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"Les organisations internationales"

L'ANALYSE POLITIQUE COMPARATIVE DES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES

Rapport général

Inis L. Claude, Jr.

Professeur à l'Université du Michigan

S I X I E M E   C O N G R E S   M O N D I A L

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La décision de mettre l'étude des organisations internationales à l'ordre du jour du Congrès de 1964 de l'A.I.S.P. est une reconnaissance de l'importance croissante des institutions internationales dans le monde des hommes politiques, et de l'analyse de ces institutions dans le monde des savants. L'objet de nos séances n'est pas uniquement, néanmoins, d'octroyer une reconnaissance à ce domaine de la réalité et à cette branche de la connaissance. Très concrètement, nous cherchons à faire progresser l'analyse comparative des organisations internationales, en mettant l'accent sur leurs aspects politiques : les phénomènes politiques qui se produisent dans leur cadre, l'effet politique des forces qui agissent sur elles, les conséquences politiques qu'entraîne leur fonctionnement. Quelques-uns des rapports soumis à notre Congrès présentent les résultats, encore provisoires, d'études comparatives ; d'autres cherchent plutôt à poser les fondements de telles études, ou encore à suggérer des possibilités de recherche. L'étude comparative des institutions internationales étant relativement récente et peu développée, nous pouvons surtout, à ce stade, examiner ses possibilités, apprécier la nature des problèmes auxquels elle se heurte, et stimuler tous ceux qui s'efforcent de la faire progresser.

Les progrès réalisés au cours des dernières années dans le domaine de l'étude comparative de la vie politique (qu'on appelle de moins en moins souvent, en anglais, "comparative government", et de plus en plus souvent "comparative politics") peuvent à certains égards servir à la fois d'exemple et de modèle pour une telle tentative. Le changement d'appellation dans ce domaine peut, en lui-même, être significatif : l'étude comparative peut commencer - doit commencer - en mettant l'accent sur les structures

et les procédures institutionnelles, mais elle atteint son but en mettant l'accent sur la dynamique et sur les effets politiques des institutions étudiées. Il reste, certes, à rassembler beaucoup de données comparatives de base concernant les organisations internationales. Un des problèmes les plus urgents est celui de la répartition la meilleure possible de cet effort de description élémentaire ; il est dans le domaine des organisations internationales des terrains en friche qui doivent être labourés par la recherche de données avant que l'on puisse y planter utilement la semence de l'analyse politique comparative : c'est la condition d'une compréhension politique approfondie. Nous avons devant nous l'exemple de la mise en culture du domaine de la vie politique comparée des divers Etats ; cela doit nous permettre de mettre au point une campagne efficace d'agronomie intellectuelle dans le domaine de la comparaison entre institutions internationales. Peut-être le Congrès de l'A.I.S.P. peut-il irriguer ce terrain suffisamment pour montrer qu'en dépit de son aridité actuelle, il est cultivable.

On peut sans doute, comme je l'ai fait, affirmer que la mise en route de l'étude comparative des institutions internationales peut s'inspirer utilement de l'évolution de l'analyse politique comparative portant sur les phénomènes nationaux ; je voudrais ajouter à cela une hypothèse : les deux voies peuvent cesser d'être parallèles, et se croiser . En d'autres termes, il pourrait y avoir non seulement analogie, mais rapport. Nous savons, bien entendu, qu'il existe des liens étroits entre la politique intérieure et la politique étrangère des Etats. Nous supposons généralement que la nature du système politique d'un Etat donné influence dans une mesure appréciable l'attitude de cet Etat à l'égard des organismes internationaux dont il est membre et son action dans ces organismes ; mais nous n'avons guère réussi à dépasser le stade des affirmations teintées de préjugés, et n'avons pas beaucoup progressé dans la voie de l'analyse objective de ces rapports. Il est généralement supposé que les activités des organisations internationales exercent une influence considérable sur les modèles de développement — économique, social, politique — de leurs membres, et particulièrement de ceux qui n'ont atteint que récemment le stade de l'Etat. Là encore, nous sommes mieux pourvus en hypothèses que véritablement informés. Voilà quelques problèmes parmi d'autres, dont les solutions se trouvent

peut-être au point d'intersection de l'étude comparative de la vie politique
et de celle de certaines institutions internationales. La possibilité de ré-
soudre ces problèmes et d'autres encore à ce point d'intersection nous incite
à nous engager dans cette voie.

Laissant de côté le rapport entre l'étude des organisations interna-
tionales et celle de la vie politique, tel que ce rapport s'est développé
et continue à le faire, nous devons nous poser, en termes plus généraux, les
questions cruciales : à quoi bon comparer les organisations internationales ?
à quelles fins ? dans quel espoir ?

Une des justifications de ce type d'étude est la possibilité d'échange,
entre organismes internationaux, de leur expérience dans la solution de cer-
tains problèmes. Un procédé ou une procédure qui se sont révélés efficaces
dans la solution d'un problème posé à une organisation donnée peuvent être
utilisés dans une autre. C'est ainsi que la plupart des organismes interna-
tionaux doivent vraisemblablement trouver des moyens pour équilibrer la
proclamation officielle de l'égalité des Etats membres et l'acceptation prag-
matique des conséquences des inégalités de fait ; la recherche d'un schéma
raisonnable et applicable d'institutionnalisation de l'inégalité pourrait
commencer par une enquête concernant le vote pondéré et d'autres procédures
analogues, telles qu'ils sont utilisés dans diverses organisations interna-
tionales. Cette optique reflète une conception mécaniste des institutions
internationales, et un désir d'améliorer les mécanismes. Nous pouvons certes
considérer cette conception comme superficielle, et résister à l'impulsion,
mais nous devons admettre que les organismes internationaux se heurtent à des
problèmes importants de nature mécanique, et que les hommes politiques de
chacun des Etats, tout comme les fonctionnaires internationaux, acceptent en
fait, à tort ou à raison, de faire des emprunts de procédés institutionnels.
La comparaison la plus superficielle des textes constitutionnels des orga-
nisations internationales révèle la fréquence de cette pratique.

Nous pouvons rejeter la conception mécaniste en faveur d'une conception
plus biologique des institutions internationales, substituant au désir
de "bricolage" l'ambition plus scientifique de comprendre les tendances d'é-
volution de ces institutions. L'étude comparative déplace alors son centre

d'intérêt du problème du transfert possible des procédés institutionnels à celui des ressemblances entre les tendances constatées dans le fonctionnement des organismes internationaux. Nous nous demanderons par exemple si l'existence de blocs à l'occasion des scrutins, constatée à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, l'est également à l'Organisation Mondiale de la Santé. Alors que le "mécanicien" cherche à prescrire, le "biologiste" cherche à prédire.

On peut objecter que le mécanicien, tel que nous venons de le décrire, a des activités analogues au stade le plus rudimentaire de l'analyse comparative des institutions, et non au stade avancé de l'analyse comparative de la vie politique ; il se borne simplement, et de façon simpliste, à recenser des formes institutionnelles, sans chercher à approfondir les processus politiques. Même le biologiste, quelle que soit sa préoccupation d'étudier les tendances politiques, peut être accusé de manquer de raffinement, dans la mesure où il paraît se contenter de chercher dans diverses institutions des analogies de développement. Si l'un cherche à étudier les possibilités de transplantation des procédures d'une organisation à une autre, le deuxième cherche à discerner la diffusion des tendances entre les institutions internationales.

Ces critiques peuvent être fondées, mais elles ne le sont pas obligatoirement. L'étude du transfert possible des expériences de solution de certains problèmes de l'organisation X à l'organisation Y encourage de toute évidence à l'analyse comparative des deux organisations, en termes politiques. La solution institutionnelle adoptée dans l'organisation X est-elle réalisable dans le contexte politique de l'organisation Y ? Aurait-elle dans l'organisation Y la même fonction politique que dans l'organisation X ? Existe-il entre les objectifs politiques dont s'inspirent X et Y des différences telles que la solution est adéquate à l'une des organisations, mais pas à l'autre ? De même, le biologiste doit examiner en profondeur la vie politique des organisations qu'il étudie afin d'expliquer les uniformités, ou leur absence, dans les tendances qu'il constate. Notre idéal est de former des analystes des institutions internationales qui s'engagent avec enthousiasme et intelligence dans ces voies. Mais nous devons, car nous sommes réalistes, admettre qu'ils ne le feront pas tous ; non sans quelque

cynisme, nous pouvons ajouter qu'aucune discipline n'a encore réussi à instituer un système de protection à toute épreuve contre l'intrusion de l'analyse simpliste.

L'optique comparative n'a de sens qu'appliquée à des matériaux présentant à la fois des similitudes et des différences ; elle est impossible lorsque les objets sont totalement différents, et inutile lorsqu'ils sont identiques. Le progrès de l'étude comparative des institutions internationales doit donc être fondé sur l'hypothèse selon laquelle il existe dans ce domaine des uniformités fournissant une base d'analyse, et des différenciations suffisantes pour laisser entrevoir des résultats intéressants et significatifs. Bref, une telle étude devrait refléter au moins autant d'intérêt pour la découverte de dissemblances que pour la mise en lumière des ressemblances, et autant de scepticisme que d'enthousiasme quant à la possibilité de transplanter les procédures institutionnelles, ou la probabilité d'une diffusion des tendances de fonctionnement d'une organisation à d'autres. Sous-tendant tout cela, il faudrait une aptitude à l'analyse politique pour l'explication des phénomènes observés.

Je souhaite pour ma part que dans ce domaine les études comparatives mettent l'accent sur la variété complexe des phénomènes englobés sous le terme générique d'organisation internationale. Les premiers résultats de telles études pourraient être des schémas de classification - des procédés permettant de mettre en lumière des modèles de similitude et de différenciation, fondés sur des critères jugés significatifs. Nous procédons, dès à présent, il est vrai, à des catégorisations des institutions internationales ; l'analyse comparative systématique peut nous permettre de mettre au point des systèmes de classification plus significatifs que **nos** systèmes actuels.

Cette insistance sur la classification traduit un désir d'éviter les grandes généralisations dans le domaine de l'organisation internationale, ou à faire marche arrière par rapport à de telles généralisations. Placer les institutions internationales dans des catégories différentes, c'est limiter la généralisation à ces catégories ; suggérer que _ceci_ est vrai de telle organisation et _cela_ de telle autre, mais que rien de véritablement important n'est vrai de _toutes_ les organisations. Un mouvement dans cette

direction peut sembler une régression à notre époque passionnée de généra-
lisation en science politique ; mais on pourrait soutenir, avec arguments à
l'appui, que ce qui fait le plus défaut à notre discipline - et non seule-
ment dans le domaine international - c'est la dé-généralisation : il fau-
drait d'une part briser les généralisations injustifiées et inexactes, et
d'autre part admettre qu'une bonne partie du domaine auquel s'applique la
science politique est trop diffus pour permettre des généralisations, sauf
pour les aspects les plus superficiels des phénomènes étudiés. Cette affir-
mation paraît certainement justifiée dans le domaine international. Toute
phrase qui commence par "tous les États, dans leurs relations internatio-
nales...," se termine vraisemblablement par une erreur ou par une banalité.
Il est peu d'affirmations ayant quelque importance que l'on puisse faire à
propos de toutes les organisations internationales. Le plus grand service que
puisse **rendre l'étude comparative** des institutions internationales
pourrait être de briser les fausses généralisations, et de concentrer l'at-
tention critique sur les caractéristiques propres à certains organismes ou,
tout au plus, à certains groupes d'organismes.

Pour illustrer cette thèse, je voudrais signaler le danger de la
tendance, très répandue, à passer de l'observation que le droit de veto a
tendu à paralyser le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, à la conclusion
que l'exigence de l'unanimité constitue un obstacle important au fonctionne-
ment efficace de toute organisation internationale. Cette thèse conduit à
affirmer que le degré auquel la règle du veto a été remplacée par les prin-
cipes majoritaires constitue une mesure significative du progrès institu-
tionnel d'une organisation donnée. Une connaissance même superficielle du
fonctionnement d'une grande variété d'organisations internationales indique
que ce jugement d'ordre général sur les effets de la règle du veto est hautement
contestable. L'examen attentif des processus politiques se déroula dans
un échantillon convenablement choisi d'organismes internationaux devrait
rendre possible un jugement plus fin concernant la signification politique du
droit de veto et ses effets sur le fonctionnement des organisations.

Pour prendre un autre exemple, deux points de vue sont souvent exprimés
concernant l'autonomie d'objet et d'influence des organisations internationales.
Parfois, les organisations sont considérées comme des acteurs de la scène
internationale, des entités jouant un rôle relativement autonome. A d'autres

égards, on ne leur accorde pas un statut aussi significatif, mais on les
considère comme de simples instruments à la disposition des Etats membres.
C'est là, pour l'essentiel, un débat au sujet de l'_identité_ des organisations
internationales : ont-elles une _identité propre_ ? Si elles en ont une, _qui_
sont-elles ? Quels individus incarnent leur personnalité morale ? Qui fixe
leurs objectifs, exprime leur point de vue, exerce l'influence qui est la
leur ? C'est là un problème d'une très grande importance, sans aucun doute,
et qui devrait être discuté à un niveau dépassant celui de la généralisation
vague et des impressions approximatives. Il devrait intéresser des compara-
tistes de l'organisation internationale, des spécialistes prêts à creuser
profondément pour trouver les réponses aux questions fondamentales dans un
grand nombre d'organismes internationaux. Le Secrétaire Général (ou le
fonctionnaire exerçant des fonctions analogues), avec ses principaux col-
laborateurs, est-il en mesure d'_incarner_ l'organisation dans une mesure si-
gnificative, tout en travaillant _pour elle_ ? Dans quelles mesures les repré-
sentants des Etats membres contrôlent-ils efficacement l'organisation et
décident-ils de son usage ? Les représentants permanents des membres sont-ils
devenus un collège qui dirige l'organisation comme l'organe d'une communauté
plus vaste, ou demeurent-ils des délégués nationaux, se faisant concurrence
pour exploiter l'appareil international dans l'intérêt de la politique de
leur gouvernement ? Une analyse comparative de tels problèmes nous montrerait
probablement qu'il existe entre organisations internationales de grandes dif-
férences concernant des facteurs tels que la composition politique de leurs
membres et la nature de leurs fonctions, qui déterminent leur capacité
à acquérir une identité propre. Elle peut montrer aussi que l'épanouissement
de ce processus est fortement affecté par les circonstances du milieu po-
litique international. L'analyse comparative peut nous permettre de savoir
quelles sortes d'organisations internationales, et dans quelles circonstances,
tendent à manifester un certain degré d'identité propre et d'importance au-
tonome pour la sphère des relations internationales.

En dernière analyse, il n'est pas nécessaire d'opter entre généralisa-
tion et dé-généralisation. On peut choisir de mettre l'accent sur l'une ou
sur l'autre, et loin d'être véritablement antinomiques, elles sont en fait
les deux aspects d'un même processus - l'affinement de notre compréhension

dans un domaine donné. Il faut généraliser, mais avec prudence, sans faire violence aux particularités d'un cas, ou d'un groupe de cas appartenant à une catégorie spéciale ; il faut spécifier, mais sans négliger les liens entre cas et entre catégories.

Appliquant cette formule à l'étude comparative des organisations internationales, nous cessons de mettre l'accent sur la différenciation pour reconnaître qu'il est important de situer les organisations internationales, au pluriel, dans le contexte de l'organisation internationale, au singulier. Les organisations internationales ne sont pas, en fin de compte, des phénomènes isolés, des réponses données en ordre dispersé à des manifestations isolées de besoins institutionnels particuliers dans le domaine des affaires internationales. Elles sont liées les unes aux autres, et liées à leurs ancêtres institutionnels, sous des aspects fondamentaux ; prises ensemble, elles représentent un aspect significatif du système moderne d'Etats multiples, le mouvement vers l'institutionalisation des rapports entre Etats. Il est peut-être permis d'espérer que le progrès de l'étude comparative de certaines organisations internationales contribuera dans une mesure appréciable à notre connaissance du phénomène général de l'organisation internationale.

RELATIONSHIP OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL TO
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

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S I X T H   W O R L D   C O N G R E S S

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As a new class of international organization international non-governmen-
tal organizations originated with the United Nations. It has been recognized as
such by other intergovernmental organizations and by many regional international
organizations, both general and special. Of the more than twenty maintaining rela-
tions with non-governmental organizations this paper discusses some of the relations
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Council of Europe, and the
World Health Organization (WHO) with the 114 non-governmental organizations which
have been granted consultative status. To illustrate its purposes and nature the
IAEA, the Council of Europe, and WHO have been selected, the first because it deals
with a subject largely under the control of governments ; the second, because of its
regional scope and popular origin ; and the third, because of its special relations
with the United Nations.

THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.

Article XVI, Section A, of the IAEA Statute authorizes the Board of Gover-
nors to conclude agreements "establishing an appropriate relationship between the
agency and the United Nations and any other organizations the work of which is rela-
ted to that of the Agency". Under this authority the Board, guided by rules approved
by the Agency's General Conference at its second regular session (1958), has accorded
consultative status to nineteen non-governmental organizations. Consultation has
three objectives, first, to systematize the procuring by the Agency of expert infor-
mation or advice ; second, to promote knowledge of the principles and activities of the
the Agency ; and, third, to make it possible for certain organizations to express
their views.

By Agency decision consultative status is not the result of an agreement
with but is a privilege granted to a non-governmental organization, hence can be
withdrawn at the Agency's will. In this way consultative status differs from agree-
ments with intergovernmental organizations, which can be terminated only with the
consent of both parties.

To be granted consultative status an organization's work must be directly
related to and be able to make a significant contribution to the Agency's work : and
the organization must be of recognized standing and have authority to speak for its
members.

Consultative status includes the following privileges : receipt of the agenda of each session of the General Conference ; observer status at all of its sessions and those of the Board of Governors and attendance at all public meetings ; circulation of written statements of not more than 2.000 words to all members of Agency organs and making of oral statements at public meetings of the main committee and any other committee or subsidiary organ of the General Conference under specified conditions, and to the Board on its invitation. Organizations in consultative status also receive non-restricted documents ; they may consult with the Secretariat on matters of mutual interest ; and, on request of the Director-General, may undertake studies or investigations or prepare papers.

By inviting some of the nineteen organizations in consultative status, and others, to attend scientific and technical conferences the Agency obtains expert advice and the organizations have a chance to express their views. Most such conferences are sponsored by the Agency itself, but sometimes they are sponsored by the Agency on the initiative of one or another non-governmental organization, and, sometimes, they are sponsored jointly. Thus, the Agency and the International Council of Scientific Unions, a non-governmental organization in consultative status, jointly sponsored a Symposium on Isotope Mass Effects in Chemistry and Biology in Vienna in 1961.

Invitations from the Agency to attend and participate in conferences are reciprocated by non-governmental organizations. The rules on consultative status do not require this ; it is a matter of courtesy and reciprocity.

Provision of expert advice and information is also covered in working agreements with non-governmental organizations, as, for example, those with the International Commissions on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and Radiological Units and Measurements (ICRU).

Not all international organizations desiring relations with the Agency have been granted consultative status. Within the Board, its Non-Governmental Organizations Committee, and the General Conference sharp differences arose over whether the World Federation of Scientific Workers and the World Federation of Trade Unions were sufficiently interested in the Agency's work and could make a sufficient contribution to it to be accorded consultative status. The decision was in the negative. The World Federation of Mental Health is another non-governmental organization whose application for consultative status was not approved. The differences

over non-governmental organizations have extended to intergovernmental organiza-
tions as well. Failure to grant the World Federation of Scientific Workers the
desired consultative status touched off a political controversy which resulted
in rejection of a formal agreement between the IAEA and EURATOM, the Atomic Energy
Agency of the European Community.[2]

Thus, beneath the surface relationship of expert opinion expressed syste-
matically to IAEA's organs according to recognized rules is a secondary layer of
relations of a political character and with ideological motivation. However, no
formal rejection of an application for status can effectively insulate IAEA from
the ideology of the World Federation of Scientific Workers and the World Federa-
tion of Trade Unions. The technical views which they are able to supply the Agency
are sought by the Secretariat informally in a manner not formally sanctioned by
the Agency. At the same time the formalization of relations between the Agency and
EURATOM is precluded.

The politics of atomic energy illustrate the deeper issue of public versus
private control. The extension of state authority into social and economic areas
is not denied. Nor is the expansion of non-governmental organizations, both natio-
nal and international, open to question. What is disputed is whether these develop-
ments, nationaly and internationally, represent an increase in power of the private
individuals and groups composing the non governmental organizations vis-vis govern-
ments or a holding operation of private enterprise and individualism against en-
croaching state authority. Eminent authority can be marshalled on both sides. Clear-
ly, the question is not open or shut. But its existence shows the deeper significan-
ce of non-governmental-intergovernmental relations than is often thought.[3]

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.

The origin of the Council of Europe differs from that of the IAEA. The
Council of Europe came into being because of the weight of the European Movement
on and despite the opposition of governments. The IAEA is the product of United
States' initiative shaped by and through intergovernmental negotiation under UN
auspices.

Within three years after the establishment of the Council of Europe in
1949, non-governmental organizations in considerable number had been brought into
formal relationship and many more enjoyed an informal working relationship. For

two trade union federations (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, ICFTU, and the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions, IFCTU) and five others in Category A, as well as two in Category B, status was in effect as of 1954. Also, at that time the applications of seventeen other non-governmental organizations were pending before the Council. A larger group of thirty-nine European non-governmental organizations listed in the Yearbook of International Organizations had occasional relations, while forty non-status non-governmental organizations showed interest in Council activities and had unofficial working relations with it. Thereafter, the Committee of Ministers acted on applications as they were received. By 1964 forty-eight non-governmental organizations had been granted consultative status.

In redefining consultative status (1960) the Council of Europe emphasized that it was giving something to non-governmental organizations they would not otherwise have ; that the grant was for the purpose of facilitating the tighter European union among the Council's members which is their aim ; that non-governmental organizations granted such status are divided into two categories I and II (corresponding to old A, and B and C respectively) ; and that each Category I organization is representative and has wide competence in at least one important area of the Council's activities, while each Category II organization is competent in a restricted area of the Council's activities. Once an organization has status the initiative for consultation comes from the organs of the Council, - the Assembly Committees, the Ministers' Committees of Government Experts, and the Secretariat, not from the non-governmental organization. In addition, the 1960 revision spells out the several steps in the process of receiving consultative status. Every three years the list is reviewed by the Committee of Ministers, including a review to determine whether any in Category II have become eligible for consideration for placing in Category I. An application rejected cannot be resubmitted short of three years. Absorption of an organization with status into a larger organization which is authorized to represent it causes loss of status.

The rights and duties of consultative status were also redefined. The rights are : to send observers to public meetings of the Assembly, but without the right to speak ; to receive agenda and public documents of the Assembly, thus

terminating the earlier customary right to receive confidential documents of the Assembly ; to present opinions orally to Assembly Committees, at their request ; to submit written observations to committees of both the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers (the previous 1000 word limit was removed ; also, with consolidation of former B and C into new Category II, the submission of written observations, hitherto denied C. organizations, is now granted ; however, the right to enlarge orally on a written statement, specifically granted before, was dropped); proposal of agenda items remains limited to Category I organizations.

The duties of organizations in consultative status are : to give maximum publicity to Council aims and accomplishments and to report annually to the Secretary-General how this duty has been fulfilled (the last is new) ; accept the principles and aims of the Council ; keep the Secretary-General informed of scheduled meetings and admit his representative as observer when the Secretary-General so requests ; be ready, on the Secretary-General's request, to furnish information, documents, and opinions, in the several fields (formerly there was a positive obligation to furnish them) ; and keep the Secretary-General informed of activities of probable interest to the Council.

Both the Committee of Ministers and the Consultative Assembly make use of non-governmental organizations. Expert committees of the Ministers have received the views of non-governmental organization representatives on a wide variety of subjects. In 1963 an expert committee studying the proposal for a European convention covering the production and sale of wine and beer met professional organizations. In 1959 an informal agreement covering the exchange of television programs was worked out with Council of Europe legal experts by international professional organizations, thus dispensing with the necessity of recommending either an international convention or domestic legislation. The International Union for the Conservation of Natural Resources, an international non-governmental organization in Category I, has worked with a Committee of Experts on the protection of nature and the countryside. In a related matter, observers from non-governmental organizations attended a meeting in 1963 of a fourteen-country committee of experts on camping, caravaning, and motoring. Europa Nostra, an international federation of private associations for the protection and preservation of historic sites and monuments, grew out of steps

initiated by the Assembly. At its direction the Secretary-General organized meetings, under the auspices of the Assembly's Cultural and Scientific Commission, with private organizations which resulted in federating eighteen interested associations from eleven European countries. One of the earliest uses made of a non-governmental organization was in the resettlement of refugee agricultural workers. The expertise of the European Association for the Study of Refugee Problems was tapped on several occasions by the Social Section of the Secretariat's Assembly Services Directorate. Use of the Maison de l'Europe in Strasbourg for meetings has been accorded regularly to such groups as the Permanent Committee of the Congress of European Youth and to the Youth Model Assembly.

On the other hand, the Consultative Assembly in 1961 warned all concerned and particularly local authorities of the activities of the Fédération mondiale des villes jumelées (FMJV) and its various branches on the ground that they were contrary to the objectives of the Council of Europe, and, in addition, recommended that all member governments refrain from extending any assistance, direct or indirect, to any of these groups.[4]

THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

The relations with and utilization of non-governmental organizations by the World Health Organization underwent expansion in 1962. While the earlier principle of not differentiating between non-governmental organizations for consultative purposes was retained, closer relations and more utilization are clearly seen in the action of the Executive Board. Both in general and in particular terms it authorized and envisaged an extension in the collaboration between WHO and non-governmental organizations.

Generally, an increase in the number of technical areas within which WHO operates and non-governmental organizations are interested is noted.

Specifically, new technical areas into which WHO is moving offer opportunities for more intensive relations with non-governmental organizations , which can take the form of listing technically qualified organization officials on panels whence WHO expert committees are drawn ; exchanges of views between WHO technical personnel and that of non-governmental organizations on the progress of technical matters

are authorized ; and invitations to non-governmental organizations specializing
in technical areas are to be given to be represented at meeting of expert commit-
tees recruited from scientific groups and at technical meetings, local and inter-
regional conferences, seminars, and symposiums organized by WHO. Easier recourse is
provided for collaboration in achieving the best results in nomenclature, unifor-
mity of methods, and in similar kinds of activity. Greater use can be made of non-
governmental organizations to spread information and technical directives origina-
ting with WHO and to promote health education and raise health standards. Coopera-
tion is made easier in obtaining information about professional groups and indivi-
duals about whom documentation is desired, in making investigations, and sharing
in research. A more liberal policy was authorized in supporting periodicals and
publications published by non-governmental organizations, in furnishing technical
information for use in their publications, and supporting conferences sponsored
jointly and held more frequently than before. In some cases, WHO might make grants
or otherwise cover expenses of studies and investigations made by non-governmental
organizations.

With the grant in 1962 of consultative status to the International Asso-
ciation of Distributers of Water the number of non-governmental organizations in
this relationship reached fifty-seven. One use made of these organizations is as a
recruiting agent. When an acute need for doctors and nurses arose in the Congo in
1960, one hundred and fifty from twenty-five countries responded to appeals made
by Red Cross Societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and national
governments. WHO saw to it that the best possible use was made of these teams. The
International Union for Health Education teamed up with WHO to sponsor an interna-
tional conference on health and health education in 1962. Numerous organizations
in consultative status are also linked indirectly with other organizations similar-
ly situated, either in WHO or in some other intergovernmental organization. One
such is the International Organization of Microbiological Societies. It has consul-
tative status with WHO and is also related to UNESCO through the International
Union of Biological Sciences which is a member of the International Council of
Scientific Unions, which has consultative status with UNESCO. The practice is now
more extensive than ever before of filling WHO's forty advisory panels, from which

expert committees are selected, from technically-qualified and professionally-positioned experts identified through non-governmental organizations. Even before the recent revision of the principles governing consultative status, WHO had made use of expert committees in studying, investigating, and solving new public health problems. The success already attained is one reason for extending the use of this method.

SOME COMPARISONS

Consultative status for some non-governmental organizations does not mean that all others are frozen out. In the International Atomic Energy Agency relations are not limited to the nineteen in the consultative status. Invitations are exchanged with others, which supply information and expert views, as do those in consultative status.

A similar situation exists at the Council of Europe. In the first few years after its establishment, when numerous non-governmental organizations had applications for consultative status pending, close relations developed, of an informal character, with the Secretariat. Nor have all non-governmental organizations desired to enter into consultative status. Many have been satisfied with a working relations classification. One, the European Movement, out of which the Council of Europe is evolving, has never attempted to formalize its relationship with the Council, "the clumsy instrumentation of formal consultative relations", as the historian of this relationship describes it.[5]

The World Health Organization, with its sixty-seven non-governmental organizations in consultative status, draws upon a much larger number for expert opinions and, simultaneously, benefits from publicity from them. WHO's redefinition of consultative status was aimed at intensifying its relations with non-governmental organizations. At the same time, the purport of the revised principles implied an invitation to many other organizations to collaborate in helping WHO to promote its program in new fields. Nothing like a closed system can be detected in the attitude or formal rules of WHO in its relations with non-governmental organizations.

So far as consultation is concerned the international secretariat is the organ of highest importance. In fact, if not in theory, consultation means not only observation of the formal procedures prescribed by the regulations but also informal day-to-day contacts. In this respect the international secretariat corresponds to the staff of a congressional committee in the United States - a communications channel, a pressure point, a source of information, an ally of some, an opponent of or neutral to other, group representatives. Both authors on IAEA- and Council of Europe-non-governmental organization relations agree.[6]

Acquisition of new rights not provided for formally sometimes results from cultivation of the international secretariat, an additional similarity between it and the staff of an American congressional committee. In the Council of Europe, for example, several non-governmental organizations acquired the right to speak as well as to observe at Assembly Committee meetings when considering agenda items pertaining to the organizations' interests. This was done with the acquiescence of the Committee Chairman concerned and, obviously, as the result of having cultivated and gained the confidence of the secretariat.

Rationalization of relations is another function performed by the international secretariat. Using the Council of Europe again for illustrative purposes, the social section of the Secretariat's Assembly Services Directorate attempted to get the ICFTU and the IFCTU to form a joint body for consultation when their applications for status were being considered. The attempt was not successful. On the other hand, the Agricultural section succeeded in a similar attempt with the European Confederation of Agriculture and the International Federation of Agricultural Producers, although each sends its own delegate to Assembly and to Assembly Committee meetings.

No obvious connection appears between the extent of use of technical committees, ad hoc and permanent, and of non-governmental organizations, even for extracting expert advice. If any, it would not be apparent from this limited examination of the IAEA, the Council of Europe, and WHO, each of which presents a special case for analysis.

As a rule intergovernmental organizations have no legislative power, hence

create no obligations either to enforce or to observe law. The International Atomic Energy Agency, the Council of Europe, and the World Health Organization are no exceptions to this rule. As a consequence compliance with resolutions adopted by their representative assemblies is not compulsory but voluntary. In such a situation the obvious step would seem to be to call to their aid non-governmental organizations and their national affiliates to assist in carrying out, or even to carry out, such resolutions. However, in the three organizations under discussion such a step seems not to have been taken. Thus, they differ from the United Nations which in the 18th session of the General Assembly placed the implementation of its resolution (1934) on a World Campaign against Hunger, Disease, and Ignorance squarely on non-governmental organizations.

In several respects this Resolution illustrates the many-faceted place and most of the problems of non-governmental in their relationships to intergovernmental organizations. Aside from the unusual origin of the idea embodied in the Resolution (the British delegation out of a non-governmental organization official), the General Assembly's purpose is to place on national and international non-governmental organizations the obligation and responsibility for effectuating a program which intergovernmental organizations are unable, and their membership unwilling, to effectuate themselves. This is open to different interpretations : abdication of responsibility ; irresponsibility ; shifting from intergovernmental to non-governmental organizations of a responsibility which governments themselves are politically unable to carry into effect ; frustration over insufficient authority to execute the program itself ; or transferring to non-governmental organizations a responsibility they are not designed to discharge. Perhaps it is a political bid for the good will and support of the less developed, newly-independent countries. It has raised questions of coordination with the Food and Agriculture Organization's Freedom from Hunger Campaign, the World Food Program, and the Development Decade. Closely related is the baffling problem of coordination of non-governmental organization efforts, not only in the United Nations but also in those of the specialized agencies, all of which are generally, and some, like FAO, WHO, UNESCO, directly involved, while one, FAO, is handicapped because of the absence from its constitution of an article authorizing consultati-

ve status for non-governmental organizations.

The unusual spectacle of the United Nations relying on non-governmental organizations to implement its most sweeping resolution touches problems deeper than mere administrative feasibility. To involve international non-governmental organizations, morally if not legally, in an administrative task, with none of the authority or resources required for effective administration, is another way of posing the basic question of freedom and authority in the modern world. Already alluded to in another connection (above p. 3), this question cannot be separated from the question of the relative value of intergovernmental and non-governmental organization in international cooperation. Within the territorial state, the basic unit of intergovernmental organization, state authority continues to expand in the economic and social fields, while, at the same time, national non-governmental organizations, in various forms, are involved in various ways in the process. Generally speaking, the stronger the forces of individualism and free enterprise, the more resistance to the expansion of state authority, with the corollary that where resistance is overcome the non-governmental organizations are usually drawn into the administrative process, there to continue the resistance or to minimize the effect of state authority on individualism. The same question as to the wisdom of such a development domestically is raised internationally with the projection of non-governmental organizations, willy-nilly, into the midst of of the international intergovernmental process, and with little consideration of the value and effects. Ot the three intergovernmental organizations here discussed, one, the Council of Europe is not directly involved ; the second, IAEA, is involved in a remote sense ; and only one, WHO, can be said to be involved directly. Since the Council of Europe is less than the other two in the traditional mold of intergovernmental organization, it is not surprising that it is with the Council of Europe that the same question of freedom and authority has been raised in another form. How to interpret the problem of power of non-governmental organizations in Europe and in world politics confronts observers of the relations between such organizations and the Council of Europe.[7]

In their relationships to and their use of non-governmental organizations the IAEA, the Council of Europe, and WHO fall into different categories, by virtue of their origins, their authority, and their structures. As far as non-governmen-

tal organizations are concerned practically the only thing common to the three
is the practice of consultation according to more or less systematized procedu-
res. Probably the matter on which there is most variation is the nature of this
consultative relation, both theoretical and practical. Is this variation a re-
flection of the different grades of esteem in which the three organizations are
held by governments and peoples ? IAEA is a disappointment ; the Council of Eu-
rope is in a transition state ; WHO is burgeoning, not completely free of inter-
national politics, but not seriously embarrassed by it. To tie the relations of
non-governmental organizations to these organizations to the far larger matter
of the extent to which they live up to, or fail to live up to, public expecta-
tions is completely justified, in view of the determining role of public opinion
in contemporary international organization politics. Fuller recognition of this
functional relationship is long overdue. [8]

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND JURIDICAL STATUS.

For many years international juridical recognition has been sought by
non-governmental organizations. To an undetermined extent they have a status in
their own right and independent of that of intergovernmental organizations, such
as consultative status, which governments may grant. For non-governmental organi-
zations and for their leaders Article 71 of the United Nations Charter was but
the first step towards a higher goal. A second step was implementation of Article
71 by the UN Economic and Social Council, by ten Specialized Agencies, and by at
least a dozen other intergovernmental organizations. A third step, which would
reach the goal, is acceptance by governments of an international convention defi-
ning the rights, privileges, and immunities of non-governmental organizations and
their representatives. Such a step is thought to be necessary because consultati-
ve status, however much it is to be desired, nevertheless provides no juridical
basis for non-governmental organizations as a class of international organization.
The Union of International Associations (UAI) has provided leadership of the Con-
ference of Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Status with UNESCO in
this matter. Other similar conferences have supported their efforts. Building on
early efforts of the UAI, of the Institute of International Law, and of a commit-
tee set up by the Conference of Non-governmental Organizations in Consultative

Status with the UN ; and, following extensive consultations with non-governmental organizations generally, the UAI Secretariat prepared a draft convention to facilitate their activities and forwarded it to UNESCO. On motion of its Director-General the project was discussed in the UN (and specialized agencies) Administrative Committee on Coordination. The UAI President was advised by the UNESCO Director-General that the opportune moment did not seem to have arrived for pressing the idea of improving the situation of non-governmental organizations by means of a convention or international recommendation. UNESCO has taken no action.

Limited measures favoring the development of non-governmental organizations have been taken by UNESCO and the Council of Customs Cooperation. Meetings organized by international organizations benefit from the advantages of the international convention, adopted in 1961, according them facilities for free importation of goods destined to be presented or used at an exposition, fair, congress, or a similar spectacle.

This was a step backward from the international convention drawn up in 1956 at the 7th session of the Conference of International Private Law, according to which legal recognition was extended to societies, associations, and foreign foundations. Although it was opened to signature by twenty states few have ratified it.

For a while it appeared as if a long step towards the goal had been taken by the Council of Europe. Operating under a directive from the Committee of Ministers, an expert committee undertook the drafting of an international convention covering societies and other profit-making organizations possessing legal personality or which, lacking capacity to sue and to have legal relations with third parties, have been set up on the territory of one of the contracting states ; as well as societies and non-profit-making organizations. After meeting eight times the experts' committee decided in 1961 to exclude from the scope of the convention societies and other non-profit-making organizations. In its opinion such groups constitute a category raising questions different from those to be covered in a convention on the establishment of societies and other profit-making organizations. The Committee of Ministers acquiesced in the abandonment of the endeavor, thus underlining the UNESCO failure to act on the draft of the Union of International Associations.

The unwillingness of governments and of their intergovernmental organizations to perfect the consultative relationship further may be explained, in part, by the heterogeneous composition of the non-governmental organization movement and by the failure of some of its members fully to utilize the status they already have. When the President of the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations in consultative status with UN ECOSOC organized a luncheon for the Secretary-General in 1962, it was found that only seventy-five out of 134 organizations in Categories A and B had registered representatives at UN Headquarters.

Headquarters agreements between host states and intergovernmental organizations, with privileges and immunities of representatives of non-governmental organizations varying from one headquarters to another, continue to govern their juridical status.

THE INFLUENCE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

The question of the influence of non-governmental organizations arises out of their presence in the intergovernmental process but with no way of measuring this influence. In theory and in practice, too, so far as the rules go, non-governmental organizations are brought into relation with intergovernmental organizations for the benefit of the latter. The former are not supposed to be pressure groups, importuning officials and delegates to accept the program or the policy of the non-governmental organization in question. No one, I am sure, is taken in by this way of thinking about the intergovernmental process. Its vocabulary is finding room for such phrases as, groupes de pression internationaux, international pressure groups.[9] And the system of nation-states organized intergovernmentally has likewise had to accommodate itself to international pressure groups. The camel got his nose under the tent via Article 71 of the United Nations Charter. Non-governmental organization representatives, in consultative status and otherwise, have spread to include the United Nations, the specialized agencies, regional organizations, and others in large number. Are they welcomed ? tolerated ? listened to ? resisted ? scorned ? No yes or no answer to these questions is possible. The range of variation among non-governmental organizations is as wide as it is among individuals, and their reasons for existence are as numerous. If, sometimes, they forget their decidedly junior status in the intergovern-

mental system and try to "pressure" delegates and officials, more frequently they adhere to the role cast for them by consultative status. Nor is the propriety or impropriety of their behavior a satisfactory test, for in international relations what is ethical is even less well defined than it is in domestic affairs. Neither can the intergovernmental process be simplified by the metamorphosis into governments of politically-dependent groups with aspirations to independence. After these petitioners to the United Nations and to world opinion are satisfied there remain hundreds of other non-governmental organizations, diverse, varying in resources, strength, and leadership, of whom too few select for their focus of attention the development of the promising path of procedural innovation. But, regardless of aim, all these non-governmental organizations have the common characteristic of wanting to influence, in one way or another, the course of intergovernmental life and the life of the world's peoples. Their representatives constitute an elite in terms of status, if not of influence. Repulsed by intergovernmental organizations in their efforts to acquire international legal status, they are, nonetheless, permanent factors which cannot be overlooked and insist on being listened to. In the ever-changing kaleidoscope of forces they are indeterminate, varying in size and value, elusive, yet never absent, a concomitant of contemporary international organization still waiting to be accorded the attention they deserve.

N O T E S

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1. – As used in Article 71 of the United Nations Charter, a non-governmental
    organization has been defined as "... any international organization which
    is not established by intergovernmental agreement..." ECOSOC Resolution
    288 (X) Paragraph 8.

2. – Rodgers, Raymond Spencer, "Commentary on Consultative Status and Special
    Privileges at IAEA," International Associations, 1959. N° 2 (February),
    pp. 152-53.

3.– See the views of Gunnar Myrdal, as quoted in Tew, E.S., "The Organizational
    World," International Associations, 1960, N° 12 (December), pp. 732 ff and
    those of David Mitrany, Ibid., 1961, N° 2 (February), p. 122 ; also, under
    the title, "International Cooperation in Action," Ibid. 1959, N° 9 (Septem-
    ber), pp. 644-48.

4. – In reporting this action International Associations appended the following
    footnote (translation from the French) : "It is doubtless very unusual, if
    not unique, for an intergovernmental organization to use such unequivocal
    language to indicate a position unfavorable to an international non-govern-
    mental organization. Whatever the basis of the problem, a position as clear
    as this can only vivify relations between the private international and the
    public intergovernmental sectors. Too often disapproval, which dare not be
    expressed, and praise, full of double meaning, stifles the atmosphere."
    1961, N° 11 (November), p. 729.

5. – Rohn, Peter H., Relations between the Council of Europe and International
    Non-Governmental Organizations. Thesis submitted to the University of the
    Saar. 1955. Reprinted by the Union of International Associations, Brussels,
    1957, p. 68.

6. – Whetton. Lawrence L., "The Relations of the International Atomic Energy
    Agency with International Non-Governmental Organizations," International
    Associations. 1963. N° 7 (July), p. 411 ; Rohn, Op. Cit., p. 48

7. – Rohn, Op. Cit., p. 69 and ftnt 1.

8. – Speeckaert, G.P., "International Organization and University Education,"
    International Associations, 1960, N° 2 (February), pp. 89-92, also p. 93 ;
    Meynaud, Jean, Les Groupes de Pression Internationaux, Lausanne, 1961,
    Ch. IV, esp. p. 412.

9. – Meynaud, Op. Cit.

Summary

The experience of intergovernmental organizations in their relationship to non-governmental organizations is mixed and inconclusive. Success varies with the fortunes of the particular organization concerned. In three selected cases analysis shows that all make use of non-governmental organizations but subject matter has affected the success attained. Strict governmental control of atomic energy has limited the usefulness of the nineteen non-governmental organizations in consultative status with the International Atomic Energy Agency largely to collaboration in formulating health and safety standards, although not without the intrusion of some politics. The theoretically apolitical nature of consultative status has not been completely realized at the Council of Europe, with which forty-eight organizations are connected, although the structural separation of governmental from consultative functions in this case has not prevented significant use in promoting the unity of Europe. In the case of the World Health Organization success with fifty-seven non governmental organizations has led it to intensify the relationship with them of supplying expert personnel and advice and disseminating information. To make the most of consultative status the international secretariat is the key organ for non-governmental organizations to cultivate. Legitimate uses of them by the United Nations do not include saddling them with administrative responsibilities. Despite sustained efforts non-governmental organizations have not succeeded in obtaining international juridical status. In the relationship of intergovernmental to non-governmental organizations similar questions to those raised by pressure groups in national societies are encountered. Extension of them to the international field constitutes another dimension of the question of fixing the frontiers dividing state authority from individual freedom.

R E S U M E

L'expérience des rapports entre organisations inter-gouvernementales et organisations non-gouvernementales ne permet pas d'aboutir à des conclusions nettes. La réussite de ces rapports dépend du sort de l'organisation étudiée. Dans trois cas précis, l'analyse montre que les organisations inter-gouvernementales font usage des organisations non-gouvernementales ; le domaine d'activité est cependant un des facteurs de plus ou moins grande réussite. Le contrôle très strict que les gouvernements exercent sur l'énergie atomique a limité l'utilité des dix-neuf organisations non-gouvernementales à statut consultatif auprès de l'Agence Internationale de l'Energie Atomique à une coopération dans l'élaboration de normes sanitaires et de règles de réussite, non sans que certains facteurs politiques jouent. Le caractère théoriquement apolitique du statut consultatif n'est pas intégralement préservé au Conseil de l'Europe, auquel se trouvent liées quarante-huit organisations ; la séparation structurelle des fonctions gouvernementales et des fonctions consultatives n'a cependant pas empêché dans ce cas les organisations non-gouvernementales d'être utilisées de façon significative pour promouvoir l'unification européenne. Dans le cas de l'Organisation Mondiale de la Santé, le succès obtenu dans les rapports avec cinquante-sept organisations non-gouvernementales a conduit à intensifier ces rapports ; les organisations en question fournissent du personnel et des avis, et diffusent des informations. Pour rendre aussi efficace que possible leur statut consultatif, c'est le secrétariat international que les organisations non-gouvernementales doivent surtout "cultiver". Dans leurs rapports avec les organisations non-gouvernementales, les Nations Unies devraient ne pas les charger de responsabilités administratives. Malgré leurs efforts répétés, les organisations non-gouvernementales n'ont pas obtenu la reconnaissance de leur statut juridique international. Des problèmes analogues à ceux posés à l'échelon national par les groupes de pression se posent à propos des rapports entre les organisations inter-gouvernementales et les organisations non-gouvernementales. Leur extension au domaine international ajoute un aspect nouveau au problème des frontières entre l'autorité de l'Etat et la liberté de l'individu.

MAN-COMPUTER SIMULATION AS A HEURISTIC
IN THE COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

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Man-Computer Simulation as a Heuristic
in the Comparative Study
of International Organizations

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In the comparative study of politics, we now seek more general bases
in terms of which political institutions and nations may be studied. In
the Inter-Nation Simulation (Guetzkow, et al., 1963), an effort has been
made to provide a somewhat general framework for the study of international
systems.[1] To what extent is it possible for this theoretical tool to serve
as a heuristic in the comparative study of international organizations ?

The Inter-Nation Simulation is an operating model of an international
system, including nation-states and international organizations. It re-
presents political, economic, and military facets of the international
scene, through interlocking sets of computer-based programs and manned
decision-making units. Within this milieu, international organizations
may be posited as part of the initial conditions, of the simulation, or
they may develop as a consequence of the simulated activity itself. Such
organizations may be unifunctional, emphasizing one set of activities, or
they may consist of some complex mixture of force, trade/aid, and poli-
tics.

An example of the inclusion in the Inter-Nation Simulation of a
universal international organization as part of the initial conditions
is found in an experiment conducted in 1960, involving sixteen replica-
tions ; later in this essay a detailed description will be made of the
ways in which two of these organizations waxed and waned. An example of
a partially inclusive, limited functional organization was developed in
an exploratory run conducted with skilled policy-makers at Asilomar in
1959. In this instance, international political leaders succeeded in
creating an international bank, which served as a vehicle for economic

growth by some small nations and simultaneously permitted the large
powers to disengage partially from their competition for hegemony.

This essay indicates how a man-computer simulation of international
systems may be of heuristic value for the development of theory in the
comparative study of international organizations. As groundwork for the
analysis, a brief overview of the man-computer simulation developed at
Northwestern University will be presented. Then, examples of the opera-
tion of the sixteen international organizations which existed in the
Brody-Driver-Guetzkow runs of 1960 will be presented. Finally, the po-
tential usefulness of man-computer simulation for comparative work in
international organizations will be assessed in terms of the framework
which Claude has developed for the analysis of international organization.

An Overview of the Inter-Nation Simulation

The man-computer system is composed of nations and one or more in-
ternational organizations ; these groups, along with their decision-
makers, constitute the units of the simulation. Let us examine how these
components function, thereby constituting an international system.

Nations in an International System : In various runs of the Inter-Nation
Simulation, the number of nations represented in the simulate has varied
from five to nine. Each nation consists of decision-makers who operate
computer programs constituting the capabilities of the state. Differences
in the development of a nation are represented in differences in its basic
capability (symbolizing such characteristics as the nation's human and
physical resources and its ability to utilize such capacities for the
generation of further capabilities), in its consumption standards, and
in the force that it may apply in external and internal activities. The
political constraints under which the decision-makers hold office within
their nations are simulated, in that the probability of remaining in
office depends on the extent to which their political validators, whether
such be oligarchic elites or democratic masses, are satisfied in terms of
their standards of living and their national security. As office-holders,
the decision-makers may lose their prerogatives through orderly or disor-

derly transfer of power to others. In office, they have varying degrees
of decision latitude, as they develop their national budgets, making al-
locations among competing demands for internal programs and improvements
as contrasted with allocations to such external activities as economic
aid and involvements of force .

In order to handle the volume of decisions which must be made in o-
perating each nation, the two to six individuals constituting a nation
may differentiate quite specialized roles. For example, one may serve as
a "decision-maker-for-force," being responsible for the establishment,
maintenance, and utilization of the nation's military forces, both in-
ternally and externally. Another may work as the "internal decision-
maker," being responsible for the "yearly" budgetary allocations and
developing guidelines for the nation's economic intercourse with other
nations. Of special interest are the participants in the simulation who
serve as "external decision-makers" (EDMs), conducting the nation's foreign
affairs and constituting its representation in international organiza-
tions. Usually these decision-makers are coordinated in their activities
by heads of state, the "central decision-makers" (CDMs) in whom authority
is lodged during their continuance in office.

Once the experimenters and participants begin operating the nations,
an international system takes form. By communicating bilaterally and mul-
tilaterally, elaborate nets of interaction are erected among the nations.
The "world newspaper" serves as a vehicle for pronouncements by states-
men ; in addition, it provides statistical information about the develop-
ments within each of the several nations. Trades are negotiated and aid
agreements are developed. Military and political alliances may be formed.
The decision-makers soon become thoroughly embedded in the programmed
and unprogrammed relationships which develop within and among the nations,
as the run continues intermittently for five, ten, or twenty hours, over
a period of days, weeks, or months.

International Organizations : In our explorations with the Inter-Nation
Simulation, it has been customary to utilize an on-going international
organization simulate (10), with one or two persons serving as its se-
cretariat. In such cases, one decision-maker in each nation is usually
designated as the "10 Delegate," meeting periodically with counterparts
from other nations. Its operation is usually guided by a "charter," which
may be modified in the course of the run--either formally through amend-
ment procedures, or informally through changes in usage. It is quite pos-
sible, too, for the conferences involved in alliances to develop quasi-
stable forms, so that in fact they become international organizations.
And, as was mentioned above, at times nations form new international
organizations for the achievement of common goals. These organizations
may designate persons for leadership roles, such as chairmen and secre-
taries-general. The nations may also transfer their capabilities (in the
form of personnel or funds or forces) to the international organizations,
so that the latter also constitute somewhat automomous units within the
international system.

This brief description of the Inter-Nation Simulation indicates
that these contrived systems may be used for comparative study. In re-
peating runs of the Inter-Nation Simulation, one may compare the results
obtained when there is an international organization against systems in
which no such organization exists. Or perhaps more interestingly, one
may contrast systems involving one form of international organization
with another form-- other things being held constant. It may be most
fruitful, however, to compare the operation of these synthetic interna-
tional organizations with those existing in the international arena of
the mid-twentieth century. With more than thirty such intergovernmental
organizations now in existence, the possibilities for such comparison
are ample.

Description of Simulated International Organizations

During the summer of 1960, in the process of conducting a study of
the potential impact of the proliferation of nuclear weapons within the

Inter-Nation Simulation, an "international organization" was operated within each of sixteen replications of the mid-twentieth century "cold war."[2] In this essay, two examples of the development of the sixteen simulated international organizations will be traced during the first half of the experimental runs, when the international system consisted of two blocs, each led by a great nuclear power, with its two or three smaller associated nations. A detailed description of the experimental arrangements used in the exploration is presented elsewhere (Guetzkow, et al., 1960).

In this exploration, the foreign affairs of each nation were handled under the Central Decision-Maker (CDM) by two individuals, an External Decision-Maker (EDMx) who served as foreign minister and a second External Decision-Maker (EDMy) who reported to the CDM and the EDMx, serving as the nation's Delegate in the International Organization (10). Operating within a framework established by a short document, which constituted the organization's charter (cf. Appendix), the 10 met periodically at somewhat regular intervals throughout the run. During the first half of the simulation constituting about six hours of real time, the 10 convened five times in each run, with an extra session occurring once in three of the sixteen systems. These meetings of the 10 spread over two successive real half-days took place within a rich context of bilateral exchanges and multilateral conferences, as are enumerated in Table 1. The 10 was in session about half of the time during which the international system operated ; the ad hoc conferences, within and between members of the two blocs, occurred both while the 10 was in session, as well as during intervals when the 10 was not meeting. There were about twice as many ad hoc conferences as there were 10 meetings.

The contents of the 10 sessions included matters of both procedure and substance, as are exhibited in Table 1. Almost 25 per cent of the agenda of the 83 meetings was devoted to procedural problems. Over half of the substantive agenda was devoted to the problems of disarmament, both at the general level and at the specific, the latter involving such

problems as inspection, an international police force, and trade-in-arms. Some quarter of the substantive items focused on economic problems, with considerable attention being given to the establishment of an international trade organization. Although only a small number of agenda items were devoted to the development of general alliances and pacts, often involving collective security, almost half of the systems did consider, at least once, the formation of alliances encompassing nations in both blocs. In all, some 31 votes were taken on the 82 issues developed in the course of the meetings of the 16 10s. The depth of the differences among the nations, as they composed their opposing blocs, is seen in the fact that although the delegates devoted some eighty hours of real time to their meetings, they were only able to bring agenda items to a vote on the average of about once every two and a half hours. Since each period in the simulation approximates a year, it supposedly took almost ten months of meetings in the 10 to achieve each resolution.

It is possible to give descriptions in some detail of the operation of the simulated international organization for two cases -- the same two cases for which an overview of the development of the entire international system has been reported elsewhere (Guetzkow, et al., 1960). Each of the sixteen systems, including numbers "IV" and "V" which are reported herewith, started with identical initial conditions, except for the attitudes of the senior high school students who served as the "decision-makers." As was mentioned above, the quasi-abstract nations were divided into two blocs ; each nation was given a contrived name. OMNE was one of the two nuclear powers, whose allies consisted of ERGA and YORA ; UTRO was the other nuclear power, with whom INGO and ZENA were associated. The seventh nation of the system, ALGO, had weak initial ties to the UTRO-INGO-ZENA bloc.

SYSTEM 8-IV

Context : The bloc-alliance system, being viewed as a cause of world tension, had prompted the nations to attempt to re-align themselves in an all-against-the-aggressor pact of mutual security. However, despite the

existence of this pact and of disarmament discussions in and out of the
10, levels of arms continued to increase through the first half of the
simulation run. Trade-aid activity was low. Efforts to reduce conflicts
were not successful.

A Chronology of the 10 :

After establishing "ground rules" for the operation of the organi-
zation at the first meeting of the 10, the chairman called for the in-
troduction of agenda items. The Delegate from YORA suggested that they
begin "to discuss breaking of the two blocs... to decrease world tension".
The delegate from ALGO urged that, "... steps should be taken in order
to insure nuclear disarmament..." These two items were considered through-
out the first half of System 8-IV.

At the second meeting of the 10, UTRO introduced the non-aggression
plan which was at that time being negotiated by her Central Decision-
Maker in bilateral talks outside of the 10. The "peace" plan included
guarantees of assistance to any nation against whom aggression was being
carried out, regardless of bloc membership. The UTRO Delegate went on to
state her nation's willingness to discuss a plan of "partial disarmament"
(i.e., reduction of arms to agreed upon "maximum force levels"). The
debate however, was to be kept separate from that on the non-aggression
pact. The discussion during the following meeting on these proposals
brought two themes into focus : the small non-nuclear nations favored
disarmament with some sort of inspection system supervised by the 10 ;
until almost the end of the first half of the run, the two nuclear na-
tions (OMNE and UTRO) favored proportional reductions with their reten-
tion of their nuclears FCns as a "guarantor of peace."

At the end of the second meeting, the suggestion was adopted that
the CDMs should be invited to participate in the next 10 meeting with
regard to a seven-nation non-aggression pact. The third meeting found
the CDMs together with their delegates (EDMy's) at the 10. In discussion
of the non-aggression pact, YORA pointed out that "any nation attacked

could expect the assistance of five other nations ; since no attacking
nation could withstand the combined counterattack of six nations, the
pact would prevent aggression from taking place." The Delegate from
ALGO questioned whether this analysis was correct, "as long as the blocs
existed." UTRO's Delegate replied, "In forming this seven-nation non-
aggression pact, the two existing blocs will be dissolved -- so there
would be complete cooperation between all other nations." To INGO's
assertion that the way to "break the blocs" was through disarmament,
YORA reiterated its view that non-aggression and disarmament should be
discussed separately. At this point, six of the nations endorsed the
pact, with ALGO abstaining. Although all but one of the CDMs failed to
take the rostrum at the 10 meeting, after further discussion among them-
selves, they eventually signed a non-aggression, collective security
pact. The CDM from ERGA refused to participate in these early conferences,
inasmuch as she believed "this non-agression pact should be made in
the world peace organization instead of by separate countries"-- but ERGA
was finally induced to join a pact developed outside the 10.

In the fourth meeting, the 10 suspended debate on the non-aggression
pact because of the special conferences being held by the CDMs. Discussion
now centered on disarmament. At both this session and the following one,
OMNE reaffirmed her stand that complete disarmament was impossible ; her
Delegate again asserted the importance of retaining her nuclear weapons.
The distrust exhibited early in the fourth meeting of OMNE's position
was muted by turning of attention to discussion of the development of
an inspection force, as well as by a move by the presiding officer, the
Delegate from ALGO, to consider improving economic relations among the
nations.

During the fifth and final meeting of the 10 in the first half of
the run, however, the early attempt to discuss special provisions for
the retention of internal force for use in domestic matters no longer
served to by-pass the critical differences between OMNE and UTRO. The
opposition between the great powers had been exacerbated by UTRO's shift

from a position favoring partial disarmament to one favoring complete
disarmament, with the exception of forces used by each nation for the
maintenance of internal order. Despite the existence of a non-aggression
pact, there was prolonged public discussion between the Delegates of the
two great nuclear powers, exhibiting their distrust of each other, as
in the following exchange :

EDMyO : OMNE would like to state that it is willing to
        disarm its conventional weapons ; however, not
        its nuclear weapons.

EDMyU : UTRO would like to question OMNE's bid for peace.

EDMyO : OMNE would like to ask UTRO to clarify its state-
        ment.

EDMyU : UTRO wonders if OMNE is for peace, if she would
        like to retain nuclear weapons when there is no
        definite need for them.

EMDyO : OMNE would like to state again that the wealth of
        its nation has been used to build up nuclears
        in OMNE. We feel if we disarm them, all these
        resources will have gone to waste.

EDMyU : In the future OMNE's funds will be saved, be-
        cause she will not have to keep up her nuclear and
        conventional power... in the future, she will be
        saving her resources instead of wasting them on
        nuclear weapons.

At this point, ALGO again attempted to mute the impasse by propo-
sing that economic measures be rendered to disarming nations, to aid in
their transition to partial or total disarmament. The end of the first
half of the run was marked by the 10 returning to the issues involving
internal force and to provisions for inspection, by providing "measures
of insuring against nations secretly arming."

Summary : Although the 10 was but one arena in which interaction among
the nations took place, it reflected significant differences between the

two large powers, despite their ability to consummate a formal treaty
of non-aggression involving all nations. Diversionary efforts to side-
pass the underlying disagreement on disarmament were of two kinds : (1)
those directed toward attempts at seeking agreement on ways of imple-
mentation, should some form of disarmament be achieved ; and (2) those
attempting to focus on new areas of potential agreement, as on ways of
increasing world trade. Neither set of tactics served to induce achie-
vement of a disarmament agreement.

SYSTEM 8-V

Context : During the first half of the run, the bloc-alliances changed
considerably. Both ALGO and ZENA made political treaties with nations
outside of their original bloc. Many of the nations had trade agreements,
crosscutting bloc demarcations. The focus of military preparations was
clearly defensive rather than aggressive in quality. The Central Decision-
Makers of the two bloc leaders, OMNE and UTRO, were in a cooperative re-
lationship with respect to disarmament. In bilateral summit talks, the
leaders were discussing potential agreements in other areas of concern.

A Chronology of the 10 :

        In the course of the five sessions of the 10 during the first half
of the run, efforts were made to improve the machinery of the organiza-
tion by proposals for (1) the formation of a "security council" to con-
trol whatever 10 enforcement capability might be developed, and (2) the
constitution of a "world court." After failing to establish either, the
10 turned its attention to the problem of disarmament, just when the
spread of nuclear capability became imminent.

        Early in the proceedings of the first meeting of the 10, OMNE pro-
posed the formation of a Security Council of three nations to govern the
"commitments of force" by the 10. There ensued much discussion concer-
ning membership on the Council, vis-a-vis the existing alliance structure.
The plethora of schemes ranged from a Council composed of one nuclear
power and two smaller powers (one from each bloc) to two nuclear powers

with the 10 chairman as the third member. UTRO concluded the session by
arguing that the Council should include all seven members of the 10.

Argument continued in the second meeting of the 10, evolving the
proposal that the Security Council consist only of two nuclear powers,
with their actions subject to individual veto by any nation. Typical
of the view point of the smaller countries wishing protection from the
hegemony of the larger powers in their alliances, the Delegate from
ZENA argued that such an arrangement would permit the blocking of "any
movement which would not be advantageous to their country." Yet, even
this proposal did not receive the unanimous endorsement that the 10
earlier had adopted as requisite, inasmuch as INGO persisted in its ear-
lier opposition to any scheme by which two nations might "have all the
power."

In the course of the third session, many of the arguments presented
earlier were repeated, especially by the smaller powers. ZENA then pro-
posed reconsideration of a three-nation Council--the two nuclear nations
with a third nation elected periodically by the 10, with provision again
for veto power by each of the seven nations. Once again, unanimity could
not be obtained, with ALGO and ERGA opposing a three-nation arrangement.

At this time, it was decided to proceed to other matters. Attention
turned to the questions of disarmament and the establishment of a World
Court. The Delegate from UTRO opened the discussion on disarmament with
the following remarks :

> UTRO would like to put herself on record by saying
> that she desires a world which is relatively free of arms
> and therefore, free of distrust and misunderstanding.
> We could start... by disarming completely except for the
> conventional arms needed to maintain internal control.

The session adjourned before the debate on disarmament got under way.

During the fourth meeting, debate on a World Court took precedence
over disarmament. ALGO proposed the creation of "a World Court--one
judge from each of the five small nations, deciding on /world_7 pro-
blems--not including disarmament and war." The Court was to be empowered

to arbitrate disputes. ALGO asserted that such a body was needed because
the Security Council "will always be blocked from effective action by
the veto power of the opposing nuclear nations." The Delegate from UTRO
objected, stating that : "just because /̄OMNE and UTRO_/ are large does
not mean that they are interested in waging nuclear war with each other.
/̄We_/ have had many communications /̄exchanging views_/ on complete
disarmament." OMNE's Delegate offered the following remarks :

> I consider the World Court a direct attempt to try to limit
> the power of the two most powerful nations... I don't
> think we should be expected to abide by the decisions
> of the smaller countries..."

ALGO's proposal failed to carry, with only ALGO and ERGA supporting the
measure.

At ZENA's suggestion the 10 recommended "debating nuclear disarma-
ment after the two nuclear nations had... /̄been given_/ an opportunity
to discuss the problem outside of the organization." The suggestion was
accepted by UTRO and OMNE, whose representatives met and returned a di-
sarmament proposal to the 10 at its next session.

The final session of the 10 opened with the following statement
from the Delegate of UTRO :

> OMNE and UTRO have decided to give all nuclear materials...
> to a bank ; ... we hope the 10 will provide for these
> atoms to be used for peaceful purposes. This will be-
> our contribution to world peace.

ALGO objected---she had become a nuclear power since the last 10 meetings
-- "Total nuclear disarmament will wreck our economy ; each nation with
nuclear weapons should be allowed to retain a small number of them."
YORA's Delegate, after informing the 10 that her nation also had gained
nuclear capability, urged support of the UTRO-OMNE resolution. The Dele-
gate from ALGO argued : "If every nation has an equal amount of nuclear
capability, there will be no arms race." OMNE countered : "There will
always be an arms race as long as one country has nuclear weapons."
ALGO's resolution for equalization in nuclear weapons was resoundingly

defeated. Yet, the discussion on disarmament continued. OMNE reiterated
the big power's proposals that nuclears be stockpiled. UTRO wondered,
"why is it necessary for a country to have any nuclear weapons. There
will be mistrust." In terminating the final meeting of the first half
of the run, the Delegate from ALGO asserted, "We must maintain our world
position" ; ZENA reiterated that unless her proposal was accepted, "We
oan and will block all attempts" at alternatives.

Summary : Concerted efforts to improve the machinery of the 10 met
defeat in a struggle between the two large powers and the five small
powers, who had trouble reaching common positions among themselves. When
the organization eventually turned its efforts toward disarmament, agree-
ment among the great powers on stockpiling nuclears was vetoed by the
smaller powers who were seeking opportunity to exercise unrestrained
autonomy. In general, the 10 was the scene of more dissension than
existed in the period-by-period behaviors of the nations constituting
the non-10 segments of the system. Even though the great powers coope-
rated with each other, no effort was made in the 10 to achieve a general
non-aggression pact between the blocs.

Central features of international organization were displayed in the
two simulations in contrasting and in similar ways. In the one case,
the 10 became an arena for the struggle of the two great powers ; in the
other case, the 10 was used by the small powers as a platform from whioh
to assert their autonomy. But both sets of conflicts prevented significant
accomplishment within the organization. In each of the cases, important
decisions on the 10 agenda were taken outside the 10 by heads-of-state.
In INS 8-IV, agreement on the non-aggression pact was consummated in a
special multilateral conference of the Central Decision-Makers ; in
INS 8-V, the critical decision of the two great powers to "bank" their
nuclears internationally was reached in a separate bilateral conference.

Some readers may be curious as to what happened to all the countries
in each system after the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In general,

it seems the new n-country situation was absorbed without discontinuity
into on-going tensions and trusts which already existed among the nations
during the bi-nuclear phase of the first half of the two runs. In Sys-
tem 8-IV, the suspicions and tensions were exacerbated by the coming of
other nations into nuclear capability. It is interesting to note the pro-
fessed continued reliance of the members of INS 8-IV upon the internatio-
nal organization, even after a small, first war. The distrust eventuates
in a series of pre-emptive strikes, leaving ERGA and INGO as sole sur-
vivors. In System 8-V , the n-country development of nuclear capability
is regarded merely as yet another problem to be handled through its de-
velopment of disarmament machinery. However, despite its success in using
the 10 for inspection, INS-V turned toward more direct, bilateral rela-
tions in the development of its world's well-being, eschewing tendencies
toward world government (adapted from Guetzkow, et al., 1960,pp. 49-50)

Simulation as a Heuristic for the Comparative Study of International Organization

To what extent does the Inter-Nation Simulation seem capable of
representing central aspects of international organization ? Using
Claude's discussion as a guideline, one notes treatment of such political
topics as the "peaceful settlement of disputes," "collective security,"
"disarmament," and "preventive diplomacy" as significant components of
international organizational process (Claude, 1964a, pp. 197-368), which
the Inter-Nation Simulation seems capable of representing without further
modification. However, to study such topics as the "Trusteeship" system
and the "International Secretariat," one would need considerable ampli-
fication of the amount of detail which is represented in the simulation,
as it now stands. Although it would be possible to emphasize the role
given to such "constitutional problems" as membership, voting, and
charter interpretation (Claude, 1964a, pp . 77-194), considerably more
effort would need to be devoted to representation of the details of an

10 Charter, with an explicit provision for a judiciary. Thus, in survey
it seems the Inter-Nation Simulation in its present form would be of more
heuristic value in representing overall international political processes
in which international organization is one central component than in
providing a vehicle for the internal study of the operation of interna-
tional organizations per se.

Let us examine in some greater detail just how the Inter-Nation
Simulation could be used for the comparative study of international
organizations. In his study of Power and International Relations, Claude
probes deeply the global question, "how can the world achieve the degree
of assurance that inter-group conflicts will be resolved or contained by
political rather than violent means... ?" (Claude, 1962, P. 271). Having
representation of both political and force components, the Inter-Nation
Simulation might be used in exploring three contrasting answers in two
comparisons. First, contrast the operation of the multi-state system as
a balance of power among autonomous nations with the accommodation of
political relations among states through international organization.
Second, contrast differing ways of "promoting order through political
management of inter-group relations" by (a) establishing a monopoly of
power within a "world government," as has been advocated by some federa-
lists, and by (b) focusing the international political process upon a
constellation of international organizations, ranging from partially
inclusive arrangements of limited scope to a universal, all-coordinating
structure, as has been suggested by some proponents of world community.
The experimental design suggested by Claude's exposition is diagrammed
in Table II, indicating that the first comparison would be a two-fold
study, comparing "independent states existing in mutual contact and
relationship" who "manipulate the distribution of power among themselves,
and share in the decentralized management of the system" with simulations
in which there are two forms of international "institutions equipped to
exercise central direction" (Claude, 1962,p. 93). The comparison exhi-
bited in the lower two cells of Table II examines a pair of important

opposing theories about ways of centralizing international decision-
making, through the assignment of a monopoly of force capability to the
10 as compared with the development of a complex of 10's which serve
as foci for processes of political accommodation. By running ten to
fifteen cases of the Inter-Nation Simulation for each of the three
cells of Table II, one might assess the extent to which "intergroup
conflicts" among the nations in the three constrasting systems "will
be resolved or contained by political rather than violent means," as
Claude queries.

But the scholar sometimes grows impatient with general probing
about wholistic questions. Often he finds comparison among alternative
organizational processes within the international system of prime in-
terest. In Claude's chapter on "The Theory of Regionalism" (Claude,
1964a, pp. 111-125), penetrating insights are presented about the inter-
relations between universal and regional organizations, arguing that
such groupings may be alternatives to each other, or they may minimize
"their competitive aspects" in developing "a pragmatic sharing of the
tasks of international organization"(Claude, 1964a, p. 120). In his
theorizing, Claude intimates how the partially inclusive groupings of
states interact with the global, all-inclusive organization, as the
latter "decentralize their operations on the basis of geographical seg-
mentation" while the former "lose their shape through persistent stret-
ching in the direction of universalism." It would seem the Inter-Nation
Simulation might easily be adapted for the comparative study of regional
organizations vis-a-vis universal organizations by simply increasing
the number of nation units involved, so that useful concatenations of
regional and universal organizations might be posited as the initial
conditions.

In his brilliant analysis of the interrelationships between the
Organization of American States and the United Nations, Claude notes
that the regional organizations which exist today are "primarily external

in their orientation ; they exist to provide joint security against
potential enemies on the outside" (Claude, 1964b, p. 17). They seem
less viable as a vehicle for handling disputes among their own members
--as has been dramatized recently in the inability of NATO to handle
the Greek-Turkish quarrel over Cyprus as a "family" problem. This
interesting idea might be propositionalized as follows :

> The greater the extent to which partially inclusive
> organizations are oriented outward in their behavior ,
> serving primarily as security groupings, the less
> they tend to solve the conflicts among their members.

By pre-arranging a series of regional organizations in some twen-
ty simulations on a continuum in terms of the extent -- from a little
to some to a great extent -- they are oriented outward, one could ex-
plore the degree to which such an orientation serves to inhibit their
ability to solve conflicts among their members, using the techniques
developed by the Hermanns and Robinson (1964) for inducing periodic crises
of conflict. Comparison then might be made of the characteristics of
disputes which were handled internally as contrasted with those which
were referred to the universal organization. Would the twenty operating
models allow one to make an induction of what kind of disputes will
be handled inside the regional organization versus what kind of conflicts
are referred to the global organization for possible solution ? The
series of laboratory runs also would provide heuristic material for the
discovery of unanticipated side-effects, not originally hypothesized
when the runs are undertaken. For example, what conditions facilitate
the tendency of partially inclusive organizations to become more in-
clusive ?

To this point in the essay, discussion of comparative work among
international organizations has been limited to studies within the si-
mulation. Perhaps the most exciting work would take place in making com-
parison between the alternative IO's developed in the simulation with
on-going "natural" international organizations. Of course, as controls
one would attempt to replicate contemporary, naturally occurring orga-

nizations within the simulates. Then one would be in a position to assay variations in the simulations, as one used the device as a heuristic tool to explore the possible outcomes of wide variations in organizational arrangements. Such laboratory work might be a useful complement to the verbal speculations which are being made now -- for example, as to whether and how there might be greater integration among the three institutions of the European Community of Six.

It is in these ways, then, that comparative study -- among simulations, and between simulations and existing international political structures -- of international organization might be accelerated through the use of various adaptations of simulation. As critic Verba remarked in reviewing work which has been completed at Northwestern in using the Inter-Nation Simulation, "If it can continue to develop and change, and if it can be maintained as part of a larger process of theory-building, in which various modes of theorizing, simulations, and empirical research all work together toward a common goal of understanding international affairs, its contribution may be significant indeed" (Verba, 1964, p. 519).

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Table 1

Contexts and Contents of Meetings of Sixteen Simulated International Organizations

| Number of System | Contexts | | Agenda Contents of 10 Meetings | | | | | |
	Number of Messages Exchanged	Number of ad hoc Conferences	Total Agenda Items	Items of Procedure	Items of Substance on General Pacts	Items of Substance on Disarmament and Its implementation	Items of Substance on Trade and Aid	Number of 10 votes (Non-procedural)
8-II	246	12	3	1	1	1	0	5
8-III₁	184	6	7	1	1	3	2	3
8-IV¹	319	7	4	1	2	1	0	1
8-V²	250	6	7	3	0	4	0	3
8-VI	332	7	8	1	1	4	2	1
8-VII	220	12	7	2	0	4	1	3
8-VIII	189	6	6	1	0	4	1	1
8-IX	253	16	3	1	0	1	1	2
8-X	328	9	4	1	0	2	1	3
8-XI	209	19	4	0	1	2	1	1
8-XII	200	16	4	1	0	0	3	2
8-XIII	234	6	5	2	1	2	0	1
8-XIV	255	16	7	1	0	3	3	3
8-XV	232	7	4	1	0	3	0	0
8-XVI	124	9	4	1	1	2	0	0
8-XVII	116	15	5	1	0	3	1	2
Totals	3691	159	82	19	8	39	16	31

1-2 Systems 8-IV and 8-V are described in detail in this essay.

Table II

Design for the Experimental Study of
the Management of Power, adapted from Claude (1962).

Classical Multi-State System (with complete decentralization of the management of power)	
10 Management through a Monopoly of Power	10 Management through World Community

Appendix

In some runs of the simulation, formal charters have been developed
by the participants for their international organization, as have been
described by Alger (Guetzkow, et al.,1963, pp. 172-173 ; 175-176).
Because of the focus on the n-country problem in INS-8, a less formal
set of "Rules of Procedure"[3] was given to were used by the delegates
to the International Organization, as presented below. As is indicated in
Table I, attention was devoted by the delegates in the course of their
meetings to making explicit aspects of procedure within the 10 which
are not formally covered in the following rules :

"1. The EDMy of each nation shall act as its permanent Delegate.

"2. The Delegates shall choose one of their number to act as Chair-
man. The Chair shall rotate among the member nations ; each Chairman
shall serve for one period. The order of rotation shall be alphabeti-
cal, beginning with the nation selected by the Delegates at the first
session of the International Organization.

"3. Each session shall be 30 minutes in length. There will be one
regular session each period of the simulation. The permanent staff mem-
ber will notify the Delegates of the times of the regular sessions.

"4. Extraordinary sessions may be called by circulating a message
to all nations and by notifying the permanent staff member. The perma-
nent staff member will arrange a time for the extraordinary session and
notify the Delegates.

"5. At the end of each session the Delegates will return home for
instructions from their home government. During the sessions Delegates
may communicate with their home governments by means of the messenger
stationed at the Organization.

"6. If the Delegates so choose, they may instruct the Chairman to
issue a press release after each session.

"7. All statements at the International Organization will be read
into the recording equipment to facilitate the gathering of a permanent
record of each session. A Delegate may only speak when he has been reco-

gnized by the Chair. The Chairman will call for and keep a speaker's list which will be the order in which the Delegates are recognized.

"8. The last five minutes of each session will be devoted to forming an agenda for the coming session. The introduction of changes in the agenda will require 2/3rds majority of those present (or by five nations voting "aye," if all nations are present)."

SUMMARY

The Inter-Nation Simulation is examined as a device for the comparative study of international organization within nation-state systems.

Contrasting with all-man and all-computer simulations, the Inter-Nation Simulation (INS) is an operating model involving computer programmed "nations" manned by human decision-makers which freely interact so as to create an international system. As the INS exists now, its programs represent political, economic, and military capabilities. To date, systems consisting of five to nine units with widely differing characteristics have been employed in exploration of international phenomena. Because the INS may be run repeatedly, it is possible to make systematic study of the simulated international system, varying initial conditions as well as inserting conditioning factors en route, for comparative purposes.

It would seem the Inter-Nation Simulation might be used for the study of international organizations, operating within the context of a larger nation-state system. Two case studies of the functioning of a universal international organization are presented as illustrations from a larger systematic study of some sixteen simulate systems. In one instance, the international organization became a vehicle for a struggle between two large powers and a loose congery of small powers.

Using a framework for the study of international organization developed by Professor Inis Claude, an assessment was made of the heuristic potential of the Inter-Nation Simulation for comparative work. It seems feasible to compare international systems with and without international organizations in the INS. Further, comparison may be made among varying kinds of international organizational arrangements, contrasting those in which there is world government with those in which universal and regional organizations with their nation-states constitute a world community. Fundamental, of course, is the comparative work involved in the validation of simulation as a heuristic, in which international organizations occurring in the contemporary, natural world are contrasted with those contrived in the political simulation laboratory.

NOTES

3.   From Brody, Richard A., International Organization Delegate's Manual,
        Inter-Nation Simulation, Program of Graduate Training and Research
        in International Relations, Department of Political Science, North-
        western University, Summer, 1960, pp. 1-2.

RESUME

La "Simulation Inter-Nations" est examinée dans ce rapport en tant que procédé d'études comparatives de l'organisation internationale dans des systèmes d'Etats-Nations.

Contrairement aux jeux de simulation utilisant uniquement des hommes ou des ordinateurs, la "Simulation Inter-Nations" (S.I.N.) est un modèle opératoire mettant en jeu des "Nations" programmées sur un ordinateur, et dirigées par des individus prenant des décisions, dont l'interaction libre crée un système international. Dans son état actuel, la S.I.N. comporte des programmes représentant diverses possibilités politiques, économiques et militaires. Jusqu'à présent, des systèmes comprenant de 5 à 9 unités ayant des caractéristiques très différentes les unes des autres, ont été utilisés pour explorer les phénomènes internationaux. La S.I.N. pouvant être répétée, il devient possible de procéder à l'étude systématique du système international simulé, en faisant varier les conditions initiales et en insérant de nouveaux facteurs en cours de jeu, à des fins de comparaison.

Il apparaît possible d'utiliser la S.I.N. pour l'étude d'organisations internationales fonctionnant dans un système plus vaste d'Etats-nations. Le rapport présente deux "études de cas" du fonctionnement d'une organisation internationale universelle, pour illustrer une étude systématique qui a porté sur 16 systèmes simulés. Dans l'un des cas, l'organisation internationale a vu s'affronter deux grandes puissances et une coalition lâche de petites puissances.

En utilisant le cadre d'étude de l'organisation internationale présenté par M. Inis Claude, on a étudié le potentiel heuristique de la S.I.N. pour les études comparatives. Il semble possible de comparer par la S.I.N. des systèmes internationaux avec et sans organisation internationale. En outre, on peut comparer divers systèmes d'organisation internationale, notamment ceux dans lesquels il existe un gouvernement mondial et ceux dans lesquels les organisations universelles ou régionales et leurs Etats-nations constituent une communauté mondiale. Il est fondamental, pour valider la simulation comme heuristique, de comparer des situations dans lesquelles les organisations internationales existant dans le monde contemporain réel sont mises en parallèle avec celles imaginées dans le laboratoire de simulation politique.

THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

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THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

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The Commonwealth of Nations is difficult to discuss in precise terms, since no date can be set for its inception, it has no secretariat or other staff, it has no written constitution, no member pays dues, and the members admit to having very little in common. Nevertheless, although there are arguments about whether it is important or effective or being distorted from its original purposes or a means of colonialist domination, no-one disputes that it exists.

BASIC CHARACTER

In basic character, the Commonwealth of Nations (formerly called the British Commonwealth of Nations; the adjective "British" was tacitly dropped when membership was widened to take in India, Pakistan and Ceylon) is an association of ex-colonies with the country which was once in charge of them. It is generally recognized that only sovereign states can be members of the Commonwealth, and that self-governing colonies, such as Southern Rhodesia, can be admitted to meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers only by invitation as observers. The British Commonwealth Relations Office was set up specifically (as the Dominions Office) to handle Britain's contacts with former colonies which, having gained sovereign status, were no longer properly the concern of the Colonial Office. Since World War II, an invitation to attend a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting has been one of the symbols of independence for new nations on their ceasing to be colonies.

As an association between a former imperial power and its exdependencies, the nearest comparisons one can find with the Commonwealth are with the arrangements made between other imperial powers, such as France, the Netherlands, and the U.S.A., and their former colonies. Taking these in reverse order, we can say that the existing arrangements between the U.S.A. and the Philippines are not unlike those between Britain and some (but not all) other Commonwealth members : the system of favoured trade in certain commodities and of special military arrangements is similar to that which exists between Britain and Malaysia, though not between

Britain and Ghana. However, whereas the U.S.A. has only one ex-colony in this
sort of relationship, Britain has 15 or 16. The U.S. system is essentially
bi-lateral, the British multi-lateral, with a variety of complications and special
arrangements which are necessarily absent from the U.S. one. Also, the US-Philip-
pines relationship is essentially a treaty relationship, with all its details
stated in black and white ; in this it differs from the informal Commonwealth
system, in which certain relationships of Britain with particular ex-colonies
are governed by treaty, but much else is left to informal consultation.

The Dutch-Indonesian Union was too short-lived for comparisons to be made effecti-
vely with the Commonwealth, though the idea of two sovereign states joined by a
single constitutional monarch and engaging in periodic consultation clearly owed
something to the Commonwealth model. The Community set up in the Constitution
of the Fifth French Republic had rather less in common with the Commonwealth, since,
while it envisaged considerable autonomy for the overseas territories, it still
kept them within the close control of a variety of institutions designed to empha-
sise French hegemony. The actual relations which exist now between France and the
former French colonies in Africa south of the Sahara have a good deal in common
with the way in which British relations are carried on with recently independent
states such as Kenya and Sierra Leone ; nevertheless, the degree of dependence
upon France for finance and favoured trade makes the general relationship very
different from that which exists between Britain on the one hand and Canada or
Australia or India or Ghana on the other.

It can be said, then, that, while the fact of association between a
former colonial power and its ex-colonies provides the basic characteristic of the
Commonwealth, the actual form of the association is different from what has eventua-
ted in other similar cases. Moreover, the Commonwealth example is the most subs-
tantial in terms of the number of states involved, and the most successful in that
very few ex-colonies have not accepted it (they include Palestine, Jordan, Iraq,
the Sudan, and Burma) [1] while only the Republic of Ireland and South Africa have

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[1].- Here I have used a fairly free definition of "colony". Jordan and Iraq, which
were British mandates, were always envisaged as independent Arab states, though
this would not necessarily have prevented their becoming Commonwealth members.
The politics of the Arab world ensured that they, the Sudan and Israel, for
different reasons, did not enter the Commonwealth. Burma was formally included
for a brief period, but never took part in the general Commonwealth system.

given up their membership after participating in the general system of Commonwealth relations. Some sixteen states remain members, spreading over all continents except South America.

ORIGINS

Given the special character of the Commonwealth, it may be appropriate to indicate how it began. It is the product of the relations of Britain with a particular group of colonies, those which were settled by white men and known as "self-governing". In the latter part of the nineteenth century this description applied to the six colonies of Australia (New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, Tasmania, and, to a lesser extent, Western Australia), to New Zealand, to Canada, to Newfoundland, to Natal and to the Cape Province in South Africa. The political condition of these colonies was one of full internal self-government, subject to a rarely-used veto from London. In external affairs they had no independent status ; for purposes of international law they were parts of the British Empire, which in turn was regarded as part of the unitary United Kingdom. Each was hungry for people and capital from Britain ; each had problems on its borders or around its shores which demanded special attention from the British government in its relations with foreign countries. Thus, while each was subordinate to Britain and could not assert a foreign policy of its own (except in the sphere of trade policy), each was developing its own view of the world and was anxious that the British government should know, and if possible adopt, this view in appropriate situations. Means of consultation were found in the Colonial Conference of the 1880's. After the turn of the 20th century, with the consolidation of the Australian and South African colonies into single states, the arrangements became formalized in a body called the Imperial Conference, which met regularly to discuss questions of defence, trade, foreign policy and mutual co-operation in technical matters such as communications. This body is the lineal ancestor of the present meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. It continued to meet until 1937 ; a further meeting in 1946 may be regarded as its final expression.

So far as _form_ is concerned, the Imperial Conference meetings were very like those of today : they were held in London, the British Prime Minister presided, they were attended by the Prime Ministers of the "Dominions" (as the self-

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governing colonies began to be called in 1907), and the emphasis was placed upon
discussion rather than decision. In the matter of status, however, changes occur-
red during the period of the Imperial Conference which altered the relative posi-
tion of Britain and the Dominions and enabled the post-World War II expansion of
the Commonwealth to take place smoothly. The participation of the Dominions and
India in World War I, and their consequent signature of the Versailles Treaty and
membership of the League of Nations, emphasized the anomaly of the orthodox view
that, as legal entities, they were simply portions of "the British Empire", which
was an extension of the British Crown. In the 1920's opposition to this orthodoxy
was particularly strong in South Africa, Canada and the Irish Free State. In con-
sequence, the British government enunciated at the 1926 Conference, and put in
legal form in the Statute of Westminster of 1931, the new doctrine that the Domin-
ions and Britain, while portions of the British Empire, were equal in status, in
no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external
affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated
as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Such an interpretation enabled
Ireland to be neutral in World War II, Canada to declare war at a different time
from Britain, and Australia to declare war on countries with which Britain was not
at war. There could be no clearer demonstration that the condition of a Dominion
was one of independence. Thus, when Pakistan and India became independent in 1947,
their leaders were prepared to accept the legal status of Dominions. It only rem-
ained thereafter to do some juggling of the doctrine in order to accommodate repu-
blics within the Commonwealth (by accepting the British Monarch, not the Crown, as
a symbol of free association between members, not as an object of allegiance), and
the way was clear for the membership of more and more African and Asian states, as
these gained their independence.

THE COMMONWEALTH SYSTEM

As the Commonwealth operates, it is characterised by hardly any rules
and obligations, but also by the presence of symbols and practices which serve as
indications that the association exists. The list is roughly as follows :

a) The Queen is the symbol of the free association between the members.

Acceptance of this symbol is necessary for membership. The Queen has no legal responsibility for the Commonwealth as a whole, and no part in the constitutions of those members which are republics or electoral monarchies. "The Crown" has no meaning in relation to the Commonwealth as a whole.

b) Meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers and Presidents are held irregularly. So far, all have been held in London and been chaired by the British Prime Minister. The meetings issue communiques about the members' joint views on the world, decide on the entry of new members, and sometimes agree to the setting up of schemes for co-operation in such fields as education.

c) Commonwealth member-states do not accredit Ambassadors to one another, but call their envoys High Commissioners ; these enjoy ambassadorial status. The practice, which began because of the reluctance of proponents of the theory of a unitary Crown to agree that the Monarch could accredit ambassadors to himself, is now retained as a sort of badge of Commonwealth relations.

d) The British government is the only one in the Commonwealth to operate a special department for Commonwealth Relations, although some other members have corresponding sections in their departments of External Affairs. The Commonwealth Relations Office in London sends out a flood of telegrams to Commonwealth members, to appraise them of British policy and seek their views. There is also a good deal of consultation between Prime Ministers, without the intervention of their Ministers for External Affairs. In general, it is claimed that Commonwealth members have a less formal relationship with one another than with no-Commonwealth states. This varies from member to member. But it is clearly the intention of the British government to encourage such a practice aherever possible.

e) The rules are minimal. I can discern only three : that initial membership of the Commonwealth does not become automatic upon a former British colony's obtaining independence, but must be requested from the existing members ; that the Queen must be recognised as a symbol of free association ; and that, when a member changes from monarchical to republican status, the fact must be notified to the other members. There is a vague obligation to inform other members of actions which might affect them. At various times it has been asserted that Commonwealth members ought to be distinguished by their observance of democracy or of

the rule of law,.but these are pious hopes, not rules. The feeling against South Africa in 1961 suggests that members practising blatant racial discrimination may not be welcome.

f) There are no obligations, except to observe the rules just mentioned.

g) It is customary for Commonwealth members to meet informally at the U.N. headquarters in New York, in order to discuss events and tell one another what lines they propose to follow.

There is no Commonwealth constitution ; no secretariat exists between meetings ; and the operation of the relationship depends very much upon the circumstances of the time and the inclinations of the various members. Such a state of affairs should be credited not solely to British pragmatism, but also to the fact that, since the Commonwealth entails no onerous obligations in money, men, promises or time, it is easy for new members to agree to. It would probably have been impossible to persuade so many Afro-Asian states to join the Commonwealth if this had not been the case. However, one final point of organisation is that the example of South Africa suggests that a member could be expelled from the Commonwealth if its behaviour displeased a large majority of other members. South Africa left of its own accord, but the possibility of its expulsion was a real one. The expulsion would have taken place, not because any known rules had been broken, but because the balance of political forces amongst Commonwealth members had tipped against white domination.

BACKGROUND

The durability of the Commonwealth is not understandable simply by reference to its symbols and practices. It must be seen against the background of a network of contacts between Britain and its former dependencies. Some of these are matters of language : apart from the United States, the Commonwealth countries are the principal speakers of English, with all that this implies in terms of literature and distinctive ways of expression. Others are matters of law and government: British legal, parliamentary and civil service practices have made a deep impression on all the other members. Some relate to religion, sport and relaxation : such institutions as cricket and the Anglican church are widespread. Others again are

matters of education : Britain had a considerable impact upon the systems of school,
university and professional education of all the members, and numerous ties still
exist. There are also substantial economic ties. By far the greater part of British overseas investment is in Commonwealth countries, which are accustomed in the
main to hold their international reserves in sterling. Trade with Britain is significant in all cases, being underpinned in regard to certain products by the remains
of preferential arrangements entered into at Ottawa in 1932. With the exception of
Canada, all Commonwealth countries look first to Britain for development capital
from abroad.

Such contacts as these reinforce one another. Political consultation
fits easily amongst them. It is aided by meetings of officials to discuss various
technical matters, by meetings of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, and
by the activities of a great many voluntary bodies. As with all Commonwealth relationships, the system is bi-lateral rather than multi-lateral, in the sense that
each member has more to do with Britain than with any other part of the Commonwealth.
It emphasises the fact that the Commonwealth has arisen because of the members' past
connections with Britain, and survives largely because of the continued strength of
these connections. It should be noted, however, that the relationship is at no
point that of master and servant. The British are too conscious of the other forces
at work in the world to attempt to dominate their associates in the Commonwealth.
References to "neo-colonialism" in this connection are wide of the mark. The British government wishes to preserve the Commonwealth as an institution, because to do
so is to underline the importance of the British connection with each member, and
also to stress the free association which they have with one another. If former
colonies refused consistently to join the Commonwealth, or left it in a huff, this
would rebound severely upon the British reputation for peaceful and sincere de-colonisation. Britain's status in international politics depends to some extent upon
its capacity to keep in intimate touch with countries in Asia and Africa ; if they
do not wish to continue in such a relationship. Britain has little or no means of
altering their views. The point can be illustrated from the examples of Burma,
Iraq, and the Sudan, with all of which Britain had military agreements on their at-

tainment of independence ; none of these agreements has survived, and none of the
three countries is in in the Commonwealth. But British relations with each of the
three countries, while tenuous, have not been embittered, and there has been no
attempt to apply any sort of discipline to them.

COHESION OF THE COMMONWEALTH

It is a matter of discussion whether the Commonwealth possesses any "unity"
or "cohesion", and, if so, how much. On the whole, little effort is now made to
assert a unity of outlook amongst Commonwealth countries, although vestiges of the
assumptions of the early Dominion period are occasionally to be found. However,
it is possible to find evidence of occasional cohesion on particular matters. The
Prime Ministers' communiques sometimes include questions of substance on which agre-
ement has been reached, as with their references to disarmament in 1961. These
are cases in which the interests of Commonwealth members have coincided for the
time being. Again, there are the informal discussions at the U.N., in which, while
no attempt is made to achieve agreement, there is an implicit understanding that
the U.N. should be kept going and that Commonwealth members, while disagreeing,
should notify one another of their disagreements before announcing them in public.
There has also been considerable cohesion in the past in financial matters, espec-
ially during the period of dollar shortage in the 1950's, when the gold and dollar
reserves of the sterling area had to be husbanded by joint action between central
banks. The fact that Britain gives the first place to Commonwealth countries and
colonies in organising its foreign aid and its export of capital is a source of
cohesion, as is the technical help which Britain extends to a number of members.

Once the effort to establish a common foreign or defence policy has been
given up (as it had been, in the Commonwealth, by about 1949), it is not difficult
for countries with unofficial and traditional ties to find things to discuss in an
amicable fashion. This is now the case with the Commonwealth. It would be fair to
say that the British government seeks opportunities for co-operation wherever these
might exist, either as general Commonwealth schemes (as in the current scholarships
scheme) or as bi-lateral arrangements with individual Commonwealth countries. In
the latter category fall the defence agreements which Britain has with some of the

members. These range from a full-scale treaty, as in the case of Malaysia, through co-operation for defence research and training, as with Australia, to occasional help with specific problems, as with India. Actual alliances can be said to exist only with Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan and Malaysia ; but of these only the Malaysian agreement (which Australia and New Zealand endorse) is capable of being called a Commonwealth agreement, since all the others involve other countries as well. Britain's alliance with Canada is in NATO, with Pakistan in CENTO and SEATO, and with Australia and New Zealand in SEATO.

My point in mentioning the military arrangements which Britain has with certain other Commonwealth members is not that there is general agreement on military matters throughout the association (this is not so), but that there is little, if any, objection from other Commonwealth members to these arrangements. Where Commonwealth members have objected to others taking part in alliances, it has usually been on grounds of involvement in the Cold War (as in the case of Indian objections to SEATO) and particularly in regard to alliance with the U.S.A. Even the neutralist members of the Commonwealth have seen little to complain about in Britain's military connections with their fellows. [2] It is a form of cohesion that bi-lateral military connections within the Commonwealth are regarded with less suspicion than those made by other states with France, the U.S.A. or the Soviet Union.

LACK OF COHESION

The lack of cohesion between Commonwealth members' foreign policies is apparent to any observer at the U.N. The Commonwealth displays nothing like the same customary ynanimity as the Latin American bloc. Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada are usually on the same side, though some may abstain while others vote in a particular direction. These four countries will nearly always be found in opposition to the Communist states. The remaining members of the Commonwealth are usually to be found in whatever posture distinguishes the Afro-Asian bloc on the particular issue. No Commonwealth country consistently votes with the Communist states. The two major issues on which Commonwealth members have differed have been the Cold War (with its lineup of blocs and alliances) and colonialism.

2.- India and Pakistan, and Nigeria and Ghana, are examples of Commonwealth members which live in a state of mutual suspicion. In both cases each is concerned about British aid to the other. The British policy, on the whole, has been to try not to discriminate in practice between them.

The normal posture of the Afro-Asian members is neutralism, though this has become rather less absolute since the Sino-Indian conflict began. India, the member which set the tone for later members' enunciation of neutralism, has become less downright about it. Malaysia, a newer Asian member, has remained firmly anti-Communist in any context involving Communist China. Sierra Leone and Nigeria have been moderating forces upon the anti-Western declamation of Ghana. Jamaica and Trinidad are not automatically neutralist. Nevertheless, no Commonwealth member except Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand has ranged itself wholeheartedly upon the American side in Cold War issues. This situation arouses little concern within the Commonwealth. The members have been living with it for much more than a decade ; it has become a fact of life. There has been little inclination on the part of Britain to adopt the Dullesian kind of demand that all Commonwealth members stand up and be counted on the anti-Communist side. Instead, much has been made of the fact that the Commonwealth contains not only countries from different continents with different ethnic backgrounds, but also countries which are neutralist and those which are strongly committed. A basic lack of cohesion has thus become an opportunity to extol the Commonwealth as something different from, and by implication either additional to or better than, more cohesive international associations.

On the colonialism issue (with which we may link the issue of racial discrimination in South Africa and elsewhere) the situation has been somewhat similar. The Commonwealth countries have usually been divided into two groups on the same lines as on Cold War questions, with the exception that Canada has been less firmly attached to Britain, Australia, and New Zealand ; each of these three has dependencies of its own, and has had to run the gauntlet of criticism in the Trusteeship Council as well as in committees of the General Assembly. While South Africa was a member of the Commonwealth, it suffered even more criticism than the other three, since its position was much more uncompromising and it showed no readiness to take advice. Its assertion of its sovereign rights was a constant source of embarrassment to the other three. Since they were pursuing policies of gradual de-colonisation, they did not wish to be identified with such an unpopular partner ; at the same time, they felt obliged for their own purposes to make the same assertions about domestic jurisdiction as South Africa. The other Commonwealth countries could

afford to denounce British colonialism in the comforting knowledge that it would not last ; their complaints never achieved the same concentrated force as similar complaints against France, Portugal, the Netherlands and South Africa.

On most issues of foreign policy not involving the Cold War or the colonial issue Britain has usually had either the tacit support or the tacit abstention from criticism of most other Commonwealth members. This was not the case in two special instances : the Suez affair of 1956 and the proposal for British entry into the E.E.C. of 1962. The first found the Commonwealth countries bitterly divided, while the second found all the overseas countries criticising the British decision. In neither case, however, were there any withdrawals from the Commonwealth.

A SUMMARY AND SOME COMPARISONS.

The Commonwealth is essentially a loose association of states, held together by the effects of past experience, and demanding little of its members. It is doubtful whether the association would continue if Britain did not give such attention to promoting it and persuading the members that it is worth retaining. While no member is dependent upon Britain either politically or militarily,[3] all except Canada are economically dependent to some extent, in that their prosperity and the pattern of their trade can be influenced by British action. All retain the network of contacts with Britain mentioned earlier ; these constitute not so much dependency as unofficial reinforcement of existing institutions. National leaders find the London meetings congenial. Some (notably the Canadians) welcome the opportunities which Commonwealth membership gives them to make effective contact with new nations in other continents ; others seem not to care much about this, but to stay in the Commonwealth from habit ; others again (notably Pakistan) seem to remain in order to counteract the influence of other members of which they are suspicious. Since no attempt is made to swing all members into line behind particular policies on divisive issues, it is possible for these various groups to remain in concert with one another. It suits their convenience to do so. The Commonwealth could, if its

3.- With the exception of Malaysia, which is at present heavily dependent upon Britain for military defence against Indonesia. However, this situation is not necessarily permanent.

members wished, take common action ; but there must be few things which the members could achieve, and would wish to achieve, only by common action in the Commonwealth. Each is involved in a network of other associations from which it can pick the appropriate venue for a particular aim. There is in fact little need for common action, if we are to take the purposes of the individual members as the test of need. But if we take the preservation of the Commonwealth itself as the test, it is possible to argue that, unless common action is taken sometimes and succeeds in dramatising the Commonwealth as an entity in its own right, the Commonwealth may die of inanition. So far, the member states have shown little inclination to take common action on any other ground than their own individual interests.

Some comparison has already been made between the Commonwealth and other examples of post-colonial relationships. However, such comparisons are probably relevant only in the immediate post-colonial situation, in which some machinery is needed to adjust relations at the level of sovereign status, and to restore connections which may have been strained during the independence period. Once this situation is established (as it has now been for many years for most Commonwealth members), the former colonial relationship is not politically important, and connection between the former colonial power and its ex-colonies must be judged in the same terms as any other form of international association. As an organisation, how does the Commonwealth compare with other international bodies ?

Comparison with the U.N. involves much contrast. The U.N., envisaged as a general security agency, has now become a forum for the pursuit of international political issues and a means of recruitment of support when particular issues arise. It is also a means of tackling awkward international problems, such as the Congo, when no clear responsibility falls upon one or more of the major powers. It is also distinguished by a massive secretariat and by a U.N. "presence" which can be manifested in a given part of the world. The Commonwealth lacks all these characteristics except that of a means of recruitment of support for particular countries' policies. In this regard it operates indirectly and without the publicity of the U.N. The two are not the same kind of body.

There are, however, some U.N. bodies with which comparison might be closer than with the U.N. itself. ECAFE, for example, has something in common with the

Commonwealth in its emphasis upon mutual discussion rather than joint action, and its adoption of the occasional joint project (such as the Asian Highway) as a means of dramatising its existence (cf. the Commonwealth scholarships scheme and the Commonwealth telephone cable links). Nevertheless, the existence of a substantial ECAFE secretariat, which attempts to steer the Commission in particular directions, militates against a parallel with the Commonwealth ; while it is true that the C.R.O. in London discreetly attempts this sort of role, its activities are not comparable. Moreover, the presence in ECAFE of powers on different sides in the Cold War has given it a different tone from the Commonwealth's.

There is little advantage to be gained from comparing the Commonwealth with alliances such as NATO or SEATO : its purpose (if one can be divined) is not military action, and it is not set up with any particular enemy in mind, as alliances are. To the extent that the term "entente" stands halfway between an "alliance" and "good relations", [4] it might be applied to the Commonwealth, except that India and Pakistan can hardly be said to enjoy even "good relations".

Perhaps the nearest comparisons with the Commonwealth are provided by such bodies as the Organisation of American States and the Nordic Council, which are essentially consultative in their operation. But, apart from the problem of comparing an association which has no obvious constitution with others of which this is a characteristic, there is the difficulty that these others are essentially regional in character, arising from the needs and aims of states in a geographical area which provides them with common dangers and problems from neighbours, with certain common economic problems, and with similarities of cultural and economic development. These particular aspects are absent from the Commonwealth, which is emphatically non-regional in its operations. Certain Commonwealth members in the same regions, such as India and Pakistan, and Ghana and Nigeria, display the very opposite of the wish to co-operate on regional issues. The Commonwealth, it seems, is sui generis.

4.- Harold Nicholson, Diplomacy (London, 1952), p. 235.

SUMMARY

1. In basic character, the Commonwealth of Nations is an association of ex-colonies with the former colonial power ; as such, its nearest comparisons are with the arrangements attempted between France, the Netherlands, the USA and their former colonies in each instance.

2. In origin, it is the product of the relations of Britain with a particular group of ex-colonies, the so-called "white dominions".

3. In operation, it is characterised by :
   a. certain symbols (Queen, Prime Ministers'meetings, use of High Commissioners, 'Commonwealth system') ;
   b. minimal rules (relating only to initial membership and to conversion to republican status) ;
   c. minimal obligations (merely 'to consult') ;
   d. lack of a secretariat ;
   e. informality of discussion ;
   f. special British machinery through Commonwealth Relations Office ;
   g. the possibility of expulsion.

4. In its background, it must be seen against the network of contacts between Britain and the other members, in trade, investment, language, education, religion, administrative practices, legal systems, etc.

5. In the context of world politics, it show cohesion in :
   a. occasional pronouncements from Prime Ministers'meetings ;
   b. informal discussions at the U.N. ;
   c. trade and financial links, through Commonwealth preference and remains of Sterling Area ;
   d. schemes for educational and economic aid ;
   e. various bilateral military connections.

6. In the same context, it shows lack of cohesion in :
   a. the Cold War context ;
   b. membership of blocs and alliances ;
   c. action in wars ;
   d. the colonialism issue.

7. Thus, it is essentially a loose association, held together by a degree of common experience, largely dependent on promotional efforts by the former colonial power, capable of common action but normally undesirous of it, with few recognisable common institutions but with certain symbolic connections. Note the differences from the UN, OAS, SEATO, ECAFE, etc.

RESUME

1. Quant à sa nature, le Commonwealth est une association entre d'anciennes colonies et l'ancienne puissance colonisatrice ; il présente des analogies a- vec les structures établies entre la France, les Pays-Bas et les Etats-Unis et les anciennes colonies de chacune de ces puissances.

2. Quant à son origine, il est le produit des rapports entre la Grande-Bretagne et un groupe particulier d'anciennes colonies, les "dominions blancs".

3. Quant à son fonctionnement, il est caractérisé par :
    a. certains symboles (Reine, réunions des premiers ministres, Hauts Commis- saires, "système du Commonwealth") ;
    b. un très petit nombre de règles (concernant seulement l'admission et l'a- doption d'un régime républicain) ;
    c. des obligations très réduites (uniquement celle de "consulter") ;
    d. l'absence d'un secrétariat ;
    e. le caractère non-officiel des discussions ;
    f. un appareil administratif britannique, le Commonwealth Relations Office ;
    g. la possibilité de l'exclusion.

4. Quant à son arrière-plan, il faut prendre en considération le réseau de contacts existant entre la Grande-Bretagne et les autres membres du Commonwealth en matière de commerce, d'investissements, de langue commune, d'enseignement, de religion, de pratiques administratives, de systèmes juridiques etc..

5. Dans le cadre de la politique mondiale, le Commonwealth montre sa cohésion dans :
    a. des textes émanant des réunions des premiers ministres ;
    b. des discussions non-officielles aux Nations Unies ;
    c. des liens commerciaux et financiers, tels que les préférences dans le cadre du Commonwealth, et ce qui subsiste des mécanismes de la Zone Sterling ;
    d. des plans d'aide en matière d'éducation et d'économie ;
    e. divers liens militaires bilatéraux.

6. Dans le même cadre, le Commonwealth montre son manque de cohésion dans :
    a. le contexte de la Guerre Froide
    b. l'appartenance à des blocs et à des alliances ;
    c. les attitudes vis-à-vis des guerres ;
    d. le problème du colonianisme.

7. Le Commonwealth est donc, pour l'essentiel, une association très lâche, dont les liens découlent d'une certaine expérience commune, dépendant en grande par- tie des efforts faits par l'ancienne puissance colonisatrice. Il est capable d'actions communes, mais ne les souhaite normalement pas, et ne possède qu'un petit nombre d'institutions communes, tout en conservant certains liens de va- leur symbolique. Le Commonwealth présente ainsi des différences avec les Nations Unies, l'Organisation des Etats américains, l'OTASE, l'ECAFE, etc.

THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

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S I X T H   W O R L D   C O N G R E S S
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THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

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The Commonwealth of Nations is difficult to discuss in precise terms, since no date can be set for its inception, it has no secretariat or other staff, it has no written constitution, no member pays dues, and the members admit to having very little in common. Nevertheless, although there are arguments about whether it is important or effective or being distorted from its original purposes or a means of colonialist domination, no-one disputes that it exists.

BASIC CHARACTER

In basic character, the Commonwealth of Nations (formerly called the British Commonwealth of Nations; the adjective "British" was tacitly dropped when membership was widened to take in India, Pakistan and Ceylon) is an association of ex-colonies with the country which was once in charge of them. It is generally recognized that only sovereign states can be members of the Commonwealth, and that self-governing colonies, such as Southern Rhodesia, can be admitted to meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers only by invitation as observers. The British Commonwealth Relations Office was set up specifically (as the Dominions Office) to handle Britain's contacts with former colonies which, having gained sovereign status, were no longer properly the concern of the Colonial Office. Since World War II, an invitation to attend a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting has been one of the symbols of independence for new nations on their ceasing to be colonies.

As an association between a former imperial power and its exdependencies, the nearest comparisons one can find with the Commonwealth are with the arrangements made between other imperial powers, such as France, the Netherlands, and the U.S.A., and their former colonies. Taking these in reverse order, we can say that the existing arrangements between the U.S.A. and the Philippines are not unlike those between Britain and some (but not all) other Commonwealth members : the system of favoured trade in certain commodities and of special military arrangements is similar to that which exists between Britain and Malaysia, though not between

Britain and Ghana. However, whereas the U.S.A. has only one ex-colony in this sort of relationship, Britain has 15 or 16. The U.S. system is essentially bi-lateral, the British multi-lateral, with a variety of complications and special arrangements which are necessarily absent from the U.S. one. Also, the US-Philippines relationship is essentially a treaty relationship, with all its details stated in black and white ; in this it differs from the informal Commonwealth system, in which certain relationships of Britain with particular ex-colonies are governed by treaty, but much else is left to informal consultation.

The Dutch-Indonesian Union was too short-lived for comparisons to be made effectively with the Commonwealth, though the idea of two sovereign states joined by a single constitutional monarch and engaging in periodic consultation clearly owed something to the Commonwealth model. The Community set up in the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic had rather less in common with the Commonwealth, since, while it envisaged considerable autonomy for the overseas territories, it still kept them within the close control of a variety of institutions designed to emphasise French hegemony. The actual relations which exist now between France and the former French colonies in Africa south of the Sahara have a good deal in common with the way in which British relations are carried on with recently independent states such as Kenya and Sierra Leone ; nevertheless, the degree of dependence upon France for finance and favoured trade makes the general relationship very different from that which exists between Britain on the one hand and Canada or Australia or India or Ghana on the other.

It can be said, then, that, while the fact of association between a former colonial power and its ex-colonies provides the basic characteristic of the Commonwealth, the actual form of the association is different from what has eventuated in other similar cases. Moreover, the Commonwealth example is the most substantial in terms of the number of states involved, and the most successful in that very few ex-colonies have not accepted it (they include Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, the Sudan, and Burma) [1] while only the Republic of Ireland and South Africa have

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1.- Here I have used a fairly free definition of "colony". Jordan and Iraq, which were British mandates, were always envisaged as independent Arab states, though this would not necessarily have prevented their becoming Commonwealth members. The politics of the Arab world ensured that they, the Sudan and Israel, for different reasons, did not enter the Commonwealth. Burma was formally included for a brief period, but never took part in the general Commonwealth system.

given up their membership after participating in the general system of Commonwealth relations. Some sixteen states remain members, spreading over all continents except South America.

ORIGINS

Given the special character of the Commonwealth, it may be appropriate to indicate how it began. It is the product of the relations of Britain with a particular group of colonies, those which were settled by white men and known as "self-governing". In the latter part of the nineteenth century this description applied to the six colonies of Australia (New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, Tasmania, and, to a lesser extent, Western Australia), to New Zealand, to Canada, to Newfoundland, to Natal and to the Cape Province in South Africa. The political condition of these colonies was one of full internal self-government, subject to a rarely-used veto from London. In external affairs they had no independent status ; for purposes of international law they were parts of the British Empire, which in turn was regarded as part of the unitary United Kingdom. Each was hungry for people and capital from Britain ; each had problems on its borders or around its shores which demanded special attention from the British government in its relations with foreign countries. Thus, while each was subordinate to Britain and could not assert a foreign policy of its own (except in the sphere of trade policy), each was developing its own view of the world and was anxious that the British government should know, and if possible adopt, this view in appropriate situations. Means of consultation were found in the Colonial Conference of the 1880's. After the turn of the 20th century, with the consolidation of the Australian and South African colonies into single states, the arrangements became formalized in a body called the Imperial Conference, which met regularly to discuss questions of defence, trade, foreign policy and mutual co-operation in technical matters such as communications. This body is the lineal ancestor of the present meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. It continued to meet until 1937 ; a further meeting in 1946 may be regarded as its final expression.

So far as form is concerned, the Imperial Conference meetings were very like those of today : they were held in London, the British Prime Minister presided, they were attended by the Prime Ministers of the "Dominions" (as the self-

governing colonies began to be called in 1907), and the emphasis was placed upon
discussion rather than decision. In the matter of status, however, changes occur-
red during the period of the Imperial Conference which altered the relative posi-
tion of Britain and the Dominions and enabled the post-World War II expansion of
the Commonwealth to take place smoothly. The participation of the Dominions and
India in World War I, and their consequent signature of the Versailles Treaty and
membership of the League of Nations, emphasized the anomaly of the orthodox view
that, as legal entities, they were simply portions of "the British Empire", which
was an extension of the British Crown. In the 1920's opposition to this orthodoxy
was particularly strong in South Africa, Canada and the Irish Free State. In con-
sequence, the British government enunciated at the 1926 Conference, and put in
legal form in the Statute of Westminster of 1931, the new doctrine that the Domin-
ions and Britain, while portions of the British Empire, were equal in status, in
no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external
affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated
as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Such an interpretation enabled
Ireland to be neutral in World War II, Canada to declare war at a different time
from Britain, and Australia to declare war on countries with which Britain was not
at war. There could be no clearer demonstration that the condition of a Dominion
was one of independence. Thus, when Pakistan and India became independent in 1947,
their leaders were prepared to accept the legal status of Dominions. It only rem-
ained thereafter to do some juggling of the doctrine in order to accommodate repu-
blics within the Commonwealth (by accepting the British Monarch, not the Crown, as
a symbol of free association between members, not as an object of allegiance), and
the way was clear for the membership of more and more African and Asian states, as
these gained their independence.

THE COMMONWEALTH SYSTEM

As the Commonwealth operates, it is characterised by hardly any rules
and obligations, but also by the presence of symbols and practices which serve as
indications that the association exists. The list is roughly as follows :

a) The Queen is the symbol of the free association between the members.

Acceptance of this symbol is necessary for membership. The Queen has no legal responsibility for the Commonwealth as a whole, and no part in the constitutions of those members which are republics or electoral monarchies. "The Crown" has no meaning in relation to the Commonwealth as a whole.

b) Meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers and Presidents are held irregularly. So far, all have been held in London and been chaired by the British Prime Minister. The meetings issue communiqués about the members' joint views on the world, decide on the entry of new members, and sometimes agree to the setting up of schemes for co-operation in such fields as education.

c) Commonwealth member-states do not accredit Ambassadors to one another, but call their envoys High Commissioners ; these enjoy ambassadorial status. The practice, which began because of the reluctance of proponents of the theory of a unitary Crown to agree that the Monarch could accredit ambassadors to himself, is now retained as a sort of badge of Commonwealth relations.

d) The British government is the only one in the Commonwealth to operate a special department for Commonwealth Relations, although some other members have corresponding sections in their departments of External Affairs. The Commonwealth Relations Office in London sends out a flood of telegrams to Commonwealth members, to appraise them of British policy and seek their views. There is also a good deal of consultation between Prime Ministers, without the intervention of their Ministers for External Affairs. In general, it is claimed that Commonwealth members have a less formal relationship with one another than with no-Commonwealth states. This varies from member to member. But it is clearly the intention of the British government to encourage such a practice aherever possible.

e) The rules are minimal. I can discern only three : that initial membership of the Commonwealth does not become automatic upon a former British colony's obtaining independence, but must be requested from the existing members ; that the Queen must be recognised as a symbol of free association ; and that, when a member changes from monarchical to republican status, the fact must be notified to the other members. There is a vague obligation to inform other members of actions which might affect them. At various times it has been asserted that Commonwealth members ought to be distinguished by their observance of democracy or of

the rule of law, but these are pious hopes, not rules. The feeling against South Africa in 1961 suggests that members practising blatant racial discrimination may not be welcome.

f) There are no obligations, except to observe the rules just mentioned.

g) It is customary for Commonwealth members to meet informally at the U.N. headquarters in New York, in order to discuss events and tell one another what lines they propose to follow.

There is no Commonwealth constitution ; no secretariat exists between meetings ; and the operation of the relationship depends very much upon the circumstances of the time and the inclinations of the various members. Such a state of affairs should be credited not solely to British pragmatism, but also to the fact that, since the Commonwealth entails no onerous obligations in money, men, promises or time, it is easy for new members to agree to. It would probably have been impossible to persuade so many Afro-Asian states to join the Commonwealth if this had not been the case. However, one final point of organisation is that the example of South Africa suggests that a member could be expelled from the Commonwealth if its behaviour displeased a large majority of other members. South Africa left of its own accord, but the possibility of its expulsion was a real one. The expulsion would have taken place, not because any known rules had been broken, but because the balance of political forces amongst Commonwealth members had tipped against white domination.

BACKGROUND

The durability of the Commonwealth is not understandable simply by reference to its symbols and practices. It must be seen against the background of a network of contacts between Britain and its former dependencies. Some of these are matters of language : apart from the United States, the Commonwealth countries are the principal speakers of English, with all that this implies in terms of literature and distinctive ways of expression. Others are matters of law and government: British legal, parliamentary and civil service practices have made a deep impression on all the other members. Some relate to religion, sport and relaxation : such institutions as cricket and the Anglican church are widespread. Others again are

matters of education : Britain had a considerable impact upon the systems of school, university and professional education of all the members, and numerous ties still exist. There are also substantial economic ties. By far the greater part of British overseas investment is in Commonwealth countries, which are accustomed in the main to hold their international reserves in sterling. Trade with Britain is significant in all cases, being underpinned in regard to certain products by the remains of preferential arrangements entered into at Ottawa in 1932. With the exception of Canada, all Commonwealth countries look first to Britain for development capital from abroad.

Such contacts as these reinforce one another. Political consultation fits easily amongst them. It is aided by meetings of officials to discuss various technical matters, by meetings of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, and by the activities of a great many voluntary bodies. As with all Commonwealth relationships, the system is bi-lateral rather than multi-lateral, in the sense that each member has more to do with Britain than with any other part of the Commonwealth. It emphasises the fact that the Commonwealth has arisen because of the members' past connections with Britain, and survives largely because of the continued strength of these connections. It should be noted, however, that the relationship is at no point that of master and servant. The British are too conscious of the other forces at work in the world to attempt to dominate their associates in the Commonwealth. References to "neo-colonialism" in this connection are wide of the mark. The British government wishes to preserve the Commonwealth as an institution, because to do so is to underline the importance of the British connection with each member, and also to stress the free association which they have with one another. If former colonies refused consistently to join the Commonwealth, or left it in a huff, this would rebound severely upon the British reputation for peaceful and sincere de-colonisation. Britain's status in international politics depends to some extent upon its capacity to keep in intimate touch with countries in Asia and Africa ; if they do not wish to continue in such a relationship. Britain has little or no means of altering their views. The point can be illustrated from the examples of Burma, Iraq, and the Sudan, with all of which Britain had military agreements on their at-

tainment of independence ; none of these agreements has survived, and none of the
three countries is in in the Commonwealth. But British relations with each of the
three countries, while tenuous, have not been embittered, and there has been no
attempt to apply any sort of discipline to them.

COHESION OF THE COMMONWEALTH

It is a matter of discussion whether the Commonwealth possesses any "unity"
or "cohesion", and, if so, how much. On the whole, little effort is now made to
assert a unity of outlook amongst Commonwealth countries, although vestiges of the
assumptions of the early Dominion period are occasionally to be found. However,
it is possible to find evidence of occasional cohesion on particular matters. The
Prime Ministers' communiques sometimes include questions of substance on which agre-
ement has been reached, as with their references to disarmament in 1961. These
are cases in which the interests of Commonwealth members have coincided for the
time being. Again, there are the informal discussions at the U.N., in which, while
no attempt is made to achieve agreement, there is an implicit understanding that
the U.N. should be kept going and that Commonwealth members, while disagreeing,
should notify one another of their disagreements before announcing them in public.
There has also been considerable cohesion in the past in financial matters, espec-
ially during the period of dollar shortage in the 1950's, when the gold and dollar
reserves of the sterling area had to be husbanded by joint action between central
banks. The fact that Britain gives the first place to Commonwealth countries and
colonies in organising its foreign aid and its export of capital is a source of
cohesion, as is the technical help which Britain extends to a number of members.

Once the effort to establish a common foreign or defence policy has been
given up (as it had been, in the Commonwealth, by about 1949), it is not difficult
for countries with unofficial and traditional ties to find things to discuss in an
amicable fashion. This is now the case with the Commonwealth. It would be fair to
say that the British government seeks opportunities for co-operation wherever these
might exist, either as general Commonwealth schemes (as in the current scholarships
scheme) or as bi-lateral arrangements with individual Commonwealth countries. In
the latter category fall the defence agreements which Britain has with some of the

members. These range from a full-scale treaty, as in the case of Malaysia, through co-operation for defence research and training, as with Australia, to occasional help with specific problems, as with India. Actual alliances can be said to exist only with Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan and Malaysia ; but of these only the Malaysian agreement (which Australia and New Zealand endorse) is capable of being called a Commonwealth agreement, since all the others involve other countries as well. Britain's alliance with Canada is in NATO, with Pakistan in CENTO and SEATO, and with Australia and New Zealand in SEATO.

My point in mentioning the military arrangements which Britain has with certain other Commonwealth members is not that there is general agreement on military matters throughout the association (this is not so), but that there is little, if any, objection from other Commonwealth members to these arrangements. Where Commonwealth members have objected to others taking part in alliances, it has usually been on grounds of involvement in the Cold War (as in the case of Indian objections to SEATO) and particularly in regard to alliance with the U.S.A. Even the neutralist members of the Commonwealth have seen little to complain about in Britain's military connections with their fellows. [2] It is a form of cohesion that bi-lateral military connections within the Commonwealth are regarded with less suspicion than those made by other states with France, the U.S.A. or the Soviet Union.

LACK OF COHESION

The lack of cohesion between Commonwealth members' foreign policies is apparent to any observer at the U.N. The Commonwealth displays nothing like the same customary ynanimity as the Latin American bloc. Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada are usually on the same side, though some may abstain while others vote in a particular direction. These four countries will nearly always be found in opposition to the Communist states. The remaining members of the Commonwealth are usually to be found in whatever posture distinguishes the Afro-Asian bloc on the particular issue. No Commonwealth country consistently votes with the Communist states. The two major issues on which Commonwealth members have differed have been the Cold War (with its lineup of blocs and alliances) and colonialism.

2.- India and Pakistan, and Nigeria and Ghana, are examples of Commonwealth members which live in a state of mutual suspicion. In both cases each is concerned about British aid to the other. The British policy, on the whole, has been to try not to discriminate in practice between them.

The normal posture of the Afro-Asian members is neutralism, though this has become rather less absolute since the Sino-Indian conflict began. India, the member which set the tone for later members' enunciation of neutralism, has become less downright about it. Malaysia, a newer Asian member, has remained firmly anti-Communist in any context involving Communist China. Sierra Leone and Nigeria have been moderating forces upon the anti-Western declamation of Ghana. Jamaica and Trinidad are not automatically neutralist. Nevertheless, no Commonwealth member except Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand has ranged itself wholeheartedly upon the American side in Cold War issues. This situation arouses little concern within the Commonwealth. The members have been living with it for much more than a decade ; it has become a fact of life. There has been little inclination on the part of Britain to adopt the Dullesian kind of demand that all Commonwealth members stand up and be counted on the anti-Communist side. Instead, much has been made of the fact that the Commonwealth contains not only countries from different continents with different ethnic backgrounds, but also countries which are neutralist and those which are strongly committed. A basic lack of cohesion has thus become an opportunity to extol the Commonwealth as something different from, and by implication either additional to or better than, more cohesive international associations.

On the colonialism issue (with which we may link the issue of racial discrimination in South Africa and elsewhere) the situation has been somewhat similar. The Commonwealth countries have usually been divided into two groups on the same lines as on Cold War questions, with the exception that Canada has been less firmly attached to Britain, Australia, and New Zealand ; each of these three has dependencies of its own, and has had to run the gauntlet of criticism in the Trusteeship Council as well as in committees of the General Assembly. While South Africa was a member of the Commonwealth, it suffered even more criticism than the other three, since its position was much more uncompromising and it showed no readiness to take advice. Its assertion of its sovereign rights was a constant source of embarrassment to the other three. Since they were pursuing policies of gradual de-colonisation, they did not wish to be identified with such an unpopular partner ; at the same time, they felt obliged for their own purposes to make the same assertions about domestic jurisdiction as South Africa. The other Commonwealth countries could

afford to denounce British colonialism in the comforting knowledge that it would not last ; their complaints never achieved the same concentrated force as similar complaints against France, Portugal, the Netherlands and South Africa.

On most issues of foreign policy not involving the Cold War or the colonial issue Britain has usually had either the tacit support or the tacit abstention from criticism of most other Commonwealth members. This was not the case in two special instances : the Suez affair of 1956 and the proposal for British entry into the E.E.C. of 1962. The first found the Commonwealth countries bitterly divided, while the second found all the overseas countries criticising the British decision. In neither case, however, were there any withdrawals from the Commonwealth.

A SUMMARY AND SOME COMPARISONS.

The Commonwealth is essentially a loose association of states, held together by the effects of past experience, and demanding little of its members. It is doubtful whether the association would continue if Britain did not give such attention to promoting it and persuading the members that it is worth retaining. While no member is dependent upon Britain either politically or militarily,[3] all except Canada are economically dependent to some extent, in that their prosperity and the pattern of their trade can be influenced by British action. All retain the network of contacts with Britain mentioned earlier ; these constitute not so much dependency as unofficial reinforcement of existing institutions. National leaders find the London meetings congenial. Some (notably the Canadians) welcome the opportunities which Commonwealth membership gives them to make effective contact with new nations in other continents ; others seem not to care much about this, but to stay in the Commonwealth from habit ; others again (notably Pakistan) seem to remain in order to counteract the influence of other members of which they are suspicious. Since no attempt is made to swing all members into line behind particular policies on divisive issues, it is possible for these various groups to remain in concert with one another. It suits their convenience to do so. The Commonwealth could, if its

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3.- With the exception of Malaysia, which is at present heavily dependent upon Britain for military defence against Indonesia. However, this situation is not necessarily permanent.

members wished, take common action ; but there must be few things which the members could achieve, and would wish to achieve, only by common action in the Commonwealth. Each is involved in a network of other associations from which it can pick the appropriate venue for a particular aim. There is in fact little need for common action, if we are to take the purposes of the individual members as the test of need. But if we take the preservation of the Commonwealth itself as the test, it is possible to argue that, unless common action is taken sometimes and succeeds in dramatising the Commonwealth as an entity in its own right, the Commonwealth may die of inanition. So far, the member states have shown little inclination to take common action on any other ground than their own individual interests.

Some comparison has already been made between the Commonwealth and other examples of post-colonial relationships. However, such comparisons are probably relevant only in the immediate post-colonial situation, in which some machinery is needed to adjust relations at the level of sovereign status, and to restore connections which may have been strained during the independence period. Once this situation is established (as it has now been for many years for most Commonwealth members), the former colonial relationship is not politically important, and connection between the former colonial power and its ex-colonies must be judged in the same terms as any other form of international association. As an organisation, how does the Commonwealth compare with other international bodies ?

Comparison with the U.N. involves much contrast. The U.N., envisaged as a general security agency, has now become a forum for the pursuit of international political issues and a means of recruitment of support when particular issues arise. It is also a means of tackling awkward international problems, such as the Congo, when no clear responsibility falls upon one or more of the major powers. It is also distinguished by a massive secretariat and by a U.N. "presence" which can be manifested in a given part of the world. The Commonwealth lacks all these characteristics except that of a means of recruitment of support for particular countries' policies. In this regard it operates indirectly and without the publicity of the U.N. The two are not the same kind of body.

There are, however, some U.N. bodies with which comparison might be closer than with the U.N. itself. ECAFE, for example, has something in common with the

Commonwealth in its emphasis upon mutual discussion rather than joint action, and its adoption of the occasional joint project (such as the Asian Highway) as a means of dramatising its existence (cf. the Commonwealth scholarships scheme and the Commonwealth telephone cable links). Nevertheless, the existence of a substantial ECAFE secretariat, which attempts to steer the Commission in particular directions, militates against a parallel with the Commonwealth ; while it is true that the C.R.O. in London discreetly attempts this sort of role, its activities are not comparable. Moreover, the presence in ECAFE of powers on different sides in the Cold War has given it a different tone from the Commonwealth's.

There is little advantage to be gained from comparing the Commonwealth with alliances such as NATO or SEATO : its purpose (if one can be divined) is not military action, and it is not set up with any particular enemy in mind, as alliances are. To the extent that the term "entente" stands halfway between an "alliance" and "good relations", [4] it might be applied to the Commonwealth, except that India and Pakistan can hardly be said to enjoy even "good relations".

Perhaps the nearest comparisons with the Commonwealth are provided by such bodies as the Organisation of American States and the Nordic Council, which are essentially consultative in their operation. But, apart from the problem of comparing an association which has no obvious constitution with others of which this is a characteristic, there is the difficulty that these others are essentially regional in character, arising from the needs and aims of states in a geographical area which provides them with common dangers and problems from neighbours, with certain common economic problems, and with similarities of cultural and economic development. These particular aspects are absent from the Commonwealth, which is emphatically non-regional in its operations. Certain Commonwealth members in the same regions, such as India and Pakistan, and Ghana and Nigeria, display the very opposite of the wish to co-operate on regional issues. The Commonwealth, it seems, is _sui generis_.

4.- Harold Nicholson, _Diplomacy_ (London, 1952), p. 235.

SUMMARY

1. In basic character, the Commonwealth of Nations is an association of ex-colonies with the former colonial power ; as such, its nearest comparisons are with the arrangements attempted between France, the Netherlands, the USA and their former colonies in each instance.

2. In origin, it is the product of the relations of Britain with a particular group of ex-colonies, the so-called "white dominions".

3. In operation, it is characterised by :
    a. certain symbols (Queen, Prime Ministers'meetings, use of High Commissioners, 'Commonwealth system') ;
    b. minimal rules (relating only to initial membership and to conversion to republican status) ;
    c. minimal obligations (merely 'to consult') ;
    d. lack of a secretariat ;
    e. informality of discussion ;
    f. special British machinery through Commonwealth Relations Office ;
    g. the possibility of expulsion.

4. In its background, it must be seen against the network of contacts between Britain and the other members, in trade, investment, language, education, religion, administrative practices, legal systems, etc.

5. In the context of world politics, it show cohesion in :
    a. occasional pronouncements from Prime Ministers'meetings ;
    b. informal discussions at the U.N. ;
    c. trade and financial links, through Commonwealth preference and remains of Sterling Area ;
    d. schemes for educational and economic aid ;
    e. various bilateral military connections.

6. In the same context, it shows lack of cohesion in :
    a. the Cold War context ;
    b. membership of blocs and alliances ;
    c. action in wars ;
    d. the colonialism issue.

7. Thus, it is essentially a loose association, held together by a degree of common experience, largely dependent on promotional efforts by the former colonial power, capable of common action but normally undesirous of it, with few recognisable common institutions but with certain symbolic connections. Note the differences from the UN, OAS, SEATO, ECAFE, etc.

RESUME

1. Quant à sa nature, le Commonwealth est une association entre d'anciennes colonies et l'ancienne puissance colonisatrice ; il présente des analogies a- vec les structures établies entre la France, les Pays-Bas et les Etats-Unis et les anciennes colonies de chacune de ces puissances.

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    f. un appareil administratif britannique, le Commonwealth Relations Office ;
    g. la possibilité de l'exclusion.

4. Quant à son arrière-plan, il faut prendre en considération le réseau de contacts existant entre la Grande-Bretagne et les autres membres du Commonwealth en matière de commerce, d'investissements, de langue commune, d'enseignement, de religion, de pratiques administratives, de systèmes juridiques etc..

5. Dans le cadre de la politique mondiale, le Commonwealth montre sa cohésion dans :
    a. des textes émanant des réunions des premiers ministres ;
    b. des discussions non-officielles aux Nations Unies ;
    c. des liens commerciaux et financiers, tels que les préférences dans le
       cadre du Commonwealth, et ce qui subsiste des mécanismes de la Zone
       Sterling ;
    d. des plans d'aide en matière d'éducation et d'économie ;
    e. divers liens militaires bilatéraux.

6. Dans le même cadre, le Commonwealth montre son manque de cohésion dans :
    a. le contexte de la Guerre Froide
    b. l'appartenance à des blocs et à des alliances ;
    c. les attitudes vis-à-vis des guerres ;
    d. le problème du colonianisme.

7. Le Commonwealth est donc, pour l'essentiel, une association très lâche, dont les liens découlent d'une certaine expérience commune, dépendant en grande par- tie des efforts faits par l'ancienne puissance colonisatrice. Il est capable d'actions communes, mais ne les souhaite normalement pas, et ne possède qu'un petit nombre d'institutions communes, tout en conservant certains liens de va- leur symbolique. Le Commonwealth présente ainsi des différences avec les Nations Unies, l'Organisation des Etats américains, l'OTASE, l'ECAFE, etc.

5

THE EXECUTIVE HEAD: AN ESSAY IN THE
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF HEADS OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS

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The underlying difficulty of all comparisons of political behaviour is that historical distance makes superficially similar phenomena strictly speaking non-comparable. What is sought, however, is not an unattainable rigour of accuracy in comparison, but some singling out of those factors of greatest importance in trying to understand the role of the executive head of an international organisation - the strategic factors which, as well as being an aid to understanding by the scholar, may also be of practical guidance to the practitioner.

First place must, however, be given to the historical context. What an executive head of a particular international organisation can do at any particular time is constrained by limits imposed by the general configuration of international relationship. There are times for initiative and for change; and there are times for patience and consolidation. While searching for maxims of broad application, the mind should never allow itself to become divorced from the particular concrete situation and from the assessment of the limitations and opportunities peculiar to that situation.

This paper is concerned with the set of intellectual tools which both scholar and practitioner may use in order to understand and work upon the concrete situations in which executive heads of international organisations find themselves. These should be such as to enable the behaviour of the executive head to be analysed within the context in which he operates; and should as much as possible preserve the completeness of his concrete situation.

In the following paragraphs, three factors are given special attention as important conditions for an international organisation to

exercise an autonomous political role.

First, is the definition of an ideology giving the organisation
a clear mission and method. This must respond to major expectations and
demands from the constituents; but it must have its own internal consis-
tency. It must enable the constituents, or many of them, to identify them-
selves with the purposes of the international organisation.

Second, it must develop a bureaucracy committed to the organisa-
tional ideology and having a sense of its own independent international role.

Third, it must have a firm and stable political base of support –
a firm core, from which the organisation can fan out to attract more wide-
spread support. It cannot easily afford to be everyone's friend some of the
time but nobody's friend all of the time.[1]

The ways in which the executive head can attempt to play a poli-
tically active role are worked out within the context of certain typical
problems which confront him. It is therefore proposed to consider how these
three strategic factors may be handled within the context of three such
typical problems as the following:

(i)   the leadership and control of the international bureaucracy;

(ii)   the relationship of the executive head with the membership; and

(iii) the potential conflict between his role in "quiet diplomacy"
       and his personal political initiative.

Leadership and Control of the International Staff

The first problem of the executive head is to establish his lea-
dership of the staff of the organisation. In doing this he has to deal
with two related sets of problems. The first concerns the relationship of
the staff to outside pressures from the constituents of the organisation. The
second concerns the executive head's relationship to the top officials of
his own staff. It is convenient to deal with these separately.

The Staff and the Constituents

Out of the inter-war experience of international organisation
grew a set of opinions broadly accepted among international officials

concerning the ideal of an international civil service. A. Loveday's
Reflections on International Administration [2], for example, embodies this
orthodoxy. The staff of an international organisation, in this conception,
should be an autonomous entity, having no links with national administrations;
and its members should cultivate a distinct "international" viewpoint. In order
to achieve this, the international civil service must be a career service; and
a career service can be built securely only on the basis of individual merit
and uniformly fair treatment under regulations which allow for no arbitrary
intervention.

The career service, while placing the primary emphasis on diplomatic
skill, would shun involvement in politics. This orthodoxy exalted the notion
of an eunuch-like detachment from politics. A major concern was to protect
the staff from political intervention; and in this connection Loveday views
the head of an international administration with some suspicion. "There is
no a priori reason", he warns, "for assuming that the head of an internatio-
nal organisation will prove competent and judicious. In all probability he
will have been appointed as a result of a political compromise and will not
be the strongest candidate available". And further: "When the organisation
is a reflection of a divided world... he may endeavour to ingratiate himself
with one camp or another, and the staff may suffer...The more politically
minded the Secretary-General, the greater the danger." [3] The attitude be-
trayed by these lines is worth stressing because it has been characteristic
of many international civil servants.

The career service thesis has not, however, had a monopoly. The
N.A.T.O. international staff was composed largely of officials on short-
term secondment from national administrations. [4] This practice may increa-
se the intensity of inter-governmental co-operation, by familiarising a
growing number of national officials with the workings of N.A.T.O. It is
clearly more appropriate to an organisation in which there is a relatively
great commonness of purpose among its members than to one more heterogeneous.
It also produces the least permanent organisational effect, since it creates

no institutional interest concerned exclusively with the perpetuation and
development of the organisation itself.

In a more broadly based international organisation with greater diversity
among its members, this secondment system would tend to produce an unmanagea-
ble cacophony. It is in this more universal context that the development of
a career service cultivating a distinct loyalty to the organisation seems
most necessary. Short-term secondments are not conductive to this concept of
international loyalty, since each temporary official would naturally be in-
fluenced by his own long-term career prospects in national service. Thus,
the universal organisation have introduced the practice of permanent con-
tracts of employment for international staff; and of career development
in international service as a means of strengthening the staff's capacity
to resist outside pressures. (The only country to apply the "N.A.T.O.
system" to its nationals employed by the United Nations and specialised
agencies has been the Soviet Union).

Within the secretariats of the European Communities, these rival concep-
tions are engaged in debate: those seeking to enhance the "supranational"
role and the development of a distinct "European" viewpoint favour a long-
term appointment policy; while those favouring the more inter-governmental
concept of l'Europe des patries advocate the method of short-term second-
ments from government services.

A long period of gradual growth under dynamic leadership can
enable an organisation to assimilate officials of widely diverse origins
into a common pattern of behaviour and outlook. I.L.O. officials in the
immediate post-war period sometimes exhibited a distinct feeling of their
own organisation's superiority in this respect to the newly-established
United Nations whose larger staff had perforce been quickly assembled.
Indeed, strong organisational tradition would seem to be a more potent
influence towards staff discipline and conformity than is a marked degree
of ideological homogeneity among the membership. The relatively strong
sense of unity within the post-war of the I.L.O. (which was working in a
world of sharp ideological divisions, especially prominent among the labour

movements with which it had to deal) contrasts with the international divisions
present now within the secretariats of the European Communities, divisions
which follow national, political party and pressure group lines.[5]   The narro-
wer range of ideological divergency within the Europe of the Six seems to
have encouraged a franker policy of representation of interests within the
secretariat, with consequently a greater measure of diversity than exists
where an established tradition exercises its formative power in the education
of newcomers in conformity.

      The concept of loyalty to the international organisation calls for
some further comment. It is a general principle enshrined in the regulations
governing international staffs that no international official should seek or
accept instructions from any external to the organisation. That is the law;
and every official is bound to it by oath of office. But there is a political
reality which modifies the law. Appointments are made so as to effect a cer-
tain balance within the staff as between different nationalities, geographi-
cal areas and sectional interest groups. This applies both at the very top
level of officials and at lower levels as well. Each member country (and in
some cases major interest groups as well) considers itself entitled to
"representation" on the staff. An executive head will normally try to give
satisfaction to these pressures (and sometimes a government may impose its
choice of officials upon him). In part he is motivated by a desire not to
alienate by a negative attitude any important segment of opinion within the
organisation. But, in a more positive sense, part of the value to the execu-
tive head of a diversified staff is as a sounding board for national, regio-
nal or sectional reactions to his policy ideas.

      The "representative" function of the staff normally does not take
the form of a crude violation of the pledge not to seek or accept outside
instructions, though sometimes it must come very close to that. Certain of-
ficials will enjoy the confidence of the official national representatives
of their country or of pressure groups such as international trade union

organisations. They may have access to information of a confidential or semi-confidential nature from two sources: the internal network of the international organisation and the external national or pressure group network. The way in which they adjust their conduct in the light of what they know, and the extent to which they reveal information from one network to the other, measures the balance of their loyalties. Even officials from the most monolithic of States acquire some degree of commitment to the organisation; and even the most disciplined of loyal international officials has to give some small change to retain the confidence of his outside contacts.

Thus "conflict of loyalties" is rarely nowadays a drama of personal conscience. At one time, perhaps it was; in the case, for example, of League officials of German or Italian nationality confronted with Nazi or Fascist reaction to the League. Yet in more recent years, one can sense a tendency of the universal organisations of the United Nations system to abandon gradually their normative content. Staff members are more easily able to espouse a variety of personal ideologies, knowing that each has the degree of respectability conferred upon it by some national or regional interest represen - ted in the organisation, while none has an imperative universal sanction.

This condition might be regarded with equanimity as but the usual derogation in practice from the ideal, were it not for the intermittent attacks led by the Soviet bloc against the concept of a conformity of outlook and a distinct "international" viewpoint on the part of international bureaucracies; and favouring a direct representation of different ideological or geographical interests on some proportionate basis. This attack has underscored the importance of the political role of international bureaucracies; and it draws attention to the political base for their action. The Soviet viewpoint considers that the normative "objective ", "international" viewpoint tends to be an ideological expression of the interests of satisfied western industrial powers. The dilemma posed for international organisation by this attack can be resolved neither by capitulating to Soviet pressure and institutionalising ideological cacophony within the secretariats, nor

by reasserting the old orthodox ideal as an absolute principle while resisting
all change and so tending to confirm the element of justification in the
Soviet charge. The only way the issue can be resolved is by seeking a broader
political base for the work of the international bureaucracy. Here two ave-
nues are possible: one is alignment with the"Third World"(giving the comfort
of majority votes with the weakness that these votes do not always correspond
to a power or will to give effect to them): the other is to place the main
stress upon maximising common interest between the western industrial nations
and the Soviet Union.

The Loveday conception cited earlier represents the secretariat as
an automatically functioning and self-regulating machine in which attempts
by an executive head to assert leadership are to be discouraged. Once the
problem of adaptation of the secretariat is posed, however, it is the exe-
cutive head who must give the leadership and direction. And his efforts
towards redefining the ideology of the organisation and towards adjusting
its political base will encounter the resistance of bureaucratic immobilisme.
The executive head faces a problem which is typical in any bureaucratic
situation: his orders will not be carried out in the way he intends them;
they will be twisted in the course of execution to conform with the prior
intentions of subordinate officials. The executive head may take special
precautions in particular instances; but his personal influence cannot be
everywhere all the time.

The very factors which are supposed to strengthen the international
character of the staff - long-term tenure of appointment, judicially inter-
preted administrative regulations, etc. - reinforce this immobilisme. The
executive head has very little latitude to dismiss officials who are patent-
ly undisciplined; he will often be reluctant to take any sanctions against
them for fear of displeasing particular member States or pressure groups.
His only recourse is to place recalcitrant officials as far as possible in
positions where they can do little harm to his plans and to manoeuvre them
out of effective circuit of communications within the bureaucracy; but even

in doing this he must often be careful to avoid arousing the protests of outside interests.

A direct consequence is the great difficulty of dislodging special limited goals and programmes (what Haas calls "sub-goals") once they have been incorporated into an organisation's regular activities. Such limited goals are served within the bureaucracy by technical specialists and are supported outside by particular pressure groups. This combination of paired internal resistance to changes and external pressures for the maintenance of existing goals and activities makes it very difficult for the executive head to effect real adjustments in the work of an international organisation in line with his redefinition of major goals and priorities. The changes he makes in the ideology tend to remain verbal only; and the "back-scratching" tendency of international conferences makes delegates reluctant to oppose individual projects which are dear to the hearts of others for fear of a hostile attitude towards their own. Thus it is rarely advisable or profitable for an executive head to risk a confrontation with the membership and with a segment of his own staff in order to eliminate redundant activities. These activities tend to continue but to atrophy slowly to the extent the executive head is able to deny them the impetus of fresh and renovating thought. This is one reason why international agencies carry so much dead wood.

Thus if stability and conformity in outlook amongst the staff are elements in strengthening its international loyalty to the organisation, these same qualities are in latent antithesis with the desire of the executive head to lead in new directions, redefining the major objectives of the organisation and readjusting its political base. This is an instance of a more general conflict between innovators and established bureaucracies. In national settings, radically new policies usually have been put into effect by an influx of new administrators. This was, for example, the case of the New Deal in the United States in the 1930s. It is also the case today of countries initiating the new policies of economic planning where conflict develops between the established bureaucracies and those seeking to put into effect the new policies. The same type of conflicts is to be antici-

pated in international bureaucracies led by innovating executive heads.

The only practical way an executive head can combat these tenden-
cies towards stabilisation of programmes and inertia of policy is to sur-
round himself with new staff committed to his objectives and to give this
new staff as far as possible the initiative for programme innovation within
the bureaucracy. He must therefore consciously inject conflict within the
bureaucracy and throw the weight of his influence, to the extent the poli-
tical constraints upon him permit, behind the innovating group.

Relations with Top Officials

The second set of problems referred to concern the executive head's
relations with the top officials within the organisation. Two difficulties
arise from a tendency towards "feudalism" characteristic of international
secretariats: there are conflicting poles of authority at the top level
of staff; and a corresponding division of loyalties into clusters of infor-
mal groups within, converging on top staff members. While these may be fac-
tors   in any large organisation, they are given special weight in inter-
national bureaucracies when senior officials base their position upon sup-
port from outside constituencies.

Internal opposition or passive resistance to new policies by the
executive head may thus originate within the bureaucracy. Such internal
opposition will be fortified by the ability of the top officials concerned
to activate a group of the organisation's constituents to put pressure on
the executive head. Conflict within the bureaucracy can thus spread to the
constituency. Within the staff it is based not only upon the fact that the
"opposition" is hierarchically in command of a sector of the staff; even
more it is based upon informal networks of communications and personal
loyalties which top officials can build up around themselves (apart from
the nobler sentiments of identification with specific policies or goals,
subordinate officials look to the top officials to advance their own
careers).

Now it is in the nature of the political position of these top
officials to be closely identified with sub-goals, in the sense Haas uses

that term. There are occupational and political reasons for this. Occupatio-
nally, each top official is responsible for a limited sector of the organisa-
tion's activity; his interests will be inclined into this sector and his
contacts will be with those most concerned with the sub-goals characteristic
of that sector. He may come subjectively to consider these sectoral sub-
goals as the main purposes of the organisation. Politically, he will look
for support to a limited group of the organisation's constituents; and must
therefore give special prominence to satisfying the expectations of these
constituents.

There are legal-institutional differences among organisations in
the relationship of the executive head to his top level subordinates. For-
mally, in the United Nations and specialised agencies, each organisation has
one executive head - the Secretary-General or the Director-General - and
other officials usually have status only as his appointees. In fact, proce-
dures have normally become established and accepted whereby the executive
head consults formally or informally with a politically representative body
before making top appointments; and understandings exist as to the regions
or pressure groups to be given satisfaction in such appointments. The execu-
tive head's freedom in such appointments is always limited. Sectors of the
bureaucracy's work will have to be allocated to these top officials.

At the other extreme, in the legal sense, are the executives of
the European Communities which are collegial bodies, on which provisions is
made for the representation of separate national and political interests.
In fact, these executives cannot work on all questions as a collegial body
and so they operate on the principle of a division of labour, each member
of the executive body being responsible for a sector of work.[6]

Thus, underlying differences in legal form, there appears to be a
common resemblance in the internal political processes of international bu-
reaucracies.

There are, in theory, three ways in which the executive head may
seek to control the top staff so as to maintain his political initiative.
These are :

(1) Complete domination and centralisation of power in his own hands

     This would mean effectively overcoming the "feudal" tendencies by
reducing the top officials to a position of dependence on the executive head,
holding their appointments at pleasure and carrying out subordinate technical
functions. It is hard to think of any example where this has been successfully
attempted. Albert Thomas seems to have aimed at something like this when he
first refused to accept Harold Butler as Deputy Director, offering him instead
an appointment as a chief of one of the divisions he intented to create. But
Thomas was soon convinced that the confidence and support of important member
governments - and in particular of the British Government - depended upon his
appointing Butler as Deputy Director.[7]

(2) Presiding over a cabinet of top officials

     Usually an executive head will want to meet with his senior staff
periodically to discuss matters of general concern to the Organisation. This
will be a means of pulling individual top officials out from under their
preoccupation with sub-goals by keeping them informed about important matters
outside their own particular sphere. It will also oblige conflicting elements
among the top staff to have at least a minimum of contact with each other.
And it may help the executive head - if he is skilled at this - to smoke out
differences among his staff about which he is not adequately informed. Collec-
tive discussion can be used as an instrument favouring a certain conformity
of policy. But it would be an unwise executive head who did not take his major
decisions on policy after consultation rather than in consultation with his
top officials. The Cabinet technique is, at best, an instrument of communica-
tion and of limited control over the top-level officials. It has not proven
to be an effective instrument of decision-making.

(3) The "reserved area" of policy

     By this is meant that the executive head reserves certain types of
decision to himself; and equips himself with a personal staff so as to be
able to act within this area of policy. The questions which an executive head
would normally reserve in this way include:

(a) those relating to the definition of the major goals and policy orientation (including programme priorities) and the development of organisational ideology; and

(b) matters of direct concern to the executive head's base of political support and his coalition policy for the construction of alliance to support his programme.

Everything else he would delegate to his top officials, and interfere as little as possible with them; but to the extent that he allows top officials to encroach upon the reserved areas he undermines his own capacity for leadership. This is the most usual method for executive heads to follow; using it in some combination with the Cabinet system, as described, for communications and general supervision.

The "reserved area" implies that the executive head acquires his own staff distinct from the staff controlled, in fact, by his senior officials (while the latter staff is, theoretically, under the executive head's supreme control, in fact he is inhibited from exercising his authority over it). This personal staff can provide an executive head with several essential, effective components to his job:

- A few people in whom he has virtually complete confidence, with whom he can talk frankly about all the issues arising within the organisation. With his top officials, because of their political position, he is always in a posture of negotiating.

- Channels of intelligence providing accurate assessment of the expectations and demands from the membership of the organisation. His top officials provide a sounding board for sectional reactions; but in addition the executive head needs his own research and intelligence network to assess the possibilities and limits presented by the world situation in terms of the policy objectives which he determines to pursue.

- Competent advisors to help him redefine as necessary the major aims which the organisation is to pursue; and to explain these in such a way as to gain the necessary political support. In other words, the

staff to effectively command programme and policy development and avoid determination of the programme by specialists committed to specific limited goals and subject to the special influence of particular outside pressure groups.

Relations with Member States

Apart from his relationship with his own staff - the source of his capacity for initiative - the other politically vital relationship for an executive head is his relationship with the national constituents of the organisation. Within this relationship the executive head tries to secure the political base for his action and to negotiate the broader consensus needed to sustain the work of the organisation. Certain factors in this relationship can be studied in the history of the I.L.O., particulary by examining a number of crises between its Directors and certain major powers.

Albert Thomas came to the directorship of the I.L.O. with the acquiescence, though not with the wholehearted political support, of the French Government. The French Government wanted a Frenchman as Director ; it could hardly have desired Thomas who was politically in opposition to it. Thomas' appointment was secured on the initiative of the western European trade unions, supported by Employer representatives, at a time when the governments had no concerted policy on the directorship. Thomas identified the I.L.O. with his ideology of reformist socialism, stressing educational action among workers, the development of trade unions, and piecemeal reforms such as worker participation in management, social insurance, nationalisation and so forth. He made the trade unions of the I.F.T.U. (Amsterdam) his political base.

Thomas soon became embroiled in a controversy with the French Government before the International Court, in the course of which he appeared in person to contest the French Government's position. This conflict between the Director and the Government of his country has to be seen within the context of French domestic politics. Thomas never gave up the intention of returning to active political life in France. He maintained his political

affiliation with the Socialist Party (S.F.I.O.); and, more particularly, retained the support of Léon Jouhaux and the C.G.T. It was this domestic political support which Thomas his freedom to criticise his political opponents who were occupying the seats of power in the Government.

Harold Butler, Thomas' successor, contributed to the development of the organisational ideology of the I.L.O. in the 1930s. He redirected I.L.O. thinking along lines similar to those of the American New Deal, advocating a broader role for the I.L.O. in the field of international economic policy particulary as regards measures to fight the depression. This major contribution to I.L.O. ideology prepared and solidified his principal political success : the acquisition of United States membership.

Nevertheless, Butler's position had political weaknesses. To some extent these may have been a question of personality. Temperamentally, he was an intellectual and a civil servant, closer to the men of government - particularly to upper middle class reformers such as the New Deal brought to the fore - rather than to the trade unions; closer, indeed, in many ways to some of the employers than to the trade unions.

Butler's last I.L.O. battle brought out these weaknesses. It was over an apparently trivial matter of an appointment to the I.L.O. staff. Four consecutive French Governments during the period from the autumn of 1937 through the spring of 1938 - the Chautemps Popular Front Government, the Chautemps Radical Government, the short-lived Blum Government of March 1938 and the Daladier Government of National Union - pressed Butler to appoint as his representative in the Paris Office of the I.L.O. a person in whom Butler had no confidence. The incident, which was considered at the highest level in France involving members of the inner cabinet, appears as a remarkable testimony to the constancy of will of the French authorities during the period of Hitler's annexation of Austria and Munich.

Butler, in this situation, had no political leverage within France, such as Thomas had enjoyed through the favour of the C.G.T. The French employers, who appeared to share Butler's views, either could not intervene to change the official position or did not consider it worth their while to do

so when they had more vital interests at stake. Butler's only weapons were the
threat to resign and the possibility of mobilising outside pressure. He tried
both and both failed to change the French position.[8] Butler first threatened
to resign over this issue in March 1938, at a time when on the broader inter-
national scene Hitler was menacing Austria. Though Butler himself might not
have come so well out of it, the French Government might equally have been
implicated in a blow at the remains of the Geneva edifice of international
co-operation. Butler was persuaded to withdraw his resignation at this time,
on the understanding he would be supported by the offices of the Governing
Body and by the British Government in resolving the issue which had brought
him into conflict with the French Government. This attempt to "internationa-
lise " a conflict between the Director and a major member State was resented
in French circles. Butler again pressed his resignation, advancing personal
grounds, as the only way out for him. His purely diplomatic position, lacking
a solid base of political support, left him powerless in a crisis with a
member State.

John Winant, Butler's successor, was a leading American political
personality, having been several times Governor of New Hampshire and holding
the respect and confidence of Franklin Roosevelt. Winant was only for a brief
period Director of the I.L.O.; but he had to handle the major crisis into which
the   outbreak of war plunged the Organisation. Winant was determined, con-
trary to the decision taken by the League, to remove the I.L.O. from the threat
that   its resources might be seized or its capacity of action destroyed by
the Axis powers; and he decided to transfer the Organisation to North America.
Indeed, destiny seemed to have given him this role to play. In June 1940, as
the Nazis advanced into France, Winant appealed to Cordell Hull, and through
him to Roosevelt, to permit the removal of the I.L.O. to the United States.
He met with their refusal; the I.L.O. was low on their list of preoccupations
and they were unprepared to face isolationist, anti-League hostility in Con-
gress. As things worked out, the result was politically satisfactory for the
I.L.O.,which went to Canada with the support of Prime Minister Mackenzie

King, and became thus located in a belligerent country from the very earliest phase of the war - a major factor in the I.L.O.'s survival into the post-war world. But the refusal of the Roosevelt administration was a blow for Winant, who resigned shortly thereafter. It underlines the point that personal relationships of confidence between a Director and the head of the government of a major State are not a sufficient guarantee of support when domestic political currents, to which national leaders will be more sensitive, are working against the policy of the Director.

David Morse, the present Director-General, has had to deal with a series of crises, in all of which the I.L.O.'s relationship to the United States was crucial. Shortly after he assumed office an anti-I.L.O. campaign became active among right-wing business circles in the United States allied with the forces advocating the Bricker amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

This attack reached its critical phase in 1956-57. The I.L.O. had the sympathy of the Eisenhower administration; yet the White House, while taking a position against the Bricker amendment, did not risk antagonising a large body of Congressional opinion by actively supporting the I.L.O., e.g. on the question of the ceiling fixed by Congress on the United States' contribution to the I.L.O. budget.

Morse had, however, the support of certain domestic forces which could independently influence Congress. These included liberal businessmen (David Zellerbach, Paul Hoffmann and others), certain Catholic groups (e.g. the National Catholic Welfare Conference) and, above all, the A.F.L.-C.I.O.

The domestic attack on the I.L.O. within the United States became accentuated in reaction to the Soviet Union's re-entry into the I.L.O. after 1954. The fact that Morse was able to arouse sufficient domestic support for the I.L.O. within the United States enabled him not only to counter the threat of reduced participation or even withdrawal of the United States from the Organisation, but also to maintain personally the confidence of both the United States and the Soviet Governments. The key factor in the situation was the

support Morse had, not from the United States administration (which while
favourable would not actively support the I.L.O. in the face of any major
challenge from public opinion or influential pressure groups), but from the
domestic groups, principally the trade unions.

This position has certain inherent difficulties, particularly that
of a possible conflict between the primary aims in the international sphere
of A.F.L.-C.I.O. and those of the I.L.O. as articulated by its executive
head. During the United States domestic crisis on I.L.O. matters in 1956-57,
the policies advanced by Morse conformed with those of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. :
notably, the abolition of forced labour and the promotion of freedom of as-
sociation for trade unions, both of which were seen at that time primarily
in terms of a challenge to the Communist world. However, the gravity and
extent of the problems confronting an international organisation and the
perspective from which an executive head has to deal with them makes it in-
creasingly difficult for him to maintain a firm doctrinal alliance with
particular domestic interests in a major member State. Yet lacking such
domestic support, the executive head may find himself defenceless in a ma-
jor crisis, since governments will be far less responsive to the appeal of
an executive head than they will to powerful domestic pressure groups.

From this outline of the relationships between executive heads
and member States, the following propositions may be drawn:

- the issues which are most important to the executive head are seldom
  of the same order of importance to national governments;

- strong local pressure groups or local political factors are more likely
  to influence a government's attitude towards an international organisation
  than any sense of commitment to the personality at the head of the orga-
  nisation;

- the interests of international organisations have to be advanced within
  the domestic context of its major member States by making use of such
  favourable currents of domestic opinion as present themselves, i.e. the
  executive head must exercise the sailor's skill in using currents to

advance in the direction of his choice;

- thus, the executive head needs to fortify his position by alliance with domestic pressure groups; he must not limit himself to "foreign" politics, but know how to make domestic politics work in favour of his policies.

In order to be able to work in this way, the executive head must have great political skill. He needs a personal confidential intelligence network reaching into domestic politics of key countries. Of necessity, these networks of contacts will be limited for any single individual to a very few countries; and taking this into account, the ideal executive head is one who is able to engage in political confrontation in those countries which at the particular time are crucial in the evolution of the organisation.

Finally, the executive head, because this is inherent in political confrontation, must be able when necessary to compromise on non-essentials in his programme and his definition of the aims of the organisation. This is a difficult matter of judgment, since he must be able to reconcile any compromise with the need for ideological clarity in his leadership of the bureaucracy and the organisation's constituents. When compromising he must appear to be acting on principle, consistent with his professed organisational aims. He must not appear to be too much of a bargainer.

Quiet Diplomacy and Political Initiative

The oldest and most regularly recurrent political function of an executive head is to be a mediator in negotiating agreement among different interests represented in the organisation. In order to do this effectively, the executive head must :

- acquire and maintain the confidence of all major segments of opinion;
- be identified with a definite, though to some extent flexible, ideology representing a consensus within the organisation, i.e. his suggestions must be seen as conforming with the aims and purposes of the organisation and not as seeking merely agreement for its own sake and at any price; and
- have an adequate intelligence at his disposal so that he can make constructive suggestions and avoid pitfalls.

These conditions are not easy to combine. There is a potential conflict between maintaining the confidence of major powers or interests and standing forth as spokesman of a clear organisational ideology. Furthermore, adequate intelligence cannot easily be acquired solely through the services of an international organisation. Thus, the executive head will have to rely on supplementary intelligence from the diplomatic services of major powers or other sources outside the organisation. The extent to which he has to rely on particular outside sources may adversely affect confidence in his impartiality on the part of those powers to which he is less close.

Much greater difficulty arises when the executive head is in the position of taking political initiative for which he and the organisation will bear the full responsibility. Such was the initiative of 1956 to create the U.N.E.F. in the Suez crisis. At this point, the Secretary-General emerged dramatically from the role of chief administrator and "quiet diplomat" to take on that of an independent actor in world affairs. The Suez initiative was carried through successfully, with considerable enhancement to the prestige of his office. It was the kind of initiative which met with a broad degree of support or acquiescence.

In the Congo, by contrast, attempting a second time to bear the same kind of political responsibility, the Secretary-General was not able to maintain the same degree of consensus behind his actions. He became a political casualty before his tragic death in the air crash of September 1961.

Hammarskjold had a keen sense of the risks of his position. Five years before his death he had written in a personal letter to Max Ascoli[9]:

"It is one thing that, in the vacuum which suddenly developed in the Suez crisis, I had, for what it was worth, to throw in everything I had to try to tide us over; it was one of those irrational and extremely dangerous situations in which only something as irrational on a different level could break the spell. But it is an entirely different thing, every time the big powers run into deadlock, to place the problem in the Secretary-General's hands with the somewhat · naive expectation that he can continue to turn up with something.

It is a matter of course that the continued use of the office of the Secretary-
General in that way sooner or latter leads to a point where he must break his
neck, politically. If, as in the Suez situation, the very facts, as establi-
shed by the policy of the various big powers, force the Secretary-General
into a key role, I am perfectly willing to risk being a political casualty
if there is an outside chance of achieving positive results. But if the Secre-
tary-General is forced into a similar role through sheer escapism from those
who should carry the responsibility, there is a place for solid warning.
Politically, the Secretary-General should be, and is, most expendable, but he
should not be expended just because somebody does not want to produce his own
money."

        An initiative-taking Secretary-General cannot become a substitute
for a Security Council that does not work because no consensus exists. When
the major powers are deadlocked, the Secretary-General may try to play a role.
In fortuitous circumstances, such as the Suez crisis, he may succeed, but it
is a risky formula. The Secretary-General can be the most significant contri-
buting factor towards building up a working consensus within the United
Nations; but his success in this depends upon maintaining the confidence of
all the major powers and groups of countries. Once a risky action has led to
this confidence being withdrawn by any major party, then - even though the
others may feel honour-bound to support him - the Secretary-General's ability
to be the architect of consensus is expended.

        The executive head needs to be able to count upon a working majority
of the organisation's constituents in support of his policies. In order to
build majorities he may, as suggested earlier, have to engage quietly in do-
mestic politics in key countries. But he cannot afford either to appear as
the spokesman of a coalition of countries or as the instigator of domestic
faction. He has to limit his coalition policy at the point where he risks
alienating a major power or interest within the organisation; and he has to
limit his personal political initiative at the same point. Once he becomes
the prisoner of any particular coalition which divides the organisation, he can
no longer perform his primary function of consensus formation. The potential

conflict between his function as catalyst of consent and his powers of per-
sonal political initiative constitutes the executive head's most troublesome
dilemma, and that most likely to lead to his downfall.

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The potential conflict between consensus-seeking and initiative-
taking has to be resolved within the particular historical power context
of international relations. The definition of organisational ideology and
the establishment of the political base for an organisation's action has
to be determined in the light of the executive head's reading of the cons-
traints imposed and the opportunities opened by the world situation.

Three years ago the then Secretary-General of the United-Nations,
in the Introduction to his Annual Report,[10] set forth ideas which appeared
to suggest the political base for U.N. action would be the emerging nations
of Asia and Africa. He attempted subtly to reconcile the notion of a univer-
sal rule of law in international relations with a notion of the will of the
international community reminiscent of Rousseau. This ideology - though one
should not impute to Hammarskjold personally what is not explicitly stated
by him - can lead to a concept of the use of Assembly majorities as a means
of putting pressure upon the industrialised countries, while the United
Nations plays little or no role towards bringing about consensus among the
major powers except insofar as the emerging nations call upon them to di-
sarm. The United Nations, in this conception, would become the gad-fly of
the great powers, an international pressure group of the poor used to secure
concessions from the rich.

An alternative policy would be to rest the political base of the
system upon western powers, while using it as an instrument of building
consensus with the Soviet Union. The corresponding ideology would seek to
expand areas of common interest between East and West and to extend from this

base towards arriving at a concerted policy of industrialised powers to fa-
cilitate economic development of the poorer nations. This policy implies a
more nominalistic pattern of thought, less appeal to the notion of a general
will of an international community. It is a less demagogic policy, more
sceptical of majorities unless they are majorities which represent negotia-
ted agreement.

Within the United Nations, there is little evidence of a disposition
to move in the direction of the latter policy. It would also imply a major
reversal of the attitude taken by United States Governments, though there is
now perhaps sufficient disenchantment with U.N. majoritarianism in the United
States to warrant such a reversal. It would move closer to the views of both
the Soviet and French government leaders on the UN. system. But the distinc-
tion to be brought out in the context of this paper is that, while the poli-
cy of alignment with the emerging nations calls for continued use of initia-
tive on the part of the Secretary-General at the risk of a growing impatience
of the industrialised countries of both East and West and a growing disillu-
sionment of the emerging nations at the hiatus between aims and results, the
policy of East-West reconciliation gives the primacy in the Secretary-Gene-
ral's role to quiet diplomacy and consensus formation.

FOOTNOTES

1. I am much indebted to Professor Ernest Haas of the University of Cali-
    fornia for the stimulus of ideas contained in his forthcoming book
    Beyond the Nation – Functionalism and International Organisation, an
    extract from the theoretical part of which was presented as a paper to
    the Conference on International Organisations convened by the Carnegie
    Endowment for International Peace at Bellagio, June 1964. My own analy-
    sis, like that of Professor Haas, is based largely on the experience
    of the I.L.O. I should add that I would not hold Professor Haas in any
    way responsible for the way in which I have used some ideas suggested
    in his book.

2. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1956.

3. Op. cit. pp. 118–119.   My italics.

4. Cf. Lord Ismay, N.A.T.O. The First Five Years, 1954, p. 64.

5. Jean Siotis, "Some Problems of European Secretariats", in Journal of
    Common Market Studies, vol. II, No. 3.

6. There is a "written procedure" in force in the European Commission whe-
    reby files with decisions by each member are circulated to all the others.
    Anyone with experience of official bodies would assume that the principle
    of non-intervention would become the rule. Rarely would any member of the
    executive college interfere in the work of another member for fear of
    others crossing his own jurisdictional boundaries.

7. E.J. Phelan, Yes and Albert Thomas, pp. 28–33.

8. It is, of course, difficult to disentangle at this distance in time the
    personal motives of Butler as regards his resignation. But these motives
    do not materially enter into the political analysis of the use of resi-
    gnation as a weapon.

9. The Reporter, New York, 26 October 1961.

10. United Nations, Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General
    on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1960–15 June 1961, General Assem-
    bly, Official Records : Sixteenth Session. Supplement No. 1 A (A/4.800/
    Add.1).

SUMMARY

The most common approach to study of the role of Secretaries-General or Directors-General of international organizations has been through the use of comparative categories, such as (1) the legal-institutional position of the executive head (conditioning e.g. the extent of initiative allowed to him) ; (2) personality and personal background (e.g. whether he is of the civil servant or political type) ; and (3) the style of leadership he adopts (whether stressing a self-effacing administrative role, "quiet diplomacy", or the creation of a public personality and doctrine).

These comparative categories, while yielding some useful insights, do not lead very far towards understanding the nature of the executive head's job. This method tends to treat him as a disembodied spirit, out of the context of his organization, its member countries, the pressure groups concerned with its work, etc. It may thus be useful to look for a method which tries to examine the executive head fully within the context in which he operates while also permitting comparative reflections.

It is suggested (following out some ideas in recent work by Ernst Haas) that the key variables in examining the role of an executive head are : (1) the extent to which he develops an ideology giving clear guidance as to the purpose and activities of the organization ; (2) the extent to which he develops a bureaucracy committed to this ideology under his leadership ; and (3) his success in following a coalition policy giving him a secure base of political support and from this base being able to carry a majority among the organization's constituents.

This paper accordingly attempts to focus upon the way these variables are dealt with by executive heads in the context of certain typical problems with which they are confronted. These problems are :
(1) how to establish leadership and control over the staff of the organization so as to be able to use it as an effective instrument for political action. This in particular involves how to master the tendencies towards "feudalism" (competing poles of authority within staffs) in international secretariats ; and towards these secretariats becoming subservient to particular outside pressures or limited goals.
(2) his relationship with the membership of the organization and the way in which he deals with national and interest group pressures. Especially significant in this regard is the executive head's relationship with his own country, when he is a national of one of the major powers ;
(3) the potential conflict between the executive heads role in "quiet diplomacy" and his powers of political initiative. The executive head must acquire and maintain the confidence of all major segments of opinion in order to work effectively as a catalyst of consent. Strong political initiatives on his part, however, risk the withdrawal of confidence by a major power or group which would preclude his performance of the negotiating function. This potential conflict between his need for universal confidence and his function of political initiative is his most difficult dilemma ; and that most likely to make of him a political casualty.

RESUME

        L'étude du rôle des Secrétaires Généraux ou des Directeurs Gé-
néraux d'organisations internationales a été faite le plus souvent en
utilisant des catégories de comparaison telles que 1) la situation
juridique et institutionnelle du chef de l'exécutif (situation qui
conditionne par exemple le degré d'initiative dont il dispose) ; 2)
sa personnalité et sa carrière (p. ex., fonctionnaire ou homme poli-
tique) ; 3) son style de direction (rôle essentiellement administratif,
"diplomatie discrète", ou création d'une personnalité et d'une doc-
trine publiques).

        Ces catégories, qui permettent certes d'arriver à quelques con-
clusions utiles, ne nous conduisent pas très loin lorsque nous cher-
chons à comprendre la nature des fonctions du chef de l'exécutif. Cette
méthode aboutit en effet à le traiter comme un esprit désincarné, hors
du contexte de son organisation, des pays qui en sont membres, des
groupes de pression intéressés par son activité, etc.Peut-être est-
il donc utile de chercher une méthode tendant à examiner le chef de
l'exécutif dans son cadre d'action, tout en permettant des réflexions
d'ordre comparatif.

        L'auteur suggère (reprenant des idées présentées dans ses travaux
récents par Ernst Haas) que les principales variables utiles pour
un examen du rôle d'un chef de l'exécutif sont : 1) la mesure dans
laauelle il construit une idéologie permettant d'orienter clairement
les objectifs et les activités de son organisation ; 2) le degré au-
quel il assure la formation d'une bureaucratie qui se sente engagée
par cette idéologie, sous la direction du chef de l'exécutif ; et 3)
son degré de succès dans l'application d'une politique de coalition
lui fournissant une base politique sûre, et lui permettant de compter
sur une majorité des membres de l'organisation.

        Le rapport cherche donc à examiner la façon dont les chefs de
l'exécutif traitent ces variables, à propos de certains problèmes ty-
piques qui se posent à eux. Ces problèmes sont les suivants :
1°) l'établissement de l'autorité et du contrôle du chef de l'exécutif
    sur le personnel de l'organisation, de façon à pouvoir l'utiliser
    comme un instrument efficace d'action politique. Il s'agit en par-
    ticulier de maîtriser les tendances à la structure "féodale" des
    secrétariats internationaux (pôles concurrentiels d'autorité à
    l'intérieur du personnel), et leur tendance à se soumettre à des
    pressions extérieures, ou à se référer à des objectifs limités ;
2°) les rapports avec les membres de l'organisation et la façon de
    répondre aux pressions des gouvernements ou des groupes d'inté-
    rêts. Particulièrement significative à cet égard est la relation
    entre le chef de l'exécutif et son propre pays, lorsqu'il se trouve
    appartenir à l'une des grandes puissances ;
3°) le conflit potentiel entre le rôle du chef de l'exécutif dans la
    "diplomatie discrète" et ses pouvoirs d'initiative politique. Le
    chef de l'exécutif doit obtenir et conserver la confiance de tous
    les secteurs importants de l'opinion pour pouvoir fonctionner
    comme catalyste du consentement. Des initiatives politiques impor-
    tantes risquent de lui aliéner la confiance d'une grande puissance

ou d'un groupe important, et de l'empêcher de remplir sa fonction de négociateur. Ce conflit potentiel entre son besoin de confiance universelle et sa fonction d'initiative politique est son dilemme le plus difficile, celui qui a les plus fortes chances de faire de lui une victime de la politique.

REGIONAL COOPERATION OF THE NORDIC COUNTRIES

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REGIONAL COOPERATION OF THE NORDIC COUNTRIES

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A - General considerations -

The regional cooperation between the five Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) is in several respects similar to the general pattern of regional cooperation which has been emerging both in Europe and in other parts of the world. It can be considered, therefore, that this cooperation is related to the diminishing of distances between different countries and to the need to rationalize and concentrate efforts in the economic as well as in other fields of activity, for which the material prerequisites have been provided by the advance of modern technology. At the same time, however, the Nordic cooperation is distinguished by certain special features, based on the historical background of these countries, their standing in world politics, population structure, economic and social conditions, cultural life and their political systems.

It can be said that, as a whole, the basis for the current cooperation between the Nordic countries is a community on interests. Since these countries can be considered to form one unified region in spite of the dividing waters(the Baltic and its bays, the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean), the cooperation is international-regional in character. Taking into account the relatively low population figure of the Nordic countries (approximately 20 millions) it is justified to ask if we are, after all, dealing with an international region proper, especially since the Nordic countries (Greenland excluded) are a part of the same continent, viz. Europe,

and politically of its western region. The most appropriate pro-
cedure, perhaps, would be to call the Nordic countries a subregional
community and to reserve the term "regional" for the more extensive
forms of European. community, which would include this subregion.
This distinction is given relevance by the fact that certain aims of
cooperation appear to be more easy to reach within the framework of a
regional, other aims again of a subregional group of states.

In addition to the actual community of interests, the historical
background is often referred to as an ideological basis for Nordic
cooperation, "nordism". During the Middle Ages the Nordic countries
were at times united in one realm, and although this union fell apart
at the beginning of the 16th Century, it, nevertheless, has left cer-
tain similarities in their social structure. A special characteristic
of the Nordic society has been the relatively strong position enjoyed
by the free peasant class which subsequently has actively contributed
to the introduction of political democracy in the course of the so-
cial changes taking place in the 19th and 20th centuries.

In the field of foreign policy the dissolution of the union resul-
ted in a competition for the leading position within the Nordic re-
gion between the two dominating countries : Denmark, to which also
Norway and Iceland were annexed and Sweden with Finland. The competi-
tion ceased only at the beginning of the 19th century after the oc-
cupation of Finland by Russia and the conclusion of a union between
Sweden and Norway. Denmark and Sweden, however, maintained a certain
pre-eminence up to the time when all the Nordic countries had won
their independence (Norway 1905, Finland 1917, Iceland 1944). The
Nordic countries emerged from the Second World War as five fully
equally sovereign states, while two Nordic regions with special
characteristics, the Aland Islands and the Faroe Islands are en-
joying political autonomy.

The Nordic cooperation in the modern sense has been developing
simultaneously with the weakening of political rivalry and the

achievement of self-determination within this area. During the last
decades of the 19th century cooperation was started in different
fields, initiated primarily by the academic circles and this left
its imprint particularly on the drafting of legislation in the Nor-
dic countries - it is often pointed out that their laws are more
alike than the state laws in the United States. These contacts, howe-
ver,did not result in any closer political cooperation until the
first world war, when a joint proclamation of a policy of neutrality
was made by Denmark, Norway and Sweden. During the inter-war period
the development of cooperation was particularly promoted by non-
governmental organizations, such as the Norden Association with
its national branches in each country, which had a certain resem-
blance with the European movement but was based more on the promo-
tion of personal contacts between the citizens of these countries.
The attempts made before, during and after the second world war to
establish closer political ties have failed because of divergent
positions vis-a-vis world politics.

Since the second world war the Nordic countries have been pur-
suing emphatically a policy of "status quo", without any expansive
tendencies. Nor have there been any territorial disputes within the
Nordic area since the disputes between Denmark and Norway on Green-
land and between Finland and Sweden on the Aland Island were sett-
led in the 1920s. The questions concerning the southern boundary
of Denmark and the eastern border of Finland can be considered as
solved also from the point of view of these countries. In spite
of the different orientation of the Nordic countries in respect of
the Great Power groups, they have one important common interest :
the maintenance of peace on the Nordic borders to the benefit of
the whole region. From the standpoint of all the Nordic countries
it is therefore important that Denmark maintains good relations
with Germany, Finland with the Soviet Union and both Norway and
Iceland with the great powers of the western alliance. As a matter

of fact it is these good neighbourly relations prevailing at the
Nordic borders that provide for closer cooperation and a stronger
feeling of unity. As paradoxical as it may sound, it is nevertheless
true that it is in the common interest of the Nordic countries to
pursue somewhat diverging foreign policies, at least as long as the
current world situation prevails. The different orientation in fo-
reign policy contributes to the regional strength only in the condi-
tion that Sweden, which is geographically centrally located, adheres
to a policy of neutrality.

In contrast to most other regional organizations the Nordic coun-
tries do not aim at a common policy in respect of the power blocs,
but at the maintenance of relations with the great powers on the basis
of the prevailing situation with mutual understanding. This is
achieved in practice by refraining from seeking a domineering posi-
tion; and no competition for a leading position is in evidence. In
the central organ for the Nordic cooperation, the Nordic Council,
this principle of equality is exemplified eg. by the fact that every
country has its own national secretariat while there exists no se-
cretariat for the Council as such. The meetings of the Council are
convened in the different Nordic capitals in rotation. The neutral-
istic position of the Council in respect of the current world polit-
ical situation is evidenced by the fact that in the delegations of
the member countries all the political parties are being represented
in the same proportion as in their respective national parliaments,
including also communists and other groups with strong leftist ten-
dencies.

The observance of equality is facilitated by the fact that all
the Nordic countries are small countries of approximately the same
size, although certain problems have been created by Sweden's some-
what larger population and especially by its position as the econo-
mically strongest country with the highest standard of living of the
Nordic countries. For instance, the Swedish labour market has attrac-

ted labour force, some of it highly skilled, fron the other Nordic
countries. In the course of discussions on a Nordic customs union
or on extensive cooperation between private companies both Norway
and Finland have expressed concern for one-sided "Swedish domina-
tion", which can create at least passing irritation. From the stand-
point of expanding, the Nordic cooperation, it appears, called for
that no country should assume an undisputed dominating position in
the economic field; this naturally does not hamper specialization
in different fields and their domination by the different states.

Another circumstance which greatly facilitates Nordic cooperation
is that the Swedish, Norwegian and Danish languages are so closely
related that at Nordic meetings everybody can use one's native ton-
gue and count on being understood by the others. As to Finland and
Iceland, the situation is somewhat different in that Finnish and
Icelandic cannot be understood by the other Nordic peoples. In Fin-
land 330,000 people or 7,5 per cent of the population have Swedish
as their mother tongue and Swedish is being taught in secondary
schools and to-day also increasingly in primary schools. In Iceland
instruction in Danish is being given correspondingly. Nevertheless,
Nordic cooperation on wide base faces a language problem, and an
attempt to solve it was made in the 1962 convention on Nordic coope-
ration along the following lines (Art.8) : "In every Nordic country,
education and training given at school shall include, in a suitable
degree, instruction in the language, culture and general social
conditions of the other Nordic countries". Hereby also the study of
Finnish and Icelandic is being encouraged in Denmark, Norway and
Sweden, but for the instruction to be really effective it requires
also a keen interest in the cultural life of the other Nordic
countries.

The language problem appears to be of increasing importance in
view of the universal development towards greater unity and the
smaller nations" chances to preserve their national identity. The
two extreme alternatives are either to forsake their own language

(and with it the indigenous culture) in preference for some major language or to resort to national isolationism with the consequent cultural stagnation. The middle course which should include both universal, regional and national points of view would consist of preserving one's language and learning, in addition, either one or several major languages as well as one regional language, the latter keeping in mind that the representative of minor language groups stand to gain nothing by mutual competition but should cooperate and by mutual support safeguard the further development and vitality of their own regional culture.

As the preceding examples show, the Nordic cooperation is not without its problems, especially in respect of expanding the scope of cooperation from its current forms. Sometimes one cannot help thinking that the appropriate authorities carefully have avoided touching on these problems instead of subjecting them to a thoroughgoing study which might have shown some way to solve them. This attitude cannot but have caused misunderstandings and disappointments, especially among those who have set as their goal the gradual extension of the Nordic cooperation to include the most important governmental agencies or even a confederation or a federation. The development has not taken this course because the Nordic states have been able to consolidate their cooperation in minor matters, but have taken divergent positions in respect of the main problems. Since these minor questions are so numerous and cover such a wide range and extend into so many different fields, it is justified to ask, if this kind of cooperation is not, after all, of greater significance from the standpoint of the Nordic community than the achievement of an understanding on eg. foreign policy or defence. Furthermore, there is often the tendency to forget the fact that although the actual conduct of foreign policy takes different forms it is, nevertheless, based on mutual understanding, which again further promotes unity. Such is the case when eg. the Nordic countries vote differently at the United Nations, but it is done only after the reasons for this have been elucidated

at a conference of the Nordic delegations. It most likely serves the
interests of cooperation better to be able to cast a different vote
at free will than to be forced by some external compulsion to cast
a bloc vote.

Not only on the questions of foreign policy and defence but al-
so on the establishment of a customs union and adjunct to it of a
common market, the Nordic community has not been able to come to
terms. The principal reason for this failure has perhaps been the
fact that the economics of the Nordic countries to a very great ex-
tent are mutually competitive and that they only in a small degree
complement each other and as a consequence measures taken in this
direction would avail nothing. Possibly the Nordic countries consti-
tute too small a market to form an effective unit from the stand-
point of foreign trade. It is also an interesting fact that the
trade within the Nordic market area has been increasing since the
establishment of the EFTA and that the EFTA has indirectly con-
tributed to the Nordic cooperation in this respect.

It can be said that the Nordic cooperation has increased in
intensity by the year ever since the end of the second world war.
The main courses pursued in this work have been codified in the
Treaty of cooperation of 1962. In it the Nordic countries express
their desire to promote "the close connections between the Nordic
nations in culture and in juridical and social conceptions". The aim
is to "create uniform rules in the Nordic countries in as many res-
pects as possible" and a wish is also expressed "to achieve in all
fields where prerequisites exist an appropriate division of labour
between these countries". The fields for cooperation are designated
as "juridical, cultural, social and economic" as well as "questions
of communications". No reference is made to political cooperation
and the economic cooperation rates only fourth place, which of cour-
se does not foreclose the possibility that it can be of very great
significance.

The general aim of the Treaty of cooperation can be considered
to reach practical results by means of concrete legislative measures
without special attention to the creation of new regional organs of
cooperation or the establishment of any permanent type of superna-
tional community. Of course there exists the Nordic Council as a cen-
tral agency for the development of the cooperation, but its work is
being complemented by a great number of more or less permanent agen-
cies. The nature of the community is mainly evidenced by the efforts
to achieve as great as possible equality in the legal status of the
citizens of the different Nordic countries, to further ease the requi-
rements for the acquisition of the citizenship of another Nordic
country, to standardize the criminal codes and the treatment of offen-
ders, to grant mutual recognition to the study at and degrees of any
Nordic university or institute of higher learning and by common social
benefits. In the economic field special reference is made to the co-
operation between Nordic enterprises and between the Nordic govern-
ments on questions of international trade and relations with the under-
developed countries. Emphasis is also being given to the benefits to
be derived from the division of labour as far as "production and in-
vestment" are concerned, as well as from the free movement of capital
within the Nordic countries.

According to the Treaty of cooperation the central agency for the
Nordic cooperation, the Nordic Council, shall "be reserved an oppor-
tunity to express its views on questions of Nordic cooperation that
are of importance in principle" (Art. 36). Otherwise questions on co-
operation are to be dealt with by ministerial meetings, within the
Nordic Council and its agencies, through special organs of cooperation
or between the authorities concerned. It is significant that Nordic
questions are not considered as questions of foreign policy proper.
Consequently "the authorities in the Nordic countries may engage in
direct correspondence with each other on all issues except those
which by their nature or for some other reason must be dealt with
through foreign service channels".

B - <u>Points of comparison with other types of regional cooperation</u> -

In the following discussion certain points of interest are touched upon by way of comparing the Nordic regional cooperation with the forms of regional cooperation as found in the other parts of the world.

First, as far as its <u>political</u> character is concerned, the Nordic Council is more pronouncedly neutral in its orientation towards great power politics than the OAS, Comecon and the West European cooperative organizations. The small size of all the participating countries might be a factor contributing to this, and consequently they have no ambitions to utilize the Nordic cooperation to enhance their political position. No internal struggle for power or "leadership" is in evidence among the Nordic countries.

In spite of the fact that the views on foreign policy and defence are divergent, they are not actually opposed either. While a policy of close liaison and cooperation between the Nordic foreign ministries and at the United Nations and other international organizations is being pursued, it does not per se oblige to a common course of action. In this respect certain similarities can be found between the cooperation within the British Commonwealth and within the Nordic countries.

Nordic cooperation is not considered as part of the actual conduct of foreign policy and to a great extent it is being carried out outside the foreign ministries. Nor is the Nordic Council based on any agreement valid within international law as is the case with the Council of Europe or the Benelux countries, but on national decisions taken individually by each country cooperating within the framework of the Council. There hardly can be said to exist any controversies between the Nordic Council and the United Nations or between the Council and other regional organs. Also the Soviet Union has adopted a benevolent attitude towards the Nordic cooperation - at least since 1955.

From the organizational point of view the Nordic Council is different from other parliamentary organs of cooperation in that cabinet members participate in the meetings of the Council. The function of different committees is of greatest significance and since they are composed of cabinet ministers, members of parliament, civil servants and experts, the issues will be considered from a number of different angles.

There were many contacts between the governments already before the establishment of the Nordic Council but the Council has made the contacts more permanent in character. Cabinet ministers meet at regular intervals and draft proposals are being prepared by committees of civil servants or independent organs of cooperation. In certain fields also the representatives of interest groups participate in the work.

Because of the great importance which the work of experts has gained it can be said that the Nordic cooperation directly influences governmental decisions. It will be difficult for a government to follow a policy different from the one agreed upon on the Nordic level, especially if the agreement was unanimous. It might happen that a politician may adopt a certain line at the Nordic council on a certain question and reverse his position in his own country, but this very easily results in criticism which is detrimental to the politicians's standing.

The evaluation of the results of the Nordic cooperation may vary widely depending on the evaluator's own political views and his overall interest in community affairs. The decisions made by the Nordic Council are recommendations by character but the member states are at all events bound by them either to report on them or to take preparatory action. From 1953-1964 the Council adopted 279 recommendations. According to an estimate made in 1962, over half the approved recommendations have been put in practice, one quarter were being worked on, and less than one quarter had been rejected.

According to Christian Lange the results of cooperation may be divided roughly into three categories : 1) measures aiming at making

a unit of the Nordic countries in juridical and social respects either by means of similar legislation in all countries or by extending the rights of the citizens of one's own country to apply also to the citizens of the other Nordic countries; 2) the establishment of joint projects or the coordination of national projects with a view of division of labour and specialization; 3) liaison in matters concerning the interests of the Nordic countries with the rest of the world.

In looking for the distinguishing features in the Nordic cooperation to achieve these results, it should be especially emphasized that juridical conformity is being achieved by means of concerted legislative action taken by each individual country and not by means of a joint declaration of human rights or by the establishment of supranational executive organs. Although some common undertakings have taken the form of institutes and special high schools, the most common form of the cooperation is the convening, at regular intervals, of conferences and inter-Nordic boards or committees. Also in the sphere of the Nordic countries relations with the outside world there are certain permanent institutions - eg. the Nordic schools in Tanganyika - but more common are various forms of consultation and coordination.The emphasis is definitely on the practical results of cooperation,not on institutionalizing and formalizing it to any pattern.

C - <u>Concluding observations</u> -

So far the Nordic cooperation has not been made the subject of a penetrating scientific analysis, although its nature has been at times the topic of discussion, eg. at the Nordic seminar on international relations held at Hässelby (Stockholm) in June 1964. At this seminar an attempt was also made to evaluate the nature of this cooperation from the standpoint of the different theories on international integration.

The regional cooperation of the Nordic countries cannot be considered as a separate problem but must be seen in a universal con-

text. The relations of the Nordic countries with the outside world, to other states, other regional communities, the leading power blocs and the United Nations must also be studied.

As a community the Nordic countries meet the requirements by Karl W. Deutsch for a "security-community", ie. its internal conflicts are likely to be solved without resorting to force. This,however,does not say much about the actual degree of integration which has been achieved.

The characteristics of the Nordic cooperation show that international integration can be carried out in a number of ways. The Nordic countries have experienced both progress and disappointments in their cooperation; the pessimists' prophesies of the total failure of the cooperation have not eventuated any more than the optimists' wishes of a steady uninterrupted progress towards Nordic unity.

In the study of regionalism within international cooperation Nordic cooperation might be well worthy of closer attention than it has received to date.

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S U M M A R Y

The cooperation between the five Nordic countries is distin-guished by certain special features. In the questions of foreign policy and defence these countries are not members of the same group, but they are pursuing a somewhat different policy in mutual under-standing according to the common interest of the whole Nordic area. This is possible because there are no internal territorial disputes and no struggle for power or "leadership" among the Nordic countries. The observance of equality is facilitated by the fact that all the Nordic countries are small countries of approximately the same size. Also the trade relations are not promoted on a purely Nordic basis but in the framework of a bigger organization, the EFTA.

The conclusion is that Nordic cooperation is of more subregional than regional character. This means that the Nordic countries are co-operating in minor questions but not questions of major importance. The dominating national interests of the different countries are accepted as common regional interests of "the North". A regional in-tegration and a regional-international policy will be possible be-cause the dominating interests are alienated as separating factors. Thus the Nordic cooperation does not appear as a part of the foreign policy of the countries or as a method for creating supranational institutions. The cooperation is therefore integrating in practice, in the daily life of the ordinary citizen, who is in more and more respects at the same time a citizen in his own country and in the whole Nordic region. The character of the Nordic cooperation cannot be understood as a separate phenomenon, but only against the back-ground of the whole system of individual, national, regional and universal interests in the modern world community.

So far the Nordic cooperation has not been made the subject of a penetrating scientific analysis. In my opinion the Nordic co-operation in the study of regionalism within international coopera-tion might be well worth of closer attention than it has received to date.

RESUME

La coopération entre les cinq pays nordiques présente certains traits particuliers. Ces pays n'appartiennent pas à un groupe unique ayant une politique étrangère commune, mais ils pratiquent chacun une politique étrangère quelque peu différente, en accord les uns avec les autres, et dans l'intérêt commun de toute la région nordique. Cela est possible parce qu'il n'existe entre eux ni conflits territoriaux, ni lutte pour le pouvoir ou pour le "leadership". Le respect de l'égalité est facilité par la taille à la fois faible et approximativement égale de tous les pays nordiques. De même, leurs relations commerciales ne se développent pas sur une base purement nordique, mais dans le cadre d'une organisation plus vaste, la zone européenne de libre échange (EFTA).

La coopération entre les pays nordiques présente donc un caractère moins régional que sub-régional. Les pays nordiques coopèrent à propos de problèmes secondaires, mais pas à propos des problèmes les plus importants. L'intérêt national prépondérant de chacun des pays est accepté comme l'intérêt commun "de la région nordique". Un certain degré d'intégration régionale et une politique internationale régionale deviennent possibles parce que les intérêts dominants sont éliminés en tant que facteurs de séparation. Ainsi, la coopération nordique n'apparaît pas comme un aspect de la politique étrangère des divers pays, ou comme une méthode de création d'institutions supra-nationales. Elle consiste plutôt en une intégration pratique, dont est conscient dans sa vie quotidienne le simple citoyen, qui se sent de plus en plus non seulement citoyen de son pays, mais aussi citoyen de la région nordique tout entière. La nature de la coopération nordique ne peut être comprise si on la considère comme un phénomène séparé, mais seulement par rapport à tout le système d'intérêts individuels nationaux, régionaux et universels de la communauté internationale contemporaine.

La coopération nordique n'a pas encore été soumise à une analyse scientifique approfondie. L'auteur estime que la coopération nordique, considérée comme un cas de régionalisme dans le cadre de la coopération internationale, mériterait un examen plus attentif.

SOME PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH THE ORGANS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

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The attempts undertaken, first and foremost, by international law specialists, in order to define an international organization (1) emphasize a variety of features which distinguish that social phenomenon (2). So far, however, there has been no agreement, in scientific literature, as to the significance, and the necessity, for an international organization to possess any such specific features as, e.g., having been created on the basis of an international agreement, having a distinct personality with regard to its members, of its organs exhibiting a relative autonomy of will as compared with the will of the total of its members, etc.

It can, e.g., be demonstrated, that there are no bases for particularly bringing out, as a supposedly indispensable feature of such an organization, its possessing a separate personality and an autonomy of will, as is done by certain French authors (3). If there were a need for providing a definition of an international organization, one could rather define it as "a form of collaboration of sovereign States, based on a multilateral international agreement, and comprising a relatively stable range of participants, the fundamental feature of which is the existence of permanent organs with definite competences and powers, acting for the carrying out of common aims" (4).

All definitions have but a relative value as instruments of research, and are construed for a definite research purpose. This

is why it is permissible to assume the possibility of there existing
various definitions of one and the same phenomenon, all of them cor-
rect from a given point of view. The more characteristic , however,
is the fact that all the authors of definitions of an international
organization agree on one point : that an essential feature of such
an organization is that it should possess permanent organs.

This, to be sure, is not the <u>differentia specifica</u> of inter-
national organizations only, but, it would seem, an essential feature
of any organization. Nevertheless, that particular feature makes its
appearance in international organizations in a way peculiar to them
only. It may be asserted that the set of problems connected with or-
gans concerns the very essence of an international organization, and
this is why it ought to constitute one of the principal subjects of
scientific research on international organizations. And there can be
no doubt that, within that set of problems, the question of the com-
position of such organs takes pride of place.

The organs of international organizations may be classified ac-
cording to various criteria. If we assume such a criterion to be the
character of the members of the organ in question (which appears to
be considerably more essential that the legal basis or else the mode
of setting up such an organ), then the organs of international or-
ganizations may be divided, in a most general way, into administra-
tive and inter-governmental organs (5).

The administrative organs are composed of officials, whose legal
position guarantees to them, in the carrying out of their service
functions, a formal independence of any authority apart from the in-
ternational organizations whose servants they are. Here belong,first
and foremost, the secretariats of international organizations (6).

The traditional, typical functions of the secretariats of in-
ternational organizations consist in providing technical services
to other organs of such organizations.

In the practice of contemporary international organizations,
however, a pronounced tendency has made its appearance to entrust
the international administration with occasionally momentous executi-
ve (operational) functions. Functions of that kind are carried out
by an international organization directly on the territory of the
States, or else with regard to certain persons (e.g. the assistance
to refugees), and consist in providing, out of the material means
placed at its disposal, financial, technical or social aid, in car-
rying out research or control, or indeed even police and military
operations. To be sure, at the present moment functions of that kind
still are an exceptional phenomenon in international organizations,
and make their appearance in them but on a small scale. Nevertheless,
such functions appear to an ever-increasing extent, and, in accor-
dance with the practice which had prevailed so far, their execution
is, as a rule, entrusted to administrative organs.

The increasingly important role, played by the administrative
organs of international organizations in this field may probably be
considered to be an objective development trend of such organizations.

In this connection the question of an appropriate adaptation of
such organs to their new and momentous role demands serious inves-
tigation. For, indeed, it is a fact that the present-day structure
and principles of the secretariats of international organizations
have been shaped so as to correspond to their typical, traditional
functions, of a technical character. Their new executive functions,
on the other hand, have an altogether different, largely political,
character. The fact of such functions being taken over, to an ever
wider and wider extent, by the secretariats, causes the latter no
longer to fit into their framework and to burst their institutional
facilities, based on traditional principles. When the conflict bet-
ween the old forms and the new contents manifests itself in a
glaring form, it can lead, in concrete situations, to an acute
crisis of such forms, as was the case e.g., with the Secretary

General of the United Nations in the years 1960-61 in connection
with the U. . operations in Congo.

This is precisely why an indispensable condition of the expansion
of such executive (operational) functions, for the carrying out of
which the administrative organs seem to be, to a considerable extent,
predestined, is the proper adaptation of both the structure and the
principles of action of such organs to the new role which they are
expected to play. The absolute necessity of such adaptation is dic-
tated by considerations of securing the international character of
such organs, and of weakening the risk of their becoming transformed,
in particular cases, into an instrument of the interests and policy
of but one of the groups of member States. These are the very same
considerations which also make their appearance with regard to the
other political organs of international organizations. This is also
why the means which are to serve the appropriate preservation of
their international character ought, in principle, to be similar,
and will be jointly discussed below (7).

The international organs are composed of States, represented by
their representatives, nominated and provided with instructions by
their respective governments. Hence it is that they may also be
described as representative organs, since it is the members of the
organizations in question that are directly represented in them. It
is from this, as well as from the kind of functions exercised by them
that their political (in the wide sense of the world) character
results (8).

It results from the very essence of a contemporary international
organization and of contemporary international relations, that the
fundamental organs of such an organization are inter-governmental
organs. They correspond, as to the character of their members, their
manner of acting, the process of the formation and manifestation of
agreement, the process of decision making, etc., to the structure of
the contemporary international community and to the character of the
relations proper to that community.

At first the international organizations possessed but one inter-
national organ (without taking into consideration auxiliary organs).
As their tasks went on increasing, however, it appeared that a such
single organ was not sufficient to ensure a proper management of
the activities of the organization in question. In the contemporary
international organizations it is mostly a system of two inter-
governmental organs that has taken shape.

One of them is always a plenary organ, composed of all the mem-
bers of the organization. Consequently the composition of the or-
ganization finds its full reflection in it. It preserves the charac-
ter of the hierarchically supreme representative organ, and the
matters of greatest importance are reserved for its competence. The
member States are represented on it by representatives of as high a
grade as possible. In connection with this, among other things, it
meets relatively rarely and for brief periods of time. Consequently
it is unfit for settling current matters or for carrying out func-
tions of a more continuous character. Such an organ is mostly
described as the Conference or the Assembly. It may be described, in
a most general way, as an organ of the conference type. That plenary
organ, in the universal organizations, has kept increasing its
numerical strength to such an extent that nowadays, with several
tens or even above one hundred members, it has become too inert and
thereby rather unfit for efficiently transacting business which
demands more operative decisions.

Under the circumstances, an absolute necessity has arisen of
appointing an organ which would meet more frequently, or indeed even
deliberate in permanence, for the purpose of transacting the current
business of the organization and of deciding matters in a more ef-
ficient way. Such an organ is composed of representatives of the
members States of a somewhat lower grade, from a political point of
view, but who, in return, can devote more of their time to the bu-
siness of the organization, and who are, moreover, more competent in

the matters under discussion. Neither can the numerical strength of such an organ, occasionally incorrectly described as the executive organ (9), be too great, since this would jeopardize the efficiency, indispensable in its action, and could also prove to be too onerous and costly for some of the members of the organization. This is precisely why, in organizations with a large number of members, first and foremost in the universal organizations, organs of that type are not plenary organs, but organs of a more restricted composition, limited to some of the members only. Such organs are mostly described as Councils or Executive Committees. They may be defined, in a most general way, as organs of the Executive Committee type.

One of the essential problems which arise in connection with the existence of two representative inter-governmental organs is, of course, the division of competences between such two organs, as well as their mutual relation to one another.

The division of competences, as far as the most essential matters are concerned, is done by the Constitution of the organization in question itself, which enumerates the matters which are to be dealt with by either of those organs. Apart from that, however, the Constitution frequently authorizes the organ of the Conference type to delegate, by resolution, matters not reserved exclusively for itself, to the organ of the Executive Committee type. A delimitation, as precise as possible, between the competences of those two organs is necessary in order to avoid doing the same work twice, and possibly even taking contradistory decisions in the same matters.

In the practice of the contemporary international organizations we may notice the fairly clear taking shape of the trends in the division of labour between both types of international organizations.

For the organ most representative, which is always the organ of the conference type, are mostly reserved decisions in the matters of fundamental importance for the organization, such as matters of membership admission of new members, suspension, exclusion, revision

of the Constitution, adoption of the budget, ratification of the
agreements concluded with the States or with other organizations.
The principal, typical functions of that organ, however, as a rule
consist in fixing general programmatic directives and lines for the
policy of the organization in question, as well as in exercising su-
pervision of the most general character over the activities of the
remaining organs, first and foremost on the basis of periodical re-
ports from their activities and by way of fixing their composition.

For the organ of a more operative character, such as the organ
of the Executive Committee type, there are provided competences
which consist in transacting current business during the periods
between the sessions of the Conference, in exercising more strict
and concrete management and supervision over the work of both
auxiliary and administrative organs, in preparing and elaborating
suggestions in programmatic matters, and in other questions which
belong to the competences of the Conference. As results from the
above, such organs, in spite of the fact that they occupy a hierar-
chically lower place in the system of organs of an international
organization, may play a decisive part in so far as its practical
activities are concerned. By preparing cases which are to be placed
on the agenda of the Conference, they become the principal platform
for the consultations conducted for the purpose of adjusting the
attitudes of the several member States and their groups. They are
to elaborate solutions which would be acceptable for the Conference
and, in this way, the role of the latter may thereby be reduced
merely to the issuing of a final approval. Consequently, organs of
that type may occupy a key position, from the point of view of the
process of the shaping of the will and taking decisions in an
international organization.

The general development trend of international organizations
also seems to tend in the same direction. The burden of the prin-
cipal responsibility for directing the organization and for rendering

its tasks more concrete clearly shifts into organs of the Executive
Committee type. This may be seen with especial clarity of the example
of the specialized organizations associated with the United Nations.
This is proved by the fact that the plenary organs of the Conference
type relatively rarely meet in ordinary session. The periods which
elapse between such sessions amount to five years in the cases of
UPU and ITU, to four years in WMO, to two years in IMCO. The consti-
tutions of such organizations as FAO, UNESCO and ICAO, which at
first provided for the sessions of those organs to take place once
a year, have subsequently been amended, and the formal amendments
introduced into them have increased those periods to two years in the
cases of FAO and UNESCO, and to three years in the case of ICAO. At
the same time we may state the existence of a clearly visible develop-
ment trend with international organizations, which aims at formally
increasing the rights and competences of organs of the Executive Com-
mittee type. This has been done by amendments, formally introduced
into the constitutions of some of those organizations (e.g. UNESCO).
The constitutions of such organizations as ICAO or IAEA formally
grant the role of supreme organs of the organization in question
precisely to organs of that type, of a more limited composition. It
is worth while to note the fact that the amendments, introduced into
the Constitution of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid in 1962
obviously tend in that same direction. Moreover, it becomes a fre-
quent occurrence in practice for organs of the Conference type to
delegate their competences to organs of the Executive Committee type.

That development trend of the institutional form of inter-
national organizations undoubtedly tends to increase the role played
by them and the effectiveness of their activity.

The postulates of substituting, for the principle of unanimity
the principle of majority in the procedure of taking resolutions and
giving to the resolutions of the organs of international organizations
the binding force of a decision also may seem to tend the same way.

They find exaggeratedly enthusiastic propagandists in certain intellectual circles of Western Europe and the United States.

One should, however, realize, what is the system of reference and the social milieu, in which this development trend, which we may consider to be objective, makes headway.

Under the present-day conditions of the social, economic and political structure of the contemporary world international organizations cannot constitute a kind of super-State authority, which would decide of what the States are to do, fix binding norms of behaviour for them and apply sanctions in the event of such norms failing to be observed. If they achieve any degree of authority at all with regard to the member States, it is only with the consent of those States and within a range limited, as a rule, to matters of lesser importance. This is particularly true of the universal organizations, which include States belonging to different, and indeed even opposing, camps.

No State and no nation is in a position to agree that foreign authorities, independent of it, should decide of its destinies, or even of matters vital for its interests. Consequently the objective limitations of the role, possibilities and effectiveness of operation of an international organization result from the very structure of the international community, from the fact that this is a community of independent States, and that its development takes place, first and foremost, within the framework of the existence of nations as States. This results from the fundamental principle of self-determination of nations. It is they themselves and each of them individually that will decide of the choice of such or such other social, economic and political system, of the forms of its collaboration with other nations and of the degree to which it will unite with them. It is on that principle also that the fundamental historical problem of our times, that of the superiority and victory,

in peaceful competition, of one or the other of the opposing sys-
tems : Socialist and Capitalist, will be decided.

Under the circumstances, both the possibilities and the effective
role of an international organization may appear as the resultant
of two different trends. There seems to appear a need for increasing
the importance of an international organization, as a form of col-
laboration between States, while, on the other hand, there appears
a legitimate tendency and need for States preserving the indispensa-
ble range of sovereignty to ensure a correct development process,
which corresponds to the interests of their own nations.

If we look at things from that other side, there can be no doubt
that the membership of an international organization, which frequent-
ly is a vital necessity for the States, and which brings to them
definite advantages, is at the same time connected with a certain
amount of risk for them. When acceding to an ordinary international
agreement, a State can, generally speaking, fairly accurately es-
timate, whether the rights and advantages which the agreement in
question grants to it, are worth the obligations and burdens which
it must assume in return. The access to an international organization,
however, does not only mean the acceptance of obligations already
known, because provided in its Constitution. An international or-
ganization is a living creation, one which goes in for practical ac-
tivities, from which there may flow new advantages for a member Sta-
te, but the result of which may also be new obligations and burdens.
Both the scope and the kind of both advantages and burdens which may
result from subsequent activities are things which cannot be exactly
foreseen by a State at the moment of its access to the organization
in question.

The activities of an international organization find their
principal expression in the passing of resolutions. Their substance
will depend on the composition of organs, on the set of forces
within them. That set of forces may change with time; it may assume

various forms with regard to various matters. It may be advantageous for a given State or group of States, but it may just as well be disadvantageous for them, depending on the question on whose side shall the majority indispensable for passing a resolution pronounce itself. It is obvious that the question of whether and to what a degree its activities will result in new rights and advantages for a given member State, or group of member States, or else in obligations, burdens or political disadvantages, may depend on that set of forces, on the formation of an appropriate majority in the organs of the organization.

By the very nature of things the States and groups of States which take part in the creation of an international organization and which shape its institutional framework, will try to minimize the risk, described above, and a danger which consists in the possibility of the organs of that organization passing resolutions and going in for activities which run contrary to the interests of such States.

At the same time, however, we ought to remember that the same risk means a serious danger for the international organization as well. It is the danger of such an international organization becoming transformed into the tool of the interests and the policy of definite States, and, to an even wider extent, of groups thereof, a tool aimed against other States or groups thereof. As results from the structure of the international community under present-day conditions, an international organization can only be a form of collaboration between States, and act on the basis of their having come to an understanding for the purpose of carrying into effect the common aims of the member States, and of satisfying their convergent interests, and not the aims and interests of but a certain group of member States. For, indeed, in the contrary case an international organization would lose its connection with its social basis and its truly international character, and, as a result of this, it would be doomed to decay. Consequently, the interests of

the member States and those of an international organization are not
by any means contradictory, as they might appear to a superficial
observer.

This kind of risk and danger, both to the member States and to
the international organization itself, may be minimised by the ap-
plication of the appropriate institutional solutions.

One of the means of diminishing the risk described above is the
limiting of the importance of resolutions in more important matters,
so as to make them merely recommendations, without legally binding
force. Such means are made use of by the overwhelming majority of the
contemporary international organizations, and exceptions to this rule
are few in number, in so far as resolutions concerning matters other
than the internal matters of the organization are concerned (10).

The most efficacious safeguard from that risk, in an inter-
national organization, is undoubtedly the requirement of unanimity in
passing resolutions. Such means had been applied by almost all the
international organizations which existed in the period preceding the
Second World War. The requirement of absolute unanimity, however,
caused a possibility of the activities of an international organiza-
tion being paralysed, in extreme cases, even by the obstructionist
attitude of a single member. The principle of unanimity was par-
ticularly burdensome, and weakened the efficiency of action, in the
international organizations with a large number of members, and those
which, moreover, exhibited a relatively big divergence of interests
between the member States. This is precisely why the development of
universal international organizations has gone, more particularly so
after the Second World War, clearly in the direction of giving up
the principle of unanimity.

The latter, however, has survived in the organizations with a
smaller number of member States, and those which exhibit a greater
degree of coherence and of convergence of interests, and, more par-
ticularly so, in such regional organizations, to the competence of

which belong matters connected with the more vital interests of States, viz. in the military and economic organizations (e.g. the NATO, SEATO, the Warsaw Pact, the OECD, the Council for Mutual Economic Aid). It is an obvious truth that the need, for the member States, of safeguarding their interests from the risk which may flow, for the latter, from the activities of an international organization, is particularly acute then, when such activities deal with important matters which have a serious political aspect. This, also, explains the fact that those organizations which depart from the principle of unanimity always reserve for the more important resolutions the procedure of a qualified majority of two-thirds or even more of the votes.

It may, therefore, be formulated as a general rule, that the requirements of the voting procedure increase the more, the greater the importance of the resolutions about to be taken : the greater the momentum of the matters which they concern, and the sharper their legal effects.

The procedure of appropriately fixed majority undoubtedly may have the purpose of preventing the passing of resolutions in the teeth of the opposition by a fairly numerous minority, and the rendering more difficult, or indeed even downright impossible, with a given set of forces within a certain organ, the outvoting of one group of member States by the remaining ones, or, in other words, the imposing of resolutions upon such a group against its will. Thus, e.g., a group which has at its disposal, within a given organ, a number of votes superior to one-third is in a position to prevent the passing of any resolutions which should run contrary to its interests, whenever a majority of two-thirds is required for the validity of resolutions. Such a group has at its disposal, as we might put it, a "defensive" number of votes or seats in a given organ, which is tantamount to a de facto right of veto being vested in the entire group.

The possibilities of manoeuvering the procedure of majority voting for the purpose of diminishing, or indeed eliminating, the risk of more important groups of member States being outvoted in an international organization are, however, limited. They might, in all probability, be larger, if the procedure of weighted voting were applied, a procedure which consists in assigning different numbers of votes to the several member States, and thereby a different voting power, depending on their importance and role in the organization. Considering, however, the fact that the system of weighted voting is in glaring contradiction with the principle of sovereign equality of the States and that the fixing of an appropriate formula of allotting votes is a difficult matter (with the exception of certain financial and commercial organizations), and, first and foremost, because that system is altogether inacceptable for the immense majority of medium and small States, there does not exist any real chance of its being adopted on anything like a wider scale.

With a given procedure of majority voting, it is the composition of an organization and its internal set of forces that decide of both the content of the resolutions and the trends of activity of that international organization. The composition of the plenary organs is identical with the membership of the organization. This is why an analysis of that composition is of fundamental importance for an evaluation of the political character of an international organization. Changes in membership directly influence that character, and this is precisely why the international organizations attach so great an importance to the matter of the admission of new members.

It is the membership that decides the question of whether a given international organization may be described as a particular Capitalist or Socialist organization, or else one of a universal character.

Under modern conditions, it is the latter category of international organizations that seems predestined to play the momentous role of the platform and mechanism for the peaceful collaboration of

the two main State systems now existing in the world : Socialism and
Capitalism. In order that an international organization should be
able to play such a role, it is not sufficient that its constitution
should proclaim its universal character, and that it should be for-
mally open for any State to accede to, whichever camp it belongs to.
The most essential condition which ought to be fulfilled by such an
organization is that both its principles and its aims should be
such as could be accepted by States of both systems, and also that
its mechanism should ensure to both those systems an appropriate
degree of influence upon its activities. The fulfilment of that
condition is only then possible, when the interests and postulates
of both systems are taken into consideration as early as the very
beginning, at the time of drawing up the constitution of the or-
ganization in question, and when subsequently they are respected in
the course of its entire activity. In the contrary case such an
organization will not be able to serve as an instrument of peaceful
co-existence and collaboration between States with various social
systems, and will be deprived of a universal character.

It must be stated that it is not all the "specialized insti-
tutions" of the United Nations that fulfil the conditions enumerated
above. In this connection some of them were unfit for the States of
the Socialist group to accede to (e.g. the International Monetary
Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
as well as its affiliated organizations of IFC and IDA). Consequent-
ly it is doubtful whether they may be regarded as having the charac-
ter of universal international organizations; they are rather just
particular organizations of the Capitalist world.

With regard to the problems here discussed by us, peculiar
interest attaches to the problem of organs of the Executive Commit-
tee type of a narrower composition. Such organs are created in the
organizations with a large number of members, first and foremost
in the universal organizations.

The limitation of their membership to certain member States only has been dictated by considerations of ensuring to them greater efficiency in functioning.

As has already been said before, the role played by that type of organs of international organizations exhibits a tendency to increase. In this connection the question of an appropriate selection of the members who are to sit on such organs becomes particularly important, since it is not all the member States that are to be directly represented in them.

We ought to consider to be correct such a selection of the members of those organs, which would ensure, and indeed even, in a certain sense, strengthen, their character of being representative of the entire organization, while at the same time securing an appropriate correlation between those factors which safeguard a correct operation of those organs, as the mechanism of collaboration between States.

The appropriate selection of the members of organs with a limited composition is carried out, in the contemporary international organizations, by means of various methods, and on the basis of various principles. Both those methods and those principles are applied in a combined way.

One of the most essential postulates which preside the carrying out of such selection is to ensure, in those organs of narrower composition, places to some extent privileged for those member States, which are of the greatest importance in the domain of the relations that lie within the competences of the international organization in question, and which, in that connection, may be described as being Great Powers in that particular field.

Even the very constitutions of international organizations reserve permanent seats on such organs with a narrower composition for such great Powers. The U.N. Charter does this nominally, with regard

to the five Great Powers (in a political sense) in the composition
of the Security Council and the Trusteeship Council. The constitu-
tion of the International Labour Organization reserves permanent
seats on the Administrative Council for ten of the most indus-
trialized member States, appointed on the basis of objective in-
dexes. The constitution of the International Atomic Energy Agency
reserves such seats on the Board of Governors for States which lead
in the field of atomic energy, on a scale of both the world as a
whole and of the several geographic regions. The Constitution of the
IMCO grants permanent seats, both on the Council and on the Maritime
Security Committee, to those States which have the largest merchant
navies. The financial organizations, such as the IBRD, IMF, IFC and
IDA, grant permanent seats to the largest shareholders of their
capital fund.

Even in those cases, however, where the constitution of a cer-
tain organization does not provide for that, in practice it is the
Great Powers that are elected to sit on the organs of such organs
with a narrower composition. For, indeed, it is both an obvious and
a universally recognized fact that those States, on whose co-
operation and support the implementation of the tasks of an or-
ganization actually depends in the first place, ought to have
ensured to them an appropriate and adequately increased influence
upon the resolutions which define and make concrete such tasks.
Otherwise such resolutions would not be realistic.

A universally applied guiding principle for the plenary organ
in deciding upon the election of the members of the organ with a
narrower composition is the principle of just geographic representa-
tion.

An appropriate division of the States into regional groups may
serve as a basic guide for reflecting the convergence of certain
interests of such States, a convergence created by history. For,
indeed, it appears that it was geographical proximity, neighbourhood

or the fact of belonging to a definite geographic region that constituted the basis for the formation, in the process of historical development, of closer relations between nations, of a certain convergence of economic interests, of a community of destiny, of a cultural, and even a constitutional and political community.

An assertion of that kind only approximately corresponds to the actual reality, which, by the very nature of things, is more complicated than that, and exhibits a number of substantial exceptions to that general rule.

The division of States into regional sets for purposes of an analysis of the system of international forces and of geographical representation in international organs is, therefore, but an auxiliary division, and is only then justified, if it does correspond, to some extent, to the political division of the world into groups of States with convergent interests. Consequently, when applying that division one ought to remember its simplified character, and carry out the indispensable political corrections. Thus e.g. in the case of the African region such a correction will concern, first and foremost, the Republic of South Africa, which, as being a racialist State, has been quite formally eliminated from the African regional group by all the members of the latter. The case is similar with Israel in the Middle East region.

The fact, however, remains that e.g. the African States, which have but recently liberated themselves from the fetters of colonialism, to a large extent exhibit a uniform attitude with regard to such international problems as the defence of their sovereignty and independence, and the tendency to accelerate their economic and social progress.

Similarly, until recently the Socialist system could be identified with the Eastern European region. The further and unavoidable development of the Socialist revolution, however, blows up, before our very eyes, the framework of a single geographic region, however elastically

it should be conceived (11) New Socialist States arise in both Asia
and Latin America.

When supplemented with the appropriate reservations and correc-
tions, a regional division may undoubtedly serve as the basis for
ensuring to international organs a proper degree of representative-
ness. For, indeed, it may be assumed, with a certain degree of well-
foundedness, that one or several of the States which belong to a
certain geographical region may come forward in the name of all or
else of the definite majority of such States, in order to give ex-
pression to the approximate attitude of the whole regional set. In
this way it would be permissible to speak here of an, as it were,
indirect representation of the remaining States belonging to a
given region, by some of the representatives of the latter.

In the practice of the international organizations the principle
of just geographical representation is applied in such a way, that
the non-permanent seats on an organ with a narrower composition are,
more and more frequently, granted in advance (on the basis of a
previous agreement, or of the resolution of the plenary organ, or
else of the provisions of the internal regulations) to the several
geographic regions, in quantities which correspond to the number of
the member States of the organization in question which belong to a
given geographical region and to their importance, while at the same
time taking into consideration the question of whether that region
is not already represented on the organ concerned by virtue of
another principle, e.g. occupying a permanent seat on it as a Great
Power. Thus, in practice, the principle of geographical represen-
tation on organs with a narrower composition undergoes an ever
greater formalization, while the appointment of the appropriate
States, which are to represent a given region, is left to the de-
cision of the regional set of States concerned.

What is particularly noteworthy is the principle of the parity
of representation of groups of States with differing interests,

identifiable in advance. Thus, e.g., it may in principle be assumed
that there will be a contradiction between the interests of the Sta-
tes which export a given commodity and of those which import it, be-
tween the interests of the States which administer the trusteeship
territories on behalf of the U.N. and those of other States, the
interests of the States which grant economic assistance and of those
which are in receipt of it. In such cases the practice of contemporary
international organizations frequently tends to create organs, on
which both opposing groups of State are granted an equal degree of
influence on the activities of such organs. In the international
agreements concerning raw materials this is achieved by granting to
both groups, viz. to the exporters and importers, an equal number of
votes (one thousand each), while applying the system of weighted
voting. In other organs, such as, e.g. the Trusteeship Council of
the U.N. or the Governing Council of the Special Fund of the United
Nations, the seats are divided half and half between the appropriate
groups of States with diverging interests.

The parity system of the representation of groups of States with
divergent interests has the purpose of serving as a safeguard against
organs of international organizations taking resolutions which would
correspond to the interests of but one group of States only. Thus,
therefore, under the conditions of that system, both the resolutions
and the activities of the appropriate organ must, to a definite ex-
tent, constitute an expression of an understanding between both groups
and neither of them is in a position of imposing its will upon the
other. This guarantees, in a fairly efficacious way, a correct func-
tioning of the organ in question, since such correct functioning is
only then possible, when there appears to exist a possibility of
reconciling their various attitudes on the basis of an existing con-
vergence of interests.

For the same considerations, in the present-day system of forces
in the world, particular importance would seem to attach to the

ensuring, in the universal organizations of a political character,
of such a composition of the organs with a limited number of mem-
bers, that equal numbers of seats should be held by each of the
three principal political groupings of States : the Socialist coun-
tries, the Western powers plus their allies, and the non-engaged
States. Such a composition, or, at any rate, a composition which
would give an equal representation to the group of Socialist States
and of the Western Powers respectively, would, under the conditions
now prevalent, be the most truly representative, since it would
constitute a reflection, more or less correct, of the actual system
of forces throughout the world. At the same time such a composition,
together with an appropriate voting procedure, would constitute the
guarantee of a correct functioning of the organ concerned, making
impossible the outvoting of any one group of States, and making it
inevitable that the resolutions of such an organ should be the ex-
pression of an understanding agreed upon by all the principal groups.

As it has been already said before, it results from the struc-
ture of the contemporary world that international organizations in
general, and, more particularly, the universal ones, are called
upon to play the important role of platform and mechanism for a
peaceful collaboration between States which preserve their sov-
ereignty, and more especially States which form part of different
social systems. It is also a task incumbent upon the international
organizations to ensure that the competition which is going on
between individual States, as well as between groups thereof,
should preserve a peaceful character.

Under the circumstances, both the efficaciousness of the
functioning of international organizations and their success in
carrying into effect the purposes they have set themselves, depend
on the possibility, for the member States, of achieving mutual
understanding, as well as on the degree to which such understanding

has been achieved. The process of achieving an understanding between States, more particularly so between States which belong to different social and economic systems, concerning their common action aimed at carrying into effect their common tasks, corresponding to convergent interests, is a process both difficult and complicated.

It is precisely the international organizations that are called upon to create such a framework and mechanism, as would favour the development of that process, facilitate its progress, fix the rules of its correct course, and remove or diminish the obstacles which obstruct its way. This is what the principal and momentous role to be played by the international organizations in the contemporary world consists in. To that role of the international organizations must be subordinated their institutional system, and the solution of such problems as the legal significance of their resolutions, the procedure of voting, and, more particularly, the composition of their organs.

N O T E S

1) In accordance with the classification accepted in the U.N., two
   fundamental categories of international organizations are
   distinguished : intergovernmental organizations and non-govern-
   mental organizations (Art. 71 of the United Nations Charter).
   In the current sense of the term, it is the former, i.e. the
   intergovernmental organizations, that are identified with in-
   ternational organizations. For, indeed, it is they that play a
   considerable role in international relations, and it is prin-
   cipally on them that the attention and interest of public opinion
   at large is concentrated. The criterion of such division is
   constituted, first and foremost, by the character of the members
   of the organization. When those members are States, we have to
   do with intergovernmental organizations. Taking this into con-
   sideration, we ought to say that the term most appropriate for
   such organizations is that of inter-State organizations.

2) Compare, e.g., the definitions suggested within the framework
   of the International Law Commission of the U.N. : by Brierly,
   U.N. Doc., A/CN.4/23, p. 19; Hudson, U.N. Doc., A/CN.4, SR 52,
   p. 9; Fitzmaurice, U.N. Doc., A/CN.4/101, p. 16.

3) E.g. Paul Reuter : Institutions internationales, Paris, 1955,
   p. 292; Suzanne Bastid : Cours d'Institutions internationales,
   Paris, les Cours de Droit, 1955-56, p. 401.

4) W. Morawiecki : Organizacje miedzynarodowe (International Or-
   ganizations), second edition, Warsaw, 1964, p. 25.

5) A third category of organs, within the framework of this clas-
   sification, consists of inter-Parliamentary organs. They make
   their appearance, as a relatively new phenomenon, within some of
   the Western-European Organizations : in the European Council
   (1949), in the European Communities : ECSC 1952, ECE 1958,
   Euratom 1958, in the Northern Council 1953, as well as in NATO,
   in the form of the extra-constitutional Conference of NATO Par-
   liamentarians. Such Parliamentarian assemblies are composed of de-
   legates of the Parliaments of the member States, in numbers pro-
   portionate as a rule, to the number of the population of the
   respective States. Their purpose, in principle, is to exercise
   certain control functions over the activities of the inter-
   governmental and administrative organs. The powers enjoyed by
   them, however, are very modest in scope. Moreover, their charac-
   ter is rather unrepresentative, because of the reactionary
   criteria applied in the selection of the delegates (the Northern
   Council constitutes an exception in this respect). In connection

with this, the role played by such organs is, in the large majority of cases, illusory.

6) According to the criterion of character of the members the category of administrative organs should also be made to include the organs of   international justice, as well as the executive organs of the European Communities. Such organs differ, in a fundamental way, from secretariats (and, indeed, they themselves have secretariats of their own). The fact, however, is worth drawing the reader's attention to, that the executive organs of the European Communities have been called upon to carry out executive functions which are, to a large extent, of the similar character as the new executive functions which are made over to the secretariats of other international organizations nowadays. The correctness of the carrying out of such executive functions has been ensured in a definite way, by the peculiar structure and principles of functioning of those executive organs, which differ fundamentally from the structure and the principles of functioning of the international secretariats.

7) Because of the political character of such functions, these will,by the very nature of things, be means which ensure the correct functioning of the political inter-governmental organs.

8) It would be most correct to describe them as inter-State organs.

9) They are not organs which carry out executive functions. The implementation of both the tasks of an international organization and of the resolutions of its organs belongs, under contemporary conditions, to the member States. It is only quite exceptionally that the organization itself carries out executive functions, within a well-defined and narrow scope, but even in such a case it does so through the intermediary of its administrative organs, rather than through that of inter-governmental ones.

10) We may consider to be internal matters of an international organization such questions as : the establishment of the agenda of both session and meetings, the election of the authorities of the several organs, the election of the members of such organs, the creation of auxiliary organs, the adoption of the rules (procedure) the adoption of the regulations concerning the administrative personnel, of financial regulations, but also the passing of the administrative budget and the fixing of the amounts of members' contributions ot it, and the admission, suspension and exclusion of members. In all the above questions the resolutions passed by international organizations have the character of binding decisions.

11) After the Second World War, the division of Europe into Western and Eastern has been dictated, not so much by geographical, as precisely by political and constitutional, considerations. For, indeed, it was exclusively the Socialist States that have been included in Eastern Europe. If the criteria of such division had really been geographical ones, it would have been unjustified to include either Finland or Greece in Western Europe.