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and

THE INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

MAY 22 - 25, 1964



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Mr. Richard Goold-Adams

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Professor Michael HOWARD	Professor of War Studies, King's College, London
Dr. L.G.M. JAQUET	Director, Netherlands Institute of International Affairs
Professor William KAUFMANN	Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The Conference was opened by the co-chairmen, Signor Lombardo who spoke in English and Mr. Goold-Adams who spoke partly in Italian. Both stressed the importance that their respective organisations attached to the development of opportunities for the private exchange of views between men of responsibility and experience on both sides of the Atlantic. Mr. Goold-Adams expressed his pleasure at the presence of two Vice-Presidents of ISS, Senator Gronchi and Professor Aron, and said that assistance in the organization of international conferences such as this was regarded by ISS as one of its most important responsibilities. The conference then passed to its first session.

Morning Session, Friday 22 May

"THE END OF A BIPOLAR WORLD?"

Signor Bartoli in the Chair.

Professor Raymond Aron introduced this subject by pointing out that "a bipolar world" had three meanings: first a concentration of military power in two states or blocs; second the coalition or rallying of all states round the leading state of each bloc; or third a fundamental ideological opposition between the two blocs or between the leading states in each bloc.

In the period between the end of World War II and today there had been only a loose bipolarity. It existed in only one part of the world, in North America and Europe: there was some competition in the rest of the world but there had been no question of all states rallying round one bloc or the other. The question today was (1) whether the two blocs still existed in the same part of the world and in the same form, and (2) whether the rivalry between them still had the same character.

With regard to the first definition of bipolarity, the concentration of military or atomic power in two states, this has not changed; or if it has, there is even greater concentration now than in the past. The British deterrent is less significant than it was five years ago and the French deterrent exists only in the future. Therefore really only two states have a deterrent now. The British force has always meant more in military terms than in political terms; and it exists politically less than it did five years ago. The French force does not exist at all in military terms but it is already here to some extent in political terms.

To what extent is it possible to translate nuclear force into diplomatic action - the ability to convince or coerce another state? The ability to destroy another state does not mean, in normal times, the ability to persuade that state, because everybody knows that the force will not be used. Secondly, to what extent has the position of leadership of each leading state changed inside each bloc?

In regard to the Soviet bloc, Albania has been able to defect from the USSR and the USSR has been just as unable to coerce Albania as any other state would be. It was the challenge of the big by the small. Partly because of the Sino-Soviet conflict, partly because the USSR has lost so much of its ability to fascinate and coerce, a greater degree of freedom was available to the East European states. This freedom was clear in the economic field (e.g. Rumania) and apparent in the internal organ-

isation of the states and to a certain extent in the ideological position they could take up. This was the key aspect of the loss of leadership by the USSR inside the Soviet bloc. But there is still a big Russian army in East Germany, East Germany still remains, the wall still exists in Berlin, Europe is still partitioned. So the big question is to what extent is the loosening in the blocs able to change the general picture? The short answer to this complex question is that it does not change it.

For the West, several factors are at work. First, the economic recovery of Europe has reduced the disparity between the economic strengths of the US and Europe, although the difference is still very great. The US has lost the possibility of using economic means to coerce her allies. Second, the feeling of security, created by the Cuba crisis, with the conviction that the two main powers are determined to avoid a direct confrontation and that the USSR has finally understood the American way of thinking. Since Cuba the Russians have behaved as if they understood the Americans - resulting in the test ban and other limited agreements between the two main powers. Third, under the protection of this security the political game has become more possible. Greater flexibility in diplomatic relations is possible, especially for a country like France. The French deterrent was created because the American deterrent is credible - France can play with the idea of having its own for the future. The argument that it had to do with the non-credibility of the American deterrent has really been abandoned, although it remains as a political argument.

As far as the non-aligned countries are concerned, the first phase of the cold war was summed up in the formula "Who is not for me is against me", which was stated both by Stalin and Dulles in different forms. The second phase was characterised by the formula "Who is not against me is for me", and the blessing of the neutrals. This was done by both the USSR and the Americans. In the third phase of de-bipolarisation there are a great many different kinds of neutralism and contests outside the two blocs. There is the Chinese-Russian game. Sometimes the Russian game may be nearer to the American than to the Peking one. The special rivalry between Moscow and Peking is conducted outside the two blocs, but there is a complication because of the effect on different Communist Parties. Moreover many countries now have their special quarrels - India and Pakistan, China and Russia, Indonesia and Malaysia: it would be absurd to try to reduce these complicated games to the simple quarrel between the US and USSR. It was never really true that there was a bipolar world outside of North America and Europe, but this is now even less true than in the past. Nevertheless, on serious problems, the hour of truth, it may be said that the two main powers still remain the two main powers.

Moreover, it is now an open question as to who are now the colonial powers. The French were the great scapegoats for anti-colonialism. Now the British and Americans, and increasingly the Americans, are getting the blame for it. In South Vietnam the US has taken up not only the burden of a war but the ideological burden of being the imperialist power. (The US has a special characteristic for taking this role e.g. in Latin America, where there must be a dominant power.) France gives advice and the US is irritated, but the fact that France is not deterred by US disapproval from her own policy in Asia adds to the complexity of international relations.

M. Aron concluded by drawing attention, first, to the disparity between military force available and the political influence exercised in the daily intercourse of nations, although emphasising that in a crisis military power will remain decisive. Second, he pointed out that polycentrism in Eastern Europe is for the time being limited to the economic field and the internal structure of the communist states and to ideological positions. Third, he emphasised that the West is now readier to accept a greater diversity of regimes in the outside world - a state can call itself socialist and the West will still support it. Conceivably a socialist Cuba no more linked with the USSR could be accepted by the US in ten years' time, just as a socialist Algeria can be supported by France so long as it is not linked with the USSR.

On the third meaning of bipolarity, the existence of a high degree of ideological opposition between the US and USSR or between the two blocs, the question is to what extent changes in the internal politics of the USSR have reduced the feeling of a bipolar world. His answer was that these changes have not reduced this feeling, mainly because the differences between regimes in the East and West remain so great that the ideological bipolarity remains; but it is somewhat reduced by the flexibility in the Soviet world and by Western acceptance of some sort of notion of socialist states in some parts of the world.

Professor Robert Osgood (first respondent) suggested that bipolarity could refer not only to the structure of military power but also to configurations of major conflicts of interest that give the pattern of international relations its characteristic, as well as to the number of states playing an active and independent role in diplomacy.

He agreed with M. Aron that if the measure is the structure of military power, there has been no significant change in international relations. But there have arisen in both blocs new centres of political initiative and activity which are less dependent on the bloc leaders. Dependent powers grow restive; new issues seem more important and attractive than those which have long dominated their alliance. This development is intensified by the nuclear stand-off, the international stability which has followed from a number of tacit agreements not to go to war and by the detente, which has created safe opportunities for lesser powers to exert a greater degree of political mobility. Many old issues are somewhat stagnant, and there is less motive for cohesion.

The dynamics of this development are, first, dissociation of the lesser members of the bloc from the leadership, and second, the tendency to build counter-coalitions against the leader. The third stage would be for the lesser members to form associations and alignments across the bloc with members of the opposing bloc. But how effective can the movement away from bipolarity become if these new centres of political activity do not become significant military powers? Can they become significant military powers, and, if they do, how will this affect the international stability that bipolarity has achieved?

In the pre-nuclear age, new centres of independent political activity coincided very closely with new centres of military power. Power equalled weight. But now that relationship between military power and diplomatic influence is not so simple or so direct. In the nuclear age, where the excessive military power which is available to the most powerful states is unusable, the test of power has become the ability to convince an adversary that if he takes a certain action he will start a war that no-one can win rather than a war which he will lose - tests of nerve and will rather than of strength. This^{has} produced a remarkable degree of stability which extends to the use of conventional as well as nuclear force. As a result the two great states have become very circumspect in the overt use of military power, because there have been only two powers and these two have been undergoing a kind of learning process, how far they can exert pressure without undergoing the extreme risk of war.

But stability also results from the fact that the power and counter-power is organised in deterrent coalitions and that in this system of international order everything depends upon the clarity of mutual commitments of the states. Since the end of the 19th century international stability has depended increasingly, not on the shifting of alliances and alignments, but rather upon the formation of deterrent coalitions in which the mutual restraints depend upon the clarity of defence commitments.

On the other hand, as M. Aron said, bipolarity under these advantages of a deterrent system carries the seeds of its own change or decay. The possibility of new centres is disturbing because they could cloud the clarity of lines of commitment on which the present stability depends. They could lead to miscalculation and catalytic war whereby a lesser member, being restive, involves the others in a chain reaction.

Both the super-powers have a common interest in preventing the shift away from bipolarity and are trying to do so by such things as the test ban. On the other hand, the USSR may be tempted to fish in troubled coalition waters, which will lead the tendency back to bipolarity. If multipolarity does take place, we must hope that the mutual restraints in the bipolar world will be transferred to the multipolar world.

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The subsequent discussion pursued three principal themes: the extent to which the detente between East and West was permanent and the effect of a judgement on this question upon the requirement of Atlantic solidarity; the relationship between military force and political influence or action; and the extent to which the structure of international relations had or would become depolarised.

The Reality of Detente

It was the view of two leading American participants that the apparent detente with the Soviet Union, on which many arguments about the end of bipolarity were based, was more fragile than many of the exponents of polycentrism accepted. The American, British and German official participants argued that the communist threat had changed only in appearance and direction rather than in intensity. "In many ways we are in a period of immobilisme

rather than detente if by 'detente' one means the solution of problems which are a source of friction." The sense of security furnished by the nuclear stalemate, argued a senior American official could be a source of weakness if it led to a diminution of Atlantic solidarity at a time when the real objectives of the communist bloc, and its ability to exploit inter-allied differences, had not altered. This view was endorsed by a German official who pointed out that to counter the diversification of the communist threat required new techniques of orchestrated diplomacy as well as a strategy of nuclear deterrence.

The question of whether Europe and the United States had diplomatic objectives which were genuinely, or were merely said to be, in conflict, was raised but not pursued.

The Relationship between Political and Military Power

M. Aron's suggestion that there was no longer a direct or proportionate connection between the military power and the political influence of various countries, except in time of crisis, was challenged. One senior American official pointed out that if this change had occurred, it was against a background of very little alteration in the relative strengths of the major powers. The political power of Europe had not yet been translated into military terms. The United States had markedly increased its ability to take military action in the uncommitted world, and was still much stronger than the Soviet Union. But another American argued that though the US was by far the most influential Western power, a great deal of American military power was unusable and therefore not able to influence events in the traditional fashion. At this point M. Aron interjected "You (Americans) have largely created the idea that it is wrong to use military force in diplomatic relations; or by creating the idea that force is there not to be used, you are directly responsible for the non-connection between the degree of military power and diplomatic influence." Another American pointed out that there was nothing surprising in this divergency of political and military power, since enormous military power imposes responsibilities and responsibilities impose restraints. Countries with less power feel less restrained.

A French participant then suggested that there was an important distinction between direct strategy (great power threats and actions against other great powers, especially involving nuclear weapons) and indirect strategy (pressure on minor allies or non-aligned countries involving subversion, para-military action or economic and political activity). The stalemate in direct strategy, which had decreased the danger of war between the blocs, had led to greater freedom of action in indirect strategy. Smaller allies had not at first been aware of this freedom - Tito was the first to realise it - and had discovered it little by little. But this freedom of action related to indirect strategy alone - direct strategy was still strongly polarised.

The view that much of Western military power was unusable was challenged by two British participants. One queried the American view that the West as a whole was stronger because the United States had stronger conventional reserves. It was communist policy to concentrate on the weakest point, and the West as a whole was at its weakest in Africa and Arabia where certain flare-ups were taking place. The other cast doubt on the view

that military power was becoming unusable by pointing to its actual use in Hungary, Cuba, Tanganyika and Gabon. To this M. Aron later replied that he had not been thinking of such current small-scale adventures in considering the relationship of military power to political influence, but rather whether it was possible to translate the possession of nuclear power into political influence; and whether the members of both blocs accepted a de facto duopoly of such power because they were aware that it was unusable and safe, and therefore gave them freedom of action to play at lesser games. A Norwegian participant expressed the fear that these smaller powers would feel that their new-found freedom of action made it possible to use their military power, and that this, as Robert Osgood had argued, could lead to miscalculation. And a Dutch member emphasised the fact that the dependence of both the major powers on the support of the United Nations, where 53 of the 113 countries had populations of less than 5 million people, enormously complicated traditional calculations about the acceptability of forceful solutions as well as representing a dangerous trend for international society as a whole.

The unresolved question, it was widely agreed, was whether Western military power really had political significance in the face of guerrilla operations.

The Extent of Depolarisation

One Italian member of the conference suggested that the distinction M. Aron had suggested between the different use Britain and France had made of their nuclear programmes would lose its significance within ten years when both the military and the diplomatic question would have been re-united in an independent Europe in a de-polarised world. M. Aron expressed his scepticism that Europe would within the next ten or fifteen years translate its new freedom of action into independent military power: there were many conflicts of view and interest on this among the European countries. And a German participant expressed his scepticism about the reality of de-polarisation. There were new centres of ambition within the alliance but not of real power. It was a delusion to think that a stable equilibrium would be achieved between Western and Eastern Europe: for the countries of both Europes it was a question of shoring up the bipolar US-Soviet relationship in the interests of stability and making the most satisfactory adjustments to its continued existence. Certainly, one American participant commented, if Europe did become a new centre of military power, the most important aspect of this would be not so much the power itself as the evidence of a united European will. A Belgian member argued that even if Europe did not become a separate centre of power, the problem of a flexible strategy would require new techniques of Atlantic decision making and taking.

Another Italian participant suggested that the most important development in the ending of a bipolar world was the emergence of China as a communist power with a separate policy. The fact that Chinese military power today was minimal was no more important than in the case of France, for once independent centres of political action are created they sooner or later become centres of military power. The view that China was going to have this effect upon the structure of international relations in the next ten years was disputed by two British officials and by M. Aron, who expressed his own belief that within the next ten years neither Paris nor Peking would have become decisive centres of political initiative or military power.

One British participant suggested that it was mistaken to argue that because power was growing within an alliance at the expense of the traditional leader, the attractive quality of the alliance was diminishing. Thus British influence had been used to try and pull the whole alliance in the direction of Britain's interests, not to create in London an alternative pole of attraction to Washington. Similarly, if German power increased, it could be used for the same purpose: to commit the forces of the West more closely to Germany, not to set up Bonn as an alternative pole. M. Aron accepted this while drawing attention to the fundamental differences in alliance techniques of Britain and of France.

Afternoon Session, Friday 22 May

"THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN DEFENCE DOCTRINE"

M. Vernant in the Chair.

Professor William Kaufmann introduced this subject by outlining certain characteristics of US defence doctrine as it had evolved over the last 19 years. The US has had to face two central problems in formulating its defence policy: first, how to adapt to the introduction of nuclear weapons, assuming always that no means is found of abolishing them; and second, what relative emphasis to place on deterrence as such as against the means of fighting effectively in the event that deterrence should fail. The problem of adapting to nuclear weapons is very complex, simply because there are at least four different types of wars that we need to be concerned about: a strategic nuclear engagement; possibly a tactical use of nuclear weapons; a more classic conventional war; and the problem of subversion, insurgency and guerrilla war.

On the problem of deterrence, the main issues have been, first, how much should we depend on deterrence by terror as such and how much we should really stake on trying to achieve military effectiveness in the event that deterrence should fail, and also whether or not in seeking military effectiveness we would enhance the deterrent. This has also raised the question of what kind of force would be usable and therefore credible.

He then drew attention to certain characteristics which have dominated the evolution of American policy. The first of these, not widely appreciated, is that for a long time the United States has had the feeling either that it was already vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear attack or that it shortly would be. This was said as early as 1946, but the first major expression of the idea was in the Finletter Air Power report of 1948. Contrary to what many Americans and Europeans may think, the United States Government has thought itself vulnerable for a long time and has got used to it. It is probable that the US has spent on the order of \$30 billion over the past ten years on air defence on the premise that the USSR could attack the continental United States.

A second characteristic of these years has been a lively debate within the US and the development of alternative schools of thought about defence and strategic doctrine. To the extent that US policy has changed, this is much more a reflection of the differing views within the US about how best to adapt to nuclear weapons than ^{due} to changes that have occurred slowly in the Soviet capabilities and force levels. The debate still goes on, and he thought it important to recognise that American policy is probably affected much more by the debate than it is by the kind of changes that have occurred in the Soviet military posture. Oscillations occurred in the Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations and may occur in the Johnson Administration. The swing has been very extreme from dependence on nuclear weapons to a more balanced capability. Originally the US placed very heavy emphasis on its nuclear capabilities, then, faced with crisis in Korea, swung over to more balanced capabilities. The same thing occurred in the Eisenhower Administration, with an initial heavy emphasis on nuclear weaponry, and then a later increase of stress on balanced capabilities.

Since 1961, in the period when there was most controversy/ ^{about} American defence policy, what we have really seen is a greater emphasis than ever before on the need for balanced capabilities. This is a reflection of what dominated the last years of the Truman Administration and a logical outgrowth of the last years of the Eisenhower. Briefly, the effort has been to try and tame nuclear power, by what has been called counterforce, controlled response, damage limitation, etc. This is an effort to try and find a mode of warfare with nuclear weapons which would not involve the complete destruction of the societies involved. We think we know how to do this, but obviously we require the co-operation of the opponent. We also think we know of ways at least to increase the probability that the opponent would wish to co-operate on a strategy of attacking military targets and avoiding civilian population.

The effort as far as nuclear strategy is concerned has been based on the very real concern that one cannot achieve 100% perfect deterrence. Therefore our concern has been to try to do our best in the way of achieving military effectiveness and limiting damage in the event that the deterrent should fail. Consequently a strong motivating factor in developing the concept of controlled response has been simply recognition of the very deep commitment to Europe and the feeling that we must find ways of making the strategic nuclear deterrent more credible than a number of us feel was the case in earlier years. Much of the propulsive force for the doctrine of controlled response stems from a desire to demonstrate that the American strategic deterrent is not completely paralysed. Nevertheless it is fair to acknowledge, as American spokesmen have acknowledged, that there are great uncertainties about how well we can do in the event of being obliged to conduct a strategic nuclear campaign, in particular the great uncertainties about the kind of damage that would result. One can imagine cases, at least in the short run, where the damage would be substantially less than in World War II, but in other cases the casualties could run up into hundreds of millions in both Europe and the US. Therefore it is central to the view of this Administration that insurance should be purchased against the event that the deterrent should fail and we find ourselves in a position where initially at least we should not be prepared to use nuclear weapons.

The purchase of this insurance looks sensible to the US not only on this ground but also on the ground that the Soviets and Chinese have been maintaining a much smaller conventional capability than had previously been estimated. For example NATO has slightly more men under arms than the Soviet bloc, so that buying insurance in the form of conventional capabilities has struck the present Administration as eminently sensible and feasible. This does not mean that the US is prepared to forego the use of nuclear weapons. She is on record that she will use all means necessary to ensure the defence of Western Europe. However, it must be recognised that under some situations this could mean very simply denying West Europe to the USSR in the sense that there might not be very much of West Europe left.

This Administration has been seeking to adapt to nuclear weapons in two ways: by trying to find ways of conducting nuclear campaigns in such a way as to minimise collateral damage, and by avoiding complete dependence on nuclear weapons in the event that difficulties arrive. In either event, deterrence is very much a function of both the magnitude of the capabilities available and their indestructability. As of now, and it may change, it is a cardinal point of American defence doctrine that there is no incompatibility between deterrence and defence; and the kinds of forces that we want and the kinds of forces that we have been developing over the past three years are keyed to the notion that the best means of deterrence is by achieving the kind of capability that would defeat the enemy in the event of war.

Dr. Theo Sommer (first respondent) said it would be rash to attempt to give a European view; he would therefore attempt to give as fair as possible a summary of some European attitudes. How far have the Europeans adapted to the American adaptations to the changing scene? Our reaction, he thought, has been one of caution, sometimes of scepticism. We are often worried about some of the signs of oscillation of which Professor Kaufmann spoke. European doubts and hesitations relate both to the form of the evolution of American strategy and to its substance. Especially under President Kennedy, the Americans developed a habit of springing new ideas on their allies out of the blue; Washington permitted the impression to arise that it did not take heed of allied susceptibilities, with bad results. Also there has been a certain insouciance about the way in which succeeding Administrations have re-evaluated the threat, which has prompted a feeling in Europe that the nature and extent of the threat was changed according to the exigencies of the American domestic scene. The third reason for European scepticism was that many ideas which develop in Washington seem to make perfect sense technically and also coincide perfectly with the national interest of the US, but not so easily with the diverse national interests of the Europeans. Consultation on nuclear weapons was started rather late in the game: in 1962 most European Defence Ministers heard for the first time of numbers of tactical nuclear weapons stored in their countries.

On problems of substance, the basic quarrel about the relative importance of deterrence and defence mentioned by Professor Kaufmann is still unresolved. Europeans still think more in terms of deterrence than defence and tend to feel that deterrence and defence are incompatible. Many Europeans feel that American efforts to adapt to nuclear weapons, counterforce strategy, controlled response, damage limitation and efforts to purchase insurance are really an attempt to evade commitments to the defence of Europe. These apprehensions and anxieties are nourished by statements such as the extract from McNamara given in the con-

ference papers when he says that "a large-scale Soviet attack on Western Europe, while not one of the most likely contingencies, would be extremely dangerous to our own security, and would compel us to respond immediately with whatever force was needed to halt the onslaught, even with tactical nuclear weapons, if necessary..." The last part of the last sentence seems to indicate that there is no more any idea of using the big retaliatory club. Personally he did not think that this was what McNamara meant, but many people in Europe interpreted it so. There is no doubt about the American response in the case of a large-scale nuclear attack. But there is doubt about the response in the case of an attack conducted without nuclear weapons, East German public disorders, or a selective Soviet use of nuclear weapons in an aggressive act.

The US says let us be flexible. But many are convinced it has become clear, by such statements as McNamara's just quoted, that "appropriate means" allows of no nuclear weapons. Professor Kaufmann says that a strategic doctrine to be credible must be usable; the Europeans must reply that they cannot think of any deterrent in Europe which is usable without destroying Europe itself. Some European Governments have replied in their own way to these American adaptations by going back to the old theory of massive retaliation. As a German, he would say this does not help us. The Germans are theoretically close to the massive retaliation school of thought, but in practice they are much closer to Washington's present school of thought. They believe in a rational tactic of uncertainty, which means no automatic use or non-use of nuclear weapons. But in the present state of the alliance, it looks as if uncertainty is in our own minds, not in the enemy's. The same weakness affects the current concept of forward strategy. This is an excellent strategy, but it is not backed up by the necessary military apparatus. Troops are not where they would be needed: it is doubtful whether they could use tactical weapons because we would have to use them on West German territory. What we really need is a proper forward strategy, one that envisages carrying the battle into the enemy's camp: only if we do that can we envisage a nuclear battle in Europe.

Therefore on the European side there is a great deal of confusion, some of it American-made, some home-grown. But it cannot be sorted out by each government on its own. Arms control will not be a decisive influence within the alliance so long as there is no jointly arrived-at strategy. Only if we have a joint strategy and the military organisation to back it up can we fit arms control into that strategy.

He had given a picture of what many Europeans feel, which is not quite fair to the Americans. Personally he felt that if the Europeans had nuclear weapons of their own, they would probably be forced to develop controlled response, damage limitation, etc., themselves. There is a time-lag which is better to be explained by the non-possession of nuclear weapons, although this is not an argument in favour of having them.

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The subsequent discussion centred around three principle themes: the direct military implications of contemporary American strategic policy; its political implications, especially as they concerned the NATO alliance; and the problem of nuclear diffusion.

The Military Implications

A Belgian participant opened this aspect of the discussion by suggesting that the McNamara doctrine was an inevitable and correct outcome of the pre-occupation with the vulnerability of the United States. Was the US now trying to get a tacit agreement with the Soviet Union not to bomb cities? To this Professor Kaufmann emphasised his belief that the American leaders had been concerned with the problem of vulnerability ever since 1949; it had merely become more dramatised in recent years. On the question of avoiding cities, he pointed out that the development of some 650 virtually invulnerable Polaris missiles by 1967 will provide a high incentive to the Soviet Union to refrain from counter-city attack.

A distinguished American academic participant supported Professor Kaufmann in his assertion that preoccupation with vulnerability was not of recent date, but disputed his view that American policy had changed markedly. He pointed out that, in Southern Asia, controlled response had been the real policy of the US for nearly a decade. He also suggested that it was mistaken, and a common European mistake, to make a hard distinction between deterrence and defence, as if it were a distinction between nuclear and conventional forces, since the fullest possible range of options was the only way to provide a fully effective deterrent.

A British member of the conference asked, first, what would be the effect on American strategy of development of Soviet nuclear forces so difficult to strike as to make it not worth while to equip ourselves with the means to do so? To what extent is a counterforce capability integral to the validity of current American strategy and force levels? Second, if the US becomes increasingly involved in other parts of the world than Europe, the six division commitment to NATO may seem increasingly onerous, particularly if there are rapid technical developments such as VTOL aircraft, which push up the general costs of defence. Europeans must get out of the habit of regarding the six divisions as the absolute symbol of American integrity and show greater comprehension of the nature of the American commitment.

An Italian participant reverted to Professor Kaufmann's suggestion that deterrence and defence are compatible and said that if this led to contemplation of the use of nuclear weapons in a selective manner, it would increase the incentives for other centres of political power to acquire nuclear weapons. Professor Kaufmann replied that while Americans have thought hard about how nuclear war could be fought without involving total catastrophe, the uncertainties are so great as to give nuclear weapons only a specialised role and to put a premium on other forms of deterrence. The use of nuclears could never be an attractive option.

A distinguished French participant suggested, first, that Europeans were mistaken in regarding the McNamara doctrine as a definitive formulation of American strategy, and especially in placing so much emphasis on the counterforce aspect. Second, that the world will never return to the naiveté of massive retaliation, that controlled response is the only responsible strategy, and that if the counterforce option is eventually precluded some other variant must be devised: the central theory will remain even if the application changes.

At a later point, Professor Kaufmann expressed his own view that a forward strategy in Europe and the ready use of tactical nuclear weapons may be incompatible, since a nuclear exchange in Europe must be two-sided, and the quick use of TAWs in response to non-nuclear Soviet pressure must lead to attack on a substantial number of West European targets. This in turn will quickly invoke strategic weapons.

The Political Implications

An American participant raised the question of whether the US emphasis on controlled response did not represent a concealed desire to maintain a political hegemony among the Western powers. Were strategic views merely a reflection of national interests? The fact that this question is often raised showed that strategic and political objectives were intertwined and that it was very hard to establish a consensus without any equivalent degree of responsibility and experience on the other side. Could Europeans acquire this sense of responsibility without actually owning nuclear weapons? Another American suggested that Europe had to choose between an American-made strategy or getting involved in the confusion and debate which Americans themselves experienced.

A senior French official felt that a new element was becoming evident. As mutual restraint between the super-powers, which was highly desirable, increased, it led to a closer dialogue between Moscow and Washington of which the content was not known to the allies and therefore placed them in a difficult position, and emphasised the imbalance of responsibilities between the US and the other allies. Moreover, the more rationally one treated the adversary, the less he believes that one will behave irrationally in an emergency.

A Swedish member of the conference pointed out the ironic fact that the US had been more successful in explaining the main elements of its policy to the adversary than to the allies. The discussion on controlled response revealed a duality between the purpose of limiting damage if war should come and of increasing the credibility of a first strike in response to a Soviet attack on Europe. One reason why the latter motive had not been appreciated in Europe is that the US had made insufficient attempts to make clear to her European allies the range of options that were open to her below the level of spasm response.

A British participant pointed out that much of the Euro can misunderstanding about American policy arose from insufficient knowledge of the American policy-making process which was so very different from that of any European government.

An American official pointed out that the handling of crises was of greater real concern than the eruption of nuclear war. On the one hand different allied interests and views must be taken into account; on the other, crises required swift and secret action. It was not possible to consider that the US would be trusted with full power of decision in a crisis: yet absolute agreement by all NATO countries was clearly unworkable in many situations. Therefore it is important to try and consider collectively future problems, possible forms of crisis or challenge, and different forms of response, not in order to have a series of cut and dried plans but to have an existing consensus on different kinds of capability and response. The four-power Berlin contingency planning provided an example of what could be done.

A French participant suggested that it would be easier to evolve such techniques if the US had to deal with only one European political centre rather than with 14 separate nations. An Italian official raised the question of whether the McNamara doctrine with its emphasis on the centralised control of decision making did not imply a bigger political than military problem. Was it reconcilable with European-American partnership, would it be tenable if there were three nuclear blocs rather than two?

An American member of the conference supported Professor Kaufmann's view that changes in US strategy and doctrine had come about more as the result of internal debate than of external circumstances, but wondered whether such a process of change was tenable without some degree of acceptance, through better communication, of the validity of modifications on the part of both the adversary and the allies.

In replying to various speakers, Professor Kaufmann explained, first, that in speaking of the internal American debate, every Administration had returned, after toying with a total nuclear strategy, to a concept of balanced forces. In reply to Dr. Sommer, he felt that the tendency to create and then dispel "missile" or "division" gaps was due to straightforward bureaucratic difficulties rather than to using figures as the tool of policy. Commenting on various references to differing US and European interests, he expressed his own belief that the US is becoming more rather than less dependent on its European allies and more deeply involved in European defence.

Nuclear Diffusion

The Chairman asked what steps the US was ready to take to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, which prompted a French participant to ask whether any steps, even in collaboration with the USSR, would be effective. Another French member sought to establish a distinction between the "extension" of nuclear weapons capabilities and their "proliferation". While such capabilities remained very expensive, their extension was unlikely to go beyond four or five powers. The US cannot prevent this because the risks they present are not so great as to justify a US showdown with France or a forceful Russian action against China. If, however, in ten or fifteen years' time cheap nuclear weapons and vehicles become possible then the US or the existing nuclear powers might have to take joint action to prevent genuine proliferation that would present a real world danger.

An American member said that US policy could at least avoid encouraging the spread.

A British participant suggested that a great deal was already being done to discourage it. One of the motives of the test ban had been the construction of a world system, and the Russians were now giving silent support to the International Atomic Energy Authority which was designed for the same purpose. Small countries will find it hard to face the international complications of breaking a test ban. Future nuclear powers will be smaller than France and China and therefore more susceptible to great power pressure. Another British member supported this view, while underlining the possible political consequences of a Chinese bomb on India and Japan. It was a Western interest to make clear the risks to which a Chinese bomb exposed China, in order to discourage the demand for independent nuclear forces in Asia.

Morning Session, Saturday 23 May

"The Control of Western Strategy"
(1) AN ATLANTIC SYSTEM OF PLANNING AND
CONTROL OF MULTINATIONAL FORCES"

General Baron del Marmol in the Chair.

Général d'Armée Beaufre introduced this subject. He said the problem was difficult because of the absolute necessity to define the aim and concept of such a force. Therefore he would deal first with the question, what is the aim of a nuclear force? It aims at maintaining peace and that is why it is called a deterrent. Therefore the practical use and the benefit we can expect from it does not lie in the firing of these weapons but in its participation in the game of deterrence, without firing them if possible. Therefore the problem of who presses the button, although important, does not seem the central one, which is the management of crises.

The second question was, how could or should a multinational force play the game of deterrence? There are three main possible methods. One is to place the whole of the force under one single control. Then the force is equivalent to one national force and the allied participation is only a reinforcement of the principal force. The potential adversary is faced by a single partner. This seems the easiest to handle and the safest, but it is also the most simple for the adversary. Moreover, it has the inconvenience of placing the allied force under the obvious and unconditional authority of the principal ally. That is why other methods have been considered.

According to the second method, the game of deterrence is played by the principal ally but the others have the right of veto or disengagement. This seems more equitable, but ruins the efficiency of the force. The veto of one of the partners would paralyse all the others; the credibility of the first strike would be so small that the adversary would be free to act on a number of levels. The solution of disengagement does not seem to limit the freedom of action of the principal allies (it is the double key system at present applied), but it could inhibit the resolution of the principal allies. The loss of solidarity in a period of tension would be bad from the psychological and the political point of view.

A third method, which stems from the present situation, consists in admitting that the multinational force is a force which is ready to act, ready to fire as a single one, thanks to its planning, training and communications, but in which each national component depends upon strictly national decisions throughout the whole of the deterrent phase; that is, before and up to the first firing of nuclear weapons. This solution is often considered very dangerous, but it could be the best under certain conditions. (i) The adversary, faced by several centres of decision, would be more uncertain of the reaction and the degree of co-ordination of reactions. (ii) The adversary playing against several would be forced to take greater care of the vital interests of all his opponents and not just the principal one. This would reduce risks stemming from miscalculation. (iii) Even the prospect of a unilateral move from one of the opponents would make the game more dangerous for the adversary, therefore the deterrent effect of the main allied force would be amplified even if the nuclear situation were very stable. Deterrence could be increased. However, the uncertainty of the adversary must not exist among the allies. Therefore a satisfactory strategy must have close co-ordination among the allies.

How can such co-ordination be realised? It is important not to concentrate on secondary needs while ignoring the essential. The secondary problems are those of mechanics and communications. The essential is the existence of a common understanding of aims and means. Such a common understanding does not exist today, mainly because of the MacMahon Act which has given rise to great differences in knowledge about strategy among the allies. Therefore a beginning must be made by organising a common and permanent study, so that instead of trying to teach the Europeans what the threat might be there would be common examination of basic ideas and common elaboration of the solutions of common interest. It would take several years to reach such a common solution. When it is achieved, the secondary considerations will become important. There must be communications between Heads of Government and their staffs, with headquarters of the military forces and between them and the different national components in order to allow instantaneous consultation, continual reassessment and orders. Only thus could the multinational force operate as a team to play the real game of deterrence.

But what if the game should not succeed, if nuclear war should break out? What military function would be given to this multinational force? There must be centralisation of control because that is essential in defence, as long as the defence is conducted along agreed lines of common interest. Therefore there must exist a single common plan of action by which every component of the force has an agreed task in all conceivable situations. This is a task of planning.

In the deterrent phase, however, whether countercity or counterforce, each element of the force should be able to allow each partner to present a sufficient strategic threat. In the defence phase the task of each force would be centrally allocated according to its technical characteristics, as SHAPE does today. Centralised control would be vital here.

But some provision must be made for an extreme but possible case, if the allies should disagree on the aims or conduct of the operation. We have had such examples in World War II, e.g. Dunkirk, the withdrawal of RAF Fighter Command in 1940 and the evacuation of Strasbourg in 1944. In such situations the organisation must be such that one or several of the nations might be able to disengage their force for an independent action. This pre-supposes the existence of a national chain of command and logistics. This is an improbable contingency, as nuclear war is improbable, but it is politically and psychologically important to avoid giving the impression that all national freedom of action is lost when the first bomb is dropped.

The first task is to agree on the aims and the general method, and on that we must focus our attention. The general concept presented might be deeply modified in the course of common study. But a common understanding is the root of everything. It is possible to reach it if we work seriously in this direction and do not give up because of initial differences of opinion.

Mr. Beaton (first respondent) said that he would like to raise three points on the problem of an Atlantic system of planning and control: (1) If the pre-crisis planning system is too strong, it could become an impediment to flexible response. (2) To talk of planning in terms of nuclear and not in terms of all forces is to think of imaginary political and military situations. (3) We cannot contemplate the use of armed force of any kind except under the authority of the heads of government of the states in question. If we want a federation we should make it clear that this is our objective; we should not blunder into a military federation when we do not have the political organisation to sustain it.

(1) He expressed strong support for the concept of "controle" in the French sense, the creation of planning bodies to discuss and formulate alliance positions and to create a consensus so that the alliance as a whole has a good idea of the response of the US President in a crisis, although it may have a limited application to real situations. But it would be dangerous to delude the non-American members of the alliance that they are thereby participating in decisions, and such a delusion could lead to a breach of confidence in a crisis when the US President thought he must act flexibly; worse, it could lead to reaction to a crisis according to a prior plan because that was all that was possible on an alliance basis. One can conceive of few situations in which planners could evaluate developments. The planning body would be doing military-type planning and would consist of people likely to overlook the whole mass of political issues that will be present in a real situation. A complicated mixture of subtle and detailed considerations arises in a real crisis, e.g. in Cuba. The whole notion of "controle" and alliance planning could impair the political judgment of the alliance; it is useful, but a highly military exercise.

(2) He suggested that the allies were far too fascinated by nuclear weapons. If one talks about real military situations, nuclear weapons become simply something we have and might use in certain situations. He was surprised that possession of nuclear weapons should be regarded as important for such discussions. What about Germany? How could we have planning without the participation of the greatest land power in Europe?

(3) On the question of control, he did not see how any nation which has produced and operates nuclear weapons will allow the decision to use them to pass from the hands of its own highest political authority. Therefore the only solution he could see to the alliance problem is to fight a war on the basis of a genuine war cabinet, composed of men with ultimate authority in the countries of the alliance. He did not think this impossible.

Mr. Beaton felt that the distinction between the deterrent and defence phases had been eliminated to some extent by the US doctrine of the last few years. He regarded this as an advance, "for we cannot go seriously wrong in the alliance to allow our serious intentions to become our deterrent. We are strong enough not to need a bluff."

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The subsequent discussion centred around three questions: the wider political implications of an alliance based on co-ordinated forces under national control; the institutions and political atmosphere required to make a multinational system effective; and the question of whether the non-nuclear allies would be satisfied with a system that contained a permanent element of discrimination.

The Political Implications

These were principally questioned by participants from Italy and the Netherlands. One Italian member suggested that the multinational system rested on the unspoken assumption that the allies behaved with great intelligence and the adversary did not. But supposing the Russians, instead of threatening the alliance as a whole, concentrated on a member in some local difficulty or used some form of blackmail against an exposed country? This would emphasise the contrast between American flexibility and the small number of alternatives open to European countries and might lead to serious divisions. Another Italian participant suggested that the multinational solution would suit the Russians admirably, for they play a highly political game and can hope to reap benefits from any bitterness or sense of discrimination within the alliance.

A Dutch member pointed out that the only circumstances which might alter the strong American commitment to Europe, and drive the United States back into isolationism, would be a growing sense that the European commitment was too dangerous to maintain. A too independent policy on the part of the European powers could have this effect.

The Working of a Multinational System: Crisis Management

An Italian official asked whether an alliance system could really be based on a plurality of forces: how would a transition from one form of command to another, easy enough to conceive in the old days of conventional forces, be effected in the rapid time-scale of modern crises? General Beaufre pointed out that the present SHAPE command was based on just such a hypothesis of a transfer from national to international command in an emergency. Another Italian asked whether a multinational system could be valid if there were five or six national nuclear forces to be co-ordinated, and General Beaufre replied that it would be possible if there really was a genuine common understanding among the allies. In reply to a Belgian query, he also expressed the view that the techniques of alliance crisis-management were as applicable to conventional as to nuclear forces.

A British official reiterated the official British position that the Atlantic framework was the only satisfactory one for defence planning, and expressed his interest in developing techniques of common intelligence, a war cabinet, and for the handling of crises. This led an American official to ask what new institutions were required to permit these techniques, to which General Beaufre replied that he would like to see a modest beginning with a permanent allied study group covering the whole field of strategy. SAC headquarters and SHAPE, where allied officers worked, dealt only with military problems and were not concerned with fundamental concepts and aims.

A French participant expressed his scepticism about the idea of separate national forces. While it would face the Russians with great uncertainty, it would give power to an imprudent Western ally to commit the others to war. To this another French participant replied that it was a question of seeking the least absurd of several solutions, and the multinational solution had the advantage of accepting current reality. An American agreed that there was no good solution, but thought the one chosen must hold out a prospect of creating the least intolerable situation: this the multinational concept did not do.

A German participant supported the plea for an allied study group, but it must include non-nuclear as well as nuclear powers. A British member said that such consultation should provide a link rather than a dividing line between the nuclear and non-nuclear powers, because it would involve much more than targeting or purely military planning and must embrace political strategy and discussion at a high level. He supported Mr. Beaton's view that in a crisis nuclear powers will not abandon the right to take decisions on the use of nuclear weapons, since short of federation and as long as sovereign powers exist they are responsible to their own people for these decisions.

An American suggested that there was a third stage, hitherto unmentioned, namely pre-crisis planning, the evolution of a common assessment of the adversary's intentions. Only once this was agreed could real planning begin. Once the crisis had started, all sorts of national interests and views within the alliance were likely to become apparent: we can at least coordinate our general assessments and aims, so that if necessary the different roles of the allies can be made to serve a complementary function rather than become a source of friction and weakness.

Two British participants suggested that if such a system of pre-crisis and crisis management is to have solid reality, it may have to be based in Washington, for such is the disproportion of American and European power that what really matters is the degree of allied influence that can be brought to bear on American policy. At the moment NATO had the worst of both worlds, a very cumbersome form of international military planning in Paris, which restricts national freedom of action yet has little real influence upon actual situations.

General Beaufre closed this aspect of the discussion by repeating that the problem of crisis management was the central one. Without condemning or advocating the multinational system, if it led to a better means of consultation it would benefit not only the nuclear but the non-nuclear powers as well.

Nuclear Discrimination

Throughout the discussion there had been a strong undercurrent of resentment on the part of many participants at the degree of discrimination which the multinational system implied.

A German participant said that he was content with a distinction between the power of the United States and that of the rest. Two or three degrees of distinction, implicit in the multinational system, might ultimately tempt Germany to become a nuclear power. He was supported by an Italian who said that the multinational system would simply institutionalise discrimination, and lead to the equally unacceptable alternatives of proliferation or an inner directorate.

A German member argued that while the non-nuclear powers were effectively under the protection of the nuclear powers, they were exposed to the same risks and these risks were multiplied if there was more than one centre of decision: their interest must be to demand greater centralisation. A multinational system also left unsolved the difficulty of tactical atomic weapons, on whose use a very early decision might have to be taken in a crisis. Another German member, on being challenged as to whether any non-

nuclear power in NATO would be led simply by the existence of several national nuclear forces to acquire one of its own, said that that was not the point: the distinction was between creating an international environment which favoured proliferation and one that discouraged it.

A senior Belgian official drew a distinction between the attitude of the small and the middle powers in NATO. The small powers could not become nuclear ones, but could easily become more and more neutralist in their views and policies. It was a strong interest to have the middle powers, Germany and Italy, working in close association with the small powers rather than feeling disgruntled at being excluded from a great power arrangement.

A Dutch member saw it as a sign of progress that Britain has assigned her nuclear force to NATO, but drew attention to the "supreme national interest" clause: he hoped that Britain would abrogate that clause at least as long as NATO continued in its present form. The road forward lay in the assignment of British and French forces to NATO rather than in their abolition. As for sovereignty, it was a highly relative term. Another Dutch participant pointed out that precisely because there was an element of discrimination between the large and small powers in NATO, the political organisation of the alliance was doubly important. As all agreed, the whole question was essentially political in nature, and one could not blame the small powers for hesitating to entrust their vital interests to any system of international consultation which was based merely on the desire to satisfy the demands of some countries for a sense of national grandeur.

Afternoon Session, Saturday 23 May

"The Control of Western Strategy
(2) MULTILATERAL FORCES"

Vice-Admiral Bos in the Chair

Professor Robert Bowie introduced this subject. He began by outlining his own belief that despite changes in the strategic situation the basic problem is not military. As a matter of vital U.S. interest, Europe remain under the American nuclear umbrella, as the Soviet leaders recognise. The strategy of flexible response, designed to enhance deterrence, does not reflect a state of conflicting interests but indicates the need for continuing emphasis on collective security. The problem is essentially a political one: the desire of the Europeans to have more of a role in the NATO strategy and control of nuclear weapons, partly because they are back on their feet and do not want the full protection of the U.S. Similarly the British and French forces are political instruments and should be viewed as such. It is highly desirable to expand the planning role of NATO, but, as discussion on the multinational solution has shown, there are serious limits to how far this can and should go. The real sharing of responsibility requires some way of allowing the European allies to take a more active part in the making of decisions in the alliance and in the actual control of weapons.

As M. Aron said earlier, there is no perfect solution if we view the problem in static terms; it is easy to destroy any solution in isolation. What are the criteria for determining what is a good solution? (1) The Atlantic nations need unity and will continue to do so for an indefinite time. Unity is needed for collective defence against the Soviet bloc, is needed to provide a range of capabilities, and can only be maintained collectively. Even if the Soviet danger should disappear, there is a whole range of problems which the allies can handle if united - economic problems, of dealing with Eastern Europe, and of relations with underdeveloped countries. The West must handle the nuclear problem in such a way that it enhances prospects for collective action.

(2) It is essential to have effective and responsible nuclear control, not down-grade deterrence by subjecting strategic force to a whole series of vetoes. (3) The situation in the Atlantic area and in Europe is not static. There are a number of divisions of views within the Atlantic area and also within Europe itself: there is no united Europe in a political sense. But there is not going to be an effective partnership between the U.S. and the separate nations of Europe. (4) The strategic situation, being stable, gives us a substantial amount of time in which to seek possible solutions in the sense of changing the conditions in which a solution must be sought. The most important criterion, therefore, is whether any actions we can take now have a tendency in a constructive direction, make it possible for more satisfactory solutions to be worked out later on, or have a tendency to worsen the situation in this sense. His own preference was for a solution which would advance European unity and foster the likelihood of close working relations between the U.S. and Europe.

National nuclear forces in Europe work against the grain of desirable solutions. First, they undermine collective defence, and it is interesting to observe that the British and French forces both tend to be justified at heart by substantially similar argumentation which must always introduce doubt about the dependability of the American ally. Second, they create and intensify political cleavages through discrimination. Third, they lead in the wrong direction - in terms of proliferation and in terms of asserting an independence which is not available to the European countries in fact, or even to the U.S. despite its great power.

Another possibility is a European nuclear force, but (a) this is not feasible now and (b) there are divided views in Europe on its desirability. The Germans would be uneasy, for example, because of the tendency to weaken the link with the U.S. Personally he would argue that the option should be kept open as a way in which a strong and united Europe might go. But such a goal must be considered in terms of working closely with the U.S. and not be based on any illusion that a separate defence of Europe and the U.S. is feasible.

By the process of elimination, therefore, one comes to consider the M.L.F. This is not an ideal solution; in a sense it is half-baked like the E.C.S.C. was in 1950. That only made sense as something on the way to something else, a pole round which forces could organise and move in a more constructive direction. The M.L.F. should be seen in the same light, not in static terms but as something which can evolve.

The M.L.F. is technically feasible, and it tends in the direction of meeting the requirements he outlined earlier. It makes it possible to visualise unifying the alliance instead of splitting it. It makes possible the equal treatment of participants, and opens up the perspective of an evolving joint capability in the nuclear field. It reinforces the notion of collective security. In the initial stage control will be cumbersome, but that problem is soluble; the system can develop as political conditions change. At the beginning it would have to operate on a unanimity rule both for planning and use, but it would be perfectly possible to agree on certain guidelines for use. If one analyses the strategic problem in the alliance and asks when would such weapons have to be used, one case is obviously in the event of a nuclear attack on NATO territory, and in that case an attack would be met by a political decision to use these weapons along with other weapons of the alliance. All other cases will involve much lower amount of force at the starting point and there would be time for consultation. At a later stage there is a possibility of the American veto being removed, and the evolution of the M.L.F. into a European force.

The M.L.F. solution is one possible way by which a British Government could get out of the nuclear business if it wanted to. France presents a more complex problem, for one can not see any likelihood of their force being integrated while de Gaulle remains. But perhaps after de Gaulle France will reach the conclusion of many people in Britain, that their national force is a dead end. If the M.L.F. exists, this is something for them to turn to. Therefore while the force starts as a combined force with a very small percentage of the capability of the alliance (although 200 missiles is a significant force), it could be a basis for evolution in the direction of either absorbing more of the Atlantic force, including the U.S. force, or of evolving into a European force if the Europeans want it, and a move in the direction of unity. But it would be a European force that would be pro-Atlantic rather than not.

Signor Spinelli (first respondent) said that from the military point of view the force is superfluous. The two crucial powers of decision in such a force, the power of establishing the targeting of the missiles and the power to use them, are subject to the unanimous decision of the associated governments; this means that the targeting will be a very cumbersome procedure, and that one or more of the states could veto its use at the last moment. It could be catastrophic if the alliance had to rely on the M.L.F. for nuclear retaliation. But the alliance will continue to rely on the Americans, and the veto of a European government would be meaningless if the U.S. decided to employ her independent deterrent. In order to make such a European veto less dangerous, the American government should either make sure that the targets of the M.L.F. are all of secondary importance, or double the M.L.F. missiles with American ones. As the missile gap is declared to be of the order of five to one in favour of the U.S., it seems double targeting would be feasible! So the M.L.F. is probably unworkable, and certainly superfluous, from the military standpoint.

But Professor Bowie was right that it is meant as an answer to a political problem. He believed it an attempt to give a consistent answer to the following problems: (1) As a consequence of their political and economic revival and sense of being less dependent on the United States, the European states are less inclined to accept their present vassal status as permanent. (2) One of the unwritten rules of co-existence is that each of the two great states will make it possible to avoid nuclear proliferation and if possible to re-absorb the proliferation that has already taken place. The M.L.F. seems the right answer to these problems, because it gives the European states the status symbol of nuclear power while giving it to them collectively, not individually, and maintaining the American presence and veto over the power of decision on use of the force, which is the essential feature of non-proliferation.

Signor Spinelli felt, however, that this solution is clever rather than wise. If it is true that the European states are so keenly desirous of the nuclear status symbol, why should they not realise that in the M.L.F. they receive only the shadow, not the substance, of nuclear responsibility? The consequence will be that in the M.L.F. there will be a very strong tendency to work for complete separation from the U.S. This separation may end with the formation of national nuclear forces if in the meantime a united Europe is not constructed, or perhaps with the construction of a European force. However, in both cases the tendency towards a growing separation is inevitable if it is true that the real motive force behind the M.L.F. is the wish for greater independence and a more acknowledged status on the part of Europe.

He suggested that the M.L.F. is in itself the first real introduction of a separation of the nuclear weaponry of Europe from that at the disposal of the U.S., which once begun, will be more and more difficult to stop. The Germans want abolition of the veto right, and that means the American veto since this is the only veto right which counts. If Britain participates she will also maintain her independent force. Disruptive forces are already operating. Americans welcome the European economic revival, but they are not disposed to accept a decline of the American hegemony and want to maintain their independence in managing the strategy of the nuclear world.

The correct answer to the challenge of the European revival should be not for the Americans to start the first beginnings of a separation (a form of limited self-government like the British gave to their colonies which ended in full independence). The Americans should, as President Kennedy said, acknowledge the era of interdependence and offer a grand design to the Europeans whereby unity of the real existing nuclear force, the American one, will be permanently maintained but its planning, finance, management, and its political control is progressively transformed from an American monopoly into a joint American-European venture. The technical stages might be similar in some forms to the M.L.F., but the whole concept would be different.

Professor Bowie had said that the M.L.F. may evolve into a common Atlantic force, but that could not happen unless it was clearly conceived as part of a grand design. It was true that the political unity of Europe was a condition of this; but the real difficulty is not that European unity lags behind. It is that the Americans do not seem to realise that the nuclear era is the sign of the end of their absolute freedom of action and still try to seek a solution which keeps their nuclear independence. If this American attitude is not modified the consequence of the M.L.F. will be a first step towards proliferation.

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The subsequent discussion dealt with three main points: whether the M.L.F. would serve a military function, and, if it did not, whether it would achieve its political purpose: the problem of control: and the relationship between German participation and re-unification.

The German Aspect

A senior French official opened the discussion by saying that he accepted the point that the proposal was largely intended to provide an answer to the problem of discrimination against Germany. Yet there was a contradiction in the argument: we could not at the same time tell the Soviet Union that the M.L.F. was the best way of preventing Germany from becoming a nuclear power and argue that this was the answer to the problem of nuclear discrimination. Was the M.L.F. concept, in any case, the best way to solve the German problem? If the balance of force was shifting in favour of the West, was the time not approaching for a major political negotiation, which might make nuclear reorganisation of less importance than it seemed today? The success even of the Berlin contingency planning had shown that there was a certain degree of absolute autonomy in national decision making which must be respected.

Another French participant asked the German members to state candidly whether they thought German participation in the M.L.F. would forward or hinder reunification. To this a German official replied that because we did not have an integrated Atlantic community, or even an integrated Europe, we must devise the best instruments we can, and that the M.L.F. offered a valuable means. But Germany would not participate if it hindered reunification. The Russians have said that Germany must remain divided if the Federal German Republic participates: one solution would be to write into the M.L.F. treaty provision for revision of the project if progress towards reunification became a reality. Two other German participants felt that it was a mistake to relate the M.L.F. to the problem of reunification, since the purpose of NATO is to present the strongest united front to the Soviet Union. Germany had decided over recent years to give higher priority to integration with the West than to reunification.

The M.L.F. as a Military or Political Concept?

A British participant suggested that the seaborne M.L.F. was a dangerous military concept, vulnerable as well as expensive, and therefore more a first strike weapon, and asked whether there were no other weapons which could be considered. Another British participant hoped that the multilateralization of land-based strike weapons would be given due consideration, since they were an integral part of the alliance military system: the seaborne force, based on international waters and symbolising the Atlantic link, could be regarded as the political element in the force.

A senior American official agreed that there was no urgent military requirement for the M.L.F., but pointed out that it was militarily viable. The great argument in its favour was the prospect it offered of tying together Europe and the U.S. not only in planning but in the actual operation of nuclear defence, at a time when the alliance was facing a divergence of paths to closer or looser co-operation.

Another American reminded the conference of the official American view that the value of additional strategic weapons, M.R.B.M.s or others, would be marginal. Western M.R.B.M.s were probably not a sensible form of counterpoise to the Soviet M.R.B.M. force: it was the whole spectrum of Western force which mattered. It was true that there had been a good deal of naval scepticism about surface ships, but technical studies have suggested that the concept is workable. There had been objections on the grounds of cost, but the sum involved represented only about 3% of the defence budgets of those countries which have expressed an interest. As for the utility of the force in bringing about a greater degree of co-ordination within NATO was concerned, countries tended to take a keener interest in projects which involve them financially. But equally it would be wrong to regard the M.L.F. as the only instrument for improving joint planning.

Views from representatives of smaller NATO powers were then expressed. Norwegian scepticism was manifest, together with a hope that Britain would clarify her position in order to help the Scandinavians clarify theirs: there was a danger that the M.L.F. might drive those small powers not participating still further into neutralism. A Swedish participant felt that the Soviet reaction required more careful study in the West. However, a Belgian official supported the M.L.F. as giving a degree of protection, participation and responsibility to the smaller powers which the British and French forces could never provide. Britain and France would have greater influence within the M.L.F. than by maintaining national forces. However, another Belgian participant displayed less enthusiasm for the M.L.F. as a complex, expensive and marginal experiment still subject to the U.S. veto: it might be wiser to ask Europe for direct financial assistance with the cost of American strategic forces. But an Italian felt that the M.L.F. did provide an answer to the problem of inter-allied solidarity, although under no circumstances must it create another nuclear power and increase the danger of proliferation.

The Problem of Control

A British official began by correcting Signor Spinelli's assertion that the Germans were already demanding the abolition of the unanimity rule and of the U.S. veto (though a German official had referred to ideas about majority rule). This led Professor Bowie to point out a contradiction in the arguments of those Europeans who say on the one hand that the force must eventually be freed of the U.S. veto, and on the other that it is a step towards dividing the U.S. from Europe.

Another British member suggested that unless the problems of control could be solved, there was no point in creating the M.L.F. If all the NATO powers feel that they at present have a form of control, through the double key arrangements covering nuclear weapons in Europe and through the responsibility of the NATO Council, there was no need for the M.L.F. Whatever the physical arrangements, if there is not political unanimity within the alliance dissenting members will find a way to make clear their non-involvement in a decision they dislike. "You cannot create unanimity where it does not exist", and therefore the priorities must be correctly thought out.

This view was disputed by another British participant who argued that the M.L.F. would give the European allies an influence over American decisions which they could not achieve in any other way, but that at the same time it was essential to retain the American veto. Another British participant expressed his perplexity over the equivocation about the U.S. veto. If there were to be any question of its withdrawal, not only should the British, the U.S. Congress and the Russians be aware of this, but the Germans, who rightly exercise great influence in the alliance already by reason of their conventional power, should not be misled.

A leading American student of NATO problems suggested that the handling of the M.L.F. proposal was of great importance. It should be regarded as a limited proposal, and it should not be represented as a means of forcing Britain and France out of the nuclear business so much as gradually phasing out their own programmes. Above all the force must be integrated with the U.S. strategic forces, and no false expectations that it would eventually be turned over to European control should be created.

Morning Session, Sunday 24 May

"The Control of Western Strategy
(3) A EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE AND A
EUROPEAN-AMERICAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP"

Mr. Seidenfaden in the Chair

Professor Aldo Garosci introduced this subject. He said that the problem was necessarily hypothetical, because it depended on what kind of European system we were going to have. At the moment we did not have European institutions for elaborating strategy and foreign policy. There was thus no framework in which European partnership with the U.S. or a European nuclear force could be started.

Nevertheless, there were fields where European thinking found a measure of agreement. There were problems on which the European states, even though their policies contradict, were more united than the U.S. States which are near to a problem are more sensitive. America's reaction to Cuba was so strong because it was not far from her own shores. Europeans react, or should react, to the problems of the East or West Mediterranean, or North Africa, for example, more rapidly and with more awareness than the Americans. Another factor making for unity is the existence of European economic and political institutions. These institutions are not politico-strategic, but the existence of a body which elaborates economic policy has some political and strategic consequences. The fact that Europe was defeated in World War II and was not able to resist totalitarianism has produced a certain depression: and this has produced the reaction of a European patriotic feeling and a European élite, which had political importance for European unity. Finally, there was a factor which may be the most important in terms of immediate consequences - the American tendency to consider Europe as a unit in the same sense as themselves.

We cannot now say whether or not the attempts to achieve some form of collaboration or federation or semi-federation in Europe will succeed. But let us start from the general hypothesis that there is some kind of body or arrangement which represents Europe. Can this body, this arrangement, possess a nuclear force independent from the American force? And would it be opportune to have this force? Could this force be fitted into a European-American strategic partnership? Could a European-American partnership be something significant (even without a European force) apart from the links which we now have with the Americans?

First of all, when we speak of a European nuclear force we are not considering some minor nuclear weapons put at the disposal of Europe by the United States but the full possession of a deterrent, including means of delivery, that can give Europe a measure of independence. Has Europe the resources to create this? Taking continental Europe and the U.K. together, and allowing a certain amount of time, he would say "Yes". Of course there are difficulties in Europe's geographical situation: the effective use of a European deterrent would be less credible than of the American one. Because of the density and distribution of population, the possibility of Europe's survival in a confrontation with the U.S.S.R. is not such as to favour Europe using her force. Therefore, even with the maximum solution - a European state, fully integrated and including the U.K., possessing as many nuclear means as the Americans - the use of such weapons will always be less probable because of the greater danger of destruction for Europe. Nevertheless, that does not make a European force impossible.

On the question of whether it would be politically opportune, he would be inclined to oppose a European force. First, a second independent nuclear deterrent besides the American one would not essentially change the balance between East and West. Nuclear strategy was not elaborated to achieve minor political aims but to guarantee the West against an attack from the East; and an independent European deterrent would not change this situation. What about the use of the threat, the greater flexibility which it would give and the confusing effect upon the enemy? He believed that while this kind of flexibility would be dangerous for the enemy, it would be much more dangerous for the possessors of the force. As a consequence the degree of stability which exists by reason of the state of bipolarity would be affected and the possibility of its transformation into a permanent agreement would be made more difficult.

It is true that there are political problems in which the interests of Europe are not coincidental with those of the United States. These must be defended by European policy, by European arms if one wished, but under the common nuclear umbrella, not necessarily under a separate one. The British and French withdrew from Suez not because of fear of Khrushchev's threats but because they considered that in the present balance of force and with their relations with their allies it was not convenient to pursue this adventure. If Khrushchev had made good his threat, the Americans would have been compelled to intervene. It is not essential to have a fully independent nuclear capacity in Europe apart from the American one, but only a specialised and very carefully prepared European armed capacity.

The problem of partnership with the United States should be posed not so much in terms of "and" a European nuclear force but more in terms of "or". Partnership can be achieved, even without an independent European nuclear force, so long as Europe has a share in a common nuclear force. But it must be a full share, not a part share as has only been considered till now. What Europe lacks today is not the feeling of being fully protected against the threat from the East: hardly anybody really thinks that some day the Americans could lose interest in Europe or let the Russians attack us. The real dissatisfaction is that Europe's political importance is not in proportion to her economic development, her vast reserves of power and intelligence and her general cultural tradition. What is most important for us is to achieve a situation in which we could reach understanding with the United States in a more effective and equal fashion.

Some conditions for an effective nuclear partnership with the U.S. are: (1) One voice for all Europe. What this voice should be is a political problem, but America cannot really share her power of decision with more than one European partner. (2) There must be a real surrender of American power. Both sides must surrender something; that is the meaning of partnership. (3) Europe must be integrated in itself, and integrated at every level with the Americans. To be independent and at the same time associated is in a sense contradictory, but once the decision is taken the difficulties can be overcome.

Even if a united Europe inherited nuclear power, from the M.L.F. or from the British and French forces, it is certain that common control of the nuclear power of the alliance is a condition of partnership. He was not for two separate powers, but a certain amount of differentiation. A bad solution of the European nuclear force could have a bad effect on the partnership which is our real aim.

Professor Kissinger (first respondent) qualified his speech by explaining that he had been asked to put the case for a European nuclear force, although he would have preferred a European to do this and could not see an overwhelming American interest in promoting such a force.

He agreed with many of the things said the previous day about nuclear control within NATO being essentially a political problem. It was primarily a problem of what system of co-operation between the U.S. and Europe would be most conducive to the long-term vitality of the Atlantic area. He was also convinced that the U.S.-Europe relationship must be seen in terms of the closest possible co-operation rather than rivalry. It would be disastrous for us all if the two sides were not able to transcend any temporary advantage from playing for short-term stakes. The problem was in part one of consultation. Consultation was often called a cure-all, but after consultation people may disagree because they understand each other only too well. Therefore consultation will not automatically reduce difficulties. We walk about unity as though it is something to be assumed; yet modern weapons are so complex that differences of opinion as to what constitutes deterrence are inevitable.

What is the best system for achieving a degree of political co-operation? Is it one that deprives our allies of the physical capability to act separately, or which grants them that capability but tries to create a political structure which reduces the desire for separate action? Mutual trust is an important element. Each side says it cannot trust the other as a justification for the possession of nuclear weapons. America and Europe can be seen in terms of a father-son relationship, the father doling out money a little at a time to let the son learn responsibility. But he never will that way.

What kind of political system do we want for the Atlantic area? One so centralised that every action everywhere affects all partners? Or a hierarchy of commitment? The answer is not obvious. If it were, it would have become clear. A case could be made for unity of action where there is a community of interest and a possibility for separate action where there is not community of interest.

The question is, how such a European identity should come about. Should it grow out of the M.L.F. or develop more organically? He believed that whatever else could be said about the M.L.F., it seemed highly unlikely that a European identity could grow out of it. In its initial stage it must emphasise rather than heal differences; but his real point was that he could not see how a European force could grow out of it which would not be more divisive. He did not see how in the structure of the M.L.F. the Europeans could try to form a separate grouping without jeopardising many of the advantages the M.L.F. is supposed to bring. The M.L.F. starts us out on a different road. We should not try to sell it with any kind of argument that comes into anyone's mind.

He could also not see clearly any other European entity coming into being right now. He was impressed by the fact that history was sometimes more complicated than even the most brilliant analysis. If things were left to develop organically they could grow into something. If as much effort was spent on bringing the British and French forces together as has been spent on other things this might have grown into something. Maybe this possibility should be more thoroughly considered.

There is the argument that a European identity in nuclear force is bound to lead to an American withdrawal from Europe. He did not share this view. He believed that both sides of the Atlantic must understand that this option does not really exist for the U.S.; the U.S. cannot withdraw out of displeasure with a certain European policy. The nuclear field is more conducive to collaboration between Europe and the U.S. than the economic field. Therefore what we are really discussing is not whether there must be a real partnership between the U.S. and Europe (which he fully accepted) but how, over a historical period, this could be more vital. There are two dangers: (1) narrow nationalism and (2) an abdication of all responsibility to the United States by other countries. We must navigate between these two extremes. It is for these reasons that he favoured some kind of European entity for nuclear matters. He had not worked out all the details and it might be a mistake to work it out in detail. The solution should not be forced.

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The discussion centred almost entirely on the desirability of a European nuclear force, though there were some references to the idea of partnership and some to the need for a new political direction for the alliance.

Support for a specifically European nuclear programme came from a variety of quarters. An Italian member began the discussion by saying he thought a European nuclear force was the best solution to the problems of the alliance. It could destroy the seeds of proliferation and discrimination. The danger in these seeds was that neutralist forces were at work in the weaker countries and there was an urge to start again at power politics in the bigger countries - Germany, France and the U.K. A European force would be a measure of arms control because it would be more sophisticated and would permit Europe to deal better with the East and to negotiate from a position of strength and an advanced strategic doctrine. To further the unity of Europe and the alliance, it must be based on a European federation and must be strongly linked with the American force.

A French participant was sceptical. A European force did not solve the real problems raised by the existence of the two national independent forces, and it raised new problems: the co-existence of a European deterrent with the American deterrent in the absence of a single policy for both Europe and the U.S. If partnership really meant integration, and this seemed to be the understanding of some Americans, we should ask ourselves if that political unity of Europe with the U.S. was our aim. Was that unity a realistic aim, given the attitude of the American Government and opinion?

Another French participant outlined the pressures for and against a European nuclear force. For it: (1) A new, integrated, powerful state with 250 million inhabitants must possess all the instruments of power; (2) Europeans wanted to participate in what is new in the nuclear field, including research and industrial development, for economic and psychological reasons; (3) the desire for political independence; (4) the fear of possible future changes in American policy. Against it: (1) The division of opinion on the question in the six countries of the European Community; (2) the military arguments, which are exactly the same against a European nuclear force as against the national forces of France and Britain and have the same validity; (3) the risk of having the Cuban situation reversed, with the Russians thinking we are sufficiently dangerous to their side for them to react as Kennedy did over Cuba. The only way out of the dilemma is the solution of partnership, which meant making the American force a real Atlantic force. We must find a way of giving a real context to partnership, which meant constant consultation on political matters, finding a way of participating in the research and development and industrial production of the Atlantic force so that it will no longer be a purely American force.

A Norwegian member asked the conference to approach the problem from the point of view of young people in Europe. The alliance was faced with the problem that young people seem to look at European integration as something to give them a sense of direction. He did not think these young people, who have lived with nuclear weapons, will find it credible to conceive a European federation without an independent deterrent, although the practical way to get it (through a Franco-British force or through an M.L.F.)

does not much concern them. As time goes on it will be brought out more and more clearly that an independent European deterrent must be co-ordinated with the American deterrent in order to serve any useful purpose. The Americans should accept the idea of a European deterrent. This idea would be a vote of confidence, which some Europeans thought they deserved.

Further support was offered by a distinguished Belgian participant. He felt that militarily, in certain circumstances, a European deterrent would add something to deterrence. He could imagine a case in which the American deterrent would not be credible; the existence of a second nuclear capability would increase the uncertainty of the situation for the U.S.S.R. From the political point of view, he remembered that Dean Acheson had said a few months ago that it seemed difficult to more and more people in Europe to admit that the vital question of peace or war should always stay in the hands of an authority 5,000 km. away. We should go from a protectorate to a partnership.

A German official felt that the road should be kept open for European political unity. The idea of partnership between the U.S. and Europe as equals had found great support in Europe and there was less European support for the idea of a fully integrated Atlantic community. Keeping the road open for political unity in Europe meant keeping it open for a European nuclear force - because a united Europe might consider the possession of nuclear forces the pre-requisite of full European sovereignty and equality with the U.S. A nuclear force was a guarantee of full participation in the game of deterrence and would guarantee independent participation in negotiations on disarmament and arms control. But that was for tomorrow. Two conclusions for today were: (1) the M.L.F. should not become a new obstacle to European unity - on the contrary, it should provide for the possibility of revision in case of a European political union; (2) the national governments of Britain and France should envisage a European political union and should be prepared to bring their national forces into a united European system.

A British official agreed about the importance of European political integration, but felt that European economic integration was the right base on which to build political integration, not the nuclear base. The right nuclear solution was an Atlantic solution. They wanted to use the progress towards nuclear co-ordination to serve the cause of the sort of Europe to which they were working - outward looking, not the autarchic Europe associated with the policy of General de Gaulle. The view was sometimes put forward that a European deterrent should be built round the British and French national forces. This was a road along which it was very difficult to advance; leaving aside the policies of the British Government, he did not believe it would be acceptable to France. If ever it was a question of melting the British and French national deterrents inside something wider, he would rather see them melted into an Atlantic institution of the M.L.F. type than into a European arrangement. To move from the M.L.F. towards a European force would be a step backwards.

A French strategic analyst favoured Europe as a smaller third force. There was a choice to be made between a European future and an Atlantic future. If taken first, an Atlantic solution would suppress any possibility of a European solution. Therefore the right sequence was a European phase one, and an Atlantic phase two. Only after Europe exists could an Atlantic federation be arranged.

Militarily a European force could exist, but it was a mistake to envisage such a force as equal to the American or even the Russian. Today we have bipolarity between the Russians and the Americans and they are not equal at all; yet they are in a certain balance. The introduction of a third force (which is not the third force foreseen by de Gaulle) may have a great bearing on the strategic issue in the world. It would certainly put Europe in a completely different situation. The military reasons for that are that now the destructive capacity necessary for a credible nuclear force is not of the order of the American or the Russian force. It does not need to be able to face either of the two big powers alone. In the present situation, a third force of a certain size is enough to be able to play its role.

The idea of a European partner in a purely Atlantic nuclear system was wishful thinking, painting the present system of a protectorate in terms of Europe; it would be an Atlantic integration and contrary to a unification of Europe, which should be supported for political reasons and also because it is the hope of our youth.

The discussion then became very much more critical of the idea. An Italian participant said that it should be realised that the operation of building a European force must inevitably take the form of strong rivalry with the United States. It would be dangerous for Europeans, Americans and Russians and would introduce great instability. In the present bipolar situation, there is not only the problem of defence but also the problem of how to avoid the danger of atomic war. If there were a third power which was expanding and unsatisfied, tension would increase enormously. An independent European nuclear force had to go in this direction and would develop in America more of a sense of disinterest and detachment from Europe.

A German member felt that the problem of defeat, of being over-run, was deeply in the consciousness of Europe and this played a much greater part in the security in Europe than people believed. If ~~was~~ certain that the only way to prevent a nuclear war would be a bipolar system of arms control and that all hopes for a European identity should be sacrificed in order to allow a really stable world system on a bipolar basis, he felt the decision for Europe would be quite clear: the price should be paid. But he did not feel bipolar stability was achieved, and therefore did not believe the sacrifice a reasonable one to make.

A British participant criticised American contempt for the British and French forces. These existed and constituted a nuclear force in Europe. The creation of any other form of nuclear force in Europe would not make either for stability or European unity. The view that the French and British would come to see the error of their ways and hand their forces to a greater European mother showed a very sketchy knowledge of how public opinion in the two countries operated. He could not understand the argument that a separate nuclear deterrent would add to the stability of the world or the prospect of arms control. The world would be less stable.

A Dutch participant wanted to know how we were going to use an independent nuclear force. We could only use it as a political weapon during certain political conflicts. The American force was credible enough to the Russians: we only needed our own force in case the Americans would not follow us. Therefore it would always be threatened in opposition to the Americans. But in opposition to the American force it would not be credible, because it would be too small, because it would have no warning, and because our territory was so small and densely populated that the Russians could destroy Western Europe while we could do no more than damage Russia to a certain extent. There was no advantage to be gained from a European force, only great danger.

A German participant felt that considering all the elements of Europe's situation, she had no real choice. The freedom of movement of Europe was only relative and had become possible only because of the nuclear stalemate, the military bipolarity between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. It was limited in scope and could only take place under the umbrella of bipolar stability. Europe had an artificial impression of the degree of real independence open to her.

An American speaker warned that Europe's benefit from a separate force would be lost if this led to American disengagement. It was remarkable that those who looked towards European unity saw this as being absolutely compatible with European-American partnership in which they assumed that American interests would be identical to or very close to Europe's. Historically, this would be remarkable; and we should not enter into this arrangement, especially if the U.S. is to encourage Europeanism, without a full recognition that the kinds of motives that lead to European unity are not the same kinds of motives that lead to the identity of European and American interests and partnership. The moral was not that the U.S. should try to keep the European states weak and dependent, but that we should all recognise the real possibility that the movement could create real differences and tension rather than harmony.

In the view of a senior Belgian official it was unreal to imagine that in the next few years any parliament in Europe would be ready to vote the huge budgets necessary to build up a significant European nuclear force. But it was a healthy sign that Europeans were anxious to create a force which would make the unity of Europe clear.

An American official took up the question of cost. Equality and partnership in general might be thought to imply something like the level of effort that the U.S. is making in defence. One would suppose that something like an equality of effort would be called for: either Europe's share goes up, or the United States share comes down, or a bit of both. He did not want to push this too far, but it illustrated the dangers of focussing on the creation of a relatively small and cheap nuclear force and believing that this is going to move Europe significantly in the direction of equal partnership. It would take much more than that.

A German member criticised the idea that the youth of Europe wanted a nuclear Europe. He thought the youth of Europe would rally round the Atlantic flag. But we did not know, and in the absence of any impartial study we should not take our opinions as facts.

No-one in favour of a European deterrent had yet said how we get from here to there. It was generally recognised that a nuclear Europe pre-supposed a politically united Europe; but there was no suggestion of how to get there. If we wanted a political Europe we must build the framework for it. But the problems inherent in the creation of a European deterrent were no smaller or less obnoxious than those posed by the creation of an Atlantic deterrent. If we must choose, we might as well choose the more ideal ideal. If we did have to have a European deterrent, the best way would be through the M.L.F. because this is one way of developing it in co-operation with the United States rather than in rivalry. And if by some quirk of history we get a European deterrent, let us be modest. It is not going to give us equality. We should never forget that permanent disparity between Western Europe and the U.S. (geographic, demographic) preventing Europe from ever obtaining perfect equality with the U.S. in the nuclear field and on the world scene.

An American official was depressed by the implicit assumption that the only kind of collective forces the alliance needs are nuclear forces. This was partnership based on problems of the past rather than of the future. Another kind of collective force needed more consideration - a collective force to be used for the problem of attacks on the flanks (not just in the NATO area but in Sweden, North Africa, the Far East etc.). To be realistic, we could not think of making up such a force from countries which have contiguous borders, like Germany and Scandinavia, because in any kind of crisis there would be very serious concern about withdrawing forces from those countries and the force would be frozen. Perhaps a separately organised force would be best, made up of countries like the United States, Britain, Canada, perhaps even France, and of course such a force could be equipped with nuclear and non-nuclear weapons.

Morning Session, Monday 25 May

"THE OBJECTIVES OF ARMS CONTROL"

On. Quintieri in the Chair.

Professor Milton Shulman introduced this subject. It was evident, he said, that the issue of arms control tends to be a divisive factor in the alliance. This appears to arise from the difficulty in distinguishing between two aspects of the relationship between the Western alliance and the U.S.S.R. that appear contradictory in their effect. An aspect of maturity is the ability to carry in one's head two or more contradictory ideas at the same time, and it is an allied problem to achieve this kind of maturity in relation to arms control.

One aspect of this relationship is a fundamental conflict of purpose. Much that has been written about arms control has turned out to be ineffective because it has not taken sufficient account of this basic fact. The other aspect is that there are some elements of common interest in reducing the possibility of general war. Some difficulties have arisen because of the confusion between these two planes or aspects: some have arisen because of varying estimates of the changes in these two aspects.

It is evident that one necessity is to clarify our understanding of the present nature of the conflict with the U.S.S.R. This is particularly true in relation to arms control. How far and in what way have the changes in the communist bloc and in the U.S.S.R. itself proceeded? Four factors are at work: (1) The most important is that the Sino-Soviet dispute and the polycentrist tendencies in Eastern Europe and in the communist parties round the world have for the time being had the effect of circumscribing the freedom of action of the U.S.S.R. in the international sphere and of strengthening the present Soviet policy towards a detente with the West. It also appears that the internal problems of the U.S.S.R., particularly serious deficiencies in agriculture, economic planning and administration, have had the effect of strengthening the tendency in Soviet policy towards an attitude of peaceful coexistence. One motive is to avoid too many serious problems at one time, while repairs are carried out in the internal structure; another is to develop trade with other countries in order to relieve major points of strain. These factors which favour a policy of peaceful coexistence have also been strengthened by the Soviet perception of external factors, such as the growth of Western strategic military power which the Soviet economy could only equal with very serious strains.

(2) The growing Soviet appreciation of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and sobriety about the risks of war as opposed to the political use of the apparent risks of war. (3) The growth of the Western economies, and particularly of the West European economies, and the social and political consequences of this economic growth. (4) The obvious developments in the underdeveloped world, the spread of independence movements and the development of national leaderships in these areas rather than revolution in the Soviet sense.

The result of all these factors has been a policy which the Chinese have attacked as revisionary and the Russians defended as neo-revolutionary. To the outside observer, Soviet policy appears as the elongation of certain tendencies originally conceived as tactical and short-term. The clearest example is the Soviet analysis that there does not appear to be a pre-revolutionary situation in the countries of Western Europe. The effect on Soviet policy has been that it addresses itself to the bourgeoisie of these countries, primarily for the purpose of influencing national policy rather than for achieving social change in the short run; the use of that political purpose is to encourage trade, to use essentially the themes of peace and trade and the theme of nationalism as a divisive factor in the Western alliance. But essentially what has been taking place is the elongation of a short-term tactic, a political manoeuvre rather than a revolutionary challenge.

Similarly in regard to the under-developed areas, it has been recognised that there has been a temporary stabilisation of the national bourgeoisie of those countries; the Russians address themselves primarily to this bourgeoisie so as to sever or weaken the ties between these areas and the metropolitan countries and to develop an anti-western front. The Chinese have coined the mot that the imperialist rear has become the anti-imperialist front. The Russians will argue that their goals are still revolutionary, but in a different sense from a few years ago or as the Chinese still use these goals. But one observes in the last few years that these terms of reference tend to grow longer as the economic demands on the U.S.S.R. have multiplied.

On disarmament and arms control, one complicating problem is the propaganda use by the U.S.S.R. of the peace issue as a major instrument for the organisation of mass support, with the aim of dividing Western governments from their people and of dividing the various governments. The atmosphere of detente is also used to open up divisions within the West - to give an impression of Soviet-U.S. rapprochement, to weaken the Western alliance, to try to gain acceptance by the West of a temporary status quo in Western Europe which essentially means Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.

At the same time there is the other aspect of this relationship: the common interest between the West and the U.S.S.R. From the Western point of view this aspect has also been evolving in recent years, and we have clarified our thinking about it. We are surely not talking about disarmament in the 1922 sense of the word, but of something more limited in its functions. These are (a) if possible to reduce the danger of general war; (b) to encourage a further modification of Soviet policies in a peaceful direction; and (c) our policies have a political conflict function, partly to counter the Soviet use of the peace issue and partly to help to win support from other peoples of the world for the peaceful purposes of the Western powers.

The first function requires a careful analysis of what the specific dangers are that arms control measures are intended to mitigate rather than a general assumption that anything done in this field is likely to be good. It has to do with the reduction of the possibility of general war arising from miscalculation, misunderstanding, the breakdown of the deterrent system, or calculated action by third parties.

But the main possibility of arms control is in the abortion of crises before they are born. Essentially this requires a further refinement of our thinking about the political use of military capabilities, a kind of deterrence involving the apparent risk of war round crisis points. This is related to the problem of crisis management. One of the major functions of this whole field can be the extent to which by eliminating misapprehensions about intentions and clarifying the implications of apparent risks we can prevent crises from coming to maturity.

Another aspect of arms control concerns efforts to limit damage in the event of war, by flexible and controlled response. Clearly the successful evolution of this aspect of our strategic thinking implies a process of communication of the concepts involved in flexible response and some acceptance of these by the enemy.

This is related to another aspect, which has to do with what is called the strategic dialogue, the relationship between what is said and written on the Soviet and on the Western side about the refinement in strategic thinking and the counter-action between the two. In general the function of the strategic dialogue is to spread the concept of security, as it is understood on both sides, by which arms control is accepted as an integral part of policy. It involves an understanding of the measures taken on each side in research and development, deployment and procurement, so that no misunderstanding arises of measures taken for short-term consequences.

One major question which faces us is what would we regard as the optimum combination of positive and negative factors - pressures and strains and encouragement - for further modification of Soviet policy in the direction we require. We must clarify our thinking on this point because it affects so many aspects of our policy.

It starts from an assumption that the present phase of Soviet policy, the evolution towards peaceful coexistence, is more desirable from our point of view than the militant phase of Soviet policy, because it is less hazardous and because we have a possibility of success. The development of our policy of arms control is vitally related to our concept of the long-term goals of the U.S.S.R. It makes the U.S.S.R. realise that her relationship with the West is a limited adversary relationship, that there are advantages in some further improvement of relations and that there are visible disadvantages in encouraging the opposite course.

There are some difficult problems in the execution of a policy which seeks to serve these functions. First, there is the difficulty in practice of distinguishing between these two levels of conflict with the U.S.S.R. Collaboration in the arms control field tends to be inflated and misconstrued as a form of political rapprochement, which it is not. It is very difficult in democratic societies to carry through limited measures in arms control without creating an atmosphere which undermines the whole nature of the conflict situation. Another hazard is that the negotiations tend to be bilateral in character and to create apprehension among the allies about whether or not the U.S. in acting as an agent in these negotiations takes sufficient account of the diverse national interests of its allies.

A second major difficulty concerns the approach to the status quo. The paradox is that Soviet policy, although fundamentally at variance with the status quo, is nevertheless for the moment in the position of being the advocate of the status quo and Western policy in the position of resisting this Soviet policy.

A third major difficulty concerns the different approaches to the reduction of tension. Many advocates of arms control assume that anything which reduces tension is good; therefore a number of measures, for example the test ban, tend to be inflated as first steps towards something very concrete, a view which can mislead both our allies and our adversary. It creates an impression on the part of the U.S.S.R. that there is an irresolution in Western policy which encourages Soviet probes around crisis points. The difficulty is that the diffused reduction in tension as a primary approach to arms control is less satisfactory than a discriminating approach to specific measures which seek to mitigate specific causes of tension rather than allow the Soviet exploitation of detente.

Some of the conclusions that emerge from this perspective are:

(1) The necessity of winning popular appreciation of the existence of these two levels in our relationship with the U.S.S.R. This requires the participation of people who have a hard-headed appreciation of the conflict and who appreciate the military and political aspects of the relationship. Arms control is too important to be left to the pacifists!

(2) The mode of negotiation in this field is crucial. It is necessary to improve the mechanism of allied consultation and to develop a common appreciation of the intellectual and political nature of the Soviet challenge and a common acceptance of arms control as an integral aspect of our policy.

(3) This matter cannot proceed on a purely bilateral basis. If on occasion it is necessary for the process of negotiation to be done by the U.S. on behalf of the West, it must be clear that the U.S. is acting as an agent and that there is to be no sacrifice of the interests of the various constituents of the Western alliance in these negotiations. Clearly this has not been sufficiently the case in the past. In so far as divergent interests remain and cannot be harmonised within the alliance, it is possible that some division of labour within the alliance can turn these divergencies to advantage. It is obvious that discussion on those measures proposed for European stability need to proceed from European rather than American initiatives.

(4) The further evolution of our understanding of the possibilities for arms control in its broadest sense is really dependent on a common definition of our long-term strategy in relation to the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe and China. It is also a problem for the West to maintain the necessary level of military capabilities and political unity in a climate of reduced tension. We do not want to generate tension, but we need a careful exercise of leadership in winning popular understanding to enable us to maintain the level of unity and strength and sang-froid even in a time of reduced tension.

Professor Howard (first respondent) said that he would concentrate on the problem of inter-allied relations on the question of arms control negotiations. As the Russians as well as the Americans have discovered, arms control is a problem of alliance control at the same time: meaningful negotiations have to be carried out on a bilateral basis but each side has got to voice a multifarious degree of interests if the agreements which are reached are going to stick. The number of points on which the U.S. and U.S.S.R. can carry on a truly bilateral dialogue are very small - e.g. the demilitarisation of outer space, the disposal of surplus fissile material - and they very quickly come down to problems which are of general concern to all their allies, associates and satellites.

As Professor Shulman had said, on questions affecting the security of Europe - demilitarised zones, observation posts, even test bans - the allies have got a certain amount to say because these are matters affecting their own security. But how is it possible for the U.S., with her enormous preponderance of power and influence and expertise, to negotiate simply as the agent for the West rather than as a kindly nanny who knows best? If Gaullism exasperated the Americans, Kennedyism often exasperated the Europeans.

The problem is, how can the European powers, carrying a very small share in the general concern of the West, deny to the U.S. the responsibility which her greater shareholding gives her? One danger for Europe is to try to buy more shares, to try to get or stay in the nuclear game in order to have a greater effect on disarmament policy. Certain statements of British ministers during the last nine months, made mainly for reasons of internal politics, have had a disastrous effect in implying the necessity to have nuclear weapons in order to make one's influence felt in disarmament negotiations. When it is argued that there should be a European nuclear force to give Europe a greater say in disarmament negotiations, then the Douglas-Home chickens are coming home to roost!

Nevertheless, the U.S. must take account of the danger that her European allies may adopt this view if they feel they are being insufficiently consulted about their own interests. On the other hand we Europeans must disabuse ourselves of the idea that we have anything at all to fear from greater American-Soviet understanding. We have much more to fear, and particularly our German friends, from American-Soviet hostility. If Europeans wish to influence negotiations about arms control, it has got to be through the medium of diplomatic intercourse within the West. The consultation about general goals, general planning, and crisis management, which needs to be developed within the Western alliance, is not going to be confined to arms control negotiations, because arms control is tied up with crisis management and crisis management is tied up with our attitude towards events outside Europe. Arms control seems not so much a separate section of international policy as an attitude towards international policy.

Professor Howard said that he sometimes doubted the value of having such institutions as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in Washington which suggested that disarmament can be set in a separate package. He preferred Professor Shulman's definition of arms control as an adult attitude towards international affairs, and especially towards East-West relations. We have to become fully adult to survive, and an adult attitude towards the Soviet Union means taking account of Soviet interests, Soviet policy and Soviet reactions. Suggestions made earlier that in formulating our policies we should not care what the Russians think about them are not to be taken seriously.

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The subsequent discussion centred around two main themes: the definition of arms control and its relation to other aspects of policy: and the relationship of Soviet-American agreements to the situation in Europe, though the two subjects were difficult to separate.

The Meaning of Arms Control

A distinguished American strategic analyst opened the discussion by contending that to use the phrase "arms control" to cover not only agreements but every aspect of national and allied military policy was to bankrupt it of all meaning. Professor Shulman had really meant it in the sense of negotiation. His second point was that if it was possible through arms control to identify certain common interests with the adversary, it should be possible to do this between allies. It was foolish to talk as if arms control made inevitable a conflict of interest between Europe and the U.S. The real European interest in the damage limitation aspect of a strategy of flexible response was a case in point.

A Swedish participant, at a later stage of the discussion, expressed his sympathy with the view that arms policy measures should be viewed in the total context of foreign policy, and that "arms policy" was a more suitable phrase than "arms control". The West faced a dilemma in striking a balance not only between measures for its own security and those that would modify Soviet policy in the right direction but also between measures that would maintain allied cohesion and those that would affect Soviet policy. Western cohesion was itself a powerful instrument affecting Soviet policy.

Arms Control and Europe

A senior American official said that it was impossible in the real world to judge arms control measures simply by their military effects, especially as there was no true stability in Europe but only a compromise of tensions. The Soviet Union always attached political conditions to its response to an arms control proposal (non-aggression re the test ban, German denuclearisation and the reduction of troops re control posts). Therefore all arms control proposals had to be considered in the light of their political implications, most particularly as they concerned Germany. Moreover, any Soviet-American agreement was invested with political significance independent of its substance. The Soviet Union is interested in reaching agreements concerning Europe in order to create the impression that the present status quo is not only reconcilable with stabilisation but must form the basis of such stabilisation. Therefore the political as well as the intrinsic merits of any arms control proposal must be carefully studied. It was therefore not the case that any Soviet-American agreement was desirable. Agreements even on questions unrelated to Europe could create fears in Germany "that the reunification of Germany is to be buried under the flowers of Soviet-American agreements".

A German participant wondered whether Professor Shulman had not exaggerated the changes in Soviet policy. Khrushchev is good at taking risks and has not really abandoned the idea of revolution: coexistence is merely the modern international form of revolution. The rise of nationalism elsewhere has made easy victories in Africa and Asia impossible, and therefore Europe is the focus of his offensive. Soviet disarmament policy is the vehicle of a definite political purpose in Europe. A French member felt that there was an inherent contradiction for the West in trying to reach agreements to lessen East-West tension and to change the military confrontation to a more political one, while trying to alter the political status quo in Europe, and that some people felt that an atmosphere of detente made the latter objective harder to achieve.

A Norwegian member reverted to the probability that arms control negotiations must lead to a point where there must be a compromise "which somebody must pay for". Hence the apprehension which European countries felt and hence the probable desirability of creating a European political organisation which might involve a European deterrent.

One Italian participant felt that the conference was taking too pessimistic a view of the Soviet policy of coexistence, which might have long-term benefits for the West. Another Italian member pointed out that there had been a parallel development in the West: we felt obliged to accept coexistence because the nuclear equation made it impossible to settle our ideological disputes by force. The short-term problem was how to manage the problem of nuclear coexistence, the middle-term problem was how to discover those aspects of the status quo that were acceptable and those that were not. These Italian views were generally supported by a Belgian official who felt that though detente was not a solution in itself, it made it easier rather than harder to work towards a peaceful solution of the German problem.

A German participant made two points. First, that everyone is still too fascinated with the discovery that two great adversaries can have useful relations with each other. It was in the German interest that both should show a rational attitude towards nuclear power. But, secondly, what options did this leave to the middle and small powers? They could accept the United States as their agent, a position which assumed that there was complete identity of interest among the allies, whereas in fact it might go no further than the prevention of war; or else seek to develop a European-American partnership, based on some European minimum deterrent force. The Germans cannot make up their mind between these alternatives until they know what the objectives of negotiation are to be. It was on objectives rather than on interests that the alliance should concentrate.

Professor Shulman closed by concentrating on two questions which had been raised earlier by a French participant. The first was whether all thought in arms control should be based on the assumption that both adversary coalitions were based on fear of aggression by the other. Professor Shulman thought that this did not sufficiently take account of a more complex aspect of the motivation for the development of military capabilities. One of the most difficult aspects in our relationship with the U.S.S.R., particularly around crisis points, is the extent to which we should give weight to the political consequences of military capabilities. Much of the Soviet procurement policy can be better understood if we take account of their strong conviction that military capabilities have important political consequences, even if there is no expectation of their employment in war. Both sides, but especially the Soviets, feel that a certain amount of military capability in the background is essential to influence political behaviour. Therefore it would not necessarily follow that if one really succeeds in dispelling any Soviet fear of our aggressive intent one would dispose of the motivation for the development of arms.

The second ^{question} concerned the Soviet fear of inspection. Obviously this is a major problem, not only because of the Soviet desire to conceal military capabilities and reliance on secrecy to protect her strategic capabilities but also because the U.S.S.R. has sought to shield her weakness. This raises the inter-relationship between progress in arms control and our long-term intentions towards the Soviet Union. To the extent that we are successful in creating a modification in this aspect of Soviet policy and expose their society to some degree of penetration, it also introduces some important influences in the evolution

of Soviet society. So far the Soviet Union has only accepted a broadening of tourism and some increase in cultural contacts. There have been some modest effects on Soviet intellectuals, but not yet of an order seriously to affect Soviet society. This argues, in such measures as the test ban, for considering its extension to include underground testing. On-site detection is important to our interest of opening up Soviet society in some degree, even if there are refinements in the technical possibilities for detection from outside the country. This is a basic problem and not likely to be easily dispelled.

Professor Shulman considered that despite our disagreements on what the Soviet Union really means by peaceful coexistence, on our own goals, and on whether what becomes possible is an extension of something desirable or is an illusion which makes the achievement of Western goals more difficult, the conference was agreed on the main essentials. Peaceful coexistence as the Soviet leadership now defines it is intended to produce political aims by more direct measures and to produce a less cohesive climate in the West within which political gains are possible. It has not so far produced a basis for a new agreement in regard to any vital problem, including Germany. On this point one has to regard peaceful coexistence as largely operating in the realm of atmosphere; it has not yet introduced new substantive attitudes on any vital issue and particularly on Germany.

There is a danger in our appearing to act as though such a basis had been opened up. "I do not share the view that in raising reservations about the real aims of Soviet policy the Federal Republic is exercising a veto. In this matter the interests of Germany are no different from those of the rest of the alliance, and it is a mistake to put the onus on Germany as an obstacle". This is why, in the exploration of measures of security in Europe, it would be important for the initiative to rest with Europe so as to avoid misapprehension.

He agreed with the point that the very climate of detente, particularly if unsubstantiated, makes it more difficult for us to pursue the positive goals of the Western alliance as well as preserve its cohesion and military preparedness. But it is a mistake to draw the conclusion from this that in order to preserve the cohesion of the alliance it is necessary to generate tension artificially. It should be our role to elucidate the nature of the problem so that we can at the same time explore what is substantial in the Soviet offer without creating a public impression that the danger is past.

The real test of the success or failure of this current phase of coexistence will only be known over a period of years. The trends in various European countries and the reactions of other parts of the world cannot yet be judged: it is too soon to draw up a score sheet. But if we do not understand the nature of this kind of political jockeying for influence and initiative, Khrushchev may succeed where the crude Stalinist policy failed.

Afternoon Session, Monday 25 May

"A GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR THE ATLANTIC POWERS?"

Professor Wohlstetter in the Chair.

Mr. Alastair Buchan introduced this subject by saying that he thought the correct title for this session should be "The Politico-military strategy of the Atlantic powers in other areas than Europe". It is a subject to which not nearly so much thought has been given as to arms control or the other forms control of Western strategy might take.

There will be a continuing security problem in Europe. But new elements are altering and accentuating the strategic problems which the Atlantic powers will face elsewhere. One is the Soviet decision to return to indirect strategy. She is being forced to do this by the nature of the Sino-Soviet quarrel, and must develop a competitive diplomacy with China in third areas, even at the expense of infringing her policy of detente towards the West.

Second, China is going to present a growing menace to international security over the next twenty years unless she is contained by more subtle and complex means than were necessary for the Soviet Union. She is going to present a menace, partly because she has a concept of international relations that recognises no form of stability or balance; partly because of her size - although she is very poor, it would take only a relatively small increase in wealth per head for her power to grow substantially; partly because of a legacy of hatred for the West as a whole.

Third, as General Beaufre had said, European countries now have considerably greater freedom to pursue individual policies outside Europe, even where these conflict with the policies and interests of the U.S. or their neighbours. This relates to the European-American relationship. If European countries feel they are vassals of the United States in the Atlantic relationship, there will be a certain temptation to demonstrate that they are not vassals by their non-European policy. Moreover while there is now a great deal of mutual comprehension on problems of nuclear strategy between Europe and the U.S., questions of indirect strategy are more subjective, and there is less agreement on how to deal with problems of subversion, etc.

Fourth, nationalism, often unrelated to communism, will grow rather than diminish in the underdeveloped countries and will be directed as much at the United States as at the ex-colonial powers. He did not agree with M. Aron that the U.S. has become more the target of anti-colonial sentiment than the old colonial powers, but she has been brought within the ambit of suspicion and resentment about the West as a whole. This increasing nationalism in the under-developed countries carries the danger of threats to Western interests arising out of pure irredentism - Indonesia, for example - which may create situations in which the communist powers will be the beneficiaries.

All the Atlantic powers, including the non-aligned such as Sweden and Switzerland, have an identifiable core of common interest in dealing with the "tiers monde". They are all

trading powers and they all have an interest in the same kind of world order, not necessarily the same as the communist countries or the under-developed countries themselves may desire. They have an interest in diminishing the international anarchy which is latent in the development of many new states: they can only flourish if international law, rights and obligations are respected. And they share a common fear, for they do not wish to see an ideological conflict give place to a racial conflict.

However, the specific problems of the Atlantic powers vary widely. The U.S. is so deeply involved in Latin America that Europe can only offer peripheral assistance. In Africa, Britain and France and to a lesser extent Belgium are the countries primarily involved, though they can usefully use American and other European support. Southern Asia involves the United States, Britain and France. The Pacific remains an American preserve - he wondered whether it ought to be. Germany and Italy and other European countries find it hard to determine what direct political interest they have in developments in these areas.

There are two broad alternative approaches to the problem. The first is a spheres of influence policy, following the concept of a European-American partnership. By this European countries would assume primary responsibility for developments and relationships in the Middle East and Africa (and especially North Africa) while the American sphere would be the Far East and Latin America, assuming that the confrontation of the Soviet Union and the problems of Eastern Europe remain joint interests. Two problems would arise from this approach: (1) Post-War experience does not suggest that this is a sound idea, since action by one Atlantic country outside Europe has tended to involve many others (for example in Indochina, Suez, the Congo, Vietnam). (2) The under-developed countries themselves would not accept such a division of responsibility, even if the Western countries did. It is hard to envisage countries that were regarded by the Atlantic powers as within the American sphere being content to confine their relationships to the United States, or the other way round.

The second approach is a co-ordinated policy that recognises that the interests of the Atlantic powers are inseparable. The danger of formalising such a doctrine is to create a monolithic Western policy which would tend to alienate the Afro-Asian bloc and fail to utilise the diversity of Western contacts with the underdeveloped countries: the French Community, the Commonwealth, the U.S. special relationships.

The beginnings of a more effectively co-ordinated approach to the non-European security problems of the Atlantic powers should start with the recognition that the United States is the only country with global non-nuclear military power in the West, though even this is strictly limited. The most impressive aspect of the recent reforms in American military policy has been the improvement in the limited war capability of the U.S. It is based on the recognition that since the U.S. bears the principal strategic responsibility for dealing with the U.S.S.R., she also has a decisive influence upon the conduct of local crises. There is a current tendency in Britain to emphasise her role in "peace-keeping" but British power and interests are now principally limited to two non-European areas, the Southern Middle East and Southern Asia. France has an ambitious global policy,

but has almost no ability to exert extra-European military power except in Africa. No other Atlantic country has the ability to exert major force at any distance from the North Atlantic area.

The recognition of this disparity of resources need not necessarily create an imbalance in the European-American relationship. Since the problem is not primarily to be conceived in military terms, the element of reciprocity which is essential to maintain a political alliance exists within it. That is to say the U.S. needs active European support in developing her Asian policy and in resuming relations with China; the U.S. as well as Europe is involved in post-colonial Africa. A candid recognition of the reciprocal element is quite reconcilable with an increased European responsibility for the defence of Europe in a purely Atlantic context.

In so far as United Nations authority may have to be invoked with increasing frequency, as a substitute for great power intervention, it cannot function without the political, financial and logistic support of both the United States and the majority of the European powers. The problem of United Nations security operations is one we shall all have to take more seriously in the years ahead.

The years 1951-57 were not dissimilar to the present period, when the threats to the major NATO powers were outside Europe - in Asia and the Middle East, Indochina, Algeria, Quemoy, Suez, Kenya. Then the existence of NATO, including the machinery of political consultation, had small effect in the ability to co-ordinate policy or the creation of sympathetic support for one ally by the others. It is true that one strong difference between the situation ten years ago and the situation today is that then the European powers were mostly engaged in colonial wars with which the U.S. for ideological and historical reasons was unsympathetic. Now the situation is almost reversed in that the U.S. is deeply involved in several areas and would like to elicit stronger European support and involvement. But the fact remains that NATO has not proved to be a satisfactory instrument for co-ordinating and resolving the extra-European policies of the Atlantic powers.

If it is accepted that the U.S. has the principal power to act anywhere in the world, but that individual European countries have essential interests which must be recognised, knowledge, or local influence which must be utilised, it can be argued that the right course is not to expand the political functions of NATO (as the Three Wise Men recommended), but to make it concentrate on performing its specialised Atlantic security functions more efficiently and economically. A looser and more diverse system is required than is needed for the confrontation of the Soviet Union in Europe. It involves other countries than the NATO partners: Australia and New Zealand, Japan, possibly India. The natural meeting point is Washington. Perhaps it requires no new institutions, though it may involve an informal council of major powers with extra-European interests: the U.S., Britain, France, Italy (or the European Community), Japan, India, Australia, Canada, Sweden. The essential point is one of perspective. If Europe, however united, confines its interests to Europe its influence will be very small. If the United States tries to conduct a strategy in Southern Asia, the Far East or Latin America that is conceived purely unilaterally, she will find herself increasingly isolated politically from Europe, not

only on non-European questions but on questions involving Europe itself.

Herr Cornides (first respondent) said that he agreed with this outline. It was important to turn to problems outside Europe, although it would be an illusion to believe that this new focus will make it any easier to solve European problems. Indeed, if such a joint approach to the outside world is to be successful, an essential precondition is a minimum of consolidated methods of dealing with our inter-European problems.

Mr. Buchan had not mentioned the impact of the Common Market on this problem. The Common Market forces its members to have a joint commercial policy towards the outside world. Whatever the E.E.C. decides will deeply affect Europe's position in other parts of the world, as well as its relations with the U.S. in other parts of the world. The need for a joint commercial policy implies the hard core of a joint foreign policy. Again this brings us back to the importance of the unresolved problems in Europe.

Herr Cornides considered that the extra-European role of Britain as a power not yet inside the Community and closely allied with the U.S. is going to be more important than many continental Europeans had estimated. Looking back, after the breakdown of 1963, many Europeans realise that there is more in this extra-European role of Britain's than they thought valid. The same applies in certain areas to France. This will not necessarily be permanent, but will last longer than we had thought, perhaps ten to fifteen years. This should be recognised, because there are many advantages in a division of labour deriving from the special position of these two countries in other parts of the world.

By the same token there is an over-estimate of what Germany can do in Cyprus, Vietnam, etc. as long as she is not part of a united Europe. Although Britain and France may have important non-European functions in the intermediate period before full European integration, the opposite is true of Germany; outside the strictly economic field the Germans are not susceptible to the argument of being the one country with a non-colonial record. They are happy that there is one field where they are not committed by the immediate past, and they have so many struggles in their immediate field of European problems that it is understandable that they should not be anxious to become politically involved in Africa, etc. One cannot make the Germans forget their European problems by giving them a role elsewhere.

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A distinguished American strategic analyst, opening the general discussion, suggested that it was desirable to differentiate the problem. There were (a) some situations such as Korea, Taiwan, where the United States is stuck with providing the assistance and the military back-up; (b) situations where the countries under pressure have historical associations with one or other of the colonial powers. This may not last since much of the metropolitan influence depends on relations with the current group of leaders, which may erode as they are replaced; (c) situations which call either for a peace-keeping or for an economic assistance operation. In the latter cases there was much to be said for trying to make this a joint enterprise - in

Latin America, Asia or Africa. These countries were going to look with resentment towards the developed rich world and there was merit in a division of Western responsibility because their resentment would be deeper if it were focussed on one Western country.

These considerations argued against a spheres of influence policy and in favour of a co-ordinated if not necessarily unified Western policy.

A Danish participant warned that an attempt to widen NATO responsibilities would increase Scandinavian neutralism and might even drive Norway and Denmark out of the alliance. This view was supported by a Dutch participant, who pointed out that the basic approach of the partners is so different that to try to come to a common Atlantic approach to the outside world would be a liability for the Alliance rather than an asset. It was not the task of NATO, though a little more candour and straightforwardness while discussing these problems within NATO would help.

A British official reminded the conference of Disraeli's statement that it was the task of political leadership to keep disunited elements together. With the nuclear stalemate in Europe, the NATO flank is being turned in Asia and Africa. The communist attack is at the weakest points, which at the moment are Aden, Libya, Cyprus, Malaysia, Zanzibar, Vietnam. There must be co-ordination of policies, whether inside WEU or in NATO, on a multilateral or a multinational basis.

Another British official, while fully agreeing with the need for a co-ordinated rather than a spheres of influence policy, wondered how a co-ordinated NATO policy might be implemented outside the NATO area. He considered that non-European problems were a NATO responsibility, although he supported Mr. Buchan's view that it would be preferable to seek a looser and more diverse system than the present NATO machinery to deal with these problems; there was much to be said for trying to organise the major industrial countries of the free world in some kind of informal council.

A French strategic analyst made three points: (1) Both in direct and indirect strategy we needed team work, with different partners playing different games to the same end. Therefore, the problem was the definition and the acceptance of the political aim. In fact the problems were on two levels - the ultimate political aim, and crisis management. (2) This world-wide problem was not a NATO problem. NATO deals with direct strategy and it would be unwise to try to draw all our European partners into these world-wide problems. (3) If we did not put this indirect world strategy into the framework of long-term aims (which admittedly are very difficult to agree), "if we continue to deal with day-to-day problems without knowing where we are going, I think we will go nowhere". An Italian participant expressed his agreement with this. He did not see what could be gained from asking European countries other than Britain and France to become more engaged in problems outside Europe. "Those questions which do not directly touch the possibility of common catastrophe will remain in practice problems to be managed and solved by the countries who happen to be directly involved". The real problem was long-term policy. It was true that Americans and Europeans have many common interests in diminishing international anarchy, maintaining the international rule of law

etc. but at the same time it was useful for the rest of the world that there should remain within certain limits a degree of competition between the two.

An American official expressed his personal feeling that as a result of crises in the past, members of NATO were now much more aware of the direct connection between the interests of NATO members and the outside world: the direct connection of Cuba had been very clear to people in October 1962. We had to face the fact that we are dealing with an adversary who has definite interests and ambitions in the third world. He was supported in this view at a later stage by an Italian and by a German official.

A German member of the conference took issue with Herr Cornides on the question of Germany's role in non-European problems, maintaining that many of the problems which seem to be the responsibility of the U.S., Britain and France do in fact involve Germany. The German economy was as dependent as the British on Middle East oil, for instance. A nation can be guilty of taking less upon itself than it ought to do by force of its interests and power, and he suggested that the Germans were shirking responsibilities which they should rightly assume. He did not envisage individual German action anywhere, but he believed Germany should not refuse to be a partner in co-ordinated Western enterprises.

A British participant observed that NATO powers involved in an extra-European conflict are always tempted to claim that they are basically fighting the common battle, a communist attack on another front. This was an absurd over-simplification: the problems facing the Americans, the French and the British are those arising out of a different world revolution from the one Marx foresaw, although the communists try to exploit any difficulties. He sympathised with the view that we should try to get our goals clear; but the situation was too confused for us to think of dealing with it in terms of some over-all political strategy and over-all concept of goals. What Britain is trying to do in places like Aden and Borneo is to maintain order, and this is in the interests of the West as a whole. He pointed out that since Britain's commitments outside Europe must be met from the same resources as provide her commitment to Europe, if Britain continues to have to deal with running sores outside Europe sooner or later it will become more difficult for her to play her part as a NATO ally.

A distinguished American participant suggested that of the three possible approaches to the problem of relations outside Europe, the worst would be for each nation to act independently according to how it sees its own national interests. He wondered whether it would not be possible to have a combination of the other two approaches, co-ordination and spheres of influence: a country which has either the political interest in an area or specialised ties (such as Britain with a Commonwealth country) would be deemed to have a particular responsibility, while the other NATO allies, being consulted, would take this responsibility into account in making their own decisions. Taking up the point made by an Italian participant about the desirability of having more than one Western approach, for which he could see an advantage in certain circumstances, he wondered whether this would mean proceeding by de Gaulle's methods, or whether it would be possible for members of NATO or of a larger

body of countries to concert among themselves a certain freedom of action.

A British member of the conference held that one advantage of the end of the colonial era is that there is no longer any fundamental basis for competition in involvement overseas: we have now evolved a truly multilateral world. However, it would be a mistake to imagine that the end of a colonial phase means the end of a sense of commitment, this was particularly true of Britain and the countries of the Commonwealth. He suggested that it is this sense of commitment which Europe asks of America and which many American participants in the conference had indicated does exist. He believed that when everybody accepts that this commitment exists, the problems of NATO will be solved.

A German official, taking up the point about the reluctance of smaller European countries to assume new obligations, stressed that it is not the size of a country which counts, but the strength of conviction and the strength with which political and diplomatic action is taken by a country. A small communist country like Yugoslavia exerts considerable influence in the non-aligned countries. Therefore the Scandinavian countries, for example, could exercise a great influence, perhaps in certain circumstances more influence than greater powers. He urged that we should make use of the variety among the nations of the West just as the adversary does in offering different forms of communist state.

An American official argued that while most crises are likely to originate outside Europe, there will always be the likelihood of Europe becoming involved because of the risk of escalation. Therefore, quite apart from reasons to do with the rule of law, it was in the Europeans' own interest to concern themselves in what is being done to handle potentially dangerous situations around the world. Moreover the Europeans would surely have an interest in influencing those countries which are dealing with any crisis that may arise. He stressed the great advantage in exerting the most effective influence, of being involved from the start in any situation. In reality there are very few conflicts of interest between North America and Europe in these other parts of the world, and the United States welcomes support in these areas. From Europe's own point of view, therefore, to become involved would be sensible, because in the long run non-involvement does not necessarily mean non-participation.

Signor Lombardo delivered a graceful closing speech, paying a warm tribute to all those involved in the organisation and financing of the conference as well as to those who had participated in the debates, in particular to the sessional chairmen, the introductory speakers and respondents.

He considered that the high level of debate had been worthy of the important themes which had formed the basis for discussion: problems involving the future of the Atlantic alliance, the very existence of our countries and our common destiny. He believed the great value of the conference lay in the thorough and methodical study that had been made of such a complex range of problems while avoiding the risk such meetings run of being too academic in tone and too specialist in participation.

The discussions had confirmed the urgent need for the free world to know how to polarise the aspirations and expectations of its peoples on the sum of supreme values which constitutes our civilisation. The biological and political need to survive forces us to draw up a global strategy - whether "politico-military" as Mr. Buchan would say, or "indirect" as General Beaufre would prefer - because the threat we face is global and so is the strategy of our adversary. A conflict is taking place, even if not in the traditional sense of the word, and even if it is marked by periods of armistice in the sense of coexistence, in the dimension of the war of nerves, psychological warfare and subversion.

Clearly we cannot win this struggle by continuing to improvise pseudo-strategic plans from one election to the other in each of our countries and each on its own account. Certainly the clash between traditional concepts and brave new visions is very painful. The turn of relations within the alliance has led to a state of cold war amongst ourselves.

Yet we possess in common a supreme attribute which ought to constitute the most formidable agent to fashion us into a single power: liberty. Perhaps Providence is offering us a choice: either to resume the old game of large and small powers in a state of perpetual rivalry, or to face the present and the future with a full understanding of our responsibilities and our obligations.

If we take the first course, our world will not be worthy of survival. If we take the second course, we will not merely assure our survival but make possible a happier future for mankind. To achieve this our strategy must be able to count on the most powerful force of dissuasion, on the most credible and most integrated deterrent which exists: our unity and common will to win through.

In the end, only faith can win. And a faith which rests on inescapable moral laws, on the service of human dignity and personality, cannot fail. But in order to triumph, faith needs the resolution and the courage of mankind as its supreme weapon.
