conference bears witness to it. This evolutionary process can only generate fruitful solutions if it takes place within the framework of more distant perspectives which it is important to keep in mind from now onwards.

Because Europe is still politically sick, military alliances with the great nuclear powers still remain necessary. But we must do our utmost to bring "Europe" into being and, most important, to settle the German problem, avoiding the indefinite continuation of the present status quo. In this intermediate phase, the military alliances must not act as a brake on the evolution which is taking shape. On the contrary, they should help to facilitate solutions capable of solving our difficulties. In order to do this, their aim should be to maintain the necessary guarantees while at the same time making possible progress in the detente between East and West.

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INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

8TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE : THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP

COMMITTEE II

Sunday 2nd October — Afternoon

The role of Great Britain in European security

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Anyone rash enough to speculate as to the future course of Britain's defence policy in the autumn of 1966 is asking for trouble. Although there has hardly been a time since the end of the last war that it was possible to say that British defence policy was on an even keel, at the present moment it is probably more in a state of flux than it has ever been before. This is not solely due to the changes proposed in the Defence White Paper of 1966; indeed, a lot of the trouble in analysing the probable future course of our defence policy is due very largely to the fact that it is quite impossible to say whether the policy outlined there will ever be implemented. The economic state of the country, and the effect this is likely to have on defence requirements, is also a major factor, but so too are the inherent contradictions arising from the policy pursued at least since 1954.

In considering the role of Britain in European security at this time, therefore, it is simply not possible to discuss this subject by itself. So many different factors must enter into account before we can decide not only what policy in Europe we ought to pursue, but also what policy we are likely to be able to pursue in the light of the present situation. For twenty years, we have been trying to pursue a defence policy suitable to one of the great powers of the world. In doing this, we have not been unsuccessful, in the sense that most of the goals which we set ourselves, we were able to carry out. But the economic burden of doing this has been colossal, and at the moment when the whole economic future of the country is in the balance, it is inevitable that defence policy is subject to the same uncertainties as all other aspects of home policy. Before coming on to the specific European issue, therefore, we must have a look at the situation as a whole.

Defence policy in Britain has been governed for ten years, and still is to-day, by two documents - the amended Brussels Treaty of 1954, and the Defence White Paper of 1957. By the first of these documents, concluded at the London and Paris Conferences of that year, we committed ourselves to maintain four divisions and a tactical air force on the Continent of Europe for the length of the Treaty - that is until 1997. This was part of the price which we had to pay to secure French support for the rearmament of Western Germany. These forces cannot be withdrawn except with the agreement of the Council of Western European Union, though there is a safety clause for use in a period of grave economic difficulty. On the only occasion so far when we have sought the permission of the W.E.U. Council - to withdraw some 20,000 troops in 1957 - it was grudgingly given. The present British Government apparently has the idea of a further withdrawal in mind if the West German Government is not more forthcoming in aiding our balance of payments difficulties arising from the stationing of so large a part of our Army in a place where it has to be paid for in foreign currency.

The 1957 Defence White Paper, which will always be associated with the name of Mr. Duncan Sandys, the Defence Minister at the time, marked another major shift in British defence policy. Coming to the conclusion that the ultimate defence of Britain must lie in our own nuclear strength, the White Paper foreshadowed the end of conscription, and the return to the traditional British idea of purely voluntary forces. It led to the scaling down of our conventional forces, so that now we have a total of just over 300,000 under arms, of which about 180,000 are soldiers. The money thus saved was to be devoted to the development of the nuclear arm, and the provision of the weapons necessary to deliver nuclear warheads.

Two things went wrong with this policy, which seemed so logical at the time. First of all, the development of the weapons proved impossibly costly, and very few of the major British attempts in this direction ever got past the development stage. Secondly, the hope that the role of conventional forces would grow less as time went on proved completely vain. At the moment when the policy was laid down, the major British defence commitment outside Europe - the crushing of the revolt in Malaya - was just coming to an end, and the Malayan State was being established in a way which, it was hoped, would lessen our commitment there for the future. At the same time, the abortive Suez operation had recently shown the ineffectiveness of purely conventional forces in a world crisis. From both these two events, the conclusion was drawn that the role

of the conventional force would be limited to small policing operations, which would not require any great numbers of men.

It was perfectly true, of course, that, in the sort of international crisis of which Suez has been one of the main examples since the war, conventional troops are pretty useless. In fact, anything which gets onto the world plain like that is likely to be dealt with by the two super-powers alone, if they can agree - Cuba, for example - or not to be settled at all, if they cannot, like Viet-Nam. But we completely overlooked the fact that, if we were to maintain our role as policeman to the Commonwealth - a role which, it seemed, many Commonwealth countries were not averse to our assuming - then this required a large effort in conventional, not nuclear, forces. Since the 1957 White Paper, British troops have been constantly engaged in various types of small operation all over the world. I can recall vividly, for example, one hectic week-end in January 1964. At that time, we had some 20,000 men in Malaysia, operating in confrontation with the Indonesians. We had a similar number in Aden, where there was also a security problem. We had garrisons of some size in Hongkong and Malta, and of a very much smaller size in Gibraltar, Libya, Bahrein, Gan, and Guyana. In addition, there was a unit in Swaziland, which had been sent out there at the time of some civil disturbance a year before, and seemed to have got forgotten. Our forces formed the major part of the United Nations force in Cyprus.

At this moment, when our forces seemed so stretched that there was no more slack left, we were suddenly confronted with a new emergency in East Africa, from which our troops had been withdrawn only six months earlier. The Governments of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania were all faced simultaneously with mutinies in their armed forces, and called for help. Luckily, we had a Marine Commando afloat off the East Coast of Africa at that time, and this was able to land at Dar-Es-Salaam in time to save the situation there, while troops were air-lifted from Aden to cope with the situation in the other two countries. We were, in a way, rather pleased with ourselves, as we had felt only a few days before that we simply could not deal with another emergency, if one arose. But, at the same time, there was a distinct feeling of resentment that, at a time like that, over a quarter of the British Army was immobilised in Germany, doing nothing effective.

Despite the warnings which this incident gave, nothing has really been done to alter the situation. The present Government's Defence White Paper of February this year purports to launch

a new policy, but nothing has really been changed. We still accept obligations all over the world, and there must be even greater doubt than before whether we have the means to fulfil them. In particular, the East of Suez policy may be slightly less costly as a result of the proposed withdrawal from Aden, but this is unlikely to help very much with the manpower problem, as we intend to maintain a sizable base in Singapore for the foreseeable future, and whatever may be our intentions as regards Bahrein, it is difficult to see how, in the present disturbed state of the Middle East, which is likely to remain disturbed for a considerable time, we are in fact going to be able to save very much on manpower there, however much we may wish to.

Quite apart from the manpower question, however, the whole East of Suez policy, to which both major parties in Britain pay lip-service, must be under the closest scrutiny. Various eminent men in British political life, notably the former Navy Minister Mr. Christopher Mayhew, and the Conservative spokesman on defence, Mr. Enoch Powell, have declared against it for a variety of reasons. Mr. Mayhew believes not only that it is impossible to carry out such a policy without a carrier fleet, but also that it is undesirable to carry it out anyway, and that the only white troops which should be tolerated East of Suez should be under U.N. Command. Mr. Powell believes that the defence of Britain's own interests must be the first consideration, and, on our meagre resources, this must involve a withdrawal into European defence. Both of these views are valid; I take perhaps an even simpler view. Given the circumstances in which we now find ourselves, the logical consequence is that, within the next ten years, we shall have no East of Suez policy at all. What worries me is that, because of the emphasis which has been placed on the Far East, we may have no defence policy for the rest of the world either.

The Government's present policy, it seems to me, cannot possibly work. I agree with Mr. Mayhew that a carrier force is indispensable, if we are to carry out a role as policeman of the Indian Ocean. The island strategy, so often discussed and now apparently embraced by Mr. Healey, is a non-starter. However much the R.A.F. may yearn to build an airstrip on Aldabra, I doubt if it will ever be built. Our one experience of this kind of thing - the building of an airstrip on Gan - has not been something which we would want to repeat, and if it is maintained that Aldabra is uninhabited and therefore we shall not be faced with the complications there which we had in Gan, the answer must be that if we start major works there, it won't be uninhabited for long. One of the major

arguments in favour of Gan was that the population was so small that there could be no political complications; within two years of operations starting, we had to have a frigate permanently standing by to take off the British Resident in case of trouble.

But even if we were able to pepper the Indian Ocean with airstips, it is still doubtful whether the policy would work. The capabilities of the FIII still remain highly questionable; it may eventually go down to history as Mr. Healey's Skybolt. But even if it turns out to be everything that Mr. Healey and Mr. McNamara claim for it, 50 planes will never be enough to carry out the role they have been assigned, granted that not more than 20 are ever likely to be operational at any one time. To get any more would run us into very heavy cost across the exchanges, as it is clear that the price at which we have contracted to buy the plane will be nothing like the eventual full cost, and any further orders will inevitably have to bear the full cost. Furthermore, I am extremely doubtful whether, by 1975 - and this is the time-scale we are discussing, for the carrier fleet remains operational until then - Governments round the Indian Ocean will really see the need for a British policeman. Even the desire of the Singapore Government to see us stay on there seems to be based much more on economic than military factors.

There is only one way in which I can foresee any British military presence effectively East of Suez after 1975, and that is if it is part of an Alliance in which the non-American members of NATO play their full part. I have argued elsewhere the case for an extension of NATO outside the European and Atlantic sphere, not only because it seems to be necessary if burdens are to be shared, but also because it is the only way I can see in which the very reasonable complaint of General de Gaulle that the European powers are liable to be dragged into a nuclear war in America's wake over a Far East quarrel in which they have no say can possibly be answered. Only this way too, I believe, through an Alliance which covers all aspects of mutual concern to the Allies, can the appallingly difficult problem of nuclear control be solved. However, this is not the place to argue this case, and anyway, I am pessimistic enough to think it highly unlikely that such a development will ever occur.

All of this may seem a long way removed from the specific topic of European defence which I have been asked to discuss, yet unless we can see the whole picture of British defence commitments after 1975, it is impossible for us to foresee exactly what contribution we are likely to be able to make to Europe at that time.

Up to now, whenever we have been accused of not pulling our weight in Europe, we have always been able to reply that we have commitments elsewhere which have made this impossible, and it is perfectly true that we have spent more per head on defence than any other NATO country except the United States. This obsession with defence outside Europe was also the main reason why we were so cool to the idea of a European Defence Community in the early 1950s, even though we had suggested it in the first place, and it is a little galling to think that, for the same price that we paid to secure Western European Union, we could have had the E.D.C., even without ourselves as members of it. The action of Winston Churchill's Government in turning our back to Europe in 1951 was, in my opinion, the worst mistake made by any British Government since the war, not only in the political, but in the military field as well. Circumstances, it would seem, which have been forcing us back economically to the position we rejected then, will also force us back politically and militarily as well, and the picture for the mid-70s will be a Britain with cirtually no commitments outside the European area, and in any case without the weapons to fulfil them.

There is one other consequence of this which I ought to mention before going on to see how we should best deal with this situation. I do not see how, under these circumstances, it is going to be possible to maintain the principle of a voluntary army. This may be something of a relief to those responsible for our defence at that time, as the abandonment of conscription has not led to the great savings which were envisaged in 1957. This is not only due to the fact that the nuclear deterrence delivery system proved so impossibly costly. The voluntary system proved to be immensely costly as well. In a time of labour shortage, the forces had to compete with the home market, and therefore had to offer rates of pay and living conditions which were reasonably comparable with life outside. Very nearly half the defence budget over the past ten years has gone on pay, and the provision of benefits such as housing and welfare services, and it is this that has made major reductions in that budget so difficult. Even then, recruiting was not easy, and there has always been an uneasy feeling that the target figure for the armed forces was adjusted up and down, not according to the number of troops the military felt they needed, but to the number the politicians thought they could obtain.

Of only one thing could we be certain, and that was that recruiting went up when our forces were engaged in combat, and went down in times of quiescence. The lure of action was very strong, and

equally strong - as market research, in which we have engaged extensively, conclusively proved - was the lure of exotic places. Hongkong and Singapore may not have looked very good when the soldier got there, but they looked terrific on recruiting posters, and even places like Tripoli and Benghazi, where our troops were housed in incomparably worse conditions than they were on Salisbury Plain, undoubtedly helped to bring the recruits in. Withdrawal East of Suez will remove this vital element from our recruiting. Under those circumstances, if all we have to offer is service in Britain or with the British Army of the Rhine - where our men have always been in greater danger of dying of boredom that from enemy bullets - the greatest attraction of service life will have gone, and though there always will be men prepared to take the job on, they will be infinitely fewer than our present forces, which are already too small for our needs.

What I envisage then after 1975 is a British defence force primarily engaged on the defence of our islands and the Continent of Europe, raised through some form of conscription - probably by means of selective service, and stationed partly on the Continent and partly at home. It will be a force whose role is totally different from any which any British force has known for the past 300 years, and it is therefore vital that, long before this time is reached, we have a clear idea of what it is we are aiming at in European defence.

Happily from one point of view, we have been given the opportunity of a thorough review of the situation now. Whatever view one may take of General de Gaulle's policies and actions - and certainly the absence of courtesy alone makes him difficult to defend - one good thing will certainly come out of the present crisis. He has forced the NATO issue into the front of people's minds throughout the Alliance, and made us concentrate on the shape of European defence to come. The opportunity will be completely wasted if we merely sit back and say that we want NATO, the whole NATO, and nothing but the NATO. The whole European situation has completely changed since 1949, both with the waning of the Cold War, and with the growth of a strong, self-reliant European Economic Community which, whatever the views of the French Government, either now or in the future, will inevitably develop into something closer and stronger in the political field. The danger of war in Europe is now greatly lessened, though it must be realised that, as long as Germany remains divided - and in consequence, Europe does too - this danger will always be there.

The framers of NATO were more prophetic than they knew when they provided for revision after twenty years, and it is up to us to make full use of their wisdom.

We must assume first of all that Germany will remain divided, at least for the foreseeable future. It would not seem to me to be in the interests of the Soviet Union and the East European countries to encourage a united Germany at this time, even though I believe that the threat to peace which arises from its division is as great for them as it is for us. We must assume, too, that Britain will shortly be a member of the European Economic Community, and that this Community will steadily develop in political, and therefore, military fields. We must assume that the fundamental anti-Americanism of current French policy is not something limited to General de Gaulle himself, but is endemic to France at the moment, that it is likely to be pursued by almost any conceivable alternative French Government, and that it awakes a sympathetic echo in a number of other circles in Europe as well. We must assume, however, that any West German Government is likely to take the American alliance as the cornerstone of its defence policy, and that any British Government will do the same, though possibly not to the same degree. And finally we must assume that no future American Government will relapse into isolationism, and that therefore we can rely on an American presence in Europe so long as NATO lasts.

Some clarification is required to the phrase "an American presence" in these assumptions - clarification which in itself leads to an additional assumption. It seems to me almost inevitable that, within the time-scale of which we are talking - that is, between now and 1975 - a drastic modification to the pattern of American troop-concentration is inevitable. A number of factors would seem to lead to this conclusion. The United States suffers almost as much as Britain from the strain which the maintenance of large-scale conventional forces in Germany imposes on her balance of payments. Politically, there has been a considerable growth in the pressure within Congress to "bring the boys back home", and militarily the growing pressure of the Viet-Nam war, with its incessant demands for more American conventional forces is bound to make the Pentagon look with ever more envious eyes on the forces in Germany. Furthermore, should there ever be a genuine <u>detente</u> in Europe, this in itself would force withdrawal of some, if not all, the troops. One could also add that possible technological developments, in the field of giant transport aircraft making possible the reinforcement of Europe by several divisions in a matter of hours, would also encourage the tendency to withdraw.

I think it unlikely that the United States would not leave some token forces behind, especially in Berlin. But it seems to me highly probable that, taking all these elements into account, we can expect the withdrawal of the major part of the U.S. ground forces from Europe in the next few years. Provision would have to be made, of course, for adequate backing to be available for the possible re-entry of these forces, but even that might not be enough to ensure adequate defence in the event of a sudden emergency. If this were to happen, therefore, it would make even more necessary the provision of more effective defence of Western Europe by the Europeans themselves.

All these are assumptions, but I think they are reasonable ones on which to base our forward planning. Though they may seem mutually contradictory, there is I think sufficient of a common basis in them to enable us at least to review the situation, and not just to claim that it is hopeless. What is the common ground from which we can proceed, and what, if any, is the British role which can emerge in this?

There are, I think, two basic elements which would be accepted by all. First, that NATO cannot continue for very much longer in its present form, if only because General de Gaulle is determined to see that it does not, and he is in a position to enforce his view. Tentatively, I would suggest, as a corollary to this, that there is general agreement that it should not continue in its present form, even among Americans. The search for some kind of multilateral force a few years ago was indirect confirmation of this. Second, that so long as Germany remains divided, the existence of military blocs in Europe is bound to continue, and that therefore some kind of collective defence is necessary. As a corollary to this, I would add that this may be no bad thing, as collective defence implies collective control, and if we stress the positive side of control, we may learn much of use on a wider field.

France remains a member of NATO, but not of the organisation set up under the Treaty. This is now the somewhat curious position of the French Government, which seems to carry the French reputation for logic a stage further. The problem is that, with the virtual French withdrawal from NATO discussions, it becomes a little difficult to see how these problems can be discussed. The basic French objection is to what she regards as American interference in purely European matters, and it is unlikely therefore that she will welcome any fundamental discussion in an organisation in which the Americans are not only present, but have in the past tended to dominate all

the discussion. The necessary transitional military measures needed to get over the immediate problem may be decided at NATO, but the long-term settlement of European defence policy will not be decided there. Where else can it be decided then? Where else but in Western European Union?

This remarkable and little-known organisation was once described, by one of my Labour colleagues in the House of Commons, as the "pompier de l'Europe". It is a striking image. Totally ignored when things are going well, it is to the Brussels Treaty that the politicians turn when they begin to go badly, and usually through the Brussels Treaty, some kind of arrangement can be made. In 1954, the Brussels Treaty was amended to create Western European Union, and to get over the crisis caused by the rejection of the European Defence Community in the French National Assembly. In 1957, it was the W.E.U. Council which resolved the crisis brought about by the British balance of payments position. In 1960, it was to W.E.U. that the politicians turned when seeking some way of closing the breach between the E.E.C and E.F.T.A. It is always there; it can be used for anything. It has a very small staff, with no opportunities for self-aggrandisement, and virtually no functions except to be useful. And useful, it has certainly been.

What is more, it has been notable throughout the whole of the NATO controversy since the General's press conference in March, that the French Government has behaved with noticeable enthusiasm towards WEU. French spokesmen have gone out of their way to state that the obligations contained in Article V of the Brussels Treaty - which are a good deal more far-reaching than those contained in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty - remain fully valid for France. It is true that France has maintained throughout that she is not going to accept in WEU the type of integration which she has just rejected in NATO, but at least we seem to have the assurance that in WEU she is prepared to discuss, because it is a purely European forum, while in NATO she is only prepared to dictate. The drawback, of course, is that in WEU only seven of the fifteen NATO countries are present, and more particularly that the Americans are absent. It will be necessary, I am afraid, for the others to trust France's partners in WEU not to betray the cause, for unless a dialogue starts in that forum, I very much doubt whether it will start at all.

It is essential that such a dialogue, if not sub specie aeternitatis, should at least concern itself rather more with the long term. We have short-term problems, of course, most notably the French withdrawal, and the British threat of withdrawal from

Germany. These can, I think, be overcome on a short-term basis. I am much more concerned with 1975, when Britain will, I think have ceased to have any defence policy outside Europe, and the full weight of her influence can at last be brought to bear there. What sort of terms should we be thinking in?

Clearly, there will have to be a purely European organisation, linked in some way with the United States and Canada - and, if possible, Australia and New Zealand as well, for one of the consequences of the ending of our role East of Suez is going to be the gradual isolation of these two countries. It would, I think, be dreaming to think in terms of going back to the old EDC context, at any rate as an immediate goal. This may be something which we should be aiming for in the distant future, but the element of supranationality will certainly put off any French Government in the near future, and probably any British Government as well. While not wholly supranational, the new body must be fairly tightly integrated; it might be worthwhile to start with the implementation of those clauses of the 1954 agreements which have remained something of a dead letter, especially those relating to compulsory inspection. (I think it would be foolish, however, to imagine that this can be done by revitalising WEU; some new form of organisation will be needed.) This European defence organisation, allied to some kind of political link between the European countries, would be the European end of the bridge across the Atlantic which President Kennedy foresaw in his speech in Philadelphia on July 4th, 1962.

Britain must make it perfectly plain that she is on the European side of the bridge. Enough trouble has been caused in the past by the attempts of successive British Governments to have it both ways by trying to pretend that our geographical position was a few miles south of Iceland rather than 20 miles off the coast of France. Precious though the special relationship between Britain and the United States has been in the past, I doubt very much if it has much longer to go anyway, and we might just as well call it a day now and finally admit that we are part of Europe. Certainly, by 1975, this fact will be forced upon us.

Britain's total identification with the European side of the bridge becomes vital when one considers the most difficult question of all - that of nuclear control. The French idea of the future organisation of European defence seems to be that the countries of the European Economic Community at least will be able to relax, conscious of the fact that they are defended by the might of the French <u>force de frappe</u>. It is understandable that France's partners do not see

it in quite the same light, not only because they have little confidence in the deterrent power of the force de frappe, but also because they are not quite certain what sort of Government will follow that of General de Gaulle in France, and prefer to rely on the known capability of the United States Strategic Air Command and the Polaris system. Despite this, however, there is no doubt that the concern felt at the concentration of so much Alliance power in the hands of the United States is genuine - and understandable. It would be quite absurd for the new European defence organisation to set out to duplicate the United States effort in nuclear development, even if the European nations were prepared to make the necessary financial sacrifice. Besides, the effect of this in terms of nuclear proliferation, especially in Eastern Europe, could be quite disastrous.

The addition of the British deterrent to the French, however, while in no way forming a substitute for the American, might change the situation sufficiently to satisfy all parties. It would still be too weak to be regarded by East Europe as a menace, but strong enough as a second strike weapon to give some measure of confidence to Western Europe. It would be indisputably Western European, but not solely French or British. While its use would have to be planned in conjunction with the United States, it would still be capable of acting on its own in a supreme emergency. And it would not involve any element of proliferation.

Of course, this raises problems as well. It would still not solve the problem of the nuclear imbalance within the Alliance, which can in any case only be solved in the context of complete abandonment of sovereignty over the weapon within the Alliance, and the United States Congress is unlikely to contemplate that with equanimity for some considerable time. Nevertheless, someone has got to start sometime with the thorny problem of nuclear control. The various suggestions for Atlantic multilateral forces are now stone dead; a European nuclear force based on the present British and French forces might be an experiment which could persuade Congress that such joint control is feasible. It might even go so far as to persuade the Russians of the same thing, and therefore help in the Geneva disarmament talks, but this is not something that one can plan for.

The principal problem, of course, lies in the machinery of control itself. One of the first tasks of those drawing up such a scheme would be to test exactly how far the French are wedded to complete nationalism in this field. If it was made plain that this was an autonomous European force, allied to but not in any way subservient to, a larger American force, then the French might be

prepared to compromise on the principle of absolute sovereignty, and agree to some committee of control, which would have to have a system of weighted voting. If this accord in principle could be achieved, then this committee would appoint the European supreme commander, and would lay down for him his general instructions. It would be up to this officer to liaise with the American who would be the supreme Atlantic commander, presumably appointed by the North Atlantic Council as now.

The disposition of conventional forces under this committee would be more easily achieved. Britain, no longer required to carry out a major role outside Europe, would find a good deal less difficulty in the maintenance of the Rhine Army. Considerable flexibility would be needed here; there are already signs that Germany, with the growth of the Bundeswehr, is getting just a little bit too full of troops, and the situation, particularly with regard to training grounds, is already very tight. It is likely to get tighter as the years go by, but the popular solution of bringing the boys home would only make matters worse. The training position may be tight in Germany; in Britain it is chaotic. It is now virtually impossible to exercise at more than brigade strength, and short of new grounds being found in Canada, or Australia, divisional training will have to remain in Germany. With the growing pressure on German training grounds, this would mean that full divisional exercises would be unlikely to be carried out more than about once every five years.

This is one argument, of course - which seems to have escaped the French so far, though they are faced with the same problem - for the maintenance of NATO. The empty spaces necessary for training a modern army are unlikely to be found on the crowded lands of Western Europe.

If, however, Rhine Army remains where it is at roughly its present strength of 50,000, it would be reasonable for the British to ask for a similar alienation of troops from the other members of the European defence organisation. It would thus be possible to form a conventional arm of some strength, available for the land defence of Europe, and also, perhaps, for operations outside Europe, either under United Nations or Allied command. But the whole thing must depend on the creation of the proper organisation within Europe, and achieving the right balance between nationalism and supranationality which would be required.

Here, I believe, Britain can play a considerable part. At the moment, all moves to any kind of political - and therefore defence -

co-operation within the Six are blocked by the fundamental difference of view between France and the rest. If Britain's entry to the E.E.C. by 1970 seems a fairly safe bet, then there will still be five years for the development of the necessary organisation for European defence. It is likely that British entry will be followed by an upsurge of interest in political and military co-operation, and equally likely that the British attitude to this - regrettably in my opinion - will be closer to the French position than that of the other five. This, in itself, may make the French more prepared to consider some kind of organisation of the kind that I have outlined.

To sum up, then, I suggest that, by 1975, Britain's role outside Europe will have virtually ceased to exist. We shall still, have a nuclear deterrent force of five or more Polaris submarines, the French submarine strike force will probably just be coming into service, and we both may have land-based means of delivery as well. We will probably have had to fall in line with the other countries of Europe in introducing some form of conscription, and we shall be full members of a European Economic Community rapidly developing a political and military role. Britain's essential task in this, other than contributing part of the European nuclear force, is to ensure that this new constellation of power does not get divorced from the United States and other NATO countries, but that it remains one of the two twin pillars of the Atlantic alliance. It will not be an easy task, and we should start planning for it now.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR QUOTATION

INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

8TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE : THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP

COMMITTEE II

Saturday 2nd October — Afternoon

Small Countries and European Security

ANTONIN SNEJDAREK

The role of small countries in world policies has undergone development throughout history and it may be said to have been determined primarily by three factors. The first is the importance in the given historical period of the technical potential for the power of individual countries, both in the military and economic fields. Whenever the industrial potential and the development of technology of different countries within a certain region were more or less balanced, the security of small countries grew along with the growing influence of these countries in international relations. Conversely, while disproportions between the industrial potential and the technology of small and large countries grow, the dependence of small countries on decisions of countries disposing of the decisive technical potential grows as well.

The second factor has been determined by objective relations among great powers. History gives evidence of the effort of the great Powers, many times resorted to, aimed at creating around themselves a sort of security zone or zone of dependent countries which would provide them with more freedom and certainty in manoeuvring in international politics. The small countries neighbouring on great Powers are then drawn into such a zone. Similarly, as history gives evidence of repeated attempts to create such zones of influence of great Powers, it also gives evidence of the disintegration of such systems which occurs with regularity according to certain historical laws at the time when the great Power which initiated the system finds itself in a complicated situation, awakened by internal or external factors. It is usually the relation between individual determining Powers which is decisive for the fate of such groupings. As soon as the balance of forces is stable, the security

system of Powers is strengthened, and vice-versa. In the period of evening up the balance of forces between the main determining Powers, small countries have possibilities of pursuing their own independent policies which might affect world events, in a relatively minor but decisive manner.

The third factor documented in history may be characterized as constantly repeated attempts by small countries to get out of dependence and to acquire the widest possible sphere for their own foreign policies. This trend has many times in history led to romantic ideas; some politicians in small countries who based their concepts on such ideas lived to see a colossal collapse of their concepts within a very short time. At the same time, however, history proves that in some cases, when the policies of small countries relied on realistic considerations and paid regard to objective factors determining international political processes, small countries scored good and, not infrequently, lasting results.

The entry of atomic weapons into history marked the beginning of a quite different era in the relations between large and small countries. It was already evident at the time of World War II that small countries cannot arm themselves quickly with sufficient quantitites of most modern weapons, which are still being perfected, and cannot repel the armed might of a Power which has all the conditions for utilizing its enormous industrial potential. The attack of Hitlerite Germany on the small European countries ended mostly in a quick defeat of the armies of those small countries, and although other, unmilitary factors, having no relation to industrial potential, played their role, it was the reality of potential supremacy that determined the course of events at that time.

World War II was followed by a period in which small countries, incapable of manufacturing atomic weapons, became in respect of military security in large measure more dependent on great Powers than ever before. Although the process that followed showed that there were possibilities of manufacturing atomic weapons even in small countries, and such possibilities have become quite big by now in some of them, this fact could change nothing in substance in the decisive position of the great Powers in world policies. In the first period after World War II and in the period of the two super Powers disposing of atomic weapons as a monopoly, the possibilities of small countries to influence world politics dropped to a minimum; in all probability this role of small countries in world policies was never so small as it was then.

However, historical processes went on. First of all for the first time in the history the world socialist system, grouped around the Soviet Union which, until World War II, had been the only socialist country in the world, came into being. Capitalist countries came under the direct influence of the United States of America and became dependent on the USA for a long time ahead in the economic and above all in the military field. Several years later another great historical process gained maturity, namely the disintegration of the colonial system and the birth of new States, the so-called third world. For a certain period the division of the world into two large blocs, headed by the two atomic super powers, remained relatively unchanged, stable and to a certain extent frozen.

The balance of forces between the two blocs, brought about by the fact that the Soviet Union, contrary to the expectations of US strategists, achieved a balance of forces with the United States in the field of missile technology, created a strange and historically unprecedented system of security based on mutual, even though tacit, respect of the forces of the other bloc. That system in itself showed the objective necessity of the existence of the two blocs. The West, and particularly the United States, was for a long time unwilling to recognize the existence of the newly-established socialist States in Europe and in Asia as a fact which cannot be changed. Practical experience showed that any hopes for internal disruption in the socialist countries were only dreams which would not be sanctioned by reality. In the latter fifties, when the Soviet Union started its drive to urge peaceful coexistence in international relations as a basis for relations among States having different social systems, those opposing the idea of peaceful coexistence found themselves first on the defensive and later in a situation in which they had to adjust their policies to new realities. In that new period peaceful coexistence, with several exceptions, started to be recognized as a political necessity and a human need.

The blocs remained in existence, and the relations between them and between individual members of these blocs started gradually to be normalized. Not only was there formal regulation of these relations; it was the beginning of a relatively broad process of new contacts between members of the two blocs involving ever wider sections of the economic, political, cultural and psychologic life of these countries. The objective possibility of peaceful coexistence became evident, and this peaceful coexistence was hailed by hundreds of millions of people in different countries as a great hope ushering in long-lasting peace and prosperity. However, it would be incorrect

not to see that this process has recently been adversely affected by disturbing interventions, primarily on the part of the United States. The launching of the war in Vietnam has created a new situation which puts a brake on the process which is now going on of the normalization of relations among States with different social systems, puts a brake on the international relaxation of tensions and, indeed, imposes a basic barrier against a further relaxation in international relations and against a further normalization in the relations of States having different social systems. It is a paradoxical situation. On the one hand there are exceptionally good conditions for a broad normalization of relations between countries with different social systems, better than ever before, world public opinion having been very largely won over in support of the principles of peaceful coexistence in international relations; on the other hand there is an artificial barrier blocking this entire process and even creating symptoms of a new, highly grave, danger of growing tensions and military conflict.

In this new stage of the historical process in which we live, the position of small countries in world policies has started to change as well. The balance of forces between the two existing blocs has placed before the small countries a number of new problems; the most important of these is the problem of creating relations of a new type within the existing blocs. The members of the existing blocs, linked by a number of interests, have started to constitute new relations among themselves, both conceptually and institutionally, determined primarily by their common presence in one bloc. In view of the profound differences in the two blocs the principles on which these new relations have started developing were different as well. In addition, they were also affected by the consequences of complex and long-term historical processes and conditions emerging from the economic structures of the members of the existing blocs. Despite all difficulties certain new relations in this respect have succeeded in both blocs, even though the core of the relationship is different in each bloc. For the first time in history, the socialist system has succeeded in laying the foundations of new relations among States which have socialized the means of production and have therefore all prerequisites for eliminating all antagonistic differences forever. However, one should not disregard the fact that this is a process not void of considerable complexities which will probably last for a whole historical epoch. The capitalist grouping has succeeded in laying the foundation of economic integration, even though it continues to exist in a state of major differences and many ambiguities.

During the initial period of the existence of this process, when the positions of the two blocs were separated by a strict line of irreconcilability, the main significance of the policies of small countries lay in the problem of finding a relationship to the process of the establishment of blocs and regulating in a new way the relations of the respective country within the existing blocs. The period of the advocacy of the peaceful coexistence of States having different social systems, placed before small states the question of organizing and intensifying relations with the countries of the other bloc. In addition, the fact that a few years brought into being dozens of new States in continents which only yesterday were colonies faced small countries with the question of how to organize relations with these new States. A large majority of them established active contacts with these new States and continues to promote them.

Small States, in whichever part of the world they may be situated, are now faced with the problem of how to avert the growing military danger and to secure the intensified process of the normalization of relations in complete peace and mutual respect among States with different social systems. Small countries do not have possibilities for settling major world problems and do not make world policies. Their interests concentrate primarily in the fields in which their possibilities are the best. This field is delineated mostly geographically.

Following the development in recent years of international relations in different geographical regions of the world, we discover that apart from common features, there are also deep differences. This, after all, is nothing new in history. The core of interest of the main factors determining history was always at certain periods created in certain regions, while being limited in others. This time, however, we observe that in different regions of the world there are forces not entirely identical. The dynamic forces of anti-colonialist revolution accompanied by colossal nationalism in the nations of the third world of Asia and Africa are active as the main factors and the main driving force of the historical processes in these continents. The situation in Europe is different. First of all, Europe has ceased to be the centre of the world, although it has remained an exceptionally significant factor in world policies. It was in Europe that the balance of forces of the existing blocs made itself felt lost, since in the process of their creation the two blocs proceeded primarily from their European positions and the blocs were formed particularly in Europe. The existence of the two blocs has created in Europe the most perfect form of the security system based on mutual respect for the strength of the other partner. This

system, relying on the military blocs of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, concentrated in Europe, more than at any other place in the world, the largest quantities of atomic weapons and created in Europe the largest and numerically the strongest military concentration in the world; at the same time, however, particularly recently, it has provided the States members of the two blocs with the possibility of substantially normalizing their mutual relations.

The establishment of NATO created a dangerous hotbed of conflict in Europe: German revanchism, represented by the attempts of the influential circles in the Federal Republic of Germany to take advantage of the Federal Republic's membership of NATO in order to implement plans for changing the state of affairs which was established in Europe in 1945 and which found its legal expression in the Potsdam Agreement. The existence of this hotbed in Europe helped maintain tensions among European States members of the two blocs for years. The fact that in the centre of Europe there is a State which has a huge industrial, and by now even military, potential and which raises territorial claims against its neighbours and against other countries has naturally prevented and stands in the way of the normalization of the relations along the line dividing the two existing blocs, i.e. at the points of the greatest and most imminent danger. Despite this fact, however, a careful analysis of the situation in Europe will reveal that it was there where stabilization and normalization tendencies have been strongest in recent years. These tendencies not only reflect the will of the overwhelming majority of the people of the European continent but are an expression of certain existing political necessities of which the leaders in European countries are well aware. The processes which started in Europe and which are going on there are quite different from the processes existing for example in Asia or in Africa. Let us recapitulate now very briefly some of the typical features of the processes going on in Europe.

Two blocs have been created, the members of which are countries having different social systems. Both these blocs have undergone certain processes of integration which have reached a relatively high stage. However, since the very beginning, the leading force in NATO has been extra-European and its interests are far from identical with European interests. This force is engaged in the other parts of the world and is in particular increasingly engaged in Asia in the war to which no European can agree and which can bring no benefit to any European country. It is, therefore, quite natural that the opposition of European partners

within NATO to the dependence on the force engaged in such a dangerous action is ever stronger. Moreover the economic dependence of Western Europe on the United States, which after World War II was a typical feature of the entire West European development, was overcome long ago. The two economic groupings in Western Europe are very strong and prosperous today and have rather become competitors of the US economy. We are witnessing the naturally progressive disintegration of NATO. The realistic politicians, like, for example de Gaulle, have been dissociating themselves distinctly from NATO policies and have set off on their own roads, independent of the United States. However, the United States still remain in Europe and tries to preserve NATO, even without France, on a new basis, having chosen as its main partner on the European continent the Federal Republic of Germany, i.e. the country wherein lies the only grave hotbed of danger for Europe. The States members of the Warsaw Treaty would welcome the dissolution of NATO since this would provide the possibility for dissolving the Warsaw Pact. Since the very start of its activity, the Warsaw Pact has been considered as a counter-measure against NATO and particularly against the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany into that grouping. It may be eliminated if NATO is dissolved.

// The hotbed of danger in Europe constituted by the absence of a solution to the German question according to the principles of the Potsdam Agreement, and the revived revanchism in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, make Europe the most dangerous spot. Until recently those inspiring such policies were successful in blocking or at least in making substantially difficult the development of relations among the other European countries, especially among smaller European States. Only a short time ago European countries, and here again small countries in the first place, tried to break this vicious circle. They took concrete initiatives aimed at the normalization of relations between themselves, which may be characterized as the interdependence of the German problem and the process of normalization of relations among the other, non-German European States. A characteristic feature of the situation is the fact that it is no longer possible to block the expansion of contacts between non-German European countries by the German problem and that, on the contrary, even the German problem itself is being affected by the progressing normalization of relations among non-German European States. However, making a more thorough analysis of the problem, we come to see that there is still a possibility for the German problem to block a further <u>rapprochement</u> of European countries: no longer at all levels, but at least at the top level. It is therefore evident

that it is impossible to reach agreement on any security system in Europe unless the two existing German States participate in such an agreement. At the same time, however, the pressure of the non-German European States on the forces still standing in the way of a peaceful and reasonable solution to the German question is growing constantly.

In some parts of Europe there have been growing tendencies aimed at safeguarding the security of Europe within regional agreements, especially such as would eliminate atomic weapons from some parts of Europe where the danger of their use is particularly great. Despite these tendencies no specific agreements to this effect have been reached so far. On the other hand, however, some detailed plans have been submitted that have received the approval of public opinion and of some official circles in both groupings. It should be noted that the main initiatives in this direction were taken mostly by the member countries of the Warsaw Pact. The NATO countries, with the exception of France, have shown relatively little initiative in this respect. Proposals have been submitted also for the creation of certain zones of controlled armaments in certain parts of Europe, in the most exposed areas. It should be particularly stressed here that most of these proposals were initiated by small European countries, which, in my opinion, constitutes significant evidence for the fact that these countries mostly feel themselves in danger and feel the necessity for influencing the future development of the situation in Europe in favour of peace and security.

Let us now try to study in a very summarized form some aspects concerning the objective possibilities of the small countries of Europe of influencing the process of creating European security. At the outset let us put to ourselves the basic question, namely, which are the factors facilitating the process of European security and which are the ones adversely affecting it. If we regard the process of creating European security as an agglomeration of forces aiming at one objective, namely at a total agreement of European countries on the elimination of war as a means for settlement of contentious issues in Europe, we see that the process would be be best facilitated by the following:

1. recognition of the status quo in Europe, including not only recognition of the present boundaries between European countries but also recognition of the objective state of affairs that has taken place after 1945. This includes e.g. recognition of the right of nations to choose whichever

social system they regard as the most suitable and the elimination of any external interference into the domestic affairs of European countries. This includes recognition of the resettlement of the German population from some European countries, as agreed under Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement;

2. renunciation of the idea that with external assistance and possibly even by force it is possoble to restore the former social systems in countries which had overthrown them. The fierce anti-communism which is still encountered constitutes a highly dangerous factor facilitating the growth of tensions among States with different social systems;

3. adoption of the principles of peaceful coexistence as the basis for relations among European countries having different social systems. These principles of peaceful co-existence should be codified and should be allowed to penetrate deeply into all specific actions in the field of foreign policy by European countries;

4. conclusion of agreements on economic, cultural, political and forms of other co-operation among European States with different social systems. The prerequisite for such agreements is, of course, primarily the normalization of relations among European countries having different social systems. Accordingly it constitutes an act facilitating the establishment of a basis for co-operation on the part of European countries in order to ensure normal diplomatic relations among States with different social systems in Europe;

5. promotion of contacts among the population, especially young people, proceeding from the endeavour to consolidate friendship among European nations. This includes facilities for tourism and the organization of free exchanges of opinion among nationals of countries having different social systems under the assumption that such exchanges are understood not as part of a system of ideological subversion but purely as a really free exchange of possibly different views on varied questions in the field of science, culture, economy and politics;

6. agreements on the limitation of armaments, and/or disarmament, on the creation of atom-free zones or other agreements facilitating a relaxation of the danger of a military conflict in Europe;

On the other hand, the process of creating European security is basically hindered by the following trends:

1. denial of the status quo in Europe and organization of actions aimed against this status quo. This includes, for example, attempts to cultivate the spirit of revenge even in the youngest generation, support for revenge-seeking and revisionists organizations, and propaganda for building up hopes that the current European status quo may be changed in the future by force and that there might be a return to the situation existing before the complete defeat of Hitlerite Germany;

2. propaganda in support of the idea that the triumph of socialism in some European countries is but a transient phenomenon and that steps should be taken to make preparations for its overthrow. This includes assistance given to groups of various emigre's who strive to prepare subversion in different forms in their home countries from the outside;

3. propaganda for the idea that peaceful coexistence is only a passing phenomenon which will lose effect after a change in the balance of forces and/or after such a shift in that balance of forces as would lead to the supremacy of the Western countries in Europe over the socialist States. These concepts include the preparation of so-called local wars which at a certain stage would be waged with conventional arms and which at various levels might be escalated to express a certain form of increased and dramatized pressure;

4. rejection of the normalization of relations among countries having differemt social systems under various pretexts. Processes and actions standing in the way of the promotion of economic, cultural, political and other co-operation among States with different social systems constitute negative acts aimed against European security;

5. support for attempts to take advantage of contacts among the peoples of countries having different social systems for ideological or other subversive activities, taking advantage of such contacts for hostile actions against the other side or endangering the security of the other side, all such activities being acts blocking development towards European security and a relaxation in relations among European states;

6. rejection of agreements on limited armaments or on a relaxation of tensions in certain areas are acts directly fomenting tensions and rendering impossible any rapprochement among European States.

Let us now pay attention to the role that small European countries may play today in urging and facilitating the process of easing international tensions in Europe and creating European security, As we pointed out earlier, the division of Europe into two groupings remains. Let us put the first question: Can small European countries pursue their policies of the relaxation of international tensions in Europe and the security in Europe by withdrawing from those groupings? Should we accept the hypothesis that all small European countries would withdraw from the two existing blocs without anticipating any substantial changes in the relations of the principal elements of the blocs? Such a position would hardly last for very long or have much importance for future development. This is because the blocs did not come into being of the will of small countries, nor do small countries play a decisive role in them. At the same time, small countries look for a certain protection within these groupings, whether they are justified in doing so or not. Their withdrawal from blocs while tensions between the main elements of the two blocks would remain, therefore, add nothing to their security; on the contrary, it would constitute an increased danger. The question of whether small countries should withdraw from the existing blocs, while tensions between the main elements of those blocs remain may be answered by saying that it would offer no solution whatsoever and that that would not be the road towards European security.

A characteristic feature of the policies of small countries in today's Europe is the natural effort of those countries to eliminate the danger of war from the European continent and to create a smoothly operating and lasting system of European security based on the equality of rights of European countries, big and small. Accordingly, small countries take a profound interest in urging measures which would eliminate the danger of war from the European continent and introduce such a security system. Having regard to their possibilities for taking practical steps in international relations and viewing realistically their specific potentialities, we come to the following conclusions:

1. In their relationship to the existing blocs, small countries depend on the development of the relations between the principal elements of these blocs. It is not within the power of small countries to dissolve the blocs, and actions such as arbitrary withdrawals of small countries from the blocs without any change in the policies of the principal partners cannot be considered as realistic.

2. However, small countries have the possibility of working towards a relaxation of tensions and facilitating the process of creating European security even with the existence of the blocs. Their possibilities lie especially in the following directions:

(a) actions within their respective blocs in favour of measures which may lead to a relaxation of international tensions and which may contribute to the establishment of the system of security in Europe. In view of the fact that the governing bodies of the existing groupings operate on the principle of equal participation of all partners within the bloc, specific possibilities of the small countries of Europe are considerable in this respect;

(b) establishing normal and friendly relations with States adhering to the other grouping, especially in cases where these are neighbours in the region of the line dividing the two blocs;

(c) making broad contacts between the peoples of countries adhering to different groupings so as to eliminate as much as possible the influence of the groups opposing the relaxation of international relations among European countries and wishing to prevent the creation of a permanent security system in Europe;

(d) expanding scientific, economic and cultural contacts to give full expression to the unity of interests of all all European countries and to create in people's minds the true idea of European coherence.

3. Small countries of Europe have the possibility of acting in the direction of ensuring that the existing blocs, which should be taken as temporary groupings, come to an end and that with the co-operation of all European countries a system of European security be created which would be based on the principle of peaceful coexistence of States having different social systems.

4. Small European countries are well aware that it is impossible to shut themselves up inside Europe and live in isolation from world events. Therefore quite understandingly they feel themselves jeopardized by any dangerous situation in the world, in whichever continent. The United States' operations in Vietnam, which have brought about a dangerous situation in East Asia, cast their shadow on Europe as well. It is, therefore, in the interest of small European countries to be as active as possible so that these operations be halted and peace be restored in that part of the world. Small countries of Europe have before them a concrete possibility to act so as to prevent the birth of such dangerous situations by clearly dissociating themselves from aggressive actions by the Power concerned and condemning similar action.

Let us now touch upon another aspect of the foreign policies of small European countries. While the blocks are in existence and the relations between them remain tense, there may be attempts to take advantage of the independent policies of small States of Europe to bring pressure on a small country in order to weaken the other grouping. (We have encountered attempts of this kind in some political actions by some Western Powers. Although certain partial achievements may be made in this direction, it may be said with certainty that this is not the right road leading to the easing of international tension, to the dissolution of blocs and to the creation of European security. On the contrary: actions of this type increase the obstinacy of a number of factors in the matter of weakening the blocs and bringing about a rapprochement of States members of other blocs. In my opinion it is highly inadvisable to use such tactics, since it injures the cause of European security. Whe analyzing concrete phenomena we must strictly differentiate between the tactics applied and the actual intention of the tactician. It is possible to support the expansion of contacts between countries having different social systems with good-will and in the endeavour to contribute in this way to the understanding among European nations. It is likewise possible to support these contacts in an attempt to use them for ideological subversion in the territory of the partner and to weaken him or upset him by means of such contacts. The other method will surely bring about increased caution on the part of the other partner, more careful

procedures in establishing contacts and eventually a limitation or cooling of such contacts. The consequences assume the form of a revived consolidation of the grouping which feels itself in danger and of a growth of distrust for any action which is taken by the other side.

On the other hand, however, contacts of states having different social systems cannot do without exchanges of opinion and a certain form of ideological contest which is the expression of the existence of different ideologies in today's Europe. However, the ideological fight must be waged with methods which do not pursue the ends of ideological subversion. It must be a true exchange of views, defended with the best of intentions, and not obscure objectives hidden behind an ideological presentation of questions.

In conclusion, I should like to summarize in brief my view on the specific mission of the policies of small European countries and the potentialities of such policies. Even if they pooled their efforts, small countries of Europe cannot eliminate dangers from Europe and cannot by themselves establish a system of collective security in that continent. By their active and realistic policies, however, they may considerably contribute to such objectives. By their example and through their peaceful actions they may pave way to agreement on the part of the great Powers. There can be no European security without such agreement. If small European countries are aware of these potentialities and if they find the right way for concrete activities in their foreign policies, the creation of the European security system may come about much sooner than if small European countries take no initiative and wait for the great Powers to take action. At the present time all countries of Europe face the task of negotiating together on safeguarding European security. Quite a number of serious proposals have been presented by unofficial and official sources in this respect. It is not fortuitous that quite a few of these have been initiated by small countries. Small European countries have now the possibility of raising their voices in support of the conference of authorized representatives of all European States which would open the door to an accelerated process of creating a long-term system of European security.

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WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE : THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP

COMMITTEE III

Sunday, October 2nd — Morning

The Future of Germany in a Changing European Context

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1. It can hardly any longer be doubted that peaceful re-unification of the German people will only be possible in connection with Europe being restored. At present , however, Europe is a more geographie notion without political identity. In Central Europe the two world powers have kept each other at bay for almost two decades. At the situation of Europe will be decisively influenced by the development of the relationship between these two world-powers, it will, however, by no means depend exc-lusively on it. Also the development within the Third World and its relation to the industrial countries as well as the scientific and technical development of the great industrical countries will exercise a decisive influence on Europe. But the most decisive influence will come from the european states stemselves.

2. The confrontations of Berlin in 1961 and Cuba in 1962 have led both world-powers to that conviction of considerable parallelism of interest which had flashed up and quickly disappeared again as early as during the double-crisis Suez-Hungaria in 1956. Since Cuba, both world powers have definitely realized the existence of parallelism of interest. For this Kennedy's strategy für peace bears evidence as well as the Moscow test-stop-treaty in 1963 and the endeavours of both sides to bring about a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The mutual nuclear patt has considerably restricted the ability of foreign policy actions of both world-powers as regards their correlation in Europe. Both know this: the strategy of both is at present - at least in Europe-directed towards maintenance and consolidation of the gained spheres of influence. With great concern both look at China which inevitably

developes into a third world power, and they look at China with more concern than for example at Europe or at Germany. The American post-war policy in Europe which was planned to pass over from containment to roll-back, has again arrived at a policy of containment.

3. In spite of great disappointments, the Soviet Union has not given up the ideology of a communist world revolution, but the manipulation of the ideology as a means for securing the power of the Soviet Union has become more important than the actual contents of the ideology itself.

Thus not from ideology comes the essential drive for the foreign policy of Moscow but the national interests of the Soviet Union are the decisive motives. The interests of the Soviet Union are at present - similar to those of the United States - restricted to the consolidation of the scope of possession and influence. This consequence is not only a result of the mutual military situation, but also of the enormous efforts which are to be made towards the internal economic process/ of development in the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership knows that social and economic development of the country needs a lot of years of peace. He, who at present imputes to the Soviet leadership a secret intention to attack Western Europe, leads himself astray. Moscow would be glad if the state of affairs in Europe could be maintained at the present state, it knows, however, that the smaller and middlesized countries of this continent will gain more and more independence. On the grounds of this reason the Soviet Union might wish to leave her troops at the territories of the "DDR", Poland and Hungary in spite of the economic sacrifice which is involved. Moscow's endeavours to isolate the Federal Republic of Germany, to stimulate the fear of Germany and the attempt

to use the disagreement within the North Atlantic Treaty, serve for the strategy of preservation as much as the attempt to melt up the East Bloc countries in the economic scope/ by means of the Comecon and the attempt to back up the Ulbricht-regime as regards its international status.

Moscow is not afraid of the Bundeswehr (FRG defence forces) as a possible opponent, but it fears a possible calling-forth of crisis or war through German politics. This is one of the reasons to refuse Bonn the access to nuclears weapons. The second reason is the anticipation of the fact that Soviet allies would want to follow the example of Bonn. The wish of Moscow to obstruct a proliferation of nuclear weapons is as original as that of Washington; it derives from the same motives. The Soviet Union is not in favour of German reunification, all the more so as a lot of difficulties are approaching the Soviets already as regards the smaller part of Germany which is under communist rule. At present and for the conceivable future, the Soviet Union is a status-quo power. She needs peace and she knows also that her own existence would be at stake in case she would run the risk of a war against the USA.

4. The great risk of any European move of both world-powers and the almost complete stiffness of their European diplomatic frontiers as a result of this risk, has - on the other hand - brought about a restricted extension of the so far shrunk scope of action of the other European countries, a development which was hardly foreseen only a few years ago. At this it should be kept in mind that from the very beginning the scope of action of the smaller partners of the Atlantic Treaty Organisation was much bigger than that of the members of the Warsaw Treaty. At present France has moved on much

farther than Rumania. Differently from the Warsaw Treaty, the crisis of Western strategy has also fully seized the military field. Kennedy's great plan of an Atlantic Community has failed. Johnson has not devised a new American policy towards Europe. He confines himself to counter the French policy as much as possible and to maintain the substance of the organisation within the Alliance. Therefore Paris will have the lead as compared with Washington as long as Europe will not be seized by new Ost-West-tensions. This might even continue if new tensions should arise on the grounds of the Vietnam-crisis. In Western Europe a natural tendendy towards neutralism can be expected as regards Vietnam. Washington realizes the increasing freedom of action of all her European partners.

5. In almost all capitals of Europe a feeling of détente has come about. At present many goverments think that a war in Europe is the most improbable of all wars. From Asia Minor to Scandinavia the fear of Soviet aggression has markedly decreased and public opinion in many Western European countries tends to underestimate the necessity of defence as regards the Soviet Union, and tends to be satisfied with the present state of affairs in Europe. Similar to this, the fear in Eastern Europe of a Western attack is going to fade away. The conception of an antagonistic bi-polarity of a high tension, which had been valid and relevant for Europe for almost two decades, now gives way to a conviction of an at least partly co-operative bi-polarity and of the expectation of a multi-polar, polycentric division of power.

6. Paris and Bucharest have exploited this process to the greatest extent. At the same time they attributed the lions's share to this process, obviously without being afraid of their own military vulnerability and obviously without being afraid of risking the

possiblility of taking recourse to their respective leading powers as regards their security.

Other nations will possibly follow this example if the mutual neutralisation of the two world powers should make further progress. In the second half of this decade european states will have more freedom of action than hitherto, they will, however, also have to pass more decisions as regards their owen problems than up to now. The way in which these decisions are passed decides whether the points can be shifted correspondingly for the next decade. Also for the Federal Republic of Germany the scope of action will be extended.

7. We Germans will have to free ourselves from maximised conceptions. Neither can there a reached an absolute security for the Federal Republic of Germany by means of NATO nor is absolute security imaginable as a modell at all.
The extent of the attainable security of any state depends on the specific opponent, the geographic situation and many other facts although of course also on one's spending on defense - only, that additional spending does by no means always create to the same extent, additional security, and - if the opponent arms additionally to the same extent, no additional security at all might be gained. Since the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany the extent of her security has been in

inverse ratio to the extent of her chances of re-unification. This will probably continue. The attempt to increase the chances of security to 100 per cent decreases the chances for re-unification to zero. It is absolutely sufficient if the defence-capacity of the West imposes an intolerable risk on any potential aggressor; thus the situation of balance, and - as a result - of security will be upheld sufficiently.

8. The double-aim of the long-termed German strategy - unique in the whole world - i.e., securing of freedom on the one hand and peaceful re-unification on the other hand, makes necessary a special and unique balance of methods and means. As long as the world had been under the sway of antagonistic bi-polarity of the two world-powers during the past 10 years, we could hardly pursue our aim of re-unification. As far as now - at least partly - and especially on our own continent multi-polarity gains ground, the aim of re-unification becomes, at least theoretically - again possible. It is understood that we can get near this aim only at the end of a long, complicated process of détente, reconciliation and normalizsation.

Our strategic problem is to bring to common denominator détente and balance. Theoretically this is a problem that can be solved: By an equivalent reduction of armaments the balance

can be transposed down to a lower level of armaments and the lowering of the armament level will serve the elimination of fear and further détente. It is probable that the failure of the non-proliferation - negotiations at Geneva will newly stimulate the reflections on regionally restricted systems of armament control.

9. Today one has to realize quite clearly that the common interest in a limitation of armaments and in arms control has gained precedence over the interest in re-unification of Germany. This applies also to our friends. Moreover, the European countries attach a very differtiated importance to the re-unification of Germany. Although the leading politicans of the European countries realize that the unsolved German-questions remains to be a basic problem of politics and represents and will continue to represent one of the moral principles of the free world, public opinion of the majority of the European countries have a relatively small interest in the re-unification of Germany at present. The same applies to the political leading élites of these countries. Moreover, there is no country in Europe- apart from Germany - which wants an alteration of those frontiers in Europe which came into existence after World War II.

10. As far as the internal German situation is concerned, the judgement of the situation by the West-Germans was determinded by the fear of Soviet power, by the rejection of the communist coercive régime in the so-called "DDR" and also by our conspicuous lead as regards economic development. These facts, which

contributed essentially to the West-German picture of the so-called "DDR", led to prejudices and biases in the long run. To this contributed also the completely silly and abstruse, by Ulbricht controled, communist agitation within the Federal Republic of Germany. This agitation lacks usually all actual psychological qualification thus causing very often just ridiculousness inside the Federal Republic of Germany. Due to this reasons of often rather primitive anti-communism has gained groun and has found for two decades now a relatively indiscrimnating acceptance by the citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany. The construction of the Berlin wall in 1961, the daily cruel hunt after people and the shooting at the barbed wire and at the wall in Berlin have stiffened the categorical refusal of communis and contributed at the same time to judgements on the situation in the so-called "DDR" which do not quite apply any longer and to the full extent.

11. It has only been during this year that there seems to develop a readiness to examine the situation uneffusively and without prejudice, a development which is, however, indispensable for re-unification. The facts in the "DDR" do not speak a simple but a rather differentiated language. On the one hand the ruling élite of the SED is still based and dependant on mere violence and on the presence of 2o Soviet divisions and by any means not on the consent of the majority of citizens. On the other hand the alternation of generation and 33 years of intellectual and social strangulation and of biased information and propaganda have begun to produce marked changes within the psychological structure in the "DDR". Many are proud of their economic progress and they are right to be proud. To be cut off from the outside world has contributed a lot to the fact that people compromised with

the existing situation.

Although the population in the "DDR" and especially the young generation, takes a sensible view of the situation and although the self-confidence has grown, the wish for re-unification of our people is so marked in the "DDR" that the SED régime has to cope with it again and again.

12. During the fifties to some foreign observers the wish for re-unification in the Federal Republic seemed to diminsh. Today this wish is, however, stronger than ever, especially as far as the young generation is concerned, although they regard this problem very coolminded and without pathos. Especially this young generation does rightly not feel guilty about the cruel dictatorship of Hitler and it rightly does not suffer of any complexes as regards the failure of the Republic of Weimar. This generation has no burdens of this kind and it tackles the problem without prejudices, a generation which increases by one million each year in the Federal Republic. But the same young people are very disappointed about those 2o years of promises and rhetorical embellishments of a policy of re-unification which passes, obviously without having any tangible effect. These facts confront the political leadership of the Federal Republic with new tasks and necessitate new ideas.

13. From the analysis of the situation we come to the

a) There will be not re-unification against the intention of one of the four powers. Before long, no effective initiative of re-unification will be taken by the four powers due to their present situation of interests. Also re-unification by one act followed by free negotiations on a treaty of peace lacks reality. The attempt to come

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to an agreement about a sequence of steps lacks also reality and is bound to fail due to the present situation of Europe. The German themselves have to be prepared to take steps - always keeping the aim in mind - although no fixing of specific further steps will be possible in advance. Due to the present phase of increasing détente and due to the transformation towards a possible mutual approach of the existing systems of defence and security in East and West, a policy as regards the german question which confines itself to a mere sticking to the legal positions, would lead past the problem of re-unification and would even cement the present situation. In case Germany would offer opposition to a further détente it would be completly isolated.

b) Therefore the methods of a policy for Germany have to be changed and those possiblilities have to be used which are a result of the general process of détente that can be observed at present. This is not only necessary in order to consolidate the confidence and the understanding of our neighbours and friends in the West, but also in order to create the same atmosphere as regards our neighbours in the East. German contributions in respect to a Common solution of the problem of security in Central Europe have to try to combine our interests with those of our neighbours. We could be the more successful the more we would be able to eliminate any fear of Germany. This fear is always being nourished by the maximum demands of the Federal Republic on the one hand and the complete subjugation of the "DDR" under Soviet policy on the other.

c) The line to be taken should leave no doubt for the other nations about our recognition that re-unification demands sacrifices - even in the most favourable case - which refer to the eventual definition of the borders of a re-unified Germany, to her military status in relation to her neighbours and within a system of security in Europe on the whole as well as to economic questions in the fields of domestic and foreign policy. Without our readiness to compromise with our neighbours there will be neither confidence nor agreement. The Federal Republic, however, will and has to refuse - now as in future - each compromise with bondage and insecurity.

d) In spite of our consequent refusal of the communist régime in the so-called "DDR" and its recognition by international law nothing should hinder us from examining all possibilities for the improvement of the intra-German relations, those possiblilities which lie below the brink of recognition. The breaking - off by the communists of the project to arrange political meatings in the "DDR" and the Federal Republic at which each time the other side could deliver speeches (the so-called "Redner-Austausch"), the permament attempts of blackmail during the negotiations on permits for East Berlin (the so-called"Passierschein"negotiations) and the vocabulary which has been used this summer by some gentlemen in East-Berlin, which reminded awfully of Hitler and Goebbels, complicate, however, the above mentioned steps.

14. The German range of action as regards foreign policy has not been fully used at present. This scope comprises particularly the fields of East-European policy and this in turn includes arms control and limitation of armaments.

We have to demonstrate and to state veraciously to the East and to the West that our aim is peace. The so-called peace-note of the Federal Government of March 1966 can be the beginning of a conprehensive and lasting policy of peace and reconciliation of the Federal Republic of Germany visavis her eastern neighbours. This policy would indirectly serve re-unification. Our neighbours in West and East have not forgotten the two world wars and Hitlers crime of genocide. They set down more blame on us than can be justified by means of history but the ascer-tainment of this fact helps us just as little as the stupid attempt to set off german crimes with those of other peoples.

15. How far can Germany contribute to a policy of an armament limitation ? World-wide disarmament is by anybody considered to be an illusion. Limitations of armament which come about either means of mutual agreement or tacitly are however a real possibility. The could also be regional. The exchange of statements as regards the abstention from application of force between Bonn and Eastern European states is under discussion. It should include the territory of the "DDR" without making the "DDR" the adressee. The exchange of observers on the occasion of manoeuvres is a possiblility also.

Naturally the West could not agree to a conference about the security of Europe in which the Soviet Union does participates but not, however, the Unites States. The Soviet note of answer invites, however, to take up the thread of the idea of a European system of security again. Therefore it is useful to enter once more into a reappraisal of the well-known Polish proposals, which are again explicitly promoted by the Soviet Union in her answers.

16. The then Rapacki- and Gomulka proposals contained three principles which still have to be kept in mind when the West thinks of regional arms limitation in Europe:

a) They did not demand the withdrawal of American troops from Germany.

b) They did not demand a neutralization of the concerned participating countries, but insinuated the continuence of their being members of alliances and of obligations and the guaranties of assistence by the USA and the Soviet Union.

c) They regarded the territories of Poland, the CSSR and the "DDR" only in their entirety as an equivalent for the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.

17. On the other side the Polish proposals contained, however, two principles which cannot be accepted:

a) They confined themselves mainly to nuclear weapons, left the conventional armed forces quite outside and did thus not at all exclude an endangering of the total balance in Central Europe.

b) As the proposals, as far as Western territory was concerned, did refer exclusively to the Federal Republic they tended to give the Federal Republic a special status, which would and probably should give the Federal Republic an isolated position among her European allies.

18. Since the Rapacki proposals almost one decade ago, the repeated realisation of the endangered situation of Berlin, demonstrated by the examples of 1958/59 and 1961, has rendered designing of Central European system of security more difficult than on the middle of the fifties. Also the refusal of France to accommodate on her territory any part of the Western military apparatuses and armed forces which

have been stationed up to now in Germany impedes the situation.

In spite of this it would seem useful to me, if the Federal Republic would continue her way of examining regional proposals as started by means of her peacenote. The mutual establishment of control outposts - of the East in the West and of the West in the East - against surprise attack would already do a lot of good in the psychological field and such posts would not affect anybody's security.

Anyhow, and I would like to emphasise that, German proposals for the improvement of European security have to be carefully worked out in order to serve as essential elements for subsequent regulations in connection with a peace-treaty for Germany. Especially under this point of view they are necessary. Such an activity simply offers itself at the present situation of Europe. German policy of detente would ensure and increase German influence on the development of Europe. Their weight depends on the question , in how far it will be possible for Germany, to urge on such a policy of detente in agreement with the interests of German's neighbours.

19. However as long as a comprehensive system of collective security, which includes West - and East-Europe, has not been created, the safequarding of peace in Europe demands categorically the maintenance of the balance of military power.

This, in turn, necessitates - due to military and political reasons - the maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance, the maintenance of the membership of the Federal Republik in this Alliance and the American presence in Europe. In order to avoid that Germay could merely fall vitim to foreign governments decisions in case of critical situations. I regard German participation in planning of the general strategy of the Alliance and in crisis-management necessary. Moreover, I think it necessary that the German Federal Government get a right of veto in the alliance in respect to certain cases of application of nuclear weapons on German territory.

The nuclear solution within the Alliance has exclusively to be found under the aspect of security and by no means under the aspect of prestige. German co-ownership of nuclears weapons and Germany's participation in joint control as regards the firing of nuclear weapons are not necessary. Moreover, the Federal Republic must not make her agreement to a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons dependent on political conditions which cannot be fulfilled. The same applies also to a German co-ownership in any interallied or multilateral nuclear armed force. Such claims do produces fear without even having a chance o-f realisation.

2o. It is in the interest of Germany - and it would be welcomed by the whole world - if the Federal Republic of Germany would be successful in normalizing step by step her relations to Eastern Europe. An active German policy towards Eastern Europe could of course not be started because one thinks that by help of this policy the East Bloc could be split. Our motive for the

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such a policy is to reduce the fear of Germany. The reduction of fear has to precede if understanding for our aim of re-unification of Germany shall be reached. But both can then become endangered, if we would present, with the same degree of importance, the question of the Oder-Neiße-problem together with our aim of re-unification of those German territories which are internationally not contested. These are two different things. The Federal Government of Germany declared in its peace-note, that it is prepared to make sacrifices for re-unification and that Germany continues to exist according to international law in her borders of 1937, until a freely elected all - German Government will recognize different frontiers.

21. At present I can only imagine re-unification if I start from the assumption that it will come about in the course of tedious and protracted changes of the status quo in Europe; changes which will demand from the Soviet Union on the one hand and from the West on the other not disproportionate, but quite the opposite, proportionate forfeitures of their hitherto influence or their geographic scope of influence. The more a change of the status quo endangers at the same time the territorial title to possessions of other countries - or seems to endanger it - the less probable is its realization. The Germans cannot expect of any future, German Government, that at the conference table of a peace-conference, which takes place one generation after the end of the war at the earliest it will make undone or even win subsequently a war which was started by Hitler, both waged and lost totally.

22. While it seems to be relatively simple to establish normal relations to the South-East-European states we will have to put forth very much patience, take pains and produce understanding in the case of Poland. Without reconciliation the idea of re-unification will remain a mere hope. The course and the end of world war II represents a burden for our relationship to Poland which is for both sides from the human point of view a very heavy one. We will be hearvily loaden with this for a long time to come. Therefore we should be all the more thankful for tendencies of reconciliation which publicly begin to stir within both peoples.

23. I understand that there is much bitterness as regards the relationship between Germany and Czechoslovakia. There are, however, no problem regarding frontiers. Reconciliation with the Czechoslovakian peoples seems therefor to be not as difficult as visavis the Poles.

24. We can, however, not fulfil the Polish request to recognize the so-called "DDR" and to establish diplomatic relations with her. To this request our answers can only be negative. Recognition of the so-called "DDR" according to international law by the Federal Republic of Germany would without any doubt lead everywhere in Europe and in the whole world to a loss of the awareness of the anomaly of Germans seperation, and lead to a disintegration of the four-powers-responsibility. Recognition according to international law would mean that we waived our claim that that we are the legitimate speaeker and representative of the interests and hopes of our nation and not those potentates in East-Berlin, Recognition according to international law and waiving our claim to be the sole diplomatic representative of

the German people would not only extraordinarily consolidate the communist SED-regime as regards its domestic policy but would also confirm the Soviet Union and other nationa to maintain that regime and thus the division of Germany, not mentioning yet the ethical and the human aspect, i.e. the distruction of hopes in many, many human beings in Germany. I do not think I need mention that any collaboration between the Social Democrates and the Communist SED ist completely out of the question. That does not mean, however, that we don't have to have talks ranging from negotiations about trade within Germany to negotiations or visits of people along the zonal border, in order to maintain our national substance and in order to help the people of our devided nation to keep in touch as far as the human sphere and daily happenings are concerned. The general principle at the filling of such an elbow-room ist, as I said abover not to touch the threshold of recognition, but to look, apart from this, for easing and relaxation of the relationship within Germany.

25. One has to talk about the possibilities of a re-unification of Germany very soberly, without illusions, and coolmindedly, although inevitably with emotional engagement. If the other nation have fear of Germany, unification will not take place. Just the same however it will not take place, if the other nations are in the long run content with a division of Germany. The German division is a curable evil, although the prevailing conditions in world polities and distribution of power are at present unfavourable for the Germans.

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We have to have courage for the truth and to face facts. The German question is a political and psychological question and not just a bundle of legal problems. It is true, that merely sticking to German maximun demands in the territorial, military and legal scope and confining ones policy to the mere maintenance of such demands for the day of comprehensive negotiations, once to come, cannot influence the development of Europe in direction of an approach to such a day of negotiation. It remains also true, that we worry about the military safeguarding of freedom of Europe and that we will and have to contribute our full share to military security.

We will unwaveringly pursue our aim of unification and if certain circumstances obstruct one way towards this aim we will look for another. We are reasonable enough to know that all peaceful re-unification will never come about like in a lawsuit in which the judge passes the judgement after the trial, but that re-unification has to find the approval of the world-powers and of all our neighbours, i.e. that the anxieties of our neighbours have to be overcome and that their aims have to be respected. We understand that re-uniting Germany has above all to be a re-unification of the German people and their human beings; the question of the geographie borders is of course important, but by any means not as important as the re-unification of the human beings under a common roof.

We understand alike that only re-creation of Europe as a whole will give the opportunities for German re-unification.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR QUOTATION

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INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

8TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE : THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP

COMMITTEE III

Saturday 1st October Afternoon

Germany and European Security. A Polish View

MIECZYSLAW TOMALA

The question of European security is of central and key significance to Poland. Its importance derives, in the first place, from the general principles of our policy, which is geared towards ensuring international security and the development of peaceful relations and co-operation among nations. Twice within the last fifty years, Europe was the scene of wars which were perhaps the bloodiest in the history of the world, and which extended far beyond its borders. The wars which began in Europe spread to practically all continents, and the dramatic effects of the last war are felt to this day by the entire world. During the laat war Poland suffered incomparable losses: 40% of the national wealth destroyed and 6,000,000 citizens murdered as the result of the occupant's policy of extermination. I mention this not as a reminder, but because it is our responsibility to remember. We cannot forget this even if we do not speak of it.

Secondly, the actuality of the problem of European security is based on the significance which peace on this continent has for the rest of the world. Nowhere else in the world, as precisely here in Europe, do the armed forces of the two greatest contemporary powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, face each other within shooting range; here the line is drawn between the two most important military-political groupings of the NATO and Warsaw Pacts.

The idea of creating a system of mutual security in Europe is not a new one. During the years before World War II, in a desire to learn from the lessons of World War I, and at a time when the danger of aggression on the part of the Third Reich was more and more clearly evident on the European political scene, attempts were made at uniting the efforts of European nations to

counteract the aggressive intentions of the Nazi Government. During World War II, parallel to the plans for creating a system to ensure world peace - which was the precise aim underlying the creation of the United Nations Organization - the creation of a separate system of unity and alliance for Europe, where both world wars had their beginning, was also proposed.

I would like here to call attention to one element of these plans which in my opinion is essential. During the war, both the European powers and overseas powers stressed - and expressed this through their actions - that a system of European security must prevent aggression on the part of German imperialism and militarism. By the same token they must have considered that the main force destroying peace in Europe had always been German imperialism and militarism. How else can one evaluate the contents of the agreements concluded during World War II between the Soviet Union and Great Britain in 1942, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in 1943, the Soviet Union and France in 1944, as well as the "Big Three" conferences held during the war in Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam?

All of the pacts and agreements concluded during the war, therefore, created realistic possibilities - unfortunately, only as a result of the tragic war experiences - for the ultimate regulation of the question of European security. Such, after all, was the universal conviction after the war of the broad masses of society in all the countries of the anti-fascist coalition. May 9, 1945, the day on which the Third Reich capitulated, was for millions of people - regardless of whether they were in Red Square in Moscow, Trafalgar Square in London, or the Champs Elysées in Paris - a day of joy, not only because the most horrible of wars had ended, but because the day brought the profound hope that the future would provide an effective system of security which would protect Europe from German militarism, the chief cause of the war just ended.

The idea of peaceful co-existence, although it was not legally formulated, found expression both in the establishment of the United Nations Organization and in the resolutions of the United Nations Charter, which defined the main goals of the organization in the area of maintaining international peace and security. Article 1, paragraph 1, of the UN charter states that in order to maintain peace and security, the UN should "apply effective collective measures to prevent and eliminate the threat to peace, suppress acts of aggression and other disturbances of the peace, settle and mediate differences or situations which could lead to disturbance of the peace by peaceful means according to the principles of justice

and international law".

From the beginning of its existence the Government of People's Poland has given expression to the fact that its chief goal is to ensure the peace, security and the just borders of the Polish nation. The Manifesto of the PKWN (Polish Committee for National Liberation) stated that "Polish foreign policy will be based on the principles of collective security".

The idea contained in the PKWN Manifesto was the basis of the first international act of People's Poland, which was the Pact of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Co-operation concluded on April 21, 1945, with the Soviet Union. Every subsequent international act of People's Poland was undertaken in accordance with the policy outlined by the Manifesto.

Similarly, in the first years after the capitulation of Nazi Germany, the desire to ensure collective security, combined with the desire to secure themselves against renewed German aggression, was reflected in the pacts concluded by other west European countries. I should like to mention in particular the pact between France and Great Britain, concluded at Dunkirk in 1947, as well as the peace treaties with Italy, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria.

However, the "cold war", which came into being at this time, gradually began to negate the first elements of collective security in Europe. One of the most characteristic signs of the violation of the accepted bases of collective European security was the departure of the Western powers from the Principles contained in the Potsdam Agreement. This took place on many levels. One of them was the negation of those resolutions which dictated the destruction of the bases of German militarism by neglecting the basic and key decisions of the Potsdam Agreement: "The Allied powers, by mutual consent shall undertake now and in the future other necessary decisions in order to achieve certainty that Germany will never again become a threat to its neighbours or to world peace".

During those years, our Government observed the development of the international situation, particularly in Europe, with anxiety and great concern. The inclusion of the West German Army, the Western powers' tolerance of revisionist claims of the Bonn Government, all this caused a turn of events in the face of which our Government's position could not remain passive. For this reason, in the most - shall I say - "hopeless" years also, we did

not spare efforts, to the extent of our abilities at the time, to prevent the deepening of the division of Europe, to prevent the aggravation of the situation. Several of the statements made by our representatives at the General Assembly sessions of the UN on the subject of the acceptance of some of the disarmament proposals attest to this fact.

Besides supporting the plans for complete universal disarmament, we spared no efforts in the direction of the realization of partial steps which might lessen the degree of danger in the most sensitive areas. This was in agreement with the principle of constructive peaceful co-existence practised by Poland. The growing threat to peace in Europe caused by the increasing armament of the German Federal Republic, its postulates of annexation and its pressing demand for nuclear weapons clearly endangered the security of this part of the world and the security of our country. For this reason also, our Government, motivated by the vital interests of its security and encouraged by signs of a certain lessening of international tension in 1957, proposed a plan to create an atom-free zone in Central Europe.

Military as well as political considerations favoured the creation of such a zone. Checking the concentration of arms at one of the stages of deconcentration, not only of nuclear arms but also of conventional weapons, would undoubtedly lessen to a great degree the threat of conflict, which, after all, is more easily provoked in a situation in which weapons are focalized than when they are scattered.

In political terms, not only would the realization of the Polish plans have most certainly raised the degree of confidence among the nations of both groupings, but it would have been an essential step in solving the German problem, since this problem can only be solved by decreasing armaments in general, but never by means of an armaments race. Whoever thinks in this way is under dangerous illusions. Solution of the German problem must be preceded by concrete steps towards at least partial disarmament in Central Europe, and may be only one stage in a series of concrete steps in which the German Federal Republic must also participate.

If we look at the activity, proposals and statements of Polish diplomacy from a perspective of years, we can claim that they form a certain logical sequence. Thus the first Polish initiative in the area of creating an atom-free zone in central Europe was the Rapacki Plan, presented by Poland for the first time at the twelfth session of the UN General Assembly on October 2, 1957. I will not

go into the details of the plan, since it is well known to everyone here. I wish only to call your attention to the fact that the Rapacki Plan took into consideration the existing state of armament in Central Europe and was clearly not intended to aggravate the situation in this area. The fact that it collided with the foundations and plans of the Bonn Government is understandable, since it was and is a plan for European security, whereas the Bonn policies to put it mildly, are calculated to maintain the status quo. It is clear that these two tendencies will never concur.

The next Polish proposal, known internationally as the Gomulka Plan and officially presented by our Government on February 29, 1964, was also based on the premise that the most urgent step to be taken in Europe is the freezing of nuclear weapons. This resulted from the fact that the efforts of the German Federal Republic to obtain access to nuclear weapons were taking on very disturbing proportions. Our Government could not ignore this. The Gomulka Plan has, in a sense, limited validity, but it concerns a very important problem, and its realization would constitute a serious step towards lessening tensions and strengthening security and progress in the area of disarmament.

Although our plans have not become the subject of official international deliberations, we would like to believe that they have not lost their timeliness. On the contrary, the greater the impression made on Western political leaders and here on my colleagues from the West of the peaceful intentions and aspirations of my country, of the peaceful aims of its foreign policy, the deeper and more universal will be the interest in our proposals. The last chapter has not yet been written.

It is not especially surprising to note that at once the greatest and the least constructive opposition came from the West German Government. An entire catalogue of alleged dangers that would face the West if the Polish proposals were accepted was presented. Even mild blackmail was used on the grounds that if the Rapacki Plan were accepted, a dangerous vacuum would arise which could "encourage a possible aggressor to unfriendly steps". Such a vacuum would only be exploited by a country which itself intends unfriendly steps and the maintenance of tension in Europe, since it is itself an outgrowth of this tension.

We are, however, confident, and I say this with complete conviction, that it is not the Bundeswehr generals who will influence the policies of other Western powers. It is becoming more and more generally accepted that West Germany's practice of

threatening its allies with the possibility of an attack by the Socialist countries is without foundation. Even certain political circles in West Germany itself no longer believe the charge. Need I remind you of some of the statements made by Chancellor Adenauer, or of the sober and realistic voices at the convention of the largest West German party, the Social Democratic Party of Germany?

It would be a gross simplification to claim that our plans for disarmament which aim at the creation of the basis of collective security in Europe are dictated solely by our own interests. These no doubt lie at the foundation of our proposals, but at the same time they harmonize with the general principles of security, and for this reason constitute a formula which any nation can find objectively possible to accept. We have no pretensions to infallibility, and for this reason, too, we willingly engage in discussion. We engage in discussion, since we sincerely and honestly seek understanding. If the idea of an atom-free zone, which is the foundation of our proposal, were in conflict with the interests of respective countries, it would certainly not be the basis of discussions aimed at creating such a zone in other parts of the world.

The argument that acceptance of the Polish plans for partial disarmament or the freezing of nuclear armaments would lead to a permanent division of Germany is voiced by the West German Government as well as by some of the other Western governments. Permit me to explain a few matters. Let us speak frankly and clearly: the union of Germany will never be brought about in the shadow of launching pads for modern rockets armed with nuclear warheads, situated on West German territory and aimed in the direction of the Socialist countries. It is also a mistake to classify our plans as plans leading to the union of the two German nations. The Polish plans, however, can influence the improvement of the international atmosphere and the lessening of tensions, developments which, in turn, would undoubtedly have a favourable influence on the creation of the climate necessary for deliberations on the German question. Rejection of our proposals does not bring any closer the kind of German unity envisaged by some West Germans, but only further separates the two German nations, since a German nation supplied with nuclear arms will never be the subject of unity.

The countries in our camp, as well as the governments of some West European nations (let us recall, for instance, the position of President de Gaulle expressed at a press conference on February 4, 1965), represent the attitude that the creation of a

system of European security would undoubtedly solve the German question. Solution of the German problem, however, must be subordinated to the system of European security. West German circles, by contrast, as well as a number of governments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, represent the position that only the union of Germany will create conditions for establishing a universal system of security in Europe, adding, at the same time, that the division of Germany is the chief element in international tension, or at least in European tension. Such a line of reasoning constitutes an attempt to reverse the problem.

/Danger to the peace of Europe has its roots in the division of Germany to the extent that it results from concrete and deliberate policies of one of the German nations, the German Federal Republic: from its policy of territorial claims, its policy of military aggrandizement, its demand for nuclear weapons and its rejection of all proposals for lessening tension even when these are suggested by a Western power (for example, the British plan for disengagement, presented by Prime Minister Eden, concerning the creation of inspection groups, etc.).

For this reason, too, the union of Germany under conditions such as those proposed by the German Federal Republic, conditions, therefore, involving the liquidation of the German Democratic Republic, would not in the least decrease international tension in Europe. Above all, it would alter the balance of power within the Western camp, with the GFR dominating its European allies to an even greater extent. From a position with a broadened economic, territorial and human base, German militarism, it is clear, would continue to voice its territorial claims in an even more ruthless manner, reaching for the position of a world power.

However, we do not see the possibilities for the creation of collective security in Europe only in terms of the acceptance of our own plans. Time and again we have stressed the need to discuss other plans, proposed by Western statesmen. It is not our fault that we are still in the phase of discussion.

The possibility of peaceful co-existence on our continent was pointed out in the declaration made at the recent conference of Warsaw Pact nations held in Bucharest early in July 1966. The declaration enumerates a variety of ways in which tensions in Europe could be relieved, measures which would undoubtedly have an influence on other parts of the world, too. First, points out, that the member-nations of the Warsaw Pact consider it necessaey

to make every effort to develop neighbourly relations among all European nations, both in the area of economics and in the area of culture.

Second, it mentions a readiness to dissolve the Warsaw Pact on condition that other military pacts are simultaneously dissolved. If, however, the members of NATO are not ready for this, the Socialist countries propose an understanding which would at least liquidate the military organizations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Third, it stresses the role of partial steps which could help to lessen tensions. Among these are the Polish proposals for creating an atom-free zone in Central Europe or freezing atomic weapons at the existing level, i.e. the Rapacki Plan and the Gomulka Plan.

Fourth, it discusses the need to eliminate the threat of the nuclear armament of the Bundeswehr. In light of what we have already said about the power and revisionist character of the German Federal Republic, this condition appears indispensable.

Fifth, it calls for universal recognition of the sovereignty of the existing borders in Europe, including the border along the Oder and Neisse Rivers. This border is, in fact, adequately defended by the power of the Socialist camp, but its formal recognition would be an exceedingly important factor in stabilizing peace in Europe. Thus, the confirmation of the famous thesis of Wladyslaw Gomulka, who stated that "there is no problem of borders, there is only the problem of peace".

Further, the Socialist countries do not forget about the need to solve the German question; indeed they stress that it can only come about as a result of the lessening of tension in Europe and must, of course, take into consideration the security interests of all of Europe.

Finally, the Socialist countries stress in their declaration the great significance which the calling of a European Security Conference would have. They do not exclude, however, other forms of discussion of the problem of strengthening peace, discussions in which no nation would be denied participation.

The theses which we have summarized are not merely the results of wishful thinking. They are in agreement with the aspirations of a great many realistically thinking political leaders in the West and have their basis in the actual European political

situation - a situation which is in fact pregnant with great problems, but undoubtedly more favourable than it was say, fifteen years ago.

As far as Germany is concerned, in our approach to this problem we base ourselves on reality. This reality is the existence of two German nations. We are associated in fraternal alliance and close co-operation in all areas of life with one of them, the German Democratic Republic. There is practically no area of political, social, economic, cultural or athletic activity in which our mutual relations are not vital and, what's more, do not continue to develop.

In the implementation of the Potsdam Agreement, the German Democratic Republic recognized the Oder-Neisse border as the final German-Polish boundary. This nation conducts a policy which is in full agreement with the Potsdam resolutions, which envisaged the full democratization of life in Germany. This nation not only combats all propaganda geared towards revision of the borders set in Potsdam, but simultaneously educates its citizens in the spirit of respect and esteem for other nations. Such policy in regard to Poland was never before conducted by any German government. We are developing a broad and multilateral trade exchange, whose level has already exceeded by 200% the pre-war exchange of goods between Poland and the whole of Germany. The scientific-technical co-operation between our two countries is increasingly varied, and Polish machinery and Polish engineers employed in the GDR are more and more frequently a synonym for the changes which are taking place in our mutual relations.

A broad range of Polish writers reach German readers, correcting misconceptions created by German imperialistic propaganda as regards the alleged inferiority of our culture. This kind of relationship may seem insignificant to some people; perhaps it gives the impression that we concern ourselves with secondary matters. There are no secondary matters in Polish-German relations. Every matter, even the most minor, is important, and each one has an outstandingly political aspect. This is why we attach such great importance to strengthening the position of the German Democratic Republic, to establishing its sovereignty and its security. It is in the most vital interests of Poland and all of Europe that an army of imperialistic Germany never again stands at our western border, that this border be peaceful and characterized by peaceful co-operation. We desire this border to unite, not divide.

Thus, too, there is profound truth in the saying that the security of the German Democratic Republic is also the security of Poland. The foreign policy of the Bonn Government in regard to Poland, on the other hand, eloquently illustrates the fact that to this day the GFR does not have normal relations with the Socialist countries. And this is strictly the fault of the GFR.

Beginning in 1955, when it declared the state of war with Germany as terminated, our Government time and again stated its desire for normalized relations with the GFR in all areas of activity. This was a great concession on our part, since, after all, it is the defeated country which - if it really admits to its responsibility and guilt - should give satisfaction to our country, which was destroyed by the Nazi Army, and seek establishment of relations. However, it is through no fault of ours that our constructive efforts did not meet with the proper response in the GFR. Quite the contrary, the entire political line of the GFR Government in regard to Poland has for years been characterized by revisionism and the demand to change the existing Polish-German border on the Oder and Neisse Rivers. A programme of recovering the territory returned to Poland by the Potsdam Agreement has been advanced, and there is a direct tendency to physically annihilate Poland as an independent nation. We are not misled by the statements of representatives or members of the Bonn Cabinet which attempt to whitewash the attitude of the Government with claims that the GFR does not conduct a revisionistic policy in regard to the Socialist countries, nor intends to do so in the future, and that it desires to live in peace and neighbourly relations.

No one in Poland is worried about our western border; it is well guarded. If, however, we require that the West German Government recognize this border, we do so because the campaign conducted in this direction is dangerous despite its unreality. It only causes an increase of tension and clouds the international scene. We in Poland know that this same government which makes territorial claims endeavours in every possible way to obtain nuclear arms, despite the fact that it is threatened by nothing and no one. Is it not our fundamental responsibility to call attention to this? We must approach the so-called Peace Note with the caution dictated by a tragic history and the actual attitude of the GFR so long as that Note is not accompanied by concrete deeds. Yet in our criticism of the Note we are far from alone, since even West German political circles have pointed out a number of its awkward passages.

I would like to deem a misunderstanding the suggestion of some political leaders in Bonn, as well as in other Western countries, that the territorial claims of Bonn in regard to Poland are merely a bargaining trump in Bonn's hand, held for a future peace conference, and that in return for our agreement in the matter of the union of Germany along the lines desired by Bonn, the GFR is ready to recognize the Polish-German border on the Oder-Neisse. No one in Poland denies the German nation the right to unity and self-determination. However, we will never allow unity and self-determination to signify a green light for the annexation of the other German state, the GDR, whether by means of a new 'Anschluss' or by any other method. Today it is no secret to anyone that the process of German unification must take place within the present condition of the existence of two nations with completely opposite socio-economic systems and historical processes, and, what is very essential to know, that it can progress only under conditions of lessened tension and strengthened mutual security and confidence in Europe. Only such an atmosphere can allow the development of co-operation and the gradual union of the two German nations. On the other hand, the GFR's subordination of any agreement whatsoever to take steps towards lessening of tension and disarmament in Europe to the question of German reunification is only an escape which leads not only the problem of lessening tensions and disarmament but the very problem of German unity into a vicious circle. It seems to me that at the basis of this policy is the mistaken evaluation of reality. There is a lack of awareness that we are now in 1966 and not 1953.

Permit me to quote here from an article entitled "We Are Not in the Centre", by B. Bohm, which appeared in the well-known West German monthly Die Politische Meinung in January 1965: "The political dragon, or when there is a lack of means of force, a narrow fanaticism saturated with illusion, has always been the German danger. We possess that dangerous tendency (and the necessary ability in such a case of convincing ourselves) of seeing things as they look in the light of our desires, and we easily lose the ability of differentiating desire from reality. This can only result in an incorrect evaluation of the facts and with this an incorrect policy".

On our part there is a full readiness to normalize relations with the GFR, a readiness which could have been definitely confirmed during trade negotiations. Economic relations between Poland and the GFR were normalized on the basis of mutual benefits, however, and the existence of trade missions in our respective

countries cannot be regarded by anyone as even the beginning of political relations. But we know full well that even now, when the policies of Bonn in regard to Poland and the Socialist countries are still marked by road signs pointing to Königsberg, Breslau or Oppeln, which actually lead to a blind alley, there exist in that country political powers which soberly look at the past and even more soberly to the future. They, too, understand that the future of the German nation lies in peaceful development and not in the creation of new obstacles.

Despite the tragic past of war, we are not at all anti-German, as we are sometimes accused of being. We are enemies only of German imperialism, about whose character in history, the most recent history, everyone here would probably agree. We are and will remain enemies of those forces which want to annihilate us, to expel those Poles who inhabit the western territories of the Polish nation to work in French mines. A large dose of ill-will is needed to equate this attitude with alleged anti-German feeling. Are not the relations with the community of the German Democratic Republic a rather eloquent example of our attitude? I deliberately say community here, since recent years have brought such a range of relations that they encompass tens of thousands of inhabitants of our countries. Are not our contacts with the youth of the GDR who, when coming to Poland, do not hesitate to visit the former death camp in Auschwitz an eloquent example of our attitude, which supports everything that has a peaceful and anti-war character in the German Democratic Republic? We do not wish constantly to recall that tragic chapter of our history, but neither can we allow ourselves to forget it. We shall be the first to accept with great satisfaction any real and honest peaceful policy of behaviour on the part of official West German circles, but it must be a policy which takes reality into account. That such policy is painful for the ruling circle of the GFR is not our fault, but the fault of those who declared World War II. Are there no sober minded statesmen in West Germany who know that this must be paid for by the recognition of what we call status quo?

We shall be happiest in Poland when we are able to devote our work to peace without having to think of threats. Anyone who visits our country leaves convinced of the peaceful aims of our policy, of our sincere aspirations for a lessening of tensions in Europe, whereever they exist. And it is precisely because of this that our words attacking those who desire to provoke new conflicts resound so sharply.

We would like to believe, however, that it is not these circles which will shape the development of international relations. We are here at this meeting to try to improve mutual understanding, to heighten an atmosphere of confidence. Every achievement along this road, even the smallest, is worth the effort, since it serves the success of a cause of vital interest to us all. None of us here can give a simple answer as to the direction of this road, but in a mutual confrontation, from our respective positions, we may find a mutual line of behaviour, discover that which unites us, and how to proceed further in order to eliminate or mitigate that which divides us. If we approach this matter with sincere desire for mutual understanding and the achievement of results, I firmly believe that these results will come within our grasp.

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INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

8TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE : THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP

C O M M I T T E E IV

Saturday 1st October Afternoon

CHINA and the Evolution of the Alliances in EUROPE

Outline for a Report

R. LOWENTHAL

1. China as an independent factor in world affairs.

a) The virtual breakup of the Sino-Soviet alliance since 1962/3 means that China must be considered a completely independent factor in world affairs. A basic alignment of the Communist powers versus the West can no longer be taken for granted on any specific issue; the international system has become triangular rather than bipolar, even though Chinese power is still of a lesser order than that of the USA and the USSR; varying combinations of two of the three main powers against the third are possible on different issues. This development is not likely to be reversed as it has been brought about not only by major differences of national interest between the CPR and the Soviet Union, but also by profoundly divergent trends of internal evolution: the change of leadership in the Soviet Union has not changed this situation, while the current internal crisis in China has even accentuated it. As a result, both the USA and the USSR, as well as the European alliances led by them, find themselves confronted with new opportunities for diplomatic manoeuvre and new problems of priority among their objectives.

b) The importance of China as a factor in world affairs has been dramatised by her first nuclear explosions as well as by the extreme militancy of both her anti-American and anti-Soviet propaganda. This has tended to obscure both the present limits of Chinese power and the practical caution imposed by the consciousness of those limits on Chinese international conduct. The technical advances and capital investments that have resulted in China's promotion to nuclear rank appear to have been achieved on a rather narrow front, and will not by themselves make China a true world power so long as her fundamental problem of

industrialisation remains unsolved; it cannot be taken for granted that this problem will be solved at all under the present type of regime, while even if the necessary changes of policy should be made and maintained, its solution could not come very fast. The Chinese conduct in relation to Taiwan, to Vietnam and to India during the 1965 crisis has shown that for all their boastful and aggressive language, the Chinese Communist leaders are sufficiently aware of the present relation of forces to seek to avoid a direct military clash with one of the superpowers.

c) Peking's main foreign policy objectives in the present phase appear to be to weaken American military encirclement, notably by getting rid of the American presence in Taiwan, Vietnam and Thailand; to avoid economic isolation, notably by expanding trade relations with Japan and Western Europe; to create a buffer zone of "friendly states" under Chinese influence in competition to American, Soviet and Indian influence; and to destroy Soviet authority and build up Chinese authority among Communist and national revolutionary movements as far as possible. The strategies applied in pursuit of these objectives have included the attempt to pose as champion of the Afro-Asian, and to a lesser extent the Latin-American, peoples and to involve them in conflict with the United States; the propaganda of revolutionary 'people's wars' everywhere as a means to tie down and weaken American strength, and particularly the support of an uncompromising line in Vietnam; the support of Pakistan against India and of Indonesia against Malaysia; and the strict rejection of all Soviet offers for a united front in aid of Vietnam on the grounds that the Soviets were really co-operating with the Americans to end the 'people's war'.

d) Over the past two years, these strategies have been remarkably unsuccessful. Peking has torpedoed its own project for a 'second Bandung' conference when it turned out that most Afro-Asian governments were unwilling to turn it into an anti-American demonstration. No 'people's wars' have erupted outside Vietnam, and the Vietnam war has led to a massive strengthening of the American military presence around China's borders. China has been unable to help Pakistan effectively in her clash with India, and as a result could not prevent Russia from gaining prestige as a mediator. The coup attempted by a group of pro-Communist officers in Indonesia with the support of the pro-Chinese Indonesian Communist Party, and probably of Peking itself, has ended in spectacular defeat, with the strongest pro-Chinese CP crushed, and the Indonesian government turning away from its pro-Chinese course, abandoning its confrontation with Malaysia and returning to the UN. Finally, the rejection of Soviet offers for a United Front has led to an increasing self-isolation of China in the international Communist movement, with the North Korean and Japanese Communists turning from a pro-Chinese position to increasingly critical neutrality, the neutral

Rumanians becoming cooler and the Cubans becoming openly critical, and even the Vietnamese Communists moving from a predominantly pro-Chinese attitude to a carefully maintained balance between the two powers on whose support they depend. Only Peking's struggle against economic isolation has attained a measure of success, but even here Soviet trade with Japan has increased more rapidly than Chinese trade while the improvement of exchanges with Western Europe has been modest.

e) This series of partly dramatic setbacks must have contributed to precipitating the present internal crisis of the Peking regime, though its basic causes are probably linked with the problems of generation change in the Chinese leadership, the conflict between revolutionary veteran elites and new expert elites in military and economic life, and the effort to assert the domination of a single leader against the tendency of the party institutions to limit his powers; to that extent, the causes of the crisis, though not the solution so far attempted, show a parallel with Stalin's purges of the 1930es. For the time being, the most likely effect of the crisis on China's international position is to increase her self-isolation as the militant energies of the regime are turned inward, presenting to the outside world a solid facade of largely passive hostility. As a result, the day when China will constitute a major threat to the surrounding region is likely to be further delayed.

II. <u>The Impact on the Soviet bloc in Europe</u>.

a) By weakening Soviet ideological authority and forcing Moscow to compete for influence on other Communist parties and governments against Peking, the Sino-Soviet conflict has been a major factor favouring the emancipation of most of the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe from satellite status. This process began as early as 1956/7 with Chinese support for the 'Polish October' and reached a climax with the Rumanian Communists' "declaration of independence" of April, 1964, which was also a declaration of ideological neutrality. Since then, however, the momentum of this development appears to have largely exhausted itself. On one side, Soviet ideological authority has been so far eroded that the European Soviet bloc has by now become much more similar to a classical alliance under a hegemonial power, resting in part on common interests and in part on Russian military and economic preponderancy in the region, and much less sensitive to ideological issues than before. On the other hand, the tactical skill of Khrushchev's successors and the doctrinaire rigidity of the Chinese leadership have left the East Europeans very little scope for independent manoeuver in exploiting the dispute for their advantage. This is not to say that these governments and parties are likely to be brought back under stricter Soviet discipline - only that they will henceforth have to defend their independence within the alliance by relying on their own increased domestic stability and national identification rather than by playing on the Soviet need for ideological competition with China

that has largely ceased to be effective in this area.

b) The impact of the potential military threat constituted by an independent, powerful and largely hostile China on Soviet strategy, on the other hand, is bound to grow, but it is in its nature long-term rather than short-term. In view of the long common frontier, the unsettled Chinese territorial claims and the pressure of Chinese population, the Soviets have long accepted future territorial conflict as a possibility; as disputes with Peking intensified with the growth of Chinese power, they must have come to view it as a probability. Even the post-Khrushchev leaders cannot have seriously counted on the success of their efforts at reconciliation, and the marked anti-Soviet trend of the current 'Peking purges' has evidently confirmed their worst fears. In view of the relation of forces, they do not regard a major war with China as a danger for the near future; but the frequency of frontier incidents makes the possibility of armed infiltration on a gradually increasing scale a constant worry to them. Moreover, the Soviets, like most Western observers (and for equally doubtful reasons) tend to take it for granted that China will solve her problem of industrialisation whatever the present errors of her leaders, and that her tremendous potential power will then become actual. For the time being, this means that the Soviets, besides ideologically competing with the Chinese for the allegiance of the Communist parties and above all of the nationalist movements and regimes of the underdeveloped world, are endeavouring to create potential counterweights among China's neighbours and to make their own frontier forces strong enough to deal with infiltration attempts. This requires a policy of economic and in part military aid to India, of mediation between India and Pakistan, of improved diplomatic and above all economic relations with Japan, and of enough aid for Vietnam to offset Chinese influence there, but so far only a very limited transfer of armed forces to Asia - either for frontier protection or for aid to Vietnam.

c) This means that as of now, the preservation, consolidation and legitimation of the Soviet position in Europe remains the priority objective of Soviet foreign and military policy; in other words, the rise of the Chinese problem has so far had only a limited impact on Soviet policy in Europe. The Soviet leaders themselves probably expect that this will change eventually, depending on the increase of Chinese power on one side, the presumed disintegration of the Western alliance on the other. It follows that they see their major interest in reaping the fruits of that disintegration <u>before</u> the Chinese danger assumes major proportions. The replacement of "NATO and the Warsaw Pact" by a "European Security System", as advocated by them, would not end the European Soviet bloc, which has other effective ties, but would end the present ties between the US and Western Europe and thus free

the Soviet Union from the strain of a military confrontation with American power, permitting it to devote the resources now tied down by that confrontation either to the Asian theatre or to domestic purposes; moreover, it would achieve this objective together with two others - the acceptance by the West of the permanence of German partition and the permanent exclusion of Western Germany from access to nuclear weapons. All the signs point to it that the Soviets regard the simultaneous or successive achievement of these three closely linked objectives of their European policy as within reach in the comparatively near future, i.e. before the Chinese danger reaches proportions demanding a reversal of priorities.

d) On the tactical level, however, Soviet policy in Europe is somewhat hampered even now by the needs of ideological competition with China in other regions, and above all by the war in Vietnam. This situation makes active negotiation with the United States difficult and may temporarily prevent partial agreements which would otherwise be possible, thus imposing a certain rigidity on the Soviet diplomatic posture. But for the present phase, this does not prevent the Soviets from encouraging the independent initiatives of General de Gaulle and thus weakening the cohesion of the Western alliance; it is only when Western disintegration appears far enough advanced for a settlement on Soviet terms that direct negotiation with the USA will become indispensable. In such a situation, the Soviets would presumably not allow themselves to be deterred by Chinese ideological attacks from exploiting an opportunity for scoring substantial diplomatic gains in the West.

III. <u>The Impact on the Western Alliance</u>.

a) The direct effect of the rise of China as an independent power on the policies of the West European states is definitely of a minor order. Only Britain still has substantial interests in the region threatened by Chinese expansion; the danger to Malaysia and the widespread apprehension in Australia have combined with the Chinese-Indian conflict in making Britain support the American policy for the military containment of China. The continental powers, having no such regional concerns, are free in principle to consider China's economic development as an opportunity for increased trade, and the growth of her political and military power as a welcome potential pressure on the Soviet Union. But the economic opportunities are limited by the narrow range of China's capacity for exports. Political speculation on the need to support China against the Soviet Union has at times been outspoken in Germany, but has found no echo in responsible circles in view of the acuteness of Chinese-American conflict and the obvious dependence of German policy towards Russia on American support. In France, where no such inhibitions operate, the diplomacy of General de Gaulle has viewed the improvement of relations with Russia as crucial for its strategy of European independence; hence

de Gaulle has established diplomatic relations with Peking chiefly as a means of raising the value of French goodwill for Moscow, and also as a preparatory move for possible French participation in a settlement of the Vietnam war - but he has never seriously considered giving major support to Chinese ambitions. Even de Gaulle's outspoken criticism of US policy in Vietnam is based on the assumption that a unified, Communist Vietnam will not be a tool of Chinese expansion, but will on the contrary offer a more stable basis for containing that expansion than would a continuation of the war.

b) In the United States, on the other hand, the rise of China as an independent power has tended to produce a gradual but major reversal of political and strategic priorities. American policy-makers have tended to view the Communist military effort in Vietnam as the spearhead of a Chinese expansionist offensive which, though using different methods, would be comparable in seriousness to Stalin's post-war expansion in Eastern Europe, and have interpreted the Chinese propaganda for the spreading of 'people's wars' as proof of serious plans for such an offensive, with scant regard for actual Chinese capacities or actions. The fact that an acute danger of Communist victory in Vietnam in 1964/5 coincided with a period of comparative détente or at any rate quiescence in Soviet-American relations in Europe has therefore led the US administration to conclude that the conflict with China in Asia had become more practically urgent, if not more theoretically important, than the conflict with the Soviets in Europe, and that the military containment of China - of which the Vietnam war is viewed as a focal sector - has become the priority task of American policy, to be pursued at the price of a withdrawal first of initiative and attention, and eventually also of part of the armed forces, from Europe. In this framework, the fact that the conflict with the Soviet Union is not militarily acute, and that Soviets and Americans have a common interest in settling it as the Chinese danger gains in importance, has led to a tendency to regard that older conflict as outdated and tending to settle itself, or at any rate as no longer dangerous enough to justify the economic and military effort involved in maintaining American forces on the former scale in Europe or the political and mental effort involved in the active pursuit of a settlement favorable to Western interests. The result has been a de facto withdrawal of American leadership from the Western alliance.

c) The withdrawal of American leadership in turn has greatly strengthened the disintegrative tendencies within the Western alliance which had long been at work for other reasons. It has enabled General de Gaulle to withdraw France from the integrated NATO organisation with overwhelming popular support. It has also enabled him to take an independent initiative in offering the Soviets proposals for a European settlement which, while substantially different from the Soviets' own objectives and in accord with essential Western interests, cannot possibly achieve the results desired unless coordinated with American policy and backed with the full weight of American

power. West German opinion, aware that a collective settlement fulfilling their demand for national unity cannot be achieved without such backing, and watching as the decisive bargaining asset for such a settlement - the presence of American forces on the Elbe - is being frittered away, is increasingly turning to ideas of seeking their own bilateral arrangements with the Soviets, and if necessary even with the East German government, on the Gaullist model. The most probable outcome, if these developments continue, is a European settlement on Soviet terms, leading to a cutting of the present links between the USA and Western Europe and to a gradually increasing dependence first of West Germany and then of the rest of continental Europe on the preponderant power of the Soviet Union.

Conclusion.

The growth of Communist China into an independent factor in world affairs constitutes a potential threat to both the present superpowers and their allies, but not a major actual threat to either. A successful solution of the difficult problems of Chinese industrialisation is likely to make her a more immediate threat to the Soviet Union than to the United States, if and when it happens. Yet while the Soviet Union has responded to the potential threat in a rational way, i.e. by a limited long-term effort without an immediate shift of priorities, and is still concentrating its main energies on obtaining a favourable settlement in Europe before the Chinese danger becomes acute, the United States have anticipated the danger of tomorrow by a present shift of priorities to the detriment of their European interests. As a result, the rise of China has in the last few years led to a much more rapid disintegration of the Western than of the Eastern alliance in Europe, and may paradoxically help to bring about a major shift in the world balance of power in favour of the Soviet Union.

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INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

8TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE : THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP

COMMITTEE IV

Sunday 2nd October Afternoon

Non-alignment and East-West Relations

LEO MATES

The recovery of the economies of the European countries after the devastation of the Second World War has enhanced their general position in the international community and given new dimensions and a better prospect to the role of Europe in the affairs of the world. There could be little doubt even in 1945 that the dislocation of the economy of Europe was only a temporary factor. It affected the international position and status of most European countries deeply, but they still had all the human and material resources that were needed to bring about rapid rehabilitation.

Although the position of the countries which lost the war made their recovery more difficult, they also made rapid progress, partly on account of the advantage of not having to bear during the crucial years of reconstruction the costs of the postwar rearmament and other expenses connected with the activities of the victorious nations overseas. The reappearance of European countries as important economic factors on the world market occurred was little affected by which side they had been on in the past war.

Postwar Europe could now be playing an even more important role were it not for another effect which the war had on the Old Continent. The division of Europe into two political spheres, caused over a period profound and lasting damage to international relations both within Europe and on a world-wide scale. This division was not caused by European antagonisms alone. It started principally from disputes over the postwar settlement within Europe, but it soon expanded to cover issues about areas far away from Europe, in some cases areas which had never been under European influence before.

Even more significant is the fact that this division developed into a prolonged state of high tension between the two Super Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The first of these is not a European Power and the other is not a solely European Power, the greater part of its territory being in Asia. The Cold War gradually became a conflict of world-wide significance, but Europe remained its most important scene for many years. There can be no doubt that this development, much more than the ravages of the war, affected the international position and the foreign policy of each and every European country. As an area, Europe certainly remained handicapped after the war because of the division and the Cold War.

There is, however, more to this development than the direct consequences of the division and the ensuing conflict. In the East of Europe a Super Power developed and soon was involved in a prolonged Cold War with the other Super Power across the Atlantic, the United States. None of the Western European Powers developed into a Super Power. A fundamental and lasting disequilibrium thus emerged and must be added to the other effects of the division, causing further harm and creating new problems for international relations in Europe.

The efforts of the Western countries to organize a purely European coalition soon proved unsatisfactory and in the spring of 1949 NATO came into being. The Western European countries entered in this way into an alliance with the United States, under the pressures of the rapidly intensifying Cold War. It would lead us too far astray to discuss here whether these countries could not have acted differently and have avoided thereby the full development of the Cold War with all its consequences. The fact is that the division of Europe, once accepted as a lasting feature with the development of the Cold War, necessarily brought the introduction of the United States into the internal affairs of Europe.

This new element in the modern history of Europe could not be overcome either rapidly, or by relying chiefly on the resources of the countries concerned, as was possible with the economic recovery. Only a complete and final disappearance of Cold War tensions and of their traces could contribute decisively to the ending of the political dependence of Western Europe on the United States of America.

The attributes of a Great Power have changed profoundly since the beginning of the Second World War and during the postwar years. Modern scientific developments and their application to the military and economic activities of industrially developed

nations emphasize bigness in all respects: the size of the domestic market, the huge aggregate national production and financial resources, as well as vastness of territory.

The United States was the one nation which immediately after the war possessed all the attributes for a modern Great Power, a Super Power. It was in that country that the nuclear weapon was first manufactured and tried out. Relying on all her advantages, the United States could embark on an ambitious course of foreign policy. It appeared to many that this was the only possible country qualifying for the status of a real Super Power.

The other possible Super Power was, of course, the Soviet Union. It was by no means obvious that she could make up for the heavy damage and losses sustained during the war and at the same time raise her technical and industrial level to the mark needed for a successful entry into the race as a Super Power. But, as frequently happens in history, that which was not obvious happened nevertheless. The Soviet Union performed the miracle and comparatively soon after the war the world faced the emergence of the second nuclear Super Power.

The balance thus established, which has contributed greatly to the lessening of the Cold War, did not solve the problem of the disequilibrium in Europe. In other words, the ending of the Cold War in Europe still depended, now even more, on the solution of conflicts between the Super Powers.

The most important consequence of the East-West division in Europe was, therefore, the dependence of Western Europe on the United States and the increased influence of relations in other parts of the world on relations within Europe. It is not necessary to emphasize that this influence brought new complications to the relations between the two parts of Europe and that the continual turbulence in various parts of the world became a continuing negative factor in the political relations among European countries.

The problems brought to Europe by the aftermath of the war, together with the additional complications injected into the European situation through the Cold War in other parts of the world, made real progress in the direction of East-West co-operation practically impossible. The effects of situations in remote places were heightened by the fact that in most cases European Powers still had considerable interests there and were linked with the problems in which the postwar disturbances had their origins.

On the other hand, we cannot overlook the fact that the conflicts in the under-developed regions and where new States emerged after the crumbling of colonial empires, would never have grown to existing proportions if there had not been the Cold War, which injected so much fuel into the flames of the process of decolonization. Furthermore, the Cold War influenced the internal development in most of those countries and regions, prolonging the period needed for stabilization or even introducing new factors, such as to make it unlikely that stability would be attained in the foreseeable future.

The major problems inherent in these regions are of a lasting nature: inadequate economic development, stagnant standards of living, problems connected with the shaping of new States and the remodelling of society after independence etc. With the probability of the continuation of the confrontation of the Super Powers on a world-wide scale, it has to be assumed that these regions will for a long time to come exercise a negative influence on internal developments in Europe, if intra-European relations continue to depend directly on the relations between the Super Powers. This probably remains true even if we accept that the Cold War has lost its intensity and will not be revived to the same degree known in the early Fifties.

In this argument no attempt has been made to pass judgment on the merits of the case of either of the Super Powers in the overall confrontation of the Cold War. This should not be taken as a lack of personal opinion, nor as an indication that no distinction could be drawn. This has been done partly because such a judgment would not change the conclusions drawn and because it would be difficult in a brief review to treat the subject in a conscientious manner and cover adequately all situations and all periods of the Cold War.

In sum then, the Cold War is a confrontation which cannot be solved as a European problem and within Europe alone. For the purpose of our examination it is therefore of paramount importance to examine whether it is possible to insulate in some way the internal problems of Europe from the negative influences of a world full of continuing problems which may well lead in the future to conflicts of one sort or another. In practical terms the question is whether it is possible to relieve the pressure exercised by the conflict between the Super Powers on the relations of European countries with each other and with the Super Powers.

It is obviously neither possible nor desirable to try to reduce the communication, and today this means interdependence, between Europe and other parts of the world. On the contrary, it is desirable that European countries develop further their relations with non-European countries, as in fact some of them are doing with increasing effectiveness. The direct involvement of the European countries in the Cold War led to a reduction in the scope and content of these relations: the lessening of Cold War tensions resulted in an improvement once more.

The anti-colonial movement in Asia and in Africa and the process of decolonization has not unnaturally produced tense relationships between the former colonial Powers and the newly established States, but taken as a whole the countries of Western Europe have eventually succeeded in bringing about tolerable if not co-operative relations with the former colonies. Except for some cases of acute conflict in the colonies remaining and some cases of post-colonial conflicts, the major source of conflicts in the former colonial empires is not primarily based on the relations of those areas with former colonial Powers.

The main problem therefore appears to be how to mitigate the effect of the involvement of Europe in the Cold War. In other words, how would it be possible to reduce the negative effect of the nuclear disequilibrium in Europe? Developments so far have shown that it is possible to establish better East-West relations on a bilateral basis in Europe without jeopardizing the security or other interests of either side. It appears to be worth the effort to examine further the opportunities and possibilities which would open up if the assumptions and anxieties of the early postwar years were more radically overcome.

This examination must, naturally, start from the present situation of still very close and exclusive groupings on both sides in Europe. It would be unrealistic to advocate starting with the elimination of the several forms of close association binding together the countries on either side. Most of them have grown out of co-operation in peaceful activities and even the military pacts are more likely to wither away through disuse than to be abrogated suddenly.

This proposition depends, however, on the reply to several important questions, among them particularly whether it is possible and acceptable to ignore the threat of a possible conflict in which the two sides of Europe would stand in the shadow of a major nuclear clash of the giants; whether it is possible to develop

friendly relations among countries with such different ways of life and systems of Government; and whether it is possible to overcome the internal problems of Europe, particularly the German question.

The first of these questions, about the threat of a major nuclear war, leads to another preliminary question: how much do the existing military blocs contribute to the defence of the participants? This is one of the most important questions relating to the European political situation. There are now three distinct positions: reliance on the military establishment of one of the Super Powers, development of national nuclear forces and non-reliance on nuclear weapons. A real alternative to the existing position can only be a general acceptance of the third attitude: non-reliance on nuclear weapons. Reliance on national forces can, obviously, apply to only a small number of European countries and also implies to some extent the reliance on a Super Power; we can therefore exclude this.

It has already been argued that the reliance on weapons of another country does not give security if the use of these weapons would bring mortal peril to the country using them. I do not propose to dwell at length on this argument, it is well known and I believe quite convincing. I am therefore ready to accept the general conclusion that a Super Power will intervene in a conflict only if her vital interests are in jeopardy and that this will apply even more strongly in the case where nuclear arms are to be used against an adversary who possesses the capacity of retaliating on a comparable level of striking power.

If we accept this, then we must also accept that:

(a) such Power will intervene even if not formally engaged to do so, and

(b) that any provocation which would call for an intervention will be deterred regardless of the existence of formal engagements.

In other words, the only military safeguard a non-Super Power can count upon in an armed world is the existence of counterbalancing nuclear Forces, irrespective of legal obligations and alliances. In fact, it would be nonsensical - and no Statesman would do it - to try to predict the behaviour of an adversary or any third party in an anticipated conflict by reference to the text of existing treaty obligations. But, there is another side to this problem. Even if a conflict involving, directly or indirectly, the major nuclear Powers did not affect the interests of a non-nuclear Power, this country could be drawn into a dangerous situation in the course of the conflict, either legally or by reason of geography. This is a calculated risk accepted every time a country adheres to an alliance,

but this risk assumes a specific meaning in this era of nuclear weapons. The new aspect of this risk is being increasingly recognized in contemporary international relations.

Apparently the old maxim "si vis pacem para bellum" has become obsolete and the preservation of peace is not well served by the rattling of arms. In particular, the adherence to alliances does not add to the weight of a deterrent which is concentrated in the striking power of a fully developed nuclear military establishment. Inasmuch as the balance of nuclear deterrence contributes to the maintenance of peace, this balance can hardly be upset by the addition to a bloc of non-nuclear military forces.

On the other hand the two nuclear Super Powers necessarily act as polarizing forces in the wider field of international relations. They contribute thereby to a more organized pattern of international tensions, more organized directionally, developing dangerous levels of intensity, as we have so frequently witnessed in the postwar years. The policy of deterrence and the general attitude of preparing for war in order to preserve peace increases the danger of war and actually reduces the security of all. This has produced an increasing sense of frustration after so much effort and resources have been invested in the armaments race. In fact the blurring of the sharp edges of polarization in international relations and the softening of the structures of the military blocs are notable consequences of the failure of the "prepare for war" attitude.

It appears therefore that an emancipation of European countries from the past attitudes towards their external security is not an unrealistic dream, but a purposeful projection into the future of attitudes which are already taking shape. The decisive element in this new trend of thinking appears to be the recognition of the importance of preventing a relapse into high tensions in the relations between European countries which is seen as a threat closer to reality than that of facing, in a possible war, an overwhelming adversary fully armed with all types of modern weapons.

It is not surprising that the improvement in intra-European relations developed simultaneously with the recovery of the economies of countries on both sides in Europe. Notably in Western Europe the improvement of the economic position led to greater reliance on non-military elements in foreign relations. It created a new spirit of national identity and self-confidence which led to more independent attitudes in foreign relations. This was duplicated by a similar trend in Eastern Europe and the way was

paved for fuller relations despite the tensions still prevailing over Cold War issues. Tensions were also lowered under the influence of these processes and of other developments in the world.

Among the other developments which contributed to the lessening of Cold War tensions we must include the successful resistance of the non-aligned countries to the pressure of the polarizing forces to divide the whole world into two irreconcilable blocs and to the other more positive aspects of the international activities of those countries. There can be little doubt that the very existence of non-aligned countries and their growing influence on international relations contributed greatly to the reduction of tensions and to a more flexible pattern in international relations in general, and in particular in divided Europe.

Thus, under several influences, the inherent inter-dependence and complementary nature of the two sides of Europe, helped by geographic proximity and historical background, regained strength and opened brighter prospects. In particular the Western countries began to realize that they must not consider their attitude towards the countries of the East only in the light of the might of the respective military establishments, but primarily in terms of the immediate and real prospects of co-operation in fields in which they are by no means inferior and in which they do not have to rely on support from across the Atlantic. The Eastern countries began to regard their relations with the West without the overwhelming distrust and anxiety of the earlier years of high tensions. With a greater sense of internal and external security, they became more and more ready to expand and intensify relations with partners on the other side of the fence.

It would be too much to say that the nuclear disequilibrium between the East and the West of Europe, of which mention was made in the beginning, has thus been overcome, but the shifting of emphasis from the military to the civilian aspect of foreign relations undoubtedly creates more favourable openings for further progress in East-West relations.

The second point, concerning the possibility of co-operation between countries with differing social systems, should cause no particular problems. My own country, Yugoslavia, has given ample evidence that these differences, if they are not burdened with other elements of a more specifically political nature, do not present too great an obstacle to friendly co-operation. Examples illustrating such relations "across the fences" are abundant and well-known.

They range from close co-operation in economic affairs, including industrial and scientific co-operation, to the elimination of visas and in some cases even passports for the movement of persons across the border. At one time even military assistance proved to be a form of co-operation acceptable to both sides. Contingencies which led to this aspect of co-operation have fortunately long since disappeared.

In recent years the experience of Yugoslavia has probably been of some use in the efforts to develop more extensive contacts between the countries of the East and West in Europe in general. It is significant that co-operation along these lines could develop to the existing level of intensity and in so many fields in spite of the existing military organizations on both sides. It still remains, however, to be seen how far this development can proceed and it is worth examining what could expedite it.

It is apparent that the recognition of a mutual interest in the development of economic relations and in particular in matters related to economic development can serve as an initial inducement. Ideological and conceptual differences in general, cannot be fully overcome but it is possible to set them aside, without sacrificing them, of course, and pass on to practical activities. It is better to do this than to try to remove the differences by searching for a compromise or by trying to impose one's own views. Ideological differences, eliminated from the sphere of inter-State relations, can continue to exist. Liberated from the constraints of the raison d'état, they can even become a positive factor, stimulating the progressive development of mankind.

In the case of East-West relations in Europe, as well as in other similar cases, the real reason for conflicts are not conceptual differences, but the practical, eminently pragmatic attitudes and aspirations of States. All existing international differences can easily be explained without blaming them on ideological differences. It is significant that all ideological or religious wars of the past have been settled without solving the conceptual or religious difference.

The last of the three questions relates to the practical problems of contemporary Europe, particularly to the German question. This, of course, is a real problem, but it can become an obstacle to the consolidation of relations in Europe only if the countries of Europe make it an obstacle. From a practical point of view it appears generally accepted that the German question cannot be solved

without a consolidation of relations in Europe; and also that it is impossible to change or shift any existing boundary or dividing line in Europe without a war and that a war must be avoided. All this would normally lead to the conclusion that this particular problem should be laid aside and all efforts applied to creating more favourable circumstances for a solution in the future.

One is tempted to add also that the German question is an outstanding example of a problem which becomes more insoluble in proportion to the endeavours made to force a solution of it. I do not propose to discuss this question further here, as it is being given all the attention necessary in another place. While mentioning it as one specific current political problem of Europe, I wish only to add that one should not expect the ending of the Cold War to open an era without problems or even conflicts.

Existing political problems in Europe, if reduced to their proper, realistic, proportions cannot be considered as unavoidable causes of the continuation of the division along the lines of the Cold War. Europe has had problems in the past just as it will have them in the future. Many of them have been solved or successfully set aside even during the postwar years: for example the settlement of the Austrian question and that of Trieste.

Summarizing this brief examination of anti-Cold War trends in Europe it is appropriate to emphasize the prevalence of positive developments, as well as the fact that the original pattern of relations in the Europe of the Fifties has already changed considerably for the better. In fact, political and economic relations have grown substantially over the boundaries set by the bloc pattern on both sides. Recent political and economic transactions between the East and the West indicate that the momentum of this anti-Cold War trend is gaining and the problem of defining the place and role of Europe in the world is steadily moving out of the sphere of speculation into the sphere of existing or potential realities.

Rather than defining it in the context of an alignment of military powers with centres in the United States and the Soviet Union, we must take into consideration other factors affecting more directly and continuously the pattern of international relations. The world was, after all, not divided into two military blocs and the development of nuclear arms has made a show down along these lines unprofitable in any circumstances.

Areas of the world which were in the past only passive elements in the picture became active and something like a new part

of the world came into being, often referred to as the third world. Mostly within this area a new political attitude was shaped, an opposition to the division of the world into two blocs, an effort to keep out of the alignments which developed under the impact of the Cold War. We have already noted that the Cold War has also brought antagonism and conflict into these parts of the world, but an increasing number of countries there succeeded in maintaining their independence of action and entered the world scene as a new and independent political force.

For years most European countries in the East and in the West ignored or underestimated the significance of this new force, the non-aligned countries. Even the concept of non-alignment was misunderstood and frequently criticized from both sides. In recent years this attitude has given place to a slightly more serious examination of this development and also to the beginning of contacts in a spirit of better understanding. The fact that this change took place more or less at the same time both in the East and in the West opens some possibilities of co-operation in a much widened framework.

This would probably not bring the majority of European countries to adopt the position of the non-aligned countries as it was defined at the high level conferences in Belgrade in 1961 and in Cairo in 1964. The elements of that platform which are derived from the specific positions of these countries would probably not be generally acceptable in the more developed European countries, nor would it easily fit into a pattern of regional integrations which have developed in the political as well as in the economic fields in both parts of Europe. But this is not of particular importance.

The important prospect which may grow out of closer and better understanding between the less developed non-aligned countries and the countries of Europe is the placing of the international relations of European countries in a wider framework. In this way it may be possible to overcome the uneasy feeling of confrontation within Europe and the tendency to overemphasize the military aspect of the international situation.

The success of the less developed countries, under the leadership of the non-aligned countries, in pressing the fundamental economic problems of their regions into the centre of the preoccupations of the councils of the world has greatly contributed to the degree to which demilitarization of international relations has already been achieved. Once the economic problem of the less developed regions of the world came to compete for priority with the

military and political problems of the more developed parts of the world a fundamental change of atmosphere began to develop in the debates in the United Nations and in other places.

These economic problems became, naturally, highly charged political questions once they were put on the conference table, but the distinction is in the way of the solutions which they require. In this sense they are here considered as economic problems and by virtue of this specific character they have exercised a demilitarization of international relations.

Of course, this does not mean that the military aspect, and in particular the armaments race, has been or could be automatically put under control. The result to be expected from a more systematic and energetic effort in the field of economic development, particularly in helping an accelerated development of the less developed countries, might only be still heavier reliance on economic measures in international relations and a greater readiness by all sides to accept economically indicated compromises in the debates on disarmament and in other fields of political or military negotiations.

In particular one would expect that a greater emphasis on economic solutions would contribute to less emphasis on the nuclear disequilibrium in Europe. In other words, if on both sides more attention is given to the economic problems of the world, it would not only mean more resources for peaceful activities but also less apprehension about the possible aims of the other side. This could create more confidence, because the assumed intentions of the other side, rather than the existence of an impressive military establishment, are the main sources of anxiety and of an over-emphasis on military matters.

As a matter of fact, on both sides in Europe the main anxiety is no longer generated by the fear of a conflict across the dividing line in Europe but by the fear of the possible spreading of a conflict which might originate in some place far away from Europe, even without the direct participation of any European Power in the initial stage.

On both sides in Europe countries are now taking a more independent view of these problems, thus enhancing the trend of moving away from a pattern in foreign affairs subordinating the national interest to a group interest. The balancing of military potentials through alliances is giving place to the effort towards strengthening the internal and ineternational position of a country through the extension of its economic relations and activities.

The continuation of this trend is favoured also by the evolution of the policies of the less developed non-aligned countries. They have successfully resisted the efforts directed toward including them into bloc alliances and have established an area of non-alignment in the world, which has received recognition as an important element in the pattern of international relations. They are now bent more on efforts to find better solutions to their individual and collective economic problems and to the prevention of the spreading of local conflicts in areas of the less developed parts of the world, than on efforts to reconcile the Super Powers, as they tried to do until only a few years ago.

It may therefore be easier now than ever before to find an increasing number of points of agreement and co-operation, on a platform which would unite the non-aligned countries of the less developed regions of the world and the countries of Europe and which would be founded on purposes and aims acceptable irrespective of the adherence to a military alliance or a bloc.

The lesson of the last ten years, beginning with the initial period of the relaxation of tensions of the Cold War after the 1955 Summit, does not necessarily point to the adoption of the full platform of non-alignment by all European countries, but rather to a further shifting of the emphasis from military to non-military, principally economic, problems. After all, the adoption of the policy of non-alignment by all European countries, including the Soviet Union and the major European Powers of the West, would not have much sense. The policy of non-alignment has had its justification primarily because the major Powers of the world did not accept it.

On the other hand that content of the platform of non-alignment which reflects the specific position of the less developed countries would necessarily become redundant if the highly developed countries assumed a co-operative attitude to these questions. The European countries cannot disregard the plight of the less developed parts of the world without paying for it with a deterioration of relations in their midst.

Europe has ceased to be the breeding ground of Great Powers and the mastery over Europe no longer automatically brings with it domination over the world. Europe has lost most of its physical projections in other parts of the world, its overseas possessions. The sooner the remainder goes the better for all European nations. The links between Europe and the rest of the world must of necessity

change further than that. Only with more independence of judgment and freedom of action towards other Powers, can the countries of Europe re-establish the internal balance in their continent and the proper balance with other parts of the world. They cannot expect security and stability in one part of the continent if this is not true for the other, regardless of all differences and conflicts which may still exist or which may arise from their living so closely together.

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INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

8TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE : THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP

C O M M I T T E E I V

Sunday 2nd October — Afternoon

Non-alignment and East-West Relations

LEO MATES

The recovery of the economies of the European countries after the devastation of the Second World War has enhanced their general position in the international community and given new dimensions and a better prospect to the role of Europe in the affairs of the world. There could be little doubt even in 1945 that the dislocation of the economy of Europe was only a temporary factor. It affected the international position and status of most European countries deeply, but they still had all the human and material resources that were needed to bring about rapid rehabilitation.

Although the position of the countries which lost the war made their recovery more difficult, they also made rapid progress, partly on account of the advantage of not having to bear during the crucial years of reconstruction the costs of the postwar rearmament and other expenses connected with the activities of the victorious nations overseas. The reappearance of European countries as important economic factors on the world market occurred was little affected by which side they had been on in the past war.

Postwar Europe could now be playing an even more important role were it not for another effect which the war had on the Old Continent. The division of Europe into two political spheres, caused over a period profound and lasting damage to international relations both within Europe and on a world-wide scale. This division was not caused by European antagonisms alone. It started principally from disputes over the postwar settlement within Europe, but it soon expanded to cover issues about areas far away from Europe, in some cases areas which had never been under European influence before.

Even more significant is the fact that this division developed into a prolonged state of high tension between the two Super Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The first of these is not a European Power and the other is not a solely European Power, the greater part of its territory being in Asia. The Cold War gradually became a conflict of world-wide significance, but Europe remained its most important scene for many years. There can be no doubt that this development, much more than the ravages of the war, affected the international position and the foreign policy of each and every European country. As an area, Europe certainly remained handicapped after the war because of the division and the Cold War.

There is, however, more to this development than the direct consequences of the division and the ensuing conflict. In the East of Europe a Super Power developed and soon was involved in a prolonged Cold War with the other Super Power across the Atlantic, the United States. None of the Western European Powers developed into a Super Power. A fundamental and lasting disequilibrium thus emerged and must be added to the other effects of the division, causing further harm and creating new problems for international relations in Europe.

The efforts of the Western countries to organize a purely European coalition soon proved unsatisfactory and in the spring of 1949 NATO came into being. The Western European countries entered in this way into an alliance with the United States, under the pressures of the rapidly intensifying Cold War. It would lead us too far astray to discuss here whether these countries could not have acted differently and have avoided thereby the full development of the Cold War with all its consequences. The fact is that the division of Europe, once accepted as a lasting feature with the development of the Cold War, necessarily brought the introduction of the United States into the internal affairs of Europe.

This new element in the modern history of Europe could not be overcome either rapidly, or by relying chiefly on the resources of the countries concerned, as was possible with the economic recovery. Only a complete and final disappearance of Cold War tensions and of their traces could contribute decisively to the ending of the political dependence of Western Europe on the United States of America.

The attributes of a Great Power have changed profoundly since the beginning of the Second World War and during the postwar years. Modern scientific developments and their application to the military and economic activities of industrially developed

nations emphasize bigness in all respects: the size of the domestic market, the huge aggregate national production and financial resources, as well as vastness of territory.

The United States was the one nation which immediately after the war possessed all the attributes for a modern Great Power, a Super Power. It was in that country that the nuclear weapon was first manufactured and tried out. Relying on all her advantages, the United States could embark on an ambitious course of foreign policy. It appeared to many that this was the only possible country qualifying for the status of a real Super Power.

The other possible Super Power was, of course, the Soviet Union. It was by no means obvious that she could make up for the heavy damage and losses sustained during the war and at the same time raise her technical and industrial level to the mark needed for a successful entry into the race as a Super Power. But, as frequently happens in history, that which was not obvious happened nevertheless. The Soviet Union performed the miracle and comparatively soon after the war the world faced the emergence of the second nuclear Super Power.

The balance thus established, which has contributed greatly to the lessening of the Cold War, did not solve the problem of the disequilibrium in Europe. In other words, the ending of the Cold War in Europe still depended, now even more, on the solution of conflicts between the Super Powers.

The most important consequence of the East-West division in Europe was, therefore, the dependence of Western Europe on the United States and the increased influence of relations in other parts of the world on relations within Europe. It is not necessary to emphasize that this influence brought new complications to the relations between the two parts of Europe and that the continual turbulence in various parts of the world became a continuing negative factor in the political relations among European countries.

The problems brought to Europe by the aftermath of the war, together with the additional complications injected into the European situation through the Cold War in other parts of the world, made real progress in the direction of East-West co-operation practically impossible. The effects of situations in remote places were heightened by the fact that in most cases European Powers still had considerable interests there and were linked with the problems in which the postwar disturbances had their origins.

On the other hand, we cannot overlook the fact that the conflicts in the under-developed regions and where new States emerged after the crumbling of colonial empires, would never have grown to existing proportions if there had not been the Cold War, which injected so much fuel into the flames of the process of decolonization. Furthermore, the Cold War influenced the internal development in most of those countries and regions, prolonging the period needed for stabilization or even introducing new factors, such as to make it unlikely that stability would be attained in the foreseeable future.

The major problems inherent in these regions are of a lasting nature: inadequate economic development, stagnant standards of living, problems connected with the shaping of new States and the remodelling of society after independence etc. With the probability of the continuation of the confrontation of the Super Powers on a world-wide scale, it has to be assumed that these regions will for a long time to come exercise a negative influence on internal developments in Europe, if intra-European relations continue to depend directly on the relations between the Super Powers. This probably remains true even if we accept that the Cold War has lost its intensity and will not be revived to the same degree known in the early Fifties.

In this argument no attempt has been made to pass judgment on the merits of the case of either of the Super Powers in the overall confrontation of the Cold War. This should not be taken as a lack of personal opinion, nor as an indication that no distinction could be drawn. This has been done partly because such a judgment would not change the conclusions drawn and because it would be difficult in a brief review to treat the subject in a conscientious manner and cover adequately all situations and all periods of the Cold War.

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It is obviously neither possible nor desirable to try to reduce the communication, and today this means interdependence, between Europe and other parts of the world. On the contrary, it is desirable that European countries develop further their relations with non-European countries, as in fact some of them are doing with increasing effectiveness. The direct involvement of the European countries in the Cold War led to a reduction in the scope and content of these relations: the lessening of Cold War tensions resulted in an improvement once more.

The anti-colonial movement in Asia and in Africa and the process of decolonization has not unnaturally produced tense relationships between the former colonial Powers and the newly established States, but taken as a whole the countries of Western Europe have eventually succeeded in bringing about tolerable if not co-operative relations with the former colonies. Except for some cases of acute conflict in the colonies remaining and some cases of post-colonial conflicts, the major source of conflicts in the former colonial empires is not primarily based on the relations of those areas with former colonial Powers.

The main problem therefore appears to be how to mitigate the effect of the involvement of Europe in the Cold War. In other words, how would it be possible to reduce the negative effect of the nuclear disequilibrium in Europe? Developments so far have shown that it is possible to establish better East-West relations on a bilateral basis in Europe without jeopardizing the security or other interests of either side. It appears to be worth the effort to examine further the opportunities and possibilities which would open up if the assumptions and anxieties of the early postwar years were more radically overcome.

This examination must, naturally, start from the present situation of still very close and exclusive groupings on both sides in Europe. It would be unrealistic to advocate starting with the elimination of the several forms of close association binding together the countries on either side. Most of them have grown out of co-operation in peaceful activities and even the military pacts are more likely to wither away through disuse than to be abrogated suddenly.

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The first of these questions, about the threat of a major nuclear war, leads to another preliminary question: how much do the existing military blocs contribute to the defence of the participants? This is one of the most important questions relating to the European political situation. There are now three distinct positions: reliance on the military establishment of one of the Super Powers, development of national nuclear forces and non-reliance on nuclear weapons. A real alternative to the existing position can only be a general acceptance of the third attitude: non-reliance on nuclear weapons. Reliance on national forces can, obviously, apply to only a small number of European countries and also implies to some extent the reliance on a Super Power; we can therefore exclude this.

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If we accept this, then we must also accept that:

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In other words, the only military safeguard a non-Super Power can count upon in an armed world is the existence of counterbalancing nuclear Forces, irrespective of legal obligations and alliances. In fact, it would be nonsensical - and no Statesman would do it - to try to predict the behaviour of an adversary or any third party in an anticipated conflict by reference to the text of existing treaty obligations. But, there is another side to this problem. Even if a conflict involving, directly or indirectly, the major nuclear Powers did not affect the interests of a non-nuclear Power, this country could be drawn into a dangerous situation in the course of the conflict, either legally or by reason of geography. This is a calculated risk accepted every time a country adheres to an alliance,

but this risk assumes a specific meaning in this era of nuclear weapons. The new aspect of this risk is being increasingly recognized in contemporary international relations.

Apparently the old maxim "si vis pacem para bellum" has become obsolete and the preservation of peace is not well served by the rattling of arms. In particular, the adherence to alliances does not add to the weight of a deterrent which is concentrated in the striking power of a fully developed nuclear military establishment. Inasmuch as the balance of nuclear deterrence contributes to the maintenance of peace, this balance can hardly be upset by the addition to a bloc of non-nuclear military forces.

On the other hand the two nuclear Super Powers necessarily act as polarizing forces in the wider field of international relations. They contribute thereby to a more organized pattern of international tensions, more organized directionally, developing dangerous levels of intensity, as we have so frequently witnessed in the postwar years. The policy of deterrence and the general attitude of preparing for war in order to preserve peace increases the danger of war and actually reduces the security of all. This has produced an increasing sense of frustration after so much effort and resources have been invested in the armaments race. In fact the blurring of the sharp edges of polarization in international relations and the softening of the structures of the military blocs are notable consequences of the failure of the "prepare for war" attitude.

It appears therefore that an emancipation of European countries from the past attitudes towards their external security is not an unrealistic dream, but a purposeful projection into the future of attitudes which are already taking shape. The decisive element in this new trend of thinking appears to be the recognition of the importance of preventing a relapse into high tensions in the relations between European countries which is seen as a threat closer to reality than that of facing, in a possible war, an overwhelming adversary fully armed with all types of modern weapons.

It is not surprising that the improvement in intra-European relations developed simultaneously with the recovery of the economies of countries on both sides in Europe. Notably in Western Europe the improvement of the economic position led to greater reliance on non-military elements in foreign relations. It created a new spirit of national identity and self-confidence which led to more independent attitudes in foreign relations. This was duplicated by a similar trend in Eastern Europe and the way was

paved for fuller relations despite the tensions still prevailing over Cold War issues. Tensions were also lowered under the influence of these processes and of other developments in the world.

Among the other developments which contributed to the lessening of Cold War tensions we must include the successful resistance of the non-aligned countries to the pressure of the polarizing forces to divide the whole world into two irreconcilable blocs and to the other more positive aspects of the international activities of those countries. There can be little doubt that the very existence of non-aligned countries and their growing influence on international relations contributed greatly to the reduction of tensions and to a more flexible pattern in international relations in general, and in particular in divided Europe.

Thus, under several influences, the inherent inter-dependence and complementary nature of the two sides of Europe, helped by geographic proximity and historical background, regained strength and opened brighter prospects. In particular the Western countries began to realize that they must not consider their attitude towards the countries of the East only in the light of the might of the respective military establishments, but primarily in terms of the immediate and real prospects of co-operation in fields in which they are by no means inferior and in which they do not have to rely on support from across the Atlantic. The Eastern countries began to regard their relations with the West without the overwhelming distrust and anxiety of the earlier years of high tensions. With a greater sense of internal and external security, they became more and more ready to expand and intensify relations with partners on the other side of the fence.

It would be too much to say that the nuclear disequilibrium between the East and the West of Europe, of which mention was made in the beginning, has thus been overcome, but the shifting of emphasis from the military to the civilian aspect of foreign relations undoubtedly creates more favourable openings for further progress in East-West relations.

The second point, concerning the possibility of co-operation between countries with differing social systems, should cause no particular problems. My own country, Yugoslavia, has given ample evidence that these differences, if they are not burdened with other elements of a more specifically political nature, do not present too great an obstacle to friendly co-operation. Examples illustrating such relations "across the fences" are abundant and well-known.

They range from close co-operation in economic affairs, including industrial and scientific co-operation, to the elimination of visas and in some cases even passports for the movement of persons across the border. At one time even military assistance proved to be a form of co-operation acceptable to both sides. Contingencies which led to this aspect of co-operation have fortunately long since disappeared.

In recent years the experience of Yugoslavia has probably been of some use in the efforts to develop more extensive contacts between the countries of the East and West in Europe in general. It is significant that co-operation along these lines could develop to the existing level of intensity and in so many fields in spite of the existing military organizations on both sides. It still remains, however, to be seen how far this development can proceed and it is worth examining what could expedite it.

It is apparent that the recognition of a mutual interest in the development of economic relations and in particular in matters related to economic development can serve as an initial inducement. Ideological and conceptual differences in general, cannot be fully overcome but it is possible to set them aside, without sacrificing them, of course, and pass on to practical activities. It is better to do this than to try to remove the differences by searching for a compromise or by trying to impose one's own views. Ideological differences, eliminated from the sphere of inter-State relations, can continue to exist. Liberated from the constraints of the raison d'état, they can even become a positive factor, stimulating the progressive development of mankind.

In the case of East-West relations in Europe, as well as in other similar cases, the real reason for conflicts are not conceptual differences, but the practical, eminently pragmatic attitudes and aspirations of States. All existing international differences can easily be explained without blaming them on ideological differences. It is significant that all ideological or religious wars of the past have been settled without solving the conceptual or religious difference.

The last of the three questions relates to the practical problems of contemporary Europe, particularly to the German question. This, of course, is a real problem, but it can become an obstacle to the consolidation of relations in Europe only if the countries of Europe make it an obstacle. From a practical point of view it appears generally accepted that the German question cannot be solved

without a consolidation of relations in Europe; and also that it is impossible to change or shift any existing boundary or dividing line in Europe without a war and that a war must be avoided. All this would normally lead to the conclusion that this particular problem should be laid aside and all efforts applied to creating more favourable circumstances for a solution in the future.

One is tempted to add also that the German question is an outstanding example of a problem which becomes more insoluble in proportion to the endeavours made to force a solution of it. I do not propose to discuss this question further here, as it is being given all the attention necessary in another place. While mentioning it as one specific current political problem of Europe, I wish only to add that one should not expect the ending of the Cold War to open an era without problems or even conflicts.

Existing political problems in Europe, if reduced to their proper, realistic, proportions cannot be considered as unavoidable causes of the continuation of the division along the lines of the Cold War. Europe has had problems in the past just as it will have them in the future. Many of them have been solved or successfully set aside even during the postwar years: for example the settlement of the Austrian question and that of Trieste.

Summarizing this brief examination of anti-Cold War trends in Europe it is appropriate to emphasize the prevalence of positive developments, as well as the fact that the original pattern of relations in the Europe of the Fifties has already changed considerably for the better. In fact, political and economic relations have grown substantially over the boundaries set by the bloc pattern on both sides. Recent political and economic transactions between the East and the West indicate that the momentum of this anti-Cold War trend is gaining and the problem of defining the place and role of Europe in the world is steadily moving out of the sphere of speculation into the sphere of existing or potential realities.

Rather than defining it in the context of an alignment of military powers with centres in the United States and the Soviet Union, we must take into consideration other factors affecting more directly and continuously the pattern of international relations. The world was, after all, not divided into two military blocs and the development of nuclear arms has made a show down along these lines unprofitable in any circumstances.

Areas of the world which were in the past only passive elements in the picture became active and something like a new part

of the world came into being, often referred to as the third world. Mostly within this area a new political attitude was shaped, an opposition to the division of the world into two blocs, an effort to keep out of the alignments which developed under the impact of the Cold War. We have already noted that the Cold War has also brought antagonism and conflict into these parts of the world, but an increasing number of countries there succeeded in maintaining their independence of action and entered the world scene as a new and independent political force.

For years most European countries in the East and in the West ignored or underestimated the significance of this new force, the non-aligned countries. Even the concept of non-alignment was misunderstood and frequently criticized from both sides. In recent years this attitude has given place to a slightly more serious examination of this development and also to the beginning of contacts in a spirit of better understanding. The fact that this change took place more or less at the same time both in the East and in the West opens some possibilities of co-operation in a much widened framework.

This would probably not bring the majority of European countries to adopt the position of the non-aligned countries as it was defined at the high level conferences in Belgrade in 1961 and in Cairo in 1964. The elements of that platform which are derived from the specific positions of these countries would probably not be generally acceptable in the more developed European countries, nor would it easily fit into a pattern of regional integrations which have developed in the political as well as in the economic fields in both parts of Europe. But this is not of particular importance.

The important prospect which may grow out of closer and better understanding between the less developed non-aligned countries and the countries of Europe is the placing of the international relations of European countries in a wider framework. In this way it may be possible to overcome the uneasy feeling of confrontation within Europe and the tendency to overemphasize the military aspect of the international situation.

The success of the less developed countries, under the leadership of the non-aligned countries, in pressing the fundamental economic problems of their regions into the centre of the preoccupations of the councils of the world has greatly contributed to the degree to which demilitarization of international relations has already been achieved. Once the economic problem of the less developed regions of the world came to compete for priority with the

military and political problems of the more developed parts of the world a fundamental change of atmosphere began to develop in the debates in the United Nations and in other places.

These economic problems became, naturally, highly charged political questions once they were put on the conference table, but the distinction is in the way of the solutions which they require. In this sense they are here considered as economic problems and by virtue of this specific character they have exercised a demilitarization of international relations.

Of course, this does not mean that the military aspect, and in particular the armaments race, has been or could be automatically put under control. The result to be expected from a more systematic and energetic effort in the field of economic development, particularly in helping an accelerated development of the less developed countries, might only be still heavier reliance on economic measures in international relations and a greater readiness by all sides to accept economically indicated compromises in the debates on disarmament and in other fields of political or military negotiations.

In particular one would expect that a greater emphasis on economic solutions would contribute to less emphasis on the nuclear disequilibrium in Europe. In other words, if on both sides more attention is given to the economic problems of the world, it would not only mean more resources for peaceful activities but also less apprehension about the possible aims of the other side. This could create more confidence, because the assumed intentions of the other side, rather than the existence of an impressive military establishment, are the main sources of anxiety and of an over-emphasis on military matters.

As a matter of fact, on both sides in Europe the main anxiety is no longer generated by the fear of a conflict across the dividing line in Europe but by the fear of the possible spreading of a conflict which might originate in some place far away from Europe, even without the direct participation of any European Power in the initial stage.

On both sides in Europe countries are now taking a more independent view of these problems, thus enhancing the trend of moving away from a pattern in foreign affairs subordinating the national interest to a group interest. The balancing of military potentials through alliances is giving place to the effort towards strengthening the internal and ineternational position of a country through the extension of its economic relations and activities.

The continuation of this trend is favoured also by the evolution of the policies of the less developed non-aligned countries. They have successfully resisted the efforts directed toward including them into bloc alliances and have established an area of non-alignment in the world, which has received recognition as an important element in the pattern of international relations. They are now bent more on efforts to find better solutions to their individual and collective economic problems and to the prevention of the spreading of local conflicts in areas of the less developed parts of the world, than on efforts to reconcile the Super Powers, as they tried to do until only a few years ago.

It may therefore be easier now than ever before to find an increasing number of points of agreement and co-operation, on a platform which would unite the non-aligned countries of the less developed regions of the world and the countries of Europe and which would be founded on purposes and aims acceptable irrespective of the adherence to a military alliance or a bloc.

The lesson of the last ten years, beginning with the initial period of the relaxation of tensions of the Cold War after the 1955 Summit, does not necessarily point to the adoption of the full platform of non-alignment by all European countries, but rather to a further shifting of the emphasis from military to non-military, principally economic, problems. After all, the adoption of the policy of non-alignment by all European countries, including the Soviet Union and the major European Powers of the West, would not have much sense. The policy of non-alignment has had its justification primarily because the major Powers of the world did not accept it.

On the other hand that content of the platform of non-alignment which reflects the specific position of the less developed countries would necessarily become redundant if the highly developed countries assumed a co-operative attitude to these questions. The European countries cannot disregard the plight of the less developed parts of the world without paying for it with a deterioration of relations in their midst.

Europe has ceased to be the breeding ground of Great Powers and the mastery over Europe no longer automatically brings with it domination over the world. Europe has lost most of its physical projections in other parts of the world, its overseas possessions. The sooner the remainder goes the better for all European nations. The links between Europe and the rest of the world must of necessity

change further than that. Only with more independence of judgment and freedom of action towards other Powers, can the countries of Europe re-establish the internal balance in their continent and the proper balance with other parts of the world. They cannot expect security and stability in one part of the continent if this is not true for the other, regardless of all differences and conflicts which may still exist or which may arise from their living so closely together.