1966

28 aprile / 1 maggio

I.S.S.: Third European-American Conference on "The atlantic world and its changing environment".

1 - Lista dei partecipanti

2 - Programma

3 - Draft Agenda

4 - Resumé (2 copie)

THE DITCHLEY FOUNDATION

INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES EUROPEAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON "THE ATLANTIC WORLD AND ITS CHANGING ENVIRONMENT"

April 29th - May 1st, 1966

CONFERENCE CHAIRMAN

Professor Louis J. Halle	-	Graduate Institute of International Affairs, Geneva.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Achille ALBONETTI	-	Commission on Nuclear Energy, Rome.
Mr. Leonard BEATON	-	Consultant, ISS, London.
Général d'Armée André BEAUFRE	-	Director, Institut Francais des Etudes Stratégiques, Paris.
Dr. Karl BIRNBAUM	-	Director, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm.
Vice-Admiral H. BOS	-	Adviser to the Prime Minister, The Hague.
Professor Robert R. BOWIE	-	Director, Harvard University Center for International Affairs.
Mr. Peter CALVOCORESSI	-	Member of Council of ISS.
Général Baron A. DEL MARMOL-	-	Lately Commandant, L'Ecole de Guerre de Belgique, Brussels.
~~Mr. François DUCHENE~~	-	~~Member of Editorial Staff "The Economist", London.~~
M. Andre FONTAINE	-	Foreign Editor, "Le Monde", Paris.
Signor Roberto GAJA	-	Director-General of Political Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs, Rome.
Dr. Curt GASTEYGER	-	Director of Programmes, ISS, London.
Lord GLADWYN	-	British Ambassador to France (1954-60).
Dr. Harold C. HINTON	-	Senior Staff Member, Institute for Defense Analyses, Arlington.
Mr. John W. HOLMES	-	Director-General, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto.
Professor Michael HOWARD	-	Professor of War Studies, King's College, University of London.

Mr. Geoffrey HUDSON	-	Director, of Eastern Studies, St. Antony's College, Oxford.
Dr. L.G.M. JAQUET	-	Director, Netherlands Institute of International Affairs, The Hague.
Professor Henry A. KISSINGER	-	Associate Director, Harvard University Center of International Affairs.
Dr. Nils ØRVIK	-	Professor of Political Science, University of Oslo.
Mr. Michael PALLISER	-	Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, London.
Dr. Klaus RITTER	-	Director, Society for Science & Politics, Munich.
Ambassador Dr. Suidbert SCHNIPPENKOETTER	-	Foreign Ministry, Bonn. Under-Secretary with special responsibility for disarmament and arms control affairs.
Mr. Erik SEIDENFADEN	-	Warden of the Danish College, Cité Internationale de l'Université de Paris.
Professor Marshall D. SHULMAN	-	Russian Research Center, Harvard University.
Marshal of the RAF Sir John SLESSOR	-	Vice President, ISS, London.
Dr. Theodor SOMMER	-	Foreign Editor "Die Zeit," Hamburg.
Dr. Altiero SPINELLI	-	Director, Institute of International Affairs, Rome.
Professor Jacques VERNANT	-	Director, Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, Paris.
Lt. Gen. Graf VON BAUDISSIN	-	Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, SHAPE, Paris.
Dr. Arnold O. WOLFERS	-	Director, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research (1957-65).
Mr. Frederick S. WYLE	-	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Washington.
~~Mr. Adam YARMOLINSKY~~	-	~~Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Washington.~~

CONFERENCE STAFF - INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

Major A.E. MAJENDIE	-	Administrative Director.
Mrs. P. EVANS Mrs. B. STROLOGO	-	Secretarial Staff.

THE DITCHLEY FOUNDATION

Mr. H.V. HODSON	-	Provost of Ditchley; formerly Editor, "The Sunday Times".
Captain R.P.S. GRANT, D.S.C., R.N. (Retired)	-	Chief Administrative Officer.
Lt. Col. B.C. MALLINSON, M.B.E.	-	Bursar
Mr. T. BEARDSWORTH	-	Research/Records Secretary.

2

THE DITCHLEY FOUNDATION

INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES EUROPEAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON "THE ATLANTIC WORLD AND ITS CHANGING ENVIRONMENT"

April 29th - May 1st, 1966

PROGRAMME

DAILY

8.30-9.15 a.m.	Breakfast	Dining Room
11-11.15 a.m.	Coffee	Library
12.30 p.m.	Sherry	Library
1 p.m.	Luncheon	Dining and Breakfast Rooms
4.30-5 p.m. (5-5.30 p.m. on Sunday)	Afternoon Tea	Library
7.15 p.m.	Sherry	White Drawing Room
7.45 p.m.	Dinner	Dining and Breakfast Rooms
10.30 p.m.	Drinks	Library

CONFERENCE PROGRAMME (All sessions will be held in the Saloon)

Friday, 29th April

Between 4 and 5 p.m. — Conference assembles

5-6.45 p.m. — First Session

The International Situation: in what direction is it moving? Evolution of Soviet policy. The trend of developments in Asia and Africa.

Saturday, 30th April

9.30-11 a.m. — Second Session

11.15-12.30 p.m. China's evolving relationship with the outside world. The development of the Sino-Soviet conflict. China as a nuclear power. The West and China.

2.30

3-4.30 p.m. — Third Session

5-6.30 p.m.

The position of the super-powers in a world of nuclear proliferation. The chances of a a multi-nuclear world. Prospects and effects of technological developments.

Sunday, 1st May

9.30-11 a.m. — Fourth Session

11.15-12.30 p.m. — The implications of a changing world for the Alliance: (a) the long-term purpose of the Alliance: limitation or expansion of the geographical area covered by Alliance policy.

2.30-5 p.m. — Fifth Session

The implications of a changing world for the Alliance: (b) the organisation of the Alliance: integration versus co-operation: the problems of crisis management.

Church Services Sunday, 1st May

Holy Communion at Charlbury (5 minutes from Ditchley)
Roman Catholic Mass at Heythrop (15 minutes from Ditchley)
— 8 a.m.

Any members of the Conference wishing to attend either service are requested to inform one of the Ditchley administrative staff by 5 p.m. on Saturday so that early calls and transport can be arranged.

324B1

Istituto Studi Strategici — mancano due esemplari !!! 29 aprile - 1 mag 66 Vedere e ... 3

THIRD ANNUAL EUROPEAN AMERICAN CONFERENCE

Subject: The Atlantic World and its Changing Environment.

Draft Agenda

In the second half of the twentieth century, scientific and technological developments have been putting an increasing strain on the political framework within which human society has hitherto been organized. Sovereign states, once self-sufficient in economic, military, and cultural terms, are so no longer. Consequently, they are moved to seek larger groupings among themselves.

Under these circumstances, in the period after 1945 the relative self-sufficiency of two powers only, among all the rest, found its expression in a bipolar world.

It is now clear that this bipolar world was not to last indefinitely. Over the first fifteen post-war years, the number of sovereign states in the world more than doubled; and the new ones, mostly in South Asia and Africa, seeking to stand outside the bipolar configuration, came to constitute what was called a third world. If, in terms of military power, bipolarity continued, in other terms there was the development of a tripartite world.

The abstract concept of either a bipolar or a tripartite world, however, implies a degree of solidarity in each of its two or three components. Instead, what we have been seeing in the 1960s, especially, is a marked tendency toward fragmentation within each.

The process of fragmentation in the Communist world has now produced the possibility that China will, in the next decade, achieve equal rank with the two superpowers of the old bipolar world by providing itself with an effective nuclear panoply, and by extending beyond its own borders the influence that great human, industrial, and military resources make possible. This would make for a tripartite world in terms of military balance.

At the same time that the movements toward political unification and the movements toward political fragmentation oppose each other, scientific and technological developments have produced a situation in which a serious breakdown of order in any part of the world is of immediate concern to every other part of the world. This, too, represents the secular trend toward the association of the whole world in what is a single civilization, however much local diversity that civilization continues to embrace.

The secular movement toward larger and ever closer associations represents certain hard necessities: e.g. the expanded requirements of continued scientific progress, or of aircraft production, or of military defence — requirements that have come, in each case, to exceed the resources available within almost any individual state. The movement toward fragmentation, on the other hand, represents abiding human difficulties in the way of establishing a single order over too wide an area of diversity.

When we ask ourselves what we may expect over the next ten years, most of us agree that we cannot expect the simple bipolarity of the past, that there will be greater complexity, greater fluidity and confusion. In the midst of this fluidity and confusion, the old established centers of power and responsibility, from Washington to Moscow, will be striving (together, one hopes) to achieve a world order that tends to assure their security, diminishing the danger of a general war in which all

might be irreparably injured.

NATO, having successfuly realized in first purpose - the prevention of further Soviet expansion - must respond to the continuing transformation of the global environment that challenges it. It is to consider that changing environment, in its implications for the development of the Atlantic alliance, that the Third Annual European-American Conference meets.

Eight questions, arising out of the foregoing, are here submitted as the Conference agenda:

A. The Environment

1. In the next five or ten years, how will the development of China influence the political configuration of the world ?

2. Will the relatively stable balance of power that has developed in the 1960s (partly in consequence of the degree of invulnerability acquired by the two great nuclear panoplies) be upset by

   (a) some development in military technology, such as the deployment of an ABM system; or

   (b) nuclear proliferation; or

   (c) an internal collapse in Russia or China?

3. What will Russia's orientation be in the next five or ten years?

4. Can we expect the persistence of a relatively stable situation on the European Continent, with an evolution by which

   (a) the former satellites of Moscow continue to acquire increasing independence

   (b) East and West Germany develop an increasing association? Or is the division of Germany, especially, an irreducible obstacle to the development of a real peace in Europe?

5. Will anarchic situations in South Asia, in Africa, or in Latin America have the effect of provoking large-scale intervention by the powers of the North (the Atlantic powers, Russia, China), thereby drawing them into head-on collisions with one another?

B. Implications for the North Atlantic Alliance.

6. Should the Allies agree to limit the geographical area of Alliance policy and action or should it seek to operate as an alliance with respect to situations that confront any of its members anywhere in the world?

7. Should the Alliance, which was originally formed only for the containment of Russian expansion, now adopt as its objective a withdrawal of Russian power in Europe, involving the reunification of Germany (as Mr Dean Acheson has suggested?)

8. How can crises both inside and outside Europe be more efficiently and safely managed within the Alliance and between the Soviet Union and the West?

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

PRIVATE

NOT FOR REPRODUCTION

4

THE INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

Resumé of the

THIRD EUROPEAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE

on

THE ATLANTIC WORLD AND ITS CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

Ditchley Park, Oxfordshire

April 29th - May 1st, 1966

THE ATLANTIC WORLD AND ITS CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

FIRST SESSION — FRIDAY 29 APRIL

Agenda The International Situation: in what direction is it moving? Evolution of Soviet policy. The trend of developments in Asia and Africa.

The Chairman recalled that as at the previous European-American Conference the focus would be on the North Atlantic community and the Atlantic Alliance. The agenda was conceived to move from the general to the particular, as a reminder that the Atlantic Alliance exists not for its own sake but as a response to the challenge presented to the Atlantic community by its environment. It is from this gradually changing environment that many of the present problems besetting the alliance have arisen; therefore if we want to deal intelligently with those problems we must begin with the environment and its changes.

He then called upon Professor Shulman to introduce the first session.

Professor Shulman began by affirming that the proceedings of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU revealed no major shifts in the general trend of Soviet foreign policy, although some significant nuances were introduced. The general message projected from the foreign policy discussion was that the relationship with the West is one of limited détente, in the sense that détente operates within limits of tension and with constraint on the Soviet side due to two factors: Vietnam, and the continuing conflict with China. These two factors have effectively circumscribed the freedom of action of the Soviet leadership so that relations with the West and with the US in particular are in an inactive phase. The Soviet leadership does not seek major settlements or major gains; it wishes simply to be left undisturbed by the West while it directs its energies towards major reforms in the direction of, first, reshaping the economy as the base of Soviet power in the future, and secondly improving relations with the other Communist Parties in managing tendencies towards fragmentation, devising a somewhat more resilient control system that can accommodate the pressures for a greater degree of political autonomy within the communist movement.

Among the nuances reflected in Soviet policy two in particular bore on relations with the advanced industrialised countries. First, the Soviet preoccupation with Germany: in terms of allotted space in speeches devoted to foreign policy issues, Germany ranked above Vietnam. The message in regard to Germany has not changed from the familiar one of revanchism and nationalism and especially the danger of access by the Federal Republic to nuclear weapons in some form. The other nuance (which might even constitute a new direction) is an aspect of the more active diplomacy which has characterised Soviet policy in many significant respects under the new leadership team; it reflects an effort to relate Soviet interest to the development of a distinctively European as opposed to Western consciousness. This aspect was dramatised by the Gromyko visit to Rome, which served a number of important functions for Soviet policy. First, the visit made very clear Moscow's interest in the development of a pan-European idea in some

form, perhaps procedural forms at the outset: the implication that a healing of relations between East and West Europe can best be handled in the first instance by diplomacy which does not include the US. This seemed likely to be strengthened by the measured handling of President de Gaulle's visit in June - measured because the Russians have indicated concern lest the visit should have disadvantageous effects in Bonn. The other important aspect of the Gromyko visit lay in his interview with the Pope, particularly its relevance to Italian party politics: the very fact of the meeting being held was symbolic of a sanctioning of the line the Italian communists have been appealing for since the Togliatti testament, the need for a broader coalition of the Left in Italian politics.

The 23rd Congress also revealed a significant nuance in the development of Soviet policy towards Asia, Africa and Latin America. Two recent commentaries in the Soviet press which have turned on how the Soviets define policy towards wars of national liberation have pointed to a broadening of the line. For example an article by young Mikoyan on Indonesia argued that despite the unfortunate loss of party cadres, the important consideration must be to establish good relations with the people governing the country. Another article by the Central Committee's main spokesman on international affairs displayed an effort to come to terms with the fact that military régimes have taken control in many of the developing countries and that the prospects for social revolution are rather dim; the lesson has been drawn that it is necessary to get on with the people running those countries, primarily to influence their orientation in foreign policy (to the extent of being anti-Western), and the question of what happens to the communist party in those countries must be subordinated to that aim. This orientation is broad and in the direction of power politics, and away from an active revolutionary policy in the immediate sense of the word. It is also related to a policy which in Western terms is called "containment of China".

In relation to the subjects on the agenda, the general question arose whether limited détente was relatively stable or whether it was likely to lead either to a deeper détente or to a relationship of greater militancy. A number of variable factors bore on the kind of evolution we might expect. (1) Third area conflicts and the generalising effect these are likely to have. The Vietnam conflict may be not an isolated phenomenon but one factor in the turbulence in Asia and Africa and Latin America, which will continue to be a major dirturbing factor affecting the relations among the major powers. (2) The rise of nationalism in various forms, in the industrialised world as well as in the under-developed. This is reflected not only in the problems of the alliance but in the internal problems within the European countries; in Japan too a general phenomenon of some sort or another is on foot. This factor affects international politics broadly and the future evolution of détente in particular. (3) Chinese policy. This question is posed in several different forms: first as it affects the CPR claim to Taiwan; secondly as it affects the Chinese effort to establish a presence in South-East Asia; thirdly as an exacerbating factor in third areas where there is turbulence). (4) Technological developments in the military field. One of the factors that may upset the partial military stabilisation on which the present détente rests in the further application to weapons systems of known scientific principles. In particular it depends first on whether an ABM system is deployed, with the effect this can have on the present level of the arms race, and secondly on proliferation of nuclear weapons, in particular as this is related to third area conflicts, which is made more complicated by the prospect of simplification and reduction in the cost of nuclear weapons.

(5) The possibility of strategic alternatives for the Soviet leadership in how they handle the conflict with China. The Soviet leadership has decided for the present to try to fend off the Chinese charges that they are not being true revolutionaries, first by a militant verbal response, and secondly by avoiding any appearance of collaboration or seeking a condominium with the US. They might however decide (as happened in relation to the test ban in 1963) in favour of a heightenening of the climate of détente, to make greater use of the peace symbol within the communist movement as a useful weapon against the Chinese. (6) A complementary question that depends on the evolution of Western policy: how the Western alliance chooses to handle the problem of the limited détente, how it resolves the conflicts between its interest in military stabilisation and the interest in the strengthening or perpetuation of the alliance, in particular how it handles the question of political evolution in Germany and the problem of nuclear sharing.

The reason why Prof. Shulman stressed the importance of the Gromyko visit was because he believed that as a logical extension of this policy we may be confronted, especially in connection with de Gaulle's visit, with some recasting of proposals made for stability in Europe in the light of this pan-European development - i.e. new proposals from the SU built around the Gomulka-Rapacki plans - and an appeal to that segment of "European" sentiment which carries something of an anti-American implication. Although such a proposal may be centred around arms control, essentially its function in this context would be politically divisive. The problem for the West could be how to handle any new approach so as to advance its interest in stability without damaging its political interest in the alliance.

Dr. Curt Gasteyger (first respondent) found himself very much in agreement with this analysis. He proposed to take a broader look at the achievements of the new Soviet leadership based on his own impressions from a recent visit to Moscow. First of all he was surprised to see how much Khrushchev's successors have achieved in the field of foreign policy. A series of policy decisions have been taken which were at least as important and successful as Khrushchev's, if less spectacular. The most significant decisions have been: (1) Soviet re-engagement in Asia, particularly in Vietnam. The Soviet position of influence in North Vietnam is not yet strong enough for them to exert any major influence on the North Vietnamese leadership, but it helps to stabilise the situation to a certain extent. (2) Containment of China - but not just on the party level, also on the political level (Tashkent, on improvement of relations with Japan, the considerable improvement of relations with North Vietnam and, most recently, the resumption of Soviet interest in the Middle East, where relations with Syria in particular have developed to a considerable extent). But despite the containment, and despite some internal pressure, there has been no formal break in relations on the party or state level with China. (3) A slow but systematic improvement of the Soviet position within the communist world, mainly at the expense of the Chinese. There has been an improvement in relations with North Vietnam and North Korea, and to a certain extent also with Rumania (they are now again on speaking terms). At the same time bilateral ties are being stressed more than multilateral ones, particularly in the economic field. The Russians have learnt to live with "diverging unity" in the Communist Camp. (4) On defence, no significant decision has been taken, although the conservative side (the elements in the SU favouring an increasing build-up of defence at the expense of consumer goods) which has almost always been in the ascendant when there is a struggle for leadership in the SU appears to be making its voice heard. The strong hints that the Soviets are going ahead with ABM deployment are in line with this trend.

In regard to the Soviet bloc, there has been a shift from Comecon to a strengthening of the Warsaw Pact. It may be that a similar kind of co-ordinated planning might be considered in the Warsaw Pact as is now being worked out in the McNamara Committee. Though the Soviets will seek to retain their full control over nuclear strategy they seem more willing to rely on a greater degree of co-operation with their East European allies. Dr. Gasteyger saw two tendencies at work within the Warsaw Pact: (1) a trend towards closer military integration and interdependence, possibly with a slightly more flexible strategy than massive retaliation, and (2) a trend towards the assertion of separate national interests and a new balance of decision-making power among the members. Prof. Shulman had mentioned the rise of nationalism in the industrialised world. This was certainly also apparent in East Europe, and would have to be taken into consideration by the SU, as well as ourselves.

The main focus of Soviet policy does lie with Europe: the SU impressed him as mainly a European power. In particular she is obsessed by Germany. The present initiative of the East German Government to establish some kind of dialogue with the SPD dated back even before Khrushchev. The proliferation issue has been seen in Moscow for a long time almost exclusively in the European context. Their outlook has now shifted a little, (i.e. in Kosygin's proposal at Geneva for a nuclear guarantee to non-nuclear powers); but he found the Russians extremely reluctant to discuss the actual question of security guarantees to non-nuclear countries.

With regard to France, he saw what is for Moscow a useful coincidence of short-term objectives between French and Soviet policy: both agree on recognition of the Oder-Neisse line; on favouring withdrawal of US troops from Europe; on no German access to nuclear weapons. But in the longer term their interests come into conflict. The Russians consider France (and fairly) as in the last resort an ally of the US, not the SU. He could not agree with Prof. Shulman that the Russians are seeking a pan-European solution without or even against the US. This may be a good vehicle for their present policy, but in the long range they are interested in some American presence in Europe as a guarantee of stability not just in Europe but for East-West relations in general.

He put four points by way of conclusion: (1) The emphasis in Soviet policy on the status quo and stability rather than on expansion and an active engagement in other areas. (2) The emphasis on internal economic development rather than on foreign policy adventures. (3) The emphasis on Europe rather than Asia. (4) Acceptance of a more flexible policy combined with cautiousness, adequately reflecting the internal situation of the present leadership which seems to be precariously balanced, with the over-all emphasis on transition rather than on durability of the present political situation.

Discussion centred on the problem of Europe, reflecting the concurrence of both introductory speakers on the primary importance attached by the Soviet Union to the European theatre and on the Soviet preoccupation with Germany as the main factor in the problem of Europe as a whole.

A German member of the conference posed the question whether Soviet concern was mainly with the role of the Federal Republic, or with consolidating the Soviet position in the DDR.

For an Italian member of the conference the question was s why the Soviet Union is so preoccupied with the German problem. He could not accept that the Soviet leadership was motivated by a fear

of Germany, either military or economic, real enough to justify their concentration on the threat of German revanchism and militarism: the German threat is played up deliberately, as a means of undermining the cohesion of the alliance at a point of weakness and creating a power vacuum at its heart. By taking Soviet propaganda at its face value, the West plays into their hands. He shared Prof. Shulman's great caution in relation to any new Soviet proposals for a pan-European conference or a Gomulka-Rapacki peace initiative: we risk being attracted by prospects for a limited détente at the expense of the real interests of the alliance.

The speaker argued that the West also plays into Soviet hands by its weakness in facing realistically the problem of Germany. If the German problem had been really important to members of the alliance it could have been solved between 1950 and 1954 by absorbing Germany within a framework of progressive European integration. He still maintained that by strengthening integration Europe and the United States would be making a major contribution towards solving the German problem.

A British participant commented that our own ideas about the alliance would have to be brought into relation with the situation as it exists today - although even if we cannot see a united Western Europe at the moment we would be well advised to ensure that any changes we may have to make in the next year or so should not be inconsistent with that goal. On the other hand we cannot escape the practical problem that suggestions for some kind of European settlement are quite likely to emerge following de Gaulle's visit to Moscow. Since for the Russians everything does turn on a solution of the German problem, if they saw a chance of feeling their way towards a neutralised or denuclearised Germany (with which reunification might be combined eventually) he would expect them to make that their first priority, precisely because it would be a way of weakening Nato, and then pursue broader schemes for pan-Europe - perhaps some kind of French-led confederation of states from Western and Eastern Europe. If we wanted to counter any such proposals, in the interests of <u>all</u> members of the alliance we ought to insist that there should be no significant reduction of American troops in Europe, at least until a united Western Europe is formed with the willing co-operation of France.

Another Italian speaker was not convinced that the Russians really want a united European front, despite their suggestion for a conference. The Russians have two alternatives: they can try to come to terms with Nato, or try to disrupt it, and he did not believe they have yet made up their minds. And in regard to the possibility of some new initiative based on Polish plans, private indications were that the Poles were not interested in discussing European security proposals in the absence of United States representatives.

In this connection he maintained that Prof. Shulman had read too much into Gromyko's visit to Rome. The initiative had come from the Italian side some months previously - partly because it was absurd for a country of 50 million inhabitants to have no contact with the Soviet leadership and partly to counter Italian communist accusations that the Government does not dare conduct a national foreign policy - and the timing had more to do with the governmental crisis in Italy than with the 23rd Congress.

A third Italian participant related the Soviet ambivalence towards pan-Europe with Dr. Gasteyger's point of difference with Prof. Shulman: the extent to which an American withdrawal from Europe is in the long-term Soviet interest. Apart from its

defensive aspect, the United States presence in Western Europe is a factor of order and stability; the same is true of the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe. The Russians have become conservative in the sense that in the last resort their interest is in preserving a degree of order in the other camp. And, he argued, the West has as great an interest in the non-disintegration of the Eastern camp. Any agreement offered by the Soviet Union would be essentially based on acceptance of the status quo: there might be room for development within the two systems, but the frontier between them must remain where it is.

An American participant found it very hard to believe that the Russians have ceased to be Marxists to the extent of committing themselves to the notion of an absolutely static international situation with no dialectic features. He considered the Russians far more likely to conceive of a world in which the United States could be ousted from Europe.

The real problem is that the Soviet Union demands the right to perpetuate the line of division of a country, which is against all main trends of the contemporary period. The Soviet Union has the right to ask Germany for guarantees in case of reunification. But she does not have the right to ask that any guarantee would be the abnegation of reunification.

A British member of the conference saw the problem rather differently. He argued that there were two German problems: German reunification, and then assimilation of a reunited Germany into a European and world balance. He had a certain sympathy for the Russians in that he could not see how they were going to solve the problem of adjusting themselves to a united and therefore powerful Germany. It was not simply a matter of a united Germany giving guarantees: it was a matter of a certain kind of power structure which would be reconstructed in central Europe. He suggested that it was not enough for the West to continue to pay lip-service to the ideal of a united Germany without thinking through precisely what this would involve for the European Community, for the alliance, and for Europe as a whole.

Drawing the discussion to a conclusion, Prof. Shulman held that the considerations raised by the last speaker, those that challenge us to think about the function of the alliance in the present period and the kind of power relationships we are looking towards, were far more important than the question of Soviet policy. The Soviet problems by and large will take care of themselves if we have a certain clarity about the kind of relationships we would like to see prevail within the Western world.

SECOND SESSION SATURDAY MORNING 30 APRIL

Agenda China's evolving relationship with the outside world. The development of the Sino-Soviet conflict. China as a nuclear power. The West and China.

Mr. Hudson (first speaker) suggested that the difference in outlook between the Chinese and the Russians with regard to these historic changes which Marxists/Leninists must believe are taking place in the world might best be expressed in the words of an epitaph in a Scottish church on an 18th century minister of religion who was stated to have preached in the church for 20 years, but without enthusiasm. The Russians have to support people's armed struggles against imperialism or the lackeys of imperialism, but they do so with a certain lack of enthusiasm. The Chinese on the other hand have enormous gusto in supporting any revolution they see. This is very largely a matter of age and of generations.

Furthermore the Russians expected in the early days that revolution would spread from Russia. And in expecting the spread of revolution they thought primarily of Europe. According to Marxist principles, revolution of the industrial proletariat was to be expected; socialism should be established in fully industrialised countries, and any outbreaks that might happen in backward agrarian countries or colonial territories were only secondary. Fundamentally that attitude has never changed in Russia. Russia is and always has been primarily a European power - it gives priority to European affairs and in its international communist policy it gives priority to European parties. These parites, some of them very strong, are, however, parties which have no prospect in present circumstances of obtaining power by violent insurrection. Their prospects lie in more or less constitutional political action within the framework of democratic politics. Their greatest need is for respectability.

The Chinese on the other hand do not look to Europe or North America. They look to the underdeveloped countries and countries which were recently colonial or semi-colonial where they see sufficient indications that violent upheavals are likely to take place in the near future. A significant indication of this is to be found in the analysis of their foreign broadcasting. The Chinese hold second place in the world after the Russians for the total volume of broadcasts abroad. There are two remarkable things about this broadcasting: (1) Their biggest effort in terms of hours is to the SU. This is important because it shows they are not simply conducting a slanging match but really are doing what they can to convert the Russians to their point of view. Mr. Hudson believed they have had <u>some</u> success in getting at the Russian conscience. The Russians cannot afford not to compete with China when there is the kind of issue on which Marxist/Leninist consciences are involved and their reputation with the world communist movement is at stake. Khrushchev made it clear that the Russians were not really interested in North Vietnam; they have no real strategic or political interest in South East Asia. But if there is a war in Vietnam in which the Americans are fighting the Vietcong and the Chinese are helping them, the Russians cannot hold aloof, however reluctant they may be to see a deterioration in their relations with the US.

(2) The concentration on Africa. The Chinese do more broadcasting to Africa than they do to Southern Asia. This is remarkable because Africa is very far from China, there are no Chinese settlers there, there is no historical connection; but the Chinese believe this is the most fertile field for revolutionary propaganda. The Chinese have suffered a number of setbacks in Africa, but these have been with governments: the Chinese are aiming at the elements of revolutionary discontent and are ready to sacrifice their relations with governments to that end. They gave important aid to the revolution in the Congo, for example - they made contact in the early stage through Burundi, afterwards helping through Congo Brazzaville.

Mr. Hudson had stressed the ideological aspect because he found too much of a tendency simply to see China in terms of a nation state with a certain geographical position, which has certain historical claims or interests in areas on its borders. He did not minimise these factors: for example the rivalry with India was a matter of power politics. But a non-communist régime in China would not be concerned with things like supporting revolution in Africa. We must recognise what kind of China we have to deal with. It is not a simple matter of military containment. As long as the present leadership is in control (this leadership is elderly and we might see a change in China after their death parallel to the changes in the SU), we will be dealing with a genuinely revolutionary régime that will try to help, particularly in the form of teaching of guerrilla war but also with supplies of arms and political propaganda and diplomatic support, any trouble which they consider progressive. This applies certainly to the whole zone of Asia and Africa, although it is very difficult for the Chinese to exercise an influence in Latin America. The Chinese view is that all these zones are unstable and revolution can erupt, and when it does they will do their best to fan the flames.

Dr. Hinton (first respondent) began by disputing, in the Draft Agenda, "the possibility that China will in the next decade achieve equal rank with the two super-powers of the old bipolar world by providing itself with an effective nuclear panoply". Clearly within the next ten years China will become a regional nuclear power, able to attack targets 700-1,000 miles distant from her frontier which would include some friendly population centres and some American bases. But she is highly unlikely to have the capability to be able to strike the United States or Western Europe: the IRBM stage would not be meaningful for China, and to proceed directly to the ICBM stage would pose a very great risk. China could possibly pose a serious threat to the United States with submarines, because the west coast bulges out and is very difficult to defend. On the other hand to keep two submarines on station off the west coast of the United States would present a formidable logistic task. Pressed about the ability of the Chinese to inflict sufficient damage on the US with a small submarine fleet to deter her from intervening with nuclear weapons in a war in South-East Asia, say, Dr. Hinton maintained that the balance on the American side is so enormous that if the US felt it necessary to intervene in that way she would go ahead. Dr. Hinton made it clear the he did not disagree with McNamara's estimate of Chinese capability in fact so much as in tone. It was important to see the Chinese military threat in perspective.

The present Chinese political scene, domestic and foreign, is dominated by the problem of Mao. His health has been poor for some years; his mental health is not good either. This is serious because his political power remains supreme. In 1964 the Chinese

communists achieved major successes in both the national and revolutionary aspects of their foreign policy. For example diplomatic relations were established with France; Khrushchev fell from power; their first nuclear test took place; victory seemed close in Vietnam. These successes led them to think that the energetic application of the same policy would lead to greater successes. They tried to inject a revolutionary content into relations with France; they set impossible conditions for a Sino-Soviet reconciliation, which Kosygin proposed in 1965; they tried to exploit their nuclear test for political advantage; they tried to counter Soviet military aid to North Vietnam with a number of threats to intervene with ground forces if the National Liberation Front and Hanoi asked them to do so. They set up military subversion in Asian and African countries with aim of assisting "people's wars" along the lines of Lin Piao's tract "Long Live the People's War"; they put pressure on Castro to counter his drift towards the SU which began late in 1964.

In the national as opposed to the revolutionary field the Chinese have held their position. Most people are prepared to support the idea of a strong and active Chinese state, principally because of their growing military strength symbolised by their two tests and expressed most pointedly for Asia by their strong wholly conventional forces. There has been a mellowing of attitude on the part of the US, expressed in the idea of containment without isolation. The US has said she is prepared to see the CPR in the UN provided the Chinese drop their conditions for entry and in particular the only really serious one, the expulsion of Nationalist China from the UN. The tight vote in the General Assembly last autumn on admission of the CPR was clearly a gain for Peking, even should this prove to have been a high-water mark. The pressure for bringing Communist China into arms control arrangements is a gain for her too. The Chinese are expanding relations with Japan and also with West Germany (trade with Bonn doubled between 1964 and 65 to $70 million). Chinese co-operation with Pakistan has apparently survived the rather crude efforts by the Chinese communists late in 1965 to prevent Pakistan from accepting first the cease-fire with India and then Soviet mediation (the Tashkent conference and declaration).

On the revolutionary side, however, the Chinese have badly over-estimated the strength of their hand. The Chinese model of revolution and nation-building after seizure of power has had some appeal in under-developed areas. But chinese policy has largely been a failure. This is mainly because the idea of intervention is unacceptable except for the extreme left. The anti-American hatred demanded by Lin Piao as necessary for a series of wars against the American imperialists does not exist so strongly. It certainly does not exist in Africa, which (as Mr. Hudson mentioned) is the most important region for the Chinese from the point of view of promise of people's wars. However, a communist victory in South Vietnam might well create a feeling in under-developed areas that the Maoist model has most to offer. The Chinese themselves feel Vietnam is a major test for the viability of this model. The American escalation in Vietnam which deprived the North Vietnamese of what would otherwise have been a military victory has been an important and even indispensable pre-condition for the setbacks since that escalation began.

With regard to the Vietnam situation, the Chinese have sent a limited amount of military aid and have recently sent some aircraft. Dr. Hinton was surprised at the postponement of this action rather than at its having occurred. The Chinese have said they would commit their ground forces under any one of three sets

of conditions: if the US should "attack China"; if the US should invade on the ground North Vietnam or Northern Laos (areas contiguous to the Chinese border); if the NLF in South Vietnam with Hanoi's consent (i.e. giving North Vietnam a veto) would request the Chinese to intervene. He thought everyone would agree that the materialisation of any of these conditions is unlikely. The Chinese are reluctant to intervene because that would create a very serious risk of American retaliation. On political grounds it would compromise the idea of self-reliance which the Chinese have extolled as an article of faith. The Vietnamese NLF have very skilfully used military aid to acquire leverage on Hanoi in connection both with the crisis and with the Sino-Soviet dispute. They have accused the Chinese of obstructing the flow of Soviet aid (which has to go over land) and of obstructing by their political behaviour what would otherwise have been united action by the communist world.

Vietnam apart, Indonesia was perhaps the most important setback for the Chinese. There is no doubt that the coup of September 1965 was very carefully planned by the communist leadership; it is known that the Chinese knew of it and supplied aid in advance. They tried to bring about a second Congo. The Chinese have not done well in Africa, which seems ripe less for revolution than counter-revolution. They suffered a severe rebuff over the postponement of the Afro-Asian conference. The Chinese quarrel with Castro has reached almost ludicrous proportions this year. On the other hand Dr. Hinton expected to see a Chinese effort to make up for their setbacks, particularly in Africa and with Castro, by attempting to inflame anti-American feeling in Latin America.

In the international communist movement the Chinese have been losing ground since the fall of Khrushchev to the Russians. On the other hand a complete break between the SU and China seems no more likely than a full reconciliation. Relations between the two will most probably continue in the same strange state of neither war nor peace. These developments have produced repercussions in Peking; a heated debate and a search for scapegoats are in process. But no speedy reversal of policy is likely until Mao dies or unless he is stripped of power like Sukarno.

Turning to the future, Dr. Hinton said that clearly China will be governed for the next 15 years by men who made the long march and for 25 years by men who joined the CP before 1949. Their outlook will not be radically different from the outlook of the present leadership. But the outlook is not the only important consideration. The conditions they confront will be important too. The outside world, while it cannot directly affect the outlook can do a lot to change the objective conditions the leadership will confront, and the US has a role to play in this.

A French member of the conference saw as the essential difference between Soviet and Chinese policy, both national and revolutionary, that the Soviet interest is in controlling situations anywhere in the world whereas the Chinese interest is in creating uncontrolled situations because of the greater revolutionary possibilities. Although the Chinese broadcasting may have made the Russians pay more lip-service to wars of national liberation, because of the fundamental difference of interest he could not agree that the Chinese have influenced Soviet policy to any significant extent.

Another French participant added that a key factor in the Sino-Soviet conflict was the different understanding of the world situation and of world strategy by the two powers. The Russians

believe that the victory of communism will be achieved through the victory of the most advanced countries within the communist bloc, while the Chinese think it will be achieved by the victory of the poor. And on the strategic level, while the Russians believe that the nuclear factor is predominant, the Chinese believe that the nuclear factor has become self-neutralised and that the dominant factor is the people.

With regard to the latter point, however, there was general assent to an American comment that the Russians poo-poo'd nuclear power until the mid 1950's, during which time they were making a tremendous effort to produce nuclear weapons themselves; the Chinese are no doubt treading the same path.

An Italian member of the conference agreed with Mr. Hudson that the Chinese help revolutionary movements everywhere, just as the Russians did after their own revolution. But the Chinese only exploit situations which already exist: if countries are able themselves, or are helped, to bring order to their development the Chinese have no opportunity to put their revolutionary theories into practice, because they are not prepared to intervene openly. Therefore whether or not over the years the Chinese grow like the Russians and preach without enthusiasm depends on conditions outside China. Mr. Hudson replied that this Chinese aid may nevertheless be <u>decisive</u> in a revolutionary war, even if they do not instigate such wars directly.

A Canadian member of the conference was not disposed to take the possibility of Chinese penetration of Africa too seriously. On the other hand Africa is an area where very small quantities of power could be of great importance, as the tiny operations mounted by France and Britain have demonstrated. The United States has shown no disposition to become involved in Africa as she has in Asia. But on geographical grounds he saw a primary <u>European</u> interest in orderly development in Africa, particularly among the ex-colonial powers, so that there might develop in Africa a source of European-Chinese conflict in which the Americans would not be involved.

A British speaker questioned this distinction between European and American interest. Certainly the United States would like the ex-colonial powers to carry the burden of economic aid to those countries; but in a really difficult situation (as happened in the Congo, for instance) the US would get very heavily involved and would find it difficult to disengage.

An American participant suggested that for China to become more involved in Africa would be a source of weakness rather than strength to her: overseas commitment tends to be a liability.

From the British side it was argued that this consideration did not apply to the kind of help China was likely to dispense in Africa: sending arms and advisers and training guerrillas etc. will continue to be a pretty safe operation - if the United States does not attack China because of what she is doing in Vietnam she will not do so because China smuggles machine guns into an African country. Moreover this kind of aid is much cheaper than building dams, for example, as the Russians have done.

A French member of the conference argued that psychology was more important than ideology in assessing Chinese policy today. Like the Egyptians, the Chinese are conscious of their great and ancient civilisation and they bitterly resent the humiliation of

not being treated as a responsible power, especially as the Soviet Union is treated in every way as a responsible and first-rank power. China's main aim is to be recognised by the world as a top nation. Her way of achieving that aim can change: she tried within the Soviet bloc and failed; she tried through building a new kind of United Nations and failed; now she does not quite know how to set about it.

The speaker maintained that when the Chinese speak of ideology they mean national interest: many African leaders believed the Chinese to be true revolutionaries and have been disappointed to find them as selfish as anybody else. If a government is prepared to be on good terms with China, the Chinese simply forget about prospects for revolutionary warfare within that country (e.g. Cambodia).

Finally the speaker pointed to a racist sentiment on the part of the Chinese which is very important. The Chinese criticise white people for treating them like negroes; they consider it perfectly normal to treat the negroes as negroes, however, and the negroes know it - and that is another reason for the setbacks in Africa.

An American member of the conference held it unwise to carry the distinction between ideology and national interest too far. He found it hard to imagine any policy of national interest or of ideology which did not take account of the same factors - geography, economics, the domestic structure and environment of the country concerned. It was a question of relative weights, which are very subtle.

Pursuing this line of argument, another American participant warned against the delusion that nationalism is a more conservative force than ideology. He considered revolutionary nationalism a greater threat to the status quo than the ideological revolutionary movements, because revolutionary nationalism feeds on national resentment and dissatisfaction. Hitler and Mussolini were the most extreme examples in the past. Today the most dynamic case is perhaps China, but Nasser and de Gaulle are also powerful personalities who express or are believed to express national ambitions and grievances. He saw de Gaulle essentially as the leader of rebellion. Where fires of national rebellion are lit they can be as effective as the universal ideological revolutionary fires.

The only encouragement he could offer to the status quo powers was that the non-universal revolutionary movements remain relatively isolated: they can only disintegrate groups. French nationalism today cannot integrate Europe. China cannot integrate the movements in Africa. Khrushchev was only able to exert dominance.

A Swedish member of the conference wanted to elicit views on Chinese action in world affairs beyond their admitted general interest in mischief-making and fostering wars of national liberation. Chinese policy does seem to have been rather cautious in South-East Asia but very active in remoter areas. Could this be intended to divert what they conceive as pressure against their home base?

Pursuing an argument about Chinese caution, a Canadian speaker observed that in the popular mind at least what is happening in Vietnam tends to be taken as evidence of Chinese instigation of aggression. The sophisticated see it as a challenge to the West to prove that wars of national liberation cannot succeed. The extent to which the Vietcong was a local movement or activated by universal communism was highly important in this context.

Mr. Hudson said there was no doubt that the trouble in Vietnam started in Hanoi, not Peking. The Vietnamese communists are the most nationalist in the world; and there is the desire for reunification of the country. The decision was taken at the Vietnamese Communist Party Congress of September 1960, but the proclamation of the revolt by the National Liberation Council in South Vietnam did not occur until the end of that year and between the Congress and the proclamation the Conference of 81 Communist Parties took place at which Russia and China had a slanging match. No doubt the enterprise received approval at this Conference: approval was necessary from Peking and from Moscow because otherwise the Vietnamese could not rely on the supply of arms, which would have to come from the major communist powers.

Taking up a point made by Dr. Hinton, Mr. Hudson agreed that the American involvement has obstructed a communist victory. But in a sense the scale of the American effort required to maintain the situation as it is now, even to withdrawing 15,000 troops from Europe, illustrates the success of that policy.

An Italian member of the conference wondered how far the Vietnam crisis was likely to increase the threat to Europe, in the sense that the Russians are under constant pressure by the Chinese to make some move in Europe. How far was the shift in Soviet emphasis from Asia to Europe as reflected in the 23rd Party Congress linked with the Sino-Soviet conflict?

An American participant argued that the true movement of Soviet policy in regard to Europe is demanded by the circumstances in Europe (the European economic revival, the receding prospect of social revolution) and domestic Soviet preoccupations, not by the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Soviet leaders feel that the advanced industrialised areas are of primary importance in world politics even though the possibilities for movement are only of small degree. Although their action in Asia presents more specific opportunities, even large changes there would be of less significance than small gains in regard to Germany or Japan.

A Canadian speaker argued that the problem of China is serious for the alliance mainly because on an issue which is increasingly becoming an essential element of policy the US and her allies are out of phase. All of America's principal allies are trying to avoid being drawn into the US confrontation with China as decently as they can and this is creating a certain difficulty.

Leading discussion back to the factors which could influence China's external policy a British member of the conference wondered whether industrialisation might not lead to a certain mellowing. Her last big adventure was the intervention over the Yalu in 1951, when her economy depended on peasants in rice fields. When she is dependent on large industrial centres which become much more vulnerable to attack, will she not tend to become more cautious? The question was also posed to what extent Chinese dependence on food imports might make her vulnerable to Western pressure. And at what stage is she likely to pursue her frontier claims against the Soviet Union, particularly in the Eastern provinces, in order to get an outlet for her expanding population?

From the American side it was argued that industrialisation per se would not affect the Chinese outlook: influence operates more subtly, and very much more through the spread of education leading

to a demand from the people for greater political participation. The speaker considered the Chinese border claims as essentially political rather than territorial; the most significant is the claim to Outer Mongolia, with which the Russians have renewed their agreement. He saw China's economic dependence less in terms of food supplies than in her need to expand relations with highly industrialised powers. West Germany is highly important to China in this context.

Pursuing the economic aspect, a Netherlands participant suggested that Japan would be even more important. A strong feeling of kinship exists between the Chinese and Japanese peoples and despite two wards there are no basic differences between the two countries. The more China is isolated from other countries, the more likely she is to look to Japan. Unless there should be a new development in Japanese relations with the Soviet Union, which could create a basic difference between China and Japan, we ought to watch the Japanese position in the Far East vis-à-vis China very carefully.

A British member of the conference suggested that European history of the 19th and early 20th centuries did not bear out the assumption that caution grows with industrialisation. His main point however was that we tend to think of Chinese industrialisation only in terms of her acquiring nuclear weapons and affecting the balance of nuclear power. But surely China's conventional capability is bound to be affected too, and this must have implications for her position in Asia and in the world as a whole. And will she become sufficiently advanced economically to become a formidable competitor in world markets with Western Europe and the United States, or to be able to penetrate with expert advisers other countries in competition with our own?

This led an American member of the conference to wonder what China was likely to do with her nuclear armament when she acquires it. A British speaker wondered whether the question of how long it would take the Chinese to acquire ICBMs was the right one: China could either try to catch up the US and USSR, or she could try to come first in another phase - in which case quite different things would count. And to what extent might fear (whether justified or not) of an American pre-emptive attack deter China from acquiring an ICBM capability? A German speaker wondered whether China would now follow the same policy on the spread of nuclear proliferation as the other nuclear powers.

Commenting on the nuclear aspect, Dr. Hinton said the Chinese have taken a rather ambiguous stand in favour of the proliferation of national nuclear forces. He thought the primary reason was a desire not to have the door to independent capability slammed in their face. They also doubt whether any nation (except Germany, which is not a problem for China) is likely to become a major nuclear power. And they may hope that the proliferation of small nuclear powers might drive the United States and Soviet Union into negotiating complete nuclear disarmament which would leave Chinese conventional forces as the dominant power in Asia. He believed it quite possible they would agree to transfer a selective amount of nuclear technology to selective friends: there was some evidence in 1965 that before the coup they dangled this prospect before the Indonesians.

The most important motivation for China acquiring nuclear weapons was security: Soviet literature in the early 1950's made it very clear to the Chinese that the USSR would not run any great

risks for them (this Soviet reaction was largely due to the doctrine of massive retaliation and the Western possession of tactical weapons). The Chinese made the definitive decision to go nuclear in 1956. They were able to persuade and pressure the Russians into giving them nuclear technical assitance, including a gaseous diffusion plant, and aid with surface-to-surface mid-range missiles in return for Chinese acquiescence in Soviet support for a test ban agreement. When in 1960 the Russians terminated their technical assistance the Chinese withdrew their support for the test ban and subsequently tested their weapon. He believed the Chinese now consider the risk of a pre-emptive strike by the United States acceptable. In 1957-8 the Chinese were worried about the need for protection during the time when they would be building up their capability and they asked the Soviet Union for short-range aid. The Russians demanded controls, however, which the Chinese were not prepared to accept.

He felt that the use of the Chinese capability was most likely to be political to range China, as had been suggested, among the top nations. In the Far East, the Chinese have the idea of hostages. Once it is known that they have a nuclear capability they hope the Asian allies of the United States will exert pressure on the US not to do certain things in the area, because they stand to be attacked if the US offends China too much.



THIRD SESSION SATURDAY AFTERNOON 30 APRIL

Agenda The position of the super-powers in a world of nuclear proliferation. The chances of a multi-nuclear world. Prospects and effects of technological developments.

Mr. Beaton (first speaker) said no country has so far taken the decision to embark on a military nuclear programme beyond the five who have exploded devices or built up weapons. Since proliferation is a very slowly changing subject, this situation may go on for some time. However a spread of plutonium is going on largely through the growth of Atoms for Peace projects; and this is so much a part of the problem of proliferation that it must be taken very seriously. Plutonium stock-piles are being built up in a number of countries. While most of these are subject to I.A.E.A. safeguards in the form of an inspectorate system, as long as ownership of the plutonium is in national hands the safeguards can be denounced on grounds that the world situation has changed. Some countries are building up a reactor programme which could be extremely useful for military purposes. Two in particular are very conscious of the military implications and have taken decisions in relation to it - India and Israel. The Prime Minister of Israel has recently appointed himself Head of the Atomic Energy Commission - as Nehru did in India. This is a sign that it has been realised that the most complex technical decisions in the atomic energy programme have major political implications. The Israelis have not provided themselves with any capacity for extracting plutonium from their irradiated fuel rods; they have however a sufficiently large reactor at the moment, for which they will be able to get an adequate source of fuel.

Perhaps the most important case is Japan which he felt must be moving towards some kind of decision. He thought the Chinese in particular would be very aware of trends in Japan, because this decision must be related to sheer wealth and industrial resources and Japanese capacity is growing very fast. Another interesting situation is that the Canadian Atomic Energy Authority has now decided to build a large uranium power reactor in Pakistan along the same lines as it is building in India. This reactor will be under IAEA safeguards (which he personally did not consider adequate to sustain the overwhelming political implications of placing plutonium in the hands of another country). India has a natural uranium refining industry and in Pakistan it should be possible also to acquire the necessary fuel.

Whatever may be happening in the sphere of nuclear weapons or delivery systems, the absolute growth in the size of industrial economies is very important for the balance of strength in the world. The simple growth of an industrial economy creates options that a country may or may not take up. A very high growth rate is apparent in four countries - West Germany, Japan, Italy and Canada. This is a factor to take account of.

On the more substantive issue of the effect of these nuclear programmes, he saw no justification for imagining that the spread of nuclear weapons spreads political sobriety. This is said partly because the first nuclear powers happened to be essentially status quo powers, although the Americans and Russians have not been particularly sober in their confrontations (Cuba and Berlin). But the

argument cannot be sustained that the Nassers of the world would not be wild men if they had nuclear weapons. Nor are new nuclear weapons programmes for new powers just a new basis for policy. They have comparatively little application in terms of new poles of power and a general change in the structure of alliances. Nuclear weapons are a means of affecting reliance on others, but they are only one component among many factors.

It could be argued that for those nations which are capable of holding a substantial prestige in the eyes of small countries as a source of sympathy or support, e.g. countries like China and France and Japan and Germany, nuclear weapons do give a public and dramatic element to their claim to be powers of importance. This has played a part in the general public debate which has surrounded France and China in recent years. But he would still argue that fundamentally even a wide spread of nuclear weapons will raise all kinds of problems of accident, etc. but will not influence the structure of alliances in itself. There is nothing in nuclear weapons which naturally unites or divides powers. Britain's nuclear weapons programme has possibly marginally increased the intimacy of Anglo-US co-operation, France's has possibly marginally decreased Franco-American co-operation; but in both cases the relationships are more fundamentally affected by factors not linked to nuclear weapons themselves.

With regard to technological developments, and particularly the Soviet-American debate about ABMs, a decision by the Russians and Americans to construct quite substantial ABM systems would introduce an important element of uncertainty into the calculations. He doubted whether any high level of certainty was possible about how such a system would perform. Nevertheless the tendency will be to strengthen the confidence of the super powers against small nuclear powers who might seek to deter them: the Americans vis-à-vis China and the Soviet Union vis-à-vis France or West Europe generally or even China, where there is no certainty of American entry into a conflict. The primary case for the ABM is not a strategic or political case, it is a damage-limitation case. The primary answer to a Chinese attempt to deter the United States with nuclear weapons is bound to be retaliation. But if there is a sense that damage limitation has reached quite a high level, an American posture vis-à-vis China which is based on damage limitation would be feasible. To the extent that this ABM defence would not include America's allies, the implications for cohesion of the alliance could by then be serious. On the other hand Mr. Beaton saw no fundamental reason why any ABM system in the US should not fairly easily be applied to Western Europe. There would be no more difficulties about damage limitation than about any other satisfactory nuclear arrangement.

Turning to the question of the super powers in relation to other poles of power Mr. Beaton was concerned about an element of weariness which is becoming important in the US and UK in particular, in regard to areas where nuclear power is not decisive. He saw a real possibility of a generalised sense of disillusion in the US over an endless and apparently meaningless involvement in Vietnam, and this could lead to an American disillusion about the rich and irresponsible Europeans. Certainly there is a British weariness with her overseas effort, which she feels she cannot afford and which is mainly being done for others who do not appreciate it; this has led to a very strong mood of abdication. He wondered if there might not be a tendency for all major powers to subscribe to the Soviet view that the proper place for armed forces is at home or in places where you defend: you play around with arms but do not commit your forces abroad. And with it comes the sense that the whole of the centre of Western power is loosening. This could have a very important effect on countries

like Germany and Japan: if countries with substantial resources at their disposal sense that there is a term on the American commitment this will be a very virulent proliferation incentive. Guarantees are a very important incentive against proliferation and have existed mainly in the sense of a permanent American commitment. In relation to Germany, for instance, since to develop weapons is a 20 year operation, the Germans must know not that they have Nato till 1970 but that they will have a permanent relationship and sense of community with the US. An anti-proliferation strategy involves long-term commitments which the present mood is tending to undermine.

Professor Bowie, (first respondent) said most people have the feeling of a relatively stable military situation, attributed to a variety of factors:- second strike capabilities, effective command and control systems, the general realisation that the costs of any nuclear war would be too high for the gains obtainable and thus not a reasonable risk, the revulsion against the use of nuclear weapons and finally the factor that the British and French forces are not conceived as likely to be used under any conditions which would be destabilising. Mr. Beaton already mentioned the factors which have changed: (1) the existence of the Chinese capacity, (2) possible spread of weapons to new states, and (3) the possible deployment of ABM systems.

If ABM systems were to be deployed by both the US and SU this would introduce an element of uncertainty, because nobody knows how effective these systems are. But it would not be a significant element of instability, because the risk of using nuclear weapons will still be far too high to encourage adventures. Also an effect would be to widen the gap between those two and any other nuclear power (except in so far as they might share their ABM system with others.) It might, as Mr. Beaton suggested, encourage a super power to be a little more bold in dealing with small forces. In terms of the US and Europe he found it very hard to prognosticate without knowing where Europe is going in terms of European unity. If Europe does unite, it will insist on either a nuclear capacity or a genuine partnership with substantial control of the American capability; he could not say which. But the French and British would certainly be under very great pressure to collectivise their forces within the European frame and he did not see how they will be able to resist this. Prof. Bowie did not see that a collective European capability would necessarily loosen the bonds with the US. He took a different view from Mr. Beaton of the American security relationship with Europe: this is not seen anywhere in the US as a commitment - it is a fact of life. He could imagine the Americans under some conditions getting exasperated and adopting a more cavalier attitude; but he could not see them washing their hands of Europe. American handling of the ABM would be important in this context: if the US were to deploy a system and the Europeans were not covered this would, as Mr. Beaton said, introduce new tension. He could imagine this becoming a crucial issue over the next 5-10 years. On the other hand other serious considerations would also be involved.

Turning to the Far East, Prof. Bowie was not sure China would move very fast to the ICBM stage. A seaborne deterrent was perhaps more likely. Their natural strategy would be one of hostages as Dr. Hinton indicated in the previous session, as Khrushchev tried to make Europe a hostage with his own IRBMs. He believed the Chinese could be contained or deterred from using these weapons by the threat of retaliation; this generation of leaders and the one to follow may, however, be more bold in thinking that under the stalemate there is more room for manoeuvre than the Russians were

prepared to take a chance on over issues like Berlin. Therefore there might be more risk of incidents that could blow up into war in the Far East. He did not see the Europeans showing much interest in the area in the period we were talking about. He expected the British interest to shrink rather than expand once the Malaysia confrontation finishes - the British may not even continue to have a major base in the area. The Americans will feel lonely but will have to carry the burden.

He anticipated a very active debate in India and Japan on whether they will need nuclear weapons. In India the policy of non-alignment prevents them from feeling they are securely covered. Prof. Bowie believed they will talk themselves into a need for a capability as long as they feel they can do it without compromising their aid from the West. In Japan, they are more happy with the security guarantee from the US and there is no sense of urgency; the feeling of revulsion is still very strong. On the other hand Japan will go right to the edge in developing capability under the heading of technology and space efforts, so as to be able to take a quick decision. However, he did not see that if either India or Japan acquire nuclear weapons it would necessarily be so damaging to international stability and security in the Far East. If the Chinese are able to offer a nuclear threat and there are doubts about the US response on behalf of India or Japan, the local capability could in fact have a stabilising effect, although in India's case the complication of disagreement with Pakistan could have a local de-stabilising effect.

In terms of the underdeveloped world, he anticipated a period of turmoil. The American experience in Vietnam will make her very reluctant to get involved elsewhere without a firm political basis. Therefore he expected a tendency to utilise other ways of damping things down, although by what means he did not know.

In regard to the smaller countries, if Sweden or Switzerland were to exercise their nuclear option this would so clearly be for the protection of their neutrality that he did not see why it should be destabilising. This would not apply in the case of Israel, however.

Prof. Bowie stressed that he was not complacent about the prospect of proliferation. But we must be honest with ourselves and see the problem as it exists. It cannot be solved in the abstract or by half-hearted measures. For instance, the idea of dealing with it by a non-proliferation treaty is terribly naive. People in India or Japan are resentful about the posture of a country like Britain that wants to shut the door because, they feel, she considers them not to be trusted. To press on with this technique might even force their hand, because they will not let themselves be treated as second-class. It is essential to deal with the problems of security and prestige involved for each of the potential countries which underlie their decision.

Discussion on the prospects for a multi-nuclear world showed a general disposition to draw a distinction between the short term when, it was felt, proliferation is not likely to extend much beyond the present five powers, and the far more serious long term, when technological development will open the door to proliferation on a large scale. A French member of the conference expected that phase to open in about ten years' time.

And as a fellow American observed in endorsing Prof. Bowie's plea for honesty and a more realistic approach to the problem, it is no use proclaiming that proliferation is too terrible to contemplate but we cannot prevent it and then waiting for a chaotic world; we should rather direct our efforts towards the actual situation which will arise if some degree of proliferation occurs. A Swiss participant

suggested that we try to face up to what degree of proliferation would at least be tolerable. He wondered whether a multi-nuclear world would be more liveable in if we showed the newcomers how to handle their weapons.

Looking at another aspect, beyond their military purpose or security value nuclear weapons could also contribute to creating or perpetuating a certain political environment. In Europe, for example, nuclear weapons have frozen a political situation which we would like to see unblocked. But might we want to encourage proliferation in certain circumstances if it helps to stabilise a fluid situation?

A French member of the conference recorded his satisfaction at the general change in attitude towards the whole problem of proliferation which has made rational and flexible discussion of such considerations possible. Taking up Prof. Bowie's reverence to the stabilising effect which an Indian or Japanese nuclear capability might produce in the Far East, he argued that while other solutions might be envisaged, some regional force would be required to balance the Chinese nuclear capability.

Following up this point, the Swiss speaker wondered whether the great powers should be brought into any regional arrangement. Might it not be wiser in a multi-nuclear world to declare that peace can be <u>divisible</u> - which to some extent would put some responsibility onto the shoulders of those who are so keen to acquire nuclear weapons?

A British member of the conference drew some comfort from the consideration that although in logic the greater the proliferation the greater the likelihood of war, there is not a greater likelihood of nuclear holocaust. Nuclear weapons might be used, but it is no longer likely that a nuclear exchange between secondary powers would <u>necessarily</u> lead to a nuclear exchange between the super powers.

An American speaker argued that it made a great deal of difference how fast proliferation occurred and in what direction, and in particular how the world situation developed. But time could work against proliferation, as well as for it, because over time problems could change and motivations for acquiring nuclear options could change. Therefore we should not abandon an anti-proliferation strategy.

The conference agreed on the need for an anti-proliferation strategy, although one British participant at least was most pessimistic about its chance of success; on the other hand he did not regard some degree of proliferation as a desperate situation.

Opinions differed however, with regard to the most effective means of achieving an anti-proliferation strategy. Disappointment was expressed by a number of participants with Prof. Bowie's condemnation of the proposed non-proliferation treaty as naive. Everyone agreed that the treaty was not adequate as it stood, but, as an American participant argued, a treaty would create a climate of opinion in which progress towards the other components of a non-proliferation strategy might be easier to negotiate; and because everything can not be done at once it would be silly not to make a start with one instrument.

A Swedish participant added that a treaty would be a useful instrument in two cases in particular: (1) Countries whose main concern is with a potential threat from a non-nuclear neighbour (i.e. Israel/UAR): (2) Countries (like Sweden) whose main concern is with the long-term effects of a comprehensive spread and conventionalisation of these weapons which could increase the likelihood

of their being used rather than with a threat from a particular country. Another advantage of the treaty approach was that the collateral elements which the non-aligned countries are insisting upon - certain sacrifices on the part of the existing nuclear powers, a comprehensive test ban and a cut-off of fissile material - would contribute to international security.

A German member of the conference supported Prof. Bowie, however. He identified four major changes which have emerged from the debate at Geneva: (1) More emphasis on the stabilising effect of nuclear weapons than on the de-stabilising effect; (2) a growing awareness that an anti-proliferation strategy must take account of security problems; (3) recognition that security requirements cannot be satisfied in one all-embracing formula; different arrangements must be made for non-aligned countries and for countries which feel the need to be in alliance, either bilaterally with a nuclear power or in a collective alliance composed of nuclear and non-nuclear powers. (4) A strengthening conviction, at least among the non-aligned countries, that non-proliferation should be seen as part of disarmament, not as an aim in itself.

A nuclear option is not available to Germany, because the existing nuclear powers are not disseminating nuclear weapons and national production of nuclear weapons was renounced by Germany in 1954. Her objective desire is to see other countries in the same position as herself. But the speaker could not see how the proposed treaty under discussion at Geneva would help bring this about. His main objections to the treaty were: (1) as it stands, the treaty contains no element of give and take. (2) The treaty will not include all the existing nuclear powers. (3) The treaty is too comprehensive in that it requires the signature of countries which do not matter in the context of proliferation (e.g. Mali of Morocco). (4) It does not contain any any measure of nuclear disarmament. (5) It does not deal with security problems.

In the German view, attention should be concentrated on means of conditioning the countries which count, the relatively small number of potential nuclear powers, and renounce their nuclear option. A piecemeal approach would perhaps offer the best chance of success. Since security is a major consideration influencing a decision to acquire a nuclear option, for countries members of an alliance the best solution would be to associate those countries with collective deterrence. This would not be a case of a finger on the trigger, because collectivised weapons would be used for deterrence, not fighting. For countries not members of an alliance, something along the lines of the Johnson or the Soviet proposal may be the limits of what is possible at this stage.

An American member of the conference maintained that the question of a collective force was and must remain extraneous to the proliferation argument. The only collective force which the United States and possibly the Atlantic alliance would have anything to do with would not in reality constitute any proliferation - and the Soviet Union is aware of this. And in so far as a collective force would not change one iota of the distribution of decision-making power in regard to nuclear weapons in the world today, it would not help solve any of the problems involved in a study of proliferation. The only conceivable contribution a collective force could make to the debate would be to the extent that people motivated by the idea of prestige might be content with association with nuclear states in a more positive form than they are today.

A French speaker argued that a collective force would be an incentive to proliferation: to the extent that it would be presented as giving the non-nuclear powers which participate in the force some effective control over nuclear weapons it would increase the desire for national nuclear protection to other countries with a security problem (such as Israel) which are not covered by such a force.

A British member of the conference failed to see why. We have had a collective nuclear force in Nato for years, and it has not led to proliferation. Practically every Nato ally has the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, and the weapons are available too, either under national control or under the double key system. What we lack is a system of political control and operational command.

The German spokesman maintained that for the non-nuclear powers participation in the collective deterrent of the alliance is a legitimate aim. The means to achieve this is another question entirely: a collective force is only one possibility.

Another British speaker did not see why the two super-powers should not drop their efforts to conclude a treaty and tell any nation that wished to waste its money on producing nuclear weapons to go ahead. But, having said that, why should they not declare their determination to use their own power jointly against any nation which uses nuclear power against any non-nuclear nation?

A French participant maintained that the only solution to proliferation in the long term was an international system including all the nuclear powers (this would be essential) and non-nuclear powers as well. Guarantees would be an essential step towards such a system; but he doubted whether a joint Soviet-American guarantee would be adequate to reassure the non-nuclear powers. Moreover as a condominium it would be a very bad solution.

An American member of the conference pointed to the problems that would arise in connection with a joint Soviet-American guarantee, supposing it could be negotiated. (1) It would not help those countries that feel threatened by one of the major nuclear powers (for example all the members of Nato). (2) If a unilateral American guarantee is not sufficient to reassure her allies, the speaker could not see in what way a joint Soviet-American guarantee could reassure other countries. (3) For such a joint guarantee to operate, the country would have to believe that it would be invoked in the case of nuclear attack, and it would have to assume that if it acquired nuclear weapons the guarantee would lapse.

It just was not reasonable to argue that a decision to go to nuclear war would depend on the kind of armament a particular country has. If the United States protects India, it is not because India is non-nuclear but because India is important to the US; and in the sense that India would continue to be important to the US, what had she to lose by acquiring a nuclear option? The whole question of guarantees should be studied most carefully, including the special influence which can be exerted over the whole policy of the guaranteeing country.

An Italian participant argued that because there has been a change of attitude towards proliferation this does not mean we have found a solution to the problems which give rise to a desire for nuclear weapons. For European countries, he believed the answer lay in a closer integration in which the guarantee of protection which they could provide for themselves would be more meaningful than the existing guarantee from the United States. He did not

feel that the treaty approach was the right one: a solution cannot be built on the basis of discrimination and the monopoly of five powers.

This led to discussion of the factors underlying a country's decision to require a nuclear option. A Belgian member of the conference argued that nuclear weapons could either be used offensively or defensively, for action or for influence, but he believed the defensive aspect was more important in the eyes of most countries because security was the prime motivating factor.

An American participant commented that American and Russian experience has shown how limited the usefulness of a nuclear establishment is: essentially the only use is for defence. But it would be a very expensive defence, and in the case of small countries the question arises defence against whom? What would India, or Japan, or Israel do with a weapons system? What use would a defensive nuclear capability be to Switzerland, if she could not use these weapons outside her borders? Of course the situation within each country was different; but he found a great deal of the current debate unreal and misleading.

A French participant agreed about the defensive use in theory: this certainly applies to the United States and Soviet Union. But this could not be taken for granted in the case of pairs of adversaries only one of whom acquired nuclear weapons. If Israel acquired nuclear capability perhaps the Arabs would be more willing to come to terms with her; on the other hand, especially if the Russians should offer nuclear assistance to the UAR, voices could well be raised in Israel in support of a war to bring the Arabs to a peace. Similar considerations would arise in the case of India and Pakistan.

A second American speaker argued that the usefulness of nuclear weapons in a military sense was not the most relevant consideration, because the symbolic effect of nuclear capability is to important. If we consider the problem of what the value of a European nuclear force would be to the European nations rather than dependence upon a US national force, discussion quickly revolves around what the possession of some nuclear force, whether large or small, confers upon those powers in the intangible field of the effect on international politics. That is why it is so hard to analyse what the actual power utility of a nuclear capability is. That is also why the motivation of each potential nuclear power must be taken into account.

A third American participant added that a systematic analysis of the problem of proliferation should consider not only the impact on each other of nuclearly armed states but also the situation within the country. So far proliferation has spread within countries with a considerable degree of domestic cohesion. The consequences could be far more serious in countries in which a military coup is likely or in countries with a military government which might be overthrown if nuclear weapons were available.

He expected the main pressure to come from a country like Israel, where the consequences of a conventional defeat would be as great as the consequences of a nuclear defeat. Such a country would risk nothing by acquiring nuclear weapons and might gain a greater margin of manoeuvre in that it could afford to wait for attack (by a conventionally armed opponent).

A German member of the conference argued that the small, unsophisticated and above all vulnerable systems which was all the small nations could afford would be nothing but a temptation to other small nations to make a pre-emptive strike.

An American member of the conference was very concerned at the extent to which we ourselves play up the prestige element of nuclear capability for example by letting a nation which has tested a bomb be considered an important military power. And we adopt a double standard: we say to the French that the force de frappe does not mean anything. But we say to the Germans that they should participate in collective deterrence, even though it does not change one iota in the distribution of decision-making power - we say that the Germans want something which is quite irrational, but we give them samples which they can sell to their public as being a form of nuclear power. And we say that China should be a permanent member of the Security Council.

Surely the point is that there <u>are</u> rational motives for desiring nuclear weapons. The real consideration is their security value. If there is a security value, unless we give countries equivalent security by other means they will insist on nuclear weapons. We cannot answer this by hard and fast rules of the size of force required - it depends upon the circumstances. On the other hand a nuclear capability that is too small to be credible as a threat imparts no security and therefore has no rational value. Therefore a lot of small powers ought to be educated in time to understand that they would simply be wasting their money and losing the support and guarantee of more powerful nations. But this is not peculiar to <u>nuclear</u> weapons: all kinds of instruments are worthwhile in some circumstances but not in others.

The speaker stressed that we should not use different arguments in different cases. Nuclear capability for the Germans makes no sense because in no circumstances conceivable today could they dare to have nuclear weapons. But the French <u>can</u> dare, and that is why the force de frappe has a security value. If we want to use the prestige argument, the speaker believed that the Germans today have more prestige from their 12 divisions than the French could ever get from their force de frappe, because the Germans have the only military instrument in Europe apart from the American which could actually be used, while the French force is extremely doubtful except as a deterrent. The prestige argument is not so clearly in favour of a country concentrating on nuclear weapons.

A Netherlands participant argued that credible nuclear capability depends not only on the number of weapons but on the territory of the country concerned: the weakness of France and Britain, regardless of the strength of their armament, is that their territory is so small compared to that of the super powers. France cannot play nuclear diplomacy against a country 40 times her size (the USSR). China does have the territory to fight against the US or USSR.

A British speaker maintained that of all the motives for acquiring nuclear weapons, genuine fear of nuclear blackmail was the least important. In the case of the British, French and Chinese the development of nuclear weapons was an assertion of independence and self-confidence aimed at the <u>allies</u> of the new nuclear power rather than against its adversaries. Therefore it was not realistic to seek to dissuade a country from going nuclear by offering guarantees which will perpetuate the clients status.

If this is an expression of prestige, countries will not be reasoned out of it and it is no good trying to minimize it by creating alliances. Ultimately some kind of nuclear status will come to be acceptable as a symbol of a certain type of power, and we shall have to live with this.

Relating this to the first question on the agenda, the position of the super-powers, the speaker argued that the super-powers will remain so because their superiority does not simply depend on their nuclear stockpile but on a far greater degree of resources of every kind which could have a pull in the world.

A German member of the conference argued that his American colleague had put the problem in the wrong perspective. The double standard stems from the fact that the problem of proliferation is symptomatic of the tension created by technological development having outrun the existing political structure of sovereign states. It is not a question of whether nuclear weapons have a simple security value. The great need is to transcend the existing political structure to come closer to the technological structure which is a given fact. Relating his argument to the discussion on a collective force, the speaker saw the true meaning of the search for participation in collective deterrence as an attempt to bridge the distance between the political and the technological order. Whatever this collective system may be, it will introduce a new element into nuclear concepts and into relationships between nations. These considerations go beyond prestige, as well as security.

Drawing the discussion to a close, Prof. Bowie argued that this need to transcend the political structure was one reason why the nuclear efforts of Britain and France are politically damaging. He maintained his fundamental objection to the non-proliferation treaty: it puts everyone into the frame of mind of what has to be done to buy a Soviet signature which is not worth buying - because the Soviet Union will not engage in proliferation - and diverts us from the real task, which is for the West to do something significant to deal with the problem.

A collective effort would move some way towards the task of trying to achieve a more stable solution and eliminate rivalry by trying to organise in some way beyond the present nation state. Even a country the size of the United States must rid itself of the illusion that the nation state is meaningful as it was in the 19th century.

FOURTH SESSION SUNDAY MORNING 1 MAY

Agenda The implications of a changing world for the Alliance: (a) the long-term purpose of the Alliance: limitation or expansion of the geographical area covered by Alliance policy.

Mr. Seidenfaden (first speaker) said the present state of Nato invited more talk about limitation of the area covered by the alliance than about its expansion. Logically, however, the changing environment could point towards the need for expansion, irrespective of whether one still accepted the idea of a valid Soviet threat, in that it would probably be agreed that the major risks of new conflicts lie outside Europe now. Indeed, events involving members of the alliance outside Europe have become more frequent during the lifetime of the alliance. Despite this, at Nato meetings discussion about broadening the scope of the alliance has been perfunctory. It has lagged far behind structural problems and partnership problems and the nuclear issue as a subject for serious consideration. A gathering like the Nato Parliamentarians includes a phrase in its final declaration about the necessity for widening the solidarity of free peoples outside the geographical area of the treaty, but that is about as far as it goes.

The call for solidarity in conflict outside the Nato area has certainly been heard: but it has been a call from one part of the alliance or one member state for solidarity in an individual venture already under way. During the anti-colonial period the call was for American solidarity on the part of European members of the alliance; now it is the other way round. Moreover the European members themselves have not always seen eye to eye: France did not enjoy the support of her European allies when she was fightingin Indo-China. Nor has there been any indication that all members of the alliance would be willing to become involved in matters outside the Nato area, even should some unity of purpose be obtained. The Scandinavian members, for example, are extremely willing to offer advice about events in the most distant countries without dreaming of assuming any responsibility in the same areas. Some solution was perhaps in de Gaulle's mind when he proposed the tripartite directorate to concentrate on worl-wide problems. However not only was his proposal turned down by the United States, it met with a hostile reaction in Europe too. Today de Gaulle himself is the most outstpken opponent of having anything to do with US interventions outside Europe.

The prospects do not appear better if the old problems are viewed in the light of the changing environment. An expanding alliance ought to have a different purpose and priorities than those envisaged ten or even five years ago. Perhaps the changing relationship between the two blocs and among the communist states themselves would no longer call for an alliance with the same anti-communist purpose - which was unimaginable a few years ago. Perhaps the emphasis should be laid much more on the political than on the military side. Perhaps greater priority should be given for example to co-ordination of assistance to the underdeveloped world. On the other hand any assumption of wider responsibilities would still depend upon a degree of political cohesion which does not exist today. The lack of unity in evaluation or interest, the

uncertainty about the extent of the change in the environment, and the non-existent will on the part of many members of the alliance to shoulder additional responsibility all make expansion of the area covered by alliance policy so far from being a practical possibility that he doubted whether the conference would wish to devote much time to it.

As regards limitation of the area, which Mr. Seidenfaden expected to be in the centre of discussion, if France were left out of the alliance this would constitute limitation of a dangerous kind. de Gaulle has not gone so far as this in his public statements, nor has the United States or anyone else drawn that conclusion. But the possibility remains - not only because this might be de Gaulle's real intention (though Mr. Seidenfaden doubted it) but because this could be the result if the crisis were handled in the wrong way. The first reaction in the Nato Council when the fourteen met was a strong condemnation of the French action. This was toned down to the statement that the fourteen believed in military integration: the view prevailed that the rift should not be widened unnecessarily. But now we are at the beginning of negotiations about Nato forces in France and French forces in Germany and American and Nato bases in France, etc., and we may have to face the possibility of France leaving or being left out of the alliance and still further limitations. The American tactic, followed by the others, is to play for time, to try to keep the ball rolling until de Gaulle is no longer there, in the hope that France will come back into line. This is dangerous because it might easily provoke a reaction after which the return of France after de Gaulle's passing would be most problematic.

Maybe the nogotiations about French dis-integration and French forces in Germany etc., will lead to some arrangements by which the alliance will not be very different in practice - neither integration nor troops being much in evidence at the moment. But even so, the <u>political</u> impact of de Gaulle's move will have repercussions in other parts of Europe. It will be more difficult for Germany to strike a balance between the US and France; there will be difficulties for the Scandinavian countries too.

The great need, as Mr. Seidenfaden saw it, is for a new political initiative within the alliance. And probably this could best be taken by Britain. He believed a solution could be found in accepting one of de Gaulle's premises, perhaps his main concern: the need for a new and more equal relationship for the United States within the alliance. In view of the alternative it would surely at least be worth probing to see whether de Gaulle's latest move is really an attempt to get results by forcing the issue. It would be a case of giving in to a sentiment held not just by de Gaulle but by a considerable body of opinion in Europe and in the United States now. He did not have in mind a relaunching of the idea of a United States of Europe, just of getting something moving instead of the imminent disintegration of Europe. What Britain could do he did not know at the moment; the British Government seemed very far from taking any initiative in this sense. However, he hoped his British friends would explore various possibilities.

Sketching out a purely personal view, and thinking back to the Marshall Plan, Mr. Seidenfaden recalled that an important factor in the success of the plan was that the distribution of aid was not handled bilaterally between the United States and the countries of Europe but between the United States and a European commission.

Might it not be possible for something like that to be done within the field of defence? We have the American deterrent, but we need a concerted idea of a common role in defence. Would it not be natural, if the Europeans could make up their minds in common, if the present dialogue between the fourteen and France were supplemented by a dialogue between the United States and Europe? This could perhaps lead to a proposal for a Nato Commission for Europe whose delegates, together with the Americans, would be responsible for defence strategy and crisis management. Perhaps now is both the psychological moment and the last chance for such a scheme. He could not imagine a Nato without France, nor could he find Nato dispensable as yet. He had been asked to make this exposé as a European; but he would be afraid to face the security problem of his own country if the present trend of the crisis were not turned in another direction.

Professor Kissinger (first respondent) proposed to confine his remarks to the question whether the geographical area covered by the alliance should be extended outside Europe. Theoretically, any international system ought to be constituted in such a way that its members would consider themselves as participants in a conventional security arrangement and would arrange their internal relationships so as to have an ideal division of labour in order to bring about the most successful over-all result. Unfortunately this is not the way international systems have operated historically. The components are nation states, sovereign units, whatever their size and internal structure, who justify themselves by a particular history and a particular view of the world. Maintaining the international system as such is frequently their sole motivation. The difficulty in constructing an international system is to reconcile the idealised picture of how the system should operate with the realities. A system which provides only for the maintenance of the system is not enough.

He postulated four requirements for the operation of an alliance of any scope, whether regionally confined or globally centred: (1) some common objective; (2) some technical possibilities of co-operation; (3) a common policy; (4) some penalty or disadvantage for non co-operation. These four conditions have been met with extreme difficulty even within an Atlantic alliance confined to Europe and in his judgment would be impossible to fulfil on a global basis, not only because Europe is fragmented: they might be even more difficult if Europe were united. Every state in the West has a general interest in maintaining the peace. But this general interest must be translated into a willingness to run risks and shoulder sacrifices. The burden can be shared only if there is (1) a common assessment of the situation and (2) the belief that but for a country's willingness to assume these burdens they will not be shared at all. Prof. Kissinger argued that neither of these conditions is fully met (he was excepting the UK to some extent from these observations).

In most cases no common assessment of the security problem outside Europe exists. Many Europeans are of the opinion that their security is not immediately threatened by anything that will happen in, say, Asia. Nobody believes that European support is essential to the US. And enough European nations to be a problem for the alliance are convinced that long before European security is threatened directly the US would be involved. European attitudes are not dissimilar from American attitudes towards European affairs before 1939, when it was very difficult to convince Americans that their security was threatened by what was happening in Europe and no European policy at that time

could have won American burden-sharing. And so far as there is a European interest in areas outside Europe it arises purely from the historical role of certain countries. For example the UK feels a commitment to India or East of Suez that transcends what France feels or is even conceivable in the Federal Republic; and the reason has to do far more with a historical tradition than with the requirements of the situation which, if that were the criterion, would interest all three countries to the same extent.

With regard to the other two criteria, there is no real penalty for failure to co-operate because of the conviction that if a requirement exists it will be assumed anyway. And in the technical field the opportunity for co-operation is so small.

Having said why extension is not possible, Prof. Kissinger proceeded to argue why it would not be desirable. He saw two essential reasons. (1) An Atlantic alliance that assumed world-wide responsibilities would come very close to facing all the disadvantages of a general system of collective security. The more wide the system, the more tenuous the will for animating it. The only possible agreement would be agreement to do nothing, and the result would be consensus on paralysis rather than on joint action. He also saw a very real danger that in such a system the marginal additional assistance that may be made by European countries on extra-European problems would demand a price in terms of domestic cohesion not comparable to the problem at stake.

(2) The idealised picture of everybody sharing responsibility everywhere and primarily on the basis of resources overlooks one of the most important elements of contemporary politics, that the limits are not physical resources but psychological resources. The difficulty is less of assembling power in a given situation than of bringing to bear the requisite span of attention to act with vision and creativity. If everybody is trying to operate everywhere at once, then the span of attention that can be given to any one problem will be so small that the danger of muddling from crisis to crisis is enormous. The burdens the Americans need to have shared are <u>psychological</u> burdens very much more than physical burdens.

Prof. Kissinger drew the following conclusion: he had always felt strongly that there should be some European identity without worrying whether this should be achieved by means of a supranational or a confederal solution. If such a structure is likely to emerge, we could reasonably expect that over a historical period with respect to those problems affecting Europe the labouring oar would be carried by Europe with the US in a reserve position; in other situations the labouring oar would be carried by the US with the others in a reserve position. He did not suggest that anybody with an interest in other parts of the world would be impeded from getting involved. But he did say that countries without an interest should not be compelled to join in outside of the limits of their domestic structure and interest. We should ask ourselves whether it would truly be in our interest to create a structure which organically connects a problem in any part of the world with every other problem, or whether we should not try to de-couple, to get structures where every crisis is handled so as <u>not</u> to be generalised into a world crisis. In his view the viability of an international system will depend on the degree to which it can relate the vision and concern of its members with the responsibilities that they in face have to carry out.

Pointing to the agreement on the part of both introductory speakers that the alliance as at present constituted cannot in practice function on a global basis, the Chairman wondered whether any member of the conference would argue the contrary.

There was no disposition to challenge this view in regard to the period immediately ahead, although some members of the conference felt that the alliance should look towards extending its area of responsibility and interest in the longer term. This argument in turn related to the prospects for European unity and a more equal relationship with the United States.

An American participant argued that if a move towards unity on the part of the Europeans were assumed, the effect would be to leave some interest in a sharing of responsibilities outside the present limits of the Atlantic area on the borizon, even though an alliance composed of the US and a Europe able to act might not undertake a much more global policy.

A British member of the conference related this point to Prof. Kissinger's reference to limitation of psychological rather than physical resources. For the UK today (and he thought for other European countries that in the past were world powers) the limitation is unquestionably one of physical resources. Therefore if Europe develops as a great power the relationship between resources and psychology could well bring Europe to move more into the direction that at present only the US does.

A second British participant pointed out that this implied looking forward to an alliance of <u>two</u> - which would be a completely different situation. Prof. Kissinger's proposition held absolutely firm in relation to an alliance of 15, because 13 at least of the members do not want an expansion of interest.

A Netherlands participant warned against an assumption that if the European countries had the capability to interest themselves in problems outside Europe a common alliance policy would be easier to reach: they might well see the problems with different eyes. From the British side it was argued that a more vigorous debate within the alliance would not be a bad thing: discussion is not very effective at present because the influence of the debaters is not in proportion.

A Canadian member of the conference argued that the pressure on resources, for Britain at any rate, is much more pressure on the <u>balance of payments</u>. This is becoming more of a problem for the Americans too. In a world of short liquidity and a fear of balance of payments problems spreading to various countries governments are extremely reluctant to undertake commitments which will impose long-term and unknown obligations on their balance of payments; therefore he did not find the argument convincing that a united Europe would create more resources available for commitment, if need be, around the world. (The British speaker disagreed about the extent to which balance of payments difficulties impede Britain from taking a larger role overseas).

Professor Kissinger defended his argument. Certainly without adequate physical resources a global role is not possible. His point was that physical resources will not <u>automatically</u> produce a greater interest outside Europe. It would not be an easy matter in most European countries today to send one company of soldiers to Vietnam, although that would not impose any strain on existing <u>physical</u> resources. If the French GNP were five times as large, would France conduct a different policy?

When he spoke of psychological limitations, he meant that in the modern democratic state the attention of the top leadership cannot of necessity be focussed on more than a limited number of problems. One advantage that de Gaulle enjoys is that he works full time on European problems, while the US President can only address himself to Nato fitfully in the midst of other crises. If the plane of attention of leading statesmen can be freed for the consideration of the really urgent problems this is as much burden sharing as everybody throwing physical resources into a common pot.

A Norwegian participant was much more concerned about the immediate problem for Nato - how to convince public opinion in various countries that the alliance is needed at all. Far from the European members of Nato being able to contribute anything to action outside Europe, the difficulty is to damp down claims to stop any action. If the Cyprus incident had been tackled as a Nato problem it would have been very hard to get Scandinavian co-operation. And even within Europe the definition of our security interest is much narrower than we would like to think: we have the problems of the Northern flank, the Centre, and the Southern flank. It might therefore be worth considering a regional approach to the problem of the alliance, apportioning tasks according to the direct security interests of the member states.

A Swiss member of the conference pointed to a different problem: for some members of the alliance, including Britain, its real function has become more and more the containment of Germany - containment not in a perjorative connotation but with the aim of finding viable solutions for the German problem, including the delicate question of German security and Germany's position in an anti-proliferation strategy.

A French participant saw as the essential problem for Nato the European problem - curing the illness left by the end of the war and the division of Europe. The political objectives of the alliance should be first to change the phase from cold war to stabilisation, and secondly, but only as a side-effect, to build up something which would allow for adapting the strategy of the present situation which is now much more in the direction of deterrence than defence. In his view Europe could only be stabilised by the re-unification of Europe up to a certain point which would allow for the reunification of Germany. The alliance should be reshuffled in order to make the stabilisation of Europe possible and to work in this direction of "Europe" on the one hand and of adapting strategy on the other.

Another French speaker argued that instead of asking what is the purpose of the alliance we should ask what are the needs and then see how to meet them. An alliance is usually designed to face a threat or to achieve an aim. Nato was set up to meet a threat: but public opinion in Europe today no longer takes seriously a military threat from the Soviet Union. If the present détente continue for some years, if a settlement is reached in Vietnam, we could reach a state where nobody would feel the need for an alliance. And before the alliance disappeared in theory it could perfectly well have ceased to exist in fact: a country like France could go further by way of disintegration, countries could remain members but be increasingly reluctant to fulfil their obligations by way of contributing troops. Indeed we have already entered that phase. The difficulty lies in the differing American and European approach: Americans in general tend to say that the alliance has a role in the historic process because it has to develop into a community of some kind some day.

The Europeans, and especially the French, are more sceptical and more realistic: they take the view that an alliance does not survive a success.

He agreed that the only possible aim for the alliance would be Europe. And if we succeeded in building Europe we would become the equal partner with the United States that she has aked for and we could then widen the scope of our interest. However, he could not see Europe being built up except against the United States - by convincing public opinion that this is the only way to become independent from the United States. Asked whether he envisaged a Europe of states, the speaker indicated that he had in mind the dumbbell concept. We must think in terms of a new body which would transform itself into a federation of a new kind. In the present state of the world the individual states of Europe could not be great enough alone to carry sufficient weight.

An American member of the conference took strong exception to the words "independent" and "against". He agreed that the construction of Europe has to be put in the sense of reducing the domination of the United States. But he did not see the creation of a strong Europe as being <u>against</u> the US in terms of its interests. The US would hope that a united Europe would see its interests as parallel to the interests of the US, that an independent Europe would be a consenting partner, not ranged against the US and carrying on a kind of power politics. The US is willing to take this gamble. Europe and the US do have some competing conceptions; but they do not necessarily end in a different position. And to say that is quite different from believing that a real deep conflict of interest is bound to arise and will keep these entities apart.

The French speaker entirely agreed; but he held to his view that the argument would have to be presented in anti-American terms to win the support of public opinion in Europe.

A Belgian member of the conference disagreed with this premise; maybe it would be easier for public opinion to have an enemy, but it was our responsibility to be more constructive. Of course a complete identity of view could not be expected between a united Europe and the US; but we all stood to gain so much more from a sharing of greater responsibility covering wider fields than purely European problems that he had no fear of a serious conflict of interest arising. His own country had accepted interdependence and supranational institutions because the advantages in security and in the economic field were held to outweigh the admitted disadvantages and limitations.

He was concerned at the tendency to consider the Soviet threat to Europe as virtually non-existent: if we look at what the Russians are <u>able</u> to do we cannot afford to dismiss a change of attitude on their part as impossible, especially if Nato should disappear. The emphasis should therefore be on strengthening the <u>alliance</u>, as well as on building Europe.

A British member of the conference endorsed this last point. The world has not been on the verge of war since October 1962: 3½ years is not so long in terms of history as public opinion would seem to suppose. Secondly, while there are two super powers in the world, there is only one super power in Europe. If the alliance breaks up, the consequence will be the natural domination of Europe by the Soviet Union, simply by virtue of her overwhelming power to which states will submit.

An Italian participant argued that merely to maintain the present structure of the alliance may lead to fragmentation in Europe because of the strong centrifugal forces in certain countries. The alternative to partnership according to the dumbbell concept is not Atlanticism but neutralism. Creation of a united Europe would not only lead to a better relationship with the United States and broadening of the scope of the alliance, it would strengthen the power of the alliance to carry out the purpose for which it was created in the European theatre.

A second Italian speaker followed up this argument by taking issue with Prof. Kissinger over the latter's indifference to the sort of Europe which might emerge. A Europe of states would be equivalent to no Europe at all. He considered a supranational European authority essential in the long run; all measures should be conceived as transitional and leading towards that end. Expansion of the scope of the alliance would then be certain, precisely because what is not a matter of concern to Italy or Denmark will be of concern to Europe as such.

A German member of the conference questioned the assumptions on which some members of the conference based their hopes of a strong Europe. The same forces which weaken the fabric of alliance cohesion are working against a strengthening of European cohesion. He identified three problems facing the alliance: the French problem, the American problem and the German problem.

The French problem is not so much what to do about the present moves of de Gaulle: if he is reasonable a solution can be found (basically accepting the present set-up under new labels) which will be less than perfect but workable. The <u>real</u> French problem is that de Gaulle criticises the hegemony of the Americans towards Europe but behaves in exactly the same way towards his fellow Europeans; therefore he prevents the coming into existence of the kind of Europe that could be a real partner of the Americans.

The American problem is created by the way in which the United States has elected to make use of the two facts of her nuclear hegemony and her global responsibilities vis-à-vis Europe. This has not always been done very tactfully or in a great spirit of partnership. Unless the Americans do show signs of an active interest in Europe again (and he did not forget their many other problems) and whet the European appetite for "Europe", the French problem will be harder to solve. If the McNamara Committee should come to nought this will justify many of the French criticisms of the Americans.

The German problem, as already suggested, is the problem of the containment of Germany in the new emerging order. Nato was formed to give security to its members, including Germany. The Germans have interpreted Nato as an instrument to achieve reunification. It has not worked. The speaker did not see how Europe could work as such an instrument either: pushing out the Americans does not create "Europe"; creating "Europe" does not bring about reunification. The basic question of the purpose of the alliance is how do we deal with the problem of Germany in a climate of détente which is based on the continuing division? The Germans do not have an answer. They are cautiously moving towards East Europe and recasting their thinking about East Germany. But somehow they have to find a way of fitting the German problem into whatever evolves - a new Nato structure or a new European structure.

A British participant broadly agreed with this analysis and with the French analysis of the changed European attitude towards the alliance. Indeed in some countries the sentiment is encountered that the alliance is not only no longer necessary militarily, it is counter-productive because it tends to perpetuate the cold-war mentality and constitutes an obstacle to a greater understanding between East and West and an impediment to German unification, and that the only way to achieve the latter is by dismantling the alliance. This feeling is dangerous and wrong, but we cannot ignore it.

He saw as the essential problem for the alliance how to shift our weight from the military foot to the political foot.

In the eyes of another British participant the alliance at present is two things: a reserve against the possibility of a 1949-type incident, and, much more vaguely, a way of contributing to world order by trailing the Europeans in the wake of American order. To give the alliance a new sense of purpose will demand as a pre-condition some re-ordering of forces in Europe. But this is not likely to come about without a radical improvement in Ango-French relations, because of the importance of those two countries in the European context. He was seriously concerned about the extent to which the British establishment, (as opposed to public opinion) which used to be regarded as solidly pro-French is now displaying a vein of anti-French, not just anti-de Gaulle, feeling which did not exist a generation ago. Mr. Seidenfaden spoke of Britain giving a lead; the speaker feared that if she did, it would be the wrong lead.

An American member of the conference argued that the function of groups such as this is to articulate long-term conceptions. He suggested that our efforts should be directed towards the one basic interest we have in common, the desire on the part of the industrialised countries for strengthening international processes. He saw no way to move towards this institutionally at the present time; but Europe does have as large a stake in stabilisation of the environment as the United States has. The American interest in South East Asia is fundamentally a concern about the environment.

A British member of the conference did not see that agreeing that we all have an interest in stability would get us very far. The problem is how to reach agreement about means of maintaining stability. How do we create a mechanism whereby all the Europeans can make their voices felt in preventing the Middle East, say, from going up in flames quickly enough so that the people in Europe directly involved do not come screaming for help at a late stage when their colleagues have not been consulted?

Following up the observation that lack of consultation could not entirely explain the highly critical European attitude towards American policy in Vietnam, another American participant added that there is a considerable sentiment in the United States that a more sympathetic attitude is expected of allies and friends in a difficult situation, regardless of their judgment as to the wisdom of American policy. When France was in a similar situation the United States poured out her treasure even though she did not entirely support French policy. This should not be ignored in relation to the durability of alliance bonds.

A Canadian member of the conference approached the problem of the international environment from a different aspect.

It is overwhelmingly important that the 100-odd weak, poor, underdeveloped countries should find themselves in a reasonably secure situation, and that is where Western military force is relevant. But those countries also need an association with more progressive and advanced states, to be involved with the techniques that go to make up a modern political society, and they need a sense that they can safely come close to more important powers that will take a genuine interest in their welfare. But size is an important element in this consideration: very small, weak powers are frightened by dealing with very large powers. If the United States urges Britain and France to join a larger grouping as being too small for the world of today, it is not surprising that she can hardly focus on the other 100-odd very much smaller states.

The speaker saw a real danger that a united Europe would be huge, self-contained, aware of its own internal problems and overcome by them in a way that Britain and France are not. A united Europe might have more, not less, difficulty on the decisive point of the continued sympathy and involvement which will save us from the political weakness of another Vietnam situation. He saw in the British approach to Europe a reflection of the real withdrawal which is going on from the whole of the thrid world by the main Western powers moving their policy in line with that of the Soviet Union rather than a desire to find increased resources to carry on the same order of tasks as she has been willing to undertake in recent years.

A British speaker commented that a significant sector of British opinion argues that the only way to continue to play a part effectively outside Europe and indeed to persuade her European partners to contribute as well is if she is prepared to go into a closer association with them.

A Netherlands participant argued that the interest of the industrialised nations in maintaining a certain international order (with which he entirely agreed) should be considered separately from the problems of the alliance itself. Nato is a defensive alliance in Europe, clearly incapable of dealing with the problem of world order. Certainly co-operation from the Netherlands in regard to extra-European problems would have to be sought through the United Nations, not through Nato or any other defensive alliance.

A second British speaker was convinced that in general terms our attitude towards the third world can best be handled by the normal means of diplomatic co-operation and co-ordination of policy where possible through the United Nations. We need to make the present system work rather better, not to seek new institutional arrangements.

But when a specific cold war situation begins to arise out of the third world which might affect the interest of the alliance and might lead to military action, consultation will be a necessity for agreement on diagnosis of the problem on the alliance level. There might be disagreement on whether it is a matter of cold war, or of local politics only: the United States did not accept the French contention that Algeria was cold war; some Europeans do not accept the American diagnosis of Vietnam as cold war. Unless there is agreement on diagnosis, a member of the alliance cannot expect its allies to come in and help eventually. And after agreement on diagnosis, agreement must be reached on the necessary action. Until these exercises are gone through, it will be futile for those countries with responsibilities in the third world to expect their colleagues in Europe and the Atlantic alliance to come to their aid in case od difficulty.

Drawing discussion to a close, Prof. Kissinger suggested that the point had been reached where we should consider the content of partnership. The intentions of statesmen are one important factor; but the structure of the system is also important, because it can create problems quite separately from the intentions of the statesmen. It would be an advantage to ask ourselves what kind of institutional arrangement we want. In those periods in history which have been peaceful, they have been so partly because of a consensus among those elements capable of disturbing stability as to what constituted a just and stable international order. This did not make conflict impossible, but it limited their scope to the adjustment of differences within that scope. Our great need today is a consensus as to what constitutes a just order.

Prof. Kissinger felt this would be a suitable subject for a future conference, to enable us more effectively to determine what the contribution of the various components of the international system might be.

FIFTH SESSION SUNDAY AFTERNOON 1 MAY

Agenda The implications of a changing world for the Alliance: (b) the organisation of the Alliance: integration versus co-operation: the problems of crisis management.

General Beaufre (first speaker) started from the idea that the political objective of the alliance should be a stabilised Europe, i.e. solving the problem of Germany and the problem of the division of Europe and adapting to the changed situation. He also had a personal approach to the problem of integration versus co-operation, because "integration" can mean so many different things that he saw little point in a theoretical discussion.

It is obvious that a military defence in war necessitates high level of "integration": there must be some inter-allied organisation to deal with things like command and the organisation of a certain number of technical jobs. Therefore when we take the problem of defence we recognise the need for a degree of "integration" in that sense. But if we take deterrence, which is obviously now the basis of our strategic problem because of the present nuclear situation in the world, deterrence is a game played in peace-time and thus necessarily under the sovereignty of the different states (until the point where we have built up supranational institutions). Therefore everything which deals with deterrence is, and has to be, on the level of cooperation.

He believed Nato should be remodelled so as to enhance European understanding of European problems by building inside the Nato organisation a subordinate European component. There should be two levels in Nato (and he stressed that he was expressing a purely personal conception) - an Atlantic level, which he would put in Washington, and a European level. At the Atlantic level the 15 powers would discuss general problems and issue general directives; the European component would run the European battle if defence is necessary and help the European powers to discuss among themselves the strategic and political problems which are now in view. The non-European powers (the United States and Canada) would be in the alliance as in the present Nato set-up, so far as the Atlantic level is concerned. In Europe the American and Canadian forces would be there within the Nato machinery (and there should be an American chain of command to take care of that). At the European level, the Americans and Canadians would sit in either as observers or as deputies for the North American forces, but not as members. There is however an absolute need for an American line of command in the organisation because of the nuclear line of command which would necessarily remain an American one.

General Beaufre made clear that he was not in favour of a withdrawal of American forces from Europe. Even if they are no longer militarily necessary they are a political "must" because of the German need for them as a psychological defence. Setting up this European council would have two highly important results. First, to lay the foundation stone of something which could lead to a European defence community within Nato. Secondly, by putting together round a table the 13 European partners which include not only the Six but those of the Seven who are not neutrals, it could ease the political situation between the Six and the Seven and

prepare the way towards a solution. Thus it would be helpful both on the strategic and on the political side. General Beaufre made clear his view that in the transitional period, before we are able to see what kind of order may emerge in Europe as a whole, European representation within the alliance would have to be on a national basis.

The two main problems which Nato has to solve and which it has failed to solve are, first, the nuclear problem, and secondly the problem of the crisis management in Europe. About the nuclear problem, he had often said that there can be no sharing in the decision to use nuclear weapons. But there should be a large sharing in the basic policy of the use of these weapons, and that could be discussed on the Atlantic level with the Americans with application at the European level. About crisis management in Europe, it is obvious that this must be studied and discussed on two levels. It should be discussed first at the European level, because there are so many problems concerning intervention in some hypothetical crisis in Eastern Europe. But once discussed among the Europeans, it should also be discussed at the Atlantic level so that the overall machinery of Nato and the mighty power of the United States can be brought in. Therefore there should be a committee in Paris and another in Washington.

The problem of world-wide crisis management could not in his view be treated as a Nato problem: it should be tackled through special groupings according to the interest of various powers in such parts of the world. Perhaps this should be located in Washington, because the Americans are in the centre of those decisions.

Dr. Ritter (first respondent) said that all the points he had it in mind to make had already been touched upon, so he proposed just to recapitulate the essential aspects of the problem as he saw it. The wording of the agenda would suggest that we are dealing with two widely separated conceptions. Both conceptions are undoubtedly complex, covering different forms and ways to approach joint assessment, strategy, targeting, planning and operation on various levels. His starting point was that we should not make an eschatalogical doctrine out of one of them: what matters is to make some effective, workable combination of institutional and non-institutional forms to match appointed purposes. Professor Kissinger had already pointed to the importance of the relationship between the institutional and the strategic aspects in policy formation. This is especially important for Germany, for overdoing the conceptional fight means at best to get a rocking German stand in this context, for internal as well as external reasons.

The general criteria for any solution to the problem of organisation of the alliance are: (1) the alliance needs "coherence" so as to ensure security; (2) for good or ill, any alliance arrangements involve the aspect of control over Germany - linked to some extent with a non-proliferation strategy; (3) some freedom of movement is essential with regard to the German question; (4) a new structure must be developed transcending the old concept of national sovereignty.

"Coherence" means in this context the capacity to conduct the game of deterrence, including crisis management, and arrangements providing for co-operation in wartime as well. A certain degree of polycentrism could be tolerated provided it does not amount to an antagonism that gives the counterpart of the alliance the key for questioning the alliance as such. This may be so particularly if vertical proliferation should outdo horizontal proliferation,

i.e. if the gap between big powers and smaller powers increases and the strategic options of the smaller powers decrease. In consequence the political significance of military arrangements in Central Europe will tend to outweigh their military significance; a British speaker seemed to have this in mind during the morning's discussion when he referred to shifting the weight from the military foot to the political foot.

In the short term Germany can hardly do other than try to maintain the organisation of the alliance, which still provides the protection that counts. But this should not exclude exploring what political possibilities may be served by shifting the emphasis towards a co-operative restructuring which may advance a political settlement combined with a new security system in Central Europe, protected equally by the United States presence and the power balance vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact.

Because of these aspects, "hardware" in the context of Atlantic integration is giving way to "co-determination". Co-determination involves the process of planning in the widest sense, including crisis management and common action in a crisis; it does not involve participating in the use of nuclear weapons. (On the question of a global or regional basis for crisis management, Dr. Ritter supported Prof. Kissinger's argument expressed during the morning session). Beyond this he would like to see different shades of co-determination developed for different levels of weapons systems, in a way that would make it possible for the Europeans to accept division of labour as the criterion rather than to judge everything on the basis of status. The McNamara Committee seemed to be conceived along these lines: if it proves successful it could, as an instituionalised arrangement guaranteeing substantive partnership, be an important instrument for the coherence we need.

With regard to the control aspect, the problem for Germany is that in spelling out her renunciation of nuclear weapons she has gone further than other members of the alliance without any corresponding action on their part to keep in balance whe obligations related to her position within the alliance. Dr. Ritter saw no need to reiterate that Germany does not want national nuclear weapons or a finger on the button. But as his German colleague had indicated earlier, the way in which France seems to observe the control aspect with regard to Germany and to try to build it into the structure of their relationship does make it hard for Germany to take up the constructive elements of French conceptions. From this point of view too the success of the McNamara Committee is highly important. France has to prove that this control aspect is not to be the corner-stone of her policy toward the East if she is to enjoy unreserved German co-operation.

The German question has some bearing too on what to look for in considering ways out of the Nato crisis. Dr. Ritter urged that this be seen not primarily as a national problem but as a problem of common therapy: he did not say it could be solved at the expense of the alliance, but it should be reconsidered by the alliance.

Over the last ten years it has become clear that a settlement of the German problem could not be brought about by good ideas, paying a good price, bargaining, or even evolutionary processes on the other side. It requires a step by step process towards new political structure which will add something to the bipolar order. To enter this process he was afraid not of the communists in the DDR but of two things: First, a disproportion

between reorganisation on our side which may look like disintegration and the extent to which changes in the opposite system constitute a basis for a real shift of aims and means. Secondly, the possibility of three different and competing approaches on the part of Washington, Paris and Bonn. Competing approaches would play straight into the hands of the other side.

It is impossible as yet to foresee the outcome of this new process. It involves a fundamental reappraisal of the balance of power problem - seeing a more political element in it - as well as of the meaning of the nation state in the international system of tomorrow. Dr. Ritter recognised that from a German, talk of the need to abandon the concept of national sovereignty must sound like sour grapes. On the other hand the Germans themselves have to learn this lesson with respect to reunification. He was convinced that reunification could not be achieved in the sense of bargaining out the division of the country so that it would regain the traditional form of a nation state. But this should be viewed constructively, since our political order must in any case face up to the supra-national interdependence of modern society. This did not mean accepting the existence of two German states: transcending the concept of national sovereignty would be conditioned by the existence of a new perspective of opportunity for action, so that the transition could be accepted as a new achievement rather than as deprivation.

But until this new process becomes a reality, therapy demands that the unification problem be kept alive, with respect both to German public opinion and Soviet strategy. Keeping it alive means keeping it a criterion for the institutional and non-institutional formation of our policy. We should be clear that the Soviet Union will make use of the unification problem to serve her own ends if the West lets Germany down before a new perspective emerges. On the other hand if and when a fundamental change occurs in the opposite system the chips would fall differently and a settlement in new terms might come into view.

A British member of the conference pressed General Beaufre on his distinction between deterrence and defence. Surely credible deterrence must involve a credible and effective capacity to fight in defence terms, conventional as well as nuclear? It is essential to have something between the H-bomb and the frontier policeman.

General Beaufre saw it as a question of emphasis. Ten years ago deterrence depended 90% on defence capability, 10% on psychological deterrence. Today, because of the balance and second-strike capability emphasis falls more and more on the pre-war phase. If deterrence succeeds, the whole manoeuvre will take place in peace-time, as happened in the Cuba crisis: that is what is understood by crisis management - or rather crisis avoidance. And because any action in peace-time is independent, this crisis management or avoidance necessarily involves independent action by the various powers. Even in the present set-up Nato has now power in peace-time: everything is based on co-operation, not integration.

An American speaker pointed to the problem that from the point of view of deterrence a number of centres of decision do complicate the aggressor's calculations, even if the power of each centre is not as great and varied as that of the most powerful, while if deterrence fails and we have to fight a war it would be highly desirable to fight according to the greatest number of options. The big unsolved question is how to combine these two elements. Perhaps the McNamara Committee might be a suitable forum.

However, the problem should not be approached in a spirit of either deterrence alone, or of concentrating everything on the options.

A second American speaker drew a sharp distinction between the advantage from different centres in the nuclear as opposed to the conventional field, because the consequences of making joint as opposed to individual decisions in the two fields are so different. Cuba was an unfortunate example, because that crisis was not avoided. If, in a similar crisis, on top of the present centre of nuclear decision there might be two or three unco-ordinated centres, any one of which might decide on its own that the time had come to launch a nuclear strike against any power's weapons or cities, while this could complicate the calculations of the aggressor it would complicate life unbearably for everyone else too.

A point of concern to several members of the conference was the practical problem of changing at the critical moment from a national to an allied strategy. A German participant argued that the military machine cannot operate effectively in conditions of today without a command and control structure which is already functioning in peace-time. For example all the strike vehicles must be beyond the disposal of the independent governments, because targeting is an allied procedure and the vehicles must be at quick alert. Perhaps ground forces may be more at the disposal of member states, provided those states are not near the area of possible crisis. But in general, if everything is left to agreement between sovereign states after the fighting phase begins the alliance will present an image of political disintegration which can only offer temptation to the other side.

An American participant found it hard to argue that even ground forces could be under soverieign control, given the deterrent effect of ground forces. Surely deterrence is not only nuclear?

A second American participant recalled General Beaufre's opening remark that "integration" means so many things. On the other hand he saw no escape from the fact that credibility must depend on the ability to carry out our commitment. Of course we are good at improvisation - and in the sense that the United States carries 90% of the burden it does not matter so much because the United States individually can always carry out the bulk of the decision. But since we are not willing to make deterrence an all-American responsibility, all the other nations who contribute to collective deterrence will want to be sure that this co-operation of independent nations will take place effectively if and when the time comes. How can infrastructure, reconnaissance, air defence, etc. be improvised smoothly?

General Beaufre replied that deterrence is the manipulation of all your military and other resources. If the enemy does something out of bounds for peace it is because he believes you will not move. The problem is essentially one of credibility in the enemy's eyes. Restoring that credibility so that the enemy realises he has gone too far is what crisis management is about. Crisis avoidance is a psychological action that takes place at an earlier stage. Decisions such as the American mobilisation of 150,000 reservists are part of deterrence because they show the will to resist. The real game is discussing (as happened with the Berlin emergency planning group for example) the different options you have to take at different times to restore the credibility of your will to defend. The reactions have to be decided by national governments: he did not see how that stage could be integrated at all.

He did agree however that some type of inter-allied planning and co-operation cannot be avoided, whatever it may be called. But he was strongly critical of the present set-up in Nato, partly because of the enormous and unnecessary proliferation of staffs and partly because of the great American preponderance. Because of the changing situation this ponderous organisation is obsolete. We need something much lighter, and above all a European organisation into which the Americans would be adapted.

Pursuing his argument, General Beaufre found it conceivable that in a few years' time stability may have so reduced credibility based on nuclear deterrence that we shall have a greater need than today of an effective defence system. However, he still maintained that defence would not need the same weight as deterrence.

The American speaker commented that General Beaufre had conceded the main point: once the idea of an organisation with common commands and common plans is accepted, the main idea of integration is accepted. The trouble is that de Gaulle does not want any of this. The speaker could only assume that the military alliance does not make much sense to de Gaulle except in the stratosphere of the nuclear deterrent - which he is confident the United States will take care of anyway - so that the main problem of making credible the ability to fight is not meaningful to him.

An Italian member of the conference pursued the question of what constitutes integration. To his mind, a body is integrated when those who compose it have the obligation to study, plan, and decide in the name of the whole community; a co-ordinated body is composed of national representatives and the object is to reach a compromise among these national points of view. A co-ordinated body can function effectively only if one member is so powerful that his view must in the long run prevail: a committee composed of national representatives of roughly equal political or military weight would be paralysed. According to this definition, practically nothing is integrated in Nato as it is now. We have co-ordination, which functions because of the American hegemony. The crisis arises because that hegemony is no longer uncontested. Do we really want integration? If we only want to continue the present pseudo-integration then we are really saying that de Gaulle is right but we are not yet ready to follow his example.

The speaker agreed that everything cannot be integrated - for example the ultimate decision in crisis management. But a great deal more could be done within the alliance by means of a system of truly integrated committees for all aspects of planning. In this sense the problem facing the alliance is similar to the problem facing the European Community: without an integrated centre of planning it is dead.

Turning discussion to crisis management, an American member of the conference made reference to the progress of the McNamara Committee which he saw as exactly in line with Dr. Ritter's approach. The Committee had just held its second meeting and hoped to make recommendations by the end of the year at latest. All Dr. Ritter's requirements for genuine consultation were part of the concept of the Committee and discussion of these very difficult and delicate issues was proceeding in a spirit of frankness and realism.

The speaker stressed however that the ultimate success of the Committee would depend much more on the <u>European</u> than on the American participation. For some years the Americans have been offering some kind of nuclear sharing arrangement to the European

partners; but (leaving aside the merits or demerits of the various proposals) nothing has happened. The Europeans have said we cannot make an intelligent response because we know nothing of these matters. This is not so. For hundreds of years Europeans have been taking decisions about force structure and deployment and tactics, and in this sense the difference between nuclear and conventional weapons is not so great. The real reason has been the lack of any genuine European will to get into this business. Europeans have been overdoing the supposed unwillingness of the Americans to share, because it is easier to say this than to look at the problem in reality. The political problems that have motivated European support for such arrangements have finally reached the point where the Europeans feel they must now participate. But the extent to which they will succeed in participating in procurement, deployment, and deterrence and fighting concepts in regard to nuclear weapons will still depend on the quality of their effort. By quality of effort the speaker meant a willingness to treat these problems on the highest military and political level and a willingness to contribute ideas and concrete suggestions.

Another American participant agreed to some extent with this analysis; on the other hand by tabling the problem of nuclear control first and putting it in terms of conduct of a nuclear war the Americans have been putting a question which is inherently very difficult to address. One of the issues which the McNamara Committee will have to face as it develops will be the incompatibility between a unitary defence and a bilateral diplomacy. The way towards reconciling some of the difficulties between deterrence and strategy is to develop some degree of common diagnosis of the international situation - not just adoption of the latest American draft but agreement on what we are trying to accomplish. If that degree of political consultation is achieved with respect to doctrine and politics, then we are likely to obtain more detailed views about the conduct of military operations. At least we will have the framework in which the whole spectrum of challenges can be discussed.

General Beaufre feared that the McNamara Committee was looking for emergency plans. And the problem about emergency plans is that the crisis may always happen differently. It is easier to decide what options or decisions will have to be taken when the crisis appears. The important thing is to understand the national positions, so that the various national leaders will know in which atmosphere a decision will be taken. The kind of co-operation leading to common understanding is more important than attempts to produce real plans. The last adjustment during the crisis is the essential thing. The key is therefore a means of quick consultation between Heads of State - for example a red TV for peace.

Invited to spell out his ideas for a new structure in Central Europe, Dr. Ritter said no one could foresee what might come up institutionally. The one sure thing is that a solution could not be envisaged merely in terms of the price to be paid for a reunified Germany. It must be seen in terms of a fundamental structural change giving rise to new incentives and possibilities. Whatever the German reservations in regard to current French policy, there are some constructive elements in the French position. The bipolar order is not conducive to this process, because a bipolar order tends to maintain the status quo. This process would be both lengthy and exceedingly complex. It would develop at first by small steps: for example in de Gaulle's talks in Moscow, in the talks between the SPD and East German officials.

In regard to the two fears he had mentioned (competing approaches towards this process and disproportion between the extent and nature of changes taking place on either side) he meant first that competing (as opposed to co-ordinated) approaches could only serve Soviet interests. The Soviet leadership plays with two different elements to serve the same purpose. They take advantage of every sign of political disintegration in the West to try to push things in their direction, and at the same time they try to preserve the bipolar tendency towards stabilisation in the direction of the status quo - not because they like the status quo but because they hope by this means to achieve Germany's exclusion from the Western community.

Secondly, he meant that he was afraid of German disengagement from the Western alliance before conditions on the other side were ripe for a successful outcome to this new process. Much is heard of the evolution taking place in Eastern Europe. Dr. Ritter did not want to minimise this. But it does not have any real effect upon possibilities in the foreign policy field. The most interesting countries for Germany at the moment are Czechoslovakia and Rumania: however hard Germany might try, no progress could be made with Poland at present. Nor does this process count with Soviet foreign policy. Even if the possibilities exist within the USSR for a change in policy towards Germany, Dr. Ritter saw no signs of any Soviet intentions in this direction. So long as the internal structure on the Eastern side does not develop strongly enough to be ripe for this new political process, we must be very careful not to allow movement on the Western side to get out of hand.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

CHAIRMAN: Professor Louis J. Halle

Dr. Achille ALBONETTI	Commission on Nuclear Energy, Rome
Mr. Leonard BEATON	Consultant, ISS, London
Général d'Armée André BEAUFRE	Director, Institut Francais des Etudes Stratégiques, Paris
Dr. Karl BIRNBAUM	Director, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm
Vice-Admiral H. BOS	Adviser to the Prime Minister, The Hague
Professor Robert R. BOWIE	Director, Harvard University Center for International Affairs
Mr. Peter CALVOCORESSI	Member of Council of ISS
Général Baron A. DEL MARMOL	lately Commandant, L'Ecole de Guerre de Belgique, Brussels
Mr. André FONTAINE	Foreign Editor, Le Monde, Paris
Signor Roberto GAJA	Director-General of Political Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs, Rome
Dr. Curt GASTEYGER	Director of Programmes, ISS, London
Lord GLADWYN	President of the Atlantic Treaty Association and of "Britain in Europe"
Professor Louis J. HALLE	Graduate Institute of International Affairs, Geneva
Dr. Harold C. HINTON	Senior Staff Member, Institute for Defense Analyses, Arlington
Mr. John W. HOLMES	Director-General, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto
Professor Michael HOWARD	Professor of War Studies, King's College, University of London
Mr. Geoffrey HUDSON	Director of Eastern Studies, St. Antony's College, Oxford
Dr. L.C.M. JAQUET	Director, Netherlands Institute of International Affairs, The Hague
Professor Henry A. KISSINGER	Professor of Government, Harvard University Center of International Affairs
Dr. Nils ØRVIK	Professor of Political Science, University of Oslo

Mr. Michael PALLISER	Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, London
Dr. Klaus RITTER	Director, Society for Science & Politics, Munich
Ambassador Dr. Suidbert SCHNIPPENKOETTER	Foreign Ministry, Bonn: Under-Secretary with special responsibility for disarmament and arms control affairs
Mr. Erik SEIDENFADEN	Warden of the Danish College, Cité Internationale de l'Universite de Paris
Professor Marshall D. SHULMAN	Russian Research Center, Harvard University
Marshal of the RAF Sir John SLESSOR	Vice-President, ISS, London
Dr. Theodor SOMMER	Foreign Editor, Die Zeit, Hamburg
Dr. Altiero SPINELLI	Director, Institute of International Affairs, Rome
Professor Jacques VERNANT	Director, Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, Paris
Lt. Gen. Graf VON BAUDISSIN	Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans & Operations, SHAPE, Paris
Dr. Arnold O. WOLFERS	Director, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research 1957-65
Mr. Frederick S. WYLE	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Washington