The Institute for Strategic Studies,European Study Commission.23-24 X 64.

1) - Premessa.
2) - Discussion on the international situation.NATO as multinational alliance.
3) - Nato as multinational alliance(paper);
4) - Recent developments in the Communist Bloc.

INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

EUROPEAN STUDY COMMISSION

Minutes of the Fifth Meeting, held at
the Institute for Strategic Studies
18 Adam Street, London W.C.2 on
23rd and 24th October, 1964

Present: Mr. Alastair Buchan (In the Chair)

Signor A. Albonetti
Mr. Leonard Beaton
Général d'Armée Beaufre
Général Baron A. del Marmol
Dr. Curt Gasteyger
Mr. Niels Haagerup
Professor Michael Howard
Dr. L.G.M. Jaquet
Herr Uwe Nerlich
Dr. Klaus Ritter
M. Jacques Vernant

Apologies for absence:

Herr Wilhelm Cornides
Dr. Nils Ørvik
Mr. Erik Seidenfaden
Dr. Theo Sommer
Signor A. Spinelli

1. FINANCES OF THE COMMISSION

Mr. Buchan drew attention to a statement of income and expenditure which had previously been circulated covering the first year of operation of the Commission. There was a substantial balance in hand (assuming payment of the contribution from the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère). Moreover the Institute considered it inequitable for the Commission to bear the full cost of Mrs. Evans' salary: it was proposed to pay from Institute funds half her salary for 1964, and two-thirds for 1965. If this adjustment were made, the current balance in hand would stand at just over £1,400, i.e. approximately half the sum which the various Institutes had been asked to contribute for the first year of operation. Thus the Commission would be able to continue during 1965 on the basis of the same number of meetings without seeking any additional finance from the Institutes concerned.

M. Vernant explained that because of their budgetary position, it would be much easier for the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère to pay the expenses of the Commission incurred in France and to set this against their contribution due to the Institute, making any adjustment that may be necessary, rather than to remit a lump sum of £540 to London. Mr. Buchan agreed to this procedure, it being left that M. Vernant would send the Institute a statement of expenses for the first and third meetings of the Commission held in Paris to enable the Institute to balance accounts for its own financial year ending on 31st October.

540 x
1600
324
54
864.000

It was then AGREED that the Commission should continue in being for a second year, on the basis suggested by Mr. Buchan.

2. FUTURE MEETINGS

Mr. Buchan proposed following up the Venice Conference with a similar European-American exchange in 1965, of which the Study Commission should form the nucleus of the European participation. He had provisionally booked the Ditchley Foundation, near Oxford, for the weekend of 30th April - 2nd May. Since accommodation at Ditchley was limited, the number of participants would be restricted to 30; however, he suggested that the Venice Conference had been too large and that 30 was a more reasonable number.

General Beaufre reported that he intended to hold the first meeting of his own Institut des Etudes Stratégiques in Paris during May 1965. The purpose of this meeting would be to present the work of his institute during its first two years, thus it would be quite different from the Venice type of conference. However, it would be international and he hoped particularly that it could be included as a meeting of the Study Commission. He would be inviting about 80 persons, allowing for a strong French participation. It was apparent that a number of people, particularly Americans and of course the Study Commission, would be invited to both meetings.

There was a general desire to maintain the momentum of the European-American exchange, together with an equal reluctance to take any step which would react unfavourably upon General Beaufre's conference in Paris. After discussion it was AGREED to accept the date suggested by Mr. Buchan for the conference at Ditchley, participation to be selected on the basis of 8 Americans, the 15 members of the Study Commission and 7 officials from European Governments.

General Beaufre provisionally fixed the date of 8th-10th May for his conference and it was AGREED that members of the Commission be invited to attend this meeting.

3. RECORDS

It was AGREED that the records of meetings should continue to be kept in their present form and regarded as strictly confidential, but that members of the Commission might at their own discretion make copies available to a limited number of officials, particularly in national Foreign Offices, on condition that the confidentiality of the records be respected.

4. WORK OF THE COMMISSION DURING 1965

A body of opinion was in favour of studying in greater depth during 1965 the subjects which had been discussed during the Commission's first year, on the basis of more detailed papers which might prove suitable for publication in some form. Against this it was argued that it would be a mistake for the Commission to limit in advance the scope of its discussion. The point was also made that for the representatives of smaller countries, the value of the Commission lay in the discussions themselves, which enabled these representatives to keep their national institutes and informed opinion better aware of wider European thinking; furthermore the smaller institutes lacked the men and resources to be able to undertake preparation of detailed papers. On behalf of the larger institutes the point was made that in the light of the first year's experience, any detailed papers arising out of the discussion would have to be prepared by younger members of their research staff rather than by members of the Commission themselves.

It was also suggested that it would be valuable if the Commission could devote some time to discussing the work being done in the various national institutes with a view to coordinating their programmes and perhaps suggesting subjects for future study. However, while the usefulness of an exchange of information was not disputed, it was felt that the Commission should not get too deeply involved in this aspect. There was strong support for the view that the general review of new developments in the international situation, and in particular of evidence of evolution in strategic thinking, was a most valuable part of the discussion at each meeting.

It was finally AGREED:-

(a) that the main subject for discussion at the Sixth Meeting should be developments in the Eastern bloc and Soviet policy and the implications for East-West relations. /It was subsequently decided to couple with this subject the implications of China becoming a nuclear power, which had received preliminary consideration during the general discussion./;

(b) that it would be advantageous to invite a representative of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs to attend the Sixth Meeting as an observer;

(c) that a subsequent meeting, probably in February or March 1965, should be devoted to reconsideration of Western policy, including the multinational solution, the multilateral solution and the concept of a European deterrent and a European-American partnership, on the basis of a definitive working paper;

(d) that the principle be adopted of associating a member of the research staff of the Institute accepting responsibility for a paper on a particular subject with the discussion on that subject, in order to facilitate the preparation of papers which could be taken to reflect the views of the Commission as a whole and which might be suitable for publication in some form;

(e) that in addition to the general review of developments in the international situation and in strategic thinking, which would be a useful part of the discussion at each meeting of the Commission, at the Sixth Meeting there should be a brief exchange of information on the research programmes for 1965 adopted by the various national institutes;

(f) that if the MLF seemed likely to come into being, consideration might be given at a future meeting to the problem of keeping within the alliance countries which were not participating in these nuclear arrangements. Mr. Haagerup undertook to produce a working paper for a meeting on this subject.

5. NEXT MEETING

It was AGREED to hold the Sixth Meeting of the Commission in Paris, at the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, on Tuesday and Wednesday, 5th-6th January 1965.

The ISS undertook to prepare a paper as the basis for discussion on developments in the Eastern bloc and Soviet policy and the implications for East-West relations, and to circulate some suitable background document on the implications of China becoming a nuclear power.

I N S T I T U T E F O R S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

EUROPEAN STUDY COMMISSION

Summary of Discussion
at the Fifth Meeting,
held in London on
23rd-24th October, 1964

FRIDAY, 23rd OCTOBER

DISCUSSION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

1. Implications of the Change of Government in Britain

Professor Howard opened the discussion. He began with the general observation that contrary to a widely accepted myth, governments of the Left in Britain had tended to be more forthcoming about defence than governments of the Right. Any idea that a Labour Government would be less interested in defence or more neutralist was not likely to be borne out; he did not expect Labour's extreme left-wing and CND supporters to have any more influence on the conduct of affairs in the future than in the past. The new government would be under heavy pressure to reduce defence expenditure to find money for various domestic reform proposals. However, he expected any money saved to result from more rationalised defence expenditure rather than from discarding any particular commitment. Much more attention would be paid to the conventional equipment of British forces, with a general improvement of fighting units as opposed to deterrent units, although this would raise financial problems.

Less or no stress would be laid on Britain's position as an independent great power. Because the Labour Government would be more alliance-minded than the Conservative, declaratory policy would be less chauvinistic: fewer clauses would be written into international agreements to satisfy backbenchers about retaining the right to withdraw weapons in case of national emergency, although such a right did in fact exist. He expected to see initiatives made in the direction of multi-lateral control of Britain's nuclear forces, although all the responsible Labour Ministers had gone on record against the MLF so much that the Government was unlikely to accept the proposal in the form tabled. However, the Ministry of Defence was now bound to submit alternative proposals which would make it possible to fulfil the election pledge of putting the British deterrent under some form of alliance control. There would probably also be an initiative to de-negotiate the Nassau Agreement, although such an initiative was unlikely to get very far because of the stage the Polaris submarine programme had reached. We should probably see this weapons system put under some kind of alliance control rather than cancelled.

Professor Howard considered that the final policy of the Labour Government in the nuclear field would depend upon the response which an initiative met within the alliance as a whole. If no form of alliance formula could be found, Labour would be justified in saying to the electorate that they had done their best, but the alliance was not interested in sharing Britain's weapons, and in that case he thought she would retain control of them.

Mr. Beaton broadly supported Professor Howard, although on the specific question of the Polaris programme Labour policy was more nuancé than many people realised and he did not feel that the idea of some form of alliance control over the weapons had much meaning. The Nassau Agreement provided that the submarines must be assigned to NATO, and the extreme national emergency clause was meaningless since in an emergency the issue would be who really controls these weapons. Alliance control must mean the alliance participating in the firing. In the light of Harold Wilson's very categoric statement that in no circumstances would Labour support any arrangement which gave the Germans a control over nuclear weapons, Labour's idea of an alliance control policy was imaginary. He agreed with Professor Howard that in the end Labour would keep Polaris.

This would mean a basic reverse of policy on nuclear weapons and would be very difficult for Labour's unilateralist supporters to swallow. Therefore as a compensation to the Left there would be no other concessions on defence. He expected a violently anti-MLF line. He also expected a strong left-wing or anti-white line to be taken in dealing with the increasingly important issues of relations with Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa.

Mr. Beaton expected renewed emphasis on building up the special relationship with Washington. This special relationship had always been an objective of British Prime Ministers since 1940, but it would be an important part of at least the preliminary general politico-military policy of the Labour Government. At the same time, the dream of the opening to the East must also be reckoned with. This too was a permanent aspect of British policy, although the Conservatives had retreated after the failure into which they led the West in the last summit conference. Professor Howard had anticipated less or no stress on Britain as an independent great power; he disagreed. There would be no stress on Britain as an independent nuclear power, but considerable stress on Britain as an independent great power. He expected attempts to play an independent hand in certain circumstances, particularly in exerting a moderating influence on the Americans and opening the conversation with the Russians in one way or another. Many prominent members of the new government were strongly pro-Commonwealth, and this sentiment would probably find expression. He foresaw a tendency to maintain commitments East of Suez, a desire to get involved in United Nations peace-keeping and third world situations, and perhaps a desire to take a lead in this sphere would manifest itself.

Mr. Buchan disagreed with both speakers about the MLF. In his view the new government had already come to realise that they must negotiate on the MLF proposal in its existing form, because it had gone so far in getting support in Europe as well as the active backing of President Johnson. The ideas pledged by prominent Labour men about de-negotiating the Nassau Agreement and establishing a more political relationship between the European allies and the Americans did not offer a viable alternative because not enough work had been done on them. Labour would undoubtedly try to modify the MLF proposal, but this could only be done through active negotiations on the proposal as it stood at present.

Taking up Mr. Beaton on the opening to the East, he did not expect any great initiative so far as the USSR was concerned, because great uncertainty about Soviet policy following Khrushchev's dismissal would persist for some time. He thought it much more likely that Labour would use the special relationship to try and exercise a moderating influence on American policy towards China. He agreed with Mr. Beaton that there would be no change of government policy on commitments East of Suez, particularly on support for Malaysia.

An interesting fact, which had implications for the Anglo-American relationship, was that Britain could cut her defence costs if she were to decide to reinforce her Asian commitments by a westabout route rather than by maintaining her existing lines of communication. This would pay political dividends too - allowing Britain a freer hand in African policy and making possible a sensible relationship with Egypt again. On the other hand, it would make British communications absolutely dependent on the United States, at a time when the US might be getting into a more militaristic frame of mind over Vietnam and China, for example.

Signor Albonetti considered the Labour Government's attitude towards the MLF as the most important aspect of their foreign policy, since it would be a test of their European and alliance policy. He fully agreed with Mr. Buchan's observations on this question.

The serious possibility of Britain remaining outside the MLF would change the whole picture of the nuclear problem inside the Atlantic alliance, as well as the political future of Europe. If Britain did not join, the Italians would be in an extremely difficult position and probably neither they, the Belgians nor the Dutch would join. Greek and Turkish adherence was of no great importance. Therefore the MLF would end up as a bilateral US-German force, and that would be the finish of the whole operation. If Britain remained outside and the MLF foundered, the drive towards closer political unity of the six European powers would become more intensified, and this would have implications for Britain's European policy outside the military field.

Even before the election, he had not believed anything would be done about Britain's Polaris programme. It would not be possible for her to negotiate any kind of nuclear control arrangement with the US. Influence could never be won by renouncing power. Therefore since Labour would not get greater influence within NATO by giving up the independent British deterrent, and since, apparently, in practice Labour will not after all give up the deterrent, the only important problem was their attitude towards the MLF.

M. Vernant stressed the importance to France, too, of Labour's position on the MLF: the implications would be as great as those of the Nassau negotiations for the Conservative Government. There was a growing tendency in French leading circles to reappraise the importance of Franco-British relations, and from that point of view Labour's policy towards the MLF would be a test-case. Secondly, there was a real contradiction between the multilateral and the multinational approaches to the Atlantic alliance. The possibility of bringing the French towards a multinational solution would be much less likely if the British became strongly committed to the multilateral solution. He agreed that logically the two concepts were not irreconcilable, but psychologically things would be made much more difficult.

Dr. Jaquet was concerned about the new government's attitude towards European unity, which was a more acute problem than opinion in Britain seemed to realise. Those in Europe who wanted British membership of the Community had been able to keep the door open for a government which was interested but could not get in; but the new government was not on record as interested in membership, and its leaders had given no reassurance to pro-British opinion in Europe.

Mr. Haagerup supported Dr. Jaquet. It was an open secret that the Scandinavian socialist parties had hoped for a Conservative victory because of Labour's cool policy towards Europe.

Dr. Jaquet took up Mr. Beaton's point about a strong Labour policy towards Rhodesia and South Africa. What more could Labour do beyond the strong line taken already by the Conservative Government towards the Smith Government in Rhodesia? And did Mr. Beaton mean that Labour would vote in the United Nations for sanctions against South Africa? If not, what was a strong policy?

Mr. Buchan replied that he expected that after a form of consultation (which Britain would not accept) Rhodesia would declare its independence; this would be a technical act of treason, although there was little Britain could do about it. He agreed that there would be little difference in the Labour and Conservative handling of the issue. On South Africa, Harold Wilson was not in favour of economic sanctions. The difference between the parties was that Labour would refuse to sell further arms - South Africa had already made approaches to France for alternative supplies.

He appreciated Dr. Jaquet's concern about Labour's European policy. However, the new Foreign Secretary had just declared that Britain did wish to be consulted about any new moves towards closer political unity in Europe and he felt that Labour was trying to be helpful.

Professor Howard doubted whether the attitude of a Labour Government would differ essentially from that of the Conservatives on the European question. Although Labour had obviously capitalised on all the resistance to the idea of joining the Community, in fact the conditions which Hugh Gaitskell had insisted upon were precisely those which the Conservative Government was negotiating for and on which negotiations broke down. Therefore the idea that Labour is opposed in principle to joining the Six and the Conservatives are in favour in principle was over-simplified.

Mr. Haagerup insisted that even if this were so, Europe's impression of Labour's policy was very different.

Signor Albonetti was not convinced of Labour's sincerity on this issue.

Mr. Beaton came back to the MLF and reaffirmed his view that anything that could fairly be called the original MLF would be impossible for the Labour Government to support. Their opposition to it would be in contradiction with their will to construct the basis of a powerful special relationship with the US, because of American pressure on Britain to join the MLF. Therefore he did not exclude some extraordinarily complex negotiations; but he did not see these negotiations leading to what he would call the MLF.

Signor Albonetti did not object to the MLF negotiations continuing for another year or two to confuse the issue politically, if this would help matters. Perhaps if a more multinational type of organisation could be devised, including the British and Americans and even a token French contribution, Labour susceptibilities would be appeased and the participation of Italy and Belgium would be made easier.

Mr. Buchan drew attention to the important modification of the MLF proposal submitted by the Conservative Government in July, in essence a suggestion that the target of 25 ships should be reconsidered and built up in blocs of 5 ships at a time to see how large this force need be, and that consideration should be given to exploring the multinational ownership, control and financing of the major interdiction weapons (TFX, TSR2, Pershing and Mirage if the French were interested). The force would be mixed-manned and jointly financed, but the control arrangements had not been spelt out. This proposal had not met with much response from the Europeans, and particularly the Germans, because they did not feel these interdiction weapons in Europe to be as important diplomatically as the Polaris of a MLF. Reports were now circulating that the British, in order to retain a central position in the MLF proposal, may consider the mixed-manning of their Polaris submarines. Although the original US MLF proposal which included mixed-manned submarines had been suppressed by Congress, Mr. Buchan thought that such a proposal from Britain might get further.

Mr. Haagerup suggested that if Labour was as serious about the United Nations as appeared from the election campaign, the impact of United Nations decisions on South Africa and on the MLF should not be under-estimated. He had been informed that a proposal for a moratorium on the MLF would be put forward by some of the neutral members of the Geneva disarmament conference: perhaps Labour might support such an initiative.

2. The Implications for Soviet Policy of Khrushchev's Dismissa

Dr. Ritter was invited to open the discussion. Khrushchev's dismissal had come as a complete surprise to the West, despite clear evidence since the middle of August that he was becoming increasingly frustrated in various fields of policy. Dr. Ritter put China foremost among the problems which led directly to his ousting: six months ago it was clear that Khrushchev's attempt to organise the condemnation of China through a world communist party conference was supported neither by the Party leaders in Moscow nor by the satellite parties, and especially not by the communist parties in the West. The Moscow-Peking friction was not caused by Khrushchev, but it had become focussed on him; there was reasonable evidence that Moscow had prior knowledge of the Chinese atomic test, and this may have contributed to the pressure to escape from the frustrations of the conflict with Peking which Khrushchev had come to personify. Other causes of dissatisfaction were Khrushchev's moves in the direction of opening up relations with western socialism (which had been severely criticised by the Soviet leadership), his advocacy of "goulash communism", his stress on the production of consumer goods, his encouragement of discussions on reform, and even some aspects of his détente policy.

How did it happen? There were signs that Kosygin and Brezhnev were not the prime movers; it seemed that the group which had wanted a change had very astutely used the people picked originally by Khrushchev himself in order to avoid a strong pro-Khrushchev reaction. Further changes could not be ruled out. Kosygin was elected unanimously by the Praesidium and was more or less neutral politically, confining his interest and activities mainly to the economic field. Brezhnev, however, who was the stronger personality, had not been elected unanimously, and it remained to be seen how he would get along with Suslov who was the main factor in the whole game.

Developments in the leadership position would, of course, depend on developments in the problems which had beset Khrushchev: these might press more heavily upon the new leaders, since a new government of this type is inevitably in a weaker position. They would need to win popularity and could hardly stop the trend towards more consumer goods, for example. Also they would have to handle the satellites very cautiously - the reaction against Khrushchev's dismissal had been surprisingly strong. In Moscow Khrushchev was at the top of a pyramid and could be manipulated. But for the satellites Khrushchev's policy was part of the base, and whatever their feelings towards the new government in Moscow they simply could not deviate far from the old course. From Bonn's point of view, the major problem was how far the new leadership would continue Khrushchev's policy towards the satellite countries and to what extent the desire of the East Europeans to achieve a greater degree of independence would open up new possibilities for discussions.

Undoubtedly the new leadership would seek a rapprochement with China; the point of interest was, what price would they pay? He thought it possible that the whole policy of co-existence might shift. The new leadership would have to continue a policy of co-existence, but they could well move closer to the Chinese version of this policy. Khrushchev's concept of co-existence consisted in playing the game with the main enemy, the United States, in order to make the so-called intermediate zone ripe for some special arrangement; in the Chinese view the main enemy must be treated as such, while the game is played with the people in the intermediate zone. Dr. Ritter suggested that if Moscow were to move closer to Peking's version of co-existence this could have a very powerful effect in the long term; and it might awaken a strong interest in Moscow in a visit to Bonn, despite the opposition within the Party to Khrushchev's intentions in this regard.

M. Vernant associated himself with Dr. Ritter's observations, except perhaps on the last point. He thought it would be very difficult for any Soviet government not to follow the same policy as Khrushchev in regard to co-existence with the United States. He therefore expected the new leadership to continue this line, while trying to adjust their relations with both the Chinese and the European satellites.

The problem for the Russians was that they could not move closer to the Chinese without widening the breach between the Soviet communist party and its satellites in Europe. Thus they had to find a common denominator between what they could do in regard to the attitudes of the East European satellites and of the most important communist parties in Western Europe and what they had to do in order to avoid a complete break with Peking, which, especially since the Chinese atomic test, is doubtless considered an absurdity in Moscow. He believed the

common denominator was for the Soviet leadership to try to make their position acceptable to the Chinese by recognising the importance of the national interests (and especially Chinese national interests) and the independence of the various communist or socialist states within the framework of the socialist family. This was in fact what Khrushchev's policy amounted to, despite the ideological overtones, and the problem was whether the Chinese would accept it or whether they would insist on a strong doctrinaire position. If the Chinese did take such a line, he did not see how the Russians could follow it.

Dr. Ritter did not disagree with M. Vernant upon reflection. However, he made the point that Khrushchev had been hampered in pursuing his policy towards the United States by the difficulties within the communist movement. The new Soviet government would certainly attempt to reach some accommodation with the Chinese; even if no real rapprochement were possible, it would still make it easier for the Soviet leadership to improve their co-existence policy.

M. Vernant suggested that the main problem for the Russians and the Chinese, and indeed for the Americans and everyone else, was to adapt to the transition period following the first Chinese atomic test. In six to ten years' time the Chinese would have an operational minimum deterrent comparable to the present French capability, and at that stage the Americans too would be very anxious to find some measure of agreement with China.

3. The Implications of the Chinese Bomb

Mr. Beaton opened the discussion. The American disclosure that the Chinese had tested a uranium and not a plutonium bomb had surprised everyone, including the Americans. The Americans clearly knew from Chinese Nationalist reconnaissance photographs that a gaseous diffusion plant was being built, and where, but they had always held this to be at a very early stage of development. They did not know that the Chinese had accumulated a stock of enriched uranium. They knew that the original Peking reactor, built by the Russians primarily for research, had been working since 1957, and assumed that this reactor had been driven into maximum production for weapons-grade plutonium. When the test, known to be imminent, took place, the Americans at first simply assumed that the Chinese had used their stock of 5 to 7 kg. of weapons-grade plutonium accumulated from the original Peking reactor and however many other reactors they had been able to construct - various sources have mentioned up to four reactors.

The element of shock in the American disclosure was that uranium could lead to a stock of hydrogen weapons whereas plutonium did not and could not. Considering the Chinese achievement in relation to the French programme, the enormous effort being made in money and resources and the fact that until the gaseous diffusion plant at Pierrelatte is operating France will have no enriched uranium of her own, one could only speculate how the Chinese have managed to accumulate a basic stock of 5 kg. of enriched uranium.

Mr. Beaton suggested four possible ways in which the Chinese might have obtained this stockpile. (1) Because the Peking reactor uses enriched uranium there must have been a charge of enriched uranium left by the Russians. This charge might have been as high as 30 percent enriched and the Chinese succeeded in getting it as high as 70 or 80 percent enriched.

(2) The Chinese might have conquered the technology of gas centrifuge. This was unlikely in itself, and particularly in view of the French programme it seemed that gaseous diffusion was still the right process for obtaining enriched uranium.
(3) This may have been in some way a Russian weapon.
(4) The most likely explanation in his opinion: simply that this had been a much longer project than anyone had assumed.

His hypothesis was that back in 1955 the Chinese decided to become a great world power, and that meant becoming a nuclear power, building a gaseous diffusion plant, and so on, and they decided to begin right away. During 1955-57 they enjoyed reasonable co-operation from the Russians, who may have given them some of the key information (since a great deal of the most important information is still classified). The Russians then realised what they were doing - perhaps this was a contributing factor to the breach - and cut off co-operation, imagining this would mean the end of the project. However, between 1958 and 1964 the Chinese concentrated all their resources on the gaseous diffusion plant. Viewed in these terms, a six-year programme was reasonable for the Chinese in relation to the American, British and French programmes. An interesting sidelight, which tended to support this hypothesis, was that all visitors to China reported a chronic shortage of electricity. Gaseous diffusion consumes fantastic quantities of power: perhaps the Chinese were short of electricity because they were using it for their gaseous diffusion plant, not because they were not producing it.

The Russians clearly did not know about the Chinese progress: Khrushchev said a year ago that the Chinese would not have any nuclear weapons for a decade, perhaps because the Russians knew that the plutonium reactors were not as far advanced as the Americans were assuming. There were so many unknown factors. We do not know what the plutonium position is. We do not really know what method the Chinese used to produce their enriched uranium. We do not know when the Chinese are going to take the next step and produce deutarium or tritium and turn their device into an H-bomb, although technically this would not be a big jump.

Signor Albonetti could not believe that a gaseous diffusion plant in working order could possibly be concealed from American intelligence. It would be much easier to steal the enriched uranium required. He thought it more likely that they obtained their uranium somehow from the USSR.

Dr. Gasteyger was convinced the Russians must have known about the gaseous diffusion plant.

Dr. Ritter confirmed that until the summer of 1958 there had been a small but definite amount of Soviet assistance to China and negotiations did take place at government level on how to co-operate in the nuclear field, but were broken off by the beginning of 1959. He agreed with Mr. Beaton that the Chinese progress was a strong reason for the Sino-Soviet breach. On the pace of the Chinese programme, there was evidence that one or two Russian experts did go over to the Chinese, and the Russians were very uncertain as to how much the Chinese really know. Therefore the Chinese achievement was at least partly due to a gap in the Soviet security system. It would be interesting to see whether the new leadership in Moscow would now enter into military negotiations with China on some form of co-operation.

Mr. Beaton interposed the thought that in 1957-8 the Russians were going out of gaseous diffusion technology, so there would be quite a few highly skilled people who had been very important to the USSR in 1951-3, for example, who by 1958 would have ceased to be important. This lent credence to the idea of defectors.

Mr. Buchan commented that contrary to the general assumption that when the Chinese test was held it would be of a rather primitive device, from the explosive aspect China may be ahead of France. It was still true, however, that their means of delivery was very primitive: they have no aircraft programme and no long-range missiles. He invited views on the political implications in particular.

M. Vernant did not doubt that the test would have profound political consequences, for the USSR and the United States as well as for China's immediate neighbours and the non-aligned world. It might also very soon have military implications: General Gallois, for example, has said that as soon as the Chinese have some atomic bombs which can be carried in their existing aircraft they will be able to use this rudimentary force as a threat. Of course it would have no meaning for retaliation, but it could be used as a first-strike weapon. He expected India to develop a nuclear capability, and he wondered what the repercussions of this would be on Peking. He suggested that the Chinese nuclear capability would make a reappraisal of their position more important for many countries in Asia.

Mr. Buchan, in support of M. Vernant's argument, mentioned Sir Zafrullah Khan quoting General Gallois at the Institute's Oxford Conference to justify the reappraisal of Pakistan's place in the American alliance system that was taking place.

However, he doubted whether India would in fact develop a nuclear capability. Although she had clearly designed her atomic programme so as to be able to, the means of delivery would represent such a strain on her resources that he felt she would rather seek some form of Anglo-American or Soviet-American guarantee.

Signor Albonetti did not agree. Developing a nuclear capability was a subject of increasingly open discussion in India. Dr. Bhabha had said he could produce a bomb in 18 months. At least the door would be kept open, and personally he believed India would go ahead. To meet the Chinese threat for some time to come India would need only a minimum nuclear force - say ten atomic bombs.

Mr. Beaton did not see that the cost of a delivery system was relevant. In purely Indian terms, the fact of facing a credible nuclear threat from China would be so important to them that they would and could afford the aircraft. He thought they would buy aircraft, not build them - the TFX or TSR2 or Mirage IV, which would be a natural plane for re-equipping their airforce.

General Beaufre suggested that the time had come when the Americans would be compelled to distribute some nuclear weapons among the smaller powers, although they would doubtless try to keep control of these weapons; the idea that each nation that wants nuclear capability must make its own way along the same road was finished. It was no use trying to meet this new situation by a new American commitment, because that would mean

in fact that any Chinese challenge would be met by the Americans alone, and this was strategically wrong. The need was for a smaller power in Asia to be able to counter a Chinese challenge so that the Americans could remain in second position; this counterbalance had to be nuclear, and he thought the Americans would have to provide it because it was so silly now for a country to have to start from scratch.

M. Vernant saw things rather differently. The problem for the United States was how to guarantee her security and that of her allies without at the same time creating a "chaos world". He did not believe than any American government would distribute nuclear weapons to any nation under that nation's direct control, because this would be interpreted, rightly in his opinion, as leading to a chaos world; if weapons were distributed without the right to control them, then they were no more than American weapons stationed abroad.

The best thing to hope for was that the number of nuclear powers, i.e. the number of countries producing nuclear weapons, would remain limited. Chinese nuclear capability was now a fact. There would probably be another Asian nuclear power, because the Americans would probably favour some kind of nuclear equilibrium in Asia and would support either an Indian or a Japanese capability: if India manufactured her own bombs, it would not be difficult for the US to supply aircraft to deliver them. He hoped personally that the necessity for some measure of agreement on limiting the tensions created by nuclear weapons would come to be recognised by China, now that she was self-evidently a nuclear power, as it has already been recognised by the Americans and Russians; so as to avoid a chaos world.

Mr. Buchan expressed agreement with M. Vernant's basic thesis.

General Beaufre did not consider that M. Vernant's solution differed essentially from his own, in that they both saw the need to interpose some intermediate power between the Chinese and the Americans. A local stalemate was necessary in the Far East such as the Russians have succeeded in imposing on the United States over Cuba. He maintained his view that between chaos and the present situation, some nuclear dissemination would be necessary.

General del Marmol held that nuclear proliferation was inevitable, and it was no use the Americans being afraid of it. It would be a pity if the West alone stuck to the concept of a bipolar world. Time was working against monopoly, and unless the United States was prepared to modify her thinking Western interests as a whole would suffer and there would be more pressure among the European nations for producing their own nuclear weapons.

Dr. Gasteyger dissented from General del Marmol's argument. There was an excellent chance now to get some agreement on non-proliferation, simply because all the immediate candidates for nuclear power have achieved it.

Dr. Jaquet warned against limiting consideration of the political implications to American or European reactions: there was bound to be a very important internal debate in India. The simplest thing would be for India to develop her own bomb and try to defend her independence. But if the Indian Government decided against this, the essential political question would be whether to accept an American nuclear guarantee or whether to revert to the position of ten years ago of trying to appease

China. An essential element of Nehru's neutralist policy had been to keep on good terms with China, and we should not assume that even if the West thought a nuclear guarantee, or even a nuclear capability, reasonable for India the Indians would be ready to accept it. He felt that the only country in Asia ready to take the calculated risk would be Japan.

Taking up Dr. Ritter's suggestion of some Russian experts having defected to China, if an opposition group in the USSR favoured Chinese nuclear development, the question of co-operating with China in the nuclear field could become a political issue in the USSR.

Dr. Gasteyger did not support the supposition of a Soviet opposition group that would favour Chinese nuclear development; this would be against Russia's own interest, which was to preserve her monopoly within the communist bloc.

On the wider question of Sino-Soviet relations, there might be some rapprochement. On the other hand, the USSR might be more interested in helping India to counter-balance China's impact on Asia. China would always consider the United States as the major threat, even in Asia. Therefore, depending on developments in Sino-Soviet relations, a combined Russo-American effort to help counterbalance China's impact in Asia was quite conceivable, particularly along the lines of helping India with means of delivery.

Dr. Ritter shared Dr. Gasteyger's doubts about any future Soviet aid for Chinese nuclear development; but he disagreed with his assumption that circumstances favoured agreement on non-proliferation. Moscow needed some reconciliation with Peking because of the damage the split was doing within the communist movement and the resulting weakening of Moscow's control over the European satellites. Moscow had already indicated that she would maintain her general policy of co-existance, but she was bound to be more careful on the precise points which provoke Peking. The USSR would not move on non-proliferation and would not be favourable to solutions in which the USSR would be expected to make commitments with the West to limit the Chinese position in Asia.

Dr. Gasteyger (supported by M. Vernant) maintained that on the contrary, now that China was a nuclear power, a non-proliferation agreement would not be against her interests.

Signor Albonetti observed that everyone agreed that the fact of China having tested an atomic bomb increased the political influence of China and the political possibilities open to her. This in itself was a proliferating device, and it exploded the American (and some European) argument that a nation could be a political power without becoming a nuclear power, the idea that one could have a multipolar world with a bipolar nuclear system. The most important lesson of the Chinese test was that a non-proliferation agreement would be a mere piece of paper against the chain reaction of the political advantages now opened up to China. Perhaps proliferation might be opposed by new institutions and new thinking; but not by treaties.

Mr. Beaton, commenting on General Beaufre's proposition, did not believe that the Americans would be forced into some form of proliferation. In Europe the Americans have played every card they could think of in the problem of giving a nuclear guarantee without a nuclear weapon, because handing over a nuclear weapon was a once and for all act. On the other hand, the formal guarantee the Americans have given in Europe has been an American presence; while this has been politically acceptable to most of the NATO allies, and particularly to Germany, it might not be so acceptable to the Indians. He would not exclude an engagement of the British in relation to India. He foresaw a general interest in the Western world, and he thought in India also, in India obtaining a deterrent against the Chinese which would not be wholly Indian, so that a problem did not arise with Pakistan.

Mr. Buchan pointed to a crucial difference between the Far East and Europe in that however rapid the Chinese advance in the nuclear field, it would be a long time before they offered any threat to the continental United States. Therefore the US could offer more credible guarantees to Asian countries, in the opinion of some Europeans, than she could to Europe.

He believed the Americans would go to great lengths to avoid dissemination to Asian countries, on the principle of avoiding chaos. Moreover there was the practical problem that apart from India and Japan, no Asian country was competent to handle nuclear weapons. India had a quarrel with China, which made her unsuitable as a general counterbalance to Chinese preponderance in the area; the feeling in Japan against any association with nuclear weapons was growing stronger, not weaker, and there was a strong Japanese desire not to get into a strong adversary relationship with China; Australia was not an Asian power.

He thought it possible for the Americans to negotiate some sort of guarantee pact - not a collective defence pact - with American aircraft based either on carriers or perhaps in Australia. He did not believe personally that the Chinese test would affect the Labour Government's desire to take the independence out of the British independent deterrent; others might disagree, however, and there was a strong emotional Labour tie with India.

Mr. Beaton reaffirmed his view that the whole question of independence was nominal, an argument about words and not reality. He saw no reason why Britain should not commit a TSR2 force outside Europe to the defence of India. But he thought the British would be very inclined to try for a joint Anglo-American guarantee, or a Commonwealth-American guarantee including Australia and Canada.

M. Vernant agreed that independence was a purely nominal question, although in politics names were very important. If India asked Britain as a member of the Commonwealth to give some kind of nuclear guarantee, or if the US committed itself by a physical presence to guarantee India, that would have political significance. And considered from China's point of view, he suggested a British nuclear force based in India would not constitute so much of a threat as an American force.

Mr. Haagerup did not see why a physical presence in India would be required, once a guarantee was given. If he were Chinese, he would be horrified at the prospect of offering any provocation to the United States to eliminate the growing Chinese nuclear power.

Mr. Buchan mentioned an expert opinion offered at the Oxford Conference that a Chinese bomb would lower the nuclear threshhold, because if China were a nuclear power the curse of the bomb being a white man's weapon would be lifted; thus the United States might, in the event of a quarrel with China, be much readier to consider using nuclear weapons than in the past.

He anticipated that we should see imported into American commitments in the Far East, in Anzus, Seato and the bilateral treaty relationships, the same arguments about a consultative relationship as have bedevilled NATO.

General del Marmol raised the question whether China's admission to the United Nations would be more likely as the result of her test.

M. Vernant believed it would. In a few years' time he expected to see China in the Security Council; this would be a good thing and a way of avoiding a chaos world. In his view, it was a matter of the Republic of China occupying the seat for China; Formosa could be left an open question.

Dr. Gasteyger saw the only problem as how to get Formosa out of the United Nations.

Dr. Ritter (supported by Mr. Haagerup) disagreed. The United States was ready to compromise over Formosa, but not to disown the Chinese Nationalists, certainly not before some progress was made on South-East Asia problems.

Mr. Beaton believed China would gain admission in any event this time, because the French have tipped the balance (at least that was the American conclusion). He did not believe the Chinese bomb would have the slightest effect, and he thought it would be a great pity if it were suggested that she got into the United Nations as a result of becoming a nuclear power.

Signor Albonetti (supported by M. Vernant) pointed out that whether the Chinese test had any effect or not, it was an additional argument for admitting China, and it could be a useful argument to convince American public opinion.

Mr. Buchan drew this section of the discussion to a close.

FRIDAY AFTERNOON, 23rd OCTOBER

NATO AS A MULTINATIONAL ALLIANCE

Mr. Buchan drew attention to the outline paper which had been circulated. Since the time available for discussion was limited, he suggested leaving aside consideration of sections (1) and (2). Section (3) contained three assumptions: that the MLF would come into being and that Britain would join; that Britain and France would remain nuclear powers; that the United States is becoming more dependent on the support of her European allies.

It was agreed to open the discussion with consideration of these assumptions.

Will the MLF come into being?

Mr. Buchan reaffirmed his view that the MLF would come into being and that the British Government would in practice find it impossible to remain outside, although every effort would be made to modify the proposal in its current form. Asked about the type of modification Britain would seek, he mentioned specifically the Government's hostility to the German ideas about majority control according to the size of the contribution. He added that he did not personally share the American and German enthusiasm for the MLF, and in his paper went on to argue that the MLF could not provide a complete solution to the problems of confidence and commitment within the alliance; however, he did feel that it must be accepted as a factor to be dealt with.

Dr. Ritter, in reply to a question, said there was no such thing as a "von Hassel plan", merely preliminary proposals which have been worked out on a rather low level. These would not be an obstacle in negotiating modifications. So far the Germans and Americans had reached agreement on the structure of the MLF: the only problem was that this should not be bilateral; the control aspect would be the main topic during the next phase of the negotiations. If Britain joined the negotiations, new points of negotiation would emerge.

M. Vernant, Mr. Beaton and General Beaufre all challenged Mr. Buchan's first assumption.

General Beaufre added that the military arguments which were the original justification for the MLF were out of date, because the defence side of NATO was less important now. What the alliance really needed was some common planning, common understanding and collective control of nuclear strategy; this would not be done through the MLF but through something else. One could argue that the MLF might become that something else, but that was another matter.

Mr. Buchan and Mr. Haagerup agreed that the old arguments in favour of the MLF had disappeared. But new arguments have taken their place; furthermore a great many political reputations have become attached to it.

Signor Albonetti did not see any alternative to the MLF. It was easy for the French or the British to say that what we need is not 25 ships but joint planning and control, because they have something to coordinate and control. But what influence would the Germans or Italians or Belgians have when it came to common planning if they had nothing to contribute? He could understand the desire to modify the MLF, but he did not believe it could be replaced, otherwise all the old arguments and bitterness between the nuclear and non-nuclear powers in Europe would persist.

Mr. Beaton pointed out that Germany contributed the principal land forces of the alliance, and the principal territory; this was a highly significant contribution.

Dr. Ritter argued that this was irrelevant. Without the MLF, German pressure for obtaining tactical nuclear weapons would grow stronger because their anxieties about the nuclear threshhold would become more acute. The idea of joining in common planning and coordination without having anything to contribute was inconceivable. In a sense, the MLF was the minimum fare for joining a system that would give the consultation that General Beaufre had in mind. If the MLF proposal as such foundered, it would have to be replaced by something else; the problem would not be solved by sending two officers to Washington.

General del Marmol did not see Signor Albonetti's point. The MLF would not add anything to the existing supply of nuclear weapons in their respective air forces and ground forces; moreover there would be so many vetoes that the member countries would have something less, not more, than they have now.

Signor Albonetti maintained that it was the feeling of possessing, and paying for, part of a nuclear fleet which mattered, the feeling of having embarked on a path which may lead to a European-American partnership. Of course if the MLF were to be no more than an organisation of national vetoes it would be foolish to support it; but everyone has understood that this is just a first step.

General Beaufre appreciated Dr. Ritter's argument; but by joining the MLF in its present form the Germans would be absorbed into a piece of American machinery and would have no power to change anything. The longer the negotiations lasted, the more likelihood of a better solution emerging. But although what emerged might be called a MLF, it would in reality be a different proposition.

Looked at from the inside, the destiny of the MLF was to become a MNF, i.e. for the same rules as now apply to the Tactical Air Forces to be applied to the 25 ships. The real problem was not the manning of the ships but the control of the weapons. He believed that when the problems of control and planning had been solved the MLF would become a multinational system, but with a higher degree of multinational control. The MLF should also be looked at from the outside. The USSR has strongly opposed the concept from the outset. If Sino-Soviet relations improve, it would not be inconceivable for the Russians to blackmail the Americans with the threat of co-operation with China. From the American side, in such a situation the MLF could well be used as a bargaining counter.

Signor Albonetti countered that the Soviet opposition set a value on membership of the MLF. Personally he used to be against the MLF, for the same reasons as General Beaufre; but he had come round to the opinion that for Germany and Italy at least, participation in the MLF was an essential step towards convincing public opinion of the need for a greater commitment in the nuclear field. Public opinion in those countries was not so mature as in France. He feared that if the MLF did not come into being, public opinion in Germany and Italy would turn neutralist.

It was agreed at this point to note the division of opinion and move on to the second assumption.

Will Britain and France remain nuclear powers?

There was no disposition to challenge this assumption.

Is American dependence on her allies increasing?

Mr. Buchan explained that he did not mean dependent as in the old sense when the US needed medium bomber bases in Europe. Militarily the US was less dependent on her allies than ever before, but she did depend on allied support for a whole range of politico-strategic questions. The need to develop ententes with her allies was felt more strongly in the US than five years ago. The idea that she could have an independent Far Eastern policy, for example, has given way to second thoughts. It was significant that Goldwater had criticised the Administration for mismanaging America's allies, not for having allies.

General Beaufre and Mr. Haagerup agreed, although the latter was concerned over the possible American reaction to continued lack of European support for her Far Eastern policy.

Dr. Jaquet suggested that it made a difference whether the United States wanted European support or European advice. Was she likely to make her Far Eastern policy one of allied planning?

Mr. Buchan doubted whether the US would seek European advice unless she expected the Europeans to do things; but there was a disadvantage in the US not having any proper conversation with France, for instance, about Far Eastern policy because the differences between those two countries were much smaller than public statements would indicate.

Mr. Beaton considered it impossible to talk about the importance of the allies to the Americans without recognising that this involved many factors, such as economic aid and trade, which were outside the Commission's immediate constituency. He saw no strong case on strategic grounds for American dependence on her European allies, except that it would be intolerable for Western Europe to fall under Soviet domination. The position was however very different viewed in economic terms, especially in view of the Kennedy Round negotiations.

Effect of the MLF on NATO

Mr. Buchan brought the discussion back to point (4) of his paper, the suggestion that in terms of NATO as a whole the MLF would raise as many problems as it would solve.

Dr. Gasteyger pointed out that the Ricketts report was very critical of the first experiment in mixed-manning. Wide differences in rates of pay, maintenance of discipline, the system of command and so on had given rise to considerable difficulties. Perhaps more thought should be given to how a mixed-manned ship would work in practice. The Swiss experience in manning forts over a period of time with Swiss nationals from different regions of the country was not encouraging.

Mr. Beaton considered the pay problem fundamental.

Mr. Buchan did not accept that mixed-manning presented insoluble difficulties.

General del Marmol challenged the assumption in section (4) that no country would enter the MLF unless it had a veto. As a representative of a small country, he did not agree. Belgium was used to depending on others for her security, and not being a nuclear power this state of affairs would doubtless continue. If some majority solution were reached, he did not see why Belgium should not agree. We should all try to be less nationalistic: if everyone had a veto, no decision would ever be taken.

Dr. Jaquet did not know what the official Dutch position was, although he imagined it would be along the same lines as the Belgian.

Mr. Beaton supported the view expressed in the paper and pressed General del Marmol. Highly difficult situations must be reckoned with which could not be forecast. Would Belgian political leaders really accept that they could be launched into war against their will? Would national parliaments accept this when it came to a vote?

General del Marmol replied that in 1914 and 1939 Belgium had been given no choice. The value of the nuclear weapon was as a deterrent. With a majority vote, the value of a deterrent would be greater because its possible use was more likely.

Mr. Buchan asked if there was general agreement that the multilateral solution, by virtue of the fact that decisions have to be taken multinationally, could not be a comprehensive solution, could not successfully embrace SAC or the Polaris system or the ready weapons on which European security depended?

Signor Albonetti suggested that the answer depended on the system of control within the MLF. A majority voting system could make the MLF more credible. Provided there was effective consultation, he would support a majority vote.

Dr. Ritter agreed that the MLF was not a solution in itself, because the main concern was to find a structure of co-operation. But if the MLF would serve as a means to this end, it should be supported. He was very interested in exploring General Beaufre's ideas of what might evolve from discussions on the MLF concept; he did feel, however, that participation in an MLF would be a valuable experience in itself and could well stimulate the search for a better arrangement.

General Beaufre did not see why Germany should feel obliged to pass through the MLF. With her Pershing missiles and her air squadrons equipped with nuclear weapons she had sufficient participation in the nuclear field for discussion and understanding of the problem. His whole point was that the

nuclear problem must be separated into its two components: push-button management and crisis management. The decision on firing was, and must remain, a national one; there could be no collective solution to the push-button problem. But there was a collective solution to the problem of crisis management. He saw no point in an exceedingly costly arrangement to build up additional means of nuclear delivery when what the alliance lacked was a means of handling crisis management and the threat of nuclear weapons.

Signor Albonetti did not disagree with General Beaufre's argument that crisis management was the real problem. But he failed to see how a nation could exert any influence in crisis management unless it had a certain physical capability as a bargaining point.

General Beaufre referred to the present double key arrangement in which Italy shared. Participation in the MLF would not even confer that degree of control. Mr. Beaton supported him.

Signor Albonetti replied that General Beaufre was forgetting public opinion. He reiterated that participation in the MLF would confer a bargaining power. If the MLF did not work, the way would then be open for a national nuclear solution. The only way to persuade Italian public opinion to accept a more national participation in nuclear sharing was through the MLF.

Mr. Buchan interposed that there was sense in the argument that experience over the past twenty years had shown that people do not successfully coordinate their views if they are merely talking about strategy or ideas in the abstract.

General Beaufre (supported by M. Vernant) was prepared to defend the contrary: part of the problem the Europeans faced in their dealings with Washington was that the overall strategic aspect had been lost sight of in the detailed day-to-day work.

General del Marmol agreed; what was wrong with the NATO organisation was the American insistence that strategic studies were their own business.

Mr. Buchan agreed on this point. But with the MLF, for the first time the allies would be mixed up in an organisation possessing strategic weapons.

Dr. Ritter suggested that in discounting the value of the MLF General Beaufre and Mr. Beaton were overlooking the political problem. The whole point was that Washington would not be able to handle the MLF like a national entity - to treat it planning-wise like the Strategic Air Command, for example. He asked General Beaufre to explain his ideas in greater detail.

General Beaufre said there were two aspects: (1) crisis management, i.e. how to use the threat of nuclear weapons and determine strategy before the firing of the first weapon; (2) how to coordinate indirect strategies in the world. The way to achieve these aims was to start with a full study of the concept of nuclear strategy. To begin with great discrepancies would be apparent between the various national points of view, but by a process of mutual education the viewpoints would come closer together. This would come about little by little through a study lasting perhaps up to three years. After that time the allies would have the appropriate machinery and the concepts to use it.

The aim would be to have a team game in a crisis, some members playing a very strong line while others adopted a more flexible attitude, so as to achieve results by indirect methods. In a crisis a greater threat would be presented to the Russians by this team than by the Americans acting alone, because the enemy was more easily confused when there were many centres of decision. Castro in Cuba had changed the game.

Was any discussion on the MLF which started from the argument of who presses the button meaningful? He hoped nobody would press the button. But what use could we make of the MLF before the button was pressed? Suppose there were a crisis in Central Europe. What should NATO do in such a situation, before the question of pressing the button arose? The vital need was for machinery to deal with that situation, not machinery to be used in the old NATO concept of zero hour.

Dr. Ritter fully accepted General Beaufre's reasoning. But he did not agree with his complete identification of the MLF with the push-button problem, although the push-button problem was part of the picture. The problem of encouraging the will towards mutual involvement did exist for certain countries and he still felt that the MLF could play a useful role in this regard.

Signor Albonetti added that with the MLF there would be more cards to play in crisis management.

General Beaufre rejoined that if he were the German Chancellor with 12 divisions, he would call that a very strong card.

Crisis management has enjoyed one success - the Berlin problem. During his term in Washington a four-power group was initiated to study Berlin, and by the time he left, after two years, mutual understanding had been built up and the group was working well. If the equivalent existed for other problems, we should have something very strong. And there was an important lesson to be drawn from consideration of the Berlin problem. There was no question in the Berlin group of using nuclear weapons; but in a crisis, escalation may be more likely with conventional weapons. Therefore coordination was needed for the use of conventional as well as nuclear weapons. But the root of coordination was common understanding.

Dr. Ritter doubted the relevance of the Berlin planning to other situations. In his view the pressures already experienced over Berlin were below the threshhold of a real crisis; if the pressure became stronger, he was not convinced that the planning group would work.

Crisis Management

Mr. Buchan suggested that the heart of the discussion had been reached. General Beaufre's views had been expressed on previous occasions, Mr. Beaton's views on crisis management and a cabinet were the subject of a recent Adelphi Paper. If some flesh were put on these bones, they would present some alternative to the MLF if the concept did break down. He therefore suggested (with general agreement) that the remainder of the discussion be spent on this idea of crisis management.

Mr. Buchan drew attention to the groups of questions at the end of his paper concerning the aspects of sovereignty which the NATO powers will not relinquish and those which they might relinquish, the various factors which would be involved in any institutional arrangement and the effect of this upon NATO. He invited General Beaufre to begin by elaborating his views on the study and thorough discussion of strategy and the institutional means of doing this.

General Beaufre stressed that it was essential for this study to be initiated at a very high level, preferably by a permanent committee of the chiefs of staff of national defence and possibly of the direct representatives of the heads of government. Such people could not spend too much time in discussion, therefore after an opening session a standing committee - perhaps the Standing Group - could take over and submit a monthly report to their chiefs of staff.

Mr. Buchan objected that committees of national representatives get nowhere: there is a restatement of national positions and an agreement to differ. Could General Beaufre point to any committee, particularly a 15-nation committee, that had done first-caass work and advanced the thinking of the alliance?

General Beaufre replied that he was not thinking of a committee of 15 nations but of a sub-committee of three to five, although the number was not so important. Mr. Buchan was right about these national committees. The reason was that sufficiently high-level people did not participate. Discussion would be useless between people who had neither authority nor influence with their national governments. First-class people must be involved in this study from the outset, so that in essence the heaas of government themselves would be involved. Of course discussions would begin on the basis of national positions, but gradually with the spread of mutual understanding views would be more and more convergent. This could not be a speedy process. The most important thing would be the choice of a suitable chairman; he would have to be an exceptional man, but such men did exist.

Mr. Buchan pressed his point. Had a successful consensus been achieved in any other field by this means?

General Beaufre pointed to the Common Market.

Mr. Buchan replied that the Common Market was brought about through the activities of a very energetic minority group, not by representatives of governments; he saw this as the key.

M. Vernant added that the Common Market was a success not so much because of the perfection of the institution itself but because the achievement of a single economic unit was the common political aim of the six governments concerned. They may have differed on the means, but they all agreed on the end. Therefore would not the success of General Beaufre's study group also depend on the existence of agreement on general policy on the part of the governments concerned? The questions posed at the end of Mr. Buchan's paper were highly relevant. We must recognise that differences exist within the alliance not only in terms of strategy but also in terms of high policy concepts. If policies are divergent, then any committee representing heads of government could only express these divergencies.

General Beaufre accepted this point, but maintained that two types of coordination were required, one for indirect strategy and one for nuclear strategy. Nuclear strategy was not the key, it was one of the tools. But if we wanted to make some use of the nuclear threat in a crisis we must find a means; and the only way to achieve this was through proper communication and better understanding.

Signor Albonetti said there could be no disagreement that coordination of policies was at the heart of crisis management. But in the world of practical politics, coordination had to start on the basis of different points of view and different powers. Could anyone deny that France's influence in discussions on crisis management would be greater as the result of her determination to become a nuclear power? Of course nuclear power was not the only source of power available to a country, but it was the most significant for imposing that country's view in this exercise of coordination, whatever the problem.

This brought him back to the MLF which could improve, even if only on psychological grounds, the bargaining position of countries which cannot be independent nuclear powers. It was no accident that the candidates for the MLF were potential nuclear powers. Even in negotiations on reconciling strategic concepts it was better not to be just one of fifteen.

General del Marmol suggested that Signor Albonetti was setting too much store by the bargaining aspect. After all, we were allies, trying to find a common approach to a security problem which involved us all.

On the point at issue, he still believed results could be achieved within NATO. A great weakness of NATO was to have the Council in Paris and the military organisation in Washington. He broadly agreed with General Beaufre that political people as well as the military must be brought into these discussions; if the NATO Council and Standing Group were in the same place this would be a start.

Mr. Beaton saw two elements militating against a common strategy: mutual ignorance, and conflict of interest. General Beaufre was quite right in his idea for dealing with mutual ignorance, although he had tended to over-emphasise this aspect of the problem. There was a very considerable degree of conflict of interest which was permanently with us and must be permanently reconciled. Given the fact of our operating through sovereign states which have their own rules, it was unavoidable that in the event of a breakdown their aims will be divergent.

Taking up Signor Albonetti's point, he would suggest that certain countries (and in particular Germany) did not have the capacity to embark on an independent policy because of the extreme military problem for them. A German de Gaulle could not play the kind of game which the French President had played over the past three or four years. Therefore for anyone bargaining with the Germans, nuclear weapons or an independent German policy did not come into the question.

A real source of a country's influence was in the long term the effect on every other country of its pursuing an independent policy. Contrasting the British and French use of their respective freedom of action, he would judge it more effective for a country to bargain with its capacity to act rather than to exhaust its credit by using that capacity.

Signor Albonetti returned to the MLF. The Americans saw this force as a means of educating non-nuclear powers in the exercise of nuclear responsibility. This education process was necessary, especially for certain European countries. But everything depended on developments within Europe. If the Europeans were to develop political institutions, and if the British and French were subsequently to decide not to proceed with their national deterrents, then the European clause could come into operation.

Mr. Buchan commented that Signor Albonetti did not want the multilateral force at all, but the control group. But would that control group supersede any kind of institutional arrangement we possessed in the meantime?

General del Marmol wondered whether it would not be possible to try and arrive at other arrangements for strategic planning before signing the MLF, to achieve something else as a bargaining counter.

General Beaufre would go further: play the MLF game, achieve some machinery for the higher coordination of strategy and crisis management, and then bargain the MLF with the Russians against some advantage.

Dr. Ritter felt that the Russian opposition to the MLF was being treated rather lightly. However, he was more immediately concerned with the German problem he had touched on earlier. Given Germany's exposed position and the special problem she faced in relation to the nuclear threshhold, the mutual involvement within the MLF would be of tremendous importance to her and must be looked at in this context. Would the type of organisation which General Beaufre had in mind, after the MLF was bargained away, also tackle this particular planning problem? This was the key consideration for the Germans.

General Beaufre appreciated Dr. Ritter's concern, but he maintained that no progress could be made by looking at the situation from the technical angle. It was essential to keep the overall picture in mind.

Mr. Buchan drew the discussion to a close.

SATURDAY MORNING, 24th OCTOBER

NATO AS A MULTINATIONAL ALLIANCE (cont.)

Mr. Buchan recalled that the previous day's discussion had been left at the point that whether the MLF came into being or not, there would have to be some overhaul of the general concept of strategic planning and crisis management in the alliance. If the MLF did not come into being it would be a matter of urgency to offer the Italians and Germans something which fulfils the same purpose as the MLF, the purpose being not to bring new weapons systems into being but to devise a more satisfactory form of political and military relationship with the United States. This would be equally necessary if the MLF did come into effect, in order to avoid a split between the members of the MLF and the member countries of the Atlantic alliance that remained outside.

He suggested that if the MLF did come into being, the principal proponents of a new arrangement for NATO as a whole would be the Germans, because otherwise they would be in a very difficult and schizophrenic position vis-a-vis France. He could not believe that Germany wished to strengthen her relations with the US at the expense of sacrificing her relations with France altogether.

He referred to the ideas General Beaufre had outlined about the need for a more fundamental form of strategic discussion. The Commission had not yet considered, however, the changes and developments in the kind of arrangements we already have within the Alliance that would make possible this much more fundamental and prolonged kind of strategic reappraisal, or a system of crisis management. He considered that Mr. Beaton's ideas on institutional means of crisis management (sketched out in his Adelphi Paper) needed a great deal more discussion.

He therefore suggested first considering NATO as an institution or series of institutions, to see whether it was worth trying to reform it or whether it should be by-passed and new techniques and machinery created, and then moving to consideration of Mr. Beaton's ideas on crisis management. It was agreed to proceed with the discussion on this basis.

NATO as an institution

Mr. Buchan drew attention to the series of questions on page 7 of his paper beginning "Why has NATO and its subordinate organisations been such a comparative failure as a system of international politico-military planning?" Did members feel that NATO, with its Council in Paris and the Standing Group in Washington and the system of Supreme Command, was still broadly what we were looking for, or were we looking for something much nearer the heart of power, a small centre with a good deal more influence in Washington?

Professor Howard observed that in his paper Mr. Buchan had suggested two possible explanations for things having gone wrong: the fault of member governments or faults in the structure of the organisation. But there was a third element, the dimensions of the problem itself.

NATO must be viewed as part of a world system. For the United States NATO was only one segment of a global spectrum of problems; for Britain the same, although a much larger segment; for France a larger segment still, but she still had other interests; for Germany NATO was virtually the totality of her problems; for other members of the alliance it was a matter of the defence of their frontiers. Thus each member country had a different type of investment in the problem. This fundamental difficulty could not be solved by improving the mechanism or the organisation.

M. Vernant supported Professor Howard. NATO was an instrument of policy. In the case of a well-defined military problem like Berlin, agreement was easy to reach. But there could be no easy agreement, or perhaps no agreement at all, on broader political problems involving long-term or short-term planning because these problems are viewed differently by the various states. Thus it was not a matter of institutions.

In his paper Mr. Buchan questioned whether the existence of an MLF control group would weaken the working of NATO itself. He recalled precisely the same objection being raised against the creation of Western European Union. But it was not WEU which has weakened NATO, nor would the MLF have this effect (although he doubted whether the MLF would come into being): NATO was weakened, and would continue to be weakened, by many other causes.

Dr. Jaquet suggested that the fault lay also with the treaty and the philosophy behind it. The treaty was limited to the defence of the territory of the member states, and the philosophy was that the US was not prepared (at least at that time) to share power with her allies, and perhaps did not want to share power in Asia and Africa with colonial powers. But the colonial powers have largely withdrawn from Asia and Africa, while since the report of the Three Wise Men there has been this idea of coordinating extra-European policies and United States policy on this question is somewhat different now. He suggested that the ex-colonial powers would have to reconsider their position before they would be ready now to share world-wide responsibility with the US in areas where they no longer have a direct interest. This problem was bound to arise as soon as the broadening of NATO was considered.

General Beaufre said that his views were on record on the need to remould the NATO institutions. But of course institutions were not the key to the problem, because institutions were the by-product of many contemporaneous considerations. It might be more logical, for instance, for the Standing Group to sit in Paris, but it might make better political sense to keep it in Washington. We needed the best practical solution in terms of current political realities, not the best diagram. Hence his previous proposition that the key to any sound reorganisation was to extend the scope of the alliance to a global nuclear strategy, by which he meant crisis management and how to achieve the best deterrent; if we did not do that, we would do nothing.

The other problem, which was on a different level, was to extend and build up some organisation to coordinate indirect strategies in the world. This might well not be tackled inside NATO, because many NATO countries have no world commitments and would thus see matters differently. But the mechanism for achieving this coordination would depend on the possibilities available at any given time.

In answer to a question from Dr. Jaquet, General Beaufre added that although decisions would be put in the context of world policy, he had never envisaged one common world policy. A single indirect strategy for the West was not feasible; but it was feasible to coordinate our various strategies so as not to play into the hands of the other side.

Mr. Haagerup was strongly of the opinion that it would be more feasible to think of some kind of institutional link for coordinating the global policies of the greater powers outside the scope of NATO. Despite his personal interest in the search for new ideas, he had to admit that opinion in the Scandinavian countries preferred the NATO of the past, not the NATO of the future. The old NATO gave a sense of stability, whereas the new NATO has some disquieting features. The feeling against involvement in things not conceived as part of their direct interest was very strong. He was not thinking specifically of crisis management, although it touched upon that aspect too; quite a few of the crises we were visualising would be crises outside the NATO area, and some of the member countries would definitely wish to be kept outside what is going on. Therefore the problem was how to preserve the existing links with those countries that did not want to be involved with the coordination of global policies, as well as to devise machinery for such coordination.

Signor Albonetti considered that the full effects of the revolution brought about by nuclear strategy had still to be felt. The concepts of territories, distances and frontiers no longer existed. The West could be threatened by events in Cyprus or Italy or a state even further from the Eastern border. Another effect of this revolution was the end of the bipolar world, because of the emergence of different centres of initiative within the Western and Eastern worlds. He had no doubt that these centres of political initiative would become centres of nuclear initiative and power; this may not be desirable, but it was inevitable. It had nothing to do with the need for more military power, it was entirely a matter of national pride and independence and to a certain extent national interests.

It was also inevitable that this would make it even more difficult for the Western alliance to hold together. An Atlantic alliance based on 5 or 6 or 8 nuclear powers could not work well. Perhaps discussion would be easier, because the European members would not suffer from such an inferiority complex, but still an alliance with up to 8 centres of real political initiative could be dangerous. Therefore if we wanted an Atlantic alliance which worked, we could not accept too many centres of political and nuclear initiative. The overriding need was to find a different equilibrium on the European side. While this must involve political institutions, it was not sufficient to have a consultative body, however strong on paper: there must be an equilibrium of strength. The dangerous unbalance was due to an inferiority complex in some countries, a sense of impotence which blinded them to the common interest. Contradictory as it may sound, if Europe were more united, or if individual countries had more strength, they would feel a stronger relationship with the US and would be more aware of the need to defend western civilisation than they are today.

M. Vernant suggested everyone would agree that NATO had become less important in recent years, and that this trend would continue. This was because NATO was essentially a military structure designed to counter the threat of Soviet military aggression in Europe, while it was obvious (and generally agreed) that this threat had receded. Thus while the function of NATO would continue, the reason for its existence was less valid now. On the other hand the political problems which the member countries had to face and would face in the future were in a different direction, and he did not believe those policy problems either would or could be raised inside the NATO framework.

Dr. Ritter stressed that while there was room for criticism of NATO, it was nevertheless well suited to the German situation. From the German point of view, it was premature to think of a major change in NATO before the situation in East Europe and the USSR were more developed so that real new aspects for German policy emerged. Obviously better instruments for crisis management were needed and the various possibilities should be explored; but it was much too soon to think of replacing NATO as an organisation.

He feared that if the idea that NATO was not essentially the best institution were to take hold, a very dangerous situation could develop in Germany. So far the interest in trying out new approaches towards dealing with the Eastern side had not affected the firm stand in the West; but this interest in opening up new possibilities was growing stronger, and if NATO were at the same time shown to be more fragile he would be apprehensive about the effect on public opinion.

Professor Howard opined that if the German people were to come to feel that their problem of reunification would best be served by some process of negotiations with the Eastern bloc, very few people in the West would stand in their way. This was largely an internal German problem; he did not like the implication that NATO should be preserved in order to strengthen the hand of one internal political group within Germany.

Dr. Ritter could not agree that it was an internal German problem. This could only be the case if it were merely a question of Bonn becoming a little more flexible so as to normalise the split to a certain extent; this was very much a British idea, but he did not see the Germans accepting it. The German question was an important element in the East-West conflict; it must be viewed in the context of breaking up the old fixed structure on the Eastern side and bringing about a general improvement in East-West relations. There was a considerable volume of opinion in favour of increased trade with the DDR and talks with Ulbricht and so on. If the world were to give Germany the impression that this was regarded as just an internal question, then some day the Germans might take steps on the grounds of national interest which their allies might not like.

Mr. Haagerup agreed about the importance of NATO for Germany. Germany's smaller neighbours strongly welcomed and supported her commitment to NATO. To them, NATO was an instrument tying Germany to the Western world and preventing her from becoming an independent, drifting, Central European power. This function of NATO must not be overlooked.

Professor Howard said of course there really was no such thing as an internal issue. But if there was going to be any sort of eventual settlement in central Europe, it must come about through the two halves of Germany growing together (by which he meant something much wider than an agreement with Ulbricht) and through increasingly good relations between the two halves of a single continent. Anything which encouraged the German people to accept this was desirable, and vice-versa. Everyone knew this question was a matter of genuine disagreement in Germany at the moment; we outside could only watch this with sympathy, realise that there was a great deal to be said on both sides, and trust that by the democratic process an intelligent process of evolution would occur.

Dr. Ritter warned that too much attention should not be paid to the dialogue between various German personalities on different ways of handling the East-West problem; this reflected a power struggle within the CDU-CSU coalition rather than a genuine difference of opinion. There was no significant policy difference even between the CDU and the SPD. Among people involved in dealing with the problem, as opposed to intellectual circles, the German problem really was viewed in the context of the whole East-West conflict and not in terms of normalising the status quo.

Professor Howard resumed the thread of his argument. M. Vernant had raised the most fundamental question: how far did the military threat of the dimensions which made it necessary to create NATO still exist? This threat had receded, but very few would say that it did not exist and would not ever resuscitate. There was still a requirement for a military alliance. Second, was the commitment of the US to Europe, which was the original purpose of the treaty, weaker than in 1949? Personally he did not think so; the US commitment was cast-iron. Third, irrespective of what American policy was, did the European nations feel they could do without the US vis-a-vis the USSR? He hoped they did not, even if they were able to create the single united unit which Signor Albonetti advocated.

If the answers to these three questions were as he had suggested, then our discussion was not about military problems and military organisations at all; it was about political problems. Therefore we should look at NATO in a political context and consider it as just one of the strands linking the nations of the Atlantic community.

On the problem of a NATO common global strategy, it would be most desirable if this could be created. But a fundamental rule of political power, as of commerce, was that voting rights are determined by the number of shares. The fact that Europe was affected by anything the United States did was not sufficient argument for the Europeans to have a say in American policy outside the European area. He did not see the possibility of a global strategy with a sort of single board of control so long as the US had such a vast predominance of the power to make her will effective in parts of the world outside Europe.

Mr. Beaton questioned whether the US had this vast predominance. Statistics such as "97% of the nuclear power of the West" were useless. In terms of the actual forces of the US in relation to her present and prospective commitments, it could not be argued that the Americans did not have a great need for a considerable accretion of support from allies such as they have raised in Europe.

His main point, however, was that institutions should be looked at to see if they existed to solve a particular problem or to give an excuse for not solving it. NATO was to some extent a piece of machinery for making tolerable to the Europeans the fact that their defence was in American hands. The MLF was quite clearly designed not to solve the problem of giving the Germans and others a say in the nuclear problems of the alliance but to avoid this problem. It was a great source of surprise to him that the German Government should have believed the MLF would give them an entrée to a problem when it was really sealing off the problem for a few years, until it would be acceptable for the Americans to do the really hard thing which was to introduce Dr. Erhard into the next Cuba crisis and let him have a real say. This was our real objective, although it would be very difficult to achieve. Therefore we should look very carefully at any institutions.

We must face the fundamental problem of how to make NATO produce for us effective unity. Everything achieved so far had really been done by Stalin and Khrushchev by putting up at appropriate moments a really severe challenge to which the only response was Western unity. But he was concerned that the Russians would be taken less and less seriously, because they have taken their challenge too far and their weakness to take any aggressive options has been demonstrated. Professor Howard's question whether Europe could get along without the US might one day produce a "yes". Underlying this question was the assumption that Western Europe and the US could cohabit in the world without coming into conflict. His private nightmare was that in the absence of unity we may drift into irritation and conflict of a character no-one could predict. Setting aside the Soviet threat, the dangers of disunity were so great that the West must recognise the need for a positive urge to create unity for its own sake. This could only be achieved if we had the sense of creating a world system.

General Beaufre fully agreed that in the narrow sense of the defence of Europe NATO was less important now. But the basic problem of overall deterrence in the world remained. This overall deterrence was a by-product of the balance and the bipolar opposition of the two big powers. The freedom of action of the French and the British and the Italians and everyone else depended upon it, and from that point of view NATO was vitally important. Moreover Dr. Ritter's point about the importance of NATO to Germany was valid. These two factors made NATO essential.

However, NATO should today be looked at from the standpoint of deterrence rather than defence. This might well imply a change in institutions. SHAPE would be relatively less important, the Standing Group more important. The main thing was to recognise that NATO was a local organisation, because of nations like the Scandinavians and even Benelux who did not want to be involved in wider commitments. This was why NATO must be headed by something higher to deal with world problems.

Mr. Buchan entirely agreed that NATO could only work well as a local alliance; all those people who have regarded NATO as the master alliance of the West were mistaken. Indeed, he doubted whether any of the Three Wise Men would subscribe today to their ideas of 1956-7.

He suggested the right course was to improve NATO as a European defence mechanism and try to organise some system of political coordination among those non-communist powers that are in treaty or have a relationship with the US. He could not imagine an effective system of coordination, particularly against indirect strategies, unless at some point the Japanese and the Indians and the Australians were involved as well as the French and British and Americans. Was there not a case, therefore, for dropping a lot of the pretence of the NATO Council being an organisation with world-wide responsibility and developing machinery, perhaps informal, for consultation (he would suggest in Washington) among those countries which do have world-wide responsibilities, which are Western orientated but outside the Atlantic area? He also made the point that at least three NATO countries - Norway, Denmark and Canada - were becoming much more interested in their United Nations role than in their place in NATO.

Mr. Haagerup was very interested in Mr. Buchan's suggestion. He saw a danger, however, that such machinery might have the psychological disadvantage of appearing as a sort of new rich, white and strongman's military set-up outside the United Nations. He was thinking particularly of the challenge from China and the political problems the West faced among the developing countries. Was it totally unrealistic to visualise the possibility of such machinery at least cooperating informally with the United Nations on some problems? For instance, the peace-keeping duties undertaken by troops from smaller NATO nations could not be carried out without the logistic support of the United States: why not take advantage of this? Psychologically much would be gained (a) if this machinery were kept on an informal basis, and (b) if an attempt was made to have some of the problems deterred, if not solved, through the United Nations or at least with the approval of a majority of the United Nations. Despite the USSR's strong opposition to the peace-keeping role of the General Assembly, he felt the Soviet Union might well adopt a neutral attitude towards such machinery if it were associated with the UN, because her own interests might indirectly be served, whereas she would be forced to take measures against it if it were exclusively outside the UN.

General del Marmol too was doubtful about the reaction in the smaller countries to Mr. Buchan's idea. It might accentuate the feeling that a few powers will direct the world and thus give rise to further political difficulties.

He suggested we were a little too pessimistic about the possibilities for consultation within NATO; during his term as Secretary General M. Spaak had built up rather a good organisation for this. The main reason why this did not seem to work well now was the policy of General de Gaulle. He still believed it would be possible to get results through consultation among NATO nations rather than by setting up a directorate in Washington.

Signor Albonetti found Professor Howard's and Mr. Beaton's interventions complementary, and he agreed with both of them. Professor Howard's analogy about votes and shares applied precisely to what has happened in NATO. Now the European nations want more votes and so they must buy more shares. We were indeed facing a political rather than a military threat, and we could only meet this threat with political unity. If we did not achieve political unity, the military threat might well resuscitate.

Political unity could not be built, however, without partners having the same kind of shares. Since in the future these shares will by natural evolution be nuclear shares, there was no use in trying to turn the clock back to the situation of one power with all the nuclear shares. Political unity had to be based on nuclear realities. He could not stress too strongly that the essence of the problem was the need for equilibrium between the United States and Europe, and without it consultation and all our political machinery was meaningless. His objection to Mr. Buchan's proposal (and to the conclusions which his paper seemed designed to invite) was that this fundamental point was not squarely faced.

General Beaufre emphasised in reply to Signor Albonetti that nuclear strategy was only part of the problem; it was important, but not the key to everything.

He referred to the studies pursued in his own institute to do with indirect strategy. The more they looked at it, the clearer it became that nuclear strategy was negative and indirect strategy positive: the former was concerned with deterrence and the latter with action. Many nations had exercised considerable influence in indirect strategy without any nuclear power at all. No nuclear power was involved in Cyprus, for example, but because Greece and Turkey were involved this problem had been of the highest international importance. By concentrating too much on the nuclear aspect we ignored this other aspect, which is tremendous.

The myth of a bipolar world was over; because of the initiatives taken by the French and the Chinese it was now known to be over. Freedom of action had existed before, although few countries recognised this; even members of a bloc had freedom of action, although this was rather limited. But now the door was open and everyone knew it. Of course it was the nuclear balance between the two main powers which made this freedom of action possible for everyone else, but this freedom was essentially political, it did not depend on individual nuclear power. However, as a result, the Americans now knew that they must find a way to deal with the allies on strategic matters and on nuclear matters.

Mr. Buchan felt he should make clear his two main reasons for suggesting that the informal machinery he had in mind should be centred in Washington. First of all, since the predominant power and influence in the world was American, if our prime aim was the coordination of policies in the face of indirect strategy, as a matter of practical wisdom we should think in terms of devices that enable the allies to have maximum influence over American policy, in the place where policy is formulated. It was a fact of American political life that American official representatives abroad did not wield much influence at home; this was the reason for the Standing Group being in Washington. Moreover while the American policy debate was very open when a new policy question came up - anybody could exert great influence on the formation of American policy in its early stages - once a decision had been taken it was extremely hard to change. Thus the weight of allied opinion had to make itself felt in Washington in order to be effective.

Second, as the problem of containing China became as important as the old problem of containing the USSR, it would become necessary in the interests of Europe to draw in a number of non-NATO countries. Washington was the logical centre for this.

Signor Albonetti was astonished at Mr. Buchan's reasoning. Of course a certain degree of influence could be exercised through persuasion and physical presence: no doubt the President of the United States on occasion accepted good advice from his valet. But this kind of political influence was the last resort, the politics of the weak. Above all, politics was strength. The location of the centre was immaterial: it was not the fact of being in Washington which would make consultation effective. If all the European members of NATO had Polaris and tactical nuclear weapons coordination would be meaningful wherever it was held.

Mr. Buchan added that he would couple with the machinery he proposed the strengthening of organisations like Western European Union, which had not been taken sufficiently seriously, and all kinds of functional co-operation so as to make the defence of Europe in the long run a primary European responsibility.

Professor Howard welcomed Mr. Buchan's mention of WEU. Since our problems were political and should be faced in a political context, perhaps we should stop worrying about NATO and worry more about WEU and industrial competition among the European nations.

On the problem of the central control of indirect strategy, the discussion so far seemed to postulate the old-fashioned concept of the communist world and the non-communist world, and the non-communist world must unite. But there were at least three worlds. What would be the Western attitude towards the emerging countries in Africa, towards Indonesia and the Middle East countries? There was something to be said for planning our attitude towards these people, as the communists perhaps planned, on the grounds that we might as well take advantage of the fact that whatever we do will be regarded as part of Western strategy; alternatively we could regard any attempt to act as the mirror image of the communist world as far as the non-aligned world goes as doomed to failure. He did not know the answer. Events in Zanzibar had shattered a number of British illusions.

But if we were to adopt a coordinated policy towards the outside world, then as Mr. Haagerup had indicated we would have to face an enormous amount of suspicion directed against us. Therefore our best policy would be not to set up a sort of overlord coordination mechanism, which would arouse the profoundest suspicion, but to work through the United Nations, coordinating our policy generally in the UN and working through organs such as Unesco, using the traditional channels of diplomacy and consultation.

General agreement was expressed with this suggestion of making better use of normal diplomatic channels.

General Beaufre made it clear that he certainly did not have in mind any kind of master plan. Coordination meant adjustment, not unity. But if we had some means of discussion, and especially prior discussion, on major problems we would be able to avoid this new-found freedom of action leading to more divergent actions. 100 percent coordination was clearly impossible; but 10 percent coordination was better than none at all. Coordination was a complement to freedom of action. It was an attitude of mind rather than a centralised thing.

Dr. Ritter supported General Beaufre. However, he suggested that the polycentrism which was apparent now was very different from the old-fashioned concept of independent national states. The freedom of action was there, but it was more limited than might sometimes appear; if a smaller state moved too far, it might trigger off the involvement of the bigger states. This applied particularly in the case of Germany. The problem was to find the right degree of coordination.

Machinery for Crisis Management

Mr. Buchan proposed moving on to the second question for discussion, crisis management. He suggested that while crises would be made more urgent and frightening by the existence of nuclear weapons, they would not necessarily be Cuba-type nuclear crises. He invited Mr. Beaton to elaborate the views on the idea of a crisis cabinet which he had already sketched out in his Adelphi Paper.

Mr. Beaton said that his main point was that no machinery would make sense unless it was recognised that serious decisions could only be taken by those carrying political responsibility for their country. Therefore coordination among governments at the highest level was essential before discussions about the kind of machinery required, otherwise the mistake would be made of setting up detatched institutions to take decisions which could only be taken in the heartland of political life by heads of government and their immediate servants.

Mr. Haagerup felt obliged to enter a reservation, at least in regard to crises outside the NATO area. He could not see any possibility of the small countries being associated with what seemed a very sensible way of coordinating policy at the highest level, because they would not want to be involved. As he saw it, a crisis cabinet would have to be limited to the major powers, with a kind of NATO Council where the smaller countries were kept informed, since their passive approval would be required, but not participating on the same level.

Mr. Beaton explained that he was not suggesting a 15-nation operation. It would be necessary to relate the real interests and the real power, and these did go together.

Mr. Buchan commented that this was closely related to machinery in some form or other. Suppose it were decided to have some heads of government consultation and to set out in advance the various government that would be consulted in different kinds of crises: there must be continuous work by teams on a lower level to enable these heads of government to take sensible decisions. Elections were always in progress somewhere, with the prospect of a new Prime Minister being elected the day before a crisis broke; such a man would be in a very weak position initially through ignorance.

Mr. Beaton replied that this was something to take care of in devising the machinery. He was not suggesting a cabinet meeting every Monday morning. His "cabinet" would have different functions from a national cabinet.

Dr. Gasteyger pointed to the problem that there would need to be several cabinets covering different issues. Some countries would not be interested in South Vietnam, for example, but would be very interested in the northern flank. Perhaps one centralised cabinet would not be the best idea...

Dr. Jaquet suggested a practical difficulty in the case of some smaller powers. If machinery were in being it would not be so easy for Holland, for instance, to say she was not interested in joining because although her interests might not be directly involved there was a tradition of commitment outside Europe. Taking up Professor Howard's analogy, perhaps we could say no representation without taxation. If countries were asked to what extent did they wish to be committed outside Europe, there would be more hesitations than if they only asked did they want to be represented. On the whole, however, he thought the idea of leaving NATO as it is but devising machinery for consultation among countries whose vital interests were at stake in a particular crisis and who would take a share in solving them was a very sensible approach.

Mr. Haagerup made it clear that he was not thinking of a straight "yes" or "no" on participation. He was talking about different levels. When the need arose, it might be fairly obvious which people would participate. But if machinery for general consultation were set up it should be done on a rather broader but lower level so that other nations could be kept informed without necessarily being involved.

Signor Albonetti just did not believe that the task of crisis management would be easier than in the past without some new kind of political institution or political system which would result in greater political unity. After all, crisis management and the coordination of alliance policy had existed to some extent since the beginning of history. This coordination might become more systematic, but there was no reason to suppose that it would be more successful just because it would be more elaborate.

General Beaufre said that obviously the old diplomatic methods could be used, but the Cuba crisis had revealed their inadequacy. That was why the red telephone was installed between Washington and Moscow. As he saw it, the essential of the new machinery was to link the principal heads of government, perhaps by closed circuit television, so that they could exchange views and explain their decisions as occasion warranted. This was purely a technical aspect, but it was essential because of the speed and the importance of speed in this context.

Mr. Buchan commented that technological developments have made this easier, and there was general agreement with him.

Mr. Beaton suggested that Anglo-American arrangements were a good pioneer for arrangements, because there was an example of what the alliance had become. The use of the telephone since 1940 to achieve coordination of policy was important. But the really significant fact was that in any crisis since the war, the British Prime Minister has felt obliged to go to Washington and the great decisions have been made personally there round the table.

Professor Howard supported Mr. Beaton. Certainly technical developments were improving communications, but nothing could compete with the full weight of the human personality. Perhaps supersonic aircraft were more valuable than television in that context.

Signor Albonetti took issue with Mr. Beaton. The curve of British influence in world affairs was decreasing, despite the improvements in the machinery of consultation. Despite the will to consult and cooperate and have an influence, over the past 5-10 years the United States has only become more conscious of her own power.

Mr. Buchan agreed on this point; the influence of the allies was greater in the late 1940's and early 1950's than it has been in the late 1950's and early 1960's. However, he was convinced that the US did now feel the need for allied support much more than during the Dulles or early Kennedy era and that she would in the future be unwilling to get involved in crises without her allies.

He was however slightly sceptical about Mr. Beaton's cabinet idea. The difficulty was that in a crisis, the situation changed so rapidly that it was very hard to judge the right moment to get everyone round a table to take a decision; a move by the adversary could change the whole situation.

He did not feel the discussion could be carried further at this stage. This subject did deserve a lot more study in the defence community of the West, and if the views expressed within the Commission stimulated further work on the subject it would be all to the good. He then drew the discussion to a close.

Paper for the Fifth Meeting of the European Study Commission
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NATO as a multinational alliance

1. This is not intended as a definitive paper. It is intended to open up certain aspects of the question for discussion in the hope that the deliberations of the Commission itself may make it possible to draft a more comprehensive paper representing a consensus of agreement of all the members. The form of the paper has been influenced by recent developments, and also by the discussions at the Venice Conference last May.

2. There has been a wide spectrum of opinion in recent years about the future vitality, necessity and structure of NATO. At one end stands General Gallois who argues that the perfection of nuclear weapons has robbed collective security and guarantee pacts of their usefulness, since a guarantor power would be exposed to quite unacceptable risks in coming to the assistance of a smaller ally who was threatened by one of the super-powers. The only prudent course, he argues, for smaller allies is either to develop their own nuclear force or to acquire unfettered control over some nuclear weapons and even to dissolve treaty systems like NATO which is a misleading sham.

At the other end of the spectrum are those who argue that a collective Western defence and strategy is more necessary than ever and that the evolution of collective machinery for controlling weapons and taking decisions is the only sound objective for the alliance until something like an Atlantic political federation emerges.

But in fact neither course, dissolution or federation, has much support in the official or public opinions of any country, and it seems improbable that NATO is headed in either direction. At the same time the status quo of 1964 is felt to be either politically or militarily unsatisfactory by almost all students of the alliance.

NATO today is a multinational coalition of which all the members retain a high degree of national control over their defence policy, deployment and expenditure and an increasing degree of political autonomy. At the same time, for strategic and geographic reasons, they would have little or no choice about acting as a unit, or else following the lead of the United States, in a serious diplomatic or military crisis. The international military command structure created nearly fifteen years ago has not the same efficiency as a national chain of command, but its existence would make it very hard for any NATO country - except the United States - to take independent action or stand aside in a crisis, at any rate a European crisis. The inadequacy of the policial machinery of NATO makes it extremely difficult to develop a fundamental consensus of view on long term policies, such as arms control, which might diminish the likelihood of crisis or render them more manageable if they should occur. But the tendency of the Communist and the uncommitted world to associate all the NATO powers as a "bloc" tends to nullify the usefulness of any independent diplomatic exploration on the part of one NATO country.

Whatever intellectual predisposition one may start with, whether one believes in a more cohesive or looser alliance, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that NATO today in many ways offers its members the worst of both worlds, the appearance of close association with a group of other countries without the full benefits and strengths of such an association. In addition, there are, of course, endemic sources of tension and argument within NATO itself which seem no nearer a solution as time passes. The preponderance of American strategic power within NATO gives her a degree of authority and autonomy to which no other ally can aspire, and leads to a natural American tendency to assume that American and allied interests are always the same. The development of British and French nuclear weapon programmes has created tension among the European allies without in any way giving either Britain or France an alternative position of leadership or causing them to put forward any constructive proposals for the reorganisation of the structure of the alliance. The United States has tried for years to persuade the European allies to assume a larger proportion of the overall costs, in terms of manpower as well as money, of the Western defence system and is soured by her failure to do so.

These problems have attracted less serious attention in recent years because relations between East and West have been in a state of "immobilisme" for the last year or more. But it was agreed in our Venice discussions that this had few of the characteristics of genuine "detente". It is true that Russia is in a situation of great difficulty at the moment, owing to the doctrinal feud within the Communist bloc and by reason of the successful Chinese attempt to circumscribe her sphere of influence in Asia. It is also true that there is the beginnings of what Shulman called a more adult attitude on the part of all concerned to problems of arms control, even though the prospects of further progress in this field are for the moment obscure. But nothing has occurred to suggest that a crisis will not reoccur in East-West relations or that there is no need to improve the techniques of the Alliance.

At the same time, the combination of a continuing nuclear stalemate with the growth of indirect strategies is complicating alliance planning and policy, and making it harder to disassociate the problems of the NATO area from those of the Far East or Africa.

3. There have been certain recent developments or trends which must affect any consideration of the development of the alliance.

(a) It now appears likely that the Multilateral Force will come into being, that the treaty outlining its organisation and institutions will be signed during the first half of 1965, and that the Control Group will acquire gradually increasing authority until the force becomes fully operational in 1970. It seems probable that the signatory powers will be the United States, Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Greece and Turkey. It is also probable that the new British government will decide to adhere to it.

(b) There seems no doubt that Britain and France will remain nuclear powers for the time being.

The evidence for British intentions is equivocal since the Labour Party is anxious to find some formula which will permit it to run down the British nuclear force in return for strengthening of political arrangements in NATO. But a large sum of money has already been committed for several years ahead

on the Polaris programme, and though this may be reduced it is hardly likely that it will be scrapped. It is possible that if the MLF formula proves a success the British force will somehow be made an integral part of it. But this depends on wider developments than just within the MLF itself.

There are no signs of serious second thoughts about the French force, and the cost of it though very steep is probably supportable. M. Deferre criticises current French policy, but his alternative solution, the French force as the basis of a European force, commands little European support at present.

The alliance is therefore likely to have to live with two European national nuclear forces for the time being.

(c) Many of the troubles which have plagued the alliance have derived from the fact that the United States has not been interested in developing an alliance system for the evolution of strategic or politico-military policy. She has taken what she conceives to be the interests of her allies into account in developing her own forces or policy, but she has not sought to foster the development of collective planning or crisis management.

It is possible that this situation may be changing. Influential Americans have said that the United States is becoming more not less dependent on the support and co-operation of her European allies as they become relatively more powerful and as the nature of the Communist problem alters and becomes diversified. Certainly it is noticeable that the first serious political challenge in twelve years from the American right wing has taken the form of criticism of the Administration for mishandling the allies, and not - as in 1952 - for having allies.

4. Whatever one's views about the soundness of the MLF as a solution to the German problem in NATO, no one, I think, would disagree that in terms of NATO as a whole it raises as many problems as it solves. If the sytem of political and military cooperation that is to be encouraged within the control group is successful, it will have the effect of creating a "little entente" of 8 powers within the 15 with two important countries, France and Canada, and one important area, Scandinavia, outside it.

It is hoped by the proponants of the MLF that if the system is a success it will draw the other 7 allies into it, and it has been suggested (e.g. by Theo Sommer in the October Foreign Affairs) that it might one day be possible to bring the whole of the American nuclear force within its control.

The difficulty with this concept lies in the operational control system. As will become evident when national parliaments start to debate the treaty, no country will enter the MLF unless it has a veto on its use: any ideas about majority control will not be acceptable to the public of the various countries concerned. A multi-veto force must have a low degree of credibility and could only be used in face of the most unambiguous kind of general nuclear attack. This is acceptable as long as a strong force under a more credible system of control exists elsewhere. The dilemma of the alliance is that nationally controlled forces remain the most credible.

However successful the MLF may be in allaying German fears about the US commitment or resentment at the pretensions of Britain and France, it is hard to see how the multilateral principle can become the basis for a solution of the problem of command and crisis management in NATO as a whole, still less for those non-NATO allies of the United States, Japan, Australia, Pakistan etc. whose influence and international importance will increase as the problem of containing China becomes more pressing. Moreover, even those countries which do become founder members of the MLF will still retain the bulk of their forces under national control, including a large number of nuclear weapons under the "dual key" system.

5. If it is true that the principle of multilateral control of all weapons and forces is an undesirable goal, it becomes necessary to enquire once again how a better system for the coordination of national policies and forces can be evolved. Presumably the point of departure for such an enquiry should be to establish what aspects of sovereignty the NATO powers will not relinquish to some central authority and then to examine those which they might relinquish.

In the first category it can be assumed that none of the allies will relinquish the right to choose between peace and war; to go to war even if their allies withhold support or to abstain from war even if their alies declare it. It is true that such nominal rights may not have very much meaning, as the smaller European neutrals discovered in 1940. But if such a right is regarded as an essential attribute to the sovereign state then it makes it pointless to discuss any form of crisis management which predicates any form of majority voting or automatic decisions. The problem remains one of coordination based on consent.

But what forms of nominal sovereignty will the NATO allies relinquish? Are they prepared to see any measure of economic or industrial autonomy pass out of their hands, as to a certain extent it has in the governments of the Six? The experience of the past 15 years has been depressing, but is the growing complexity and cost of weapons systems a factor that is now beginning to work against the present nationalistic attitude of all the industrial NATO powers in the defence field? Does the experience of the last year or so suggest that there is a hope of moving towards agreements on major hardware - e.g. tanks and aircraft?

Can any progress be made in this field without pursuing a more fundamental agreement on the strategic environment and requirements of the next ten or twenty years. If the right institutional means could be found for pursuing such agreement, would the major NATO countries honour it? Could such a synthesis be developed without first developing something like a common intelligence system? Would the allies be prepared to relinquish the right of national interpretation of intelligence data to a central system? Could such a synthesis be conceived as long as the major NATO powers, for geographical, historical or other reasons, have different interests as far as the Soviet Union, China and the "tiers monde" are concerned. In other words, is there any hope of achieving a closer reconciliation of ends and means by better institutional devices, or are we setting ourselves a problem that of its own nature defies solution?

Nations with different interests and policies can still take concerted action in a crisis provided they have a common appreciation of the immediate problem and a common understanding of each other's capabilities and methods. How can a better system of crisis management in NATO be evolved? What are its essential components?

Finally, why has NATO and its subordinate organisations been such a comparative failure as a system of international politico-military planning. Is it the fault of member governments? Or are there inherent flaws in the structure of the organisation itself? Will the existence of an MLF control group in which 7 or 8 of the NATO countries will hold prior discussions improve or weaken the work of NATO itself?

If, as seems probable, there is both a need and a desire to develop a more cohesive system of Western policy making, can the organisation be reformed or revitalised, or would it be wiser to restrict its functions and develop new machinery? How much support is there for the view that, because of the preponderance of American power and the nature of the American policy making process, it might be easier to create an influential centre of alliance planning in Washington than in Europe?

The last four paragraphs are merely a string of speculative questions, and no answers. But they are questions which are too little discussed and which do need re-examination in an expert and forward looking group such as the ESC. I will reduce them to an agenda and I hope we can discuss them as adventurously as possible.

Alastair Buchan

I. Khrushchev's Fall

Why did Khrushchev fall and what were the reasons for it? Since October 15th, many explanations by Communist and non-Communist experts alike have been put forward but none of them seems to be absolutely convincing. It may well be - and much can be said in favour of this - that there was in fact no single reason for Khrushchev's ousting but a whole series of reasons. The mistakes, errors and shortcomings of the fallen dictator probably have over a period of time continuously piled up until they became an overwhelming bulk of accusations sufficiently strong to unite all or most of the Party leaders against Khrushchev.

This paper does not intend to give an additional explanation or add any further evidence as to how and why Khrushchev had to fall. However, it may be interesting to discuss some of these possible reasons because they clearly show what the present leaders considered to be wrong in Khrushchev's policy and by what kind of new measures they intend to overcome its failures.

Attention may be drawn first to a hitherto unpublished document the new leaders have circulated amongst top Party hierarchy and which tries to explain their action against Khrushchev (some reliable Western sources in Moscow have mentioned this document). In this document Khrushchev is accused of having created an increasing estrangement between himself and the other party leaders by bypassing them on major policy decisions and relying more and more on the advice of non-party specialists (technicians, scientists and, to some extent, generals). As clear proof of this disregard of other Party leaders it is said that the meetings of the Central Committees were turned by Khrushchev into large "conventions" of all sorts of people who had nothing to do with the CC itself.

The document blames Khrushchev for having launched manifold reforms in the field of party organization, economic management and agriculture. Most of the criticism is directed against the major party reform in 1962 which split up the Party in two separate branches - one for agriculture, one for industry - and against the constant reshuffling of regional economic units. These reforms, it is said, created nothing but confusion and inefficiency. They made the Party interfere in state administration and take over some of its functions. This above all did

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enormous harm to the Party's prestige as the hitherto unquestioned leader because it now could be blamed to be equally responsible for the failures of the administration. What the document does not say but what lies perhaps at the roots of Khrushchev's indefatigable although unsuccessful zeal for reforms is his vane attempt to change the Soviet system without changing its fundamental principles it is built upon. Khrushchev may have felt the need to transform his country into a modern industrial society, but he was not able or willing to do it outside the traditional but outdated pattern of totalitarian dictatorship. Khrushchev can be called a man of transition - i.e. transition from the open terror of Stalinism to new forms of Communist government the precise character and political structure we do not know yet. He was courageous enough to initiate new methods but was still too much imbued with communist doctrine to be able to change the system itself. Furthermore, he lacked the patience to wait until his reforms bore fruits and was carried away by his own promises.

He committed himself to make his country overtake the United States in the main sectors of industrial and agricultural production within the next few years. Realizing that the economic system he based his assumption on failed to do so he switched at an accelerating pace to another one hoping that sooner or later one system would succeed and eventually bring about the decisive breakthrough. This permanent unrest of abortive reforms did inevitably tremendous harm to Soviet economy, shattered the confidence in the leadership and destabilized Soviet domestic policy as a whole.

With regard to foreign policy the Party document mentioned above puts forward two other charges against Khrushchev. Apart from the accusation of "nepotism" he is blamed for having relied too much on a bilateral relationship with the United States and attributed too much importance to his visit to West-Germany. This was bound to affect the interest of some allies and therefore did considerable harm to the unity of the Communist bloc, the revolutionary movement in the "Third World" and the relationship with China. In that connection Khrushchev's clumsy handling of the Sino-Soviet conflict is critisized, and particularly the way he pressed for the December meeting of the 26 Communist Parties irrespective of its disastruous consequences for the Communist world as a whole and a complete break with China in particular.

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Incidentally , of the twenty-five parties (other than the CPSU) invited to the conference six had refused the invitation, twelve had accepted (amongst which most of the Eastern European Parties, the Mongolian and the French CP), and seven had not replied by the time Khrushchev fell.

In the meantime the Chinese themselves published a lenghty and triumphant statement in which they gave twelve reasons why Khrushchev had to be dismissed (English text in: Peking Review No.48/November 27th, 1964, pp. 6-9). In addition to the charges already mentioned Khrushchev is accused for his signing the partial nuclear test ban treaty, for obstructing the revolutionary movements in capitalist countries, sabating the national-liberation movement, mainly in Algeria and South Viet-nam, co-operating with Yugoslavia, interfering in internal affairs of the Comecon-countries in the name of "mutual economic assistance" and conducting large-scale subversive activities in Sinkiang (this probably refers to anti-Chinese propaganda amongst the population in that area but could equally include Soviet attempts to cause damage to the Chinese military (nuclear) installations in that area.) These Chinese allegations and accusations have been listed because they point out precisely what Peking wants the new Soviet leaders not to do lest they be identified with Khrushchev's policy.

How did Khrushchev's successors behave hitherto and what are therefore the possible developments in Soviet foreign policy?

II. The New Soviet Leadership

1. The recent changes in Soviet Party and State Leadership may best be shown by juxtapposing its composition as it was before Khrushchev's fall and as it is at present:

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The Changes in Soviet Party and State Leadership.

1. The situation before October 14, 1964.

Khrushchev

CC Secretariat	CC-Praesidium	Praesidium Council of Ministers
	Full members	
1. Khrushchev (1st Secretary)	1. Khrushchev	1. Khrushchev (Prime Minister)
2. Kozlov (2nd Secretary)	2. Kozlov	
3. Brezhnev	3. Brezhnev	
4. Suslov	4. Suslov	
5. Podgorny	5. Podgorny	
	6. Mikoyan (Chairman, Supreme Soviet)	
	7. Kossygin	2. Kossygin (First Deputy Prime Minister)
	8. Polyanski	3. Polyanski
	9. Voronov	
	10. Kirilenko	
	11. Shvernik	
6. Shelepin (Chairman, Committee for State and Party Control)		4. Shelepin
	Candidates	
7. Titov	12. Yefremov	5. Ustinov (First Deputy Prime Minister)
8. Ilychev	13. Grishin	6. Lesechko
9. Ponomariev	14. Shelest	7. Lomako
10. Andropov	15. Masurov	8. Dymshits
11. Poljakov	16. Mshavanadse	9. Novikov
12. Demichev	17. Rashidov	10. Rudniov
		11. Smirnov

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2. After October 14, 1964 (by December 17, 1964)

CC Secretariat	CC Praesidium	Praesidium Council of Ministers
	Full Members	
1. Brezhnev (1st new Secretary)	1. Brezhnev	1. Kossygin
2. Suslov	2. Suslov	
3. Podgorny	3. Podgorny	
	4. Mikoyan	
	5. Kossygin	
	6. Polyanski	2. Polyanski
	7. Shvernit	
	8. Voronov	
	9. Kirilenko	
4. Shelepin	10. Shelepin (new)	3. Shelepin
5. Titov	11. Shelest (new)	
6. Ilychev		
7. Ponomarev		
8. Andropov		
	Candidates	
	12. Yefremov	4. Ustinov
	13. Grishin	5. Lesechko
	14. Mazurov	6. Lomako
	15. Mshavanadse	7. Dymshits
	16. Demichev (new)	8. Novikov
		9. Rudnjov
		10. Smirnov

A few obvious trends emerge from this picture:

i) Frol Kozlov, for some time the great rival of Khrushchev and its potential successor is definitely out of both the CC-Praesidium and Secretariat.

ii) Brezhnev and Podgorny are the only two leaders who are at the same time member of the CC-Praesidium and Secretariat. Both come from the Ukraine and because of this were closely connected with Khrushchev. Especially Podgorny was a staunch follower of Khrushchev, his position was reinforced by the election of the Ukrainian Shelest to the Praesidium.

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iii) Kossygin and Polyanski share membership in both the CC-Praesidium and Praesidium of Council of Ministers.

iv) Most important of all, however, is Shelepin's position: he is the only Soviet leader being member of all three top bodies: Secretariat, Party Praesidium and Praesidium of Council of Ministers. Moreover, he was head of the State Police until 1962, (and has certainly not lost full control over it) and is now head of the most influential Committee for State and Party Control.)

2. As of this writing the new Soviet leaders have undertaken in the field of domestic policy the following steps either cancelling or shifting the emphasis on some of Khrushchev's reforms.

i) Khrushchev's farreaching Party reform in 1962 which turned the whole Party machinery upside down has been abolished; Party officials will be withdrawn from administrative functions and the Party's purely political and ideological leadership has been re-emphasised.

ii) Khrushchev's campaign for further restrictions on private farm land and cattle breeding has been cancelled - a measure which was certainly welcomed by the peasants. Furthermore, the new budget envisages tax alleviations in favour of the peasants.

iii) The usefulness of Sovnarkhozes (regional economic units) is questioned. They are likely to be eventually abolished or transformed into different and more efficient economic units. At the same time the "Liberman discussion" has been resumed. All this may well lead to new measures introducing greater incentives and more opportunities for competition in Soviet industry.

iv) A slight liberalisation of Soviet cultural policy. The new leaders seem to look for an improvement in the relations between the Party apparatus and the intelligentsia. The new budget as a whole puts more emphasis on consumer goods and investments in agruculture without abandoning the priority of heavy industry.

On the whole this means that the new leadership intends to drop some of the chaotic and, from the Party's point of view, unnecessary if not harmful Khrushchevian reforms. They obviously try to prove by this that a collective leadership alone is capable to put more order, avoid costly overlapping and,

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above all, attract more confidence of Soviet population in the efficiency of Party and State organization.

For the moment it looks as if the collective leadership would not risk more drastic steps. It has promised everything to everybody: more consumer goods for ordinary citizens, bigger smallholdings for the peasants, more credits for light industry and more hardware for the defence. Whether it is able to do so for a prolonged period of time is open to question. Sooner or later more drastic and less popular decisions will have to be taken. Whether a collective leadership is able to do so is not proven yet. The present policy reflects adequately its balanced structure which does not allow more than compromise decisions. One thing, however, is sure: this policy implicitly admits that a) Khrushchev's economic policy was basically popular and b) light industry and social welfare need further improvement even at the expense of heavy industry and defence expenditure. This again implies that - at least for the time being - the new leaders are reluctant to overdo their criticism of Khrushchev. The reason for this is obvious: they know that such critic can all too easily deteriorate into a full-fledged "de-Khrushchevian"-campaign, similar to the "de-Stalinization"-campaign and inevitably raise the serious question whether there is not something wrong with the Soviet system itself having produced twice a disastrous leadership. To blame one man - Stalin - for twenty years of brutal dictatorship is one thing; to do so again in a similar vein with regard to Khrushchev without involving the system of Party regime will be practically impossible. The new Soviet leaders are certainly aware of this danger. Their critisism of Khrushchev therefore does question neither his de-stalinization campaign nor the basic principles of his domestic and foreign policy. What it appears to intend, however, is to continue this policy in a more cautious, flexible and premeditated way. It is an improved form of "Khrushchevism" but without Khrushchev and better than under Khrushchev. If this assumption is correct then Soviet foreign policy will not undergo basic changes but may be limited to shifts in emphasis only: with regard to Eastern Europe, the Communist Movement and the co-existence policy towards the non-communist world, even towards China. It means at the same time that the Sino-Soviet conflict will basically remain unsolved.

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III. Eastern Europe

Khrushchev's fall caused general surprise in Eastern Europe - a proof for its suddeness and the pack of consultation in the Communist alliance - and, surprisingly enough, was cautiously but unmistakenly critisized by some Communist leaders (in and outside the Communist camp.) This, for the first time, constitutes some kind of direct intervention of Communist Parties in domestic Soviet affairs and reflects clearly the remarkable change in the relationship between Moscow and its former satellites. Pressure was put on the new leaders to give full details of Khrushchev's dismissal and sufficiently credible assurance that it would not affect Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe. The new men in the Kremlin hastened to do so. They were fully aware of the fact that they probably needed their allies support in the forthcoming months more than ever before.

1. Poland and especially Gomulka were particularly affected by the unexpected events in Moscow. In recent time Gomulka had balanced out his loss of prestige on the home front by building up a "special relationship" with Moscow by becoming Khrushchev's first and foremost foreign adviser. It may therefore well have been on his initiative that he was the first to be consulted by the new Soviet leaders. That small compensation could, however, not silence the mounting criticism Gomulka finds himself confronted with in his country. He is considered to be unable to defend Polish interests outside and solve the various problems (mainly of economic and social nature) inside the country. At the same time Gomulka has to fight against the rising opposition of the former Stalinists who attack him for being seriously compromised by his too close association with the dismissed Khrushchev. The only positive element Gomulka may have seen in Khrushchev's fall is the cancellation of his visit to West-Germany. The Soviet leaders will probably take a fresh look at the present relations with West-Germany and therefore relieve - at least for some time - Gomulka from the nightmare of a Soviet-German rapprochement.





2. Czechoslovakia: Many observers were surprised to see President Novotny safely survive the fall of Khrushchev. He had been one of the staunchest supporters of Khrushchev and his re-election as State President was due shortly after Khrushchev's dismissal. In spite of these handicaps he must have convinced his fellow partyleaders (as well as the new Soviet leaders) that at this time any change in the

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presidency would seriously shatter the country's stability, and stir up the lingering unrest of his opponents. Furthermore, doubts could be raised in Moscow about the hitherto unconditional support and solidarity of the Czech Communists. Small wonder that after his election Novotny was given a red carpet treatment at his arrival in the Soviet Union. The joint communiqué speaks of complete unanimity and nobody doubts that there really was On the home front the Czech Government has launched some interesting economic reforms. They are meant to solve the permanent economic crisis which had considerably worsened this year. The Regime is now introducing more incentives to stimulate competition and improve the system of industrial management.

3. Hungary: The Hungarian leaders found themselves in a similar position as did their Polish colleagues. Since the early 1964 Khrushchev and Kadar had reached a better understanding on almost every issue of common concern. They manifestly supported each other wherever possible. Kadar made it clear to his people that Khrushchev's policy had in fact enabled them to embark on a policy of gradual liberalization.

4. Rumania: The Rumanians have kept remarkably silent about the changes in the Kremlin. Although they may have felt some satisfaction on Khrushchev's fall they are now more concerned about what his successors are going to do. They are well aware that any rapprochement between Moscow and Peking may seriously affect their present bargaining position which turned out to be so rewarding. In such a case Rumania would have to follow again more obediently Moscow's line and give up its opposition to further integration in Comecon.

5. East Germany: No doubt that the East German regime felt relieved about Khrushchev's fall. They had even better reasons to do so than the Poles: Khrushchev's visit to Bonn put Ulbricht in a awkward position. As an obedient supporter of Khrushchev he was nevertheless suspicious of a possible Soviet deal with his archenemies in Bonn. For some time already Ulbricht was haunted by the idea that Moscow and Peking could enter into a rivalling competition to expand their trade with West-German industry and might be prepared to pay a political price for it. Having overcome this potential threat Ulbricht now takes advantage of the change in Moscow by trying to establish himself as mediator between the two rivals. He certainly would welcome any rapprochement between them which he thinks can only work

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in his favour. It would give him back at least their common support he badly missed for some time. Obviously, Ulbricht's position in- and outside this country has improved already. The tough line he takes on the Berlin passport agreement may confirm this.

6. Yugoslavia: Yugoslavia finds herself in a much less enviable position. Her relations with the Soviet Union have gradually improved in the last 2-3 years mainly thanks to Khrushchev. It was he who re-established Soviet-Yugoslav relations in 1955 and Tito's pro-Soviet bloc alignment was almost exclusively based on his approval of Khrushchev's general policy. Yugoslavia became member of some bodies in the Comecon organization, expanded her trade with almost all of the Comecon-countries and, above all,supported Khrushchev in his fight against the Chinese "dogmatists". Khrushchev being gone and a somewhat precarious truce reigning between Moscow and Peking Belgrad feels very uncertain whether the new Soviet leaders can be relied upon as equally trustworthy. As long as this truce goes on the Yugoslav cannot be sure whether they might not be sacrificed for the sake of Sino-Soviet friendship. They remember that unlike Khrushchev Brezhnev did not show the same understanding for their special situation and they noticed carefully the non-committal speech the Soviet delegate (Demitchev) delivered at their 8th Party Congress in December. In fact Moscow is obviously hesitant to show any sign of special support to Belgrad lest the Chinese have no reason for further attacks. And indeed, the main Chinese (and Albanian) polemics in the last week were not directed so much against the Soviet Union than against "revisionist policy" Yugoslavia is the centre of. The purpose of this may well be the isolation of Belgrad and its influence within the Communist movement.

Summing up the present situation in Eastern Europe it can be said that :

i) There is a general feeling of insecurity as to what kind of moves the new Soviet leaders are up to and who will eventually - if at all - emerge as the most influential leader;

ii) On the other hand the fall of Khrushchev made them realise how much their relationship with the Soviet Union has changed. Though they were reminded by the events in Moscow of the extent to which they still depend on the Soviet Union they

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

became aware of how vulnerable and exposed to external pressure the Soviet regime has become in the last years.

iii) These conclusions may induce the East European countries to expand their relations with Western Europe in order to better balance out their hitherto almost exclusive dependence on the Soviet Union on the one side and their isolation from the West on the other. Such policy might, in the long run, give them more freedom of action, at least in the economic and cultural field.
(Incidentally, this trend may correspond to some extent with President de Gaulles plans for a more active engagement in Eastern Europe as is shown by the growing number of visits Communist heads of government pay to Paris).



The Sino-Soviet Conflict

The fall of Khrushchev brought about a short interlude of precarious détente between Moscow and Peking. By sending Prime Minister Chou En-lai to Moscow the Chinese apparently wanted to manifest their willingness to consider Khrushchev's dismissal as a hopeful sign for an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, and a start for resuming the bilateral negotiations, broken off in July 1963. It soon turned out, however, that neither side was prepared to give way and the Chinese Prime Minister left Moscow leaving behind a short communiqué bare of any content. It simply stated that the exchange of opinions had been "open" and "fraternal". According to time honoured Communist terminology this means that there was no agreement whatsoever. The only exception to this was the decision to meet again in January in Peking. In addition the Soviets may have made it understood that they were prepared to postpone the December meeting of the 26 CPs Khrushchev had attached so great importance to. They obviously try to pursue a more flexible and positive policy towards China. To line up behind the Chinese position seemed, however, equally impossible for them. The Soviet Union has no interest whatsoever to leave the United Nations to break off its relations with the USA and to give up its policy of coexistence even if this may be subject to some important modifications.

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China, on the other hand, has no interest to give way either. It has eventually recovered from the almost ruinous withdrawal of Soviet aid and stands now on its own feet. But Russia's behaviour remains unforgotten and shapes China's policy. China in 1964 is living - as Robert Guillain reports (Sunday Telegraph, November 29th, 1964.) through its "anti-Russian phase". The quarrel with Moscow, penetrating in all sectors of Chinese life had an effect on everything and changed the whole orientation of the country. It is therefore difficult to see why the Chinese should suddenly change their attitude towards the Soviet Union as long as there is no real guarantee that Khrushchev's successors fundamentally alter their policy - and make the first move. Even if they do not the Chinese would not mind it. They profit now largely from the conflict and see themselves on the winning side. In their view the situation in the top Soviet echelons remains fluid and should not be stabilized by any kind of reconciliation. On the contrary: The object of their famous diatribe against "Khrushchev the buffoon" was not to reopen the polemic . . . It was designed to stimulate the powerful elements in the Kremlin who are in favour of an anti-Khrushchev purge. This is a trend the Chinese would like to push further and, if possible to exploit in their own favour. For the moment they use the Albanians as their vanguard to resume the polemics and to reveal the actual Chinese intentions: the complete abandonment of Khrushchev's "revisionist policy" and the rehabilitation of Stalin which both, if done, would imply a reversal of Soviet policy (see: K.S. Karol in: The New Statesman, 4.12.1964).

In this connection the Chinese ideas on the control of nuclear weapons is of interest. On November 22 Peking published a lengthy statement rejecting implicitly almost all Soviet disarmament proposals (see: Peking Review, No.48, November 27, 1964): the Chinese not only refused the completion of the partial test ban treaty by a ban of underground tests, but also dismissed the (Soviet) proposal for a quasi total destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles, the establishment of atom free zones and the participation of China at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

The Soviets indirectly replied to this in their Memorandum published in Pravda on December 8th, seconded by Foreign Minister Gromyko's speech at the UN General Assembly a day

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before. In this Memorandum they reaffirmed their well known proposals on reduction of defence expenditure, abolition or reduction of foreign stationed troops, liquidation of foreign bases, prohibition of nuclear proliferation and use of nuclear weapons, establishment of nuclear free zones, abolition of bomber aircraft, underground test ban, non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact, prevention of surprise attack. It was a clear manifestation of the new leaders to continue Khrushchev's disarmament policy irrespective or even against Chinese protests.

One may go even a step further and say that the Soviet position has noticeably stiffened (within the last few weeks) with regard to China. Thus reference has been made again to the merits of the test ban treaty after a remarkable silence in the first weeks following Khrushchev's fall. Furthermore, the Soviets came out with a new date (March 1st, 1965) for the 26-Party-Conference without even waiting until their second conference with the Chinese in January is over. Moscow knows perfectly well that the Chinese and their allies will not accept this date either. The following months may therefore be decisive for the future of the Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviet Union cannot possibly postpone the Conference again without risking to loose what is left of its prestige within the Communist movement. Its new proposal therefore shows that nobody in Moscow does believe anymore in a reconciliation with China for a long time.

This is confirmed by the changing patterns of Soviet declarations on the national liberation movement. Immediately after Khrushchev's fall the new leaders hastened to stress - as the Chinese do - the importance of promoting the armed struggle against the "imperialists". That has changed, too, and their attitude has again become similar to that Khrushchev took. The more belligerent set-up remains basically limited to a series of vigourous declarations against the Congo intervention and US commitment in South Viet-nam. In practice Moscow does not seem to have changed its previous cautious policy towards and in the "Tiers Monde".

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V. The Soviet Union and the West.

The same applies more or less to Soviet policy towards the West. The new leaders try to pursue a moderate line of conduct which leaves the door open for possible negotiations and visits (a test case whether this assumption is correct may be Moscow's reaction to Chancellor Erhard's invitation to Kossygin to visit Germany). It is, indeed, hard to see why they should have any interest in creating additional tensions and difficulties on their foreign front as long as they have enough to do to solve the innumerable domestic problems and re-organize the Communist Movement. The new Soviet budget can be interpreted as being more concerned with economic and less with military or general political affairs. The various although sometimes rather incoherent speeches of the new leaders point in the same direction. Generally speaking it seems as if they would not feel particularly pressed to take new initiatives in their external relations. There is satisfaction about the outcome of the American and British election and the dissention in the Atlantic Alliance. In addition the Soviet may welcome the fortuitous but fortunate coincidence that they share their opposition against the MLF with France. On balance most events in the West seem therefore to favour the prospects of a continued period of détente. If the Soviets fight more vigourously against the MLF than before they do so for mainly three reasons (apart from their genuine fear of a Germany getting access to the control of nuclear weapons):

- There is increasing pressure by their most important allies (GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia) to resist the creation of the MLF:
- Fear of possible consequences the MLF might have in the Communist bloc, including a growing demand by these countries for a similar kind of Communist MLF; and, above all,
- Fear that the MLF might upset the present political and military balance in favour of the West by increasing considerably the European (mainly German) influence on US strategy and by linking it so closely to the defence of Europe that the hostage value Europe always had for Soviet strategy would be made meaningless by the new American commitment.

As of this writing the Soviet reaction to the new British proposals for the ANF is not known yet or has not yet clearly emerged. It can be said, however, that it will be equally negative as long as no real guarantee can be given that a)

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no nuclear proliferation is involved and b) the balance of power between East and West will not be seriously affected by such a plan. In the present psychological situation it is hard to see how the Soviets can be convinced that neither of these two things will happen when some kind of ANF comes into being.



VI. Military Affairs

It seems now pretty clear that Soviet military establishment had no decisive influence on the ousting of Khrushchev although the recent "disappearence" of Marshall Malinovskii may indicate the existence of actual dissensions about the state of Party-Military relations and strategic doctrine. This mainly refers to the rivalry between "traditionalists" and "modernists" on one side and the eternal problem of ressource-allocation on the other. Khrushchev's repeated demands for further cuts in conventional troops met with constant opposition but so did apparently his plan to build up a costly Anti-Missile-Missile-Defence-System. There were recently some (unconfirmed) rumours that the latter project was sharply attacked by Party leaders and some generals alike and that it constituted one major cause of his dismissal. Be that as it may, the considerable cut in defence expenditure (500 m. Rubles) the new Soviet budget envisages, shows that some branches of weaponry development and/or troops have to suffer by this reduction but it is still difficult to say which ones. The recent appointment of Marshall Zakharov as successor of Marshall Biriuzov in the post of Chief of the General Staff does not really give a hint in either direction. It may as well be a compromise and therefore a temporary assignment. He is old (66) and has hold already this post from 1960-1963 until he was replaced by Biriuzov, a reliable supporter of Khrushchev's military policy. Whereas Biriuzov clearly expressed his preference for the missile-nuclear strategic forces Zakharov's view on that was less explicit. Moreover, he had been highly critical, with Malinovskii, of the excessive interferences by the political organs in military affairs. The appointment of Zakharov should, however, not be overrated nor should his views be considered as indicating a new trend in Soviet military doctrine. There will probably be shifts of emphasis but

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it is hard to see what role Zakharov should play in this unless some other major changes take place in the Party and army leadership.

This view is strengthened by some other facts: there has been for example, no significant statement on military doctrine since the important article by Sokolovskii and Tcherenitchenko on the "revolution in warfare and the art of warfare in a new phase" (in: Kraznaia Zvezda, August 25th, 1964). Equally, there seems to be some confusion in military circles about the future allocation of ressources. So, for instance, an issue of "Communist of the Armed Forces" published two articles on this problem saying the exact opposite of what the other says and leaving the reader wondering whether eventually heavy or light industry should be given priority and where the armament industry had to come into the picture. The recent speeches by Brezhnev, Kossygin, Mikoyan and other Soviet leaders give no satisfactory answer either to this fundamental dilemma of Soviet economic industry.

All one can say for the moment, taking into account everything which has been said previously, is that the Soviet Union after Khrushchev is still in a state of flux where farreaching decisions are postponed and day-to-day policy is marked by a cautious and rather sober testing of how future Soviet policy should look in order to become more efficient and successful.

London, 18th December, 1964. Curt Gasteyger.