The Institute for Strategic Studies.European Study Commission.

The First Meeting (Parigi,29-30 XI 63)

1) - Programma.

2) - Discussion on the international situation.Discussion on the European assessment of developments in the Communist Bloc. Discussion on the implication of Moscow Treaty.

The Second Meeting.(Londra,31 I-1 II 64)

3) - Programma.Discussion on a European Strategic Force.Desirability of a European Nuclear Force.Discussion on requirements for a European Strategic Nuclear Force.Discussion on the international situation.

The Third Meeting (Parigi,20-21 III 64)

4) - Programma.

5) - Discussion on the international situation.The European view on American Strategic Policy and doctrine and on command and control in NATO.

I N S T I T U T E F O R S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

EUROPEAN STUDY COMMISSION

Minutes of the First Meeting, held at
the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère,
54, rue de Varenne, Paris 7e, on
29th and 30th November, 1963

Present: Général d'Armée Beaufre (in the Chair)

Signor A. Albonetti	Général del Marmol
Mr. L. Beaton	Herr U. Nerlich
Admiral Bos	Dr. K. Ritter
Mr. A. Buchan	Mr. E. Seidenfaden
Herr W. Cornides	Dr. T. Sommer
M. de Rose	Signor A. Spinelli
Professor M. Howard	M. J. Vernant

Absent: Dr. N. Ørvik

1. FINANCE

Mr. Buchan recalled the decision reached at the preliminary meeting in Cambridge that (except in the case of the Italian members) the various national Institutes should be responsible for the travel arrangements and costs of their members, but that the Institute for Strategic Studies would set up a central fund to cover administrative expenses and the costs of accommodation and meals involved in attendance at meetings. The contribution required from each member of the Commission to this central fund had been assessed at £180, based on the estimated cost of two nights' accommodation and meals for a total of six meetings. It was understood that a careful account would be kept of the costing and any monies unspent would be refunded to members on a per capita basis at the end of one year.

It was agreed to accept this figure for the initial per capita contribution to the costs of the Commission.

2. MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMISSION

(a) Signor Spinelli proposed that M. Etienne Hirsch be invited to join the Commission.

It was agreed that it might be more appropriate to consider inviting M. Hirsch to attend a particular meeting of the Commission if and when it was thought that his views would be of special interest to the subject under discussion.

(b) Mr. Seidenfaden raised the question of Swedish participation in the work of the Commission.

It was felt that associateship would be more appropriate than membership. It was agreed to give further consideration to this possibility at the next meeting, and in the meantime Mr. Seidenfaden undertook to sound his Scandinavian colleagues on the matter and also to try to ascertain what the Swedish reaction would be to an invitation to be associated in some way with the work of the Commission.

3. RECORDS OF MEETINGS

It was agreed that a fairly extensive summary report of proceedings be prepared after each meeting, for circulation to members of the Commission as a private document.

It was further agreed that the author of the working paper, which would be prepared as a basis for discussion on the special subject on the agenda for each meeting, should redraft his paper in the light of the discussion, in a suitable form for circulation under his name outside the Commission.

4. SECOND MEETING OF THE COMMISSION

It was agreed to hold the second meeting of the Commission in London, at the Institute for Stragegic Studies, on Friday and Saturday, 31st January and 1st February, 1964.

It was agreed that the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère should prepare the working paper for the special subject, which would be "The desirability of a European system of strategic deterrence. European interdependence in weapons and forces.".

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INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

EUROPEAN STUDY COMMISSION

Summary of Discussion
at the First Meeting,
held in Paris on
29th-30th November, 1963

FRIDAY MORNING, 29th NOVEMBER

DISCUSSION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

1. The United States

M. Vernant, opening the discussion, put as the main question whether the United States was entering a period of internal political instability which would have its effect on her foreign policy. He felt this instability did exist, and would have had to be reckoned with irrespective of President Kennedy's assassination. The civil rights issue was a major factor, and so was the need for a revolution in American political institutions. Without a radical modification of these institutions he did not see how any important problem could be solved. The United States was also facing a difficult period in her international relations, particularly with Latin America and Vietnam.

Mr. Buchan doubted whether Kennedy's death would make a great difference to the United States' external policy. It might in fact facilitate certain modifications, particularly a move towards some accommodation with France which Kennedy had seemed to have in mind. But who-ever becomes the next President, he will not have the scope for action that Kennedy would have enjoyed during his second term. We must be prepared for a lack of imagination in American leadership over a perio1; Kennedy's authority, drive and style would be sadly missed. He was convinced that the American system was inherently stable. The assassination had damaged the extreme right and he expected the Republicans to nominate Nixon or Rockefeller rather than Goldwater.

Herr Cornides agreed with Mr. Buchan's observations. It was tragic that many of Kennedy's aims would be easier to achieve after his death. He had spelled out his policy on a great range of major issues, but he had pushed his ideas so far and so fast, while failing to establish clear priorities, that a kind of cramp had set in in Congress, the Administration and the universities. President Johnson might have more success, especially in the new climate of opinion; the tragedy itself may have a cathartic effect. His main concern was whether a dialectical policy can be carried on by Johnson within the framework of the existing American institutions. He agreed with M. Vernant that reform was essential; we must try to change the Washington system and not compromise with it. But if institutional reforms were not forthcoming, it would be even more essential for Johnson to lay down priorities. It would probably be best for America if he were to decide to concentrate on urgent domestic issues and slow down on East-West negotiations and problems affecting the alliance. But the important thing for Europe was to discover whether the Americans are capable of deciding on priorities; if Johnson tri'd to do everything at once he would succeed with nothing.

Dr. Sommer was not too hopeful about the internal prospects; much depended on the long-term emotional reaction of the American people to the assassination and this would not make itself felt until the motive had been established. We could not depend on the effect of the shock being cathartic. He agreed with M. Vernant about a period of political instability; this would be with us for a good many Presidents yet, although one could not say whether it would be a disabling instability preventing the United States from acting on the world scene. Europeans who had been speaking out for European separatism would have to be very careful now; there was a risk that they might be taken seriously.

He could not accept Herr Cornides' argument in favour of priorities. American policy was like a four-lane highway and issues must be dealt with as they crop up; Johnson could not take a sovereign decision to establish priorities. The important question was whether Johnson is prepared to strive for leadership as hard as Kennedy did; if he is not, then there would be strains within the alliance. On balance, however, he thought the Americans had come out of the crisis rather well; we should not portray them as weaker than they are or ourselves as stronger than we are.

Herr Cornides maintained his position on the need for priorities; even on a four-lane highway one can install traffic lights.

Professor Howard thought there was a danger that no motive would be established for the assassination, so that it would remain a continuing source of bitterness dividing public opinion.

M. Vernant concurred on this point.

Signor Spinelli said that Kennedy had induced a kind of instability in the United States, although of a fertile nature, through the pressure of all his new ideas. The main characteristics of his policy were: (1) In his Administration he had given an important role in policy-making to the intellectuals. (2) He had shown great energy in tackling the civil rights problem and other domestic issues. (3) He was seeking co-existence with the USSR.

He doubted whether Johnson would follow Kennedy's example on (1). On (2), despite Johnson's declared intentions, he feared a more cautious attitude and a general slowing-down on domestic issues. Goldwater's diminished chances indicated that the United States is going to sleep; the expected confrontation between concervative and progressive elements was now unlikely. On (3) the key question was whether Johnson would try to carry on Kennedy's policy.

Herr Cornides agreed that fertile instability was a Kennedy creation. Whether this would lead to immobilism or to disabling instability would depend, in the foreign policy field, on the European attitude.

Admiral Bos was moderately optimistic about prospects under the Johnson administration on internal questions; Johnson's longer political experience and greater ability to win public support should enable him to avoid the frustrations that had latterly beset Kennedy. The demands of the election campaign would inhibit much activity on the international scene.

Général del Marmol expressed optimism about American policy in the short term because Johnson would profit from the force of Kennedy's ideas. But what would happen after the next elections? He considered that uncertainty about the nominations even, and the ferment of political forces which must be expected in connection with the election campaign were a source of instability.

Dr. Ritter believed that Johnson would find a way of stabilising the internal situation, but he was not optimistic about his ability to continue Kennedy's East-West policy. This had been based not upon any expectation of practical achievements but upon the hope that a gradual change might come about in the Soviet system as a result of the strains which a policy of co-existence would impose on the communist parties. Because Johnson was more interested in striking bargains and less interested in what went on inside the Soviet bloc, and the Russians were unlikely to make any real concessions, Johnson was likely to lose interest in a policy of detente. For the present the Russians were moving very cautiously, but recent incidents indicated that they were again focussing their attention on central European problems. Since it would be more difficult for Johnson to make progress with approaches to theUSSR he might pay more attention to questions affecting the alliance, such as the MLF.

Général Beaufre expressed his concern about the violence lying just below the surface in American life.

Mr. Beaton said his instinct was that any serious violence or instability in the American system was unlikely; he expected a surge of conservative sanity which would manifest itself soon in a collective attachment to a new father figure. He felt the main dangers to be that America may fail to get her economy moving, and that the Russians may misunderstand Johnson as they had misunderstoc Kennedy in the early part of his administration.

Professor Howard considered that a real difficulty for Johnson arose from the reaction to Kennedy's death in many European quarters. The claims for leadership which were being voiced, even if temporary, would exert a centrifugal pull on the alliance.

M. Vernant agreed with Professor Howard that the assassination had reinforced some people's convictions.

Général Beaufre observed that Kennedy's prestige was sufficient to maintain his position, whereas Johnson had still to show his capacity for leadership.

Admiral Bos pointed out that the change of President did not change the East-West military relationship. 97% of the military potential of the West was in the hands of the American President, whoever he may be, and this fact could not be ignored.

Mr. Seidenfaden felt there were two main considerations for Europe: (1) Would the relative importance of Europe within the Atlantic alliance change? Whether there were a more united European attitude would depend very much on de Gaulle. (2) What would be the psychological effect of Kennedy's death on European opinion? The Kennedy mystique had had an impact on some fringes of opinion that were not necessarily pro-NATO.

2. Germany

Dr. Sommer said that he did not expect the change of Chancellor to lead to any significant change in policy. There would be a greater dedication to the Atlantic cause. Erhard was as committed to friendship with France as Adenauer had been, but he was not as committed to the specific policies pursued by de Gaulle. There was an increasing inclination to be more critical of France, particularly in the military field. Schroeder was a Kennedy man and he felt freer now than under Adenauer. It would depend on events in America whether a greater reluctance emerged to tying Germany so closely to the United States; he felt however that there was no real political or military alternative to the Americans. Although there was an understandable reluctance to express a choice between France and the United States, a choice had already been made.

In reply to a question from Mr. Buchan, he agreed that a bipartisan foreign policy had emerged covering a large part of the political spectrum. The main opposition to the Government now came from the Bavarian wing of the C.D.U. The S.P.D. was also divided, although mainly on policy towards the East. On European policy, Erhard would work hard for an extrovert Europe, if only for economic reasons. He would make a sincere effort to settle economic problems with France, but here much depended on whether the French would accept the Mansholt plan. Many people in Germany saw this plan as their one chance to impose a solution of the difficult agricultural problem on the Germans themselves.

Herr Cornides broadly agreed with Dr. Sommer. One difference under Erhard was that economic problems would now be discussed with France. Because Erhard wanted to make a success of the Franco-German relationship and understood economic affairs, he stood a chance of finding some solutions. A main aim of German policy was to keep in balance her relations with the United States and with France. If solutions could be found within the framework of the Community, this would balance the priority accorded to the United States in the military field.

3. Italy

Signor Spinelli said that the decision of the Socialist Party to join a coalition with the Christian Democrats had great importance for Italian political life and if this coalition demonstrated its capacity to govern, and particularly to achieve some domestic reforms, it would open up new perspectives. In any event it would have a profound effect on the Italian Communist Party, which was divided in its attitude towards this experiment and had been on the edge of a crisis for some time.

There was inflation in Italy at the moment, and the coalition parties had agreed on short-term measures to control this before tackling economic reforms; there would be a two-stage programme. However, this inflation was not so serious as had been represented; partly it reflected a confrontation between capitalist and labour forces and big business had been campaigning vigorously. Production was good and the economy was basically sound. The real problem was whether Italian political institutions could survive in their present form. There had been a shifting of forces now that the Christian Democrat Party could no longer be identified with the state; it remained to be seen if the Italian ruling class could adjust to this situation.

He believed the new Government would pursue a more active policy towards the Community. External policy might be more difficult: the Socialist Party were the major problem here and lengthy negotiations had been necessary to produce a formula to allow discussions on the MLF to continue. But on balance he was optimistic about the new Government's chances.

4. Britain

Professor Howard said that Sir Alec faced the same task as Lyndon Johnson - to win an election in less than a year. Electoral considerations would therefore influence every step the Government took. There were signs of a crash programme of domestic reform, but complete immobility must be expected in international affairs until we had a new Government. Sir Alec would try to project himself as a man of peace bridging the gap between East and West, although from a position of strength; maintenance of the independent nuclear deterrent would be a main Conservative election plank. The Labour Party would try to outbid the Conservatives on domestic reforms but had become very cautious on the subject of the deterrent and would try to avoid this becoming an election issue. Neither side was prepared to advocate national service or increased defence expenditure or to introduce any change in the status of the independent deterrent.

Mr. Beaton wished to add that the economy was stronger now, and this had generated confidence; there was a belief that the country was at last getting the better of its deep-seated economic problems. There was no need for apprehension about Sir Alec's attitude towards Moscow; he was a strong member of the Washington camp and his heart was in the special British relationship with the United States. The danger was that he would fail to pay enough attention to relations with Europe.

The Labour Party did not like the MLF and was more concerned with how to multilateralise the nuclear power which already existed Sir Alec's view of the MLF was that Britain should know what the rest were up to; he was a man to try and influence policies he did not like, not to ignore them. On present form Labour was expected to win the election; but the Conservatives' prospects were brighter under Sir Alec, who might well prove a formidable vote-winner.

Mr. Buchan agreed with Mr. Beaton's point about Europe, although no British Government was likely to consider re-opening negotiations with the Six for another two years or so. Many people felt it was time the Government made a gesture to strengthen relations with Germany. Personal animosity between Macmillan and Adenauer had militated against such a step, but with new leaders in both countries a different relationship could be considered.

5. France

M. Vernant, replying to a question from Dr. Sommer about the effect on French diplomacy of the coming into existence of the force de frappe, said he did not consider that the situation had changed. The actual arrival of the force de frappe was not an event but a development in a situation which had existed for some time.

Général Beaufre said that de Gaulle had made it clear that France did not conceive her defence other than through the Atlantic alliance and the alliance was the basis of her policy. There was no inconsistency in France having her own ideas and her own policies, which she would maintain.

FRIDAY AFTERNOON, 29th NOVEMBER

DISCUSSION ON THE EUROPEAN ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Général Beaufre began by expressing the view that there were really three aspects to a study of developments in the Communist bloc: (1) The events themselves so far as we can understand them: (2) The effect of these events on the United States: (3) The consequences for Europe of these events and the American reaction to them. He felt that the paper prepared by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, although excellent in itself, was only concerned with the first part of this study. However, it might be advisable to concentrate on the first of these aspects today, basing discussion on the German paper, and to consider Soviet-American relations and the wider consequences for Europe the following day.

Signor Spinelli opened the discussion by putting forward some important considerations which he felt were either missing from the paper or insufficiently dealt with. (1) There seemed to be a basic assumption that Soviet foreign policy is aggressive. He could not accept this. Of course the USSR seeks to expand her influence; but one cannot say that her policy is aggressive in the sense that Hitler's was. Believing that the enemy will fall apart through internal contradictions, she is waiting for power to drop into her lap, not planning military conquest. Yet Western military planning is based on the hypothesis of a massive Soviet attack. (2) No consideration was given to areas of possible agreement between East and West, which are important for trying to find a modus vivendi with the Soviet bloc. These areas do exist. Khrushchev is at one with the West in wishing to avoid nuclear war - he is prepared for limited war, but he wants to leave a way open for compromise to prevent total war. Another common interest is in a qualified liberalisation of the Communist bloc. (3) On the German problem, the USSR considers the division of Germany useful for maintaining a stable balance in the world. The continued division violates the national principle, but it does help to maintain stability. What it amounts to is that Russia today wants her adversary to accept the result of the war; while this may not please us, we cannot call that aggressive. He believed there is a tacit understanding between East and West to maintain the present frontier in Germany, which is not the same thing as maintaining the Ulbricht regime in power.

M. Vernant wished to add to Signor Spinelli's general impressions. The lesson of the German paper was that the present Soviet attitude is essentially tactical. But is the policy of a detente itself only tactical? The hypothesis that it is something more was insufficiently explored in the paper, and developments inside the USSR which will have their effect on her external policy were insufficiently discussed. The problem of Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany was different, however; it would be wrong to see her European policy in terms of her policy for East Germany.

Herr Cornides pointed out first of all that the purpose of the paper was to produce chapter headings for discussion, not to argue a detailed case for a particular viewpoint. On the other hand, they had to start with some assumptions. He agreed that the basic assumption, that there is an expansionist dynamism in Soviet policy, was not discussed in the paper. He could not agree with

Signor Spinelli's interpretation of what the text assumes. (1) The paper stated that Europe continues to be in the focal point of the Soviet political offensive. Nowhere was it stated that Soviet policy is one of military aggression, in Europe or anywhere else. He quite agreed that it would be a mistake to compare Khrushchev with Hitler. (2) The paper did not deny the existence of points of agreement between East and West; their assumptions were more narrow. Certainly the possibility that the USSR does wish to avoid nuclear war, or war by miscalculation, was not excluded by the paper. He did not agree however with the idea that the political offensive of the West cancels the political offensive of the East is a point in common. The West is working for liberalisation in the Soviet bloc in the hope of slowing down the Soviet system as much as of easing tension. (3) While unwilling to discuss the German problem at this stage, he considered Signor Spinelli's argument logical only if the German problem today is seen as the problem of Hitlerite Germany - which is surely not the case. And could one really accept that the final objective of the USSR is the acceptance of two Germanies - surely she wants the Western part to go Communist so that the political balance is upset in favour of the USSR?

Professor Howard questioned how far it is true to say that Europe continues to be in a focal point of the Soviet political offensive. Soviet policy, like American policy, is a four-line highway. There is an abiding Soviet interest in Europe because the USSR is half in Europe; but that does not mean that Europe bulks largest in Soviet policy, any more than that her intention in Europe is basically aggressive. He admired the paper as a whole, but felt it did not give enough emphasis to the USSR as a world power and to her interest in exploiting difficulties abroad. It was arguable that the short-term Soviet interest in Europe is to achieve some sort of settlement so as to make it possible to push forward in other areas, e.g. in Latin America, where the opportunities for Communism seem more favourable. The USSR assumes that West Germany will go Communist finally; the question is whether it is in a ripe state now.

Signor Spinelli supported Professor Howard. Historically the Communists were very intersted in Europe as their source of power and influence. But Russia is now a world power and has drawn the consequences from this fact. From the point of view of Communist doctrine, the USSR realises that there is no prospect of economic revolution in Western Europe, although there may be such prospects in other parts of the world; she can win in Europe only by a military offensive. Since Soviet policy towards Europe is no longer offensive in military terms, this means that in Europe there is an intention to arrive at an agreement. One must understand the difference in Khrushchev's views on world Communist strategy compared to Stalin's.

Général del Marmol wondered to what extent the USSR was developing more truly national interests in relation to the outside world along with her ideological interest in revolutions.

Dr Sommer felt that some courses of revolutionary action are likely to be detrimental to the national interests of the USSR. The Cuba crisis was one incident where the instinct of self-preservation prevailed over revolutionary interest.

Mr Buchan, in answer to Professor Howard, made the point that if the four-lane highway analogy was correct, there was no need for the USSR to reach a settlement in Europe to be active in Latin America. If the USSR wanted a settlement in Europe, it would be for intrinsically European reasons.

Herr Cornides repeated that the paper aimed at defining problems rather than solutions. Clearly the question whether there is still a master plan of campaign governing Soviet policy, whether what happens in Latin America, for example, is strategically related to the situation in Europe, is of major importance. We must accept that in the long term the Soviet leaders want to change the status quo in Europe in their favour.

Général Beaufre pointed out that the problem of trying to assess Soviet policy is not new: an 18th century French diplomat had written that Russia never pursues less than three policies at a time; if you succeed in isolating one, there are always two alternatives which can be brought into play. The present Soviet leaders proceed in the same fashion. To help the discussion, he had drawn up a list of the main factors which he believed are influencing Soviet policy today: (1) economic considerations: (2) the tendency of Soviet society to take on an increasingly bourgeois character: (3) her dispute with China: (4) purely tactical considerations: (5) a deliberate attempt to deceive the West and lead us into a trap.

Signor Albonetti. He too had prepared a list, although under somewhat different headings. (1) The will and the power of the West to resist Soviet aggression in the political, economic and military fields: (2) internal factors: the Soviet leaders are trying to control an empire, and the difficulties with China and with the satellites arise from this: one could call it the difficulties of a great power: (3) economic difficulties - the guns and butter problem: (4) her policy towards the Third Countries. He agreed with Général Beaufre that Russia never follows a single line of policy. He felt that whether her present policy is tactical or long-term depends partly on whether we in Europe keep up the resistance we have shown hitherto. He believed Russia's economic difficulties were only short term: the difficulty of holding an empire together, with which was bound up the question of Moscow's place as the centre of the Communist world, is certainly long term. Russia had concentrated her efforts in the third countries, particularly the former colonial territories, where one would have considered the chances brightest for a Communist take-over; nevertheless the third world is going its own way, independent of Russia.

Mr Beaton took the author's side against Signor Spinelli and Professor Howard, maintaining that Russia is fundamentally a European power. She is very interested in maintaining a bilateral world with the US in which she is the equal of the United States; but her whole military policy reveals that in comparison with the Americans she does not pretend to be a world power. It is a mistake to speak of any government's long-term objectives; governments operate only in the short-term and the USSR sees as her short-term interest to hang on to what she has in Europe. She wants to maintain a stable situation in Europe so that she can get by with a lower defence expenditure and improve her economy.

Admiral Bos wished to raise one point on the German paper: he wondered why, if one takes the line that the signature of the test ban treaty was an example of a change in Soviet tactics following the sharp lesson of the Cuba crisis, Khrushchev had not made great efforts to follow this up with further agreements. He had not even tried to put those Western governments who might have been opposed to next steps in a difficult position with their public opinion, which would have been to his advantage. The paper did mention that the Russians have backed down on next steps, but he would have liked to see this aspect dealt with more fully. In regard to Soviet policy having failed to win power in the third countries and having failed to stir up revolutionary movements in Europe (which he agreed with the paper was still their main target), the Russians are now trying to achieve the same result by other means. They are now trying to make Communism respectable. The national Communist parties are being given instructions to join up with socialist movements, in the hope of achieving popular front governments. Perhaps this primary interest in the industrialised countries of Western Europe is one explanation for Khrushchev's insistence on preaching a different line from Mao about the way to achieve world Communism.

Général Beaufre felt that this view reflected Soviet tactics rather than policy. The central problem was, had there been a fundamental change in the Soviet situation or were they pursuing the same policy with different applications?

Professor Howard agreed with Admiral Bos about present Soviet tactics in Western Europe. But he felt there was a new element in the situation, which must affect Soviet policy towards Communist parties overseas - the existence of two Communist Popes. Already many Communist parties were deeply divided. If the USSR tries to be simply a European power, or if she does not show herself just as concerned as the Chinese with the spreading of world revolution, then she will forfeit world Communist leadership to Peking.

Mr Buchan suggested that there was a geographical conflict of interest as well as an ideological conflict between Russia and China. Russia has had Asian interests for over 150 years which she cannot liquidate.

Général del Marmol wondered to what extent Khrushchev's policy towards China was a personal one, in the sense that what would happen to Sino-Soviet relations when he died?

Dr Sommer commented that one element not mentioned in either Général Beaufre's or Signor Albonetti's list was the fact that we are now living in the nuclear age. The Russians may want to be offensive, but so long as we have the strength and the will to inflict unacceptable damage on them they can only be aggressive at a suicidal risk. Therefore their policy of a detente is not tactical - they have no alternative. The popular front policy is a faute de mieux. He agreed with Mr Beaton that Russia is for the status quo in Europe. Both sides want to survive because they both think they will win in the end. Communism is in the position of Christianity after its failure to convert the world: they want it, but they will not fight for it.

Signor Spinelli agreed with Dr Sommer. He was convinced that the fundamental aim of Soviet policy to avoid nuclear war is the underlying cause of the great polemic between the Soviet and Chinese parties.

Signor Albonetti considered this a dangerous attitude: if you think the Russians cannot do otherwise than support the status quo, then you run into the deceit which Beaufre mentioned on his list. The Russians have adopted their present attitude because Western resistance has forced them into it, and it is essential for us to maintain our position. He could not accept that the USSR had reached the stage of interpreting co-existence in the sense of excluding resort to nuclear war.

Dr Sommer intervened to say that he agreed we must not give the Russians openings - he had certainly not intended leaving security out of the picture.

Général del Marmol wished to raise a point on the military aspect. The paper seemed to assume that a chenge in Soviet military posture was probable, with less importance being accorded to ground forces. He questioned the grounds for believing that this was a long-term trend.

Herr Cornides explained that the paper reflected the McNamara speech and other American information that the Russians are losing interest in conventional strength.

Général Beaufre suggested that if the nuclear stalemate is accepted as a factor in preserving peace, we should consider how far Soviet policy is one of military aggression in Europe or whether they intended to exploit the cold war in all parts of the world; or do they really want peaceful co-existence as as kind of armistice to allow them to grapple with their internal political and economic problems.

M. Vernant using the word cold war to describe the whole range of action short of military conflict, said he felt that what we have called peace has always been cold war to some extent. The question was whether the USSR is disposed today to seek solutions to her own advantage to conflicts which exist in Europe and elsewhere other than by force. If we accept Spinelli's argument that she has excluded force, that still leaves all sorts of questions open.

Dr Ritter wished to take up Dr Sommer's point about the meaning of the detente for the USSR. He felt that Soviet strategy has not changed so much in a situation of nuclear stalemate, because the military aspect of Soviet policy was in some respects always deterrent rather than offensive - it was designed to block counteraction against Soviet dynmanism. The problem for the USSR today is much more how to launch a new dynamism when the old-fashioned dynamism is dying out, and this was the great problem for Khrushchev after Stalin.

He traced Khrushchev's efforts to make Communism more attractive, his early concentration on the third countries as the most promising field for the development of a new dynamic, his activities in the Near East and Far East and in particular his provocation of crises in an attempt to bring about negotiations at the highest level; the gradual development of the rift with China; his turning of attention to Europe with the Berlin crisis of 1958 in his ceaseless search for a political break-through.

Professor Howard complimented Dr Ritter on his analysis, but disagreed with the suggestion that the various crises which have developed in parts of the world where the USSR has attempted to press her case have been manufactured by the USSR. The USSR will intervene and exploit a situation, but that is not the same as manufacturing a crisis.

Mr Beaton agreed about the splendid opportunities the USSR has enjoyed for exploiting situations in the ex-colonial territories. He wondered however to what extent she would wish to get involved in disputes in those areas now, such as the India-Pakistan and the Indonesia-Malaya conflicts, when the arguments are between former colonial territories themselves. His impression was that the Russians are moving rather cautiously in this regard.

Herr Cornides could not go so far as to agree that everything happens and the USSR just uses opportunities as they arise. He felt that the Soviet system was really in the throes of a religious transformation. The Russians have accepted their ideology rather as we have accepted Christianity in Europe; but now there is China pressing Russia hard for a strictly orthodox interpretation of the Communist gospel and this makes more difficult the natural evolution of Communist ideology. He saw Soviet policy as working mainly for summit conferences, for popular front parties combined with a policy of moving towards a Soviet-American bilateralism and avoiding nuclear conflicts, and for neutralisation in Europe by weakening the dynamism in Western Europe and strengthening Soviet Europe.

He thought it might be helpful if he tried to put the German problem into perspective at this point, although the paper had not been drafted with the idea of calling special attention to the German position. There were two aspects of Soviet policy towards Germany which the paper had tried to bring out: it was militarily defensive but politically offensive. It is important to see what can be done to stabilise the military aspect still further without completely closing the door to further possibilities for political evolution. The dilemma for the West Germans is that they would like to profit from every element of flexibility that exists to keep the situation open, but at the same time cause as little inconvenience as possible to Western policy in order to have the full support of the Western alliance on the German side. He added that he realised Spinelli was not alone in advocating a permanent settlement based on the present division of Germany: this view was widely held in Europe and even in America. Bascially only the Germans themselves - and perhaps the East Europeans - have an interest in moving away from the status quo.

Professor Howard added that he did not want to give the impression that all crises were spontaneous. The Communist party in various parts of the world does provoke or exacerbate trouble, even if Russia is not immediately involved; the extent to which Russian national policy is defensive or offensive has only a limited effect on the attempts of the world Communist movement to make trouble.

Signor Spinelli agreed with Professor Howard, but maintained that in certain societies the Communist parties were developing along rather different lines. One could not compare an elite party like the British CP, for example, with mass parties like the French or Italian which were becoming part of the fabric of the state.

Admiral Bos expressed concern about the opportunity for a Communist party with mass support (like the Italian) to come to power in the guise of a socialist movement; the hard core of elite Communists in such a party would surely manage to impose their will on the not-so-doctrinaire majority.

Signor Spinelli agreed that this could happen in times of great social crisis such as in 1931 in Italy. But Communist revolution had no significance in affluent societies, where the dilemma for the Communist parties was that they wanted power, but could only hope to achieve it if they take on the character of social democratic parties. Personally he expected the Italian Communist party to be in coalition with the Christian Democrats in 10 years.

M. Vernant broadly agreed with Spinelli.

Dr Ritter said he felt a little uneasy about the view taken of Communist party activities in relation to Soviet policy. It is all bound up with the current ideological dispute within the international proletariat. The question is whether the modern class struggle should be in terms of a socialist country or a capitalist country or lifted to the level of the international struggle, i.e. the policy of co-existence. The Chinese say that Khrushchev has betrayed the idea of revolution if he says that a policy of co-existence is the class struggle in the international setting. The Italian Communist Party's support for a co-existence rather than an old-fashioned revolutionary policy reflects Moscow's view in opposition to Peking. The European CPs do not get orders to be aggressive and revolutionary; but this does not mean that a revolutionary and offensive policy is not to be tried elsewhere. Khrushchev has to apply his policy of co-existence where he can; Central Europe happens to be an area where the possibilities for such a policy exist.

He maintained in opposition to Spinelli that there is a politically aggressive aspect of the Soviet status quo policy in Germany. There is tremendous unofficial pressure on Bonn to accept recognition of Eastern Germany. Brzezinski, who could hardly be suspected of partiality towards the German case, had commented that the Americans must face the fact that every step in the disarmament field - the test ban, talks on control posts, etc. - is linked so as to get one step forward towards acceptance of the status quo, and that the Russians should not be allowed to make any progress against the West's policy of non-recognition of the DDR, because that is precisely what the Russians are working for so as to de-stabilise the Western alliance. He believed that through all the turns of Soviet tactics, all the crises she has created, she has been working for negotiations with the Americans with the aim of getting compromises by small steps, one at a time, so that the actual degree of compromise can be concealed and the Americans are persuaded to act as Russia's accomplices.

Général Beaufre regretted that the discussion on this aspect of Soviet policy could not be continued. The general consensus seemed to be that the Russians are always themselves: conditions change but they do not.

SATURDAY MORNING, 30th NOVEMBER

DISCUSSION ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MOSCOW TREATY

Général Beaufre opened the discussion by listing the reasons which he considered most likely to have influenced the USSR in favour of concluding the test ban agreement: (1) A reciprocal interest in making bilateral agreements with the United States. (2) A desire to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons. (3) A desire to slow down, or begin to slow down, the arms race and the expenditure involved for the two powers. (4) An interest in a bipolar policy or condominium. He agreed that there was a connection between the first and last points; but the first was factual and reflected a present interest while the last was philosophical and a possibility for the future.

Signor Albonetti wished to present his own list: (1) He linked Général Beaufre's first and last points, which he saw as two stages of the same policy. He would call this an interest in monopoly, since it would be to Soviet advantage to establish a monopoly of nuclear power between herself and the United States. (2) Non-proliferation; he saw this as aimed particularly at German and China. (3) Fear of Chinese influence in the third countries. This really arose out of point (2) but was important enough to warrant separate mention. He recalled Professor Howard's observati the day before that strong competition from China must have an effect upon Soviet policy towards the third countries; he considere the test ban agreement a powerful weapon in Russian hands to counte Chinese influence, because Russia could claim that if China persist in trying to become a nuclear power, she would be working against peace. (4) An economic interest in easing the burden of arms expenditure. (5) Technical reasons: it had been said that Russia had no more need to test large nuclear weapons - her problem was miniaturisation, and underground testing would permit this - hile the United States' problem was the exact opposite. (6) Political reasons - a desire to divide the West by creating discrimination within the Atlantic alliance.

M. de Rose considered that apart from the number of countries which had signed the treaty, the agreement could not be considered a bilateral one if it was intended to stop proliferation. Personally he doubted whether it had anything to do with non-proliferatio

M. Vernant pointed out that one must distinguish between form and substance. Formally the aim was to include as many powers as possible; but in reality one could speak of the agreement in terms of a bilateral interest since it was intended to show world opinion that the US and the USSR could come to an agreement on something.

Professor Howard suggested that one Soviet motive for signing the treaty was simply that there was so many propaganda reasons for signing and no strong arguments against. The USSR had gained prestige for many years through her propaganda initiatives in favour of complete disarmament; since 1961, however, the West had managed to expose Soviet insincerity and the USSR was under heavy pressure to give proof of her professions of world peace.

M. Vernant agreed with Professor Howard. Given the Soviet and the American desire to demonstrate their will to reach a minimum agreement, the almost mechanical search for an area where there were least obstacles had led to the test ban agreement.

Admiral Bos expressed interest in Professor's Howard's point. Why had the Soviet need to show that her interest in peace was not merely propaganda only become apparent in the last two years? In 1960 or early 1961 the same proposals as led to the present agreement had been submitted by the Americans but were rejected by the Russians as a dirty Western trick, and the Chinese now confront the Russians with this. He believed it was the West beating Russia at her own game which had brought about the changed Soviet attitude.

Signor Spinelli agreed that the US and the USSR were obliged by their propaganda to come to some agreement, but the underlying motives for the agreement were very important. He considered the most important reason to be the need of the two countries which hav the capacity to wage total nuclear war to agree on some rules of co-existence. The test ban was the easiest minimal step in this direction, and he saw the treaty more as a declaration of intent than as a real contribution to disarmament. He expected the search for bilateral agreements to continue between the rival nuclear powers.

Herr Cornides considered the timing of the change in the Sovie attitude, to which reference had been made, very significant. It occurred in November 1961, when a new round of bilateral talks with the US began in Moscow after the Berlin crisis had ceased to be acute. Therefore this great shift in Soviet policy had come about when the whole problem of central Europe and Berlin was under discussion in bilateral talks with the US. In fact all the points to which the Germans had objected in 1963 when the treaty was signed, had nearly come to be agreed during the 1961 negotiations.

Dr. Ritter believed it would be helpful, before asking why the USSR had changed her mind in 1961, to compare the difference in the situation in 1958 (when agreement on some kind of test ban was relatively close, until the Americans changed all their figures) and in 1963. He felt the Soviet desire in 1958 may have been to find a way of putting their agreement of 1957 to share some nuclear information with China under an international arrangement; in 1959 this agreement with China was broken off. In 1963, at the Rusk-Gromyko talks, the Russians said they must have some point of agreement because of developments inside the Eastern bloc. The development of the dispute with China was an important factor in the decision to conclude the treaty. The timing of the test ban negotiations was immediately after the July 5th meeting between the Soviet and Chinese parties, when negotiations broke down. So far as Washington's motives were concerned, he believed the treaty was seen as a clever move to influence Khrushchev's turn against the Chinese line far more than as a contribution to disarmament or even non-proliferation.

Général Beaufre observed that there were now five more reasons (1) Technical reasons. (2) A desire to divide the West politically (Signor Albonetti). (3) Strength of propaganda (Professor Howard). (4) Establishment of new rules between the two nuclear powers (Signor Spinelli). (5) A technique to put the Chinese diehards out of court (Dr. Ritter).

Général del Marmol agreed with Professor Howard about the propaganda aspect, but he thought technology came into the picture too. Since 1963 a nuclear balance had existed between East and West, and he believed that this feeling of being on the same footin as the Americans had influenced the Russians in favour of coming to an agreement.

Mr. Buchan expressed the view that a great deal of the confusion of the first two or three years of test ban negotiations had been due to nobody on either side understanding much about the science of detection of tests. Tremendous work had been done on seismology and atmospheric monitoring between 1958 and 1963. Considering that the control aspect had always been a stumbling block, it was reasonable to suppose that the availability of technical means of detecting explosions at a considerable distance was an important consideration.

M. de Rose said that on the political level, he was reminded somewhat of the Russian agreement to the Austrian State Treaty which they had opposed for years. No-one really understood why th agreed to it. He thought the tactical considerations had to do with the American position as much as with China. It was signif-icant that the treaty was signed after the Cuba crisis, when Khrushchev had seriously revised his estimation of President Kennedy and when the world was under the influence of the Russian retreat. Khrushchev realised that he could not beat the US through a trial of strength and changed his methods. He was lookir for something which would look new and erase the memory of Cuba, without compromising the USSR's fundamental interests. A propa-ganda aspect also came into it, of course. He believed that instea of concluding the treaty as a move in his dispute with Peking, Khrushchev had been forced to do this in spite of the bad effect it would have on relations with China.

Signor Albonetti agreed with M. de Rose about the timing of the treaty in relation to the Cuba crisis. But it must also be recalled that the agreement took place in a difficult situation within the Atlantic alliance: there was a crisis about nuclear control, the French strike force was coming on the scene, there was uncertainty about German ambitions and the MLF project was under consideration. The Russians threw the test ban agreement int the arena as an obstacle to the discussions which were going on within the alliance and the effect was to make all the problems more difficult. This was the political motive for the agreement - to undermine the West by strengthening the centrifugal forces of the alliance.

M. Vernant felt one should be careful not to confuse the effec with the motives.

Dr. Sommer, commenting on Signor Albonetti's observations, doubted whether the Western world was any more divided now than it had been before the test ban agreement. He felt rather that it was the conflict in the Eastern camp which had been sharpened.

Dr. Ritter returned to the Rusk-Gromyko negotiations, when the Russians had said they must find a way closer to the Chinese, or go on with their co-existence policy. Soviet policy from 1958-63 reflected the problem of how to make progress with a policy of co-existence without making the rift between Peking and Moscow too deep.

The parting of the ways between Russia and China in the external field came in 1959, over the Camp David meeting. Despite Khrushchev's strange performance over the 1960 Paris conference, discussions continued inside the Soviet bloc on the implications of the Camp David policy of co-existence and the problem of how to use it in the under-developed countries. In 1960 the Russians tried to reach a compromise with the Chinese at the conference of 81 parties

/by establishing

by establishing a formal equality of all parties, but this broke down the following year, when the Russians came up with a new party programme laying down new rules for making the transition to socialism. The Soviet and Chinese parties were even more bitterly divided in 1962 over the Cuba crisis, and by July 1963 the point was reached when negotiations between them broke down completely. The Russians then decided to push their co-existence policy harder

The Russians really wanted a non-aggression pact, because that would serve as a framework for a political settlement in central Europe, and it was interesting that Kennedy had proposed such a pact after the Cuba crisis; however, because of strong opposition to the idea in NATO and of course from the German side, Rusk suggested to Gromyko that they should conclude a test ban treaty instead, as a symbol of a readiness to co-operate. The test ban agreement only came about because the Americans said that if the Russians would cut the formal link between a test ban and a non-aggression pact, in return for a promise to take up the questio of a pact immediately afterwards, the Americans would sign a treaty with them. He believed the link between these two questions indicated that the Soviet Union's main aim is to bring about a political settlement in central Europe based on the division of Germany by a process of one step at a time - a test ban agreement, then a non-aggression pact, then control posts, and so on.

M. Vernant felt that perhaps Dr. Ritter was laying too much emphasis on the relationship of the Moscow treaty to the central European problem. This aspect was important, but it was not the only one.

Dr. Ritter replied that he had been trying to illustrate the connection between internal problems facing the USSR and her use of various steps under the broad heading of disarmament as an instrument for making a political breakthrough.

He would like to add another point: one must keep in mind that the Nassau agreement and the German-French treaty both came up in 1962-3; there was also the growing strength of the Western economy, and in particular the difficult problem of the Soviet bloc attitude towards the European Community; all these were a stimulus to the USSR to try to loosen up the Western front.

Mr. Beaton wished to put forward some technical considerations. (1) Underground testing would meet the needs of any country wishing to develop a smaller nuclear weapons programme because it would be adequate for testing plutonium, which is relatively cheap to acquire but must be tested to make sure it will explode. In this sense the exclusion of underground testing from the agreement was important. (2) The US was taking a gamble that she would never need very large nuclear weapons, leaving a monopoly of the 100 MT weapons to the Russians.

One effect of the treaty had been to throw responsibility for nuclear weapons off the original nuclear powers and onto the nascent nuclear powers. The French and Chinese Governments had been put in a difficult position politically. But countries like India or Sweden, which might wish one day to become nuclear powers, would be in an even more embarrassing position, firstly because of their somewhat less important place in the world and secondly because they have already signed the treaty. Another effect could be that the great powers would find that they had a moral obligation to co-operate with their allies. This would pose an acute dilemma for the Americans at present if their relations with France happened to be good.

M. de Rose agreed with Mr. Beaton that the treaty does not prevent third nations from becoming nuclear powers by underground testing. On the other hand it did serve as an excuse for countrie which are capable of becoming nuclear powers but do not wish to dc so. The treaty was, however, designed to prevent any other countr from becoming a thermonuclear power. This was its only bearing or the proliferation argument, and since so few countries would conceivably wish to become thermonuclear powers, he did not see th the treaty would have much influence in limiting proliferation.

On the plane of Franco-American relations, he did not deny th tensions existed; but he doubted whether this aspect had influenc the Russians. The Russians admit that there was nothing to prever the Americans from concluding an agreement on the sharing of nucle information with France when they signed the test ban agreement, and the treaty could have had the effect of making France a nuclea power earlier than she would have been without it.

Signor Albonetti agreed with M. de Rose about the implicatior for Franco-American relations, although he imagined that US contrc over French policy might be strengthened as a result. The US-Soviet interest in creating a bipolar world did not exclude powers like Britain or France connected with one of the poles possessing independent nuclear facilities, although a bipolar world made it easier to keep down proliferation and the emergence of nuclear powers.

Professor Howard observed that the Russians were being credit with two mutually contradictory intentions: (1) to create a bipolar world with the Americans so that negotiations would be simpler and the balance more stable; (2) to create dissension within the alliance, which works against a bipolar world. In fact the West has these same contradictory intentions towards the Sovie bloc, so no doubt the USSR did have both these aims in mind. He d not agree that one Soviet motive for the test ban was to divide th West, however, because on that level the Russians seemed genuinely anxious to reach some stable agreement with the US as the leader c the West, and the dissenting voices of the West were an embarrassm to Moscow because they embarrass the US.

Général Beaufre suggested that this intervention involved the last point on his list, the question of a condominium.

Herr Cornides stressed that a careful distinction should be made between the concepts of bilateralism and condominium. The Americans were very interested in the concept of bilateral crisis management, in Soviet-American techniques for avoiding war by mis-calculation or accident, avoiding escalation of any hostilities that did break out, or a new Cuba-type situation. He felt the Western allies could accept that the US and the USSR do have a bilateral interest, which they do not themselves share, in this ty of management. Some of the suspicion directed against smaller ste like the establishment of control posts arose from the not too clear relationship between crisis management and condominium, and was directed against a condominium, not crisis management.

Dr. Sommer added that bilateral crisis management implied certain steps to make it possible, and that was where the test bar treaty, a non-aggression pact, ground control posts and so on came in. Such measures would be acceptable so long as they referred to the management of crises mainly or directly involving the US and USSR. But condominium was something different - it amounted to multilateral crisis management.

Herr Cornides felt that the key question was which measures would contribute to crisis management and which would lead towards a condominium. Steps up to a non-aggression pact could be considered in the first category; but a non-aggression pact would be a political agreement on the status quo in Europe. He was not quite certain where to place control posts.

Dr. Sommer agreed that a non-aggression pact would put the seal on the status quo, but he considered that it also contained an element of crisis management. At the moment no-one in Germany was talking of a non-aggression pact; but a mutual declaration of non-aggressive intent was under discussion and he believed that the Federal Government might accept this if it were linked to guarantees for access to Berlin and the safety of Berlin.

Signor Albonetti considered a Soviet-American condominium unworkable. He saw no contradiction in saying that the USSR wants a bipolar world and also seeks to increase divisions in the Atlantic alliance, because a bipolar world did not exclude differences within each of the blocs. He considered the fundamental Soviet aim to be to establish themselves and the Americans as the only two nuclear powers, and he believed the Russians would be willing to pay a heavy price for that.

M. Vernant pointed out that by definition a condominium was not the same thing as the bipolar world which seemed to be envisaged.

Mr. Buchan agreed with M. Vernant. He considered the condominium idea hopelessly unreal - it would only lead to the formation of a European-Chinese alliance. No Russian could think that a condominium with an anti-communist power like the US would be ideal. The US was thinking in terms of bipolar crisis management, as Herr Cornides had outlined, which was quite a different concept.

Général Beaufre then adjourned the discussion for lunch.

SATURDAY AFTERNOON, 30th NOVEMBER

DISCUSSION ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MOSCOW TREATY (Cont.)

M. Vernant (in the Chair) suggested that the discussion on a condominium be continued. He wondered how far the world situation would permit a condominium, particularly from the point of view of the existence of two poles within the Eastern bloc, the Russian and the Chinese.

Signor Spinelli maintained that a Soviet-American condominium was not possible precisely because of the existing state of bipolarity. The two great powers which have the power to make nuclear war have a major responsibility for avoiding it and an interest in agreeing to maintain this situation: but all parties have freedom of movement. Condominium would depend on the two great powers agreeing on some form of world government, and that could be envisaged only in the very long term. He hoped this bipolarity would continue; the emergence of a third or fourth nuclear element would be a bad thing.

From the European side there were two main perspectives: (1) to break the bipolarity. He considered that de Gaulle's great aim was to be able to deploy French power to get a European force to break the bipolarity. (2) to exercise a growing influence on the strategy and policy of the United States. The second perspective was aimed not at breaking the polarity, but at winning a greater voice in decisions of a bipolar type. He thought Britain was more interested in the second perspective. In regard to the Communist world, he did not believe the division between Russia and China would be permanent. It was possible that China wished to become an independent nuclear power, to create a tripolar world, but he believed the nuclear ambitions attributed to China were exaggerated.

M. de Rose agreed that bipolarity existed in the military field; it would remain so for a long time, irrespective of the fact that Great Britain had a nuclear force and France was about to have one. But a system whereby ultimate responsibility belonged to two men, Khrushchev and the man in the White House, was not condominium, because condominium would amount to agreement between the two powers to govern the world in a certain way. In the existing situation of military bipolarity the confrontation remained between the communist and capitalist systems, and the ideological struggle would continue. In fact the only thing in common was a negative thing, a desire not to bring the conflict up to the level of violence. Taking up Signor Spinelli's perspectives, he did not see any justification for Western Europe seeking to reach a tripolar military level. It was a defamation of French policy to present it in those terms or as seeking to rupture the Western alliance. France was seeking much greater political independence and on the military level a counter-assurance vis-a-vis the Americans, which was a different thing.

Mr. Buchan held that there was a fundamental difference between condominium, which implies long-term policies enforced throughout the world, and bilateral action in a crisis. The argument was sometimes put forward that over the very long term the American and Soviet societies would tend to resemble each other, so that the ideological contest would die out. But even so, he found the idea of condominium impossible because he did not see how the will of the condominium could be enforced in the rest of the world, given the unusability of nuclear weapons in such circumstances.

Signor Albonetti maintained that the threat of nuclear weapons would suffice in such a case. He expected the ideological struggle to continue, and there was no question of an absolute condominium. But in a world where only two countries have nuclear power, then in matters on which they were in agreement other countries would have to do what they said. Except for Britain and France, we should be in that state now. Politically, he could not see a significant difference between power and nuclear power. He agreed that there were other forms of power which contributed towards a nation's strength, but one could not avoid the fact that the greatest powers today are those with nuclear capability, and this would remain so until general disarmament were achieved.

Personally he preferred a bi-bloc world to a bipolar world, with peace maintained by the USSR and the Western alliance; but then one comes to the problem of the organisation of the alliance. He agreed with trying to influence American policy, and was ready to begin by denationalising the French European deterrent, but what would happen if the Americans refused to denationalise their deterrent? He could not consider a Western alliance with only conventional power on the European side a true alliance of equal partners.

Mr. Beaton could not agree that nuclear power was the same as power, because nuclear power was too unusable. The nuclear weapons in Washington and Moscow had not made much difference to the development of events in the Congo, for example. He believed a Russian-American condominium could never work because, even assuming the Americans made the Russians their prime allies, those in whose interest it would be to stop the condominium operating in a given situation could always succeed in splitting the two powers. And immediately the US made the USSR her prime ally, her European policy would be in ruins.

M. Vernant, commenting on Mr. Beaton's point about the possibilities which would always exist for preventing a political rapprochement between the US and USSR, drew the conclusion that condominium could only be established to the extent that the USSR abandoned her position in central Europe, because so long as Europe remained divided one or other of the European peoples could always make agreement impossible. If the USSR and the US both felt that central Europe was a vital field of interest to themselves, then they could only make a relatively secondary agreement and not establish a true condominium in the area.

Mr. Buchan considered that if there were anything in the concept of condominium it was more likely to apply outside Europe than inside. The security of India was one possibility.

Dr. Ritter considered that bipolarity rested primarily on three factors: (1) on the overwhelming power of the two great states, especially in the nuclear field; (2) on the existence of alliances and the interplay of political and economic factors between them; (3) on political tensions between the two poles. This kind of bipolarity always contained a certain degree of condominium in so far as both poles had an interest in maintaining the nuclear stalemate. But if the trend went so far as to replace the third element, political tensions, and open up the second, a rapprochement of the countries within the alliances so as to allow a certain mutual exchange between the two blocs, then the bipolarity would break down. There might be local exceptions to this rule in Asia or Latin America, but not in the main areas of conflict.

Signor Spinelli supported Dr. Ritter. When we spoke of bipolarity we meant a joint interest in avoiding nuclear war; but there were certain consequences which went beyond that. The great world powers had a common interest in controlling the development of all wars, even those between other countries, which was greater than the desire of each to exploit the wars of others to its own advantage. Perhaps there was an element of condominium in this, but it did not prevent a diversity of attitudes in other fields.

However, one consequence was that there was a certain consolidation of agreed frontiers. So far as Europe was concerned, this meant that it was necessary to say that if the future of humanity must be based on these perspectives, we could not promise reunification to the Germans. Eastern Germany must be accepted as something which existed. The great weakness of Western policy was that it was following two policies at the same time - accepting the status quo, while trying to keep perspectives open for making the Soviet position in Eastern Europe crumble. For Russia to abandon Eastern Europe would mean a major defeat in the cold war. We must accept that the destiny of the East Germans was the same as that of the Poles and the Russians: they must accept communism until the very end.

Admiral Bos opposed Signor Albonetti's equation of power with nuclear power. A great state could not impose its will on its allies, however great its military power. Kennedy had said that not until he became President did he become aware of the limitations of his power. The United States could prevent war breaking out through the existence of a bipolar military situation; but she could not force the European countries to accept an agreement that was detrimental to their interest. A true condominium was not possible because even the US needed the co-operation of her most interested allies in an important political question, that was, in central Europe. If America decided to go it alone, she would defeat her own ends. We must keep in mind that the aim of the US was to keep Western Europe on her side. Since she needed the support and co-operation of Germany, she could not accept the existing line of division in central Europe.

Herr Cornides felt there was a certain ambiguity in the American outlook on this possibility, mentioned by Mr. Beaton, of having the USSR one day as her prime ally. There were three elements in this: (1) the gradual evolution of a similar economic and social pattern in the two countries; (2) the idea of a military, stable bipolar system based on American sea and air power and Soviet land power; (3) the Wilsonian dream of a world government which in the [illegible] stage of arms control would be based on a stable bipolar system. He considered these were theories rather than practical possibilities. However, the result was a tendency to try to return to an American monopoly in the nuclear field, and he wanted to relate this to American policy towards Germany.

The essence of this was the offer of the MLF project to the Germans to satisfy their ambitions within the framework of the alliance. Some American spokesmen have implied that the project would lead to European control and partnership, but in reality it meant restoring the American monopoly and the joint assistance was intended as an interim arrangement only; and German pressure on France was expected in return. But in order to enlist German support, something was promised which was in complete contradiction to this basic trend, namely reunification and permanent protection of the Berlin situation.

He believed that if the thesis of bipolarity were taken seriously, it implied the status quo in Germany and the Soviet position on Berlin sooner or later. The Americans could not give up their position in West Berlin now, but logically neutralisation over the next ten years was to be expected. He felt that sooner or later this ambiguity must be resolved: the Germans must either accept the consequences of joining a multilateral force, which would amount to a hardening of the division of Europe, or give up their ambitions in the nuclear field and accept some degree of discrimination in order to be able to maintain a sincere interest in every sort of flexibility in Europe. It was no less important for the Americans to face up to this ambiguity too.

Général del Marmol appreciated Herr Cornides point, but could not understand how the gesture which the Americans were making to associate certain European powers besides Germany more closely with nuclear policy could be considered damaging.

Herr Cornides replied that he was sure the Americans were not aware of the ambiguity in their policy. If one asks Americans how they reconcile their interest in the MLF with their insistence that negotiations on arms control measures shall continue, they say there is no contradiction because the Russians have said they are not too worried about the MLF because it is a means of controlling German nuclear ambitions. But nevertheless a contradiction did exist: if the Russians were to accept the MLF as a means of controlling the German national deterrent they would do so in the framework of a bipolar world in which West Germany is brought under the control of American nuclear strategy and East Germany is brought under that of the Soviet Union. It was true that Berlin could still be maintained as an enclave under American protection. But once the West Germans accepted the concept of two Germanies they would have to accept that Berlin would never be the capital of a united Germany; West Berlin would gradually fade away as a political symbol. The Russians were perfectly aware of this. The Americans were not consciously playing a double game - the dialectic of the situation was not fully clear to everybody.

Dr. Sommer considered that Herr Cornides had over-simplified the argument. Germany was at a cross-roads - just as when she had decided to rearm, to join NATO, or even to have a West German Mark. The real problem was that today a solution of the German problem could be hoped for only within the framework of an East-West detente. This depended on maintaining the alliance intact, and in order to keep it intact (which was the German reason for supporting the MLF) the Germans wanted a stronger link with the US. If they gained that, they could then wait on events. Perhaps the American and Soviet societies would draw closer together as Mr. Buchan had said. But if the Germans did not go along with the West on projects for closer integration they would lose the backing of the alliance; and they might lose the alliance without regaining reunification.

He did not see what the East Germans could do about the MLF. He did not share Herr Cornides' fear that the division of Germany would be hardened - the point of no return had been reached already. If the Germans were to put reunification first, they would have to pray for a Soviet-American condominium, because only under such circumstances could the situation arise in which the German problem could be settled in isolation from other world issues. But in present circumstances, he firmly believed that West Germany must continue to co-operate with the alliance; moves towards integration with the West could hardly make the German situation much worse, and they might help in the future to make Russia change her views.

M. de Rose that the discussion had moved right away from the subject on the agenda - the Moscow agreement. It justified his own conclusions, however, that the treaty had been signed by all three parties, and especially the Russians, without any idea that it could have an important bearing on any major international problem between East and West.

Herr Cornides maintained that there was a link between the treaty and the central European problem, at least as far as the Germans were concerned, because of the connection with the non-aggression pact as the next step. Even accepting all the reservations made by Britain and America, the Germans felt that this had been the last occasion on which such negotiations could take place without having an immediate bearing on the German situation. They feared that the next round of East-West negotiations, whether on a non-aggression pact or any other proposal, would lead to the division of Germany being finalised.

He differed from Dr. Sommer only on the issue of the MLF. If one accepted the idea of Tom Schelling that progress in East-West negotiations is only made after a major crisis has been successfully overcome, then when the next crisis came it would matter whether or not the Germans were members of the MLF. If they became members, then the negotiations would be about a non-aggression pact, or some other proposal, not linked with the Berlin situation but simply intended to offset the MLF. But if the Germans did not join, or preferred other multilateral arrangements not linked with the MLF, then their position would be slightly better because they would not stand revealed as wanting nuclear weapons. Once the step of joining the MLF had been taken, the Russians might turn all their propaganda against Germany and demand assurances. He urged that the Germans should find out beforehand whether involvement in the MLF was really worthwhile.

Dr. Ritter supported Herr Cornides' argument.

M. de Rose said that personally he had never been convinced that the Russians sincerely believed that German nuclear rearmament would be a threat to themselves. The possession of some nuclear weapons by Germany would not fundamentally change the situation inside the alliance; in case of war it would be the overwhelming American forces with which they would have to deal. The possibility for West Germany to influence the military policy of the US existed already. The Soviet claim that nuclear weapons for Germany would be a danger for the world was just propaganda.

He believed the position of Germany in the nuclear problem was given an importance it did not have. He did not consider that the MLF concept changed anything. Mixed crews would not affect the situation fundamentally at all. He was not convinced that the Moscow agreement was the last thing that the Germans could sign without being obliged to admit the division of Germany, but if considered from a tactical standpoint as a move in a game of chess, he could see the point.

Mr. Buchan considered the German analysis much too subtle and much too German-centred. Germany did play an enormous role in international diplomacy, but not so large as Germans tended to think. Herr Cornides had quoted Schelling's view that progress comes out of each crisis; but the achievement from the Cuba crisis was the hot line, not the test ban. He considered that one motive for the test ban, which had not been explored, was the fantastic cost which both the super-powers would incur if they were to go into the anti-missile field. The Americans could perhaps afford the necessary effort, but he doubted whether the Russians could.

Dr. Ritter said how painful it was as a German to have to stress that Soviet policy was at present primarily focussed on central European problems, because this inevitably gave rise to the suspicion that he was over-stating the case. This was why he had deliberately cited Brzezinski yesterday, as being one who does not consider these problems from the German point of view.

He quite agreed with Mr. Buchan that the hot line was the direct result of the Cuba crisis. On the other hand, the hot line would not settle any problem in itself. He believed the Cuba crisis had been really a political adventure on the part of Khrushchev to build up the possibility of pressure on Berlin, not intended as a bargaining position to bring about the withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey, for example.

Signor Spinelli stated that Dr. Ritter seemed to take the view that the West, Europe and the US, must probe all the possibilities of flexibility on the part of the USSR. But if some agreement was to be reached, the Western side must be flexible too. Where were we disposed to make some concessions? It was essential to know, with reference to Herr Cornides' argument, whether some development of the policy that has led to the hot line and the test ban treaty would go to the point of accepting the present situation in Europe. The question was whether the principal act of flexibility should be made by the West, not by the East.

Dr. Ritter maintained that the West had shown some flexibility in making the test ban treaty; West Germany had shown flexibility in making her recent commercial agreements with some East European countries. But the probing discussions that were taking place between Washington and Moscow on a variety of problems were not getting very far. The talks must have some substance. Why do the Russians refuse to give a guarantee on the problem of access to Berlin? They just want a non-aggression pact, in isolation, and they want to link the problem of access with ending the occupation status of Berlin so that through the back door they could achieve recognition that the status quo is normal and the status of Berlin abnormal.

Dr. Sommer underlined Dr. Ritter's observations. German policy was becoming much more flexible. There had been a relaxation of the Hallstein doctrine as regards the countries in Eastern Europe under Soviet domination. He maintained, however, that the Germans must not let themselves get into the position of always acting with two eyes cocked on Russia instead of trying to see sense in the policies of the West, or they would condemn themselves to immobility.

Général del Marmol supported Dr. Sommer. He felt there was a tendency to pay too much attention to the Russians. He also supported Mr. Buchan's point that the problem of the anti-missile missile may have been a factor in the decision to conclude the test ban agreement; a non-aggression pact was not necessarily the most important Soviet objective.

At this point the discussion was concluded.

I N S T I T U T E F O R S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

EUROPEAN STUDY COMMISSION

Minutes of the Second Meeting, held at the Institute for Strategic Studies, 18 Adam Street, London W.C.2 on 31st January and 1st February, 1964

Present: Mr. A. Buchan (in the Chair)

Signor A. Albonetti	Professor M. Howard
Mr. L. Beaton	Général Baron A. del Marmol
Général d'Armée Beaufre	Dr. E. Örvik
Admiral H. Bos	Dr. K. Ritter
Herr W. Cornides	Dr. T. Sommer
M. F. de Rose	Signor A. Spinelli
Mr. N. Haagerup	M. J. Vernant
	Herr U. Nerlich

1. SWEDISH PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION

Mr. Buchan reported on correspondence with the Danish and Norwegian representatives on the ESC on the desirability of associating the Swedish Institute of International Affairs with the work of the Commission, such association to take the form of receiving all reports of meetings of the Commission but only being invited to attend meetings when the main subject for discussion would be of special interest to Sweden.

Mr. Haagerup reported that he had heard from Dr. Birnbaum, the Head of the Swedish Institute, that he would like to receive reports of the Commission's proceedings and that he would accept any form of association that the Commission agreed would be appropriate for Sweden.

Without wishing to press a formal objection, M. Vernant expressed doubts about the wisdom of sending Dr. Birnbaum's Institute the procès-verbal of meetings of the Commission because this would create a precedent; requests for these reports might be received from Institutes of International Affairs in other countries besides Sweden, and this could lead to difficulties. He agreed with the principle of inviting a Swedish representative to certain meetings of the Commission, but he felt that the decision to restrict the distribution of the procès-verbal to the persons who had attended each meeting should be upheld. M. de Rose supported M. Vernant.

Mr. Buchan explained that the ISS was particularly interested in keeping in touch with the Swedish Institute because they do some of the best research on defence and related problems in Europe and because he was anxious that the Study Commission should not consist entirely of countries members of NATO. He proposed that Dr. Birnbaum be sent the working papers which would be prepared as a basis for discussion of the special subject for each meeting of the Commission together with any studies which might be produced emanating from these discussions (which would take the form

of one individual's interpretation of the discussion, as agreed at the first meeting of the Commission) and that the Commission should consider from time to time whether it would be desirable to invite a Swedish observer to attend a particular meeting.

Mr. Buchan's proposal was agreed.

2. STUDY PAPERS

(a) Mr. Buchan reported that Herr Nerlich had prepared a revised version of the working paper considered at the first meeting of the Commission and copies were available in German. Herr Nerlich was working on an expanded version of this study which would be published by the Institute for Strategic Studies as an Adelphi Paper.

It was agreed that on the understanding that this paper would reflect an individual interpretation of the sense of the discussion, as had been agreed at the meeting in Paris, there would be no need to circulate Herr Nerlich's draft to members of the Commission before it was printed.

(b) It was agreed that the French members of the Commission would produce a similar study paper based on the discussion of a European strategic force at the second meeting of the Commission.

3. EUROPEAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE IN VENICE

Mr. Buchan reported on discussions with Signor Albonetti and Signor Gaja in Rome on the possibility of organising a European-American Conference in Venice towards the end of May on similar lines to that held at Harvard in 1963. It was proposed that members of the European Study Commission should form the nucleus of the European membership of the conference, to which would be added some 15 Europeans and 10 Americans, to make a total conference of 40 persons plus staff. The conference would be organised jointly by the Institute for Strategic Studies and the Italian Atlantic Committee, and sufficient funds would be available to pay for the conference centre and for the board and lodging of the participants. The Fondazione Cini was available as a conference centre, and the ISS would make arrangements to accommodate everyone concerned in hotels in Venice.

It was proposed that the conference should be held over four working days, Friday to Monday (with Sunday as a half-day) May 22nd-25th. A tentative agenda had been drawn up as follows:

Friday 22nd May

Morning	The end of a bipolar world: the strategic implications
Afternoon	The significance of American strategic superiority

Saturday 23rd May	
Morning	The control of Western strategy (1) An Atlantic system of planning and control of the forces of the present NATO nuclear powers
Afternoon	(2) Control through multilateral forces
Sunday 24th May	
Morning	(3) A European nuclear force and a European-American strategic partnership
Afternoon	Free
Monday 25th May	
Morning	The Objectives of Arms Control Policy
Afternoon	The Foundations of Co-existence

It was agreed to accept the proposal as outlined by Mr. Buchan. It was further agreed:

(a) to treat the conference as a regular meeting of the Commission, so that members' fares to Venice would be paid by their Institutes;

(b) to seek to reimburse the Scandinavian members of the Commission for part of the cost of their fares from the monies contributed by the FIAT Foundation to pay the travel expenses of the Italian members;

(c) to decide the time of the opening of the conference in the light of air transport to Venice.

As regards the selection of participants other than members of the Commission, after some discussion of possible participants it was agreed that Mr. Buchan should correspond with various personalities to obtain a balanced representation from each country concerned. It was further agreed that it would be desirable to invite a representative from the Commission of the European Economic Community, if possible M. Marjolin.

4. THIRD MEETING OF THE COMMISSION

It was agreed to hold the third meeting of the Commission in Paris, at the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, on Friday and Saturday, 20-21 March 1964.

It was agreed that the special subject for discussion would be "The European view of American strategic policy and doctrine, and command and control of NATO" and that the Institute for Strategic Studies would be responsible for drafting the working paper for this discussion. Mr. Buchan explained that he personally would be unable to present this paper because he was already committed to a conference in the United States at that time.

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at the Second Meeting,
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31st January-1st February, 1964

FRIDAY MORNING, 31st JANUARY

DISCUSSION ON A EUROPEAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE

Desirability of a European Nuclear Force

Mr. Buchan (in the Chair) proposed that the morning be devoted to discussion of the desirability of a European nuclear force. He noted however that the French paper had not defined "Europe" in that context.

M. de Rose said that in drafting their paper the French members had been very careful not to raise this issue because they did not want to turn the discussion towards a political argument about a Europe of the 6 or the 7 or the 15. They had defined the force as a military instrument independent of the American nuclear force. The problem must be viewed from the military aspect, and the first question to be discussed was whether the defence of Europe and the defence of the United States were the same thing. If it was agreed that there was a requirement for a nuclear force in Europe independent of American control, the next points to be considered would be the capability of that force and the nature of its mission. The question of who would form a European force could be left open for the time being, until the desirability of the force itself had been agreed upon.

Admiral Bos agreed with M. de Rose, with the reservation that if such a force were considered desirable the question posed on page 5 of the French paper, that there must be a politically united Europe in order to command and control such a force as well as to constitute it, would arise. We might find that we agreed that a European force would be desirable, but that it would not be feasible.

Mr. Buchan suggested that desirability had a great influence on practicability. However, he thought M. de Rose's definition very useful and proposed that consideration be given first to the question whether American and European strategic interests were identical.

Général Beaufre said the arguments were set out in the French paper; he would like to know the reactions.

Herr Cornides considered that it depended a great deal on the map one used and how one looked at it. If one focussed on the Atlantic as the Mediterranean of the modern world, there was a real identity of interest on both shores; but then what about the Pacific and Asian interests? He felt obliged to agree with the first sentence of the French paper. There was an identity of interest in the context of a bipolar world. But once we accepted a world with different centres, the interests of Europe and the United States were no longer identical. And the further away we moved from a purely nuclear deterrent, the greater the differentiation of interests. Solidarity was another matter, of course.

Professor Howard suggested it was a matter of priorities rather than interests. A division of interests was bound to arise in any large and complex political unit. During the Second World War the British Empire had had to face the problem whether the strategic interests of Australia and New Zealand and India were identical with those of Britain; they were not identical from a geographical point of view, but they were within the political context. The question was whether the Western world were to be regarded as something comparable to the British Empire during World War II, e.g. something which in the last resort would accept some over-riding power in the general interest, or whether we admitted we were not yet at that stage of political integration.

Signor Albonetti welcomed Professor Howard's intervention because it brought members a little further away from the purely geostrategic appreciation of the differences between the United States and Europe. It was dangerous to try and divide up the discussion, because starting from geographical data one could jump to conclusions which had political implications. Even if one wanted to argue that there was an identity of interest, it must surely be admitted that in certain areas there could be a difference of appreciation due to the fact that the strategic, geographical and even political positions were not the same for all members of the same community. This did not in itself justify jumping to the conclusion that Europe needed a separate centre of military decision. However, Europe did face a more general problem in her relations with the United States than the question whether the US would intervene in the event of any attack on Europe. This problem did not only involve current issues; it was essential to think ahead to the situation in 5, 10 or 20 years' time. The French paper was subtly argued and he believed it should certainly be accepted as a useful basis for discussion.

Admiral Bos commented that in global terms the strategic interests of the United States and Europe could not possibly be identical; the strategic interests of the different European NATO members were not even identical. But this was not relevant to the discussion, which was specifically concerned with the defence of Europe. He therefore proposed leaving out consideration of all interests outside Europe.

He took issue with the French paper on the examples cited to illustrate differences in the appreciation of interests between the United States and Europe. He could not see what Munich and Dunkirk had to do with it. Yalta was another matter; but even so, times had changed so much that he would not choose Yalta to illustrate present differences. He could accept that the US and Europe would not necessarily take the same attitude towards an incident involving Berlin, for example; on the other hand would the European powers take an identical view of the same question? He could not see any justification for arguing that there had recently been any clear difference in outlook between the US and Europe on an issue of primary concern to Europe.

Mr. Buchan thought it unwise to key the question of a European force entirely to the defence of Europe. In 20 years' time, for example, Europe might conclude that she needed some expression of power like an independent nuclear force not only for European defence but against the encroachment of Chinese influence on European interests.

Admiral Bos agreed with Mr. Buchan. He felt however that the problem for the future was quite different from the desirability of creating an independent European nuclear force while the NATO treaty was in force, and he therefore proposed that the two issues be discussed separately.

Dr. Sommer seconded Admiral Bos's proposal. He also agreed with him that the French examples were not particularly relevant. He thought there had been two recent examples - Berlin and Hungary. But these revealed not a definite divergence of interest but a community of non-interest. It was theoretically conceivable for Europe to have a difference of interest with the United States. In practice, however, Europe would react in the same way as the United States because she was subject to the same threat - a greater threat even, because Europe stood to suffer greater destruction; both would be reluctant to use nuclear weapons. Over Berlin in 1961 and over Hungary in 1956, there had been stronger reluctance to take any decisive action in Bonn than there had been in Washington. He believed that when the chips were down, the Europeans and Americans alike would back down.

Signor Spinelli taking up Professor Howard's point observed that differences of opinion were as inevitable among coalitions as they were between political parties in a single state. But the interest of the whole must surely prevail over the interest of any one part. Western military defence was organised on the basis that an identity of interest did exist, and he believed this was so, although there were certain tendencies which sought to break it. The problem for Europe was, was it better to try and strengthen this identity of interest or to try and break it? Two different conceptions were involved and must be considered before taking up Signor Albonetti's point about looking 20 years ahead, because Europe would be developing in one direction or the other. Personally he believed that the European-American identity of strategic interest was worth maintaining and strengthening. But if one argued the contrary, then the questions of a multipolar system and the feasibility and credibility of an independent European deterrent had to be considered. The essential choice was between building on the present basis or trying to transform it.

M. Vernant did not see how differences of interest could be avoided between members of an alliance which like NATO remained a multinational system; and the more widely separated geographically the members the more divergent their interests. In a crisis France would have a greater identity of strategic interest with Belgium and Germany because of their propinquity than she would have with the United States, leaving aside the question of power or what each member contributed to the alliance. Therefore because of her geographical position, Europe had solid interests which would not be the same as those of the United States, independent of the degree of political integration in that Europe.

Commenting on Signor Spinelli's intervention, he feared that misunderstandings might arise if the problem were considered in a military or quasi-military framework. To give priority to a European-American identity of interest would mean admitting that we were in a military situation requiring the organisation of the alliance on a war footing with a single command system and overriding control exercised by the most powerful member. But we were not in a state of war, or even in a situation where military action was envisaged. And NATO was not comparable with the British Empire during World War II. The problem facing Europe today was to make sure in time of peace that the essential interests of Europe would be maintained while maintaining peace. A European deterrent only made sense in this context.

Général del Marmol said the main consideration was, would a European nuclear element contribute to the security of the whole free world as well as to the security of Europe? He believed it would. The credibility of a deterrent was highly important: would it add to the factors which a potential enemy would have to take into account? He believed a European force would act as a deterrent because it would increase Soviet uncertainty about Western intentions. It would also be politically significant for European-American relations, because if we accepted that the nuclear element should be solely in American hands the Atlantic alliance would become a protectorate rather than a partnership.

M. de Rose taking up Signor Spinelli's argument said the problem was not whether we favoured breaking the identity of interest between Europe and the US but whether we were adding to the division which existed already. Because of geography, Europe could be attacked by the USSR by an infinity of means from a few battalions to an all-out attack, whereas North America could only be attacked by an all-out nuclear attack, and this created a certain difference in appreciation and assessment of the situation. And he felt that overseas interests must be taken into account. The totally different reactions of the United States to the recent Panama Canal crisis and to the Suez Canal crisis were very significant.

However, over and above European-American differences, the overriding concern was the reaction of the USSR in a given situation. The USSR was under no illusion about American-European solidarity at present; but it would be dangerous for Europe to assume that this would always be the case. The Russians were not infallible; if they could make a mistake about the American reaction to their placing missiles in Cuba, almost on America's doorstep, they could make a mistake about America's reaction to a situation in Europe. The existence of a non-American deterrent force would be helpful because it would add to the factors to be taken into account by the Russians, as Général del Marmol had concluded. A European force would add little to the total strength of the West, although it would add something. But this was not the main consideration. Its importance would be primarily political, to contribute to Western security by adding to Soviet uncertainty. There was no question of a European force substituting for the American force.

Général Beaufre took up Admiral Bos's question about Munich. The importance of Munich was that it illustrated a case where allies made a change of strategy because of circumstances. Why had Britain and France changed their strategy, which resulted in their abandoning an ally? Because they reasoned that it was better to sacrifice Czechoslovakia than risk a world war at that particular time. But if Czechoslovakia had possessed nuclear weapons and had been prepared to go to war in her own defence, the decision of France and Britain would have been very different. Mentioning a series of discussions held at the Paris Centre about the nature of deterrence, he said the first tentative conclusion reached was that a multiplicity of centres of decision increased the deterring effect on a potential aggressor (which was in line with Général del Marmol's argument); the second conclusion reached was that an independent nuclear force created additional bonds between those countries making up the force, greater than the normal solidarity between allies: the solidarity of risk. If there had been this nuclear bond between Czechoslovakia and France, say, at the time of Munich, Hitler would have been deterred from applying the pressure he did apply to the Czechs because of the greater risk of war.

But besides creating a stronger reciprocal solidarity between allies, nuclear weapons also created a certain solidarity among all nuclear powers towards the outside world, independent of their political will. Because of the instruments of destruction in their possession, nuclear nations did not have the same liberty of action as non-nuclear powers. The Russians and the Americans were almost tied to one another because of the balance they must preserve. Therefore, because of this inter-dependence of nuclear weapons systems, a European nuclear force would create much stronger ties between Europe and America than existed today.

Mr. Buchan did not find Général Beaufre's analogy of Munich in the nuclear age very convincing. He considered that if Germany, Britain and France had been major nuclear powers and Czechoslovakia had had a very small force (which was all her economy could have supported), the desertion of Britain and France might have convinced Benes that he could not use his nuclear force; and without the intervention of Britain and France to limit the destruction and cripple Germany, Czechoslovakia would have been so destroyed that Benes would have had no alternative but to surrender.

Général Beaufre maintained that if the Czechs had resisted militarily with conventional weapons but with the ability to wage a nuclear war, Britain and France would have stepped in because of the danger to the whole world. He reaffirmed his previous arguments, and added that in 1939 nobody could have foreseen the situation that existed today. It was equally impossible to foretell the situation 25 years hence. Mr. Buchan had already mentioned the example of China. Given this uncertainty, it would be very serious for Europe to renounce a means of adapting herself to any situation which might arise.

Herr Cornides asked for clarification of the second sentence of the French paper about Europe forming a system of outposts East of the Atlantic. The references to Europe so far had really been to Western Europe; yet implicit in the argument was the existence of Russian as well as American outposts on European soil, with the larger Europe acting as a trial ground for the two major powers which were based well back from the area. In such a situation, how was security increased if Western Europe had its own element of security, in the light of the French view about the common interest between the US and the USSR arising from their both being nuclear powers?

Mr. Buchan agreed that this was an important consideration; he believed the idea of an independent European force would tend to solidify the division of Europe.

Signor Albonetti said the main objection against a European deterrent was the fear of dividing the West. But on political grounds, he believed a European deterrent was necessary to maintain Western unity, for the following reasons: (1) In the long run Western unity depended on the creation of an Atlantic community. But even if an Atlantic federation were possible, it could not be reached by 15 states in the relationship of one giant to 14 dwarfs; there must be partnership. And he could not envisage European political and economic unity, which was essential to make the partnership a reality, without a defence system. The relationship between the allies would not be healthy if it were based on the American nuclear monopoly - and indeed monopoly did not work now. The growth of economic and political reconstruction in Europe would increase the need for Europe to have influence and responsibility; and responsibility meant nuclear responsibility.

(2) A European nuclear force would avoid the danger of discrimination between nuclear powers and non-nuclear powers in Europe itself. (3) A European system of deterrence would avoid the proliferation of national deterrents. (4) National European deterrents might not be very credible because they would be rather weak and unsophisticated. A European deterrent would not suffer from these disadvantages, and because it would be more credible it would to a certain extent be a measure of arms control in Europe.

Mr. Beaton did not consider the geostrategic issue was the key one. It must be a factor in any situation; but the central problem was the permament one illustrated by Yalta: could and would the United States sell out some of her interests in Europe in the event that Europe were one kind of power rather than another? The American interest in Europe was much greater than the American interest in South Korea or Vietnam, because Europe was so powerful economically and industrially and any transfer of loyalties was of profound interest to the US. The American interest in the USSR was because of Soviet power; it was an interest to bargain in certain circumstances and also a need to bargain because of her military power.

Would Europe obtain counters, such as a seat at the summit, in vital situations by forming her own deterrent as the French claimed? This related to the question whether it would lead to partnership. He was very hesitant about Général Beaufre's firm conclusion that nuclear power would strengthen the links of an alliance. That depended on an examination of the nature of the alliance and the amount to which it depended on an element of patronage and an element of dependence, or the extent to which it was a genuinely interdependent relationship. M. de Rose's observation that the existence of another centre of power introduced an element of uncertainty was true - but it applied to the Americans as well as to the Russians. It was important to realise that this could lead to some very profound reconsideration of policy and commitments on the part of the United States. Europe would be changing in a fundamental way her relationships inside and outside the alliance, and would have to be careful to be quite clear that the present structure could survive, if Europe wanted it to survive, if Europe became militarily a great power.

Mr. Haagerup agreed with Mr. Beaton that neither geographical nor physical factors were decisive, because when we spoke of strategic interests we were concerned primarily with how those interests were being decided by the body politic in the various countries. He further agreed with Mr. Beaton about the effect of a European deterrent upon the American body politic. It would also create differences within Europe, because many people in Europe would doubt whether the potential of a so-called European system would be of real assistance to Europe in time of crisis. This had much more to do with the certainty factor which we called politics than with geography. It was very difficult to make a firm judgment; but he was more inclined to agree with Mr. Beaton than with Général Beaufre.

Dr. Ritter also supported Mr. Beaton's first point. He believed the case for a European nuclear deterrent depended on whether in the nuclear age Europe needed a strategic nuclear potential to pursue political interests of her own. If it was agreed that political interests could not be enforced without the existence of a credible range of options in the military field as well, then the case for Europe having her own deterrent must be admitted.

Professor Howard pointed out that the British nuclear deterrent had existed as a nuclear force in Europe for at least 10 years; but this had not prevented France from feeling it necessary to create her own force, for reasons which Britain understood. But if the arguments of Général Beaufre and M. de Rose to defend the need for such a force were valid, they were valid so long as there was a force in Europe. Dr. Ritter's intervention raised arguments for the creation of other forces by other European states.

Admiral Bos maintained that the starting-point must be that the defence of the West was one and indivisible at the present time. As the French paper stated, no country could defend itself alone; therefore a strong alliance among all 15 members of NATO must be maintained. It appeared from the morning's discussion that the creation of a European nuclear force could either (1) enhance solidarity among the members of NATO and strengthen relations between Europe and the United States (as Général Beaufre suggested); or (2) not greatly affect the alliance but have the advantage of satisfying European feelings of prestige or partnership (as Signor Albonetti suggested); or (3) possibly create a split between Europe and the United States (as Mr. Beaton suggested).

Personally he was convinced that if the creation of an independent European deterrent should gravely endanger the solidarity which now existed between the US and Europe, no other consideration would make up for that consequence.

He did not suggest that Britain and France should do away with their own deterrents; it would be realistic for them to continue developing their nuclear weapons as far as they saw fit. But Britain and France should take into account the fact that America provided 95% of the strength of the West and pledge that so long as NATO continued in its present form their weapons would be integrated in the general strategic nuclear power of the United States so that the American President would have the sole responsibility for using the deterrent. He was not entirely happy with the present situation so far as consultation and planning, etc. were concerned; but that was a secondary consideration.

Mr. Haagerup said that Denmark and Norway were both very much Atlantic-minded; their military interests were believed to be more identical with those of Britain and the United States than of continental Europe. Therefore any decision in Europe to build an independent nuclear force contrary to the wishes of the United States, whether or not it was logical, would be considered in the Scandinavian countries to undermine the security they felt at present.

FRIDAY AFTERNOON, 31st JANUARY

DISCUSSION ON A EUROPEAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE (cont.)

The Implications for European-American Relations

Mr. Buchan (in the Chair) recalled that a principal argument raised during the morning for a European system of deterrence was the unhealthiness of a relationship between a power of the size of the United States and 14 small countries. There was no disagreement about this, even on the part of Americans. Many Americans felt baffled about the difficulty of upholding a relationship in which they were so much stronger than any of the countries they dealt with and were becoming more and more involved in a series of bilateral relationships with the other countries of the alliance.

The question was, however, whether the carrying of the concept of European unity to the point of Europe having the means of pursuing an independent diplomacy (because that was the real purpose of a European nuclear force) would lead to a more successful and enduring relationship between Europe and the United States, or whether such knowledge as we had in the past about the relationship between two big units in an alliance, like Germany and Austro-Hungary or Russia and China, gave us cause to wonder whether a relationship between two units of roughly equal economic power and comparable strategic power in the end led to friction and to the break-up of the relationship altogether. He felt that the effect of a decision to create an independent European nuclear force on the relationship with the United States should be considered before the very important question whether such a decision would be a "federateur" of European political unity.

Mr. Beaton dissented from the idea that Americans did not feel able to work with those less strong than themselves. They never said this about Latin America, or Japan, or Canada; and so far as it was said about Europe it was insincere. He believed that what the Americans really wanted was simpler relations: they hoped for a Europe which would be stronger than the present one, politically united, with which they could deal as a political unit. But they were not really prepared to see a "strong" Europe. And they did not believe Europe would become any more powerful or independent as the result of a European deterrent.

Signor Albonetti said that the United States had wanted a European federation since the Second World War for two quite different reasons: (1) to put an end to what they saw as the continual strife among the European nations; and (2) to see as strong a unit as possible fill the gap in central Europe in the face of the military threat posed by the USSR.

Dr. Sommer said the case stated in the French paper was brilliant; yet he was not convinced. One difficulty was that the French case was put in the abstract. Theoretically he could support a European deterrent. But would such a force in fact lead to a higher degree of solidarity and cohesion within the alliance? Theoretically the contrary could be argued: that a nuclear monopoly led to the highest degree of solidarity, the only problem being to ensure that the monopoly were exercised in a tolerable way and made politically acceptable by the processes which had been going on - information, consultation, planning and projected participation as in the MLF. Duopoly by definition maintained a split and might in practice lead to the lowest degree of solidarity. He would therefore like to hear the reasoning behind the French case.

He believed the effect of a European deterrent on our relations with the United States would depend as much upon the means as upon the end itself. If the Europeans worked for an independent force without the Americans or even against the Americans they could create the opposite effect from that intended. If they worked with the Americans, however, they might gain greater solidarity or at least prevent rivalry from developing. He suggested that the MLF was one way towards a European deterrent which would do less harm than others. He envisaged starting out under American hegemony and then trying to struggle free; after 8-10 years the Americans might be prepared to sell their shares to the Europeams, or abolish their veto, and a European capability would then exist but without the strains and stresses that an independent approach might bring. He was not convinced by the implication in the French paper that a European deterrent must be built on the basis of the existing national deterrents. The British and French cases had shown that their motives were counter-productive, and this was not a sound foundation for a European force. And where would Germany and Italy fit in? He believed it would be wiser, and more profitable, to begin with an Atlantic deterrent.

M. de Rose replied first to Mr. Buchan that the French paper had not meant to imply that an independent strategy was possible for Europe in the full meaning of the term. He had tried to make clear earlier his belief that while a European force would add an element of a stable character to the American force, it must remain supplementary to the American presence in Europe and to the maintainence of bonds between Europe and the United States. Of course the European force could only contribute a small percentage in military terms; its contribution to Western security was in the political field of dissuasion. To Admiral Bos, he would say that if it were a case of having to choose between the American force with a guarantee or the British and French nuclear force without an American guarantee, of course we would choose the permanent American guarantee.

As to the effect of this force upon the Atlantic alliance, he supported Général Beaufre's argument that it must bring about a greater solidarity. But he also believed - and this was implicit in the French paper - that there must be acceptance on the part of America of the useful role which a non-American force could play. The Europeans must

try to reach agreement about this themselves so as to create the force in the framework of a Europe which was purposeful, politically united and at least confederal if possible in structure; they would not get American support if the US continued to believe that it was her sole responsibility to act as the world's policeman and that supplementary forces would only complicate her task. Therefore the Europeans must first reach agreement among themselves and then convince the Americans. If this were done, it would be easy enough to reach agreement on the co-operation of the two forces.

Mr. Buchan returned to the question whether a European force implied an independent strategy. If strategy were taken to mean all that part of a nation's ambitions in international affairs concerned with the use of force, he did not think the Europeans would want to create a nuclear force without some assurance that it would give them a measure of independence of the United States. The history of the British and French forces showed that the arguments from ambition were stronger than the arguments from fear. Talk about a complementary strategy was unrealistic. Europe would not make the tremendous financial effort required unless it wished to be a part of an important new element in a multipolar world.

M. de Rose said the effort required to build an independent strategic force would be gigantic. He maintained that as a first step the right approach was to try and convince the Americans of the necessity for a complementary force.

Signor Spinelli maintained that the construction of a European force must be looked at in the context of the general political situation. Général Beaufre had pointed out the common interest which existed between nuclear powers. One element in this was their common opposition to proliferation. If the Europeans set out to build an independent nuclear force, they would inevitably come up against the opposition of the Russians and the Americans. The Americans would be put into the position of having to choose between continuing their policy of co-existence with the USSR and stifling the European effort, or supporting the Europeans and going back to a hard cold-war posture vis-a-vis the USSR. He believed this was too high a price to expect the Americans to pay for supporting a European deterrent.

He was convinced that it would benefit the Europeans more to ask the US to recognise the demands of partnership. We lived in a world of interdependence and our aim ought to be not to abolish this interdependence but to transform a protectorate into a partnership. As European unity made progress, Europe could claim an increasing say in the planning and decision-making of the Atlantic alliance. In the very long term a President of Europe might be envisaged who would be able to take a decision on behalf of Europe. But for a long time to come, it would be an advantage for Europe to have the President of the US at the head of the alliance. European unity at the moment was more apparent than real, and he believed that in a crisis the deterrent would be more credible if the man in charge were the President of the US. Europe must accept the state of interdependence in which history had placed her and which could not be changed.

Général del Marmol deplored the tendency to contrast a European deterrent with the American deterrent. They must be complementary. He was not persuaded that a European deterrent would be disadvantageous from the American point of view. Certainly Khrushchev would not want to see it; he would prefer power to remain in American hands because it made things easier for him. But he personally saw no reason why the Americans should necessarily have a muclear monopoly nor why this should be thought desirable. He pointed to the conclusions set forth in his own paper which had been circulated. The nub of the question was that this point of view was beginning to find recognition in the US too, for example in General Norstad's suggestion for a three-power directorate which would dispose of a certain nuclear capability.

Mr. Buchan assumed that Général del Marmol agreed with Dr. Sommer on the desirability of constructing some Atlantic system of deterrence.

Général del Marmol concurred, although he did not agree that this system should be the MLF.

Herr Cornides observed that the time when we did not talk about partnership in the Atlantic alliance, in the 1950's, was the time when it existed. This had been due to (1) the existence of a strong common threat, and (2) the fact that the only other nuclear power, Britain, had a special relationship with the US. Now that this was passing, many people who had opposed it would regret it. Substantial differences of opinion had emerged in the United States over this whole problem. Some people accepted the need and the consequences of partnership (a united Europe with a political force of its own); others accepted the need but not the consequences (those who supported the MLF); others again maintained that more thinking needed to be done about whether the US preferred a really united Europe or a network of bilateral relationships. He believed that what most Americans really wanted was a politically and economically stronger Europe which recognised that it did not need an independent military role and was integrated with the US.

The real difficulty was not the force itself, but the policy for which it would be used. Dr. Ritter had posed the question this morning about the relationship of nuclear capability to a changing political situation. This was the key issue and it could not be answered once and for all time. It would look very different during the next four years, when the NATO treaty was not in question, and in the 1970's. He felt the important thing was to try to reach a solution which would leave Europe the option of deciding later on in favour of creating her own deterrent. Any American attempt to close the door would be counter-productive. If Europe were forced to take this decision now, it would hold up economic and political unification or even understanding between the European powers. It was impossible to look ahead 20 years. He would prefer to see Europe concentrate for the present on economic and political co-operation, provided the possibility were left open for a military solution at some date in the future. It was a question of how long certain issues could be kept open. The problem of Britain's attitude to the European Economic Community was pending and this was an important issue for Europe. Would it be wise, therefore, to give priority to the nuclear issue in the present situation?

Signor Albonetti suggested that the time factor might permit a rapprochement of the different points of view. Dr. Sommer, Signor Spinelli and Herr Cornides all feared a European deterrent might well split the West instead of uniting it, in opposition to Général Beaufre. They all agreed that in the long term neither monopoly nor national nuclear forces was the right answer. Dr. Sommer and Signor Spinelli had made suggestions for interim arrangements, whereas those who had argued in favour of a European deterrent had not said anything about the timing. Perhaps it would prove acceptable to everybody to leave aside the question whether it would be appropriate to establish a European force now, but to seek to leave open the means of exercising an option to establish such a force, which might evolve through the development of national military co-operation and through the American renunciation of her veto, in such a way as to guarantee the maintenance of strong bonds between Europe and the US.

Mr. Buchan welcomed Signor Albonetti's intervention. The lead-time involved in nuclear projects was very great. Even if they were governments and could take a decision this very day, their decision would not bear fruit before 1970; this was part of the difficulty.

M. Vernant said the expression "a European deterrent" could be interpreted in several ways. The first consideration to bear in mind was that the attitude of the US towards Europe had modified considerably since the idea of European unity was first launched; it had been modified by the reconstruction and the political evolution of Europe. He was not sure that today, if a great European nation, with all that that implied, should somehow come into being, this development would arouse any enthusiasm in Washington. The US wanted Europe as a partner, but she also wanted to remain in control of the alliance.

The second consideration was that a European deterrent must mean the British and French nuclear forces. He did not see the possibility either of other European powers having national forces or of the two existing nuclear powers transforming themselves into a system of European deterrence. There was no point in a purely theoretical discussion. The problem must be looked at in terms of the existence of two national forces in Europe - which had both been created largely because of political considerations - together with the existence of an American guarantee.

Mr. Buchan was impressed by M. Vernant's argument. Perhaps it would be helpful to draw up one or two models of a European force and its possible relationship to an American force. The considerations they were discussing would take on a very different character according to whether one envisaged a European community which was primarily economic rather than political with the two independent national forces in it, or if the British and French forces were pooled, or if a force were built from scratch by some kind of European defence community. He suggested taking these three possibilities before continuing to discuss the effect of a European force on European political unity and on relations with the United States.

There was general assent to this proposal.

Possible models for a European Force

Mr. Buchan said everyone agreed that the American monopoly had gone for ever, and probably everyone agreed that national forces, in Europe or anywhere else, had not got a very long future ahead of them. He wondered whether this was the French view.

M. de Rose said the American monopoly was not acceptable. There was no question that France must remain a nuclear power. The Communists apart, no party in France would renounce a French nuclear force. He believed that any alternative French Government would do its utmost to obtain a European formula; but since a European Executive capable of taking a decision would not exist for a long time no French Government would abandon its power of decision.

He referred to the line of argument he had proposed during the morning to discuss first the need for a European force and then (if that were agreed) the mission and the capability of such a force. The problem was that on the national level there was no means of establishing a force which would represent the likely level of power required. Therefore another solution was necessary. The proposal that had been made, for a European solution, was acceptable to the French in the sense that it was not intended to come into effect immediately.

Mr. Beaton said he did not believe the British national force would disappear until the American force disappeared. He agreed with M. Vernant that nuclear weapons derived much from the national position, and it was most unlikely that Britain would abandon the most effective weapons in the world. However, he did not want to argue about British domestic politics.

Mr. Buchan maintained that Mr. Beaton was discounting the loss of British confidence in the political advantages that this particular kind of force brought to a nation. The formal British position was that the Conservatives supported the existence of a British nuclear force, although they based their argument on giving Britain a role in disarmament negotiations rather than on strict military requirements. The Labour Party appeared to have abandoned the idea that a British/ Labour Government would cease to be a nuclear power, partly because of the difficulty of convincing the rest of the world, and to have moved towards the position in which it would abandon the attempt to buy or develop strategic weapons but would develop aircraft or special-purpose kinds of weapon under a close relationship with NATO. Quite a strong wing of the present British Government believed (wrongly, in his opinion) that why Britain failed to get into the Common Market was because she was not prepared to make any gesture towards Europe with her nuclear force, and would like to see either an Anglo-French solution or some kind of European beau geste. There was no counterpart of this tendency within the Labour Party.

Professor Howard maintained there was a great difference between the argument advanced by strategic analysis and the political significance of the nuclear capability itself. He could not visualise any arrangement whereby Britain put her nuclear weapons at the disposal of NATO which did not contain even a formal clause on the right to withdraw them. It might be possible for the British force to become available to some sort of European control, but constitutional formalities would have to be preserved. There was no chance of either a Conservative or a Labour Government acquiescing in a bonfire of destruction or a total commitment of nuclear weapons without any possibility of withdrawal, because of factors which were quite different from those being discussed here.

Mr. Beaton said he could not conceive of any nation allowing its nuclear weapons to be fired against its will. This was more important than the question of the right of withdrawal. The British force would in the last analysis be under British control. The same was true of the Americans, the Russians and the French.

Herr Cornides stressed the need to keep in mind the time factor. The question was not whether the Germans or any other country must have nuclear weapons because that was the British or French position, but for how long the Germans could not ask for them and what must happen in the meantime to prevent other national positions being pushed to the extreme.

Dr. Sommer said the great German desire was to multilateralise the nuclear potentials that existed, not to become a nuclear power herself. He believed the minimum the Germans would ask for very soon was planning participation and penetration. He expected very strong German pressure on Paris and London to get the same kind of information and consultation rights that had already been granted by Washington.

Mr. Beaton believed the British would go further and faster than the Americans in that regard. The commitment of Bomber Command to NATO was very important.

Herr Cornides pressed his point. Assuming that consultation developed, that progress was made in relations with the US, that a certain amount of progress was made within the Six towards political integration: would the Germans then press for a more national development (which would destroy this tendency) or would they accept discrimination a little longer in the hope of speeding up developments?

Mr. Buchan felt that time was working against any perpetuation of a national situation, although he doubted whether Paris held this view. One clear difference was that French military commitments had now almost entirely receded into Europe. France intended to spend 25% of her defence budget on her nuclear effort, as against Britain's 10%; therefore the French weapons development would have more behind it than the British. And there seemed to be more confidence in France that the nuclear force would enhance the national position.

Général Beaufre said American ideas had evolved considerably over the past 15 years; they would continue to change and that was to be expected. We were now at the end of an era during which the basic tenet had been the maintenance of the complete unity of the nuclear system under the control of the American President. Most Americans now accepted that things must be different. The French situation was now different too, because they had a Government which was creating an independent nuclear system. He considered that although the French effort had been undertaken for purely national political considerations, its effect would not be detrimental to the true interests of the alliance. It would create a new form of solidarity, as he had already explained, and it would oblige the Americans to treat the Europeans as partners. From the day when a French force came into existence, the Americans would be obliged to seek co-operation and there would be a re-balancing of responsibilities within the alliance.

He admitted this would be rather a mixed solution. The British had always admitted that except for a formal constitutional reservation their force would be more or less integrated in an Atlantic system. But de Gaulle's difficult personality made him reject this. However, posing the problem in such uncompromising terms had forced a re-thinking of the whole issue, and ideas were still evolving. By maintaining the principle of an independent force the French had obliged the Americans to envisage a system other than a monopoly one.

Signor Albonetti interjected that the problem would still have been posed by the "push" of Europe, i.e. by the success of the Common Market and the political unity of Europe.

Général Beaufre pointed out that this would have happened later on. It was the premature posing of the problem by France that forced an examination of the whole issue and gave rise to ideas which prepared the possibility for a united Europe to have an independent strategy (which would naturally be co-ordinated with an Atlantic system). How to pass from the present system to a future system was something which would have to be discussed.

Signor Albonetti suggested that it be discussed now.

M. Vernant replied that if Europe, and especially the Europe of the Six, made progress towards political and military unification, as was demanded from the French side some years ago, it would be relatively easy to obtain participation in strategic planning for France's European partners.

Signor Albonetti observed that this was not sufficient. The Europeans wanted to participate in American planning, not French planning.

M. Vernant rejoined that he was expressing a personal view. It was up to France's partners: if this proposal was not acceptable, they would all have to think again.

Mr. Buchan suggested considering whether present difficulties might be resolved by pooling the British and French forces. In its favour was the fact that it would reduce the number of nuclear powers by one, so that it would be an anti-proliferation measure. The main questions were: (1) ould it meet the requirements for which the British and French forces were laid down? (2) Would it meet the difficulties and anxieties of the non-nuclear members in the alliance? (3) Would it hasten political unity in Europe?

M. de Rose said he could see a single, integrated force being created only in the context of a Franco-British political system where it would be acceptable to both partners to give each other the right of veto; this led in the direction of the Churchill idea of a common Franco-British Government. But in that case, what about the effect on the other European partners of France? One could only proceed to this type of Franco-British Government if the other European partners were left outside; but from that moment, the nuclear factor would be a factor for disunity in Europe. Therefore he could not see a pooled force which would reduce the number of nuclear powers by one; it meant a force which the two Governments would work jointly to construct.

In reply to Mr. Buchan's questions: (1) On the technical level, it certainly would respond to France's aims because she had so much to gain from Britain. But Britain had only a limited technical interest, and if her nuclear tie-up with the US were in jeopardy it would not be to Britain's advantage. And if France were to have access to American techniques, why not have access directly and not through Britain? On (2), it was for the non-nuclear powers themselves to say whether a Franco-British force would satisfy them. On (3), he did not believe an exclusively Franco-British system would be conducive to European unity. He had grave doubts about the wisdom of making an effort in the nuclear field before resolving the question whether a European community which could be responsible for the whole of the area was obtainable.

Professor Howard said a Franco-British arrangement would have to be a mixture or a compound. A mixture would not achieve very much; it would be too likely to split open in a crisis. But a compound raised several interesting questions. The two forces would have to be integrated on the level of manufacture; there would have to be a single integrated operational force, an integrated system of command and control. The difficulties were obvious; but if it were found possible to overcome them, he saw no reason why other European nations should not be brought into the Anglo-French sharing of resources. If it were found feasible to have an integrated Anglo-French force, it would be a very short step on to invite other European nations to share in targeting and manning. And it would be no more difficult from the point of view of public opinion.

Signor Albonetti supported Professor Howard's last point. Unless other European nations were brought in, an Anglo-French force would create more problems than it would solve.

Mr. Beaton said there were three main aspects: (1) Targeting and planning; (2) firing; (3) development programmes and the building of equipment. On (1), the most important consideration for France and Britain was to have common targeting with the Americans; a separate Anglo-French exercise would have no meaning so long as NATO were in existence. On (2), firing, he had already expressed his view. The British would only accept such a scheme on the basis of a mutual veto. Although a mutual veto would reduce the deterrent effect of both forces, a force on that basis should not be excluded. On (3), Britain had no particular requirement for warheads or bombs. Her problem was delivery systems. She was going to buy Polaris, the best delivery system in the world. This agreement could not be matched from the technical point of view; but it had caused great political strain and might never be repeated. In another situation the British Government might well consider combining with the French to produce a cheap weapon.

Général Beaufre agreed that an attempt was being made on the French and British side to think in terms of reducing expenditure by working in common (for example on the Concorde airliner project). There was a difficulty about nuclear weapons because of the British-American tie-up. But there might be a possibility for Franco-British co-operation on vehicles - rockets or submarines - where the British-American nuclear problem did not come into the picture.

He entirely agreed with Professor Howard that it would be as easy from the internal political point of view to share with the rest of Europe as with the French. He believed that if we were to push in that direction, since a technical and financial interest already existed, perhaps we could make progress in breaking down the political barriers which were so strong at the present time. A priori, some attempt at a Franco-British system, even if it did not get very far, was in a sense an attempt at a European solution, because the day when Franco-British differences were resolved we should be on the road to a European system.

Mr. Buchan made two comments: (1) the British were nearer this than they used to be, in the sense that they no longer conceived their nuclear force as fulfilling a world-wide function. (2) A central problem for Europe was that none of its countries was strong enough to act as a guarantor for the others. It was conceivable that a new Anglo-French combined force could be strong enough to act as a guarantee force for Europe. He was doubtful however whether the non-nuclear powers in Europe would share this view.

Dr. Sommer said that from the German point of view there were four possibilities of nuclear organisation within the alliance. In order of undesirability, these were: (1) independent national forces; (2) an Anglo-French force; (3) a European force; (4) an Atlantic force. Any of the first three were acceptable as transitional stages towards an Atlantic deterrent, but they were unacceptable as ends in themselves.

He did not believe that any of these projects would work out on a strictly military level. European unity had to come before a European nuclear force, just as an Anglo-French confederation would have to precede a combined force. He endorsed Général Beaufre's and Professor Howard's conclusion that the political difficulties would be no greater for a larger project than for a limited one. If an Anglo-French project were feasible a European project would be feasible; and we should then be well on the way to an Atlantic project.

Herr Cornides agreed about the four alternatives, although they could not all be transitional because we must end up somewhere. He believed the Germans were undecided whether they wanted to end up with a European, or bipolar, solution or with an Atlantic solution. Some support had been expressed for both alternatives, but the majority were undecided and wanted to keep the door open as long as possible, depending on the progress which France was willing to accept towards European political integration. If the French were too negative towards political integration, then the Germans would move via the MLF in an Atlantic direction. A decision could not be deferred indefinitely, particularly because of the problem of the lead-time which Mr. Buchan mentioned. However, the issue could be kept in the air for another two or three years before the degree of progress, or the lack of it, within the European Economic Community would force a decision.

Signor Albonetti suggested that Germany could combine membership of the MLF with the "open door" policy; the European solution was always open.

Dr. Sommer said that the Government and Opposition alike in Germany were in favour of the MLF precisely because it left open this option. It might turn out to be a safety-net for Britain and France; it might lead to an Atlantic federation; it might develop into a genuinely Atlantic deterrent to which the Americans would subscribe the bulk of their nuclear arsenal. It might lead to nothing at all - but in that case what would be lost?

Signor Spinelli maintained than even if a Franco-British force were able to act as a nuclear guarantee for Europe, it would still be unacceptable. Why abandon the American guarantee in favour of a Franco-British guarantee? All the arguments about the United States appreciating her own or Europe's interests differently from the Europeans themselves applied to France and Britain. The US was in fact more likely to support Europe in a crisis because she had an interest in maintaining a balance with the USSR which Britain and France did not share.

Général del Marmol believed that if there were any merit in a Franco-British force, it would be an advantage for Europe so long as it were organised in a European framework.

Mr. Haagerup said that public opinion in Denmark did not like to face the fact that the American monopoly had gone. There would be no enthusiasm about changing the present position. The Danish attitude towards an Anglo-French nuclear partnership would be heavily influenced by progress being made at the same time in the economic field, since Denmark was very preoccupied with the economic aspect of the division between the Six and the Seven. Norway would share this view, but to a lesser degree because of her less exposed economic position.

Scandinavian opinion towards a European deterrent would evolve out of either ambition or fear. Ambition was not a factor. If the detente continued, fear would lessen. We ought also to anticipate a determined Soviet peace offensive; the USSR was already propagating the idea of nuclear-free zones. Taking into account also a feeling of reluctance towards nuclear weapons, it was likely to prove very difficult to arouse any enthusiasm in Scandinavia for any nuclear project. If a nuclear force were the by-product of a far-reaching European economic union it might be possible to envisage "sleeping partners" in the North. But unless the economic interest were parallel with the nuclear interest, given that in four years' time a decision must be taken on the future of NATO, a decision to create a nuclear partnership in Europe might arouse a strong negative reaction in Scandinavia, particularly if the decision were taken in the face of American opposition.

Dr. Ørvik broadly endorsed Mr. Haagerup's observations. He emphasised one factor which would be more important for Norway, and that would be the loss of British leadership. The attitude of the British Labour Party on nuclear weapons weighed very heavily with the Norwegian Government. An Anglo-French merger would not be very popular because it would identify Britain more closely with European affairs. But if such a merger could be achieved, the symbolic effect would be very much greater than the gain in terms of military efficiency. It would then be much harder for the United States to maintain her dislike of the idea. The American position was very important to Norway. However, if Britain and France could carry through such a merger before other European countries came in, it would be more acceptable.

Implications for European Unity

Mr. Buchan suggested terminating the discussion of an Anglo-French force and considering whether a decision to create a European force would in principle be likely to hasten European political unity.

Signor Albonetti observed that a Norwegian had just pointed out that even an Anglo-French deterrent would anchor Britain to the continent. If Britain made a public offer to Europe tomorrow, this would have greater significance than her 1961 declaration in favour of joining the Common Market. But there was no escaping the fact that European unity was a political problem and no supra-national defence arrangement could be built except on the basis of political unity. Nuclear discrimination was an obstacle to unity and therefore any discussions on political union must involve discussions on nuclear sharing. How could there be any real political unity in Europe when two of the leading countries had nuclear weapons and the others did not? But to speak of the nuclear factor as a "federateur" in Europe was exaggerating.

Mr. Buchan agreed that it was very hard to see a practical decision taken until there was a political union. On the other hand, convergences of objective and decisions in principle could be reached without political machinery.

Signor Spinelli said that in a sense deciding to create a European nuclear force was the same thing as deciding to create European political unity, because otherwise a European force had no meaning. But the question looked rather different in the context of the present political situation. The Common Market had made sufficient progress economically to be able to make a start on political unification. It was still open for Britain to join the Six (which he sincerely hoped she would do), although he believed Britain would only be induced to take up negotiations again if she saw the Common Market going full steam ahead. But this European process was taking place in the framework of an Atlantic defence and foreign policy. A European nuclear force only made sense if it were intended to be independent of the American force. He was convinced that such a decision would make things much more difficult in Europe. In each of the countries of the Six there was a trend of opinion favouring European unification. But once the nuclear problem were posed, public opinion would be divided and the degree of unity achieved so far would be broken.

Admiral Bos said that in Holland the reason for wanting to maintain the present position was the overriding desire to keep the level of tension in the cold war as low as possible. It was believed that stability would be greatest if there were only two nuclear powers, although they were not too worried about the existence of the British force. There was a little more anxiety about the French force, because of uncertainty about French political intentions. But there would be an outcry if it were a question of Germany having control of nuclear weapons. That was why German membership of NATO was accepted. The strength which Germany contributed to NATO was appreciated; but there would be the strongest opposition to any decision to create a European force in which Germany would participate on equal terms with other countries. Because of this consideration, and because they understood the opposition of Germany and Italy to discrimination, they were convinced that the best solution would be to rely on the American nuclear guarantee.

SATURDAY MORNING - 1st FEBRUARY

DISCUSSION ON REQUIREMENTS FOR A EUROPEAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE

1. Minimum Requirements for a European nuclear force to become operational in 1972, in terms of command and control and in terms of political institutions.

Herr Cornides (in the Chair) suggested that members keep to the definition of a European strategic nuclear force set down in the French paper - a military instrument independent of the American force. It was clear from Friday's discussion that nobody wanted a European force to substitute for the American force, only to supplement it. Therefore co-ordination of the European force with the American force could be assumed.

General Beaufre said that since the abandonment of the massive retaliation theory the problem was one of continuous modification of planning in the light of events requiring a whole series of political decisions. As the game could be bilateral, a continuous evaluation of one's own forces and military techniques was equally necessary. The survivability of forces was as important as the reliability of means of delivery. These were fundamental problems for the Americans, what they meant by command and control. But surely Europe was in a different situation. Survivability was not of primary importance for a European deterrent, because if a general nuclear war broke out Europe would perish in any event. A European force must have a certain capacity to be credible, but its essential role was before the outbreak of hostilities, not afterwards, i.e. to exert an influence for the political evolution of a crisis. Flexibility was the most important consideration, because we could not let ourselves be in the position of having only two buttons to press. But Europe did not need a completely protected system sure of survival in a bilateral situation, because its role would then automatically pass to the United States.

Admiral Bos dissented from General Beaufre's reasoning. He agreed that the force was intended primarily for political use; but he felt that without survivability it would not be credible even as a political instrument. A European strategic force would already have the disadvantage of being extremely small; if it were "soft" as well it would be useless.

General Beaufre replied that he was referring not to the force itself but to the control system, the large, complex and highly expensive network of communications, calculating machines and so on which even the Americans found it difficult to protect. Of course our weapons must be as invulnerable as possible.

M. Vernant supported General Beaufre.

M. de Rose maintained that even though the system of planning, targeting and control might be rudimentary, it must exist so as to permit autonomous decisions and employment of the European force independently of the American system. At the same time, the European system must be usable with the American system, which was superior but very complicated, so that the two forces could co-operate operationally.

Mr Beaton assumed that everyone was talking about a wise and responsible European system. It would be extremely unwise if it were designed to bring in the American force against their will, because that would lead the Americans to loosen their military bonds with Europe. He agreed with M. de Rose that the European force must be usable with the American force.

He considered the basic requirements were: (1) there must be some kind of defence community system which would control all the effective armed forces in the European area; (2) there must be speed of decision and ability to make discriminatory decisions - e.g. to sacrifice one area in order to save another; no system with built-in national vetoes could be effective. The fundamental question was whether something like the NATO technique could be employed, which was a commitment by sovereign states operating by unified command once decisions had been taken, or whether a system akin to the EEC Council of Ministers could be created which would gather together the remaining national military resources and would work together with a planning authority. Such an arrangement was theorectically conceivable, and had the advantage that even if it were unworkable in practice the Russians dare not take this for granted.

Mr Buchan agreed that an organisation such as Mr Beaton had described would be capable of taking planning decisions - on the size of the force, its location, targeting etc. But he considered that a very different arrangement would be necessary for crisis management. In the US, the USSR and France there was already one man with supreme authority over the State, and the British Prime Minister was becoming more like a President partly because of his responsibility for nuclear weapons. Therefore if the European force were to constitute a deterrent and to be usable in a blackmailing situation as a counter-threat to Soviet threats, credibility demanded our envisaging one man having a great deal of power over the total defence of the area as a whole, as Mr Beaton had pointed out, so that he could take a decision to commit the force. Such a man could hardly be a soldier; he must command great public confidence and he must be popularly elected. Therefore crisis management of a European force which was something more than European national forces, would seem to demand an elected President of Europe.

Professor Howard attached great importance to Mr Buchan's point about public confidence. One reason why the peoples of Europe and Britain were at present prepared to entrust their defence to the President of the United States was the immense strength and credibility of the American deterrent. But a European deterrent would not be so credible, simply because only the Americans could prevent the USSR from retaliating against Europe with devastating strength, and the general public would therefore be much less certain about trusting their defence to a European crisis manager. Also, the nearer one got to an efficient form of crisis management the further away one got from the roots of public opinion. In a crisis, in Britain at least, there would be enormous reluctance to entrust our defence to any form of European political organisation. There would have to be a very great change in European society and in the political structure of Europe before this could come about.

Signor Albonetti considered that the important thing about crisis management was to combine will and capacity. What were the alternatives? (1) The President of the United States acting on behalf of Europe. He had tremendous capacity, but his will might not correspond to that of Europe. (2) The Head of each of our national States. They had the will because they would be directly involved, but where was the capacity? (3) Mr Buchan's suggestion of an elected President of Europe. This would be the ideal solution but looking at the political realities of today we must be content with something more modest. He would like to see discussed the idea of a European coalition, which would still have advantages over national deterrents or leaving our defence to the President of the United States.

General Beaufre felt that we must think in terms of transitional solution. He was thinking along the lines of a "team" (which he defined as a football team rather than a committee) - men who would know each other's minds and could operate as a team, who could carry out a policy of dissuasion without making mistakes. If we admitted the hypothesis of such an intermediate solution, it should be possible to conceive a system among the sovereign states which in time of crisis management would become a team of leading statesmen; representatives would not do - in time of crisis the leaders always consult each other. A TV circuit could keep them in continuous contact. Perhaps in time this team would become institutionalised. On Professor Howard's point about public opinion, he maintained that even if there were a single leader, a President of Europe, that man could not in fact take a decision in isolation; there would have to be consultations.

Signor Spinelli disagreed with General Beaufre. In a situation of crisis management, if a decision were to be taken it could only be taken by one man. If it were not the President of the United States, it would have to be another man in Europe, otherwise the European force could not function as an effective independent deterrent. On the other hand he did not believe that this idea was realistic. European unity was very easily spoken of, but it would be a very long time before there was the fundamental unity which would be able to focus itself in one man, the President of a united Europe, with the ability to take such a decision.

General del Marmol supported Mr Buchan's suggestion as a long-term solution. There was no problem at any time if Europe were attacked. But in a crisis where there would be room for diplomatic activity, which was more likely, he believed General Beaufre's intermediate solution was feasible. Of course public opinion was not ready for any such move now - but we were talking about 1972 and public opinion could evolve.

Dr Ørvik agreed with Professor Howard that public opinion was certainly more in favour of trusting the Americans. But the situation had changed, and the problem must be faced of getting over to the public the fact that automatic nuclear response by the United States was no longer automatic in the same sense. He agreed that a committee would be more acceptable to public opinion as a transitional arrangement, although it would be less effective than a President. It would be very difficult to argue realistically for any independent European nuclear force in terms of organistion without doing something to explore the concept, but he was doubtful about how to present this to public opinion.

M. Vernant also supported Mr Buchan's and General Beaufre's conceptions. The problem for the moment was how to achieve the "team", which would probably be with us for a long time. He felt that this team ought really to consist of two teams: one composed of government leaders from the Confederation of Europe, which would no doubt having planning bodies under it, what we should call the "European team"; and another team linking Europe and the United States which would comprise leaders of government from France, Britain and the United States. This second team was necessary since there would remain a certain number of questions which would be more easily dealt with among the three nuclear powers than in a confederal framework.

Herr Cornides objected that in that case we should have no more than a multinational system - so where was the independent European force?

Dr Sommer observed that some members who wanted a European deterrent but did not see a President of Europe had hit upon the team as an interim solution that would give us the deterrent without the President. But he agreed with Herr Cornides that this would still be a multinational set-up. The European TV circuit was all very well; but as long as we made it clear that we did not want to force the Americans into a war against their will the American President would for all practical purposes have a veto over any European deterrent - and in those circumstances what was the point of it?

Mr Buchan appreciated the argument for a team, but maintained that it still did not solve the problem of arriving at a decision. In all the crises so far that had even implied the use of nuclear weapons there had been a tremendous divergence of views, even within the national governments. He was afraid a TV circuit might lead to paralysis unless somebody were charged by the others, by some institutional means, with responsibility for deciding. The difference between European and American consultations was that the American President had the power, and the obligation, after all the arguments had been thrashed out, to take a decision. He did not see any European political figure being able to do this without a radical change in the political framework of Europe. The crisis the team would be presented with would be the one that had never crossed their minds. Therefore without a man, who in the last analysis could take the final decision, the European deterrent would lack credibility.

Mr Beaton considered the important question was whether the Russians would be sure that the team could never come to a decision.

Signor Albonetti appreciated Mr Buchan's point, but the team was the best solution they could hope for in the present situation. Who might the President of the United States be in ten years' time? He would rather put his trust in a European deterrent, even though based on such a weak structure.

General Beaufre replying to a question from Dr Sommer, explained that he saw his "team" as an evolutionary system. For a considerable time the team would operate within the States of Europe, but the members would gradually become European instead of national in principle. At the end one man would evolve whom one could presuppose to be a President of Europe. This man would be in a position to take a decision, but he would not do so, unless he were an exceptionally strong personality, without consulting the other members of the team to arrive at a concensus of opinion.

M. Vernant expressed agreement with General Beaufre's concept once we arrived at the stage of having a President. His concern was about the intermediate period. This was why he wanted to see a team including the two nuclear powers and other non-nuclear powers who wanted to work for the creation of a European force. If the Europeans wanted a single united Europe but were not prepared to accept national co-operation in the interim, we should never make progress.

General del Marmol agreed that we must begin on the basis of the existing nuclear powers. However, the team must represent Europe as a whole rather than their national governments; the privilege of possessing nuclear weapons did not necessarily confer the right upon any member of the team to be considered more representative of the whole of Europe.

Signor Albonetti urged that a definite time-scale be kept in mind and that as many common European enterprises as possible be undertaken to prepare for this team. He was convinced that once the Europeans took a firm decision to make the necessary effort in creating such a deterrent and thus demonstrated their will to defend themselves, negotiations with the United States would be of a more equal character and the Americans would offer them some help.

Professor Howard argued that while it might be militarily necessary and logical to create a President of Europe, there were other aspects of the problem and this decision might prove undesirable in the light of all the factors. It would therefore be unwise to commit ourselves to a particular political structure on purely military grounds.

M. de Rose believed the important thing was the recognition that a European force must be submitted to a strong political authority, and that there was determination to resolve the enormous difficulties involved.

Herr Cornides summarised the discussion so far. It seemed that to get from our present stage, which was less tightly knit than the British Commonwealth, to the stage of a President of a European Federation with final responsibility over the European deterrent, we should have to pass through two intermediate stages: first national co-operation between the European nuclear and non-nuclear powers, and then the creation of a Confederation of Europe led by a "team".

2. The Minimum Size, Weapons System and Cost of a European Force.

General Beaufre said the figure depended on the degree of penetration required, i.e. how much of the force, and which weapons, must reach the target. He did not think a very high figure was required, since the force was intended to operate on the political rather than on the military level. It also depended on our capacity and on our estimate of Soviet capacity. He believed 100 thermonuclear bombs would suffice.

Mr Beaton considered the vulnerability of the European force on the ground was a factor to be taken into account, as well as penetration.

M. de Rose maintained that the number of weapons which would reach their target was the major consideration. We were not trying to compete with the American system or to have a second strike capacity. On General Beaufre's figure, 50% penetration meant 50 Polaris missiles.

Mr Buchan pointed out that it would be tremendously risky to trust the fortunes of Europe to one particular weapons system - by 1972 Polaris might have become too vulnerable. Surely Europe must have a mixed land-based missile and aircraft force, as well as Polaris submarines. He believed that taking into consideration the factors about aircraft penetration, mal-function of missiles and the fact that some of the Polaris submarines would always be out of commission, a figure of about 500 units must be envisaged.

M. de Rose mentioned an article by M. Faure in "Le Monde", which had impressed him, advocating that a European force should have a strategic capacity for a counter-economic potential mission. This was important, because the mission of a force determined its type and number of weapons. The objective of a European force had to be limited and precise. He disagreed with Mr Buchan's view that it must be capable of inflicting a disastrous attack on the USSR (the only enemy he envisaged for years to come). Obviously a European force could not hope to inflict on the USSR any damage comparable to what the USSR could inflict on Europe. This was not the point. Surely what Europe wanted to do was to make the USSR take account of her force. The USSR was today mainly concerned about her relationship with the United States and was making tremendous efforts to catch up with the latter's economic power. If the USSR were threatened by a force which could threaten her position as a great power by inflicting major damage on her industrial concentrations so as to slow down the pace of her economic advance, then the force would constitute an effective deterrent. Therefore a counter-economic potential capacity was more important for the European force than a counter-city capacity, He believed that in 1972, a European force equipped with a fleet of 6 or 10 Polaris submarines would represent a serious element of destruction for the USSR so far as her economic potential was concerned.

Professor Howard held that the first decision to be taken must be whether the force were intended as a first strike or as a second strike. If as a first strike, he thought the problems of political control would be almost insoluble. He thought too that any kind of general war bargaining would be out of the question, because the European force could not dispose of sufficient capacity. However, he did believe it feasible to think in terms of a second strike force which while it could not destroy the USSR, would be impossible for the Russians to wipe out in a first strike and would make them weak and totally vulnerable to an American first strike.

Mr Buchan agreed with Professor Howard about a first strike. It was probably impossible even for any national government to take the decision to strike first.

Dr Sommer asked about the 750 MRBMs in the western regions of the USSR pointed at Europe. The existence of this force was one of the motives for an independent European force and he questioned the wisdom of leaving it out of their calculations.

Mr Beaton could not conceive a European power operating with the kind of subliminal deterrent which M. de Rose had advocated and which would perhaps be more appropriate for France's resources than for those of Europe. The Russians were in a very tight position economically, but even they recognised a simple counter-city force as inadequate. The Russianshad considerable options available to them, particularly in Western Europe where they had a counter-force as well as a counter-city capacity. Therefore in a situation of bargaining, if the European had nothing but a counter-city capacity to oppose the range of options available to the USSR they would be pushed to the point of crisis as the Russians had been pushed by the Americans over Cuba.

Assuming that Europe preferred to go into a genuine great power posture, three basic systems would be necessary: (1) a low-level bomber, such as the TSR2 or the Mirage IV; (2) a land-based missile on trucks comparable with the MRBM; (3) Polaris missiles. He would like to put forward some figures as a basis for discussion: broadly speaking to develop the basic rocket industry required for a great power would cost $10 billion, a Polaris system with 30 submarines would cost $6 billion and a second weapon would cost $4 billion; this amounted to a budget of some $20 billion spread over 10 years at $2 billion a year. This was substantially less than 1% of the GNP of the European nations at present. This kind of programme would be within the resources of a united Europe and appeared a logical way to make a great nuclear power.

Mr Buchan pointed out that a 1% increase in the GNP in many countries represented a 25% increase in defence spending and for all countries an average of about a 15% increase. He also pointed out that 1% of the GNP was generally accepted as the figure the advanced countries must contribute in aid to the under-developed countries. Would not a European deterrent compete with priorities in this field?

General del Marmol supported Mr Beaton. Of course the force must be complementary to the American force, but it must also be credible and Europeans must understand the great financial effort involved. Coming back to the objective of the European force: the possibility of a Soviet attack must always be kept open. A nuclear attack was unlikely because the USSR was aware that this must precipitate a general nuclear war involving American retaliation. Much more interesting was the possibility of a conventional Soviet attack on some corner of Europe - in Berlin, Greece or Norway for example. The European force could serve either to dissuade such a conventional attack, or to intervene in response to it.

Professor Howard maintained that nuclear retaliation to a Soviet attack on Greece, for example, by a united European command would be as unlikely as nuclear retaliation by the United States. By creating a vulnerable first strike capability in Europe we would only make the situation more difficult.

Admiral Bos objected that the discussion was unrealistic. We really must be clear about what we wanted and what was feasible. To speak of a force which would be complementary to the American nuclear force (which anyway had no need of added strength) in one breath and to speak of using it in case the Americans did not wish to act in the next breath made nonsense of the complementary idea. There was no justification whatever for a European nuclear force unless it were of a size that in itself could deter the Russians. In the second place, members were talking loosely about deterring the Russians from attacking Europe. This was not a practical proposition. Given the presence of American forces in Europe, the Russians knew that any attack would trigger off war with the United States as well as Europe. The original idea of the European deterrent was to prevent the Russians from doing something we did not like politically; we wanted to be able to threaten the Russians ourselves with nuclear weapons in case the Americans were prepared to acquiesce in any Russian political move at the expense of Europe. This meant intending to use the European force as a first strike, and members must realise this. The European concern was about a political situation and the prime consideration was credibility. Were they really convinced that in an actual situation, if the Russians wanted to take some action in Berlin, for example, and the Americans were prepared to come to terms with them, that the Russians would be deterred by a nuclear threat from a European "team"?

Herr Cornides felt that if the basic issue raised by Admiral Bos were re-opened the discussion would never be concluded. As well as the question of a first or second strike capacity, there was also the question whether the force should be considered complementary to the American force or as a substitute for it. Mr Beaton's figures suggested a substitute force. Was there general agreement that such a force could be achieved by Europe without ruin? What about some figures for the forces suggested by Mr Buchan and General Beaufre?

Mr Buchan said that he and Mr Beaton agreed about the cost of the force. His 500 units would cost about $14-15 billion, but there were some very difficult things to cost. A better Early Warning system and a hard command system would be needed, and a lot of additional items that would need careful calculation.

Mr Beaton agreed that his figure of $20 billion would give 30 Polaris submarines and 800 Minutemen - say a 1,000 unit front-line force at any time.

General Beaufre agreed that the official estimate for the force de dissuasion was 50 milliard francs over the next six years, although the relevant Committee estimate was only 45 milliard francs. He felt that one great difficulty of this discussion was that his concept of dissuasion was so different from that of M. de Rose, so that their estimates of the size of the force differed.

Admiral Bos maintained that even if the effort of creating a European force were not ruinous, it would certainly be to the detriment of their conventional forces. And if it came on top of an effort to build up the conventional forces the financial strain would be severe.

3. The American reaction to a European force and what system of co-ordination could be envisaged; and the question whether a multipolar system of deterrence would be more or less stable than the present system.

Dr Ritter considered that accepting the idea of an independent nuclear force amounted to an intention to dissolve the bipolar situation to some extent. They must look at both sides of the coin. It was no use dreaming of having a third power between America and Russia and refusing to draw the consequences. Once the bipolar situation was dissolved, Europe would have to play a different kind of political role. She would have to be more neutral between East and West. The independent possession of nuclear weapons would give Europe a bargaining position; but her power would be much weaker than that of the other two poles and she would have to think out her new political role and in particular her relationship with the United States.

Admiral Bos submitted that the American reaction to a decision to create a European nuclear force would be very unfavourable.

Herr Cornides considered that the American reaction would differ according to whether it was a force de dissuasion with a complementary deterrent (as General Beaufre envisaged) or a completely different force which would change the whole international system.

Professor Howard suggested that the US would dislike either, but for rather different reasons. She would dislike a force such as Mr Beaton had suggested because it would be destabilising and provocative without adding to the strength of the West; she would dislike a complementary system because it would reduce the possibility of reaching general agreement with the USSR on questions like arms control and would make the world a more complex place.

Admiral Bos maintained his opposition to the term "complementary". A European force could not complement the American force militarily unless the policy were identical. Europe wanted to use her force independently and therefore we must speak of an independent force.

General del Marmol felt that the Russian reaction ought to be considered as well as the American. He was sure that Khrushchev would be very much opposed to having a European deterrent as well as an American deterrent, and this was one of the arguments in favour of the European force. He believed that the Americans would accept a European force as adding to the whole of the complex of the security of the alliance and would not consider it anti-American. General Norstad's proposal looking to a suppression of the American veto in favour of a three-power directorate showed that there were Americans thinking in the direction of a greater European say in the affairs of the alliance.

Signor Spinelli agreed that the Russian reaction was very important and that it would be unfavourable. It would face the Americans with the alternative of going back to an extreme cold war posture, or of telling the Europeans not to interfere. He was convinced the United States would do her best to prevent the creation of a European force. But if Europe persisted, a different perspective would open up. If Europe were an equal partner of the United States within the Atlantic alliance, other diplomatic possibilities would be available to her.

Dr Ørvik observed that everyone was saying that the Americans would not like this; what could the Europeans do that the Americans would like? It was clear that the present situation was unsatisfactory for everyone. He was not convinced that the Americans would dislike a European force provided the Europeans could win the confidence of the Americans, by a series of practical steps to make the force complementary in function, that they would not act against American interests. Provided the Europeans moved towards their deterrent cautiously and in full correspondence with the Americans progress could be made: and if they were able to evolve some political institution as well the whole concept would become much more attractive.

Mr Beaton thought it was obvious that the Americans would dislike a European force because they disliked anything which was a breach of their monopoly or outside their control. The great question was how would they react. The important element here was the true political intentions and character of the European effort. The Americans had two interests: (1) to reduce their commitment in Europe and (2) to be supported in their own interests in other parts of the world by strong allies. If Europe were taking her proper place in the world as the result of creating this force, then the American alliance would become secondary and the operation of a political interest would become primary. He believed that if properly handled, the Americans could be made to reconcile themselves to a European force.

Mr Buchan considered that the American reaction would be slow to formulate as plans for such a force would be slow to formulate. It might coincide with the beginnings of an equation of China's power with China's population. Since the real long-term American pre-occupation might well be with China, Europe might find herself taken at her word to a greater extent than she expected, and left to deal with Europe on her own while America looked upon the Pacific and Southern Asia as her sphere of influence. This would force Europe to the alternative not of a complementary force but of a force in its own right.

Signor Albonetti remarked that Mr Buchan's and Mr Beaton's observations were very useful in balancing the American reaction. It was not true that the Americans were on record as being against a European deterrent; even President Johnson, before he became President, had said he had nothing against a European deterrent unless it were outside of a European political institution. According to some American spokesmen, the MLF was seen as leading towards a European deterrent under European control. He did not expect the Americans to encourage the idea officially; but once Europe made progress with her force he believed a more positive reaction would be forthcoming from the American side. Britain had been long opposed to European union; but when European unity began to become a reality she asked to join in. The Russian attitude to European unity had also undergone a great change. He believed a European deterrent based on a European federation would stabilise the European situation; it would be preferable to relying on the present bipolar world.

Mr Buchan said that those Americans who talked about the MLF as a basis for a European deterrent were very irresponsible in claiming to know what the United States Congress would decide in 5-8 years' time.

Herr Cornides observed that those persons seemed to amount to 4½ in number - Rostow, Schaetzel, Owen, Bowie and half of Dean Rusk!

M. de Rose said that McGeorge Bundy was certainly against the idea. But the problem was not to know whether the US would look with favour upon a European nuclear force; the problem was the attitude of the United States towards a Europe which would be politically united and a greater power in world affairs than she was today. If the US said she favoured European unity, but did not want to accept the consequences of that unity, then there would be difficulties. The first consideration was to make it clear to the United States that the European force was not intended as a third force, that it would add to the forces available to the West as a whole. But of course the military aspect was not the only one. A bipolar West would be created instead of a bipolar world and this would inevitably give rise to certain problems. But unless the Europeans were prepared to make an effort to force the United States to move, they could wait until the end of the century for any Atlantic bipolarity.

SATURDAY AFTERNOON, 1st FEBRUARY

DISCUSSION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

1. Disarmament Prospects and the Geneva Negotiations

Mr. Buchan (in the Chair) opened the discussion by putting forward two recent initiatives for consideration: (a) the levelling-off of military budgets in the USA and USSR; and (b) the new Soviet and American proposals put forward at Geneva, of which the only new elements were the proposed freeze of nuclear delivery systems and the proposal to get rid of old bombers. As originally proposed by President Johnson the latter seemed intended more as an anti-proliferation measure than as a contribution towards disarmament. Khrushchev's response, that all bombers should be scrapped, was intriguing because he (Buchan) felt that at some stage, when the missile had evolved into a really reliable weapons system, the great powers would wish to get rid of bombers; because of the vulnerability of aircraft bases, special precautions had to be taken in a crisis and such precautions could in themselves make the crisis worse.

Mr. Beaton agreed that this was true so far as heavy bombers were concerned. He was convinced however that no nation sincerely wished to get rid of all bombers as such; he could not see the Americans abandoning their TFX programme, for example.

Général Beaufre said that he had been struck by the association of destruction or reduction with control in the Johnson proposal. The control aspect was crucial and must relate to what remained, not only to the planes that actually go on the bonfire. He wondered if the Russians would accept the necessary control.

Professor Howard considered that so far as obsolete bombers were concerned, it did not matter very much. Western intelligence was reasonably reliable in this regard, and provided we were satisfied that the Russians had burned the number agreed, he did not believe the number remaining, even if unverified, would be important for the East-West balance.

Dr. Sommer felt that the Americans had put forward this proposal as an experiment in atmospherics - they would mothball their obsolete planes anyhow, so why not try to get the USSR to reciprocate in destroying these planes and at the same time make a gesture of détente?

Mr. Beaton suggested that the American proposal for a freeze of nuclear delivery systems was a more substantive proposal of considerable scope. It meant the retaliation force would be kept to a very small force compared with what was envisaged at the moment, because the American plans went up to 1967. On the other hand, nobody could stop research and development. If the Russians took up this proposal seriously, there would be protracted negotiations and in the meantime the Americans expected to build up their stocks.

Dr. Sommer saw it as a concomitant of the "bonfire" proposal. He wondered however if it would not put the Russians into the position of arguing that the strategic delivery gap was on their side now.

Mr. Buchan said that there was no evidence that the Russians were worried about the missile gap. According to recent Soviet literature, an anti-city force of high-yield heavy ICBMs targeted on the US was felt to fit their needs in their particular situation, and there were few signs of alarm and panic over the American superiority.

Mr. Beaton observed that the American Government had not panicked over the missile gap either; it was Kennedy who had made such a feature of it in his election campaign.

Dr. Ritter supported Mr. Beaton, although he felt that President Eisenhower had been more concerned than he admitted in public. The argument had not been about the figures but about their interpretation, and President Eisenhower had not worried unduly because of his confidence in the U2.

Général Beaufre observed that the Russians did not need an offensive nuclear system because their political strategy was offensive; they only needed a defensive capability and what they had was adequate. It was the Americans who needed the offensive nuclear capability because their policy was more defensive.

Dr. Sommer asked about the new version of the Rapacki plan, which seemed to envisage only a freeze on nuclear weapons already in the zone covered by the plan. He thought this might be militarily acceptable now, because of the vast number of tactical nuclear weapons already located in Europe.

Mr. Buchan said that the Poles had retreated from the original Rapacki plan in the face of arguments that a nuclear-free zone would lose its value if the MLF, for example, existed and was equipped with weapons which could fire right into such a zone. Some Poles claimed that Soviet opposition to the MLF was the result of Polish pressure.

Général Beaufre agreed with Dr. Sommer that there were sufficient nuclear weapons available now. On the other hand the position could change, and he was particularly concerned about possible developments in the field of anti-missile missiles which could make many of our existing weapons unusable. It was impossible to stop research and development. There had been a great change in the mood of the world since Cuba; we were in a new era with new laws, not yet fully understood, which would probably exclude the type of war for which we had all been preparing for years. The problem had switched from defence to deterrence and perhaps to indirect warfare, and the defence problem had lost much of its actuality. At present it was felt that the two major adversaries could not indulge in nuclear warfare; but if one side developed an effective anti-missile missile or made some other break-through, the situation could change and it was dangerous to rely on the present stability becoming permanent.

Dr. Ritter felt that the last Kennedy statement on the unlikelihood of either the Americans or the Russians succeeding with the early development of an anti-missile missile was a very strong argument, particularly in view of the tremendous cost involved.

Mr. Buchan and Mr. Beaton supported Dr. Ritter.

Mr. Beaton agreed, however, that the Americans had been out-done by other countries in research, despite their enormous resources. They were fabulous at production, but not at research. The Russians had surprised them with the Sputnik and had also beaten them on rockets.

Général Beaufre maintained his position.

Mr. Buchan suggested that it might be worth calling in some scientific friends at some stage for a discussion on technological developments in the balance of power.

Général Beaufre mentioned that a discussion with scientists was arranged for the Paris Institute in February, and promised to keep Mr. Buchan informed.

2. Problems facing the Western Powers in East Africa and Southern Asia

Mr. Buchan began by sketching the background to the Malaysia situation. The basic element in Britain's colonial withdrawal had been an attempt (not very successful) to leave behind the most viable units. A United States of Malaya had been official British policy since 1946, but for many years had appeared impossible because of Malay-Chinese enmity in Malaya and Singapore. Once the Malays and Chinese agreed to sink their differences, however, Britain gave every encouragement to the formation of the Federation of Malaysia. Perhaps this policy had been pursued too hastily; certainly there were grave risks in linking North Borneo and Sarawak, which form part of the same land mass as Indonesia, with Malaya. In any event, the consequence was the determination of Sukarno to try and prevent North Borneo and Sarawak from becoming part of an independent State and if possible to prevent Malaysia from becoming an opposite pole of attraction to Indonesia in that part of the world. A subsidiary effect had been to encourage the Philippines to resuscitate a very old claim to part of Borneo.

From the military point of view, Britain was in for a very prolonged holding operation to keep Indonesian infiltrators out of North Borneo and Sarawak until the Malaysian Federation could build itself up into an effective state. There was a certain conflict of policy with the United States in that area, as in the Middle East. The Americans believed that security in both areas depended on developing the strongest local power into a responsible country having responsible relations with the West: the United Arab Republic in the Middle East, and Indonesia in Southern Asia. This was an admirable aim; but it conflicted with British commitments to Aden and the Gulf Sheikhdoms and to Malaysia. The British and American appreciations of the internal situation in Indonesia also differed. Britain believed that the Army, which was American-trained and pro-Western, was more likely to take over from Sukarno, whereas the Americans were more afraid of a communist take-over and were less prepared to be firm with Sukarno than Britain would like. Australia and New Zealand were not showing much solidarity with Britain. New Zealand's size and remoteness made her attitude understandable; but Australia was very lazy about defence and unwilling to become involved. He felt there was great determination in Britain to honour the commitment to Malaysia. One effect of the situation was to make it far less likely that Britain would be out of Asia (except for Hongkong) by 1965 or 1966 as many people had expected, and this had a bearing on her relations with Europe.

Professor Howard said that whereas, apart from the naval base at Singapore, Britain still had substantial economic interests in Malaysia and a great reason to see that State viable politically, her interest in East Africa had been more peripheral than anywhere else in the Empire. She had only become involved originally to check the slave trade, and she no longer had any substantial interests in the area. Recent events had been an appalling embarrassment to Britain and she hoped the shocks may have given an impetus to the development of an East African Federation that could build up some kind of security force capable of dealing with these problems. Britain should in fact be happy to see the United Nations build up an East African force. Britain had no national interest - merely a desire from the prestige point of view not to allow the collapse of something she had helped to build up.

From the military point of view, the British forces were less happy, technically speaking, about intervening in Africa than in Malaysia. Since 1945 all three services had been adapting themselves to deal with the type of operations required in Malaysia and had acquired a certain expertise; the prospect of operations there was not entirely unwelcome to British troops. But an internal security operation in East Africa had not been envisaged and there was no enthusiasm for it.

M. de Rose considered there was a fundamental difference between the problems and realities in Africa and Southern Asia. In Africa the main danger was chaos, whereas in Asia it was either military extremism or communism. In Africa police operations would be required - such as the United Nations had carried out in the Congo or Britain in East Africa - to maintain order and foster the beginnings of organised government, but with no political aim. But in Asia it was a question of winning, and the great problem was whether a military or a political solution was the right answer. The basic aim of both France and the United States in Asia was to prevent communism from establishing itself - but their policies differed. The United States was trying for a military solution, while France believed a military solution was not possible.

Mr. Buchan welcomed M. de Rose's analysis, but made the point that in Asia there must be at least a transitional military role because the military were the only forces of internal law and order. The Japanese during World War II had destroyed much of the basis of civil government in Southern Asia and the military were now playing what was properly a policeman's role. A great mistake of the United States in the postwar world had been to confuse the functions of the soldier and the policeman. There was no confidence in Britain that there could be any successful military outcome in Malaysia, but Sukarno presented all the appurtenances of a great military power and for the time being he had to be confronted by military means; in the short term Britain had to perform this task.

Dr. Sommer wondered how a neutral Southern Asia could be envisaged and who would guarantee it. The example of Laos was not encouraging.

M. Vernant did not agree that the Laos example was so significant. The results of the Laos Agreement had not been entirely negative, and would have been better if all the powers in the area and in Laos itself had adopted a truly neutral posture. American policy had been very much at fault. A political solution would be difficult, but provided that all the interested great powers and the states in the area recognised that neutralisation would be more advantageous than the present situation, he believed progress would be possible.

Mr. Buchan agreed that the idea should be explored much more; certainly the American operation in Vietnam was running into the sands. There was an argument for the United States giving bilateral guarantees to Thailand and the Philippines and abandoning the attempt to organise a collective security arrangement through SEATO. The prospects for genuine neutralisation of the Indochina peninsular depended a great deal upon whether it was considered to be on the strategic highway to anywhere. The United States had let it be known she was no longer so attached to the "domino" theory. Perhaps there should be something like the Eisenhower doctrine for the Middle East: instead of trying to have a military treaty organisation, to give a general Western guarantee of the integrity of the small Southern Asian states and keep the Chinese guessing as to what the Western reaction would be to any violation of it. Perhaps a deterrent force could be based on Australia, which was very suitable.

M. de Rose was doubtful whether such a deterrent could be effective in that area, given the great political instability and the difficulty of identifying the enemy.

Professor Howard agreed with M. de Rose that the problem was political subversion rather than military intervention and whether the presence of Western military forces made it more or less difficult for the Chinese to subvert. The West ran a considerable risk by propping up unpopular regimes that we disapproved of, simply because they were anti-communist. He presumed that neutralisation would not prevent massive Western economic aid and advice and keeping the states within our general sphere of influence. He felt that if we washed our hands completely, the Chinese would just flood in as they did in Korea.

Dr. Sommer was not hopeful about even a political solution for Vietnam. He did not see how neutralisation could stop subversion, or how any state of neutrality could be guaranteed once the Americans were removed from the scene.

Signor Spinelli maintained that the search for a political solution meant seeking greater confidence in the internal forces of the countries concerned. If those forces were able to prevent a communist state, well and good. But the West must learn to show a certain indifference to political developments in those countries. The establishment of communist states did not necessarily mean an accretion of strength to the communist bloc as a whole. If a country decided of its own will that it could only make progress through a communist system we should accept this and at the same time try to help them.

Professor Howard pointed out that this had in fact been United States policy towards China until June 1950 (when the Korean war began).

Signor Spinelli observed that if the United States had maintained relations with China, even an anti-American China, by now it would have been possible for the Chinese to begin to think that the United States could help them.

M. Vernant agreed with Signor Spinelli that neutrality could not mean preventing political evolution in a state which was guaranteed. Neutrality was no more than an international status, and attempts to limit the right of a country to determine its own form of government would be dangerous.

Mr. Buchan suggested that the problem would be easier if there were an opposite pole of attraction to China in the area, i.e. if Indonesia were a responsible or progressive country or if India were not so unpopular with other Asians. But there was no opposite pole for neutrality and past experience was not encouraging.

Mr. Beaton reported that the idea was under discussion in some American circles of a separate deterrent force for use against China which could not be used against the USSR: a Minuteman force based on Australia (because it did not have the range to reach China otherwise without passing over the USSR).

M. de Rose did not see how such a force could ever be used. It had been said that morning that it was impossible for the West to make a first nuclear strike, and this force could not possibly be used against China because of a coup in Vietnam.

Mr. Beaton agreed. But the United States had had a formidable nuclear capacity against the USSR long before the USSR had her own nuclear capacity, and this nuclear threat had been an important element in American policy, particularly when it was the main counter to the threat of the Red Army. He could not exclude that the United States would want to mount such a threat against China.

3. French Policy in the Far East

Mr. Buchan expressed sympathy with the French action in recognising China, which Britain had recognised since 1950. However, Britain had reaped little dividend from her China policy and her representative in Peking had had little success in fostering relations. He concluded that China did business with other countries when it suited her, irrespective of whether that particular country recognised her. He was interested to know to what extent the French decision was part of a fundamental revaluation of relations with China, an isolated incident, or a desire to go against American policy.

Général Beaufre explained that broadly the decision was concerned with two elements in French policy: (1) recognition that a military solution was not possible in Southern Asia; (2) the Sino-Soviet conflict. China presented a long-term danger, but in the short term this conflict helped the West. We could not yet tell how China's nuclear development would affect us. But it was important to prevent the Chinese from being thrown into the arms of the Russians. Neither of these perspectives was anti-American; the Americans disliked France's move mainly because of internal political considerations and a rational appraisal would show them that this move could be helpful to the United States in the long run.

M. Vernant added that incontestably China was a world power. She had demonstrated her will to have an independent foreign policy, and this had been a significant element for General de Gaulle in the timing of his decision. Personally, he believed the whole free world had an interest in maintaining normal relations with China - not to show approval of her policy but so as to give her an opportunity of expressing herself other than through violence. Recognition was a means, however limited, of bringing some reason and moderation into China's international conduct. A desire to annoy the Americans had not been a practical consideration. The United States was in danger of ending up in the same position in Vietnam as France had been in Algeria; the problem was whether France should let the Americans make their mistakes, or take some initiative herself to de-block the situation. He believed it was time for France to take the initiative.

M. de Rose endorsed the observations of General Beaufre and M. Vernant.

Mr. Buchan said there were signs of a move towards reconsideration of the American position, although not much could be expected during an election year.

Dr. Sommer felt the French initiative might hinder rather than help this tendency. He agreed with the French reasoning; it was the style of the action that displeased him.

M. de Rose commented that if he were opposed to this decision he would question rather what French diplomacy expected to gain in return for this move, which was highly advantageous to China. He could not see any immediate benefit in terms of Southern Asian prospects. However, it could open the way to a different appreciation of the internal situation in China and to creating flexibility for the possibility of a solution. The real question was, did this recognition lead to something constructive for the interests of the West as a whole? De Gaulle was a very hard opponent of communism and would not have made such a move just for China's benefit.

M. Vernant maintained that recognition of a state was not and could not be a matter of bargaining: if a state satisfied a number of agreed criteria it was entitled to recognition, and China's legal position was very strong.

Herr Cornides questioned the basis for the French assumption that the Sino-Soviet conflict meant that China was pursuing an independent foreign policy, and that this foreign policy would have to be permanently in conflict with that of the USSR. Sino-Soviet differences were indeed substantial; but he wondered whether their relationship had changed so much that one could speak of them as acting really independently.

M. Vernant agreed that one could not conclude anything definite about the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations. But there was at least the possibility that these relations would not be mended. They would be partly determined by Western policy towards China, and if the West wanted to exert any influence they must give China an opportunity for normal contacts.

Mr. Buchan concluded the discussion by quoting from a China News Agency dispatch on the French move, which was described as a major achievement for China's foreign policy.

4. Cyprus

M. Vernant asked what were the chances of the two Cyprus communities accepting a NATO task force; what was the position of the British Government; what was the position about the possible participation of the United Nations; which member countries of NATO would agree to participate in the force; which fundamental modifications would be considered acceptable to the Cyprus constitution?

Mr. Buchan replied that Britain had not expected the 1960 constitution to be permanent, but it had broken down sooner than expected and there was a real fear of a Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The British forces were subject to maximum strain, being tied down in many parts of the world, and could not raise more than 6,000 of the 10,000-strong force which it was calculated was necessary to prevent fresh communal rioting. Therefore an international presence of some kind was indispensable. A NATO solution was being sought because of Greek and Turkish membership of NATO, but this conflicted with President Makarios's desire for a United Nations force. Personally he thought a UN force would be more satisfactory, but he doubted whether it could be mobilised in time; moreover there would be difficulties over its financing and composition.

Professor Howard wondered whether Britain's NATO allies felt any obligation to help her in this crisis: what was the German reaction for example?

Herr Cornides said there had been no official German reaction yet, although some Bundeswehr units had been alerted. But he did not believe that the Germans were psychologically prepared to become involved. German attention was concentrated on the Central European problem and there was great reluctance to get involved in any colonial problems. Psychologically they were entirely unprepared to take up a role that other people might expect Germany to acquire.

Dr. Ritter doubted whether in any case German participation would be useful because of the strong reaction it would arouse in other parts of the world; the Cyprus problem too could only have a political solution, and he felt the presence of German soldiers would make that solution more difficult.

M. Vernant supported Dr. Ritter

Mr. Beaton observed that the Italians had shown a very different attitude towards Africa from the Germans.

Signor Spinelli agreed with Mr. Beaton. However, he did not see the new Italian Government becoming embroiled in a military expedition to Cyprus.

Général Beaufre enquired about the Ever-Readies (the British army first line reserve). He understood the difficulties about the Regular army, but on straight numbers, counting this reserve, there should be no problem.

Mr. Buchan replied that it would create a major political storm to put the Ever-Readies on a mobilised footing. But even if the men were available, he wondered whether a purely British commitment in Cyprus would be correct. The air base was a major interest for Britain and for her commitment to CENTO, but there were also implications for the solidarity of the NATO alliance. What was the NATO Council for, if such issues could not be discussed within it?

Professor Howard felt there were two aspects. Britain's allies had every reason to object to her asking them to pull her chestnuts out of the fire because she had been too lazy or too shortsighted to organise a proper military system. At the same time, the extent to which NATO could reasonably be expected to take charge of other things besides the simple confrontation with the USSR along its frontiers was an important point of principle.

Général Beaufre said it depended on our concept of NATO: either we make it a complete alliance and try to work out a common policy on all issues, or we keep everything in compartments and do not consider what is not strictly a NATO problem.

Mr. Buchan felt that the degree to which the kind of Europe the Commission had been discussing, able to adopt a common perspective and act as a common unit, could come into being would depend not only upon European questions but on how issues like Cyprus, Indo-China and the Far East could be handled as well.

There was general assent to this observation, which concluded the discussion.

I N S T I T U T E F O R S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

EUROPEAN STUDY COMMISSION

Minutes of the Third Meeting, held at
the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère
54, rue de Varenne, Paris VIIe, on
20th and 21st March, 1964

Present: Général d'Armée Beaufre (in the Chair)

Mr. L. Beaton
Vice-Admiral H. Bos
M. F. de Rose
Mr. N. Haagerup
Professor M. Howard
Dr. L.G.M. Jaquet
Herr U. Nerlich
Dr. N. Ørvik
Signor A. Spinelli
M. J. Vernant

Apologised for absence:

Signor A. Albonetti
Mr. A. Buchan
Herr W. Cornides
Général Baron A. del Marmol
Dr. K. Ritter
Dr. T. Sommer

1. VENICE CONFERENCE

Mr. Beaton reported on the progress made so far with the arrangements for the conference and on the response to invitations. It was agreed to circulate more detailed information, particularly with regard to travel and hotel accommodation, during April.

2. FIFTH MEETING OF THE COMMISSION

It was agreed that the date of the Fifth Meeting of the Commission be decided at Venice. In principle, however, it was felt that suitable dates would be Friday and Saturday, either 23rd-24th October or 6th-7th November 1964.

It was further agreed that the main subject for discussion at the Fifth Meeting would be the results of the Venice conference. The Fifth Meeting would also be the occasion to consider (a) possible fields of action for future study by the Commission and (b) the frequency at which meetings should be held.

INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

EUROPEAN STUDY COMMISSION

Summary of Discussion
at the Third Meeting,
held in Paris on
20th-21st March, 1964

FRIDAY MORNING, 20th MARCH

DISCUSSION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

1. Cyprus

Mr. Beaton opened the discussion. He thought the situation had raised a fundamental problem from the outset for both the British force and the UN force. Everything depended on whether the directive given to the UN force would be to keep the peace by stopping fighting of all kinds (i.e. by disarming Greeks and Turks alike) or by co-operating with the Cyprus authorities (i.e. disarming the Turks only). President Makarios believed he had manoeuvred the UN into the position where it had no alternative but to co-operate with the Greek Cypriot authorities and make permanent the predominent position of the Greeks and that he had made it impossible for Turkey to exercise her right of intervention. The directive given to the UN force would show whether this belief was correct.

If new constitutional negotiations were to be held these must take account of Turkey's interests and restore the tripartite position. There was a strong possibility, however, that instead there would be a gradual erosion of the position which the Turkish Government had established under the Zurich Agreement and the disappearance of the entrenched rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority. He did not know how and when the central decision about the UN forces would be taken; a great deal turned on the extent to which the Turkish Government had won commitments from the Americans in return for failing to intervene in Cyprus a few days beforehand.

M. Vernant saw two stages involving two distinct problems. The first stage was the cessation of hostilities and the problem was the directive to be given to the UN force, as Mr. Beaton had indicated. The second stage, and the second problem, concerned the political negotiations which were implicit in the Security Council resolution of 4th March, appointing a mediator charged with trying to bring about agreement on a just and durable solution. He was particularly interested to know how Britain envisaged a political solution might be found.

Professor Howard said, first, that so far as the British Government was concerned, the Zurich Agreement was a just and durable one and its disintegration had left Britain without a policy. Secondly, the intervention of British troops was comparable to the intervention of policemen - to restore order on the assumption that order was there to be restored. This police operation had proved entirely inadequate and it was obvious that the problem was much deeper than Britain had realised. Although

it was most unwise not to have alerted the UN earlier, even if Britain had had sufficient forces available to keep the peace she would still have been left with a fundamental political problem for which no immediate solution could be seen.

Mr. Beaton did not see any political solution which could be really satisfactory to both sides. The Zurich Agreement was satisfactory to the Turks; but the Greeks maintained that their great majority position ought to give them a right to sovereign control over the island. The fundamental problem was the rights of the minority, for which the system of the sovereign state made no provision. Therefore unless the Turks were to be partitioned, or deported, or slaughtered, it seemed that Cyprus could not be a truly sovereign state. He believed the UN presence in Cyprus, although officially on a temporary basis, would in fact become permanent.

M. Vernant agreed that some kind of UN trusteeship over Cyprus was conceivable in theory; but in terms of practical politics it was out of the question. Minority rights were indeed important; but this problem existed in many other states besides Cyprus. If the UN was to be brought in to every state where there was a minority problem it would find itself responsible for a large part of the world. He believed we must get back to the policy which had been Britain's policy under the Treaty of Lausanne - that there was no Turkish minority, only Cyprus nationals, and Turks must choose whether they were Cyprus subjects living in Cyprus or Turkish subjects living in Turkey.

Professor Howard observed that the Treaty of Lausanne was no longer relevant. The Turks who had decided in 1923 that they wished to remain Cyprus nationals rather than go back to Turkey had done so on the assumption that Cyprus would remain under British rule, not be ruled by a Greek majority.

Signor Spinelli did not see the Turks peacefully accepting the situation, as M. Vernant seemed to imagine. He believed the prospects for a solution to the Cyprus problem depended entirely upon the state of relations between Greece and Turkey. Until such time as they improved sufficiently to make a settlement possible, Cyprus would remain an open wound and a UN presence would be necessary to keep the peace. The Trieste problem had proved insoluble until relations between Italy and Yugoslavia improved, and then the problem disappeared.

Mr. Beaton suggested that if the present situation were allowed to continue for too long the old Greek feeling that the Russians were their protectors would be aroused. The Russians were the champions of the Greeks in the UN and were doing their best to foster the very old link between the two countries. Russia was in an ideal position to undermine NATO at one of its weakest points.

M. de Rose found the Russian support of the Greeks so as to upset the stability of NATO quite normal; but the US support of Turkey was rather paradoxical.

Général Beaufre agreed; if the Russians and Americans both supported the Greeks there would be no problem, because the Turks would have no choice but to accept a settlement.

The Cyprus conflict had grave implications for NATO because of the strategic location of the island. Although there was no longer a Turkish Empire, the Turks were still a very imperialistic people with a tendency towards reconquest. Bad feeling between Greeks and Turks was very easily brought to the surface. If Russia continued to champion Greece and the United States to champion Turkey, we could risk seeing a break-up of the right flank of NATO.

Professor Howard wondered how serious the strategic question really was. Obviously Greece would accept maximum Soviet support, although she was unlikely to reach the point of becoming a Soviet satellite, and the Russians would undoubtedly exploit every opportunity to make life more difficult for us politically; but the real strategic force in the area was the American VIth Fleet, and everyone knew this. Certainly NATO's position would be weakened politically, but in terms of the strategic confrontation the military danger was not likely to become extreme.

M. de Rose and Général Beaufre both agreed that the danger was political rather than military, but they felt it was none the less serious for that.

Dr. Ørvik considered that the Soviet attitude towards the Cyprus situation illustrated a new approach: to pay much more attention than hitherto to NATO's flanks. This crisis gave the USSR opportunities which would establish a pattern for her policy towards the West. He agreed that the Greek reaction to the Soviet campaign would be more likely to take the form of neutralism than direct co-operation with the USSR. He was interested to know whether there had been any official Greek reaction to the suggestion that de Gaulle should act as a mediator.

M. Vernant said one must distinguish between Greek opinion and Greek Cypriot opinion. Greek opinion was in general more favourable towards France than Greek Cypriot opinion. He felt that Makarios's suggestion had been a tactical move rather than a formal request. The idea of a mediator was now, however, embodied in the UN Security Council resolution.

He pointed out that strictly speaking the Russians were supporting not the Greek Government but the Cyprus Government. Thus the USSR was enjoying the favour of all the newly independent states which feared having UN intervention in their affairs imposed on them, as well as making a bid for Greek favour.

Replying to Signor Spinelli, he could not accept the possibility of a Trieste-type solution for Cyprus. The circumstances of the two territories were quite different. Cyprus was an independent sovereign state and a member of the United Nations, and above all she prized her independence. No matter how far Greek/Turkish relations improved, the Cyprus problem could not be solved by means of an imposed solution. Any kind of trusteeship status was completely unacceptable to Cyprus - and so was partition. The Turks were a very small minority and thoroughly intermingled with the Greek population. An attempt to group together all the Turks on an island the size of Cyprus would result in a concentration camp.

M. de Rose compared the situation in Cyprus to the situation in Palestine before the British departure. He well understood the Greek Cypriot objections to partition. But if no other solution were found possible, partition would have to come, as it had come between Jews and Arabs. Partition would not come about through the UN, because of the opposition of the smaller powers to this idea; but it would most likely impose itself in the end, whether we liked it or not.

Mr. Beaton said he had always assumed that partition would not mean creating a little Turkish Cyprus on the island, but that the partitioned section would be taken over by Turkey. In power terms the Zurich Agreement had tried to create a Turkish part of Cyprus by giving the Turks the right of intervention.

Signor Spinelli observed that this would be an Irish solution. He maintained that the central problem was that of Greek/Turkish relations and that time must be allowed for these relations to improve.

M. Vernant insisted that Britain had given Cyprus an unworkable constitution. If a corner of the island were Turkish there would be continuous Turkish intervention in Cyprus affairs. It would be a new application of the policy of divide and rule, and it would only push the Greeks directly into the arms of the Russians.

2. The Sino-Soviet Dispute

Signor Spinelli mentioned recent reports indicating that a final showdown between China and the USSR was imminent.

Admiral Bos confirmed knowledge of these reports; apparently the Russians had threatened the Chinese with exposure of certain deeds unless the Chinese fell back into line. He believed the recent visit to China of Rumanian leaders had been an independent effort to patch up relations again, although it had apparently been unsuccessful.

Signor Spinelli considered that Rumania's prime interest was in her own economic independence. Rumania had no ideological interest in China; she merely cultivated good relations with Peking in order to be able to cultivate good relations with the industrialised Western world, to which she badly wanted access.

On the Sino-Soviet dispute itself, although the whole argument was expressed in Marxist terms, what was really at stake was Russia's policy of detente and her relations with the third world.

M. de Rose pointed out that the differences were not confined to Peking and Moscow; they went right through the satellite countries and the non-communist countries. To the Russians their relations with the third world were tremendously important and they were not prepared to sacrifice leadership of it to the Chinese. In the third world Russia was fighting the Chinese as much as the West, and her estimate of how that battle was going would have a profound effect on Soviet policy.

Mr. Beaton suggested that the basic factor for the Russians was whether their policy of trying to seem a bourgeois country was getting results. The belief that the Chinese were an extremely dangerous, war-like people had been fostered from Moscow, so as to help Russia's policies seem moderate in comparison. This campaign had paid dividends; but with their sorties into Africa the Chinese seemed to be reversing this image of themselves. Many people were now wondering whether the USSR might feel as a result that there was more to be gained by reverting to a more extreme position. Personally he believed that Khrushchev was quite capable of putting the whole policy of detente into reverse for a year or two, especially if he had to contend with internal problems and problems within the Soviet Praesidium. If it were decided to develop a more pure communist line, this would have a lot of consequences

Signor Spinelli said that insofar as the Russians saw the problem as one of ideological conformity he could imagine them reverting to the tough line. On the other hand, Khrushchev was obliged to take far more account of Soviet public opinion than Stalin ever was. There was a general trend in Russia today towards a de-ideologising of the political struggle and Khrushchev could not ignore this pressure from the grass-roots.

Dr. Jaquet said that both parties had to express the conflict in ideological terms because communists could not afford to admit the existence of national conflicts; nevertheless the real differences were in national interests and political concepts. The differences were primarily about priorities; the Soviet decision taken in the late 1950's to give priority to her internal development had had wide consequences for Soviet policy. Possibly the jockeying for position in the under-developed countries was connected with this question of priorities: the Russians were prepared to advance their positions where they could, but not at the price of nuclear brinkmanship. The whole policy of detente was an element in this. As soon as the Russians decided to give priority to their own economic development, it was possible for them to go much further along the line of nuclear detente with the West than if, like the Chinese, they were giving priority to their own nuclear development.

Dr.Ørvik taking up Mr. Beaton's point, suggested that much depended upon the support the Russians could muster from non-communist parties. If they pressed on with their anti-Chinese line they would have trouble with many national communist parties (and certainly with the Norwegian CP). Therefore he expected the USSR to try to make up any lost support from non-communist sources. So far as the northern flank of NATO was concerned, there were no signs of a lessening of the Soviet "charm campaign" in that area.

Mr. Haagerup supported Dr. Ørvik. The Russians were making a great effort to create an impression of detente in preparation for Khrushchev's tour of the northern European countries timed for summer 1964. This campaign was if anything more strongly directed towards the non-communist parties because of their greater political importance, and personally he believed the Soviet campaign had a fair chance of success.

Dr. Ørvik added that there was some evidence to support this. Khrushchev had first announced his intention of visiting Scandinavia three years ago; at that time the reaction from all quarters except the communists had been very unfavourable. But this time, after his policy of detente had been in operation for a year or so, hardly any serious objections were raised to his coming. He believed the test-ban agreement had made a tremendous impression as an earnest of Soviet good-will.

M. de Rose suggested that the Soviet preoccupation with the Nordic countries might be connected with the fact that the Russians were already beginning to think ahead to 1969, when the Atlantic Treaty would come up for review. Obviously the Treaty would be renewed in some form. But if their policy of detente were successful, perhaps the revised Treaty would not have the same force behind it. This was their only way to get a solution of the German problem on their own terms. He saw a sustained policy directed against Germany's neighbours with the aim of playing up the German issue and isolating Germany as a bastion of NATO policy so that NATO would be identified with Germany. The German issue was an excellent one to concentrate on from the Soviet point of view because it was such a sensitive issue for other members of NATO.

Mr. Beaton doubted whether there was any reason to believe that there would necessarily be a renegotiation or even a renewal of the Atlantic Treaty in 1969. The Treaty itself was continuous; all it said was that after 20 years any member might leave if it gave notice. Thus the initiative rested with any member state which wanted to wreck NATO. The undertakings contained in the Treaty itself were very mild; most of the NATO superstructure had been superimposed on the Treaty. Considering the kind of difficulties facing the Atlantic alliance at the present time, would anyone be so unwise as to put the question of renegotiation on the table? It would be rash on the part of the Russians to assume that they would have an opportunity in 1969 to confound their enemies.

Dr. Ørvik dissented from Mr. Beaton's argument and supported M. de Rose. He considered that regardless of what NATO itself or the member Governments would like to do, there would be popular pressure to reconsider the Treaty; indeed pressure was building up already. The latest trend in Soviet-inspired agitation in Norway was to seek not complete rejection of the Treaty but rather a watering-down of it, so that membership of the Treaty would continue on paper but without any of the obligations which made membership active. This kind of agitation was much harder to counter than the old-fashioned direct opposition to NATO.

3. The Gomulka Plan and Arms Control Measures

Mr. Haagerup raised the question of the Gomulka Plan. First, he would like to ask Herr Nerlich whether he thought this Polish initiative would be in line with what M. de Rose had mentioned as the new Soviet policy of trying to isolate Germany in the sense that it would force Germany to oppose proposals that might be attractive to other West European countries. Secondly, during a recent visit to Germany he had been disturbed to find the Germans so quick to reject out of hand not only the Polish initiative but any arms control measure limited to central Europe. He felt that if the Germans continued that line, it would only give support to the Soviet policy of trying to isolate Germany.

Herr Nerlich replied on the first point that he was not sure whether the Gomulka Plan was co-ordinated with the USSR. Perhaps it now seemed to fit into the Soviet political line, but a few weeks ago it had appeared that the Russians did not welcome this Polish initiative.

On the second point, he felt that Mr. Haagerup had not been given an accurate picture of official German opinion. True there were strong objections to the Gomulka Plan; but official opinion was not completely negative on the whole issue of arms control. In private German opinion was more flexible than declared policy would suggest. In particular there was a certain sympathy for an American proposal on control posts which although it was primarily limited to the central European scene was considered to contain some political advantages. The main element of this American proposal (which had not yet been tabled) was a combination of control posts with (a) military missions attached to moving divisions in areas in the DDR and West Germany and (b) air surveillance.

Professor Howard enquired about a proposal which he believed had been floated that the Scandinavian countries might be interested in acting as a pilot area for arms control measures.

Dr. Ørvik said that such a proposal had been put forward and he had been associated with serious studies that had been made of it, in relation both to Norway proper and to Spitzbergen; they had found that in both cases the disadvantages and the dangers would be too great. Whether the Government would endorse their conclusions was another matter; but so far the Norwegian Government had flatly rejected any suggestion of creating a nuclear-free zone in Scandinavia.

Pressure from public opinion (which was partly Soviet-inspired and partly pacifist-inspired) was mounting to make Scandinavia a nuclear-free zone. Of course Scandinavia was a nuclear-free zone in fact; the campaign was aimed at getting this state of affairs formalised, the real Soviet aim being to get the introduction or use of nuclear weapons banned in wartime as well as in peacetime so as to make NATO activity in the area impossible. He did not believe that any of the Governments would bow to this pressure, however.

Mr. Haagerup said that the only proposal the Danish Government had made about a northern area as a trial ground for arms control measures concerned Greenland. At the UN, when disengagement was being discussed, the then Danish Foreign Minister Mr. Krag had offered to make Greenland part of an inspection area, but only on condition that it was part of a much wider agreement including presumably portions of Soviet territory too. So far as Denmark was concerned, because she had so many common interests with the continent, especially Germany, an agreement limited to Scandinavia as such was unlikely to find favour.

He endorsed Dr. Ørvik's observations about the campaign for a nuclear-free zone.

4. Latin America

M. de Rose said it was clear from de Gaulle's speech in Mexico that he envisaged an expansion of not merely French but European interest in Latin America and a more active policy on the part of the industrialised countries towards that continent. This theme would be developed during de Gaulle's tour in September/October which would take in a number of countries. He suggested it would be interesting to get the reactions of other European countries to this idea to see if we could arrive at a concensus of opinion on the role which Europe should play in aid to Latin America.

Asked by Dr. Jaquet whether de Gaulle had in mind the Europe of the Six only, M. de Rose said that he had not been specific as to what he meant by Europe. Certainly some studies on Latin America had been done within the Six. He believed however that de Gaulle's thinking had been broader and more political. The position was that America had a very strong economic policy in Latin America but her political position was very weak. The USSR had done very little in economic terms but had a very strong political position. Europe was absent from Latin America on the political level, although there were cultural links. De Gaulle had wanted to get the idea across that there were countries besides America and the USSR which could help Latin America. France was in the western camp, but she preserved her independence; they could do the same. They did not need to throw themselves into the arms of either Russia or Castro. France could help them a little on the economic level, but above all on the political level.

He believed that underlying this initiative was a new orientation of French policy which was still being worked out. It was therefore too soon to give serious consideration to this question now, but at a subsequent meeting of the Commission it would be very helpful to have an idea of the general European reaction.

Général Beaufre agreed that it would be most useful to get some discussion of this issue before de Gaulle's autumn tour. However, the next meeting of the Commission would be of a special nature. On the other hand, from a study of the proposed subject headings for the Venice conference it looked as if the Friday morning's discussion would give an opportunity for a general review of the world situation and no doubt the question of Latin America could be raised in that context. The presence of Americans at the discussion would if anything be advantageous.

There was general assent to this proposal, which concluded the discussion.

FRIDAY AFTERNOON, 20th MARCH

THE EUROPEAN VIEW ON AMERICAN STRATEGIC POLICY AND DOCTRINE AND ON COMMAND AND CONTROL IN NATO

/NB The first hour of this discussion took place on Friday morning, but for convenience this has been included with the afternoon's discussion/

Général Beaufre (in the Chair) complimented the British members on the excellent paper prepared by the ISS. He proposed to take the discussion in the order followed in the paper, and this was agreed.

I. American Strategic Policy and Doctrine

(a) Flexible Response

Signor Spinelli opening the discussion said that in the present situation the principle of flexible response was sound. There were two important consequences, however, to which he wanted to draw attention: first, that tremendous power and responsibility devolved upon the man who would have to decide among the various options; and secondly (as stated in the paper) that the continuously changing situation made it more difficult to apply the notion of alliance participation and extensive prior planning. Of course the solution was to have an international war cabinet, and the political cabinet which would precede the war cabinet; the problem was how to organise it. However, any prospective rationalisation of planning arrangements would have to tackle this problem.

M. de Rose suggested that if flexible response meant giving full iniative for conduct of a battle to the commander in the field, did that not imply a delegation of the military powers which the President of the US held now? This was the fundamental question and must be considered first of all.

He wondered about the distinction made by the Americans between flexible response and the graduated deterrence which was with us five years ago, before McNamara took office. Was there any real difference between these two concepts?

Mr. Beaton said that graduated deterrence implied the use of nuclear threats. In addition to the deterrent aspect, it was based on the premise that one could initiate limited nuclear actions on a retaliatory basis. The underlying thesis of the flexible response doctrine, however, was that one must give oneself a very large number of options, many of them non-nuclear. Thus flexible response also included an element of actual war policy as opposed to a threat of retaliation which was intended to avoid war; it was a war winning or an objective winning policy rather than retaliation.

M. de Rose added that the idea seemed to be, then, to increase deterrence by making your war policy more credible. But this depended on having adequate forces to exercise the wide range of options implied in flexible response.

Admiral Bos maintained that the difficulty about the doctrine of flexible response was that it was highly theoretical. People spoke about flexible response and controlled warfare as though it would be possible to fight a war in central Europe from Washington. Obviously there must be some previous planning, and certain major decisions could be taken from Washington. But the conduct of operations must be left to the judgment of the Commander-in-Chief on the spot.

There were three main considerations: (1) If flexible response had any meaning at all, our first reaction to any hostilities must be with conventional means. (2) R-hour was the authorisation to use nuclear weapons. Once this authorisation had been given, it would not be practicable to set an arbitrary limit on the scale of weapons which the Commander-in-Chief might use. Therefore SACEUR must understand that he would not have immediate authorisation to use tactical nuclear weapons. (3) But declaration of R-hour must not be withheld too long, otherwise it might come too late to save the situation. Perhaps there was a case for instructing SACEUR to try to use conventional weapons only for as long as possible, even after R-hour had been declared; but too great a delay could be dangerous.

If we would only examine how flexible response would work in practice, it would become clear that in reality there were not so many options. In fact he did not believe there would be any limited Soviet attack in central Europe because he did not see what the USSR could possibly hope to gain in such a case; but should a limited attack occur, it would have to be decided in a very short space of time whether we could contain it with the very limited conventional means at our disposal or whether we were to throw in everything we have.

Dr. Ørvik said there was no difficulty about accepting the principle of flexible response; the main problem was credibility, as M. de Rose had pointed out. He believed that something could, and indeed must, be done to strengthen credibility by building up the conventional forces which would make flexible response possible. There were areas in northern Norway which the Norwegian Army could not defend at all. There was an urgent need for some good mobile NATO forces which could be rushed in to deal with any emergency. There might be a small and seemingly insignificant incursion made for political reasons; such an attack would be swift and efficiently mounted and could only be countered by equally swift and effective conventional means on NATO's part. NATO's proud boast was that no territory covered by the alliance had been violated. If the USSR could disprove this statement by extending her control even for a short time over a small area of NATO territory without such a move meeting an immediate and effective response, the political impact of such an incursion would far outweigh its military significance.

Admiral Bos replied that he understood Dr. Ørvik's point, and he appreciated the very exposed position of northern Norway. However, in his considered judgment the USSR was extremely unlikely to take a step which would bring the whole of the West up in arms for the sake of gaining control over a few almost uninhabited mountains. From the Soviet point of view, this would be ridiculous.

Dr. Ørvik agreed that in strictly military terms Admiral Bos was quite right. But if a small incursion would look ridiculous to the USSR, might it not also look ridiculous to NATO? In this sense, a small incident was more to be feared, because of the greater political gains to be had from it. He agreed, however, that this was not a likely possibility, although flexible response should include planning for what we thought were unlikely contingencies.

Signor Spinelli supported Dr. Ørvik. One could act on the hypothesis that any incident must be treated as a massive attack because the USSR was only interested in a major war against Europe; in that case there was no problem and no flexible response either.

But he considered it far more likely that incidents might be provoked within NATO countries during a time of internal instability or frontier incidents occur on the Iron Curtain, perhaps involving East and West German troops rather than the USSR directly. After all, our doctrine of flexible response assumed that the enemy would make a flexible attack - it involved making a limited response to a limited move. This could only be done if there were a tacit understanding by the two major powers to limit any hostilities that might occur. Of course there was always the danger of escalation; but everything turned on the hypothesis that even in central Europe a localised situation was possible, and that the USSR would accept this.

Mr. Beaton dissented from Admiral Bos's argument. He maintained that in a real situation, decisions would turn on highly subtle or even seemingly trivial points which no military planning could possible foresee. Any kind of unpremeditated situation would involve thousands of politically complicating factors. A man like General Lemnitzer did not and could not have in his mind the whole United Nations situation and the mass of highly political issues that would appear in any real situation. NATO would be inviting disaster if it laid down a rigid clear-cut policy to a clear-thinking military man; we dare not become the slaves of our previous planning. It was true that the alliance problem was totally unresolved; but the doctrine of flexible response was a very correct proposition of how to deal with the situation.

Admiral Bos entirely agreed with Mr. Beaton. Perhaps there was a misunderstanding - his point was simply that the flexibility of the flexible response was not so great as people thought, in the sense that in case of war in central Europe tactics could not be led from across the Atlantic. The response could be divided into stages but that was all.

He accepted Signor Spinelli's argument about the possibility of local incidents provoked by the USSR so far as Berlin was concerned. But Berlin apart, he saw no opportunity for border incidents along the Iron Curtain. One could not even see the other side, let alone approach the border, because of all the fortifications designed to stop the East Germans escaping.

Mr. Beaton observed that if planning were only for probabilities, we could rely on perpetual peace. Who would ever have thought it probable that Cuba would go communist and then have Soviet missiles on her soil? We must face the fact that some improbables do come up. The opportunities for political change, even in central Europe, were great. The point was that our planning amounted to an insurance policy, and however unlikely the contingency against which we insured, if that contingency did occur the the terms of the policy would be all-important.

Général Beaufre endorsed Mr. Beaton's view that the time for planning was before a crisis broke, not after. But it would be doubly dangerous to be too rigid before hostilities commenced and too flexible after.

Professor Howard doubted whether the distinction between peace and war would be as simple in the future as in the past. He anticipated various actions of a military nature which either could or could not be considered as acts of war. Both sides would use their troops not in orthodox strategy but as pawns in a game, to seize territory for use as a bargaining counter.

He thought that Admiral Bos had interpreted the term flexibility too rigidly - i.e. as meaning the movement of troops on a battlefield instead of considering the whole of strategy globally and thinking about an infinite number of reactions to an infinite number of moves and situations which might arise without a conscious decision by either side.

Admiral Bos suggested it would be helpful if we defined what we meant by flexible response. He had been talking about it in relation to an attack in Europe, and particularly central Europe, and this was how it had been conceived in the US. Now, however, people were talking of it in relation to South Vietnam, Latin America and elsewhere. He did not see that the term "flexible response" could properly be applied to a global reaction which meant every response short of nuclear weapons.

Dr. Jaquet and Herr Nerlich supported Admiral Bos's interpretation of flexible response.

Général Beaufre considered that the points of view expressed on the one hand by Mr. Beaton and on the other by Admiral Bos were of fundamental importance, although Mr. Beaton's raised issues rather wider than the subject of this discussion.

It was important to distinguish between the problem of concerting action in an alliance after an incident had occurred and the problem of trying to get as imaginative a consultation as possible beforehand. The ideal would be complete discussion and complete co-ordination of policy in all its aspects and this was unattainable. But common understanding of the various issues was attainable, and indeed essential as an educational process. Even if nothing happened, the fact that through envisaging together the maximum number of hypotheses we had an idea of how opinion in our various countries would react and what the major political considerations were for each of our governments could only be helpful.

And if a crisis did arise, co-ordination of policy would only be possible if we knew already broadly what would be acceptable to one another. After all, if we did not want to surprise the enemy with our reaction, we surely did not want to surprise ourselves either.

Allied planning over Berlin demonstrated that it was possible to reach agreement on a response to every conceivable situation. Such agreement had not existed at the outset, it had evolved from a continuous study and exchange of views. The essence of flexible response was the fullest possible prior consultation, to avoid a unilateral decision being taken at the last minute.

This was not a complete answer to Mr. Beaton, but it was a necessary step towards a solution of the problem.

Mr. Beaton very much agreed with Général Beaufre's analysis. He agreed that common planning was essential; it could achieve a great deal and a certain meeting of minds. But, he felt, the unpredictability of situations led directly to a requirement for machinery to conduct political consultation at the highest level during crises. It was the only way to come through a delicate crisis as an alliance.

Général Beaufre said that then there were two types of organisation required: (1) organisation of planning, as an educational process as he had already indicated, and (2) the organisation of decisions, if possible in common. The first was an intellectual process, the second was one of communication. If each Head of Government could communicate over a closed TV circuit or special telephone line with the US President, consultation could be very speedy. Such an arrangement did not exist as yet; nevertheless we ought to have a more organised contact.

M. de Rose stressed the importance of knowing the aim of all this planning. If the idea was to substitute a hypothetical for an actual situation, it would not work. Moreover if the result was to harden opinion in various countries against consideration of certain possibilities, the person who had responsibility for taking a decision would not accept the limitation of action imposed by this planning. The aim must be to create and increase understanding of the nature of the problem, between the allies and in the alliance as a whole, rather than to seek to tie decisions in real situations to what had been decided in hypothetical circumstances.

M. Vernant suggested that there were two sets of considerations which were coupled: planning with decision, and flexibility with control, and it was the relationship between these two that gave rise to problems. For instance, if flexibility was the primary consideration, how could this be reconciled with the organisation of civil control over the military, or central command over local command, or control by the other allies over the decisions of those allies who would have to carry out the decisions?

He therefore thought it would be better to discuss point (c), Controlled Response, with Flexible Response, since these two were linked while (b), Counterforce Strategies, raised quite different issues.

Général Beaufre agreed with M. Vernant.

He suggested discussing two points in this section of the paper not yet touched upon: the reference on page 2 to substantially increased forces and on page 3 to "European reluctance".

Admiral Bos said part of his objection to the doctrine of flexible response was that it was far too widely discussed. Of course there must be a certain flexibility; his fear was that all this public debate would give the USSR too clear an indication of our military thinking. Secondly, there was real anxiety in Europe, and above all in Germany, that R-hour would not be declared or not declared soon enough to save their territory from Soviet occupation. He believed it would do more good if the Americans would talk less about flexible response and more about assuring the people of Europe that although there was no question of massive retaliation, nevertheless in the event of an attack a decision would be taken very soon as to whether a major attack was intended, in which case nuclear weapons would be used.

Professor Howard replied that the sort of public debate Admiral Bos deplored was inevitable in an open society. But it was not harmful - the sheer volume of studies and discussions on record made it much more difficult for Soviet intelligence to appraise Western military planning, especially after everything had been filtered through marxist spectacles.

Herr Nerlich stressed to Admiral Bos that the German position was not as expressed in the paper. The German position was (a) that there should be weapons in Europe capable of constituting a threat to the USSR, and (b) that the risk should not be kept calculable. That was not inconsistent with flexible response.

Général Beaufre said that therefore if the risk was not to be kept calculable, we should not say that in every case we would be reasonable. He agreed with Professor Howard that since our system could not be completely closed, we did better to drown the enemy in possible solutions.

M. de Rose considered that, judging from American literature, the Americans concentrated too much on the military problem; they thought in terms of flexible response to a military threat, whereas Europe was more concerned with a flexible response to a political threat. If the Americans had not intervened in Korea the West would not have suffered a military defeat, but it would have suffered a major political defeat. A comparable situation could develop in Europe. Flexible response was right so long as it was designed to prevent the success of a political move which could threaten our security, even if it were not expressed in military terms. And from the point of view of deterrence, it was necessary to envisage other than conventional operations.

Signor Spinelli agreed that the Americans tended to be too concerned with the military aspect. However, we must see things in perspective. The American guarantee to defend Europe arose from the problem of the world balance of power, deterrence in a global sense. Western Europe was quite capable in terms of population and resources of building up adequate forces to contain even a strong Soviet conventional attack by conventional means. He could not conceive that the USSR would possibly want to make a nuclear attack on Europe - she wanted political gains, not a nuclear-devastated wasteland.

Taking up Admiral Bos's argument, was it seriously suggested that in the event of hostilities the Germans would really prefer nuclear war to losing even half of their territory? He was convinced that from all points of view it would be wiser to envisage in flexibility the possibility of some of our territory being occupied before taking the disastrous step of unloosing nuclear war. If the Europeans really objected for doctrinal reasons to any policy which suggested that European adventuring would not be disastrous for the USSR (as the paper suggested), then their attitude was one of Götterdämmerung. In such a situation it would be in the best interests of Europe to sit tight, not to despair: more in our interest than in the American interest, perhaps. What was the use of a devastated Europe with the US and USSR intact? He did not want R-hour declared as soon as possible but as late as possible. So far as Europe was concerned, flexibility depended on our having capability to maintain war at the conventional level. And certainly he favoured an increase in our present conventional strength to make this possible.

M. Vernant said that therefore Signor Spinelli envisaged making war bearable.

Signor Spinelli replied that our policy must be to prevent war; but should it come, we must try to make it bearable.

Général Beaufre agreed with Signor Spinelli. However, there was a dilemma in that attempts to humanise war beforehand would make it more likely.

Professor Howard suggested that the dilemma was more profound than Général Beaufre had indicated: we would only be able to fight in a controlled way if we had made preparations- if we had a doctrine which was understood down to the smallest unit and people were trained in it. But the enemy would inevitably get to know about any such preparations, and this weakened our deterrent.

Général Beaufre suggested that the answer was to make as clear and open preparations for a "spasm" response as for a flexible response. With the two kinds of preparation we could keep the initiative - indeed without them both we could not be really flexible. Preparation for a "spasm" war was part of deterrence.

Mr. Beaton observed that this meant educating the American President: if he took in the declared policy and not the subtle policy he could take the wrong decision. The McNamara argument was that we were so strong we could afford the luxury of a policy of humanised war. He thought this was fundamentally right.

M. de Rose agreed about the dilemma and with Général Beaufre's suggestion for resolving it. He thought the two types of response could be reconciled by adapting ourselves to the enemy's political objective. If we were always to deny him his political aim, there could be no limit to what we would be prepared to do to stop him. It might be irrational to use nuclear weapons, but it would not be irrational to consider using them in a situation where a minor military defeat would mean a major political defeat. As Signor Spinelli had said, the USSR was not interested in a nuclear-devastated Europe.

Général Beaufre indicated another consideration: let us assume a small outbreak of hostilities amounting to very little in military terms but a great deal in political terms, as M. de Rose had in mind. The doctrine of flexible response would make this a minor incident in which bargaining settled the matter. But the enemy would inevitably gain something from the bargaining. Of course both sides might gain something, but on the other hand it was much easier in an alliance to get agreement on a defensive than on a counter-offensive system.

On the question of conventional forces, he pointed out as a matter of military fact that no serious Soviet advance could be held even with 30 divisions. It was not a matter of matching our 30 divisions against 22 Soviet divisions: we had too long a front to defend in depth. Therefore the threat of tactical nuclear weapons was necessary to make a conventional attack less likely.

Admiral Bos supported Général Beaufre. There were three gaps in Europe with no natural barriers and a full-scale Soviet attack would inevitably break through. So long as there were tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, however, the Russians would not dare to launch a purely conventional attack because this would involve massing their divisions and thus forming ideal targets for nuclear attack. It would be perfectly possible for the Russians to double the number of their divisions in East Germany very quickly without the West finding out. There were at least 50 battle-ready divisions in western Russia and as many as required could easily be moved to the DDR. If ever we did away with tactical nuclear weapons as part of a bargain with the USSR, Europe would be indefensible.

He believed however that we ought to try to build up our forces to around 30 divisions; militarily it was the minimum force to give cover to the whole front, and politically it would give the Russians the impression that we were determined to do something for our own defence.

Général Beaufre said it would be very easy for the Russians to make a landing with conventional troops in Denmark, for example. In all the exercises he took part in at SHAPE nuclear weapons were involved, but even with pre-planning it took a minimum of 48 hours to install them on the spot. 48 hours would be too late to save Denmark and Norway. In the present situation this was not likely to happen; but if our system of deterrence was not maintained it could happen.

Asked by Mr. Beaton about the possibility of nuclear bombing from existing bases in such a situation, Général Beaufre pointed to the problem of targeting nuclear bombs in a changing situation. If the Danes were overwhelmed, where could the bombs be dropped? Nuclear air support had to be indirect, not tied to operations. If nuclear weapons were to be used on the battlefield they must be integrated with the system of defence. Opinion at SHAPE had been constant on this point and we could not ignore it. We must face the fact that we did not have sufficient conventional forces for our defence, but at the same time we would not solve the security problem by increasing them. It would perhaps improve the situation, but it was not a "cure-all".

Dr. Ørvik supported Général Beaufre. This was why the position was so serious in northern Norway. The Norwegians had taken a decision not to have nuclear weapons themselves. However, despite the pressure of public opinion, he believed something could be done to establish prepated positions and stockpile material to make it possible for nuclear weapons to be used in an emergency. It was a matter of very grave concern that America was encouraging the Norwegian attitude to nuclear weapons.

Mr. Haagerup added that on a recent visit to SHAPE it had been confirmed to him that the Danish refusal to accept nuclear warheads was a handicap. There was a joint Danish-German NATO command with tactical weapons south of the joint frontier, yet the same Danish General could not have nuclear weapons at his disposal because of the opposition of the Danish Government. Unfortunately it was out of the question politically at present to consider trying to change public opinion.

Général Beaufre appreciated the political difficulty. On the other hand, public opinion was always behind the times and saw nuclear weapons as they were five or six years ago. Nuclear weapons had now become an instrument of peace because of their deterrent effect.

Dr. Ørvik drew attention to another aspect of the nuclear-conventional argument. The psychological effect of Norway's decision not to have nuclear weapons had also made itself felt in the conventional field, because it seemed that by this decision the responsibility for national defence had been transferred to those who did have nuclear weapons. This was never said openly; but the total Norwegian defence effort had decreased since the decision was taken and the implication was that if we did not want the really effective weapons it did not matter if the less effective weapons were more or less numerous.

Admiral Bos supported Dr. Ørvik.

Professor Howard put forward two hypotheses for consideration: (1) that the US might revert to a fortress America strategy, no longer pledged to the defence of Western Europe; and (2) that the USSR wished to launch a major attack on Western Europe. Would the presence of tactical nuclear weapons deter the Russians in that case? Their declared view was that any war would be a nuclear war; Soviet troops were trained to use tactical nuclear weapons and did not seem to believe that they favoured the defence. It was clear that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe would be more disastrous for us than for them, since our interdiction would fall mainly on Eastern Europe rather than on the USSR.

He accepted all the military arguments for the need to have tactical nuclear weapons in a tactical situation. But was not the knowledge that an attack on Western Europe would bring American retaliation the real deterrent to the USSR?

Admiral Bos agreed with Professor Howard. But he insisted that if the American forces ever withdrew from Europe the tactical weapons must remain to prevent the temptation of easy gains and the risk of a swift "pounce" which could present the Americans with a fait accompli.

M. de Rose supported Admiral Bos.

Signor Spinelli did not agree. To the extent that we concentrated on tactical nuclear weapons we increased our offensive capability and this increased tension.

Admiral Bos took issue with Signor Spinelli. Our tactical nuclear strength would never be sufficient to give the Russians cause to fear an offensive from our side. The strategic situation was so different. Russian troops were only 150 km. from the Rhine. But Russia itself was such a great distance away from Western Europe that we could not possibly mount or maintain any operation with our 30 divisions that could reach Soviet territory. In Western Russia there were 6 or 700 medium-range missiles which could reach every point in Europe, and at least 50 divisions over and above those stationed in Eastern Europe. The Soviet troops in Russia and East Germany were riddled with tactical nuclear weapons. It was inconceivable that we could ever be considered a military threat to Soviet security.

Signor Spinelli maintained his position. It was true that our forces could not reach Soviet territory; but we could reach Eastern Europe. What the Russians feared most was an attack on Eastern Europe since this could wreck the whole Soviet system. It was the West, not the East, which had territorial ambitions in Europe.

Mr. Beaton wondered whether we would necessarily consider it wise for the Americans to introduce tactical weapons into any country in Southern Asia, for example, to make a situation more stable. Surely by introducing these weapons we made it more difficult to respond in a non-nuclear way. Therefore it did increase the deterrent, provided that the other side would be afraid of the kind of war we might provoke.

Taking up Professor Howard's argument, he thought the Russians were fundamentally only afraid of a war in Germany from the standpoint of escalation. The prospect of an awful short limited nuclear war in central Europe which would so devastate Germany that she would not be a power to be reckoned with for 20 years or so might not prove so unacceptable to the Russians. He felt that from the European point of view, the American switch to a strategic counterforce as opposed to a local counterforce doctrine was a good thing for Europe because it got away from this tremendous danger of a Russian-American agreement to leave each other's territory alone and keep a conflict local in central Europe. The argument about tactical weapons must be examined very carefully.

Général Beaufre suggested that this applied to conventional war also; modern conventional warfare could be terribly destructive. He could not accept that there was a lesser risk to Europe without tactical nuclear weapons. He maintained that the Europeans would prefer a situation which might be dangerous for them but which would have a profound deterrent effect on the Russians to a less dangerous situation which would be proportionately less dissuasive.

Professor Howard agreed that modern conventional war could be terribly destructive - but only after lengthy tooling-up. Even one tactical nuclear weapon could inflict as much damage as it took the British four or five years of very hard concentration of all their national resources to inflict on Germany during the last war. Even though a conventional war would be more unpleasant and destructive than at any time in the past, there was still an enormous difference in quality of destructiveness compared with atomic warfare which we must not under-estimate.

Général Beaufre accepted this point. All the same, modern conventional warfare would become increasingly dangerous because of scientific advance. It was all the more important to avoid war of any description.

(b) Controlled Response

Général Beaufre said that this doctrine came into operation after the commencement of hostilities, to permit the minimisation of the employment of force and notably nuclear force. He was interested to know whether her special relationship with the US was still considered satisfactory to Britain, in view of the reference to the American interest in different arrangements with her NATO allies.

There were three main points: (1) the problem of controlled response in itself - did the British think they could keep control of controlled response through their special relationship with the US? (2) Did the prospect of a series of bilateral arrangements offer a better solution? (3) Or was the only possibility a system like the one for Berlin, i.e. committees where all the hypotheses were studied so that any response would not be a unilateral response by the US.

Mr. Beaton, asked by Professor Howard to clarify the difference between flexible response and controlled response, said the basic thing about controlled response was that it was not uncontrolled response. In the context of the decline of massive retaliation, the notion of controlled response was a necessary assertion of the fact that all responses in all situations would be controlled. If we wanted to go on to say that we want the control to be highly flexible, that was another issue.

Professor Howard added that then flexible was something which our forces are capable of being; controlled response was something that our political command structure is capable of doing.

M. de Rose said that at its simplest, control was something the US Government exercised on US forces and other Governments did not. The problem was whether it was possible to associate the other governments with these American decisions. This was not how the Americans saw it: the problem for them was how to control the British and French nuclear forces.

It was true that to the extent to which Britain thought she had control not simply on the conduct of operations but in the preparation of planning she participated to a certain extent in the major decisions before a conflict began. But as the paper stated, this was not true for the alliance as a whole. Would it be possible for a system which satisfied Britain but did not satisfy the other Europeans to be acceptable to them? De Gaulle had only expressed what others felt when he said it was not right for the British alone among the Europeans to participate in the decision-making.

M. Vernant maintained that controlled response was only workable so far as the Europeans were concerned if the right of participation in decisions was admitted.

Général Beaufre added that bearing in mind that there were two phases - group planning/decision and flexibility/control, using the coupling suggested by M. Vernant earlier. When we were discussing bilateral relationships as in the paper, or the Berlin-type consultations he himself had mentioned, this was in the first phase of planning, before any hostilities. Flexibility/control was the application of what had been planned and must come at a later stage. In the paper, when talking about flexibility or control, we were talking about practical control that could be exercised in the framework of the alliance.

Professor Howard put it the other way round - planning with flexibility and decision with control. The best possible type of previous planning led to the maximum number of options and thus flexibility in a crisis. But adequate control depended on a decision-making authority capable of choosing between the options at its disposal. So decision had to come last, and without decision control was impossible.

Mr. Haagerup was not quite happy with the tone of the paragraph on page 5 of the paper referring to the "contradictory tendency" in American policy. He felt that the consequences for American policy of the breakdown in the Brussels negotiations had been overlooked. Surely Washington would have preferred to transfer the "special relationship" from Britain to the new European group including Britain? If this was true, the tendency to seek bilateral relations was not so much contradictory as forced on the US by the breakdown of negotiations in January 1963.

Mr. Beaton replied that personally he believed those who wanted bilateral relationships were of a different school of thought from those who wanted a united Europe. It was hard-boiled people like McNamara who wanted bilateral relationships because they wanted results; McNamara saw no results when he dealt with allies within the alliance framework. He believed the Kennedy Administration advisers considered the special relationship with the British an embarrassment in their relationship with the French and Germans and Italians; the Americans wanted to put all four allies on the same level, and were more interested in levelling the British down than the others up.

In reply to Général Beaufre's question, he thought the British were satisfied with their arrangements with Washington at the moment, although the position could change. There were three elements in the British satisfaction: (1) a genuine absence of articulation and system in the British approach to these things; (2) a genuine British conviction that nothing was going to happen in Europe anyway, so that not having a proper system did not matter; (3) a belief that if anything did happen it would be a massive retaliation affair so that there would be no policy to be in on.

Cuba had been a genuine shock to Britain, however: a highly unpremeditated situation arose and we were not consulted. But this apart, our successive Prime Ministers had had a real sense of access to the heart of Washington. While the Kennedy group had tended to say that the special relationship must end, it was obvious that it continued to exist. Perhaps the paper gave the impression that there was a system about this relationship, which was not so; but at the moment the relationship remained satisfactory on its rather woolly basis.

Dr. Jaquet thought Mr. Beaton had perhaps over-simplified the American approach. Did it not reflect a dual problem: on the one hand the desire to win strong allies and see a united Europe as a strong ally, and on the other hand recognising that a really strong, united Europe could diminish the ultimate American control over the deterrent?

He agreed with M. de Rose that control was in American hands because they had the real forces. As the British paper said, the problem was to involve the US in Western Europe as completely as possible. But was the French way, the way of an independent European deterrent to force the US to take more account of European views, the right way? Would that not tend to build up American isolationism? Surely the right way for Europeans to influence the Americans was to become more loyal and more strong partners in the alliance.

Mr. Beaton agreed with Dr. Jaquet that this dual problem existed to a certain extent; on the other hand, he saw no sign of George Ball, for instance, who was pro a united Europe, being allowed to contradict McNamara, who was a firm advocate of strong central control. There was no American support for the idea of two great centres of control.

M. de Rose wondered if the American attitude towards a united Europe was not something like the British attitude towards arrangements in time of war: perhaps European unity would come about, but it was such a long-term prospect that they could afford not to worry about it for the present.

In reply to Dr. Jaquet, he emphasised that the motive behind the desire for an independent European force was not to drag the US into a war against her will. The fundamental problem as the French saw it was that the Europeans no longer felt that the problem of their defence was their problem. The Atlantic alliance was a system by which the Europeans had handed over responsibility for their defence to the Americans. Integration was constantly talked about, but it was a facade: the strategy, the weapons, the policies and the decisions were all American. The problem which de Gaulle sought to solve was how to restore the feeling that although in strictly military terms the defence of Europe had to depend to a great extent on the US, Europe was associated with the decisions and with the problems. European defence must be a European responsibility as well as an American one.

Signor Spinelli maintained that unified control was essential in order to make a flexible policy possible. He did not believe that an extension of bilateral relationships or a so-called multilateral solution like the MLF would help in this very real problem which M. de Rose had posed.

He considered that the Europeans must either abandon the idea of co-operation through the alliance and embark on the road to a third force or try to find a way of really participating in American control. Of course the answer was to denationalise the American nuclear force. This could not be done here and now. But once the principle was accepted, we could work towards it. The important thing was to have a long-term objective. The construction of the Europe of the Six had continued to make progress in spite of all the past and present difficulties simply because they had a long-term objective; the same thing would be true of an Atlantic partnership.

SATURDAY MORNING, 21st MARCH

THE EUROPEAN VIEW ON AMERICAN STRATEGIC POLICY AND DOCTRINE(cont.)

(c) Counterforce Strategies

Général Beaufre (in the Chair) drew attention to the points made in this section of the paper. What was not mentioned, however, was the idea that a counterforce strategy had greater and greater limitations because of technology.

M. de Rose mentioned hearing James E. King state in London the other week that the counterforce doctrine was considered to be no longer applicable and that therefore less and less public reference was being made to it; McNamara was said to share this view.

M. Vernant said the idea that counterforce strategy was outdated had wide currency; if it was true, there was no point in discussion under this heading.

Admiral Bos shared M. Vernant's impression. He believed McNamara's strategic thinking had evolved since the counterforce doctrine was publicly announced. The idea of choosing your objective was all very well, but it was also highly theoretical. Moreover to his knowledge the Russians had never given the slightest indication that they would accept such a bilateral understanding. According to Marshal Sokolovsky's book, the Soviet intention was to destroy the enemy's country as rapidly and as completely as possible in the event of a major war, and their weapons were clearly designed for this end. He believed there was already a reaction in the US in favour of trying to limit the damage, even in a major war.

Professor Howard thought there was a confusion between counterforce strategies and limited strategic war. The idea of bargaining with your weapons, carrying arms control into central war, had been discussed to some extent; but neither McNamara nor his spokesmen had ever suggested that this was or had been American policy. What they meant by counterforce was that the primary target would be the enemy's weapons system, not his cities.

Mr. Beaton suggested that American policy was not out of date in the sense that McNamara began to emphasise more and more the extent to which the US can buy damage limitation, which was parallel with the development of anti-missile systems. However, absolute adherence to a counterforce doctrine did conflict with a flexible response doctrine and he thought McNamara had opted for a return to flexible response. There would be no repetition of the Ann Arbor speech - the insistence now was on the need to offer maximum options to the President.

He suspected that the "no cities" offer still stood, the intention was to hit the enemy's forces. But as counterforce became technically difficult to put into effect, as the Russians achieved mobility and secrecy, then there were two possibilities for McNamara: (1) that he had gone back to a countercity doctrine, or (2) that he had abandoned a strategic nuclear doctrine altogether except in retaliation against an attack on Western cities.

Général Beaufre considered this very important, especially in view of what M. de Rose had said. Naturally the counterforce doctrine could never be purely counterforce, otherwise it would come to look very much like massive retaliation. The counterforce doctrine had therefore evolved towards a more controlled system which was in fact flexible response.

M. Vernant was struck by the second possibility for American policy mentioned by Mr. Beaton.

Général Beaufre agreed that this was important. But regardless of whether a counterforce strategy was practicable for war, a counterforce capacity was nevertheless highly important for deterrence. There was a difference between planning for deterrence and planning for war. From the deterrent point of view, it could not possibly be argued that a state which had no counterforce capacity was as well placed as a state which did have a counterforce capacity.

Counterforce capacity was not a question of numbers; what counted was effectiveness against whatever weapons the enemy had. The important point was that technically a counterforce capacity was useless against submarines; and 5-10 missiles were necessary to destroy one silo. But it kept its value against surface vessels and land-based installations, radar, communications - all highly important elements of the enemy weapons system. It appeared that high-level nuclear bursts could upset the electronic mechanism of missiles, for instance. This aspect of counterforce, which was paralysis rather than destruction, was undergoing intensive study and had great possibilities from the deterrent point of view. It could be a factor of great importance to Europe, which could come under fire from Soviet short-range and long-range missiles as well as aircraft.

Professor Howard suggested that countercity and counterforce were not clearly separated or mutually exclusive alternatives. To attack Moscow was to disrupt command and control and industrial potential, not just to kill citizens, and even a countercity doctrine never advocated attacking Russian cities just for the sake of killing Russian citizens. However, it seemed to him that counterforce in the sense of our discussion consisted not simply in striking the enemy's armed forces to the exclusion of anything else but in flexible response in depth. The basic military desideratum was to retain a range of options as long as possible. Therefore instead of considering what objectives we would strike, we considered what objectives we would not strike, and why. A doctrine of "no cities" (rather than a counterforce doctrine) had been a passing phase, and he agreed that this was no longer current doctrine in the US.

Admiral Bos supported Professor Howard.

Mr. Beaton amplified his previous observations. He had been thinking particularly of a real war situation. American doctrine had led them not to consider attacking Russian cities unless Western cities were attacked because they considered cities as hostages. On this point he disagreed with Professor Howard. In order to bargain it was certainly necessary to have the ability to destroy the enemy's cities; but once they were destroyed the bargaining counter was lost.

This was perhaps an embarrassing and over-sophisticated policy, but it remained the number one recommendation which the President would get in a real situation. The overriding considerations for the Americans were, first, damage limitation and second, crisis bargaining - even if a city might have to be destroyed to demonstrate the will to do so - rather than retaliation or all-out strategic war. Personally he fully supported this doctrine, although the implications were too complicated for everyone.

Général Beaufre considered that all this had come about from American resentment at the vulnerability of their great cities to Soviet nuclear attack. Their interest in damage limitation was understandable, although he believed that in case of war limitation would prove extremely difficult. But he maintained that this whole discussion was only meaningful in the context of deterrence.

He saw two contradictory tendencies in American strategy: (1) the desire to make a first strike credible, and (2) the fear of escalation. To make a first strike credible there must be a probability of escalation; by making escalation less likely the deterrent is weakened. He believed that counterforce capacity was the key to first strike credibility. Our interest was in preventing war, not in waging it.

M. de Rose suggested that the contradiction was in the nature of things rather than in American strategy.

Signor Spinelli raised the problem posed by submarine development.

Général Beaufre replied that this problem had led to the American interest in the idea of finite deterrence - to abolish all systems of deterrence except the nuclear missile submarine. But by the time that stage was reached war would be waged by conventional means.

Mr. Beaton said, first, that nuclear war was completely unknown territory, despite all the spelling-out of doctrine. The threat of escalation would never diminish in the mind of the enemy. Secondly, he thought the Americans were attempting to unify their declaratory and fire policy and get away from this spurious system of saying one thing and meaning another. It had been argued that the other side could not be expected to play by rules which made war sane unless these rules were believed and understood in advance. The Americans believed that, although the Russians had given no hint, when war broke out there would be a considerable capacity for tacit agreement if this were technically possible. McNamara's point was that it was his duty to try to make war sensible. At Ann Arbor he had believed it necessary to engage in a public dialogue to establish the fundamental comprehension in which healthy bargaining responses on each side could be established.

Professor Howard believed it a mistake to think in terms of a state of peace and a state of war. We should think in more Clausewitzian terms of "when force is introduced into the bargaining process".

It was not a case that if the deterrent had to be used it had failed. The deterrent must continue into the phase when force was being used. The real deterrent to escalation was the knowledge that if the enemy used certain types of force we could meet him and do more damage to him than he could inflict on us. Therefore the McNamara doctrine of "no cities" was intended to keep hostilities or bargaining at a certain level.

Général Beaufre saw deterrence and action as complementary. In peacetime we had 100% deterrence and no action (although cold war or conventional war were still possible). Even in a state of war, there would always be a proportion of deterrence and a proportion of action, a dialectical kind of action at each level.

He suggested that the major problem today was to stabilise the conventional level which was inherently unstable. Cold war would always be with us and could not be prevented, but this was more a matter for political strategy. He did not believe there was any great danger of nuclear war, because the reciprocal risk was so great: the nuclear arms race was a stabilising factor. But it was very difficult to apply the concept of deterrence to conventional war. Perhaps the nuclear threat could be used to deter conventional war as well.

M. de Rose said that this did not justify the Soviet position that all major wars would be nuclear wars. He saw their refusal to admit the possibility of any graduation as their deterrence. He did not see how there could be any understanding between two states with such a different level of nuclear capability.

Admiral Bos added that it was not only the number but the yield of the weapons which did not allow the Russians to have a sophisticated reasoning like the Americans.

He entirely agreed with Professor Howard's point that in military matters to be able to do everything one must be able to threaten to do everything. It was essential to be able to destroy cities with huge warheads, not just to have battlefield weapons available. From this point of view he was worried about McNamara's preference for Polaris and Minuteman as opposed to Titan and Atlas, because the second-generation missiles did not have powerful enough warheads to be credible as a countercity or counter-large industrial potential force.

The Russians had developed 50-megaton bombs each capable of destroying surface areas of up to 30,000 sq.km., which was about the surface area of Holland. It had been reported that if exploded at very high altitude, an area as large as 150,000 or 200,000 sq.km. could be very severely damaged, and missiles even in silos would be disabled.

Général Beaufre reported that from specialist discussions held in Paris it appeared that very high altitude bursts could disable missiles. And it was possible that the Russians had made a break-through in the anti-missile field. We could not ignore the possibility of technological advance changing the present balance between the USA and USSR.

M. de Rose thought we should consider the problem more from the European point of view. The plain fact was that because of its size and density of population, in Europe no distinction was possible in practice between counterforce and countercity. This was not the fault of the doctrine: technological evolution had made the application of a counterforce doctrine inapplicable to a European theatre. Perhaps it was only really applicable to the American theatre where the location of silos was known and the silos were a long way from any city. It was less applicable to the Soviet theatre, but completely inapplicable to Europe. Thus the US, the USSR and Europe were on different levels of insecurity and vulnerability. Therefore the problem of European defence was a very special problem in relation to the problem of defence as a whole. The protection that Europe had until now derived from American nuclear superiority had been modified by technical evolution. Our problem was to know what doctrine could restore a sense of security to Europe.

M. Vernant took up Professor Howard's reference to Clausewitz. He considered that any "force introduced into the bargaining process" would inevitably be nuclear force. In the light of what M. de Rose had said, was it realistic to think in terms of maintaining the bargaining process even during the course of hostilities?

He saw two difficulties: (1) that it was not realistic to think of the use of nuclear force in the same terms as force was envisaged in the 19th century. The moment nuclear weapons were used at any level, there would be an irresistible temptation to either side to settle things by a pre-emptive attack on the nerve-centres of the other side; (2) in terms of the consequences for Europe, this would be catastrophic.

Mr. Beaton maintained that it was just as unrealistic to suggest that either side would launch an all-out attack, since heavy retaliation would surely follow.

M. Vernant said that this was one reason why we needed a European nuclear force, to reinforce the deterrent in just such an impasse between the two great powers.

Général Beaufre did not believe there would be a war.

Professor Howard agreed that war was unlikely; but it was our duty to think about what would happen if it did occur. At the moment it seemed that European doctrine about nuclear war was defeatist. We accepted it as axiomatic that if nuclear war broke out we were finished: there was no point in thinking through after the deterrent had failed, because we should not be here to think about it. Was there no possibility of fighting intelligently as Europeans to ensure a certain amount of survival?

M. de Rose said that if a "spasm" war occurred Europe would have no control over it. A "spasm" war was highly unlikely, however. But even in a local or limited war, Europe was far more vulnerable than either the US or the USSR, as he had said earlier. The real problem before our group was, how could a war limited to Europe and limited in its means be conducted so as to preserve some relationship between the conduct of operations and political objectives?

Général Beaufre was very interested in Professor Howard's point about the defeatist attitude to nuclear war. The "Ban the Bomb" psychology in Britain feared nuclear war because it could happen. He personally did not fear it because it would not happen. What he did fear was the possibility of conventional war. As men were not wholly reasonable beings, force must express itself on some level. Because nuclear war was so terrible to contemplate we must not blind ourselves to the great possibilities of war at a lower level.

Professor Howard replied that the Ban the Bomb movement in Britain was a natural and to some extent rational reaction to the official Government announcement that in the event of nuclear war Britain would be annihilated.

Coming back to his previous point: let us suppose that the Angel Gabriel told us there would be a war in 1980 and that we must think what would be the most intelligent course for Europe to prepare for it now. We could advocate adopting a political course of neutralism to try and avoid it; but if the possibility of such a war were accepted, we should have to think about our policy, our planning, our forces and our bargaining power. It was not right to say nothing could be done to prevent the destruction of Europe until we had explored all the possibilities.

Signor Spinelli agreed that war would not happen in the sense of one step from a state of peace to a state of nuclear war. But it could happen gradually, by escalation, from any minor outbreak of hostilities. A tre endous amount of planning and study was being devoted to the military aspects of flexible response and other doctrines whereas more attention should be devoted to the political aspect. The cold war would be with us for a very long time, with opportunities for subversion, propaganda warfare and so on. We must not allow the other side to win this type of warfare, but at the same time we must keep up the search for a modus vivendi so as to be able to deal with any situation that might lead to war by political means. It was not enough for NATO to seek a common military strategy; we must try to get a common political strategy.

Général Beaufre saw this as indirect strategy. The first half of the 20th century was a phase of conventional war and the second half a phase of indirect strategy; in between there came a period of nuclear terror which was the link and the balance between the two. He agreed with Signor Spinelli that we must try to operate on the level of political strategy, but we must also maintain nuclear stability in spite of technical evolution by an intelligent arms policy.

Mr. Beaton suggested other considerations which were unfavourable from Europe's point of view. The most serious was that while the USSR had substantial options against Europe, she did not have a large force for use against the US. The discovery that the Russians have only 100 ICBMs meant that the US had less cause to be frightened of war than Europe; and she now had no need to rely on Europe for bases. Since 1955 the Americans had embarked on a deliberate policy of technical disengagement from Europe.

The situation now was, very roughly, that there was a US force targeted on the USSR and a Soviet force targeted on Europe, but no appreciable force targeted on the US. Thus in terms of any strategically limited war, Russia and Europe would be hit. In a certain sense this might create a satisfactory situation from Europe's point of view - it had given the Americans such a sense of confidence in the confrontation with the Russians that it might provide a more effective security system for Europe than a more carefully worked out system of forces in which there was a true equality of missiles on Russian soil or in European hands. But undoubtedly the evolutionary system had put Western Europe into an isolated and vulnerable position as a hostage to the Russians for American good behaviour.

Dr. Ørvik agreed that the fact of the vast proportion of Soviet missiles being targeted on Europe, not the US, was very disturbing. The 700 MRBMs would have great blackmailing potential in a period of crisis. And as the threat could not be met in Europe or by Europeans only, we would be very much out of any bargaining position. It really justified a more logical examination of previous attitudes towards national nuclear forces, for example. National nuclear forces were not necessarily a good thing, but those in favour certainly had a case.

Général Beaufre supported Dr. Ørvik.

While he agreed with Mr. Beaton that the Americans were less threatened than the Europeans, there was a threat to their major cities from the very powerful Soviet ICBMs which was more than the Americans could bear politically. Therefore Europe would be the battlefield in the event of a limited war between the USSR and the US. It was in Europe's interest to deter Russia and the US from risking any activity in Europe which could lead to war at Europe's expense, through having a nuclear force of our own.

Signor Spinelli said that if Europe decided to become a nuclear power this would be taken badly by the Russians and the Americans. Europe herself would have to pay a very high price in terms of continuous effort and expense just for the sake of a psychological feeling of being a great power. But it would be a very lengthy process, and at some stage would come a moment when both the Americans and the Russians had a common aim in stopping that process. They could threaten Europe, if need be with nuclear weapons, and Europe would have to give in. Certainly it was technically feasible for Europe to create an independent nuclear force; but politically it would be disastrous. In reality Europe must face the fact of her dependence on the US and put her efforts to changing the relations between Europe and the US in the direction of interdependence. An independent European iniative would be more dangerous than the present situation.

M. Vernant did not agree that it would be more dangerous.

M. de Rose agreed with Signor Spinelli that Europe could not build a deterrent force except with American co-operation. But if Europe was in a militarily exposed position, this was dangerous for the West as a whole. Surely it was not healthy for the US for her principal ally to be militarily exposed? If the American reaction to this argument were one of indifference we should have to accept the situation; but we were members of an alliance, and this changed things.

Dr. Jaquet supported Signor Spinelli.

Mr. Beaton thought the need for equality in order to deter could be over-rated. The Russian force was very small in relation to the American force, and yet it did deter. It was not a question of the relative strength, but of the absolute damage given the will. This factor, and also the existence of an alliance with the US, must be taken into account before a European force could be dismissed as ineffectual to deter in its own right.

Admiral Bos agreed with Mr. Beaton, although he could not see a European force reaching the point of being able to inflict unacceptable damage on the USSR, especially since the Russian response to any nuclear attack from Europe would devastate Europe.

M. de Rose found the argument about devastating response not very convincing because the devastating character of nuclear war existed no matter who were the protagonists. In any conflict involving the US and the USSR Europe would be destroyed. But if for that reason we refused to contemplate war, there would be no North Atlantic alliance. But we and the Americans accepted this risk.

Admiral Bos said that if Europe stood alone, he would be in favour of making as many nuclear weapons as possible to defend ourselves at all costs. But at the moment we had a stable situation, the stability lying in the fact that the Russians knew that they would be completely devastated by the Americans if it came to a war. But unless it was suggested that the US would not honour her guarantee to Europe, he opposed the creation of a European force because (a) it was not necessary in military terms and (b) there was a grave danger of it damaging our political relationship with the US.

Professor Howard suggested that taking the argument that the value of a European force maximised the deterrent effect against the Russians not because it could of itself inflict unacceptable damage but because it would ensure that any war in Europe was a nuclear war, then according to Mr. Beaton's line of argument Europe ought to try to develop the same sort of force to threaten the Russians as the Russians have to threaten the Americans; that would mean maximum yield warheads to inflict catastrophic damage on the USSR. Whether it would be technically possible for a European authority to produce warheads of this type he did not know, but in strategic terms there was much to be said for trying to do so. If the British and French and anyone who joined them did have an effective deterrent against the USSR, then the European force would not simply a catalytic one but a deterrent in its own right.

Mr. Beaton agreed; this was precisely what the British Government says about the British force, and it was true. He did not think the size of the warhead was so important - 2-megaton weapons were quite sufficient. It was the countercity capacity which counted.

Dr. Ørvik agreed with Admiral Bos that the Americans did not want a European force, and he was aware of all the arguments against. On the other hand, looking ahead, we must take many possibilities into account. He was inclined to the view that although creation of such a force would involve risks, the risks would not be much greater than those involved in letting this issue ride.

Admiral Bos reaffirmed the position he had expressed in London: the British and French national forces should continue in being, but in order not to damage relations with the US both countries should declare that for the duration of NATO in its present form they will integrate their nuclear forces into the alliance. In this way the future would be safeguarded. But in the present situation, it was highly dangerous to think of playing political nuclear strategy from different capitals.

II. Command and Control in NATO

Type I - Creation of a Nuclear Executive

Général Beaufre suggested that in solutions of this type it was not only the number of participants which mattered but also their power.

Signor Spinelli maintained that in a war situation control must remain in the hands of one man, whoever he may be. It was not conceivable that three or four could share responsibility.

In the planning phase, he thought it would be difficult to organise consultation on the basis of national representation. We must begin to build something to represent the community, however gradual a process this might be, otherwise the planning group would find themselves trying to get the sum of national points of view. If differing national viewpoints always had to be reconciled, paralysis could result.

M. de Rose disagreed. He maintained that it was essential to have national representatives because only Governments could commit their states to a certain course of action. Until such time as we had a European Government, Signor Spinelli's proposal would mean a group of men with neither responsibility nor authority deliberating matters of the highest importance; this was out of the question.

Général Beaufre supported M. de Rose. In practice the difficulties of working together as allies were much greater than the optimistic supporters of a united Europe imagined. That did not mean we should not try; we could not avoid the problem. He recalled his personal experience of the tripartite consultation over Berlin to illustrate that gradually, despite the differing national points of view, it was possible to arrive at a common position.

Mr. Beaton asked Général Beaufre if he felt that the consultation over Berlin would have been as effective if Berlin had been a true NATO responsibility. Was that type of agreement possible on a wider scale?

Général Beaufre said it was important to distinguish between consultation and decision. No decision could ever be reached by 12 or 15 people discussing together, but a decision could evolve from a restricted group - four people at most. There must be general consultation on a wide basis, so that all members of the alliance were in the picture and there was a general sense of everyone's opinion, but the deliberations from which a decision would evolve, although one man would have the actual responsibility of deciding, would have to be conducted by a small group.

Mr. Haagerup agreed that in matters involving NATO the views of the smaller nations could not be ignored. However, many of the sophisticated proposals would not appeal to the smaller countries; from their internal political point of view it would be disadvantageous for their Governments to be involved in complicated planning on a difficult issue. It would be much easier for them to persuade public opinion after a successful crisis management that everything had happened for the best. There were many issues best left to the great powers to handle. Therefore he thought there was much to be said for the idea of wider general consultation and then the smaller nations giving their proxy vote, mentally, to one of the larger powers.

M. Vernant said that of the solutions proposed under Type I he would prefer (b), perhaps combined with (a). He thought Klaus Knorr's suggestion of five nations to control nuclear planning seemed reasonable; he did not object to the WEU Assembly proposal for two rotating members instead of Germany and Italy. But this was on the planning level. He thought it would be necessary to create a nuclear executive body as well, which could be the US-French-British body suggested by Norstad. He did not agree, however, with majority voting and decision; decision must remain a national responsibility.

/There was general agreement that Norstad's proposal permitted a national negative decision, since if two out of the three were opposed to action then none of them could act/

Admiral Bos asked what decisions Norstad meant this body to take: did he have in mind decisions on matters of peace and war, or only on fighting in Europe? Did he mean the total might of the West, or the use of certain weapons only? The question of decision-taking was far more important than that of committees for guidelines and deliberation.

M. de Rose thought Norstad meant a decision on the right to use nuclear weapons.

M. Vernant agreed; Norstad was trying to meet European susceptibilities while avoiding the argument of 15 fingers on the trigger - he was proposing 3 fingers instead. Of course a decision on the use of all nuclear weapons could only be taken by the President of the US or Prime Ministers, so presumably they would be this executive within NATO. But he did not understand the relationship between that executive and the Commander-in-Chief.

Admiral Bos said he thought Norstad had been thinking about the case of a war in Europe in a situation where the shield forces were in action and strategic nuclear weapons had not been used; if the military situation deteriorated, the crucial decision whether tactical nuclear weapons may or may not be employed would have to be taken. To allay anxiety in Germany and France that these weapons would not be used in time, Norstad wanted to have an executive body in the heart of Europe which could authorise the use of these weapons. He thought this must be the idea behind Norstad's proposal, because otherwise if we envisaged this executive having control over Western policy as a whole it would amount to the directorate which de Gaulle has proposed in 1958. Authority for the use of strategic nuclear weapons could only be given by the President of the US. Therefore this executive must be limited to fighting in Europe.

Général Beaufre agreed that responsibility for authorising the general use of nuclear weapons must remain with the President of the US.

Mr. Beaton said that Norstad had come up against two elements in McNamara's policy: (1) the fundamental point that nobody but the President could take the decision to authorise the use of nuclear weapons; and (2) that the idea of a local nuclear strategy was inconceivable. The notion of a central European war with certain weapons involved only and detached from the progress of the war in general was quite foreign to McNamara's point of view. The executive body could easily be changed into the delegates of Governments, but this was not quite what Norstad had envisaged.

Général Beaufre said the delegate would have to be a very high-level representative in close touch with his Chief Executive, whose point of view he would put forward.

Professor Howard said that therefore a decision to use tactical weapons in Europe would not be taken merely in a European context but in the context of the global confrontation. It could only be taken at Head of Government level and could not be delegated.

Mr. Beaton agreed that this was so.

Général Beaufre brought the discussion back to the three solutions in the paper, mentioning M. Vernant's idea of a five-nation body for planning with a three-nation executive which would consist of delegates in permament contact with their Governments.

M. de Rose considered the WEU Assembly idea of two members rotating every two months was useless from the planning point of view. To be able to take any responsibility for serious planning a country would have to be a member for two years rather than two months.

He suggested that Norstad's proposal for an executive body operating on guidelines laid down by the full NATO Council would be a convenient way of associating the smaller countries. They would participate in the drawing up of the guidelines, and after the executive group had done its planning, the results would be communicated to the wider group. Would that not be sufficient association?

Général Beaufre agreed with M. de Rose's first point. However, the concept of five members was reasonable. The views of Germany and Italy were important and they must be represented together with the three nuclear powers. If the other nations must be represented, even by a rotating post, then there would have to be a sixth member.

Admiral Bos believed that even five was too large a number; he would prefer to see the executive limited to the three nuclear powers.

Dr. Jaquet maintained that the principle of one or two rotating posts would make the proposal politically more acceptable to smaller countries.

Mr. Haagerup took the opposite view to Dr. Jaquet for the reasons he had already explained. Moreover it must be a small executive to be efficient.

M. Vernant explained that the system he envisaged was not intended to function in time of crisis. He was thinking of planning, which could take place first on the level of the 15 for guidelines, then on the level of the five for more precise planning, and then a more detailed and intimate exchange of views on the basis of personal contact between representatives of the three nuclear powers. But in a crisis, things would be different.

Dr. Ørvik could not give unqualified support to Mr. Haagerup. He considered that for public opinion it might be as bad to be out of the picture as to be in.

Signor Spinelli reaffirmed his view that an attempt must be made to develop community thinking and community loyalty. In addition to whatever arrangements were made for national representation, a start should be made on a European planning commission.

Général Beaufre objected that this would complicate things by adding yet another point of view to the national points of view. In his personal experience at SHAPE and on the Standing Group, and in the Suez campaign, he had come to appreciate very keenly the difference between being subordinate to the authority of an integrated body and being subordinate to the authority of a national government. It was extremely difficult in grave situations to give full authority even to a body like NATO. When it came to the point of taking action, at the highest level of operation there must be a national right of veto.

SATURDAY AFTERNOON - 21 MARCH

COMMAND AND CONTROL IN NATO (Cont.)

Type II - Reform of NATO Machinery

Mr. Beaton wondered how many people who had supported solutions under Type I this morning were really supporting Type II. Type I solutions envisaged real executive powers, and there was general agreement that real executive powers without consultation was out of the question. But a fundamental difficulty of Type I or Type II solutions was how we could possibly talk about the tactical without reference to the strategic problem, or the national without relation to the international problem.

On (b), he thought the idea of a SACAIR and a SACEUR was nonsense. (d) seemed to be what we were really talking about, combined possibly with (a) which came to much the same thing; this "equipe" must of course represent Heads of Government.

Adding to what was said yesterday about TV sets, we ought to recognise the potential of the supersonic aircraft. By 1970 we could easily envisage an alliance cabinet meeting twice a week in Washington. However, this was a purely technical point. The important thing was that we wanted the capacity to act together in war and in crisis management, and this must involve the whole range of weapons, not just the nuclears.

Admiral Bos fully supported Mr. Beaton's last point

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M. de Rose said that Type I and Type II solutions turned always in the same difficulty: how to reconcile reaching a decision which must in practice be taken by the US President with creating a system which gives the Europeans a feeling of being part of that system and a sense of exercising a certain influence on the decisions affecting their fate. Consultation and common appraisal of the situation was perfectly possible; but it was not possible to participate in the decision-making unless each of us had his own weapons and co-operated in planning. Consequently although he thought (a) the idea of a civil and military secretariat was worth considering and might be better than what we have now, it would not solve the fundamental problem to which in fact he saw no solution. It would be a palliative, not a remedy.

On (b), he agreed with Mr. Beaton. NATO military opinion was unanimous that a separation of nuclear responsibility from general operational responsibility would make the conduct of a battle impossible, and his own studies led him to the same conclusion.

General Beaufre recalled his view that at the highest level there must be a national right of veto. Therefore a NATO Chief of Staff could not assume all the responsibilities of the present Standing Group. However, one advantage of a NATO General Staff would be that it would curb the power of the NATO Commanders. NATO was a body with very powerful arms but no head. SACEUR and SACLANT were almost autonomous, and if they were men with strong personalities they exceeded the limits of their responsibilities as institutional officers. We needed a head, but the Standing Group as constituted today was not a head, In this sense it would be good for the alliance to have a small committee as a permanent group.

On (b), it was nonsense to suggest that SACAIR should have responsibility for all nuclears except for short-range ones, which meant those actually used on the battle-field. In battle almost any weapon could be used in a tactical or strategic sense - it was a question of the mission. There was a contradiction here.

On (c), the creation of an European Defence Community, for those who took a certain view of European integration (different from that of the French Government) this proposal was logical. It would be very difficult to bring about, however, because it involved the problem of the industrial interests of the various states.

On (d), the special "equipe" would become necessary because an integrated general staff would need national representation for crisis management.

He agreed with M. de Rose, that all this was a matter of putting a better face on a basically unsatisfactory situation. The problem in NATO today was that nuclear weapons was entirely an American preserve. To have any discussion of nuclear questions in NATO would be an improvement. Even if we did not get the Americans to modify their doctrine, if we had some means of making our views felt it would be a beginning. And from another point of view, if we ever wanted to coordinate the French and British forces, an organisation such as this would be necessary. However, he preferred a Type I solution which he though would perform this better.

Type III - A European Nuclear Force

MR. Beaton said that what Kissinger had in mind was a force under completely European control, at the disposal of a President of Europe. It was supposed to start with the British and French as the beginning of a united Europe, but there would have to be a European authority. This would be the sine qua non of American support.

M. de Rose agreed; the idea was to have one single European force (i.e. a contribution to non-proliferation) but above all to get the political integration of Europe.

M. Vernant recalled the discussion in London on this subject. The minimum possibility was continuation of the British and French national forces in close co-operation and on the understanding that the two forces would stand as a guarantee of the security of the whole of Western Europe. The maximum was a European state with a President of the United States of Europe, with the same powers as the President of the US, who would have at his disposal European, not national, forces. Would the United States Government really be in favour of that?

Signor Spinelli maintained that a European force was only of academic interest because at the moment only national forces existed. Certainly a decision to create a European force would be a decision to create a United States of Europe, but this had no significance now; the practical problem for the present was how to link the British and French forces to the American force.

There were two different schools of thought behind a European nuclear nuclear force. Monnet represented one school which saw a European force as a bargaining counter to get fuller integration with the Americans. At bottom this idea was partnership. The other school of thought was represented by de Gaulle, who already has a national position and would like a European position as well. His idea did not lead to increased cooperation with the Americans but to rivalry. It was possible to discuss this question with Monnet because his aim was the integration of the alliance; but not with de Gaulle because he just wanted France to play her proper role. But this was a political question, not a military one.

Professor Howard agreed that this was a purely political question. To try to talk about military structure and command before a political authority existed was a waste of time.

Dr. Ørvik pointed out that Kissinger was taking an opposite attitude to the present American attitude that discussion on sharing control must come after European political unity. Kissinger's point was that without European nuclear independence political unity was not attainable.

M. de Rose agreed that opinion in Europe was divided as to whether we wanted to be more closely integrated into an American system or whether we wanted to be able to speak to the US on equal terms, because equality was France's aim, not rivalry. But we did not know what the Americans wanted either. He agreed with M. Vernant that it would indeed be altruistic of the US to want to see a really strong and united Europe. However, the fact remained that only national forces did exist in Europe, and this was likely to remain the position for a long time. However, the idea of the two national forces acting as a catalyst for politcal unity in Europe could be envisaged as an ideal.

Professor Howard could not visualise the British Government or public opinion taking kindly to the idea of the British nuclear force being used as an instrument to advance certain American ideas as to how Europe ought to organise itself, which was what Kissinger really suggested, or allowing it to be put at the disposal of or integrated into a common structure of a particular European kind in which the US played no part at all. This was connected with the argument whether the British are Europeans or not, on which both major parties in Britain were deeply divided.

Dr. Ørvik objected that most supporters of a European force saw it as a means of achieving better and closer co-operation with the Americans, not their exclusion.

Professor Howard replied that it was a matter of stubborn political prejudice rather than reason. All sorts of forms of NATO nuclear authority would be considered practical politics by informed British public opinion. But the idea of a European nuclear force which excluded the US, even though US wanted the British to become Europeans, would run into very stubborn political difficulties.

Mr. Beeton said there were some people in British political life who supported this. They were mostly Conservatives and not the most influential, but they did exist and 18 months ago they thought their view might prevail.

Signor Spinelli suggested that the Kissinger proposal was not aimed at the Europeans at all but was an attempt to convince the Americans who were opposed to supporting de Gaulle that they should change their policy. It was fashionable in the US just now to speak of helping Europe, not de Gaulle, but he believed that Kissinger's real aim was to help the French.

M. de Rose agreed with Signor Spinelli.

General Beaufre commented that according to what the paper reported of Kissinger's views, he was advocating help to Britain and France now, before the creation of a European force. If the Americans really wanted to help us save a lot of money that would be of great benefit to the alliance as well. Putting our nuclear weapons at the disposal of our European allies would involve European machinery for nuclear decision, planning and use. But if this idea had any real support in American thinking it would be worth exploring.

Professor Howard thought it might be possible to envisage the British saying that they regarded their nuclear force as something to be used only in a European context. This would be a first and very considerable step. The Second step would be to say that if, only to be used in a European context its use should be discussed and plans made in association

with Britain's other European allies. This would be a very gradual process, but it could be visualised. Eventually this might develop into the sort of machinery under types I and II where there would be an international staff for planning but where for actual use in a crisis the matter would be under national control. But even so, he believed the supposition that this would be a purely European affair would give rise to many political difficulties.

General Beaufre agreed - and not least for the Americans, whose doctrine it would offend.

Type IV - The MLF

Herr Nerlich, asked whether German opinion were still pro-MLF, said he believed it was, but the basis for argument was changing. The whole concept was more closely tied up with NATO now, especially since Lemnitzer declared that the MLF would be a partial solution to the MRBM danger. Last year one major German argument in favour was that it was the only way by which a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons could be made acceptable; but now that such a treaty seemed less likely, this motivation had disappeared. The principal arguments in favour of the MLF now were (1) as a means to have as close a military integration with the US forces as possible; and (2) as a basis for further steps towards political integration, including the Americans. The serious discussion now on the MLF was however on the military level, and the arguments had become sounder and more favourable. All the military members of the sub-committee which had just finished its report on the MLF supported it.

Signor Spinelli said that on the Italian side the issue was in abeyance, although it could become active again. There was a certain pressure from the American side, but the Italians were in a rather delicate political position on this issue. The great fear that the Germans might choose the Gaullist alternative with Adenauer changed with the end of the Adenauer era and the matter was not now considered so urgent.

Mr. Beaton said the British situation was interesting. The Conservatives were not fundamentally interested in the issue and so the Government had a certain freedom of action. But it was very significant that Butler, in particular, had declared categorically that there was no question of a transfer of authority being involved, although he must know that the Americans and Germans were saying very nearly the opposite. A case was apparently being prepared in case the Government subsequently decided they wanted to oppose any revision of control. On the Labour side there was passionate interest in these issues. What Labour wanted was more planning and control over nuclear weapons, not the MLF. Harold Wilson had committed himself strongly against the MLF, to the irritation of Americans. But a lot of evolution was possible. There was a predisposition in the Labour Party to do something with the Germans; and this was in a sense contradictory to their opposition to the MLF. It could lead to an interesting evolution if they came to power.

Dr. Orvik said Norway had rather hoped the issue would die, but it seemed they would have to take a stand and this would be very difficult. The logical thing to do would be to accept the principle and give support, even if not to participate, but it was very hard to visualise Norway even giving facilities at the moment. This issue showed up the inconsistencies in American policy: so far the new Administration had encouraged Norway in her non-nuclear policy, but this attitude worked against the MLF and would make it hard for Norway to give any facilities.

M. de Rose considered it a mistake to see the MLF as a "solution". It meant integration, not co-ordination. With 100 missiles, if you have authorisation you have a countercity force. It was inconceivable that the Americans would envisage authorising European use of the means which only the US could provide. Therefore the US must retain control of the force.

The MLF was really the residue of something which did not happen. The US thought that after Nassau the French would accept the Polaris offer and would accept an agreement like the British did. Therefore a French force would have come into being which would have had a certain value in American eyes, but which would have divided the French and British from the rest of Europe. They were sure the French would accept becoming a privileged partner of the United States - the MLF was to appease the others! France persisted with her independent force, but the Americans were still stuck with the MLF.

Admiral Bos suggested there was another element which Herr Nerlich touched upon, that the MLF was becoming more and more envisaged as a tactical rather than a strategic force. Even a year before he resigned, Norstad was saying that there ought to be in central Europe a replacement of tactical strike fighters for the interdiction programme because of the vulnerability of aircraft. There was an attempt to sell the idea of land-based Polaris for this purpose, but the European Governments did not take to it. Then the Americans came up with the MLF with the double aim of satisfying European ambitions and allaying German anxiety about the interdiction programme. At first the MLF was opposed by the military and supported by a number of politicians; but now that it was becoming envisaged more as a force to replace the tactical strike fighters (which is what Lemnitzer really meant), it was military rather than political opinion which was enthusiastic. He thought too that the American switch to this more definite military role for the MLF was to some extent due to their disappointment about the lack of political support for the concept.

General Beaufre agreed. He maintained however that militarily the idea of meeting the medium-range missile threat with Polaris was not good. He did not like the idea of surface ships either, because of their vulnerability.

Admiral Bos said that Holland was participating in the preliminary talks and had already designated part of the crew; however, there was no great enthusiasm for the project. Belgium had declared she was not interested in the project.

Signor Spinelli thought the principal fault of the MLF was the way in which it was presented. Had it been proposed as the first part of a grand design for European-American cooperation it would have been significant. But as it is, the Europeans will pay for the Polaris missiles and the Americans will keep control.

In military terms, American unwillingness to consider European participation in nuclear control was because it is a question of fighting an enemy who is ultra-centralised. The US President has great powers, but our right of consultation would attenuate his power of decision. In a crisis, the US must have freedom to act. We should bend our efforts more in the direction of political strategy.

General Beaufre drew the discussion to a close.