CENTRE EUROPÉEN DE LA DOTATION CARNEGIE
GENÈVE

1

CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Bellagio, June 12-16, 1964

METHODES ET PROGRAMMES DE RECHERCHE CONSACRES A L'ETUDE DES INSTITUTIONS EUROPEENNES

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I

Une analyse des méthodes de recherche adoptées pour l'étude des institutions européennes et des programmes prévus à cet effet doit tenir compte des considérations préliminaires suivantes :

1. En ce qui concerne l'enseignement universitaire, les thèmes et les problèmes relatifs aux institutions européennes sont presque exclusivement étudiés dans les cours traitant de l'"organisation internationale" et de nature surtout juridico-intitutionnelle (institutions internationales, international organization, etc.). Actuellement, ces cours ne sont pas dispensés dans toutes les facultés que cet enseignement pourrait intéresser.

En France, la situation semble être la suivante. Des cours d'"institutions internationales" sont donnés dans les facultés de droit et d'économie, en première année, et c'est dans le contexte de ces cours que les étudiants reçoivent les premières notions concernant les organisations européennes.[1)] En quatrième année, ces notions sont complétées et approfondies par des cours spéciaux sur les organisations européennes où sont, tout particulièrement, mis en relief les thèmes et les problèmes relatifs aux Communautés européennes.

Dans certains cas et dans le cadre des cours de doctorat, un professeur d'institutions internationales enseigne le "droit communautaire".

Il est à noter, dès à présent, que dans ce système qui paraît être le plus complet, si l'on considère la situation qui semble caractériser les autres pays [2)], même si les problèmes européens sont enseignés en quatrième année dans un cours spécial, ces problèmes ont été considérés antérieurement, c'est-à-dire en première année, dans le contexte du phénomène d'organisation internationale à tendance universelle, et que le "droit communautaire" est enseigné par le professeur d'institutions internationales. Ces deux considérations préliminaires nous seront utiles plus loin lorsque nous aborderons le problème de la méthodologie.

En Italie, des cours d'organisation internationale sont donnés dans cinq facultés seulement dont trois facultés de droit (Bari, Milan et Padoue) et deux de sciences politiques (Rome, Université catholique de Milan). En outre, un cours d'"organisation économique internationale" est dispensé à la Faculté des sciences politiques de Padoue. Mais on prévoit, pour les prochaines années académiques, que d'autres facultés des sciences politiques et de droit donneront des cours d'organisation internationale. Il faut remarquer que ces cours, tous facultatifs, sont donnés par des chargés de cours, sauf à la Faculté des sciences politiques de l'Université de Rome où se trouve l'unique chaire d'organisation internationale.[3)]

Même en République fédérale d'Allemagne la situation semble loin d'être uniforme et cela est dû en grande partie à l'absence d'un Ministère fédéral de l'éducation nationale. De toute façon, aussi bien en ce qui concerne la République fédérale d'Allemagne que d'autres pays comme la Belgique, la Hollande, le Royaume-Uni, etc. - sur les systèmes desquels nous n'avons pas d'informations précises- les notes que la Dotation Carnegie a demandées à chacun des participants à cette conférence nous seront extrêmement utiles. Il importe seulement de mettre en lumière le fait que - d'après les informations dont nous disposons - le problème de promouvoir dans l'enseignement universitaire un plus grand intérêt pour les phénomènes de l'organisation

européenne est encore loin d'être résolu.

Même si dans certains cas, comme nous l'avons vu, la situation semble être positive, il n'en demeure pas moins que pratiquement jamais l'enseignement des disciplines traditionnelles n'a été organiquement restructuré et élargi à ce point.[4)]

2. Ce qui a été exposé ci-dessus nous permettra de mieux comprendre la situation telle qu'elle se présente au niveau post et extra-universitaire, tout au moins en ce qui concerne certains de ses aspects.

En premier lieu, il faut noter qu'il existe en Europe un nombre important d'instituts et de centres d'étude qui s'occupent de l'examen des problèmes juridiques, économiques et politiques européens.[5)] En second lieu, il faut relever que la plupart d'entre eux se concentrent dans deux pays : l'Allemagne et l'Italie où la situation au niveau universitaire enregistre des lacunes. De tels instituts (du moins les plus connus et les plus efficients, selon les informations dont nous disposons) sont, en effet, au nombre de 14 en République fédérale d'Allemagne, 9 en Italie, 4 en France, 4 en Belgique, 3 en Hollande, 2 en Grande-Bretagne et 2 en Suisse. En troisième lieu, on ne peut négliger le fait que les problèmes historiques et sociologiques européens ne sont presque jamais étudiés,[6)] alors que les problèmes économiques - suivis immédiatement par les problèmes juridiques et, dans une moindre mesure, par les problèmes politiques - sont le plus souvent traités.

S'il est vrai que toute cette floraison de centres d'étude dépend, en partie, d'une exigence qui n'est pas autrement satisfaite, il est aussi vrai que ce phénomène peut être interprété comme étant la preuve que l'objet de leurs recherches est tel qu'il ne peut pas être étudié,d'une manière autonome, au niveau des facultés. Nous nous contentons de mentionner ici ce point qui sera repris par la suite.

II

Ces simples considérations vont nous permettre de mieux analyser les méthodes et les programmes de recherche afin d'en tirer les conclusions qui s'imposent.

Au mot "méthodes", nous donnons ici une double signification : d'une part, nous entendons désigner le contexte matériel ou instrumental dans lequel d'effectue la recherche et, d'autre part, le cadre conceptuel, afin d'étudier à quel point de vue, dans quelle perspective et pour quelles finalités une telle recherche est entreprise.

En ce qui concerne le contexte matériel ou instrumental, le moyen le plus fréquent est la thèse de doctorat. Ce fait nous amène à faire au moins deux remarques qui mettent en lumière l'interdépendance qui doit exister entre la recherche et l'enseignement.

1. Puisque les thèses de doctorat semblent être le moyen quantitativement le plus important d'effectuer la recherche sur les sujets relatifs aux institutions européennes, il apparaît évident qu'il faille développer l'enseignement dans ce domaine ne serait-ce que dans le but d'orienter un nombre toujours plus important de personnes vers ce genre de recherche. Cette considération tient surtout compte du système universitaire italien où le cycle universitaire se termine, pour tous les étudiants, par une thèse de doctorat. Mais, même dans les systèmes où les cours de doctorat sont réservés à un nombre restreint d'étudiants, il n'y a certes personne qui ne se rende compte de l'importance qu'il y aurait à développer pour tous un tel enseignement.

2. L'observation selon laquelle la recherche sur ces questions est effectuée en majeure partie par des jeunes qui abandonnent l'université, et dont seulement un faible pourcentage se consacre à la vie académique, met en évidence que cette recherche, même quand elle atteint un niveau scientifique, n'est pas utilisée uniquement à des fins d'enseignement.

Ceci, au moins en partie, est démontré par le fait que bien rares sont les manuels traitant des différentes disciplines qui consacrent suffisamment de place aux sujets et aux problèmes nouveaux liés à l'existence et à l'activité des institutions européennes. Or, c'est un fait reconnu que les manuels, surtout dans les systèmes universitaires continentaux, sont l'unique indice sûr qui fasse état de la préparation des élèves dans chaque discipline.

Un autre instrument catalyseur des activités de recherche sont les séminaires et les réunions d'étude, suscités surtout et organisés par des instituts post et extra-universitaires qui, du moins dans une certaine mesure, les enregistrent en un volume d'Actes. Ces initiatives ont une importance considérable parce qu'elles suscitent l'intérêt des professeurs d'université sur des questions déterminées qui, auparavant, n'étaient pas souvent abordées. Mais il faut encore observer que, en majeure partie, les travaux présentés à ces réunions d'étude ne sont pas - pour des raisons évidentes - approfondis et complets, mais sont plutôt des schémas qu'il faudrait élaborer ensuite.

Les recherches effectuées en équipes sont d'un type particulier. Elles sont entreprises d'ailleurs, presque exclusivement à l'initiative et pour le compte d'instituts extra-universitaires ou par les institutions européennes elles-mêmes, ces dernières ayant développé récemment - et pour leur propre compte aussi - une activité de recherche qui peut être d'un extrême intérêt pour ceux qui se consacrent à l'étude de ces problèmes.

Les études des professeurs d'université faites dans le cadre de leur activité académique sont, au contraire, toujours accomplies à titre individuel[7)], et se présentent essentiellement sous forme d'articles de revue, d'essais, etc. plutôt que sous forme de monographies assez vastes.

Enfin, la méthode de l'enquête est très peu usitée, sinon par des instituts extra-universitaires et des institutions européennes qui donnent une importance majeure à un tel instrument. Ceci met en

lumière - s'il en était besoin - une tendance théorique et abstraite des études accomplies dans le cadre de l'université.

III

Nous en arrivons maintenant au sujet bien plus important et central du cadre conceptuel.

Ainsi que nous l'avons déjà dit, les institutions européennes sont surtout étudiées du point de vue économique et juridique.

En ce qui concerne les sciences économiques, il faut noter que les sujets traités s'attachent presque exclusivement à la politique économique, alors que rares ou relativement rares sont les études de théorie économique. Si un tel état de choses s'expliquent assez facilement, il ne se justifie guère dans la mesure où il reflète une conception abstraite de la théorie économique, Nous faisons ici abstraction de l'opinion de la majeure partie des spécialistes en économie politique selon laquelle le phénomène de l'intégration européenne ne joue qu'un rôle insignifiant pour la théorie économique. Ceux-ci soutiennent, en effet, que les nouvelles structures super-étatiques n'ont pas d'influence particulière sur les fondements de la doctrine économique puisque un système d'échanges internationaux, limités à un groupe d'Etats, ne différerait pas en substance d'un système qui englobe tous les Etats. Nous nous bornerons ici à souligner qu'on ne peut pas accepter la thèse de ceux qui soutiennent que le phénomène de l'intégration économique européenne n'a pas d'effet sur les théories,étant donné qu'une théorie a une structure logique qui lui est propre et, sur laquelle les événements extérieurs n'ont pas d'influence. S'il est vrai que la validité d'une théorie repose entièrement sur l'exactitude de ses hypothèses de base, il n'y a pas de doute néanmoins que le processus d'intégration européenne met en question certaines hypothèses, ce qui oblige à reconsidérer les théories afin qu'elles soient le plus possible à même de rendre compte de la réalité des choses, car c'est vraiment là leur fonction que d'expliquer la réalité.

Quand aux sciences juridiques, il convient de faire certaines remarques qui semblent fondamentales. A la lumière des travaux accomplis ou en cours il apparaît clairement que, lorsqu'on parle de "droit européen", on entend donner à une telle expression - du moins inconsciemment - une valeur de synthèse.

C'est-à-dire que "droit européen" peut signifier :

1. le droit des organisations internationales de la région européenne;

2. le droit des Communautés européennes ou "droit communautaire".

Par "droit communautaire", on entend :

a) le droit des Communautés européennes du point de vue institutionnel;

b) le droit des Communautés européennes du point de vue matériel;

c) le droit relatif à un "secteur" particulier des ordres juridiques des Etats membres, comblé par les normes communautaires lorsque les normes internes ne s'appliquent plus;

d) le droit uniforme (positif ou coutumier) des Etats membres;

e) le droit interne des Etats membres.

Cette subdivision qui peut sembler évidente, ne l'est pas en réalité : c'est la raison pour laquelle surgissent tant d'équivoques et d'incompréhensions entre ceux qui considèrent l'étude du "droit européen" comme tâche spécifique de l'internationaliste et ceux qui, par contre, la considèrent comme relevant du publiciste de droit interne et du privatiste, ou même d'un prétendu spécialiste de "droit communautaire". Bien souvent, en outre, on entend inclure dans cette expression l'activité que les communautés européennes déploient dans les secteurs les plus disparates (politique économique, politique sociale, finances, transports, etc.).

Or, nous pensons que l'on peut affirmer, sans besoin de démonstrations particulières, qu'il revient à l'internationaliste, et en particulier au spécialiste de l'organisation internationale,

d'étudier le droit des organisations internationales de la région européenne,[8] mais il est nécessaire que nous développions de façon convaincante la thèse selon laquelle le "droit communautaire" n'existe pas en tant qu'objet d'étude unitaire et autonome ainsi que le prétendent certains esprits qui se disent spécialistes d'une telle discipline.

En fait, du point de vue institutionnel, il va sans dire que le droit des communautés européennes - en d'autres termes l'ordre juridique interne, les organes, les pouvoirs, les actes de ces communautés, etc. - doit être étudié par le même spécialiste qui étudie - disons - l'ordre juridique interne, les organes, les pouvoirs, les actes de l'Organisation des Nations Unies ou du COMECON. Lui seul peut, en effet, élaborer une théorie générale des ordres juridiques des organisations internationales.

L'affirmation contraire faite sur la base du caractère de "supranationalité" des Communautés européennes est absolument sans consistance, car la "supranationalité" n'est pas un concept qui peut être défini du point de vue du droit, mais seulement du point de vue de la science politique.[9] De même, l'idée que l'ordre juridique communautaire ne peut constituer l'objet d'étude de la part d'un internationaliste - ses normes pouvant s'adresser et s'appliquer directement aux individus - n'est pas exacte, puisqu'elle oublie que les rapports entre l'ordre juridique international et les individus ne présentent pas un problème nouveau en droit international, mais que c'est plutôt cette dernière discipline qui doit se poser de nouveau le problème.

Du point de vue matériel, ou de l'établissement de normes, le droit des communautés européennes intéressera, selon les circonstances, les spécialistes des questions administratives, commerciales, fiscales, du travail, etc. En ce qui concerne les effets de cet établissement de normes sur les ordres juridiques internes, nous pensons qu'ils devront être étudiés par le spécialiste des questions constitutionnelles, avec l'aide de l'internationaliste, du moins jusqu'à un certain point.

Enfin, en ce qui concerne le droit des Communautés européennes (voir supra c) comme droit de tel "secteur" des ordres juridiques des Etats membres complété par les normes communautaires, comme droit uniforme des Etats membres (voir supra d), comme droit interne de tels Etats (voir supra e).[10] Nous nous contenterons ici de remarquer qu'il ne peut être étudié que selon la méthode comparative adoptée par les spécialistes des différentes disciplines.[11]

Il est opportun, maintenant, de mentionner que le droit des Communautés européennes serait - d'après certains[12] - "la branche du droit qui - sans négliger les rapports avec les organismes internationaux existants - a pour but d'approfondir systématiquement non seulement l'étude des traités institutifs des Communautés européennes, mais encore celui de l'évolution juridique qui suit la mise en application progressive des principes sanctionnés dans les traités, l'adoption des normes communautaires prévues par les traités eux-mêmes et l'interprétation de la jurisprudence (elle aussi communautaire, telle qu'elle est élaborée par la Cour de justice des Communautés) relative soit aux dispositions des traités soit aux normes et aux mesures édictées par les institutions des trois communautés".

Sans tenir compte d'autres considérations, il est opportun de faire quelques objections à une telle définition. En premier lieu, il semble qu'il y ait contradiction entre le fait de postuler l'autonomie scientifique du "droit des Communautés européennes" et le fait de lui attribuer aussi comme objet d'étude "les rapports avec les organismes internationaux existants", tâche qui revient clairement au droit international. En second lieu, "l'étude des traités institutifs des Communautés européennes" ne devrait pas être une longue description de leur contenu (comme, semble-t-il, on l'entend) mais plutôt une recherche de principe dans le cadre d'une théorie générale des ordres juridiques des organisations internationales (qui n'est certes pas la tâche du prétendu spécialiste de "droit communautaire"). En troisième lieu, l'étude "de l'évolution juridique qui suit...", implique l'adoption d'une méthode comparative de la part des spécialistes des différentes disciplines et non de la part d'un seul

spécialiste. De même, et enfin, afin d'assurer "l'interprétation de la jurisprudence" de la Cour relative "aux normes et aux mesures édictées par les institutions des trois Communautés", toute la doctrine d'un spécialiste d'une seule discipline ne pourrait être suffisante, alors que pour l'interprétation relative "aux dispositions des traités" il semblerait qu'il faille encore une fois avoir recours aux spécialistes du droit international.

Et maintenant nous allons commenter brièvement l'approche politique. Elle n'est pas encore bien développée et il lui reste un long chemin à parcourir par rapport aux analyses qui ont été faites sur les institutions européennes du point de vue économique et juridique.

La conception selon laquelle la science politique ne pourrait pas étudier les phénomènes qui dépassent les limites des structures nationales constitue - ici sur le continent - un obstacle fondamental au développement des recherches effectuées dans cette perspective.

A ce propos et par rapport à l'intégration européenne, on a affirmé [13] que l'approche politique "désigne la formation d'une union nouvelle à partir d'unités de base distinctes. Elle se place précisément à mi-chemin entre unités séparées et autorité politique commune. De ce fait, elle sort du champ des relations internationales sans pénétrer dans celui de la science politique. Celle-ci, en effet, concentre ses analyses sur le gouvernement des sociétés politiques et, du même coup, demeure prisonnière des structures nationales. D'où le dilemme : déformer la réalité pour les besoins de la science ou adapter la science politique aux dimensions européennes".

L'auteur de ces lignes n'hésite pas à donner sa réponse en affirmant que la science politique a devant soi une occasion unique dont elle doit profiter : celle du processus in fieri de l'intégration européenne qui constitue un exemple macroscopique et vivant de transition des formes étatiques à une forme fédérative. En retardant,si peu soit-il, une telle analyse, on risquerait de perdre une occasion unique.

Nous adhérons pleinement aux affirmations de cet auteur. De plus, celles-ci nous invitent à nous demander si ce qui est possible au niveau "communautaire" le serait aussi au niveau des organisations internationales à tendance universelle. On pourrait, en effet, objecter - si l'on pense aux limites traditionnelles de la science politique - que cette dernière ne peut guère s'étendre beaucoup au-delà du contexte étatique. Quant à nous, il nous semble pouvoir donner à cette question une réponse positive surtout si l'on remarque que le phénomène du pouvoir dans les sociétés - objet de la science politique - comporte de nombreux aspects, se présentant, en effet, comme pouvoir politique, économique, moral, etc. Or, il est bien certain - et il n'est pas nécessaire d'en donner des exemples - que les organisations internationales peuvent être considérées comme des centres de pouvoir. Il suffit de penser - par exemple - à l'incidence que l'Organisation des Nations Unies et les organisations internationales en général ont sur la formation, le développement et le déroulement des activités politiques nationales, et en particulier sur l'évolution de la politique extérieure des Etats. Il n'est certes pas besoin d'insister ici sur le fait que les relations qui existent entre la politique étrangère et les organisations internationales s'effectuent dans les deux sens suivants : l'un, selon lequel les organisations internationales sont conditionnées par certaines conceptions, décisions et actions de politique étrangère; l'autre, selon lequel la politique étrangère est à son tour conditionnée par l'autonomie inévitable des institutions internationales, qui peuvent, à juste titre, être définies comme "l'aile marchante" de la conscience des peuples.[14)]

Il n'y a pas de doute qu'une compréhension plus complète du concept de supranationalité pourrait être obtenue par la contribution du spécialiste de science politique. Certains ont en effet observé que les relations internationales peuvent être caractérisées par trois niveaux : a) la recherche du compromis sur la base du plus petit dénominateur commun (niveau de la diplomatie traditionnelle);

b) la médiation offerte par les organisations internationales afin de permettre aux parties en cause de se rencontrer "à mi-chemin" (niveau des organisations intergouvernementales non particulièrement investies de pouvoirs concrets); c) le fait de donner une priorité aux intérêts communs sur les intérêts particuliers (niveau des Communautés dites "supranationales").

Nous voudrions ici souligner que, si par "supranationalité" on entend - de prime abord - la titularité, prévue par les statuts institutifs ou bien acquise, de la part des organisations internationales, de pouvoirs soustraits à la libre disponibilité des Etats membres, on ne peut méconnaître, dans cette nette tendance des organisations internationales (non définies comme "supranationales") à prendre en charge des tâches toujours plus vastes et importantes, la présence d'un coefficient de "supranationalité". Pour ne donner qu'un exemple, on peut observer la tendance - ce qui n'est même pas démenti par la succession des personnes - du Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies à assumer des pouvoirs politiques et à prendre des initiatives non prévues aux termes de la Charte. L'analyse de ce lent processus pourrait porter à conclure que la "supranationalité" qui caractérise les institutions communautaires, bien que beaucoup plus évidente et concrète en raison du caractère "constitutionnel" des traités de Paris et (surtout) de Rome, se place - naturellement à l'avant-garde - dans le cadre de l'évolution générale qui modifie le poids spécifique des organisations internationales.

En ce qui concerne l'investigation sociologique, elle est pratiquement négligée, à l'exception de quelques cas très rares. Contentons-nous ici de dire que l'étude sociologique des relations internationales est très probablement "le seul moyen de former des techniciens capables d'assurer le fonctionnement du mécanisme international" et d'assurer la formation de l'homme cultivé de notre temps qui "ne peut, sans faire voeu de cécité, renoncer à connaître son propre monde qui est toujours plus à base sociale. La cosmologie du XXe siècle est une cosmologie sociale et la société internationale

en est une des données fondamentales".[15)]

On a aussi affirmé - toujours à ce propos - qu'une sociologie des relations internationales risque d'arriver trop tard en ce sens que "la poussée des événements a déjà contraint à une action pratique sur le plan d'une sociologie appliquée". Il suffit de se rappeler certaines des initiatives du Bureau international du travail, de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture, de l'UNESCO, des Communautés européennes, dont les résultats pourraient même subir le préjudice de la "carence d'une étude scientifique unitaire".[16)]

Enfin, en ce qui concerne l'investigation historique, on a l'impression que, bien qu'il existe de remarquables ouvrages d'histoire politique, économique, ainsi que de la pensée politique de l'Europe, dont les auteurs sont des professeurs d'université et, dans quelques rares cas, des équipes de spécialistes, par contre, les contributions dues à des thèses de doctorat sont très rares, pour ne pas dire inexistantes. Ce type d'études procède en effet plutôt lentement, non pas à cause du peu de documentation (il arrive qu'elle soit parfois abondante), mais surtout par manque d'encouragement (on dit souvent que cette matière n'est pas particulièrement prisée par les Commissions académiques d'examens). C'est là,peut-être, l'explication du manque presque absolu de thèses de doctorat sur ces thèmes). Dans ce cas, il apparaît évident que la recherche est conditionnée par la situation qui existe au niveau de l'enseignement.[17)]

Avant de parler très brièvement des programmes, qu'il nous soit permis de faire deux remarques de caractère général relatives à ce que nous venons de dire sur le problème de la méthodologie.

En premier lieu, on notera que la recherche sur les institutions européennes est dirigée par des spécialistes de différentes disciplines. Il n'existe pas, en somme, un nouveau type de juristes qui puisse aspirer à monopoliser le titre de spécialiste en droit européen (ou communautaire), conçu comme une nouvelle discipline organique qui ait une autonomie scientifique. Ceci,du reste,apparaît

bien naturel si l'on tient compte du fait que "le rapport entre l'ordre communautaire et l'ordre interne des Etats membres est un rapport d'intégration, et non certes, de séparation".[18] Du reste, le problème ne se pose même pas pour les économistes et pour les historiens; et c'est certainement là une des meilleures preuves visant à exclure que le même problème soit légitime quand il se réfère au domaine juridique.

En second lieu, il faut observer que le problème des rapports des institutions européennes avec le reste du monde, et en particulier avec les autres organisations internationales, est, dans l'ensemble, plutôt négligé. On tend, en d'autres termes, à voir les problèmes typiquement européens hors d'un contexte plus vaste dans lequel ces derniers pourraient trouver leur vraie dimension et leur sens spécifique.

IV

Quant aux programmes, nous ne pensons pas qu'il soit utile que nous nous étendions ici sur les activités, les projets, les tendances, puisque, en parlant des méthodes, nous avons abordé implicitement ce point. Il nous semble plus important de souligner dans quelle direction il serait plus opportun que l'on oriente les recherches des universités et des instituts post et extra-universitaires. Ce que les programmes ne prévoient pas encore, ou ne prévoient pas de manière suffisante, nous apparaîtra mieux de ce fait.

C'est précisément parce que nous ne prétendons pas avoir donné une réponse définitive au problème de l'autonomie scientifique de ce que l'on appelle droit européen ou communautaire, qu'il nous semble nécessaire d'approfondir les recherches visant à écarter les équivoques conceptuelles qui sont encore très graves dans ce domaine et qui découlent du fait qu'une étiquette a été donnée bien avant que le contenu ait été individualisé. Il faut, en d'autres termes, chercher à individualiser un champ de recherche, c'est-à-dire un

éventuel contenu autonome de ce droit européen ou communautaire (ainsi que de toutes les "disciplines" qui, par l'adjonction de l'adjectif "européen" prétendent se différencier scientifiquement des disciplines traditionnelles; il faut individualiser les sources sur lesquelles la recherche doit s'appuyer, parce que l'individualisation des sources constitue un apport essentiel à une meilleure définition de chaque discipline et à l'éventuelle reconnaissance de son autonomie.[19] C'est donc une heureuse initiative du Centre européen de la Dotation Carnegie que d'avoir organisé cette deuxième "conférence sur l'organisation internationale" dont les résultats - comme ceux de la rencontre de 1960 - risquent d'avoir des conséquences sur le cours des recherches qui pourront alors adopter des critères méthodologiques plus rigoureusement précisés et des priorités instrumentales devant aboutir à une connaissance du phénomène plus rapide et plus sûre.[20]

En outre, on reconnaît la nécessité de coordonner les recherches soit par une initiative qui tend à comparer synthétiquement les principaux travaux accomplis (selon l'ordre des matières) - initiative qui serait de très grande utilité en vue d'une mise à jour des manuels - soit par la création d'un service ayant les fonctions de clearing house de la recherche scientifique en cette matière.

V

Nous ne pouvons pas, au moment où nous allons conclure ce rapport très sommaire, ne pas parler de l'enseignement des institutions européennes, parce que nous pensons que la recherche et l'enseignement sont deux moments de l'activité universitaire très difficilement dissociables.

A notre avis, l'organisation européenne peut et doit être enseignée : a) dans le contexte des cours d'organisation internationale; b) dans le contexte des disciplines traditionnelles; c) exceptionnellement, dans certains secteurs bien définis et qui ont un caractère de nouveauté absolue, au moyen de cours autonomes : citons comme exemple le droit nucléaire, dont les normes sont pratiquement

uniformes, au moins dans tous les Etats membres des Communautés.

Certains pensent que, si l'on était sûr que les organisations européennes ne dépassent pas le stade de développement auquel elles sont parvenues, on pourrait - avec un peu d'effort et quelques accomodements - insérer la matière relative à l'organisation européenne dans le cadre des programmes académiques actuels (qui ne comprennent pas de cours ad hoc sur les institutions européennes); mais que, si les institutions européennes représentent - comme cela semble être le cas - une phase transitoire, il devient alors évident que les instruments actuels, qui déjà sont de nos jours insuffisants, le seraient demain plus encore, et qu'il faudrait donc parvenir à un enseignement autonome de la matière. A cette thèse nous objecterons que c'est justement parce que nous croyons que les institutions européennes évoluerons vers des formes fédératives qu'une étude ad hoc des problèmes de l'intégration européenne ne se justifie pas.

Le phénomène de l'organisation européenne, en d'autres termes, doit être vu - au niveau institutionnel - dans le contexte de l'organisation internationale à tendance universelle dans lequel il trouve - comme nous l'avons déjà dit - sa propre dimension et son sens spécifique. Il devrait donc être enseigné dans le cadre d'un cours d'organisation internationale qui fournirait les catégories générales d'interprétation pour l'étude des différentes organisations internationales. De cette façon seulement, on pourra évaluer avec plus de précision la fonction d'avant-garde que le processus d'intégration européenne et les structures communautaires réalisent des différentes formes d'intégration régionale extra-européennes, et même des formes et des modes de la coopération internationale à tendance universelle.[21)]

En ce qui concerne l'étude des problèmes de secteur, la solution consiste - comme nous l'avons déjà dit du reste - dans la réévaluation qualitative plutôt que quantitative du contenu des disciplines traditionnelles qui pour une raison ou une autre se ressentent du processus d'intégration européenne. Il devient dès lors

indispensable de reviser certains principes théoriques.

Nous nous permettons d'espérer que ces lignes pourront susciter un débat fécond qui, par la richesse de ses suggestions, suppléera aux lacunes de ces notes. Elles traitent trop rapidement, en effet, d'un sujet qui aurait mérité une plus longue réflexion.

Mai 1964

Umberto Gori

N o t e s

1) Voir par exemple Claude-Albert Colliard, Institutions internationales, Paris, Dalloz, 1956, pp. 352-408 et 454-456; Paul Reuter, Institutions internationales, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1962, pp. 280-295.

2) La raison pour laquelle ces cours sont donnés en France dans toutes les facultés tient surtout du fait que, dans ce pays, l'uniformité des programmes universitaires est obligatoire.

3) Il existe en outre: un cours libre d'organisation internationale post-lauream donné - en collaboration avec la Société italienne pour l'organisation internationale - à la Faculté de droit de l'Université de Florence; un cours libre sur la "Protection de la population et des travailleurs contre les radiations ionisantes" donné à la Faculté de droit de l'Université de Bologne; et un séminaire sur les transports dans le Marché commun à l'Université de Trieste.
Tous les cours sont donnés par des spécialistes de droit international. Au moment où nous écrivons, il n'existe pas encore de libero docente en organisation internationale; mais il faut ajouter que prochainement un concours sera ouvert en faveur de cette discipline.

4) A ce propos, des résultats significatifs ressortent de l'enquête sur "L'Université et la Communauté européenne", menée à bien par la Société italienne pour l'organisation internationale (SIOI), à l'initiative et pour le compte du Service de presse et d'information de la Communauté européenne.

5) En voici une liste, tant soit peu complète (pour les finalités et les activités de la majeure partie d'entre eux, voir Recherches et études universitaires sur l'intégration européenne, Institut de la Communauté européenne pour les études universitaires, Bruxelles, no 1, 1963) : Belgique, Bruges : Collège d'Europe; Bruxelles : Centre interuniversitaire de droit comparé; Liège : Institut d'études juridiques européennes; Louvain : Institut de recherches économiques, sociales et politiques; - France, Nancy : Centre européen universitaire; Paris : Centre universitaire d'études des Communautés européennes; Centre français de droit comparé; Strasbourg : Centre universitaire des hautes études européennes; - Italie, Genova : Istituto di economia internazionale; Milano : Centro internazionale di studi e documentazione sulle Comunità europee; Istituto Giangiacomo Feltrinelli; Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale; Roma : Istituto di studi europei

"Alcide De Gasperi"; Istituto di studi sul lavoro; Scuola di perfezionamento in studi europei; Società italiana per la organizzazione internazionale; Torino : Institut universitaire d'études européennes; - Hollande : Amsterdam : Europa-Institut; Leiden : Europa-Institut; Utrecht : Het Economische Instituut van de Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht; * - République fédérale d'Allemagne : Bonn : Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik; Frankfurt-am-Main : Institut für Ausländisches und Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht; Freiburg-in-Breisgau : Seminar für Vergleichendes Handels - und Wirtschaftsrecht; Institut für Offentliches Recht; Hamburg : Institut für Wirtschaftsintegration; Max-Planck-Institut Ausländisches und Internationales Privatrecht; Seminar für Oeffentliches Recht und Staatslehre; Kiel : Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel; Köln : Institut für das Recht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften der Universität Köln; Forschungsinstitut für Politische Wissenschaft und Europäische Fragen der Universität zu Köln; Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik an der Universität Köln; München : IFO-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung; Tübingen : Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Förderung der Forschung auf den Gebieten des Europäischen Rechts un der Europäischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen; Saarbrücken : Institut d'études européennes de l'université de la Sarre; - Royaume-Uni : Edinburgh : Committee on European Community Studies; London : The Royal Institute of International Affairs; - Suisse : Genève :Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales; Institut universitaire d'études européennes; Lausanne : Centre de recherches européennes de l'Université de Lausanne.
Il convient, néanmoins, d'observer que, au moins en ce qui concerne l'Italie, certains de ces instituts exercent leur activité au niveau de l'enseignement ou de l'information (cours d'information plus ou moins longs, conférences, tables rondes, etc.).

* Volkenrechtlelijk Instituut van de Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht.

6) A la seule exception, semble-t-il, de l'Istituto Giangiacomo Feltrinelli de Milan où l'on étudie uniquement des problèmes de ce type.

7) Ceci prouve, entre autres, l'importance que peuvent avoir les instituts extra-universitaires pour l'étude interdisciplinaire des différentes questions.

8) Sauf, bien entendu, lorsqu'il faut considérer les conséquences de certaines dispositions conventionnelles sur les ordres juridiques internes. Par exemple, c'est au spécialiste des questions constitutionnelles que revient la tâche d'évaluer les effets de l'admission du "recours individuel", qui caractérise le système instauré par la Convention européenne pour la sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales, sur le rapport citoyen-Etat tel qu'il est conçu traditionnellement.

9) Voir infra, pp. 11-12.

10) Voir supra, p. 7.

11) On peut dire que les finalités des études juridiques comparatives semblent être au nombre de quatre :
a) finalités pratiques (l'étude de la législation d'un Etat plus ou moins contigu pour s'informer de l'adaptation de son système juridique aux nouvelles contingences);
b) finalités théorico-scientifiques (élaboration d'une philosophie du droit, recherche de notions abstraites et de concepts communs);
c) finalités politiques (unification du droit et harmonisation des législations);
d) finalités ethiques (meilleure compréhension internationale grâce à une considération plus impartiale de son propre système juridique).
En ce qui concerne l'examen du droit des pays membres des Communautés européennes, la finalité politique est prioritaire, ainsi qu'il résulte clairement du chapitre 3 du titre I du traité institutif de la Communauté économique européenne (art. 100-102).

12) N. Catalano (ancien juge à la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes), Manuale di diritto delle Comunità europee, Milan, 1962, p. 3.

13) Dusan Sidjanski, Dimensions européennes de la science politique, Paris, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1963, p. 2.

14) Il est à noter que - au moins dans un certain sens - ce qui est "science politique" appliquée au phénomène de l'organisation internationale devient, au niveau des écoles primaires et secondaires, éducation civique internationale. C'est donc dans l'université que résident les bases essentielles d'un enseignement généralisé (c'est-à-dire à tous les niveaux) de la science politique, qui "cesserait d'être ainsi un problème exclusivement scientifique pour prendre l'aspect d'un véritable problème de paix". Voir Lazare Kopelmanas, La science politique contemporaine; Contribution à la recherche, la méthode et l'enseignement, Paris, UNESCO, 1950, p. 654.

15) Jacques Vernant, "Verso una sociologia delle relazioni internazionali" dans Mondo Aperto, février 1953.

16) Edoardo Andreoli, "Contributo per una sociologia delle relazioni internazionali" dans Mondo Aperto, avril 1953.

17) Au moins en ce qui concerne l'Italie, le nombre limité de chaires d' "histoire contemporaine" qui sont au nombre de 4 - par rapport aux nombreuses chaires d'histoire ancienne et médiévale, histoire moderne, histoire du "Risorgimento", etc. - joue un rôle important. Rares sont aussi les chaires d'histoire des traités et de politique internationale qui semble cependant être la discipline la plus apte à traiter ces problèmes.

18) Riccardo Monaco, Primi lineamenti di diritto pubblico europeo, Milan , 1962, p. 62.

19) A notre avis, on pourrait parler d'une discipline autonome seulement dans la mesure où il serait possible d'élaborer une théorie générale des modifications qui se produisent dans les Etats membres en suite de la mise en application progressive des traités institutifs des Communautés. Mais cela pourrait tout au plus se vérifier seulement après que les recherches spécialisées accomplies dans le contexte des différentes disciplines soient parvenues - ce qui n'est pas le cas - à des résultats concluants. Mais, dans ce cas même, il est fort douteux que cette nouvelle discipline puisse être définie comme fondamentalement juridique et, partant, être considérée comme "droit".

20) En ce qui concerne la Société italienne pour l'organisation internationale, elle a en cours un programme complet de réunions d'étude qui devrait, entre autres, établir de quelle façon il serait possible de donner dans le cadre de l'enseignement universitaire une plus grande attention aux problèmes posés par le phénomène de l'organisation internationale.

21) Nous avons traité cet argument très rapidement parce qu'il dépasse les limites de notre exposé.

CENTRE EUROPÉEN DE LA DOTATION CARNEGIE
GENÈVE

2

CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Bellagio, June 12-16, 1964

THE EUROPEAN REGIONAL SUB-SYSTEM, ITS RELATION TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND ITS EFFECT ON THE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

By Stanley Hoffmann

The studies devoted to Western European integration have reached a remarkable level of sophistication : thanks in particular to the work of Ernst B. Haas we dispose of an empirical theory of considerable analytic power and predictive ambition. Studies devoted to the Atlantic alliance have not displayed the same conceptual brilliance, for reasons which it would be interesting to investigate in another forum; however, there are some respectable works which examine the state and the problems of the alliance. What is missing, on the whole, is the study of the linkages between the European experiment and the Atlantic alliance, the study of their mutual impact.[1)]

Why this gap exists is easy to understand. E.D.C., the single foray of the Western European nations into military integration - which raised immediately the problem of Europe's role in NATO - ended in failure. Thus it became possible to analyze the experiment of the Six as an economic process - and I want to emphasize both those words. It was the process which most of the authors examined : how are the six nations interacting so as to reach joint decisions or to delegate decisions to new central organs or to transfer their expectations and political activities to a new center ? [2)] The emphasis on the process led to a certain neglect

of the context, or at least to a view of the context that may have been too selective : it certainly left out the connection with the Atlantic alliance. Also, the Western European nations have concentrated on economic and social functions - broadly speaking, they have sought integration through welfare. Until recently, these were not functions which the Atlantic alliance stressed within its own realm.

The gap is no longer tolerable. For, on the one hand, the very success of European integration in the sphere of economics has led the United States to put matters of tariffs and trade at the center of Atlantic concerns; on the other hand, the recovery of Western Europe has led at least some Europeans to demand that their nations carry the enterprise of integration from the realm of welfare into the realm of power. It is not exaggerated to say that the very future of the European experiment is now commanded by the problem of its relations to the Atlantic alliance. With the benefit of hindsight, we can assert that this was inevitable, given the nature of international relations : despite bold hopes and lofty words, we still live in a world in which nations, or groups of nations, compete for power, influence, prestige and ideas; in which there is a hierarchy of the strong and the weak; in which the mighty usually try to preserve their eminence, and the weak often want to rise; in which the problem of who commands remains crucial. Consequently, the relations between the Six and the Atlantic alliance were bound to be uncomfortable. For the Atlantic alliance, underneath its complexities, is a configuration of a most traditional type : an association of nations which accept, within certain limits, to align their military and their foreign policies under the leadership of a predominant member, the United States. It is a hegemonial alliance - not an empire, since the members preserve their formal sovereignty, their domestic autonomy and even a considerable margin of freedom in their foreign and military policies, but not an association of equals either, because of the preponderance of one member, which

leads within the alliance to some of the usual "domination effects". Thus, the dominant member tends to see himself as the guardian of the general interest, and to think of the lesser members as more parochial and selfish. The weaker partners tend in some important matters to take the senior partner's advice as gospel, and his leadership for granted, for he has the better expertise and the broader horizon. The leading power is capable of developing within the other countries a clientele of statesmen who are convinced of the wisdom of its views. This may not be a fashionable way of looking at the Alliance; but it is both particularly difficult and absolutely essential to distinguish ideology and reality in this respect (and also to be aware of the ideological function of certain words like community or partnership). A commitment to certain values and ideals shared by Atlantic elites, a reasoned belief in the usefulness of the alliance should not be obstacles to scholarly analysis.

In this light, the Western European experiment can be compared - however tired the metaphor may be - to the proverbial iceberg that rises from the sea. For a long time, it rose from the depths but still under the surface; i.e. what happened among the Six was certainly important in determining the relations between them, but the rest of the world was not vitally affected. In the last four or five years, the iceberg has emerged. Consequently the whole enterprise takes on new dimensions; for the nations of the outside world, and especially the United States, are increasingly aware of the problems the iceberg creates for them, and thus would like to tame or control it. The different partners engaged in the enterprise, who now discover horizons they did not see as long as they were still operating under the sea's surface, also become more eager to control the process so as to steer the iceberg in directions which correspond to their interests - on which they do not agree. In other words, the tug-of-war roughens and uncertainties thicken.

All of this could have been foreseen. If it was not, it can be explained by the fact that the United States, when it gave

its blessing to the European enterprise, did not really envisage that its leadership might be challenged by the entity that it helped create, and by the fact that many Europeans, when they launched the experiment, did not think through its implications either. The United States encouraged integration for a variety of reasons : the conviction that the fusion of sovereignties in Western Europe would pacify a zone whose divisions had provoked two World Wars that shattered America's quiet; the desire to have in Western Europe a single partner capable of speaking with authority and of sharing America's burdens; but it was never really thought that the new partner might want to open a firm of its own instead of serving as the junior partner in America's mighty concern. As for the Europeans, their motives were mixed and manifold, but what came to prevail in the mix was, on the one hand, a somewhat mystical faith in political integration as an end in itself - a way of overcoming the poison of nationalism and the debility of the old nation states - on the other hand a rather pragmatic concern with solving step by step the concrete problems at hand, starting with those of economic life.[3)] In neither case was much clear thought devoted to what one might call the problems of ultimate direction, i.e. problems far more political than mystical, but of bigger scope and broader reach than the immediate ones : is Europe going to adopt a diplomacy of its own towards the USSR, Red China, the new nations ? Will it try to organize its defense in such a way as to lessen its dependence on the US ? Will its economy stress a preference for its members or adopt a more universalist and liberal stand ? All those problems raise the same, more general question : that of unity vs. diversity, of harmony vs. conflict in the Atlantic world.

II.

A look at the European "subsystem" today shows both the merits and the limits of Haas' theory of integration.

1. The "spill-over" process has continued to operate in the realm of welfare. Recent discussions over common agricultural policies and over a common stand on tariffs at the GATT conference have shown that, just as before, the Six manage to reach compromises which further integration in the double sense of promoting joint policies and of strengthening the common organs. In particular, the Commission of the EEC continues to play the role of the shaper of and spokesman for the common interest to which the governments are willy-nilly obliged to turn for elements of solution so as to avoid the alternative of deadlock and failure. As Haas has written, "the support for given steps rests on the convergence of expectations of the participants; competing expectations and goals can be compromised on the basis of swapping concessions from a variety of sectors, all under the generalized purview of supranational institutions and processes".[4)]

However, even within this realm, a number of difficulties have appeared.

a) In some sectors, "the 'spill-over' has turned into a trickle". The failure of the Six to agree on a common energy policy, the continuing resistance of Germany to any move that smacks of planning, the relative failure of Euratom indicate that "when the problem...represents an important fraction of the nations' resources or affects a well-organized interest or both, "there is no necessity for the ascending spiral of economic integration to unwind.

b) On the whole it has been easier for the Six to agree on "negative" than on "positive" policies, i.e. to eliminate tariffs, quotas, obstacles to competition or to mobility, than to take measures that require a more painful, deliberate and persistent transformation of existing practices (for instance against inflation).

c) The more the communities progress, the more difficult agreement tends to become. The difference between the two types of agreements which Haas calls "splitting the difference" and "upgrading the common interest" tends to vanish. The reasons are as

simple as they are serious. The whole spill-over process is a fiduciary operation : "you and I accept today a measure that gives us less than you and I have hoped for, because each of us expects our concession of today to be repaid tomorrow on another issue". Now, a day must come when the reckoning has to be done and the credit is exhausted. First, the more each partner has already obtained through past measures - i.e. the more the gains expected from integration have already been cashed in - the less he will be incited to make new concessions in anticipation of further gains. Thus Germany's reluctance to lower its farm prices is not unconnected with the fact that the lowering of tariffs on industrial goods within EEC has already brought great advantages to the Federal Republic. Success may be the worst enemy of spill-over, even within the realm of welfare. Secondly, the more the process develops, the less likely it is to affect only or mostly sectors in which all parties have convergent expectations of gains : this is clearly not the case in agriculture. Consequently compromises have to range over a variety of sectors, and conform increasingly to the pattern of do ut des (sometimes rechristened "synchronization") - and such compromises are likely to involve exchanges of immediate benefits rather than expectations of future gains. Thirdly, both of the difficulties I have just mentioned are aggravated once the process reaches issues which affect inextricably the realm of power and high politics as well as the realm of welfare : here again, "spill-over" compromises may be capable of delaying choices for a while, but there must be a time when ambiguities have to be cleared : at which point agreement becomes much more difficult, and progress may stop or fizzle out altogether. Thus the earlier rejection of the Free Trade Area in favor of a more "closed" community of the Six but one nevertheless endowed with a relatively liberal external tariff did not answer once and for all the question of how "outward-looking" in its trade policies the Community would be; the answer to this question is commanded in part by conflictive expectations and desires about membership in the Community. Similarly German concessions

to France in the drafting of the EEC treaty may have been motivated by the expectation of further progress toward political integration; when it becomes clear that such progress is blocked, German willingness to keep making concessions, say, on agriculture, necessarily declines.

None of this suggests that economic integration will fail. But it indicates that, contrary to a famous French proverb, the first steps may be the easiest ones : the bigger the functional scope of integration, the more interests members tend to see as vital are likely to be at stake - and the less smooth the process may become.

2. Let us forget temporarily about the grains of sand that may slow down the machine in the realm of welfare. In the areas of industry, trade and even to some extent agriculture, monetary policy or cartels, where there are at least cooperation and efforts toward unification, the Six can be seen as a unit, under a singular mixture of central and separate, but coordinated institutions. None of this is true in the realm of high politics.

> "When the functions are concerned with the ineffable and intangible issues of 'Grosspolitik',when grandeur and prestige, rank and security, domination and dependence are at stake, we are fully within the realm of traditional interstate politics. There are no actors, no constituents, other that the governments. The discontinuity between the 'material' realm and that of military and foreign policy amont the Six has been striking. It has been said that supranational bodies like the Common Market Commission make possible among nations the elaboration of majority decisions with objectivity, in contrast to majority rule, say, in the UN; for the supranational organ provides and pressures the separate nations' representatives with proposals that take only the common interest into account. The trouble is that in the range of higher politics such objectivity becomes almost impossible. The bigger the stakes, the less applicable the method that consists of flooding the common interests with light and leaving the conflicting ones in the dark. For not only is this separation highly artificial and distorting, but the very nature of interstate competition pushes the spotlight back on the conflicting interests. There may be harmony when the nations' interests are identical and deals when they diverge, but it is hard to define a 'common' and superior interest detached from those of the states."[5)]

As Raymond Aron has shown recently, each one of the Six has his own conception of what the national interest requires with respect to security and foreign policy.[6] Americans sometimes lament that the Six were more united on these subjects ten years ago : this is both true (within certain limits) and irrelevant, for what sharpens the divergence today is the newly acquired possibility for certain Western European nations to play a role again in areas once reserved to the United States. In 1952-1953, the more enthusiastic "Europeans" wanted to promote a Political Community so as to accelerate both the development of economic integration and the establishment of a Defense Community that would not have challenged at all America's strategic predominance. Today, economic integration proceeds under its own steam, and the creation of a Political Community depends on whether the nations of Western Europe will be capable of agreeing in defining a policy toward the US.

III.

Indeed, Western Europe's relation to the US is at the heart of all the important issues discussed among the Six at the present time :

1. In the EEC the two main current issues are the elaboration of a common agricultural policy and the definition of a common stand on tariffs for the so-called Kennedy round of GATT. In both cases, what is at stake is the possibility for the US and for nations (especially underdeveloped ones) whose well-being is an object of major concern for the US, to export their industrial and their farm products to Europe without being stopped by a wall of protection. This is what is involved in the battle of clichés which oppose an "inward-looking" and an "outward-looking" Europe.

In those areas, the maneuvers and decisions of recent months have shown that the EEC is both a force and a stake. It was precisely the economic strength which it represents and the threat

which it constitutes as a rival of the US, that led President Kennedy to promote the Trade Expansion Act. The pressure to which the EEC has been submitted on those issues by the US has tended to make of the Community an even more real force, since the members have agreed on the need to adopt a common stand at the GATT conference, i.e., to define a common policy once again and to let the Commission play an important role both in this definition and in the negotiations with the US. On the other hand, the divisions among the Six have provided the US with good opportunities for trying to influence the course of the Community; for on both issues, there exists a measure of convergence of interests between the US and West Germany. The results have been ambiguous : the Six have indeed succeeded to a large degree in closing their ranks but they have adopted a moderate position on the problem of disparities in tariffs, and the implementation of a common agricultural policy that would tend to replace farm products from outside the Six with French ones on the German market continues to be delayed by German resistance. Such resistance is explainable by domestic German factors, to be sure; but the pressure from the outside makes it possible for Mr. Erhard to present Germany's position as motivated by the desire to preserve the German market for the agricultural exports of non-members.

2. It is in the area of political integration that the problem of the relations with the US dominates the scene most imperatively. Here, we are faced with a paradox : all the statesmen of the Six agree on the need to "crown economic integration" with some kind of political association; and yet no progress has been made since the fiasco of EPC in 1953, repeated in 1962 by the failure of the "Fouchet plan".

a) It has been said that the movement toward political integration has been delayed by General de Gaulle's obstinate rejection of supranationality, but that the forces that push toward "regional government" are so strong that supranational institutions will ultimately spill over from the economic into the other spheres

(although perhaps in modest form). Ernst Haas has argued, subtly and powerfully, that supranationality corresponds exactly to the main economic component of the new Europe - industrialism - and to the prevailing style of political activity in Europe - collective bargaining with a strong participation by "technocrats". The new Europe is dominated by the welfare calculus; consequently designs (like de Gaulle's) inspired by a power-and-grandeur calculus are likely to lose their relevance just as the old ideologies have lost their appeal.

> Grandeur is merely a phrase left over from a pre-industrial setting... In a sense everything is political simply because the modern industrial system engenders public concern - if not control - over so many aspects of economic and social life. But by the same token there is no longer a distinctly political function, separate from economics, welfare or education, a function which finds its reason for being in the sublime heights of foreign policy, defense and constitution-making. (see n. 4)

This thesis appears to me as essentially mistaken, for many reasons. First, in no industrial society (certainly not in the US) has the distinct political function disappeared : if the welfare calculus prevailed, the defense budget, the space race, foreign aid would not have reached the astronomic heights at which they are. De Gaulle may be more concerned with those "sublime heights" than many, but no statesman - and certainly no statesman of a nation that can pretend to a significant role in world affairs or that is forced by events to be either a major actor or a major stake (like West Germany) - can afford to act on the basis of welfare calculations alone. Smaller nations can (within limits) - but only because the bigger ones cannot ; thus it is under the shelter of a big brother's political and military establishment that the small ones can apply the welfare calculus. But the protector soon tires of carrying the burden all by himself. Thus, there is everywhere an autonomous sphere of "high politics", which will exist as long as there is an international competition.

Secondly, not only is welfare not the single criterion of political action, but welfare often tends to be a means toward other goals. The question that the return to prosperity in Western Europe raises is, to what purposes is economic well-being going to be used ? Undoubtedly, certain statesmen (especially in the small nations) would be satisfied with leaving the costly functions of defense to others, such as the US, and with achieving prosperity for its own sake. However, many of the so-called Europeans including Mr. Monnet, as well as the General and his supporters, have higher ambitions for Europe. Thus the question becomes : will the welfare of the Six serve as the basis for a joint political action by a united Europe, or serve as the instrument which the separate nations of Western Europe will use for their separate political ends ? Precisely because there is a distinct political function, the economic wealth accumulated thanks (in part) to the Common Market may find itself used up for power purposes - a reverse kind of spill-over. And precisely because the Six remain politically disunited, this exploitation of resources may feed diversity rather than unity (cf. the force de frappe). Indeed, I would argue that there was more of a European "sense of community" in the "pre-industrial" days of postwar dejection and humiliation; prosperity has strengthened the nation-states along with the common enterprise.

Thirdly, the style of collective bargaining is sharply limited : on the one hand, it hardly extends to that sphere of "high politics" whose autonomy strikes me as evident; on the other hand, even in the economic and social sphere, where the various interest groups and the "technocrats" have undoubtedly played a major role in the process of integration, it is a mistake to forget that some of the actors are neither of the same kind nor at the same level as the others; I refer to the states or, if one prefers, the governments : for their decisions during the process are not explainable only in terms of pressures and counterpressures from interests; often, political calculations lead governments to take positions to which

powerful groups are hostile. "Welfare solutions" left to private groups would often be such as to penalize the consumers (cf. the pressure toward uniformly high farm prices); "welfare solutions" negotiated by the governments are likely to be more balanced and complex - thus the states are quite unlikely to leave the field to interested parties and experts alone. Moreover, the states' decisions are at the origin of the process itself; students of the universe's wanderingsought to remember that there was a creation first. In Europe's case, this creation - both in 1950, in Mr. Schuman's days, and in 1955, at the time of Messina - cannot be accounted for in "group" terms. (Cf. the passionate hostility of the French steel industry to the establishment of the ECSC).

Finally, both the welfare calculus and collective bargaining, even when they operate without inhibition, cannot fail to reach a stage at which "high politics" again takes over : the question of the geographical dimensions of the enterprise. The point must come (indeed, for the Dutch and for many Germans it has come) when the interest groups themselves wonder whether the geographical framework makes sense, whether they would not gain more by enlarging it (or on the contrary by making it absolutely clear that their competitors within the enterprise cannot hope for any enlargement). If welfare alone had been the goal, the limitation of the experiment to the Six would have been rather absurd. Nor are proposals for geographical extension based on economic calculations alone; once again we find unacceptable either the image of the irresistibly rising tide, or the idea of the necessary spill-over.

Thus, within well-defined limits, Haas' theory is valid; beyond those limits, it becomes an act of faith in a kind of modern saint-simonisme, as appealing and as erroneous as Saint Simon's gospel in his days.

b) If political integration cannot be seen as a necessary if delayed "spill-over effect", then it must be envisaged in its own terms. But this is far from simple. For its most immediate

and conspicuous terms are institutional - the contest between "supranationalists" and Gaullist "confederalists". On this subject, so much has been written that it would be impossible to add anything of interest. But what must be said is that it is to a large extent a faux débat, or rather a façade : the battle on procedure conceals a battle on substance. This is why it must be discussed carefully; for if de Gaulle's policy resided merely in a rigorous hostility to certain institutions, it might be wise to consider him (as so many US officials do) as just a passing aberration. But the fundamental problems he has raised risk being with us for a very long time - even if they will never again be posed so sharply - in part precisely because he has posed them and acted about them in his trenchant style, and in part because the evolution of world affairs would have raised them anyhow.

The proponents of supranationality operate on two assumptions : first, the obsolescence of the nation-state, i.e., the irrelevance of "independence" and sovereignty if not for all nations at least for those of Western Europe; secondly, the belief in the capacity of the supranational procedure to solve problems on which governments cannot agree if they are left to themselves (i.e., in 1957 no inter-governmental agreement on a farm policy would have been possible; in 1962-1964 such an agreement has become possible through the very process of the Common Market). Both assumptions could be called reasoned acts of faith. De Gaulle's opposition is based on the following grounds. First, his concern for the substance of European policies leads him to refuse a procedure which may produce policies opposite to those he wants for Europe, because he may not be able to exert sufficient control over the direction : i.e., the procedure leaves too much to chance, in an area he considers too vital for such gambling, and in which the national stands are so far apart that an outcome satisfactory for his views is not sufficiently assured. Secondly, he is convinced that in matters of vital interest for the states (such as diplomacy and strategy) majority rule is totally unrealistic; as for "technocratic" solutions based

on "upgrading the common interest" or on mutual concessions and fragmented bartering, they are impossible because of the difficulty of finding here a "common" interest other than the lowest common denominator, because these problems are not susceptible of quantitative bargaining, and because this whole area is one in which technical expertise is much less essential than in matters of economic and social policy. Thirdly, he believes that for all its weaknesses the independent nation-state that pursues its own policies is highly preferable to the nation "integrated" in an entity whose policies serve primarily the interests of others :

> for a given nation, the choice is not between its obsolescent sovereignty and a larger community or civilization; it still is what it always was... a choice between trying to be wherever possible the master of its fate and becoming the client or protégé of some other nation.[7)]

Thus, to put it bluntly, de Gaulle rejects supranationality both because he thinks it cannot work, and because he is afraid that if it works at all it would go against the policies he wants for France and Europe; precisely because what he advocates is so far from being accepted by the other Five, a procedure somewhat akin in his eyes to Russian roulette is intolerable. His opponents, precisely because they do not like his policies, would settle either for a supranational process in which his own will and freedom of maneuver would be diluted and canalized, or for an intergovernmental process in which Britain would participate, thus introducing into the enterprise a member capable of offsetting the General's leadership drive and of promoting policies closer to theirs than to his.

The effect of Gaullism has been to displace attention - rather rudely - from discussions on institutions to discussions on substance. The key problem for the General is : What <u>will</u> shall animate Europe. In his conception of politics, it cannot be the will of "technocrats", for "he disapproves of civil servants who, because they lack political sense and democratic responsibility or because

their experience is chiefly in the economic field, run the risk of deriving their inspiration from outside of Europe in matters of foreign and military policy",[8] especially since the overwhelming power and expertise lies across the Atlantic. Nor can it be the will of a parliamentary Assembly, for he doubts the capacity of any Assembly to define a coherent policy in such matters. Thus it must be the will of governments. But the only purpose of the enterprise, as he sees it, is to give to Europe a personality distinct from that of the US; otherwise there would be no point. Obviously, what is at stake is Europe's relation to the US; what is going on is a battle of state wills; de Gaulle tries to force upon a reluctant Europe a policy which he considers to be the only legitimate one for the continent, the US deems his policy destructive of the alliance as a whole and divisive for Europe. He sees in the US a power that tries, if not to keep Europe divided (for the record is obviously on the other side), at least to keep Europe subordinated; the US sees in him a man whose nationalism and methods delay the emergence of a united Europe and of a true Atlantic partnership. In this battle of wills, the following aspects have emerged :

— The other five are a kind of battleground in this contest. De Gaulle rejects as not really "European" the views of those governments which either do not want to loosen the ties between the US and Europe, or do not want to appear choosing French leadership against US leadership. As a result, it sometimes looks as if, almost by definition, the only "European" view, in de Gaulle's eyes, were de Gaulle's. The other statesmen of Western Europe do not take easily to such apparent arrogance. The strength of the General's position is also its weakness; among Europe's statesmen he is the only one who tries to find for Europe an autonomous international mission. The others either accept the United States' vision of a united Europe whose policies would not challenge those of the US and which would be bound to the US in an Atlantic partnership that would be Europe's main international dimension (although it has

rarely been more than one of the United States' arenas), or else they do not dare challenge openly America's conception. De Gaulle accepts the Atlantic alliance as a necessity for the present, but neither with respect to Eastern Europe and the hoped-for settlement with a "thawing" USSR, nor with respect to Europe's role in the underdeveloped countries does the General agree to placing an "Atlantic" harness on the European horse. As a result, the battle of clichés - "inward-looking" vs "outward-looking" - is an extraordinary contribution to confusion : de Gaulle is "inward-looking" insofar as he wants common European policies that tend, in economic matters especially, to establish a sort of European preference; but they are also "outward-looking" insofar as he proposes a bold European diplomacy and strategy in the world-at-large. What antagonizes many of his partners is not only the "inwardness" which disturbs various economic interests in Germany or Holland, but also the boldness and scope of his "outwardness"; for it shocks them out of the kind of slumber into which World War Two and decolonization have plunged Europe, and it also raises in them fears of the withdrawal of US protection.

— De Gaulle exploits in his diplomatic strategy not only France's regained economic strength and new political stability but also an asset that West Germany, the other major continental power - well-endowed in the first two respects - does not have : considerable freedom of maneuver, due to a privileged geographical position (i.e., France is not immediately behind the danger line), to the fact that no problem comparable to partition imposes any crippling imperatives and restraints on its diplomacy, and to the fact that due to a troubled past bold German initiatives could provoke a kind of Holy Alliance of Germany's ex-enemies (especially in the nuclear field) whereas France's initiatives do not. In other words, population and GNP figures are not all; West Germany is far more susceptible to punishments or denials than France. Here again, de Gaulle's strength is his weakness, for those very factors that keep German freedom narrow also keep Germany from embracing Gaullism.

— De Gaulle's veto of Britain was due to at least three factors that led him to question Britain's "European-veto". One was England's continuing preference for trade policies that reminded the French of the free trade area in which they feared that Western Europe's distinctive interests (i.e., especially the "joint policies" aspect of the enterprise, and the agricultural interests) might be drowned. Then England was thought to have encouraged the Benelux nations to reject the Fouchet plan - a move explainable only if England opposed de Gaulle's substantive policies, since the institutions suggested by the plan were exactly those to which England could most easily have acceded. Finally, England agreed as Nassau to put its nuclear force under American command and control.

— Having thus remained alone with partners reluctant to strengthen the bonds that, by linking them to him, might turn Europe into a Gaullist cage, de Gaulle plays a cool waiting game - waiting until the others accept France's position. Or rather, while he waits for the others to come around to him, he creates independently (and usually without consultation, especially since they have rejected his scheme of political cooperation) a situation that he hopes irreversible. His action has a double thrust : it tends to commit Europe willy-nilly to the policies he pushes (cf. his stand on a non-aggression pact with the Warsaw alliance and his rejection of the multilateral nuclear force; both make it difficult for the US to promote policies a more compliant Europe could have made possible). But his actions also tend to increase France's weight in Europe (cf. the nuclear striking force). His rationale is simple : to wait without doing anything so as to facilitate agreement and to smoothen ruffled feathers would be self-defeating, for it is not agreement for agreement's sake that interests him. Consequently, as long as the others do not say amen to his views, thus making his policies joint ones, he has to say "I" instead of we - or to pretend that "I" means "we".

— As a result, there is something of a vicious circle in the present situation and deadlock. De Gaulle wants the emergence of a "European Europe", but his tactics and his conceptions prevent the emergence of the only kind of Europe that could theoretically speak with one voice - a federated Europe. The General wants to speak for Europe; but it is a Europe which politically does not exist yet and which is often repelled by his imperious way of acting alone, of rejecting supranational integration, of promoting purely French policies and of upsetting the unwritten rules of the Community by resorting to vetoes and threats. However, the Gaullist argument is that at present a federated Europe would be either a sham (a façade behind which intergovernmental haggling would continue) or an entity incapable of reaching a policy of its own, and capable only of "following someone outside, who would have a policy; there would be a federator, but he would not be European".[9] In other words, the alternative to a Gaullist policy <u>for</u> Europe would be an American policy <u>in</u> Europe, either promoted by America's "clients" or filling the vacuum left by conflicting European policies that would cancel each other out. In the nuclear area, this clash of perspectives is particularly sharp; had de Gaulle accepted the MLF, the joint American-European nuclear force might have become the source of a later European force (including England) to which the US could relinquish its veto. On the other hand, de Gaulle prefers a <u>purely</u> French force that could <u>later</u> become the core of a European one to a joint Atlantic force whose "Europeanization" would have to be paid at a price which the US could ask for and exact. Thus the alternatives are once again, not a French force <u>or</u> a European one, but a <u>potentially</u> European force that is originally French or a <u>potentially</u> European one at the mercy of the US.

IV.

The problem raised by the current deadlock is that of its eventual resolution. Does the present crisis among Europeans over America's relations with Europe allow for any institutional development of the Community ?

1. Nothing serious prevents a streamlining of the existing institutions; the so-called fusion of the Communities will in all likelihood be accomplished, and it will probably be accompanied by an extension of the powers of the European Parliament, so as to increase "democratic" control over the "technocratic" organs. This change in the procedures is acceptable to all, precisely insofar as it implies no change in the policies. The new Commission would contribute to the working out of common policies exactly as in recent years, and since the functional scope of the new Community would not exceed the total of the functions of the three present ones, a Parliament not elected by direct universal suffrage could hardly be expected to behave like the National Assembly in 1789.

2. The decisive level thus remains the political one. Here, the future appears much more uncertain, for there are too many variables.

a) There is an American variable. In the military area, the more the US insists on the need for centralized control of nuclear weapons and on the dangers of nuclear proliferation, the more the construction of a "political" Europe will be delayed. Should the US accept the idea of a European force over which it would have no military veto nor political control (by contrast with the MLF), the process could on the contrary be hastened. Politically, the more the US seeks a détente with the USSR, the more it will tend to emancipate Europe from its "Atlantic" cast : for - paradoxically enough - both those Europeans who are afraid of new Yaltas and those who are eager to opt out of the cold war altogether would find in such a trend an invitation to assert Europe's distinctiveness. Thus the American variable leads to a Soviet one : as General de Gaulle appears to have surmised, a Soviet "thaw" is likely to benefit European solidarity.

b) There is a British variable. Should the next British government slam the door on Europe and either confirm the policy of nuclear "independence" under US control or liquidate Britain's nuclear policy, those continental Europeans who insist on

waiting for the British Godot before any political relance would be in a difficult position. To the extent to which Britain was "America's Trojan horse", any move by the horse which removes it from the gates is a boon to de Gaulle's policy.

c) There is a French variable. Much of what General de Gaulle has done - especially in raising the question of Europe's projet in the world - strikes me as irreversible. But whether he will succeed in his self-appointed role as Europe's midwife depends largely on his succession. Will France's new leaders be willing to play as bold a game of poker as he has ? Will they be capable of pursuing the highly expensive policies designed to give a French face to the new Europe, or to give France a legacy of independent strength should other Europeans refuse to follow her ? Much will depend on France's domestic health, and much on his successors' personal ideas.

There are, of course, other variables as well (one could rake up a whole series of "what ifs" with respect to West Germany - a favorite pastime in and around Washington). But if I had to make a purely personal guess (let us not call it a prediction), it would be that after General de Gaulle (not while he is in power) Western Europe will become increasingly Gaullist, if not in its institutions, at least in its policies. He may well be the Moses who drags Europe to the promised land, into which he cannot enter himself not only because of his age but because the others won't let him. Institutionally, a return to a subdued form of supranationality may become the key to an agreement on political cooperation. Substantively, I would be surprised if the policies on which the governments would agree (with the help of Community organs) would not go far in the directions indicated by the prophetic and active French leader (and should this be the case, then French willingness to trust supranational procedures would of course rise). For it seems to me that a whole series of convergent events point to a kind of political redemption of Europe (following its economic recovery) and to an increasing assertion of Europe's separateness : the end of Europe's

decolonization, and the beginning of America's "time of troubles" in Latin America and South East Asia; the end of the US nuclear monopoly (which raises questions not about America's commitment but about American stategy) and also the decline of the threat of "total" or "local" war (to use Mr. Khrushchev's categories); for whereas the former event poses the problem of the worth of America's guarantee while the latter raises that of the need for it, both tend to shake Europe's sense of dependence. Undoubtedly, it will be a slow process, and whether it will lead to a formal merger of sovereignties is hard to answer - especially since the very loosening of the blocs, the relaxation of the cold war and the return of prosperity remove some of the pressures toward integration. But what may be lost for a federal type of integration may be gained for a looser form of the so-called federalizing process.[10] And anyhow, cooperation and harmonization are the necessary preludes to a merger that could be not merely formal, but also meaningful in substance.

April 1964. Stanley Hoffmann

Notes

1) This paper should be read primarily as a long additional footnote to two essays in which I have tried to deal more systematically with the topic : "Discord in Community : The North Atlantic Area as a Partial International System", in Francis O. Wilcox and H. Field Haviland, Jr. (eds), The Atlantic Community (New York : Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 3-31; and "De Gaulle, Europe and the Atlantic Alliance", International Organization, vol. XVIII, No 1 (Winter 1964), pp. 1-28. It is in these essays that the reader will find an analysis of the various issues. This paper tries to reflect about them, rather than to analyze them all over again.

2) See Leon Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 1963).

3) See for instance Max Kohnstamm, "The European Tide", Daedalus, Winter 1964, pp. 83-108.

4) "Regional Government and the New Europe" (unpublished).

5) "Discord in Community", op. cit., p. 13.

6) "Old Nations, New Europe", Daedalus, Winter 1964, pp. 43-66.

7) S. Hoffmann, "Cursing de Gaulle Is Not a Policy", The Reporter, vol. 30, No 3 (January 30, 1964), p. 41.

8) "De Gaulle, Europe and the Atlantic Alliance", loc. cit., p. 5.

9) De Gaulle's press conference, May 15, 1962.

10) See Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government (New York : McGraw-Hill, 1963), ch. 32.

CENTRE EUROPÉEN DE LA DOTATION CARNEGIE
GENÈVE

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CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Bellagio, June 12-16, 1964

Da pag. 20 alla fine

FUNCTIONALISM AND ORGANIZATIONS

By Ernst Haas

Ernst Haas will finally be unable to attend the Conference on International Organization. This report is an excerpt from chapter four of his forthcoming book, entitled Beyond the Nation - Functionalism and International Organization. It is intended to be a contribution to the general discussion on the study of International Organization.

If systems are abstractions invented by the observer to render comprehensible a very complex world, organizations are very concrete entities, made of living people, divisions, hierarchies, budgets and programs. Functionalism thrives on organizations; neither the ideological nor the sociological variety of functional thought could live without concrete organizations as a field for projection and empirical study. We must complete our reformation of Functionalism now by relating it explicitly to the organizations whose conduct we wish to characterize in the context of international integration.

But what is an organization? Some treat it as a system, others as a polity, still others as analogous to a primary group

subject to all the esoteric qualities of group dynamics. Each definition seems to command a body of theory all its own, much as did the versions of systems and functionalism we encountered before. For immediate purposes let us note that organizations are the entities enclosed in the boxes which appear on our system diagram, the entities which convert purposes into functions or dysfunctions, the units that evolve the tasks which - if functionally successful - transform the existing international system into something new. Organizations, in this sense, are the flesh-and-blood sub-systems of the international system which, through their feedbacks, influence the parent system. But because they are flesh-and-blood they must be treated in far more human terms than the parental relationships we have examined thus far. This, in turn, requires an examination of modern organization theory to determine which of its many formulations will help in our task.

1.- Functionalism and Organization Theory

To begin with, let us recapitulate our objective. Eventually, we wish to examine one international organization, the ILO, in terms of its contribution to international integration. But we wish to do so only in order to observe in real life a formal entity of civil servants, experts, governments and voluntary group representatives which seems to approximate the optimal conditions for integration culled from functional analysis. This objective, furthermore, is merely instrumental in positing the kind of international organization which would seem required by functional imperatives in order to maximize integration; yet we also insist that this kind of organization be at least akin to the species represented by the United Nations. Our survey of the current literature of organization theory is made necessary by the desire to profit from the kindred ruminations of others, to match and apply their analytical schemes and empirical conclusions to the international field which constitutes a virgin wilderness from the viewpoint of organization theory. In so doing, of course, I am not proceeding as if the study of international organization were a tabula rasa. My examination of the literature and

my selection from it is guided by which I believe to know already about the nature and behavior of international organizations, before having submitted all of them to the test of integrative analysis. By resubmitting what I think I know to a sharpened focus compounded of empirical knowledge, theoretical assumptions validated - hopefully - by my argument about interest, groups, law, and the nature of systems, and a model of proper organizational behavior now to be developed, I hope to facilitate the prediction of functions advancing integration.

Novices venture recklessly where the expert fears to tread. Organizations have been studied "theoretically" by psychologists, sociologists, mathematicians, biologists and students of business and public administration. Yet there obviously is no generally recognized "theory" in this area any more than in the field of systems. Every student, though he draws on the findings of other students in the realm of data, prefaces his presentation with his own model, scheme, typology or "theory". Every basic definition is matched with a revised but equally basic definition, It may well be that no science can grow without undergoing this variety of sadomasochistic self-examination, but for the moment it obviously remains true that every student is his own theorist.[1] And from this fact the novice draws his courage.

Thus we confront the question : What is an organization ? The phenomenon, as Dwight Waldo found, " shades on one side into 'group', on the other into 'institution' or 'society'", depending on whether the vantage point of the observer is that of psychology or of sociology.[2] And his definitional conclusion is incontrovertible :

> In view of the inconclusiveness, the diversity, the amorphousness of the materials put under Organization Theory heading nowadays, one must conclude that, if they all concern the same elephant, it is a very large elephant with a generalized elephantiasis.[3]

If "organization theory" is taken to refer to generalizations about any human collectivity, using such analytical wedges as cybernetics, relational mathematics, or decision theory based on the theory of games, it will not serve our purpose. In Waldo's sense, then, we

must rather be interested in "theories of organization", devoted to the search for propositions at the more mundane level of administered organizations where the dominant concern could be over degrees of rationality in decision-making and goal articulation, power and hierarchy, instrumental and consummatory ends and means, the organization in its environment and in its relation to stability or change. But the emphasis on the constraining adjective "administered" may also be misleading for our purposes. To be sure, we wish to exclude primary groups, social institutions, social systems, "bureaucracies" in the abstract, factories, mental hospitals, prisons, parcel delivery services, and the routinized ordering of paper clips. The emphasis on administration is important but not sufficient. Insofar as it delimits scope and focusses attention on a specific structure with fixed internal relations it certainly narrows the field, but to the extent that it is dominated by internal structures it is likely to guide our attention more to the management and human relations aspects than is warranted in the international field.

Thus even the notion of "administered organization" includes too many varieties of the species and excludes a number of analytical features which are of primary empirical relevance in the case of international organizations. Hence I find it very difficult to make use of theories of organization without first specifying the nature of the context in which I wish to generalize.[4] That context is exceedingly political, diffusely penetrated with clashing interests, and subject to all the forces we summarized earlier in our schema of the Functionaliste revised separabiility doctrines. Hence there is every reason to treat our administered organizations as polities which respond to external demands, and which may develop into independent centers of power if the "proper" interaction with those demands is achieved through the manner in which the organization is administered. Administration, then, ceases to be an internally-directed, management-dominated concern and becomes a politically adaptive pursuit in which leadership is crucial.[5] If we keep our attention firmly fixed on that political process, most of whose impulses come from the

environment in which the organization is active, and if we bear in mind that the bulk of these environmental impulses stems from the reasoned demands of governments rather than the subjective needs of bureaucrats, then the outlines of the context are plain. With this understanding we can then move back to certain theorists of organizations : 1. the formal objectives for which the organization was created, 2. the actual expectations on whether and how these objectives can be reached, as entertained by the organization, 3. the actual choices made by the organization toward meeting the expectations, and 4. the measures taken with respect to the implementation of the choices.[6] Questions of growth, adaptation, and changes in task can be subsumed under these headings as intended or unintended consequences.

It then becomes obvious that one dominant type of organization theory which proceeds on the basis of psychological emphasis is largely irrelevant to our quest. Psychological models show great concern for the internal efficiency of an organization in "doing its job", and they conceive of efficiency in terms of the happiness of the staff and the perfect adjustment of human means to organizational ends. Now efficiency can be approached in motivational terms; the scholar who works along these lines will then specify optimal arrangements of human work groups and attain efficiency by way of a utilitarian calculus of happiness.[7] Even though Harry Stack Sullivan and Kurt Lewin tend to replace Bentham and Mill, this type of theory stresses the notion that the life of the organization is internally determined, and thus only secondarily related to the external environment. Approaches which focus on problem solving and conflict resolution are equally irrelevant because of the fact that both the theory and the experiments derived from it stem from the study of small group dynamics. Experiments designed to replicate problem solving in conflict-dominated situations simply do not help us in the study of international integration as long as the attempt is confined to three-person teams working with artificial problems.[8] International organizations are not small groups, and the conciliation of

clashing interests does not proceed on the basis of "interpersonal adjustment".

But even non-psychological approaches to organization which stress efficiency as the central concept do not help much. The organization objectives, expectations, choices and administrative steps singled out for attention in our context remain politically relevant even if an utter disregard for efficiency were to characterize the men who give life to these words.[8a)] Any public administrative agency operates within a system of values defined by the total political system which it serves; its internal allocation of resources is therefore measured in terms of the satisfaction of its external clients and their values. Efficiency can be used as a concept for the study of public organizations only if we postulate a pervasive consensus on priorities among values and ends held by the groups and individuals who make up the larger political system. Efficiency becomes relevant only if what Dwight Waldo called a "pyramid of values" is perceived by the clients of the organization.[9)] Such a consensus rarely exists within a nation, not to mention the international society. Without such a pyramid we cannot speak of an operationally valid notion of authority, and without a concept of systemic authority the concern for efficiency is merely the business of the management consultant.

Perhaps we can obtain theoretical guidance if we focus on growth as a central concept. Growth theories show a great concern for the environment; they see integration as an aspect of mastering the environment. They evoke memories of the Functionalist discussion of task expansion as society becomes more mindful of its welfare needs. Why are they not the obvious answer?[10)]

Organic growth theory is wholly deterministic and makes no allowance for volitional ambiguities. Organizations are held to expand (in terms of assets, employees and physical size) in accordance with mathematically ascertainable rates. Momentary departures of actual business firms from the rates were found by Haire to be of a short-run character; the pattern of growth, in the long run, was

ultra-stable. These growth rates depend not so much on the wisdom or the neuroses of leaders but on "the geometry of the space within which the organization exists, just as the growth curves tie its growth to the ecological equilibrium between the organization and its environment".[11] Attractive as the dynamism of this conception is for our purposes, it taxes our belief in the metaphysics of an "ecology" which is not operationally meaningful in terms of specific conceptions of objectives, expectations and choices, Such is the danger of the organic analogy : concern with efficiency leads to neglect of a living and varying environment; but exclusive concern with growth engenders neglect of the rationale underlying the choices of people whose decisions make organizations grow or decline. One approach sacrifices the system to the actors while the other sins in the opposite sense.

Among the most ambitious models of organizations we find those which seek to explain organizational development on the basis of the concept of survival. Organizations are here treated as subsystems of the larger social system; they are judged in terms of their relationship to the total system in that their activities are either "functional" or "dysfunctional".[12] At the same time this species of theory is in tune with the tendency of students of public administration to view their subject matter in terms other than mechanical efficiency or wholesome primary group feelings. Organizations are regarded as a species of social system seeking to achieve their purposes in the context of a larger system. Hence, theoretical constructs dealing with decision-making and bureaucracy are intimately connected with this perspective. It is this type of theory which would appear most germane to our purposes.

In the hands of Talcott Parsons the survival model of organization is defined in essentially static terms; if, in the fulfilment of their goals, organizations also perform services which are functional for the system as a whole, they will prosper and survive; if not, they will pass from the scene. In order to make this conception serviceable for our purposes one would have

to impute functions to the social system at the global level, an approach rejected in the previous chapter. A similarly static quality is found in the managerial theory of organization developed by Chester Barnard. The function of the manager is to enable his organization to survive in a constantly changing and essentially hostile environment, made more intractable still by the sharp limits imposed on human free will by Barnard's theory of decision-making. A generous range of dynamic qualities are imputed to the executive in working for adaptation; but the overall system is not conceived in dynamic terms by Barnard.[12a)] Yet his approach is of interest to us because of his important distinction between effectiveness and efficiency in making survival possible. Both qualities must be attained but they refer to different aspects of organizational behavior. Effectiveness "relates to accomplishment of an objective of the system and is determined with a view to the system's requirements". But efficiency is the capacity of the organization "to maintain itself by the individual satisfactions it affords".[12b)] It would appear, then, that effectiveness refers to relations with the environment while efficiency concerns the commitment and happiness of the staff of the organization in seeking to realize purposes vis-a-vis the environment. Survival, in short, depends on satisfying both clients and staff in a perpetually adaptive manner.

This distinction is utilized by Etzioni in arguing that what may be functional for society, the larger system, may be dysfunctional for the survival of the organization. "The paradox of ineffectiveness" introduces a dynamic dimension, suggesting that an organization whose objectives clash with its actual expectations and whose choices do not yield implementation consonant either with its objectives or its expectations may be ineffective merely in its own eyes.[13)] Still, if the choices and their implementations result in an expended task which is "functional from the vantage point of system transformation", the organization is very effective in the context of Functionalism. Basing his concepts on the study

of essentially non-political organizations Etzioni tends to feel that efficiency (in Barnard's sense) will triumph over effectiveness; the organization will adapt by downgrading its goals and purposes in facilitating the survival of its staff and status patterns.[14] Such a conclusion assumes that the founders of the organization are unable to recognize the hiatus between organizational ineffectiveness and functional success. If we were to adopt this assumption also our organizational model would be condemned to the peripheral role which Functionalists assume willy-nilly. The traditional Functional approach to the study of international organization tended to equate organizational effectiveness with the task imposed by the international society. International organizations, administrations and treaties owed their origin to technological and welfare demands which developed "in the national societies of which /they are/ composed. The same new inventions, the same intensification and complication of social life have led to a great increase in international regulations which have to do with the relations of States in the economic and social fields and which affect the daily lives of individuals".[15] Hence the approximations to international government which exist are merely a recognition of a universal need, a need imposed by technology and translated into policy by private groups directly and immediately affected. "International public action in this sense affects the interests and wishes of many individual groups in the nations concerned, just as the laws of a single government affect the interests and wishes of many individuals in a national society".[16] Hence the forms which international organizations take are dictated not be idealism or philosophy, but by the functional demands of whatever need requires regulation. Form rigidly follows function and function is dictated by the interaction between the demands of technology and welfare. It follows that no dramatic increase in international government can be expected and that interesting constitutional arrangements have no inherent expansive logic of their own because they remain tied to the context of the original

need. This conception, sobering and sane as it is, nevertheless condemns Functionalism to a degree of "effectiveness" which subordinates all possibility of integration to the prevailing perceptions of need and the ability of given organizations to meet them. It eliminates the possibility of evolution by way of unintended consequences, dynamic learning, interaction among many clashing objectives and expectations, and a new consensus at the level of the system which may condemn to death any given organization which has outlived its usefulness.

To ignore organizational objectives and expectations in favor of the consequences of organizational behavior does damage to what we know about organizations. But to concentrate on these objectives as derived from social need is to condemn our study to the trivial. We do need an effectiveness model in which the criterion of success is the transformation of the international system to a higher level of integration instead of the survival of the existing system. Possibly, effectiveness for the system may imply ineffectiveness for its constituent organizations, but not necessarily. By stressing the relationship between initial objectives, implementation, consequences for the system and resulting new objectives - in short on a process of adaptation resulting from functions and dysfunctions as we defined them - we marge the hitherto rival foci of goals and systemic effectiveness.

We can now state the assumptions on which our model of international organization must rest. Because relations with environmental forces are more important than questions of internal efficiency we must identify and sort the demands and expectations which flow from the national governments and private groups and we can safely assert that our "organization theory is only concerned with those aspects of behavior which are determined by organizational structures", not by the psycho-analytic interaction among staff members, bureaus or sections.[17] The formal objectives of the organization must be related to these demands and the

structural features introduced by the convictions, the ideology, of the organizations' leaders. But since we are under no illusion regarding the autonomy of these leaders from the environment we expect formal objectives to yield to various countervailing pressures and to result in a "settling for" lower-level expectations which will guide the search for policy choices and restrict the measures singled out for eventual implementation. Systemic transformation will then be sought in analyzing the results of these measures on the environment. This view of international organizations fits essentially into the definition of "organization", with its stress on the political, the adaptive qualities which flow from continual conflict, pioneered by Philip Selznick :"1. the concept of organizations as cooperative systems, adaptive social structures, made up of interacting individuals, sub-groups, and informal plus formal relationships; 2. structural functional analysis, which relates variable aspects of organization (such as goals) to stable needs and self-defensive mechanisms; 3. the concept of recalcitrance as a quality of the tools of social action, involving a break in the continuum of adjustment and defining an environment of constraint, commitment and tension".[18)]

Functionalists pin their hopes for rational organizational action to the technical and noncontroversial character of international welfare activity. I have argued that the process by which a given activity becomes noncontroversial is itself a political matter, derived not from initial consensus but from initial conflict which may shake down to a consensus as a result of national redefinition of "need". If this is true it follows that a purely rational decision-making model is as inappropriate for a public international organization as it is for any public administrative agency which performs more than routine tasks, such as selling postage stamps or regulating the diameter of telegraph wires.

In a gross and blunt way a commitment to advancing the welfare of some international clientele may be expected to follow the propositions derived by a study of the Chicago Housing Authority.

The various private groups interested in and affected by the Authority's formal program (i.e., to clear slums and build new housing) were and remained in disagreement. Various governmental bodies reflected this disagreement and therefore failed to give the Authority unambiguous support for a clear program. That organization thus became more concerned with preserving its own existence than with stating and implementing firm objectives worked out by its leaders. Therefore, it can be provisionally concluded that

1. Serious reflection and firm announcements concerning the objective of an organization tends to destroy the organization by giving the enemies among its clients opportunities for denunciation;
2. Ambiguity in formal organizational objectives facilitates the ability of the leadership to elaborate less ambitious short-range aims reflecting its modest private expectations of success;
3. Commitment to firm objectives prior to the evolution of a reliable clientele undermines the ability of the organizational leadership to develop less ambitious (and less controversial) plans;
4. The making of alternative choices is determined not by overall rationality but by the short-run needs of organizational survival in a hostile environment. Thus, what is ineffective in terms of the objectives of the organization is effective in terms of survival facilitating the meeting of lower-level expectations, and eventual system transformation. Effectiveness, in a sense, consists of merely planning enough to survive each crisis as it comes along;
5. The politics of conflicting interests impose the need for compromise in the making of choices and the manner of program implementation. Hence consistency in programming cannot reasonably be expected.[19)]

Is there no way of getting above the plateau of organizational action on which "satisfying" as large a number of clients

and groups as possible is the operational maxim rather than a possible maximizing of organizational objectives? [20] Not in the sense of avoiding the constraining environmental and ideological forces to which the organization remains accountable. However, while the full achievement of initial organizational objectives is perhaps never possible it is precisely in the manner of the adjustment to new objectives that the organization displays its integrating powers. Thus formal objectives are "vague platitudes and pious cant" only if they do not undergo some dynamic process of adaptation. For insight into the evolution of objectives we must turn to the qualities of organizational leadership and ideology, as treated by Selznick.[21]

The basic distinction which Selznick establishes is that between "organization" and "institution". Organizations are entities established for a narrowly defined technical purpose and confined to that purpose from then on. Their decisions are of a routine character, they call for no self-assessment, no reflection on ultimate values and no special qualities of administration other than "efficiency". Institutions, however, are entities "stamped by distinctive ways of making decisions or by peculiar commitments to aims, methods, or clienteles. In this way the organization as a technical instrument takes on values. As a vehicle of group integrity it becomes in some degree an end in itself. This process of becoming infused with value is part of what we mean by institutionalization. As this occurs, organization management becomes institutional leadership. The latter's main responsibility is not so much technical administrative management as the maintenance of institutional integrity".[22]

So conceived, the kind of international organizations able to help "functional" integration must partake of the qualities of Selznick's institutions. Mitrany's simple expert bodies dealing with routine affairs would not achieve the qualities necessary for growth. Creative leadership is the quality which enables an organization to adopt new goals, a new mission flowing from a change in its internal or external environment. But such adaptive redefinition of goals is often a wholly unplanned, instinctive act by the organizational leadership, adaptive in the functional sense but common sensi-

cally goal-directed as far as the leader is concerned.

The key elements in such a process are: 1. administrative ideologies "as conscious and unconscious devices of communication and self-defense" evolved ad hoc or deliberately, accepted spontaneously by the staff or the result of deliberate managerial manipulation;[23] 2. a special elite to develop and carry on the ideology and to provide future leaders; 3. contending interest groups, clustering around various aspects of the organization's program and the values it represents, inside the organization as well as among its external clients. Organizations which do not develop these characteristics remain routine-bound technical bodies. The organization must "become valued for itself, not as a tool but as an institutional fulfilment of group integrity and aspiration". How do we determine when this occurs? Infusion with value is a quality discerned by the observer rather than by the participants in the life of the organization who may continue to think of themselves merely as "doing their job". It can be identified when staff members and clients exhibit a commitment to the task and the aspirations associated with it, when they consider the organization as somehow vital to their hopes and expectations.[24] The purely technical and instrumental mature of an organization has been surpassed when the entity is no longer considered expendable by its clients and staff.

The immediate result of these considerations is my inability to place the model clearly and sharply within the categories and classifications of current theorizing about organizations. Our adaptive international organization is obviously not a smoothly functioning machine, a servo-mechanism; hence it does not fit into the "classical" tradition of theorizing in terms of input-output efficiencies. Nor is our organization a biological entity, a body which "grows" or an organism of interdependent persons who "interact" so as to maintain equilibrium. While we are sketching an entity which does possess some of the attributes of a survival-oriented social system, our concern with systemic transformations cautions us not to rely too consistently on the propositions associated with such a model. Even though our organization will contain a variety

of bureaucratic elements and will rest in some measure on the success of bureaucratic leadership, it cannot be defined in terms of the Weberian bureaucratic ideal type or the authority pattern which goes with it. Even Barnard's metaphor of the electromagnetic field which he uses to define the species "organization", though approximating the present need more closely than the notions of machine or organism, suggests more determinative qualities than I am willing to concede.[25] The eclectic seems condemned to fall between rather than safely repose on categories.

Given the likelihood that the recalcitrance of the environment will condition the organization's objectives much as Banfield argues, we must rely on the ability of the organization's leaders and their structure with value commitment as our link with systemic evolution. But leaders work with subordinate officials who must agree with them and with governments who finance their operations.[26] They also depend, in the Functional context, on demands and responses of private groups. As seen by Selznick in the national context, so on the international scene effective adaptation demands close attention to the interest groups in the environment and to their corresponding service departments in the organization. Hence our adaptive international agency must: 1. function with special sensitivity in relation to the environment, 2. feature methods of internal conflict resolution which effectively compromise hostile environmental inputs and result in adaptive redefinition of Objectives, 3. develop its own dynamic program so as to survive by assuring itself of external support, and 4. so make its choices and push for the implementation of programs that its mission and impact grow in terms of feedback to its clients, whether these be governments or voluntary groups. We now turn to each of these imperatives.

2.- The Dominance of the Environment

International organizations, like other such entities, have formal objectives : these are invariably spelled out in some detail in the opening paragraphs of their constitutions, charters or cons-

tituent treaties. Usually, these objectives violate the postulate of flexibility - or vagueness - because national states do not readily participate in agencies whose goals are not clearly defined at the outset. If we are concerned with the redefinition of objectives, as the hostile environment makes the simple implementation of the official program impossible, we must throw into relief the constraining foci of action from which such an effort may issue forth. The nature of the context limits us to two such sources : the government and voluntary groups which make up the environment and the organization's own leaders, its bureaucracy.

It is hardly more than a truism to call attention to the ideological heterogeneity of that environment, at least in the case of organizations with a nearly universal membership.[27] Ideological heterogeneity is manifest, first, in the variety of demands which governments press upon their international organizations. Economic underdevelopment linked with revolutionary-reformist values results in one type of demands; communism carries with it its own variety of inputs; industrialism linked with a free enterprise doctrine differs in its demands from industrialism subject to welfare doctrines. Dependence on the nature of the national system-making demands, then, is a constraining feature of some weight. Moreover, the momentary nature of the group structure of nations is a crucial and unstable environmental factor. A given organization usually includes member states characterized by the dominance of 1. oligarchies made up of institutional interest groups, such as churches and armies, 2. monolithic single parties subsuming all interest groups, 3. pluralistic groups with specific and limited aims, and 4. anomic "groups" with no predictable demands at all but continually destabilizing effects on their national polities. Depending on the last election or revolution, each of these national systems poses its own demands on the organization, stemming from very different values.

Organizational leadership, if it is true to the imperatives I have sketched, will seek to impose its own values, its organizational ideology, on this cacophony of values. It will seek to

isolate from this welter aspirations common to all groups and systems and deify these on the altar of organizational objectives. But which values should be picked? What means shall be chosen to meet them? What services should be offered to whom? Should the choice be based on some minimum common denominator among all possible present and future demands? Or should it feature some "strategic" value with its appropriate strategic means which will force the opposition in the environment to go along? to answer these questions, we must highlight the typical features of the internationnal bureaucracy.

International bureaucracies, typically, are a far cry from the nicely adjusted, self-contained and hierarchically-ordered models of organization theorists. Lest I be accused of excessive cynicism in simply ruling out the relevance of management theory to an understanding of the dynamics of international organizations I adduce the judgment of Gunnar Myrdal, a judgment arrived at as a result of his experiences as Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe:[28)]

> The basic fictitious notion about inter-governmental organizations, as conveyed by their constitutions, is that they are something more than their component parts, something above the national states in somewhat the same sense as the individual states are above the provincial governments. Their constitutions give them the appearance of being political entities in their own right, following certain political goals, attempting to accomplish certain political changes, in one word : establishing, pursuing and enforcing a collective policy. But it should be clear from the outset that the analogy to the individual sovereign state is a false one. The conference of an inter-governmental organization is not in any real sense comparable with the legislative assembly of a state : the delegates are not elected by people but appointed by governments; they represent nations only indirectly; collectively they do not legislate; there is no supranationnal government to execute decisions taken, no sanctions can be applied and no taxes levied...." In the typical case international organizations are nothing else than instruments for the policies of individual governments, means for the diplomacy of a number of disparate and sovereign national states. When an inter-governmental organization is set up, this implies nothing more than that between the states a limited agreement has been reached upon an institutional

> form for multilateral conduct of state activity in a certain field. The organization becomes important for the pursuance of national policies precisely to the extent that such a multilateral co-ordination is the real and continuous aim of national governments.

Myrdal rules out any true independent powers for the bureaucracy in making or executing decisions, irrespective of the organization's constitution, because the secretariat remains merely the instrument of governments and "it is only on the basis of their commonly shared confidence, and with their acquiescence, that the secretariat can move at all in the service of the collectivity of governments."[29] This formulation would seem to suggest that only an organizational ideology incorporating the minimum common denominator among governmental objectives can survive.

Let us assume an organizational leader with almost charismatic qualities and an unmatched political sense in choosing strategies designed to attract environmental support and contributing to infusing his agency with value commitment. Still, international bureaucracies are staffed with specialists and generalists originating in all the member states; and frequently the governments exercise a heavy hand in selecting the supposedly neutral civil servant who is enjoined not to seek or accept any instructions from anyone except his hierarchical chief. The staff thus represents the heterogeneity of ideologies, the cacophony of values. Working with this material, the head of the organization must seek to subject his staff to the organizational ideology he has accepted or even fostered.

These facts make it obvious that the simple application of the Weberian bureaucratic model would be beside the point, at least as far as a rigid hierarchical ordering of the staff is concerned. Moreover, Myrdal makes it quite clear that the leadership's relationship to the organization's clients is unlikely to be of a bureaucratic nature. Yet the Weberian model contains so much that might be important to a future international system that we cannot simply let it go by default.

The engagement of staff exclusively on the basis of

professional qualifications, reward and promotion according to merit, close hierarchical supervision and the employment of sanctions in order to promote detached professional service are of the essence of public bureaucracies in modern industrial states. Weber associated hierarchical staff relations with a clear chain of command downward, with a concept of authority which rests on the voluntary submission of subordinates to the imperative will of the superior. While this submission is explicable in terms of "charismatic" and "traditional" considerations in some contexts, in the modern state authority rests on rational perception of legal relationships on the part of all the actors, superiors and subordinates: imperative command is accepted voluntarily because the subordinate feels it is right and proper that orders be given, a feeling legitimated by the subordinate's understanding and approving of rational-bureaucratic relationships.[30] If this model described the actual authority relationships in contemporary international organizations integration might proceed far more smoothly than, in fact, it does. On the other hand, the so-called"democratic-bureaucratic" model comes closer to describing the actual nature of authority and staff relations within the organizational hierarchy. While Weber's model, if it prevailed in fact, would enhance integration, the democratic model, because it does prevail in fact, tends to hinder it.[31]

For a concept of bureaucratic authority and structure which combines the best features of the features of the monocratic and the democratic approaches and remains true to the nature of the present international system we may take our cue once more from Chester Barnard. "The decision as to whether an order has authority or not", notes Barnard, "lies with the persons to whom it is addressed, and does not reside in 'persons of authority' or those who issue these orders".[32] This formulation sums up the real state of affairs in bureaucratic relationships within the staff of an international organization. But what is more important, it also describes the nature of authority between the leadership and the clients, the environmental forces which produce most of the cons-

traints under which international organizations function. In short, hierarchy must prevail as regards hiring, promotion and the evaluaevaluation of work on the part of the staff. But orders with respect to the formulation and implementation of a policy cannot rest exclusively on a bureaucratic chain of command : they must rest on the voluntary and non-imperative acceptance of the values implicit in the policy on the part of the subordinate officials. And the same is true of the acceptance of "orders" by the governments and voluntary groups who constitute the clients of the organization.

These conceptions of bureaucracy and authority imply certain maxims concerning the normal growth of organizations which are well summarized by Selznick :

1. Selection of the social base of the organization after the basic mission is defined, involving the choice of external clientele and supporters, the identification of competitors and enemies.
2. Building the institutional core, which involves the choice of personnel motivated and indoctrinated with the organization's ideology and mission, as to direct its program to the social base selected. It also involves the fostering of an elite, inside and outside the organization, capable of giving continuity to the program to adjust it.
3. While an organization passing through these steps will at first be chacterized by open-ended procedures, personal interventions and even the suggestion of charismatic leadership, at some stage internal and external administrative procedure must be formalized into legal and constitutional channels, especially as the organization grows in size and complexity. To the extent that this occurs dynamic leadership will suffer a decline.Hence it is important that formalization does not occur too soon in the history of an organization.[33)]
4. Decentralization of staff and program implementation can be successfully undertaken only after the period of central

institutional growth has been completed, unless the local personnel is reliably indoctrinated in the organization's ideology, and the lines of authority to the center are unambiguous in the first place. However, in practice these two conditions are rarely met.[33a)]

5. Organizational viability in future periods will continue to depend on the autonomy of the elite associated with it, its high belief in its own standards and task, on its "exclusiveness". Their specific values must therefore be given an opportunity to mature. This also implies that organization sub-units should be permitted to remain autonomous only for as long as may be necessary to permit these values to become firmly established.[33b)] In short, as long as the values in question are held only precariously, central control is crucial.

But all this must take place, in the case of international organizations, in the setting of a very heterogeneous and not necessarily consistently friendly environment. Hence

> the leader's job is to <u>test</u> the environment to find out which demands can become truly effective threats, to <u>change</u> the environment by finding allies and other sources of external support, and to <u>gird</u> his organization by creating the means and the will to withstand attacks.[34)]

This may be a tall order for the Director-General of an international organization whose bosses happen to be also the forces which constitute the environment. But unless he does these things his organization is bound to remain in the realm of the technical, the routine.

Given this tension between organizational imperatives and environmental realities, we must next turn our attention to the character of organizational decisions calculated to make the organization triumph over its constraints. Certain kinds of organization experience acquire the importance of key determinants of maintenance, expansion and value infusion: <u>the ability to use a crisis in the relationship between organization and environment as an opportunity for self-assessment and self-redefinition</u>, to profit from critical experience,

to have the elite undergo growth in its character and understanding. To be sure, a "critical" decision cannot always be differentiated from a "routine" one until the outcome is known. The leadership may not consciously know it is making a critical decision. A functional theory of international organization is all the more useful, then, in calling attention to the unintended integrative consequences of decisions made by leaders conscious only of some pressing business. The decision will nevertheless be "critical" if it engenders a new affirmation of organizational objectives under challenge from hostile or cross-cutting environmental pressures, if it thereby strengthens the sense of purpose of the organization's staff at the expense of environmental ties. But it is crucial to recall that unless the leadership is willing to examine useless old objectives and strike out in new directions with a revalued body of aims, it will merely reaffirm the stale old pattern, it will remain mired in routine.[35)]

The manner in which organizations must advance institutionalization differs fundamentally from Mitrany's approach. Tasks do not take care of themselves; form does not automatically follow function; institutional goals do not flow naturally from obvious welfare commitments of the clients. It is the task of the organization - the leadership - to define aims <u>specifically</u> enough to act as a guide to policy but <u>generally</u> enough to achieve rapport with an articulated body of values. Over-specificity condemns the organization to routine technical tasks (the risk Mitranian Functionalism runs most seriously); but over-generality results in the platitudinous if not hypocritical programming which Banfield takes for granted. For creative leadership the desire to separate the "military" from the "political" is as fatal as the wish to keep the "welfare" insulated from "power", or "administration" from "politics". The correct balance can be attained only if the organization constantly re-examines its aims in the light of changing environments and if it avoids early commitment to operating efficiency or a specific technological orientation.[36)]

The emphasis is therefore once more on the political. But politics, as we all know, is the art of the possible. Creative decision-making, therefore, remains constrained by what the environment permits. The leader must develop an organizational ideology, imbue his staff with it, strike the delicate balance between developing self-conscious and committed sub-elites in his organization and retaining overall hierarchical control, and revalue the whole effort when challenged - all within the basic vise of squeezing organizational functions from the explicit purposes of governments. If he fails, the governments will recognize the functions as detrimental to their purposes and punish the organization by starving it financially, cutting down its task or bypassing it. The true art of the possible, therefore, does not lie in the Machiavellian practice of deceit through the mouth and pen of the alert international official, but in his ability to persuade governments that the functions are compatible with national purposes, provided the governments merely reassess their own true aims. Political persuasion, however, rests less on golden words than on the sapient construction of coalitions with identical or converging interests. In short, purposes can be turned into functions with the eventual knowledge of the environmental powers if the tasks involved are part of the interests of a viable coalition of forces.

But how can leaders both lead and make deals? Will not deals involve sacrifices to organizational objectives? If the head of an international organization must simultaneously manipulate his external supporters and clients and his own staff specialists who are identified with the environmental groups in an eternal attempt at deviding, if not conquering, will not all objectives speedily be lost in a practice of making routine decisions designed to achieve only organizational survival? That danger is certainly prominent. Much depends on the manner in which supporting coalitions are constructed and influenced. In a situation in which all groups neatly balance each other in influence a form of immobilisme may result in which the normal clashes of interest politics, even in interna-

tional organizations, can be resolved only through bargaining at the level of the lowest common denominator. The result is descent into the mire of routine, of sheer survival. In situations, however, in which the way groups face each other is not left up to them, but dictated by constitutional rules or shaped by programmatic alternatives presented by the organization itself, minimal bargaining may be replaced with negotiated decisions. Here creative space is reserved for the leader who knows which and whose interests most closely approach the functional need.[37] It is the study of interest politics in polities which furnishes us with the necessary sensitivity.[38]

My emphasis on interest politics and creative manipulation is quite deliberate. Selznick runs the risk of imbuing his creative leader with the attributes of the "heroic administrator", the man uniquely capable, because of certain personality traits and gifts of perception, to shape the environment, to fire the imagination of subordinates and the passions of clients. The head of an international agency is seldom a hero and more rarely still a philosopher-king. Barnard's executive possesses these heroic attributes to an even greater extent. He must lead, not from a sense of duty, but on the basis of a belief that what he does is good for the organization and consonant with his personal values. Insincerity, even if temporary, seems not to be permissible. This constitutes the supreme organizational morality and it determines the life of the organization.[38a]

My treatment, on the contrary, is more modest in its expectations. It accepts as relevant and important the many studies of public administration and policy-making in bureaucratic agencies which show the possibility of combining politics with administration, of proceeding on the basis of negotiation stressing acceptable common values between staff and clients, administrative leaders and the public. Administration, instead of appearing in the guise of a heroic ordering of chaos, assumes the form of continuous negotiation attentive to the possibility of maximizing common values.[38b]

3.- Decision-Making and Conflict Resolution

For our purposes "decision-making" and "conflict resolution" are the same thing. Students of administration and of organization prefer the label of decision-making because of their dominant interest in inter-personal and inter-group influence patterns within a bureaucratic structure. A given decision may or may not involve conflict among participants and therefore the concern over conflict as such need not be central. Students and advocates of pacifism, positive coexistence, unilateral relaxation of international tensions, non-violent action, systematic negotiation for the elimination of racial, social or interstate strife and the like prefer to label their endeavors as conflict resolution. For them the presence of "conflict" - and its pacification - is the central item of interest.

Let it be repeated that we are concerned with state and organizational action which may have functional consequences for the international system. It is clear, therefore, that we are constrained to focus exclusively on action within a bureaucratic framework (be this governmental, intergovernmental, or that of voluntary groups). We are also constrained by the nature of our actors. These are always and exclusively established power-holders in national or international structures, or in voluntary groups occupying elite positions with reliable access to public officials. Yet we know, following our assumptions regarding the nature of interest politics and of group identification with perceived interests, that every major decision is a choice among conflicting demands and values, and therefore involves the relative victory of one group over another. Hence, in the focus of our concern, what is usually considered "decision-making" and "conflict resolution" are one and the same process. From this formulation two important corollaries can be deduced.

First, organizational decision-making theory which seeks to focus on the effortless and routinized selection of alternatives along the path of the most efficient flow of communication is

irrelevant. This is true not only because of our previous argument concerning the functional importance of crisis decisions but because of the fact that in a setting of interest-informed politics there are no routine decisions in the sense of choices free from group-supported controversy. Second, the suggestive and growing literature on the virtues and possibilities of non-violent action in the resolution of conflicts is equally irrelevant, at least in the way in which it is usually argued. This is so because all types and historical examples of non-violent political action have always featured efforts by the outsiders, the "weak", those without a foot on the established ladder of power, to bring about a change of some kind.[39] Whether it be Gandhi fighting racial discrimination in South Africa, the Norwegian teachers sabotaging the indoctrination policies of the Nazis, or the Fellowship of Reconciliation protesting nuclear arms - the resolution of conflict involves dedicated but unofficial groups at the periphery of the "establishment". Further, all historical examples have been confined to non-violent action (or, often, inaction) within the structure of one state, in opposition to an unambiguous body of national law. We cannot assume the relevance of the experience to the kind of international action which provides our context. Yet the fact remains that certain non-violent techniques have a strong family resemblance to the doctrines of Functionalism and to this theme we must return.

Analytical light can be shed on this discussion if we distinguish firmly between the outcomes of a decision and the process through which it was reached. But we must be concerned with both aspects, especially since decision-making theories concentrate on the latter and conflict resolution studies on the former. When we deal with outcomes we must have in mind the preferences of the actors; but when we focus on the process, their notions of causation, of antecedent facts, of scientific data relating to the decision, or of sequences of past events perceived as relevant, emerge as dominant.

May, 1964. Ernst HAAS

Notes

1) The heterogeneity of theory and the patent capacity of recognized and leading students of the field to entertain quite distinct notions of how one approaches theory supposed to relate to a phenomenon in which they are all interested is demonstrated in Mason Haire (ed.), Modern Organization Theory (New York : Wiley, 1959), a work which collects a number of fascinating essays and furnishes a spectrum of current thought. I have drawn on it liberally in the pages which follow.

2) Dwight Waldo, "Organization Theory: An Elephantine Problem", Public Administration Review, vol. XXI, no. 4 (Autumn 1961), p. 211.

3) Ibid., p. 216. Italics in original. Consider E. Whight Bakke's definition of "organization", also commented on by Waldo, is given in Haire, op. cit., p. 50;

> A social organization is a continuing system of differentiated and coordinated human activities utilizing, transforming, and welding together a specific set of human, material, capital, ideational, and natural resources into a unique problem-solving whole whose function is to satisfy particular human needs in interaction with systems of human activities and resources in its particular environment.

Almost each term required additional definition, and after that effort is made the species so circumscribed becomes almost cotarminous with any human collectivity, whether we call it system, bureaucracy, society, state, etc. Bakke also provides an exhaustive scheme for studying and interrelating each of these components of an "organization". I am reminded, in perusing this effort, of Richard C. Snyder's approach to decision-making: rather than explaining any one thing the total effort is in the nature of a check-list of "things" any self-respecting social scientist should study and ponder if he wishes to achieve a systematic view of a phenomenon, without specifying priorities, strategies, or assumptions we could safely make initially. Bakke's and Snyder's efforts, then, are impressive as taxonomies but not as explanations, and hence not very useful in our context. For a succinct statement of Snyder's apporach see his "A Decision-Making Approach to the Study of Political Phenomena", in Roland Young, Approaches to the Study of Politics,(Evanston : Northwestern University Press, 1958), pp. 3-37.

4) At present organization theory is dealing mainly with general propositions which apply equally well but also equally badly to all organizations. The differences among various organizational

types are great; therefore any theory of organizations in general must be highly abstract. It can serve as an important frame for specification, that is, for the development of special theories for the various organizational types, but it cannot substitute for such theories by serving itself as a system model, to be applied directly to the analysis of concrete organization". Amitai Etzioni, "Two Approaches to Organization Analysis : A Critique and a Suggestion", Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 2 (September 1960), p. 270.

5) See the discussion of administration from this viewpoint by Norton E. Long, "The Administrative Organization as a Political System", in Sidney Mailick and Edward H. Van Ness, (eds) Concepts and Issues in Administrative Behaviour, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. 120-121.

6) This four-fold scheme is borrowed from R.M. Cyert and J.G.March, "Organizational Objectives", Haire, op. cit., p. 78. The authors treat these headings as "sub-systems" of a "model" appropriate for all organizations. "Model" here seems to mean the same as "system" and even though each sub-system is treated autonomously for purposes of simulation on the computer, the assumption of dependence on the total system is retained. I make no such claims here. These headings are merely suggestive empirically and logically in giving us a way of talking intelligibly about organizational behaviour, but they are in no sense autonomous and in no way merely aspects of an analytical system. They are real processes in agencies made up of reasoning and reasonably intelligent officials, all too aware of their own concreteness.

7) For an exhaustive statement of the motivational-organic approach to the study of organizations see Rensis Likert, in Haire, op. cit., pp. 184-214.

8) Anatole Rapoport describes a small-group experiment whose major characteristics parallel certain problems of international organizations quite well, especially in terms of the patterns of cooperation and conflict which are thought to arise in problem solving. But it is doubtful that a theory of international integration can learn anything from this analogy any more than from the "games"played by teams of individuals simulating governments and international organizations in the "interpersonal" approach to international relations featured by Harold Guetzkow. For Rapoport's experiment see "A Logical Task as a Research Tool in Organization Theory", Haire, op. cit., pp. 91 ff.

8a) Three "models of bureaucracy" are presented in James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958), pp. 36-47. Internal efficiency is the over-riding criterion of organization here too, even though the basic analogy is mechanical rather than

organic. The effort, it should be noted, does not result in "models" which meet the more rigorous mathematical-predictive requirements. Further, efficiency is equated with organizational self-maintenance, or the survival of the unit in isolation from the environment in which it is - one would assume - located. Useful as such a formulation may be for theorizing about bureaucracy it helps very little when one seeks relationships between environment and organization, and hopes to discover something about integration of organization with clients or subjects.

9) Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State, (New York : Ronald Press, 1948), pp. 198-205.

10) Thus Mason Haire defends organic growth theory as the proper approach to organization theory in terms the Functionalist should find attractive; he notes that this theory is "focused on the fact that an outstanding characteristic of a social organization is simply that it is a special kind of aggregation of individuals. Many of the problems of organization seem to arise from two facets of this fact - first, that it is made up of individuals and, second, that it is an aggregation of them. From the first comes the problem of conflict between individual and organization, and the organizational necessity of resisting the centrifugal force associated with individuals - each with his own goal and each tending to fly off from the path of the whole. From the second comes the pressure, as the size of the aggregation increases, to provide communication among the parts, integration of the parts into the whole, and the possibility of specialization of function". "Biological Models and Empirical Histories of the Growth of Organization", in Haire, op. cit., p. 273.

11) Ibid., pp. 304-305.

12) "Survival" models of organizations are featured by these authors: Talcott Parsons, "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations", Administrative Science Quarterly (June 1956 and September 1956), pp. 63-85, 225-239; Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947); Amitai Etzioni, "Two Approaches to Organizational Analysis...", op. cit. The link to systems theory is explicitly argued by William G. Scott, "Organization Theory: An Overview and an Appraisal", Journal of the Academy of Management (April 1961).

12a) Barnard, op. cit., pp. 3-7, 14-15, 88-89, 98-99.

12b) Ibid., pp. 56-57.

13) Etzioni, op. cit., pp. 267-269.

14) Etzioni really ignores the goals and objectives of organizations since such goals "are not meant to be realized". Ibid., p. 260. The founders of the World Health Organization or the International Labor Organization would, no doubt, be fascinated to learn this about themselves!

15) Joseph P. Chamberlain, "International Organization", as reprinted in International Organization, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1955), p. 87. Chamberlain's essay is a famous statement of the Functionalist rationale and a more direct application of it to actual international agencies than attempted by Mitrany. It was originally published in 1942. In the volume cited, Philip C. Jessup, Adolf Lande and Oliver J. Lissitzyn examine "Functional" developments since 1942 and come to the conclusion that Chamberlain's formulation retains its entire validity. Ibid., p. 83.

16) Ibid., p. 91.

17) Victor A. Thompson, Modern Organization, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 9.

18) Philip Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of Organization", American Sociological Review, vol. 13, no. 1 (February 1948), p. 32. While Selznick considers this definition to apply to all kinds of organizations I prefer to think of it as more nearly appropriate to public administrative agencies.

19) The Chicago Housing Authority study was published by Martin Meyerson and E.C. Banfield as Politics, Planning and the Public Interest (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955). My treatment here has used and adapted Banfield's own summary, "Ends and Means in Planning", in Mailick and Van Ness, op. cit., pp. 78-79

For most international agencies Banfield's sardonic statement of the role of formal objectives may be accepted provisionally: "The end-system of an organization is rarely, if ever, a clear and coherent picture of a desirable future toward which action is to be directed. Usually, a set of vague platitutes and pious cant is used to justify the existence of the organization in the eyes of its members and of outsiders. The stated ends are propaganda, not criteria for guiding action". Ibid., pp. 77-78.

20) Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1957), p. XXIV.

21) The following discussion is heavily indebted to Selznick's Leader Leadership in Administration (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1957), which - while accepting the political constraints on organizational action posited by Banfield - strives for a theory of organization which can help explain systemic change.

22) Ibid., p. 138. Italics in original. Selznick also conceives of his "institutions" in quasi-organismic terms, as "social organisms" or "natural communities". I have no wish to push the notion that far.

23) Ibid., p. 14.

24) Ibid., p. 16. I prefer this formulation of the notion of "commitment" (or "engagement", as European students of international life are likely to put it) to Selznick's emphasis on "need", which suggests an organic and bio-psychological approach I am anxious to avoid in view of my own emphasis on perceptions of interest. See Selznick, pp. 17, 89, 74, 143.

25) Barnard, op.cit., pp. 75-75. I shy away from the consistent adoption of the electromagnetic metaphor, tempting though it is, because Barnard claims that "the hypothesis we follow is that all of the phenomena concerned are usefully explained if we adopt it, and that existing knowledge and experience are consistent with that assumption".

26) Selznick distinguishes between organizational achievement and institutional success as very different results of "leadership" in organizations. While organizational achievement, in the sense of survival, is a necessary prior condition for institutionalization it is not the same thing. Institutionalization seems to imply a commitment to expanding values, a feature to which a leader's mere concern for organizational stability and prestige is necessary but not sufficient. For our purposes it is not essential that we adopt this notion of leadership. Functional implications from organizational action may be discernible without the emphasis on special leadership qualities, even though these would help. Ibid., pp. 26-27-95.

27) The same proposition, however, seems to hold with reference to most regional organizations. Cultural, linguistic and religious homogeneity among member states is uniformly less important in making for the continuity of attachment to formal objectives than economic, military and political homogeneity. The Arab League, the Organization of American States, the two Latin American common markets, the Nordic Council and the Council of Europe are telling examples of this truth. On the other hand, the experience of the European Communities demonstrates the proposition that homogeneity in economic and social structure is the single most important background factor making for goal stability.

28) Gunnar Myrdal, Realities and Illusions in Regard to Inter-Governmental Organizations (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 4-5.

29) Ibid., p. 25.

30) For a discussion and admirable critique of the Weberian model see Peter M. Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1956), and Blau, "Critical Remarks on Weber's Theory of Authority", American Political Science Review, vol. LVII, no 2 (June 1963), especially pp. 306-308, 311-315.

31) The democratic model of bureaucracy is elaborated by Victor Thompson, op. cit. Thompson would give the specialist full powers by stripping the central administrator of charismatic and dramaturgic qualities. He stresses expert and interest group prominence because he feels that the hierarchical or monocratic organizational model is both unreal and undesirable. Competent specialists cooperating freely are held to make for effective organizations. Ibid., pp. 74-77. I would counter this emphasis by suggesting that the deliberate scrapping of the Weberian conception condemns the leadership of an international organization to the subversion of central goals in favor of exclusive catering to the external special interests of clients acting in coalition with appropriate specialists on the staff.

32) Barnard, op. cit., p. 163.

33) Selznick, op. cit., pp. 104-107.

33a) Ibid., p. 112.

33b) Ibid., pp. 121-122, 127.

34) Ibid., p. 145. Italics in original

35) "Critical" and "Routine" decisions are discussed by Selznick, op. cit., pp. 38-42, and also very acutely by William R. Dill, "Administrative Decision-Making", in Mailick and Van Ness, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

36) Selznick, op. cit., pp. 65-68. Organization theory often turns to notions of role-taking and role theory when it reaches the point of seeking to specify who is going to behave how in order to maximize the institutionalization process, and in so doing begins to draw heavily on social psychology. Selznick (pp. 82 ff.) defines role as "a way of behaving associated with a defined position in a social system" and makes the definition operational in his discussion of leadership by seeking to relate personality characteristics to the particular way of behaving chosen by an organization in implementing its basic purposes (e.g., field action v. headquarters directives; participation with local clients v. reliance on officials alone).

Role theory seems of no particular help in the study of international organizations because the personalities of the officials and the way in which they would go about doing their work is less important than their relationship to the environment, the clients and their demands. Personal styles certainly do differ among officials of international organizations. But since it is difficult to speak of an "international social system" the roles are freely floating in space rather than anchored to some social point of reference.

37) This manner of viewing interest politics is inspired by what Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom have called "polyarchy" and "bargaining". See their Politics, Economics, and Welfare (New York, Harpers, 1953).

38) A purely administrative emphasis, by way of contrast, is given to the issue of coalition formation by the formulation adopted by March and Cyert (in Haire, op. cit., pp. 88-89). They wish to be able to predict optimal choices for potential coalition partners and hence they want to give quantitative values to group demands. However, and quite apart from the feasibility of quantifying demands, the source of the demands is sought inside the organization, and the environment as a source of inputs is again neglected.

38a) Barnard, op. cit., pp. 281-284. The personal qualities requisite for this type of leadership are truly heroic. The executive must be a master of the "science of cooperation, a true adept who substitutes creative decisions based on management science for the slap-dash procedures of the ordinary, short-run political process". Ibid., pp. 291-293. The heroic dimension is clearly implicit when Barnard describes the quality of "mind" required of the major executive as including "logical reasoning processes (which are) increasingly necessary but are disadvantageous if not in subordination to highly developed intuitional processes". Ibid., p. 320.

38b) Such an emphasis is demonstrated as flowing from the experience summed up in the case program in public administration and is formally argued in a very convincing manner in Heaphey, op. cit., particularly pp. 80-82.

39) The notion of "weakness" is used as Gandhi used it in contrasting non-violent direct action with satyagraha. One involves merely non-violent group action to remedy a specific injustice, the other includes a commitment to a positive general program of perfection, of personal and collective search for "truth". "Weakness" thus means not only relative distance from official

power but also a spiritual inperfection. for an excellent discussion of these issues, as well as for an analysis of nine types of "non-violence" see Gene Sharp, "The Meanings of Non-Violence : a Typology (revised)", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. III, no. 1 (March 1959), especially pp. 56-58.

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CENTRE EUROPÉEN DE LA DOTATION CARNEGIE
GENÈVE

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CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Bellagio, June 12-16, 1964

REGIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL INTEGRATION : SOME LESSONS OF BRUSSELS

By Uwe Kitzinger

I

In model-building the economist seeks neither to describe the present nor predict the future nor prescribe an optimum : he merely abstracts certain strategic factors from the intractable mass of sheer data, much as a scientist artificially isolates elements not normally found in a pure state in nature, in order to examine their implications and interactions. This brief paper similarly concentrates only on one or two among a number of recent trends in international relations, to focus the Sunday morning discussion on such problems as they may already be raising and may come to pose increasingly in the future.

If I append marked photostats of an emotive reaction to January 14th 1963, it is not in order to divert discussion from analysis to a particular set of recommendations on policy-making which I would naturally want to amend fifteen months after, but rather to exhibit a possible line of prescription (possible at least in the sense that someone has argued that way, or more than one even, it being my own fault that I had not read David Mitrany's work of twenty years earlier); and to save re-stating detailed arguments at one or two stages to repeat which might only be wearisome to some members of the Conference.

II

For obvious technological reasons social organization has in the past been based mainly on regional sub-divisions, until the principle of national

sovereignty has come to consecrate the notion that one authority should have unlimited powers, or at least, Kompetenz-Kompetenz, over a limited geographical area.

While it might possibly be argued that the size of a market was determined by its income more than by the number of its population, and that de Gaulle-type do-it-yourself bombs and tactical nuclear weapons were similarly giving at least a respite to national units of the 50-million-people size, broadly speaking the increasing international interdependence of modern economics, communications, defence requirements, etc. have made many of these regional subdivisions untenable in respect of a wide variety of functions of government. On many of the obvious indices, the advances made in the past half-century or century represent progress a hundred, a thousand or a million times all the previous progress in human history; and the continuing acceleration in the rate of technical change is likely to make the opportunity cost of purely national organization even greater in the future.

As a consequence we have seen attempts (mainly of two types) to supplement or even replace the nation state : both types have been made on both regional and ecumenical (or near-ecumenical) scales. Indeed it seems to me that whereas there is obviously a type of "offensive" (or defensive) regionalism that may depend (or depend on the assumption that it depends) on exclusiveness for its benefits, there is also a faute de mieux regionalism, recognising that for hard practical or political reasons a tighter bond can for the moment be forged only between a smaller number of units, which is still essentially open in character. Nor should it be forgotten that there is for the moment no all-inclusive international organization (not even the IPU) and that the United Nations still excludes inter alia the most populous state in the world. If small regions sometimes look threatening to those standing outside their organization, all-but universal regions may well pari passu look all the worse, as discriminating not in favour of their participants, but rather in effect against those left out.

The distinction between regional and universal organizations does not therefore seem to be very fundamental : that between "open" and "closed", related to it, is more important. But we must note that in this sense while the EEC is doubly a "closed" organization, being open only to European countries and only to those unanimously admitted by the existing members (Art. 237), the United Nations

also is a closed organization, open only to those admitted by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council (Art. 4), and moreover one that can expel existing members (Art. 6). As Herbert Nicholas puts it: "in fact about half of the vetoes cast by the USSR have been used to black-ball candidates for membership". (The United Nations as a Political Institution, p. 72).

More important still is the difference between constitutional and co-operative, or "federal" and "functional" approaches. On the one hand we have had ideals such as those of world government or of a United States of Europe seeking to by-pass the component nation state and base a new super-sovereignty on a new constitutional document issued ultimately in the name of "We, the People" - ideals that have in effect put the cart before the horse in their once-and-for-all radicalism and remained unrealised both on the European and on the world scale. On the other hand the more modest approach, which argued that it was only very limited specific functions that required organization on a scale wider than that of the traditional national unit, and believed that these could be co-ordinated by purely functional intergovernmental co-operation which need at no point detract from the legal sovereignty of any member state, has scored concrete successes up to a point. GATT, the IMF, and the EPU are examples of multilateral arrangements which - without too directly raising ideological and constitutional problems and without detracting from legal freedom of action - can by sanctions and rewards, substantially alter the parameters of unilateral action and therefore substantially modify it (usually by reducing the effective range of choice open to each participant).

Between these two approaches there is a difference, rather than a distinction, in the sense that these in practice if not in law are points on a scale : for the sanctions and rewards are absolutely automatic only in a highly detailed international treaty, with an element of discretion and incertitude more usually left open for negotiation between the partners in the light of circumstances arising : so that the need for mutual accommodation of standpoints, while not eliminating a formal veto, in practice places limits on its use and a premium on albeit reluctant agreement.

Nevertheless the Community method as exemplified in EEC is not simply a compromise form between the two but a third, different in kind from both the types of organization just sketched : for both are instantaneous, or static, arrangements in law, even if in practice the passage of time may make them more (or alternatively less) restrictive on national freedom of action. The Community treaties are the only ones (at least known to me) which have built into them a time-dimension, which are progressive not only as to the substance but far more important as to the procedure : which progressively limit national veto powers partly with the automatic passage of time, partly (at least until 1961) by default of a national veto on the original time-table. There are thus not a point situated somewhere on the scale of inter-governmental to federal organization, but are on institutionalised movement along it. The Treaties in effect transpose to the constitutional sphere some of the techniques of French indicative planning.

Moreover not only does each treaty legislate such a process, but the strategy of European integration has conceived each treaty as but a phase in a larger process, simultaneously setting up pressures and diminishing obstacles for wider, less specific arrangements leading up to broader, less functional and more federal constitutional developments.

III

Once it is the process and not the area, the function and not the region, the method and not the substance we focus on, the question arises how independent the one is from the other. Do e.g. Wheare's preconditions of federation have to be fulfilled to the hilt for functional co-operation to go beyond the purely intergovernmental ? What sociological conditions, in particular, have to obtain for there to be a hope of irreversible Community-type arrangements to be instituted ?

The sphere of defence is one in which in NATO we have gone well beyond the intergovernmental approach already, and if the multilateral force is ever to become a politically convincing concept we would have to go a great deal further along that road (at least the United States would have to accept the possibility of being outvoted). In GATT the "chicken war" was resolved by a technique closely resembling in practice if not in law the supranational authority of a Community type. And if we have gone beyond the intergovernmental technique

here no less than in different peace-keeping missions of the United Nations, what pre-conditions have to be fulfilled for progressive changes in institutions along this scale to be themselves institutionalised in advance ?

In other words (a) how far can the existing specialised agencies of the United Nations be reinforced by the attrition or elimination of national vetoes (b) how extensive can the existing intensive Community-type organizations become, and (c) is there any case for new organizations intermediate in extension and intensity between the tight Community and the loose United Nations structures ?

I tried to argue in the photostat appendix that a reform of the International Monetary Fund, an effective Kennedy round, a Baumgartner-type solution to the problems of temperate agriculture, and tropical commodity stabilisation plans of the kind now canvassed at UNCTAD might materially require advances along these lines. This type of approach might even be able to by-pass ideological battles-royal in seeking concrete solutions.

IV

Whether this model is taken as a caricature of existing states of affairs, a prophecy of inevitable brave new worlds, or as a messianic panacea, it leads - as models should do - to a general theory : a two-dimensional organization of the world in which specific public functions hitherto exercised on a "vertical" territorial basis are separated out and subtracted from traditional state sovereignty and - like many economic functions in EEC - re-organised "horizontally" and joined up on a functional basis : in which the traditional single authority with unlimited powers over a limited geographical area is partly supplemented, partly replaced by a single authority with specifically limited powers over (in the ultimate solution) an unlimited geographical area.

While all these authorities are geographically co-extensive (as ECSC, EEC and Euratom are) they may be regarded as complementary steps towards a larger "vertical" organization of a federal type. The problems arise when membership differs - as between EEC and NATO - and differences in membership are reflected in differences in majorities on questions that might (pace the more primitive functionalist assumptions) remain obstinately interlocked between functions no less than between regions. At the same time it is worth noting that despite predictions to

the contrary, the problem of co-ordination such as between NATO defence and EEC economic policy has not arisen so far in any serious form. Moreover this is of course in principle a transitional problem : once membership is universal in all functional activities co-ordination of different activities on the universal scale should not be more difficult than co-ordination of different activities on a national scale, and should be less difficult than the co-ordination of different national policies in the same realm of activity. (The way in which the requirements of EEC are helping the German government co-ordinate German agriculture with the rest of the German economy is of some interest here).

The United Nations in this model has a strong "vertical" role co-ordinating different activities organized on a world scale (just like a nation state does today) and its "horizontal" role banging different governments' heads together should then be all the easier by the confinement of some of the concrete conflicts of interest to the level of specialised agencies.

If co-ordination is the first problem, democratic responsibility is the second. The European Community can aim at direct election of a Parliament and the revocability of the Commission by it : though since the Council takes the main decisions, democratic control over these remains and must remain exercised by the national parliaments severally. Where membership of different Community-type functional bodies is not congruent, the indirect responsibility through the several national constitutions will be even more difficult to supplement along the lines envisaged by many "Europeans" : but while national governments remain the basic units out of which majorities are formed on substantive decisions, this does not really seem to affect either the principle of majority decisions or that of a chain of responsibility at least as democratic as those obtaining inside Britain or France today. This again is in principle a transitional problem - until the functional approach flows into the federal-type solution on a world scale with Charter reform. But if the model has diagnostic validity, then this second transitional difficulty is a problem we are already facing today - as witness the power without responsibility viz. annihilation without representation, of the U.S. President and his European allies in NATO now.

V

Perhaps this is only a pseudo-theoretical rationalisation for an agenda of international planning on which President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Wilson could attempt to have a meeting of minds. Though its point then is chiefly tactical, I hope it could still just serve as an Aunt Sally for Bellagio.

May 1964

Uwe Kitzinger

CENTRE EUROPÉEN DE LA DOTATION CARNEGIE
GENÈVE

5

CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Bellagio, June 12-16, 1964

THE STUDY OF EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS AND ITS RELATION TO THE STUDY OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

By R.W. Cox

Are European studies a separate discipline, distinct as to subject and method from the study of general international organization ? The historical uniqueness of the European experience, the novelty and imaginativeness of European institutional developments cannot be denied. Yet the question points to a false issue, which arises not from the things themselves but from the way people have thought about them.

Utopian and Scientific Approaches

International or regional studies have been characterised by a high degree of commitment on the part of scholars. One has tended to be "for" international institutions. The great debates have been about methods, like the classical debate between the constitutionalists and the functionalists. Yet in the midst of debate, it often appears that the end is more important to the contestants than the means. The functionalists, for all their pretensions to be more practical people, turn out to be not really interested very much

in the specific functions to be performed - in postal services or labour problems - but only in seizing what they take to be so many opportunities towards their final goal of a tightening web of world government. They are at heart just as Utopian as the world federalists.

Now the Utopians have driven a cleavage between European studies and international studies. They tend towards exclusiveness, because of the telelogical quality of their thinking. The end for one is Europe, for the other world government. That the ends are of the same kind is less important than that they are specifically different.

The European federalist wants to recruit activists for the European idea; he reconstructs the past from one of separate national histories into one of European linkages; and he projects this reconstructed past into a future, envisaging new roles for a Europe which is transmuting its previous colonial expansion into a permanent "civilising" mission. Particularist nationalisms are to be subsumed in a European sentiment - supra-nationalism - which is to be cultivated in order to bring the new united Europe into being. (Evocations of Charlemagne, Lotharingia and Gothic art).

The world government Utopians, on the other hand, seeking to recruit activists for their goal reconstruct history in their own perspective - naively as a progressive world movement towards the final goal after the manner of H.G. Wells; with more sophistication, after the manner of Arnold Toynbee, as an interpenetration of rising and declining civilisations whose conflicts made more formidable by technological development lead to the alternative of universal government or universal destruction.

At the opposite pole from the Utopians, are those who have aimed at a scientific, analytical study of the political processes of universal and regional institutions. Their aim is the further development of the science of political behaviour. The existence of international and regional organisations, like the new interest in the

politics of the extra-European developing areas, has helped to impress upon scholars the great variety in the expanding universe of political systems. No longer can politics be considered in terms of comparative governments using a few examples from Europe and North America as basic models. This breaking of the old mould of political studies has made a revolution in political analysis, shifting away from comparisons of specific institutions towards an attempt to define concepts applicable to all systems. It has helped thus to comprehend the novel - amongst which regional and international organisations are to be counted.

Thus, whereas the Utopians tend to exclusiveness, the "scientific" approach t nds towards a generalising of political studies. "European" political science is a term which makes no sense; science of its essence is universal.

The scientific approach has yielded new insights into the politics of international and regional organizations. If it has a defect this may be that in leaving conventional values aside it tends to replace them unconsciously by new values which are less precise and more questionable. "Integration" and "community" though defined as morally neutral political abstractions tend to acquire a value of their own. The questions "What kind of community?" "What means of integration?" seem old-fashioned, or relevant only if we mean the questions to apply to efficiency rather than to worth.

It is a truism that purpose conceived in a sense of values cannot be excluded from political studies as it cannot from politics. The important thing in political studies is to try to keep the scholars' purpose and values under conscious control. The paragraphs which follow betray an "unscientific" commitment to certain values; at the same time I hope they avoid an utopianism which starts with a view of a final goal of a particular form of European or world government. Consequently from the standpoint adopted below, the European-universal antithesis is meaningless.

What I propose is to suggest several problems in the present and future development of international organizations drawn mainly

from the European regional system. In the treating of these problems, I find it hard, and indeed undesirable, to fix firm boundary lines around subject matter and disciplines. The study of international or regional organizations cannot be isolated from national politics or the activity of intermediate groups within countries; the problems themselves have to be defined in terms of economics as well as of institutions and political behaviour. But as with the Dodo's caucus-race, the best way to explain it is to do it...

Employment and Economic Planning

The years following the coming into effect of the Rome treaty were characterised by a high rate of economic growth in the Six countries, with rising productivity, incomes and employment. These economic conditions antedated E.E.C. and greatly facilitated the setting up of the new institutions, the reduction of protectionism and the adaptation of business to the Community. Continuation of these conditions it may be suggested, is necessary to the political success of the Community.

Amongst these economic conditions, the maintenance of a high level of employment is the most critical. Bankers and some businessmen may attach greater importance to currency stability, but politicians will give the top priority to employment. If substantial unemployment were to occur and the rules and obligations of E.E.C. were to prevent or inhibit drastic remedies (as well they might), governments would find it hard to resist popular pressures to abandon these obligations. Those who seek to advance the cause of integration will do everything possible to avoid the workers being confronted with the alternative: jobs versus the European idea. For there can be little doubt what the workers' answer would be.

There was a taste of worker hostility to "Europe" - and of local solidarity with worker protest - during the Decazeville strike early in 1962 provoked by the closing of redundant coal mines in the

Centre Midi; and if such an early adherent to "Europe" as Paul Ramadier adopted a position of reserve towards the supra-nationalism of the High Authority, was it not in consciousness of discontent among his own constituents with the adverse employment implications of the Coal and Steel Community?

Employment may thus be a critical test of the viability of European institutions. It therefore behoves us to consider what, in a crisis, the Community might be able and willing to do to sustain employment. There are, broadly speaking, three main aspects of the economic problem of maintaining a high level of growth and employment. To each aspect corresponds a different type of policy:

1) Maintenance of sufficient aggregate <u>demand</u> through appropriate fiscal and monetary policies;

2) Facilitating structural changes, i.e. long-term measures to develop scientific and technological research and its applications; to modernise equipment and change the pattern of investment taking account of growth opportunities in different economic sectors; to improve education and training; and to facilitate occupational and geographical mobility of labour etc. There are a variety of instruments for structural change including investment planning (e.g. as practised in France), regional development planning, educational planning and an active labour market policy;

3) An <u>incomes</u> policy designed to reconcile economic growth and full employment with monetary stability by preventing excessive increases in wages and profits. This third aspect has been given increasing prominence in recent years. Governments have been inhibited by international commitments (I.M.F., G.A.T.T., E.E.C., etc.), from reimposing trade or currency controls to correct a persistent adverse balance in payments. They are thus left with deflationary fiscal measures as an alternative way out; and such measures achieve their effect at the cost of dampening growth and incurring the risk of unemployemnt. An incomes policy seeks to avoid the situation arising in which

such drastic measures become necessary. It differs from the policies relating to demand and structural changes in that incomes policies, within the political and economic systems of Western Europe, cannot be decided and enforced by government alone;incomes policy depends upon agreement among the organised economic and social interests (mainly employers and trade unions) and upon their capacity to insure observance by their members of the bargain struck between these organizations and the government. These conditions have rarely been met; and so there is more talk than action about incomes policies.

Considering the Community as a whole, it seems possible that the major threats of employment in the years to come may result from, on the one hand, structural maladjustments, and on the other, the tendency of incomes to rise faster than increases in productivity.

The incomes problem has been frequently reiterated in the press of late: there has been a persistent inflationary tendency in recent years, especially marked in France and Italy, contributing to a weakening payments position of the Community as a whole; and the finger has been pointed at rising labour costs, the result jointly of trade unions taking advantage of labour shortages to push up wage levels and of employers causing "wage drift" above agreed levels by competing for scarce skills.

On the structural side, there are three major contributing causes to maladjustment:

The first is the possibility that one effect of the Common Market will be to increase the disparities between the industrial heartland (from the Netherlands southwards to Northern Italy) and the less developed periphery, because investments will be attracted towards those areas in which they will be most profitable. Attempts are being made by the various countries to counteract this by means of regional development plans, starting new poles of development so as to bring jobs to people instead of requiring people to go to jobs. Such regional programmes have not, on the whole, been a marked success.

The second structural problem is the existence of a great reserve of labour in agriculture and other occupations, e.g. retail trades, in which productivity in Western Europe is substantially lower than modern methods and organization would permit if applied. Very substantial amounts of labour would be released by modernisation in these sectors; but this would be labour which could only be employed by a considerable investment in re-education, re-training and re-location.

The third factor is the acceleration of technological change - often associated with "automation" - which is having important effects on the structure of occupations, eliminating many specialised skills and much semi-skilled and unskilled work and requiring higher standards of technicians and managerial personnel. Adaptation to these changes will require considerable development of human resources parallel with, and in many cases proceeding (because of the longer lead time) investment in new equipment; and also social measures to anticipate residual unemployment, earlier retirment, and greater leisure time.

Taken together, these impending structural changes affecting the labour force suggest that future investment in capital equipment will be accompanied by a lesser rate of increase in employment and perhaps by considerable disemployment. A structural policy will be needed to promote rational investment in capital equipment and even more especially in human resources development so as to maximise the adaptation of the labour force to future economic needs of the Community and to minimise social upheaval. Such a structural policy would have to be conceived on the scale of the Community as a whole since that is the framework within which the changes will take place.

These structural problems and the incomes problem are of course well known to the European Commission. The Commission, however, has very limited powers to deal with them. The Rome treaty is conceived in a philosophy of economic liberalism; its objectives are to free the movement of goods, labour and capital and to introduce

a kind of anti-trust machinery to check and control monopolistic tendencies. The Treaty reflects a distrust of planning and dirigisme.

Of course, institutional evolution may change this situation in practice; and there is some pressure in this direction. But for the present the Commission has few powers of decision and its authority in the wider spheres of economic policy is mainly to study and to propose measures. The machinery of E.E.C. might be used to co-ordinate national policies.

There is, however, a strong suspicion that the law and institutions of the Community are loaded in favour of businessmen and bankers. Article 104 lays the stress on member countries' obligations to ensure equilibrium in the balance of payments and confidence in their currencies; only as something of an afterthought does it refer to the desirability of maintaining a high level of employment. The Treaty also set up a Monetary Committee of central bank and treasury representatives which has a position of influence considerable in comparison with that of the Economic and Social Committee on which trade unions and other groups are represented. The Monetary Committee's influence might tend to encourage restrictive fiscal and monetary policies whereas no body of comparable influence would throw its weight behind measures to maintain employment.

The trade unions might be expected to be the most vigorous defenders of a full employment policy and advocates of planning if necessary to that end. They are; but the trade union position in the Community's institutions does not seem to be a very strong one. In the first place the biggest labour movements in France and Italy (C.G.T. and C.G.I.L.) are excluded from all official representation on ideological grounds. This leaves the German D.G.B. overwhelmingly the strongest organisation in the Community sphere, which implies a danger of sensitivities on the part of other weaker organisations ill conducive to the achievement of cohesion amongst those trade union movements associated with the Community. The minority organisations in France and Italy (Christian and Socialist) are commited to European institutions without having much real influence in them.

Their official status in the Community was sought as a prize, to outbid the Communists domestically for worker support; but it may prove to be a prison if the non-represented are freer to criticise while the represented are unable to show results. The unions have no access to the Monetary Committee or to the Economic Policy Committee (concerned with anti-cyclical measures), both of which may be influential in matters affecting employment. The unions have pressed unsuccessfully for Community-wide planning and for representation on the body which would be entrusted with planning. And they have been increasingly irritated with their lack of influence over the activities of the Commission in this field.

The Community's approach to incomes policy stems from the Monetary Committee which, since 1959, has been calling attention to the dangers of inflation from rising production costs. These opinions have been vigorously echoed by members of the Commission, principally M. Marjolin, in various public utterances. In his statement to the European Assembly in January 1964, M. Marjolin proposed that governments cut public expenditures, defer long range investment projects, and otherwise restrict demand while at the same time persuading trade unions and employers to limit increases in incomes - a hard remedy for a Socialist to prescribe! The organised economic interests (particularly the unions), however, while showing interest in investment planning have been resolutely opposed to any restriction, self imposed or otherwise, to their freedom as regards wages and prices.

Thus, to strike a balance concerning the Community's capabilities in these areas of economic policy which are critical from the standpoint of employment, it may be suggested :

- As regards <u>monetary and fiscal</u> policy there is a machinery, intergovernmental in character, permitting co-ordination of national measures (meetings of Finance Ministers, Monetary Committee, Economic Policy Committee, etc.). But this machinery reflects a primary concern for monetary stability; and therein lies its weakness from the standpoint of employment policy.

- Limited progress has been made on the fringes of structural policy. The community can take decisions in matters such as readaptation grants from the Social Fund and loans from the Investment Bank. The main issue, however, is some form of investment programming by major sectors, taking account of regional needs and human resources development needs. In this regard progress has been halting and uncertain. The main advance has been in the development of the E.E.C.'s economic information and capacity to produce analyses and forecasts. But there is as yet no consensus in support of planning or "programming" within the community in the investment field; and little advance towards the association of the political and interest groups in the framing of goals and the discussion of methods for planning.

- Incomes policy has not passed beyond the stage of exhortations. The Finance Ministers of the Six and the Council last April agreed on an anti-inflation "stabilisation" plan of the classical type (budget cuts and credit squeeze).

Organising economic interests and community planning

These conclusions concerning the E.E.C.'s capacities in the economic policy field point to the institutional inadequacy of the Community to cope with what are likely to be the major issues of employment policy - in other words to ensure that full employment and rising incomes underwrite the political viability of the Community.

This institutional incapacity reflects a deficiency in the organised interest groups, which would have to be brought into active working relationship with the organs of the Community to carry out a "structure" policy or an "incomes" policy. There are two aspects to this inadequacy: the first ideological, the second organisational.

From an ideological standpoint, incomes policy, though it has arisen specifically from a preoccupation with the balances of payments, raises the whole question of the just distribution of national income. Hitherto governments, under pressure from unions and other organised social forces, have attempted to remedy injustices

ex post facto through transfer payments. Incomes policy poses the problem at the stage of formation of incomes. In few societies is it likely to be easy to reach consensus on this. In most of the Six it is certainly going to be extremely difficult. The issue touches directly those fundamental disagreements amongst Europeans about the aims of society which the ideology of European unity was in large measure intended either to resolve or to obscure.

The unions fear that "incomes policy" is just a euphemism for wage restraint: that it will not control profits (and this is especially feared where tax fraud is suspected of being common). They do not accept that wages be limited to average advances in productivity; since this would perpetuate the status quo in the distribution of incomes whereas the purpose of the labour movement is to alter it in favour of workers. The French C.G.T. has stated its position that the criteria (e.g. productivity) suggested for an incomes policy would only be valid "s'il s'agissait d'une société différente de la nôtre".[1] Employers for their part are reluctant to give up their freedom to hoard labour or to offer higher wages to attract skills in short supply.

An incomes policy implies that a bargain concerning future distribution of national income will be struck between the organised economic and social interest under the aegis of the government. Structure policy implies a willingness to call these organising interests into consultation concerning the future pattern of investment which is one way of influencing future income distribution. In neither case do conditions seem propitious for agreement among the major social forces within Western Europe.

From the organisational standpoint, it is questionable how far the present organisations of workers and employers would be effectively able to commit their members to an incomes policy should

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1) La Documentation française, Recueils et Monographies No.47, Rapport sur la politique des revenus établi à la suite de la Conférence des revenus, 1964.

one be agreed. (Of course, the inability to ensure commitment is one reason, in addition to ideological discord, why agreement is unlikely. No organisation is going willingly to demonstrate its own weakness).

The French case is not entirely typical of the Six, but shows some of the problems in their most extreme form. French trade unions are weak organisationally. The numbers of paid-up members are very low, as is the sense of commitment to membership of a particular union among the majority of French workers. Furthermore, the unions have not been able to secure a firm foothold in the undertaking because of the resistance of employers and because legislation has sponsored other forms of workers representation within the undertaking. Unions have tended, in consequence, to be vehicles of spontaneous worker protest, during which times they acquire an unusual degree of unanimity and influence upon government and employers. But such influence is spasmodic and in one direction : from the base upwards. In normal times, unions are divided ideologically in their objectives and leaders are unable to ensure that the membership will follow an agreed policy. It is unlikely they would be capable of entering into long-term commitments concerning permissible limits of increases in wages and welfare such as an incomes policy would require - even if they were disposed to, which they are not.

It is true, the unions have been drawn into participation in the specialized commissions advising the Commissariat du Plan; but the experience has not been notably successful from the union standpoint. Trade union representatives are a small minority (about ten per cent) in these commissions; trade union counsels are divided; and union influence on the planning process is much less than that of business interests.

There are some conclusions to be drawn from the foregoing. The first is that the E.E.C. has not yet achieved among its government members any consensus as to the way in which it should confront structural and incomes policy problems, particularly as to the degree of official intervention and planning. The Commission is pushing gently in the direction of "programming" for both investment and incomes but so far has not been able to go beyond encouraging some co-ordination of fiscal and monetary policy.

The second is that any further advance in this direction will raise in acute form the need for interlocuteurs valables among the economic and social interests. This is a particularly serious problem on the trade union side. At present it is obstructing the adoption of incomes policies in the different countries.

The situation seems unlikely to change markedly of itself. A further advance may thus depend upon the E.E.C. with the support of its member governments, taking steps to create or strengthen interlocuteurs valables. This is, of course, official heresy in trade union circles and may smack of Bolshevism in some government circles. But it is in substance what the New Deal administration and the Wagner Act did in the 1930s in the United States : government threw its support behind the more active forces of trade unionism so as to bring into being a movement which could play its part in the effort for economic recovery. The precipitating cause in the 1930s - mass unemployment and dislocation of the economy - is fortunately not now present; but some of the economic and social problems on the horizon may prove to be not of lesser magnitude. To follow this course would, however, imply a change of heart on the part of the governments and of the E.E.C.; and at present there is no evidence of such a disposition.

Without wishing to labour the analogy, a somewhat similar problem arises in the under-developed countries. The basic document outlining the aims of the U.N. Development Decade gives prominence to "enlisting popular support for the tasks of national development, and th

participation of broad social groups in them".[1] "Participation" is a vague term; but in this context it means essentially that unless strategic sections of the labour force can be inspired to work for development goals, to adopt new methods, and to forego some immediate gains in income in the interest of a continuing rate of investment, the development effort will fail. Thus, types of human organisation must be formed which will give rural and industrial workers an opportunity of articulating their views, of participating in setting the social goals of economic development, of understanding their own responsibilities in the development effort and of being organised to work effectively. Much less attention has hitherto been given to this problem than to matters such as resources surveys, assessment of investment needs and opportunities, training programmes and so forth. The Secretariats of the United Nations and some of the specialised agencies, are, however, conscious of this problem now and may be expected to attempt to play a greater role in influencing directly the development of the institutional infrastructure for economic growth.

Thus international organisations - both European regional and general international - are likely to be concerned at least indirectly in the organisation of economic and social interest groups. The questions of how this is to be done - particularly as regards workers' organisations - of what different forms these organisations may take and of their role in respect of economic policy, constitute important objects of study relevant to the further development of international organisation itself.

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1) The United Nations Development Decade : Proposals for Action : Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, New York 1962, p. 25.

Parliamentary democracy and international organisation

Assemblies composed of representatives from national parliaments have constituted one of the characteristic modes of European regionalism, reflecting a federal intention if not a federal reality. There has been some considerable interest in the study of these bodies as to how they work, the extent to which they may lead to further "integration" among political groups on cross-national lines, the ways in which they achieve consensus, etc. It is also perhaps useful to consider the actual political functions of these parliamentary bodies in relation to parliamentary democracy in its classical national forms.

Within the E.E.C., the political balance of powers is between the Commission and the Council. The Commission is the motor of progress towards further integration. The initiative in making proposals rests primarily with it; and its role is one of attempting to strengthen and extend the powers of the Community organs towards full economic union and ultimately federal union. The Council is the embodiment of national interests represented by member governments. This confrontation of Commission and Council is essentially a duel of bureaucracies : the Commission controlling an administrative mechanism for analysing and presenting information in such a way as to further supranational goals; the ministers in the Council being advised by national civil servants.

The European Parliamentary Assembly has certain formal rights of "parliamentary control"; but these turn out to be rather transparently unreal powers, e.g. the power to dismiss the Commission en bloc by a vote of censure (Article 144). The Assembly has in fact tended to become an auxiliary of the Commission in its duel with the Council.

One reason for this is the way in which the Assembly is composed. Its members are selected by national parliaments in a manner so as to exclude extremists beyond the pale of European ideology,

Communists and their associates and neo-Fascists. The delegations tend to be composed of those parliamentarians who are most enthusiastic for the "European" cause; they are more favourable towards the expansion of supranational powers than are national parliaments or public opinion. Thus the Assembly is both quite capable of taking a more advanced position on integration than the Commission itself and quite incapable of influencing the Council directly in any material way. The Council would be responsive only if the Assembly views reflected a movement of opinion within national parliaments; and in fact the main political function of the Assembly appears to be to act through its members to influence national opinion within national parliaments. It is more a tool of the Commission than a check or control over the Commission

The Assembly is but one of the auxiliaries in the Commission's forces. The Commission has also entered into contact with organised pressure groups whose interests are bound up with the Common Market - industrial associations, trade unions, agricultural interest groups and so forth. A network of relationships and consultations has been systematically built up, all converging upon the services of the Commission. The Economic and Social Committee, designed as a channel for such contacts, has not proven a very vital body; and the most effective contacts are the direct ones between pressure groups and the Commission. The Commission has not only welcomed the creation of new pressure groups structured on the Common Market and provided them with full facilities; it has also tried, in some cases, to provoke the creation of new pressure groups where none existed, for example in the field of consumers' interests. The Commission calls these Community-level pressure groups into frequent consultations on a wide range of matters of social and economic policy. It takes their views on questions like the common transport policy before drawing up proposals for the Council; and it has consulted with the employer and trade union organisations even on the results of statistical inquiries into labour costs and

workers' incomes and into the current manpower situation before making them public.

The Commission's apparent enthusiasm for pressure groups is not difficult to fathom. They provide, available in Brussels, spokesmen for the main private interests within the Common Market who are able to advise the Commission on the acceptability to their members of different possible Commission initiatives. They may also encourage their members to adopt "European" in preference to national or local positions; though it is difficult to know how far such influence holds good and it seems possible that it does not extend very far below the top layer of people directly involved in the work of the Communities.

The existence of a whole constellation of organised interest groups and political groups at the European level undoubtedly facilitates the Commission's task of working towards European integration. And these groups are in turn influenced by a further set of pressure groups working towards the enlargement of the role of the European institutional system. At the summit of these "European" pressure groups is the Action Committee for the United States of Europe organised by Jean Monnet in 1955, which has planned and influenced the execution of successive stages of development in European regionalism from the Messina Conference to more recent proposals, such as that for a European currency reserve union. This Committee includes leaders from various groups - political authorities, industry, trade union, etc. Its proposals filter down through other "European" groups and economic pressure groups and into the European Parliamentary Assembly.

Thus the political system which has grown up about the E.E.C. is extremely complex; much of it operates through channels not exposed to public scruting. In this system, the pressure groups appear to play a big role in articulating interests; and the Commission and the pressure groups (particularly the Monnet Committee)

together are important in aggregating interests and initiative policy. The role of the European Parliamentary Assembly is a distincly subordinate one; and this is not a very reassuring prospect for the future of parliamentary institutions within the Community.

Looked at from the standpoint of national parliaments, the picture is hardly more reassuring. The Rome Treaty has removed some matters from the effective control of the parliaments of the member countries; and the sphere of encroachment upon parliaments will expand to the extent that European institutions are able to extend their sphere of decision-making. National governments may also use their committments to international organisations as a means of putting pressure upon reluctant parliamentarians towards acceptance of policies deemed desirable from a European or an Atlantic or a United Nations standpoint, even if these policies do not appear particularly desirable from the standpoint of domestic policy or local interests. Thus participation in regional and international programmes may, in some cases, enhance the executive authority of governments at the expense of parliamentary control.

One reaction to this problem in the United States was the proposed Bricker amendment - representing perhaps an extreme isolationist viewpoint, even though widely supported in Congress and by the states. If the Bricker forces suggest Right-wing reaction, they have in this matter been joined by a significant Left-wing reluctance in Britain to allow any derogation from Parliament's rights to control public policy in connection with the British application for membership in the Common Market. (William Pickles, who has been prominent in taking this stand, has contrasted the docile character of "parliamentary control" through the European Parliamentary Assembly with the activity of British M.P.'s by pointing out that 100 or so detailed questions are raised by members of the Assembly as against approximately 30,000 in the House of Commons during a

normal year).[1)]

A further factor is that, taking the world as a whole, the prestige of Parliamentary democracy does not stand very high; and there is no reason to anticipate much improvement in its status. In years gone by, the adherents of parliamentary democracy fortified themselves with the thought that they were in the van of progress and soon the whole world would be drawn into the system. Now, outside of Western Europe and North America, parliamentary institutions are, for the most part, either perverted in practice or - increasingly and with greater honesty - rejected in theory in favour of other instrumentalities for associating the various sections of the population with the political process. And in the heart of Europe itself, the new regime of France has,both in law and in style, downgraded Parliamentary institutions.

If the believer in parliamentary government cannot seek assurance in the march of history, either he will abandon faith or he will assert the value of his belief independently of whether other people are prepared to accept it.And this latter course argues for a certain restraint in undertaking the kind of involvements in international or regional organisation which limit unduly the parliamentary control of national policy.

One objection to his view will be that the dilemma may be resolved by taking another step towards strengthening parliamentary controls within the framework of regional institutions; that there should be a directly elected European Parliament; or in the Atlantic sphere (one step behind) there should be a parliamentary organ on the present European pattern. Mr. Christian Herter argues

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1) William Pickles, "Political Power in the E.E.C.", Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. II, No 1, p.66.

that the origins of modern parliaments were in the "grand assize" of the nation, whose function was criticism and restraint before it became one of law-making; and that this function would at present be a useful means of working towards an Atlantic community.[1] My analysis suggests conclusions more cautions than these.

The real political functions of the parliamentary organs of European regionalism, first of all, to be more fully studied and understood. It appears to me that these functions are to propagandise for regionalism rather than to exert real political controls. They are primarily ideological gimmicks, instruments used by international executives to influence popular and national parliamentary opinion.

Where parliamentary control still occupies a place of value in the political mores, it is most effective at national and local levels. There is thus a strong argument in favour of preserving the independence of governments controlled in this manner so that they may negotiate directly with other governments within regional or international framework, rather than submit to international authorities over which democratic control is far less effective.

The full potentialities of co-operation of the strictly inter-governmental type have not perhaps been adequately explored, though there has been considerable practical progress in this direction since the war. The fascination with novel institutions (in which respect Little Europe has been fertile) has perhaps diverted attention from this other method whereby governments attempt to reconcile their respective policies by negotiation while preserving

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1) Christian A. Herter, Toward an Atlantic Community, New York, 1963, pp. 72-74.

the autonomy of their own constitutional and political processes. The experience of O.E.E.C., and in some respects of N.A.T.O., would merit fuller attention, following up the avenues of inquiry opened by Max Beloff in New Dimensions in Foreign Policy. The intergovernmental method has the additional advantage of keeping pressure group activity within proper perspective and control.

Finally, much greater attention should be given to understanding what may be called the "federal style" in politics. This is well defined by one politician with considerable experience both of federalism and of international affairs : "Statesmen find it worth making great efforts, and displaying great restraint, in order to devise policies which will if possible obtain popular support in all the main regions affected. When this cannot be achieved, it is at least virtually essential to obtain from all sections an acquiescence that is willing and understanding rather than grudging or forced".[1)]

The negotiation and maintenance of consent is the main art of politics, whether we are concerned with the national, regional or international sphere. But as the political system becomes larger and more heterogeneous, as the number and variety of interests to be taken into account multiply, the qualities required to negotiate and maintain consent are stretched.

Sometimes one has the impression that some political scientists, in seeking to become more scientific, are trying to forget about the politicians or to resolve them into mathematics. It is, however, more than ever important to give politicians and

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1) Lester B. Pearson, Democracy in World Politics, Toronto, 1955, p. 45.

administrators, whose background is always local, the guidance that comes from seeing a reflection of their activity in the larger sphere of regional and international politics : showing the difficulties arising from inadequate perception of the range of interests which interact in international situations and which are present in international and regional organisations; and analysing the techniques of negotiation, The main purpose of political studies remains the political education of those who can lead.

May 1964 R. W. Cox