The Institute for Strategic Studies,European Study Commission.Parigi,25-26 VI 65.

1) - Sommario.

2) - Discussion on the international situation.Discussion on recent developments in relation between East and West Europe.Discussion on the attitude of Scandinavian member countries of NATO towards the problems of the Alliance.

I N S T I T U T E F O R S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

EUROPEAN STUDY COMMISSION

Minutes of the Eighth Meeting, held at the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, 54, rue de Varenne, Paris VIIe on 25th and 26th June, 1965

Present: Général d'Armée Beaufre (In the Chair)

Signor A. Albonetti
Mr. Alastair Buchan
Herr Wilhelm Cornides
M. J-M de la Gorse
Baron General del Marmol
Signor Ennio Eccarini
Dr. Curt Gasteyger
Mr. Niels Haagerup
Mr. Geoffrey Jukes
Dr. Nils Ørvik
Herr Uwe Nerlich
M. J.B. Raimond
Dr. Klaus Ritter
Mr. Erik Seidenfaden
Professor Jacques Vernant

Apologies for Absence:
Mr. Leonard Beaton
Professor Michael Howard
Dr. L.G.M. Jaquet
M. Jean Laloy
Dr. Theo Sommer
Signor A. Spinelli

General Beaufre welcomed Signor Eccarini, Mr. Jukes and M. Raimond attending in the place of Signor Spinelli, Professor Howard and M. Laloy respectively, and welcomed M. de la Gorse as an observer.

1. FUTURE OF THE STUDY COMMISSION

Mr. Buchan recalled that sufficient money is in hand to carry the Commission through to the end of 1965, on the basis of four meetings including the Ditchley European-American Conference. Herr Cornides had expressed the view that in future three meetings a year would be sufficient. Mr. Buchan therefore sought the Commission's views (a) on the desirability of continuing the Commission in its present form after 1965, and (b) on the frequency of meetings.

It was AGREED that it would be desirable to continue the Study Commission in its present form during 1966 and that meetings should continue to follow the pattern of discussion on a special subject, on the basis of a working paper, together with a review of the international scene.

It was further AGREED that three meetings a year would be sufficient, in principle in late spring, autumn and January, and that the practice of organising the spring meeting in the form of a European-American confrontation should be continued. It was clearly understood, however, that additional meetings could be held if events warranted and that it would be open to any member of the Commission to propose an extraordinary meeting.

2. MEMBERSHIP

Mr. Buchan reported that Professor Howard felt unable to continue his membership because of the pressure of his academic responsibilities. Mr. Buchan suggested as a possible replacement Mr. Francois Duchene, one of the Foreign Editors of The Economist, who formerly had worked with Jean Monnet. No objections were raised to this suggestion.

It was generally agreed that while it would be in order for substitutes to attend individual meetings, much of the value of the Commission's work lay in the meeting of minds made possible by continuity of membership.

3. NEXT MEETING

It was generally felt that unless unforeseen developments made an autumn meeting desirable, it would be preferable to hold the next meeting of the Commission after the German and French elections.

It was therefore AGREED to hold the Ninth Meeting of the Study Commission on Friday and Saturday, 14th-15th January, 1966 in London, the main subject for discussion to be decided upon at a later stage.

INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

EUROPEAN STUDY COMMISSION

Summary of Discussion
at the Eighth Meeting,
held in Paris
25th-26th June, 1965

FRIDAY MORNING, 25th JUNE

DISCUSSION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

(a) Vietnam

General Beaufre (in the Chair) opened the discussion. He saw no need to add to the impression of the general situation which he had given at the previous meeting following upon his visit to Vietnam. The United States has embarked on a policy of escalating military pressure, with two aims: to strengthen the morale of the South Vietnamese, and to bring about negotiations leading to an agreement on non-intervention in the affairs of Vietnam. To a certain extent this policy has succeeded in its first aim; but it has so far failed utterly in its second. The Americans are making a great show of strength, but at the same time they have been so cautious and sparing in their use of it that the North has not been sufficiently impressed to be prepared to open negotiations. A questionmark hangs over Soviet intentions. So far they have only made gestures of support for North Vietnam; but the time may come when they may feel obliged to demonstrate their solidarity. This American policy, General Beaufre suggested, could have an unforeseen result: it could offer an opening to the Russians to act as the peace-makers, presenting themselves as reasonable men in contrast to the irrational and extremist Chinese and Americans. They would win a measure of support from the third world and also from Europe for such a role. He did believe negotiations will come about eventually, but under much less favourable conditions than could have been obtained six months previously.

Professor Vernant underlined the extent to which this American policy of escalation has been accompanied by an acceleration of the general political collapse in the South. And as the internal situation worsens, so the military position and the American negotiating position become correspondingly more delicate. The American assumptions that time was on their side and that by putting pressure on the North the political and military position in the South could be improved have proved quite unjustified. And what is the point, he wondered, of the build-up of American troops if the US is going to continue to make such sparing use of her military might?

General Beaufre saw no intention on the part of the US to intervene openly in the war; the consequences would be too grave. He believed the US wanted to have a large force in the country on committal to strengthen her negotiating position: once talks begin, she would not be able to bring in more men.

Asked about the proposed Commonwealth mission, Mr. Buchan found this misconceived. Even if it were launched, he doubted whether such a mission could have any bearing on the situation.

What troubled Mr. Buchan most was that he did not see any meaningful formula emerging from negotiations if they were held. He could imagine some formula of neutralisation working if there were very strong guarantees against its breaking down. But this would require much stronger machinery than that provided by the 1954 agreements: for example a mixed American/Chinese/Russian/Indian armistice commission on the spot with very wide powers. And this would depend on a level of Chinese-American understanding which does not exist. A country cannot just be neutralised and left with a number of very strong external powers still very interested in its future. Until there is some more fundamental understanding between the Chinese and the Americans about what their interests are and how they can be deliniated, he could not see any negotiations being successful.

Professor Vernant agreed with Mr. Buchan that a concept of neutralisation involving the direct presence on the ground of Chinese, Soviet and American troops is not feasible. But he did not see why the concept of neutralisation implied in the Geneva agreements, involving the withdrawal of the great powers and their non-intervention, should not be applied.

Mr. Buchan objected that such an agreement would not last.

General Beaufre maintained that the first consideration must be to open negotiations to see if any formula of neutralisation could be agreed. But the Chinese are the key to the whole problem. And they will have to be paid a price: the question is what they want.

To the suggestion by Dr. Gasteyger that the Chinese influence on North Vietnam may be over-estimated, General Beaufre replied that psychological factors are tremendously important in this type of situation. Just as no military solution was possible in Algeria because of the international support ranged against France, so the shadow of China represents hope of success to the North Vietnamese. As soon as the Chinese declare their readiness to accept a package deal the North Vietnamese will accept too; but while China holds aloof they will never come to terms.

Mr. Jukes held that to some extent the American escalation of the war into North Vietnam is designed to drag in the USSR. So far Soviet assistance to Hanoi has been only token. But the North needs medium-range ground-to-air equipment which it cannot get from the Chinese but could get from the USSR. The kind of intervention made by the Americans so far could provoke that assistance, and if the USSR were dragged in to protect the Northern cities this would suit the Americans: it would demonstrate the limits of Chinese support and force the North Vietnamese into greater reliance on the USSR; and the USSR being easier for the US to negotiate with than China, something may come out of negotiations. This may be one reason why the Soviet Union is very reluctant to become more involved.

Professor Vernant commented that if this were the American intention, it has not succeeded. Surely the avowed American aim, to bomb the North to bring pressure on Hanoi and indirectly on Peking for negotiations but to limit the action so as to stop the USSR feeling obliged to intervene, is more logical?

M. Raimond supported Professor Vernant. He was not convinced that Chinese militancy has made things more difficult for the Russians: the Chinese are becoming more isolated and their position has not improved in the Communist world. He was very dubious of

the advantage to the Americans on the international scene of dragging the Russians into North Vietnam. The Soviets have been interested in influencing North Vietnam since before the bombing started, for reasons to do with the struggle in the world communist movement, and the bombing must therefore make it more difficult for them to favour negotiations on terms acceptable to the Americans. And the effect on the detente could be serious. He saw the Americans as playing into Russian hands.

Mr. Jukes agreed that this is a very delicate exercise for the Americans; it involves bringing in the USSR in such a way that she will induce the North Vietnamese to moderate their aims somewhat rather than in such a way as to reinforce North Vietnamese militancy. So far he did not think it was working. Nevertheless the Soviet involvement does seem to be slowly increasing, and the Chinese have shown themselves sensitive to this aspect of American policy by their earlier interference with Soviet shipments to North Vietnam - they are sensitive to anything being sent by the USSR which they could not themselves supply.

Essentially it is too subtle and sophisticated a policy for this kind of situation. And it ignores the local element: the extent to which the Vietcong is a Vietnamese movement should not be under-estimated. The main danger is that it may not bring the desired result if it did succeed: the USSR may find itself compelled to compete in militancy with the Chinese. On the other hand if the Soviet involvement were minimal, it would not matter to them whether the Vietcong wins or not; if the Vietcong lose they would be able to use this in their argument with the Chinese.

General Beaufre pointed to the danger of placing the Russians in a dilemma, pushing them into a position of inferiority vis-a-vis the Chinese so that they are driven to choosing between China and the US. He feared they might resolve their dilemma by standing back and letting events take their course.

Mr. Buchan suggested that the continued build-up of American troops might well lead to a considerable improvement in the military situation by the end of the year. On the other hand the Americans may be even more deeply committed politically as one weak government after another breaks in their hands.

(b) Algeria

M. de la Gorse outlined the background to the previous week's events. Although the coup came as a surprise to everyone, the conditions for it had been developing for some time. Since the revolution of 1962 there has been a complete change of leadership in Algeria. Ben Bella lost the support of one after another of the men on whom he depended in coming to power, and he in turn gradually eliminated all his rivals. And in all these trials of strength Ben Bella sought and obtained the support of the army, which became the principal instrument of his success. Thus he became increasingly dependent on the support of the army; the revolution was leading towards an identification of the army with the state. For some time the army has been responsible for internal security and has incurred considerable unpopularity over its severity, although it has only carried out policies laid down by the Administration.

M. de la Gorse pointed to three particular events which led up to the crisis: (1) the army had to carry responsibility for the extremely harsh and unpleasant work of crushing the Kabylia rebellion. (2) The army felt very badly about the frontier incident

with Morocco; they felt they had been sent ill-prepared into an ill-conceived operation. Since that episode relations have hardened between Boumedienne and the Egyptians, because they strongly influenced Ben Bella. There has been considerable distrust of the U.A.R for pushing Algeria into an unsuccessful venture to serve their own international policy. (3) The worsening economic position had made Ben Bella's position very difficult.

Ben Bella was planning to reconstruct his administration and to take under his own control the Ministry of Economic Affairs as well as the Foreign Ministry. The Minister of Economic Affairs was a man of considerable influence and authority, but relations between him and Ben Bella had become extremely bad. Undoubtedly this impending reshuffle was an important factor in the crisis and in Boumedienne's decision to take power by surprise. There was no mystery about the timing of the coup: it would have been impossible to use force against Ben Bella once all the Heads of State were present, it had to be done at once or not at all. He considered it too early to say what the effects would be on Algerian foreign policy, although he did not expect to see much difference. But he was convinced that the coup was precipitated by internal policy considerations and conceived within the country.

There was general assent to this last observation. Dr. Gasteyger commented on the speedy recognition of the new Government by China in contrast to the Soviet caution; on the other hand the Algerian army is equipped almost exclusively with Soviet material. Could this indicate that the new Government will be extremely cautious towards the USSR but will display more freedom of action towards China?

M. de la Gorse thought the new Government would concentrate for the time being on consolidating its position at home. The Chinese may have wanted to take advantage of its relative weakness by rallying swiftly to its support and then pressing for the Bandung Conference to be held without the Russians so as to strengthen their own influence in North Africa. But there are not sufficient grounds for judging what the relations of the new regime will be with the USSR. The reference to Soviet military equipment was highly relevant. Probably they will try to maintain the relatively neutral posture of the Ben Bella Government towards the Sino-Soviet dispute, although if the considered Soviet reaction is too reserved Boumedienne's fierce patriotism could lead to another alignment.

(c) The Atlantic Alliance

Discussion centred on the McNamara proposal for an executive committee made at the NATO Defence Ministers' meeting.

Herr Cornides considered the vagueness of the McNamara proposal an advantage: it is a broad formula into which people can put their own thoughts. Although it seems to have been sprung at short notice on the State Department it has in fact been in the mill for a long time. For instance at the Venice Conference in 1964, Henry Rowen had very much in mind a broad formula for crisis management and was hoping that the Europeans would push in that direction; this was clearly not the idea of a directorate but of something along the lines suggested by Leonard Beaton and, from a different angle, by General Beaufre. Personally he considered this a much more sensible approach to the whole problem of structural changes in the alliance than the MLF-type approach (and his own group in Bonn had also been thinking along this line). It

could mean that there is not going to be a proposal for any machinery for decision-making in the alliance; on the other hand this may be meant as a flexible way of opening up crisis management or open-ended groups on various problems to see how they work, similar to the Berlin planning group. He believed this was much more what the Americans have in mind than going back to the talk of 1958-9 of a directorate.

General Beaufre pointed to the very important reference in the text to the use of strategic nuclear forces: for the first time the Americans are prepared to talk about their own strike power. He agreed with Herr Cornides that this proposal is a way of opening broad discussions. On the other hand from the wording of the text it is clear that this is a proposal for broadening participation in nuclear strategy; it has to do with war, not deterrence, and it is not concerned with crisis management. But possibly it could lead to discussion of crisis management. Much depended on clarification from the American side.

Mr. Buchan said the British were as surprised as anybody else by this proposal. The Labour Government has modified its original commitment to the abolition of British nuclear weapons to putting the weapons under some form of alliance arrangement; if the Americans are going to put forward rather loose formulas, this leaves the British Government hanging in the air. Therefore this proposal may make them scratch their heads. But he expected the idea of an executive committee to appeal to Europeans - although the old problem immediately arises of who is to be the fifth member.

Dr. Ritter said the initial German reaction was positive: the Foreign Office was very interested. But this interest subsided somewhat after Dean Rusk played down the proposal during his conversation with Erhard in Washington. Nobody knows what is really behind the proposal, whether it is just a pragmatic attempt to fill the vacuum which arises from the stagnation of the MLF/ANF projects. Another aspect is the dissatisfaction which has been apparent from people at SHAPE at not being allowed to give information to their Government; a more intimate group for consultation on things other than targeting might help to remedy this situation. There is some feeling in Bonn that the detente could be adversely affected by the Vietnam crisis and that some difficulty might arise in Europe; all we have is the group for contingency planning on Berlin, and this is not enough. There is uneasiness that the form of co-operation within the alliance is not really solved. But the original positive reaction to the proposal has not been maintained because everyone is waiting for clarification from McNamara and is waiting to see how much weight is accorded to the proposal.

Signor Eccarini said the Italian reaction was still confused; clarification is still awaited from Washington. The Italian Government has recently shifted its position against the MLF, although no official statement has been made. Intellectual circles were attracted by the McNamara proposal. There has recently been a considerable amount of writing and discussion on this whole question and the conclusion seems to be that the only solution to the problem of Western strategy is a full Atlantic integration by one means or another. But this has not gone beyond intellectual circles.

Herr Cornides added that this confusion in Italy and Germany is because a majority of people reacted towards the McNamara proposal according to their attitude towards the MLF and ANF: those who had supported the MLF saw the proposal as an opening to get back onto this line and were more positive. Then they realised that the American reaction was vague, and they felt the Americans were insecure about it.

Personally he believed the MLF is a closed book. On the other hand it would be very bad if this confusion remained: it would be bad for the Europeans to let the MLF and ANF drop and give the Americans the impression that we are incapable of producing an alternative. He strongly advocated trying to clarify the issues and push in the other direction: to accept that European interests extend beyond the Atlantic area, to recognise that problems of arms control as well as defence problems exist in Europe, and to welcome this proposal as a means of setting up machinery for discussion of these wider issues which need not be institutionalised in NATO.

Dr. Ritter suggested that Herr Cornides had over-simplified the reaction in regard to the MLF, at least in Germany. It is increasingly felt in Bonn that the MLF and ANF are at a critical stage in regard to a number of urgent problems which must be dealt with. The MLF has bred the ANF and the ANF raises a very difficult problem for Germany insofar as it involves a very strong anti-proliferation clause. Bonn is deeply concerned about finding a solution that will be sufficiently institutionalised but will not make formally explicit the non-nuclear status of Germany. The Germans do not want nuclear weapons; but they maintain that the question must be left open to leave them with some leverage on questions of European security. If anything did come out of the McNamara approach it would ease this problem because it is pragmatic and the machinery is less formalised.

Herr Cornides agreed with Dr. Ritter's interpretation.

General del Marmol argued that the important thing is that the Americans are accepting the necessity to do something; it is up to the Europeans to try to build something worthwhile. The McNamara proposal does constitute a basis for discussion, and he favoured trying to push the Americans in the direction suggested by Herr Cornides.

General Beaufre said that if the Americans believe that European acceptance of this proposal creates an institution, there will be difficulties. The essential thing is to start with study and research into the whole problem; the institution must come afterwards. If this committee were renamed a study group or a working committee that would offer more possibilities. Whether the group should consist of 5 would be a matter for decision, but if all 15 members of NATO are included the study group would get nowhere: the 15 would have to be consulted, but the initial study must be done by a smaller group. To the observation that it would be a political problem to choose the members of a restricted study group, General Beaufre pointed out that the group he had in mind would not be responsible for nuclear strategy. To a further question he made it clear that he was thinking of an ad hoc body.

Herr Cornides commented that this was precisely the point at which discussion in his group in Bonn got bogged down. Mr. Beaton had presented a paper with the phrase "war cabinet" in it and the discussion could get no further than the composition of this "cabinet".

Looking back to the recommendations of the Three Wise Men, he suggested that a group is needed which is much less than a war cabinet but more organised than the Three Wise Men; an ad hoc working group was probably the best idea, given the task of looking three to five years ahead to the kind of machinery they would like to have. This could be a means of taking the whole problem of consultation in the alliance out of its present chaotic state.

Mr. Buchan wondered whether all that McNamara had in mind really was a working group. And if such a group were set to work on revision of the alliance and its extension to other fields, etc. would this really satisfy the Germans?

Herr Cornides replied that McNamara may well have had more in mind, but the actual proposal leaves it open. He agreed that a working group would not satisfy the Germans at present, because the German mind is still set on the MLF/ANF road. They have not reacted as dramatically as had been feared to Lyndon Johnson's dropping of the MLF; but they would not be content with a very vague committee, especially if it were only concerned with crisis management in peacetime and nothing was said about decision-making in war. If a headlong clash were to be avoided between Bonn and Paris and Paris and Washington, a committee directed to both aspects crisis management and decision-making, is probably the best thing obtainable; this could not be a committee of the whole NATO membership, and that would probably be satisfactory to the Scandinavians.

Dr. Ørvik agreed, although the way in which such a proposal was presented would be extremely important.

Mr. Buchan wondered how much importance should be attached to the numerous press reports before the Defence Ministers' meeting to the effect that France was contemplating leaving not the NATO alliance but the organisation. Secondly, he wondered to what extent the McNamara initiative was inspired by the need to make some offer to France: would the proposal meet some of de Gaulle's most fundamental objections to the alliance?

Professor Vernant pointed out that all the recent official French statements have drawn a clear distinction between the alliance, which remains necessary, and the organisation, which has great disadvantages and must be modified. But there has been nothing official to justify these highly speculative press reports. Pressed about the likelihood of positive proposals emanating from France about institutional reform of NATO, Professor Vernant replied that he understood proposals were under consideration; it was not possible at this stage to predict what form they would take, beyond the well-known perspective of French official thinking on nuclear matters. In regard to the McNamara proposal, the French Government is waiting for clarification the same as other governments.

M. Raimond endorsed Professor Vernant's remarks. He stressed the importance of moderation in interpreting one another's policies.

Herr Cornides recalled that after de Gaulle's press conference last February, the consideration was present in some American and European minds that we might be heading for a showdown on these issues: the question was whether a showdown could be avoided, or whether it would be better to provoke it. The same consideration has become apparent in relation to recent developments in the European Community. In regard to the alliance, there has been some canvassing of reactions among Europeans if the French should say, for example, that they no longer wished to see the headquarters at Fontainebleau; and for the same reason there was some attempt to discover if there would be a united front isolating France in that contingency. He suggested that this explained the press reports.

Herr Cornides believed this phase is now over: it is clear that we cannot afford a showdown, either in the Community or in the alliance. The tendency now is to avoid a showdown, and this is important if a new approach is to be considered. The McNamara proposal ties in with this chronologically and also tactically, as it leaves the way open. He believed that on the French side too there is no mood to force a showdown.

Professor Vernant agreed with Herr Cornides.

Mr. Buchan commented that the Pentagon seems to have won over the State Department. The State Department has been the stronghold of the view that a two-tier alliance may be necessary, that the US will co-operate closely with those who co-operate with her. McNamara on the other hand grades powers according to their importance, not according to whether they are sympathique; he was never in favour of the two-tier alliance implicit in the MLF. McNamara carries more weight than Dean Rusk with President Johnson. Mr. Buchan believed the two-tier idea is dying.

FRIDAY AFTERNOON, 25th JUNE

DISCUSSION ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST EUROPE

(based on an article by Z.K. Brzezinski "Peaceful Engagement - A Plan for Europe's Future" published in the April 1965 issue of 'Encounter')

Herr Cornides introduced the discussion. First of all he found it very helpful to have a paper which assembles all the important elements of the problem, even if one does not agree with the plan itself. The basic ideas of Brzezinski's approach are not new: they have merely been forgotten for a long time. In the early post-war years people used to look at the problems of Europe more or less in the same light as he does: in July 1947, for example, before the start of the Marshall Plan, good Europeans left the Congress of Montreux with the decision to hold their next meeting in Prague. Until the Marshall Plan the two halves of Europe did broadly live together. Many things which happened at the start of the cold war cannot be understood unless we remember the reluctance of people like Bevin to get away from this larger picture to the cold war confrontation. We did not choose this confrontation, we were forced into it, and we have forgotten some of the wider perspectives. Also Herr Cornides found it good that Brzezinski reminds us of the many similarities between the American and the French approach to European problems: many things now called Gaullism have at other times been pushed by the Americans, and vice-versa. It takes the problem out of the unhealthy atmosphere in which only de Gaulle or only the Americans are thought to have the right ideas. Brzezinski is more realistic, and this is a very positive aspect.

He listed three main points on the negative side. First, the whole focus is too much concentrated on Poland. To Brzezinski, Poland is the France of Eastern Europe - for example when he compares German-French with German-Polish understanding. He takes it for granted that the only constructive approach is via Polish-German understanding. Herr Cornides acknowledged the tragedy of the Polish experience: even including German partition, the Poles have been in the most tragic situation of any country in Europe. But when we take a new look at the European picture and look for leverage, is it wise to start from the most difficult point? Would not Czechoslovakia, for example, be a more realistic point of departure? Czechoslovakia has a position mid-way between the USSR and the Balkans; compared to Poland she has a sounder economic position, there is less point d'honneur in the Czech approach to politics, a much easier border problem vis-a-vis Germany. The German problem with Czechoslovakia is the problem of the Munich crisis, it is not a border problem in the strict sense; moreover the border does run between the Federal Republic and the country concerned. From all these aspects the German-Czech problem is much simpler than the German-Polish. And Brzezinski's emphasis on starting the whole approach from recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, which is very sensible from the Polish point of view but very difficult from the German, is not so realistic.

Secondly, while it would be going too far to say Brzezinski sees rapprochement purely in economic and cultural terms, he does not deal with the essence of the military problem in Europe. This is not only a problem for Germany: NATO has a flank in the North and South. The nub of the problem is the military status of a Germany after a solution has been found to the problem of the German state, and Brzezinski does not give a satisfactory answer. If one takes his premise that the military presence of the Americans and Russians in Europe must be reckoned with for a long time, what sort of Germany can then be expected? What military limitations must Germany accept? He suggests that for an agreed period of time East Germany should be a demilitarised area. He suggests that only the Western part of a united Germany should remain in NATO. What contribution could it make to the defence of Europe? This is the hard core of the problem and he does not face up to it.

Thirdly, even in the economic field he makes broadly the same errors in seeming to assume that somehow a liberalised Eastern Europe with its state-controlled economy and a Western Europe comprising EFTA and the EEC, also retaining its own economic system, could live together and together with the United States cooperate in a European development plan. Again, he has raised a point; but he does not shed new light on the fundamental problem.

On balance Herr Cornides considered this a helpful and interesting approach. It is easy to agree on the broad proposals, easy to agree on most of Brzezinski's five points individually. But the crux of the problem lies in the priority - especially from a German point of view, because if we follow his line the Germans make all their basic commitments in the initial stage - on the border problem vis-a-vis Poland, on the future military status of Germany without knowing all the consequences, on liberalising economic policy and intensifying East-West trade and cultural exchanges - and he says this is the way to start the game! The Germans could only hope for reunification, because any possibility of leverage would have been removed. However, he did agree with Brzezinski's footnote to the effect that the idea that the Germans could gain leverage by a military build-up and particularly using nuclear armament as a bargaining device would be dangerous: the damage to the German reputation and the credibility of the German position by ambivalence towards the nuclear position is much greater. On the other hand many people in Germany do honestly believe that they cannot give away one of their bargaining positions now. Basically, therefore, the paper is helpful; but the question of priority within the various proposals is the key, and Brzezinski has not thought this through.

Dr. Ritter expressed his basic agreement with Herr Cornides. He entirely agreed about the problem of priority. The question also arises of whether to consider these proposals in the abstract, or to relate them individually to the possibilities for action at a given moment of time. In relation to the situation as it stands now, Dr. Ritter was very doubtful as to how far we could go. For the past year, and especially since the autumn of 1964, West Germany's room to manoeuvre has been narrowed down. This was already noticeable towards the end of Khrushchev's period of office: for example in the agreement between the USSR and East Germany. Some say the Warsaw Pact meeting in autumn 1964 was a dividing line; certainly since then the Eastern bloc has become more rigid.

Examples of this are the pressure over Berlin and the reluctance of the Hungarians to negotiate with the German trade mission: in some respects Hungary has gone further than the other satellites in the direction of liberalisation, and, leaving Rumania aside as a special case, is in some ways the most interesting. Not that the Hungarisns do not want improved cultural relations, etc.; but they want to force the Germans into new negotiations in which they could hope to eliminate the Berlin clause, for example. The whole of Eastern Europe at the moment is pursuing a totally inflexible line to force the Germans into negotiations from which they could make gains in the direction not of frontier claims but of the claims of the DDR. Generally Ulbricht's position has improved, very surprisingly and very strongly, and the sharpening of the Berlin situation is a consequence of this. The DDR are not acting against Moscow: Moscow has been persuaded to give them more freedom of action to try and move things more in their direction. Therefore until a real change occurs in the international climate and in particular in the Soviet attitude, the chance of pursuing the type of policy Brzezinski proposes stands more or less at zero.

Furthermore Brzezinski does not seem to appreciate that much more than the security aspect is involved in loosening the dependence of these states on Moscow. The existence of a reform movement makes it more urgent for them to stand firm with Moscow on matters of international policy. During the Polish uprising of 1956, for example, Gomulka wrote to Moscow promising to keep strictly in line on foreign policy questions to make sure that the revolt would not be repressed by Soviet intervention. So often it is a case of freedom of action in internal affairs in exchange for conformity in international affairs. In Rumania it is the other way round: there is no real liberalisation within the country, but they lean more towards nationalism in foreign policy.

He was not sure either how far we could go in the direction of encouraging relations with the East European states and isolating the DDR. It would not be possible or advisable to pursue a policy of small steps or fostering revolution in the DDR, because the structure of the East German Government would not offer opportunities for this. On the other hand Dr. Ritter did not advocate trying to deal with the DDR like Poland, for example. Even if we adopted Brzezinski's suggestions for multilateral or bilateral settlements with the Eastern countries, we could hardly avoid freezing the relationship with the DDR to some extent. One of the reasons, but not the only one, is the problem of non-recognition. The German stand on non-recognition is often criticised as artificial; it is argued that they should not try to block an evolutionary step by step development towards unification. Certainly this is logical, but the problem is more complicated. This is hinted at in one of Brzezinski's arguments on the effect of the wall: he argues that to a certain extent the wall improves conditions for reunification because among other things it shows up so clearly the artificiality of the situation. This is followed to some degree in the non-recognition policy too. The German fear is of normalising the situation, of removing the artificial element, through negotiations with Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc. before they have a real possibility of changing the <u>real</u> situation. It is not just a question of whether West Germany is hindering an evolutionary trend: it makes a great difference whether or not the other side can base their plans on a situation in which they believe that normalisation of the division of Germany is an accepted fact.

Dr. Gasteyger listed four points on which he considered Brzezinski's proposals unrealistic. (1) He certainly did not believe that the isolation of East Germany is practicable. Apart from the Soviet interest in maintaining the East German regime, Gomulka and Novotny also have an interest in keeping East Germany under communist control in order to avoid dangerous developments once they face a reunified Germany. (2) Brzezinski does not mention the strong economic ties through Comecon which have developed considerably over the last five years. (3) There is very close military cooperation through the Warsaw Pact. Brzezinski leaves open the military status of the East European countries. They would probably to some extent have alienated the Soviet Union and would therefore have doubts about the Soviet shield; yet they would not at that stage have any equivalent protection from the West. So they would be bound to ask themselves where is their protection to come from. (4) East European fear of German revanchism is more more differentiated than Brzezinski suggests. The Poles have a real fear, perhaps the Czechs to some extent; but the Rumanians or Bulgarians or Hungarians do not share the same feeling about German revanchism.

Mr. Jukes added that there seemed to be very questionable propositions in the analysis of the process itself. The idea that when a country increases its independence from the Soviet Union it should be rewarded and vice-versa is naive in the extreme. And he found the economic argument suspect, particularly the argument that the economic character of the proposals would diminish the suspicions of the political elite: on the contrary, being good Marxists they would look for the political nigger in the economic woodpile. Moreover he was highly critical of the proposal that Soviet-engineered delays in the Allied right of access to Berlin should perhaps be immediately reciprocated by similar harrassment of Soviet shipping on the international waters around Cuba: the two things are not at all comparable. Somebody should do a serious study of the problem, but this is not it.

Professor Vernant agreed about the astonishing naiveté of the economic argument in particular. He wondered how anyone could seriously expect the Eastern countries to make themselves independent of the USSR in exchange for economic dependence on the United States through a revival of the Marshall Plan. If the least African country will not accept economic aid with strings, why should the Poles be different? It seemed that the roll-back which is not possible by military means is to be achieved by a process of economic seduction.

Dr. Ørvik entirely agreed with all the criticisms about the approach to the Eastern side. He thought Brzezinski skated very lightly over Western problems too: he doubted whether the degree of coordination which would be necessary to make negotiations effective could be achieved.

M. Raimond did not dissent from Brzezinski's broad propositions. But his analysis does rest essentially on the idea that the German problem is a security problems for the East European peoples in terms of fear of German revanchism. This leads him to some rather strange reasoning: for example in regard to the wall, nowhere does he say that the tension over Berlin was of Soviet origin; the massive flights of refugees was a main consequence of this tension, and this in turn led to construction of the wall. Soviet, not West German, policy was responsible. Yet Brzezinski concludes that the wall favours reunification to the extent that it creates a feeling of security for the Eastern peoples.

Security is not the whole problem. Brzezinski under-estimates the purely communist problem in Eastern Europe. Even in a period of national communism, the loss of one communist state is a threat to the power of the rest. M. Raimond suggested that East European fears have a great less to do with military security than with political survival.

Herr Cornides argued that anyone who puts up a plan on East-West relations can be shot down. What he found interesting is the attempt to think about a Europe in which both the Americans and the Russians will be present and the character of their presence will be changed from military confrontation to cooperation. This thesis is safer from the point of view of world security than some of the dangers that would come from a vacuum in Europe. The idea that one ought to deal with the problem of what is the minimum presence, symbolic or military, needed to maintain stability and of the implications for possibilities of loosening up ties in the Eastern bloc and for better East-West relations is valuable, because it forces us to think more realistically.

Mr. Buchan commented that debate about the future of East and West Europe has only come into the centre of the picture in recent years in the literature of arms control. But he expected the arms control aspect of European relations to become less important in years ahead. What therefore would be the driving force for any development in relationships between the two Europes in the immediate future? Will it be trade? Or will there be a new German preoccupation with reunification as a new generation comes to maturity which feels no moral responsibility for the war?

Dr. Ritter said the sense of urgency is all on the West German side. The East European states feel strongly that having East Germany as a communist neighbour, even if her policy is more rigid than they would like, offers them greater security than any arrangement in terms of arms control or disengagement, because the communist Governments in East Europe have to struggle harder to keep themselves in power as communists.

There is a growing feeling among West German public opinion that the non-recognition policy is artificial. The problem of contacts and easing the lot of the East Germans, brought to the fore by the exchange of visits, is increasingly becoming the subject of debate. Moreover there is a general impression that with the test ban and the Geneva talks on arms control the whole process of detente is slowly going ahead, but that the German problem is being by-passed; this has also had a stimulating effect.

Professor Vernant suggested the economic approach might offer possibilities for change, although on a much more modest scale than Brzezinski envisages. In the German view, are initiatives such as Krupp has undertaken with Poland likely to develop, and what results can be expected from them? Secondly he wondered whether the Western powers as a whole could follow the German example, and if so, whether the type of problem produced by the Marshall Plan would immediately arise.

Herr Cornides followed up Mr. Buchan and Professor Vernant. He considered it important to distinguish between motivations for change in Europe stemming from the global situation and motivations stemming from the European situation. On the global situation we have the blue and red areas problem: Europe as a whole is an

area broadly stabilised by the American-Soviet nuclear balance which gives a high degree of stability, whereas the outside world is riven by crises which may even escalate into nuclear crises. A possible motivation for change in Europe may come from this. If there is inter-action between Dominica and Cuba and Berlin or between Vietnam and Berlin, for example, that brings new factors into the situation. Also if Europe as a whole acts in common in the third world that also has repercussions in Europe.

The European situation has two aspects, the situation in Germany and the wider situation in Europe, both East and West. In regard to Germany, there is the argument propounded by Helmut Schmidt that restlessness is growing and something must be done quickly about reunification or the top will blow. There is something in this argument, but it should not be exaggerated. Much will depend, he argued, on the evolution of the Common Market. So long as the West Germans are fairly happy and prosperous, while they will have a growing interest in the German problem it will look very different from what it would if Germany were in a state of economic crisis. The evolution in Europe is in the Common Market and also in the Comecon.

What Krupp is trying to do in a very pragmatic way is to find an extra way of dealing with the problem of two economic systems in Europe so long as rigid control on the Eastern side prevents a multilateral position. Krupp put a factory in Poland; Renault did the same thing in Yugoslavia. The next step is to try to do something in third countries, to increase whatever help the others are able to give. And if for example Germany has a shortage of labour and the Poles a surplus and they can co-operate in this field, this can improve German-Polish relations. But the gains are mainly in the psychological field: the results in terms of East-West trade will not be significant. It might achieve a 5% increase. But so long as the East Europeans insist that there must be no Western capital assets in their countries and so long as their external trade is rigidly state-controlled, he did not see how there could be any large-scale increase, even with cooperation in third countries.

His conclusion would be that the motivations for change from outside Europe are not very strong. The motivations inside Europe are not strong, but they do exist. If one assumes that every two years or so there will be a crisis which has repercussions on Europe, and that the interest within Europe will continue, there is a fair amount of dynamism, although it would be unwise to overdramatise it.

Mr. Buchan saw a long-term pressure. According to the World Bank's population estimate, the percentage of world population accounted for by West Europe, East Europe and the USSR will by 1980 have dropped to 18%.

He also wondered about the extent to which the economic aspect of the military confrontation in Europe may act as an incentive to change. There is no doubt that the non central-European powers in NATO (Canada, the UK, the US) find for balance of payments reasons the cost of confrontation more and more difficult. Is it not possible that the USSR may find the strain of maintaining her position in East Europe mounting?

Mr. Jukes said there was no indication of this from East European sources. The strain of Soviet spending has emerged in the maintenance of very large conventional forces; but where cuts have been made, they have been made in anywhere else but Eastern Europe. We have not yet got to the stage where the cost of the troops in East Europe is a significant factor for the USSR.

General Beaufre agreed there must be some system of East-West rapprochement; but we must equally have a concept of the kind of Europe we want. We shall not get very far unless we have a goal and are clear about the intermediate steps. There is the problem of marrying the two economic systems, and not just that. Beyond that, there is the question of the strategic system into which either a unified Europe or its various parts must be fitted. What about the relations of the East European countries with the Soviet Union? He wondered whether those states really would risk integration with Western Europe, or is Brzezinski's idea of an East European confederation leading towards a revived concept of Mittel Europa? Personally he believed German reunification could only take place within the larger framework of European unification as far as the Vistula. To try to solve the German question first would create great problems.

Herr Cornides was struck by the reference to Mittel Europa. The Germans and the Poles both lose from the fact that there is no Central Europe and no opportunity for entering as old-time national entities into the game of European politics. Not only has the old Mittel Europa been destroyed through the German defeat, with the Soviet and American presence in the centre of Europe the new Mittel Europa is the part of the world where they confront each other. When Brzezinski speaks of the restoration of Europe he is really harking back to the old German and Polish ideas about a Mittel Europe in which the Poles and the Germans would play a large role. In a way today the French have taken over the lost tradition of the Germans, and the Germans are the Poles of today. The whole thing has been pushed to the West as a result of the war. The interesting side of Brzezinski is that he says we must live with this situation, must offer the Russians and Americans incentives to transform the character of their presence rather than withdraw it.

Mrl Buchan did not see how the character of a military presence could be changed: soldiers are soldiers.

Herr Cornides was not so sure. Although we are in the nuclear age, we have completely conventional ideas that physical presence, whether of nuclear weapons or troops, in a territory must always have the same result on the sovereignty of the area. Perhaps we should give incentives to those powers to change the aims of what they want to do: instead of opposing the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, perhaps we should try to make them a better hegemonial power.

Professor Vernant was also struck by the nostalgic flavour of parts of Brzezinski's article, particularly where he envisages an East European confederation; the emigré governments in London during the war had the same idea for creating a stable Europe. There seem to be two alternative approaches: Brzezinski represents one school of thought which sees a basically bipolar world; they see peace and stability in Europe through changing the character of the two super powers, humanising the hegemonies. The alternative view, expressed in official French thinking, is that stability will never exist as long as either of these hegemonies holds sway over Europe, no matter how moderate and flexible they may become.

When he asked about German-Polish projects it was with the idea that this would be a modest step which would not give rise to great problems, but nevertheless would be something that the Europeans themselves could undertake.

Herr Cornides found it very difficult to answer a question from General Beaufre whether West Germany would be prepared to pay for reunification by demilitarisation of her territory or the future federal state. In the logic of the German situation there must always be the hypothesis that once the cards are played this could in certain circumstances lead to a neutralised central Europe. But this is purely theoretical, because Germany cannot deal with Russia in a vacuum.

In the Community of the Six and in Eastern Europe enormous transformations are in process because the real dynamism on both sides is in the direction of integration (although the integration is of a different order). In the realities under which Europe and Germany will evolve they will not be confronted with this problem. As Europe changes year by year it becomes less and less feasible to put this alternative in meaningful terms; not because West Germany will become so integrated in political terms in the Western world that she could not make any independent moves, but because she will have become part of a system which would not allow her to follow a policy of neutralism and make a deal with the DDR, because of the Warsaw Pact.

Brzezinski is falling back on the dream of a Mittel Europa, although not an armed Mittel Europa. Some Germans follow that line instinctively. But, Herr Cornides felt it is a dream, because if such a Mittel Europa would be viable and if the Germans felt secure in it, they would be so strong that the German threat would re-appear, even if it were non-nuclear. But he did not believe this could happen.

Professor Vernant could see a third possibility beyond Herr Cornides' idea of humanising the two hegemonies within a system of bipolar responsibility for Europe or a neutralised central Europe, which he agreed would not be very realistic. The French line of thought could lead to a third solution, the idea of a cathedral on which another cathedral is built, the idea of a Europe including the whole of East plus West Europe, balancing the united Germany that would be contained within it.

Herr Cornides said he was thinking more in terms of this third possibility when he spoke of transformation; he was thinking of more than humanisation of the Soviet presence. Transformation would imply modification of bipolarity. Indeed we no longer have a bipolar European system in the old sense because of the development of the force de frappe. If we add the economic development of the Common Market, add the re-emergence of a balance of states in Western Europe, not only on the European level but on a wider level with the US: he did not know how far we could go, but certainly the alternative to Mittel Europa is not just humanising the Soviet presence in the old bipolar system.

Mr. Buchan doubted very much whether anybody - Russians, Americans, British, French or Germans - wanted to recreate Mittel Europa. Was it not true to say that there is as strong an instinct against it in Germany as elsewhere?

Herr Cornides was not sure how far the Germans have rationalised it! If the Germans shed all their illusions and were squarely faced with the risks of a new Mittel Europa they would be horrified. But he felt they needed illusions - or ideals - which prevented them from rationalising things to the last extreme.

Signor Albonetti pressed on General Beaufre's question. He was interested in the reaction of German public opinion. Personally he believed that as we go on it will become increasingly difficult for Germany to pay for reunification with neutralisation. But if Germany wanted to pay this price she could do so. Left wing opinion in Western Europe has made clear its view that German reunification should be paid for by renunciation of nuclear weapons plus a considerable reduction in conventional strength.

Herr Cornides replied that opinion in diplomacy and politics does not work along the lines of paying. The option of neutralisation remains and should remain; the Scandinavians for example have remained in NATO and are protected but have the option of neutrality in certain circumstances. The best way to keep the Germans with the West is not to constrain them militarily but to leave certain options open and rely on their own reasonableness to tell the Germans there is no real alternative. But if East and West combine to take all the options away from the Germans, then all the conditions for intellectual neutrality will have been created.

General Beaufre commented that this is another card for the Germans; the possibilities are limited, but it has a value.

M. Raimond objected that there is nothing to buy for the moment; there are no serious proposals of any kind from the Eastern side. There is also the complication of what kind of neutrality the Germans would be buying. At the moment all these cards have a purely theoretical value.

Dr. Ørvik asked whether if the standard of living were raised in East Germany to a level almost equal to that of West Germany, this would be a greater or a lesser incentive to reunification?

Dr. Ritter replied that technologically and technically it would be easier for West Germany to deal with a more equal DDR. But psychologically it would make things more difficult, because the demand for reunification within the DDR would be less strong if their economic position were greatly improved; they would be less antagonistic towards the Ulbricht Government. The DDR would have an incentive to work for reunification via sharpening of the division.

Herr Cornides added that the effects of overspill from economic change into the political field were still unknown even in the Common Market. Certainly it would be easier for the Eastern Government to point up its successes. On the other hand the maintenance of control may be more difficult for other reasons.

Mr. Buchan assumed there would be no support for the kind of line Dean Acheson took two years ago of building so strong a West that an ultimatum could be issued to the East for reunification.

His impression from the discussion was that the future of East-West relations in Europe would be conditioned by people's political perspectives and would not derive from any artificial measures to lower tension.

General del Marmol, trying to come to a conclusion in General Beaufre's sense of a strategic aim, thought Professor Vernant's third possibility the most hopeful. A solution based on bipolar responsibility is already being bypassed by events, and everyone seemed agreed that a more or less neutralised Mittel Europa would not be desirable. Therefore we come to the idea of a West Europe strengthened on the economic and the political level, perhaps with the inclusion of Britain, and with a certain military independence of its own, coming together in the long term with the Eastern states. Within this perspective West Germany ought to try to take advantage of the circumstances to improve her own relations with the East and particularly East Germany. In this regard General del Marmol disagreed with Brzezinski: he failed to see how isolating East Germany could help the process of reunification.

Herr Cornides said in the long range this is true; but some aspects of Brzezinski's argument are also true. Since this will be a very long-range process the West Germans cannot simply start today co-operating with Ulbricht by disregarding the non-recognition problem.

Dr. Ritter said that opinion generally in the East is much more concerned about fostering a growing interdependence in central Europe than about the national problem of German reunification. If the DDR sincerely wanted growing interdependence and was interested in closer contacts and a federalist approach, the whole problem would not be so bad as it is. But the other side is working from the opposite direction, using contacts to gain leverage to pull the West over to their side. The West Germans would like to develop more interdependence in Eastern Europe and to see a greater East-West relaxation in general; but they are not prepared to sit back and see the other side using this general relaxation to sharpen the division of Germany. All the people in Germany who want to do away with the Halstein doctrine have their personal reasons, but they do not give sufficient weight to the fundamental problem. Any kind of policy of increasing interdependence must be linked with unification.

SATURDAY MORNING, 26th JUNE

DISCUSSION ON THE ATTITUDE OF SCANDINAVIAN MEMBER COUNTRIES OF NATO TOWARDS THE PROBLEMS OF THE ALLIANCE

Dr. Ørvik opened the presentation. He wanted to call attention to two main questions relating to the position of these countries within the alliance and the effect of their deviation on the military efficiency of the alliance: first, how important is the territory which they occupy on the Northern flank, and has their opposition towards nuclear weapons and bases weakened NATO's flank? Secondly, how will this policy affect their own national security, and will it affect the military posture of any other NATO country?

He proposed to deal briefly with the background to the nuclear and base policy from a Norwegian point of view. To sum up, the reasons for it were partly Soviet diplomatic pressure, to a lesser extent domestic pressure from neutralist forces, but mainly the Government's evaluation of the actual threat. He added that this policy was adopted on the explicit condition that it should be compensated for by a substantial increase in conventional armament. This has not happened: in fact conventional preparedness has decreased relative to what it was in 1961. Also the Honest John vehicles which were received prior to the decision have been removed, leaving only the Nike with conventional warheads.

All the Norwegian Government's statements on nuclear policy give as their main aim prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. Their definition of 'spread' is somewhat arbitrary. Officially it is connected with national control of these weapons, but it has also been extended to include the physical presence of these weapons because, it is argued, effective control is difficult to maintain when weapons are spread over large areas. The basis of Norwegian objections to the MLF and subsequently to the ANF has been that the control and anti-proliferation provisions were inadequate. The Norwegian Government supported the Under Plan and has tried to support the Irish resolution for an agreement among the non-nuclear powers. There has recently been a strong drive for a new look at various disengagement proposals and, from the neutralist side, for looking into the Gomulka Plan to see whether possibilities exist for combining the Kekkonen Plan (for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Scandinavia) with the various Polish proposals. This is not Government policy, but pressure is building up on that issue.

Most Norwegians are not greatly worried about the state of the alliance. They feel that many members have now come round to the evaluation of the situation which they themselves reached some years ago, and this should give no cause for concern. They are satisfied with the situation as it is. The McNamara proposal was favourably received: Norway would certainly not insist on becoming the fifth member of the committee - "B" status is quite acceptable. There has been some concern that this very lax and complacent attitude might lead to an isolated position with Norway being gradually written off or faded out of the focus of the alliance: some people want to discuss possibilities for a non-nuclear integrated force of some kind (there is no concrete proposal) and have been looking into other possibilities for a higher degree of integration. There is great interest in the economic approach, i.e. through closer relations with the EEC. This reflects a growing uneasiness about the role of the smaller nations in NATO and a desire to work out a useful function. On the other hand there is a group, headed mainly by the neutralists, which wants a Nordic defence union or Nordic regional arrangements rather than a national policy. This alternative has been weakened, however, by Swedish reservations about schemes for nuclear-free zones: she agrees in principle, but has a list of specifications which it will be very hard to meet.

Dr. Ørvik saw no indication at the moment of Norway's membership of NATO ever being called in question. The Gallup Polls show a clear majority in favour of continued membership. Campaigning for the September elections is already starting up; all the parties except the Socialist People's Party (which has only 2 seats in the Storting out of 150) are clearly pro-NATO. Should the Labour Party lose the election, however, there would be cause for concern. The alternative would be a coalition between the Conservatives, Farmers and Liberals which could only be maintained at the cost of many compromises whose consequences it is hard to foresee. Also within the Labour Party itself the Left has increased its influence during the past year; if it lost the election the Party might move somewhat to the Left, just for the sake of opposing those who have led policy fir the past thirty years. And a split within the Labour Party (which remains as a possibility, although not a likely one) would lead to a very unstable situation.

Dr. Ørvik was cautious about drawing any conslusions. However, it would be safe to say that up till 1969 at least Norway will hold on to NATO, even if other members should leave. He saw a greater danger that NATO itself will become an empty forum, more like the League of Nations, giving an illusion of security to cover a de facto isolation which would allow the country to drift into a Finnish situation caught between the two sides. (He was not taking account of any East-West rapprochement) Norway will be very reluctant to enter into any new arrangement which will imply new duties and added responsibilities. Therefore if the Scandinavain countries are considered to be important to NATO, any revision that must be made within NATO should take place within the NATO framework; it would be much harder for Scandinavia to support any new arrangement outside the organisation. He suggested that the possibilities of achieving closer ties to Europe through economic arrangements are not being exploited as they might be: there is a growing interest in European affairs which is economic in origin, although Norway is still very much tied to her Anglo-American past and anti-German feeling is still very strong; it is still much easier to get support for a move which has first been made by Britain.

Mr. Haagerup said there were many similarities in the positions of Denmark and Norway. Where differences do exist they are not always of vital importance from the discussion point of view. For example the Danish Government has not made any statement of its position towards the ANF. But by and large the Danish Government is more concerned and uneasy about the present state of relations with the EEC than about the state of the alliance; a rather active diplomacy is being conducted to offset the negative effects of the market situation, whereas it is very limited in what is being done in the field of security.

The domestic motivations behind the Danish nuclear exclusion policy are being played down, although Mr. Haagerup believed they may be more important than the foreign policy considerations which are being played up. The Danish Foreign Minister has more than once referred to the refusal to accept nuclear warheads on Danish soil as a contribution to the marked stability and equilibrium that characterise the North. The Danish Government has tried hard to get both her Western allies and the USSR to accept this: the refusal to accept warheads was even included in the joint communique after the Khrushchev visit, although this was not a question which should have been on the agenda. At the same time the Danish Government (and the Norwegian) does not want to become part of any separate security arrangement outside NATO, which would have been the case if they had accepted the Kekkonen Plan (which was limited to the Scandinavian countries). All three Scandinavian countries have turned down the Kekkonen Plan.

With regard to the internal situation, the next elections will be held not later than 1968; undoubtedly the question of Danish membership of NATO will play an important part in the campaign (although this does not mean that this is in doubt). Among the opponents of NATO are the traditional pacifists and unilateral disarmers, the left-wingers, grouped within the small and politically insignificant Communist Party and in the much larger Social People's Party and to a certain extent found on the Left wing of the Social Democratic Party. Opponents are also to be found among the Radical Liberals; this party traditionally holds a balancing role in Danish politics and has an influence out of proportion to its size. The most outspoken critics are the left-wing intellectuals, who play a considerable role in Danish public debate. And curiously enough there is a small fringe of NATO opponents on the Right, but this is a consequence of their opposition to Danish membership of the Common Market, largely for reasons of patriotism, prestige, rellgion. No alternative is put forward by the opponents of NATO except for unarmed neutrality. In the major parties, however, there is a healthy majority in favour of continued membership. According to the public opinion polls, there is a very high proportion of don't knows (38% in the latest poll, at one time this figure ran as high as 50%). But these figures also reflect the current state of international relations: in time of crisis the proportion of don't knows will go down.

He felt that the question of Danish membership of NATO will only really arise in connection with larger changes that have taken place in the world, in Europe and in NATO itself: Denmark will be affected by what happens or does not happen in NATO. In regard to the MLF, if French opposition has been the main reason for shelving this proposal, at the same time a government like the Danish has been relieved of the problem of facing up to the question of its exact relationship.

Mr. Haagerup did however draw attention to one difference between Norway and Denmark: Denmark is much more influenced by developments in central Europe and in Germany. As long as the possibility of a German-Soviet military confrontation in Europe remains, it will be very difficult to visualise an arrangement that would isolate Denmark militarily from Germany. The problem for Denmark is how to preserve her freedom of action while making sure that a potential aggressor realises that any attack against Denmark will also automatically involve Germany. Denmark prefers this defence co-operation to be multilateral, through NATO, rather than bilateral, because she does not want to increase her dependence on Germany; this is al a reason for Denmark stressing the Nordic aspect of her policy. In the original set-up in NATO Denmark, Norway, Britain and Germany became the Northern Region; this was partly done for political reasons to meet the explicit wishes of the Danes. For many years British and American forces have taken part in exercises on Danish soil; but only this spring have German forces taken part for the first time.

Mr. Seidenfaden did not dissent from what Dr. Ørvik or Mr. Haagerup had said. But he could not exclude the possibility of Denmark and perhaps Norway leaving NATO in the future in certain contingencies. For example if NATO were to take on responsibilities outside Europe, especially if a scheme for some sort of directorate were adopted, this would strongly influence Danish public opinion which would not want to carry more responsibilities and risks. Another contingency might be the development of a stronger nationalist movement in Germany. If such developments in NATO coincided with a continuing detente, so that the defensive need of the alliance were not felt so strongly, there might then not be sufficient support for continued membership, because the present opponents of NATO would be reinforced by the latent neutralist sentiment which does exist behind all the parties' official policy.

Turning to the question posed initially by Dr. Ørvik, Mr. Seidenfaden suggested that serious consideration should be given to how important Denmark's and Norway's contribution to the alliance really is. If their departure became a serious possibility, what pressure would be exerted by the rest of the alliance to keep them in? Of course there would be the general interest that no-one should leave NATO, for prestige reasons. He would also expect strong American pressure over the Greenland issue (which is easier with the Scandinavians in NATO), and strong German pressure because Denmark is a strategic part of her defence. He would appreciate other comments on this point.

General Beaufre asked what the reaction in the Scandinavian countries would be in the event of a US war with China (in terms of support for NATO).

Dr. Ørvik said a weakening of support would become apparent in the Gallup Polls. On the whole he agreed with Mr. Seidenfaden, if extra-European involvement of NATO should rise to a very high level and at the same time demand a material contribution, Scandinavian reluctance to become involved would increase in proportion.

Mr. Seidenfaden added that much would depend on how such a war came about. It would be too much to say that public opinion is more pro-Chinese than pro-US over Vietnam; on the other hand anti-American feeling does exist.

Mr. Haagerup argued that it would also depend on the extent to which it was believed that such a war might adversely affect the local situation. (it was generally agreed that this consideration would apply to other members of NATO too.)

Mr. Buchan found the Scandinavian concern about extra-European involvement ironic. Of all the NATO powers, Denmark and Norway have been most involved in UN peace-keeing operations: surely they would be prepared to be involved outside Europe under a pale blue flag? Why not under a NATO flag?

Mr. Seidenfaden said the irony is that this involvement is a proof of latent neutralism: Scandinavians are prepared to accept anything under the UN flag, but not under NATO auspices. Dr. Ørvik added that to most Scandinavians NATO smacks of great power politics (which has been looked upon with disfavour all through the centuries) whereas the UN is looked upon as the instrument to take care of the small nations. This underlines the necessity, if Scandinavian co-operation is wanted in practical terms, of studying very carefully the form in which it is put.

General Beaufre posed a further question: what is Scandinavian feeling about the future of Europe?

Mr. Seidenfaden replied that Denmark's attitute towards Europe is absolutely dominated by economic considerations. Discussion about the desirability of trying to join the EEC has centred almost entirely upon the economic arguments; questions of European security or the creation of any European sentiment have hardly arisen. On the other hand, because the economic considerations are predominant, provided this aspect were favourable the organisational and other implications would be accepted as a by-product.

Dr. Ørvik said that for Norway the Atlantic ties are predominant. But if Atlantic ties should be identified with great wars and heavy involvement in other areas with contributions, then a European alternative might look somewhat different. Although it is still very vague, there is a growing interest in Europe which was not apparent in Norway three years ago; it results from the campaign fought by the Labour Party in 1961-2 to gain entry into the EEC. Mr. Haagerup added that a European alternative in the security sense would however be much more difficult to sell to the Danish or Norwegian electorate in isolation, unaccompanied by an economic solution.

Mr. Buchan. said that if the Scandinavian countries did apply for membership of the EEC (probably at the same time as Britain), this would mean the break-up of EFTA and entry into a very strong economic and probably political system of which Sweden and Finland do not form a part. Would Norway and Denmark accept to be more divided from their fellow Scandinavians than they are at present? If so, is Scandinavian solidarity meaningful? Furthermore might there be a catch for Norway and Denmark in considering membership of the EEC in that it may lead on to a political and defence community which may force them to reverse or modify their present defence policies in ways they do not at present envisage?

Dr. Ørvik acknowledged that Scandinavian solidarity is more apparent than real: in a crisis the support from the other countries in the area has been very limited. Certainly there is no solidarity in terms of the Scandinavian economy. Moreover the Swedes are very practical in the application of their neutral policy, particularly in the economic sense. At the time when Norwegian entry into the EEC seemed likely, Swedish official opinion was very strongly aware that she could not afford to remain outside, and it was being said privately that realistic considerations would lead to some arrangement being found.

Mr. Seidenfaden said Sweden has been trying to delay attempts which are now being made to bring the two markets together, (which would be advantageous to Denmark) and is going pretty far in attempts to delay Denmark's entry into the EEC. She has been prepared to make very heavy concessions for the sake of this.

Signor Albonetti observed that the Swedish policy of trying to avoid any European integration goes back to the old European Free Trade Area negotiations: Sweden was the staunchest ally of Britain, with Austria and Denmark at the other end wanting to come to some arrangement with the Six. The Swedes went very far in their concessions to try and prevent a very strong Common Market or one which could absorb other European countries as members.

Professor Vernant argued that if EFTA and the EEC do come together this could only be in a much looser framework than the Brussels arrangement: he certainly could not see any organisation comprising the Six plus the Seven being based on a supra-national structure, it would have to be very flexible. Therefore he did not believe this could be a major obstacle to the Scandinavian countries; their solidarity could still be retained in a certain form. He argued that the reluctance of Sweden and Finland is due to wider political considerations involving their own relationship with the USSR - if the two blocs did come together their position would become more marginal.

Mr. Seidenfaden agreed; and if (as he believed) a larger Community were based on a much looser political framework, the problem of Scandinavian defence policies would not be posed so acutely.

But anxiety arises from the possibility that Denmark alone might join (hitherto her policy has been only to join when Britain did). Pressure is growing for Denmark to act unilaterally because the economic consequences of the split are much harder for Denmark than for the other EFTA countries. However, Mr. Haagerup said the Moderate Liberals are the only party in Denmark advocating unilateral accession to the EEC; there is definitely not a political majority today for such a step.

Taking up Dr. Ørvik, Mr. Haagerup argued that the emotional appeal of Scandinavian solidarity should not be under-estimated; it does still carry great weight in domestic political terms.

Dr. Ørvik agreed; but when it comes to facts, this solidarity is shown to be hollow. For example, the attempts between 1952 and 1958 to create a Nordic customs union were finally unsuccessful, as were the discussions in 1948-9 on a Scandinavian defence union (Norway backed out on both occasions). Since 1958 the feeling has been growing that the Scandinavian area is too small and must be affiliated with a larger European or Atlantic framework in terms of security and economics. The ideal has been for the Scandinavian countries to move together and agree among themselves and then enter some larger organisation. But so far this has not been possible, for geographical reasons and for economic reasons: Swedish industry and Norwegian shipping and Danish agriculture.

Professor Vernant posed two questions: (1) What would be the effects, from the strategic aspect and in terms of command, of a defence organisation (with adequate means of defence) comprising Sweden, Norway and Denmark? How would this relate to the theory of the Nordic balance? (2) What would be the effects, both on the strategic situation and on the state of public opinion in Norway and Denmark, of Sweden acquiring nuclear capability?

Mr. Jukes said the Soviet strategic interest in Scandinavia is not very great on the whole (speaking particularly of Norway). The situation at the moment is one the Soviets have learnt to live with - and the status quo suits both us and them. We should have to consider very seriously their reaction if we change it. If nuclear weapons were placed in Scandinavia these would be American weapons and would be viewed by the USSR as such; and the Soviet reaction would be rather sharp and unfavourable.

Dr. Ørvik replied to M. Vernant that the term Nordic balance is misleading. It was developed for reasons of convenience and its main importance is political. It came up in 1961 with the Soviet Note to the Finnish Government threatening that the agreement of 1948, which could involve military occupation of Finland, could be invoked. The Norwegian Government sent a Note to the effect that if Finland's status were changed, Norway would reconsider her nuclear policy. The intention was to have a lever to support Finland in time of crisis. But of course this has no substance: the real problem is the Norwegian coastline, and if the Russians were to do anything in that area and Norway tried to invoke changes in her nuclear policy, the Russians could counter this by threatening action against Finland! Moreover it would be very hard to build up any political credibility for a change in Norway's nuclear policy.

On the question of Swedish nuclear capability, this is entirely a matter of political decision. Sweden decided in 1960 that there would be no need to make a decision about this until 1963 or 1965. This year there has been discussion on this question, and the Head of the armed forces did ask the Government to cut down the time they would need to make a nuclear weapon from seven to four years, saying the situation may change and seven years is too long; his implications were clear. The Government has refused, thus it will still be a long time before Swedish nuclear capacity is converted into a weapons industry. But the capability does exist.

As far as Norwegian defence goes, it is no secret that less than a thousand conventionally armed soldiers are stationed on a border of 150 km, while there is a much larger force on the other side. But Dr. Ørvik did not foresee any change for the moment. Norwegian forces are not being increased, for economic and also for public opinion reasons. Nor will there be any change in the base policy or in nuclear policy.

Mr. Seidenfaden pointed out that a country could be defended by nuclear weapons without these being stationed in the country. Denmark's refusal of nuclear weapons is not so absolute as Norway's: there is an escape clause. In times of crisis Denmark would be open to receiving nuclear warheads, and the Russians know that, so they have to reckon to a certain extent that nuclear weapons might be used from Scandinavian territory. (Mr. Haagerup argued that this escape clause has been undermined by the reference to Denmark's nuclear policy in the Khrushchev communique).

General Beaufre said the fact that Denmark can be supported by nuclear weapons in a crisis is half true. True she would have the advantage of some air support, but tactical nuclear weapons to prevent a landing in Denmark could probably not be brought in quickly enough. He agreed that that kind of risk is not great now according to the general situation, but it should be borne in mind.

Signor Albonetti referred back to a question in Dr. Ørvik's introductory remarks: the effect of the Scandinavian deviation on the military efficiency of the alliance. He did not believe this affected the credibility of the alliance; but it did have psychological effects and could increase certain centrifugal tendencies within the alliance which he considered rather dangerous. Neutralist forces are already increasing in Italy; if they become active elsewhere too the equilibrium which allows Norway and Denmark to pursue their present policy may not be easy to maintain. Even if we understand the special position of the Scandinavian countries (especially Finland and Sweden) we should be more aware of these political and psychological implications for the alliance as a whole.

The question of what would have been the effect of the Unden Plan on the alliance is closely related to this point. The Unden Plan would mean a change in the present situation because it would freeze it; this could have greater consequences in other countries than leaving the general situation as it is. Furthermore he saw the danger of this approach being built up into a general philosophy. Of course the USSR is against any change in our defence dispositions, but we should beware of building up on the basis of the status quo (as implied in the Unden Plan) and then justifying this on the grounds of Soviet opposition to any change. And the Unden Plan would have an unhealthy effect by increasing the discrimination which already exists within the alliance.

Herr Cornides was struck by the word "deviation": surely everybody deviates to a degree according to his geographical position and status, and this is a normal state of affairs. Under pressure and in times of direct threat we have probably somewhat abused the concept of integration to the detriment of normal geographical and other differences. Rather than a deviation, is this not a direction into which the whole alliance is moving that will permit some of the classical instruments of planning to be applied to the nuclear situation? He questioned whether the Nordic balance is a mature doctine; but there are balances within a greater imbalance. We should learn to play with that through crisis management and other ways, taking advantage of the fact that we have a geographically fairly good position in the Northern sector to be more flexible, rather than spreading out all we have evenly and thinly and making everything centrally controlled, because the central control can only come from Washington. We can go in this direction without neutralism. It would probably be an antidote to neutralist tendencies if we could show that the alliance is not a rigid structure, that it can be adapted to the problems of the flanks, and that we do not seek because of the problem of the centre to tie them into one absolutely integrated position.

Dr. Ørvik welcomed Herr Cornides' line of argument. Scandinavians feel much easier when they see that so many others have a special position so far as the alliance goes. He would like to see some work done on the role which the smaller partners can play in the alliance. The hardest thing to meet neutralist arguments is to be able to say just what is the usefulness of the alliance. Perhaps more concrete tasks could be undertaken within the alliance framework without too tight an integration.

Signor Albonetti agreed that not everybody must have the same task within the alliance. If integration does not work we must find other means - the alternative is not just between integration and hegemony. The important thing is not to be content with the present situation, just to rest on the different political and geographical situation of every country. But one comes back to the old question of what is the meaning of consultation if the potential of the various countries is so different?

Mr. Buchan recalled that one of the techniques originally quite widely used in NATO but which has fallen into disuse is the idea of more intensive regional consultation. If we are going to try to promote closer contingency planning, would it perhaps be better to develop (say) three or four regional mechanisms? For example a Northern Europe group with the US, UK, Germany, Norway, Denmark; a Central Europe group consisting of the countries with forces in the area; and a Mediterranean group (US, Italy, Greece, Turkey, France and UK). He could see very strongly the sense of frustration that a country the size of Denmark or Norway must feel in trying to make any impact on a group of fifteen; but the electorate could probably be persuaded that their Foreign Minister does exert a degree of influence and control in a regional organisation.

Mr. Seidenfaden pointed out that there is a regional arrangement in the Nordic Command.

Mr. Haagerup argued that this is a purely military command; Mr. Buchan was suggesting a political organisation.

General Beaufre said that in the military sphere there are three regional commands in Europe. But this organisation has been completely disorganised by the proliferation of SHAPE: the local commanders have no real authority. Speaking personally, he would take everything out of SHAPE that has to do with local organisation and administration and relations with governments: he would raise Oslo to the level of Fontainebleau.

Dr. Ørvik found Mr. Buchan's suggestion interesting, particularly as it includes Germany. There is still a difference between the Norwegian and the Danish attitudes to Germany. The participation of German troops in an exercise such as took place on Danish soil this year could not have happened in Norway. Anti-German sentiment is weakening, although there is a long way to go. But it would be useful to discuss this kind of suggestion in the alliance, which gives the impression of being stale and linked to the past and has no attraction to public opinion.

Herr Cornides believed institutionalised political groupings would be very difficult because of the decision of who is in and who is out. But if there were corresponding to this command structure study groupings, so to speak, on the political level, to which the Swedes for example could send observers without being members of NATO, then they would be open-ended. Would it not be possible to have open-ended study machinery on an ad hoc basis to correspond to the command structure? (He made the proviso that in the case of a crisis in a particular area, members in different regional groupings would still wish to retain the right to be in on consultations.)

Mr. Buchan believed Herr Cornides' suggestion would be possible if there were a political dynamic in NATO which does not exist now.

General Beaufre considered that it would help contingency planning because different answers would be received from different areas.

Mr. Haagerup argued that Herr Cornides under-estimated the rigidity of the Swedish non-alignment policy; it would not be politically possible for Sweden to join even a study group. (He agreed that it would be possible to do something without the Swedes).

Dr. Ørvik supported Mr. Haagerup. The Swedes have been stiffening their neutrality rather than loosening it: in a recent pamphlet the Swedish Government has made it clear that Swedish defence is meant for the defence of Sweden alone, and they take no responsibility for what is happening in neighbouring countries. The possibility of Sweden joining any regional Scandinavian command at the moment is very faint, partly because of her doubts about the ability of any regional Nordic grouping to defend itself against the USSR.

Dr. Gasteyger asked whether Swedish neutrality extends to co-operation in arms production, or whether there were possibilities in this field?

Mr. Haagerup and Dr. Ørvik made it clear that Sweden is quite anxious to sell, it is entirely a matter of whether she can supply what is needed. Norway has bought a fair amount of Swedish equipment (particularly transport) and some items are being produced in Norway.

General Beaufre wondered what the possibilities might be for a Nordic defence union as a neutral grouping. If the detente continues, might there not be some possibility in this direction?

Mr. Seidenfaden said public opinion would be strongly in favour of such a concept; but from a military point of view it makes no sense in the nuclear age - it is too late. Therefore if it came about, it would presumably mean peace in that part of the world so that NATO itself would not be necessary. He would like other comments, however.

Dr. Ørvik stressed that a neutral Scandinavia would be virtually an undefended one. That became clear during the 1948-9 discussions with the Swedes; they realised that a neutral Nordic defence union would have to be paid for by themselves, so it would be much better for them to have an isolated Swedish neutrality! There would be no possibility of even discussing this except as a neutralised area with guarantees.

Mr. Buchan expected a very stiff rearguard action from the Western military to any suggestion that we could live happily with a neutral Scandinavia in present circumstances. The sailors would be very unhappy if they did not have the control of the Danish Straits that Danish membership provides. And the UK has a direct interest in a military arrangement with Norway and Denmark because of early warning: the whole of her early warning system would be virtually useless without the station in Norway. Of course these may become more marginal considerations than they were in the early days, and the whole question may become more political.

Herr Cornides (asked by Mr. Seidenfaden whether in a crisis a neutral Denmark would have to be occupied by Germany) said clearly a neutral Scandinavia would raise difficult problems for Germany; he could not exclude this possibility.

General del Marmol maintained that the nuclear policy of the Scandinavian countries should be viewed from the point of view of the security of Europe as a whole. In present circumstances this policy cannot be said to diminish the security of NATO to any significant extent. But if they took certain measures which would affect the security of Europe as a whole, then in his view their nuclear policy should be revised.

Mr. Buchan took up another aspect related to the Brzezinski discussion. If we are in for a period of years when there will be a demand to shape a new basis for relations with East Europe, have the Scandinavian members of NATO a special role to play in this? Can they take the lead, or become a channel to develop new ideas on how to bring the two halves of Europe together that may not be open to West Europe proper?

Mr. Seidenfaden said contacts are growing with the Eastern countries, and there are many cultural contacts with Poland in particular. But he doubted whether Scandinavia could play a leading role in anything that could affect the major question of security. They might perhaps lead in the psychological sphere, but otherwise they would have to follow the general development. Denmark has been very careful about going into direct talks with the Poles on the Rapacki Plan, for example, on the grounds that these things must be solved as part of a wider arrangement where Denmark has no special part to play.

Dr. Ørvik said there is a movement (which incorporates a large sector of the Left wing of the Labour Party) which aspires to the role of mediator as Mr. Buchan suggested. Relations with Poland have picked up remarkably in the last few months and there have been many exchange visits. But there is some caution. The Kekkonen Plan is strongly supported from the East, whereas Norway has been uneasy about an agreement of this sort and would prefer a general framework. With regard to the Gomulka Plan, Norway is not likely to enter anything which did not include the West Germans. He was firmly of the opinion that the economic approach has the best psychological and political implications for an improvement in East-West relations.

Signor Albonetti also wished to link this discussion with the discussion on Brzezinski. While it is not suggested that the best way to deal with the East is to strengthen ourselves militarily, we are in no position to stand the strain of lengthy negotiations with the Russians or a very strong economic initiative towards the East (which was the basis of the Brzezinski discussion) so long as there is not much more political cohesion within the alliance. Nothing can substitute for the attraction of unity and political cohesion. If there were a stronger move for unity within the alliance and for closerintegration in Europe, the power of leverage of the alliance, even for the German problem, would be much stronger than any initiative taken on the basis of the alliance in its present state.

Herr Cornides agreed upon the need for greater cohesion; but if we envisage talks continuing for 10-15 years, there is room for discussion of what we mean by cohesion. We have learnt in the Community that economic integration, political unity and military effectiveness are quite different things. It was felt yesterday that from a German point of view, thinking over long-range ideas about improving relations between the two halves of Germany, that there will have to be some limitation of the military status at least of the DDR; we must try and think of situations where we can have political unity, economic integration and yet a different military solution. From a German point of view we should not say that if we have an economic community, even a larger one, that we should enforce on all members a military status which does not make sense from a military point of view in a changed European situation. From the German point of view, therefore, there is an interest in not being too rigid with regard to the Scandinavian position.

Dr. Ørvik disagreed with Signor Albonetti on the question of cohesion. We must be content with the possibilities that exist and not be obsessed by the best solution.

Signor Albonetti denied that it is a question of the best solution. Our priorities have changed: we now put negotiations with the East first, taking for granted NATO and European unity and our own security, and this is a great mistake. The only thing he could accept would be an attempt to negotiate with the East in parallel with movement towards European unity in the political and military field and a better arrangement within the alliance. He did not believe economic integration could last very long so long as we do not have other goals and do not proceed in the political and military field. And he did not believe NATO would last very long if we ignored our internal problems and thought only about external problems.

Herr Cornides suggested that Signor Albonetti's late arrival during the Brzezinski discussion may have given him a false impression. He believed we could take it for granted that the economic community must go on and must have its political sector; the whole problem is to find how much of Brzezinski's ideas could be fitted in. But he reaffirmed his view that we cannot say that in the present situation political unity, military integration and economic integration must be brought together entirely within one area; we cannot have a European nuclear force for a long time for this reason. If one says that European unity must mean getting to the point of complete military integration, the German problem becomes insoluble.

Dr. Ritter supported Herr Cornides.

General Beaufre saw the question of priority differently from Signor Albonetti. In the past the first priority was defence, and because of that we needed some kind of cohesion. Then the problem of economic unity arose, but from quite a different angle. Now the situation has been reversed. Defence has become less important, though it is still there, but we now have the idea of unification which stems from the economic idea and which in fact now has first priority, and defence has second or third priority.

Signor Albonetti did not disagree with General Beaufre. He just wanted to point out how optimistic our outlook is if we feel we can launch an economic initiative and even start discussing a new political posture while ignoring the political and defence problems within our own ranks, imagining that there is no risk because the military danger from the East has decreased.

Mr. Buchan brought the discussion back to Scandinavia. Implicit in the question of the Scandinavian and the British relationship to Western Europe is whether one wants to dilute the national unity that can be developed among the original Six. The question of what is 'Europe', or non-Communist Europe, is still undetermined. And there is the second question whether the Six are a natural entity in a way that a larger Europe would not be. He added that the problem also arises whether the British can subscribe to the general geist of the unity that has developed.

General del Marmol said a certain feeling does exist in Brussels that if the UK enters the Community a supranational authority will be more difficult to obtain, that the British will never relinguish control over their own affairs. On the other hand many people realise that while the British have their own point of view, they do not damage an international policy so much as France does.

Signor Albonetti added that for the Six, obviously if two giants have to be swallowed it is easier one at a time. He believed France would have to be digested before they could swallow Britain.

General Beaufre commented that dilution goes with integration. For him the problem is how to have a united Europe without losing the particularities of Europe which have been its great distinction. He did not want a Europe like the United States for example. It will be a good thing to have Scandinavians and Frenchmen and Italians etc. But if we try to put together two different mentalities there will be an explosion. The problem is how to put these parts together in something which will work, and which at the same time would be liberal and flexible enough to allow differences. He would therefore suggest Switzerland as a model.

INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

EUROPEAN STUDY COMMISSION

Summary of Discussion
at the Eighth Meeting,
held in Paris
25th-26th June, 1965

FRIDAY MORNING, 25th JUNE

DISCUSSION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

(a) Vietnam

General Beaufre (in the Chair) opened the discussion. He saw no need to add to the impression of the general situation which he had given at the previous meeting following upon his visit to Vietnam. The United States has embarked on a policy of escalating military pressure, with two aims: to strengthen the morale of the South Vietnamese, and to bring about negotiations leading to an agreement on non-intervention in the affairs of Vietnam. To a certain extent this policy has succeeded in its first aim; but it has so far failed utterly in its second. The Americans are making a great show of strength, but at the same time they have been so cautious and sparing in their use of it that the North has not been sufficiently impressed to be prepared to open negotiations. A questionmark hangs over Soviet intentions. So far they have only made gestures of support for North Vietnam; but the time may come when they may feel obliged to demonstrate their solidarity. This American policy, General Beaufre suggested, could have an unforeseen result: it could offer an opening to the Russians to act as the peace-makers, presenting themselves as reasonable men in contrast to the irrational and extremist Chinese and Americans. They would win a measure of support from the third world and also from Europe for such a role. He did believe negotiations will come about eventually, but under much less favourable conditions than could have been obtained six months previously.

Professor Vernant underlined the extent to which this American policy of escalation has been accompanied by an acceleration of the general political collapse in the South. And as the internal situation worsens, so the military position and the American negotiating position become correspondingly more delicate. The American assumptions that time was on their side and that by putting pressure on the North the political and military position in the South could be improved have proved quite unjustified. And what is the point, he wondered, of the build-up of American troops if the US is going to continue to make such sparing use of her military might?

General Beaufre saw no intention on the part of the US to intervene openly in the war; the consequences would be too grave. He believed the US wanted to have a large force in the country on committal to strengthen her negotiating position: once talks begin, she would not be able to bring in more men.

Asked about the proposed Commonwealth mission, Mr. Buchan found this misconceived. Even if it were launched, he doubted whether such a mission could have any bearing on the situation.

What troubled Mr. Buchan most was that he did not see any meaningful formula emerging from negotiations if they were held. He could imagine some formula of neutralisation working if there were very strong guarantees against its breaking down. But this would require much stronger machinery than that provided by the 1954 agreements: for example a mixed American/Chinese/Russian/Indian armistice commission on the spot with very wide powers. And this would depend on a level of Chinese-American understanding which does not exist. A country cannot just be neutralised and left with a number of very strong external powers still very interested in its future. Until there is some more fundamental understanding between the Chinese and the Americans about what their interests are and how they can be deliniated, he could not see any negotiations being successful.

Professor Vernant agreed with Mr. Buchan that a concept of neutralisation involving the direct presence on the ground of Chinese, Soviet and American troops is not feasible. But he did not see why the concept of neutralisation implied in the Geneva agreements, involving the withdrawal of the great powers and their non-intervention, should not be applied.

Mr. Buchan objected that such an agreement would not last.

General Beaufre maintained that the first consideration must be to open negotiations to see if any formula of neutralisation could be agreed. But the Chinese are the key to the whole problem. And they will have to be paid a price: the question is what they want.

To the suggestion by Dr. Gasteyger that the Chinese influence on North Vietnam may be over-estimated, General Beaufre replied that psychological factors are tremendously important in this type of situation. Just as no military solution was possible in Algeria because of the international support ranged against France, so the shadow of China represents hope of success to the North Vietnamese. As soon as the Chinese declare their readiness to accept a package deal the North Vietnamese will accept too; but while China holds aloof they will never come to terms.

Mr. Jukes held that to some extent the American escalation of the war into North Vietnam is designed to drag in the USSR. So far Soviet assistance to Hanoi has been only token. But the North needs medium-range ground-to-air equipment which it cannot get from the Chinese but could get from the USSR. The kind of intervention made by the Americans so far could provoke that assistance, and if the USSR were dragged in to protect the Northern cities this would suit the Americans: it would demonstrate the limits of Chinese support and force the North Vietnamese into greater reliance on the USSR; and the USSR being easier for the US to negotiate with than China, something may come out of negotiations. This may be one reason why the Soviet Union is very reluctant to become more involved.

Professor Vernant commented that if this were the American intention, it has not succeeded. Surely the avowed American aim, to bomb the North to bring pressure on Hanoi and indirectly on Peking for negotiations but to limit the action so as to stop the USSR feeling obliged to intervene, is more logical?

M. Raimond supported Professor Vernant. He was not convinced that Chinese militancy has made things more difficult for the Russians: the Chinese are becoming more isolated and their position has not improved in the Communist world. He was very dubious of

the advantage to the Americans on the international scene of dragging the Russians into North Vietnam. The Soviets have been interested in influencing North Vietnam since before the bombing started, for reasons to do with the struggle in the world communist movement, and the bombing must therefore make it more difficult for them to favour negotiations on terms acceptable to the Americans. And the effect on the detente could be serious. He saw the Americans as playing into Russian hands.

Mr. Jukes agreed that this is a very delicate exercise for the Americans; it involves bringing in the USSR in such a way that she will induce the North Vietnamese to moderate their aims somewhat rather than in such a way as to reinforce North Vietnamese militancy. So far he did not think it was working. Nevertheless the Soviet involvement does seem to be slowly increasing, and the Chinese have shown themselves sensitive to this aspect of American policy by their earlier interference with Soviet shipments to North Vietnam - they are sensitive to anything being sent by the USSR which they could not themselves supply.

Essentially it is too subtle and sophisticated a policy for this kind of situation. And it ignores the local element: the extent to which the Vietcong is a Vietnamese movement should not be under-estimated. The main danger is that it may not bring the desired result if it did succeed: the USSR may find itself compelled to compete in militancy with the Chinese. On the other hand if the Soviet involvement were minimal, it would not matter to them whether the Vietcong wins or not; if the Vietcong lose they would be able to use this in their argument with the Chinese.

General Beaufre pointed to the danger of placing the Russians in a dilemma, pushing them into a position of inferiority vis-a-vis the Chinese so that they are driven to choosing between China and the US. He feared they might resolve their dilemma by standing back and letting events take their course.

Mr. Buchan suggested that the continued build-up of American troops might well lead to a considerable improvement in the military situation by the end of the year. On the other hand the Americans may be even more deeply committed politically as one weak government after another breaks in their hands.

(b) Algeria

M. de la Gorse outlined the background to the previous week's events. Although the coup came as a surprise to everyone, the conditions for it had been developing for some time. Since the revolution of 1962 there has been a complete change of leadership in Algeria. Ben Bella lost the support of one after another of the men on whom he depended in coming to power, and he in turn gradually eliminated all his rivals. And in all these trials of strength Ben Bella sought and obtained the support of the army, which became the principal instrument of his success. Thus he became increasingly dependent on the support of the army; the revolution was leading towards an identification of the army with the state. For some time the army has been responsible for internal security and has incurred considerable unpopularity over its severity, although it has only carried out policies laid down by the Administration.

M. de la Gorse pointed to three particular events which led up to the crisis: (1) the army had to carry responsibility for the extremely harsh and unpleasant work of crushing the Kabylia rebellion. (2) The army felt very badly about the frontier incident

with Morocco; they felt they had been sent ill-prepared into an ill-conceived operation. Since that episode relations have hardened between Boumedienne and the Egyptians, because they strongly influenced Ben Bella. There has been considerable distrust of the [illegible] for pushing Algeria into an unsuccessful venture to serve their own international policy. (3) The worsening economic position had made Ben Bella's position very difficult.

Ben Bella was planning to reconstruct his administration and to take under his own control the Ministry of Economic Affairs as well as the Foreign Ministry. The Minister of Economic Affairs was a man of considerable influence and authority, but relations between him and Ben Bella had become extremely bad. Undoubtedly this impending reshuffle was an important factor in the crisis and in Boumedienne's decision to take power by surprise. There was no mystery about the timing of the coup: it would have been impossible to use force against Ben Bella once all the Heads of State were present, it had to be done at once or not at all. He considered it too early to say what the effects would be on Algerian foreign policy, although he did not expect to see much difference. But he was convinced that the coup was precipitated by internal policy considerations and conceived within the country.

There was general assent to this last observation. Dr. Gasteyger commented on the speedy recognition of the new Government by China in contrast to the Soviet caution; on the other hand the Algerian army is equipped almost exclusively with Soviet material. Could this indicate that the new Government will be extremely cautious towards the USSR but will display more freedom of action towards China?

M. de la Gorse thought the new Government would concentrate for the time being on consolidating its position at home. The Chinese may have wanted to take advantage of its relative weakness by rallying swiftly to its support and then pressing for the Bandung Conference to be held without the Russians so as to strengthen their own influence in North Africa. But there are not sufficient grounds for judging what the relations of the new regime will be with the USSR. The reference to Soviet military equipment was highly relevant. Probably they will try to maintain the relatively neutral posture of the Ben Bella Government towards the Sino-Soviet dispute, although if the considered Soviet reaction is too reserved Boumedienne's fierce patriotism could lead to another alignment.

(c) The Atlantic Alliance

Discussion centred on the McNamara proposal for an executive committee made at the NATO Defence Ministers' meeting.

Herr Cornides considered the vagueness of the McNamara proposal an advantage: it is a broad formula into which people can put their own thoughts. Although it seems to have been sprung at short notice on the State Department it has in fact been in the mill for a long time. For instance at the Venice Conference in 1964, Henry Rowen had very much in mind a broad formula for crisis management and was hoping that the Europeans would push in that direction; this was clearly not the idea of a directorate but of something along the lines suggested by Leonard Beaton and, from a different angle, by General Beaufre. Personally he considered this a much more sensible approach to the whole problem of structural changes in the alliance than the MLF-type approach (and his own group in Bonn had also been thinking along this line). It

could mean that there is not going to be a proposal for any machinery for decision-making in the alliance; on the other hand this may be meant as a flexible way of opening up crisis management or open-ended groups on various problems to see how they work, similar to the Berlin planning group. He believed this was much more what the Americans have in mind than going back to the talk of 1958-9 of a directorate.

General Beaufre pointed to the very important reference in the text to the use of strategic nuclear forces: for the first time the Americans are prepared to talk about their own strike power. He agreed with Herr Cornides that this proposal is a way of opening broad discussions. On the other hand from the wording of the text it is clear that this is a proposal for broadening participation in nuclear strategy; it has to do with war, not deterrence, and it is not concerned with crisis management. But possibly it could lead to discussion of crisis management. Much depended on clarification from the American side.

Mr. Buchan said the British were as surprised as anybody else by this proposal. The Labour Government has modified its original commitment to the abolition of British nuclear weapons to putting the weapons under some form of alliance arrangement; if the Americans are going to put forward rather loose formulas, this leaves the British Government hanging in the air. Therefore this proposal may make them scratch their heads. But he expected the idea of an executive committee to appeal to Europeans - although the old problem immediately arises of who is to be the fifth member.

Dr. Ritter said the initial German reaction was positive: the Foreign Office was very interested. But this interest subsided somewhat after Dean Rusk played down the proposal during his conversation with Erhard in Washington. Nobody knows what is really behind the proposal, whether it is just a pragmatic attempt to fill the vacuum which arises from the stagnation of the MLF/ANF projects. Another aspect is the dissatisfaction which has been apparent from people at SHAPE at not being allowed to give information to their Government; a more intimate group for consultation on things other than targeting might help to remedy this situation. There is some feeling in Bonn that the detente could be adversely affected by the Vietnam crisis and that some difficulty might arise in Europe; all we have is the group for contingency planning on Berlin, and this is not enough. There is uneasiness that the form of co-operation within the alliance is not really solved. But the original positive reaction to the proposal has not been maintained because everyone is waiting for clarification from McNamara and is waiting to see how much weight is accorded to the proposal.

Signor Eccarini said the Italian reaction was still confused; clarification is still awaited from Washington. The Italian Government has recently shifted its position against the MLF, although no official statement has been made. Intellectual circles were attracted by the McNamara proposal. There has recently been a considerable amount of writing and discussion on this whole question and the conclusion seems to be that the only solution to the problem of Western strategy is a full Atlantic integration by one means or another. But this has not gone beyond intellectual circles.

Herr Cornides added that this confusion in Italy and Germany is because a majority of people reacted towards the McNamara proposal according to their attitude towards the MLF and ANF: those who had supported the MLF saw the proposal as an opening to get back onto this line and were more positive. Then they realised that the American reaction was vague, and they felt the Americans were insecure about it.

Personally he believed the MLF is a closed book. On the other hand it would be very bad if this confusion remained: it would be bad for the Europeans to let the MLF and ANF drop and give the Americans the impression that we are incapable of producing an alternative. He strongly advocated trying to clarify the issues and push in the other direction: to accept that European interests extend beyond the Atlantic area, to recognise that problems of arms control as well as defence problems exist in Europe, and to welcome this proposal as a means of setting up machinery for discussion of these wider issues which need not be institutionalised in NATO.

Dr. Ritter suggested that Herr Cornides had over-simplified the reaction in regard to the MLF, at least in Germany. It is increasingly felt in Bonn that the MLF and ANF are at a critical stage in regard to a number of urgent problems which must be dealt with. The MLF has bred the ANF and the ANF raises a very difficult problem for Germany insofar as it involves a very strong anti-proliferation clause. Bonn is deeply concerned about finding a solution that will be sufficiently institutionalised but will not make formally explicit the non-nuclear status of Germany. The Germans do not want nuclear weapons; but they maintain that the question must be left open to leave them with some leverage on questions of European security. If anything did come out of the McNamara approach it would ease this problem because it is pragmatic and the machinery is less formalised.

Herr Cornides agreed with Dr. Ritter's interpretation.

General del Marmol argued that the important thing is that the Americans are accepting the necessity to do something; it is up to the Europeans to try to build something worthwhile. The McNamara proposal does constitute a basis for discussion, and he favoured trying to push the Americans in the direction suggested by Herr Cornides.

General Beaufre said that if the Americans believe that European acceptance of this proposal creates an institution, there will be difficulties. The essential thing is to start with study and research into the whole problem; the institution must come afterwards. If this committee were renamed a study group or a working committee that would offer more possibilities. Whether the group should consist of 5 would be a matter for decision, but if all 15 members of NATO are included the study group would get nowhere: the 15 would have to be consulted, but the initial study must be done by a smaller group. To the observation that it would be a political problem to choose the members of a restricted study group, General Beaufre pointed out that the group he had in mind would not be responsible for nuclear strategy. To a further question he made it clear that he was thinking of an ad hoc body.

Herr Cornides commented that this was precisely the point at which discussion in his group in Bonn got bogged down. Mr. Beaton had presented a paper with the phrase "war cabinet" in it and the discussion could get no further than the composition of this "cabinet".

Looking back to the recommendations of the Three Wise Men, he suggested that a group is needed which is much less than a war cabinet but more organised than the Three Wise Men; an ad hoc working group was probably the best idea, given the task of looking three to five years ahead to the kind of machinery they would like to have. This could be a means of taking the whole problem of consultation in the alliance out of its present chaotic state.

Mr. Buchan wondered whether all that McNamara had in mind really was a working group. And if such a group were set to work on revision of the alliance and its extension to other fields, etc. would this really satisfy the Germans?

Herr Cornides replied that McNamara may well have had more in mind, but the actual proposal leaves it open. He agreed that a working group would not satisfy the Germans at present, because the German mind is still set on the MLF/ANF road. They have not reacted as dramatically as had been feared to Lyndon Johnson's dropping of the MLF; but they would not be content with a very vague committee, especially if it were only concerned with crisis management in peacetime and nothing was said about decision-making in war. If a headlong clash were to be avoided between Bonn and Paris and Paris and Washington, a committee directed to both aspects crisis management and decision-making, is probably the best thing obtainable; this could not be a committee of the whole NATO membership, and that would probably be satisfactory to the Scandinavians.

Dr. Ørvik agreed, although the way in which such a proposal was presented would be extremely important.

Mr. Buchan wondered how much importance should be attached to the numerous press reports before the Defence Ministers' meeting to the effect that France was contemplating leaving not the NATO alliance but the organisation. Secondly, he wondered to what extent the McNamara initiative was inspired by the need to make some offer to France: would the proposal meet some of de Gaulle's most fundamental objections to the alliance?

Professor Vernant pointed out that all the recent official French statements have drawn a clear distinction between the alliance, which remains necessary, and the organisation, which has great disadvantages and must be modified. But there has been nothing official to justify these highly speculative press reports. Pressed about the likelihood of positive proposals emanating from France about institutional reform of NATO, Professor Vernant replied that he understood proposals were under consideration; it was not possible at this stage to predict what form they would take, beyond the well-known perspective of French official thinking on nuclear matters. In regard to the McNamara proposal, the French Government is waiting for clarification the same as other governments.

M. Raimond endorsed Professor Vernant's remarks. He stressed the importance of moderation in interpreting one another's policies.

Herr Cornides recalled that after de Gaulle's press conference last February, the consideration was present in some American and European minds that we might be heading for a showdown on these issues: the question was whether a showdown could be avoided, or whether it would be better to provoke it. The same consideration has become apparent in relation to recent developments in the European Community. In regard to the alliance, there has been some canvassing of reactions among Europeans if the French should say, for example, that they no longer wished to see the headquarters at Fontainebleau; and for the same reason there was some attempt to discover if there would be a united front isolating France in that contingency. He suggested that this explained the press reports.

Herr Cornides believed this phase is now over: it is clear that we cannot afford a showdown, either in the Community or in the alliance. The tendency now is to avoid a showdown, and this is important if a new approach is to be considered. The McNamara proposal ties in with this chronologically and also tactically, as it leaves the way open. He believed that on the French side too there is no mood to force a showdown.

Professor Vernant agreed with Herr Cornides.

Mr. Buchan commented that the Pentagon seems to have won over the State Department. The State Department has been the stronghold of the view that a two-tier alliance may be necessary, that the US will co-operate closely with those who co-operate with her. McNamara on the other hand grades powers according to their importance, not according to whether they are sympathique; he was never in favour of the two-tier alliance implicit in the MLF. McNamara carries more weight than Dean Rusk with President Johnson. Mr. Buchan believed the two-tier idea is dying.

FRIDAY AFTERNOON, 25th JUNE

DISCUSSION ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST EUROPE

(based on an article by Z.K. Brzezinski "Peaceful Engagement - A Plan for Europe's Future" published in the April 1965 issue of 'Encounter')

Herr Cornides introduced the discussion. First of all he found it very helpful to have a paper which assembles all the important elements of the problem, even if one does not agree with the plan itself. The basic ideas of Brzezinski's approach are not new: they have merely been forgotten for a long time. In the early post-war years people used to look at the problems of Europe more or less in the same light as he does: in July 1947, for example, before the start of the Marshall Plan, good Europeans left the Congress of Montreux with the decision to hold their next meeting in Prague. Until the Marshall Plan the two halves of Europe did broadly live together. Many things which happened at the start of the cold war cannot be understood unless we remember the reluctance of people like Bevin to get away from this larger picture to the cold war confrontation. We did not choose this confrontation, we were forced into it, and we have forgotten some of the wider perspectives. Also Herr Cornides found it good that Brzezinski reminds us of the many similarities between the American and the French approach to European problems: many things now called Gaullism have at other times been pushed by the Americans, and vice-versa. It takes the problem out of the unhealthy atmosphere in which only de Gaulle or only the Americans are thought to have the right ideas. Brzezinski is more realistic, and this is a very positive aspect.

He listed three main points on the negative side. First, the whole focus is too much concentrated on Poland. To Brzezinski, Poland is the France of Eastern Europe - for example when he compares German-French with German-Polish understanding. He takes it for granted that the only constructive approach is via Polish-German understanding. Herr Cornides acknowledged the tragedy of the Polish experience: even including German partition, the Poles have been in the most tragic situation of any country in Europe. But when we take a new look at the European picture and look for leverage, is it wise to start from the most difficult point? Would not Czechoslovakia, for example, be a more realistic point of departure? Czechoslovakia has a position mid-way between the USSR and the Balkans; compared to Poland she has a sounder economic position, there is less point d'honneur in the Czech approach to politics, a much easier border problem vis-a-vis Germany. The German problem with Czechoslovakia is the problem of the Munich crisis, it is not a border problem in the strict sense; moreover the border does run between the Federal Republic and the country concerned. From all these aspects the German-Czech problem is much simpler than the German-Polish. And Brzezinski's emphasis on starting the whole approach from recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, which is very sensible from the Polish point of view but very difficult from the German, is not so realistic.

Secondly, while it would be going too far to say Brzezinski sees rapprochement purely in economic and cultural terms, he does not deal with the essence of the military problem in Europe. This is not only a problem for Germany: NATO has a flank in the North and South. The nub of the problem is the military status of a Germany after a solution has been found to the problem of the German state, and Brzezinski does not give a satisfactory answer. If one takes his premise that the military presence of the Americans and Russians in Europe must be reckoned with for a long time, what sort of Germany can then be expected? What military limitations must Germany accept? He suggests that for an agreed period of time East Germany should be a demilitarised area. He suggests that only the Western part of a united Germany should remain in NATO. What contribution could it make to the defence of Europe? This is the hard core of the problem and he does not face up to it.

Thirdly, even in the economic field he makes broadly the same errors in seeming to assume that somehow a liberalised Eastern Europe with its state-controlled economy and a Western Europe comprising EFTA and the EEC, also retaining its own economic system, could live together and together with the United States cooperate in a European development plan. Again, he has raised a point; but he does not shed new light on the fundamental problem.

On balance Herr Cornides considered this a helpful and interesting approach. It is easy to agree on the broad proposals, easy to agree on most of Brzezinski's five points individually. But the crux of the problem lies in the priority - especially from a German point of view, because if we follow his line the Germans make all their basic commitments in the initial stage - on the border problem vis-a-vis Poland, on the future military status of Germany without knowing all the consequences, on liberalising economic policy and intensifying East-West trade and cultural exchanges - and he says this is the way to start the game! The Germans could only hope for reunification, because any possibility of leverage would have been removed. However, he did agree with Brzezinski's footnote to the effect that the idea that the Germans could gain leverage by a military build-up and particularly using nuclear armament as a bargaining device would be dangerous: the damage to the German reputation and the credibility of the German position by ambivalence towards the nuclear position is much greater. On the other hand many people in Germany do honestly believe that they cannot give away one of their bargaining positions now. Basically, therefore, the paper is helpful; but the question of priority within the various proposals is the key, and Brzezinski has not thought this through.

Dr. Ritter expressed his basic agreement with Herr Cornides. He entirely agreed about the problem of priority. The question also arises of whether to consider these proposals in the abstract, or to relate them individually to the possibilities for action at a given moment of time. In relation to the situation as it stands now, Dr. Ritter was very doubtful as to how far we could go. For the past year, and especially since the autumn of 1964, West Germany's room to manoeuvre has been narrowed down. This was already noticeable towards the end of Khrushchev's period of office: for example in the agreement between the USSR and East Germany. Some say the Warsaw Pact meeting in autumn 1964 was a dividing line; certainly since then the Eastern bloc has become more rigid.

Examples of this are the pressure over Berlin and the reluctance of the Hungarians to negotiate with the German trade mission: in some respects Hungary has gone further than the other satellites in the direction of liberalisation, and, leaving Rumania aside as a special case, is in some ways the most interesting. Not that the Hungarisns do not want improved cultural relations, etc.; but they want to force the Germans into new negotiations in which they could hope to eliminate the Berlin clause, for example. The whole of Eastern Europe at the moment is pursuing a totally inflexible line to force the Germans into negotiations from which they could make gains in the direction not of frontier claims but of the claims of the DDR. Generally Ulbricht's position has improved, very surprisingly and very strongly, and the sharpening of the Berlin situation is a consequence of this. The DDR are not acting against Moscow: Moscow has been persuaded to give them more freedom of action to try and move things more in their direction. Therefore until a real change occurs in the international climate and in particular in the Soviet attitude, the chance of pursuing the type of policy Brzezinski proposes stands more or less at zero.

Furthermore Brzezinski does not seem to appreciate that much more than the security aspect is involved in loosening the dependence of these states on Moscow. The existence of a reform movement makes it more urgent for them to stand firm with Moscow on matters of international policy. During the Polish uprising of 1956, for example, Gomulka wrote to Moscow promising to keep strictly in line on foreign policy questions to make sure that the revolt would not be repressed by Soviet intervention. So often it is a case of freedom of action in internal affairs in exchange for conformity in international affairs. In Rumania it is the other way round: there is no real liberalisation within the country, but they lean more towards nationalism in foreign policy.

He was not sure either how far we could go in the direction of encouraging relations with the East European states and isolating the DDR. It would not be possible or advisable to pursue a policy of small steps or fostering revolution in the DDR, because the structure of the East German Government would not offer opportunities for this. On the other hand Dr. Ritter did not advocate trying to deal with the DDR like Poland, for example. Even if we adopted Brzezinski's suggestions for multilateral or bilateral settlements with the Eastern countries, we could hardly avoid freezing the relationship with the DDR to some extent. One of the reasons, but not the only one, is the problem of non-recognition. The German stand on non-recognition is often criticised as artificial; it is argued that they should not try to block an evolutionary step by step development towards unification. Certainly this is logical, but the problem is more complicated. This is hinted at in one of Brzezinski's arguments on the effect of the wall: he argues that to a certain extent the wall improves conditions for reunification because among other things it shows up so clearly the artificiality of the situation. This is followed to some degree in the non-recognition policy too. The German fear is of normalising the situation, of removing the artificial element, through negotiations with Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc. before they have a real possibility of changing the <u>real</u> situation. It is not just a question of whether West Germany is hindering an evolutionary trend: it makes a great difference whether or not the other side can base their plans on a situation in which they believe that normalisation of the division of Germany is an accepted fact.

Dr. Gasteyger listed four points on which he considered Brzezinski's proposals unrealistic. (1) He certainly did not believe that the isolation of East Germany is practicable. Apart from the Soviet interest in maintaining the East German regime, Gomulka and Novotny also have an interest in keeping East Germany under communist control in order to avoid dangerous developments once they face a reunified Germany. (2) Brzezinski does not mention the strong economic ties through Comecon which have developed considerably over the last five years. (3) There is very close military cooperation through the Warsaw Pact. Brzezinski leaves open the military status of the East European countries. They would probably to some extent have alienated the Soviet Union and would therefore have doubts about the Soviet shield; yet they would not at that stage have any equivalent protection from the West. So they would be bound to ask themselves where is their protection to come from. (4) East European fear of German revanchism is more more differentiated than Brzezinski suggests. The Poles have a real fear, perhaps the Czechs to some extent; but the Rumanians or Bulgarians or Hungarians do nct share the same feeling about German revanchism.

Mr. Jukes added that there seemed to be very questionable propositions in the analysis of the process itself. The idea that when a country increases its independence from the Soviet Union it should be rewarded and vice-versa is naive in the extreme. And he found the economic argument suspect, particularly the argument that the economic character of the proposals would diminish the suspicions of the political elite: on the contrary, being good Marxists they would look for the political nigger in the economic woodpile. Moreover he was highly critical of the proposal that Soviet-engineered delays in the Allied right of access to Berlin should perhaps be immediately reciprocated by similar harrassment of Soviet shipping on the international waters around Cuba: the two things are not at all comparable. Somebody should do a serious study of the problem, but this is not it.

Professor Vernant agreed about the astonishing naiveté of the economic argument in particular. He wondered how anyone could seriously expect the Eastern countries to make themselves independent of the USSR in exchange for economic dependence on the United States through a revival of the Marshall Plan. If the least African country will not accept economic aid with strings, why should the Poles be different? It seemed that the roll-back which is not possible by military means is to be achieved by a process of economic seduction.

Dr. Ørvik entirely agreed with all the criticisms about the approach to the Eastern side. He thought Brzezinski skated very lightly over Western problems too: he doubted whether the degree of coordination which would be necessary to make negotiations effective could be achieved.

M. Raimond did not dissent from Brzezinski's broad propositions. But his analysis does rest essentially on the idea that the German problem is a security problems for the East European peoples in terms of fear of German revanchism. This leads him to some rather strange reasoning: for example in regard to the wall, nowhere does he say that the tension over Berlin was of Soviet origin; the massive flights of refugees was a main consequence of this tension, and this in turn led to construction of the wall. Soviet, not West German, policy was responsible. Yet Brzezinski concludes that the wall favours reunification to the extent that it creates a feeling of security for the Eastern peoples.

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Security is not the whole problem: Brzezinski under-estimates the purely communist problem in Eastern Europe. Even in a period of national communism, the loss of one communist state is a threat to the power of the rest. M. Raimond suggested that East European fears have a great less to do with military security than with political survival.

Herr Cornides argued that anyone who puts up a plan on East-West relations can be shot down. What he found interesting is the attempt to think about a Europe in which both the Americans and the Russians will be present and the character of their presence will be changed from military confrontation to cooperation. This thesis is safer from the point of view of world security than some of the dangers that would come from a vacuum in Europe. The idea that one ought to deal with the problem of what is the minimum presence, symbolic or military, needed to maintain stability and of the implications for possibilities of loosening up ties in the Eastern bloc and for better East-West relations is valuable, because it forces us to think more realistically.

Mr. Buchan commented that debate about the future of East and West Europe has only come into the centre of the picture in recent years in the literature of arms control. But he expected the arms control aspect of European relations to become less important in years ahead. What therefore would be the driving force for any development in relationships between the two Europes in the immediate future? Will it be trade? Or will there be a new German preoccupation with reunification as a new generation comes to maturity which feels no moral responsibility for the war?

Dr. Ritter said the sense of urgency is all on the West German side. The East European states feel strongly that having East Germany as a communist neighbour, even if her policy is more rigid than they would like, offers them greater security than any arrangement in terms of arms control or disengagement, because the communist Governments in East Europe have to struggle harder to keep themselves in power as communists.

There is a growing feeling among West German public opinion that the non-recognition policy is artificial. The problem of contacts and easing the lot of the East Germans, brought to the fore by the exchange of visits, is increasingly becoming the subject of debate. Moreover there is a general impression that with the test ban and the Geneva talks on arms control the whole process of detente is slowly going ahead, but that the German problem is being by-passed; this has also had a stimulating effect.

Professor Vernant suggested the economic approach might offer possibilities for change, although on a much more modest scale than Brzezinski envisages. In the German view, are initiatives such as Krupp has undertaken with Poland likely to develop, and what results can be expected from them? Secondly he wondered whether the Western powers as a whole could follow the German example, and if so, whether the type of problem produced by the Marshall Plan would immediately arise.

Herr Cornides followed up Mr. Buchan and Professor Vernant. He considered it important to distinguish between motivations for change in Europe stemming from the global situation and motivations stemming from the European situation. On the global situation we have the blue and red areas problem: Europe as a whole is an

area broadly stabilised by the American-Soviet nuclear balance which gives a high degree of stability, whereas the outside world is riven by crises which may even escalate into nuclear crises. A possible motivation for change in Europe may come from this. If there is inter-action between Dominica and Cuba and Berlin or between Vietnam and Berlin, for example, that brings new factors into the situation. Also if Europe as a whole acts in common in the third world that also has repercussions in Europe.

The European situation has two aspects, the situation in Germany and the wider situation in Europe, both East and West. In regard to Germany, there is the argument propounded by Helmut Schmidt that restlessness is growing and something must be done quickly about reunification or the top will blow. There is something in this argument, but it should not be exaggerated. Much will depend, he argued, on the evolution of the Common Market. So long as the West Germans are fairly happy and prosperous, while they will have a growing interest in the German problem it will look very different from what it would if Germany were in a state of economic crisis. The evolution in Europe is in the Common Market and also in the Comecon.

What Krupp is trying to do in a very pragmatic way is to find an extra way of dealing with the problem of two economic systems in Europe so long as rigid control on the Eastern side prevents a multilateral position. Krupp put a factory in Poland; Renault did the same thing in Yugoslavia. The next step is to try to do something in third countries, to increase whatever help the others are able to give. And if for example Germany has a shortage of labour and the Poles a surplus and they can co-operate in this field, this can improve German-Polish relations. But the gains are mainly in the psychological field: the results in terms of East-West trade will not be significant. It might achieve a 5% increase. But so long as the East Europeans insist that there must be no Western capital assets in their countries and so long as their external trade is rigidly state-controlled, he did not see how there could be any large-scale increase, even with cooperation in third countries.

His conclusion would be that the motivations for change from outside Europe are not very strong. The motivations inside Europe are not strong, but they do exist. If one assumes that every two years or so there will be a crisis which has repercussions on Europe, and that the interest within Europe will continue, there is a fair amount of dynamism, although it would be unwise to overdramatise it.

Mr. Buchan saw a long-term pressure. According to the World Bank's population estimate, the percentage of world population accounted for by West Europe, East Europe and the USSR will by 1980 have dropped to 18%.

He also wondered about the extent to which the economic aspect of the military confrontation in Europe may act as an incentive to change. There is no doubt that the non central-European powers in NATO (Canada, the UK, the US) find for balance of payments reasons the cost of confrontation more and more difficult. Is it not possible that the USSR may find the strain of maintaining her position in East Europe mounting?

Mr. Jukes said there was no indication of this from East European sources. The strain of Soviet spending has emerged in the maintenance of very large conventional forces; but where cuts have been made, they have been made in anywhere else but Eastern Europe. We have not yet got to the stage where the cost of the troops in East Europe is a significant factor for the USSR.

General Beaufre agreed there must be some system of East-West rapprochement; but we must equally have a concept of the kind of Europe we want. We shall not get very far unless we have a goal and are clear about the intermediate steps. There is the problem of marrying the two economic systems, and not just that. Beyond that, there is the question of the strategic system into which either a unified Europe or its various parts must be fitted. What about the relations of the East European countries with the Soviet Union? He wondered whether those states really would risk integration with Western Europe, or is Brzezinski's idea of an East European confederation leading towards a revived concept of Mittel Europa? Personally he believed German reunification could only take place within the larger framework of European unification as far as the Vistula. To try to solve the German question first would create great problems.

Herr Cornides was struck by the reference to Mittel Europa. The Germans and the Poles both lose from the fact that there is no Central Europe and no opportunity for entering as old-time national entities into the game of European politics. Not only has the old Mittel Europa been destroyed through the German defeat, with the Soviet and American presence in the centre of Europe the new Mittel Europa is the part of the world where they confront each other. When Brzezinski speaks of the restoration of Europe he is really harking back to the old German and Polish ideas about a Mittel Europe in which the Poles and the Germans would play a large role. In a way today the French have taken over the lost tradition of the Germans, and the Germans are the Poles of today. The whole thing has been pushed to the West as a result of the war. The interesting side of Brzezinski is that he says we must live with this situation, must offer the Russians and Americans incentives to transform the character of their presence rather than withdraw it.

Mrl Buchan did not see how the character of a military presence could be changed: soldiers are soldiers.

Herr Cornides was not so sure. Although we are in the nuclear age, we have completely conventional ideas that physical presence, whether of nuclear weapons or troops, in a territory must always have the same result on the sovereignty of the area. Perhaps we should give incentives to those powers to change the aims of what they want to do: instead of opposing the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, perhaps we should try to make them a better hegemonial power.

Professor Vernant was also struck by the nostalgic flavour of parts of Brzezinski's article, particularly where he envisages an East European confederation; the emigré governments in London during the war had the same idea for creating a stable Europe. There seem to be two alternative approaches: Brzezinski represents one school of thought which sees a basically bipolar world; they see peace and stability in Europe through changing the character of the two super powers, humanising the hegemonies. The alternative view, expressed in official French thinking, is that stability will never exist as long as either of these hegemonies holds sway over Europe, no matter how moderate and flexible they may become.

When he asked about German-Polish projects it was with the idea that this would be a modest step which would not give rise to great problems, but nevertheless would be something that the Europeans themselves could undertake.

Herr Cornides found it very difficult to answer a question from General Beaufre whether West Germany would be prepared to pay for reunification by demilitarisation of her territory or the future federal state. In the logic of the German situation there must always be the hypothesis that once the cards are played this could in certain circumstances lead to a neutralised central Europe. But this is purely theoretical, because Germany cannot deal with Russia in a vacuum.

In the Community of the Six and in Eastern Europe enormous transformations are in process because the real dynamism on both sides is in the direction of integration (although the integration is of a different order). In the realities under which Europe and Germany will evolve they will not be confronted with this problem. As Europe changes year by year it becomes less and less feasible to put this alternative in meaningful terms; not because West Germany will become so integrated in political terms in the Western world that she could not make any independent moves, but because she will have become part of a system which would not allow her to follow a policy of neutralism and make a deal with the DDR, because of the Warsaw Pact.

Brzezinski is falling back on the dream of a Mittel Europa, although not an armed Mittel Europa. Some Germans follow that line instinctively. But Herr Cornides felt it is a dream, because if such a Mittel Europa would be viable and if the Germans felt secure in it, they would be so strong that the German threat would re-appear, even if it were non-nuclear. But he did not believe this could happen.

Professor Vernant could see a third possibility beyond Herr Cornides' idea of humanising the two hegemonies within a system of bipolar responsibility for Europe or a neutralised central Europe, which he agreed would not be very realistic. The French line of thought could lead to a third solution, the idea of a cathedral on which another cathedral is built, the idea of a Europe including the whole of East plus West Europe, balancing the united Germany that would be contained within it.

Herr Cornides said he was thinking more in terms of this third possibility when he spoke of transformation; he was thinking of more than humanisation of the Soviet presence. Transformation would imply modification of bipolarity. Indeed we no longer have a bipolar European system in the old sense because of the development of the force de frappe. If we add the economic development of the Common Market, add the re-emergence of a balance of states in Western Europe, not only on the European level but on a wider level with the US: he did not know how far we could go, but certainly the alternative to Mittel Europa is not just humanising the Soviet presence in the old bipolar system.

Mr. Buchan doubted very much whether anybody - Russians, Americans, British, French or Germans - wanted to recreate Mittel Europa. Was it not true to say that there is as strong an instinct against it in Germany as elsewhere?

Herr Cornides was not sure how far the Germans have rationalised it! If the Germans shed all their illusions and were squarely faced with the risks of a new Mittel Europa they would be horrified. But he felt they needed illusions - or ideals - which prevented them from rationalising things to the last extreme.

Signor Albonetti pressed on General Beaufre's question. He was interested in the reaction of German public opinion. Personally he believed that as we go on it will become increasingly difficult for Germany to pay for reunification with neutralisation. But if Germany wanted to pay this price she could do so. Left wing opinion in Western Europe has made clear its view that German reunification should be paid for by renunciation of nuclear weapons plus a considerable reduction in conventional strength.

Herr Cornides replied that opinion in diplomacy and politics does not work along the lines of paying. The option of neutralisation remains and should remain; the Scandinavians for example have remained in NATO and are protected but have the option of neutrality in certain circumstances. The best way to keep the Germans with the West is not to constrain them militarily but to leave certain options open and rely on their own reasonableness to tell the Germans there is no real alternative. But if East and West combine to take all the options away from the Germans, then all the conditions for intellectual neutrality will have been created.

General Beaufre commented that this is another card for the Germans; the possibilities are limited, but it has a value.

M. Raimond objected that there is nothing to buy for the moment; there are no serious proposals of any kind from the Eastern side. There is also the complication of what kind of neutrality the Germans would be buying. At the moment all these cards have a purely theoretical value.

Dr. Ørvik asked whether if the standard of living were raised in East Germany to a level almost equal to that of West Germany, this would be a greater or a lesser incentive to reunification?

Dr. Ritter replied that technologically and technically it would be easier for West Germany to deal with a more equal DDR. But psychologically it would make things more difficult, because the demand for reunification within the DDR would be less strong if their economic position were greatly improved; they would be less antagonistic towards the Ulbricht Government. The DDR would have an incentive to work for reunification via sharpening of the division.

Herr Cornides added that the effects of overspill from economic change into the political field were still unknown even in the Common Market. Certainly it would be easier for the Eastern Government to point up its successes. On the other hand the mairtenance of control may be more difficult for other reasons.

Mr. Buchan assumed there would be no support for the kind of line Dean Acheson took two years ago of building so strong a West that an ultimatum could be issued to the East for reunification.

His impression from the discussion was that the future of East-West relations in Europe would be conditioned by people's political perspectives and would not derive from any artificial measures to lower tension.

General del Marmol, trying to come to a conclusion in General Beaufre's sense of a strategic aim, thought Professor Vernant's third possibility the most hopeful. A solution based on bipolar responsibility is already being bypassed by events, and everyone seemed agreed that a more or less neutralised Mittel Europa would not be desirable. Therefore we come to the idea of a West Europe strengthened on the economic and the political level, perhaps with the inclusion of Britain, and with a certain military independence of its own, coming together in the long term with the Eastern states. Within this perspective West Germany ought to try to take advantage of the circumstances to improve her own relations with the East and particularly East Germany. In this regard General del Marmol disagreed with Brzezinski: he failed to see how isolating East Germany could help the process of reunification.

Herr Cornides said in the long range this is true; but some aspects of Brzezinski's argument are also true. Since this will be a very long-range process the West Germans cannot simply start today co-operating with Ulbricht by disregarding the non-recognition problem.

Dr. Ritter said that opinion generally in the East is much more concerned about fostering a growing interdependence in central Europe than about the national problem of German reunification. If the DDR sincerely wanted growing interdependence and was interested in closer contacts and a federalist approach, the whole problem would not be so bad as it is. But the other side is working from the opposite direction, using contacts to gain leverage to pull the West over to their side. The West Germans would like to develop more interdependence in Eastern Europe and to see a greater East-West relaxation in general; but they are not prepared to sit back and see the other side using this general relaxation to sharpen the division of Germany. All the people in Germany who want to do away with the Halstein doctrine have their personal reasons, but they do not give sufficient weight to the fundamental problem. Any kind of policy of increasing interdependence must be linked with unification.

SATURDAY MORNING, 26th JUNE

DISCUSSION ON THE ATTITUDE OF SCANDINAVIAN MEMBER COUNTRIES OF NATO TOWARDS THE PROBLEMS OF THE ALLIANCE

Dr. Ørvik opened the presentation. He wanted to call attention to two main questions relating to the position of these countries within the alliance and the effect of their deviation on the military efficiency of the alliance: first, how important is the territory which they occupy on the Northern flank, and has their opposition towards nuclear weapons and bases weakened NATO's flank? Secondly, how will this policy affect their own national security, and will it affect the military posture of any other NATO country?

He proposed to deal briefly with the background to the nuclear and base policy from a Norwegian point of view. To sum up, the reasons for it were partly Soviet diplomatic pressure, to a lesser extent domestic pressure from neutralist forces, but mainly the Government's evaluation of the actual threat. He added that this policy was adopted on the explicit condition that it should be compensated for by a substantial increase in conventional armament. This has not happened: in fact conventional preparedness has decreased relative to what it was in 1961. Also the Honest John vehicles which were received prior to the decision have been removed, leaving only the Nike with conventional warheads.

All the Norwegian Government's statements on nuclear policy give as their main aim prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. Their definition of 'spread' is somewhat arbitrary. Officially it is connected with national control of these weapons, but it has also been extended to include the physical presence of these weapons because, it is argued, effective control is difficult to maintain when weapons are spread over large areas. The basis of Norwegian objections to the MLF and subsequently to the ANF has been that the control and anti-proliferation provisions were inadequate. The Norwegian Government supported the Under Plan and has tried to support the Irish resolution for an agreement among the non-nuclear powers. There has recently been a strong drive for a new look at various disengagement proposals and, from the neutralist side, for looking into the Gomulka Plan to see whether possibilities exist for combining the Kekkonen Plan (for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Scandinavia) with the various Polish proposals. This is not Government policy, but pressure is building up on that issue.

Most Norwegians are not greatly worried about the state of the alliance. They feel that many members have now come round to the evaluation of the situation which they themselves reached some years ago, and this should give no cause for concern. They are satisfied with the situation as it is. The McNamara proposal was favourably received: Norway would certainly not insist on becoming the fifth member of the committee - "B" status is quite acceptable. There has been some concern that this very lax and complacent attitude might lead to an isolated position with Norway being gradually written off or faded out of the focus of the alliance: some people want to discuss possibilities for a non-nuclear integrated force of some kind (there is no concrete proposal) and have been looking into other possibilities for a higher degree of integration. There is great interest in the economic approach, i.e. through closer relations with the EEC. This reflects a growing uneasiness about the role of the smaller nations in NATO and a desire to work out a useful function. On the other hand there is a group, headed mainly by the neutralists, which wants a Nordic defence union or Nordic regional arrangements rather than a national policy. This alternative has been weakened, however, by Swedish reservations about schemes for nuclear-free zones: she agrees in principle, but has a list of specifications which it will be very hard to meet.

Dr. Ørvik saw no indication at the moment of Norway's membership of NATO ever being called in question. The Gallup Polls show a clear majority in favour of continued membership. Campaigning for the September elections is already starting up; all the parties except the Socialist People's Party (which has only 2 seats in the Storting out of 150) are clearly pro-NATO. Should the Labour Party lose the election, however, there would be cause for concern. The alternative would be a coalition between the Conservatives, Farmers and Liberals which could only be maintained at the cost of many compromises whose consequences it is hard to foresee. Also within the Labour Party itself the Left has increased its influence during the past year; if it lost the election the Party might move somewhat to the Left, just for the sake of opposing those who have led policy fir the past thirty years. And a split within the Labour Party (which remains as a possibility, although not a likely one) would lead to a very unstable situation.

Dr. Ørvik was cautious about drawing any conslusions. However, it would be safe to say that up till 1969 at least Norway will hold on to NATO, even if other members should leave. He saw a greater danger that NATO itself will become an empty forum, more like the League of Nations, giving an illusion of security to cover a de facto isolation which would allow the country to drift into a Finnish situation caught between the two sides. (He was not taking account of any East-West rapprochement) Norway will be very reluctant to enter into any new arrangement which will imply new duties and added responsibilities. Therefore if the Scandinavain countries are considered to be important to NATO, any revision that must be made within NATO should take place within the NATO framework; it would be much harder for Scandinavia to support any new arrangement outside the organisation. He suggested that the possibilities of achieving closer ties to Europe through economic arrangements are not being exploited as they might be: there is a growing interest in European affairs which is economic in origin, although Norway is still very much tied to her Anglo-American past and anti-German feeling is still very strong; it is still much easier to get support for a move which has first been made by Britain.

Mr. Haagerup said there were many similarities in the positions of Denmark and Norway. Where differences do exist they are not always of vital importance from the discussion point of view. For example the Danish Government has not made any statement of its position towards the ANF. But by and large the Danish Government is more concerned and uneasy about the present state of relations with the EEC than about the state of the alliance; a rather active diplomacy is being conducted to offset the negative effects of the market situation, whereas it is very limited in what is being done in the field of security.

The domestic motivations behind the Danish nuclear exclusion policy are being played down, although Mr. Haagerup believed they may be more important than the foreign policy considerations which are being played up. The Danish Foreign Minister has more than once referred to the refusal to accept nuclear warheads on Danish soil as a contribution to the marked stability and equilibrium that characterise the North. The Danish Government has tried hard to get both her Western allies and the USSR to accept this: the refusal to accept warheads was even included in the joint communique after the Khrushchev visit, although this was not a question which should have been on the agenda. At the same time the Danish Government (and the Norwegian) does not want to become part of any separate security arrangement outside NATO, which would have been the case if they had accepted the Kekkonen Plan (which was limited to the Scandinavian countries). All three Scandinavian countries have turned down the Kekkonen Plan.

With regard to the internal situation, the next elections will be held not later than 1968; undoubtedly the question of Danish membership of NATO will play an important part in the campaign (although this does not mean that this is in doubt). Among the opponents of NATO are the traditional pacifists and unilateral disarmers, the left-wingers, grouped within the small and politically insignificant Communist Party and in the much larger Social People's Party and to a certain extent found on the Left wing of the Social Democratic Party. Opponents are also to be found among the Radical Liberals; this party traditionally holds a balancing role in Danish politics and has an influence out of proportion to its size. The most outspoken critics are the left-wing intellectuals, who play a considerable role in Danish public debate. And curiously enough there is a small fringe of NATO opponents on the Right, but this is a consequence of their opposition to Danish membership of the Common Market, largely for reasons of patriotism, prestige, rellgion. No alternative is put forward by the opponents of NATO except for unarmed neutrality. In the major parties, however, there is a healthy majority in favour of continued membership. According to the public opinion polls, there is a very high proportion of don't knows (38% in the latest poll, at one time this figure ran as high as 50%). But these figures also reflect the current state of international relations: in time of crisis the proportion of don't knows will go down.

He felt that the question of Danish membership of NATO will only really arise in connection with larger changes that have taken place in the world, in Europe and in NATO itself: Denmark will be affected by what happens or does not happen in NATO. In regard to the MLF, if French opposition has been the main reason for shelving this proposal, at the same time a government like the Danish has been relieved of the problem of facing up to the question of its exact relationship.

Mr. Haagerup did however draw attention to one difference between Norway and Denmark: Denmark is much more influenced by developments in central Europe and in Germany. As long as the possibility of a German-Soviet military confrontation in Europe remains, it will be very difficult to visualise an arrangement that would isolate Denmark militarily from Germany. The problem for Denmark is how to preserve her freedom of action while making sure that a potential aggressor realises that any attack against Denmark will also automatically involve Germany. Denmark prefers this defence co-operation to be multilateral, through NATO, rather than bilateral, because she does not want to increase her dependence on Germany; this is al a reason for Denmark stressing the Nordic aspect of her policy. In the original set-up in NATO Denmark, Norway, Britain and Germany became the Northern Region; this was partly done for political reasons to meet the explicit wishes of the Danes. For many years British and American forces have taken part in exercises on Danish soil; but only this spring have German forces taken part for the first time.

Mr. Seidenfaden did not dissent from what Dr. Ørvik or Mr. Haagerup had said. But he could not exclude the possibility of Denmark and perhaps Norway leaving NATO in the future in certain contingencies. For example if NATO were to take on responsibilities outside Europe, especially if a scheme for some sort of directorate were adopted, this would strongly influence Danish public opinion which would not want to carry more responsibilities and risks. Another contingency might be the development of a stronger nationalist movement in Germany. If such developments in NATO coincided with a continuing detente, so that the defensive need of the alliance were not felt so strongly, there might then not be sufficient support for continued membership, because the present opponents of NATO would be reinforced by the latent neutralist sentiment which does exist behind all the parties' official policy.

Turning to the question posed initially by Dr. Ørvik, Mr. Seidenfaden suggested that serious consideration should be given to how important Denmark's and Norway's contribution to the alliance really is. If their departure became a serious possibility, what pressure would be exerted by the rest of the alliance to keep them in? Of course there would be the general interest that no-one should leave NATO, for prestige reasons. He would also expect strong American pressure over the Greenland issue (which is easier with the Scandinavians in NATO), and strong German pressure because Denmark is a strategic part of her defence. He would appreciate other comments on this point.

General Beaufre asked what the reaction in the Scandinavian countries would be in the event of a US war with China (in terms of support for NATO).

Dr. Ørvik said a weakening of support would become apparent in the Gallup Polls. On the whole he agreed with Mr. Seidenfaden, if extra-European involvement of NATO should rise to a very high level and at the same time demand a material contribution, Scandinavian reluctance to become involved would increase in proportion.

Mr. Seidenfaden added that much would depend on how such a war came about. It would be too much to say that public opinion is more pro-Chinese than pro-US over Vietnam; on the other hand anti-American feeling does exist.

Mr. Haagerup argued that it would also depend on the extent to which it was believed that such a war might adversely affect the local situation. (it was generally agreed that this consideration would apply to other members of NATO too.)

Mr. Buchan found the Scandinavian concern about extra-European involvement ironic. Of all the NATO powers, Denmark and Norway have been most involved in UN peace-keeing operations: surely they would be prepared to be involved outside Europe under a pale blue flag? Why not under a NATO flag?

Mr. Seidenfaden said the irony is that this involvement is a proof of latent neutralism: Scandinavians are prepared to accept anything under the UN flag, but not under NATO auspices. Dr. Ørvik added that to most Scandinavians NATO smacks of great power politics (which has been looked upon with disfavour all through the centuries) whereas the UN is looked upon as the instrument to take care of the small nations. This underlines the necessity, if Scandinavian co-operation is wanted in practical terms, of studying very carefully the form in which it is put.

General Beaufre posed a further question: what is Scandinavian feeling about the future of Europe?

Mr. Seidenfaden replied that Denmark's attitute towards Europe is absolutely dominated by economic considerations. Discussion about the desirability of trying to join the EEC has centred almost entirely upon the economic arguments; questions of European security or the creation of any European sentiment have hardly arisen. On the other hand, because the economic considerations are predominant, provided this aspect were favourable the organisational and other implications would be accepted as a by-product.

Dr. Ørvik said that for Norway the Atlantic ties are predominant. But if Atlantic ties should be identified with great wars and heavy involvement in other areas with contributions, then a European alternative might look somewhat different. Although it is still very vague, there is a growing interest in Europe which was not apparent in Norway three years ago; it results from the campaign fought by the Labour Party in 1961-2 to gain entry into the EEC. Mr. Haagerup added that a European alternative in the security sense would however be much more difficult to sell to the Danish or Norwegian electorate in isolation, unaccompanied by an economic solution.

Mr. Buchan. said that if the Scandinavian countries did apply for membership of the EEC (probably at the same time as Britain), this would mean the break-up of EFTA and entry into a very strong economic and probably political system of which Sweden and Finland do not form a part. Would Norway and Denmark accept to be more divided from their fellow Scandinavians than they are at present? If so, is Scandinavian solidarity meaningful? Furthermore might there be a catch for Norway and Denmark in considering membership of the EEC in that it may lead on to a political and defence community which may force them to reverse or modify their present defence policies in ways they do not at present envisage?

Dr. Ørvik acknowledged that Scandinavian solidarity is more apparent than real: in a crisis the support from the other countries in the area has been very limited. Certainly there is no solidarity in terms of the Scandinavian economy. Moreover the Swedes are very practical in the application of their neutral policy, particularly in the economic sense. At the time when Norwegian entry into the EEC seemed likely, Swedish official opinion was very strongly aware that she could not afford to remain outside, and it was being said privately that realistic considerations would lead to some arrangement being found.

Mr. Seidenfaden said Sweden has been trying to delay attempts which are now being made to bring the two markets together, (which would be advantageous to Denmark) and is going pretty far in attempts to delay Denmark's entry into the EEC. She has been prepared to make very heavy concessions for the sake of this.

Signor Albonetti observed that the Swedish policy of trying to avoid any European integration goes back to the old European Free Trade Area negotiations: Sweden was the staunchest ally of Britain, with Austria and Denmark at the other end wanting to come to some arrangement with the Six. The Swedes went very far in their concessions to try and prevent a very strong Common Market or one which could absorb other European countries as members.

Professor Vernant argued that if EFTA and the EEC do come together this could only be in a much looser framework than the Brussels arrangement: he certainly could not see any organisation comprising the Six plus the Seven being based on a supra-national structure, it would have to be very flexible. Therefore he did not believe this could be a major obstacle to the Scandinavian countries; their solidarity could still be retained in a certain form. He argued that the reluctance of Sweden and Finland is due to wider political considerations involving their own relationship with the USSR - if the two blocs did come together their position would become more marginal.

Mr. Seidenfaden agreed; and if (as he believed) a larger community were based on a much looser political framework, the problem of Scandinavian defence policies would not be posed so acutely.

But anxiety arises from the possibility that Denmark alone might join (hitherto her policy has been only to join when Britain did). Pressure is growing for Denmark to act unilaterally because the economic consequences of the split are much harder for Denmark than for the other EFTA countries. However, Mr. Haagerup said the Moderate Liberals are the only party in Denmark advocating unilateral accession to the EEC; there is definitely not a political majority today for such a step.

Taking up Dr. Ørvik, Mr. Haagerup argued that the emotional appeal of Scandinavian solidarity should not be under-estimated; it does still carry great weight in domestic political terms.

Dr. Ørvik agreed; but when it comes to facts, this solidarity is shown to be hollow. For example, the attempts between 1952 and 1958 to create a Nordic customs union were finally unsuccessful, as were the discussions in 1948-9 on a Scandinavian defence union (Norway backed out on both occasions). Since 1958 the feeling has been growing that the Scandinavian area is too small and must be affiliated with a larger European or Atlantic framework in terms of security and economics. The ideal has been for the Scandinavian countries to move together and agree among themselves and then enter some larger organisation. But so far this has not been possible, for geographical reasons and for economic reasons: Swedish industry and Norwegian shipping and Danish agriculture.

Professor Vernant posed two questions: (1) What would be the effects, from the strategic aspect and in terms of command, of a defence organisation (with adequate means of defence) comprising Sweden, Norway and Denmark? How would this relate to the theory of the Nordic balance? (2) What would be the effects, both on the strategic situation and on the state of public opinion in Norway and Denmark, of Sweden acquiring nuclear capability?

Mr. Jukes said the Soviet strategic interest in Scandinavia is not very great on the whole (speaking particularly of Norway). The situation at the moment is one the Soviets have learnt to live with - and the status quo suits both us and them. We should have to consider very seriously their reaction if we change it. If nuclear weapons were placed in Scandinavia these would be American weapons and would be viewed by the USSR as such; and the Soviet reaction would be rather sharp and unfavourable.

Dr. Ørvik replied to M. Vernant that the term Nordic balance is misleading. It was developed for reasons of convenience and its main importance is political. It came up in 1961 with the Soviet Note to the Finnish Government threatening that the agreement of 1948, which could involve military occupation of Finland, could be invoked. The Norwegian Government sent a Note to the effect that if Finland's status were changed, Norway would reconsider her nuclear policy. The intention was to have a lever to support Finland in time of crisis. But of course this has no substance: the real problem is the Norwegian coastline, and if the Russians were to do anything in that area and Norway tried to invoke changes in her nuclear policy, the Russians could counter this by threatening action against Finland! Moreover it would be very hard to build up any political credibility for a change in Norway's nuclear policy.

On the question of Swedish nuclear capability, this is entirely a matter of political decision. Sweden decided in 1960 that there would be no need to make a decision about this until 1963 or 1965. This year there has been discussion on this question, and the Head of the armed forces did ask the Government to cut down the time they would need to make a nuclear weapon from seven to four years, saying the situation may change and seven years is too long; his implications were clear. The Government has refused, thus it will still be a long time before Swedish nuclear capacity is converted into a weapons industry. But the capability does exist.

As far as Norwegian defence goes, it is no secret that less than a thousand conventionally armed soldiers are stationed on a border of 150 km, while there is a much larger force on the other side. But Dr. Ørvik did not foresee any change for the moment. Norwegian forces are not being increased, for economic and also for public opinion reasons. Nor will there be any change in the base policy or in nuclear policy.

Mr. Seidenfaden pointed out that a country could be defended by nuclear weapons without these being stationed in the country. Denmark's refusal of nuclear weapons is not so absolute as Norway's: there is an escape clause. In times of crisis Denmark would be open to receiving nuclear warheads, and the Russians know that, so they have to reckon to a certain extent that nuclear weapons might be used from Scandinavian territory. (Mr. Haagerup argued that this escape clause has been undermined by the reference to Denmark's nuclear policy in the Khrushchev communique).

General Beaufre said the fact that Denmark can be supported by nuclear weapons in a crisis is half true. True she would have the advantage of some air support, but tactical nuclear weapons to prevent a landing in Denmark could probably not be brought in quickly enough. He agreed that that kind of risk is not great now according to the general situation, but it should be borne in mind.

Signor Albonetti referred back to a question in Dr. Ørvik's introductory remarks: the effect of the Scandinavian deviation on the military efficiency of the alliance. He did not believe this affected the credibility of the alliance; but it did have psychological effects and could increase certain centrifugal tendencies within the alliance which he considered rather dangerous. Neutralist forces are already increasing in Italy; if they become active elsewhere too the equilibrium which allows Norway and Denmark to pursue their present policy may not be easy to maintain. Even if we understand the special position of the Scandinavian countries (especially Finland and Sweden) we should be more aware of these political and psychological implications for the alliance as a whole.

The question of what would have been the effect of the Unden Plan on the alliance is closely related to this point. The Unden Plan would mean a change in the present situation because it would freeze it; this could have greater consequences in other countries than leaving the general situation as it is. Furthermore he saw the danger of this approach being built up into a general philosophy. Of course the USSR is against any change in our defence dispositions, but we should beware of building up on the basis of the status quo (as implied in the Unden Plan) and then justifying this on the grounds of Soviet opposition to any change. And the Unden Plan would have an unhealthy effect by increasing the discrimination which already exists within the alliance.

Herr Cornides was struck by the word "deviation": surely everybody deviates to a degree according to his geographical position and status, and this is a normal state of affairs. Under pressure and in times of direct threat we have probably somewhat abused the concept of integration to the detriment of normal geographical and other differences. Rather than a deviation, is this not a direction into which the whole alliance is moving that will permit some of the classical instruments of planning to be applied to the nuclear situation? He questioned whether the Nordic balance is a mature doctine; but there are balances within a greater imbalance. We should learn to play with that through crisis management and other ways, taking advantage of the fact that we have a geographically fairly good position in the Northern sector to be more flexible, rather than spreading out all we have evenly and thinly and making everything centrally controlled, because the central control can only come from Washington. We can go in this direction without neutralism. It would probably be an antidote to neutralist tendencies if we could show that the alliance is not a rigid structure, that it can be adapted to the problems of the flanks, and that we do not seek because of the problem of the centre to tie them into one absolutely integrated position.

Dr. Ørvik welcomed Herr Cornides' line of argument. Scandinavians feel much easier when they see that so many others have a special position so far as the alliance goes. He would like to see some work done on the role which the smaller partners can play in the alliance. The hardest thing to meet neutralist arguments is to be able to say just what is the usefulness of the alliance. Perhaps more concrete tasks could be undertaken within the alliance framework without too tight an integration.

Signor Albonetti agreed that not everybody must have the same task within the alliance. If integration does not work we must find other means - the alternative is not just between integration and hegemony. The important thing is not to be content with the present situation, just to rest on the different political and geographical situation of every country. But one comes back to the old question of what is the meaning of consultation if the potential of the various countries is so different?

Mr. Buchan recalled that one of the techniques originally quite widely used in NATO but which has fallen into disuse is the idea of more intensive regional consultation. If we are going to try to promote closer contingency planning, would it perhaps be better to develop (say) three or four regional mechanisms? For example a Northern Europe group with the US, UK, Germany, Norway, Denmark; a Central Europe group consisting of the countries with forces in the area; and a Mediterranean group (US, Italy, Greece, Turkey, France and UK). He could see very strongly the sense of frustration that a country the size of Denmark or Norway must feel in trying to make any impact on a group of fifteen; but the electorate could probably be persuaded that their Foreign Minister does exert a degree of influence and control in a regional organisation.

Mr. Seidenfaden pointed out that there is a regional arrangement in the Nordic Command.

Mr. Haagerup argued that this is a purely military command; Mr. Buchan was suggesting a political organisation.

General Beaufre said that in the military sphere there are three regional commands in Europe. But this organisation has been completely disorganised by the proliferation of SHAPE: the local commanders have no real authority. Speaking personally, he would take everything out of SHAPE that has to do with local organisation and administration and relations with governments: he would raise Oslo to the level of Fontainebleau.

Dr. Ørvik found Mr. Buchan's suggestion interesting, particularly as it includes Germany. There is still a difference between the Norwegian and the Danish attitudes to Germany. The participation of German troops in an exercise such as took place on Danish soil this year could not have happened in Norway. Anti-German sentiment is weakening, although there is a long way to go. But it would be useful to discuss this kind of suggestion in the alliance, which gives the impression of being stale and linked to the past and has no attraction to public opinion.

Herr Cornides believed institutionalised political groupings would be very difficult because of the decision of who is in and who is out. But if there were corresponding to this command structure study groupings, so to speak, on the political level, to which the Swedes for example could send observers without being members of NATO, then they would be open-ended. Would it not be possible to have open-ended study machinery on an ad hoc basis to correspond to the command structure? (He made the proviso that in the case of a crisis in a particular area, members in different regional groupings would still wish to retain the right to be in on consultations.)

Mr. Buchan believed Herr Cornides' suggestion would be possible if there were a political dynamic in NATO which does not exist now.

General Beaufre considered that it would help contingency planning because different answers would be received from different areas.

Mr. Haagerup argued that Herr Cornides under-estimated the rigidity of the Swedish non-alignment policy; it would not be politically possible for Sweden to join even a study group. (He agreed that it would be possible to do something without the Swedes).

Dr. Ørvik supported Mr. Haagerup. The Swedes have been stiffening their neutrality rather than loosening it: in a recent pamphlet the Swedish Government has made it clear that Swedish defence is meant for the defence of Sweden alone, and they take no responsibility for what is happening in neighbouring countries. The possibility of Sweden joining any regional Scandinavian command at the moment is very faint, partly because of her doubts about the ability of any regional Nordic grouping to defend itself against the USSR.

Dr. Gasteyger asked whether Swedish neutrality extends to co-operation in arms production, or whether there were possibilities in this field?

Mr. Haagerup and Dr. Ørvik made it clear that Sweden is quite anxious to sell, it is entirely a matter of whether she can supply what is needed. Norway has bought a fair amount of Swedish equipment (particularly transport) and some items are being produced in Norway.

General Beaufre wondered what the possibilities might be for a Nordic defence union as a neutral grouping. If the detente continues, might there not be some possibility in this direction?

Mr. Seidenfaden said public opinion would be strongly in favour of such a concept; but from a military point of view it makes no sense in the nuclear age - it is too late. Therefore if it came about, it would presumably mean peace in that part of the world so that NATO itself would not be necessary. He would like other comments, however.

Dr. Ørvik stressed that a neutral Scandinavia would be virtually an undefended one. That became clear during the 1948-9 discussions with the Swedes; they realised that a neutral Nordic defence union would have to be paid for by themselves, so it would be much better for them to have an isolated Swedish neutrality! There would be no possibility of even discussing this except as a neutralised area with guarantees.

Mr. Buchan expected a very stiff rearguard action from the Western military to any suggestion that we could live happily with a neutral Scandinavia in present circumstances. The sailors would be very unhappy if they did not have the control of the Danish Straits that Danish membership provides. And the UK has a direct interest in a military arrangement with Norway and Denmark because of early warning: the whole of her early warning system would be virtually useless without the station in Norway. Of course these may become more marginal considerations than they were in the early days, and the whole question may become more political.

Herr Cornides (asked by Mr. Seidenfaden whether in a crisis a neutral Denmark would have to be occupied by Germany) said clearly a neutral Scandinavia would raise difficult problems for Germany; he could not exclude this possibility.

General del Marmol maintained that the nuclear policy of the Scandinavian countries should be viewed from the point of view of the security of Europe as a whole. In present circumstances this policy cannot be said to diminish the security of NATO to any significant extent. But if they took certain measures which would affect the security of Europe as a whole, then in his view their nuclear policy should be revised.

Mr. Buchan took up another aspect related to the Brzezinski discussion. If we are in for a period of years when there will be a demand to shape a new basis for relations with East Europe, have the Scandinavian members of NATO a special role to play in this? Can they take the lead, or become a channel to develop new ideas on how to bring the two halves of Europe together that may not be open to West Europe proper?

Mr. Seidenfaden said contacts are growing with the Eastern countries, and there are many cultural contacts with Poland in particular. But he doubted whether Scandinavia could play a leading role in anything that could affect the major question of security. They might perhaps lead in the psychological sphere, but otherwise they would have to follow the general development. Denmark has been very careful about going into direct talks with the Poles on the Rapacki Plan, for example, on the grounds that these things must be solved as part of a wider arrangement where Denmark has no special part to play.

Dr. Ørvik said there is a movement (which incorporates a large sector of the Left wing of the Labour Party) which aspires to the role of mediator as Mr. Buchan suggested. Relations with Poland have picked up remarkably in the last few months and there have been many exchange visits. But there is some caution. The Kekkonen Plan is strongly supported from the East, whereas Norway has been uneasy about an agreement of this sort and would prefer a general framework. With regard to the Gomulka Plan, Norway is not likely to enter anything which did not include the West Germans. He was firmly of the opinion that the economic approach has the best psychological and political implications for an improvement in East-West relations.

Signor Albonetti also wished to link this discussion with the discussion on Brzezinski. While it is not suggested that the best way to deal with the East is to strengthen ourselves militarily, we are in no position to stand the strain of lengthy negotiations with the Russians or a very strong economic initiative towards the East (which was the basis of the Brzezinski discussion) so long as there is not much more political cohesion within the alliance. Nothing can substitute for the attraction of unity and political cohesion. If there were a stronger move for unity within the alliance and for closerintegration in Europe, the power of leverage of the alliance, even for the German problem, would be much stronger than any initiative taken on the basis of the alliance in its present state.

Herr Cornides agreed upon the need for greater cohesion; but if we envisage talks continuing for 10-15 years, there is room for discussion of what we mean by cohesion. We have learnt in the Community that economic integration, political unity and military effectiveness are quite different things. It was felt yesterday that from a German point of view, thinking over long-range ideas about improving relations between the two halves of Germany, that there will have to be some limitation of the military status at least of the DDR; we must try and think of situations where we can have political unity, economic integration and yet a different military solution. From a German point of view we should not say that if we have an economic community, even a larger one, that we should enforce on all members a military status which does not make sense from a military point of view in a changed European situation. From the German point of view, therefore, there is an interest in not being too rigid with regard to the Scandinavian position.

Dr. Ørvik disagreed with Signor Albonetti on the question of cohesion. We must be content with the possibilities that exist and not be obsessed by the best solution.

Signor Albonetti denied that it is a question of the best solution. Our priorities have changed: we now put negotiations with the East first, taking for granted NATO and European unity and our own security, and this is a great mistake. The only thing he could accept would be an attempt to negotiate with the East in parallel with movement towards European unity in the political and military field and a better arrangement within the alliance. He did not believe economic integration could last very long so long as we do not have other goals and do not proceed in the political and military field. And he did not believe NATO would last very long if we ignored our internal problems and thought only about external problems.

Herr Cornides suggested that Signor Albonetti's late arrival during the Brzezinski discussion may have given him a false impression. He believed we could take it for granted that the economic community must go on and must have its political sector; the whole problem is to find how much of Brzezinski's ideas could be fitted in. But he reaffirmed his view that we cannot say that in the present situation political unity, military integration and economic integration must be brought together entirely within one area; we cannot have a European nuclear force for a long time for this reason. If one says that European unity must mean getting to the point of complete military integration, the German problem becomes insoluble.

Dr. Ritter supported Herr Cornides.

General Beaufre saw the question of priority differently from Signor Albonetti. In the past the first priority was defence, and because of that we needed some kind of cohesion. Then the problem of economic unity arose, but from quite a different angle. Now the situation has been reversed. Defence has become less important, though it is still there, but we now have the idea of unification which stems from the economic idea and which in fact now has first priority, and defence has second or third priority.

Signor Albonetti did not disagree with General Beaufre. He just wanted to point out how optimistic our outlook is if we feel we can launch an economic initiative and even start discussing a new political posture while ignoring the political and defence problems within our own ranks, imagining that there is no risk because the military danger from the East has decreased.

Mr. Buchan brought the discussion back to Scandinavia. Implicit in the question of the Scandinavian and the British relationship to Western Europe is whether one wants to dilute the national unity that can be developed among the original Six. The question of what is 'Europe', or non-Communist Europe, is still undetermined. And there is the second question whether the Six are a natural entity in a way that a larger Europe would not be. He added that the problem also arises whether the British can subscribe to the general geist of the unity that has developed.

General del Marmol said a certain feeling does exist in Brussels that if the UK enters the Community a supranational authority will be more difficult to obtain, that the British will never relinguish control over their own affairs. On the other hand many people realise that while the British have their own point of view, they do not damage an international policy so much as France does.

Signor Albonetti added that for the Six, obviously if two giants have to be swallowed it is easier one at a time. He believed France would have to be digested before they could swallow Britain.

General Beaufre commented that dilution goes with integration. For him the problem is how to have a united Europe without losing the particularities of Europe which have been its great distinction. He did not want a Europe like the United States for example. It will be a good thing to have Scandinavians and Frenchmen and Italians etc. But if we try to put together two different mentalities there will be an explosion. The problem is how to put these parts together in something which will work, and which at the same time would be liberal and flexible enough to allow differences. He would therefore suggest Switzerland as a model.